Philosophical and Methodological Foundations of Delphi

IAN I. MITROFF and MURRAY TUROFF

It takes two of us to create a truth,

one to utter it and one to understand it.

—Kahlil Gibran

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to show that underlying any scientific technique,
theory, or hypothesis there is always some philosophical basis or theory about
the nature of the world upon which that technique, theory, or hypothesis
fundamentally rests or depends. We also wish to show that there is more than
one fundamental basis which can underlie any technique, or in other words, that
there is no one "best" or even "unique" philosophical basis which underlies any
scientific procedure or theory. Depending upon the basis which is presumed,
there results a radically different developmental and application history of a
technique. Thus in this sense, the particular basis upon which a scientific
procedure depends is of fundamental practical importance and not just of
philosophical interest.

We human beings seem to have a basic talent for disguising through

phraseology the fundamental similarities that exist between common metho-
dologies of a different name. As a result, we often bicker and quarrel about such
superficial matters as whether this or that name is appropriate for a certain
technique when the real issue is whether the philosophical basis or system of
inquiry that underlies a proposed technique or methodology is sound and
appropriate. We are indeed the prisoners of our basic images of reality. Not only
are we generally unaware of the different philosophical images that underlie our
various technical models, but each of us has a fundamental image of reality that
runs so deep that often we are the last to know that we hold it. As a result we
disagree with our fellow man and we experience inner conflict without really
knowing why. What's worse, we ensure this ignorance and conflict by hiding
behind catchwords and fancy names for techniques. The field of endeavor
subsumed under the name of Delphi is no less remiss in this respect than many
other disciplines. Its characteristic vocabulary more often obscures the issues
than illuminates them.

One of the basic purposes of our discussion is to bring these fundamental

differences and conflicts of methodology up to the surface for conscious
examination so that, one hopes, we can be in a better position to choose
explicitly the approach we wish to adopt. In order to accomplish this we
consider a number of fundamental historical stances that men have taken toward
the problem of establishing the "truth content" of a system of communication
signals or acts. More precisely, the purpose of this article is to examine the
variety of ways and mechanisms in which men have chosen to locate the criteria
which would supposedly "guarantee" our "true and accurate understanding" of
the "content" of a communication act or acts. We will also show that every one
of these fundamental ways differs sharply from the others and that each of them
has major strengths as well as major weaknesses. The moral of this discussion
will be that there is no one "single best jay" for ensuring our understanding of
the content of a set of communication acts or for ascribing validity to a
communication. The reason is that there is no one mode of ensuring
understanding or for prescribing the validity of a communication that possesses
all of the desired characteristics that one would like any preferred mode to
possess. As we wish to illustrate, this awareness itself constitutes a kind of
strength. To show that there is no one mode that can satisfy our every
requirement, i.e., that there is no one mode that is best in all senses and for all
circumstances, is not to say that each of these modes does not appear to be
"better suited" for some special set of circumstances.

Since these various modes or characteristic models for ensuring validity

basically derive from the history of Western philosophy, another objective of
this article is also to show what philosophy and, especially, what the philosophy
of science specifically and concretely has to offer the field of Delphi design. For
example, one of the things we wish to show is which among these various
philosophical modes have been utilized to date (and how) and which have been
neglected. When there has been little or no utilization of a particular
philosophical basis then we may infer existing gaps in the development of the
Delphi to date.

Before we describe each of these philosophical modes or systems more fully, we

can rather easily and simply convey the general spirit of each of them by means
of the following exercise. Suppose we are given a set of statements or
propositions by some individual or group which pretend to describe some
alleged "truth." Then each of our philosophical systems (hereafter referred to as
an Inquiring System, or IS) can be simply differentiated from one another in
terms of the kind of characteristic question(s) that each would address either to
the statement itself or to the individual (group) making the statement or
assertion. Each question in effect embodies the major philosophical criterion
that would have to be met before that Inquiring System would accept the
propositions as valid or as true.

The Leibnizian analyst or IS would ask something like:

How can one independently of any empirical or personal considerations give a
purely rational justification of the proposed proposition or assertion? Can one
build or demonstrate a rational model which underlies the proposition or
assertion? How was the result deduced; is it precise, certain?

The Lockean analyst or IS would ask something like:

Since for me data are always prior to the development of formal theory, how can
one independently of any formal model justify the assertion by means of some
objective data or the consensus of some group of expert judges that bears on the
subject matter of the assertions? What are the supporting "statistics"? What is
the "probability" that one is right? Are the assertions a good "estimate" of the
true empirical state of affairs?

The Kantian analyst or IS would ask something like:

Since data and theory (models) always exist side by side, does there exist some
combination of data or expert judgment plus underlying theoretical justification
for the data that would justify the propositions? What alternative sets of
propositions exist and which best satisfy my objectives and offer the strongest
combination of data plus model?

The Hegelian (Dialectical) analyst or IS would ask something like:

Since every set of propositions is a reflection of a more general theory or plan

about the nature of the world as a whole system, i.e., a world-view, does there
exist some alternate sharply differing world-view that would permit the serious
consideration of a completely opposite set of propositions? Why is this opposing
view not true or more desirable? Further, does this conflict between the plan and
the counterplan allow a third plan or world-view to emerge that is a creative
synthesis of the original plan and counterplan?

Finally, the Singerian analyst or IS would ask:

Have we taken a broad enough perspective of the basic problem? Have we from
the very beginning asked the right question? Have we focused on the right
objectives? To what extent are the questions and models of each inquirer a
reflection of the unique personality of each inquirer as much as they are felt to
be a "natural" characteristic or property of the "real" world?"

