Audit of the Ottawa Police Service’s Response to

the Convoy Protest – Collaboration with the City

of Ottawa

February 2023
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

Table of Contents

Message from the Auditor General.................................................................................. 1

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 3
Background and context.................................................................................................. 3
Convoy Protest......................................................................................................... 3
Roles and responsibilities ........................................................................................ 5
OPS and City collaboration and support .................................................................. 6
Audit objective and scope ............................................................................................... 7
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 8
Audit findings and recommendations .............................................................................. 9
1. OPS did not consider the OEM as a prime partner in pre-planning...................... 9
2. Intelligence shared by OPS with the City was insufficient, impacting the
effectiveness of the City’s planning ........................................................................ 10
3. OPS did not consistently engage City resources in traffic management
throughout the convoy protest ................................................................................ 12
4. Roles and responsibilities of OPS and City communications departments ........ 14
Appendix 1 – About the audit ........................................................................................ 16
Audit objective and criterion ................................................................................... 16
Audit approach and methodology........................................................................... 16
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

Message from the Auditor General

In January and February 2022, thousands of trucks and
protestors from around the country came to Ottawa with what
was said to be a protest against COVID-19 vaccine mandates
and restrictions. While the effects of this protest were felt
across the country, the downtown core of our City was the
most impacted. For a city well accustomed to large protests,
this was an event unlike any the City had ever experienced.

In March 2022, I received requests from both the City Manager

and the Ottawa Police Services Board (OPSB) to consider
conducting a review of both the City of Ottawa’s (the City) and
the Ottawa Police Service’s (OPS) responses to these events
in our nation’s capital. As an independent Statutory Officer, I
felt it pertinent that I accept the requests and provide, to the oversight bodies and the
residents of Ottawa, a depiction of key events and a description of how all parties could
improve for similar future events.

On April 25, 2022, the Government of Canada established the Public Order Emergency
Commission to inquire into the circumstances that led to the declaration of emergency
that was in place from February 14 to 23, 2022, and the measures taken for dealing with
the emergency. Given similar mandates, we chose to reach out to the Commission
team to maintain an open line of communication.

With the downtown core residents and businesses being the most impacted, my Office
embarked on our first ever public consultation from June 2022 to July 2022. To gain a
better understanding of how Ottawa residents and businesses were impacted during the
protest, we held two virtual consultations, released a survey and allowed those
interested to provide direct written submissions to my Office. We received
approximately 1,600 responses to our survey, among the highest response rates for a
City of Ottawa survey. We are very grateful to those that took the time to share their
feedback with us as it greatly assisted my team in the completion of their audit work.

It is important to note when reading the findings in our report, that my Office has the
benefit of hindsight. We do our best to apply this lens when setting expectations as to
what a reasonable person should have done with the information available to them at
the time in question.

We consulted with other agencies performing a similar scope of work to better refine the
focus of our audit and ensure we were adding value to the residents of Ottawa, the City,

1
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

the OPS and the OPSB, without duplicating efforts. As we could not obtain certainty on
the depth of the reviews being conducted on the OPS, we decided to limit our scope to
their communication and collaboration with the City and the OPSB. Once these
agencies have reported on the results of their reviews/inquiries, additional work may be
conducted by my Office.

I would like to take a moment to thank the OPS and City staff that took the time to
provide us with the key information we required to conduct our work and for all their
collaboration. I would also like to thank my team for their extraordinary dedication,
application of exceptional professional judgement and their steadfast integrity in the
conduct of their work.

Respectfully,

Nathalie Gougeon, CPA, CA, CIA, CRMA, B.Comm

Auditor General

2
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

Introduction
On February 7, 2022, City Council approved Motion No. 69/13, requesting that the City
of Ottawa, “commission an independent evaluation of the response to the occupation of
the city of Ottawa with a view to better overall governmental agencies’ response to
planning, coordination, communications, sharing of resources including deployment”.
On March 29, 2022, City management requested that the Office of the Auditor General
(OAG) consider undertaking the independent evaluation. The Auditor General accepted
this request on March 29, 2022.

On March 28, 2022, the Ottawa Police Services Board (OPSB or the Board) requested
that the OAG consider conducting an audit of the Ottawa Police Service’s (OPS or the
Service) response to the convoy protest.

The scope of this report is focused exclusively on the activities of the OPS and is limited
to the OPS’s collaboration with the City of Ottawa’s staff prior to and during the convoy
protest. The OPS’s collaboration and communication with the OPSB has been included
in a separate report related to the OPSB.

