2022400237

Reyes, Six

1S Persons and Family Relations Law

Parental Authority Basic Principle Cases

1. Medina Vs. Makabali

The rights of the parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge
of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic
training and development. (Art 356,Civil Code)

While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the
basic principle that “in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s
welfare shall be paramount”(Art 363, Civil Code) and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven
may be ordered separated from the mother.

In this case, while it is true that the age of the child is 7 years old the court and should be with the biological
mother, the petitioner proved remiss in the sacred duties bestowed upon parents. She not only failed to
provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit in his tenderest years,
when he needed his mother the most.

Therefore, the custody was given to the foster parent, Dr Makabali.

2. In the Matter of the the Petition for Habeas Corpus of minor Shang Ko Vingson Yu Shirly Vingson

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving
the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor
children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat
them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that
they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counseled.

In this case, the minor expressed preference to stay in the custody of Calvary Kids and that the police
recommendations that it was not in Shang Ko’s best interest to return her to her mother who abused and
maltreated her, considering the factual issues the court ordered that Shang Ko to remain in the custody of
Calvary Kids as it is in her best interest.

3. Bucal vs Bucal

Courts cannot grant visitation rights in litigation under violations of the RA 9262 which are not prayed for in
pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by a party to a case. Granting of visitation rights that are
unexplained and not prayed for in litigations under the VAWC law is a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any court granting it.
 In this case, a protection order was issued against the respondent preventing further acts of violence against
a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of RA 9262 and during the proceedings neither parties have
prayed for visitation rights of the husband. As such the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
something that was not prayed for.

4. Cabanas vs Pilapil

The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution.

Article 320 of the Family Code states that “the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator
of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is
worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the
Court of First Instance."

Article 321 of the Family Code states that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with
his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father
or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives."

In this case, while it is true that the uncle is a family by consanguinity and the proceeds of the insurance
expressly name him as trustee, it is still the mother who shall have parental authority. Ownership of the child
shall be under the supervision of the mother. Even if the uncle was declared as the trustee of the insurance
policy, the State, in its role as parens patriae to strengthen the family as a basic social institution, the welfare
of the child is the paramount consideration. Between the mother and an uncle, it is more likely that the former
would provide more care and pay greater attention to the child.
Therefore, the mother should be entrusted with the responsibility.

5. Bagtas vs Santos

In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the child’s welfare is the most important
consideration. The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child.
The child’s welfare is the supreme consideration.
In this case, while it is true that the grandparents are the default substitute of parental authority as stated in
Art 214 of the family code, the general welfare of the child is still the supreme consideration. If the welfare
of the child so demands, the courts may deprive the parent concerned of the parental authority over the child
or adopt measures as may be proper under the circumstances.

6. Espiritu and Layug vs CA

Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's
interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award
the custody on the basis of that consideration.
The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a future
character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and adjusted.

In this case, as both children are now over seven years of age, their choice of parent have been given respect
by the court. As the children can now ascertain what is right and moral, the court should give due respect to
their decision to stay with their father and aunt in the Philippines. Furthermore, a mother’s constant flirtations
from one man to another is considered by the court as a compelling reason not to award the children’s custody
to her, for said behaviour forms an immoral environment especially to a growing child. From all indications,
Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting two requirements found in Article 213(1) of the Family Code.

7. Gualberto vs Gualberto
 Art 213 (2) of the Family code provides that “No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
The “tender-age presumption” under Article 213 of the Family State provides that it may be overcome only
by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness such as neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable
disease. To deprive the mother of custody, the father must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an
adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper
parental care.

In this case, it is not enough that Crisanto to show merely that Jocelyn was a lesbian. He must also
demonstrate that she carried same sex relationship in the presence of their son or under circumstances not
conducive to the child’s proper moral development. There was no evidence that the son was exposed to the
mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral or psychological development suffered.

8. Grande vs Antonio

Article 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname
of their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law with the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.

In this case, the particular provision used the word “may”, which shows that the law’s intention is not to
compel an acknowledged illegitimate child to use the surname of his illegitimate father. Under the rules of
statutory construction, the word “may” connote that the law is merely permissive and does not indicate a
mandatory meaning.

This means that the law only confers discretion upon the illegitimate child if whether he/she chooses to use
his/her father’s surname or not. Therefore, a father cannot compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children.

9. Dacasin vs Dacasin

As to the Agreement on the Joint Custody, it cannot be enforced as it is VOID for being contrary to law and
public policy.

Art 213 (2) of the Family code provides that “No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”

The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age.
The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child

In this case, the joint custody agreement was established while the child was under seven years of age and as
provided in Art 213(2), no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother.

10. Vancil vs Belmes

Art 212 of the Family Code provides that “In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present
shall continue exercising parental authority...”
Art 214. “In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be
exercised by the surviving grandparent..."
 In this case, the respondent Belmes, biological mother, is very much alive and has exercised continuously
parental authority over the child. Vancil, grandmother, has to prove Belmes' unsuitability. Assuming that
Belmes is unfit as a guardian of the minor, still Vancil cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She admitted
in her petition that an expatriate like her will find difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian. As the
Court held in Guerrero vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the
jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult to protect the wards.