AN INTRODUCTION TO

HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

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A01_DANI2950_05_SE_FM.indd 2 07/04/16 7:07 pm
 AN INTRODUCTION TO
HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

FIFTH EDITION

Edited by

PETER DANIELS
School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences,
University of Birmingham

MICHAEL BRADSHAW
Warwick Business School, University of Warwick

DENIS SHAW
School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences,
University of Birmingham

JAMES SIDAWAY
Department of Geography, National University of Singapore

TIM HALL
Department of Applied Social Studies, University of Winchester

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 Pearson Education Limited
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Third edition 2008 (print)
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Fifth edition published 2016 (print and electronic)

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Daniels, P. W., editor.
Title: An introduction to human geography / edited by Peter Daniels [and four others].
Description: Fifth edition. | New York : Pearson, 2016.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016003272 | ISBN 9781292082950
Subjects: LCSH: Human geography--Textbooks.
Classification: LCC GF41 .I574 2016 | DDC 304.2--dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016003272

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NOTE THAT ANY PAGE CROSS REFERENCES REFER TO THE PRINT EDITION

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 Dedicated to Jasmin Leila Sidaway
(see www.rgs.org/ourwork/grants/research/jasmin+leila+award.htm)

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 Brief contents

Contributors xi Section 4
Acknowledgements xiii Production, exchange and consumption
Introduction 14 Geographies of the economy 281
Geography: finding your way in the world 1
15 Geographies of food production 302

Section 1 16 T
 he geographies of global production
Worlds in the past: changing scales of networks 321
experience and past worlds in the present 17 Service economies, spatial divisions of
1 Pre-capitalist worlds 19 expertise and the second global shift 343

2 The rise and spread of capitalism 37 18 G

 eographies of money,
finance and crisis 365
3 The making of the twentieth- and twenty-
first-century world 59 19 Consumption and its geographies 379

Section 2 Section 5
Population, resources, food, the Political geographies: geopolitics,
environment and development territory, states, citizenship and
governance
4 Demographic transformations 79
20 Geopolitical traditions 399
5 Resources, energy and development 107
21 Territory, space and society 421
6 The environment and environmentalism 133
22 The place of the nation-state 439
7 Food security 156
23 The geographies of citizenship 456
8 Worlds apart? The changing
geographies of global development 170 24 Global governance 470

Glossary 491
Section 3
Bibliography 505
Society, settlement and culture
Index 547
9 Cities: urban worlds 189
10 Urban segregation and social inequality 206
11 Changing rural worlds – a global view 226
12 Social constructions of nature 246
13 Geography, culture and global change 261

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 Contents in detail

Contributorsxi 3 The making of the twentieth- and

Acknowledgementsxiii twenty-first-century world 59
Denis Shaw
Introduction
3.1 The changing capitalism of the early
Geography: finding your way in the world 1
twentieth century 60
James Sidaway, Michael Bradshaw, Peter Daniels,
3.2  Fordist capitalism 62
Tim Hall and Denis Shaw
3.3 Challenges to liberal capitalism:
Approach of the book 11 Nazism, communism 64
Further reading 12 3.4  The end of imperialism? 68
Research and study guides, readers and further 3.5  Globalized capitalism 70
  insights into human geography 13 3.6  The world in the early twenty-first century 71
Useful websites 14 3.7 Conclusion 75
Learning outcomes 75
Section 1 Further reading 75
Worlds in the past: changing scales of Useful websites 76
experience and past worlds in the present
Edited by Denis Shaw
Section 2
1 Pre-capitalist worlds19 Population, resources, food,
the environment and development
Denis Shaw
Edited by Michael Bradshaw
1.1  Making sense of the past 22
1.2  A classification of human societies 23
1.3  Hunting and gathering 23
4 Demographic transformations 79
1.4  Human settlement and agriculture 25 Dimitris Ballas and Danny Dorling
1.5  Cities and civilization 28 4.1 Introduction 80
1.6  Pre-capitalist societies 34 4.2  Geographies of population growth 80
1.7  The heritage of the past 35 4.3 Geographies of changing birth and death
Learning outcomes 35 rates and the demographic transition model 85
Further reading 36 4.4 Global population growth and
Useful websites 36 punctuated equilibrium 88
4.5  Migration and population change 92
2 The rise and spread of capitalism 37 4.6  Geographies of mortality and life expectancy 94
Terry Slater 4.7 The demographic impact and geography of
2.1  What is capitalism? 38 disease, natural disasters and wars 96
2.2  Other perspectives, other stories 39 4.8  The challenges of an ageing population 102
2.3  The transition from feudalism to capitalism 40 4.9 Conclusion 102
2.4  An expanding world 42 Learning outcomes 105
2.5  Imperialism and racism 47 Further reading 105
2.6 Industrialization 48 Useful websites 106
2.7 Urbanization 54
2.8 Conclusion 56 5 Resources, energy and development107
Learning outcomes 58 Michael Bradshaw
Further reading 58 5.1  Natural resources 108
Useful websites 58 5.2  Fuelling the planet 113

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 viii    contents in detail

5.3  Energy and development 126 Section 3

5.4  Conclusions: global energy dilemmas 130 Society, settlement and culture
Learning outcomes 132 Edited by Tim Hall
Further reading 132
Useful websites 132 9 Cities: urban worlds189
Tim Hall and Heather Barrett
6 The environment and environmentalism133 9.1  Defining the urban world 191
Rachel Howell and Jenny Pickerill 9.2  Multiple geographies of the urban world 192
6.1  What kind of world do you want? 134 9.3  Contemporary urban issues 200
6.2 How we value the environment and perceive 9.4 Conclusion 203
environmental issues 134 Learning outcomes 204
6.3 Limits to growth and the challenge Further reading 204
of capitalism 139 Useful websites 205
6.4  The complexity of scale and responsibility 142
6.5  Strategies for change 146 10 Urban segregation and social inequality206
6.6 What is missing from our focus on Phil Hubbard
‘the environment’? 150 10.1  Poverty and urban segregation 207
6.7  Environmentally sustainable futures 153 10.2  Urban segregation and cultural stereotypes 213
Learning outcomes 154 10.3  Racial segregation in the city 217
Further reading 154 10.4  Gentrification: reclaiming the margins? 220
Useful websites 155 10.5 Conclusion 224
Learning outcomes 224
7 Food security156 Further reading 224
Bill Pritchard
7.1 Introduction 157
11 Changing rural worlds – a global view226
Warwick E. Murray
7.2  Hunger in human history 157
7.3 The present scale and geography 11.1  Words and worlds: what is ‘rural’? 228
of global hunger 158 11.2  Changing rural geographies 229
7.4  Defining food security 160 11.3  Shifting rural worlds 231
7.5  Food availability 163 11.4 Conclusion 244
7.6  Food access 166 Learning outcomes 245
7.7 Conclusion 168 Further reading 245
Learning outcomes 169
Further reading 169 12 Social constructions of nature246
Useful websites 169 James Evans
12.1  Questioning nature 247
8 Worlds apart? The changing geographies 12.2  Cultural constructions of nature 250
of global development170 12.3  Environmental myths 253
Marcus Power 12.4  Constructing human nature 254
12.5  Nature and the media 258
8.1 Development and the geography of
12.6 Conclusions 259
the ‘Third World’ 173
Learning outcomes 260
8.2  Conceptualizing development 176
Further reading 260
8.3 Development practice: the historical
Useful websites 260
geography of development 179
8.4 The ‘rising powers’ and the emergence
of new ‘Southern’ donors 182 13 Geography, culture and global change261
8.5 Conclusions: geography, unevenness Cheryl McEwan and Shari Daya
and inequality 184 13.1  What is culture? 262
Learning outcomes 185 13.2  Towards a global culture? 264
Further reading 185 13.3  Reinventing local cultures? 268
Useful websites 185 13.4  Multi- and hybrid cultures? 271

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 contents in detail    ix

13.5 Conclusion 275 16.6  Reshaping global production networks? 338

Learning outcomes 276 16.7 Conclusion 341
Further reading 276 Learning outcomes 342
Useful websites 277 Further reading 342
Useful websites 342
Section 4
Production, exchange and consumption 17 Service economies, spatial divisions of
Edited by Peter Daniels expertise and the second global shift343
John R. Bryson
14 Geographies of the economy281 17.1  Defining services 344
Peter Daniels and Andrew Jones 17.2 Two common misconceptions about
14.1 The changing nature of service economies 347
economic geography 282 17.3  The body, services and emotional labour 351
14.2  What is the economic problem? 285 17.4 Services and the spatial
14.3  What are economies? 286 division of expertise 353
14.4 A geographical approach to economic 17.5  The second global shift 357
processes 287 17.6 Conclusion 363
14.5  The rise of a global economy 289 Learning outcomes 363
14.6 Global uneven development: the examples Further reading 364
of trade and foreign direct investment 291
14.7 Places and localities in an uneven 18 Geographies of money, finance and crisis365
global economy 294 Manuel B. Aalbers and Jane Pollard
14.8  The rise of a new global digital economy? 296
18.1  Money and finance in geography 366
14.9  Global re-balancing: the eastward shift 299
18.2  The global financial crisis 373
Learning outcomes 300
18.3  Conclusion: placing finance 377
Further reading 300
Learning outcomes 378
Useful websites 301
Further reading 378
Useful websites 378
15 Geographies of food production302
Damian Maye
19 Consumption and its geographies379
15.1  Thinking about food 303 Ian Cook and Philip Crang
15.2 Geographies of food production and
global supply 304 19.1  Economic geographies of consumption 380
15.3 Alternative geographies of food: 19.2  Branding and marketing geography 383
concepts and case studies 309 19.3  Local geographies of consumption 388
15.4 Food security: questions of scale, 19.4 Consumption and geographies of
definition and interpretation 314 (dis)connection 391
15.5  Conclusion: the ethical foodscape 317 Learning outcomes 396
Learning outcomes 319 Further reading 396
Further reading 319 Useful websites 396
Useful websites 319
Section 5
16 The geographies of global production Political geographies: geopolitics,
networks321 territory, states, citizenship and
Neil M. Coe governance
Edited by James Sidaway
16.1  Engaging with global production networks 322
16.2  Production chains, production networks . . . 323
16.3 Geographies of production networks: 20 Geopolitical traditions399
spatial divisions of labour 326 James Sidaway, Virginie Mamadouh and Chih Yuan Woon
16.4  The governance of production networks 332 20.1 Introducing the idea of a geopolitical
16.5 The institutional context of production tradition 400
networks 337 20.2  The organic theory of the state 401

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 x    CONTENTS IN DETAIL

20.3 Brazilian national integration 401 22.4 Nation-states as symbolic systems 450
20.4 Antarctic obsessions 402 22.5 Sovereigntyscapes: ‘shadows’,
20.5 Heartland 403 ‘borderlands’ and ‘transnationalisms’ 452
20.6 Nazi and Fascist geopolitics 407 22.6 Conclusions: the place of the nation-state? 452
20.7 Cold War geopolitics and the logics Learning outcomes 454
of containment 410 Further reading 455
20.8 Cold War geopolitics in art and culture
and ‘popular geopolitics’ 413 23 the geographies of citizenship 456
20.9 New World Order, the Long War, Richard Yarwood
Cold Peace and beyond 415 23.1 Introduction: citizenship and place 457
20.10 Conclusions: shifting hegemonies? 416 23.2 Bounded citizenship 459
Learning outcomes 419 23.3 Beyond boundaries 462
Further reading 419 23.4 Local citizenship: activist citizens 463
23.5 Activist citizens and transnational networks 465
21 territory, space and society 421 23.6 Citizenship and everyday places 466
David Storey 23.7 Conclusions 467
21.1 Territory and territoriality 422 Learning outcomes 468
21.2 Territoriality, race and class 424 Further reading 468
21.3 Geographies of security, policing
and protest 429 24 global governance 470
21.4 Territoriality, gender and sexuality 431 Klaus Dodds and Chih Yuan Woon
21.5 Work, rest and play 433 24.1 Conceptualizing governance 471
21.6 Conclusions 436 24.2 Theorizing global governance 473
Learning outcomes 437 24.3 Governing the Arctic Ocean 479
Further reading 437 24.4 Governing the South China Sea 484
24.5 Conclusion 487
22 the place of the nation-state 439 Learning outcomes 487
James Sidaway and Carl Grundy-Warr Further reading 488
22.1 Historical and geographical variability Useful websites 489
of states 440
22.2 Nations as ‘imagined’ political communities 440 Glossary 491
22.3 Constructing boundaries: upwards Bibliography 505
and outwards 448 Index 547

Lecturer Resources ON THE

WEBSITE
For password-protected online resources tailored to
support the use of this textbook in teaching, please visit
www.pearsoned.co.uk/daniels

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 Contributors
Manuel B. Aalbers   Associate Professor of Geography, Klaus Dodds   Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway,
Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, KU University of London. Geopolitics and international relations;
Leuven/University of Leuven, Belgium. Urban and financial Arctic and Antarctic; geography and popular culture.
geography; political economy and financialization; housing,
mortgages and real estate; neighbourhood change, exclusion Danny Dorling   Halford Mackinder Professor of Geogra-
and gentrification. phy, School of Geography and the Environment, University
of Oxford. Social and spatial inequalities; housing, health,
Dimitris Ballas   Senior Lecturer, Department of Geog- employment, education and poverty.
raphy, University of Sheffield. Regional science; economic
geography; social and spatial inequalities, geoinformatics James Evans   Senior Lecturer in Geography, School of
and the social sciences. Environment, Education and Development, University of
Manchester. Environmental governance; urban sustainability;
Heather Barrett   Principal Lecturer in Human Geogra- mobile methods.
phy, Institute of Science and the Environment, University of
Worcester. Urban geography; urban morphology, planning Carl Grundy-Warr   Senior Lecturer in Geography, Depart-
and conservation; pedagogic research; employability, learn- ment of Geography, National University of Singapore. Geo-
ing spaces. politics; forced migration; political ecology; and transnational
resource politics.
Michael Bradshaw   Professor of Global Energy, Warwick
Business School, the University of Warwick. The geopoliti- Tim Hall   Professor of Interdisciplinary Social Studies and
cal economy of energy, economic geography and energy Head of Department of Applied Social Studies, University
security. of Winchester. Urban geography; economic geography of
organized crime; higher education and pedagogic research.
John R. Bryson   Professor of Enterprise and Competive-
ness, Birmingham Business School, University of Birming- Rachel A. Howell   Lecturer in Sociology/Sustainable
ham. Economic geography; expertise-intensive industries; Development, School of Social and Political Science, Uni-
industrial design; manufacturing and competitiveness; spatial versity of Edinburgh. Lower carbon/sustainable lifestyles;
divisions of expertise; sustainability and innovation. pro-environmental behaviour change; social movements for
sustainability; climate change communication.
Neil M. Coe   Professor of Economic Geography,
National University of Singapore. Global production net- Phil Hubbard   Professor of Urban Studies, School of
works and local economic development; geographies of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, University of
local and transnational labour markets; geographies of Kent. Geographies of sexuality; urban consumption and gen-
innovation; institutional and network approaches to eco- trification; geographies of higher education.
nomic development.
Andrew Jones   Dean and Professor of Economic Geog-
Ian Cook   Associate Professor of Geography, University of raphy, School of Arts and Sciences, City University London.
Exeter. Cultural geography; long-standing interests in mate- Globalization; transnational firms; business services; eco-
rial geographies, multi-sited ethnographic research, connec- nomic practices; knowledge economy; international voluntary
tive aesthetics and critical pedagogy, combined in/as the work.
‘follow the thing’ approach.
Clare Madge   Reader in Human Geography, University of
Philip Crang   Professor of Cultural Geography, Depart- Leicester. Postcolonial geographies; creative geographies;
ment of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London. everyday online communities.
Cultural and economic geography, especially commodity
Virginie Mamadouh   Associate Professor of Political and
culture.
Cultural Geography, University of Amsterdam, The Nether-
Peter W. Daniels   Emeritus Professor of Geography, lands. Geopolitics and critical geopolitics; political geogra-
School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, phies of European integration; multilingualism; new media
University of Birmingham. Geography of service industries; and transnationalism.
services and globalization; trade, foreign direct investment
Damian Maye   Reader in Agri-food Studies, Countryside
and internationalization in services.
and Community Research Institute, University of Glouces-
Shari Daya   Lecturer in Human Geography, Department of tershire. Agri-food restructuring; alternative food networks;
Environmental and Geographical Science, University of Cape short food chains; geographies of food security; sustainable
Town. Culture; identity; modernity; geographies of production food transitions; agricultural biosecurity and animal disease
and consumption. governance.

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 xii    Contributors

Cheryl McEwan   Professor of Human Geography, Depart- Denis Shaw   Honorary Senior Research Fellow, School of
ment of Geography, Durham University. Feminist and cul- Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University
tural geographies; post-colonial theory and development; of Birmingham. Historical and contemporary geographical
geographies of transformation in South Africa. change in Russia; history of geographical thought.
Warwick E. Murray   Professor of Human Geography James D. Sidaway   Professor of Political Geography,
and Development Studies, School of Geography, Environ- Department of Geography, National University of Singapore.
ment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University of Wellington, Political geography; finance, cities and borders; history of
New Zealand. Development geography; globalization; rural geographic thought.
change; Latin America and Oceania.
Terry Slater   Honorary Senior Research Fellow, School of
Jenny Pickerill   Professor of Environmental Geography, Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University
Department of Geography, University of Sheffield. Environ- of Birmingham. Historical geography; urban morphology;
mental and social justice; eco-housing and eco-building; topographical development of medieval towns; urban conser-
geographies of activism; indigenous geographies. vation.
Jane Pollard   Professor of Economic Geography, Centre David Storey   Principal Lecturer in Geography, Institute
for Urban and Regional Development Studies and School of Science and the Environment, University of Worcester.
of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University. Nationalism, territory and place; sport and national identity;
Geographies of money and finance; political economy and rural development, heritage and place promotion.
regional economic development.
Chih Yuan Woon   Assistant Professor, Department of
Marcus Power   Professor of Human Geography, Depart- Geography, National University of Singapore. Critical geo-
ment of Geography, Durham University. Post-socialist and politics; geographies of peace and non-violence; security;
post-colonial transformations in Southern Africa; critical Southeast Asia; China geopolitics
geographies and genealogies of (post)development; vision,
Richard Yarwood   Associate Professor (Reader) in Geog-
visuality and geopolitics; ‘clean development’ and low-carbon
raphy, School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sci-
transitions; and the growing presence of (re)emerging pow-
ences, Plymouth University. Citizenship; social geography;
ers in Africa.
rural geography; crime; military geographies.
Bill Pritchard   Associate Professor of Economic Geogra-
phy, School of Geosciences, University of Sydney, Australia.
Geography of food and agriculture; global trade rules in agri-
culture; food security and rural development.

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 chapter 00 chapter Title    xiii
contributors

Acknowledgements
As ever, the on-going success of this project relies on the owe them all a debt of gratitude for seeing this project
goodwill and enthusiasm of the contributors. We would through to completion. Thanks are also due to Peter
also like to thank the panel of reviewers who assessed Jones, Department of History, University of Birming-
the fourth edition and made suggestions on the ways ham, for advice concerning Section 1 of the book.
in which it might be improved. This edition therefore Those who have used earlier editions will note that
includes some new chapters that reflect the feedback this one includes a new editor. For the fifth edition a new
from the panel and which continues to ensure a lively (fifth) member of the editorial team (Tim Hall) brings
collection of contributions: from those who have con- fresh ideas, energy and insight. The old hands are very
tributed from the outset, from those who joined as new pleased that Tim so readily agreed to join us! For all of
contributors to the second, third or fourth editions, and the editors, production of the fifth edition has taken
from those who are new to the fifth edition. All have place at a time when we have all been facing numerous
enthusiastically responded to the editors’ edict that they challenges and demands on our time, whether as a result
should seek to adopt an accessible writing style that will of moving to pastures new, family commitments, mak-
engage readers and encourage them to make connections ing the transition to formal retirement, or simply coping
between many of the issues discussed in the book and with the ever-changing landscape of higher education.
their day-to-day experiences. This is achieved by using However, we have continued to work closely together as
contemporary/everyday examples that makes the mate- a team. Sticking to the task has again been made easier
rial more meaningful and less abstract. The importance by the continuing enthusiasm shown by all the contribu-
of developing global perspectives is retained while also tors and the team at Pearson; this has ensured that we
encouraging the contributors to include as wide a range have produced a fifth edition that we can all be proud of.
of examples as possible, especially from Europe. We The School of Geography, Earth and Environmental
have again sought to ensure good integration between Sciences at the University of Birmingham kindly offered
the case studies/artwork and the text so that the reader us temporary office space, where sections of this edition
can see why a particular feature is situated at a particu- could be assembled during the spring and early summer
lar point in a chapter, what it is there to illustrate, how of 2015 and where an early draft of the Introduction was
it can provoke readers to think through the issue, and first hammered out by James and Tim. We are all grate-
how it relates to the main narrative. It has also been very ful for this and James also thanks them for the wider
important to ensure that the fifth edition continues to hospitality during his sabbatical visit to Birmingham in
offer readers perspectives on recent debates, issues and 2015. James would also like to thank colleagues and stu-
controversies that were a feature of the earlier editions. dents at the University of Amsterdam and National Uni-
The contributors have risen to all these challenges and we versity of Singapore, where many of the ideas in Section
would like to acknowledge their constructive response 5 were rehearsed.
to the dialogue that this has necessitated along the way. As with all the past editions, the most important moti-
The editors and contributors are indebted to Patrick vation, of course, is our hope that the ideas, perspectives
Bond (then at Pearson) who initiated the discussions and challenges discussed in this book will encourage
that led to the decision to prepare a fifth edition. Just as readers to connect with human geography; after all, the
the process was getting underway he handed over to Lina vitality of the discipline depends on students being en-
Aboujieb, who then offered invaluable support and en- thused and critically, as well as creatively, engaging with
couragement during the process of pulling together the human geography within and beyond the classroom.
final manuscript and liaised with the contributors over PWD
contracts and queries associated with the artwork and MJB
illustrations. There are other members of the editorial TH
and production staff at Pearson that the Editors do not DJBS
meet, such as those tasked with preparing the artwork JDS
or undertaking the copy-editing and proofreading; we Birmingham, July 2015

A01_DANI2950_05_SE_FM.indd 13 07/04/16 7:07 pm

 xiv    Acknowledgements

The editors and publishers would like to thank the fol- research.org/volumes/vol22/15; Figures 4.13, 4.15 from
lowing reviewers of the fourth edition for their invalu- http://www.worldmapper.org, © Copyright 2006 SASI
able input into the shaping of ideas for this fifth edition: Group (University of Sheffield) and Mark Newman (Uni-
John Stubbs, University of Derby versity of Michigan); Figure 5.1 from Natural Resources:
Daniel Hammett, University of Sheffield Allocation, Economics and Policy, 2 ed., Rees, J., ©
1985, Routledge, reproduced by permission of Taylor &
David Bell, University of Leeds
Francis Books UK; Figure 5.2 from Global Change and
Samarthia Thankappan, University of York
Challenge: Geography in the 1990s, Rees, J. in Bennett,
Ed Hall, University of Dundee
R. and Estall, R. (eds) , © 1991, Routledge, reproduced
Isla Forsyth, University of Nottingham
by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK; Figure
David Haigh, Leeds Beckett University
5.3 from Natural Resources: Allocation, Economics and
Annie Hughes, Kingston University London
Policy, 2  ed., Rees, J, © 1985, Routledge, reproduced
Ruth Healey, University of Chester
by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK; Figure
Agatha Herman, University of Reading 5.9 from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015
Andrew Power, University of Southampton (2015:15); Figure 5.11 from Environmental Resources,
Allan Watson, University of Staffordshire 1 ed., Mather, A.S. and Chapman, K., © Prentice Hall,
Eifiona Thomas Lane, Bangor University 1995, Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis
Michelle Newman, University of Coventry Books UK; Figure 9.1 from United Nations (UN-HAB-
Tim Brown, Queen Mary University of London ITAT 2008), © United Nations, New York, Reprinted
David Featherstone, University of Glasgow with the permission of United Nations; Figure 14.1 ex-
Stephen Burgess, University of Cardiff tracted from World Bank Development Indicators data
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator, accessed 17 De-
cember 2014); Figure 14.2 from http://www3.weforum.
org/docs/GITR/2013/GITR_OverallRankings_2013.
Publisher’s acknowledgements pdf, GITR, Overall Rankings, World Economic Forum,
­Switzerland, 2013; Figure 15.1 from Forging linkages in
the commodity chain: the case of the Chilean salmon
Figures
farming industry, 1987-2001, Sociologia Ruralis, 43, pp.
Figure 2.2 from Descricao da Fortaleza de Sofala e das 108-27 (Phyne, J. and Mansilla, J. 2003), Reproduced
mais da India, Fundacao Oriente, Lisbon (Carneiro, A de with permission of ­Blackwell Scientific; Figure 15.2 from
M 1990); Figure 2.6 from Yorkshire Textile Mills 1770– Alternative (shorter) food supply chains and specialist
1930, 1 ed., HMSO (Giles, C. and Goodall, I.H. 1992) livestock products in the Scottish-English borders, Envi-
p. 102, MD94/04156, © Crown copyright. NMR; Fig- ronment and Planning A, 37, pp. 823-44 (Ilbery, B. and
ure 2.7 from Yorkshire Textile Mills 1770-1930, HMSO Maye, D. 2005); ­Figure 16.1 republished with permission
(Giles, C. and Goodall, I.H. 1992) p. 102, Courtesy of the from Sage Publications Ltd, from Global Shift: Mapping
Ironbridge Gorge Museum Trust; Figure 4.1 from http:// the Changing Contours of the World Economy, 5 ed.,
www.worldmapper.org, Benjamin Hennig, © 2006 SASI Fig. 1.4c, Dicken, P., © 2007 Sage Publications Ltd; per-
Group (University of Sheffield) and Mark Newman (Uni- mission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center,
versity of Michigan); Figure 4.3 from United Nations, Inc.; Figure 16.3 from ­Technology and organizational
2013, p. xv, © United Nations, New York, Reprinted factors in the notebook industry supply chain, The Per-
with the permission of United Nations; Figure 4.6 after sonal Computer Industry Center publication, Figure 2
Human Population: Fundamentals of Growth: Future (Foster, W., Cheng, Z., ­Dedrick, J. and Kraemer, K. L.
growth, Population Reference Bureau (2007) Avail- 2006), UC Irvine; Figure 16.7 from Commodity Chains
able at http://www.prb.org/Educators/TeachersGuides/ and Global Capitalism, Praeger (Gereffi, G. in Gereffi,
HumanPopulation/FutureGrowth/TeachersGuide. G. and Korzeniewicz, M. (eds.) 1994); Figure 16.8 from
aspx?p=1; Figure 4.7 from http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/ Globalization and ­ paradoxes of ethical transnational
publications/Files/WPP2012_HIGHLIGHTS.pdf—Page production: code of conduct in a Chinese workplace,
12, 2012, © United Nations, Reprinted with the permis- Competition and Change, 9, pp. 181-200, Figure 1 (Sum,
sion of United Nations; Figure 4.9 from Vienna Yearbook N-L. and Ngai, P. 2005); Figure 17.1 from Service Worlds:
of Population Research, L Lutz, W. Goujon, A., Samir, People, Organizations, Technologies, Bryson, J. R., Dan-
K.C. and Sanderson, W., 2007; Figure 4.10 from Projec- iels, P.W. and Warf, B, © 2004, Cengage, Reproduced by
tion of populations by level of educational attainment, permission of Taylor & Francis Books, UK; Figure 17.2
age and sex for 120 countries for 2005- 2050, Samir, K.C., from Input-Output Analysis: 2005, ONS (Mahajan, S.
Barakat, B., Goujon, A. et al., Demographic Research, (ed) 2005) p. 23, Office for National Statistics licensed
22, p.432, 2010, Available at http://www.demographic- under the Open Government Licence v.3.0.; Figure 17.3

A01_DANI2950_05_SE_FM.indd 14 07/04/16 7:07 pm

 Acknowledgements    xv

from T­ ransnational Corporations and Spatial Divisions Table 6.4 from Environmental Politics: Britain, Europe
of ‘Service’ Expertise as a Competitive Strategy: The Ex- and the Global Environment, 2 ed., Macmillan (Garner,
ample of 3M and Boeing, The Service Industries Journal, R. 2000) p. 11, Robert Garner, Environmental Politics,
Bryson, J. R. and Rusten, © 2008, Routledge, Repro- Reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan;
duced by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK. Table 10.2 from Dangerous Disorder: Riots and Violent
Disturbances in Thirteen Areas of Britain, 1991-1992, Jo-
Maps seph Rowntree Foundation (Power, A. and Tunstall, R.
1997); Table 10.3 from The changing dynamics of com-
Figure 1.1 adapted from Changing the Face of the Earth: munity opposition to human service facilities, Journal
Culture, Environment, History, 2nd ed., Wiley Black- of the American Planning Association, 63(1), pp. 79-93
well (Simmons, I. G. 1996) p.48; Figure 1.2 after Sher- (Takahashi, L.M. and Dear, M.J. 1997); Table 14.1 from
ratt, A., Cambridge Encyclopedia Archaeology (1980), World Bank, World Development Indicators at http://
Cambridge University Press; Figure 2.3 after Atlas of the data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
British Empire, 1st ed., (Bayley, C. 1989), © Octopus indicators [accessed 4 January 2015]; Table 14.2 from
Publishing Group; Figure 2.5 after The Hamlyn His- World Tourism Highlights, 2010 Edition, United Nation
torical Atlas, (Moore, R. I. (ed) 1981); Figure 2.8 after World Tourism Organization (2010), UNWTO, Ma-
Pounds, N.J.G, An Historical Geography of Europe, drid, © UNWTO, 9284405315; Table 14.3 from Major
Cambridge University Press (1990); Figure 5.7 from BP FDI Indicators, UNCTAD (2010)—United Nations Con-
Statistical Review of World Energy 2015, BP (2015:19); ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Major
Figure 5.8 from BP Statistical Review of World Energy FDI Indicators (extract from table at http://unctad.org/
2015, BP (2015:29); Figure 20.1 after The Fate of the sections/dite.dir/docs/WIR11_web%20tab%202.pdf)
Forest: Developers, Destroyers and Defenders of the [accessed 8 January 2015], 2010, © United Nations. Re-
Amazon, Verso (Hecht S. and Cockburn A. 1989) p.127; printed with the permission of United Nations; Table
Figure 20.2 adapted from Political Geography, John 14.4 from Yeandle and Davies (2013), Table 11, p. 35;
Wiley (Glassner M.I. 1993) p.498, Reproduced with Table 14.5 from Internet usage, by world region, 2010,
permission of Blackwell Scientific; Figure 20.4 from Ar- www.internetworldstats.com/stats.html; Table 16.2
quivo Histórico Militar (Galvão, H. 1934) Archival Ref: from The growing power of retailers in producer-driven
PT/AHM/DIV/3/47/AV2/2325; Figure 20.6 after Political commodity chains: a ‘retail revolution’ in the US auto-
geography and panregions, Geographical Review, 80, mobile industry?, (Kessler, J. and Appelbaum, R. 1998)
pp. 1-20 (O’Loughlin J. and van der Wusten, H. 1990). unpublished manuscript, Department of Sociology, Uni-
versity of California at Santa Barbara, USA; Table 17.1
from OECD, 2014, based on data from Employment in
Tables
Manufacturing and Service, 2012 and 2013, accessed on
Table 2.1 from The Hamlyn Historical Atlas, (Moore, 14/01/2015; Table 17.2 from A ‘Second’ Global Shift?
R.I. (ed), 1981), p. 57, Copyright © Octopus Publishing The Offshoring or Global Sourcing of Corporate Ser-
Ltd., 1981; Table 4.2 from from Population Division of vices and the Rise of Distanciated Emotional Labour,
the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the Geografiska Annaler (Bryson, J.R. 2007), Reproduced
United Nations Secretariat World Population Prospects: with permission of Blackwell Scientific.
The 2012 Revision, © United Nations, New York. Re-
printed with the permission of United Nations; Table Text
5.1 from Global Change and Challenge: Geography in
the 1990s, Rees, J. in Bennett, R. and Estall, R. (eds), © Poetry on page 4 from Geography is Everywhere by Dr.
1991, Routledge, reproduced by permission of Taylor & Clare Madge; Poetry on page 64 from ‘Slough’, from
Francis Books UK; Table 5.2 from BP Statistical Review Collected Poems, by John Betjeman © 1955, 1958, 1962,
of World Energy (2015: 41); Tables 5.4, 5.5 from OECD/ 1964, 1968, 1970, 1979, 1981, 1982, 2001. Reproduced by
IEA (2014) Key World Energy Statistics 2014. Also avail- permission of John Murray, a division of Hodder and
able at: www.iea.org/statistics, © OECD/IEA 2014, IEA Stoughton Limited.
Publishing. Licence: www.iea.org/t&c/termsandcondi-
tions; Table 6.1 from The Politics of the Environment: Photographs
Ideas, Activism, Policy, Cambridge University Press
(Key: b-bottom; c-centre; l-left; r-right; t-top)
(Carter, N. 2001) p. 15; Table 6.2 from The shallow
and the deep, long-range ecology movement, Inquiry Alamy Images: David R. Frazier Photolibrary, Inc 450,
16 (Naess, A. 1973) pp. 95-100, Oslo; Table 6.3 from ITAR-TASS Photo Agency 112tl, Justin Kase 425, Lord-
The Politics of the Environment: Ideas, Activism, Pol- price Collection 69, MARKA 311, Alan Payton 118, The
icy, Cambridge University Press (Carter, N. 2001) p. 4; Art Archive 41; Archant Norfolk: 221; Banksy: 252b;

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 xvi    Acknowledgements

Bridgeman Art Library Ltd: Mr and Mrs Andrews, Association Images: AP/John ­Froschauer 356, AP/Remy
c.1748-9 (oil on canvas), Gainsborough, Thomas (1727- de la Mauviniere 213; Reuters: Toby Melville 472, Ed-
88)/National Gallery, London, UK/Bridgeman Images uardo Munoz 159; Rex Shutterstock: courtesy of Everett
252t; Corbis: Bettmann 367, 411bl, 411br, Stefano Bian- Collection 415, 481bl, 481br, SIPA PRESS 401; Ronald
chetti 30, Sherwin Crasto/Reuters 354, Angelo Hornak Grant Archive: 20th Century/Lionsgate Film 257; Shut-
60; T. Paul Daniels: 289; Mike Deaton: 198; Fotolia. terstock.com: 1000 Words 380, 360b 67br, ArtWell
com: Carabay 114, EyeMark 426, fotomuhabiri 471, 330, Asianet-Pakistan 458, Diego Barucco 24cl, Bike-
Leonid Ikan 482, Juulijs 478, karenfoleyphoto 411tl, worldtravel 463, Caminoel 410, cdrin 287, Malcolm
labalajadia 422, Monkey Business 344, Oksana Perkins Chapman 93, Jeffrey J Coleman 388br, coloursinmylife
432, tanjalagicaimage 11, TheStockCube 440, Vacclav 461, ermess 383bl, Everett Historical 66, 348, 447, Iakov
452; Getty Images: Anadolu Agency 473b, Boston Globe Filimonov 63tl, 67bl, peter jeffreys 63br, johnbraid 24cr,
269, Jean-Pierre Fouchet 475, Spencer Platt 377, Popper- Joshua Rainey Photography 383br, Matej Kastelic 435,
foto 112br, Mark Ralston/AFP 193, Chris Scott 431; Tim KieferPix 322, thomas koch 100, Daniel Korzeniewski
Hall: 199t, 199b, 202; Phil Hubbard: 214; PARS Interna- 312, Alexander Kuguchin 28, kisa kuyruk 473t, Labo-
tional Corp, Time Inc: from TIME, 15 January 1979 © rant 201, Daryl Lang 466, littleny 166, meunierd 384,
1979 Time Inc. Used under license. TIME and Time Inc. Michaelpuche 388tl, Jan Mika 457, Slobodan Miskovic
are not affiliated with, and do not endorse products or 34, Luciano Mortula 263, Gilles Paire 109, pcruciatti 21b,
services of, Licensee. 412; John F. Kennedy Presidential PhotoSmart 390, Ppictures 70, Pyty 299, Radiokafka 464,
Library and Museum, Boston: Cecil Stoughton. White Dr. Morley Read 341, Joseph Sohm 385, TCJ2020 451,
House Photographs 174; LBJ Library Photo: by Yoichi urbanbuzz 381, 386, Jeff Whyte 274; Terry Slater: 45,
Okamoto 177; Paul Lunnon: 248, 248bl, 248br; War- 55 (a), 55 (b), 55 (c), 55 (d), 57 (a), 57 (b), 57 (c), 57 (d);
wick E. Murray: 227t, 227c, 228, 229, 232, 233, 234t, SuperStock: © Salvador Dali, Fundació Gala-Salvador
234b, 238bl, 238br, 240 /John Overton 227b; NASA: 7; Dalí, DACS, 2016. 413; The Independent: 393; TopFoto:
Panos Pictures: Paul Lowe 176; PhotoDisc: 248tl; Jenny 414; UNOG Library, League of Nations Archives: 483.
Pickerill: 134, 135t, 135b, 139, 141, 147, 150, 153; Press

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 Geography: finding your
way in the world

Introduction

James Sidaway
Michael Bradshaw
Peter Daniels
Tim Hall
Denis Shaw

Geography is indispensable to survival. All animals, including

­American students who consistently fail their geography tests,
must be competent applied geographers. How else do they get
around, find food and mate, avoid dangerous places?
(Yi-Fu Tuan 2002: 123)

We believe that our everyday lives are simply teeming with the kinds
of issues and questions that are often pigeon-holed as theory. Much
of the excitement and value in Human Geography lies in addressing
these issues and questions by thinking through aspects of our own
lives and of the world(s) in which we live.
(Cloke et al. 2014: 2)

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 2    INTRODUCTION

T his book is the fifth edition of An Introduction to

Human Geography. The first edition was published
in 2001. The task of compiling the first edition there-
to specialize in geography, and they will usually have
experienced limited or no exposure to it as a discipline at
high school. Geography is seldom taught in the Ameri-
fore dates back to 1997–98 so that it is now approach- can ‘K–12’ (kindergarten to pre-university) school sys-
ing 20 years since we wrote the first introduction. tem. The institutional setting within which the present
While the fifth edition incorporates further changes to textbook has been put together is different. The editors
the structure and contents and one new editor, we have and most of the contributors are currently attached to
retained the original goal, which was to provide an (or associated with) British or continental European uni-
introduction to human geography that focuses upon versities, or in countries where the influence of a British
contemporary issues and approaches. What introduc- style educational system is more evident. Many of their
tory textbooks in human geography choose to include students have chosen to specialize in geography at a sec-
and foreground (and what is excluded or neglected) ondary school or college and have made a choice to read
some years ago became the subject of heated debate for a degree in geography. Consequently, students from
in a leading disciplinary journal (Transactions of the these countries often have ideas about the subject mat-
Institute of British Geographers). According to one ter of the discipline (although this may turn out to be
of the protagonists, textbooks (in part via their influ- rather different from much of what they will subsequently
ence on a prospective new generation of geographers) encounter at university: see Bonnett 2003 and Stannard
become part of what shapes the dominant themes for 2003). Further, the departmental contexts within which
research and scholarship in a discipline. Textbooks are geography is taught and learnt within universities varies a
thereby implicated ‘in strategies to mobilize support great deal between different institutions and national sys-
for a particular set of disciplinary practices’ (Johnston tems of higher education. The fact that the discipline is
2007: 437). being reproduced across a variegated international insti-
Textbooks also reflect where they are written and tutional landscape may be having an impact on geogra-
where they are read. For example, most textbooks written phy’s immediate futures (see Spotlight box I.1).
in North America devote a significant number of words Moreover, human geography and the world that it seeks
to explaining what geography is and what constitutes to interpret and represent are dynamic. In the years since
a geographical approach. Early on in one of the most we embarked on the first edition of this book a great deal
widely used American human geography introductions, has changed in the world; ongoing processes of migration,
Marston et al. (2011: 2) noted that: urbanization and economic transformations (such as the
fast pace of development in parts of China, the Persian
The power of geography comes from its integrative
Gulf and India) are producing new spaces, connections
approach, which addresses global connections, his-
and flows that require new maps and geographical narra-
torical trends, and systemic political-economic and
tives. New divisions are also being created, old conflicts
socio-cultural relations by drawing on the intellectual
revived and, on first appearances, the world might appear
tradition in both the natural and social sciences.
to be more fragmented and contested than it was at the
The reason why introductory textbooks in the United start of the twentieth century. For example, the aftermath
States need to explicitly consider definitions of human of the 2008 global financial crisis, which is still being felt in
geography and devote space to explaining what a geo- many economies across the world, seems to have acceler-
graphical approach amounts to is that many of the stu- ated the shift in the centre of geo-economic power further
dents taking a module in introductory human geography towards parts of Asia; although such shifts are uneven and
are not geography majors; that is, they will not go on there are some countervailing trends.

Spotlight box I.1

Departments and the reproduction of elsewhere worked hard to create a subject that is, today,
geography: where do you fit? far larger and more buoyant than they could possibly have
imagined’. The scale and complexity of geography as an
University geography departments are very diverse enti- academic discipline is apparent in a number of ways, one
ties. As Noel Castree (2011, 5) has noted, ‘A century ago, of which is the complexity of its management arrange-
a small number of university geographers in England and ments, the ways in which it is organised into departments

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 INTRODUCTION    3

in universities. Some geography departments are single your department? Does it differ from the management of
subject, autonomous units but increasingly, in the UK at geography in other universities? Most importantly, though,
least, and for much longer in other countries, geography does this management of geography in your university
is managed alongside other subjects such as archaeol- matter? Does it impact upon the geography you study?
ogy, sociology, environmental science, geology and a host For example, are you able to take courses taught with
of others from across the sciences, social sciences, arts students from other subjects, perhaps that are taught by
and humanities. One of the editors, along with a number non-geography staff? How does this affect your emerg-
of other colleagues mapped the changing management ing geographical imagination (see page 6)? Does your
of geography within UK higher education, interpreting exposure to perspectives from beyond geography enrich
these trends within the wider political economies of UK or diminish your own geographies? If you are in a sin-
and international higher education systems (Hall et al. gle subject autonomous geography department look at
2015). And all five editors were once either postgradu- the publications produced by your lecturers (usually their
ate students or staff at what was in the 1990s (when the homepages indicate some of these, but they can also be
first edition of this textbook was planned) a single subject searched on Google Scholar and the like). Do they con-
geography department (founded in 1924, although the duct research and publish with non-geographers? Who
subject was taught from the 1890s in Mason College, are these collaborators, why have these collaborations
which became the University of Birmingham in 1900), arisen and what sort of geographies are being produced
but is now a larger School of Geography, Earth and Envi- through them? Very quickly you will discover that geogra-
ronmental Sciences at the University of Birmingham. phy is not a hermetically sealed discipline but it overlaps
These different departmental configurations and with other fields in many ways and for many reasons.
management arrangements reflect a number of things Think also about the history of geography in your
including traditions of academic management, national university. Can you find out if the management of geog-
systems of higher education, fluctuations in student num- raphy has changed over time? This information is not
bers, financial and administrative pressures as well as always readily available – but it may be worth looking
disciplinary and intellectual fashions, trends and aspira- into. Asking your lecturers may be a starting point or
tions. For example, in most North American universities finding out if there is a published history of your depart-
geography courses are required to meet the needs of ment (such as the one for Birmingham by Giles, 1987).
non-geography students who are taking geography as an The issue of why has it changed and who got to decide
option or elective. Single subject, autonomous geography geography's institutional position is often complex, how-
departments are therefore the exception rather than the ever. Was this the result of decisions made by geography
rule, and in many continental European countries, physi- staff or university managers, most of whom were prob-
cal and human geography are separate departments. ably not geographers by background? You will find that
Think about the university department at which you geography is not just an intellectual pursuit that exists in
are studying geography. Understanding the administrative a vacuum but is impacted by its immediate disciplinary,
place of academic geography can tell you a lot about the institutional and wider socio-economic contexts. The
institutional pressures that it has to confront, its security, geography you will learn and the geographer you will
the wider structures that the discipline is located within become will also be a product of these and the many
and the possibilities for its immediate futures. Reflect other contexts within which geography is reproduced
upon the place of geography within your university and here and around the world. You can start to understand
what this reveals. For example, is geography the only sub- and unpack the reproduction of geography by turning
ject in your department or is it managed alongside other your critical eye on your own geography department and
subjects? If it is the latter, what are the other subjects in the geographies it is producing.

Changing worlds: changing human geographies The root of the word ‘geography’ combines geo (earth) and
graphy (writing). To engage in geography is to write about
Geographical knowledge is not – and should not attempt to be –
the earth (which includes its lands and seas, resources,
static and detached from what is going on in the world, but is rather
places and peoples) or, more widely perhaps, to represent
dynamic and profoundly influenced by events, struggles and politics
the earth in text (which includes maps: some of the most
beyond u ­ niversity life.
complexly crafted of all texts). Of course, many other
(Blunt and Wills 2000: x–xi) branches of knowledge such as history, anthropology,

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 4    INTRODUCTION

sociology, oceanography, politics and geology (from which terms italicized in the last sentence have been enduring top-
geography draws) and many other sciences are also in some ics in human geography. However, approaches too them
way or other about the world. Traditionally, what has been have shifted radically over the decades. Moreover, human
distinctive about human geography is that it puts an empha- geography is not just about ‘out there’, it is also about ‘in
sis on people in places and spaces, on landscapes modified here’ (see Spotlight box I.2). Thus, you all create your own
by human interventions, human relationships with nature personal geographies derived, for example, from where you
and environment and on complex spatial connections. The live, where you work or when you travel.

Spotlight box I.2

Geography is everywhere back through its ‘irrepressible vitality’. So, if geography

By Clare Madge is everywhere, how is this poem geographical? What
can it tell us about geographical worlds and how those
Willow fell and swallow soar worlds might be expressed?
Geography is everywhere, emerging out of our lived
In my back garden
lives. As the poem shows, these lived lives are not simply
there were two
about our human world but are infused with animals,
beautiful
plants and atmospheres. Moreover, these geographical
wispy
worlds may at the same time be about death, dying and
emerald
vulnerability as well as life, living and vitality: spaces of
willow
dissolution and fragility circulate beside spaces of regen-
trees.
eration, challenging simplistic oppositions of life/death.
where pigeons roosted
The poem also reveals that therapeutic landscapes exist
and swallows soared.
far beyond medicalised places (hospital wards), and that
One day
these landscapes can be metaphorical and s­ piritual.
Two men
Those experiencing life-threatening illnesses can cre-
Climbed
ate a vision of the world – an active place-making –
The trees
that helps them sculpt out a way of being in the world
And
that makes a life worth living. So although perhaps not
Felled
instantly apparent, this poem touches upon those well-
Them
versed geographical themes of place, space, landscape
Whole.
and nature. But it is about more than that too.
In life there are many things
Geography is everywhere and geographical worlds
that can bring us to our
can be emotional, sentient and visceral. They can be
knees,
about minded-bodies that feel. The poem is deliberately
fell us sure as any tree.
and unashamedly intimate and it paints a picture from
But, like the willow stump,
‘the inside’, from a one minded-body going through a
we can grow shoots
particular experience of a cancer diagnosis. Such inti-
and again start sprouting
mate expression can be used to counter disembodied
to journey with swallows.
accounts, disclosing detailed knowledge and candid
Geography is everywhere. The poem might not feelings – a sort of finely tuned life-writing – thus being
immediately appear to be ‘geography as you know it’. a means to insert the ill minded-body into geographi-
I wrote the poem as I was sitting in my garden recover- cal publishing space, populating geographical texts with
ing from chemotherapy. In the poem I was meditating the diverse bodies that are still sometimes forced to its
about my cancer diagnosis and my will to survive. At margins. Poetic encounters can act as a portal into such
that moment I felt a resonance with the felled tree, its inner lifeworlds, bringing alive a fleshy, fine-grained emo-
life being truncated and its future unknown, although I tive analysis of everyday lived life, albeit from a specific
also drew strength from the tree, knowing it would grow framing or perspective.

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 INTRODUCTION    5

So  .  .  .  geography is everywhere, and it can be and spatial inequalities in health outcomes and experi-
expressed in a multitude of ways. While the vast majority ences. As poetry is also emotive and embodied, it has
of geographic texts are written in conventional academic the potential to ‘show’ another person how it is to feel or
style, there are also alternative ways of expressing geog- experience something beyond their specific world per-
raphy. Examples include creative writing, theatre, photog- spective, enabling appreciation that the world is made
raphy, painting, films, music and poetry. Thus geography up of manifold, heterogeneous geographies, which are
is a subject that can be expressed in multifaceted, multi- constantly changing.
sensory creative formats (Madge 2014a, 2014b). Thus, geography is everywhere and is continu-
However, while geography is everywhere, it is every­ ally emerging: it is a living subject. The poem was a
where differently. This poem is written from the frame response to my changed life circumstances, but it was
of someone experiencing one specific illness, located also a reflection on living on and shaping a world in
in a precise place, with its particular system of health which I was part. It is on this point that I wish to finish.
care, embedded in specific social and political networks Geography is a living subject and in its liveliness we
and experienced through a distinct minded-body. Cancer all have potential to shape the world in which we live.
is, however, a prevalent worldwide disease. As a health Geography is not simply a static, flat canvas which we
issue of (differential) global significance, it is therefore describe and interpret as scholars, but we can shape the
a topic of important consideration, but the experience contours and terrain of that geographical landscape too.
of cancer varies enormously across the globe. Poetic It is exciting to think about all those diverse geographies
expression can carve out space for ‘other’ stories about not yet expressed, waiting to emerge out of your (multi-
cancer from ‘other’ places, illustrating the intense social ple) experiences, voices and visions.

Through such myriad social–cultural, political and and, until 2015, also published the daily Financial Times
economic geographies, we inhabit a world, as John Pick- and the weekly Economist. The company found itself in
les (2004: 5) pointed out: the headlines in March 2011, when it was revealed that the
holdings of the Libyan Investment Trust (LIT), who held
that has, in large part, been made as a geo-coded
3.2 per cent of Pearson’s shares, had been suspended, along
world; a world where boundary objects have been
with the freezing of other assets belonging to the then gov-
inscribed, literally written on the surface of the earth
ernment of Libya (and the Qaddafi family who formed its
and coded by layer upon layer of lines drawn on paper.
core). This followed the outbreak of a civil war – in which
Those geo-codes have increasingly become digital. Britain and other outside powers had taken military sides
They are stored, transformed, transmitted and negotiated with the anti-Qaddafi rebels, who soon after overthrew the
electronically; as in the signal that your mobile phone regime leading to protracted civil war. In turn, Pearson’s
is transmitting regarding your current location (unless stake in the LIT reflects the flows of money associated
you have turned it off) or the data about you that is in with geographies of resources (oil and gas) and the mod-
archives, online or within that phone (be it on or off). ern financial system that are considered in later chapters.
Such complexity, connections and challenges (as well as But, in turn, Libyan economic and political geographies
diverse ‘geo-codes’) are evident when we consider the idea cannot be understood without reference to colonial histo-
of ‘globalization’. As many of the chapters spell out, a com- ries (the then Ottoman Turkish lands that today comprise
bination of technical, political, ideological, cultural and Libya were invaded by Italy in 1911, in a bloody war that
economic transformations throughout the twentieth cen- cost thousands of Arab lives), nationalism, revolution and
tury enhanced the sense of global interconnection. Take the geopolitics. It can be argued that these led the post-colonial
case of this book. The copy that you are reading may well Libyan state (established in the early 1950s in the debris of
have been printed far from where you picked it up. Or you Italian fascist imperialism and the Second World War) into
may be reading it as an e-book. Either way, it was published violent conflict with the West, with some of its neighbours
by a multinational company, whose ownership and ‘home’ (whose boundaries themselves were drawn by competing
location may not be immediately evident. The shares of the European colonialists) as well as with more conservative
publisher (Pearson) are traded in London, part of the daily Arab regimes. Such colonial histories continue to be con-
turnover on the world’s largest stock exchange. In addition tested elsewhere in the Middle East, with ongoing conse-
to textbooks such as this, Pearson publishes Penguin books quences for Libya and the wider world.

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 6    INTRODUCTION

To describe contemporary technological, economic, force, breaking down barriers, making capitalism more
cultural or political tendencies as ‘globalization’ is to efficient and spreading its benefits throughout the world.
invoke a certain geographical imagination: a vision of For others it is a more negative process enabling another
the growing significance of a global scale of action, of round of exploitation, often with the further destruction
the world as a single place. Yet, we know that many of local cultures and identities and further commodify-
people and places remain relatively marginalized, sense ing life and nature. Everything is for sale, everything has
dangers or face threats from these supposedly hypermo- a price. Obviously, globalization has been contested, in
bile ways of living and working. And some people and terms of both the meanings attributed to it and the evalu-
places benefit from them more than others. Of course, ation of its consequences. Judge for yourself, but as you
such power and inequality are not themselves new. Con- do so, do not make the mistake of assuming that everyone
sider the profits and consequences of the transatlantic everywhere shares your vantage point and experiences of
slave trade between the sixteenth and nineteenth centu- the world. And having boomed as a term and way of talk-
ries, for example (see Chapter 2). Cheap sugar and cot- ing about the world in the 1990s, recent years have seen
ton for northern hemisphere markets and manufacturers use of the term begin to decline. Although based on a
in Europe and America enabled new links, markets and selective sample of books published in English since 1900,
economies. But the humans traded as unpaid workers data provided by Google’s scanning of books indicates
(slaves) and objects of exploitation who did the work did that the number using the term ‘globalization’ peaked in
not see it that way (if they lived long at all). Today, a low- the mid-2000s after a steep rise from almost zero in the
paid worker (or self-employed prospector) in a diamond 1980s (see Figure 1).
mine might experience the global trade in these miner- Some events and moments have had global coverage as
als rather differently to the companies that dominate the an iconic image likened by some to the moment when the
jewellery business. Certainly the benefits of globalization American Apollo 8 spacecraft in 1968 captured the first
are uneven. This is not new. image of the earth as a whole from space, or the reception
As an alternative to the term ‘globalization’, we might of photographs of the earth from space by subsequent
use other terms: ‘imperialism’, ‘power’ or ‘capitalism’, NASA missions (see Plate 1). These images have since
for example. Each carries particular connotations. In this circulated widely and are credited with reshaping human
way, ‘globalization’ serves as a particular concept that is perceptions of the planet (see Cosgrove 2001). Yet the way
used to make sense of the world whereby a certain geo- that some events become ‘significant’ or ‘global’ reflects
graphical imagination, of an increasingly connected and where they happen and who they affect. The spectacu-
‘shrinking’ world for example, is emphasized. Yet just lar losses of thousands of lives in Manhattan on ‘9/11’,
because something is imagined and interpreted in par- for example, became a global media event and subject of
ticular ways and by reference to particular geographies, debate in the way that the death of several million peo-
it does not make it any less real to those caught up in ple through a decade of war from the mid-1990s in the
it. Globalization is seen by some as a broadly positive Democratic Republic of Congo never did.

1400%
Globalization
1200%

1000%

800%

600%

400%

200%

0%
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Figure 1  Use of the term ‘globalization’, 1900–2009, based on a survey of digitized material in Google books.
Source: http://ngrams.googlelabs.com/graph?content=globalization&year_start=1900&year_end=2008&corpus=0&smoothing=1

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 INTRODUCTION    7

separate degree schemes. This happened as the old cur-

riculum – based on classical learning in philosophy and
sciences – began to break down with the rise of science,
commerce and new capitalist rationalities. The fact that
the late nineteenth century was also a time when many
European states (chief amongst them Britain, France and
the Netherlands) were engaged in overseas colonization
and empire-building, and all were keen to foster their
sense of national identity and territorial coherence, gave
geography a new practical relevance. Children needed to
be taught, it was argued, about their nation and its place
in the world and their teachers thus required a degree
in geography. At the same time, geographical knowledge
had direct strategic and military relevance (this was the
moment too of the birth of geopolitics, as detailed in
Chapter 20) as well as commercial and imperial relevance,
such as in schemes to exploit the perceived agricultural
potential of colonies in Africa and Asia, for example.
Nineteenth-century ideas about the relations between
Plate 1  ‘The Blue Marble’. Photograph taken by a climate, environment and ‘race’, and (to use the language
crew member aboard Apollo 17 on 7 December 1972. of that time) ‘civilization’ and progress, were caught up
(NASA) with the emergence of the discipline, but so too were the
impacts of Darwin’s ideas about evolution (which influ-
The evolution of academic geography enced physical geography too: in the conception of the
way that landforms evolve).
A brief glance at the available disciplinary histories of geography The early years of the modern discipline were there-
gives an indication of a long association between geography and fore inescapably tied up with nationalism and empires.
the militarized attempts to claim territory on behalf of a particular This continued into the early twentieth century, with a
imperial project. growing number of geography departments being estab-
(Nayak and Jeffrey 2011: 5) lished at universities in the USA and Canada, in many
Latin American countries, in the European colonies and
Consider how the contents and style of this text, like dependencies and in Japan. In some instances, such as
those others, is marked by where it was written. Geogra- Russia, the earliest departments were organized in the
phy, as a subject, has both history and its own geography; 1880s and this was tied to nation-building rather than
it has varied in space and time. As a student of the sub- overseas expansion. Such was also the case in Germany
ject, you might want to venture online, or into the recess and in Scandinavia. By the time of the Second World
of a library, to discover past textbooks, such as Haggett War, geography was relatively well established – and the
(1972) which over 40 years ago was a ground-breaking practical knowledge (as part of military ‘intelligence’, for
text. It is important to appreciate this – and the longer- example) it yielded in wartime helped to consolidate the
term – intellectual heritages of geography. discipline’s place in universities in many countries. After
As a distinct subject (with students reading for a degree 1945 new challenges arose as other disciplines expanded,
in it) geography has been present in European universi- but (with some exceptions such as the closure of a few
ties since the mid- to late-nineteenth century. Before then, departments in the United States), geography benefited
however, geographical knowledge was studied and taught from the first big post-war expansion in the number both
in many universities (not only those in Europe, but in the of universities and of students in the 1960s. Human geog-
great centres of learning in the predominantly Islamic raphy increasingly reoriented itself to the technological
world, such as Baghdad and Cairo), as part of a variety of and scientific spirit of the times, fed by a new phase of
programmes of study – sometimes alongside mathemat- military competition in the Cold War (on this, see Barnes
ics and geometry for example, or as part of (or alongside) and Farish 2006).
natural history, astronomy or cosmography (see Withers In an age of formal decolonization, where the old impe-
and Mayhew 2002). In the second half of the nineteenth rial disciplinary role was waning, human geography also
century, universities were reorganized around modern found new fields of study and outlets for its graduates
disciplines, increasingly with discrete departments and (such as conservation, development and planning: but also

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 8    INTRODUCTION

many others, by virtues of the broader skills they would Nearly 40 years later, another leading geographer
acquire within a geography degree). There were, however, claimed that:
fierce debates about the appropriate focus (for example it is worth affirming the importance of the geographi-
over the status of regional geography) and methods (such cal imagination, as a matter of both practical wisdom
as the role of statistical analysis), which meant that what and scholarly reflection, and not least for its pleasure
undergraduate students were exposed to (and thus had and enchantment, for people’s love of learning about
to learn) to pass a geography degree continued to change the world and their place within it.
(though unevenly, depending on where they studied).
By the 1960s and 1970s, the world was changing and so (Daniels 2011: 186)
was human geography. At first it led geographers to adopt Today though, the taken-for-granted ‘him’ of Har-
statistical techniques, seeking to render the discipline vey’s (1973) quote would be qualified with ‘him or
more scientific. But other, more radical social and politi- her’: and with this perhaps a recognition of significant
cal changes (think of the hippies, the rise of feminism and gender differences in experiences and assumptions. For
gay liberation, or the movements against the American example, where do men and women experience space
war in Vietnam and for civil rights in America and the differently and how does this relate to spaces of power,
wider spirit of revolution that came to the fore in the late sexuality, work and reproduction? Such sensitivity has
1960s) kindled interest in the underlying economic causes evolved out of the ways that by the 1970s geographers,
of inequality, turmoil and conflict in capitalist societies. David Harvey amongst them and later joined by others
An early 1990s textbook, introducing the ensuing theo- from many different backgrounds, started to ask more
retical debates in human geography, noted how, by the difficult questions about inequality, power, exploitation
1970s, ‘human geography as an academic discipline had and difference. In turn, capitalism entered a phase of
just entered into a period of considerable turmoil’ (Cloke heightened restructuring (shaped by economic reces-
et al. 1991: viii). They go on to note how: sions, new technologies and new forms and places of
production and regulation, as detailed in Section 4).
One of the most obvious characteristics of contem-
Reflecting the times, human geographers became more
porary human geography is its diversity of approach.
concerned with inequality, economic and political
Within human geography today there is an unprec-
crises and contradictions. Feminist, humanistic, eco-
edented liveliness to the engagement with issues of
logical and other critiques also started to impact on
method and theory. Rarely, if ever before, has the sub-
human geography and feed into re-evaluations both of
ject seen such a plurality of research methodologies
its history (the way that early twentieth-century impe-
and encompassed such a broad sweep of topics of
rial geography was shaped by racism and sexism, for
investigation.
example) and contemporary contents. Moreover, the
(Cloke et al. 1991: 1) boundaries between many of human geography’s sub-
disciplines, such as urban, political, historical or cul-
This liveliness has continued, reflecting both changes
tural geography, became more blurred. However, along
in the world (including political, economic and cultural
the way, the modelling, data processing and visual-
shifts) and accompanying technical developments, theo-
izing capabilities of geographic information science
retical exuberance and shifting funding arrangements
continued to be refined (Fairbairn and Dorling 1997;
for, and ways of, running universities. Cloke et al. (1991)
Fotheringham et al. 2000; Schuurman 2004) and the
looked back to what one particularly creative geographer
Internet, digitisation and mobile technologies produced
had once termed a geographical imagination. They thus
new capacities for communication and altered
cited David Harvey (1973: 24):
relations and perceptions of proximity and distance
This imagination enables the individual to recognize (see www.zooknic.com for work on the geographies
the role of space and place in his own biography . . . to of the Internet). For some, outside the discipline, the
relate to the spaces he sees around him, and to rec- decline of the Cold War in the late 1980s brought the
ognize how transactions between individuals and ‘end of history’. For others, the development of tech-
between organizations are affected by the spaces that nology and the globalization of the economy were cre-
separate them. It allows him to recognize the relation- ating a ‘borderless world’; some even proclaimed the
ship which exists between him and his neighbour- ‘end of geography’.
hood, his territory, or, to use the language of the street Yet the fact that social and economic processes take
gangs, his ‘turf’ . . . It allows him to fashion and use place across space matters. Indeed the way they do so is
space creatively and to appreciate the meaning of the vital to how they operate. Human geography is not just
spatial forms created by others. about describing the spatial manifestations of economy

M00_DANI2950_05_SE_INTRO.indd 8 31/03/16 7:05 pm

 INTRODUCTION    9

and society: it is about explaining how space is config- environmental and related issues that face the world in
ured and shapes economies, societies and social pro- the early years of the twenty-first century. It is for you to
cesses. Thus, geography is not a passive outcome; it is use this book to inform your own insights and opinions
a critical component of dynamic social and economic as geographers; and to read beyond it. In other words,
processes. More than that, geography in its broader defi- reading this textbook is the beginning of your introduc-
nition provides an interface between the human and the tion to human geography, not the end.
natural worlds. We would argue that geography is a key Today, human geography is characterized by a wide
subject for the twenty-first century, in part because many variety of approaches; there are many ways of writing
of the challenges that face humanity are at the interface geography and approaches to doing so (see Spotlight
between human societies and natural environments. One box I.2). The idea of a single, all-encompassing geo-
of the oldest themes of human geography (and indeed graphical approach (which may have been evident in
of geography as a whole, including its physical side) – times past) is not convincing anymore. Since we have
human–environment relations – has become an urgent adopting an issue-based approach, there is not the scope
agenda for the twenty-first century. here to say much more about the evolution of debates in
Human geographers have also become more aware of human geography. You can further explore their trajec-
the ways that knowledge is socially constructed. This is tory using some of the other readings listed at the end
complex, reflecting ideology. But in the simplest terms, of this chapter. Alternatively, track down and read Chris
the way you see the world is partly a function of who Philo’s (2008) fluent summary alongside his ‘map’ of
you think you are and, hence, where you see yourself as changing approaches in human geography. But at this
coming from. Human geographers have come to realize point please accept our word that this story (like Philo’s
that much of the knowledge and understanding that ‘map’) becomes immensely complex, intertwined and
they claimed to be universal is in various ways Euro- convoluted, reflecting the intellectual trends and social
centric: it comes from somewhere and any idea that changes mentioned earlier.
it is universally true (for all and everywhere) might be However, it is important to appreciate some shared
challenged. Similarly, Eurocentrism has been associated concepts. Most disciplines have their central concepts
with a very ‘white’ view of a multi-ethnic world such as and ideas that define what it is they study and how
the fairly widespread self-perception that white folk are they study it. Human geography is often accused of
not really themselves members of a particular ‘ethnic’ borrowing ideas from elsewhere, rather than generating
group, except amongst racists and white supremacists. its own; but it is possible to identify a set of concepts
Yet in global terms they are arguably a distinctive ‘eth- that make it distinct and different. We might disagree
nic minority’ whose identity has been forged through on what they might mean (and each is the subject of a
comparisons and interactions with other people clas- vast literature), but ideas of place, space, and scale are
sified as non-white. In turn, however, such ideas about certainly central to human geography and have been for
race and ethnicity are rooted in colonial histories (and a long time, as has an interest in landscape, difference,
hierarchies) that are evidently themselves particular connectivity and unevenness. All of the core ideas of
(imperial) ways of knowing, ordering and interpreting human geography can be deployed to interrogate and
the world. These resurface in contemporary racism, explain the places where we live and the places where
and have their own historical geography. Ideas about we travel. As geographers, we seek explanations as to
race, which today may seem self-evident and obvi- why something came to be where it is, how places are
ous, would not have been present in, for example, the experienced, connected and represented, or how the
Roman Empire, which had other ways of ordering and physical environment and nature are transformed by
stratifying society and demarcating insiders, barbari- society. Chapter 12 notes how the planetary scale of
ans, citizens and slaves. All this means that geographers such transformations has been re-conceptualized as
must now reconsider the ways in which assumptions a human-influenced geological epoch (the Anthropo-
and value judgments shape the way they view the world. cene). At a more personal scale, in Spotlight box I.3,
They must accept that all descriptions of the world are one of the editors explains his engagements with a par-
culturally determined, often politically motivated, and ticular place – or set of places connected on a path. It
can always be contested. is our hope that, as a practising human geographer, you
So, think about your position; realize that this book will also find your own literal or metaphorical paths
presents the views of human geographers working at through this discipline and be inspired to think geo-
particular places and times. We have set out to chal- graphically. For us, then, human geography is a way of
lenge readers to think about the ways that human geog- seeing, enquiring and understanding past, present and
raphy interprets the major social, cultural, economic, potential future worlds.

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 10    INTRODUCTION

Spotlight box I.3

James' wanderings alone in this of course and his paper draws on an enor-
mous literature about walking in cities from many sites
One of us especially likes walking. It is a deeply geo- and a vast range of authors. But sometimes it is nice to
graphical practice. For (even enabled by the geo-tech- get away from the city (even the one he currently lives
nologies of GPS and mobile Internet) it is easy to get in: Singapore) and walk in more remote places. So over
lost, or find oneself in the ‘wrong’ place, or feel ‘out of the years since the third edition of this book, he has bit
place’, or discover new places. Walking requires an inti- by bit been walking one of the routes there that is com-
mate encounter with place, whilst negotiating space and monly referred to as the Camino de Santiago (Way of St
landscape. James has done this often in different cities James), mapped in Figure 2. As the account of another
and written scholarly geographies about it, linking it to who walked this way has noted:
the geopolitics and memories in/of a particular one: the the Camino de Santiago is really a network of routes,
English city of Plymouth (Sidaway 2009). He is far from many of Roman origin, extending throughout Europe

Paris

Vezelay
Tours

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Limoges
THE CAMINO FRANCES
THE MAIN PILGRIM ROUTE Le Puy

Saint Jean Bordeaux

Pied-de-Port
Finisterre
Arles
Santiago
Leon Toulouse
Roncesvalles
Astorga
Burgos Jaca
Puente
Zamora
la Reina
Salamanca

Caceres

Merida

A
SE
Seville EAN
AN
RR
D ITE Figure 2 
ME A map of the
routes known
as Camino de
Santiago.

M00_DANI2950_05_SE_INTRO.indd 10 31/03/16 7:05 pm

 INTRODUCTION    11

that have been used by pilgrims since the eleventh

century to reach Santiago de Compostela [whose
Cathedral houses the shrine dedicated to the Apostle
St James] . . . The early medieval pilgrimage played
an important role . . . fostered by the reigning political
forces.
(Frey 1998: 5)

Frey's book also describes how, with the lessening

of Christian influence in the latter half of the twenti-
eth century, the ancient pilgrimage routes declined,
before undergoing a rapid renaissance in recent years.
Today many thousands walk these routes daily (Plate
2). Not all are pilgrims. Some go mostly for the exer-
cise, others for a change of scene, as a holiday, or
as a personal or even spiritual journey that may not
be grounded in a formal religion. But to walk it is to
experience everyday geographies of slow movement
– as on any other popular long-distance walking trail,
such as those in Appalachia, the UK, Germany, New
Zealand or on grander scales and higher altitudes in,
say, Nepal or Peru.
Plate 2  Signalling the Camino to Santiago de
Long-distance walkers must negotiate and become,
Compostela.
sometimes painfully, aware of scale, topography and
tanjalagicaimage/fotolia
landscape. When you are walking, distances, pace,
elevations and inclines matter fundamentally. Weather,
food and water become things that may not be taken becomes more complicated. This is because, when you
for granted, as must what you decide to carry or decide pause to think about it, any place on the path becomes
to leave behind (as in other travel of course: including part of a vast network extending in many directions.
those using sophisticated technologies like aircraft). To make such a journey also links mind, body, land-
Economic geographies and cultural geographies are scape and movement in ways that are hard to capture
evident: place names and language differences for in words: geographical imaginations may be rich, but
starters; carrying enough money; where to eat and some things you can only learn – or fully appreciate – by
sleep; and who gains from all that expenditure? So are doing them. Moreover, others walk long distances not
political geographies, if you know where to look. But for pleasure or spiritual gain, but simply to collect water,
glance up and see an aircraft far overhead – during a seek a living or escape conflict. And other demands,
long day of remote walking perhaps – and encounter injuries, age or disability, or preferences mean that hik-
other walkers from across the world, or discuss where ing long distances is not something that everyone can,
you started from with them, and the question of scale or might want to, do.

a great deal. Many of the contemporary issues discussed

Approach of the book in this book, such as the geographies of development and
of inequality, owe much to the way the world looked in
The major sections of this book focus on important issues 1900, or considerably earlier. A sense of history is critical
facing the world, but they also relate to major sub-disci- to an understanding of contemporary human geography.
plines in human geography. Section 1 provides historical However, if we cast our minds even further back into the
context for the four issue-oriented sections that follow. records of antiquity we are reminded that societies are
While it is natural for us to proclaim that geography mat- transitory; nothing lasts forever. States and civilizations
ters, it is also the case that historical geography matters. have come and gone and this should teach us that there
A cursory examination of an atlas printed at the start of is little permanent about the current world order. At the
the last century will show you that the world has changed same time, what is past, and not always immediately

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 12    INTRODUCTION

visible, often has a profound influence on the world we internalizes both the disadvantages of disciplinarity and
live in now. Section 1 highlights some of these issues and the potential advantages of multidisciplinarity. In other
then focuses on the emergence of capitalism and its rela- words, as Harrison (2009: 163) notes:
tionship with the making of the modern world.
it incorporates perspectives from a very wide range
It probably makes sense to work with Section 1 first;
of diverse subjects from the social sciences (including
after that each section can be utilized in whatever order
history, sociology, politics, economics, and psychol-
you see fit. It starts with a brief summary of the impor-
ogy) and from the natural sciences (including physics,
tant issues covered by each of the chapters and there is
biology, ecology and geology). To some, this diversity
logic to the order in which the chapters are presented.
has been regarded as a sign of weakness, suggesting a
Section 2 examines the interrelationship between popu-
subject with such a broad range of research fields must
lation change, resource production and consumption,
treat those in a superficial manner. Others have seen
global economic development and the environment. Sec-
it as a sign of strength, arguing that geography has
tion 3 focuses on social and cultural issues within urban
avoided the intellectual trap of increased specializa-
and rural contexts and at a global scale and includes a
tion and held on to a holistic view.
chapter on the social construction of nature and what
this means for the analysis and interpretation of how, for Much of the promise of geography lies on the margins
example, to manage the global environment in a sustain- between the sub-disciplines, between human and physical
able way. Section 4 examines the globalization of eco- geography or, for example, between economic and cul-
nomic activity, production networks, the emergence of tural geography. In your studies you should make the most
a global financial system and means of exchange (which of this promise, seek out the space on the margins and
has played an increasingly visible role in recent decades), look for the connections between the human and natural
and the importance of consumption to an understand- environments, the economic, the social and the cultural.
ing of the geography of economy. Section 5 considers a Many of the challenges that face humanity also occupy
variety of political geographies at differing scales and these margins. The emphasis on places and spaces and
how they interface and intertwine. Here too the sense how they are interconnected, imagined and represented
of continuity and change is evident, as in shifting global (the hallmarks of human geography) is itself promis-
geopolitical scenarios since the decline of the old super- ing. Engaging with such promise will deepen, stretch,
power Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union enrich and challenge your understanding of the world.
and the USA that had lasted for 50 years from the 1940s Geography is a worldly discipline. At once grounded
to the 1990s and whose legacies remain active today. and practical, human geography can sometimes be also
So, where else do you go from here? As a geography deeply theoretical, abstract and philosophical; it mobi-
student (or any other kind of student for that matter), lizes words, maps and numbers, and articulates social
you may be faced with choices, for example between sciences and the humanities, in a symbiotic relationship
human and physical geography or between more spe- with the science of physical geography. Wherever geog-
cialized subjects within one of those traditions. It is in raphy takes you intellectually and professionally, we hope
the nature of academic disciplines to subdivide and to that the chapters and arguments brought together in this
compartmentalize knowledge. Geography is unusual in book will (when supplemented by further reading, critical
that it sits at the intersections between the humanities, thought, writing and conversation) encourage you to con-
social sciences and natural sciences. This means that it tinue to engage with the promise inherent in geography.

The third edition of an innovative text: 59 inviting short

Further reading chapters that reflect the diversity of approaches in contem-
porary human geography. Well worth delving into wherever
This first set of readings points you towards two other text- you may be.
books that you can use to enrich your perspectives on human Marston, S.A., Knox, P., Liverman, D., Del Casino, V. and
geography. Individual chapters from them are sometimes Robbins, P. (2013) World Regions in Global Context: Peo-
cited elsewhere as references in this book, but they are also ple, Places, and Environments, 4th edition, Prentice Hall,
worth browsing to get a sense of the different ways in which Upper Saddle River, NJ. A comprehensive and acces-
human geography is presented. sible text written principally for the North America market
Cloke, P., Crang, P. and Goodwin, M. (eds) (2014) Introduc- with lots of pictures and diagrams. Probably the best US
ing Human Geographies, 3rd edition, Routledge, Oxford. textbook.

M00_DANI2950_05_SE_INTRO.indd 12 31/03/16 7:05 pm

 INTRODUCTION    13

Research and study guides, Clifford, N. and Valentine, G. (eds) (2010) Key Methods in
Geography, 2nd edition, Sage, London. Covers the methods
readers and further insights used in both human and physical geography, including those
into human geography they share.
Cloke, P., Crang, P., Goodwin, M., Painter, J. and Philo, C.
This section is dedicated to publications that will assist you (2002) Practising Human Geography, Sage, London. A more
in conducting geographical research and/or expand your advanced (but very readable and inviting) guide to research
knowledge of debates and approaches in the discipline. methods and writing strategies in human geography. An
The list comprises dictionaries, and books on methodology, inspiring guide to the use of qualitative methods. You will
approaches and theory in human geography as well as a few need to look elsewhere if you are interested in using quanti-
(such as auto-biographies of influential geographers) that tative techniques or GIS.
are hard to categorize. You should also seek out the various Couper, P. (2015) A Student’s Introduction to Geographical
‘readers’ (comprising reprints of influential papers that usu- Thought: Theories, Philosophies, Methodologies,
ally first appeared in journals) that have been produced. Led Sage, London. A superb introduction to ideas and theories
by publishers, these have proliferated in recent years, along across both human and physical geography. The companion
with encyclopedias, dictionaries and companions to the disci- website offers rich student resources. Sample them:
pline, or for specific sub-disciplines. Some bring together the https://study.sagepub.com/couper.
most influential readings in a particular area of human geog- Crampton, J.W. (2010) Mapping: A Critical Introduction to
raphy, whilst others are collections of specially commissioned Cartography and GIS, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. One of a
review essays that assess the status of particular areas of series of ‘Critical Introductions to Geography’. A fantastic
research. guide to maps and mapping.
Agnew, J. and Duncan, J.S. (eds) (2011) The Wiley-Blackwell Cresswell, T. (2004) Place: A Short Introduction, Blackwell,
Companion to Human Geography, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. Oxford. Explores how human geographers have studied,
Comprising commissioned original essays, this is a rich start- debated and complicated a concept that may seem self-evi-
ing point to get a feel of how the discipline has evolved and dent and familiar, but which turns out to be dependent upon a
what it includes today. range of assumptions, ideologies and contests.
Atkin, S. and Valentine, G. (eds) (2014) Approaches to Cresswell, T. (2012) Geographic Thought: A Critical Introduc-
Human Geography: Philosophies, Theories, People and tion, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. Another survey of the history of
Practices, 2nd edition, Sage, London, New Delhi and Thou- geographic thought that is especially good on developments
sand Oaks, CA. A good way into the range of theoretical (and in recent years.
methodological) debates in human geography. Daniels, S. and Lee, R. (eds) (1996) Exploring Human
Benko, G. and Strohmayer, U. (eds) (2004) Human Geogra- Geography: A Reader, Arnold, London. Includes articles not
phy: A History for the Twenty-First Century, Arnold, London. intended primarily for a student audience, but the collection
Republished by Routledge in 2014, this book sought to provides a useful survey of human geography in the 1980s
address histories of continental European and Anglophone and 1990s.
geography and the relations between them. It only scratches Dorling, D. and Fairbairn, D. (1997) Mapping: Ways of Repre-
the surface. senting the World, Prentice Hall, Harlow. Maps have always
Blunt, A. and Wills, J. (2000) Dissident Geographies: An been associated with geography and geographers. This text
Introduction to Radical Ideas and Practice, Prentice Hall, will help you to understand how maps express the will to
Harlow. This book is worth tracking down. The geographies describe, understand and control.
explored all share political commitments to critique and to Flowerdew, R. and Martin, D. (2005) Methods in Human
challenging prevailing relations of power: from gay and les- Geography: A Guide for Students Doing a Research Project,
bian geographies to geographies of anarchism and anti-rac- 2nd edition, Longman, Harlow. A guide to a wide variety
ism, it brings out some of the ways in which the production of the research techniques used by contemporary human
of geographical knowledge is tied to politics and struggles geographers.
outside, as well as within, universities. Gould, P. and Pitts, F.R. (eds) (2002) Geographical Voices:
Boyle, M. (2014) Human Geography: A Concise Introduction, Fourteen Autobiographical Essays, Syracuse University
Wiley Blackwell, Chichester. Structured around the idea of Press, Syracuse, NY. A collection of autobiographies that
geographic imaginations, this is an ambitious, though inviting chart the experiences and insights of some of leading geog-
and accessible text. raphers of the past 70 years.
Castree, N. (2005) Nature, Routledge, London and New York. Gregory, D., Johnston, R.J., Pratt, G., Watts, M. and What-
A challenging introduction to how geographers have studied more, S. (eds) (2009) The Dictionary of Human Geography,
nature and what this tells us about the nature of academic 5th edition, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. Over a thousand pages.
geography. We think it is an indispensable reference. But, like vintage

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 14    INTRODUCTION

wines, some prefer earlier editions (each one thicker and histories and geographies, including the historical geography
weightier than the last). If you want to spend an afternoon of empires (see Chapter 2), which meant that aspects of a
learning a lot about academic geography, track down older British-style educational system were long imposed on many
ones and look at how the entries have changed. territories in Africa and Asia (and in Ireland). For more sys-
Clifford, N.J., Holloway, S.L., Rice, S.P. and Valentine, G. tematic reflections on the relative position of geography in the
(eds) (2009) Key Concepts in Geography, 2nd edition, Sage, academy in a range of countries, see the set of papers in the
London. Worth reading alongside this text, especially if you Journal of Geography in Higher Education, 31(1), compiled
are taking introductory classes in human and physical geog- by and following a brief introduction by Kong (2007) (see
raphy – this collection addresses both. also Spotlight box I.1). Browsing other issues of the Journal
Hubbard, P., Kitchin, R. and Valentine, G. (eds) (2008) Key of Geography in Higher Education can be instructive, since
Texts in Human Geography, Sage, London. A starting point, it is full of ideas and guides to research and geographical
designed to lead you beyond textbooks into classic texts in learning.
the field. Many were not written for a student audience but as This and other material from scholarly journals must
entrée it is especially helpful. usually be downloaded whilst logged in to a university net-
Johnston, R.J. and Sidaway, J.D. (2016) Geography and work; since university libraries pay the subscription costs to
Geographers: Anglo-American Human Geography since publishers of such journals. However, the following is free to
1945, 7th edition, Arnold, London. First published in 1979, all: Barder, H. and Engel-Di Mavro, S. (eds) (2008) ­Critical
the seventh edition of this book provides an updated and Geographies: A Collection of Readings, Praxis (e)Press:
fairly comprehensive survey of the major trends in human www.praxis-epress.org. This reprints a collection of classic
geography since 1945 in the English-speaking world. and inspiring geographies; starting with an 1885 essay by an
Includes a discussion of geography as a discipline that will anarchist Russian geographer on ‘What Geography Ought to
help you to better understand what academic geographers do Be’. We suggest you start here.
and how the discipline is structured. But why stop with the Earth? If you read the following book,
Livingstone, D. (1992) The Geographical Tradition: Issues in you will soon see how geography of Mars is, in the end,
the History of a Contested Enterprise, Blackwell, Oxford. On more about the Earth than Mars. With time, you might begin
publication this immediately became a landmark scholarly to agree with us that all geographies of other places tell as
study of the long-term history of human geography. It still is. much about where they are written as that which they purport
to describe:
Nayak, A. and Jeffrey, A. (2011) Geographical Thought: An
Introduction to Ideas in Human Geography, Pearson, Harlow. Lane, M.D.K. (2011) Geographies of Mars: Seeing and
This does what it says in the title. Knowing the Red Planet, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, IL.
Thrift, N. and Kitchin, R. et al. (eds) (2000) The International
Encyclopedia of Human Geography, Elsevier, Oxford. This If Martian geographies are not to your taste, but you are also
A–Z is a comprehensive survey of human geography. You taking classes in physical geography, see if you can impress
can lose yourself inside it for hours and only scratch the those who seek to teach you physical geography by asking
surface. them what they think about:

Tuan Yi-Fu (1999) Who am I? An Autobiography of Emotion, Clifford, N. (2009) ‘Globalization: a physical geography per-
Mind and Spirit, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI. spective’, Progress in Human Geography, 33(1), 5–16.
The autobiography of a Chinese-American who arrived in the Finally, one of the key unfolding areas of debate in contem-
United States as a 20-year-old graduate student in the 1950s porary geography is how the discipline might engage with the
and went on to become one of America’s most original and Anthropocene idea. This recent forum, organized by two edi-
respected geographers. tors but with contributions from six other scholars, provides a
Women and Geography Study Group (1997) Feminist Geog- way into these debates:
raphies: Explorations in Diversity and Difference, Longman, Johnson, E. and Morehouse, H. (eds) (2014) ‘After the
Harlow. Republished by Routledge in 2013, this remains a Anthropocene: politics and geographic enquiry for a new
great way to begin to understand how feminist geographies epoch’, Progress in Human Geography, 38(3), 439–56.
have reshaped the study of human geography.
Wylie, J. (2007) Landscape, Routledge, London. A fascinat-
ing text that examines how human geographers (and others) Useful websites
have conceptualized and narrated landscape.
As this introduction has sketched, human geography (under- This section provides access to the sites of some of the
stood as the subject, and those who study and teach it) has major geographical societies in the United Kingdom and
its own geography (understood as locations), in so far as it is North America. Visit the sites of other university geography
unevenly developed (in some countries it is studied as part departments across the world and discover how geography
of the school curriculum, in other places – most significantly is represented and taught in different places. With the partial
perhaps in the USA – it is hardly studied at schools). How exception of the Canadian Association of Geographers, the
and why this has come about is a complex reflection of wider links below focus on the Anglophone world.

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 INTRODUCTION    15

www.aag.org  The website of the Association of American originally founded in 1830 and the RGS-IBG is still the pri-
Geographers. Founded in 1904, the AAG is the primary mary academic organization in UK geography. The website
academic geography organization in the United States. This provides information on the societies as well as a route to
site provides a wealth of information on the Association’s its three key journals: Area, the Geographical Journal and
activities, as well as access to its two scholarly journals: the Transactions.
Annals of the Association of American Geographers and As you will probably already know, there are dozens of com-
Professional Geographer. mercial websites that will help you to try to short-cut and
www.amergeog.org  The website of the American Geograph- circumvent learning and scholarship, by buying putatively
ical Society. The Society was established in 1851 and is the old- top-grade custom-written essays for almost any assignment.
est professional geographical organization in the United States. Like other even seedier sides of the Net, these have their
The society publishes the Geographical Review and Focus. own geography, in terms of by whom and where they are pro-
www.cag-acg.ca  The website of the Canadian Associa- duced, where the money goes, plus the spatiality of the wider
tion of Geographers. Founded in 1951, the CAG-ACG is the economies, trends and technologies that enable them. In the
primary academic organization in Canada. The association words of a geographical account of these published more
publishes The Canadian Geographer and organizes national than a decade ago:
and regional meetings.
The technology of the Internet has connected remote
www.geography.org.uk  The website of the Geographical places and facilitated the diffusion of any number of
Association, which was founded in 1893 and is the national economic activities such as call centers, off-shore bank-
subject teaching organization for all geographers in the ing, and data processing. The Internet adult industry is
United Kingdom. The Association publishes three journals: yet another example of how a combination of regulatory
Primary Geographer, Teaching Geography and Geography. issues, lower costs for content, and low barriers to entry
www.iag.org.au  The website of the Institute of Australian results in a restructuring of production and consumption.
Geographers. The IAG was founded in Adelaide in 1958 and While allowing access to a whole new range of people,
is the principal body representing geographers and promot- the Internet is still shaped by existing structures of regula-
ing geography in Australia. The institute publishes the journal tion, power, and hegemony. In short, the space of flows
Geographical Studies. cannot be understood without reference to the ‘space of
www.nationalgeographic.org  A public face of geography places’ to which it connects.
in the English-speaking world. Home to the National Geo- (Zook 2003: 1283)
graphic magazine, the site also provides access to the maps
and photographs that appear in its magazine, as well as a
As for those commercial essay-writing websites, although
searchable index.
some pretend otherwise, they rest on a specialist form of
www.rgs.org  The home of the Royal Geographical Society fraud known as plagiarism, severely sanctioned in all univer-
(with the Institute of British Geographers). The RGS was sities when detected.

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M00_DANI2950_05_SE_INTRO.indd 16 31/03/16 7:05 pm
 Section 1

Worlds in the past:

Changing scales of experience and
past worlds in the present

Edited by Denis Shaw

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 The world in which we live today has been Chapter 1 of this section considers what the world
moulded and is constantly being remoulded by was like before capitalism and what if any gener-
the forces of capitalism (defined in Chapter 2, alizations can be made about this long period of
pp. 38–9). As modern capitalism spread across human history. Chapter 2 analyses the rise and
the globe it inevitably changed the societies which spread of modern capitalism down to the end of the
preceded it. But the pre-capitalist societies, while nineteenth century. Its history during this period is
adapting to capitalism, did not necessarily lose intimately linked to the rise of the European powers
all their distinctive features, and capitalism itself and to the worldwide spread of their influence. This,
was configured through the process of interact- of course, is not to deny that capitalism probably
ing with them. The fact that human societies in sprouted, and then died, in other societies in other
the modern world differ among themselves in all periods, or that it might have gained worldwide sig-
kinds of ways is only partly the result of the way nificance on the basis of a non-European core had
global capitalism works and of the ways in which circumstances been different. During the twentieth
societies are now adapting to the various forces and twenty-first centuries, which are the subject of
affecting them. Societies also differ because of Chapter 3, capitalism became a truly global phe-
their past histories, histories that stretch back nomenon and radically changed in the process.
into pre-capitalist times. The world into which This chapter thus provides a more immediate back-
modern capitalism spread was itself already enor- ground for the ­sections that follow.
mously varied and had been changing in innumer-
able ways over thousands of years. This section In summary, this part of the book emphasizes the
presents a brief survey of that long history and variety and complexity of the world before globali-
argues that the human geographer cannot under- zation. And it demonstrates that only by knowing
stand the ­present-day world without knowledge of something about that world can we understand
the worlds which have existed in the past. globalization itself.

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 Pre-capitalist worlds

Chapter 1

Denis Shaw

Topics covered
■ Why geographers need to know about the past
■ Ways of classifying past and present societies
■ Bands, tribes, chiefdoms, regulated states, market-based
states
■ Hunting and gathering
■ The invention and spread of agriculture
■ The rise of cities, states and civilizations
■ Medieval feudalism
■ Problems of studying past societies

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 20    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

M uch of this book is about how capitalism has spread

across the globe and even now is remoulding human
societies in new and unexpected ways. This chapter is
marked seasonal movements depending on the character
of the local resources as groups moved between exploit-
ing the fish and mammals of the open ocean, hunting
about what the world was like before capitalism. In other seals on the ice, and seeking caribou, musk ox and simi-
words it is about how human beings have lived during lar fauna inland. The rich Inuit culture is also varied but
most of their existence on this planet. It will also say by no means as varied as the Aboriginal (there are only
something about why it is important for human geogra- two interrelated languages, for example). Considering
phers to be aware of that past. the vast geographical spaces that the Inuit occupy, the
Capitalism has changed the world profoundly and latter fact is remarkable and may reflect a relative ease
often very quickly. In the first half of the twentieth cen- of communication by sledge and boat as well as the fre-
tury it was still possible for geographers and others to quency of migrations. Like the Aborigines, the Inuit have
travel to regions where its influence was minimal and had to adapt in the recent period to an intrusive, mainly
where people still lived in pre-capitalist societies. Today white culture, but are still sufficiently conscious of their
this is much less true. Even so, the geographer can still ­distinctive histories and life-styles to have a strong sense
find numerous areas where the way of life has many pre- of identity.
capitalist traits, though perhaps increasingly influenced The Australian Aborigines and the Inuit are but two
by the modern world. Let us consider some examples. of many human groups existing either now or in the
About 2 per cent of the population of Australia recent past who have lived by hunting and gathering (see
identifies as Aboriginal; whose ancestors first settled Figure 1.1). The present-day world also contains other
the continent up to 50,000 years before white Europe- groups whose way of life to a greater or lesser extent
ans (Broome 2002). Today their way of life ranges from reflects pre-capitalist characteristics. Pastoral nomads,
that of suburban professionals to remote outstations for example, live mainly by raising and herding domestic
and homelands where people live partly off the land in animals (cattle, sheep, goats, camels, yak, reindeer and
traditional style. When the British established their first others), that provide them with food, clothing and other
penal colony on Australian soil in 1788, more Aborigines necessities. Pastoralists are particularly found in marginal
lived on the continent than today, and they were divided (semi-arid, sub-arctic, sub-alpine) lands in parts of Eura-
into some 500 groups displaying a wide variety of lan- sia and Africa (see Plate  1.1). Another example is the
guages, cultures, economies and technologies. All were many peasant farmers still to be found in parts of sub-
hunters and gatherers leading a semi-nomadic existence Saharan Africa, southern Asia and elsewhere. Some still
and using some similar tools, like stone core hammers, grow much of their own food and market relationships
knives, scrapers and axe heads as well as wooden imple- have yet to become of central importance to their lives
ments like spears, digging sticks and drinking vessels. (Wolf 1966). To the extent that such people eat and oth-
However, there was also a variety in technology and erwise depend on what they grow and raise rather than
economy that reflected the diverse environments in which on what they can sell or earn outside the farm, their way
Aboriginal peoples lived. Whether living on coasts, river- of life is similar to that of peasants over the centuries.
banks, in woodland or desert regions, they were efficient Of course, nowadays the number of peasants is declin-
and skilled at exploiting the flora and fauna of their sur- ing and they are increasingly exposed to the influences of
roundings. Aboriginal peoples who hunt and fish today the outside world. But again they remind us of a world
are often using skills honed by their ancestors over thou- before capitalism.
sands of years. Their languages and cultures similarly The point, then, is that today’s world still contains
reflect the experiences of many hundreds of generations. many societies whose ways of life differ from those lived
The Inuit or Eskimo peoples living in the Arctic, by most of this book’s readers and which recall earlier
mainly coastal, territories of Greenland, northern Can- periods in human history. In order to understand those
ada, Alaska and the extreme eastern tip of Russia, are ways of life and the world as it is now, the geographer
another group who in the past lived almost entirely by must know something about the world before capitalism.
hunting and gathering (Sugden 1982; Bone 2009). Hunt- Learning about that world helps us to see how capitalism
ing and gathering still plays an important role in many has changed the world and the pluses and minuses of
of the remoter communities. Like the Australian Aborigi- that process.
nes, the Inuit showed a remarkable ability to exploit the A number of arguments can be advanced to suggest
resources of what, in their case, is an extremely harsh why it is important to know something about the world
environment. Because of their environment, Inuit com- before capitalism:
munities demonstrated less economic variation than the Understanding the past helps geographers and others
Aborigines but they were far from uniform. There were to understand themselves and their societies. Societies

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 Chapter 1  Pre-capitalist worlds    21

Location of hunting and gathering groups Snow climate with dry season in winter

Tropical climate Highland climate

Dry climate Snow climate with year-round precipitation

Warm temperate climate Ice climate

Figure 1.1  World distribution of hunter-gatherers today and in the recent past, with indication of their habitats
(based on a classification of climate).
Source: adapted from Simmons (1996: 48)

Plate 1.1  Nomadic herders

unloading their yaks on high-
altitude pastures near Tso
Moriri, India.
(pcruciatti/Shutterstock)

and individuals are products of the past, not just of the An example of the latter is the character of the physi-
present. The present cannot be understood in ignorance cal environment in which people now live. Human beings
of the past. Studying the past provides answers not merely have lived on this planet for so many thousands of years
to questions about how things were but also about how that over vast areas the physical environment has been
things are now (and, more tentatively, about how things profoundly modified. The world today is the product of
will be in the future). thousands of generations of human activity. In fact, can

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 22    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

any of the world’s landscapes now be said to be truly One reason why Rostow oversimplified the pre-
‘natural’? (The implications of this are explained in industrial past was that he was not much interested in
Chapter 12.) This shows us that it is likely that human it. He was really interested in modernity, as exemplified
activity will continue to modify our environment into the by the United States and its Western allies. Furthermore,
future. Keeping the environment exactly as it is now is a his theory can be described as ‘unilinear evolutionary’
very unlikely option. But how far we can control those inasmuch as it suggested that all societies should pass
changes, or keep them within acceptable limits, is a more through a series of set stages of economic development
difficult question. before finally arriving at the age of ‘high mass consump-
A further important point is that Aborigines, Inuit and tion’. The United States (where Rostow lived) and other
other indigenous peoples (those peoples native to a ‘developed’ countries have already reached this age. Evo-
particular territory that was later colonized, particularly lutionary models have certainly long been a popular way
by Europeans) have recently been asserting their rights. for Western societies to try to make sense of the past.
For example, Australian Aborigines have asserted their One of the attractions of such models has no doubt been
right to be recognized as part of the Australian national their tendency to suggest that the West is the most ‘devel-
identity, pointing out that the story of Australia does oped’ and thus most ‘progressive’ part of the world and,
not begin with Captain Cook’s landing in 1788, as the by implication, the best (and a model for development:
whites have so often assumed, since the Aborigines were see Chapter  8, pp. 177–9). But quite apart from the
in Australia long before. Indigenous peoples have also questionable assumption that all societies should seek
been claiming rights to local resources long ago usurped to imitate the West, this raises important issues about
by outsiders and are trying to protect their distinctive cul- the meaning of ‘progress’ and ‘development’, two terms
tures. Such peoples often feel they are the victims of the that certainly carry very positive connotations in the
past. By studying that past and trying to understand the West. For example, while those parts of the world usu-
variety of cultures and ways of life that exist in the world ally deemed most developed and wealthiest certainly use
and how they came to be, geographers are more likely to most energy (see Chapter 5) and enjoy access to more
understand and respect such feelings. material goods, they also make huge demands on the
Thus, while human geography is primarily about the environment, perhaps ultimately to everyone’s undoing.
present, it cannot afford to ignore the past. Some of the Thus, what is progress in this context? Similarly, it has
above points will be illustrated in the following pages. often been noted that the price people tend to pay for
more ‘development’ and wealth is that they have to work
harder and for more hours. Unless hard work is regarded
as a virtue in itself, this again raises questions about the
1.1 Making sense of the past meaning of progress. The point here is not to disparage
all forms of evolutionary theory or idea (for example, to
Despite the spread of capitalism and globalization, the deny that human societies have, by and large, become
world of today remains immensely varied and complex. more complex and spatially extended through time; see
The same is true of the world in the past. The question Dodgshon 1987). Rather, it is to suggest that what is most
for the geographer is how to make sense of this complex recent or new or complex is not necessarily best. Thus, in
past; how to make it amenable to geographical analysis what follows, words like ‘modern’ do not imply ‘better’,
and understanding. nor do ‘ancient’ or ‘primitive’ imply ‘worse’.
Different scholars have tried different ways of answer- An alternative method of trying to make sense of
ing this question, but all suffer from shortcomings. For the past, and one that does not have the unilinear evo-
example, the economist W.W. Rostow, in his famous lutionary structure of, say, Rostow’s theory, is to classify
theory of economic growth typical of capitalist develop- human societies into a series of types. Classification can
ment, simply described the pre-industrial period as ‘tra- be described as a way of simplifying a complex world
ditional society’ (Rostow 1971: 4–6). Yet the fact is that by grouping together phenomena that are regarded as
pre-industrial human societies ranged from the smallest having some common feature or property, particularly
communities of hunters and gatherers to societies as where the latter is deemed especially significant. Thus
sophisticated and geographically extended as the Roman Marxists have commonly grouped societies in accord-
Empire, ancient China and feudal Europe. Inasmuch as ance with their prevailing mode of production, or in
such societies existed in the past, and not today, it is not other words with the way in which material production
possible to observe them directly. But the more scholars is related to social structure (Hindess and Hirst 1975).
learn about them, the more they realize how unlike one As a geographer, primarily interested in spatial structure,
another these early societies were. Robert Sack classified societies in accordance with their

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 Chapter 1  Pre-capitalist worlds    23

use of territoriality (Sack 1986) (a theme taken up in one important point. Our knowledge of prehistoric soci-
­ hapter 21). The point is that there is no right or wrong
C eties (societies which have left no written records) derives
mode of classification. It all depends on what the purpose mainly from archaeological data, or material left by such
of the classification is. Most social theorists have wanted societies and the traces of their environmental impacts.
to claim that their mode of classifying societies is particu- Methods for analysing such data have become ever more
larly significant for understanding how and why societies sophisticated, but the data themselves obviously become
differ. The problem is that there is a large measure of scarcer the older they are. Moreover, there are many kinds
disagreement about what the best mode is, and each has of questions, for example about the way early people
its shortcomings. viewed the world around them, which cannot be answered
directly from the archaeological evidence. New discoveries
are always liable to change our understanding of past soci-
eties, and especially of the earliest ones. Our knowledge
1.2 A classification of human societies of the latter societies, and of the dates attaching to them,
must therefore be regarded as especially tentative.
As an example of the kinds of difficulties that face any
attempt to classify past and present human societies,
this chapter will focus on one mode of classification
that has had widespread appeal not only for human 1.3 Hunting and gathering
geographers but also for anthropologists and other
scholars. This is the mode of classifying human socie- The time when the first human-type species (hominids)
ties into bands, tribes, chiefdoms and states (regulated first appeared on earth is very uncertain, but a date of
and market-based) (see Bobek 1962; Dodgshon 1987). at least two and a half million years ago is often given.
Spotlight boxes 1.1 to 1.5 describe, in simplified form, Homo erectus, believed by some to be the forerunner of
the major characteristics of each type of human society the modern human species, is thought to have appeared
according to this classification. It will quickly be seen around 1.9 million years ago, and the modern species
that the classification describes a range of societies from (Homo sapiens sapiens) at least 40,000 years ago (but see
the simplest and most primitive to the capitalist societies Foley 1995 for a contrary view). Since agriculture appears
of today. What it does not suggest is the circumstances to have arisen about 12,000 years ago, hunting and gath-
under which one kind of society may change into, or be ering in bands have been the basic occupations for much
succeeded, by another. of humanity’s existence (see Spotlight box 1.1).
One reason why this mode of classification has had As noted already, only a limited amount is known
such appeal is because it suggests that over the course of about early human societies (see Plate  1.2). In addition
human history larger and more complex societies have to archaeological evidence, much has to be inferred, for
tended to appear. It also relates size and complexity to the example from hunter-gatherers who are still in existence
way societies occupy space and their relationships to their or who existed until quite recently. Needless to say, such
physical environment. However, it is worth reiterating inference can be dangerous because modern hunter-
that this is only one way of classifying human societies. gatherers have probably been influenced by other, more
Indeed some scholars reject the whole idea of classifying ‘advanced’, societies that now share their world. Their
human societies because they feel it leads to misappre- way of life is thus unlikely to be identical with those who
hensions about how societies are formed and survive, and existed in the remote past (Barnard 2004).
even to dangerous notions of unilinear evolution. It thus The distribution of hunter-gatherers in the recent
needs to be remembered that this scheme is suggestive past shows that they have existed in every major climatic
only, and does not necessarily describe the way any given zone and have practised enormously varied economies,
society has actually changed through time. In particular, depending on the nature and potentials of the local envi-
it does not stipulate that societies must develop through a ronment (Figure 1.1). This fact alone suggests that a sim-
series of set stages, or that one type of society necessarily plistic evolutionary model of human societies will fail to
leads to the next. do justice to their complex histories. Some generaliza-
Subsequent sections will outline some of the social pro- tions do seem possible, however – for example, that in
cesses that might have helped to produce, change and per- recent times groups living in the highest latitudes (above
haps destroy the different kinds of human society described 60 degrees) have relied largely on hunting, and those
in Spotlight boxes 1.1 to 1.5. In so doing, some of the below 39 degrees on plant collecting. Fishing seems to
limitations of the classification system used will become have played an important role for many groups living in
apparent. Before proceeding, however, it is worth making intermediate latitudes (Lee 1968; Oppenheimer 2012).

