In this book Mark Neufeld argues that the predominance of the

positivist approach to the study of international politics has meant

that theory committed to human emancipation remains poorly
developed. He suggests that International Relations theory must
move in a non-positivist direction, and takes recent developments in
the discipline (including Gramscian, postmodernist, feminist and
normative approaches) as evidence that such a shift is already under
way. In a comprehensive treatment, he argues that the critical theory
of the Frankfurt School can be used to reorient the study of world
politics. Drawing on recent work in social and political theory, as
well as International Relations, this book offers an accessible analysis
of recent developments in the study of international politics.
CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 43

The restructuring of
International Relations theory

Editorial Board

Steve Smith (Managing editor)

Ken Booth Christopher Brown Robert W. Cox
Anne Deighton Jean Elshtain Fred Halliday
Christopher Hill Andrew Linklater Richard Little
R. B. J. Walker

International Political Economy

Roger Tooze Craig N. Murphy

Cambridge Studies in International Relations is a joint initiative of

Cambridge University Press and the British International Studies
Association (BISA). The series will include a wide range of material,
from undergraduate textbooks and surveys to research-based mono-
graphs and collaborative volumes. The aim of the series is to publish
the best new scholarship in International Studies from Europe, North
America and the rest of the world.
 CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

43 Mark Neufeld
The restructuring of International Relations theory
42 Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.)
Bringing transnational relations back in
Non-state actors, domestic structures and international institutions
41 Hayward R. Alter
Rediscoveries and reformulations
Humanistic methodologies for international studies
40 Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair
Approaches to world order
39 Jens Bartelson
A genealogy of sovereignty
38 Mark Rupert
Producing hegemony
The politics of mass production and American global power
37 Cynthia Weber
Simulating sovereignty
Intervention, the state and symbolic exchange
36 Gary Goertz
Contexts of international politics
35 James L. Richardson
Crisis diplomacy
The Great Powers since the mid-nineteenth century
34 Bradley S. Klein
Strategic studies and world order
The global politics of deterrence
33 T. V. Paul
Asymmetric conflicts: war initiation by weaker powers
32 Christine Sylvester
Feminist theory and international relations in a postmodern era
31 Peter J. Schraeder
US foreign policy toward Africa
Incrementalism, crisis and change
Series list continues after index
The restructuring of
International Relations theory

Mark A. Neufeld
Department of Political Studies
Trent University
Peterborough, Ontario

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia

© Cambridge University Press 1995

First published 1995

A catalogue record for this book is availablefromthe British Library

Library of Congress cataloguing in publication data

Neufeld, Mark A.
The restructuring of International Relations theory / Mark A. Neufeld.
p. cm. - (Cambridge studies in international relations: 43)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0 521 47394 2 (hard) - 0 521 47936 3 (pbk.)
1. International relations - Philosophy.
I. Title. II. Series.
JX1391.N477 1995
327.r01-dc20 95-7672 CIP

ISBN 0 521 47394 2 hardback

ISBN 0 521 47936 3 paperback

Transferred to digital printing 2002

CE
For my mother, Elsie Louise Neufeld,
and in memory of my father, Alfred Harry Neufeld,
with love and gratitude
 Contents

Acknowledgments page x

Introduction 1
International Relations theory and the Aristotelian
project 9
2 Defining positivism 22
3 Reflexivity and International Relations theory 39
4 Human consciousness and International Relations
theory 70
5 International Relations theory and social criticism 95
6 Conclusion 122

Notes 126
Bibliography 163
Index 172

IX
 Acknowledgments

The image of the monkish scholar working productively in isolation

has, for good or for ill, never applied in my case. In the absence of
interaction with others of similar interest, I have found creative
thinking to be virtually impossible. Accordingly, I wish to acknowl-
edge the many people who read all or parts of this book and
provided me with helpful comments and/or stimulating discussion
along the way. Among them: John Sigler, Michael Dolan, Rianne
Mahon, Tariq Ahsan, Andreas Pickel, Roger Epp, Alex Wendt,
V. Spike Peterson, Nicholas Onuf, and, last but certainly not least,
Stephen McDowell. To them I owe my thanks.
I would also like to thank my exceedingly able research assistant,
Sheryl Shore, for going over the manuscript with a fine-toothed comb,
as well as Departmental secretary, Shirley Lynch, for handling my
messages and chasing down missing faxes with such good humour
and efficiency.
I am indebted to Richard Little and Steve Smith of the Cambridge
Series Editorial Board. Without their support for this project, it is
doubtful that it would ever have seen the light of day. I benefited as
well from the constructive criticisms of two anonymous reviewers. At
all times the advice and guidance from John Haslam of Cambridge
University Press was much appreciated.
I want to thank my one-time fellow graduate student, Sandra
Whitworth. In addition to being the perfect office-mate (she rarely
came to campus), she was instrumental in convincing me that a
theory of world politics which aspires to be truly critical must be
feminist as well.
Above all I wish to thank Tracy Heffernan for her support and
patience. Her contribution to this work was both direct (reading and
 Acknowledgments

rereading the entire manuscript) as well as indirect (at critical

moments, shouldering an asymmetrical amount of child-care so that I
could have the 'fifteen more minutes' I needed to 'finish up this
section'). Throughout the writing process she helped me keep this
project in perspective by reminding me that critical theory also has to
have something to say about how I lead my life away from the
computer. Above all, she never let me forget that if theorizing is itself
a form of practice necessary for emancipatory struggle, it is, none-
theless, a form of practice that can never suffice on its own.
Funding for much of the research and writing of this book was
provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada.
Selections from chapters 1 and 5 appear in 'The Pedagogical is
Political: The 'Why', the 'What', and the 'How' in the Teaching of
World Polities', in Lev S. Gonick and Edward Weisband, eds.,
Teaching World Politics: Contending Pedagogies for a New World Order
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
An earlier version of chapter 3 appeared as 'Reflexivity and
International Relations Theory', in Millennium: Journal of International
Studies, 22, No. 1 (1993), 53-76; reprinted in Claire Turenne Sjolander
and Wayne S. Cox, eds., Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on
International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1994).
An earlier version of chapter 4 appeared as 'Interpretation and the
Science of International Relations', Review of International Studies, 19,
No. 1 (1993), 39-61.

XI
 Introduction

International politics being but a specific instance of a general

political theory, the main task is to understand the requirements and
problems of such a theory. For if this assumption is correct, the key
to a theory of international politics will not be found in the specific
subject matter of international politics but in the requirements and
problems of a general political theory.
Hans J. Morgenthau1

Maybe there are periods when one can get along without theory, but
at present its deficiency denigrates people and renders them helpless
against violence. The fact that theory may evaporate into a hollow
and bloodless idealism or sink into a tiresome and empty rehashing
of phrases, does not mean that these forms are its true forms. (As far
as tedium and banality are concerned, philosophy more than finds
its equal in the so-called investigation of facts.) In any case, today
the whole historical dynamic has placed philosophy at the centre of
social actuality, and social actuality at the centre of philosophy.
Max Horkheimer2

This book is concerned with providing an answer to a very specific

question: why is it that theory oriented toward human emancipation
remains poorly developed within the discipline of International
Relations? The answer offered is one rooted in an analysis and
critique of the predominant approach to the study of world politics -
that of positivism. It is argued that it is the internal logic of positivism
- the positivist 'logic of investigation' - that accounts for International
Relations theory's lack of emancipatory content. Consequently, Inter-
national Relations theory needs to be 'restructured' in a non-positivist
direction; it must be reconstituted as a form of 'critical' theory if it is
The restructuring of International Relations theory

to make a meaningful contribution to human emancipation. Finally, it

is argued that the beginnings of such a meta-theoretical 'restructuring'
process are already visible in contemporary theorizing about world
politics.
This, in a nutshell, is the central argument being offered. The
argument itself will, no doubt, prove sufficiently controversial. What
may prove nearly as unsettling, however, is the orientation of the
book as a whole. For this is an exercise in international meta-theory.
As the notion of 'international meta-theory' may be unfamiliar to the
target audience of this work - International Relations scholars - it is
important to be clear about the meaning of the term and, by
extension, the significance of this type of exercise.
Perhaps the best way to clarify the meaning of meta-theory is by
way of analogy. Consider, for instance, the discipline's treatment of
empirical evidence. While International Relations is concerned with
incorporating facts into explanatory accounts, it has generally not
subscribed to what some have labelled the position of 'barefoot
empiricism'. That is to say, International Relations scholars have
generally not succumbed to the empiricist temptation of assuming
that 'facts speak for themselves'. On the contrary, it is generally held
to be the case that facts require interpretation in order to have
meaning - interpretation which is the product of the application of
theory to facts. In short, the meaning of facts is not a factual question,
but a theoretical one. Consequently, given that explanation is one's
goal, 'there is nothing so practical as a good theory'.
The insufficiency of this widely held position is that it leaves
unanswered a very important question: 'what constitutes good
theory?' And just as answering the question 'what do these facts
mean?' requires a move to a higher level of abstraction than that of
the empirical - namely, the theoretical - so also does the question
'what constitutes good theory?'. In short, just as the meaning of facts
is not a factual question, but a theoretical one, so the nature of good
theory is not a theoretical question but araeta-theoreticalone.
International meta-theory, then, seeks an answer to the question:
'what constitutes good theory with regard to world politics?' As such,
it is a vital part of the quest for explanatory accounts of the subject
matter of the discipline. Indeed, if it is true that facts are dependent
upon theory for their meaning, and that theory, in turn, is dependent
on meta-theoretical reflection to ensure its adequacy, then the general
assessment of the place of meta-theory may be in need of significant
 Introduction

revision. Meta-theory is not a diversion from the 'real substance' of

the discipline, theoretically informed analysis of empirical evidence.
Rather, meta-theory is the indispensable foundation of competent
scholarly activity and the basis of the adequacy of the explanatory
accounts which are developed. Consequently, it can be argued that
the relative neglect of meta-theoretical questions in the discipline of
International Relations accounts for a good many of the serious
limitations to which contemporary theorizing about world politics is
presently subject.
As an exercise in international meta-theory, this book must,
virtually by definition, attempt to straddle the line between two
distinct subfields of social science: 'social and political theory' and
'International Relations theory'. In so doing, it seeks to apply the
insights generated within the field of social and political theory to
theorizing about world politics.
Of course, this straddling effort is itself rather atypical of a
discipline which has for a good part of its existence understood itself
to be, in some sense, sui generis. In fact, it is becoming increasingly
clear that the claim that 'International Relations is a discrete area of
action and discourse, separate from social and political theory', 3 can
no longer be sustained. It can no longer be sustained because today
International Relations is confronted with theoretical challenges it
seems incapable of meeting on its own. These include:
(i) calls for ways to promote meaningful discussion and debate
in a discipline increasingly marked by paradigmatic plur-
alism;
(ii) calls for theory which is as competent and comfortable in
theorizing change in the world order as it is in analysing
continuity;
(iii) calls for theory to guide practice which can address normative
concerns as well as questions of practical efficacy.
Grappling with these kinds of issues is at the very core of the field of
social and political theory. Hence the insights afforded by social and
political theory are now more relevant than ever for the discipline of
International Relations.
With these introductory remarks in place, this chapter has four
specific objectives remaining: (i) to clarify the research strategy that is
adopted; (ii) to draw attention to the nature of the methodology
employed; (iii) to note briefly the politico-philosophical specificity of
The restructuring of International Relations theory

the approach adopted; and (iv) to sketch a general outline of the book
as a whole.

Research Strategy
As was noted above, the research strategy adopted is that of
applying the insights of social and political theory to the discipline
of International Relations. This strategy - and, indeed, a good part
of the argument being advanced here - is rooted in Richard
Bernstein's path-breaking study of the mid-1970s: The Restructuring of
Social and Political Theory* Drawing on the efforts of philosophers of
science, phenomenologists and hermeneuticists, as well as theorists
associated with the Frankfurt School, Bernstein argued that the social
sciences were undergoing a 'dialectical movement' of restructuring at
a (meta-)theoretical level. The restructuring process posited by
Bernstein involved a shift away from a positivist approach to the
study of the social world to one which - while not neglecting
empirical analysis - incorporates (i) a concern with achieving an
interpretive understanding of the intersubjective meanings which
constitute that world, as well as (ii) an interest in criticizing that
world as part of the effort to change it in a way consistent with the
goal of human emancipation.
Bernstein's discussion of a (meta-)theoretical restructuring process
taking social science in a critically interpretive, post-positivist direc-
tion led me to wonder if his thesis might not also have relevance for
the discipline of International Relations. As I began to explore this
possibility, I became convinced of three things: first, that a restruc-
turing of International Relations theory in a non-positivist direction is
necessary; secondly, that evidence for a restructuring process similar
to that outlined by Bernstein already exists in contemporary theo-
rizing about international politics;5 and thirdly, that the outcome of
that restructuring process will have profound consequences both in
terms of the discipline's ability to meet adequately the theoretical
challenges noted above, as well as in terms of the larger issue of
making a meaningful contribution to human emancipation.
As I worked to assemble arguments in support of these conclusions,
I benefited greatly from the work of earlier critics of positivism in
International Relations theory.6 Though some of them now advocate a
postmodernism of which I remain wary, my indebtedness to this
 Introduction

group of thinkers is quite profound. At pivotal junctures encounters

with the ideas of individuals such as Ashley, Cox, George, Frost,
Linklater, and Walker helped provide answers, not only to specific
queries about positivism, but also to larger questions about what
form critical thinking could take in a discipline not noted for its
openness to such an enterprise.
A final point needs to be made concerning the research strategy
being adopted here. As already noted, this is a study in meta-theory.
That is, this book concerns itself with the background of philosophical
tenets and assumptions that provide rules for the construction of
particular theories and a framework for the analysis of particular
issues. As such, the focus of attention is the presuppositions of a
critical International Relations theory rather than the details of its
structure. Consequently, specific analyses of concrete issues in inter-
national politics will not be offered. Indeed, as will be noted in the
concluding chapter, the translation of the meta-theoretical gains of the
restructuring process into advances in the analysis of specific topics in
international politics remains to be effected.

Methodology
Beyond the issue of research strategy, the methodology adopted in
this study also bears noting. What will be undertaken here, in the
effort to explore the issue of a (meta-)theoretical restructuring of
International Relations theory, is what is referred to in the tradition of
critical theory as an 'immanent critique' of the discipline. The method
of 'immanent critique', which is central to the work of Hegel, and
advocated by members of the Frankfurt School such as Max
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno,
starts with the conceptual principles and standards of an object, and
unfolds their implications and consequences. Then it re-examines
and reassesses the object ... in light of these implications and
consequences. Critique proceeds, so to speak, 'from within'. 7
It is the methodology of 'immanent critique' which is responsible
for the focus of this study on positivist epistemology. It is a common
observation that International Relations has traditionally been pre-
occupied with epistemological questions (how best to study world
politics), often to the neglect of ontological ones (assumptions about
the nature of the world). Accordingly, in keeping with the notion that
The restructuring of International Relations theory

critique is most effective when it proceeds 'from within', epistemology

is the principal focus here. In this way, it is hoped that the analysis
offered here is less likely to be rejected with the charge that 'its
concepts impose irrelevant criteria of evaluation'. 8
At the same time, it must be stressed that adopting the method of
'immanent critique' has implications not just for what issues are taken
as the focus of discussion, but also for how those issues are treated. In
simplest terms, the telos of immanent critique is positive: it leads to a
reassessment of the object in question with an eye toward its
transformation. If carried out properly,

a new understanding of the object is generated - a new comprehen-

sion of contradictions and possibilities ... The object's view of itself
is contradicted by its effective actuality. Through reflection and
critique, it can become aware of its own limitations; that is, that it
fails by its own standards. Through this awareness it develops and
becomes open to radical change.9

In terms of International Relations theory, then, an immanent

critique of positivist epistemology leads well beyond conventional
conclusions about the need to refine techniques of information
gathering and processing. In raising questions about issues such as
the status of norms, of the human subject, and of reason/truth, it
directs our attention to the imperative for a fundamental rethinking of
all of the assumptions upon which the discipline rests: ontological as
well as epistemological.

Politico-philosophical specificity of the study

at hand
Before moving to an overview of chapter content, it is important to
draw attention to the specificity of this study, particularly as regards
its politico-philosophical orientation.
It is one of the core arguments of this work that the 'view from
nowhere', which serves as a regulative ideal for much of mainstream
International Relations scholarship, is not only not attainable but a
dangerous illusion; that all theoretical efforts proceed from and
embody a perspective. This holds equally for the study at hand.
Specifically, the argument regarding a 'restructuring' of International
Relations theory which is advanced here is framed in the terms of the
 Introduction

tradition of Western Marxism (including Gramsci), and in particular

the variant known as the 'Frankfurt School'.
Other critically oriented traditions exist within the discipline, of
course, and they cannot be overlooked. Two in particular - those of
postmodern International Relations theory and feminist International
Relations theory - are considered in terms of their contribution to
the emancipatory restructuring process identified in contemporary
theorizing.10 For despite suffering from important limitations - and I
will argue this holds especially true for postmodern International
Relations theory11 - it must also be recognized that the rise of these
traditions over the last decade is some of the strongest evidence for
the critical restructuring of International Relations theory.

Chapter outline
On the basis of this brief discussion of research strategy, metho-
dology, and specificity, I will now outline the course this book will
follow. In chapter one, the inadequacy of contemporary theorizing in
International Relations will be discussed. Specifically, it will be
argued that in its failure to place the issue of human emancipation at
the centre of theorizing, International Relations is missing an historic
opportunity to contribute to the betterment - if not the very survival
- of the human species. It is argued that if International Relations
theory is to make a meaningful contribution to human emancipation,
it will need to be fundamentally 'restructured' so as to incorporate the
elements necessary for theorizing in terms of the goal of human
emancipation. Drawing on the tradition of 'critical theory', three such
elements are identified.
In chapter two, and as part of the effort to account for the absence
of the elements which characterize 'critical theory' from theorizing
about international relations, an examination of the dominant
approach to the study of international politics - that of 'positivism' -
is undertaken. Specifically, the central tenets and underlying assump-
tions of 'positivism' as an approach to the study of human society are
identified.
In the three chapters which follow, each of the three elements
which characterize critical theory is discussed in relation to contem-
porary theorizing about International Relations. In each case, the
absence of the critical element is explained in terms of the predomi-
The restructuring of International Relations theory

nance of the positivist approach. As a consequence, it is argued that

part of the process of 'restructuring' International Relations theory in
a critical fashion must involve a challenge to positivism itself.
However, the study goes beyond simply indicating the elements
which must be integrated if International Relations is to be
reconstituted as a critical discipline. Rather, in each case it is argued
that the process of challenging positivism and of restructuring
International Relations theory is already underway. Indeed, it is the
central contention of this study that contemporary developments in
the discipline which seem at first glance to be unrelated - if
significant - challenges to positivist orthodoxy are, in fact, evidence
of a profound process of theoretical 'restructuring': a 'restructuring'
which is already taking International Relations theory in a more
critical direction.
 1 International Relations theory and
the Aristotelian project

Perhaps no event has had a more disastrous effect upon the

development of political science than the dichotomy between
political theory and political science. For it has made political theory
sterile by cutting it off from contact with the contemporary issues of
politics, and it has tended to deprive political science of intellectual
content by severing its ties with the Western tradition of political
thought, its concerns, its accumulation of wisdom and knowledge.
Hans J. Morgenthau1

To the extent that it is correct to speak of a crisis in science, that

crisis cannot be separated from the general crisis.
Max Horkheimer2

consciência Theory and the 'global polis'

'The leading of a good and just life in the polis' was the 'Aristotelian
telos' of all political inquiry.3 Exploring and cultivating public
awareness of the basis upon which the citizens of the polis might lead
such a life - the 'Aristotelian project' - was the task of all responsible
students of human society. No other justification for their activity as
scholars and teachers was necessary, or, indeed, acceptable.
preocupação
The nature of the polis was of central concern for those working
within the Aristotelian project. In this regard, it is important to note
that the polis was not so much a 'place' as a 'way of living'. As
Hannah Arendt has argued, the Aristotelian conception of the polis
was that of a very special and freely chosen form of political
organization.4 In short, the polis was more than just the locality in
which citizens were to live - the polis was the 'moral-political order
that rendered its citizens capable of leading a good and just life'.5
The restructuring of International Relations theory

Central to this form of political organization was the understanding

that to live in a polis meant that everything was decided through através
words and persuasion, and not through force and violence.6 But the
idea of the polis involved more than the simple absence ausência
of overt
violence. It was also coterminous with cujo the values of liberty and
equality. The polis 'knew only equals' whose shared objective was
'neither to rule nor to be ruled'. And it was on this basis of equality
that the realm of the polis was to be the 'sphere of freedom'.7
It should be noted, however, that equality between the members of
the polis was not understood in terms of some objective quality of
human beings located outside of history. It was viewed neither as a
natural condition of human beings, nor as an attribute or right with
which human beings have been endowed by their creator. Rather, this
freedom-guaranteeing equality was seen as a function of the polis
itself. In Arendt's words,
Isonomy guaranteed ... equality, but not because all men were born
or created equal, but, on the contrary, because men were by nature
... not equal, and needed an artificial institution, the polis, which ...
would make them equal.8
It is clear then, that the polis was not a naturally existing locality. Nor
should it be understood as a locality defined by fixed geographical
boundaries. Rather, the polis was a socially created 'political space'
pelo contrário,
whose dimensions were determined by the people participating in its
creation. Notes Arendt, 'not Athens but the Athenians were the polis'-?
The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical
location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting
and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living
together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be.
'Wherever you go, you will be a polis': these famous words ...
expressed the conviction that action and speech create a space
between the participants which can find its proper location almost
any time and anywhere.10
dispostos
Arendt's point that the polis can be created by willing participants
'almost any time and anywhere' is an important one. It is also
important to note that different times and historical contexts may
require different conceptions of the spatial dimensions of the polis.
As was observed above, the function of the political arrangement
known as the polis was to ensure
assegurar
the conditions necessary for the
leading of a good and just life, a life encompassing the values of
abrangendo

10
 International Relations theory and the Aristotelian project

equality and freedom. It follows that to be capable of this, the polis

'must be coterminous with the minimum self-sufficient human
reality'.11
During the time period of classical Greece, the small city-state was
viewed as adequate to this task. In modern history, however, it has
been considered that a polis of those dimensions can no longer suffice.
For Hegel, writing at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
political institution which best conformed to the requirement of being
'coterminous with the minimum self-sufficient human reality' was
that of the modern nation-state.12 In contrast to the focus of the
classical Greeks on their fellow citizens in the city-state, for thinkers
such as Hegel - and especially for his followers, the Young Hegelians
- it was the fellow citizens of one's nation-state who were to be of
central concern to those committed to working within the Aristotelian
project.
Even before Hegel's time, however, there were those openly
questioning whetherse the modern nation-state was an adequate
geopolitical container for the ideal of just human relationships.
talvezPerhaps one of the best representatives of this group was Immanuel
Kant. What was innovative about Kant's approach to international
politics was the substitution of luiman beings' for 'citizens' as the
concern.13 This substitution can be seen as an
apropriado proper subjects of moral preoocupação

important step in the modern effort to redefine the Aristotelian

project in more universal terms throughatravés
the 'extension of the area of
14
the common good'.
This effort has taken on new impetus
impulso
in the twentieth century. The
threats to human well-being and autonomy posed by weapons armas
of
mass destruction, the ecological crisis, the systematic violation of
human rights around the globe, and the growing disparity between
rich and poor within an increasingly interdependent world economy,
have been interpreted as requiring a supersession of the present
world order, and as demanding a transformation of our most basic
political categories.15
In a context in which the factors which will determine whether the
human species will survive or perish, suffer or prosper, operate on a
global scale, a good case can be made that the polis which is
'coterminous with the minimum self-sufficient human reality' is the
planet itself. In short, the problems presently faced by the human
species call out for the identification of the idea of the polis with the
planet as a whole: a truly global polis.

11
The restructuring of International Relations theory

As was noted at the beginning of this essay, the Aristotelian

project involved theoretical reflection on - as well as cultivation of
public awareness of - the conditions necessary for the leading of a
'good and just life in the polis', where the polis is defined as a
'sphere of freedom' in which community life is oriented to
promoting equality between its members. It follows that if we are
now to speak of a global polis, distinguished by the presence of
global-level threats to human well-being, then we shall require a
body of theory capable of conceptualizing the Aristotelian project on
a global scale and in terms of contemporary challenges. In short,
what we require is nothing less than a body of theory which can
provide us with a 'new, encompassing language for political
discourse on a planetary scale'.16
It could be argued that the most logical candidate for such a task is
'International Relations theory'. Moreover, it is worth noting that
prominent theorists within this discipline have, with increasing
frequency, been claiming just such a papel
role for International Relations
theory. In the words of Stanley Hoffmann:
the architectonic role Aristotle attributed to the science of politics
might well belong today to International Relations, for these have
become in the twentieth century the very condition of our daily life.
To philosophise about the ideal state in isolation, or to theorise about
political systems in the abstract, has become almost meaningless.17

Indeed, a number of prominent International Relations scholars

would seem to share classical theory's concern with contributing to
the quality of human life. 'An introduction to the study of Interna-
tional Relations in our time', writes Karl Deutsch, 'is an introduction
to the art and science of the survival of mankind'. 18 'We study world
humanidade

polities', affirms Robert Keohane, 'because we think it will determine

the fate of the earth'.19 And 'specialists in world affairs', argues
assunto
J. David Singer, 'have a special responsibility ... to address the major
20
problems confronting the global village'.
Yet one cannot but be disappointed upon examining the theoretical
content of the discipline of International Relations in light of the idea
of the polis. For theory which is oriented toward making human
relations at the global level a 'sphere of freedom' must, in light of the
considerable constraints on human autonomy, be theory which
addresses the question of human emancipation. Lamentably, it is just
this kind of theory which is so notably absent from the discipline of

12
 International Relations theory and the Aristotelian project

International Relations. As Andrew Linklater notes in his review of

the discipline,
Little elaboration is needed ... of the fact that theory committed to the
reduction or eradication of constraints upon human autonomy
remains poorly developed within the field of International Relations.2
If Linklater's assessment is accurate - and it is a central contention
of this study that it is - then we are forced to confront an unattractive
conclusion. Despite its prima facie suitability for a global analysis, and
despite the professed desire of a number of its leading scholars, in its
present state International Relations theory is incapable of making a
meaningful contribution in the terms set out by the Aristotelian
project. Furthermore, it is equally clear that if a meaningful contribu-
tion is to be made, a fundamental transformation of the discipline - a
'restructuring' of International Relations theory which will place the
question of human emancipation at centre-stage - is required.
Contemplating the idea of a 'restructuring' of International Rela-
tions theory raises two important questions. First, there is the question
of why 'theory committed to the reduction or eradication of con-
straints upon human autonomy remains poorly developed within the
field of International Relations': that is, why are the defining
characteristics of emancipatory theory absent from International
Relations theory? Secondly, there is the question of the future
evolution of International Relations in relation to the Aristotelian
project: that is, what are the prospects that International Relations
theory can be 'restructured' so as to incorporate the defining
characteristics of emancipatory theory into the discipline?
It is the task of the chapters that follow to provide answers to these
two questions. Before proceeding any further however, a third question
must first be addressed. It concerns the nature of theorizing that does
place the issue of the 'reduction or eradication of constraints upon
human autonomy' at the centre of its concerns: that is, what are the
defining characteristics of emancipatory theory? The remainder of this
chapter will concern itself with providing an answer to this question.

Human emancipation and the tradition of critical

theory
As a means to identify the defining characteristics of emancipatory
theory, I will focus on one tradition of political theory which has

13
The restructuring of International Relations theory

consistently placed the question of human freedom at the centre of its

concerns: that of 'critical' theory. By critical theory is meant that
tradition of theorizing which has its roots in the Enlightenment notion
of 'critique'.22
In fact, the term 'critique' itself predates the Enlightenment. It was
first used by Humanists and Reformers during the Reformation
period who were engaged in biblical criticism, and described the 'art
of informed judgment appropriate to the study of ancient texts'. 23
This 'art' was used to uncover hidden assumptions and, above all, to
debunk claims to authority. In the pre-Enlightenment context of the
Reformation, then, critique served as a powerful weapon in the hands
of those engaged in the criticism of established ecclesiastical practice.
Thus, from the beginning, the tradition of theorizing associated with
the notion of critique served as an instrument for the delegitimization
of established power and privilege.24
It was in the context of the Enlightenment, however, that the 'art of
critique' assumed its mature form. For it was then that critique began
to enjoy a status independent of the authoritative scriptures to which
it was applied. Increasingly, critique was adopted as a criterion of
truth, where truth was defined as the product of clear and rational
thinking. Indeed, much to the chagrin of all of the contending factions
during the Reformation, the critical definition of truth began to
assume a place in opposition to that of 'truth from revelation'.
Indeed, critique was now equated with the 'essential activity of
reason' itself. As such, it claimed to stand in judgment of 'all spheres
of life',25 including the political sphere. Indeed, in the context of the
Enlightenment, critique was viewed to have acquired 'public force',26
and became virtually synonymous with the existence of an informed,
critical public.27 And it was in the Enlightenment context that critique
- in its ability to combat 'unfreedom' rooted in false beliefs and
distorted thinking - became inextricably linked to the project of
human emancipation.
It is thus understandable that Immanuel Kant asserts, in the preface
to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781),28 that his time should be
understood as no less than the 'age of critique'.29 Nor is there any
question that Kant shared this Enlightenment orientation:

Enlightenment is mankind's release from its self-incurred tutelage.

Tutelage is mankind's inability to make use of its understanding
without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when

14
 International Relations theory and the Aristotelian project

its cause lies not in lack of reason but in the lack of resolution
and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere audel
'Have courage to use your own reason!' - that is the motto of
enlightenment.30
Indeed, Kant's own contributions to the notion of critique were
considerable, and the Kantian element in the tradition of critical
theory is fundamental. In keeping with the Enlightenment notion that
'unfreedom' was rooted in false beliefs and distorted thinking, for
Kant, critique was defined first and foremost as reflection on
conditions of reliable knowledge for human beings possessing the
faculties of knowing, speaking, and acting. Specifically, Kant's central
question, which served as the guiding thread to his theorizing in the
Critique of Pure Reason, was the following: what are the conditions of
human knowledge through which our experience of the world
around us is possible?
Kant's philosophical adversaries, the empiricists Locke and Hume,
argued that inquiry must be restricted to the 'contents' of conscious-
ness: that is, the world experienced through sense impressions. Kant
did not deny these 'contents'. But where he diverged from the
empiricists was in insisting that the organization and interpretation of
these 'contents' also bore examination. For the fact is that only an
incoherent profusion of impressions and sensations are given in
perception. And yet, noted Kant, we always perceive the world as a
realm of ordered things.31
The fact that we do so, argued Kant, can only be understood in
terms of the creative and ordering function of human consciousness.
Thus, in contrast to the empiricists, who affirmed that reliable
knowledge - to the degree to which it was attainable at all - was the
product of a passive reception of sense impressions, Kant affirmed
that empirical reality is always apprehended 'in a mediated fashion
by means of a priori categories of the mind'.32 In short, argued Kant,
while reality is not a pure construct of mind, knowledge is dependent
on the 'active, synthetic function of the mind'. 33
Kant's assertion of the need for theorizing about the origins and
nature of knowledge, as well as his emphasis on the creative role of
human consciousness, was further developed by the second major
Enlightenment contributor to the tradition of critical theory: George
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. It should be noted that for Kant, the
creative role of human consciousness in the ordering of perceived
reality and the production of knowledge was framed in terms of a

15
The restructuring of International Relations theory

self-contained and unchanging transcendental subject. Furthermore,

in Kant's terms, the need for theorizing about the origins and nature
of knowledge was limited to a concern with 'epistemology',
narrowly conceived.34 Hegel's contribution to the development of the
tradition of critical theory involved a radical transformation of both
of these formulations.
First, Hegel rejected Kant's notion of a self-contained and un-
changing transcendental subject, a formulation corresponding to the
liberal conception of the autonomous, atomized individual as the
starting point for understanding human interaction and development.
The problem with Kant's liberal-inspired formulation was that it did
not recognize that society as an expression of the interaction of
'autonomous' individuals was itself historically contingent; that
individuation which marks modernity is not a timeless state but a
social process.35
It was thus Hegel's contribution that he underscored the fact of the
'intersubjective' and historically contingent nature of human identity
and human consciousness. The synthesizing categories of the mind to
which Kant had drawn attention - but for which he was unable to
account theoretically36 - were now understood as historically emergent
intersubjective categories shared by mutually interdependent members
of a community. Moreover, because these categories were now under-
stood as products of an historical process, they were also seen to be
subject to change and further evolution as human communities
continued their struggle to comprehend and master a changing social
environment of which they are, at one and the same time, the product
and the creator. In short, argued Hegel, the criteria of reliable
knowledge are themselves historically emergent social products.
In conjunction with, and as a consequence of, this first reformulation,
Hegel redefined Kant's conceptualization of theoretical reflection on
reliable knowledge as being limited to the concerns of 'epistemology'.
For while not denying the importance of epistemological questions,37 it
was clearly one of Hegel's most important innovations that he
relocated the question of epistemology within the context of the
'historical self-formative process' (Bildungsprozefi) noted above: an
historical process whose endpoint was that of truth defined as self-
realization.38 In Hegel's words:

the truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential
nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own

16
 International Relations theory and the Aristotelian project

development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a

result, that only at the end is it what it is in its very truth; and just in
that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject or self-
becoming, self-development.39
The importance of this 'relocation' is central to the development of
the problematic of human emancipation within the tradition of
'critique'. At the core of Hegel's theorizing is the Enlightenment
position that a defining characteristic of human existence throughout
history has been the presence within human communities of a system
of constraints on human autonomy which are themselves humanly
produced. However, because the true origins of these constraints are
rarely recognized - because, for example, social distinctions are
perceived to be part of nature, and thus 'naturally sanctioned' -
constraints are seen as unchangeable. In short, it is the recurring
misrecognition of the nature of socially constructed constraints on
human autonomy which has to a great extent resulted in their
persistence, and, as a consequence, in an alienated existence.
Yet Hegel also argued that an equally fundamental characteristic of
human history and historically contingent rationality is the process of
'negation': that is 'the criticism in life and in thought of the constraints
imposed by each of its specific historical forms'.40 It was Hegel's
contention that
At each new stage in the self-development of consciousness, the
subject reconstructs its self-understanding in relation to its past. This
reconstruction involves the 'negation' of the old forms of conscious-
ness, which are forms of, and attitudes toward, concrete life.41
It was this process of 'negation' that led to the recognition that
history is nothing more than 'human practice'; that social relations
have their source not in nature, but in that same practice, and thus
may be 'determined by human deliberations'.42 In short, affirmed
Hegel, it was critical thinking that would promote the development of
the 'species-powers' necessary to human freedom.
In this way, Hegel radicalized Kant's epistemological preoccupation
by introducing the notion of a human subject who attains knowledge
through a struggle for understanding and for recognition with others.
With the notion of critique broadened to include 'the experience of an
emancipation by means of critical insight into relationships of power,
the strength of which lies, at least in part, in the fact that these
relationships have not been seen through',43 critical theory's task was

17
The restructuring of International Relations theory

extended to encompass reflection upon humanly produced systems of

constraints on human liberty.44 From this point on, critical theoretical
reflection would be understood to involve more than the questions
specific to epistemology narrowly defined: the 'critique of knowledge'
(Kant) would be seen to '[entail] a critique of rational action or forms
of life' (Hegel).45
Thus, it was in specifying the role of critique as more than 'negative
judgement' - indeed, as playing a central and positive role in the
historical movement from 'self-estrangement' to 'self-determination' -
that Hegel reinforced the link between critical theory and the goal of
human emancipation. Yet it was left to a third and final Enlight-
enment contributor to the tradition of critique - Karl Marx - to bring
that tradition to its mature formulation.
To begin, there is no question that Marx identified himself with
the tradition of critical theorizing begun by Kant and extended by
Hegel.46 It cannot be denied, for example, that 'the dominant
characteristic of history as a history of human capacities or species-
powers is reiterated within Marx's framework'.47 Even after his
break with the 'Young Hegelians', Marx retained the notion of
critique as a process of theoretical reflection oriented toward human
emancipation. As the Western Marxist philosopher Korsch has noted,
it is not insignificant that Marx subtitled all of his major works as
'critique'.48
Notwithstanding his identification with the central emphasis of
Kant, and especially Hegel, Marx did go beyond both of their
conceptualizations to make a vital contribution to the evolution of the
tradition of critical theory. The nature of his contribution grew out of
his dissatisfaction with the highly 'speculative' nature of Hegel's
philosophy as concerned the nature of the creative subject in history
as well as the general path to human emancipation. We shall examine
these two elements in turn.
The difficulty Marx saw in Hegel's theoretical formulation was that
the human dimension of social and political life was subsumed within
- and, indeed, subordinated to - the central and creative role of 'Geist'
(spirit). In place of the unfolding of the 'World Spirit', Marx under-
scored ' "sensuous human activity" through which labouring subjects
regulate their material exchange process with nature and in so doing
constitute a world'.49 'People make their own history', affirmed Marx,
even if not under the circumstances of their choosing.50 Thus one of
Marx's primary contributions to the development of the critical

18
 International Relations theory and the Aristotelian project

tradition was to replace 'spirit' with thinking and acting human

subjects as the creative force in history.
Marx also felt dissatisfaction with the path to emancipation outlined
by Hegel. As was noted above, it was the central contention of
Hegel's conception of critique that human unfreedom was rooted in
'false beliefs' (ideology). As a consequence, it was held that one had
only to 'reform consciousness to set the individual on the path to
autonomy'.51
While certainly accepting that false beliefs lay at the root of human
alienation, Marx was clearly dissatisfied with the proffered solution.
The problem with the Hegelian conceptualization, noted Marx, is that
it is 'a merely theoretical emancipation'.52 As such, it risked reducing
the Enlightenment notion of emancipation as 'self-determination' to
that of reconciliation with the status quo. In short, the major flaw in
the Hegelian solution to the problem of unfreedom is that it left the
real world untouched.
This was a major failing, for while Marx agreed that the reform of
consciousness was a vital and necessary first step in overcoming
alienated human existence, he also recognized that the goal of human
emancipation required fundamental change in the way society was
organized. And it was no doubt in response to this important
limitation in Hegel's theoretical contribution that Marx formulated his
well-known eleventh thesis on Feuerbach:
The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways;
the point, however, is to change it.53
In short, critique would be understood as more than theoretical
reflection on epistemological concerns, and as even more than
intellectual judgments on ideology. As a result of Marx's reformula-
tion, critical theory would be understood in terms of practical political
activity - undertaken by 'conscienticized' human agents - and
oriented toward a radical transformation of society.54

On the basis of this admittedly schematic overview of the origins

and evolution of the emancipation-oriented theoretical tradition
associated with the notion of 'critique', we are now in a position to
identify the defining characteristics of emancipatory theory. 55 Simply
put, the defining characteristics of emancipatory theory are those
core elements which together constitute the critical tradition. There
are three.

