Five R's

A cross-sectoral landscape of Just Transition in India

FIVE R’s 1
 Five R's
A cross-sectoral landscape of
Just Transition in India
Authors: Chandra Bhushan and Srestha Banerjee
Cover design: Raj Kumar Singh
Design and Layout: Raj Kumar Singh

We would like to thank The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF) for their support in developing
this study.

© 2021 Sustainability Innovations and Advisories Pvt. Ltd.

June 2021

ISBN: 978-81-949354-1-4

Material from this publication can be used with acknowledgement.

Citation: Chandra Bhushan and Srestha Banerjee. (2021). Five R’s: A cross-sectoral landscape of Just
Transition in India, International Forum for Environment, Sustainability & Technology (iFOREST), New Delhi.

Published by:
Sustainability Innovation and Advisories Private Limited
G-60, Nizamuddin (West), Delhi - 110013

Printed at: Print Edge Inc.

Contents
List of Tables ......................................................................................................................................................................... VI
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................................................................... VIII
List of Maps ........................................................................................................................................................................... IX
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................................................ XI
Summary for Stakeholders .............................................................................................................................................. 12
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................................... 22

Section I: Fossil Fuels ................................................................................................................... 23

Chapter 1: Coal ................................................................................................................................................................... 24
Chapter 2: Oil ...................................................................................................................................................................... 42
Chapter 3: Natural Gas ...................................................................................................................................................... 56

Section II: Industries .....................................................................................................................61

Chapter 4: Coal-based Thermal Power Plants ........................................................................................................... 62
Chapter 5: Iron and Steel ................................................................................................................................................. 74
Chapter 6: Cement ............................................................................................................................................................. 86
Chapter 7: Road Transport .............................................................................................................................................. 96
Chapter 8: Fertilizers ...................................................................................................................................................... 102

Annexures
Annexure 1: Assessment of GHG emission reduction potential and technology readiness .......................... 110
Annexure 2: Potential job loss and reskilling scenarios from sectoral transitions ......................................... 112
Annexure 3: Consumption of various petroleum products (2019-20) and replacement technology/ fuels .. 114

References ...................................................................................................................................................................... 116

FIVE R’s V
List of Tables
Summary for Stakeholders
Table 1: Net Zero pathway by mid-2060 .................................................................................................. 12
Table 2: Net Zero pathway by 2051 ......................................................................................................... 12
Table 3: Estimated workforce ................................................................................................................ 15
Table 4: Sales taxes from petrol and diesel, and direct revenue from coal mining .................................... 18

1. Coal
Table 1: Coal and lignite imports ............................................................................................................ 27
Table 2: Sector-wise coal and lignite consumption ................................................................................ 28
Table 3: Central and State/UTs Government revenue from coal ............................................................... 31
Table 4: Contribution of coal mining to Centre and State exchequer in top coal states ........................... 32
Table 5: Share of coal mining revenue in State revenue .......................................................................... 33
Table 6: Coal share of DMF in coal producing states ............................................................................... 33
Table 7: Coal production vs consumption in key coal states ................................................................... 34
Table 8: Revenue earning from freight traffic of Indian Railways ............................................................ 35
Table 9: Modes of coal dispatch ............................................................................................................. 35
Table 10: Estimated direct employment in operational coal mines .......................................................... 36
Table 11: Estimated installed capacity by 2029-30 ................................................................................. 38
Table 12: Electricity generation under STEPS, IVC and SDS .................................................................... 38

2. Oil
Table 1: Distribution of oil refineries ...................................................................................................... 45
Table 2: Production and availability of petroleum products .................................................................... 46
Table 3: Employment in oil and gas companies ...................................................................................... 50
Table 4: Total formal employment in oil sector ........................................................................................ 51
Table 5: Contribution of the oil sector to Centre and State/UT exchequer .............................................. 52
Table 6: Oil demand under STEPS, IVC and SDS ...................................................................................... 53
Table 7: Share of population using various cooking fuels under STEPS, IVC and SDS .............................. 54

4. Coal based Thermal Power

Table 1: Top 25 coal-based thermal power districts ................................................................................ 68
Table 2: State-wise electricity consumption for top 20 states ................................................................ 69
Table 3: Capacity of CPPs ...................................................................................................................... 70
Table 4: Size distribution of CPPs .......................................................................................................... 70
Table 5: State-wise coal-based power plants installed more than 25 years ago ...................................... 73

VI FIVE R’s
5. Iron and Steel
Table 1: Number of iron and steel plants in India ..................................................................................... 76
Table 2: Top steel producing districts of India ......................................................................................... 81
Table 3: Crude and finished (alloy + non-alloy) steel production ............................................................... 81
Table 4: Technological readiness of steel sector transition .................................................................... 85

6. Cement
Table 1: Top 25 cement districts ............................................................................................................ 92
Table 2: Technological opportunities in cement sector .......................................................................... 95

7. Road transport
Table1: Fuel consumption by transport sector ....................................................................................... 98
Table2: GHG emissions from road transport .......................................................................................... 98
Table 3: Domestic automobile sales ...................................................................................................... 99
Table 4: Domestic automobile production ............................................................................................. 99
Table 5: Employment in the automobile sector .................................................................................... 100

8. Fertilizers
Table 1: Year-wise consumption of fertilizers in India ........................................................................... 104
Table 2: Details of urea plants .............................................................................................................. 105
Table 3: District-wise formal employment in urea plants ....................................................................... 107

FIVE R’s VII

List of Figures
Summary for Stakeholders
Figure 1: Emissions vs Technology readiness .......................................................................................... 13

1. Coal
Figure1: Trend in coal and lignite production and import ........................................................................ 26
Figure 2: Contribution of various sources of energy in primary energy demand ...................................... 27

2. Oil
Figure 1: Trend in refinery capacity and processing ................................................................................ 45
Figure 2: Oil consumption by various sectors ......................................................................................... 46
Figure 3: Estimates of passenger car sales under various scenarios ...................................................... 53

3. Natural Gas
Figure 1: GHG emissions of coal vs. natural gas ...................................................................................... 58
Figure 2: Production, import and availability of natural gas .................................................................... 59
Figure 3: Sector-wise consumption of natural gas ................................................................................. 59

4. Coal Based Thermal Power

Figure 1: Sector-wise power consumption ............................................................................................. 69

5. Iron and Steel

Figure 1: Sector-wise steel consumption ............................................................................................... 82

6. Cement
Figure 1: Sector-wise cement consumption .......................................................................................... 93

7. Road Transport
Figure 1: Global EV sales and fleet size .................................................................................................. 101

8. Fertilizers
Figure 1: Production and import of fertilizers ....................................................................................... 104

VIII FIVE R’s

List of Maps
Summary for Stakeholders
Map1: The transition geography of this decade ....................................................................................... 14
Map 2: Distribution of multidimensional poverty ..................................................................................... 19
Map 3: Forest cover in top coal districts ................................................................................................ 20

1. Coal
Map 1: State-wise domestic coal and lignite consumption ...................................................................... 28
Map 2: State-wise production of coal and lignite .................................................................................... 29
Map 3: State-wise distribution of operational coal mines ....................................................................... 29
Map 4: District-wise distribution of coal mines ...................................................................................... 30
Map 5: District-wise distribution of coal production ................................................................................ 31
Map 6: Distribution of DMF accruals in top coal mining districts ............................................................. 34
Map 7: Distribution of formal coal mine workers ..................................................................................... 37

2. Oil
Map 1: State-wise number of petrol pumps ............................................................................................ 48
Map 2: State-wise number of LPG marketing companies ....................................................................... 49

4. Coal based Thermal Power

Map 1: State-wise distribution of TPPs (capacity) ................................................................................... 65
Map 2: State-wise distribution of TPPs (number) ................................................................................... 65
Map 3: District-wise distributions of coal-based power plants (capacity) ................................................ 66
Map 4: District-wise distributions of coal-based power plants (number) ................................................. 67
Map 5: District-wise distribution of estimated manpower ........................................................................ 71

5. Iron and Steel

Map 1: State-wise distribution of steel plants (number) .......................................................................... 77
Map 2: State-wise distribution of steel plants (capacity) ........................................................................ 78
Map 3: District-wise distribution of iron and steel plants (number) ......................................................... 79
Map 4: District-wise distribution of iron and steel plants (capacity) ........................................................ 80
Map 5: District-wise distribution of formal employment in iron and steel industry .................................. 83

FIVE R’s IX
6. Cement
Map 1: State-wise distribution of cement plants (number) ...................................................................... 89
Map 2: State-wise distribution of cement plants (capacity)..................................................................... 89
Map 3: District-wise distribution of cement plants (capacity) ................................................................. 90
Map 4: District-wise distribution of cement plants (number) ................................................................... 91
Map 5: District-wise employment distribution in cement industry .......................................................... 94

7. Road transport
Map 1: Key Automobile OEM & component manufacturing districts ...................................................... 100

8. Fertilizers
Map 1: Distribution of urea plants ......................................................................................................... 106

X FIVE R’s
Abbreviations
ACM Auto Component Manufacturer LCV Light Commercial Vehicle
ASI Annual Survey of Industries LDO Light Diesel Oil
BAT Best Available Technologies LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
BAU Business-as-Usual LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
BCCL Bharat Coking Coal Limited MCL Mahanadi Coalfields Limited
BOF Basic Oxygen Furnace MCV Medium Commercial Vehicle
BORL Bharat-Oman Refinery Limited MRPL Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals
BPCL Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited Limited
CAGR Cumulative Annual Growth Rate NCL Northern Coalfields Limited
CCL Central Coalfields Limited NIC National Industrial Classification
CCUS Carbon Capture Utilisation and Storage N2O Nitrous Oxide
CDQ Coke Dry Quenching NRL Numaligarh Refinery Limited
CEA Central Electricity Authority NSS National Sample Survey
CGD City Gas Distribution NSSO National Sample Survey Organisation
CIL Coal India Limited NTPC National Thermal Power Corporation
CNG Compressed Natural Gas NUE Nitrogen Use Efficiency
CO2 Carbon Dioxide OC Open Cast
CO2e Carbon Dioxide Equivalent ONGC Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
CPCL Chennai Petroleum Corporation Limited PEM Proton Exchange Membrane
CPP Captive Power Plants PMUY Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana
CPSE Central Public Sector Oil and Gas PNG Piped Natural Gas
Enterprises PSU Public Sector Undertaking
CRF Controlled-Release Fertilizers PV Photovoltaic
DMF District Mineral Foundation RINL Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited
DRI Direct Reduced Iron RIL Reliance Industries Limited
EAF Electric Arc Furnace RE Renewable Energy
ECL Eastern Coalfields Limited SAIL Steel Authority of India Limited
EV Electric Vehicles SCM Supplementary Cementitious Materials
GHG Greenhouse gas SDS Sustainable Development Scenario
GST Goods and Services Tax SCCL Singareni Collieries Company Limited
GWP Global Warming Potential SECL South Eastern Coalfields Limited
HCV Heavy Commercial Vehicle SOEC Solid Oxide Electrolysis Cells
HMEL HPCL-Mittal Energy Limited STEPS Stated Policies Scenario
HPCL Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited TPP Thermal Power Plant
HSD High Speed Diesel TRT Top-pressure Recovery Turbines
IBM Indian Bureau of Mines TRL Technology Readiness Level
IC Internal Combustion 2W Two wheeler
IEA International Energy Agency 3W Three wheeler
IFFCO Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative UG Underground
Limited UT Union Territory
IOCL Indian Oil Corporation Limited VAT Value Added Tax
IVC India Vision Case WCL Western Coalfields Limited
JV Joint Venture

FIVE R’s XI
Summary
for Stakeholders
Just Transition approach will be determined by the energy transition pathways
India’s trajectory for energy transition will determine the policy and planning approach for just transition. Two
recent modelling studies on net-zero emissions pathways for India provide a glimpse of possible trajectories
to reduce fossil fuels over the next three to four decades.

a. India Energy Outlook (IEA, 2021): This India-specific report projects India’s energy systems development
till 2040. One of the scenarios considered in the report is the Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS). The SDS
essentially explores how India could mobilise an additional surge in clean energy investment to produce an early
peak and rapid subsequent decline in emissions to reach net-zero by the mid‐2060s. Under this scenario, India’s
coal demand will have to halve by 2040 and reduce by 85% by 2050. Natural Gas can increase three-fold by 2040
and be 2.5 times the 2019 levels in 2050. Oil can increase by 15% by 2040 and then reduce by 30% by 2050.

Table 1: Net-zero pathway by mid-2060

SDS
Fossil-fuel sector
2019 2030 2040 2050*
Coal demand (Mtce) 590 454 298 100
Oil demand (mb/d) 5.0 6.2 5.8 3.48
Natural gas demand (bcm) 63 144 210 150
* IEA has provided data only till 2040. For 2050, an extrapolation has been done assuming that coal will reach zero by 2055, oil by
2065, while gas use in 2065 is similar to 2020. At these consumption levels, India will reach net-zero in 2065.

b. India: Transforming to a net-zero emissions energy system (TERI and Shell, 2021): This report explores
the pathways to steer the domestic energy system towards net-zero emissions by 2050. The report, which
remains cautiously optimistic about achieving a net-zero emissions energy system by 2050, heavily relies on
technological advancements and policy support to achieve it. However, the pathways in this report project
less reduction in coal demand (by 60%) and more reduction in oil use (60%) by 2050 compared to the IEA
report. The natural gas use increase, however, is the same -- three-fold by 2050 compared to current levels.

Table 2: Net Zero pathway by 2051

Primary Energy requirement (Mtoe) 2021 2051
Coal 505 216
Oil 222 89
Gas 53 149
Nuclear 19 45
Hydro 21 33
Solar 93 876
Wind 27 548
Bio/Waste/other 92 204
Source: TERI and Shell, 2021

12 FIVE R’s
 From the two modelling studies, what can be concluded is that the transition pathways depend on assumptions
on factors such as cost, technology, energy security, etc. What is, however, clear is that in any net-zero scenario,
coal use will have to go down sharply, while gas use can increase three to four-folds. Oil consumption will also have
to go down, but it will depend on the interplay of cost, alternatives, and energy security.
Therefore, policy and planning for transition in the coal sector should be prioritised from a just transition
perspective.

Just transition should be prioritised for sectors with significant emission

reduction potential and competitive alternate technologies
The assessment of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction potential and availability of competitive
alternate technologies suggest that the sectors that need to be prioritised for a just transition include coal
mining, thermal power plants, road transportation, other industries, and agriculture soil (urea use). These
sectors collectively emit 64% of India’s GHG, and 90% of technologies required for the transition in these
sectors will be commercially available in the next five years (Figure 1 and Annexure 1). Coal mining, thermal
power plants and road transportation are likely to see disruptive changes both in terms of job losses and
skill requirements during this decade. Other industries and agriculture soil, on the other hand, will see a
progressive transition. Most other coal-dependent sectors such as steel, cement, and fertilizer will need to
start planning for a just transition only in the 2030s.
Some transition is already underway in residential, commercial, and agriculture sectors, but these will
have to be upscaled significantly. In agriculture, for example, reduction in urea use (which contributes to
N2O emissions) is being promoted by adopting neem-coated urea and promoting other nutrients. But this
has not led to a significant reduction in use. Similarly, energy efficiency is being promoted in residential and
commercial sectors, but the best-in-class technologies in building, cooling, and heating sub-sectors are
not being adopted. Just transition in these sectors is mainly about progressive enhancement in efficiency,
training, and capacity building.

Figure 1: Emissions vs Technology readiness

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FIVE R’s 13
60 districts in 16 states should be prioritised for just transition
There are 120 districts (out of the 718 districts) in the country with a sizeable presence of fossil fuel or fossil-
fuel dependent industries – coal mining, oil and gas production, thermal power plants, refineries, steel,
cement, fertilizer (urea), and automobile. These districts have a population of about 330 million, or about
25% of the country’s population.
Of the 120 districts, there are 60 districts where just transition should be prioritised as these districts
account for 95% of coal and lignite production, 60% of thermal power capacity, and 90% of automobile
and automobile component manufacturing. Jharkhand has the highest number of districts (8), followed by
Maharashtra (6), and Chhattisgarh and Karnataka (5 each). About one-third of the districts are concentrated
in the coal belt of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and West Bengal (Map 1).

Map1: The transition geography of this decade

Coal districts
Thermal power districts
Automobile districts

Punjab
Uttarakhand

Haryana

Uttar
Rajasthan Pradesh

Madhya Jharkhand
Gujarat West
Pradesh
Bengal

Chhattisgarh
Odisha

Maharashtra Telangana

Karnataka

Tamil
Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

Note: Many districts have both coal mining and coal-based power plants. For simplicity, the district that is comparatively in a higher
ranking for coal mining is depicted as a coal mining district, and that with a higher ranking for thermal power capacity is depicted as
a thermal power district.

14 FIVE R’s
Over 20 million workers are currently engaged in fossil-fuel and fossil fuel
dependent industries; they will need job replacement and reskilling
The Indian economy is dominated by informal workers, with more than 90% of the workforce accounted
for by the informal economy.1 Most fossil fuel sectors reflect this dominance of informality (Box 1: Defining
informal workers in India).
There is no consolidated data on employment in fossil fuel and fossil fuel-dependent sectors. Scattered
data (typically formal manpower estimates) are available from various sources, including the Annual Survey
of Industries (ASI), company-wise annual reports, publications of ministries, and various government
departments. These data have been collectively considered to arrive at the employment situation in these
sectors. To estimate the formal and informal division, the NSSO 68th round of survey on employment and
unemployment situation of India, which provides an estimation of the proportion of formal and informal
employment in various industries and sectors (as per NIC 2008 classification), has been used.2
Our estimates show that at least 21.5 million people work in fossil fuels and fossil fuel-dependent sectors
(Table 3). Automobile, iron and steel, and coal mining are the biggest employers. In all of these sectors, the
informal workforce is nearly four times the formal workforce.

Table 3: Estimated workforce (in million)

Sectors Informal Employment Formal Employment Total Employment
Coal mining 1.8 0.8 2.6
Coal-based thermal power (1) 0.05 0.13 0.18
Iron and Steel 2.6 0.3 2.9
Cement 1.2 0.2 1.4
Oil and Gas, excluding refineries (2) NA 0.12 0.12
Refineries 0.08 0.04 0.12
Fuel Retail 0.96 0.14 1.10
LPG distribution 0.01 0.09 0.10
Fertilizer (3) 0.2 0.02 0.22
Automobile (4) NA NA 12.8
Total 6.9 1.8 21.5
Sources: iFOREST estimates based on annual reports, Annual Survey of Industries and NSSO 68th round of survey3.
Explanatory notes: (1) Excluding fly ash handling and processing. (2) This is formal employment in oil and gas companies. The total
employment is likely to be higher, due to the large-scale use of contract workers. (3) Only urea manufacturing plants, which are
directly dependent on fossil fuels for feedstock. (4). Division of formal and informal workers not available. Includes employment in
servicing and dealership.

There is a difference in the spatial distribution of employment. While oil and gas and automobile
employment are spread across the country, coal and coal-related industries employment is concentrated in
a relatively smaller number of districts.
In some districts, the coal sector’s employment is the most important contributor to the district’s
economy. For example, in the Korba district of Chhattisgarh, over 7.2% of the district population is formally
employed by the coal-mining and coal-based power plants. However, the overall employment is far higher
than this (nearly three times, considering the informal workers employed in coal mining and coal-based
power). A similar case is observed for Dhanbad and Chatra districts of Jharkhand, and Angul and Jharsuguda
districts of Odisha, the other key coal regions.

FIVE R’s 15
 Defining informal sector and worker in India
Informal worker/employment: These include unorganised workers working in the unorganised sector
or households, excluding regular workers with social security benefits provided by the employers, and the
workers in the formal sector without any employment and social security benefits provided by the employers.
Informal sector: The informal sector may be broadly characterised as units engaged in producing goods
or services with the primary objective of generating employment and incomes for the persons concerned.
These units typically operate at a low level of organization, with little or no division between labour and
capital as factors of production, and on a small scale. Labour relations - where they exist - are based mostly
on casual employment, kinship, or personal and social relations rather than contractual arrangements with
formal guarantees.
Informal economy: The informal sector and its workers and informal workers in the formal sector constitute
the informal economy.
Indirect employment: This can be defined as contract workers, who are hired, supervised, and remunerated
by a contractor who, in turn, is compensated by the establishment.
Source: Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour and Employment. (2015). Employment in Informal Sector and Conditions of Informal
Employment. Volume IV, 2013-14. Government of India.

Just transition will involve Five R’s

A just transition in India will need policy and planning for five key elements:
1. Restructuring of the economy and industries;
2. Repurposing of land and infrastructure;
3. Reskilling existing and skilling new workforce;
4. Revenue substitution and investments in just transition; and,
5. Responsible social and environmental practices.
All of these need to be considered appropriately in a sectoral and region-specific manner to ensure
targeted interventions and achieve just socio-economic and environmental outcomes.

1. Restructuring of the economy and industries

Most of the top coal mining districts are mono-industry districts, which has created a dominance of coal in the
economic landscape of these regions. In these districts, the economy is heavily reliant on coal mining, power
plants, and coal-dependent industries. This has stymied the development of other sectors and undermined
the scope of economic diversification. It has also affected people’s psyche in these regions, creating a sense
of ‘perceived dependence’. As a result, most economic activities and income opportunities in these regions
can be assumed to be somehow influenced by the mono-industry. Therefore, a critical component of just
transition in India will be restructuring the economy and industries of these regions.
A well-designed industrial restructuring plan can facilitate a transition with minimum economic disruption.
This will involve developing appropriate industrial policies by the concerned State Governments and district
development plans in consultation with local institutions.
Besides developing low-carbon industries and attracting necessary investments for them, a particular
focus of the economic and industrial restructuring should be harnessing the potential of local resources. In
many fossil fuel districts, there is huge potential to boost the local economy and create sustainable industries
based on agricultural and forest products, aquaculture, dairy, and sustainable tourism. For instance, on
average, India’s top coal mining districts have over 31% forest cover, which is 10% higher than India’s average.
At the same time, many of the top coal districts have significant agricultural potential, with cultivable areas

16 FIVE R’s
ranging between 30%-45%. However, much of this potential remains neglected due to poor market support
and linkages for agriculture and forest products or inadequate investments in these sectors.

2. Repurposing of land and infrastructure

Reclamation and repurposing of mining and industrial lands (brownfields) and associated infrastructure will
be important for economic diversification and socio-economic development in fossil fuel regions.
An estimated 0.45 million hectares (ha) of land is available with coal mining and major coal allied
industries, including coal-based power, iron and steel, and cement.4 In fact, only coal mines and power plants
account for about 0.3 million ha of land. In some districts, coal mining companies hold as much as 10% of the
geographical area.5
The available land provides a massive scope of creating immediate and long-term economic opportunities.
In the short term, land reclamation and redevelopment will require the engagement of large numbers of
skilled and unskilled workers, creating direct employment. Moreover, well-planned infrastructure projects
with complementary investments can also have a far-reaching benefit for the local economy.6 However,
certain reforms would be required in the land acquisition and reclamation laws to allow for the smooth
repurposing of land and infrastructure. This includes modifications in the mine reclamation, land use change,
and ownership laws.

