Does Psak Apply to
Matters of Hashkafa?
Rabbi Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
1. The Issue
The Gemarai relates that Rabbi Abba said in the name of Shmuel: Beit Shammai and Beit
Hillel argued for three years, each side claiming the halacha was as they maintained. A bat
kol [heavenly voice] then came forth and stated: “Eilu va'eilu divrei Elokim chaim [these and
those are the living words of Hashem], but the halacha is according to Beit Hillel.”
Disputes in halacha must end with a pragmatic resolution that regulates our behavior –
viz., a psak halacha. There are many principles that guide the pursuit of a psak halacha – e.g.,
halacha follows Beit Hillel over Beit Shammai, Rabbi Yochanan over Rav, later decisors over
earlier ones, the majority of opinions, the more stringent opinion in d'oraita issues [biblical
laws], the more lenient opinion in d'rabbanan [rabbinic] issues, etc.
Are these principles applicable to matters of hashkafa – beliefs and attitudes?ii
For example, let us say we could somehow determine that, on the one hand, a majority iii of
halachic authorities are opposed to Religious Zionism, yet, on the other hand, are
supportive of the existence of the State of Israel – does that mean that an observant Jew must
accept that position and may not follow either the very positive “da'at yachid” (lone opinion)
of Rav Kook towards the State of Israel nor the very negative “da'at yachid” position of the
Satmar Rebbe?
Hashkafa2
Similarly, in matters of Jewish law (halacha) we have a
principle that instructs us to follow the Minhag HaMakom –
local custom. If one takes up residence in a city in which the
majority of the inhabitants follow the perspectives on divine
service espoused by Mitnagdim, is he therefore forbidden to
follow the perspectives of Chasidim?
2. Contemporary Sources
Contemporary thinkers, including outstanding roshei yeshiva
and renowned writers, have expressed opinions on both sides
of this issue.
Rabbi Aharon Feldman, Rosh HaYeshiva, Yeshivat Ner Yisroel
in Baltimore, writes:
It should be pointed out that the principle, the majority
opinion rules, applies equally to ideas as well as to
practical halacha. Beliefs, besides falling under certain
commandments, affect a Jew’s status with respect to
various laws and are therefore also part of practical
halacha.iv
Rabbi Herschel Schachter, Rosh Yeshiva, Yeshivat Rabbeinu
Yitzchak Elchanan, writes:
People are wont to say that the Torah is comprised of
two separate parts, that there is halacha and there is
hashkafa. But I heard from Rabbi Aharon Kahn that he
heard several times from our Master [Rabbi Yosef Dov
Halevi Soloveitchik, Rosh HaYeshiva, Yeshivat Rabbeinu
Yitzchak Elchanan] that he learned from his forefathers
that this distinction is erroneous, for even that which is
called hashkafa is also a part of halacha. Just as there are
halachot concerning what one is permitted to do, what
one is forbidden to do and what one is required to do,
so too there are halachot concerning what one is
permitted to think, what one is forbidden to think and
what one must think.v
A different perspective is reported by Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan,
Hashkafa3
renowned prolific author and popularizer of many Jewish
concepts. Basing himself on a number of eminent authorities
(see footnote below), he records their opinion that,
In a question of halacha, after there is a discussion of
different opinions, we must come to one conclusion.
Anyone not abiding by that conclusion is going against
halacha – ke-neged halacha. However, in the case of
hashkafa, or historical questions, this is not true. The
Rambam makes this point in his Peirush HaMishnayot...vi
In any case, the Rambam says clearly that in questions
of hashkafa or history, there is no psak. In other words, if
an opinion is found in Chazal or in our accepted Torah
sefarim, one cannot say that we do not pasken (rule) like
that opinion. Thus, the Rambam often takes a da'at
yachid (the opinion of just one person) and builds an
entire hashkafa on it. He may use this opinion because it
fits into his system of logic, even though it may be a
minority opinion. He can do this, since the entire
concept of psak only applies to questions of halacha and
not to questions of hashkafa.vii
3. The Scope of the Issue
In order to address this question and seek resolution, we
must first determine what is meant by hashkafa.viii A reasonably
accurate definition can be found in the Wikipedia entry on
“Orthodox Judaism:”
Since there is no one Orthodox body, there is no one
canonical statement of principles of faith. Rather, each
Orthodox group claims to be a non-exclusive heir to the
received tradition of Jewish theology, while still affirming
a literal acceptance of Maimonides' thirteen principles
[author's emphasis].