Even at this point in the discussion, it should be apparent that as a body these are
very different kinds of questions and that each of them is indicative of a
fundamentally different way of ascribing content to a communication. It should
also he apparent, and it should really go without saying, that these do not
exhaust the universe of potential questions. There are many more philosophical
positions and approaches to "validity" than we could possibly hope to deal with
in this article. These positions do represent, however, some of the most
significant basic approaches and, in a sense, pure-modes from which others can
be constructed.

The plan of the rest of this article is briefly as follows: first, we shall describe
each inquirer in turn and in general terms, but we hope in enough detail to give
the reader more of a feel for each system; second, along with the description of
each inquirer, we shall attempt to point out the influence or lack of influence
each philosophy of inquiry has had on the Delphi technique; and third, we shall
attempt to point out some general conclusions regarding the nature and future of
the Delphi technique as a result of this analysis.
It should be borne in mind as we proceed that the question of concern is not how
we can determine or agree on the meaning of "truth" with "perfect or complete
certainty," for put in this form, the answer is clearly that we cannot know
anything with "perfect certainty." We cannot even know with "perfect certainty"
that "we cannot know anything with `perfect certainty."' The real question is
what can we know and, even more to the point, how we can justify what we
think we can know. It is on this very issue that the difference between the
various Inquiring Systems arises and the utility or value of the Delphi technique
depends.

Inquiring Systems (IS)

The process of inquiry, whether it be for a single individual or a group of

individuals, may be "represented" by a very general system. We start with some
assumed "external event" or "raw data set" which for the moment we consider to
be a characteristic property of the "real world," i.e., we assume the data set
"exists" in the "external world." (As we shall see in a moment, this amounts to
assuming a Lockean IS beginning. The point is that we can't even begin to
describe the "world" and our "knowledge" of "it" without having to invoke some
"conceptualization," i.e., some Inquiring System characterization, of "it.") Next
we apply some transformation and/or filter to the "raw data" in order to get it
into the "right form" for input to some model. The model, which may be any sort
of structured process, is represented by a set of rules which may be either in the
form of an algorithm or a set of heuristic principles. The model acts on the input
to transform it from the state of "input data" to the state of "output information."
This output information may in turn be passed through another filter or
transform to put it in the right form so that a decisionmaker can recognize and
utilize it as "information" or as a "policy recommendation." In terms of this
general configuration, the various IS can be differentiated from one another with
respect to (1) the priority assigned to the various systems components, i.e.,
which components are regarded as more important or fundamental by one IS
than by another, and (2) the degree of interdependence assigned to the various
systems components by each IS.

Our objective in the following discussion will be to draw a sufficient distinction

between the philosophical Inquirying System (IS) concepts so that we can place
alternative Delphi design methodologies into this perspective.

Lockean IS

As first pioneered by Dalkey, Helmer, and Rescher at Rand, the Delphi

technique represents a prime example of Lockean inquiry. Indeed, one would be
hard pressed to find a better contemporary example of a Lockean inquirer than
the Delphi.

The philosophical mood underlying the major part of empirical science is that of
Locke. The sense of Lockean IS can be rather quickly and generally grasped in
terms of the following characteristics:

(1) Truth is experiential, i.e., the truth content of a system (or communication) is
associated entirely with its empirical content. A model of a system is an
empirical model and the truth of the model is measured in terms of our ability
(a) to reduce every complex proposition down to its simple empirical referents
(i.e., simple observations) and (b) to ensure the validity of each of the simple
referents by means of the widespread, freely obtained agreement between
different human observers.
(2) A corollary to (1) is that the truth of the model does not rest upon any
theoretical considerations, i.e., upon the prior assumption of any theory (this is
the equivalent of Locke's tabula rasa). Lockean inquirers are opposed to the
prior presumption of theory, since in their view this exactly reverses the
justifiable order of things. Data are that which are prior to and justify theory, not
the other way around. The only general propositions which are accepted are
those which can be justified through "direct observation" or have already been
so justified previously. In sum, the data input sector is not only prior to the
formal model or theory sector but it is separate from it as well. The whole of the
Lockean IS is built up from the data input sector.

In brief, Lockean IS are the epitome of experimental, consensual systems. On

any problem, they will build an empirical, inductive representation of it. They
start from a set of elementary empirical judgments ("raw data," observations,
sensations) and from these build up a network of ever expanding, increasingly
more general networks of factual propositions. Where in the Leibnizian IS to be
discussed shortly the networks are theoretically, deductively derived, in a
Lockean IS they are empirically, inductively derived. The guarantor of such
systems has traditionally been the function of human agreement, i.e., an
empirical generalization (or communication) is judged "objective," "true," or
"factual" if there is "sufficient widespread agreement" on it by a group of
"experts." The final information content of a Lockean IS is identified almost
exclusively with its empirical content.

A prime methodological example of Lockean thinking can be found in the field

of statistics. Although statistics is heavily Leibnizian in the sense that it devotes
a considerable proportion o£ its energies to the formal treatment of data and to
the the development of formal statistical models, there is a strong if not almost
pure Lockean component as well. The pure Lockean component manifests itself
in the attitude that although statistical methods may "transform" the "basic raw
data" and "represent" "it" differently, statistical methods themselves are
presumed not to create the "basic raw data." In this sense, the "raw data" are
presumed to be prior to and independent of the formal (theoretical) statistical
treatment of the data. The "raw data" are granted a prior existential status.
Another way to put this is to say that there is little or no match between the
theory that the observer of the raw data has actually used (and has had to use) in
order to collect his "raw data" in the first place and the theory (statistics) he has
used to analyze it in the second place A typical Lockean point of view is the
assertion that one doesn't need any theory in order to collect data first, only to
analyze it subsequently.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the Delphi, at least as it was

originally developed, is a classic example of a Lockean inquirer. Furthermore,
the Lockean basis of Delphi still remains the prime philosophical basis of the
technique to date.

