12! City Planning and Political Values: An Updated View" Susan S. Fainstein and Norman Fainstein Contemporary planning theorists have virtually all accepted the argument that planning decisions are unavoidably political. Nevertheless, analyses of planning, while increasingly grounded in contemporary social thought, have largely ignored the classical literature of political theory. The intent of this chapter is to make explicit the links between current discussions of planning and long traditions of political thought. An exam- ination of the political thought that underlies different approaches to planning can reveal the political value and interests embodied in planning procedures and allow planning processes to be related to political culture. The exercise therefore serves two purposes: First, it shows the implications of each type of planning in terms of political benefits; that is, it makes clear which social groups each form favors. Second, it points toward an explanation of why planning has largely been shunned within the American polity We define planning here as future-oriented, public decision making directed toward attaining specific goals; for the purposes of our discus: sion, we exclude planning carried out by private bodies. Although a plan ‘once enacted constitutes a politically determined public policy, it differs from other kinds of political decisions in that it is based on formal266 Susan S. Fainstein and Norman Fainstein | rationality and is explicit about ends and means. This specificity is in | sharp contrast io many other public decisions, which are left purpovetully | vague and ambiguous so as to mitigate controversy. While a decision } need not be labeled a plan in order to fit our definition, political decisions directed at long-term goals are rarely made except under the auspices of a planning group, 1t is possible to set up a typology of planning approaches on the basis of who determines the plan’s goals and who determines its means. While one can conceive of a number of different bases for typologies of planning, that of policy determination is politically the most important. t For once planning is viewed as a political process, and once a typologe is established that is based upon the location of authoritative decision making, it becomes possible to equate each planning type with a partic- ular model of decision making in political theory The Planning Typology The categories that follow are derived from the points of view presented in discussions of planning and are not necessarily either exhaustive or mutually exclusive. Like the political doctzines to which they will be elated, they contain internal contradictions and elements in common with one another. Thus, the planning typology that we are establishing is empirical rather than strictly logical. But as we shall attempt to show later, the differences among the types make a great deal of sense within } the history of political thought. ‘The four kinds of planning we discuss are (1) traditional, (2) demoe- ratic, (3) equity, and (4) incremental (although we shall attempt to demonstrate that incrementalism, while often presented as a de facto planning model, is not truly planning). We trace these four planning approaches to technocratic, democratic, socialist, and liberal political theory respectively, although our discussion of socialism shows that equity planning is a hybrid form incorporating elements of both demo: cratic and socialist thought. Traditional planning 6. ; | In this type of planning, the planner prescribes both the goals of the plan and the means of attaining them (Gans 1993: chapter 8). The justi- fication for the elitism involved in such an approach is that there is a | right and wrong way to developa city. Planners, by virtue of their exper: tise and experience, know the correct path, can exercise unbiased judgment, and can be trusted to use their technical knowledge to dis- cover the public interest The principal objective of traditional planners is the orderly develop- | i i i | i }City Planning and Political Values 267 ‘ment of the urban environment, and the proximate goals of the plan are derived from standards that supposedly measure desirable physical arrangements. Thus, for example, the amount of land to be devoted to parks is calculated on the basis of a fixed ratio between green space and Population density, The use of general standards permits the designation of planning objectives without consulting groups within the general Population. Thomas A, Reiner (1967: 232) summarizes the traditional outlook as follows: An appealing and plausible idea attracts planners the world over: we are scientists, or at least capable of becoming such. As scientists, or technicians, we work with facts o arrive at truth, using methods and lartguage appro priate to our tasks, and our ways of handling problems are not subject to outsiders’ criticism, The conception of scientific planning assumes that planners’ special qualifications free them from class or special-interest biases when they are formulating the contents of the plan. Like the entire movement for municipal reform, of which the planning movement formed part, plan- ning advocates assumed that elficiency and orderly administtation in government were general public goals that did not serve particular social interests. Gans (1993: 128), however, correctly points out that planners have generally advocated policies that fit the predispositions of the upper classes but not those of the rest of the population, The ends underlying the planners’ physical approach reflected their Protestant upper- and middle-class view of city life. As a result, the master lan tried to eliminate as “blighting influences” many of the facilities, land arid institutions of working-class, low-income, and ethnic groups. The plans called for many parks and playgrounds. but left out the movie house, the neighborhood tavern, and the local club room; they proposed museums and churches, but no hot-dog stands and nightclubs; they planned for industrial parks, but not loft industry; for parking garages, but not auto~ ‘mobile repair stations. The much-criticized replacement of Boston's West End (see Fried 1967; Gans 1967) by a group of neatly arranged, high-rise apartments for upper-income residents marked the apogee of the movement to upgrade the urban environment through the imposition of physical orderliness. The different kinds of order that observers such as Gans found in the West End were not apparent to the planners, whose criteria for demarcating slums rated the number of “standard” dwelling units present in an area Critics of the claims of sciemific analysis supposedly embodied in268 Susan S. Fainstein and Norman Fainstein SSS Planning contend that the vocabulary of planners primarily functioned to deflect opposition, masking the interests served by the urban system: Does it make sense even, to tell the inner-city tenant that the rent paid to the landlord is not really a payment to that man who drives a big car and lives in the suburbs but a payment to a scarce factor of production? The “scien tization” of social science seems to have been accomplished by masking real social relationships — by representing the social relations between people and groups of people as relations between things. (Harvey 1985: 167; see also Fischer 1990, 1991) Even the one element within the planning movement that did con- cern itself with the plight of the poor incorporated upper-class assumptions. The advocates of urban playgrounds and public housing were attempting to improve the welfare of slum dwellers and showed considerable concer with the lot of the disadvantaged. Their overall goal of an orderly