Summary and Citations Johnson Matthey Catalyst DBA Johnson Matthey Inc REDACTED - Redacted
Summary and Citations Johnson Matthey Catalyst DBA Johnson Matthey Inc REDACTED - Redacted
1) You may request an extension of the correction date(s) set forth in this Citation(s) when you cannot correct the alleged
violation(s) by the date listed because of circumstances beyond your control. The request must be in writing and filed
with the TOSHA area office supervisor no later than the end of the business day on the day after the original
abatement date. The request must include the following information:
The employer shall post a copy of the request in a conspicuous place for a period of twenty (20) calendar days. The area
supervisor then has ten (10) days after the posting period to grant or deny the request and will inform the employer of
such, in writing, by the end of the ten (10) day period.
To request an extension of correction date(s), contact Terry Hopkins, Area Supervisor via email at [email protected],
at telephone (423) 854-5156 or fax (423) 239-7839.
You must notify Terry Hopkins, in writing, when correction of each alleged violation has been completed. Enclosed is the
Abatement Certification Form to be used to report corrective action taken for each violation. Instructions for completing
this form are also enclosed.
You must also notify your employees and their representatives (if represented) of corrective action taken by posting the
Abatement Certification Form, or by other effective means.
For items identified in this Citation as “Abatement Verification Required”, you must include additional documentation
such as photographs, receipts, work orders, etc. to verify the corrective action taken. Failure to provide this additional
documentation to TOSHA will subject the employer to additional penalties of up to $1,000.00. This additional
documentation must also be posted at or near where the violation occurred. Failure to post the additional documentation
will subject the employer to additional penalties of up to $3,000.00.
PAYMENT OF PENALTY
Payment for the penalty is due in full thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of this Citation and Notification of
Penalty unless a notice of contest is filed. Correction of alleged violation(s) does not excuse you from payment of any
penalty which has become a final order of the Department of Labor and Workforce Development. Penalties not paid
within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt will be assessed late fees and interest (see the Penalty Notice enclosed).
Penalties may be paid online by visiting www.tnosha.gov or by check or money order made payable to: “Treasurer State
of Tennessee.” Mail payments to the following address:
State of Tennessee, Department of Labor and Workforce Development
Division of Occupational Safety and Health
Attn: Penalty Payments
220 French Landing Drive
Nashville, TN 37243-1002
You may request an informal conference to discuss the alleged violations and/or penalties. Informal conferences must be
held within twenty (20) days of the receipt of this Citation and Notification of Penalty. To schedule an informal
conference, contact Terry Hopkins, Area Supervisor at telephone (423) 854-5156 or fax (423) 239-7839. Twenty four
(24) hours prior to the informal conference post the “Notice to Employees of Informal Conference” and bring a copy of
the notice to the informal conference. A copy of the notice is enclosed.
FORMAL CONTEST
You have the right to contest any or all parts of this Citation and/or the penalties before the Tennessee Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission. If you choose to contest, you must submit written notification to the Commissioner of
Labor and Workforce Development stating what parts of this Citation and Notification of Penalty you are contesting.
Notification must be received within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of this Citation and Notification of
Penalty. If you do not contest within the twenty (20) calendar day period, this Citation and Notification of Penalty shall
be deemed a final order and not subject to further review by any agency or court (T.C.A. §§ 50-3-307(b) and 50-3-407,
and Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development Rules Chapter 0800-01-04).
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
For additional information, contact Terry Hopkins, Area Supervisor, Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce
Development, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, 5788 Bobby Hicks Highway, Gray, TN 37615 or via email at
[email protected].
2) You may request an extension of the correction date(s) set forth in this Citation(s) when you cannot correct the alleged
violation(s) by the date listed because of circumstances beyond your control. The request must be in writing and filed
with the TOSHA area office supervisor no later than the end of the business day on the day after the original
abatement date. The request must include the following information:
The employer shall post a copy of the request in a conspicuous place for a period of twenty (20) calendar days. The
area supervisor then has ten (10) days after the posting period to grant or deny the request and will inform the
employer of such, in writing, by the end of the ten (10) day period.
3) To request an extension of abatement/correction, contact Terry Hopkins, Area Supervisor via email at
[email protected], or at telephone (423) 854-5156 or fax (423) 239-7839.
4) Email to [email protected]; you may also mail or fax the completed form to the Area Office shown on the form.