As defined earlier Delphi is a procedure for structuring a communication

process among a large group of individuals. In assessing the potential
development of, say, a technical area, a large group (typically in the tens or
hundreds) are asked to "vote" on when they think certain events will occur. One
of the major premises underlying the whole approach is the assumption that a
large number of "expert" judgments is required in order to "treat adequately"
any issue. As a result, a face-to-face exchange among the group members would
be inefficient or impossible because of the cost and time that would be involved
in bringing all the parties together. The procedure is about as pure and perfect a
Lockean procedure as one could ever hope to find because, first, the "raw data
inputs" are the opinions or judgments of the experts; second, the validity of the
resulting judgment of the entire group is typically measured in terms of the
explicit "degree of consensus" among the experts. What distinguishes the Delphi
from an ordinary polling procedure is the feedback of the information gathered
from the group and the opportunity of the individuals to modify or refine their
judgments based upon their reaction to the collective views of the group.
Secondary characteristics are various degrees of anonymity imposed on the
individual and collective responses to avoid undesirable psychological effects.

The problems associated with Delphi illustrate the problems associated with
Lockean inquiry in general. The judgments that typically survive a Delphi
procedure may not be the "best" judgments but, rather, the compromise position.
As a result, the surviving judgments may lack the significance that extreme or
conflicting positions may possess.

The strength of Lockean IS lies in their ability to sweep in rich sources of

experiential data. In general, the sources are so rich that they literally overwhelm
the current analytical capabilities of most Leibnizian (analytical) systems. The
weaknesses, on the other hand, are those that beset all empirical systems. While
experience is undoubtedly rich, it can also be extremely fallible and misleading.
Further, the "raw data," "facts," or "simple observables" of the empiricist have
always on deeper scientific and philosophical analysis proved to be exceedingly
complex and hence further divisible into other entities themselves thought to be
indivisible or simple, ad infinitum, More troublesome still is the almost extreme
and unreflective reliance on agreement as the sole or major principle for
producing information and even truth out of raw data. The trouble with
agreement is that its costs can become too prohibitive and agreement itself can
become too imposing. It is not that agreement has nothing to recommend it. It is
just that agreement is merely one of the many philosophical ways for producing
"truth" out of experiential data. The danger with agreement is that it may stifle
conflict and debate when they are needed most. As a result, Lockean IS are best
suited for working on well-structured problem situations for which there exists a
strong consensual position on "the nature of the problem situation." If these
conditions or assumptions cannot be met or justified by the decisionmaker-for
example, if it seems too risky to base projections of what, say, the future will be
like on the judgments of expertsthen no matter how strong the agreement
between them is, some alternate system of inquiry may be called for.

While the consensus-oriented Delphi may be appropriate to technological

forecasting it may be somewhat inappropriate for such things as technology
assessment, objective or policy formulation, strategic planning, and resource
allocation analyses. These latter applications of Delphi often or should involve
the necessity to explore or generate alternatives, which is very different from the
generation of consensus.

Leibnizian IS

The philosophical mood underlying the major part of theoretical science is that
of Leibniz. The sense of Leibnizian inquiry can be rather quickly and generally
captured in terms of the following characteristics:

(1) Truth is analytic; i.e., the truth content of a system is associated entirely with
its formal content. A model of a system is a formal model and the truth of the
model is measured in terms of its ability to offer a theoretical explanation of a
wide range of general phenomena and in terms of our ability as modelbuilders to
state clearly the formal conditions under which the model holds.
(2) A corollary to (1) is that the truth of the model does not rest upon any
external considerations, i.e., upon the raw data of the external world. Leibnizian
inquirers regard empirical data as an inherently risky base upon which to found
universal conclusions of any kind, since from a finite data set one is never
justified in inferring any general proposition. The only general propositions
which are accepted are those that can be justified through purely rational models
and/or arguments. Through a series of similar arguments, Leibnizian IS not only
regard the formal model component as separate from the data input component
but prior to it as well. Another way to put this is to say that the whole of the
Leibnizian IS is contained in the formal sector and thus it has priority over all
the other components.

In short, Leibnizian IS are the epitome of formal, symbolic systems. For any
problem, they will characteristically strive to reduce it to a formal mathematical
or symbolic representation. They start from a set of elementary, primitive
"formal truths" and from these build up a network of ever expanding,
increasingly more general, formal propositional truths. The guarantor of such
systems has traditionally been the precise specification of what shall count as a
proof for a derived theorem or proposition; other guarantor notions are those of
internal consistency, completeness, comprehensiveness, etc. The final
information content of Leibnizian IS is identified almost exclusively with its
symbolic content.

A prime example of Leibnizian inquiry is the field of Operations Research (OR)

in the sense that the major energies of the profession have been almost
exclusively directed toward the construction and exploration of highly
sophisticated formal models. OR is a prime example of Leibnizian inquiry not
because there is no utilization of external data whatsoever in OR models but
because in the training of Operations Researchers significantly more attention is
paid to teaching students how to build sophisticated models than in teaching
them equally sophisticated methods of data collection and analyses. There is the
implication that the two activities are separable, i.e., that data can be collected
independently of formal methods of analysis.

Delphi by itself is not a Leibnizian inquirer and is better viewed from the
perspective of some of the alternative Inquiring Systems. However, many of the
views and assertions made with respect to the Delphi technique involve
Leibnizian arguments. Delphi has, for example, been accused of being very
"unscientific." When assertions of this type are examined one usually finds the
underlying proposition rests on equating what is "scientific" to what is
"I,eibnizian." This is a common misconception that has also affected other
endeavors in the social, or so-called soft, sciences where it is felt that the
development of a discipline into a science must follow some preordained path
leading to the situation where all the results of the discipline can be expressed in
Leibnizian "laws." We have today in such areas as economics, sociology, etc.,
schools of research dedicated to the construction of formal models as ends in
themselves.

