1.

TRUCK DRIVER POSITION OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

 Petitioner, a driver assigned with a specific vehicle, was

entrusted with the transportation of respondent company's
goods and property, and consequently with its handling and
protection, hence, even if he did not occupy a managerial
position, he can be said to be holding a position of
responsibility. As to his act — principal ground for his dismissal
— his attempt to smuggle out the scrap iron belonging to
respondent company, the same is undoubtedly work-related.
(Lopez v. Alturas Group of Companies, G.R. No. 191008,
[April 11, 2011], 663 PHIL 121-131)

2. LABOR LAWS AND DECISION SHOULD NOT BE OPPRESSIVE

TO EMPLOYER.

 In protecting the rights of the workers, the law, however,

does not authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the
employer. The constitutional commitment to the policy of social
justice cannot be understood to mean that every labor dispute
shall automatically be decided in favor of labor. The
constitutional and legal protection equally recognize the
employer's right and prerogative to manage its operation
according to reasonable standards and norms of fair play.
(Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corp. v. Alcon, G.R. No.
194884, [October 22, 2014])

 While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social

justice and the protection of the working class, it should
not be supposed that every labor dispute will be
automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also
has its own rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its
concern for those with less privileges in life, this Court has
inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his
cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism,
however, has not blinded us to the rule that justice is in every
case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. (Sosito v.
Aguinaldo Development Corp., G.R. No. L-48926, [December
14, 1987], 240 PHIL 373-378)

 The commitment of the court to the cause of the labor

should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers
when they are right, as here. In fine, we should be more
cautious in awarding financial assistance to the undeserving
and those who are unworthy of liberality of the law. (Manila
Water Co. v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 188747, [January 29,
2014], 725 PHIL 513-525)

 Withal, while the scales of justice usually tilt in favor of labor,

the peculiar circumstances herein prevent this Court from
applying the same in the instant petition. Even if our laws
endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social
 justice and on the protection of labor, it does not mean
that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the
workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights
which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of fair play. (Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL v.
Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao, G.R. No. 174040-41,
[September 22, 2010], 645 PHIL 387-420)

3. SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AS BASIS TO TILT IN FAVOR OF

EMPLOYEE WHEN IT IS CLEAR THAT EMPLOYEE IS WRONG
AND HAVE INFRACTIONS

4. FALSIFYING TIME RECORDS SUFFICIENT FOR DISMISSAL

 For this reason, we find petitioner's dismissal to be in order.
Falsification of time cards constitutes serious misconduct
and dishonesty or fraud, which are just causes for the
termination of employment under Art. 282(a) and (c) of the
Labor Code which provides:

ARTICLE 282. Termination by employer. — An employer may

terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee

of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed

in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

(Emphasis added) (Felix v. Enertech Systems Industries,

Inc., G.R. No. 142007, [March 28, 2001], 407 PHIL 1032-
1045)

 The falsification and fraud which the private respondents

committed against their employer were inexcusable. Major
Asaytuno's initials on the false entries in their time cards
did not purge the documents of their falsity. Their acts
constituted dishonesty and serious misconduct, lawful
grounds for their dismissal under Art. 282, subpars. (a) and
(c), of the Labor Code, which provides:
"ART. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following just causes:

"(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee

of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work.

xxx xxx xxx

"(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed

in him by his employer or duly authorized representative." (San
 Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 82467, [June 29, 1989], 256 PHIL 271-276)

Falsifying company records:

 As clearly established by his own account, petitioner, despite

his knowledge that Cabuhat did not hire any jeep nor conduct
field verification on June 6, 1987, released the petty cash
representing Cabuhat's meal allowance and rental fee for a jeep.
Petitioner's attempt at exoneration deserves scant
consideration. As custodian of the petty cash fund, he had the
duty to ascertain that the circumstances which brought about
any claim therefrom were in order. Petitioner thus committed
dishonesty and breached MERALCO's trust, which
dishonesty calls for reprimand to dismissal under
MERALCO's rules. (Naguit, Jr. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 120474, [August 12, 2003], 456 PHIL
68-82)