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 24    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

Spotlight box 1.1

Bands ● Bands are the smallest and simplest of human

groups.
● Bands are societies of hunter-gatherers. Most of ● Bands rarely exceed 500 people.
human history has been lived in this way. ● For most of the time band members generally live in
● Bands live by hunting wild animals and gathering smaller groups of 25–100 people, which allows for
food from the surrounding flora. efficient exploitation of the environment.
● Because of the pressures they place on the surround- ● Bands usually have a minimum of social differentia-
ing environment, bands are almost always nomadic. tion and functional specialization.

Plate 1.2  Artefacts from early human sites: (a) Prehistoric stone tool dating back some 400,000 years;
(b) The much more recent Neolithic settlement of Skara Brae, Orkney, Scotland, dating from about 3000 BC.
((a) Diego Barucco/Shutterstock (b) johnbraid/Shutterstock)

Hunter-gatherers have lived in this world for such major biomes as the African savannas and the prairies
a long period that today’s environment is the way it is of North America is the result of the human use of fire
partly as a result of their activities. For example, any over thousands of years (Simmons 1996). More recently,
notion that early human beings lived in complete har- contacts between hunter-gatherers and agricultural and
mony with their environments or always had ‘sustainable’ industrial societies frequently had even more far-reaching
economies is simply untrue. Thus hunter-gatherers are environmental effects. At the same time, other scholars
credited with the extinction of many animals. An out- have asserted that the relations between such groups and
standing case is North America where perhaps two-thirds their physical environments were rarely if ever exploita-
of the large mammal fauna living there just before the tive in the modern sense. Hunter-gatherers lived in an inti-
arrival of the ancestors of modern native Americans (via mate relationship with their environment and frequently
the Bering land bridge, possibly about 12,000 years ago) regarded it, or aspects of it, as sacred. Some scholars
subsequently disappeared. The most likely explanation have thus described their relationship as ‘organic’ in a
is the effects of hunting. The discovery of fire, its use by way which has been forgotten by our modern societies,
hominids long predating the appearance of Homo sapi- much to the detriment of today’s global environment
ens sapiens, was also an important instrument whereby (Merchant 2005).
human beings changed their environments. Some schol- Scholars have wondered about processes whereby
ars have argued that the present-day appearance of such bands evolved into tribes, or hunter-gathering economies

M01_DANI2950_05_SE_C01.indd 24 31/03/16 7:05 pm

 Chapter 1  Pre-capitalist worlds    25

into agricultural ones (Harris 1996a, 1996b). It has been scholars, for example, doubt whether the category ‘tribe’
pointed out, for example, that where the natural envi- (Spotlight box 1.2) is particularly helpful, implying as it
ronment was especially favourable, the packing of bands does the lack of a hierarchical social structure (Fried-
tended to be denser, leading to less mobility and per- man and Rowlands 1977). Such scholars tend to believe
haps to semi-permanent settlement and closer interac- that the appearance of agriculture will have sparked off
tion between bands. There may also have been a much competition for access to the best land, or at least rules
greater degree of manipulation of the environment and whereby such land was allocated and inherited, and that
its resources than might be expected in a pure hunter- some people and groups will inevitably have lost out.
gatherer economy. Altogether the life of bands was much They therefore see a social hierarchy (characteristic of
more variable and a good deal less stable than the above chiefdoms and states – see Spotlight boxes 1.3 and 1.4)
classification scheme suggests. The boundary between beginning to emerge even as agriculture and the process
band and tribe is thus blurred. of permanent settlement began.
Be that as it may, it is now widely accepted that the
traditional picture of agriculture being invented in a
small number of ‘hearths’ and then spreading across the
1.4 Human settlement and agriculture globe is far too simple. Bands of hunters and gatherers
are known to develop an often intimate knowledge of
Just as the boundary line between band and tribe may their local environments, and no doubt human beings
not always be easy to define in practice, the same can be understood much about the factors influencing plant and
said of the boundary between tribe and chiefdom. Some animal development long before they began to practise

Spotlight box 1.2

Tribes ● Agricultural societies thus tend to be bigger than

bands, with higher population densities.
● Tribes appeared with the invention and spread of ● Settlements tend to become more fixed than in
agriculture. bands.
● Agriculture usually demands considerable invest- ● The greater spatial fixity of society encourages
ment of human effort into a relatively small area. intermarriage and the development of extended
This reduces the propensity to migrate (but pastoral family networks. Tribes thus develop a sense of kin-
nomads are an exception). ship and of common descent.
● The appearance of agriculture usually allows more ● Socially, tribes are relatively egalitarian, at least as
people to live in a smaller space. between kinship groups.

Spotlight box 1.3

Chiefdoms remains the chief bond between ruler and

subject.
● Chiefdoms arose with the emergence of ‘ranked ● Chiefdoms imply a greater degree of centralization
and stratified’ societies. and control within society than in a tribe (shown,
● ‘Ranked’ societies are societies where groups and for example, in the imposition of taxes and tribute
individuals have, on a relatively permanent basis, on the ordinary subjects). Spatially this might be
different degrees of status and power. reflected in the greater importance accorded to
● ‘Stratified’ societies are societies where groups and a central settlement (proto-city) where the ruler
individuals have, on a relatively permanent basis, resides.
different degrees of material wealth. ● The first chiefdoms began to appear about 3000 BC
● A chiefdom implies the presence of a permanent in Europe, but earlier elsewhere.
ruling group and/or individual, though kinship

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 26    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

Spotlight box 1.4

Regulated (pre-modern) states ● Pre-modern states existed in a world before mod-

ern capitalism. The market was not central to their
● Whereas the chiefdom is organized around the prin- functioning and was often controlled (‘regulated’)
ciple of kinship, the state is organized on the basis in various ways. Thus economic relationships were
of territory (viz. one is subject to the state if one generally subordinated to political, social and reli-
resides in the territory of that state). gious considerations.
● States, whilst also based on social inequality, tend ● Other forms of social relationship, for instance
to be larger and administratively more complex than landholding, also often tended to be controlled
chiefdoms. This implies greater functional specializa- (regulated) rather than being determined by the
tion and greater probability of the rise of urban forms. market.

Spotlight box 1.5

Market-based states ● The market is of key importance to their

functioning.
● Market-based states are modern states whose ● In the last two centuries these states have been
development is closely linked to that of capitalism associated with colonial and national projects (see
and thus of the world economy. Chapters 2, 3 and 22).

full-blown agriculture. David Harris (1989, 1996a, 1996b) gathering, hardly applies to naturally productive envi-
argued that the development of agriculture was a long ronments where it clearly involved much greater effort
drawn-out affair and that there must have been much trial relative to the return achieved. Some scholars favour pop-
and error before it finally emerged in some places in a ulation pressure. Others, however, argue that this view is
fully recognizable form. Some prehistoric northern Aus- over-deterministic and point out that even hunter-gath-
tralian Aborigines, for example, knew about agriculture, erers had the means of controlling population growth.
but never adopted it. Such scholars tend to favour more complex explanations
Something can, however, be said about when, and that embrace cultural preferences and choices as well as
perhaps why, agriculture appeared. The archaeologi- environmental and population pressures (Maisels 1993:
cal evidence makes it possible to detect and date the 25–31).
remains of domesticated varieties of plants and animals. Just as the factors that led up to the appearance and
According to Simmons (1996: 93) there were probably spread of agriculture are by no means straightforward,
three foci for the initial surges of domestication: around the same is also true of its further development. No sim-
7000 BC (to use the Christian chronology) in south-west ple evolutionary model can account for how agriculture
Asia, around 6000 BC in south-east Asia, and around has changed and developed throughout the world. Every­
5000 BC in Meso-America. Different species of plants where traditional agriculturalists showed a remarkable
were associated with each, for example: wheat, barley ability to adapt their practices to local environmental
and oats in south-west Asia; rice in south-east Asia; and conditions. Eventually they largely displaced the hunter-
maize, squash and gourds in Meso-America. Domesti- gatherers (Figure 1.2) and gave rise to an enormous vari-
cated animals also began to appear about the same time ety of agricultural systems.
(though the dog, domesticated from the wolf, appeared Agriculture’s effects on the landscape were much
before agriculture). Sheep, goats, pigs and cattle are greater than the effects of hunting and gathering. It
all associated with south-west Asia (Simmons 1996: changed the vegetation cover of wide areas as forests and
87–134), though pigs may also have been domesticated grasslands disappeared under fields, practices like terrac-
independently in eastern Asia. ing and irrigation were introduced, and the effects on soil
As to why agriculture was adopted, scholars differ. The composition abetted erosion in some places. The grazing
simple answer, that it was more efficient than hunting and of animals and other forms of resource use frequently

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 Chapter 1  Pre-capitalist worlds    27

(a)

Agriculture
Hunting and gathering
Ice
Uninhabited

(b)

Agriculture
Hunting and gathering
Combined agriculture/hunting–gathering
Ice
Uninhabited

Figure 1.2  World distribution of agriculture and hunter-gathering about ad 1 (a) and ad 1500 (b).
Source: Sherratt (1980: 97, 117)

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 28    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

changed the species composition of forests, grasslands racial and cultural characteristics which equipped them
and other areas. Agricultural systems, crops and domes- to dominate the ‘inferior’ Celtic peoples. Similar ideas, of
ticated animals spread way beyond their initial locations. course, reached their ultimate absurdity in the racist theo-
An outstanding example is the cultivation of rice, which ries propounded by Adolf Hitler and the Nazis. Nowa-
may have started in east Asia around 5000 BC, if not days, with the availability of new scientific approaches
before, and spread as far as Egypt and Sicily by Roman like molecular archaeology and DNA studies, we know
times. Such developments long preceded the European that the origins of the English and of other peoples are
overseas expansion beginning in the fifteenth century AD, much more complex than was once thought and that
which was to have even more far-reaching consequences ‘different’ peoples are in fact remarkably similar in their
both for the geography of agriculture and for the environ- capabilities (Miles 2006: 18–31; Oppenheimer 2012). Dif-
ment (see Chapter 2, pp. 42–7; Crosby 2004). ferent human groups, settling in the same region, may
There is no doubt that the spread of agriculture gradually have adopted similar languages and cultural
(whether as a result of migration or through cultural dif- patterns, thus slowly fusing into one people or ethnic
fusion) had far-reaching effects on human society, encour- group even though they were not originally closely inter-
aging permanent settlement and the emergence of tribal related. In this way the study of even the remote past can
systems (though Crone, 2003, questions the nature of the cast light on issues which cause contention today and,
link between agriculture and tribes). Tribal members, as in this case, help to discredit theories based on crude
living permanently side by side, almost inevitably devel- racist prejudices and a misreading of history.
oped similar cultural traits such as common languages.
As suggested in Spotlight box 1.2, tribes also typically
develop myths of common ancestry (indeed, this seems
to be part of their definition). In the late nineteenth and 1.5 Cities and civilization
early twentieth centuries, a period much influenced by
ideas based on Darwinian evolution as well as by myths The invention of agriculture was only one of the events
of European racial and cultural superiority bolstered by that moved human societies along a road that ultimately
European overseas imperial expansion, it became fash- led to the kinds of societies which predominate in the
ionable, on very limited evidence, for scholars to imagine world today. Others included the appearance of cit-
that modern ethnic differences have a biological basis and ies, states and civilizations. Cities and states usually
that certain ‘races’ or ethnic groups are inherently supe- go together. Maisels (1993: 302), for example, argues
rior to others. In Britain, for example, many historians that the functional specialization associated with cit-
and archaeologists regarded the modern English as deriv- ies allowed rulers to rule more effectively and also to
ing almost entirely from Anglo-Saxon invaders with both put a greater social distance between them and their

Plate 1.3  Winter view of

the medieval walled town of
Nordlingen, Bavaria, Germany.
(Alexander Kuguchin/Shutterstock)

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 Chapter 1  Pre-capitalist worlds    29

subjects. The gathering of specialists around the person with the Shang dynasty, arose about 1500 bc, and by
of a state’s ruler fostered urban life, commerce and the about 1000 BC the Maya civilization had appeared in
many other things (such as writing, technology, religion Meso-America. In Europe the first states are commonly
and speculative thought) with which is associated the taken to be the Greek city-states that began to develop
word ‘civilization’. Indeed, the very words ‘city’ and in eastern Greece and the neighbouring islands about
‘civilization’ have a common Latin root (civitas, mean- the eighth century bc. Whether the state arose indepen-
ing ‘state’). dently in different places across the globe, or whether the
As is the case with the appearance of agriculture, the idea of the state was somehow diffused from one or two
processes that eventually gave rise to cities and civiliza- initial foci, is uncertain.
tions are far from straightforward. It is clear that the Early states took many different forms. All faced dif-
development of a social hierarchy was a necessary pre- ficulty in enforcing and maintaining their territoriality in
cursor, but what produced that? Different scholars have the context of poor communications, and different states
debated the merits of alternative potential causes such approached this problem in different ways. The Greek
as land shortages, inheritance rules, or the emergence of city-states, for example, typically occupied only small
particularly strong or charismatic individuals. But while areas and restricted their population sizes. When popu-
these and other factors may have produced chiefdoms lation in any one state exceeded a certain threshold, that
(see Spotlight box  1.3), something more seems to be state would found a self-governing colony elsewhere on
required to explain the rise of cities, states and civiliza- the sea coast. Travel by sea was generally easier than over-
tions. As Maisels writes, chiefs enjoy only ‘hegemony’ land travel and thus settlements could keep in touch (see
over their peoples, and are bound by rules of kinship Plate  1.4). In this way the Greeks eventually colonized
which imply mutual obligations. Chiefdoms were noto- much of the eastern Mediterranean coast (Figure 1.3).
riously unstable. Kings and other state rulers, by contrast, The huge Roman Empire, by contrast, could not rely
exercise ‘sovereignty’ (ultimate power) over a territory solely on sea travel. This was a much more centralized
and its peoples (Maisels 1993: 199). Thus scholars have polity and only by having superb military organization,
cast around for particular factors which enabled individ- an elaborate system of roads and fortifications, good
ual leaders to have their power recognized as legitimate administration, and a state-controlled religion centred
by subject peoples and persuaded the latter to pay over on the person of the emperor, could it survive for several
the tribute, food surpluses and services which cities and centuries (Figure 1.4 and Case study 1.1). The Mongol
rulers required to maintain themselves in existence. Such Empire was also very extensive, controlling much of
particular factors might have included religious sanc- Asia and a good slice of central and eastern Europe in
tions, military skills or organizing power. The problem the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries AD. The Mongols
is to show how the kind of social inequality that might were pastoral nomads whose formidable warrior skills
be produced by such processes then transforms itself were based on their horsemanship and their ability to
into the stable and legitimate power that a ruling group outmanoeuvre their enemies. But nomadic empires had a
exercises in the state. Some scholars, therefore, have pro- tendency to contract as quickly as they arose. It was dif-
posed that states came into being as a result of different ficult for the emperor to maintain control over his swift-
processes working together in a contingent way rather moving armies of mounted warriors. Finally, medieval
than being caused deterministically by a single overriding Europe’s answer to the problem of territoriality was to
process (Maisels 1993: 199–220). decentralize political power through kings to territorial
Whatever may be the explanation for the initial devel- lords and minor nobles (see Case study 1.2). In return
opment of states and associated cities, they gave rise to for their rights to their land and other privileges, lesser
major changes in human societies (see Spotlight box 1.4). nobles owed their lords a duty of military support in time
Rather than being organized around the principle of kin- of need, which meant having to appear with an army of
ship like the tribe and the chiefdom, for example, states knights, retainers and other soldiers when ordered to do
were organized on the territorial principle. This means so. The lords in turn owed loyalty to their overlords, and
that the rulers of states exercised their rule over defined so on in a hierarchy that ended with kings or other rulers.
territories and their inhabitants, no matter who the latter Medieval European states were thus quite decentralized
happened to be. This proved an extremely powerful way and unstable, as regional lords and their underlings were
of organizing human societies. States thus appeared in often tempted to rebel (Figure 1.5). Only after centuries
different parts of the globe. The first organized states are of struggle between rulers, lords and ordinary subjects
believed to have developed in Sumer in present-day Iraq did the European states of today finally appear.
around 3000 BC. According to Maisels, these took the What all this tells us is that the present-day pattern of
form of city-states. In China the first state, associated states is contingent on and the outcome of quite random

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 30    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

Plate 1.4  A Classical Greek

ship of the kind which plied the
Mediterranean in Antiquity.
(Stefano Bianchetti/Corbis)

Tanais

E u x i n e
ilia
Mass

Propontis
cia
ae
Gr
na
ag

o l is
tap
en
P

Greek colonies and areas under Greek influence

Figure 1.3  The Greek colonization of the ancient Mediterranean and Black Sea c. 550 BC.
Source: after Pounds (1947: 49)

historical processes. Had other processes taken place, emergence of states like the United Kingdom, France,
the outcomes might have been totally different. In other China or Nigeria, whatever present-day nationalists
words, there was no historical inevitability about the might like to think. Often enough state-building has

M01_DANI2950_05_SE_C01.indd 30 31/03/16 7:05 pm

 Chapter 1  Pre-capitalist worlds    31

Inchtuthil 0 50 100 150 km

0 50 100 miles
Ardoch Carpow
ANTONINE WALL 0 50 100 Roman miles

Inveresk Main radials from London

Newstead

Loudoun
Hill

STANEGATE
HADRIAN'S WALL
South Shields
Carlisle Corbridge

Moresby
Brougham Piercebridge
Ravenglass

Aldborough

York
Brough-on-Humber

Manchester

Lincoln
Caernarvon Chester
Caister-by-
Yarmouth
Wroxeter Wall
Caersws Leicester Caistor-by-
Norwich
Leintwardine

Carmarthen Gloucester Alchester

Usk Colchester
E
SS

Caerleon Cirencester Verulamium Chelmsford

London
FO

Sea
Mills Richborough
Bath
Silchester Dover
Ilchester Lympne
Exeter Bitterne Chichester
Pevensey
Dorchester
Nanstallon

Figure 1.4  Roman Britain.

Source: © Oxford University Press 1984. Redrawn from map VI from Roman Britain in Oxford History of England, edited by Peter Salway
(1984), by permission of Oxford University Press

been a murky and messy business in which many inno- celebrated in modern national mythologies. And if the
cent people have suffered, and it was rarely character- existence of modern states is the product of historical
ized by the glorious victories and heroic deeds so often chance, why should things be any different in the future?

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 32    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

Royal Domain c. 1475

Fiefs still independent at end

of sixteenth century

Papal Territory

ARTOIS Frontier of France in 1492

PICARDY

N O R M A N
D Y
C H A
M P
A G
N
E
B R
I T M
T A
A I
N N
Y E

BUR
N
ANJOU V

GUNDY
E
R
S
BERRY
P
O
IT B
O O
U UR
BO
NNA
IS

D D
OR A
IG U
ER GE
S AUVERGNE P H
P I N
I MO E
L

G U
Y E
N N E
ROUERGUE

P R O V E N C E
O C
U E D
L A N G

Figure 1.5  France towards the end of the feudal period, showing the political fragmentation typical of many
parts of Europe prior to the appearance of modern states.
Source: based on The Times Atlas of World History (1989: 15.1). © Collins Bartholomew Ltd 1989, reproduced by permission of HarperCol-
lins Publishers

Case study 1.1

The Roman Empire at its zenith be crossed and enormous territories controlled in
(first to fourth centuries AD) spite of the absence of modern industrial technolo-
gies. At its greatest extent the empire’s east–west
The Roman Empire was one of the greatest achieve- axis stretched from the Caucasus to Cape Finisterre
ments of state-building in the pre-modern period and in north-west Spain, a distance of about 2,800 miles.
is testimony to the way in which huge distances could North–south it reached from Hadrian’s Wall, near the

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 Chapter 1  Pre-capitalist worlds    33

present-day Anglo-Scottish border, to the fringes of the were interconnected by a network of fine roads, and an
Sahara in North Africa, some 1,600 miles. The empire official transport system (the cursus publicus) with inns
was characterized by two major languages (Latin and and posting stations at regular intervals speeded official
Greek), low tariff barriers, a common currency, a com- communications. There were even roadbooks (itiner-
mon code of laws, and the basis of a common system aria) for the guidance of the many travellers, including
of education and culture for the Romanized elite. some tourists. Fortified lines, of which Hadrian’s Wall
Rome was a truly ‘universal state’, which lasted in its is the most celebrated, protected the most vulnerable
mature form for half a millennium, and in its eastern frontiers. But the empire was not held together only by
(Byzantine) manifestation until the capture of Constan- military force. It was also by judicious extensions of
tinople by the Turks in 1453. Roman citizenship and other privileges to local elites,
Like all early states, Rome had problems in enforcing and by fostering helpful religious practices like emperor
its territoriality – the sheer scale of the empire meant worship, that local loyalties were ensured.
that there were always difficulties in maintaining control The empire’s economic and cultural achievements
over its far-flung provinces. That the empire was able to were many. Long-distance trade in such items as
endure for so long (albeit with many vicissitudes) was grain, metals and luxury goods was important, for
a tribute to its highly developed capacity for organiza- example, though there were many hindrances to com-
tion and an astuteness in gaining and retaining local merce and most people depended on local agriculture
loyalties. The acquisition of new territories proceeded and manufacture. It must also be remembered that
by a mixture of conquest, colonization by Roman and there was a heavy dependence on slavery. In the end
Latin colonists, the establishment of vassal kingdoms the Romans could never be assured of political sta-
and powers, alliances (often forced) and other means. bility, even in their heartlands. Reliance on the army
The Roman army, reformed by the Emperor Augustus contributed to the empire’s eventual undoing – gener-
after 13 BC, was a masterpiece of military organiza- als and their armies competed for political power, the
tion superior to any of Rome’s enemies in this period. economy was undermined by overtaxation and other
The seas and waterways were patrolled by the navy, factors, and growing military weakness invited rebel-
protecting merchant shipping. Towns and military bases lion, and invasion by ‘barbarians’.

Case study 1.2

European feudalism supporting them with their military forces and per-
forming other services as required.
■ Feudal society was hierarchical – ranked and ■ Feudal states were quite decentralized, parcelled out
stratified. into lordships and they in turn into jurisdictions of vari-
■ The majority of the population were subsistence farm- ous kinds.
ers, engaged in extensive forms of agriculture (for ■ Towns were generally small and few and far between
example, by cultivating strips in open fields shared (see Plate  1.3). Most were centres of trade and
with others, raising some livestock) and exploiting crafts. Their residents (merchants, burgesses) often
local resources like pastureland, woodland and fish. enjoyed freedoms and privileges (‘liberties’) denied to
■ Many of the rural population were obligated to their most rural dwellers.
lords and landholders, for example not to move away ■ Merchants and itinerant traders joined together net-
from their villages, to work the lord’s land, to pay the works of local and long-distance trade, linking local
tribute and taxes the lord and the state required, to fairs and markets with towns, ports and so on. Craft
serve the lord militarily and to perform other services. production and trade were generally subject to a vari-
■ Lords held their land conditionally from their overlord ety of restrictions and controls, and often played only
and ultimately from the king or other ruler. Land could a minor role in the lives of rural dwellers.
not easily be sold. Lords exercised jurisdiction over ■ The medieval world-view was strongly influenced
those living on their estates. by the Church, whose priests and officials were
■ Lords owed allegiance to their overlords (and they among the few educated people and were universally
in turn to their overlords and so on), for example in present.

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 34    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

demands which were made upon them. From the time of

1.6 Pre-capitalist societies the appearance of states down until the twentieth cen-
tury the lives of most people were lived in the context of
It should be clear by now that pre-capitalist societies such peasant communities. As mentioned earlier, such
were by no means simple. They differed among them- communities are still characteristic of parts of the world
selves in all kinds of ways. At the same time, when com- today, though increasingly eroded by commercialism and
pared with present-day capitalist societies, they appear growing contacts with modernity.
to have had a number of distinguishing features. This Scholars researching traditional peasant societies
section will consider some of the more obvious ones. have frequently pointed to the many cultural differences
Geographers and others have sometimes been tempted between such rural dwellers and the cities that ruled over
to think that past societies, lacking modern communica- them and which they might occasionally visit. A case in
tions, were essentially small in scale and localized, with life point is religion. Religion has been a fundamental factor
based around the community. It is hoped that enough has in social organization and in outlook in virtually every
been said already to suggest how over-simplified this view human society down to the twentieth century. Early states
is. Huge empires had to be administered and defended, were generally associated with an official religion that
great cities like classical Rome had to be fed. Classical legitimized the established order and which was often
Rome imported some 17 million bushels of wheat each practised in cities but was rarely fully understood by the
year from Egypt, North Africa and Sicily (Simmons 1996: peasants, most of whom were probably illiterate (see
109). In the Roman Empire and other societies, high-value Plate  1.5). Even where the peasants officially followed
goods often travelled much greater distances. Even the the same religion as the elite, as in medieval Europe, they
Inuit, living the lives of hunters and gatherers, sometimes almost always interpreted its teachings in their own ways,
travelled hundreds of miles each year on hunting trips, and mixing them with their own superstitions and ‘pagan’
their geographical knowledge frequently covered an even beliefs. The life and outlook of the ruler and the elite, if
wider span. Enough has been said above about migrations not of all cities, were entirely alien to them. And equally
and the diffusion of artefacts and practices across great their way of life was alien to the cities.
distances to suggest how space could be overcome even if For this reason, it would be completely misleading
individuals were immobile, at least by today’s standards. to think of the subjects of pre-capitalist states as ‘citi-
There was, however, no avoiding the problems of zens’ in the modern sense. Traditional rulers knew little
communication in pre-modern societies. Most people of the countryside, where most of their subjects lived,
in agricultural societies lived lives which were bound to and cared even less (except, perhaps, where they had
their villages and the surrounding regions. Their work landed estates, and even then the running of the estate
consisted essentially in winning the means of subsist- could be left to officials). What mattered to rulers was
ence for themselves and their families from their environ- law and order, and extracting the taxes and tribute the
ment, as well as paying the taxes and meeting the other state needed to maintain itself in existence. The idea

Plate 1.5  Icons of the Virgin

Mary, Jesus and saints of the
Eastern Orthodox Church.
Such images would have
impressed the peasants of
the Christian Orthodox parts
of eastern Europe and the
Middle East, even if they did
not fully understand the icons’
significance.
(Slobodan Miskovic/Shutterstock)

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 Chapter 1  Pre-capitalist worlds    35

that rulers should care for the welfare of their ordinary international tourists and cultural visitors, whilst tourist
subjects, let alone consult them about their policies, is providers and also those charged with the conservation of
very modern indeed. the past compete to sell the past to visitors. What cannot
It is difficult for most people living in a world domi- be viewed out of doors is gathered together into muse-
nated by capitalist relationships to conceive of societies ums which become ever more elaborate and ever more
where this was not the case. Before capitalism, most peo- tied to the leisure industry rather than to the educational
ple were engaged in subsistence activities: hunting, gath- role which defined them in the past. Cities which are in
ering, farming, fishing or whatever. They might have to the business of selling themselves to international inves-
pay taxes or tribute, and they might trade some of what tors and global companies use their cultural resources,
they gathered or produced, but market trade, generally including heritage, to do so. Altogether, it seems, our age
organized by a small minority of merchants and traders, is obsessed with the past, and nostalgia has become part
was often quite marginal to them. Where market trade of almost everyone’s life.
did exist in early societies, it was frequently hedged about Not surprisingly, perhaps, the present-day significance
by laws and restrictions of various kinds. There might be of heritage has not escaped the notice of human geogra-
laws against the taking of interest on loans, for exam- phers and other students of society (Graham et al. 2000;
ple, regulations on price, or restrictions on where and Johnson 2003; Benton 2010). Geographers have been con-
when trade might take place or who might engage in it. cerned to know what it is about the past which appears
Only with the rise of modern capitalism did the market to attract so much public interest and how people under-
become central to the way societies functioned. stand those facets of the past which they encounter. More
It is very difficult to generalize about pre-capital- specifically, since the past is no longer with us and cannot
ist societies and almost any generalization is open to be encountered directly, scholars have begun to ask about
objection. Case study 1.2 describes the main features which particular past is being viewed under the guise of
of the feudal society that existed in medieval Europe heritage, and about the ways in which the past is manipu-
which, according to many scholars, was the seedbed for lated for public consumption. For the fact is that there
the development of world capitalism (see Chapter  2). are many pasts, depending on the viewpoints of those
Even here, however, one must be careful – the features who wish to describe them and on the messages which
described would be more or less true, depending on the those in control of heritage wish to purvey. Whether it
date and the place being considered. be politicians wishing to convey some lesson about ‘the
nation’ (such as the recent discussion in the UK about so-
called ‘British values’), museum curators trying to explain
particular historical events or epochs, or the guardians
1.7 The heritage of the past of historic sites aiming to entertain and titillate tourists,
the scope for historical distortion (even if it means only
Nowadays the past, or what is commonly referred to telling one side of the story) is immense. History, in other
as heritage, is big business. Medieval cities and cathe- words, is all around us, and history is controversial. Only
drals, historic villages and battlefields, monuments, by knowing something about the past can the geographer
gardens and ruined temples are objects sought out by hope to avoid ignorance about the present.

Learning outcomes ● Classifying societies into types is a way of making

Having read this chapter, you should begin to appreci- sense of the past and of trying to understand the
ate that: geographical characteristics of varied societies. But
all classifications have their shortcomings.
● The surviving evidence necessarily limits our ● Overcoming the friction of space was a severe prob-
knowledge of past societies, since they cannot be lem in pre-capitalist societies. But it is important not
observed directly. In general, the further back in to exaggerate its effects – people often travelled, and
time past societies existed, the more uncertain our often migrated, long distances even in ‘primitive’ soci-
knowledge about them becomes. eties, ideas and artefacts travelled vast distances,
● People in the past lived very different lives from and empires were successfully established.
those of most people alive today. But it is important ● The landscapes that can be seen today have been
not to oversimplify or overgeneralize about past profoundly influenced by past societies, including
societies that varied enormously in their structures hunter-gatherer ones. Our world is the product of
and ways of life and in their degree of complexity. generations of human activity.

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 36    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

● Change and progress are two different things. imperialism, Annals of the Association of American Geog-
Social change almost always means winners and raphers, 95(1), 141–61. This article argues for longer term
losers. The human record suggests that the latter historical perspectives in human geography.

have often been the majority. Simmons, I.G. (1996) Changing the Face of the Earth: Culture,
Environment, History, 2nd edition, Blackwell, Oxford. A history
● We must not assume that our present-day society is
of the impact of humans on the natural environment from the
the world’s most successful or progressive. We should earliest times to the present. Contains excellent chapters on
be prepared to learn from others and to allow for the pre-capitalist societies, especially from the environmental point
possibility that other ways of organizing society might of view, but tends to be a little technical in places.
be better at coping with some problems (for example, The Times Archaeology of the World (1999), new edi-
that of environmental degradation) than our own. tion, Times Books, London. A lavishly illustrated survey of
● There are many pasts depending on the viewpoint archaeology.
of the observer. Many assumptions adopted by The Times Atlas of World History (1999), new edition,
people alive today are based on misunderstandings Times Books, London. A highly acclaimed survey of world
history beginning with human origins. This is in fact more
or distortions of the past. We should always be pre-
a history book with maps than a true atlas and fails to pro-
pared to test our ideas and assumptions against the vide detailed maps despite its large format. But it is lavishly
historical evidence. We should be prepared to do illustrated and contains a wealth of factual and explanatory
the same with the ideas and assumptions of others. material. Other similar atlases are available.
● Only by knowing something about the past can the
human geographer hope to avoid ignorance about
the present. Useful websites
www.britishmuseum.org  The British Museum, London.
Further reading The museum holds a unique collection of art and antiqui-
ties from ancient and living societies across the globe. The
Benton, T. (ed.) (2010) Understanding Heritage and website gives details of the museum’s holdings and current
Memory, Manchester University Press, Manchester. A set exhibitions, hosts discussions on prehistory and past civiliza-
of essays exploring the contentious nature of heritage and tions, and gives guidance on how to find further information.
memory, including the idea of cultural landscape, arguing www.si.edu  The Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC.
that it is never possible to impose a single set of values or The Smithsonian is a focus for many kinds of scientific and
interpretations on acts of remembering. cultural endeavour in the United States. The website contains
Crone, P. (2003) Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre- much that is useful for readers of this chapter, especially in
Modern World, Oneworld, Oxford. An excellent introduction to relation to the history and prehistory of North America.
the character of pre-industrial societies, from the invention of www.jorvik-viking-centre.co.uk  The website of the Jorvik
cities and civilization. Written for undergraduates. Viking Centre in York, England, famed for its reconstruction
Dodgshon, R.A. (1987) The European Past: Social Evolu- of life in York in the Viking period.
tion and Spatial Order, Macmillan, Basingstoke. An original http://english-heritage.org.uk  The website of English Herit-
examination of European prehistory and history, taken from a age, which is responsible for the upkeep of many prehistoric and
geographical perspective. Based on the social classification historic sites in England, many of which are open to the public.
system highlighted in this chapter. Very detailed, but repays www.besthistorysites.net Entitled ‘Best of History Websites’,
careful study. a comprehensive guide to history-oriented resources online,
Dodgshon, R.A. and Butlin, R.A. (eds) (1990) An Historical starting with prehistory. For teachers, students and others.
Geography of England and Wales, 2nd edition, Academic www.british-history.ac.uk  British History Online is a digital
Press, London. An historical geography of the region from library of key printed primary and secondary sources for the
prehistoric times to 1939. Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate the history of Britain and Ireland. The accent is on the period
issue of feudalism. between 1300 and 1800.
Jones, R. (2007) People/States/Territories: The Political http://whc.unesco.org/  The official world heritage site
Geographies of British State Formation, Blackwell, Oxford. of UNESCO, which designates and seeks to protect
People, power and places in the making of the British state. ‘World Heritage’, defined as ‘cultural and natural heritage
Jones, R. and Phillips, R. (2005) Unsettling geographi- around the world considered to be of outstanding value to
cal horizons: explaining pre-modern and non-European humanity’.

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 The rise and spread of
capitalism

Chapter 2

Terry Slater

Topics covered
■ Definitions of capitalism
■ The cyclical nature of capitalism
■ The transition from feudalism to capitalism
■ The beginnings of European imperialism
■ Colonial commerce
■ Transatlantic migrations and the slave trade
■ European colonial empires and racism
■ Industrial and agricultural transformations
■ New modes of transportation
■ Industrial urbanism

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 38    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

B etween 1500 and 1900 there was a fundamental

change in the way an increasingly large part of the
Western world was organized. Beginning in particular in
doing this was through the division of labour, dividing
manufacturing tasks into simple, repetitive operations
that could be performed by unskilled, and therefore
parts of England, and spreading to other parts of Europe, cheap, labour. Another important way in which manu-
the capitalist economic system was to change, or influ- facturers could seek competitive advantage over their
ence substantially, not only the economies, but also the fellows was to be first in the use of new technology. The
political, social and cultural dimensions of newly power- significance of the invention and adoption of new ways
ful nation-states. By 1900, capitalism was the dominant of doing things, whether through science and technol-
socio-economic system over a large part of the world, a ogy, or ideas and organization, has often been crucial to
by-product of the colonial empires of those nation-states. firms, industries and regions in getting ahead of com-
petitors. This is still very clearly so today in technologi-
cal ‘hotspots’ like the Milano and Stuttgart regions of
the European space economy. Most scholars agree that
2.1 What is capitalism? the capitalist system began to cohere into an integrated
whole in a particular place (England), at a particular time
A number of writers have provided theoretical frame- (the seventeenth century), and that it then took another
works for understanding the workings and ramifica- long period (until the mid nineteenth century) before it
tions of the capitalist system. The first was devised by matured in the states of north-west Europe and in North
the Scottish philosopher, historian and father of classi- America (Green and Sutcliffe 1987: 6–7) (­Spotlight
cal economics, Adam Smith, in his book An Inquiry into box 2.1). We do need to note, however, that recently this
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). viewpoint has been challenged by some historians who
Like all theoretical models, Smith’s is a simplification of believe that it is too Eurocentric and that greater atten-
reality, but it introduced a terminology and series of con- tion should be given to developments in China and the
ceptualizations that are still familiar to us today. Smith East more generally (Section 2.2.3).
assumed the model was driven by people’s selfish desires
for gain and self-interest. Thus, production takes place to
generate profit; surplus profits are accumulated as capi-
tal; and the basic rule of the system is ‘accumulate or per-
2.1.1 C yclical characteristics of economic
ish’. Integral to the system is the determination of prices
development
which, in a free market, said Smith, are determined by the Smith went on to model the workings of a national econ-
supply of, and demand for, the factors of production. In omy over a year (macroeconomics) to elucidate the way
order to maximize their profits, industrialists will always in which capitalism works in a series of interconnected
seek to minimize their costs of production, including the cycles. These cycles have been studied subsequently by
wages that they pay their workforce, so as to outcom- other economists, most notably the Russian N. Kondra-
pete other producers by having lower prices. One way of tieff (1925), whose name is now used for the roughly

Spotlight box 2.1

Characteristics of states with a mature ● Wage labourers were increasingly closely super-
capitalist economy and society vised by managers of the production processes.
● The means of production of wage labourers was
● The majority of the population in these countries were owned by capitalists whose aim was to make a
wage labourers forming a ‘working class’ who sold profit on their investment.
their labour power for wages in cash or kind so as to ● There was an increasing disparity between the
purchase food and other commodities to survive. ‘profit’ of capitalists and the ‘wages’ of workers with
● The majority of these wage labourers were male an increasing propensity for conflict between the
and worked outside the home; females increasingly two.
‘worked’ in the home, both in the domestic care of ● The vast majority of goods and services, including
their families and by ‘selling’ surplus labour time for fixed property like land, were distributed through
minimal wages. monetary exchange.

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 Chapter 2  The rise and spread of capitalism    39

50-year-long cycles of boom and depression that have provides a threefold categorization of historical socio-
characterized the capitalist world since the mid eight- economic systems. Wallerstein proceeded to delimit the
eenth century. spatial characteristics of the capitalist world economy
In seeking the explanation for these cycles of growth into core, periphery and semi-periphery. These terms
and stagnation, Schumpeter (1939) argued that technical are not used in the everyday sense but signify areas in
innovation leading to the development of new industries which particular processes operate. For Wallerstein, core
was the key to understanding the growth phase of the processes are those characterized by relatively high wages,
cycle. Because technical innovation is spatially uneven, advanced technology and diversified production; periph-
then so too has been the geography of economic devel- ery processes are characterized by low wages, simple
opment under capitalism. The question then arises as technology and limited production. Between the two is
to why the geography of innovation is uneven. Recent the semi-periphery: areas that exploit the periphery but
research has suggested that the socio-institutional struc- which are exploited by the core, so that they exhibit a
tures of regions of innovation, or of those lacking innova- mixture of both core and peripheral processes (Taylor
tion, are the key to explanation; in other words, whether 1989: 16–17). In the period between the seventeenth and
educational, governmental and social organizations the end of the nineteenth century some regions of the
encourage or discourage enterprise and change. Others world were in the core (north-west Europe, for exam-
have criticized the technological determinism of these ple) or periphery (central Africa) throughout the period.
theories (Mahon 1987). Other regions moved from the semi-periphery into either
the core (the southern states of the USA, for example) or
the periphery (the states emerging from the ruins of the
2.2 Other perspectives, other stories Ottoman/Turkish empire). Wallerstein’s theory has been
very influential in explanations of the growth of globali-
zation, but it is an explanation only at the ‘structural’
2.2.1 Marxism
level. It says little about the complexities of the social and
The viewpoints of orthodox economics are not the economic networks that enable the system to work, or of
only interpretation of the transformation of large parts the resistance by groups or individuals trying to change
of the world over the past 300 years. Karl Marx, in his it (Ogborn 1999).
book Das Kapital (1867), took a very different perspec-
tive in his analysis of capitalism (see Spotlight box 3.2).
He proposed that profit arises out of the way in which 2.2.3 Eurocentrism
capitalists (the bourgeoisie) dominate labour (the work- In recent decades, a significant group of scholars (mostly
ers) in an unequal class-based relationship. This unequal historians) have claimed that most of the theories dis-
class relationship was perceived by Marx to lead inevita- cussed above are ‘Eurocentric’. That is they tell the
bly to class conflict. In his later writing he sketched out story of these three centuries as being about the ‘rise
ways in which labour could gain control of the means of the West’ owing to its developing humanism, scien-
of production and thereby ‘throw off their chains’. This tific rationalism and democratic politics. The story of
was to have dramatic long-term consequences for the the East is relegated to a few footnotes because it was
socio-political organization of the world through most perceived as passive, unchanging and despotic. This new
of the twentieth century between the Russian Revolu- group of scholars, beginning perhaps with Edward Said
tion and the upheavals of 1989 (see Chapter 3, pp. 65–7). (1978) and his concept of ‘Orientalism’, have tried to
We need to note, however, that Marx’s writing is domi- show that, in fact, the story of East and West is funda-
nated by an historical, but not a geographical, perspec- mentally intertwined and that capitalism would not have
tive: it traces class relationships in time but not in space. emerged without the import of eastern technology, ideas
Marxist interpretations of capitalist development have and resources along long-established long-distance trade
therefore always had difficulty in conceptualizing uneven routes developed by eastern merchants and connecting
spatial development. It is also highly Eurocentric in its to Europe through the Middle East. Eurocentrism was
perspective. deeply embedded in the West (at least from medieval
times onwards) and also led to a distinctive, socially con-
structed European ‘identity’ that was Christian and ‘civi-
2.2.2 World systems theory lized’ and could be set against the so-called ‘primitive’
Another way of conceptualizing the nature of these peoples of North America, Africa and Australasia who
changes is to be found in the writings of Immanuel could be exploited as European states began to develop
Wallerstein (1979), whose ‘world-systems theory’ their empires (Hobson 2004).

M02_DANI2950_05_SE_C02.indd 39 31/03/16 7:06 pm

 40    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

By the later fifteenth century, larger European towns

2.3 T he transition from feudalism were dominated by what has come to be called mer-
to capitalism chant capitalism. Merchants were both the providers
of capital and principal traders in a regionally special-
The transformation of the European economy into a cap- ized, complex, Europe-wide trading nexus based not on
italist one was a long drawn-out process and historians luxury goods as in the medieval period, but on bulky
continue to argue the precise causes of the changes that staples like grain and timber, and on an increasing array
took place. Writers using an avowedly Marxist frame of of manufactured products. Towns that flourished eco-
reference (Dobb 1946; Kaye 1984) have made many of the nomically in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe
most significant contributions in this debate. To them, were those whose inhabitants were able to copy and
the development of a class of wage labourers is crucial, manufacture imported products more cheaply than the
together with the assumption of political power by the exporting regions, and develop a constant stream of
new class of capitalists. Geographers have been particu- new, innovative, marketable products (Knox and Agnew
larly concerned to trace the outworking of these histori- 1994: 154–61) (Spotlight box 2.2). For most commenta-
cal processes of social and economic transformation in tors, the key question then becomes: why did these pro-
the particular space economies of local regions (Gregory cesses of transformation coalesce first in sixteenth- and
1982; Langton 1984; Stobart and Raven 2004). seventeenth-century England?
The disintegration of feudalism (see Case study 1.2), We can begin to answer this question by suggesting
with its carefully controlled market system, was consid- that, since land was one of the key factors of produc-
erably speeded by the after-effects of the Black Death in tion, critical in the sixteenth century was the enormous
mid-fourteenth-century Europe. The European popula- transfer of land in England from conservative ecclesi-
tion was reduced by between one-third and a half, and astical ownership to secular ownership. This was the
towns were especially hard hit. The resulting labour consequence of the dissolution of the monasteries
shortage meant that enterprise and new ways of doing by Henry VIII in the later 1530s. Even the monastic
things were more likely to be rewarded, since the feudal buildings could be adapted by capitalist manufactur-
elite required more revenue to maintain their power. At ers, as the Wiltshire clothier William Stumpe showed at
the same time, the slackening of social and cultural con- Malmesbury Abbey where he installed 300 weavers in
trols meant that new ways of thinking could flourish, the 1540s (Chandler 1993: 487–9). Land was also being
especially in the growing towns. transformed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

Spotlight box 2.2

Characteristics of the period of merchant ● Technical innovations transformed industries; the

capitalism in Europe most significant was probably the development of
the printing press by Gutenberg, in Mainz, ena-
● Increasing numbers of people sold their labour for bling knowledge to be diffused cheaply and rapidly.
money wages. They ceased to work on their own However, we need to note that paper-making, block
land. This led to increased consumer demand for printing, and the movable metal-type press all origi-
food, clothing and household goods; in many places nated earlier in China/Korea.
there was a notable rise in living standards. ● The rediscovery of Classical knowledge led to new
● More producers of both agricultural and craft-man- ways of seeing the world and, consequently, to its
ufactured products began to accumulate capital as rebuilding to reflect these new images, especially in
they produced for this growing market. These pros- towns.
perous yeoman farmers and manufacturers were ● Ultimately, these changes led to religious upheaval
the foundation of a new class of capitalists. and political revolution whereby the new capital-
● The removal of feudal market restrictions and controls ist class became dominant in the governance of
by guilds on production led merchants to invest in the nation-states.
reorganization of production on a capitalist basis.

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 Chapter 2  The rise and spread of capitalism    41

through the process of enclosure. This enabled live- and this period is known as the ‘Age of Absolutism’.
stock to be raised more efficiently for the urban meat Landowners, especially the rulers of small states, amassed
markets and experimentation in new agricultural tech- enormous wealth from their control of land. This wealth
niques to be undertaken by yeoman farmers (Butlin was expended on increasingly spectacular landscapes of
1993: 178–9). display: huge palaces, filled with works of art and every
In the seventeenth century it was the social, religious luxury, set in carefully designed, and often very intricate,
and political transformation of England that was critical, landscapes reliant on vast inputs of labour for their main-
according to Dobb (1946). The struggles between Crown tenance (Figure 2.1). King Louis XIV of France had set
and Parliament during the Civil War and Commonwealth the model at his palace of Versailles, outside Paris, using
(1642–60) are seen as a conflict between landowners, the resources of a much larger state. Such conspicuous
and capitalist yeomen and manufacturers. Though this displays of wealth and privilege by the few led, ulti-
struggle was continued through the Restoration (1660) mately, to a much bloodier revolution than in England.
and Glorious Revolution (1688), by the end of the seven- The French Revolution saw the slaughter of not simply
teenth century the capitalist bourgeoisie were politically the royal house, but of the landowners, intellectuals and
predominant and were able to transform the state to their the bourgeoisie, since this was the first of the workers’
own advantage. revolutions, with its cry of ‘Liberté, egalité, fraternité’.
Elsewhere in Europe landowners remained pre-emi- However, it led rapidly to the totalitarian militarism of
nent over a predominantly peasant agricultural workforce Napoleon.

Figure 2.1  The palace of Versailles in 1662 by Pierre Patel. Louis XIV’s mansion already has vast formal
gardens stretching to the horizon, reservoirs to supply the fountains (to the right of the palace) and a patte d’oie of
avenues (in the foreground) to provide processional routes. The growing town (left and right) gave accommodation
to government officials and military officers.
Source: The Art Archive/Alamy

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 42    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

of the European colonial empires that were to dominate

2.4 An expanding world and control almost every aspect of life for the next 400
years. The Portuguese established a far-flung network of
As the European economic and cultural world was grad- small fortified port bases around Africa and the Indian
ually transformed, European travellers began to voyage Ocean, many of them based beside existing Arab ports,
beyond the shores of Europe. They travelled overland through which they were able to link western Europe into
into Asia, drawn both by a thirst for greater knowl- the trade in gold, spices and textiles (Figure 2.2). Equally
edge and, more significantly, by the rewards that could significant was their use of African slaves to produce
be reaped from direct exploitation of scarce commodi- sugar on plantation farms in their Brazilian territory.
ties for European consumption. These included spices, The Spanish founded a more militaristic, oppressive and
sugar, silk, muslins, porcelain and the like, which had exploitative empire in central and south America which
previously been traded through the eastern Mediterra- saw the decimation of local populations through war-
nean. In the late fifteenth century, however, this region fare and the catastrophic effects of European diseases,
was coming under Turkish (Ottoman) control. The Por- especially smallpox and measles. It also brought enor-
tuguese, funded by Italian bankers, were the first Euro- mous inflows of gold and silver bullion into Spain and,
peans to navigate round Africa into the Indian Ocean, ultimately, onwards into the European economy. Blaut
using the existing Arab-dominated sea-based trading (1993) sees this as the event that more than any other
networks (Arabs had already rounded the Cape in the kick-started the European capitalist world system.
other direction), whilst soon after (in 1492), Christopher Fairly quickly, control of the products of this new
Columbus, again funded by Italian (Genoese) merchant Western maritime world economy moved from south-
capital, sailed westwards across the Atlantic to open the west to north-west Europe. The Dutch began to compete
Americas to European exploitation using African labour. successfully with the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and
For Spain and Portugal, this is the heroic ‘Age of the the centres of European capital moved from Lisbon and
Navigators’, as they moved rapidly to take control of Seville first to Antwerp by the mid sixteenth century, and
these new maritime trade routes looking out to the Atlan- then to Amsterdam at the end of the century. The mer-
tic. The merchants of Lisbon and Seville grew rich on this chants of these ports successfully integrated the Atlantic
trade. For the rest of the world it marks the beginning trade with that flowing from the Baltic and from central

Figure 2.2  The Portuguese

fortress and trading station
of Sofala, in modern
Mozambique, in 1558. For a
time it was the administrative
centre for all Portuguese
trading with India. Note the
well-defended Portuguese
fortress, the warehouses
and accommodation of the
merchants, with a Catholic
church, defended by a moat,
and the houses of local people
in the forest landscape beyond.
Source: Carneiro (1990)

M02_DANI2950_05_SE_C02.indd 42 31/03/16 7:06 pm

 Chapter 2  The rise and spread of capitalism    43

Europe via the Rhine valley. It was at Antwerp that the capitalist system moved once more, from Amsterdam to
first stock exchange was established, enabling capital London (Dodgshon 1998).
raised in one business to fund investment in another. The colonialist trading systems that developed in the
Amsterdam’s rise was based on having greater military period up to 1770 have often been described in simple
and naval power than its neighbours and using it to dualist, oppositional, terms (core–periphery; dominant–
enforce the privileges of a distinctive trading monopoly: subordinate; metropolitan–colonial, for example). Blaut
the state-licensed joint-stock charter company (the Dutch (1993) is especially critical of the Eurocentric character
East India Company) (Dodgshon 1998: 74–83). of this type of argument. More recently, a more com-
At the same time, French and English fishermen plex, multi-layered interpretation has been posited. We
had followed John Cabot’s exploratory voyage across need to note, first, that different parts of the developing
the North Atlantic to begin to exploit the rich fishing world economy operated in somewhat different ways,
grounds off Newfoundland and, subsequently, to trade were based on different product interactions between raw
with native Americans for fur pelts. From these small materials, manufacture and consumption, involved com-
beginnings French and English merchant influence began plex transportation flows, and required different politico-
to expand through the seventeenth century in the Indian military frameworks to make them function properly.
Ocean (using similar company trading monopolies to the Meinig’s (1986) model of the Anglo-French mid-eight-
Dutch); in the Caribbean, where sugar plantations and eenth-century North Atlantic economy uncovers some of
slave labour were copied from the Portuguese; and in these complexities in terms of the commercial, political
North America. They superseded the Dutch in the early and social systems that were required for the geography of
eighteenth century through superiority of arms, but it colonial capitalism, and Ogborn (1999) has added details
was not until the later eighteenth century that the Brit- of networks of individuals and patterns of resistance
ish emerged dominant in the developing Western world (Figure 2.3). The North Atlantic ‘triangular trade’ is cer-
economy. Consequently the primary city of the European tainly the best-known of these colonial trading systems.

Liverpool
FU Bristol London
RS

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METAL GOODS,
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NEW (750,000) WINDWARD
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BARBADOS (390,000) er
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LEONE E
NT AS
T
Christianbourg
‘TH LI HA CO
E AS LD

*
MID BE Lagos
GO

**
BRITISH DLE R IA Calabar
Estimated total import of slaves until the DUTCH FRENCH PAS
(750,000) GUIANA GUIANA GUIANA SAG
abolition of the British slave trade in 1807 E’ S LAVES
BIGHT
OF BENIN

American slave triangle

British slave triangle Fernando
Elmina Cape Po
Caribbean slave trade Coast

* West African trading forts Castle

Major slave ports Accra

Figure 2.3  The eighteenth-century North Atlantic trading system between Britain, Africa and North and Central
America.
Source: Bayley (1989: 46–7)

M02_DANI2950_05_SE_C02.indd 43 31/03/16 7:06 pm

 44    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

2.4.1 Colonial commerce frontier a barter system of exchange was as likely to

be found as a money economy. Nonetheless, fur, fish,
In Meinig’s North Atlantic commercial system, London timber and agricultural produce flowed in the opposite
and Paris acted as the source of finance, commercial direction for storage and transhipment back to Europe
intelligence and marketing (London’s Royal Exchange (see Figure 2.3).
was founded in 1566). The expanding industries of par- In North America, tobacco, rice, sugar, rum and cot-
ticular regions of western Europe were growing, in part ton were the major export products. All were produced
because they supplied a developing colonial market with on the plantation system using slave labour. By 1750,
manufactured goods such as textiles, tools, armaments some 50,000-60,000 people were being forcibly trans-
and household necessities. These goods were assem- ported across the Atlantic each year from all parts of
bled in Atlantic ports such as Bristol, Liverpool, Bor- the western African seaboard. Many died en route or
deaux and Le Havre. After crossing the Atlantic they shortly afterwards but, altogether, some 3.8 million
were stored, disassembled and distributed from colonial Africans had been transported by 1750, just over half
ports such as New York, Charleston and New Orleans to Latin America, the remainder to English, French
(Figure 2.4, Plate  2.1) by major traders. They sold on and Dutch North America and the West Indies. These
to local traders towards the colonial frontier. At the

Figure 2.4  Plan of the French

colonial entrepôt city of New
Orleans at the head of the
Mississippi delta in 1720,
published in London in 1759
by Thomas Jefferys.

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 Chapter 2  The rise and spread of capitalism    45

Plate 2.1  Madame John’s Legacy, c.1788. One of the oldest houses in
New Orleans, it was built during the Spanish colonial period (1765–1803).
Commercial functions occupy the brick-built ground floor, residence the
balcony floor.
(Terry Slater)

staggering figures meant that African-Americans were would sail first to African trading stations to exchange
easily the largest new culture group to be established in manufactured products, including guns, tools and chains,
both North and South America in the colonial period for slaves. The slaves would then be taken to the West
(Meinig 1986: 226–31). Indies or Charleston, with ships returning to Liverpool
The African abolitionist Olaudah Equiano, who or Bristol with a cargo of sugar, tobacco, rum or rice,
gained his freedom in England, wrote forcefully from and sometimes slaves such as Equiano, too. Most of the
his own experience about the horrors of the ‘middle latter were destined for domestic service in aristocratic
passage’ voyage from West Africa to the West Indies. households (see Figure 2.3).
He said:

The stench of the hold while we were on the coast was

intolerably loathsome ... but now that the whole ship’s 2.4.2 Colonial society
cargo were confined together, it became absolutely The slave trade was perhaps the most significant aspect
pestilential ... The air soon became unfit for respira- of the cultural transformation effected by the eight-
tion... and brought on a sickness among the slaves, eenth-century capitalist world economy in the Ameri-
of which many died ... This wretched situation was cas and, it should not be forgotten, in Africa. One of
aggravated by the galling of the chains ... and the filth the distinctive features of this transformation in the
of the necessary tubs (toilets) into which the children Americas was the ‘othering’ of Africans by Europeans.
often fell and were almost suffocated. The shrieks of They were regarded as in every way inferior to Euro-
the women and the groans of the dying, rendered the peans; they were legally and socially defined as differ-
whole scene of horror almost inconceivable. ent; and they therefore lived their lives separately from
(1789) white settlers. The social consequences of this were to
reverberate through the next 250 years, into our own
By 1750, the trade in slaves was dominated by large times, where spatially segregated city neighbourhoods
European companies using specially constructed and fit- based on ethnicity are still a commonplace in North
ted ships, but many smaller traders from the Atlantic ports American cities, whilst from the 1950s West Indian

M02_DANI2950_05_SE_C02.indd 45 31/03/16 7:06 pm

 46    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

migration to Britain saw similar ethnic areas develop in their dedicatory saints gave name to many of today’s
many British cities. Where Africans were in the major- largest cities: San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego,
ity in the eighteenth-century colonies, as they were in for example (Conzen 1990).
the West Indies, and in the Carolinas and Louisiana, By the beginning of the eighteenth century, signifi-
this enabled distinctive African-American cultures to cant migrations of Scots, Irish, French, Germans, Dutch,
develop within the confines of political and economic Swiss and Moravians had taken place, but the dominant
enslavement. migrant group were the English. Between 1700 and 1775
There were, of course, other trans-Atlantic migra- the population of the eastern colonies grew tenfold to
tions throughout the time period covered in this chapter. some 2.5 million and, by 1820, the population of the
The earliest included those seeking to escape religious United States surpassed that of Britain (Lemon 1987:
persecution in Europe, or to establish religious utopias 121). The losers were native Americans who were dispos-
in the new continent. The Puritan ‘Founding Fathers’ of sessed of their lands east of the Appalachians and often
New England were in this category and, right through taken into slavery.
to the Mormon migration in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, such groups continued to leave Europe’s shores for
what was perceived to be a better new world. Religious
2.4.3 Colonial politics
faith also inspired another group of settlers who came There were major differences in the way European states
to convert the native people of the Americas to Christi- governed their colonial empires. The Spanish devel-
anity. The competition in Europe between Catholic and oped a highly centralized system in which all aspects
Protestant versions of the faith – between Reformation of policy were laid down in Madrid. The Laws of the
and Counter-Reformation – was exported to the colo- Indies, which laid down in meticulous detail how colo-
nies since both native Americans and African slaves were nization should take place and how new towns should
perceived as being in need of conversion. Consequently, be planned, are symptomatic of this centralization
Jesuit monasteries or Franciscan friaries often stand at (Nostrand 1987) (Case study 2.1). The French governed
the heart of Spanish colonial towns and cities, whilst through a similar centralized structure of military,

Case study 2.1

Summary of the Laws of the Indies by Laws 43–109

Philip II of Spain, 1573 Establish the legal and taxation regimes for new
colonies and lay down that each town should have at
Laws 1–14 least 30 families. The ideal size of house plots, farms,
Establish that exploration cannot take place without herds, and commons is established.
royal permission; that governors should learn all they
can about their territory; they should consult with and Laws 110–128
negotiate with local ‘Indians’. ‘Discoverers’ should take Provide details of the plans of new towns, including
possession of land and should name rivers, hills and the size of the plaza, the orientation and breadth of
settlements. the streets, the location of churches and public build-
ings, and the allocation of house plots by lot.
Laws 15–31
Lay down that Spaniards should treat ‘Indians’ in a Laws 129–135
friendly manner; they should help priests in their work Describe provision for common land and farms and the
of conversion. character of domestic buildings.

Laws 32–42 Laws 136–148

Concern the type of region that should be explored, Lay down relationships with local ‘Indians’ and the way
pacified, settled and brought under Spanish mandate; in which they should be converted to Christianity so
the siting of towns in such regions, and the establish- that they ‘can live civilly’.
ment of local government. Source: Crouch et al. (1982: 6–19)

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 Chapter 2  The rise and spread of capitalism    47

administrative and ecclesiastical strands of authority 1807, and then to slavery in 1833. Sadly, the invective of
linked to government departments and the Crown in both populist and bourgeois writing opposed to abo-
Paris. The English, in contrast, allowed each colony to lition characterized Africans, Australian Aborigines,
be virtually self-governing and the links to London were Indians and native Americans as not only unchristian
many and various. English colonial plantation owners and therefore ‘uncivilized’ but also as less than human;
and merchants were not averse to threatening a gover- inferior to Europeans in every way; both savage and yet
nor if their capitalist trading relations were endangered. child-like, and therefore needing to be controlled and
It should occasion no surprise that it was the English disciplined. By the middle of the nineteenth century,
colonies that eventually first rebelled and fought for these attitudes were widespread amongst all classes in
their independence. Overlapping these colonial territo- Britain and were fuelled further by popular antagonism
ries were the older territorial patterns of native group- to events such as the Indian Mutiny (1857), the Zulu
ings, those of the Iroquois and Creeks remaining well rebellion (1879) and the Maori wars (1860s). By the late
into the eighteenth century (Meinig 1986: 262). That nineteenth century, Darwin’s ideas on evolution were
was to change dramatically after 1815 when, over the being misused to give a scientific veneer of respectabil-
next 15 years, the south-eastern United States was ‘eth- ity to this ‘othering’ of non-Europeans, to the extent
nically cleansed’ of its native American inhabitants. that Australian Aborigines were being shot as ‘vermin’
The resultant land sales of millions of acres of 160-acre rather than seen as fellow humans.
‘quarter sections’ saw the first great economic boom in In the United States the institution of slavery
the United States, in much the same way as the sale of ­continued to flourish, especially in the lower Missis-
monastic lands had done in Britain in the mid sixteenth sippi ­valley where it was an essential part of the cotton-
century (Johnson 2013). growing plantation economy. In 1800 there were some
100,000 slaves in the present states of Louisiana and
Mississippi; by 1860 there were more than 750,000.
The slave trade had been successfully internalized
2.5 Imperialism and racism and American firms with jails and large yards walked
slaves from the south-eastern states to the Mississippi,
A second phase of colonial expansion, through the bred children for sale and, as the recent film 12 Years
nineteenth century, was geographically distinct in that a Slave (2013), based on the 1853 autobiography of
it was focused on Asia and, especially after 1880, on Solomon Northup, so graphically showed, kidnapped
Africa. It is also marked by the development of a much men, women and children from freedom into slavery
more virulent racism in the ‘othering’ of all non-Euro- (Johnson 2013).
peans. The consolidation of European states in the The mid nineteenth century marked both the deliver-
nineteenth century, especially of Germany and Italy, ance of one continent from colonialism to self-govern-
and the increasing economic competition they offered ment, as South America broke free from Spanish and
to the eighteenth-century leaders of the world economy, Portuguese control, and the colonizing of another, as
Britain and France, led them to seek new opportunities European powers raced to divide Africa amongst them-
through the colonial exploitation of hitherto economi- selves. The interior of Africa remained largely unknown
cally peripheral lands. Britain seized the Dutch Cape to Europeans until the 1860s except for Christian mis-
Colony at the tip of southern Africa in 1806 to prevent sionaries. But by the end of the century, borders had
its use by Napoleon’s navy. By 1820, 4,000 British set- been delineated and fought over, natural resources were
tler graziers were in conflict with African pastoralists, being rapaciously exploited, and the polities, cultures
despite the fact that the low-wage labour of those same and economies of native peoples had been disrupted
Africans was essential to maintain the farms (Lester or destroyed (Figure 2.5). Again, this period of history
1999). At much the same time, the first British farmers reverberates down to the beginning of the twenty-first
were beginning to establish themselves in Australia as its century because the boundaries drawn to the satisfac-
period as a convict colony began to draw to a close. The tion of European soldiers, administrators and traders
recent novel by Kate Grenville, The Secret River (2006), did not correspond to African ethnic, cultural and polit-
gives a perceptive, imaginative account of the struggle ical divisions. In some respects the origins of the geno-
for land between farmers and Aborigines at this time cides of Biafra (1960s’ Nigeria) and Rwanda (1990s),
and the consequences for both cultures of that struggle. and the long civil war in Sudan, which is still ongoing
Meanwhile, in Britain itself, Christian-inspired reform- in Darfur and South Sudan, can be laid at the door of
ers succeeded in bringing an end to the slave trade in the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the later nineteenth century.

M02_DANI2950_05_SE_C02.indd 47 31/03/16 7:06 pm

 48    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

Belgian territory
British territory
French territory
German territory
Italian territory
Figure 2.5  Africa in
Portuguese territory
1914 after the European
Spanish territory
imperial contest to divide
Independent states the continent.
Source: Moore (1981: 74)

2.6 Industrialization homes. These producers generally worked in family

units and were paid piece rates on a weekly or monthly
basis. Their ‘time geography’ was therefore under their
2.6.1 Proto-industrialization
own control. As long as the contracted number of items
The early phases of capitalist industrial development were made each week then recreation or other activities
in Europe, up to about 1770, are categorized in vari- could be fitted into the week. Many early industrial pro-
ous ways. To some writers this is the period of mer- cesses were located in the countryside to avoid problems
chant capitalism (see Spotlight box 2.2), to others this with urban guild restrictions and to enable machinery
is the period of proto-industrialization. Both terms to be water-powered.
have generated a substantive academic debate as to pre- Textile manufacture is the most studied production
cisely what processes of transformation were involved. process of this period. Its transformation began in sev-
Proto-industrialization is characterized by some type eral parts of Europe as early as the fifteenth century.
of ‘domestic’ production system whereby the capital- By the early eighteenth century, more and more of the
ist merchant provides the raw materials and often the production processes were being mechanized and indus-
machinery for producers who worked in their own trialists were concentrating their machinery into single,

M02_DANI2950_05_SE_C02.indd 48 31/03/16 7:06 pm

 Chapter 2  The rise and spread of capitalism    49

multi-floor buildings. By the 1770s, the mechanization of I began work at the mill in Bradford when I was nine
spinning had been completed and weaving followed in the years old . . . we began at six in the morning and worked
1820s. The logic of this transformation was completed until nine at night. When business was brisk, we began
by steam power and the factory was established as both at five and worked until ten in the evening.
a building (Figure 2.6) and a system of production (Spot-
(Hannah Brown, interviewed in 1832).
light box 2.3). Different sectors of the textile industry
went through this transformation at different times, and Legislation dating from this time remains effective in
some sectors declined absolutely as capital was diverted controlling the age at which children and young people
to the most prosperous sectors. The textile industry, more can work and their hours of employment.
than any other, had a relentless tendency to geographi- The complex interaction of resources, labour skills,
cal specialization and concentration with the result that technological innovation, and capital circulation in par-
many towns and regions were dangerously dependent on ticular regional economies, which increased production
a single industry (Laxton 1986). By the 1770s in Britain, and lowered prices, meant that new markets had to be
west Yorkshire was beginning to dominate light worsted developed and transport improved. Market opportuni-
woollen cloth, Lancashire and the north Midlands cotton ties were to be found both in the growing urban markets
cloth production, the Welsh borders flannel, and the east at home, and among the colonial populations overseas.
Midlands hosiery. Thus, cotton textiles were first imported to Britain from

Figure 2.6  Starkey’s woollen textile mill, Huddersfield, c.1850. Though this mill was steam-powered, by mid-
century its powerlooms were still housed in multi-storey buildings rather than a single-storey shed, since the site
was a restricted one.
Source: Giles and Goodall (1992: 102) © Crown Copyright. NMR

Spotlight box 2.3

The factory system of production ● Could apply capital to the development of new
machinery to simplify processes and reduce labour
Under the factory system the capitalist: costs through mechanization; and,
● Had complete control of the production process ● By dividing the tasks of the production process,
from receipt of raw materials to finished product. could reduce labour costs further by employing
● Had control of the labour force on whom a new, women and children.
disciplined time geography could be imposed (early
factories often worked day and night).

M02_DANI2950_05_SE_C02.indd 49 31/03/16 7:06 pm

 50    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

India; the techniques of production were learnt; manu- (jewellery and silver plate), as well as the Duke of Bridge-
facture commenced; factory production lowered costs; water (landowner and coal owner), all invested some of
cotton textiles were exported to India; there they under- their capital in canal companies to improve the distribu-
cut and destroyed the Indian industry. tion of their products (Freeman 1986). A similar pattern
A key transformation of the transport infrastructure, is observed in New England. In France and Germany, by
so essential to industrialization, was the improvement of contrast, new roads were seen to have a military function
links with growing towns, and with the ports. Canals and in the centralization of state control and were therefore
turnpike (toll) roads, which were the principal innova- largely financed by the state through taxation.
tions before the 1820s, also lowered the costs of raw mate-
rials, especially of coal. This is graphically illustrated by
the way in which urban populations celebrated the open-
2.6.2 Agricultural change
ing of new canals, not for their industrial potential, but It was not just industries such as textiles, metal manu-
because they dramatically reduced the cost of domestic facturing and pottery that were transformed by early
heating. In Britain, the construction of better roads, and capitalist production: society needed food production to
of the canal network, mostly between 1760 and 1815 keep pace with a rising population that was increasingly
(the growth phase of the first Kondratieff cycle) was employed full-time in manufacturing. Consequently,
financed by private capital. The state was involved only the eighteenth century saw the transformation of agri-
in providing the necessary legislation to enable construc- culture into increasingly capitalistic modes. In parts of
tion to take place and fees or tolls to be levied. Thus Europe, especially in Britain, self-sufficient peasant farm-
Josiah Wedgwood (china and pottery), Abraham Darby ing began to come under pressure from landowners who
(iron manufacturer) (Figure 2.7) and Matthew Boulton used state legislation to remove common rights to land in

Figure 2.7  The world’s first iron bridge, constructed across the River Severn, east Shropshire, in 1788 by
Abraham Darby Ill’s Coalbrookdale Company, was part of the transport infrastructure improvements financed
by local industrialists.
Source: The Ironbridge Gorge Museum

M02_DANI2950_05_SE_C02.indd 50 31/03/16 7:06 pm

 Chapter 2  The rise and spread of capitalism    51

favour of private ownership through enclosure. Owner- all became an important part of the semi-periphery of
ship was increasingly concentrated into fewer hands, and Britain’s global economy. This export-dominated agri-
farms were consolidated from scattered strips to single- culture was reliant on overseas investment by British capi-
block holdings, again especially in Britain and, rather tal in new railway networks to transport these products
later, in Scandinavia and northern Germany. Elsewhere to slaughterhouses and industrial packing plants at the
in Europe this process was delayed until the twentieth port cities whilst, in the USA, Chicago was growing rap-
century. In northern and western Europe, landowners idly on the same economic foundations (Cronon 1991;
invested in transforming production for the new urban Miller 1997). It was accompanied, too, by new waves of
markets, using technology and new techniques and crops migration to the colonies and the mid-west of the USA
first developed in the Low Countries in the seventeenth (Table 2.1), especially from Ireland and Scotland, where
century. In eastern Europe, the semi-periphery, this period the Great Famine and the Highland Clearances, respec-
saw a reversion to serfdom and near-feudal relations tively, were other manifestations of capitalist agricultural
of production. Capital was also deployed to increase change in the British Isles. The United States absorbed
the area of land under intensive, rather than extensive, enormous numbers of European migrants throughout the
production. Fenland and coastal marshes were drained; nineteenth century. Irish migrants predominated in the
heathland soils improved for cultivation, and the moor- 1840s and 1850s, followed by Scots and English, Scan-
land edge of improved pastures pushed higher up hill and dinavians and Germans through the second half of the
mountain slopes. century, with Russians, Italians and south-central Euro-
In the nineteenth century, European agriculture con- peans from the 1880s onwards (Table 2.1) (Ward 1987).
tinued to increase production but was unable to keep This later colonization, and the internal coloniza-
pace with the demand from the growing urban industrial tion of the United States mid-west in particular, were
population. In 1840, Britain repealed the Corn Laws, grandly characterized as a moving frontier of settlement
which had protected local grain producers, and opened by the American historian, F.J. Turner, writing in 1894,
its markets to colonial and American producers. New who suggested that it also transformed the ‘character’
methods of extensive grain farming were used in mid- of frontier settlers, making them self-reliant, opportun-
western North America, and in the new British colonies istic, individualistic and democratic. Recent commen-
in Australasia and South Africa. The invention of the tators have noted that Turner’s hypothesis says little
steam ship, allowing more rapid transport, and of refrig- about the continued sweeping aside of the rights of the
eration and meat canning from the 1870s, led to similarly native populations of these lands who fought a long
extensive ranch grazing of sheep and cattle in these coun- and ultimately unsuccessful attritional battle to retain
tries. Together with the Pampas grasslands of Argentina, it for their own use (the land was regarded as ‘open’ or

Table 2.1  European emigration 1881–1910

Source countries Destination countries Numbers of migrants

Great Britain N. America, S. Africa, Australasia 7,144,000

Italy USA and N. Africa 6,187,000
Germany North and South America 2,143,000
Austria/Hungary North and South America 1,799,000
Russia USA 1,680,000
Scandinavia North America 1,535,000
Spain Central and S. America; N. Africa 1,472,000
Ireland USA 1,414,000
Portugal South America 775,000
S.E. Europe USA c.465,000
France Central and S. America  223,000
Low Countries USA  171,000
Source: Moore (1981: 57)

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 52    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

‘free’ for white settlement); nor does it give any credit Many other industries were developed in the same
for the settlement process to women, who provided both way as new markets arose on a national and interna-
the domestic labour and, often, especially in the initial tional basis and production expanded. Food and drink,
phase of settlement, much of the farm labour too. The for example, is rarely thought of as a factory-based
advancing frontier of capitalist agriculture was as much industry, but brewing, once the prerogative of almost
small-scale, incremental and domestic as it was wide- every village inn, became increasingly an urban, large-
sweeping and large-scale. scale industry with regional markets for its beers. In
England, Burton-upon-Trent developed rapidly as the
‘brewing capital’ of Britain, with huge factory-scale
2.6.3 Factories and industrial production
breweries, on the basis of its colonial contracts to sup-
Some commentators have seen the ‘Industrial Revo- ply bottled ‘India Pale Ale’ to troops and civilians sta-
lution’ in Britain as a short period, between 1770 and tioned in the Indian sub-continent as a substitute for
1830, of rapid transformation whereby the country’s local water. For other industries, however, including
economy moved from an agricultural to an industrial many manufacturing industries, ‘factories’ remained
manufacturing basis. More recent writers see the trans- small-scale workshops employing fewer than 50 people
formation as much more drawn out, extending from the (the Sheffield cutlery industry in northern England, and
seventeenth century and into the early twentieth century. wire-drawing in the eastern Ruhr in Germany are good
They also see it as much more regionally diversified and examples). Indeed, many industries remained almost
geographically uneven, with particular regions special- domestic in scale well into the twentieth century (for
izing in particular products which transformed their example, the Birmingham jewellery and Coventry watch
production systems at different times. Most attention industries, both in central England).
has been given to the textile and iron and steel indus- The nineteenth century is characterized not only by
tries, both of which are characterized by large factories this enormous variety in the scale of production, but
requiring massive capital investment in buildings and also by an equally enormous variety of manufactured
machinery, driven by steam power, with manufacturing products. The tag ‘The Workshop of the World’ is as
processes increasingly vertically integrated, and employ- true of nineteenth-century Britain in general as it is of
ing a large, and increasingly disciplined labour force several of the country’s manufacturing cities. In other
(see Figure 2.6). The same forces were at work in New British, European and American regions there was an
England. By 1855, there were 52 cotton mills in Lowell, increasing specialization so that local economies were
Massachusetts, employing more than 13,000 people, dependent on maintaining market advantage on a sin-
two-thirds of them women (Groves 1987). In Europe, gle industry: the Polish textile city of Lódź and Lanca-
Lille (France), Ghent (Belgium), Lódź (Poland) and the shire’s cotton mill towns were of this kind. Such places
Wupper valley of Germany developed as centres of cot- also produced distinctive working-class cultures, which,
ton textile manufacture (Pounds 1990: 402). in the case of Lódź, was also predominantly Jewish
Recently, Johnson (2013), in an avowedly Marx- (Koter 1990). Again, in those same mill towns much
ist interpretation, has suggested that historians have factory employment was female (see the example of
viewed the cotton trade (the largest single sector of the Lowell above), whereas in heavy industry centres, such
global economy in the first half of the nineteenth cen- as ship-building in Newcastle and Sunderland, in the
tury) through the wrong end of the telescope. It was north-east of England, waged employment was male-
not Lowell, Liverpool and Lódź that were the founda- dominated and women’s roles were primarily domes-
tion stones of the capitalist economy, but the Missis- tic. E.P. Thompson, in his classic Marxist interpretation
sippi valley, where the raw cotton was produced, where of The Making of the English Working Class (1963),
the planter’s capital was human bodies (slaves) which is especially sensitive to the variety of experiences of
were more valuable than all the machinery, infrastruc- working people in this period of aggressive industrial
ture, manufacturing and free labour elsewhere in the capitalism. There are, however, some common features
United States. The ‘industry’ of slave-based plantation of nineteenth-century industrial development in Brit-
cotton production in the Mississippi valley was what ain and, subsequently, in Europe and North America.
tied together the fortunes of cotton planters of Loui- First was the fact that the power supply for the major-
siana, the cotton brokers of Liverpool and the cotton ity of industries came to be dominated by steam. There
manufacturers in Manchester. What kept the slaves was therefore a move by many industries to the coal-
from revolt and crushed slave resistance was the use of field regions to reduce the cost of fuel (Figure 2.8). The
the state’s military might to ensure that the system was development of the Ruhr region of Germany (Pounds
maintained (Johnson 2013). 1990: 412–29), and of western Pennsylvania in the USA

M02_DANI2950_05_SE_C02.indd 52 31/03/16 7:06 pm

 Chapter 2  The rise and spread of capitalism    53

140
Coalfields

120 Modern national boundaries

100 Principal towns N

Ruhr
Million tonnes

80

60
Aachen

40 Belgium

20
Northern
France 0 20 40 60 miles

1850 1870 1890 1910 0 20 40 60 80 100 km

Dortmund
Essen
NETHERLANDS u hr
R. R
Krefeld Duisburg
Wuppertal
Düsseldorf
Antwerp

Ghent Cologne
R. R
Maastricht
e
ld
hin
BELGIUM Aachen

e
e h
Sc

Liège
R.

G E R M A N Y
Lille
Namur e
M eus
Charleroi R.
e
ell
os

M
R.
FRANCE
LUXEMBOURG

Figure 2.8  The coalfields of north-west Europe saw a concentration of new industrial enterprises after the
1780s as steam-powered machinery became normal in textile manufacturing, iron and steel making and metal
goods manufacturing.
Source: Pounds (1990: 44)

(Meyer 1990: 256–8), are good examples of this process. the transport costs of both raw materials and finished
The reason for this change in fuel supply was the inven- products almost as dramatically as it reduced the fric-
tion and commercial development of the rotative steam tion of distance. The Western and, increasingly, the
engine by James Watt and Matthew Boulton in 1769–75. colonial worlds saw a new time geography from the
Secondly this, in its turn, was fundamental to the 1840s onwards, whereby journeys previously requiring
invention and development of railways that transformed several days to accomplish could be undertaken in a few

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 54    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

hours. This was especially important in the industriali- There are perhaps two major phases of development
zation of North America with its vast transcontinental in Western industrial cities before 1900, and the begin-
distances (the first transcontinental line was completed nings of a third. The first phase, which began in Britain
in 1869). It was also significant in Britain’s imperial in the 1770s, was characterized by the need to provide
control of India, and of Russia’s colonization of the homes for workers once the production process was sep-
interior of Siberia and central Asia. In all three cases the arated from home. Initially, such housing was provided
railways enabled industrial-scale exploitation of natu- by a process of ‘densification’ whereby more and more
ral resources (from timber to metalliferous ores) to take living spaces were crammed into the existing built-up
place, the profits from which could, in turn, be invested area. Gardens and yards were used for increasingly high-
in further industrial, urban or railway development. The density basic accommodation, much of which was multi-
rapid expansion of San Francisco following the Califor- occupied. By the 1770s in larger British cities this process
nia gold and Nevada silver discoveries in 1849 and 1859 could go no further and housing began to be provided
respectively is a good example of this (Walker 1996). on the city fringe where it proved a profitable ‘crop’ for
Railways were also major industries in their own right, small landowners. Such housing was brick-built, basic,
of course; the Indian railways employed three-quarters unplanned and unregulated, and regionally distinctive
of a million people by the 1920s, for example. in its plan forms (Plate  2.2(a)). The most notorious of
Third was the fact that, as capitalists sought econo- these forms was the back-to-back dwelling originating in
mies of scale, the transformations of the nineteenth the Yorkshire textile towns (Beresford 1988). The lack of
century were largely urban. By 1851, Britain had become regulation meant that these housing areas lacked effec-
the first country anywhere in which a majority of its tive water supplies, sewage and waste disposal systems,
inhabitants lived and worked in towns. By 1900 there social and educational facilities, and connected road
were sixteen cities in the world with a population that systems. The consequences, when combined with the
exceeded one million, as against one (Peking [Beijing]) poverty of low wages, were ill health, disease and very
in 1800, and another 27 places which had half a million high urban death rates, especially among children. Euro-
or more (Lawton 1989). pean and North American cities were also characterized
by unregulated slum housing areas as urban populations
rose from the 1820s onwards (Pounds 1990: 368–91;
Homburger 1994: 110–11).
2.7 Urbanization The second feature of this first phase of industrial cit-
ies was the separation of the residences of the bourgeoi-
The urbanization of capital has been theorized from a sie from those of the workers. Industrial cities became
Marxist perspective by Harvey (1985a, 1985b). He notes class-divided cities, though the working classes, espe-
that, as capitalists over-accumulate, the surplus flows into cially young females, were recruited to provide domestic
secondary circuits of capital, of which the principal is the services by the elite (Dennis 1984). In the southern states
built environment (in its widest sense). As in the primary of the USA that servant class was African-American and
industrial circuit, these flows are cyclical according to the still slaves until the 1860s. Thirdly, the capitalist land
perceived profitability of such investment. Because of the market began to value more highly the accessibility of
longevity of the built environment these ‘building cycles’ the city centre and so the central business district began
(sometimes called Kuznets cycles) are much longer than to emerge, as did districts in which industry and ware-
the business cycles, somewhere between 15 and 25 years. housing were the predominant land use, often close to
Crises may lead to the loss of profitability of an invest- the port facilities of canal, river frontage or harbour.
ment, but they do not often lead to the loss of building One of the classic portrayals of this phase of urban
fabric. Western cities are therefore made in the image of development in Britain is Engels’ (1845) The Condition
past capitalist decisions and subsequent adaptations to of the Working Class in England. Warehouse districts,
fit new circumstances. Harvey goes on to suggest ways of course, have recently been ‘revalued’ in many cities
in which class struggle is written into the landscape of to become today’s loft apartments or high-tech offices
the Western city (1985a: 27–31), which he explores in (Zukin 1989).
more detail in an analysis of Paris in the third quarter of The second phase of development, from 1840 to the
the nineteenth century. More recently, Dodgshon (1998: 1890s, was one of increasing regulation in towns and
148–61) has built on these arguments to show how the cities. New forms of local government and the collection
built environment of towns and cities is a major source of statistical information led to building regulations; the
of inertia in capitalist economies and societies. provision of sewerage and better water supplies; the

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 Chapter 2  The rise and spread of capitalism    55

(b)

(a)

(c) (d)

Plate 2.2  English nineteenth-century industrial housing. (a) Back-to-back courtyard house, Birmingham c.1840.
The door on the right leads on to a court of 12 identical houses fronting a narrow courtyard. Such houses were
found in the Midlands in the period 1770–1860. (b) Tunnel-back bye-law houses, Teignmouth, Devon c.1880.
The distinctive rear elevation resulted from bye-laws derived from the 1875 Public Health Act. These houses are
found in all cities in the period 1875–1914. (c) Harborne Tenants Association, Birmingham, 1908. These houses
derive from the garden city movement. Experimental estates of the Edwardian period provided the model for
twentieth-century municipal housing. (d) Improved industrial dwellings, east London c.1885. Industrial Dwellings
Associations experimented with tenement blocks with open galleried staircases.
(All photographs Terry Slater)

provision of new cemeteries and parks; and better urban of the urban workforce in the last quarter of the nine-
transport, especially tramways. All this led in turn to the teenth century. These transformations occurred in most
increasing suburbanization of the better-paid elements European core economies, and in North American

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 56    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

cities, but with temporal variations. Thus, in England, The incipient third phase of urban development
the characteristic late-nineteenth-century dwelling was reflected a minority interest in improving the living con-
a suburban, brick-built, tunnel-back, terraced house ditions of workers by industrialists. Model settlements
(Plate  2.2(b)). In North America, excepting only the have a history that dates to the beginning of the factory
largest cities, the vast majority of urban housing was system. Modern commentators note both the gener-
timber-built; in much of the rest of Europe, from Stock- ally higher standard of accommodation in these places,
holm to Naples (as well as in Scotland), the apartment and the capitalist control of the home life as well as the
or tenement block was the norm (Plate  2.2(d)). The working life of their workers. At the century’s end the
North American city, from the 1840s, was also char- experimental garden suburb settlements at Bournville
acterized by the ghettoization of immigrant popula- and Port Sunlight in England (Plate  2.2(c)) were widely
tions: first Irish and Germans, then freed slaves from admired and imitated in Germany (Margarethenhöhe
the southern states after the Civil War, then Italians, in Essen, for example) and the USA (Radburn, New
and finally, from the 1890s, Jewish migrants from Jersey). At the same time, the first experiments in the
the Russian empire of eastern Europe (Ward 1987) large-scale provision of social housing were underway
(Plate  2.3(d)). in London using apartment-block housing. These two
Central business districts were modified by two other themes, the garden suburb and social housing, were
major transformations in the capitalist system in this to combine powerfully in the development of modern
second phase. First, banking services were increasingly planning to shape the urban environment in the first
required to enable surplus capital to be safely stored, half of the twentieth century in Europe and its empires,
efficiently invested and recycled towards new opportuni- but not in North America.
ties; such banks were but one aspect of developing office
quarters, including, for example, insurance offices, land
agents and other property services, and legal services.
Many of these well-constructed buildings have been 2.8 Conclusion
found alternative uses today, as cafes, pubs or homes,
because they have become valued parts of city conserva- Within three centuries, Western capitalism had utilized
tion areas. This tertiary employment sector grew rapidly its ill-gotten gains from its first colonial adventures to
in the second half of the nineteenth century and ‘the develop a series of specialized industrial regions sup-
office’ developed as both a specialized building type and plying worldwide markets. Food production, industrial
a means of production (Daniels 1975). It was increas- manufacture, service provision, consumption and trans-
ingly characterized by female employees using typewrit- portation were all radically transformed by the capital-
ers (the key technological invention) supervised by male ist enterprise. Cultures, societies and governments were
managers. In North America the building type showed necessarily impelled to change, too. States became more
an increasing propensity to both large floor areas and centralized and powerful. The difference between rich
height at the end of the century. The skyscraper was and poor both at the level of individuals and between
born in Chicago and relied on the development of steel- countries became more marked. For some individuals
frame construction methods and the invention of the and groups capitalism brought prosperity, improved liv-
elevator (Gad and Holdsworth 1987) (Plate  2.3(a) and ing conditions and greater freedom; for others it brought
(b)). Second was the growth of consumption. This led destruction of local cultures, impoverishment, degrada-
to the development of a variety of new retail spaces in tion and slavery. At the end of the nineteenth century
city centres, including department stores and arcades the South African Boer War gave the first glimpse of the
(Plate  2.3(c)), as well as an enormous growth in the industrialization of warfare which was to scar the twen-
variety of specialized shops. tieth century so deeply.

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 Chapter 2  The rise and spread of capitalism    57

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

Plate 2.3  American nineteenth-century city buildings. (a) Reliance office building, Chicago;
architect: Daniel H. Burnham & Co (1895). This is the nearest that a steel-framed building
got to being sheathed almost entirely in glass in the nineteenth century. (b) Flat Iron office
building, New York; architect: Daniel H. Burnham (1901–2). This famous skyscraper of
22 storeys is in the style of an elongated Renaissance palazzo. The steel frame is clad in
limestone and terra cotta. (c) Carson Pirie Scott & Co store, Chicago: architect: Louis H.
Sullivan (1899–1904). Department stores were an important retail innovation in large city
centres. (d) New York tenement building; 97 Orchard Street (1863–4), now the Lower East
Side Tenement Museum. There were two shops in the sub-basement with four three-room
apartments on each of the five floors. Seventy-two mostly German immigrants lived there in
1870; in 1900 there were 111 mostly Russian Jewish residents.
(All photographs Terry Slater)

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 58    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

Learning outcomes Knox, P., Agnew, J. and McCartney, L. (2014) The Geography
of the World Economy, 6th edition, Edward Arnold, London.
Having read this chapter, you should know that:
A well-written and popular textbook which will give readers
● Scholars have interpreted and theorized the devel- another perspective on this period and much else besides.
opment of capitalism in different ways. Langton, J. and Morris, R.J. (eds) (1986) Atlas of Industrial-
● The European colonialist enterprise was critical in izing Britain, 1780–1914, Methuen, London and New York.
Historical atlases usually treat this period very well with
the evolution of capitalism.
innovative cartography and thought-provoking texts. This one
● Industrial capitalism transformed all sectors of the deals with Britain in considerable detail.
economy, including the built environment and social Mitchell, R.D. and Groves, P.A. (eds) (1987) North America:
relations between individuals and classes. The Historical Geography of a Changing Continent,
● Industrial capitalism was essentially urban. Hutchinson, London. There are a number of good histori-
cal geographies of North America. This one is well written,
thoughtful and copiously illustrated.
Further reading Ogborn, M. (2007) Indian Ink: Script and Print in the Making
of the English East India Company, University of Chicago
Blaut, J.M. (1993) The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Press, Chicago, IL. This book explores the geographies of
Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History, Guilford power and knowledge in the rise of the British Empire in
Press, New York and London. This is a very readable and India.
thought-provoking polemic of post-colonial writing, provid- Watts, M. (2001) Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño
ing an alternative explanation of the ‘success’ of European Famines and the Making of the Third World, Verso, London.
capitalism. An account of the interactions between imperialism, ecology
Dodgshon, R.A. (1998) Society in Time and Space: A and famine in the nineteenth century. It is worth reading in
Geographical Perspective on Change, Cambridge University tandem with Crosby, A.W. (1986) Ecological Imperialism:
Press, Cambridge. A more advanced text which provides The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900. Cambridge
much more detailed arguments and evidence for the themes University Press, Cambridge.
of this chapter.
Hobson, John M. (2004) The Eastern Origins of Western
Civilisation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Useful websites
Challenges the Eurocentric interpretation of this period of the
world’s developmental history. www.besthistorysites.net  Entitled ‘Best of History Web-
Johnson, Walter (2013) River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and sites’, a comprehensive guide to history-oriented resources
Empire in the Cotton Kingdom, Belknap Press, Cambridge online. For teachers, students and others.
MA. This recent scholarly book melds the institution of slavery, www.british-history.ac.uk  British History Online is a digital
the cotton plantation economy of the Mississippi valley, and library of key printed primary and secondary sources for the
the global cotton trade in the nineteenth century to present a history of Britain and Ireland. The accent is on the period
new way of seeing what we previously thought of as familiar. between 1300 and 1800.