5) Contact the Area Office Supervisor for additional information or if you have any questions
2/1a 02/18/2008 A plumbed emergency eyewash and drench shower were installed by ABC Plumbing Co
in the acid mixing area. Employees have been trained in the proper use and maintenance
of this emergency equipment.
2/1b 02/24/2008 A written hazard communication program has been developed (copy enclosed). All
employees have been trained about the haz com program and its components. They have
also been trained in the proper use of the specific chemicals they may use in performing
their jobs.
2/4 REQUEST
EXTENSION We ordered deluge showers on 12/15/15 (P.O. #76) and were informed that they would be
OF shipped 12/16/15. Request extension until 01/17/16. As an interim safety precaution, we
ABATEMENT temporarily provided rubber water hoses at faucets near the plating tanks. Personal
PERIOD protective equipment is mandatory for this area.
I certify that a copy of this request was posted on the employee’ bulletin board on (date) and
that employees have been informed of their rights under the Act.
OR
We ordered deluge showers on 12/15/15 (P.O. #76) and were informed that they would be
shipped 12/16/15. Request extension until 01/17/16. As an interim safety precaution, we
temporarily provided rubber water hoses at faucets near the plating tanks. Personal
protective equipment is mandatory for this area.
I certify that a copy of this request was posted on the employees' bulletin board on (date) and
that employees have been informed of their rights under the Act.
SUBMITTED BELOW IS THE ACTION(S) TAKEN TO CORRECT THE ALLEGED VIOLATION(S) LISTED
ON THE CITATION(S) AS THE RESULT OF INSPECTION NUMBER: 1609871 ISSUED TO:
Johnson Matthey Catalysts dba Johnson Matthey Inc., 1246 Airport Road, Sevierville, TN 37862
A COPY OF THE CITATION(S) WAS (WERE) POSTED AS REQUIRED BY TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED §50-3-307(a)(4).
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
OF
INFORMAL CONFERENCE
Post this notice twenty-four (24) hours prior to the informal conference.
PENALTY NOTICE
Pursuant to T.C.A. § 50-3-107 interest and delinquent fees will be assessed for all unpaid penalty amounts that are over
thirty (30) calendar days from the date you received this Citation and Notification of Penalty.
Interest charges will be assessed every thirty (30) days, at an interest rate established pursuant to T.C.A. § 67-1-801(a)(1).
In addition to the interest applied, a delinquent fee of ten percent (10%) will be assessed for each penalty unpaid at thirty
(30), sixty (60), and ninety (90) days to a maximum of thirty percent (30%).
Unpaid penalties are referred to the Attorney General for collection at one hundred eighty (180) days past due.
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
Citation and Notification of Penalty Page 12 of 13 TOSHA-2 (Rev.
3/09)
Johnson Matthey Catalysts dba Johnson Matthey Inc
Inspection No. 1609871
UPA No. 1923724
H7174-037-2022
Referral Status
Media reported referral for an explosion at the Johnson Matthey site located in
Sevierville, TN.
The bag house and dust collection system were severely damaged and destroyed
during the explosion. Results from Dekra a third-party investigation team
determined that a) Ductwork conveying dust between the melt room and the
baghouse was subjected to water intrusion. b) Filters in the Camfil-Farr baghouse
unit were subjected to manual blowdown cleaning, allowing for excess material
accumulation and reaction with humid air. c) There were no means in place to detect
sources of excessive heat and/or fire and extinguish them.
Citations will be issued for this item and for other hazards identified during the
inspection.
Johnson Matthey Catalysts dba Johnson Matthey Inc
Inspection No. 1609871
UPA No. 1923729, 1923725
H7174-037-2022
Complaint Status
1. Roof leak in the area that nickel and aluminum ingots are smelted. Heavy rain
occurred the day of the explosion. and decided on
Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d) Witness Identity/Identifiable Information T
The bag house and dust collection system were severely damaged and destroyed
during the explosion. Results from Dekra a third-party investigation team
determined that the ductwork conveying dust between the melt room and the
baghouse was subjected to water intrusion. The water intrusion led to the reaction
and subsequent explosion.
2. Roof was in desperate need of being replaced, was told it was never budgeted.
The bag house and dust collection system were severely damaged and destroyed
during the explosion. Results from Dekra a third-party investigation team
determined that the ductwork conveying dust between the melt room and the
baghouse was subjected to water intrusion. The water intrusion led to the reaction
and subsequent explosion.
a) Ductwork conveying dust between the melt room and the baghouse was
subjected to water intrusion.
b) Filters in the Camfil-Farr baghouse unit were subjected to manual blowdown
cleaning, allowing for excess material accumulation and reaction with humid air.
c) There were no means in place to detect sources of excessive heat and/or fire
and extinguish them.
