Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No.

138570, October 10, 2000 (Exception: Treaty

stipulations)
Doctrine: This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.

Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government
and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership
of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments
in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessels and aircraft, and importation and exportation
of equipment, materials, and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.” 

Issue:

- Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement is Unconstitutional

Ruling:

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence
handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution
. . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the
United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be
sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has
stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For
as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the
mandate of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 181052 November 14, 2012

RODOLFO BELBIS, JR. y COMPETENTE and ALBERTO BRUCALES, Petitioners,

vs.

PEOLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Digest

(Direct, natural consequence)

Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales filed a petition for Review on Certioari to seek reversal and
setting aside of the Decision of CA which affirms the modification of the Decision by RTC of finding them
guilty of Homicide. Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga,
Tiwi, Albay. Around 9:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house and proceeded to the area
assigned to him. Later on, around 10:00 p.m., Veronica Dacir (Veronica), Jose's live-in partner, heard
Jose shouting and calling her name and went to where Jose was and saw blood at his back and shorts. It
was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy (petitioner Alberto Brucales), while Paul
(petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was taken to St. Claire Medical Clinic at Tiwi, Albay,
about four kilometers from Barangay Naga where he was initially attended by Dr. Bernardo Corral (Dr.
Corral). Jose was later referred to Ziga Memorial District Hospital at Tabaco, Albay and, thereafter, was
referred to Albay Provincial Hospital on December 10, 1997 at 2:00 a.m. He was confined therein for six
(6) days. Dr. Sancho Reduta (Dr. Reduta), his attending physician, issued a medical certificate, which
stated multiple stab wounds, alcohol intoxication. Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, Medical Officer III of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) of Naga City, Region V, conducted an autopsy on the victim's cadaver on
January 14, 1998 and issued Autopsy Report No. BRO No. 98-02, which indicated multiple organ failure
as the cause of the victim's death.

Issue:

- Whether Belbis and Brucales are guilty of HOMICIDE

- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE
VICTIM TO VERONICA DACIR, ONE MONTH PRIOR TO THE VICTIM'S DEATH. CONSTITUTES A
DYING DECLARATION WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 37, RULE 130 OF THE RULES
OF COURT? NO
- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE? YES Not entitled
- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STAB WOUNDS WERE
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE VICTIM'S DEATH? NO
- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IS NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR? NO

Ruling:

RTC:
Petitioners claimed that they are entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Through the
testimonies of petitioners, Dr. Olga Bausa and Dr. Edwin Lino Romano, their version of the incident is as
follows:

Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store in Naga, Tiwi, Albay, engaged
in a conversation with other people when Jose went to them and told them to go home. While on their
way home, they heard Jose's whistle go off as the latter was following them. Petitioner Rodolfo asked
Jose what is the matter and the latter replied, "What about?" Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on
petitioner Rodolfo, but the latter was able to evade it. Afterwards, Jose held the nightstick horizontally
with both hands and tried to hit petitioner Rodolfo's forehead. Petitioner Rodolfo held the nightstick
which was in reality, a bolo sheathed on a scabbard. Jose pulled the bolo inside and the wooden
scabbard was detached from it, thus, the blade thereof injured his left hand. Petitioner Rodolfo kept
holding the wooden scabbard and when Jose thrust the bolo to petitioner Rodolfo, the latter parried it
with the wooden scabbard he was holding. Petitioner Rodolfo managed to take the bolo away from Jose
and, thereafter, the latter embraced petitioner Rodolfo while trying to get the bolo back. Petitioner
Rodolfo held the bolo with his right hand and swung it away from Jose. Thereafter, Jose pushed
petitioner Rodolfo causing the bolo to slip from the latter's hand. Jose tried to pick the bolo up, but
petitioner Rodolfo was able to hold it first, thus, Jose stepped back. During that commotion, petitioner
Alberto was only watching and told Jose and petitioner Rodolfo to stop fighting.

Thereafter, petitioner Alberto accompanied petitioner Rodolfo to the latter's house because he suffered
a hand injury. Petitioner Rodolfo was then brought to Tabaco General Hospital before he was referred to
Albay Provincial Hospital. Dr. Reduta sutured the top layer of his wound and the following day, he went
back to Tabaco General Hospital where he was operated on his left hand injury by Dr. Romano.

Petitioner Rodolfo brought the bolo used in the incident with him in his house and reported the matter
to the police station of Tiwi and surrendered the same bolo to the police authorities.

The RTC convicted the petitioners of the crime charged against them, but appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The dispositive portion of the decision follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the death of Jose Bahillo. Considering the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense in their favor, and applying the Indeterminate

Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of Jose Bahillo the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.

CA:

denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that there was no mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 23 December 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Albay,
Branch 17 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Accused-appellants
Rodolfo C. Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

SC:

A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts which
concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is
impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of
retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a
person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating the facts
concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.

As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration
is made by the deceased under the consciousness of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the
time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of
the declarant’s death; and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s death
is the subject of inquiry

The fact that the victim was stabbed on December 9, 1997 and died only on January 8, 1998 does not
prove that the victim made the statement or declaration under the consciousness of an impending
death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and
imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid
succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that
the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending.11 As such,
the CA incorrectly ruled that there were dying declarations.

The CA should have admitted the statement made by the victim to Veronica Dacir right after he was
stabbed as part of the res gestae and not a dying declaration. Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, reads as follows:

Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
In sum, there are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act,
the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.

Clearly, the statement made by the victim identifying his assailants was made immediately after a
startling occurrence which is his being stabbed, precluding any chance to concoct a lie.

Be that as it may, the CA need have discussed in its decision the presence of a dying declaration or a
statement as part of the res gestae, because petitioner Rodolfo admitted to stabbing the victim but
insists that he had done the deed to defend himself.

From the above testimony, it is apparent that the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased
when petitioner Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Although there was still some
struggle involved between the victim and petitioner Rodolfo, there is no doubt that the latter, who was
in possession of the same weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor. Retaliation is not the same
as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when
the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was
injured by the accused. Such an aggression can also be surmised on the four stab wounds sustained by
the victim on his back. It is hard to believe based on the location of the stab wounds, all at the back
portion of the body (right lumbar area, left lumbar area, left buttock, medial aspect and left buttock,
lateral aspect), that petitioner Rodolfo was defending himself. It would have been different if the
wounds inflicted were located in the front portion of the victim's body.

Anent the contention of petitioners that the CA failed to consider the testimony of the doctor who
performed the autopsy in its entirety, the same is without any merit. What really needs to be proven in
a case when the victim dies is the proximate cause of his death. Proximate cause has been defined as
"that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." The autopsy report
indicated that the cause of the victim's death is multiple organ failure. According to Dr. Wilson Moll Lee,
the doctor who conducted the autopsy, the kidneys suffered the most serious damage. Although he
admitted that autopsy alone cannot show the real culprit, he stated that by having a long standing
infection caused by an open wound, it can be surmised that multiple organ failure was secondary to a
long standing infection secondary to stab wound which the victim allegedly sustained. What is important
is that the other doctors who attended to the wounds sustained by the victim, specially those on the left
and right lumbar area, opined that they affected the kidneys and that the wounds were deep enough to
have caused trauma on both kidneys.

As to the claim of petitioners that they are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, the same does not deserve merit. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following
requisites should be present: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary.29 The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give
himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes
to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and
capture.30 Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the
inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and,
therefore, cannot be characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.31 In
the present case, when the petitioners reported the incident and allegedly surrendered the bladed
weapon used in the stabbing, such cannot be considered as voluntary surrender within the
contemplation of the law. Besides, there was no spontaneity, because they only surrendered after a
warrant of their arrest had already been issued.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, dated February 22, 2008, of Rodolfo
Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales, is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated August 17, 2007, and its Resolution dated January 4, 2008, affirming with modification the
Decision dated December 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Tabaco City, Albay, Branch 17, finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide are hereby AFFIRMED.

When death is presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted.

The death of the victim is presumed to be the natural consequence of the physical injuries inflicted,
when the following facts are established:

1. That the victim at the time the physical injuries were inflicted was in normal health.

2. That death may be expected from the physical injuries inflicted.

3. That death ensued within a reasonable time. (People vs. Datu Baginda, C.A., 44 O.G. 2287)
[G.R. No. 46539. September 27, 1939.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VALENTIN DOQUEÑA, Defendant-Appellant.

Primicias, Abad, Mencias & Castillo for Appellant.

Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, jr ., for Appellee.Digest

(Minority)

This is an appeal filed against the ruling of the lower court wherein the accused Doqueña was
prosecuted for Homicide in relation to the stabbing Ragojos in his chest, with allegedly discernment.
Between 1 and 2 o’clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and
one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the intermediate school of the municipality of
Sual, Province of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said yard, intervened and, catching
the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. Ragojos retaliated and chased Doquena
around the yard and slapped his nape, and punched him on the mouth. Doquena looked around the
yard to find a stone, but he found none so he asked his cousin Romualdo Cocal to bring him his knife.
Romualdo refused, afraid that he might use it against Ragojos, but Doquena succeeded in obtaining his
knife. Valentin Doqueña approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him another blow
with his fist, to which the deceased answered that he did not want to do so because he (Juan Ragojos)
was bigger than the accused. Ragojos, continued playing and, while he was thus unprepared and in the
act of stopping the ball with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he
carried."

Issue:

- Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that Doquena acted with discernment in the
commission of the crime

Ruling:

The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that the appeal taken
from said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to determine discernment by the means
resorted to by the attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his brief. He claims that to determine
whether or not a minor acted with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time
the crime was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on
the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear
that the attorney for the defense mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the
Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as a mitigating
circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The
discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded by the records in each
case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial (U. S. v. Maralit, 36
Phil., 155).

Appeal is granted

To be exempt from criminal liability under paragraph 3 of Article 12, two conditions must be present:

a. That the offender is over 9 and under 15 years old; and

b. That he does not act with discernment

Art. 80. Suspension of sentence of minor delinquents. — Whenever a minor of either sex, under sixteen
years of age at the date of the commission of a grave or less grave felony, is accused thereof, the court,
after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction,
shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or
private, benevolent or charitable institution, established under the law of the care, correction or
education of orphaned, homeless, defective, and delinquent children, or to the custody or care of any
other responsible person in any other place subject to visitation and supervision by the Director of
Public Welfare or any of his agents or representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the
superintendent of public schools or his representatives, subject to such conditions as are prescribed
hereinbelow until such minor shall have reached his majority age or for such less period as the court
may deem proper.
 G.R. No. 181071               March 15, 2010
LADISLAO ESPINOSA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Digest (Self-Defense)
This is an appeal/petition regarding the Ruling of RTC, (Iba, Zambales) and CA convicting Espinosa for the
Crime of Serious Physical Injuries with a penalty of arresto mayor (6 months), and to pay Php 54, 925.50
for the damages. On 6 August 2000, at about 10 o’clock in the evening, private complainant Andy Merto,
went to the house of Espinosa in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. Merto shouted violent threats
while standing outside the house of Espinosa and challenged him to face him outside. Espinosa went out
of the house to pacify the anger of Merto, but Merto hurled Espinosa with a stone. Espinosa ducked and
instinctively hit the left leg of Merto with a bolo scabbard. Espinosa continued to hit Merto, as the latter
fell to the ground, until Espinosa’s cousin, Rodolfo Muya, restrained him. Merto sustained two (2) bone
fractures, one in his left leg and another in his left wrist. It took about six (6) months for these injuries to
completely heal. Espinosa was originally charged with Frustrated Homicide but was modified and
convicted of an offense of serious physical injuries. The trial court denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that self-defense cannot be appreciated to justify the act of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE premises considered, judgment is rendered finding accused Ladislao Espinosa GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Serious Physical Injuries defined and penalized under Art. 263,
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced [to] suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of Arresto Mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional as maximum. Accused is ordered to pay private complainant Andy Merto the amount of
₱54,925.50 as and by way of actual damages.

Prosecution Failed to prove the element intent to kill

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a
deadly weapon in the assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely
medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is present

Issue:

- Whether or not complete self-defense may be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.

Ruling:

The Court rules in the negative.

Article 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following requisites concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The court affirmed the 1st and 2nd requisites:

1st – Merto’s attempt in throwing a stone

2nd- Merto’s invitation for confrontation and shouting of violent threats against Espinosa

In arguing that the means employed was reasonable to repel the unlawful aggression, the petitioner
invokes the application of the "doctrine of rational equivalence," delineated in People v. Gutual,11 to wit:

x x x It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal factors the emergency, the imminent
danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or
impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests
upon the imminent danger of such injury. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court is not impressed.

The very application of the doctrine of rational equivalence, invoked by the petitioner, militates against
his claim. The doctrine of rational equivalence presupposes the consideration not only of the nature and
quality of the weapons used by the defender and the assailant—but of the totality of circumstances
surrounding the defense vis-à-vis, the unlawful aggression.

Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner merely used a scabbard in fending off the unlawful
aggression—the totality of the circumstances shows that after the aggressor was taken down to the
ground, the petitioner ceased to be motivated by the lawful desire to defend himself. He was, by then,
acting with intent to harm the private complainant whose aggression had already ceased.

The Appeal is DENIED for lack of merit

 G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Mala in se/Mala Prohibita)
Digest

ARSENIA B. GARCIA filed a petition to review the judgment of CA that convicted him in violation of
Section(b) RA 6646

Sec. 27. Election Offenses. - In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in
Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an
election offense:

b. Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or
decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses,
after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections, an
information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio
R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and GARCIA, with violation of Section
27(b). That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995
elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, GARCIA, together with his co-
conspirators and accomplices, willfully and unlawfully decreased the votes of senatorial candidate
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from (6,998) votes to (1,921) votes with a difference of (5,077) votes

Issue:

- The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se
or mala prohibita? MALA INSE
- Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
- Whether Garcia is Guilty of violating Section(b) RA 6646

Ruling:

RTC:

In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence,
except GARCIA who was convicted

sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however,
accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification
to hold public office and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.

