THE ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM:

THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRACY

BY
HAFSA JAHAN
THE ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM:
THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRACY

BY
HAFSA JAHAN
 A VOTING SYSTEM IS A SET OF GUIDELINES THAT
ESTABLISHES THE PROCEDURES FOR HOLDING ELECTIONS
AND REFERENDUMS AS WELL AS HOW THEIR OUTCOMES
ARE DETERMINED. VOTING ALLOWS CITIZENS TO TAKE
PART IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. LEADERS ARE
CHOSEN BY THE PEOPLE WHO WILL SERVE AS THEIR
REPRESENTATIVES AND CHAMPION THEIR CAUSES. FOR
THE PUBLIC TO HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THEIR VOTES
ARE COUNTED AND THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION IS
FAIR AND ACCURATE, THE QUALITY OF THIS
GOVERNMENTAL VOTING SERVICE MUST BE MAXIMIZED.

 VOTING IS HOW DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE THEIR LEADERS FOR HIGH

OFFICE. CONSIDER THE VOTING PROCEDURE FOR THE STUDENT
COUNCIL. CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE VOTING PROCESS THAT
ALLOWS FOR PARTICIPATION BY THE ENTIRE STUDENT BODY IS AN
ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF ADMINISTERING A STUDENT COUNCIL
ELECTION.

TO EXPRESS THEIR THOUGHTS AND FREELY SELECT WHO TO VOTE

FOR WITHOUT OUTSIDE INFLUENCE, ALL STUDENTS SHOULD BE ABLE
TO TAKE PART IN THE ACTIVITY. THERE SHOULD BE A VOTING FORM
FOR THE STUDENT COUNCIL VOTING PROCESS SO THAT STUDENTS
CAN CHOOSE THE APPROPRIATE CANDIDATES FOR EACH POST AND
CAST THEIR BALLOTS. ADDITIONALLY, INFORMATION REGARDING
THE CANDIDATES RUNNING FOR STUDENT COUNCIL SHOULD BE
VISIBLE. THIS WOULD EVENTUALLY ASSIST THE ELECTORATE IN
MAKING A DECISION BY GIVING THEM A GENERAL NOTION OF WHO
TO SELECT OR ALLOWING THEM TO COMPARE THE CANDIDATES. THE
PUPILS WILL ALSO HAVE ACCESS TO THIS ONLINE.

FOR INSTANCE, THEY COULD UTILIZE A GOOGLE FORM THAT STUDENTS

COULD ACCESS AND THEN USE TO SELECT THE CANDIDATES THEY
WANTED TO VOTE FOR. SINCE STUDENTS CAN COMPLETE THIS FROM
THEIR HOMES AS WELL, TIME IS SAVED. MAKING ENSURING THAT THE
ENTIRE PROCEDURE IS TRANSPARENT ALSO HELPS. HOWEVER, STUDENTS
CAN ALSO COMPLETE THE IDENTICAL ACTIVITY IN FRONT OF THE CLASS.
THEY CAN ASK THE KIDS WHO THEY WANT TO VOTE FOR, AND THE
STUDENTS CAN CHOOSE TO RESPOND VERBALLY. ALL OF THE RESPONSES
CAN THEN BE RECORDED.

IT IS POSSIBLE TO EXAMINE AND DETERMINE WHO RECEIVED THE MOST

VOTES AFTER COLLECTING ALL THE NECESSARY DATA. THE STUDENT
WHO RECEIVED THE MOST VOTES WILL THEN BE ELECTED PRESIDENT.
MEETINGS OF THE STUDENT COUNCIL MUST BE PLANNED AND RUN BY
THE PRESIDENT, WHO ALSO DELEGATES DUTIES TO THE OTHER OFFICES.
ADDITIONALLY, THEY COORDINATE AND DIRECT STUDENT EVENTS AND
SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE STUDENT BODY WHEN SPEAKING WITH
PROFESSORS.

VOTING CAN TAKE PLACE IN SMALLER ORGANIZATIONS IN A VARIETY OF

WAYS. FORMALLY BY BALLOT TO DETERMINE ROLES FOR OTHERS,
MEMBERS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, OR EMPLOYEES WITHIN A
CORPORATION.

VOTING OFTEN OCCURS IN A NATION TO ENSURE THAT DECISIONS ARE

NOT WHOLLY PREJUDICED AND TO PROVIDE CITIZENS THE
OPPORTUNITY TO CHOOSE THE LEADERS WHO WILL BEST REPRESENT
THEIR OPINIONS AND VALUES. A SINGLE WINNER MAY BE CHOSEN TO
FILL A SPECIAL POSITION, SUCH AS THAT OF PRIME MINISTER, PRESIDENT,
OR GOVERNOR, WHILE SEVERAL WINNERS MAY BE CHOSEN TO FILL
POSITIONS SUCH AS THOSE OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT OR BOARDS OF
DIRECTORS.

AROUND THE WORLD, VOTING PROCEDURES ARE USED FOR PURPOSES

OTHER THAN JUST CHOOSING REPRESENTATIVES TO REPRESENT THE
PEOPLE. ELECTIONS ESTABLISH A SENSE OF A DEMOCRATIC
ENVIRONMENT WITHIN A NATION; THEY HOLD THE GOVERNMENT IN
POWER ACCOUNTABLE AND GIVE IT LEGITIMACY, SUPPOSING THE
VOICE OF THE POPULACE IS BEING HEARD.IT HELPS TO ENSURE THAT
IMPARTIAL JUDGMENTS ARE MADE AND GIVES EVERY CITIZEN A VOICE
TO EXPRESS THEIR BELIEFS. THE MAJORITY OF NATIONS IN THE GLOBE
HAVE DEMOCRATIC REGIMES, AND IT IS ALSO HIGHLY SUPPORTED. THIS
IS HOW DEMOCRACY IS DEFINED, WHERE A LEADER IS CHOSEN AFTER A
VOTE IS TAKEN.

 THE VOTERS WILL SELECT THEIR ALTERNATIVES FROM THE OPTIONS

PRESENTED AND PLACE THEM IN THE BALLOT BOXES. THE CANDIDATE
WITH THE MOST SUPPORT WILL BE SELECTED AS THE LEADER. EVERY
PERSON HAS THE FREEDOM TO EXPRESS THEIR POLITICAL OPINIONS IN
A DEMOCRACY.

CANDIDATES MUST RECEIVE A MAJORITY OF VOTES IN A MAJORITY

VOTING SYSTEM IN ORDER TO BE ELECTED, WHETHER IN A RUNOFF
ELECTION OR IN THE FINAL ROUND OF VOTING. ELECTION SYSTEMS
DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER NOT ONLY IN HOW CANDIDATES ARE
CHOSEN, BUT ALSO IN THEIR MORE GENERAL NORMS AND
REGULATIONS, WHICH ARE TYPICALLY OUTLINED IN A NATION'S
CONSTITUTION OR ELECTORAL LEGISLATION.