3. Reskilling existing and skilling new workforce

The review of transition scenarios for each fossil fuel-related sector suggests three primary modes of
impact on the workforce. These include:
• Job loss due to declining production and eventually closing down of operations;
• Retraining and reskilling of the existing workers due to changes in production processes or repurposing
of facilities; and,
• Skilling of the new workforce to meet the requirements of new zero-carbon industries.
The extent of job loss and the requirement of reskilling and skilling is related to the nature of operations
of these sectors and the distribution of workforce (such as formal and informal), including their skills levels.
A review of job loss versus reskilling in various sectors is elaborated in Annexure 2.
It can be inferred from the job loss versus reskilling matrix that sectors that will experience job loss are
coal mining, coal-based power, and refineries. This is because there will be progressive phasing down of
operations of these sectors in the coming decades. In the rest of the sectors, a well-planned reskilling and
skilling programme will avoid job losses. Of course, job losses can happen for informal workers in all sectors,
but a timely intervention of reskilling and retraining can help them to get readily absorbed, as there is no
overall scaling down of activities or net decrease of production in the coming years in sectors other than coal
mining and thermal power.
For coal mining, the challenge of job loss is far higher than coal-based power plants or refineries, considering
the predominance of the informal workforce. In addition to this, there is a subsistence coal economy in many
of the old coal mining regions, particularly in the coal-mining districts of Eastern India. In these regions,
stretching from Raniganj coalfields in West Bengal to the Jharia and North Karanpura coalfields of Jharkhand,
thousands of people earn a living by manually gathering and selling coal in local markets.7
For job loss, the following policy and planning interventions would be required: creating alternative
livelihood opportunities through industrial restructuring, supporting entrepreneurship, and harnessing the
local resource base; repurposing and redeveloping the brownfield areas (as discussed above); providing
pensions, compensations, and transition packages; and reskilling and retraining of particularly the younger
workforce.
Investments in reskilling and skilling will be necessary for the workforce in all sectors. This is particularly
important for the young formal and informal workers. Moreover, there will be a huge requirement in all low/

FIVE R’s 17
zero-carbon industries for skilled jobs, such as in factories for solar panels, EVs, battery, and other equipment
manufacturing.
For reskilling and skilling to happen, having proper skilling policies at the Government and company levels
will be important. This, in fact, is a prerequisite for just transition, particularly considering the predominance
of the informal workforce, who are primarily unorganised.

4. Revenue substitution and investments in just transition

A critical issue for just transition is the substitution of public revenue from fossil fuel and related sectors.
Coal, Oil, and Gas collectively contribute 18.8% of the total revenue receipts of the Central Government and
about 8.3% of the total revenue receipts of the State Government.8 About 91% of revenue contribution is
from the oil and gas sector; coal contributes only about 9%. Therefore, from a just transition perspective,
revenue substitution from the oil and gas sector will be a far bigger challenge than the coal sector. Also, as
the oil and gas phase down is likely to happen only in the 2030s, revenue substitution is not an immediate
concern and can be spread out over the next two to three decades.
The revenue loss from coal mining, however, will affect the State Governments. For states, the main
source of revenue from coal is royalty and District Mineral Foundation (DMF) contributions. In most top coal
states, such as Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, the share of royalty, DMF, and taxes from coal mining to the total
revenue receipt is about 5%-6%. In other coal-producing states, such as West Bengal, the contributions are
far lower, about 1%-1.5%. In fact, some coal-producing states earn more by taxing petrol and diesel than by
taxing coal (Table 4).

Table 4: Sales taxes from petrol and diesel, and direct revenue from coal mining (2019-20)
State/UT Sales Tax/VAT from CPSEs (K Billion) Coal mining taxes and
revenues of PSUs to
Petrol Diesel
state (K Billion)
Chhattisgarh 12.67 24.84 32.21
Jharkhand 8.97 20.19 39.92
Madhya Pradesh 28.71 38.75 34.10
Odisha 15.79 38.39 29.11
Source: iFOREST analysis based on data of Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell for CPSEs, and respective company annual
reports and accounts for PSUs.; Note: Central Public Sector Oil and Gas Enterprises

Still, the public revenue substitution must be planned carefully. This is also because states will have to play
a role in just transition financing through public revenue. In this context, both DMF and GST compensation
tax is extremely important.
The most significant tax on coal is the GST compensation cess (originally instituted as the coal cess to fund
green energy transition), levied at I 400 per tonne on the dispatch of coal and lignite. The GST compensation
cess in 2019-20 was an estimated I 400 billion. This is almost double the revenues (taxes, royalty, and DMF)
that states get from coal. However, the GST compensation cess will lapse in 2022. Post this, there is an
opportunity to reverse this to coal cess and use it for just transition in coal mining areas. Similarly, DMF
funds should be aligned to just transition investments, which currently have a cumulative accrual of about
I 184 billion in the coal-mining districts.

5. Responsible social and environmental practices

Just transition provides us with an opportunity to create a better world than what we have today. Resource
extraction has led to large-scale displacement and deprivation for local communities in India. The use of
these resources, on the other hand, has led to pollution and ecological destruction.

18 FIVE R’s
 ‘Resource curse’ is a reality in the coal districts of India. More than 50% of the population in most top coal
districts are multidimensionally poor, suffering from poor health, education, and living standards; this is
twice India’s average of 27.5% (Map 2). Additionally, districts with the dominance of coal mining, power plants,
steel, cement, and refineries are critically polluted in terms of air, water, and soil pollution. Coal mining is
also responsible for about half of all the forestland diverted for mining, affecting forest-based livelihoods, an
important source of income for marginalised communities.9

Map 2: Distribution of multidimensional poverty

India Population in
average Multidimensional Poverty (%)
27.5% 0.0-10.0
10.1-20.0
20.1-30.0
30.1-40.0
40.1-50.0
>50

Shahdol 50.8%
Singrauli 57.4%
Sonbhadra 53.5%

Uttar Pradesh

Kutch 31.0%

Paschim Bardhaman 26.8%

Madhya
Gujarat Jharkhand West
Pradesh
Bengal

Nagpur 8.2% Chhattisgarh Godda 58.1%

Yavatmal 28.9%
Odisha Dhanbad 32.8%
Chandrapur 22.5% Bokaro 33.5%
Ramgarh 32.1%
Maharashtra Telangana Hazaribagh 39.3%
Chatra 58.4%
Angul 31.3%
Sundargarh 34.2%
Latehar 56.1%
Jharsuguda 29.5%
Raigarh 37.0%
Cuddalore Surguja 54.2%
14.3% Korba 39.1%
Mancherial 34.5%
Tamil Pedapalli 12.1%
Nadu Bhadradri Kothagudem 16.7%

Source: iFOREST analysis; Data adopted from India country-level analysis of Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative.

But we have an opportunity to reverse this trend by adopting better social and environmental policies
and practices. Just transition planning in the coming years allows us to develop a new ‘environmental and
social contract’ between the people, the government, and the private sector. The new social contract
must ensure inclusive decision-making, poverty alleviation, fairer income distribution, and investments in
human development and social infrastructure. The new environmental contract should be about ecological
protection and restoration, which will also contribute to the enhancement of sustainable livelihood and
income opportunities.

FIVE R’s 19
 There is already a huge untapped potential for this. For example, the average forest cover in coal mining
districts is nearly double the country’s average (Map 3). Similarly, there are huge tracts of agricultural
land in these areas whose productivity can be improved through investments in irrigation and watershed
management practices.10

Map 3: Forest cover in top coal districts

Sidhi 40.6%
Singrauli 38.4%
Sonbhadra 36.8%
Percentage of
geographical area Chatra 47.8%
under forest cover Ramgarh 24.5%
India avg
21.67% Bokaro 19.9%
Dhanbad 10.5%
Godda 18.7%

Uttar Pradesh

West Bengal
Madhya Pradesh
Jharkhand

Maharashtra Chhattisgarh
Yavatmal 19.2% West Burdwan 4.8%
Odisha
Chandrapur 35.4%
Sundargarh 44%
Telangana
Angul 43.7%
Jharsuguda 15.7%
Surguja 45.0%
Raigarh 37.0%
Korba 51.4%
Koriya 62.0%
Annupur 23.2%
Cuddalore 10.6%
Khammam 33.8%
Tamil Nadu Jayashankar Bhupalpally 23.0%

Source: iFOREST analysis

To conclude, just transition will be a strategic process that must be planned carefully and rolled out over
the next few years. This should be done considering the opportunities for transition in various sectors,
the geographies which are particularly vulnerable to the closure of operations and subsequent job loss,
distribution of the workforce (formal and informal), and the overall resilience of the local communities and
the regions dependent on fossil-fuel and allied sectors.
The assessment clearly shows that a transition by no means can happen in one go for all sectors, nor should
it be planned in that manner. Therefore, a road map must be developed for the coming decades aligning
with the emission reduction targets and considering the opportunities at hand to usher in a transformative
change that is inclusive, just, and viable.

20 FIVE R’s
Introduction

R
apid decarbonization has become necessary to limit global
warming to 1.5°C to avoid catastrophic impacts of climate
change. Transformative changes and decisive actions will
be required to accelerate decarbonization. This will involve
decisions on production and use of fossil fuels, transformation
of energy-intensive industries, and re-invention of supply chains. The
latest report of the International Energy Agency (2021) – Net Zero by
2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector – has underscored the
scale and urgency of action that must be undertaken by policy makers,
industries, and various other actors, to ensure that in the next three
decades the world can remain on track to meet the goals of the Paris
Agreement (2015).
However, the road to the net-zero target must also be socially
and environmentally responsible and inclusive. Therefore, the Paris
Agreement has emphasised on the importance of a ‘just transition’. For
India, a just transition becomes extremely important as we do not have
a predominantly formal economy or resources for social support like
the developed countries, where just transition is largely about reskilling
and providing employment and support to formal workers. The informal
nature of the Indian economy coupled with large-scale deprivation
and development deficit, demands a much more holistic approach to
a just transition in India. In other words, a just transition in India will
entail ‘structural changes’ and require a broad-based socio-economic
transition, not just reskilling and support systems for formal workers.
Developing a just transition roadmap and plan(s), therefore, will require
an elaborate exercise and a deliberative bottom-up process involving all
stakeholders. It will require mapping out each of the fossil fuel and allied
industrial sectors with respect to their contribution to greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, the opportunities for substitution, a viable timeframe for
transition, the regional impacts, and the potential impact on the workers
(formal and informal) with respect to job-loss or skill development.
In this report, we evaluate the fossil fuel sectors and the following key
allied industrial sectors :
1. Thermal power
2. Iron & Steel
3. Cement
4. Fertiliser
5. Road Transport
We have analysed the spatial distribution of these sectors, their
employment and livelihood dependence, and the development indicators
of top fossil fuel districts to assess coping capacity and resilience.
Finally, we highlight five critical elements of a just transition, essentially
for ensuring a sustainable and just socio-economic transition in our path
to net-zero emissions.

22 FIVE R’s
Fossil
Fuels
Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3

Coal Oil Natural

Gas
 Chapter 1
Fossil fuel

Coal
Coal
sector

Directly Coal Imported

Impacted mining Coal
Level I

Directly Steel,
Impacted Washeries & Informal Thermal Other
Railways Cement &
Level II Coke Oven coal sector Power Plant sectors
Brick

Indirectly
Passenger Restaurant, Construc- Fly ash
Impacted Discoms
Transport cooking fuel tion industry
Sectors

24 FIVE R’s FIVE R’s 25

C
oal is considered the backbone of India’s energy supply. Meeting 44% of the country’s primary
energy demand,1 it is the single largest source of energy and GHG emissions in the country. The
sector is responsible for over 64% of total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the fossil fuels and
cement production.2 Besides, it contributes to significant emission from other industrial sources
that are dependent on coal as fuel, such as steel and brick. Overall, given its centrality in India’s
energy mix, it has massive direct and indirect impacts on various sectors of economy.
India’s coal demand, however, is projected to experience a rapid decline in the next decade due to
exponential growth in the renewable energy sector, particularly solar and wind. Moreover, recent studies
on India’s pathway towards achieving net zero emissions unanimously suggest that coal consumption must
reduce drastically, at least to half by 2040.3
The reduction in coal demand will have a significant impact on coal mining. There are already huge
concerns of unprofitability about the low-producing underground mines in various coal districts.4 Even
opencast mines in some areas are experiencing decline in production and ‘temporary’ closure. For example,
in Jharkhand, 50% of the mines are already closed due to unprofitability and other reasons.5
Considering the labour distribution in coal mining and related activities (which is dominated by informal
workers) and the dependency of several coal regions on this industry,6 it becomes crucial for the coal sector
to conceptualise a road map for just transition in the coming decades.

1. Production and consumption

In 2020, India produced 773 million metric tonnes (MMT) of coal and lignite, of which 95% was by public sector
undertakings (PSUs). During the same period, the country imported about 251.5 MMT of coal worth I 1,588
billion (Table 1). Given India’s growing energy demand, both coal production and imports have increased over
the past five years (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Trend in coal and lignite production and import

900 Coal production Lignite production Total production (coal+lignite) Total import (Coal+lignite)

800

700

600

500
MMT

400

300

200

100

0
2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20
Source: Office of the Coal Controller, 2020

26 FIVE R’s
 Table 1: Coal and lignite imports (2020)
Type Import (MMT) Share of total (%) Import cost (K Billion)
Non-coking 196.7 78.2 914.65
Coking 51.8 20.6 612.67
Coke 2.9 1.2 60.26
Lignite 0.05 0.02 1.07
Total 251.45 100 1,589
Source: Information compiled from NITI Aayog Energy dashboard, 2021

The contribution of coal in India’s primary energy demand has steadily increased over the past two decades
(Figure 2). This growth in coal’s share has been influenced by its demand for power generation and by heavy
industries such as cement and steel. Besides, medium- and small-scale industries such as sponge iron and
brick are also largely reliant on coal as a fuel source.

Figure 2: Contribution of various sources of energy in primary energy demand

Other Modern renewables Traditional biomass Natural gas Oil Coal Total demand (right axis)
100% 1000

80% 800

60% 600

Mtoe
40% 400

20% 200

0% 0
2000 2010 2019 2020
Source: Figure adopted from International Energy Agency, 2021

Power sector remains the single largest coal consumer accounting for nearly three-fourths of the total
coal and lignite consumption (Table 2). The demand for coal and lignite has steadily grown in this sector
over the past years. For instance, consumption of domestic coal and lignite has increased from 425 MMT
in 2010 to 689 MMT in 2019,7 which suggests a cumulative annual growth rate (CAGR) of almost 5% over the
last decade.8 However, for the first time in 2020, there was a slight dip in coal consumption by the power
sector.9 Though this can arguably be attributed to the COVID-19 crisis, there are clear indications that coal
consumption by the power sector will steadily decline in the next decade and thereafter, due to expansion in
renewable energy and storage systems.
Among the industrial sectors, the increase in demand for coal has been one of the highest in the iron and
steel industry, with a CAGR of about 6.8% in the last decade.10 The sector is, however, highly dependent on
imported (coking) coal, which accounts for about 75% of the coal consumed by the sector.
The cement industry is also highly reliant on coal for clinker production,11 and is estimated to consume
over 40 MMT of coal in 2020. This is going to sharply rise in the coming years, as India’s cement demand is
expected to reach 550-600 MMT per year by 2025, owing to growing housing and infrastructure demand.12

FIVE R’s 27
 Table 2: Sector-wise coal and lignite consumption (2020)
Sector Consumption (MMT) Share of total (%)
Coal Lignite Total
Power 632.6 36.3 738.1 73.5
Iron & Steel 69.2 69.2 6.9
Cement 40 40 4.0
Brick 35 35 3.5
13
Sponge Iron 26.4 26.4 2.6
Others 91 4.9 95.9 9.5
Total 1004.6 100
Source: Estimated by iFOREST
For power and steel sector (including imports), NITI Aayog Energy Dashboard. 2021; For cement sector, calculation is based on IBM,
2020, Indian Minerals Yearbook-Cement and CSIR 2014- specific coal consumption by cement sector; For sponge iron, calculation is
based on Annual Report 2019-20, Ministry of Steel and CSIR,2014- specific coal consumption by sponge iron sector; For brick, Bureau
of Energy Efficiency, 2019; Figures for other sectors are based on Energy Statistics 2021.

The three top power producing states—Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh—had the largest
share of coal consumption in 2020, each consuming over 80 MMT of domestic coal. Other key industrial states
such as Maharashtra, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, and Rajasthan have significant coal consumption (Map 1).14

Map 1: State-wise domestic coal and lignite consumption (2020)

Consumption (MMT)
0.0-25.0
25.1-50.0
50.1-75.0
>75
Punjab
(13.6)

Haryana Uttar
Rajasthan (12.2) Pradesh
(35.9) (90.0) Bihar
Assam
(22.4)
(2.1)

Madhya Jharkhand
Gujarat (48.3)
Pradesh
(28.1)
(81.8) Chhattisgarh West Bengal
(88.9) (54.2)
Odisha
Maharashtra (77.0)
Telangana
(69.6) (35.4)

Andhra
Karnataka Pradesh
(13.1) (35.7)

Tamil Nadu
(42.2)

Source: Information compiled from NITI Aayog Energy dashboard, 2021,

28 FIVE R’s
2. Spatial distribution
India currently has 459 operational coal mines, combining opencast (OC) and underground (UG) mines,15 which
are mostly concentrated in six states: Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Telangana, and
Maharashtra (Map 2). In 2019-20, these six states accounted for over 90% of the country’s total coal production.

Map 2: State-wise production Coal production (MMT)

of coal and lignite 0.0-25.0
25.1-50.0
50.1-100.0
>100.0

Uttar
Rajasthan Pradesh
(47.36) Assam (0.52)
(8.2)
Jharkhand
Madhya (134.3)
Gujarat
Pradesh (96.67)
(11.06)
Chhattisgarh West Bengal (32)
Maharashtra (157.24)
(54.77)
Telangana Odisha (142.17)
(65.75)

Tamil Nadu
(23.46)
Source: iFOREST analysis

With respect to spatial concentration of mines, Jharkhand tops the chart with 114 coal mines. The other
key ones are West Bengal, Telangana, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Odisha (Map 3). While Jharkhand
has the largest number of mines, in many of the districts, the production capacity is relatively small
compared to other major coal-producing states.

Map 3: State-wise distribution Coal mines

of operational coal mines 0-25
26-50
51-75
76-100
>100

Rajasthan Uttar
(7) Pradesh (5) Assam (3)

Madhya Jharkhand
Gujarat
Pradesh (50) (114)
(9)
Chhattisgarh West Bengal
(52) Odisha (70)
Maharashtra
(54) (29)
Telangana
(57)

Tamil
Nadu
Source: iFOREST analysis (3)

FIVE R’s 29
 A district-level assessment of coal mines in various states further highlights the highly concentrated
nature of mining activities and production in certain parts of India. For example, out of the total 459
operational mines, over 67% (308 mines) are located in just 15 districts (Map 4). The highest number of mines
are in Paschim Bardhaman district (West Bengal) with a total of 65 mines (of which 65% are UG). This is
followed by Dhanbad district (Jharkhand), with a total of 51 operational mines, of which 33% are UG.16
In terms of production, just 25 coal districts account for 94% of India’s total coal production (Map 5). Out
of these 25, 13 districts produce more than 20 MMT of coal annually, and account for 75% of India’s coal and
lignite production.

Map 4: District-wise distribution of coal mines

Total number
of mines
0-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
>20

Rajasthan Uttar Assam

Pradesh

Jharkhand
Gujarat Madhya
Pradesh
West
Chhattisgarh Bengal

Maharashtra Odisha

Telangana

Tamil
Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

30 FIVE R’s
Map 5: District-wise distribution of coal production (MMT)

Total production in MMT (2019-20)

0.00-5.00
5.01-10.00
10.01-15.00
15.01-20.00
>20.00

Rajasthan Uttar Assam

Pradesh

Gujarat Madhya Jharkhand

Pradesh West
Chhattisgarh Bengal

Maharashtra Odisha

Telangana

Tamil
Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

3. Contribution to the public exchequer

The share of coal and lignite sector to India’s GDP is about 0.8%.17 However, the tax and non-tax revenue from
the sector constitute an important income source for the Governments. The Centre’s main source of direct
revenue from coal are the taxes, duties, and cess, while for the State Governments and Union Territories
(UTs), the major source is royalties (Table 3).18 Districts receive significant contributions to the District
Mineral Foundation (DMF) Trust.

Table 3: Central and State/UTs Government revenue from coal (L Billion)

2018-19 2019-20
Revenue type Centre+State/ Centre+State/
Centre State/UT Centre State/UT
UT UT
Taxes, Duties, Cesses etc. 578.76 44.17 622.93 552.8 46.75 599.55
Royalty, DMFT, State taxes etc. 61.54 172.52 234.06 51.92 169.83 221.75
Total exchequer contribution 744.32 212.09 956.41 604.72 216.58 821.3
Source: Prayas, 2020

FIVE R’s 31
3.1 Contribution to Centre and State Government exchequer
Collectively, the contribution of the coal sector to the Centre and the State Governments/UTs’ exchequers
was over I 956 billion in 2018-19. This showed a slight dip in 2019-20 (I 821.3 billion), which can be attributed
to the COVID-19 pandemic and associated disruptions.19 The Government further expects to receive about Rs
66.5 billion (I 6656 crore) annually from commercial coal mine auctions that commenced in 2020.20
A state-wise analysis gives a clearer picture of the direct revenue dependence of major coal producing
states on the sector, as well as the Centre’s key sources of coal-based revenue (Table 4).
In most top coal states, the share of direct coal mining revenue (from PSUs, the major operators) in total
revenue contribution of the State Governments is 2.5%-5.5% (Table 5).21 The low revenue share of coal
mining can be attributed to the high proportion of UG mines in these states (having low productivity), which
contribute little to the royalty or DMF. A classic example is West Bengal, where there is a large number of low-
producing UG mines and revenue contribution to the state is one of the lowest.
For the Centre, a major share of revenue, currently, is the Goods and Services Tax (GST) compensation
cess (earlier the coal cess). Companies have been paying this to the Centre since 2017 with the enactment
of the Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act 2017.22 The GST compensation cess as levied
at I 400 per tonne on the dispatch of coal and lignite, is one of the largest tax on coal. Thus, the revenue
contribution to the Centre exchequer by coal companies is nearly two to three times as compared to the
contribution to the State Government exchequer.

Table 4: Contribution of coal mining to Centre and State exchequer in top coal states (2019-20)
Major coal Mine operations of
Coal revenue (K Billion)
State name operators companies considered
considered OC UG OC/UG Centre State Total
Jharkhand CCL, BCCL, ECL 66 27 10 61.21 39.92 101.13
Odisha MCL 17 8 109.64 29.11 138.75
Chhattisgarh SECL 18 28 90.81 32.21 123.02
Madhya Pradesh SECL, NCL, WCL 16 35 2 95.54 34.10 129.64
Maharashtra WCL 39 13 21.29 16.91 38.20
Telangana SCCL 30 26 0.00 0.00 61.24
West Bengal ECL, BCCL 13 45 8 14.34 18.35 32.69
Uttar Pradesh NCL 5 9.19 6.67 15.86
Total 640.52
Source: Revenue calculations based on annual reports and accounts of respective coal companies, and NMET and DMF
requirements as specified by the Ministry of Mines, 2021
Note: CCL= Central Coalfields Limited; BCCL= Bharat Coking Coal Limited; ECL= Eastern Coalfields Limited; MCL= Mahanadi
Coalfields Limited; SECL= South Eastern Coalfields Limited; NCL= Northern Coalfields Limited; WCL= Western Coalfields Limited;
SCCL= Singareni Collieries Company Limited

32 FIVE R’s
 Table 5: Share of coal mining revenue in State revenue
State name Total state revenue Revenue from PSU coal Share of coal in total
(K Billion) companies (K Billion) revenue (%)
Jharkhand 728.59 39.92 5.5
Odisha 1,117.85 29.11 2.6
Chhattisgarh 756.96 32.21 4.3
Madhya Pradesh 1,485.61 34.10 2.3
Maharashtra 3,098.81 16.91 0.5
West Bengal 1,632.59 18.35 1.1
Uttar Pradesh 3,702.66 6.67 0.2
Source: State revenue calculations Reserve Bank of India, 2020-2021

3.2 District Mineral Foundation funds

The District Mineral Foundation (DMF) funds form a significant share of states’ non-tax revenue from coal
mining. As per the latest information of the Ministry of Mines (the nodal ministry entrusted with DMF), over
Rs 456 billion (I 45,977 crore) has accumulated in DMFs of various coal and non-coal mining districts across
India. Of the total accrual, the coal’s share remains 40.3%, which translates to about I 184 billion.
Among the states with the highest DMF share from coal, Jharkhand tops the list. The state’s cumulative DMF
accrual from coal mining stands at I 47.7 billion (I 4,765 crores). Other top coal states also have very significant
DMF corpus from coal, such as Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Telangana and Maharashtra. (Table 6).23
Making use of DMF funds to facilitate just transition at the local level is a significant opportunity. The fund is
extra budgetary and directly comes to the district as contribution from mining companies. Moreover, the fund is
untied and non-lapsable, creating opportunities for short, medium, and long-term investments that are necessary
to support a just transition. For instance, the DMF in Dhanbad district—Jharkhand’s old coal mining area—has, so
far, received I 16.7 billion (I 1,670 crore). Similarly, another old coal district, Ramgarh, has I 8 billion (I 800 crore) in
DMF. In Chhattisgarh’s biggest coal district, Korba, the DMF accrual stands at I 17.8 billion (I 1,778 crore); in Angul,
Odisha’s biggest coal mining and power hub, the sum is I 15.6 billion (I 1,563 crore) (Map 6).

