The Journal of North African Studies
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The pitfalls of Russia’s growing influence in Libya
Raphaël Lefèvre
To cite this article: Raphaël Lefèvre (2017) The pitfalls of Russia’s growing influence in Libya, The
Journal of North African Studies, 22:3, 329-334, DOI: 10.1080/13629387.2017.1307840
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2017.1307840
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THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES, 2017
VOL. 22, NO. 3, 329–334
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2017.1307840
COMMENTARY
The pitfalls of Russia’s growing influence in Libya
Raphaël Lefèvrea,b
a
Rank-Manning Research Fellow in Social Sciences, New College, Oxford, UK; bNonresident
Fellow, Carnegie Middle East Centre, Beirut, Lebanon
Many of the reports concerning Russia’s ‘return’ to the Middle East have
focused on the extensive military intervention launched in Syria in 2015 in
order to shore up Bashar al-Assad’s regime and on recent initiatives by the
Kremlin to play a greater role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. But,
far from only being visible in the Levant, Russia’s comeback is perceptible
in North Africa as well. This is particularly the case in Libya, where Moscow
has been intensely critical of Western actions since the NATO-led intervention
of 2011 paved the way for the overthrow of Mu’ammar Gaddafi.
The country is broadly split between two competing power centres – on
the one hand, the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) led by
Prime Minister Fayez Al-Sarraj and located in the capital Tripoli and, on the
other, the so-called ‘Tobruk Parliament’ based in the East which supports
the Libyan National Army (LNA) headed by rogue army officer Khalifa
Haftar. Russia, determined to secure a range of long-term strategic interests,
is staunchly backing Haftar, perhaps hoping that his bid for power will
bring a modicum of security and stability back to Libya.
The Kremlin’s support for Haftar has resulted in considerably weakening
the UN-backed GNA to the extent that a growing number of Western
countries now argue that his forces should be brought into the fold to
become a key part of future attempts at finding a political settlement to
the conflict. It is far from certain, however, that the Russian-backed strongman
actually has the capacity to single-handedly pacify the country, let alone to
lead a broad-based coalition to overcome its divisions. Russia’s return to the
Middle East might make headlines, but its success in Libya is not guaranteed.
The logics of Russia’s comeback
The Kremlin’s current attempts at bolstering its influence in Libya should
come as no surprise for Russia, after all, was the country that lost most from
the 2011 toppling of Mu’ammar Gaddafi. Indeed, Libya had been a historical
ally of Moscow during the Cold War when a close partnership was forged
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
330 R. LEFÈVRE
during Gaddafi’s landmark December 1976 visit to the Soviet Union and lasted
until the late 1980s. During that time, a thousand Soviet engineers settled in
Libya to build missile bases and a reported 11,000 Russian soldiers partici-
pated with Gaddafi’s army in various conflicts (Saini Fasanotti 2016). The
relationship between Libya and Russia deepened further from 2008 until
2011 as Vladimir Putin wrote off $4.5 billion in debts that Libya had contracted
during Soviet times in exchange for securing the Russian fleet’s access to the
port of Benghazi and a $2.2 billion contract to build a railway there. The over-
throw of Gaddafi endangered these agreements as well as Russia’s position in
the region. The civil war that followed also cost Moscow dearly – the passing
of a UN arms embargo meant that Libya, which as of 2010 acquired up to 12%
of Russia’s arms exports, stopped buying weapons, causing a $10 billion loss in
contracts to Russian arms manufacturers (Reuters, 2011).
Yet, despite being largely in retreat between 2011 and 2015, Russian influ-
ence has recently come back to the fore. Emboldened by the success of its
intervention in Syria despite international condemnation, Moscow now
wants to play the Libyan card to ‘utilize the West’s failures to strengthen its
position in the Mediterranean while also promoting a solution for the war-
ravaged country’ (Sputnik News, 2017). The Kremlin has much to earn from
exploiting the current situation. Given Libya’s own proximity to the shores
of Europe, securing influence there will strengthen Russia’s hand as it seeks
to lobby the European Union into abandoning the economic sanctions
against Moscow that it has implemented in recent years. Indeed, Libya has
become a focal point of the EU’s attention since it emerged as a fast-
growing hub for illegal immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa and the
Middle East into Europe. The number of migrants making the journey from
Libya rose from 153,000 in 2015 to 181,000 in 2016 while the first few
months of 2017 seemed to confirm a further increase in the making (Jeune
Afrique, 2017). European concern was on full display at an EU summit in
Malta in February 2017 when member states expressed their ‘determination’
to ‘significantly reduce migratory flows’ going through Libya. As a result,
Moscow’s growing clout there can only help it improve its bargaining position
with Brussels.