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 The making of the twentieth-
and twenty-first-century
world

Chapter 3

Denis Shaw

Topics covered
■ The second industrial revolution
■ Fordism – new patterns of production and consumption in the
twentieth century
■ Fordist capitalism
■ Challenges to liberal capitalism: Nazism, communism
■ The end of European imperialism; informal imperialism
■ Globalized capitalism
■ The world in the early twenty-first century

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 60    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

T he twentieth century could be said to have been the

period when capitalism finally triumphed over most
of the globe. But it was neither a straightforward tri-
seem to my barbaric mind to be merely playing at being
factories.’ Armed with a copy of the now celebrated
textbook, The British Isles: Geographic and Economic
umph nor an unchallenged one, and capitalism itself was Survey by Stamp and Beaver (1933), which was later to
changed in the process. This chapter is concerned with be used by generations of geography undergraduates
the various spaces created by and in response to twen- (including the present writer), Priestley went on to make
tieth- and twenty-first-century capitalism – spaces of some astute geographical and social points about these
resistance and reinterpretation as well as spaces of adap- factories: ‘Actually, I know, they are tangible evidence,
tation and acceptance. The patchy and unequal world in most cunningly arranged to take the eye, to prove that
which we now live reflects the erratic and conflict-laden the new industries have moved south. You notice them
nature of the processes that have produced it, and we decorating all the western borders of London. At night
need to know something about those processes to under- they look as exciting as Blackpool. But while these new
stand the world as it is now. industries look so much prettier than the old, which I
remember only too well, they also look far less substan-
tial. Potato crisps, scent, tooth pastes, bathing costumes,
fire extinguishers; those are the concerns behind these
3.1 T he changing capitalism of the pleasing facades’ (Priestley 1937: 3–5).
early twentieth century In these few words, Priestley summarized some of the
major ways in which the industrial world of the twen-
In the autumn of the year 1933 the writer and journalist tieth century was to differ from its nineteenth-century
J.B. Priestley set out by bus on a trip that was to take him predecessor. The fact that he was making his journey
the length and breadth of England and which he later by road was itself significant; 30 years before he would
described in his English Journey (Priestley 1937). As he have had to go by rail. The new factories he observed
left London by the Great West Road, Priestley noted how were the products of the technological changes that had
the road ‘looked odd. Being new, it did not look English. been transforming industrial capitalism since the late
We might have suddenly rolled into California.’ What nineteenth century, and many had clearly developed to
struck Priestley as particularly odd was ‘the line of new serve an expanding consumer market (see Plates 3.1 and
factories on each side’ of the road. ‘Years of the West 3.2). And the location of the factories by the new arterial
Riding’, he explained (he was born and raised in Bradford highway leading westwards out of London was the result
in northern England), ‘have fixed forever my idea of what not only of a revolution in transport and communica-
a proper factory looks like: a grim, blackened rectangle tions but also of the locational freedom deriving from
with a tall chimney at one corner. These decorative lit- the availability of electricity and other fuels. The textile
tle buildings, all glass and concrete and chromium plate, industries that Priestley remembered from his childhood

Plate 3.1  The Hoover factory,

Perivale, west London. This
splendid example of Art Deco
architecture, designed by
Gil Wallace in 1932, reflects
the new consumer industries
which were being established
in the years after the First
World War.
(© Angelo Hornak/CORBIS)

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 Chapter 3  The making of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century world    61

in Bradford were tied to the coalfields; the newer indus-

tries that were appearing in London by the 1930s no
longer needed coal, and were much cleaner and brighter
in consequence.
Of course, what Priestley saw along the Great West
Road was by no means representative of all the technolog-
ical changes that had been affecting the industrial econo-
mies of Britain and other countries for the previous few
decades. What had been happening in these countries was
that a whole series of new industrial branches had been
developing to supplement, and eventually to eclipse, the
traditional activities based on coal, iron and textiles. Not
all of these were as pleasing to the eye as those observed
by Priestley. In the second half of the nineteenth century,
for example, the metallurgical industries had been trans-
formed as a result of a series of inventions allowing the Plate 3.2  Admiring one of the new consumer
production of cheap steel. Next came the rapid devel- products which were becoming available for more
opment and proliferation of different branches of the affluent groups by the 1930s.
chemical industry (alkalis, dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, (Everett Collection/Shutterstock)

explosives, lacquers, photographic plates and film, cel-

luloid, artificial fibres, plastics). The electricity genera- some other areas. Much of what was later to become
tion industry, which began to flourish by the end of the known as the Third World, or the developing world, was
nineteenth century, was dependent on earlier inventions, still agricultural. Yet, in continuation of earlier processes
like the steam turbine. About the same time came the (see Chapter 2, pp. 42–5, 50–2) many colonies and other
rise of the motor industry, which was in turn associated regions were now being organized commercially to supply
with other industries like oil and rubber. When Priestley the industrial countries with raw materials and tropical
set out on his journey, society was already beginning to products – for example, bananas and sugar from Cen-
adjust to the impact of the many new activities c­ atering tral America and the Caribbean, Brazilian coffee, Indian
to the consumer (most notably, domestic appliances – tea, Malaysian rubber. They were thus being tied in to
see Plate 3.2) and to new means of transportation (car, the capitalist world economy. Gradually certain of these
bus, aircraft). Of course the full impact of such develop- countries began to adopt the technologies of the indus-
ments was to come later, after the Second World War, trialized world – the rise of the Indian textile industry is
while some technologies, like regular TV broadcasting, one example – but only later in the twentieth century did
the jet engine, nuclear power and the microchip, still lay industrialization become more widespread.
in the future. Thus the foundations of what is now known as a global
So profound were the technological and accompa- economy were already being laid in Priestley’s day, or even
nying social changes that affected industrial capitalism earlier. By the beginning of the twentieth century capital-
from the late nineteenth century that some historians ism had become a world phenomenon, tying far-flung
have described them as a ‘second industrial revolution’ countries together by means of international trade and fos-
(Landes 1969: 4). But it is important to remember that the tering international capital flows through major financial
older industries – coal, textiles, railways, some forms of centres like London and New York. The first multinational
engineering – did not die immediately or indeed quickly. corporations were already appearing. All this was aided
One of the features of the changing industrial geogra- and abetted by the new systems of communication and
phy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries transport – telegraph, telephone, radio (from the 1900s),
was that countries like the USA and Germany, whose fast steamships, aircraft – which were beginning to pro-
industrialization came later than Britain’s, now began to vide services that spanned the globe. Of course, none of
forge ahead on the basis of the newer industries described this bears comparison with the forces of globalization that
above. Britain remained overdependent on the older and were to become so significant later in the century. Yet the
less dynamic branches (Figure 3.1). world was already becoming a smaller place (see Plate 3.8).
For the first half of the twentieth century, the indus- J.B. Priestley himself suggested this when he compared the
trial changes described above only directly affected cer- Great West Road to ‘California’. What might this mean to
tain parts of the world, notably Western Europe, North the average English reader in the 1930s? The answer is – a
America, Japan, and by the 1930s the Soviet Union and great deal. The Hollywood film industry in Los Angeles

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 62    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

Per Sq mile Fife &

Midlothian
0–1 Virtually
uninhabited
1–50 Sparse Rural
50–400 Dense Rural Central
(Lanark)
400–6400 Suburban and
Industrialized Ayrshire
Rural Northumberland
over 6400 Urban & Durham

Cumberland

Yorkshire
Lancashire

Nottingham
& Derby
N. Wales

N. Staffs

Shropshire Leicester
Forest of Dean
S. Staffs
Warwick

S. Wales
Kent
Bristol, Somerset

Coalfields

Figure 3.1  The geography of the UK population and coalfields compared. With the significant exception of
London, there is a strong correlation between the geography of population and that of coalfields, reflecting both
the early stage at which Britain industrialized and urbanized, and the country’s long dependence on nineteenth-
century industries.
Sources: population, based on Mitchell (1962); coalfields, Stamp and Beaver (1963: 286)

was in its heyday and the people, homes and landscapes it It was Karl Marx who originally emphasized the
portrayed were being viewed, and copied, the world over. unplanned, competitive and even chaotic nature of
capitalism’s development. But one of the features of the
twentieth century has been the attempt, by both national
governments and private agencies, to regulate and even
3.2 Fordist capitalism to control it. The reasons for this phenomenon are many,
but they are no doubt linked both to the precipitate
It would be a mistake to suppose that the advance of nature of technological change during this period and
capitalism in the twentieth century was a story of unmiti- to the severe fluctuations mentioned above. Attempts to
gated triumph. On the contrary, its fluctuations and mis- ‘organize’ capitalism have taken a number of different
fortunes were such that one historian felt constrained forms. For example, already in the late nineteenth cen-
to call the period the ‘Age of Extremes’ (Hobsbawm tury, and especially in the USA and Germany, there were
1995). The first half of the century – Hobsbawm’s ‘Age moves towards the formation of inter-firm agreements,
of Catastrophe’ – was particularly disturbed, with two cartels and larger companies and corporations. Large
world wars (1914–18 and 1939–45) and a deep world eco- corporations could more easily marshal the huge capital
nomic depression (1929–33). resources which modern industry requires, and also influ-
By contrast, the years between 1945 and 1973 were ence their markets more effectively. As noted already, the
ones of growing prosperity across much of the globe first multinational corporations appeared at this time,
(Hobsbawm’s ‘Golden Age’) only to be followed once those based in the USA being most notable. Nineteenth-
more by a disturbed period in the wake of the oil price century examples include the German electrical firm, Sie-
rise shocks of the 1970s. mens, and the US Singer sewing machine company (see

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 Chapter 3  The making of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century world    63

international monetary payments, promote trade and

encourage economic development. At the national level,
numerous countries, especially some of those in Western
Europe, pursued democratic agenda of various kinds,
such as attempts to construct ‘welfare states’ to tackle
social problems like unemployment, ill health, old age
and social inequity. Arguably the experience of govern-
ment planning and controls in wartime (and possibly also
a fear of communism – see below) helped pave the way
for the optimistic belief in the benefits of planning and
large-scale social engineering that characterized the post-
war period. In Western Europe especially this was the era
of bold experiments in new town and city development,
Plate 3.3  The former Singer building on Nevsky
Avenue, St Petersburg, Russia. Constructed in 1904
slum clearance and ambitious social housing schemes,
by the architect P. V. Suzor in the art nouveau style regional planning, and extensive controls over land use
fashionable at the time, this building symbolizes (Hall 2014). No doubt the success of these schemes was
the globalized economy which was beginning to dependent on the spreading affluence that accompanied
appear by the early twentieth century. The property Hobsbawm’s ‘Golden Age’. Across Western Europe and
was confiscated after the 1917 Russian Revolution North America a tide of suburbanization signalled not
and subsequently served as one of the city’s main only a growing ability to own one’s own home in a desir-
bookshops, a function it still performs today. able location but also the availability of the social and
(Iakov Filimonov/Shutterstock) physical infrastructure, the private cars and the many
new consumer products which now made such a goal
Plate 3.3). Twentieth-century examples include US-based possible for many (see Plate 3.4).
Hoover, Ford, Coca-Cola, Pepsi Cola, Nabisco (Shredded The writers Scott Lash and John Urry have described
Wheat), and Kellogg’s, all of which invested in Britain in the era ushered in by the methods of Ford and Taylor
the 1930s. Most of the major international oil firms also that reached its apogee during the period 1945–73 as
date from this period. ‘organized capitalism’ (Lash and Urry 1987). Some of its
A further way in which capitalism became more
‘organized’ was the phenomenon of mass production,
linked especially to the growing consumer market. Here
two Americans are regarded as particularly significant.
F.W. Taylor (1856–1915) is especially associated with
time-and-motion studies, whereby complex tasks on the
factory floor could be completed more efficiently and
productivity increased. The other is Henry Ford (1863–
1947) who organized car production in his Dearborn,
Michigan plant using modern methods like the assembly
line and interchangeable parts. The result of his central-
ized approach was a significant reduction in the time
and cost of producing cars, meaning they could now be
manufactured on a mass basis. These production meth-
ods and associated patterns of mass consumption are
frequently referred to as Fordism, hence the capitalism
of this period is often referred to as Fordist capitalism.
Governments were also affected by the desire to
Plate 3.4  Brick and render middle-class housing
‘organize’ capitalism and to tackle the many problems
built in the suburbs of a West Yorkshire town in
to which it seemed to give rise. At the international level,
the 1930s. The suburbanization of the inter-war
the USA, which emerged after the Second World War period was a product of the affluence and increased
as the undisputed leader of world capitalism, took the mobility of some middle-class groups at the time.
lead in establishing a series of institutions like the World Suburbanization was to become even more prominent
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the after the Second World War.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to ease (peter jeffreys/Shutterstock)

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 64    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

Spotlight box 3.1

Fordist or ‘organized’ capitalism ● There is state regulation of the economy to

overcome problems generated by the market, for
● Extractive and manufacturing industries are the example regional unemployment problems.
dominant economic sectors. ● Big industrial cities are the spatial expression of
● There is an accent on economies of scale, leading large-scale manufacture.
to the importance of large industrial plants. Such ● There is state-controlled welfare provision to even
plants may structure entire regional economies out social inequalities, address unemployment
around themselves. Examples might include (in the problems and raise health standards.
United Kingdom): the West Midlands, based on cars ● In culture and social provision, there is an accent on
and engineering; Lancashire, based on cotton tex- mass provision, for example in housing, consumer
tiles; the North-East, based on mining, shipbuilding goods, TV programming and newspapers. The
and heavy engineering; and (in the USA): Detroit, emphasis on mass coverage and standardization
based on cars and engineering; and Philadelphia, leaves relatively little choice, reflecting a modernist
based on textiles and port-related activities. perspective.
● Manufacturing plants are controlled centrally by big
industrial corporations – there is an emphasis on Source: after Lash and Urry (1987)

mass production and standardization.

principal features (which were especially characteristic of John Betjeman’s famous fulminations against the
the developed world) are described in accordance with town of Slough, situated just west of London and expe-
their views in Spotlight box  3.1. riencing developments similar to those observed by J.B.
Needless to say, such generalizations would be more Priestley a few years earlier, are in fact a hymn against
or less true, depending on the time and location being modernity. Betjeman was railing against many of the
considered. Capitalism had different histories in differ- social repercussions of the profound twentieth-century
ent places, and the exact form it took had much to do changes noted earlier in this chapter. In this he was by no
with the long-term evolution of each society affected means alone. Similar attitudes have been characteristic
by it. of many commentators living in countries where moder-
nity (here defined as the spectrum of economic, social,
political and cultural changes associated with twentieth-
3.3  hallenges to liberal capitalism:
C century capitalism) has brought problems of adaptation.
Nazism, communism It has already been noted that the twentieth century
cannot be described as a century of uninterrupted pro-
gress for capitalism, particularly in its Western ‘liberal’
Come, bombs, and blow to smithereens, form. Capitalism has been subjected to a series of chal-
Those air-conditioned, bright canteens, lenges and political struggles that greatly affected the
Tinned fruit, tinned meat, tinned milk, tinned beans, course of twentieth-century history, and in various parts
Tinned minds, tinned breath. of the world there have been attempts to create spaces
Mess up the mess they call a town – in which alternatives to liberal capitalism can flourish.
A house for ninety-seven down Interestingly enough, in terms of Wallerstein’s world
And once a week a half-a-crown systems theory (discussed in Chapter 2; see p. 39), most
For twenty years of these attempts have been associated with countries
From ‘Slough’ by John Betjeman (1937)1 outside the core, or with those like Germany after its

1
Poem: ‘Slough’ from Collected Poems by John Betjeman © 1955, 1958, 1962, 1964, 1968, 1970, 1979, 1981, 1982,
2001. Reproduced by permission of John Murray (Publishers)

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 Chapter 3  The making of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century world    65

defeat in the First World War struggling to rejoin the One of the oddities of Nazism was that it was, at
core states. Particularly important for the political geog- one and the same time, both reactionary and modern-
raphy of the twentieth century were the attempts by izing (Herf 1984). On the one hand, the Nazis looked
Marxists and others to reject the capitalist development backwards to an imagined heroic and rustic Germany
model entirely and to reconstruct society on a new basis. of the past, to Nordic myths, Germanic towns and
This issue will be discussed below. First, however, atten- landscapes (see Rollins 1995; Hagen 2006) and happy
tion will be paid to another twentieth-century move- peasants tilling the fields in traditional costume. They
ment that challenged Western-style capitalism without tried to bolster the ‘traditional’ family: women were to
discarding it entirely: Nazism, together with its close remain at home and raise children for the fatherland.
relative, Fascism. There were even attempts to build villages and garden
Although they had nineteenth-century anteced- settlements to reflect such ideals. On the other hand, the
ents, both Fascism and Nazism were essentially prod- Nazis were also modernizers who built the autobahns,
ucts of the inter-war years. Fascism, under its leader fostered industry and spent vast sums on the military,
­Benito Mussolini, ruled in Italy from 1922 until its organizing their capitalist economy to these ends. Their
final defeat in the Second World War in 1945. Nazism aim was to turn Germany into a superpower, able to
under Adolf Hitler ruled Germany from 1933 until it dominate the European continent and regions beyond
too was defeated in 1945. Various Fascist or neo-Fascist (see Chapter 20, pp. 407–10).
groups ruled or were active elsewhere in Europe, and in Nazism’s central and most notorious feature was its
some other regions, during this period, and to a lesser racism. Building on common European assumptions of
extent since. racial and cultural superiority (prejudices which have
There is no doubt that Nazism was by far the most by no means disappeared, even today), they taught that
influential Fascist movement after 1933, and so the fol- the Germans and related Aryan races were equipped
lowing brief remarks will be devoted to it (Kershaw by nature to dominate the globe. All non-Aryan peoples
2000). One of the problems of discussing Nazism or were regarded as inferior, particularly the Jews who,
other forms of Fascism is their lack of a consistent ideol- because of their culture, religion and cosmopolitan
ogy or philosophy. However, certain general points can ways, seemed to represent all that the Nazis feared and
be made. Like certain Western intellectuals and others, hated. As time went on, it became clear that the Nazis
the Nazis were moved by a dislike of facets of capital- meant to exterminate the Jews (they killed six million
ist modernity, such as commercialism, materialism, indi- of them) as well as others (Roma peoples, homosexu-
vidualism, threats to the traditional family like the rise of als, the mentally ill, certain religious groups) who could
female employment (see Plate 3.4), and similar tendencies have no place in the world they intended to reconstruct.
that they associated with the ‘decadent’ Western democ- The Nazi death camp at Auschwitz in Poland, which
racies. They also despised Western-style parliamentary has been researched by geographers (Charlesworth et
democracy, with its plurality of political parties and class al. 2006; Knowles et al. 2014), is kept as a memorial to
divisions. In its place, they advocated the concept of a the huge numbers who were murdered and as a solemn
single national community, a Volksgemeinschaft, headed warning to today’s world of the horrific consequences
by a single Leader or Führer (Hitler), who was regarded of racial prejudice.
as representative of, and chosen by, the people (this was Perhaps the most significant challenge to liberal
the Nazi concept of ‘democracy’). The Leader’s power capitalism in the twentieth century, however, came from
was absolute. Such a creed, however, seemed exceedingly Marxist-style communism (Calvocoressi 1991). By the
unlikely to come to power in Germany in the early 1930s 1960s and 1970s up to one-third of humanity was living
had it not been for the extreme circumstances reigning under communist governments that explicitly rejected
there. One was a general sense of resentment at Ger- capitalism as an acceptable way of organizing society.
many’s defeat in the First World War and subsequent The reasons for that rejection and why it largely failed
national humiliations. As extreme nationalists, the Nazis must now be considered.
promised to avenge this defeat. Another was the dire eco- An outline of some of the principal features of
nomic and social straits to which many of the middle Marxism is given in Spotlight box  3.2. An important
class had been reduced by post-First World War inflation point is that Marx’s teachings failed to change those
and the Depression that began in 1929. There was also societies at which they were initially aimed – the indus-
the fear of the many strikes and disorders perpetrated by trial societies of Western Europe and North America.
communists and other left-wing groups (as well as by the Marx himself had expected that communism would find
Nazis) that were, of course, encouraged by the selfsame support among the growing industrial working classes
economic difficulties. of countries like Germany and Britain, where factories

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 66    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

Spotlight box 3.2

Marxism ● Marxism teaches that the capitalists are forced by

the very nature of capitalism to maximize the profits
● Marxism, which derives from the teachings of Karl they obtain at the expense of the workers.
Marx (1818–83), is related to other forms of social- ● Marx thought that eventually capitalism would
ism that seek to moderate or reform the injustices become so exploitative and prone to crises that its
of capitalism. downfall was inevitable.
● Unlike some other forms of socialism, Marxism ● It would then be replaced by a much more just,
regards capitalism as an innately unjust and exploit- classless society (socialism, gradually maturing into
ative system. communism).
● According to Marxism, capitalism divides society ● In the meantime Marx exhorted the world’s workers
into antagonistic classes: those who own the main (especially the industrial workers) to organize politi-
sources of wealth (the capitalists) and those who cally to hasten capitalism’s downfall.
must live by selling their labour to the capitalists
(the proletariat).

were bringing such groups together in increasing num-

bers. However, it was by no means obvious, as the years
passed, that the workers of those countries were neces-
sarily being increasingly exploited, as Marx seems to
have expected (later, these countries were accused by
Marxists of exporting exploitation to colonies and
other less developed regions). Instead, Marxism tri-
umphed in Russia (in 1917), in what was in fact the least
industrialized of Europe’s great powers. Thus, whereas
in terms of Wallerstein’s world systems theory Marxism
was expected to find favour in the core countries, in fact
it initially triumphed in a semi-peripheral one. That it
did so changed the character of Marxism, which was
now faced with the challenge of building socialism in
a peasant society, and in virtual isolation from the rest Plate 3.5  Women workers in an American
of the world. armaments plant during the First World War. The
What happened after 1917 in Russia (or the Soviet labour shortage during the First World War gave
Union as it was now to be called) was of profound women job opportunities which were increasingly
importance for the other countries that later adopted taken as the twentieth century advanced.
communist systems, if only because Russia was the (Everett Historical/Shutterstock)
pioneer. What happened there began to assume some-
thing of the character of orthodoxy (Sakwa 1999). In
view of the difficulties they faced, and in all likelihood of this extraordinary economic system was both to
because of their own inclinations, the Bolsheviks (as speed the process of economic development and to
the Russian or Soviet communists were called) adopted build up the country’s military resources. As the 1930s
a highly centralized political system that brooked no advanced, it became clear that what had earlier seemed
opposition and entailed the destruction of the previ- a rather vague threat from the outside capitalist world
ous ruling and capitalist class. Eventually, from the late was beginning to take a concrete and menacing form in
1920s, they implemented a fully centrally planned eco- the guise of Nazi Germany. The centrally planned or
nomic system. This involved the abolition of private command economy (which involved much suffering on
enterprise and virtually all forms of market relations, the part of the Soviet people) eventually proved equal
and the collectivization of agriculture. The purpose to this challenge. In the ensuing war with Germany

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 Chapter 3  The making of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century world    67

(1941–5), the Soviet Union emerged victorious, but only to the whole idea of capitalism (Sakwa 1999). Internally,
after sustaining enormous losses. whilst it led to attempts to reconstruct society on a dif-
Soviet victory in the Second World War greatly ferent basis, it did in fact give rise to new forms of spa-
enhanced that country’s prestige. Moreover, because tial inequality (Bater 1986). Interestingly enough it also
the Soviet armies were now in occupation of much of had certain spatial features in common with Nazism
central and eastern Europe, they were able to ensure and Fascism, such as an emphasis on creating urban
that regimes friendly to the Soviet Union (that is, com- spaces specifically for the purpose of mass ceremonial
munist regimes) would assume power in those regions. and display (Plate 3.6). The creation of ‘spaces of ter-
Communism soon spread into other countries, notably ror’, such as concentration camps for the incarceration
China (in 1949), south-east Asia and beyond: in other or elimination of those deemed unacceptable to the
words, into Wallerstein’s ‘periphery’. All these countries regime, was also a feature of the two systems (Moran
initially followed the Soviet development model, but soon 2004; Pallot 2005).
found that it was necessary to adapt it to their own needs. In the end, communism failed to prove itself a
In the meantime the spread of communism, and Soviet ­successful, viable challenger to capitalism. Especially
ambitions, excited the suspicions of the capitalist West. from the 1970s, the Soviet Union and its eastern Euro-
After 1945, therefore, the world was split into two armed pean allies fell behind their capitalist rivals in terms
camps, both equipped with nuclear weapons. The ensu- of productivity, flexibility and innovation. Whether
ing confrontation, known as the Cold War, profoundly this was because of problems inherent to command
influenced both sides and encouraged their militarization economies as such, or whether it has more to do with
(see Chapter 20, pp. 410–13). However, many countries, mistakes made by the various political leaderships, is
especially in the developing world, tried to avoid taking hard to say. Whatever the reasons, by the end of the
sides, while China, though communist, began to pursue 1980s practically the whole of the communist world
its own version of communism outside the Soviet sphere. was in a state of economic and political crisis. The
While the actual form that communism took in the subsequent fall of communism in eastern Europe, and
Soviet Union and other countries may have been a modi- the splitting of the Soviet Union into 15 separate states
fication of Marx’s own ideas, it did represent a radical in 1991, signalled the end of the Cold War. Since then
departure from the capitalist development model. Not the post-communist states, plus China which continues
only was the command economy a very different, state- to pursue its own version of socialism ‘with Chinese
centred approach to economic development (and one characteristics’, have been struggling to adapt to the
which was copied in many parts of the developing world market economy and in other ways to cope with the
after the Second World War, with varying degrees of problems of post-communist transformation (Gwynne
success), it regarded itself, and was regarded, as a threat et al. 2003: 59–72, 101–8).

Plate 3.7  A section of the Berlin Wall in central

Plate 3.6  Red Square, Moscow, one of the open Berlin in October, 1988. The fall of the wall in the
spaces enhanced by the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin following year signalled the end of communism in
for official communist demonstrations and ceremonial the Soviet bloc and the removal of a major twentieth-
display. century challenge to world capitalism.
(Iakov Filimonov/Shutterstock) (360b/Shutterstock)

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 68    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

captured by Rudyard Kipling in his comic poem ‘We and

3.4 The end of imperialism? They’, quoted above.
However, the future of European imperialism was
Father, Mother, and Me already being questioned even before the First World War.
Sister and Auntie say The English liberal J.A. Hobson, and later the Russian rev-
All the people like us are We, olutionary V.I. Lenin, popularized the idea that Europe’s
And everyone else is They. overseas colonies were being economically organized and
And They live over the sea, exploited mainly for the benefit of the European ‘mother
While We live over the way, countries’, forming an undeveloped periphery to the Euro-
But – would you believe it? – They look upon We pean core. Lenin taught that imperialism was an inevita-
As only a sort of They! – ble consequence of capitalism – its ‘highest stage’. In the
meantime various rumblings of discontent were being felt
From ‘We and They’ by Rudyard Kipling
in various parts of the European empires.
(1912: 763–4)2
But it was the three great episodes of the first half of
At the beginning of the twentieth century Britain and the twentieth century – the First World War, the Great
several other European powers sat proudly at the centre Depression (1929–33) and the Second World War – that
of a series of empires that spanned the globe (Figure 3.2). fatally undermined European imperialism. Nationalism,
As noted in Chapter 2, these empires were the products of which had had such an impact on the political geography
a long period of European exploration, settlement, eco- of Europe (see Chapter 22), had also influenced the colo-
nomic exploitation and imperial rivalry. Something of the nial world where ‘national liberation movements’ began
complacency and condescension with which Europeans to demand independence for their countries. Starting
commonly regarded their empires at this period is nicely with the independence of India in 1947, the next quarter

R U S S I A N E M P I R E
CANADA
P E
R O
U
E
U N I T E D
S TAT E S A T L A N T I C C H I N A JAPA N
O C E A N
P A C I F I C
WEST
INDIES INDIA O C E A N
A F R I C A
PHILIPPINES

INDIAN
SOUTH OCEAN DUTCH
P A C I F I C AMERICA EAST
O C E A N INDIES

AU S T R A L I A

British Empire
French Empire NEW
German Empire ZEALAND

Portuguese Empire

Figure 3.2  The world in 1914 showing British, French, German and Portuguese empires. Note, too, the Russian
empire, the Dutch East Indies, and other colonial territories under Belgian, Italian and Spanish rule.

2
Poem: ‘We and They’ by Rudyard Kipling, with permission of A.P. Watt Ltd on behalf of Gráinne Yeats

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 Chapter 3  The making of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century world    69

of Western models was not always a suitable response

to their problems. For example, many of the new states
attempted to copy the European idea of the nation-
state, hoping to unite their peoples around a common
sense of national identity. But the old colonial bounda-
ries had generally been drawn up to suit imperial con-
venience rather than that of local communities. Thus
these boundaries, now the boundaries of independent
states, frequently grouped peoples into one state who
had no common culture or history while dividing others
who did so. This contributed little to the political stabil-
ity or unity of many new states. Another problem was
the feeling among many citizens of the new states that
the capitalist economy was responsible for the underde-
velopment of their countries. This set off a search for
socialist or communist alternatives, much to the annoy-
ance of the West, and encouraged debates about the
meaning of ‘development’ (see Chapter 8, pp. 176–9).
Finally, fundamental questions were frequently posed
about how far modernization, as generally understood,
was compatible with the traditions of the former colo-
nial peoples. The Islamic revival, discussed below, can
be seen as one response to this dilemma.
Just as imperialism had a profound impact on the
political and social geographies of enormous areas in
Africa, Asia and the Americas, it equally affected the
imperial countries themselves. One of the most impor-
tant manifestations of this in the twentieth century was
Plate 3.8  Imperial Airways flies to Australia. Imperial the flow of migrants from colonies and former colonies,
Airways was the major British airline company which especially in the tropics and sub-tropics, to take up jobs
operated at ever more ambitious international and in the former imperial states. This naturally had a far-
intercontinental scales during the 1930s. reaching cultural impact in cities and regions in Western
(Lordprice Collection/Alamy) Europe. In fact the whole experience of imperialism led
to the mixing of peoples and cultures on a grand scale. It
also led to widespread questioning of long-held assump-
of a century witnessed the break-up of all the European tions about European (and often male) cultural superior-
empires (though the Soviet Union, successor to the old ity (see Chapter 2, p. 47).
Russian empire, finally disappeared only in 1991). Many Many scholars have argued that the end of European
new, independent states appeared on the map of Africa, colonialism did not mean the end of exploitative rela-
Asia and other regions, though not, unfortunately, with- tionships between the core countries of the world econ-
out considerable turmoil in some cases. The world’s omy (including the former imperial powers) and what
political geography was transformed. was now increasingly referred to as the ‘Third World’.
In giving (or being forced to give) independence to According to such thinkers, the formal imperialism of
their colonies, the former imperial powers hoped that the colonial era had merely been replaced by a more
they would adopt European-type political systems ‘informal’ alternative, but the basic situation of the core
and capitalist economic systems, partly because these exercising hegemony over the periphery had not really
appeared the best basis for future development, and changed (Wallerstein 1980; Frank and Dutt 2002). From
partly because they seemed a reasonable way of uphold- the 1970s, however, some fundamental changes seemed
ing European influence. The elites who were now to to affect the world economy which, in the opinion of
hold power in the new states were often sympathetic to certain scholars, demanded that international rela-
these aims, since they had frequently been educated by tionships be viewed in a new way. Lash and Urry have
Europeans and wished to see their countries modernized described these changes as ‘the end of organized capital-
along European or Western lines. However, the adoption ism’ (Lash and Urry 1987).

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 70    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

transnational corporations. Many manufacturing and

3.5 Globalized capitalism service firms now began to locate in parts of the Third
World, where costs were lower, whilst core industrial
In 1960 the industrialized areas of Western Europe and countries began to experience deindustrialization and
North America produced almost 80  per cent of the a switch into services and ‘control’ functions (the head-
world’s industrial output. Even Japan accounted for only quarters of the transnational corporations still tended
around 4 per cent. Much of the Third World remained to be located in the traditional core countries). A fur-
agricultural. Only after this time did industrialization ther important result of the development of information
spread beyond its traditional centres (which since the technology was that production became much more flex-
1930s had included the Soviet Union). Meanwhile many ible than before and more geared up to highly specialized
of the older industrial countries began to lose industries, markets, changing fashion and the whim of the individual
even some of those which had arrived with the twentieth consumer. This new, more flexible approach to produc-
century. tion is sometimes known as post-Fordism.
Of course, some areas of the ‘Third World’ benefited Later chapters of this book will explore some of
far more from this industrial spread than did others. Most the specific economic and social implications of these
spectacularly, the newly industrialized countries of changes. Meanwhile, it is worth stressing here how unset-
East Asia, Brazil, Mexico and certain others soon seemed tling such developments have been, especially for the core
set to join the industrial core. Yet others, like certain Mid- countries. The years of growing affluence after 1945 were
dle Eastern states, earned huge revenues from their energy succeeded, from the mid-1970s, by a period of greater
exports. But there remained many areas, especially in uncertainty as deindustrialization gathered pace (see
Africa, which missed out on the new developments (even Plate 3.8), unemployment rose, insecurity became more
so the latter part of the twentieth century was a period widespread, and social inequality became more appar-
of unprecedented population growth and urbanization ent. By the century’s end it seemed that Western-style
across much of the developing world – see Chapters 4 capitalism and democracy were increasingly threatened
and 9). The term ‘Third World’, used to group together and, if anything, the feeling of threat and uncertainty has
countries with such disparate economic characters, grown into the new century. The last part of this chapter
seemed increasingly redundant, and the world as a whole will briefly survey some of the factors that lie behind that
seemed as unequal as ever (Sidaway 2012). uncertainty.
How is one to explain the changes affecting the world’s Just as Lash and Urry used the term ‘organized capi-
economic geography in the last third of the twentieth talism’ to describe the years down to about 1973 when
century and at the beginning of the twenty-first? Geog- Fordism reached its apogee, so they have described the
raphers and others argued that such changes are part of closing years of the twentieth century as those of ‘disor-
the process of globalization. Speedier communications ganized capitalism’. Some of its more prominent features
meant that the world was becoming a much smaller are listed in Spotlight box  3.3, once again paying particu-
place as the twentieth century drew towards its close. lar attention to how the changes have affected the core
Capitalism itself was now a truly global phenomenon as countries of the world economy.
markets were internationalized and finance became fully
mobile. Before 1960, despite the importance of interna-
tional trade, the world economy was structured around
individual states. After 1960, the world economy became
in effect transnational as the boundaries of individual
states became ever less important to its functioning. Thus
this period witnessed the rise to global importance of
the transnational corporations, commercial conglomer-
ates which became major players on a world scale (see
Chapters 14 and 16). Because of the wealth and politi-
cal influence they wielded, such huge companies became
increasingly free to switch their operations from country
to country as economic circumstances dictated. States,
which had previously seemed unchallenged within their
own frontiers, found it ever more difficult to control their Plate 3.9  Inside the hall of a coal mine abandoned
own economies and began to bid against one another in the wake of 1980s deindustrialization.
to attract footloose investment and the favours of the (Ppictures/Shutterstock)

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 Chapter 3  The making of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century world    71

Spotlight box 3.3

Globalized or ‘disorganized’ capitalism ● The global economy reduces the effectiveness of

state attempts at economic regulation – from the
● The onset of ‘disorganized capitalism’ is marked state’s point of view, the economy becomes less
by a decline in the relative importance of extractive predictable.
and manufacturing industries. ● Rising costs, demands for reduced taxation, and
● There is a relative increase in the importance of growing social inequality challenge the idea of a
service and consumer industries, especially in centralized welfare state.
employment. ● Smaller, more footloose industries, the rise of ser-
● The use of flexible technologies encourages a vices, better communications and other factors
reduction in the average size of manufacturing reduce the traditional importance of big, industrial cit-
plants with more accent on labour-saving invest- ies by comparison with small towns and rural areas.
ments and more flexible employment processes, all ● There is a rise in importance of the educated social
induced by competition. strata needed to work in the new administrative,
● Because of the need for flexibility and cost-cutting, control, service and related activities – the so-called
industrial firms tend to ‘hive off’ many of the ser- ‘service class’ – with more sophisticated and individ-
vices and supporting activities they need to other ualized tastes in consumption and other areas. The
firms and organizations. There are thus more age of mass cultural provision is replaced by greater
opportunities for small firms, changing the tradition- cultural fragmentation and pluralism (sometimes
ally specialized nature of the regional economy. referred to as post-modernism). There is a com-
● Regional economies are also affected by the mensurate decline in faith in large-scale planning
greater emphasis on non-standardized and similar activities associated with modernism.
production – traditional regional specializations
become less marked. Source: after Lash and Urry (1987)

through ‘free markets’. Just how ‘free’ markets were

3.6 T he world in the early meant to be he did not say. But in the opinion of many,
twenty-first century what Fukuyama was celebrating at the dawn of the new
millennium was in effect the final triumph of Western-
In 1992, some three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, style capitalism, and of the Western way of life, over the
an event which is regarded as marking the end of the rest of the world – an awesome claim indeed.
Cold War (see Plate 3.7), the American political scientist Now in the second decade of the new millennium, and
Francis Fukuyama published a book entitled The End of more than 20 years since Fukuyama published his book,
History and the Last Man (Fukuyama 1992). Here Fukuy- it is probably true to say that relatively few people are as
ama made some startling claims regarding what he saw optimistic about the prospects for liberal democracy as
as the recent global triumph of ‘liberal democracy’. The he evidently was. In fact the future seems as uncertain as
end of the Cold War, Fukuyama asserted, meant that lib- ever and ‘liberal democracy’ (whatever that might mean
eral democracy had now ‘conquered rival ideologies like in practice) is faced with new challenges, some of which
hereditary monarchy, fascism and . . . communism’ and were perhaps only dimly discernible when Fukuyama
that this triumph marked ‘the end point of mankind’s wrote. Understanding these challenges forms the sub-
ideological evolution’. He went on to announce that stance of the chapters which follow. Here we can only
‘while earlier forms of government were characterized summarize the most significant among them.
by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their even-
tual collapse, liberal democracy [is] arguably free from
3.6.1 Economic challenges
such internal contradictions’. Hence ‘the ideal of liberal
democracy could not be improved on’. A close reading Fukuyama published his book at a time when most
of Fukuyama’s text reveals that what he had in mind by Western states, and many others as well, had strongly
‘liberal democracy’ was not only a specific political sys- espoused the economic doctrine known as neoliberal-
tem but also a way of organizing the economy, namely ism. This was a reaction to the disappointing economic

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 72    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

record of the 1970s and promised to achieve high and public expenditure of various kinds (whose reduction is
sustainable economic growth through freeing up markets, partly associated with the neoliberal policy of lowering
privatizing as much of the economy and associated activ- taxes) suffer deprivation as well as the unemployment
ity as possible, and restructuring the state (see Hendrikse and other problems invariably associated with a volatile
and Sidaway 2010). In the event the actual record of eco- economy (see Chapter 10).
nomic achievement was much more modest than had been Many wonder whether such levels of inequality are
hoped for (Harvey 2006: 30, 42; Dicken 2015) and there compatible with the maintenance of free and democratic
was much volatility on the world market. Furthermore, polities. Meanwhile, at an international scale, numer-
the removal or absence of regulation over much economic ous scholars regard neoliberal attitudes as being partly
activity seemed to encourage financial speculation and responsible for the growing economic inequalities and
even corruption in many places, culminating in a major other disparities between countries in different parts of
international banking crisis in 2008, and precipitating the world (Stiglitz and Charlton 2007; see Chapter 8). It is
economic recession and a crisis in the Eurozone in 2011. argued that the factors encouraging this include the inap-
As a result many countries found themselves deeply in propriate ways in which the rules governing international
debt and were forced to make major cuts in public spend- trade have been applied to developing countries, and the
ing which especially disadvantaged the poorer elements hypocritical way in which many Western countries, hav-
in society. As we have seen, this was not the first occasion ing espoused free trade principles as applied to other
that Western-style capitalism has been seized with crisis. countries, actively seek to avoid their full application in
But this recent occurrence has caused many to question their own case. In consequence, whilst Western countries
whether the way in which the world economy has been pump huge amounts of aid into poorer countries, this is
managed recently has been sensible and whether some more than counteracted by the trade policies they pursue.
alternative policy should now be adopted, particularly
as some countries like China have very successfully pur-
sued rather different (and more state-centred) economic
3.6.2 Geopolitical challenges
policies. Indeed, some economic analysts have suggested At the time Fukuyama published his book it seemed safe
that the West can no longer assume economic dominance to assume that, with the collapse of communism and the
over the rest of the world with rising economic powers Soviet Union, the United States would be left as the only
like China and India now entering the fray. The West’s remaining superpower, well placed to dominate the rest
days as the centre of the global economy may thus be of the globe. Thus there dawned the vision of a world
numbered. Some of these issues are discussed further in organized in accordance with a Pax Americana, whereby
Chapters 14 and 16. the benefits of American democracy and of the Western
There is an additional reason why many people have way of life more generally might spread to the rest of
begun to question the wisdom of a neoliberal approach the globe. Again, however, in the second decade of the
to economic policy. This is the growing inequalities that twenty-first century, this vision now seems too simplis-
it seems to engender. For example, many countries that tic for a number of reasons. One, mentioned above, has
have adopted neoliberal economic and social policies have been the phenomenal rise of China and of other parts of
experienced the emergence of huge gaps between rich and East Asia in the recent period (Dicken 2015). Economic
poor. Indeed, according to a report issued by the charity power, of course, invariably means political power, and in
Oxfam in January 2015, 1 per cent of the world’s popu- this situation the United States’ geopolitical dominance
lation will soon own more wealth than the remaining is no longer assured (see Chapters 20 and 23), especially
99 per cent! Thus, at one end of the scale, many people since, according to some estimates, China is now the
now enjoy previously unimaginable income levels, ben- world’s biggest economy. A symptom of the changing
efiting among other things from low levels of taxation, situation lies in the growing competition and disagree-
allowing them to escape the consequences of the reduc- ment between the USA and China in such areas as trade
tions in public expenditure which are the hallmark of relations, currency policy and industrial policy as well
neoliberalism. In the UK and other countries the public as disputes over such matters as human rights and pub-
concern expressed at the levels of payments and bonuses lic access to the Internet. A further symptom erupted in
being made to bankers and others whose activities are 2014 when civil war in Ukraine, arising out of disputes
widely regarded as having precipitated the 2008 bank- over whether the country’s future lay with the EU and
ing crisis (which resulted in huge investments of public NATO to the west or with its eastern neighbours includ-
money to rescue the faltering banks) is symptomatic of a ing Russia, resulted in Western sanctions against Russia
broader dissatisfaction. And, at the other end, many of and the threat of a much wider conflict (Sakwa 2015a).
the poor, who are most dependent on public welfare and Thus the blithe assumption that the USA can order the

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 Chapter 3  The making of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century world    73

world according to its wishes and that the rest of the population (itself a problem of the utmost importance; see
world will gladly adopt American values is questionable. Chapters 4 and 15). Needless to say, the impoverishment
This is quite apart from the problem of the numerous of the web of life, or the biosphere as it is often called,
poor and peripheral states across the world (Afghanistan which sustains life on earth could have catastrophic con-
and Somalia, for example) which neither the USA nor sequences for everyone. A related issue, one that has been
China nor anyone else seems able to control. vividly illustrated during 2013–15 by the Ebola crisis in
Given the rising significance of China and other parts West Africa, is the spread of new diseases or the revival
of Asia in the recent period, it has become fashionable of old ones. Thus the apparently reducing effectiveness of
among certain scholars to attempt to explain this phe- antibiotics exacerbated by their overuse might in future
nomenon from a long-term, historical perspective (see, result in bacterial-borne diseases like tuberculosis becom-
for example, Frank 1998; Darwin 2007). Andre Gunder ing major killers once again.
Frank’s book, ReOrient (Frank 1998), is a case in point. The issue of climate change has come on to the agenda
Contrary to the ideas of Wallerstein and others (see recently as data have become available showing that the
Chapter 2, p. 39), his thesis is that by the year 1500 there continuous emission of carbon dioxide and other green-
was already a single global economy in existence cen- house gases into the atmosphere, which is a hallmark
tred on Asia whose roots went back many thousands of of industrial societies, may already have led to marked
years. In this global system Europe was both relatively (and in some opinions unstoppable) climate change.
and absolutely marginal and continued to be so until Increases in the incidence and intensity of hurricanes,
about 1800 when it assumed dominance over Asia, partly bush fires, floods, droughts, heat waves are, in the opin-
because of its successful conquest of the Americas. Thus, ion of some, symptoms of climate change. In the more
according to Frank, there is nothing particularly surpris- extreme scenarios, the complete melting of the polar
ing about Asia’s recent resurgence. Hence he is challeng- icecaps, the flooding of much of the earth’s low-lying
ing the rather Eurocentric perspective adopted in the first (and most densely populated) regions, and catastrophic
three chapters of this book as well, it might be said, as changes elsewhere, are predicted.
that adopted by the overwhelming majority of Western There is no need to emphasize the point that the more
historians and other scholars. dramatic predictions regarding the dire consequences
of continuous and unsustainable environmental change
threaten the entire basis of our modern way of life. We
3.6.3 Environmental challenges
must either change our entire mode of life, it seems, or
In the opinion of many people, the most urgent prob- hope, through further technological development for
lem facing the world today is that of environmental example, to solve some of the most pressing problems.
change, and in particular climate change. As we saw in But even then it is difficult to envisage the model of con-
Chapter 1, there is nothing new about the idea of human tinuous economic growth in the way we understand it
beings changing the environments in which they live. now being sustainable in the longer term, at least on this
Indeed they have probably done so ever since they first planet. Not surprisingly, given the rhetoric surrounding
appeared on earth. But what has become particularly environmental issues (and, perhaps, the vested interests
worrying in the most recent period is the notion that who might be threatened if the more dramatic scenarios
such changes are now becoming unsustainable and are are taken seriously), there are those who discount such
beginning to threaten not only our way of life but also, claims, questioning some of the evidence supporting cli-
perhaps, our very existence. Concern about such matters mate change and other predictions. The whole question is
goes back many years, to the nineteenth century at least, therefore controversial. Some of the ramifications of the
but became more pressing from about the 1960s when environmental debates, and their political implications,
some of the environmental consequences of continuous are explored in Chapters 4–7.
economic growth became more noticeable. Thus alarm
began to be expressed about the possibility of the world
running out of its most significant resources, especially 3.6.4 Value and identity issues
energy resources, a worry that has hardly diminished
On the first anniversary of the 9/11 attack on the World
as the search for oil and gas now impinges on the Polar
Trade Center in New York, US President George W. Bush
and sub-Polar regions, some of the most ecologically
made the following declaration:
fragile regions on earth. Likewise, there is concern over
the loss of biodiversity, associated among other things We will use our position of unparalleled strength and
with the pressure to intensify agriculture and to expand influence to build an atmosphere of international
food production to feed the world’s rapidly growing order and openness in which progress and liberty can

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 74    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

flourish in many nations. A peaceful world of growing long-term consequences of this strong pro-independence
freedom serves American long-term interests, reflects vote for the stability of the United Kingdom have yet to be
American ideals and unites America’s allies . . . We seen. Elsewhere in the world, nationalism has often been
seek a just peace where repression, resentment and an even more significant issue.
poverty are replaced with the hope of democracy, Unfortunately the debates over issues of values and
development, free markets and free trade . . .  identity have sometimes given rise to disorder and even
outright violence. Some of these points are explored fur-
(quoted in Harvey 2006: 11).
ther in Chapters 13 and 22.
In this declaration, President Bush clearly implied that
such ‘ideals’ are not only American but also need adopt-
ing by the rest of the world.
3.6.5 Security issues
But what exactly is ‘freedom’ in a world in which, The horrifying attack on the offices of Charlie Hebdo,
for example, the USA has felt able to imprison so-called a French satirical magazine, in January 2015, an attack
‘terrorists’ in its Guantanamo Bay prison camp without which caused the deaths of 12 people and injuries to 11
trial and allegedly even used torture on them? Or what is others, was a sharp reminder to the West of a phenomenon
‘democracy’ in a world where the USA and its allies back which is all too common elsewhere in the world. The Paris
numerous repressive regimes in their own security inter- attack, horrific as it was, pales by comparison with other
ests, or where politicians, having made certain promises terrorist activities elsewhere in the world. For example, the
to their electorates, appear to feel free to do the exact actions of Boko Haram in Nigeria and some neighbouring
opposite once they are elected as well as engaging in countries are believed to have caused the deaths of more
corrupt practices in certain cases? No wonder that such than 5,000 civilians up to June 2014. In this case there
vaunted ‘values’ are being questioned in many quarters are clear links with Islamic fundamentalism. But the link
rather than simply being accepted as presented. between Islam and terrorism should not be overstressed as
In fact the whole area of values, what they mean and it involves only a tiny minority of Muslims. The fact is that
whose interests they serve, seems to be an increasingly the Islamic revival, which is associated with the desire to
contested one (witness the ongoing debate about ‘British return to traditional Muslim values on the part of many
values’ in the UK). This is linked to the issue of identity. who reject Western values based on secularism and mate-
Perhaps related to feelings of social injustice and/or loss rialism (and thus Western-style capitalism), is a far more
of certainty and personal autonomy in an increasingly broadly based movement than any misleading attempt to
globalized world, more and more people appear to feel link it with terrorism might imply (Park 1994; Esposito
the need to assert their distinctiveness and their freedom 1995). In the opinion of the majority of scholars, Islam and
either as individuals or as groups. Movements like femi- the adoption of terrorist tactics are incompatible.
nism, gay liberation and animal rights are a case in point. Clearly, however, the dangers and apparent frequency
Another is the recent rise of fundamentalist religious of terrorist acts are a sharp reminder of the limits to the
movements among many established faiths, whether it power of states in an increasingly globalized world. They
be among Christians, Muslims, Hindus or others (some- are a challenge to the democratic freedoms enjoyed in
times, it must be said, in reaction against some of the many states (despite the caveats about the meaning of the
movements mentioned above, and sometimes against the term ‘democracy’ outlined above), not least because they
materialism and secularism which are such a feature of encourage governments to adopt more and more strin-
modern life). In many Western countries, for example, gent security measures. But terrorism in the above sense is
the problem of ‘radicalization’ of some Muslim youth, by no means the only security threat to menace states and
whereby, apparently under the influence of the Inter- communities as the twenty-first century advances. One
net, some have been travelling to join militant groups in might mention the spread of weapons of mass destruc-
the Middle East, has been a cause of concern to politi- tion, including chemical and biological weapons, and the
cians. Rising nationalism also seems to be a problem in possibility of cyber-terrorism, as two that are particularly
many parts of the world. Thus whereas Fukuyama airily worrying (see Chapter 20). Many states and citizens are
assumed that, in Western Europe at least, nationalism also concerned about the issue of international migration
was being ‘tamed’, the demands for regional or ethnic as a security concern. Encouraged by such events as wars
autonomy, or recognition, seem by no means to be abat- and disturbances, ecological catastrophes and economic
ing. For example, the September, 2014 referendum on hardship, such movements are often most unfortunately
whether Scotland should become an independent state targeted by right-wing political elements eager to warn
saw a voter turnout of almost 85 per cent with nearly of the danger of national cultures being ‘swamped’ and
45  per cent of voters supporting independence. The of the need to defend national identity.

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 Chapter 3  The making of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century world    75

embracing global system. Yet it would be a mistake to

3.7 Conclusion imagine that this was an uncontested process, or one
that threatens to bring about a global uniformity. The
The twentieth century was a period of rapid economic legacy of the twentieth century for the twenty-first is a
and social change over most parts of the world. It was world that is both dynamic and uneven, and therefore
also a period when the world seemed to become smaller very uncertain. The rest of this book tries to grapple with
and most regions were gradually drawn into an ever more this uncertainty.

Learning outcomes
Having read this chapter, you should know that:
Further reading
● Capitalism is inherently dynamic and unstable. It Dicken, P. (2015) Global Shift: Mapping the Changing
was so throughout the twentieth century, and is Contours of the World Economy, 7th edition, Sage, London.
likely to continue to be so in the future. A comprehensive overview of developments in the global
economy up to the present time. Chapter 2 considers the
● The concepts of Fordist or ‘organized’ and Glo- longer-term development of that economy with particular
balized or ‘disorganized’ capitalism are ways of emphasis on the period since 1960. It is therefore particularly
trying to make sense of the changes that affected relevant to the second half of the present chapter.
capitalist societies during the twentieth century. Frank, A.G. (1998) ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age,
● ‘Fordism’ and ‘post-Fordism’ (concerning production University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. A rather idiosyn-
cratic book that seeks to challenge the Eurocentric assumption
and consumption) and ‘modernism’ and ‘postmod-
of many scholars that the global economy (and other signifiers
ernism’ (concerning culture) similarly try to make
of modernity, including ‘capitalism’) had their origins in Europe
sense of twentieth and twenty-first century change. and then spread to the rest of the world. Frank argues that the
No concepts, however, can do justice to the com- rise of Asia preceded that of Europe with the latter only becom-
plexity of change during this period. ing predominant after about 1800. Thus the recent rise of Asia
● Western-style liberal capitalism is only one variant is only a return to its former preeminence.

of capitalism. It has been challenged in various Hall, P. (2014) Cities of Tomorrow: an Intellectual History
of Urban Planning and Design since 1880, 4th edition,
ways in the twentieth century, some of which have
Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester. A splendid account of urban
had long-term consequences for different parts of
development in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries in
the globe. Future challenges might prove more suc- different parts of the world. The accent is on urban planning
cessful than past ones. and design, but there are many social insights.
● The twentieth century has been an era of Hobsbawm, E. (1995) Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth
­nation-states and of nationalism. Towards the end Century 1914–1991, Abacus, London. What quickly became
of the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries a classic account of twentieth-century history, written by a
the role of the nation-state seems increasingly doyen of British Marxist historians. Any chapter is worth read-
ing, but geography students will find those dealing with eco-
­challenged by globalization. Nationalism, however,
nomic, social and cultural change especially revealing.
may yet flourish as a response to globalization.
Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty-first Century, Belknap
● Modernity may not lead to the disappearance of Press, Cambridge, MA. A world best-seller, this book exam-
traditional cultural practices. The Islamic revival, ines the long-term evolution of social inequality, the concen-
and similar religious revivals across the world, are a tration of wealth and prospects for economic growth. The
case in point. author argues that, over the long term, returns on capital tend
to exceed the rate of economic growth. Therefore those who
● Despite the view of some that globalization is lead- already have capital have an inherent advantage over those
ing to the emergence of a global culture, it might who are dependent on wages only. This situation threatens to
actually increase the differences between places generate extreme inequalities in wealth, abetting discontent
and hence the importance of geography. and the undermining of democratic values.

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 76    Section 1  Worlds in the Past: Changing Scales of Experience and Past Worlds in the Present

is a very useful source for twentieth-century history and

Useful websites ­developments, with particular emphasis on the United
States.
www.si.edu  The Smithsonian Institution, Washington, www.besthistorysites.net  Entitled ‘Best of History Web-
DC. The Smithsonian is a focus for many kinds of scientific sites’, a comprehensive guide to history-oriented resources
and cultural endeavour in the United States. The website online. For teachers, students and others.

M03_DANI2950_05_SE_C03.indd 76 31/03/16 7:08 pm

 Section 2

Population, resources, food,

the environment and development

Edited by Michael Bradshaw

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 77 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Writing in 2009, John Beddington, the Chief Sci- storm warnings. The chapters highlight the diver-
entific Adviser to the UK government, noted that sity of problems that exist at the global, interstate
by 2030 the world would need to produce 50 per and local level. In this era of heightened globaliza-
cent more food and energy, together with 30 per tion, developments in one locale, region or state
cent more fresh water, while at the same time miti- can have global impact. For example, the so-
gating and adapting to climate change. He warned called ‘developed world’ has achieved high levels
that this combination of challenges threatened of consumption, but in doing so has exhausted
to create a ‘perfect storm’ of global events. As indigenous sources of energy, raw material and
Lester Brown (2011: ix) notes in the preface to food supply, making consumers increasingly reli-
his book World on the Edge, Jonathon Porritt, then ant on global supply chains. The same regions
Chair of the UK Sustainable Communities Devel- now face high production costs, a shortage of
opment Commission (which was subsequently skilled labour and an increasingly elderly and
axed by the then Coalition Government), endorsed dependent population. Elsewhere in the major-
Beddington’s analysis, but suggested that the ity of the world there are regions and states that
storm was more likely to strike closer to 2020 than suffer from an absence of economic development
2030 (Porritt 2009). Recent events might suggest and an inability to compete in the global market-
that Porritt is right: we seem to be experiencing place for much needed resources: a problem often
extreme climatic events with increasing frequency compounded by the fact that they have to export
and energy price volatility now seems the new food and natural resources to generate income to
reality. However, there is also reason for optimism: support the trappings of statehood. All too often,
in 2015 the Millennium Development goals were local political elites misappropriate the national
reset on the basis of significant progress and surplus to support their own livings standards
there is hope for a global agreement on climate and safeguard their control over power. Events
change. The world’s leaders agreed collective in the Arab world in the spring of 2011 reflect in
action at the COP-21 meeting in Paris in late 2015 part the peoples’ frustration with this situation.
to limit global warming to less than 2 degrees. At the same time, despite the recent global eco-
While this section does not deal explicitly with nomic crisis, the continuing rapid growth of new
the issues of climate change and water security, centres of demand in the emerging economies of,
which are normally covered elsewhere in a geog- for example, Brazil, China and India, highlights
raphy curriculum, it does deal with the issues the dynamic nature of the global system and the
of population, food, energy, environment and fact that new sources of demand for resources
development. Thus, it provides an essential back- are placing additional stress on the planet’s abil-
ground to understanding many of the issues that ity to support global capitalism. The analysis
contribute to the ‘perfect storm’ scenario. presented in this section suggests that there can
be no doubt that the storm clouds are gathering
This section makes clear both the scale and the and that urgent action is needed to change the
complexity of delivering the more sustainable relationship between environment, society and
approach to development needed in the face of development.

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 Demographic transformations

Chapter 4

Dimitris Ballas and Danny Dorling

Topics covered
■ The geographies of population growth
■ Changes in life expectancy and fertility
■ Population projections
■ Migration
■ The geography of disease, natural disasters and wars
■ The challenges of an ageing population in Europe

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 80    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Nations Population Division (see Table 4.1) the global

4.1 Introduction population in year zero (just over 2,000 years before
today) was estimated to have been around 300 million.
Demographic processes are relevant to almost every topic However, other estimates of the world population at
discussed in this book. For example, changes in popula- that time vary between 170 and 400 million. Up to the
tion size and structure can have an impact on the envi- end of the first millennium the world’s average popu-
ronment (including consumption patterns that affect lation growth rate was under 0.1 per cent. During the
climate change) as well as on the economy of countries second millennium population growth rates were slow
and regions. They may also influence the formation of and at times of plague and the spread of diseases to the
government policies and strategies at all geographical new world they were negative, but despite such setbacks
levels. Events such as environmental disasters, wars, the global human population reached one billion in
economic shocks and rising inequality can alter a whole 1820. From then it went up to 1.3 billion by the early
populations’ life expectancy and lead to significant twentieth century and then rose rapidly to a stagger-
demographic shifts. This chapter draws on recent work ing 6 billion by 1999. On 31 October 2011 the United
by the authors (Dorling 2013) to explore the geography Nations declared that the global population reached
of global population growth trends and processes. It also 7 billion (United Nations 2011). Table 4.1 shows how
presents traditional demographic concepts and models the population changed throughout the last 2,000 years.
that were developed to better understand such processes
(drawing on and updating relevant sections in earlier ver-
sions of this chapter written by John Round 2012). Fur-
Table 4.1  World population 0–2011 (in billions)
ther, we critically reconsider such models in the context
of a global environment where countries, regions and cit- Year Billions
ies and their populations are increasingly interdependent
and at a point when there are growing numbers of people 0 0.30
moving over national and international borders. We also 1000 0.31
discuss more recent events and demographic transforma- 1250 0.40
tions in the context of official population projections that
suggest that the world population is now stabilizing. The 1500 0.50
chapter then considers case study examples where factors 1750 0.79
such as wars and environmental disasters can be seen to
1800 0.98
be strongly associated with demographic processes and
can have a significant impact on the population structures 1850 1.26
of many countries and within countries. The chapter 1900 1.65
concludes by providing a summary of the issues discussed
1910 1.75
and also a brief discussion of the impact of income and
wealth inequality upon life expectancy (which in recent 1920 1.86
years in Europe and the USA have been exacerbated for 1930 2.07
some groups of the population by the implementation of
1940 2.30
austerity measures that disproportionally affect them).
1950 2.52
1960 3.02

4.2 Geographies of population growth 1970 3.70

1980 4.44
Before 1851 the world’s population experienced rela- 1990 5.27
tively slow growth for most of human history, with
1999 5.98
the exception of the period that is known as the Neo-
lithic revolution (which is thought to have taken place 2000 6.06
around 11,500 years ago). In particular, just before the 2010 6.79
Neolithic revolution, which is also known as the Agri-
2011 7.00
cultural Demographic Transition, the global population
of humans has been estimated to have been around 6 2015 7.32
million people, with a huge amount of error associated Source: United Nations Population Division (1999, 2012);
with that estimate. According to estimates of the United Population Institute (2011)

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 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    81

The numbers in Table 4.1 and discussion of world popu- thought that Christ was born), the population of what
lation growth do not tell us anything about the geographical is now China, Mongolia and Korea combined was the
distribution of that growth. We can explore the changing same as the population of the United Kingdom today,
geography of the global population with the help of maps around 62 million people. Hardly anyone lived in what is
and cartograms from the Worldmapper project (see Useful now the UK, just enough for it to be worth the Romans
websites section at end of chapter). In the context of this invading (a few years after Christ is thought to have died
project the world is categorized in 12 Worldmapper regions, in what is now Israel). The population of what is now
which are geographically contiguous territories of popu- India, then at the centre of the (known) world, was, at
lation groups (containing at least 100 million people per 78 million, less than that of Germany today. Across all of
region) classified by the UN Human Development Index the rest of the planet the remaining 90 million humans were
and colour coded accordingly, with different shades for unevenly spread out. As can be seen in the first cartogram,
individual countries. Visit the Worldmapper website for a the largest territories are China (bright green) and India
further explanation of the regional definition. Using a rain- (orange), where an estimated 135 million people, more than
bow scale, ranging from violet for the best-off region (con- half of the then total global population, were thought to
sisting of Japan alone) to dark red for the poorest region live. At that time there were 40 million people in Europe,
comprising countries in the centre of the African continent, 18 million in the Middle East and 11 million in Northern
Figure 4.1 presents a series of Worldmapper cartograms Africa, whereas North and South America as well as Asia
highlighting the changing geographies of population Pacific were very sparsely populated. Generally the colder
growth over the last 2,000 years, based on past population areas in Northern latitudes tended to have lower populations
estimates (from the Angus Maddison Project; see Useful whereas the territories that now encompass the Ganges,
websites at end of chapter for more details). Tigris, Yangtze, Nile and Po rivers were the most populous.
These maps are cartograms in which the territories The second map in the figure shows the distribution of
are drawn in proportion to their population at the dif- the population in year 1500, the time of the Spanish con-
ferent moments in time. In year one (around when it is quest in South America. Although the global population

1
Population in year 1500

Population in year 1900 Population in year 1960

Population in year 2000 Population in year 2015

Figure 4.1  The geography of population growth by Worldmapper regions (worldmapper.org).

Source: cartography by Benjamin Hennig (viewsoftheworld.net).

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 82    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

nearly doubled from year 1 to year 1500, its geographical 1820 when the world population reached 1 billion. It can
distribution remained largely the same, with Southern and be argued that this change was the long-term result of the
Eastern Asia remaining the most populous world regions. encounter between the Old and the New World in 1492,
It is also interesting to note that at this time the combined which led to a new demographic transition and a new
population of Mexico and Peru was greater than the total human equilibrium as described above, and as will also be
of the land now labelled as all other American countries. discussed in more detail in the next sections of this chapter.
This pattern was about to change in the following cen- The 120-year period between 1851 and 1971 is charted
turies. In particular, the encounter of the New World in in Figure 4.2 and is known as the era of global popu-
1492 was accompanied by the exposure of its inhabitants lation acceleration. After 1851 the population was not
to germs and illnesses to which they did not have immu- just growing, the growth itself was growing! In particu-
nity. This had a devastating effect upon the indigenous lar, the rate of global population growth experienced
population that died far faster from those diseases than a rapidly increasing trend itself throughout this period
from the colonial wars and atrocities committed by the with the notable exceptions of periods associated with
Old World powers (Diamond 1997; Mann 2011; Dorling the two World Wars and a small number of other sig-
2013). Back across the Atlantic, the shock was so great nificant events. The world’s average population annual
that the economy of the Old World was transformed; growth rate rose from 0.1 per cent to over 0.5 per cent
riches plundered from the New World turned the social between 1851 and 1900 and went up to over 1 per cent
order of continents on their head. Suddenly, the underde- in the beginning of the twentieth century, with the
veloped far west of Asia (called Europe) became the cen- brief drop to 0.3 per cent during the First World War
tre of the world; and China was peripheral. Trade flows and the influenza pandemic that followed (1918–1919).
altered, colonization began, the taking of slaves acceler- It then went up to 1.3 per cent during the 1920s, before
ated in Africa and for most people in the world within a falling again to 0.8 in the era of the Great Depres-
few centuries everything that was solid had melted into sion from 1929 to 1936. It then briefly rose to just over
air. From continent to continent human populations 1 per cent again in the late 1930s, before falling dramati-
began to multiply rapidly as the established social orders cally during the Second World War. After that first truly
were overturned. The first, fastest and most destabilizing global war there was a further and rapid acceleration to
population explosion was within Europe itself. Africa was 1.8 per cent by the mid-1950s, briefly interrupted in the
depopulated through both slavery and 400 years of forced three years of the Great Chinese Famine (between 1958–
migration, mostly to the New World. India was colonized 1961, when up to 45 million premature deaths occurred)
(twice), Chinese empires were destroyed, partly through and peaking at 2.1 per cent in 1971. The period of global
the British Empire-orchestrated opiate trade. A nascent population acceleration ended in that year and annual
North American empire was conceived. Between 1500 and growth fell to 1.6 per cent in 1982, jumped to 1.9 per cent
1900 the global population tripled to 1.5 billion and the in 1983 and has been falling continuously since then. It
geographical distribution changed significantly, as shown should be noted that all these increases are compound
in the fourth map. During this period, which was char- (the annual increase are in addition to previous growth)
acterized by imperial rule and territorial expansion, the and therefore a growth of 2 per cent means that the world
populations of Britain and North America increased more population doubles every 35 years – if that rate continues.
than ten-fold. Also, by comparing the second and third The review and analysis of past trends in population
maps we can observe the devastating impact of slavery growth can be used by demographers in order to try to
upon Africa. The fourth map in the series reproduced here project what the future population growth rates might
shows the geography of the global population in 1960, be. In countries without population registers, such as
when it reached 3 billion. South America has increased its the UK and USA, the population census, which records
proportion of the world’s population living in that conti- demographic and socio-economic information at a sin-
nent rapidly since 1900. In contrast, the Western European gle point in time and is normally carried out every ten
proportion of the world population began to decline in years (Rees et al. 2002), is an essential instrument that
relative terms in 1900 when it was 15 per cent, to 11 per is used in order to obtain reliable estimates of popula-
cent in 1960 and then 6 per cent in 2000. The fifth car- tion numbers. Censuses were taken in ancient times by
togram shown in Figure 4.1 portrays the geographical dis- kings, pharaohs and emperors to estimate the size of the
tribution of the estimated 6.1 billion global population in population they had to keep suppressed and the num-
2000, one year after it reached 6 billion, whereas the sixth ber of soldiers they could raise, as well as to estimate
and last cartogram shows how the 7.32 billion people in their tax base. However, the first modern-day repeated
2015 are geographically distributed in our own time. census taking took place in Prussia in 1719 and in the
As noted above, after a long period of stability there USA in 1790, whereas the first census in Britain was not
was a great demographic change. A key milestone was held until 1801. Census datasets describe the state of the

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 82 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    83

2.5%
End of global
population
acceleration

2.0%

1.5%

Annual change
The Great
Chinese
1.0% Famine

Crash
and
long Second World War
0.5% Depression and return

First World War

and pandemic
Start of global acceleration
0.0%
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Figure 4.2  World annual
population growth, 1821–2001.

whole national population and are extremely relevant for rates to have major consequences for population totals
the analysis of a wide range of socio-economic issues over a long period. However, it is population ageing that
and related policies. In addition to the census there is will be responsible for most population growth in coming
an increasingly wide range of administrative and private decades, but high fertility would alter this. Thus, as­
sector sources of suitable socio-economic data that can ­Figure 4.3 shows, the UN produces a range of predictions
be used for demographic research. based on different fertility rates for 2050, with those
The data collected from censuses of populations can made in 2012 ranging from 8.3 billion to 10.8 billion.
be used in order to provide estimates of population in the It is instructive to break down the UN estimates
past as well as projections into the future. In particular, and predictions by country and world regions. One
once a census is taken, it is possible to calculate birth and of the classifications used by the UN to classify world
death rates and once these rates are calculated it becomes regions and countries is that of ‘more developed coun-
possible to project population numbers both backwards tries’ or ‘less developed countries’ which (as discussed in
and forwards in time, including estimates of future and ­Chapter 8) is problematic; nonetheless these terms are
past migration flows. used in this chapter (as well as other socio-economic
On the basis of the past demographic trends reviewed and political classifications), as they are routinely and
above it is expected that in coming decades the global widely employed by organizations such as the UN and
population growth rates will continue to decline, as they the World Bank. Figure 4.4 shows the official UN esti-
have for the last four decades. In particular, the United mated past and projected future growth rates in so-called
Nations predicts a fall in growth rates to below 1 per ‘more developed’ and ‘less developed’ countries. As can
cent by around 2020, declining further thereafter to be seen, population size in the ‘more developed coun-
0.3 per cent by 2050 (which will be the lowest growth tries’ has remained relatively stable since the late 1950s,
level recorded since the mid-eighteenth century). How- at around 1 billion. In contrast, the total population of
ever, even these more modest growth rates will see the the ‘less developed countries’ has increased rapidly
world’s population grow by over 35 million a year until from approximately 1 billion to 5 billion since 1950.
2050. Even such slowed growth results in an overall popu- This difference in growth rates is depicted starkly in
lation of 9.5 billion, 2.5 billion more than present. Given Figure  4.4, which shows that the rates of population
the compound nature of population growth, as we shall growth in less developed regions, although declining
see below, it takes only small changes in fertility/death rapidly, will continue to be far above those in more

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 83 01/04/16 8:44 am

 84    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

30

Medium Low
25
High Constant-fertility

20
Population (billions)

15

10

0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
Year

Figure 4.3  How changes in fertility rates might impact on future population growth.
Source: United Nations (2013: xv)

10
9
8
7
6
Billions

5
Less developed regions
4
3
2
1
More developed regions
0
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090

Figure 4.4  Population growth by more and less developed countries (in billions).
Source: based on data from World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision (United Nations 2014a)

developed regions for the foreseeable future. The most above those in ‘more developed regions’ for the foresee-
striking aspect of the geography of population change able future.
is how population size in the ‘more developed countries’ Even within the category of ‘less developed’ there are
has remained relatively stable since the late 1950s, at still further variations, the reasons for which will become
around 1 billion. In contrast, the total population of more apparent below. The 48 least developed countries,
the ‘less developed countries’ has increased rapidly from according to UN data, experienced the greatest increases
approximately 1 billion to 6 billion since 1950. Also, in population growth. This group only held 8 per cent of
as can be seen in Figure  4.4, the rates of population the world’s population in 1950 but in the subsequent half-
growth in ‘less developed regions’ are projected to be far century, as a result of their rapid population growth, they

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 84 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    85

contributed around 15 per cent of the overall global growth.

Such differences in population growth rates have altered the 4.3  eographies of changing birth and
G
relative distribution of the world’s population. For exam- death rates and the demographic
ple, the ‘more developed’ countries in 1950 combined to transition model
provide approximately a third of the world’s population.
By 2010 this had fallen to around 18 per cent (this global
To explain changes in population growth rates demog-
shift is discussed in Chapter 5 in relation to global energy
raphers often use the demographic transition model.
demand and carbon emissions). As Table 4.2 shows, this
According to this model there are five stages through
has meant that significant changes have occurred in over-
which most countries have passed in their demographic
all population share by region. Consequently, as Table 4.2
history. Figure 4.5 summarizes the model and shows the
demonstrates, Europe’s share of the world’s population fell
stages (see Lee 2003 for an overview of its development).
from approximately a quarter to around an eighth between
During stage one, health care is rudimentary and many
1900 and 2000, with Africa contrasting most as the big-
people die from what are now easily treatable diseases,
gest continental gainer in percentage terms. What is most
leading to very high crude death rates (CDR – deaths per
significant here is how this has happened, with most of the
1000 people). Birth rates (CBR – births per 1000 people)
changes taking place since 1950.
were also high as large families were the norm, possibly as
By 2050 Europe’s share of the world’s population is
insurance against uncertainty and to ensure that parents
likely to have fallen to 7 per cent, while Africa’s share is
will have support when they can no longer work. With
expected to be nearly three times that. Over the period
birth and death rates relatively equal, overall population
2003–2050 Africa’s population is projected to grow by
size does not increase dramatically during this stage.
just under 1 billion people, representing over one-third of
Countries move to stage two, as their political, economic
all global growth in humanity (36.4 per cent) compared to
and social organization evolves and leads to the develop-
only one-sixth (16.6 per cent) for 1950–2003. Meanwhile,
ment of health care and sanitation systems, so that fewer
Asia seems destined to remain the main contributor in
people die from easily preventable diseases. However, there
absolute terms, adding a further 1.4 billion up to 2050,
is usually a period during which birth rates remain high.
but this is a marked reduction in the pace of growth com-
This might be due to a delayed adjustment to the new
pared to its 2.4 billion gain between 1950 and 2003.

Table 4.2 Changes in overall population share (%) by region

2050

Major area 1950 1975 2010 Low Medium High Constant

More developed regions 32.2 25.7 17.9 13.8 13.6 13.5 11.4
Less developed regions 67.8 74.3 82.1 86.2 86.4 86.5 88.6
Least developed countries 7.7 8.5 12.1 19.1 19.0 18.8 23.0
Less developed regions, 60.1 65.7 69.9 67.1 67.4 67.7 65.6
excluding least developed
countries
Less developed regions, 45.9 51.3 62.0 71.4 71.5 71.6 76.3
excluding China
Africa 9.1 10.3 14.9 25.4 25.1 24.7 29.0
Asia 55.3 58.6 60.2 53.7 54.1 54.4 52.3
Europe 21.7 16.6 10.7 7.5 7.4 7.4 6.1
Latin America and the 6.6 8.0 8.6 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.0
Caribbean
Northern America 6.8 6.0 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.1
Oceania 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects:
The 2012 Revision, United Nations, New York (United Nations 2014a).

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 85 01/04/16 8:44 am

 86    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

50
Stage one Stage two Stage three
45 (pre-modern) (urbanizing/ (mature industrial)
industrializing)
40 Stage four
CBR, CDR rate per 1000 (post
35 industial)

30

Population
25

20

15
CBR
10
CDR
5 Total population
0

Year

Figure 4.5  The demographic transition model.

Source: http://pages.uwc.edu/keith.montgomery/Demotrans/demtran.htm

Less developed countries More developed countries

50

40
Natural
increase Natural increase
Rate per 1000 people

30

20

10

0
1775

1800

1825

1850

1875

1900

1925

1950

1975

2000

1775

1800

1825

1850

1875

1900

1925

1950

1975

2000

Birth rate Death rate

Figure 4.6  How changes to birth and death rates can lead to changes in natural population growth.
Source: Population Reference Bureau (2007)

situation, or because economic growth sees an increasing From these figures we can see that, in less developed
demand for family labour. This gap between death and countries, from the middle of the previous century death
birth rates results in an increasing population. As death rates fell dramatically as health care began to improve. How-
rates can fall rapidly this can often cause a rapid rise in pop- ever, birth rates, although declining, did not converge with
ulation growth. Figure 4.6 demonstrates how this occurs. death rates, resulting in a rapid increase in the rate of natural

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 86 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    87

population growth. More developed countries have entered your life and to be in a same sex relationship, which
the third stage of the demographic transition model where tends to result in fewer births.
birth and death rates converge. Birth rates have fallen rapidly ● A rapid increase in the average age of first birth. If the
for a combination of reasons, including the following: first birth is delayed then a large family is less likely.
● The setting up of systems of social security and pension A combination of these factors has resulted in a dramatic
systems meaning that many parents no longer have to fall in global fertility rates. In the 1960s fertility rates aver-
rely on their children for support during old age. aged around 5 children per woman, but have now fallen to
● Increased social and economic choices for women, below half that figure. The fertility rate today worldwide
gained by women; these include improving opportuni- ranges from 1.2 children per woman in the Republic of
ties in the workplace, much greater levels of participa- Korea to 7.6 in Niger (World Bank 2015a), and the world
tion in higher education than in previous generations average fertility rate is now estimated to be 2.5.
and the availability of reliable contraception. In Asia and South America the average fertility rate
● Cultural attitudes towards large families have changed is still rapidly falling and in almost all cases is below
so that rather than being the norm, having many chil- 2.5 children per couple if not below 2.1. In sub-Saharan
dren is seen as unusual and an increasing number of Africa the majority of countries currently have fertility
women are deciding not to have children at all. rates of above 3 or in a few cases 4, and many are begin-
● Increasing levels of divorce and single parent families ning to see fertility decline more quickly than before.
means that large families are less likely. It is also far ­Figure 4.7 shows how the average fertility rates were fall-
more accepted today to be single for much or all of ing up to 2010 and are predicted to continue to fall. They

8
2013

World
Africa
7 Asia
Europe
South America
North America
6 Oceania
Children per woman

1
1950–1955
1955–1960
1960–1965
1965–1970
1970–1975
1975–1980
1980–1985
1985–1990
1990–1995
1995–2000
2000–2005
2005–2010
2010–2015
2015–2020
2020–2025
2025–2030
2030–2035
2035–2040
2040–2045
2045–2050
2050–2055
2055–2060
2060–2065
2065–2070
2070–2075
2075–2080
2080–2085
2085–2090
2090–2095
2095–2100

Figure 4.7  Total fertility 1950–2100.

Source: UN historic estimates and projections, 1 June 2011 (Dorling 2013)

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 87 01/04/16 8:44 am

 88    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

are now well below the population replacement rate of from 0.16 per cent to 0.08 per cent and are now negative
2.1 (the minimum needed for a population not to decline (as we write in 2015); in Italy, growth of 0.2 per cent in
over the long term) in Europe and North America; and 2000 has declined so fast that it became a fall of 0.03 per
they are projected to reach that level in most regions in cent even as early as 2009, in Germany a 0.14 per cent rise
the world before 2100. The highest fertility predicted by turned into a fall of 0.5 per cent and in Japan a 0.19 per
the UNPD for 2100 is 2.13 children per couple in Africa cent rise became, in just 10 years, a fall of 0.16 per cent, all
(as a whole). The lowest is 1.93 (which is almost certainly this in the years 2000 to 2009. All this before the greatest
too high an estimate). Many demographers suspect that economic slump since 1929 set in with its rapid effects on
the lowest rates will be much lower than 1.93 simply curtailing fertility even more quickly. United Nations data
because they are lower already. in 2015 still refers to estimates revised in 2012. As yet we
do not have a full picture of how global economic reces-
sion has impacted on fertility and mortality. By the time
you read this we should know. So if you want to know
4.4  lobal population growth
G what has happened, look for updates at: http://esa.un.org/
and punctuated equilibrium unpd/wpp/index.htm.
In revised biological theories of evolution, the concept
The demographic transition model can help with the anal- of the punctuated equilibrium is used to describe whole
ysis and understanding of past trends and demographic sets of species suddenly dying out and new ones emerg-
processes. However, one of its key limitations is that it ing. This is usually following a period of general stability
does not take into account the inter-dependencies of cities, before another period of quiescence (which means stabil-
regions and countries, which need to be considered when ity, quiet and stillness) establishes. In general there is equi-
analyzing past and future world population growth. In librium. All that changes during the quiescence are the
this section we draw on recent relevant work presenting an mechanisms that tend to operate to preserve the status
alternative approach to the analysis of global population quo, to bring events back into line. However, occasionally
growth, adapting punctuated equilibrium ideas from biol- and very rarely, that equilibrium is punctured and there
ogy. Discussing further and revisiting the graph shown in is great and rapid change. That is what has happened
Figure 4.2 can illustrate this alternative and more sophis- to human beings: there has been a rapid change in our
ticated model. Figure 4.8 shows an extended version of numbers since 1492, a change so great that it has only
that graph, adding the total population numbers as well as been seen once before – a very long time ago.
projections to 2100. The period from 1851 to 1971 can be Many millennia ago the ecology of interacting groups
described as an era of global population acceleration (bar- of humans evolved after the Neolithic revolution, itself
ring the four epochal events annotated in both figures). a great puncturing, to become what, in 1990s terminol-
The year 1851 can be described as a global minimum for ogy, was called a self-organized critical steady state; in
recent population growth. Looking at our recent past, in this case a state of gently rising population numbers
Figure 4.8, in relation to what our near future is projected interspersed with the occasional plague or famine. How-
to be, we can clearly see that we have been living through ever, when one particular group of humans adapts, and
a major demographic transformation. However, global jumps across some barrier, such as the Atlantic Ocean,
population change started to decelerate in 1971 and has that group mutates to a different kind of human society,
continued unabated since then. Currently the population and this eventually affects all other human groups on the
growth (thin) line in Figure 4.8 is still dropping almost as planet. All their equilibria are punctured.
quickly as it did in the 30 years up to 2000, although you At first the effects of humans regularly crossing the
can see a slight ‘hump’ of baby boom just around 2010 if Atlantic were hardly noticeable, if you just considered
you look carefully. Annual global population growth was average global statistics. The World’s population had
1.27 per cent in the year to 2000; it fell to 1.03 per cent fallen slightly in the years immediately after 1492 as
by the year to 2009. That is a continuous rapid decline in deaths in the Americas spread with the introduction of
growth rates. It is made up of many slightly greater decel- Old World germs and diseases. However, globally, annual
erations and a few slower ones (including the 2010 mini population growth rates rose to a quarter of a percent-
baby boom). The Netherlands saw growth rates fall from age a year from 1500 to 1600, next falling to just 0.08
0.67 per cent to 0.42 per cent over the same period, the per cent on average from 1600 to 1700, but then rising to
United Kingdom 0.39 per cent to 0.28 per cent (although just under half a percentage growth a year, on average,
growth there has been rising in very recent years but only between 1700 and 1850, after which the puncturing of the
due to a mini baby boom among the children of recently equilibrium finally resulted in all human groups in every
arriving migrants), in Spain population growth rates fell continent growing quickly.

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 88 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    89

2.5% 10

1 First World War and Pandemic 9

4 7
2 Crash and Long Depression
3 Second World War and Return
2.0% 8
4 The Great Chinese Famine
5 Projected population change
of slow decelaration
6 Start of global population acceleration 7
7 End of global population acceleration
1.5%

Population in billions
6
Annual change

3 5
2
1
1.0% 4

3
5

0.5% 2

6
0.0% 0
1820

1840

1860

1880

1900

1920

1940

1960

1980

2000

2020

2040

2060

2080

2100

Figure 4.8  World annual population growth and level, 1821–2100.

Different groups are influenced most strikingly by led to so many of those in power realizing that they
events outside of their control at different times. For could not continue to treat others beneath them almost
example, the populations of the Americas were deci- as slaves.
mated many times over; from shortly after that first mod- The nineteenth-century population acceleration could
ern Atlantic crossing was made. also partly be related to the understanding and control
It is hard to tell what occurred around 1851 to cause of diseases stemming from overcrowding, poverty and
that date to be the global minimum for recent popula- unsanitary living, as well as the introduction of condoms
tion growth. It may well have been a combination of fac- (which became widely popular in North America in the
tors. Some may have been technological, including the 1840s before they were widely used in the UK). It is not
slow and benign spread of electricity that aided people impossible that just as it took a great deal of birth con-
to read and learn after dark. Some were political, such trol to later put on the brakes, just a little birth control
as the immediate and dramatic effects of the 1848 year had earlier enabled the conditions for some (then) more
of revolution spreading across Europe, and how that sustainable growth to become established.

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 89 01/04/16 8:44 am

 90    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

The discussion above of possible reasons for the limit their numbers once the great change began in 1851
acceleration that began in 1851 and had its source and there could have been demographic developments
as early as 1492 provides just one of many possible similar to the predictions and consistent with the views
explanatory frameworks for demographic transforma- (which were proven completely wrong and unjustified,
tions. Similarly, we can consider possible reasons that especially about future population growth) of Reverend
might have caused the slowdown in 1971 that now looks Thomas Malthus who, in his Essay on the Principle of
as if this was not just another of those events brought Population (published in 1798), forecast a never-ending
on by a catastrophe (as annotated in Figure 4.8), but cycle of population growth, war and famine.
what we now see clearly as a turning point. Reasons But other factors mattered: vaccination, student upris-
for our current slowdown can include the gradual and ing, limits to growth theory, and – perhaps of far more
benign spread and multiplication of vaccines that has importance than all of these – women’s emancipation.
greatly reduced infant mortality, to the immediate and What all these have in common is education. And educa-
dramatic effects of the 1968 uprising across the rich tion was not just widespread by the 1970s; it was about
world and that led to so many in power coming to see to boom. In particular, it can be argued that the punctu-
that there were limits to endless growth (it is notable ated equilibrium settling back down again to ordinary
that the Club of Rome was formed that year). In addi- equilibrium is occurring through our collective learning.
tion, other potential very important reasons include the By 1995, a majority of working-age people in the world,
work that was done that resulted in understanding and those aged 15–64, had been educated to secondary level.
spreading education, especially to women, the spreading Less than a third had been so educated in 1970. It was
by word of mouth of the invention and availability of only in 2007 that it became clear just how quickly edu-
the contraceptive pill, widespread use of which began cational improvements were spreading, and that these
in North America in the 1960s, through to seeing, for figures could be confirmed as changing so quickly (Lutz
the first time, the earth from the moon in 1969. There et al. 2007 – see Figure  4.9). This global educational
are numerous possibilities for what it was that caused improvement is remarkable and to date shows no signs
the tide to turn shortly after 1968. It is highly likely that of slowing down, despite, or perhaps because of, the
without effective and widespread new forms of con- beginnings of the deceleration in population numbers.
traception, human beings would not have managed to As people all around the world have far fewer children,

45%

Women none
40%
Men none
35% Women university
Men university
30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

Figure 4.9  Men and women at university and with no qualifications, worldwide, 1970–1995.
Source: Lutz, W., Goujon, A., Samir, K.C. and Sanderson, W. (2007) Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 2007

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 90 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    91

more and more work harder to ensure that their offspring example is provided by South Korea. In the 1960s, based
are better educated than they were. on historical growth data, the economic outlook would
A recent projection (Samir et al. 2010) of educational have been modest, but projections of its future educa-
changes has suggested that future trends for India and tional attainment profile may have indicated that it was
China will result in the numbers in any form of education about to enter a window of opportunity combining high
in India not peaking until 2050, but the absolute numbers qualifications with low dependency ratios’(Samir et al.
in various categories of learning falling in China from 2010). When the rapid current uptake in educational
2020 onwards. This will occur as the numbers of young opportunities is taken into account, then an even more
people most likely to attend educational institutions rapid future population slowdown would appear yet
continues to fall there even as the proportion attending more likely in both India and China. Women in particular
higher education rises. The report accompanying the pro- tend to have fewer children when educated to secondary
jection ends with the following salutary note: ‘A historical level, and fewer still if university educated. Figure 4.10

China
1200

1000
Population in millions

800
Tertiary
600

400 Secondary

200 Primary

No education
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Years

India
1200

1000
Tertiary
Population in millions

800

600 Secondary

400

200 Primary

No education
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Years

Figure 4.10  Population by education level, 1970–2050.

Source: Samir, K C, Barakat, B, Goujon A. et al. (2010: 432) Projection of populations by level of educational attainment, age and sex for 120
countries for 2005–2050, Demographic Research, 22, 383–472, www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol22/15/

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 91 01/04/16 8:44 am

 92    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

shows the highest level of education achieved or projected the number of borders tends to remain fixed. Accord-
to be achieved by adults in India and China. Children are ing to recent data from the World Bank and the United
not included in these figures. Even in countries as affluent Nations, approximately 3 per cent of the global popula-
as the United States, educational changes are still linked tion (213 million people) in 2010 lived in a country dif-
to fertility changes. ferent from their country of birth. This compares to 2.4
per cent (72 million) of the total global population having
permanently crossed a border in 1960. Table 4.3 shows
the trends from 1960 to 2010 for the world as well as
4.5 Migration and population change selected major regions and political and socio-economic
groupings, whereas Figure 4.11 shows the changes over
A world in which fertility’s contribution to population this period of 50 years for world regions by income level
growth is declining will see future population change (as classified by the World Bank).
within any region and country being attributed far more As can be seen in Figure 4.11, the number of immi-
often to migration. In addition, there is an increasing grant residents as a percentage of total population tends
movement of people between regions and countries so to be higher in more affluent countries with nearly 12 per
these patterns are changing. As the world urbanizes, more cent of the population in the high income countries (as
will move more often and further. Far more often than classified by the World Bank) born abroad (in 1960 it was
before those moves will be over international borders, 3.9 per cent). This can be attributed to ‘pull factors’ in
simply because it has become easier to move slightly such countries such as better job opportunities or higher
longer distances (and to video-call back home), while pay rates, but it should also be noted that immigrants

Table 4.3 Number of people born in a country other than that in which they live as a percentage of total population

International migrants (% of total population) 1960 1980 1990 2000 2010

World 2.4 2.1 2.9 2.9 3.1

By supra-national membership grouping
Arab World 3.6 5.9 7.0 6.4 7.4
Euro area 2.3 3.5 6.4 8.4 10.9
European Union 2.8 3.6 5.7 7.3 9.4
By Human Development Index, income ­category
and other status
Fragile and conflict affected situations 3.9 4.3 3.5 2.7 2.6
Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) 3.9 3.6 3.5 2.6 2.1
Latin America & Caribbean (developing only) 2.7 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.1
Latin America & Caribbean (all income levels) 2.8 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.2
Least developed countries: UN classification 2.8 2.3 2.2 1.6 1.4
OECD members 3.9 4.6 6.0 7.6 9.0
High income 3.7 4.9 7.7 9.4 11.2
High income: non OECD 1.9 3.9 11.6 12.5 14.2
High income: OECD 4.1 5.1 6.8 8.7 10.5
Upper middle income 1.0 0.7 1.2 1.1 1.1
Lower middle income 2.7 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.3
Low & middle income 1.8 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.2
Low income 2.6 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.4
Source: authors’ calculations using data from the United Nations Population Division (2015) and The World Bank (2015b)

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 92 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    93

12

10

% total world population

World
Figure 4.11  Trends (global 8
High income
and by income region) Upper middle income
between 1960–2010 of 6
Lower middle income
number of people born
Low & middle income
in a country other than 4
Low income
that in which they live
as a percentage of total 2
population.
Source: authors’ calculations using
0
data from the United Nations Popu-
lation Division and The World Bank
1960 1980 1990 2000 2010
(2015b)

themselves contribute to the economic growth and pros-

perity of the destination countries. And destination
countries often actually desperately need immigrants
to replace the babies that have not been born as fertility
declined rapidly two or three decades earlier. However,
this is often an unfair trade. In particular, immigrants
bring in skills but have been educated at the expense of
the taxpayer in their home country. This is the case even
with those who may be unskilled or have no formal educa-
tion qualifications, as when they are employed they paid
contributions to social insurance and pension schemes
and in many cases they are doing jobs that existing resi-
dents do not want to do. Migrants also bring benefits in
Plate 4.1  A Greek Coastguard ship having picked
non-monetary ways that are more difficult to quantify,
up refugees who have crossed from Turkey to Europe
as they expose their new country to different cultures. near Mytilene, Lesvos on 11 June 2015. Lesvos is
Overall, there needs to be a change of thinking now a hotspot for refugees.
towards understanding that just as gaining migrants (Malcolm Chapman/Shutterstock)
is usually positive, for the migrant leaving a country is
often a positive move too. In particular, the conditions in
destination counties are generally good and this applies well as economic migrants, as is the case with the recent
to both poorer countries and within the richer world. events in the Mediterranean sea, which is often seen as
The large majority of migration in the world occurs a failure of immigration control rather than an oppor-
where the large majority of people are, in the poorer tunity to celebrate humanity, offering a better future to
areas of the world. Often called south–south migration, those in need and at the same time benefiting European
this is when people leave one country within a continent countries with their rapidly ageing populations (see also
such as Africa to move to another, usually neighbouring, Case study 4.3 and Section 4.8).
country. Such moves are can be viewed as problematic: It should also be noted that it is more sustainable to
‘The assessment of development progress is based on build up population where there is already infrastructure,
measurements within national boundaries. The emigra- an abundant water supply, flat land and a demand for
tion of people is still seen as a symptom of develop- new labour, as compared to where many of these things
ment failure’ (Bakewell 2011). Similarly, emigration to are lacking. For existing cities that see their populations
the rich world is often seen as a failure of immigration expanding often the only way is up, and more apartments
control, rather than a success story of mass human are the future. For example, it would make little sense for
endeavour. This also applies to situations where people Europe and Japan to depopulate. If migration to them from
are forced to leave their homes and become refugees as poorer areas were to increase, their population growth

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 93 01/04/16 8:44 am

 94    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

would help slow down total world population growth impact can be extremely positive, especially when societies
even faster than it is already slowing, possibly resulting in are properly prepared to welcome them. For more discus-
a global population which never exceeds 9 billion (because sion, arguments and examples of why and how migration
fertility falls faster than predicted). It should also be noted is beneficial to host countries see Rowe (2014).
that when people move countries they, or their children,
tend to quickly adopt the fertility rates of the places they
are moving to. However, these facts tend to be overlooked
in debates about migration in developed countries and
4.6  eographies of mortality
G
especially by the tabloid press that publish misleading and and life expectancy
alarming stories about ‘immigrants taking our houses, our
school places and our hospital beds’ (Rowe 2014) and by One of the key messages of the discussion above is
far-right political parties (especially in Europe) which – just that there has been a significant improvement of life
as their fascist forebears did – use immigrants and people expectancy across the world over the past 200 years and
seen as different (such as the Jews) as a scapegoat, blam- that unless there is a terrible disaster, a new plague or
ing them for the rise of unemployment and representing widespread famine, examples of where whole countries
them as a threat, when in fact, as argued above, the overall experience life expectancy below 50 years should soon

80

High income
Middle income
Low income
70
Upper middle income
Fragile and conflict affected
situations
Sub-Saharan Africa
(developing only)
60
Least developed countries:
UN classification
Heavily indebted poor
countries (HIPC)

50 Latin America & Caribbean

(developing only)
Sierra Leone
Japan
World
40

30
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Figure 4.12  Life expectancy trends, 1960–2013.

Source: graph drawn based on data from The World Bank (2015c)

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 94 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    95

be relegated to the historical record, along with exam- already relatively high, such as Western Europe and
ples of countries where the average couple has four or North America. For instance, life expectancy in North
five children. America went up from 69.9 to 79.1 years and in coun-
According to the most recent data from the World tries that now make up the European Union it went up
Bank, the global population life expectancy at birth in from 69.3 to 80.4 years. Worldwide the increase was 18.5
2013 was 71 years. Figure  4.12 shows the trends from years between 1960 and 2013. However, life expectancy
1960–2013 for world regions (using geographic, ­economic remains stubbornly low in the ‘least developed’ countries
and political criteria) as well as for Japan and Sierra and especially in sub-Saharan African countries, where
Leone, which are the countries with the highest and low- HIV/AIDS has been a major cause of death. In particu-
est life expectancy in 2013 respectively. lar, in several of these countries there was no change in
There has been a significant increase in life expec- life expectancy or a decline (also see discussion in the
tancy in most regions, although the rates of increase vary next section). Other causes of significant declines in life
considerably between the different categories of coun- expectancy include major environmental disasters such
tries as well as over different time periods. In particular, as the recent earthquake in Nepal but also armed con-
there was significant progress in the 1960s and 1970s in flict, such as the 1990s genocide in Rwanda, or the more
all countries. The rates of increase were higher in coun- recent wars in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan.
tries and regions where they were already extremely low. There is also a high but rapidly falling infant mor-
For example, as seen in Figure 4.12, life expectancy in tality rate in the least developed regions: whereas the
sub-Saharan African countries went up from 40.2 years IMR for the period 2005–10 was just over 4 per 1,000
in 1960 to 56.9 in 2013. In addition, according to data live births in North America, most of Europe and Aus-
from the World Bank (2015c), life expectancy in the tralia/New Zealand, it averages 22 in Latin America, 56
world region of Middle East and North Africa went up in south-central Asia and 80 in sub-Saharan Africa (also
from 46.6 in 1960 to 72.4 in 2013. In the same period the see ­Figure 4.13). It was one of the United Nation’s Mil-
increase for countries in East Asia and the Pacific went lennium D ­ evelopment Goals to reduce by two-thirds the
up from 48 to 74.9 years. There were smaller increases mortality rate among children under five (www.undp.org)
in higher income countries where life expectancy was (see Case study 4.1).

Figure 4.13  Infant mortality. Territory size shows the proportion of infant deaths worldwide that occurred there
in 2002. Infant deaths are deaths of babies during their first year of life.
Source: www.worldmapper.org

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 95 01/04/16 8:44 am

 96    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Case study 4.1

United Nation’s Millennium by almost half since 1990 (but not yet to two-thirds
Development Goal number 4: reduce of that rate). In addition, the rate at which under-five
by two-thirds the mortality rate among mortality is declining has more than tripled during the
same period, with Eastern and Southern Africa having
children under 5
the highest annual rate of reduction in the world once
The Millennium Development Goals are eight develop- East Asia and the Pacific are excluded from the com-
ment objectives that were set to be achieved by the parisons. It is also noted that under-five mortality is fall-
end of 2015 (see discussion in Chapter 8). They were ing among the poorest children. However, the progress
adopted by 189 nations at the UN Millennium Sum- has been insufficient to meet goal number 4 by the end
mit in September 2000 (see www.undp.org/mdg for a of 2015 and if current trends continue the target will
full overview of the goals). Goal number 4 aimed to only be reached by 2026, 11 years behind schedule.
reduce by two-thirds the mortality rate among children Further, without rapid increases in funding to prevent
under 5. easily preventable child deaths, the UN estimates that
Progress was to be measured by the following indica- in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa the goals will not
tors: under-5 mortality rate; infant mortality rate; and the be reached until 2115. Despite the progress the toll of
proportion of one-year-old children immunized against under-five deaths over the past two decades is stagger-
measles. UN data shows, however, that in the first four ing, as 223 million children worldwide died before their
years of the scheme little progress had been made in fifth birthday during that period. Most of these deaths
sub-Saharan Africa. Few countries there saw infant continue to occur in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
mortality decrease significantly and some had even As pointed out in by UNICEF (2014):
seen rates increase. Some countries had experienced a Sub-Saharan Africa continues to shoulder the greatest
rise in immunization rates but this is not universal to the burden: 1 in 11 children born there still die before
region (for an excellent database on Millennium Devel- age 5, nearly 15 times the average in high-income
opment Goal data go to http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg). countries (1 in 159). The recent momentum achieved
Elsewhere though there had been great progress, but in sub-Saharan Africa needs to be sustained and
accelerated.
these achievements was averaged down by the deaths
of so many very small children in the very worse-off With regards to the causes of under-five deaths, it is
places. noted that:
Overall, according to the latest Millennium Develop-
although under-five deaths from leading infectious
ment Goals Reports by the UN (2014a) and another
diseases have declined significantly, pneumonia, diar-
report by UNICEF (2014), although there has been rhoea and malaria are still the main killers of under-
considerable progress, the world was still falling short of fives. In 2013, pneumonia, diarrhoea and malaria
the MDG child mortality target by 2014. In particular, it is caused about one third of all under-five deaths. Impor-
noted that there has been major progress in improving tantly, neonatal deaths account for 44 per cent of all
child survival with the under-five mortality rate declining under-five deaths.

(1939–1945); and the Great Chinese Famine (1958–61).

4.7 The demographic impact and These events significantly affected global life expectancy
geography of disease, natural and trends in fertility, mortality and migration. Although,
disasters and wars there have been no similar events since the Great Chi-
nese Famine that so massively affected global population
growth, there have been a number of terrible disasters
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter (see
and wars that had a massive impact on the life chances
­Figure  4.5) the era of global population acceleration
and demographic processes of particular world regions
between 1851–1971 was interrupted by four major events:
and countries. For example, as discussed in the previous
the First World War through to the end of the influenza
section, most of the countries in the world that expe-
pandemic (1914–19); the economic crash of 1929 through
rienced a decline in life expectancy over the past few
to the end of depression in 1936; the Second World War
decades were in sub-Saharan Africa, where HIV/AIDS

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 96 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    97

3
2.5
2
1.5 Botswana
Zambia
1
Zimbabwe
0.5
South Africa
0 Uganda
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
–0.5 Swaziland
–1
–1.5
–2
–2.5

Figure 4.14  Annual change in life expectancy in five sub-Saharan countries.

Source: authors’ calculations using data from The World Bank (2015c)

has been a major cause of death, despite the fact that population). The figures will not be that dissimilar today,
the AIDS pandemic has been subsiding in recent years. if you are reading the book shortly after its publication.
According to the World Health Organization there were Figure 4.14 shows the trends in life expectancy in a
an estimated 1.5 million deaths from AIDS in the year number of selected countries that have experienced
2013 alone. This cause of death is now declining in very high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates and numbers of
importance. These were 22 per cent fewer deaths in 2013 deaths. During the 1970s and 1980s there were significant
than in 2009 and 35 per cent fewer than the peak year of improvements of health care and life expectancy across
2005 (World Health Organization 2011). However, over the world (including the least developed regions) due to
two-thirds (1.1 million) of these deaths were in Africa the successful introduction of sustained programmes
(World Health Organization 2014). Soon more people curbing easily preventable diseases. For example, life
will die each year in road crashes than from HIV/AIDS. expectancy in Botswana rose to approximately 65 by the
That, of course, is not much cause for celebration. But mid-1980s and it was predicted that it would have reached
perhaps then we will begin to treat so many avoidable 69 by 2011, but for HIV/AIDS. Instead, in 2011 male life
deaths from car crashes worldwide as seriously as we expectancy was 55. In Swaziland life expectancy is now
view pandemics? 46; without HIV/AIDS it is estimated that it would be
According to UNICEF (2013) and UNAIDS (2010) 64. As Figure 4.14 shows, there have been dramatic falls
there were then nine countries with HIV prevalence in life expectancy throughout the period when the HIV/
rates of over 10 per cent and the worst affected country AIDS epidemic affected each of these countries. However,
at that time was Swaziland, which had the highest rate there has been a gradual improvement in the more recent
in the world (26 per cent), followed by Botswana (23.4 years for some countries that can be attributed to the use
per cent), whereas in terms of absolute numbers South of antiretrovirals and increased education levels about the
Africa was home to the world’s largest epidemic with 5.6 transmission of HIV and the increased use of condoms,
million people living with HIV (17.3 per cent of its total despite the attempts of some religious groups to stop this.

Case study 4.2

HIV/AIDS immune system, making minor infections life threat-

ening. There is currently no cure for this disease.
HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) is a virus that The virus is most commonly passed on by sexual
can develop into AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency contact and the sharing of infected needles and can
Syndrome). This syndrome leads to the failure of the also be transmitted during pregnancy and through
➜

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 97 01/04/16 8:44 am

 98    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

➜ breastfeeding. While the scale of the pandemic is middle-income countries have not been able to access
clear, the origins of HIV/AIDS are not easily identifi- them at all. At the beginning of the 21st century there
able. There are many competing theories as to why were very few people in low and middle-income coun-
and where the disease began, but it first came to the tries with access to HIV treatment. This was to some
attention of the medical profession in the early 1980s extent due to the very high prices of antiretroviral drugs
when groups of patients started to suffer from diseases and the international patents that stopped them from
rarely seen within their age group and which were being manufactured at cheaper prices. However, since
extremely resistant to treatment (see www.avert.org or 2001 drug manufacturers in developing countries began
www.unaids.org for further details). By the mid-1980s to manufacture generic drugs under special terms in
the disease was named, tests became available and international trade law and this resulted in a significant
public awareness campaigns on how to avoid infection reduction in price, enabling the expansion of treatment
began. Despite this, the number of people becoming on a global scale (AVERT 2014). According to UNAIDS
infected grew rapidly. One of the main causes of this the cost of first-line antiretroviral therapy in some
is the fact that HIV is asymptomatic and can be carried low- and middle-income countries has been reduced
for many years before AIDS develops, therefore a car- to around US$140 per person per year by 2013, from
rier can infect many other people before they become ill US$10,000 per person per year which was the esti-
themselves. mated cost in the mid-1990s.
Today HIV/AIDS affects every country in the world. In late 2006 UNAIDS estimated that out of over 7
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), million people living with HIV in these countries less
since the beginning of the epidemic, almost 78 million than 2 million had access to antiretroviral medication.
people have been infected with the HIV virus and about In 2012 this number was estimated to be 9.7 million
39 million people have died of HIV. WHO estimates that and there was an overall 40-fold increase in access to
globally, 35.0 million people were living with HIV at the antiretroviral therapy between 2002–2012 (UNAIDS
end of 2013. Sub-Saharan Africa is the region of the 2013). In addition, UNAIDS estimated that there was
world worst affected with nearly 1 in every 20 adults an overall 33 per cent decrease in new HIV infections
living with HIV and accounting for nearly 71 per cent of between 2001 and 2012 and a 29 per cent decrease in
the people living with HIV worldwide. AIDS related deaths between 2005 and 2012. However,
While there is no cure there are drugs, known as in many sub-Saharan African countries less than half of
antiretrovirals, that can slow down the progression of expectant mothers with HIV receive the medication they
the disease. This can greatly improve the health and life require to reduce the risk of transmission to their child.
expectancy of people living with HIV/AIDS and they can While there is still the will to increase access to medica-
block the transmission of the virus from mother to child. tion, the current prolonged global economic downturn
According to a UNAIDS report antiretroviral therapy (as we write in 2015) means that even though the cost
averted 5.5 million deaths in low and middle-income of the drugs continues to fall many governments are
countries from the peak in 1995 until 2012 (UNAIDS struggling to purchase them in sufficient quantities or to
2013). However, these drugs are not a cure and if treat- maintain the health care infrastructure needed for their
ment is missed or a patient develops resistance to the effective delivery. Overall, UNAIDS highlights that there
drug then the disease reverts to its normal course. Also, has been remarkable progress over the last decade, but
due to the cost of the drugs many people in low and also that significant challenges remain.

World demography is still altered by several major and displacement especially following major environ-
infectious diseases. Malaria is another disease that has mental disasters including epidemics, droughts, famines,
significantly affected life expectancy in several Afri- earthquakes, volcanoes, storms, fires and events caused
can countries. In 2003 there were an estimated 110 by accidents or indirectly caused by wars. There is a
million deaths from Malaria and 92 per cent of them very uneven geography of such deaths that reflects the
were recorded in Africa, with the rest mainly in Asia relative vulnerability of the population (Affifi and Jäger
Pacific and Southern Asia. Deaths from Malaria when 2010). With regards to the people affected by disaster and
estimated globally are now found to be falling (United requiring external assistance (such as shelter, water, sani-
Nations 2014b). tation, medication and food) to survive, 43 per cent were
Other possible causes of significant declines in life in Southern Asia, 41 per cent in Eastern Asia and 5 per
expectancy, as well as disease, include human mobility cent in Southern Africa (Worldmapper 2015a).

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 98 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    99

The ability of countries to deal with disasters and to disaster (e.g. reduction of water availability, desertifi-
minimize the loss of human life heavily depends on the cation, recurrent flooding), the possibility of ‘sinking’
local infrastructure, which includes good communica- small states and violent conflict triggered by a decrease
tions and early warning systems and adequate planning in essential resources (such as water, land, food) owing to
as well as the readiness of the international community climate change (UNHCR 2014). UNCHR have already
to provide support. Again, there is an uneven geography been involved in operations aimed at mitigating the
of the potential of countries and regions to address the impact of disasters for which there are strong reasons to
impact of disasters, leading to higher number of deaths believe are caused by climate change, such as the flood-
in some areas that could have been prevented (e.g. see ing of Somali refugee camps in north-eastern Kenya in
Worldmapper 2015b). For instance, the 2015 earthquake November 2007 resulting in 12,000 refugees losing their
in Nepal had a devastating effect upon the country’s shelters and displacing another 80,000 (UNHCR 2014).
population and economy and there was an urgent and Related to climate change is the increased use of cars
very strong need for international assistance. In contrast, for commuting in the world and traffic – one of the
Japan was in a much better position to deal with the causes of death expected to rise (Dorling 2011). Accord-
Great Eastern Earthquake and tsunami disaster in 2011 ing to the latest data from the World Health Organi-
with minimum international assistance. zation there were 1.24 million deaths from road traffic
It is also increasingly argued that natural disasters are accidents in 2010.
now more and more likely to be the result of ­climate After road crashes the next highest source of trau-
change and there is a great amassing of evidence in rela- matic death is war. War has a huge impact on the
tion to the processes at play and mitigating the environ- demographic structure, life expectancy and migration
mental impact that human activity has on the planet. At patterns of whole countries and regions. Ever since the
the same time there are increased calls for action from Second World War there has been no military conflict
humanitarian agencies such as the Office of the United that would have such an impact on global population
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). growth. However, since then there have been a number
Such agencies are increasingly developing climate-change of smaller wars and armed conflicts resulting in more
scenarios that envisage massive environmental disasters than 50 million deaths, and these have had a devastating
which would result in direct or indirect human displace- effect on the populations of particular countries and
ment (and environmental migration, which includes world regions. Figure 4.15 shows the geographical dis-
climate migration) including hydro-meteorological dis- tribution of deaths resulting from wars between 1945
asters (flooding, hurricanes, typhoons, cyclones, mud- and 2000. China, Vietnam and the Democratic Republic
slides etc.), environmental degradation and slow onset of Congo and Sudan had the highest number of war

Figure 4.15  War deaths, 1945–2000.

Source: www.worldmapper.org

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 99 01/04/16 8:44 am

 100    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

deaths during this period, whereas there were very few

war deaths affecting the populations of Japan, Western
Europe and North America. There were relatively few
war deaths in Eastern Europe (including the wars in for-
mer Yugoslavia) and South America (mainly in Bolivia,
Colombia and Guatemala).
Figure 4.16 shows the annual changes in life expec-
tancy of five selected countries affected by war and armed
conflict. War and other disasters result in population
displacement and forced migration, which has a demo-
graphic and socio-economic impact on the structure of
regions and countries that are the destinations of immi-
grants (see Case study 4.3).
Plate 4.2  Unidentified Syrian people in refugee
camp in Turkey on 18 June 2011 on the Turkish–
Syrian border.
(thomas koch/Shutterstock)

2 Iran, Islamic Rep.

Iraq
1
Rwanda
0 Syrian Arab Republic
Somalia
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012

–1 World

–2

–3

–4

–5

Figure 4.16  Annual change in life expectancy in five selected countries affected by war and armed conflict.