THERE ARE NUMEROUS ELECTORAL PROCESSES. PAPER BALLOTS ARE

USED IN THE MAJORITY OF ELECTIONS, AND VOTERS MARK THEM WITH
THEIR SELECTIONS. THIS MAY ENTAIL CHECKING A BOX TO INDICATE
THEIR SUPPORT FOR A CANDIDATE OR PARTY ON THE BALLOT OR
WRITING THE NAME OF A WRITE-IN CANDIDATE ON THE BALLOT (IF IT IS
NOT LISTED).

 A VOTING PLATFORM HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHERE QUALIFIED VOTERS
MAY CAST THEIR BALLOTS. DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME, A POLITICAL
CHOICE WILL BE MADE. BALLOT BOXES ARE OPENED AND ALL VOTES ARE
COUNTED ONCE EVERY VOTE HAS BEEN CAST. THE RESULTS OF THE
COUNTING WILL THEN BE ADDED UP.

TO DETERMINE THE WINNER, THE VOTES THAT EACH CONTENDER

RECEIVED WILL BE TALLIED AND COMPARED. ANOTHER CRUCIAL
ELEMENT OF AN ELECTION IS THE NOMINATION OF A CANDIDATE. THIS
REFERS TO OFFICIALLY ENDORSING A CANDIDATE FOR OFFICE. THE
PROCEDURE OF CHOOSING A CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION TO A PUBLIC
OFFICE IS REFERRED TO AS NOMINATION.

THE PARTIES INVOLVED MAY WISH TO CHOOSE ONLY ONE PERSON, A

COMMITTEE, OR EVEN THE FULL PARLIAMENT. THERE IS OFTEN JUST
ONE WINNER WHEN CHOOSING A PRESIDENT, THOUGH THE ORIGINAL
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES ALSO CHOSE THE RUNNER-UP TO SERVE
AS VICE PRESIDENT.

A NATION'S CITIZENS TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS WHEN THEY ARE GIVEN

THE OPPORTUNITY TO CAST BALLOTS. PEOPLE CAN, HOWEVER, ALSO
CAST BALLOTS IN INITIATIVES AND REFERENDUMS. A DIRECT VOTE BY
THE POPULACE ON A PROPOSITION, LAW, OR POLITICAL PROBLEM IS
KNOWN AS A REFERENDUM. THIS IS IN CONTRAST TO A REPRESENTATIVE
VOTING ON A MATTER.

ELECTION RESULTS COULD CAUSE CONFUSION AND, IN THE WORST-

CASE SCENARIOS, BLOODSHED. VOTING SYSTEMS CAN BE DIFFICULT TO
COMPARE OBJECTIVELY SINCE ATTITUDES REGARDING THEM ARE
STRONGLY IMPACTED BY HOW THEY AFFECT THE GROUPS THAT
SUPPORTERS OR OPPONENTS OF THOSE SYSTEMS SUPPORT OR OPPOSE.

THE ABILITY FOR PEOPLE TO REMOVE A PARTICULAR LEADERSHIP FROM

POWER IS MAYBE MOST SIGNIFICANT. ELECTIONS ARE A SUREFIRE WAY
FOR PEOPLE TO REPLACE UNDESIRABLE LEADERSHIP WITH A BETTER
OPTION. FIRST OF ALL, WE CAN SEE THAT ELECTIONS ARE A CALM AND
EFFECTIVE WAY TO SELECT POLITICAL LEADERS. ADDITIONALLY,
CITIZENS OF A COUNTRY ELECT THEIR LEADERS BY VOTING. CITIZENS
CAN CHOOSE SOMEONE WHOSE OPINIONS ARE MOST SIMILAR TO THEIR
OWN IN THIS WAY.

PEOPLE SHOULD USE ELECTIONS AS A PLATFORM TO EXPRESS THEIR

UNHAPPINESS. THE ABILITY TO DISMISS A CERTAIN LEADERSHIP IS
CRUCIAL IF PEOPLE DON'T LIKE IT.

 ELECTIONS ALLOW PEOPLE TO CHOOSE A BETTER LEADER IN PLACE OF

ONE THEY DON'T LIKE. THE MAJORITY OF DEMOCRACIES PERMIT
REGULAR CITIZENS TO RUN FOR OFFICE INDEPENDENTLY. A FANTASTIC
OPPORTUNITY TO GET INVOLVED IN POLITICS IS THE ELECTION.
THEREFORE, A CITIZEN COULD PUT INTO PRACTICE REFORMS THAT
DON'T ALIGN WITH THE GOALS OF A POLITICAL PARTY. ADDITIONALLY, A
PERSON MAY CREATE A NEW POLITICAL PARTY TO RUN FOR OFFICE IN
THE MAJORITY OF DEMOCRACIES. THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL
LEADERS IS REGULATED IN PART BY ELECTION.

MANY TIMES, POLITICAL LEADERS MAY DESIRE TO MAKE CHOICES THAT

ARE AT ODDS WITH WHAT THE PUBLIC BELIEVES, AND AS A RESULT, THE
PUBLIC HAS THE OPTION OF NOT SUPPORTING THOSE LEADERS IN THE
UPCOMING ELECTION.

DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF LOSING THE ELECTION, THE RULING

PARTIES CANNOT AFFORD TO HARM THE PUBLIC IN ANY WAY. ELECTION
THEREFORE FUNCTIONS WELL AS A POWER CHECK AND CONTROL FOR
PEOPLE IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY.

LET'S FIND OUT WHAT THE ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM HAS TO

DO WITH THE VOTING SYSTEM NOW THAT WE ARE FAMILIAR WITH IT.

 WHAT IS ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM?

ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IS NAMED AFTER ECONOMIST AND

NOBEL LAUREATE KENNETH ARROW, WHO DEMONSTRATED THE
THEOREM IN HIS DOCTORAL THESIS AND POPULARIZED IT IN HIS 1951
BOOK SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES.

“A DIFFICULTY IN THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL WELFARE” WAS THE TITLE OF

THE ORIGINAL PAPER. THIS THEOREM IS A STUDY IN SOCIAL CHOICE
AND IS ALSO KNOWN AS “THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM” OR
“ARROW’S PARADOX.” IT PROVIDES AN ANSWER TO A FUNDAMENTAL
QUERY IN THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING.