CA:

Denied the motion for reconsideration

SC:

mala in se - felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of
are inherently immoral

- they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law
- criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no
crime is committed.

mala prohibita - the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the
law says they are forbidden.

- the sole issue is whether the law has been violated

- Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.

Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and
miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional
election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by
a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.

Neither can this Court accept the petitioner’s explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea how
the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that the private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of
6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, the petitioner’s concern was to assure
accurate, correct, and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and
fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal
responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law

As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921
votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy
may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as
reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to
remain on record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from
one document to another.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
petitioner’s conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six
months is AFFIRMED.
 G.R. No. L-5036 November 17, 1909
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
LUCIANO MALEZA and GABRIEL ADLAON, Defendants-Appellees.
Digest
(Negligence as a crime)
A complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal charging Luciano Maleza and Gabriel Adlaon with the crime
of falsification of a public document by reason of reckless negligence. On the 31st of May, 1906, Luciano
Maleza, as treasurer of the municipality of Sevilla, Province of Bohol, certified that an account of the
same date, showing payments made to carpenters and day laborers who worked on the construction of
the municipal building during the years of 1903 and 1904, as well as the cost of certain packages of nails
used therein, was a true and exact statement; said account amounted to P249.35, and was approved by
a resolution of the municipal council. He further certified that the services were rendered as stated and
were necessary for the public interest, and that the articles purchased had been recorded in the
municipal register. Maleza, however, failed to tell the truth in the statement of facts contained in the
said document, inasmuch as he stated therein that the money was intended to pay the carpenters,
when as a matter of fact it was drawn and paid to Luciano Maleza himself, he being commissioned by P.
Cayetano Bastes to collect and receive the amount loaned by the said Bastes to the municipal president
and treasurer of Sevilla in the year 1903. Gabriel Adlaon, whose signature appears at the foot of the
document, had received the said amount as the balance due of a former account and also failed to tell
the truth when he said that he had received the money, when in reality neither was the money paid for
the work done by the carpenters nor was it received by him.

Issue:

Whether or not Maleza and Adlaon are guilty with the crime of falsification of public documents on the
grounds of reckless negligence

Ruling:

Between an act performed voluntarily and intentionally, and another committed unconsciously and
quite unintentionally, there exists another, performed without malice, but at the same time punishable,
though in a lesser degree and with an equal material result; an intermediate act which the Penal Code
qualifies as negligence, or reckless negligence.

A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts, it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible
for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except
through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, and those of his fellow-
beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
Therefore, any act executed without malice or criminal intent, but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or
negligence, and which has harmed society or an individual, deserves the qualification of either reckless
or simple negligence or imprudence.

For the considerations above set forth, and which relate solely to the reasons on which is based the
order appealed from, and considering that the classification of falsification of documents by reason of
reckless negligence is perfectly legal, considering the nature and circumstances surrounding the act
which is the subject of the complaint, it is our opinion that the said order should be reversed. Let the
case be remanded to the court whence it came with a certified copy of this decision, and let the judge
below proceed with the case and enter judgment therein in accordance with the law. So ordered.

Remanded – return to the lower court where the case came from
G.R. No. 207175 November 26, 2014

EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Digest

(Mistake of Fact)

Eduardo Magsumbol filed a petition questioning his conviction for Theft on the Case decided by the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino (Mogsino). Apolonio Inanoria
(Jnanoria), and Bonifacio Ramirez (Ramirez). was charged with the crime of Theft in the Information,
dated August 30, 2002, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55 (RTC) and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2002-1017. That on or about the 1st day of February 2002, at Barangay
Kinatihan I, in the Munipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon, Philippines, Magsumbol, together with
7 John Does willfully and unlawfully and feloniously stole Php 44,400 worth of 33 coconut trees from the
coconut plantation of Menandro Avanzado. Culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Ernesto Caringal (Caringal), private complainant Engr. Menandro Avanzado (Menandro), and SPO1
Florentino Manalo (SPO1 Manalo), it appears that at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning of February 1,
2002, Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare unregistered parcel of land located in Candelaria, Quezon,
and co-owned by Menandro, saw the four accused, along with seven others, cutting down the coconut
trees on the said property. Later, the men turned the felled trees into coco lumber. Caringal did not
attempt to stop the men from cutting down the coconut trees because he was outnumbered. Instead,
Caringal left the site and proceeded toSan Pablo City to inform Menandro about the incident. Atanacio
Avanzado testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and Magsumbol, to cut down the
coconut trees within the boundary of his property, which was adjacent to the land co-owned by
Menandro. Atanacio admitted that he had never set foot on his property for about 20 years already and
that he was not present when the cutting incident happened. All the accused vehemently denied the
charges against them. Ramirez and Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within
the land owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, were cut down on that morning of
February 1, 2002. Ramirez and Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within the
land owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, were cut down on that morning of
February 1, 2002.

Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in the felling of the coconut trees but merely supervised the
same, and claimed that he did not receive any remuneration for the service he rendered or a share from
the proceeds of the coco lumbers sale. Ramirez added that he was a coco lumber trader and that
Atanacio offered to sell the coconut trees planted on his lot.

Issue:
 - Whether or not CA committed serious errors in finding the accused GUILTY of the crime of
Theft: Yes
- Whether or not there is enough evidence that the trees that were cut down belong to the
property owned by Anatacio: Cannot be determined
- Whether or not malice and intent to gain is present in the act on the case at hand: NO

Ruling:

RTC:

On March 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its decision stating that the prosecution was able to establish with
certitude the guilt of all the accused for the crime of simple theft. The RTC rejected the defense of denial
invoked by the accused in the face of positive identification by Caringal pointing to them as the
perpetrators of the crime. It did not believe the testimony of Atanacio and even branded him as biased
witness on account of his relationship with accused Magsino and Magsumbol.

hereby sentences them to suffer an imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day of Prision
Correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

The accused are likewise directed to pay jointly and severally Engr. Menandro Avanzado and the other
heirs of Norberto Avanzado the sum of ₱13,200.00 representing the value of the 33 coconut trees they
have cut and sold to accused Ramirez.

CA:

The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of Caringal who
was not shown to have been motivated by any ill will to testify falsely against the accused. It agreed with
the RTC that Atanacio’s testimony should not be given any evidentiary weight in view of his relationship
with Magsino and Magsumbol, which provided sufficient reason for him to suppress or pervert the
truth. Anent the element of intent to gain, the CA stated that the mere fact that the accused cut the
coconut trees on Menandro’s land and made them into coco lumber, gave rise to the presumption that
it was done with intent to gain.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 15, 2011, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-
appellants Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez are
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum, to
seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as maximum; and to pay jointly and severally private
complainant Menandro Avanzado the amount of Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (₱13,200.00).

SC:

In view of such conflicting claims and considering the meager evidence on hand, the Court cannot
determine with certainty the owner of the 33 felled coconut trees. The uncertainty of the exact location
of the coconut trees negates the presence of the criminal intent to gain.

Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing unrebutted testimony of Atanacio for being
unreliable and considered him a biased witness simply because he is related by affinity to Magsumbol
and Magsino. Family relationship, however, does not by itself render a witness’ testimony inadmissible
or devoid of evidentiary weight. To warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be
clearly shown that, independently of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or
defective, or that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.

Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or
mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The
exception of course is neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences, which is
equivalent to criminal intent, for, in this instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the
element of negligence and imprudence.

The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and his co-accused even sought
prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut down the coconut trees which was done openly
and during broad daylight effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies the
reason that the accused would still approach the barangay captain if their real intention was to steal the
coconut trees of Menandro. Besides, criminals would usually execute their criminal activities
clandestinely or through stealth or strategy to avoid detection of the commission of a crime or
wrongdoing.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 14, 2012 Decision and the May 6, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Eduardo Magsumbol is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
 Navales vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 162318-162341, October 25, 2004 (Jurisdiction of
Military Court)
Doctrine: As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has
jurisdiction to do so.

Facts:

Before the Court are two petitions essentially assailing the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial to
conduct the court-martial proceedings involving several junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) charged with violations of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No.
408, as amended) in connection with their participation in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003.

At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted men, mostly
from the elite units of the AFP – the Philippine Army’s Scout Rangers and the Philippine Navy’s Special
Warfare Group (SWAG) – quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed
the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They planted
explosives around the building and in its vicinity. Snipers were posted at the Oakwood roof deck.

The soldiers, mostly in full battle gear and wearing red arm bands, were led by a small number of junior
officers, widely known as the Magdalo Group. The leaders were later identified as including Navy LtSG.
Antonio Trillanes IV, Army Capt. Gerardo Gambala, Army Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, Navy LtSG. James
Layug, and Marine Capt. Gary Alejano.

Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers were able to issue a public statement through the ABS-CBN
News (ANC) network. They claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Among those grievances were: the graft and
corruption in the military, the sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, the bombings
in Davao City which were allegedly ordered by Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus, Chief of the ISAFP, in order to
obtain more military assistance from the United States government, and the "micro-management" in
the AFP by then Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary Angelo Reyes. They declared their
withdrawal of support from the chain of command and demanded the resignation of key civilian and
military leaders of the Arroyo administration.

Around 9:00 a.m., Pres. Arroyo gave the soldiers until 5:00 p.m. to give up their positions peacefully and
return to barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the existence of a "state of rebellion" and issued an
order to use reasonable force in putting down the rebellion. A few hours later, the soldiers again went
on television reiterating their grievances. The deadline was extended twice, initially to 7:00 p.m., and
later, indefinitely.

In the meantime, a series of negotiations ensued between the soldiers and the Government team led by
Ambassador Roy Cimatu. An agreement was forged between the two groups at 9:30 p.m. Shortly
thereafter, Pres. Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood was over. The soldiers agreed to
return to the barracks and were out of the Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m.
Issue:

- Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.

Ruling:

No. The writs of prohibition (G.R. No. 162318) and habeas corpus (G.R. No. 162341) prayed for by the
petitioners must perforce fail. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the
court which has jurisdiction to do so. Further, the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the
party sought to be released had been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body. The term "court"
necessarily includes the General Court-Martial. These rules apply to Capt. Reaso, et al., as they are under
detention pursuant to the Commitment Order dated August 2, 2003, issued by the respondent Chief of
Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War.

On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards
or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by
law. As earlier discussed, the General Court-Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed against
petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. under Rep. Act No. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent
it from exercising its jurisdiction.

Wherefore, the Petition is DISMISSED

 PDEA vs. Brodett, G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011 (Forfeiture and
Confiscation)
Facts:

PDEA filed a petition for review against the Decision of CA affirming RTC Decision of acquittal of the
accused Brodett et, al., who were charged with violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act RA
9165.

On April 13, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, charged Richard Brodett
(Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic
Act No. 9165 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City. On the 19th day of September 2008, in
the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding each other, they
not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver
and give away to another, sixty(60) pieces of blue-colored tablets with Motorola (M) logos, contained in
six (6) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets with a recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for the presence of
METHAMPHETAMINE, dangerous drug.

Issues:

WON the CA erred in affirming the order for the release of the car to Ms. Brodett.

Ruling:

In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and
shall pass to the Government. But it is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the
court in such a manner that it can be said to be within its jurisdiction. We rule that henceforth the
Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and should
not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of
the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.

People vs. Abina, G.R. No. 129891, October 27, 1998 (Principal by Direct Cooperation)

Doctrine:

To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a

conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing
another act without which it would not have been accomplished. In order that a person may be
considered an accomplice, the following requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing
that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b)
he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and (c) there must be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as an
accomplice.
Facts:

Albina et, al filed a petition for review against the Decision of CA affirming RTC ruling of conviction of the
crime of murder, whereas the victim Eulalio Peleo was stabbed by the accused allegedly acting in
unison. The two accused held the victim, but was astonished when Caroso, one of the accused started
stabbing the victim. This resulted to the two accused, desisting and letting go of the victim while Caroso
chased after the victim.

Issue:

- Whether or not the accused Albina is a co-principal of the crime

Ruling:

Considering the absence of unity of purpose between the appellants, on the one hand, and Rodrigo
Caroso, on the other, as well as the utter lack of proof that the appellants have been aware of any
intention on the part of Caroso to kill Eulalio, neither may appellants be considered principals by
indispensable cooperation or accomplices in the commission of the crime.

At all events, where the fate of a person rests solely upon circumstances capable of two or more
inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible
with guilt, courts will not hesitate to tip the scales of justice in favor of the accused. The presumption of
innocence must prevail and the court must acquit.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and appellants Alejandro Abina and Romeo Abina ACQUITTED of the crime of murder for lack
of proof beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired with Rodrigo Caroso in its commission.
Accordingly, their immediate release from custody is ordered unless they are held for another cause.

People vs. Agudez, G.R. No. 138386-87, May 20, 2004 (Conspiracy)

Doctrine:

Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. However, direct proof is not required as conspiracy may be proved by
circumstantial evidence.

Facts:

This case is a judicial automatic review of the Ruling of RTC convicting Aguadez et, al with the crime of
murder conspiring with his co-accused in shooting their victim Dominador Castro with a shotgun.
Adoracion further testified that the five accused shot at her husband and nephew because they were in
the belief that it was her son who had earlier killed a son of appellant Eufrocino.

Issue:

- Whether or not there is a conspiracy between the accused when the crime was committed

Ruling:
We agree with the trial court’s finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. However, direct proof is not required as conspiracy may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be proved through the collective acts of the accused, before,
during and after the commission of a felony, all the accused aiming at the same object, one performing
one part and another performing another for the attainment of the same objective, their acts though
apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The overt act or acts of the accused may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. Direct
proof of a person in agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the time of the
commission of a crime, all the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in their execution. 