Given this (relative) philosophic flexibility, variant
viewpoints are possible, particularly in areas not
explicitly demarcated by the halacha. The result is a
relatively broad range of hashkafot within Orthodoxy.
4 THE JOURNAL OF HALACHA
The greatest differences within strains of Orthodoxy
involve the following issues:
The degree to which an Orthodox Jew should integrate
and/or disengage from secular society, based, in part, on
varying interpretations of the Three Oaths,ix whether
Zionism is part of Judaism or opposed to it, and
defining the role of the modern State of Israel in
Judaism.
Their spiritual approach to Torah such as the relative
roles of mainstream Talmudic study and mysticism or
ethics...
The validity of authoritative spiritual guidance in areas
outside of halakhic decision (Da'at Torah).(sic)
The importance of maintaining non-halakhic customs,
(sic) such as dress, language and music the role of
women in (religious) society. The nature of the
relationship with non-Jews.x
4. Hashkafa vs. Foundational Beliefs
The Wikipedia entry implies a distinction between areas of
hashkafa – such as the examples it provides – and foundational
beliefs [“Maimonides' thirteen principles”]. Not all
philosophies, attitudes nor beliefs can be classified as hashkafa.
Some beliefs are mandated by halacha. Our foundational
concepts and core beliefs are halachic issues, that are
mandated by halacha, and that have halachic ramifications.
One who does not accept these core beliefs will fall into one of
several categories of non-believers – e.g., a min, a kofer, an oved
avoda zara, etc. – and these categories have definite halachic
parameters and halachic repercussions.
A case in point is a Talmudic text that relates Rav Yosef's
treatment of Rabbi Hillel's position concerning Mashiach
(Messiah)– a position that relates to our foundational belief in
the coming of Mashiach.
Hashkafa5
The Gemaraxi cites the opinion of Rabbi Hillel:xii “The Jewish
people [will] have no Mashiach, as they already consumed it
[i.e., the Messianic period] in the days of [King] Chizkia.” Rav
Yosef repudiates and invalidates Rabbi Hillel's position. He
states: “May his Master [Hashem] forgive Rabbi Hillel! When
did Chizkia [reign]? In the period of the First Temple. Yet [the
prophet] Zecharia prophesied [later] during the Second
Temple period, and he states:xiii Rejoice very much, O Daughter of
Zion, trumpet, O Daughter of Jerusalem, behold your king will come
unto you, righteous and redeemed...”
Rabbi Hillel's perspective is one that rejects the very belief
which Rambam ultimately codified as the twelfth belief on his
list of Judaism's thirteen core beliefs – the eventual advent of
Mashiach. Moreover, Chatam Soferxiv states categorically that
since the overwhelming majority of sages have rejected Rabbi
Hillel’s perspective, one is not allowed to defy the majority
opinion and adopt Rabbi Hillel's perspective. Chatam Sofer
asserts that this case is essentially the same as the case –
discussed elsewhere in the Talmudxv – of Rabbi Eliezer, who
ruled that machshirei milah may be performed on Shabbat (e.g.,
cutting wood to make charcoal to smelt iron to make a knife in
order to perform a circumcision on Shabbat). During Rabbi
Eliezer's lifetime, the members of his community were entitled
to abide by his ruling. However, since the majority of the sages
rejected his view, anyone outside his community – and, after
he passed away, even the members of his own community –
who would perform machshirei milah on Shabbat would be
considered to be desecrating the Sabbath.