Case study 4.3

Forced displacement, migration and seek protection elsewhere, either within the borders of
deaths in the Mediterranean Sea their own country or in other countries (UNHCR 2015a).
This represents a significant increase to previous years
The number of refugees caused by persecution, war and (23,400 in 2012 and 14,200 in 2011). In the same year,
conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations there was a record 1.1 million individual applications
grew significantly over the five years 2010–15. According for asylum or refugee status submitted to governments
to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and UNHCR offices in 167 UN countries or territories.
(UNHCR) report, during 2013 an average of 32,200 As put by António Guterres, head of the UN’s refugee
individuals per day were forced to leave their home and agency ‘We are witnessing a quantum leap in forced

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 100 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    101

displacement in the world’ (The Guardian 2015). Overall, drawing on data by the International Organization for
an estimated total of 51.2 million individuals were forced Migration (www.iom.int/) more than 1,700 people are
to flee their homes around the world by the end of 2013 believed to have died in the first four months of 2015,
and this is the highest recorded level since the Second compared with 96 up to the end of April in 2014.
World War. If all these people had their own country it At least 800 people drowned in a single incident on
would be the 24th most populous in the world. UNHCR 19 April 2015 after the boat they were travelling in cap-
identifies seven population categories of forcefully dis- sized in the Libyan waters south of the Italian island of
placed people: refugees; asylum-seekers; internally Lampedusa on 19 April 2015. According to UNHCR, in
displaced persons (IDPs); refugees who have returned the first five months of 2015 more than 42,000 people
home (returnees); IDPs who have returned home; per- (most of them refugees) arrived by sea in Greece, six
sons under UNHCR stateless mandate; and others who times the level of the same period in 2014 and almost
do not fall under any of these categories. the same as the total for all 2014. Over 90 per cent of
The largest source country of refugees is Afghani- these people originated from refugee-producing coun-
stan (and has been for over three decades) as a result tries, principally Syria (over 60 per cent of arrivals in
of long-term conflicts and war. It is now closely followed the first five months of 2015), Afghanistan, Iraq, Soma-
by Syria, which became the second largest origin of lia and Eritrea (UNHCR 2015b).
refugees within just five years and has moved from being The increasing numbers of people trying to seek
the second largest refugee-hosting country to being the refuge in Europe and the recent deaths of thousands
second largest refugee source country. The civil war of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean prompted
that broke out there in the spring of 2011 has resulted in the European Union to prepare an emergency
the uprooting of half the country’s pre-war population. response to stave off a worsening of the humanitarian
According to UNHCR more than 4 million Syrians are crisis. This includes proposals for all member states
refugees in neighbouring countries and an additional 7.6 to host a set number of migrants, partly to relieve the
million internally displaced (BBC 2015). Other countries pressure on southern states like Italy and Greece.
that are in the top origins of refugees include Somalia, However, they also include controversial proposals (that
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNHCR were heavily criticized by human rights activists and
2015a). More details and statistical data (including data organizations such as Amnesty International) for mili-
on historical trends by region and by country) are avail- tary action to identify, capture and destroy boats that
able via the UNHCR’s statistical website (www.unhcr. carry migrants before they embark to Europe (Traynor
org/statistics). 2015). So far, as we write in 2015, protestors have
The overwhelming majority (86 per cent) of the manged to prevent the military powers of rich nations
global refugee population is hosted by developing from carrying out such inhuman acts. It should also be
countries (UNHCR 2015b). The country with the noted that there are also now strong anti-immigration
largest number of refugees is Pakistan (1.6 million), sentiment and views in some regions and countries
followed by Iran, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. A rela- of Europe that oppose the welcoming and integration
tively small proportion (15 per cent) of refugees are of immigrants and refugees. These are similar to the
located in Europe (UNHCR 2015b). However, there is anti-refugee sentiments in the 1930s and early 1940s
a very large (and rapidly increasing) number of people that resulted in Jewish people being barred entry into
risking (and losing) their lives in order to seek refuge countries such as the UK. At the same time, there are
there. According to ‘The Migrants Files’ (www.detec- emerging movements and activist networks calling
tive.io/detective/the-migrants-files/), a project set up for open welcoming spaces, such as the ‘all together’
by a pan-European consortium of journalists and the initiative in the Greek island of Lesvos (http://lesvos.
European Network Against Racism ‘United for Inter- w2eu.net/). Similarly, over 70 years ago activists man-
cultural Action’ (www.unitedagainstracism.org/), there aged to help Jewish children escape mainland Europe
have been at least 29,000 deaths of people (including on the kinder-transports – if not their parents. Given
hundreds of babies and children) attempting to reach knowledge of refugees situations in our recent past it
Europe since 2000. A lot of these deaths occurred in is surprising that such initiatives are not more warmly
the Mediterranean sea, as desperate people attempt to embraced and supported by the European Union and
cross it in often rickety and unseaworthy boats, dying by local and national governments, given the potential
on an almost daily basis (Rice-Oxley and Mahmood benefits (see Section 4.5) and the expedient challenges
2014). According to a recent report by the BBC (2015) of aging populations in Europe (also see Section 4.8).

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 102    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

young people enter the economy in the future. A few gov-

4.8 The challenges of ageing ernments are therefore resorting to incentive schemes to
populations try and arrest the declining birth rates experienced by
many European countries. For example, the German gov-
According to UN calculations (Population Reference ernment introduced in January 2007 a ‘parents’ money’
Bureau 2014) in 1970 just under half (48 per cent) of the law, which means that parents who remain at home to
global population was younger than 20. Another 47 per look after their child will receive 67 per cent of their pre-
cent was aged 20–64 and the remaining 5 per cent was vious income for a year (up to €1800 per month). Those
aged 65 and older. The age structure of the world’s popu- on a low income will receive 12 monthly payments of
lation has now significantly changed as a result of lower €450. This is extremely generous when compared to the
fertility rates and longer life expectancy. The population British system wherein a new mother receives 90 per cent
under age 20 is now approximately just 35 per cent and is of her previous pay for 6 weeks and then a flat €150 for
falling most rapidly, whereas the population aged 20–64 26 weeks only. Men can take 2 weeks paid paternity leave
is 58 per cent, falling in numbers more slowly and the at €150 per week for 2 weeks. In Norway mothers receive
population aged 65 and over is 7 per cent and rising as a 10 months at full pay and men have to take 4 weeks pater-
share of the total. However, there is considerable varia- nity leave at full pay, helping the country to the third high-
tion across world regions and countries. est birth rate in Europe. Poland and Italy have recently
Europe and North America have populations that are introduced an incentive of a one-off payment for each
much older than the global average. It can be argued that child born.
this is the result of them entering the final stage of the The more obvious solution of encouraging interna-
transition model discussed in Section 4.2. Whereas, in tional migration into countries with ageing populations
contrast, Africa’s current youthful age structure is simi- is also a way of increasing their workforce and slowing
lar to the global average in 1970 (Population Reference down population growth in poorer countries. In addition,
Bureau 2014). These differences in population structures increased migration into countries like the UK would help
are illustrated in the diagrams shown in F ­ igure  4.17. reduce current debts, and also help in caring for a grow-
These diagrams, known as population pyramids, show ing elderly population. It would also reduce global popu-
the distribution of the men and women in the world and lation growth faster than even the current very fast rate of
different world regions by age groups in 1970 and 2014. growth slowdown. That is because young migrants from
It is worth noting the difference in the shape between poorer countries who move to countries like the UK tend
Europe and North America and the other continents to have fewer children than they would have had had they
(and especially Africa). The shape of these diagrams for not migrated. Although many other factors will influence
Europe and North America (and especially by 2014) is the future level of public sector debt in the UK, increased
often described as a ‘constrictive pyramid’ typical for immigration reduces debt, while emigration of younger
affluent societies with low fertility and mortality rates adults from Britain will increase it.
and relatively older populations. As can be seen in the
first pyramid shown in Figure 4.17, there is a trend for
the world population pyramid to become ‘constrictive’.
In addition, the 2014 pyramids for Europe and North 4.9 Conclusion
America clearly stand out from the rest
Soon most countries in Europe and North America Throughout human history the global population expe-
are going to be faced with a demographic and pension rienced relatively slow growth, with the exceptions of the
crisis as there will be fewer people of working age and Neolithic Revolution and the most recent era of global
fewer taxpayers, making it impossible to provide current population acceleration from 1851 to 1971, leading to
levels of support, especially in areas of net out young a population explosion from 1 billion in 1820 to 7 bil-
migration and fertility below 1.5 children per potential lion in 2011. The most significant increase occurred in
couple. A possible solution to these issues could include the past 60 years, when the population went up by 4 bil-
increasing the retirement age (and this has already hap- lion, from 3 billion in 1950 to 7 billion in 2011. How-
pened in some countries, including the UK), as this would ever, it is vital to realize that for the majority of those
result in additional working years and tax revenues and a past 60 years population growth rates have been rapidly
reduction in the time that a person might receive a state decelerating everywhere. During this period the popula-
pension. Another possible solution often discussed is for tion of the more affluent world (described by the UN as
governments to try and stimulate birth rates so that more ‘developed regions’) increased from 800 million in 1950

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 102 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    103

1970 Male Female 2014 Male Female

World
80+
75–79
70–74
65–69
60–64
55–59
50–54
45–49
40–44
35–39
30–34
25–29
20–24
15–19
10–14
5–9
0–4
10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Percentage of population

Africa Asia
80+ 80+
75–79 75–79
70–74 70–74
65–69 65–69
60–64 60–64
55–59 55–59
50–54 50–54
45–49 45–49
40–44 40–44
35–39 35–39
30–34 30–34
25–29 25–29
20–24 20–24
15–19 15–19
10–14 10–14
5–9 5–9
0–4 0–4
10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Percentage of population Percentage of population

Europe Latin America & Caribbean

80+ 80+
75–79 75–79
70–74 70–74
65–69 65–69
60–64 60–64
55–59 55–59
50–54 50–54
45–49 45–49
40–44 40–44
35–39 35–39
30–34 30–34
25–29 25–29
20–24 20–24
15–19 15–19
10–14 10–14
5–9 5–9
0–4 0–4
10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Percentage of population Percentage of population

North America Oceania

80+ 80+
75–79 75–79
70–74 70–74
65–69 65–69
60–64 60–64
55–59 55–59
50–54 50–54
45–49 45–49
40–44 40–44
35–39 35–39
30–34 30–34
25–29 25–29
20–24 20–24
15–19 15–19
10–14 10–14
5–9 5–9
0–4 0–4
10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
Percentage of population Percentage of population

Figure 4.17  Age structure, 1970–2014.

Source: Population Reference Bureau (2014: 10)

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 104    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

to only 1.2 billion in 2011 (and it is now only stabilized countries’ the average life expectancy at birth was 61.5
by in-migration), whereas the population of the poorest years in 2013, whereas in sub-Saharan African countries it
(‘least developed’) regions more than trebled, going up was 56.9 years. In contrast, in the affluent world (in the so-
from 1.7 billion to 5.8 billion. That global division is due called ‘high income countries’ as classified by the World
to deceleration in the growth rate having been earliest and Bank) average life expectancy was 79.4 years and in par-
fastest in the richest of places and, at the other end of a ticular parts of the regions of this richest section of the
continuum, latest and slowest in just a few parts of Africa. world it was even higher (e.g. 83.3 in Japan and 80.4 years
The overall planetary population increase has been when the European Union is averaged out). In contrast to
placing a strain on environmental, food, housing and such longevity, poorer countries are far more affected by
welfare infrastructures. However, it should be noted that disease, natural disasters (including disasters caused by
it is not just the number of people that has an impact on climate change) and wars that have been disproportion-
these infrastructures, but how people live. For instance, ally affecting all the poorest regions of the world, leading
the so-called ‘developed countries’ have been polluting to the slow-down in gain, or even a short decline in life
the environment and contributing to global warming expectancy, as well as to human displacement. Mostly
and climate change far more compared to the most popu- recently, countries such as Afghanistan and Syria have
lous poorer parts of the world (see Chapter 6). The strain reported significant numbers of premature deaths due to
is not from those who are greatest in number, but from conflict and huge numbers of people having to become
those whose greed is most great, in both rich and poor refugees. The overwhelming majority of the world’s refu-
countries alike. Greed control is now much more impor- gees are hosted by developing countries and only a rela-
tant than population control. tively small number are hosted by affluent countries. For
This chapter has highlighted as especially impor- example, only 15 per cent of global refugees are hosted in
tant the fact that since 1971 the world has entered an Europe and 7 per cent in the Americas.
era of global deceleration of population growth rates. Recently some groups within some of the more afflu-
There is projected to be an even more significant slow- ent countries have been facing decreases in life expectancy
down in population growth very soon, which is expected due to rising income and wealth inequalities as well as the
to lead to a world human population peak of, at most, introduction of severe and sometimes punitive austerity
ten b­ illion being reached by around 2100. Average fertility measures (O’Hara 2014; The Guardian 2015). Further,
rates worldwide are rapidly falling and are predicted to there have been a growing number of studies suggesting
continue to fall and converge to just below the population a very strong link between a number of factors relating
replacement level rate of 2.1 by 2100 in all world regions. to life expectancy, well-being and health of populations
Estimates, of course, vary greatly although few people and income and wealth inequality, especially in more
talk as seriously as they should about the future low- affluent societies. In particular, according to the ground-
fertility scenarios in which fewer than 9 billion ­people breaking book The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better
might be the peak. In contrast, in 2015 talk of 11 billion for Everyone, by epidemiologists Richard Wilkinson and
humans by 2100 was more common. The uncertainty is Kate Pickett (2010), a wide number of indicators (includ-
important to acknowledge. We humans think we know so ing demographic indicators such as life expectancy) are
much but we don’t even know how many grandchildren related to inequalities in income and wealth.
we are likely to have, even in aggregate. Regions of the affluent world (in short especially
As fertility’s contribution to population growth is Europe, North America and Japan) are facing the chal-
declining, migration is playing a more and more impor- lenges of ageing populations and a potential demographic
tant role in the growth and social and economic devel- and pension crisis on top of all the trends already listed
opment of countries and regions, and there have been here. As we argued in this chapter, an obvious way to
increasing numbers of international migrants crossing respond to this potential crisis is to encourage international
borders in recent years. At the same time, there has been migration, including a warmer welcome and integration
a dramatic increase in average life expectancy across of refugees. Net international migration tends to be into
the world over the past 200 years. In 1800 all countries countries with ageing populations and is also a way of
around the world had an average life expectancy at birth increasing their workforce and slowing down population
of less than 45 years (according to the Gapminder; see growth in poorer countries. Migrants tend to have fewer
Useful websites section); by 2013 the estimated global children than people in the areas they leave, and to behave
average life expectancy was 71 years. more like the population they join in terms of their fertility.
Averages only tell us so much. There are still signifi- Overall, it is very important to understand demo-
cant social and spatial inequalities in life expectancy and graphic trends and processes as well as the interdepend-
life chances worldwide. In the so-called ‘least developed encies between countries, regions and cities and all their

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 104 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Chapter 4  Demographic transformations    105

populations, but to also highlight the fact that the actual in all other chapters of this book. It is not how many of
number of people on the planet is, to an important us there are or will be that matters most, but how we all
extent, incidental to the impact humans have on both behave, think and act in future. Control greed and we can
the environment and each other. This is also illustrated expect a healthy demographic future.

Learning outcomes Hennig, D. B. (2013) Rediscovering the World: Map Transfor-

mations of Human and Physical Space, Springer, Heidelberg.
Having read this chapter, you should be able to:
Hughes, B. (2010) Too Many Of Whom and Too Much Of
● Recognize the dynamic nature of populations, What? What the New Population Hysteria Tells us About
not only in terms of size but also with respect to the Global Economic and Environmental Crisis, and its
the geographies which exist within the overall growth. Causes, A No One Is Illegal discussion paper, www.noii.org.
uk/2010/01/13/too-many-of-whomand-too-much-of-what/.
● Explore how sudden economic changes, disasters
or disease affects life expectancy and alters the Hugo, G. (2007) Population geography, Progress in Human
Geography, 31(1), 77–88. One of a series of articles looking
course taken by countries through the demographic
at developments in population geography in the Southern
transition process. Hemisphere. This article looks at population vulnerability and
● Acknowledge the increasing importance of migra- migration.
tion as a component of national population change Jones, H. (1990) Population Geography, Paul Chapman,
alongside fertility and mortality. London. A clear introduction to geographical perspectives
● Assess the significant problems that ageing popu- on population. Look especially at the chapters on population
lations will have in terms of social and economic growth and regulation, international variations in mortal-
ity, fertility in developed countries, fertility in less developed
development, as well as issues of selfishness,
countries, and international migration.
empathy and greed.
National Research Council (2000) Beyond Six Billion: Fore-
● Understand the potential impact of inequality upon casting the World’s Population, National Academy Press,
demographic issues and life expectancy. Washington, DC. This presents the findings of a US National
Academy of Sciences panel on population projections. It
contains detailed examinations of transitional and post-transi-
Further reading tional fertility, mortality and life expectancy, and international
migration, together with assessments of the accuracy of past
Bailey, A.J. (2011) Population geographies and climate projections and of the uncertainties in current population
change, Progress in Human Geography, 35(5), 686–95. forecasts.
Bailey, A.J. (2010) Population geographies, gender, and the UNAIDS (2010) UNAIDS 2011–2015 Strategy: Getting to
mitigation-development nexus, Progress in Human Geog- Zero. Available to download at www.unaids.org/en/media/
raphy, (3), 375–86. The first of these articles connects the unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2010/
themes of this chapter with those of Chapters 5 and 6, the JC2034_UNAIDS_Strategy_en.pdf. This report gives a
second with those of Chapters 7 and 8. comprehensive overview of the challenges that countries
Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. (2009) The Age of Migration: and international organizations face when confronting the
International Population Movements in the Modern World, 4th epidemic. It also details many success stories and the devel-
edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. This book, now in opment of good practice as well as providing country and
its fourth edition, provides a comprehensive survey of past regional statistics.
trends and current developments in international migration. United Nations (2010) World Population to 2300. Available
See the companion website at: www.age-of-migration.com/ to download at www.un.org/esa/population/publications/. . . /
UK/index.asp. WorldPop2300final.pdf. The report provides an overview of
Dorling, D. (2013) Population Ten Billion: The Coming Demo- global demographic trends and explores in detail population
graphic Crisis and How to Survive It, Constable, London. size and growth, urbanization and city growth, population
Harper, S. (2005) Ageing Societies, Hodder Arnold, London. ageing, fertility and contraception, mortality and international
This book explores the issues of population in both devel- migration.
oping and mature countries. It examines the necessity for Vlassopoulos, C. (2013) Defining environmental migration
people to extend their working lives, the changes ageing in the climate change era: problem, consequence or solu-
societies have on families, the challenges it poses for state tion?, in Faist, T. and Shade, J., Disentangling Migration
social provision and the impact these issues will have on and Climate Change: Toward an analysis of Concepts,
developing regions. ­Methodologies, and Policies, Springer, New York.

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 105 01/04/16 8:44 am

 106    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Census, Washington, DC. This is a computerized source of

Useful websites demographic data.

www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination  The
www.worldpopulationatlas.org  A collection of world maps, Neighbourhood Statistics website provides access to a
where territories are re-sized on each map according to the wealth of UK Official Statistics, including data from the 2001
subject of interest. and 2011 Censuses.
www.gapminder.org  An online interactive visualization of
www.unhcr.org  Provides access to publications and data
data resource promoting sustainable global development and
of the United Nations Refugee Agency.
achievement of the United Nations Millennium Development
Goals. http://data.worldbank.org  Free and open access to data
www.iom.int  Provides access to the International about development in countries around the world (including a
Organization for Migration publications and statistics. wealth of demographic data).
www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm  Provides access www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm 
to extracts from the United Nations’ population-related The Maddison Project, providing information (including popu-
publications and statistics. lation data sets) in relation to the work of Angus Maddison,
www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb  US Census Bureau (online) who was a world scholar on quantitative macro-economic
International Data Base, United States Bureau of the history.

M04_DANI2950_05_SE_C04.indd 106 01/04/16 8:44 am

 Resources, energy and
development

Chapter 5

Michael Bradshaw

Topics covered
■ The nature of natural resources and ways of defining and
classifying them
■ The factors that influence resource availability
■ Types of renewable energy
■ The changing geography of oil and gas production and
consumption
■ Global energy dilemmas

Resources are defined by society, not by nature.

(Adapted from Rees 1985:11)

Resources are not, they become; they are not static but expand
and contract in response to human wants and actions.
Zimmerman (Peach and Constantin 1972:16)

M05_DANI2950_05_SE_C05.indd 107 04/04/16 6:08 pm

 108    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

T he large-scale exploitation of the planet’s resource

base is one of the defining characteristics of the age in
which we live (McNeill 2000); fortunately, we are increas-
a function that a thing or a substance may perform, or
to an operation in which it might take place.’ He also
notes that ‘resources are . . . as dynamic as civilization
ingly aware of the finite nature of the planet’s resource itself’. In fact, one can suggest that each major human
base (see Chapter 6). The explosion at the Deepwater civilization was sustained by a particular set of resources
Horizon drilling platform in April 2010, and the subse- and technologies for their exploitation (Smil 1994; Sim-
quent oil leak that poured oil into the Gulf of Mexico for mons 1996); the archaeological record includes the Stone
three months, provides a stark reminder that the exploita- Age, the Bronze Age and the Iron Age. In reference to the
tion of natural resources usually results in environmental Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century, Simmons
degradation. There are also many tragic reminders of the (1996: 208) states that ‘industrialization based on fossil
human cost of resource extraction, such as the continuing fuel energy represents a turning point in the history of
high death toll of coal miners in China. Indeed, all energy human–nature relations’. If the nineteenth century was
sources carry risks, as the crisis in March 2011 at the based on the era of coal, then the twentieth century will
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in Japan follow- been seen as the era of oil. Clearly, the changing notion
ing the devastating earthquake and tsunami showed. This of what constitutes a ‘resource’ is an important factor in
chapter explores the nature of natural resources and con- shaping the relationship between human societies and the
siders the relationship between resource production and natural environment. As Blunden (1995: 164) observed,
consumption, economic development and climate change ‘Because definition as a resource depends on usefulness
(see Gautier 2008 for a discussion of climate change and to human society, natural materials may be required as
the role of energy). The chapter is divided into three sec- resources by societies in some times and places but not in
tions, each with a distinct task. The first section examines others.’ While it is still the case that people in many parts
the nature of ‘natural resource’, it evaluates the various of the world live in what Mather and Chapman (1995:
ways of classifying resources and analyses the diverse fac- 139) call ‘low-energy societies’ (dependent upon plants,
tors that influence their availability. The second section animals and human labour), one of the defining charac-
analyses the specific case of energy resources, and reviews teristics of our age, and a consequence of the processes of
the various types of renewable energy and the changing globalization, is that the majority of societies now have
geographies of oil and gas production and consumption. some shared notion of what sorts of things constitute
The third section considers the interrelationship between resources. The Inuit living in northern Canada are as
energy consumption, economic development and climate dependent on gasoline for their skidoos as the commut-
change. The chapter concludes by discussing the energy ers for their cars in Los Angeles or London are. Further-
dilemmas that currently face the different regions of the more, echoing Lenin’s famous edict that ‘Communism is
world and the emerging global energy paradox in relation electrification plus Soviet labour power’, the provision of
to continued investment in fossil fuels. electricity is central to the modernization process in all
types of societies. There are still 1.4 billion people around
the world that lack access to electricity (IEA, UNDP and
UNIDO 2010). There is increasing acknowledgement of
5.1 Natural resources the centrality of energy access to poverty alleviation and
2014 marked the beginning of the UN’s decade of ‘Sus-
The Earth holds a finite stock of resources, the resource tainable Energy for All’.
base. However, what human societies consider a resource If the notion of resource is dynamic and intimately
has varied through time and across space. As both Zim- linked to the evolution of human society, it follows
merman and Rees acknowledge above, something is a that so-called ‘technological progress’ both creates and
resource because human society attaches value to it. Many destroys resource value. As new technologies emerge,
of the things we value today as ‘resources’ held no value dependent on particular resources, so old technolo-
in the past and may hold no value in the future. Followers gies and their associated resources become redundant.
of science fiction, such as Star Trek, see a future based on For example, today flint has limited value as a building
resources and technologies that have yet to be created. material, yet in the Stone Age it was an essential resource
for making tools. Because such resources had ‘use value’
they were also objects of trade. Other resources that
5.1.1 Defining resources were valued in the Bronze Age, such as copper and zinc,
In his seminal work World Resources and Industries, are still valued today as new ways of using them are
Zimmerman (Peach and Constantin 1972: 9) states: discovered. New technologies also create new demands
‘The word “resource” does not refer to a substance, but and concerns, such as the availability of so-called rare

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 Chapter 5  Resources, energy and development    109

and gas companies – Shell, Exxon Mobil, BP, Sinopec

(China Petroleum and Petrochemical Company) and
CNPC (China National Petroleum Company) (Dicken
2015: 395–422). Our discussion so far has implied that
all resources share the same characteristics. However,
we know that there are many different types of natural
resource and the various ways of classifying them is the
subject of the next section.

5.1.2 Classifying resources

Natural resources are commonly divided into two types:
Plate 5.1  The use of firewood for cooking in a ‘low non-renewable or stock resources and renewable or
energy’ consumption society. flow resources (Figure  5.1). Stock resources are those,
(Gilles Paire/Shutterstock) mainly mineral, that have taken millions of years to form
and so their availability is finite. Hence, we also refer to
them as non-renewable as there is no possibility of their
earth metals used in many ‘green’ technologies or lith- being replenished on a timescale of relevance to human
ium that is needed for rechargeable batteries. The use society. Within the category of stock resources, it is useful
value of resources also means that control over their to distinguish between those that are consumed by use,
supply is an important part of political and economic such as fuel minerals, those that are theoretically recover-
power. In theory at least, resource-rich regions are able able and those that are recyclable, such as aluminium. A
to exploit this natural advantage in their dealings with further characteristic of stock resources is that they tend
resource-poor regions. Consequently, gaining control to be highly localized, that is they are found in relative
over particular resources has been at the heart of many abundance only in specific places, such as ore deposits
wars and much conflict (Klare 2002; Le Billon 2007). and coalfields. Some stock resources are more abundant
The European colonization of the ‘developing world’ than others and their relative scarcity affects their value.
was motivated by a desire to discover and control new For example, aggregate minerals, like sand and gravel, are
sources of resources. It is also no surprise that even relatively abundant, while precious metals, such as gold
today five of the world’s ten largest corporations are oil and silver, are relatively rare.

Non-renewable/stock Renewable/flow

Consumed Theoretically Critical zone Non-critical

Recyclable
by use recoverable zone
Oil All Metallic Fish Solar energy
elemental minerals
Gas minerals Forests Tides

Wind
Coal Animals
Waves
Soil
Water
Water in Air
aquifers

Critical zone resources

become stock once
Flow resources regenerative capacity
used to extinction is exceeded

Figure 5.1  Classification of resource types.

Source: J. Rees, Natural Resources: Allocation, Economics and Policy, 2nd edition, Routledge, 1985, p. 15

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 110    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Renewable or flow resources are those that are achieved in 2010, five years ahead of schedule. In 2012,
naturally renewed within a sufficiently short time-span 89 per cent of the world’s population had access to an
to be of use to human society. Again we can distinguish improved source, up from 76 per cent in 1990. Over 2.3
between different types of stock resource. Figure 5.1 billion people gained access to an improved source of
divides flow resources into ‘critical zone’ and ‘non-­critical drinking water between 1990 and 2012.
zone’ resources. The distinction here is between those
However, a large rural–urban divide still exists with
flow resources whose continued availability is dependent
access still an issue in rural areas. By comparison, far less
upon management by society (critical zone) and those
progress has been made on the sanitation goal, and here
that will continue to be available independent of the
the situation is much worse in urban than rural areas. The
actions of society (non-critical zone). As indicated by
resource continuum recognizes that access to (clean) air
the arrows, it is possible for critical zone flow resources
and water supply now have scarcity value and should be
to become stock resources if they are mismanaged and
considered as finite.
their regenerative capacity is exceeded. Thus, resource
In our discussion so far we have highlighted the com-
management aims to ensure that exploitation of a par-
plexity of the notion of natural resource and considered
ticular renewable resource does not damage its capacity
the various ways of classifying resources, but what factors
to replace itself. In recognition of the increasing chal-
affect the availability of particular resources?
lenge, and the numerous failures, to manage renewable
resources, Rees (1991: 8) has developed an alternative to
the conventional two-part typology of natural resources: 5.1.3 Resource availability
‘All resources are renewable on some timescale . . . what
As was noted earlier, at any moment in time there is
matters for the sustainability of future supplies is the
a finite stock of natural resources on the planet, the
relative rates of replenishment and use . . . it seems bet-
resource base. Each stock resource has its own resource
ter . . . to think in terms of a “resource continuum” than
base, the total quantity of a substance or property on
the conventional two-part typology’ (Figure 5.2). Water
the planet, for example, the total amount of oil geo-
might once have been considered a relatively abundant
logically present today. However, that total resource
resource, but the combined impact of population growth
base is not the amount available for human exploita-
and industrialization is placing increasing stress on the
tion. ­Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationship between the
planet’s finite supply of fresh water. Millennium Devel-
resource base and the various sub-divisions of resource
opment Goal 7 (see www.developmentgoals.org) is to
availability. The term proven reserve is applied to those
ensure environmental sustainability, and a target was set
deposits that have already been discovered and are
to halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sus-
known to be economically extractable under current
tainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanita-
demand, price and technological conditions. However,
tion. In their 2014 assessment (United Nations 2014c),
the extent of a proven reserve is dynamic and dependent
the UN noted that:
upon a host of interlinked factors. These include the
The target of halving the proportion of people with- availability of the technology and skills to exploit the
out access to an improved drinking water source was resource, the level of demand, the cost of production

Non-renewable, Renewability dependent on Naturally renewable

consumed by use use levels and human investment independent of use

E I
x Fossil Plants Non-metal Metallic Air and Solar energy
n r
h fuels element minerals water supply f e
a Animals
minerals i n
u Fish Tidal and ne
s i w
t Forests wind power
t a
i eb
b Soils
Water l l
l ye
e resources

Figure 5.2  The Resource continuum.

Source: J. Rees, Resources and environment: scarcity and sustainability, in Bennett and Estall (eds) Global Change and Challenge:
­Geography for the 1990s, Routledge, 1991, p. 9

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 Chapter 5  Resources, energy and development    111

ed
Us

s
e

urce
us
Recycled

s
ve
e
rc

reso
u

er
so

es
Re r

s
n

ve
ve

ve
o

er
r

la t i
P

es
lr

cu
Potentially recoverable

na

e
itio

Sp
nd

Resource base
Co

s
rce
r esou
l
etica
Hypoth

Resource base

Economically recoverable Undiscovered

Sub-economic Hypothetical resource base

Figure 5.3  Resource availability.

Source: J. Rees, Natural Resources: Allocation, Economics and Policy, 2nd edition, Routledge, 1985, p. 20

and processing, the price it can command in the mar- The category of conditional reserve refers to depos-
ketplace, the availability and price of substitutes, and its that have already been discovered but are not eco-
the environmental and social costs of developing the nomic to work at prevailing price levels using currently
resource. The extent to which each of these factors available extraction and production technologies. The
influences resource development also varies across boundary between proven and conditional reserves
space and time. Today we have the technological abil- is dynamic and bi-directional (that is, resources that
ity to recover resources in geological and environmental change from conditional to proven reserves can, if con-
conditions that were previously uneconomic. For exam- ditions change, revert to conditional status). Canada’s
ple, the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of oil sands are at this boundary. High production costs
Mexico that was destroyed by an explosion in April require an oil price of US$65 or higher to be economic,
2010 was designed to operate in waters up to 2,400 when the price falls below this level investment in oil
metres (8,000 feet), to a maximum drill depth of 9,100 sands production falls substantially. This has happened
metres (30,000 feet). It was pushing the limits of off- more than once before and the most recent fall in the oil
shore production into ever-deeper waters and deeper price has again resulted in a reduction in investment in
fields. The recent growth of shale gas production in oil sands projects. One of the reasons that OPEC (Saudi
North America relies on new techniques of horizontal Arabia in particular) is allowing the oil price to fall is
drilling and fracturing that release the oil and natu- that they want to test how sensitive unconventional oil
ral gas trapped in shale deposits far below ground at a and gas production in North America is to a low-oil-
competitive cost, resulting in a dramatic surge in natu- price environment.
ral gas production in the USA, but also a reassessment The two remaining categories of resource are not
of the scale of global natural gas reserves. readily available to society. Hypothetical resources

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 112    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

factors that can promote resource scarcity (Table 5.1).

The resource crisis of the 1970s was motivated by geo-
politics, but by increasing the price of energy, it brought
about other forms of scarcity. For example, the increased
price of oil had a major negative impact upon those coun-
tries in the ‘developing world’ that had embarked upon
industrialization and had become increasingly dependent
upon imported oil. However, it also shocked the ‘devel-
oped world’ into the realization that energy resources
were finite, energy conservation was worthwhile and that
alternative sources of energy were required. The ‘devel-
oped world’, and particularly the United States, then
recognized the strategic importance of securing ‘energy
Plate 5.2  Offshore technology advances, so more
independence’, which is now seen by many as achievable
remote resources can be exploited.
thanks to unconventional oil and gas.
(ITAR-TASS Photo Agency/Alamy)
In July 2008 the oil price peaked at US$144 a barrel,
only to fall below US$40 by November 2009 as a global
are those that we may expect to find in the future in economic crisis took hold. Despite continued geopoliti-
areas that have only been partially surveyed and devel- cal tensions in the Middle East and North Africa, we still
oped. Thus, the US Geological Survey has suggested have a relative abundance of oil, in large part because
that the Arctic accounts for 13 per cent of the world’s the global economic recession reduced demand. The
undiscovered oil and 30 per cent of its undiscovered gas. oil price soon rebounded and found a new equilibrium
There are also hypothetical resources in regions such as around the US$100 mark; however, in the summer of
Antarctica, but the international community has placed 2014 the price started another dramatic decline, falling
a moratorium on resource development, for the time to less than US$50 a barrel. At the time this book went
being at least. Speculative resources are those that to press the price had fallen below $30 a barrel. This time
might be found in unexplored areas that are thought the cause is over-supply relative to global demand. But
to have favourable geological conditions. Finally, there there is no scope for complacency; the rapid growth of
remains a large part of the earth about which we have energy demand in the emerging economies, especially
no information on its potential resource base. The China and India, is causing concern that high energy
strength of this classification is that it stresses the highly prices will eventually return. This coincides with increas-
dynamic nature of the concept of resource reserve. Its ing societal concerns about the ecological consequences
weakness is that it lends itself to the idea that we will of increased energy consumption (for the most recent
never run out of resources; there will always be more to analysis of the causes of anthropogenic change see IPCC
discover and new technology will continue to make new 2014). The prospect of increasing demand as a result of
resources available for exploitation. Even if that was the
case, and clearly it is not, the planet now faces the addi-
tional problem that the consumption of resources, such
as hydrocarbon fuels, produces wastes that threaten the
stability of the global ecosystem. Thus, there is a need
to rethink the whole notion of resource scarcity to take
into account the ecological cost of our current ‘fossil
fuels society’.
Given the highly dynamic nature of resources, at any
moment in time, it is very difficult to estimate the level of
resource availability. It is even more difficult to speculate
about future levels of production and consumption and,
thus, the possibility of resource scarcity. Nonetheless,
the supporters of ‘peak oil’ maintain that the world will
soon reach the point of maximum oil production (Def- Plate 5.3  The energy crisis of 1973 brought queues
feyes 2001), which is highly contested, not just because at the petrol pumps in many western countries and a
extrapolation on the basis of current trends is often mis- three-day week in the UK.
leading, but also because there are a whole variety of (Popperfoto/Getty Images)

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 Chapter 5  Resources, energy and development    113

Table 5.1  The dimensions of resource scarcity

Type of scarcity Concern

Physical scarcity ●  Exhaustion of minerals and energy.

●  Human populations exceed the food production capacity of the land.
●  Depletion of renewable resources such as fish, soils or timber.
●  Growing demand for water for human use threatens aquatic ecosystems and the
ability of river systems to replenish themselves.
Geopolitical scarcity ●  Use of minerals exports as a political weapon.
●  Shift in the location of low-cost minerals sources to ‘hostile’ or unstable blocs of
nations.
Economic scarcity ●  Demand at current price levels exceeds the quantity supplied, resulting in shortages.
●  Needs exceed the ability of individuals or countries to pay for resource supplies
(resource poverty).
●  Rich economies can always outbid the poor for essential resources, creating
unequal patterns of resource use.
●  Economic exhaustion or falling demand for specific minerals or renewable resources
causes economic and social disruption in producer regions or in nations dependent
on them.
Renewable and ●  Distribution of essential biogeographical cycles (e.g. the carbon cycle and the
environmental greenhouse effect) threatening sustainability of life on earth.
resource scarcity ●  Pollution loads exceeding the ‘absorptive’ capacity, causing economic health and
amenity problems.
●  Loss of plant and animal species (biodiversity) and landscape values, with wide, but
poorly understood, long-term consequences.
Source: Adapted from J. Rees (1991) Resources and environment: scarcity and sustainability, in Bennett and Estall (eds) Global Change and
Challenge: Geography in the 1990s, Routledge, London, p. 6

economic development in the ‘global south’, combined The Industrial Revolution changed the way in which cer-
with the challenges of climate change, has led to the idea tain parts of the world powered their economies, leaving
of a ‘New Energy Paradigm’ that combines traditional the remainder dependent upon renewable resources.
concerns about security of energy supply at reasonable
prices with the need to devise energy policies that reduce
5.2.1 The dominance of fossil fuels
carbon emissions (Helm 2007).
Since the invention of the steam engine about 200 years
ago, much of human society has become ever more
dependent upon the exploitation of non-renewable
5.2 Fuelling the planet energy resources (see Smil 2010 for an introduction to
the energy system and energy transitions). According
Of all the different types of resource that we have dis- to BP (2015), in 2014 fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) still
cussed so far, in recent history it is those that provide accounted for 86.3 per cent of the primary commercial
energy services (we transform energy resources to obtain energy consumed on the planet. These resources were
services such as heating, light, transportation, etc.) that formed from the decomposition of organic materials mil-
have been the most sought after. For most of human his- lions of years ago and have been transformed by heat and
tory societies have utilized renewable sources of energy; pressure into coal, oil and natural gas. The advantage of
flow resources such as wood that can be depleted, sus- fossil fuels as a source of energy is that they are readily
tained or increased by human activity; and continuous accessible, a highly concentrated source of energy, easy
resources, such as water to drive watermills or the wind to convert using proven technologies, and cost-efficient
to turn windmills, that are available irrespective of human in production and use. Unfortunately, the combustion of
activity (Figure 5.4). They have also used draught animals, fossil fuels is also the single largest source of greenhouse
horses, buffalo, etc., but these need to be fed and housed. gases (GHG).

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 114    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Primary energy

Fossil fuels
Renewables Nuclear power
(Non-renewable)

Natural gas
Geothermal
Biomass

Hydro
Wave
Solar

Wind

Tidal

Coal

Oil
LOW CARBON HIGH CARBON

Figure 5.4  Categories of energy resources.

Oil is the most versatile fossil fuel while coal, even

though it is relatively bulky, is still used in many indus-
trial processes, as a source of heat, and is the most
important fuel for electricity generation. The great
advantage of oil is its transportability over long dis-
tances in large volumes using pipelines, ocean tankers,
or smaller rail and road tankers. It has spawned a huge
petrochemical industry producing a vast range of prod-
ucts, including plastics and textiles, that have substi-
tuted products based on renewable resources, such as
wood and cotton, for those based on non-renewable
resources. In addition, oil has created many resources,
such as jet engine fuel, for which commercially viable Plate 5.4  Special LNG tankers are used to distribute
substitutes have yet to be developed. Consequently, liquefied natural gas to markets worldwide.
advanced industrial societies are totally dependent (Carabay/fotolia)
upon the continued supply of oil at a reasonable price,
which explains the importance that governments attach
to energy security (for a comprehensive discussion of in the Asia-Pacific region, while the European Union sees
oil see Bridge and Le Billon 2012). LNG supplies as a means of compensating for declines in
In recent years, natural gas has become an increasingly domestic production and diversifying its sources of sup-
important source of energy and a feedstock for petro- ply away from Russia.
chemicals. In many advanced industrialized economies it
has replaced coal as the favoured resource for electricity
5.2.2 Alternative sources of energy
generation and domestic heating. However, the transport
flexibility of natural gas is inferior to oil; pipeline trans- Given the finite nature of hydrocarbon fuels, the prob-
port is most economic but the infrastructure investment lems of scarcity and the environmental consequences
needed requires sizeable reserves, a secure source of pro- of burning fossil fuels, it is no surprise that alterna-
duction (security of supply) and stable markets (security tive sources of energy have been sought. There are two
of demand). Liquefied natural gas (LNG), produced via alternatives (see Figure 5.4): first, developing new ways
cooling and high pressure, is an option but the process of harnessing renewable energy sources, and second,
requires substantial investment in plant and consumes developing nuclear power. At present all commercial
large quantities of energy. Nevertheless, LNG production nuclear power stations use so-called fission reactors
is becoming an increasingly important fuel, particularly that release energy, mainly in the form of heat, which

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 Chapter 5  Resources, energy and development    115

is then used to generate electricity. In the 1950s, nuclear The other alternative to fossil fuels is the development
energy was heralded as a cheap and clean alternative to of ‘new’ or ‘modern’ renewable sources of energy (Evans
fossil fuels, but safety issues discouraged the expected 2007: 81–114). Many of these renewable sources involve
expansion of the nuclear industry (see Case study 5.1). applying new technologies to historic sources of energy
In recent years, since it does not generate CO2, the supply and scaling them up to provide an alternative source
nuclear option for electricity production has been back of electricity generation and fuel. While no single source
on the agenda even though many of the concerns about is likely to provide an alternative to fossil fuels, collectively
high costs, safety, the disposal of radioactive waste they can start to reduce our reliance on hydrocarbons. A
and the decommissioning of power stations remain. review by the Swedish Academy of Sciences (Destouni and
The disaster at Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Frank 2010: 19) maintains that, by 2050, renewable energy
Japan has reopened the debate and there is renewed can be expected to provide up to 35 per cent of global
uncertainty about the role that nuclear power can play energy supply and nearly half of electricity production,
in meeting the growing demand for energy and mitigat- which still means that 65 per cent of global energy will
ing climate change. come from fossil fuels and nuclear power.

Case study 5.1

Nuclear power remains in the mix 3. Radioactive waste has to be disposed of safely and
reactors have to be decommissioned, all of which is
During the 1950s the peaceful use of nuclear power extremely costly.
was heralded as the great hope for the world’s energy 4. The radioactive materials needed to fuel the reac-
needs. Harnessing the power of the atom promised tors need to be kept safe and secure from theft or
a cheap and clean source of electricity. The energy misappropriation to make nuclear weapons (the so-
crisis of the 1970s increased interest in a nuclear called proliferation problem).
solution. By developing a nuclear power industry, the
Over the years public trust in nuclear power has been
developed world hoped that it could reduce its reliance
significantly eroded by a number of serious accidents,
upon OPEC-supplied oil. The 1970s and 1980s saw
such as those at Windscale, Cumbria (United Kingdom)
a rapid expansion in the generating capacity of the
in 1957, Three Mile Island (USA) in 1979, Chernobyl
world’s nuclear power plants. Between 1960 and 1990
in the Ukraine in 1986 and most recently Fukushima in
total global electrical generating capacity had grown
2011. Furthermore, as the true cost of building, main-
from zero to 328 gigawatts. In the last decade or so
taining and decommissioning nuclear power plants has
growth has stalled (in 2008 the total global capacity was
become apparent, many have questioned the economics
372.5 gigwatts) with the real possibility of a decline in
of nuclear power relative to other sources of energy.
total capacity. What went wrong and have conditions
Despite these problems, in 2008 nuclear power
changed such that a return to nuclear power is now
accounted for 15 per cent of global electricity gen-
back on the agenda?
eration, but until recently it has been very much an
In short, as the nuclear power industry developed,
option for the developed world, partly because of
expanded and matured it became increasingly appar-
cost and technology, but also because of concerns
ent that the supposed benefits were far outweighed
over the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 1996,
by the environmental problems it posed. Reddish and
OECD member states accounted for 86.6 per cent
Rand (1996: 79) listed four criticisms levelled at nuclear
of total nuclear power production, but by 2005 that
power by environmental groups and these remain the
share had fallen slightly to 83.8 per cent (IEA 2006:
major concerns today:
437). In 2008 the top three countries in terms of
1. Abnormal radiation levels from normal operations nuclear capacity were the United States (27.1 per
will cause cell damage, malignant cancers, genetic cent), France (17.0 per cent) and Japan (12.4 per
diseases, etc. cent). In the same year, nuclear power accounted for
2. Reactor operations and transport of irradiated fuels 76 per cent of total domestic electricity generation
cannot be guaranteed safe against catastrophic in France and 42 per cent in Sweden. Sweden had
accidents. decided to phase out its nuclear power stations and
➜

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 116    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

➜ switch to conventional thermal power stations, but to build nuclear power plants, a decision needs to be
in 2009 it reversed this policy. Germany, by contrast, made now to avoid energy shortages in the future. The
has decided to phase out nuclear power by the early environmental movement remains vehemently against
2020s. However, concerns about climate change nuclear power as it argues that none of the long-
and the associated desire to reduce CO2 emissions, standing problems have been adequately addressed.
plus worries about fossil fuel energy security, means Thus, the nuclear debate is being revisited in the
that many countries remain committed to nuclear United ­Kingdom and elsewhere in the OECD, as the
power. Hedberg et al. (2010: 3) report that at present ­disadvantages of the nuclear option are set against the
55 new reactors are being built in 30 countries, 137 possible benefits it might bring in terms of addressing
are planned and a further 295 are proposed for the climate change and promoting energy security (see
future; there are currently nearly 440 fission reactors Case study 5.2). The UK government is now committed
in operation in 30 countries (for further details visit to building a new generation of ten nuclear power sta-
www.world-nuclear.org). tions, all on the site of existing soon-to-be-decommis-
For the emerging markets of China, India and sioned nuclear stations, but progress is very slow and a
Russia the expansion of nuclear power is seen as a new fleet of power stations now seems unlikely until the
key element of policies to meet the energy demand mid-2020s at the earliest. The United States’ Energy
associated with rapid economic growth. Russia, for Information Administration (EIA 2010: 4) predicts that
example, has a programme to increase the share of electricity generation from nuclear power will increase
nuclear power in electricity generation from 15 per cent from 2.6 trillion kilowatt-hours in 2007, to 3.6 trillion
now to 25 per cent by 2020 and it is also exporting kilowatt-hours in 2020 and 4.5 trillion kilowatt-hours by
nuclear power stations to emerging markets. China has 2035. The strongest growth will be in non-OECD Asia,
set a target to build 40 gigawatts of nuclear generating where nuclear power electricity generation is projected
capacity by 2020 and India has a target of 40 gigawatts to grow at an annual rate of 7.7 per cent a year from
by 2030. Many OECD countries are also reconsider- 2007 to 2035. However, the disaster at Fukushima has
ing the nuclear option because, first, it addresses the increased public concern about the safety of nuclear
need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and second, power and the lessons learnt may increase the costs
increased reliance on imported oil and gas is raising of nuclear power further, calling into doubt its viability.
concerns about energy security. In particular, follow- If nuclear power has fallen from favour again it may
ing supply disruptions in 2006 and 2009 and now the result in even higher levels of fossil fuel consumption
conflict in Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions fol- as power companies turn to coal and gas as a low-cost
lowing the annexation of Crimea, the European Union alternative. Alternatively, it could spur investment in
wishes to reduce its reliance on supplies of natural gas renewable energy, but that will also require advances in
from Russia. Given the high costs and long lead times storage technologies.

● Biomass energy was the very first form of energy crops for biofuel production is either a natural habi-
used by humans and involves the burning of plant tat supporting biodiversity or agricultural land that
and animal residue to produce heat. In much of the could be used for food production. At the same time,
world it is still the traditional source of energy. The increased demand for crops such as corn is increas-
IEA, UNDP and UNIDO (2010: 20) maintains that ing the cost of animal fodder and basic foodstuffs.
there are currently 2.7 billion people in developing Further, much of this production requires the use of
countries who rely for cooking primarily on biomass fertilizers and pesticides that are hydrocarbon-based
used in inefficient devices. In industrially developed and consume considerable amounts of energy when
economies, wood waste from pulp and paper mills they are produced. The net result is that many ‘first
is used to generate heat and electricity, and in some generation’ biofuels may actually consume more
households wood-burning fires are used for space energy to produce than they generate when used
heating, although often more as a lifestyle choice to run a vehicle. So-called ‘second generation’
than out of necessity. More recently, the use of bio- ­b iofuels aim to use non-food feedstock, organic
mass to produce alternative fuels, so-called biofu- waste and algae and may become a viable alterna-
els, has gained popularity in the developed world; tive to fossil fuels. Finally, on a small scale, gas from
but it is increasingly apparent that if not properly landfill sites and from the anaerobic digestion of
managed biofuels production creates as many prob- vegetable waste is also being developed to produce
lems as it solves. The land being taken up to produce bio-methane.

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 Chapter 5  Resources, energy and development    117

● Solar energy is ultimately the source of all energy, with capacity in 2014, China is first with 31 per cent, followed
the exception of nuclear power. Solar energy usually by the United States with 17.8 per cent and Germany with
involves capturing the sun’s rays in order to produce 10.6 per cent (REN21 2015: 135). China is developing
thermal energy to warm buildings, heat hot water or renewable energy at an astonishing pace, as it badly needs
generate steam to produce electricity. Alternatively, pho- new sources of energy that will not aggravate already
tovoltaic cells turn the sun’s rays directly into electricity substantial energy-related environmental problems. It
(solar PV). As the efficiency of solar panels increases also sees the supply of equipment, such as wind turbines
and their cost declines, so solar energy is becoming a and solar PV, as a new growth area for industry for both
viable small-scale local solution at the household or domestic consumption and export.
building level. However, it is subject to daily or sea- ● Hydropower generation also pre-dates the industrial
sonal variations and is weather-dependent, but it can revolution, but dams and hydroelectric schemes have
provide an efficient supplemental source of energy for now replaced the watermills that powered the early
heating domestic hot water, and so on (visit the website machines. In many regions of the world hydroelectric-
of the International Solar Energy Society at www.ises. ity has become an important source of energy, but, in
org). There are now some very ambitious large-scale all but a few cases, Norway being one, it cannot offer
projects aimed at harnessing the sun’s energy and trans- a large-scale solution to a country’s energy needs. The
mitting it via high-voltage transmission lines to centres building of dams to store water and build a ‘head’ to
of demand. The so-called ‘Desertec Concept’ is based drive the turbines that generate the electricity floods
on the proposition that ‘Within 6 hours the deserts large areas of land; it also starves river systems of flow
receive more energy from the sun than humankind con- and damages deltaic and riverine environments. The
sumes in a year’ (www.desertec.org) and it proposes the construction of Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze
development of a network of concentrating solar power River in China involved the displacement of 1.2 million
installations in North Africa to generate electricity for people and the creation of a reservoir occupying 111,000
export to Europe. However, the current political insta- hectares. Other forms of waterpower, such as wave and
bility in North Africa precludes immediate progress tidal power, are also being developed. At present, there
with this project. As the technology improves, energy is only one large-scale commercial tidal power station in
costs increase and the costs of solar energy decrease, it the world, the La Rance Tidal Power Plant in Brittany,
will increasingly become part of the low-carbon energy France. In the UK a proposal to create a tidal lagoon in
solution. Cardiff bay to generate power is being backed by the
● Wind power is of historical significance and has now Government. New forms of wave power and tidal power
made a return in the form of ‘wind farms’. Improved are being developed, such as the Pelamis Wave Energy
design has increased the efficiency of modern windmills Converter, but these are still at the developmental stage.
and they are becoming an increasingly common sight in ● The final form of renewable energy is geothermal
exposed coastal and upland locations in the developed energy. As the name suggests, this form of energy
world. Wind farms can generate electricity for local use uses naturally occurring heat in the earth’s crust
or for the power grid. However, some would argue that and is only really viable in areas of volcanic activity.
modern wind farms lack the aesthetic qualities of tradi- There are two forms of geothermal energy. One is wet-
tional windmills and therefore many see them as a source rock geothermal energy where steam or hot water is
of both visual and noise pollution. In Europe, Germany, trapped from boreholes or surface vents and used to
Spain and the UK currently lead the way in wind power heat buildings or generate electricity. The other is hot–
(EWEA 2014). In September 2010, Vattenfall opened the dry geothermal energy, which is accessed by boreholes
Thanet Offshore Wind Farm, which has 100 wind tur- drilled into hot dry rocks. Water is then forced down
bines and covers an area of 35 square kilometres. At that and the steam used to generate electricity. At present
time it was the largest operational offshore wind farm geothermal energy accounts for about 10 per cent of
anywhere in the world and has a capacity of 300 mega- New Zealand’s electricity production. In global terms,
watts, which has boosted UK offshore wind capacity by it is the United States that produces the most electric-
30 per cent, producing on average enough electricity to ity with geothermal power. In 2009, US geothermal
supply more than 200,000 homes. The UK has plans for power plants produced 15.2 billion kilowatt-hours, or
further offshore wind farms to be built off the coast in 0.4 per cent of total US electricity generation, and
the Thames Estuary, the Greater Wash and the North- seven states have geothermal power plants. At a very
west, and the energy from them is expected to power local scale there is growing interest in using ground-
15 per cent of UK households; however, onshore wind is source heat pumps to heat individual buildings. This
meeting increased opposition and government subsidies technology does not require a geothermal source, but
are being withdrawn early. In terms of total installed wind makes use of renewable energy stored in the ground.

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 118    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

remain, as shown in Table 5.2. Simply because it accounts

for most of the world’s energy consumption, the evolu-
tion of the energy mix tends to be linked to the develop-
ment of the industrialized world where coal was by far
the most important energy resource at the start of the
twentieth century. The oil industry was still in its early
stages; the first modern oil well was drilled in the US state
of Pennsylvania in 1859. Natural gas was not recognized
as a resource at all. Hence, the dominance of coal was not
threatened. Advances in transportation technology, such
as the invention of the jet engine, and the emergence of a
petrochemicals industry triggered a rapid increase in the
demand for oil in the boom years after the Second World
Plate 5.5  Thanet Offshore Wind Farm.
War. In 1950 coal accounted for 61 per cent of the world’s
(Alan Payton/Alamy)
commercial energy consumption with only 27 per cent
coming from oil, by 1970 it was 30 per cent from coal,
In nearly all of the above cases, renewable energy is 44 per cent from oil and 20 per cent from natural gas.
already providing localized, small-scale solutions to energy Even so, the absolute level of global coal production con-
needs but, at present, does not provide a viable alternative tinues to increase at the same time as economic growth
to fossil fuels. That said, the share of renewable energy in in the developed world is increasingly underpinned by
the global energy system is growing rapidly, albeit from a oil and, more recently, by natural gas. The recent ‘dash-
low base and there are places where it is making significant for-gas’ in the developed world was driven by a desire
inroads – for example in Germany, where its growth fol- to reduce dependence on oil imported from the Middle
lows a decision to move away from nuclear power. In 2013 East and the fact that electricity generation using natu-
renewable energy, including large-scale hydroelectricity, ral gas generates less greenhouse gases. Thus, in the past
accounted for 19.1 per cent of global final energy con- hundred years, the energy mix in the industrialized world
sumption, this includes 10.1 per cent for modern renewa- has undergone two major transitions, from coal to oil and
bles and 9 per cent for traditional biomass (REN21 2015: from oil to gas. In 2014, in the OECD, oil accounted for
6). The challenge is to ‘scale up’ modern renewable energy 37 per cent of primary energy consumption, natural gas
production to provide a low-carbon alternative. This can 26.1 per cent and coal 19.1 per cent (BP 2015: 41).
take the form of large-scale centralised systems, like an The energy mix in the developing world is somewhat
offshore wind farm or a concentrating solar array, or different (see Table  5.2). For the most part it remains
decentralised generation within individual households and more reliant upon oil for its commercial energy and in
buildings. At present, most of these alternatives require some regions coal remains the dominant resource. For
considerable capital investment and access to advanced example, China in 2014 accounted for 50.6 per cent of
technology and they do not, therefore, offer an obvious global coal consumption that produced 66 per cent of
solution to the fast-growing energy needs of the ‘devel- its primary energy consumption (BP 2015). Over the
oping world’. To provide a more global solution, those past few years China has met its growing energy needs
technologies, and the finance to purchase them, will need by burning even more coal, raising obvious concerns
to be made available to the regions experiencing the most about climate change. Elsewhere, dependence upon oil
rapid increases in energy demand, i.e. the global south. has made countries in the developing world particu-
The rapid fall in solar PV costs thanks to the expansion of larly vulnerable to sudden periodic increases in oil price
production in China is already having a significant impact over the past three decades, but they lack the capital
on the growth of solar power across the world. If similar and technology to develop their own energy potential
developments can deliver low-cost electricity storage, then or to diversify their energy mix. However, as it depletes
a renewable solution to energy access in the global south its own sources of oil and gas the developed world has
may be possible. become increasingly dependent upon supplies from the
developing world. Historically, the international oil com-
panies (IOCs) were the key actors delivering the energy
5.2.3 The changing energy mix
resources of the developing world, but increasingly the
The balance between the various sources of energy is governments of the oil-producing states have seized con-
known as the energy mix. During the last century it has trol over their oil and gas industries. Now IOCs, such
changed substantially, but substantial regional variation as BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total and Shell, work in

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 Chapter 5  Resources, energy and development    119

Table 5.2  Regional variations in energy balance, 2014 (per cent of total consumption)

Oil Natural gas Coal Nuclear HEP Renewables Per cent of total world

European Union 36.8 21.6 16.7 12.3 5.2 7.4 12.5

OECD 37.0 26.1 19.1 8.2 5.7 3.9 42.5
NON-OECD 29.3 22.0 38.1 1.7 7.6 1.4 57.5
North America 36.3 30.7 17.3 7.7 5.4 2.6 21.8
Europe & Eurasia 30.3 32.1 16.8 9.4 6.9 4.4 21.9
S. & C. America 47.1 22.1 4.6 0.7 22.4 3.1 5.4
Africa 42.7 25.7 23.5 0.9 6.6 0.7 3.2
Middle East 47.5 50.6 1.2 0.1 0.6 – 6.4
Asia-Pacific 26.8 11.4 52.0 1.5 6.4 1.8 41.3
World 32.6 23.7 30.0 4.4 6.8 2.5 100.0
Includes commercially traded fuels only. Therefore excludes wood, peat and animal waste as fuels. Also excluded is wind,
geothermal and solar power.
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2015: 41) (also available at: www.bp.com)

partnership with regimes whose human rights records are reflect the energy legacies of the post-socialist states in
condemned by governments and NGOs in the developed Central Europe and the former Soviet Union while in
world – the most high-profile case being Shell in Nigeria. the developing world China and India are the new major
Furthermore, the most attractive oilfields are reserved for emitters. The past decade has seen a global shift in the
the national oil companies (NOCs) of the reserve-holding energy system. Population growth and economic develop-
states. The age of ‘easy oil’ is over for the IOCs and they ment in countries like Brazil, India and China is driving
must now make do with access to the most technologi- up energy demand, while the developed economies are
cally and environmentally challenging fields. Rising costs seeking reduced levels of energy consumption. This dif-
and falling prices are leading many to question the future ferential growth rate, together with the decline in indig-
prospects for the IOCs. enous production in the developed world, has major
implications for global geopolitics (Klare 2008).
There are three elements to the geography of energy
5.2.4 The changing geography of energy production production: the global distribution of reserves and
and consumption production, the distribution of consumption, and the
Whereas in 1950 North America, Europe and the Soviet resultant pattern of trade between energy-surplus and
Union accounted for nearly 90 per cent of world energy energy-deficit regions. As noted earlier, the potential to
demand, by 1990 their share had fallen to two-thirds produce coal, oil and natural gas is geologically deter-
(Jones and Hollier 1997: 181). In 1997 the member states mined, but the actual exploitation of a deposit depends
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and on numerous factors (for a more detailed discussion,
Development (OECD) accounted for 58.4 per cent of see Bradshaw et al. 2015). Reserve to production ratios
global energy consumption but by 2006 this had fallen to (how long current reserves would last at current rates of
50.1 per cent and by 2014 to 42.5 per cent (Table 5.2). The production) for the three fossil fuels show that coal is
redistribution of energy consumption has not been due the most abundant fossil fuel, followed by natural gas
to decline in the developed world, although during the and then oil. World reserves of coal at the end of 2014
1990s this was the case in the so-called ‘transition econo- would last 110 years at current rates of consumption, cur-
mies’, but to increased demand in the developing world rent oil reserves would last 52.5 years, and natural gas
(Table 5.3). There are substantial variations in terms of reserves 54.1 years (BP 2015). While the OECD coun-
level of per capita energy use and energy and carbon tries have more than sufficient coal to meet their needs,
intensity, with high-income countries having by far the it is these economies that have most reduced their reli-
highest level of energy use. The high usage levels in the ance upon coal, making the developed world dependent
middle-income countries and in Europe and Eurasia upon the very fuels for which it has the lowest reserve to

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 120    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Table 5.3  Energy consumption, efficiency and carbon intensity in 2011

GDP per unit of energy CO2 emissions per

use (2011 ppp $/kg oil Energy use per capita unit of GDP (kg per
equivalent) 2011 (kg oil equivalent) 2011 2011 $ of GDP) 2011

World 7.3 1,890 0.4

Low income -- 40.2 0.2
Middle income 6.8 74.2 0.4
Lower middle income 7.9 64.0 0.3
Upper middle income 6.4 79.5 0.5
High income 7.9 4,877 0.3
East Asia & Pacific 5.6 1,671 0.6
Europe & Central Asia 6.3 2,080 0.4
Latin America & Caribbean 10.6 1,292 0.2
Middle East & N. Africa 8.3 1,376 0.3
South Asia 8.1 555 0.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.6 681 0.3
Euro Area 10.7 3,485 0.2
China 4.9 2,029 0.7
United States 7.1 7,032 0.4
United Kingdom 12.3 2,973 0.2
India 7.8 614 0.4
Source: World Bank (2015d) World Bank Development Indicators 2015 (also available at: www.worldbank.org )

production ratios, i.e. oil and gas. This has been reduced Likewise, North Sea production falls well short of meet-
in North America by the development of unconventional ing Europe’s demand for oil and is now past its peak
oil and gas, but Europe and Asia are likely to become ever production. The result is a movement of oil production
more dependent upon imported oil and gas. The Mid- dominated by Middle Eastern supply to Europe and
dle East still accounts for the majority of the world’s oil North America and substantial movements to China and
reserves – 47.7 per cent at the end of 2014, with a reserve Japan (Figure 5.7).
to production ratio of 77.8 years (BP 2015: 6). Natural The major exporters and importers of natural gas are
gas reserves are dominated by the Middle East and the listed in Table 5.5, while Figure 5.8 shows the movements
former Soviet Union where three countries, Iran, Russia of natural gas. The less ‘transportable’ nature of natu-
and Qatar, account for 48.7 per cent of global reserves ral gas is clearly shown in Figure 5.8; for the most part
(BP 2015: 20). Thus, a large share of the world’s oil and there is a balance within each region, excepting Africa
gas reserves are in regions that are presently perceived to and the former Soviet Union (Russia and Turkmenistan),
be politically and/or economically unstable by the major which have a surplus of natural gas, and Europe, which
importing states. has a deficit. Natural gas supply into Europe is via pipe-
The diagrams shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 compare line from West Siberia (Russia) and North Africa or as
the share of world production and consumption of oil LNG from North Africa. At present most of this LNG
and gas by major region. Asia-Pacific, Europe and North originates from the Asia-Pacific region, but this is chang-
America are the major deficit regions, Africa, the Mid- ing as supply from the Middle East (Qatar) to Asia and
dle East, the former Soviet Union and South and Central from the west coast of Africa to Europe increases, and as
America are the major surplus regions. Despite being the new projects come online in Australia. The recent rapid
second largest producer in 1997, the United States still growth of unconventional gas production, which has seen
imports almost as much oil as it produces (Table 5.4). the US pass Russia as the world’s largest gas producer, has

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 Chapter 5  Resources, energy and development    121

Asia Pacific

Africa

Middle East

Europe & Eurasia % consumption

% production

S. & Cent. America

Figure 5.5  Distribution

of oil production and North America
consumption in 2014.
Source: BP Statistical Review 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
of World Energy 2015 (2015: % world
10–11) (also available at: www.
bp.com)

Asia Pacific

Africa
% consumption
% production
Middle East

Europe & Eurasia

S. & Cent. America

Figure 5.6  Distribution

of natural gas production North America
and consumption in
2014.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Source: BP Statistical Review of % world
World Energy 2015 (2015: 22–3)
(also available at: www.bp.com)

dramatically reduced the need for the US to import gas Energy Research Associates put the cost of production
and the US should be exporting LNG by the end of 2015. in the Middle East as low as US$2/barrel (The Econo-
These geographies of production and consump- mist, 4 March 1999: 29). That same report estimated the
tion arise from a complex interaction of economic and cost of production in Indonesia at US$6, Venezuela and
political factors. Not surprisingly, there are substantial Nigeria at US$7, Mexico at US$10, the United States and
regional differences in the cost of oil production. The the North Sea at US$11 and Russia at US$14. The recent
record-low oil prices of the late 1990s focused attention period of high oil price promoted exploration activity in
upon the actual cost of producing oil and Cambridge high-cost locations, such as the deep water offshore in the

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 122    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Table 5.4  Producers, exporters and importers of crude oil (million tonnes)

Exporters in Importers in
Producers in 2013 Mt % of world 2012 Mt 2012 Mt

Saudi Arabia 540 13.1 Saudi Arabia 371 United States 442
Russia 525 12.8 Russia 239 China 269
United States 440 10.7 Nigeria 124 India 185
China 208 5.1 Iraq 119 Japan 179
Canada 193 4.7 UAE 118 Korea 128
Kuwait 16 4.0 Kuwait 103 Germany 93
Venezuela 155 3.8 Venezuela 93 Italy 74
UAE 153 3.7 Canada 90 Spain 60
Iraq 153 3.7 Angola 84 Netherlands 57
Iran 151 3.7 Mexico 66 France 57
Rest of World 1,434 34.7 Rest of World 578 Rest of World 507
World 4,117 100 World 1,985 World 2,051
Source: OECD/IEA (2014) Key World Energy Statistics 2014 (also available at: www.iea.org)

31.9 296.4

45.8
22.0 15.6

18.1 78.4
167.7 101.6 157.0
16.9
39.0 26.5 59.5 30.8 171.7

41.8 53.3 27.3

93.0 19.6 26.8 19.9
63.7 79.2 25.4 121.1
47.4
237.0

37.5

18.2
USA 22.8
Canada
Mexico 28.9
S&C America
Europe & Eurasia 57.4
34.4
Middle East
37.2
Africa
Asia Pacific

Figure 5.7  Major oil trade movements in 2014 (Million tonnes).

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 (2015: 19) (also available at: www.bp.com)

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 Chapter 5  Resources, energy and development    123

Table 5.5  Producers, exporters and importers1 of natural gas (billion cubic metres)

Producers in 2013 BCM % of world Exporters in 2013 BCM Importers in 2013 BCM

United States 689 19.8 Russia 203 Japan 123

Russia 671 19.3 Qatar 121 Germany 76
Qatar 161 4.6 Norway 103 Italy 62
Iran 159 4.6 Canada 54 Korea 53
Canada 155 4.5 Algeria 45 China 49
China 115 3.3 Turkmenistan 45 Turkey 45
Norway 109 3.1 Netherlands 40 France 43
Netherlands 86 2.5 Indonesia 35 United Kingdom 39
Saudi Arabia 84 2.4 Australia 26 United States 37
Algeria 80 2.3 Nigeria 22 Spain 30
Rest of World 1170 33.6 Rest of World 156 Rest of World 279
World 3479 100.0 World 850 World 836
1
Exports and imports include pipeline gas and LNG
Source: OECD/IEA (2014) Key World Energy Statistics 2014 (also available at: www.iea.org)

120.8

39.8

26.9 24.2
35.7 11.5
74.6
21.8 10.5 27.2
3.1 25.5
23.7 13.2
14.2 5.2 25.0
4.1 6.5 28.3
5.8 7.7
20.5
34.0
20.1 8.5
7.5
9.7
17.0

1.9 6.6
5.7

11.1 6.5
USA
3.4
Canada
Mexico
S&C America
Europe & Eurasia
Middle East Pipeline gas
Africa LNG
Asia Pacific

Figure 5.8  Major trade movements in natural gas 2010 (billion cubic metres).
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 (2015: 29) (also available at: www.bp.com)

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 124    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Gulf of Mexico and off the coast of Brazil. It was also and used the oil embargo to punish the industrialized
essential to the dramatic development of unconventional West for supporting Israel in the Arab–Israeli war the
oil and gas in North America, which itself is relatively price of oil rapidly escalated. The first oil shock was
expensive to produce. This prompts two questions: why followed by another in 1979–80 following the Iranian
develop high-cost fields and unconventional resources Revolution and a mini-shock in 1990–1 because of the
when the Middle East has massive reserves and very low Gulf War (see Figure 5.9). Following the second shock
production costs, and what will be the consequences of a prices started to decline. There were at least three rea-
prolonged period of lower oil and gas prices? sons: first, high energy costs promoted conservation;
The answers lie in the realms of geopolitics as much second, the high price of oil and the actions of OPEC
as economics (see Klare 2008). Prior to the first oil promoted production by high-cost non-OPEC produc-
shock of 1973–4 the industrialized world had become ers; and third, recession and economic restructuring
increasingly dependent upon supplies of cheap oil from reduced the growth of demand in the developed world.
the Middle East (Odell 1989). When the Middle East- As a response to very low prices, OPEC members agreed
ern oil producers formed OPEC (the Organization of to cut back production, which, combined with global
Petroleum Exporting Countries, see www.opec.org) economic recovery, saw prices recover by 1999. However,

Growth of Venezuelan production

Discovery of Spindletop, Texas

East Texas field discovered

Netback pricing introduced

Sumatra production began
Russian oil exports began

Fears of shortage in USA

Loss of Iranian supplies

Pennsylvanian oil boom

Post-war reconstruction

Asian financial crisis

Iraq invaded Kuwait
Iranian revolution
Yom Kippur war

Invasion of Iraq

‘Arab spring’
Suez crisis

130
120
110
100
90
US dollars per barrel

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1861–69

1870–79

1880–89

1890–99

1900–09

1910–19

1920–29

1930–39

1940–49

1950–59

1960–69

1970–79

1980–89

1990–99

2000–09

2010–19

$ 2014 $ money of the day

1861–1944 US average
1945–1983 Arabian Light posted at Ras Tanura
1984–2014 Brent dated

Figure 5.9  Historical trends in world crude oil prices, 1861–2014.

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 (2015:15) (also available at: www.bp.com)

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 Chapter 5  Resources, energy and development    125

subsequent events dramatically illustrate the volatile principally China and India, plus tight supply as a result
nature of oil and gas markets. of underinvestment in the previous decade and continued
In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, a global eco- instability in the Middle East all contributed to a short-
nomic downturn kept oil prices low. Then the global term ‘supply gap’. By mid-2008 a combination of tight
geopolitical situation changed dramatically with the markets and financial speculation in oil futures pushed
war in Afghanistan and then the second Iraq War. But the price to a record US$147 a barrel. Then the collapse
despite this, a surge in demand from emerging markets, of Lehman Brothers triggered a global financial crisis,

Case study 5.2

Energy security national governments to devise policies to promote

energy security. These may take the form of seek-
At present, the United States – with something less ing to promote energy conservation, promoting other
than 5 per cent of the world’s total population – con- sources of energy supply, promoting cooperation with,
sumes about 25 per cent of the world’s total supply of and investing in, oil- and gas-producing states (often via
oil. In 2025, if current trends persist, we will be con- support for the activities of state and private oil compa-
suming half as much petroleum again as we do today;
nies) and in extremis taking military action to protect the
however, domestic production will be no greater than
supply of oil. Many would argue that since the so-called
it is today, and so the entire increase in consumption –
approximately 10 million barrels of oil a day – will have ‘Carter Doctrine’ of 1979, when President Jimmy Carter,
to be supplied by foreign producers. And because we in the wake of the Soviet invasion of A ­ fghanistan (see
can’t really control what goes on in those countries, Spotlight box 20.1, p. 412), ‘declared that any move
we become hostage to their capacity to ensure an by a hostile power to acquire control over the Gulf
uninterrupted flow of petroleum. region would be regarded “as an assault on the vital
interests of the United States of America”, which would
Klare (2004: 11)
be opposed “by any means including military force”’
A generally accepted definition of ‘energy security’ (quoted from Rutledge 2006: 48), US foreign policy in
is the reliable supply of energy at reasonable prices. the Middle East has been all about oil (Harvey 2003;
As we know from discussions earlier in this chapter, Klare 2004). Both President Bush and Prime Minister
resource scarcity is seldom about the physical short- Blair denied that the invasion of Iraq was motivated by
age of a particular resource: this is particularly true of a desire to secure Iraqi oil production; even if it was, it
oil and gas. When the first edition of this book was in failed as Iraqi production is now lower than before the
preparation we were in a period of very low oil prices; war and this is helping to keep the oil price up. Whatever
today we face sustained higher oil prices. Furthermore, the motivations for military intervention in the Middle
there seems to be a growing consensus that in the East and North Africa, it is a fact that the international
longer term we have to reduce our reliance on the oil market is dependent on supplies of oil from that
consumption of hydrocarbons to avoid the more cata- region. Thus, even if the USA is less dependent on
strophic consequences of climate change. physical imports of oil, it is still exposed to volatility in
Despite the global economic crisis, we seem to be the global oil market, which determines the price of its
experiencing a period of pressure on global oil supplies own crude oil. The civil war in Syria and the emergence
because of increased demand from growing econo- of the so-called Islamic State poses a new threat to
mies, such as China and India, combined with supply the stability of the oil-exporting states in the region. At
interruptions caused by hurricanes and oil leaks in the same time, Europe is seeking to reduce its reliance
the Gulf of Mexico, labour unrest in Nigeria, declining on imported energy from Russia, a determination that
production in long-established fields and delays in bring- has been further advanced by ­Russia’s annexation of
ing on new fields. Thus, there is increased competition Crimea and the continuing conflict in eastern Ukraine
for access to supplies of oil and gas. Furthermore, an that has resulted in sanctions being imposed on Russia.
increasing share of the oil and gas consumed by the The combination of concerns about the geopolitical
developed world (OECD) is imported from non-OECD dimension of energy security, becoming increasingly
and OPEC suppliers, particularly in the Middle East. reliant on unreliable and potentially hostile sources of
In such a context, it seems that it is the business of supply, climate change, and the need to reduce levels
➜

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 126    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

➜ of hydrocarbon consumption, have created a new all consumers stability resides in the stability of this
energy paradigm (Helm 2007) and have also prompted market.
a need to rethink the concept of energy security ● The importance of information that underpins well-
(Yergin 2006). As Daniel Yergin (2006: 70) put it in a functioning markets.
highly influential article in the journal Foreign Affairs:
In addition to these principles, Yergin (2006: 70) main-
‘a wider approach [to energy security] is now required
tains that there is a need to recognize the globalization
that takes into account the rapid evolution of global
of the energy security system, which means that the
energy trade, supply-chain vulnerabilities, terrorism,
developed world must engage with the likes of China
and the integration of major new economies in the
and India, and a need to expand the concept of energy
world market.’ According to Yergin, this new approach
security to include the entire energy supply chain and
or framework must abide by the following principles:
infrastructure. In the longer term, it may be the case that
● Diversification of supply to reduce the impact of a the solution lies in developing an alternative to today’s
disruption in supply from one source. hydrocarbon economy; however, for the next 30 years or
● A ‘security margin’ in the energy supply system more we will depend on oil and gas for the majority of
that provides a buffer against shocks and facilitates our energy needs and the competition for increasingly
recovery after disruptions. scarce resources means that concerns about energy
● Recognition of the ‘reality of integration’, that there is security can only grow. Next time you switch on the
only one global oil complex and a worldwide system light think about the complex set of issues that now lies
that moves 86 million barrels of oil every day. For behind keeping the lights on!

demand fell and by the end of the year the price was manufacturing as the major generators of wealth. At the
below US$40 a barrel. It then recovered and for a while same time, conservation and technological change has
was relatively stable around the US$100 a barrel mark. made industry more energy-efficient. Similarly, a change in
The average price between 2011 and 2014 was US$ 107.65; transportation technology has increased energy efficiency;
however, in mid-2014 the price started to fall to a low of as a result, today’s post-industrial societies have decou-
US$45 in January 2015. In early 2016 it was less than $30 pled the link between economic growth and increased
a barrel with little prospect of a revival. The cause of the energy consumption. That said, it is still the case that the
latest slump is at least three-fold: the growth of uncon- developed world consumes a large amount of the world’s
ventional oil production in North America; the unwill- energy, although non-OECD primary energy consumption
ingness of Saudi Arabia to cut back production; and the surpassed that of the OECD for the first time in 2008.
continued weak demand for oil. The current situation is
a challenge for many oil exporting states, but a bonus for 5.3.1 Energy consumption, economic development
oil importing states and consumers; it also highlights the and climate change
complex relationship between energy consumption and
economic development and the volatility of energy prices. The relationship between energy consumption and eco-
nomic development is usually depicted as a scatter plot
showing the level of per capita energy consumption on
one axis and gross national product (GNP) per capita
5.3 Energy and development on the other (Figure 5.10). The chart shows that the higher
the level of GNP per capita the higher the level of energy
The experience of the developed world suggests that in consumption. Obvious outliers are easily explained away:
the initial phases of industrialization there is a direct link some countries, such as the Soviet-type economies that
between increased energy consumption and economic had a bias towards heavy industry and were notoriously
development. That is, as industrial activity grows it con- wasteful in their use of energy traditionally had higher
sumes more and more energy. However, in the past 40 levels of energy consumption than GNP. Others, such as
years it has become increasingly apparent that in the devel- Japan, have low levels of energy consumption but high
oped world the relationship between economic develop- GNP because they introduced energy-saving technologies
ment and energy consumption has changed. This is largely at an early stage and moved energy-intensive industry off-
due to the processes of de-industrialization and economic shore. Finally, there are some countries, such as Canada,
restructuring that have seen the less energy-intensive ser- where climatic extremes (both hot and cold) require a
vice sector replace heavy industry and, to a lesser degree, large amount of energy to be used for heating or for air

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 Chapter 5  Resources, energy and development    127

10000

Czech Rep. Japan

Energy consumption per capita
Korea Rep.
1000 Syria
Brazil

Guatemala
Nigeria
100
Guinea

Cambodia
Burkina Faso
10
100 1000 10000 100000
GDP per capita

Figure 5.10  Relationship between energy consumption and economic growth.

conditioning. There are also other factors, for example one-quarter. Most future emissions growth will come
the more urbanised a country the higher its level of per from today’s developing countries, because of their more
capita energy consumption. Finally, the size of a country rapid population and GDP growth and their increasing
may determine the amounts of energy that are required share of energy-intensive industries.
to move between places. Such an argument could be mar-
It suggests that we need to ‘decarbonise’ development
shalled to explain the very high levels of energy consump-
so that the developing world can enjoy the benefits of
tion in the United States, as could climatic factors, but the
economic growth without substantially increasing global
average American household also consumes more energy
CO2 emissions. A report on ‘Development and Climate
than anywhere else in the world.
Change’ echoes this sentiment and highlights the impor-
On the face of it the relationship between energy
tance of ensuring that the developing countries do not
consumption and economic development seems unprob-
get ‘locked in’ to the development of high-carbon energy
lematic. However, the whole question of what stands for
infrastructures (World Bank 2010: 190).
‘development’ is itself contested (as Chapter 8 reveals).
The historical relationship between industrialization
The measurements used in Figure  5.10 systematically
and energy consumption implies that all the countries
understate the relative position of the developing world.
of the developing world will eventually follow an energy
First, because the use of commercial energy as a meas-
and development trajectory similar to the developed
ure of energy consumption ignores the role of non-
world. Thus, the patterns of energy and development
commercial biomass energy sources, it therefore only
can be equated to a stage model of the kind proposed
measures the ‘modern’ sectors of the economy. Second,
by W.W. Rostow (Figure 5.11). This model examines the
the monetary measure of GNP per capita inadequately
change in the energy ratio (the relationship between
measures the ‘human condition’ in many of the world’s
the rate of change in energy consumption and the rate
poorest countries. That said, a more representative meas-
of change in economic growth) over time as an econ-
ure would only move them slightly ‘up the curve’ and it
omy develops (Mather and Chapman 1995: 154). In the
would not modify the clear relationship between indus-
pre-industrial phase the energy ratio is less than one,
trialization and energy consumption. The Stern Review
as these are ‘low-energy’ societies mainly dependent
(2006: xi) into the economics of climate change notes:
on subsistence agriculture. As discussed earlier (also
CO2 emissions per head have been strongly correlated see Chapter 2), the industrial revolution resulted in a
with GDP per head. As a result, since 1950, North change in the relationship between society and resource
America and Europe have produced around 70 per cent consumption; harnessing new sources of energy was at
of all the CO2 emissions due to energy production, the heart of this process. As economies industrialize, the
while developing countries have accounted for less than energy ratio begins to exceed one. In the early phases of

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 128    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

High

ies
untr
co
ed Slow growth
op or reduced
energy use

el
ev
Energy ratio < 1.0

D
Energy use

Energy ratio 1.0

es
tri
un
co
g
in
p Energy ratio > 1.0
e lo
ev
D

Energy ratio < 1.0

Low
Pre-industrial Industrial Post-industrial

Development over time

Figure 5.11  Energy ratios and economic development.

Source: Environmental Resources, Mather, A.S. and Chapman, K., Pearson Education Limited © Prentice Hall (1995)

industrialization energy efficiency is low and economies energy demand and sustaining energy prices. With that
are dominated by energy-intensive industries. As the have come increased CO2 emissions, making the energy
industrial economy matures so the energy ratio declines needs of these emerging economies a major obstacle in
due to increased efficiency, increased energy costs, or global climate change negotiations. There are signs that
the actual decline in the level of economic activity. This China is now moving out of this energy-intensive phase
stage is typified by the developed world during the 1970s. as its economy restructures and in 2014 demand for coal
Eventually, the economy moves into a post-industrial fell 3 per cent and emissions fell for the first time since
phase and the ratio falls below one. If the model seems 1999 (IEA 2014). Meanwhile, as noted earlier, a much big-
very familiar, it is much like that for demographic transi- ger question mark hangs over the developing world. Is it
tion (see Chapter 4) because it describes the evolution of inevitable that it will have to industrialize to improve liv-
the energy economy as it actually occurred in Western ing standards? If so, then access to energy resources and/
Europe and the United States. or energy-saving and low-carbon technologies will have
What evidence is there that the rest of the world will to be a central component of the development agenda in
inevitably pass through the same stages? It could justi- the twenty-first century. Furthermore, as we have seen
fiably be argued that the newly industrialized countries in this chapter, many of those same countries are also
(NICs) of Asia have followed this pattern of industri- likely to be the major suppliers of oil and gas and other
alization; however, the time taken has been compressed minerals and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that
as the NICs have tried to diversify their economies and such resource-based development often fails to provide a
promote service sector growth without the advantage sustainable basis for improving living standards (see Case
of substantial indigenous energy resources, a fact that study 5.3) and can generate conflict and instability. The
has made them vulnerable to the effects of energy price first decade of the twenty-first century suggests that the
volatility. At present it is the rapidly growing energy global shift in economic growth and energy demand is
demands of the emerging economies such as China, generating a whole series of new challenges to the exist-
India and Brazil that is driving the growth in global ing world order.

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 Chapter 5  Resources, energy and development    129

Case study 5.3

Resource abundance: blessing pattern of economic development. In some instances

or curse? there is also a tendency to use resource income
to subsidize and protect the activity of inefficient
From all that has been said in this chapter, one would producers in the non-resource sector. Later, when
assume that having a relative abundance of natural the resource income dwindles and the economy
resources would convey an advantage in terms of pros- is opened up to international competition, these
pects for economic development. However, the reality is inefficient producers then fail.
somewhat different. There is now substantial evidence ■ In many instances, often as a consequence of a colo-
to suggest that resource-abundant economies have nial heritage, the resource economy remains relatively
actually performed worse in terms of rates of economic isolated from the rest of the economy. This minimizes
development than resource-poor economies. The geog- the multiplier impact of large-scale resource-based
rapher Richard Auty (1993, 2001) was the first to term investment projects, beyond their payment of taxes.
this phenomenon the ‘resource curse thesis’. Sachs One solution is to impose a ‘local content’ require-
and Warner (2001) have weighed up the evidence and ment on the resources companies, forcing them to
conclude that there is sufficient evidence to suggest use local suppliers of goods and services. However,
that ‘high resource intensity tends to correlate with slow given the relative lack of ‘economic development’ in
growth’. In other words, economies that have a high many resource economies it is often difficult to source
degree of dependence on the resource sector tend to goods and services locally.
grow more slowly than resource-poor economies. While ■ The increase in export income associated with a
the ‘resource curse thesis’ is now generally accepted, resource boom tends to result in a strengthening of
there are exceptions to the rule, those usually cited the value of the domestic currency of the resource
being Botswana, Chile and Malaysia, and there is no economy. This can have the effect of making the cost
single explanation for this underperformance. Sachs of domestic production in the agricultural and manu-
and Warner suggest that most forms of explanation facturing sectors higher than the cost of imports. This
follow some form of ‘crowding out’ logic, whereby the is known as ‘Dutch Disease’ following the experience
dominant resource sector inhibits the development of of the Netherlands; the net result is a decline in the
the non-resource sector. Resource economies are par- competitiveness of the non-resource sector, which
ticularly susceptible to fluctuations in income because of aggravates the problems discussed above.
the volatility of resource prices, added to which, as we ■ Finally, there is increasing evidence that suggests that
know from earlier discussions, the resource base itself a sudden influx of resource income tends to promote
is often soon depleted. Once the ‘resource boom’ is over, crime and corruption, armed conflict and an abuse of
the economy is not sufficiently developed or diversified human rights. Such problems not only have a direct
to sustain living standards and a period of ‘bust’ often impact on the welfare of individuals, but also promote
follows. Such a ‘boom and bust’ cycle is by no means increased social inequality and undermine the effec-
inevitable: effective government policy can use resource tiveness of the state (see Ross 2001; Renner 2002;
income to promote a more diversified economy that can Le Billon 2007).
sustain living standards once the boom has passed. A
The continuing underperformance of resource-
review of the literature (Stevens 2003) suggests that
rich economies has led the World Bank and the
there are number of dimensions to the ‘resource curse’
major resource companies to reassess the impacts
(though Stevens favours the term ‘resource impact’):
of resource development. The World Bank through
■ In many resource-rich economies there has been a its Extractive Industries Review (www.eireview.org) is
failure to save income during boom periods to cover reconsidering whether it should be promoting resource-
periods of bust (some states have created so-called based development as a means of improving living
‘stabilization funds’ to save for a rainy day), plus a standards and promoting sustainable development.
tendency to spend income on consumption (usually The EIR’s final report, called Striking a Better Balance,
through increased imports) and on prestige projects. concludes: ‘the Extractive Industries Review believes
■ There is also a failure to redeploy income from the that there is still a role for the World Bank Group in the
resource sector to promote a more sustainable oil, gas and mining sectors – but only if its intervention
➜

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 130    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

➜ allows extractive industries to contribute to poverty alle- revenues from oil, gas and mining.’ High oil and gas
viation through sustainable development and that can prices and concerns about energy security have also
only happen if the right conditions are in place’. The EIR promoted increased oil and gas activity off the shores
was prompted by the World Bank’s decision to finance of West Africa and elsewhere (Gary and Karl 2003;
the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) Rowell et al. 2005; Ghazvinian 2007) as the developed
pipeline from landlocked Azerbaijan to the Mediterra- and emerging economies (China in particular) seek to
nean coast of Turkey. The collapse of the Soviet Union gain control of sources of energy (Bradshaw 2009).
has prompted a dash to gain access to new energy Sustained high energy prices are resulting in a new
resources in the Caspian and Central Asia, and more influx of resource revenues and the expansion of oil
recently in Siberia and the Russian Far East (Kleveman and gas production into new areas will create a new set
2003). The BTC pipeline also prompted the UK govern- of resource-abundant economies and regions; NGOs
ment to champion the Extractive Industries Transpar- such as Revenue Watch (www.revenuewatch.org) are
ency Initiative (http://eiti.org/), which is ‘a coalition of now closely monitoring the flow of revenues arising from
governments, companies, civil society groups, investors these new resource projects (see Caspian Revenue
and international organizations. The EITI now includes Watch 2003). The dangers of the resource curse are
23 countries and supports improved governance in now well recognized, but only time will tell if the inter-
resource-rich countries through the full publication and national community can assist the newly resource-rich
verification of company payments and government economies to avoid the pitfalls of the past.

The unconventional oil and gas revolution in North

5.4  onclusions: global energy
C America has certainly reduced import dependence, but
dilemmas it is also creating a new set of environmental problems,
particularly oil sands in western Canada. The developed
This chapter has considered the nature of resources world can afford to seek technological solutions to its
through a detailed study of the relationship between energy dilemma and it is essential that it achieves very
energy and economic development. We conclude by substantial reductions in fossil fuel consumption and
considering the world’s energy dilemmas. It is not just GHG emissions to create the atmospheric ‘headroom’
a matter of whether or not there is access to sufficient needed for the developing world to improve its living
energy resources to meet demand; rather, it is a question standards and constrain global warming to 2°C.
as to whether the global ecosystem can absorb the con- In the original global energy dilemmas framework
sequences of continued increases in energy production presented in previous editions and elsewhere (Bradshaw
and consumption. Put simply, at the global scale and to 2009, 2014), the post-socialist transition economies were
avoid catastrophic climate change, can an energy system identified as a separate group. However, it is more than
that delivers secure, affordable and equitable energy ser- 25 years since the collapse of the Berlin wall and being
vices that are also environmentally benign be created? ‘post-socialist’ no longer unifies this group of coun-
The exact nature of the energy dilemma varies across tries. In Central Europe most have joined the European
the globe, so there is no single energy dilemma, nor a Union and are fast becoming ‘high-energy societies’
universal solution (for further discussion of global energy with their attendant problems. The southern periphery
dilemmas, see Bradshaw 2014). of the Caucasus and Central Asia now rank among the
In the developed market economies (including the low- and middle-income economies of the world and
Asian NICs), the energy dilemma relates to the economic some of them are resource-abundant economics. Both
and political costs of geopolitical scarcity and the envi- Belarus and Ukraine find themselves caught between an
ronmental impacts of high levels of GHG (greenhouse expanded European Union and an increasing belligerent
gas) emissions (see Table 5.1). Increasingly, these econo- Russia, whose annexation of Crimea has heightened ten-
mies are finding themselves dependent upon what they sions with the international community and resulted in
perceive to be ‘hostile’ and ‘unstable’ sources of energy economic sanctions, some of which are targeted at the
supply. The response has been to develop high-cost con- energy sector.
ventional and unconventional resources close to home, Russia faces its own particular set of energy dilemmas
to promote increased efficiency and conservation and to (Bradshaw 2014). It remains the world’s largest producer
seek low-carbon alternatives, such as renewable energy. and exporter of hydrocarbons, but its domestic economy

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 Chapter 5  Resources, energy and development    131

is still woefully inefficient and the state is dependent upon huge potential for consumption-driven energy demand to
oil and gas revenues. It could pursue a path of economic increase, through car ownership, for example. Thus, the
modernisation, diversification and energy efficiency, but energy dilemma for these fast-growing economies relates,
it seems more likely to continue its path of fossil fuel on the one hand, to securing the necessary energy to fuel
dependence, which will mean investment in both uncon- continued economic development; while, on the other
ventional oil and Arctic oil and gas. However, it will also hand, ensuring that increased energy consumption does
need to find new markets as Europe seeks to reduce it not result in further environmental degradation and rapid
consumption of fossil fuels and its reliance on Russia in growth of GHG emissions.
particular. This is well understood in Moscow and Rus- In the developing world a dualistic pattern of resource
sia’s ‘Asian Energy Pivot’ is well underway with an oil consumption seems to have developed in relation to
pipeline to the Pacific and a new pipeline – the Power of energy. On the one hand, there remains a ‘low-energy’
Siberia – to deliver gas to China. rural society dependent upon biomass energy and subsist-
The resource-abundant economies of the emerg- ence agriculture, in which the majority of people exist.
ing and developing world face particular challenges as Here population pressure is leading to environmental
a consequence of their resource wealth. For many, but problems as forests are stripped for fuel wood and land
not all, access to revenue from oil exports has proved a ploughed up or over-grazed. On the other hand, there
mixed blessing. However, it would be wrong to label all exists a growing ‘high-energy’ society linked to increas-
energy-exporting economies as victims of the resource ing commercial agricultural (see Chapter 6 for more on
curse. There is a world of difference between the oil and this), industrial activity and the spread of urbanization.
gas exporting states of the former Soviet Union, the Mid- In common with the colonial past, much of this activity
dle East and West Africa. They all have their peculiarities, is aimed at supplying natural resources and agricultural
but all are vulnerable to the volatility of energy prices products (including biomass for energy production) to
(though some far less so than others). Thus, for the pre- the developed and emerging economies. The two sectors
sent at least, their energy dilemma relates to the challenge of society combine to create an increasing demand for
of using energy exports to finance a more sustainable energy services, and increased pressure on the environ-
model of economic development. In the longer run, these ment. The balance between the sectors also varies greatly
states must deal with the fact that climate change policies among the countries of the developing world. Paradoxi-
will reduce the demand for their principal source of rev- cally, solutions to the problem of rural poverty will inevi-
enue, which makes economic diversification all the more tably be increased demands for energy services, though
imperative. the absolute levels of per capita energy consumption will
Over the last decade or so, a group of rapidly indus- remain low.
trialising economies has emerged and their rate of eco- Given that the majority of the world’s population
nomic development, population growth and urbanization lives in the emerging and developing worlds that are also
is driving rapid growth in demand for energy services. experiencing population increase and rapid urbanization,
Although economies such as China and India possess the growth in energy demand in global south will be the
substantial energy resources of their own, they tend to major factor contributing to increases in GHG emissions
be reliant upon coal; at the same time, the rate of demand over the coming decades. More than a decade ago, in its
growth has outstripped the capacity of their domestic Global Environment Outlook 2000, the United Nations
energy industries to match demand. The net result has Environment Programme (UNEP 1999: 2) concluded
been a rapid increase in energy imports, particularly oil that: ‘A tenfold reduction in resource consumption in the
and increasingly gas. This growth in energy consump- industrialized countries is a necessary long-term target
tion is also associated with increasing GHG emissions. if adequate resources are to be released for the needs of
As discussed earlier, energy- and carbon-intensive types developing countries.’ It is this increasing energy demand
of industrial activity dominate their current economic in the developing world that now raises the spectre of
structures, and they have yet to decouple economic scarcity in any number of forms. To address the many
growth from growing energy demand. Somewhat para- global energy dilemmas, the developed world must
doxically, because of their very large populations, their address its own energy profligacy and at the same time
per capita levels of energy consumption and CO2 emis- help the developing world to shape an entirely new rela-
sions are still low. As individual incomes increase there is tionship between energy and development.

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 132    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Learning outcomes
Having read this chapter, you should understand Useful websites
that:
There is a huge amount of material available on the Web that
● The notion of what is a resource is socially con- relates to the issues discussed in this chapter. Some of the
structed and varies through time and across space. key reference sources are listed below; additional websites
have been referenced in the text.
● There is a variety of different ways of classifying
www.bp.com Home of the BP Statistical Review of World
natural resources.
Energy and the BP Energy Outlook. This website, which is
● There is a complex set of factors that influence the updated on an annual basis, has a wealth of statistical infor-
availability of natural resources. mation on the energy sector, much of which is downloadable
● There are substantial regional variations in energy in Excel format or as PowerPoint slides.
production and consumption and a growing mis- www.iea.org  The official site of the International Energy
match between the countries that consume most of Agency. The site contains information on the Agency’s
the world’s energy and those that produce it. operations and publications, as well as statistics on energy
production and consumption. Also has links to other
● There is a complex and increasingly challenging
international organizations.
relationship between energy consumption,
www.eia.doe.org  The official site of the US government’s
economic development and climate.
Energy Information Administration. In addition to information
● Different types of energy dilemmas confront the on US energy matters, it contains reports on individual
different regions of the world. countries and a massive list of links to other US government
agencies, international agencies, foreign governments and
commercial company sites.
www.ipcc.ch  The official site of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established by the UN
Further reading Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World ­Metrological
Organization (WMO) to provide the world with a clear
Bradshaw, M.J. (2014) Global Energy Dilemmas: Energy ­scientific view on the current state of knowledge on climate
Security, Globalization and Climate Change, Polity, Cam- change and its potential environmental and socio-economic
bridge. A book-length analysis using the global energy impacts. The site hosts all of the IPCC’s Assessment Reports
dilemmas framework introduced at the end of this chapter. and supporting documentation.
Bridge, G. and Le Billon, P. (2012) Oil, Polity Press, Cam- www.worldbank.org  The official site of the World Bank.
bridge. An analysis of the geopolitical economy of the global The site contains information on World Bank operations and
oil industry, written by two geographers. publications, as well as downloadable statistics and briefing
Dicken, P. (2015) Global Shift: Mapping the Changing documents.
Contours of the Global Economy, 7th edition, Sage, Lon- www.wri.org  The World Resources Institute is an
don. The latest edition of this excellent textbook has a new independent centre for policy research and technical
chapter on the extractive industries. assistance on global environmental and development issues.
Ekins, P., Bradshaw, M. and Watson, J. eds. (2015) Global Its website provides information on its own activities and
Energy: Issue, Potentials and Policy Implications, OUP, publications, some of which are downloadable, as well as
Oxford. A key reference source that covers many of the links to other organizations in the same area. The Institute,
issues raised in this chapter in much greater detail. together with the UNEP, UNDP and World Bank, produces the
Gautier, C. (2008) Oil, Water and Climate: An Introduction, biennial Resource Report, which is an indispensable refer-
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. An introduction ence guide to the state of the Earth’s resources.
to the essential background on climate change needed to www.ren21.net  REN21 is the global renewable energy
understand the relationships between energy, population and policy network that connects a wide range of key actors.
environment. REN21 facilitates the collection of comprehensive and timely
Robbins, P., Hinstz, J. and Moore, S.A. (2014) Environment information on renewable energy. It produces an annual report
and Society, 2nd edition, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. Has lots of on the global status of renewable energy. Its activities are
material relevant to this chapter and others in this section. managed by a Secretariat, based at UNEP in Paris, France.

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 The environment and
environmentalism

Chapter 6

Rachel Howell and Jenny Pickerill

Topics covered
■ How we value ‘the environment’ and perceive environmental
issues
■ The evolution of sustainable development
■ The complexity of scale of environmental problems
■ Different strategies for action
■ Challenges to how we conceptualize ‘environmental issues’
■ Positive steps towards a sustainable future

No one is untouched by the emerging environmental agenda;

­everyone has an interest in shaping the development of
­environmental politics (for good and bad).
(Connelly and Smith 2003: 358)

The language ‘It’s too late’ is very unsuitable for most environmental
issues. It’s too late for the dodo and for people who’ve starved to
death already, but it’s not too late to prevent an even bigger crisis.
The sooner we act on the environment, the better.
(Environmental Philanthropist Jeremy Grantham in an interview with
Leo Hickman, 2013)

When asked if I am pessimistic or optimistic about the future, my

answer is always the same: If you look at the science about what is
happening on Earth and aren’t pessimistic, you don’t understand data.
But if you meet the people who are working to restore the Earth and
the lives of the poor, and you aren’t optimistic, you haven’t got a pulse.
(Environmentalist Paul Hawken, commencement speech at Portland
State University, 2009, www.up.edu/commencement/default.aspx?cid=9456)

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 134    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

6.1 What kind of world do you want?

What kind of world do you want? If we don’t act now, we won’t
have a choice. Do you want a world where climate change con-
tinues to devastate our environment?

