Wiley

Thinking in Movement
Author(s): Maxine Sheets-Tohnstone

Source: The J'ournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Summer, 1981, Vol. 39, No. 4
(Summer, 1981), pp. 399-407
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

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 MAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE

Thinking in Movement

And what is thinking?—Well, don’t you ever think? Can’t you observe yourself
and see what is going on? It should be quite simple. You do not have to wait for
it as for an astronomical event and then perhaps make your observation in a hurry.
—Wittgenstein

A dance improvisation is unique in the problems of ontological identity may be

sense that no score is being fulfilled, no per­ said to arise since each dance improvisation
formance is being reproduced. The dancer is the only one of its kind: a dance impro­
who is improvising understands this unique­ visation is either being created, in the very
ness in the very manner in which he or she process of being born, or it is not at all.
has approached the dance. That is, the Insofar as it has no past or future perform­
dancer has agreed to follow the rules, as it ances, it exists only in the here and now
were, of a dance improvisation, rules which of its creation.
might very generally be summed up under If one were pressed for an artistic
the rubric: dance the dance as it comes into comparison, one might say that a dance
being at this particular moment at this improvisation is akin to a jazz jam session
particular place. More restrictive rules might wherein a group of musicians literally make
be incorporated into a dance improvisation music together: they bring something into
specifying, for example, a certain kind of being, something which never before was,
improvisation or a certain sequence of something which will never be again. To
movement; to wit, “contact improvisation create a dance improvisation is thus not to
only” or “group movement to alternate create an artistic product, that is, to bring
with slow, large individual movement.” into being a form which might be rendered
Such rules notwithstanding, the aim of the in future performances by different dancers.
dancer is not to render something planned It is to create an ongoing present from the
or choreographed in advance. Whatever the world of possibilities at any given moment.
framework of rules which act as constraints In view of its unique appearance, it is not
upon movement, the aim of the dancer is to surprising that a dance improvisation is
form movement extemporaneously. It is to commonly described as an unrehearsed and
dance this evening's dance, whatever it spontaneous form of dance. What is not
might turn out to be; no more than anyone commonly recognized, however, is that that
else does the dancer know what this eve­ description hinges upon the more funda­
ning's dance will be until it has in fact been mental characteristic suggested above: in a
created. In view of its intentional and/or dance improvisation, the process of creating
conceptual uniqueness, none of the standard is not the means of realizing a dance, it is
the dance itself. A dance improvisation is
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone is assistant professor of the incarnation of creativity as process and
dance at Temple University. as such, its future is open. Until the precise