19
The restructuring of International Relations theory

The first defining characteristic of emancipatory theory is that of

'theoretical reflexivity'. This concerns the notion, highlighted by Kant,
and reaffirmed by Hegel and Marx, that theorizing which hopes to
make a meaningful contribution to human emancipation cannot
confine itself to an examination of the empirical, as important as that
is. Emancipatory theory must also involve an on-going process of
'theoretical reflection on the process of theorizing itself.
The second characteristic derives from the recognition, underscored
by Kant, and broadened by Hegel and Marx, of the creative role of
human consciousness: a role which goes beyond the process of
knowledge production, narrowly defined, to include the constitution
and transformation of modes of social and political life. It is the on-
going attention to the constitutive and non-reductive power of human
consciousness in dialectical interaction with the natural environment
which stands as the second characteristic of emancipatory forms of
theorizing.
And finally, in keeping with the general orientation of the
Aristotelian project, emancipatory theory is characterized by its
engagement in social criticism in support of practical political activity
oriented toward societal transformation. Specifically, emancipatory
theory seeks to promote a process of education and 'constientization'
among those poorly served by present social and political arrange-
ments, through which the disadvantaged can empower themselves
to effect radical social change. In short, emancipatory theory is
characterized by the desire to serve as 'the self-clarification of the
struggles and wishes of the age'.56

Conclusion
In this chapter we have accomplished two tasks. First, we have noted
the failure of the discipline of International Relations to make a
meaningful contribution in terms of the contemporary requirements
of the Aristotelian project. Specifically, International Relations has
been faulted for not having placed the issue of human emancipation
at the centre of its theoretical concerns, a weakness all the more ironic
in view of the clear interest of some of its leading theorists in
promoting human welfare.
Secondly, we have examined a tradition of theorizing that has
consistently placed the question of human emancipation at centre-

20
 International Relations theory and the Aristotelian project

stage: that of critical theory. In the process, we have identified the

three 'critical' elements which characterize emancipatory theory:
theoretical reflexivity, attention to the creative role of human con-
sciousness, and a concern with social criticism in support of practical
political activity oriented toward radical social change.
In the following chapters, it will be argued that if International
Relations has not placed the question of human emancipation at the
centre of its theoretical concerns, this can be best understood in terms
of the traditional absence of the core elements of the theoretical
tradition of 'critique'. Moreover, it will be argued that the absence of
these 'critical' elements is not accidental. Specifically, it will be argued
that the absence of these elements is a direct result of the predomi-
nance of a particular philosophy of science in the discipline of
International Relations: that of positivism. Before the relationship
between the presence of positivism and the absence of the elements of
emancipatory (critical) theory can be understood, however, the
characteristics of positivism must be identified. That is the task of the
chapter which follows.

21
2 Defining positivism

It is the task of theory to detect in the welter of the unique facts of

experience that which is uniform, similar, and typical. It is its task to
reduce the facts of experience to mere specific instances of general
propositions, to detect behind them the general laws to which they
owe their existence and which determine their development.
Hans J. Morgenthau1

The question 'What is theory?' appears to pose no great problems for

contemporary science. What counts for theory in customary research
is the sum-total of propositions about a subject area that are
connected to each other such that from a few one can derive the rest
... Theory is a store of knowledge in a form that makes it useful for
the most thorough-going description of facts.
Max Horkheimer2

Introduction
Before proceeding any further it is important to have a clear idea of
what is meant by a positivist approach in the context of the social
sciences. This is a critical question and it is important to be clear
about what is being argued here. To that end, it may be useful to
begin by pointing out what is not being argued in this study.
First of all, it is not being argued that positivism can be understood
in terms of the popular caricature identified with amoral, atheoretical
'number crunchers'. This popular caricature is inappropriate because
many positivists have strong moral commitments and are quite
concerned with theory. Furthermore, as will hopefully become clear,
quantification is neither sufficient nor necessary for a study of the
social world to qualify as positivist.

22
 Defining positivism

It will also not be argued that one can equate positivism in the
social sciences with the work of self-designated positivists; such a
strategy is simply too restrictive. It must be recognized that many
social scientists are self-consciously 'agnostic' with regard to questions
concerning the philosophy of (social) science. However, because
individual scholars do not consciously identify themselves with the
positivist approach does not mean that such an approach has not
been adopted unconsciously. Moreover, whether or not positivism is
consistently applied by specific individuals, it can still be argued that
positivism is structuring the bulk of the research that is being
undertaken through its generalized pervasiveness as the unspoken
epistemological backdrop of the research efforts of the research
community as a whole.
Consequently, were we to limit ourselves to those individuals who
have self-consciously and rigorously pursued a positivist research
agenda, the extent of positivism's influence on theorizing about
international politics would be greatly underestimated. Of course, we
cannot escape making reference to individual statements and analyses
in the effort to show the predominance of positivism in the study of
the social world. However, the point is what these statements/
analyses say in their combination about the discipline in question,
rather than whether the individual researchers to whom they are
attached are self-conscious and consistent adherents of the positivist
approach.
Finally, it will not be argued that positivism can be defined in
terms of the specific methodological characteristics of one or another
of the more well-known variants of positivism. This strategy is not
useful for the simple reason that the positivist tradition has spawned
many variants which often differ significantly in both methodology
and research design, not to mention the fact that those variants are
often applied in a non-rigorous manner. To identify positivism as a
whole with one or another of its historically specific variants (or
rather, a corrupted version thereof) would again be too restrictive,
and would also lead to the misrecognition of the full extent of
positivism's influence on contemporary social science.
Consequently, the strategy that will be adopted is the following. In
the first part of this chapter, I will examine two distinct variants of
the positivist tradition: (i) Comtean positivism - the earliest manifesta-
tion of the tradition dating from the nineteenth century, and (ii)
logical positivism - perhaps the most fully developed and influential

23
The restructuring of International Relations theory

variant, dating from the first half of the twentieth century. What I
shall be concerned with is something more probing than a surface-
level description of these two variants of positivism. What I shall be
attempting to capture are the central tenets common to these and
indeed to all other variants of positivism - the central tenets that
together constitute 'the positivistic logic of investigation'. 3
Following the determination of these core tenets, I will proceed to a
discussion of their underlying assumptions. The identification of these
assumptions is crucial, as it is the task of later chapters to cast doubt
on the core tenets of positivism by challenging the validity of the
assumptions on which they rest. In a context in which positivism
continues to form the unquestioned backdrop of academic discourse,
it is only by exposing the limitations of positivism that a space can be
created for alternative forms of theorizing about international politics.

Comtean and logical positivism

The positivist approach to the study of society has a long history
within the social sciences, spanning almost two centuries. It has its
roots in the early part of the nineteenth century in the work of
Auguste Comte. Comte envisaged three distinct types of knowledge -
theological, metaphysical and 'positive' - corresponding to three
stages in the evolution of human society: primitive, intermediary, and
scientific, respectively. Thus for Comte 'positive' knowledge - from
which the 'positivist' tradition takes its name - was seen to
correspond in temporal terms to the rise of 'scientific' (industrial)
society.
According to Comte, the positivist approach would yield a
methodologically unified conception of science which would provide
true, objective knowledge in the form of causal laws of phenomena,
derived from observation.4 For our purposes, three aspects of this
conceptualization should be noted.
First, positive knowledge would be 'true' in that it would
correspond to empirical experience (facts). In this Comte was clearly
influenced by seventeenth-century empiricists such as David Hume. 5
Secondly, positive knowledge would be 'objective' in that its grasp
of the facts would be achieved without reference to (and without
being subject to the distorting influence of) normatively oriented
theological and metaphysical ideologies.6

24
 Defining positivism

And finally, positivism as an approach would be 'methodologically

unified' in that it is held to be as well-suited to the study of the social
world as it is to the natural world. It was Comte's view that each of
the individual sciences must progress through a series of stages
before achieving positive, scientific knowledge. And while it was the
destiny of the science of society - 'sociology' (the term was Comte's) -
to be the last to do so, its attainment of the positive knowledge was
just as certain as that of the other sciences.
It cannot be denied that Comte's views were very influential in the
nineteenth century; his concern with identifying universal laws
operating in human society caught the imagination of a number of
students of human affairs. Marx and Engels, for example, despite
holding grave reservations about Comte's politics, shared his concern
with uncovering the 'natural' laws of human social development.7
Nonetheless, Comte's views suffered from a number of impreci-
sions and even internal contradictions.8 For that reason, they were to
give way in the early part of the twentieth century to a new variant of
positivism - 'logical positivism'. Logical positivism arose in the 1920s
in Austria (the Vienna Circle), Germany (the Berlin School) and
Poland, and quickly became dominant. Many of its principal theorists,
however, such as Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Hans Reichenbach
and Carl Hempel, moved to the United States with the rise of
Nazism.9 Furthermore, many of the logical positivists were physicists
and mathematicians, highly admiring of the new physics (relativity
theory and quantum mechanics), who were concerned to explore the
nature of science and, above all, to demonstrate what made it a
reliable source of knowledge.
The adjectival modifier 'logical' in logical positivism indicates how
this variant of positivism attempted to overcome the limitations of
Comte's approach. What marked the work of the logical positivists
was the central role played by symbolic logic, as developed by Russell
and Frege.10 By means of symbolic logic this group of philosophers
attempted to purge the last vestiges of metaphysics from the positivist
legacy (for which they blamed, in large part, Comte himself)11 by
providing a precise, formal rendering of the structure of science.
The emphasis on symbolic logic gave rise to three distinctive
aspects of logical positivism: (i) the referential theory of meaning; (ii)
the deductive-nomological method of explanation and the related
hypothetico-deductive model of justification; and (iii) the axiomatic
view of theories. These three aspects will be treated in turn. 12

25
The restructuring of International Relations theory

The logical positivists located many of the problems and uncertain-

ties of science, especially those associated with the social sciences, in
the unclear use of language.13 Scientific language must be governed
by strict rules of meaning, argued the logical positivists. In the
absence of such rules, confusion reigns and scientists end up
producing utterly meaningless statements. In the context of scientific
discourse, a meaningless statement was worse than incorrect - it was
not understandable.14
This raises the question of the criteria for meaningful statements. In
their discussion of proper rules of meaning, the logical positivists
followed Comte (and the classical empiricists) in linking knowledge
to the empirical realm. There was an important innovation in their
approach, however. Previously, ideas had played a central role in
positivist and classical empiricist analysis; ideas were viewed as units
of thinking and were considered to be the 'causal products of sensory
experience'.15 For the logical positivists, in contrast, ideas were 'fuzzy
entities'. And it was for that reason that ideas were replaced by
'linguistic entities' - sentences and words - as the basic 'vehicles of
meaning'.16
To explain how these linguistic entities were related to the empirical
realm, the logical positivists advanced the 'referential theory of
meaning'.17 At the centre of this theory stood the 'verifiability
principle',18 according to which 'the meaning of a sentence was the
set of conditions that would show that the sentence was true'. 19 In its
simplest terms, the verifiability principle stipulated that 'a statement
makes sense only if, and to the extent that, its empirical reference can
be firmly corroborated'.20 Every 'meaningful problem', affirmed
Vienna Circle member Moritz Schlick, would be solved through the
process of verification. And this process, wrote Schlick,

in which the path to the solution finally ends is always of the same
sort: it is the occurrence of a definite fact that is confirmed by
observation, by means of immediate experience. In this manner the
truth (or falsity) of every statement, of daily life or science, is
determined.21

The logical positivists argued further that meaningful sentences

could be separated into two classes. The first class of sentences -
termed synthetic statements - were sentences which could be directly
verified through experience. Although there was some disagreement
about what kind of sentences belonged in this class, by and large

26
 Defining positivism

logical positivists accepted sentences which referred to physical states

of the world as being synthetic statements.22
However, there was another class of meaningful sentences - known
as analytic statements - which could not be directly verified in terms
of the empirical realm. Sentences containing theoretical or definitional
terms which referred directly neither to empirical data nor to
observable objects, for example, fell into this class. Yet it was also true
that such sentences played an important role (that is, they had
meaning) in scientific discourse. For that reason, the logical positivists
tried to determine ways in which the truth or falsity of sentences
using theoretical or definitional terms (analytic statements) could be
verified indirectly by means of sentences which did refer directly to
the empirical realm (synthetic statements).
In sum, it was the self-designated task of logical positivism
to arrange all meaningful problems of cognition under two rubrics:
they either concern analytical truths in the sense of a tautological
explication of sign rules within a linguistic system; or else they deal
with synthetic (aposteriori) statements in which case they must be
anchored in extra-linguistic states of affairs denoted by language.23

The key to linking the two domains was provided by symbolic logic,
which was employed to 'translate' analytic statements into synthetic
statements. These translations generally consisted of 'biconditional
sentences' in which one statement (the analytic statement) was held to
be true if and only if the other (synthetic) statement was found to be
true (in other words, if it conformed to the facts).24
Ultimately, the requirement that theoretical/definitional analytical
statements have to be translatable into empirical synthetic statements
was found to be too difficult to satisfy completely. Some theoretical
terms can be translated in more than one way, and some seem not to
be translatable at all.25 Nonetheless, it c^n be argued that this criterion
has remained regulative for individuals working within a positivist
framework, premised as that framework is on the referential theory of
meaning.
Finally, it is important to note the status of those sentences which
do not fall into the two aforementioned categories. Such sentences
include statements of a normative nature (e.g., 'freedom is good'). In
terms of the referential theory of meaning, such statements were not
so much wrong as 'meaningless'; not so much incorrect as 'empty
sounds'.26

27
The restructuring of International Relations theory

Of course logical positivists conceded that 'meaningless statements'

were capable of playing an important role in eliciting emotional
responses or provoking human action. But, maintained the logical
positivists, that kind of role was possible only outside the realm of
scientific discourse. In the realm of scientific discourse the concern is
that of truth - of distinguishing between true and false statements - a
concern which requires that all statements be meaningful in order to
be assessable. Non-meaningful discourse (e.g., normative discourse)
might be 'effective' in some contexts, but from the perspective of
science it could only ever be confused discourse.27
But the logical positivists went beyond simply explicating criteria
for making meaningful statements. Their central concern, like Comte
before them, was to explain events in the empirical realm and to
predict their future occurrence.28 This raises the issue of what
constitutes an adequate explanation in logical positivist terms, and
how accurate predictions are possible. The logical positivist answers
to these questions bring us to the second distinctive aspect of their
formulation of the positivist approach: the deductive-nomological
model of explanation, and the related hypothetico-deductive model of
theory development.
In logical positivist terms, events in the empirical realm are held to
be instances of observable regularities. These regularities, moreover,
are held to be independent of time, place, and the human observer.
Thus in answer to the question of the nature of adequate explanation
for such an event, logical positivists argued that 'explaining an event
consisted of deriving a statement describing that event from state-
ments of scientific laws and statements describing antecedently
known empirical facts (initial conditions)'.29
This view of explanation came to be known as the deductive-
nomological or 'covering law' form of explanation. In simplest terms,
an occurrence in the observable empirical realm is held to have been
'explained' once it has been identified as a manifestation of a
regularity and has been subsumed under a general 'covering law'
which specifies the causal determinants of the occurrence in question.
In the words of Karl Popper:
To give a causal explanation of an event means to deduce a
statement which describes it, using as premises of the deduction one
or more universal laws, together with certain singular statements,
the initial conditions ... The initial conditions describe what is
usually called the 'cause' of the event in question.30

28
 Defining positivism

The exact nature of these laws is clearly specified by logical

positivism. Laws are conditional statements of the form 'if 'x'
happens, 'y' (will) happen(s)'. As to statements describing initial
conditions, these statements tell us that 'x' has happened. 31
As noted by Brian Fay, the relationship between the variables
specified by the law must satisfy three conditions:
i) the relationship must be invariable
ii) one variable must temporally precede, or at least be simultaneous
with, the other
iii) the relationship must be asymmetrical, such that the occurrence of
one (the independent) variable induces the occurrence of the other
(dependent) variable, while the reverse is not true.32

In sum, notes Fay, covering laws which are causal in form 'state an
invariable sequential order of dependence between kinds of states of
affairs'.33 And it should be noted that this form marks a law as
positivist whether the law specifies individual variables or whether it
is probabilistic in form, specifying the invariant relationships among
mass events.34
How then does one go about developing laws to explain instances
of empirical regularities? The answer provided by the logical
positivists is that of the hypothetico-deductive method. According to
this method, the scientist starts with an event that requires explana-
tion. S/he then develops an hypothesis to account for its occurrence
which - if true - can be used to derive a general covering law. This
hypothesis is then tested against changed initial conditions. If the
predictions stemming from the hypothesis are true, the hypothesis is
confirmed.35
It should be noted here that positivism concerns itself not at all
with the question of where the hypothesis comes from, or how the
individual scientist arrives at the explanatory hypothesis in question.
The speculative process which underlies hypothesis formulation
belongs, according to the positivist approach, to the 'context of
discovery' - a context potentially of interest to psychologists, but not
really of any relevance to science. What is of relevance to science is
the 'context of justification' - that is, the context in which strict
methodological procedures must be followed in order to ensure that
the testing of a given hypothesis against the facts is done properly. 36
The point can be made clearer with an example from the natural
sciences. Suppose that we are interested in explaining the boiling of

29
The restructuring of International Relations theory

water. One possible hypothesis to account for that event is one which
relates the boiling of water to its temperature. Specifically, one might
hypothesize that if water attains a temperature of 100 degrees Celsius,
it will boil.37 We might then test this hypothesis against varying
initial conditions (i.e., different temperatures). If we find through such
testing that, all things being equal, water boils when the temperature
rises to 100 degrees Celsius, and if, moreover, experimentation
indicates it always does so, we can consider the hypothesis to be
confirmed.38
Now a confirmed hypothesis does more than account for why
water has boiled in the past; it also allows us to predict when it will
do so in the future. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to
appreciate the unique nature of the deductive-nomological form of
explanation. In fact, the positivist covering law-centred form of
explanation postulates a 'structural identity' of explanation and
prediction.39 Since an empirical event is held to be explained once it
has been identified as a regularity independent of time, place and
observer, and can be derived from a general covering law, the same
covering law will serve to predict its reoccurrence in the future.
An hypothesis which can be shown to be true through testing
satisfies a necessary condition to be considered a 'covering law'. But
while correspondence with the empirical world is a necessary
condition for being considered a law, it is not sufficient. Bechtel
provides a good example of why this is the case:
if it were true that I only carried $1 bills in my wallet, then the
following would be a true general statement: for all 'x', if 'x' is a bill
in my wallet, then it is a $1 bill. But this intuitively is not a law. The
reason is that there does not seem to be any reason except chance or
my perversity for me to carry only $1 bills in my wallet. It is
commonly thought that laws are more than general statements that
happen to be true. We think they tell us something about the limits
of how things must be.40
This then raises the question of how the logical positivists
differentiated between bona fide laws and 'accidental generalizations'.
The answer they provided to this question brings us to the third
distinctive characteristic of logical positivism: the axiomatic account
of theories.
Put simply, logical positivists differentiated between laws and
accidental generalizations by arguing that laws, unlike accidental
generalizations, are grounded in scientific theories. In fact, argue

30
 Defining positivism

logical positivists, just as events are 'explained' in terms of (i.e.,

derived from) laws, so laws themselves are explained in terms of (i.e.,
derived from) theories. Indeed, the very definition of a scientific
theory offered by logical positivists was that of a 'structured network
of statements from which one could derive specific laws'. 41
An example of the kind of theory favoured by logical positivists is
that of Euclidean geometry. At its core is a set of basic terms and
postulates from which axioms can be derived. Drawing on this
example, the logical positivists argued that scientific theories should
also be conceived as deductive structures built around a core of basic
terms and postulates. The axioms which could be derived from this
core would be the specific laws.42
In short, argued the logical positivists, scientific theory should be
conceptualized as an axiomatic structure. Moreover, to the extent that
scientists can be taught to think of theory in these terms, science itself
will benefit. Efforts to axiomatize existing theoretical explorations will
serve to introduce more rigour and clarity into the theoretical
enterprise. Moreover, axiomatization may help scientists to discover
implications of their theories of which they were not aware, thus
providing new opportunities for hypothesis testing.43
In sum, then, logical positivism distinguished itself as a systematic
and extremely elegant scientific project. It is a project which advances
a theory of meaning in which scientific discourse is grounded in the
empirical realm, and which employs deduction to show how specific
events could be explained by scientific laws. It is a project in which
the role of confirmation in the verification of laws is specified, and in
which scientific laws themselves are shown to be derivable from
axiomatic theoretical structures. For all of these reasons, logical
positivism became dominant in the first half of the twentieth century,
and, with some modifications, remains the standard for the vast
majority of working scientists.44
Despite these distinctive characteristics, however, it is clear that
logical positivism stands firmly within the tradition that began with
Auguste Comte. Commonalities between the earlier Comtean positi-
vism and logical positivism exist in at least three important respects.
First, logical positivists, like Comtean positivists, make the empirical,
observable realm the focus of investigation. The development of
positive knowledge is viewed as a cumulative process in which more
and more events are identified as being manifestations of regularities
and subsumed under general covering laws. And it is the direct

31
The restructuring of International Relations theory

correspondence of positivist theory to the empirical realm which

guarantees the truth of that theory.
A second commonality between logical positivists and Comtean
positivists is the conviction that positivist research methods are as
well suited to the study of the social world as they are to the study of
the natural world. Indeed, some logical positivists went beyond a
methodological unity to espousing a substantive unity of science in
which the laws of specialized disciplines (e.g., psychology, political
science) are viewed as 'derivative laws which, in principle, can be
derived from the most basic laws of physics', thereby opening the
possibility that human sciences might one day be 'subsumed within
physics as a special application of physical laws'. 45 In any case, it is
clear that in terms of logical positivism, Comte's original dream of a
true 'science of society' remains a regulative ideal.
And finally, logical positivists, like the Comtean positivists before
them, affirmed that the knowledge developed by means of their
approach was objective knowledge. It was objective in that it was
uninfluenced (i.e., undistorted) by metaphysical concerns and, indeed,
occupied a sphere separate and distinct from that inhabited by
'nonsensical' normative and value-oriented discourses.
Of course, the positivist tradition continued to evolve beyond the
contours of logical positivism. Important contributions were made in
the post-war period by Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos, especially as
regards the question of confirmation/falsification of hypotheses and
'research programmes'.46
At the same time, however, the three commonalities just noted
have remained fundamental elements of the positivist tradition in
both its Popperian neo-positivist and, most recently, Lakatosian
variants. As such, they will serve as guideposts in our effort to
identify the basic tenets of the positivistic logic of investigation. It is
to a discussion of those tenets - and of the assumptions that underlie
them - that we now turn.

The positivistic logic of investigation: tenets and

assumptions
Based on this, admittedly cursory review of two concrete variants of
the positivist tradition, we can now specify more clearly the central
tenets which together form the core of the contemporary 'positivistic

32
 Defining positivism

logic of investigation' in the social sciences. In line with the three

commonalities identified above, it will be argued that there are
three.47 They are (i) the tenet of 'truth as correspondence'; (ii) the
tenet of the methodological unity of science; and (iii) the tenet of the
value-free nature of scientific knowledge. These three tenets are
themselves based upon three distinct assumptions. I shall proceed
with a discussion of these three tenets - and their underlying
assumptions - in turn.

The first tenet: truth as correspondence

This tenet is at the very core of the positivistic logic of investigation.
According to this tenet, positive knowledge - in contrast to 'metaphy-
sical' or 'theological' knowledge - is reliable because it corresponds
directly to the observable, empirical realm. Moreover, it is that
correspondence which guarantees the 'truth' of positive knowledge.
Of course, it is important to note that positivists recognize that the
knowledge they generate may not now - nor perhaps ever -
correspond perfectly to objective reality. Even so, the goal of perfect
correspondence remains the regulative ideal.48
What then is the assumption underlying this tenet? In short, it is
the assumption of the separation of subject and object. This assump-
tion postulates the existence of a 'real world' - the 'object' - which is
separate and distinct from the theoretical constructions of the (social)
scientist - the subject. It is held, moreover, that the theoretical
constructions of the subject can be formulated in terms of a non-
idiosyncratic intersubjectively valid observation language which
captures reality - the facts - in direct terms.49 Indeed, it is because of
the possibility of methodologically 'factoring out' the identities of the
individual researcher that 'objective knowledge of an intersubjectively
transmissible character in the social sciences' is at all possible. 50
Thus for positivists, true knowledge - Comte's 'positive' knowledge
- is held to be knowledge which conforms to (and derives its truth-
value from) objective reality. And there is no question that this
position is shared by positivists working in the social sciences.
Empiricism, affirms political scientist Eugene Meehan, 'is the only
epistemic base for human knowledge'.51 The task of the political
scientist, states David Easton, is the collection of the 'objective facts'
of political activity, while the validity of observation statements 'is

33
The restructuring of International Relations theory

determined by the correspondence of a statement to reality'. 52 In

short, asserts political scientist Robert Dahl, in a particularly straight-
forward restatement of the tenet of 'truth as correspondence' (and its
assumption of the non-relevance of the identity of the observer):
'Whether [an empirical] proposition is true or false depends on the
degree to which the proposition and the real world correspond.'53

The second tenet: the methodological unity of science

According to this tenet, the research methodology developed for the
study of the natural world - a methodology which has proved
extremely successful - is equally suited to the study of the social
world.
What then is the assumption underlying this second tenet? Here the
assumption is that of naturalism. That is, it is assumed that there is
no difference between the social world and the natural world so
fundamental that the approach developed to conduct a scientific
analysis of the natural world is not appropriate to the social world.
It is an integral aspect of the assumption of naturalism that the
social world contains the same kind of regularities as one finds in the
natural world. In this case, necessitous 'behavioural regularities' are
independent of time, place, and, consistent with the first assumption
of the separation of the subject and object, observer.
Once again, there is no question that this second core tenet of
positivism - and the assumption underlying it - is held by positivists
active in the study of human society. In the words of political scientist
George Catlin:

There can be no science of politics unless there are these political

uniformities, these constants of behaviour, which admit of formula-
tion as laws. And [these laws are] as timeless as the laws of
mechanics, holding for the human race wherever and whenever it is
found. And men in so far as they obey these laws will act in as
timeless a fashion as ... atoms act in their chemical combinations
according to formula. We are looking for this and nothing else.54

Easton would concur: without the 'search for uniformities in political

relations', and for 'various levels of generalizations', the 'development
of research towards theory is ... retarded'. For, argues Easton, the
central task of political science is to develop a 'general framework

34
 Defining positivism

within which ... facts [can] acquire meaning to transcend any

particular time and place'.55
It is the assumption of naturalism which accounts for the extent to
which the proponents of the forms of positivism reviewed above -
both Comtean positivism and logical positivism - take considerable
inspiration from the natural sciences (physics in particular). And it is
the assumption of naturalism as well which explains the confidence
expressed by adherents of the positivist approach that progress,
defined as the gradual accumulation of ever truer hypotheses and
theories, will occur in the social sciences as it has in the natural
sciences: through hypothesis testing and replication.
Thus it is that Popper notes the tremendous successes attained by
modern physics since the time of Galileo. In biology too, notes
Popper, since the time of Pasteur - the Galileo of biology - scientific
advance has been the norm. Only the social sciences lag behind,
observes Popper, for they 'do not as yet seem to have found their
Galileo'.56
The reason for Galileo's absence in the social sciences - the
explanation for 'the disappointing results of a discipline already
twenty-five hundred years old' - argues Easton, is the reluctance to
emulate the 'scientific method' championed by Galileo and his
successors.57 As a consequence, it is the adoption of that method that
will allow the social sciences to achieve their fullest promise. 58 And
with its adoption in the twentieth century, affirms Kaspar Naegele,
'The study of society as a cumulative and, therefore, scientific,
enterprise, is under way.'59

The third tenet: the value-free nature of scientific knowledge

This tenet of the contemporary positivistic logic of investigation is
composed of two parts. First, it affirms that knowledge produced
through positivist methodology and research design is knowledge
restricted to the realm of the objective (i.e., empirical) world. Thus
scientific knowledge does not pronounce upon disputes in the non-
factual realm for the simple reason that resolving normative questions
is not within the competence of science.
Secondly, this tenet affirms that the knowledge produced through
positivist methodology and research design is knowledge unaffected
by the value commitments of the researchers themselves. As such,

35
The restructuring of International Relations theory

positive knowledge is held to be knowledge which can be accepted

by scholars with varying value orientations, thereby providing a
'common ground' on which constructive scientific interaction can take
place.
What then is the assumption underlying this third tenet? Under-
lying the tenet of the value-free nature of scientific knowledge is the
assumption of the separation of fact and value. In short, positivism
assumes that the factual and the normative can be separated into
distinct realms, with science concerning itself with the former while
judiciously avoiding pronouncing upon or being influenced by the
latter. This separation is at the heart of the logical positivist endeavour
to separate meaningful statements (relating to the factual) which fall
within the purview of science, from 'meaningless' statements such as
those pertaining to normative issues. It is also at the heart of the
considerable efforts made by positivists to devise methodological
techniques and research designs which can serve to 'filter out' the
value-bias of the individual researcher.
Once again, there is no question that this tenet and assumption are
shared by positivistically inclined social scientists. Thus traditional
concepts such as freedom, equality, democracy, and the 'good and
just life' must be purged from the field of political science, for not
only are such concepts 'vague, ambiguous, difficult or impossible to
operationalize, useless as a guide to empirical choice',60 but they are
'value-laden' and thus 'provide the additional difficulty of conveying
both factual and distinctly evaluative meanings in research which
presumably seeks to be primarily empirical'.61
Of course it is undeniable that researchers themselves have value
commitments which underlie the research in which they engage. Even
so, responds Easton,
The mere statement ... that values underlie all research, does not in
itself lead to the inevitable conclusion that these values must, by
virtue of their presence, influence this research. Conceivably they
could be there, but remain quite innocuous and even irrelevant.62

And, in any case, the goal of a value-free science remains the norm.
But what of the place of values in explaining human behaviour? Is
it not important to be able to treat normative concerns in so far as
they influence social interaction? Indeed, it is, responds Easton, who
holds out the possibility of studying values - in so far as people do
'hold values' - as 'social facts'.63 At the same time, it is crucial to

36
 Defining positivism

recognize that the assumption of the positivist student of social life

is that

values can ultimately be reduced to emotional responses conditioned

by the individual's total life-experiences. In this interpretation,
although in practice no one proposition need express either a pure
fact or a pure value, facts and values are logically heterogeneous.
The factual aspect of a proposition refers to a part of reality; hence it
can be tested by reference to the facts. In this way we check its truth.
The moral aspect of a proposition, however, expresses only the
emotional response of an individual to a state of real or presumed facts.64'

The positivist position is clear. Values as 'emotional responses' - as

'social facts' - have meaning and can be used to generate knowledge.
But what of value questions outside of the realm of facts? Here
positivist social scientists fall into two camps. In the first and smaller
camp are those who, starting from the premise that 'Knowledge is not
knowledge until it has been substantiated, using the procedures
which have been labelled "scientific method'", 65 argue that value
questions debated outside of the realm of facts are meaningless. This
position, however, while a popular one during the reign of logical
positivism, has more recently fallen into some disrepute.
In the second and numerically larger camp, one finds positivists
who, while continuing to affirm that scientific knowledge is value-free
knowledge based on facts and validated by means of the 'scientific
method', nonetheless hold out the possibility that theorizing which
does not make a claim to science and which restricts itself to the
treatment of normative issues may have something to contribute as
well.66 Indeed, it is the widespread acceptance that this position has
achieved in the positivist-dominated era that lends credence to the
argument that the very enterprise of 'normative theory' - as some-
thing distinct from that of 'scientific theory' - is a creation of
positivism itself.67
In sum, the tenet of the value-free nature of scientific knowledge,
and the assumption of the separation of fact and value underlying it,
insists that the competence of science lies in the analysis of objective
reality alone - the 'is' and not the 'ought'. And should one desire to
go beyond the realm of facts, even the most generous of positivists
will feel obliged to point out that in so doing one moves beyond the
realm of science as well. Moreover, even if they are of the opinion
that normative issues are worthy of study and analysis, their positivist

37
The restructuring of International Relations theory

counsel may well be the following: 'These are philosophical questions

better left to the philosophers/ 68

Conclusion
To summarize, we have established that the logic of investigation of
present-day positivism comprises three basic tenets: (i) truth as
correspondence; (ii) the methodological unity of science; and (iii) the
value-free nature of scientific knowledge. These three tenets rest, in
turn, upon three basic assumptions: (i) the separation of subject and
object; (ii) naturalism; and (iii) the separation of fact and value.
Finally, we have established that these three tenets and their under-
lying assumptions are shared by positivist social scientists.
With this as background, we are now in a position to understand
how the predominance of positivism in the discipline of International
Relations has inhibited International Relations theory from developing
as critical theory. The exact nature of the relationship between the
dominance of positivism in International Relations theory and the
absence of the defining characteristics of critical theory noted in the
preceding chapter will be explored in the chapters which follow.
Finally, to the extent that this study is successful in demonstrating
that a link exists between the dominance of positivism and the
absence of critical theorizing, it is clear that if a 'space' is to be created
for a more critical approach to the study of international relations - if
International Relations theory is to be 'restructured' in a more critical
fashion - then positivism itself will have to be challenged. It is thus
the task of the next three chapters to show not only how the
predominance of positivism in International Relations has impeded
the development of critical forms of theorizing, but also to detail how
the challenging of positivism and the restructuring of International
Relations theory has already begun.

38
 Reflexivity and International
Relations theory

The 'personal equation' of the political scientist both limits and

directs his scholarly pursuits. The truth which a mind thus socially
conditioned is able to grasp is likewise socially conditioned. The
perspective of the observer determines what can be known and how
it is to be understood. Hans J. Morgenthau1

'That we disavow reflection is positivism.' Jiirgen Habermas2

Introduction
We are now in a position to begin to address the central contention of
this study. Specifically, at several points in this book, the following
two arguments have been advanced. First, it has been suggested that
the absence of the 'critical' elements which constitute emancipatory
theory from the discipline of International Relations can be explained
in terms of the predominance of positivism in International Relations
theory. Secondly, it has been suggested that the predominance of
positivism in International Relations theory is no longer unchal-
lenged; that the prospects for incorporating the elements which
distinguish emancipatory theory are improving. In sum, it is being
suggested that there are signs that International Relations theory is in
the process of being 'restructured' in a fundamental, 'critical' fashion,
and that as a consequence, the potential for the discipline of
International Relations to make a meaningful contribution in terms of
the contemporary requirements of the Aristotelian project - a
contribution to human emancipation - are better now than they have
been for some time.

39
The restructuring of International Relations theory

It is the task of this chapter and the two which follow to develop
and substantiate these arguments. This chapter will focus on the
question of 'theoretical reflexivity' - one of three 'critical' elements
which constitute emancipatory theory. To that end, we shall proceed
as follows. In the first part of this chapter, I will define more fully the
notion of theoretical reflexivity as well as explain its essential
incompatibility with positivist social science, including positivist
International Relations theory. I will do this by relating the core
elements of reflexivity to the positivist understanding of theory and
knowledge, paying particular attention to the first of the three central
tenets of the positivist approach: that of 'truth as correspondence'.
Then, in the second part of this chapter, I will explore the question
of theoretical reflexivity in terms of International Relations theory. I
will show how recent developments in positivist International
Relations theory both reflect the influence of themes in contemporary
social and political theory as well as underscore the continuing
hegemony of positivist categories. Perhaps even more importantly,
however, I will show that developments in social and political theory
which have led to a questioning of positivism and a simultaneous
opening to theoretical reflexivity also have their parallel in Interna-
tional Relations theory, albeit at the margins of the discipline. As a
consequence, it is concluded that notwithstanding the fact that '[f]or
many years the international relations discipline has had the dubious
honour of being among the least self-reflexive of the Western social
sciences',3 the prospects for the development of theoretically reflexive
International Relations theory are not as limited as they might at first
appear.

Defining theoretical reflexivity

As was noted in chapter one, theoretical reflexivity can be defined in
general terms as 'theoretical reflection on the process of theorizing
itself'. It is important to recognize that within the parameters of this
general definition, at least three core elements can be identified: (i)
self-consciousness about underlying premises; (ii) the recognition of
the inherently politico-normative dimension of paradigms and the
normal science tradition they sustain; and (iii) the affirmation that
reasoned judgments about the merits of contending paradigms are
possible in the absence of a neutral observation language. These three

40
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

elements will be treated in turn. Furthermore, in the effort to show

the essential incompatibility of a fully reflexive orientation with
positivism, each element will be related to the positivist conception of
theory and knowledge.4
Being aware of the underlying premises of one's theorizing is the
first core element of theoretical reflexivity. That is, theoretical
reflexivity is understood to involve attention to, and disclosure of, the
too-often unstated presuppositions upon which theoretical edifices are
erected.
If reflexivity were limited to this first element, then the positivist
forms of theorizing which have dominated the discipline of
International Relations would qualify with little difficulty as
reflexive forms of theory; positivist notions of theory require that
the sum total of generalizations be derived axiomatically from
clearly identified starting assumptions. It is the presence of the two
additional elements, however, which are incompatible with - and
indeed, emerged from challenges to - positivist forms of theory that
makes reflexivity a virtual antonym of positivism.
The second element of reflexivity is the recognition of the inherently
politico-normative content of paradigms and the normal science
traditions they generate. To understand the sense in which this
element of reflexivity stands in opposition to positivist theorizing, it is
important to recall the first tenet of the positivist tradition: that of
'truth as correspondence'.
As will be recalled from our discussion in the last chapter, 'truth as
correspondence' is one of three core tenets of positivism.5 That is,
positivism stipulates that theoretical explanations will be true to the
extent that they accurately reflect empirical reality; to the extent that
they correspond to the facts.
It will also be recalled that this tenet rests upon a particular
assumption: that of the separation of subject and object, of observer
and observed. In other words, the tenet of 'truth as correspondence'
assumes that through the proper application of research design and
techniques, the researcher(s) can be 'factored out', leaving behind a
description of the world 'as it truly is'. In short, the tenet of 'truth as
correspondence' is the expression of the goal of rendering science a
'process without a subject'.
The consequence of this tenet and of this assumption is that a
number of problematic issues are swept aside. In making the
separation of subject and object a defining condition of science, the

41
The restructuring of International Relations theory

positivist approach ignores the active and vital role played by the
community of researchers in the production and validation of knowl-
edge. It ignores the fact that the standards which define 'reliable
knowledge' are dependent upon their acceptance and application by a
research community.6
As a result, a number of important questions not only go
unanswered - they are never raised. They include questions of the
historical origin and nature of the community-based standards which
define what counts as reliable knowledge, as well as the question of
the merits of those standards in the light of possible alternatives.
These questions do not arise in positivist-inspired theorizing because
the central standard of scientific truth - that of truth as correspon-
dence - is seen to belong not to a time-bound human community of
scientific investigators, but to an extra-historical natural realm. In
short, the knowledge-defining standard of positivism is understood to
be 'Nature's own'.7
In contrast, a theoretically reflexive orientation is one whose
starting point stands in radical opposition to that of positivism in
that it rejects the notion of objective standards existing independently
of human thought and practice. In this, reflexively oriented theorists
draw philosophical sustenance from the efforts to develop a post-
positivist philosophy of science associated with the work of Kuhn
and Feyerabend, as well as the linguistic turn in social and political
theory, manifest in the Wittgensteinian analysis of 'language games',
neo-pragmatist renditions of Gadamerian 'philosophical hermeneu-
tics', and Foucault's analysis of power-knowledge discourses.8 As
different as these approaches are, all serve to undermine the
assumption that it is ever possible to separate subject (the knower)
and object (the known) in the manner postulated by positivism.
Simply put, if the paradigm (language game/tradition/discourse)
tells us not only how to interpret evidence, but determines what will
count as valid evidence in the first place, the tenet of 'truth as
correspondence' to 'the facts' can no longer be sustained.
Thus it is that the notion of reflexivity directs us beyond merely
identifying the underlying assumptions of our theorizing. It directs us
to recognize that the very existence of objective standards for
assessing competing knowledge claims must be questioned. It moves
us to understand that the standards which determine what is to count
as reliable knowledge are not nature's, but rather always human
standards - standards which are not given but made, not imposed by

42
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

nature but adopted by convention by the members of a specific

community.
In so doing, moreover, we are compelled to acknowledge the
politico-normative content of scholarly investigation. Seeing knowl-
edge-defining standards as community-created conventions in specific
contexts moves us to see that
evolving descriptions and ever-changing versions of objects, things,
and the world issue forth from various communities as responses to
certain problems, as attempts to overcome specific situations, and as means
to satisfy particular needs and interests?