Penalty
Severity Value 10 Probability Assessment Safety
For
# of Workers Exposed 3 Frequency of Exposure 8
Employee Proximity 8 Stress/Working
Conditions
Other Factors Probability Value 6
Gravity 8 Gravity based Penalty $5,000.00
# of Times Repeated Multiplier
Size 40% Good Faith 0%
History 10% Decrease Quick Fix
Calculated Penalty $2,500.00 Proposed Penalty $4,000.00
Proposed Penalty Per the FOM maximum reduction for gravity 8 is 20% with no good faith.
Justification
Abatement Details
Multi-Step Abatement
Employee Exposure
Worksheet Details
On July 21,2022 an explosion occurred in the baghouse adjacent to the melt process area at the Johnson
Matthey sponge nickel facility in Sevierville, Tennessee. From onsite observations, interviews, and review of
employer documentation it was found that employees working in and around the melt process area were
exposed to combustible dust hazards. The facility manufactures an activated form of nickel which serves as a
catalyst in many industrial organic reactions. This activated type referred to onsite as sponge nickel, is made
by first alloying nickel metal with aluminum metal. The alloy is then crushed, and the aluminum is chemically
removed which yields the activated nickel. The process of focus is the crushing and/or milling of the alloy
before chemical removal. In this portion of the process the alloy is loaded into a jaw crusher which roughly
crushes the material. Dust from this process is collected and conveyed to an air material separator consisting
of a cyclone and baghouse unit. Both the cyclone and baghouse are in a building which is connected to the
melt process area via ductwork that travels between the baghouse building and the melt process area. The
employer explained that the building was designed to be separate from the rest of the facility in the event
that an explosion was to occur it would do so away from occupied areas. Entry into the baghouse was also
controlled by lock and key and no one was permitted to enter until after the process has undergone a
complete shutdown procedure.
Due to the nature of the hazards of the worksite TOSHA representatives did not enter the portion of the
facility where the explosion occurred to collect samples. However, a report provided by the employer explains
that the dust is explosible, with a Kst value of 169 (bar*m/s). The metal mixture is water reactive, and the
reaction is exothermic. On the day of the incident a significant amount of rain had fallen from the early
morning until around 12:00 PM. Around the time that rain had begun to fall, the baghouse exhaust fan speed
was increased, and jaw crushing begun. Fine powdered metal began to accumulate on the filter bags in the
baghouse and moist air was forced through the layer of metal powder. The blowdown process did not occur
because it was a manual process rather than automatic. The accumulated metal remained on the bags the
whole time. Both metal oxidation and reaction with water in the moist air caused heat buildup on the filter
bags. Simultaneously, water ingress was also occurring at the ductwork connecting the melt process area to
the baghouse. A photograph provided by the employer shows an agglomerated mass of nickel, aluminum,
and green nickel oxide in the duct section. This mass heated through both metal oxidation and reaction with
water. This provided both a heated surface/mass and potentially embers of metal to serve as a source of
ignition. Documentation provided by the employer states that the ductwork connection "was not secured and
was only held together by a flanged square transition piece that is normally used for HVAC systems"
At approximately 12:45 PM Heat from both the reactions occurring in the ductwork and on the filters
eventually caused the filter media to collapse. The dispersed dust then ignited from the heat. As the
deflagration propagated, it vented out of the collector's explosion vents, inspection hatches, and back toward
the melt room. Pressure and flame from the deflagration continued into the melt room, venting out of
inspection hatches on duct work leading back to the jaw crushing area.
One factor in this deflagration is the buildup of dust in both ductwork and on the baghouse filters. Because
the baghouse had to be subjected to a manual blowdown, it was not being automatically monitored and
cleared. As a result, dust collected on the filters throughout the entire jaw crushing run on the morning of
the explosion. This dust accumulation then remained on the filters with hot moist air forcing through it. By
following NFPA 484 and setting up the AMS blowdown to be automatic, there would be less dust
accumulation on the filters and therefore less dust to disperse in the event of a bag failure. As a further
safety measure the employer could take steps by determining the threshold of dust accumulation that may
lead to ignition due to exothermic reaction with humid air. Where accumulation exceeds predetermined limits
as monitored by pressure drop, a controlled shutdown of the collector and dust generation equipment would
be implemented.