physical environment for both rich and poor, how- ever, reflected a class bias against the seeming disorderliness of the lower lasses, a belief that along with physical neatness went desirable patterns of social behavior, and an unwarranted hope that social problems resulting from insufficient income could be remedied through physical improvements. Democratic planning During the 1960s, critics of traditional planning accused planners of imposing their vision of an idealized bourgeois world on a resistant pop- ulation. They called for the transformation of planning from a top-down to a participatory process. For example, Gans, in discussing planning for the public library, argued that “the planning of its facilities ought to be determined by whatever goal or goals the community considers impor- tant . .." (Gans, 1968: 102-3). According to David R. Godschalk (1967: 972), *What is needed is a modus operandi which brings governmental planners face-to-face with citizens in a continuous cooperative venture, Such a venture could not only educate and involve the community in planning, but could also educate and involve the planners in their community.” Godschalk’s stress on the importance of constant communication between planners and the public continues to the present in the works of such influential planning theorists as John Friedmann and John Forester. Friedmann (1987: 327) calls for a “struggle .. . for a recovery of the political community on which our Western ideas of democratic governance are based.” He discusses the role of radical planners in achiev. ing this social transformation, stipulating that they must be open to the knowledge possessed by those “in the front line of action ~ households,City Planning and Political Values 269 Jocal communities, social movements” (Friedmann 1987: 394). Similarly, Forester (1989: 155) exhorts planners to develop a set of community relations strategies, for example, cultivating community networks, alerting less organized interests of significant issues, assuring that community-based groups are adequately informed and engage in critical analysis of policies affecting them, exercising skills in conflict manag ment and group relations, and compensating for political and economic pressures. Democratic planners rely on the public as the ultimate authority in the formulation of plans and take a populist view that differentiates between special interests and the public interest. Most writers in this tradition generally side with the underdog, thereby privileging economically or politically disedvantaged groups in their analysis. To this extent their arguments merge with those of equity planners (discussed below), and there is a tendency in theory - although not in practice ~ to favor those least well off, often at the expense of those in the middle. Inkerently, however, democratic theory cannot assume that the interests of any group should be preferred; therefore, there is confusion over which clien- teles should be involved in the formulation of plans. As Gans (1968: 103) utsit in his discussion of the public library, “The question is, which users should be planned for?” While the problem is not insurmountable in the planning of a library, where different branches can accommodate different users, it becomes : much more difficult in cases where there are fewer possibilities of servin, a plurality of interests simultaneously. For example, should urban rede- velopment planning involve only present or also potential future ‘occupants of the site? Should it involve business and other groups that may not occupy the site but may nonetheless have an important stake in opportunities presented by revitalization? Should zoning regulations and housing programs be aimed at perpetuating the character of a district as it is, or should they respond to the desires of outsiders who might wish to move into the district? Is the issue different when the outsiders are low-income people seeking to enter a higher-income area than when they are high-income households gentrifying a low-income one? The democratic planner must contend with the problem of conflicting inter- ests and must judge the legitimacy of the representatives of various dlienteles. By accepting the right of community actors to participate in the planning process, democratic planners find themselves forced t0 make political judgments that the insulated, traditional planner neve: had to confront. Vet in making these judgments, they evade admitting that they are advancing the particular Values or interests of some segment of society: rather, they claim to be acting in the public interest or, by pressing for the interests of typically excluded groups, creating the neces- sary condition for genuine democracy. Although, according to the democratic planning ideal, the public chooses both ends and means, in270 Susan S. Fainstein and Norman Fainstein Rractice the planner shapes the alternatives that will be considered by determining the composition of the planning group. Equity planning Fauity and democratic planning are overlapping types, but while demo plan Panning emphasizes the participatory process, the thrust of equity Plenning is on the substance of programs, The issue thus shits hom why, Soverns to who geis what. Planners begin with the ov. increasing equality; who determines the depends on the situation ‘ihe concept of equity planning contains an explicit recognition of a ‘multitude of conflicting social interests, some of which may become nec facilable. From this viewpoint all public programs create winners and losers, and all 00 often the typical losers are those who already arc eater, ing from social and economic disadvantages. Rather than attempting o plan for society as a whole, the equity planner would “promote » waicy Tange of choices for those . . . residents who have few" (Krumhols and Forester 1990: 48). Equity planners, rather than engaging in cost-benelit analyses that determine whether a policy is beneficial in the aggregate, examine the distribution of costs and benelits The terms equity and advocacy planning are now used more or less interchangeably.’ As originally defined by Paul Davidolf, however, advocacy planning referred to the defense of excluded interests, While the advocate planner could theoretically work for any social group, the term has generally been interpreted to mean “advocate for the poor” Advocacy planning, in this firs formulation, was a more limited concept than equity planning, since it did not present a model of a planner Working for a public body. Rather, Davidoff based his model on the legal system and developed a scenario in which the planner was responsible to his or her client and unabashedly sought to express only the clients interests (Davidoff 1967)” Advocacy planning as limited to this approach, was an extension of what Lindblom calls partisan mutual adjustment (see below). It depended on a pluralist bargaining system in which previously excluded groups were given equal standing with other interests that had always been able to purchase the services of profes sional planners. Advocate planners were simply consultants who acted on behalf of groups that could afford their services only if offered pro bono or financed by outside sources like foundations or government programs. The concept of advocacy planning, however, has evolved to inchide planners inside as well as outside government. The planner’s activities, paralleling changes in the profession in general, have become more of Jess fixed and less tied to plan preparation: “This kind of advocacy is more entrepreneurial than legal - more open in its framework of assumptions ‘erarching goal of means and intermediate goalsCity