Background and context

Convoy Protest
It became known to the OPS in mid-January 2022 that a group that called themselves
the “Freedom Convoy” was organizing a demonstration to be held in Ottawa on January
29, 2022 and was asking for truckers and supporters to travel to Canada’s capital from
across the country. The group intended to protest COVID-19 vaccine mandates and
restrictions, stating that they would not leave until all related restrictions and mandates
were repealed. As various convoys travelled across Canada, there was widespread
media coverage showing the vast number of vehicles on the road, including many
tractor-trailers and other heavy equipment.

The Freedom Convoy started arriving on January 28, 2022; it was not until February 20,
2022 that the OPS and its policing partners cleared the convoy from the streets of
downtown Ottawa. During this time, protesters were observed engaging in numerous
violations of City by-laws, including setting unlawful fires, discharging fireworks,
committing noise infractions related to constant honking of horns, blocking and
damaging highways, and idling vehicles.

The demonstration caused traffic impacts including blockades and closures of many
streets and interprovincial corridors for more than three weeks. Many businesses
suffered financial losses during this time. Those living and working in the areas in and

3
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

around the centre of the protest (known as the “red-zone”) were significantly impacted
and many residents did not feel safe in their neighbourhoods. Over 1,600 City of Ottawa
residents and business owners participated in the OAG’s public consultation and shared
experiences of how they were impacted during the demonstration. The most commonly
reported complaints included noise levels, difficulties accessing transit, diesel fumes,
and mental health impacts.

Table 1 below outlines some of the key dates associated with the response to the
convoy protest.

Table 1: Timeline – key events relevant to the convoy protest

Date Events
January 13 • OPS began receiving intelligence about the upcoming
convoy protest planning to travel to the nation’s capital.
• Planning by the OPS commenced to prepare for their arrival.
January 22 • The Freedom Convoy started travelling across Canada,
headed to Ottawa.
January 27 • The City’s Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) was
mobilized to work with all City services to support the OPS.
January 28 • The National Capital Region Command Centre (NCRCC)
was activated as the Area Command.
• Protesters and trucks started arriving in Ottawa.
January 28 – • Members of the convoy parked their large vehicles, blocking
February 20 streets in Ottawa’s downtown core.
• Many protestors engaged in behaviours that violated
municipal by-laws.
• City residents reported incidents of harassment and negative
impacts on their well-being.
February 6 • The Mayor declared a municipal state of emergency in the
City of Ottawa (City).
February 7 • The Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted a 10-day
injunction banning honking in the area north of the
Queensway. This injunction was brought on by a private
citizen.
February 8 • An Integrated Planning Team was established, comprised of
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Ontario
Provincial Police (OPP), and the OPS to coordinate a
policing response.
February 11 • The Premier of Ontario declared a state of emergency in
Ontario.
February 12 • The OPS established the Integrated Planning Command
Centre.

4
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

Date Events
February 14 • The federal government declared a public order emergency
under the Emergencies Act.
• The City was granted an injunction against the violation of
City by-laws (noise, idling, fireworks, open-air fire, and use
and care of roads).
• The Unified Command Centre was stood up.
February 16 • Interim Chief Bell indicated that police had the resources and
a plan to bring the occupation to an end. The plan started
with handing out leaflets to protesters, warning them to leave
or face criminal charges.
February 20 • Authorities cleared much of the city’s downtown area of the
Freedom Convoy’s vehicles and protesters.
February 20 • City staff cleaned up after the Freedom Convoy was cleared
– 27 out.
February 23 • The federal government revoked its declaration of a public
order emergency under the Emergencies Act.
• The Premier of Ontario terminated the state of emergency in
Ontario.
February 24 • The Mayor terminated the state of emergency in the City.
March 2 • The EOC demobilized and the City returned to normal
operations.

Roles and responsibilities

The OPS was the lead for the overall planning and response to the convoy protest. The
OPS’s priorities included traffic management; maintaining emergency routes; keeping
peace and order; protecting monuments; addressing threatening and/or high-risk
behaviours; and maintaining the safety of all individuals involved.

The City of Ottawa’s response to the protest was coordinated by the EOC. The EOC
had to align its activities with and seek direction from the OPS, through the NCRCC,
and later the ICC. The EOC had the dual role of:
1) Supporting the police in their protest preparedness and response activities; and
2) Overseeing and managing City service impacts resulting from the protest (and to
mitigate impacts to residents, businesses, and essential services, where
possible).