In short, 'ideas, words, and language are not mirrors which copy the
"real" or "objective" world' - as positivist conceptions of theory and
knowledge would have it - 1?ut rather tools with which we cope with
"our" world'.10 Consequently, there is a fundamental link between
epistemology - the question of what counts as 'reliable knowledge' -
and politics: the problems, needs and interests deemed important and
legitimate by a given community for which 'reliable knowledge' is
being sought.11
The inextricably politico-normative aspect of scholarship has an
important consequence for the social sciences in terms of the
incommensurability thesis (that contending paradigms are not only
incompatible but actually have 'no common measure'). In the case of
the natural sciences, one may reasonably contest the thesis that
contending paradigms are incommensurable, given their shared
politico-normative goal of instrumental control of nature. 12 In the case
of the social sciences, however, different paradigms have not only
different terminologies, but are often constructed in terms of quite
different values and oriented to serving quite different political
projects. Consequently, the thesis of the radical incommensurability of
contending paradigms in a social science such as International
Relations is much more difficult to dispute. 13
We arrive now at the third element of a fully reflexive orientation:
the affirmation of the possibility of reasoned judgments in the absence
of objective standards. Once again, this element of reflexivity can best
be understood in relation to positivism. As was noted above,
positivism strives, by means of the separation of subject and object, to
derive a 'neutral observation language' which will allow for a point
by point comparison of rival paradigms. In this context, it is
important to note the possibility of a reasoned assessment of empirical

43
The restructuring of International Relations theory

claims. Indeed, it is not going too far to assert that for positivists this
assumption is at the core of reason itself.
The faith in the possibility of a neutral observation language and
the accompanying conviction that such a language is a necessary
condition for reasoned assessment explains much of the distress
exhibited by positivists in the face of the assertions about incommen-
surability. To accept incommensurability is, for positivists, to promote
what Popper termed the 'Myth of the Framework' according to which
'we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories; our
expectations; our past experiences; our language', and that as a
consequence we cannot communicate with or judge those working in
terms of a different paradigm.14
In contrast, reflexive theorists accept incommensurability as the
necessary consequence of the fact that paradigm-specific knowledge-
defining standards are themselves intimately connected to and
embedded in competing social and political agendas, the politico-
normative contents of which are not amenable to any neutral
observation language.15 At the same time, however, reflexive theorists
do not accept that recognizing contending paradigms as incommen-
surable means reasoned assessments are impossible. Rather, a
reflexive orientation sees how both the positivist insistence on 'truth
as correspondence' and Popper's notion of the 'Myth of the Frame-
work' are expressions of a common philosophical apprehension. They
are both expressions of what Bernstein has termed the 'Cartesian
anxiety' - the notion, central to identitarian thinking from Rene
Descartes to the present, that should we prove unsuccessful in our
search for the Archimedean point of indubitable knowledge which
can serve as the foundation for human reason, then rationality must
give way to irrationality, and reliable knowledge to madness. 16
As the driving force of modern philosophy, the Cartesian anxiety -
which is reflected in positivism's insistence on the ahistorical, extra-
social standard of 'truth as correspondence' - is bound up with the
conception of knowledge that Aristotle called episteme: apodictic
knowledge of the order and nature of the cosmos. Furthermore, the
peculiarly modern fear that the undermining of the viability of
episteme must lead inexorably to irrationality and chaos is the result of
the limiting of the modern conception of knowledge and rationality to
episteme.
It is this limiting of reason, moreover, which has resulted in the
marginalization and impoverishment of normative discourse. Given

44
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

the positivist emphasis on the centrality of a neutral observation

language, the treatment of normative issues in mainstream social
science has typically taken the form of descriptive accounts of
individual value preferences. One might, of course, engage in crude
utilitarian calculation to determine the course offering the most in
terms of human happiness. Foreclosed, however, is the reasoned
adjudication of the inherent value of competing normative claims.
Indeed, in the realm of normative discourse the hold of the positivist
model of social science has been so powerful that it has made us
'quite incapable of seeing how reason does and can really function in
the domain'.17
Consequently, the means of exorcising the Cartesian anxiety lies in
elucidating a conception of reason which is not limited to episteme,
and which does not depend on a fixed Archimedean point outside of
history or on the existence of a neutral observation language. It is
worth noting that just such an effort has been underway in
contemporary social and political theory. It is evident in Charles
Taylor's privileging of Hegel's 'interpretive or hermeneutical dialec-
tics' - a form of reasoning which, in contrast to the claim of 'strict
dialectics' (which makes claims to an undeniable starting point),
posits no such foundation and yet still aims to convince us by means
of reasoned arguments: 'by the overall plausibility of the interpreta-
tions [it] give[s]'.18 It is evident in Hans-Georg Gadamer's linguisti-
cally based reappropriation of the Aristotelian notion of phronesis
which, in contrast to episteme, is oriented to the exercise of reasoned
judgment not in the context of the timeless and unchanging, but of
the variable and contingent.19 It is evident in Jiirgen Habermas'
contribution to the theory of 'communicative action', in particular the
discursive validation of truth claims.20 And perhaps most strikingly,
given the predominance achieved by the notion of 'paradigm' in
contemporary International Relations theory, it is evident in Richard
Bernstein's re-evaluation of Kuhn, as someone whose work leads us
not to the Myth of the Framework - as was charged by Popper - but
rather evidences a movement toward a form of 'practical reason'
having great affinity to Gadamer's reconceptualization of phronesis?1
In all of these efforts and more, the emphasis is upon the elucidation
of a form of reason which refuses to limit our conception of human
rationality to a mechanical application of an eternal, unchanging
standard; which affirms that a broader and more subtle conception of
reason is possible than that which underlies both the positivist tenet

45
The restructuring of International Relations theory

of 'truth as correspondence' and that of radical relativism as the

logical consequence of incommensurability; which experiences no self-
contradiction when employing a 'language of qualitative worth', and
which is thus as suited to a consideration of normative claims as it is
to empirical ones.
Expanding the conception of reason beyond positivistic episteme is
vital to a reflexive orientation. For having reclaimed normative
discourse as a domain in which reason can and does function,
reflexive theorists argue that what makes paradigms incommensur-
able - the politico-normative content of the normal science they
generate - also makes reasoned assessments of them possible. In
short, judgments about contending paradigms are possible by means
of reasoned assessments of the politico-normative content of the
projects they serve, of the ways of life to which they correspond.22
Having established what reflexivity is, perhaps it would be useful,
by way of conclusion, to state briefly what it is not. Reflexivity is not
a 'research programme' designed to provide cumulative knowledge
about the world of empirical facts or about the world of theory. Nor
can reflexivity be reduced to the idea that while agreement on facts is
possible, value disagreements will continue to plague scholars in their
quest for disciplinary consensus. Finally, reflexivity does not provide
specific, a priori standards or criteria for assessing the merits of
contending paradigms.
Reflexivity is 'theoretical self-consciousness' involving (i) a recogni-
tion of the interrelationship of the conception of 'facts' and 'values' on
the one hand, and a community-specific social and political agenda
on the other, and (ii) an openness to engaging in reasoned dialogue to
assess the merits of contending paradigms. Whether this kind of self-
consciousness is in evidence in recent theorizing within the discipline
of International Relations is the question we shall now address.

Reflexivity and International Relations theory

We move now to a consideration of reflexivity in terms of Interna-
tional Relations theory. I will begin by examining a recent meta-
theoretical debate in the discipline: International Relations theory's
'Third Debate'. Specifically, I will examine the contributions of a
sampling of International Relations scholars to the Third Debate to
determine to what extent the elements of reflexivity are in evidence. I

46
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

will argue that in terms of the Third Debate, the break with positivist
conceptions of theory and knowledge is, at best, partial and that the
contribution of the Third Debate to reflexivity is, consequently, a
limited one.
The focus will then be shifted to the contributions of scholars
representing three minority traditions in the discipline: (i) neo-
Gramscian International Relations theory; (ii) postmodern Interna-
tional Relations theory; and (iii) feminist International Relations
theory. I will argue that it is here, at the 'margins' of the discipline,
that the best evidence is to be found - and the best hopes reside - for
a truly 'reflexive turn' in International Relations.

The Third Debate reconsidered

International Relations theory's Third Debate, which dates from the
late 1980s, can be seen as the third in a series of 'discipline-defining'
debates23 in the twentieth century: the first being that between
'idealism' and 'realism' in the 1940s and 1950s,24 with the second,
which occurred during the 1960s, centring around the confrontation
between 'history' and 'science'.25
On the one hand, one can understand the Third Debate in the same
general terms as the First and Second: namely, as an expression of the
on-going quest for better theory. At the same time, one should also
see the Third Debate in terms of contemporary developments in the
realm of social and political theory more generally. It has already
been suggested in this study that the claim that 'International
Relations is a discrete area of action and discourse, separate from
social and political theory',26 can no longer be sustained. In fact,
nowhere is there better evidence for this position than in International
Relations theory's Third Debate.
To reiterate, like the debates which preceded it, the Third Debate is
part of the search for better theory. In the case of the Third Debate,
however, and in line with current social and political theory, this
search is being conducted not in terms of individual propositions or
hypotheses, but in terms of larger conceptual schemes. The Third
Debate is a 'discourse about choice of analytic frameworks'.27 It
involves a focus on 'meta-scientific units' (i.e., paradigms), where
particular attention is directed to examining the 'underlying premises
and assumptions' of the paradigms in contention.28

47
The restructuring of International Relations theory

A good example of this approach to the on-going quest for better

theory is the work of Michael Banks. In an important contribution to
the Third Debate, Banks conceptualizes the present state of the
discipline in terms of three contending paradigms: realism, pluralism,
and structuralism. "The debate about their respective merits', argues
Banks, 'occupies centre stage in the discipline'.29
Banks attempts to detail and contrast the 'basic images' of the
respective paradigms. He notes:
Each of the three starts with a wholly different basic image. For
realists, the world society is a system of /billiard-ball/ states in
intermittent collision. For pluralists, it is a 'cobweb', a network of
numerous criss-crossing relationships. For structuralists, it is a
'multi-headed octopus', with powerful tentacles constantly sucking
wealth from the weakened peripheries towards the powerful
centres.30
It is these contrasting images, notes Banks, that serve as the
foundation for the erection of theoretical structures. These structures,
while internally coherent, contradict one another in terms of major
theoretical categories including (i) actors, (ii) dynamics, (iii) dependent
variables, (iv) subject boundaries, and (v) specific concepts.
With regard to actors, writes Banks, 'realists see only states;
pluralists see states in combination with a great variety of others; and
structuralists see classes'. As regards dynamics, 'realists see force as
primary; pluralists see complex social movements; structuralists see
economies'. As concerns dependent variables,
realists see the task of IR [International Relations] as simply to
explain what states do; pluralists see it more grandly as an effort to
explain all major world events; and structuralists see its function as
showing why the world contains such appalling contrasts between
rich and poor.31
With regard to subject boundaries,
Realists define the boundaries of their subject in a narrow, state-
centric fashion, often preferring the term 'international politics' to
describe it. Pluralists widen the boundaries by including multi-
national companies, markets, ethnic groups and nationalism as well
as state behaviour, and call their subject IR or world society.
Structuralists have the widest boundaries of all, stressing the unity of
the whole world system at all levels, focusing on modes of
production and treating inter-state politics as merely a surface
phenomenon.32

48
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

And finally, as regards specific concepts, Banks notes that:

Some concepts are found only in one paradigm, because they are of
crucial importance to it: deterrence and alliances in realism, ethnicity
and interdependence in pluralism, exploitation and dependency in
structuralism. Others, however, are used with broadly similar mean-
ings in all three: power, sovereignty, and law, for example. Yet
others, like imperialism, the state, and hegemony, are used in all
three but with sharply different interpretations.33

It is clear there is much room for disagreement with the specifics of

Banks' intervention. His conceptualization of the contending para-
digms - from their basic images through to their contrasting notions
of actors, dynamics, etc. - can be challenged as to its accuracy and
adequacy. Indeed, disagreements may extend all the way to the labels
used to designate contending paradigms.34 In contrast to Banks' use
of the terms 'realism', 'pluralism', and 'structuralism', for example,
Kal Holsti prefers those of the 'Classical Tradition', 'Global Society',
and 'Neo-Marxism';35 Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi employ those of
'realism', 'pluralism', and 'globalism';36 R. D. McKinlay and R. Little
identify their paradigms by the labels of 'realist', 'liberal', and
'socialist'.37 The point remains, however, that Banks' work serves as
an excellent example of how the emphases of contemporary philo-
sophy of science have spilled over into International Relations, and
influenced the form that interventions have taken in the Third Debate.
As was noted above, the Third Debate, like its forerunners, is a
discipline-defining debate, concerned with the 'search for better
theory'.38 For that reason alone, it bears consideration. However, the
Third Debate has special significance in terms of the concerns of the
present chapter. For beyond the immediate arguments about the
number, identifying characteristics, and appropriate labels for the
paradigms in International Relations theory, the Third Debate affords
a valuable opportunity for exploring the issue of theoretical reflexivity
in the discipline.
It has been argued that International Relations theory's Third
Debate not only reflects the influence of contemporary philosophy of
science in general (with its emphasis on meta-scientific units), but that
it is a direct expression of post/anti-positivist currents. In the words of
Yosef Lapid, the Third Debate is 'linked, historically and intellec-
tually, to the confluence of diverse anti-positivistic philosophical and
sociological trends'.39 Indeed, it is because the Third Debate has been

49
The restructuring of International Relations theory

understood as marking International Relations theory's break with

positivist orthodoxy that it has been associated with an important
increase in theoretical reflexivity within International Relations.40
In the pages which follow, this interpretation of the Third Debate
will be examined. It will be argued that to see the Third Debate as
marking a conclusive break with the positivist legacy, and an opening
to theoretical reflexivity, would be a mistake. Rather, it will be
suggested that for two important reasons, the Third Debate's
contribution to increased reflexivity in the discipline has been limited.
First, a significant number of interventions in the Third Debate
continue to be structured in terms of positivism's tenet of 'truth as
correspondence'. And secondly, of the interventions which do
evidence an attempt to break with the notion of 'truth as correspon-
dence', the vast majority remain trapped within positivist-derived
conceptions of reasoned assessment. In both cases, reflexivity remains
foreclosed.

Interventions in the Third Debate

On the basis of our discussion of positivism and reflexivity in the first
part of this chapter, three possible stances with regard to contending
paradigms can be distinguished.41 The first stance, having its basis in
the acceptance of the positivist tenet of 'truth as correspondence', is
that of 'commensurable and therefore comparable'. Rival paradigms
are comparable, asserts this position, because ultimately they can be
assessed according to a common standard - that of correspondence to
the real world. This stance, it will be remembered, is incompatible
with the development of theoretical reflexivity, in that it sees the
standard for what constitutes reliable knowledge as 'Nature's own',
and thus beyond criticism.
A second stance with regard to contending paradigms is that which
corresponds to the Popperian notion of the 'Myth of the Framework'.
According to this stance, rival paradigms are 'incommensurable and
therefore incomparable'. This stance breaks with positivism to the
degree that it recognizes that standards for what constitutes reliable
knowledge are human constructs and social conventions. However, it
remains firmly attached to the positivist conception of reasoned
assessment - in particular, the idea that the acceptance of incommen-
surability means that rival standards cannot be compared and

50
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

assessed. While embodying the first two elements of reflexivity, then,

this stance nonetheless fails in relation to the third.
Finally, a third stance can be identified. According to this stance - a
stance associated with efforts to elucidate dialogic, non-foundation-
alist conceptions of reason - rival paradigms are 'incommensurable
yet still comparable'. This stance recognizes the social and political
nature of the standards for what constitutes 'reliable knowledge', of
the 'coping vocabularies' devised by different communities. But it
also affirms that these conventions and vocabularies can be compared
and assessed by means of reasoned argument and deliberation about
their politico-normative content. It is this stance - and this stance
alone - which qualifies as fully reflexive.
With these three stances in mind, we can now move to an
examination of the Third Debate. Interventions in the Third Debate
can be classified and assessed in terms of their break with positivism
and their contribution to reflexivity. We will begin with the first
stance: that of 'commensurable and therefore comparable'.

Stance I: commensurable and therefore comparable

One of the best examples of 'Stance I' in the Third Debate is to be
found in the writings of K. J. Holsti.42 To begin, there is no
question that Holsti is most comfortable within the realist - or in
his terms, 'Classical' - tradition. Indeed, The Dividing Discipline can
be seen as a spirited defence of the realist approach to the study of
international politics at a time when calls are being heard for its
replacement.
What is even more important in terms of the present discussion,
however, is Holsti's adherence to a (Lakatosian) version of positivism,
and his consequent acceptance of the positivist tenet of 'truth as
correspondence'. Holsti's allegiance to positivism is clearly evidenced
in his statements concerning the purpose of theory and the nature of
knowledge accumulation. For Holsti, 'the ultimate purpose of theore-
tical activity is to enhance our understanding of the world of
international polities'; it is to 'increase our knowledge of the real world
by helping to guide research and interpret data'.43 Moreover, notes
Holsti, 'We add to knowledge primarily when we render reality more
intelligible by seeking generalizations of empirical validity ... / 4 4
It is out of the understanding that theory is a reflection of the 'real
world' that Holsti explains the origins of the contending paradigms

51
The restructuring of International Relations theory

which constitute the Third Debate. 'A plethora of ... "paradigms"',

notes Holsti, 'is an expression of greater international complexity'.45
And because '[o]ur world is complex and growing more so', he
asserts, 'it is ... unlikely that any single theory or perspective ...
could adequately explain all of its essential characteristics'. 46 Thus, he
concludes, 'Theoretical pluralism is the only possible response to the
multiple realities of a complex world.' 47
It should be noted, however, that for Holsti, paradigmatic pluralism
is more than just an inevitable condition of theorizing which tries to
comprehend a complex reality. In addition, pluralism is an important
principle which, when respected, serves some very beneficial func-
tions. Clearly echoing Lakatos' rejection of the Popperian notion of
strict falsification, Holsti affirms that:
Pluralism ... guards against the hazards of 'intellectual knockouts',
those attempts to disown past methodologies and theories on the
assumption that they are entirely wrong ... This was a major
shortcoming of the most extreme behaviorism and of some recent
efforts to demolish realism and its variants.48

In addition to guarding against straightforward falsification of

paradigms which, despite anomalies, have proven their worth as
interpretive tools, the principle of pluralism also serves to ensure that
the discipline keeps progressing in its quest for ever truer descriptions
of reality. Thus, notes Holsti, if the dominant realist tradition shows
itself to be inadequate as a description of reality, 'then new departures
may help us redirect inquiry into the proper channels'. If realism is
lacking, argues Holsti, it can be refurbished by 'grafting' new
theoretical formulations on to it.49
It is important to note that despite his support for paradigmatic
pluralism, Holsti is not arguing that all paradigms are of equal value.
In keeping with the positivist tenet of 'truth as correspondence',
paradigms may be evaluated according to the accuracy of their
description of the facts. Notes Holsti,
Progress is thus not measured by unlimited accumulation of
perspectives, paradigms, models, or methodologies any more than it
is by the replacement of 'units of knowledge'. Some perspectives,
models, and the like should and do have higher intellectual claims
than others. The ultimate test is how elegantly and comprehensibly
they describe and explain the important persisting, new, and devel-
oping realities.50

52
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

Thus it is that early in The Dividing Discipline, Holsti affirms that

'isomorphism' and 'correspondence with the observed facts of inter-
national politics' are the standards by which rival paradigms must be
assessed.51
Indeed, it is on the basis of its transhistorical correspondence with
the facts that Holsti continues to promote the realist paradigm over its
rivals. In an interesting reversal of the traditional sense of inferiority
experienced by social scientists in regard to their counterparts in the
natural sciences, Holsti affirms that:

We cannot throw away paradigms (or what passes for them) as

natural scientists do, a la Kuhn, because the anomalies between
reality and its theoretical characterization are never so severe in
International Relations as they are in the natural sciences. None
of the thinkers of the past portrayed the world of international
(or world) politics in so distorted a manner as did the analysts of
the physical or astronomical universe prior to the Copernican
revolution.52

From his affirmations that competing paradigms may be 'synthe-

sized' ('grafted' one on to another), and that realists have been more
successful than many physicists in approximating reality - not to
mention his assertion that 'correspondence with the observed facts of
international politics' is the basis upon which rival paradigms must
be assessed - it is clear that Holsti does not accept the incommensur-
ability thesis. The theory-ladenness of all facts, not to mention the
politico-normative content of all theorizing, is something he cannot
embrace. Notes Holsti,
I remain sceptical of the 'liberation of theory from data', or as
Halliday has put it, a 'rejection of empiricism in favor of a theoretical
approach that accepts the place of data in a subordinate position'.53

The implications of Holsti's rejection of the notion of incommensur-

ability for increased theoretical reflexivity are clear. In the continued
affirmation of the notion that 'Nature's own' standards - specifically,
'truth as correspondence' - must be applied in the knowledge
validation process, the possibility of critical reflection on the social
origins and politico-normative content of the conventions which
define what is to count as reliable knowledge remains remote.
Theoretical reflexivity, to the degree that it figures at all, is reduced to
the much more limited notion of 'careful examination of assumptions

53
The restructuring of International Relations theory

and premises7 - a notion that Holsti correctly notes is perfectly

consistent with positivism.54
In conclusion, it should be noted that the greater part of the
interventions in the Third Debate - of which Holsti's stands out only
because of his clarity - conform to the positivist-inspired stance of
'commensurable and therefore comparable'. As a consequence, the
interpretation of the Third Debate as marking a disciplinary shift
toward post-positivist theoretical reflexivity bears being reconsidered.

Stance II: incommensurable and therefore incomparable

Although the majority of the interventions in International Relations
theory's Third Debate reflect what has been termed here 'Stance I', 55
it should be noted that there are important exceptions. Noteworthy
among these are those theorists who have adopted the second stance:
that of 'incommensurable and therefore incomparable'.
An important intervention by R. D. McKinlay and R. Little - Global
Problems and World Order - is a good example of this stance in the
Third Debate. McKinlay and Little's starting point is that the source
of the paradigms found in the literature - in their terms, Realism,
Liberalism, and Socialism - is not to be found in 'international
complexity' (where paradigmatic pluralism is seen as the inevitable
by-product). Rather, contending paradigms are expressions of radi-
cally different politico-normative orders embedded in competing
ideological frameworks.
Highlighting the links between paradigms and specific social-
political agendas is one of the ways in which Stance II adherents
demonstrate a clear advance over those of Stance I in terms of
reflexivity.56 The treatment of the realist paradigm in International
Relations theory serves as a good example. As Smith has argued,
because International Relations theory, as primarily an 'American
discipline', has been
so closely identified with the foreign policy concerns of the country,
it is not surprising that the assumptions of Realism have proven to
be so difficult to overcome. This is because the focus of Realism,
namely how to maximize power so as to manage international
events, fits extraordinarily well with the needs of a hegemonic
power. The three key elements of Realism's account of world politics,
the national interest, power maximization and the balance of power,
are particularly well-suited to the requirements of a foreign policy
for the US.57

54
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

In short, from the perspective of Stance II, realism is understood

not as a neutral description of the world as it 'truly is', but rather as a
'coping' vocabulary of a specific community (e.g., US state managers)
designed to address certain problems, to satisfy particular needs and
interests.
Furthermore, the assessment of realism as a 'coping' vocabulary
can be undertaken only in relation to the problems defined, the needs
and interests identified. Consequently, the success of realism has, pace
Holsti, had less to do with its alleged accuracy in grasping the 'facts'
of international politics, than with its demonstrated utility for guiding
state managers in their activities of 'state- and nation-building'. That
is to say, the realist paradigm has validated its truth-claims by
demonstrating its ability to guide state policy-making;58 realism is
'true' because it has met the needs of the policy-makers of the great
powers - most recently and perhaps most importantly, the United
States - engaged in the pursuit of a specific agenda and faced 'with a
specific set of foreign policy problems'.59
If the success of the realist paradigm cannot be understood apart
from particular social actors and their political projects - specifically
US state managers dedicated to the maintenance of American
hegemony - then a similar relationship must hold for other para-
digms. Notes Smith,
Just as it has been argued ... that the US policy agenda dominated
the study of International Relations by dominating Realism within
the US, so we should expect different paradigms [i.e. pluralism and
structuralism] to appeal to persons in different settings.60
In their discussion of rival paradigms in International Relations
theory, Alker and Biersteker adopt a similar tack. It is noteworthy
that their stated aim is to evidence a 'broader and deeper kind of
political and epistemological self-consciousness' than that found
within the positivist tradition - a self-consciousness which recognizes
'the deep connections between the social and political contexts of
particular theoretical enterprises and the kind of work actually
done'.61 Thus, in a manner similar to Smith, they affirm that:
Two global superpowers both able to destroy each other, but likely
to self-destruct in the same process, are likely to have scholars
especially interested in 'global interdependence' or 'peaceful coex-
istence'. Anti-colonial revolutionaries in relatively undeveloped
countries are driven by other practical imperatives.62

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

In sum, unlike Stance I, Stance II accepts that contending paradigms

in International Relations theory are incommensurable, and that the
hope held out by the adherents of Stance I - that of paradigm
'synthesis' - is thus a pipedream. The consequence of incommensur-
ability, note McKinlay and Little, is that
even when the models [i.e. paradigms] look to the same topics, the
general framework within which the topic is processed leads to
systematic variation in problem explication.63

As a consequence, 'as any one model begins to engineer solutions to

its perceived problems, it will in all likelihood create a problem for
another model'.64
With their rejection of the notion of a theory-independent realm of
facts by which one can assess the merits of competing paradigms,
and a recognition of the politico-normative content of the normal
science traditions, adherents of Stance II appear to be on the post-
positivist path to theoretical reflexivity. Unfortunately, this is not the
case. It is not the case because the adherents of Stance II remain
trapped by a notion of reason limited to episteme. Consequently, they
equate the incommensurability of paradigms with the incompar-
ability of paradigms.
Again, McKinlay and Little serve as a useful example. The ability to
assess the merits of competing paradigms, they argue, 'presupposes
some form of comparatively valid evaluation procedure, entailing
some decision rule which would stipulate which model was to be
retained'. And since any evaluation procedure which might be
proposed would be no more than a social convention, and hence,
inherently contestable, comparative assessments are virtually impos-
sible. The 'only comparatively valid test procedure', they conclude, 'is
to inquire whether each model is internally consistent'.65 And this
criterion they judge to be met in each case.
Indeed, not only is comparative assessment virtually impossible,
argue McKinlay and Little, but the very idea of meaningful commu-
nication between the adherents of rival paradigms - and the learning
which is a product of that communication - is out of the question:
[The] sophistication and internal coherence of each model, combined
with their very different goals, structural arrangements and belief
systems, make meaningful inter-model debate well-nigh impossible
... Compromise and constructive debate can largely only be
conducted within the confines and parameters of a single model.66

56
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

Given this view of incommensurability, the comparative assessment

of the substantive content of rival paradigms is foreclosed completely.
Relating rival paradigms one to another is possible only by means of
a 'sociology of knowledge', that is, a discussion of the social origins
and purposes of the paradigms in question. Yet as Adorno noted, the
problem with the sociology of knowledge is that it is inherently
relativistic - it involves no reasoned assessment of the merits of the
knowledge systems being investigated.67
Given the assumption of the essential incomparability of para-
digms, how is one to account for paradigm choice by members of the
research community? The position of James Rosenau on this issue is a
good example of how Stance II adherents respond to this question. In
accordance with the core assumptions of the stance of 'incommensur-
able and therefore incomparable', Rosenau affirms that 'the way in
which analysts become adherents of one or another approach is not
necessarily based on intellectual or rational calculation'. What then is
the explanation for paradigm choice? By definition, the explanation
must be found outside the realm of reason and argumentation.
Rosenau's answer is consistent, if disconcerting: 'our temperaments',
he affirms, ' . . . are the central determinants of which approach we
will find most suitable'.68
To conclude then, the second stance of 'incommensurable and
therefore incomparable',69 while having broken with positivism in
important respects, remains trapped within the positivist-reinforced
limitation of reason to episteme. Neither reasoned assessment nor even
communication between paradigms is possible. By definition, they are
condemned to 'pass like ships in the night'.70 As a consequence, and
despite some important progress beyond Stance I, for Stance II
reflexivity remains foreclosed.

Beyond the Third Debate

We have examined the two stances to which the interventions in
mainstream International Relations theory's Third Debate corre-
spond. In each case, we have seen that the possibilities for the
development of theoretical reflexivity - to the degree that they
exist at all - remain limited. At the same time, the third stance of
'incommensurable yet still comparable', the only stance which
represents a fully reflexive orientation, is not represented. This

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

raises an important question: beyond the Third Debate, is there

any evidence of this third stance in contemporary theorizing in the
discipline?
For examples of this third stance it is necessary to move outside
of the mainstream to the margins of the discipline. Here three
distinct efforts will be examined: (i) Gramscian-inspired neo-
Marxist International Relations theory; (ii) postmodern International
Relations theory, and (iii) feminist International Relations theory.
The first tradition is that of the Gramscian-inspired neo-Marxist
International Relations theory represented by Robert Cox. In a piece
which predates the Third Debate by several years, Cox evidences a
clear awareness of the core elements of theoretical reflexivity. Beyond
attention to basic assumptions, Cox also shows awareness of the
politico-normative content of any theoretical enterprise. Specifically,
he argues that it is necessary to recognize that 'Theory is always for
someone and for some purpose'; that theory is shaped by a
problematic rooted in the 'human experience that gives rise to the
need for theory'.71 Accordingly, there is 'no such thing as theory in
itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space'. As a conse-
quence, argues Cox, 'When any theory so represents itself, it is more
important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed
perspective.'72
In short, paradigms/theories are expressions of diverse perspectives
linked to disparate social and political projects. It is, therefore, a
central task of the theorist to achieve 'a perspective on perspectives'
by becoming 'more reflective upon the process of theorizing itself'; by
becoming 'clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to
theorizing, and its relation to other perspectives'.73
As such, Cox's position represents a clear break with the positivist
notion of truth as correspondence and distinguishes itself clearly from
the stance of 'commensurable and therefore comparable'. At the same
time, it is important to note that Cox breaks as well with the position
of Stance II. Refusing to equate incommensurability with incompar-
ability, Cox affirms that achieving a 'perspective on perspectives' is
oriented to a specific goal: 'to open up the possibility of choosing a
different valid perspective'\74
The perspective on perspectives which Cox presents involves a
distinction between two types of theorizing - two distinct, rival and
incommensurable paradigms. The first Cox labels 'problem-solving
theory', an approach distinguished by the fact that it

58
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory
takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power
relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as
the given framework for action.75

In contrast to 'problem-solving' theory, the second approach - that

of 'critical theory' - is distinguished by the fact that it 'stands apart
from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came
about'; that it 'does not take institutions and social and power
relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself
with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process
of changing'.76
Despite the recognition of the incommensurability of these two
approaches, Cox shows himself quite ready to engage in a reasoned
comparison of them by means of a critical examination of their
politico-normative contents. Notes Cox:
The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to
fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the
statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables
which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination. The
ceteris paribus assumption, upon which such theorizing is based,
makes it possible to arrive at statements of laws or regularities
which appear to have general validity but which imply, of course,
the institutional and relational parameters assumed in the problem-
solving approach.77

However, Cox insists, problem-solving theory's assumption of a fixed

order
is not merely a convenience of method, but also an ideological bias.
Problem-solving theories can be represented ... as serving particular
national, sectional, or class interests, which are comfortable within
the given order. Indeed, the purpose served by problem-solving
theory is conservative, since it aims to solve the problems arising in
various parts of a complex whole in order to smooth the functioning
of the whole.78

In contrast to problem-solving theory, critical theory recognizes that

it stems from a perspective. Secondly, 'critical theory contains
problem-solving theories within itself, but contains them in the form
of identifiable ideologies, thereby pointing to their conservative
consequences'.79 And thirdly, critical theory having as a 'principal
objective' the clarification of the 'range of possible alternatives',
'allows for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order

59
The restructuring of International Relations theory

different from the prevailing order'.80 Thus, while acknowledging

problem-solving theory's strengths,81 Cox nonetheless judges 'critical
theory' superior on the basis of its emancipatory politico-normative
content.
Now it is of course possible to raise reasoned objections to Cox's
conclusion regarding the relative merits of the two approaches. But
the contestability of his conclusions should not distract us from the
main contribution of Cox's intervention in terms of reflexivity: namely
that reasoned comparison of incommensurable approaches is not only
necessary but possible, and that it is possible once one extends the
grounds of assessment to include the politico-normative dimensions
of rival theoretical enterprises.
Despite the importance of Cox's contribution, however, it must be
conceded that his intervention remains preliminary and in need of
further development. In this regard, it is hopeful to note that Cox's
concern with promoting a reflexive brand of theorizing is being taken
up by others within the tradition of Gramscian-inspired analysis of
world politics.82 Yet it can be argued that it is within non-Gramscian
theoretical traditions - those of postmodern International Relations
and feminist International Relations - that the notions that theory is
always 'for something' and 'for someone' have been taken up most
intensively.
At first glance, the potential for postmodern International Relations
theory to contribute to reflexivity would seem quite good. To begin,
postmodern approaches recognize the highly problematic nature of
the positivist tenet of 'truth as correspondence', arguing that the
world is never known except through a 'discourse' which 'generates
the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and
explained' and which 'makes "real" that which it prescribes as
meaningful'.83
It is with regard to the insight that all theory has politico-normative
content, however, that postmodernism makes its main contribution to
reflexivity. As George has noted, the distinguishing characteristic of
postmodernism is that it 'refocuses contemporary analysis on the
power/knowledge nexus and ... on theory as practice'.84 Accordingly,
drawing out the hidden politico-normative content of ostensibly
neutral, apolitical knowledge-discourses has been a major focus of
postmodern theorizing more generally.85 This concern is clearly in
evidence in the work of postmodern International Relations scholars,
who have insisted that all theorizing about world politics is done

60
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

from some perspective, and that the goal of 'apocalyptic objectivity' -

that is, 'a totalizing standpoint outside of time and capable of
enclosing all history within a singular narrative, a law of develop-
ment, or a vision of progress toward a certain end of humankind' 86 -
is untenable.
It is in their specific attentiveness to the politico-normative content
of mainstream International Relations theorizing that postmodernist
theorists have distinguished themselves.87 Their contributions in this
regard include (i) showing standard interpretations of Machiavelli as
a proto-realist to be reflective of a contemporary quest to legitimize
the practices of Realpolitik;88 (ii) demonstrating the link between the
'great texts' of diplomatic discourse, the social context of which it was
both an expression and shaper, and the designation by that discourse
of which practices would be viewed as legitimate and which not;89
and (iii) exploring the crucial role of contemporary 'strategy/security
discourse' in providing justification for realist practice and con-
straining non-traditional conceptualizations of security.90 In these
ways and more, postmodern International Relations theorists have
reinforced the reflexive insight that theory is always 'for something'.
At the same time it must be acknowledged that aspects of
postmodern International Relations raise serious questions as to its
potential to contribute to increased reflexivity. A central difficulty lies
in the ambiguous relationship of postmodernist theorizing to reason
and, by extension, to reasoned critique. Postmodernism more gen-
erally has been faulted for equating instrumental rationality with
reason tout court91 - an equation which, if taken to its logical
endpoint, entails a rejection not only of domination rooted in
instrumental reason, but a rejection of reasoned criticism itself. As
Bernstein notes in reference to Foucault's work:
Critique - even genealogical critique - must preserve at least one
standard by which we engage in the critique of the present. Yet
when critique is totalized, when critique turns against itself so that all
rational standards are called into question, then one is caught in a
performative contradiction.92
It is, of course, true that postmodernist theorists like Foucault have
tried to distance themselves from the charge of irrationalism:
There is the problem raised by Habermas: if one abandons the work
of Kant or Weber, for example, one runs the risk of lapsing into
irrationality.

61
The restructuring of International Relations theory
I am completely in agreement with this, but at the same time, our
question is quite different: I think that the central issue of philosophy
and critical thought since the eighteenth century has always been,
still is, and will, I hope, remain the question, What is this reason that
we use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits, and what
are its dangers? How can we exist as rational beings, fortunately
committed to practicing a rationality unfortunately crisscrossed by
intrinsic dangers? ... In addition, if it is extremely dangerous to say
that Reason is the enemy that should be eliminated, it is just as
dangerous to say that any critical questioning of this rationality risks
sending us into irrationality.93

This disclaimer notwithstanding, however, what remains lacking in

Foucault's work 'is an attempt to discriminate among aspects (or
versions) of rationality in order to locate more clearly its beneficial
and pernicious dimensions'.94 The difficulty this poses for reflexivity
is clear, given the centrality of the notion that reasoned judgments are
possible even in the face of incommensurability.
The ambiguous status of reason in postmodernism generally is
paralleled by a similarly ambiguous status within postmodern Inter-
national Relations theory. Indeed, the conclusion that postmodern
International Relations harbours an underlying current of 'irration-
alism' has become commonplace in the writings of the critics of
postmodern International Relations.95 And as in the case of Foucault,
it has become equally commonplace for postmodern International
Relations theorists to attempt to repudiate this charge. What they
reject is not reason, argue postmodern International Relations theor-
ists, but rather a conception of reason which remains entrapped
within Bernstein's notion of the 'Cartesian anxiety' - 'the modernist
proposition which asserts that either we have some sort of ultimate
'foundation' for our knowledge or we are plunged into the void of
the relative, the irrational, the arbitrary, the nihilistic'.96 In a similar
vein, Ashley and Walker's defence of a postmodern 'ethics of
freedom' against the charge that it sanctions 'a sort of licentious
activity whose credo might be "Anything goes!"/97 can be read as an
affirmation of the possibility of the reasoned adjudication of rival
politico-normative claims which is central to comparing the incom-
mensurable. When words and deeds proceed in the 'register of
freedom', they argue, this does not mean that

every notion of criticizing and disciplining conduct is out the

window because, given the refusal to refer conduct to some

62
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

presumably fixed and universal standard of judgment, every word

and deed must be presumed to be as good, as ethical, or as effective
as the next.98
At the same time, it must also be acknowledged that certain
interventions by postmodern International Relations theorists do raise
questions about the conception of reason which informs postmodern
theorizing. Let us take, for example, Ashley's affirmation that
Poststructuralism [postmodernism] cannot claim to offer an alter-
native position or perspective, because there is no alternative ground
upon which it might be established."