Another factor in this deflagration is that Ductwork conveying dust between the melt room and the baghouse
was subjected to water intrusion. Neither the exposed duct nor the connection was designed to be watertight.
By using a length of solid duct instead of a connector, the hazard of moisture ingress from exterior sources
could have been avoided.
The employer did not have a means in place to detect sources of excessive heat and/or fire and extinguish
them. The employer had a Fike suppression system in place but the system utilized pressure as the trigger
source. As a result the amount of excessive heat generated caused the trigger wire to fail, and subsequently
the suppression system failed to fire when it was needed. Following NFPA 654 and evaluating this via a dust
hazard analysis (DHA) for excessive heat conditions (metal/moisture and potential metal/metal oxide
reactions) and implementing detection and extinguishing controls for fire and/or excessive heat conditions
could prevent the buildup of heat in the ductwork and on the filters which served as a point of ignition.
E) Measurements:
F) Employer Knowledge: Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d) and Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d)
are both in the production area daily and are aware of the combustible dust hazard.
G) Comments: 1. The employer failed to keep the workplace free of a hazard to which an employee of that
employer was exposed. An employee was exposed to an explosion hazard from combustible dust coming in
contact with moisture while being required to work in the melt process area.
2. The hazard was recognized. The employer was aware of the dust hazard as they installed a dust collection
system and conducted weekly blow downs of the area.
3. The hazard was causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm. The explosion of the bag-house
caused serious damage to the structure of the building; which would likely cause serious physical injury or
death.
4. There was a feasible and useful method to correct the hazard. Among other methods, one feasible and
acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to follow National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Standard 652: Standard on the Fundamentals of Combustible Dust, and NFPA Standard 484: Standard for
Combustible Metals, including, but not limited to: 1. Ensuring that combustible metal dust conveying
ductwork is moisture and weathertight. 2. Determine the threshold of dust accumulation that may lead to
ignition due to exothermic reaction with humid air. Where accumulation exceeds predetermined limits as
monitored by pressure drop or an equivalent sensor, a controlled shutdown of the collector and dust
generation equipment shall be implemented. 3. Automatic cleaning of filters in the Camfil-Farr baghouse. 4.
Evaluate via a dust hazard analysis (DHA) for excessive heat conditions (metal/moisture and potential
metal/metal oxide reactions) and implement detection and extinguishing controls for fire and/or excessive
heat conditions.
Standard 1910.37(a)(2)
Alleged Violation 29 CFR 1910.37(a)(2):Exit routes were not arranged so that employees would
Description not have to travel toward a high hazard area, nor was the path of travel
effectively shielded from the high hazard area by suitable partitions or other
physical barriers:
In that the exit route from the production area directed employee travel toward
the dust collection system which exploded on 07/21/2022.
Penalty
Multi-Step Abatement
Employee Exposure
Worksheet Details
D) Injury/Illness (and Justifications for Severity and Probability): Severe burns and other serious
injury
E) Measurements: N/A
F) Employer Knowledge: Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d), and Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d)
are both in the production area daily and see the exit route marked as such.
G) Comments:
Standard 1910.135(a)(1)
Alleged Violation 29 CFR 1910.135(a)(1):The employer did not ensure that each affected
Description employee wear a protective helmet when working in areas where there is a
potential for injury to the head from falling objects:
In that one employee was exposed to falling objects while wearing a bump cap
to survey the damaged dust collector following an explosion on 07/21/2022.
Penalty
Multi-Step Abatement
Employee Exposure
Worksheet Details
said the bump cap was not designed to be used in areas requiring a hard hat. Once the bump cap
was pointed out to he said that it was not supposed to be worn for protection from falling
Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA
objects and brought the employee an approved hard hat. Failing to require employees to wear appropriate
head protection when overhead hazards exist could place them at risk of being struck in the head by falling
metal debris or from striking overhead objects, both of which could cause serious injuries.
C) Location: The damaged dust collector system on the north east side of the building.
E) Measurements: N/A
F) Employer Knowledge: The bump cap and hard hats were issued to employees by the employer.
W tness
were conducting the walk through with the CSHO and observed the employee wearing the bump
cap and not a hard hat.
G) Comments:
Standard 1910.157(c)(1)
Alleged Violation 29 CFR 1910.157(c)(1):Portable fire extinguishers were not mounted, located
Description and identified so that they were readily accessible without subjecting the
employees to injuries:
In that a fire extinguisher in the smelting production area was blocked by metal
bins used to store nickel aluminum dust and not readily accessible for employee
use.