It should be noted that the OPS is a distinct organization that is separate from the City
of Ottawa (the corporate entity of municipal government in Ottawa). The two
organizations had distinct roles and responsibilities during the response to the convoy
protest, as shown in the table below.

5
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

Table 2: Responsibilities of the OPS and the City during the protest

Responsibilities OPS City of

Ottawa
Gathering intelligence from other agencies to inform planning
Overall planning for the protest
Planning for effects on City services using intelligence provided by
the OPS and the NCRCC.
Creating and coordinating an operational plan for the event
Leading day-to-day decision-making at the NCRCC
Obtaining information from the NCRCC to determine impacts on
the City
Traffic management (with the OPS being the lead)
Communications to the public
Providing resources and assistance to policing as requested
Providing emergency services to assist residents with basic needs
Deciding whether to cancel / close City services and facilities
Requesting assistance from other policing agencies
Requesting assistance from other levels of government
Enforcing municipal by-laws at the direction of police
Applying for an injunction
Declaring a municipal state of emergency

OPS and City collaboration and support

The City played a key role in supporting the OPS through the fulfillment of requests
made by the OPS, through the NCRCC. Examples of such requests included:
• Providing Traffic Management staff that had expertise on City roads
• Providing, installing, and dismantling concrete barriers and fencing
• Providing heavy vehicles to block emergency lanes (during the early days of
the demonstration)
• Providing hand-held radios to the officers that came from other policing
agencies
• Towing of vehicles blocking emergency lanes
• Deploying by-law enforcement officers to work with police-led Quick Response
Teams within the red-zone
• Providing buses to shuttle police to various locations

6
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

• Seeking towing services from other jurisdictions, providing OC Transpo’s two

(2) heavy-duty tow trucks
• Making City facilities available for use by various policing agencies
• Assisting 9-1-1 with calls received that were 3-1-1-related requests
• Assisting OPS Communications with media advisories and Zoom meetings

The OPS, while the lead for the response, also provided critical support to the City in
their response and support of residents during this time. This came primarily in the form
of security for front-line workers to ensure continuity of necessary services. Examples of
such support included:
• For any front-line staff (public works, paramedic, fire, by-law) that required
access to the red-zone, as long as resources were available, officers were
made available to accompany them
• Support for Fire, Paramedics, and the Human Needs Task Force by guiding
them on the best routes to take given the traffic congestion
• The OPS stationed officers near the Lemieux water treatment plant at the
request of the City to protect this critical infrastructure
• The OPS accompanied by-law enforcement officers when ticketing
• When by-law officers got swarmed by protesters, OPS officers were there to
resolve the matter peacefully
• In the second week of the protest, the OPS worked with the EOC to facilitate
essential worker entry into the secured area

Audit objective and scope

The objective of the audit was to assess whether the collaboration between the OPS
and the City of Ottawa in response to the convoy protest was timely and effective in
supporting each organization’s overall objectives.
The request for the OAG to conduct an audit of the OPS’s response to the convoy
protest was a full-scope audit. However, because of other agencies performing a similar
scope of work, our Office chose to limit the scope of our OPS audit, at this time, to their
collaboration with City of Ottawa staff prior to and during the convoy protest. Once these
agencies have reported on the results of their reviews/inquiries, additional work may be
conducted by the OAG.

The scope of the audit did not include OPS’s collaboration with any policing agency or
partner outside of the City of Ottawa.

Please see Appendix 1 for the audit objective and criterion.

7
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

Conclusion
The convoy protest that took place in Ottawa in early 2022 was an unprecedented
emergency that significantly impacted both the OPS and the City of Ottawa. The OPS
was the lead policing agency in managing the event and the City of Ottawa had a
responsibility to support the OPS, and to manage the significant implications on the
municipality and its residents.

The audit noted the tireless efforts of officers and senior leadership within the OPS, who
worked under the harshest of conditions (e.g., staff vacancies/shortages, frigid winter
temperatures, and extended shifts) throughout the convoy protest to ensure the safety
of the residents of Ottawa, the protestors and their fellow officers. Equally, City of
Ottawa staff and management worked relentlessly, many behind the scenes, to ensure
the continuation of City services and to provide support to the residents of Ottawa.

We can conclude that, to the extent possible, the OPS and the City worked effectively
together towards a common objective and each organization was able to support the
other in providing resources, infrastructure and expertise, when available.