In denying the existence of objective grounds on which to privilege

one perspective over another, Ashley is clearly breaking with the
positivist-empiricist stance of 'commensurable and therefore compar-
able'. However, in twinning the rejection of foundational knowledge
with the denial of the possibility of offering a reasoned defence of one
politico-theoretical alternative over another, Ashley's affirmation
remains captive to the logic of the 'Cartesian anxiety'. As such,
postmodern International Relations would seem to offer no real
challenge to positivism's limiting of reason to episteme.
Similarly, Rengger's critique of the critical conception of Interna-
tional Relations theory inspired by Cox, as presented by Mark
Hoffman,100 reproduces the terms of the 'Cartesian anxiety' in fairly
standard terms. Rengger faults 'Coxian Critical Theory' for its explicit
call for the creation of alternative orders better suited to promoting
human welfare. The problem with such a call, he argues, is that it
flies in the face of the 'thesis of radical value incommensurability' as
developed in the works of postmodernists such as Foucault and
Rorty.101 His conclusion is not an unfamiliar one: critical theory's
desire to mount a reasoned defence of an alternative order is proof
that it remains 'foundationalist',102 since it is only by achieving the
'view from nowhere'103 that rational judgments about the incommen-
surable are possible.
It is true, of course, that foundationalist elements are identifiable in
the work of individual critical International Relations theorists. 104 Yet
it must also be recognized that in terms of reflexivity, Rengger's
critique entails some rather problematic formulations of its own -
particularly as regards his equating of incommensurability with
incomparability, and his limiting of reason to episteme. As has already
been noted, such formulations are quite consistent with positivist

63
The restructuring of International Relations theory

conceptions of reason, and, consequently, hardly compatible with a

reflexive orientation.
It could, of course, be countered that these interventions by Ashley
and Rengger are unrepresentative of postmodern International Rela-
tions more generally; alternatively, it might be suggested that this
discussion simply misunderstands their arguments and the postmo-
dern assumptions that inform them. Even so, Jay's critique of Foucault
applies equally in this case. In the absence of a sustained effort by
postmodern International Relations theorists to elucidate conceptions
of reason and of reasoned criticism which would allow us to
discriminate between the positive as well as the negative dimensions
of rationality, it will remain difficult to counter the suspicion that
postmodernist International Relations is better suited to undermining
the role of reason in toto than to expanding the notion of reason
beyond the confines of positivist episteme in a way consistent with
reflexivity.
The final tradition to be considered is that of feminist International
Relations theory. Here again, it can be argued that the contribution of
feminist International Relations in terms of reflexivity is mixed. The
main impediment to reflexivity within feminist International Relations
is the presence of research agendas which are very much in keeping
with the positivist logic of investigation. Termed 'feminist empiri-
cism',105 this orientation accepts the positivist assumption of the
separation of subject and object/knower and known, and argues that
'sexism and androcentrism are identifiable biases of individual
knowers that can be eliminated by stricter application of existing
methodological norms of scientific and philosophical inquiry'. 106
On the plus side, however, is the growing number of feminist
theorists who are quite explicit in their rejection of the positivist tenet
of 'truth as correspondence'. Notwithstanding the acceptance of
positivist strictures by some feminists, Peterson argues convincingly
that it has been one of the central contributions of feminist theory to
problematize positivist notions of knowledge creation and validation.
This strand of 'post-positivist' feminist International Relations advo-
cates a theoretical self-consciousness involving the
rejection of transcendental (decontextualized) criteria for assessing
epistemological, ontological and/or normative claims and therefore
the necessity of taking responsibility for the world(s) we make -
including the criteria we construct for assessing epistemological,
ontological, and normative claims.107

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 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

Like others who have rejected the regulative ideal of 'truth as

correspondence', post-positivist feminists theorize 'the interdepen-
dence of categories and frameworks' in their efforts to 'expose the
gender politics of categorizing practices'.108 Equally significant in
terms of reflexivity, however, is the recognition by feminist scholars
that an advocacy of 'post-positivism' is not to be equated with the
notion that there exists no possibility for a reasoned assessment of
incommensurable frameworks.
In this regard it is worth noting recent interventions by post-
positivist feminists on the question of which of the possible non-
positivist epistemological orientations - 'feminist standpoint', 'fem-
inist postmodernism', and 'critical feminism' - is best suited to the
project of overcoming 'International Relations of gender inequality'. 109
It is significant that these interventions have been carried out without
either recourse to positivist arguments about which approach better
'fits the facts' or by abandoning the issue of paradigm choice to the
a(nti-)rational realm. Rather, post-positivist feminist International
Relations theorists have endeavoured to draw out the politico-
normative content of contending perspectives and frameworks -
particularly in relation to the issue of whom theorizing is for - and
have made that content a central focus in assessing the merits of
contending epistemological orientations.
Runyan and Peterson's treatment of 'feminist standpoint' epis-
temologies is exemplary, and very much in keeping with a reflexive
orientation's attentiveness to the politico-normative content of com-
peting paradigms. Feminist standpoint epistemologies, typically
associated with radical, cultural and socialist feminists, are grounded
in 'historical materialism's insight that social being determines
consciousness' and

reject the notion of an 'unmediated truth', arguing that knowledge is

always mediated by a host of factors related to an individual's
particular position in a determinate sociopolitical formation at a
specific point in history ... they argue that while certain social
positions (the oppressor's) produce distorted ideological views of
reality, other social positions (the oppressed's) can pierce ideological
obfuscations.110

In Runyan and Peterson's view, what makes the standpoint solution

attractive in the search for a systematized post-positivist epistemolo-
gical framework is that it

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

provides a basis for a feminist critique of androcentrism that feminist

empiricism ends up forfeiting by its marriage to liberal positivism ...
it offers an account of an 'alternative' and valorized gynocentric
reality that seeks to significantly alter and, indeed, eradicate
oppressive power relations at all levels in the world.111
They are equally concerned with feminist standpoint's politico-
normative liabilities, however:
What is particularly troubling about the standpoint 'solution' ... is
its tendency toward a dualistic treatment of gender, a monistic view
of women, and an unsubstantiated faith in women's access to higher
truth. In its quite justifiable urgency to undermine patriarchal
discourse and practices, standpoint theory ... tends to reproduce
such gendered dichotomies as masculine-feminine, public-private,
reason-emotion, and violence-pacifism even as it seeks to valorize
the 'feminine' side of these dualisms. Moreover, it reduces women to
a unitary concept of 'woman' or 'the feminine' to promulgate a
feminist perspective to undergird a unified politics of sisterhood.
Too often, however, the feminist perspective elaborated by some
standpoint theories is based on the experience of largely Western,
white, middle-class women.112
A preferable alternative, they argue, is that of 'feminist postmo-
dernism' - an orientation which avoids feminist standpoint's tendency
to 'universalize' a 'particular' understanding of feminism by stressing
that
the claims of every knower reflect a particular perspective shaped by
social, cultural, political and personal factors and that the perspective
of each knower contains blind spots, tacit presuppositions, and
prejudgments of which the individual is unaware.113
One does not have to accept Runyan and Peterson's conclusions
regarding the merits of postmodernism (and it should be clear from
the critique of postmodernism offered above that the author has
strong reservations in this regard) to recognize the degree to which
they conform to a reflexive orientation. Not only is truth as
correspondence not the deciding criterion, but reasoned arguments
about the advantages and liabilities entailed by the politico-normative
content of contending epistemological frameworks are central.
Nor is their intervention the only example of reflexivity in feminist
theorizing. A recent response to and critique of Runyan and
Peterson's endorsement of feminist postmodernism by Marysia
Zalewski focuses on the liabilities of postmodernism in terms of the

66
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

requirements of an emancipatory feminist critique and practice. Of

particular concern, argues Zalewski, is postmodernism's 'tendency to
lead towards nihilism', and its 'distaste for subject-centred enquiry
and subject-based politics' which 'propels postmodernism into
gender blindness'.114 As an alternative, she suggests, following
Sandra Whitworth,115 that Critical Theory may be more in harmony
- politically as well as theoretically - with the aims of an
emancipatory feminism.116
Finally, Christine Sylvester, after reviewing the liabilities of both
'feminist standpoint' and 'feminist postmodernism', advocates an
approach she terms 'postmodern feminism'.117 This approach is
marked by a method of 'empathetic cooperation', and represents a
combination of the strengths of 'feminist standpoint effort to interpret
the subject women, and the postmodernist effort to examine how
specific subjects came to be (or not) and what they have to say'. 118
While no simple panacea, argues Sylvester, postmodern feminism and
its corresponding 'socialist feminist' practice is oriented toward a

radically empathetic conversational politics that helps us to learn the

strengths and limitations of our inherited identity categories and to
decide our identities, theories, politics, and daily concerns rather
than to continue to derive them from, or reject them out of hand
because they come from, established authority sources.119

Whether Sylvester's 'postmodern feminism' represents the best

hope for resolving the tension l)etween articulating women's voices
and deconstructing gender'120 is, of course, open to question.
Whitworth has countered that while the political connections which
Sylvester draws between feminist empiricism and liberal feminist
politics or feminist standpoint and radical feminist politics may be
clear, those she draws between postmodern feminism and social
feminist politics are rather problematic. It is, notes Whitworth,
'precisely the critique rendered by socialist feminists against post-
modernism that it lacks a clear and decisive politics of any sort'. 121
Two points can be made in light of this review of feminist
interventions on epistemological questions. First, the diversity of
positions stands as a clear refutation of any simplistic notion that
there exists a single, unambiguous 'feminist' position on the study of
world politics. Just as importantly, however, the commonality of
these interventions is extremely relevant in terms of the issue of
reflexivity. For what is significant about Zalewski's, Sylvester's, and

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

Whitworth's interventions is that they, like those of Runyan and

Peterson, evidence a strong concern with the identification and
reasoned assessment of the politico-normative content of competing
(meta-)theoretical frameworks. In sum, post-positivist feminist Inter-
national Relations theorists are offering some of the most striking
evidence for the growth of reflexivity in the discipline to date.

Conclusion
It may be useful to conclude by reflecting on some of the
implications of a fully reflexive orientation for the members of the
International Relations scholarly community on a personal, self-
definitional level. As was noted, a reflexive orientation leads us to
view rival paradigms as incommensurable 'coping vocabularies'
linked to contending social agendas and political projects. It should
also be noted that recognizing such a link greatly facilitates
rationally comparing incommensurable paradigms. Simply put, once
the link between 'coping vocabulary' and political project is recog-
nized, the question of 'which paradigm is superior?' can be restated
as 'which general social agenda/concrete political project is most
appropriate to the global polis?'; the question of 'what is reliable
knowledge?' can be reformulated as 'how should we live?'.
This recognition is imperative in the discipline of International
Relations. Given that paradigms validate themselves in terms of both
social actors and specific purposes, the question of social identity and
political purpose can no longer be avoided by those who comprise
the community of International Relations scholars. For if it is true that
at the level of scholarship, '[paradigms] compete by virtue of the
accounts they provide in explaining what we as scholars ... define as
central to our purpose, enquiry, ideology'?22 then reflexivity directs us to
a broader debate about which 'purposes', which 'enquiries' and
which 'ideologies' merit the support and energy of International
Relations scholars. If it is true that, to paraphrase Fichte, 'the sort of
comprehensive theory one chooses depends on what sort of person
one is',123 then the question of the kind of people International
Relations scholars are cannot be avoided.
To adopt a fully reflexive stance is to recognize that participating in
the 'normal science' tradition of any paradigm means - consciously or
not - lending support to a specific political project; it is to accept that

68
 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

to engage in paradigm-directed puzzle-solving is - intentionally or

not - to direct one's energies to the establishment and maintenance of
a specific global order. As a consequence, it becomes vital to engage
in a critical examination of the relative merits of rival political projects
and of contending global orders. For once it is recognized that the
knowledge-defining standards that we adopt are not neutral, but
have an undeniable politico-normative content, then it becomes
imperative that we make a reasoned assessment of that content a
central component of our deliberations about international politics.
Of course, the notion that all scholarship has a politico-normative
content may well provoke significant resistance in the members of a
community who have laboured hard to achieve for the discipline the
title of 'science'. Such a notion runs counter to the self-image of
impartial, unbiased observer of international reality. Indeed, it may
even prompt the charge that reflexivity is but a veiled attempt to
'politicize the discipline'. If it does so, this would indeed be ironic.
The point of reflexivity is, after all, that the study of world politics
always has been informed by political agendas, and that it is time that
the content of those agendas be brought out into the open and
critically assessed.
To conclude, it has been argued in this chapter that the questions
central to theoretical reflexivity have begun to make their appear-
ance in contemporary theorizing about international politics, albeit
at the margins of the discipline. This appearance, moveover, can be
understood as signalling a potentially far-reaching restructuring of
International Relations theory consistent with the emancipation-
oriented tradition of critique.
Yet the restructuring of International Relations theory in a critical
fashion is not restricted to the growth of theoretical reflexivity alone.
It is to a second body of evidence which is indicative of a
fundamental restructuring of International Relations theory - one
which concerns a recognition of the central role of human conscious-
ness in global politics - that we now turn.

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 Human consciousness and
International Relations theory

The observer ... is able, by virtue of his own rationality, to retrace

the steps which politics has taken in the past and to anticipate those
it will take in the future. Knowing that behind these steps there is a
rational mind like his own, the observer can put himself into the
place of the statesman - past, present, or future - and think as he
has thought or is likely to think. Hans J. Morgenthau1

But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity,

so remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing
light of a truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society
has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore
to be found within the modifications of our own human mind.
Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers ...
should have neglected the study of the world of nations, or civil
world, which, since men had made it, men could come to know.
Giambattista Vico2

Introduction
The rise of theoretical reflexivity at the margins of the discipline is not
the only evidence for a restructuring of International Relations theory.
In this chapter, it will be argued that a second defining characteristic
of emancipatory theory derived from the Enlightenment tradition of
'critique' - an emphasis on the fundamental role of human conscious-
ness - is also found in contemporary International Relations theory. If
true, this would lend further support to the argument that there is
currently a process of (meta-)theoretical 'restructuring' occurring in
the discipline.

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 Human consciousness and International Relations theory

To that end, the present chapter will proceed as follows. In the first
part of this chapter, the conventional conceptualization of human
consciousness and its place within mainstream social science will be
examined. It will be argued that the predominance of the positivist
approach to the study of human society in mainstream social science
- and in particular, the positivist tenet of the methodological unity of
science - has impeded the recognition of the constitutive and
transformative role of human consciousness in social and political life.
It will also be argued, however, that recent developments within
social and political theory - in particular, the rise of 'interpretive
social science' - are challenging the positivist tenet of the methodolo-
gical unity of science, thereby creating a space for the full recognition
of the non-reductive power of human consciousness.
Then, in the second part of this chapter, the discipline of Interna-
tional Relations will be examined for parallels to social and political
theory. Specifically, the conventional conceptualizations of human
consciousness associated with positivist International Relations theory,
as well as the rejection of those conceptualizations with the rise of
'interpretive' International Relations theory, will be reviewed. The
impact that interpretive approaches, derived from the work of social
and political theorists, are having on the (re-)conceptualization of the
role of human consciousness within the discipline of International
Relations will be presented as further evidence of the restructuring of
International Relations theory in a critical, emancipatory direction.

Human consciousness in social science

In order to understand the conventional form that conceptualizations
of human consciousness have taken within mainstream, positivist-
dominated social science, it is important to review the major
components and implications of the positivist tenet of the methodolo-
gical unity of science. As was noted in chapter two, according to this
tenet the research methodology developed for the study of the natural
world is equally suited to the study of the social world.
It will also be remembered from our discussion of the positivist
tradition in chapter two that underlying the tenet of the methodolo-
gical unity of science is the assumption of 'naturalism'. That is, it is
assumed that there is no fundamental difference between the social
world and the natural world; the social world contains the same kind

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of regularities independent of time and place - in this case,

'behavioural regularities' - as exist in the natural world. It is for this
reason that the approach developed to conduct a scientific analysis of
the natural world - an approach designed to identify regularities and
subsume them under general covering laws - is held to be equally
appropriate to the social world. It is this underlying assumption of
naturalism which accounts for the way human consciousness has
been conceptualized and treated within mainstream social science.
At the same time, it is important to note that the positivist
conceptualization of human consciousness has not gone unchallenged
in contemporary social and political theory. Specifically, theorists
concerned with developing and promoting an 'interpretive' approach
to the study of society3 have argued that the positivist conceptualiza-
tion of human consciousness has served to obscure and misrepresent
the fundamental role of human consciousness in social life.
I will begin by briefly reviewing two distinct ways that human
consciousness has been conceptualized within positivist social science.
I will then proceed to a review of the criticisms of positivism
developed by 'interpretive' theorists. A review of the alternative
formulation proposed by these theorists - and the significance of their
formulation in terms of the emancipation-oriented tradition of critique
- will conclude the first part of this chapter.

Positivist formulations of human consciousness

Human consciousness has been conceptualized in two distinct ways
in positivist social science. The distinction between the two
approaches derives from the different answers positivist social
scientists have given to the question of the significance of what
Weber called 'subjective meanings' - the meanings which human
subjects attach to behaviour - and the value of trying to apprehend
those meanings in terms of the goal of 'causal adequacy'.
Depending on the answer given to this question, positivist social
scientists fall into one of two camps: (i) 'strict behaviouralism' and
(ii) 'meaning-oriented behaviouralism'.
'Strict behaviouralism' is the original version of the behaviouralist
movement in social science, a movement representing perhaps the
most concerted effort to apply the positivist tenet of the methodolo-
gical unity of science to the social world. 'Strict behaviouralism'

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 Human consciousness and International Relations theory

takes overt behaviour as the proper object of study. Considerable

energy is directed toward achieving standardization in the measure-
ment of human behaviour, and especially in operationalizing
theoretical concepts in terms of observed behaviour. The ultimate
goal, of course, is the subsumption of regularities in overt behaviour
under general covering laws, themselves derived axiomatically from
basic assumptions.
What then of human consciousness? What of the insistence, found
in the work of Weber, for example, on the importance of the
'subjective meanings' that human beings attach to their behaviour,
and of the Verstehen tradition in social science which orients itself
toward understanding those 'subjective meanings'?
In general, strict behaviouralists hold that the understanding of
'subjective meanings' is not only not sufficient for the validation of
scientific knowledge about the social world, but that 'subjective mean-
ings' are in no way necessary to the development of scientific accounts
of social life. The reasoning behind this position is simple. Scientific
knowledge of the social world - positivistically conceived - must be
based on empirical evidence only (i.e., publicly observable objects or
events - a category into which behaviour would fall). Since the domain
of human consciousness is not amenable to such observation - since
the 'subjective meanings' attached to social phenomena do not exist in
the public realm (but rather in the private consciousness of the
individual(s) concerned) - it can have no place either as a component
of reliable knowledge of the social world, or as a means of validating
such knowledge (i.e., no place in the 'context of justification').
This is not to say, however, that 'strict behaviouralists' see
absolutely no role for Verstehen in scientific investigation. Understood
as a technique oriented toward 'empathetic identification' - putting
oneself in the subject's shoes - Verstehen is regarded by strict
behaviouralists as a potentially fruitful method for generating hypoth-
eses relating external stimulus to behavioural response; a useful tool
in the 'context of discovery'. In no sense, however, does the employ-
ment of interpretive techniques (i.e., Verstehen) affect the logic of social
inquiry, or serve to demarcate it from the logic of the natural
sciences.4
While all positivistically minded social scientists accept, by defini-
tion, that the 'understanding' of 'subjective meanings' has no place in
the context of validation, not all would be comfortable with the
notion that 'subjective meanings' themselves have no place in the

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scientific explanations of 'social action'. Indeed, the adherents of a

second positivist formulation of human consciousness - termed here,
'meaning-oriented behaviouralism' - insist that the integration of
'subjective meanings' into social scientific accounts of human beha-
viour is necessary for the achievement of 'causal adequacy'.
This of course raises the question of how 'subjective meanings' are
to be integrated into a scientific (i.e., positivistic) logic of investigation
which stresses publicly verifiable standards of proof. Specifically, how
is the social scientist to determine the exact nature of the preferences/
motives /goals of the subject(s) under study?
All positivist-inspired social scientists - including those committed
to integrating 'subjective meanings' into causal analysis of 'social
action' - share unease with regard to variables not open to public
scrutiny. As a consequence, 'meaning-oriented behaviouralists' have
expended considerable effort to develop research techniques - content
analysis, interviews, surveys, questionnaires - which are designed
both to bring 'subjective meanings' (preferences/motives/goals) into
the public realm and to facilitate standardized measurements of them.
Like 'strict behaviouralists', 'meaning-oriented behaviouralists' would
no doubt acknowledge that the methods of Verstehen ('sympathetic
imagination' /'empathetic identification') have proved useful in the
'context of discovery'.5 The final goal, however, remains the bringing
of 'subjective meanings' attached to social action into the public
realm, so that they can be treated as 'intervening variables' between
the 'stimulus' (the action context) and the 'response' (behaviour).
By correlating particular beliefs/motivations/values with a parti-
cular behaviour in a particular context, it becomes possible to 'derive
empirically testable hypotheses about uniformities of behaviour under
specific conditions'.6 In this way, argue 'meaning-oriented behaviour-
alists', the importance of 'subjective meanings' in 'social action' can be
accommodated without violating the positivist standard of 'causal
adequacy'.7
The suitability of 'meaning-oriented behaviouralism' in terms of the
goal of positivist social science is clear. By integrating 'subjective
meaning' into regularities linking context and behaviour, and by
devising ways of ensuring that those variables remain open to public
scrutiny by the members of the scientific community, this approach
conforms completely to the positivist tenet of the methodological
unity of science. In short, while the 'subjective meanings' attached to
behaviour would seem to require a modicum of innovation at the

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 Human consciousness and International Relations theory

level of research techniques, 'meaning-oriented behaviouralists' - like

'strict behaviouralists' - do not see the 'meaningfulness' of social life
as necessitating any qualitative change at the level of the positivistic
logic of investigation.
It is this view - and the assumption of naturalism of which it is the
expression - that is the prime focus of criticism of those wishing to
promote an alternative to positivist approaches to the study of social
life. It is to their criticisms - and their alternative formulation - that
we now turn.

Beyond positivism: human consciousness as constitutive

of social life
We have seen in our brief review of conventional positivist-inspired
treatments of human consciousness in the social sciences that
consciousness has been conceptualized as 'subjective meaning' which
either has relevance only in heuristic terms in the 'context of
discovery' or which is integrated into scientific investigation as an
'intervening variable' between context and behaviour. In either case,
the dimension of human consciousness in social life does not pose
any challenge to the assumption of naturalism which underlies the
positivist tenet of the methodological unity of science. That is, human
consciousness is not seen to raise any challenge to the idea that
regularities independent of time and place exist in the social world in
the same way as they do in the natural world.
It is the positivist accommodation of human consciousness to the
assumption of naturalism that theorists advocating an interpretive
approach to the study of society reject. It is important to be clear about
the exact nature of the challenge posed by the interpretive approach to
positivist social science. Interpretive theorists do not deny that
behavioural regularities exist in the social world. Nor do they contest
that individuals attach 'subjective meanings' to their behaviour.
What interpretive theorists contest is that the behavioural regula-
rities which can be observed in the social world exist independently
of time and place as they do in the natural world. What they also
contest is that the notion of 'subjective meanings' attached by
individuals to their behaviour is an adequate conceptualization of
human consciousness in social life.
Interpretive theorists start with the understanding that human

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

beings are 'fundamentally self-interpreting and self-defining'.8 That is,

human beings live in a world of cultural meaning which has its
source in their own interpretations of that world; human beings act in
the context of a 'web of meaning' - a web that they themselves have
spun. As a consequence, the social world - in contrast to the natural
world - 'is itself partly constituted by self-interpretation'.9
The fundamental dimension of self-interpretation in the social world
has important consequences for social science. As a consequence, argue
interpretive theorists, the objects of study of social science must include
the interpretations and definitions of the human subjects whose
interaction makes up the social world. Social science, then, is inter-
pretive in a double sense. On one level, it is, like any knowledge-
generating activity, an interpretive enterprise.10 What distinguishes it
from interpretations of the natural world, however, is that an important
part of the subject matter of social science is itself an interpretation - the
self-interpretation of the human beings under study. 11
The 'web of meaning' spun by human beings is fundamental to the
nature of their behaviour. For it is the 'web of meaning' which makes
the behavioural regularities observed in the social world what they
are - that is, human practices - and distinguishes them from the non-
human regularities observed in the natural world.12 And it is for this
reason, affirm interpretive theorists, that the practices in which
human beings are engaged cannot be studied in isolation from the
'web of meaning', which is, in a fundamental sense, constitutive of
those practices, even as it is embedded in and instantiated through
those same practices.
It is clear then, that while interpretive theorists may agree that
behavioural regularities are an identifiable feature of the social world,
they would nonetheless oppose 'strict behaviouralism's' exclusive
focus on actions 'that are supposedly brute-data-identifiable'13 to the
neglect of the 'web of meaning' constitutive of and embedded in
those actions. But what of the alternative offered by 'meaning-
oriented behaviouralists'? Does not their approach, which renders the
concern with 'meaning' compatible with the positivist goal of
subsuming behavioural regularities under general covering laws,
meet the concerns of interpretive theorists?
Interpretive theorists deny that it does. The approach of 'meaning-
oriented behaviouralists' is not satisfactory, argue interpretive theor-
ists, because of the way it conceptualizes both the 'web of meaning'
and the relationship of the 'web of meaning' to human practices.

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 Human consciousness and International Relations theory

Specifically, 'meaning-oriented behaviouralism' conceives of the 'web

of meaning' as the sum-total of the 'subjective meanings' of the
individuals involved. And it conceives of the relationship between the
'web of meaning' and human practices as a correspondence of specific
'subjective meanings' to specific actions - a correspondence which
allows for the establishment of verifiable correlations compatible with
causal explanation.
Once again, it must be stressed that an interpretive approach has
no more difficulty accepting that individuals may attach 'subjective
meaning' to their actions than it does acknowledging that behavioural
regularities may be identified in the social world. What an interpre-
tive approach contests, however, is: (i) that the 'web of meaning'
should be understood as the sum-total of individual 'subjective
meanings', and (ii) that the relationship between the 'web of meaning'
and human practice is one of correspondence.
Interpretive theorists, in contrast to 'meaning-oriented behavioural-
ists', conceive of the 'web of meaning' not as a sum-total of 'subjective
meanings' which grow out of individual self-interpretations and self-
definitions, but rather as being comprised of 'intersubjective mean-
ings' which are the product of the collective self-interpretations and
self-definitions of human communities. These 'intersubjective mean-
ings', moreover, are not the same as the positivist notion of a
'consensus' about beliefs or values. As Charles Taylor notes,
When we speak of consensus we speak of beliefs and values which
could be the property of a single person, or many, or all; but
intersubjective meanings could not be the property of a single person
because they are rooted in social practice.14
Furthermore, the relationship between the 'intersubjective mean-
ings' which make up the 'web of meaning' and human practices is
not one of correlation, where 'intersubjective meanings' serve as an
'intervening variable' in a causal sequence. Rather, the 'intersubjective
meanings' are constitutive of those practices.
There is no question that positivist-dominated social science has
great difficulty in coping with this notion of 'intersubjective mean-
ings'. As Taylor has noted in a discussion of positivist political
science,
Intersubjective meanings, ways of experiencing in society which are
expressed in the language and descriptions constitutive of institu-
tions and practices, do not fit into the categorical grid of mainstream

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The restructuring of International Relations theory
political science. This allows only for an intersubjective reality that is
brute-data-identifiable. But social practices and institutions that are
partly constituted by certain ways of talking about them are not so
identifiable. We have to understand the language, the underlying
meanings that constitute them.15
This is not to deny that 'subjective meanings' can be placed in a
relationship of covariance with specific actions. Notes Taylor,
We can allow, once we accept a certain set of institutions or practices
as our starting point and not as objects of further questioning, that
we can easily take as brute data that certain acts are judged to take
place or certain states judged to hold within a semantic field of these
practices - for instance, that someone has voted Liberal or signed the
petition. We can then go on to correlate certain subjective meanings
- beliefs, attitudes, and so forth - with this behaviour or its lack.16
But this approach has serious - and from the perspective of
interpretive theorists, pernicious - consequences for social science.
Continues Taylor,
But this means that we give up trying to define further just what
these practices and institutions are, what the meanings are which
they require and hence sustain. For these meanings do not fit into
the grid; they are not subjective beliefs or values, but are constitutive
of social reality. In order to get at them we have to drop the basic
premise that social reality is made up of brute data alone ... We
have to admit that intersubjective social reality has to be partly
defined in terms of meanings; that meanings as subjective are not
just in causal interaction with a social reality made up of brute data,
but that as intersubjective they are constitutive of this reality.17
An example provided by Taylor may serve to illustrate the points
being made here. Let us take the case of negotiation, a form of social
interaction familiar to the inhabitants of liberal, capitalist societies.
First, it is quite plausible that behavioural regularities might exist in
negotiation settings, and that furthermore, 'strict behaviouralists'
might succeed in identifying those regularities. It is also true, virtually
by definition, that different parties in a negotiation setting will have
different subjective motivations, goals, and values, and that 'meaning-
oriented behaviouralists' might succeed both in identifying those
'subjective meanings' and in establishing significant correlations
between them and specific actions (e.g., negotiating positions).
What interpretive theorists stress, however, is that those beha-
vioural regularities and those diverging 'subjective meanings' are

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 Human consciousness and International Relations theory

dependent upon the existence of negotiation as a social practice for

their very possibility. Moreover, negotiation, as a social practice, is
itself constituted by a specific set of 'intersubjective meanings'.
The actors may have all sorts of beliefs and attitudes which may be
rightly thought of as their individual beliefs and attitudes, even if
others share them; they may subscribe to certain policy goals or
certain forms of theory about the polity, or feel resentment at certain
things, and so on. They bring these with them into their negotiations,
and strive to satisfy them. But what they do not bring into the
negotiation is the set of ideas and norms constitutive of negotiations
themselves. These must be the common property of the society
before there can be any question of anyone entering into negotiation
or not. Hence they are not subjective meanings, the property of one
or some individuals, but rather intersubjective meanings, which are
constitutive of the social matrix in which individuals find themselves
and act.18
The 'intersubjective meanings' which constitute the practice of
negotiation are very specific. Notes Taylor:
Our whole notion of negotiation is bound up ... with the distinct
identity and autonomy of the parties, with the willed nature of their
relations; it is a very contractual notion.19
These particular 'intersubjective meanings', moreover, are them-
selves context specific. As Taylor notes, the set of 'intersubjective
meanings' which constitute the practice of negotiation and bargaining,
are not present in every society:
But other societies have no such conception. It is reported about the
traditional Japanese village that the foundation of its social life was a
powerful form of consensus, which put a high premium on
unanimous decision. Such a consensus would be considered shat-
tered if two clearly articulated parties were to separate out, pursuing
opposed aims and attempting either to vote down the opposition or
to push it into a settlement on the most favourable possible terms for
themselves. Discussion there must be, and some kind of adjustment
of differences. But our idea of bargaining, with the assumption of
distinct autonomous parties in willed relationship, has no place
there.20
As a consequence, the naturalist assumption that regularities in the
social world - conceived independently of or in causal relation to
individual 'subjective meanings' - are, like regularities in the natural
world, independent of time and place, must be rejected. By extension,

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

the positivist tenet of the methodological unity of science can no

longer be sustained.
It is important to be clear about the argument that is being
advanced by the interpretive theorists. Two points, in particular,
merit stressing. First, while it is true that an interpretive approach
stands opposed to positivism's 'mechanical materialism', it would be
a mistake to conclude that what it proposes as an alternative is a
return to a radical form of idealism (i.e., that the world is a creation of
mind). It would be a mistake, first, because interpretive theorists have
consistently argued that just as human practices are always consti-
tuted by a 'web of meaning', so also a 'web of meaning' is always
embedded in, and instantiated through, concrete human practices.
Thus, just as practices cannot be understood apart from the 'web of
meaning' which constitutes them, neither can a 'web of meaning' be
understood in isolation from the practices in which it is embedded.
Furthermore, an interpretive approach does not imply idealism
because such an approach recognizes that the process of self-reflection
and self-interpretation always takes place in relation to a concrete
historical context (material and social).
The second point which needs to be stressed - and at somewhat
greater length than the first - is that an interpretive approach should
not be equated with what might be termed the 'hermeneutics of
recovery'. That is, it should not be understood as advocating that: (i)
the true subject matter of social science is individual consciousness;
(ii) the appropriate methodology for the researcher is one of empathy;
and (iii) the appropriate goal of social science is one of 'recovering'
the original 'intentions' of human agents. The interpretive approach
'emphatically refutes the claim that one can somehow reduce the
complex world of signification to the products of self-consciousness in
the traditional philosophical sense'.21 As noted above, interpretive
theorists do not argue that the object of investigation is individual
consciousness (subjective meaning), but rather the 'web of meaning' -
'the web of language, symbol, and institutions that constitutes
signification'22 - comprised of 'intersubjective meanings'. As a
consequence, 'intentionality' - like human behaviour itself - is under-
stood to be 'dependent on the prior existence of the shared world of
meaning within which the subjects of human discourse constitute
themselves'.23
As a consequence, 'empathy' is not seen as an appropriate
methodology for an interpretive approach. For empathy is a metho-

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 Human consciousness and International Relations theory

dology oriented to gaining access to private consciousness. But as

noted above, the 'intersubjective meanings' are not confined to the
realm of private consciousness. They are embedded in and instan-
tiated through social practices which are part of the public realm.
Note Rabinow and Sullivan:

Meanings or norms 'are not just in the minds of the actors but are
out there in the practices themselves; practices which cannot be
conceived as a set of individual actions, but which are essentially
modes of social relations, or mutual action/ These meanings are
intersubjective; they are not reducible to individual subjective
psychological states, beliefs, or propositions. They are neither
subjective nor objective but what lies behind both.24

Instead of empathy, the methodology appropriate to an interpretive

approach can be described as the 'hermeneutic circle'. By 'herme-
neutic circle' is meant that the social scientist endeavours to 'make
sense' of the social world by demonstrating that 'there is a coherence
between the actions of the agent and the meaning of his situation for
him'.25 'Making sense' of the social world, then, involves a process of
'testing' the adequacy of a proffered 'reading', that is (i) of the 'web of
meaning' in terms of the concrete social practices in which it is
embedded, and (ii) of the 'coherence' of observed social practices in
terms of the 'web of meaning' which constitutes those practices.26 As
a consequence, the interpretation of a given 'web of meaning'/social
practice can never be tested against an objective standard. Rather, the
testing and refinement of particular interpretations is always done in
terms of other interpretations. It is never possible to escape the
'hermeneutic circle'.27
And finally, to conclude this second point, it would not be correct
to equate an interpretive approach with a 'hermeneutics of recovery'
because the objective of social science for those committed to an
interpretive approach is not limited to 'recovering' the self-interpreta-
tions and self-definitions which constitute social practices.28 Because
social practices are constituted by 'intersubjective meanings', 'reco-
vering' those meanings - by means of the 'hermeneutic circle' - is an
important step.29 Yet as is apparent from Taylor's statements that
'social reality has to be partly defined in terms of meanings', 30 that
'that of which we are trying to find the coherence is itself partly
constituted by self-interpretation',31 an interpretive approach is quite

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capable of accepting that the subject matter of social science extends

beyond 'webs of meaning'.
Rather, the objective of an interpretive approach is to re-express the
relationship between 'intersubjective meanings', which derive from
self-interpretation and self-definition, and the social practices in which
they are embedded and which they constitute - in short, the 'form of
life' - in order to exercise critical judgment.32 In short, the goal of an
interpretive social science is not to restate the understanding of the
human agents involved, but to 'attain[] greater clarity than the
immediate understanding of agent or observer'.33
We have seen that the notion of 'intersubjective meanings' asso-
ciated with an interpretive approach to the study of the social world
offers an alternative to the positivist conceptualization of 'meaning' in
social life as either an 'heuristic aid' or as 'subjective meanings' which
can be correlated to specific actions. We have also seen how the
alternative offered by an interpretive approach challenges the positi-
vist tenet of the methodological unity of science by undermining the
assumption of naturalism. In this way, interpretive social science
opens a space for conceiving of human consciousness as both
constitutive and potentially transformative of the social world - a
development very much in keeping with the emancipation-oriented
tradition of critical theory.
The question remains, however, to what extent, if any, the insights
of interpretive social theory are being applied in the discipline of
International Relations. Specifically, to what extent, if any, is an
alternative to positivist conceptualizations of human consciousness in
International Relations theory being offered? To what extent is a
parallel space for conceiving of human consciousness as both
constitutive and potentially transformative of international politics
being created? It is to these questions that we now turn.

International Relations theory and the question of

human consciousness
Positivist formulations of human consciousness in
International Relations theory
On the basis of our review of positivist formulations in the first part
of this chapter, it is now possible to place positivist formulations of
human consciousness in International Relations theory in a larger

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meta-theoretical context. We shall begin with a review of the

methodological pronouncements of an individual who, it can be
argued, serves as a model for positivist theorists working within the
discipline of International Relations. Specifically, we will begin with a
look at the work of Hans Morgenthau.
On consecutive pages of the classic Politics Among Nations, Mor-
genthau makes the following two statements:
Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is
governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature ...
The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences,
men will challenge them only at the risk of failure.34

For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them

meaning through reason ... To give meaning to the factual raw
material of foreign policy, we must approach political reality with a
kind of rational outline, a map that suggests to us the possible
meanings of foreign policy. In other words, we put ourselves in the
position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign
policy under certain circumstances ... We assume that statesmen
think and act in terms of interest defined as power ... That
assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate ... the steps a
statesman - past, present, or future - has taken or will take on the
political scene. We look over his shoulder when he writes his
dispatches; we listen in on his conversation with other statesmen; we
read and anticipate his very thoughts.35
This raises the question of how one is to understand the relation-
ship between these two statements. One possible response is to follow
Ashley in arguing that Morgenthau's work - and the realist tradition
in general - is marked by 'genuine antinomies', and 'critical
tensions'.36 The root of these 'antinomies/tensions', according to
Ashley, lies in the fact that Morgenthau's work attempts to unite two
distinct and mutually opposed methodological traditions: specifically,
positivism (as expressed in Morgenthau's first statement) and inter-
pretive theory - Verstehen (as expressed in the second). The inter-
pretive tradition is in evidence in Morgenthau's admonition to put
ourselves in the place of the statesman - to adopt 'the historian's pose
peering over the statesman's shoulder, listening in on his conversa-
tions, and anticipating his thoughts'. 37 The positivist approach, on the
other hand, is visible in Morgenthau's affirmations that '[interna-
tional] politics is governed by objective laws' which are 'impervious
to our preferences'.