Table 6: Coal share of DMF in coal producing states

Total cumulative DMF Coal based accrual Share of coal in total
State name
accrual (J Billion) (J Billion) (%)
Jharkhand 65.33 47.65 73
Chhattisgarh 64.7 34.43 53
Madhya Pradesh 37.55 30.4 81
Odisha 121.86 28.97 24
Telangana 29.99 18.98 63
Maharashtra 23.07 14.44 63
Uttar Pradesh 8.9 4.81 54
Tamil Nadu 7.77 3.15 41
Gujarat 8.6 1.09 13
Rajasthan 46.64 0.67 1.4
Assam 0.89 0.52 58
West Bengal 0.66 0.15 23
Source: Information compiled from DMF/PMKKKY dashboard, Ministry of Mines, 2021

FIVE R’s 33
Map 6: Distribution of
DMF accrual (I billion)
DMF accruals in top coal 0-5
mining districts 5-10
10-15
> 15

Hazaribagh

Chatra Godda
Singrauli
Umaria Korea Dhanbad
Annupur Raigarh Ramgarh
Korba Sundargarh
Nagpur Jharsuguda Angul
Yavatmal
Chadrapur
Peddapalli

Kothagudem

Cuddalore

Source: iFOREST analysis

Box 1: Coal and Railways

Besides tax and non-tax revenue, coal mining makes another significant contribution to public revenue in
the form of freight revenue to the Indian Railways. A large share of the coal mined in Jharkhand, Odisha,
and Chhattisgarh is not used locally (Table 7) and is transported to other states, particularly in northern
and western India, for use in various sectors.24

Table 7: Coal production vs consumption in key coal states

State name Production (MMT) Consumption (MMT)
Chhattisgarh 157.8 88.9
Jharkhand 131.8 48.3
Odisha 143 77.0
Madhya Pradesh 125.7 81.8
Source: Information compiled from NITI Aayog Energy dashboard, 2021

A primary mode of transportation is the railways, and coal accounts for nearly half of all commodity
transport of the railways. Every year, the Indian Railways earns about I 544 billion from coal freight,
which is nearly half of its total freight revenue earnings (Table 8). This freight revenue generated is used
to cross-subsidise passenger fare. Overall, coal and coal-dependent sectors account for over 75% of the
freight revenue.25

34 FIVE R’s
Table 8: Revenue earning from freight traffic of Indian Railways (2019-20)
Share of Share of
Commodity/ MMT Earnings
Sub-commodity MMT carried earnings
Commodity group carried (K Billion)
(%) (%)
Coal Power houses 252.9
Public use 276.8
Steel plants 57.1
Washeries 0.1
Total coal 586.9 48.6 544.27 48.8
Iron and Steel Raw material for steel plants 25.6
except iron ore
Pig iron and finished steel 53.1
Iron ore (85.6 MMT for steel 153.4
plants)
Total iron and steel 232.1 19.2 204.69 18.4
Cement 110.1 9.1 87.45 7.8
Fertilizers 51.4 58.08
Food grains 37.5 61.54
Mineral oil (POL) 44.7 59.28
Container services 61.1 25.54
Balance other goods 84.7 73.89
Grand Total 1,208.4 1,114.72
Source: Indian Railways annual reports and accounts 2019-20
However, it is to be noted here that a large volume of coal is also dispatched by modes of road transport
such as trucks. While a comprehensive estimation on this is not available, a company-wise estimation of
some PSUs for whom data is available shows this. For instance, for three of the major coal PSUs—SECL
in Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, CCL in Jharkhand, and MCL in Odisha—coal is primarily transported
through roadways. In fact, for SECL offtake, more coal is transported by road than rail (Table 9).
This trend suggests that in the event of a coal sector transition, it is not only the Indian Railways
freight revenue substitution that needs to be considered, but the earnings of the truck freight must also
be factored in. From a job and livelihood perspective, road transport is likely to have larger implications
than rail transport. Any data on the number of jobs (and estimation of job losses from coal transition),
therefore, should account for this.

Table 9: Modes of coal dispatch

Total offtake Dispatch mode (MMT)
Company (MMT) Merry- Consumer’s own Local transport and
2019-20 Rail Road Belt
go-round wagon colliery use
SECL 141.9 49.6 59.5 24.4 6.3 2.1
CCL 67.3 35.7 22.9 8.8
MCL 134 76.8 43.2 12.4 1.5 0.002
Source: SECL and CCL annual reports and accounts 2019-20, MCL Offtake and transport obtained from company website,
2021 (https://www.mahanadicoal.in/About/eofftake.php)

FIVE R’s 35
4. Employment
Employment and livelihood dependence in the coal mining sector is difficult to estimate owing to the
association of a large proportion of contracted workers (with no specific information of employment from
these contractors) and informal workforce with the sector. For this study, an approximate figure of ‘direct’
employment26 (can also be considered formal employment) has been estimated by considering company-
wise employment factors (number of employees per million tonne production) for open cast and underground
mining operations.27
Going by the employment factor approach, currently there are about 0.75 million people associated with
direct coal mining jobs provided through parent companies or by contractors running the mines (Table
10).28 The analysis also shows that UG mining operations employ a disproportionately high number of people
compared to their production.

Table 10: Estimated direct employment in operational coal mines

Mine type No. of mines Production (MMT/annum)* Direct employment
OC 256 721.0 531,893
UG 183 36.0 143,377
OC+UG 20 16.4 69,989
Total 459 773.5 745,259
Source: Data adopted from Pai, Zerriffi and Kaluarachchi, 2021; analysis by iFOREST
*Production as per the latest estimates obtained district-wise and can reflect slight departure from Coal Controller and Coal
Ministry annual report figures.

The distribution of people directly employed in coal mining is high in top producing states and districts.
For example, Jharkhand’s Dhanbad district and Chhattisgarh’s Korba district have about 0.1 million people
each directly employed in coal mining activities. Most of the top coal districts in the states of Jharkhand,
Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Telangana have more than 20,000 people directly employed in coal mining (Map 7).
However, a key determining factor in the employment scenario is the type of mining operations in the
districts. Typically, districts with a high number of UG mines (even with very low production) have high
numbers of people directly employed in mining activities. A classic example of this is Paschim Bardhaman
district of West Bengal, which has the highest number of UG mines (42) and is among the top three districts
in terms of direct employment (over 68,350 people). A sharp contrast to this is Singrauli district of Madhya
Pradesh. Its production volume is one of the highest in the country (more than 82 MMT in 2019-20 from seven
opencast mines), but has just over 12,000 people directly employed.
In fact, high direct employment in Dhanbad is also attributed to the high proportion of UG mines (out of 51
operational mines, only 24 are OC, rest 17 are UG and 10 are mixed operations of UG and OC).
However, the main challenge with the coal industry is the vast number of informal workers, who are non-
inventoried and are engaged in various activities through a complex set of informal hiring mechanisms such
as daily wage by contractors and subcontractors, seasonal wages, part of a group that is referred to as gang,
etc. This includes people such as loaders, levellers, carriers, coal transporters, etc.
For an overall estimation of informal workers in the coal mining sector, the 68th round of National Sample
Survey (NSS) on employment and unemployment situation of India has been considered. Analysis based on
the 68th round data suggests that the mining sector (both coal and non-coal minerals) has nearly 71% informal
workers and 29% formal workers.29 Going by the overall estimate, the number of informal workers is about 1.84
million (however, coal mining will have a higher percentage of informal workers as compared to non-coal mining
due to the type of activities involved). Also, the estimates do not account for a large number of people in mining
areas who are dependent on coal for subsistence livelihood by gathering and selling coal in local markets. This
is a typical phenomenon in old coal regions of eastern India such as Jharkhand and West Bengal.30

36 FIVE R’s
Map 7: Distribution of formal coal mine workers

Manpower
0-1000
1001-5000
5001-10000
10001-15000
15001-20000
>20000

Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Assam

Gujarat Madhya Pradesh

Jharkhand West Bengal
Chhattisgarh

Maharashtra Odisha

Telangana

Tamil
Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

5. Future trend of coal sector

While the coal mining sector has been experiencing an overall production growth, there are two factors that
suggest a declining demand in coal mining activities as well as the closure of coal mines in coming years.
These include:
i. Reduction in demand for coal by power sector; and
ii. Unprofitability of low-producing underground mines.
i. Reduction in demand for coal by power sector: The demand of coal is estimated to go down in the
coming decades, particularly considering its diminishing share in power generation, given the advancement
in renewable energy (RE) technologies and the share of electricity generation from non-conventional sources.
The Central Electricity Authority (CEA) has projected a significant reduction in coal-based power
installation and generation capacity over the next 10 years. By 2029-30, the percentage share of RE in the
total installed capacity is projected to be nearly twice of coal and lignite-based sources (Table 11). The CEA
has also projected an increase in the share of RE in gross electricity generation. While RE’s share in total

FIVE R’s 37
installed capacity is currently about 21%, its share in gross generation remains only about 9%. This is due
to several reasons, including grid capacity, issues with storage systems, etc. By 2029-30, the share of RE
(combining solar, wind, hydro, and biomass) in gross electricity generation has been estimated to be 44%
(factoring in the reduction in price of battery energy storage systems).31

Table 11: Estimated installed capacity by 2029-30

Energy resources Capacity (MW) Share of total (%)
Coal and Lignite 266,827 32.1
Gas 24,350 2.9
Nuclear 16,880 2.0
Solar 300,000 36.1
Wind 140,000 16.8
Biomass 10,000 1.2
Hydro 73,445 8.8
Total 831,502
Battery energy storage 34,000MW/136,000MWh
Source: Central Electricity Authority, 2020

While there can be some revisions in the timeframe of this estimates due to the impacts of COVID-19
pandemic, yet there remains high optimism about the exponential growth in solar power in the coming two
decades and consequent reduction in coal’s share in power generation.32
The International Energy Agency (IEA), in 2021, has come up with revised projections for India’s fossil fuel sector
and energy outlook in the next two decades (by 2040). The projections have been done based on three scenarios:
the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), the India Vision Case (IVC), and the Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS).33
Under all the three scenarios, from the most conservative STEPS to the most ambitious SDS, electricity from
coal shows a steady decline in the next 20 years. In 2019, while the share of coal-based electricity is nearly 57%, it
is projected to decline to 34% in 2040 under STEPS, to 25% under IVC, and to 5% under SDS scenario (Table 12).
With respect to coal production and supply, while there is no decline in STEPS and IVC scenarios, there is
a rapid decline in SDS (Table 13).

Table 12: Electricity generation under STEPS, IVC and SDS

Current STEPS IVC SDS
Indicator
2019 2030 2040 2030 2040 2030 2040
Electricity 1 ,583 2,461 3,887 2,599 4,225 2,365 3,601
generation (TWh)
Coal 1,135 1,343 1,334 1,099 1,076 708 181
Solar PV 48 392 1,221 517 1,307 584 1,368
Wind 66 195 520 251 677 343 782
Hydro 175 226 307 226 307 258 361
Other RE 42 81 121 81 121 118 320
Total renewables 332 893 2,169 1,074 2,413 1,302 2,832
Natural gas 71 108 157 309 509 240 337
Nuclear 40 109 222 109 222 107 247
Source: International Energy Agency, 2021

38 FIVE R’s
 Overall, it can be concluded that India’s coal mining sector is likely to experience a rapid downsizing over
the next two to three decades to meet the climate goals. This has huge implications for the major coal
producing districts (Box 2: Just transition in coal districts).
ii. Unprofitability of low-producing underground mines: There are a large number of low- producing
UG mines, particularly in India’s old coal mining regions such as Jharia and Raniganj coalfields in Jharkhand
and West Bengal, respectively. There are 183 operational UG mines (out of total 459 operational mines),
which account for only 36 MMT of domestic coal production. Similarly, labour productivity of these mines is
extremely poor. Over 0.14 million people (direct and contractual) are employed by these mines. Continuing
with many of them has become a liability for the coal companies.
In 2017, Coal India Limited (CIL), India’s largest coal producer, had identified 65 loss-making mines for
closure, out of which 62 were UG operations. These mines employed about 40,000 workers at that time,
which was about 13% of the company’s total employee strength.34
The burden of UG mines continues to grow on CIL and its subsidiaries. While less than 5% of the company’s
raw coal production comes from these mines, they account for about 40%-45% of CIL’s total workforce.
The company nearly incurs a loss of about I 160 billion (I 16,000 crore) annually from continuing with these
operations, which is about the same as the company’s annual profits (I 167 billion) in 2019-20.35 In fact, the
company, in its latest annual report (2019-20), has identified “high cost of production in underground (legacy)
mines” as coal companies’ top “weakness”.36 There is merit in closing down underground mines and using the
extra profits of coal companies to start just transition in coal regions.
Key players of the coal industry are wary of the transition that the sector will undergo in the coming years,
considering rapidly changing market demands as well as opportunity for investments in other sectors such
as RE and extraction of non-coal minerals.37
In 2018, CIL announced a target of 20 gigawatt (GW) solar power generation in the next 10 years as part of the
company’s diversification plan.38 Recently, in April 2021, the company further announced the establishment
of two wholly-owned subsidiaries—CIL Solar PV and CIL Navikarniya Urja Limited—for undertaking solar
photovoltaic manufacturing and renewable energy projects.39

Box 2: Just Transition in coal districts

More than 90% of the workforce in India are linked to the informal economy, comprising people who belong
to socially and economically backward sections of the society.40 Coal mining sector is no exception to this.
Formal employment in coal (and lignite) mining operations, which is about 0.75 million, reflects a
fraction of the overall income dependence on the coal industry.41 Apart from the fact that official estimates
of informal workers directly related to coal mining activities is nearly 2.5 times the formal workers, there
is a huge section of people in India’s old coal mining areas for whom coal is a subsistence resource. In
the coal-bearing areas of Eastern India, which spans across Raniganj coalfields of West Bengal to Jharia
and North Karanpura coalfields of Jharkhand, there are millions of people who earn a living by gathering
coal manually and selling in local markets.42 These people, commonly referred to as ‘cycle wallahs’, are a
common sight in top coal mining districts of Jharkhand, including Dhanbad, Hazaribagh, Ramgarh, and
Chatra. An empirical study in Ramgarh district of Jharkhand—where one in four households depends on
coal for an income—shows that gathering and selling coal is the primary source of income for about two-
thirds of the coal-dependent population.43
The informal and unorganised workforce also do not have any bargaining power, which is a major
challenge. Though there are several labour laws to protect them such as the Unorganised Workers
Social Security Act (2008) and the Minimum Wages Act (1948), including state-specific rules, these are

FIVE R’s 39
 barely exercised. The desperation of ‘some income’ sustains an ecosystem of exploitation (by various
middlemen), and labour rights take a backseat.
Not only there is a large proportion of informal workforce with low income (and no social security
benefits) in the coal mining regions, but these regions are also saddled with poor social infrastructure and
development indicators. In several top coal mining districts of India, more than 40% of people are multi-
dimensionally poor, which is much higher than India average of 27.5%. Hence, these people have lower
adaptive capacity for any abrupt and unplanned closure of mining activities.44
Therefore, just transition in coal districts of India will have to be beyond just a transition of the formal
workforce and consideration for creating decent jobs for them. Predominance of informal workers (and
subsistence economy), along with poor human development indicators, will require envisioning and
planning a broad-based socio-economic transition to ensure justice for all.
As the first step, the process of a just transition must engage with the informal sector. A bottom-up
approach will be necessary to capture the needs and aspirations of these people, including identifying
their skills, potential for adapting to alternate livelihood opportunities, and scope of mobility. Moreover,
considering the significant presence of marginalised communities in many of the coal mining regions and
engagement of a large number of women in various informal work arrangements (and also subsistence
work such as gathering coal), the just transition process must take into account issues of gender and
vulnerabilities of marginalised communities, alongside the informal workers.
Secondly, as most of the people working in the informal sector are semi-skilled and unskilled, the
economic diversification plans must be broad-based to secure alternative livelihood opportunities for
this category. This may include:
• Expanding livelihoods in natural resource-based sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, etc;
• Augmenting Government employment generation schemes;
• Employment in building new social and economic infrastructure; and,
• Skill development to join the formal economy.
Finally, as the fossil fuel-dominant regions have comparatively poor Human Development Indicators
and physical infrastructure, there is a need to strengthen social and physical infrastructure and safety
nets to secure long-term welfare gains and build community resilience to adapt to a transition.

6. Transition roadmap
The coal sector is ripe for a transition considering the availability of affordable alternative technologies to
replace coal use in many sectors, most importantly the power sector. However, there are both challenges
and opportunities in ensuring a just transition.
• There is a strategic need to prioritise and start planning just transition in India’s old coal belts such as in
West Bengal and Jharkhand, which have a large number of old UG mines. Low-producing and loss-making
UG mines are a drag on a company’s balance sheet. This creates a situation where these mines can be
closed temporarily or permanently without any planning. The unplanned mine closure must be avoided.
• Closing down unprofitable mines and using extra profit to start the process of just transition is a win-win
opportunity for coal companies, workers, and communities.
• There are other resources that can be utilised for just transition:
» One of the biggest revenue sources that can be made available is the GST compensation cess. Post 2022,
this cess should be reinstated as the coal cess, or as a clean energy transition cess, and can be used to
support just transition and achieve gainful outcomes.

40 FIVE R’s
 » The other key revenue source from coal that creates significant opportunity for supporting just transition
at local levels is the DMF funds. Currently, this significant corpus is being misutilised or underutilised
in almost all top coal producing states. A proper planning mechanism for using DMF funds with the
objective of just transition will ensure that the funds’ potential is harnessed optimally.
» The perception of huge revenue loss due to decline in coal mining is not as grave as it is considered. The
GST for coal mining is lower than many other industrial sectors.45 In fact, in most of the top coal mining
states, the share of revenue from coal mining is below 5% of the state revenue.
For the above to happen, the Government will need to develop a policy aligned with its energy transition
targets and climate commitments. A national level policy needs to be developed in the immediate future
to prevent haphazard closure of mines and socio-economic disruptions. The policy should include
components of-
• Coal phase-out strategy at the national and state-level (based on a mapping exercise);
• Coal-based power phase out plan, and simultaneous incentivisation of clean energy;
• Regulatory revisions of the coal industry pertaining to mine closure and reclamation, leasing/lease
transfer, labour, etc.
Also, it will be crucial to reduce coal requirements for various downstream sectors/industries that are
reliant on it. The transition scenario of these industries is discussed in the following sections.

FIVE R’s 41
 Chapter 2
Fossil fuel

Oil
Oil
sector

Directly Imported oil

Exploration &
Impacted & petroleum
Production
Level I products

Directly
Impacted Refineries
Level II

Directly
Road Other Petrochemi- Other
Impacted Cooking fuel Electricity
Transport Transport cals industries
Level III

42 FIVE R’s FIVE R’s 43

T
he oil sector is already facing transition challenges due to shift in some of the end-use sectors
that have historically relied heavily on petroleum products. Road transportation sector is
key among them. As electrification of fleet has become a major tool to reduce local pollution
and GHG emissions, the popularity of electric vehicles (EVs), particularly cars, two-wheelers
and three-wheelers (2Ws and 3Ws), is growing. Backed by policies, industry investments and
consumer demand, it is projected that by 2030, EV sales will constitute 60% of the total car sales globally,
up from mere 5% today.1 While, it is true that any decline in oil demand due to penetration of EVs could be
offset by demand growth in other sectors such as freight transport or petrochemicals (which currently
have fewer and more costly substitutes),2 yet transition in certain sectors of the oil value chain in the
coming years is inevitable.
For India, the demand for oil has increased rapidly over the last decades and it is now the third-
largest oil-consuming country in the world.3 Today, oil has a share of over 26% in the country’s total
primary energy supply, making it the second largest after coal.4 However, oil demand, is projected
to reduce in some of the end-use sectors such as transportation and domestic use. While the
projected rise in EV sales of India over the next two decades5 will have major implications for petrol
demand, the penetration of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) as a cooking fuel has already resulted in
a steady decline of kerosene consumption (declining at CAGR of 12% over the last decade). Now,
piped natural gas supply and electricity (for cooking) are poised to reduce LPG demand, particularly
in the cities.
From a just transition perspective, the downstream sector of the oil industry is of the highest
significance to India. This includes refining and production of petroleum products, and their marketing
and distribution. The upstream sector, which includes exploration and production of oil, is not significant
as India is heavily reliant on import of crude oil, which has remained 82% - 85% in the past years. In 2019-
20, domestic oil production stood at 32.2 million metric tonnes (MMT), while 226.9 MMT was imported.
In fact, over the past 10 years, there has been a steady decrease in domestic production, while imports
have gone up.6 Therefore, even if India continues to produce oil at the current levels, it can easily meet its
decarbonisation targets of 2050.