SC Affirms the Decision of RTC convicting all accused on the grounds of conspiracy.

People vs. Agustin, G.R. No. L-18368, March 31, 1966 (Education)

Doctrine: The condition of lack of instruction cannot be taken as a mitigating circumstance because it
has not been established that illiteracy was coupled with such a low degree of intelligence that the
malefactors did not fully realize the consequences of their criminal act. Neither may poverty and
voluntary surrender be appreciated in their favor. Extreme poverty may mitigate a crime against
property, such as theft, (People vs. Macbul, 74 Phil. 436) but not a crime of violence, such as murder. 

Facts:

Agustin et, al. filed a petition against the ruling of the lower court convicting them of the crime of
murder against Benito Labauan, and frustrated murder of the latter’s wife Emilia Labauan, which
stemmed from a land dispute, wherein the accused hacked the victims with a bolo.

Issue:

- Whether or not illiteracy can be used as a mitigating circumstance by the accused

Ruling:

We come now to the circumstances that attended the commission that attended the commission of the
offense. The condition of lack of instruction cannot be taken as a mitigating circumstance, because it has
not been established that illiteracy was coupled with such a low degree of intelligence that the
malefactors did not fully realize the consequences of their criminal act. (People vs. Ripas, 95 Phil. 63;
People vs. Gorospe, L-10644, Feb. 19, 1959; People vs. Magpantay, L-19133, Nov. 27, 1964). Neither
may poverty and voluntary surrender be appreciated in their favor. Extreme poverty may mitigate a
crime against property, such as theft, (People vs. Macbul, 74 Phil. 436) but not a crime of violence, such
as murder. The four aforementioned appellants did not surrender. Silverio Apolinario testified that he
was arrested in the market, while the three others stated that they went to see the chief of police, not
for the purpose of surrendering but because the latter had called for them for reasons they did not
know.

On the other hand, the circumstance of treachery — which qualifies the killing to murder — must be
taken against appellants, considering the suddenness of the attack, launched by them from a hidden
position. This circumstance absorbs that of abuse of superior strength (People vs. Tiongson, L-9866-67,
Nov. 28, 1964); while the elements to constitute the circumstance of evident premeditation have not
been clearly established. The crime was, however, committed by a band of armed men - at the very least
six, namely, the four appellants and the two who had owned the crime, each of whom carried a bolo;
and in an uninhabited place, which was purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime.

The law prescribes the capital penalty for the offense but for lack of sufficient votes to impose it the
Court simply affirms the judgment appealed from with respect to appellants Julito Rizardo, Silverio
Apolinario, Adriano Apolinario and Diosdado Apolinario with costs. Appellant Conrado Apolinario is
acquitted, with the corresponding costs de oficio.
 People vs. Barroga, G.R. No. 31563, January 16, 1930 (Obedience to Lawful
Order)
Doctrine: In order to exempt from guilt, obedience must be due, or as Viada lucidly states, it must be a
compliance with "a lawful order not opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern, and that the
person commanding, act within the scope of his authority.

Facts:

Barroga filed a petition alleging that the lower court erred in its Decision, not recognizing the element of
Justifying the Circumstance of his obedience to his superior, and was convicted of a crime of falsification
of documents

Issue:

- Whether or not Justifying Circumstances invoked by the petitioner can be invoked

Ruling:

With respect to the alleged instructions give by said Baldomero Fernandez, even supposing that he did
in fact give them, and that the defendant committed the crime charged by virtue thereof, inasmuch as
such instructions were not lawful, they do not legally shield the appellant, nor relieve him from criminal
liability. In order to exempt from guilt, obedience must be due, or as Viada lucidly states, it must be a
compliance with "a lawful order not opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern, and that the
person commanding, act within the scope of his authority. As a general rule, an inferior should obey his
superior but, as an illustrious commentator has said, "between a general law which enjoins obedience to
a superior giving just orders, etc., and a prohibitive law which plaintiff forbids what that superior
commands, the choice is not doubtful." (1 Penal Code, Viada, 5th edition, p. 528.)

We reiterate the statement that it has not been proved that the defendant committed the acts charged
in the information in obedience to the instructions of a third party. But even granting, for the sake of
argument, that such was the case, we repeat that such obedience was not legally due, and therefore
does not exempt from criminal liability. (U. S. vs Cuison, 20 Phil., 433.)
 People vs. Bartolome, G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013 (Entrapment)
Doctrine:

Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention to commit, in
order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of ways and means to trap
or capture a lawbreaker.

Facts:

Bartolome filed a petition for review against the Decision delivered by the lower court convicting him of
a crime of violating RA 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, wherein the accused was caught
selling shabu through an entrapment operation by the police officers. According to the accused, the
operation was just a frame-up as he denies selling illegal drugs.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused’s claim of the alternating circumstances of entrapment/instigation has
merit

Ruling:

To establish the crime of illegal sale of shabu, the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt (a)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of the sale; and
(b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the thing. The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, requires simply the consummation of the selling transaction,
which happens at the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In short, what is material is
the proof showing that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the thing sold as evidence of the corpus delicti.

Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in
order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for
the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents
incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise
not commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to
commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely
facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot
justify his or her conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have
to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been said, instigation is a
"trap for the unwary innocent," while entrapment is a "trap for the unwary criminal."

As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as a form of entrapment, is a valid means of

arresting violators of Republic Act No. 9165. It is an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the
act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the
offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.
Petition is DENIED. SC Affirms the lower court Decision of conviction against the accused

G.R. No. L-4445 February 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO, and JACINTO
ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants.
Digest

(No felony if no intent)

An appeal was filed by the accused Beronilla, Velasco, Paculdo, Adriatico from the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder for the execution of Arsenio
Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the town of La Paz, Province of Abra. Arsenio Borjal was the
elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the
Japanese occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon his
life by unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military
Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army,
operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his appointment as Military
Mayor, Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in
Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason,
espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the enemy" . Beronilla placed Borjal to custody when the
latter returned from Bangued to La Paz as per his instructions from Lt. Col Arnold. A 12-man jury was
appointed by Beronilla. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all
accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records
of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review, and on the night of the same day, April
18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio
Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was asked to administer the last
confession to the prisoner, while Father Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church performed the last rites
over Borjal's remains. The state, however, predicates its case principally on the existence of the
radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling
attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution claims was
known to the accused Beronilla.

Issue:

- Whether or not Beronilla is guilty of murder in connection with the execution of Borjal
- Whether or not Beronilla received the message from Col. Volckmann

Ruling:
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no satisfactory proof that
Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied
it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what papers were enclosed in the package
he delivered to Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who
claimed to have been present at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof.

Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to
transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do
away with Borjal must be rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who
was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.

Actually, the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice
(dolo). The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher command; the
appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel, one of them (attorney Jovito Barreras) chosen by
Borjal's sister; the trial lasted nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose about its legality,
and it was not resumed until headquarters (then in Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and
sent an observer (Esteban Cabanos, of the S-5) to the proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure
were followed; and when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence imposed, the records
were sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and Borjal was not punished until the records were
returned eight days later with the statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the case
is hereby approved" (Exhibit 8), which on its face was an assent to the verdict and the sentence. The
lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing
soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese)
expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was not for political or personal reason that the
accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).

Actus non facit reum nisi mens si rea. - “an act does not render a man guilty of a crime unless his mind
is equally guilty,”

given the benefit of the Presidential directive to the Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No. 11, of
October 2, 1946) that "any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty)
proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused" (42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as was done in People vs.
Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.

For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with
costs de oficio.
 People vs. Bulagao, G.R. No. 184757, October 5, 2011 (Insanity)

Doctrine:  Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it
with clear and convincing evidence. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the
time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.

Facts:

Bulagao filed an appeal against the Decision of CA convicting him of 2 counts of rape against a 14-year
old minor. Later on, AAA, the minor recanted her statement, alleging that she was forced to the sexual
intercourse when she was threatened by Bulagao with a knife. She is now stating that she consented to
the said act and that she was not threatened by Bulagao with a knife. Bulagao’s party is also claiming
that he is suffering from mental retardation, which was not proven in court.

Issue:

- Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime charged against him. YES
- Whether or not the recantation will reverse the judgment against the accused. NO

Ruling:

"[c]ourts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained from witnesses
through intimidation or for monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction does not necessarily negate an
earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor by the
courts. Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice,
simply because the witness who has given it later on changes his mind for one reason or another."

Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial court that he was suffering
from mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree with the finding of the trial court that there was no
proof that the mental condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by
Yolanda Palma was already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Only when
there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the
exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.

SC DENIED the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of CA with the ff modifications:

1) Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao is hereby ordered to pay AAA the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of rape, in addition to the amounts awarded by the Court of Appeals,
namely: civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00,
both for each count of rape; and

2) All damages awarded in this case should be imposed with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
 People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011 (Imbecility/Mental Age)
Doctrine: The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only
when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental
deficiency impairing her reason or free will.

Facts:

Butiong filed a petition from the Decision rendered to him by CA convicting him of the crime of rape
against the 29-year-old mentally retarded woman. AAA, then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was
invited by Butiong, her long-time neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her
something. AAA obliged. He locked the door as soon as she had stepped inside his house, and then took
off his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led her to the sofa, where he had carnal knowledge of her. AAA
remembered that she then felt pain in her abdomen and became angry at him for what he had done.
Later on, AAA reported the incident to her sister, which latter reported to the police station.

Issue:

- Whether or not the exact date of the incident is a material fact in proving the crime. NO
- Lower Court erred that Mental Retardee is in the same class of a normal woman. NO

Ruling:

1. We need to emphasize, however, that the date of the rape need not be precisely proved
considering that date is not an element of rape.
2. The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only
when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering
some mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that
she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal
knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes rape.
Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot, sexual intercourse
with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was
incapable of giving any rational consent.

The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough.
Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual intercourse with an insane
woman was considered rape. But a deafmute is not necessarily deprived of These circumstances
must be proven. Intercourse with a deafmute is not rape of a woman deprived of reason, in the
absence of proof that she is an imbecile.

SC Affirmed CA Decision of conviction

People vs. Comillo, G.R. No. 186538, November 25, 2009 (Passion)
Facts:

This is a case of review regarding the ruling of lower court finding accused-appellants Ausencio Comillo
Jr., Lutgardo Comillo and Romulo Altar guilty of the crime of murder.

That on December 18, 1999, at about 8:30 o’clock in the evening at Escalo Street, Barangay 11, Llorente,
Eastern Samar, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused armed with bladed weapons conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another and
taking advantage of superior strength with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound PEDRO BARBO,
which caused the direct death of said PEDRO BARBO, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
victim.

Joselito Bojocan (Joselito) and Marcos Borac (Marcos) witnessed the stabbing incident. Joselito was
standing near a barbecue stall along Escola Street when he saw the gruesome act. He was six meters
away from Pedro and appellants when the incident occurred. He was one of those who rushed Pedro to
the hospital after the incident. On the other hand, Marcos was walking along Escalo Street when he
witnessed the felony. He was ten meters away from Pedro and appellants when the crime transpired.
Joselito and Marcos recognized Pedro and appellants on that tragic night, as the scene was well-lighted.

Issue:

- Whether or not the accused are guilty of murder

Ruling:

Yes. Self-defense is a weak defense because, as experience has demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to prove. Thus, for this defense to prosper, the accused must proved with clear and convincing
evidence the elements of self-defense. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution. Even if the evidence of the prosecution is weak, it cannot be
disbelieved if the accused admitted responsibility for the crime charged. 41 In the case before us,
appellant Lutgardo failed to prove with plausible evidence all the elements of self-defense. Hence, his
plea of self-defense must fail.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make. 49 The
essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that renders the victim unable and unprepared to
defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. Two essential elements are
required in order that treachery can be appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner
of execution that would ensure the offender’s safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended
party who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious
choice of means, methods or manner of execution. Pedro’s shoulders were restrained by appellant
Ausencio. Then, he was hit by appellant Romulo with a ukulele. These acts facilitated the stabbing of
Pedro by appellant Lutgardo. Verily, the manner in which Pedro was restrained and assaulted was
deliberately and consciously adopted by appellants to prevent him from retaliating or escaping and,
ultimately, to ensure his death.
 People vs. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. L-45127, May 5, 1989 (Subsidiary Imprisonment)
Doctrine:

That subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty, there can be no doubt, for, according to article 39 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is imposed upon the accused and served by him in lieu of the fine that he fails
to pay on account of insolvency.

Facts:

On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria,
public school officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for
violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded not
guilty and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with preliminary injuction before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due  to the correctional nature of the
penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed for the offense
b.  Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed and
may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter
were the legislative department of the Government.

On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent Judge, Judge
Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.

Issue:

- Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.

- Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

 Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.

Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power by
vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of imprisonment, as if
the courts were the legislative department of the government.

Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case. 
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes punishable by fine of not
more than Php 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal courts.

The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the
Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
 People vs. Deopante, G.R. No. 102772, October 30, 1996 (Physical Defect)
Doctrine:

Voluntary Surrender: In order to appreciate voluntary surrender by an accused, the same must
be shown to have been "spontaneous and made in such a manner that it shows the intent of the
accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his
guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and
capture.

Physical Defect:

In order for this condition to be appreciated, it must be shown that such physical defect limited
his means to act, defend himself or communicate with his fellow beings to such an extent that
he did not have complete freedom of action, consequently resulting in diminution of the
element of voluntariness.