At first glance, it might seem that Chatam Sofer here is
applying principles of psak halacha to an issue of hashkafa. This
would seem all the more so to be the case based on what
Chatam Sofer goes on to state – viz., that the beliefs in the
eventual redemption and the coming of Mashiach are not in
and of themselves essential principles of Judaism. However,
Chatam Sofer goes on to explain that one who denies these
beliefs is implicitly rejecting the validity of Zecharia's
prophecy. Accordingly, by extension, he is rejecting the
underlying essential principle of belief in the Torah and in the
6 THE JOURNAL OF HALACHA
words of the prophets. Thus, by virtue of its grounding in
prophecy, the belief in the coming of Mashiach has become in
and of itself a foundational belief. Consequently, the concept
and the principles of psak halacha certainly do apply to the
issue of the coming of Moshiach.
5. “Nimnu V'Gamru”
Let us turn, then, to sources pertaining to “pure” hashkafa –
viz., matters which have neither any halachic ramifications nor
any connection to any foundational beliefs.
A Baraitaxvi relates that for two and a half years the academy
of Shammai (Beit Shammai) and the academy of Hillel (Beit
Hillel) disputed a matter of hashkafa. Beit Shammai maintained
that it would be “better” (“no'ach lo”) for man not to have been
created rather than to have been created, while Beit Hillel
maintained that it is better for man to have been created rather
than not to have been created. The Baraita then relates that
“nimnu v'gamru” – they “voted and concluded” – that it would
have been better for man not to have been created, but that
now that he has been created, he should scrutinize his deeds
(“yefashfesh b'ma'asav”) or, as some say, analyze his deeds
(“yemashmesh b'ma'asav”).
The expression nimnu v'gamru would seem to indicate that
in this issue – which seems to meet our criteria for
consideration as pure hashkafa – the Sages voted and,
following the majority, came to a definite conclusion – i.e., a
“psak” in hashkafa. This is certainly the most simple and
straightforward understanding of the language of the Baraita.
However, the commentators advance other possible
interpretations. Maharashaxvii writes that nimnu here does not
refer to a vote, but to a count. He explains that the Tana'im
counted the number of positive commandments (mitzvot aseh)
and negative commandments (mitzvot lo ta'aseh) in the
Torah.xviii When they found that there were more negative
mitzvot than positive ones (365 vs. 248), they concluded that
man is more likely to violate negative commandments and
become liable to punishment, than to fulfill positive
Hashkafa7
commandments and merit reward. They therefore agreed that
it would have been “better” for man not to have been
created.xix
Alternatively, Maharalxx explains that the entire description
of the dispute is allegorical (including the two and a half year
time span of the dispute), and understands nimnu v'gamru as
indicating that they reached a philosophical consensus, as
opposed to a vote or psak.xxi
6. “Halacha B'Yadu'a”
Another source bearing on the question at hand is the
comment of Rashi:xxii “It is a known halacha (“halacha
b'yadu'a”) that Esav hates Yaakov.” Maharatz Chiyusxxiii
derives from Rashi's expression that the term “halacha”
applies to hashkafa as well. He explains the application on the
basis of Aruch,xxiv who writes that the term “halacha” connotes
a concept that goes on (“holeich”) from beginning to end, or,
alternatively, a matter by which the Jewish nation goes.
On the other hand, numerous commentators note that in the
Sifrixxv text which is the source of this statement, the language
is different. There it is stated as a question: “Is it not known
(“ha'lo b'yadu'a”) that Esav hates Yaakov?”xxvi Moreover, Rabbi
Moshe Feinsteinxxvii poses the question (according to Rashi’s
version) of how the term “halacha” is relevant here, and
explains that it means to teach us that just as halacha never
changes, so too this hatred never changed.
7. Bavli vs. Yerushalmi?
According to Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook, xxviii a
difference between the Bavli and the Yerushalmi at the
beginning of Perek Eilu Hein HaNechnakim in Sanhedrin
indicates that the question of whether the concept of psak
applies to hashkafa is the subject of a dispute between the two
Talmuds.
Both the Bavli and the Yerushalmi there are examining the
versexxix that introduces the law of the rebellious elder (zaken
8 THE JOURNAL OF HALACHA
mamrei). The verse reads: And if a matter [davar] becomes
extraordinary, between blood and blood, between judgment and
judgment or between affliction and affliction, matters of contention
within your gates... The Torah goes on to instruct that such
matters be brought before the Great Court in the place that
Hashem shall designate. The Torah subsequently teaches the
law in the case of a rebellious elder who refuses to accept the
ruling of the Great Court.