1. Refineries
There are 23 refineries in India (18 public sector, 3 private sector and 2 joint venture), with a cumulative
production capacity of about 250 million metric tonnes per year (MMTPA). They are located in 22 districts
across 18 states (Table 1).
Among the public sector companies, the largest player is the Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) with
nearly 28% of total refining capacity in the country. The major private player is the Reliance Industries
Limited (RIL) with over 27% refining capacity.
The refining capacity in the country has grown at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 3.5% over
the last decade (2010-11 to 2019-20). The growth in crude oil output from the refineries has also increased
at a CAGR of 2.9% during the same period. This has aided India to become the fourth largest refiner in the
world, and the second largest in Asia (after China).7

44 FIVE R’s
 Table 1: Distribution of oil refineries
Year of Capacity
State District Company
commissioning (MMTPA)
Assam Digboi IOCL 1901 0.65
Assam Guwahati IOCL 1962 1
Assam Bongaigaon IOCL 1974 2.35
Bihar Barauni IOCL 1964 6
Gujarat Koyali IOCL 1965 13.7
West Bengal Haldia IOCL 1975 8
Uttar Pradesh Mathura IOCL 1982 8
Haryana Panipat IOCL 1998 15
Odisha Paradip IOCL 2016 15
Maharashtra Mumbai BPCL 1955 12
Kerala Kochi BPCL 1963 15.5
Maharashtra Mumbai HPCL 1954 7.5
Andhra Pradesh Visakhapatnam HPCL 1957 8.3
Tamil Nadu Manali CPCL 1965 10.5
Tamil Nadu Narimanam CPCL 1993 1
Assam Numaligarh NRL 1999 3
Andhra Pradesh Tatipaka ONGC 2001 0.07
Karnataka Mangalore MRPL 1996 15
Gujarat Jamnagar RIL 1999 33
Gujarat Jamnagar RIL 2008 35.2
Gujarat Vadinar Nayara Energy Limited 2006 20
Madhya Pradesh Bina Bharat-Oman Refinery Limited (BORL) 2011 7.8
Punjab Bhatinda HPCL-Mittal Energy Limited (HMEL) 2012 11.3
Total 249.9
Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, 2021

Figure 1: Trend in refinery capacity and processing

260 Refining capacity (MMTPA)
Crude oil processed (MMTPA)
240

220

200

180

160

140

120

100
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20
Source: Data adopted from Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, 2021

FIVE R’s 45
1.1. Production
The highest proportion of petroleum products produced domestically include diesel and petrol, which are
consumed by the transportation sector. In 2019-20, high-speed diesel oil (HSD) accounted for 42.3% of the
total output, followed by petrol (motor gasoline), which accounted for 14.7%.8 India is also a net exporter of
these products (Table 2).
With respect to LPG, which is another highly consumed product, India’s current imports exceed its domestic
production. The other major imported product is petroleum coke, which is primarily used in the industries,
especially as feedstock in coke ovens for the steel industry and as a substitute for coal in cement industry.9

Table 2: Production and availability of petroleum products

Product Production (MMT) Import (MMT) Export (MMT) Availability (MMT)
Diesel (HSD+LDO)* 111.8 2.8 31.7 83.0
Petrol (motor gasoline) 38.6 2.2 12.7 28.1
LPG 12.8 14.8 0.5 27.2
ATF 15.2 0.1 6.9 8.4
Kerosene 3.1 0.0 0.2 3.0
Naphtha 20.7 1.7 8.9 13.4
Fuel oil 8.6 4.6 1.5 11.7
Lubes 0.9 2.7 0.0 3.6
Bitumen 5.2 1.6 0.0 6.8
Petroleum coke 15.5 10.7 0.5 25.7
Others 30.3 2.8 2.9 30.2
Total 262.9 43.8 65.7 241.0
Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, 2021; *Production of HSD is 111.2 MMT; LDO=Light Diesel Oil

1.2. Demand and replacement technologies

India’s oil demand grew by more than 50% over the last decade, mostly led by rapid demand growth in the transport
sector and residential consumption—a big driver of which is use of LPG as cooking fuel.10 In 2019-20, the transport
sector accounted for nearly half (49%) of the total oil consumption (Figure 2). The two other major sectors are the
residential and industrial sectors, accounting for 10.7% and 11.5% of total consumption, respectively.11

Figure 2: Oil consumption by various sectors (%)

1% Private imports
7%
4% Other non-energy Others

10% Refinery fuel

(including losses) 49%
Transportation
1% Commercial

5% Petrochemicals 11%
Residential
12% Industry
Source: Data adopted from NITI Aayog Energy Dashboard, 2021

46 FIVE R’s
 With respect to end-use consumption of petroleum products by various sectors, the highest consumption
is of diesel and petrol by the transport sector through retail (Annexure 3). Diesel remains the most consumed
oil product, accounting for 39% of total petroleum product consumption in 2020, primarily used for freight/
commercial transportation. Petrol consumption accounts for nearly 14%, which has grown over the past
years, due to increase in the number of passenger cars and 2Ws and 3Ws.12
For LPG, which is the most consumed petroleum product after diesel and petrol, the highest demand is for
cooking fuel (domestic distribution), accounting for 87.6% of the LPG consumption.
As industrial fuel, the major petroleum products are petroleum coke (largely by the steel industry) and
furnace oil. Besides, low-sulphur diesel stock and light diesel oil (LDO) are also used for industrial consumption.
Another major petroleum product, naphtha, is primarily consumed by the petrochemical industry.
However, the refining sector faces major challenges because of the significant changes in product
demand due to the availability of alternative technologies.
With rapid electrification of cars and 2Ws and 3Ws, there will be a major drop in demand for petrol in the
next few years. Similarly, electricity, biofuel and hydrogen will reduce the demand for diesel, but this will take
longer as replacement technologies are not yet market-ready. Oil products used as industrial fuels will also
be replaced by electricity, bio-fuels or hydrogen over the next 10-15 years as cost-effective heat pumps and
other electric-based systems become widely available.
The only sector where demand is likely to increase is petrochemicals. This means that products like
naphtha could see an increase in production. But overall, refinery sector will see significant reductions and
closures.

2. Marketing and Distribution

In the oil industry, major marketing and distribution happens for products such as diesel, petrol, and domestic
fuel (LPG and kerosene). The marketing and distribution sector is very significant for a just transition because
this is where the most immediate impacts of oil transition will be experienced in India. As noted earlier, the
triggers such as momentum for EVs and changing patterns in cooking fuel are already there.
The marketing and distribution components are also important from an employment perspective. The
formal employment in marketing and distribution is, in fact, far more than the employment provided by
the oil and gas companies, including refineries (See section on employment). Besides formal employment,
marketing and distribution also employs a large number of semi-skilled and contract workers.

2.1. Retail outlets

India’s rising vehicle fleet has contributed to the increasing number of retail outlets/petrol pumps. The
number of petrol pumps has increased from 45,104 in 2011-12 to 63,093 in 2019-20.13 Typically, the number of
petrol pumps is correlated with population and urbanisation (Map 1). The Government of India further plans to
increase the number of petrol pumps to ensure adequate availability of fuels like petrol and diesel.14

FIVE R’s 47
Map 1: State-wise number of petrol pumps (2019-20)

0-100
100-500
Jammu & 500-1000
Kashmir (533) 1000-2500
Himachal 2500 – 5000
Pradesh (494) >5000

Punjab Chandigarh
(3,551) (42)
Uttarakhand (629)
Haryana Arunachal
(3,061) Delhi (398) Pradesh (116)
Sikkim
Uttar
(55)
Pradesh
Rajasthan (4,967) Assam
(8,210) Nagaland
Bihar (980)
Meghalaya (94)
(2,968)
(225) Manipur
(136)
Gujarat Madhya Jharkhand
(4,575) Tripura (79)
Pradesh (1,358)
(4,230) West Bengal (2,523) Mizoram (45)
Chhattisgarh
(1,462) Odisha (1,894)
Dadra and
Maharashtra
Nagar Haveli
(6,458)
(30)
Daman and
Telangana (3,079)
Diu (31)

Goa (118) Andhra

Pradesh
Karnataka (4,811) (3,719)
Andaman
and Nicobar
Tamil Puducherry (164) Islands (16)
Nadu
Kerala (5,804)
(2,238)

Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, 2021

2.2. LPG distributors

Government subsidy and policy push for clean cooking fuel, along with increasing urban population, have
contributed to a growing consumption of LPG in India.15 Consequently, the number of LPG distributors has also
increased over the past decade, from 10,541 LPG marketing companies in 2010-11 to 24,670 in 2019-20 (Map 2).16
However, the increase is not equal for all states. In more urbanised states/UTs such as Delhi or Chandigarh,
the number plateaued over the last decade. In Chandigarh, in 2010-11, the number of marketing companies
was 27, which has remained unchanged in the last 10 years. Similarly, in Delhi, over the last 10 years, the
number has only increased marginally, from 314 in 2010-11 to 322 in 2019-20. In contrast, in Uttar Pradesh, the
number has increased significantly over the last decade from 1,299 in 2010-11 to 4,110 in 2019-20. Some other
states such as Jharkhand and Bihar have also shown a four-fold increase.17

48 FIVE R’s
Map 2: State-wise number of LPG marketing companies (2019-20)

0-100
100-250
Jammu & 250-500
Kashmir (287) 500-1000
Himachal 1000 – 2500
Pradesh (203) >2500

Punjab Chandigarh (27)

(856)
Uttarakhand (313)
Haryana Arunachal
(621) Delhi (322) Pradesh (83)
Sikkim
Uttar
(24)
Pradesh
Rajasthan (1,372) Assam
(4,110) Nagaland
Bihar (559)
Meghalaya (81)
(1,938)
(62) Manipur
(99)
Gujarat (968) Madhya Jharkhand
Tripura (74)
Pradesh (536)
(1,507) West Bengal (1,445) Mizoram (59)
Chhattisgarh
(534) Odisha (938)
Dadra and
Maharashtra
Nagar Haveli
(2,184)
(3)
Daman and
Telangana (777)
Diu (3)

Goa (55) Andhra

Pradesh
Karnataka (1,238) (1,057)
Andaman
and Nicobar
Tamil Puducherry (27) Islands (9)
Nadu
Lakshadweep (1) (1,623)
Kerala
(675)

Source: Petroleum Planning & Analysis Cell, Government of India, 2021

3. Employment
It is difficult to estimate the total number of people employed in the entire oil sector value chain due to
scattered nature of the data. However, an attempt has been made to estimate the employment in oil and gas
companies, refineries, and marketing and distribution sector.
The central public sector oil and gas enterprises (CPSEs) provide permanent employment to slightly over 0.1
million people in 2019-2020.18 The major shares of employment are in exploration and production (largely in ONGC),
refining and marketing, accounting for about 28.9%, 24.4%, and 27.3% of oil CPSE jobs, respectively (Table 3).
However, private sector now contributes about 20-25% of crude oil and gas production and has over 35% of refining
capacity. Reliance India Limited and Nayara Energy Limited operate three large oil refineries and run 7,400 retail
outlets across the country.19,20 The data on employment provided by the private sector companies is not available.
FIVE R’s 49
 To estimate the total permanent employment in oil and gas companies, including public and private
sector, an employment factor approach has been considered, using CPSEs as the baseline. Going by the
approach, the total permanent employees in the oil and gas companies is estimated to be 0.16 million. The
actual numbers, however, are likely much higher due to large-scale use of contract workers and outsourcing
of jobs in marketing and distribution (particularly retail).

Table 3: Employment in oil and gas companies

Exploration
Refining Marketing Others Total
and Production

CPSEs 29,987 25,322 28,380 201,43 103,832

Private and JVs 9,996 18,456 19,722 11,088 59,262

Total 39,983 43,778 48,102 31,231 163,094

Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, 2021 (for CPSEs)

Note: 1. Does not include expats, foreign experts, contract workers and retail.; 2. Private and joint ventures (JVs) are estimated
based on employment factor approach.; 3. Employment in CPSEs from Ministry of Oil and Natural Gas, 2021, and company annual
reports of CPSEs

3.1. Refinery
The total permanent employees in oil refineries is estimated to be about 44,000 (Annexure 4). However, there
is a high share of contract workers in the refining sector. While current estimates are not available, a report
of the Labour Bureau of 201021 estimated that there are 58,894 contract workers in the refining sector across
India.22 This was nearly twice (1.7 times precisely) the number of permanent workers in the refinery (CPSEs)
at that time (34,036 as per 2009-10 estimates).23 If the ratio between contract and permanent employees
is considered, then the total number of contract workers in the refineries currently can be estimated to be
about 74,000. This is likely an underestimation, as the number of contract workers in the oil and gas sector
is increasing.
Overall, about 0.12 million people are employed in refineries. Among public sector, IOCL has the highest
employee strength, primarily concentrated in eastern and central parts of India. Among private sector,
considering its scale of operation, RIL has the maximum employees. Overall, considering both public and
private sector, the maximum number of employment in refineries are in Gujarat, accounting for nearly 41%
of total refinery workers.

3.2. Oil retail

The employment in the retail sector—both public and private outlets—is estimated to be about 1.1 million as
of 2020.24 While retail outlets are spread across the country, their numbers are much higher in states such
as Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra. Other states with high workers share include, Karnataka, Gujarat, Madhya
Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, and Punjab. Overall employment in the oil retail sector is
estimated to be over 0.1 million. A significant proportion of this are semi-skilled workers, and are mostly
supported through basic wage rates.25

3.3. LPG Distribution

The total workforce in LPG distribution is estimated to be about 0.1 million.26 The states with most
concentration of workers include Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Rajasthan, Tamil
Nadu, and Maharashtra. However, as discussed earlier, this is likely to see a declining trend in cities due to
increased penetration of piped natural gas.

50 FIVE R’s
 Like oil retail workers, the LPG distribution segment also includes at least 50% of semi-skilled workers,
who are involved in loading, unloading, and delivery. While oil retail workers will need reskilling due to
penetration of EVs, LPG distribution jobs are likely to reduce in many pockets due to reduced consumption
of LPG as cooking fuel.
Overall, the total formal employment in the oil sector is estimated to be at least 1.4 million. The estimation
on informal employment requires further work.

Table 4: Total formal employment in oil sector

Sectors Formal employment

Oil and gas companies (excluding refineries) 119,316

Refineries 118,132

Oil Retail 1,105,488

LPG distribution 98,680

Total 1,441,616

Source: iFOREST analysis

4. Public revenue contribution

The share of oil sector (oil rents) to India’s GDP has largely been declining since 2011. As compared to 1.36%
in the reference year (2011), the sector’s contribution to the country’s GDP stands at about 0.4%, as per the
latest estimates of 2019.27 However, taxes from the oil and gas sector are a significant revenue source for
the Government. The Centre’s main source of revenue are the taxes, duties, and cess, while for the states/
UTs the biggest source of revenue is sales tax/VAT on petroleum products. In 2019-20 (as per information
computed from 16 major oil and gas companies), the total contribution of the petroleum sector to the
Government exchequer was I 5,554 billion (I 555,370 crore), of which, Centre had a share of over 60%, and
the States/UTs’ share was about 40% (Table 5).
The contribution of the oil and gas sector to the central government’s revenue is as high as 17.2%. The
sector contributes 7.5 % to the state governments’ revenue. This huge reliance of the public exchequer
on the oil and gas sector means reduced oil and gas consumption, especially petrol and diesel use in road
transport that provides a bulk of the tax revenues, will have financial implications.

FIVE R’s 51
 Table 5: Contribution of the oil sector to Centre and State/UT exchequer (2019-20)
Contribution types Particulars Amount (K Billion)

Central Tax/ Duties on Crude oil and Cess on Crude Oil 147.89
Petroleum products
Royalty on Crude Oil / Natural Gas 56.02

Customs Duty 229.27

NCCD on Crude Oil 11.3

Excise Duty 2,230.57

Service tax 0.17

IGST 130.99

CGST 68.31

Others 0.88

Income tax, dividend to Central Corporate/ Income Tax 231.34

Government etc.
Dividend income to Central Govt. 122.7

Dividend distribution tax 54.62

Profit petroleum on exploration of oil/ gas 59.09

Total contribution to central exchequer 3,343.15

Percentage contribution to central exchequer (as % of total revenue) 17.20%

State/UT Tax/ Duties on Crude oil Royalty on Crude Oil / Natural Gas 118.82
and Petroleum products
Sales Tax/ VAT 2,004.93

SGST/UTGST 73.45

Octroi, Duties Incl. Electricity Duty 7.16

Entry Tax / Others 4.05

Dividend / Direct tax etc. Dividend income to State Govt. 2.15

Total contribution to state exchequer 2,210.56

Percentage contribution to state exchequers (as % of total revenue) 7.50%

Total contribution of oil and gas sector to the government revenue 5,553.7

Percentage contribution to the government revenues (as % of total revenue) 11.40%

Source: Petroleum Planning & Analysis Cell, Government of India, 2021

52 FIVE R’s
5. Transition challenges
The future of the oil sector in India in the coming years, including its implications for a just transition, is
related to two major end uses:
• Road transportation, including freight and passenger vehicles; and,
• Cooking fuel.

5.1. Road transportation

Energy use in India’s transport sector has increased nearly five times in the past three decades, consuming
more than 100 million tonnes of oil equivalent (MTOE) in 2019. Unlike electricity and other industrial sectors
which have a relatively diverse source of energy mix, the transport sector is heavily reliant on oil, with 95% of
its fuel demand being met by petroleum products.28
Growing urbanisation, coupled with industrial growth, will trigger growth in the transportation sector,
and consequently, oil consumption, under business-as-usual scenario. The projection of oil demand by
International Energy Agency (IEA) in India does not show a significant dip in the next two decades due to
massive increase in freight transport (Table 6).29 Only in the Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS), there
is a moderate growth in oil demand. While growth in freight trucks is projected even under SDS, it is assumed
that there will be increase in hybrid, electric, hydrogen and natural gas freight vehicles.30

Table 6: Oil demand under STEPS, IVC and SDS

Oil demand (mb/d) by various sectors Current STEPS* IVC* SDS
2019 2030 2040 2030 2040 2030 2040
Road transport 1.9 2.9 3.8 3.0 3.8 2.4 2.1
Aviation and shipping 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.4
Industry and petrochemicals 0.9 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.7 1.2 1.3
Buildings 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.1
Source: International Energy Agency, 2021; *STEPS: Stated policies scenario; *IVC: India vision case

However, if we just consider passenger vehicles, the reliance on oil shows a decrease under all three
scenarios. In fact, under SDS, the passenger cars move out of diesel and petrol.

Figure 3: Estimates of passenger car sales under various scenarios

Petroleum ICE CNG Hybrid Electric Sales (right axis)
100% 40

75% 30
Million vehicles

50% 20

25% 10
STEPS

SDS
IVC

0% 0
2019 2040
Source: International Energy Agency, 2021

FIVE R’s 53
 Considering the diversification of fuel mix for freight vehicles, and increase in electric cars, 2Ws and 3Ws,
two impacts can be assumed in context of just transition:
• There will be reduction in demand for diesel and petrol production by refineries, which are currently the
main output; and,
• There will be reduction in the number of petrol pumps or modification of these infrastructures in
commensurate with electrification of vehicular fleet.
For the first one, as per current Government projections, there is no reduction in refinery capacity or
output in the next 30 years. The IEA (2021) also suggests an increase in refining capacity till 2040.31 However,
other modelling studies indicate significant reduction in oil demand by 2050.32 Overall, there will be changes in
the product mix of the refinery sector. This will reduce refining capacity and lead to significant technological
changes. Hence, both job loss and reskilling requirements should be anticipated.
There will be considerable implications for petrol pumps. If passenger vehicles move to electricity, then
either the number of pumps will go down or they will be modified to serve electric vehicles. In the first
scenario, there will be job losses, and in the second, reskilling will be required.

5.2. Cooking fuel

In a bid to adopt and use clean cooking fuel, the Government has been aggressively pushing LPG. At the
end of first three phases of the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY) scheme in 2019, about 94% of
the Indian households have an LPG connection.33 Besides LPG, other modes of cooking fuel such as
piped natural gas (PNG), biogas and improved cookstoves are also being promoted and expanded at
various levels.34
Considering such pathways of clean cooking fuel, the IEA (2021) has projected massive increase in the use
of LPG and modest increase in natural gas and electricity (Table 7).

Table 7: Share of population using various cooking fuels under STEPS, IVC and SDS
Share of population reliant (%) in 2030
Cooking fuel source
STEPS IVC/SDS

Traditional fuel-biomass 33 0

LPG 54 76

Natural gas 6 9

Improved biomass cookstoves 2 7

Other clean 5 8
Source: Adopted from International Energy Agency estimates, 2021

However, a review of the existing PNG network suggests that urban India will move to PNG. The Government
is planning to spend I 120,000 crore over the next 10 years to expand the city gas distribution (CGD) network
across the country to cover 407 districts, and for about 70% of the population. This includes households
as well as industrial and commercial users.35 Similarly, electric cooking is slowly finding a foothold due to
affordability.36 From a just transition perspective, therefore, LPG distributing companies, along with their
workforce, will be impacted.

54 FIVE R’s
 Overall, the scoping of the oil sector brings out some of the opportunities and challenges of a
just transition.
• The transition in the downstream sectors such as refining (with reduced production of petrol and diesel),
marketing and distribution will not see a huge job loss, but the primary requirement will be retraining and
reskilling of the workforce.
• In oil refineries, the expected demand downturn of petrol, diesel, and LPG in the coming years, can be
substituted by adaptation of oil refineries to produce other ‘modern’ fuels.37 The existing workforce can be
retrained/upskilled, accordingly.
• Electrification of vehicle fleet, including two and three wheelers, passenger cars, and a proportion of
freight vehicles, will require redesigning the retail infrastructure. The Government is already planning
to set up at least one EV charging kiosk across 69,000 petrol pumps in India.38 As EV sales and use go
up, the publicly available alternative fuel infrastructure must increase to the tune of 1 charger per 10 cars
(European Commission directive 2019)39. As the infrastructure gets redesigned, the workforce can be
reskilled in phases, accordingly.
• For the LPG distributing network, there will be job losses and the need for alternative employment.
However, this should be a lesser problem considering comparatively low workforce (overall about 1 lakh),
and the fact that the transition can start with major cities.
• Finally, one of the key challenges for a transition in the oil sector will be substitution of public revenue.
Many of the States/UTs make up for their revenue deficit through sales of petrol and diesel. For the
Centre, too, the excise duty is a very significant part of revenue. The Government, in near term, will have
to plan a taxation policy to offset the loss of sales taxes from petrol, and in the mid-term for loss of taxes
from diesel.

FIVE R’s 55
 Chapter 3
Fossil fuel Natural
sector Gas
Natural
Directly
Impacted
Exploration &
Production
LNG
imports
Gas
Level I

Directly
Cooking Power
Impacted Fertilizer Industry Transport
Fuel plants
Level II

Indirectly
Impacted Agriculture
Sectors

56 FIVE R’s FIVE R’s 57

A
mong the three fossil-fuels, the natural gas sector is likely to see the least disruptions. Both
policy makers and energy experts envision an increased use of natural gas to meet the local
pollution and GHG emission reduction targets.1 All the net-zero models project 3-4 folds increase
in natural gas by 2050.2 The Government of India has also set a target to increase the share of
natural gas in India’s energy mix from current 6% to 15% by 2030.3 Natural gas consumption,
therefore, is projected to increase through city gas distribution (CGD), industrial sector, as well as the
power sector.4
However, natural gas use has significant implications for global warming, though there is uncertainty
regarding its actual contributions, in particular the level of methane emissions – whether by accident or by
design – from well-to-burner. A 2019 study published in Nature found that methane leaks from the fossil fuel
industry were underestimated by at least 40%.5
Methane is a more potent greenhouse gas than CO2, but has a lower half-life than CO2. The Global Warming
Potential (GWP) of methane, compared to CO2, averaged over 100 years is 25. Averaged over 20 years, the
GWP of methane rises to 84. Some studies, however, peg the 20 years GWP of methane as 105.6 As the
GWP of methane is high, any significant release of methane during the life cycle of natural gas increases
the climate footprint significantly. It is estimated that at a GWP of 105, if 3% of natural gas production
is emitted from well-to-burner, then gas loses all its GHG emissions advantage over coal (Figure 1).7 The
growth in natural gas use worldwide, therefore, will largely depend on better understanding regarding its
global warming impacts.

Figure 1: GHG emissions of coal vs. natural gas

2.0 8%
Ratio of GHG emissions of gas over coal

6%
1.5 Methane emissions
5% as share of total
production

1.0 3%
2%

1%
0.5
Typical value

0.0
0 25 50 75 105
Assumed methane global warming potential
Source: Figure adopted from International Energy Agency, 2012

1. Production and consumption

While India is ambitious of a ‘gas economy’, the country until now is heavily reliant on natural gas imports to
meet its demand. For instance, in 2019-20, India produced about 30.3 billion cubic meters (BCM) of natural
gas and the import was nearly 34 BCM. In fact, over the past decade, the import of natural gas has increased
steadily, from 18 BCM in 2011-12 to about 34 BCM in 2019-20. The domestic production has gone down during
this period, from 46.5 BCM in 2011-12 to 30.3 BCM in 2019-20.8

58 FIVE R’s
Figure 2: Production, import and availability of natural gas (BCM)
70 Net production LNG import Net availability

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20
Source: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, 2021

With respect to consumption, it is primarily driven by the demand of the fertilizer sector. The Indian fertilizer
industry is largely dependent on natural gas as a feedstock and fuel.9 In 2019-20, the sector accounted for
29% of natural gas consumption. The other key sectors are power, refinery and city gas distribution (CGD).
The transport sector, accounts for about 8% of natural gas consumption (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Sector-wise consumption of natural gas

1% Internal consumption
1% Sponge Iron 8%
Miscellaneous
1% Industrial
1% LPG shrinkage
29%
6% Petrochemical Fertilizer industry
8% Transport
12% CGD 19%
Power
14% Refinery
Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, 2021

2. Transition challenges
Presently, the gas sector doesn’t seem to have major transition challenges because of the projected growth
in this sector till 2050. In any case, natural gas production is not a major issue as India can easily increase gas
production and still meet its net zero targets. There will be, however, implications on the imports of natural
gas due to an interplay between pricing of LNG and the competitiveness of alternative technologies. If the
alternatives like hydrogen and electricity becomes cheaper than imported LNG, then gas use will not grow as
much as is being projected by various agencies.