(Friends of the Earth flyer, June 2006)

Environmentalists are often accused of being unrealis-

tic and demanding the impossible. Yet people seldom
ask the question ‘What kind of world would we like?’
If we considered this a little more we might be taking
bigger steps towards curbing our environmental impact
Plate 6.1  Old-growth forests in north eastern
and seeking environmental justice. Environmental issues
Tasmania.
affect all places and societies – the urban and the rural,
(Jenny Pickerill)
the rich and the poor, nobody is unaffected. The environ-
ment matters and our impact upon it is often damaging,
from pollution of the air that we breathe to degradation
of the soils we rely on to grow food. should be valued. These values are used to answer ethical
The rise of environmental activism has highlighted the questions about the environment and non-human life; for
importance of environmental protection, with some nota- example, whether we should eat meat, or whether it is
ble successes. In 2010, the British government cancelled justifiable to cut down a tree in order to burn it to heat
plans to expand Heathrow airport, as well as refusing per- a house. Understanding values helps us understand why
mission for new runways at Gatwick and Stansted, and some people care greatly about the environment and oth-
the logging of old-growth forests has been all but stopped ers less so.
in Western Australia. Britain has the ‘oldest, strongest, We can use three categories of value when talking
best-organized and most widely supported environmental about the environment: intrinsic, inherent and instrumen-
lobby in the world’ (McCormick 1991: 34), but there are tal values (see Table 6.1). An object or living being has
examples worldwide of people taking a stand and making an instrumental value when we view it as a resource, of
changes to protect the environment. However, ‘there is no use to us for a specific end. For example, a forest has an
doubt that environmental issues have had a big impact on instrumental value if we view it just as a source of wood
contemporary politics, and yet the frequency with which for fuel. At the other end of the continuum an element
governments adopt a business-as-usual response to envi- has intrinsic value if we view it as important in and of
ronmental problems raises the cynical thought that per- itself, with no reference to how we might use it or to how
haps nothing much has really changed’ (Carter 2001: 2). it might make us feel. For example, people generally view
Thus, despite high levels of environmental concern and human life as intrinsically valuable.
an active environmental movement, we are faced with a In between these, inherent value (sometimes referred
wide array of environmental problems – from global cli- to as ‘weak’ instrumental value) refers to how we value
mate change to river pollution, from water supply issues something beyond its use as a resource but still relate
to nuclear power. To understand why this is, we need to value to how the thing makes us feel. For example, we
explore: different approaches to environmental issues and might value a woodland because we enjoy walking
how we value the environment; limits to growth; the com- through it and feel less stressed after doing so.
plexity of scale and responsibility; various strategies for We can understand this better if we consider the
action; what a focus on ‘the environment’ ignores; and rule of no-substitution. If something is instrumentally
finally what positive steps we should take. valuable, its value will disappear if there is a preferable
substitute. For example, wind and water power was
replaced by steam engines in mills in nineteenth-century
Britain because they were more reliable, efficient, and
6.2  ow we value the environment
H flexible in terms of where mills could be located. But
and perceive environmental issues if something is inherently valuable for itself, and not
as an end, it is not substitutable in this way. Hinchliffe
We each value the environment in different ways and and Belshaw (2003) use the example of the wild tiger
for different ends. Historically we have always debated to illustrate the consequences of these values. The wild
how various parts of our human and non-human world tiger population is threatened by the international trade

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 Chapter 6  The environment and environmentalism    135

Table 6.1  Defining value

Instrumental value Value which something has for someone as a means to an end
Inherent value Value something has for someone, but not as a means to a further end
Intrinsic value Simply the value something has. No appeal need be made to those for whom it has value
Source: Carter (2001: 15)

in tiger parts, often for use in Chinese medicine. One

solution is to establish tiger farms. However, if we find
such farms acceptable that implies an instrumental val-
uation of tigers. If tigers’ inherent value is paramount,
then the notion of farming becomes objectionable.
The implications of such values are also explored in
Case study 6.1.
We can also consider the values we accord the envi-
ronment by understanding the terms ‘anthropocentrism’
and ‘ecocentrism’. At its most extreme, an anthropo-
centric approach views only humans as having intrinsic
value and the environment as having only instrumental
value. In other words, the environment is only useful as
a resource for humans, and environmental sustainability
is only considered for the sake of human welfare. Eco-
centrism critiques anthropocentrism and suggests that
non-human entities have intrinsic value. However, for
many people the situation is not this black and white.
There is a large range of intermediate views, within
which some non-human entities have value, others do
not, but humans are valued as more important than the
environment. Thus there is a continuum between these
approaches, just as there is between ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’
ecology (Naess 1973). Shallow ecology is an anthropo-
centric position. Deep ecology, as defined by Naess,
is a form of ecocentrism but one where everything has
intrinsic value (see Table 6.2 for the eight basic princi- Plate 6.2  Logging in Styx Valley, Tasmania,
ples of deep ecology). The approach asks us to consider Australia.
humans not only as part of nature but also of equal value (Jenny Pickerill)
to non-human entities. This is a holistic vision whereby
all human and non-human entities are interconnected
and interdependent. A holistic perspective enables us to
understand that if we upset one element it will have an
impact on all other elements. If we were to adopt such
an approach it would require us to make radical changes
to the way we live.
How we value the environment is not the only influ-
ence on how we relate to it and perceive environmental
issues. There is evidence for gender differences associ-
ated with environmentalism; for example, a review by
Zelezny et al. (2000) showed that stronger pro-environ-
mental attitudes and behaviour among women than men
are found in Spain and 13 countries in North and South
America. They suggest that gender differences in pro- Plate 6.3  Styx Valley, Tasmania, Australia.
environmental behaviour (PEB) arise because of the (Jenny Pickerill)

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 136    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Case study 6.1

Old-growth logging in Tasmania, Australian logging debate says, ‘our forests are places
Australia that inspire and rejuvenate us all – nurturing us as well
as the delicate ferns and mosses on the forest floor,
The logging of old-growth forests is a particularly or connecting us to timeless grandeur as we touch the
controversial issue in Australia, with views sharply tallest flowering plants on Earth’ (2006).
polarized (Hutton and Connors 1999). Old-growth The campaigns to save the old-growth forests have
forests have experienced only minimal human interfer- ranged from small-scale local protests to garnering
ence, take hundreds of years to grow and contain the international support. The Styx Valley in the south-east
tallest plants on earth. They are often considered to be is an example of an iconic campaign. It contains the
of high conservation value. world’s tallest hardwood trees – Eucalyptus regnans.
The state government of Tasmania has shown little Many are taller than a 25-storey building. The forest is
inclination to curb the logging of old-growth forests. This also home to many native species of wildlife, including
is despite a consultation process (Tasmania Together) the majestic Wedge-tailed Eagle and the Yellow-tailed
where the population voted to end deforestation. In Black Cockatoo. While a few of the largest trees in
May 2003 the government lifted a ban on logging in the valley have been protected, between 300 and 600
the Tarkine – the single greatest stretch of temperate hectares are being logged each year. Furthermore the
rainforest in Australia. The forests of the south-east and main form of logging is destructive clear felling and
north-east are also threatened by expanding logging burning (not ­selective logging).
operations. Every year approximately 15,000 hectares Action on a local level has involved occupying threat-
of old-growth forest are logged in Tasmania. ened trees and targeting the woodchip mills. Region-
In a country which draws much of its wealth from its ally, environmentalists have been using their research
natural resources (forests, minerals, uranium, fishing to argue against clear fell logging, and to prove the
and agriculture), logging is often justified by the need environmental implications of logging. Environmental-
to provide jobs in rural areas and earn export revenue. ists have appealed to the federal government and the
Loggers argue that Australia has limited resources Australian populace for support through media cam-
and therefore needs to make the most profitable use paigns and advertising. In 2013 there was an historic
of them; that they have historically ‘managed’ forests breakthrough in the 30-year-long campaign against
through selective logging, consequently arguing that all old-growth logging, when environmentalists, timber
forests in Tasmania have been influenced by humans communities, forest unions, state government and the
for generations. logging industry jointly signed the Tasmanian Forests
Environmentalists have argued that logging is simply Intergovernmental ­Agreement on how a sustainable
a waste of resources. Logging in Tasmania is heav- timber industry could be created while also protecting
ily subsidized and uneconomical (not only in the price the remaining old-growth forests. The agreement would
obtained for products but in its negative impact upon protect key old-growth forests like the Tarkine and Styx
tourism). Most of the wood is sold as woodchips to Valley, amongst others. The main logging company –
be made into paper. Moreover it is unsustainable and Gunns – promised to end its operations in the state.
irreversible and many of the trees destroyed would The agreement requires the state government to finan-
take over 300 years to regrow, e.g. the Houn Pine in the cially support workers and contractors to stop logging,
south-west of the island takes 3,000 years to grow to and to implement legal changes to safeguard forests
full size. Old-growth forests cannot simply be replaced; as formal reserves to the same level of protection as
their destruction results in the loss of biodiversity national parks. This is the first time that all the protago-
of a barely understood and fragile ecosystem. Defor- nists have come to an agreement, and it is likely to sig-
estation does not only have localized effects but also nal the end of old-growth logging in Tasmania.
plays a key role in reducing carbon dioxide absorption Analysis of the conflicts about protection of forests
and can upset hydrological systems beyond the area enables us to understand how the environment is
of logging. Environmentalists also believe that the valued differently within a community; in other words,
largest trees are important in and of themselves. The why some argue for its protection and others choose
Wilderness Society, a key environmental group in the its destruction. The state government and logging

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 Chapter 6  The environment and environmentalism    137

companies clearly view the forests as a resource for by the Wilderness Society’s recognition of the reju-
use by humans, thus they believe they have an instru- venating effects of being in forests), and an intrinsic
mental value. They will only be interested in managing value which is not related to human need. Therefore
forests sustainably if that will add value to their use and many believe old-growth forests should be protected
exploitation in years to come. For environmentalists it from all but recreation, and left untouched for future
is more complex. On one level, many acknowledge the generations to enjoy.
instrumental value of forests (for making furniture, for
example) but think the current methods of forestry are Q   How do you value forests like those in Tasmania
wasteful. But in addition environmentalists believe the and how does that affect your perspective as a
environment has an inherent value (as demonstrated geographer?

Table 6.2 The eight basic principles of deep ecology

1 The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms:
intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for
human purposes.
2 Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in
themselves.
3 Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
4 The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human
population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.
5 Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6 Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological and ideological
structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
7 The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations on inherent value)
rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the
difference between big and great.
8 Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try and implement the
necessary changes.
Source: Naess (1973: 95–100)

greater socialization females experience to be socially different cultural types demonstrate different patterns of
responsible and to care about others. Older people also consumption. These views and consumption patterns are
score higher for various types of PEB (Olli et al. 2001). shown in Figure 6.1.
This may be due to the social conditions which shaped Cultural theory and the associated myths of nature can
their habits; many older people in Britain, for example, help explain why individuals vary in their perception of
experienced rationing and grew up with a ‘waste not, the risks of environmental issues such as climate change,
want not’ mentality that is less prevalent now. and their responses to them (Hulme 2009). For example,
Cultural theory asserts that there are different ‘cul- Steg and Sievers (2000) found that individuals who regard
tural types’ of people, differentiated by whether they nature as finely balanced (the egalitarian view) showed
have a preference for – or feel bound by – strong or weak more awareness of the problems of car use, felt more
societal rules and hierarchical structures, and strong or responsibility for those problems, were more likely to
weak ‘group’ features of society (ties to others; sense agree that reducing car use is necessary, and stated more
of community). The theory posits that each of the four support for policy measures to reduce car use than other
cultural types – hierarchists, egalitarians, individualists, types, particularly those who view nature as ‘benign’ (the
and fatalists – has a different view (or ‘myth’) of nature individualist view). Marshall (2007) uses the theory to
and a different preferred management style for deal- suggest that different messages are needed to motivate
ing with environmental (and other) problems (Steg and individuals to adopt lower-carbon lifestyles, depending
Sievers 2000). Dake and Thompson (1999) showed that on their consumption preferences. While egalitarians

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 138    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Strong sense
of hierarchy
Fatalist Hierarchist

View nature as capricious, i.e. View nature as perverse/tolerant,

random and unpredictable i.e. stable within limits but it is
Preferred management strategy: possible for humans to upset the
cope balance with lasting impacts
Fatalists do not make active Preferred management strategy:
choices; they muddle through regulation and control
constrained by budget or unable to Value duty and order; consume
take control for other reasons traditional food and goods

Weak Strong
‘group’ ‘group’
Individualist Egalitarian

View nature as benign, i.e. stable; View nature as ephemeral, i.e. it is

humans can have little lasting finely balanced and humans can
impact on it easily upset the balance
Preferred management strategy: Preferred management strategy:
market system radical changes in society; equality
Value liberty and innovation; keep Politically engaged, concerned
up with fashions; conspicuous and with environmental and social
competitive consumers values; ethical consumers

Weak sense
of hierarchy

Figure 6.1  Cultural theory and myths of nature. (Note: the diagrams in this figure represent the view of nature
held by each type.)
Sources: based on diagrams and information from Michaelis (2007) and Steg and Sievers (2000).

(whom he names strivers) will respond to typical envi- One of the main factors that differentiates beliefs
ronmental messages to ‘save the planet’, individualists about climate change is political affiliation, with con-
(he calls them winners) will find these kind of appeals servatives more likely to be sceptical about the reality of
off-putting, and instead need to be persuaded that high- human-induced climate change than others. This is par-
carbon lifestyles will go out of fashion and that savvy ticularly true in the USA, where there has been a widen-
consumers buy low-carbon technologies such as electric ing gap between Democrats and Republicans in terms of
cars. We should stress to hierarchists, or traditionalists attitudes and beliefs about climate change in the last few
as Marshall calls them, that climate change will threaten years (Dunlap and McCright 2008). Feygina et al. (2010)
things they value such as the countryside, but solutions argue that the ‘conservative white male’ effect of denial
to climate change will be actions they already support, of environmental problems occurs because conservative
like holidaying in Britain and buying British food. And white men are more likely to defend and justify the soci-
because fatalists (or ‘survivors’) feel little control over etal status quo when faced with the threat posed by envi-
their own lives and often have little money, the message ronmental issues, since they have a stronger preference for
for them needs to emphasize that energy saving measures things as they are than other people (women, liberals, and
save money and that being prepared for climate change ethnic minorities). But it is possible to combat the nega-
will mean it doesn’t make life even harder. tive effects of system justification on environmentalism

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 Chapter 6  The environment and environmentalism    139

by presenting PEB as patriotic and as a means of preserv- can make a difference by engaging in pro-environmental
ing the status quo. behaviour, are cornerstones of modern environmental
The conservative white male effect reveals something thought. Another key insight is that there are limits to
very interesting about the way individuals think about growth. The earth is a finite system and thus growth in
environmental issues. While we might expect beliefs and use of resources and production of wastes cannot con-
risk perceptions about a problem to affect what people tinue indefinitely. This was highlighted by Meadows et
consider we should do about it, and how they themselves al. in 1972 with the publication of Limits to Growth.
are willing to respond, the political split about various Using computer models they sought to project trends in
environmental issues shows that the reverse is also true. resource use and population growth into the future. They
Views on action in response to environmental problems predicted natural limits on future growth and two of their
(e.g. whether or not it is patriotic) can influence whether simulated scenarios ended in environmental catastro-
people believe the problem exists, and how concerned they phe by the mid to latter part of the twenty-first century.
feel about it. This is one of many reasons that simply giv- Although the report has been criticized for being overly
ing people information about a problem does not neces- pessimistic, defenders say that elements of the projec-
sarily lead them to change their behaviour or campaign tions are similar to observed data so far, and the idea of
for government action in response. If they do not want to limits and finitude (scarcity rather than abundance) has
accept the implications of the issue for their own lifestyle, remained important.
or do not support government legislation to tackle the However, it also became apparent, for people in the
problem, they are likely to ignore or reject the information. minority world at least, that it was possible to maintain
The ‘information-deficit model’ – the idea that people economic growth and reduce resource consumption per
who do not feel concerned about an environmental prob- unit of wealth created. This argument resulted in the
lem, or are not acting in response to it, simply don’t know emergence of an alternative view to ecocatastrophism:
enough about it and therefore more information is the a view that would develop into the concept of sustainable
answer – has been criticised for many other reasons. For development (see Spotlight box 6.1).
example, people do not tend to take action unless they feel Connelly and Smith (2003) identify two broad inter-
a sense of agency, which has two aspects. The first is the pretations of what an environmentally sustainable soci-
belief that it is possible to take action oneself; people who ety would look like: a deep green approach, and the
have this sense of personal control are more likely to engage more reformist ecological modernization. The deep
in PEB than those who see control residing in an external green interpretation is a radical approach that calls for
source beyond their influence (Jonsson and Nilsson 2014). change and restructuring at all levels of society in politi-
The second aspect of agency is a belief that taking action cal, economic and social arenas. In essence it is a critique
will make a difference and therefore is worth doing. Evalu- of everything about the way we currently live today, a
ating the UK government’s ‘Helping the Earth Begins at critique of contemporary consumerist society and free-
Home’ campaign, Hinchliffe (1996) noted that many peo- market capitalism. In this understanding of sustainable
ple he spoke to expressed a sense of futility about taking development, accepting that there are limits to growth
individual action because they didn’t believe others would means changing our notions of what makes a good life
do so. Acting together with others in a group helps to create and learning to live more simply (thus slowing growth):
a feeling of agency (see Case study 6.4 for an example). The
social norms that operate in our society and peer groups are
another important influence on our perceptions of envi-
ronmental issues and the way we respond to them (Smith
et al. 2012). By engaging in PEB we help to change what is
perceived as ‘normal’ in society and therefore our actions
can have bigger effects than we might think.

6.3 L imits to growth and the

challenge of capitalism
The rejection by environmentalists of the anthropo- Plate 6.4  Low-impact house: Tony’s Roundhouse,
centric approach whereby the environment is viewed Brithdir Mawr, Wales.
purely instrumentally, and the belief that individuals (Jenny Pickerill)

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 140    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Spotlight box 6.1

Sustainable development is to view the economy as a subsystem of human soci-

ety, which in turn is dependent on the biosphere. This
The 1987 Brundtland Report adopted the position is represented by a diagram of three nested circles,
that it was possible to pursue economic growth without economy inside society, inside environment, empha-
compromising the environment, and it provided the first, sizing that these are not separate domains of action
still widely used, definition of sustainable development: (see Figure 6.2). Product standards that refer to these
‘development which meets the needs of the present three elements of sustainable development include
without compromising the ability of future generations the Fairtrade mark and Rainforest Alliance certifica-
to meet their own needs’. tion. Culture is now increasingly recognized as a fourth
However, this definition is highly contested and aspect of sustainable development.
vague, leading to weak interpretations. For example,
how can present and future needs be determined, and
whose needs does it refer to? Many attempts have been
made to refine the concept, which have led to numerous,
often contradictory, definitions. The result is that ‘sus-
tainable development’ is often little more than a sound- Environment
bite, signalling recognition that the environment matters
but failing to provide substance.
The real success of the Brundtland Report was Society
the emphasis it placed on the relationships between
economic growth, social conditions and environmen-
tal degradation, an emphasis that placed sustainable Economy
development firmly on the global political agenda.
Sustainable development is therefore often under-
stood as involving three elements: economic, social,
and environmental sustainability. These are sometimes
conceptualized as three separate but equally neces-
sary ‘pillars’ of sustainability, but another perspective Figure 6.2  Three elements of sustainable development.

Case study 6.2

Low-impact living in Britain In Britain there is a growing number of LIL pro-

jects. Hockerton Housing Project in Nottinghamshire
Low-impact living (LIL) is a form of living that is an earth-sheltered, self-sufficient terrace of five
enables people to reduce or even minimize the envi- single-storey houses. Built into the side of a hill
ronmental impact of their daily lives. Those advocating with large windows to the south, they rely solely
LIL often build houses from local, natural and recycled on passive solar heating and generate all their
materials and in rural areas ensure they have a low electricity through wind turbines and photovoltaic
visual impact by blending with their surroundings. Many systems. The houses are highly energy-efficient and
developments aim to generate their own renewable waste is disposed of through a reed-bed system into
energy and deal with their own waste (through recy- a large lake. They also grow their own vegetables
cling and composting). In addition LIL is about more and generate income through education. Another
than just environmentally friendly buildings: it is about a example is Tony Wrench’s roundhouse at Brithdir
way of life. Implicit in the LIL approach is an emphasis Mawr, south-west Wales (Plate 6.4). This is built from
on minimizing vehicle use, reducing consumption and home-grown timber, straw and earth. It is built into
purchasing goods locally, growing food, and, in rural the earth with a turf roof so that, from behind, you
areas, creating livelihoods largely from the land. can hardly see it. It is highly insulated, has recycled

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 Chapter 6  The environment and environmentalism    141

windows and uses a wood burner and passive this policy. Lammas eco-village (www.lammas.org.uk) is
solar heating. a low-cost nine-house community on 76 acres of mixed
It has often been very difficult to get planning per- pasture and woodland next to the village of Glandwr,
mission in Britain for LIL projects. Many rural communi- Pembrokeshire.
ties have secretly constructed their dwellings or fought LIL projects don’t have to be in rural areas. LILAC
long retrospective planning battles to keep their homes. (Low Impact Living Affordable Community; www.lilac.
However, on 13 July 2006, eight years after the dis- coop) was built in Leeds in 2013, and includes 20
covery of ecohouses at Brithdir Mawr and the ensuing households and a common house. The buildings are
planning controversy, Pembrokeshire County Council made of locally sourced super-insulated straw bale
and Pembrokeshire National Park adopted an innova- and timber panels. Residents grow food on their allot-
tive policy on low-impact development. This explicitly ments next to the buildings, share tools and resources,
allows rural greenfield development under a number and get together for shared meals and events to
of conditions aimed to ensure developments remain build a sense of community. Beddington Zero Energy
low impact. Development must be highly sustainable, Development (BedZED) in London consists of 82
using local, renewable, recycled and/or natural mate- homes plus work space, built in 2000–2002. Although
rials and built to high standards of eco-design, with there have been some problems (e.g. with the biomass
the emphasis on ‘low impact’, including visual effects. Combined Heat and Power plant), BedZED residents
Moreover, the proposal must offer positive environmen- use 45 per cent less electricity and 81 per cent less gas
tal, social and/or economic contributions with public for heating per year than the average for the borough
benefit. These could include services to the community, they live in, and less than half the local average of
economic diversification for the area, opening paths mains water (Hodge and Haltrecht 2009).
for walkers or improved biodiversity. Furthermore, resi-
dents must prove a need to be on the land (rather than Q   What measures should we put in place to ensure
clustered within existing rural settlements). In 2009 the our buildings, and the way we live in them, have
first large-scale new eco-village was approved under minimal environmental impact?

own needs, e.g. through growing your own vegetables. See

Case study 6.2 for a British example of low-impact living.
The ecological modernization interpretation is far less
radical and has been adopted by many more in main-
stream politics. Supporters of ecological modernization
criticize the deep green vision as naive and utopian with
an unnecessary and ineffective focus on localization. In
essence this approach argues that economic growth does
not need to be slowed to ensure environmental protec-
tion. It does not undermine the limits to growth thesis
entirely, but suggests that we can ‘reorient’ economic
growth and find technological solutions for environ-
mental problems, or ‘decouple’ economic growth from
Plate 6.5  The Dales house, Tir y Gafel eco-village,
increased energy use, pollution and waste, thus overcom-
Wales.
ing the environmental impact of growth. It is a very weak
(Jenny Pickerill)
interpretation of sustainable development that allows
for a reformist response where the current dominance of
for example, consuming less overall but more locally pro- free-market capitalism is not challenged; ‘the future of
duced goods, generating less waste, travelling less and environmental politics on this reading is a technical ques-
being conscious of our impact on the environment in our tion of how to make capitalism more environmentally
daily lives. The result is an emphasis on ‘localization’, sensitive’ (Connelly and Smith 2003: 359).
living small-scale, perhaps more communally to share the The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypoth-
load of everyday tasks, in energy-efficient buildings, and esis states that although pollution and environmental
often with importance attached to producing for your degradation initially increase with increasing per capita

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 142    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

income, once a country becomes rich enough it begins and Nature, George Perkins Marsh presented evidence
to implement environmental protection measures and for negative consequences of tropical deforestation.
the damage is reversed. Thus ecological modernizers Carter (2001) has categorized the evolution of environ-
argue that economic growth is necessary, to ensure both mental issues (Table 6.3) into three key periods. Pre-1960s
a decent material standard of living and environmental a great deal of environmental concern was focused upon
protection. But the theory appears to hold true only for small-scale localized problems such as local pollution and
some local pollutants and measures of air quality (Dinda wildlife protection. In the 1960s concern grew about the
2004). Ecological footprint measures are highest in the interrelation between human actions and more complex
richest countries of the world, for example, and Dietz environmental impacts. For example, Silent Spring, writ-
and Adger (2003) found that an EKC does not exist for ten by the biologist Rachel Carson in 1962 is generally
biodiversity loss. It may be that the EKC hypothesis only regarded as a milestone in modern environmentalism.
works when industrialization, urbanization and eco- Carson pointed out the long-term ecological conse-
nomic development cause environmental problems that quences of intensive agriculture, particularly the ways in
have very obvious local impacts, such as the pollution of which synthetic pesticides (notably DDT) persist in the
rivers by sewage and chemicals. As people become richer food chain and poison birds and mammals (including
they have higher expectations regarding their local envi- humans). At the same time there were growing concerns
ronment and urge protection of it, but environmental about overpopulation. Paul Ehrlich, Garrett Hardin
problems that are less obvious, or have impacts far from and Barry Commoner were considered neo-Malthusian
home, do not gain so much attention or response. because they saw environmental problems as a conse-
The EKC hypothesis has also been criticized on the quence of population growth, following the arguments
grounds that the apparent improvement in measures set out by Thomas Malthus in the late eighteenth cen-
of environmental health may be due to rich countries tury. The misguided simplicity of neo-Malthusian expla-
‘exporting’ their pollution and energy consumption nations of environmental problems is shown in studies
abroad (Suri and Chapman 2008). The reduction in that have tried to explain land degradation in terms of
UK greenhouse gas emissions has been achieved partly population dynamics (Boserüp 1990). Not only is the
through the decline in British manufacturing and evidence contradictory, for example increased land deg-
increased reliance on imported goods; emissions associ- radation in northern China has been linked to population
ated with the latter are not counted as part of the UK’s growth (Takeuchi et al. 1995), whereas in northern Yemen
carbon footprint but may be higher in poorer countries (Carapico 1985) and Kenya’s Machakos Hills (Tiffin et al.
with more lax environmental regulations. Thus globali- 1994) it has been related to population decline, but also it
zation and free-market capitalism pose a real challenge is clear from these studies that linking land degradation
to our ability to adjust to the reality of limits to growth. to one explanatory parameter – population size – masks

6.4 T he complexity of scale Table 6.3  Evolution of environmental issues

and responsibility First generation: ­ Protection of wildlife

Preservation and and habitats
­conservation (pre-1960s) Soil erosion
The scale of response to environmental issues is a key Local pollution
point of debate. As we have seen, deep greens argue that
localization is one of the most important elements to Second generation: Population growth
‘Modern ­environmentalism’ Technology
enacting environmental sustainability. If we adopt a more
(from 1960s) Desertification
localized lifestyle then we can minimize our environmen- Pesticides
tal impact. However, our environmental problems are far Resource depletion
more complex, and global, than the notion of ‘localiza- Pollution abatement
tion’ suggests. To understand this we need to explore the
Third generation: Acid rain
evolution of environmental concern from one of local Global issues (late 1970s Ozone depletion
problems to global environmental issues. onwards) Rainforest destruction
There is no clear beginning to environmental concern. Climate change
Plato, Lucretius and Caesar all noted the problems of soil Loss of biodiversity
erosion. Many of today’s most pressing environmental Genetically modified
issues were first identified in the nineteenth and early organisms
twentieth centuries. For example, in his 1869 book Man Source: Carter (2001: 4)

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 Chapter 6  The environment and environmentalism    143

the complexity behind population dynamics and labour- a wider, less quantifiable impact on environmental issues
land relationships (Millington et al. 1989). Environmen- worldwide, particularly in that:
tal problems are in fact a function of consumption of
● it elevated the importance of the environment on the
resources and production of wastes, as well as population
political agendas of most countries (the majority now
and other factors.
participate in the conventions that were agreed to at
By the early 1970s there was recognition not just of
Rio, and many have used these conventions to pass
the interconnectedness of environmental issues, and of
new environmental legislation);
the problems of cumulative damage, but also that these
● the multilateral negotiations led to some issues gain-
were global problems that needed internationally coor-
ing internationally important status (perhaps most
dinated responses. Environmental scientists identify two
notably biodiversity loss, which had only been recog-
types of global environmental change. On the one hand,
nized by scientists some 12 years earlier), and which
systemic change occurs when there is a direct impact
changed long-standing, often ineffective attitudes to
on a physically interconnected, global system, e.g. the
nature conservation;
atmosphere or the oceans: for example, the effects
● legislation at the international scale was negoti-
that increased emissions of greenhouse gases have on
ated, heralding an era of global environmental
global climate. Cumulative change, on the other hand,
policy-making;
occurs when many discrete events become significant
● there was recognition that many stakeholders had
because their distribution is global or because, added
legitimate voices in environmental policy-making (the
together, their impact is felt across a large proportion
recognition of the stakeholder principle was vital in
of the globe. For example, across the Americas, Africa
allowing actors outside government to become effec-
and Asia-Pacific, the relatively small amounts of tropi-
tive in bringing about changes in environment and
cal forest lost in each area being converted from forest
development, a point that proponents of the bottom-
to farmland, or being lost to a mining operation, add
up approach to development had long argued for).
up to a global-scale problem affecting humid tropical
forests, one of the most biodiverse biomes found on Each of the three main conventions agreed at Rio has
earth, of vital significance to the global water and car- been followed by annual conferences of the parties (i.e.
bon balances. Recognition of this duality is important the countries that have signed a convention), at which
in formulating policies and strategies. Addressing sys- progress towards ratification and implementation of the
temic issues need to be a global effort, with all countries conventions has been discussed. Whilst the Convention to
agreeing and adhering to action. Focusing on cumulative Combat Desertification and the Convention on Biologi-
issues requires both global approaches (e.g. in the fields cal Diversity proved relatively straightforward to ratify
of data exchange and comparative research) and local and implement, negotiations arising from the Framework
strategies (to reduce the impacts of a problem because Convention on Climate Change have been beset by disa-
different causes may exist in different geographical loca- greements (see Case study 6.3).
tions) (Middleton 2003). The Earth Summit was followed by the World Summit
In 1992, after five years of negotiations and prepara- on Sustainable Development (‘Rio+10’) in 2002 and the
tory meetings, the UN Conference on Environment and United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development
Development (also known as the Earth Summit) was (‘Rio+20’) in 2012. These conferences were not as ground-
held in Rio de Janeiro. It brought together 172 govern- breaking as the original; in 2002 the USA did not attend,
ment delegations, 108 heads of state or government, and the main outcome of Rio+20 was a non-binding docu-
2,400 NGO representatives and a press corps of nearly ment, The Future We Want. In it the heads of state of the
10,000. The parallel NGO Forum, which had consultative 192 governments attending reaffirmed their commitment
status, was attended by 17,000 people (see www.un.org/ to sustainable development and to previous action plans.
geninfo/bp/enviro.html). A rift opened up between the Although a few governments have found it difficult to
representatives of the majority world and the minority ratify conventions and make efforts to achieve targets,
world countries, the former being worried that environ- the implementation of sustainable development actions
mental concerns would be used by the minority world to by local administrations – Local Agenda 21s – has been
limit their development. Shifting tensions between geo- far more successful. The International Council for Local
political blocs developed over issues such as biodiversity, Environment Initiatives (2002) reported that 6,416 LA21s
climate change and desertification. But whatever its fail- were underway or committed to in 113 countries, that
ings, the key point is that the Earth Summit resulted in a national campaigns were underway in 18 countries, and
number of specific agreements that now form the basis of that formal stakeholder groups had been established in
a global strategy for sustainable development and it had 73 per cent of administrative units with LA21s.

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 144    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Case study 6.3

Negotiating and implementing an while Norway, Australia and Iceland were actually
international convention: the obsta- allowed to increase their emissions from 1990 levels.
cles faced in tackling climate change The European Union committed to an 8 per cent reduc-
tion, to be shared out between members; Germany and
The latest scientific report by the Intergovernmental Denmark promised to reduce emissions by 21 per cent
Panel on Climate Change states that warming of the each, while the UK agreed to 12.5 per cent and poorer
climate system is ‘unequivocal’. Atmospheric concen- countries such as Portugal and Greece were allowed to
trations of the greenhouse gases (GHGs) carbon diox- increase emissions. Not surprisingly, a complex set of
ide (CO2), methane and nitrous oxide are higher than rules and regulations surrounds the targets, making it
they have been for at least the last 800,000 years. Their possible to trade ‘emissions reductions’ between states.
effects are ‘extremely likely’ (95–100 per cent probabil- One means of doing this is the clean development
ity) to have been the main cause of observed climate mechanism (CDM), through which minority world
change since the mid-twentieth century (IPCC 2014). countries are able to earn credits towards their own
The United Nations Framework Convention on reduction targets by investing in emission reduction
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was created at the Rio projects in the majority world. In other words, the minor-
Earth Summit in 1992 and came into force on 21 March ity world will have to help the majority world implement
1994 (see www.unfcc.int for further details). The ultimate the CDM and this will require transfer of considerable
objective of the UNFCCC is to ‘stabilize greenhouse amounts of capital and technology. Thus O’Riordan
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that (2000: 202) notes that:
will prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human induced) the CDM mechanism denies the right of Third World
interference with the climate system. Such a level should nations to select their own CO2 future. This is ‘ecologi-
be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow eco- cal colonialism’ by another name. While the minority
systems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure world has access to the capital and technology to
that food production is not threatened and to enable achieve the Kyoto targets, it still requires the political
economic development to proceed in a sustainable will. In the majority world, political will amounts to lit-
manner’. Annual conferences of the parties (COPs) are tle without the material requirements to balance the
economic growth with environmental needs.
attended by all the states that have ratified or acceded to
the Convention (196 as of November 2014). There are now significant concerns as to the efficacy
The third COP, held in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 of this mechanism. The Copenhagen Accord agreed in
saw agreement on the Kyoto Protocol, which was 2009 has done little to quell these fears, being widely
intended to commit all industrialized nations to reduce regarded as too weak and vague to really tackle these
their emissions compared to 1990 levels by 2008–12. key concerns. Although there were similar criticisms of
Although the Protocol was signed in Bonn in July 2001, the outcomes of the Cancun climate talks in 2010, pro-
it did not come into force until 16 February 2005 after gress was made in establishing a new Green Climate
Russia ratified it, therefore ensuring the requirement Fund. This is intended to raise and distribute £64 billion
was met that it was ratified by at least 55 countries a year by 2020 to assist in technology transfer and low-
producing at least 55 per cent of global emissions in carbon development for the poorer countries.
1990. However, the USA, the world’s second- largest Overall the Kyoto Protocol should have achieved
emitter of CO2 after China, has never signed up to the an average reduction in GHG emissions of 5 per cent
Kyoto Protocol, and the original targets were reduced from 1990 levels by the end of 2012, for those coun-
during the Bonn meeting to ensure that Japan, Canada tries involved. Whether this has been accomplished
and Australia would agree. Ultimately, 37 industrialized depends on exactly how emissions are counted. Under
nations (and the European Community as a whole) the rules of the Protocol, only emissions produced in a
were bound by targets during the first Kyoto commit- country count towards its total, and using this ‘produc-
ment period. These varied between countries, to reflect tion perspective’ many countries (including the UK)
the ease or difficulty of reducing emissions, what had have met their targets. However, from a ‘consumption
already been done, and what countries would accept. perspective’, which assigns GHGs associated with
Japan and Canada had a 6 per cent reduction target imported goods to the country consuming them rather

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 Chapter 6  The environment and environmentalism    145

than the producer country, emissions reductions are increasing need to explore alternatives such as a global
more than cancelled out by the GHGs ‘embedded’ in carbon tax (see, for example, this blog by Dieter Helm,
imports from the majority world (Peters et al. 2011). Professor of Energy Policy at the University of Oxford:
COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 was supposed to http://e360.yale.edu/feature/forget_kyoto_putting_a_
result in a new set of post-2012 binding reduction com- tax_on_carbon_consumption/2590/).
mitments. This didn’t happen; all that was agreed was Why has it been so difficult to negotiate a climate
the Copenhagen Accord, a set of non-binding, voluntary change treaty, compared to the process that resulted in
targets. Furthermore, Canada withdrew from the Kyoto the Montreal Protocol to prevent depletion of the ozone
Protocol in 2011 to avoid heavy financial penalties that layer, often cited as a successful example of interna-
it would otherwise face as it would not meet its emis- tional policymaking? Key features of the ‘ozone hole’
sions reductions targets, while Japan and Russia stated problem were that the scientific evidence of damage was
that they would not take on further targets. ‘The Kyoto relatively clear and simple to understand; it would affect
Protocol does not cover the world’s largest two emitters, rich countries through increased cancer rates, which
the United States and China, and therefore cannot work,’ the public was concerned about; ozone depletion was
argued Canadian Environment Minister Peter Kent. In caused by relatively few chemicals which were therefore
2010 UK Prime Minister David Cameron had blamed fairly easy to regulate; and rich-world industries had
the USA and China for obstructing the discussion pro- already started producing non-ozone depleting substi-
cess when he said that he doubted further international tutes so it was in their interests for a treaty to be agreed
agreement on emissions reductions was likely. The that would speed up adoption of these alternatives.
essence of the problem is that the USA is unwilling to In contrast, evidence for climate change causes and
accept binding targets while rapidly industrializing coun- impacts is extremely complex; most people in the rich
tries do not; China and other majority world countries world see climate change as a problem that will impact
argue that, historically, the industrialized world is respon- other people, distant in time and space; climate change
sible for the vast majority of emissions, so they should is caused by GHGs associated with a huge range of
not have to accept emissions reductions yet that would human activities, affecting many aspects of our everyday
hamper their economic growth and ability to reduce lives; reducing energy-related GHGs is seen as putting
poverty. However, in November 2014 China and the USA a break on economic growth, which is not acceptable to
announced a joint plan to tackle climate change, involv- the majority world; and many industries regard emissions
ing a commitment by China to ensure its emissions peak reduction policies as contrary to their interests and so
by 2030 at the latest, while the USA will reduce its emis- have been involved in trying to obscure climate science,
sions by 26–28 per cent from 2005 levels by 2025. promote scepticism and inhibit mitigation action.
At COP21 in Paris in 2015 it is intended to create a
new global climate agreement with binding targets from Q   What will it take for all countries and elites
2020 for all parties to the UNFCCC. However, some everywhere to cast aside their domestic concerns
commentators argue that rather than continue to seek and privileges in favour of the global and collective
to agree Kyoto-style targets and pledges, there is an good?

The problem of scale can make it hard to determine example, if we want to reduce the negative consequences
how to take the best action. Not only do we need to of driving cars we can reduce individual use, encourage
unpack the causes of environmental change and identify companies to design more fuel-efficient vehicles, and
likely solutions, but also ‘those making decisions con- lobby governments to increase the price of petrol through
cerning global environmental problems need to consider tax rises, subsidize eco-alternatives and introduce road
the ramifications for national economies and local popu- pricing. However, in practice, governments of countries
lations’ (Harris 2004: 13). In other words, we (individuals, like the USA have argued in the past that it would dam-
businesses, nations, etc.) need to take responsibility for age their economy, making them less globally competitive
our environmental impacts and understand the conse- (leading to job losses).
quences of mitigating these problems (for other people, All these complexities are shaped by how we value the
the economy, and so on). The problem of climate change environment, at what scale we view these problems, and
is thus ‘a local and social problem as much as it is a thus whose responsibility we believe it is to make changes.
global environmental problem’ (Barnett 2007: 1361). For While many individuals, NGOs and governments argue

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 146    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

that we all need to take responsibility for our actions, a simultaneously subvert the process by looking to practise
solely localized approach by some of us will allow the more participatory democracy and pushing for funda-
harmful environmental consequences of others to go mental change. They did this through the legislation they
unchecked. Multi-scalar action is required, from local sought, funding environmental groups and organizations,
to international, involving all of us in the processes of and structurally by rotating their representatives sitting in
change. But how have people sought to make such change parliament, limiting the length of office of their leaders
happen and how does it work in practice? and practising participatory decision-making processes.
However, over time ‘the party has been colonized by
the demands and temptations of parliamentary activity’
(Dobson 2001: 127). It has dropped many of its earlier
6.5 Strategies for change commitments (environmental sustainability, disarma-
ment, social justice and participatory democracy) and
There are a wide variety of ways in which action is taken, abandoned ‘their experimental attempt at institutional-
through international agreements, the legislature (i.e. for- izing direct democratic structures within the framework
mal party politics), lifestyle changes, community living, of representative democracy’ (Poguntke 1993: 395).
and through direct action (Dobson 2001). We can broadly The radical faction lost out to those in the party who
conceive of these as a continuum between reformist and believed in reformist change. This led to the party forg-
radical approaches (see Table 6.4). Both approaches are ing coalitions with other parties, eventually forming an
part of the broad and diverse environmental movement, alliance with the Social Democrats to form the national
and many people hold positions somewhere between the government in 1998, consequently weakening their
extreme ends of the continuum. We can use some exam- stance on war and nuclear power, and taking a stance
ples to explore these strategies in practice: in national against those undertaking environmental direct action
party politics (the German Green Party), political lobby- (Doyle 2005). The German experience is a caution-
ing (Friends of the Earth UK), direct action (Earth First!), ary tale about the difficulties of implementing change
individual actions, and business responses. through formal political arenas.
The German Green Party – Die Grünen – made its Environmental NGOs and related groups serve two
entrance into formal politics in 1983 with 5.6 per cent key roles in society: they often identify environmental
of the national vote and 27 seats in Federal Parliament problems and, importantly, they seek to translate envi-
(Doyle 2005). The party emerged from a vibrant envi- ronmental concern into practical strategies for change.
ronmental movement that was particularly active on anti- In 1971 Friends of the Earth (FoE) was launched in Lon-
nuclear issues. When it was first launched Die Grünen don; it has become one of the biggest and most influen-
was closely aligned to those seeking radical change. tial of the British environmental NGOs, and is part of
Petra Kelly, an early leader of the party, described Die an international FoE network. Its formation reflected a
Grünen as ‘half party and half local action group – we frustration with the staid conservation movement’s lack
shall go on being an anti-party party’ (Kelly 1984: 21). of action against perpetrators of environmental degrada-
Thus the party aimed to be part of formal politics but tion (Rawcliffe 1998). They have a five-pronged strategy:

Table 6.4  Reformist and radical approaches to environmentalism

Reformist Radical
1. Modified sustainable economic growth/ 1. Limits to, and undesirability of, economic growth.
ecological modernization.
2. Large role for technological development as a 2. A distrust of scientific and technological fixes.
­provider of solutions for environmental problems.
3. Environmental solutions can co-exist with existing 3. Radical social and political change necessary: either
social and political structures. authoritarian or decentralized and democratic p­ olitical
organization.
4. Anthropocentrism and a commitment to 4. Intrinsic value of nature or, at least, a weaker version
­intragenerational and intergenerational equity. of anthropocentrism; a commitment to social justice
within human society and between humans and
­non-human nature.
Source: from Robert Garner, Environmental Politics, published 2000, (Macmillan) reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan

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 Chapter 6  The environment and environmentalism    147

to lobby those in political power and industry, often using Such actions have been influenced by many others
legislative activity to press for change; to generate sci- and replicated worldwide. In Australia, environmental-
entific research and publish it in accessible formats; to ists have employed direct action since the late 1970s.
employ the media to attract attention to particular issues; Tree sits and roadblocks at Terania Creek (New South
to mobilize the public through local groups; and to coor- Wales), Daintree (Queensland) and surrounding the
dinate and cooperate with other groups to run large-scale Franklin Dam (Tasmania) all focused on preventing
campaigns. the logging of old-growth trees. India has an even more
By the early 1990s, however, FoE had evolved extensive history of satyagraha (non-violent action)
from a radical group to one that seemed less keen to inspired by Mahatma Gandhi. In the early 1970s, vil-
press for far-reaching change. In effect it had become lagers (mostly women) from Uttar Pradesh physically
­reformist – pragmatically seeking inclusion of environ- began to try to prevent local logging – resulting in the
mental concern within the current political and social Chipko Andalan movement (McCormick 1989). More
system. Many saw this reformist approach as being inef- recently, villagers threatened with losing their land,
fectual, slow and hierarchical, though it has achieved homes and livelihoods by the construction of the Nar-
some successes, such as influencing the creation and mada Dam have committed to drowning rather than
passing of the UK Climate Change Act of 2008. Draw- forced resettlement (Shiva 2002).
ing inspiration from other movements and other coun- A key tenet of many environmental approaches is
tries, smaller, more radical environmental groups (or the need for individuals to take action. With a grass-
informal networks) began to proliferate. They pose a roots movement of individuals making changes, bigger
systematic challenge to existing societal practices, often changes can occur: ‘the only possible building blocks
rejecting ‘representative’ democracy and formal politics of a Greener future are individuals moving towards a
and promoting grassroots participation in environmen-
tal decision-making and a ‘do-it-yourself’ approach. The
tactics employed reflect their belief in the need for radical
change and often involve the use of non-violent direct
action such as road blockades and office occupations.
Direct action is ‘intended to have an immediate effect
on a situation, as distinct from political activity which
might have a roundabout effect through representatives,
or demonstrative activity whose effect was to get public-
ity’ (Rooum 1995: 27).
One such group, Earth First! (EF!), formed in the
United States in 1979 and spread to the United Kingdom
in 1991. Based upon anarchist ideology, it is a network
of autonomous groups that eschew formal membership
and hierarchy (and thus leadership) and espouse consen-
sus decision-making structures and non-violent direct
action: one of their slogans is ‘If not you, then who?’
(Wall 1999; Doherty 2002). EF! has been influential in
British anti-roads protests, e.g. Twyford Down (1992),
Newbury (1995–6) and the A30 in Devon at Allercombe
and Fairmile (1994–7). They used protest camps with
tree-sits, tunnels and lock-ons with the aims of (i) physi-
cally preventing road construction; (ii) generating media
publicity; (iii) educating the public; and (iv) acting as a
catalyst for mass mobilization. The defining characteris-
tics of such activism are the continuously evolving crea-
tivity in tactics coupled with a broad concern for a variety
of issues; for example ‘they see exploitation of the Third
World, the global poor, women, animals and the environ-
ment as a product of hierarchy, patriarchy, anthropocen- Plate 6.6  An anti-car stunt calling for radical
trism, racism and, most prominently, capitalist economic environmental activism.
relations’ (Seel and Plows 2000: 114). (Jenny Pickerill)

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 148    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Case study 6.4

Reducing fossil fuel consumption Advocates of PCT argue that it would increase car-
through personal carbon allowances bon literacy and be a fair and effective way to create
a more sustainable society in which everyone would
Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) has been proposed be interested in energy-efficient products, supportive
as a means of reducing individuals’ fossil fuel con- of renewable energy, and motivated to change their
sumption. As a strategy for change, it is a gradualist lifestyles. Many details of how PCT would work would
approach that allows people choices in how they still need to be clarified before it could ever become a
respond, but proponents argue that it would create the reality. The UK Department for Environment, Food and
necessary conditions for a radical transformation to a Rural Affairs (Defra) conducted a study to assess the
low- or zero-carbon society. The policy would involve proposal and concluded that although it would be tech-
allocating every eligible citizen a ‘personal carbon nically feasible, PCT is ‘ahead of its time’, particularly
allowance’, their free, equal share of a ­country’s per- because of the high costs of implementing it and lack
mitted carbon emissions, which they would have to of public acceptability (Defra 2008). However, others
use when buying certain fossil-fuel related goods. The suggest that the costs would be lower and the benefits
allowances would decrease over many years, in order greater than Defra’s calculations, and that Defra’s own
to meet emissions reduction targets. research shows that PCT is preferred to other policies
Every eligible adult would have a ‘carbon account’ such as a carbon tax (Fawcett 2010).
(and associated ‘carbon card’), similar to a bank From 2006, Carbon Rationing Action Groups
account, which would be automatically credited with (CRAGs) were formed in the UK and then in a few
their free carbon allowance (composed of ‘carbon other countries including the USA, Canada and China.
units’) at regular intervals. Parents might receive an These were grassroots voluntary groups of people who
extra allowance for children or else higher child benefit put some of the PCT proposals into practice by setting
payments to compensate for the costs of buying extra themselves a carbon allowance each year. Some groups
credits to cover their family’s energy use. Fossil fuels for operated basic trading, with a financial penalty for over-
home and vehicle use (principally gas, oil, coal, petrol emitters that was shared out to members who used less
and diesel), electricity generated from non-renewable than the allowance, but most groups didn’t do this and
sources, and possibly travel tickets would be assigned instead emphasized supporting each other to cut their
a carbon rating, based on the amount of CO2 emitted carbon emissions from home energy use and personal
by using these goods. We would be required to pay in transport. People involved in CRAGs showed that it is
carbon units as well as money for these purchases (e.g. possible to make significant reductions by changing their
an electricity bill or tank of petrol). Fuel and travel tickets behaviour, installing insulation and renewables (e.g. solar-
are the only goods that would be carbon-rated; for sim- powered hot water systems) at home, and buying more
plicity, PCT schemes are not designed to cover ‘embed- efficient appliances. An especially popular action was to
ded’ emissions in products such as food and clothes. cut down or give up flying, which is very carbon-intensive.
Carbon units would be legally tradable between indi- Being part of a CRAG helped people by offering support
viduals. Those with spare credits could sell them on a and a sense of accountability to the group, and encour-
regulated market to people who required more than their agement, because they could see that their individual
free allocation. This is an important aspect of PCT, since reductions put together added up to something more
the allowance necessary to cover current CO2 emissions significant. CRAG members also shared information,
varies considerably between individuals. It would prevent resources like energy monitors, and social time together.
a black market and also provide an incentive for us to cut Source: adapted from Howell (2012)
our emissions below the allowance level, which would For more information on Personal Carbon
not exist if we could not sell spare credits. Allowances (also called Tradable Energy Quotas)
People would be able to check their carbon see www.teqs.net.
accounts and buy or sell credits at post offices and
banks, by phone, or using the internet. They would Q   ‘If something cannot be manufactured, built or
also be able to buy carbon units at point-of-sale when grown without causing irreparable ecological dam-
purchasing carbon-rated fuels and travel tickets, so you age, can’t we strive to create something to take its
wouldn’t end up stranded on the petrol station forecourt place, or simply decide to do without it?’ (Tokar 1994:
if you suddenly realized you had no credit remaining on 80). What could you do without in your consumption
your carbon card, or had left it at home. and what would make you willing to give it up?

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 Chapter 6  The environment and environmentalism    149

Greener way of life themselves and joining together with technologies that reduce environmental impacts (wind
others who are doing the same’ (Bunyard and Morgan- farms are one example), support ecological projects
Grenville 1987: 336). Thus individuals are encouraged, through providing financial services (e.g. Triodos Bank
for example, to ‘reduce, reuse, recycle’. The three R’s and the Ecology Building Society), and practise Corpo-
are deliberately in the order of magnitude of impact. So rate Social Responsibility throughout their operations.
reducing our fossil fuel energy consumption (see Case Globally the United Nations Global Compact attempts
study 6.4) will have a far greater environmental ben- to encourage such action by asking businesses to sign
efit than recycling, which is time, energy and financially up to ten universally accepted principles in the areas of
inefficient. In recent years there has been a rapid rise in human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption.
‘green consumerism’ – purchasing goods such as eco- However, some companies have lobbied hard against
friendly washing powder or ‘natural’ shampoos that are legislation that they perceive would impact upon their
intended to be less damaging to the environment than profits. The Global Climate Coalition was formed by
alternatives. While this is a step in the right direction, (mainly USA) companies involved in energy-intensive
green consumerism is not about buying less, just pur- industries such as coal, oil, automobile, electricity
chasing different products. Potentially more sustainable generation, cement, and paper to cast doubt on cli-
ways to meet our needs include swap shops, Freecycle mate change science and campaign against government
and similar online recyling networks (which enable measures to limit GHG emissions (Jeswani et al. 2008).
people to get unwanted goods for free, thus reducing Some companies also face accusations of ‘greenwash-
waste and demand for new products), Local Exchange ing’ – appearing green while changing none of their
Trading Systems and Time Banks (which use alterna- fundamental approaches. Spotlight box 6.2 discusses
tive currencies to encourage non-monetary exchanges one practice that has attracted this kind of criticism.
of goods and services), and ‘Buy Nothing Day’ (www Moreover, businesses’ entry into green markets can
.buynothingday.co.uk). However, unfortunately at pre- lead to a dilution of the original principles and eventu-
sent, ‘it seems unlikely that a massive number of indi- ally subvert the environmental benefits. For example, a
viduals will experience the conversion that will lead to core element of organic food production is to reduce
the necessary changes in their daily behaviour’ (Dobson pollution. This principle is enhanced when people pur-
2001: 131) so it is also necessary to campaign for legisla- chase organic food locally (for example, through a box
tion to change the infrastructure and social norms that scheme from a local farm). However, when supermar-
create unsustainable ways of living. kets saw organics as a market opportunity, they began
Finally, businesses can play a key role in strategies for to import organically produced food from Africa and
environmental change, both good and bad (Doyle and Latin America, undermining many of its environmental
McEachern 2007). Businesses have sought to develop benefits (Hughes 2005, 2007). Here supermarkets failed

Spotlight box 6.2

Carbon offsetting and is another way that companies and individuals

can buy their way out of responsibility for the environ-
Carbon offsetting is the practice of buying carbon credits ment. There is significant debate as to its validity and
from projects which are intended to reduce greenhouse effectiveness, with arguments about measurement
gas emissions. The credits are then ‘offset’ against the and ‘additionality’ (i.e. whether projects would have
purchaser’s carbon footprint. In other words, counted as happened anyway, in which case the payments for
a reduction in their actual carbon emissions. Individu- carbon credits are not responsible for extra emissions
als, companies and countries increasingly seek to buy reductions). Tree-planting offset schemes have been
carbon credits through funding energy efficiency, refor- especially criticised because of the time it takes for
estation or renewable power projects, often in majority new trees to absorb carbon dioxide, and because they
world countries. In 2005 HSBC, one of the world’s big- only ‘offset’ emissions for as long as the trees don’t
gest banks, asserted that it had gone ‘carbon neutral’ burn or die and rot. The website www.cheatneutral.com
by buying carbon offset credits from renewable energy explores some of the criticisms of carbon offsetting in
projects in New Zealand, Australia, India and Germany. an amusing way by comparing it to paying others to be
Critics of carbon offsetting argue that it is a poor monogamous or celibate so as to offset cheating on
substitute for actually reducing our carbon emissions your partner.

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 150    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

to take account of the importance of reducing the ‘air of progress on poverty and debt in the Third World
miles’ that food has travelled as part of the measure of (see Chapter 8 for more discussion on this theme). For
the environmental impact of food consumption. many in the majority world the links between poverty,
The dilemma remains how best to enact change, be it development and the environment are explicit. It is not
through NGOs that are able to lever access to the halls a simple case of poverty leading to environmental dam-
of power but in doing so can appear elitist, or through age: there are countless examples of poor people being
radical direct action which encourages grassroots partici- key actors in environmental campaigns in India, Indone-
pation and individual responsibility but which in turn can sia, the Philippines and across South America. Certain
be small in scale and effect. For now, the answer appears forms of development have significant environmental
to lie in the vibrancy of environmental movements com- consequences – such as dam building, fossil fuel power
posed of a variety of contesting, challenging and support- generation and natural resource extraction (see Chapter 5
ive groups, incorporating international NGOs alongside for further information). But we should understand these
more radical small-scale groups. developments within the context of a history of colonial
What can one person, one household, one community exploitation and contemporary processes of competitive
or one administrative unit do when governments of some economic globalization.
of the world’s most economically powerful states cannot Ecological modernization has failed to consider
be brought onside? The environmentalist’s answer is to be international justice (Connelly and Smith 2003). Where
a good global citizen, to put pressure on administrations, industrialized nations have sought to reduce their envi-
governments, corporations and supranational organiza- ronmental damage they have in many cases simply
tions through political and non-political means, and to exported their environmental problems to less indus-
educate, encourage and work with others. We have gone trialized countries: for example, the export of harmful
some way down this route in the past four decades, but
significant problems remain.

6.6  hat is missing from our

W
focus on ‘the environment’?
One of those problems is the way in which we concep-
tualize the environment and ‘environmental issues’ as
separate from other aspects of our lives and concerns.
‘Environmentalists’ are stereotyped as ‘treehuggers’ who
care more about animals than people, and it is assumed
that they are not the same people as those who campaign
about human rights and social justice. However, we are
beginning to acknowledge the complex web of relation-
ships between humans and the environment, and the
relation of ‘environmental’ problems to poverty, devel-
opment, human health, injustice and issues of democracy.
In reality, environmental issues are social issues, as shown
by the increasing focus of development NGOs such as
Oxfam and Christian Aid on ‘environmental’ concerns
like climate change.
At the level of international policymaking, too, the
emphasis has changed since the Rio Earth Summit to
one that seeks to integrate environment and develop-
ment more closely and for the environmental agenda to
include concerns about poverty. These lines of thinking
are underpinned by the World Bank’s Poverty Alleviation
Strategies and the Millennium Development Goals which Plate 6.7  Teaching Indigenous knowledge about the
were agreed by the UN General Assembly in September land, Australia.
2000 (www.un.org/millenniumgoals) in response to lack (Jenny Pickerill)

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 Chapter 6  The environment and environmentalism    151

computer wastes to China (Shabi 2002). Environmental sea-level rises on Pacific Islanders will be so catastrophic
injustice also occurs within countries (see Spotlight box that it will potentially wipe out entire nations. People
6.3). Furthermore, environmental protection as well as who take action on climate change are often motivated
environmental damage has resulted in the dispossession not so much by concerns about ‘the environment’ for its
of Indigenous peoples from their land, to make way for own sake, as by the plight of poor people in the majority
national parks for example (see Case study 6.5). This world who have contributed least to the problem but will
practice results from two mistaken beliefs: first, that suffer most (Howell 2013). Rather than being seen as a
humans will only ever have a detrimental impact on their hindrance to wildlife preservation, Indigenous people’s
surroundings and second, that preservation of an envi- environmental knowledge and management skills are
ronment is more important than human ties to a particu- slowly beginning to be valued. The 2004 Arctic Climate
lar place, and in some cases, human survival. Impact Assessment, for example, portrays Indigenous
Thus the industrialized world’s approach to ‘the people as both at risk of losing their ways of life, and
environment’ often fails to understand majority world as holders of valuable knowledge about the impacts of
experiences, the need to incorporate humans into our climate change (see www.acia.uaf.edu/). Moreover, Indig-
understandings of the environment, and to acknowledge enous peoples’ often alternative ways of viewing the envi-
that some people have limited environmental choices. ronment, as being a melding of culture, land and sky in
Recent work has sought to change how we view the envi- the case of Indigenous Australians for example, challenge
ronment, suggesting that the division between human our conceptualizations. The need to understand the psy-
and non-human is an artificial and unhelpful one (see chology behind environmental concern and to promote
Chapter 12). Environmental concerns have been recast behavioural changes are becoming priority areas for envi-
as issues of social survival. For example, the impact of ronmental research (Hulme 2004).

Spotlight box 6.3

Environmental justice It is also a critique of environmentalists’ focus on

wilderness preservation rather than the plight of the
The environmental justice movement calls for acknowl- underprivileged, and ‘has dragged other parts of the
edgement that it is often the already marginalized who US environmental movement into a political place
suffer most from environmental degradation. Robert where the social ramifications of being green have
Bullard in his book Dumping in Dixie (1990) argued that to be confronted’ (Doyle and McEachern 2001: 69).
toxic dump sites were more likely to be near neighbour- Understanding environmental problems as rooted in
hoods of black Americans than whites – race being a inequality is helpful in understanding some of the con-
major factor in the quality of a person’s environment. temporary issues in dealing with climate change. Parks
The African National Congress asserted that ‘poverty and Roberts (2008) argue that ‘global inequality may
and environmental degradation have been closely be a central impediment to interstate cooperation on cli-
linked’ in South Africa (McDonald 2004: 2). These are mate change policy’ (p. 621) and therefore that we need
forms of environmental injustice. to tackle this injustice first.

Case study 6.5

Wilderness and conservation employ an emotive language using words such as

debates in Australia ‘pristine’, ‘untouched’, ‘undisturbed’, ‘intact expanse’
and ‘wild frontiers’ to rally support. Photographs of
Environmental campaigns worldwide are often framed lands empty of people or any human structures often
as conserving ‘wilderness’ and preventing exploitation accompany these words. Whether directly, through
of natural resources. Organizations lobbying for pro- hunting for example, or indirectly through their develop-
tection of vast tracts of Alaska, Canada and Australia ment activities, people are usually held responsible
➜

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 152    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

➜ for wildlife losses. Until the 1980s, conservationists’ vague policy of supporting Indigenous rights. Some
solutions relied on strategies like hunting bans and groups have attempted to go further and alter their
­establishing protected areas through World Heritage language and practices to implement this policy. The
status or as National Parks. Wilderness Society has shifted away from large-scale
However, there is increasing recognition not only agreements and broad alliances with Indigenous
that Indigenous people have historic rights of posses- groups to grounded community-level cooperation.
sion to some of that land, but also that Indigenous Although they have not discarded the contentious goal
environmental knowledge and land management prac- of creating National Parks, they are working more in
tices can be beneficial for conservation outcomes. This collaboration with traditional owners, supporting a class
recognition and the legal changes that have accom- of National Park which is owned as Aboriginal Land
panied it (such as the development of Native Title in but managed under the Nature Conservation Act,
Australia) have forced environmental and conservation supporting attempts to gain Aboriginal Freehold
groups to reconsider their approach, although many land, and to establish Indigenous Protected Areas
have been slow to change their language or practices ­(Schneiders 2006: 27).
when it comes to viewing areas as ‘wilderness’ devoid The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) has
of people. taken a different path. They have instigated a northern
Language is a key articulation of power in under- Australia Programme, which aims to take a long-term
standings of the ‘environment’. The term ‘wilderness’ proactive approach towards creating a bicultural organi-
and its relation ‘wild’ are highly problematic when talk- zation. It is focused on coming up with joint goals rather
ing of any landscape, but especially so in Australia, a than finding campaign partners for issues the ACF think
land inhabited by the Indigenous population for tens of are important. To this end they have even opposed the
thousands of years. Yet these terms are still employed. creation of new National Parks when traditional owners
Such a romanticization of the environment draws upon have objected. ACF avoids the words ‘wilderness’ and
the writings of Henry David Thoreau, John Muir and ‘biodiversity’ altogether and instead talks about ‘nature’
Miles Dunphy, and is used to sell Australia and garner and ‘culture’.
support for environmental protection. Both these organizations have made progress in
Indigenous people have been highly critical of modifying their language and practices in response to
the use of such words. They have colonial and racist the charge that they were party to ‘a form of ecologi-
connotations, and the narrow vision, propagated by cal imperialism’ (Langton 1998: 18). However, two key
environmental groups, of what ‘wilderness’ entails is problems remain. First, the majority of Indigenous
dualistic. Indigenous Australians argue that there can engagement by these two groups has been confined to
be no such division between the environment and cul- northern Australia. A view persists that there is no need
ture and that ‘land is a much more energetic configura- to engage with Indigenous politics further south, per-
tion of earth and air, water and minerals, animals and petuating the myth that only those Indigenous people
plants, as well as people, than a surface area contained who have a more apparent and historic (according to
by lines on a map’ (Whatmore 2002: 71). It is precisely non-Indigenous adjudicators) connection to their home-
because of these interrelations between environment land need consultation. Second, although the language
and culture that Indigenous people need to live on their has changed, the underlying premise of why a land-
land in order to care for their country; ‘the land needs scape is of enough value to protect has not altered.
the people and the people need the land ... these are Both still employ a biophysical-based and scientific
important cultural environments that require people method to determine value. We are a long way from
to manage them according to tradition and culture, to bridging the gap between ‘environment’ and ‘culture’
maintain ... and to encourage species’ (Damian Britnell, and widening the ways in which we value landscape.
Mossman Gorge Aboriginal Community). Source: adapted from Pickerill (2008)
The Indigenous critique of ‘wilderness’ and
approach to ‘country’, especially calls to live on land, is Q   Do you think later settlers should have any say
controversial. However, the majority of environmental in the environmental management of Indigenous
groups in Australia now have (albeit only recently) a land and the wildlife that inhabits it?

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 Chapter 6  The environment and environmentalism    153

argue that it is the grassroots-community level where sig-

6.7 Environmentally sustainable nificant innovation occurs that can offer us inspirational
futures visions of alternative futures. We have seen this in the case
studies about low-impact living and Carbon Rationing
Action Groups. Some of these innovations are small-scale
Society is taking action: policies are being designed and
in their approach, others, such as permaculture, are
implemented at global, regional and local scales. But
now being adopted globally. Fourth, and least ­radically,
there are issues that still dog progress:
we need to improve our management of the current
● The impacts of some environmental problems are dis- ­situation. There are existing environmental issues that
tant in time and space from those who contribute most we need to mitigate immediately, even while we begin to
to causing them. explore alternative futures. For example, in Britain there
● Remediation and restoration of many types of envi- are growing numbers of car users. A 2006 government
ronmental damage takes years. report, The Eddington Transport Study, supported road
● The costs of environmental remediation and protect- pricing, rather than more road building, in order to over-
ing environments are often enormous. come existing congestion problems, and argued that ‘all
● Our incomplete knowledge about many aspects of the transport users should meet all their external economic,
environment, and how environment–society linkages social and environmental costs’ (Eddington 2006: 2). This
work, can act as a barrier to finding effective solutions. approach has led to the introduction of the congestion
● The drive for economic growth is strong, while charge in London. However, plans to implement similar
the negotiation and implementation of global and schemes in Manchester and Edinburgh have been publicly
regional environmental policies is slow. rejected. We have to decide if road pricing is an appro-
priate management strategy, or whether an alternative
Despite these obstacles it is up to us to decide what
policy such as having a travel allowance, akin to ration-
kind of world we want and to work towards it. We have
ing, would be better. Given these choices, which pathways
explored a range of ways in which we understand and
forward are you going to take?
value the environment, different ways in which we could
‘reconceive the environment’, and strategies for change.
In summary, there are four key steps we can take towards
reducing our environmental damage.
First, we need to understand our environmental
impacts better: globally, regionally, locally and indi-
vidually. At an individual level we can use an ecological
footprint calculator (e.g. http://footprint.wwf.org.uk)
to evaluate our resource use. Second, we can participate
in environmental decision-making. Connelly and Smith
(2003: 361), through their concept of ecological democ-
ratization, argue that the only way to achieve environ-
mentally sustainable practices is through ‘a commitment
to both justice and participation’. They advocate exten-
sive citizen participation and development of democratic
institutions to tackle environmental issues at all scales. In Plate 6.8  A Reclaim the Streets demonstration in
many ways this is an extension of many pre-existing local Hull, May 1999, which illegally occupied the streets for
initiatives. Third, we need to recognize and make use of a day in protest at a car-obsessed culture.
innovative grassroots solutions. Seyfang and Smith (2007) (Jenny Pickerill)

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 154    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Learning outcomes Klein, N. (2015) This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs.

the Climate, Penguin Books, London. An incisive critique of
Having read this chapter, you should understand:
our current response to climate change, with – unusually
● The concepts of limits to growth and sustainable in books on this topic – a whole section on movements for
development. change and reasons for hope.

● That information about environmental problems Marshall, G. (2014) Don’t Even Think About It: Why Our Brains
is not necessarily enough to motivate action; Are Wired to Ignore Climate Change, Bloomsbury USA, New
York. Engaging and easy-to-read discussion of why we ignore
responses depend on people’s worldviews and
climate change and what to do to stop that happening.
how they value the environment.
McNeill, J.R. (2000) Something New Under the Sun: An
● The complexity of scale when looking for solutions
Environmental History of the World in the 20th Century,
to environmental problems.
Penguin, London. A very readable history of the impact of
● The possibilities and limitations of different strate- humanity on the planet and the rise of environmental concern.
gies for action.
Peet, R., Robbins, P. and Watts, M.J. (eds) (2011) Global
● How we can begin to make progressive steps Political Ecology, Routledge, London. This book includes a
towards reducing our environmental impacts. large variety of case examples exploring the relationships
between environmental issues, economics, poverty and
politics.
Further reading Peterson Del Mar, D. (2012) Environmentalism, 2nd edition,
Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon. A short thought-provoking book
Böhm, S., Pervez Bharucha, Z. and Pretty, J. (2015) which examines the complex relationship between prosperity
Ecocultures: Blueprints for Sustainable Communities, and environmentalism.
­Earthscan, London. A book packed full of global examples of
Reynolds, M., Blackmore, C. and Smith, M.J. (2009) The
environmentalism and environmental projects in action.
Environmental Responsibility Reader, Zed Books, London.
Dauvergne, P. (2009) The A to Z of Environmentalism, The A good collection of essays and extracts on topics such as
Scarecrow Press, Toronto. A great dictionary of key terms, environmental ethics, ecological citizenship and individual
events and people related to environmentalism. and collective responsibility. It contains key pieces that have
Doyle, T. (2005) Environmental Movements in Majority and influenced environmental thinking, including extracts from
Minority Worlds: A Global Perspective, Rutgers University Silent Spring by Rachel Carson, and Garrett Hardin’s essay
Press, London. A good introduction to a variety of environ- on the tragedy of the commons.
mental movements in the USA, Australia, Britain, Germany, Robbins, P., Hintz, J. and Moore, S.A. (2014) Environment
the Philippines and India, incorporating protection of forests, and Society: A Critical Introduction, 2nd edition,
rivers and wilderness areas, and movements against mining, Wiley-Blackwell, London. An accessible introduction to the
road building and nuclear power. relationship between society and environmental challenges,
Harris, F. (ed.) (2012) Global Environmental Issues, 2nd usefully illustrated with a broad range of examples.
edition, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester. Taking a global Stibbe, A. (ed.) (2009) The Handbook of Sustainability
perspective this book examines environmental problems as ­Literacy: Skills for a Changing World, Green Books,
complex issues with a network of human and biophysical Dartington, Devon. A book of essays on the skills and
causes. values ‘necessary for surviving and thriving in the declining
Haq, G. and Paul, A. (2012) Environmentalism since 1945, conditions of the world in ways that slow down that decline
Routledge, London. A brief history of how minority world as far as possible.’
environmentalism became a global movement. Uekötter, F. (2014) The Greenest Nation? A New History of
Hulme, M. (2009) Why We Disagree About Climate Change: German Environmentalism, MIT Press, London. A concise
Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity, Cam- and revealing history of the environmental movement in
bridge University Press, Cambridge. This book seeks to Germany.
reconsider how we perceive climate change and views it as Wapner, P. (2010) Living Through the End of Nature: The
an environmental, cultural and political phenomenon rather Future of American Environmentalism, MIT Press, London.
than simply a threat. It combines a scientific approach with This book explores the tension between environmentalism
social and political standpoints. and nature, and explores the future of environmentalism.

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 Chapter 6  The environment and environmentalism    155

www.foe.co.uk Friends of the Earth is an international

Useful websites environmental organization which campaigns for action on
climate change, food and biodiversity.
www.climatecrisis.net  Provides additional information, www.unep.org/geo United Nations Environment ­Programme
science and ‘take action’ suggestions for Al Gore’s film An website, including links to their latest publications on the state
Inconvenient Truth about climate change. of the environment and trends at regional and global scale, the
www.ipcc.ch  Provides information from the Intergovern- Global Environmental Outlook (GEO) reports.
mental Panel on Climate Change on the science of climate http://old.quaker.org.uk/extras/climateimpact/index.html 
change and future change scenarios. Carbon Calculator: enables you to estimate your carbon
www.lowimpact.org  Low Impact Living Initiative. A non- footprint. This one is handy if you don’t have figures from
profit organization whose mission is to help people reduce household energy bills; it lets you estimate based on the size
their impact on the environment, improve their quality of life, of your house and how many people live in it. It also shows
gain new skills, live in a healthier and more satisfying way, you results as you go along, so you can see very easily how
have fun and save money. making changes to your lifestyle will affect your footprint.
www.wilderness.org.au  The Wilderness Society Australia. www.resurgence.org/education/carbon-calculator.html 
Contains information on old-growth logging in Australia and Another carbon calculator. This one is quite detailed and you
the wide variety of other environmental campaigns with will need information from energy bills to calculate your car-
which this Australian environmental advocacy organization is bon emissions from home energy use, which should give an
involved. accurate figure.

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 Food security

Chapter 7

Bill Pritchard

Topics covered
■ Famines
■ Undernourishment
■ Entitlements
■ Green revolution
■ Genetically modified foods and world hunger
■ Food-aid dependency
■ The Right to Food

Starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough

food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there being not enough food
to eat. While the latter can be a cause of the former, it is but one of
many possible causes.
(Opening words to Amartya Sen’s Poverty and Famines: An Essay on
­Entitlement and Deprivation, 1981)

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 Chapter 7  Food security    157

of the Pilgrim settlers in 1620–21. Following a success-

7.1 Introduction ful harvest that kept the settlers alive, a Thanksgiving
feast was held. Comparably, in Australia, the First Fleet
Food security’ is a term that is used in many different settlers of 1788 faced imminent starvation within two
ways. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss this con- years of arrival due to the expiration of their rations and
cept in a manner that is consistent with its usage at the farming failures.
international level by entities such as the UN Food and Amongst European peoples worldwide, the politics of
Agriculture Organization. We begin by placing contem- hunger continued to hold important sway right up until
porary debates about food security into an historical the end of the Second World War, often associated with
perspective. interruptions to seasonal harvests brought on by climate or
war. Thus, in 1815 when the far-distant Tambora volcano
erupted in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) and sent
a shower of ash into the upper atmosphere, a resultant
7.2 Hunger in human history global cooling of temperatures decimated food harvests
in the northern hemisphere the following summer, creating
Widespread hunger has stalked humankind perennially. a hunger crisis in cities on America’s Atlantic seaboard.
Although this threat might seem far removed from the The author Simon Winchester describes this event as ‘the
quotidian concerns of most people living in the global last great subsistence crisis of the Western world’ (2003:
North during the early twenty-first century, the chal- 295). Food insecurity remained a present threat in urban
lenge to feed and sustain the human population has America through the nineteenth century, including New
been a pre-eminent social, political and economic strug- York’s ‘bread riots’ in 1837, and food riots in many cities
gle across history, and remains central to the planet’s during the Civil War (1861–65). In Europe, the wars of the
circumstances today. nineteenth and twentieth centuries were often accompa-
In Western Europe, battles over food and hunger were nied by food shortages and hunger. Perhaps the last ever
seminal to the cycles of political evolution and revolution full-scale famine in Western Europe occurred in 1944–45
which forged nation states. Rousseau’s apocryphal descrip- in the western Netherlands, when Dutch resistance to
tion of a French princess (not Marie Antoinette, as com- Nazi rule caused disruptions to food transports and an
monly attributed) asking why the peasants would prefer estimated 18,000 people died of hunger (van der Zee
bread to cake [‘Qu’ils mangent de la brioche!’ (‘popularly 1982). More recently (though perhaps less dramatically),
translated as ‘Let them eat cake!’)] is a testament to the the end of the Cold War saw heightened food insecurity in
symbolic and material power of food in political and the former Soviet Union over several years as its economic
social life. Throughout the period right up until the twen- system restructured to the logics of capitalism. Yet for all
tieth century, periodic civil strife over food was a defining the importance of hunger within the record of Western
element of European life. In the British Isles, there was civilization, non-European populations have been the over-
ongoing hunger and malnourishment for the working and whelming bearers of hunger across human history. An East
agrarian classes throughout the onset of the industrial India Company trader visiting (what is now known as) the
period, which erupted episodically into food riots, such state of Gujarat in India during the great famine of 1630–
as those affecting England and Wales in 1772–73. During 32 recorded that: ‘from Suratt [sic] to this place [Agra]
the nineteenth century, a key element in the debate over our noses were never free of the stinck [sic] of corpses’
the passage of the Corn Laws (which allowed cheaper, and ‘the [roads] were so full of dead bodyes [sic] that we
imported food into Britain) was the need to feed (and, could hardlie [sic] pass them without treading on or going
thus, politically placate) the fast-growing urban work- over some’ (cited in Keay 1993: 115). The strengthening of
ing class. All the time, however, the threat of widespread British colonial rule in ensuing centuries exacerbated hun-
hunger was ever-present. In Ireland, as is well known, the ger vulnerabilities. Local politico-administrative systems
collapse in potato production because of phytophthora were recomposed to fit within colonial logics, which had
infestans (potato blight) instigated famine conditions over as their core the extraction of profit to service the Empire.
the period 1845–52. Perhaps less well known, similar con- A series of famines in India during the nineteenth century
ditions also afflicted the Scottish Highlands over this same saw the deaths of an estimated 30–40 million people. The
period, with a level of death and out-migration which was last major famine under British rule occurred in Bengal, in
of almost equal magnitude to the Irish famine. 1942–43, when a combination of war-induced decisions to
As European peoples spread across the world, these restrict the transportation of rice and cyclonic devastation
challenges travelled with them. The American tradition resulted in the starvation deaths of between 1.5 million and
of Thanksgiving traces its origins to the near-starvation 4 million persons (see Case study 7.1).

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 158    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Case study 7.1

The Bengal famine of 1942–43 a ‘mid-range’ estimate of 2.1 million deaths. For the
Famine Commission estimate, see p. 68 in Weigold,
Estimates of deaths from the 1942–43 Bengal fam- A. (1999) Famine management: the Bengal famine
ine remain disputed. The Famine Commission set up (1942–44) revisited, South Asia, 22(1), 63–77. For
by the British authorities reported 1.5 million deaths. Amartya Sen’s discussion of the death toll, see p. 52
Amartya Sen has suggested the death toll was closer in Sen, A. (1981) Poverty and Famines: An Essay on
to 3 million, and some other Indian sources sug- Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford University Press,
gest it was higher still. Ó Gráda (2007: 19) adopts Oxford.

Histories of China, other parts of Asia and Africa reap

a similar story. In Ethiopia, for example, widespread crop 7.3 T he present scale and geography
failures and the related onset of hunger occurred with of global hunger
regularity once or twice a decade from recorded history
many centuries ago until 1984–85, when a severe fam-
Notwithstanding this receding of large-scale repeat fam-
ine impelled global action. The United Nations defines a
ine cycles, chronic hunger remains at unacceptable levels
famine as occurring when three conditions are met: (1) at
across the world, and almost everywhere, exists side-
least 20 per cent of the population has fewer than 2,100
by-side with a worsening incidence of overweight and
calories of food a day; (2) the prevalence of acute malnu-
obese populations. Many countries are now confronted
trition exceeds 30 per cent of children; and (3) the death
with a double-burden of malnutrition, having to deal
rate exceeds two deaths per 10,000 people, or four child
simultaneously with problems of hunger within some
deaths per 10,000 people per day. The arrival of these
segments of their population and overweight/obesity in
conditions in Ethiopia in 1984–85 provided the impetus
others. However, focusing on undernutrition and hunger,
for a major charitable intervention in the West through
a key turning point in this recent history was 2008, when
the ‘Live Aid/Band Aid’ initiative, and brought images of
there was a confluence of rapidly rising prices for food
famine to many Western eyes for the first time. The eco-
(Figure 7.1) and energy (see Chapter 5). These trends
nomic historian Cormac Ó Gráda (2007: 5–6) observes
sparked a dramatic increase in global hunger. In 2008,
that ‘By the 1990s, famine-induced deaths were confined
it was estimated (although see Spotlight box 7.1) that
to poverty-stricken and often war-torn pockets of the
the number of people living in chronic undernourish-
globe’. At the time of writing, the most recent episodes
ment was estimated to have exceeded one billion peo-
of famine were in Somalia (2011–12) and West Africa
ple. Subsequent revisions to official data suggest that
(2012). In both cases, war and civil unrest were centrally
the spike in undernourishment was not as severe as
implicated within the onset of famine conditions.

Spotlight box 7.1

How many hungry people are there But, as is well known, food is not always distributed
in the world? equitably within households (in many societies there is a
prevalence of men being fed first and women often going
The FAO estimates that in 2014 there were 791 million hungry). Also, just because a household can feed itself
undernourished people on the planet. In all probability, doesn’t mean it does feed itself; in many households
however, this is a lower bound estimate of global hunger. across the globe, money that should be used for food
The methodology by which these data are collected (via is used for alcohol, drugs and gambling, for instance.
national household surveys and modelling the effects of Indeed, one of the world’s leading food researchers, Per
changes in incomes and food prices) tends to assume Pinstrup-Andersen, cites an estimate of two billion iron
that if a household has the capability to acquire enough deficient people on the planet as evidence to suggest
food to meet the daily minimum energy requirements of that global hunger is far greater than official estimates
its members, then no-one in that household is hungry. suggest (Pinstrup-Andersen 2009: 6).

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 Chapter 7  Food security    159

1050
2009
1000

950
2008
900 2010
1969–71
Millions

1990–92
850
1979–81 2000–02
2005–07
800
1995–97
750

Figure 7.1  Number of undernourished people in the world, 1969–71 to 2010.

Source: adapted from FAO (2010) State of Food Insecurity, p. 9

originally thought (Pritchard and Choithani 2014) (Fig- persons who are undernourished has fallen since 2008,
ure 7.1), however increased food prices triggered food it is still at an unacceptable level, and progress remains
riots across 60 countries, which saw at least one govern- at the mercy of economic volatility and the limitations
ment (in Haiti) fall (Plate 7.1). Significantly, the events of our planetary resources.
of 2008 arguably constituted the first-ever global food Furthermore, global hunger is dispersed across the
crisis. Because of the highly integrated international world in a highly uneven way, with 40 per cent of the
character of contemporary food commodity markets, world’s undernourished people living in China and India.
ripple effects from one country to the next occurred in A further four countries (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Demo-
a rapid and coordinated fashion. With hunger a mat- cratic Republic of the Congo, and Indonesia) account for
ter of global political and economic concern, interna- a further 26 per cent (FAO 2010: 10). Moreover, with the
tional policy makers were shaken from their complacent exception of China, all of these countries failed to meet
assumptions about the world community ‘winning the the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) for reducing
war’ on undernutrition. Although the global number of hunger (see Figure 7.2 and Case study 8.1). The MDG for

Plate 7.1  Protests over food prices in Haiti in 2008.

(Eduardo Munoz/Reuters)

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 160    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Progress achieved (1990–92 to 2005–07)

Already met MDG 1 or very close to meeting the target
Progress sufficient to reach MDG 1 if prevailing trends persist
Progress insufficient to reach MDG 1 if prevailing trends persist
No progress or deterioration
Not relevant – prevalence of hunger was below 5% in 1990
Missing or insufficient data

Figure 7.2  Progress towards Millennium Development Goal 1: hunger target.

Source: www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/es/Hunger_Portal/MDG_Progress_Map.pdf

hunger aims to reduce by half (between 1990 and 2015) the causes and manifestations of hunger. Central to these
proportion of people in the world suffering from hunger – current debates is the newly articulated concept of food
measured statistically as (i) the prevalence of under-weight security. To a large degree, this concept has become the
children under 5 years of age, and (ii) the proportion of the foundation stone for contemporary s­ trategic interven-
population below minimum dietary energy consumption. tions of international organizations (such as the FAO)
Clearly, this map paints a depressing picture of global food and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (such as
security; many of the world’s countries with the highest Oxfam, ActionAid and Red Cross/Red Crescent). In the
rates of food insecurity are also those currently display- following section, the concept of food security is defined,
ing worst progress in generating improvements to these and afterwards, its a­ pplication to key issues relating to
situations. Moreover, it needs remembering that hunger global hunger is discussed.
and undernourishment also exist in the developed world.
The recent global recession has exacerbated the extent
of hunger: in 2008, 14.6 per cent of the US population
was food insecure at some point in the year, including 7.4 Defining food security
5.7 per cent with ‘very low food security’, meaning ‘that
the food intake of one or more household members was Until the mid-1990s, the prevailing perspective in inter-
reduced and their eating patterns were disrupted at times national debates on food and hunger tended to prioritize
during the year because the household lacked money and production-centric explanations with the emphasis on
other resources for food’ (Nord et al. 2009: 1). Five years maintaining food stocks in the context of an unpredict-
later, in 2013, these statistics remained unmoved, despite able world. Hence, in the case of the Irish famine of
the considerable gains of the US economy since 2008 1845–52, cited earlier, famine was seen to be caused by
(Coleman-Jensen et al. 2013). the unexpected threat of potato blight. In Ethiopia or the
The rapid changes in the incidence of global under- Indian subcontinent, famine vulnerability was tied to the
nourishment in recent years have triggered renewed unpredictability of the monsoon. Clearly, the implicit sug-
debate amongst researchers and policy makers on the gestion within these explanations was that such problems

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 Chapter 7  Food security    161

were premised on catastrophic and unavoidable circum- 1970s was instigated by the brutal maladministration of the
stances – ‘acts of God’, as an insurance policy might say. militaristic Khmer Rouge. The 1984–85 famine in Ethio-
Hence, in 1974, the World Food Conference defined food pia was associated not only with drought, but in a context
security as: ‘Availability at all times of adequate world where the national government diverted a massive share of
food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady scarce national resources to the military. Famine in North
expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations Korea in 1998 was associated with crop failures in the con-
in production and prices’ (cited in FAO 2006: 1). text of an autocratic regime that prioritized national secu-
Fundamental aspects of this perspective remain impor- rity and protection of the interests of the elite class.
tant within present thinking. Rarely, if ever, are rapid From this analysis, Sen proposed the concept of entitle-
descents into widespread hunger not associated with a ments as a way of understanding hunger. This concept
food production shock of some kind (climatic, environ- sought to explain hunger and famine by way of asking ques-
mental, biological or human-induced, e.g. war). Such tions about the social, cultural and economic frameworks
cataclysms obviously impact on people’s abilities to feed that bestowed rights to ownership within populations. As
themselves and, from a policy perspective, require an Sen contended, even the seemingly straightforward notion
immediate response in the form of food aid. Nevertheless, of possessing a loaf of bread (and thus forestalling one’s
since the mid-1990s there has been an increasing recogni- hunger) assumes a chain of entitlement relations:
tion of the need to build more sophisticated conceptual
understandings of what causes hunger. Instead of seeing I own this loaf of bread. Why is this ownership
particular biological, climatic or environmental contexts accepted? Because I got it by exchange through paying
as catastrophic events that define these problems, the emer- some money I owned. Why is my ownership of that
gent approach is to understand food production shocks as money accepted? Because I got it by selling a bamboo
triggers that reverberate (in socially uneven ways) through umbrella owned by me. Why is my ownership of the
populations. This approach refocuses the attention of bamboo umbrella accepted? Because I made it with my
researchers and policy makers to the broader systems that own labour using some bamboo from my land. Why is
connect people to the food system. This perspective goes my ownership of the land accepted? Because I inher-
under the banner of the food security approach. ited it from my father. Why is his ownership of that
The chief and most influential proponent of such an land accepted? And so on. Each link in this chain of
altered perspective has been Amartya Sen, an Indian econo- entitlement relations ‘legitimizes’ one set of ownership
mist and philosopher. Sen was awarded the Nobel Prize by reference to another, or to some basic entitlement
in Economics in 1998 for a body of work that included in the form of enjoying the fruits of one’s own labour.
landmark analyses of the causes of famine. Sen addressed (Sen 1981: 1–2)
the causes of hunger and famine from a radically different
set of premises from that which prevailed in mainstream Thus, in Sen’s writings on this subject, he asserted that
thinking. He saw that famines in different circumstances the ability of a person to avoid starvation depended on
worldwide each could be understood as having a common her/his entitlements, which, in turn, was constructed from
socio-politico-economic themes. Whereas dominant con- her/his ownership bundle (the combination of labour
temporary explanations about these episodes looked to a powers, resources and assets s/he can use to acquire food)
fall in food production as the root causes of hunger, Sen and the exchange entitlement regime s/he faced (the rights
documented a more complex reality. Hence in the Irish to resources s/he can access to transfer an ownership bun-
famine, the potato crop failed but Ireland remained a large dle into food). Or, in slightly more simplified language:
exporter of foodstuffs across to England. In Ethiopia in the ‘Entitlements are defined as the set of all commodity bun-
famine of 1972–73, food was trucked from famine areas to dles over which a person can establish command given
the capital of Addis Ababa. The great Bengal famines of the legal, political, economic and social arrangements of
1942–43 and 1972–73 were associated with ‘moderate’ falls the community in which they live (including traditional
in production being translated into severe market shortfalls rights such as access to common resources)’ (FAO 2006:
due to hoarding, speculation and ‘administrative chaos’ 1). Applying this framework to Ireland in 1845–52, Sen
(Sen 1981: 76). Extending this further, Sen’s approach contended that famine was caused because the pre-emi-
asked why some ‘poor years’ of agricultural production nent asset within the ownership bundle of the rural Irish
produced widespread hunger or famine, whilst others did poor (their control over small plots of land on which to
not. Clearly, other factors came into play. China’s disas- grow potatoes, their staple food) became suddenly worth-
trous ‘Great Leap Forward’ of 1957 caused famine not just less with the onset of potato blight, and the population
because of crop failures, but also through ill-conceived cen- had few other rights over resources that could replace
tral state planning. Famine in Cambodia during the late this loss (piecemeal social safety net efforts, such as the

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 162    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

workhouse system, were associated with poor manage- and social circumstances. Notably, unlike the 1974 World
ment and/or were hotbeds for infectious diseases (Ó Food Conference definition, cited earlier, this does not
Gráda 2007:17)). Hence, although potato blight was the equate ‘food security’ with maximizing food production,
trigger, it was this combination of ownership bundles and or having large stocks of food in reserve. These supply-
exchange entitlements amongst the poor that provided side factors are obviously important, but the over-riding
the ultimate cause of the Irish famine. message in this definition is that the attainment of food
Sen’s work was an important precedent for the ways security is primarily about the social, economic, cultural
that policy makers approached these issues at the 1996 and political circumstances that either enable or restrict the
World Food Summit (WFS), in Rome. This Summit is provisioning of food to needy populations. Thus, the WFS
popularly credited with launching the concept of food definition of food security can be seen as a political enact-
security into mainstream food policy discourse. As ment of Sen’s notion of entitlements. Ultimately, what is
defined at the WFS: important for addressing hunger is not only the ability to
produce food, but a social-political-economic regime that
Food security exists when all people, at all times, have
enables people in need to gain that food.
physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe
In order to give this definition operational relevance,
and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and
however, it needed elaboration. Accordingly, in the imme-
food preferences for an active and healthy life.
diate years after the 1996 WFS, an FAO Working Group
(FAO 1996) developed a framework for understanding the processes
that created particular patterns of food security/insecu-
Expressed in this way, the concept serves a dual pur-
rity. This framework – which is shown diagrammatically
pose. At one level, it encapsulates a normative goal; an
in Figure 7.3 – conceives food security as being an out-
aspiration for the world community to attain this outcome
come from three dimensions of the food system:
for ‘all people, at all times’. But also, it represents a defini-
tional signpost. The clear focus of the quote above is that ● Availability: The supply-side factors that shape the
‘food security’ is defined in terms of the extent to which availability of sufficient quantities of food of appro-
a food system satisfies individuals’ nutritional, livelihood priate quality.

Care Practices
Child care
Feeding practices
Nutrition education
Food Availability Food preparation
Socio-Economic
(trends and levels) Eating habits
and Political Intra-household food
Production
Environment distribution
Imports (net)
Utilization (food, non-food)
National level
Stocks Food
Population
Consumption
Education Stability of Food Energy intake
Macroeconomy Supplies and Access Nutrient intake
Policy environment (variability)
Natural resource Nutritional
Food production
endowment Incomes Status
Markets Food
Agriculture sector
Social entitlements Utilization
Market conditions
by the Body
Access to Food Health status
Subnational level
Household (trends and levels)
characteristics Purchasing power Health and
Livelihood systems Market integration Sanitation
Social institutions Access to markets Health care practices
Cultural attitudes Hygiene
Water quality
Sanitation
Food safety and quality

Figure 7.3  Conceptual framework of possible causes of low food consumption and poor nutritional status.
Source: adapted from FAO (2008) Climate Change and Food Security: A Framework Document, p. 4

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 Chapter 7  Food security    163

● Access: The political, social, cultural and economic illustrates this trend. (The international wheat price is a
processes that connect supply-side processes to good indicator of overall food prices.)
individuals. A myriad of factors were behind these production
● Utilization: The elements of clean water, sanitation gains: more land put to agricultural use, improvements
and health care that ensure that food that is made in water infrastructure and technologies; developments in
available and is accessible (i.e. the two categories post-harvest technologies and storage facilities; increased
above) generates nutritional well-being for consumers. capitalization and economies of scale in farming (allow-
ing machinery such as tractors and combine harvesters to
Reflecting the importance of these three d ­ imensions
be employed); innovations in livestock breeding and hus-
within contemporary debates on food security, the
bandry; and intensive protein production (fish, poultry and
remainder of this chapter uses this framework as an
pork, in particular). However, two key factors stood out.
organizing device to bring into focus a series of issues
The first was in the early decades of the twentieth century,
relating to food security in the contemporary world.
when developments in plant genetics converged with the
We focus on the first two categories – availability and
invention of synthetic, nitrogen-based fertilizers to enable
access – because the third relates primarily to nutrition
agribusiness firms to match particular seed varieties with
and ­dietary science and, as such, is somewhat outside the
specific chemical inputs (see Goodman and Redclift 1991:
scope of the current chapter.
95–100 and Pritchard 1998: 66). These innovations gen-
erated profound boosts to agricultural productivity, espe-
cially in the ‘new world’ agricultural heartlands of the
7.5 Food availability USA, Canada, Argentina and Australia. The second key
shift occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, with the develop-
As noted above, the concept of food availability refers ment of green revolution varieties of staple cereal crops,
to the overall capacity of the planet to produce enough notably, rice and wheat (see Case study 7.2). Notwith-
food to eliminate hunger. (Whether that food gets to the standing ongoing controversy about the social and envi-
hungry, of course, is another matter – to be discussed ronmental impacts of the green revolution, discussed in
in Section 7.6). By-and-large, the past century has wit- Case study 7.2, with the passage of time its legacy remains
nessed unparalleled progress in this regard. Increases in indisputable. It provided a boost to world food output pre-
the quantum of food being produced on the planet dra- cisely at a time when the global population was increasing
matically exceeded population growth, so that, during very rapidly, thus forestalling worst-case eventualities of
the twentieth century, food became cheaper. Figure 7.4 potential famine and undernourishment.

1000 8
Wheat price
Population
800
(2000 US$/metric ton, 3-year

6
Population (billions)
Wheat price

600
averages)

400

2
200

0 0
1872

1880

1888

1896

1904

1912

1920

1928

1936

1944

1952

1960

1968

1976

1984

1992

2000

2008

Figure 7.4  Wheat prices and population 1872–2008.

Source: adapted from Von Braun (2008) Food and Financial Crises: Implications for Agriculture and the Poor, p. 2

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 164    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Case study 7.2

The green revolution was argued, Communist sympathies would be muted.

Thus, as one historian has contended: ‘American plant-
The start of the ‘green revolution’ is generally traced breeding science thus became part of the Cold War’s
to the plant-breeding research of Norman Borlaug in defence of capitalist political economies’ (Perkins
Mexico, commencing in the late 1940s. By the early 1997: 239). However, there were (and remain) many
1960s, Borlaug and his colleagues had developed and dissenting voices about the social and environmental
globally distributed a series of high-yield ‘dwarf wheat’ implications of green revolution interventions. It put
varieties with dramatically increased potentials. Also many rural societies onto a pathway of increasing
around this time, a series of parallel developments in inequality, because richer farmers were best able to
rice research (undertaken mainly in the Philippines) exploit these technologies and, once they had cap-
saw new high-yield varieties developed. These innova- tured the benefits, used the returns to buy more land
tions became the centrepieces for major international (Atkins and Bowler 2001: 221). Ecologically, green
development assistance efforts during the 1960s revolution varieties were associated with increased
and 1970s. Proponents argued that because of their pesticide use (often in poorly regulated contexts – thus
undeniable capacities to boost global cereals produc- leading to health and environmental problems), intensi-
tion, they held the keys to eliminating world hunger. fied water extraction and the replacement of multi- for
Additionally, these agendas enmeshed with the Cold mono-cropped agricultural systems, thus reducing
War politics of the time – by assisting the rural poor, it local agro-biodiversity (see Shiva 1991).

Yet in meeting this challenge, new questions have been Perhaps the harshest criticisms of the contemporary
opened about ‘what kind of food system’ the world has global food system, however, relate to its impacts on
created. During the last decade, in particular, the ethi- the environment. There is now heightened appreciation
cal basis of food production (in terms of animal wel- across the world that food production systems cannot be
fare, social issues and environmental sustainability) has assessed independently from environmental systems –
come under intensified scrutiny. Many have asserted that a perspective known as the food–water–environment
technology has bolstered global food production, but at Nexus approach. The huge boost to global agricultural
what cost? The intensification of protein production production in the twentieth century depended on a mas-
systems has been associated with factory farm regimes sive injection of energy inputs into agriculture, with little
that raise questions about animal rights and welfare. regard to the ecological limits of natural resources (see
Renowned philosophers, such as Peter Singer, contend Spotlight box 6.1). Thus, in the Indian State of Punjab –
that there has been a moral vacuum at the heart of agen- the nation’s breadbasket and a key site for the green
das to optimize global food production (see Singer 2009). ­revolution – the demands from water-thirsty farming
Moreover, the boost to global agricultural production systems is seeing the water table fall at an average rate of
has occurred hand-in-hand with increased dependence 55 cm per year (Aggarwal et al. 2009). This issue shows
on international food trade (see Fold and Pritchard the inevitable connections between food, water and energy
2005), raising questions about the labour standards and security. Unless new solutions are proffered, the ability of
livelihood conditions that underpin global agriculture Punjab’s farmers to feed the nation will be seriously com-
and food production. These concerns include such mat- promised, and thus India’s poor record on food security
ters as low wages, hazardous working conditions (food (see Figure 7.2) will be harmed further. The problem of
workers are often exposed to dangerous agro-chemicals, ecological limits is more severe still, however, with regards
especially in the developing world) and the exploitation to animal protein. Marine fish stocks appear to be in rapid
of smallholder producers by commodity traders. Ensu- decline, with more than half of the world’s catch coming
ing public debates have given rise to an expansion of fair from less than 7 per cent of the oceans, ‘in areas charac-
trade initiatives, corporate social responsibility agendas, terized by an increasing amount of habitat damage from
and various types of codes of conduct; however, legiti- bottom trawling, pollution and dead zones, invasive species
mate questions still remain about the social ethics of the infestations and vulnerability to climate change’ (Nelleman
global food system. et al. 2009: 23). If the world’s population is to continue to

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 Chapter 7  Food security    165

eat seafood at its current rate, consumption will need to be access genetically modified materials). Thus, whilst genetic
sourced increasingly from aquaculture. But the rub, here, modification may assist farmers to generate higher
is that aquaculture systems are more resource-intensive yields and/or enable lower pesticide use, its wider social
than marine capture, because they depend on fish being and environmental implications remain an ongoing mat-
fed from manufactured foodstuffs. Hence, it seems that ter of contention.
the only viable way to sustain the global appetite for sea- In the early twenty-first century, sub-Saharan Africa is
food is to push production into more energy- and resource- the cradle for debate on what role genetic modification
intensive (i.e. unsustainable) ways. Comparable arguments could and should play in agricultural development. By and
can also be made with regards to meat production (see large, the green revolution of the 1960s and 1970s exerted
Spotlight box 7.2 and Case study 6.4). relatively little influence on sub-Saharan African agricul-
So does the continued operation of the current global ture, because the key hybrid seed varieties were developed
food system imply that to feed the world’s population and trialled in Asia. Thus, in 2006, an agreement to fund
in the twenty-first century, the only option is to further a coordinated plan to develop a ‘uniquely African’ green
degrade the global environment? As the journal Nature revolution was established, under the name the Alliance
editorialized in 2010, the challenge of feeding the world for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA). The founding
was easy . . . ‘Easy, that is, if the world brings into play donors for AGRA were the Rockefeller Foundation and
swathes of extra land, spreads still more fertilizers and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, with partnership
pesticides, and further depletes already scarce ground- support from a wide range of international development
water supplies’ (Nature 2010: 531). According to many, and agricultural research organizations. AGRA affirms
a key element in resolving the Hobson’s choice of food that it has learnt from mistakes of the original green revo-
versus the environment is to embrace genetically modi- lution, and professes to implement initiatives that assist
fied foods (GMFs). In this chapter we cannot do justice the interests of smallholders (as opposed to large farms),
to the debate on GMFs, which is complex and multi-fac- but some NGOs have been critical of its activities (see
eted. However, in terms of the debate on food security, Spotlight box 7.3). At the time of writing, AGRA says it
it can briefly be observed that advocacy of genetic modi- ‘is not funding the development of new varieties through
fication needs to tackle the same kind of charges that the use of genetic engineering’ (AGRA 2010); however,
confronted the green revolution; namely, it intensifies the this does not preclude future involvement in these activi-
high input–high output technological treadmill of farm- ties, ‘when it is the most appropriate tool to address an
ing, with potentially highly uneven social impacts (richer important need of small-scale farmers and when it is con-
farmers are, in general, better placed than smallholders to sistent with government policy’.

Spotlight box 7.2

Meat and the environment land used for feedcrops that go into meat production)
is a key factor driving global deforestation and reduced
Increased consumption of meat is a central feature of biodiversity. Further to these points, the feeding of crops
the current global food system. As populations within to animals for meat production represents a diversion
developing countries become wealthier, their consump- of output away from humans. On average, it takes 3 kg
tion of meat tends to rise dramatically. Researchers of grain to produce 1 kg of meat. It is estimated that if
worldwide agree that the effects on the global environ- global per capita meat consumption could be stabilized
ment of this consumption are overwhelmingly negative: at year 2000 levels, then by the year 2050 an extra 400
‘[T]he livestock sector is by far the single largest anthro- million tonnes of cereal would be available for human
pogenic user of land. The total area occupied by grazing consumption: ‘enough to cover the annual calorie need
is equivalent to 26 per cent of the ice-free terrestrial sur- for 1.2 billion people’ (Nelleman et al. 2009: 26–7). Even
face of the planet. In addition, the total area dedicated to if it is unlikely that the world will move to a wholly veg-
feedcrop production [i.e. crops grown to feed animals for etarian diet, there are many initiatives to reduce per
meat production] amounts to 33 per cent of total arable capita meat consumption in different countries, such as
land’ (Steinfeld et al. 2006: xxi). Hence, the expansion the ‘meat-free Monday’ campaigns in Western countries.
of grazing lands for meat production (and the additional See also Jarosz (2009) and D’Silva and Webster (2010).