Facts:

Deopante filed a petition against the Decision of CA convicting him of the crime of murder against Dante
Deopante with a fan-knife. Around nine o-clock in the evening while Dante was having a conversation
with his friend Molina, suddenly saw accused Deopante approaching them with a fan-knife in his hand.
Dante ran away but was chased by the accused, and eventually, the former was mortally stabbed in the
basketball court. According to the accused, the acts he did was due to self-defense. According to him, he
was the one running away from Dante, who was drunk at that time. The accused claimed that Dante was
holding a grudge against him due to arresting Dante for crimes involving drugs when he was a
policeman.

Issue:

- Whether or not the accused claim of Physical Defect and Voluntary Surrender as his defense, be
sustainable

Ruling:

"Neither can we accept accused-appellant’s plea of voluntary surrender. He did not surrender to the
police. In fact, the evidence adduced shows that it was the police authorities who came to the factory
looking for him. It was there that the accused-appellant was pointed to them. With the police closing
in, Accused-appellant actually had no choice but to go with them. Seeing that the police were already
approaching him, Accused-appellant did not offer any resistance and peacefully went with them. To be
sure, no surrender was made by Accused-Appellant."

Such cannot be appreciated in the case at bar where the appellant’s physical condition clearly did not
limit his means of action, defense or communication, nor affect his free will. In fact, despite his
handicap, appellant nevertheless managed to attack, overcome and fatally stab his victim.

Accused is found guilty of murder and convicted of his crime with penalty of reclusion perpetua a fine of
50, 000
 People vs. Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011 (Irresistible
Force/Uncontrollable Fear)
Doctrine: A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he
does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my
will is not my act.

Facts:

Dequina et, al. filed a petition against the CA Decision convicting them of the crime of violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, when they conspired in selling, and deliver prohibited drugs and marijuana. The
accused was caught by police officers in flagrante delicto while they are trying to deliver the said
contraband. Dequina contends that she transported the marijuana under the compulsion of an
irresistible fear. Jundoc and Jingabo, on the other hand, claim that they went along to accommodate
Dequina, a trusted childhood friend.

Issue:

- Whether or not the petitioner’s claim of exempting circumstance of Uncontrollable Fear can be
sustained. NO

Ruling:

The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts
not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be
of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal
combat. Here, Dequina’s version of events that culminated with her and Jundoc and Jingabo’s arrests on
September 29, 1999 is implausible. Equally far-fetched is Jundoc and Jingabo’s assertion of blind trust in
Dequina and total ignorance of the transportation of marijuana.

While [Dequina] wants us to believe that she acted under compulsion and that a certain Sally called all
the shots, she nevertheless admitted that their accommodations when they reached Manila was with
her aunt in Guadalupe. On cross examination, she said that it was she who told Sally that they were
going to stay with her aunt. More importantly, the alleged threat on her daughter was unclear. At one
point in her testimony, she claimed that her daughter was to be under the custody of Sally while she
was away. However, during the trial her lawyer manifested that her daughter was in fact in Manila and
in the courtroom attending the hearing.

Wherefore, SC DENIED the petition and Affirms CA Ruling

 People vs. Escares, G.R. No. L-11128-33, December 23, 1957 (Three-fold Rule)
Doctrine: The three-fold provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, can only be
considered, not in the imposition of the penalty, but in connection with the service of the sentence
imposed.

Facts:

On April 21, 1954, Rene Escares was arraigned and pleaded not guilty in each of the six above-
mentioned cases but later he asked permission to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and substitute
it for a plea of guilty on 6 informations of robbery.

Issue:

- Whether or not the 3-fold rule applies to the accused.

Ruling:

It should be noted that the imposable penalty in each of the six cases where appellant pleaded guilty in
accordance with paragraph 5, Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code, is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, which should be applied in its minimum period
in view of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, not offset by any aggravating circumstance, or
from 4 years 2 months and 1 day to 6 years one month and 10 days. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the appellant should be sentenced for each crime to an indeterminate penalty the
minimum of which shall not be less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional, and the maximum shall not be less than 4 years 2 months and 1
day of prision correccional nor more than 6 years 1 month and 10 days of prision mayor. But in applying
the proper penalty, the trial court imposed upon appellant the three-fold rule provided for in paragraph
4 of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This is an error for said article can only be taken into account,
not in the imposition of the penalty, but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed.
 People vs. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012 (Self-defense)
Facts:

Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso
Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to
the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from
hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted
at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic,
where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.

At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been
standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had
boxed him in the stomach. Although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting
him with his fists, striking him with straight blows. Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both
his legs. He had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right
side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face down to the ground. He had then left the scene
for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving. The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-
defense. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue:

- Whether or not Olais claim of self-defense is tenable

Ruling:

No. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful
aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.

By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death
of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction
of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus
admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he
established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by relying
on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be
disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.
 People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004 (Battered Woman
Syndrome as a Defense)
Facts:

This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During
their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and
the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that
every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever
beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the
killing, appellant and the victim quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was
able to run to another room. The Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against the appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim
was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn
child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying
that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause
of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said
experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a
partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The
Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to
the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman
syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan
and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the
Supreme Court as part of the records.

Issue:

1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as
constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling:

1. No. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the
“battered woman syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her
to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of
intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of
violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering
incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer
and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of
the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual --
grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against
the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense.
Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she
had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to
the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context
of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense
must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and
actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following
requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden
and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In
the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient
time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had
already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s
bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even
the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position
that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however,
taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological
 paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by
the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the
exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have

naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present
when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior
unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as
the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an
argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because
the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the
assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party
attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-
spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child,
overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her
reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the
presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the
penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained
for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is
eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
 People vs. Hernandez, 54 Phil 240 (Arson/Consummated)
Facts:

The appellant knew that Miguel Dayrit and his children lived and were in the house that night.

The testimony of the offended party, corroborated by that of Artemio Tanglao and Daniel Mallari,
establishes beyond all doubt the fact that it was the appellant who set fire to the house. The stick which
Miguel Dayrit saw in the appellant's possession on that night was found leaning against the house with
the end burnt and a rag soaked with petroleum dangling from it. Daniel Mallari recognized it as the stick
which the appellant used in getting guava fruits.

It should be noted, moreover, that prior to the crime, the appellant and the offended party, Miguel
Dayrit, had some disagreements because the offended party suspected that the appellant was stealing
his paddy piled up behind his house. The offended party communicated his suspicions to the barrio
lieutenant, who, together with the complainant, went to the appellant's house, but the latter armed
with a bolo, barred their way, saying that he would cut them to pieces, and that he recognized no
authority. This characteristic violence on the part of the appellant was also shown when, in pursuance of
this information, he was arrested; for he refused to give himself up.

Issue:

- Whether or not the accused is guilty of Arson

Ruling:

The crime of arson having been consummated, as it appears from the facts thoroughly proved, article
549 of the Penal Code is applicable herein, with the corresponding penalty of cadena temporal  to life
imprisonment. And as the aggravating circumstance of nighttime must be taken into consideration, as
having been doubtless sought by the appellant in order to insure the commission of the crime, the
penalty must be imposed in its maximum degree.

In view of these considerations, the judgment appealed from is modified, and in accordance with article
549 of the Penal Code the appellant is found guilty of the crime of arson, committed in a dwelling,
knowing that within it were the offended party and his children; and, considering one aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime, the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment, with the
accessories, and the costs.

The appellant is an old man, about 85 years of age, and in view of this, and of the fact that the damage
caused was very slight, the Attorney-General recommends that, in pursuance of the second paragraph
of article 2 of the Penal Code, these facts be explained to the Executive, for the exercise of his clemency
to such an extent as he may deem proper. The suggestion is accepted, and it is hereby ordered that the
clerk forward a copy of this decision, once it becomes final, to the Governor-General for consideration.
 People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil 707 (Attempted felony)
Facts:

The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, finding him guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer two years and
four months of prision correccional  and to an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision
mayor  for being a habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs of
the proceeding.

At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado
and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an
iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last-named street. At that time the owner
of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in
breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who
instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.

The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the trial
judge, and the Solicitor-General, as constituting attempted robbery, which we think is erroneous.

Issue:

- Whether or not Lamahang is guilty of Theft

Ruling:

It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is
wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must
be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be
such that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the
persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show without any
doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation,
that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act,
must not and can not furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes. 

The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the consummated offense of trespass to dwelling, if
committed with force, is  prision correccional  in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding P1,000 (art. 280, par. 2); therefore the penalty corresponding to attempted trespass to
dwelling is to degrees lower (art. 51), or, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Because of
the presence of two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance the penalty must be
imposed in its maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the same Code, the accused is not entitled to
credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment.

Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and the accused is hereby held guilty of attempted
trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory
penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
 People vs. Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003 (Attempted felony)
Facts:

Ricardo Orillosa and his wife, Rose Orillosa, natives of San Isidro, Bohol, had three (3) children, namely:
Analia, who was born on December 18, 1985; Jepsy, who was 11 years old, and Rossel, who was nine
years old. However, the couple decided to part ways and live separately. Rose left Bohol and settled in
Manila with her young children. She worked as a waitress to make both ends meet.

In 1994, Rose met the accused-appellant. They decided to live together as husband and wife at No. 1252
Jose Abad Santos Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila. In 1996, Rose resigned from her job as a waitress.
She secured a loan, bought a truck, and used it for her business.

In the meantime, Rose secured a loan anew and used the proceeds thereof to put up a video shop in her
house. She sold Avon products from house to house to augment her income. Whenever she was out of
their house, Rossel and Analia took turns in tending to the video shop and attending to customers.

Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when the accused-appellant entered. He laid on top of her,
and removed her T-shirt and underwear. He then inserted his finger in her vagina. He removed his finger
and inserted his penis in her vagina. Momentarily, she felt a sticky substance coming out from his penis.
She also felt pain in her sex organ. Satiated, the accused-appellant dismounted but threatened to kill her
if she divulged to anyone what he did to her. The accused-appellant then returned to his room. The
incident lasted less than one hour. Petrified by the threats on her life, Analia kept to herself what
happened to her.

On November 9, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Rose left the house. Accused-appellant was in the sala of the
house watching television. Analia tended the video shop. However, accused-appellant told Analia to go
to the sala. She refused, as nobody would tend the video shop. This infuriated accused-appellant who
threatened to slap and kick her.

Analia ignored the invectives and threats of the accused-appellant and stayed in the video shop. When
Rose returned, a heated argument ensued between accused-appellant and Analia. Rose sided with her
paramour and hit Analia. This prompted Analia to shout. "Ayoko na, ayoko na." Shortly thereafter, Rose
and Analia left the house on board the motorcycle driven by her mother in going to Don Bosco Street,
Moriones, Tondo, Manila, to retrieve some tapes which had not yet been returned. When Rose inquired
from her daughter what she meant by her statement, "ayoko na, ayoko na," she told her mother that
accused-appellant had been touching the sensitive parts of her body and that he had been on top of her.
Rose was shocked and incensed. The two proceeded to Kagawad Danilo Santos to have accused-
appellant placed under arrest. On November 10, 1998, the two proceeded to the Western Police District
where Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint to PO1 Carmelita Nocum in the presence of SPO2 Fe H.
Avindante. She related to the police investigator that accused-appellant had touched her breasts and
arms in August, 1998, September 15, 1998, October 22, 1998 and on November 5, 1998, at 3:00 p.m.
Analia then submitted herself to genitalia examination by Dr. Armie Umil, a medico-legal officer of the
NBI. The medico-legal officer interviewed Analia, told him that she was raped in May, 1997 at 3:00 p.m.
and November 5, 1998 at 3:00 p.m
Issue:

- Whether or Not Lizada is guilty of Consummated Rape

Ruling:

The barefaced fact that the private complainant remained a virgin up to 1998 does not preclude her
having been repeatedly sexually abused by the accused-appellant. The private complainant being of
tender age, it is possible that the penetration of the male organ went only as deep as her labia. Whether
or not the hymen of private complainant was still intact has no substantial bearing on accused-
appellants commission of the crime. Even, the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or
the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that there
be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum.
 People vs. Oasnis, G.R. No. 47722, July 27, 1943 (Performance of Duty)
Facts:

Captain Godofredo Monsod (Provincial Inspector of Cabanatuan) was instructed to arrest Balagtas, a
notorious criminal, and, if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. The same instruction was given to the
Chief of Police Oanis who knew the whereabouts of Irene, the paramour of Balagtas. Upon arriving at
Irene’s house, Oanis approached Mallare and asked her where Irene’s room was. Mallare indicated the
place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour.

Defendants Oanis and Galanta (Corporal of the Philippine Constabulary) then went to the room of Irene,
and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw
her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants
still firing at him. It turned out later that the person shot and killed was not Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Tecson, Irene’s paramour.

Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with the crime of murder.

The trial court found the appellants guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. Hence, the present
appeal. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance
of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong.

Issue:

Whether or not appellants are criminally liable for the death of Tecson.

Ruling:

Yes. The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional
and not accidental.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to
secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in
treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be
affected. And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force
or violence in making an arrest. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and
vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life.
 Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000 (Exception: Treaty
stipulations)
Doctrine: This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.

Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government
and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership
of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments
in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessels and aircraft, and importation and exportation
of equipment, materials, and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.” 