FIVE R’s 59
IndustrIes
Chapter 4 Chapter 5

Coal-based Iron and

Thermal Power Steel
Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8

Cement Road Fertilizer

Transport
 Chapter 4
Coal-based
Thermal Power

62 FIVE R’s FIVE R’s 63

T
he thermal power sector is the one that is most inextricably linked to coal, and is at the threshold
of a transition. While coal-based thermal power still contributes about 72% of the country’s
electricity generation,1 the sector is increasingly losing its competitive edge due to the cost-
competitiveness and reliability of electricity supply from renewable energy (RE) sources.
The installed cost and tariffs of utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) plants in India have fallen by
85% since 2010, coming down to I 2.50-3.00/kWh (US$ 0.35-0.45/kWh) by 2019. This is already 20% to 30%
cheaper than the cost of power from existing coal plants. This trend is widely expected to continue, with
solar power prices expected to fall to around I 2.00/kWh (US$ 0.025/kWh) or even lower by 2030, while the
cheapest pithead coal power price is likely to rise to I 4.85/kWh (US$ 0.07/kWh) by that time.2 In fact, in the
past five years, solar PV capacity has grown at a rate of about 60% (and wind at around 10%), outpacing the
7% growth in overall installed capacity.3
At the same time, the reliability of uninterrupted energy supply from renewable sources is also growing
due to advancement in battery storage. In May 2020, in the first ever “round-the-clock” RE auction (RE
with battery storage), the average tariff quoted was I 4.30/ kWh (US cents 6.1/kWh), which is the cheapest
renewable-plus-battery storage tariff anywhere in the world. At this tariff, renewable plus battery storage
will outprice most new coal-based power plants.4
The cost competitiveness of RE has also worsened the burden of non-performing assets in the thermal
power sector. The installed capacity of coal-based power had grown exponentially in the last one and a half
decade, particularly since the end of the 10th five-year plan (2002-07). Between 2007 and 2017, 121,042 MW of
coal-based power was installed.5 This did overshoot the actual demand, and eventually, the capacity remained
underutilised with plants running at a 60% to 65% capacity. With thermal power companies forming a major
share of the stressed assets of banks, the investor sentiment has been further hurt.
The future projections of coal-based thermal power are reflecting this sentiment. It has now become
clear that there will be no net growth in the coal-based power sector going ahead, barring only the ones that
are already currently under construction.6
Finally, the GHG emission of the coal-based power sector has made its transition inevitable. India is the
third-largest emitter of CO2 globally,7 and coal-based power is responsible for 70% of India’s energy sector
CO2 emissions.8 Between 2011-12 and 2015-16, the CO2 emissions from the power sector grew at a compound
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 7.3%. It has since grown at 3.26% until 2021, as per projections.9
In the above context, it is essential to evaluate the just transition scenario for the thermal power sector
in India.

1. Spatial distribution
India currently has 189 operational coal-based thermal power plants (TPPs), with a cumulative installed
capacity of 205,136 MW (2019-20). Most of the TPPs are concentrated in seven states—Maharashtra,
Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh (UP), Madhya Pradesh (MP), Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu—which account for nearly
66% of the total installed capacity (Map 1). Maharashtra has the highest installed capacity (24,966 MW),
closely followed by Chhattisgarh (23,128 MW), Uttar Pradesh (22,409 MW), and Madhya Pradesh (21,150 MW).

64 FIVE R’s
Map 1: State-wise Capacity (MW)
distribution of TPPs 0 to 2,500 2,501 to 5,000
(capacity) 5,001 to 7,500 7,501 to 10,000
10,001 to 12,500 12,501 to 15,000
Punjab 15,001 to 20,000 more than 20,000
(5,680)
Haryana
(5,330)
Uttar Pradesh
Rajasthan (22,409) Assam
(9,820) Bihar (6,390) (750)

Gujarat Madhya Jharkhand

(16,232) Pradesh (4,460) West Bengal
(21,150) Chhattisgarh
(23,128) Odisha (14,178)
Maharashtra (9,800)
(24,966)
Telangana
(6,763)
Andhra
Pradesh
Karnataka
(11,590)
(9,480)

Tamil
Nadu
Source: iFOREST analysis (13,010)

With respect to numbers, 60% of the TPPs are concentrated in six states (Map 2). Chhattisgarh has the
highest number of TPPs (27) in the country, followed by Maharashtra (23), Uttar Pradesh (19), West Bengal (16),
Tamil Nadu (15) and Madhya Pradesh (14).

Map 2: State-wise Number of TPPs

distribution of TPPs 0 to 5
(number) 6 to 10
11 to 15
Punjab 16 to 20
(5) more than 20
Haryana
(5)
Uttar Pradesh
Rajasthan (19) Assam (1)
(8) Bihar
(6)
Gujarat Madhya Jharkhand
(12) Pradesh (8) West Bengal
(14) Chhattisgarh (16)
(27)
Maharashtra Odisha (8)
(23)
Telangana
(6)
Andhra
Pradesh (9)
Karnataka
(7)

Tamil
Nadu
Source: iFOREST analysis (15)

FIVE R’s 65
 While coal-based power plants are spread out across various states, a closer look into the districts show
that there is a higher concentration of these units in the coal-rich regions or in the coastal areas due to
access of domestically produced or imported coal. These include, the coal districts of Chhattisgarh, Odisha,
Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, and the coastal districts of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh (Map 3 and 4).
In fact, the power production capacity in India is largely concentrated in just 25 districts. These districts
account for about half (precisely over 47%) of the country’s total installed coal-based power capacity as well
as the number of units. With respect to installed capacity, Singrauli (Madhya Pradesh) has the highest share.
In terms of number of units, Korba (Chhattisgarh) has the maximum number of power plants (Table 1). The
analysis also shows that most of the top power producing districts are the top coal mining districts as well.
These include, Korba, Raigarh, Singrauli, Sonebhadra, Angul, Jharsuguda, and Chandrapur, among others.

Map 3: District-wise distributions of TPPs (capacity)

Total installed capacity (MW)

0-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2000
2001-2500
Punjab >2500

Harayana

Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Assam

Bihar

Gujarat Madhya Pradesh

Jharkhand West Bengal
Chhattisgarh

Maharashtra Odisha

Telangana

Andhra
Pradesh
Karnataka

Tamil Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

66 FIVE R’s
Map 4: District-wise distributions of TPPs (number)

Number of TPPs
0-2
3-4
5-6
7-8
9-10
Punjab >10

Harayana

Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Assam

Bihar

Gujarat Madhya
Pradesh Jharkhand
West Bengal
Chhattisgarh

Maharashtra Odisha

Telangana

Andhra
Pradesh
Karnataka

Tamil Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

FIVE R’s 67
 Table 1: Top 25 coal-based thermal power districts (capacity-wise)
State District Number of TPPs Installed capacity (MW)
Nellore 5 5,140
Andhra Pradesh
Visakhapatnam 2 3,040
Bilaspur 1 2,980
Janjgir-Champa 4 5,440
Chhattisgarh
Korba 15 7,438
Raigarh 5 5,400
Gujarat Kutch 4 9,160
Haryana Jhajjar 2 2,820
Bellary 3 2,560
Karnataka Raichur 2 3,320
Vijayapura 1 2,400
Khandwa 1 2,520
Madhya Pradesh
Singrauli 4 11,240
Chandrapur 5 4,780
Maharashtra Gondia 1 3,300
Nagpur 6 7,176
Angul 3 4,660
Odisha
Jharsuguda 3 3,290
Rajasthan Baran 2 3,640
Cuddalore 7 4,690
Tamil Nadu
Tuticorin 4 3,550
Telangana Karimnagar 2 2,663
Prayagraj 2 2,640
Uttar Pradesh
Sonbhadra 5 9,924
West Bengal Murshidabad 2 3,700
Source: Central Electricity Authority, 2020

2. Power Consumption
India is the third largest power consuming country globally, next only to China and the United States (US)10.
The share of coal in power generation has been consistently around 76% on an average over the last five
years.11 Industry sector is the biggest consumer of power, accounting for 42%. This is followed by residential,
agricultural, and commercial uses (Figure 1).
Among the states and Union Territories (UTs), Maharashtra is the biggest consumer (139,488 GWh in 2019),
followed by Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh.

68 FIVE R’s
Figure 1: Sector-wise power consumption

9% 2%
Commercial Public water works
and sewage

20%
Agriculture 42%
Industrial

27%
Residential
Source: NITI Aayog Energy Dashboard

Table 2: State-wise electricity consumption for top 20 states (2019)

State Consumption (GWh)
Maharashtra 139,488
Gujarat 110,161
Uttar Pradesh 101,735
Tamil Nadu 98,257
Karnataka 75,300
Odisha 70,205
Madhya Pradesh 69,234
Rajasthan 67,805
Andhra Pradesh 63,342
Telangana 61,640
Punjab 52,364
West Bengal 50,199
Chhattisgarh 44,749
Haryana 44,077
Delhi 29,171
Jharkhand 26,815
Kerala 22,283
Bihar 21,198
Uttarakhand 12,495
Jammu and Kashmir 9,637
Source: NITI Aayog Energy Dashboard, 2021

FIVE R’s 69
 Box 1: Captive power plants
Captive power plants (CPPs) are a unique feature of India’s industrial landscape. Almost all major
industries have CPPs as the main source of electricity or as a backup to the grid supply. At the end of
2019, there were 2,861 existing CPPs with a combined capacity of 69.9 GW. In addition, 230 CPPs of 16.6
GW capacity were under construction.
Overall, India currently has 3,100 CPPs with a combined capacity of about 86.4 GW (Table 3). About
90% of these plants are less than 50 MW in size; only 0.8% have more than 500 MW capacity (Table 4).
A majority, about 61.5%, of the captive power capacity is coal-based. This is followed by natural gas at
15.4% and biomass at 8.5%. However, wind and solar also have a combined capacity of 9.1%. For plants
constructed after 2019, the share of solar is about 12%.

Table 3: Capacity of CPPs

Current capacity Upcoming Total capacity Share of total
CPP type
(MW) capacity (MW) (MW) capacity (%)
Coal (including lignite and petcoke) 40,737 12,456.7 53,194 61.5
Gas 12,360 936 13,296 15.4
Diesel 2,309 170 2,479 2.9
Biomass 6,991 371.5 7,363 8.5
Wind 5,364 44 5,408 6.3
Solar 1,737 702 2,439 2.8
Others 361 1,901 2,262 2.6
Total 69,859 16,581 86,440 100

Table 4: Size distribution of CPPs

CPP size Existing plants Upcoming plants Total Share of total (%)
Less than or equal to 5 MW 1,355 38 1,393 45.1
5-10 MW 370 35 405 13.1
10-50 MW 883 106 989 32.0
50-100 MW 129 15 144 4.7
100-500 MW 108 28 136 4.4
> 500 MW 16 8 24 0.8
Total 2,861 230 3,091 100.0

The CPPs are cost-effective due to the electricity tariff structure. Under this structure, the industrial
and commercial users are charged higher to cross‐subsidise residential and agricultural customers.
With solar and wind becoming cheaper and 24x7 electricity from RE becoming a reality due to the falling
cost of storage, a large number of smaller CPPs can be moved to renewable energy. This can also be
facilitated by the open access policy, under which large consumers can install off-site renewable power
plants and transfer electricity by paying grid charges.
Along with the old power plants, shifting older and smaller coal-based CPPs to renewables will also be
an economically sensible move.
Source: Bhushan, C. (2017, October 31). End of Coal. Down To Earth. https://www.downtoearth.org.in/coverage/energy/the-end-
of-coal-58909,

70 FIVE R’s
3. Employment
The manpower in the coal-based TPPs has been estimated considering the estimation norm of the Central
Electricity Authority (CEA), on a plant-to-plant basis. This standard norm includes estimation for both regular
and contractual employment.12
Based on such an approach, the overall employment is estimated to be about 0.13 million. Of this, about
57% of the manpower is concentrated in the top 25 districts (Map 5). The sector, being largely mechanised,
has a relatively low share of informal workers.13

Map 5: District-wise distribution of estimated manpower

Total manpower
0-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2000
2001-2500
Punjab >2500

Harayana

Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Assam

Bihar

Gujarat Madhya
Pradesh Jharkhand
West Bengal
Chhattisgarh

Maharashtra Odisha

Telangana

Andhra
Pradesh
Karnataka

Tamil Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

FIVE R’s 71
4. Future trends and just transition scenario
The coal-based thermal power sector is poised for a steady decline in the coming years. This is primarily
triggered by three factors:
• Growing cost-competitiveness of RE, particularly solar and wind;
• Growth of utility-scale RE and assurance of round-the-clock supply, backed by growth in battery storage
capacity; and
• Strengthening of the grid infrastructure, boosting flexibility in operations.
All of these are being backed by Government policies and strong market support. The RE boom in the
last decade has been a response to the Government of India’s ambitious target to create 175 GW of RE
capacity by 2022. The Government has now set a further ambitious target of 450 GW of RE by 2030, and
has simultaneously announced increasing storage capacity.14
Besides the Centre, some of the State Government’s such as Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, and Gujarat
have also announced no new coal power plant policies. Some states such as Karnataka are considering a
planned phase-out.
The power industry has also recognised the opportunity. For instance, National Thermal Power
Corporation (NTPC)—the country’s largest power utility—plans to have a minimum of 32,000 MW capacity
through RE sources by 2032, constituting nearly 25% of its overall power generation capacity.15 The
company is investing heavily on research and development (R&D) to this end.16
Overall, it has been projected that RE, along with battery storage, will see an exponential growth in both
share of installed capacity and electricity generation.17
Therefore, for districts where the coal-based power industry is concentrated, planning a just transition
should start. Considering the geographic spread and age of TPPs, following are some of the immediate
opportunities:
• The states and districts with the highest concentration of TPPs should start planning a phasing down
of coal-based power plants in the coming years. This can be done based on their operational efficiency
and age.
• About 30% of the country’s operational TPPs (59 in total) were commissioned before 1995. These TPPs
have a cumulative installed capacity of 73,540 MW, which is about 36% of the total installed capacity
(Table 5). The Centre and the states can start planning their phasing out considering their declining
efficiency and costs of ‘must run’ status.
• With respect to transition of workers, the thermal power industry will have far fewer challenge than
the coal-mining sector as the former has a lesser number of regular/formal workers and a much lesser
challenge of the informal workers.
• The transition of workers will be primarily a combination of retraining and reskilling, pension/early
retirement compensations, and a provision of temporary transition assistance funds.
• Also, since many of the top coal and thermal power districts/regions overlap, it is only meaningful to plan
a coal mining and thermal power transition in these regions together, so that integrated plans can be
made, and effective outcomes can be achieved.
Overall, a just transition policy scenario for India should integrate components of a spatio-temporal
phase-out plan for coal-based power, along with coal mining, to meet the CO2 reduction targets, while not
compromising on the country’s economy and energy security.

72 FIVE R’s
 Table 5: State-wise coal-based power plants installed more than 25 years ago
State No. of plants installed before 1995
Andhra Pradesh 2
Bihar 3
Chhattisgarh 3
Gujarat 6
Haryana 1
Jharkhand 4
Karnataka 1
Madhya Pradesh 4
Maharashtra 8
Odisha 3
Punjab 1
Rajasthan 1
Tamil Nadu 4
Telangana 2
Uttar Pradesh 9
West Bengal 7
Source: Central Electricity Authority, 2020

FIVE R’s 73
 Chapter 5
Iron & Steel

74 FIVE R’s FIVE R’s 75

I
ndia’s focus on robust manufacturing-led growth, along with the ‘Make in India’ vision has made the steel
sector one of the most significant ones for the country’s economy. In terms of crude steel production,
India is already the second largest player in the world after China. The Government further envisages
increasing the crude steel capacity to 300 million metric tonnes (MMT) by 2030, which is nearly three
times the current capacity. This is based on competitive advantages that India has for steel production:
domestic availability of high-grade iron ore and non-coking coal (two important raw materials), a rapidly
growing market for steel, and competitive labour costs.1
However, the contribution of the iron and steel sector to global GHG emission is a growing concern. The
sector’s high reliance on coal, which is 74% of its energy inputs, contributes to significant CO2 emissions.
In 2019, the sector accounted for 2.6 Gt of direct CO2 emissions globally, which is about one-fourth of total
industrial CO2 emissions and 7% of total energy sector emissions (including process emissions).2
India’s iron and steel industry is resource and energy intensive, a major share of which is coal. In 2019-20,
steel, along with the sponge iron sector, accounted for over 10% of the total coal consumption (See section
on coal mining). At the same time, the sector consumes about 70 Mtoe of energy per year and coal accounts
for 85% of the energy input. In 2019, direct emission of the sector was about 250 Mt CO2, which is nearly 10%
of the country’s total energy system CO2 emission.3
In such a scenario, the transition of the iron and steel sector will be extremely important for a system-
wide transition in India to reduce GHG emission. This, in turn, will require a consideration for transition of the
workforce and regions where the sector constitute an important component of the economy.

1. Spatial distribution
India currently has 2,531 iron and steel units, which include large integrated steel plants, mini steel mills,
sponge iron plants and secondary producers like rolling mills and other ancillary industries (Table 1).4

Table 1: Number of iron and steel plants in India

Segment No. of units Annual capacity (MMT)
Pellets 39 81.14
Sponge iron 285 47.85
Blast furnace 57 79.57
Crude steel
Basic oxygen furnace (BOF) 17 57.30
Electric arc furnace 39 40.51
Induction furnace 858 44.50
Total crude steel 914 142.30
Finished Steel
Re-rolling 1020 79.60
HR Products 23 54.38
CR Products 68 26.35
GP/GC Sheets 28 9.61
Colour Coated Products 17 2.82
Tinplate 4 0.84
Pipes 76 9.43
Total finished steel 1,236 183.03
Source: Joint Plant Committee, Ministry of Steel, 2020

76 FIVE R’s
 Most of the units are concentrated in five states: Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Karnataka, and Maharashtra.
In 2019-20, these five states have over one-third (870) of the units (Map 1). Among them, Chhattisgarh has the
maximum number of plants (279), followed by Odisha (190), Maharashtra (173), Jharkhand (131), and Karnataka (97).5
With respect to total installed capacity, Odisha tops the chart (over 109 MMT capacity) given high access to two
of the necessary raw materials, iron ore and coal. Similarly, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka and Maharashtra
also have very high capacity (over 50 MMT each), given their access to both of these resources (Map 2).

Map 1: State-wise distribution of steel plants (number)

0 to 25
26 to 50
Jammu &
51 to 75
Kashmir (27)
76 to 100
101 to 150
Himachal
Pradesh (53) 151 to 200
Chandigarh (4) more than 200
Punjab (359) Arunachal
Uttarakhand (55) Pradesh (5)
Haryana (26)
Delhi(4)

Uttar Pradesh (134)

Rajasthan (94) Assam (9)
Bihar (31)
Meghalaya (10)

Gujarat (173) Madhya Jharkhand (131)

Tripura (2)
Pradesh (42)
West Bengal (152)
Chhattisgarh (279)
Odisha (190)
Dadra and
Nagar Haveli Maharashtra (173)
(25)
Daman and
Diu (3) Telangana (84)

Goa (28) Andhra

Pradesh (70)
Karnataka (97)

Puducherry (21)
Tamil Nadu
Kerala (58) (192)

Source: iFOREST analysis

FIVE R’s 77
Map 2: State-wise distribution of steel plants (capacity)

Installed capacity
(‘000 tonnes)
0 to 500
Jammu & 501 to 5,000
Kashmir (792)
5,001 to 10,000
10,001 to 15,000
Himachal Pradesh 15,001 to 20,000
(2,529) more than 20,000
Punjab (13,327) Chandigarh (224)

Uttarakhand (2,577)
Haryana (2,896)
Delhi(38) Arunachal Pradesh
(227)
Uttar Pradesh (7,683)
Rajasthan (5,430) Assam (269)
Bihar (2,007)
Meghalaya (357)

Gujarat Madhya Pradesh Jharkhand (61,264)

Tripura (55)
(46,364) (2,289)
West Bengal (33,113)
Chhattisgarh (59,629)
Odisha (109,321)
Dadra and
Nagar Haveli Maharashtra (51,656)
(556)
Daman and
Diu (46) Telangana (4,590)

Goa (1,999) Andhra Pradesh

(30,798)
Karnataka (69,060)

Puducherry (717)
Tamil Nadu
Kerala (1,252) (10,322)

Source: iFOREST analysis

78 FIVE R’s
 A district-wise analysis further brings out the precise geographical distribution of India’s steel production.
In terms of number of plants, the iron and steel sector is highly dispersed (Map 3 and 4). There are 30 districts
having more than 25 plants each. Some of these districts such as Raipur in Chhattisgarh and Fatehgarh
Sahib in Punjab have more than 200 plants each.

Map 3: District-wise distribution of iron and steel plants (number)

Total number
0-10
Jammu & Kashmir 11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
Himachal Pradesh
Punjab >50

Uttarakhand
Harayana Arunachal
Delhi Pradesh

Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Assam

Bihar Meghalaya

Tripura
Gujarat Madhya Pradesh
Jharkhand
West Bengal
Chhattisgarh

Maharashtra Odisha

Telangana

Goa Andhra
Pradesh
Karnataka

Kerala
Tamil Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

FIVE R’s 79
Map 4: District-wise distribution of iron and steel plants (capacity)

Total cumulative capacity (‘000 tonnes)

0-200

Jammu & Kashmir 201-400

401-600
601-800
801-1000
Himachal Pradesh
Punjab >1000

Uttarakhand
Harayana Arunachal
Delhi Pradesh

Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Assam

Bihar Meghalaya

Jharkhand Tripura
Gujarat Madhya
Pradesh
West Bengal
Chhattisgarh

Maharashtra Odisha

Telangana

Goa Andhra
Pradesh
Karnataka

Kerala
Tamil Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

However, crude steel production is highly concentrated. There are just 20 districts that produce more
than 1 million metric tonnes (MMT) of crude steel annually (Table 2). These districts, together, account for
77% of India’s crude steel making capacity. From a just transition perspective, these districts are more
important as major energy transition is required in the production of crude steel.