The logic behind Russia’s comeback to Libya is also linked to securing a
host of other national interests. Given the faltering economy at home, the
Kremlin is determined to seek every business opportunity. The reconstruction
of Libya has much to offer to Russian companies which seem particularly
interested in participating in the rebuilding of Sirte, a city affected by the
eight-month long conflict between the GNA-backed Bunyan Marsous forces
and ISIS which destroyed 8000 homes there (Libya Herald (a), 2017). Libya’s
oil sector is also attracting Russian attention. The country is home to the
largest oil reserves on the African continent and, while the conflict has
impacted production since 2012, with oil output reaching a historically low
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 331
220,000 barrels per day in November 2013, it remains highly lucrative. Indeed,
Libya was recently exempted from the OPEC production cuts, the National Oil
Corporation (NOC) is one of the country’s last fully functioning institutions and
its installations are still operational despite repeated attack. It is in this frame-
work that Russian oil giant Rosneft struck in February 2017 a deal with the
NOC for the exploration and production of new oil fields (Libya Herald (c),
2017), positioning itself as a growing actor in a North African energy sector
otherwise dominated by American and European oil companies.
But the return of Russia’s influence in Libya is not just economic – it is also
political and military. Officially, of course, Moscow maintains the façade that it is
an impartial actor. It adopted, for instance, UN Security Council Resolution 2259
of December 2015 endorsing the Libyan Political Agreement which paved the
way for the formation of the supposedly consensual, UN-backed GNA. In reality,
however, it has since then done all it could to undermine the GNA’s very
credibility. Instead, it has backed rival factions in the East perceived as more
sympathetic to Russian interests. This became evident in May 2016 when the
Kremlin organised the printing of 4 billion Libyan dinars ($2.9 billion) for the
Eastern Central Bank – an institution belonging to the Tobruk centre of
power. Then, it invited key eastern opponents of the GNA to visit Moscow
and received them with honours. Khalifa Haftar, the self-styled leader of the
LNA who was marginalised by the GNA but is backed by the ‘Tobruk Parlia-
ment’, and Aguila Saleh, one of his closest political allies, both travelled to
Moscow twice in mid to late 2016, the former even being given the rare privi-
lege of visiting Russia’s flagship aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov as it was
passing by Libya in January 2017. There are now growing reports that, in
spite of the UN arms embargo, Russia has signed a $2 billion weapons deal
with him and that it will treat wounded LNA soldiers in Moscow (The New
Arab (b), 2017). In exchange for the Kremlin’s support, Haftar is said to have
agreed to a Russian request to build a naval and air base in the eastern city
of Benghazi, which his forces control (Libyan Express, 2016).
The derailing of Libya’s peace process
The dynamics of Russia’s assertive return to Libya have profoundly altered the
political equation. Thanks to Moscow’s backing, Khalifa Haftar’s LNA, which
until 2015 had only been influential in the East, has secured control of most
of Cyrenaica and also extended into the South and parts of the West of the
country. In September 2016, his forces even managed to seize oil terminals
from militias allied with the central government in the highly contested pro-
vince of the Oil Crescent, in the centre of the country. This episode signifi-
cantly weakened the UN-backed GNA. It not only deprived it of control over
the oil revenues crucial to the running of government and the provision of
limited services, thus affecting its very credibility, but it also illustrated
332 R. LEFÈVRE
Khalifa Haftar’s military capacities and rising political profile. This has
prompted a rethink on the part of the states that have the most interest in
stability in Libya, such as Southern European countries, which, after having
long insisted that Haftar’s conquests were spreading chaos, now argue that
the strongman must be ‘part of the solution’ (Libya Herald (b), 2017).
Perhaps not incidentally, the Kremlin welcomed this development and
expressed its readiness to mediate between Haftar’s camp and the GNA to
find a compromise bringing the two sides together. Yet it is far from certain
that a political deal with the Libyan strongman would help restore security.