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

If Ashley is correct, it would seem to pose a major problem in

terms of the coherence of Morgenthau's contribution to the founda-
tions of the discipline. As George has argued, however, there is good
reason to question this interpretation.38 It is important to recognize
that Ashley's identification of antinomies/tensions within Mor-
genthau is dependent on equating an interpretive approach with the
techniques of empathetic identification associated with Verstehen. Yet
as was noted in the first part of this chapter, Verstehen's emphasis on
private, subjective meanings stands in stark contrast to interpretive
social science's concern with public, intersubjective meanings. On the
other hand, positivists have had little difficulty in incorporating
Verstehen into positivist research. Specifically, positivists have re-
mained faithful to the tenet of the methodological unity of science
and the assumption of naturalism by employing Verstehen as a
technique potentially relevant to the context of discovery, and by
subordinating its results to the methods appropriate to the testing of
hypotheses in the context of justification.
In short, it can be argued that the two statements by Morgenthau
noted above are less a sign of antinomies/tensions in his work than
evidence that from Morgenthau onward mainstream International
Relations theorists have accommodated Verstehen techniques to their
positivist-inspired study of world politics in the same way as
mainstream theorists in social science more generally39 - they have
redefined Verstehen as a technique potentially relevant to the context
of discovery and subordinated it to the methods appropriate to the
testing of hypotheses in the context of justification.40
This is not to say that all positivist-minded International Relations
scholars have taken the same stance regarding human consciousness.
For as in the case of positivist social science more generally, it can be
argued that to mainstream International Relations theory's reconcilia-
tion of 'subjective meanings' to the exigencies of the positivist
tradition correspond two distinct positivist formulations in Interna-
tional Relations.
On the one hand one finds those International Relations theorists
who correspond to our discussion of 'strict behaviouralism' in the
first part of this chapter. These scholars followed Morgenthau in
affirming that the central focus of the study of international politics
must be 'the examination of political acts performed'.41 Dominated as
the discipline has been by realist assumptions,42 it comes as no
surprise that the political acts focused upon were performed by states.

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 Human consciousness and International Relations theory

The realist-inspired 'strict behaviouralists' congregated to form one

of the two main approaches to the study of international politics: that
of 'systems theory'. From this perspective, states were treated as
billiard balls, operating in a system.43 Moreover, in keeping with the
general orientation of 'strict behaviouralism', it was assumed that 'the
perceptions of the actors ... [were] essentially irrelevant to the task of
explanation'.44
Others, however, appealed to Morgenthau's (and Weber's) asser-
tions to argue that while the examination of the behavioural facts of
international politics - the 'political acts performed' - was vital, the
'examination of the facts is not enough'. They followed Morgenthau
in affirming that
To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we
must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline, a map
that suggests to us the possible meanings of foreign policy. In other
words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman.45
That is, these theorists - corresponding to the category of 'meaning-
oriented behaviouralists' - affirm that the 'subjective meanings'
attached to 'political acts performed' were a vital component of the
development of scientific explanations of those acts. In the words of
Philip Lawrence, 'In judging and explaining foreign policy decision-
making, the most crucial elements that must be evaluated are
purposes and motives.'46 And once again, reflecting the realist
hegemony in the discipline, the behaviour in question is that of the
leaders of states, while the 'subjective meanings' - the 'purposes and
motives' - to be evaluated are those attached by these state managers
to their actions.
If the 'strict behaviouralists' in the discipline of International
Relations were to be found in the 'systems theorists' camp, 'meaning-
oriented behaviouralists', as suggested by the Lawrence quote above,
tended to gravitate to that of 'foreign policy analysis'. 47 Here the
attempt to determine the 'subjective meanings' attached by state
managers to their actions took a variety of forms employing a wide
range of creative methodological techniques. These ranged from 'the
image',48 to 'belief systems',49 to 'operational codes',50 to 'cognitive
maps',51 to 'lessons of the past',52 to 'Brecher's research design'53 in
the case of form, and included techniques such as 'content analysis'
and questionnaires.54 The underlying commonality which unites these
approaches, however, is adoption of the 'subjectivist' position55 - that

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

is, the concern with identifying the 'subjective meanings' attached to

international behaviour and with bringing those meanings into the
public realm. As with 'meaning-oriented behaviouralism' in general,
the 'subjective meanings' of state managers - their 'perceptions' and
I^eliefs' - were understood as intervening variables - a 'filtering
device'56 - between the empirical reality of the international context
and international behaviour. And in keeping with the positivist tenet
of the methodological unity of science, it was the position of
'meaning-oriented behaviouralists' in the discipline of International
Relations that if the 'perceptions [of state managers] could be studied
and if significant regularities could be found, then here was another
route to [scientific] International Relations theory'.57
As with treatments of human consciousness in positivist social
science in general, then, in positivist International Relations theory the
realm of human consciousness is conceptualized as either an 'heuristic
aid' in the context of discovery, or as a significant 'intervening
variable' which can be correlated to specific behaviour in specific
contexts. What this shows is that positivist International Relations
theorists were just as determined to assimilate human consciousness
to the tenet of the methodological unity of science in accordance with
the assumption of naturalism which underlies it. As a consequence,
positivist International Relations theory - whether 'strict behaviour-
alist' or 'meaning-oriented behaviouralist' - is fundamentally unable
to appreciate the constitutive and potentially transformative nature of
human consciousness in terms of the global order.
There is, however, an alternative formulation of human conscious-
ness in International Relations theory - a formulation which draws
not upon positivism, but upon interpretive social science for its
inspiration - which does not suffer from positivism's limitations. It is
to that alternative formulation that we now turn.

Interpretive approaches to the study of international

world politics
The issue of 'interpretive' approaches to the study of International
Relations has achieved prominence in recent meta-theoretical discus-
sions of the discipline. In his 1988 International Studies Association
presidential address, Robert Keohane noted that the work of inter-
pretive theorists, such as Hayward Alker, Richard Ashley, Friedrich

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 Human consciousness and International Relations theory

Kratochwil, John Ruggie, and Robert Cox, now provides a clear

alternative to the mainstream, positivist-inspired approach to the
study of International Relations in general, and international institu-
tions in particular.58
Given the preceding discussion of the differences between positivist
and interpretive social science, and given the traditional predomi-
nance of positivist research in International Relations, we are now
well placed to understand both the distinctiveness and unorthodox
nature of interpretive approaches to the study of International
Relations. We can, for example, grasp the significance of Keohane's
observation that an interpretive approach to the study of international
institutions is marked by an emphasis on the 'importance of the
'intersubjective meanings' of international institutional activity',59 and
that such an approach 'stresses the impact of human subjectivity and
the embeddedness of contemporary international institutions in pre-
existing practices'.60
Given that attention to the constitutive role of human consciousness
is a defining characteristic of critical theory, the rise of interpretive
approaches would seem a clear indication that International Relations
theory is undergoing a process of restructuring. Here it will be argued
that though such a conclusion is warranted, it must also be
recognized that not all applications of interpretive social science in the
discipline serve emancipatory aims. To make this point, let us turn
our attention to the sub-field of International Organization.
In the 1980s, neorealist-inspired analysis of international organiza-
tion dominated much of the field of International Relations. The
substantive concern of this approach was the institutionalized co-
operative behaviour existing among advanced capitalist states in the
context of the Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO). The
approach featured a focus on the monetary and trade institutions -
the 'regimes' - which regulated that order, where regimes were
defined as
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given
area of International Relations.61
This definition was well-suited to neorealism's self-consciously
positivist orientation. The traditional concern with 'prevailing prac-
tices', 'behaviour', and 'action', lent itself well to analysis according to
the approach of 'strict behaviouralism', while the emphasis on

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

'expectations' and 'beliefs' seemed to leave open the possibility of a

'meaning-oriented behaviouralist' analysis of regimes.62
In time, however, some scholars began to sense the inherent
limitations of the positivist approach to the study of international
institutions. The prime difficulty lay in a disjuncture between
'ontology and epistemology' - that is, between the nature of interna-
tional institutions and the dominant modes of analysis. Specifically, it
was argued by interpretive theorists such as Kratochwil and Ruggie
that difficulties in understanding the workings of regimes - when
they were present and when not, and how they changed over time -
arose because of the incompatibility between on the one hand an
intersubjectively constituted object of study requiring an interpretive
method and study and, on the other, a positivist method of study
premised on the assumption of naturalism.63
Given this analysis of the difficulties in positivist regime analysis,
the solution was clear: the resolution of the problems in the analysis
of regimes, affirmed Kratochwil and Ruggie, 'will require the
incorporation into prevailing approaches of insights and methods
derived from the interpretive sciences'.64 In short, interpretive social
science was seen to offer an important contribution to the resolution
of a number of fundamental anomalies in the neorealist analysis of
regimes.65
Despite their important insights, however, it can be argued that
Kratochwil and Ruggie's discussion of the potential contribution of an
interpretive approach is incomplete. For the contribution of the
approach is, in their view, limited in its scope. Interpretive epistemol-
ogies will not be required, they conclude,
in circumstances that require little interpretation on the part of the
relevant actors - because the environment is placid, because shared
knowledge prevails, or because coercion determines outcomes.66
It is important to stress that in limiting interpretive approaches in
this way, Kratochwil and Ruggie are departing from one of the main
insights of interpretive social science, namely that all social practices -
whether they occur in an environment that is 'placid' or overtly
coercive in nature - are constituted through intersubjective meanings;
that all social activity requires interpretation both by immediate
participants and by those seeking to analyse that activity in a
systematic fashion.67
Indeed, it can be argued that a second contribution of interpretive

88
 Human consciousness and International Relations theory

social science to realist theorizing is exactly this: to re-establish the

fundamental commonality between institutions regulating interaction
in the realm of 'low politics',68 and institutions regulating interaction
in the realm of 'high polities'. And in this regard, it is noteworthy that
one of the most recent and most extensive discussions of interpretive
social science and the study of international politics - Hollis and
Smith's Explaining and Understanding International Relations69 - extends
the purview of interpretive approaches to include the realm of 'high
polities'.
Hollis and Smith draw on Winch's Wittgensteinian formulation of
interpretive social science as the exploration of intersubjectively
recognized rules constituting 'games', 70 affirming that the approach
has much to offer in the study of international politics. It can be
argued, of course, that the 'power of tanks and missiles is not the
internal authority of an abbot', and that 'moving a nuclear submarine
is different from moving a castle in chess'.71 Even so, argue Hollis and
Smith, there are interesting similarities between the arena of interna-
tional politics - including the realm of 'high politics' - and games in a
Wittgensteinian sense:
Nuclear submarines function as threats and bargaining counters: the
abbot's authority may have something to do with threats of hell-fire.
Unless some kind of international society had been constructed,
there could be no United Nations, with its Assembly and its fragile
but often effective agencies.72
Thus, affirm Hollis and Smith,
The more the constructed arena of international diplomacy matters
for what nations are enabled and constrained to do, the more it is
worth thinking of the arena as a place where Wittgensteinian games
are played.73
In short, interpretive social science directs us to see that the coercive
state practices which make up the 'balance of power' can and should
be analysed in the same way as one would analyse the liberal trade
and monetary practices associated with the LIEO - by analysing them
to uncover the intersubjective meanings which constitute those
practices and which are simultaneously instantiated through them. 74
It would seem, then, that interpretive social science contains
important resources for reforming and revitalizing realist theorizing
about international politics. And so it does, but only at the cost of
artificially restricting the scope of the practice of interpretation. In

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

fact, and pace the efforts of Kratochwil, Ruggie, Hollis, and Smith,
while interpretive approaches can be used to refurbish realist
theorizing, they are even more ideally suited to challenge it.
To understand the potential an interpretive approach holds for
challenging the realist mainstream, it is necessary to consider
standard objections to progress in the realm of international politics.
Specifically, the long-held realist opposition to the development of
'progressivist' approaches to international politics derives not only
from the emphasis upon the conflictual nature of international politics
(war of all against all), but also from the essentially positivistic
characterization of the international order as fundamentally unchan-
ging (and hence fundamentally unchangeable).75 It is a direct
consequence of the unchanging nature of the global order, argue
realists, that International Relations theory can never be a theory of
the 'good life', but only a theory of 'survival'.
Of course, the realist formulation did traditionally allow for the
possibility that human practice might mitigate some of the worst
effects of the global order. Many realists accept that international
institutions can play an important role in regulating the global orders
in which they are 'nested'76 - the capitalist world economy in the case
of trade and monetary regimes; the anarchical Westphalian system of
states in the case of the balance of power.
As was noted above, interpretive approaches can be used to
achieve new insights into the constitution and functioning of regula-
tory international institutions. It must also be recognized, however,
that interpretive approaches offer more than just a means for under-
standing the constitution and functioning of regulatory international
institutions. They can be used as well to generate insights into the
very orders in which regulatory international institutions are em-
bedded.
The uniqueness of interpretive social science is the insight it
provides into the fact that the totality of social existence is an on-
going process of self-interpretation and self-definition by human
collectivities. Consequently, not only the regulatory institutions but
the underlying world orders themselves are comprised of social
practices, are themselves constituted by and instantiating intersub-
jective meanings.
It is in this regard that interpretive approaches provide a welcome
antidote to realism's positivist-reinforced pessimism about the possi-
bility for progress. To reiterate, interpretive social science maintains,

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 Human consciousness and International Relations theory

in opposition to naturalistic orientations, that all social and political

orders - including the global order - are the products of social
practices. In short, from the perspective of interpretive social science,
both the LIEO and international anarchy can be seen as constituted by
intersubjective meanings.77
It has been the concern of a small but growing number of
interpretively oriented International Relations scholars, moreover, to
identify these meanings. Among the intersubjective meanings which
constitute the contemporary global order are the notions that

people are organized and commanded by states which have

authority over defined territories; that states relate to one another
through diplomatic agents; that certain rules apply for the protection
of diplomatic agents as being in the common interest of all states;
and that certain kinds of behaviour are to be expected when conflict
arises between states, such as negotiation, confrontation, or war.78

In this regard, the contribution of postmodern International Rela-

tions scholars has been considerable. Postmodernists in the discipline
have been particularly effective in exploring and 'deconstructing'
intersubjective meanings fundamental to the modern global order
such as sovereignty, anarchy, and foreign policy.79
Also included in the intersubjective meanings that constitute the
global order are the 'packages of expectations' which define masculine
and feminine identities (i.e., gender). And here it is important to take
note of the contribution of feminist theorists in excavating and
rendering these meanings explicit. Their particular focus has been on
meanings relating to gender, and the way in which those meanings
both inform and are instantiated through institutions and practices as
varied as the national security state, networks of military bases,
diplomacy, tourist, and international organizations.80
Given this understanding of the nature of the global order, it is
clear how interpretive approaches offer support for notions of
progressive and emancipatory change. The intersubjective meanings
which constitute the global order are themselves the product of an
on-going process of self-definition and self-reflection; they are, then,
like the practices which instantiate them, open to change. 81
Finally, in anticipation of a common objection to interpretive
approaches raised by positivists, it is important to recognize that an
interpretive perspective does not deny that regularized behaviour
patterns have characterized much of international politics (e.g.,

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

power-seeking states, power-balancing interactions). The point is not

to deny the existence of the behavioural regularities that positivistic
analysis has identified in the social world, but rather
to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities
of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen
relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed.82
The notion of regularized behaviour in the global order as an
expression not of natural necessity, but of 'ideologically frozen
relations of dependence', also has consequences for our understanding
of mainstream theorizing in International Relations. It moves us to
effect a reappraisal of Keohane's observation that
Realist and neorealist theories are avowedly rationalistic, accepting
... a 'substantive' conception of rationality, characterizing 'behaviour
that can be adjudged objectively to be optimally adapted to the
situation'.83
For once one sees the 'situation' not as a 'given' reality but rather as
a socially constructed order, then it is possible to see the regulative
ideal of 'substantive rationality' in a rather different light - not as a
neutral formulation capturing a timeless, universalized thought-
process, but rather as a self-limiting form of 'instrumental rationality'
severely circumscribed in its capacity for fundamental self-reflection.
Similarly, it lends additional support to understanding traditional
positivist-informed International Relations theory not as a neutral
body of knowledge, but as a form of 'traditional theory' having the
function of facilitating the 'adaptation' of human beings to their basic
circumstances, no matter how violence-prone or inequitable.84 In
short, positivist-inspired mainstream International Relations theory
can be seen as a major social force contributing to the maintenance of
'ideologically frozen relations of dependence', an effect it accom-
plishes through the 'reification' of the global order, in other words by
presenting that order as a 'thing' standing apart from and indepen-
dent of human will or action.
Indeed, not only does the notion of 'substantive rationality' appear
in a new light, but so do the efforts to supplement the traditional,
realist/positivist-inspired approach to the study of International
Relations noted above. For while it is true that the efforts of
mainstream interpretive theorists such as Ruggie, Kratochwil, Hollis,
and Smith help to dereify the international institutions which regulate

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 Human consciousness and International Relations theory

the global order(s), their failure to recognize that an interpretive

analysis can be extended beyond a study of regulatory international
institutions to include the global orders in which those institutions are
'nested' has an important consequence. Ultimately, that failure serves
to reinforce the notion that the global order is natural and fixed; a
reality to be accommodated and even accepted. Consequently, not
only can traditional, positivist-inspired theorizing be seen as a form of
'traditional theory', but so can much of interpretively oriented
theorizing about international politics as well.85
It is this perspective on traditional, positivist-inspired theorizing -
as well as on recent efforts to supplement that theorizing with an
interpretively derived analysis of regulative international institutions
- that gives the effort to develop an emancipation-oriented interpre-
tive theory of International Relations its distinctive character. For it is
a central tenet of such theorizing that an interpretive analysis of
regulative international institutions cannot be conducted indepen-
dently of an interpretive analysis of the global order itself, and that
the latter cannot be effectuated successfully without attention being
paid to the 'ideological' component of the reproduction of that
order.86 In short, from this perspective, change in the global order is
dependent upon mounting a challenge to the 'ideologically frozen
relations of dependence' which sustain it.87 This raises the question of
the kind of practice which is suited to such a challenge. It is that
question we will take up in the chapter which follows.

Conclusion
This chapter began by exploring the issue of human consciousness in
terms of social and political theory. It was argued that the predomi-
nance of the positivist approach to the study of human society in
mainstream social science - in particular, the positivist tenet of the
methodological unity of science - has impeded the recognition of the
constitutive and potentially transformative role of human conscious-
ness in social and political life. It was also argued, however, that the
rise of interpretive approaches to the study of society have challenged
positivism's hegemony, and have created a space for the full
recognition of the non-reductive power of human consciousness.
Then, in the second part of this chapter, the discipline of Interna-
tional Relations was examined in the light of the developments in

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

social and political theory. It was argued that once again, despite the
predominance of positivist formulations of human consciousness in
International Relations theory, the rise of interpretive approaches in
the discipline is undeniable. Furthermore, despite the objections that
have been raised - and continue to be raised88 - there is good reason
to believe that interpretive approaches will not be easily dislodged
from contemporary International Relations theory. Finally, and most
importantly, interpretive approaches to the study of International
Relations are serving not only to reform and reinvigorate established
traditions such as realism, they are also being employed to underscore
the possibility of a radical, emancipatory transformation of the global
order.
As a consequence, it can be argued that the same space for the
recognition of the constitutive and transformative role of human
consciousness that has been created in contemporary social science -
a recognition which stands as one of the three defining characteristics
of critical theory - is being created in the discipline of International
Relations. If true, this is further evidence for the 'restructuring' of
International Relations theory in a more critical, emancipation-
oriented direction.

94
 International Relations theory
and social criticism

Hence, a theory of politics presents not only a guide to under-

standing, but also an ideal for action. It presents a map of the
political scene not only in order to understand what that scene is
like, but also in order to show the shortest and safest road to a given
objective. The use of theory, then, is not limited to rational
explanation and anticipation. A theory of politics also contains a
normative element. Hans J. Morgenthau1

True, the rationality of pure science is value-free and does not

stipulate any practical ends, it is 'neutral' to any extraneous values
that may be imposed upon it. But this neutrality is a positive
character. Herbert Marcuse2

Introduction
In the preceding two chapters, we have reviewed the evidence for a
critical restructuring of International Relations theory in terms of
reflexivity and the conceptualization of human consciousness. There
remains, however, one defining characteristic of critical theory that
has not yet been discussed in relation to contemporary theorizing
about International Relations. This is critical theory's engagement in
social criticism in support of practical political activity for the
transformation of established 'forms of life'.
It is the task of the present chapter to address this issue. As some of
the issues central to this task have already been encountered, this
chapter will proceed somewhat differently from the previous two.
After noting the centrality of the tenet of value-freedom in the

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

discipline of International Relations, I will review arguments in

support of the tenet. I will then attempt to counter these arguments
by identifying the 'hidden normative content' of the positivist quest. I
shall do so, first, by recalling points made in the previous two
chapters, and then by focusing on a third aspect not yet developed:
the relation of theory to practice.
The implications of positivism's 'hidden normative content' will be
taken up in terms of two issues with wide implications for the
discipline. First, there is the issue of renewed interest in 'normative
International Relations theory'. As in previous chapters, my concern
will not be primarily theoretical. That is, I will not be concerned so
much with the very worthy issue of contending normative theories
and their application to concrete issue areas such as just wars,
distributive justice, and human rights. Rather my focus will be meta-
theoretical or meta-ethical: What is the status of normative theorizing
in the discipline? What kind of intellectual 'space' has the traditional
positivist dominance of theorizing in the discipline left for normative
theorizing? And what are the possibilities of theorizing ethical
questions in world politics in terms of postmodern epistemologies
and ontologies?
Secondly, I will address the question of critical theory's engagement
in social criticism in relation to the 'practical political activity' in which
a great many International Relations scholars are already involved:
that of teaching world politics. Overall, however, the intent of this
chapter parallels that of those which preceded it: to show how the
predominance of positivism in social science has inhibited the develop-
ment of theorizing which is self-consciously engaged in social criticism,
and to show why positivism's influence can and must be challenged.

Value-freedom and International Relations theory

To begin, there is little question that the positivist quest for value-
freedom has been a prominent fixture of contemporary theorizing
about world politics. As Smith has noted,

For the vast majority of students of International Relations educated

during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the dominance of positivism as
an epistemological orthodoxy was obvious, so obvious that its
assumptions were rarely questioned. Values and analysis had to be
kept apart. The former could inform the analyst as citizen or,

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 International Relations theory and social criticism

possibly, determine what he or she looked at, but had to be omitted

from the process of analysis itself.3
James Rosenau's admonition that 'To think theoretically one has to
be clear as to whether one aspires to empirical theory or value theory'
serves as a perfect example of the way positivist strictures have been
applied to the study of world politics. 4 'Progress in the study of
international affairs', he argues,
depends on advances in both empirical and value theory. But the
two are not the same. They may overlap; they can focus on the same
problem; and values always underlie the selection of the problems to
which empirical theories are addressed. Yet they differ in one
overriding way: empirical theory deals essentially with the 'is' of
international phenomena, with things as they are if and when they
are subjected to observation, while value theory deals essentially
with the 'ought' of international phenomena, with things as they
should be if and when they could be subjected to manipulation.5
Rosenau is willing to concede that the 'habit of making the
necessary analytical, rhetorical, and evidential distinctions between
empirical and value theory can be difficult' to develop. 6 'Young
students' and those 'who have strong value commitments and a deep
concern for certain moral questions', notes Rosenau, are particularly
susceptible to laxity in this regard. 7 He attempts to counter this
tendency by assuring those with strong moral commitments that
'Empirical theory is not superior to moral theory; it is simply
preferable for certain purposes, and one of these is the end of
deepening our grasp of why international processes unfold as they
do.' 8 Moreover, he argues,
moral values and policy goals can be ... best served, by putting
them aside and proceeding detachedly long enough to enlarge
empirical understanding of the obstacles that hinder realization of
the values and progress toward the goals.9
Rosenau also recognizes that 'impatience with [purely] empirical
theorizing' tends to be 'especially intense among Third World
students of International Relations':
The newly developed consciousness of the long-standing injustices
built into First World-Third World relationships, the lure of depen-
dency theory, and perhaps a frustration over the central tendencies of
social science in the First World have made Third World theorists
particularly resistant to detached empirical theorizing.10

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

And it is noteworthy that Rosenau is not unaffected by this

resistance:
Their resistance gives a First World scholar pause: is his insistence
on habituating oneself to the is-ought distinction yet another
instance of false superiority, of projecting onto the developing world
practices that have worked in industrial societies?11

However, while Rosenau concedes that 'Of late I have become

keenly aware of the biases that may underlie my intellectual
endeavours', he concludes by reaffirming his commitment to the
separation of fact and value:
In this particular instance ... I cannot even begin to break the habit.
The relevance of the distinction strikes me as global, as independent
of any national biases, as necessary to thinking theoretically
wherever and whenever enlarged comprehension is sought.12

It is not hard to see how the dominance of positivism in

International Relations, as in social science more generally, places
severe limitations on the development of theory engaged in social
criticism. As Bernstein has noted, for the researcher committed to
scientific standards of investigation, 'the very idea of the theorist as a
critic of society and politics is avoided or ruled out by "methodolo-
gical prohibitions" '.13
Accordingly, if a space for social criticism is to be created within
the discipline of International Relations, the positivist tenet of the
'value-free' nature of scientific knowledge must be challenged. The
mounting of such a challenge will proceed by way of a critical
examination of the underlying assumption of that tenet: the assump-
tion that it is possible to separate fact from value. Simply put, it will
be argued that the claim that it is possible to separate fact and value
cannot be sustained. In order to substantiate this conclusion, I will
focus on the most rigorous effort within social science to ensure the
separation of fact and value: that of the positivist approach itself.

Positivism's hidden normative content

As a first step to calling into question the assumption that it is
possible to separate fact and value, I will review a set of arguments
advanced in support of that assumption by one of the discipline's
most sophisticated advocates of the positivist approach: Michael

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Nicholson.14 Nicholson is an ideal figure to engage in this regard. He

holds the rare distinction of having made respected contributions in
both International Relations and social and political theory more
generally. Furthermore, not only are his positivist convictions clearly
in evidence in his recent work on world politics, he is one of the very
few in the discipline who has offered an extended justification for
adopting the positivist approach in the first place.15
To begin, it should be noted that Nicholson's commitment to the
positivist tenet of value-freedom is closely tied to his acceptance of
the accompanying positivist tenets of 'truth as correspondence' and
the methodological unity of science. With regard to the former, he
notes that it is a core requirement for science that propositions be
formed which are both unambiguous (so as to be widely understood),
and 'which are empirical in the sense that observations can confirm or
refute them'.16 And with regard to the second, he affirms that there

does seem to me good reason to think that there can be explanation

of social behaviour, and in particular political behaviour, which in
style follows the general pattern of the explanation of natural
phenomena.17

It is in his defence of the assumption that it is possible to separate

fact and value, however, that Nicholson distinguishes himself. He
begins by affirming that the question of whether the search for a
value-free social science is itself misguided is wholly dependent upon
the answer one gives to the question of whether 'explanation and
evaluation can be separated in the social sciences'. Nicholson's
answer is unambiguous: 'With qualifications', he affirms, 'I believe
they can'.18
Unlike cruder advocates of positivism, Nicholson is more than
willing to recognize that the activity of scientific research takes place
in an environment in which values are ubiquitous. He is prepared to
concede, moreover, that individual researchers who are committed to
a positivist approach to the study of society may be influenced by
their personal values in the pre-scientific choice of topic or research
area. He also recognizes that the findings of scientific research may be
applied in the post-research context in value-laden ways.
None of this, however, is taken to invalidate the goal of value-free
knowledge. Indeed, it is because of his recognition of the ubiquitous-
ness of values and norms that Nicholson lays such stress on a

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

research methodology designed to prevent the incursion of extraneous

values into the scientific research process itself.
The key to substantiating the possibility of distinguishing fact from
value, argues Nicholson, is to grasp the 'simple distinction between
the content of a statement and the act of asserting that statement'. He
clarifies this distinction as follows:
A set of statements can be in itself totally value-free, but their
assertion in a certain context can be a moral act. For example, a
lecture on how to kill someone with bare hands could consist
entirely of factual statements to the effect that blows of a certain
amount of force on specified parts of the anatomy will have specific
effects on the 'recipient' ... It would scarcely be denied ... mat to
give such a lecture would be a moral act, however neutral its
vocabulary or well-established its propositions.19
Even so, Nicholson reaffirms, 'the circumstances of a sentence's
utterance ... must be scrupulously differentiated from the content of
the sentence itself'.20 It is the latter that imparts a normative
dimension to the statements, and not the statements themselves. They
remain, in and of themselves, value-free. Accordingly, Nicholson
concludes, there is 'no excuse for muddling the moral and evaluative
judgements with science itself. These are of a totally different
character and non-scientific' - a judgment which, he stresses, should
not be understood as 'pejorative'.21
Nicholson's defence of the positivist goal of value-freedom is all the
more noteworthy in terms of the present discussion given that it is
intended to refute the claims of radical critics:
There is a widespread view that an empiricist social science of
anything, but perhaps in particular international conflict, is fraudu-
lent in its pretensions because social science is inherently a political
activity and in fact tends to be in the service of the status quo.22
It is certainly the case, notes Nicholson, that
inasmuch as one wants to alter society, then one does it by a
knowledge or assumed knowledge of social behaviour which is
parallel in general form to the scientific laws of the behaviour of
inanimate material.23
However, he argues, the very neutrality of the statement of social
laws means that the study of how they might be used to change
society 'can be fruitfully studied by reactionary, conservative, refor-
mist or revolutionary'. 24 The point is, in the end, quite simple: 'Why

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 International Relations theory and social criticism

one wants to alter social behaviour is not a scientific question: how

one alters behaviour is/ 25
How, then, can Nicholson's conclusion be countered? Some of the
evidence to support such an argument has already surfaced in
preceding chapters. We need only review it quickly here. First, in our
discussion of reflexivity, it was noted that the positivist limiting of
reason to episteme has the effect of rendering problematic - if not
foreclosing altogether - the application of reason to the realm of
normative discourse. The direct result is that the adjudication of
normative questions, being by definition of a 'non-scientific' character,
becomes entirely derivative of a/non rational factors (i.e., 'personal'
value preferences) located beyond the reach of reasoned debate or
criticism.
Indeed, Frost has argued that the predominance of positivism in
International Relations theory - in his terms, the 'positivist bias' - has
resulted in the paucity of normative theorizing in the discipline. Frost
links the 'positivist bias' (i.e., the equating of reason with episteme) to
'prevailing doubts about the worth of normative theory relating to
International Relations generally'.26 He notes further the resulting
tendency to conceive of normative discourse in 'decisionistic' terms -
as arationally (if not anti-rationally) 'emotivist' in nature, where
a value judgement may be seen as purely arbitrary, i.e. it may be
seen as a judgement for which a person simply opts [which] is
neither right nor wrong, but is simply what the person has chosen.27
In short, there is no reason to doubt positivists such as Rosenau
and Nicholson when they affirm their respect for non-scientific
'normative theory'. However, it must also be recognized that in a
social and political context where reason is both privileged and
limited to scientistic episteme, to term an issue area 'non-scientific'
cannot but be pejorative in its effect. And given positivism's contribu-
tion to the making of that context, and thereby to the impoverishment
of normative discourse, it must be concluded that positivist social
science has a clear normative content in and of itself.
Similarly, in our discussion of the treatment of human conscious-
ness it was noted that positivism's commitment to naturalism and the
methodological unity of science has an undeniable normative dimen-
sion. The resulting reification of social facts and behavioural regula-
rities sets clear limits on the scope of change deemed possible. It is in
this sense that positivism can be understood to promote an accom-

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

modation to existing forms of life. It is also in this sense that it can be

argued that positivism limits not only the scope of change possible,
but also limits the task of theory to facilitating the functioning of the
given order. Once again, any tradition which promotes 'wise resigna-
tion' in the face of 'what is' (i.e., behavioural regularities), and which
actively contributes to the maintenance of the status quo, has a clear
normative content in and of itself.
There is a third sense, however, in which it can be argued that the
positivist approach has a clear normative content. In this case,
positivism's normative content derives not from its impoverishment
of normative discourse, nor from its tendency to reinforce existing
forms of life, but from the kind of politics which derive from its
conceptualization of the relation of theory to practice.
It will be remembered from the overview of the positivist tradition
in chapter two that the structure of explanation is one in which there
exists a symmetry between explanation of the occurrence of a
phenomenon in the past and the prediction of the reoccurrence of that
phenomenon in the future. That is, it is integral to positivism's
structure of explanation that the subsumption of an occurrence under
a general covering law - coupled with the assumption that such
occurrences are manifestations of regularities independent of time and
place - will allow for an exact determination of the conditions under
which that phenomenon will reoccur.
It is this symmetry of explanation and prediction within the
positivist tradition which provides the basis for manipulative control
of the natural world. It is this symmetry of explanation and prediction
which has led to the near-miraculous successes of natural science in
areas as varied as the exploration of space and the splitting of the
atom.
However, the significance of positivism's theory of explanation
goes further. As Fay has noted, this theory of explanation is rooted in
and expressive of 'a whole series of metaphysical assumptions as to
the nature of truth and reality'.28 That is, for the positivist-inspired
researcher,
reality is comprised of observable objects and events which are
related nomologically, i.e. they are related according to a series of
general laws of the type, if X then Y under situation C, and that
therefore, in line with this scientific assumption about reality, only
statements which reveal the concrete forms which those general
relationships take can be true statements. Science must view the

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 International Relations theory and social criticism

world this way in order for it to provide the kind of explanations it

prizes, which is to say, in order for it to provide the control over
the phenomena which is a sign of its having understood a
phenomenon. Because science marks out the 'world' as a world of
observable phenomena subject to general laws it thereby is
constituting this 'world' from the viewpoint of how one can gain control
over it.29

Concludes Fay:
It is for this reason that possible technical control provides the
framework within which the definition of reality and truth in
[positivist] science occurs ... The possibility of controlling variables
is a factor in terms of which one distinguishes a cognitive enterprise
as scientific, and thus technical control is a defining element in the
scientific enterprise itself.30
In short, the positivist conception of the relationship between theory
and practice is one of knowledge of regularities for the purpose of
exercising instrumental control.
It is important to note that the in-built interest in technical control
which Fay identifies in the positivist theory of explanation is not
limited to applications of the positivist approach to the natural world.
In that the structure of explanation remains unchanged, it can be
asserted that positivism's interest in control is equally present in its
application to the study of the social world. Indeed, it is noteworthy
that from the beginning, positivist theorists have been quite cognizant
of and explicit about this interest. 'From Science comes Prevision',
noted Comte, and 'from Prevision comes Control'.31
The conduct of scientific inquiry conceived as an interest in control
in the social world has definite normative content. For the objects of
technical control in the case of a 'science of society' are neither atoms
nor molecules - they are human beings. As a consequence, the
application of a positivist approach to the study of science cannot be
separated from the form of politics implicit in the interest in the
technical control of human beings integral to positivism's theory of
explanation. Notes Marcuse:
The science of nature develops under the technological a priori
which projects nature as potential instrumentality, stuff of control
and organization. And the apprehension of nature as (hypothetical)
instrumentality precedes the development of all particular technical
organization ...
The technological a priori is a political a priori inasmuch as the

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

transformation of nature involves that of man, and inasmuch as the

'man-made creations' issue from and re-enter a societal ensemble.
One may still insist that the machinery of the technological universe
is 'as such' indifferent towards political ends ... However, when
technics becomes the universal form of material production, it
circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a historical totality - a
'world'.32

In short, the form of politics which corresponds to positivist social

science's interest in technical control is quite simply a politics of
'domination', in which 'Scientific-technical rationality and manipula-
tion are welded together into new forms of social control.'33 Within
this form of politics, the manipulation of human behaviour and even
human thought is key. Moreover, it is a defining characteristic of this
form of politics that control is exercised over the majority by a small
minority of 'technical experts', whose knowledge of the regularities
manifest in the social world allows for the effective control of that
world.
Of course, in liberal democratic societies, technical experts are
nominally under the control of the elected representatives of the
people at large. Yet as Habermas has noted, the politics of 'domina-
tion' - in his terms, the politics of 'technocratic consciousness' - are
increasingly marked by a situation in which 'the objective necessity
disclosed by the specialists seems to assert itself over the [elected]
leaders' decisions':
The dependence of the professional [technical expert] on the
politician appears to have reversed itself. The latter becomes the
mere agent of a scientific intelligentsia which, in concrete circum-
stances, elaborates the objective implications and requirements of
available techniques and resources as well as of optimal strategies
and rules of control... The political would then be at best something
of a stopgap in a still imperfect rationalization of power, in which
the initiative in any case passed to scientific analysis and technical
planning.34

As a consequence, concludes Marcuse, positivism's 'Technological

rationality ... protects rather than cancels the legitimacy of domina-
tion, and the instrumentalist horizon of reason opens on a rationally
totalitarian society.' 35
This discussion has direct relevance for an assessment of the
normative content of positivist theorizing about world politics. It is
significant that Nicholson promotes the adoption of a scientific

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 International Relations theory and social criticism

approach to the study of world politics because 'our ability to

understand and control social systems is low'. 36 On the other hand,
he argues, 'the firmer is our knowledge of social behaviour, the
greater our potential control over it';37 the more extensive our grasp
of the social laws and regularities, the greater our ability to engage in
'social engineering' in the interest of human betterment. 38
There is no need to question Nicholson's motives in this regard.
His genuine concern with finding solutions to humanity's pressing
problems (e.g., war) is obvious. Nor is he incorrect in his assertion
that the study of how social laws might be used to change society
'can be fruitfully studied by reactionary, conservative, reformist or
revolutionary'. Where he is wrong is in assuming that the
positivist-inspired social engineering he advocates is neutral with
regard to the implementation of a particular political programme.
What I have endeavoured to show here is that positivist social
engineering has its own telos which will necessarily inform the kind
of political practices that result from its adoption as the strategy for
social change.
The nature of positivism's hidden normative content is now
manifest. In its contribution to the impoverishment of discourse about
normative issues, in its reification of social practices, and finally, in its
very promotion of a politics of domination, the positivist approach to
the study of the social world cannot be seen as 'value-free'. In short,
and '[d]espite all the talk of objectivity and value neutrality', it is clear
that positivist social science - including positivist International
Relations theory - is 'shot through with explicit and implicit value
judgements, and controversial normative and ideological claims'. 39
What conclusions may be drawn from this discussion? In fact, the
implications are more far reaching than simply concluding that
positivist knowledge has undeniable normative content. We have
already noted that positivism has made a concerted and on-going
effort to separate fact from value in the production of 'value-free'
scientific knowledge. If positivism has failed in that effort, then it is
reasonable to conclude that the very assumption of the possibility of
separating fact and value must itself be reconsidered; the very tenet of
'value-freedom' in scientific knowledge reassessed.
In short, what positivism's failure to separate fact from value
shows is that the goal of 'value-freedom' in scientific knowledge is
a chimera. Accordingly, the proper question is not 'How can
normative concerns be accommodated within the value-free scien-

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

tific enterprise?', but rather, 'What norms and values inform what
kinds of theorizing?'
Recognizing positivist International Relations theory's hidden nor-
mative content allows us to understand the significance of recent
developments in the discipline for the restructuring of International
Relations theory. With regard to positivism's contribution to a politics
of domination, for example, one notes the growing concern with the
dangers posed by the 'scientization of polities'. Ashley, for example,
has criticized positivist neorealism's reduction of politics to 'pure
technique': 'Political strategy is deprived of its artful and performative
aspect, becoming instead the mere calculation of instruments of
control.'40
The undemocratic implications are clear:
Absent from neorealist categories is any hint of politics as a creative,
critical enterprise, an enterprise by which men and women might
reflect on their goals and strive to shape freely their collective will.41
In short, concludes Ashley, positivist neorealism is 'an ideology that
anticipates, legitimizes, and orients a totalitarian project of global
proportions'.42
A similar recognition of positivism's normative content in terms of
its reification of social relations underlies the growing calls for
theorizing which stresses 'interpretation, practice, and the critique of
reification',43 and which shows itself willing to stand 'apart from the
prevailing order of the world and ask[ ] how that order came about',
in order that it might 'clarify [the] range of possible alternatives' to
the existing order, and in this way serve as 'a guide to strategic action
for bringing about an alternative order'.44
Perhaps the greatest significance of the present discussion,
however, lies in the space such a recognition creates for explicitly
normative theorizing in the discipline. It is to a consideration of this
issue that we now turn.