80 FIVE R’s
 Table 2: Top steel producing districts of India
State District No. of crude steel plants Total capacity (MMT)
Andhra Pradesh Visakhapatnam 2 6.3
Chhattisgarh Raigarh 17 6.3
Raipur 53 5.9
Gujarat Surat 1 10
Kutch 7 1.2
Jharkhand East Singhbhum 7 10.2
Bokaro 4 6.5
Seraikela Kharsawan 14 2
Karnataka Bellary 6 13.8
Maharashtra Nagpur 6 5.2
Wardha 2 1.4
Odisha Durg 6 6.3
Dhenkanal 4 5.6
Sundargarh 28 5.2
Angul 1 5
Jajpur 4 4.8
Sambalpur 3 3.5
Tamil nadu Salem 9 1.3
Tiruvallur 15 1.2
West Bengal Paschim Bardhaman 26 8.1
Total 215 109.8
Source: Joint Plant Committee, Ministry of Steel, 2020

2. Production and import

In 2019, India produced over 111 MMT of crude steel, which is about 78% of the installed capacity (142.3 MMT).
Finished steel production during the same period was about 104 MMT, and for sponge iron, it was nearly 37
MMT (Table 3). The coal-based route accounted for about 82% of total sponge iron production (37.10 MMT)

Table 3: Crude and finished (alloy + non-alloy) steel production (2019-20)

Category Production (MMT) Import (MMT) Export (MMT)
Crude steel 111.34 - -
Sponge iron 36.8 - -
Finished steel 102.62 7.44 8.21
Source: Ministry of Steel, 2021

FIVE R’s 81
3. Consumption
The overall steel demand has been showing a steady growth over the past seven years at a CAGR of 5.3%.
In 2019-20, India’s total steel consumption was 100 MMT, driven largely by the demand from the housing
and construction sector, which accounted for 43% of the total consumption. The other key sectors are
infrastructure, engineering and packaging, and automotive (Figure 1).6

Figure 1: Sector-wise steel consumption

9% 1%
Automotive Defence

22%
Engineering 43%
and packaging Housing and
construction
25%
Infrastructure

Source: Ministry of Steel, 2021

82 FIVE R’s
4. Employment
While an overall employment scenario of the steel sector is not available, an attempt has been made to
estimate this by developing employment factors for various segments of the iron and steel value chain.
For large units, an employment factor approach has been followed by analysing manpower of major steel
producers, including Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited (RINL), Tata Steel
Limited and JSW Steel Limited.
The overall formal employment in the iron and steel industry can be estimated to be about 0.34 million as
of 2019-20.7 More than 75% (0.26 million) of this is concentrated in the top 25 steel districts (Map 5). However,
considering the high proportion of informality in the manufacturing sector (about 88%),8 it is evident that
the overall employment (formal and informal) is far higher. It has further been estimated that about 2 million
people are indirectly employed by the steel sector.9

Map 5: District-wise distribution of formal employment in iron and steel industry

Total manpower
0-1000

Jammu & Kashmir 1001-2000

2001-3000
3001-4000
4001-5000
Himachal Pradesh
Punjab >5000

Uttarakhand
Harayana Arunachal
Delhi Pradesh

Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Assam

Bihar Meghalaya

Jharkhand Tripura
Gujarat Madhya
Pradesh
West Bengal
Chhattisgarh

Maharashtra Odisha

Telangana

Goa Andhra
Pradesh
Karnataka

Kerala
Tamil
Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

FIVE R’s 83
5. Future opportunities and just transition scenario
The projected growth of the steel sector under a business-as-usual scenario is strongly correlated to
growth of energy demand, which is largely reliant on coal (as discussed earlier). However, to reduce India’s
overall CO2 emission, the energy- and resource-intensive nature of the steel industry will have to change.
The low carbon pathway for the sector will not be a case of shutting down steel units, but a change in
technology. Also grandfathering (old rules apply to existing situations and new rules apply to future cases)
will not be an option for the steel sector, unlike some of the old thermal power plants (TPPs), as the steel-
producing units in India are through with a little more than one-third of their typical lifetime, which is
around 40 years on average.10
For the iron and steel sector, therefore, the need is for a rapid transformation of the production fleet
to reduce coal dependence and support low-emission technologies and infrastructure. The good news is
that some of the technologies to reduce the sector’s emission footprint are at hand. They are being used
by some countries already. Further, there are other technologies, which will be available in the next 10-15
years.11
The technologies that can lead to reduced emission in the iron and steel production processes include,
carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS), hydrogen-based technologies, direct electrification,
and bioenergy. A synopsis of these technologies and their applications in various production processes
is provided below (Table 4). The evaluation provides an understanding on the availability of the key
technologies with respect to production processes, the Technology Readiness Level (TRL)12, the timeframe
of availability, as well as effectiveness in emission reduction.
For India, it is expected that within the next 10-15 years, some of the more radical decarbonization
technologies, which are currently being demonstrated, would be commercially available. This particularly
includes hydrogen-based production, which involves the substitution of coal or natural gas as a reducing
agent with hydrogen. Supported by India’s RE advancements, if hydrogen is produced from emissions-free
electricity, the total emissions from the iron and steel industry can be reduced by 94%. It is also further
estimated that if hydrogen can be delivered at a cost of 2.5-3.5 US$/kg, it will be cost competitive with the
blast furnace and basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) route of steel production.13
In the immediate future, the sector can maximise its operational efficiency by investing in best available
technologies (BAT). For instance, around 40% of blast furnaces in India are currently equipped with top-
pressure recovery turbines (TRTs), and over 30% of coke ovens are equipped with coke dry quenching
(CDQ), two examples of BAT. Widespread adoption of these technologies, along with efforts towards
achieving material efficiency, can contribute to considerable emission reductions.14
A just transition for the workers associated with the iron and steel sector will primarily involve ‘reskilling
and retraining’. The maximum proportion of this will be required in units using the BF-BOF route and the
sponge iron units. As evident from the spatial distribution, the particular focus of this will be the states of
Odisha, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand, which have over 40% share of the total manpower.

84 FIVE R’s
 Table 4: Technological readiness of steel sector transition
Year Potential for emission
Technology Process TRL
available reduction
CCUS Blast furnace: Off-gas hydrogen enrichment and/or 5 2030 Very high
CO2 removal for use or storage
Blast furnace: Converting off-gases to fuels 8 At present Medium
Blast furnace: Converting off-gases to chemicals 7 2025 Medium
DRI: Natural gas-based with CO2 capture 9 Today Very high
Smelting reduction 7 2028 Very high
Hydrogen Blast furnace: Electrolytic H2 blending 7 2025 Medium
DRI: Natural gas-based with high levels of 7 2030 High
electrolytic H2 blending
DRI: Based solely on electrolytic H2 5 2030 Very high
Ancillary processes:H2 for high temperature heat 5 2025 High
Direct Electrolysis: Low temperature 4 - Medium
electrification
Electrolysis: High temperature molten oxide 4 - Medium
Bioenergy Blast furnace: Torrefied Biomass 7 2025 Medium
Blast furnace: Charcoal 10 At present Medium
Source: Adopted from International Energy Agency, 2020

FIVE R’s 85
 Chapter 6
Cement

86 FIVE R’s FIVE R’s 87

I
ndia is the second largest cement producer in the world, accounting for about 8% of the world’s cement
production.1 Given the sustained growth of construction activities, coupled with ambitious schemes of the
Government that are in various stages of planning and implementation,2 the demand and consumption of
cement will increase significantly in the coming decades. As per latest estimates of industry association
and the Government, by 2025, the demand for cement per year will be about 550-600 MMT.3 By 2050,
cement production in the country will reach 1.36 billion tonnes annually.4
The growing demand and increase in cement production will be accompanied by increasing carbon
footprint in the coming years under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. On a global scale, the cement sector
is the third-largest industrial energy consumer and is responsible for 7% of industrial energy use. It is also
the second largest industrial emitter of CO2, with about 7% share of global emissions.5
While India is considered one of the most energy-efficient countries when it comes to cement
manufacturing, the emission footprint is still significant. The sector consumes about 26 million tonnes of oil
equivalent (Mtoe) of energy per year.6 In 2019, the sector emitted about 144 Mt CO2 —about 6% of the country’s
emissions.7
Considering the growing demand for cement in construction and infrastructure (which is aligned to India’s
growth ambition), it will be important for the sector to reduce its carbon footprint significantly. To echo
what was enshrined in the Paris Agreement 2015, the sector must also consider “the imperatives of a just
transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally
defined development priorities.”8

1. Spatial Distribution
India currently has 259 operational cement plants (large units), which include integrated cement plants as
well as clinker producing units. Besides, there are more than 350 mini cement plants with an estimated
production capacity of about 11.1 MMT.9 About 99% of production capacity lies with the private sector.
While there are 23 cement-producing states in the country, most of the large units are concentrated
in eight states: Rajasthan, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and
Madhya Pradesh. Over 61% of the units are found in these eight states as well. Among them Rajasthan (26)
and Andhra Pradesh (27) have the maximum numbers (Map 1).
These states collectively account for over 71% of the country’s total production capacity (Map 2). In 2019-
20, Rajasthan topped the chart with a production capacity of nearly 88 MMT per year. However, region wise,
the southern part of India has the maximum capacity, including the states of Andhra Pradesh (over 63 MMT),
Telangana (over 35 MMT), Karnataka (over 49 MMT) and Tamil Nadu (over 43 MMT).10

88 FIVE R’s
Map 1: State-wise 0 to 5 6 to 10
distribution of cement Jammu & 11 to 15 16 to 20
plants (number) Kashmir (3) 21 to 25 more than 25
Himachal
Pradesh (7)
Punjab
(4) Uttarakhand (2)
Haryana
(5)
Uttar Pradesh
Rajasthan (17) Assam (7)
(26) Bihar (6)
Meghalaya (9)

Gujarat Madhya Jharkhand (5)

(17) Pradesh West Bengal (16)
(14) Chhattisgarh
(12) Odisha (4)
Maharashtra
(14)
Telangana
(21)
Andhra
Karnataka Pradesh
(17) (27) Andaman
and Nicobar
Islands (1)
Tamil
Kerala Nadu
(2) (23)
Source: iFOREST analysis

Map 2: State-wise
Installed capacity (MMT)
distribution of cement Jammu & 0 to 5 5 to 15
plants (capacity) Kashmir (0.83) 15 to 25 25 to 35
Himachal Pradesh 35 to 45 more than 45
(13.59)
Punjab (6.95)
Uttarakhand (2.1)
Haryana
(7.2)
Uttar Pradesh
Rajasthan (27.58) Assam (6.27)
Bihar
(87.77) Meghalaya (10.74)
(10.7)
Madhya
Gujarat Pradesh
Jharkhand
(41.27) (10.25) West Bengal (22.04)
(42.32)
Chhattisgarh
(28.1)
Odisha (10.45)
Maharashtra
(34.23)
Telangana
(35.48)
Andhra
Pradesh
Karnataka
(63.24) Andaman and
(49.24)
Nicobar Islands
(1.65)
Tamil
Kerala Nadu
(0.86) (42.63)
Source: iFOREST analysis

FIVE R’s 89
 The district-wise analysis shows that there are a total of 130 cement-producing districts in the country,
with a higher concentration in the Southern and Western parts of India (Map 3 and Map 4). However, only 25
districts account for over 58% of the production capacity (Table 1). Gulbarga district of Karnataka has the
highest capacity. It has eight plants with a combined capacity of about 33.6 MMT.

Map 3: District-wise distribution of cement plants (capacity)

Total capacity (MMT)

0.00-5.00
Jammu & Kashmir 5.01-10.00
10.01-15.00
15.01-20.00
>20.00
Himachal Pradesh
Punjab

Uttarakhand
Harayana

Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Assam

Bihar
Meghalaya

Jharkhand
Gujarat Madhya Pradesh
West Bengal
Chhattisgarh

Maharashtra Odisha

Telangana

Andhra
Pradesh
Karnataka

Kerala
Tamil Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

90 FIVE R’s
Map 4: District-wise distribution of cement plants (number)

Total number
0-2
Jammu & Kashmir 3-4
5-6
7-8
9-10
Himachal Pradesh
Punjab >10

Uttarakhand
Harayana

Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Assam

Bihar
Meghalaya

Jharkhand
Gujarat Madhya
Pradesh
West Bengal
Chhattisgarh

Maharashtra Odisha

Telangana

Andhra
Pradesh
Karnataka

Kerala
Tamil Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

FIVE R’s 91
 Table 1: Top 25 cement districts
State District No. of plants Installed capacity (MMT)
Andhra Pradesh Anantapur 4 14.2
Guntur 5 6.1
Kadapa 4 13.76
Krishna 4 13.16
Kurnool 4 11.77
Bihar Aurangabad 2 5.6
Chhattisgarh Durg 3 7.3
Raipur 6 15.15
Gujarat Amreli 2 7.85
Junagadh 2 6.9
Kutch 3 7.5
Surat 4 9.66
Himachal Pradesh Solan 5 8.94
Karnataka Gulbarga 8 33.58
Madhya Pradesh Satna 6 19.5
Maharashtra Chandrapur 5 19.95
Meghalaya East Jaintia Hills 7 8.56
Rajasthan Chittorgarh 6 28.4
Pali 4 12.88
Sirohi 3 18.4
Tamil Nadu Ariyalur 5 12.56
Perambalur 2 6.55
Telangana Nalgonda 15 22.5
Ranga Reddy 3 5.9
West Bengal Paschim Bardhaman 6 6.69
Source: Data computed from Indian Bureau of Mines, 2020

2. Production
In 2019-20, India produced about 334.37 MMT of cement.11 There is a significant difference between installed
and production capacity due to low utilisation of capacity, which has reduced from 83% to 60% since 2010.
The top 20 cement companies in India account for almost 70% of the total cement produced.12
India is largely self-sufficient in cement. The country remains a net exporter of cement; it exported 5.8
MMT of cement in 2019, worth I 20.3 billion. The import was only about 2.3 MMT, 50% of which was Portland
grey cement.13

92 FIVE R’s
3. Consumption
India’s cement consumption has been steadily growing over the last decade due to demand from construction
activities. Between 2012 to 2019, cement consumption increased from 240 MMT to 338 MMT.14
The demand of cement is primarily driven by the growth in housing and real estate sectors, which
collectively account for about 67% of the total consumption. This is followed by infrastructure, commercial,
and other industrial sectors.15 (Figure 1)

Figure 1: Sector-wise cement consumption

9%
Industrial

11%
Commercial 67%
Housing and Real Estate

13%
Infrastructure

Source: WBCSD, 2019

4. Employment
While there is no current estimate available on overall manpower directly employed by the cement sector,
the estimation has been arrived at by analysing the manpower requirement separately for major integrated
cement plants and grinding units, and then considering an employment factor approach for both separately.
The estimated employment, however, is commensurate with the earlier estimates of the Government of India.16
The cement companies (operating large plants), currently, provide direct employment to about 0.17 million
people. Over 65% (over 0.1 million) of this is concentrated in the top 25 cement districts (Map 5). The informal
employment in the cement plants is estimated to be 1.3 million, using the formal-informal ratio derived from
National Sample Survey (NSS).17 Overall, large cement factories employ about 1.5 million people.
As a key driver of many manufacturing and construction activities, the sector also has significant
implications for downstream employment. It is estimated that the sector employs about 20,000 people
downstream for every million tonnes of cement produced.18
Besides, the 350 plus mini cement plants are a significant source of local employment. While estimates are
not available, this is clear from the intention with which these were set up in the late 1970s. As envisioned by
the Government of India, these plants are supposed to augment local cement production, but also intended
for developing small entrepreneurs, generating local employment, and boosting the local economy.19

FIVE R’s 93
Map 5: District-wise employment distribution in cement industry

Total manpower
0-1000

Jammu & Kashmir 1001-2000

2001-3000
3001-4000
4001-5000
Himachal Pradesh
Punjab >5000

Uttarakhand
Harayana

Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Assam

Bihar
Meghalaya
Jharkhand
Gujarat Madhya
Pradesh
West Bengal
Chhattisgarh

Maharashtra Odisha

Telangana

Andhra
Pradesh
Karnataka

Kerala
Tamil
Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

5. Future opportunities and just transition scenario

The cement sector has been considered one of the most energy-efficient ones among the major economic
sectors. However, fossil fuels (particularly coal) continue to be the major energy supplier for cement
production, a large amount of which is consumed during the calcination process (clinker production).20
There are a number of propositions to reduce CO2 emissions from the cement industry, and increase its
production efficiency. Use of alternative fuels (such as industrial and municipal waste) in producing clinker is
one of the options.21 Besides, there are considerations for the use of Supplementary Cementitious Materials
(SCM), such as geopolymer/alkali activated cement, calcium sulfoaluminate (CSA) cement, magnesia binder,
celitement, etc., that will help reduce the use of clinker for cement production, and thereby reduce the
overall requirement of coal.22

94 FIVE R’s
 There are also evaluations that are being done in the Indian context. Some of the technological
opportunities that have been identified, include the use of waste heat recovery systems and carbon capture,
utilisation and storage (CCUS),23 A synopsis of these technologies and their application in various production
processes is provided below (Table 2).

Table 2: Technological opportunities in cement sector

Energy saving opportunities Technology readiness level Payback period
Waste heat recovery Fully commercial 5 to under 8 years
Co-processing and pre-processing platform for Fully commercial Over 12 years
increased alternative fuel utilisation
Carbon capture through algal growth First of a kind -
Oxy-fuel combustion technology Demonstration level -
Source: Adopted from Bureau of Energy Efficiency, 2018

With respect to just transition, the cement sector will not see a downsizing in the number of production
facilities in the coming two decades in India. The sector will keep reducing its carbon footprint by using
alternate fuels and raw materials, and by improving efficiency. But in the long term, the cement sector will
have to rely on CCUS to survive. The other option is to develop alternative cementitious material without
carbon emissions. In essence, technology transfer and capacity building are a key for the sector to keep
innovating and delivering low- carbon products.

FIVE R’s 95
 Chapter 7
Road
Transport
96 FIVE R’s FIVE R’s 97
T
he transport sector is the largest oil consumer in India, accounting for about 50% of the total oil
consumption (237.2 MMT) in 2019-20 (Table 1). High volume of oil consumption makes it one of the
largest contributors to GHG emissions in the country as well.
Within the transport sector, road transport accounts for about 90% of the total GHG emissions.1
In fact, road transport is the second largest source of GHG emissions in India, accounting for
about 10% of the total emissions.2 Most of it is accounted for by freight vehicles (trucks), passenger cars,
two-wheelers (2Ws), and three-wheelers (3Ws) (Table 2).

Table1: Fuel consumption by transport sector

Sector Consumption (MMT) Share of total consumption (%)
Transport 44.86 18.92
Resellers and retail* 71.1 29.97
Total 115.9 48.9
Source: NITI Aayog Energy Dashboard, 2021; * Reseller and retail largely cover the transport sector

Table2: GHG emissions from road transport

Emission components GHG emissions as share of India total (%)
Trucks 4.4
2Ws and 3Ws 2.0
Passenger cars 2.0
Other road transport 1.4
Source: iFOREST estimates

1. Current status and demand

The oil demand for road transport is primarily driven by road freight activity. Since 2000, India’s freight
activity has grown by four times, and there has been a 13-fold increase in the stock of heavy freight trucks.3
India is currently the fifth largest country in the world with respect to commercial vehicle sales (0.85 million,
as per sales records of 2019), after the USA, China, Canada, and Japan.4
India is also the fifth largest in the world with respect to passenger car sales, after China, USA, Japan,
and Germany. In 2019, nearly three million passenger cars were sold.5 Besides, the number of 2Ws and 3Ws—
which have a large share in the total fleet of vehicles—is five times larger than passenger cars.6
However, in 2020, the sale of automobiles has experienced a significant dip, particularly in the sales of
2Ws and 3Ws (Table 3). This is due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which affected consumer demand.
However, a rapid comeback is expected by 2023 (getting back to 2019 levels).7 In the long run, it is projected
that under a business-as-usual scenario and steady recovery from COVID-19, there will be an addition of 170
million passenger cars and 25 million trucks to the vehicle stock.8

98 FIVE R’s
 Table 3: Domestic automobile sales
Category 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20
Passenger cars 2,025,097 2,103,847 2,174,024 2,218,489 1,695,441
Utility vehicles 586,576 761,998 922,322 941,474 946,010
Vans 177,535 181,737 192,235 217,426 132,124
Total Passenger Vehicles 2,789,208 3,047,582 3,288,581 3,377,389 2,773,575
Total 3Ws 538,208 5,11,879 635,698 701,005 636,569
Scooters 5,031,678 5,604,673 6,719,909 6,701,430 5,566,036
Motorcycles 10,700,406 11,094,547 12,620,690 13,598,190 11,214,640
Mopeds 723,767 890,518 859,518 880,227 636,940
Total 2Ws 16,455,851 17,589,738 20,200,117 21,179,847 17,417,616
MCVs and HCVs 302,397 302,567 340,781 390,732 224,806
LCVs 383,307 411,515 516,135 616,579 492,882
Total commercial vehicles 685,704 714,082 856,916 1,007,311 717,688
Quadricycle - - - 627 942
Total 20,468,971 21,863,281 24,981,312 26,266,179 21,546,390
Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers, Annual Report 2020-21

2. Automobile production, component manufacturing

and distribution
The automobile industry in India produced over 23 million vehicles in 2019-20, which included passenger
vehicles, commercial vehicles, 2Ws and 3Ws, and quadricycles. Among these, the highest production share
is of 2Ws, which is nearly 80% of the total production (Table 4).

Table 4: Domestic automobile production

Category 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20
Passenger Cars 2,565,970 2,711,911 2,746,658 2,711,160 2,175,242
Utility Vehicles 717,809 909,555 1,093,346 1,099,780 1,124,973
Vans 181,266 180,204 180,263 217,531 133,798
Total Passenger Vehicles 3,465,045 3,801,670 4,020,267 4,028,471 3,434,013
Three Wheelers 93,4104 783,721 1,022,181 1,268,833 1,133,858
Scooters 5,276,138 5,926,499 7,117,795 7,095,164 6,027,198
Motorcycles 12,816,203 13,088,208 15,167,481 16,499,424 14,359,418
Mopeds 737,886 919,032 869,562 905,189 649,678
Total Two Wheelers 18,830,227 19,933,739 23,154,838 24,499,777 21,036,294
MCVs and HCVs 341,287 342,761 344,592 444,356 233,979
LCVs 445,405 467,492 550,856 668,049 518,043
Total Commercial Vehicles 786,692 810,253 895,448 1,112,405 752,022
Quadricycles 531 1,584 1,713 5,388 6,095
Total 2,4016,599 25,330,967 29,094,447 30,914,874 26,362,282
Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers, Annual Report 2020-21

FIVE R’s 99
 As a global hub of cost-effective and scalable engineering, India’s automobile manufacturing industry
remains a successful one. While original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and component manufacturers
are spread across various states in India (Map 1), there are primarily three dominating automobile clusters:
Mumbai–Pune–Nasik–Aurangabad in the West, Chennai–Bengaluru–Hosur in the South, and Delhi–Gurugram–
Faridabad in the North.9

Map 1: Key Automobile OEM and component manufacturing districts

Punjab

Harayana
Uttar
Rajasthan Pradesh

Gujarat Madhya
Pradesh
West Bengal
Maharashtra

Andhra Pradesh

Tamil Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

3. Employment
While there are many estimates on the number of people employed by the automobile sector, it can be
reasonably assumed that the sector employs in excess of 12 million people (Table 5). Auto component
manufacturers (ACMs) and service centres—the two most critical sub-sectors which are likely to be impacted
by the energy transition—employ 70% of the people.

Table 5: Employment in the automobile sector

Employment (in million)
Sector
2017 2022 (Projected)
OEM 2.04 2.23
ACM 5.99 7.26
Service centers 3.10 3.44
Dealerships 1.68 1.95
Total 12.81 14.88
Source: National Skill Development Council, 2018

100 FIVE R’s

4. Transition challenges
The auto sector is primed for electrification. Globally, electric vehicles (EVs) are already a significant player in
the market of 2Ws, 3Ws, and buses. The popularity of EVs as passenger cars is also growing, with the current
fleet size of electric passenger cars being about 10 million (Figure 1). In fact, other than heavy commercial
vehicles (HCVs), EVs will achieve parity with conventional vehicles within two to five years in all segments. In
HCVs as well, EVs are already viable in some markets for short-distance haul.10 For a longer distance, it will
take another 10 years to reach market parity.

Figure 1: Global EV sales and fleet size

EV share of sales
1% 4% 39% 44%

1M 10 M 600 k 260 M
Size of EV Size of EV Size of EV Size of EV
fleet fleet fleet fleet

Vans and truck Passenger cars Buses 2 and 3 wheelers

Source: Electric Vehicle Outlook, 2021, Bloomberg NEF

Electrification of the automobile sector is also becoming a reality for India. While the sales of EVs is still
modest (238,120 units11 or 1.6% of all vehicles sold), this is likely to change soon. Backed by government
policies such as the National Mission on Transformative Mobility and Battery Storage and Faster Adoption
and Manufacturing of (Hybrid) and EV (FAME) scheme, sales of EVs are likely to witness an exponential
growth in the next five to 10 years. According to IEA (2021), more than 30% of new vehicle sales in India will
be electric by 2030.12
The above technological transition will not lead to job losses. The auto sector in India, in fact, will employ
more people as the sales of vehicles are projected to increase in all segments. But some job losses can be
expected in the sub-sectors of the auto component manufacturing segment.
The automobile sector, however, will see major restructuring in employment because the disruption will be
in terms of change in technology. For example:
• As EVs have lesser number of components than the internal combustion (IC) engines, many auto component
manufacturers involved in manufacturing of IC engines and related components will see phasing down of
their operations. On the other hand, the businesses involved in electric motors will see a major increase in
demand. Reskilling, therefore, is going to be very important for the auto component sector.
• The servicing sector related to the automobile industry will need huge reskilling, given the skills that will be
required to service EVs. A targeted effort will be required to reskill the informal sector involved in servicing.
• The employment related to dealerships should largely remain unchanged.