Planning and Political Values Oeics ‘more creative in its solutions, much broader in the kinds of understand- ingiit tries to synthesize, more interactive and responsive” (Marris 1994) In this new formulation, there is no distinction between advocacy and equity planning Equity planning differs fundamentally from traditional planning, in that particular planning specifics need not be justified as being in the general public interest (although equity planners argue that their overall objective of achieving redistributional goals is in the public interest and, if they occupy a public office, would certainly try to look nonpartisan) Unlike traditional planners, equity planners enlist the participation of the Public or client group in determining substantive goals and explicitly accept planning as a political rather than a strictly scientific endeavor Traditional planning was part of the old movement for municipal reform: equity planning is part of the new movement for urban change that calls for greater representation of disadvantaged groups in the governmental process and for the decentralization of governmental policy making. Equity planners are not always democrats, since they will favor redistri- butional goals even in the absence of a supportive public. Nevertheless, as noted above, equity and democratic planning overlap, arising as they do from the same impulse toward social equality. Democratic planners, however, are ambivalent on the subject of whether each citizen is to be counted equally and whether popular majorities should rule, Since the democratic planner’s ethic is a procedural one of allowing all voices to be heard, he or she runs into serious difficulty if the popular will conflicts with the interests of deprived groups. Equity planners, even when holding office, have a particular responsibility to advance the interests of the poor and racial or ethnic minorities, even when opposed by popular majorities. Formulation of those interests ideally includes involvement of the people on whose behalf planning is being done, but ongoing partici- pation is not a necessary condition, for the aim is equity, not consultation. Incremental planning In incremental planning, policy makers come to a decision by weighing the marginal advantages of a limited number of alternatives. Rather than working in terms of long-range objectives, they move ahead through successive approximations Decision makers typically consider, among all the alternative policies that they might be imagined to consider, only those relatively few alternatives that represent small or incremental changes from existing policies. In this sense decision making is incremental. In short, policy makers and analysts take 45 their starting point not the whole race of hypothetical possibilities, but only the here and now in which we live, and then move on to consider how alterations might be made at the margin. (Lindblom 1965: 144) ani272 Susan S. Fainstein and Norman Fainstein EE Planning is not done by a single agency: “That society requires conscious control and manipulation is one assertion; that an ‘organizing center’ is required is quite another” (Lindblom 1965: 5), Like Davidoff, Lindblom recognizes a multitude of interests. But where the advocate planner sees irremediable conilict, the incrementalist sees an ultimate harmony (see Lindblom 1965: 4) In terms of our definition of planning, incrementalism is not really planning at all. Policy outcomes are not arrived at through formal ratio- nality, and there is no specifying of ends and means. But Lindblom claims that the mechanism of “partisan mutual adjustment” ~ the working out of different claims through compromise, adherence to procedural rules, and the market process - results in rational decision making: “The concern of this study has been . .. with partisan mutual adjustment as a method: for calculated, reasonable, rational intelligent, wise, policy 4 making* (Lindblom 1965: 294). Even though ends and means are not — formulated, decision makers work out ways to reach socially desirable goals: Behind the incremental and disjointed tactics we have just summarized isa concept of problem solving asa strategy. In this view public problems are too complex to be well understood, too complex to be mastered. One develops @ strategy t0 cope with problems, not to solve thems, (Lindblom 1965: 148) Therefore, while incrementalism embodies the opposite of planningin. its methods, it produces the fruits of planning in its results. Like an economic system of numerous buyers and sellers, a political system of atomized decision makers working at cross-purposes can rely on the invisible hand to produce orderly progress toward social goals ~ in fact, to produce the very goals themselves 4 Lindblom (1965: 225) attempts to show that seemingly ad hoc methods of arriving at public policies result in a hidden rationality. The ultimate 4 decision-making power does not lie with a single group, and it is nol desirable that any one social interest should prevail. Political interaction causes the clash of interests to be resolved in a Pareto optimum, so that ‘no group can benefit further without some other group losing out Lindblom assumes that such an optimum, which implies the preserva. tion of the existing arrangement of social power, is desirable.* Four Types of Political Theory Planners have mainly been satisfied to contain within narrow bounds their debate over who should make planning decisions. To a large extent, they have attempted to justify their arguments by evaluating the merits of the policies each type of planning is likely to produce rather thanCity Planning and Political Values 273 ooking at the fundamental questions of social power and legitimacy that cach type raises. The principal exceptions to this assertion are provided by Marxist and poststructuralist planning theorists, who are very concerned with these fundamental questions but who, for the most part. have not provided prescriptive theories of planning within capitalist soci. eties (see Fainstein and Fainstein 1979),* As Peter Hall (1988: 239) says of the Marxists: “[Their] logic is strangely quietist; it suggests that the planner retreats from planning altogether into the academic ivory tower.” Similarly, poststructuralists tend to be critical rather thian proac- tive, espousing strategies for resistance rather than formulating roles for planners (see Beauregard, 1991) Political theorists offer insights into appropriate behavior for planners, since, like most planning theorists, they endeavor to find models of decision making that will produce desirable social outcomes. They differ from other social theorists because they go beyond simply analyzing social relations to address practical questions of governance. Within the tangle of political thought in the modern, Western world - that is, in the Period since Locke ~ we can identify four major types of political theory that correspond to our typology of planning theories. Even though this typology of political theories is not exhaustive, it offers a framework by which we can judge the strengths and weaknesses of the planning theories and evaluate the fit between the planning theories and American political traditions. Technocratic theory and traditional planning Technocratic thinking is a product of the industrial era. It represents an effort to come to grips with the central social problems created by the Industrial Revolution ~ the miserable condition of the lower classes and the breakdown in the old structure of authority that previously main- tained order. Like the conservatives, the technocrats désife to restore the order of the preindustrial world, but untike the conservatives they