The resurgence of normative International

Relations theory
As has already been noted, positivism's equating of reason with
episteme lay at the root of 'prevailing doubts about the worth of
normative theory relating to International Relations generally'. 45
Accordingly, the explicit rejection of the 'decisionist' implications of

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positivism's conception of truth as correspondence to the facts implicit

in recent efforts in normative International Relations theory is a
welcome development.46 In a clear break with positivism's limiting of
reason to episteme, recent contributions in normative International
Relations theory have reaffirmed the possibility of rational debate
about normative issues and the integration of such debates into the
theory process.
At the same time, however, there are problems attached to the
renewed interest in normative International Relations theory. The first
is that in attempting to establish the legitimacy of explicitly normative
theory, there is a temptation to revert to the problematic notion of
two types of theorizing, one of which is 'normative' and the other
'non-normative'. This is a strategy adopted by Chris Brown in his
recent work on normative theory.47 Significantly, Brown poses a
question virtually identical to that posed by Nicholson. 'Is it, in fact,
possible', he asks, 'to have theory that is not in some sense concerned
with the business of standard setting and norm creating?' Equally
significantly, Brown's answer also parallels that of Nicholson:
'Rhetoric aside, yes, it is possible to have that kind of theory.' 48
Taken literally, of course, Brown is correct. It is indeed possible to
have theory that is not concerned with the business of standard setting
and norm creating. But that it is possible to have theory that is not, in
actuality, setting standards and creating norms is an entirely different
question, and one which, on the basis of our discussion of positivism's
hidden normative content, would have to be answered in the
negative. In short, the liability inherent in the representation of
normative International Relations theory as the twin to 'non-norma-
tive' theory is that it reinforces the legitimacy of the positivist tenet of
value-freedom, and thereby of the hegemony of positivism itself.
A second problem with recent efforts in normative International
Relations theory is the failure to challenge adequately the positivist
accommodation of 'normative' to 'non-normative theory'. 49 For
positivists, the need for normative theory is tied directly to the
successful development of empirical accounts: in the words of
Michael Nicholson, the greater our potential control over social
behaviour, 'the greater the need for clarification of moral issues'. 50 In
a context in which positivist conceptions retain great influence, the
consequences of not challenging those conceptions are extremely
serious. What is required in the present context is not simply a greater
concern with normative issues, but rather the recognition that the

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

study of world politics is, and always has been, unavoidably

normative; not that normative concerns ought to be addressed, but
that 'they have always been at the centre of the subject'; that
Lying at the heart of value-neutrality was a very powerful normative
project, one every bit as 'political' or 'biased' as those approaches
marginalized and delegitimized in the name of science.51
It is in this regard that normative International Relations theory can
make a significant contribution. It is also in this regard that the
positivist conception of the proper relation of normative to 'non-
normative' theory poses such a danger. Simply put, unless the
positivist conception of the relationship of 'normative' to 'non-
normative' theory is countered, the renewed interest in normative
International Relations theory may end up providing little more than
clarification on the potential ends to which a politics of domination
may be put - a form of theory limited to dealing 'with things as they
should be if and when they could be subjected to manipulation'?2
It might, of course, be countered that the continuing centrality of
problematic positivist concerns and categories in recent explorations
of normative International Relations theory is simply a reflection of
the fact that much of the discussion of ethics and world politics is
being conducted in decidedly modernist terms. If true, then recent
efforts to elucidate a postmodern view of ethics and world politics
must be considered as well. To begin, there is no question that
postmodernist International Relations theorists have made ethics a
central concern. David Campbell's Politics Without Principle: Sover-
eignty, Ethics and the Narratives of the Gulf War, for example, makes a
significant contribution in this regard.53 Inspired by the Foucaultian
notion that 'war is the narration of politics/the political by other
means',54 Campbell draws upon postmodern 'discourse analysis' to
analyse the discursive practices that moved the crisis toward conflict -
in particular, the 'discourse of moral certitude' through which the
West attributed all responsibility for the war to Iraq.
What is arguably most significant is Campbell's attempt in the final
chapter of the book to 'articulate an ethico-political disposition that is
both consonant with the complexities of the postmodern world and
capable of encouraging us to resist undemocratic practices'. 55 The
elements of the ethico-political disposition Campbell promotes are as
follows. First, it is necessary to recognize that the notion of the
'autonomous subject' cannot be sustained; that subjects are consti-

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 International Relations theory and social criticism

tuted intersubjectively - that is, T^y their relationship with the

Other'. 56 Following from this is the recasting of the notion of ethics
from one of 'a set of rules and regulations adopted by autonomous
agents - to something insinuated within and integral to that
subjectivity'. 57 Accordingly, argues Campbell,
ethics is not ancillary to the existence of a subject ...; ethics is
indispensable to the very being of that subject, because a subject's
being is only possible once its right to be in relation to the Other is
claimed.58

The consequence of this is the recognition

that 'we' are always already ethically situated; making judgments
about conduct, therefore, depends less on what sort of rules are
invoked as regulations [morality], and more on how the interdepen-
dencies of our relations with others are appreciated.59

Accordingly, ethics is recast from efforts to derive objectively valid

general(izable) rules of social behaviour to a recognition and accep-
tance of 'heteronomous responsibility'.60
The significance of such a shift in the view of the subject and of
ethics, argues Campbell, is the way it would alter standard practices
in international politics. Were such a view of the subject and ethics to
be embraced in foreign policy, for example, the result would be a
greater 'appreciation for ambiguity and a sensitivity to contingency'
the result of which would be that 'the adversarial or the unexpected
[would] not become an occasion for moral absolutism and violent
retribution akin to the dark days of the Cold War'.61 In the face of
growing interdependence, such a disposition counsels 'humility rather
than hubris', an engagement with the world that 'seeks to affirm life',
and, as a consequence, 'might offer the prospect of an improved
quality of life for many'.62
Campbell's intervention is to be welcomed; his efforts to elucidate a
life-affirming ethics is certainly consistent with the general thrust of
the present study. Nor is he alone in this regard. Framing their
theorizing in terms of an 'ethics of freedom', Ashley and Walker
define the goal of postmodern International Relations theorizing as
that of aiding persons occupying 'marginal sites' 63 to
proceed in a register of freedom to explore and test institutional
limitations in a way that sustains and expands the cultural spaces
and resources enabling one to conduct one's labours of self-making

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

in just this register of freedom, further exploring and testing

limitations.64
In this regard, Walker's championing of a 'postmodern politics of
resistance' bears noting.65 Walker directs attention to the struggles of
'critical social movements': movements, in the North and in the South
engaged with a multitude of issues; movements whose members are
suspicious of all Traditional claims for emancipation on behalf of the
people, the class, the common interest and sceptical of all singular,
homogenized images of 'reality/ 'liberty/ 'freedom/ and all 'isms'
proclaiming post-Enlightenment visions of the good life;66
movements that seek to 'extend processes of democratization into
realms where it has never been tried: into the home, into the
workplace, into processes of cultural production'. 67
How, then, are we to assess postmodern interventions on the
question of ethics? Not surprisingly, this is not a simple matter. On
the one hand, it is clear that the emphasis on pluralism and the
diversity of experience and identity, and on the need to hear the
voices of the marginalized, is an important corrective to modernity's
'monologic' tendencies. In this, postmodern International Relations
theorists represent the best of postmodernism generally: that is, the
sensitivity
to the multifarious ways in which the liistory of the West' - even in
its institutionalization of communicative practices - has always
tended to silence differences, to exclude outsiders and exiles, those
who live on the margins.68
Still, as valuable and important as these postmodern interventions
are, there are serious questions that pose themselves. The first is that
of the question of human agency or subjectivity. In simplest terms, it
is not always clear if postmodernism rejects only the traditional
notion of a fully formed subject - the cogito of Western philosophy -
or whether its rejection encompasses the notion of subjectivity tout
court. And as has been observed in relation to Foucault's aestheticized
conception of ethics - ethics defined as treating one's life as a 'work
of art' - it is uncertain that the line remains uncrossed. As Bernstein
notes, one of the more problematic issues
is [that] the very way in which Foucault talks about ethics in terms
of the self's relationship to itself seems to presuppose a way of
speaking about the self that he had previously so effectively

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 International Relations theory and social criticism

criticized. What precisely is a 'self'? How is the 'self' related to what

Foucault calls a 'subject'? Who is the T that constitutes 'itself' as a
moral agent?69
Parallel questions can be raised about postmodern International
Relations. If we follow Ashley in adopting a Foucaultian-derived
genealogical attitude which
accounts for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of
objects, etc. without having to refer to a subject, whether it be
transcendental in relation to the field of events or whether it chase
its empty identity throughout history .. 7°
then who is the subject who constitutes itself in relation to the Other?
If we accept the genealogical standpoint that
there are no subjects ... having an existence prior to practice ...
[that] the subject is itself a site of power political contest, and
ceaselessly so ... [that] the subject itself exists as an identifiable
subject only in the precarious balancing and dispersal of plural
interpretive elements resulting from the continuing strategic inter-
play of multiple alien forms .. .71
then who is it that is to 'conduct one's labours of self-making' in a
register of freedom?
If, on the other hand, the point of postmodernism is not to deny
subjectivity in its entirety, but only the notion of a fully formed,
atomistic subject, we are confronted with the question of the relation-
ship of the postmodern version of the subject to that of modernist
theorizing. Campbell is surely right in saying that within the
modernist metaphysical tradition (and the conventional International
Relations literature it informs) subjectivity is often understood as
autonomous agency, and ethics as a set of objectively grounded 'rules
of conduct or the moral code that undergirds, through various
commands, the path to the good and just life';72 that the dominant
model of ethics within modernist theorizing rests upon the notion 'of
a deep self, a hidden other, for example the unconscious or the real
me, that is the location of some constellation of one's real interests,
beliefs, feelings, or concerns'.73 It is this model of subjectivity and
ethics which is the proper object of Campbell's critique.
Yet it must also be stressed that modernist theorizing is not a
monolith. Specifically, it is not necessary to abandon modernist
theorizing to encounter the recognition of the 'relational character of
subjectivity' or the conception of ethics as context-dependent reflec-

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tion on deeply contrastable ways of being in the world. These

elements are also present within the 'critical--expressivist' approach to
ethics.74 Here the notion of the subject is one in which desires, beliefs,
and feelings are located between two poles:
On the one hand, there are those desires, beliefs, and feelings that I
reflectively choose and (more or less) understand the conditions of
their existence or emergence. On the other hand, there are those
desires, beliefs, and feelings that are formed under mistaken assump-
tions, tied to wrong objects, or are the result, in some mechanical
sense, of external effects.75
Furthermore, the critical-expressivist model directs us to radically
different questions from the dominant approach to ethics. Instead of
the correspondence-oriented query of 'How am I able to get my
conscious self, interests, ideas, etc. to correspond to or represent my
real interests?', the questions that emerge are those that seem quite in
harmony with the kind of reoriented ethical reflection Campbell
wishes to promote, namely:
How have I come to have the feelings, desires, and interests that I
have? Are they the types of feelings, etc., that I want to have, given
the opportunity to choose between alternatives, or are they the
outcome of some previously unrecognized processes of which I have
little or no control?76
However, it is not simply that it is possible to explore the
intersubjective constitution of the subject from within modernist
theorizing. The point is that it may be difficult to do so adequately
from anywhere but within modernity. For to be concerned with the
kind of ethical reflection desired by both Campbell and critical-
expressivism is, as Gibbons has argued,
to be concerned with the conditions under which one can more
easily engage in this type of reflection and, subsequently, to be
concerned with the conditions under which critical reflection
flourishes. This in turn leads one to consider the social and political
arrangements that encourage that type of reflection and allows the
questions of political reflection and the problems of political
philosophy to emerge.77
In this way we are brought to a second problem-area with regard
to postmodern discussions of ethics - that of the unwillingness to
provide a conception of the 'good' having pretensions to universaliz-
ability. Specifically, what is at issue here is the postmodernist

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 International Relations theory and social criticism

resistance to specifying what kinds of social and political arrange-

ments are conducive to the 'good life', and what kinds of action
strategies are best suited for achieving that life.
The postmodernist unease with defining the good in abstraction is
not difficult to find in the writings of postmodern International
Relations theorists. In the words of Ashley and Walker,
we cannot represent, formalize, or maxim-ize deterritorialized
modalities of ethical conduct. We cannot evoke a juridical model,
define the good life and lay down the code crucial to its fulfilment,
as if bespeaking some universal consensus formed according to rules
of discourse already given, without at the same time covertly
imposing a principle of territoriality that these modalities refuse to
entertain.78
Likewise, Campbell's treatment of the Gulf War is very much in
keeping with the postmodernist disinclination to define the good or
the means to achieve it: tellingly, he gives scant attention to the issue
of how political structures and power relations - domestically and
globally - would have to change for a view of ethics as 'hetero-
nomous responsibility' to become the guiding framework for policy-
making. Nor does Campbell suggest which social forces might lead in
the struggle to effect those far-reaching changes. Similarly, statements
such as 'Poststructuralism [postmodernism] ... is an emphatically
political perspective' but one 'which refuses to privilege any partisan
political line'79 are reflective of that resistance.
Postmodernists are quick to insist, moreover, that an unwillingness
to define the good does not preclude a discussion of normative issues
in their theorizing. In the words of Ashley and Walker,
our inability to represent human beings does not prevent us from
talking about it [the good life] or from trying to understand how it
might orient deterritorialized ethics in the valuation and disciplining
of their activities.80
There are, however, problems associated with the postmodern
position. To begin, is it really correct to say, as postmodernists seem
to do, that the effort to give substantive content to the notion of the
'good life', or to action strategies designed to achieve it, must
inevitably bespeak 'some universal consensus formed according to
rules of discourse already given'? Hermeneutically oriented theorists
have argued, to the contrary, that much is to be gained, even in the
absence of universal consensus or pre-given rules of discourse,

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

through the 'joining of horizons' of different notions of the good and

of the traditions in which those notions are embedded.81
Furthermore, it can be argued that the postmodern position entails
serious liabilities in terms of the exercise of ethical judgment necessary
to emancipatory solidarity. Once again, a parallel can be drawn
between postmodern International Relations and postmodernism
more generally. Foucault's championing of an 'insurrection of sub-
jugated knowledges' of those on the margins of history has provoked
concerns about how one is to engage in critical assessment of those
knowledges. As Bernstein notes, not unsympathetically,
if we stick to the specific and local - to the insurrection of subjected
knowledges - there is an implicit valorization here that never quite
becomes fully explicit, and yet is crucial for Foucault's genre of
critique. For there are subjected knowledges of women, Blacks,
prisoners, gays, who have experienced the pain and suffering of
exclusion. But throughout the world there are also the subjected
knowledges of all sorts of fundamentalists, fanatics, terrorists, who
have their own sense of what are the unique or most important
dangers to be confronted. What is never quite clear in Foucault is
why anyone should favor certain local forms of resistance rather
than others. Nor is it clear why one would 'choose' one side or the
other in a localized resistance or revolt.82
Similar questions can be posed to postmodern International
Relations. For example, serious scrutiny is warranted by Bradley
Klein's affirmation that the proper task of a post-hegemonic (i.e.,
postmodern) study of world politics is to
ask interesting questions that speak to, and listen to, ongoing social
and political struggles. In this sense, the task of social science is to
give voice and clarity to the multiple forces and social movements
that help constitute world politics.83
The problem with this position is obvious: in limiting itself to a
neutral, non-partisan representation of contending voices, it fails to
take a position on the respective merits and liabilities of the differing
political and social agendas being pursued by the 'multiple forces and
social movements that help constitute world polities'. At the same
time, however, in the absence of a notion of the 'good life', it is
unclear that postmodern International Relations can aspire to any-
thing more than a non-judgmental representation.
Similar concerns can be raised about Walker's support for critical
social movements in their struggle for democracy. Walker's resistance

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to specifying universalizable notions of justice is clearly manifest in

his statement that 'Universalism, to put it bluntly and heretically, can
be understood as the problem, not the solution/ 84 In the absence of a
conception of the 'good' with pretensions to universalizability,
however, how is one to know which social movements are truly
'critical' and which are reactionary?; in the absence of a discussion of
the 'good life', how is one to know what constitutes real democracy
and what is merely a deformed caricature thereof?
Significantly, in his earlier work Walker acknowledges this
dilemma, wishing, as he does, to distinguish progressive 'critical'
social movements from their 'reactionary' authoritarian counterparts:
Whether as Klu Klux Klan, as religious fundamentalisms, or through
slogans about evil empires and the magic of the market, the
reactionary forces of our time maximize exclusion, render complex-
ities in sharp strokes of black and white, and reject connections in
favor of keeping their backs to the wall and their weapons out ...
whatever the populist or democratic rhetoric, movements of reaction
exaggerate hierarchies and justify the need for order from above.
These forces of reaction are profoundly antidemocratic.85
Such a vigorous (and welcome) condemnation of the forces of reaction
is only possible, however, on the basis of universalizable notions of
the value of democracy, equality, and solidarity with others pursuing
emancipatory aims. It is surely significant, moreover, that in this
context - and in contrast to his pronouncements in others - Walker
concedes that:
The problem is not the claims of universalism as such ... [but]
rather, the way in which universalism has come to be framed as
both the opposite of and superior to pluralism and difference.86
Such a concession, however, raises once again the question of the
relation of postmodern to modernist theorizing. If the goal of
postmodernist theorizing is not to reject universalism, but rather to
reconcile some form of universalism with a respect for pluralism and
difference, then what distinguishes those efforts from modernist
ones?87
In the end, the resistance of postmodernists to defining the 'good
life' is not difficult to locate: the question of the political arrangements
that encourage ethical behaviour, after all, 'constitute the ethos of the
Enlightenment and modernity';88 at the same time, these are issues
which postmodernists have decried as being constitutive of the

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

discourse of 'governability, sovereignty and discipline' - the themes

that typify political thought and action in the modern, carceral
society.89
It would seem, however, that universalizable conceptions of the
good life - and of the means to achieve it that are consistent with the
ends pursued - are not merely useful, they are indispensable. They
are indispensable if we are to choose wisely, to act justly, and to work
in solidarity with others for emancipatory ends. Accordingly, it is not
at all clear that postmodern International Relations theorists can find
a way to avoid being drawn back into some version of modern social
and political theory if they pursue an 'engagement with the world'
that 'seeks to affirm life' by means of an 'ethic of freedom' to its
logical conclusion.

Critical restructuring and emancipatory pedagogy

There are two reasons why taking up the issue of pedagogy is a
fitting way to conclude this chapter. To begin, the positivist 'logic of
investigation' had strong implications not only for research but for
pedagogy as well. Specifically, the tenet of value-freedom posited a
strict separation of facts and values not only in the process of analysis,
but also in the practice of teaching. As such, the role of the teacher
was largely limited to that of representing, in a neutral, objective
fashion, the 'facts' of world politics, devoid of any normative
assessment. Certainly, the proper task of the teacher was not to
promote a specific value orientation in the classroom, but rather to
help students internalize a positivist orientation to values.
Of course, total success in this regard was never guaranteed. As
Rosenau has noted, with discernible frustration,
I have found that helping students become habituated to the is-
ought distinction is among the most difficult pedagogical tasks. They
can understand the distinction intellectually and they can even
explain and defend it when pressed; but practising it is another
matter.90
Still, the goal of responsible teaching was clear.
It is surely significant, in light of the concerns of this chapter, that
the renewed interest in normative International Relations theory has
been paralleled by increasing attentiveness to the question of
'engaged pedagogy'. A recent volume of contributions on the topic of

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 International Relations theory and social criticism

teaching world politics, for example, frames the question of pedagogy

in terms of an unambiguous commitment to 'reducing the inherited
tension between justice, peace, and security',91 by (re)presenting the
world to students not as a 'given' to be accepted, but as a 'world of
our making'92 which can, in principle, be remade.
The explicit commitment to an 'engaged pedagogy' - that is, a
pedagogy rooted in a self-conscious commitment to criticizing the
status quo in the interests of justice and peace - is certainly a
welcome one. The activity of teaching affords a clear opportunity for
engaging in social criticism in support of the transformation of
established 'forms of life'.
It can be argued, however, that while the politico-normative
impetus to teaching is crucial, what has not received sufficient
attention in regard to 'engaged pedagogy' is the way specific
pedagogical strategies can serve either to support or undermine the
commitments which give rise to teaching; the way they can,
independently of the value commitments of the teacher, serve to
promote either a politics of emancipation or, indeed, of domination.
This leads, then, to the second reason that the issue of pedagogy is
important in this context. For critically oriented social theorists have
argued that in the effort to I^e a guide to strategic action for bringing
about an alternative order', emancipatory theorizing must incorporate
an 'educative' - as opposed to an 'instrumental' - conception of that
relationship. What is distinctive about an educative form of practice is
that it

does not see social theory as useful because it allows people to

manipulate causal variables so that they can get what they want in
an efficient manner. Instead, social theory is seen as a means by
which people can achieve a much clearer picture of who they are,
and of what the real meaning of their social practices is, as a first
step in becoming different sorts of people with different sorts of
social arrangements ... The purpose of ... theory is to engender self-
knowledge and so to liberate people from the oppressiveness of their
social arrangements.93

In short, an educative conception of the relationship between theory

and practice corresponds not to the positivist goal of the replacement
of politics by the 'administration of things', but to the democratic
ideal of human beings consciously acting together to define and
organize the community in which they live; not to the positivist telos

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

of 'social engineering', but to the Aristotelian telos of the leading of a

good and just life in the polis'.94
As a way of showing the importance of considering both the form
and content of our pedagogical practices, I will draw on the work of
Paulo Freire95 to examine two strategies which can be used to address
the central challenge for anyone teaching world politics: that of
making global structures and processes, which almost inevitably
appear distant and abstract, real and meaningful to students.
One popular strategy to meet that challenge is that of 'making the
local, global'. By this I mean efforts by the teacher to bring the
realities of global-level structures, processes and actors into the
localized experiences of students in the classroom.96 The underlying
assumption of this strategy is that understanding international politics
is a matter of acquiring a body of relatively unproblematic factual
knowledge. If students are not in a position to understand the realm
of international politics, it is simply a function of the fact that they
lack that knowledge. Indeed, it is commonly noted, with considerable
frustration, that students regularly lack even the most basic back-
ground knowledge about the world (i.e., the fundamentals of
geography, history, etc.) thereby rendering the task of imparting the
more specialized knowledge of world politics extremely difficult. The
operative question then becomes, 'Given the widespread ignorance of
the students we confront, which pedagogical techniques can be used
to 'engineer' a learning context in which students will receive the
knowledge required in the limited time available?'
The assumption and general thrust of the strategy of 'making the
local, global' conform very closely to what Freire has termed 'banking
education'. That is, education in which learning is understood as an
apolitical process in which a body of neutral, objective information is
'deposited' in the students' minds where it can be retrieved later
upon demand. In the words of Freire,
In the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed
by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom
they consider to know nothing.97
The assumption of absolute ignorance on the part of those to be
taught is not a neutral one. In making this assumption, argues Freire,
'banking' education draws a distinction between teacher and student
in a way that 'mirror[s] oppressive society as a whole'. 98 In the
following list of the defining characteristics of the 'banking model',

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 International Relations theory and social criticism

Freire underscores how the relationship of teacher to student is

reflected and reproduced:
The teacher teaches and the students are taught.
The teacher knows everything and the students know nothing.
The teacher thinks and the students are thought about.
The teacher talks and the students listen - meekly ...
The teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through
the action of the teacher.
The teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own
professional authority ...
The teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while the students
are mere objects."
It should be noted that what is at issue here is the logic of the
pedagogical practices in question, and not simply the aims of
teachers. As Freire notes, certainly 'there are innumerable well-
intentioned bank-clerk teachers who do not realize that they are
serving only to dehumanize'.100 Nonetheless, the politics of the
pedagogical strategy informing the 'banking' model may overwhelm
even the most admirable goals of the educator. In short, regardless of
whether the intent is to promote social change or even just to
'educate', the pedagogical methodology employed has the effect of
inculcating a world view that maintains relations of inequality and
subordination, and contributes to a 'praxis of domination' in which
people are rendered ever more vulnerable to control from above.
The intent of emancipatory theorizing, however, is surely the exact
opposite: to shed light on the nature of relations of subordination and
domination, and to work to 'demystify as ideological rival approaches
that obfuscate[] or rationalize[ ] those relations'.101 What kind of
pedagogy is consistent with such an emancipatory intent?
Freire's counter-pedagogy is one which is fundamentally dialogical.
It begins with the recognition that 'Teachers and students ... are both
Subjects, not only in the task of unveiling ... reality, and thereby
coming to know it critically, but in the task of re-creating that
knowledge.'102 To facilitate this dialogue between Subjects, teachers
must begin with the understanding that students are not ignorant,
empty vessels to be filled with objective knowledge, but rather self-
reflecting and knowledgeable beings whose self-definitions and
understandings must form the starting-point - though clearly not the
end-point - of the learning process. Only by according recognition
and respect to the knowledge that students bring with them can a

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

meaningful dialogue be started. Only by affirming students in their

identities as co-makers of the world they inhabit can the process of
strategizing about remaking the world in a way consistent with
emancipatory ends be initiated.
If the pedagogical strategy of 'making the local, global' conforms to
that approach which Freire has named the 'banking' model of
education, what strategy in the teaching of world politics would be
consistent with his pedagogical alternative? That alternative strategy,
drawing on the feminist insight that the 'personal is international', 103
can be termed 'making the global, local'. This second strategy entails
identifying within the experiences and knowledge students bring with
them to the classroom the presence of the global structures and
processes which, at first encounter, seem so distant and abstract.
By way of example, the strategy of 'making the global, local' could
involve drawing links between (i) male domination of classroom
discussion time (statistically, men are much more likely to interrupt
women than the inverse)104 with global structures of patriarchy (e.g.,
'women do 60 per cent of the world's work, make 10 per cent of the
world's income, own 1 per cent of the world's property'); (ii) the great
numbers of foreign nannies, on the one hand, and global economic
processes such as IMF austerity programmes which underlie the
Third World's export of women to work as servants for wealthy
Northern families, on the other;105 (iii) racist images and statements
evident in popular culture (television situation comedies, rock videos)
and racist colonialist and neo-colonialist foreign policies; and (iv) the
high-priced, fashionable footwear that is de rigueur on so many
campuses and the working conditions of Third World labourers
engaged by transnational corporations in Export Processing Zones.
Like its counterpart, the strategy of 'making the global, local' is an
effective means of making world politics real and meaningful.
Furthermore, it has the added benefit of counterposing to the
traditional view of world politics - that is, a political realm
constituted by and consisting of the activities of state-elites - a vision
which makes the activities and experiences of 'ordinary' non-elites as
important in the production and reproduction of the global order as
any other, thereby opening a space for theorizing strategies for
changing the global order. And, last but not least, it stands in clear
opposition to a politics of domination by affirming students as active
agents of their own learning. In this way, the pedagogical strategy of
'making the global, local' helps to ensure that the results of an

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 International Relations theory and social criticism

'engaged pedagogy' are consistent with the politico-normative com-

mitments which give rise to it.

Conclusion
The recognition of the implicit 'normative content' of positivist
International Relations theory - and of the impossibility of 'value-free'
knowledge - has important consequences in terms of the restructuring
process which has served as the focus of this study. In general terms,
it has helped to create a theoretical 'space' in the discipline of
International Relations for self-consciously normative criticism of the
established global order and the promotion of alternatives in both
theory and practice. Finally, it has contributed to a growing
consciousness on the part of International Relations scholars that their
role as teachers must be framed in accordance with the need for
'transformative intellectuals' operating in the emancipatory interest. 106
As such, it stands as one more piece of evidence in support of the
fundamental 'restructuring' of International Relations theory.

121
 Conclusion

A political science which is true to its moral commitment ought at

the very least to be an unpopular undertaking. At its very best, it
cannot help being a subversive and revolutionary force with regard
to certain vested interests - intellectual, political, economic, social in
general. Hans J. Morgenthau1

The value of a theory is not decided alone by the formal criteria of

truth ... the value of a theory is decided by its connection with the
tasks, which in the particular historical moment are taken up by
progressive social forces. Max Horkheimer^

This study has concerned itself with providing an answer to a very

specific question: why is it that theory oriented toward human
emancipation remains poorly developed within the discipline of
International Relations? We are now in a position to provide an
answer to this question, both in terms of what does explain the
traditional absence of emancipatory International Relations theory as
well as what does not.
This absence cannot be explained by either a lack of commitment to
the improvement of human welfare on the part of International
Relations theorists, or a lack of awareness by these theorists as to the
nature of the threats under which our planet is living. Indeed, as was
shown early on in this study, an explicit concern with human welfare
is clearly manifest among a significant number of International
Relations theorists. Though working out of different analytical tradi-
tions, these theorists remain united in their view of the study of

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 Conclusion

International Relations as 'the art and science of the survival of

[human]kind'.3
This being the case, it was necessary to locate the explanation for
the dearth of emancipatory theorizing elsewhere than the personal
concern (or, rather, presumed lack of it) with the 'common good'. As
a consequence, the explanation for the lack of emancipatory theo-
rizing was sought in the very structure of mainstream International
Relations theory. To do this, however, it was necessary to move
beyond the bounds of International Relations theory proper, to avail
ourselves of the insights of social and political theory more generally.
By drawing on a range of arguments put forward by social and
political theorists, it was possible to arrive at an explanation of the
virtual absence of emancipatory theory in terms of the predominance
of the positivist approach in the discipline of International Relations.
Specifically, the three tenets which together comprise the 'positivist
logic of investigation' - that of 'truth as correspondence', the
methodological unity of science, and the 'value-free' nature of
scientific knowledge - were shown, in their turn, to have inhibited the
development of the three elements which characterize emancipatory
theory: 'theoretical reflexivity', attention to the active and creative role
of human consciousness, and social criticism in support of the
transformation of established 'forms of life'.
The benefits of the incorporation of the insights of social and
political theory into a discussion of International Relations theory
proved even more far-reaching than expected, however. For the
insights afforded by social and political theory allowed for much
more than a 'wrecking operation' in terms of positivist International
Relations theory. Along with exposing the limitations of positivist
International Relations theory - the non-viability of the separation of
subject and object, naturalism, and the separation of fact and value -
these insights also directed us toward positive alternatives for
changing International Relations theory in a way more in harmony
with the emancipatory imperative of the 'Aristotelian project'. More-
over, and perhaps most importantly, the meta-theoretical perspective
afforded by social and political theory has also made clear the degree
to which theorizing about international politics is already showing
signs of undergoing such change - a 'restructuring' of International
Relations theory. Specifically, it has become clear that in important
respects International Relations theory already is being restructured in
a post-positivist direction which is (i) self-consciously reflexive, (ii)

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The restructuring of International Relations theory

intentionally interpretive, and (iii) explicitly critical of the existing

global order. In short, the 'restructuring' of International Relations
theory is its transformation into emancipatory, 'critical' theory.
Of course, noting the existence of critically oriented theorizing in
the discipline can be no more than a starting-point. Crucial is the
validation of that theorizing. And here, it bears noting that as a form
of 'critical' theorizing, critical International Relations theory must be
validated on two distinct levels. At one level, it must, like conven-
tional forms of theorizing, be validated by developing reasoned
arguments in support of its claims which are successful in gaining the
assent of the relevant academic community. Yet while this level of
validation is crucial, it is not sufficient. In the words of Horkheimer:

General criteria for assessing critical theory as a whole do not exist,

for they are always based on the recurrence of events and thus on a
self-reproducing totality ... For all its insight into isolated events and
for all the agreements of its elements with the most advanced
traditional theories, critical theory has no specific authority on its
side other than the interest in the abolition of social injustice which is
connected to it.4

In short, a 'critical' International Relations theory must also validate

itself in terms of the lives of those to whom it is ultimately directed. 5
Critical International Relations theory must realize itself in the
concrete emancipation of human beings.
Of course, the appropriation of specific forms of theorizing never
occurs in a vacuum. Currently, in the face of the limitations on the
well-being and autonomy of the members of the global polis identified
in the first chapter - limitations posed by weapons of mass destruc-
tion, the ecological crisis, the systematic violation of human rights
around the globe, and the growing disparity between rich and poor
within an increasingly interdependent world economy - people have
increasingly begun to search for a global perspective to guide them in
their locally based activities of organizing and resistance. In concrete
terms, as the urban poor in underdeveloped countries have become
increasingly aware that decisions made in International Monetary
Fund boardrooms in Washington, DC have a profound impact on
their daily struggle for survival, as workers in advanced industrial
states have become increasingly conscious of the fact that the
'globalization' of national economies has a direct bearing on job
security and living standards, as peace, human rights, and environ-

124
 Conclusion

mental activists around the planet have become increasingly cogni-

zant that militarization, environmental degradation, and human
rights violations are inextricably linked to existing global structures,
the demand for critical, emancipatory theory which incorporates a
global perspective has grown in stride. It is this demand, emanating
from a growing transnational constituency, for critical, emancipatory
theory with a global perspective which provides the emerging critical
International Relations theory identified in this study with a concrete
opportunity to realize itself - an opportunity which may well not
have existed even twenty years ago.
At the same time, this opportunity also draws our attention to the
limits of the restructuring process that has been identified. For while
it can be argued that significant changes are taking place at a meta-
theoretical level, it must also be recognized that those changes have
yet to be translated into significant gains in theoretical-empirical terms.
The enterprise of erecting substantive analyses of, for example, inter-
state conflict or global economic disparities upon the meta-theoretical
foundation of critical theory has hardly begun. In short, while the
restructuring of International Relations theory may be of discernible
actuality at the level of meta-theory, at the level of theoretical analysis
of concrete issues it remains little more than potentiality. Yet it is
clearly crucial to carry out this enterprise if the promise held out by
the meta-theoretical restructuring process identified in this study is to
be fulfilled.
Inevitably, a critical theory of international politics which is
committed to working for human emancipation will, virtually by
definition, come into conflict with 'certain vested interests - intellec-
tual, political, economic, social in general'.6 Even so, there is no
alternative. If International Relations theory is to remain 'true to its
moral commitment', the restructuring process now underway must be
brought to its 'subversive and revolutionary' conclusion.7 It is only in
this way that the discipline of International Relations can hope to
make a meaningful contribution to the 'Aristotelian project' of the
'leading of a good and just life' in our global polis.

125
 Notes

Introduction
1 'The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations', in William
T. R. Fox, ed., Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 16.
2 'Die gesellschaftliche Funktion der Philosophic', in Alfred Schmidt, ed.,
Kritische Theorie: Line Dokumentation (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 1968), II,
p. 308, my translation.
3 Mark Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', Millen-
nium, 16, No. 2 (1987), 231.
4 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976). Indeed, it was the title of
Bernstein's work which provided the inspiration for that of the present study.
5 I say 'similar' rather than 'identical' for two reasons. First, rather than
seeing 'critique' as one dimension of the restructuring process among
others (along with, for example, an interpretive approach), in this study
the notion of 'critical theory' is understood to subsume all of the elements
of the restructuring process within it. (See chapter one below.)
Secondly, while I agree with Bernstein that the restructuring process
must involve both a concern with achieving an interpretive understanding
of the intersubjective meanings which constitute the social world, as well
as an interest in criticizing that world as part of the effort to change it, I
also argue that a third element of a critical restructuring is 'theoretical
reflexivity': theoretical reflection upon the process of theorizing itself. (See
chapter one below.) However, while 'theoretical reflexivity' was not
featured in The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, Bernstein does
address this issue in his subsequent study, Beyond Objectivism and
Relativism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983) - a work
upon which I draw heavily in my discussion of 'theoretical reflexivity'.
(See chapter three below.)
6 I provide here a representative, though by no means exhaustive list of earlier
work in this regard. See, for example, Richard K. Ashley, 'Political Realism
and Human Interests', International Studies Quarterly, 25, No. 2 (1981), pp.

126
 Notes to pages 5-9
204-36, as well as Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism', in R. O. Keohane,
ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986);
Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond Interna-
tional Relations Theory', especially the 'Postscript 1985', also in Keohane,
Neorealism and Its Critics; Mervyn Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); R. B.
J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Andrew Linklater, Beyond
Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (New York: St
Martin's Press, 1990); as well as V. Spike Peterson, 'Introduction' to Gendered
States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1992); see also Richard Higgott, ed., New Directions in International
Relations? Australian Perspectives (Canberra: The Australian National Uni-
versity, 1988), especially the contributions by Jim George ('International
Relations and the Positivist Empiricist Theory of Knowledge') and David
Campbell ('Recent Changes in Social Theory: Questions for International
Relations'). More recent works in this vein are Claire Sjolander and Wayne
Cox, eds., Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994) and Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994).
7 David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 184.
8 Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, p. 184. Indeed, given the traditional
preoccupation with epistemology in the discipline of International
Relations, it comes as little surprise that critiques constructed at the level
of ontology have often met with just this charge.
9 Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, pp. 184-5.
10 See chapters three, four and five, below.
11 As was noted above, some of the current advocates of postmodernism in
contemporary International Relations theorizing contributed, during the
1980s, trenchant critiques of positivism in the discipline. Some of those
critiques, moreover, were constructed in terms very much in line with
those of the Frankfurt School and, by extension, this study (Richard
Ashley is the prime example - see note 6 above). For reasons discussed in
later chapters, however, I do not follow these theorists beyond their
critiques of positivism to adopt postmodernism as the optimal alternative
to mainstream positivist theorizing.

