An Historical-Anthropological Approach to Islam in Ethiopia: Issues of Identity and Politics

Author(s): Jon Abbink

Source: Journal of African Cultural Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Dec., 1998), pp. 109-124
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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Journal of African Cultural Studies, Volume 11, Number 2, December 1998, pp. 109-124

An historical-anthropological approach to
Islam in Ethiopia: issues of identity and
politics*

JON ABBINK
(Afrika-Studiecentrum, Leiden)

ABSTRACT The study of Islam and Islamic populations in Ethiopia ha

relatively understudied since the great survey of J.S. Trimingham publish
1952. Ethiopian Islam is interesting both because of its antiquity (sin
inception of Islam itself) and because of the particular patterns of interactio
symbiosis with an, until recently, predominantly Christian culture. A
cultural and historical explanation of patterns of tolerance of Islam a
Christianity since the 16th century deserves to be developed. In additio
relationships between religious and ethnic identification among Ethio
diverse populations are not well known and need further scrutiny.
In the last decade, new issues of religious identity and communal pol
identity of Muslims in Ethiopia emerge in the wake of the political and so
economic reforms in federal Ethiopia and the impact of 'globalization' proc
in the cultural sense. While Ethiopians Muslims have in recent years
through a phase of revivalism and self-assertion, they have remained r
impervious to 'fundamentalist' ideological movements in both a socia
political sense.
This article gives a brief historical overview of Islam in Ethiopia, its position
in the pre-1974 empire and its relationship with Christianity, and the changes
under the Communist Mengistu regime up to 1991. Finally some of the major
changes since 1991 are discussed, presenting challenges for debate and further
socio-historical research on the place and role of Muslims in Ethiopia and on the
relationship of Islam (and Christianity) with 'modernity', ethnicity and group
identity in Ethiopia.

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the seminar 'Islam as a Globalizing
Project,' Globalization Research Group, African Studies Centre (Leiden), 29th April
1998. I am indebted to members of the research group and others present for their
comments and criticism.

1369-6815/98/020109-16 O 1998 Editors of Journal of African Cultural Studies

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110 Jon Abbink

1. Introduction

African Islam has many forms, and since the introduction of the faith on the
continent it has been marked by a history of multiple interactions with pre-
existing belief-systems and with Christianity - both imported missionary
Christianity and indigenous forms (Egypt, North Africa, Nubia, and Ethiopia).
In the African context, the role and place of Islam in Ethiopia have remained
relatively understudied. However, a deeper understanding of Islam in this country
is of great relevance, not only because of the notable political changes in the
country since 1991, but also in the context of late twentieth-century conditions of
political, economic and cultural globalization which is shaping both domestic
policies and ethnic identification as well as international relations.
A consideration of Islam in Ethiopia evokes several interesting questions: (a)
what is the historical trajectory of Islam in Ethiopia as part of the general
movement of Islam as a world religion in Africa?; (b) what are the patterns of
coexistence and articulation of Islam - as a faith and a way of life - with
ethnicity, Christianity and traditional religions in Ethiopia?; and (c) will
Ethiopian Islam ideologically connect with global ideological movements of
revivalism and 'fundamentalism', which have been emerging as a counter-
discourse against Western-driven economic and cultural 'modernity'?
In this respect, we start by noting three characteristics of Ethiopian Islam that
cry out for more research:
(a) the pattern of the spread and adoption of Islam in Ethiopia as part of a
sub-global movement into Africa connected to an intercontinental
tradition of learning and civilization;
(b) the reasons for alternating phases of violence and incorporation in the
interaction of Muslims with the wider Ethiopian society; and
(c) the social organization and 'indigenization' of Islam by ethnic, regional
and social groups in Ethiopia (on this point it should be seen as part of the
wider north-east African region).
These questions will not all be answered here but they define the outlines of a
more in-depth study of Ethiopian Islamic populations.
The 'quest for identity' is an expression that can be applied to the efforts of
Ethiopian Muslims to be recognized, to organize, and to raise their position in the
country towards parity with the Christians, who have been politically and
culturally dominant from the fourth century until the 1970s. This quest has been
fraught with difficulties of an historical and political nature, some of which will
be mentioned in what follows.
In the past decade, especially since the arrival of a new regime in Ethiopia in
1991 emphasizing the ethnic identity and public religious equality of Islam and
Christianity, the issue of connecting to global developments in Islam as an
expanding world-religion and identity has emerged as a major concern for
Ethiopian Muslims, who had until then been marked by a strong inward
orientation.

An important question at present is whether Islam in Ethiopia will serve as a

vehicle for political or social mobilization and exclusivist identity, as has

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Islam in Ethiopia: issues of identity and politics 111

happened in several other African countries (notably Malawi, S

Nigeria), where earlier patterns of co-existence between Christians and
are being redefined in the context of emerging 'fundamentalisms.' Thi
is in fact one relating to the social foundations of Islam in Ethiopia an
political culture of an ex-imperial state.