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 400 SHEETS-JOHNSTONE

moment at which a dance improvisation necessary interdependence before examin­

ends, its future is uncharted: where it will ing experience itself, and prematurely to
go at any moment, what will happen next, declare impossible something which may
no one knows. It is by virtue of its unique not be impossible at all, and perhaps, on
temporality, its being in the process of be­ the contrary, quite common, i.e., thinking
ing created moment by moment that a in movement. To deny peremptorily the
dance improvisation is commonly described possibility of thinking in movement may
as unrehearsed and spontaneous. There is also be to insist that thinking takes place
nothing to practice, nothing to perfect in only by means of something, that is, by the
advance, because no artistic product exists. agency of a symbolic system of some sort, a
A dance improvisation is process through system having the capacity to mediate or
and through, a form which lives and to carry thought. In contrast, to affirm the
breathes only in the momentary flow of its possibility of thinking in movement is not
creation, a flow experienced as an ongoing to regard movement as a vehicle for think­
or prolonged present.1 ing, that is, as a means by which meanings
The question is, how is such a dance pos­ are brought forth. In such thinking, move­
sible? What is the nature of improvisation ment is not a medium by which thoughts
such that dancers can create a dance on the emerge but rather, the thoughts themselves,
spot? What is the nature of the creative significations in the flesh, so to speak. In
process which brings such a dance to life? support of this latter understanding, one
In order to answer these questions, we must might paraphrase Merleau-Ponty’s remarks
describe the creative process from the upon language and say that, in order to
dancer's perspective; we must unravel the understand what it means to think in move­
nature of an ongoing present and discover ment, “movement must somehow cease to
its genet ative core. In so doing, we will find be a way of designating things or thoughts,
that what is essential is a nonseparation of and become the presence of that thought in
thinking and doing, and that the very the phenomenal world, and, moreover, not
ground of this nonseparation is the capacity, its clothing but its token or its body.”3
indeed, the very experience of the dancer, Similarly, one might paraphrase Goldstein’s
to be thinking in movement. To think in remarks upon language and say that, “As
movement does not mean that the dancer soon as man uses movement to establish a
is thinking by means of movement or that living relation with his fellows, movement
thoughts are being transcribed into move­ is no longer an instrument, no longer a
ment. In order to describe more precisely means; it is a manifestation, a revelation of
what is meant by thinking in movement, it intimate being and of the psychic link
is necessary first to point out two particular which unites us to the world and our fellow
assumptions about thinking, assumptions men.”4
which will otherwise hinder a clear grasp of Whichever the layer considered, the first
what it means to think in movement. assumption is ultimately based upon a
The first of these assumptions has several quite particular and exclusive reification of
layers. To begin with, there is the presump­ thinking. What a descriptive account of
tion that thinking is tied to language, that improvisational dance will challenge is not
it takes place only via language and further, the possibility of linkage between thinking
that thinking and language are both tied and language or between thinking and
to rationality.2 The underlying basis for rationality, but the view that thinking is
these preconceptions seems to be that think­ wholly dependent upon, and to that extent
ing, language, and rationality are a kind limited to, a symbolic system; that thinking
of holy, if nonetheless human, triumvirate, is transactable only in terms of a hard cur­
a kind of congealed hallmark of preemi­ rency like language, and furthermore, that
nently human existence. To tie thinking it proceeds in a linear, i.e., rational, fashion,
down to language and rationality, however, its progression being marked by a systematic
is to take for granted an inherent and/or reasonableness which develops on the basis

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Thinking in Movement 401

of particular connections between thoughts some form, but that thinking necessarily
and/or on the basis of specific rules demand­ does. It is, after all, possible that in the
ed by the symbolic counters or currency course of improvising, a dancer may have
utilized. What a descriptive account of im­ an image or an inclination, for example,
provisational dance will suggest is that to and thus affirm the experience of thinking
reify thinking in this manner is to exalt prior to moving. For instance, at the same
humankind at the expense of denying time that he or she is moving, a dancer
dimensions of human experience, i.e., di­ might have an image of a particular move­
mensions of thinking which though non- ment—perhaps a leg extension—or an image
symbolic might nonetheless be designated of a particular movement quality—perhaps
as rational and which, from a development­ a strong and abrupt upward reaching of the
al or evolutionary perspective, might be arm. Similarly, at the same time that he or
evidenced across a broad spectrum of ani­ she is moving, a dancer might have an incli­
mate life. nation to run toward another dancer or
The assumption rooted in a particular toward a particular place on the stage. Such
and exclusive reification of thinking may be thoughts, while emerging within the ex­
accompanied by a parallel assumption perience of an ongoing present, do not
rooted in a distinction between mind and interrupt the flow of movement which is
body: to deny the possibility of thinking in the dance. The dancer does not stop mov­
movement may also be to uphold the notion ing; he or she is not impeded in any way
that thinking is something only a mind can or brought to a standstill by the thought.
do, while doing or moving is something a It is simply that a different kind of think­
body does. Insofar as thinking is assumed ing and thus a different kind of thought has
to be separate from its expression, a thought momentarily intruded itself into, or super­
in one’s head, so to speak, exists prior to imposed itself upon the process of thinking
its corporeal expression. Thinking must in movement. It should be noted then that
thus be transcribed into movement: when thinking in movement and thoughts of
the mind formulates a thought, the tongue movement are two quite different experi­
and lips move to express it; when the mind ences though, as suggested in the previous
thinks of going to the store, the body com­ sentence, it may happen that, in the experi­
plies by walking or driving it there. The ence of the dance itself, the one thought
notion that thoughts must be transcribed, now preempts the other or the two now
that they exist separately from their expres­ exist concurrently. What is clear, however,
sion, has been justly criticized by such is that, unlike thinking in movement,
philosophers as Wittgenstein and Merleau- thoughts of movement are experienced as
Ponty. “When I think in language,” Witt­ discrete events: I have a thought at this
genstein insisted, “there aren’t ‘meanings* moment of a certain leg extension, a
going through my mind in addition to the thought at this moment of a certain reach­
verbal expression.”5 Similarly, Merleau- ing of the arm, and so on. It might be em­
Ponty insisted that “speech is not the ‘sign* phasized too that within the context of
of thought, if by this we understand a improvisational dance, such thoughts most
phenomenon which heralds another as always arise autonomously; that is, they are
smoke betrays fire. ... Nor can we con­ momentary intrusions, tangential spin-offs
cede . . . that it is the envelope and cloth­ of my thinking in movement rather than a
ing of thought.” 6 Although in both of these result of any ongoing thinking in images
examples, it is a question of language and while moving or a result of any deliberative
not movement, the same critical insights thinking, e.g., “what if I ... ,” or “shall I
into the phenomenon of thinking are rele­ . . . ?” or “if I were to . . . ,” and so on.
vant. What a descriptive account of im­ What a descriptive account of improvisa­
provisational dance will challenge is not the tional dance will furthermore challenge is
possibility that thinking (or a thought) the idea that either any movement of the
might occur prior to its overt expression in body is the result of a mental process which