1 International Relations theory and the Aristotelian project

1 'The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations', in William
T. R. Fox, ed., Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 16.
2 'Bemerkungen iiber Wissenschaft und Krise', in Alfred Schmidt, ed.,
Kritische Theorie: Eine Dokumentation (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 1968), I,
p. 7, my translation.

127
Notes to pages 9-11
3 Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. xxii; Leonard Harris, 'Review
of The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory', International Philosophical
Quarterly, 19 (1979), p. 485.
4 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958), pp. 13-14.
5 Thomas A. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), p. 2.
6 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 26.
7 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 32.
8 On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 23. See also Richard J.
Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 208.
9 The Human Condition, p. 195.
10 The Human Condition, p. 198. Of course, it can be argued that in historical
terms the 'golden age' of the Greek city-state deviated in many respects
from the ideal contained in classical political theory: i.e. that those made
'free and equal' by the polis tended to be a narrow strata of men, with a
sizeable female and slave underclass excluded from the noble interaction
of unconstrained speech and action. Nonetheless, it is the regulative ideal
of the polis as a 'realm of freedom' for all with which I am concerned here.
11 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1979), p. 93.
12 Hegel and Modern Society, p. 93. See also Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens
in the Theory of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 146-9.
As Linklater notes, Hegel opposed any doctrine of 'cosmopolitanism which
took issue with the roles and responsibilities integral to the state' (p. 147).
At the same time, however, Linklater also underscores the fact that there
does appear to be a contradiction between Hegel's 'principle of human
freedom, which demands the rational organization of political life, and the
actual operations of the international states-system, the coercive or
uncontrolled relations which pertain to the life of states' (p. 148). Avineri's
argument that for Hegel, history involved the creation of a community of
states within a world 'united by culture and reason' may be one way of
resolving this contradiction. See Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the
Modern State (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 207. It may
also serve to temper the Hegelian claim that 'the European state
represented the highest form of political association' (Linklater, p. 149).
13 Linklater, Men and Citizens. It can be argued that Kant was preceded in
theorizing the conceptual shift from the rights and freedoms of 'citizens'
to 'persons' by Rousseau. See Linklater, Men and Citizens, passim. See also
Michael C. Williams, 'Rousseau, Realism and Realpolitik', Millennium, 18,
No. 2 (1989), pp. 188-204. It is also Linklater's contention that Kant's
'desire for a universal society of free individuals' stands at the centre of
the theorizing of Karl Marx (p. 159).

128
 Notes to pages 11-12
14 The words are T. H. Green's from his Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxford, 1906),
p. 283, and are quoted in Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 208, note 20.
This is not to argue that Kant's understanding of 'politics' was in the
tradition of classical political theory. On the differences, see Jiirgen
Habermas, 'The Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to Social
Philosophy', in Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 42.
15 Including the nation-states system. See, for example, Richard Falk, The
End of World Order (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983). See also Linklater,
Men and Citizens, p. 6. For a similar conclusion, this time from a realist
perspective, see John Herz, The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics
(New York: David McKay, 1976), pp. 15-19. Notes Herz, 'only a radical
change in attitudes [in the direction of universalism] and policies could, in
the long run, save the world from disaster', p. 15.
16 Falk, The End of World Order, p. 15.
It should be noted that Arendt herself, and despite her assertion that
the polis could be created almost anywhere and any time, would most
probably have had great difficulty in conceptualizing the polis in global
terms. This is because Arendt held that only small groups of people
allowed for the creative actions which distinguished the polis. In larger
collectivities of people, argued Arendt, creative action was invariably
supplanted by conformist behaviour. See Arendt, pp. 42-3. See also
Terence Ball, 'Ontological Presuppositions and Political Consequences', in
Daniel R. Sabia, Jr, and Jerald T. Wallulis, eds., Changing Social Science
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), pp. 40-2.
In response, one could argue that there is no reason why a world
order created in conformity with the idea of the polis could not be based
on loose federation of communities small enough to allow for the kind
of creative, non-conformist behaviour Arendt fears is lost in larger
groups. For an effort to theorize a global order in terms of the notion of
a 'global polis' while attempting to accommodate the kind of concerns
raised by Arendt, see Richard Falk, 'Anarchism and World Order',
Nomos, 19 (1978).
17 Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 4. Also quoted in Linklater, Men
and Citizens, p. 5.
18 See Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 3rd edn
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. ix.
19 Robert O. Keohane, 'Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and
Beyond', in R. O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 199. Keohane is clearly making
reference to the work of Jonathan Schell. See J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982).
20 J. David Singer, 'The Responsibilities of Competence in the Global
Village', International Studies Quarterly, 29, No. 3 (1985), p. 245.

129
Notes to pages 13-16
21 'Realism, Marxism and Critical International Theory', Review of Interna-
tional Studies, 12, No. 4 (1986), p. 308. See also his Beyond Realism and
Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (New York: St Martin's
Press, 1990).
22 This historical review will focus on the Enlightenment origins of critical
theory and, in particular, the evolution of the tradition through the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is true, of course, that additional
modifications and reformulations were made during the twentieth
century, especially by those identified with the tradition of Western
Marxism: Lukacs, Korsch, Gramsci, and, of course, the members of the
Frankfurt School, who adopted the term 'Critical Theory' to describe their
work. Nonetheless, with Marx's contribution to the base already laid by
Kant and Hegel, the broad outlines of critical theory which concern us
here were already established.
23 Paul Connerton, editor's introduction to Critical Sociology: Selected Readings
(New York: Penguin, 1976), p. 15. See also the heading 'critique' in the
Dictionary of Sociology (2nd edn. London: Penguin, 1988), p. 56.
24 Of course, as Connerton notes, the weapon of critique was double-edged,
as Catholics employed philological methods to demonstrate the very
necessity of the Church tradition which Protestants were seeking to
undermine. See Connerton, Critical Sociology, p. 15.
25 Connerton, Critical Sociology, p. 16.
26 Ibid.
27 See Jiirgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit (Berlin: Luchterhand,
1962).
28 Trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), p. 9.
29 Literally, 'das Zeitalter der Kritik'.
30 'Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklarung?'. Quoted in Thomas A.
McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jiirgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.: MET
Press, 1978), p. 77.
31 Connerton, Critical Sociology, p. 17.
32 Scott Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical Theory: Philosophy and Political
Inquiry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 29.
33 Ibid.
34 That is, the exploration of the conditions through which modern natural
science is possible. In part, Kant's relatively narrow conceptualization of
epistemological issues can be traced to his assumption - not at all foreign
to contemporary positivists - of a normative concept of science, with
modern physics taken as the model of legitimate 'scientific knowledge'.
See Jiirgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J.
Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 13-15.
35 Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 144.
36 It was the inability of Kant's epistemology to justify itself - to explain
how the preconditions of knowledge are themselves already knowledge -
that led Hegel to deem Kant's formulation a l?ad infinity' incapable of

130
 Notes to pages 16-18
serving as a 'first philosophy'. For a fuller discussion of this point, see
Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical Theory, pp. 33-4.
37 It can be argued, as does Habermas, that in one sense, Hegel's reformula-
tion did not so much radicalize epistemology as abolish it; that Hegel's
'philosophy of identity' subsumed epistemology within the notion of
'absolute knowledge' and thus left itself - and by extension, the entire
tradition of critical theorizing - open to being discredited by the ensuing
practical successes achieved by positivist natural sciences. See Habermas,
Knowledge and Human Interests, chapter one. See also McCarthy, The
Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas Part I, as well as Garbis Kortian,
Metacritique (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1979), pp. 19-20.
38 John B. Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul
Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981), p. 72.
39 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (New York:
Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 81-2. Also quoted in Thompson, Critical
Hermeneutics, p. 72.
40 Connexion, Critical Sociology, p. 19.
41 Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical Theory, p. 36, emphasis in the original.
42 Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 146.
43 Connexion, Critical Sociology, p. 19.
44 Hegel himself provides an outstanding example of this kind of
emancipation-oriented theoretical reflection which presents the idea of
liberation from coercive illusions in his discussion of the Master-Slave
relationship in the Phenomenology of Mind. The Master tries to make the
Slave the instrument of his will. The Slave expresses himself in his
productive activity and then recognizes that expression in the objects he
has created. As a consequence, the Slave experiences himself as a
subject. And it is in this way that the distorting pressures of slavery
lead dialectically to the demand for freedom. For Hegel, the Bildung-
sprozefi evident in the Master-Slave relationship was a universal feature
of human life and thought.
45 Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical Theory, p. 36.
46 Nor is it inappropriate to discuss Marx's theorizing in terms of the larger
Aristotelian project. As the Western Marxist philosopher Georg Lukacs
noted, the entire Hegelian-inspired tradition of historicist Marxism can be
understood as a form of left-wing Aristotelianism. See Tom Rockmore,
ed., Lukacs Today: Essays in Marxist Philosophy (Boston: D. Reidel
Publishing Company, 1988), p. 5.
47 Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 151.
48 See the discussion of Marx and 'critique' in the section dealing with the
tradition of 'Western Marxism' in Tom Bottomore, ed., Dictionary of
Marxist Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983),
pp. 523-6.
49 McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, p. 55. McCarthy is para-

131
Notes to pages 18-25
phrasing Habermas. See Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 28.
50 'Der Achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte', in Karl Marx und Friedrich
Engels: Ausgewahlte Werke (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981), p. 99.
51 Steven Seidman, ed., Introduction to Jiirgen Habermas on Society and
Politics: A Reader (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), p. 3.
52 Karl Marx, 'Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right',
quoted in McCarthy, The Critical Theory ofjiirgen Habermas, p. 16.
53 'Thesen iiber Feuerbach', in Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels: Ausgewahlte
Werke, p. 28.
54 'Conscientization' is the English transliteration of the Portuguese word
conscientizacgao by the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. See P. Freire,
Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1983).
55 In addition to the influence of Bernstein noted in the Introduction, the
three defining characteristics employed here were also inspired by and, at
least in part, derived from those of 'reflexivity, the acceptance of a
methodological and ontological orientation distinct from the naturalist
paradigm, and a commitment to social criticism and advocacy' advanced
by Sabia and Wallulis in their discussion of 'critical social science'. See
Daniel R. Sabia, Jr, and Jerald T. Wallulis, 'The Idea of a Critical Social
Science', in Sabia and Wallulis, Changing Social Science, pp. 6-7.
56 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1968), p. 41; quoted in Nancy Fraser, 'What's Critical about
Critical Theory?' in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, eds. Feminism as
Critique (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 31.

2 Defining positivism
1 'The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations', in William
T. R. Fox, ed., Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), pp. 19-20.
2 Traditionelle und Kritische Theorie', in Alfred Schmidt, ed., Kritische
Theorie: Line Dokumentation (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 1968), II, p. 137,
my translation.
3 See Jiirgen Habermas, 'The Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to
Social Philosophy', in Habermas, Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1973), p. 44.
4 William Outhwaite, New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermeneutics
and Critical Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), p. 5.
5 William Bechtel, Philosophy of Science (London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1988),
p. 18.
6 Outhwaite, New Philosophies of Social Science, p. 5.
7 Ibid.
8 For example, having counterposed the objective knowledge of positivism
to the normatively distorted knowledge of theology and metaphysics,
Comte began to reintroduce normative elements into positive knowledge

132
 Notes to pages 25-27

by speaking of the development of a positivist morality and politics.

Similarly, Comte's teleological philosophy of human history was consid-
ered by later positivists to have disturbingly metaphysical overtones. See
Outhwaite, New Philosophies of Social Science, pp. 5-6.
9 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 17. Another prominent philosopher of
science associated with logical positivism - though in some ways more as
a 'friendly critic' than a core adherent - was Karl Popper.
10 Symbolic logic, to be distinguished from Aristotelian 'syllogistic logic', is
composed of 'sentential' or 'propositional' logic on the one hand and
'quantiflcational logic' (also known as 'predicate calculus') on the other.
For an extended discussion of the development and characteristics of
symbolic logic, see Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, pp. 3-8.
11 See above, note 8.
12 This discussion is based heavily on Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, pp. 19-
31, and Fred R. Dallmayr, Language and Politics (Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 28-52. For parallel discussions,
see Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, Understanding and Social
Inquiry (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977),
pp. 77-9, as well as Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1975), chapter two.
13 See Dallmayr, Language and Politics, p. 29.
14 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 19.
15 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 20.
16 Ibid.
17 Dallmayr, Language and Politics, p. 30. As Dallmayr notes, one of the most
committed defenders of the referential theory of meaning was the
philosopher Bertrand Russell. See Dallmayr, pp. 29-32.
18 Dallmayr, Language and Politics, p. 36.
19 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 20.
20 Dallmayr, Language and Politics, pp. 36-7. An important exception, of
course, are strictly syntactical-analytical propositions.
21 Schlick, quoted in Dallmayr, Language and Politics, pp. 37-8.
22 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 20. An example is the statement 'The sky
is blue.'
One of the most staunchly argued positions was that of 'physicalism' -
the position that 'basic report sentences can and should be stated in
physicalist language, that is, in the form of quantitative descriptions
referring to concrete space-time points'. A position championed by both
Neurath and Carnap, the chief advantage to descriptions formulated in
physicalist terms is held to be their 'reliance on (presumably) inter-sensual
or intersubjective data'. See Dallmayr, Language and Politics, p. 34.
23 Karl-Otto Apel, Die Idee der Sprache in der Tradition des Humanismus von
Dante bis Vico, 3rd edn (Bonn: Bouvier, 1980), p. 29, quoted in Dallmayr,
Language and Politics, p. 29.

133
Notes to pages 27-30
24 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 20.
A derivation of symbolic logic holding particular importance for the
research design of logical positivism is the modus ponens or 'affirming the
antecedent' (A is the analytical statement; B is the synthetic statement):
If A, then B.
A
Therefore, B.
As Bechtel notes (p. 21), this effort to
explicate the meaning of all scientific discourse in terms of observa-
tion conditions is closely related to the very influential doctrine,
associated with the American physicist and mathematician Percy
Bridgman, of operational definitions. According to this doctrine, in
introducing a theoretical concept, it is necessary to specify operations
through which one can confirm or disconfirm statements using that
term. Bridgman's notion of an operational definition extends the
Positivists' conception of an observation term by supplying proce-
dures for producing the requisite observations/
25 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, pp. 21-2.
26 Schlick, quoted in Dallmayr, Language and Politics, p. 38. Typical is
Carnap's response to Heidegger's essay 'What is Metaphysics?':
in the domain of metaphysics, including all philosophy of value and
normative theory, logical analysis yields the negative result that the
alleged statements in this domain are entirely meaningless.
Quoted in Dallmayr, Language and Politics, p. 36.
27 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 19.
28 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 22.
29 Ibid.
30 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1968),
pp. 59-60.
31 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 23.
32 Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, pp. 32-3.
33 Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, p. 33.
34 Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, p. 37. Hempel was particularly
concerned to modify the deductive-nomological/covering law form of
explanation to allow for 'inductive-statistical' explanations. See Bechtel,
Philosophy of Science, p. 24.
35 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 24.
36 For further discussion of the distinction between the 'context of discovery'
and the 'context of justification', see Frederich Suppe, The Structure of
Scientific Theories, 2nd edn (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977), p. 125.
37 Note that it is of no consequence how we have arrived at this hypothesis
- a question relating to the 'context of discovery'.
38 Of course, should we ever notice, all things being equal, that water does
not boil at 100°C, we can consider the general proposition relating the

134
 Notes to pages 30-33
boiling of water to its temperature disconfirmed, thereby ensuring that the
quest to specify the causal relationship between temperature and boiling
(if any) will be reopened.
39 Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, p. 31.
40 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 25, emphasis in the original.
41 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 28.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 One of the more important modifications was the shift in emphasis,
stemming from the work of Karl Popper, from confirmation of true
hypotheses to the falsification of untrue hypotheses.
45 Bechtel, Philosophy of Science, p. 29.
46 For Popper's and Lakatos' contribution of the notions of (methodological)
'falsification' and 'sophisticated methodological falsificationism', respec-
tively, see Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery and Imre Lakatos,
'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in
I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1970). For a good introduction to
the contributions of Popper and Lakatos, see A. F. Chalmers, What is
This Thing Called Science?, 2nd edn (St Lucia, Queensland: University of
Queensland Press, 1982).
47 For another effort to identify the distinguishing characteristics of the
positivist tradition as a whole - one which does so in terms of four 'rules'
- see Leszek Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist
Thought, trans. Norbert Guterman (New York: Doubleday, 1968).
48 For a discussion of the on-going movement of fallibilistic positivist science
toward an ever closer approximation to the truth (understood as
correspondence to objective reality) - in Popper's terms, 'verisimilitude' -
see Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific
Knowledge, 3rd edn (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969),
chapter 10.
49 It should be noted that 'facts' have a special status in positivism: 'Facts'
refer 'to a class of phenomena which were believed to be in some
manner ... "given" in immediate experience and represented in an
indefeasible observation language.' Gunnell, 'Philosophy and Political
Theory', Government and Opposition, 14, No. 2, p. 208. Quoted in Roger
Tooze, 'International Political Economy', in Steve Smith, ed., International
Relations: British and American Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985),
p. 113.
50 Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century
Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 481,
quoted in Scott Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical Theory: Philosophy and
Political Inquiry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 8.
51 The Theory and Method of Political Analysis (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press,
1965), p. 12, quoted in Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical Theory, p. 8.

135
Notes to pages 34-37
52 The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 225-6, quoted in Warren, The Emergence of
Dialectical Theory, p. 11.
53 Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 8.
54 George E. G. Catlin, A Study of the Principles of Politics (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1930), p. 39.
55 The Political System, pp. 78, 86, 89, quoted in Warren, The Emergence of
Dialectical Theory, p. 9.
56 The Poverty ofHistoricism (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), pp. 1-2, quoted
in Fred Gareau, 'The Long, Uncertain Road to Social Science Maturity',
International Journal of Cognitive Sociology, 29, No. 3-4, (1988), p. 178.
57 Easton, The Political System, pp. 3-4, quoted in Warren, The Emergence of
Dialectical Theory, p. 7.
58 Nor has the adoption of the scientific method, to the degree that it has
occurred, been uniform across the social sciences. Notes Easton:
If the condition of political science represented the exhaustion of its
present potentialities, then there would be little justification in
voicing any concern about it. But comparison with the level of
achievement of other social sciences demonstrates what political
science could be doing. However much students of political life may
seek to escape the taint, if they were to eavesdrop on the whisper-
ings of their fellow social scientists, they would find that they are
almost generally stigmatized as the least advanced. They could
present society, they would hear, with at least a slice of bread but
they offer it only a crumb.
The Political System, p. 40, quoted in Warren,
The Emergence of Dialectical Theory, p. 7.
59 Kaspar D. Naegele, 'Some Observations on the Scope of Sociological
Analysis', in T. Parsons, M. Shils, and E. Naegele, eds., Theories of Society:
Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1961),
I, p. 3.
60 Eugene J. Meehan, Value Judgement and Social Science: Structures and
Processes (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1969), p. 147, quoted in Warren,
The Emergence of Dialectical Theory, p. 9.
61 Easton, The Political System, p. 45, quoted in Warren, The Emergence of
Dialectical Theory, p. 9.
62 The Political System, p. 225, quoted in Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical
Theory, p. 11, my emphasis.
63 Easton quoted in Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical Theory, p. 10.
64 Easton, The Political System, p. 221, quoted in Warren, The Emergence of
Dialectical Theory, p. 10, my emphasis.
65 Alan Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science: An Introduction to the
Methodology of Political Inquiry (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1969), p. 56,
quoted in Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical Theory, p. 11.
66 Popper, for example, felt that the logical positivists went too far in
asserting that value questions were 'meaningless'.

136
 Notes to pages 37-41
67 On this point, see Dante Germino, Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political
Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 83.
68 Heinz Eulau, The Behavioural Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random
House, 1964), p. 133, quoted in Warren, The Emergence of Dialectical Theory,
p. 10.

3 Reflexivity and International Relations theory

1 'The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations', in William
T. R. Fox, ed., Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 21.
2 Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1971), p. vii, emphasis in the original.
3 Yosef Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory
in a Post-Positivist Era', International Studies Quarterly, 33, No. 3 (1989),
pp. 249-50.
4 Although conceived independently, the elements of the definition of
reflexivity being advanced here are closely paralleled by those proposed
by Connolly under the rubric of 'theoretical self-consciousness', defined as
first, an effort to clarify for self and others the basic presumptions
and conceptual organization of the perspective brought to inquiry;
second, an assessment of the extent to which the available evidence
supports or contravenes the perspective; third, a full statement of the
normative import of the theory; and finally, an assessment of the
extent to which available evidence and other explicit considerations
justify acting in support of those normative conclusions.
See William Connolly, 'Theoretical Self-Consciousness', in
William Connolly and Glen Gordon, eds., Social Structure
and Political Theory (London: D. C. Heath, 1974), pp. 57-8.
5 And so it remains. Imre Lakatos' neo-positivist 'methodology of scientific
research programmes' is the most recent reformulation of the positivist
tradition, and because of its current popularity among International
Relations theorists, it bears special mention. The central distinctions
between Lakatos' formulation and that of his teacher, Karl Popper, are (i)
Lakatos' rejection of Popper's 'strict falsificationism', (ii) his shift of
emphasis from individual statements to meta-theoretical units, i.e. 're-
search programmes', as the proper concern of the philosophy of science (a
shift which is thoroughly consistent with trends in social and political
theory more generally), and (iii) his advocacy of tolerance of theoretical
pluralism. Nonetheless, Lakatos' 'sophisticated methodological falsifica-
tionism', like Popper's 'methodological falsificationism' before it, con-
tinues to uphold the core tenets of the positivist logic of investigation:
namely, (i) value-freedom in scientific knowledge, (ii) the methodological
unity of science, and, most importantly in terms of the concerns of this
chapter, (iii) the correspondence theory of truth.
On the latter point, note Lakatos' affirmation that 'the methodology
of scientific research programmes is better suited for approximating the

137
Notes to pages 42-43
truth in our actual universe than any other methodology'. Quoted in
A. F. Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science?, 2nd edn (St Lucia,
Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1982), p. 104, emphasis
added. Accordingly, it would seem that if Keohane's modernist-
positivist reading of Lakatos' philosophy of science is untenable, his
reading is nonetheless consistent with Lakatos' own understanding of
what ends his work is intended to serve. See Robert O. Keohane,
'International Institutions: Two Approaches', International Studies Quar-
terly, 32, No. 4 (1988), pp. 379-96, and Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J.
Walker, 'Speaking the Language of Exile', International Studies Quarterly,
34, No. 3 (1990), pp. 259-68.
6 It is true, of course, that neo-positivists such as Karl Popper implicitly
acknowledged the theory-dependent nature of empirical evidence, a
recognition which would seem to pose considerable problems for the
notion of truth as correspondence. Despite this recognition, however,
'truth as correspondence' remained the regulative ideal of positivist social
science, while the difficulties posed by theory-dependence were addressed
in the efforts to specify 'rules of correspondence'.
7 The expression is Richard Rorty's. See his Consequences of Pragmatism
(Brighton: Harvester, 1982), p. xxvi.
8 For a useful introduction to these traditions, see Jim George and David
Campbell, 'Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical
Social Theory and International Relations', International Studies Quarterly,
34, no. 3 (1990), pp. 269-94.
9 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy (Madison: The University
of Wisconsin Press, 1989), p. 201, my emphasis.
10 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy, p. 201.
11 It is important not to confuse the notion of the inherently politico-
normative content of paradigms with the considerably less radical
argument (in that it remained consistent with the regulative ideal of
'truth as correspondence') advanced by post-behaviouralists: i.e., that
scholars needed to become more aware of their personal 'value biases'
and the way these could 'distort' the accuracy of empirical findings. In
contrast, the argument from theoretical reflexivity is (i) that the (politico-)
normative dimension of scholarship is not the property of individual
scholars but adheres to the process of scholarly inquiry itself; (ii) that the
politico-normative content of scholarship is not a 'contamination' of
empirical research, but, in fact, constitutive of all such research (e.g., in
detennining what will count as a fact). For a clear statement of the post-
behavioural position on values and social science, see David Easton, 'The
New Revolution in Political Science', in Easton, The Political System: An
Inquiry Into the State of Political Science, 2nd edn (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1971), pp. 323-48.
12 See chapter five below.
13 For a useful discussion of the distinction between natural and social

138
 Notes to pages 44-45
sciences in terms of the incommensurability thesis, see Steven Lukes,
Moral Conflict and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), chapter
three.
14 Karl Popper, 'Normal Science and Its Dangers', in I. Lakatos and
A. Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 56.
15 The fact that a neutral observation language cannot be used to adjudicate
normative claims is, of course, recognized by positivists as well, and goes
a long way in explaining traditional positivist antipathy to debates about
the validity of competing normative claims.
It is also important that the difference between paradigms not be seen
as one of a simple conflict over values - a position which implies that
while agreement on the facts is possible, disagreement over values lies at
the root of the failure to achieve intersubjective consensus. Values may
indeed differ across paradigms, but the notion of what is to count as a
fact is equally contested.
16 As Bernstein notes in his review of the 'father of modern philosophy':
With a chilling clarity Descartes leads us with an apparent and
ineluctable necessity to a grand and seductive Either/Or. Either there
is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge,
or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with
madness, with intellectual and moral chaos.
See Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism:
Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 18, emphasis in the original.
17 Charles Taylor, 'The Diversity of Goods' in his Philosophy and the Human
Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 230.
It is, of course, true that only the logical positivists advocated the
extreme position that normative claims were just so much 'nonsense', and
that others in the positivist tradition - Popper, for example - were more
sympathetic to the idea that normative theorizing could produce knowl-
edge. So strong is the notion of 'truth as correspondence' in the positivist
tradition, however, that even the most sympathetic have been hard
pressed to explain how reason could serve in assessing the truth value of
normative claims.
18 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979), p. 64.
19 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1988).
20 Jiirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. Thomas
McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).
21 Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. According to Bernstein (p. 86, emphasis
in the original),
Kuhn did not introduce the incommensurability thesis in order to
call into the question the possibility of comparing theories and
rationally evaluating them, but to clarify what we are doing when we
compare [incommensurable] theories.

139
Notes to pages 46-49
22 An example of how a judgment about contending paradigms may be
made on the basis of their politico-normative content is provided by
Connolly. He argues that where evidence is insufficient to dictate the
choice between competing theories in social science (as is the case when
incommensurability obtains), a certain presumption should operate in
favour of the theory which is more optimistic. His reasoning is as
follows:
concepts and beliefs about social life help to some degree to
constitute that life. Therefore, privileging the more optimistic
assumption ... might well help both to bring out evidence in its
support previously unavailable and to contribute itself to the optimistic
possibility. Thus the shared belief in a society that people must seek
aggressively to exploit others justifies that conduct on the part of the
privileged and contributes thereby to the assurance that such
relationships are inevitable. Similarly, conduct based on more
optimistic beliefs can sometimes contribute to their fulfilment.
'Theoretical Self-Consciousness', p. 64, emphasis in the original.
Of course, one might well dispute Connolly's reasoning in developing his
guidelines for theory choice. Still, aside from the specifics of his position,
what is worth noting is that he is engaging in a form of reasoned
assessment of incommensurable frameworks in terms of their politico-
normative content.
23 Lapid, 'The Third Debate', p. 236.
24 See E. H. Carr, The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the
Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1939).
25 For a collection of contributions to this second debate, see Klaus Knorr
and James N. Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches to International Politics
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969).
26 Mark Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate',
Millennium, 16, No. 2 (1987), p. 231.
27 Michael Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', in Margot Light and A. J. R.
Groom, eds., International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory (London:
Pinter, 1985), p. 20.
28 Lapid, 'The Third Debate', p. 239.
29 Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', p. 9.
30 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', p. 12.
31 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', pp. 12-13.
32 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', p. 13.
33 Ibid.
34 Apart from disagreeing on the content and labels of contending para-
digms, authors also disagree on the issue of the number of relevant
paradigms, some identifying many more than three. Three does seem to
be the most common number, however, and in this regard Banks is once
again representative.
35 The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

140
 Notes to pages 49-55

36 International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York:

Macmillan, 1987).
37 Global Problems and World Order (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1986).
Similarly, in his overview of the sub-field of international political
economy, Robert Gilpin speaks in terms of the 'Nationalist', 'Liberal', and
'Marxist' perspectives. See his The Political Economy of International
Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).
38 Michael Banks, as quoted in Lapid, 'The Third Debate', p. 235.
39 Lapid, 'The Third Debate', p. 237.
40 See Lapid, 'The Third Debate', pp. 249-50.
41 As has already been noted, my notion of 'theoretical reflexivity', and of
the three possible stances, is inspired by and derivative of Richard
Bernstein's Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. See especially Part Two.
42 For Holsti's interventions, see The Dividing Discipline, as well as his
response to Lapid, 'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which are the Fairest
Theories of All?', International Studies Quarterly, 33, No. 3, (1989),
255-61.
43 'Mirror, Mirror', pp. 255-6, my emphasis.
44 'Mirror, Mirror', p. 256.
45 'Mirror, Mirror', p. 259.
46 'Mirror, Mirror', p. 256.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 The Dividing Discipline, p. viii.
50 'Mirror, Mirror', p. 258, emphasis in the original.
51 The Dividing Discipline, p. vii.
52 'Mirror, Mirror', p. 257.
53 'Mirror, Mirror', p. 259.
54 'Mirror, Mirror', p. 255.
55 'Commensurable and therefore comparable'.
56 Indeed, as McKinlay and Little observe, with obvious reference to those
who have adopted 'Stance I', it is the refusal of those engaged in the
Third Debate to acknowledge the ideological character of their work that
leads them into 'endowing their model with a spurious empirical or
scientific validity, which is made all the more striking in contrast to the
mere "ideology" offered by other models'. Global Problems and World
Order, p. 272.
57 Steve Smith, 'Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Devel-
opment of International Relations as a Social Science', Millennium, 16, No.
2 (1987), pp. 189-206.
58 The employment of the word 'guide' is meant to indicate realism's
importance for the practice of state managers in both a 'practical' as well
as a 'technical/instrumental' sense. For a discussion of the distinction
between the two senses as manifest in the realist tradition, see Richard K.

141
Notes to pages 55-58
Ashley, 'Political Realism and Human Interests', International Studies
Quarterly, 25, No. 2 (1981), pp. 204-36.
59 Smith, 'Paradigm Dominance', p. 197.
60 'Paradigm Dominance', p. 202. 'After all', notes Smith, 'if you are not a
great power, in Morgenthau's use of the term, what foreign policy options
do you have?' (p. 201).
61 Hayward R. Alker, Jr and Thomas J. Biersteker, 'The Dialectics of World
Order: Notes for a Future Archaeologist of International Savoir Faire',
International Studies Quarterly, 28, No. 2 (1984), pp. 138-9.
62 'The Dialectics of World Order', p. 139. For Alker and Biersteker's efforts
to link contending paradigms to particular political agendas, see Figure 4,
p. 138.
63 'The Dialectics of World Order', p. 267.
64 Ibid.
65 'The Dialectics of World Order', pp. 269, 270.
66 'The Dialectics of World Order', pp. 272-3.
67 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York:
Continuum, 1973), p. 197.
68 See James N. Rosenau, 'Order and Disorder in the Study of World
Polities', in R. Marghoori and B. Ramberg, eds., Globalism Versus Realism:
International Relations Third Debate (Boulder: Westview, 1982), pp. 4, 5.
Rosenau also affirms that 'temperaments tend to remain ... fixed and
resistant to new evidence' (p. 7), underscoring further the impotence and
irrelevance of reasoned argumentation in the process of paradigm choice.
69 Another intervention which would fit into this category is that of
Richard W. Mansbach and Yale H. Ferguson, The Elusive Quest: Theory
and International Politics (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina
Press, 1988). In addition, certain of Gilpin's comments in his The Political
Economy of International Relations might also qualify him as at least a
part-time proponent of the stance of 'incommensurable and therefore
incomparable'.
70 McKinlay and Little, Global Problems and World Order, p. 273.
71 Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond Interna-
tional Relations Theory', in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its
Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 207, 217,
emphasis in the original. Cox's piece was first published in 1981 in
Millennium, 10, No. 2 (1982), pp. 126-55. Cox (p. 207) notes further that:
All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position
in time and space, specifically social and political time and space.
The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or
social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining
power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past
experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future.
72 Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders', p. 207.
73 'Social Forces, States and World Orders', pp. 207-8.
74 Ibid., my emphasis.

142
 Notes to pages 59-62

75 'Social Forces, States and World Orders', p. 208.

76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 'Social Forces, States and World Orders', p. 209.
79 Ibid.
80 'Social Forces, States and World Orders', p. 210.
81 That is, its ability to produce cumulative, law-based explanations of
'reality' which can serve as guides to action.
82 See Stephen Gill, ed., Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), especially the
introduction.
83 Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to
International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 30, emphasis in
the original.
84 Discourses of Global Politics, p. 191, emphasis in the original.
85 Foucault's exploration of power-knowledge discourses, already noted,
stands as the clearest example.
86 Richard K. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a
Critical Social Theory of International Polities', Alternatives, 12, No. 4
(1987), p. 408.
87 For an accessible overview of postmodernist contributions to the study of
world politics, and to which this discussion is deeply indebted, see
George, Discourses of Global Politics, especially chapter eight.
88 See R. B. J. Walker, 'The Prince and the "Pauper": Tradition, Modernity
and Practice in the Theory of International Relations', in James Der Derian
and Michael J. Shapiro, eds., International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern
Readings of World Politics (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1989).
89 See James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
90 See Bradley Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
91 See, for example, Martin Jay's discussion of Foucault, in Marxism and
Totality (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 'Epilogue',
pp. 510-37.
92 Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons
of ModernityfPostmodernity (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991), p. 151, emphasis
in the original. The argument that postmodernism suffers from a
'performative contradiction' has been put most forcefully by Habermas.
See, for example, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures
(Cambridge: Policy Press, 1987).
93 Quoted in Jay, Marxism and Totality, p. 526, emphasis in the original.
94 Jay, Marxism and Totality, p. 526.
95 See, for example, Pauline Rosenau, 'Once Again Into the Fray: Interna-
tional Relations Confronts the Humanities', Millennium, 19, No. 1 (1990),
pp. 83-110.

143
Notes to pages 62-65

96 Jim George and David Campbell, 'Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration
of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations', Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, 34, No. 3 (1990), p. 289.
97 Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, 'Reading Dissidence/Writing the
Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International
Studies', International Studies Quarterly, 34, No. 3 (1990), p. 389.
98 'Reading Dissidence', p. 389.
99 Ashley, 'Living on the Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War', in
Der Derian and Shapiro, International/Intertextual Relations, p. 278, my
emphasis.
100 See Mark Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate',
Millennium, 16, No. 2 (1987), pp. 231-49; N. J. Rengger, 'Going Critical? A
Response to Hoffman', Millennium, 17, No. 1 (1988), pp. 81-9; Mark
Hoffman, 'Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory',
Millennium, 17, No. 1, pp. 91-5.
101 'Going Critical?', p. 83.
102 Ibid.
103 'Going Critical?', p. 85. The phrase is Thomas Nagel's.
104 For example, Cox's rejection of problem-solving theory on the grounds
that it 'rests upon a false premise, since the social and political order is
not fixed but . . . is changing' ('Social Forces, States and World Orders',
p. 209) is a clear foundationalist appeal to the 'true nature' of reality - an
appeal which is arguably in contradiction to a reflexive stance.
105 This epistemological category, like those which follow it ('feminist
standpoint' and 'feminist postmodernism') are, of course, taken from the
well-known work of Sandra Harding. See her The Science Question in
Feminism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986).
106 Mary Hawkesworth, quoted in Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike
Peterson, 'The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist Subversions of IR
Theory', Alternatives, 16, No. 1 (1991), p. 72. Examples of feminist
empiricism in the study of world politics are: Betsy Thorn, 'Women in
International Organizations: Room at the Top: The Situation in Some
United Nations Organizations', in C. F. Epstein and R. L. Coser, eds.,
Access to Power: Cross-National Studies of Women and Elites (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1981), and Carol Riegelman Lubin and Anne
Winslow, Social Justice for Women: The International Labour Organizations
and Women (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990).
107 V. Spike Peterson, 'Introduction' to Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of
International Relations Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 19,
emphasis in the original.
108 Peterson, Gendered States, p. 18, emphasis in the original.
109 Sarah Brown, 'Feminism, International Theory, and International
Relations of Gender Inequality', Millennium, 17, No. 3 (1988), p. 472.
110 Hawkesworth, quoted in Runyan and Peterson, 'The Radical Future of
Realism', pp. 73-4.

144
 Notes to pages 66-73
111 Runyan and Peterson, 'The Radical Future of Realism', p. 74.
112 Ibid., emphasis in the original.
113 Hawkesworth, quoted in Runyan and Peterson, 'The Radical Future of
Realism', pp. 74-5.
114 Marysia Zalewski, 'Feminist Theory and International Relations', in Mike
Bowker and Robin Brown, eds., From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and
World Politics in the 1980s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993),
pp. 136-7.
Postmodernism's problematic treatment of the subject will be taken up
in chapter five below.
115 Sandra Whitworth, 'Gender in the Inter-Paradigm Debate', Millennium,
18, No. 2 (1989), pp. 265-72.
116 Zalewski, 'Feminist Theory and International Relations', p. 140.
117 Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
118 Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era, p. 63.
119 Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era, p. 14.
120 Kathy Ferguson, quoted in Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International
Relations in a Postmodern Era, p. 63.
121 Whitworth, Review of Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and Interna-
tional Relations in a Postmodern Era, in Canadian Journal of Political Science,
28, No. 1 (1995), p. 178. In Whitworth's words, when Sylvester 'suggests
that socialist feminism is the appropriate politics of postmodern
feminism, she is trying to pull an el(l)e-phant out of a hat'.
122 Smith, 'Paradigm Dominance', p. 202, my emphasis.
123 The original reads 'The sort of philosophy one chooses thus depends on
what sort of person one is/ Quoted in J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human
Interests, p. 208.

4 Human consciousness and International Relations theory

1 'The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations', in William
T. R. Fox, ed., Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 21.
2 The New Science of Giambattista Vico (1744), trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin
and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), para.
331, p. 96.
3 Also sometimes referred to as 'hermeneutics'.
4 On this point, see Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, eds.,
Understanding and Social Inquiry (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1977), pp. 77-80. The positivist philosopher Otto Neurath
has equated Verstehen techniques with a 'cup of coffee': something which
might increase the 'serendipity' of the social scientist, but which has no
place in empirical work. See Dallmayr and McCarthy, Understanding and
Social Inquiry, p. 6.