2. Background
From its very inception, Islam has been a trans-continental religion, in
helped by the proximity of the African Red Sea Coast to the Arabian h
where it first emerged. In fact the first converts to the new religion - o
close circle of the Prophet Muhammad - are assumed to have been Ethi
the year 615, so tradition goes, the first Hijra occurred: a group of Arab
of Islam in danger of persecution by the dominant Quraysh authoritie
(Mecca) were advised by Muhammad himself to seek refuge across t
the empire of Aksum, where a '... righteous king would give them pro
These refugees were indeed well-received in Aksum and could practis
faith freely. Requests from the Meccan authorities to deliver them
refused. The tolerant attitude of the Ethiopians gave rise to a whole new
Arab literature extolling the virtues of 'the Ethiopians.' The practical e
that on the authority of the Prophet himself Ethiopia was not to b
target forjihad. Undoubtedly there is an economic side to the story: Ak
in decline, and the trade from and to the empire was not as attractive as
Middle East, to which the attention of the Islamic conquerors was direct
decades following the death of Muhammad, however, there were variou
clashes between Ethiopians and Arabians and raids by both sides (
1981: 36-38), also related to the control of the Red Sea trade.
The new faith did not, however, attract many followers in Ethiopia, c
not in the highland Christian areas.2 Its expansion was very gradual an
took place in the lowland coastal areas inhabited by pastoral nomads, sp
later (eleventh-twelfth century) to the Somali areas in the south-east.
While Ethiopia was thus one of the first countries to receive Isla
developing centres of Islamic learning in Harar, Massawa, Zeyla, later J
has also seen a notable tendency towards inward orientation, displaying

I Tradition cited in Trimingham (1952: 44). However, the first (Arabian) conv
Islam to Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity can also be traced back to this epi
of the exiled stayed on in Aksum and became Christians.
2 Although Arab-Islamic legends predictably claim that the king of Aksum at
(called by Arab sources Ella Asham) converted in secret to the new faith, afte
from the Prophet Mohammed. For more on the Islamic mythology, se
(1996). For an excellent overview of this period and a critical review of the
see Cuoq (1981: 128-38).
During a December 1997 symposium on the Ahmed Nejash mosque in
(Tigray), attended by the ambassadors of Iran, Turkey, Yemen and Li
officially opened by the president of Tigray Regional State, the (highly cont
assumption was that "Ahmed Nejash" was the "first Ethiopian Muslim king"
Zemen, Ethiopian state newspaper, 9 December 1997).

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112 Jon Abbink

of seclusion and self-sufficiency that was equally characteristic of Ethiopian

Christianity. In addition to the geographical reasons for this, linguistic and
cultural factors probably also played a part. Arabic never was and never became
an indigenous spoken language3 - even most Ethiopian Muslims only knew
Quranic passages and prayers in Arabic (cf. Drewes 1976) - and for many
purposes ethnic and regional identities tended to be as important as religious
identity (see below).

3. Distribution

At present, at least 30% of the Ethiopian population professes Islam.4 The

religion cannot be identified clearly with particular regional or ethnic groups5 and
is found across most of them. Islam is strongly represented in the north-east, east
and south-east and a small strip in the west of the country (Afar, Harari,
Argobba, Somali, Garri, part of the Oromo, part of the Gurage, Beni Shangul).
In Ethiopia - where since the fourth century a deep-rooted Orthodox Christian
religion was predominant, especially in the highland plateau - Islam largely
spread by peaceful expansion, via trade routes and itinerant teachers (many of
Yemeni and Arab origin), tolerated by the Christian monarchs. This tolerance can
be explained by a variety of reasons, among them the particular hierarchical
social structure and ethos of the Amhara-Tigray Christians - amongst whom
craft-work and regional and international trade were somewhat despised
activities, in favour of soldiery, peasant-farming, administration and priesthood -
and by the emerging international slave, gold and ivory trade from Ethiopia,
fuelled by Arabian, Yemeni, Hadramauti and Swahili entrepreneur-traders
especially from the twelfth century. The presence of Islamic groups and

3 Only the Rashaida people in Eritrea, a group ('tribe') of about 5-6000 people that
emigrated from Arabia to Ethiopia in the early nineteenth century, had Arabic as its
mother tongue. For a valuable study on the status and use of Arabic (mainly as a
written language) in Ethiopia, see Drewes (1976). This author, a leading authority on
the Semitic languages of Ethiopia, mentions the fact that Amnharic has long been an
important language of Islam in Ethiopia, both in ceremonies and in written texts,
although few of the latter have appeared in print (1976: 184).
4 On the basis of the faulty idea that numbers equal importance, a highly partisan
presentation of statistical material on the number of adherents of the various faiths in
Ethiopia (as on that of the ethnic groups), is repeated time and again by various
authors, without mention of any serious source. E.g. Seifuddin, in a rather flawed
paper (1997: 136), writes of Muslims as being the majority group in Ethiopia, but
again his source is unclear.
The best course, however, would be to take the Ethiopian censuses of 1984 and
1994 as indicative (they too have a measure of error, but it is a slight one, and evenly
spread). The 1994 census (the official document cited in Ethiopian Register 6(1),
1998, p. 52) gives the number of Muslims in Ethiopia as 14.3 million, or 28.7% of the
population. The 1984 census had counted Muslims as 12.5 million, or 32.9% of the
population). It has to be noted that the 1994 census left out Eritrea: independent since
1993 (ca. 50% of its people - some 1.8 million - are Muslims). In both censuses the
Orthodox Christians are the numerical majority, with more than 52%.
5 Except the numerically less significant Somali, Argobba, Beni Shangul/Berta and
Afar, who are virtually all Muslims.