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 166    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Spotlight box 7.3

The Alliance for a Green Revolution in than African governments; (iv) not enough attention has
Africa (AGRA) been placed on smallholders’ ‘access to land, water,
infrastructure, information and credit’ (p. 12). In sum,
The NGO ActionAid (2009) has published a broad cri- ActionAid advocate a food sovereignty approach, which
tique of AGRA. It argues that: (i) too much faith is placed suggests that the best livelihood course for smallholders
on technological solutions, rather than seeking to estab- is to extract themselves from the potentially exploitative
lish conducive and stable political, economic and social effects of involvement in the global economy. The NGO
frameworks to underpin these investments; (ii) the pro- contends that the ‘overall goal [of a restructured AGRA]
gram’s enthusiasm for private sector-led solutions blinds should be to reverse the current dependence on global
it to the potential for smallholders to become depend- agricultural technological and commodity markets,
ent on technologies and seeds owned by large corpo- which submerge local knowledge and technologies and
rate interests; (iii) ‘large private consulting firms’ have deepen the extraction of farming surpluses (through the
played too great a role in project developments, rather unfair pricing of food and inputs)’ (p. 22).

access. The food security of a household in a coastal vil-

7.6 Food access lage of India might depend on fish being caught daily
by one household member, fruits and vegetables to be
The debates discussed above frame the question of bought at a local market using the cash income earned
whether there is global capacity to feed the world’s popu- by another household member, and rice and cooking oil
lation. However, for food production to actually reach the being acquired at a public distribution outlet operated as
mouths of the needy requires a further set of considera- part of a government food program.
tions to come into view. As the scientific journal Nature Comparably, in the developed world, self-sufficient
(2010: 532) acknowledges: ‘Nor are science and technol- production and food disbursement programs play an
ogy by themselves a panacea for world hunger. Poverty, important (indeed, possibly increasing) role for many
not lack of food production, is the root cause’. This set of households. Urban agriculture schemes based around
issues – which invoke the concept of food access – raises community gardens and individual allotments have
questions about the entitlement mechanisms that connect grown steadily during the past decade, and media reports
people with food. have suggested that this trend has accelerated since the
In a general sense, people gain access to food in three onset of economic recession in 2008 (Plate 7.2). The
ways. First, people can grow or procure their own food symbolic development of a kitchen garden on the White
directly, either by cultivating crops, tending livestock or House lawn by first lady Michelle Obama in 2009 tapped
by hunting, fishing or foraging. Of course, for most of
human history this has been the dominant food access
regime for most people on the planet. Even today, a very
large proportion of the world’s population relies heavily
on such mechanisms to ensure their day-to-day survival.
Second, people can buy food through the use of money.
(This is akin to Amartya Sen’s example of the umbrella
seller, quoted above.) Most of the readers of this book, one
would imagine, obtain the vast majority (if not all) of their
food through this method. Third, people can gain access to
food through disbursement programs (such as food banks,
food aid and food voucher welfare programs) operated by
governments, international organizations (such as the
UN’s Food World Program) or charities/NGOs.
These three general mechanisms of food access do not Plate 7.2  A community garden/urban agricultural
operate separately to one another. Households across the allotment.
world have diverse, multi-dimensional modes of food (littleny/Shutterstock)

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 Chapter 7  Food security    167

this zeitgeist. Likewise, the recession has also spawned agriculture. In Collier’s vision, food security is best
increased demand for emergency food disbursements, attained by encouraging small farmers to abandon their
across both sides of the Atlantic. In part, these efforts plots of land, and then to aggregate those holdings into
have been entwined also within the ethics of the food large-scale farms. Former peasants could then work on
rescue movement, whereby excess and unused food from those farms, or move to cities where incomes are gener-
shops, restaurants and other facilities are acquired and ally higher (see UNDP 2009). In 2009, the World Bank’s
redistributed to the needy – thus generating a double- World Development Report chimed in to support key
benefit addressing both the environment and hunger. aspects of this argument, arguing that the welfare of the
Focusing on the developing world (where these issues world’s hungry and poor would be best served by policies
tend to have more pressing livelihood implications), two that encouraged the movement of people from rural to
vital debates are pertinent to contemporary discussions urban areas (a so-called ‘three D’s’ strategy: encouraging
of how food access arrangements impact on food security population density (i.e. population growth in cities), dis-
outcomes. The first relates to the future of small farms; tance (encouraging people to be mobile, in search of jobs)
whether food security for the rural poor in developing and division (removing barriers like tariffs and some
countries is ultimately best served by seeking to main- restrictions on migration that inhibit the flow of goods
tain smallholder, self-sufficient production. The second and people)). The assumption of these visions is that (i)
relates to national food policies; the extent and character large-scale agriculture enables food to be produced at
of governments’ interventions in food markets to secure lower costs, and (ii) the higher wages paid in cities places
food security for the poor (a debate about food security more money in the pockets of the poor; a tandem process
via disbursements). that generates quantum improvements in food security.
Yet many researchers question the assumptions that
lie behind these visions. Encouraging rural smallholders
7.6.1 F ood access via self-production or the market?
to divest their land and move to cities makes sense only if
Debate on the future of small farms
countries are at a stage of development where sufficient
The future of small farms in the developing world is cur- numbers of city-based jobs are available. If this isn’t the
rently a topic of major discussion. In essence, what is at case, rural migrants add to the ranks of squatter-settle-
stake is the question of what works best for hungry peo- ments with highly insecure food and economic prospects.
ple: a food entitlement regime based on people growing A more reasonable approach, according to a number of
their own food, or one in which they buy food at local leading geographers (see Wiggins et al. 2010) is to establish
markets, shops and supermarkets. more gradualist, ‘multi-track’ strategies of rural poverty-
The economist Paul Collier kick-started the most reduction. According to the proponents of these views,
recent instalment of this debate with an influential arti- smallholders’ control over land has foundational impor-
cle published in the journal Foreign Affairs, in the midst tance in allowing own-production for basic sustenance.
of the 2008 food crisis. Collier’s chief charge was that Hence, food security strategies should aim to bolster the
‘the world needs more commercial agriculture, not less’ livelihoods of the poor through constructing viable rural
(2008: 68), and that ‘[T]he first giant that must be slain economies, rather than advocating abandonment of rural
is the middle- and upper-class love affair with peasant settlements for an uncertain urban life (see Case study 7.3).
agriculture’ (2008: 71). Collier asserted that foreign aid It should also be noted that smallholder-based agriculture
projects and ‘rural-friendly’ international financial pro- is generally more climate-friendly, in that it is associated
grams from the West were inspired by a wrong-headed, with lesser comparative greenhouse gas emissions than
allegedly ‘romantic’ attachment to support small-scale large-scale intensive agriculture (IAASTD 2009).

Case study 7.3

Small rural farms and food security a household). Thus, many agricultural smallholders
in the developing world suffer chronic hunger, despite
In many parts of the developing world, the majority of having the ability to grow their food. A good summary
the food insecure population live in rural areas (FAO of the debate about the future of these populations
2005: 5). Many of these people exist on small plots can be found in a special issue of the journal
of land that are sub-economic (that is, on their own, World Development dedicated to this problem
they can’t produce enough food or income to sustain ­(Wiggins et al. 2010).

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 168    Section 2  Population, resources, food, the environment and development

7.6.2 Food aid and provisioning programs food entitlements. Technological innovations will play a
key part in future arrangements, with bureaucrats seek-
In many developing country contexts, food aid and food ing to use smart card and electronic monitoring systems
provisioning schemes provide important complements to to cut down on system ‘leakage’.
peoples’ access to food via own-production or the market.
Finally, in this regard, is debate over the right to food.
Usually this involves food programs (operated by national
The above discussion implicitly assumes that the task of
governments or international agencies, for example the
getting food to people in need relies on the goodwill of the
World Food Program) warehousing and distributing major
international community and/or national governments.
food staples (rice, wheat, etc.) to populations in need.
However, it is increasingly recognized that governments
Such disbursements are crucial in preventing starva-
have human rights obligations to feed their citizens. In
tion deaths in times of crisis, but, long-term, have been
1948, the UN Declaration of Human Rights recognized
criticized because of the potentially adverse implications
peoples’ Right to Food, but this was not clearly incorpo-
of creating cycles of food-aid dependency. The crux of
rated into any international legal framework until 1996
this criticism is the alleged displacement effects of food
(when the Right to Food was adopted by the World Food
aid. This arises in contexts where the food security of
Summit) and then 2000, when the UN Commission on
rural populations is dependent upon the sale of agricul-
Human Rights appointed (for the first time) a Special
tural outputs to cities and towns. In such cases, periodic
Rapporteur on the Right to Food (a person with over-
large disbursements of food aid can swamp local markets,
arching authority to report on international progress on
thus driving down prices and taking away the incomes
the Right to Food). These initiatives triggered a shift in
of farmers who rely on market sales. Closely related to
many countries to a rights-based approach to food, that
these criticisms is the charge that food aid disbursements
is, the recognition by governments in many countries
can often be donor-driven (meaning that they serve the
that their people had a legal right to be provisioned with
interests of the senders, not the recipients). For example,
food, which could be justiciable (that is, heard in court).
the decision by the US government to heavily subsidize its
Thus, in India in 2013 the national government enacted
agricultural sector has gone hand-in-hand with policies
Food Security legislation that would have the purpose of
to procure large amounts of staple food crops for inter-
enshrining people’s legal right to food.
national food aid. As many critics have argued, therefore,
US policies to disburse food aid can be seen as strategies
that help prop up the incomes of American farmers, as
much as they are policies aiming to assist hungry popu- 7.7 Conclusion
lations. Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, an
exhaustive study of these issues by the FAO (2006) con- The issue of food security is extensive and complex. This
cluded that the adversities of food-aid dependence tended chapter has sketched key themes in relation to this con-
to arise mainly when food aid was poorly managed: ‘On cept, but many more have remained outside its purview.
balance, the report finds that food aid can support food For example, a crucial area for ongoing consideration is
security both in emergencies and in cases of chronic hun- the question of how food security and climate change
ger if it is properly managed’ (p. vii). connect to one another. During the past few years, there
In many developing countries, international food aid has been widespread discussion of these issues using the
plays a secondary role to food provisioning policies oper- notion of food system stability and the Nexus approach
ated by national governments. India is a case in point. (see above) – the extent to which food systems are resilient
The national government operates the Food Corpora- to environmental and social change of various kinds.
tion of India (which purchases and stores key food items The vital message of this chapter is that the food secu-
from farmers) and the Public Distribution System (which rity needs to be understood as a social outcome. It exists
distributes food to the poor at highly subsidized prices when all people, at all times, have physical, social and eco-
through a nationwide network of ‘Fair Price’ shops). nomic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food. Thus,
In theory, these activities should ensure a basic level of the concept of food security should not be confused with
nutritional subsistence to the poor. However, well-docu- debates on the technologies to maximize food production,
mented problems of maladministration and corruption or on whether any country (whether the UK, Japan or
have ensured that these arrangements work less than Botswana) is reliant on food imports. What matters are
perfectly (see Programme Evaluation Organisation 2005; the socio-cultural, political, environmental and economic
Ram et al. 2009). Hence, recent years have witnessed a systems that link a food system to a population. To think
keen public debate in India on how to restructure these about food security, thus, is to think about the environ-
schemes to ensure that people in need receive their full mental sustainability and social justice of the planet.

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 Chapter 7  Food security    169

Learning outcomes Shiva, V. (1991) The Green Revolution in the Punjab, The
Ecologist, 21(2), 57–60. A famous article which provided a
Having read this chapter, you should understand that:
critical perspective on the Green Revolution and provided
● Food security is defined socially. It concerns not the foundation for alternative viewpoints on technology and
simply the amount of food that is produced, but the agriculture.
extent to which a food system is able to satisfy the Wiggins, S., Kirsten, J. and Llambi, L. (eds) (2010) The future
of small farms: special issue, World Development, 38(10),
nutritional requirements of everyone in a population.
1341–526. Articles in this special issue of World Develop-
Therefore, food security research must focus on the
ment summarize key aspects of debate around the fate of
three core elements of food access, availability and smallholders in ensuring global food security.
utilization. Sen, A. (1981) Poverty and Famines: An Essay on
● During the past half century, the world has been ­Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
able to successfully address problems of famine, This book changed the way that leading policy makers began
but levels of chronic malnutrition remain of major to view the issue of food security. It was a major element
concern. Increases to global food prices since in justifying Sen’s subsequent award of the Nobel Prize for
Economics.
2007–08 have exacerbated these problems.
Davis, M. (2000) Late Victorian Holocausts, Verso, London.
● Proposals to increase world food supply through
This book traces the history of famine back to Colonial times
technologies such as genetic modification should
and examines the roles of politics and economics for wide-
be assessed in terms of how they address the spread hunger.
needs of the most vulnerable and whose interests
they serve.
A key question in the world today is whether the
●
Useful websites
long-term food security needs of the planet are
­better served by a shift to large-scale agriculture, or www.fao.org  The Food and Agriculture Organization of the
the maintenance of smallholder systems of farm UN. This is the pre-eminent global body charged with respon-
production. sibility for international coordination of food and agricultural
● Food security is a human right, and recent efforts.
approaches to this issue have stressed peoples’ www.ifpri.org  The International Food Policy Research
Right to Food. ­Institute (IFPRA) is a policy and research arm of the
­Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.
It provides extensive information on international food prices
Further reading and under-nourishment.
www.gatesfoundation.org/Pages/home.aspx  The Bill &
Jarsoz, L. (2009) Energy, climate change, meat and markets: Melinda Gates Foundation funds extensive research and
mapping the coordinates of the current world food crisis, extension activities in the areas of food, agriculture and
Geography Compass, 3(6), 2065–83. This article relates to hunger.
issues considered in Spotlight box 7.2 and other chapters in www.foodfirst.org  Food First is a US-based
this section. ­Non-­Government Organization with a long track record
FAO (various years) The State of Food Insecurity, FAO, Rome. in ­monitoring global food and hunger.
An annual report that provides the most up-to-date assess- www.mssrf.org  The M.S. Swaminathan Research
ment of global conditions with regards to food security. Each ­Foundation is a leading Indian Non-Government Organization
year, a different aspect of this issue is highlighted in the report. in the area of food policy.

M07_DANI2950_05_SE_C07.indd 169 04/04/16 6:14 pm

 Worlds apart?
The changing geographies
of global development

Chapter 8

Marcus Power

Topics covered
■ Development as knowledge and power
■ The view from ‘the South’ and the view from ‘below’
■ Alternative geographies of global development and inequality
■ North–South and South–South development cooperation
■ The ‘rising powers' and ‘emerging economies' of the global
South

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 Chapter 8  Worlds apart? The changing geographies of global development     171

D evelopment is one of the most complex words in the

English language (Williams 1976) and little consen-
sus exists around the meaning of this heavily contested
‘Third World’ (Ahluwalia 2001). In other words, these
narrations of the disparities between regions are space-
producing practices that help to construct and imagine
term, yet many nation-states and international organi- a world in need of development. As Escobar (1995) has
zations claim to be pursuing this objective in some way argued, the idea of a ‘Third World’ gives enormous power
and vast sums of money are spent every year in its name. to Western development institutions to shape popular
Notoriously hard to define, the term ‘development’ often perceptions of Africa, Asia or Latin America. The ‘Third
refers simply to ‘good change’, a positive word that in World’ is thus partly defined by and becomes intelligible
everyday parlance is practically synonymous with ‘pro- through the languages and representations of the agen-
gress’ and is typically viewed in terms of increased living cies and institutions of global development.
standards, better health and well-being and other forms In some ways the lack of an agreed set of international
of common good that are seen to benefit society at large. development indicators and measures or of common sys-
Development also often simply means ‘more’: whatever tems of data collection tells its own story of the failure of
we might have some of today we might or should have international development since 1945 (see Case study 8.1).
more of tomorrow (Wallerstein 1994). In many ways the A major problem with the geographies of development
strength of development as an idea comes from its power produced from these statistics is that they have allowed
to seduce, in every sense of the term: ‘to please, to fasci- some observers to label whole areas as ‘Third World’ or
nate, to set dreaming but also to abuse, to turn away from ‘lesser developed’ as if the same could be said of all its
the truth, to deceive’ (Rist 1997: 1). constituents (Wood 1985). In emphasizing what people
A distinction can usefully be made here between ‘big are deprived of (as is implied by poverty), statistics impose
D’ Development and ‘little d’ development (Hart 2001). a negative uniformity upon non-Western societies as poor
The former refers to a post-Second World War project people are categorized and become objects of study or
of intervention in the ‘Third World’ whilst the latter are labelled in ways that homogenize them, ignoring the
points to the development of capitalism as a ‘geographi- complexity of their identities (which are then ‘fixed’ and
cally uneven, profoundly contradictory set of historical reduced by imposing labels such as ‘poor’ or ‘refugee’).
processes’ (Hart 2001: 650). D/development can thus be Further, labelling whole regions and spaces as ‘developed’,
viewed simultaneously as both a project and a process. In ‘lesser developed’ or ‘developing’ (all of which are value-
other words, development is both a continuous intellec- laden expressions) reduces and overlooks the political,
tual and ideological project as well as an ongoing mate- economic, social and cultural diversity of the places and
rial process. Historically the pursuit of ‘development’ communities included within these gross generalizations,
has been focused on particular spaces and regions: most simplifications and aggregations.
frequently on the space of the ‘Third World’, which was Thus, the picture of unevenness and injustice in the
often seen to be characterized by common features such as contemporary world that comes to us through these labels
poverty, famine, environmental disaster and degradation, is not always a sharp, coherent and precise one and often
political instability, regional inequalities and so on. A this unevenness is not effectively conveyed in the statisti-
particular geography of the ‘Third World’ has thus been cal measures that are taken as indices of what constitutes
historically imagined around a powerful and negative set ‘development’. Crucial then to the imagination of a world
of images and a series of tragic stereotypes, along with a requiring development interventions is a process of set-
bewildering array of labels for people and places that are ting worlds apart and a politics of labelling. All too often
seen as ‘deficient’ in some way or that are not considered the ‘developing world’ has been defined as a ‘problem’
‘developed’ and therefore require external intervention. In for Western governments that can only be resolved with
many ways this is the power of development: ‘the power the intervention of Western ‘experts’, donors, technol-
to transform old worlds, the power to imagine new ones’ ogy, expertise or ideology (see Case study 8.2). Moving
(Crush 1995: 2). beyond the labelling of ‘Third World’ peoples and places
Development agencies often draw upon statistical as a homogeneous group, it is important to grasp how
indicators to produce certain stories about the peoples places and peoples are spatially and socially differenti-
and places where they seek to intervene and to narrate ated through development and inequality, experiencing
the lives and geographies of aid recipients, but what con- progress and ‘good change’ in a variety of ways.
stitutes ‘knowledge’ in development policy and practice Behind the tragic stereotype of the ‘Third World’
is often defined in relation to quantitative measures, sta- there is an alternative geography, one which demon-
tistical data, formal academic research and Western ‘sci- strates that the introduction of development has been a
ence’ and this often helps to reproduce the image of an ‘protracted, painstaking and fiercely contested process’
underdeveloped, primordial, traditional and war-ravaged (Bell 1994: 175). The chapter also argues that the use of

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 172    Section 2 Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Case study 8.1

The Millennium Development Goals economic development. While the MDGs, in theory,
applied to all countries, in reality, they were considered
One area where a consensus has been established by targets for poor countries to achieve, with finance from
the international community is around the Millennium wealthy states. There was often a perception then
Development Goals (MDGs). These are eight interna- that the MDGs were rooted in a Northern agenda and
tional development goals that all 192 United Nations that countries of the North should thus pay for them
member states and at least 23 international organiza- (in other words that the MDGs were to be achieved
tions had agreed to achieve by the year 2015, following through aid alone). As the MDG deadline approached,
the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000. around 1 billion people were still living on less than
They included: (1) eradicating extreme poverty and US$1.25 a day – the World Bank measure on
hunger; (2) achieving universal primary education; (3) poverty – and more than 800 million people do not have
promoting gender equality and empowering women; enough food to eat. Women are still fighting hard for
(4) reducing child mortality; (5) improving maternal their rights and millions of women still die in childbirth.
health; (6) combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other dis- To take these targets beyond 2015 a set of ‘Sustain-
eases; (7) ensuring environmental sustainability; and able Development Goals’ (SDGs) have been agreed
(8) developing a global partnership for development. that represent a new universal set of goals, targets
Together with these eight goals were 21 targets and a and indicators that UN member states will be expected
series of measurable indicators for each target. There to use to frame their agendas and policies over the
is broad agreement that while the MDGs provided a next 15 years. In total 17 goals have been agreed
focal point for governments on which to hinge their pol- (and within them are a further 169 targets), although
icies and overseas aid programmes to end poverty and it remains unclear how they will be funded. Member
improve the lives of poor people – as well as provide a states agreed the draft of 17 SDGs set at a UN summit
rallying point for NGOs to hold them to account – they in September 2015. They became applicable from
have been criticized for being too narrow. The eight January 2016 and must be met before the deadline
MDGs failed to consider the root causes of poverty, of 2030. Their success or failure will have immense
or gender inequality, or the holistic nature of devel- ­consequences, not only for the world’s poor, but also
opment. No mention was made of human rights or for the credibility of collective action by the international
energy issues, nor did the MDGs specifically address community.

categories (such as ‘developing world’ or ‘Third World’) most important conceptual perspectives that have been
to demarcate world regions on the basis of their levels of formulated on the relations between development and
development is increasingly disputed as these categories inequality: the modernization and dependency schools.
are beginning to break down and decompose (Sidaway Although there have been many other different strands of
2012). This is happening partly as a consequence of the development thinking, both these perspectives have been
recent (re)emergence of a number of ‘rising powers’ in the widely influential and remain relevant to an understand-
global South such as Brazil, China and India which are ing of theory and practice today. The next section then
shifting global economic power towards the South and outlines the need to view development historically and to
unsettling the boundaries used to differentiate rich and formulate a sense of how it has been redefined through
poor, ‘First’ and ‘Third’ World, ‘developed’ and ‘develop- time. How have historical forces shaped our understand-
ing’ countries. ing of the geography of development and in what ways
The first section of the chapter examines the ori- are the legacies of the past important to understanding
gins of the ‘three worlds’ schema during the Cold War contemporary global economic difference and inequal-
and the emergence of a space called the ‘Third World’ ity? The penultimate section of the chapter then looks at
that became a focal point for the ideological struggle the ‘rising powers’ and examines the emergence of new
between capitalism and communism, between the USA Southern donors, exploring the implications of their rise
and the USSR and their different forms of aid and ‘devel- for contemporary geographies of development. The con-
opment’. The next section then discusses two of the cluding section returns to the key themes of unevenness

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 Chapter 8  Worlds apart? The changing geographies of global development     173

and inequality and challenges the notion that ‘develop- global economic downturn in 2007 has had implications
ment’ is just an issue for the global South. for the livelihoods of almost everyone in an increasingly
interconnected world and there has been evidence of ris-
ing levels of unemployment, poverty and homelessness
in many supposedly ‘advanced’ and ‘developed’ Western
8.1  evelopment and the geography
D economies.
of the ‘Third World’ ‘Development’ has historically served in part as a kind
of ‘lighthouse’ (Sachs 1992) or as a ‘lodestar’ (Wallerstein
Definitions of the term ‘Third World’ have been con- 1991) into which several different movements, govern-
tested, as have the origins of the phrase (Mountjoy 1976; ments and institutions have invested faith and meaning.
O’Connor 1976; Auty 1979; Pletsch 1981; Wolfe-Phillips The period 1955–75 was one of extraordinary global
1987), yet the concept of ‘three worlds’ can hardly be change and of confrontational political realignment
said to convey a precise meaning or to be characterized as a result of the global ideological struggle between
by a specific geography with clear boundaries. The three capitalism and communism (the Cold War), but it was
worlds schema posited a ‘First World’ of advanced capi- also a period that saw an intensification of debates con-
talism in Europe, the USA, Australia and Japan, a ‘Second cerning the development of the ‘Third World’ and the
World’ of the socialist bloc (China’s position within this beginning of collective political demands in the fields
has been much debated) and a ‘Third World’ made up of of ‘development’ and politics (see Case study 8.2). With
the countries that remained when the supposedly ‘signifi- the accelerating pace of decolonization and the creation
cant’ spaces of the world had been accounted for. These of independent states in the South, geopolitical ques-
terms thus have to be approached with some caution. For tions begun to be addressed from a set of new or ‘Third
some observers the terms global ‘North’ and ‘South’ are World’ perspectives and there was a growing perception
preferable to the ‘three worlds’ scheme but again there that ‘underdeveloped’ countries had distinct geopolitical
have been problems with defining where the boundaries considerations from those of Western societies (see also
of this global divide can be drawn. Chapter 20).
Following the fall of the Eastern Bloc (or Second The ‘three worlds’ schema is very much a Cold War
World), many of its constituent countries were reclas- conceptualization of space and is strongly associated
sified as ‘developing’, despite being geographically with the global social and political conflict between cap-
located in the ‘North’. At the same time, geographically italism and communism, between the USA and USSR,
‘southern’ nations previously considered to be part of in the second half of the twentieth century. During this
the ‘Third World’ such as China, Brazil, India and South time both these superpowers used the giving of foreign
Africa, have experienced levels of economic growth that aid as a way to promote their own wider political and
appear to bring them closer to the ‘First World’. Further- strategic objectives and to promote their own particular
more, the lines that have so far divided North and South ideological visions of the ‘correct’ pathways to develop-
are now present within every nation-state and are mak- ment (capitalist or communist) (see Case study 8.2). For
ing ever less appropriate the conventional language used the USA, on the one hand, the idea of development was
to interpret the geography of development in the world seen as the way to counter the spread of communism and
economy (rich/poor, North/South, First World/Third of ‘making the world safe for capitalism’ (Westad 2006:
World, developed/developing) (Power 2003). 31) since the donation of foreign aid was often linked to a
Subscribers to the three worlds scheme have been criti- recipients acceptance of market access and the exclusion
cized for the simplicity of these divisions and their failure of communists and left-wing socialists from government.
to recognize diversity and difference within these spaces; The USSR, on the other hand, saw foreign aid as a way
the world does not consist of a series of discrete individ- of ‘exporting’ communist revolution to the periphery,
ual national or regional economies in the way often sug- of building a sphere of influence and creating a block
gested in United Nations and World Bank reports and in in opposition to the West (Berzoets 2011). Both the USA
the context of globalization it is important to attend the and USSR identified vital national interests in ‘Third
interdependencies that link and connect different places, World’ territories and for both Washington and Moscow
peoples, nations and regions. We also need to remember ‘developing areas appeared critical to the achievement of
that the pursuit of development is not exclusive to par- basic strategic, economic, political and ideological goals’
ticular regions (such as the so-called ‘Third World’) and (McMahon 2001: 2). In both cases foreign aid was thus
that issues of poverty and inequality are also highly per- used to secure alignment between the politics of emer-
tinent in both the ‘First World’ and in the former socialist gent ‘Third World’ countries and the wider geopoliti-
states that comprised the ‘Second world’. The onset of a cal strategies of the USA and USSR (see Case study 8.3)

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 174    Section 2 Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Case study 8.2

Bandung, non-alignment and the was in many ways the ‘launching pad for Third World
‘Third World’ demands’ where countries distanced themselves from
the ‘big powers seeking to lay down the law’ (Rist
The Bandung conference was a meeting of repre- 1997: 86). It was not hard for countries with shared
sentatives from 29 African and Asian nations, held in histories of colonial exploitation to find something in
Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955, which aimed to promote common, since the ‘agenda and subject matter had
economic and political cooperation within the ‘Third been written for centuries in the blood and bones of
World’ and to oppose colonialism. The conference participants’ (Wright 1995: 14). In his opening speech
was sponsored by Burma, India, Indonesia, Ceylon to the conference on 18 April 1955, President Sukarno
(Sri Lanka) and Pakistan and tried to cut through the of Indonesia urged participants to remember that they
layers of social, political and economic difference that were all united by a common ‘detestation’ of colonial-
separated nations of the ‘Third World’ in order to think ism and racism (Sukarno 1955: 1) and pointed out that
about the possibility of common agendas and actions. colonialism was not dead or in the past but also had
The aims of the 29 nations that attended included a its modern (‘neo-colonial’) forms. The conference was
desire to promote goodwill and cooperation among especially successful in hastening the arrival of new
Third World nations and to explore and advance international institutions explicitly dealing with ‘devel-
their mutual as well as common interests. Bandung opment’ (Rist 1997).

underlining the importance of geopolitics to both the

theory and practice of development.
In 1949, US President Harry Truman spoke of the emer-
gence of an ‘underdeveloped’ world that presented a ‘handi-
cap and threat both to them and the more prosperous areas’
(Truman 1949). Truman went on to explain the need for
‘modern, scientific and technical knowledge’ as a pathway
to overcoming this ‘handicap’ of underdevelopment and
announced the beginning of a ‘bold new program’ within
the ‘developed world’ to resolve inequality and remedy
impoverishment in ‘backward’ areas. This agenda was fur-
ther advanced under the administration of President John
F. Kennedy (1961–3) that oversaw the creation of the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) in
Plate 8.1  President Kennedy introduces the First
1961. In the same year Kennedy also proposed an ‘Alliance
Lady at La Morita, Venezuela in 1961 as part of
for Progress’, a 10-year US$20 billion programme that con-
establishing his ‘Alliance for Progress’ in Latin
siderably increased economic and development cooperation America. The Kennedy administration underwrote
between the US and Latin America as a way of stopping the all the economic policies of Venezuelan President
spread of communism in its tracks. Romulo Betancourt’s government through the Alliance
The Soviet Union also sought influence through aid for Progress, which used Venezuela as the exemplar
after the Second World War. Initially it offered modest for all of Latin America.
amounts of subsidized oil and technical assistance along (Photograph by Cecil Stoughton. White House Photograph. John F.
with weaponry and military training before moving to Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)

a much more extensive involvement in regional conflicts

through the supply of military capabilities and the use the proletariat and of the first proletarian state, the Soviet
of proxies, such as Cuba. After Eastern Europe, the Union. Their struggle for independence from the imperi-
Soviet Union progressively drew in Cuba, Vietnam, Laos alist West would contribute to the weakening of the major
and several African states (such as Angola, Ethiopia and opponents of the Soviet Union, including ultimately the
Mozambique), drawing upon Lenin’s argument that the United States. In the early stages of Soviet involvement in
peoples of the colonial world represented de facto allies of the ‘Third World’ the model that clients were expected to

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 Chapter 8  Worlds apart? The changing geographies of global development     175

Case study 8.3

The ‘strategic interests’ of foreign aid governments has fostered dependency, encouraged
corruption and ultimately perpetuated poor governance
In many ways, examining the case for aid can tell us and poverty. Thus, many critics of foreign aid have
a great deal about the history of development theory sought to highlight the ‘strategic interests’ at work in
and practice and provides a useful opening on to its distribution as well as the inequality and unpredict-
wider discussions of North–South relations. Most ability of aid provision. During the ‘War on Terror’, for
­official development assistance (ODA) comes from the example, there is evidence that the USA used foreign
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aid donation to secure support from a number of states
whose 28 members collectively contributed in the South such as Pakistan. Just as ‘development’
US$134.8 billion in 2013 (OECD 2014a) representing was once seen as a means of countering the spread
0.30 per cent of DAC donors’ combined gross national of communism in the 1950s, shortly after 9/11 it was
income. A further US$15.9 billion in ODA came from increasingly re-constructed as a means of countering
the European Commission in 2013 whilst non-DAC terrorism. Strangely, except for a brief period during the
countries gave an additional US$9.4 billion. Only five mid-1970s, anti-poverty measures have not been an
members of the DACs 28 member countries, however, important focal point of foreign aid, whilst aid has led
have met a long-standing UN target for ODA to com- to many reversals as well as to advances. Seen as a
prise at least 0.7 per cent of a donor’s gross national (simultaneous) remedy to problems of growth, govern-
income (GNI) (Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden ance, poverty and inequality, it has become (not unlike
and the UK). DAC aid to developing countries grew the idea of development) overburdened with expecta-
steadily from 1997 to a peak in 2010, but then fell in tions (Sogge 2002) and an overambitious enterprise
2011 and 2012 as many governments took austerity (Rist 1997). A report by ActionAid claimed that only
measures and consequently sought to trim their aid 39 per cent of total overseas development assistance is
budgets. Around two-thirds of DAC aid is government- ‘real aid’ and that the remainder is ‘phantom aid’, made
to-government or bilateral aid and the remainder is up of overpriced technical assistance, double-counted
multilateral aid disbursed by agencies like the World debt relief and poorly targeted and uncoordinated aid
Bank group, the UN bodies and the European Union. (ActionAid International 2005). Although aid from OECD
Critics of foreign aid have argued that it has been donors has increased in recent years, much of this is in
less effective than private investments and commer- the form of debt relief, or humanitarian or military aid,
cial loans in stimulating long-term economic growth. which does little to advance long-term development.
Other critics point to the dubious Cold War record of Not surprisingly (given the size of its economy) the
foreign aid and its subsidizing of autocratic regimes United States remained the largest DAC donor in 2013
and inflammation of regional conflicts. Foreign aid has by volume with net ODA flows of US$31.5 billion, yet
sometimes been seen as a kind of political narcotic, this constitutes only 0.19 per cent of US gross national
fostering addictive behaviour among states that receive income. Countries like Afghanistan and Iraq (in the
it and thus come to depend on it. States are thought reconstruction of which the USA has been heavily
to exhibit the symptoms of ­dependence – ­a short-run involved in recent years) have figured prominently in
‘fix’ or benefit from aid, but external ­support some- the list of major DAC aid recipients, yet interestingly so
times does lasting damage to the country. For Moyo too have emerging economies like India which is itself
(2009) limitless development assistance to African increasingly active as an aid donor.

follow was that of the Soviet Union itself with its focus technical assistance and the education and training of
on state control of the ‘heights’ of the economy, heavy local people to build the foundations of modern indus-
industrial projects, import substitution, reduction of trial and agricultural enterprises. Soviet aid almost always
ties with the capitalist West, and closer integration with went for large and visible projects in the state sector that
socialist states (Valkenier 1983). An important aspect of were expected to increase the productive capacities of
Soviet policy toward countries across Asia, Africa and the recipient country and reduce their dependence on the
Latin America was the provision of equipment for infra- capitalist West. Over time, however, military support gen-
structure and industrial development projects as well as erally outweighed economic assistance in Soviet policy.

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 176    Section 2 Population, resources, food, the environment and development

8.2 Conceptualizing development

When considering the many ways in which ­development
has been conceptualized it is useful to consider the his-
tory of ‘Development thinking’ (Hettne 1995), or the
sum total of ideas about development theory, ideology
and strategy. Development theories are logical proposi-
tions about how development occurred in the past and/
or should occur in the future. Development ­strategies
are the practical paths to development adopted by a
wide range of actors, from the ‘grassroots’ to the inter-
Plate 8.2  American Marines guarding food aid national. Development ideologies are the different goals
distribution in Mogadishu during ‘Operation Restore and objectives that underpin development theories and
Hope’. In 1991 President Barre was overthrown strategies. In many ways this ‘development thinking’ has
by opposing clans, but they failed to agree on often been caught in a ‘Western’ perception of reality or
a replacement and plunged the country into has been based around ‘Western’ philosophies, experi-
lawlessness and clan warfare. In December 1992 ences and histories (Hettne 1995; Power 2003). Concep-
US Marines landed near Mogadishu ahead of a tualizing development is partly about the negotiation
UN peacekeeping force sent to restore order and of what constitutes ‘progress’ and ‘improvement’ and
safeguard relief supplies.
the definition of what constitutes ‘appropriate’ inter-
(Paul Lowe/Panos)
vention in the affairs of ‘poor’ or ‘lesser developed’
countries. Since all-encompassing definitions have
China also used aid and development cooperation to been contested and controversial, little consensus exists
further its socialist agenda and to compete with Soviet today but some core conceptions have emerged, many
and US influence in regions like Africa, constructing itself of which have continued relevance in the contemporary
as part of the ‘Third World’ and at the head of a united world. Although there are many different strands of
international proletariat battling against imperialism. development thinking to explore, the modernization
Chinese leaders believed that by fomenting revolution and dependency approaches have been two of the most
in the various ‘rural’ areas of the world, eventually the influential in the twentieth century. Both approaches
liberation movements would surround and overrun the were far from being static, uniform or unified, however,
urban areas, just as they had in China during its civil and neither represents a singular commonly agreed
war. Between 1967 and 1976 China’s aid had reached an approach. In discussing these different conceptions
average of 5 per cent of government expenditure and at then it is important to think about where and when
the start of the 1970s Chinese teams were building close they emerged. Most reflect some of the priorities of
to 100 different turn-key aid projects around the world development thinking characteristic of their era. The
(Brautigam 2009: 41). By 1978 some 74 countries were formation of development theories, therefore, depends
receiving aid from China, the largest group of which on different perceptions of ‘development challenges’ at
were in Africa, and by then China had aid programs in different times.
more African countries than the USA. The Chinese often
made a point of supporting schemes that the West had
rejected on narrowly economic grounds or which were
8.2.1 The modernization school:
important to African states for political or psychological
an anti-communist manifesto
reasons, and they also made a point of ‘doing something’ With the end of the Second World War and after the
for districts that the Europeans had been content to leave United Nations was established, conceptualizations of
as backwaters (Snow 1988). Aid was also an important development received a decisive stimulus. Between 1945
geopolitical tool for the Chinese in the contest with Tai- and 1981, UN membership rose from 51 to 156 nation-
wan (also an aid giver) and the USSR (where the Chinese states (Berger 2001). With many new states being formed
aimed to shame the Kremlin by stepping up their charity after the end of colonialism and in the context of the
and economic aid and by providing fewer arms). Aid thus Cold War, theorizing development became a more com-
became an important way of exposing the limitations of plicated and contested enterprise. In some ways the task
China’s opponents, both Western and Soviet. of development was seen by some as seeking to provide

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 Chapter 8  Worlds apart? The changing geographies of global development     177

‘an ethos and system of values which can compete suc- of capitalist development from urban-industrial areas to
cessfully with the attraction exercised by Communism’ other regions (Stöhr and Taylor 1981) as Rostow (1960)
(Watnick 1952–3: 37). In this regard many observers predicted that nations would ‘take off’ into development,
called for the modernization of ‘underdeveloped areas’ having gone through five stages, which he likened to the
and painted a picture (following President Truman) of stages an aeroplane goes through before take-off, from
‘underdeveloped peoples’ confined to ‘backwardness’ but taxiing on the runway to mid-flight. Ranging from stage
torn between the appeal of communism and the prospect one, ‘traditional society’, to stage five, the ‘age of high
of Western modernization. This was an essential char- mass consumption’, the theory takes our faith in the
acteristic of the modernization school, which was often capitalist system for granted since Rostow assumed that
dualistic, opposing ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ life-styles, all countries will be in a position to ‘take off’ into devel-
‘indigenous’ to ‘Westernized’, as if no country or citizen opment. Further, in common with other modernization
could belong to both categories. approaches, Rostow’s model devalues and misinterprets
Albert Hirschmann (1958) was a key proponent of ‘traditional societies’, which represent the ‘lowest’ form
modernization ideas, voicing the optimistic view that or stage of development. The advanced state of mod-
the forces of concentration (‘polarization’) will ‘trickle ernization was always represented as ‘Western mod-
down’ from the core to the periphery at national, regional ernization’; traditional societies seem like distant, poor
and global scales. Hirschmann explained how develop- relations.
ment economics might ‘slay the dragon of backwardness’ In America the Democratic administrations of the
(quoted in Rist 1997: 219). John Friedmann’s (1966) core– 1960s took Rostow’s theory to mean that if the USA
periphery model adopts many of the same assumptions could help shepherd ‘underdeveloped’ countries safely
about the polarization of development in ‘transitional through the take-off stage then the Communist ‘con-
societies’ and the ‘trickle-down’ effect of development. tagion’ could be arrested. Many social scientists like
Geographers at the time sought to contribute to the map- Rostow thus turned modernization theory’s description
ping of modernization geography, seeking to look at how of the modernity of Western societies into a prescrip-
progress trickled down along urban hierarchies, through tion for transforming the Third World. It is important
transport systems or with the introduction of modern to remember, however, that theories of modernization
technology. The message from these modernization geog- were not an exclusively American enterprise – moderni-
raphies was that underdeveloped countries could move zation was also a very influential idea within the Soviet
briskly into the modern tempo of life within a few years, Union. In part then the conflict between East and West
whilst the state (concerned with macro issues and the in the Third World was an expression of two competing
national economy) would be the key monitor and broker models of modernization, a democratic one led by the
of development. USA and a socialist one led by the USSR (Westad 2006).
One of the modernization theorists who identified Geographies of inequality and development cannot be
‘stages of growth’ in the development process was the
American economic historian and political theorist Walt
Whitman Rostow. Subtitling his book A Non-Commu-
nist Manifesto, Rostow (1960) played a key role in the
administrations of both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.
Johnson in the 1960s and closely shaped US foreign policy
in South-east Asia during this time. For Rostow Com-
munism was ‘an opportunistic virus that took out infant
nations not yet blessed with a constitutional “maturity”’
(Gilman 2003: 195) and he was the first to advise Presi-
dent Kennedy to send US combat troops to South Viet-
nam in 1965 and the first to recommend the bombing of
North Vietnam in 1966. To Rostow, communism was not
the agent of modernization but a side effect of it. It was a
‘disease of the transitional process’ likely to spread in any
nation during the early, difficult stages of development Plate 8.3  Walt Rostow shows US President Lyndon
and instead of accelerating growth communism ‘dis- B. Johnson a model of the Khe Sanh area in Vietnam
figured’ it, producing an unbalanced and dysfunctional in the ‘situation room’ in 1968.
modernity. Again the focus was on a top-down ‘trickling’ (LBJ Library photo by Yoichi Okamoto)

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 178    Section 2 Population, resources, food, the environment and development

neatly summarized as a set of prescriptive stages how- 8.2.2 T he dependency school:

ever. Urban areas, for example, are themselves subject beyond ‘core’ and ‘periphery’?
to uneven development and inequality (see C­ hapter 10).
Modernization approaches have also largely failed to One of the major weaknesses of the modernization
address the importance of gender, assuming that men approach was that the notion of a ‘trickle-down’ dif-
and women occupied equal positions in terms of power fusion of development implied that there were precise
relations and decision-making. Further, the ‘trickle- demarcations available of where the ‘core’ ends and the
down’ effect has often failed to materialize among ‘periphery’ begins when this has never really been the
those who have been the subjects of modernization case. Radical dependency approaches that emerged in
projects. This approach seemed to suggest that devel- the 1960s and 1970s challenged this notion of positive
opment could be mimicked, copied and replicated and core–periphery relations, identifying instead exploita-
that ‘underdeveloped’ countries should try to reproduce tion between ‘satellites’ and ‘metropoles’. Whilst the
the development paths of richer ‘developed’ nations like modernization approach was taken up by many inter-
Britain or the USA. As Gunder Frank has argued, this national institutions and bilateral donors, dependency
approach can also be understood as reflections of the approaches comprised all those opposed to US post-war
‘Sinatra Doctrine’: imperialism and allied in some way to the movement of
‘third worldism’. The dependency school is most com-
monly associated with Latin America, but also emerged
Do it my way, what is good for General Motors is good
in Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East. Drawing
for the country, and what is good for the United States
upon Marx’s writings about the unevenness of capitalist
is good for the world, and especially for those who
development, dependency scholars such as Celso Fur-
wish to ‘develop like we did’.
tado (1964) and Milton Santos (1974) drew attention
(Frank 1997: 13) to the mode of incorporation of each country into the
world capitalist system, identifying this as a key cause
In the modernization schema, it was implied that of exploitation.
there is nothing before the beginning of development The dependency school is most commonly asso-
in a ‘developing country’ that is worth retaining or ciated with the work of André Gunder Frank who
recalling, only a series of deficiencies, absences, weak- published a number of seminal pieces on ‘The devel-
nesses and incapacities (Abrahamsen 2000; Andreas- opment of underdevelopment’ in the late 1960s (Frank
son 2005). The approach was also in a sense very much 1966). This thesis is relatively uncomplicated in that it
based around a ‘top–down’ rather than a ‘bottom–up’ views development and underdevelopment as opposite
approach, implying that the process could be brokered sides of the same coin; the development of one area
by states or development institutions rather than emerge often necessitates the underdevelopment of another.
from the ‘grass-roots’ struggles of ‘Third World peoples’ For the dependency scholars (or dependentistas), a big
as had been called for in some more radical approaches. part of the economic development and wealth of the
In terms of common criticisms, the division of the rich countries is wealth that has been directly imported
world into modern and traditional has often been seen from the poor countries as the world economic system
as problematic (Pletsch 1981). Modern societies were actively generates inequality. Dependency on a metro-
much more fractured and were divided by ethnicity, politan ‘core’ (e.g. Europe, North America) increases
class and politics and were not as united and respon- the ‘underdevelopment’ of satellites in the ‘periphery’
sive to the blueprints of planners as was often assumed. (e.g. Latin America, Africa). Unlike many moderni-
The scale of modernization programmes was also often zation approaches, the dependentistas sought to view
a problem in that they assumed that ‘big is beautiful’ development in historical context, and argued, for
(involving large dam-building and irrigation projects, example, that colonialism helped to put in place a set
for example). Rostow was also able to say little about the of dependent relations between core and periphery.
‘final stage’ of his organic model of development since These peripheral satellites, they argued, were encour-
his underlying principle was that growth had no limits aged to produce what they did not consume (e.g.
(Rist 1997) and instead he simply discussed a number of primary products, including natural resources) and
very generalized scenarios. Like so many theorizations consume what they did not produce (e.g. manufac-
of development that followed, it ended with a creed, a tured or industrial goods). Thus, rather than likening
set of principles about what was to be done, and heav- the process of economic growth to an aeroplane setting
ily invested faith in the goals of mass consumption and off into a blue sky of urban-based, Western life-styles
Westernization. and consumption, the dependency school was arguing

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 Chapter 8  Worlds apart? The changing geographies of global development     179

that many ‘underdeveloped’ areas had been stalled 1949, but the idea of development is much older than this
on the runway by unequal relations and a history of (Cowen and Shenton 1996) and has much more diverse
colonialism, denying them a chance of ever being air- geographical origins. Development was not a simple ‘gift’
borne, ‘modern’ or ‘industrialized’. A dependence on following contact with Europeans but predates the ‘age
natural resources can lead to slower growth and pat- of discovery’ (1400–1550) and the ‘age of empire’ (1875–
terns of development that are geographically uneven 1914) (see Section 1 of this book). It is, however, particu-
(see also Chapter 5 for a discussion of the ‘resource larly important to examine the significance of Empire in
curse’ thesis). the making of international development. Between 1800
In many ways, dependency approaches were so directly and 1878, European rule, including former colonies in
opposed to modernization approaches (almost point by North and South America, increased from 35 per cent to
point) that eventually both ‘seemed to checkmate each 67 per cent of the earth’s land surface, adding another
other’ (Schuurman 2001: 6). The dependency school even 18 per cent between 1875 and 1914, the period of ‘for-
appeared to preserve the dualistic and binary classifica- mal colonialism’ (Hoogevelt 1997: 18). In the last three
tion of the world into ‘developed’/’underdeveloped’, decades of the nineteenth century, European states thus
‘First World’ and ‘Third World’, core and periphery, added 10 million square miles of territory and 150 mil-
and also lacked a clear statement of what ‘development’ lion people to their areas of control or ‘one fifth of the
actually is. Key criticisms directed at the dependentis- earth’s land surface and one tenth of its people’ (Peet
tas were that the theory represents a form of ‘economic with Hartwick 1999: 105).
determinism’ and also overlooks social and cultural vari- Colonialism has been variously interpreted as an eco-
ation within developed and underdeveloped regions. The nomic process of unequal exchange, as a political process
dependency framework seemed to leave the simplistic aimed at administration and subordination of indigenous
impression of an ‘evil genie who organizes the system, peoples, and as a cultural process of imposing European
loading the dice and making sure the same people win superiority (see Chapters 2 and 20). According to the
all the time’ (Rist 1997: 122) and like modernization dependency theorists it was in this period that the periph-
approaches it also dealt in dualistic either/or scenarios ery was brought into an expanding network of economic
and viewed poverty in deprivationist terms. Another exchanges with the core of the world system. A new sense
point of contention was that the dependency theorists of responsibility for distant human suffering also first
seemed to be calling for a de-linking from the world capi- emerged during this time as the societies of Europe and
talist economy at a time when it was undergoing further North America became entwined within global networks
globalization and economic integration. Elements of the of exchange and exploitation in the late eighteenth and
dependency writings were, however, quite thought-pro- early nineteenth centuries (Haskell 1985a, 1985b). Thus
voking and remain relevant, particularly their contention the origins of a humanitarian concern to come to the aid
that the obstacles to development equality were struc- of ‘distant others’ lay partly in response to the practices
tural, arising not from a lack of will or poor weather of slavery in the transatlantic world (see Case study 8.4)
conditions but from entrenched patterns of global ine- and to the expansion of colonial settlement in the ‘age
quality and ‘dependent’ relationships. of empire’:

Not only did colonisation carry a metropolitan sense

of responsibility into new Asian, North American,
8.3  evelopment practice:
D African and Australasian terrains, it also prompted
the historical geography of humanitarians to formulate new antidotes, new
development ‘cures’ for the ills of the world.
(Lester 2002: 278).
Whilst both modernization and dependency approaches
alluded to the importance of ‘tradition’, many early These new antidotes, cures and remedies were to
writings about development lacked a sense of histori- have enduring significance for the shaping of twentieth-
cal perspective (Rist 1997). As Crush (1995) points out, century global development theory and practice, which
development is primarily ‘forward looking’, imagining a also often carried an implicit ‘metropolitan sense of
better world, and does not always examine issues of his- responsibility’. Colonial development was also asso-
torical and geographical context. Many recent histories ciated with an unconditional belief in the concept of
of development have dated its beginnings as an area of progress and the ‘makeability’ of society, being ­heavily
theory and state practice to President Truman’s speech of conditioned by the dominance of the evolutionary

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 180    Section 2 Population, resources, food, the environment and development

Case study 8.4

Race, native lands and the origins of of the plantations of the Mississippi Valley and the
US capitalism and development textile mills of Manchester ‘were tied together through
the cotton trade-the largest single sector of the global
When US President Thomas Jefferson acquired the economy in the first half of the nineteenth century’
Louisiana Territory of 828,000 square miles of land (Johnson 2013: 10). The slaveocracy that emerged
from France in 1803 he envisioned an ‘empire for lib- around the Cotton Kingdom also laid the groundwork
erty’ populated by self-sufficient white farmers. The for wider continental expansion (America’s ‘mani-
plantation economy, however, that emerged in the Mis- fest destiny’) and US overseas imperialism through
sissippi Valley in the years that followed can tell us a attempts to annex Nicaragua and Cuba in order to
great deal about the development of capitalism in the accumulate more land to distribute to the non-slave
United States and about the indigenous lands, African holders along with the US obsession with control of
bodies and global trade networks that this depended the Caribbean and Central America and other military/
upon. As Walter Johnson (2013) has shown, in many imperialist ventures (Johnson 2013).
ways there was no nineteenth-century US capitalism Similarly, Domosh (2015) has shown how some
without slavery. Beginning with the violent expropria- of the key elements of US international development
tion and ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the land that indigenous practices in the post-war era can be traced back to the
agriculturalists (the Muskogee, Cherokee, Chickasaw US South, a region considered ‘undeveloped’ in the first
and Choctaw nations) had farmed for millennia before decades of the twentieth century, and the agricultural
the arrival of Europeans, the area was quickly trans- extension practices that targeted the rural farm home
formed into a frontier of accumulation by selling off the and farm women. This is one of a number of recent
collective Native land base to individual capitalist plant- studies that trace US development practices to the first
ers. Using enslaved Africans, slaveholders then trans- decades of the twentieth century, if not earlier, and to
formed the Mississippi Valley into the Cotton Kingdom events that occurred as much within the USA as outside
that formed the basis for US capitalism and world trade of it (Ekbladh 2002, 2010a, 2010b; Sneddon and Fox
(Johnson 2013). In 1800, there were around 100,000 2011). Domosh (2015) examines the ways in which the
slaves living within the boundaries of the present-day Extension Service of the US Department of Agriculture
states of Mississippi and Louisiana but by 1860 there (USDA) targeted rural women and the home as sites
were more than 750,000 (Johnson 2013: 32). Although of modernization and development through a series of
there were already some enslaved Africans in the area heavily gendered and racially segregated interventions.
before the boom, approximately a million slaves were The US government then drew on its experiences with
brought to the Mississippi Valley between 1820 and what was called Home Demonstration Work (HDW) in
1840. Thus the slaveholding economy of the American the American South in order to conduct ‘home work’
South, which played a foundational role in the wider overseas, linking early US interventions into other coun-
development of US capitalism, depended in large tries under the guise of agricultural modernization with
part on coerced African labour and the dispossession the USA’s own domestic agricultural extension service.
of indigenous lands. Britain was at the time the main Domosh (2015) argues that international develop-
industrial giant and imperialist power, and its primary ment – a form of hegemony different from but related to
industry was fuelled by US cotton. Most Mississippi colonialism – thus needs to be understood not only as
Valley cotton went to Liverpool for sale, making up a geopolitical tool of the Cold War, but also as ‘a tech-
80 per cent of the cotton that British manufacturers nique of governance that took shape within the realm of
imported (Johnson 2013). Thus the fortunes of cotton the domestic and through a racialized gaze developed
planters in Louisiana and cotton brokers in Liverpool, in the US South’ (Domosh 2015: 3).

thinking that was popular in Europe at the time. Impe- this came a missionary zeal to ‘civilize’ and modern-
rialism was viewed as a cultural and economic necessity ize the colonized and their ways of life. An important
where colonies were regarded as the national ‘property’ contention here then is that colonialism ‘conditioned’
of the metropolitan countries and thus needed to be the meanings and practices of development in a number
‘developed’ using the latest methods and ideas. With of important ways.

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 Chapter 8  Worlds apart? The changing geographies of global development     181

After 1945 and under US President Truman, ‘under- was invested with the hopes and dreams of many newly
development’ became the incomplete and ‘embryonic’ emerging states who wanted to address these inequali-
form of development and the gap was seen as bridgea- ties and divisions in their societies (Rahnema 1997).
ble only through an acceleration of growth (Rist 1997). Decolonization was thus simultaneously an ideologi-
Globally, development would have its ‘trustees’, guid- cal, material and spatial process, just as complicated as
ing ‘civilized’ nations that had the ‘capacity’ and the colonization (Pieterse and Parekh 1995). An important
knowledge or expertise to organize land, labour and issue here concerns the extent to which colonial state
capital in the South on behalf of others. Quite a pater- machineries were reworked and transformed after inde-
nal and parental style of relationship was therefore pendence (Power 2003). The colonial state had rested
established through the imperial encounter between on force for its legitimacy, a legitimacy that was thus
colonizer and colonized in ways which have continued highly superficial. Colonial states also had a role in cre-
to have a bearing on the definition of North–South ating political and economic communities, defining the
partnerships in the ‘post-colonial’ world. ­Additionally, rules of the game and the boundaries of community
what is also relevant here is that many ‘post-­colonial’ whilst creating power structures to dominate them. The
states continue to maintain important political, colonial state was also the dominant economic actor,
­cultural and economic ties with their former colonial creating a currency, levying taxes, introducing crops,
rulers (see Figure 8.1). developing markets, controlling labour and production.
Colonialism put in place important political and Above all, colonial state administrations sought the inte-
economic relations but the cultural legacies of coloni- gration of the colonial economy into the wider econo-
alism bequeathed deep social and cultural divisions in mies of empire, to make linkages with the metropole
many societies. In the process of decolonization, ‘devel- and to establish flows of peoples and resources. After
opment’ became an overarching objective for many the formal end of colonialism, new states have had to
nationalist movements and the independent states they formulate alternative methods of garnering legitimacy
tried to form. Although experiments with development for their authority (i.e. other than the use of force pre-
were tried in many colonies, the idea of development ferred by the colonists).

1945–1955
1955–1965
1965–1975

Figure 8.1  Decolonization and the proliferation of independent states, 1945–75.

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 182    Section 2 Population, resources, food, the environment and development

It is worth remembering that indigenous peoples in more fluid. In some ways, however, it would be more
Africa, the Americas, Asia and Australasia had highly appropriate to refer to some of these countries as ‘re-
developed and sophisticated cultures and technologies emerging economies’ as, until the nineteenth century,
prior to colonization (Dickenson et al. 1996). As the China and India were the world’s largest economies and
European capitalist system expanded and became ever dominated global output until the onset of Britain’s
more global in its reach however, the structures of eco- industrial revolution.
nomic, social and political life that existed in colonies First coined in 2001 by an economist at the multi-
before colonialism were often radically remade. The his- national global investment firm Goldman Sachs, the
torical process by which ‘gaps’ began to emerge between ‘BRICs’ acronym (referring to Brazil, Russia, India and
‘North’ and ‘South’ has been interpreted in a variety of China) identified a group of four countries in particular
ways, but a key question has been: to what extent did that were, due to their scale, population size and growing
European expansion and colonialism ‘underdevelop’ share of global GDP, regarded as the leading non-West-
(Frank 1966) large areas of the world? The impact of ern economies and as future motors of global economic
imperial expansion was not uniform; the geographical change. The ‘BRICs’ acronym has since come into wide-
patterns of expansion varied, as did the motivations for spread use as a symbol of the apparently epochal shift
it. Hall (1992) argues that an important divide was put in in global economic power away from the developed
place between ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’ as a direct result economies towards the ‘developing world’ and the wider
of this imperial expansion, reminding us that ‘the West’ realignment of world economic and ultimately political
is much more of an idea than a geographical reality. By power that would be engendered by the collective influ-
accelerating contact between cultures and economies ‘the ence of these four countries. South Africa began efforts
West’ was presented as ‘the best’ and most advanced or to join the grouping in 2010 and the process for its for-
‘civilized’ of all humanity. Many accounts of the history mal admission began in August of that year with South
of European expansion are thus dominated by the pre- African President Jacob Zuma attending the 2011 BRICS
sumed supremacy of ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ with only summit as a full member.
limited references to the complex histories and cultures With the inclusion of South Africa, the five BRICS
of the areas that were colonized. countries now represent almost three billion people with
a combined nominal GDP of US$16.039 trillion and an
estimated US$4 trillion in combined foreign reserves
(IMF 2013). Over the past decade, FDI inflows to the
BRICS countries have more than tripled to an estimated
8.4 T he ‘rising powers’ and the US$322 billion in 2013 (UNCTAD 2014). As a result
emergence of new ‘Southern’ their share in world FDI flows kept rising even during
donors the recent global economic crisis, reaching 22 per cent in
2013, up from 6 per cent in 2000. The BRICS countries
[T]he rapid and steady intrusion and recognition of a set of have also become important investors – their outward
major emerging economies is challenging the established order, FDI has risen from US$7 billion in 2000 to US$126 bil-
wrenching global relations into flux. lion in 2012 and now accounts for around 9 per cent of
global flows, up from only 1 per cent in 2002 (UNCTAD
(Shaw et al. 2009: 27)
2013). As a result, some countries of the global South are
The United States emerged pre-eminent after the Sec- beginning to exert more influence on the ‘advanced’ and
ond World War and built a post-war international order ‘developed’ economies of western nations with signifi-
around a range of governance institutions, including the cant implications in terms of inflation, wages and unem-
United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), ployment, profits and interest rates. Globally, increasing
the World Bank, the General Agreement on ­Tariffs and economic integration has made labour cheaper and more
Trade (GATT) and regional security ­alliances. The end abundant with workers in developing countries conse-
of the Cold War consolidated this American-led global quently losing some of their bargaining power. Further,
institutional order, but in recent years a group of fast- the monopoly that western donors once had on devel-
growing non-Western countries or ‘rising powers’ as opment finance (and the power to frame the terms and
they are sometimes referred to (namely China, India content of development debates) is being steadily eroded.
and ­Brazil) have been rising up the ranks of the world (Power 2015).
system as the boundaries used to differentiate rich and The recent global economic crisis has also opened up
poor, ‘first’ and ‘third’ world countries are becoming space for the emerging economies of the global South to

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 Chapter 8  Worlds apart? The changing geographies of global development     183

play an increasingly active role in the reform of global is becoming clear is that the rapid and steady intrusion
economic and political governance, to the extent that a and recognition of a set of major emerging economies
‘regime change’ in global governance is now at least a dis- is challenging the established global order, ‘wrenching
tinct possibility (Gray and Murphy 2013). This has been global relations into flux’ (Shaw et al. 2009: 27). As a
characterized by some as the beginning of a transition result Western modernity is ‘no longer uncritically viewed
from a unipolar US hegemony to one of ‘emancipatory as the future of developing countries’ (Humphrey 2007:
multipolarity’ (Pieterse 2011), in which the countries that 16). These (re)emerging powers have economies that will
represent the majority of the world’s peoples now have a rival the USA and Europe in the years ahead and they
position at the head table, or even as a broader underly- are already becoming an international economic force.
ing ‘global centre shift’ or ‘hegemonic transition’ (Gills Additionally these (re)emerging powers hold most of the
2011). Reforming the governance of the IMF and the world’s financial reserves and are placing significant new
World Bank has been a central component in the strategy demands on energy and raw materials (many of which
of ‘global power diffusion’ pursued by the BRICS. They are being sourced from countries of the global South)
have argued that the West is overrepresented in the IMF at with important implications for the environment and the
the expense of developing countries and have called for a prospects for addressing climate change and sustainable
greater share of votes and a change in what they see as the development goals.
organization’s obsolete governance. As they are becom- The rise of countries like China, India and Brazil thus
ing growing net contributors to the IMF, the BRICS are has potentially far-reaching implications for global geog-
thus pressing for a greater voice within the institution, raphies of development and the international landscape
even threatening to hold back the additional financing of development cooperation but also for the post-war
requested by the IMF to fight the European debt crisis institutions of governance in world politics. Further,
unless they gained greater IMF voting power. many of these ‘rising powers’ are (re)emerging as aid
There have also been discussions about the creation donors themselves, providing development assistance to
of a parallel mechanism to the World Bank including a range of other non-Western partners and often herald-
proposals for a ‘BRICS development bank’ that would ing this as ‘South–South cooperation’. These ‘Southern’
lend to infrastructure projects and the facilitation of donors are also questioning the very idea of development
sustainable development in the countries of the group- cooperation as a Western concept but also the develop-
ing themselves as well as other developing countries. ment paradigm as a whole (Six 2009). Brazil, China,
More generally, the BRICS have also focused on the India and South Africa not only espouse the cause of
need for national policy autonomy and have been criti- ‘developing countries’ but are also vociferous in their
cal of the global economic governance frameworks that assertions that they themselves belong to this group in
introduce rules and norms corresponding to dominant ways that are reminiscent of older Third Worldist coali-
country interests. The BRICS have also been instrumen- tions that some of these countries led at different points
tal in establishing regional development banks that have in the past such as Bandung (Narlikar 2013). Part of their
eroded the primacy of the IMF and World Bank as lend- appeal as ‘development donors’ (Mawdsley 2012) is that
ers in Asia and Latin America and have agreed to use they don’t have the same imperial histories of colonizing
their own currencies when trading among themselves, large parts of the global South that many existing West-
effectively reducing their dependence on the US dollar ern donors do. Paradoxically, these ‘new’ donors repre-
as the main currency of trade. sent models of economic success, yet they have been, or
There is no doubt then that in recent years both the are still, recipients of international aid. Although India,
architecture of international governance and the estab- for example, is a donor (aid expenditures reached US$1.3
lished modes of development cooperation have been billion in 2014–15, more than double New Delhi’s antic-
increasingly transformed by the (re)emergence of the ipated net foreign aid receipts of US$655 million that
rising powers as development donors with important financial year) it was the world’s eighth-largest recipient
implications for global geographies of investment, pro- of official development assistance as recently as 2008 (to
duction and trade (Power and Mohan 2010). Twenty the value of US$2.1 billion) and was fourth overall from
years ago, it would have been difficult to imagine Brazil 1995 to 2009. Further, considerable levels of poverty and
as the main regional leader in Latin America, India as a inequality remain within each of the BRICS despite the
major player in the WTO, or China as the second largest many claims that have been made about their ‘miracu-
economy in the world (Vom Hau et al 2012), but what lous growth’.

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 184    Section 2 Population, resources, food, the environment and development

the emergence of the BRICS and the rising economies of

8.5 Conclusions: geography, the South.
unevenness and inequality Many recent critiques of development thus appear
disillusioned with the future of the development indus-
The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual
try and its capacity to understand and alleviate world
landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crimes
poverty. Further, many politicians in Western countries
have been the steady companions of development and they tell a
are only gradually beginning to wake up to the realities
common story: it did not work. Moreover, the historical condi-
of these contemporary global inequalities. A number of
tions which catapulted the idea into prominence have vanished:
them see these concerns as those of distant geographies,
development has become outdated.
a world of problems pushed and ‘worlded’ beyond the
universe of immediate moral concern even though the
(Sachs 1992: 1). lines that have historically divided ‘North’ and ‘South’,
Development is nearly always seen as something that is ‘First World’ and ‘Third World’ are now present within
possible, if only people or countries follow through a every nation-state. The effects of poverty and inequality
series of stages or prescribed instructions. Many theories, (a bit like those of climate change) are thus regarded as
strategies and ideologies have thus sought to prescribe diffuse and long-term (Wade 2001). Additionally, rather
how development could or should proceed and ‘devel- than thinking of a single, interconnected and interde-
opment thinking’ has long been caught in a ‘Western’ pendent global economic system, this impoverishment
perception of reality and been based around ‘Western’ and inequity is constructed as somehow unique or
philosophies, knowledges, experiences and histories. exclusive to the peoples of particular spaces of global
There is a sense, however, that despite the wide variety Development such as the ‘Third World’. If our concern
of interventions that have been made in its name the is to build a more radical development geography then
‘project’ of Development has been accompanied by a it needs to be understood that poverty also occurs in
common story: that it ‘did not work’ and that its ‘steady ‘developed’ countries and that the aid and ‘development’
companions’ have been ‘delusion and disappointment, policies of such countries, far from being a part of the
failures and crimes’ (Sachs 1992: 1). solution, may actually be considered a part of the prob-
Some critics have even argued that historically lem. Marginality and deprivation (or for that matter,
­Development is in many ways a dubious solution in search excessive consumption amongst the affluent) in Europe,
of a problem (Escobar 2011) and has thus ‘created abnor- North America or Russia and other post-communist
malities’ such as poverty, underdevelopment, backward- ‘transition economies’ should also be seen foremost as
ness and landlessness before proceeding to address them issues of ‘development’.
in ways that deny value or initiative to local cultures and The rapid economic growth experienced by (re)emerg-
that prevent individuals from making their own histories ing powers in the South like Brazil, India and China,
and geographies under conditions of their own choosing. and their increasingly significant roles in development
More importantly, there is also a sense in which the his- cooperation and aid disbursement, requires us to adopt
torical conditions that gave rise to the idea of D/develop- a framework for analysis that is liberated from the tyr-
ment have fundamentally changed and a sense that the anny of dualism and that allows for changes in the world
idea lies ‘in ruins’ or has become ‘outdated’. Some of the economy and variation within and between states. Their
prior meta-geographical demarcations that have shaped collective size and impact on trade, finance, energy, and
development theory and practice, the categories such as the environment will make them important players in the
‘Developed’ and ‘Third World’ which emerged after 1945, years to come. This also means moving beyond the tragic
and which have ‘long provided key points of reference, stereotypes of a single condition of ‘Third World poverty’
commitment, analysis and mobilisation’ (Sidaway 2012), and a single ‘geography of the Third World’. This could
have shattered and are breaking down in part because of make a world of difference.

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 Chapter 8  Worlds apart? The changing geographies of global development     185

Learning outcomes Power, M. (2003) Rethinking Development Geographies,

Routledge, London. Draws out the spatial dimensions of
Having read this chapter, you should understand:
development and outlines how the discipline of geography
● D/development is both a continuous intellectual and has been implicated and involved in the theory and practice
ideological project as well as an ongoing material of ‘development’. The book offers a critical and stimulating
introduction to the imperial and geopolitical dimensions of
process
development, looking at Cold War and colonial constructions
● The value of historical and geographical of ‘The Tropics’ and the ‘Third World’.
­perspectives on D/development Rigg, J. (2007) An Everyday Geography of the Global South,
● The power and politics of ‘labelling’ and Routledge, London. Draws on more than 90 case studies
­categorizing poor peoples, places and the spaces from 36 countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America,
of development. starting with the lived and ‘everyday’ experiences of ‘ordinary’
● The changing geographies of north-south and people as they encounter development.

south-south interactions and development Sidaway, J.D. (2012) Geographies of development: new maps,
new visions?, The Professional Geographer, 64(1), 49–62.
­cooperation and the rise of emerging economies
This paper reconsiders what remains of the ‘Third World’.
from the global South like China, India and Brazil.
Williams, G., Meth, P. and Willis, K. (2014) Geographies of
Developing Areas: The Global South in a Changing World,
2nd edition, Routledge, London. Another rewarding survey
Further reading that focuses on the diversity of life in the South, and looks at
the role the South plays in shaping and responding to current
Chant, S. and Mcllwaine, S. (2009) Geographies of global change.
­Development in the 21st Century, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Willis, K. (2005) Theories and Practices of Development,
Explores the immense social, cultural, political and e
­ conomic
Routledge, London. Explores the development theories
variations among countries and in different places in
behind contemporary debates such as globalization and
the global South, providing an engaging introduction to
transnationalism and traces the main definitions of ‘develop-
development.
ment’ and ‘development theory’ over time. It contains student-
Desai, V. and Potter, R. (eds) (2014) The Arnold Compan- friendly features, including case studies, with examples,
ion to Development Studies, 3rd edition, Arnold, London. definitions, summary sections, suggestions for further read-
Contains short and accessible chapters on a wide variety of ing, discussion questions and website information.
development themes. A useful companion text in studying
development, with suggestions for further reading on each
topic.
Mawdsley, E. (2012) From Recipients to Donors: Emerging
Useful websites
Powers and the Changing Development Landscape,
www.eldis.org  The ELDIS Development information
Zed, London. An accessible introduction to the emergence
research gateway site with a useful country search facility
of new development donors such as China, India, Brazil
and good web links.
and South Korea and the implications of their rise for
the institutions, practices and modalities of development www.guardian.co.uk/global-development  A site focusing on
cooperation. global development and tracking progress towards the MDGs.
Potter, R., Binns, T., Elliott, J.A. and Smith, D. (2008) www.peopleandplanet.org UK students campaigning on
­Geographies of Development, 3rd edition, Longman, London. world poverty, human rights and the environment.
Updated and revised in a third edition, this book offers www.brettonwoodsproject.org  The website of the ­Bretton
a wide-ranging discussion of theories of development, Woods Project, an organization seeking to monitor and
urban/rural spaces and the important institutions of global ­challenge the power of the World Bank and IMF and to seek
development. alternatives.

M08_DANI2950_05_SE_C08.indd 185 31/03/16 7:08 pm

M08_DANI2950_05_SE_C08.indd 186 31/03/16 7:08 pm
 Section 3

Society, settlement and culture

Edited by Tim Hall

M09_DANI2950_05_SE_C09.indd 187 04/04/16 6:21 pm

 Geographers are interested in difference, the networks is addressed before the chapter turns
ways places differ, and also in the similarities and to examine urban problems like poverty, cul-
interconnections between places. But the changes tural diversity and environmental sustainability
that human societies have experienced since the and how these might best be understood and
late twentieth century render the geographer’s addressed. Chapter 10 on urban segregation
task of making sense of the world increasingly and social inequalities argues that all modern
­difficult. Old dichotomies, like that between ‘urban’ societies are riddled with inequalities. It dem-
and ‘rural’, and the lines which geographers have onstrates that one of the clearest ways in which
­customarily drawn on their maps to divide country social disadvantage is reflected is through its
from country, region from region and culture from geographical expression, particularly in the
culture, seem to make less sense in a dynamic existence of spaces described as being ‘on
globalizing environment. Even so the results of the margins’. Chapter 11, ‘Rural worlds’, ana-
such processes seem not to be a world that is lyzes the alternative consequences for both
more uniform. While distant places interconnect rural spaces and individuals of the processes
and interact with increasing intimacy, new spaces of urbanization and globalization. Chapter 12
appear where people are excluded from such on social constructions of nature argues that
developments, and almost everywhere some indi- nature is not some pre-given physical reality,
viduals who share spaces with others are denied existing totally outside ourselves, but is in fact
the rights and advantages that the latter enjoy. an idea which is constructed by society. It is
never easy to draw a line between things that
It is such complexities, making themselves felt
are deemed ‘natural’ and things that are ‘social’,
in urban and rural spaces and in the spheres of
and different ways of conceiving of what is
culture and nature, that form the subject of this
‘natural’ can be used to advance particular
section.
political agendas. Chapter 13, which looks at
The world has become more urban. But the expe- culture, defines it as a process and as a sys-
rience of urbanization differs radically between tem of shared meanings. The argument is that
cities, spaces within cities, and for different indi- globalization is not producing a single global
viduals. The corollary is that the world has become culture although the idea of a global culture is
less rural, but again those spaces, and the indi- becoming important. It debunks the myth that
viduals within them, are affected in very different globalization equates with cultural homogeniza-
ways by such processes. Further, culture seems to tion. Global cultural processes interact with pro-
be assuming ever greater importance in the world. cesses occurring at national and regional levels
Issues like identity and the meanings and ways of to produce a complex world in which it is neces-
life that are shared by, or that divide, individuals sary to foster approaches that will welcome and
and groups become matters of concern, contesta- celebrate cultural differences rather than shun
tion and even conflict. These processes are inter- and fear them.
acting though with an increasingly vulnerable and
This section makes clear the fact that the
contested global ecology.
­geography of a globalizing world is as much a
Chapter 9 looks at cities, the roles cities now geography of exclusion and difference as it is one
play in global and regional economic and power of ­interconnection and interlinkage.

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 Cities: urban worlds

Chapter 9

Tim Hall and Heather Barrett

Topics covered
■ Sociological and administrative definitions of cities
■ Edge cities
■ The rural–urban fringe
■ Levels of urbanization by world region
■ Impacts of economic change on urbanization patterns
■ Networks and connectivity between cities
■ Connectivity and power
■ Researching urban connectivity
■ The internal structures of cities
■ Postmodern urbanization
■ Influences of the state and the planning system on urban form
■ Global urban poverty and inequality
■ Cultural diversity in cities
■ Cities and sustainability

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 190    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

T here is a tendency, certainly within the media but also

at times within the academic discourse of urban
geography, to talk about cities in very unequivocal terms.
of little surprise that urban geography has not been
particularly good at, or indeed often has not been
interested in, making sense of many of the smaller
Talking about cities in this way tends to perpetuate cer- elements that make up a city.
tain urban myths. Pro-urban myths include seeing the
(Latham 2008: 215–15)
city as civilized, modern, liberating, exciting or perhaps
romantic, while anti-urban myths see the city as ugly, A corollary of this tendency within urban geography
alienating, corrupting, dirty or dangerous, amongst other to see the city in unequivocal terms has been the ten-
things. The tendency to talk about cities in this way is dency to focus on a narrow range of big cities, such as
not new. A number of commentators have recognized Los Angeles, London, Mexico City and Tokyo, where the
the existence of urban myths throughout history, trac- processes of urbanization are manifested most clearly
ing the earliest to Ancient Greece and Rome (Williams and spectacularly. However, it would be wrong to dismiss
1973; Gold and Revill 2004; Short 2006). Urban myths both the mundane concerns outlined above and smaller,
are significant in that they reflect widely held cultural seemingly less interesting cities. These concerns make up
attitudes towards the urban. They tell us what societies the fabric of everyday life for the majority of urban dwell-
think about cities at different times. These urban myths ers and, despite their large population sizes, the majority
are also significant because they are still constantly of the world’s urban population do not live in large cities
reproduced. This is not to suggest that these impressions but in smaller urban settlements (Bell and Jayne 2006):
are untrue, rather that there is a tendency when we talk
52 per cent of the world’s urban population resides in
about the city to focus on these eye-catching aspects and
cities and towns of less than 500,000 people. A similar
to exaggerate them at the expense of the subtleties and
picture is painted for developed and developing coun-
complexities that exist in cities. However, it is important
tries, as 54 and 51 per cent of their urban population,
not to dismiss this way of thinking about cities entirely.
respectively, live in such cities. Despite the attention
Such myths emphasize the sheer diversity of the urban
they command, megacities – cities with over 10 million
world and begin to provide a framework for understand-
people – are home to only 9 per cent of the world’s
ing and working through this diversity. Yet relying entirely
urban population.
on them as a guide carries with it the danger that much
of the detail that makes up the daily ‘stuff’ of urban life (UN HABITAT 2009: 27)
eludes analysis. A review of almost any local newspaper,
Further, although the issues above may seem trivial or
for example, tells of a range of more mundane concerns
of only limited interest in themselves, they constitute part
that typically constitute the daily life of cities. Gloucester
of much bigger, broader, more significant and wide-rang-
is a small city in the south-west of England. Its newspa-
ing urban issues and for this reason deserve our attention.
per, The Citizen, for example, regularly runs stories on
Thus, we need to try to appreciate the fine grain of daily
issues such as the problems caused by an infestation of
urban life, the big issues and the relations between these.
seagulls in the city centre, recurrent minor incidents of
This chapter, then, aims to outline ways to think through
anti-social behaviour and vandalism, deaths and injuries
the complexity and diversity of the urban world and to
caused by traffic accidents, financial problems affect-
talk about the ways that geographers have tried to recon-
ing independent retailers, educational successes of local
cile both big issues and more mundane concerns in their
schools, and reports from the city’s sports clubs. This
work. It will do this first by focusing on three aspects
daily diet of local news is typical of cities the world over.
of cities that form enduring themes in urban geography,
Such mundane issues though are rarely the substantive
which can be thought of as the multiple geographies of
concerns of urban geographers who tend to focus on the
the urban world, as follows:
‘big issues’ rather than the minutiae of life in the city:
Urban geography and urban studies is a discipline ●● The macro-geography of the urban world: the ways
populated by Big Things. Cities for a start. They are in which processes of contemporary urbanization are
by definition big. Motorways and mass transportation changing the distribution of the urban population
systems, urban redevelopment projects, and suburban around the world.
shopping malls are pretty big too. Then there are ●● The host of networks and connections that exist
skyscrapers, mega-projects, new-towns, edge cities, between cities and the effects that these webs of con-
again all large, obvious, written across the landscape nections have on cities.
and close to the heart of urban geography’s sense of ●● The diversity of the internal worlds of individual
itself . . . Given its attraction to the Big, it is perhaps cities.

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 Chapter 9  Cities: urban worlds    191

Although these will be considered separately here, it (1907/1978), and Louis Wirth’s essay ‘Urbanism as a way
should be remembered that they are interrelated issues. of life’ (1938). Influential in their time, they have been the
Each of these aspects affects the others. These can be subject of much debate across a number of disciplines
thought of as some of the basic or fundamental ques- concerned with questions of the urban. Broadly speaking,
tions of urban geography. Geographers have sought to Simmel’s perspective was temporal, arguing that the cul-
explore these in a variety of ways over time devising often ture of the modern period (roughly from 1850 onwards)
radically different theoretical perspectives on them. As has been urban, while Wirth’s was spatial, seeking to
Paddison argues: recognize distinctly urban qualities that differed from
those of the rural. Simmel’s concern was primarily with
Historically then, the study of cities is identifiable
the effects of the development of the money economy in
with continuities and discontinuities – continuities
the modern period on social relations. He argued that it
in terms of the basic questions cities pose, discon-
produced blazé, reserved, instrumental relations between
tinuities in terms of how they have been studied and
people that are found at their most developed in cities, the
theorised.
centres of the money economy. This he contrasted with
(Paddison 2001: 4) the social relations of earlier historical periods. Simmel’s
work has often been misinterpreted as attributing causal-
The discussion of these basic questions is situated
ity to cities. However, it was money rather than cities per
within a reflection on some key recent theoretical debates
se which, he argued, produced the distinctive social rela-
and challenges within urban geography. The chapter con-
tions that he observed (Byrne 2001; Savage et al. 2003;
cludes by a looking at a number of contemporary issues.
Hubbard 2006). Wirth, by contrast, attempted to show
While some of these have echoes in earlier phases of
that the characteristics of cities, notably their size, density
urban geography, others have emerged more recently.
and heterogeneity, produced social relations of a different
type to rural areas:
Wirth’s basic argument was that city life was charac-
9.1 Defining the urban world terized by isolation and social disorganization, and
that this was due to the fact that all cities were large,
Trying to define the urban world is fraught with difficulty. dense and heterogeneous.
One does not need to be a student of urban geography
(Savage et al. 2003: 108)
to recognize characteristics of urban settlements and the
differences between cities, towns and villages. However, Although undoubtedly pioneering and influential,
organizing this understanding systematically and using these works have failed subsequently to sustain the notion
it to define what and where is urban has proven more that distinctly urban qualities, processes and ways of life
problematic. Fundamentally we need to ask if we can rec- exist. Criticisms, particularly of Wirth’s arguments, have
ognize any qualities that are uniquely or distinctly urban. included the recognition of many cultural groups within
Although there are undoubtedly differences between cities, a plethora of subcultures rather than the singular
rural and urban, the question here becomes: are these urban culture that Wirth proposed, and the identifica-
differences of type or of degree? This question formed tion of close-knit communities in cities, though ones
the basis of a significant strand of sociological debate frequently undergoing profound change (Hoggart 1957;
during the twentieth century. Young and Wilmot 1962), which runs counter to Wirth’s
The search for qualities or processes that are uniquely assertions of isolation and social disorganization as the
urban has long been at the heart of sociological enquiry key characteristics of urban society (Byrne 2001; Savage
into the city. This originated in the work of Ferdinand Toe- et al. 2003).
nnies (1887) who distinguished between Gemeinschaft Defining the urban for administrative purposes, the
(traditional communities) and Gesellschaft (modern measurement, management and planning of cities, has
societies characterized by more instrumental social rela- proven equally problematic as attempts to define it soci-
tions). This spawned a tradition of sociological enquiry ologically. Amongst administrative definitions of the
that explored the supposed differences between rural urban, population size is perhaps the most basic criterion
and urban societies and the ways of life that character- used to define the nature of settlements. Internationally
ized them (Savage et al. 2003: 109). The most influential though there are huge variations in the ways in which
of these were the work of Georg Simmel, particularly his this criterion is applied. While in parts of Scandinavia
essay ‘The metropolis and mental life’ (1903/2004) and the a settlement of 300 can be classed as urban, in Japan
longer treatment of his ideas in The Philosophy of Money only settlements whose population size exceeds 30,000

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 192    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

qualify. Higher population densities are often cited as a rounds of urbanization in many parts of the developed
characteristic of urban areas but here again there is no world. Often edge cities straddle administrative bounda-
natural or universally agreed cut-off point that separates ries, fragmenting their true form and extent within offi-
urban from non-urban settlements. Indeed, the extensive cial statistical returns. The rapidity with which edge cities
depopulation that has recently been observed in some old have colonized rural land in some areas means that where
de-industrialized cities such as Detroit in the USA and these processes are at their most prevalent, the adminis-
across parts of Eastern and Central Europe (Hall and trative framework of regions is more a reflection of his-
Pfeiffer 2000; Oswalt 2004) has meant that large parts torical rather than contemporary processes and patterns
of these long-established urban areas now have very low of urbanization. The amorphous nature of postmodern
population densities. urbanization has led some to question whether edge cities
The task of drawing boundaries around cities, sug- and associated settlement forms should be thought of as
gesting a neat separation from rural areas beyond, is cities at all (Pile 1999: 30). This neatly returns us to the dif-
further complicated by the ambiguous nature of the ficult sociological questions of the urban discussed above.
rural–urban fringe or peri-urban zone. Here is a zone While acknowledging that it is difficult to define
where rural and urban functions intermingle and where exactly what and where is urban, it should not be
often substantial components of the hidden infrastruc- assumed from this that urban questions are unimpor-
ture of the city, such as sewage works, power plants and tant. ‘Cityness’, namely the density, not only of people
server farms, along with major transport and distribution but also of institutions and built forms (Pile 1999), and
functions such as airports and motorways sit in otherwise the intense heterogeneity and juxtapositions of cities,
rural surroundings. Many rapidly growing cities in the clearly matter (Amin and Thrift 2002: 2). The nature
Global South have extensive peri-urban areas containing and quality of urban life are different in different places
a mosaic of urban and rural-agricultural land uses and and this is influenced in large part by the surroundings
activities, these zones providing a home for many of the within which urban lives are lived. Living in a suburb of
new migrants to these cities (Simon 2008). Commenta- a small European town, for example, is very different to
tors have long argued over whether these zones should living in the heart of Tokyo. While we should not fall
be more accurately defined as rural, urban, transitional into the trap of fetishising the city, of attaching unique-
zones, or as something altogether quite different and dis- ness and causality to its qualities, we should not dismiss
tinct (Gallent 2006; Gallent and Anderson 2007). A walk the differences within and across the urban world. Indeed
around these areas soon demolishes the impression that geography is all about acknowledging these differences
there is a neat break between urban and rural. and this has emerged as a key aspect of recent theoretical
While the landscapes of the rural–urban fringes of debates in urban geography. Differences in the nature of
many cities are regarded as somewhat prosaic outcomes places matter and have effects on the creative possibilities
of urbanization, the edges of some, particularly Ameri- open to urban dwellers (Florida 2002) and to the fears and
can, cities are regarded as more spectacular manifesta- problems they face (Valentine 1989; Patel 2000; Hayward
tions of these processes. The processes operating here 2004; Aas 2007).
and their outcomes reveal the inability of a relatively
static administrative framework to contain the dynamic
and unruly processes of late capitalist urbanization. Edge
cities, as they are generally referred to, are settlements 9.2 Multiple geographies of the
that contain many of the traditional functions of cities urban world
but which have grown rapidly through private develop-
ment during the last 30 years. They owe their name to
their location on the edges of, or at times beyond, exist-
9.2.1 Global patterns of urbanization
ing cities. They seem to be producing new geographies Current trends in urbanization are changing the macro-
of the urban world, prompting some commentators to geographies of the urban world. By macro-geographies
suggest that they represent a new postmodern phase of we mean broad patterns in the distribution of the global
urban history very different from that of the nineteenth urban population (see Pacione 2009: Chapter 5). The
and twentieth centuries (Dear and Flusty 1998; Soja 1989, extent to which different regions of the world are urban-
1996, 2000; Dear 2000). We look at some of these new ized varies hugely. This is a long-standing historical fea-
geographies of the urban world in the following section. ture in which, generally, levels of urbanization correlate
Edge cities, though, can be thought of as alternatives to with those of economic development. The most highly
the city rather than extensions to it, as in the case of sub- urbanized nations, then, have tended to be the most
urbs which constitute the archetypal landscape of earlier economically developed. Consequently, until the mid

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 Chapter 9  Cities: urban worlds    193

twentieth century, significant urban development was reflection of broad trends in national or international eco-
largely concentrated in Europe, North America and Latin nomics. For some cities, however, there are signs that the
America. However, since then, urban growth in these process of decline might be more terminal. These include
regions has been slow with only modest growth in the manufacturing cities in the north-eastern United States,
proportion of their populations living in towns and cities. such as Detroit, and many in Eastern and Central Europe.
In addition, within these regions there has been uneven Here an almost total reliance on industries that have now
growth by city size, with the largest growth occurring declined or relocated globally, a failure to stimulate sig-
in smaller urban areas. This reflects the changing eco- nificant economic growth in Eastern Europe since 1989,
nomic geographies of key sectors in these regions and the and stark inequalities within the deeply racially divided
choices of mature urban populations for suburban living populations of the North American rustbelt, appear to
and relocation to smaller urban areas and the countryside be keys in understanding the problem.
(Champion 1999). The most significant growth in the urban world in the
The fate of large cities in these regions has been last 30 years has taken place in those regions with tra-
mixed. A small number of global or major capital cities, ditionally low percentages of urban populations, namely
such as London, Paris and New York, have maintained Africa and Asia. Asia has witnessed particularly rapid
their position or grown in population and influence dur- urban growth during this period, headed by China and
ing this period. This has occurred mainly on the back of India, something that is predicted to continue into the
the growth of their financial sectors and their primacy foreseeable future. Despite both continents experiencing
within international, national and regional economic significant urban growth, the nature of growth in Africa
systems (Short 2004; Kim 2008). These cities have not and Asia has been quite different. While China, for exam-
been without their problems though. Many have seen ple, has seen growth in its urban populations concentrated
significant shrinkage in their manufacturing sectors cou- largely in major urban centres, Africa’s has predominantly
pled with problems related to their failure to adequately taken place in small and intermediate cities. Yet, concerns
accommodate, manage and plan for large immigrant have been raised about the volatility and longer-term
populations (Sandercock 1998, 2003; Saunders 2010). ­sustainability of much of this rapid urban growth. In
The problems of Paris’ North African immigrant popula- China, a number of under-occupied ‘ghost cities’ have
tions that culminated in civil disturbances in a number of emerged fuelled by unstable economic conditions and
suburban banlieues typify this (Wacquant 2007). Whereas volatility in local property markets (see Case study 9.1).
bald population statistics suggest overall buoyancy in These broad changes in the macro-geographies of the
these cities there has been widespread redrawing of their urban world are captured clearly in shifts in the number
internal social geographies and this has not been without and location of the world’s mega-cities (cities with more
cost (see Chapter 10). than 10 million inhabitants) (Figure 9.1). The United
Second-tier, regional cities, particularly those with a Nations predicts that the number of these cities will
large manufacturing economy, have tended to struggle in increase to 41 in 2030 and that the majority of them will
the latter half of the twentieth century. While this is the be located outside the developed world. The rapid recent
result of a general global shift of manufacturing away urban growth and its concentration in large settlements
from its traditional heartlands (see Chapter 14) the out-
comes of this are mediated locally. Since the 1950s many
of these cities have suffered significant population loss
as their manufacturing economies have contracted. Liv-
erpool, in the north-west of England, for example, lost
an average of 10,000 people per year during the 1970s.
Attempts to regenerate many cities of this type through
ambitious property-led, city centre developments seemed
to be stemming this decline as, by the late 1990s, many
cities such as Liverpool, which had experienced long-term
decline, were seeing their populations stabilize and even
in some cases grow slightly. These optimistic signs have
been tempered somewhat in recent years, however, as the
global recession has impacted on the financial, business,
travel and property sectors around which these urban
renaissances have typically been constructed (Martin Plate 9.1  Kangbashi. China’s ‘Ghost city’.
2010). The fortunes of many of these cities seem to be a (Mark Ralston/AFP/Getty Images)

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 194    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

Case study 9.1

China’s ‘Ghost City’ of basic conveniences has discouraged households

from relocating. Second, many native Ordos residents
The rapid pace of urbanization in China has been a key have purchased homes in Kangbashi primarily as
feature of global urbanization trends in the early twenty- second homes or investment properties. This fuelled
first century. In 1990, 26 per cent of people in China lived a vibrant speculative real estate market between 2006
in cities; in 2014 this was 54 per cent and is expected to and 2011, with high prices stimulating further building
rise to 76 per cent by 2050. Presently, 16 of the world’s 71 but constraining residential settlement. More recently
urban agglomerations containing over 5 million people the development of the new city has slowed with the
are in China (United Nations 2014d). However, for all the bursting of the local credit and real estate bubble in
spectacular urban growth of major cities such as ­Beijing, 2011, linked to a fall in coal prices related to the wider
Shanghai and Shenzhen other cities in China have expe- slow-down in China’s economic growth rate. The
rienced more mixed fortunes, with new urban develop- resulting proliferation of unoccupied residential and
ment plans falling foul of overheated property market commercial buildings in the new city, many abandoned
speculation and a slow-down in economic growth. This mid-construction, has captured media attention around
has spawned the curious presence of a number of over- the world and led to its labelling as China’s largest
built and under-populated ‘ghost cities’, where new urban ‘ghost city’. Commentators have subsequently seized
development lies empty awaiting the arrival of people. on Ordos as a metaphor for the arrogance and reck-
Perhaps the most well known of these is the new city lessness of China’s rampant urbanization.
development of Kangbashi, in the Ordos District of Inner It is clear that the pace and scale of urban growth
Mongolia. Traditionally a sparsely populated poor rural during the boom years was unsustainable, and the key
region, the Ordos District has boomed economically in concerns now are dealing with the accumulation of
recent years as a result of the exploitation of its coal vacant property and continuing to attract people, mainly
reserves. This resource boom and its resulting wealth local famers, to relocate to Kangbashi. However, here
provided the impetus for the local leadership to embark challenges remain. Simply pushing unskilled farmers into
on an ambitious urbanization plan with the goal of build- urban labour has not translated into disposable incomes
ing a ‘one million person metropolis’. The plan was to high enough to maintain a life in the city for many as gov-
develop an urban district with a new city, Kangbashi, ernment compensation packages have been reduced.
linked to the old urban core of Dongsheng. When devel- Educating the farmers is now a key goal for the Ordos
opment of Kangbashi began in 2004, Ordos seemed government, ensuring new residents have the skills nec-
set to become a spectacular jewel in China’s crown of essary to obtain jobs and live a purposeful urban life.
city states. Kangbashi’s role was to be the administra- The situation in Ordos has informed broader debates
tive, cultural and economic centre of the municipality, on urban development in China. It can be seen as a
with a full range of urban functions, infrastructure, and ‘test run’ for the Chinese government’s plans to urban-
abundant cultural and leisure amenities. The scale of the ize the rural interior of the country over the next two
development has been huge, with large squares, wide decades. In 2014, the Chinese government released
roads and the building of an immense square footage of the ‘National New-Type Urbanization Plan’, which
municipal and residential buildings, with dozens of high- announced the intention to increase the proportion of
rise apartment towers and hotels. The new city is also the nation’s population living in cities to 60 per cent by
packed with monuments and cultural references that 2020, which would mean bringing 100 million new resi-
evoke the Mongolian heritage of the area. Images of the dents to cities. The proliferation of similar failed projects
city’s spectacular architectural excesses have captured in cities around China has raised questions about this
the imagination of the outside world. model of urban development and how to temper exces-
To boost settlement in the new city the municipal sive speculative development in real estate and balance
government moved its administrative offices, key medi- housing supply and demand. The longer-term success
cal facilities and top-ranking schools to Kangbashi. of Kangbashi is far from certain, and in the meantime
However, despite this the pace of settlement has been it has become something of a tourist spectacle and a
slow, due to a number of overlapping causes. First, curiosity for urban scholars around the world.
despite incentives, commercial businesses have been
Sources: The Land of Many Palaces (2015), dir. Smith, A.J. and Song.
slow to open up, citing lack of customers, and this lack T. [film], Pulan Films; United Nations (2014d); Woodward (2015)

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 Chapter 9  Cities: urban worlds    195

2014 2030
Population Population
(thousands) (thousands)

1 Tokyo 37,833 1= Tokyo 37,190

2 Delhi 24,953 2= Delhi 36,060
3 Shanghai 22,991 3= Shanghai 30,751
4 Mexico City 20,843 4 ▲ Mumbai 27,797
5 Sao Paulo 20,831 5 ▲ Beijing 27,706
6 Mumbai 20,741 6 ▲ Dhaka 27,374
7 Kinki MMA (Osaka) 20,123 7 ▲ Karachi 24,838
8 Beijing 19,520 8 ▲ Cairo 24,502
9 New York-Newark 18,591 9 ▲ Lagos 24,239
10 Cairo 18,419 10 ▼ Mexico City 23,865
11 Dhaka 16,982 11 ▼ Sao Paulo 23,444
12 Karachi 16,126 12 ▲ Kinshasa 19,996
13 Buenos Aries 15,024 13 ▼ Kinki MMA (Osaka) 19,976
14 Kolkata 14,766 14 ▼ New York-Newark 19,885
15 Istanbul 13,954 15 ▼ Kolkata 19,092
16 Chongquig 12,916 16 ▲ Guangzhou, Guangdong 17,574
17 Rio de Janeiro 12,825 17 ▼ Chongquig 17,380
18 Manila 12,764 18 ▼ Buenos Aries 16,956
19 Lagos 12,614 19 ▼ Manila 16,756
20 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana 12,308 20 ▼ Istanbul 16,694
21 Moscow 12,063 21 Bangalore 14,762
22 Guangzhou, Guangdong 11,843 22 ▲ Tianjin 14,655
23 Kinshasa 11,116 23 ▼ Rio de Janeiro 14,174
24 Tianjin 10,860 24 Chennai 13,921
25 Paris 10,764 25 ▲ Jakarta 13,812
26 Shenzhen 10,680 26 ▼ Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana 13,257
27 London 10,189 27 Lahore 13,257
28 Jakarta 10,176 28 Hyderabad 12,774
29 ▼ Shenzhen 12,673
30 Lima 12,221
31 ▼ Moscow 12,200
32 Bogota 11,915
33 ▼ Paris 11,803
34 Johannesburg 11,537
35 Bangkok 11,528
36 ▼ London 11,467
37 Dar es Salaam 10,760
38 Ahmadabad 10,527
39 Luanda 10,429
40 Ho Chi Minh City 10,200
41 Chengdu 10,104

New megacities

Figure 9.1  Mega-cities, cities with more than 10 million inhabitants, 2014 and 2030.

are particularly apparent here. Cities from this region are in the distribution of the world’s most powerful cities?
predicted increasingly to dominate the mega-city league The issue of power highlights the importance of connec-
table, whereas longer-standing mega-cities in the West tivity in the contemporary urban world.
and Latin America, such as New York–Newark and Mex-
ico City, will slip down the rankings. A key issue related
to this that has attracted the attention of urban analysts
9.2.2 Global urban connectivity
has been that of power in the urban world. Namely, does It is perhaps not surprising that in a global age the issue
this changing geography of mega-cities represent a shift of connectivity has gained significance within the analysis

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 196    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

of cities. Connectivity simply refers to the connections financial and producer service offices, air travel, finan-
that exist between places, although in actuality the nature cial flows and electronic communications data to map the
of these connections is often highly complex. Commonly networks and connections that flow between the world’s
places are connected through the movement of goods, cities. Using these methods it is possible to rank cities
people, information, ideas and money. The current age according to their connectivity and apparent influence
is often represented as one of connection and cities act within the global economy.
as vital hubs in global or regional networks of various Using these measures, it is possible, for example, for
kinds. Connectivity between cities is not a characteristic some relatively large cities to be poorly connected, and
of the recent past. Networks of trade, politics, empire hence marginal, in the current age despite their size.
and travel, for example, are observable back to ancient John Rennie Short (2004; see also Hubbard 2006: 180)
history. However, recent technological changes that have cites cities such as Teheran (Iran), Dhaka (Banglagesh),
led to the development of truly global communications Chongqing (China) and Khartoum (Sudan) as examples
systems have wrought both qualitative and quantita- of such cities. Dhaka was actually the eleventh largest
tive discontinuities in the nature of these networks. The city in the world in 2014 with a population of 16,982,000
speed, capacity, intensity, quantity and quality of the con- and is estimated to become the world’s sixth largest city
nections between cities has grown significantly since the by 2030 (United Nations 2014d). However, despite this
1980s (Harvey 1989; Dodge and Kitchen 2000; Hubbard it is relatively little connected into global financial net-
2006). While not dismissing the importance of historical works, nor is it a major global trade hub or centre of
connections and networks stretching around the world global media networks, except those serving the Bangla-
(see Sheppard 2002) the ubiquity and intensity of con- deshi diaspora. In all the attempts to quantify the sig-
nection in the current age is unparalleled. Social scientists nificance and levels of connectivity of the world’s major
have been quick to pick up on the significance of this. For cities (see Sassen 1994; Smith and Timberlake 1995;
example, they have adopted various forms of network or Taylor 2004; Derudder and Wilcox 2005) it occupies a
relational approach (Dicken et al. 2001; Sheppard 2002; very lowly position, if it is present at all. This relational
Bosco 2006; Murdoch 2006) that have sought to prob- analysis provides a glimpse of the nature, distribution
lematize the sedentary tendencies of much traditional and operation of power in a global age. However, it has
social theory. Both have been influential in reshaping drawn some criticism for its focus on data that reflect the
urban geography in recent years (see Spotlight box 9.1). processes of Western economic globalization, thus ignor-
The example of London in Spotlight box 9.1 reminds ing other potentially important dimensions of contem-
us that, if the contemporary world is a networked one, porary globalization (Short et al. 1996; Robinson 2006).
then the major nodes in these networks are cities. It is Hierarchies of global cities of culture, religion or politics,
here that all major networks coalesce, be they networks for example, might look quite different from those eco-
of travel and migration, trade, communication, finance nomic rankings that have prevailed in analysis to date.
or politics. These networks do not coalesce evenly across This is not to dismiss the importance of this global cities
the urban world, however. Inevitably there is a geogra- research, rather, to argue that it represents only one take
phy to these networks within which some cities are sig- on globalization, albeit arguably the most significant,
nificantly more important nodes than others. It is here amongst many.
that an important relationship between connectivity and
power begins to emerge that destabilizes earlier notions
of power associated with cities that were, in large part,
9.2.3 The internal structure of cities
related to the size of those cities. For many years it has The trajectories of urban development vary a great deal
been taken for granted that the largest cities were the most around the globe. They reflect the particular combina-
important. The relational view of cities, though, raises tions of local and general factors that come together in
some questions about the validity of this assumption. different times and at different places. Consequently the
Rather than simply reading off the power or importance internal worlds of cities are similarly complex and hetero-
of cities as some function of population size it is now geneous. Despite this, geographers have expended a great
clear that a more accurate and relevant analysis of power deal of effort attempting to find patterns and regularities
in a connected age takes account of the nature and extent within this complexity and devise models of the inter-
of the connections flowing in and out of cities. Attempts nal structure of cities. Some of the most influential work
to quantify the significance and connectivity of cities in in the subject is reflective of this tradition within urban
the current age have been a major focus of global cities geography (see Burgess et al. 1925; Hoyt 1939; Harris
research since the mid-1990s. Analysts have employed a and Ullman 1945; Shevky and Bell 1955; Mann 1965; Soja
variety of sources of data including the distribution of 1989, 1996, 2000; Dear and Flusty 1998; Dear 2000). Work

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 Chapter 9  Cities: urban worlds    197

Spotlight box 9.1

Relational approaches and global cities it will take a lot to displace the A–Z or concentric circle
image of London by a relational map that incorporates
Relational approaches have encouraged scholars of the network of sites around the world that pump fresh
the city not to regard cities as bounded, isolated entities. food into a distribution centre called Covent Garden,
Rather they have viewed cities as nodes within a variety that draws neighbourhood boundaries around settle-
of networks, many of which are global in their extent. ments in postcolonial countries with which social and
When thinking about the hinterland of cities, for example, kinship ties remain strong, that makes us see sites
relational approaches have not referred to the contiguous such as Heathrow airport or Kings Cross station as
spaces surrounding cities, as was the case in the earlier radiations of trails shooting out across the land and far
models of Christaller and von Thünen. Rather they have beyond.
argued that cities’ hinterlands potentially encompass (Amin 2004: 34; cited in Hubbard 2006: 204)
spaces that are spatially distant but which are nonethe-
less closely bound together within networks. This has led While many, if not most, cities have hinterlands that
some to question the assumption that we can identify a are potentially global in their extent, there are significant
small subset of ‘global’ cities – cities such as New York, differences between the specific connections that flow
London and Tokyo commonly painted as the control cen- in and out of different cities and hence in the nature of
tres of the global economy – and to argue that all cities these hinterlands. This reminds us that it is important not
are global to a greater or lesser extent (Taylor 2004). to be seduced by the global rhetoric that infuses much of
London may be a more significant node within global net- this discourse. It is the materiality of the city, the internal
works than cities such as Gloucester (England), Oaxaca mixes of people, firms and institutions and the interac-
(Mexico) or Hobart (Australia), but these cities are cer- tions that take place within cities that affect the ways in
tainly not, somehow, ‘non-global’ (Hubbard 2006: 185). which cities articulate with the outside world (and visa-
Relational approaches represent a fundamental versa of course) (Thrift 1996). The internal worlds of
rethinking of prevailing conceptions of space. They different cities are highly diverse and it is important to
potentially profoundly affect the ways in which we con- appreciate that this is a component of, and a context
ceive of cities. Ash Amin discusses this in the context of within which, the geographies of global networks are
the representation of London in maps: formed.

exploring the internal structure of cities has tended to be and the religious and cultural beliefs of societies. Later
characterized by a focus on either the physical morphol- the emergence of mercantile and subsequently indus-
ogy of cities, their buildings, streets and spaces, or the trial capitalism and processes of colonization became
complex and dynamic economic and social geographies both determining influences on the evolving structures
that overlie this morphology and that are both reflective of cities and systems through which ideas about urban
of it and active in its transformation. The two-way rela- form were transmitted around the world. More recently
tionship between the city’s physical form and its social many commentators have argued that globalization and
and economic geographies is one key to understanding post-industrial or postmodern capitalism has become the
the nature of cities’ internal worlds. The focus is on the dominant influence on urban form across the globe. Some
former here but with a cautionary note not to attribute have argued that this most recent phase is one of global
to it too great a deterministic quality. urban convergence where difference between the inter-
While a variety of processes have shaped the geog- nal worlds of cities is being reduced (Plate 9.2), although
raphies of cities it is possible to recognize some broad other authors have recorded evidence of diversity as well
historical and geographical distinctions within which as similarity within postmodern cities (Poulsen et al.
certain processes have been dominant. The very earli- 2002). These forces, certainly since the medieval period,
est cities that appeared in places such as Mesopotamia have also been mediated through the state, which has
between 5000–6000 BP and later the Indus Valley, Egypt, demonstrated differing degrees of centralization his-
China and the Mediterranean tended to reflect a com- torically and geographically. For example, the cities of
bination of local physical and environmental conditions communist Eastern Europe and China demonstrated a

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 198    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

conditions of postmodern globalization that are distinc-

tively different from those produced under industrial
capitalism has been the subject of considerable debate
(Harvey 1989). Similarly, too ready a recourse to models
of urban form carries with it the risk of masking a patina
of local distinctiveness in the internal worlds of cities.
It is important to remember that, eye-catching as the
epochal processes of urbanization may be, their imprint
on cities is always uneven and their effects are mediated
locally. Some cities, perhaps smaller cities in particular
(Bell and Jayne 2006), might be relatively lightly touched
by these processes while elsewhere processes of contem-
porary urbanization might be transforming the archi-
tectural landscape of cities while leaving the underlying
structure or plan relatively unaffected. Cities’ internal
worlds, then, are often palimpsests within which it is pos-
sible to discern many phases of partial urban transforma-
tions. The universalizing tendencies within urban theory
and its masking or disregard of urban cosmopolitanism
has recently been the subject of some significant critiques
(Hubbard 2006; Robinson 2006).

