Barredo v.

Garcia

A head-on collision took place on the road between Malabon and Navotas between a taxi driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
caratella guided by Pedro Dimapalis. As a result, the caratella overturned and caused injuries to one of its passenger, Faustino
Garcia, which eventually caused his death. A criminal action was filed by the Defendants Severino and Timotea Garcia, parents of
Faustino, against Pedro Fontanilla, which was convicted and imprisoned thereafter but was not sued for civil action.

Eventually, Defendants filed an action against Petitioner Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the taxicab and employer of
Fontanilla. Petitioner raised the defense that he cannot be sued for damages because his responsibility is merely subsidiary to that
of Fontanilla because the latter’s negligence was punishable by Penal Code. If at all, Fontanilla was not sued for civil action and
his property was not exhausted.

The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the Defendants, while the Court of Appeals also ruled in their favor with
modifications.

Whether or not the Petitioner can be sued for damages under Article 1903

The Court ruled in favor of the Defendants.

There is a distinct and separate individuality between civil action arising from criminal negligence under the Revised Penal Code
and responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1901 to 1910 of the Civil Code. The same negligent act may produce
either civil liability under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code or a separate responsibility under the Civil Code. Nevertheless, it is
concrete that the Petitioner is primarily responsible for damages under Art. 1903 of the Civil Code.

If the Court allowed the Petitioner to be subsidiary responsible in the present case, the Petitioner can simply guise himself from
damages caused by his employees due to the literal wording of the law (not punishable by law). It would be tantamount to make it
cumbersome for the Defendants to sue Fontanilla for damages before going after the Petitioner. Workmen and employees should
be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the
profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter’s careful
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others.

RULING;
Petition is DENIED.

==============
Mendoza v. Arrieta
G.R. No. L-32599, June 29, 1979

Facts:

A three- way vehicular accident occurred involving a car owned and driven by petitioner Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep owned
and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar, and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by
Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to
Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the CFI of Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-
driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar’s jeep and petitioner’s
car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded
damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar. After the
termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed a civil case against respondents Salazar and Timbol for the damages sustained by
his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles.

Issue:

whether or not the lower court in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against private respondents

Held:

Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The respondent Judge wrongfully sustained Timbol’s allegations that the civil
suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in a criminal case filed against him, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case
was made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against Salazar only. For
petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict. Respondent Judge committed reversible error
when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that, “When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.” Timbol’s submission that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the
criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action, as required under section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, bars the
institution of such separate civil action is untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31 (in relation to Articles 2176 and 2177) of the Civil
Code creates a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised
Penal Code, no reservation is required to be made in the criminal case. And so, to reiterate, the civil case filed against Timbol is
not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on
quasi-delict.

But insofar as Salazar is concerned the answer is no. Inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence
cases, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil
Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is
deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the
offended party. The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause
of action against Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in
the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action
until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action
as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case.

Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by petitioner’s car for considering that the collision between
the jeep driven by him and the car owned and driven by Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck
driven by Montoya, it cannot be said that Salazar was at fault. Hence, the right of petitioner to claim damages from Salazar did not
arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c) which
provides that, “Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil right arise did not exist…”

FACTS- A three- way vehicularaccident occurred involving a car owned and driven bypetitioner Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep
owned and driven by respondent RodolfoSalazar, and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven
byFreddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence CausingDamage to
Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the CFI of Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-
driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collisionbetween Salazar’s jeep and petitioner’s
car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by thetruck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner
awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver
Salazar. After the termination of thecriminal cases, petitioner filed a civil case against respondents Salazar and Timbol for the
damages sustained by hiscar as a result of the collision involving their vehicles

.ISSUES1. Whether or not the lower court in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against private
respondents

RULING(1) That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals
in thecomplaint to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned
anddriven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's
jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving agravel
and sand truck iii the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision, petitioner's carsuffered extensive
damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigationexpenses and attorney's fees.

Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the
owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the
negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee,Montoya, in driving the truck, causing
Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were alleged in theComplaint.

Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he
dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.

At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the
offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court isdeemed
simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application bythe offended
party.The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of
actionagainst jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation
andintervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved
inthe criminal action until its termination.RATIONALEWhen the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the actor
omission complained of as a felony, such civil actionmay proceed independently of thecriminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO

M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.

FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business Administration.
Assailants, who were not members of the schools academic community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed
Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for
damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods
before, during and after the attack on the victim. 

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of action against them
based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court.
Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court. 

ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

 
RULING: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between
parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not
prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. 

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. Article
2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational
institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material
situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students
of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is
absolved form liability. 

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the
students while in the school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. 

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between
the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures.
This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the
school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua
nonto the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

AIR FRANCE
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-21438             September 28, 1966

 Facts:
Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
     
On March 28, 1958, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to Carascoso a "first class" round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced
him to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because there was a "white man”, who the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the
seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, a commotion ensued, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they
found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man, they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"; and respondent reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

Because of the incident, respondent filed an action for damages for breach of contract.

Respondent contended that he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts the following:
1. That the said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties;
2. That said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class
protection; and
3. That the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of
first class seats.

CFI/ RTC ruling:

-Petitioner tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although respondent paid for, and was
issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said
witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidences presented by the plaintiff which clearly show that the respondent was issued, and
paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. It cannot be believe that after such confirmation, petitioner had a verbal
understanding with respondent that the "first class" ticket issued to him by petitioner would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 

-CFI ruled in favor of Carrascoso. It sentenced petitioner to pay respondent P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome plus
P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit

CA ruling:

- CA slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in
all other respects", with costs against petitioner.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat

2. Whether or not he is entitled to damages

SC Ruling:

1. Yes. If airline companies would have the policy that a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that
seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. There is no
security for the passengers. It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket,
and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. It is a rule that, a written document speaks a uniform language. There must be
adherence to the ticket issued by the airline company. Since Carrascoso was given a “first class” airplane ticket, he is entitled to such.

2.
Yes.
-First, That there was a contract to furnish Carrascoso a first class passage covering, among others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; 
Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and  Third, that there was bad
faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation  "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in
the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

- A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual obligation because of the relation
which an air carrier sustains with the public. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, could give ground for an action for damages. Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso
 is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public
duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

- Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that, “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

Exemplary damages are also well awarded since the action of the respondent is based on a contract. In addition, the plaintiff’s act of
ejecting the respondent in his first class seat is an act which was done in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.

-SC affirmed the decision of CA.