Issue:

- Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement is Unconstitutional

Ruling:

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence
handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution
. . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the
United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be
sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has
stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For
as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the
mandate of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 181052 November 14, 2012

RODOLFO BELBIS, JR. y COMPETENTE and ALBERTO BRUCALES, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Digest
(Direct, natural consequence)
Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales filed a petition for Review on Certioari to seek reversal and
setting aside of the Decision of CA which affirms the modification of the Decision by RTC of finding them
guilty of Homicide. Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga,
Tiwi, Albay. Around 9:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house and proceeded to the area
assigned to him. Later on, around 10:00 p.m., Veronica Dacir (Veronica), Jose's live-in partner, heard
Jose shouting and calling her name and went to where Jose was and saw blood at his back and shorts. It
was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy (petitioner Alberto Brucales), while Paul
(petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was taken to St. Claire Medical Clinic at Tiwi, Albay,
about four kilometers from Barangay Naga where he was initially attended by Dr. Bernardo Corral (Dr.
Corral). Jose was later referred to Ziga Memorial District Hospital at Tabaco, Albay and, thereafter, was
referred to Albay Provincial Hospital on December 10, 1997 at 2:00 a.m. He was confined therein for six
(6) days. Dr. Sancho Reduta (Dr. Reduta), his attending physician, issued a medical certificate, which
stated multiple stab wounds, alcohol intoxication. Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, Medical Officer III of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) of Naga City, Region V, conducted an autopsy on the victim's cadaver on
January 14, 1998 and issued Autopsy Report No. BRO No. 98-02, which indicated multiple organ failure
as the cause of the victim's death.

Issue:

- Whether Belbis and Brucales are guilty of HOMICIDE

- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE
VICTIM TO VERONICA DACIR, ONE MONTH PRIOR TO THE VICTIM'S DEATH. CONSTITUTES A
DYING DECLARATION WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 37, RULE 130 OF THE RULES
OF COURT? NO
 - WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE? YES Not entitled
- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STAB WOUNDS WERE
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE VICTIM'S DEATH? NO
- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IS NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR? NO

Ruling:

RTC:

Petitioners claimed that they are entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Through the
testimonies of petitioners, Dr. Olga Bausa and Dr. Edwin Lino Romano, their version of the incident is as
follows:

Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store in Naga, Tiwi, Albay, engaged
in a conversation with other people when Jose went to them and told them to go home. While on their
way home, they heard Jose's whistle go off as the latter was following them. Petitioner Rodolfo asked
Jose what is the matter and the latter replied, "What about?" Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on
petitioner Rodolfo, but the latter was able to evade it. Afterwards, Jose held the nightstick horizontally
with both hands and tried to hit petitioner Rodolfo's forehead. Petitioner Rodolfo held the nightstick
which was in reality, a bolo sheathed on a scabbard. Jose pulled the bolo inside and the wooden
scabbard was detached from it, thus, the blade thereof injured his left hand. Petitioner Rodolfo kept
holding the wooden scabbard and when Jose thrust the bolo to petitioner Rodolfo, the latter parried it
with the wooden scabbard he was holding. Petitioner Rodolfo managed to take the bolo away from Jose
and, thereafter, the latter embraced petitioner Rodolfo while trying to get the bolo back. Petitioner
Rodolfo held the bolo with his right hand and swung it away from Jose. Thereafter, Jose pushed
petitioner Rodolfo causing the bolo to slip from the latter's hand. Jose tried to pick the bolo up, but
petitioner Rodolfo was able to hold it first, thus, Jose stepped back. During that commotion, petitioner
Alberto was only watching and told Jose and petitioner Rodolfo to stop fighting.

Thereafter, petitioner Alberto accompanied petitioner Rodolfo to the latter's house because he suffered
a hand injury. Petitioner Rodolfo was then brought to Tabaco General Hospital before he was referred to
Albay Provincial Hospital. Dr. Reduta sutured the top layer of his wound and the following day, he went
back to Tabaco General Hospital where he was operated on his left hand injury by Dr. Romano.

Petitioner Rodolfo brought the bolo used in the incident with him in his house and reported the matter
to the police station of Tiwi and surrendered the same bolo to the police authorities.
The RTC convicted the petitioners of the crime charged against them, but appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The dispositive portion of the decision follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the death of Jose Bahillo. Considering the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense in their favor, and applying the Indeterminate

Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of Jose Bahillo the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.

CA:

denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that there was no mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 23 December 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Albay,
Branch 17 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Accused-appellants
Rodolfo C. Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

SC:

A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts which
concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is
impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of
retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a
person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating the facts
concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.

As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration
is made by the deceased under the consciousness of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the
time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of
the declarant’s death; and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s death
is the subject of inquiry

The fact that the victim was stabbed on December 9, 1997 and died only on January 8, 1998 does not
prove that the victim made the statement or declaration under the consciousness of an impending
death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and
imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid
succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that
the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending.11 As such,
the CA incorrectly ruled that there were dying declarations.

The CA should have admitted the statement made by the victim to Veronica Dacir right after he was
stabbed as part of the res gestae and not a dying declaration. Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, reads as follows:

Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

In sum, there are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act,
the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.

Clearly, the statement made by the victim identifying his assailants was made immediately after a
startling occurrence which is his being stabbed, precluding any chance to concoct a lie.

Be that as it may, the CA need have discussed in its decision the presence of a dying declaration or a
statement as part of the res gestae, because petitioner Rodolfo admitted to stabbing the victim but
insists that he had done the deed to defend himself.

From the above testimony, it is apparent that the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased
when petitioner Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Although there was still some
struggle involved between the victim and petitioner Rodolfo, there is no doubt that the latter, who was
in possession of the same weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor. Retaliation is not the same
as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when
the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was
injured by the accused. Such an aggression can also be surmised on the four stab wounds sustained by
the victim on his back. It is hard to believe based on the location of the stab wounds, all at the back
portion of the body (right lumbar area, left lumbar area, left buttock, medial aspect and left buttock,
lateral aspect), that petitioner Rodolfo was defending himself. It would have been different if the
wounds inflicted were located in the front portion of the victim's body.

Anent the contention of petitioners that the CA failed to consider the testimony of the doctor who
performed the autopsy in its entirety, the same is without any merit. What really needs to be proven in
a case when the victim dies is the proximate cause of his death. Proximate cause has been defined as
"that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." The autopsy report
indicated that the cause of the victim's death is multiple organ failure. According to Dr. Wilson Moll Lee,
the doctor who conducted the autopsy, the kidneys suffered the most serious damage. Although he
admitted that autopsy alone cannot show the real culprit, he stated that by having a long standing
infection caused by an open wound, it can be surmised that multiple organ failure was secondary to a
long standing infection secondary to stab wound which the victim allegedly sustained. What is important
is that the other doctors who attended to the wounds sustained by the victim, specially those on the left
and right lumbar area, opined that they affected the kidneys and that the wounds were deep enough to
have caused trauma on both kidneys.

As to the claim of petitioners that they are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, the same does not deserve merit. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following
requisites should be present: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary.29 The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give
himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes
to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and
capture.30 Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the
inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and,
therefore, cannot be characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.31 In
the present case, when the petitioners reported the incident and allegedly surrendered the bladed
weapon used in the stabbing, such cannot be considered as voluntary surrender within the
contemplation of the law. Besides, there was no spontaneity, because they only surrendered after a
warrant of their arrest had already been issued.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, dated February 22, 2008, of Rodolfo
Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales, is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated August 17, 2007, and its Resolution dated January 4, 2008, affirming with modification the
Decision dated December 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Tabaco City, Albay, Branch 17, finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide are hereby AFFIRMED.

When death is presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted.

The death of the victim is presumed to be the natural consequence of the physical injuries inflicted,
when the following facts are established:

1. That the victim at the time the physical injuries were inflicted was in normal health.

2. That death may be expected from the physical injuries inflicted.

3. That death ensued within a reasonable time. (People vs. Datu Baginda, C.A., 44 O.G. 2287)
 [G.R. No. 46539. September 27, 1939.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VALENTIN

DOQUEÑA, Defendant-Appellant.

Primicias, Abad, Mencias & Castillo for Appellant.

Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, jr .,

for Appellee.Digest (Minority)
This is an appeal filed against the ruling of the lower court wherein the accused Doqueña was
prosecuted for Homicide in relation to the stabbing Ragojos in his chest, with allegedly discernment.
Between 1 and 2 o’clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and
one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the intermediate school of the municipality of
Sual, Province of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said yard, intervened and, catching
the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. Ragojos retaliated and chased Doquena
around the yard and slapped his nape, and punched him on the mouth. Doquena looked around the
yard to find a stone, but he found none so he asked his cousin Romualdo Cocal to bring him his knife.
Romualdo refused, afraid that he might use it against Ragojos, but Doquena succeeded in obtaining his
knife. Valentin Doqueña approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him another blow
with his fist, to which the deceased answered that he did not want to do so because he (Juan Ragojos)
was bigger than the accused. Ragojos, continued playing and, while he was thus unprepared and in the
act of stopping the ball with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he
carried."

Issue:

- Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that Doquena acted with discernment in the
commission of the crime

Ruling:

The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that the appeal taken
from said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to determine discernment by the means
resorted to by the attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his brief. He claims that to determine
whether or not a minor acted with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time
the crime was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on
the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear
that the attorney for the defense mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the
Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as a mitigating
circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The
discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded by the records in each
case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial (U. S. v. Maralit, 36
Phil., 155).

Appeal is granted

To be exempt from criminal liability under paragraph 3 of Article 12, two conditions must be present:

a. That the offender is over 9 and under 15 years old; and

b. That he does not act with discernment

Art. 80. Suspension of sentence of minor delinquents. — Whenever a minor of either sex, under sixteen
years of age at the date of the commission of a grave or less grave felony, is accused thereof, the court,
after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction,
shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or
private, benevolent or charitable institution, established under the law of the care, correction or
education of orphaned, homeless, defective, and delinquent children, or to the custody or care of any
other responsible person in any other place subject to visitation and supervision by the Director of
Public Welfare or any of his agents or representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the
superintendent of public schools or his representatives, subject to such conditions as are prescribed
hereinbelow until such minor shall have reached his majority age or for such less period as the court
may deem proper.

G.R. No. 181071               March 15, 2010

LADISLAO ESPINOSA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Digest (Self-Defense)

This is an appeal/petition regarding the Ruling of RTC, (Iba, Zambales) and CA convicting Espinosa for the
Crime of Serious Physical Injuries with a penalty of arresto mayor (6 months), and to pay Php 54, 925.50
for the damages. On 6 August 2000, at about 10 o’clock in the evening, private complainant Andy Merto,
went to the house of Espinosa in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. Merto shouted violent threats
while standing outside the house of Espinosa and challenged him to face him outside. Espinosa went out
of the house to pacify the anger of Merto, but Merto hurled Espinosa with a stone. Espinosa ducked and
instinctively hit the left leg of Merto with a bolo scabbard. Espinosa continued to hit Merto, as the latter
fell to the ground, until Espinosa’s cousin, Rodolfo Muya, restrained him. Merto sustained two (2) bone
fractures, one in his left leg and another in his left wrist. It took about six (6) months for these injuries to
completely heal. Espinosa was originally charged with Frustrated Homicide but was modified and
convicted of an offense of serious physical injuries. The trial court denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that self-defense cannot be appreciated to justify the act of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE premises considered, judgment is rendered finding accused Ladislao Espinosa GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Serious Physical Injuries defined and penalized under Art. 263,
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced [to] suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of Arresto Mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional as maximum. Accused is ordered to pay private complainant Andy Merto the amount of
₱54,925.50 as and by way of actual damages.

Prosecution Failed to prove the element intent to kill

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a
deadly weapon in the assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely
medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is present

Issue:

- Whether or not complete self-defense may be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.

Ruling:

The Court rules in the negative.

Article 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following requisites concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The court affirmed the 1st and 2nd requisites:

1st – Merto’s attempt in throwing a stone

2nd- Merto’s invitation for confrontation and shouting of violent threats against Espinosa

In arguing that the means employed was reasonable to repel the unlawful aggression, the petitioner
invokes the application of the "doctrine of rational equivalence," delineated in People v. Gutual,11 to wit:

x x x It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal factors the emergency, the imminent
danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or
impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests
upon the imminent danger of such injury. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court is not impressed.

The very application of the doctrine of rational equivalence, invoked by the petitioner, militates against
his claim. The doctrine of rational equivalence presupposes the consideration not only of the nature and
quality of the weapons used by the defender and the assailant—but of the totality of circumstances
surrounding the defense vis-à-vis, the unlawful aggression.

Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner merely used a scabbard in fending off the unlawful
aggression—the totality of the circumstances shows that after the aggressor was taken down to the
ground, the petitioner ceased to be motivated by the lawful desire to defend himself. He was, by then,
acting with intent to harm the private complainant whose aggression had already ceased.

The Appeal is DENIED for lack of merit

G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006

ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(Mala in se/Mala Prohibita)

Digest

ARSENIA B. GARCIA filed a petition to review the judgment of CA that convicted him in violation of
Section(b) RA 6646

Sec. 27. Election Offenses. - In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in
Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an
election offense:

b. Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or
decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses,
after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections, an
information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio
R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and GARCIA, with violation of Section
27(b). That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995
elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, GARCIA, together with his co-
conspirators and accomplices, willfully and unlawfully decreased the votes of senatorial candidate
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from (6,998) votes to (1,921) votes with a difference of (5,077) votes

Issue:

- The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se
or mala prohibita? MALA INSE
- Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
- Whether Garcia is Guilty of violating Section(b) RA 6646
Ruling:

RTC:

In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence,
except GARCIA who was convicted

sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however,
accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification
to hold public office and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.

CA:

Denied the motion for reconsideration

SC:

mala in se - felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of
are inherently immoral

- they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law
- criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no
crime is committed.

mala prohibita - the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the
law says they are forbidden.

- the sole issue is whether the law has been violated

- Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.

Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and
miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional
election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by
a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.

Neither can this Court accept the petitioner’s explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea how
the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that the private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of
6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, the petitioner’s concern was to assure
accurate, correct, and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and
fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal
responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law

As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921
votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy
may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as
reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to
remain on record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from
one document to another.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
petitioner’s conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six
months is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-5036 November 17, 1909

THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

LUCIANO MALEZA and GABRIEL ADLAON, Defendants-Appellees.