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Islam in Ethiopia.- issues of identity and politics 113

sultanates deep in the heartland (e.g. Dawaro, Hadiya, later Jimma)

early date (late thirteenth-fourteenth century) may partly be
strategy of self-protection: in these areas outside the purview of t
monarchy, conversion to Islam exempted the people from being en
Arab traders, teachers and entrepreneurs have settled in the count
married with Ethiopians, but on a rather limited scale. Ethiopian M
derive from 'Arab stock' but are indigenous, belonging to the v
communities of the country. They only rarely trace descent from p
lineages (an example is the Mirghani family in Eritrea, see Hisk
Some holy men or sheikhs who did so have become the object of v
pilgrimage.

4. Historical patterns
The emergence and identity of Ethiopian Islam has been inextricab
the nature of the Ethiopian state and its economic base, and w
Orthodox Christianity (and vice versa). Both religions are part of o
religious framework rooted in a multi-ethnic Ethiopian culture. Th
cannot be understood without the other. They have had their phas
antagonism and confrontation but in the past centuries have ev
vivendi of practical everyday co-existence and co-operation, especi
three centuries. This modus vivendi was grounded in the economic
the Muslims, who introduced trade in and markets for new produ
pioneers intensifying trans-national commercial trade relations wi
outside Ethiopia, and also in common elements in the underlying c
of Ethiopian societies.6
Nevertheless, one fact stands undisputed: despite its ancient hist
in the country, Islam in Ethiopia has always been a religion with s
in the eyes of many Ethiopian leaders inferior, status; it emerged
of Christianity and often suffered from suppression and discrimina
had its impact on social opportunities, religious and civil rights an
of self-organization of the Muslims.
Due to its link with the 'divinely ordained' Solomonic monarchy
inevitably was the core world-view of the political elite and a defini
nationhood in a historical sense. Moreover, a majority of the p
adhered to Christianity since later Aksumite times.

4.1. The seventh century

Since its arrival in the seventh century, Islam only expanded in a
without spectacular growth. The arid and sparsely populated Dahlak
the Eritrean coast were the first fully Islamic region where a sult
On the mainland, Islamic sultanates were founded from the twelfth
their rulers paid tribute to the Ethiopian kings, who since anci

6 It is, for instance, notable that a social trait like patrilateral cross-cou
(widespread in Arab countries) is still very rare among Ethiopian Musli
only to be found among the Afar and the Somali.

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114 Jon Abbink

claimed sovereignty over the lands up to the coast. Whenever the sultanate
refused to pay, violent conflicts ensued. These conflicts marked the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, with the Christian empire usually emerging the winne
(although important direct-trade revenues were lost to the sultanates, e.g. Yifat
and Adal, see Hiskett 1994: 140).7

4.2. The sixteenth century jihad

In the first half of the sixteenth century, under the leadership of a skilled soldier
and Islamic revivalist Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (nicknamed Gragn, the 'left-
handed'), the new sultanate of Adal (with its centre in the city of Harar) becam
so strong that a full-scalejihad was launched against a weakened Ethiopian state.
His forces received essential help from Arab mercenaries and from the Turks,
who had been encroaching on the coast up to the city of Massawa, and who
supplied fire-arms, cannons and matchlock men from their own army to the Ada
forces (the Christian armies did not yet have fire-arms). The stated aim of this
war was to root out and destroy Christianity in the area and to end the Solomoni
monarchy (which had been reinstated in 1270).8 The havoc and destruction
wrought by this 14-year war (1529-1543), during which virtually the whole of
Highland Ethiopia was conquered and a great number of centres of Ethiopian
Christian civilization were destroyed, long shaped the Christian perception o
Muslims as the 'danger from within.' The jihad was finally ended by Christian
'guerrilla' resistance and with the help of a contingent of Portuguese soldiers sen
upon the request (in 1535) of the Ethiopian king and whicharrived in 1541.
Ahmed ibn Ibrahim was killed in 1543. His successor Nur ibn al-Mujahid, wh
continued the war until his death in 1568, was less successful. Although Empero
Gdilawdewos was killed in 1559, the Christian empire recovered under emperors
Minas (1559-1563) and especially Sdirsdi Dingil (1563-1597).
The background to the conflict was again the struggle for control of interna
and especially external trade routes. The Turkish-Portuguese rivalry can also be
explained in this light. Nevertheless, the deeply ideological-religious aspect o
this war should not be neglected.