Both the Bavli and the Yerushalmi expound the word davar.
The Bavlixxx states that davar refers to halacha, while the
Yerushalmixxxi states that davar refers to agada – i.e., matters of
hashkafa. Rav Kook understands the Yerushalmi to mean that
the Great Court would determine not only matters of halacha,
but also matters of agada, whereas the Bavli limits their
jurisdiction to matters of halacha.xxxii Rav Kook posits that after
the eventual redemption will take place, the operative
perspective will be that of the Yerushalmi, but until then (even
in Eretz Yisrael), the operative perspective is that of the Bavli –
viz., that currently there is no concept of a psak hashkafa.
Be that as it may, Rav Kook's interpretation of the Yerushalmi
is not the commonly accepted explanation. Both standard
commentaries on the Yerushalmi – i.e., the Pnei Moshe and
Korban HaEdah – explain that the Yerushalmi's statement
concerning the implication of the term davar as part of its
definition of a muflah she'b'beit din – the foremost member of
the Great Court – who must be involved in a legal procedure
in order for the law of zaken mamrei to be applicable. The
novelty of the Yerushalmi's definition is its requirement that the
foremost member of the Great Court be not only an expert in
matters of halacha, but also in matters of agada. Accordingly,
the text in the Yerushalmi would not pertain to the question of
whether there exists a concept of a psak hashkafa.
8. Rambam's Position
In his Commentary on the Mishnah, Rambam writes in three
places about this issue:
Hashkafa9
1.Commentary to Sotah 3:3: “And I have already told you
more than once that whenever the Sages dispute a
matter of perspective or opinion that has no bearing on
any actual practice, one cannot say the law is in
accordance with one of them.”
2. Commentary to Shavuot 1:4: “And we have already
explained that in regard to any logical position that
does not pertain to any actual practice it cannot be said
that the law is in accordance with so-and-so.”
3. Commentary to Sanhedrin, Introduction to Chap. 10, in
regard to the question of who does and does not have a
portion in the World to Come: “We have already
mentioned to you several times that in regard to any
dispute among Sages that does not pertain to actual
practice, but is solely in the realm of ideas, there is no
room to render a psak in favor of one of them.”
These statements would seem to indicate beyond a doubt
that Rambam rejects the application of the concept of psak to
hashkafa. However, some contemporary writers assert that
Rambam himself contradicts this principle in Hilchot Teshuva
(7:4).
The Gemaraxxxiii cites a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and
Rabbi Avahu as to whether a Baal Teshuva (a Jew who repents
of his sinful lifestyle) is on a higher level than someone who
never needed to do Teshuva in the first place, or vice versa.
Rambam (Hilchot Teshuva, ibid.) seems to rule in accordance
with the opinion that a Baal Teshuva is on a higher level than
someone who never sinned. As this is an issue of “pure”
hashkafa – viz., it does not concern a foundational belief, nor
does it possess any practical ramification – Rambam's ruling
seems to indicate that the concept of psak does apply to matters
of hashkafa, apparently contradicting his position in the Peirush
HaMishnayot.
It is possible, however, to contend that there is no
contradiction. It is Rambam's wont in Mishneh Torah
(particularly at the end of a section of laws) to include
10 THE JOURNAL OF HALACHA
exhortations and advice that are not, strictly speaking,
halachic. It may be that Rambam in this statement intended to
provide encouragement to Baalei Teshuva. As part of that
encouragement, Rambam writes that “the Sages said that the
place in which Baalei Teshuva stand is one that complete
Tzaddikim cannot attain.” Accordingly, he did not mean to
issue a halachic ruling. Rather, Rambam is citing this opinion
to inform Baalei Teshuva that such an opinion exists, indicating
the great stature that a Baal Teshuva can aspire to attain.xxxiv
9. Conclusion
In conclusion, it is evident that there is significant difference
of opinion about whether or to what extent matters of belief
are obligatory in the same way as matters of Jewish practice.
While the concept of psak [a definitive, obligatory ruling]
certainly pertains to a number of beliefs considered
foundational, it is a matter of dispute whether psak pertains
equally to hashkafa in general, which would require that an
observant Jew must accept the majority opinion, just as in
Jewish law. However, according to the perspective that rejects
the application of the concept of psak to hashkafa, it emerges
that in regard to an issue that does not touch on a foundational
belief – and that also does not have any halachic ramifications
– one is not bound to follow the “majority opinion,” and may
accept a perspective advocated by a minority of thinkers –
even a perspective that is a lone opinion, a “da'at yachid,” just
as Rambam did.
Returning to a prior example, Rav Kook saw the
establishment of a state in the Land of Israel as the atchalta
d'geula – the beginning of the ultimate redemption. The Satmar
Rebbe, on the other hand, saw the establishment of the state as
a violation of the Three Oaths mentioned in Ketubot 111a. Most
authorities do not accept either view in its entirety. If hashkafa
is subject to the same rules as halacha, then – except in certain
locations that are inhabited predominately by followers of
either Rav Kook or the Satmar Rebbe – one would not be
Hashkafa11
allowed to adopt either of their perspectives. If hashkafa is not
subject to the same rules of halacha, a person would be
allowed to adhere to Religious Zionism, or to Satmar anti-
Zionisim, based on personal inclination (or, preferably, the
guidance of his mentors), even though the vast majority of
authorities rejects their perspectives.
i
Eruvin 13b.
ii
Hashkafa literally means “perspective.” In this context it refers to philosophies and attitudes that are not definitively
within the purview of halacha.
iii
To be sure, the notion of determining the existence of a majority of rabbinic authorities is an elusive one. Chazon Ish
(Orach Chaim, Eruvin 112:10), notes that such majorities must be “weighted” majorities – i.e., the stature and reasoning of
each posek must be weighed when considering his views and counting his psak in the halachic equation.
iv
“The Slifkin Affair” in Eye of the Storm, p. 161 note 40; available online at
zootorah.com/controversy/SLIFKINARTICLE.doc.
v
MePninei HaRav, p. 206; a snippet is available at http://books.google. com/books?
id=icTXAAAAMAAJ&focus=searchwithinvolume&q=%D7 %94 %D7%A9%D7%A7%D7%A4%D7%94.
vi
We will examine Rambam's perspective in greater detail below.
vii
The Age of the Universe – A Torah-True Perspective, p. 7ff; available online at
http://www.simpletoremember.com/faqs/Kaplan-SimpleTo Remember .com.pdf.
viii
See Alei Shur vol. 2 p. 144, where Rabbi Shlomo Wolbe asserts that the entire contemporary concept of hashkafa is
actually a foreign transplant, a graft of the German concept of a weltanschauung onto Judaism, and a negative
phenomenon. In making this point he refers to Rashi to Bereishit 18:19: “Any time the word hashkafa appears in Scripture
it is in a negative context, except in the case of 'Gaze [Hashkifa] from your holy abode’, etc.” (Devarim 26:15).
ix
See Ketubot 111a.
x
Wikipedia, Orthodox Judaism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orthodox _Judaism.
xi
Sanhedrin 99a.
xii
Evidently an Israeli Amora, perhaps Hillel II, to whom the fixed calendar is often attributed.
xiii
Zecharia 9:9.
xiv
Teshuvot, Yoreh Deah 2:356.
xv
See Yevamot 14a.
xvi
Eruvin 13b.
xvii
Makkot, Chiddushei Aggadot 23b d.h. Taryag.
xviii
Evidently, the determination of what was a mitzvah and what kind of mitzvah it was, took two and a half years.
xix
The Munkatcher Rebbe (the Minchat Elazar) derived an interesting “halachic” conclusion from Maharsha's explanation.