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 402 SHEETS-JOHNSTONE

exists prior to, and is distinguishable from, it is experienced is led to the heart of that
the physical process in which it eventuates, experience and to an understanding of its
or it involves no thinking at all. What the inherent structures.
account will suggest is that to separate Thinking in movement is obviously a
“mind-doing” and “body-doing” is to per­ bodily phenomenon. The body inhabits
form a radical surgery upon the body such movement in the literal sense of living in it.
that its lived reality is reduced to a faint Yet not only is movement the very medium
and impotent pulp, or excised altogether. of a body’s transactions with the world, but
In more positive terms, the account will movement is a natural mode of being a
suggest that thinking may be a process of body, a perpetual susceptibility, as it were,
making one’s way in movement, just as mov­ of animate life. This kinetic declaration of
ing may be a way in which a mindful body animate existence, this spontaneous opening-
explores the world. up into movement, was clearly recognized
Before proceeding with that account, by Merleau-Ponty when he wrote of
however, a brief clarification of purpose Cezanne’s “thinking in painting” as a pro­
should be made to the effect that the ac­ cess in which “vision becomes gesture.”8 By
count of dance improvisation which follows this Merleau-Ponty did not mean move­
is basically a descriptive, not a theoretical ment follows perception, i.e., doing follows
account. As such, it is not an argument for seeing, but that perception is interlaced
a certain conception of dance improvisa­ with movement and to the point where it
tion. The purpose of the analysis is not to is impossible to separate out where percep­
claim or document a theory about dance tion begins and movement ends or where
improvisation but to describe as accurately movement begins and perception ends; the
as possible, indeed, to capture, the essential one informs the other. We might begin
character of a dance improvisation as it is elaborating this experience—this interfusion
experienced by the dancer to the end that of sense and motion—by way of a distinction
the kind of thinking which lies at the core between the kind of thinking in movement
of its spontaneous creation is clearly elabo­ which would be fully equivalent to
rated. In order to render the experience of Cezanne’s thinking in painting, and think­
the dancer justly, we must leave a literal ing in movement as an aesthetic phenom­
language behind to the extent that it may enon in and of itself, that is, a distinction
tie us to facts about the experience rather between nonimprovisational and improvisa­
than lead us to a conception of its felt tional dance. In the former situation, the
quality or character. Thus, a metaphoric choreographer stands back from time to
language is called for precisely because an time and views the work in progress, with
experiential account is a first-person account an eye to judging it, changing it, and so
of the world as it is lived, an account in on. In the latter situation, the dance is
which it is not facts per se which matter— created in one nonstop choreographic swoop.
I flexed my knee, I circumducted my arm, Thinking in movement as the process of
I saw another dancer out of the corner of creating the dance is thus different from
my eye, and so on—but their felt reality. thinking in movement as part of the process
Literal language, as Marjorie Grene has of choreographing the dance. One might
remarked,7 presupposes metaphoric lan­ characterize this difference in terms of how
guage; literal meaning is, in fact, the min­ the process of thinking in movement stands
imal case of metaphoric language—as “the in relation to the actual making of the
corner of my eye” well shows. Accordingly, dance, i.e., whether the process is trans­
while phrases or terms might first appear cendental to or immanent in the making.9
to be self-indulgent jargon, precious or fan­ The distinction notwithstanding, however,
ciful verbal excesses, their successive descrip­ thinking in movement is patently as central
tive elaboration should clarify their mean­ to the choreographer’s ongoing creation of
ing such that anyone interested in grasping the dance as it is to the moving dancer’s on
the physiognomic character of the dance as the spot creation of the dance. While in the