With the benefit of hindsight, the audit identified opportunities for improvement in the
area of collaboration between the OPS and the City to be considered in the response to
future emergencies where both organizations are implicated. This includes sharing
intelligence and plans with the appropriate City representatives to ensure a timely and
coordinated response, leveraging the expertise of City staff, as appropriate, as well as
formalizing roles and responsibilities for communications.

8
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

Audit findings and recommendations

1. OPS did not consider the OEM as a prime partner in pre-planning
Mandated by the province, the City’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) is
responsible for managing the City’s Emergency Management Program (EMP) and has
the responsibilities of planning and preparing prior to an emergency and ensuring the
continuation of essential services during an emergency. Typically, when planning for an
upcoming protest, the OPS engages with specific City representatives who would be
implicated based on the nature of the protest. Because most protests are not deemed
as a City “emergency”, the OEM would not be a typical partner for the OPS in planning
for the event, nor does a process exist for notifying the OEM.

Between January 14 and 23, 2022, the OPS reached out to specifically implicated City
departments including Transit Services, Traffic Management, Fire and Paramedics to
involve them in pre-planning for the protest. The OPS did not reach out to the OEM, the
central unit within the City that is responsible for coordinating emergency planning. As
the City was receiving developing information about the size and nature of the protest
and the potential impacts on the City, the OEM initiated contact with the OPS on
January 24, 2022. Due to a lack of timely notification, the City was unable to commence
coordinated planning activities until mere days before the arrival of the protestors.

Although each City department had a responsibility to raise significant concerns to

management, once the magnitude of the event, the possibility of it being high risk and
the likelihood of significant impacts to the City were known, the OEM should have been
notified by the OPS.

RECOMMENDATION 1 – EARLY ENGAGEMENT WITH OEM IN SIGNIFICANT FUTURE EVENTS

The Deputy Chief should work collaboratively with the GM of Emergency and
Protective Services (EPS) to develop a process to ensure timely engagement of the
OEM (along with all other relevant City departments) when the size and nature of a
protest (or other similar event) has the potential for significant City impacts. This will
ensure that the handling of future similar events are grounded in the City’s
Emergency Management Plan to support a City-wide coordinated response.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE 1

The Convoy demonstration was unprecedented. The OPS’s response to the Convoy
required a significant number of resources as well as complex operational decisions.
Following the Convoy demonstration, the OPS adapted and implemented changes to

9
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

ensure that a more coordinated approach with its partnering agencies and services is
achieved.

Please find below examples of larger events that occurred in the City of Ottawa in
2022 since the Convoy that were peaceful and/or successful:
• St. Patrick’s Day;
• Next Generation Convoy;
• Motorcycle Demonstration;
• Derecho Storm;
• Canada Day;
• Solidarity with Dutch Farmers;
• Capital Pride; and
• Panda Games (University Football)

The OPS agrees with and supports this recommendation to engage City departments,
as required, to support a City-wide coordinated response. This is achieved through
the Integrated Event Command Table (“IECT”), which has commenced as of Q1 2022
to include all required City departments and partnering agencies/services. The IECT
is engaged from the early stages of event planning and decision-making for City
events and is carried on right through the event itself. The representative from the
OEM holds a seat at the IECT at all levels throughout the entire process. The OPS is
in the process of establishing the IECT and will continue to review and refine where
applicable.

The Specialized Policing Directorate and Strategic Planning Branch, in consultation

with other sections and partnering agencies, will establish a Terms of Reference for
the IECT by Q4 2023.

2. Intelligence shared by OPS with the City was insufficient, impacting

the effectiveness of the City’s planning
As noted above, while City departments were engaged by the OPS prior to the convoy’s
arrival, the intelligence shared with the City was not sufficient to allow the City to
conduct effective planning for the event. The City is dependent on the OPS for
intelligence collection as there is no function or ability to do this within the City.
However, the OPS controls and limits the amount of intelligence shared with other
parties as intelligence sharing is strictly on a need-to-know basis. While the OPS was
unable to share classified intelligence that originated from other law enforcement /
national security agencies, the OPS could have shared, as they saw fit, unclassified

10
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

intelligence and planning information developed within the OPS. In the days leading up
to the convoy’s arrival, City departments received very little information from the OPS.