In a speech that he gave in honor of the birthday of the president of Czechoslovakia, he stated that it is not customary for
Jews to celebrate birthdays, and that this is on account of the Baraita's conclusion that it would be better for man not to
have been created. However, he qualifies, this only applies to Jews, as it is based on the count of mitzvot lo ta'aseh vs.
mitzvot aseh. Non-Jews, on the other hand, who are only obligated to fulfill seven mitzvot, do not face the vast pitfalls of
myriad negative commandments. Therefore, he concludes, non-Jews – and especially Chasidei Ummot HaOlam such as the
Czechoslovakian president – properly celebrate their birthdays as days of mazal and simcha (Divrei Torah 88, cited in an
essay by Rabbi Zvi Ryzman on the topic of birthdays, which can be found at http://www.haoros.com/Archive/Index.asp?
kovetz= 999&cat=9&haoro=3).
xx
Derech Chaim 2:9.
xxi
According to Mahari Mintz this Baraita does have halachic ramifications. It is on its basis, he explains, that Chazal
phrased the Birchot HaShachar in a negative format – viz., “that He has not made me a non-Jew,” “that He has not made
me a slave,” “that He has not made me a woman” – as opposed to a positive format – viz., “that He has made me a Jew,”
“that he Has made me a free person,” “that He has made me a man.” Mahari Mintz explains that our Baraita's conclusion
means that so far as a person's soul is concerned, it would have been better for it to have remained in its original spiritual
state and not to have been placed in a physical body. He writes that the reason Hashem takes a soul out of its holy source
and places it in a body is for it to add to its perfection by exercising its free will in this material world and following in
Hashem's pathways through its performance of Torah and mitzvot. Yet, all too often, once the soul comes into the
material world it follows base desires and commits evil. For such persons, coming down into this world was
counterproductive. Accordingly, they cannot thank Hashem for being made a certain way, as they would have been
better off not being made! They can only thank Hashem that once they had to be made nonetheless, they were not
further disadvantaged by being made in a way that would make their success in Avodat Hashem even more difficult to
accomplish.
xxii
To Bereishit 33:3-4.
xxiii
Darkei Moshe, Kol Kitvei Maharatz Chiyus vol. 1 p. 479.
xxiv
Erech Halach.
xxv
Sifri, Bamidbar 69 dh. O B'Derech.
xxvi
It has been suggested that the original form of the statement in Rashi was הל' בידוע, and that the typesetter erroneously
understood the abbreviation to connote halacha, whereas it actually connoted ha'lo (Introduction to the 1982 edition of
Sifri p. 32 note 26).
xxvii
Iggerot Moshe, Choshen Mishpat 2:77.
xxviii
Iggerot HaRayah no. 103.
xxix
Devarim 17:8.
xxx
Sanhedrin 87a as well as several Midrashei halacha.
xxxi
Sanhedrin 55a in the Vilna edition.
xxxii
Rav Kook suggests that in Eretz Yisrael the Torah learning was imbued with a prophetic character, which diminished the
distinction between halacha and agada, whereas in Chutz LaAretz the learning was limited to what could be attained by
logic alone, so that definitive clarity in matters of agada cannot be achieved.
xxxiii
Berachot 34b.
xxxiv
This issue – and others, some of which we have dealt with, and some not – are raised at
http://www.jewswithquestions.com/index.php?/blog/1/entry-2-paskening-hashkafa-academic-vs-practical-rationales/.
The other issues raised there can be addressed in manners similar to the way we have addressed this issue. See also the
discussion at http://youngerlight. blogspot. xcom/2011/04/psak-in-hashkafa.html. Other sources that are brought to bear
on the question of whether there exists a concept of psak in agada include the question of issuing a ruling in a matter that
is Hilchata l'Meshicha (see Kiddushin 71a with Ramban, Raavad, Ritva). In fact, however, that issue is irrelevant to our
discussion, as it concerns halacha – not a halacha that is currently relevant, but a halacha nonetheless. Another source is
the Gemara in Kiddushin 36a. Rashba (Teshuvot 1:194) considers the issue there – viz., whether a Meshumad (apostate) is
metamei b'ohel just like an observant Jew or not. He mentions there that “according to Rabbi Meir he is also included in
banim (sons).” This statement, however, is not necessarily meant to be the basis of the psak. He may only be mentioning a
point of fact, that according to R' Meir, a Meshumad is still included in the category of Banim atem la'Hashem Elokeichem
(you [Jews] are sons of God). For further elaboration, see http://rygb.blogspot.com/2010/08/psak-in-hashkafah-or-
aggadah.html.