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Thinking in Movement 403

former situation, thinking in movement is spectra of experience, fortuitously joining

transcendental to the dance, the choreog­ together by virtue of happening to, or in,
rapher is not thereby in a cataleptic trance, the same body. Perceptions are plaited into
staring immobile at the unfinished spectacle my here-now flow of movement. Sensing is
before her. To be thinking in movement always at the interface of movings of a mind­
here means that the choreographer’s percep­ ful body.
tion of the dance is itself a kinetic drama: Insofar as my actual creating is concerned,
at the same time the choreographer views then, I am not exploring first, and then
the dance with an eye for movement, he or later taking some action. It is not as if I
she views it with a moving eye—and with a am contemplating or must contemplate a
moving body.10 In other words, thinking in world of possibilities in order to choose
movement is always a process in which from among them a ripest course of action.
sense becomes motion and motion, sense. My possibilities are not explicit and neither
Thus, whether choreographing the dance is my choosing. Rather, I make my way in
piecemeal or in one fell swoop, in the a pre-rational manner, a more primitive
immediacy of the creative act, perceiving mode of being, in which thinking is not
and moving are not separately occurring divorced from doing any more than per­
moments of experience. In turning exclu­ ceiving is divorced from moving. The
sively to improvisational dance, we can phrase, “more primitive,” and the term,
flesh out this experience more easily since “pre-rational,” are appropriate in respect to
it is here that the process of creating a dance a narrow view of thinking, i.e., a view in
is wholly and quintessentially a process of which rationality is tied to language and to
thinking in movement. thinking via a system of counters.11 Were
To say that in improvising, I am in the the notion of thinking broadened and in
process of creating the dance itself out of consequence the notion of rationality as
the possibilities which are mine at any well, then clearly, thinking in movement
moment of the dance, is to say that I am could be regarded and/or qualified as a
exploring the world in movement; that is, particular kind of rationality rather than as
at the same time that I am moving, I am pre-rational. This latter possibility will be
taking into account the world as it exists suggested again when the concept of a
for me here and now. As one might wonder bodily logos is introduced. For the present,
about the world in words, I am wondering certain psychological and semiotic concepts
the world directly, in movement; I am or theories might be singled out which,
actively exploring its possibilities and what while arising within a totally different con­
I perceive in the course of that wondering text, and at times propounding a wholly
or exploration is enfolded in the very antithetical position viz the idea of thinking
process of moving. A density or fluidity of without language, nonetheless suggest com­
other dancers about me, for example, or a monalities with the phenomenon of think­
sharpness and angularity of movement, is ing in movement as a form of rationality:
not first registered as a perception (still less for example, Piaget’s “practical or sensory­
as a sense-datum, and certainly not as a motor intelligence” which he describes as a
stimulus) a perception to which I then re­ “logic of action,”12 and Kristeva’s “pri­
spond in some manner by doing something. mordial semiotic of gesture” in which there
Qualities or presences are enfolded into my is no distinction between signifier and sig­
ongoing moving quality and presence. They nified, and in which a bodily doing sets
are absorbed by my movement. The world forth relations without specifying objects
which I am perceiving is inseparable from within these relations.13 Such a logic and
the world in which I am moving, in the semiotic clearly point toward a rationality
same way that the world I am exploring is which is active, that is, to a kinetic intelli­
inseparable from the world 1 am creating. gence, to a systematic kinetic ordering of
Sensing and moving do not come together the world. Whether such an intelligence be
from the nether ends of two separate designated “pre-rational” or “rational” is in