Given the large number of vehicles and protesters expected, a key aspect of planning
for the convoy was traffic management. The OPS had developed a 46-page traffic plan
as of January 26, 2022, based on the intelligence available at the time, but did not share
the plan with the City. Only a brief single page plan showing police unit posts was
shared with the City’s Traffic Management unit on January 29, 2022. Despite the OPS’s
plan being based on information that was constantly changing and the fact that the
behaviour of incoming protesters was unpredictable, sharing the established traffic plan,
when it was in a sufficiently finalized state, would have enabled the City to be better
prepared.

As an impact of this, without being provided the traffic plan, Transit Services did not get
sufficient information to properly plan for bus service impacts. Transit Services found
itself in the position of having to re-route, create detours, post signage, and get
information out to the public all at the last minute. Having the OPS’s traffic plan would
have at the very least made Transit Services aware of the planned road closures, road
restrictions, staging / stacking areas, and ingress and egress routes.

In planning for the event, the City also received conflicting risk ratings from different
sources. The whole range of high, medium, and low risk ratings were provided
depending on who provided the information. The City may not have adopted the
appropriate planning and preparedness approach for the event because of the varying
risk ratings received and the overall limited intelligence received.

RECOMMENDATION 2 – SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH THE CITY

The Deputy Chief should work collaboratively with the GM of EPS to develop a
process to have the OPS regularly share intelligence on matters that have City-wide
impacts with select individuals (with security clearance) within the City’s OEM. This
will enable the City to receive more timely and detailed intelligence to aid responses
to future events.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE 2

The OPS’s Intelligence section has revised its internal processes to assess and
determine the potential sharing of intelligence to the appropriate City
individuals/departments, specifically the OEM and INTERSECT1, to ensure better

1 INTERSECT is a multi-jurisdictional, all-hazards emergency preparedness program within the National Capital
Region (NCR). It is designed to enhance emergency management and preparedness initiatives in the NCR.

11
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

planning and decision-making of all future events. This is achieved through the IECT,
which has been implemented to include all required City departments and partnering
agencies/services.
The OPS agrees with and supports this recommendation to continue to share
information and unprotected intelligence, as previously mentioned, with the City’s
selected point person through the IECT for timely collaboration and decision-making.
The OPS is in the process of establishing the IECT and will continue to review and
refine where applicable.

The Specialized Policing Directorate, Intelligence, Information & Investigations

Command, and Strategic Planning Branch, in consultation with other sections and
partnering agencies if required, will establish a Terms of Reference for the IECT by
Q4 2023.

3. OPS did not consistently engage City resources in traffic

management throughout the convoy protest
Generally, subject matter expertise in the area of traffic planning and management lies
within the City’s Traffic Management unit. As part of their responsibilities, they:
• Work closely and effectively to deal with major incidents with partner agencies
including Ottawa Police, OC Transpo, Société de transport de l'Outaouais (STO),
Ontario Provincial Police, Ministry of Transportation of Ontario, City of Gatineau,
Sûreté du Québec, and the Ministry of Transportation of Québec;
• Create and deploy special response plans and real-time traffic management
strategies including signal timing modifications, police assistance, flexible lane
designations controlled through variable message signs, installation of detour
routes; and
• Communicate to the public the impacts to the road network of the incident via the
web, media, and Variable Message Signs.

During the convoy protest, traffic management was police-led; however, given the
impact of the protest on City roads, transportation and services, the City needed to be
more actively engaged in traffic planning. The OPS could have missed key
considerations, like the impacts on City departments and services (e.g., OC Transpo,
snow removal, fire, paramedics, etc.) by excluding the City from planning and ongoing
traffic management.

The audit found that the development of the initial traffic plan was not collaborative
between the OPS and the City. The City initially provided the OPS a template for a
traffic plan but when it was determined that the size and nature of the protest needed a

12
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

substantially different traffic plan, the OPS did not re-engage the City in its
development. Further, as noted in Finding 2 above, this detailed traffic plan, dated
January 26, 2022, was not shared with the City.

During the first two weeks of the convoy protest, the OPS did not leverage the expertise
of, nor collaborate with the Traffic Management unit for ongoing traffic management.
The City found itself reacting to OPS requests (e.g., assistance with setting up barriers)
related to traffic. Traffic Management found the situation chaotic as requests were being
made of them (which were not always feasible), but they were not privy to the
communications related to the traffic plan behind the requests. Despite this, the City did
not formally request that the OPS include them in traffic planning prior to the convoy’s
arrival, nor throughout the first two weeks of the event.