In Delphi we find a similar phenomenon taking place where models are

constructed for the purpose of describing the Delphi process and for determin
ing the "truth" content of a given Delphi. (See, for example, the articles in
Chapter IV.) One model hypothesizes that the truth content of a Delphi result
(often measured as the error) increases as the size of the Delphi group increases.
This concept is often used to guide the choice of the size of the participant group
in a Delphi. Other formal models have been proposed to measure an individual's
"expertise" as a function of the quantity of information supplied and the length
of associated questions. All such models, which are independent of the content
of what is being communicated but look fo r structured relationships in the
process of the communication, are attempts to ascribe Leibnizian properties to
the Delphi process. The existence of such models in certain circumstances do
not in themselves make the Delphi technique any more or less "scientific." They
are certainly useful in furthering our understanding of the technique and should
be encouraged. However, they are based upon assumptions, such as the
superiority of theory over data and the general applicability of formal methods
of reasoning, which are quite suspect with respect to the scope of application of
the Delphi technique and the relative experimental bases upon which most of
these models currently rest. The utility of Delphi, at least in the near future, does
not appear to rest upon making Delphi appear or be more Leibnizian but, rather,
in the recognition of what all the IS models can contribute to the development of
the Delphi methodology. Our current understanding of human thought and
decision processes is probably still too rudimentary to expect generally valid
formal models of the Delphi process at this time.

For which kinds of problem situations are Lcibnizian analyses most appropriate?

First of all, the situations must be sufficiently "well understood" and "simple
enough" so that they can be modeled. Thus, Leibnizian IS are best suited for
working on clearly definable (i.e., well-structured) problems for which there
exists an analytic formulation as well as solution. Second, the modeler must
have strong reasons for believing in the assumptions which underlie Leibnizian
inquiry, e.g., that the model is universally and continually applicable. In a basic
sense, the fundamental guarantor of Leibnizian inquiry is the "understanding" of
the model-builder; i.e., he must have enough faith in his understanding of the
situation to believe he has "accurately" and "faithfully" represented it.
Note that there is no sure way to prove or justify the assumptions underlying
Leibnizian inquiry. The same is true of all the other IS. But then this is not the
point. The point is to show the kinds of assumptions we are required to make if
we wish to employ Lcibnizian inquiry so that if the decisionmaker or modeler is
unwilling to live with these assumptions he will know that another IS may
possibly be called for.

Kantian IS

The preceding two sections illustrate the difficulties that arise from emphasizing
one of the components of a tightly coupled system of inquiry to the detriment of
other components. Leibnizian inquiry emphasizes theory to the detriment of
data. Lockean inquiry emphasizes data to the detriment of theory. When these
attitudes are translated into professional practice, what often results is the
development of highly sophisticated models with little or no concern for the
difficult problems associated with the collection of data or the seemingly endless
proliferation of data with little regard for the dictates of currently existing
models.

The recent controversy surrounding the attempts of Forrester and Meadows1 to

build a "World Model" is a good illustration of the strong differences between
these two points of view. In our opinion, the work of Forrester and Meadows
represents an almost pure Leibnizian approach to the modeling of large,
complicated systems. The Forrester and Meadows model is, in effect, data
independent. One can criticize the model on pure Leibnizian grounds, e.g.,
whether the internal theory and structure of the model are sound with respect to
current economic and social theory, and some of the critics have chosen to do
this. However, it would seem to us that more often than not the critics have
chosen to offer a Lockean critique, i.e., that some other way, say using accurate
statistical data, is a better way to build a sound forecast model of the world.
While this is a legitimate method of criticism, to a large extent it only further
exacerbates the differences between the two approaches and hence misses the
real point. To us the real point is not whether the ForresterMeadows approach is
the correct Leibnizian approach, or whether there is a correct Lockean approach,
but rather, whether any Leibnizian or Lockean approach acting independently of
the other could ever possibly be "correct." Forrester and Meadows seek to justify
(guarantee?) their approach through the robustness and richness of their model,
and their Lockean critics attempt to establish the validity of their approach
through the priority and "regularity" of the statistical data to which they appeal.
Perhaps if the debate proves anything, it raises the serious question as to whether
an advanced modern society can continue to rely on purely Leibnizian or
Lockean efforts for its planning. In order to evaluate the relative merits of
separate Leibnizian or Lockean in quirers, it is necessary to go to a competing
philosophy which incorporates both, such as the Kantian inquirer.

The sense of Kantian inquiry can be rather quickly grasped through the
following set of general characteristics:

(1) Truth is synthetic; i.e., the truth content of a system is not located in either its
theoretical or its empirical components, but in both. A model of a system is a
synthetic model in the sense that the truth of the model is measured in terms of
the model's ability (a) to associate every theoretical term of the model with some
empirical referent

1 Meadows, Dennis "Limits to Growth" 1972 Universe Books. and (b) to show

that (how) underlying the collection of every empirical observation related to the
phenomenon under investigation there is an associated theoretical referent.
(2) A corollary to (1) is that neither the data input sector nor the theory sector
have priority over one another. Theories or general propositions are built up
from data, and in this sense theories are dependent on data, but data cannot be
collected without the prior presumption of some theory of data collection (i.e., a
theory of "how to make observations," "what to observe," etc.), and in this sense
data are dependent on theories. Theory and data are inseparable. In other words,'
Kantian IS require some coordinated image or plan of the system as a whole
before any sector of the system can be worked on or function properly.

