Satbir & Anr. vs Ms. Adarsh Kaul Gill & Ors.

* THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgment delivered on: 13.02.2012 + EFA(OS) No. 4/2012
SATBIR & ANR. ...... APPELLANTS Vs MS. ADARSH KAUL GILL & ORS. ..... RESPONDENTS

Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the Appellants: Mr Pramod Ahuja & Dr. N. Pradeep Sharma, Advocates. For the Respondents: Mr C.S.
Sundaram, Sr. Adv. with Mr Anish Kapur, Ms Durga Bhalla & Mr Zafar Inayat, Advocates.

CORAM :-

HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER RAJIV SHAKDHER, J
Caveat No. 152/2012 The respondent has put in an appearance and the caveat stands discharged.

CM No. 2685/2012 (Exemption) Allowed subject to just exceptions.

EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 & CM No. 2686/2012 (Stay)

1. The captioned appeal impugns the order of the learned Single Judge dated 02.02.2012 passed in
Execution Petition No. 286/2011. The only submission EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 1 of 16 made before us,
by the learned counsel for the appellant, in support of the appeal is that, the warrants of possession
issued qua the immovable property i.e., land comprising in Mustatil No. 90, Killa No. 11/2, Mustatil No. 91,
Killa Nos. 7/1, 7/2, 14, 17, 15/2 and 16, total admeasuring 17 Bighas and 4½ Biswas, situated within the
revenue estate of Village Dera Mandi, Delhi (hereinafter referred to in short as the property) ought not to
have been issued, as the execution petition was not maintainable, in view of it being barred, by limitation.
In support of this submission learned counsel for the appellant Mr Pramod Ahuja, relied upon Article 136 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the Limitation Act).

2. We are in these circumstances called upon to decide as to whether in the factual matrix, which obtains
in the instant case, the execution petition filed, was instituted, beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
In order to appreciate the issue raised by the appellant, the following facts are required to be noticed:

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2.1 Respondent no. 1, who is the decree holder in the present case, had instituted a suit, on 10.10.1988
being CS(OS) : 2524/1988, to seek specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 02.05.1988 (in
short agreement). To be noted this agreement was executed between respondent no. 1 and respondent
nos. 2 to 4 alongwith appellant nos. 1 and 2 (collectively referred to as the vendors); being the other party
in the said agreement. The total sale consideration, as set out in the agreement, is a sum of Rs 7,20,000/-.
It is not in dispute, that over a period of time respondent no. 1 paid a sum of Rs 2,50,000/-.

2.2. It appears that the vendors did not proceed to execute a sale deed, which propelled respondent no. 1
to institute the aforementioned suit for specific performance. Since, despite service of summons, (which
were admittedly received by respondent no. 4, i.e., Satpal) no appearance was put in by the EFA(OS) No.
4/2012 Page 2 of 16 vendors, by an order dated 06.11.1989, the vendors, who were impleaded in the suit,
were proceeded ex-parte.

2.3. It appears that the vendors took no immediate steps to retrieve the situation, which resulted in the
court proceeding to decree the suit against the vendors based on the evidence placed before it by
respondent no. 1. The judgment and decree thus came to be passed on 15.11.1990. Interestingly,
respondent no. 1 in its suit had only sought a decree of specific performance of the agreement referred to
above, which was granted by the court with a direction that the balance sale consideration be deposited
by her, in court, within two weeks. The vendors, who were the defendants in the suit, were directed to
take steps for execution and registration of the "sale deed" within two weeks of the deposit of the sale
consideration, failing which the Registrar of this Court was directed to take necessary steps for execution
and registration of the sale deed.

2.4. It is not in dispute that the vendors took no steps towards execution of the sale deed and
consequently the Registrar of this court executed a sale deed dated 22.10.1991, in favour of respondent
no. 1.

2.5. A perusal of the list of dates filed by the appellant, would show that admittedly, respondent no. 1 had
taken out proceedings before the Revenue Assistant for mutation of the property in issue, in her favour.
These proceedings were taken out in 1992. According to the appellant, on 23.11.1994, the Revenue
Assistant declined the request for mutation as it was made in contravention of Section 33 of the Delhi
Land Revenue Act, 1954 (in short DLR Act).