4.3. The Gondarine monarchy (sixteenth-seventeenth century)

The imperial state revived in the late sixteenth century and flowered until the
1730s. A new imperial capital emerged in the town of Gondar, stimulated by
Emperor Fasilidis (r. 1632-1667). The policy of the Ethiopian emperors was one
of tolerance vis-a-vis Muslim traders and middlemen, but also reservations
against employing them in important positions in the Christian-dominated stat
service and in the army. As a rule, Muslims were also excluded from obtaining
the hereditary land right (rist), which was a defining element of highland
Ethiopian Christian culture (among people of Amhara and Tigray). Internally, the
Muslim communities were accorded autonomy, e.g. in matters of religious law.

7 It is interesting that in some of the contemporary chronicles the Muslims were

described as the 'infidels'; see Cuoq (1981: 136).
8 The contemporary source is Chihab ed-Din (ArabfaqTh) (1897).

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Islam in Ethiopia: issues of identity and politics 115

This policy of co-existence was maintained with minor modification

reign of Emperor Tewodros (r. 1855-1868), who tried to restore auth
period of disunity in the so-called 'Era of Princes' where region
quasi-independent, despite the semblance of imperial authority m
nominal emperors at the court in Gondar. In this period, Isl
provincial lords in Wollo and Yejju (northern Ethiopia) were the mos
elements in Ethiopia. Emperor Tewodros re-emphasized Orthodox
again as a programmatic core element in defining Ethiopian nationh
unity (see below).

5. Ethiopian state and faith: enduring questions of 'national integrat

As may be evident from the brief historical sketch above, Islam has
been in an inferior position vis-a-vis Orthodox Christianity in Ethio
of political influence and cultural dominance (as well as numbers). Th
state since the Aksum period (from the fourth century onwards) has
partly through its association with Christianity. The emperor of Et
'had to be a Christian' and was the 'Protector' of the Church, while
the Church officiated in the crowning ceremony of the emperors. T
was until 1974 also the largest land-owner in the country. But Chris
never the officially prescribed 'state religion', and emperors and the
often at odds on matters of policy, issues of morality, or law and just
There was, however, a serious and inherent problem of 'national in
in Ethiopia since the emergence of the imperial state: central monar
and its extension over steadily increasing areas with diverse religiou
cultural groups increased the challenge of a unitary discourse and an
national identity. This issue was never resolved but only controlled an
with violent means if need be.
As far as the issue of religious identity was concerned, only emperors
Tewodros (r. 1855-1868) and Yohannis IV (r. 1872-1889) attempted to formally
proscribe the practice of the Islamic religion, endeavouring to enforce mass
conversion to Christianity to enhance national unity. However, despite several
initial campaigns, their edicts had no serious and long-term effect on the religious
situation in Ethiopia. Emperor Minilik II (r. 1889-1913) also hoped for more
religious unity, but after a few abortive mass campaigns and revolts he did not
use force or legal measures to achieve it, as long as the dominance of
Christianity, as the ideological framework of the empire, and the loyalty of elites
were guaranteed. The campaigns of expansion of Emperor Minilik, who at the
end of the nineteenth century almost doubled the size of Ethiopia, led him into
many Islamic and other non-Christian areas, for instance the territories of the
Oromo, Sidama, Harari, Somali, Wolayta and Kaficho. In the course of this
southward movement, several peoples resisting conquest and submission took up
Islam as a resistance ideology against the Christian overlords, who usually took
away most of their land and destroyed or redirected their economy. The Arssi
Oromo, who live some 200-300 km. south of Addis Ababa, are a case in point

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116 Jon Abbink

(Abbas Haji 1992, 1993):9 seen by Emperor Minilik first as a target of huge cattle
raids in the early 1880s, their country was conquered in a violent campaign
during which the Arssi - who until then had had their own traditional religion -
came to identify 'Christianity' (the religion of the emperor and the large body of
the army) with looting, cruelty, gross injustice and oppression. In their search for
an overarching collective identity beyond their local belief system, Islam wa
attractive, as it forged links with groups further removed from them (Somali) bu
known to have a tradition of successful armed resistance to invading foes
According to Abbas (1993) and others, this conquest sowed the seeds of the
failure of the modem Ethiopian nation-state project, despite 40 years of tactical
manoeuvring by Emperor Haile Sellassie (Haylai Sillase) (r. 1930-1974) t
develop a modem, inclusivist state drawing in the different ethnic groups under
programme of Amharization (in the linguistic sense mainly). In this context
Islam in Ethiopia had no defining role in the formation of national identity, and i
also remained second-class under his regime, although very gradually some
restrictions (in political participation, education, celebration of religious
holidays) were lifted.
In this century, Ethiopia has seen two brief but telling episodes as far as the
inherent tension between Islam and national identity or integration is concerned,
in the Iyasu intermezzo and the Italian occupation.