These hardly begin to exhaust all the features we identify with Kantian inquiry.
A more complete description would read as follows: Kantian IS are the epitome
of multimodel, synthetic systems. On any problem, they will build at least two
alternate representations or models of it. (If the alternate representations are
complementary, we have a Kantian IS; if they are antithetical, we have a
Hegelian IS, as described in the next section.) The representations are partly
Leibnizian and partly Lockean; i.e., Kantian IS make explicit the strong
interaction between scientific theory and data. They show that in order to collect
some scientific data on a problem a posteriori one always has had to presuppose
the existence of some scientific theory a priori, no matter how implicit and
informal that theory may be. Kantian IS presuppose at least two alternate
scientific theories (this is their Leibnizian component) on any problem or
phenomenon. From these alternate Leibnizian bases, they then build up at least
two alternate Lockean fact nets. The hope is that out of these alternate fact nets,
or representations of a decisionmaker's or client's problem, there will be one that
is "best" for representing his problem. The defect of Leibnizian and Lockean IS
is that they tend to give only one explicit view of a problem situation. Kantian IS
attempt to give many explicit views. The guarantor of such systems is the degree
of fit or match between the underlying theory (theoretical predictions) and the
data collected under the presumption of that theory plus the "deeper insight" and
"greater confidence" a decisionmaker feels he has as a result of witnessing many
different views of his problem.

The reason Kantian IS place such a heavy emphasis on alternate models is that
in dealing with problems like planning for the future, the real concern is how to
get as many perspectives on the nature of the problem as possible. Problems
which involve the future cannot be formulated and solved in the same way that
one solves problems in arithmetic, i.e., via a single, wellstructured approach.
There seems to be something fundamentally different about the class to which
planning problems belong. In dealing with the future, we are not dealing with
the concrete realities of human existence, but, if only in part, with the hopes, the
dreams, the plans, and the aspirations of men. Since different men rarely share
the same aspirations, it seems that the best way to "analyze" aspirations is to
compare as many of them against one another as we can. If the future is 99
percent aspiration or plan, it would seem that the best way to get a handle on the
future is to draw forth explicitly as many different aspirations or plans for the
future as possible. In short, we want to examine as many different alternate
futures as we can.

In the field of planning, Normative Forecasting, Planning Programming

Budgeting Systems (PPBS), and Cost-Effectiveness or Cost-Benefit Analyses
are all examples of Kantian inquiry, although these are such low-level Kantian
inquirers as to be almost more Leibnizian in nature than Kantian. The Kantian
element that these various approaches share is the fact that they are all
concerned with alternate paths, or methods, of getting from a present state to a
future state characterized by certain objectives, needs, or goals. When these
various planning vehicles have failed, it is not just because we are dealing with
an inherently fuzzy problem-indeed that is the basic nature of the problembut
because we have failed to produce alternatives that are true alternatives and to
show that the data, models, and objectives cannot be separated for purposes of
planning.

In recent years, there have been a number of Delphi studies which in contrast to
the original Lockean-based consensus Delphis begin "to take on" more actively
the characteristics of Kantian inquiry. The initial Delphis were characterized by
a strong emphasis on the use of consensus by a group of "experts" as the means
to converge on a single model or position on some issue. In contrast, the explicit
purpose of a Kantian Delphi is to elicit alternatives so that a comprehensive
overview of the issue can take place. In terms of communication processes,
while a "consensus," or Lockean, Delphi is better suited to setting up a
communication structure among an already informed group that possesses the
same general core of knowledge, a Kantian, or "contributory," Delphi attempts
to design a structure which allows many "informed" individuals in different
disciplines or specialties to contribute information or judgments to a problem
area which is much broader in scope than the knowledge that any one of the
individuals possesses. This type of Delphi has been applied to the
conceptualization of such problems as: (1) the definition of a structural model
for material flows in the steel industry (see Chapter III, C, 3); (2) the
examination of the current and the potential role of the mentally retarded in
society (see Chapter VI, D); (3) the forecasting of the future characteristics of
recreation and leisure (see Chapter VI, D); and (4) the examination of the past

history of the internal combustion engine2 for a clue to significant events

possibly affecting its future. While all of these Delphis had specific forecasting
objectives, none of them could be achieved if all the parties to the Delphi were
drawn from the same specialized interest group. The problems were broader
than that which could be encompassed by any single discipline or mode of
thinking. For exa mple, the examination of the role of the mentally retarded in
our society is neither the exclusive problem nor the sole province of any special
group. Educators, psychiatrists, parents, and teachers all have different and valid
perspectives to contribute to the definition of the "problem." Consensus on a
single definition is not the goal, at least not in the initial stages, but rather, the
eliciting of many diverse points of view and potential aspects of the problem. In
essence, the objective is establishing how to fit the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle
together, and even determining if it is one or many puzzles.

The problem of conceptualizing goals and objectives is not an explicit part of

the three inquiry processes we have discussed so far. That is, the Leibnizian and
Lockean IS are not explicitly goal directed. For example, Leibnizian IS assume
that the same rational model is applicable no matter what the problem and the
objectives of the decisionmaker or who it is that has the problem. In contrast, the
Kantian IS is explicitly goal oriented, i.e., it hopes by presenting a
decisionmaker with several alternative models of his problem to better clarify
both the problem and the nature of the objectives, which after all are part of the
"problem."

Kantian inquiry is best suited to problems which are inherently illstructured, i.e.,
the kinds of problems which are inherently difficult to formu late in pure
Leibnizian or Lockean terms because the nature of the problem does not admit
of a clear consensus or a simple analytic attack. On the other hand, the Kantian
inquiry is not especially suited for the kinds of problems which admit of a single
clear-cut formulation because here the proliferation of alternate models may not
only be costly but time consuming as well. Kantian inquiry may also overwhelm
those who are used to "the single best model" approach to any problem. Of
course this in itself is not necessarily bad if it helps to teach those who hold this
belief that there are some kinds of problems for which there is no one best
approach. Social problems inherently seem to be of this kind and thus to call for
Kantian approach. The concept of "technology assessment" as a vehicle for
determining the relationships between technology and social consequences
would also seem to imply the necessity of at least a Kantian approach. Many
efforts which fall under the heading of "assessments" have proved to be
inadequate because they were conducted on pure Leibnizian or Lockean bases.