2.6 Undeniably, against the order dated 23.11.1994 a revision petition was filed by one of the vendors.
This revision petition was filed on 04.07.1995.

EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 3 of 16

The appellants in the present proceedings were made parties to the revision petition.

2.7 A revision petition was, as it appears, preferred even by respondent no. 1 before the Financial
Commissioner against order dated 23.11.1994, passed by the Revenue Assistant. This revision petition
was dismissed on 21.12.1995, on the ground, that the gaon sabha being a necessary party, had not been
arrayed as party in the said proceedings. Against the said proceedings a writ petition being: WPC(C)

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1489/96 was filed. The appellant claimed to have received notice of the said writ petition, on 05.10.1998.

2.8 We may observe here, that there is a brief mention of aforesaid events pertaining to revenue
proceedings only in the list of dates. There are no averments, in this regard, the writ petition. One of the
reasons perhaps the appellants have been constrained to refer to these events in the list of dates is
because in an earlier round this very bench had heard an appeal being FAO(OS) No. 228/1999, wherein
reference to these proceedings was made though the order ultimately came to be passed on other
grounds to which we would shortly make a reference.

2.9 The point to be noted is that, the appellants were aware of the ex-parte judgment and the resultant
execution of the sale deed during the course of the revenue proceedings. Despite, such a position
obtaining, the appellants for the first time, preferred an interlocutory application being: IA No. 9784/1998,
under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code), for
setting aside the ex-parte judgment and decree dated 15.11.1990, only on 30.10.1998. The said
application, however, was also accompanied with IA No. 1398/1998, preferred under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, to seek condonation of delay.

EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 4 of 16

3. A single Judge of this court, by an order dated 07.07.1999, dismissed the application for condonation of
delay, and consequently, the application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code.

3.1 It is against the aforementioned order that an appeal being: FAO(OS) No. 228/1999 was preferred
before the Division Bench of this court. In the said appeal, i.e., FAO(OS) 228/1999 came to be admitted on
30.04.2001. At that stage, in the interlocutory application being: CM 2789/1999, the Division Bench
passed the following order.

"C.M. 2789/99 Heard.

No other or further order is required to be passed on this application except by directing

The application stands disposed of."

3.2. The said appeal was finally disposed of by this very Bench, by an order dated 16.08.2011. Briefly, the
appeal was disposed of in rather peculiar circumstances. The reason being that the appellants before us,
denied their signatures both on the application and the affidavit supporting the application filed under
Order 9 Rule 13 as also the Vakalatnama placed on the suit record. In these circumstances, we were faced
with the situation that there was, as a matter of fact, no application on record under Order 9 Rule 13 read
with Section 151 of the Code or, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The situation was no
different qua the appeal, as they denied their signatures even on the appeal and the affidavits filed in
support of the appeal as also on the Vakalatnama accompanying the appeal. The proceedings having
come to this pass, the appeal was dismissed by us, on the ground that it was incompetent. We refrained
from proceeding further, for the reason that the appellants claimed EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 5 of 16 that

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they had, not had, much education. This apart, any further enquiry by us would have embarrassed the
advocate on record who had admittedly identified the signatures of the appellants.

3.3. The appellants, as a matter of fact also preferred a review petition qua our order dated 16.08.2011,
to seek withdrawal of the statements recorded on 16.08.2011. The said review petition was dismissed on
09.12.2011 with costs of Rs 50,000/-. The costs, in term of the order had to be paid within a period of one
week. We may note that this had not been paid and a cheque in the sum of Rs 50,000- was handed over
to the counsel for Respondent no. 1 today in court.