MOST IMPORTANTLY, WE HAVE TO NOTE THAT IT IS A SOCIAL CHOICE

PARADOX ILLUSTRATING THE FLAWS OF RANKED VOTING SYSTEM.
CANDIDATES ARE RANKED FROM TOP TO BOTTOM IN LINEAR ORDERS
WHICH ARE ALSO KNOWN AS PREFERENCES. IT CLAIMS THAT NO
RANKED VOTING ELECTORAL SYSTEM CAN TRANSLATE VOTERS' RANKED
PREFERENCES INTO A COMMUNITY-WIDE (COMPLETE AND TRANSITIVE)
RANKING WHILE ALSO SATISFYING THE SET OF REQUIREMENTS WHICH
CONSISTS OF: UNRESTRICTED DOMAIN, NON-DICTATORSHIP, PARETO
EFFICIENCY, SOCIAL ORDERING AND INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT
ALTERNATIVES.

 THE THEOREM STATES THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DISREGARD THE FIVE

CONDITIONS LISTED ABOVE AND PRODUCE CYCLIC PREFERENCES OR
INTRANSITIVE VOTING. THIS MEANS THAT ARROW MADE AN EFFORT TO
DESIGN A VOTING PREFERENCE SYSTEM THAT WOULD BE FAIR,
CONSISTENT, AND MORE TRANSITIVE IN NATURE. THERE IS
DISAGREEMENT OVER THE THEOREM'S USEFUL APPLICATIONS. ARROW,
HIMSELF HAS SAID "MOST SYSTEMS ARE NOT GOING TO WORK BADLY
ALL OF THE TIME. ALL I PROVED IS THAT ALL CAN WORK BADLY AT
TIMES."

A DEMOCRACY IS A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THE PUBLIC

HAS THE POWER TO DECIDE LEGISLATION AND ELECT REPRESENTATIVES
TO CARRY IT OUT. THE FREEDOMS OF ASSEMBLY, ASSOCIATION,
PROPERTY RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RELIGION, INCLUSIVITY
AND EQUALITY, THE RIGHT TO VOTE, THE FREEDOM FROM UNJUSTIFIED
GOVERNMENTAL DEPRIVATION OF THE RIGHTS TO LIFE AND LIBERTY,
AND MINORITY RIGHTS ARE AMONG THE FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
OF DEMOCRACY.

 ALL QUALIFIED CITIZENS ARE TREATED EQUALLY BEFORE THE LAW AND
HAVE EQUAL ACCESS TO LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES, WHICH IS A
REFLECTION OF DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES. ON A SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC
ISSUE, LIKE CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION, THERE IS A RISK OF TRIAL BY
A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ELECTORS, AS THE PUBLIC MAY NOT
NECESSARILY POSSESS ANY SPECIAL COLLECTIVE WISDOM.
SAY THERE ARE TWO PARTIES: JOHN AND PETER. DUE TO THE NOISE
POLLUTION PRODUCED BY THE CARS AS A RESULT OF THE HEAVY
TRAFFIC, JOHN AND PETER HAVE BEEN FEELING QUITE DISSATISFIED.
ACCORDING TO THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, NOISE
POLLUTION FROM CONGESTED ROADWAYS IS ALMOST AS BAD FOR OUR
HEALTH AS AIR POLLUTION.

A DISTURBING LEVEL OF NOISE POLLUTION HAS DEVELOPED OVER TIME

AS A RESULT OF THE QUICK ADVANCEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY,
INDUSTRIALIZATION, URBANIZATION, AND OTHER COMMUNICATION
AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS. THIS LEVEL OF NOISE POLLUTION
NEEDS TO BE STUDIED AND CONTROLLED TO PREVENT VARIOUS
HEALTH EFFECTS LIKE HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE, INSOMNIA, NAUSEA,
HEART ATTACKS, DIZZINESS, AND INDUCED HEARING LOSS. NOW, JOHN
AND PETER ARE MORE LIKELY TO NAME NOISE POLLUTION AS THE
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE THEY BELIEVE TO BE THE MOST PRESSING.

 THEY ARE SELECTING THIS ISSUE BECAUSE IT IS VISIBLE TO THEM AND

AUDIBLE TO THEM. BUT BECAUSE THEY FEEL THAT THIS ISSUE IS
EXTERNAL AND BEYOND THEIR CONTROL, THEY WON'T GIVE CLIMATE
CHANGE ANY THOUGHT. THE PRIMARY ISSUE HERE IS THAT
DEMOCRATIC DECISION-MAKING CAN RESULT IN LOGICALLY
INCORRECT OUTCOMES, AS WE ARE ILLUSTRATIVELY DEMONSTRATING.
THE ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM WAS SKILLFULLY USED TO
ILLUSTRATE THIS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM WITH DEMOCRACY.

THE ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM FURTHER ESTABLISHES THAT IT

IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR A RANKED-VOTING SYSTEM TO SATISFY THE
REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH BY
COLLECTING AND CONVERTING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE ORDERS
INTO A COMMUNITY-WIDE PREFERENCE ORDER.

BEFORE WE MOVE ONTO THE NEXT POINT, LET'S FIRST LEARN ABOUT
WHAT UNRESTRICTED DOMAIN, NON-DICTATORSHIP, PARETO
EFFICIENCY, SOCIAL ORDERING AND INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT
ALTERNATIVES REALLY MEANS.

 UNDERSTANDING UNRESTRICTED DOMAIN

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CONDITIONS OF THE ARROW’S

IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IS UNRESTRICTED DOMAIN. ADDITIONALLY,
ANOTHER NAME FOR UNRESTRICTED DOMAIN IS UNIVERSALITY. IT IS
PRIMARILY A CHARACTERISTIC OF SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS WHEN
ALL VOTER CHOICES (BUT NO OTHER FACTORS) ARE ACCEPTED. AS A
RESULT, WITH UNRESTRICTED DOMAIN, THE SOCIAL WELFARE
FUNCTION TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION ALL VOTER PREFERENCES TO
PRODUCE A DISTINCT AND COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF SOCIETAL
OPTIONS. IN THIS WAY, THERE WON'T BE ANY CONFLICTS THAT MAY
ARISE AND IT ALSO HELPS TO MAKE SURE THAT NO VALUABLE
INFORMATION ABOUT THE VOTING CHOICES OF THE INDIVIDUALS IS
MISSED OUT.

DETERMINISTICALLY PROVIDING THE SAME RANKING EACH TIME

VOTERS' CHOICES ARE PRESENTED IN THE SAME WAY, THE VOTING
MECHANISM MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES
AND DO SO IN A WAY THAT YIELDS A FULL RANKING OF PREFERENCES
FOR SOCIETY.

UNDERSTANDING NON-DICTATORSHIP

NON-DICTATORSHIP IS WHEN THE WISHES OF MULTIPLE VOTERS ARE

SAID TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.