Digest

(Negligence as a crime)

A complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal charging Luciano Maleza and Gabriel Adlaon with the crime
of falsification of a public document by reason of reckless negligence. On the 31st of May, 1906, Luciano
Maleza, as treasurer of the municipality of Sevilla, Province of Bohol, certified that an account of the
same date, showing payments made to carpenters and day laborers who worked on the construction of
the municipal building during the years of 1903 and 1904, as well as the cost of certain packages of nails
used therein, was a true and exact statement; said account amounted to P249.35, and was approved by
a resolution of the municipal council. He further certified that the services were rendered as stated and
were necessary for the public interest, and that the articles purchased had been recorded in the
municipal register. Maleza, however, failed to tell the truth in the statement of facts contained in the
said document, inasmuch as he stated therein that the money was intended to pay the carpenters,
when as a matter of fact it was drawn and paid to Luciano Maleza himself, he being commissioned by P.
Cayetano Bastes to collect and receive the amount loaned by the said Bastes to the municipal president
and treasurer of Sevilla in the year 1903. Gabriel Adlaon, whose signature appears at the foot of the
document, had received the said amount as the balance due of a former account and also failed to tell
the truth when he said that he had received the money, when in reality neither was the money paid for
the work done by the carpenters nor was it received by him.

Issue:

Whether or not Maleza and Adlaon are guilty with the crime of falsification of public documents on the
grounds of reckless negligence

Ruling:

Between an act performed voluntarily and intentionally, and another committed unconsciously and
quite unintentionally, there exists another, performed without malice, but at the same time punishable,
though in a lesser degree and with an equal material result; an intermediate act which the Penal Code
qualifies as negligence, or reckless negligence.

A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts, it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible
for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except
through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, and those of his fellow-
beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.

Therefore, any act executed without malice or criminal intent, but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or
negligence, and which has harmed society or an individual, deserves the qualification of either reckless
or simple negligence or imprudence.

For the considerations above set forth, and which relate solely to the reasons on which is based the
order appealed from, and considering that the classification of falsification of documents by reason of
reckless negligence is perfectly legal, considering the nature and circumstances surrounding the act
which is the subject of the complaint, it is our opinion that the said order should be reversed. Let the
case be remanded to the court whence it came with a certified copy of this decision, and let the judge
below proceed with the case and enter judgment therein in accordance with the law. So ordered.

Remanded – return to the lower court where the case came from

G.R. No. 207175 November 26, 2014

EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Digest

(Mistake of Fact)

Eduardo Magsumbol filed a petition questioning his conviction for Theft on the Case decided by the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino (Mogsino). Apolonio Inanoria
(Jnanoria), and Bonifacio Ramirez (Ramirez). was charged with the crime of Theft in the Information,
dated August 30, 2002, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55 (RTC) and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2002-1017. That on or about the 1st day of February 2002, at Barangay
Kinatihan I, in the Munipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon, Philippines, Magsumbol, together with
7 John Does willfully and unlawfully and feloniously stole Php 44,400 worth of 33 coconut trees from the
coconut plantation of Menandro Avanzado. Culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Ernesto Caringal (Caringal), private complainant Engr. Menandro Avanzado (Menandro), and SPO1
Florentino Manalo (SPO1 Manalo), it appears that at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning of February 1,
2002, Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare unregistered parcel of land located in Candelaria, Quezon,
and co-owned by Menandro, saw the four accused, along with seven others, cutting down the coconut
trees on the said property. Later, the men turned the felled trees into coco lumber. Caringal did not
attempt to stop the men from cutting down the coconut trees because he was outnumbered. Instead,
Caringal left the site and proceeded toSan Pablo City to inform Menandro about the incident. Atanacio
Avanzado testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and Magsumbol, to cut down the
coconut trees within the boundary of his property, which was adjacent to the land co-owned by
Menandro. Atanacio admitted that he had never set foot on his property for about 20 years already and
that he was not present when the cutting incident happened. All the accused vehemently denied the
charges against them. Ramirez and Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within
the land owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, were cut down on that morning of
February 1, 2002. Ramirez and Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within the
land owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, were cut down on that morning of
February 1, 2002.

Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in the felling of the coconut trees but merely supervised the
same, and claimed that he did not receive any remuneration for the service he rendered or a share from
the proceeds of the coco lumbers sale. Ramirez added that he was a coco lumber trader and that
Atanacio offered to sell the coconut trees planted on his lot.

Issue:

- Whether or not CA committed serious errors in finding the accused GUILTY of the crime of
Theft: Yes
- Whether or not there is enough evidence that the trees that were cut down belong to the
property owned by Anatacio: Cannot be determined
- Whether or not malice and intent to gain is present in the act on the case at hand: NO

Ruling:

RTC:

On March 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its decision stating that the prosecution was able to establish with
certitude the guilt of all the accused for the crime of simple theft. The RTC rejected the defense of denial
invoked by the accused in the face of positive identification by Caringal pointing to them as the
perpetrators of the crime. It did not believe the testimony of Atanacio and even branded him as biased
witness on account of his relationship with accused Magsino and Magsumbol.

hereby sentences them to suffer an imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day of Prision
Correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

The accused are likewise directed to pay jointly and severally Engr. Menandro Avanzado and the other
heirs of Norberto Avanzado the sum of ₱13,200.00 representing the value of the 33 coconut trees they
have cut and sold to accused Ramirez.

CA:

The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of Caringal who
was not shown to have been motivated by any ill will to testify falsely against the accused. It agreed with
the RTC that Atanacio’s testimony should not be given any evidentiary weight in view of his relationship
with Magsino and Magsumbol, which provided sufficient reason for him to suppress or pervert the
truth. Anent the element of intent to gain, the CA stated that the mere fact that the accused cut the
coconut trees on Menandro’s land and made them into coco lumber, gave rise to the presumption that
it was done with intent to gain.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 15, 2011, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-
appellants Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez are
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum, to
seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as maximum; and to pay jointly and severally private
complainant Menandro Avanzado the amount of Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (₱13,200.00).

SC:

In view of such conflicting claims and considering the meager evidence on hand, the Court cannot
determine with certainty the owner of the 33 felled coconut trees. The uncertainty of the exact location
of the coconut trees negates the presence of the criminal intent to gain.

Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing unrebutted testimony of Atanacio for being
unreliable and considered him a biased witness simply because he is related by affinity to Magsumbol
and Magsino. Family relationship, however, does not by itself render a witness’ testimony inadmissible
or devoid of evidentiary weight. To warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be
clearly shown that, independently of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or
defective, or that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.

Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or
mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The
exception of course is neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences, which is
equivalent to criminal intent, for, in this instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the
element of negligence and imprudence.

The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and his co-accused even sought
prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut down the coconut trees which was done openly
and during broad daylight effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies the
reason that the accused would still approach the barangay captain if their real intention was to steal the
coconut trees of Menandro. Besides, criminals would usually execute their criminal activities
clandestinely or through stealth or strategy to avoid detection of the commission of a crime or
wrongdoing.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 14, 2012 Decision and the May 6, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Eduardo Magsumbol is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

Navales vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 162318-162341, October 25, 2004 (Jurisdiction of
Military Court)
Doctrine: As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has
jurisdiction to do so.

Facts:

Before the Court are two petitions essentially assailing the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial to
conduct the court-martial proceedings involving several junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) charged with violations of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No.
408, as amended) in connection with their participation in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003.

At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted men, mostly
from the elite units of the AFP – the Philippine Army’s Scout Rangers and the Philippine Navy’s Special
Warfare Group (SWAG) – quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed
the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They planted
explosives around the building and in its vicinity. Snipers were posted at the Oakwood roof deck.

The soldiers, mostly in full battle gear and wearing red arm bands, were led by a small number of junior
officers, widely known as the Magdalo Group. The leaders were later identified as including Navy LtSG.
Antonio Trillanes IV, Army Capt. Gerardo Gambala, Army Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, Navy LtSG. James
Layug, and Marine Capt. Gary Alejano.

Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers were able to issue a public statement through the ABS-CBN
News (ANC) network. They claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Among those grievances were: the graft and
corruption in the military, the sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, the bombings
in Davao City which were allegedly ordered by Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus, Chief of the ISAFP, in order to
obtain more military assistance from the United States government, and the "micro-management" in
the AFP by then Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary Angelo Reyes. They declared their
withdrawal of support from the chain of command and demanded the resignation of key civilian and
military leaders of the Arroyo administration.

Around 9:00 a.m., Pres. Arroyo gave the soldiers until 5:00 p.m. to give up their positions peacefully and
return to barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the existence of a "state of rebellion" and issued an
order to use reasonable force in putting down the rebellion. A few hours later, the soldiers again went
on television reiterating their grievances. The deadline was extended twice, initially to 7:00 p.m., and
later, indefinitely.

In the meantime, a series of negotiations ensued between the soldiers and the Government team led by
Ambassador Roy Cimatu. An agreement was forged between the two groups at 9:30 p.m. Shortly
thereafter, Pres. Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood was over. The soldiers agreed to
return to the barracks and were out of the Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m.

Issue:

- Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.
Ruling:

No. The writs of prohibition (G.R. No. 162318) and habeas corpus (G.R. No. 162341) prayed for by the
petitioners must perforce fail. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the
court which has jurisdiction to do so. Further, the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the
party sought to be released had been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body. The term "court"
necessarily includes the General Court-Martial. These rules apply to Capt. Reaso, et al., as they are under
detention pursuant to the Commitment Order dated August 2, 2003, issued by the respondent Chief of
Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War.

On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards
or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by
law. As earlier discussed, the General Court-Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed against
petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. under Rep. Act No. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent
it from exercising its jurisdiction.

Wherefore, the Petition is DISMISSED

 PDEA vs. Brodett, G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011 (Forfeiture and
Confiscation)
Facts:

PDEA filed a petition for review against the Decision of CA affirming RTC Decision of acquittal of the
accused Brodett et, al., who were charged with violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act RA
9165.

On April 13, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, charged Richard Brodett
(Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic
Act No. 9165 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City. On the 19th day of September 2008, in
the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding each other, they
not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver
and give away to another, sixty(60) pieces of blue-colored tablets with Motorola (M) logos, contained in
six (6) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets with a recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for the presence of
METHAMPHETAMINE, dangerous drug.

Issues:

WON the CA erred in affirming the order for the release of the car to Ms. Brodett.

Ruling:

In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and
shall pass to the Government. But it is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the
court in such a manner that it can be said to be within its jurisdiction. We rule that henceforth the
Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and should
not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of
the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
 People vs. Abina, G.R. No. 129891, October 27, 1998 (Principal by Direct
Cooperation)
Doctrine:

To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a

conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing
another act without which it would not have been accomplished. In order that a person may be
considered an accomplice, the following requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing
that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b)
he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and (c) there must be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as an
accomplice.

Facts:

Albina et, al filed a petition for review against the Decision of CA affirming RTC ruling of conviction of the
crime of murder, whereas the victim Eulalio Peleo was stabbed by the accused allegedly acting in
unison. The two accused held the victim, but was astonished when Caroso, one of the accused started
stabbing the victim. This resulted to the two accused, desisting and letting go of the victim while Caroso
chased after the victim.

Issue:

- Whether or not the accused Albina is a co-principal of the crime

Ruling:

Considering the absence of unity of purpose between the appellants, on the one hand, and Rodrigo
Caroso, on the other, as well as the utter lack of proof that the appellants have been aware of any
intention on the part of Caroso to kill Eulalio, neither may appellants be considered principals by
indispensable cooperation or accomplices in the commission of the crime.

At all events, where the fate of a person rests solely upon circumstances capable of two or more
inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible
with guilt, courts will not hesitate to tip the scales of justice in favor of the accused. The presumption of
innocence must prevail and the court must acquit.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and appellants Alejandro Abina and Romeo Abina ACQUITTED of the crime of murder for lack
of proof beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired with Rodrigo Caroso in its commission.
Accordingly, their immediate release from custody is ordered unless they are held for another cause.
 People vs. Agudez, G.R. No. 138386-87, May 20, 2004 (Conspiracy)
Doctrine:

Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. However, direct proof is not required as conspiracy may be proved by
circumstantial evidence.

Facts:

This case is a judicial automatic review of the Ruling of RTC convicting Aguadez et, al with the crime of
murder conspiring with his co-accused in shooting their victim Dominador Castro with a shotgun.
Adoracion further testified that the five accused shot at her husband and nephew because they were in
the belief that it was her son who had earlier killed a son of appellant Eufrocino.

Issue:

- Whether or not there is a conspiracy between the accused when the crime was committed

Ruling:

We agree with the trial court’s finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. However, direct proof is not required as conspiracy may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be proved through the collective acts of the accused, before,
during and after the commission of a felony, all the accused aiming at the same object, one performing
one part and another performing another for the attainment of the same objective, their acts though
apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The overt act or acts of the accused may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. Direct
proof of a person in agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the time of the
commission of a crime, all the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in their execution. 

SC Affirms the Decision of RTC convicting all accused on the grounds of conspiracy.
 People vs. Agustin, G.R. No. L-18368, March 31, 1966 (Education)

Doctrine: The condition of lack of instruction cannot be taken as a mitigating circumstance because it
has not been established that illiteracy was coupled with such a low degree of intelligence that the
malefactors did not fully realize the consequences of their criminal act. Neither may poverty and
voluntary surrender be appreciated in their favor. Extreme poverty may mitigate a crime against
property, such as theft, (People vs. Macbul, 74 Phil. 436) but not a crime of violence, such as murder. 

Facts:

Agustin et, al. filed a petition against the ruling of the lower court convicting them of the crime of
murder against Benito Labauan, and frustrated murder of the latter’s wife Emilia Labauan, which
stemmed from a land dispute, wherein the accused hacked the victims with a bolo.