9.2.4 Postmodern urbanization

The main process of contemporary urbanization that
has caught the attention of urban theorists is that of
postmodern urbanization. Some have argued that we are
witnessing a new phase of postmodern urbanization that
Plate 9.2  Global urban convergence? Auckland,
is producing cities that are distinctly different in their
New Zealand.
form and their social and economic characteristics from
(Mike Deaton)
earlier waves of urban development. This claim actually
rests on empirical investigation of only a small number
distinctive ‘camel-back’ urban form, with a high-density of cities, of which Los Angeles has assumed a primacy
centre surrounded respectively by low-density industrial (Plate 9.3). A key motif of postmodern urbanization is
and high-density residential zones, a form resulting from an apparent fragmentation of both urban form and the
centralist state-control of land markets and planning and social and economic geographies of the city. The post-
not seen in cities of the capitalist world (Pacione 2009: modern city is said to demonstrate a chaotic urban form
184). Further, observable differences between the forms characterized by the juxtaposition of spectacular ‘frag-
of British and American cities during the twentieth cen- ments’ of commercial and residential development and
tury were attributed largely to the history of UK gov- redevelopment set within extensive areas of environmen-
ernment state intervention in the housing market (Mann tally and economically degraded and ethnically segre-
1965; Ward 2004). gated space (Soja 1989, 1996, 2000; Davis 1990; Dear and
Broad categorizations such as these, or typologies that Flusty 1998; Dear 2000). These urban geographies, it has
suggest distinctive epochs or categories either in the evo- been argued, reflect profound changes in the processes
lution of urban form or in types of cities, are undoubt- that shape cities and their urban landscapes. Rather than
edly helpful in that they begin to work through the the relatively stable phase of industrial capitalism, medi-
complexity and variety of cities. However, they do carry ated by an engaged but not centralized planning system
with them the risk of overemphasizing either the perva- in much of the global North during the twentieth cen-
siveness of processes such as postmodern urbanization, tury, we now have a phase of chaotic capitalism and more
or the distinctiveness of urban epochs. For example, the emasculated planning systems driven primarily by eco-
extent to which it can be said we are currently witness- nomic rather than social imperatives (Hall and Hubbard
ing a new phase of urbanization producing cities under 1996, 1998).

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 Chapter 9  Cities: urban worlds    199

Some of the most detailed explorations of the land-

scapes of the postmodern city include Mike Davis’s and
Ed Soja’s readings of Los Angeles, a city constructed
within urban theory as the archetypal postmodern
metropolis (Davis 1995; Scott and Soja 1996). Soja has
highlighted a number of economic, social and cultural
processes that have underpinned Los Angeles’ develop-
ment. Economically he cites the growing significance of
new sectors such as producer services, high-technology,
cultural entertainment and knowledge-based industries,
each of which show distinctive clustering patterns around
which new urban forms have emerged. These develop-
ments have disrupted the more mono-centric, regular
patterns of urban form characteristic of industrial capi-
talism. Los Angeles is characterized by a number of edge Plate 9.3  Los Angeles, constructed as the archetype
city, or post-suburban, developments, such as those spread of postmodern urbanization.
across Orange County, which have emerged around these (Tim Hall)
and other new or growing economic sectors. In addition
the global connectivity of cities discussed above has seen
of future urbanization? Although scholars have traced
Los Angeles’ functions as a key hub, particularly with
the imprint of postmodernity across urban landscapes
links to the Pacific region, underpin growth through an
and forms well beyond Los Angeles (Watson and Gib-
influx of global capital to the city.
son 1995; Poulsen et al. 2002), there has yet to emerge
Socially Los Angeles has been characterized by height-
ened levels of, particularly ethnic, segregation and polari-
zation and increasing levels of tension and unrest across
its culturally and economically diverse landscapes. Per-
ceptions of Los Angeles as a dystopian realm, while a
staple of films such as Bladerunner (1982), Falling Down
(1993), Escape from LA (1996) and Lakeview Terrace
(2008), appear to reflect widely held views of the city by
its residents. Increasingly, residential, leisure and com-
mercial landscapes are characterized by ‘paranoid’ or
‘carceral’ architecture based on protection, surveillance
and the exclusion of perceived threats (Plate 9.4). Evi-
dence would suggest that, rather than making residents
feel safer, such ‘fortress landscapes’ merely exacerbate
levels of segregation between communities and, because
they preclude the possibility of cross-cultural mixture and
dialogue, heighten perceptions of threat associated with
unknown or demonized urban populations (Sandercock
2006). A counterpoint to this dystopianism, and perhaps
a response to it, has been the pervasiveness of fantasy and
simulation throughout the city’s landscape. Originally
deriving from the fantasy worlds of expositions, world’s
fairs and theme parks such as Disneyland (Ley and Olds
1999), they now permeate the city more widely and are
found in examples such as themed shopping malls and
residential districts (Crawford 2004).
While Los Angeles offers a convincing narrative of
postmodern urban development, the question remains, Plate 9.4  Sign warning of private security force in
as with all urban models, to what extent does this one the residential neighborhood of Venice Los Angeles.
case represent a more widespread process or a harbinger (Tim Hall)

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 200    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

a consensus around the extent to which it represents an wider, with both social and public health implications,
epochal break in the history of urbanization. Tracing for example. Levels of poverty and inequality are both an
its imprint across the urban world remains an ongoing issue within cities and between cities and are fundamental
project for urban geographers. Certainly though, the to many of the problems that they experience.
discourse of a uniform postmodernism as an inevitable There are huge global disparities in the equality of
form and type for cities around the world would appear income distribution between countries. While the aver-
to be an oversimplification. There is evidence, for exam- age income of the top 20  per cent in Sierra Leone is
ple, of significant differences, as well as similarities, roughly 58 times greater than that of the bottom 20 per
between postmodern cities (Poulsen et al. 2002), while cent, in Slovakia this figure is only around four times
the interactions of postmodernism with post-colonial greater (UN Development Programme 2009). Cities tend
urbanization across the global South are as likely to lead to reflect these national and regional patterns of wealth
to complex patterns of locally mediated outcomes as and development but it tends to be within cities that the
they are to the emergence of a uniform global postmod- juxtapositions of wealth and poverty are at their most
ern ‘blandscape’. intense and visible. The effects of this inequality are
compounded by the failure of governments in countries
within which it is at its greatest to intervene effectively
and to support their poorest residents. Put simply, where
9.3 Contemporary urban issues the wealthiest in a country command so much of the
money available there is neither sufficient left over to
The definition and identification of contemporary urban support the poorest, nor often the political will, given
issues varies with scale. The example, mentioned at the the connections that frequently exist between the eco-
start of this chapter, of the issues highlighted by a local nomic and political elites. This inequality, and the pro-
newspaper within a single city, points to a range of issues cesses that underpin it, produce fractured cities that are
that are primarily reflective of the local urban context. very difficult to plan and manage in any meaningful way.
However, the specific minutiae of these issues should not They are not good cities.
distract us from the fact that they are also reflective of Manifestations of urban poverty and inequality dif-
more broadly conceived urban concerns. Examples of fer in the cities of the global North and South. In the
minor incidents of anti-social behaviour are constitu- global South the most archetypal landscapes of poverty
tive of broader issues of crime, safety and conflict within are the, often extensive and now long-standing, informal
the city (Valentine 2001). This in turn might speak of settlements (shanty towns or favelas) that ring many cit-
the relationships between different groups of people, for ies (Potter and Lloyd-Evans 1998; Davis 2006). These are
example, distinguished on the basis of age, ethnicity or a product of the high levels of rural to urban migration
lifestyle. The problems caused by seagulls in the city cen- and rapid urbanization in these regions and the inability
tre, for example, speak to broader concerns about the of formal housing channels to provide enough affordable
relationships between society and nature, the human and housing for rapidly urbanizing and largely impoverished
the non-human, in cities (Wolch 2002; Hinchcliffe 2007) populations. The provision of basic services such as clean
and perhaps of cities and sustainability. It is to these water and sanitation are often impossible in these set-
broadly conceived contemporary urban issues that we tings. While these are typically portrayed through refer-
now turn. Although different authors might highlight dif- ence to poverty and exclusion, some have seen them as
ferent sets of concerns, we wish to highlight three press- sites of hope that provide self-help solutions or alterna-
ing issues facing the urban world in the early twenty-first tive futures where the state, the market and international
century. These are issues of global urban poverty and development policy are not able to provide adequate
inequality, cultural diversity within cities, and the rela- housing (Keivani and Werna 2001). The modernization
tionship between cities and sustainability. of some cities such as Dubai has created huge visual con-
trasts within their landscapes between the monuments to
9.3.1 Urban poverty and inequality modernization that have been constructed recently and
the camps of the construction workers employed to build
There is nothing inherently urban about poverty and ine- them (Plate 9.5). The persistence of poverty within many
quality (see Chapter 10). However, the urban world is the countries of the global South, alongside the embrace of
context within which they are seen at their most intense modernization, has produced cities in places such as India
and perhaps intractable. While poverty here is understood whose landscapes, and economic and social geographies
primarily as an economic phenomenon reflecting levels of can be read as manifestations of ongoing inequality in
wealth, development and income its impacts are much these countries (see also Case Study 9.1).

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 Chapter 9  Cities: urban worlds    201

precarious employment and restricted mobility. Cer-

tainly the majority would resist having the underclass
tag attached to describe themselves and their experiences.
However they may be manifest, poverty and inequality
remain some of the most significant and long-standing
urban issues. Indeed, many commentators argue that
poverty and inequality are increasing as a result of the
adoption of a range of neoliberal urban policies in cit-
ies around the world (Cochrane 2007), which have seen
reductions in state support for local populations in the
form of cuts to welfare services, and which it is argued
have intensified following the Wall Street Crash of 2008
as part of a politics of ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck 2012).

9.3.2 Cultural diversity in cities

The sociologist Sharon Zukin has argued that urban
‘publics have become more mobile and diverse’ (Zukin
1995: 3). This has resulted in increasing levels of cultural
diversity becoming a defining characteristic of contempo-
Plate 9.5  Landscapes of urban inequality. High rise rary cities. Leonie Sandercock coined the phrase ‘mongrel
developments and construction worker in Dubai, UAE. cities’ to describe cities in which ‘difference, otherness,
(Laborant/Shutterstock) multiplicity, heterogeneity, diversity and plurality prevail’
(2006: 38). This brings with it the potential for innova-
tion, mixing, intercultural dialogue and the emergence
In the global North, postmodern urbanization has of new, hybrid cultural forms. However, it can also pose
been interpreted by many as an urbanization of inequal- challenges and give rise to more negative outcomes.
ity. The commentaries on Los Angeles discussed above, Sandercock’s work starts from the premise that mongrel
for example, all highlight the juxtapositions of spectac- cities are an undeniable reality and that it is an obliga-
ular wealth and grinding poverty found within it. Ine- tion of both the city-building professionals and citizens
quality lies at the heart of the fear that has been said to to respond to the challenges those cities present.
permeate residents of postmodern cities which has seen Many myths and images of multicultural cities are pro-
them retreat behind gated communities and appar- moted through the marketing campaigns of cities keen to
ently become so reliant on other fortress landscapes. Of stress the contributions of different groups to their public
widespread concern within debates about contemporary cultures. By contrast, Richard Sennett (1994) has argued
urbanism has been the apparent emergence of an interna- that mongrel cities tend to lack civic culture (Plate 9.6).
tional urban underclass, not only in postmodern cities He argues that these cities are overwhelmingly character-
but also those associated with high levels of immigra- ized by tolerance, rather than hostility, between different
tion and deindustrialization, who have become cut off cultural groups. However, this is a tolerance characterized
from routes into the formal economy and who have as by indifference towards other cultural groups rather than
a consequence turned to precarious informal and illegal an active engagement with diversity. It constitutes a form
economies, most notably drug dealing, as rational-choice of indifference across which very little inter-cultural dia-
alternatives. The appeal to such evocative labels, which logue takes place and a form of stasis in which cultural
bear the weight of hundreds of years of demonizing the groups are predominantly inward looking. The result is
urban poor, carries with it the danger of universalizing that little common ground emerges between groups, few
conditions that might be particular to only some cities. meaningful cross-cultural institutions develop and little
While groups whose poverty is long-standing and whose cross-cultural political capacity emerges through which
ties to the formal economy have been effectively sev- cities can be shaped in desirable ways. The challenge of
ered do exist, their experience is not typical of all of the cultural diversity in cities, then, is how to develop this
urban poor. Poverty for the majority in the global North missing engagement and solidarity between different
is much more mundane than evocations of the underclass cultural groups (Calhoun 2002: 108; cited in Sandercock
would suggest, and involves struggles to make ends meet 2006: 39). Sandercock, drawing on the work of Sennett,
and struggles over inadequate housing, healthy food, argues that this involves ‘the challenge of living together

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 202    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

Plate 9.6  Mongrel cities:

The Dominican Day Parade
New York City August 2010.
Whilst parades like this affirm
the cultural diversity of the
contemporary city, they do so
primarily through celebrations
of national identity rather than
through inter-cultural dialogue.
(Tim Hall)

not simply in tolerant indifference to each other, but in which cultural differences can be bridged around a recog-
active engagement’ (Sandercock 2006: 40). nition of shared interests, presences and common goals.
Leonie Sandercock, in reviewing the work of social Whilst keen not to idealize these micro-publics, Amin
theorists in this area, highlights the contributions of recognizes that inter-cultural dialogues will not just hap-
the geographer Ash Amin in seeking to explore routes pen in these spaces. Indeed within many existing micro-
to more convivial futures for mongrel cities (2002). publics such dialogues are not typical. Rather these
Amin is particularly critical of several popular policy potentials are something that often need to be shaped
approaches to developing multiculturalism. Many of and fostered. It is easy to be sceptical of the potentials
these are design-led and revolve around the supposed of micro-publics in this regard. Multiculturalism is not
potentials of the public realm as a resource, shared necessarily a characteristic of many sports clubs, for
between cultural groups, through which, with appro- example. It is common in many cities globally to see
priate design, inter-cultural encounter can be fostered sport organized formally or informally, to some extent,
(Rogers 1999). Sandercock though, drawing on Amin’s along ethnic and national lines, as with the case of soccer
findings, offers a sceptical assessment of the utopian associations for Latin Americans in US cities (Hamilton
potentials of public space. and Chincilla 2001: 169) and Asian cricket teams and
leagues running in parallel to the official league structure
The depressing reality, Amin counters, is that far from in British cities such as London and Birmingham (Dutta
being spaces where diversity is being negotiated, these 2014). This is not to say that there is no integration of
spaces tend either to be territorialized by particular these communities within mainstream leagues and teams,
groups (whites, youths, skateboarders, Asian families) rather that they are formed as a result of perceptions by
or they are spaces of transit, with very little contact some players of exclusion from mainstream clubs, along
between strangers. with the costs of membership. They may also serve as
(Sandercock 2006: 44) ways of fostering social contact and cultural and national
solidarity amongst members. However, given the failure
Rather than pursuing conventional design-led policies, of conventional policy routes towards multiculturalism
Amin argued for an alternative focus on the potentials of these settings offer potential alternatives through which
‘micro-publics’, spaces such as workplaces, schools, com- to incubate future policy. It would be naïve, though, to
munity centres and sports clubs that provide contexts in pretend that they are any more immune to the politics
which inter-cultural dialogues, although often mundane of indifference, hostility and nationalism than any of the
or ‘prosaic negotiations’ (Sandercock 2006: 44), can take city’s other spaces and settings. The challenge, then, is
place. Micro-publics, Amin argues, offer contexts within both how desirable dialogues and encounters might be

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 Chapter 9  Cities: urban worlds    203

fostered within these micro-publics, and how they might encompassed many dimensions including consumption
feed into macro-public civic and political movements patterns and resource use amongst urban populations
shaping more convivial futures in mongrel cities. (Rees and Wackernagel 2008), sustainable urban size and
form (Breheny 1995), the roles of neighbourhoods and
green spaces in promoting sustainable development (Car-
9.3.3 Cities, sustainability and resilience ley 1999; Chiesura 2003), transport and mobility (Hall
The ecological crises of the current age are well known. 2003) and encounters with nature in the city (Hinchliffe
They are discussed elsewhere in this volume in some et al. 2005; Benton-Short and Short 2008). Just as many
detail (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). The challenges posed by sub-disciplines of human geography have been reshaped
dwindling global supplies of accessible oil and climatic as they have undergone a cultural turn in recent years, it is
chaos are global in their extent and fundamental in their increasingly likely that urban geography will be reshaped
significance to the planet (Atkinson 2007a, 2007b, 2008; as it undergoes an ecological turn in the near future. The
Newman et al. 2009). The relationships between cities imperatives for this could not be greater. Atkinson, in a
and these ongoing crises are becoming an ever greater series of essays (2007a, 2007b, 2008), argues that the cur-
concern of urban scholars, as witnessed by the growth rent crisis will lead to no less than the collapse of modern
of literature on cities and sustainability since early key civilization as we now know it. Ultimately, he predicts:
publications from the mid 1990s (Haughton and Hunter
It is not at all clear how fast and through what stages
1994). Concern here is two-way involving both the ways
the collapse will unfold because there are many vari-
in which cities pose a threat to the environment and the
ables which will interact differentially and depend cru-
ways in which the environment poses a threat to cities.
cially on political decisions taken – and possibly major
The latter is evidenced by the recent growth in the urban
conflicts – along the way; however, we can be sure that
resilience literature (Coafee et al. 2009; Newman et al.
in general the decline will be inexorable. By the lat-
2009). The former concern involves both the mapping of
ter decades of this century, a radically altered world
the contributions of cities to these crises and outlining
will have emerged, with a greatly reduced population
possible solutions to them while the latter is concerned
living surrounded by the defunct debris of moder-
primarily with the ways in which cities might build
nity, comprised of fragmented and largely self-reliant
resilience to crisis into their infrastructures and social
political entities. Our complex, ‘globalized’ world
and economic structures and practices. There is over-
of megastates and technological hubris will be but a
lap between these literatures as the latter is concerned
fading memory. The impacts of global warming and
both with reactive measures to mitigate the impacts
other environmental legacies of our age will reduce
of crises but also the development of long-term prac-
the options for reconstruction, possibly fatally.
tices and processes that may contribute to the resolu-
tion of ecological crises, or at least their reduction and (Atkinson 2008: 79)
management.
The challenge facing urban dwellers, urban managers
Without doubt, given that over half of the world’s
and urban geographers in the future is to try to ensure
population now lives in cities, the rates of future growth
that Atkinson’s and other gloomy prognoses for the
of the world’s urban population and the ecological
future of the urban world are not realized.
demands made by cities and their populations, the urban
world will be the key site across which the impacts of
these ecological crises are felt and the key site in any
possible resolution of them. It should be remembered 9.4 Conclusion
that when scholars of the city discuss sustainability,
crisis and resilience, their discussions are not restricted The urban world, as we have seen, is big, dynamic, diverse
to matters of environmental science. Human geogra- and complex: a potentially intimidating topic of study.
phers have key contributions to make to these debates, However, it is also a fascinating, rewarding and impor-
since inequality as highlighted above, for example, is tant topic for which there are economic, social and eco-
an inherently unsustainable condition. It compromises logical imperatives that demand it is better understood
resilience as the impacts of ecological crises are felt une- and managed.
venly across social groups, the poor being less able to This chapter has attempted to provide a broad frame-
insulate themselves from them. Further, it undermines work through which to approach cities. This involves, at
attempts at collective solutions to ongoing problems of its heart, the resolution of the small and immediate con-
environment and sustainability. The debates around the cerns of the urban here and now with the broader trends,
relationships between cities and ecological crises have patterns and issues of which they are part.

M09_DANI2950_05_SE_C09.indd 203 04/04/16 6:21 pm

 204    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

Urban geography and urban geographers at all levels will certainly be an urban century, but how urban systems
have important contributions to make to the future reso- and cities will change, and what these will look like at
lution of the urban issues identified at the end of this the end of the century, will continue to pose intriguing
chapter and many more besides. The twenty-first century questions for urban geographers to address.

Learning outcomes focus on the apparently ‘big’ issues at the expense of the
everyday experience. Offers fresh ways of looking at the
Having read this chapter, you should be able to:
­contemporary urban world.
● Appreciate the nature and diversity of the urban Hall, T. and Barrett, H. (2012) Urban Geography, 4th edition,
world. You should be able to recognize the char- Routledge, Abingdon. An accessible guide to the subject that
acteristics of cities, the nature of urbanization, focuses particularly on the recent history of cities. Contains
a number of student-friendly case studies, examples and
the diversity of global urban forms and their
exercises.
characteristics.
Hubbard, P. (2006) City, Routledge, Abingdon. A panoramic
● Recognize the difficulties inherent in trying to define
sweep over the contemporary urban world viewed through
and represent the urban, either within scholarly the lens of urban theory from geography and beyond. An
­discourses or through systems of administration, important critical synthesis of ways of thinking about and
planning and management. looking at the city. Combines a historical sensitivity with a
● Think geographically about cities as socio-spatial keen eye on the city as it is today.
entities. Cities are the products of social relations. Latham, A., McCormack, D., McNamara, K. and McNeill, D.
This is reflected both in the relationships within (2009) Key Concepts in Urban Geography, Sage, London. A
series of engaging, concise essays on a range of key issues
­cities, for example between different groups of
and concepts. Critical, occasionally quirky and contemporary
­people, and between cities. Understanding the
in its organization, approach and outlook. Acts as both a key
nature and effects of these relationships is an starting point for the novice urban geographer and a handy
important aspect of differentiating cities. source of reference.
● Appreciate the range of issues that face cities LeGates, R.T. and Stout, F. (eds) (2010) The City Reader, 5th
in the present era and the ways in which these edition, Routledge, Abingdon. A landmark collection of key
can vary between different parts of the world and writings on the city from the nineteenth century to the present
between different types of city. In addition it is day. An authoritative collection that presents key articles
along with useful biographical essays on the authors and
important to critically evaluate the different routes
overview of their career and work. An essential resource for
to the resolution of these problems that have been
the serious urban geographer.
advocated.
Pacione, M. (2009) Urban Geography: A Global Perspective,
● Understand the different ways in which cities have 3rd edition, Routledge, London. The most comprehensive
been conceptualized in geographical and socio- urban geography textbook currently available. Covers cities
logical thought. Scholars of cities have developed from the developed and developing world through a series
many different takes on the city, approaching it from of well organized chapters filled with a wealth of references,
examples and illustrations.
different angles and studying different aspects of it.
Robinson, J. (2006) Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and
Evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of these
Development, Routledge, Abingdon. Offers a serious chal-
different approaches is a key skill for the urban
lenge to the tendency of traditional urban theory to universal-
geographer. ize the experiences of a small number of cities and fail to
engage with the complex diversity of the global urban world.
Argues from a post-colonial standpoint for a cosmopolitan
Further reading urban theory that is able to embrace and include global urban
diversity. An important critical intervention in thinking about
Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (2002) Cities: Reimagining the Urban, the city.
Polity, Cambridge. An important contribution to recent Browse the journals Cities, City, the International Journal of
debates about the city. Challenges the tendencies within Urban and Regional Research, Urban Geography, or Urban
urban geography to see the city as a bounded entity and to Studies for many urban case studies.

M09_DANI2950_05_SE_C09.indd 204 04/04/16 6:21 pm

 Chapter 9  Cities: urban worlds    205

www.centreforcities.org/  Centre for Cities – excellent

Useful websites resource containing interactive data tools with reports and
policy briefs looking at contemporary and recent urban
change.
www.unhabitat.org  The site of the UN Habitat programme
concerned with shaping better futures for cities. http://maps.google.com  Zoomable maps, satellite imagery
and street-level panoramas.
www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc  The home of the Global and World
Cities Network at the University of Loughborough. A wealth www.thisisgloucestershire.co.uk  The home of Gloucester’s
of data and reports on the networks of global cities. Citizen local newspaper mentioned in the chapter. Check
out the latest on the seagull infestation and other stories
www.city-data.com  Rich data archive for US cities.
­concerning Gloucester’s citizens. Most other towns and cities
www.architecture.com/RIBA/Aboutus/SustainabilityHub 
will have their equivalent newspaper/site.
Royal Institute of British Architects – UK. Site containing a col-
lection of materials about sustainable architecture and design.

M09_DANI2950_05_SE_C09.indd 205 04/04/16 6:21 pm

 Urban segregation and
social inequality

Chapter 10

Phil Hubbard

Topics covered
■ The city as socially divided
■ The connections between social exclusion, poverty and urban
segregation
■ Stereotyping, urban representation and the exclusionary urge
■ Racial segregation: places and spaces of ethnicity
■ Regeneration, gentrification and the social ‘cleansing’ of
the city

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 Chapter 10  Urban segregation and social inequality     207

A ll societies are riddled by inequalities, some of

which are more fundamental than others (for
example, a person’s skin colour, age, or religion typi-
non-white than any time in the recent past, despite gen-
eral evidence that the nation is becoming more ‘multicul-
tural’ (Sturgis et al. 2014; Johnston et al. 2015).
cally plays a critical role in shaping their status in con- Through such mappings of the city, geographers have
temporary society, whereas their hair colour or shoe demonstrated that the city continues to be divided on
size tends to be less significant). Quite why some social social lines. As we will see in this chapter, however, this is
differences matter more than others is a key debate in merely a starting point for urban social geography, that
the social sciences – one to which geographers have part of the discipline most preoccupied with identifying
contributed in a variety of ways. One contribution patterns of segregation and documenting their conse-
involves forms of ‘mapping’ that show that different quence for different groups. This chapter explores some
social groups are differently distributed in space. Such of the key concepts in this sub-discipline, particularly
mappings typically demonstrate that particular social those revolving around segregation and exclusion. Rather
groups, defined by age, sexuality, class, gender, reli- than focusing solely on the idea that neighbourhoods are
gion or ethnicity, dominate in particular areas, often to formed via the clustering of like-minded individuals who
the exclusion of other groups. Arguably, such mapping want to live alongside one another, it explores the ways
of social space began not in geography, but sociology, that segregation creates clusters or areas associated with
with members of the Chicago School of Sociology social stigma and disadvantage, and proposes that this is,
including Ernest Burgess and Robert Park in the 1920s. in part, a sign that some groups do not want to live along-
Burgess in particular was a keen proponent of map- side social groups who they identify as Other or inferior
ping and expected his students to become proficient in in some way. As this chapter will demonstrate, one of
mapping, and able to combine their own observations the clearest ways that the social disadvantage of such
on the quality of different residential neighbourhoods neighbourhoods is expressed is through their labelling as
with extensive use of Census and other sources. being ‘on the margins’ – e.g. ‘slums’, ‘problem estates’ or
The most famous outcome of this type of social map- ‘ghettos’. For those who do not live in such spaces, these
ping was the concentric zone model of Chicago that rep- areas can often be spaces of fear and fascination because
resented the city as a set of successive zones typified by they represent spatial concentrations of those who fail to
rising wealth and prosperity as distance from the centre match mainstream ideas of how people should live and
or CBD increased. Over subsequent years, geographers work. The stigma surrounding these places compounds
have developed this initial model to provide other sche- their poverty and isolation, as once a place is labelled as
matic mappings of the city showing its divisions into dis- degraded and deprived, its residents may find it hard to
tinctive social spaces or neighbourhoods. And though the be accepted by mainstream society. Underlining the fact
rigid divisions of the industrial city have given way to a that space plays an active role in shaping people’s stand-
more complex post-industrial geography (see Chapter 9), ard of living, this chapter’s focus on urban geographies
it is clear that the city remains a far from undifferentiated of segregation and exclusion demonstrates why a sensi-
social space: rather, it is a complex ‘patchwork’ in which tivity to place matters, and illustrates some of the ways
different social groups take their allotted place. Many urban social geographers contribute to pressing debates
neighbourhoods and streets are of course mixed and, on social inequality.
conversely, few residential streets or neighbourhoods are
homogeneous in their social make-up. This said, there
appears to be strong tendencies towards clustering, seg-
regation and socio-spatial sorting, meaning we can still 10.1 Poverty and urban segregation
associate specific neighbourhoods with specific types of
residents, whether classified by class, age, ethnicity, sexu- While geography has always had a strong interest in
ality, religion, gender, disability and so on. The underly- mapping social groups and their location in space, for
ing logic is simple: those with privileged social identities many urban social geographers this is a means to an end:
tend to be found in more valued locations (something namely, highlighting the importance of spatial processes
reflected in the property prices in different areas. While in perpetuating social inequality. Urban social geography
geographers now deploy different theories to explain hence circles around questions of the quality of life that
this patterning than was the case in the time of Burgess, people experience in different spaces. In simple terms,
the same type of conclusions about the city as a ‘sorting quality of life can be defined as the extent to which
machine’ can be drawn. If anything, these tendencies are our needs and desires (be they social, psychological or
becoming more clear-cut over time: in the UK, for exam- physiological) are fulfilled. Though this can only truly be
ple, it is now easier to typify some inner urban areas as measured through subjective assessments of the extent to

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 208    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

which individuals are satisfied with their own life, many terms of goods, services and the necessities of life. Con-
studies by geographers have reached consensus that it sequently, recent attempts to measure poverty have gen-
is easier to attain an acceptable or good quality of life erally defined people as being in poverty if they lack the
in areas that offer ample economic opportunities, good financial resources needed to obtain the living conditions
social facilities, and a quality environment. Given this, that are customary and ‘normal’ in the society to which
we can see that our life chances are closely related to our they belong. Identifying such thresholds does not suggest
place of residence. One well-known aspect of this is the that everyone’s needs are the same, but does suggest an
so-called ‘postcode lottery’ around health services in the income level that is socially unacceptable for any indi-
UK: depending on where you live, you will enjoy very vidual to live below. For example, the Poverty and Social
different levels of medical provision through the National Exclusion project suggested that 33  per cent of the Brit-
Health Service (White et al. 2012). Likewise, in the USA ish population were living in poverty in 2012 on the basis
there are known patterns of health provisioning which that their income would not secure at least three of the
mean that poorer people live in areas where health risks 35 items considered by at least 50 per cent of the Brit-
are highest and access to good health services lowest ish population as necessary for maintaining an accept-
(Kwan 2013). Where you are born, and where you live, able standard of living (see Table 10.1). While some of
thus has a major bearing on where (and how) you die. these items may not have been considered a necessity
The same is true of prosperity (or lack of it). Geo- in previous decades (and others remain luxuries that
graphical studies of wealth and income suggest that we many in the global South can only dream of), compari-
should not just think about neighbourhoods with con- son of these figures with previous studies suggests the
centrations of rich people, but should recognize the exist- incidence of poverty has actually risen sharply. In 1983,
ence of rich neighbourhoods. This distinction is subtle 14 per cent of British households lacked three or more
but significant, for it suggests that wealth is amplified necessities because they could not afford them, a figure
in some places. To elaborate: people who are born in that increased to 21 per cent in 1990, 26 per cent in 1999
places characterized by high concentrations of afflu- before accounting for a third of the population in 2013
ence are more likely to be wealthy themselves because (see Pantazis et al. 2006; Gordon et al. 2013).
the concentration of money in the area means standards Increases in costs of living clearly have an impact
of education, health care and employment are relatively here, with decreases in poverty in the early 2000s seen to
good. While house prices are high, housing standards be reversing in more recent years as disposable incomes
are good, and may be an important source of inherited failed to keep pace with rises in fuel costs, food costs and
wealth. As Dorling (2004) explains, there is a circularity (especially) housing costs. In 2010, the required income
here whereby affluence breeds affluence. for a single person of working age to be able to afford a
Surprisingly, geographers have said little about urban minimum standard of living was suggested to be around
geographies of affluence, despite the obvious relation- £16,200 per annum, rising to £40,400 for a couple with
ship that exists between income and quality of life (Bea- two dependent children (Davis et al. 2014). Roughly trans-
verstock et al. 2004; Hay and Muller 2012). In contrast, lated, such figures suggest that nearly 14 million people
much has been said about geographies of poverty, with in the UK cannot afford what are considered acceptable
social geographers often drawn towards this topic because standards of living. While such deprivation is particularly
they feel their relatively privileged position might allow pronounced among those who are out of work, many of
them to draw attention to – and perhaps improve – the life those in the lower strata of the labour market are also
chances of those living in poorer urban areas. Poverty can living in poverty (the persistence of low-paid, part-time
be defined as the condition where individuals or house- or precarious forms of employment being significant
holds are unable to afford what might be perceived to be here, alongside the restructuring of welfare provision for
the normal necessities of life. Inevitably, judgments of those on low incomes). Coupled with the rapidly rising
what we need to consume to survive vary across time and incomes characteristic of managerial and professional
space, meaning geographers are generally more interested occupations (particularly in ‘knowledge-rich’ sectors
in relative rather than absolute poverty. On a worldwide such as law and finance), the consequence is an increas-
scale, for example, it is evident that indicators such as ingly polarized society. For example, between 1979 and
average income per capita provide only a very superficial 1991, the average British income grew by 36 per cent,
insight into experiences of poverty in different nation- yet for the bottom tenth of the population it dropped by
states (see Chapter 8). Relative income measures – e.g. 14 per cent. While the rate of income polarization slowed
the definition of poverty as being 60 per cent of median in the 1990s – partly because of welfare reform – the gap
equivalent income – are somewhat more meaningful, but between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ accelerated in the
fail to take into account what that income can secure in twenty-first century (Dorling and Rees 2003, 2004). By

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 Chapter 10  Urban segregation and social inequality     209

Table 10.1  Perception of adult necessities and how many people lack them (all figures show % of UK adult
population)

Percentage of respondents Percentage of population

Item considering items necessary unable to afford item

Heating to keep home adequately warm 96 9

Damp-free home 94 10
Two meals a day 91 8
Visiting friends or family in hospital or other 90 3
institutions
Replace or repair broken electrical goods such as 86 26
refrigerator or washing machine
Fresh fruit and vegetables every day 83 8
Washing machine 82 1
Dental work/treatment 82 17
Celebrations on special occasions such as Christmas 80 3
Attending weddings, funerals and other such 79 3
occasions
A warm waterproof coat 79 4
Telephone at home (landline or mobile) 77 2
Meat, fish or vegetarian equivalent every other day 76 4
Curtains or window blinds 71 19
A hobby or leisure activity 70 8
Household contents insurance 70 12
Enough money to keep your home in a decent state 69 20
of decoration
Appropriate clothes to wear for job interviews 69 8
Taking part in sport/exercise activities or classes 56 8
To be able to pay an unexpected expense of £500 55 33
Two pairs of all-weather shoes 54 7
Regular savings (of at least £20 a month) for 52 31
rainy days
Television 51 0

2010/11, the average income of the top fifth of house- expressed, whether as a division between rich and poor
holds was around 15 times greater than for those in the regions, an urban–rural divide or differences in wealth
bottom fifth (£73,800 per year compared with £5,000) between cities. However, it is clear that the sharpest con-
(see Figure 10.1) and most measures of income inequality trasts between wealth and poverty are found within cities,
suggest the UK is more unequal than at any previous time and one of the major contributions urban social geog-
in the last 30 years. raphers have made to debates surrounding poverty is to
While some nations do not exhibit the levels of social draw attention to areas of acute urban need. According to
polarization apparent in the UK, it is important to note the United Nations (2001), over one billion of the world’s
that levels of social inequality evident in many other population lives in ‘slum’ urban environments without
nations are far in excess of this (see Spicker 2006). Yet access to safe water, acceptable sanitation and secure, ten-
in each and every case this social inequality is spatially ured housing of an acceptable standard. Ninety-five per

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 210    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

90,000

Average per household (£ per year)

80,000 Original income
Final income
70,000

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0
Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top All
Households

Figure 10.1  Average original and final (i.e. after taxes and benefits) income per household by quintile, UK, 2011–12.
Source: National Statistics Online (2014), www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_367431.pdf

cent of these concentrated slum environments are found 2010, more than half of those living in the socially rented
in the ‘Third World’, and it has accordingly become some- housing typical of such estates had less than 60 per cent
thing of a geographical cliché to juxtapose the assuredly of median income, and could thus be defined as living in
affluent ‘Westernized’ city centres now typical of many poverty (Department of Work and Pensions 2011).
of the world’s rapidly expanding cities with the ‘slum’ The particular combination of problems encoun-
dwellings that are often just a stone’s throw away. For tered in deprived local authority estates created national
instance, profiling Jakarta in Indonesia (population 9 headlines in the 1990s as confrontations between police
million), Cybriwsky and Ford (2001) contrast the city’s and local youths (especially joyriders accused of stealing
Golden Triangle of prestigious residential districts (e.g. cars) escalated into fully fledged riots. The spatial con-
Cikini, Kuningan and Menteng) with the rumah liar (‘wild centration of unemployment on these estates, especially
houses’) characteristic of its sprawling, chaotic kampungs. among young men, was hypothesized as the most impor-
They thus conclude that Jakarta ‘has extraordinary con- tant underlying cause of these disturbances. Figures for
trasts between the worlds of prosperity and poverty, and the 13 estates affected by serious disorder between 1991
significant challenges ahead for continued development as and 1992 suggest that nearly 80 per cent of their occu-
a global metropolis’ (Cybriwsky and Ford 2001: 209). pants were either economically inactive or unemployed
Yet such ‘extraordinary’ contrasts between landscapes (Table 10.2). A simultaneous withdrawal of economic
of wealth and poverty are not just restricted to megacities infrastructure – including businesses, shops and banks
or those cities living with the legacy of colonial rule: for (Case study 10.1) – meant that there was little money
example, while London remains the most deeply divided circulating locally, and this had negative impacts on men-
city in Britain in terms of income disparities, most British tal and physical health. The mythical black market (an
cities display obvious contrasts between the affluent land- informal economy based on petty theft, drug dealing or
scapes of the central city and the ‘pockets’ of deprivation cash-in-hand trading) did not offer any sort of escape for
that surround it. Notable here are those areas of 1960s the majority of residents, given that black markets rarely
local authority housing, which came to be characterized flourish when there are few people who can afford to buy
by high rates of economic inactivity. While these are not stolen goods, let alone legitimate ones (Green 1997).
‘slums’ according to the UN’s definitions, evidence from While geographers stressed that uncivil urban actions
20 of these ‘unpopular’ housing estates in the 1990s sug- are also connected to processes of economic restructuring
gested they possessed unemployment rates, on average, and institutional disinvestment, the media largely ignored
two and a half times higher than the surrounding urban such arguments in favour of a rhetoric depicting Britain’s
area (Power and Tunstall 1997), representing pernicious local authority and social housing estates as breeding
spatial concentrations of relative poverty (Table 10.2). In grounds of immorality, characterized by high rates of

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 Chapter 10  Urban segregation and social inequality     211

Table 10.2  Social characteristics of 12 ‘riot’ estates and 20 ‘unpopular’ estates from 1991 UK Census of
Population

British average 20 ‘unpopular’ housing 12 ‘riot’ housing

(%) estates (%) estates (%)

Unemployment 10 34 31
Economic inactivity 36 44 45
Population under-16 19 31 31
Population under-24 33 46 48
Lone parents 4 18 15
Ethnic minority population 6 26 11
Pupils aged 15+ gaining 43 20 20
5+GCSEs (grade A–E)
Source: A. Power and R. Tunstall, Dangerous Disorder: Riots and Violent Disturbances in Thirteen Areas of Britain, 1991–92, Joseph Rowntree
Foundation, 1997. Reproduced by permission of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation

Case study 10.1

Geographies of retail disinvestment products are processed and fresh fruit and vegetables
are poor or non-existent.
During the late 1990s, debates on poverty began to
(Laurence 1997)
focus on the role institutional disinvestment played in
exacerbating the problems encountered by those living This has raised serious concerns about the health of
in ‘poor places’. One dimension of this was the with- those in poor places, with the lack of fresh fruit and veg-
drawal of financial services from poorer areas, with as etables and a reliance on fatty, fast foods implicated in
many as 15 per cent of bank branches in the United the making of significant health inequalities. Confirming
Kingdom closed down in the early 1990s, the major- the intensity of food-access problems in some of the large
ity in low-income, inner-city areas (Leyshon and Thrift local authority housing estates in British cities, Wrigley et
1994). Another was the closure of once-vibrant neigh- al. (2003) noted significant improvements in diet follow-
bourhood shops as retail chains concentrated on the ing the construction of a new superstore in the Seacroft
development of large superstores catering to mobile district of Leeds, an area that had previously suffered con-
and affluent consumers (Williams and Hubbard 2001). siderable retail disinvestment. Against this, there remains
Given that many of these were located in out-of-town a noted correlation between deprivation and the quality
and edge-of-town locations, this left many neighbour- of local high streets in Britain, with the Royal Society for
hoods described as food ‘deserts’, where a range of Public Health (2015) suggesting ‘unhealthy’ high streets
affordable and varied food was available only to those remain typified by bookmakers, payday loan shops, fast
who had private transport: food outlets and tanning salons, whereas pharmacies, lei-
Food deserts . . . are those areas of cities where sure centres, and health services are found on the healthi-
cheap, nutritious food is virtually unobtainable. Car- est and wealthiest High Streets, often alongside a diverse
less residents, unable to reach out-of-town supermar- range of independent food retailers (see also Maguire et
kets, depend on the corner shop where prices are high, al. 2015; Cox et al. 2010).

teenage pregnancy, widespread drug abuse, alcoholism surrounds) of the enclaves of high crime and violence
and antisocial behaviour: associated with Los Angeles and its ghettos in the
months leading up to the 1992 riots. Public space is
The sense of decline and neglect in many of these
often colonized by young men in baseball caps and
areas is palpable: the built environment in many of
cheap khaki.
these areas has now taken on all the classic, ominous
characteristics (boarded-up windows, barbed wire (Taylor 1997: 6 © Guardian News & Media Ltd 1997)

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 212    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

While there were as many as 2,000 local authority and market, blighted by a debilitating cycle of labelling
housing estates in Britain, accounting for nearly two and marginalization. An example here is provided by the
million people in total (Goodwin 1995), the term ‘no-go’ banlieues (suburbs) of social housing surrounding Paris
estate became a convenient way for the media and public and other major French cities. In October 2005, three
alike to label a wide variety of social environments in the young men in one of these banlieues – Clichy-sous-Bois
1990s (even though only a small number of which experi- (NE Paris) – sought to evade a police check (a regular
enced unrest). Such labelling exacerbated neighbourhood occurrence in the banlieues) by hiding in an electricity
decline: those who could, moved out, leaving behind only substation. Two were electrocuted, prompting an anti-
the most vulnerable (Hastings and Dean 2003). In the police protest that rapidly spread across the country. In
words of Hanley (2011), many large estates appeared over a week of riots, 10,000 cars were torched and 3,000
‘ringed by an invisible forcefield that asks outsiders why people arrested. Video footage of burning cars was
they might want to enter, and insiders why they might screened nightly by the world’s media, prompting com-
want to leave’. mentators to speculate why such scenes were happening.
Such factors also appeared to be present in the ‘Eng- Whilst some sections of the press suggested these were
lish Riots’ of 2011, which involved several nights of loot- simply copycat protests in which young men wanted to
ing and public disorder in the largest cities. Although appear on television, more trenchant critiques suggested
politicians were quick to denounce the riots as the work that at their source were structural inequalities that
of ‘feral’ gangs, and argued for a swift law and order needed to be understood in geographical and histori-
response to quell an ‘epidemic’ of criminality, other com- cal context. For, as Dikeç (2006) argues, the banlieues
mentators drew attention to the inequalities between are not all deprived (and some are reasonably affluent).
those living in the poorer areas of cities and the grow- Yet they have always had negative connotations, identi-
ing affluence of the richest. Dorling and Lee (2014), for fied as ‘les quartiers difficiles’ which contain the social
example, describe the disturbances as both symptomatic problems that have, by and large, been cast out of the
of a divided nation, but more specifically of dividing central city. At the turn of the millennium, these areas
cities. In their analysis they quote Ministry of Justice of social housing possessed unemployment rates twice
data to conclude that 41 per cent of suspects lived in the the national average, with 40 per cent of young people
10 per cent most deprived places in England and that the unemployed. The fact that some of these areas of social
majority of areas where suspects lived were categorized housing were explicitly designed to house North African
as deprived, with 66 per cent of those areas becoming immigrants in the 1960s is also highly significant here,
poorer between 2007 and 2010. For esteemed social theo- given that the banlieue has always been understood as
rist, Zygmunt Bauman (2011, np) these riots were seen a ‘problem area’ (i.e. designed to solve the problem of
to be the outcome of the combination of rising consum- housing new migrant labour).
erism and rising inequality. As he put it, ‘this was not a Writing before the riots, Tissot and Poupeau (2005:
rebellion or an uprising of famished and impoverished 5) argued that ‘when one talks of poverty in France, one
people or an oppressed ethnic or religious minority – but can talk of the “socially excluded”, the “immigrants”,
a mutiny of defective and disqualified consumers, peo- or even of “the young”, but it is easier for reports to
ple offended and humiliated by the display of riches to dwell on the places where it is found: “les banlieues”’.
which they had been denied access . . . city riots in Britain Post-millennium, and in a context of considerable
are best understood as a revolt of frustrated consumers’ Islamaphobia in the West, the problem of the banlieue
(Bauman 2011). The implication here is that the paral- was transformed from one where inhabitants of the ban-
lel lives led by residents living in different areas of the lieue were a problem for one another to one where they
city – some privileged, others associated with an ‘under- were imagined as threat to the city (and the nation) as
class’ – resulted in a moment of collapse when those liv- a whole. By way of example, Garbin and Millington
ing in deprived areas, often adjacent to areas of wealth, (2012: 2071) argue that stigma and shame were attached
seized the consumer goods they felt they were denied by to La Courneuve’s Citédes 4000 zone that excluded the
the accident of geography. mainly North African inhabitants from the ‘Republican
As we will subsequently see, in recent times Brit- project’ in a symbolic defamation that chained residents
ish local authority estates have been subject to forms to this specific space, and denied them wider participa-
of regeneration that mean that the overt concentration tion in society. As they write, ‘relegated spaces such as
of poverty in such neighbourhoods is being mitigated La Courneuve enclose individuals and families already
by processes where more affluent residents are encour- deprived of capital and exacerbate their exclusion by
aged to move in. However, in other instances, ‘problem’ reducing the likelihood that they may gain access to
estates appear to have been abandoned by both state capital in the future’.

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 Chapter 10  Urban segregation and social inequality     213

Plate 10.1  Banlieue riots.

(AP/Remy de la Mauviniere/Press
Association Images)

The connections made here between ethnicity and society that has not made distinctions between the social
space are significant, and we will return to these subse- mainstream (or norm) and those Others who seemingly
quently. At this point, it suffices to say that the white- threaten the coherence of society. The notion of a scape-
dominated media in France could not accept that the goat is certainly an ancient one, and history can tell of
protest was one in which French citizens were justifiably many groups – e.g. Jews, prostitutes, homosexuals – whose
declaring their anger at the deteriorating housing, lack lives have been made intolerable because they are seen to
of transport and poor schooling that characterized their pollute the body politic (Sennett 1994). Such groups have
banlieue. Rather, this was depicted as a riot in which often been cast out, physically, as well as metaphorically,
‘outsiders’ from the colonial margins sought to attack socially excluded on the basis that they disturb social and
the centre (Dikeç 2006). Such arguments support Shields’ spatial order. In situations where they have been allowed to
(1991: 5) view that marginal places ‘carry the image and remain, their occupation of space has often been fiercely
stigma of their marginality which becomes indistinguish- contested: in many contexts, the socially excluded have
able from any empirical identity they might have had’. In been unable or unwilling to occupy the spaces associated
this sense, it is clear that media stereotypes play a cru- with mainstream society, carving out their own geogra-
cial role in creating and perpetuating social and spatial phies on the margins.
inequalities. Writing in the context of the urban West, Winchester
and White (1988) suggest that socially excluded groups
include the unemployed, the impoverished elderly, lone-
parent families, ethnic minorities, refugees and asylum
10.2  rban segregation and
U seekers, the disabled, illegal immigrants, the homeless,
cultural stereotypes sexual minorities, prostitutes, criminals, drug users and
students. If you are reading this book, the chances are
The fact that the media exacerbated the deprivation expe- that you are a student. If so, the identification of stu-
rienced in the banlieue and outer city estates by drawing dents as an excluded group may be causing you some
broad-brushed stereotypes of place suggests that when we puzzlement. Even though some students are highly
explore social inequality, we need to think carefully about indebted, may come from poor backgrounds or have to
the way representations of people and place entwine. This take part-time jobs to fund their (supposedly) full-time
involves consideration of cultural issues (see Chapter 13), studies, few live in the conditions of poverty described
and shifts attention from the economic manifestations of above. In fact, in the UK the average student is from the
inequality to questions of why some groups become iden- South-east (the most affluent part of the United King-
tified as threats or problems for mainstream society. No dom) and has parents who are part of the professional
matter how widespread the rhetoric that we are all cre- or managerial class (Dorling 2004). This means most
ated equal has been, historically it is difficult to identify a students are able to afford most of the adult necessities

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 214    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

identified in Table 10.1 (and even when they are unable, parts of the town or city where you study where you are
they may be assisted through hardship grants or student told students are not welcome and where you may have
loans). Some now live in privately managed halls boast- felt ‘out of place’. For example, some pubs or clubs let
ing state-of-the art wifi, plasma TVs, integrated gymna- students know, in subtle or not-so-subtle ways, that they
sia and security (Smith and Hubbard 2014). So why is it are not welcome. You may even know of instances where
appropriate to describe students as an excluded group? students have been verbally abused (or even attacked) just
The answer is that students are identified as a dis- for being students. Thankfully, such instances are rare. In
tinctive and different group because their lifestyles are contrast, opposition to studentification – the increased
often perceived to lie outside the norms of society, mak- student occupation of the local housing market – is
ing them infrequent or unwelcome visitors in many of becoming very common. This phenomenon is mainly
the spaces that are the loci of mainstream social life. limited to university towns in the UK where on-campus
Historically, this is related to popular understandings accommodation is not sufficient to house burgeoning
of students as politically radical, embracing alternative numbers of students and where particular areas become
fashion and music in a way that marks them out as part associated with high levels of rental accommodation tar-
of the ‘counter-culture’. In the contemporary context, it geting students (Smith and Holt 2007). Though student
is also associated with stereotypes of students that sug- occupation can increase house prices (with the buy-to-let
gest they transgress the established social boundaries market proving extremely lucrative), student housing is
between work and play (and day and night) by holding often opposed by long-term residents who blame it for
late-night parties (at times when other people are sleep- neighbourhood decline. In some areas, the consequences
ing) and sleeping all day (when other people are work- of studentification have been reported to be nothing
ing). Now, as you read this you will no doubt argue that short of catastrophic, with lobby groups arguing for
the reality of the situation is a good deal more complex: stronger controls on the licensing of student housing to
not all students enjoy drinking, clubbing and partying to prevent neighbourhoods becoming ‘over-run’ by young,
all hours – and those that do are often able to do so while transient populations, displacing longer-term residents
devoting considerable time to their studies. Further, while (UK Universities 2005). Highly dramatized media sto-
some students remain deeply committed to issues such ries evoke the environmental and social transformation
as environmentalism, animal rights or the restructuring occurring in districts undergoing student expansion,
of Third World debt, stereotypes of student radicalism, illustrated with images of overgrown gardens, rubbish
drug-taking and ‘free love’ which were consolidated in the left out and sheets used as makeshift curtains. Addition-
late 1960s are now woefully inaccurate as descriptors of ally, campaign groups opposing student occupation allege
contemporary student cultures. students cause noise and nuisance, displace local long-
That said, it is possible that you may have experienced term residents and fail to contribute to community life
exclusion in your own life as a student. No doubt there are (Hubbard 2008, 2009).

Plate 10.2  A ‘studentified’

landscape of rented housing
in multiple occupation,
Loughborough
(Phil Hubbard)

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 Chapter 10  Urban segregation and social inequality     215

We can see here that media stereotypes of students and As we have already seen, visceral metaphors also occur
student housing are mutually reinforcing in a variety of in the language used to describe those who live in poorer
ways, and certainly many opponents of student housing or deprived areas. For example, Ken Clarke, Conservative
allege that students do not look after their house because Home Secretary at the time, described the participants in
they are too busy socializing. A counter argument here is the 2011 English riots as ‘feral’, invoking ideas that this
that the deleterious state of many student houses is down group is less than human. Owen Jones (2012) – author
to the absentee landlords who fail to look after them, and, of the book Chavs on the demonization of the British
in any case, not all student households are noisy and dis- working class – also highlighted the ways in which the
regarding of their neighbours. No matter, all it takes is one media rounded on the ‘rabble’ living in more deprived
or two instances of antisocial behaviour to reinforce popu- places, and used the label of ‘chav’ to reduce the complex
lar stereotypes and instigate campaigns aiming to reduce causes of the rioting to the level of individual failings.
student occupation in particular areas (such as Storer in Tyler (2013: 21) also describes the way that the poor in
Loughborough, Headingley in Leeds, Elvet in Durham and Britain have been described as ‘revolting’ subjects, known
Selly Oak in Birmingham). In some cases, long-term resi- through a language which emphasizes their non-human
dents even adopt the metaphor of ‘studenticide’, arguing and even animalistic characteristics. For Tyler, the brutal-
that studentification needs to be reversed lest it destroys izing language of Otherness creates ‘abject’ figures who
the urban social fabric: surveys suggest homeowners in are required to do ‘the dirty work’ required by modern
UK cities now fear student neighbours more than squat- societies (e.g. work in the servicing economy in precari-
ters. And this is not merely a UK phenomenon: studies of ous and poorly paid roles), but who are denied full inclu-
studentification suggest the proliferation of student hous- sion in that society because of their seeming vulgarity
ing is regularly opposed in the USA (Powell 2014), Europe and lack of distinction. This invocation of the notion of
(Boersma et al. 2013), China (He 2014) and beyond. social abjection betrays Tyler’s interest in the notion of
This discussion of studentification is highly relevant disgust, a concept more associated with psychology than
to our discussion of social exclusion, given it demon- geography. This concept is significant for work on urban
strates that some groups may experience stigmatization segregation in at least two senses. First, it emphasizes the
irrespective of their income or class. Yet talking about way that fears of contamination, pollution and despoil-
students as a marginal group remains problematic given ment fuels the policing of boundaries which may be
students occupy their ambivalent social position for a boundaries of class, but may also be boundaries between
short time only, and typically move from a marginalized different neighbourhoods. Second, it allows us to think
and indebted position to one of relative affluence within about segregation as a socially lived process, which makes
a few years as they convert their education and cultural particular subjects the object of a violent, objectifying
­ apital into financial rewards. However, in other instances
c disgust and subjects then to control, stigma and censure.
socially excluded groups suffer social stigmatization that In making such arguments, Tyler enriches the theo-
is more likely to be associated with long-term f­ inancial retical materials available to us for thinking about the
exclusion or deprivation. For example, Gleeson (1998) ways that the projection of negative values onto Others
suggests that people with a physical impairment or produces social segregation, extending recent analyses of
mobility problem typically find themselves excluded from class relations in contemporary Britain (e.g. Skeggs 1997;
workplaces designed around an able-bodied ideal. Here, Haylett 2001; Lawler 2005; Nayak 2006) by revealing a
the portrayal of the disabled as representing what Shake- continuing devaluation of working class cultures created
speare (1994) describes as the ‘imperfect physicality’ of through repeated disgust reactions. This type of analysis
human existence is a major factor, with the able-bodied suggests that highly diverse groups can become known
remaining anxious about those who are visibly different. through narrow social stereotypes, with these stereotypes
This found acute expression in the USA ‘ugly laws’ of the shaping the relationship between them and dominant
nineteenth century, which witnessed several cities forbid- social groups. This suggests that while social exclusion has
ding anyone from entering public space who was ‘dis- an important symbolic dimension, being created in the
eased, maimed or mutilated or anyway deformed to be realms of representation. Here, the term representation
an unsightly or disgusting object’ (taken from Ordinance is taken to encompass the wide range of media – such as
passed in Chicago, 1881, cited in Schwiek, 2009). These films, TV, internet sites and newspapers – through which
acts were used to exclude the disabled from participation we come to understand the world and our place within it
in mainstream urban life, compounding fears and fanta- (Woodward 1997). Inevitably, such media provide a par-
sies about those who appeared ‘different’, and collapsing tial and simplified view of the lifestyles of heterogeneous
a huge range of identities (and bodies) into a particular social groups. Although most people do not necessarily
emergent category (the ‘disabled’). accept these stereotypes uncritically, they inevitably find

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 216    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

themselves drawing on them in their everyday life. What homeowners in US cities reveals a ‘continuum’ of accept-
is especially significant about these stereotypes is that ance, where facilities for populations depicted as ‘differ-
they are ideological in nature, in the sense they are gener- ent’ (such as homes for the elderly) are regarded more
ally created by (and in the interests of) dominant social favourably than those for populations stereotyped as
groups – typically white, able-bodied, heterosexual, mid- ‘dangerous’ or ‘deviant’ (such as those living with HIV)
dle-class men. It is those who do not conform to their (Table 10.3). This frequently results in the concentration
view of the world who are defined as society’s Others. of facilities in inner-city areas where home-ownership
A vivid example of how such stereotyped images con- rates are low and community opposition is least vocal
tribute to social and spatial exclusion was provided by the (Case study 10.2). As DeVerteuil (2013) writes, NIMBY
media reporting of HIV/AIDS that occurred in the mid- remains an important concept in urban social geography
1980s. In the ensuing moral panic that followed diagno- because it places attention precisely on how the forms
sis of the virus and its mode of transmission, a sometimes of opposition to particular social groups takes spatial
hysterical media began to focus on the groups most read- expression – and how, in turn, this maintains socio-spa-
ily identified as at risk – non-white ethnic minorities, tial segregations based on fears of Otherness.
intravenous-drug users and gay men (Watney 1987). The NIMBY opposition to facilities for those living with
presence of HIV infection in these groups was generally HIV, those without homes, asylum seekers, people with
perceived to be no accident, but portrayed as a condi- disabilities and populations dependent on welfare hence
tion affecting those whose ‘inner essence’ diverged from demonstrates that the geographies of marginal groups
that of normal society (and whose lifestyles were judged are, to a lesser or greater extent, the product of domi-
to be incompatible with the maintenance of ‘family val- nant imaginary geographies casting minorities as
ues’). Hence, sensationalist stories of sexual immorality, ‘folk devils’ who need to be located elsewhere. As Sibley
irresponsibility and wilful hedonism among those groups
most affected by the virus were used to create social bar-
riers between the ‘healthy’ and those regarded as sexually
promiscuous, socially irresponsible and unclean. Conse- Table 10.3  Relative acceptability of human service
quently, this symbolic marking of HIV-infected groups facilities, based on a US survey of 1,326 respondents
as deviant informed their social exclusion, encouraging
Facility type Mean acceptability,
widespread discrimination, prejudice and neglect. As 1 = low, 6 = high
Wilton (1996) has shown, this had clear spatial effects,
with those infected with HIV exhibiting ‘diminishing School 4.75
geographies’ as their access to the workplace, the home Day care centre 4.69
and the street was subject to increasing constraint. In his
Nursing home for elderly 4.65
analysis, Wilton stresses that these constraints were not
a product of the physical onset of AIDS but of the social Medical clinic for allergies 4.40
stigma surrounding it. Symptoms of this stigma have Hospital 4.32
included employers refusing to take on those with HIV,
Group home for mentally 3.98
dentists refusing to treat them and, as Wilton relates,
retarded
community groups opposing the construction of AIDS
hospices in their neighbourhood. Alcohol rehabilitation centre 3.80
Such neighbourhood opposition to community facili- Homeless shelter 3.73
ties and welfare services is so widespread in Western soci-
Drug treatment centre 3.61
ety, particularly in suburban landscapes, that few stop to
question why people might object to such developments Group home for mentally 3.51
in their neighbourhood. Certainly, many NIMBY (Not disabled
In My Back Yard) campaigns are fought with reference Group home for people with 3.47
to detrimental environmental impacts (such as noise or depression
air pollution during construction). Such impacts are, to Mental health outpatient facility 3.45
an extent, quantifiable; what is less measurable is the
Independent apartment for 3.30
concern that homeowners have about the arrival of stig-
­mentally disabled
matized populations. However, for Takahashi and Dear
(1997), community opposition to facilities for those living Group home for people living 3.20
with AIDS/HIV is indicative of the more general antipa- with AIDS
thy displayed towards Other populations. Their survey of Source: Takahashi and Dear (1997: 83)

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 Chapter 10  Urban segregation and social inequality     217

Case study 10.2

Community opposition to asylum Group expressed vehement opposition to the pro-

seekers posal, with campaigners arguing that the develop-
ment would cause increases in crime, vandalism and
In accordance with the United Nations’ protocol on social disorder, and that property prices would fall.
refugees, the United Kingdom is obliged to offer One resident claimed that parents would be ‘terri-
asylum to those in fear of persecution on the basis fied of letting their children play out’, while another
of their race, religion or culture. However, in the late asked ‘Can we be assured there are no child abus-
1990s, a mounting backlog of asylum applications, ers, drug addicts or convicted rapists among them?’.
together with media stories of ‘bogus’ asylum seek- The fact that this is by no means an isolated example
ers, combined to demonize this group in the public demonstrates how effective the media have been
imagination. One strategy adopted by the government at exploiting public anxieties about the threat that
as it sought to diffuse concern about the ‘wave’ of asylum seekers pose to the sanctity and purity of the
asylum seekers ‘flooding’ Britain was the dispersal of nation. As an extremely vulnerable group, asylum
asylum seekers away from the Channel ports where seekers have been less able than some to oppose
their visibility had been exploited by right-wing groups these racist myths, and many have reported harrow-
intent on exploiting racist fears of difference. As part ing experiences of discrimination. For example, in the
of this process of planned dispersal, the Home Office Sighthill area of Glasgow, the arrival of 1,200 Kurdish
proposed the construction of accommodation cen- and Kosovan refugees in 2001 prompted a number
tres for asylum seekers in a number of rural locales. of vicious assaults by local white youths who claimed
However, this policy often met with considerable local the asylum seekers were being shown favouritism by
opposition. For example, in February 2002, residents the local council. Following a series of attacks, it took
of Newton in Nottinghamshire learnt that the Home the murder of 22-year-old Kurdish asylum-seeker
Office was planning to convert nearby RAF Newton Firsat Dag to draw attention to the everyday rac-
into an accommodation centre for asylum seekers. ism fuelled by a media rhetoric that depicted asylum
A series of protests organized by the Newton Action seekers as ‘social security scroungers’.

(1995: 49) contends, this elsewhere might be nowhere,

as when the genocide of gypsies and Jews was under- 10.3 Racial segregation in the city
taken by the Nazis, or it might simply be a space ‘out of
sight’ of mainstream populations (such as the red-light The discussion above suggests that while society is highly
districts that are the focus of sex work in many British diverse, some social differences are ‘amplified’ into sig­
cities – see Hubbard 1999). Predating the work of Tyler nificance through practices of representation. An promi-
(2013), in Geographies of Exclusion, Sibley (1995) offered nent example here is the division of society on racial
a theoretically informed account of how these imaginary lines. Like class, age, or religion, race is a social con-
geographies fuelled exclusionary practices. Drawing par- struct, an invention of the many discourses and images
ticularly on psychoanalytical ideas about the importance that suggest that our skin colour matters, with cultural
of maintaining self-identity (literally, maintaining the difference following biological differentiation. Race,
boundaries of the Self), Sibley argued that the urge to therefore, is intimately linked to racism. Unpacking the
exclude threatening Others from one’s proximity is con- imaginary geographies that cast minorities to the mar-
nected to ideas about the importance of bodily cleanli- gins, research in social geography has exposed the way
ness, many of which may be inculcated in early infancy. that media negativity identifies ethnic minority groups
Sibley detailed how fears of the Self being defiled are con- as the source of social problems such as criminality,
sequently projected (or mapped) on to those individuals poor health and environmental decline (see Smith 1989a;
and groups depicted as polluting or dirty. In turn, Sibley Anderson 1991; Dunn 2001). Sibley (1999) accordingly
argued that individuals adopt a series of exclusionary argues that the equation of whiteness with purity, order
strategies designed to retain ‘psychic distance’ between and cleanliness in northern European cultures has been
themselves and Other groups, building symbolic, psycho- responsible for the creation of negative stereotypes of
logical and physical boundaries in the process. (for example) Africans, Afro-Caribbeans, people from

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 218    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

the Indian subcontinent and Roma gypsies. He contends and bordering (Anderson 2010). In other contexts, this
that each of these groups has consequently been allocated segregation has been institutional and via ‘tighter’ forms
only a marginal role in national cultures because of their of control: for example, under apartheid in South Africa,
‘threatening’ nature. In turn, such marginalization fuels the Group Areas Act prevented black people from stray-
spatial segregation, with the creation of ethnic-minority ing into residential areas declared ‘white’, leaving a leg-
enclaves in the poorest neighbourhoods of many Euro- acy of cities that are sharply divided on ethnic lines (see
pean cities being a product of personal prejudice in the Case study 10.3).
job and housing markets that is fuelled by negative media While segregationist policies have long been illegal in
stereotypes (Wacquant 2010). For example, in the UK the USA, whiteness remains profoundly encoded in the
there remains talk of white and non-white groups lead- city–suburb distinction that exists there, with the sub-
ing ‘parallel lives’, despite efforts at partnership designed urbs seen to provide a refuge for the white middle classes
to instil ‘community cohesion’: evidence suggests that the from the dirt, disorder, and, above all, criminality of
often-convivial everyday encounters that occur in public the coloured inner city (Valentine 2001). Indeed, the
and workspaces between non-white and white individu- imagined association between areas of predominantly
als are not necessarily mirrored in the creation of resi- black residence and the welfare-dependent ‘ghetto’ has
dentially-mixed neighbourhoods (Swanton 2010). In this become so pernicious in the USA that it dominates
context, some have suggested ethic segregation in the UK white assumptions about Afro-American lifestyles, cre-
is largely ‘voluntary’ – and hence self-segregation by both ating stereotypes that often bear little resemblance to
white and non-white groups. While this conclusion is dis- black people’s urban experiences. Events such as the
puted in some quarters (see Peach 1996; Phillips 2006), Rodney King riots of 1992 (prompted by the acquit-
it suggests that cultural racism and processes of fear, tal of a white police officer for the filmed beating of
resentment and prejudice maybe more significant than a black Los Angeles resident) consolidated the reputa-
institutional or state-sponsored attempts at segregation tion of the US ghetto as a crime-ridden environment;

Case study 10.3

Ethnic division in apartheid cities white fears of ‘swaart gevaar’ (black danger), and led
to national legislation designed to construct buffer
Apartheid-era South Africa is often cited as representing zones between the white city and non-white townships.
an extreme example of socio-spatial segregation, with Both physically and symbolically on the margins of
a white minority population passing a series of Acts in South African cities, the townships thus became abject
the mid-twentieth century designed to circumscribe the landscapes, depicted by the white media as spaces
mobility of coloured, Indian and African people. Under of vice, disease and lawlessness. Repeated attempts
apartheid laws, non-whites were denied access to major at creating racially sanitized, planned townships were
cities except if in possession of a pass that indicated thus part of an explicit attempt to modernize South
they were gainfully employed in the city. As such, while African society while maintaining the distance between
the ruling white minority depicted non-whites as racially poorer non-white groups and the affluent white city.
inferior, they recognized their importance as a source Rather than suggesting that the apartheid city
of unskilled and semi-skilled labour. Initially, non-white represents a racist distortion of the processes of seg-
workers were housed in barracks or municipal hostels regation evident elsewhere in the world, more recent
where they were subject to regimentation designed to commentaries on the apartheid era suggest it illustrates
curb the ‘animal instincts’ of natives and instil the impor- the racist conceits that underpinned twentieth-century
tance of ‘the proper habits of work and life’ (Popke 2001: modernism (Robinson 1997; Popke 2001). As such,
740). The understanding that non-whites possessed use- it is possible to identify planning and ‘improvement’
ful and productive bodies, yet were prone to indolence schemes as underpinned by racist imaginaries through-
and incivility, was clearly connected to colonial repre- out the world (and not just in those nations with a colo-
sentations that associated non-whiteness with savagery, nial history). Indeed, despite the abolition of apartheid
animality and nature, characteristics that were repressed Group Area Acts, racist fears of difference continue to
in ‘civilized’ Western cultures (Anderson 2000). fuel socio-spatial exclusions in South Africa, with the
However, the continued growth of non-white ‘shanty growth in gated communities being merely one mani-
towns’ around the periphery of major cities fuelled festation of this (Jurgens and Gnad 2002).

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 Chapter 10  Urban segregation and social inequality     219

although the areas of unrest were typically those with Though nearly 30 years old, Wolfe’s depiction
the poorest income levels, high population densities and remains revealing of white anxieties. This depiction
high school-dropout rates, it was the ‘racial character’ of the Bronx as a wasteland inhabited by ‘lots of dark
of these areas that was highlighted in the subsequent faces’ again reminds us of the ways in which fears of
reporting (Smith 1995). difference (in this example, based on skin colour) can
This association between US minority populations provoke anxiety and feed the urge to exclude. From the
and specific criminalized places has been cemented over perspective of the white narrator in Wolfe’s book, the
the years in those media that have used ‘ghetto’ as a urban decay of the Bronx mirrors his perceived view
coded term for the imagined deviance of black peo- of the city’s black population as Other: they are street
ple (especially black men). As McCarthy et al. (1997) people rather than the ‘air people’ who inhabit his social
argue, the American middle classes tend to learn more world (adopting Raban’s, 1990, memorable description
about black inner cities through ‘long-distanced’ media of those who can afford to distance themselves from
images than through personal everyday interactions. marginal places).
Stories of ‘black-on-black’ violence abound in the For many Afro-Americans, ghetto life is similarly typi-
media, with black urban males depicted as the main fied by anxiety, but an anxiety originating from problems
criminal threat in the USA (Wilson 2005). The cultural of poverty (in 2012, 25 per cent of black families were
responses – in the form of black media practices – have living below the US poverty line, and 42 per cent of black
been ambivalent in their outcomes, with the gangsta rap single parent families, a figure which has increased since
that emerged in the 1990s accused of banalizing every- 2000). As the renowned feminist and cultural theorist bell
day violence and gun crime. Even ‘new wave’ black cin- hooks relates, the experience of living in the black ghetto
ema such as Menace II Society, Boyz ‘n the Hood, Jungle is one that consistently reinforces feelings of subordina-
Fever and Straight Outta Brooklyn, which sought to tion and inferiority:
show something of the reality of everyday life for Afro-
Americans, ultimately served to stereotype such places To be in the margin is to be part of the whole but
as landscapes of endemic violence and drug dependence outside the main body. As black Americans living in a
(Benton 1995). In this context, ‘urban’ cinema, film and small Kentucky town, the railroad tracks were a daily
literature can be seen as a corroboration of dominant reminder of our marginality. Across those tracks were
white myths that imagine drugs, guns and criminality paved streets, stores we could not enter and restau-
to be part of everyday ghetto life. Such white fears and rants we could not eat in, and people we could not
fantasies about the black inner city are acidly invoked look directly in the face. Across these tracks was
in Wolfe’s (1988) fictional account of the Wall Street a world we could work in as maids, as janitors, as
trader, Sherman McCoy, who one night takes the wrong prostitutes, as long as it was in a service capacity. We
turning on his drive home only to be confronted with a could enter that world, but we could not live there. We
side of New York that he remains cosseted from in his always had to return to the margin, to cross the tracks,
‘yuppie’ housing development: to shacks and abandoned houses on the edge of town.

At the next corner, he turned – west, he figured – and (hooks 1984: 9)

followed that street a few blocks. There were more low
Until the 1960s it was not uncommon to find spe-
buildings. They might have been garages, they might
cific planning ordinances and zoning laws controlling
have been sheds. There were fences with spirals of
the development of black neighbourhoods. Although
razor wire on top. But the streets were deserted, which
such laws have long since been overturned, the legacy
was okay, he told himself. Yet he could feel his heart
of these remain in the racist practices of mortgage
beating with a nervous twang. Then he turned again.
financiers, banks and estate agents, who may seek to
A narrow street with seven or eight storey apartment
maintain the blackness or whiteness of particular neigh-
buildings; no sign of people, not a light in a window.
bourhoods in the interests of maintaining house prices
The next block, the same. He turned again, and as
(Short 1996). It is thus unsurprising that the Otherness
he rounded the corner – astonishing. Utterly empty,
of the Afro-American population is mirrored in what
a vast open terrain . . . here and there were traces of
has been termed hypersegregation, with black peo-
rubble and slag. The earth looked like concrete, except
ple remaining more spatially concentrated than any
it rolled down this way, and up that . . . the hills and
other US ethnic minority. The average black citizen
dales of the Bronx . . . reduced to asphalt, concrete
lives in a neighbourhood that is 45 per cent black, even
and cinders.
though blacks only make up 13 per cent of the overall
(Wolfe 1988: 65) US population (Logan 2013). However, Dissimilarity

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 220    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

Table 10.4  The ten most segregated cities in the USA, measured by white/Afro-American Dissimilarity Index,
1980–2010

2010 2010 2000 1990 1980

Rank Area Name Segregation Segregation Segregation Segregation

1 Detroit-Livonia-Dearbom, MI 79.6 85.9 85.6 83.0

2 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 79.6 82.2 82.8 83.9
3 New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ 79.1 81.3 82.0 81.7
4 Newark-Union, NJ-PA 78.0 80.4 82.7 82.8
5 Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL 75.9 80.8 84.6 88.6
6 Philadelphia, PA 73.7 76.5 81.4 82.6
7 Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL 73.0 72.4 71.8 79.3
8 Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 72.6 77.2 82.8 85.8
9 St. Louis, MO-IL 70.6 73.4 77.2 81.6
10 Nassau-Suffolk, NY 69.2 73.6 76.4 76.9
1 = complete segregation, 0 = complete integration
Source: Logan and Stuits (2011)

Indexes exploring how the Afro-American population disinvestment was part of a deliberate attempt to cut
is distributed relative to the white population suggest back on public spending by withdrawing services from
that their segregation has actually declined over the the very districts most in need. As they detail them, the
past 30 years (see Table 10.4). Yet the declines remain long-term consequences have often been catastrophic
modest, and some metropolitan areas actually experi- (including increases in infant mortality rates, low birth
enced an increase in residential segregation over the weights, cirrhosis, TB and AIDS-related deaths). At the
period 1980–2010 (the seven highest increases all in the same time, many areas stigmatized as pockets of black
southern USA, including Columbus, GA; Goldsboro, poverty have become insurance no-go zones where small
NC; Athens, GA; and Danville, VA). Wilson (2005) also businesses find it impossible to get insurance because pre-
notes a deepening of poverty within the most ghettoized miums are so high, and large percentages of the popula-
neighbourhoods, measured through the ratio of high- to tion are denied car insurance because of excessive costs.
low-income residents, with the ratio of rich to poor in Moreover, the intensification of the activities of police,
Chicago’s Englewood and Woodlawn neighbourhoods courts and prison is recognized to have disproportion-
increasing by 40 per cent between 1990 and 2000, and ately affected such ‘imploding ghettos’, with the mass
80 per cent in Cleveland Hough and Fairfax in the same incarceration of young, working class African American
period. Workfare programmes fail to alleviate the situa- men seen by many as a state strategy designed to ‘dis-
tion, with the poorest forced into dead-end and demean- cipline’ and manage the socially dispossessed (Waquant
ing employment for minimal wages. 2010). It is for such reasons that some ­commentators still
While the disappearance of well-paid work from US feel justified in speaking of the ‘apartheid’ of American
inner cities (and the associated out-migration of the cities (Wallace and Wallace 1998).
black middle class) has been postulated as the major
cause of such concentrated black poverty in the USA,
Mohan (2000) argues that such factors alone cannot
explain the continuing segregation of Afro-Americans.
10.4 Gentrification: reclaiming
Instead, he suggests it is necessary to consider the whole- the margins?
sale institutional abandonment that has accompanied
the economic stigmatization of Afro-American com- As already noted, all cities possess less affluent areas,
munities. Coining the phrase ‘desertification’ to describe whether these are described as ‘problem’ estates, welfare-
the planned shrinkage of essential health, welfare and dependent neighbourhoods or racialised ghettos. Often,
emergency services in the Bronx in the 1970s and 1980s, the boundaries of such places have remained stubbornly
Wallace and Wallace (1998, 2000) suggested that such recalcitrant over time, even if the individuals and groups

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 Chapter 10  Urban segregation and social inequality     221

they contain have changed (an example here might be the diversify housing with an eye to ending the status of such
persistence of the inner city as a disordered or transient areas as homogeneously working class or ‘poor’ places.
urban zone given the earliest mappings of the Chicago The key assumption here has been that mixing different
School identified it as such). This is clearly connected to types of housing tenure would lead to greater social mix
questions of power, with dominant social groups able to and to positive effects for (poor) urban residents and for
physically and symbolically claim the centres, marginal- deprived neighbourhoods at large.
izing the less powerful: The impact of such urban regeneration is decidedly
mixed. Suffice to say, many policies of regeneration
Centre/periphery distinctions tend frequently to be appear to be ‘taking back’ the margins from marginal
associated with endurance in time. Those who occupy people, rather than empowering them, effectively trans-
centres establish themselves as having control over forming landscapes of poverty and decay into prestigious
resources which allow them to maintain differentials (and ordered) space through selective investment and
between themselves and those in peripheral regions. redevelopment aiming at attracting more affluent resi-
The established may employ a variety of forms of dents. For example, some have argued that the ­public–
social closure to sustain distance from others who are private partnerships which are being undertaken by the
effectively treated as outsiders. majority of London boroughs in order to regenerate
(Giddens 1991: 131) council estates, are merely leading to the displacement
of long-established residents (e.g. see Lees 2014 on Lon-
In this chapter we have already examined numerous don’s Aylesbury estate). This is a process being resisted
processes which tend to spatially isolate and exclude less by some residents, albeit it has required emphasis on the
powerful groups in urban space – e.g. social prejudice, right of families to remain in place to secure notable press
institutional racism, NIMBY politics and so on. Yet coverage (see Plate 10.3). Hence, the net result of such
there are significant policy processes which also effect improvement policy is often the onset of gentrification.
such spaces, with urban policy in particular often prefig- A much-debated phenomenon in urban social geography,
ured on the idea that marginal places need to be bought gentrification is the process by which poor neighbour-
back into the ‘mainstream’ in the interests of economic hoods are transformed by an influx of affluent homebuy-
development as well as social cohesion. In many nations, ers and renters. In some instances, this involves individual
such policies are underpinned by an increasingly com- gentrifiers buying existing properties and transforming
plex diversity of agencies and partnerships, blurring them (often with governmental subsidy); in others, it
the distinction between public and private sectors as involves the wholesale replacement of low-income hous-
property developers and policy-actors work in tandem ing with prestigious apartments by corporate developers
to regenerate deprived areas and engineer urban regen- (Davidson and Lees 2010). Either way, the net result is
eration. Here, a notable trend has been to achieve this often one of displacement, with former residents fre-
through policies promoting social mix. For example, in quently unable to afford to live in gentrified areas which
many local authority housing estates and ‘projects’ in the become characterised by shops and cultural facilities
USA and UK, there has been an attempt to redevelop and which cater exclusively for incoming populations (an

Plate 10.3  Resisting

gentrification: E15 Mothers
protest, Carpenter’s Estate
London, 2014.
(Archant Norwich)

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 222    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

issue highlighted by the protests against ‘hipster’ cafes in the leading neo-Marxist urban commentators, Neil Smith
the East End of London in 2015) (Hubbard 2016). (1996), famously argued that gentrification ultimately only
Marginalized populations may see their neighbour- occurs if the gap between actual and potential land value
hoods enjoy a spectacular renaissance, but often do not is such that property development becomes lucrative. In
share in its subsequent prosperity (Lees 2008). While lit- such circumstances, the processes of disinvestment associ-
tle is known about displacement and its consequences, ated with marginalization become the precursor to a sub-
Dutch research (Kleinhans 2003) suggests personality can sequent wave of reinvestment. But for profits to be realized,
be important in shaping experiences of displacement, with the marginalized groups and land-uses which occupy these
more resilient individuals most able to take a positive view devalued spaces must be driven out, so that potential devel-
of the ‘relocation’ process. In a UK context, longitudinal opers can view them as safe investment opportunities. It is
research in Glasgow by Kearns and Mason (2013) also sug- here that the role of the local state is crucial. Smith (2002:
gests that there might be a difference in the ‘psychosocial’ 442) pointed to this when he detailed how squatters, the
impacts of displacement between those willing to move homeless, squeegee merchants and ‘street people’ were
and those who are reluctant movers. Their conclusion was ruthlessly dealt with in New York following the election of
that ‘most of those who moved considered that they had Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and appointment of Police Com-
“bettered” their residential conditions, though again less missioner William Bratton. Espousing a rhetoric of Zero
so in neighbourhood than in dwelling terms’ (Kearns and Tolerance for miscreants, these individuals were pivotal in
Mason 2013: 195). This suggests that the displaced might identifying the urban disadvantaged as a disorderly popu-
end up with better housing conditions, but not necessarily lation. This urge to tame urban disorder was to trigger
in neighbourhoods that provide them with a satisfactory notorious police brutality against minorities, justified with
quality of life or ‘sense of belonging’. reference to the need for improved quality of life, but actu-
For such reasons, most Western cities appear to be see- ally intended, Smith argues, to make particular areas of the
ing changes in patterns of segregation, with the emergent city safe for corporate gentrification (and the associated
of affluent enclaves and gentrified developments displacing invasion of upper-income groups). One notable example
and scattering the urban poor, with the latter sometimes of this process was the wholesale removal of the homeless
forced to relocate to different towns and cities. Hence, while and their supporters from Tompkins Square Park at a time
gentrification might instigate processes of improvement when developers were seeking to sell the Lower East Side as
that have long-term benefits for marginal groups (and the a space for ‘family’ residence. The seizure and subsequent
jury is still out on ‘trickle-down’ urban theory), most geog- ‘purification’ of the park (and surrounding areas) serves
raphers remain sanguine about their impacts. Gentrifica- to underline how exclusionary urges may turn a genuinely
tion, it seems, can be conceptualized as yet another form of public space into a space reserved for those who accord
profit-generation for the wealthy, representing a property with mainstream ideas of living and working (see also
wager rather than an investment in people. Indeed, one of Mitchell 1996).

Case study 10.4

Gated communities in Uruguay as offering a new form of urbanism that may rekin-
dle sociality and encourage diverse peoples to live
One of the most obvious symptoms of social division together. In most cases, however, gated communi-
in our cities is the presence of gated communities ties have been found to promote social dissociation
(Kenna and Dunn 2009). These communities currently and sharpen social segregation, being woven into
enjoy a widespread popularity because their design processes of gentrification and urban revanchism
promises security as well as a sense of belonging: by catering to middle-class tastes (and incomes)
residents typically sign up to a legally binding code of (Atkinson and Flint 2004).
conduct that ensures all residents understand their In the case of Montevideo (Uruguay), there are still
rights and responsibilities as members of a com- only a handful of gated communities (certainly if com-
munity. Physically separated from the wider city, and pared to its Latin American neighbours). Alvarez-Riva-
often offering a privatized form of social life through dulla (2007: 51) points out that the majority of these
the provision of enclosed gardens, gymnasia, shops are peripheral to the city centre in the Carrasco sub-
and facilities, gated communities have been postulated urb, and offer a semi-rural setting in which the urban
➜

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 Chapter 10  Urban segregation and social inequality     223

➜ threats of downtown Montevideo are far removed: ‘bird communities move to them are not so different
song replaces traffic noise, the grey of the city gives from the motivations listed by suburban dwellers in
way to shades of green’. As is the case in most gated studies in the UK and the USA: a desire to escape
communities, however, the residents are remarkably the unpredictability of the city, seek stability and
homogeneous in terms of age, family status and class, put down roots. Located on the periphery of the
as well as sharing certain cultural dispositions (such city – an area traditionally associated with Montevi-
as their enthusiasm for golf). Their social life tends to deo’s urban poor – these gated communities have
be strongly family-oriented, and inward- rather than effectively displaced working class and marginal
outward-looking. The occupants are manifestly not part populations in shanty dwellings, and raised land val-
of any global elite, but are significantly more affluent ues in the vicinity, exacerbating contrasts between
than the average for the city. Significantly, as Alvarez- the traditionally affluent neighbourhoods and the
Rivadulla (2007) notes, this is not a group that had neighbourhoods belonging to the urban poor. In a
ever mixed with less affluent groups (even if it shares reversal of the trends we noted earlier in the chap-
the same urban public spaces and neighbourhoods ter, an archipelago of affluent gated communities
with them). As such, gated communities reinforce can be seen to be emerging within a sea of poverty
already-existing social tendencies, feeding on fears of (as opposed to cities in the USA and UK, where
difference and myths of urban danger. we noted the existence of islands of deprivation
Alvarez-Rivadulla (2007) concludes that the increasingly dissociated from an otherwise mobile
reasons that the occupants of Montevideo’s gated and affluent city).

The vicious urban revanchism that Smith docu- suggest that poorer groups are unable to resist these pro-
ments is a symptom of the deep-rooted fear amongst cesses. For example, some excluded groups may well resist
white middle- and upper-class citizens of Other popula- forms of social closure by transgressing into the spaces
tions, be they the unemployed, sex workers, the home- of the powerful, challenging taken-for-granted expecta-
less and immigrants. It is very common for mainstream tions about where they should locate (Cresswell 1996).
middle-class groups to wax lyrical about urban living, Such transgressions may trigger a moral panic (such as
and celebrate the diversity of the city, but all too few that which surrounded asylum seekers in the late 1990s
seem prepared to leave the suburbs unless it is for a simi- or people living with HIV in the 1980s), encouraging new
larly homogeneous gentrified inner-city district (Atkin- forms of social and spatial control. This control is often
son and Flint 2004). Moreover, these tendencies are not underpinned by the use of police power, as was the case
merely confined to the urban West, and it is easy to find with the French banlieue riots, where curfews were rigor-
instances of marginalized populations being displaced ously enforced in affected areas. In such cases, practices of
throughout the global South as shanty towns or informal spatial ordering and surveillance quickly reassert the social
settlements are bulldozed to make way for new middle- order, and remind people of their place. However, trans-
class developments, gated communities, shopping centres gressions may also set in motion social changes by chal-
and highway developments (see Case study 10.4). Though lenging assumptions about who or what belongs where.
often resisted, the net result is the corporate gentrifica- Parades, sit-ins, strikes, squats: all enact an opposition
tion of city centres worldwide, to the extent that the CBD that, however fleeting, may bring about a change in social
of Manila now looks very much the same as the CBD of attitudes. For instance, gay pride marches in Western cit-
Sydney (­Winchester et al. 2003). While such processes of ies have often drawn attention to homophobia in society,
corporate gentrification may ultimately attract mobile and over time have encouraged the repeal of discrimina-
consumer capital, and tie Third World cities into a net- tory legislation; perhaps less successfully, Muslim-identi-
work of world cities, the consequence is of course the pro- fying populations have pursued a variety of public actions
duction of new landscapes of exclusion and segregation. designed to topple the Islamophobia that is rampant in
The prognosis here for marginal groups is not good, as the Western nations.
some of the main policies advocated in their name seem Developing these ideas on transgression and resistance,
destined to serve interests other than their own. But while geographers have hence conceptualized places on the mar-
such practices of regeneration tend to carve up space in gin as sites where the relatively powerless can organize
favour of powerful middle-class elites, it is dangerous to themselves into self-supporting cultures of resistance and

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 224    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

cooperation. For example, so-called ‘gay ghetto’ areas in the English riots of 2011 or the French suburban riots
the USA (e.g. Castro in San Francisco, or West Hollywood of 2007 thrust it back into the limelight. But beyond the
in Los Angeles), France (e.g. the Marais, Paris) and South headlines, we must acknowledge it remains one of the
Africa (e.g. De Waterkant, Cape Town) have been trans- most important issues facing society in the twenty-first
formed from marginal spaces of persecution to relatively century. As we have seen, many societies possess ‘wild’
affluent centres of gay male cultural life through political and ‘untamed’ urban zones – ghettos, slums, banlieues,
organization, creativity and activism, creating new gay favelas – as well as more mundane sites of marginaliza-
identities in the process (see Forest 1995; Visser 2003; Siba- tion, poverty and stigma. While we need to be wary of
lis 2004; Hubbard 2012). Likewise, alternative economies suggesting these sites share common characteristics (e.g.
thrive in many racialized areas (particularly in the cultural the multi-ethnic make up of the French banlieue or many
industries – food, music, fashion, arts and media), allowing British inner cities stands in stark contrast to the eth-
‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ to bring different values and ideas to nic homogeneity of the US ‘ghetto’), there are a number
the attention of wider audiences, making them more main- of key themes that geographers routinely invoke when
stream in the process. This gradual demarginalization analysing their geographies: namely, exclusion, margin-
process may, over time, bring excluded populations into the alization and segregation. Taken together, these themes
mainstream – though the debate on the possibilities of this emphasize the fact that space is never an abstract surface
remains heated. Indeed, there remains considerable debate on which social life is played out, but is socially produced.
about the degree to which the physical characteristics of a As such, research on urban geographies of residential seg-
neighbourhood have an impact on the lives of its inhabit- regation does not just provide valuable insights into the
ants, and whether moving poor people into more affluent particular combination of problems that beset our most
areas actually improves their quality of life. vulnerable urban populations; it also makes a key con-
tribution to theoretical debates about the role of urban
space in constructing socially significant categories of
identity and difference (such as class, gender, sexuality
10.5 Conclusion and race). In the final analysis, the concept of urban seg-
regation is not solely of relevance to the issues of social
Segregation is just one of many issues explored by urban inequality discussed in this chapter: it is fundamental to
social geographers. It is also something of a timeless making sense of the diversity that characterizes the con-
issue, threatening to drift into abeyance until events like temporary world.

Learning outcomes ● Understand that efforts to reclaim spaces of

Having read this chapter, you should be able to: exclusion in the name of improvement and ‘urban
regeneration’ often instigate urban gentrification – a
● Understand that cities are divided in ways that often process that often triggers new forms of spatial
segregate stigmatized ‘Other’ groups. purification and exclusion rather than social mixing.
● Appreciate the complexity of the processes
encouraging this segregation, including people’s
desire to distance themselves from populations Further reading
represented by the media as threatening or polluting.
● Identify the characteristics of urban spaces of DeVerteuil, G. (2015) Resilience in the Post-welfare Inner
exclusion, which tend to lack economic, social or City: Voluntary Sector Geographies in London, Los Angeles
political infrastructure, and are typified by health and Sydney, London, Policy Press. Focusing on homeless
lives and facilities, this timely book provides an overview
problems and a poor quality of life for those who
of changing provisioning for the poor and welfare-users in
live there. ten different inner-city neighbourhoods in three global city-
● Recognize the importance of spatial stigmatization regions (London, Los Angeles and Sydney).
in exacerbating social divides; once a neighbour- Dikeç, M. (2007) Badlands of the Republic: Space, Politics,
hood has obtained a reputation as a space of and French Urban Policy, Blackwell, RGS/IBG Book Series,
exclusion, it is unlikely to attract investment of a Oxford. Develops ideas about the social and political imagi-
type that will benefit its inhabitants. nations that have marginalized French immigrant populations

M10_DANI2950_05_SE_C10.indd 224 04/04/16 6:30 pm

 Chapter 10  Urban segregation and social inequality     225

in the banlieues (the ‘badlands’ of his title), offering significant in the wider context of colonial and post-colonial tensions,
insight into the 2005 urban unrest in French cities. especially religious and cultural ones.
Lees, L., Slater, T. and Wyly, E. (2013) Gentrification, Rout- Sibley, D. (1995) Geographies of Exclusion: Society and
ledge, London. Perhaps the most exhaustive and com- Difference in the West, Routledge, London. Remains a land-
prehensive account of the causes and consequences of mark theoretical statement on geographies of exclusion, bring-
gentrification. International in scope, this is an accessible and ing geographical ideas into dialogue with psychoanalytical
critical overview. literatures. The book is illustrated throughout with examples
Musterd, S. and Ostendorf, W. (eds) (2013) Urban ranging from the marginalization of gypsies to the exclusion of
Segregation and the Welfare State: Inequality and Exclusion non-white voices from the spaces of the academy.
in Western Cities, Routledge, London. This is a very valuable Wacquant, L. (2009) Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal
collection for those seeking comparative analysis of patterns Government of Social Insecurity, Duke University Press,
of urban segregation in different cities, with a specific focus Durham, NC. A powerfully argued book that suggests con-
on comparative welfare regimes and the legacies of govern- temporary penal strategies in the USA (and beyond) are
mental initiatives in European cities. responding not so much to fears of crime but social resent-
Nightingale, C.H. (2012) Segregation: A Global History of ments underpinned by racial – and racist – imaginaries. The
Divided Cities, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. focus on the ‘hyperincarceration’ of young, black men from
Provides a more historic account of segregation than has ‘ghetto’ environments suggests neoliberal policy continues to
been possible in this chapter, and considers urban division gain its legitimacy from spatial ordering.

M10_DANI2950_05_SE_C10.indd 225 04/04/16 6:30 pm

 Changing rural
worlds – a global view

Chapter 11

Warwick E. Murray

Topics covered
■ Definitions and meanings of ‘rural’
■ Trajectories and gaps in rural geography as a sub-discipline
■ The interlinking of rural change in the global North and South
■ Demographic change in rural worlds: depopulation,
counterurbanization and rural–urban drift
■ Political change in rural worlds: countryside movements and
rural resistance
■ Cultural change in rural worlds: social constructions of the
country, commodification of rural areas, social change
■ Economic change in rural worlds: productivist vs.
post-productivist agriculture, multifunctional rural areas,
ethical value chains (fair trade, organic networks and
geographical indicators (GIs))

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 Chapter 11  Changing rural worlds – a global view     227

W hat do you think of when you use the term ‘rural’?