5.1. The lyasu intermezzo (1913-1916)

Lijj Iyasu was the young inheritor of the Ethiopian throne after the death in 191
of emperor Minilik II (whose grandson he was). He was the son of a Muslim lord
of Wollo region converted to Christianity. Iyasu was politically rather immatur
and had no clear policies, except that he tried to integrate Muslims into th
Ethiopian nation-state project. He was a frequent visitor to Muslim chiefs, built
alliances with them (also through inter-marriage or concubinage with their
daughters) and sought to bypass the established Christian elites of centra
Ethiopia. He also made contacts with Turkey and with the rebellious Somali
leader Mohammed 'Abdilleh Hassan who fought against the British. This being
the period of the First World War, Allied diplomats in Addis Ababa were also
concerned about the course Ethiopia was taking, and demanded explanations. A
combination of internal and external pressures and military force finally pushed
Iyasu (who had never been officially crowned) out of office after only thre
years.

5.2. The Italian occupation (1936-1941)

A second important episode in the relations between Ethiopian Muslims and the
state (and with the Christian populations) is that of the Italian occupation. In
these violent years, the Christians of Ethiopia (especially the educated elites and
the Amhara) were singled out for repression. The Amhara in general, who had
migrated to all parts of the country and had acquired land and resources, often

9 Also the Wollo Oromo: see Mohammed (1994).

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Islam in Ethiopia: issues of identity and politics 117

though not exclusively, at the expense of the indigenous population

many areas dismissed, expropriated and forced out by the Italian gover
The exploitative peasant labour corv6e (gabbar) system which still
many areas was ended by the Italians, and this was seen as a liberation
of the rural underclass. The Italians systematically favoured the M
Ethiopia at the expense of the Christians. They provided full freedom o
for Muslims, stimulated Islamic education and the introduction of Arabic in
schools, built fifty new mosques, and supported Muslim leaders financially
(Hussein 1994: 776). The Muslims thus largely welcomed Italian policy, and this
did not endear them to the Ethiopians fighting for national liberation.
The problems of integration and of the shaky ideological basis of the unitary
state were also revealed in the course of the guerrilla war of the Patriots (the
Ethiopian resistance fighters in the provinces) against Italian occupation. They
were mostly Ethiopian Christian highlanders, and after several battles with the
Italians, the retreating Ethiopian Patriot forces were attacked and killed by
Muslim Oromo (e.g. in Wollo, cf. McClellan 1995: 70-71), who saw the Italo-
Ethiopian war as none of their business (though they were armed and encouraged
by the Italians) and considered the highland Christians as much their enemies as
the Italians. Such incidents in their turn increased the animosity of highland
Christians towards the 'treacherous Muslims' in the lowlands.

5.3. The post-Haile Sellassie era

After the era of Emperor Haile Sellassie, characterized by a policy of repressive
tolerance and only a partial granting of rights to Muslims, the socialist-oriented
military regime (known as Derg) came to power. Under this Derg regime (1974-
1991) there was active discouragement of religion in all its forms, and both
Christianity and Islam were the target of state propaganda and subversion. In the
view of the regime, religion being 'false ideology,' 'backward,' and 'anti-
development,' was systematically weakened. The first measures taken aimed to
reverse the privileged position of Christianity: for example, the Church lost all its
land, its immovable property was confiscated, and religious education in schools
was proscribed. Policies were devised which aimed at changing the religious
culture of the population. However, the large number of Christians and Muslims
as well as the deep-rooted religiosity of most Ethiopians was a social factor
which could not be ignored by the regime, so it settled for a policy of co-
existence and co-optation. It rhetorically granted religion, especially Islam, a new
public status and equal rights, recognized the most important Christian and
Islamic religious festivals as public holidays, and tried to give ceremonial
recognition to the two communities, e.g. by making their leaders appear at state
occasions. But the practical exercise of religion and the social basis of religion
among the population at large was discouraged and sidetracked in many ways. 10

10 In the various rebel movements that waged armed struggle against the Derg, Islam
played a role as a mobilizing ideology, but these movements (apart from the Afar
movement ALF) never attained solid mass support. This was the case for example
with the SALF ('Somali Abo Liberation Front') and the WSLF ('Western Somali

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118 Jon Abbink

The post-1991 regime of the EPRDF liberalized the political, economic and
cultural climate of the country. Religious freedoms were largely restored,
although the demand of political loyalty - now defined through ethnic allegiance
- was maintained. The present Abundi (head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church),
installed after 1991 in a controversial 'election,' is a man from Tigray, the region
from where the reigning political elite of Ethiopia derives. The present leaders of
the Muslim community are also often seen as more or less loyalists. However,
resistance to such co-optation within the Muslim community preceded their
coming to power. The reigning and long-established Supreme Council of Muslim
Affairs in Ethiopia and its controversial vice-chairman1 I were challenged by a
newly set up 'Ad Hoc Organizing Committee of Ethiopian Muslim Affairs' to
respect the decision of the Shari'a court (see note 11). On 21st February 1995,
things came to a head in an unprecedentedly violent incident within the
compound of the al-Anwar Mosque in Addis Ababa (the biggest in the country
and the centre of the Muslim community). As always in such cases, the
circumstances of the incident have remained very unclear, but worshippers and
the police came to blows and the latter instantly used their fire-arms. In the
ensuing violence, nine people were killed and 129 people wounded.12 There was
never any independent judicial inquiry into the incident. The ultimate effect of
the conflict was a strengthening of the position of regime loyalists. Thus, while
the conflict may have started because of certain internal problems, the
government quickly intervened with rather excessive use of force. The events
seem to indicate that a co-optation of organized Islam continues under the new
political regime.