4. The second round of litigation thus commenced, when respondent no. 1 filed the aforementioned
execution petition being EP No. 286/2011; in which the impugned judgment has been passed by the
learned Single Judge. It appears that in the aforementioned execution petition the prayer made was to
direct the vendors, i.e., the judgment debtors to hand over possession of the property in issue, or in the
alternative, permit the amendment of the plaint to include the relief of possession. The learned Single
Judge, by way of a detailed judgment, has discussed at length this aspect of the matter as well as the
other issue of limitation, which is raised in the present appeal before us, both from a factual and legal
angle. The learned Single Judge in respect of the first issue after noticing the legal position, in particular,
the observations of the Supreme Court in Babu Lal vs Hazari Lal Kishori Lal (1982) 1 SCC 525, came to the
following conclusion as noted in paragraph 28 of the impugned judgment:

"28. .....Grant of relief for delivery of possession is just a formality and even though, no specific
prayer is made in the plaint and even the decree is silent about the delivery of possession, the
Executing Court is empowered and bound to grant such relief. If I go through the judgments
referred above, it is not even necessary to amend the plaint, as it is the admitted position in
the present case that the sale deed in terms of the decree has already been executed in
favour of the decree-holder EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 6 of 16 and there is no involvement of
the third party regarding the possession. This fact has not been controverted by the judgment-
debtors in the pleadings also as status-quo orders passed by this Court till the disposal of the
appeal. Thus, it is clear that the possession was with the judgment-debtors. Therefore, the
facts of the cases directly apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. However,
since the objection is raised by the judgment-debtors and the decree-holder has also sought
amendment of the plaint for including the relief for possession of the property in question,
coupled with the fact that a conflicting view has been taken by the Courts in some of the cases
and the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 allows the
plaintiff who has not claimed any such relief provided in clauses (a) or (b) of sub-section (1) of
Section 22 to amend the plaint for including a claim for recovery of possession. The
amendment, under these circumstances, can be allowed at any stage of proceedings including
the execution proceedings........"

5. On the aspect of limitation, the learned Single Judge was of the view that, since the Division Bench had
by an order dated 30.04.2001 restrained the vendors/judgment debtors from transferring, alienating,
parting with or creating any third party interest in the property during the pendency of the appeal; which
was followed by an order dated 07.10.2010 restraining them from carrying on construction; vendors/

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judgment debtors could not have parted with possession, as acting contrary to it would have resulted in
breach of the order of the Division Bench. Therefore, impliedly, respondent no. 1, i.e., the decree holder
was restrained from taking possession of the property. The relevant observations in this regard made in
the impugned judgment are extracted hereinafter for the sake of convenience.

"..... It is also not in dispute that the Division Bench on 30.04.2001, while admitting the appeal,
passed the interim order directing the judgment debtors not to transfer, alienate, part with or
create any third party interest in the property in question during the pendency of the appeal.
Not only that, on 07.10.2010 further interim order was passed in the appeal to the effect that
no further construction would take place.

EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 7 of 16

Therefore, in case both the interim orders are read together, it is clear that the judgment-
debtors were precluded to part with possession of the suit property otherwise it would have
been breached of the order passed by the Division Bench. Similarly, by the said orders, the
decree-holder was impliedly asked not to receive the possession.

18. In the case referred by Mr Ahuja, the facts are different, i.e., the suit was filed for
declaration of title and recovery of possession. There was no stay at any stage, granted by the
court and the execution was filed after the expiry of twelve years. But in the present case, the
Appeal Court has passed the specific order not to part with the possession of the suit property.
Further, in the present case, in terms of decree, the sale deed was already registered in the
name of decree holder in the year 1991 and next steps was merely to hand over the
possession of the suit property which could not be parted with because of interim orders. Thus,
the period, in which the interim orders were operated against the parties, is to be excluded for
the purpose of limitation. It is also the admitted position that after the dismissal of appeal filed
by the judgment-debtors, who failed to handover the possession of the suit property in terms
of agreement, the decree-holder was within her right to file the present execution for the
purpose of remaining in compliance. The objection now raised about limitation is misconceived
and is not tenable to the facts of the present case, as it was an obligation on the part of the
judgment- debtors to deliver the possession in terms of agreement, in consonance with the
provisions of Section 55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which mandates that the
seller to give, on being so required, to the buyer, the possession of the suit property as its
nature admits. The entire scheme is that it has to be done in order to avoid multiplicity of
proceedings and such duty is to be performed by the party who is also a party to the
agreement meaning thereby it would be implied.