 THIS DEMONSTRATES THAT IT CANNOT JUST REPLICATE A VOTER'S

PREFERENCES. THE PREFERENCES OF EVERY SINGLE PERSON ARE
UNFORTUNATELY NOT ALWAYS FOLLOWED. SINCE THERE IS NO
DICTATOR, IT BASICALLY MEANS THAT NO VOTER'S PERSONAL
PREFERENCES ALWAYS ALIGN WITH THE SOCIETAL RESULTS.

UNDERSTANDING PARETO EFFICIENCY

ACCORDING TO THE ECONOMIC PRINCIPLE OF PARETO EFFICIENCY, NO

REALLOCATION OF RESOURCES CAN BENEFIT ONE PERSON WITHOUT
HARMING AT LEAST ONE OTHER. ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT GUARANTEE
EQUALITY OR JUSTICE, PARETO EFFICIENCY SUGGESTS THAT RESOURCES
ARE DISTRIBUTED IN THE MOST ECONOMICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS WAY.

PARETO EFFICIENCY, HOWEVER, ESSENTIALLY IN THE ARROW'S

IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM MEANS THAT INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES MUST
BE RESPECTED. LET'S ASSUME THERE ARE TWO CANDIDATES FOR THE
SAKE OF CLARITY. ONE IS CALLED CANDIDATE A AND ANOTHER IS
CALLED CANDIDATE B. CANDIDATE A SHOULD BE THE ONLY WINNER IN
THIS SCENARIO IF EVERY VOTER CHOOSES CANDIDATE A OVER
CANDIDATE B. ON THE OTHER HAND, CANDIDATE B WOULD LOSE
AGAINST CANDIDATE A DUE TO THE SHORTAGES OF VOTES. THIS MEANS
THAT IT WILL ACT AS A PARTICULAR DEMAND THAT THE SOCIAL
WELFARE FUNCTION TO BE AS INSENSITIVE TO THE PREFERENCE
PROFILE AS POSSIBLE.

 UNDERSTANDING INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES

ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT

ALTERNATIVES, THE ORDER OF THE REMAINING CHOICES SHOULD NOT
CHANGE IF ONE IS ELIMINATED. IN PRINCIPLE, ALTERATIONS OR ANY
TYPE OF CHANGES IN AN INDIVIDUAL'S RANKINGS OF UNIMPORTANT
OPTIONS (THOSE OUTSIDE OF A PARTICULAR SUBSET) SHOULDN'T HAVE
AN EFFECT ON THE SUBSET'S RANKING IN SOCIETY.
LET'S SEE AN EXAMPLE WHERE THERE ARE THREE OPTIONS KNOWN AS:

OPTION 1
OPTION 2
OPTION 3

REMOVING OPTION 3 SHOULD NOT CHANGE THE RELATIVE RANKINGS

OF OPTIONS 1 AND 2 IF OPTION 1 IS RANKED HIGHER THAN OPTION 2.
THIS CHARACTERISTIC HAS TO DO WITH ELIMINATING THE LOSING
CHOICE. AS A RESULT, IT MAKES IT VERY OBVIOUS THAT THE OUTCOMES
FOR THE REMAINING OPTIONS SHOULDN'T CHANGE IF YOU ELIMINATE
AN OPTION THAT HAS ALREADY LOST.

THE PHRASES "BINARY INDEPENDENCE" OR "INDEPENDENCE AXIOM"

ARE OTHER WORDS FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT
ALTERNATIVES. IT IS FREQUENTLY EMPLOYED IN A VARIETY OF
CONTEXTS WITH A VARIETY OF CONNOTATIONS. THIS ENABLES US TO

 COMPREHEND THAT THE INDEPENDENCE AXIOM MAY BE OFTEN

APPLIED TO A VARIETY OF CONTEXTS AND IT MAY ALSO BE HEAVILY
UTILIZED IN THE VOTING SYSTEM IN THE FUTURE. IF WE RELATE IT
WITH THE EXAMPLE OF THE CASE OF INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT
ALTERNATIVES THAT WE TALKED ABOUT PREVIOUSLY, WE SHOULD ALSO
ADD THE FACT THAT IF EVERY VOTER'S PREFERENCE BETWEEN X AND Y
REMAINS UNCHANGED, THEN THE GROUP'S PREFERENCE BETWEEN X
AND Y WILL ALSO REMAIN UNCHANGED WITH THE ADDITION OF A NEW
CANDIDATE.

ADDITIONALLY, THE PRECISE FORMULATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF

IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES VARIES GREATLY IN TERMS OF
TERMINOLOGY, LANGUAGE AND MOST IMPORTANTLY THE EXACT
CONTENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE SHOULD ALSO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT OF OTHER FACTORS SUCH AS: CHANGES IN THE OUTCOMES.

ELECTION OUTCOMES SHOULDN'T BE ABLE TO BE CHANGED BY ADDING

UNNECESSARY (LOSING) CANDIDATES. HOWEVER, THERE ARE
EXCEPTIONAL SITUATIONS WHERE THE OPPOSITE OUTCOME MIGHT
HAPPEN, SUCH AS: ELECTION RESULTS CHANGING SOLELY BECAUSE OF
AN ADDED IRRELEVANT (NON-WINNING) CANDIDATE. THIS TYPE OF
CIRCUMSTANCE CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE WHEN THE ADDED CANDIDATE
CHANGES THE ELECTION RESULT INTO ONE WHERE HE/SHE IS ONE OF
THE WINNERS IN THE ELECTION THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE.

 ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ALSO HAVE TO NOTE ABOUT THE

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND THE
INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES. IT IS WORTH NOTING
THAT THIS THEORY ASSUMES THAT THE INDIVIDUAL ECONOMIC
AGENTS WHO ARE INVOLVED ARE RATIONAL. WHEN HUMANS ARE
BEING RATIONAL, THEY ARE OFTEN THINKING IN SUCH A WAY THAT
THE OUTCOME OF AN ACTION LEADS TO THEIR BENEFITS ONLY. THEY
DON'T TEND TO CARE ABOUT OTHER PARTIES WHO MAY HAVE BEEN
INVOLVED. PEOPLE WHO ARE THINKING IN A RATIONAL WAY, OFTEN
TEND TO HAVE A SELFISH MINDSET. ADDITIONALLY, INDIVIDUALS WHO
EXHIBIT RATIONAL BEHAVIOR MAKE DECISIONS THAT PROVIDE THEM
WITH THE HIGHEST AMOUNT OF PERSONAL SATISFACTION. RATIONAL
CONSUMERS WILL ALWAYS CHOOSE THEIR MOST PREFERRED
ALTERNATIVE. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT RATIONALITY USUALLY LEADS A
PERSON TO FORMULATE PREFERENCES THAT ARE TRANSITIVE,
REFLECTIVE, AND COMPLETE. ARROW'S THEOREM CONCLUDES THAT
THERE EXISTS NO RULE OF AGGREGATION OR PREFERENCE THAT
POSSESSES NORMATIVE PROPERTIES WHICH ARE DESIRABLE UNLESS A
DICTATOR FORCES THESE PREFERENCES.
RATIONAL BEHAVIOR MAY NOT INVOLVE RECEIVING THE MOST
MONETARY OR MATERIAL BENEFIT, BECAUSE THE SATISFACTION
RECEIVED COULD BE PURELY EMOTIONAL OR NON-MONETARY. AS LONG
AS THEY ARE FULLY SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME BECAUSE OF THE
DECISION THEY TOOK, THEY WILL MOST LIKELY TAKE A SIMILAR
DECISION IN A SIMILAR SITUATION AS WELL.