FIVE R’s 101

 Chapter 8
Fertilizer
102 FIVE R’s FIVE R’s 103
T
he nitrogenous fertilizers, particularly urea (which dominates India’s fertilizer sector), is a significant
GHG contributor. While emission from production processes constitutes only a small part of the
lifecycle GHG emission, the major share of emissions for urea is related to its use in the field. The
use of urea contributes to emission of CO2 and nitrous oxide (N2O), which is an extremely potent
GHG.1 It is estimated that application of a tonne of urea leads to 1.1 tonnes of CO2 emission, and N2O
emission equivalent to 3.13 tonnes of CO2. Greenhouse gas emission beyond the gate of a fertilizer plant, thus,
amounts to 4.22 MT CO2e/MT of urea consumed2, which is 6-7 times the CO2 emission from production plants.
Considering that India consumed 33.5 million metric tonnes (MMT) of urea in 2019–20, the total CO2
emission from urea use would amount to 141 MT CO2e. In the same year, the GHG emission from the urea
plants was 17.5 MT CO2e.3 The just transition in the urea sector is, therefore, as much about changing the
agricultural practices, as it is about changing the urea production technology.

1. Production, import and consumption

India’s fertilizer sector accounts for the largest share of natural gas consumption. Among this, the highest
consumption is for urea production. Urea is the main fertilizer produced and used in the country’s agricultural
sector. In 2019-20, the total production of urea, Di-ammonium Phosphate (DAP), nitrogen, phosphorus, and
potassium (NP/NPKs) and single super phosphate (SSP) is estimated to be about 42 MMT.4 Out of this, the
share of urea was about 58.3% (24.5 MMT). Additionally, India also imported about 18.5 MMT of fertilizers
(Figure 1), much of which was also urea.

Figure 1: Production and import of fertilizers (2019-20)

30 Production Import

25

20
MMT

15

10

0
Urea DAP NP/NPKs SSP MOP
Source: Adopted from Fertiliser Association of India, 2020

The total consumption of fertilizer in India in 2019-20 was 56 MMT. Of this, the share of urea fertilizers
was about 60%.5 Over the years, the consumption of urea has dominated fertilizer use, owing to government
policies and high subsidies (Table 1).

Table 1: Year-wise consumption of fertilizers in India (MMT)

Year-wise Urea DAP MOP NPKs
2015-16 30.6 9.1 2.5 8.8
2016-17 29.6 8.9 2.8 8.4
2017-18 29.9 9.3 3.1 8.6
2018-19 31.4 9.2 2.9 9.0
2019-20 33.5 10.0 2.8 9.6
Source: Department of Fertilizers, 2021 and Fertiliser Association of India, 2020; Note: MOP= Muriate of Potash

104 FIVE R’s

2. Urea plants – spatial distribution and employment
There are currently 31 operational urea plants in the country with a cumulative production capacity of nearly
24 MMT (Table 2). All of them are gas-based units expect for two, one in Mangaluru and one in Tuticorin which
run on Naphtha. The private sector is the dominant player, running 13 gas-based units, followed by the public
sector (10 gas-based units). Besides, six units are run by co-operatives. The urea plants are highly concentrated
in Uttar Pradesh, which has eight plants with over 8 MMT capacity. Half of these plants are run by co-operatives
(IIFCO) and the rest are private. Gujarat and Rajasthan are the other key states (Map 1).

Table 2: Details of urea plants (2019)

Reassessed Production
State District Unit name
capacity (MMT) (MMT)
Andhra East Godavari Nagarjuna Fertilizers and Chemical Limited (NFCL)-Kakinada I 0.6 0.39
Pradesh East Godavari Nagarjuna Fertilizers and Chemical Limited (NFCL)-Kakinada II 0.6 0.2
Assam Dibrugarh Brahmaputra Valley Fertilizer Corporation Limited (BVFCL)-Namrup III 0.32 0.23
Dibrugarh Brahmaputra Valley Fertilizer Corporation Limited (BVFCL)-Namrup II 0.24 0.06
Goa South Goa Zuari Agro-Chemicals Limited (ZACL)-Goa 0.4 0.41
Gujarat Surat Krishak Bharti Cooperative Limited (KRIBHCO)- Hazira 1.73 2.24
Bharuch Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Limited (GNFC)-Bharuch 0.64 0.65
Gandhinagar Indian Farmer Fertiliser Corporation Limited (IFFCO)- Kalol 0.55 0.6
Baroda Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Limited (GSFC)-Baroda 0.37 0.37
Haryana Panipat National Fertilizers Limited (NFL)-Panipat 0.51 0.58
Karnataka Dakshina Mangalore Chemicals & Fertilisers Limited (MCF)- Mangalore 0.38 0.35
Kannada
Madhya Guna National Fertilizers Limited (NFL)-Vijaipur II 0.87 1.18
Pradesh Guna National Fertilizers Limited (NFL)-Vijaipur Pur I 0.87 1.06
Maharashtra Raigad Rashtriya Chemicals & Fertilizers (RCF) Limited-Thal 1.71 1.98
Mumbai Rashtriya Chemicals & Fertilizers Limited (RCF)-Trombay-V 0.33 0.39
Suburban
Punjab Bhatinda National Fertilizers Limited (NFL)-Bhatinda 0.51 0.6
Rupnagar National Fertilizers Limited (NFL)-Nangal 0.48 0.54
Rajasthan Kota Shriram Fertilisers and Chemicals Limited (SFC)-Kota 0.38 0.39
Kota Chambal Fertilisers and Chemicals Limited (CFCL) I- Gadepan 0.87 1.13
Kota Chambal Fertilisers and Chemicals Limited (CFCL) II- Gadepan 0.87 0.99
Kota Chambal Fertilisers and Chemicals Limited (CFCL) III- Gadepan 1.27 0.38
Tamil Nadu Chennai Madras Fertilizers Limited (MFL)-Chennai 0.49 0.39
(Madras)
Thoothukudi Southern Petrochemical Industries Corporation Limited (SPIC)- 0.62 0.65
Tuticorin
Uttar Budaun Yara Fertilisers India Pvt Limited-Babrala 0.87 1.3
Pradesh Amethi Indo Gulf Fertilisers (IGF)- Jagdishpur 0.87 1.14
Bareilly Indian Farmer Fertiliser Corporation Limited (IFFCO), Aonla-I 0.87 1.12
Bareilly Indian Farmer Fertiliser Corporation Limited (IFFCO), Aonla-II 0.87 1.12
Shahjahanpur KRIBHCO Fertilizers Limited (KFL)-Shahjahanpur 0.87 1.06
Prayagraj Indian Farmer Fertiliser Corporation Limited (IFFCO), Phulpur-II 0.87 1.05
Prayagraj Indian Farmer Fertiliser Corporation Limited (IFFCO), Phulpur-I 0.55 0.67
Kanpur Kanpur Fertilizers & Cement Limited (KFCL) 0.72 0.67
Total 22 23.9
Source: Report of the Standing Committee on Chemicals and Fertilizers, 2019-20

FIVE R’s 105

Map 1: Distribution of urea plants

Production capacity (MMTPA)

0.5-1.0
1.1-2.0
>2.0

Punjab

Haryana

Uttar Pradesh
Rajasthan Assam

Madhya Pradesh
Gujarat

Maharashtra

Andhra Pradesh

Tamil Nadu

Source: iFOREST analysis

3. Employment
The employment figures for all urea plants are not available. However, formal/direct employment with some
of the major public sector companies and co-operatives is available. Based on available employment data, an
employment factor approach has been followed to estimate the overall employment scenario of operational
urea plants. The total formal employment can be estimated to be 0.02 million across India (Table 3).

106 FIVE R’s

 However, the total employment in urea plants is far higher considering the engagement of informal workers
in the sector. Considering the National Sample Survey (NSS) estimates on the ratio of formal and informal
workers in the manufacturing sector,6 it can be estimated that about 0.25 million people are employed
informally in the urea plants. Overall, 0.27 million people are employed in manufacturing urea.
Beyond the direct employment in the urea units, the number of people employed in the transportation and
distribution sector linked to urea is likely to be much higher and remains unaccounted for so far.

Table 3: District-wise formal employment in urea plants

State District Estimated manpower
Rajasthan Kota 2,673
Gujarat Surat 2,074
Uttar Pradesh Bareilly 2,073
Madhya Pradesh Guna 2,066
Maharashtra Raigad 1,835
Uttar Pradesh Prayagraj 1,590
Uttar Pradesh Budaun 1,203
Uttar Pradesh Amethi 1,052
Uttar Pradesh Shahjahanpur 984
Uttar Pradesh Kanpur 620
Tamin Nadu Thoothukudi 603
Gujarat Bharuch 597
Punjab Bhatinda 558
Gujarat Gandhinagar 557
Andhra Pradesh East Godavari 542
Haryana Panipat 538
Punjab Rupnagar 501
Goa South Goa 379
Tamil Nadu Chennai (Madras) 364
Maharashtra Mumbai Suburban 363
Gujarat Baroda 343
Karnataka Dakshina Kannada 323
Assam Dibrugarh 266
Total 22,105
Source: iFOREST analysis

4. Just Transition
On the environmental front, the world has breached the planetary limit for nitrogen, with excessive use of
nitrogenous fertilizer being the primary cause. Only 33% of the nitrogen that is applied through fertilizers is
taken up by the plants in the form of nitrates. This is called Nitrogen Use Efficiency (NUE). The remaining 67%
remains in the soil and seeps into the surrounding environment, causing surface and groundwater pollution
as well as a cascade of environmental and health impacts.

FIVE R’s 107

 It is estimated that India loses nitrogen worth US $10 billion per year as fertilizer value, while the costs of
nitrogen pollution on health ecosystems and climate are calculated to be US$ 75 billion per year year (as per
Society for Conservation of Nature’s estimates of 2017).7 In addition, urea production and use is a fast-growing
contributor to global climate change. Hence, both the environmental and health costs of nitrogen pollution
must be taken seriously and addressed quickly to ensure food security and environmental sustainability.

4.1 Technology change

A significant share of CO2 emission from urea production is a result of the use of hydrocarbons as feedstock
to produce hydrogen. In a climate-constrained world, it is imperative that less carbon-intensive methods be
developed and used for hydrogen production.
Hydrogen can also be produced through electrolysis of water. Additionally, if the electricity needed
for this process is produced from renewables, the entire chain could be made carbon-neutral. In fact,
electrolysis was a common means of producing hydrogen in areas with cheap power before hydrocarbon-
based processes took over. Fertilizer Corporation of India’s Nangal plant employed electrolysis to produce
hydrogen until it switched to hydrocarbons (then LSHS and fuel oil) in the 1970s due to shortage of power in the
Bhakra grid.
Modern electrolytic systems for hydrogen include alkaline-based technology, proton exchange membrane
(PEM) electrolysis and solid oxide electrolysis cells (SOEC). Of these, alkaline systems are the best developed,
with the lowest capital costs. However, their efficiency is low, increasing their energy costs. While the
current cost of hydrogen produced from electricity (particularly renewables) is high, it is expected to fall
with the reducing cost of renewables.
Despite high cost, small initiatives towards electrolytic production of hydrogen are being taken up. Yara, a
leading global ammonia producer, is setting up a small solar-powered electrolytic plant to produce hydrogen
for ammonia production at its facility in Pilbara, Australia.8 However, these technologies are likely to become
mainstream only in the 2030s.
Another alternative is the use of biomass, including crop residues, organic municipal solid waste, animal
waste, etc. for hydrogen production. Hydrogen may be produced from biomass through multiple processes,
including gasification and pyrolysis, and then used in ammonia synthesis. These are not yet commercially
viable for the scale required for a urea plant, but are likely to mature in the coming years.
Overall, Indian urea sector will see shift towards green hydrogen only in 2030s. As these are only
technological changes, reskilling and development of new skilled manpower is the key for this sector.

4.2 Changes in agriculture practices

The largest potential to reduce the GHG and other environmental impacts is to optimise the use of urea
in agriculture.
The efficiency of fertilizer use is poor in India and significant quantities of nutrients are lost without being
taken up by the plants. Nitrogen use efficiency in India is 35% for lowland rice and under 50% for upland
crops.9 Efficiency may be improved through several means, including adjusting application rates based on
precise estimation of crop needs (e.g., precision farming), using slow or controlled-release fertilizers (CRF)
or nitrification inhibitors, which slow the microbial processes leading to N2O formation. Applying nitrogen
when it is least susceptible to loss—just prior to plant uptake (improved timing)—placing nitrogen more
precisely into the soil to make it more accessible to the roots of crops, and avoiding nitrogen application in
excess of immediate plant requirements are other possible ways.10 In this regard, the government’s initiative
of mandating neem-coating urea is a positive step as it promotes the slower release of nitrogen, leading to
enhanced efficiency of use. But the use of more effective nitrification, hydrolysis, and urease inhibitors also
holds potential.

108 FIVE R’s

 Similarly, fertigation (injection of water-soluble fertilizers into an irrigation system) allows frequent supply
of nutrients and ensures application of nutrients only to the wet soil volume where roots are active, which
reduces loss of nutrients by leaching. Moreover, runoff due to wind is avoided with this method. Hence, it will
help reduce overall fertilizer use at the field level and promote better yields. For this, the government needs
to promote drip irrigation.
Overall, for a just transition, the urea sector and the agriculture sector will have a massive requirement
of training and capacity building as well as policies to promote efficient and renewable-based technologies.

FIVE R’s 109

110
Annexure 1
Assessment of GHG emission reduction potential and technology readiness

FIVE R’s
GHG emis- Technology readiness for large-scale deployment
sions (% Main fuel/ Key technologies or best available options for emis-
Sectors Sub-sector Years from
of India’s emissions sion reduction Assessment
total) present

Mining, pro- Coal 0.7 Fugitive Phased mine closure 0-30 years Closure of non-profitable and UG mines over
cessing and CH4 the next 10 years
storage
Oil and Gas 0.8 Fugitive Reduced flaring and methane capture, reduction in 1-2 years Flaring reduction and methane capture
CH4 oil and gas extraction economically viable and available
Thermal Coal 42  Coal/ CO2 Renewables and storage 5 years 24x7 renewables outcompetes Coal power
power before 2030. Next 10 years crucial for battery
storage and smart grid development. Solar and
wind are already cost competitive1
Gas 1.6 Natural gas/ Renewables and storage 20 years Scope to increase gas-based power for peaking
CO2 if economically viable. Reduction can be
planned after 2040
Oil 0.3 Oil/CO2 Renewables and storage 0 24x7 Renewables already cheaper than oil-
based power
Transport Trucks 4.4 Diesel/CO2 Electric, biofuels and hydrogen 15 years Biofuels already viable. Hydrogen and electric
in 15 years2
2-3 2 Petrol/CO2 Electric 0 Already viable. Massive scaling up projected in
wheelers the next 10 years
Passenger 2 Petrol and Electric 3 years In 2-3 years
cars Diesel/ CO2
Other road 1.4 Petrol and Electric 0 City buses already viable
transport Diesel/ CO2
Civil 0.6 ATF/CO2 Electric- electrification of ground operations in > 20 No clear timeframe for India
aviation aircraft (taxiing)
Railways 0.3 Diesel/CO2 Already highly electrified 0 100% electrification by 2023; Net zero carbon
by 2035
Navigation 0.1 Diesel and Electric, biofuels and hydrogen 10-15 years Technology in process of development and
furnace oil/ demonstration
CO2
 GHG emis- Technology readiness for large-scale deployment
sions (% Main fuel/ Key technologies or best available options for emis-
Sectors Sub-sector Years from
of India’s emissions sion reduction Assessment
total) present

Industrial Brick 0.4 Coal/ CO2 Intermediate technologies like zig-zag, porous, 20 years Intermediate technologies already available,
perforated, hollow bricks/blocks, fly ash brick, AAC needs scaling up through market support. Clay
etc. are available and commercially viable. But clay bricks to be replaced with sustainable building
bricks will have to be phased-out in the next two-three materials in next 2-3 decades
decades to meet climate and other ecological goals
Refinery 2.8 Oil/CO2 Improvements in efficiency and reduction in flaring 1-2 years Cost competitive
Iron and 5.4 Coal/ CO2 Scrap‐based electric arc furnaces (EAF), hydrogen- > 15 years Hydrogen-based DRI & Iron ore electrolysis in
steel based direct reduced iron (DRI) facilities, iron ore 15 years
electrolysis and ancillary equipment electrification
Cement 6.3 Coal & Alternative fuels and Supplementary Cementitious 5 years A 25% thermal substitution rate and 0.5 clinker:
process Materials (SCM)3 cement ratio is achievable by 2025-2030. Other
emissions/ technologies not in sight. CCUS consideration
CO2 of long-term future
Fertilizer 0.7 Gas/CO2 Hydrogen to produce ammonia 15 years Green ammonia production technology
currently in process of development and
demonstration4
Other 8 Coal, oil & Renewable based captive power plants, heat pumps, 5 years In contrast to heavy industries, most of the
industries gas/ CO2 and electric, biofuels and hydrogen boilers and technologies required for deep emission
furnaces and high efficiency motors reductions in this sub‐sector are available in the
market and can be deployed in scale in the next 5
years.. This is in because more than 90% of total
heat demand is low/medium temperature, which
can be more readily and efficiently electrified
Residential 5 Oil, gas & Energy efficiency, super-efficient appliances and 1-5 years Technologies available at commercial scale.
biomass/ electric cooking Can be mainstreamed in 1-5 years
CO2
Commer- 3 Coal, Oil and Energy efficiency, electric boilers and electrification 5 Most of the technologies required for deep
cials/Insti- gas/ CO2 (heat pumps) emission reductions in this sub‐sector are
tutional available in the market and can be deployed in
scale in the next 5 years
Agriculture Agricultural 2.7 N20 Reduction of urea use through better agricultural Ongoing This is available, only requires change in
soils (urea) practices is the easiest option. The use of bio- farming practices and policy push

FIVE R’s
fertilizers (such as manure) is also important

111
112
Annexure 2
Potential job loss and reskilling scenarios from sectoral transitions

FIVE R’s
Sector Activity Production process-Labour intensity  Labour distribution Indirect labour, Key transition Job loss vs reskilling
Transportation mechanism to scenario
Mechanized Manual reduce GHG
emissions
Coal Mining Mechanization High dependence Predominantly Road (very Phasing down Primarily job loss of
increasing over years on manual labour in informal significant, for of operations, informal workers and
in mining activities; old coal regions for major PSUs about including closures reskilling of skilled
reduction in formal loading, unloading 50% of production manpower
and skilled labour and various mining being transported
activities by road) and rail
Crude oil Extraction Highly mechanized Predominantly formal Pipeline No significant NA
phase down
Natural Gas Extraction Highly mechanized Predominantly formal Pipeline No significant NA
phase down
Refining Production Highly mechanized Predominantly formal Road, pipeline and Change in Some job loss can be
of petroleum rail production anticipated in refineries
products process as refining activities
reduces after 2 decades;
reskilling and retraining
also significant
Marketing and Manual labour More informal Repurposing of Primarily reskilling and
distribution significant in retail facilities retail retraining for marketing;
centres and also facilities, phasing for LPG distribution job
LPG distribution down of LPG loss
distribution over
time.
Coal-based Production Mechanized Predominantly formal Grid Phasing down Job loss for unskilled
thermal of operations, and informal, reskilling of
power including closures skilled
Steel Production of Mechanized Manual labour in Formal including Rail and road Change in Reskilling and retraining
iron and steel loading, unloading, contractual in main production
(including crude waste management production process process
and finished ) etc. significant
 Sector Activity Production process-Labour intensity  Labour distribution Indirect labour, Key transition Job loss vs reskilling
Transportation mechanism to scenario
Mechanized Manual reduce GHG
emissions
Cement Production Mechanized Manual labour in Formal including Rail and road Change in Reskilling and retraining
loading, unloading, contractual in main production
waste management production process process
etc. significant, however
has implication for
huge amount of em-
ployment in related
manufacturing and
construction sector
Fertilizer Production and Mechanized Application in farms, Rail and road Change in Reskilling and retraining
application on labour intensive application and
soil process

FIVE R’s
113
114
Annexure 3
Consumption of various petroleum products (2019-20) and replacement technology/ fuels

FIVE R’s
Product Annual Share of total consumption in end-uses (%) Replacement
name con- technology
sump- Trans- Re- Industry/ Petro- Domestic Power Fertiliz- Planta- Mining & Manu- Miscel-
tion porta- sellers/ Commer- chemi- distribu- genera- ers tion/ Quarry- factur- laneous/
(MMT) tion* cial cals tion tion ing ing Pvt.
Imports
Retail Agricul-
ture
HSD 82.6 7.3 85.6 1.6 0 0.3 0.7 1.9 2.6 Electric, biofuel
and hydrogen
Petrol 29.98 99.6 0.4 Electric
LPG 26.3 0.7 9.9 87.6 0.004 0.1 0.6 1.1 Electric and
biogas
Pet Coke 21.7 100 Pet coke used as
fuel replaced by
electricity and hy-
drogen. Pet coke
used as feed-
stock; non-fossil
alternatives not
available
Naphtha 14.3 76.2 0.003 1.05 22.73 Naphtha used as
fuel replaced by
electricity and hy-
drogen. Naphtha
used as feedstock
to remain
Aviation 8 No technology in
fuel near term
LDO 0.6 0.8 6.1 54.5 24.4 1.9 2.2 10 Electric, biofuel
and hydrogen
Furnace 5.9 14.4 4.9 36.2 5.1 1.2 1.4 36.7 Electric, biofuel
Oil and hydrogen
 Product Annual Share of total consumption in end-uses (%) Replacement
name con- technology
sump- Trans- Re- Industry/ Petro- Domestic Power Fertiliz- Planta- Mining & Manu- Miscel-
tion porta- sellers/ Commer- chemi- distribu- genera- ers tion/ Quarry- factur- laneous/
(MMT) tion* cial cals tion tion ing ing Pvt.
Imports
SKO/ 2.4 3.6 90.7 5.7 Electricity &
Kero- biogas
sene
Low 0.4 29 51.8 4.6 1.6 12.9 Electric, biofuel
Sulphur and hydrogen
Heavy
Stock
Lubes 3.8 Continued use
and
Greases
Bitumen 6.7 Continued use
Waxes 0.3 Continued use
Others 11.1
Total 214.1
Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, 2021, * Reflects fuel transportation

FIVE R’s
115
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3. Ibid
4. Estimated by iFOREST based on the following land-factor: Land with coal companies is about 0.22 million ha; For coal-
based power, land requirement is 0.4 ha/MW, for iron and steel it is 250 ha/million MT and for cement it is 40 ha/million MT.
5. Central Coalfields Limited’s mine lease area in Ramgarh is about 10% of the district’s total area.
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The Coal Nation: Histories, Ecologies and Politics of Coal in India. Page 39-62. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Surrey, England.
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SeCtion i: FoSSil FuelS

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energy-outlook-2021
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6. Ibid
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mospi.nic.in/sites/default/files/reports_and_publication/ES/Energy%20Statistics%20India%202021.pdf
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mospi.nic.in/sites/default/files/reports_and_publication/ES/Energy%20Statistics%20India%202021.pdf
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of cement and sponge iron industries. https://www.ccai.co.in/circular-policies/cil/cil-report-july-2014-regarding-
normative-coal-requirement-for-cement-sponge-iron-industries.pdf
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Industry, Government of India. https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/annualReport_English2019-20.pdf
13. Calculated considering coal-based sponge iron production of 27.8 MT (2018-19, as most complete available data), and
the requirement of 951 kg of coal per tonne of production.
14. NITI Aayog. (2021). Coal overview. https://niti.gov.in/edm/#coal
15. Pai, S; Zerriffi, H. and Kaluarachchi, S. (2021). Indian coal mine location and production - December 2020. Harvard
Dataverse, V1. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TDEK8O
16. Ibid
17. World Bank. (2020). Coal rents (% of GDP)-India. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.COAL.
RT.ZS?end=2019&locations=IN&start=2015