accept modernization, welcoming technology as the cure for the ills of mankind. ‘Their motto is “order and progress.” Their most significant thinkers are Comte, Saint-Simon, and, to a lesser extent, Owen and Fourier.” ~The technocrats stand in opposition to the socal anarchy they see created by capitalism, In their eyes, capitalism dissolved the bonds of the ancien régime, replacing community with the marketplace, and the pater- nalism of the old elite with the laissez-faire of the new. But rather than intending a return to the days before industrialization — an impossibility ~ they wish to harness the power of technology to create a new society and thereby to ameliorate the condition of the lower classes, as well as the threat they pose to social order. The technocrats desire to unleash the power of reason and science, to transpose the old, theological religion. into a modern, positivist one. Through rational planning, the power of274 Susan S. Fainstein and Norman Fainstein ————— ae ee the state will be employed to regulate the economy and advance the lower classes, as well as to ensure the position of the productive ones, All of this will be possible only when the scientific and industrial classes control the state and do away with politics in the name of science and. reason. In the words of Comte (n.d. 781) Since the abolition of personal servitude, the lowest class has never been really incorporated with the social system; the power of capital. .. has become exorbitant in daily transactions, however just sits influence through its generality and superior responsibilty... This philosophy will show that industrial relations, instead of being left toa dangerous empiriciom and an oppressive antagonism [between the classes}, must be systematized according {0 moral laws. The duty [ofthe upper classes} 10 the lower classes, will not «consist in almsgiving, The obligation will be to procure forall suitable eduea- tion and employment ~ the only condition that the lower classes can justly demand. The Saint-Simonians, who echo Comie’s faith in science arid concen for the condition of the lower classes, also stress the positive. quality of power as a tool in remolding society. ‘The most direct method of improving the moral and physical welfare of the ‘majority ofthe population ito give priority in State expenditures to ensuring work for ail fit men, to secure their physical existence. We must add to this the measures necessary to ensure that the national wealth is administered by men most fitted for it, and most concerned in its administration, that isto Say, the most important industrialists. (Saint-Simon 1964 edn: 77) The technocrats visualize a hierarchical society in which the lower orders are secure and happy, but strictly subordinate to the managerial: scientific elite. In this respect, as in others, technocratic theory, while more detailed and explicit than discussions of traditional planning Presents a picture of society that is quite compatible with traditional planning ideas and useful in baring their hidden foundation. Underlying traditional planning is the technocratic faith in progress through science and rationality tied to the constructive use of power in the form of the plan. The technocrats make explicit the planner’s belief that there is indeed some unitary public interest that experts of goodwill can identify and maximise. Like traditional planners, they seek to replace politics with sciemtific administration, According to the technocrats, social change must be engineered from the top, by social strata that command the economy, and in the public interest, indeed in the interest of the lower classes; for they see a harmony of interests between themselves and the masses. Here again,City Planning and Political Values 275 ee eee technocratic theory makes explicit an assumption of traditional planning: that social change for the benefit ofall society must be initiated patemal- istically by the upper classes, Because all classes benefit from increasing productivity and public order, the interests of the upper classes become identical with the public interest. If the natural rulers fail to play their roles, sometimes even resist change, itis only because they remain as yet insufficiently enlightened . Traditional planners, much more limited in their expectations than the technocrats, did manage to see some of their programs carried out. Parks were built, building codes passed and sometimes enforced, transit lines planned and constructed, slums razed; land-use zoning became a commonplace. Social change was initiated from the top in the name of the public good, sometimes in the interest of the lower classes, and with the ultimate necessity of legislative sanction. — ~ Nevertheless, traditional planning suffered from the basic weaknesses of technocratic thought within the United States. It was always limited in its scope by the unwillingness of the upper strata to support reform (see Foglesong 1986)._In fact, traditional planners have long been perplexed by the all-too-common refusal of the holders of political and _sconomic power 10 recognize the importan¢e of rational planning as a neans for the improvement of lie (see Fainstein and Fainstein 1985) Equally significant, in a culture permeated by a majoritarian populist Ideology, technocratic elitism provoked widespread suspicion of its prog. enitors and its aims. From the time of the defeat of Alexander Hamilton's national bank to the present, Americans have rejected dominance by small groups claiming special expertise. Thus, the role of traditional planning was limited by well-founded distrust of decision makers insu- ‘ated from accountability, generalized hostility to abstract ideas, and the tefusal of most of the upper class to engage in long-range planning, Democratic theory and democratic planning Democratic planning stands squarely within the mainstream of democ- Ric thought, The following argument relies mainly on the work of {Alexis de Tocquevillg as exemplifying democratic political thought; other | democratic theorists diverge considerably in their arguments concerning appropriate democratic forms, the protection of minority and individual rights, the role of intermediate groups, and the scope of governmental action. Democratic theory begins with the sanctity of the individual and the icy_of his or-her interests. Not only does all sovereignty emanate from the people, they are also the only source of public values: ‘Everyone is the best and sole judge of his own private interests” (see Tocqueville 1957 edn: 67). Everyone is equal and has an equal right to advance his or her cause. There is no interest in society that cannot be276 Susan S. Fainstein and Norman Fainstein related to that of its members. Thus, the democrats start with equal indi- viduals and their desires - rather than the social origin or intrinsic merit of these desires - and goes on to equate the public interest with the interests of the public, or at least with those of the majority. Having accepted individual sovereignty as a basic axiom, the democ: rats then go on to deal with the problem of government, of how public power is to be distributed, Some form of differentiation between the government and the citizenry becomes immediately necessary ~ unless, of course, the size of the polity is severely limited.