Issue:

- Whether or not illiteracy can be used as a mitigating circumstance by the accused

Ruling:

We come now to the circumstances that attended the commission that attended the commission of the
offense. The condition of lack of instruction cannot be taken as a mitigating circumstance, because it has
not been established that illiteracy was coupled with such a low degree of intelligence that the
malefactors did not fully realize the consequences of their criminal act. (People vs. Ripas, 95 Phil. 63;
People vs. Gorospe, L-10644, Feb. 19, 1959; People vs. Magpantay, L-19133, Nov. 27, 1964). Neither
may poverty and voluntary surrender be appreciated in their favor. Extreme poverty may mitigate a
crime against property, such as theft, (People vs. Macbul, 74 Phil. 436) but not a crime of violence, such
as murder. The four aforementioned appellants did not surrender. Silverio Apolinario testified that he
was arrested in the market, while the three others stated that they went to see the chief of police, not
for the purpose of surrendering but because the latter had called for them for reasons they did not
know.

On the other hand, the circumstance of treachery — which qualifies the killing to murder — must be
taken against appellants, considering the suddenness of the attack, launched by them from a hidden
position. This circumstance absorbs that of abuse of superior strength (People vs. Tiongson, L-9866-67,
Nov. 28, 1964); while the elements to constitute the circumstance of evident premeditation have not
been clearly established. The crime was, however, committed by a band of armed men - at the very least
six, namely, the four appellants and the two who had owned the crime, each of whom carried a bolo;
and in an uninhabited place, which was purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime.

The law prescribes the capital penalty for the offense but for lack of sufficient votes to impose it the
Court simply affirms the judgment appealed from with respect to appellants Julito Rizardo, Silverio
Apolinario, Adriano Apolinario and Diosdado Apolinario with costs. Appellant Conrado Apolinario is
acquitted, with the corresponding costs de oficio.
 People vs. Barroga, G.R. No. 31563, January 16, 1930 (Obedience to Lawful
Order)
Doctrine: In order to exempt from guilt, obedience must be due, or as Viada lucidly states, it must be a
compliance with "a lawful order not opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern, and that the
person commanding, act within the scope of his authority.

Facts:

Barroga filed a petition alleging that the lower court erred in its Decision, not recognizing the element of
Justifying the Circumstance of his obedience to his superior, and was convicted of a crime of falsification
of documents

Issue:

- Whether or not Justifying Circumstances invoked by the petitioner can be invoked

Ruling:

With respect to the alleged instructions give by said Baldomero Fernandez, even supposing that he did
in fact give them, and that the defendant committed the crime charged by virtue thereof, inasmuch as
such instructions were not lawful, they do not legally shield the appellant, nor relieve him from criminal
liability. In order to exempt from guilt, obedience must be due, or as Viada lucidly states, it must be a
compliance with "a lawful order not opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern, and that the
person commanding, act within the scope of his authority. As a general rule, an inferior should obey his
superior but, as an illustrious commentator has said, "between a general law which enjoins obedience to
a superior giving just orders, etc., and a prohibitive law which plaintiff forbids what that superior
commands, the choice is not doubtful." (1 Penal Code, Viada, 5th edition, p. 528.)

We reiterate the statement that it has not been proved that the defendant committed the acts charged
in the information in obedience to the instructions of a third party. But even granting, for the sake of
argument, that such was the case, we repeat that such obedience was not legally due, and therefore
does not exempt from criminal liability. (U. S. vs Cuison, 20 Phil., 433.)
 People vs. Bartolome, G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013 (Entrapment)
Doctrine:

Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention to commit, in
order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of ways and means to trap
or capture a lawbreaker.

Facts:

Bartolome filed a petition for review against the Decision delivered by the lower court convicting him of
a crime of violating RA 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, wherein the accused was caught
selling shabu through an entrapment operation by the police officers. According to the accused, the
operation was just a frame-up as he denies selling illegal drugs.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused’s claim of the alternating circumstances of entrapment/instigation has
merit

Ruling:

To establish the crime of illegal sale of shabu, the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt (a)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of the sale; and
(b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the thing. The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, requires simply the consummation of the selling transaction,
which happens at the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In short, what is material is
the proof showing that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the thing sold as evidence of the corpus delicti.

Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in
order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for
the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents
incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise
not commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to
commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely
facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot
justify his or her conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have
to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been said, instigation is a
"trap for the unwary innocent," while entrapment is a "trap for the unwary criminal."

As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as a form of entrapment, is a valid means of

arresting violators of Republic Act No. 9165. It is an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the
act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the
offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.

Petition is DENIED. SC Affirms the lower court Decision of conviction against the accused
 G.R. No. L-4445 February 28, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO, and JACINTO
ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants.
Digest
(No felony if no intent)
An appeal was filed by the accused Beronilla, Velasco, Paculdo, Adriatico from the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder for the execution of Arsenio
Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the town of La Paz, Province of Abra. Arsenio Borjal was the
elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the
Japanese occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon his
life by unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military
Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army,
operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his appointment as Military
Mayor, Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in
Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason,
espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the enemy" . Beronilla placed Borjal to custody when the
latter returned from Bangued to La Paz as per his instructions from Lt. Col Arnold. A 12-man jury was
appointed by Beronilla. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all
accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records
of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review, and on the night of the same day, April
18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio
Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was asked to administer the last
confession to the prisoner, while Father Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church performed the last rites
over Borjal's remains. The state, however, predicates its case principally on the existence of the
radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling
attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution claims was
known to the accused Beronilla.

Issue:

- Whether or not Beronilla is guilty of murder in connection with the execution of Borjal
- Whether or not Beronilla received the message from Col. Volckmann

Ruling:

We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no satisfactory proof that
Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied
it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what papers were enclosed in the package
he delivered to Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who
claimed to have been present at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof.

Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to
transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do
away with Borjal must be rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who
was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.

Actually, the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice
(dolo). The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher command; the
appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel, one of them (attorney Jovito Barreras) chosen by
Borjal's sister; the trial lasted nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose about its legality,
and it was not resumed until headquarters (then in Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and
sent an observer (Esteban Cabanos, of the S-5) to the proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure
were followed; and when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence imposed, the records
were sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and Borjal was not punished until the records were
returned eight days later with the statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the case
is hereby approved" (Exhibit 8), which on its face was an assent to the verdict and the sentence. The
lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing
soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese)
expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was not for political or personal reason that the
accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).

Actus non facit reum nisi mens si rea. - “an act does not render a man guilty of a crime unless his mind
is equally guilty,”

given the benefit of the Presidential directive to the Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No. 11, of
October 2, 1946) that "any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty)
proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused" (42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as was done in People vs.
Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.

For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with
costs de oficio.
 People vs. Bulagao, G.R. No. 184757, October 5, 2011 (Insanity)

Doctrine:  Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it
with clear and convincing evidence. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the
time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.

Facts:

Bulagao filed an appeal against the Decision of CA convicting him of 2 counts of rape against a 14-year
old minor. Later on, AAA, the minor recanted her statement, alleging that she was forced to the sexual
intercourse when she was threatened by Bulagao with a knife. She is now stating that she consented to
the said act and that she was not threatened by Bulagao with a knife. Bulagao’s party is also claiming
that he is suffering from mental retardation, which was not proven in court.

Issue:

- Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime charged against him. YES
- Whether or not the recantation will reverse the judgment against the accused. NO

Ruling:

"[c]ourts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained from witnesses
through intimidation or for monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction does not necessarily negate an
earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor by the
courts. Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice,
simply because the witness who has given it later on changes his mind for one reason or another."

Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial court that he was suffering
from mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree with the finding of the trial court that there was no
proof that the mental condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by
Yolanda Palma was already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Only when
there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the
exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.

SC DENIED the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of CA with the ff modifications:

1) Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao is hereby ordered to pay AAA the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of rape, in addition to the amounts awarded by the Court of Appeals,
namely: civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00,
both for each count of rape; and

2) All damages awarded in this case should be imposed with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
 People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011 (Imbecility/Mental Age)
Doctrine: The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only
when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental
deficiency impairing her reason or free will.

Facts:

Butiong filed a petition from the Decision rendered to him by CA convicting him of the crime of rape
against the 29-year-old mentally retarded woman. AAA, then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was
invited by Butiong, her long-time neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her
something. AAA obliged. He locked the door as soon as she had stepped inside his house, and then took
off his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led her to the sofa, where he had carnal knowledge of her. AAA
remembered that she then felt pain in her abdomen and became angry at him for what he had done.
Later on, AAA reported the incident to her sister, which latter reported to the police station.

Issue:

- Whether or not the exact date of the incident is a material fact in proving the crime. NO
- Lower Court erred that Mental Retardee is in the same class of a normal woman. NO

Ruling:

3. We need to emphasize, however, that the date of the rape need not be precisely proved
considering that date is not an element of rape.
4. The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only
when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering
some mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that
she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal
knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes rape.
Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot, sexual intercourse
with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was
incapable of giving any rational consent.

The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough.
Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual intercourse with an insane
woman was considered rape. But a deafmute is not necessarily deprived of These circumstances
must be proven. Intercourse with a deafmute is not rape of a woman deprived of reason, in the
absence of proof that she is an imbecile.

SC Affirmed CA Decision of conviction

 People vs. Comillo, G.R. No. 186538, November 25, 2009 (Passion)
Facts:

This is a case of review regarding the ruling of lower court finding accused-appellants Ausencio Comillo
Jr., Lutgardo Comillo and Romulo Altar guilty of the crime of murder.

That on December 18, 1999, at about 8:30 o’clock in the evening at Escalo Street, Barangay 11, Llorente,
Eastern Samar, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused armed with bladed weapons conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another and
taking advantage of superior strength with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound PEDRO BARBO,
which caused the direct death of said PEDRO BARBO, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
victim.

Joselito Bojocan (Joselito) and Marcos Borac (Marcos) witnessed the stabbing incident. Joselito was
standing near a barbecue stall along Escola Street when he saw the gruesome act. He was six meters
away from Pedro and appellants when the incident occurred. He was one of those who rushed Pedro to
the hospital after the incident. On the other hand, Marcos was walking along Escalo Street when he
witnessed the felony. He was ten meters away from Pedro and appellants when the crime transpired.
Joselito and Marcos recognized Pedro and appellants on that tragic night, as the scene was well-lighted.

Issue:

- Whether or not the accused are guilty of murder

Ruling:

Yes. Self-defense is a weak defense because, as experience has demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to prove. Thus, for this defense to prosper, the accused must proved with clear and convincing
evidence the elements of self-defense. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution. Even if the evidence of the prosecution is weak, it cannot be
disbelieved if the accused admitted responsibility for the crime charged. 41 In the case before us,
appellant Lutgardo failed to prove with plausible evidence all the elements of self-defense. Hence, his
plea of self-defense must fail.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make. 49 The
essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that renders the victim unable and unprepared to
defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. Two essential elements are
required in order that treachery can be appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner
of execution that would ensure the offender’s safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended
party who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious
choice of means, methods or manner of execution. Pedro’s shoulders were restrained by appellant
Ausencio. Then, he was hit by appellant Romulo with a ukulele. These acts facilitated the stabbing of
Pedro by appellant Lutgardo. Verily, the manner in which Pedro was restrained and assaulted was
deliberately and consciously adopted by appellants to prevent him from retaliating or escaping and,
ultimately, to ensure his death.
 People vs. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. L-45127, May 5, 1989 (Subsidiary Imprisonment)
Doctrine:

That subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty, there can be no doubt, for, according to article 39 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is imposed upon the accused and served by him in lieu of the fine that he fails
to pay on account of insolvency.

Facts:

On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria,
public school officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for
violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded not
guilty and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with preliminary injuction before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due  to the correctional nature of the
penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed for the offense
b.  Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed and
may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter
were the legislative department of the Government.

On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent Judge, Judge
Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.

Issue:

- Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.

- Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

 Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.

Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power by
vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of imprisonment, as if
the courts were the legislative department of the government.

Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case. 
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes punishable by fine of not
more than Php 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal courts.

The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the
Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
 People vs. Deopante, G.R. No. 102772, October 30, 1996 (Physical Defect)
Doctrine:

Voluntary Surrender: In order to appreciate voluntary surrender by an accused, the same must
be shown to have been "spontaneous and made in such a manner that it shows the intent of the
accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his
guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and
capture.

Physical Defect:

In order for this condition to be appreciated, it must be shown that such physical defect limited
his means to act, defend himself or communicate with his fellow beings to such an extent that
he did not have complete freedom of action, consequently resulting in diminution of the
element of voluntariness.

Facts:

Deopante filed a petition against the Decision of CA convicting him of the crime of murder against Dante
Deopante with a fan-knife. Around nine o-clock in the evening while Dante was having a conversation
with his friend Molina, suddenly saw accused Deopante approaching them with a fan-knife in his hand.
Dante ran away but was chased by the accused, and eventually, the former was mortally stabbed in the
basketball court. According to the accused, the acts he did was due to self-defense. According to him, he
was the one running away from Dante, who was drunk at that time. The accused claimed that Dante was
holding a grudge against him due to arresting Dante for crimes involving drugs when he was a
policeman.

Issue:

- Whether or not the accused claim of Physical Defect and Voluntary Surrender as his defense, be
sustainable

Ruling:

"Neither can we accept accused-appellant’s plea of voluntary surrender. He did not surrender to the
police. In fact, the evidence adduced shows that it was the police authorities who came to the factory
looking for him. It was there that the accused-appellant was pointed to them. With the police closing
in, Accused-appellant actually had no choice but to go with them. Seeing that the police were already
approaching him, Accused-appellant did not offer any resistance and peacefully went with them. To be
sure, no surrender was made by Accused-Appellant."