19. Since, after the dismissal of the appeal, the judgment-debtors did not come forward to
handover the possession, the decree- holder is entitled to recover the same by filing of
execution proceedings. Thus, the decision referred by the judgment- debtors does not help the
case of objector, as the facts of the present case are materially different......"

EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 8 of 16

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6. Mr Pramod Ahuja, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the observations of the learned
Single Judge were not in consonance with the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Charanji
Lal (D) by L.Rs. vs Hari Das (D) by L.Rs. AIR 2005 SC 2564 and Ram Bachan Rai & Ors. vs Ram Udar Rai &
Ors. AIR 2006 SC 2248. Mr Ahuja further submitted that the provisions of Article 136 of the Limitation Act
required execution of the decree within a period of twelve years. The judgment and decree having been
passed in this case on 15.11.1990, the execution petition was woefully beyond the prescribed period of
limitation. It was Mr Ahuja's contention that, there being no order of any competent court staying the
operation of the judgment and decree, the limitation continued to run against respondent no. 1, i.e., the
decree holder. In other words, despite the respondent no.1 having a sale deed in her favour, she could not
seek possession of the property from the appellant through the mode of execution.

7. Mr C.A. Sundaram, learned senior counsel for the respondents, instructed by Mr Anish Kapur, opposed
the admission of the appeal.

8. Having perused the record and heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the
appeal is without merit for the following reasons. Article 136 of Limitation Act prescribes that the
execution of a decree (other than a decree granting mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court
should take place within a period of twelve years. What is, however, crucial is that the period of twelve
years commences when the decree or order, whose execution is sought, becomes "enforceable" or is
capable of being enforced. The Supreme Court's observations in that regard in the case of Akkayanaicker
vs A.A.A. Kotchadainaidu & Anr. (2004) 12 SCC 469 being apposite are extracted hereinbelow:

"14. In pursuance of the recommendations made by the Law Commission of India, Section 48
CPC was repealed by Section 28 EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 9 of 16 of the Act and Article 182
was replaced by the present Article 136. As noticed earlier in this judgment, Article 136 of the
Act being the governing statutory provision, prescribes a period of 12 years when the decree
or order becomes enforceable. This court in Hameed Joharan vs Abdul Salam after referring to
the meaning ascribed to the word "enforce" from various dictionaries held that the words
"when the decree or order becomes enforceable" should be read in their literal sense and as
per intention of the legislature 12 years' period is to be reckoned from the date and decree
became enforceable. It was observed that the language used by the legislature in Article 136 if
read in its proper perspective must have been to clear up any confusion that might have
arisen by reason of the user of the expression "the date of the decree or order" which was
used in the earlier Act. The requirement of the Limitation Act in the matter of enforcement of a
decree is the date on which the decree becomes enforceable or capable of being enforced. The
intention of the legislature being clear and unambiguous a meaning other than the literal
meaning of the words used in the statute did not arise.

15. Section 48 CPC which provided for a limitation of 12 years for the execution of a decree
has been replaced by Article 136 of the Act. The words "when the decree becomes
enforceable" which find place in Article 136 were not there in Section 48 CPC. Because of the
change brought about by the legislature in the starting point of limitation would be the date on

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which the decree becomes capable of execution. The amendment carried out in the decree in
the present case was substantial and not inconsequential like correction or clerical or
arithmetical mistake under Section 152 CPC. The decretal amount was substantially reduced
because of the scaling down of the decree in terms of Act 40 of 1978. A learned Single Judge in
Fatimunnisa Begum vs Mohd. Zainulabuddin Saheb relying upon the expression in Article 136
of the Act "when the decree becomes enforceable" which is not there in Section 48 CPC
concluded that the decree which was subjected to an amendment can be enforced only as
amended and the period of limitation would start only from the date of the amendment of the
decree....."

8.1. Before, we proceed further to examine as to what would be the result if the aforesaid principle is
applied, it would be useful to extract the provisions of Article 136 of the limitation Act:

EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 10 of 16

"Art. For the Twelve [when] the decree or order 136 execution of Years becomes enforceable or any
decree where the decree or any (other than a subsequent order directs any decree granting payment of
money or the a mandatory delivery of any property to be injunction) or made at a certain date or at order
of any recurring periods, when civil court. default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which
execution is sought, take place: Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree
granting in perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation."