It was not until February 21, 2022, two days prior to the end of the protest, when the
City’s Traffic Management unit’s expertise was utilized by the OPS, and the City
obtained knowledge of the detailed traffic plan from there onwards.

RECOMMENDATION 3 – COLLABORATION WITH CITY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

The Deputy Chief should work collaboratively with the GM of EPS to develop a
process to ensure that for future events of significant size and nature, the City will
be engaged by the OPS for integrated planning. This would include actively
engaging the City’s Traffic Management unit to carry out its traffic incident
management responsibilities and make use of its subject matter expertise in traffic
management. Further, City input should be sought when developing traffic plans.
Traffic related documents should be shared, along with any changes throughout
the event, as traffic management has significant implications to City services.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE 3

The OPS agrees with and supports this recommendation. The representative from
City Traffic Management now holds a seat at the IECT at all levels throughout the
entire process. The OPS is in the process of establishing the IECT and will
continue to review and refine where applicable.

The Specialized Policing Directorate, in consultation with other sections and the City,
will establish a Terms of Reference for the IECT by Q4 2023.

13
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

4. Roles and responsibilities of OPS and City communications

departments
Since the convoy protest was a police-led event, with numerous downstream impacts
on City services, it was important for the City’s Public Information and Media Relations
(PIMR) department to collaborate with the OPS’s Communications department to
ensure that all published communications were timely, appropriate, coordinated and
accurate.

The audit found that PIMR and OPS Communications worked collaboratively throughout
the event. For instance, PIMR would often help set up and coordinate logistical support
for OPS media availabilities, and the OPS would review and approve public service
announcement content being proposed by the City that fell under OPS jurisdiction
before it was published. Both groups worked collaboratively by relying on the
established good working relationships the individuals in the positions had with each
other. While this worked well during this event, individuals in the positions could change
and as a result, the relationship between the two communication offices could be
different in the future.

Currently, there is no documented process that provides guidance on how PIMR and
OPS Communications should work together during an emergency. Established and
formalized roles, responsibilities, and authorities will enable both organizations to
provide clear and consistent messaging to the public in a timely manner.

RECOMMENDATION 4 – FORMALIZE COMMUNICATION ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

BETWEEN OPS AND THE CITY

The Director of Communications, in collaboration with the Chief Communications

Officer, should document their respective roles, responsibilities, authorities and
formalize guidance on how the organizations will work together during emergencies
to ensure there is adequate review and approval of communications before they
are published.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE 4

The OPS agrees with and supports this recommendation. Through the IECT a
corporate communications structure and process has been established unifying all
stakeholders. This process will continue to solidify and strengthen the operational
relationship between the OPS and the City. While the OPS has made this change, the
Service will continue to review and refine where applicable.

14
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

The Corporate Communications Branch, in collaboration with the Chief

Communications Officer of the City of Ottawa, will establish a Memorandum of
Understanding by the end of Q2 2023.

It is important to note that the OAG has not audited the content of management
responses to our recommendations for accuracy. These responses are direct comments
from Management. The status and completion of the recommendations will be assessed
by the OAG at a later date.

15
Audit of Ottawa Police Service’s Response to the Convoy Protest –
Collaboration with the City of Ottawa

Appendix 1 – About the audit

Audit objective and criterion
The objective of the audit was to assess whether the collaboration between the OPS
and the City of Ottawa in response to the convoy protest was timely and effective in
supporting each organization’s overall objectives.

The request for the OAG to conduct an audit of the OPS’s response to the convoy
protest was a full-scope audit. However, because of other agencies performing a similar
scope of work, our Office chose to limit the scope of our OPS audit, at this time, to their
collaboration with City of Ottawa staff prior to and during the convoy protest.

The criterion listed below reflects the limited scope of this audit.

1. Collaboration between OPS and the City of Ottawa

1.1 The collaboration between the City and the OPS allowed the City to make
timely and effective decisions, to support the OPS as the lead for the response,
and to request assistance from the OPS to provide continuity of City services,
when necessary.

Audit approach and methodology

Audit staff performed the following procedures to complete this audit:
• Reviewed relevant documents (e.g., meeting minutes, correspondence from
custodians, media releases, memos to City of Ottawa Management / Council,
correspondence);
• Interviewed and performed walkthroughs with stakeholders from the OPS and the
City of Ottawa; and
• Performed other analysis, as deemed necessary.

Visit us online at www.oagottawa.ca

Follow us on Twitter @oagottawa

16