 IN ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM, EVEN THOUGH THE

CONCEPTUALIZATION VARIES GREATLY IN TERMS OF TERMINOLOGY, IT
ALWAYS HELPS TO MAKE SURE THAT THE SYSTEM AIMS TO GIVE AN
ACCOUNT OF RATIONAL INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR. THESE DECISIONS
PROVIDE PEOPLE WITH THE GREATEST BENEFIT OR SATISFACTION
GIVEN THE CHOICES AVAILABLE. FURTHER, A PERSON’S WILLINGNESS TO
TAKE ON RISK, OR CONVERSELY, THEIR AVERSION TO RISK, MAY BE
CONSIDERED RATIONAL DEPENDING ON THEIR GOALS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES. IT IS MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY DO NOT WANT TO TAKE
SUCH A RISK THAT IT WOULD LEAD TO A HORRENDOUS AND HORRIFIC
CONSEQUENCE WHICH MAY LEAD TO PERMANENT DAMAGE. THAT'S
WHY THEY HAVE TO TAKE THEIR TIME INTO THIS AND BE COMPLETELY
RATIONAL WHILE MAKING AN IMPORTANT DECISION. RATIONAL
BEHAVIOR IS VERY IMPORTANT BECAUSE WHEN INDIVIDUALS ARE
GIVEN A STRICT NUMBER OF OPTIONS TO CHOOSE FROM, THEY MAY
WANT TO EVALUATE EACH OPTION AND THEN TRY TO THINK ABOUT
WHICH OPTION WOULD TO THE BEST OUTCOME. THEY WILL MOST
LIKELY NOT CARE ABOUT THE IMPACT THAT IT MAY CAUSE TO OTHER
PEOPLE. THAT'S WHY INDIVIDUALS HAVE TO CHECK WHETHER
CHOOSING A PARTICULAR OPTION WOULD LEAD TO THE DESIRED
OUTCOME OR NOT. AN INDIVIDUAL WHO EXHIBITS RATIONAL
BEHAVIOR CONSIDERS ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND EVALUATES
ITS COSTS AND BENEFITS AND TAKES SUFFICIENT TIME TO MAKE A
UTILITY-MAXIMIZING DECISION. IF THE BENEFITS EXCEEDS THE COSTS,
CHANCES ARE HIGH THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WILL MOST LIKELY

 TAKE A UTILITY- MAXIMIZING DECISION. IF THE COSTS EXCEEDS THE

BENEFITS, THEN MOST LIKELY THE INDIVIDUAL WILL HAVE TO TAKE
ANOTHER DIFFERENT DECISION WHICH WOULD SOMEHOW MANAGE
TO LEAD TO UTILITY MAXIMIZATION. DISSATISFACTION WHICH IS
CAUSED BY NOT TAKING A DECISION BASED ON RATIONAL BEHAVIOR
MAY FURTHER LEAD TO NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES. THIS MAY ALSO
LEAD TO REGRET FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO RESEARCH IN THE GREATEST
WAY POSSIBLE ABOUT THE OPTIONS WHICH THEY WERE GIVEN TO
CHOOSE FROM. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMISTS HAVE ARGUED THAT
INDIVIDUALS CANNOT EXHIBIT FULLY RATIONAL BEHAVIOR DUE TO
REAL-WORLD LIMITATIONS, SUCH AS THE LACK OF FULL INFORMATION
AND THE TIME LIMITATION IN DECISIONS. INDIVIDUALS MAY HAVE TO
TAKE A DECISION IN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME AND AS A RESULT IN
THE HEAT OF THE MOMENT, THEY MAY TAKE DECISIONS WHICH
WOULD NOT LEAD TO A UTILITY- MAXIMIZATION OUTCOME.
INDIVIDUALS NEED TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY TAKE THE BEST DECISION
POSSIBLE IN THE GIVEN TIME PERIOD OR ELSE THEY MAY CONSTANTLY
OVERTHINK ABOUT IT AND START FEELING THAT THEY TOOK A
DECISION WHICH IS NOT GOING TO LEAD TO THE POSITIVE
CONSEQUENCES THAT THEY HAD EXPECTED. ONE OF THE EXAMPLES OF
RATIONAL BEHAVIOR IS GIVEN BELOW:

LET'S SAY, DAVID, AN EMPLOYEE AT FIREWORKS CORPORATION, A

SOFTWARE COMPANY, HAS BEEN WORKING THERE FOR 30 YEARS AND IS
NOW ALMOST 40 YEARS OLD.

 NOW, HE IS HIGHLY CONSIDERING TO RETIRE BECAUSE HE WANTS TO

RETIRE WHILE BEING YOUNG. HE OFTEN THINKS THAT NOW HE
SHOULD JUST SPEND HIS TIME WITH HIS FAMILY, GO ON VACATIONS
AND ENJOY HIS LIFE WITHOUT CONSTANTLY HAVING TO WORRY
ABOUT WORK. HOWEVER, IF WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OF THE SALARY,
WE HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THAT IF DAVID STOPS WORKING, HE WILL
NOT BE RECEIVING THE SALARY ANYMORE. AS A RESULT, HE'LL BE ABLE
TO SPEND HIS TIME HOWEVER HE WANTS TO. NOW, DAVID COULD BE
EXHIBITING RATIONAL BEHAVIOR IF HE IS RETIRING EARLY RATHER
THAN STAYING AT THE COMPANY AND EARNING A PAYCHECK IF HE
FEELS THE UTILITY GAINED FROM RETIRING EARLY EXCEEDS THAT OF
THE PAYCHECK. IN SUCH A SCENARIO, THE MAXIMUM SATISFACTION
FOR DAVID WOULD ENTAIL CHOOSING A DECISION THAT PROVIDES
NON-MONETARY BENEFITS.

