Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48006             July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.

Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.

Jose G. Advincula for respondents.

BOCOBO, J.:

This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto
Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of
Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The
carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia,
suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the
criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March
7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto
Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the
plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was
modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest
from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was
the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high
speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
 ... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p.
22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla
who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and
speeding (Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of
Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify
plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no
civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:

... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents.
In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903
of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16,
Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising
from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book
IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is
applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or
commission not punishable by law.

The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:

... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be

imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a
misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in
article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee.

The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil
action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible
under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant
maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his
(defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code,
but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been
exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the
minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under
the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This
should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and
remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the
luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise
guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity
of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.

Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate

legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that
is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the
wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of
employers may be safely anchored.

The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:

CIVIL CODE

ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and
from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or
negligence intervenes.

xxx     xxx     xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be

governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.

ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions
of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.

xxx     xxx     xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by
his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
 ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible,
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible.

The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with them.

Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons

subject to their authority and living with them.

Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any

damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service
in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.

The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but
not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly
devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
next preceding article shall be applicable.

Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.

The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned
therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage.

ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may
recover from the latter what he may have paid.

REVISED PENAL CODE

ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally

liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:
 First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts
committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years
of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said
insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which
each one shall be liable.

When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or
when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants
of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent
of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner
prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using
violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no
such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of
their property exempt from execution.

ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors

of establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern
keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
 Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by
robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of
such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions
which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to
the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.

ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability

established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed
by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of
their duties.

xxx     xxx     xxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless

imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute
a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less
grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed."

It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be
broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article
1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple
imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code
has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse
confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in
regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising
from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-
delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.

The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable.

This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex
Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is
often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of
the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of
Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a
sabiendas en daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."

The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article

1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-
delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de
culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be
governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion
of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.

Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:

1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.

2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the
Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only
if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all
acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted
that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic
when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol.
3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts
and the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica

Española" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:

El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y

comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil
propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal
alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo
delito o falta."

The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises
different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in
no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a
necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or
misdemeanor."

Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been
a collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and
the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal
case, in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil
damages. The employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the
Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the
Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril
del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes,
Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):

Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos,

todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la
obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el
choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el
resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas
de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion
causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones,
reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma atañen al orden
publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y
claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el
agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual
coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones
civiles para pedir indemnizacion.

Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no

vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del
Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daños o perjuicios, en que
intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son
ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia
punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128
del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo,
desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de
delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se
denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris.
Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion
de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las
diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.

Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las

responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables
del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al
servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o
sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables
criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La
obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y
omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe
responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y
empleados de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea
con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la
jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales
con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son
demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la
obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero
postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y
tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en
distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por
añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del Ferrocarril
Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub
judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio
intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no
hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba
legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no
existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que
tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion
civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento
permanece incolume, extraña a la cosa juzgada.

As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less
tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for
damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title
upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil
responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each
nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal
measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or
indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason,
they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is
clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party
no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not
eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.

Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which
are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article
1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages
in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are
every day filed before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering
therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind
the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate
the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime
under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with
legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a
detailed comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the
obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary
to point out to one of such differences.

Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or
misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary
character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of
those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not
coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next
preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons
enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or
enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their
functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial
decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal
cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are
sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before
the civil courts.

Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between
punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system,
so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as
different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaña del Ferrocarril
Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved
the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for
indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was
not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a
sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered.
Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that
such action had been legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but
 because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the non-
existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject
matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater
reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for
its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.

Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which
the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article
1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another),
without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is
accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed
by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted
till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary
to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a
principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol.
20, pp. 734-735.)

Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430),
declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He
writes:

Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u

omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria?
es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar,
en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una
responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante
afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las
faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables.
La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa,
pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la
imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueño o director del
establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que
enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes,
aprendices) causan un daño, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro,
 etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el daño. Esta
falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno,
sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho
propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto,
completamente inadmisible.

Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or
omissions of those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In
order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what
the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of
another person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary
to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that
everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility
in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the
same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or
negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of
the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article
referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any
damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have
committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is
this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is
a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for
one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore,
completely inadmissible.

Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo

Civil Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:

Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia

culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena
respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que
motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es
subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores
e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y
subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del
articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la
 responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se
deba responder."

That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable
only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception,
one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which
gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the
order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and
incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other,
declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the
latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the
case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, according
to the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of
those persons for whom one should be responsible."

Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld
the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate
and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from
criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily
and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.

One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In
that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car
owned by the "compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor was
prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil
action against the street car company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000
pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme
Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final
judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme
Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:

Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado

supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compañia Electrica
Madrileña al pago del daño causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente
Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria
deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo
cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos,
y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el
hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado
descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico
fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no
califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y
que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de
establecimientos o empresas por los daños causados por sus dependientes en
determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo
hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compañia recurrente a la
indemnizacion del daño causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer
los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de
Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir
atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el
fallo recaido en la causa.

Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken
supposition that the trial court, in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the
payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo,
disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in
the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact that the
two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects,
and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the
act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave
carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no
exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a
source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in
accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers of
establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees
under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company,
appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its
employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of
the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading
attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way
contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:

First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street
car company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla,
has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.

Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence,
so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would
have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held
subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his
primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence — which he did not
overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's
criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under
article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred
the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be
observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method
of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any
judgment against him for damages.

Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was
held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a
previous criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at
bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver
had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case
cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted
in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and
was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional.

(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was
brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed
by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles
consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly
under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:

Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que

consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1.º, que las expediciones
facturadas por la compañia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas
vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera
a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2.º, que llegadas a su destino tales
mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la
estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que la falta de
entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le
originaron daños y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como
expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que
dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho
por los remitentes en los envases:

Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos
que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae
no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda
vez que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun
otro vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de
aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente
descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daños
y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa
negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas,
segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente
sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la
Compañia demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones
de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.

Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which
it declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by
the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty
receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with
 wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached their destination,
their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent without
justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these
goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and
damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines
and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the
orders sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:

Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments
of error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from
non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based
on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties
litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the
decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for
reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on
account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods
consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's
responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in
virtue of the next article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected
with the person who caused the damage by relations of economic character and
by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)

The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both
the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified
and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it
was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was
being sued.

Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.

In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365
[year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant,
because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which
the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was
broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the
necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries
through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily
to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of
the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track, and on
his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by
him and secondarily by his employer.

This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject.
Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or
negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title
XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:

"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when

there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is

demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.

xxx     xxx     xxx

"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable

for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.

xxx     xxx     xxx

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage."

As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient

to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for
failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation
therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than
criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be
reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific
codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts,
would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for
prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by
reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these
articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but
clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal
Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in
actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory
effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal,
might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending
the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started,
the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the
party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the
future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could
be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be
extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133
of our Penal Code on the same subject.

An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of
these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be
merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly
provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or
omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person
criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil right.

Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be

regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only
while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the
existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under
the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by
 the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been
instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal
Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally
determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived
the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and
criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.

The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case
appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the
words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the
comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It
has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his
employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence
punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than
this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the
law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the
Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be
those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But
where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from
contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles
1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction
may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective
machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out
of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for
passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act
itself.

In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old
child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting
from the death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and
managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment,
said in part:

If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana
Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met
vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the
 opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again
started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along
Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which
he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely
reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto
precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred
if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the
defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in
a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter
street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had
occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the
child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the
automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance
shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a
high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions
had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the
death of the child would not have occurred.

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by
the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being
a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising
from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine.
In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327,
the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to
recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and
negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday
procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter
Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After the
procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran
Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by
defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The
little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that
she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from
the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The trial
courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But
this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the
parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence
was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:

Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he
nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the
court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had
a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening
when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing
the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could
foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child
running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in
the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7
Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The
contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a
bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
damages.

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902
of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code.

In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages
for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence
of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the
mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the
automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying
passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court
to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment
as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good
father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903.
This Court said:

As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable
garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were
likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government
in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had
been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the
evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the
defective condition of the steering gear.

The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:

Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence,
but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage."

From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure,
and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer
shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieve from liability.

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil.,
37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant
had so negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public
vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court,
applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in
part (p. 41) that:

The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or
director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while
the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.

Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison
vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for
damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little
boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell
from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo
Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant
Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless
negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and
1903, held:

The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship

of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes
[1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)

In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930)
the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had
been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p.
526):

The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed
was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any
tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation
as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the
opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome
by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting
 Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the
cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.

It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is
negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases,
primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article
1902, of the Civil Code.

Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study
first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision
between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took
place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto
Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and
slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a
fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila
filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the
defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower
court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case
was governed by the Penal Code, saying:

With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion
that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily
understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The
Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from
crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of
the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or
omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up
with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words,
the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its
jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises
and not a case of civil negligence.

xxx     xxx     xxx
 Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to
the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would
permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the
master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to
prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but
might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on
conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said
further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument
advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code
should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)

It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because
the Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability
arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila
vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the
subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas
the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the
employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen
that this is a proper and independent remedy.

Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the
defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been
convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay
the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the
subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant
attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this
Court held:

In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that
the exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all
who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to
the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.

The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case,
because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's
subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of
action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of
the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that
decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article
1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability under the
Penal Code.

In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to
recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by
the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code, and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.

The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case
need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability
arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-

delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a
distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal
Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited
render it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the defendant-
petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient
to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been
little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to
fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of
the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any
degree of negligence — even the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through
the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere
would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we,
in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the
spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which
can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many
instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that
is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to
compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief.
True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way,
which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article
1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil
wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of
delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and
similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay
damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this
roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws,
courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers
and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen
and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the
public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the
services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the
latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard
has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others
for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is
much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or
director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the
injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee
because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many
jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of
representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already
cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser
como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le
emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the
employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire
a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of
stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy
of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its
waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes
an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution,
and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.