6. Questions of identity
It is obvious from the above that the question of the collective role and identity of
Ethiopian Muslims within a predominantly 'Christian state' has never been
resolved.
Interestingly, however, the historical pattern of conflict and conquest of the
border areas between Christianity and Islam in the Ethiopian Middle Ages
(especially in Eastern Shewa, Wollo and Eritrea, the latter then called the 'Bahr
Negash' area) and the shifting boundaries of Islamic and Christian control, has
led to a peculiar pattern of 'flexible' religious identification in the country, which
can be recognized in several areas up to the present. In the course of a lifetime
people may convert from their religion of birth to Christianity or Islam and back.

Liberation Front), both strongly dependent on the Siyad Barre government in Somalia.
Islam became the predominant factor in neither of these movements. Cf. Krylov
(1990: 174-76).
11 Whose position had been declared null and void by the Shari'a court but who had
stayed on nevertheless. Eye-witnesses in the Mosque stated that when the deposed
vice-chairman (a pro-government man) entered the Mosque that day with his armed
(!) secretary, there was immediate protest.
12 The official count given in the evening news broadcast of Ethiopian Television, 21st
February 1995. Other sources spoke of about 20 people killed.

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Islam in Ethiopia: issues of identity and politics 119

Social factors determining this are marriage, trade relations, migration t

an area predominantly inhabited by members adhering to the other rel
even (today especially) ethnic or political affiliation.
This cultural phenomenon of what I term religious oscillation has
studied systematically13 but is of great interest: it shows not only
forms that Islamic religious culture can take in an African context (it
also e.g. in parts of Nigeria, Cameroon and Mali), but also leads us to in
the nature of (Islamic and Christian) religiosity and into conditio
existence and non-exclusivist identification on the basis of religions us
to be exclusivist and - in the case of Islam - not tolerant of conversion to another
faith.

Long-standing cultural affinities between Ethiopian Christians and Muslims

(and others), questions of land inheritance, and social and kinship organization
may have provided the main reason for this pattern of oscillation and for the
religious tolerance associated with it. Another has undoubtedly been the limited
impact of urban-based 'scriptural religion' as defined and prescribed by the
ulema class, often coming from Arab-Islamic centres of learning: both this class
and important urban centres were absent in pre-twentieth century Ethiopia, with
the exception of Harar.

7. 'Ethnic dimensions' of Islam

A factor which has enhanced the everyday pattern of tolerance and pragmatic co-
existence between adherents of the diverse religions may have been that of the
ethnic diversity and the rich indigenous culture of Ethiopia. An understanding of
Islam in Ethiopia must be grounded not only in the apprehension of the context
of Ethiopian state formation and political authority but also in a study of the
interaction of indigenous culture with the tenets and idiom of the Islamic faith. 14
In anthropological studies on the various ethnic groups of Ethiopia many
varieties and forms of Islamic practice have been described. What is clear is that
Islam and ethnicity are not isomorphic: moreover, among the overwhelmingly
Christian Amhara people, there is a sizeable number of Muslims (in the Gojjam,
Wollo and Gondar regions).
To look at the 'ethnic roots' is also important because several similar cultural
institutions and customs are found across defined ethnic groups, be they of
Christian, Muslim or traditional religion. Characteristic are:
a blend of 'traditional,' so-called pre- or non-Islamic rituals, practices and
beliefs with 'official' Islam. Among these can be counted magical practices,
initiation, spirit possession and certain (not all) divination methods. This
Ethiopian (African) heteropraxis has a tenuous legitimacy in the eyes of
orthodox literate Muslims, especially non-Ethiopians.

13 But it will be part of future research in the Wollo area.

14 A fascinating example of this interaction is described in A. Pankhurst's article
(1994a).

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120 Jon Abbink

- the importance of (past) saints and holy men (awliya) and the pilgrimage to
their tombs. This is widespread in Ethiopia (prime examples are the locations
of Sheikh Hussein in Bal6, and Faraqasa in the Arssi region). Interestingly, in
Ethiopia Christian pilgrimage places also draw Muslims, and vice versa (for
one example see Abebe 1995: 31-32). Ethnic and religious boundaries often
blurr in the worship of many such pilgrimage sites (see Pankhurst 1994b).
- the important role of the Sufi mystics and orders (pl. turuq). These have also
been important in the spread of Islam, e.g. the Qadiriyya (since the sixteenth
century), and the Sammaniya and Tijaniyya (nineteenth century). Conversion
in many areas meant becoming member of a Sufi order. Among groups
where traditional initiation and ritual fell into disuse (perhaps in the western
Oromo areas), the entrance into a tariqa (Sufi order) was the logical
alternative. The role of the turuq in Ethiopia, is however, another subject on
which remarkably little is known (see Trimingham 1952, and Abebe 1995 for
some recent information).
Islam in Ethiopia has been moulded by these and other elements from the cultural
and ethnic traditions of the country. The Ethiopian societal context has, so to
speak, forced the idea of 'pluralism' not only on the minds of the country's
Christians but also on that of its Muslims.