EXAMPLE OF INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES

THE AXIOM OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES

CAN MOST POSSIBLY BE UNDERSTOOD SIMPLY IN RELATION TO THE ACT
OF VOTING. LET’S SAY THERE ARE THREE PARTIES WHO TOOK PART IN A
VOTING CONTEST. THEIR NAMES ARE ROBERT, SAM AND ELIOT. NOW,
LET’S SAY THAT ROBERT IS THE IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVE. HE HAS NOW
DECIDED TO ENTER IN THIS CONTEST BETWEEN THE OTHER TWO
PARTIES NAMED SAM AND ELIOT. NOW, LET’S SAY THAT SAM BECAME
THE LEADER SINCE HE WAS LIKED BETTER THAN ELIOT, WHO BECAME
THE RUNNER-UP LATER ON. NOW, IF AN INDIVIDUAL VOTER LIKES
ROBERT LESS THAN SAM, HE/SHE WILL NOT SWITCH HIS VOTE FROM SAM
TO ELIOT. BECAUSE OF THIS REASON, A VIOLATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF
IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES IS COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS THE
"SPOILER EFFECT". RELATING IT TO THIS CASE, IT IS MOSTLY SAID THAT
ROBERT HAS “SPOILED" THE ELECTION FOR SAM, WHILE IT "LOGICALLY"
SHOULD NOT HAVE. AFTER ALL, SAM WAS ACTUALLY LIKED WAY MORE
THAN ELIOT, AND ROBERT WAS LIKED LESS THAN SAM.

UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ORDERING

VOTERS MUST BE ABLE TO USE THEIR RIGHT TO VOTE IN A WAY THAT IS

RELATED AND IN A MANNER THAT GOES FROM BEST TO WORSE IN ORDER
TO SATISFY THIS CRITERIA. EACH PERSON SHOULD ALSO BE ALLOWED TO
RANK THE OPTIONS ANYWAY THEY LIKE AND INDICATE TIES. THEREFORE,
THEY HAVE TO ORDER THEIR CHOICES IN A CONNECTED AND
TRANSITIVE RELATION.

NON-DICTATORSHIP, UNRESTRICTED DOMAIN, INDEPENDENCE OF

IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES, SOCIAL ORDERING AND PARETO EFFICIENCY
ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM THAT ALLOWS FOR
REASONABLY FAIR VOTING.

ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM: EXAMPLE 1

TO COMPREHEND THE THEOREM, ONE MUST EXAMINE THE EXAMPLE OF

THE ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM. IT IS COVERED NEXT:

LET US ASSUME THAT THERE ARE THREE DIFFERENT VARIETIES OF MILKSHAKE

– STRAWBERRY, VANILLA AND CHOCOLATE – AT THE THICKSHAKE FACTORY.
NOW, SUPPOSE THAT THERE IS A GROUP OF THREE PEOPLE AND THEIR NAMES
ARE: RIA, JENNA AND BRIANA. THIS GROUP OF 3 PEOPLE IS NOW SELECTED TO
CONVEY THEIR ORDER OF PREFERENCE FOR THE VARIETIES OF MILKSHAKE AT
THE THICKSHAKE FACTORY. THESE PEOPLE MUST DISCLOSE THEIR CHOICE OF
MILKSHAKE ALONG WITH THE RANKING OF THE MILKSHAKE’S VARIETIES’. AS A
RESULT, WE’LL BE ABLE TO KNOW THEIR RANKING OF CHOICES ACCORDING
TO THEIR TASTE, FROM BEST TO WORSE.

AFTER A FEW MINUTES, THE THREE PARTIES CONSISTING OF: RIA, JENNA AND
BRIANA PRESENT THEIR ORDER OF PREFERENCE. IT IS GIVEN BELOW:

RIA – STRAWBERRY, VANILLA, CHOCOLATE

JENNA – VANILLA, CHOCOLATE, STRAWBERRY

BRIANA- CHOCOLATE, STRAWBERRY, VANILLA

THESE ARE THE RESULTS OF THE PREFERENCES. NOW, LET’S ANALYZE THEM.

1) RIA PREFERS STRAWBERRY OVER VANILLA AND VANILLA OVER CHOCOLATE.

2) JENNA PREFERS VANILLA OVER CHOCOLATE AND CHOCOLATE OVER

STRAWBERRY.

3) BRIANA PREFERS CHOCOLATE OVER STRAWBERRY AND STRAWBERRY OVER

VANILLA.
 WE CAN NOW CONCLUDE THAT:

1/3 PREFERS STRAWBERRY > VANILLA > CHOCOLATE

1/3 PREFERS VANILLA > CHOCOLATE > STRAWBERRY

1/3 PREFERS CHOCOLATE > STRAWBERRY > VANILLA.

WE CAN ALSO SAY THAT:

2/3 PREFER STRAWBERRY OVER VANILLA

2/3 PREFER VANILLA OVER CHOCOLATE

2/3 PREFER CHOCOLATE OVER STRAWBERRY

IN THE END, WE CAN NOTE THE FACT THAT A PARADOX OCCURS WHERE 2/3
OF EACH OF THE MAJORITY PREFERS STRAWBERRY OVER VANILLA, VANILLA
OVER CHOCOLATE, AND CHOCOLATE OVER STRAWBERRY.

AS A RESULT, KENNETH ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM GETS VALIDATED

AS ONE OF THE CONDITIONS IN THE THEOREM IS VIOLATED WHILE RANKING
THE ORDER OF PREFERENCE AMONGST THE THREE ALTERNATIVES
STRAWBERRY, VANILLA AND CHOCOLATE.

ACCORDING TO ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO

FORMULATE A SOCIAL ORDERING ON A PROBLEM LIKE THE ONE MENTIONED
ABOVE WITHOUT BREAKING ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS. THESE
 CONDITIONS INCLUDE: NON-DICTATORSHIP, PARETO EFFICIENCY,
INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES, UNRESTRICTED DOMAIN,
AND SOCIAL ORDERING. THE CONTRADICTORY OUTCOME VALIDATES
ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM.

ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM: EXAMPLE 2

NOW, LET’S LOOK AT ANOTHER EXAMPLE ILLUSTRATING THE TYPE OF

PROBLEMS HIGHLIGHTED BY ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM.

IN THIS CASE, LET’S SAY UK HAS DECIDED TO WORK ON IMPROVING THE

QUALITY OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS. THEY’LL BE ABLE TO DO THAT
BY CREATING MARKETS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, ENHANCE THE
ATTRACTIVENESS OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS FOR PRIVATE FUNDING AND
BY OVERHAULING INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RADICAL INNOVATION AND
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH.
NOW, VOTING SHALL TAKE PLACE.