116 FIVE R’s

18. Prayas (Energy Group). 2021. Energy Taxes and Transition in India. Working Paper. https://www.prayaspune.org/peg/
publications/item/485-energy-taxes-and-transition-in-india.html
19. Ibid
20. Ministry of Coal. Press Information Bureau. (2020). States to garner I 6,656 Crores of annual revenue from the historic
success of nation’s first commercial coal mining auction: Shri Pralhad Joshi. https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.
aspx?PRID=1671487
21. State revenue calculations based on- Reserve Bank of India. 2021. State Finances: A Study of Budgets; State revenue
from coal PSUs based on company annual reports and accounts
22. The Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act. (2017). Government of India. https://legislative.gov.in/sites/
default/files/A2017-15_2.pdf
23. Ministry of Mines. (2021). DMF/PMKKKY dashboard
24. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris, France. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-
energy-outlook-2021
25. Indian Railways. (2021). Annual reports and accounts 2019-20. Government of India. https://indianrailways.gov.in/
railwayboard/uploads/directorate/stat_econ/Annual-Reports-2019-2020/Indian-Railways-Annual%20-Report-
Accounts%20-2019-20-English.pdf
26. These include workers working in the mines and washeries, executives working in coal company offices and support staff.
27. Pai, S. and Zerriffi, H. (2021). A novel dataset for analysing sub-national socioeconomic developments in the Indian coal
industry. IOP Sci Notes. https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2633-1357/abdbbb/pdf
28. Pai, S., Zerriffi, H., Kaluarachchi, S. (2021). Indian coal mine location and production - December 2020. Harvard
Dataverse, V1. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TDEK8O,
29. NSS data as cited in Venumuddala, V.R. (2020). Informal Labour in India. Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.06795.pdf
30. Lahiri-Dutt, K. (2014). Between Legitimacy and Illegality: Informal Coal Mining at the Limits of Justice. In Lahiri-Dutt, K.
(Ed.), The Coal Nation: Histories, Ecologies and Politics of Coal in India. Page 39-62. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Surrey,
England.
31. Central Electricity Authority. (2020). Draft report on optimal generation capacity mix for 2029-30. Ministry of Power,
Government of India
32. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris, France. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-
energy-outlook-2021
33. Ibid
34. Bose, P.R. (2017, June 01). CIL plans to shut down 65 loss-making mines. The Hindu Business Line. https://www.
thehindubusinessline.com/companies/cil-plans-to-shut-down-65-lossmaking-mines/article9717877.ece
35. Coal India Limited. (2020). Annual Report 2019-2020. https://www.coalindia.in/media/documents/Coal_India_English__
final.pdf
36. Coal India Limited. (2020). Annual Report 2019-2020. Page 189. https://www.coalindia.in/media/documents/Coal_India_
English__final.pdf
37. Arora, S., Malakar, B. (2020, December 26). Coal India set to diversify into non-coal mining areas in 2021. Mint. https://www.
livemint.com/companies/news/coal-india-set-to-diversify-into-non-coal-mining-areas-in-2021-11608968548890.html
38. Press Trust of India. (2018, April 01). Coal India sets 20 GW solar power generation target in next 10 yrs. ET Energy World.
https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/renewable/coal-india-sets-20-gw-solar-power-generation-
target-in-next-10-yrs/63566675
39. Mercom India. (2021, April 22). Coal India Forms Subsidiaries for Solar Manufacturing and Renewable Energy Projects.
https://mercomindia.com/coal-india-subsidiaries-solar-manufacturing-renewable/
40. Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour and Employment. (2015). Employment in Informal Sector and Conditions of Informal
Employment. Volume IV, 2013-14. Government of India. https://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/Report%20vol%20
4%20final.pdf
41. Bhushan, C., Banerjee, S. and Agarwal, S. (2020). Just Transition in India: An inquiry into the challenges and
opportunities for a post-coal future. International Forum for Environment, Sustainability & Technology, New Delhi, India.
42. Lahiri-Dutt, K. (2014). Between Legitimacy and Illegality: Informal Coal Mining at the Limits of Justice. In Lahiri-Dutt, K.
(Ed.), The Coal Nation: Histories, Ecologies and Politics of Coal in India. Page 39-62. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Surrey,
England.
43. Bhushan, C., Banerjee, S. and Agarwal, S. (2020). Just Transition in India: An inquiry into the challenges and
opportunities for a post-coal future. International Forum for Environment, Sustainability & Technology, New Delhi, India.
44. ibid
45. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris, France. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-
energy-outlook-2021

FIVE R’s 117

Chapter 2: oil
1. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-energy-
outlook-2021
2. Kah, M. (2018). Electric vehicles and their impact on oil demand: Why forecasts differ. Centre on Global Energy Policy.
Columbia University. USA. https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/CGEP_Electric%20
Vehicles%20and%20Their%20Impact%20on%20Oil%20Demand-Why%20Forecasts%20Differ.pdf
3. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. (2021). Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics 2019-20. Government of India
4. Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. (2021). Energy Statistics 2021. Government of India. http://
mospi.nic.in/sites/default/files/reports_and_publication/ES/Energy%20Statistics%20India%202021.pdf
5. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-energy-
outlook-2021
6. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. (2021). Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics 2019-20. Government of India
7. Ibid
8. International Energy Agency. (2020). India 2020: Energy Policy Review. IEA, Paris. https://niti.gov.in/sites/default/
files/2020-01/IEA-India-In-depth-review2020.pdf
9. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. (2016). Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics 2015-16. Government of India
http://petroleum.nic.in/sites/default/files/pngstat_1.pdf
10. International Energy Agency. (2020). India 2020: Energy Policy Review. IEA, Paris. https://niti.gov.in/sites/default/
files/2020-01/IEA-India-In-depth-review2020.pdf
11. NITI Aayog. (2021). Energy Dashboard-Oil consumption. http://www.niti.gov.in/edm/#oilConsumption
12. U.S Energy Information Administration. (2020). Country Analysis Executive Summary: India. https://www.eia.gov/
international/content/analysis/countries_long/India/india.pdf
13. Petroleum Planning & Analysis Cell. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. (2021). State-wise retail outlets data.
Government of India.
14. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. (2021, March 17). RAJYA SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO.2535. Government of
India. https://pqars.nic.in/annex/253/Au2535.pdf
15. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-energy-
outlook-2021
16. Petroleum Planning & Analysis Cell. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. (2021). State-wise retail outlets data.
Government of India.
17. Ibid
18. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. (2021). Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics 2019-20. Government of India
19. Nayara Energy. (2021). Retail footprint. https://www.nayaraenergy.com/retail-footprint
20. Jacob, S. (2019, August 7). Reliance, BP announce JV to set up 5,500 petrol pumps; RIL to hold 51%. Business Standard.
https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/reliance-bp-announce-jv-to-set-up-5-500-petrol-pumps-ril-
to-hold-51-119080601048_1.html
21. Labour Bureau. Ministry of Labour and Employment. (2011). Working conditions of the contract workers in Petroleum
Refineries and Oil fields 2009-11. Government Of India. http://labourbureau.gov.in/CL_WC_Pet_Ref.pdf?pr_
id=7Lfk2NwJIyc%3D
22. Ibid, page 21
23. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. (2015). Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics 2014-15. Government of India.
https://mopng.gov.in/files/TableManagements/pngstat_2.pdf
24. The retail employment has been calculated using the thumb-rule of minimum 16 employee per outlet with monthly sales
of 170 kilolitres. This thumb-rule is used by OMCs for calculating commissions of the outlets.
25. Jacob, S. (2017, December 23). Minimum wages for petrol pump employees stayed oil firms suffer setback. Business
Standard. https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/minimum-wages-for-petrol-pump-employees-
stayed-oil-firms-suffer-setback-117122200834_1.html
26. Workers estimated considering 2 office staff and 2 loaders/unloaders (who also do delivery) as per letter of intents of
OMCs
27. World Bank. (2020). Oil rents (% of GDP)-India. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS?locations=IN
28. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris, France. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-
energy-outlook-2021
29. Ibid
30. Ibid
31. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris, France. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-
energy-outlook-2021

118 FIVE R’s

32. Shell-The Energy and Resources Institute. (2021). India: Transforming to a net-zero emissions energy system. https://
www.shell.in/energy-and-innovation/new-sketch-india-transforming-to-a-net-zero-emissions-energy-system.html
33. Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana. Government of India. (2021). https://www.india.gov.in/spotlight/pradhan-mantri-
ujjwala-yojana#tab=tab-4
34. Patnaik, S., Tripathi, S. and Jain, A. (2019). Roadmap for Access to Clean Cooking Energy in India. Council on Energy,
Environment and Water. New Delhi, India. Report.pdfhttps://niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2019-11/CEEW-Roadmap_
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35. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. https://mopng.gov.in/en/pdc/investible-projects/oil-amp-gas-infrastructure/
city-gas-distribution
36. Electric cooking starts to simmer in rural India (2019, November 5). https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/
news/oil-and-gas/electric-cooking-starts-to-simmer-in-rural-india/71825232
37. Gudde, N. J. (2018). Adaptation of oil refineries to make modern fuels. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical
Engineers, Part D: Journal of Automobile Engineering, 232(1), 5–21
38. Govt to set up EV charging kiosks at 69,000 petrol pumps across India. (2020, November 24). https://www.
financialexpress.com/auto/electric-vehicles/govt-to-set-up-ev-charging-kiosks-at-69000-petrol-pumps-across-
india/2135090/
39. International Energy Agency. (2020). Global EV Outlook 2020. IEA, Paris. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/
af46e012-18c2-44d6-becd-bad21fa844fd/Global_EV_Outlook_2020.pdf

Chapter 3: natural Gas

1. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris, France. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-
energy-outlook-2021
2. TERI-Shell. (2021). India: transforming to a net zero emissions energy system. Shell. https://
www.shell.in/promos/energy-and-innovation/india-scenario-sketch/_jcr_content.
stream/1617850096430/4dc1d51b4d29c3dfea47f0a57e9eef62000a021b/india-transforming-to-a-net-zero-emissions-
energy-system-scenario-sketch-report.pdf
3. Staff reporter (Anon). Business Today. India’s oil and gas sector to see 300 billion investments by 2030. (2020, October
26). https://www.businesstoday.in/sectors/energy/india-oil-gas-sector-to-see-300-billion-investment-by-2030/
story/419921.html
4. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris, France. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-
energy-outlook-2021
5. Nisbet, E.G. et. al. (2019). Very strong atmospheric Methane growth in the 4 years 2014-2017: Implication for the Paris
Agreement. Global Biogeochemical Cycles, Vol 33 (3), page: 318-342. https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
full/10.1029/2018GB006009
6. Shindell, D. et al. (2009). Improved Attribution of Climate Forcing to Emissions. Science, Vol. 326, No. 5953, page: 716-
718. https://science.sciencemag.org/content/326/5953/716
7. International Energy Agency. (2012). Golden rules for a golden age of gas: World Energy Outlook special report on
unconventional gas. IEA, Paris, France. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/8422ef9a-9ae8-4637-ab1c-
ddb160ab7c59/WEO_2012_Special_Report_Golden_Rules_for_a_Golden_Age_of_Gas.pdf
8. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. (2021). Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics 2019-20. Government of
India. https://mopng.gov.in/files/TableManagements/IPNG-2019-20.pdf
9. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. (2021). Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics 2019-20. Government of
India. https://mopng.gov.in/files/TableManagements/IPNG-2019-20.pdf

SeCtion ii: induStrieS

Chapter 4: Coal-based thermal Power
1. Central Electricity Authority. (2020). Growth of Electricity Sector in India 1947-2020. Ministry of Power, Government of
India. https://cea.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/pdm/2020/12/growth_2020.pdf
2. Bhushan, C., Banerjee, S. and Agarwal, S. (2020). Just Transition in India: An inquiry into the challenges and
opportunities for a post-coal future. International Forum for Environment, Sustainability & Technology, New Delhi, India.
3. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris, France. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-
energy-outlook-2021
4. Bhushan, C., Banerjee, S. and Agarwal, S. (2020). Just Transition in India: An inquiry into the challenges and
opportunities for a post-coal future. International Forum for Environment, Sustainability & Technology, New Delhi, India.
5. Central Electricity Authority. (2020). Growth of Electricity Sector in India 1947-2020. Ministry of Power, Government of
India. https://cea.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/pdm/2020/12/growth_2020.pdf

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6. Ibid
7. Timperley, J. (2019, March 14). The Carbon Brief Profile: India. Carbon Brief. https://www.carbonbrief.org/the-carbon-
brief-profile-india
8. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-energy-
outlook-2021
9. Central Electricity Authority. (2018). Carbon Emissions from Power Sector. Government of India. http://erpc.gov.in/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/carbon-emissions-from-power-sector-7062018.pdf
10. Central Electricity Authority. (2018). Carbon Emissions from Power Sector. Government of India. http://erpc.gov.in/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/carbon-emissions-from-power-sector-7062018.pdf
11. Ministry of Power, Government of India. (2021). Power Sector at a Glance, All India. https://powermin.gov.in/en/content/
power-sector-glance-all-india
12. Central Electricity Authority. (2018). National Electricity Plan. Ministry of Power, Government of India. https://cea.nic.in/
wp-content/uploads/2020/04/nep_jan_2018.pdf
13. As per interaction with labour unions and industry workers in the districts of Chhattisgarh.
14. Ministry of Power. (2020, November 28). “Increasing storage and democratising RE deployment will be next frontier for
the Government of India” Power Minister Shri R K Singh at valedictory session of 3rd Global Re-Invest. Government of
India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1676863
15. National Thermal Power Corporation. (2021). Renewable Energy. https://www.ntpc.co.in/en/power-generation/
renewable-energy
16. National Thermal Power Corporation. (2021). New and Renewable Energy. https://www.ntpc.co.in/en/services-and-
initiatives/netra/key-issues-and-mandates/new-renewable-energy
17. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. Paris. France. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-
energy-outlook-2021

Chapter 5: iron and Steel

1. Ministry of Steel. National Steel Policy. (2017). National Steel Policy 2017. Government of India. https://steel.gov.in/sites/
default/files/draft-national-steel-policy-2017.pdf
2. International Energy Agency. (2020). Iron and Steel Technology Roadmap: Towards more sustainable steelmaking. Paris,
France. https://www.iea.org/reports/iron-and-steel-technology-roadmap
3. Ibid
4. Joint Plant Committee, Ministry of Steel. (2020). The Indian Iron and Steel Database, 2019-20. Government of India
5. Ibid
6. Ministry of Steel. (2021). Annual Report, 2020-21. Government of India. https://steel.gov.in/sites/default/files/
Annual%20Report-Ministry%20of%20Steel%202020-21.pdf
7. As per National Steel Policy 2017, Govt estimates were about 2.5 lakhs. But crude steel production has also increased 5
MT between 2016 to 2019.
8. NSS data as cited in Venumuddala, V.R. (2020). Informal Labour in India. Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.06795.pdf
9. Jain A. (2019, May 24). India’s Road Towards Being an Economic Powerhouse Is Paved On Steel. Invest India. International
Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency https://www.investindia.gov.in/team-india-blogs/indias-road-towards-
being-economic-powerhouse-paved-steel
10. International Energy Agency. (2020). Iron and Steel Technology Roadmap: Towards more sustainable steelmaking. Paris,
France. https://www.iea.org/reports/iron-and-steel-technology-roadmap
11. Ibid
12. A scale used to assess where a technology is on its journey from initial idea to maturity; the IEA uses a scale with 11
increments which are grouped into six categories: Concept (TRL 1-3), Small prototype (TRL 4), Large prototype (TRL
5-6), Demonstration (TRL 7-8), Early adoption (TRL 9-10) and Mature (TRL 11)
13. Hall, W., Spencer, T. and Kumar, S. (2020). Towards a low-carbon steel sector. The Energy and Resources Institute
(TERI). New Delhi, India. https://www.teriin.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/towards-low-carbon-sector.pdf
14. International Energy Agency. (2020). Iron and Steel Technology Roadmap: Towards more sustainable steelmaking. Paris,
France. https://www.iea.org/reports/iron-and-steel-technology-roadmap

Chapter 6: Cement
1. International Energy Agency. (2020), Cement, IEA, Paris. https://www.iea.org/reports/cement

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2. The Government of India has been laying a massive emphasis on infrastructure development, with 100 smart cities,
modernisation of 500 cities, affordable housing for all by 2022, cement concreting of national highways, provision of
sanitation facilities, etc.
3. Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. (2021). Annual Report 2020-21. Government of India. https://
dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/annualReport-English2020-21.pdf
4. World Business Council for Sustainable Development. (2019). Indian Cement Sector SDG Roadmap. https://www.wbcsd.
org/contentwbc/download/7018/116131/1
5. International Energy Agency. (2018). Cement technology roadmap plots path to cutting CO2 emissions 24% by 2050.
Paris, France. https://www.iea.org/news/cement-technology-roadmap-plots-path-to-cutting-co2-emissions-24-
by-2050
6. Bureau of Energy Efficiency. (2018). Improving Energy Efficiency in Cement Sector: Achievement and way forward. BEE-
GIZ. https://www.keralaenergy.gov.in/files/Resources/Cement_Sector_Report_2018.pdf
7. Friedlingstein et al. (2020). Global Carbon Project (Global Carbon Atlas). http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-
emissions
8. United Nations. (2015). Paris Agreement, [Preamble, para 10] https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/
convention/application/pdf/english_par¬is_agreement.pdf
9. Indian Bureau of Mines. (2020). Indian Minerals Yearbook, Cement. Government of India. https://ibm.gov.in/
writereaddata/files/07072020143800Cement_2019.pdf
10. Ibid
11. Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. (2021). Annual Report 2020-21. Government of India. https://
dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/annualReport-English2020-21.pdf
12. World Business Council for Sustainable Development. (2019). Indian Cement Sector SDG Roadmap. https://www.wbcsd.
org/contentwbc/download/7018/116131/1
13. Indian Bureau of Mines. (2020). Indian Minerals Yearbook, Cement. Government of India. https://ibm.gov.in/
writereaddata/files/07072020143800Cement_2019.pdf
14. Statista Research Department. (2021). Consumption volume of cement in India from financial year 2009 to 2018 with
an estimate for financial year 2019. https://www.statista.com/statistics/269322/cement-consumption-in-india-
since-2004/
15. World Business Council for Sustainable Development. (2019). Indian Cement Sector SDG Roadmap. WBCSD. https://
www.wbcsd.org/contentwbc/download/7018/116131/1
16. Rajya Sabha Secretariat. (2011, February). 95th report on Performance of Cement Industry. Rajya Sabha, Parliament of
India. https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/Performance_Cement_Industry.pdf
17. NSS data as cited in Venumuddala, V.R. (2020). Informal Labour in India. Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.06795.pdf
18. Cement Manufacturers Association. (2021). Indian Cement Industry- Contribution to domestic economy. https://www.
cmaindia.org/indian-cement-industry-contribution-to-domestic-economy/
19. Planning Commission of India. Working Group Eleven. Government of India. https://niti.gov.in/planningcommission.
gov.in/docs/aboutus/committee/wrkgrp11/wg11_cement.pdf
20. Verma, Y.K., Mazumdar, B. and Ghosh, P. (2021). Thermal energy consumption and its conservation for a
cement production unit. Environmental Engineering Research. 26(3). https://www.eeer.org/journal/view.
php?number=1175#:~:text=Around%2070%E2%80%9380%25%20of%20the,only%20for%205%E2%80%9310%25.
21. Confederation of Indian Industry. (2016). Promoting alternate fuel and raw material usage in Indian cement industry:
Approach paper for achieving 25% Thermal Substitution Rate in Indian cement industry by 2025. Hyderabad, India.
https://www.mycii.in/KmResourceApplication/50819.25TSRby2025.pdf
22. Wojtacha-Rychter, K., Kucharski, P. and Smolinski, A. (2021). Conventional and Alternative Sources of Thermal Energy in
the Production of Cement—An Impact on CO2 Emission. Energies. 14 (1539). https://doi.org/10.3390/en14061539
23. Bureau of Energy Efficiency. (2018). Improving Energy Efficiency in Cement Sector: Achievement and way forward. BEE-
GIZ. https://www.keralaenergy.gov.in/files/Resources/Cement_Sector_Report_2018.pdf

Chapter 7: road transport

1. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. (2021). India: Third Biennial Update Report to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Government of India. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/
INDIA_%20BUR-3_20.02.2021_High.pdf
2. Ibid
3. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook. , Paris, France. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/
assets/1de6d91e-e23f-4e02-b1fb-51fdd6283b22/India_Energy_Outlook_2021.pdf

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4. Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers. (2020). Annual Report 2019-2020. https://www.siam.in/uploads/ar/22-
22ndAnnual%20Report%202019-20.pdf
5. Ibid
6. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook. Paris, France. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/
assets/1de6d91e-e23f-4e02-b1fb-51fdd6283b22/India_Energy_Outlook_2021.pdf
7. Shah, A. (2021, May 10). Indian auto dealers predict slow sales recovery virus spreads rural areas. Reuters. https://www.
reuters.com/world/india/indian-auto-dealers-predict-slow-sales-recovery-virus-spreads-rural-areas-2021-05-10/
8. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook. Paris, France. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/
assets/1de6d91e-e23f-4e02-b1fb-51fdd6283b22/India_Energy_Outlook_2021.pdf
9. Dhawan, R., Gupta, S.& et. al (2018). The auto component Industry in India: Preparing for the future. Mckinsey &
Company. https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/asia%20pacific/the%20auto%20
component%20industry%20in%20india%20preparing%20for%20the%20future/acma%20vertical_onscreen_final.
ashx
10. Bloomberg NEF. (2021). Electric Vehicle Outlook 2021. https://about.bnef.com/electric-vehicle-
outlook/#:~:text=The%20Electric%20Vehicle%20Outlook%20is,two%2Fthree%2Dwheeled%20vehicles
11. Society of Manufacturers of Electric Vehicle. (2021). EV Sales. https://www.smev.in/ev-sales
12. International Energy Agency. (2020). Global EV Outlook 2020. Paris, France. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-
outlook-2020

Chapter 8: Fertilizer
1. Bhushan, C. et.al. (2019). Grain by Grain: Green rating of the fertilizer sector. Centre for Science and Environment, New
Delhi, India
2. Anon 2011. Carbon Footprint Reference Values, Fertilizers Europe, Brussels
3. Calculation based on Bhushan, C. et.al. (2019). Grain by Grain: Green rating of the fertilizer sector.Centre for Science and
Environment, New Delhi, India
4. Fertilizer Association of India. (2020). 65th Annual Report, 2019-20. https://www.faidelhi.org/general/FAI-AR-19-20.pdf
5. Ibid
6. NSS data as cited in Venumuddala, V.R. (2020). Informal Labour in India. Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.06795.pdf
7. Sangomla A. (2017, December 15). We have breached the planetary limit for nitrogen. Down To Earth. https:// www.
downtoearth.org.in/news/agriculture/when-n-means-noxious-59279
8. Anon. (2018, June 6). Key to a sustainable future: Thyssenkrupp launches advanced water electrolysis. https://www.
thyssenkrupp-industrial-solutions.com/en/media/press-releases/key-to-a-sustainable-future--thyssenkrupp-
launches-advanced-water-electrolysis-1536.html
9. Chander S. (2016). Nitrogen in Indian Agriculture, Indian Journal of Fertilizers, Fertiliser Association of India, New Delhi.
https://www.faidelhi.org/Frank%20 notes/IJF-April-16.pdf
10. Bellarby, J., Foereid, B., Hastings, A. and Smith, P. (2008). Cool Farming: Climate impacts of agriculture and mitigation
potential, Greenpeace International, Amsterdam. http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/68831/1/1111.pdf

Annexure 1
1. NITI Aayog. (2019). Energy Storage System, Roadmap for India: 2019-2032. Government of India
2. International Energy Agency. (2021). India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA, Paris, France. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-
energy-outlook-2021
3. SCMs include, Geopolymer/Alkali activated cement, Calcium Sulfoaluminate (CSA) Cement, Magnesia binder,
Celitement, Carbonatable Calcium Silicate cement.
4. Brown, T. (2019). Renewable hydrogen sustainable ammonia production. https://www.aiche.org/resources/
publications/cep/2019/august/renewable-hydrogen-sustainable-ammonia-production

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 https://iforest.global/

International Forum for Environment, Sustainability & Technology

(iFOREST) is an independent non-profit environmental research
and innovation organisation. It seeks to find, promote and scale up
solutions for some of the most pressing environment–development
challenges. It also endeavours to make environmental protection
a peoples’ movement by informing and engaging the citizenry on
important issues and programs.