* Even though some i form of representation is necessary, democratic thinkers seek to maintain_ as much political power in the hands of the citizenry as is feasible. The | rule of the majority becomes the instrument by which citizens control the government. For “the very essence of democratic government consists in j the absolute sovereignty of the majority” (Tocqueville 1957 edn: 264) ‘The governors must be forced to remain the delegates of the governed. Unless they do—and they will only if power remains within the hands of the citizenry ~ government cannot be expected to advance the interests of the majority. Government by representatives freed from the control of the majority, by an independent aristocracy of wealth (or even merit), is likely to act in its own interests, which are necessarily at odds with those of the sovereign people Democratic laws generally tend to promote the welfare ofthe greatest possible number; for they emanate from the majority ofthe citizens, who are subject to error, but [who] cannot have an interest opposed to their own advantage. The laws of an aristocracy tend, on the contrary, to concentrate wealth and power in the hands of the minority; because an aristocracy, by its very nature, constiutes a minority (Tocqueville 1957 edn: 247). Under aristocratic governments public men are swayed by the interest of their order, which, if it is sometimes confused with the interests of the ‘majority, is very frequently distinct from them (Tocqueville 1957 edn: 249) Democratic planning requires the planner to act as delegate of the citi- zenry. But this is not to say that the democratic planner must be a passive figure blindly following instructions. Rather, the democratic planner, like the democratic governor, both responds to constituents and attempts to educate them, to show them alternatives and the relation between partic- ular policies and their interests, Indeed, the reason that citizens must participate in government and retain power in their hands is not only to prevent governmental outcomes contrary to their interests but also so that they themselves may grow, learn from participation, and become { even more knowledgeable and betier able to govern themselves. There are three major criticisms of democratic theory, which apply equally to democratic planning, First, democratic policy makers are i }City Planning and Political Values 277 immediately confronted with the short-term relative ignorance and self- ‘shness of the citizenry, and the fact that “education through participation” is a slow process for which public policy cannot wait. In real life, participating citizens may not readily accept the planner’s under- standing of how means are related to goals, or of how particular policies may be derived from their interests. In addition, people are frequently unwilling to make long-run decisions, that is, to plan, when doing so necessitates the deferment of immediate gratification. Asa result, democ. Jacies are less likely to plan than technocracies. Most worrisome is the problém Rousseau confronted when he established a dichotomy beween the general will and the will ofall: Instead of acting as citizens seeking to determine the well-being of the community in which they participate (hati, acting in accordance with the general will), people will typically act in their narrow self-interest (that is, in conformity with the will of all)” The perennial planning problems captured by the term “NIMBYism” (not in my backyard”) point to the difficulty of getting democratic agree- ment on necessary but costly policies Second, it is difficult for democratic theory to explain why citizens should bother to participate in public policy making or planning at all, for a rational calculus of the costs and benefits of participation often makes apathy quite compatible with the private interests of individuals (see Olsen: 1968, and his followers in the resource mobilization school of theory"). Given the minimal impact of the individual, the cost of one person's time and effort outweigh any real benefits that could accrue to him or her personally. So most citizens are apathetic most of the time, and the democratic planner has only a small minority with whom to plan Democratic planning in these circumstances cither becomes impossible or requires planners to take upon themselves the task of divining the will ‘of the majority, in which case the planning process can hardly be called democratic." The final criticism of democratic theory suggests that the rule of the majority leads to social mediocrity and even to fascist authoritarianism, Tocqueville regarded democracy as a threat to elevated taste; in a classic statement of the problem (1957 edn: 262) he stated: Do you wish to give a certain elevation to the human mind and teach it to. regard the things ofthis world with genuine feelings, to inspire men with a corm of mere te tages? Is it your object to refine the habits, embellish the manners, and cultivate the arts, promote the love of poetry, beauty and glory? If you believe such to be the principal object of society, avoid the government of the democracy, for it would not lead you with certainty 0 the goal, Although Tocqueville's formulation now sounds dated and :insuffer- ably elitist, contemporary critics of mass culture mount a similar attack,278 Susan S. Fainstein and Norman Fainstein eee alee although their claim, somewhat confusingly, is that the vulgarized forms of urbanity embodied in Disneyland and “theme-parked” urban spaces are inherently antidemocratic. Thus, when Michael Sorkin, an architee- tural critic, argues against synthetic spaces in the name of democracy, he is echoing Tocqueville's aristocratic claim concerning “genuine” feeling: The theme park presents its happy regulated vision of pleasure — all those artfully hoodwinking forms —as a substitute for the democratic public realm, «and it does so appealingly by stripping troubled urbanity ofits sting, of the presence of the poor, of crime, of dirt, or work. (Sorkin 1992:.xv) ‘The argument here is essentially that people are fooled into accepting the rsatz.as real. Rather than blaming democracy for the failures of mass taste to recognize the genuine, Sorkin castigates those who pander to it. But the subtext of his argument parallels Tocqueville's: The people are easily misled into accepting the tawdry over the genuine. Even more serious, however, is the concern that mass participation is conducive to the triumph of demagoguery as unscrupulous leaders play on the fears and aspirations of the public (see Ortega y Gasset 1932). The danger ‘of mass mobilization behind authoritarian nationalist move- ments has been glaringly evident in the twentieth century. Even at the evel of city and community we see, in widespread resistance to school integration or housing for the homeless, the pitting of incensed majorities against weak minorities. Within liberal-democratic systems the protection of minority rights and civil liberties is intended to guard against immoderate majorities. Clearly, however, the threat of democ- racy out of control is inherent to this method of governance rather than aberrational Socialist theory and equity planning Since the first formulations of socialist theory in the nineteenth century, socialists have divided according to whether or not they believed in peaceful reform as a means of achieving significant social change. The aspects of the theory of socialism that we will develop here are con- cerned entirely with obtaining power and benefits for the poor within an existing democratic capitalist society, as opposed either to socialist revolution or the operation of a purely socialist government. We are thus developing a reformist rather than a Marxist mode! of socialism, since Marxist socialism precludes the possibility of achieving equity ler capitalism. Socialism begins with a conflict analysis of society. It highlights the divergence of interests among different social strata and emphasizes the extent to which the upper strata maintain control of a dispropor- tionate share