145
Notes to pages 74r-78
5 For example, in designing questionnaires, guiding the researcher in the
interview process, etc.
6 Thomas A. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), p. 153.
7 It can, of course, be argued that 'meaning-oriented behaviouralists' have
brought 'subjective meanings' into the public realm only by operationa-
lizing those meanings in terms of specific forms of behaviour - i.e., a
specific opinion on an issue is operationalized in terms of a specific
response to a question in an opinion survey. From this perspective, what
is being correlated is not a 'subjective meaning' with a specific behaviour,
but rather one type of behaviour (e.g., the response to an opinion survey)
with another (e.g., a vote in an election).
8 Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, 'The Interpretive Turn', in
P. Rabinow and W. Sullivan, eds., Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look,
rev. edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 7.
9 Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', in Rabinow and
Sullivan, Interpretive Social Science, p. 46.
This is not to say that human beings are always fully cognizant of their
participation in this on-going self-definition and self-interpretation
process. Rather, in Giddens' terms, the activity of self-definition and self-
interpretation often takes place at the level of 'practical consciousness'
(and not the more explicitly self-conscious level of 'discursive conscious-
ness'). See Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the
Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), p. 375.
10 As was noted in the previous chapter.
11 Following Winch, Anthony Giddens has attempted to theorize the two
levels at which social science is interpretive. See his discussion of the
'double hermeneutic' in The Constitution of Society, p. 374.
12 For example, the regularities in the interaction of molecules which serve
as the focus of chemistry need not be considered in relation to any 'self-
interpretations' or 'self-definitions' of those molecules.
13 Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', p. 48.
14 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', p. 58.
15 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', p. 59.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
As Taylor notes, one particularly promising way of conceptualizing
'intersubjective meanings', the full implications of which are beyond the
scope of this book, is as 'rules' having both normative and constitutive
effect. Once again, Anthony Giddens has made an important contribution
in this regard. See his discussion of 'structuration theory' in New Rules of
Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociologies (London:
Hutchinson, 1976). For a useful discussion and critique of Giddens'
contribution, see John B. Thompson, 'The Theory of Structuration', in
David Held and John B. Thompson, eds., Social Theory of Modern Societies:

146
 Notes to pages 78-81
Anthony Giddens and His Critics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989).
18 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', p. 57.
19 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', p. 52.
20 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', pp. 52-3.
21 Rabinow and Sullivan, 'The Interpretive Turn', p. 6.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid. The work of Hans-Georg Gadamer has particular relevance to this
point. For a good introduction to his work in this regard, see Georgia
Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition, and Reason (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1987).
24 'The Interpretive Turn', p. 7. Rabinow and Sullivan are quoting Taylor. Or
again, as Taylor notes,
It is not just that all or most people in our society have a given
set of ideas in their heads and subscribe to a given set of goals.
The meanings and norms implicit in these practices are not just in
the minds of the actors but are out there in the practices
themselves, practices which cannot be conceived as a set of
individual actions, but which are essentially modes of social
relation, of mutual action.
'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', pp. 56-7.
25 Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', p. 43.
26 It should, of course, be emphasized that to 'make sense' of some
behaviour in no way implies that the behaviour is rational. On the other
hand, as Taylor notes, 'even contradictory, irrational action is 'made sense
of, when we understand why it was engaged in'. 'Interpretation and the
Sciences of Man', p. 43.
27 From the perspective of the 'hermeneutic circle', then, the proper analogy
for the methodology of an interpretive approach is not the method of
physics (the subsumption of empirical regularities under covering laws),
nor that of Dilthey's 'romantic hermeneutics' (empathic identification), but
rather the learning of a second language (the 'web of meaning' which
constitutes observed social practices) and then the translation of that
language into one's mother tongue (the concepts of the social scientist).
For a discussion of hermeneutics not as 'empathy' but as a form of
'translation', see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York:
Crossroad, 1988).
28 Though it might be argued that the formulations of some interpretive
theorists - starting with Dilthey - have tended in this direction. For a
critique of this more limited notion of an interpretive approach to the
social world, see Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1975), chapter four. For a response which argues
that Fay's critique does not apply to all forms of interpretive social
science - in particular, to that proposed by Charles Taylor - see Michael
Gibbons, 'Introduction: The Politics of Interpretation', in M. Gibbons, ed.,
Interpreting Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).

147
Notes to pages 81-82
29 I have placed the word 'recovering' in inverted commas to underscore
the problematic nature of the 'recovery' process. Specifically, the notion
of 'recovering' the intersubjective meanings particular to a community
of human agents is problematic for at least two reasons. First, though
such meanings are always the product of an on-going process of self-
interpretation and self-definition, as was noted above, that process is
rarely one about which human agents are reflexively self-conscious. As
a consequence, the human agents themselves may be incapable of
articulating the 'intersubjective meanings' which constitute their prac-
tices. To 'recover' unarticulated 'intersubjective meanings' is then no
simple and straightforward activity.
Secondly, the notion of 'recovery' must also be nuanced through the
recognition that all acts of 'recovery' involve interpretation. That is, the
'reading' of a specific 'web of meaning' and social practice is, in keeping
with the reality of the 'double hermeneutic', expressed in the language
and terms of the social scientist. And because there is no way to escape
the 'hermeneutic circle' - because there is never any way to establish the
validity of a particular reading beyond any doubt - every 'reading', no
matter how plausible or sophisticated, remains potentially contestable.
In short, an interpretive approach does not alter in any way the sense in
which a 'science' of international politics is 'interpretive' in the way that
all scientific activity is 'interpretive' - i.e., all scientific activity involves the
'interpretation' of data in terms of paradigm-specific conventions about
what constitutes 'valid knowledge'. In other words, the focus on the
'intersubjective meanings' which constitute social practices is no escape
from the 'Cartesian anxiety' (see chapter three). For an argument which
does advocate the incorporation of 'intersubjective meanings' into Interna-
tional Relations theory as a means of getting around the problems posed
by the paradigm-determined nature of all knowledge, see Roger Tooze,
'Economic Belief Systems and Understanding International Relations', in
Richard Little and Steve Smith, eds., Belief Systems and International
Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), pp. 132-3.
30 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', p. 59, my emphasis.
31 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', p. 46, my emphasis.
32 Because an interpretive approach focuses first and foremost on 'inter-
subjective meanings', there is no difficulty in accommodating the need to
examine, for example, unintended consequences of human behaviour or
structural dimensions of human interaction (as there would be were
'subjective meanings' the exclusive focus).
It should be noted that although Taylor's work is being privileged in
this chapter, contemporary interpretive social science draws on and has
been influenced by at least five distinct traditions, including (i) the
tradition of phenomenology/ethnomethodology as developed by
Husserl and Schutz; (ii) the 'linguistic tradition' as developed by the
later Wittgenstein and Winch (and into which Taylor's work falls); (iii)

148
 Notes to pages 82-84
the hermeneutic tradition as developed by Heidegger and Gadamer; (iv)
the tradition of Critical Theory as developed by Marx and Habermas;
and (v) the tradition of genealogy as developed by Nietzsche and
Foucault. Despite their differences, the five traditions do share the
commonality of seeing the dimension of 'meaning' as both 'intersubjec-
tive' in nature and 'constitutive' of social reality. For useful introduc-
tions to the various traditions represented in contemporary interpretive
social science, see Gibbons, Interpreting Politics, Dallmayr and McCarthy,
Understanding and Social Inquiry, and Rabinow and Sullivan, Interpretive
Social Science.
For a critical discussion of the distinctive characteristics of Taylor's
approach - an approach Gibbons terms 'Critical-Expressivism' - see
Gibbons, 'Introduction: The Politics of Interpretation', in Gibbons, Inter-
preting Politics. For an interesting comparison of this approach with that of
genealogy, see Michael T. Gibbons, 'Interpretation, Genealogy and
Human Agency', in Terence Ball, ed., Idioms of Inquiry: Critique and
Renewal in Political Science (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1987).
33 Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', p. 47.
For a good discussion of the place of the 'hermeneutics of recovery' in
interpretive social science, see Michael Gibbons, 'Introduction', in
Gibbons, Interpreting Politics.
34 Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edn (New
York: Knopf, 1985), p. 4.
35 Politics Among Nations, p. 5.
36 Richard K. Ashley, 'Political Realism and Human Interests', International
Studies Quarterly, 25, No. 2 (1981), p. 207.
37 Ashley, 'Political Realism and Human Interests', pp. 209-10.
38 Jim George, 'The Study of International Relations and the Positivist/
Empiricist Theory of Knowledge', in R. Higgott, ed., New Directions in
International Relations? Australian Perspectives (Canberra: The Australian
National University, 1988), p. 93. See also Jim George, Discourses of Global
Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1994), pp. 172-6.
39 Michael Nicholson, who stands as one of the most sophisticated advocates
of naturalism in the discipline, provides an excellent example of the
positivistic incorporation of Verstehen. He notes that:
A social scientist with a good empathetic understanding of his
subject-matter is more likely to seize on goals which are fruitful than
one who has little understanding of his subject. However, the
empathy is a means to an end. The tests of goals are the indirect
ones and empathy as such plays no part in the logic of the
explanation, however large a part it played in suggesting the form of
the explanation in the first place ... The test of empathy [Verstehen]
is not its intensity but its predictions. It is a useful guide, but the
discipline of testing must be given primacy.

149
 Notes to pages 85-88
51 See Robert Axelrod, ed., Structure of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1976).
52 See Ernest May, 'Lessons' of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in
American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). See
also, Ernest May and Richard Neustadt, Thinking in Time (New York: Free
Press, 1986).
53 See Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg and Janice Stein, 'A Framework for
Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13,
No. 1 (1969), pp. 75-101.
54 For an excellent overview of the distinctive characteristics of these
different approaches and techniques, as well as references, see Smith,
'Belief Systems and the Study of International Relations', pp. 17-27.
55 The term is A. N. Oppenheim's. See his 'Psychological Processes in World
Society', in Michael Banks, ed., Conflict in World Society (Brighton:
Harvester, 1984), p. 114.
56 Smith, 'Belief Systems and the Study of International Relations', p. 11.
57 Smith, 'Belief Systems and the Study of International Relations', p. 16.
58 See Robert O. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches',
International Studies Quarterly, 32, No. 4 (1988), pp. 379-96. It should be
noted that what in this essay are termed the 'interpretive' and 'positivist'
approaches, Keohane refers to as 'reflective' and 'rationalist' approaches,
respectively.
59 'International Institutions', p. 381, my emphasis. In addition to the
interpretive efforts undertaken by Ruggie, Kratochwil, Alker, Ashley,
Haas and Cox, one might also note those of Nicholas Onuf, Alexander
Wendt, and Raymond Duvall. See Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making:
Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, S.C.:
University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-
Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organi-
zation, 41, No. 3 (1987), pp. 335-70.
60 'International Institutions', p. 379.
61 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:
Regimes as Intervening Variables', in S. Krasner, ed., International Regimes
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2. The definition continues:
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are
standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations.
Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and imple-
menting collective choice.
62 For a representative sampling, see Krasner, International Regimes, as well
as Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1985).
63 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Organization:
A State of the Art on an Art of the State', International Organization, 40,
No. 4 (1986), p. 764.

151
Notes to page 88
64 'International Organization', p. 771. Nor are they daunted by predictable
attempts by at least some members of the International Relations
community to discredit interpretive approaches, (p. 765):
Interpretive epistemologies that stress the intimate relationship
between validation and the uncovering of intersubjective meanings
are simply too well developed today to be easily dismissed by
charges of subjectivism - or, more likely in the arena of international
relations theory, of idealism.
65 For example, Kratochwil and Ruggie argue that by treating the norms
which are an integral part of regimes as intersubjective elements of a 'web
of meaning' which form the 'constitutive basis of regimes' - instead of the
more common practice of treating them as 'causal variables' determining
behaviour - regimes can be seen to be vibrant and robust even when
norms are ignored in specific instances. See the discussion by Kratochwil
in 'Regimes, Interpretation and the 'Science' of Politics: A Reappraisal',
Millennium, 17, No. 2 (1988), pp. 277-8.
Similarly, they argue that recognizing the intersubjective nature of the
'principles', 'norms', etc. which constitute regimes as social practices
(and not as timeless behavioural regularities) also provides a means of
theorizing the change within and of regimes. In short, regimes are
subject to change because they are the product of an on-going process
of community self-interpretation and self-definition in response to
changing context. As such, an interpretive approach to the study of
regimes avoids positivism's problematic assumption that 'once the
machinery is in place, actors merely remain programmed by it'.
'International Organization', p. 770.
It is lamentable - if not surprising given the traditional antipathy in the
discipline to meta-theoretical questions - that in a recent reprinting of
Kratochwil and Ruggie's 'International Organization' the discussion of the
need for interpretive methodologies has been deleted. See Paul F. Diehl,
ed., The Politics of International Organizations: Patterns and Insights (Chicago:
Dorsey Press, 1989), pp. 17-27.
66 Kratochwil and Ruggie, 'International Organization', p. 774.
67 Nor is this the only difficulty in their treatment of interpretive social
science. Even as they are promoting interpretive social science as a distinct
alternative to positivism, for example, the formulation of regimes as
intersubjective in nature because they involve 'converging expectations'
comes dangerously close to confusing the important distinction, noted
earlier by Taylor, between intersubjective meanings and consensus in
terms of subjective meanings. Similarly, in an earlier piece, Kratochwil
seems to link an interpretive approach to an analysis of the 'background
of intentions', rather than the intersubjective meanings which make
subjective intentions possible in the first place. See Friedrich Kratochwil,
'Errors have their advantage', International Organization, 38, No. 2 (1984),
p. 319. It should be noted that Kratochwil has revised his position in a

152
 Notes to pages 89-91

fashion more in line with interpretive social science in more recent

contributions.
68 For example, liberal trade and monetary regimes.
69 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International
Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
70 A formulation with strong affinities to that of Charles Taylor.
71 Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p. 179.
72 Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p. 180.
73 Ibid.
74 It is even possible that with this latest turn in neorealist theory, there
may be hope for a rediscovery and revaluation of the contributions of
those classical realists who - in contrast to neorealists - saw even
conflictual, coercive forms of state interaction such as the balance of
power' as 'social institutions', comprised of rules and roles, and serving
to regulate the conflict-prone 'anarchical society' of states. The contribu-
tion of Hedley Bull - in particular, his The Anarchical Society: A Study of
Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) - is
perhaps the prime example here, though one might read Morgenthau's
comments on balance of power as a moral consensus (Politics Among
Nations, chapter 14) as an attempt to draw attention to the intersubjective
meanings underlying the practices which together comprise the 'balance
of power'.
75 We are reminded here of Martin Wight's affirmation, in a formulation
having obvious affinity with the positivist assumption of naturalism, that
international politics is 'the realm of recurrence and repetition'; 'the field
in which political action is most regularly necessitous'. Martin Wight,
'Why is There No International Theory?' in H. Butterfield and M. Wight,
eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 26. On naturalism, see chapter
two above.
76 Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural
Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989),
p. 14.
77 In this sense, interpretive social science must be seen as standing in a
'relational contradiction' to the realist tradition; as being both 'life-giving'
(in providing realism with a way of overcoming anomalies in the study of
regimes) as well as 'life-taking' (in undermining realism's foundational
'myth' of the essentially unchanging and self-reproducing nature of
international politics). On the notion of 'relational contradictions' as
simultaneously 'life-giving' and 'life-taking', as both sustaining and
undermining, see Robert L. Heilbroner, Marxism: For and Against (New
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980), chapter two.
78 Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond Interna-
tional Relations Theory', in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its
Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 218.

153
Notes to pages 91-92
79 See Richard K. Ashley, 'Living on the Border Lines: Man, Poststructur-
alism and War', in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, eds.,
International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics
(Toronto: Lexington Books, 1989); Richard K. Ashley, 'Untying the
Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique',
Millennium, 17 (1988), pp. 227-62; and David Campbell, Writing Security:
United States' Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1992), respectively. For a useful introduc-
tion and overview to the contributions of these postmodernists and
others, see Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics, especially chapter
eight.
80 The notion of gender as 'packages of expectations' is Cynthia Enloe's . See
her path-breaking work, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense
of International Politics (London: Pandora, 1989), as well as her more recent
The Morning After: Sexual Politics At the End of the Cold War (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993). See also Sandra Whitworth, Feminism
and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1994).
In a related vein, Jean Elshtain's Women and War (New York: Basic
Books, 1987) explores the intersubjective meanings associated with the
ethic of 'armed civic virtue', and the attendant gendered identities of men
- (public) 'just warriors' - and women - (private) 'beautiful souls' -
bequeathed to Western moderns. For a critique which argues that while
Elshtain's work serves to underscore the socially constructed reception of
gender differences, it does not adequately address the social construction
of gender as difference, see Sarah Brown, 'Feminism, International
Theory, and International Relations of Gender Inequality', Millennium, 17,
No. 3 (1988), pp. 461-75.
81 Of course, while the possibility of fundamental change may serve as an
antidote to positivist/realist-inspired pessimism about the possibility of
progress - a pessimism grounded in the assumption of the essentially
unchanging (and unchangeable) nature of international politics - it is
not sufficient, in and of itself, to dispel all forms of pessimism. For
example, it is quite possible to accept the potential for changing existing
social practices while maintaining that efforts to effect progress through
change of social practices inevitably make things worse. Similarly, one
can argue that the recognition of the possibility of change does not, on
its own, necessarily lead to emancipation, in that the latter also requires
an independent, normative judgment about the way the world should
be.
82 Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 310.
83 'International Institutions', p. 381.
84 On the distinction between 'traditional' and 'critical' theory, see Max
Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', in Horkheimer, Critical
Theory: Selected Essays (New York: Continuum, 1989), pp. 188-243. What

154
 Notes to pages 93-94

Horkheimer calls 'traditional theory', Cox terms 'problem-solving theory'.

See chapter three above.
85 It is ironic, in this regard, that one of the most insightful analyses of the
way intersubjective meanings constitute not only regulatory institutions
within the global order but the global order itself is to be found in Ruggie's
discussion of the shift from the medieval to the modern world system. See
John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity:
Toward a Neorealist Synthesis', in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics,
pp. 131-57. It is not clear how Ruggie reconciles his historicist sensitivity
with the reification of the state/inter-state system that his realism would
seem to require, and that his meta-theoretical pronouncements on the
appropriate subject matter of interpretively oriented analysis reinforce.
86 This concern can be seen quite clearly, for example, in Cox's Gramscian-
inspired efforts to develop an historicist approach which focuses on the
intersubjective meanings which predominate in a given context, and how
changes in those meanings give rise to changes in global order. Although
a full discussion of Cox's conception of hegemony in international politics
is beyond the scope of this study, it is significant that what distinguishes
it from the positivist-inspired neorealist conception of hegemony is that
Cox's Gramscian notion of hegemony 'joins an ideological and inter-
subjective element to the brute power relationship'. 'Postscript 1985', in
Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 246. See also Cox, 'Gramsci,
Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method, Millennium,
12, No. 2 (1983), pp. 162-75.
87 It is important to recognize, moreover, that the change in intersubjective
meanings which is the product of the on-going process of collective self-
interpretation and self-definition cannot be equated with a change in
subjective 'preferences', as is suggested by Keohane. Subjective prefer-
ences may indeed change, but such a change would not result in a
fundamental change as would be the case of change in intersubjective
meanings of which subjective preferences are derivative. As such,
Keohane's formulation of intersubjectivity as 'preferences' indicates again
the difficulties experienced by mainstream, positivist-inspired theorists in
comprehending the nature of the interpretivist challenge. See Keohane,
'International Institutions', p. 391.
88 For example, Robert Keohane, operating from a Lakatosian positivist
position, faults interpretive approaches for their failure to develop an
adequate 'research program that could be employed by students of world
polities'. 'Waltzian neorealism', he notes,
has such a research program; so does neoliberal institutionalism,
which has focused on the evolution and impact of international
regimes. Until the reflective [i.e., interpretive] scholars or others
sympathetic to their arguments have delineated such a research
program and shown in particular studies that it can iUuminate
important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins
of the field, largely invisible to the preponderance of empirical

155
Notes to pages 95-99
researchers, most of whom explicitly or implicitly accept one or
another versions of rationalistic [i.e., positivistic] premises.
'International Institutions', p. 392.
For an 'interpretivist' response to and criticism of Keohane's positivisti-
cally informed discussion of interpretive approaches to international
politics, see R. B. J. Walker, 'History and Structure in the Theory of
International Studies', Millennium, 18, No. 2 (1989).

5 International Relations theory and social criticism

1 'The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations', in William
T. R. Fox, ed., Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 18.
2 One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 156, emphasis in the
original.
3 Steve Smith, 'The Forty Years' Detour: The Resurgence of Normative
Theory in International Relations', Millennium, 21, No. 3 (1992), p. 489.
4 'Thinking Theory Thoroughly', in The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, rev.
edn (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), p. 22.
It is clear that Rosenau defines the idea of a scientific theory of
International Relations in terms of the positivist tradition: 'To think
theoretically', he affirms, 'one must be able to assume that human affairs
are founded on an underlying order', and 'one must be predisposed to
ask about every event, every situation, or every observed phenomenon,
"Of what is it an instance?"' (p. 25).
5 'Thinking Theory Thoroughly', p. 22.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 'Thinking Theory Thoroughly', p. 23.
9 'Thinking Theory Thoroughly', p. 22.
10 'Thinking Theory Thoroughly', p. 23.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
Of course, Rosenau is not alone in this regard. Kal Holsti, for example,
clearly indicates his acceptance of the positivist tenet of the 'value-free'
nature of scientific knowledge in his castigation of the World Order
Models Project (WOMP) for engaging in a normatively based condemna-
tion of the nation-state system which 'does little to enhance international
theory as a discipline with scientific pretensions'. See Holsti, The Dividing
Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Allen &
Unwin, 1985), p. 141.
13 Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 54.
14 See his Formal Theories in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), as well as his Rationality and the Analysis of
International Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

156
 Notes to pages 99-105

15 Michael Nicholson, The Scientific Analysis of Social Behaviour (London:

Frances Pinter, 1983). Accordingly, it will be this earlier work which will
be the focus here.
16 Scientific Analysis, p. 6.
17 Scientific Analysis, p. 9.
18 Scientific Analysis, p. 5.
19 Scientific Analysis, p. 235.
20 Scientific Analysis, p. 236.
21 Scientific Analysis, p. 237.
22 Scientific Analysis, p. 235.
23 Scientific Analysis, p. 9.
24 Scientific Analysis, p. 244.
25 Scientific Analysis, p. 9.
26 Mervyn Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 2.
27 Towards a Normative Theory, p. 16.
28 Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1975), p. 40.
29 Ibid., emphasis in the original.
30 Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, pp. 40-1.
31 As quoted in Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, p. 37.
32 One-Dimensional Man, pp. 153-4.
33 One-Dimensional Man, p. 146.
34 Jiirgen Habermas, 'The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion', in
Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1970), pp. 63-64.
35 One-Dimensional Man, pp. 158-9.
36 Scientific Analysis, p. 3.
37 Scientific Analysis, p. 235.
38 Scientific Analysis, p. 244.
Nor is Nicholson alone in this regard. 'The urge to explain', notes
Waltz, 'is not born of idle curiosity alone. It is produced also by the
desire to control, or at least to know if control is possible'. Theory of
International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 6, my
emphasis.
The same 'control-impulse' is to be found in positivistically oriented
'peace research', particularly as post-behaviouralist concerns with 'rele-
vance' and 'action' have taken centre-stage. As two critical peace
researchers have noted:
For more and more peace researchers, the chasm between peace
research and peace action, between peace researcher as knower and
the peace researcher as actor, has come to be regarded as a
particularly acute problem. Some (like Lentz and the Newcombes)
have redoubled their efforts to devise more sophisticated technical
means and instrumental strategies for predicting and/or repressing the
outbreak of violence.

157
Notes to pages 105-107
Herbert G. Reid and Ernest J. Yanarella, Toward a Critical
Theory of Peace Research in the United States: the Search
for an "Intelligible Core"', Journal of Peace Research, 13, No.
4 (1976), p. 331, emphasis added.
39 Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, pp. 52-3.
40 'The Poverty of Neorealism', in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its
Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 292.
41 Ibid.
42 'The Poverty of Neorealism', p. 258, my emphasis.
Once again, it is important to be clear about what is being argued. To
the extent that neorealism feeds into a 'totalitarian project', it does so not
because it is realist but because it is positivist. A liberal/pluralist or radical
approach to international politics, for example, despite the significant
differences from one which is realist in inspiration, also contributes to a
politics of 'domination' to the extent that it is positivist.
43 R. B. J. Walker, 'History and Structure in the Theory of International
Studies', Millennium, 18, No. 2 (1989), p. 163, my emphasis.
44 Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond
International Relations Theory', in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics,
pp. 208, 210.
45 Frost, Towards a Normative Theory, p. 2.
46 See, for example, Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, eds., Traditions of
International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), as
well as Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative
Approaches (London: Wheatsheaf, 1992).
47 See his International Relations Theory.
48 Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 3. Brown, however, and in
contrast to Nicholson, provides no arguments in support of this position.
A pessimistic reading would suggest that in the time period between
Nicholson's and Brown's interventions, the distinction between normative
and empirical theorizing has come to be viewed as sufficiently uncontro-
versial as to make further justifications unnecessary.
49 Nardin and Mapel (Traditions of International Ethics) do not take up the
issue at all. Brown notes the impetus for normative theory in the
'postbehavioural revolution' - that is, the concern for 'relevance' borne of
the 'sudden discovery by American social scientists that they had been
ignoring the real problems of American society' (International Relations
Theory, p. 9). Unfortunately he does not investigate the implications for
the role of normative International Relations theory implicit in postbeha-
viouralism's positivist accommodation of 'normative' to 'non-normative'
theory.
50 Nicholson, Scientific Analysis, p. 235. Rosenau promotes the same kind of
understanding of the proper relationship between 'normative' and 'non-
normative' empirical theory. To overcome students' resistance to separ-
ating fact and value, Rosenau suggests the following:

158
 Notes to pages 108-111
This is the one line of reasoning on behalf of thinking theoretically
that my most value-committed students find persuasive. If empirical
theory is posited as a tool of moral theory, they can approach it
instrumentally and see virtue in habituating themselves to distin-
guishing between the two.
'Thinking Theory Thoroughly', p. 22.
51 Smith, 'The Forty Years' Detour', p. 490.
52 James Rosenau, 'Thinking Theory Thoroughly', p. 22, my emphasis.
53 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993).
54 Politics Without Principle, p. 3.
55 Politics Without Principle, p. 91.
56 Politics Without Principle, p. 92.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., emphasis in the original.
59 Politics Without Principle, p. 93.
60 Ibid. The term is that of Emmanuel Levinas.
61 Politics Without Principle, p. 94.
62 Politics Without Principle, pp. 95, 97, 94.
63 Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, 'Speaking the Language of Exile:
Dissident Thought in International Studies', International Studies Quarterly,
34, No. 3 (1990), p. 260.
64 Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, 'Reading Dissidence/Writing the
Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International
Studies', International Studies Quarterly, 34, No. 3 (1990), p. 391.
65 See R. B. J. Walker, One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World
Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988). For a useful overview, see Jim
George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to Interna-
tional Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), chapter eight.
66 George, Discourses of Global Politics, p. 212, emphasis in the original.
67 Walker, One World, Many Worlds, p. 160. Also quoted in George,
Discourses of Global Politics, p. 215.
68 Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of
ModernityfPostmodernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 51. It is the
exclusionary dimension of the celebrated 'conversation of mankind' that
explains why postmodernist theorists like Derrida and Foucault 'speak'
(pp. 51-2)
to those who have felt the pain and suffering of being excluded by
the prevailing hierarchies in the text called 'the history of the West' -
whether they be women, Blacks, or others bludgeoned by the
exclusionary tactics.
69 Bernstein, The New Constellation, p. 163.
70 M. Foucault, Power, Truth, Strategy (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979),
p. 35, quoted in Richard K. Ashley, 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space:
Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Polities', Alternatives, 12,
No. 4 (1987), p. 408, emphasis added.
71 Ashley, 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space', p. 410.

159
Notes to pages 111-118
72 Politics Without Principle, p. 91.
73 Michael T. Gibbons, 'Interpretation, Genealogy, and Human Agency', in
Terence Ball, ed., Idioms of Inquiry: Critique and Renewal in Political Science
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 161.
74 A tradition exemplified by theorists such as Charles Taylor.
75 Gibbons, 'Interpretation, Genealogy, and Human Agency', p. 161.
76 Ibid.
77 Gibbons, 'Interpretation, Genealogy, and Human Agency', p. 162.
78 'Reading Dissidence', p. 391.
79 Jim George and David Campbell, 'Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration
of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations', Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, 34, No. 3 (1990), p. 281.
80 'Reading Dissidence', p. 391.
81 For a good overview, see Georgia Warnke, Justice and Interpretation
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82 Bernstein, The New Constellation, p. 160, emphasis in the original.
83 'Discourse Analysis: Teaching World Politics Through International
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Politics: Contending Pedagogies for a New World Order (Boulder: Westview
 Notes to pages 118-121
95 It is lamentable that Freire's work would seem to have had relatively
little impact on the discipline of International Relations. Indeed, even in
contributions by members of the discipline on the subject of pedagogy,
one sees only the scarcest of references to his arguments. For a rather
atypical exploration of Freire's work in terms of war and peace issues, see
Marguerite Rivage-Seul, 'Peace Education: Imagination and the Pedagogy
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For an excellent critical introduction to and review of Freire's
contribution to emancipatory pedagogy, see Stephen T. Leonard, Critical
Theory in Political Practice (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1990), chapter five.
96 One of the most common operationalizations of this strategy is that of the
in-class 'simulation exercise'. Here, typically, students are asked to take
on the identities of 'international actors' - e.g., diplomats, government
officials, officers of international organizations - and to engage in mock
international-type activities (e.g., inter-state negotiations to resolve a
'crisis'). For a critique of simulation exercises in terms of the two
pedagogical strategies under discussion, see M. Neufeld, 'The Pedago-
gical is Political: The "Why", the "What", and the "How" in the Teaching
of World Polities', in Gonick and Weisband, Teaching World Politics,
chapter five.
97 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1983), p. 58.
98 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 59.
99 Ibid.
100 Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 61.
101 Nancy Fraser, 'What's Critical about Critical Theory?' in Seyla Benhabib
and Drucilla Cornell, eds., Feminism as Critique. (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 31.
102 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 56.
103 Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of
International Politics (London: Pandora, 1989). For a representative
example of a feminist pedagogy in world politics, see Anne Sisson
Runyan, 'Undisciplining World Politics: The Personal is Political', in
Gonick and Weisband, Teaching World Politics.
104 A particularly useful reading on this point is Bernice R. Sandier, 'The
Classroom Climate: Chilly for Women?' in A. Deneef, C. Goodwin, and
E. McCrate, eds., The Academic's Handbook (London: Duke University
Press, 1988).
105 On this, see Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases, chapter eight.
106 An interest which, as Aronowitz and Giroux note, must incorporate an
'engagement in self-criticism as a way to improve their own pedagogy
and to signal their anti-authoritarian intention'. See Stanley Aronowitz
and Henry Giroux, 'Radical Education and Transformative Intellectuals',
Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 19, No. 3 (1985), p. 56.

161
Notes to pages 122-125
6 Conclusion
1 "The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations', in William
T. R. Fox, ed., Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 22.
2 Quoted in David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to
Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 192, emphasis
in the original.
3 Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 3rd edn (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. ix.
4 'Traditionelle und Kritische Theorie', in Alfred Schmidt, ed., Kritische
Theorie: Eine Dokumentation (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 1968), I, p. 190,
my translation.
5 For an excellent treatment of this dimension of critical forms of theorizing,
see Stephen T. Leonard, Critical Theory in Political Practice (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1990).
6 Morgenthau, 'The Nature and Limits', p. 22.
7 Ibid.

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 Index

Adorno, Theodor, 5, 57 episteme, 44-5, 46, 56, 57, 63, 64,101,106,

Alker, Hayward, 55, 86 107
Arendt, Hannah, 9-10
'Aristotelian project7, 9,13, 20,123 fact, separation from value, 36-7,38,98,116
Aristotle, 44 Fay, Brian, 29,102-3
Ashley, Richard, 62-3, 64, 83, 86,106, feminist International Relations theory, 7
109-10, 111, 113 critical pedagogy, 120
interpretive approaches, 91
Banks, Michael, 48-9 theoretical reflexivity, 64r-8
behaviouralism, in International Relations Feyerabend, Paul, 42
theory Fichte, 68
meaning-oriented, 85-6 Foucault, Michel, 42, 61-2, 63,108,
strict, 84 110-11,114
behaviouralism, in social science Frankfurt School, 5, 7,130 n. 22
meaning-oriented, 73-5, 76-7 Freire, Paulo, 118-20
strict, 72-3 Frost, Mervyn, 101
Bernstein, Richard J., 4, 44, 45, 61, 62, 98,
110-11,113 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 42, 45
Biersteker, Thomas, 55 George, Jim, 60, 84
Brecher, Michael, 85 Gibbons, Michael, 112
Brown, Chris, 107 'good', the, conception of
postmodernism and, 112-16
Campbell, David, 108-9, 111, 112,113 Gramscian International Relations theory,
'Cartesian anxiety', 44r-5, 62 7
Catlin, George, 34 theoretical reflexivity, 58-60
Connolly, William, 137 n. 4,140 n. 22
covering law, 28-9, 30,102 Habermas, Jiirgen, 45, 61,104
Cox, Robert, 58-60, 63, 87 Hegel, 5,11,15-18,45
critical-expressivism, 112,149 n. 32 hermeneutic circle, 81
see also Taylor, Charles hermeneutics, of recovery, 80-2
critique, immanent, 5-6 Hoffman, Mark, 63
Hoffmann, Stanley, 12
Dahl, Robert, 34 Hollis, Martin, 89, 92
Descartes, 44 Holsti, Kal, 49, 5 1 ^ , 55
Deutsch, Karl, 12 Horkheimer, Max, 5,124
human consciousness, in International
Easton, David, 33-4, 35, 36-7 Relations theory
empathy, 80-1 interpretive formulations, 86-9

172
 Index
positivist formulations, 82-6 positivistic 'logic of investigation', 32-8,
human consciousness, in social science 123
interpretive formulations, 75-82 methodological unity of science, 34^5,
positivist formulations, 72-5 71-2
Hume, David, 24 truth as correspondence, 33-4, 41-6
value-freedom, 35-8, 96-106,116
Jay, Martin, 64 post-behaviouralism, 138 n. 11, 158
n. 49
Kant, 11,14^-15 postmodern International Relations
Kauppi, Mark, 49 theory, 7
Keohane, Robert, 12, 86-7, 92 interpretive approaches, 91
Klein, Bradley, 114 relation to modernist International
Kratochwil, Friedrich, 87, 88, 92 Relations theory, 115-16
Kuhn, Thomas, 42, 45 theoretical reflexivity, 60-4
see also normative theory
Lakatos, Imre, 32, 51, 52
Lapid, Yosef, 49 Rabinow, Paul, 81
Lawrence, Philip, 85 reflexivity, theoretical
Liberal International Economic Order defined, 40-6
(LIEO), 87-91 see also feminist International Relations
Linklater, Andrew, 13 theory; Gramscian International
Little, Richard, 49, 54, 56-7 Relations theory; postmodern
International Relations theory
Machiavelli, 61 Rengger, N. J., 63-4
McKinlay, R. D., 49, 54, 56-7 Rosenau, James, 57, 97-8,101,116
Marcuse, Herbert, 103-4 Ruggie, John, 87, 88, 92
Marx, Karl, 18-19, 25 Runyan, Anne Sisson, 65-6, 68
meanings
intersubjective, 77-9 Schlick, Moritz, 26
subjective, 74, 75 Singer, J. David, 12
web of, 76-7, 80 Smith, Steve, 54-5, 89, 92, 96-7
Meehan, Eugene, 33 subject, separation from object, 33, 38, 41,
Morgenthau, Hans, 83-4, 85 43,64
'Myth of the Framework', 44, 45 subjectivity
modernism, 111-12
Naegele, Kaspar, 35 postmodernism, 110-11
naturalism, 34-5, 38, 71-2, 75, 84, 86,101 'substantive rationality'
Nicholson, Michael, 98-101,104-5,107 as instrumental rationality, 92
normative theory, 37, 46,101,106-16 Sullivan, William, 81
postmodern treatments of, 108-16 Sylvester, Christine, 67

object: see subject, separation from object Taylor, Charles, 45, 77-9
theory, critical, 13-19
peace research, 157-8 n. 38 defined, 20
pedagogy, emancipatory, 116-21 validation of, 124-5
pedagogy, strategies of theory, emancipatory: see theory, critical
'making the global, local', 120-1 theory, meta, 2-3
'making the local, global', 118 theoretical-empirical analysis, 125
Peterson, V. Spike, 64, 65-6, 68 theory, traditional
polis, global, 9-12,124-5 International Relations theory as, 92-3
Popper, Karl, 28, 32, 35, 44, 45, 50 theory-practice relationship, 102-5
positivism educative versus instrumental, 117-18
Comptean, 24-5, 31-2 Third Debate, 46-57
logical, 25-32 Stance I: commensurable and therefore
see also positivistic 'logic of investigation' comparable, 51-4

173
Index
Third Debate (continued) Viotti, Paul, 49
Stance II: incommensurable and
therefore incomparable, 54-7 Walker, R. B. J., 62,109-10,113,114^15
Weber, Max, 72, 73, 85
universalizability Western Marxism, 7
postmodernism and, 115-16 Whitworth, Sandra, 67, 68
Wittgenstein, 42, 89
value: see fact, separation from value
Verstehen, 83-4 Zalewski, Marysia, 66-7

174
 CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

30 Graham Spinardi
From Polaris to Trident: The development of US Fleet Ballistic
Missile technology
29 David A. Welch
Justice and the genesis of war
28 Russell J. Leng
Interstate crisis behavior, 1816-1980: realism versus reciprocity
27 John A. Vasquez
The war puzzle
26 Stephen Gill (ed.)
Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations
25 Mike Bowker and Robin Brown (eds.)
From Cold War to collapse: theory and world politics in the 1980s
24 R. B. J. Walker
Inside/outside: international relations as political theory
23 Edward Reiss
The Strategic Defense Initiative
22 Keith Krause
Arms and the state: patterns of military production and trade
21 Roger Buckley
US-Japan alliance diplomacy 1945-1990
20 James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.)
Governance without government: order and change in world
politics
19 Michael Nicholson
Rationality and the analysis of international conflict
18 John Stopford and Susan Strange
Rival states, rival firms
Competition for world market shares
17 Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.)
Traditions of international ethics
16 Charles F. Doran
Systems in crisis
New imperatives of high politics at century's end
15 Deon Geldenhuys
Isolated states: a comparative analysis
14 Kalevi J. Holsti
Peace and war: armed conflicts and international order 1648-1989
13 Saki Dockrill
Britain's policy for West German rearmament 1950-1955
12 Robert H. Jackson
Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third
World
11 James Barber and John Barratt
South Africa's foreign policy
The search for status and security 1945-1988
10 James Mayall
Nationalism and international society
9 William Bloom
Personal identity, national identity and international relations
8 Zeev Maoz
National choices and international processes
7 Ian Clark
The hierarchy of states
Reform and resistance in the international order
6 Hidemi Suganami
The domestic analogy and world order proposals
5 Stephen Gill
American hegemony and the Trilateral Commission
4 Michael C. Pugh
The ANZUS crisis, nuclear visiting and deterrence
3 Michael Nicholson
Formal theories in international relations
2 Friedrich V. Kratochwil
Rules, norms and decisions
On the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international
relations and domestic affairs
1 Myles L. C. Robertson
Soviet policy towards Japan
An analysis of trends in the 1970s and 1980s