Hegelian, or Dialectical, IS

The idea of the Hegelian, or Dialectical, IS can be conveyed as follows:

(1) Truth is conflictual; i.e., the truth content of a system is the result of a highly
complicated process which depends on the existence of a plan and a
diametrically opposed counterplan. The plan and the counterplan represent
strongly divergent and opposing conceptions of the whole system. The function
of the plan and the counterplan is to engage each other in an unremitting debate
over the "true" nature of the whole system, in order to draw forth a new plan that
will, one hopes, reconcile

(synthesize, encompass) the plan and the counterplan.

(2) A corollary to (1) is that by itself the data inlnit sector is totally meaningless

and only becomes meaningful, i.e., "information," by being coupled to the plan
and the counterplan. Further, it is postulated that there is a particular input data
set which can be shown to be consistent with both the plan and the counterplan;
i.e., by itself this data set supports neither naturally, but there is an interpretation
of the data such that it is consistent with both the plan and the counterplan, It is
also postulated that without both the plan and the counterplan the meaning of the
data is incomplete, i.e., partial. Thus, under this system of inquiry, the plan and
the counterplan which constitute the theory sector are prior to the input sector
and indeed constitute opposing conceptions of the whole system. Finally, it is
also assumed that on every issue of importance, there can be found or
constructed a plan and a counterplan; i.e., a dialectical debate can be formulated
with respect to any issue. On any issue of importance there will be an intense
division of opinion or feeling.

Hegelian, or Dialectical, IS are the epitome of conflictual, synthetic systems. On

any problem, they build at least two, completely antithetical, representations of
it. Hegelian IS start with either the prior existence (identification) of or the
creation of two strongly opposing (contrary) Leibnizian models of a problem.
These opposing representations constitute the contrary underlying assumptions
regarding the theoretical nature of the problem. Both of these Leibnizian
representations are then applied to the same Lockean data set in order to
demonstrate the crucial nature of the underlying theoretical assumptions, i.e.,
that the same data set can be used to support either theoretical model. The point
is that data are not information; information is that which results from the
interpretation of data. It is intended that out of a dialectical confrontation
between opposing interpretations (e.g., the opposing "expert" views of a
situation), the underlying assumptions of both Leibnizian models (or opposing
policy experts) will be brought up to the surface for conscious examination by
the decision- maker who is dependent upon his experts for advice. It is also
hoped that as a result of witnessing the dialectical confrontation between experts
or models, the decisionmaker will be in a better position to form his own view
(i.e., build his own model or become his own expert) on the problem that is a
"creative synthesis" of the two opposing views.
In considering the resource allocation and decision processes which govern our
society and institutions, the role of the "expert" has become somewhat confused
and clouded. In a historical perspective the emergence of systems analysts,
efficiency or productivity experts, and operation researchers can be viewed as
the establishment of a new group of advocates. They advocate decisions,
policies, and actions which may optimize certain unique measures such as
benefits, costs, efficiency, etc. However, their training does not enable them to
reflect on all the factors which the decisionmaker must account for in the
process of reaching a decision. Perhaps part of the problem we have had in the
past is a misconception that the "expert" has the only view pertinent to the
decision and our error in our not attempting to balance and place in perspective
the views arising from political, sociological, psychological and ethical
considerations which may advocate alternative options. Perhaps "experts" can be
better used by the decision processes if they are viewed from the perspective of
the Hegelian inquirer as just one component of the decision analysis process.
This view of the use of expertise underlies concepts such as the Policy Delphi.

Whereas, in the Lockean IS the guarantor of the validity of a proposition is

agreement, in the Hegelian it is intense conflict, i.e., the presumption that
conflict will expose the assumptions underlying an expert's point of view that
are often obscured precisely because of the agreement between experts.
Hegelian IS are best suited for studying "wickedly" ill-structured problems.
These are the problems that, precisely because of their ill-structured nature, will
produce intense debate over the "true" nature of the problem. Conversely,
Hegelian IS are extremely unsuited to well-structured, clear-cut problems
because here conflict may be a time -consuming nuisance.
Except for the Policy Delphi concept of Turoff (see Chapter III, B, 1,3), the use
of conflict as a methodology is conspicuously absent in the field of
technological forecasting or in Delphi studies in general. In the Policy Delphi
the communication process is designed to produce the best underlying pro or
con arguments associated with various policy or resource allocation alternatives.
In a non-Delphi mode of communication (e.g., face to face), one of the most
interesting applications can be found in the activity of corporate or strategic

planning. In an important case study, Mason3 literally pioneered the

development of what may be termed the Dialectical Policy inquirer. The
situation encountered by Mason was one in which the nature of the problem
prevented traditional well-structured technical approaches to planning (i.e.,
Leibnizian and Lockean methods) from being used.