 We now come to the appropriateness of the penalty of dismissal

imposed on private respondents by petitioner. Section 2, Article
VIII of the Code of Discipline of petitioner provides:

"Any employee who makes a false or fraudulent

claim against the Company; or knowingly initiates or
takes part in any action intended to defraud the
Company or to obtain a payment, benefit, or gain from
the Company to which he is not entitled, or knowingly
honors a forged signature for his own benefit or that of
another person; or gives due course or approval to a
document knowing it to be false or erroneous shall
suffer the penalty of dismissal." [emphasis supplied]

and Section 5, Article VIII, viz.:

"Any employee who, for personal gain or for the

benefit of another, shall falsify, conceal, or fabricate
company documents or records or enters false
information on any official company document to the
prejudice of the Company shall suffer the penalty of
dismissal." [emphasis supplied]

Undoubtedly, the offenses committed by the private

respondents involve fraud and falsification. These are serious
offenses and private respondents cannot be heard to complain
that they were unaware that dismissal awaits any employee who
transgresses petitioner's rules on fraud and falsification.
(Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 117038, [September 25, 1997], 344
PHIL 860-877)

5. REPEATED INFRACTION
 In the instant case, there is no doubt that Buguat was
habitually absent, tardy and neglectful of her duties. We agree
with the Court of Appeals that:

Elvie's commission of three (3) violations of the

company's rules and regulations, including her
unauthorized absences and tardiness, all committed in
the span of two years, shows that she did not only fail to
observe due diligence in performing her job, but she has
little regard for the consequences of her acts and
inactions. x x x

xxx

We find the penalty of dismissal from the service reasonable and

appropriate to Buguat's infraction. Her repeated negligence is
not tolerable; neither should it merit the penalty of suspension
only. The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in
determining the penalty that should be meted out. Buguat
committed several infractions in the past and despite the
warnings and suspension, she continued to display a neglectful
attitude towards her work. An employee's past misconduct and
present behavior must be taken together in determining the
proper imposable penalty. The totality of infractions or the
number of violations committed during the period of
employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to
be imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed
by him should not be taken singly and separately but in their
totality. Fitness for continued employment cannot be
compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of
character, conduct, and ability separate and independent of
each other. It is the totality, not the compartmentalization,
of such company infractions that Buguat had consistently
committed which justified her dismissal. (Challenge Socks
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165268, [November 8,
2005], 511 PHIL 4-14)

 We hold that the National Labor Relations Commission and the

Labor Arbiter committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in ordering Teodoro's reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and with back wages for one year
notwithstanding the repeated acts of misconduct and willful
breach of trust committed by him.

Even the Labor Arbiter admits that Teodoro failed to observe the
company's standard operating procedure in the matter of block
mapping for the assignment of facilities, to the prejudice of the
customer and the embarrassment of the company, and to carry
out lawful instructions of his supervisors in the performance of
his job.

This is a clear case where the erring employee forfeited his right
to security of tenure. His dismissal is justified. (Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Co. v. National Labor Relations
 Commission, G.R. No. L-59724, [May 30, 1983], 207 PHIL
544-547)

6. SERIOUS MISCONDUCT CASES —- DISHONEST. FRAUD.

REPEATED INFRACTION

 Records show the various violations of respondent company's

rules and regulations committed by petitioner. His dismissal
from the service is, therefore, in order. Indeed, in Piedad vs.
Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc., we ruled that a
series of irregularities when put together may constitute
serious misconduct, which under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, as amended, is a just cause for dismissal. (Gustilo v.
Wyeth Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 149629, [October 4,
2004], 483 PHIL 69-80)

 Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It

is the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave
and aggravated character. Such misconduct, however serious,
must nevertheless be in connection with the employee's work to
constitute just cause for his separation. Thus, for misconduct
or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must
be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the employee's
duties; and, (c) must show that the employee has become unfit
to continue working for the employer.

xxx

As a measure of self-preservation against acts inimical to

its interests, an employer has the right to dismiss an
employee found committing acts of dishonesty and
disloyalty. The employer may not be compelled to continue
to employ such a person whose continuance in the service
would patently be inimical to his employer's interest. The
law, in protecting the rights of workers, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. (Lopez v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 167385,
[December 13, 2005], 513 PHIL 731-739)

 Lastly, in National Power Corp. v. Olandesca, we elucidated

upon the concept of dishonesty — an allied notion of fraud — as
follows: [D]ishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray. (Bookmedia Press, Inc. v.
Sinajon, G.R. No. 213009, [July 17, 2019])

 Loss of trust and confidence is a just cause for dismissal under

Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, which provides that an
 employer may terminate an employment for "[f]raud or willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative."