Such cannot be appreciated in the case at bar where the appellant’s physical condition clearly did not
limit his means of action, defense or communication, nor affect his free will. In fact, despite his
handicap, appellant nevertheless managed to attack, overcome and fatally stab his victim.

Accused is found guilty of murder and convicted of his crime with penalty of reclusion perpetua a fine of
50, 000
 People vs. Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011 (Irresistible
Force/Uncontrollable Fear)
Doctrine: A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he
does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my
will is not my act.

Facts:

Dequina et, al. filed a petition against the CA Decision convicting them of the crime of violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, when they conspired in selling, and deliver prohibited drugs and marijuana. The
accused was caught by police officers in flagrante delicto while they are trying to deliver the said
contraband. Dequina contends that she transported the marijuana under the compulsion of an
irresistible fear. Jundoc and Jingabo, on the other hand, claim that they went along to accommodate
Dequina, a trusted childhood friend.

Issue:

- Whether or not the petitioner’s claim of exempting circumstance of Uncontrollable Fear can be
sustained. NO

Ruling:

The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts
not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be
of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal
combat. Here, Dequina’s version of events that culminated with her and Jundoc and Jingabo’s arrests on
September 29, 1999 is implausible. Equally far-fetched is Jundoc and Jingabo’s assertion of blind trust in
Dequina and total ignorance of the transportation of marijuana.

While [Dequina] wants us to believe that she acted under compulsion and that a certain Sally called all
the shots, she nevertheless admitted that their accommodations when they reached Manila was with
her aunt in Guadalupe. On cross examination, she said that it was she who told Sally that they were
going to stay with her aunt. More importantly, the alleged threat on her daughter was unclear. At one
point in her testimony, she claimed that her daughter was to be under the custody of Sally while she
was away. However, during the trial her lawyer manifested that her daughter was in fact in Manila and
in the courtroom attending the hearing.

Wherefore, SC DENIED the petition and Affirms CA Ruling

 People vs. Escares, G.R. No. L-11128-33, December 23, 1957 (Three-fold Rule)
Doctrine: The three-fold provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, can only be
considered, not in the imposition of the penalty, but in connection with the service of the sentence
imposed.

Facts:

On April 21, 1954, Rene Escares was arraigned and pleaded not guilty in each of the six above-
mentioned cases but later he asked permission to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and substitute
it for a plea of guilty on 6 informations of robbery.

Issue:

- Whether or not the 3-fold rule applies to the accused.

Ruling:

It should be noted that the imposable penalty in each of the six cases where appellant pleaded guilty in
accordance with paragraph 5, Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code, is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, which should be applied in its minimum period
in view of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, not offset by any aggravating circumstance, or
from 4 years 2 months and 1 day to 6 years one month and 10 days. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the appellant should be sentenced for each crime to an indeterminate penalty the
minimum of which shall not be less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional, and the maximum shall not be less than 4 years 2 months and 1
day of prision correccional nor more than 6 years 1 month and 10 days of prision mayor. But in applying
the proper penalty, the trial court imposed upon appellant the three-fold rule provided for in paragraph
4 of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This is an error for said article can only be taken into account,
not in the imposition of the penalty, but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed.
 People vs. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012 (Self-defense)
Facts:

Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso
Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to
the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from
hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted
at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic,
where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.

At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been
standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had
boxed him in the stomach. Although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting
him with his fists, striking him with straight blows. Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both
his legs. He had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right
side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face down to the ground. He had then left the scene
for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving. The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-
defense. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue:

- Whether or not Olais claim of self-defense is tenable

Ruling:

No. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful
aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.

By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death
of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction
of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus
admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he
established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by relying
on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be
disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.
 People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004 (Battered Woman
Syndrome as a Defense)
Facts:

This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During
their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and
the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that
every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever
beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the
killing, appellant and the victim quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was
able to run to another room. The Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against the appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim
was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn
child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying
that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause
of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said
experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a
partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The
Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to
the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman
syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan
and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the
Supreme Court as part of the records.

Issue:

3. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as
constituting self defense.
4. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling:

3. No. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the
“battered woman syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her
to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of
intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of
violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering
incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer
and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of
the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual --
grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against
the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense.
Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she
had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to
the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context
of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense
must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and
actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following
requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden
and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In
the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient
time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had
already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s
bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even
the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position
that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however,
taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological
 paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by
the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the
exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have

naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present
when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior
unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might recover her normal equanimity.
4. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as
the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an
argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because
the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the
assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party
attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-
spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child,
overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her
reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the
presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the
penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained
for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is
eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
 People vs. Hernandez, 54 Phil 240 (Arson/Consummated)
Facts:

The appellant knew that Miguel Dayrit and his children lived and were in the house that night.

The testimony of the offended party, corroborated by that of Artemio Tanglao and Daniel Mallari,
establishes beyond all doubt the fact that it was the appellant who set fire to the house. The stick which
Miguel Dayrit saw in the appellant's possession on that night was found leaning against the house with
the end burnt and a rag soaked with petroleum dangling from it. Daniel Mallari recognized it as the stick
which the appellant used in getting guava fruits.

It should be noted, moreover, that prior to the crime, the appellant and the offended party, Miguel
Dayrit, had some disagreements because the offended party suspected that the appellant was stealing
his paddy piled up behind his house. The offended party communicated his suspicions to the barrio
lieutenant, who, together with the complainant, went to the appellant's house, but the latter armed
with a bolo, barred their way, saying that he would cut them to pieces, and that he recognized no
authority. This characteristic violence on the part of the appellant was also shown when, in pursuance of
this information, he was arrested; for he refused to give himself up.

Issue:

- Whether or not the accused is guilty of Arson

Ruling:

The crime of arson having been consummated, as it appears from the facts thoroughly proved, article
549 of the Penal Code is applicable herein, with the corresponding penalty of cadena temporal  to life
imprisonment. And as the aggravating circumstance of nighttime must be taken into consideration, as
having been doubtless sought by the appellant in order to insure the commission of the crime, the
penalty must be imposed in its maximum degree.

In view of these considerations, the judgment appealed from is modified, and in accordance with article
549 of the Penal Code the appellant is found guilty of the crime of arson, committed in a dwelling,
knowing that within it were the offended party and his children; and, considering one aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime, the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment, with the
accessories, and the costs.

The appellant is an old man, about 85 years of age, and in view of this, and of the fact that the damage
caused was very slight, the Attorney-General recommends that, in pursuance of the second paragraph
of article 2 of the Penal Code, these facts be explained to the Executive, for the exercise of his clemency
to such an extent as he may deem proper. The suggestion is accepted, and it is hereby ordered that the
clerk forward a copy of this decision, once it becomes final, to the Governor-General for consideration.
 People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil 707 (Attempted felony)
Facts:

The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, finding him guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer two years and
four months of prision correccional  and to an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision
mayor  for being a habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs of
the proceeding.

At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado
and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an
iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last-named street. At that time the owner
of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in
breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who
instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.

The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the trial
judge, and the Solicitor-General, as constituting attempted robbery, which we think is erroneous.

Issue:

- Whether or not Lamahang is guilty of Theft

Ruling:

It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is
wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must
be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be
such that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the
persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show without any
doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation,
that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act,
must not and can not furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes. 

The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the consummated offense of trespass to dwelling, if
committed with force, is  prision correccional  in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding P1,000 (art. 280, par. 2); therefore the penalty corresponding to attempted trespass to
dwelling is to degrees lower (art. 51), or, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Because of
the presence of two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance the penalty must be
imposed in its maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the same Code, the accused is not entitled to
credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment.

Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and the accused is hereby held guilty of attempted
trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory
penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
 People vs. Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003 (Attempted felony)
Facts:

Ricardo Orillosa and his wife, Rose Orillosa, natives of San Isidro, Bohol, had three (3) children, namely:
Analia, who was born on December 18, 1985; Jepsy, who was 11 years old, and Rossel, who was nine
years old. However, the couple decided to part ways and live separately. Rose left Bohol and settled in
Manila with her young children. She worked as a waitress to make both ends meet.

In 1994, Rose met the accused-appellant. They decided to live together as husband and wife at No. 1252
Jose Abad Santos Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila. In 1996, Rose resigned from her job as a waitress.
She secured a loan, bought a truck, and used it for her business.

In the meantime, Rose secured a loan anew and used the proceeds thereof to put up a video shop in her
house. She sold Avon products from house to house to augment her income. Whenever she was out of
their house, Rossel and Analia took turns in tending to the video shop and attending to customers.

Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when the accused-appellant entered. He laid on top of her,
and removed her T-shirt and underwear. He then inserted his finger in her vagina. He removed his finger
and inserted his penis in her vagina. Momentarily, she felt a sticky substance coming out from his penis.
She also felt pain in her sex organ. Satiated, the accused-appellant dismounted but threatened to kill her
if she divulged to anyone what he did to her. The accused-appellant then returned to his room. The
incident lasted less than one hour. Petrified by the threats on her life, Analia kept to herself what
happened to her.

On November 9, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Rose left the house. Accused-appellant was in the sala of the
house watching television. Analia tended the video shop. However, accused-appellant told Analia to go
to the sala. She refused, as nobody would tend the video shop. This infuriated accused-appellant who
threatened to slap and kick her.

Analia ignored the invectives and threats of the accused-appellant and stayed in the video shop. When
Rose returned, a heated argument ensued between accused-appellant and Analia. Rose sided with her
paramour and hit Analia. This prompted Analia to shout. "Ayoko na, ayoko na." Shortly thereafter, Rose
and Analia left the house on board the motorcycle driven by her mother in going to Don Bosco Street,
Moriones, Tondo, Manila, to retrieve some tapes which had not yet been returned. When Rose inquired
from her daughter what she meant by her statement, "ayoko na, ayoko na," she told her mother that
accused-appellant had been touching the sensitive parts of her body and that he had been on top of her.
Rose was shocked and incensed. The two proceeded to Kagawad Danilo Santos to have accused-
appellant placed under arrest. On November 10, 1998, the two proceeded to the Western Police District
where Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint to PO1 Carmelita Nocum in the presence of SPO2 Fe H.
Avindante. She related to the police investigator that accused-appellant had touched her breasts and
arms in August, 1998, September 15, 1998, October 22, 1998 and on November 5, 1998, at 3:00 p.m.
Analia then submitted herself to genitalia examination by Dr. Armie Umil, a medico-legal officer of the
NBI. The medico-legal officer interviewed Analia, told him that she was raped in May, 1997 at 3:00 p.m.
and November 5, 1998 at 3:00 p.m
Issue:

- Whether or Not Lizada is guilty of Consummated Rape

Ruling:

The barefaced fact that the private complainant remained a virgin up to 1998 does not preclude her
having been repeatedly sexually abused by the accused-appellant. The private complainant being of
tender age, it is possible that the penetration of the male organ went only as deep as her labia. Whether
or not the hymen of private complainant was still intact has no substantial bearing on accused-
appellants commission of the crime. Even, the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or
the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that there
be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum.
 People vs. Oasnis, G.R. No. 47722, July 27, 1943 (Performance of Duty)
Facts:

Captain Godofredo Monsod (Provincial Inspector of Cabanatuan) was instructed to arrest Balagtas, a
notorious criminal, and, if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. The same instruction was given to the
Chief of Police Oanis who knew the whereabouts of Irene, the paramour of Balagtas. Upon arriving at
Irene’s house, Oanis approached Mallare and asked her where Irene’s room was. Mallare indicated the
place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour.

Defendants Oanis and Galanta (Corporal of the Philippine Constabulary) then went to the room of Irene,
and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw
her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants
still firing at him. It turned out later that the person shot and killed was not Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Tecson, Irene’s paramour.

Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with the crime of murder.

The trial court found the appellants guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. Hence, the present
appeal. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance
of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong.

Issue:

Whether or not appellants are criminally liable for the death of Tecson.

Ruling:

Yes. The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional
and not accidental.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to
secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in
treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be
affected. And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force
or violence in making an arrest. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and
vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life.
 People vs. Opuran, G.R. No. 147674-75, March 17, 2004 (Insanity)
Facts:

On Nov. 19, 1998, 6:30 pm at Catbalogan, Samar, Anacito Opuran, herein accused, stabbed Allan Dacles,
who was lying on a bench. At 7:45 pm of the same day, Demetrio Patrimonio was walking on the
national highway of Catbalogan, Samar. Thereafter, the accused emerged from where he was hiding and
stabbed Patrimonio.

The defense claimed insanity as grounds for exempting circumstances from criminal liability.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused can use the exempting circumstance of insanity as a defense.

Ruling:

No. Insanity must exist immediately before or at the précised moment of the commission of the act. The
accused failed to prove that he was insane at the precise moment of commission or immediately before
said act. Thus, insanity is not attendant in the case at bar.

NPeople vs. Opuran, G.R. No. 147674-75, March 17, 2004 (Insanity)

Facts:

On Nov. 19, 1998, 6:30 pm at Catbalogan, Samar, Anacito Opuran, herein accused, stabbed Allan Dacles,
who was lying on a bench. At 7:45 pm of the same day, Demetrio Patrimonio was walking on the
national highway of Catbalogan, Samar. Thereafter, the accused emerged from where he was hiding and
stabbed Patrimonio.

The defense claimed insanity as grounds for exempting circumstances from criminal liability.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused can use the exempting circumstance of insanity as a defense.

Ruling:

No. Insanity must exist immediately before or at the précised moment of the commission of the act. The
accused failed to prove that he was insane at the precise moment of commission or immediately before
said act. Thus, insanity is not attendant in the case at bar.