These phenomena also raise the question of the relation between 'folk Islam'
and 'scriptural Islam,' 'saint' and 'doctor,' to refer to the well-known though
controversial point made by E. Gellner on Muslim society (Gellner 1981: 114f.).
In its original formulation, this dichotomy may have been too 'essentialist,' but it
does point to an undeniable status hierarchy in Islam. In an interesting analysis of
the Argobba Muslims in Ethiopia, Abebe (1995: 29) has claimed that both poles
in Gellner's model are not only complementary (and can be mediated by Sufi
orders), but can also be interpreted within the framework of Islamic orthodoxy.
Without pursuing this discussion here, I want to make the point that in the
areas of this above-mentioned symbiotic and oscillating religious identification,
one sees a form of non-literate folk Islam which does go against the grain of
strict Islamic ulema doctrine: if strictly applied, Islam, in this view, 'should not
allow' this kind of flexible behaviour.
Indeed, in recent years, after the 1991 change of regime, these very patterns of
tolerance (in Wollo and elsewhere) have been the target of a movement of
itinerant teachers/preachers of 'true Islam.' In 1994 during interviews in the
Aliyu Amba area (a traditional mixed border-area in east-central Ethiopia where
Islamic and Christian people live together in the villages), it was remarkd to me
by some people that their village had been visited by persons who came and
asked them to reduce their contacts and co-operation with the Christians, and to
reinforce the 'Muslim character' of their village and their way of life.
Schlee (1994: 988-999), in an important study of changing relationships
between Boran, Gabbra, Garri and Somali in southern Ethiopia, has in a similar
vein noted the problems of a new Islamic identity intersecting with ethnicity,
disturbing the local co-existence of groups.

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Islam in Ethiopia: issues of identity and politics 121

It is likely that such local-level developments - which can, however

understood in the changing configuration of a globalizing Islam that is
under new social and political conditions - will reshape the socia
Islamic societies in Ethiopia and the nature of Muslim identity and id
in the country. Villagers will be drawn into a wider debate, initiated
oriented scriptural Islamic community leaders or missionaries, on Isl
and practice. The present climate in Ethiopia of politicizing everythi
personal identity and choice of friends to economic activity and
development work, will enhance this development.

8. Prospects
In an economic sense, the Ethiopian regime is at present making an accelerated
effort to insert itself in the global economy: it liberalizes markets, invites foreign
private investment, co-operates with the IMF and World Bank in a Structural
Adjustment Facility, privatizes state companies, and devolves central state power
to regions, all the time, however, maintaining the 'ethnic balance' in its own
favour. People from the northern Tigray region and loyalists from other groups
control the key positions in national politics and business, and religious
organizations of Christians and Muslims are largely co-opted.15 The political
discourse in present-day Ethiopia, after the demise of the Ethio-Communist
Mengistu-regime with its meta-narrative of state-socialism, areligiosity and the
unitary state, has dissolved all conflicts and social issues of nation-wide
importance into ethnicity. Ethnic identity is - rightly or wrongly - seen and
defined by the Ethiopian regime as the determinant of political debate, of
economic and educational policy, and of regional and local administration. It is
held to be the 'vessel' or prism through which people's democratic rights are
realized. Religious identification has also been drawn into this: one is not Muslim
or Christian but one is Oromo or Afar Muslim and Amhara or Gurage Christian.
There is, however, a struggle for allegiance going on between religion and
ethnicity.
Except in a formal manner, the question of national integration or cohesion is
hardly posed in Ethiopia: each ethnic (and religious) community has been
accorded the right and duty to manage its own affairs in the shadow of a federal
government providing the semblance of unity. The models and ideals of
searching for common ground and patterns of trans-regional, trans-ethnic and
trans-religious co-operation are de-emphasized, in view of the past problems
posed by diversity, suppression and social inequality. This is perhaps an
interesting societal model: it carries a radical recognition of diversity and of a

15 It is ironic that at present the largest private investor in Ethiopia today is a Muslim
business tycoon, Mohammed al-Amudi (from an Ethiopian-Saudi family), the
wealthiest man in the region, with an extending global network of interests. He does
not style himself as a Muslim revivalist but primarily as an Ethiopian of Muslim faith
committed to national development and business. He has funded Muslim educational
programmes and the building of many mosques in Ethiopia, but his charitable trust
also supports Christian and non-denominational social or educational projects.