VOTERS ARE ASKED TO RANK THEIR PREFERENCE OF THREE INFRASTRUCTURE

PROJECTS THAT THE COUNTRY'S ANNUAL TAX POUNDS COULD BE USED FOR:

THE THREE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS ARE:

1) BUILDING NEW ROADS

2) IMPROVE TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES

3) IMPROVE THE SEWAGE SYSTEM

 SUPPOSE, UK HAS 99 VOTERS WHO ARE EACH ASKED TO RANK THE ORDER,
FROM BEST TO WORST, FOR WHICH OF THE THREE PROJECTS SHOULD
RECEIVE THE ANNUAL FUNDING. THE RESULTS ARE GIVEN BELOW:

1) 33 VOTES:

NEW ROADS > TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES > SEWAGE SYSTEM

1/3 OF THE VOTERS PREFER NEW ROADS OVER TELECOMMUNICATION

FACILITIES AND PREFER TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES OVER THE SEWAGE
SYSTEM

2) 33 VOTES:

TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES > SEWAGE SYSTEM > NEW ROADS

1/3 OF THE VOTERS PREFER TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES OVER SEWAGE
SYSTEM AND PREFER SEWAGE SYSTEM OVER NEW ROADS

3) 33 VOTES:

SEWAGE SYSTEM > NEW ROADS > TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES

1/3 OF THE VOTERS PREFER SEWAGE SYSTEM OVER NEW ROADS AND PREFER
NEW ROADS OVER TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES

AFTER ANALYZING THE RESULTS, WE CAN CONCLUDE THAT:

1) 66 VOTERS PREFER NEW ROADS OVER TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES

 2) 66 VOTERS PREFER TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES OVER SEWAGE
SYSTEM

3) 66 VOTERS PREFER SEWAGE SYSTEM OVER NEW ROADS

THEREFORE, A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY OF VOTERS PREFER NEW ROADS OVER

TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES
OVER SEWAGE SYSTEM AND SEWAGE SYSTEM OVER NEW ROADS---A
PARADOXICAL RESULT WHICH IS COMPLETELY BASED ON THE REQUIREMENT
TO RANK ORDER THE PREFERENCES OF THE THREE ALTERNATIVES OF THE
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.

APART FROM CHOOSING WHICH INFRASTRUCTURE TO INVEST ON, ARROW’S

IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IS ALSO APPLICABLE WHEN VOTERS ARE ASKED TO
RANK POLITICAL CANDIDATES.

ONLY RANKED VOTING SYSTEMS ARE COVERED BY ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY

THEOREM; CARDINAL VOTING SYSTEMS ARE NOT COVERED. IN CARDINAL
VOTING, CHOICES CAN BE GIVEN NUMERICAL SCORES. ANY ELECTORAL
SYSTEM THAT ENABLES THE VOTER TO PROVIDE EACH CANDIDATE WITH A
SEPARATE EVALUATION—TYPICALLY A RATING OR GRADE—IS REFERRED TO AS
A "CARDINAL VOTING" SYSTEM.

THREE AUTOMATIC ELIMINATION PROCESSES ARE USED IN 3-2-1 VOTING, IN

WHICH VOTERS SCORE EACH CANDIDATE AS "GOOD," "OK," OR "BAD." THE
CANDIDATE WHO RECEIVES THE MOST "GOOD" RATINGS IN THE FIRST STEP
AND THE LEAST "BAD" RATINGS IN THE SECOND STEP ARE CHOSEN AS THE
WINNER. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT FOR WINNING IS THAT A SIZABLE NUMBER
OF PEOPLE BELIEVE IN AND SUPPORT YOU. IT IS EXTREMELY CLEAR THAT YOU
WILL PROBABLY LOSE IF A LARGE ENOUGH NUMBER OF PEOPLE DON'T AGREE
WITH YOU OR SUPPORT YOU. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE VOTES WILL PUT
THE OTHER CONTENDERS FAR IN FRONT. THE SECOND PREREQUISITE IS THAT
AS FEW PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE SHOULD BE AGAINST YOU; IDEALLY, THERE
SHOULDN'T BE A MAJORITY. YOU MUST ENSURE THAT NO ONE IS AGAINST
YOU AND THAT EVERYONE WANTS TO BE ON YOUR SIDE. BECAUSE VOTING IS
BASED ON PUBLIC OPINION, AND IF THE PUBLIC DISLIKES YOU, THEY WON'T
VOTE FOR YOU, IT IS CRUCIAL TO MAKE A GOOD IMPRESSION.

JUST "MAJORITY RULES" AMONG VOTERS WHO MADE SOME

DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE TWO CANDIDATES WHO PASS THOSE TWO
FILTERS. EACH OF THESE THREE STEPS IS CRUCIAL. IT WILL BE SHIFTED IF THEY
ARE NOT GOING TO BE IN THIS ORDER. PAIRWISE MUST COME LAST BECAUSE
IT ONLY WORKS WITH A PAIR, AND PUTTING THE "FEWEST BAD" STEP FIRST
RUNS THE DANGER OF LEAVING JUST INOFFENSIVE NONENTITIES.
THEREFORE, THEY MUST GO IN THAT SEQUENCE.

THE CARDINAL UTILITY IS ALSO THOUGHT TO BE A MORE TRUSTWORTHY

INDICATOR OF SOCIAL WELFARE. ON THOSE FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD
WHO OFTEN DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO VOTE, THE DECISION TO VOTE
MIGHT HAVE EXTREMELY SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS. . VOTING BY RESIDENTS
WILL DETERMINE HOW THESE POLICIES, LAWS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE WILL
BE IMPLEMENTED BECAUSE MANY LAWMAKERS WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE
NATION'S POLICIES, LAWS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE COMING YEARS.
CARDINAL VOTING GIVES EXTRA DETAILS, ALLOWING A CARDINAL-VOTING
SYSTEM TO TRANSLATE INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE ORDERS INTO A SOCIETAL

 PREFERENCE ORDER. A BALLOT, WHICH CAN BE FOUND AS A SHEET OF PAPER

OR A TINY BALL USED IN SECRET VOTING, IS A DEVICE USED TO CAST VOTES IN
AN ELECTION. IT IS UNCLEAR HOW WELL DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES HAVE
WORKED. IT IS CRUCIAL TO REALIZE THAT ELECTIONS SERVE AS A PILLAR OF
DEMOCRACY BECAUSE, IN THE EVENT THAT ALL ELSE FAILS, WE MAY STILL
SELECT THE IDEAL CANDIDATE TO LEAD THE NATION. IN THE SENSE THAT IT
MAY HAVE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS ON THOSE NOT CONNECTED TO A
COUNTRY, MANY PEOPLE MAY BE IMPACTED BY PICKING THE WRONG
LEADER. VOTERS RATE THEIR SELECTIONS ON AN ORDINAL SCALE AND SUBMIT
RANKED BALLOTS WHILE VOTING IN RANKED ELECTIONS. VOTERS CAN
INDEPENDENTLY RATE EACH OPTION WHILE USING A CARDINAL BALLOT.
SINCE RATING SYSTEMS ALLOW VOTERS TO EXPRESS VARIED DEGREES OF
PREFERENCE AND THE ABILITY TO GIVE NUMEROUS CANDIDATES THE SAME
SCORE IF THEY FEEL THE SAME WAY ABOUT EACH, THEY PROVIDE MORE
INFORMATION.