However, in order for the employer to properly invoke this

ground, the employer must satisfy two conditions.

First, the employer must show that the employee concerned

holds a position of trust and confidence. Jurisprudence
provides for two classes of positions of trust. The first class
consists of managerial employees, or those who, by the nature
of their position, are entrusted with confidential and delicate
matters and from whom greater fidelity to duty is
correspondingly expected. The second class includes "cashiers,
auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal and
routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant
amounts of [the employer's] money or property."

Second, the employer must establish the existence of an act

justifying the loss of trust and confidence. 19 To be a valid
cause for dismissal, the act that betrays the employer's trust
must be real, i.e., founded on clearly established facts, and the
employee's breach of the trust must be willful, i.e., it was done
intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable
excuse. Moreover, with respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss
of trust and confidence, as ground for valid dismissal, requires
proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that
mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the
employer will not be sufficient. (Distribution & Control
Products, Inc. v. Santos, G.R. No. 212616, [July 10, 2017],
813 PHIL 423-438)

7. PIERCING CORPORATE VEIL IN LABOR CASES.

 What the petitioners desire, the Court cannot do. This fiction
of corporate entity can only be disregarded in cases when it
is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, or defend crime. Moreover, to justify the disregard of
the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the
wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established.

In the instant case, none of these circumstances is present

such as to warrant piercing the veil of corporate fiction and
treating Globalbank and Metrobank as one. (Jiao v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 182331, [April 18,
2012], 686 PHIL 171-191)

 Whether the separate personality of the corporation should

be pierced hinges on obtaining facts appropriately pleaded
or proved. However, any piercing of the corporate veil has to be
done with caution, albeit the Court will not hesitate to disregard
the corporate veil when it is misused or when necessary in the
interest of justice. After all, the concept of corporate entity was
not meant to promote unfair objectives.
 The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only in three
(3) basic areas, namely: 1) defeat of public convenience as when
the corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an
existing obligation; 2) fraud cases or when the corporate entity
is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or 3)
alter ego cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is
a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the
corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so
conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency,
conduit or adjunct of another corporation. (Sarona v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 185280, [January
18, 2012], 679 PHIL 394-424)

 Next, settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that a corporation is

vested by law with a legal personality separate and distinct from
those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the
people comprising it.

The general rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation,

acting through its directors, officers, and employees, are its sole
liabilities. However, solidary liability may be incurred, but only
under the following exceptional circumstances:

1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the

officers of a corporation: (a) vote for or assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation; (b) act in bad faith or with
gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs; (c) are
guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the
corporation, its stockholders or members, and other
persons;

2. When a director or officer has consented to the issuance

of watered stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, did not
forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written
objection thereto;

3. When a director, trustee or officer has contractually

agreed or stipulated to hold himself personally and
solidarily liable with the corporation; or

4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific

provision of law, personally liable for his corporate action.

Not one of these circumstances is present in this case.

Furthermore, the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate

fiction finds no application in the case. Piercing the veil of
corporate fiction may only be done when "the notion of legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime."

The general rule is that a corporation will be looked upon as

a separate legal entity, unless and until sufficient reason to
the contrary appears. For the separate juridical personality
of a corporation to be disregarded, the wrongdoing must be
clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be
presumed. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by
another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a
corporation is not in itself sufficient ground for disregarding the
separate corporate personality. (Uy v. Villanueva, G.R. No.
157851, [June 29, 2007], 553 PHIL 69-86)