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122 Jon Abbink

new kind of equality. It also opens up a potentially destabilizing dynamics of

parochial identity formation and sectarian counter-discourse along ethnic and
religious lines.
However, since 1991 Ethiopian Muslims do have more rights and more
breathing space, compared with earlier periods. They have also achieved virtual
parity with the Christians, except in numbers. They are also no more reticent in
claiming their rightful place in Ethiopian society. Evidence of this was, for
instance, the big public demonstration by tens of thousands of Muslims in the
capital on 28th November 1994, advancing the demands of the Muslim
community to the government.
An important sign is that Ethiopian Muslims are more involved in emerging
debates in the independent press'6 on the history and role of their religious
community in Ethiopia and in the world (see Carmichael 1997). They are also
more exposed to contacts with the wider Islamic world: more Ethiopian Muslims
travel to study and work there, the quota for the Hajj is enormously increased,
and Islamic activists, scholars and teachers from the Middle East come to
Ethiopia to work and promote their view of Islam. Iranian, Saudi and some
Libyan groups are active in this respect (also in missionizing).'7
With regard to the role and identity of Ethiopian Muslims the question could
be asked whether in the present era of decentred national identity and redefined
modernity a stronger overarching trans-national religious identity will develop,
and whether one will see a politicization of Islam in the form of
'fundamentalism' or a broad social and cultural movement of revivalism.
Fundamentalism I define here as an ideological programme or world-view
characterized by:
- an unquestioned belief in own-group superiority on the basis of 'revealed
truths' derived from scriptures (laying down supernatural, 'eternal' truths);
- hierarchization and boundary-setting between 'us' and 'them';
- both exclusivism and expansionism toward the outside world, often defined
as polluted and defiled but to be cleansed, reformed, and redefined on a basis
of immutable ideas (dogmas) of 'certainty.'
In practical terms, this world-view and social programme implies the use of all
possible means to spread these certainties (through conversion campaigns, often
dramatic and radical) to the rest of society, increase numbers, and bend the
political system to its ends. As such the above designation applies to, for
instance, its Hindu, Christian or Islamic varieties.

16 Three Islamic magazines - in Amharic, with some Arabic sections - have been
founded since 1991.
17 There is no doubt that the actively missionizing 'Islamic Call' (ad-Dawwa al-
Islamiyya) Movement, headquartered in Khartoum, is active in Ethiopia, but Sudanese
influence has dwindled greatly since the failed assassination attempt by Sudanese and
Egyptian Islamists on Egyptian president Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995, after
which Ethiopia froze relations with the al-Bashir government and sent home many
Sudanese nationals.

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Islam in Ethiopia: issues of identity and politics 123

In this respect, 'fundamentalism' in its Islamic form exists on a stat

Africa only in Sudan (with its National Islamic Front government), wh
movements are active in Algeria, Egypt, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya
Senegal and a few other countries. In Ethiopia such a movement is a
will not find fertile ground for any mass allegiance.18 My hypothesis is
social and cultural conditions for the emergence of political Is
'fundamentalist' or, better, Islamist form are not good in Ethiopia. Eth
socio-economic factors and the specific nature of the Ethiopian state (e
in its present federalized form)19 will transect any homogenizing tende
'Islamic identity' on a collective basis. However, Islamic revivalism
striving for and maintaining of full equal rights for Muslims as citizen
ideological,20 'ethnicized' Ethiopia will continue (paralleling r
developments in the Orthodox Christian Church, and especially in P
movements in Ethiopia). Whether this quest will ultimately take a poli
is doubtful. The Ethiopian government has become embroiled in verbal
with the Islamist regime in Sudan and in actual armed struggle in Somal
some Islamist Somali groups like Al-Ittihad, operating in the southe
area. The government also keeps a close watch on similar-minded g
Ethiopia like the IFLO (= Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia), a
Muslim movement among the Oromo with an exclusivist and anti-
programme. The initial openness of the present government toward th
world and toward Islamic revival in Ethiopia may thus be gradually
Furthermore, if in the longer term the ethnicity-oriented state policy
may become a major vehicle for mobilizing political, economic an
regional groups in Ethiopia. The context of Islam as a global narrative
to be essential here in further defining the self-image and socio-politi
the Muslims in Ethiopia.
In view of the above, the process of Islamic revival in Ethiopia - as e
the new written media, self-organization and proselytizing - together
forms of expression of Islamic identities among the various major ethn
of the country will provide a fruitful as well as urgent area of study.

JON ABBINK may be contacted at the Afrika-Studiecentrum, P.O.

2300 RB Leiden, the Netherlands (e-mail: abbink@ rulfsw.fsw.LeidenU
fax: (+) 31-71-5723344).

18 In Eritrea small groups exist. They have partly emerged from the de
(Eritrean Liberation Front, a Muslim-dominated movement) in the early 19
Tesfatsion 1994: 78-80). At present there is an Eritrean Islamic Jihad M
active, formed in 1988, with bases in Sudan and supported by the NIF-regim
the latter's habitual denials).
19 In which Islamic parties are - as in Eritrea - forbidden. Neither has th
clamour among the public for 'Islamic' (or 'Christian') political partie
example in Kenya.
20 I.e. non-Christian (up to 1974) and non-Communist/Socialist (up to 1991) Et

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124 Jon Abbink

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