8.2. As noted hereinabove by us while detailing out the facts in the instant case, the decree dated
15.11.1990 granted specific performance of the property in issue, as the plaint at the relevant point in
time did not seek the consequential relief of possession. This decree was satisfied, on the Registrar
General of this court executing a sale deed dated 22.10.1991 in favour of respondent no. 1/decree holder.
Therefore, the decree as it stood on 15.11.1990 was satisfied. This decree by virtue of the impugned
judgment includes the relief of possession by permitting the amendment of the plaint. The impugned
judgment is dated 02.02.2012. The learned Single Judge in coming to this conclusion, i.e., in allowing the
amendment of the plaint at the state of execution of the decree has relied upon the dicta of the judgment
of the Supreme Court in Babul Lal (supra). The relevant observations are extracted hereinafter:

EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 11 of 16

"19. The same High Court, however. in M/s. Ex-Servicemen Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Sumey
Singh14 considered the effect of section 22 (2) with its proviso. In that case the decree did not
give the plaintiff the relief of possession. The question arose: Was the Court powerless to put
him in possession of the property though he had a decree for specific performance in his
favour ? The Delhi High Court observed:

"Section 22 enacts a rule of pleading. The legislature thought it will be useful to introduce a
rule that in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings the plaintiff may claim a decree for
possession in a suit for specific performance even though, strictly speaking the right to
possession accrues only when specific performance is decreed.. The legislature has now made

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a statutory provision enabling the plaintiff to ask for possession in the suit for specific
performance and empowering the court to provide in the decree itself that upon payment by
the plaintiff of the consideration money within the given time, the defendant should execute
the deed and put the plaintiff in possession.

In my opinion the proviso gives ample power to a court to allow the amendment of the plaint
even at this stage. The proviso says that the amendment of the plaint can be allowed "at any
stage of the proceedings" on such terms as may be just for including a claim for possession
where the plaintiff has not claimed such relief in his original plaint.

* * * The term "proceeding" is a very comprehensive term and generally speaking means a
prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right. It is not a technical expression with a
definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning will be governed by the
statute. It indicates a prescribed mode in which Judicial business is conducted.

The word "proceeding" in Section 22 in my opinion includes execution proceedings also......"

The High Court had relied upon Rameshwar Nath v. U.P. Union Bank Ltd. for its decision in this
case. We are in 14 AIR 1976 Del 56: ILR (1975) 2 Del 539 EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 12 of 16
complete agreement with the view taken by the Delhi High Court on this case.

20. It is thus clear that the Legislature has given ample power to the court to allow
amendment of the plaint at any stage, including the execution proceedings. In the instant case
the High Court granted the relief of possession and the objection raised on behalf of the
petitioner is that this was not possible at the execution stage and in any case the Court should
have allowed first an amendment in the plaint and then an opportunity should have been
afforded to the petitioner to file an objection.

21. If once we accept the legal position that neither a contract for sale nor a decree passed on
that basis for specific performance of the contract gives any right or title to the decree-holder
and the right and the title passes to him only on the execution of the deed of sale either by the
judgment-debtor himself or by the Court itself in case he fails to execute the sale deed, it is
idle to contend that a valuable right had accrued to the petitioner merely because a decree
has been passed for the specific performance of the contract. The limitation would start
against the decree-holders only after they had obtained a sale in respect of the disputed
property. It is, therefore, difficult to accept that a valuable right had accrued to the judgment
debtor by lapse of time. Section 22 has been enacted only for the purpose of avoiding
multiplicity of proceedings which the law courts always abhor.

22. The only amendment to be made in the plaint was to add a relief for possession
necessitated because of the provisions of section 22, which is only an enabling provision.

23. There has been a protracted litigation and it has dragged on practically for about 13 years
and it will be really a travesty of justice to ask the decree-holders to file a separate suit for

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possession. The objection of the petitioner is hyper-technical. The executing court has every
jurisdiction to allow the amendment. The only difficulty is that instead of granting a relief of
possession the High Court should have allowed an amendment in the Plaint. The mere
omission of the High Court to allow an amendment in the plaint is not so fatal as to deprive the
decree-holders of the benefits of the decree when section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act
authorises the transferee to get possession in pursuance of a sale deed."

EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 13 of 16

8.3. Crucially the aforesaid aspect of the matter was not assailed before us in the appeal. Nevertheless,
we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has come to a correct conclusion in law, which is borne
out from the observations made in paragraph 28 of the impugned judgment; which we have culled out in
the earlier part of our judgment. The sum and substance of the discussion of the learned Single Judge, on
this aspect is, that the relief of possession is embedded in the decree for specific performance, and that,
in any event even at the stage of execution, the executing court is permitted to allow the amendment of
the plaint for inclusion of such a relief.

8.4 Given this position in law, the argument of Mr Ahuja that the period of limitation has to be counted
from 15.11.1990 is, according to us, without merit. The decree vis-à-vis the relief of possession, in a
sense, became enforceable only on its formal inclusion in the judgment and decree dated 15.11.1990.

8.5 This apart, during the course of the argument we had put to Mr Ahuja, that in view of the interim order
dated 30.04.2001 have been passed by the Division Bench in FAO(OS) 228/1999, whereby the vendors
which included the appellants, had been directed not to transfer, alienate or create third party rights in
the property, whether an execution petition, in all practicality, would have been entertained by the single
judge? Mr.Ahuja's laconic answer to the query was that, it ought to have been instituted nevertheless. In
our view, if such a submission is accepted, it would in a sense lead to a situation where substantive law
which is required to accord with justice and equity will have to pay obeisance to a futile procedural
exercise. The mirror image of the order of the Division Bench whereby the vendors, which included the
appellants, were restrained from creating third party rights; was that respondent no.1/decree holder could
not seek execution of the judgment and decree dated 15.11.1990 as, if granted, would have amounted to
a variation of the Division Bench Order by a single judge of this court. Therefore, no fruitful purpose would
have been EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 14 of 16 served by respondent no.1/decree holder instituting an
execution petition which, could not be brought up for hearing before the executing court.

9. In so far as the two judgments cited by Mr Ahuja are concerned, in our view, the same are clearly
distinguishable. The first judgment, i.e., Dr. Chiranji Lal (supra) deals with the issue as to when the period
of limitation for execution of a decree, passed in a partition suit, commences. In the instant case we are
dealing with a decree passed in a suit for specific performance where the plaint was amended to include
the relief for possession by the executing court. The judgment is clearly distinguishable on facts.

9.1 In so far as the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Bachan Rai (supra) is concerned; it
is again distinguishable on facts. The plaintiff, in the said case, had filed a suit for declaration of title and
recovery of possession. The defendants had appeared and filed a written statement. Since, the defendant

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did not appear on the date fixed, the suit was decreed ex-parte. Against the ex-parte decree, an
application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code was preferred, which was dismissed for default. A
restoration application filed, was also dismissed, by the trial Court. Against the said order passed in the
restoration application, a civil revision was preferred, which was also dismissed. All this while there was no
"stay" granted by any court. The decree holder after a gap of nearly four years, after the dismissal of the
civil revision petition, filed an application for execution of the decree. The issue thus arose, as to whether
limitation would commence from the date of dismissal of the civil revision petition. The Supreme Court
came to the conclusion that the limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act commences form the
date the decree becomes "enforceable" and, therefore, date of dismissal of the civil revision petition was
not relevant (See paragraph 11 at page 2250). In the instant case there was not only an interim order in
operation but also the presence of an additional factor, which was the amendment of the decree.

EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 15 of 16

9.2 As a matter of fact, the judgment reinforces the principle that the period of limitation under Article
136 of the Limitation Act commences from the date the decree becomes enforceable.

10. For the aforesaid reasons we agree with the rationale provided in the impugned judgment by the
learned Single Judge on this aspect of the matter. The continued proceedings / defences of the appellant
are clearly abuse of process of court to deprive respondent no.1 of the fruits of success in prior litigation.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with cost of Rs 50,000/- to be paid to respondent no.1.

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL,J RAJIV SHAKDHER, J FEBRUARY 13, 2011 kk EFA(OS) No. 4/2012 Page 16 of 16

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