First, there is no certainty that Khalifa Haftar, who is suspected of having
ambitions for a dominant political role, would accept and respect such a
deal in the long term. He has so far shunned all attempts at de-escalating ten-
sions with the GNA, even cancelling at the last minute the meeting that had
been scheduled with GNA president Fayez al-Sarraj in February 2017 when
both were in Cairo. Far from striking a conciliatory tone, he has instead
suggested that, after conquering the Oil Crescent, his forces would begin pre-
paring an assault on the Libyan capital, where the GNA is based. ‘Our final aim
is Tripoli’, confirmed a spokesman for the LNA to Libyan media (Libya Herald
(d), 2017). These statements, even though they might be more reflective of
Haftar’s long-term goals and propaganda than a tangible short-term threat
to the GNA, are certainly not conducive to any peace process. Moreover, his
ideological rhetoric remains deeply divisive. He might have toned down his
earlier promise to ‘cleanse’ Libya of the Muslim Brotherhood but he continues
to advocate a violent suppression of other Islamist groups, including those
that have laid down weapons, formed political parties and now participate
in the governance of local municipalities (Journal Du Dimanche, 2017). And
Russia, perhaps attracted by his secular and anti-Islamist rhetoric, has not
tried to restrain him. Given how polarising a figure Haftar remains, it is thus
unlikely than a ‘deal’ with him would restore stability.
Second, even if he were to reach a position of power, his record on security
does not bode well. His fight against Islamist militants in Benghazi, dubbed
Operation Dignity, started in 2014 and is still ongoing, having caused con-
siderable human loss and massive material damage to Libya’s eastern city.
Even now, although most of the town is in the hands of the LNA, it remains
seriously plagued by insecurity. More generally, outside Libya’s eastern
region, the LNA has struggled to transform its quick territorial gains into
lasting military victories, as was shown by its loss of parts of the Oil Crescent
to rival militias in March 2017. The LNA, in fact, for all the Russian help it gets,
does not yet seem to be in a position to act as a coherent military platform
with a firepower which is effective nationwide. Its forces remain concentrated
on Benghazi and, while it can count on opportunistic allies elsewhere, as in the
western city of Zintan, any further advances outside its eastern stronghold are
likely to be forcefully resisted by Tuareg and Tebu forces in the South as well
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 333
as by powerful militias from the coastal city of Misrata in the West. Khalifa
Haftar’s LNA, therefore, might not be best placed to pacify the country in
the long term.
Third, there are particular concerns about the role of the ‘Madkhali Salafis’
who fight with Haftar. Indeed, the LNA leader may style himself as a secular
strongman hostile to Islamists of all stripes, but a key paradox is that he has
received the support of Libyan Salafis who follow the teachings of Rabia
bin Hadi al-Madkhali, a Saudi cleric advocating the doctrine of obedience to
the ruler (wali al-amr). Many remained loyal to Mu’ammar Qaddafi and now
fight on behalf of the LNA (Wehrey 2016). While their support during
Haftar’s struggle against Islamist militants in Benghazi was crucial to the
LNA’s military victory, there are now worries that they might use their new-
found influence with him to impose a Salafi agenda on parts of eastern
Libya. They have invited conservative Saudi clerics to tour Libyan mosques
in areas controlled by the LNA and their political influence was on full
display when, in early 2017, authorities in the East imposed a travel ban on
women not accompanied by a chaperon and confiscated a truckload of
books reportedly promoting Sufism, Shi’ism and atheism. For someone con-
stantly boasting of being at the forefront of the ‘struggle against Islamism’
to count Islamic extremists within his ranks sheds doubts over the seriousness
of his commitment to stability.
There are no doubts that the Kremlin is aware of Khalifa Haftar’s key weak-
nesses as outlined above. It is possible that, by nevertheless backing him,
Moscow hopes to use his nuisance capacity as a card in its negotiations
with the UN-backed GNA to revive Gaddafi-era contracts over the purchase
of weapons and the construction of a railway as well as to obtain new
favours such as a share in the oil industry and a concession to build a military
base – even if it temporarily derails the peace process. Yet it is equally possible
that, buoyed by the success of its Syria campaign and narratives of Russia’s
historical return to the Middle East, the Kremlin has decided to back Khalifa
Haftar’s forces all the way, whatever their structural weaknesses, in the
hope that they will topple the current political order which was born, after
all, out of the 2011 intervention of NATO, Russia’s arch-rival. Recent state-
ments from the Kremlin indicating that Russia wants an ‘early restoration of
strong power in Libya’ (The New Arab (a), 2017) could indicate that Moscow
is tilting towards the second option. But, instead of stabilising Libya, such a
strategy could add fuel to the fire and bring the country to the brink of a
renewed and ferocious civil war. Russia’s return to the Middle East might
make headlines, but its success is far from guaranteed.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
334 R. LEFÈVRE
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