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 404 SHEETS-JOHNSTONE

a sense immaterial for what really matters or “thinking in images” might be.14 Yet
is the acknowledgement of a particular “thinking in movement” is an apt descrip­
modality of intelligence—of thinking—in tive rendering of a way of being in the
which possibilities and choices of action are world, a way which can be clarified and
neither spelled out in advance nor spelled elaborated further. It is possible in fact to
out explicitly. Within this modality, think­ point to situations other than improvisa­
ing is not linguistically or symbolically tional dance in which thinking in movement
reified in any way. At the same time neither occurs.
are the actions themselves counters in a A young pre-verbal child who first begins
system: they are not pointing or referring dismantling and reassembling a toy—a
to meanings beyond themselves but are in string of beads which comes together and
and of themselves intelligent and intelli­ apart by pushing and pulling, for example
gible. —is thinking in movement, making its way
This is not to say that, in the course of in a kinetically intelligent manner—perhaps
improvising, I might not at times move in a through what one might call a logic of action
way which, by certain cultural standards (or or a primordial semiotic of gesture—just as
according to certain aesthetic theories) might are two hungry female lions in tandem
be seen as referential. For example, I might strategic pursuit of a zebra.15 It would seem
shrug my shoulders, wave goodbye to a absurd in either situation to claim that
dancer leaving the stage, push another there is no thinking involved, or that there
dancer off balance, fall into the arms of a are thoughts which exist separately from the
nearby dancer, and so on. Within the con­ movement, thoughts which have been
text of improvisational dance, thinking in transcribed into movement and which the
movement is not limited to thinking in movement now clothes, e.g., “Let’s see, if
dance movement; hence, the incorporation I head it off from this direction, perhaps
of gestures from everyday life which have a Mary over there will move up on the zebra’s
certain culturally recognized meaning is right flank and . . . .” But it would be
not ruled out. Such gestures or movements, equally absurd to claim that the progression
however, do not necessarily make the dance of thought is tied to an externally imposed
symbolic. To use the above examples in rationality, that is, to a set of rules or con­
turn, the dance in which such a movement ditions of development which exist outside
happens is not thereby a dance about resig­ of the event or situation since no such rules
nation, a dance about partings, a dance or conditions of development are to be
about aggression, or a dance about love. found in the immediate flow of movement.
While each of the movements might be read On the contrary, the progression of thought,
off as standing for something, for the dancer the process of thinking in movement is tied
who is creating the dance, it is the dynamic to the evolving, changing situation itself.
patterning of movement, its subtleties and Hence, if one would speak at all of a
explosions, its range and rhythm which systematic reasonableness in either situation,
are paramount, and not its referential value. then it could not be in terms of each move­
Thus, in a dance improvisation, my move­ ment’s being logically connected to the next
ments are not “about” something any more movement by some formal, linear, or other­
than a smile is about pleasure. wise externally imposed regulative scheme.
Since my movements do not preexist tor The situation which is being created mo­
me as some kind of vocabulary out of which ment by moment is a process which develops
1 will form my thoughts (or dance) or into its own logic, i.e., its own rational or pre-
which I will pour my thoughts (or dance)— rational integrity, and it develops that logic
my movement is experienced neither as a or integrity, that systematic reasonableness,
means by which I am thinking nor as a on the basis of an implicit bodily logos.
container for my thoughts—the phrase To be thinking in movement means that
“thinking in movement” might be mislead­ a particular situation is unfolding as it is
ing, just as the phrases “thinking in words” being created by a mindful body; a kinetic

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Thinking in Movement 405

intelligence is forging its way in the world, dissolve into stillness or end abruptly, I
shaping and being shaped by the developing could not say when the gesture ended and
patterns surrounding it. The possibilities of when the stillness began, or that the stillness
the situation at any moment do not then was not an ongoing creation of the dance.
stand out as so many recourses of action My thinking in movement is thus not an
possible to take; they are adumbrated, assemblage of discrete gestures happening
mutely or tacitly given, in the immediacy one after the next, but an enfolding of all
of the evolving situation itself, a situation movement into a perpetually moving pres­
which moment by moment opens up a ent; my thinking in movement is an experi­
certain world and a certain way of being in ence in which all movements are blended
the world. Thus, in improvisational dance, into an ongoing kinetic happening: a sing­
possibilities arise and dissolve for me in a ular kinetic density evolves.
fluid complex of relationships, qualities, At the same time, that singular kinetic
and the like, without becoming thematic density is indistinguishable from my move­
for me. Pari passu, choices are not explicitly ment: this ongoing flow, this perpetually
made. Rather, a certain way of moving calls moving present, is nothing other than this
forth a certain world and a certain world moment in which my arm is sequentially
calls forth a certain way of moving; it is as waving, this moment in which my head is
much a matter of the fluid complex moving turning, and so on. My experience of an on­
me as it is a matter of my moving it, and going present exists only in virtue of an
from either end of the experience, it is a immediate moment, that is, the actual here-
matter of an implicit bodily logos.16 now creating of this gesture or movement.
There is thus a further way in which the But this gesture or movement is itself an
actual moment by moment creation of the opening out of the dance, a process of mov­
dance may be described as my thinking in ing. It has a thickness or density about it;
movement. The movement which I actually the turning movement I am now making
create at any moment is not a thing which with my head capsulates the dance, as it
I do, an action which I take, but a passing were, gathering up in its momentum all
moment within a dynamic process, a pro­ that has gone before and all that might lie
cess which I cannot divide into beginnings ahead. Each actual here-now movement of
and endings. There is an ambiguity about the dance has such a density, a pregnancy
my moving, a dissolution of my movements of being which stretches out the present
into my perpetually moving present and a moment, transfiguring it from a mere pass­
dilation of my perpetually moving present ing phase of a movement into a kinetic full­
in my movements. The sequential, waving ness or plentitude which radiates outward
gesture I am now making with my arm, for in a boundless procession of movement. The
example, is spilling over into a turning ongoing present I experience is thus indis­
movement I am now making with my head, tinguishable from the actual movement I
and the turning movement I am now mak­ am here and now creating. Thinking in
ing with my head is spilling over into a movement is a perpetual dissolution and
bending of my torso and a sideward leaping dilation, even a mutability, of here-now
in a direction opposite to that of my turn­ movements and a moving present. In fact,
ing head, and so on. I have indeed made I am creating the dance moment by moment
each of these movements—I have wondered in the possibilities of movement I discover
my way into them in the course of improvis­ in moving and in the possibilities of moving
ing—yet they are not detachable moments. I discover in movement.
They have no separate or separable exist­ There is one further aspect to be touched
ence for me. They are like the passing stages upon in this descriptive account of improvi­
of a forward-rolling, ongoing spiral coiling sational dance. We have seen that, in con­
back on itself in the process of rolling for­ trast to a quite particular and exclusive
ward. Even were the sequential, waving reification of thinking and/or to a concep­
gesture I am now making with my arm to tion of thinking as an exclusively mental

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 406 SHEETS-JOHNSTONE

event, thinking in movement is a way of thinking, or rather, reflect upon our experi­
being in the world, of wondering or explor­ ence of thinking and describe it fully, we
ing the world, of taking it up moment by might find that our insights have conse­
moment, and living it in the flesh. Think­ quences for epistemology and evolutionary
ing in movement is thus not a matter of a thought as well as for aesthetics.
symbol-making body, but of an existentially
declarative body. An existentially declarative 1 A “prolonged present” is Gertrude Stein’s de­
body does not mediate its way through the scriptive rendering of an ongoing present, a con-
tinuous-experiential-now. Her phrase is similar to
wrorld but lives it directly. The world it lives
William James’s “specious present” and to Henri
directly is not a given, immutable, or fac­ Bergson’s “the live present.” See Gertrude Stein,
titious world but the protean world it Composition as Explanation (London, 1926), pp.
creates moment by moment. That world 16-17; William James, The Principles of Psychol­
is experienced as an elongated or ongoing ogy (New York, 1950), p. 609; Henri Bergson, Mat­
present in which there are no hereafters, no ter and Memory (London, 1951), p. 176. See also
Shiv K. Kumar, Bergson and the Stream of Con­
sooner-or-laters, no expected or anticipated sciousness Novel (New York University Press, 1963),
places of arrival, and so on. Thus it is clear pp. 1-16 particularly. The experience of an ongoing
why the kind of dance it creates is not a or prolonged present in improvisational dance has
dance which the dancer might acknowledge obvious affinities with the experience of a stream
as being “about” something unless that of consciousness. If “stream of consciousness” did
not connote as well as denote an exclusively in­
something were movement itself. To under­
ternal, i.e., mental, process (James, Psychology, p.
stand such phenomena is to understand 239), it would in many instances be interchangeable
what Gertrude Stein meant when she said, with “thinking in movement.” Well-meaning tam­
“a rose is a rose is a rose.” Clearly, a rose perings with James’ original phrase—e.g., “stream
is not about something. Yet we might add of consciousness-body” or “stream of body”—fall
short of the mark and seem to perpetuate rather
that it is not either a capricious jumble of
than to allay the basic problem.
petals any more than the dance is a capri­ 2 Either this presumption is not the least out of
cious jumble of movements. The kinetic vogue, or if it is, I am not alone in beating a dead
intelligence which has created the dance horse. One of the most recent writings which both
informs the dance itself. No more than the documents and questions the practice of enshrin­
ing thinking in this fashion is Andrew Harrison’s
body must a dance stand for or refer to
Making and Thinking: A Study of Intelligent Ac­
something beyond itself in order for the tivities (Indianapolis, 1978). For an earlier but by
phenomenon to be dance: to have meaning no means obsolete critical review of the practice
is not necessarily to refer and neither is it see Hans G. Furth’s Thinking Without Language:
necessarily to have a label. Psychological Implications of Deafness (New York,
1966).
It would seem that if we are to fathom
3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Per­
such strata of human experience, we must ception, tr. by Colin Smith (New York, 1962), p. 182.
turn back to an existential world or find 4 Kurt Goldstein, quoted in Merleau-Ponty, op.
in our symbol-laden world patches where cit„ p. 196.
such phenomena as thinking in movement 5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investiga­
might come to light. Only in so doing might tions, tr. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1963), p.
107.
we discover that fundamental creativity 8 Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., pp. 181-182.
founded upon a bodily logos, that is, upon T Lectures in Contemporary Continental Philos­
a mindful body, a thinking body, a body ophy given at Temple University, Philadelphia,
which opens up into movement, a body Pennsylvania, March and April 1979.
which, in improvisational dance, breaks 8 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” tr. by
Carleton Dallery, in The Primacy of Perception, ed.,
forth continuously into dance and into by James M. Edie (Northwestern University Press,
this dance (as a body might break forth 1964), p. 178.
continuously into painting and into this 9 Harrison, Making and Thinking, p. 34: “The
painting, or into music and into this music), theological opposition which I have touched on in
a body which moment by moment fulfills a the previous chapter between a conception of a
maker’s activity that opens a logical gap between
kinetic destiny and so invests the world acting on materials and doing something to what
with meaning. It might even be suggested is made and a conception of a maker’s activity
that if we would rethink our notion of where there is no such gap might be labelled, if