In the company situation studied by Mason, there were two strongly opposing
groups of top executives who had almost completely contrary views about the
fundamental nature and management of their organization. They were faced
with a crucial decision concerning the future of their company. It was literally a
life -and-death situation, since the decision would have strong repercussions
throughout all of their company's activities. The two groups each offered
fundamentally differing plans as to how to cope with the situation. Neither of the
plans could be proved or "checked out" by performing any technical study, since
each plan rested on a host of assumptions, many of them unstated, that could
probably never be verified in their entirety even if time to do this were available,
which it wasn't. Indeed, if the executives wanted to be around in the future to
check on how well their assumptions turned out, they had to make a decision in
the present. It was at this point that the company agreed to let Mason try the
Dialectical Policy inquirer to see if it could help resolve the impasse and suggest
a way out.
After careful study and extensive interviews with both sides, Mason assembled
both groups of executives and made the following presentation to them: First, he
laid out side by side on opposite halves of a display board what he took to be the
underlying assumptions on which the two groups were divided. "Thus, for every
assumption on the one side there was an opposing assumption for the other side.
It is important to appreciate that this had never been done before. Prior to
Mason's contact, both groups had never fully developed their underlying
positions. They were divided, to be sure, but they didn't know precisely how and
why. In this sense Mason informed both groups about what they "believed"
individually. Next, Mason took a typical set of characteristic operating data on
the present state of the company (profit, rate of return on investment, etc.) and
showed that every piece of data could be used to support either the plan or the
counterplan; i.e., there was an interpretation of the data that was consistent with
both plans. Hence, the real debate was never really over the surface data, as the
executives had previously thought, but over the underlying assumptions. Finally,
as a result of witnessing this, both groups of executives were asked if they, not
Mason, could now formulate a new plan that encompassed their old plans.
Fortunately in this case they could and because of the intense and heated debate
that took place, both groups of executives felt that they had achieved a better
examination of their proposed course of action than normally occurred in such
situations.

Of course, it should be noted that such a procedure does not guarantee an

optimal solution. But then, the DIS (Dialectical Inquiring System) is most
applicable for those situations in which the problem cannot be formulated in
pure Leibnizian terms for which a unique optimal solution can be derived. DIS
are most appropriate for precisely those situations in which there is no better
tool to rely on than the opinions of opposing experts. If the future is 99 percent
opinion and assumption, or at least in those cases where it is, then the DIS may
be the most appropriate methodology for the "prediction" and "assessment" of
the future.

It is important to appreciate that the DIS and Policy Delphis differ

fundamentally from other techniques and procedures that make use of conflict.
In particular, they differ greatly from an ordinary courtroom debate or adversary
procedure. In an ordinary courtroom debate, both sides are free to introduce
whatever supporting data and opposing arguments they wish. Thus, the two are
often confounded. In a DIS, Hegelian inquirer or Policy Delphi, the opposing
arguments are kept strictly apart from the data so that the crucial function of the
opposing arguments can be explicitly demonstrated. This introduces an element
of artificiality that real debates do not have, but it also introduces a strong
element of structure and clarity that makes this use of conflict much more
controlled and systematic. In essence, the Hegelian Inquiry process dictates a
conceptual communication structure which relates the conflict to the data and
the objectives. Under this conception of inquiry, conflict is no longer antithetical
to Western science's preoccupation with objectivity; indeed, conflict actually
serves objectivity in this case. This will perhaps be puzzling to those who have
been brought up on the idea that objectivity is that upon which men can agree
and not on what they disagree. While the Hegelian inquirer does not always lead
to a new agreement (i.e., a new plan), the resulting synthesis or new agreement,
when it occurs, is likely to be stronger than that obtained by the other inquirers.

Singerian-Churchmanian IS

Singerian IS are the most complicated of all the inquirers encountered thus far
and hence the most difficult to describe fully. Nevertheless, we can still give a
brief indication of their main features as follows:
(1) Truth is pragmatic; i.e., the truth content of a system is relative to the overall
goals and objectives of the inquiry. A model of a system is teleological, or
explicitly goal-oriented, in the sense that the "truth" of the model is measured
with respect to its ability to define (articulate) certain systems objectives, to
propose (create) several alternate means for securing these objectives, and
finally, at the "end" of the inquiry, to specify new goals (discovered only as a
result of the inquiry) that remain to be accomplished by some future inquiry.
Singerian inquiry is thus in a very fundamental sense nonterminating though it is
response oriented at any particular point in time; i.e., Singerian inquirers never
give final answers to any question although at any point they seek to give a
highly refined and specific response.

(2) As a corollary to (1), Singerian IS are the most strongly coupled of all the
inquirers. No single aspect of the system has any fundamental priority over any
of the other aspects. The system forms an inseparable whole. Indeed, Singerian
IS take holistic thinking so seriously that they constantly attempt to sweep in
new variables and additional components to broaden their base of concern. For
example, it is an explicit postulate of Singerian inquiry that the systems designer
is a fmclamental part of the system, and as a result, he must be explicitly
considered in the systems representation, i.e., as one of the system components.
The designer's psychology and sociology are inseparable from the system's
physical representation.

Singerian inquirers are the epitome of synthetic multirnodel, interdisciplinary

systems. In effect, Singerian IS are meta-IS, i.e., they constitute a theory about
all the other IS (Leibnizian, Lockean, Kantian, Hegelian). Singerian IS include
all the previous IS as submodels in their design. Hence, Singerian inquiry is a
theory about how to manage the application of all the other IS. In effect,
Singerian inquiry has been illustrated throughout this chapter in our descriptions
of the inquirers, for example, in our previous representations of the inquirers and
in our discussions of which kinds of problems the inquirers are best-suited to
study. A different theory of inquiry would have described each of the preceding
inquirers differently.

Singerian IS contain some rather distinctive features which none of the other IS
possess. One of their most distinctive features is that they speak almost
exclusively in the language of commands, for example, "Take this model of the
system as the "true" model (or the true model within some error limits +_ E)."
The point is that all of the models, laws, and facts of science are only
approximations. All of the "hard facts" and "firm laws" of science, no matter
how "well-confirmed" they are, are only hypotheses, i.e., they are only "facts"
and "laws" providing we are willing to accept or make certain strong assump
tions about the nature of the reality underlying the measurement of the facts and
the operation of the laws. The thing that serves to legitimize these assumptions
is the command, in whichever form it is expressed, to take them seriously, e.g.,
"Take this is as the true model underlying the phenomenon in question s o that
with this model as a background we can do such-and-such experiments." Thus,
for example, the Bohr model of the atom is not a "factually real description of
the atom," but if we regard it as such, i.e.,. if we take it as "true," then we can
perform certain experiments and make certain theoretical predictions that we
would be unable to do without the model. What Singerian inquirers do is to
draw these hidden commands out of every system so that the analyst is, he
hopes, in a better position to choose carefully the commands he wishes to
postulate. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter, it can be shown how
this notion leads to an interesting reconciliation between the scientist's world of
facts (the language of "is") and the ethicist's world of values (the language of
"ought"). In effect, Singerian inquiry shows how it is possible to sweep ethics
into the design of every system. If a command underlies every system, it can be
shown that behind every technical-scientific c system is a set of ethical
presuppositions.