of social resources through their use of power. SocialismCity Planning and Political Values 279 sees the interests of individuals as determined by the objective, material circumstances of their lives ~ that is, by their class situation, Since the advantages gained by the capital-owning class are at the expense of the working class, the conflict of interests is real and unavoidable. This situation will continue so long as the capitalist class controls the condi- tions under which the remainder of society labors. From the argument that interests are class-based, it follows that what is generally called “the public interest” must not be such at all. Rather, itismerely a reflection of the values and programs of the politically and economically dominant groups. Only these groups are in a position to define what is particularly beneficial to them as being also genetally beneficial to the whole society. This view was stated most strongly by Marx and Engels (1947 edn: 39): “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.c., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.” Even in varieties with a more flexible diagnosis of thé range of possibility within capitalist society, socialist thought assumes the prevalence of a dominant ideology favoring capital The socialist emphasis on material, rather than simply legal or politi- cal, equality also characterizes the argument for equity planning. For equity planners, as for socialists, the general good of society is embodied in the welfare of its most numerous class: and the fundamental value by ‘which to judge a society is equality. Both groups throw in their lot with those at the bottom of the social order and realize that doing so places them in conflict with the particular interests of the upper strata. Equity planning likewise shares the socialist drive to demystify state policies that benefit capital while claiming to be in the public interest. Thu: downtown renewal, which is supposed to promote economic develop- ment and jobs for the working class, s revealed as providing subsidies to developers and corporations while displacing low-income people and failing to improve their employment situation, Despite their class analysis of society, however, equity planners believe in the potential of democratic government. Thus, although recognizing conflict as unavoidable, Krumholz also expresses his faith “that equity in the social, economic, and political relationships among people is a requi site condition for a just and lasting society” (Krumholz and Forester 1990: 51). He considers that his logic will lead authoritative decision makers to support “people less favored by present conditions” (Krumholz and Forester 1990: 49), even though they lack power and may even be fewer in number than their opponents. The final outcome will be based on “ultimate consensus” (Krumholz and Forester 1990: 50), Equity planning assumes an ultimately benevolent state. Although the advocacy strand within it posits endemic social conflict, even Davidoff, in his seminal article on advocacy planning, takes it for granted that a neutral judge ~ presumably a public official ~ will rule in favor of280 Susan S. Fainstein and Norman Fainstein CaO___ disadvantaged groups who have adequate spokespersons for their cause. Hence, while Davidoff begins with a conflict perspective and does not explicitly deal with the role of the state, he, like Krumholz, accepts an autonomous role for public policy and a state sector that does not sim- ply act in the narrow interests of officials dependent on capitalist largesse, Equity planning combines the socialist’s belief in equality with the democrat’s faith in government by the people. Consequently, its philo- sophical home is within democratic socialism, which extends the concept of democracy to include social as well as political rights. As the British political philosopher, T. H. Marshall (1965: 103) stated, “Social rights imply an absolute right to a certain standard of civilization which iscondi- tional only on the discharge of the general duties of (democratic) citizenship.” Within this framework the democratic state, rather than being overwhelmed by the power of property holders, can force powerful social interests to give up their privileges to promote the good of others. | In contrast, for Marx and Engels and their followers, real social change never takes place from the top. It does not result from the per- suasive power of reasonable argument directed toward those who control our government and economy, for the upper classes are willing to redistribute their power or wealth only when under duress from those beneath them. Social change, in fact, can be initiated only by a social force arising from the collective action of an exploited class: it can- not be produced by public officials acting in accordance with a philosophical position. Marxist socialism, however, while internally logical, offers litle guidance for planners. Within its constraints even reformist planners have no choice but to uphold the status quo (Harvey 1985: chapter 7). Planners searching for a role that allows them to assist those with fewest choices may share much of the Marxist critique of contemporary sodety, but they almost necessarily must abandon the Marxist remedy of total social restructuring if they are going to take action short of revolution. (On the other hand, the democratic socialist stance, while offering a direction for altruistic policy makers, does not provide a strong defense against critics on either the left or the right. On the left, adversaries can demonstrate that the space for state-sponsored reformism is quite narrow. Because capital is free to flee those places that seriously limit capitalist autonomy ~ in other words, those that have a “poor business climate” ~ it holds the upper hand in restricting attempts at redistribu- tion. On the right, critics contend that well-meaning radicals oppose policies that benefit hardworking, middle-class taxpayers to favor unpro- ductive social parasites. In response to both these attacks, democratic socialists are left arguing a moral position that, unlike Marxism, neither makes claims to historical inevitability nor, as does belief in the invisible hand of the marker, purports to produce efficiency or reward individualCity Planning and Political Values not E ted to'equity planning “because it is right.” Ultimately, the argument an E {ordemocratic socialism depends on this justification as well. ea : list he 4 ficemental decision making is the form of planning logically implied by eral political theory. Lindblom’s model is nothing more than the partic- pt | “llar application of the general premises of liberal thought, as formulated ee 'Y-Locke in the seventeenth century and developed by Bentham, Spencer, and a number of other thinkers in the nineteenth century. alism begins with an atomistic conception of human society, seeing 9 ‘human beings as rational actors who are the best judges of their own 'n private interests, The public interest is accepted as real but is regarded as a “esting fron ‘of private interests within bg confines of the political marketplace. a Es /The obligation of liberal government is first and foremost to guaran- ' ‘upon procedures; as Locke put it, > “Aolact as an impartial judge or umpire. Liberalism-in-pure form gives $ @BBSe government no other function than this role of umpiréJand thus no } F mandate to address social inequality. There is, hoWever, nother strand i “during the carly part of the twentieth century. It does give 10 government the additional function of trying to advance its own con- = ception of the public interest. In this activist version of the liberal