Recommended
Abatement Action
# Instances 1 # Exposed 3
Penalty
Multi-Step Abatement
Employee Exposure
Worksheet Details
E) Measurements: N/A
F) Employer Knowledge: Employer was aware of the fire extinguishers and locations in the building but
had not taken steps to ensure open and easy access to them. Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d) , is
in the smelting production area daily and with due diligence would have noticed the metal storage bins in
front of the fire extinguisher blocking access.
G) Comments:
Standard 1910.178(a)(5)
Alleged Violation 29 CFR 1910.178(a)(5):The powered industrial truck was equipped with front-
Description end attachments other than factory installed attachments, however the
employer did not request that the truck be marked to identify the attachments
and show the approximate weight of the truck and attachment combination at
maximum elevation with load laterally centered:
In that forklifts were not equipped with a data plate identifying the lifting devices
and the approximate weight of the truck and attachment combination at
maximum elevation and with load laterally centered in the following instances:
Penalty
Multi-Step Abatement
Employee Exposure
Worksheet Details
a) Toyota Forklift Truck 7FGU35 (SN 63494) is used daily with the bucket attachment, drum dumper
attachment, and site made pusher attachment in the main plant area. The attachments are used to poke,
drag, scoop, or carry the raw materials throughout the production area.
b) Drexel FL60EX (SN 935974-155) is used in the jaw crusher area daily to move material and product
around.
B) Equipment: Drexel FL60EX (SN 935974-155), Toyota Forklift Truck 7FGU35 (SN 63494),
bucket attachment, drum dumper attachment, and site made pusher attachment
E) Measurements: N/A
F) Employer Knowledge: The employer provides the attachments for use with the forklifts.
Witness Identity/Iden
, is present in the main plant area daily where the attachments are used on the forklifts.
G) Comments:
Standard 1910.178(a)(6)
Alleged Violation 29 CFR 1910.178(a)(6):The employer did not ensure that all nameplates or
Description markings were maintained in a legible condition:
In that the data plate identifying the model, serial number, and load limits on the
Drexel FL60EX (SN 935974-155) Powered Industrial Truck was not legible.
Recommended
Abatement Action
# Instances 1 # Exposed 3
Penalty
Multi-Step Abatement
Employee Exposure
Worksheet Details
E) Measurements: N/A
F) Employer Knowledge: The employer provides the forklifts. Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d) ensures
forklift training is completed by employees. Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d) , is present in the
main plant area daily where the forklifts are used. The data plate is in plain view on the forklift.
G) Comments:
Standard 1910.305(a)(2)(x)
Alleged Violation 29 CFR 1910.305(a)(2)(x): Flexible cords and cables were not protected from
Description accidental damage, as might be caused, for example, by sharp corners,
projections, and doorways or other pinch points.
In that a flexible cord was not protected from accidental damage as it ran
through two doorways.
Recommended
Abatement Action
# Instances 1 # Exposed 1
Penalty
Multi-Step Abatement
Employee Exposure
Worksheet Details
stated that the flexible cord had been run through the doors for at least a week that he was
aware of. Failure to protect flexible cords could lead to damage of the cord, resulting in possible electric
shock.
E) Measurements: N/A
F) Employer Knowledge: Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d), and Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d) ,
stated that they each conduct walk through inspections of the facility at least daily. The extension cord not
protected from accidental damage was in plain view.
G) Comments:
Standard 1910.28(b)(1)(i)
Alleged Violation 29 CFR 1910.28(b)(1)(i): Except as provided elsewhere in this section 29 CFR
Description 1910.28, the employer did not ensure that each employee on a walking-working
surface with an unprotected side or edge that is 4 feet (1.2 m) or more above a
lower level is protected from falling by one or more of the systems described in
29 CFR 1910.28(b)(1)(i).
In that the double doors leading from the water treatment room opened up to a
loading access point 48 inches above the ground with no fall protection in place.
Penalty
Multi-Step Abatement
Employee Exposure
Worksheet Details
B) Equipment: Access doors to water softener room from the exterior of the building
E) Measurements:
F) Employer Knowledge: Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d), and Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d)
walk through the area daily and the access area is in plain site. Witness Identity/Identifiable Information TCA 50-3-302(d) ,
said the doors used to be a loading area in the past and was no longer used to off load trucks. Other loading
areas had sufficient guard rails in place.
G) Comments: