DIVERSIFIED CREDIT V.

ROSADO 26 SCRA 470

DOCTRINE:

Co-ownership; Where a co-owner has no right to sell a divided part of the real estate owned in common,
or convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds.—It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership
that no individual co-owner can claim title to any def inite portion of the land or thing owned in common
until the partition thereof. Prior to that time, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners. The principle is
emphasized by the rulings of this Court. In Lopez v. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567, it was held that while a co-owner
has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, he has no right to sell a divided part of the
real estate owned in common. "If he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has the right to
sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and convey the
whole of one part by metes and bounds." The doctrine was reiterated in Mercado v. Liwanag, L-14429,
June 20, 1962, holding that a co-owner may not convey a physical portion of the land owned in common.
And in Santos v. Buenconsejo, L-20136, June 23, 1965, it was ruled that a coowner may not even
adjudicate to himself any determinate portion of land owned in common.

Where claim of conversion of wife's share from paraphernal to conjugal in character as a result of a
building construction was rejected; Article 158, Civil Code, held inapplicable; Case at bar.—The key
question in the case at bar is whether by the construction of a house on the lot owned in common by the
Jaymes, and sold by them to the appellant corporation, the land in question or a 1/13th part of it became
conjugal property. Since the share of the wife, Luz Jayme, was at no time physically determined, it can
not be validly claimed that the house constructed by her husband was built on land belonging to her, and
Article 158 of the Civil Code can not apply. Certainly, on her 1/13th ideal or abstract undivided share, no
house could be erected. Necessarily, the claim of conversion of the wife's share from paraphernal to
conjugal in character as a result of the construction must be rejected for lack of factual or legal basis.

FACTS:

The case had its origin in the Municipal Court of Bacolod City, when the Diversified Credit Corporation
filed an action to compel the spouses Felipe Rosado and Luz Jayme Rosado to vacate and restore
possession of a parcel of land in the City of Bacolod.

After... answer, claiming that the lot was defendants' conjugal property, the Municipal Court ordered
defendants to surrender and vacate the land in litigat

Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance, the case was submitted on the following stipulation of facts
(Rec. on App., pp. 59-60):

1. That Lot No. 62-B of Bacolod Cadastre belongs to the thirteen co-owners, including the wife of
the defendant herein, who owns 1/13th part... pro-indiviso;
2. That on May 11, 1964, Luz Jayme Rosado, wife of the defendant Felipe Rosado, signed a Deed
of Sale together with the co-owners of the property to the... plaintiff;
3. That on the lot in question the defendant Felipe Rosado had built a house sometime in 1957
without the whole property having been previously partitioned among the thirteen (13)... co-
owners;
4. That the title of the property has already been transferred to the plaintiff upon registration of the
Deed of Sale in June, 1964, with the Office of the Register of Deeds;
 5. That demand was made by the plaintiff upon the defendant Felipe Rosado and his wife Luz
Jayme Rosado on October 19, 1964, but until now the defendant Felipe Rosado has... refused to
vacate the premises or to remove his house

The Court of first Instance in its decision rejected the claim of ownership advanced by Rosado, based
upon the construction of a house on the disputed lot by the conjugal partnership of the Rosado spouses,
which allegedly converted the land into conjugal property under

Article 158, paragraph 2 of the present Civil Code of the Philippines

Defendant Felipe Rosado resorted to the Court of Appeals, and his appeal (CA-G. R. No. 37398-R) is the
one now before us.

ISSUE:

Whether or not by the construction of a house on the lot owned in common by the Jaymes, and sold by
them to the appellant corporation, the land in question or a 1/13th part of it became conjugal property.

RULING:

Rosado further contends that as the building of the house at the expense of the conjugal partnership
converted the 1/13 undivided share on his wife in Lot 62-B into property of the community, the deed of
sale of May 11, 1964 in favor of the appellee corporation... was void in so far as said 1/13 share is
concerned, because his wife, Luz Jayme, had ceased to own such share from and after the building of the
house; and Rosado, as manager of the conjugal partnership, had not participated in the sale, nor
subsequently ratified... the same.

The appellant's thesis legally untenable.

For it is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership, both under the present Civil Code as in the Code of
1889, that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in...
common until the partition thereof.

The principle is emphasized by the rulings of this Court. In Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567, it was held that
while a co-owner has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, he has no right to... sell
a divided part of the real estate owned in common. "If he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of
land, he has the right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two
parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and... bounds."

Since the share of the wife, Luz Jayme, was at no time physically determined, it can not be validly
claimed that the house constructed by her husband was built on land belonging to her, and Article 158 of
the Civil Code cannot apply.

Certainly, on her 1/13 ideal or abstract undivided share, no house could be erected. Necessarily, the claim
of conversion of the wife's share from paraphernal to conjugal in character as a result of the construction
must... be rejected for lack of factual or legal basis.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. Costs against appellant Felipe
Rosado.