state, government aids private interests that are ill-treated in the marketplace Gosilive liberalisin, weds the technocratic conception of constructive ‘governmental action to the mainstream of liberal thought; in its most radical identity, positive liberalism begins to merge with democratic (socialism. Nevertheless, liberalism in all its forms emphasizes the prime impor- tance of a diffusion of power within society. Freedom is the most fmportant social value, and efficiency is the outcome of its exercise. Neither the technocrat’s elite, the democrat’s majority, nor the socialist’s deprived class should have absolute power. No group or institution should have so much power that it can corner the political market. The most proactive liberal conception of government still sees it as being only = primus inter pares. The largest role played by the governmental decision ‘maker is to add another input to the market of alternative policies — a ‘government may create plans and attempt to implement them, but it can ‘never be assured of their being carried out. ‘Thus, the general direction in which society is to move, or the way in which political benefits are to be distributed, is not decided explicitly at all. Rather, itis the result of a large number of decisions, some of which _ may be made by government. Overall social policy is not made282 Susan S. Fainstein and Norman Fainstein ree deliberately but results from a mechanism that acts like an invisible hand, producing outcomes that are ultimately rational. Incrementalism, like classic liberalism, is based on a procedural value of maximizing individual freedom. Consequently, it benefits primarily those social groups already most privileged under present conditions. ‘These are the strata that command the greatest share of power resources (sce Dahl 1961: esp. 94 for use of the term), enabling them to take a dis- proportionate amount of social rewards. The most acceptable form of governmental activity for these groups is that which ensures their present position - hence, the accepiability of zoning ordinances and the like, Because they have favored government as an arbiter rather than positive actor, they have rallied behind the values of efficiency and economy in municipal government rather than bebind those of welfare and innovation. Incrementalism thus shares the weaknesses of liberalism. In a society where not just wealth but also power is unequal, those who are worst off materially also have the least ability to change the system. Moreover, the very pluralism of interests makes any transformative change extraordi- narily difficult, even if the great majority would benelit from it. Thus, for example, efforts at environmental preservation and conservation of energy resources founder as a result of a process of incremental decision making that strictly limits the scope of change. Significance of the Typology ur discussion of the relationship between planning types and political theories shows the concepts of planning to be not just analogous to certain strains in moder political thought but actually fragments of these Political formulations. The fuller articulation of the planning types in. terms of value assumptions and justifications of social power permits us to understand why America has largely rejected the programs of city. planners ~apart from certain exceptions, in the area of parks, zoning, and urban renewal. For a variety of historical and cultural reasons, the United States has been dominated by the liberal tradition.” This tradition values individualism, accepts the primacy of private interests, and prefers minimal government. Thus, the very notion of planning, which assumes an overriding and ascertainable public interest that can be realized through the positive actions of government, is antithetical to general American political values. As Lindblom correctly argues, most decision ‘making in this country follows his description of partisan mutual adjust- ment. Policy is determined incrementally; it is arrived at through the clash and compromise of opposing views within the political market- place. But this incrementalism itself marks the absence of planning.City Planning and Political Values 283 | Incrementalism and partisan mutual adjustment maximize liberal values: “They restrict the role of government to that of umpire in the political “marketplace, thus guaranteeing the enforcement of procedural rules but ‘temaining oblivious to outcomes, to which groups win and which lose in the process of politics. At a maximum, government becomes another actor in the political process, offering its own solutions to social problems, ‘with the proviso that its solutions must compete with those offered by private decision makers. The American political tradition is, of course, democratic as well as liberal. Why, then, has there been an absence of democratic planning in “the United States? For, to the extent that we have had planning, it has it involved widespread participation. In the United States “positive” government has been associated with the centralization of power. © Reasons are both inherent in any effort at democratic planning and also © specific to the U.S. system of fragmented democracy. Unlike democratic planning, traditional planning has been inhibited neither by a lack of institutional mechanisms nor by the absence of supportive social conditions. Like Europe, the United States has a ‘powerful scientific-industrial class. But this group in America has largely ejected technocratic thought in favor of liberalism. Thus, planning has “been much more powerful in Europe, where the capitalist elite has “consciously visualized itself as an aristocracy of talent, attempting to supplant the old aristocracy of birth. The technocratic idea has been “embodied in the Furopean planned city, the mixed public-private cor poration, the whole dirigiste tendency of the modern western European economies. ‘American business leaders have tended to see themselves as individual entrepreneurs rather than as members of an aristocratic class. They have supported laissez-faire instead of dirigisme. It is extremely significant that the great successes of traditional planning in the United States have ‘Occurred in those cases where business interests have participated in “public-private partnerships’ to improve the central city. In these instances planning was carried on in the name of the general good, but lis direct beneficiaries were downtown business interests and upper- middle-class residents (Squires 1989). It was assumed that everyone ‘would benefit from the economic expansion that supposedly would result from the construction of new office buildings and retail centers, even though most of the people who received specific advantages in terms of governmental subsidies were already well off. ‘The relative absence of equity planning, like the limited extent of traditional planning, can be attributed largely to American political Values. There are two prerequisites for socialist planning: The first is the political organization of those seeking redistribution; the second is the existence of a political spectrum broad enough to permit the presentation fa radical ideology by advocates for the poor. Except perhaps for a brief284 Susan S. Fainstein and Norman Fainstein i eee | period during the 1930s, these conditions did not exist in the United States at all until the 1960s. Low-income people accepted the individu- alist bias of the general political culture, The middle-class sympathizers who constituted the intellectual leadership of European socialist move- ments were unable to escape from the dominant American liberal ideology. Thus, they stumbled into technocratic reformism rather than socialist radicalism. It was only the rise of black militancy, based on the premise that the interests of lower-class blacks are fundamentally opposed to those of middle-class white Americans, that led to a new consciousness on the part of a segment of the lower class. This change in the consciousness of the lower class, combined with the movement toward the left among young American intellectuals during the 1960s and 1970s, laid the foundation for the development of equity planning. Until the present time, social change in America has largely been unplanned. While the poor may have benefited from increasing material prosperity, they have not been the special beneficiaries of change, and the improvement of their lot - to the extent that it has taken place ~ has been largely accidental. The planners who intend to ameliorate the conditions of the deprived must recognize that redistribution of social goods will not take place without social conflict. As advocates for the poor, they must admit, at least to themselves, that they are supporting the particular interests of a particular social group. Realistic planners must give up the delusions that they can serve the whole public equally well and that there is an indissoluble social good, which they are partic ularly well circumstanced to ascertain. They must, in short, reject many of the technocratic biases underlying the professional rhetoric of planning and construct a new rationale for themselves. t Notes 1 This is a substantially revised version of the article, “City Planning and Political Values,” originally published in the Urban Affairs Quarterly, 6 (March 1971), pp. 341-62, At the time the original article was published, planning theory asa distinct realm of analysis barely existed. This situation. Fs well as the preoccupations of planning theorists, has changed dramati ‘ally in the intervening quarter century. This revision seeks to take into account this wansformation 2 Sce the articles in the recent forum on advocacy planning in Checkoway (1994) 3 Krummholz and Forester (1990: 250, 1.6) quote Charles Hoch to this effect {would argue that you {Krumholz and his staff} were not really advocate planners, that is identifying with a client and representing their interests in a partisan manner. 4 Any redistribution of social power would require some other group to suffer a oss equal to the benelit received by the Up. 5. For Marxist critiques of planning, see Dear and Scott (1981), especially the {Mea ae: City Planning and Political Values 285 shanter by 8.7. Roweis: Castells 1977): Harvey (1985: chapter 7). For post. Stucturaist examinations, see Boyer (1983); Beauregard (1991); Ligget and Perry (forthcoming) © fisimportanto recognize that we ae discussing secular systems of thought that, wrthin the discourse of Weberian sociology, would be defined se modern. We have seen a resurgence of political conflict in the world that has been defined by religious principles and inherited identities thot are mot Part of this “modern” debate. Indeed, our focus may seem a bit of hand Waving designed to cover up a rather glaring omission, for there is no ‘mension in our typology of tray conservative thought ~ that, for example, associated with Edmund Burke in England or with Bonald and de Maistre in France, We have purposely ignored conservative thought for two reasons. The frst is that conservative thinking stands antithetical to the whole idea of tavional policy making, if we took the time to discuss iti would only be to dismiss it, Second, there is in America a total absence of conservotine thinking, of the conservative desire to maintain a feudal past. What genuine conservatism exists is combined with pratse of industealism and thus fg | under our classification of technocratic thought. What is sometimes called conservatism in the United States is nothing more than liberalisin at ite extreme ~ the liberalism of Spencer and the Social Darwinists; as such, we treat it in our section on liberalism, 7 The reader may note that the last three names are usually associated with the category “utopian socialism.” The use of this term is, we feel, mislead. ing and almost entiely a result of the fact that Marx made the label stk Louls Hartz calls them “feudal socialists,” which is a better choice of words, since it makes any simplistic association of their names with socialism more Gilfcalt. By choosing to emphasize Comte and the elements in the though | of the others most closely related to his theories, we have even further loosened the connection between technocratic and socialist thought 5 Rousseau imposes precisely such a limitation when he describes his own democracy % Rousseau, in the Social Contract, distinguishes between the citizen as a ‘member of the community and unsocialized natural man, who is not evil bur who does not have the benefits of civilization. Through his theory of democracy he attempts to make the constraints of civilization legitimate. tn a democratic society citizens themselves determine the laws that will linie their freedom rather than having constraints imposed upon them. When each citizen makes a decision in conformity with the collective good, the resulting choice embodies the general will When decisions are made only ‘on the basis of narrow self-interest, the consequence is the will of alh (Rousseau 1950 edn; see Hartz 1990: chapter 5) 10 Olsen develops his argument within the paradigm of neoclassical econom. ics like all neoclassical economic models, his places the individual prior to the community and defines rationality as the maximization of individusl self-interest 11 Altshuler (1965) describes the difficulties encountered by Minneapolis's Planners when they sought to involve citizens in formulating the goals for downtown redevelopment. t the stage of general goal setting, few people286 Susan S, Fainstoin and Norman Fainstein Gould forese the implications of decisions for themselves. But by the ume the planning process gor down to specicy, the famemonk hed as sed. tn my own recent work om hinneapols(Elason ea Lan which bs examined the neihborteod planning proces. veld hg ‘in most neighborhoods, relatively few people parpae anathore eee ar the low-income, renter population does no tecome nvelees 1D. Forextensveapumenss in support ofthis intepeeation oe hone 55, Roorstein (1953) and Lipset (i References Atle, A.A, 1965, The cy Panning Paces. haca: Cornel Universiy Pes Beauregard, R.A. 1991. "Widuut ante modern pang oo owns D315. The enue Ameria alts hago: Universo hago ong Econ and Retard, 10 (Sumner ony Castes. 1977. The Urban Quoion, Cambridge MAC hi Checkoway, Be) 194 "Pal avide end advocacy planing fa serospe” 4 Comte. Am The Pste Phish of guste Ce rs I. rae York Pete Ekle, Dahl. 1961 We Gera New Have: Yale University Pes David P1965, Advocacy and plus Is planning” Just ofthe rin Dear Mand A 3. Sot (eds) 1981, Urban Pieming ad Urbanization in Capa Foinsein. S'S and. 1 fintein, 2985, “is state planning ecessary for (December) 485-307. — 19. “New Debates in urban planning: the impac of Mars hear within "he United States” Ptration aural of Urbano Raionl Renee en Frinscin. 8S. wih NJ, Glkman, €. Grvoa, and C st 1995 An tater Elution ofthe Minepots Nghlerhed Reaeaton Proce Brunswick NU: Center fe Ubon Pley Resear Fischer, F 1991 “Rsk assessment and enevonmental es toward an eps ton of scence and partpation.” fal re Quasar hee 1990, Tehnaracy and th Palit of Eger Newby Ear, CA. age Fopesong RE 198, ling the Capt iy Prneion Pincson Covey Fried, 1967. “Grleving for alt hom," Pp. 359-879 i J. @. Wine, ‘rbonRenewel Cambridge, MA: MIT res, Friedmann, J. 1987. Pleo ithe Puss Donn. Fuinceton: Peineenn wc. erkcly. CA: Univers of Calon