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Thinking in Movement 407

we choose to adopt somewhat traditional theologi­ 12 Jean Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, tr. by Elea­
cal or metaphysical teminology (sic), as that be­ nor Duckworth (Columbia University Press, 1970),
tween a picture of a creator who is ‘transcenden­ pp. 41-46.
tal’ to his creation and one where his process of 13 Julia Kristeva, “Le Geste, Pratique ou Com­
thought ... is ‘imminant’ (sic) in the process of munication?” in Semiotike: Recherches pour une
his creation’s coming to be. What I am suggesting Semanalyse (Paris, 1969), pp. 94-97, particularly.
therefore is that very much this kind of contrast 14 See for example Hans Furth, Thinking With­
. . . reappears in that between the sort of maker’s out Language, p. 33: speaking of the followers of
activity exemplified by a worker on an assembly Wundt who insisted that thinking is always medi­
line and that of a sculptor ‘working on’ his ma­ ated by an internal image, Furth writes, “Included
terials.” I came across Harrison’s book after having in the term ‘image’ was internal language of some
written this essay but found his mode of distin­ sort, the visually imagined written word, the heard
guishing between ‘‘thought in action” and “thought word, and muscle movements of articulatory organs.
about action” much clearer and more succinct than Thus it could be said that thinking always took
my original description. Accordingly, I have appro­ place ‘in’ something.” Later on Furth questions,
priated his terminology, however reticently it might “Do we think with words, in words or do we visu­
have been adopted in the first place. alize or imaginatively hear words?” (p. 68).
10 See Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invis­ 15 For examples of nonverbal thinking in animals
ible (Working Notes), tr. by Alphonso Lingis see Otto Koehler’s “Non-Verbal Thinking” in Man
(Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 257: “To and Animal (London, 1972), pp. 92-101. Koehler
elucidate Wahrnehmen and Sich bewegen, show in fact makes the point that “So far as we know
that no Wahrnehmen perceives except on condition human beings are in no way superior to animals
of being a Self of movement.” See also, Theodore in nonverbal thinking, where matters that concern
Kisiel, “Aphasiology, Phenomenology of Perception animals are involved” (p. 99). On the other hand,
and the Shades of Structuralism,” in Language and one might speculate and with considerable justifi­
Language Disturbances, ed. by Erwin W. Straus cation whether, in the evolution of all animate
(Duquesne University Press, 1974), pp. 222-23: “one life, that is, including humans,, thinking in move­
might say that the language of the world is spon­ ment does not find its paradigmatic expression in
taneously translated into the language of the body the hunt—and for predator and prey alike. In other
in the process of mutual impregnation already dis words, wherever it is a question of attack and de­
cussed as physiognomic perception.” fense, thinking in movement is foundational. A
Scientific experimentation would seem to docu­ kinetic intelligence is certainly strongly suggested
ment further and indeed, depend upon, the lived even in the distinctly sedentary and “abstract”
reality described as an interpenetration of sense game of chess. See for example William G. Chase
and motion. Hinde, in his book, Animal Behavior: and Herbert Simon, “Perception in Chess,” Cog­
A Synthesis of Ethology and Comparative Psychol­ nitive Psychology, 4 (1973), 55-81: “By analyzing
ogy, notes, for example, that “In many of the ex­ an expert player’s eye movements, it has been
periments discussed thus far, perceptual develop­ shown that, among other things, he is looking at
ment has been assessed by the measurement of limb how pieces attack and defend each other.” They go
movement” (New York, 1970). on to say that, “It is no mistake of language for
11 It is interesting to note that in Harrison’s book the chess master to say that he ‘sees’ the right
cited above a case is made for “free design” (think­ move” (pp. 55 and 56 respectively).
ing in action as opposed to thinking about action) 18 For a comparative descriptive analysis of a
representing “practical thinking at its most primi­ bodily logos in music, see F. Joseph Smith, “To­
tive” (p. 160). A few pages earlier, Harrison has ward a Phenomenology of Musical Aesthetics,” in
noted that “the claim that the sort of thinking that Aesthesis and Aesthetics, ed. by Erwin W. Straus
is involved in designing is logically primitive to
and Richard M. Griffith [Duquesne University Press,
that practical thinking that is goal-directed or gov­
1970). For example, “There can be no artificial dis­
erned by principles expresses very little more than
tinction between thinking and doing. . . . The in­
the claim that experience of what is the case is a
condition for realistically imagining what might be. terplay of both theory and practice in a living
But this little more may still be of some impor­ praxis is best seen in the art of keyboard improvi­
tance, for what it argues is that a model of ration­ sation where mind leads fingers and fingers lead
ality that is based on goals and principles is one mind in an exhilarating musical experience. It is
that is divorced from the roots of thought in ac­ here . . . that one thinks with one’s body, in this
tion” (p. 154). (All italics added.) Again, though case with the fingers, which Stravinsky called his
this essay was written prior to a reading of Harri­ ‘inspirers’. . . . Phenomenologically speaking it is
son’s book, some parallel conceptions are suggested, a question of body thought ... in this case the
and to an extent, mutually reinforced. composer’s hands moving on the keyboard” (p 212).

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