Another distinctive feature is that Singerian IS greatly expand on the potential

set of systems designers and users. In the extreme, the set is broadened to
include all of mankind, since in an age of larger and larger systems nearly
everyone is affected by, or affects, every other system. While the space is not
available here to discuss the full implications of this proposition, it can be shown
that every Singerian IS is dependent upon the future for its complete elucidation.
If the set of potential users for which a system exists is broadened to include all
of mankind, then this implies that every system must be designed to satisfy not
only the objectives of the present but also the objectives of the future. Thus, a
Singerian theory of inquiry is explicitly concerned with the future and is by
definition involved with the forecasting of the future. Singerian IS attempt to
base their forecast of the future on the projections of as many diverse
disciplines, professions, and types of personalities as possible.

Singerian inquiry has been conspicuously absent from the field of Delphi
design; hence, unfortunately, we cannot talk about any current applications of
Singerian IS to Delphi. There are hints of Singerian overtones in those few
Delphis that ask people for the contrast in their real views and the views they
would state publicly. However, none of these has ever explored the underlying
values and psychology to the extent of warranting a Singerian label.
Nevertheless, we can say something about what a Singerian Delphi would look
like.
Of all the many features that Singerian inquiry could potentially add to Delphi
design, one of the primary ones would be a general broadening of the class of
designers. That is, at some point the participants should not merely participate in
a Delphi but be swept into its design as well. In a Singerian Delphi, one of the
prime features of the exercise would not only be to add to our "substantive
knowledge" of the subject matter under investigation, but just as much, to add to
the participants' knowledge of themselves. How do the participants change as
the result of participating in a Delphi? Are their conceptions of polity formation,
and of who and what constitutes an "expert," the same afterwards as before?
How is it possible to sweep the participants more actively and more consciously
into the design of the Delphi? What are the values and/or psychology that led me
and my fellow respondents to answer with this view? These are only a very few
of the many issues with which a Singerian-designed Delphi would be concerned,
and as a result, would thus act to build into the design of the Delphi the potential
for pursuing these questions systematically. In short, a Singerian- based Delphi
is concerned with raising and building explicitly into the design of the technique
the self-reflective question; How do I learn about myself in the act of studying
others and the world? Why is it that some minds think they can best learn about
the world and the contents of other minds (i.e., their communications) by formal
models only? Why do others believe they can best learn through empirical
consensual means, and others still, through multiple synthetic or conflictual
means? And finally, why do Singerians want to spend so much time studying the
others? What kind of mind is it that studies others? Perhaps, perverse; most
certainly, reflective-the very spirit that moved the first pioneers of the Delphi
technique to want to study how and under which circumstances a group of
reflective minds was better than one.

Concluding Remarks
In many ways a brief commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of Singerian
inquiry provides the most fitting summary to this chapter.

The strength of Singerian inquiry is that it gives the broadest possible modeling
of any inquirer on any problem. The weakness is the potentially prohibitive cost
involved in comprehensive modeling efforts. However, given the increased fear
and concern with our environment, we may no longer have the choice but to pay
the price. We may no longer be able to afford the continued "luxury" of building
large-scale Leibnizian and Lockean techrological models that are devoid of
serious and explicit ethical considerations and which fail to raise the self-
reflective question. We certainly no longer seem able to afford the faulty
assumption that there is only one philosophical base upon which a technique can
rest if it is to be "scientific." Indeed if our conception of inquiry is "fruitful"
(notice, not "true" or "false" but "productive") then to be "scientific" would
demand that we study something (model it, collect data on it, argue about it,
etc.) from as many diverse points of view as possible. In this sense strict
Leibnizian and Lockean modes of inquiry are "unscientific" because they inhibit
this effort, a conclusion which we are sure most of our "scientific" colleagues
would be surprised to find and even more reluctant to accept. But then, believing
in conflict as we do, we might have a good debate on the matter. If one were to
design a Delphi to investigate the matter, which Delphi inquirer design do you
think we (you) ought to use?

References

The references listed below are intended to provide the reader with general
reviews, further background, and some specific examples of topics covered in
the article. On the subject of Inquiring Systems the best place to seek further
explanation would be:
C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems, Basic Books, New York,
1971.

Those interested in attempts to construct formal mathematical representations of

Inquiring Systems are directed to the following three articles:

Ian 1. Mitroff, "A Communication Model of Dialectical Inquiring Systems-A

Strategy for Strategic Planning," Management Science, 17, No. to (June 1971),
pp. 13634-13648.

Ian I. Mitroff and Frederick Betz, "Dialectical Decision Theory: A Meta-Theory

of Decision Making," Management Science 19, No. 1 (September 1972), pp. 11-
24.

Ian I. Mitroff, "Epistemology as a Basis for Building a Generalized Model of

General Policy- Sciences Models," Management Science, special issue on "The
Philosophy of Science of Management Science," to appear.

This chapter is, in large part, a specialization of an earlier more general article:

Ian I. Mitroff, and Murray Turoff, "Technological Forecasting and Assessment:

Science and/or Mythology?" Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 5,

No. I (1973).4