FOR INSTANCE, SUPPOSE THERE ARE JUST THREE CHOICES AVAILABLE:

A: SPEND A WEEK TRAVELING TO TURKEY.

B: STAY OVERNIGHT IN NEW YORK

C: SPEND A MONTH TRAVELING IN JAPAN

ALTHOUGH A > B > C MAY BE THE PREFERRED RANKING, B > C IS A

CONSIDERABLY GREATER PREFERENCE THAN A > B. RATINGS WOULD MORE
CLOSELY RESEMBLE A: 100%, B: 99%, AND C: 0%.

 TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF VOTES NEEDED, VOTERS RANK THEIR

PREFERENCES. A CANDIDATE IS DEEMED THE WINNER IF THEY RECEIVE THE
MAJORITY OF FIRST-PREFERENCE VOTES. THE CANDIDATE WITH THE FEWEST
FIRST-PREFERENCE VOTES IS REMOVED IF NO CANDIDATE RECEIVES A
MAJORITY OF THOSE VOTES. MULTIPLE ROUNDS OF VOTE COUNTING ARE
USED IN CONVENTIONAL RANKED-CHOICE VOTING (RCV).

THE CONTENDER WHO PERFORMS THE WORST IN EACH ROUND IS

ELIMINATED. FIRST-PREFERENCE VOTES CAST FOR THE UNSUCCESSFUL
CANDIDATE ARE DISQUALIFIED, ELEVATING THE CHOICES LISTED AS NEXT-
PREFERENCE ON THOSE BALLOTS. TO DETERMINE WHICH CANDIDATE HAS
RECEIVED A MAJORITY OF THE REVISED VOTES, A FRESH COUNT IS DONE. IN
THE MEANWHILE, IF A VOTER'S FIRST CHOICE IS DISQUALIFIED, THEIR SECOND
CHOICE WILL TAKE ITS PLACE. AS CANDIDATES COMPETE FOR SECOND-
CHOICE VOTES, THEY ARE ALSO MORE LIKELY TO TREAT RIVALS WITH
RESPECT. RANKED-CHOICE VOTING AND SINGLE-TRANSFERABLE VOTING ARE
SOMETIMES USED INTERCHANGEABLY. VOTING IS THEREFORE A CRUCIAL
ASPECT OF CHOOSING THE GOVERNMENT'S LEADERS SINCE WITHOUT IT, THE
GOVERNMENT'S CONSTITUENTS WOULD PROBABLY STIR UP PUBLIC
DISSATISFACTION. ELECTIONS PLACE POWER IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE
AND OFFER THEM THE ABILITY TO CHOOSE THE GOVERNMENT THAT WILL
WORK FOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH.

VOTERS CAN ALSO SEE A NEW BEAM OF HOPE FOR THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE
AND A NEW GLOW OF OPTIMISM DURING ELECTIONS. ELECTION AWARENESS
ENABLES PEOPLE TO MAKE INFORMED DECISIONS AND SUPPORT DESERVING
CANDIDATES BY EDUCATING THEM ABOUT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS,
POLITICAL PARTIES, THEIR PLATFORMS, AND THE CANDIDATES' BACKGROUNDS.
 ONE OF THE KEY FOUNDATIONAL ELEMENTS OF A NATION'S DEMOCRACY IS
ITS ELECTORAL SYSTEM. ELECTIONS ARE ANOTHER WAY THAT THE
GOVERNMENT IS KEPT IN CHECK BECAUSE THEY ARE HELD AT REGULAR
INTERVALS AND THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION MAY BE OVERTHROWN AND
CHANGED IF ITS POLICIES ARE DETRIMENTAL TO THE GENERAL WELFARE OF
THE POPULACE. BY DIRECTLY INVOLVING ITS POPULATION IN SELECTING A
GOVERNMENT FOR THE NATION, ELECTIONS IN A DEMOCRACY SUPPORT
DEMOCRACY.

AS A RESULT, ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IS A SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

THAT INVESTIGATES THE BLENDING OF PERSONAL PREFERENCES, INTERESTS,
AND VIEWPOINTS TO ARRIVE AT SOCIETAL CONCLUSIONS. THE THEOREM
STATES THAT NO VOTING SYSTEM IS EVER COMPREHENSIVE, LOGICAL, OR
FREE OF DICTATORS. SINCE WELFARE ECONOMICS CONCENTRATED ON THE
TECHNIQUES FOR AGGREGATING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES, ARROW'S
IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM HAD A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THIS FIELD OF
STUDY.

 References:
1. Arrow, Kenneth J. (1950). "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" Journal of
Political Economy. 58 (4): 328–346.
2. Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: Wiley, 1951;
republished in an extended form, 1963)
3. Barbera, S.: Pivotal voters. A new proof of Arrow’s theorem. Economic Letters 6. 13-16
(1980)
4. Geanakoplos, J: Three brief proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Cowles
Foundation Discussion Paper 1123R, 1996
5. Suzumura, Kōtarō (2002). "Introduction". In Arrow, Kenneth J.; Sen, Amartya K.;
Suzumura, Kōtarō (eds.). Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1. Amsterdam,
Netherlands: Elsevier.
6. McKenna, Phil (12 April 2008). "Vote of no confidence". New Scientist. 198 (2651):
30–33.
7. "Democracy". Oxford University Press. Retrieved 24 February 2021.
8. "Direct democracy | Definition, History, & Facts | Britannica"
9. Arrow's Impossibility Theory – Explained, What is Arrow's Impossibility Theorem?
Written by Jason Gordon, The Business Professor
10. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, Wikipedia
11. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, CFI Team, Corporate Finance Institute
12. Baujard, Antoinette; Gavrel, Frédéric; Igersheim, Herrade; Laslier, Jean-François;
Lebon, Isabelle (September 2017). "How voters use grade scales in evaluative voting"
(PDF). European Journal of Political Economy. 55: 14
13. CAN RANKED-CHOICE VOTING WORK? A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH, by
Adam Kissel, Cardinal Institute for West Virginia Policy
14. "3-2-1 voting". Electowiki. 30 June 2021
15. Quinn, Jameson (28 May 2017). "Make. All. Votes. Count. (Part II: single-winner)".
Jameson Quinn.
16. "Ballot". Merriam-Webster. Retrieved 2012-11-07
17. Ranked-choice voting (RCV), BALLOTPEDIA
18. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, StudySmarter