Your response will be influenced heavily by where
you ‘come from’ in both a territorial and sociocultural
sense. It is an assumption, but if you are from Britain
you might imagine black and white cottages, beauti-
ful tidy villages, welcoming pubs, neat hedge rows,
and charming village fêtes. I am from such a place
and despite doing rural geography research across the
globe in order to experience and try to understand
multiple rural worlds, this is still what comes to my
mind. Yet, perceptions of the ‘rural’ will be far less
pleasant in Tonga, for example. There it might be sug-
gested that poor infrastructure, absence of electricity,
grinding poverty, patriarchal governance systems, vul-
Plate 11.1  A ‘typical’ English rural setting, conserved
nerable housing, environmental deterioration, and and commercialized for tourists. Stokesay, Shropshire,
marginal and precarious livelihoods characterize such United Kingdom.
places (see Plates 11.1 and 11.2 for example). This is (Warwick E. Murray)
not to suggest that all is well with the countryside in
the global North and ill in the global South; margin-
alization and poverty are increasingly recognized to be
part of rich-world rural areas, just as there are pockets
of privilege in rural areas in poorer countries. Further-
more, within and between the global South and global
North there are widely different rural geographical
imaginations: in Australia the concept of ‘rural’ tends
to be associated with wilderness, whereas in Western
Europe notions of the rural tend to be more idyllic.
In the Americas, for example, Argentinian notions of
the rural – of unkempt green fields, horseback riders,
unpaved roads, and vineyards set against the snowy
Andes – are very different to what might be imagined
in the US West, where de-populated settlements, iconic Plate 11.2  Rural women make a tapa cloth for
landforms, drought and desert might be pictured (see ceremonial use and sale, Tongatapu Island, Tonga.
(Warwick E. Murray)
Plates 11.3 and 11.4). The point being made here is
that imaginaries and indeed realities of the ‘rural’ are
not homogenous across the globe either within or
between regions and territories, varying across time
and space in ways that alter how the rural is defined,
interacted with, inhabited, interpreted and socially
constructed.
Much recent work in rural geography, in both the
Anglo/North American/Australasian (ANAA) tradi-
tion and increasingly in other geographical communi-
ties across the world such as those of Latin America,
South-east Asia and the Pacific Islands, has sought to
show that there are in fact rural worlds within worlds
and that peoples’ identity and social position play a role
in the way rural spaces are conceptualized and experi-
enced. Furthermore, as already suggested, the experience Plate 11.3  Rural Argentina, A hacienda-like vineyard
of the rural varies widely between the global North and with a view of the Andes, Mendoza, Argentina.
global South, though much more geographical research (John Overton and Warwick E Murray)

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 228    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

Plate 11.4  Iconic Wild West

Wilderness, Arizona, USA.
(Warwick E. Murray)

on the latter is required (Murray 2008). Although rural and local environmental issues, though arguably less
spaces differ vastly across the world, arguably they form pressing than those in the South, are also considerable
interlinked parts of one global complex. As such, as glo- and the use of the rural idyll as a marketing tool to com-
balization unfolds, the social, economic and environmen- modify ‘countryside’ means that the rural is important
tal shifts that are occurring in rural worlds everywhere across the urban/rural divide. Far from being stagnant
do not occur in isolation (Murray and Overton 2014). or in decline, as it is sometimes portrayed as for exam-
This chapter investigates a range of perspectives on rural ple in British sit-com The Last of the Summer Wine, the
worlds from different geographical viewpoints. In doing ‘rural’ is shifting rapidly – and these changes are existent
so, it purposefully draws on my own fieldwork-based in and have implications for global society as a whole.
examples from around the globe to paint a picture of This chapter looks first at how we might define the term
the highly dynamic and increasingly interwoven spaces ‘rural’; it then turns to how geographers have approached
we term ‘rural’. and theorized change in such places. We then move on
From the vantage point of highly urbanized societies to consider changing global rural geographies in terms
that tend to characterize the global North (and Latin of demographic, political, cultural and economic shifts.
America in the global South), it is easy to forget that just
under half (46 per cent in 2014) of the world’s population
lives in rural areas, representing a total of 3.36 billion
people. In both absolute and relative senses the global 11.1 Words and worlds: what is ‘rural’?
South is more rural with 3.09 billion inhabitants repre-
senting 52 per cent of the total population of the South What is meant by the term ‘rural’? As already discussed
in 2014. Africa and Asia accounted for close to 90 per above, meanings and definitions vary across cultures and
cent of the global rural population in 2014 with close to places. At the general level, there are two ways we can
1.5 billion rural inhabitants in India and China alone. approach defining the rural. The first set of approaches
The vast majority of the rural world then is Southern. In might be termed empirical, and includes functional
the global North in 2014 there were just under 276 mil- approaches including measuring land-use characteris-
lion rural inhabitants, representing 22 per cent of total tics as well as demographic approaches that involve such
population there (UN 2014c). As such, it could be argued things as population density measures. The second set
that rural geography, at the global scale, should be prin- of definitions can be termed conceptual and does not
cipally concerned with issues of social, economic, envi- use directly quantifiable measures of rurality, drawing
ronmental and cultural change in poorer countries. This instead on social constructs, which have to do with
is why this chapter seeks balance in this respect, build- how we imagine the countryside.
ing on examples from both the global North and South. Governments have their own methodologies for
The issues at stake in rural worlds across the world are delimiting what is meant by rural, which are generally
serious and pressing, and concern billions of people. In empirical and are important for planning and develop-
the rural global South, poverty and deprivation are high, ment purposes. Using a functional definition assumes
cultural loss and environmental degradation is advancing that there is a rural/urban dichotomy and that the rural
rapidly. In the rural global North social justice concerns is defined by what it is not – that is, not urban. But this

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 Chapter 11  Changing rural worlds – a global view     229

rural/urban dichotomy will vary between places greatly, the rural. Under such definitions rural is something in the
as both the rural and the urban are variously understood. mind – and thus rural ‘social’ space need not correspond
In the Pacific Island territories, such as Fiji, Samoa or with rural ‘geographic’ space. More will be said on this
Rapa Nui (a.k.a Easter Island), many of the areas that are issue when we consider how rural geography has itself
defined as urban in official statistics would likely be seen changed over recent years.
as rural areas to people from the North; such areas often Cloke (2000: 718) defines the ‘rural’ as:
have lush vegetation, informal communal gardens and
Areas which are dominated by extensive land uses
relatively low-density populations. Rapa Nui is defined as
such as agriculture or forestry, or by large open
100 per cent urbanized in official statistics, for example,
spaces of underdeveloped land, which contain small,
as all of its approximately 3,800 inhabitants are located in
lower order settlements demonstrating a strong rela-
the capital Hanga Roa (see Plate 11.5). This low-density
tionship between buildings and extensive landscape,
settlement would most likely not be considered ‘urban’
and which are perceived as rural by most residents.
by Western standards, however. In this sense, using
(Emphasis added)
functional as well as demographic and other empirical
measures leads to complexities when intended to allow The emphasis is added above in order to highlight the
comparison across societies. fact that rural geographers have come to think of ‘rural-
Human geographers realize that the rural and urban ity’ as much as a state of mind as one based on a specific
overlap in many ways. It is common to refer to peri- configuration of functions. Cloke goes on to argue that
urban, rurban and semi-urban areas. In this regard, some while some rural areas are still defined functionally, in
have argued that rural and the urban are best thought of those closer to urban centres ‘rural is more of a socially
as lying on a rural–urban continuum. Overall, it is now constructed and culturally constructed and therefore
recognized that seeking to define the rural and the urban contested category’ (Cloke 2000: 718). This latter point
in opposition to each other (what are sometimes called is most relevant to the global North where the blurring
binaries) is not the most useful approach. Both political between urban and rural is increasingly pronounced
economy and more recent cultural approaches to rural and where cultural commodification of the countryside
geography emphasize, in various ways, that rural and and the construction of the rural idyll are widespread.
urban spaces are constructed by processes that cut across As we will see, although these processes are evident in
both, and that whilst the impacts of these processes on some cases, rurality in the global South generally has very
the ground will not be equal they are responding to com- different connotations.
mon stimuli (see Chapter 9).
Conceptual definitions of rural are important, and not
as obscure as they may appear at first. As we will see, eco-
nomic opportunities, planning, infrastructure develop- 11.2 Changing rural geographies
ment and many other ‘concrete’ outcomes are predicated
on how individuals, collectives and governments imagine In order to understand the geographies of rural space, it
is useful to review the evolution of rural geography as a
sub-discipline. Rural geography is the study of the rela-
tionship between humans and the environment in rural
areas, the nature of rural localities, economies, societies,
cultures and environments and how this varies across
space. Trajectories within the sub-discipline vary mark-
edly across the world, but in the ANAA tradition there
has been a relatively common path. Within the context of
geography in general, rural geography has, until recently,
been somewhat neglected. This may be because in richer
countries the rural population is a minority. Also, it could
be argued that much Western scholarship carries an urban
bias, based on the assumption that it is in such areas that
social progress is designed and experienced. The past
Plate 11.5  The wharf at Hanga Roa, the urban 25 years has seen a rise in interest in rural geography in
centre and capital of Rapa Nui (Easter Island), ­ the ANAA tradition and rural areas in the global North
South Pacific. are seen as spaces where general cultural and economic
(Warwick E. Murray) processes can be researched, understood and interpreted.

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 230    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

Indeed, rural studies are increasingly interdisciplinary Argentinian rural geography has long been dominated by
(see, for example, the leading academic journal in this land use analysis, functional definitions, and quantifica-
area, Journal of Rural Studies). Rural geographies of the tion oriented towards planning and poverty alleviation,
poor world have been treated very differently and have for example, although there are signs this is changing in
tended to be conflated with development studies: thus, the fieldwork of a new generation of researchers. In this
notwithstanding research in Latin America on the Nueva sense, as Roche (2002) argues in a classic review article,
Ruralidad there is relatively little cultural geography of it is more meaningful to talk of rural ‘geographies’ rather
the rural global South (see Kay 2008; Murray 2008). than a singular geography.
Early geography paid some attention to rural areas but The most recent turn in rural geography has been pro-
this declined with the quantitative revolution and the rise foundly influenced by the general cultural turn in human
of spatial science in the 1960s. Rural geography at this geography which itself was stimulated by the shift to
time was essentially agricultural geography, as ‘rural’ and postmodern ideas in the social sciences. This shift has
‘agricultural’ were – for good empirical reasons – more by no means been homogenous and there are commenta-
explicitly interchangeable at the time. Rural geography tors who have argued that this has made our rural geogra-
made something of a comeback in the 1970s and early phies less rather than more relevant (see Wilson and Rigg
1980s, and during this period the sub-discipline could be 2003). In the global South new rural cultural geographies
described as ‘functionalist’, concerned with such issues as have been eclipsed by the study of what is perceived as
rural planning, land use change and urban encroachment. more pressing socio-economic and environmental con-
In hindsight, this approach can be seen as ‘uncritical’ and cerns. As a consequence the exploration of important
theory-free. The relevance of such rural geography was cultural themes has been woeful. Only recently have we
questioned in terms of its contribution to broader society seen the emergence of more ‘holistic’ approaches, for
in the late 1980s. Some also argued that by focusing on example such as Desarollo rural con identidad (rural
the distinctiveness of the countryside it ignored processes development with identity) in countries including Peru,
that cut across the increasingly blurred rural–urban Mexico and Ecuador. The cultural approach, then, seeks
divide (Woods 2010). to break down old binaries and structures, interrogating
By the early 1990s, in the ANAA tradition, there rurality as an environmental as well as social construct,
was resurgence in rural geography based on concepts which is participated in by persons of shared cultural,
from political economy. This focused in particular on social and moral values. Crucially, the social space of the
a critique of the role of the ‘restructuring’ impacts of rural (which can be imagined and thus be located any-
­ lobalization and – although not referred to as such
g where) need not necessarily overlap with the territorial
then – neoliberalism. This approach saw the applica- space of the rural. Thus the new rural geography engages
tion of concepts from neo-Marxist and world systems with ideas that have to do with the social construction
perspectives and was focused on how circuits of capital of categories, and the way they are then represented and
across the world conditioned, and were conditioned by, reproduced.
the nature of rural space in different locations and how Partly in response to the cultural turn, political
the state intervened in such flows. Some such concepts ­economy approaches have broadened to include, among
have been applied to agriculture in the South, particularly other things, studies of those who are ‘marginalized’,
commodity and value chain analysis, although not always including geographies of rural women, the young, the old
under the title of rural ‘geography’. Themes considered and those in poverty, for example. There have also been
during this period included diversification, environmental a number of more contemporary geographies exploring,
change, international food chains and deregulation, as among other things, rural sexuality, feminism, travel-
well as attempts, in later forms at least, to bring together lers and those who, because of dominant cultural con-
social and political issues with economic concerns (Cloke structions of the countryside (in the United Kingdom at
2005a). The latter included work on commodification, least), have been severely ‘othered’ (Little and Leyshon
gentrification, accessibility and counterurbanization. 2003; Woods 2010, 2012). Finally, there has been a shift in
Much of the work in this area, particularly in agri-food the ANAA tradition towards the exploration and promo-
systems, has continued until the present. Indeed one tion of ‘alternative’ and ‘ethical’ rural and agricultural
might argue that in New Zealand and Australia emphasis production networks and sustainable rural livelihoods in
has remained on the political economy of agriculture and both the global North and South, including fair trade,
on the impacts of globalization, and has not shifted to organic projects and geographical indications, for exam-
cultural interpretations to the extent that it has in the UK ple (see Spotlight box 11.2).
(Argent 2002). Furthermore, across the world traditional Linking the new cultural rural geography and political
land use studies remain popular; Chilean, Peruvian and economy rural studies is an important challenge (Argent

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 Chapter 11  Changing rural worlds – a global view     231

2002; Philips 2002). Furthermore, building in empirical out of neoliberalism, and shifting cultures in rural areas.
and theoretical input from geographers in areas other These shifts have been configured in very different ways
than the United Kingdom and the United States is also across space but, in general terms, depopulation in the
very important. Most rural dwellers live outside the countryside has been an almost universal trend since the
countries where the global rural geography agenda is set, industrial revolution in the global North, and since the
and in conditions that are very different to those found export of industrial-led growth models after the Sec-
there. In this regard, more research on the rural geogra- ond World War in the global South. Table 11.1 shows
phy of poorer territories and regions is required (Mur- that whilst absolute world rural population rose from
ray 2008). Overall, the important thing to remember is 1.7 billion to over 3.36 billion between 1950 and 2014,
that numerous traditions in rural geography coexist and in relative terms it declined, falling from 71 per cent to
that ‘paradigms’ or perspectives never neatly succeed one 46 per cent of the total global population.
another; communicating across and between these rural Table 11.1 also shows the breakdown of rural
world-views is a central challenge for human geographers ­population by region, illustrating that in a proportional
in general. sense Africa is the most ‘rural’ – with levels of over
60 per cent – followed by Asia with 52 per cent. Looking
at regional data at this scale often hides important varia-
tions – for example, Oceania includes the highly urbanized
11.3 Shifting rural worlds countries of Australia and New Zealand, as well as rela-
tively rural Pacific Island countries such as Vanuatu, Solo-
In what follows we will consider geographical change in mon Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. Overall,
rural demographies, polities, cultures and economies. however, it is clear that there is a significant North/South
Relative weight is placed on the latter two categories, divide in terms of the demographic rural/urban dichot-
although this does not mean that they are more signifi- omy; in the richer countries there are just over 275 m­ illion
cant than other areas. Processes that operate in any one rural inhabitants, representing approximately 22 per cent
of these spheres interact in various ways with processes of the total population, whilst in the South there are
in others, just as rural areas are bound together as one over 3 billion rural inhabitants, accounting for just over
global network. 52 per cent of the total population at the present time.
Rather than considering the global North and South Since the Industrial Revolution the relative loss of
separately, examples from each and the links between population in the countryside in the global North has
them are emphasized within this framework. The forces proceeded as national economies became based first on
that cut across these boundaries can be summarized as industry and then services, both of which are generally,
modernization (see modernity in the glossary) (includ- though not exclusively, concentrated in urban areas.
ing increased urbanization and industrialization), and This population loss has commonly been highly selec-
its latest incarnates, neoliberalism, retroliberalism and tive, often taking the young and sometimes the skilled,
globalization (see Murray and Overton 2015). These pro- leaving depleted labour markets and service provision
cesses fall unevenly in different places, given local his- (see Plate 11.6). Indeed, as noted above, rural popula-
tories and respective positions in the global system. As tions across the world are both ageing and in relative
global divisions of labour spread further across the planet decline. Rates of urbanization are most rapid by far in
and borders become increasingly permeable, rural and the global South, while the level of urbanization remains
agricultural spaces in very different places form constitu- low compared to the West. The most rapid rates of rela-
ent parts of an evolving global network of rural spaces. tive rural population decline, then, are found in poorer
As such, land use and identity and all other aspects of regions of the planet, which has significant and generally
rural change in the North must be seen as intimately tied deleterious consequences for the rural society left behind
to changing socio-economic, environmental and cultural as well as to the swelling urban populations which they
ruralities in the South. are augmenting.
There have been some exceptions to the rule of relative
rural depopulation and one of the most studied demo-
11.3.1 Dynamic rural demographies graphic processes in the global North has been coun-
Rural demographies across the world are highly dynamic. terurbanization. In the 1970s in the USA, for example,
This demographic change has been conditioned, to vary- fuelled by rising net in-migration, smaller towns grew at
ing extents, by generally increasing levels of urbanization, a more rapid pace than larger ones, reversing the histori-
the diversification of the economic base of the country- cal trend in urbanization towards large agglomerations.
side away from agriculture combined with the rolling In the 1980s and early 1990s in the United Kingdom

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 232    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

Table 11.1  Rural population by region and development grouping, 1950–2050

1950 1975 1990 2014 2050(*)

Population Population Population Population Population

(million) % (million) % (million) % (million) % (million) %

Africa 191 85.3 310 74.6 518 63.6 611 60.4 729 49.3
Asia 1162 83.2 1820 76 2313 62.9 2402 58.3 2236 45.9
Europe 271 49.5 232 34.4 206 28.3 201 27.5 152 21.7

Latin America 97 58 125 38.8 129 24.6 121 20.7 113 15.7
North America 62 36.1 64 26.2 66 20.9 63 18.1 53 13.3
Oceania 5 38 6 28.5 9 29.5 11 29.8 11 26.2
Global North 390 47.9 350 33.1 320 26.8 310 25.1 240 19.2
Global South 1400 81.9 2210 73.1 2920 59.7 3059 55.4 3050 43.9
World Rural 1790 71 2560 62.8 3240 53.3 3406 49.9 3290 40.1
World Total 2520 4070 6090 6829 8200
* = projected
Source: author’s calculations on data from UN (2010 and 2014c)

Cardiff re-located to villages and small towns across the

county. The real and perceived diseconomies of scale
of large cities as well as changes in the nature of work
and private mobility led to this outcome. Cultural shifts
also influence this demographic change. As people have
tired of the costs inherent in urban living, such as con-
gestion, pollution and social distance, some have sought
out the idyll of rural life, closer community, and many
other stereotypes that abound regarding the countryside
in the global North. In New Zealand and Australia the
rise of the ‘lifestyle block’, an acre or two of land in the
countryside where the ‘good life’ can be practiced, within
commuting distance of a large city, is a growing phenom-
enon. In the United Kingdom ‘barn conversions’ are the
outcome of similar processes albeit in a more densely
Plate 11.6  The monthly market in Chile Chico, a
populated context (see Plate 11.7).
small isolated settlement high in the Chilean Andes
on the border of Argentina and Chile. The universality of counterurbanization in the global
(Warwick E. Murray)
North has been called into question and some see it
as very time- and place-specific: related to a period of
manufacturing and service decentralization in Europe
smaller settlements and some rural areas experienced and USA that took place in the 1970s and early 1980s
growth whilst inner cities recorded net losses. Hereford, especially. Countries that have experienced periods of
an agricultural centre in the west of England located on growth in the proportion of the total population living
the Welsh border, became the fastest growing settlement in rural areas include Germany (1970–85), United King-
in the country in the late 1980s, for example. There were, dom (1950–70), Finland (marginally from 1980 onwards)
and still are, visible manifestations of urban to rural and Australia (1975–90) (United Nations 2006). There
migration in Herefordshire as a whole, including ‘barn- has been a clustering of relative rural population gain in
conversions’ and small rural housing estates as working Central and Eastern Europe since 1990 in places including
populations from cities such as Birmingham, Bristol and Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Romania, Czech Republic and

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 Chapter 11  Changing rural worlds – a global view     233

detect smaller regional units of buoyant rural population

growth based on migration patterns. This shift is influ-
enced by urban-to-rural migration among certain groups
and changes the nature of rural areas in a variety of ways.
Some rural areas, particularly those close to larger urban
settlements, have become effectively dormitory zones.
When in-migrant populations in the rural United King-
dom – characterized inherently by high mobility – bypass
local services such as small shops, local pubs, health clinics
and small hospitals, post-offices and railway stations, the
impact on the socio-cultural nature and economic base of
rural areas can be dramatic. The influx of urban migrants
in some areas has occasionally led to tensions between the
existent and in-migrant population, in terms of how rural
Plate 11.7  A ‘barn conversion’ in Herefordshire, settlements are governed and managed. Through the 1970s
England. and 1980s, Welsh nationalists, in response to the perceived
(Warwick E. Murray) ‘invasion’, burnt a number of holiday homes purchased by
non-Welsh newcomers, for example. Interestingly, however,
also Russia, for example. However, in many countries – studies in the United Kingdom have shown that social col-
including Spain, Holland, Belgium, Canada, Sweden and lectives, such as playgroups, village football teams, local
New Zealand, for example – net counterurbanization has fitness groups and creative activities such as orchestras (as
not occurred at all at a national scale, although there are in the case of my own home village of Tarrington in Here-
many examples of urban to rural migration, they have fordshire) have been characterized by high participation by
not outweighed the reverse. Outside of Europe there are in-migrants, clearly keen to illustrate their commitment to
virtually no examples of relative rural population gain their new home and live out the imagined community spirit
over the past 60 years, except in some very small coun- that some might seek. Cloke (2005b) argues that differing
tries or small island nations. However, the rural–urban densities of population and territorial size lead to differ-
drift has slowed in the global North; the rate of decline ent impacts with respect to the processes outlined above.
in rural population slowed from rates of 1.35 per cent per In the United Kingdom, for example, rural areas that are
annum in the period 1950–55 to 0.66 per cent between subject to immigration effectively become suburbs. This is
the years 2005 and 2010, and declined further by 2014 contrasted to the situation in the USA, Australia and, to
(United Nations 2009 and 2014c). Rural depopulation is an extent, New Zealand, where the migratory ‘footprint’
undoubtedly the dominant pattern in richer countries, of any given city will be relatively dispersed. Again what
albeit at lower rates than previously, particularly as inner should be clear from this discussion is that there are vari-
cities are rejuvenated and people appear to be seeking able outcomes across global rural space.
settlement closer to their place of work (see Chapter 9). The demographic processes at work and outcomes in
Recently, the rise of Internet communications has led the rural areas of the global South are, generally speak-
some to suggest that a new process of counterurbaniza- ing, very different to those outlined in the preceding
tion could well be imminent, as people can increasingly discussion, although the theme of rural depopulation in
locate at a distance from their place of employment. terms of the proportion of total population living in rural
Whilst possible in theory, such technology does not obvi- areas is a common one. As already noted, this process is
ate the essential human need to meet face to face and generally much more rapid in poorer countries in terms
such a process relates to only certain kinds of tertiary and of absolute rates of migration. Although rural–urban
quaternary activities and is therefore socially-selective; to drift has ebbed and flowed in different places at different
date there is no evidence that cyber-technology is revers- times, this shift has become one of the defining features
ing rural depopulation anywhere on the planet. of social change in the South over the past decades, lead-
Although counterurbanization is not a worldwide ing to the abandonment of rural areas in extreme cases
phenomenon, representing a fascinating yet ultimately (Plate 11.8) and the explosion of urban populations in
unimportant diversion from the principal trend of rural receiving areas. Latin America has seen a particularly
depopulation, there is no doubt that the social structure of marked rural depopulation over the past 50 years in pro-
the rural population in the global North is shifting because portional terms, for example, as has the Pacific Island
of demographic change. When one looks below the scale region, which in many cases has seen the rise of inter-
of the whole nation-state, it has often been possible to national rural to urban migration (see Case study 11.1).

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 234    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

Plate 11.8  Inca de Oro,

which translates as Gold
Inca, was formerly an
important mining centre
in the Atacama region of
Chile. The concentration and
modernization of mining has
seen it decline and suffer
depopulation and service
decline.
(Warwick E. Murray)

Case study 11.1

Rural depopulation in the been abandoned leaving empty shells where once
Pacific Islands: Niue were houses; and the country’s agriculture suffers from
severe labour shortages (Plate 11.9). After the devastat-
Niue provides a good example of rural depopulation ing cyclone Heta in late 2004, some on the right-wing of
in the global South. Niue is a very small island nation New Zealand politics asked whether the country could
with a population of close to 1,500. Although Alofi, survive and at what point it should be declared unviable.
its capital, is defined as an urban area, functionally The disappearance of the rural society on the island
and demographically it is rural, being low-density and of Niue would deny the world a unique and fascinating
dominated by subsistence agricultural production. culture that contributes to the world’s human diversity. A
From a peak of 5,000, this rural island has been losing similar story is true across many of the Pacific Islands
population since the 1960s, a process which acceler- such as Rapa Nui, Samoa, Wallis and Futuna, Tuvalu
ated when the colonial power from 1901, New Zealand, and Tokelau, as rural population is lost to the process of
offered dual citizenship for Niueans on independence both intra- and transnational urbanization (Murray and
in 1974. Owing to a mixture of cyclones, environmental Terry 2004; Connell 2008; Overton and Murray 2014).
degradation, and misguided economic development
policy, the islanders have moved consistently and in
very high relative numbers to the cities of New Zea-
land, especially Auckland, and to a lesser extent to
Australia. This loss has its positive side – remittances
sent back from Niuean migrants, often second and third
generation, form part of the backbone of the country’s
economy, with over 50 per cent of GDP accounted for
by such flows, with much of the rest of national income
accounted for by aid flows (Murray and Overton 2014).
Unlike remittance-based migration from some rural
areas to urban areas in the South, this case is not cir-
cular in its nature: it is largely permanent. However, this
loss of population means that Niue is the most rapidly Plate 11.9  Abandoned housing in Niue, Central
depopulating rural zone and country in the world. The Pacific. International rural to urban migration has
consequences of this demographic shift have been dev- seen numerous villages in the country struggle to
astating: services in retail and transport have declined remain viable.
as they become uneconomic; whole settlements have (Warwick E. Murray)

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 Chapter 11  Changing rural worlds – a global view     235

A number of factors explain this rural–urban drift in this has been coupled with severe environmental decline
the South, with the weight of each varying from place to because of over-exploitation, rapid commercialization or
place. Generally speaking, the move abroad of transna- climate change. Severe drought has increased over recent
tional corporations (TNCs) beginning in the 1960s, the years in the sub-Saharan rural zones, for example, lead-
increasing mobility of capital from the 1980s onwards, and ing to a rise in rural–urban drift. Under such conditions,
the concomitant rise in industrial employment, together political circumstances, including wars, and neoliberal
with development theory and policy that promotes mod- and retroliberal economic policies such as export ori-
ernization (i.e. industrial urban development) as beneficial entation, have often aggravated environmental tensions
and desirable, have combined to precipitate this outcome leading to full-scale food shortages and famine. Prob-
(Potter et al. 2008). The process has been aggravated by the lems in rural areas in the South are made all the more
legacy of unequal landholding structures in rural areas, significant when one considers that despite rapid relative
where peasant farmers often exist side by side with large population loss, the largest absolute rural populations
landowners sometimes directly descended from colonial are found in poor countries and this is set to be the case
elites. The simultaneous commercialization of agriculture in the foreseeable future. Table 11.2 shows the largest ten
and de-agrarianization of national economies has often led rural populations by country in 2014, projected into 2050,
to fewer opportunities for small-scale producers, as larger with the USA being the only country in the global North
producers have access to the credit and collateral required featuring on the list.
to purchase the technology in order to compete. Thus
smaller producers have either lost their land to become
temporary labourers on large farms or have migrated
11.3.2 Dynamic rural polities
to the city – leading to what is known as proletarianiza- Political power in the countryside in both the global
tion in the case of the former, and de-peasantization in North and South is shifting considerably in terms of
the case of the latter (Murray 2006). There are instances how it is gained and exercised. As such, the governance
when this rural population decline has been stopped or of rural spaces is increasingly complex and contested. In
even reversed, as is the case in the Monte Patria comuna Northern countries, rural areas have traditionally been
(district) of northern Chile during the peak years of the over-represented in parliamentary politics, owing in part
grape export boom in the early 1990s and is now the case in to the inherited importance of the landed elite in national
the rapidly expanding wine export regions of the Central affairs of state as well as the desire of some democratic
Valley (Overton and Murray 2011). In some cases in places governments to escape accusations of urban bias. Within
as diverse as Peru, Fiji and Sarawak, Malaysia the rise of the countryside itself this created space for various coun-
rural tourism has led to localized rural population growth, tryside interest groups, alliances, political parties and
but overall this is not common. social movements that draw on particular imaginaries
In short, rural areas in poorer countries have become of the countryside to make their case. In New Z ­ ealand,
increasingly less attractive economically and socially and for example, a small political party – the Outdoor Rec-
a large-scale drift to the cities has occurred. In some cases reation Party NZ – won 1.3  per cent (approximately

Table 11.2  Ten largest rural populations by country, 2014 and 2050 (millions)

Country Rural population 2014 Country Rural population 2050 (projected)

India 857 India 805

China 635 China 335
Indonesia 119 Nigeria 144
Pakistan 114 Ethiopia 117
Bangladesh 106 Pakistan 115
Nigeria  95 Indonesia  94
Ethiopia  78 Bangladesh  90
Vietnam  62 Uganda  71
USA  60 Philippines  69
Philippines  56 Dem. Rep. of Congo  61.4
Source: author’s calculations from UN (2014c)

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 236    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

25,000) votes in the 2002 general election on a platform (UNASUR) and the Southern African Development Com-
of ‘preserving’ rural areas for hunting and fishing as well munity (SADEC), have historically seen this as a form of
as broader rural-first policies and as a consequence of this protectionism, allowing the continuance of subsidized
success was integrated into a larger party – the United agriculture in richer countries. At the same time that such
Future – in subsequent elections. The Countryside Alli- support persists, global financial institutions insist on
ance in the United Kingdom is another case. With the the adoption of free-market, non-subsidized, neoliberal
motto ‘love the countryside’, the movement was formed policies in poorer countries, a situation that discriminates
in 1997 and grew rapidly in reaction to the single issue against millions of rural inhabitants.
of the proposed ban on fox-hunting contained in the In the global South the practice of modernist devel-
Labour Party 2001 election manifesto. The movement opment has often been described as ‘urban biased’ (Kay
soon mushroomed to include a range of disgruntled rural 2001). The persistent neglect of rural development initia-
groups who argued that central government was increas- tives in favour of industrial urban policy has been writ-
ingly over-interventionist in rural affairs. The Alliance ten about widely and consistently, most notably in Africa
argues that over 100,000 individuals are members. The and Latin America. In the latter, rural zones have been
movement culminated in a massive march on UK Parlia- neglected by administrations that have been over-central-
ment in October 2002 involving approximately 400,000 ized, partly a consequence of a legacy of urban-based
people. The imagined conflict between city and country Hispanic society, and partly the result of the opening
– ­traditional and modern, and ‘authentic’ and ‘fake’ – was of economies to foreign capital which exploits cheap
invoked in speeches during the march. Many groups that labour pools in urban areas during the recent phase of
are truly marginalized in the countryside, such as travel- neoliberalism and subsequent retroliberalism. There are
lers for example, were not represented to the same extent numerous examples of rural resistance to the neoliber-
as the ‘sport’ of fox-hunting. This has led some to argue alization of rural areas and its associated urban bias in
that the Alliance was a smokescreen erected by the elite, places as diverse as Thailand, Fiji and Brazil. One of the
utilizing stereotypical interpretations of the countryside, most notable examples is that of the Zapatistas in Chia-
to push a single issue pertinent to them, whilst drawing pas, Southern Mexico (Murray and Overton 2014). This
in support from the rural masses (see Woods 2005 for a movement was very influential in terms of the rise of the
discussion). Casting the particularities of the situation anti-globalization groups that characterized the early
to one side, what is interesting is the way the Alliance 2000s and the group remains powerful in popular culture
used ‘imaginaries’ of the countryside in order to pursue a today, evidenced in Mexican singer/musician Lila Downs’
­specific political point. It is also clear that these imaginar- recent song ‘Zapata sigue’ which celebrates the dynamic
ies – of fox-hunting and hounds and red suits on horses and complex rural Mexican culture linked to the figure of
– are not necessarily shared, or even considered desirable, Zapata and the uprising in Southern Mexico. Despite rises
by the majority in the countryside in the United Kingdom. in commodity agro-exports, effective control of resources
But representations of the rural for political gain are still remains in urban areas, resulting in a process of what
not just made from within the countryside itself: argu- could be called internal colonialism. Rural dwellers in the
ments about rural identity are sometimes invoked in order South have to endure the double impact of over-central-
to make broader political gains. Countries in the Euro- ized and urban-biased governments, and the economic
pean Union, especially France, have used arguments con- control of large corporations based in capital cities or,
cerning the importance of ‘rurality’ to make the case for often, outside of the borders of the country itself.
the maintenance of subsidies for agriculture, organized There are also examples of resistance to ‘modern-
broadly under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) ist’ rural production methods in the South by popula-
since 1962, claiming that such funds help sustain the life- tions in the global North. Participation in alternative
styles and landscapes that make a broader contribution to food networks, organic supply chains, local economic
the character of the European countryside. More recently, trading schemes, slow food networks, localized farmer
European governments have couched this argument in markets/food miles movements and fair trade linkages
terms of the protection of the ‘multifunctionality’ (see as forms of opposition have become significant, on the
also later discussion) of the countryside; that is to say, sus- fringes of the modernist production and consumption
taining agriculture has positive knock-on effects in other networks of the North. Some, however, have conceptu-
areas (such as environmental preservation, for example) alized alternative projects as just part of neoliberalism,
that others in broader society also value. Governments of controlled by powerful multinational retail conglomerates
the South, articulated through the G77 and the World or bodies that serve their interests, where ‘alternatives’ are
Trade Organization (WTO) as well as various regional mainstreamed quickly in order to protect the capitalist
groupings such as the Union de Naciones Suramericanos status quo. However, fair trade NGOs and the Fairtrade

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 Chapter 11  Changing rural worlds – a global view     237

labelling bodies themselves maintain that consumers can The foregoing trends have influenced the cultural con-
play an important role in terms of caring at distance that sumption of the countryside and the allied commodifica-
can make a difference to rural spaces in poorer countries. tion of the rural experience. In the global North, rural
McCarthy (2006), however, argued that to date alternative imaginaries are used to sell things. When objects, traits
ethical networks had done little to alter existing North– and ideas of a particular culture are brought into capi-
South dynamics and power remains largely concentrated talist circuits, or when new traits are invented in order
in the former. Research efforts are being undertaken in this to stimulate economic gain, ‘cultural commodification’
area and will reveal more clues as to the impact of such can be said to be occurring. Increasingly, ‘cosmopolitan
networks in the coming years (see Spotlight box 11.2). consumers’ seek out ‘authentic’ experiences that will help
them differentiate themselves from the masses. There are
further examples across the ‘cultural’ economy – ‘world’
11.3.3 Dynamic rural cultures
music, poverty tourism, ‘ethnic’ food aisles in supermar-
Traditional rural cultures are being altered profoundly by kets, cultural quarters: Chinatown, Little India and the
the shifting relationship between the urban and the rural, like – established in cities as diverse as San Francisco,
although what is meant by ‘traditional’ is contested. As ­Singapore, London, Cape Town, Rio de Janeiro and
noted previously, the increasing intermingling of urban Auckland (see Chapter 13). Although the flow of cultural
and rural processes and populations raises questions as to items from the periphery to the core was initiated d ­ uring
what is meant by ‘rural’ at all. Indeed some have argued Western imperial times, there can be little doubt that
that the concept of rurality exists only in the mind and there is a growing tendency towards the consumption of
that the ‘binary’ of rural and urban is a false one. Thus, ‘the Other’ in richer markets facilitated by globalization
as noted previously, rural social space and rural territo- (see Chapter 19).
rial space are not necessarily the same thing and therefore In the case of rural areas, cultural commodification
‘rurality’ is something that has to be deconstructed. Some has been especially important. This is most obvious in
have even argued that we have reached a ‘post-rural’ con- the advertising world, which uses rural references in order
dition in that pure rurality no longer exists, if it ever did. to sell products that have little or nothing to do with the
Cultural geographers have been hard at work trying to countryside. For example, the advertising campaign for
tease out the way that meanings of rurality are perceived Speights Beer in New Zealand involves images of typical
by different actors in the global North (but relatively rural South Island men who are tough in outlook and pio-
­little in the South) and how this affects socio-cultural and neering in spirit. As heroes they are spurred on by the taste
­economic behavior and patterns. of Speights beer, which allegedly gives them energy, and
Postmodernists argue that much of the contemporary which they prefer above all ‘urban’ temptations (such as a
world is simulacrum where symbols or signifiers of an box at Eden Park rugby ground, the main stadium home
event replace direct experience. Reality is thus experi- of the All Blacks, in one advert). The good-humoured
enced through representations of it, creating a ‘hyper- rivalry between North and South Islands of New Zealand,
reality’ that is disembedded from territorial space. It has which is a proxy for urban and rural in some ways, is used
been argued, based largely on evidence from the UK, that to sell a product that ‘real men’ drink. In reality, most Spei-
this has occurred in the case of the perception of the rural ghts beers are brewed in Auckland, located in the northern
by some urban dwellers who wish to experience the ‘rus- part of the country – a large urban conglomeration much
tic’ and the relatively ‘untouched’, which they imagine to like any other, far away both territorially and culturally
be associated with the countryside. This might include: from much of the South Island.
wearing country clothes, driving large four-wheel-drive There is also a trend towards ‘place-making’ in rural
all-terrain vehicles around city streets, designing the inte- areas across the global North, for the purposes of creat-
rior of their homes like country cottages, and so on. It ing niche products, including tourism. This involves tak-
could be argued that many people who live in the rural– ing a trait, or inventing one, which is characteristic of a
urban fringe extend this hyper-reality to their everyday locality and using this for economic gain – another term
existence. The idea that we are in a post-rural condition for this is fictive place (see Overton and Murray 2016).
takes the argument too far, however, and certainly does Ludlow, in the English county of Shropshire, for example,
in the case of the global South where such notions are at has reinvented itself as one of the principal gourmet desti-
best irrelevant and, at worst, fanciful, elitist and damag- nations in the country based on the coincidental location
ing. As such and in general, the cultural meanings associ- there of a number of top restaurateurs in the 1990s. This
ated with the rural have caused a shift in the relationship has created a hub of restaurants, cafés, wine bars and
between society and geographical space, and between tea shops, which bears little relevance to the ‘authentic’
culture and nature (see Chapter 12). history of this small medieval rural town which grew up

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 238    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

based around its castle built to defend from and further rural areas. In New Zealand, in the area around Rotorua
penetrate that part of the British Celtic fringe now known (central North Island), there are numerous ‘authentic’
as Wales. In New Zealand, Taihape has pronounced itself Maori villages that have been developed for tourists to
‘gumboot’ (wellington boot) capital of the world, has an visit and experience indigenous culture. In New Zea-
annual world gumboot throwing competition, and has land’s leading tourist destination, Queenstown, in an
erected statues and opened tearooms to celebrate this area not intensively settled by Maori historically, there
(Plate 11.10)! Towns that have been bypassed by the is a strong tourist-based ‘Maori experience’ on offer at
establishment of large highways turn this to their advan- various performances locations throughout the town.
tage by advertising the ‘best of rural life’ on large high- Today, most Maori live in urban areas and their lifestyle
way billboards to attract weary travellers, as in the case is far removed from the hyper-reality and fictive place
of Marton, New Zealand. Alexandra in Central Otago, depicted in such locations, but such businesses provide
New Zealand, has recreated the original settlers’ rural an important source of income for those involved, includ-
township in order to stimulate the tourist demand for ing many Maori who lead the groups that perform haka
authentic rural experiences, and there are many similar (dance) and waiata (song). Cultural commodification
examples across Anglo settler societies such as the USA, has the potential to bring economic gains but it can also
Canada and Australia. These examples illustrate attempts straightjacket places into fossilized cultural representa-
to use rural imaginaries to create diversified livelihoods in tions, leading to the creation of damaging stereotypes.
areas where traditional agricultural production patterns Notwithstanding this, some have argued that such ven-
are rapidly restructuring. In such efforts culture, invented tures help maintain traits of Maori culture that might
or otherwise, plays an important economic role. otherwise die out, thereby rejuvenating rural indigenous
A phenomenon linked to cultural consumption is culture.
the creation of rural spectacle in order to market place In the rural global South cultural issues are very differ-
(Cloke 2005b). The construction of ‘fresh’ and ‘natu- ent. Rural cultures are, of course, vibrant and enormously
ral’ experiences is important in this respect. Adventure varied. Given that the vast majority of rural dwellers on
tourism in New Zealand and Australia – including white earth live in the global South this variety is kaleidoscopic.
water rafting, bungee jumping and zorbing, for e­ xample In some cases ‘national’ culture is rooted in traditional
– is an interesting example of how rural areas have recon- and conservative imaginaries of the rural (see Plate 11.1),
figured their economic bases. At Kiwi 360 near to Tau- although this culture is sometimes fossilized and invented.
ranga, New Zealand, it is possible to visit orchards, take Notwithstanding this, very little is known of the rural
part in activities and tour a museum to kiwi fruit pro- cultural geography of the South, and human geography
duction. The multiple connotations of the word ‘kiwi’ in the North has tended to ignore it. There is a rich tradi-
– which refers to a native flightless bird, a fruit, and often tion of anthropology of rural areas in the Third World,
used to describe a New Zealander – are clearly used in but this tends to focus on the unusual rather the everyday
marketing such rural spectacles. Related to the concept cultures of the rural poor. In some post-colonial territo-
of rural spectacle is the evolution of cultural visits to ries rural areas are often home to ‘indigenous’ cultures, or

Plate 11.10  Taihape, Central North Island, New Plate 11.11  The annual horse sprint tournament
Zealand – gumboot capital of the world! high in the Limarí Valley, Norte Chico, Chile.
(Warwick E. Murray) (Warwick E. Murray)

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 Chapter 11  Changing rural worlds – a global view     239

at least they were so before the onset of rural–urban drift. circa 400,000) might well still consider themselves as
This raises particular issues with respect to rural develop- ‘being of’ Taveuni, Ovalau, Tailevu or some other rural
ment planning in poorer countries. In Chile, for exam- area and they will make this known very early on dur-
ple, many Mapuche – once one of the only unconquered ing both formal ceremonial and informal conversational
indigenous group in Latin America – live in the south of exchanges. Notwithstanding some continuity, there are
the country in a marginalized economic and social envi- also significant changes; the influence of urban Fijians
ronment. Those Mapuche that have moved to the capital that return to the village, temporarily or otherwise, is
city have often fared no better in the urban context and contested and often bemoaned by those who stay behind,
have become, until very recently, almost invisible in the as they bring with them concepts, such as property rights,
nation’s consciousness. Far from the buzzing and pri- individualism and capitalism, which hitherto were alien
mate metropolis of Santiago, the rural Mapuche have, in such societies.
until recently at least, been left behind by the economic The marketization of the countryside in ways that
and political progress made in the country over the past increase tourism and niche products are relatively rarely
25 years. In contrast to the global North, the experience practised in the global South, although it is possible to
of ‘rurality’ can be painful and poverty-stricken for such find increasing examples of exceptions to this rule. Wine
groups (see Spotlight box 11.1). tourism in rural Chile, for example, is growing in popular-
Across the Third World the peasantry is declining ity with the urban middle and upper classes who travel to
and this is leading to rapid change in the cultural life of the countryside locations such as the Colchagua and Cas-
rural dwellers. As neoliberalism unfolds, peasant farm- ablanca Valleys to taste and buy wine on estates that recre-
ers and other small-scale producers are forced from their ate the colonial hacienda period as a rural idyll and fictive
land and, as discussed previously, leave for the cities. In place (Overton and Murray 2011). Similarly, there are
Fiji, despite leaving their homes, urban migrants from small rural towns across Africa, Asia and Latin America
the countryside still retain much of their rural culture – that specialize in handicrafts for tourists. In Fiji resorts will
although it is metamorphosing. Through the concept of often re-create a version of traditional rural life, includ-
Vanua indigenous Fijians are linked to the land; indeed ing meke (dance) and kava ceremonies, in the thatched
they see themselves as indivisible from the land, and in roofed bures that characterize rural settlement for visit-
particular the rural places they come from. Second- and ing tourists. In rural Tonga, as across Polynesia, women
third-generation urban Fijians who live in the urban make tapa, a beautifully decorated bark cloth which is
agglomeration based in and around Suva (population traditionally used for ornate and ceremonial purposes,

Spotlight box 11.1

The hidden others of the countryside its operation geographically. This, together with other
rural economic shifts, led to very high levels of poverty
As mentioned previously, researching the ‘hidden oth- in some rural regions such as Taranaki and the East
ers’ of the countryside in the West has now become Coast, rural decline and depopulation, and some unin-
more important in the ANAA geographical tradition. tended consequences such as the closure of rural rugby
This research has revealed a darker underside to the clubs, further undoing the social and cultural fabric of
rural idyll where people are excluded because of vari- the countryside (Willis 2001). Despite limited state inter-
ous identity traits or socio-economic characteristics. vention it has proven impossible for many such areas
Work has been undertaken on travellers, marginalized to regain dynamism, and pockets of poverty, crime and
sexualities, the unemployed, the elderly and the poverty- work-poor cultures in small rural towns such as Patea
stricken, for example. Poverty in the countryside in the and Waverley remain stubbornly present to this day.
West can be disturbingly high, and this has been particu- One of the ironies is that many recent countryside
larly the case as the economic base has rapidly restruc- movements and alliances, such as those discussed
tured over the past two decades under neoliberalism. in a preceding section, represent anything but such
In New Zealand, for example, the neoliberal restructur- disadvantaged groups in the case of the global North,
ing of the 1980s and 1990s led to the closure of many although the involvement of all classes in often elitist
small- and medium-scale dairy reception plants, as the causes is frequently solicited in order to create the
New Zealand Dairy Board (later Fonterra) rationalized impression of a ‘rural consensus’.

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 240    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

for sale at tourist markets in the capital Nuku’alofa. In rural economic landscapes across the world. In order to
rural Sarawak (Malaysian Borneo) it is possible for for- understand this transition, below we consider ‘produc-
eign tourists to undertake longhouse (traditional com- tivist’ agriculture, as well as newer concepts of ‘post-­
munal dwellings) visits. However, in general, agricultural productive’ and ‘multifunctional’ rural spaces.
production, combined with other diversified and off-farm The contemporary agri-food system can be conceptual-
– often precarious – livelihood forms, are the mainstay of ized as a complex that stretches across continents, linking
such localities, and culture as a commodity usually plays producers, consumers, supermarket retailers, and gov-
a minor role unless it is invoked to make profit for large ernment policy makers among other agents, all of which
companies who might trade on such fictional notions. represent nodes within commodity networks. Driving the
Notwithstanding, there has been a partial shift – at this agri-food system is agribusiness, which is associated with
stage minimal in impact – towards models of development the industrialization and globalization of agriculture (Le
that seek economic and cultural identity based progress Heron 1993). This has led to a shift in the nature of farm-
simultaneously such as the Desarollo rural con identidad ing in many parts of the world involving a delocalization
approaches favoured by some rural NGOs previously of activity and the creation of long networks, which see
mentioned in Latin America. Geographical research is production oriented away from local and national markets
currently on-going as to whether such approaches deliver and towards the global economy. The global agri-food net-
the holistic outcomes they might aspire to. work has not led to the homogenization of rural space.
At the same time as we witness the industrialization of
agriculture, especially in parts of the global South, we
11.3.4 Dynamic rural economies are also seeing the rise of niche, organic and alternative
In the past the economy of rural localities was essentially agriculture particularly in the North. Furthermore, in
agricultural. The terms ‘rural’ economy and ‘agricultural’ places such as Latin America and South-east Asia where
economy are no longer interchangeable, however. In this large-scale commercial and export-oriented agriculture is
section we look at how the rural and the agricultural have increasingly evident, we see the continued importance of
decoupled and what has replaced agricultural livelihoods, full and semi-­subsistence farming.
at least in part. This shift has arisen as the world econ-
omy has ‘de-agrarianized’, involving a large-scale shift Productivist rural economies
away from agricultural to industrial and service activi- Productivist agriculture can be defined as the highly
ties. Increasingly, and particularly in the North, there is intensive production of a limited collection of primary
a tendency towards pluriactivity (diversified livelihoods) commodities (McCarthy 2005). The agricultural sec-
in rural areas (see Plate 11.12). However, diversification tor has industrialized and commercialized, eclipsing
away from agriculture, viewed at the global scale, has non-capitalist agriculture. Agribusiness has expanded
been uneven, leading to the creation of very different through vertical and horizontal integration, forming

Plate 11.12  Pluriactivity in

rural New Zealand – off this
stretch of State Highway 1,
north of Levin, you can buy
petrol, book a river paddle tour
and have a cup of tea in an
aeroplane!
(Warwick E. Murray)

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 Chapter 11  Changing rural worlds – a global view     241

conglomerates that link the field to the supermarket. This component of their operations to poorer countries. This
has allowed companies to reduce the costs of transact- is especially the case in fresh fruit, horticultural and flo-
ing, and internalize the risk of the inherently vulnerable ricultural sectors, resulting in a proliferation of counter-
business of farming. Consequently, agricultural sectors seasonal exports to the Northern markets. As a network,
have increased in terms of ownership, and a new politi- for example, floriculture now generates over US$50 bil-
cal economy of agriculture based largely on monopoly lion in sales per annum, and involves fresh-bloom sup-
capitalism and mass production has emerged. Some have ply from over 80 countries, as far flung as Ecuador and
referred to this as Fordist agriculture. Companies such Kenya, most of which is channelled through the Nether-
as Monsanto, Nestlé, Fonterra, Cadbury’s and Bulmer’s lands to third countries in the rich world. Globalization
are major players in this new economy. has drawn Third World rural spaces into global capitalist
Given the liberalization of the world economy from circuits, yielding profound impacts. Export-oriented agri-
the 1970s onwards, agribusiness TNCs have increasingly culture destined for the North has, in the case of Latin
invested abroad. Cheap labour and land as well as less America, led to the evolution of monocultural localities
strictly enforced environmental regulations provide incen- which are extremely vulnerable economically, socially and
tives for agribusiness TNCs to diffuse the production environmentally (Murray and Overton 2014).

Spotlight box 11.2

Researching ethical value chains – of agencies that has evolved to serve this function. The
resistance to or perpetuation of marketing of this concept also evolves in the North,
global networks? although farming has been largely ‘organic’ for millennia,
until the rise of Fordist agriculture to feed growing urban
It is in response to the ill-effects of the globalized pro- populations and to fuel export markets.
ductivist system that ‘ethical’ global value chains have Of the three overlapping ethical value chain (EVC)
evolved. The chains seek to link the South with the North types, fair trade has perhaps captured the imagination
in ways that do not undermine the social-economic the most as a potential way of delivering socio-eco-
viability of small-scale farmers, threaten environmental nomic and cultural benefits to small-scale producers
sustainability, and protect local cultures and identity. Fair in the long networks that bring together the North and
trade, organic networks and geographical indications South. The system has evolved over the last 50 years,
are three – often overlapping – value chains that have bringing to fruition a much longer heritage of charitable
evolved in order to address these concerns respectively interactions led initially by church groups and building
and in reaction to broader process of agricultural glo- on the concept first proposed at the 1968 UNCTAD
balization. Northern consumers and some of the elite (United Nations Commission on Trade and Develop-
in Southern territories are increasingly concerned with ment) that development required ‘trade not aid’. Over
issues of justice, environment and identity related to the the last two decades it has grown considerably to now
products they consume. account for over €5.5 billion of trade. Although this is
Geographical indicators (GIs) originate from Europe a minute proportion of the total agricultural commodity
and were developed through the use of terroir in the trade it does involve hundreds of countries in dozens of
French wine industry – that is, production that is dis- products. The largest traded product is coffee, followed
tinct in a physical and cultural sense to the locality from by sugar and fruit. Suppliers from across Asia, Africa,
which it emanates. Increasingly such strategies are but in particular Latin America, supply markets in the
being adopted and legalized in the South in a range of North – with the largest single ones being the UK, USA
rural sectors including fruit, wine and fisheries. In Chile, and Germany. A number of agencies have evolved to
for example, there are now over 20 products registered certify fair trade networks, the largest being Fairtrade
with an increasingly sophisticated GI system. There is international, which was established in 1997 with the
often an element of fictive place in GIs as histories and amalgamation of a number of labelling systems. In
cultures are moulded to fit marketing purposes. Not- essence, and across the various certifying bodies, to
withstanding, the potential to protect local identities is qualify collectives must be established that guarantee
clear. Organic networks are those which are certified as a price for growers over the medium term, offer access
being environmentally sustainable by the proliferation to credit, information and technological extension, and
➜

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 242    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

➜ invest a proportion of the profits on social projects in by Heather Walker, Kelle Howson and Kellie Agazziz,
the localities involved. Producers must have a say in has showed that in some communities in East Timor
the structure and direction of the collectives and the and Indonesia, small growers had little concept of the
allocation of the premium. There are many success fair trade system and saw it much as any other com-
stories and a visit to the website Fairtrade Interna- modity market (unpublished research). Furthermore, in
tional (www.fairtrade.net) provides ample evidence the worst cases social premiums did not find their way
of this. Recent work by the author in Chile uncovered to the farmers. The literature has identified problems,
a nascent yet very promising fair trade sector evolv- including eclipsing of justice issues by environmental
ing in wine production, led by some of the industry’s issues, in-fighting between various labelling bodies, the
established players but bringing in small-producers. A problems surrounding the correct use of the social pre-
number of groups has evolved to stimulate this with mium, discrimination against the least viable farmers,
collectives such as Ruta de Vino incorporating eco- and regressive monopsony dominance by a single buyer
nomic as well as cultural goals, drawing not only on (Murray and Overton 2014). Some economists argue
fair trade principles but also concepts related to GIs, that by artificially raising prices, fair trade is actually
and utilizing organic production. unfair to others not in the system and locks producers
There can be little doubt that fair trade has helped into commodity systems thereby perpetuating the initial
the lives of millions of farmers across the world and rationale for intervention. These latter analyses go too
their families. However, the system is not perfect. It far, fair trade and the EVC networks that they are part
remains to be seen whether very marginal producers, of are arguably a move in the right direction; however,
the smallest and poorest, can hope to enter the sys- they require careful monitoring and regulation in order
tem. Little work has been done on the impacts on labour to serve the purpose for which they were designed and
and only ongoing research will reveal the outcome. to prevent them from being co-opted by powerful agro-
Recent unpublished research supervised by the author, capitalist interests.

The evolution of agribusiness has profound implica- Post-productive agriculture and rural worlds
tions for local rural socio-economies in the global North We are witnessing the return, in some places, of smaller-
as well. It has, for example, led to the relative decline of scale agriculture, sometimes as a direct resistance to the
the family farm (Whatmore 1995) (see Case study 11.2). globalization of agriculture. Simultaneously we can also
Furthermore, agribusiness has altered the rural landscape, observe the various uses of rural spaces intended to diver-
removing hedges and practising other policies intended to sify livelihoods and add ‘off farm’ components. These
capture economies of scale. Rural choices have also been can be termed ‘post-productive’ rural landscapes where
impacted by the consolidation of agribusiness. the goals, aside from maximizing agricultural yields,

Case study 11.2

Productivist agriculture in the of competing medium-sized cider producers including

­Hereford cider industry Symond’s (producer of Scrumpy Jack). This granted
Bulmer’s a regional bilateral monopsony position
In the 1980s rapid growth in the UK cider industry led (single buyer and seller simultaneously) in the county
to a fundamental restructuring of the Herefordshire (and for many country miles beyond). Small-scale cider
economy as the largest global producer of cider – HP producers were out-competed, and the grubbing up
Bulmer’s – began an aggressive campaign to domi- of many old varieties of cider apples in place of the
nate local supply networks and to secure the lucrative new mass-production bush-stock varieties accelerated
national market. The company purchased land from the decline of small-scale farmhouse cider producers,
small-scale farmers and consolidated orchards in a way thereby eroding diversity and choice.
that allowed it to take full advantage of mechanized
harvesting. At the same time it employed hundreds of
medium-sized farmers on two-yearly contracts in order
to shore up supply. Bulmer’s also took over a number

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 Chapter 11  Changing rural worlds – a global view     243

include cultural commodification, optimizing ecological but it is still heavily productivist, and because of a boom
value, and stimulating niche-based agriculture. in demand from China large-scale dairy farming is in
The transition to post-productive agriculture is linked fact on the rise as more and more land is converted to
to the perceived costs and falling productivity of the glo- dairy farming. In the global South the evidence for post-
balized model and the regulatory crisis it is facing. Gov- productivism is even scarcer. There are some examples,
ernment intervention is being rolled back, and large-scale such as the rise of wine tourism in Chile as noted, but
production operating at a loss can no longer be tolerated. in general we are seeing a shift towards productivism
There is some evidence to suggest that the main bastion as neoliberalism is allowed to penetrate localities in the
of productivist protectionism, the European Union’s periphery. The rise of GM and its diffusion is likely to
Common Agricultural Policy, may be dismantled over the accentuate this trend. We thus have a significant North–
next decade or so. In this sense the transition to post-pro- South divide in agriculture, and rural geography might
ductive agriculture is consistent with neoliberalism and do well to revisit older ideas including dependency and
cannot be seen as resistance to it. Indeed, if we view the structuralism, in order to interpret these differentiated
evolution of this part of the system as the consequence of outcomes in the context of one global system.
the farming-out of the labour- and land-intensive parts of
the agri-food production complex to the periphery, then
the rise of post-productivism forms part of the broader Multifunctional rural worlds?
evolution of global capitalism. Post-productivism has been heavily criticized; use of the
In contrast to the above, some commentators see the term is problematic because it makes assumptions about
rise of post-productive agriculture as indicative of resist- what is meant by ‘productivist’. The nature of productiv-
ance to globalization, greater concern for the environ- ist agriculture has varied, and still does vary across the
ment and the search for smaller scale, short network, world; it persists in some localities whilst in others it has
sustainable and alternative food networks. Consumer never arrived, and probably never will. In places such as
demand has transformed Northern consumption pat- the Pacific Islands, subsistence agriculture plays a very
terns, and food safety and quality issues also motivate important role in agricultural production and rural lives,
elites in the South. This has led to a worldwide boom and commercial networks bypass millions of rural dwell-
in organic farming as noted in Spotlight box 11.2 for ers. Although modernist discourses might portray this as
example, that has impacted agricultural landscapes in backward, the socio-cultural and nutritional role of sub-
the North and South. The short network approach can sistence and semi-subsistence is critical. Yet agriculture of
be seen as resistance to commodity production, with all this nature is being squeezed by globalization.
of its inherent injustice and non-sustainability and as In recognizing the problems associated with the con-
such is a further aspect of the ethical value chain system. cept of post-productivism, the term ‘multifunctional’
Yet, arguably it undermines long network fair trade has become employed in Northern rural studies. Wilson
­systems – does replacing imports, and thus putting out argues that the productivist debate has been ‘concep-
of work producers, from the South lead to an unethical tualized from a UK-centric perspective that has largely
and unjust outcome viewed from the vantage point of failed to discuss whether the concept has applicability in
the global society as whole? Are short networks moral Europe or beyond’ (2001: 77). Instead he suggests that the
alternatives or just localized protectionism? use of ‘multifunctional agricultural regimes’ is a better
In reality, we face a situation in rural worlds where way to characterize the shifts that are occurring in Euro-
a mixture of productivist and post-productivist func- pean rural space. Multifunctionalism refers to the notion
tions exist. At the global scale there is, of course, a divi- that ‘rural landscapes typically produce a range of com-
sion of labour that sees much productivist agriculture modity and non-commodity use values simultaneously
located in poorer countries because of favourable loca- and that policy ought to try and recognize and protect the
tional comparative advantages, such as cheap land entire range of values’ (McCarthy 2005: 774). It is argued
and labour, counterseasonality, and lax environmental that this concept is more useful than post-productivism
regulations. Niche agriculture is undoubtedly becom- as it offers a positive characterization: it recognizes the
ing more common in Northern countries. However, continued importance of commodity production and is
this dichotomy blurs a complex reality. In the United sensitive to geographical difference.
Kingdom post-productive activities in the countryside Multifunctionalism implies that the countryside
are advanced, but in places such as New Zealand, Aus- across the world is used for both productive and post-
tralia and the USA there is only limited evidence of a productive purposes and that the combination of uses,
post-productive shift. New Zealand is considered one including commodification and conservation, varies from
of the most cutting-edge of the agricultural economies place to place. Whilst this formulation reflects complex

M11_DANI2950_05_SE_C11.indd 243 31/03/16 7:14 pm

 244    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

rural worlds much more accurately than previous con- of rural areas. Certain constructions of rural culture
structions, it is also vulnerable to criticism. In some ways and fictive places are used to sell the countryside and
the concept says everything and nothing at the same time. to represent its interests while ‘other’ cultures remain
Furthermore, commentators from the South have argued marginalized or are disappearing. In short, rural spaces
that its use in policy formation in the European Union, are increasingly dynamic demographically, politically,
for example, is a disguised form of protectionism. As ­culturally, environmentally and economically. Rural
already noted, governments, particularly in France, have geography has had to move swiftly in an attempt to
argued that subsidies to agriculture create positive social ­capture the complex changes and in the case of change
externalities by supporting other, often less tangible, in the South it has not kept pace.
functions of the countryside which help maintain ‘rural- This general shift, at the global level, has been influ-
ity’. Meanwhile, poorer countries are expected to open enced by the unfolding of neoliberalism and globaliza-
their markets and perform the productivist element of tion. At the world scale, whilst it is true that rural spaces
the global agri-food complex. Indeed, it could be argued in the global North are becoming increasingly multifunc-
that there is a move away from multifunctionalism in the tional and are shifting away from ‘Fordist’ agriculture, in
South, as monocultural neoliberalized sectors replace for- the South we are seeing an erosion of multifunctionality
merly diversified livelihoods. and pluriactivity overall. This is certainly the case where
neoliberal agriculture penetrates and the diversified live-
lihood-sustaining activities that have often been built up
over decades and centuries are eroded. These are dynamic
11.4 Conclusion times for rural spaces and populations all across the
world, as the insecurities, socio-economic and environ-
‘Rural’ is a relative term; it shifts across time and space. mental, associated with the acceleration of globalization
It is also an enormously diverse category and therefore abound. This is especially the case in the South where
difficult to make generalizations about. It is increasingly neoliberal governance continues to run unrestrained
difficult to define rural spaces, be they social or geo- despite some policy shifts to the contrary. Although rapid
graphical. In both the South and North rural spaces are advances have been made in rural geography in and of the
increasingly politicized, often in ways that move beyond West, it is imperative that geographers turn attention to
‘normal’ electoral politics as new political movements rural spaces of the South, which have so often borne the
abound. Rural identities have conditioned this political brunt of the evolution of global capitalism. Furthermore,
change and have themselves shifted in response to new by shifting focus in this way geographers can contribute
social, economic and cultural configurations. Environ- to a more balanced and democratic human geography
ments are threatened in all worlds because of neoliber- that is relevant to rural society as a whole and reflective
alism and the rapid shift in the economic exploitation of truly global change.

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 Chapter 11  Changing rural worlds – a global view     245

Learning outcomes
Having read this chapter you should be able to: Further reading
● Discuss the contested definitions of ‘rural’ from both Cloke, P.J., Marsden, T. and Mooney, P. (eds) (2006) Hand-
a functional and conceptual point of view. book of Rural Studies, Sage, London. This is a very broad-
ranging and complete edited collection of viewpoints from
● Account for the evolution of dominant trends in rural
some of the top writers in the field of rural studies that is
geography in the ANAA (Anglo/North American/­
particularly strong on cultural perspectives.
Australasian) tradition and how these have
McCarthy, J. (2007) Rural geography – globalizing the country-
influenced interpretations of rural processes. side, Progress in Human Geography, 31(1), 1–6. An excellent
● Appreciate the impact of neoliberalism and stock-take of work in rural geography that seeks to explore the
globalization on rural spaces and how change in ‘globalized’ nature of rural areas across the world.
the global South and global North is linked. Munton, R.M. (ed.) (2008) The Rural: Critical Essays in Human
● Consider the evidence for rural depopulation Geography, Wiley-Blackwell, London. A useful way to follow up
across the world and outline the arguments for arguments here through a collection of rural geography essays
from the AAA perspective, focusing mainly on the British case.
counterurbanization in richer countries.
Murray, W.E. (2008) Neoliberalism, rural geography and the
● Understand shifting rural polities and the nature
global South, Human Geography, 1(1), 33–8. This paper
of the alliances and resistance movements that presents an argument for taking the rural geographies of the
have evolved over the recent past across the global South more seriously and highlights the importance of
world. viewing rural change in any location as part of a global whole.
● Interpret the commodification of the ‘rural’ in richer Roche, M. (2002) Rural geography: searching rural
countries and the contribution of culture to the geographies, Progress in Human Geography, 26(6), 823–9.
economic dynamism of the countryside in the This review article provides an excellent stock-take and
discussion of the main trends and major scholarly articles in
global North through fictive place.
rural geography through the 1980s and 1990s.
● Appreciate the debate concerning the positive and
Woods, M. (2010) Rural, Routledge, London. This is an
negative aspects of fair trade and other attempts to excellent and relatively advanced survey of contemporary
make value chains ethical. debates in rural geography.
● Comprehend the concepts of ‘productivist’, Woods, M. (2012) Rural Geography, 2nd edition, Sage, London.
‘post-productivist’ and ‘multifunctional’ rural Although focused on western cases, this is a landmark text and
economies, and debate the shifts between the three a first rate entrance point into the rural geography literature.
in various parts of the world. The Journal of Rural Studies (Elsevier), is the leading schol-
arly journal of rural studies. Encompassing work from human
● Recognize that more research on issues in
geography and across the social sciences it provides the
the rural global South is required if a more most recent state-of-the-art research in this area. Attempts to
democratic and globalized rural geography is ‘globalize’ the scope of articles in order to include more in the
to be written. rural global South are underway.

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 Social constructions of nature

Chapter 12

James Evans

Topics covered
■ The concept that nature is not a pre-given physical reality,
but an idea that is constructed by society
■ The political implications of representing things, behaviours
and landscapes as natural
■ Environmental myths
■ Science and the construction of human nature
■ How ideas about nature influence media coverage of
environmental change

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 Chapter 12  Social constructions of nature    247

to understand this process, suggesting that production is

12.1 Questioning nature the critical force driving human interaction with nature:
Not only do the objective conditions change in the
The one thing that is not natural is nature.
act of reproduction, e.g. the village becomes a town,
(Soper 1995: 7) the wilderness a cleared field etc., but the producers
change, too, in that they bring out new qualities in
What is nature? There is an easy answer. It is the birds
themselves, develop themselves in production, trans-
and the bees, the plants and the landscapes around us –
form themselves, develop new powers and ideas, new
from the familiar things in our lives, like pet cats and
modes of intercourse, new needs and new language.
dogs and the park at the end of the road, to more distant
things that we see on television, like Amazonian rainfor- (Karl Marx 1973, originally 1861, Notebook V)
ests and Giant Pandas. Nature is the set of things that are
This quote captures one of the fundamental argu-
separate from humans. We have the social world on the
ments of Marxist thought – that social development
one side, with its politics, injustices and cultural achieve-
unfolds through the transformation of nature. From the
ments, and on the other we have the natural world, a pre-
basic work of a peasant clearing a field to the industrial
given set of biological entities – the domain of natural
exploitation of oil resources, economic production simul-
scientists – that have no politics and no culture . . . things
taneously transforms nature and society.
that simply are.
Perhaps nature existed before modern humans arrived
Albert Einstein once quipped that ‘the environment
on the scene then? Conservationists talk about ‘restor-
is everything that isn’t me’. But is it really this simple?
ing’ landscapes that have been spoilt by human activities
Can we draw lines between ourselves and the surround-
to their natural condition. Environmentalists hark back
ing world so easily? The microbes that occupy our gut to
to the natural conditions that existed before humans
the food like fruit and vegetables that we eat every day
altered the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere and biolo-
to sustain and reproduce ourselves suggest that it is hard
gists talk about how many more species there would be
to draw clear lines between our own bodies and the sur-
in the absence of humans. But when was this pre-human
rounding environment. Food itself is far from natural. We
condition? For example, the dominant vegetation in
use fertilizers, pesticides and mechanized agriculture to
pre-industrial Britain was temperate forest, and what is
give nature a helping hand. Biologically, food represents
generally considered to be Britain’s ‘natural’ landscape is
the culmination of thousands of years of selective breed-
constituted by the species that typified this landscape, like
ing to create more productive plants and animals. In more
oak trees. But if one goes back to the last glaciation some
recent times humans have created new organisms using
ten thousand years ago (when human impact was even
genetic modification in laboratories. Bruce McKibben
less apparent, and thus the landscape it could be argued
(1999) has taken this argument to its logical conclusion,
was even more ‘natural’) there was no forest, and no tem-
arguing that it is impossible to find a part of the planet
perate species existed in Britain (Birks 1997). Quintes-
that has not been affected by humans in some way – even
sentially British species like oaks did not arrive until the
the remotest inland Antarctic ice sheets have trapped
end of the last ice age. Depending on what timescale is
CO2 in them from industrial emissions. This observation
used they can be seen as either native to Britain, or as an
leads him to argue that ‘nature’, in its traditional sense as
invasive species. When we go back in time no historical
something separate from and untouched by human soci-
cut-off is more valid than any other as the supposed point
ety, has now ended. Scientists are in agreement suggesting
at which the environment was in a natural state.
that the earth has entered a new geological time period
called the Anthropocene (from the Greek word anthropos
meaning humankind), in which humans are now the main
12.1.1 The social construction of nature
drivers of environmental change (Zalasiewicz et al. 2011). So, if nature does not exist as something separate, and
It is similarly hard to draw a line between human soci- never really did, then what is it? Many academics have
ety and nature at larger scales. Since our ancestor Homo argued that instead of being a pre-given reality, nature is
erectus began using primitive tools some 1.9 million years actually an idea, or a social construct, which varies for
ago, the history of human society has been one of envi- different people in different times and places. The phrase
ronmental transformation, culminating in the massive ‘social construction’ was coined by sociologists Peter
levels of urbanization that characterize the world today Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966), who argued that
(see Chapters 1–3). With every technological advance, humans establish meanings and truths through habits and
human society has learnt to adapt its surroundings to institutions. So, for example, things like laws are social
its own use. Over a hundred years ago Karl Marx tried constructions because they have no essential existence

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 248    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

outside of the society in which people have decided to that? If I then take that chemical formula and repre-
agree and act as if they exist – they are ‘social facts’. sent it to you as a tree, then you relate to it in a dif-
Social constructionism recognizes that individuals ferent way. Now, what’s nature? Is it all the molecules
and groups participate in the creation of their realities that make up the tree, or is it the tree? The point is that
through the way in which they perceive things and events. if you see a tree, you’ll react to it differently than you
Critically, it follows from this idea that various groups of would if you saw a bunch of molecules, and if you see
people will interpret things and events differently, because a tree in a habitat in a forest with a spotted owl sitting
their perception is coloured by their previous experiences in it you would react very differently than if you just
and differing social norms. David Harvey gives a classic saw a tree.
example of how this problem of perception can work in
relation to nature: (Harvey, in Banrffalo, 1996)

What’s nature? What if I give you a chemical formula Plate 12.1 shows four representations of the same
and say, how do you feel about your relationship to ‘thing’. It is easy to argue that all are natural, and yet

Plate 12.1  Carbon, tree, forest, wood.

(Photdisc Inc (tl); Paul Lunnon (tr, bl, br))

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 Chapter 12  Social constructions of nature    249

each prompts very different reactions and will be inter- the advent of mechanized production and better-yielding
preted variously by different types of people. For exam- crop varieties, food supply has far outstripped popula-
ple, a trained chemist will recognize the carbon molecule tion growth. Despite an almost ten-fold increase in the
as constitutive of wood, while a conservationist will rec- number of people living on our planet since Malthus’s
ognize that the forest depicted is not just any forest, but time, a greater proportion enjoy clean water today than
a rainforest – the most biodiverse habitat on the planet. ever before.
Indigenous inhabitants of that rainforest will react with Debates today over food, climate change and oil often
a whole different set of emotions, although they may not fall back on the idea of natural limits. But are these
recognize their home from an aerial photo. The pile of resources really ‘natural’? For example, in what way is it
timber is a resource to be burned, while the solitary tree ‘natural’ to burn oil? Oil did not become a resource until
is not. The way in which each representation is perceived the invention of the internal combustion engine, and with
depends on the experience and knowledge that the viewer the proliferation of electric cars and bio-fuels it will cease
has, which in turn depends on the society and culture in to be the most fought-over global resource. Oil is only
which he or she lives. Viewing nature as a social construct important to human existence in the relatively recent era
helps us to understand why people from different places of industrialization, and, even then, only if you are one
and times behave so differently towards the environment. of the few who either buys it or owns it. Far from being
To return to the example of trees, early US settlers were a ‘natural’ resource, the demand for oil depends entirely
fearful of the impenetrable dark forests that dominated on the existence of a socio-economic system that values
the Eastern seaboard, and believed that clearing trees for and uses it.
agriculture was ‘God’s work’. In stark contrast to the atti- David Harvey (1974) argues that the real cause of
tudes of today, chopping trees down was actually seen as scarcity is the unequal distribution of resources. For
morally good. The idea of nature is subjective – it means example, the richest 1 per cent of the world’s adult pop-
something slightly different to you than it does to me. ulation owned 40 per cent of global assets in the year
This matters because it helps us to understand why con- 2000. By contrast, the poorest half of the world adult
flicts occur over the environment and how they might be population owned only 1 per cent of global wealth
averted. (Davies et al. 2006). As Harvey notes, the earth could
That said nature is often presented as if it is some- not support the current population if everyone enjoyed
thing fixed and objective, because it provides a powerful a Western lifestyle. The idea that resource shortages
basis for how society should behave. As the American are due to overstepping ‘natural’ limits conceals these
environmental historian William Cronon puts it, peo- grotesque imbalances. When we look at famines on a
ple tend to ‘appeal to nature as a stable external source global scale, the problem is not food production, but the
of non-human values against which human actions can distribution of the food that we produce. Geographers
be judged’ (1996: 26). Constructions of nature are thus have sought to understand who benefits and who suf-
highly political, because specific versions of what is ‘nat- fers from different social constructions of nature and
ural’ can be used to privilege certain social behaviours blaming problems on overpopulation shifts the blame to
and actions over others. the poorest people, while protecting the monopoly rich
Perhaps the most influential idea that has shaped nations enjoy over resources. Radical geographers are
debates concerning the environment and our relationship interested in how constructions of nature serve different
to it is that of the limits to growth. The idea that there are political interests. The notion of natural limits clearly
natural limits to population growth comes from the writ- serves the interests of those who control the lion’s share
ings of Thomas Malthus in the late eighteenth century. of the world’s wealth.
Malthus was a churchman who deplored the overcrowd- Social constructionists seek to understand how ideas
ing and unsavoury conditions in which the newly-created of nature reproduce the cultural, political and spiritual
working classes of the British industrial revolution lived. beliefs of a society, and the ways in which ideas of nature
In his Principle of Population he attributed this problem are used to support specific political viewpoints. If cer-
to a disjuncture between the geometric rate of popula- tain types of behaviour or ways of organizing society can
tion increase (1,2,4,8,16) and the arithmetic rate of food be shown to be ‘natural’, then it makes it hard to jus-
supply (1,2,3,4,5). Overstepping the limits of natural tify any other way of acting. The authority to speak for
resources (most notably at that time, food) would inevi- nature becomes the authority to speak for society. Geog-
tably result in famine and death. Malthus deplored the raphy has traditionally tried to understand the interface
moral depravity of the working classes and sought to between society and the environment, and the ways in
control their behaviour by invoking the idea of natural which nature has been constructed and contested have
limits. Of course Malthus has been proved wrong. With particular relevance to this task.

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 250    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

‘wilderness prophet’ John Muir founded the Sierra Club

12.2 Cultural constructions of nature in California, which went on to establish a national wil-
derness preservation system. Of course, national parks
The great enemy of truth is very often not the lie – d
­ eliberate, are exactly that – parks – and great effort was required to
contrived and dishonest – but the myth – persistent, persuasive preserve these areas as wildernesses. People had to be kept
and unrealistic. out, animals had to be kept in. Vistas had to be opened
up for tourists while simultaneously not compromising
(J.F. Kennedy)
the appearance of the area as untouched. So painstaking
were the efforts to create wilderness that Muir actually
David Demeritt (1998) identifies the main use of social
praised Yosemite for its resemblance to an artificial land-
constructionism within geography as refuting established
scape garden (Schama 1995: 191).
claims about nature. This is perhaps not surprising as
The artificiality of wilderness is taken to its extreme
social constructions can be understood as a form of
in the landscapes of Frederick Olmsted, who is perhaps
‘myth’ that may become widely accepted in the absence
most famous for designing New York’s Central Park. In
of any counter evidence. The majority of work in geog-
1887 Olmsted became involved in the preservation of
raphy on the construction of nature has sought to reveal
another symbolic American landmark of natural vigour,
myths concerning nature.
Niagara Falls. As William Irwin notes (1996: 77), Olm-
sted ‘believed that parks and nature retreats relieved the
festering distress of the poor and working classes’. The
12.2.1 Wilderness
area had become overrun with disorganized tourist devel-
One of the most cherished notions of nature in West- opments and industry, and Olmsted sought to transform
ern societies is that of wilderness. Images of wilderness the area into a pure pastoral park in which the visitor
are used widely, to sell holidays, relax us and inspire us. might enjoy the splendour of nature in peace. In its return
Motivational posters showing ‘man conquering the great to nature, however, the minutest details were planned,
outdoors’, with captions like ‘Success’ and ‘Risk’, will including widespread landscaping and the installation
be familiar to you if you have ever set foot in a gym. The of viewing points to maximize the vistas over the falls.
idea of wilderness as a form of nature untouched by The landscape that now surrounds the falls represents
humans has a long history. In the USA it has been argued an idealized version of how Olmsted thought the Falls
that the idea of wilderness appealed to settlers, who, as should look, rather than a reproduction of the original
they moved west across the country, preferred to believe landscape, which was renowned for hindering the efforts
that the lands they were claiming were devoid of humans of visitors to see the falls.
and waiting to be inhabited. Exploding what he calls Wilderness appeals to the American psyche because it
the ‘Pristine Myth’, Bill Denevan (1992) uses extensive is reminiscent of the birth of their country through set-
archaeological and historical research to argue that native tlement, and it remains a powerful and emotive cultural
Amerindians actually managed their landscapes through construction of nature in contemporary North America.
cutting, burning, terracing and building. These forms of However, while the idea of wilderness is aesthetic on one
management created landscapes that European settlers level today, the politics involved in valuing landscapes
assumed were untouched because they were unable to rec- that are free of humans are still influential (see Case
ognize forms of management that they were unfamiliar study 12.1).
with. America was only a ‘discovery’ for the white Euro- In Britain the excesses of industrialization and
pean and, similarly, the plains of the USA only appeared urbanization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
to be uninhabited wildernesses to white European set- generated a cultural backlash that began to value envi-
tlers. While the idea of wilderness is obviously related ronments that were seen as more natural. The Romantic
to the inability of the settler to ‘see’ the human impacts movement which emerged at this time was typified by
upon unfamiliar landscapes, it had drastic effects. When Wordsworth’s love of the Lake District and an increas-
indigenous people inconveniently did appear in these ingly negative attitude towards cities. This was in part an
landscapes, they were often exterminated. aesthetic reaction to the physical degradation of the envi-
The idea of wilderness was fundamental to the birth ronment associated with the Industrial Revolution, but
of the modern environmental movement in North Amer- it was also a moral reaction to the squalor and poverty
ica. The first National Park was created by Congress in of the cities. In contrast, the countryside became seen as
1864 in Yosemite Valley, quickly becoming a national the repository of moral purity. Interestingly, this repre-
symbol of the spiritual home of the modern United States sented a U-turn in British attitudes to wild landscapes.
in the aftermath of the Civil War. In 1892 the so-called In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries mountainous

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 Chapter 12  Social constructions of nature    251

and uninhabited regions were actually regarded with landscape takes a three-dimensional world and repre-
fear and disregard. We have reports of travellers drawing sents a single view of it in two dimensions. In doing so
the curtains of their carriages to block out the ‘Satanic’ it establishes a highly visual relation between the viewer
view as they travelled through mountainous regions. Less and nature that emphasizes aesthetic detachment and
than one hundred years before Wordsworth claimed of mastery over nature.
the Lake District ‘Who comes not hither ne’er shall know A classic example of how a landscape painting con-
how beautiful the world below’, the great diarist Daniel veys social power is found in John Berger’s (1990) analy-
Defoe called the area a ‘barren and frightful place’. So sis of Gainsborough’s Mr and Mrs Andrews, which was
if you hate hiking up mountains, simply tell people you completed c. 1750 (Plate 12.2). The painting depicts an
have an early Georgian attitude to nature! upper-class land-owning couple in the foreground, with
As with the US environmental movement, the British their estate stretching into the distance behind them.
Romantic movement established the idea that nature has While the painting shows a highly cultivated patchwork
spiritual value. In the United Kingdom this happened of fields, there are no workers in this rural landscape.
primarily as a reaction to industrialization, while in the Their effacement represents the new balance of power
United States it emerged from the pioneer/settler men- in the countryside after the Enclosures Acts seized com-
tality. In each case the idea of nature has been carefully mon land from peasants and parcelled it up to landown-
constructed by societies seeking to preserve a world free ers. The landscape is familiar to us as an archetypically
of human development. English landscape, Constable Country if you like, and
the nature in it is archetypically English. There are other
things going on in this representation too, such as the
12.2.2 Landscape dominance of the male figure standing over his seated
This new relation to nature was expressed through the wife, and the phallic symbol of the gun. The symbolism
genre of landscape painting, which emerged in the sev- of masculine control over nature could not be more obvi-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries. As a way of seeing, ous. Landscape painting invented an English aesthetic of

Case study 12.1

Contesting wilderness coffee-table book called On the Wild Side. In it they

championed Clayoquot Sound as a pristine wilderness,
Clayoquot Sound is a small ocean inlet on Vancou- evoking emotive spiritual ideas of the forest as a para-
ver Island in British Columbia. The surrounding area dise unspoilt by humans.
contains ‘old growth’ temperate rainforest, one of the On one level, the representations of the forest as eco-
rarest habitats in the world. While such forests once nomic resource and ecological wilderness reproduced
covered large parts of Europe and Asia they now com- familiar opposing Western constructions of nature. But
prise just 0.01 per cent of the earth’s land area. In the Braun’s real insight is that both the representations of
early 1990s the logging firm MacMillan Bloedel applied the logging company and the environmental group fail to
for a logging licence in the area, but was vigorously include the indigenous Indians who live in the forest. He
opposed by the Western Canada Wilderness Society. argues that this erasure of the indigenous population is
The geographer Bruce Braun (2002) explored how the a common feature of both the wilderness and resource
resulting dispute played out through a series of repre- constructions of nature, and can be traced back to the
sentations and counter-representations of the area. tendency of settlers to appropriate nature from the indig-
MacMillan Bloedel produced a brochure titled enous peoples. The importance of constructing nature
Beyond the Cut, which represented Clayoquot Sound as separate from humans (in this case as uninhabited)
as a natural resource that was needed by the Canadian allows powerful (if opposing) claims to be made over the
people. Constructing the forest as a resource, they pre- area by both the logging company and the environmental
sented their credentials as responsible and experienced group. The real political import of this process is that the
managers who would use scientific techniques to create people who live there are excluded from their own home.
a sustainable industry and create much-needed jobs.
By contrast, the Western Canada Wilderness Q   How does the idea of wilderness exert an influ-
Society produced a popular and glossily illustrated ence over global conservation priorities?

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 252    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

Plate 12.2  Mr and Mrs

Andrews by Thomas
Gainsborough.
(Mr and Mrs Andrews, c.1748–9 (oil
on canvas), Gainsborough, Thomas
(1727–88)/National Gallery, London,
UK/The Bridgeman Art Library)

landscape, but it also established a new era of control, agenda should dispel forever the illusion of innocence sur-
both of humans over nature and of the landed upper rounding the words nature, natural, and native . . .’.
classes over the countryside in Britain. The British association of nature with idealized rural
Representations of landscape are central to national landscapes has impacts that are felt beyond the art gallery.
identities. Indeed, the word ‘nature’ derives from the One is to divide the affairs of the city from the affairs of
Latin natura, which comes in turn from nasci – to be the country. The graffiti artist Banksy produced a series
born. Thus nature is linked to other words from the of works exploring the politics of this division, in which
same root, such as nascent, innate, native and nation. he placed typically ‘urban’ objects such as parking tick-
Just as wilderness plays an important symbolic role in the ets and graffiti into traditional landscape paintings (see
pioneer mentality of the USA, so the ‘countryside’ land- Plate 12.3). This juxtaposition disturbs constructions of
scape is quintessentially English. Authors have explored the countryside as a somehow ‘natural’ place untroubled
the importance of the oak tree to British culture, as a sign by the problems of cities, and in doing so highlights how
of strength derived from their use to build the ships that exclusive this vision of the countryside actually is. As
allowed the British navy to rule the seas for 200 years. rural geographers have noted, the idea of the rural idyll
These constructions of nature also have profound is not particularly helpful as it conceals real problems
political effects. The historical geographer David Lowen- of poverty, drug-use and deprivation in rural areas (see
thal (1994) argues that in France the legacy of peasant
agriculture has left a national landscape of diverse small-
holdings, which is cherished for the variety of cheese,
wines and foods that it produces. Staunch French oppo-
sition to proposed reforms to the European Common
Agricultural Policy, which would increase the exposure
of its small producers to market forces, suddenly becomes
intelligible as an attempt to preserve the French landscape
and culture rather than simply blunt economic protec-
tionism (see Chapter 11). The relationship between land-
scape and national identity was carried to its ideological
extreme by the Nazis, who were probably the most eco-
logically aware government ever to exist.
Fond of being photographed in forest settings, they
viewed the Black Forest of southern Germany as their spir-
itual home. Non-native plants were eradicated in exactly the
same way as the non-Aryan human population. As Anne
Whiston Spirn notes (1997: 253–4) ‘the use of “native” Plate 12.3  Banksy, Bombed Village, 2006
plants and “natural” gardens to represent the Nazi political (Banksy)

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 Chapter 12  Social constructions of nature    253

Chapter 11). Conversely, urban areas are assumed to be lens that has been moulded by their social experience’.
bereft of nature, despite often being more biodiverse than However sanitized lab work is made to appear, experi-
massive swathes of agricultural land, and supporting vast ments require human interaction and judgements to
infrastructures to control elements such as water and work. Science is a particularly influential realm in which
waste (Gandy 2002). In many ways elements of nature are nature is constructed and contested, because it has the
more important in the city, but have simply been ignored capacity to make very strong truth claims about reality,
until recently, as they do not correspond with unspoken and hence how we should live and behave. But its findings
cultural constructions of what nature should look like. and models remain influenced by cultural factors.

12.3.2 Ecology and politics

12.3 Environmental myths In the past 30 years, geographers have become increas-
ingly interested in how dominant models of ecology rely
on social constructions of nature. The field of politi-
12.3.1 The power of science cal ecology recognizes that ecological knowledge is not
What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our always neutral, but reflects the specific aims of those
method of questioning. involved in producing it. This can have profound politi-
cal consequences upon how different landscapes are man-
(Heisenberg 1958)
aged, and for whom. In the words of Paul Robbins (2004:
Science adheres to a very detailed and rigorous set of rules 12), the goal of political ecology is to ‘take the hatchet’ to
for building knowledge that accurately reflects the natural environmental myths, using both scientific and social sci-
world, but in practice science is not immune to social con- entific studies to expose the false assumptions and unsuit-
structions of nature. As the biologist Richard Lewontin ability of certain ecological models. Bill Deneven’s work
says (1993: 3), ‘Scientists do not begin life as scientists, on the ‘Pristine Myth’ described in the previous section
after all, but as social beings immersed in a family, a state, is an example of this, but the hatchet has been taken to
a productive structure, and they view nature through a other scientific myths too (see Case study 12.2).

Case study 12.2

Desertification They argue that the idea of desertification forms

part of a longer history of reports from Westerners
Desertification became an important international in the Sahara concerning advancing deserts. For
issue in the 1970s when successive years of drought example, early accounts of desertification originated
in the Sahel (the area bordering the southern edge of in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when
the Sahara) caused widespread famine. The United scholars believed the Sahara to have been created
Nations (UN) responded with the 1977 conference on by the Romans and Phoenicians through deforesta-
desertification, and a subsequent Convention to Com- tion, overgrazing and over-cultivation. In the twentieth
bat Desertification, which focused on land degradation century, colonial land managers took on this idea that
in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas. This con- deserts advance because of the mismanagement and
ference popularized and publicized the term, but was over-exploitation of land. In 1935 E.P. Stebbing, a for-
based on little actual science. David Thomas and Nick ester, published his views widely on the causes of the
Middleton (1994) have identified four ‘myths’ of deser- ‘encroaching Sahara’ in British West Africa, blaming
tification in dryland areas: shortened agricultural fallow periods, shifting agricul-
ture and overgrazing. It was concluded that the Sahara
1 That it is a ‘voracious process’ affecting one-third of
had grown, and was still growing, owing to poor land
the world’s land area.
management, which had worsened under the colonial
2 That drylands are fragile ecosystems.
regime. The spectre of sand dunes encroaching upon
3 That desertification is the primary cause of human
fertile land remained an enthralling one, and a report in
suffering and misery.
1975 suggested that the Sahara was advancing at the
4 That the UN is central to its understanding and
astonishing rate of 5.5 km per year.
solution.
➜

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 254    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

➜ Thomas and Middleton question both the sup- forces like drought far outweigh human factors like
posed pace and causes of this process. They suggest over-stocking.
that biophysical processes have been the primary The myth of desertification is bound up with the fail-
cause of Saharan advance over the twentieth cen- ure of Western scientists to understand the dynamics of
tury, because of the progressive desiccation (drying dryland areas, simply falling back on received colonial
out) of North Africa since the end of the Pleistocene stereotypes of overgrazing and advancing deserts. As
ice-age 10,000 years ago. Advances and retreats Paul Robbins states (2004: 109), the notion of soil ero-
within this overall pattern reflect climatic variations sion was ‘a social construction that helped to secure
in rainfall over tens of years. They also attack the colonial power’, and while the term is generally consid-
idea that humans are to blame for desertification, ered unhelpful amongst scientists today, it perseveres
arguing that policies to reduce the grazing of dryland within the policies of international agencies such as the
areas are ineffective. ‘Expert’ knowledges about UN and NGOs.
dryland fragility, they argue, actually undermine adap- Once specific constructions of nature become
tive strategies that have evolved over centuries. For established, they assume a life of their own. Funding
example, lowering livestock densities damages the streams for research, policies and the vested inter-
ability of local farmers to resist drought. The focus ests of those that work within the field act to keep
on mismanagement obscures both the biophysical the concern alive. As they circulate through networks
causes of dryland degradation and specific social of scientists, institutions, funding bodies, the media
problems, such as firewood scarcity. As Batterbury and policies, such constructions of nature become
and Warren note (2001), degradation is usually local- ­established as seemingly incontrovertible facts.
ized and ephemeral, and it is very hard to overgraze
in a dynamic non-equilibrium system dominated by Q   Why is it hard to produce definite scientific
annual grasses, such as rangelands, where external answers to large-scale environmental questions?

These myths have real influence over the way in which such as Amazonian Indians, who are romantically depicted
environmental problems are tackled. For example, the living at one with nature, almost as part of nature rather
assumption that degradation is caused by mismanage- than humanity (Slater 1995). The exclusion of humans
ment generally leads to the imposition of solutions upon from ecological models distorts conservation practices,
people, rather than developing solutions that use their which lack the ability to capture the value of landscapes
local knowledge and understanding (see Robbins 2004, influenced by humans. These oversights are unfortunate;
Chapter 8, for a wealth of examples). This resonates not only do humans influence almost all habitats today,
with Bruce Braun’s work on Clayoquot Sound discussed but, in order to live more sustainably, we require ecological
in the previous section, where both economic and envi- models that can understand humans as part of ecosystems
ronmental representations of the forest actively excluded rather than just undesirable disturbances to them.
the indigenous population living there.
There are aspects of ecological science that clearly
reflect the places and periods in which they developed.
Directly parroting the language of US settlement, ecolo- 12.4 Constructing human nature
gists in the early twentieth century talked about the suc-
cession of plant ‘communities’ from pioneers, who come There is a long tradition of looking directly to the animal
in first and settle an area, through to the stable ‘climax’ world in order to establish how humans should behave,
forest. There is some circularity to this process. Models and science has been integral to such attempts. If science
of ecology reflect the social context in which they are pro- can show certain behaviours or modes of social organi-
duced, but then, having become established as scientific zation to be ‘natural’, then it is assumed that they are
‘facts’, become models for human society. Some authors unquestionably ‘right’. As evolutionary biologist and
have argued that the appeal of nature as a stable commu- social commentator Richard Lewontin (1993: 87) sug-
nity goes back to the Judaeo-Christian myth of the Garden gests, ‘the problem for political philosophers has always
of Eden, when humans supposedly lived in perfect har- been to try to justify their particular view of human
mony with nature before their fall from grace. This yearn- nature’. This is a game of high stakes; think about how
ing for a return to innocence often finds expression in the often you hear political commentators talk about things
kinds of stories that are told about indigenous peoples, like war being ‘a part of human nature’, or capitalists

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 Chapter 12  Social constructions of nature    255

justifying the free market on the grounds that competi- the researchers conducting the study. Male research teams
tion and the need to own things are ‘in our nature’. It demonstrate a tendency to explain ape behaviour in terms
does not take much to spot the flaws in this logic. Animals of sexual competition between aggressive males to impreg-
do not cook, but no one would say cooking food is wrong nate passive females. By contrast, female primatologists
because it is unnatural (apart from Raw Food advocates, focus on communication and basic survival activities of
of course). Putting it another way, James Weinrich says, the apes, generating very different interpretations of their
‘when animals do something that we like, we say it is social behaviour. Depending on who is doing the research,
natural. When they do something that we don’t like, we different aspects of behaviour will be measured and dif-
call it animalistic’ (1982: in Bagemihl 1999: 77). ferent inferences drawn from them. Gender and politics
The attempt to draw parallels between animal and become tangled up in the process of scientific enquiry, so
human behaviour is one of the most obvious ways in which that the ape becomes the site of legitimization for what is
nature acts as a mirror for the values of society. Donna and is not ‘natural’. This in turn provides a proxy moral
Haraway’s (1989) work on primatology (the study of apes) framework for the social behaviour of humans. A more
re-examines evidence from major research projects on ape recent debate to hit the media involves the naturalness of
behaviour to show that they are biased by the gender of homosexuality (see Case study 12.3).

Case study 12.3

Gay animals 78) says, ‘what is remarkable about the entire debate
about the naturalness of homosexuality is the frequent
WHAT DOES A DOG HAVE TO DO ROUND HERE TO absence of any reference to concrete facts or accurate,
PROVE HE’S GAY????!!!!! comprehensive information about animal homosexual-
(Ingilby 2002) ity’. Bagemihl also asks a more fundamental question:
how has science overlooked this considerable subset
In 1999 a biologist called Bruce Bagemihl published a of animal behaviour? His answer is that zoology is
book called Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexu- essentially a conservative profession, dominated by
ality and Natural Diversity (Bagemihl 1999). Drawing white male heterosexuals who impose social assump-
upon a lifetime of research, Bagemihl works his way tions about homosexuality as perverse and unnatural
through the animal world, from mammals to birds to on to the things they study. He gives examples of how
cockroaches, describing a profusion of homosexuality, the term ‘homosexual’ is avoided in favour of terms like
bisexuality, orgies, transvestism and transgenderism. ‘male-only social interactions’, ‘multi-female associa-
The book includes field sketches of female bonobos tions’, unisexuality, isosexuality or intrasexuality. As one
engaging in cunnilingus and photographs of male newspaper reported at the time,
whales entwining their penises in sexual commun-
ion, all of which provoked a considerable degree of A female ape wraps her legs around another female,
outrage. Being gay is seen as an exclusively human rubbing her own clitoris against her partner’s while
behaviour, something that by definition is not natural. emitting screams of enjoyment. The researcher
explains: It’s a form of greeting behavior. Or reconcilia-
This is a longstanding Christian idea (although there
tion. Possibly food-exchange behavior. It’s certainly not
is very little about it in the bible). The Church Council
sex. Not lesbian sex. Not hot lesbian sex . . .
of Nablus in AD 1120 wrote the first law condemning
homosexuality, which was subsequently preserved in (McCarthy 1999)
the Vatican library. By the time of the Renaissance this
idea had found its way into the laws of many countries, It is not only science that is to blame either. How com-
and today many groups in society claim that homo- mon is it for parents to tell small children who enquire
sexuality is wrong because it is ‘unnatural’. why two male dogs are mounting each other that they
Bruce Bagemihl’s book threw this myth into doubt. are just ‘confused’? In the USA pet owners have been
In some penguin colonies, as many as one in ten acquitted for shooting their dogs on the grounds that they
pairs of penguins may be same-sex, while in bonobo were exhibiting ‘gay’ behaviour. The topic of gay animals
chimpanzees the whole species is bisexual. If homo- is laced with contradiction, which may explain why it is
sexuality is found throughout the animal kingdom then a topic so beloved of comedians, from Ricky Gervais to
how can it possibly be unnatural? As Bagemihl (1999: South Park’s ‘Big Gay Al’s Big Gay Animal Sanctuary’
➜

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 256    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

➜ and Sparky the Gay Dog (famously played by George In 2006 the Oslo Natural History Museum ran an
Clooney). exhibition on gay animals, tellingly called ‘Against
Prudishness is only half the story though. Bagemihl’s nature’ (BBC 2006). There was considerable hostility
work is scientifically controversial because it suggests to the exhibition, with organisers reporting criticism and
that sex is not solely practised for reproduction. of being told by one opponent they would ‘burn in hell’.
This seems to contradict the most important theory in An American commentator said it was an example of
biology – ­that of evolution. Researching animal homo- ‘propaganda invading science’. More recently still, sci-
sexuality is not the road to a successful career: applica- entists in America have claimed that they can ‘cure’ gay
tions for research grants that appear ignorant of the sheep by manipulating hormone levels in their brains to
theory of evolution do not tend to stand a good chance make them attracted to ewes (Oakeshott and Gourlay
of receiving funding. However, sex between animals – as 2006). The implication that gayness might be ‘curable’
between humans – is often a matter of enjoyment, rather in humans has caused outrage. Competing construc-
than procreation, and this applies to animals of the tions of nature are not only highly charged politically,
same sex as well as opposite sexes. Non-heterosexual but cut across science and religion, parts of modern
practices can also be beneficial. For example, pairs of society that are often seen as unrelated.
male birds may rear eggs ‘donated’ by a female, and two
males can command a larger territory than a heterosex- Q   Do you think there is any such thing as human
ual pair, improving the chances of survival for chicks. nature?

12.4.1 Our place in nature Estimates varied wildly from 40,000 and 200,000. When
the preliminary results were published in 2001 it turned
The biological sciences have also attempted to interrogate out that humans only have about 32,000 genes, far fewer
our genes to find out what makes humans distinctive from than expected. The most disturbing element of this dis-
other organisms. Attempting to place humans in nature, covery was how close other organisms were, with the
while simultaneously maintaining their position above popular press jumping on the fact that the weed thale
nature, is an old trick. The ‘great chain of being’ devised cress has 25,000 gene pairs, worms 19,000 and banana
by medieval cosmologists represents a clear ordering of flies 13,600. Suddenly we were not as special as we had
different things and beings in the world, with humans thought.
second only to God. Maintaining a scientific basis for Within the scientific world the idea of human unique-
human superiority has become progressively harder since ness, although momentarily shaken, was rescued by the
Darwin placed us squarely among the apes, but has gen- explanation that our genes interact in complex ways that
erally been based upon the argument that, while made allow them to produce greater numbers of proteins than
of the same stuff, humans are much more complex than in other organisms. It appeared that individual genes did
other animals. not control individual elements of an organism’s phe-
While our attempts to benchmark human behaviour notype (appearance and behaviour) after all. The idea
against ‘natural’ standards have tended to fail, even our of natural human superiority was transposed from gene
own biology is not quite what we were hoping. The numbers to protein numbers, and the things being com-
Human Genome Project (HGP) was a major interna- pared shifted from genes to base pairs. So while report-
tional scientific collaboration to map the entire human ers could write that we share 99 per cent of our genes
genome (the entire set of human genes that determines with apes, they could simultaneously state that we do not
the sequence of our DNA), begun in 1990 and completed share 3.5 million base pairs, thus upholding the distinc-
in 2003. The project aimed to advance our understand- tion between human and animal. While science places us
ing of human genes in order to support biotechnology firmly in nature, our cultural beliefs require reaffirmation
research. Tori Holmberg (2005) has argued that the HGP of our uniqueness.
represented a modern attempt to discover some inherent
physical basis for what makes ‘human-ness’ distinct from
nature. By counting the number of genes of other organ-
isms as well, the HGP promised a potential verification
12.4.2 Natural disasters
of human superiority. Today, these versions of nature come together in media
As the HGP progressed the issue of how many genes descriptions of natural disasters, which hold both a fas-
human beings possessed became increasingly vexed. cination with the frailty of human life, and highlight the

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 Chapter 12  Social constructions of nature    257

potential for future ecological destruction. In the envi- too. The Cambridge dictionary defines a disaster as
ronmental era, the spectre of global catastrophe is con- ‘an event causing great damage, injury or loss of life’,
stantly invoked, from the impending ice age predicted in which means that it cannot be a disaster unless there
the 1970s, to the threat of global warming that emerged are people involved. Yet equally a natural disaster would
in the 1990s. In The Ecology of Fear, Mike Davis (1998) be a massive event not harming humans in any way. But
explores this fascination with disaster through the city the things commonly described as natural disasters do
of Los Angeles, which he claims has been destroyed 145 harm humans. Increasingly disasters are seen as events
times on film and in books by everything ranging from that exacerbate pre-existing social and economic prob-
earthquakes and nuclear weapons to Bermuda grass and lems. The flooding of New Orleans in 2005 in the wake
the Devil. Crisis fascinates humans; it sells papers and of Hurricane Katrina demonstrates this point well – the
makes people watch TV and films. people who were harmed most were the poorest because
The film The Day After Tomorrow suggests what may they were unable to leave. Media representations of
happen if the Gulf Stream shuts down because of the the disaster tended to fall back on the traditional con-
melting of the Canadian and Greenland ice caps due to struction of nature as a destructive force. A New York
climate change. While there is evidence from Quaternary Times editorial on 30 August 2005 led with the headline
studies that this has possibly happened in the past, the ‘Nature’s Revenge’, even though it went on to criticize
film suggests that it could freeze the North Atlantic over- the government policies that exacerbated the disaster
night. In reality the process would take at least 50 (and (notably the loss of protective coastal wetlands to devel-
probably more like 500) years. As the poster for the film opment and the disrepair of the levees due to federal
shows (Plate 12.4), nature’s capacity for destruction is budget cuts).
used to sensationalize the film. Representations of crisis The idea that nature can do things to us often results
can also be politically useful, for example to international in its personification as a subjective force (in this case
aid agencies seeking to attract funding. harbouring a whim for revenge). While The Day After
The irony here of course it that there is little ‘nat- Tomorrow reflects our fears about upsetting nature
ural’ about a natural disaster – humans are required through the inadvertent effects of burning fossil fuels,

Plate 12.4  Film poster for The Day

After Tomorrow.
(20th Century/Lionsgate Film/Ronald Grant
Archive)

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 258    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

a similar understanding holds concerning the potential environmentalism, a fragile blue image that transcends
impact of intended responses as well. The potential to national borders and political divisions, and on which
‘geo-engineer’ our climate by injecting particles into human features are invisible.
the atmosphere that would reduce the amount of the The second construction of nature beloved of the
sun’s energy reaching the surface sounds like science media is that of an uncontrollable, violent force. This
fiction, but is being seriously explored as a potential version of nature is older, speaking to a pre-modern
palliative to global warming. Given that this is a fairly period in which human fortunes were largely determined
unusual and unknown option the UK government com- by climate, natural disasters and disease. Press reports of
missioned research to investigate public opinion on it, floods and hurricanes often speak of nature’s wrath, and
which revealed a strongly held general concern about the the unstoppable forces of nature. While the constructions
dangers of ‘meddling with mother nature’ (Corner et al. of fragility and violence appear to be contradictory, they
2013). The idea of nature as something that exists sepa- both reveal insecurities in society’s relation to the envi-
rately to us in a state of equilibrium, but which is liable ronment. Our original fear of nature’s capricious power
to exert its wrath upon us if we ‘meddle’ too much in its to destroy drove us to strive to control and dominate our
affairs is clearly alive and well. surroundings, but our technological mastery has now
made us the potential authors of our own destruction.
The quote from the trailer for Al Gore’s documentary,
which opens this section, asks whether we betrayed the
12.5 Nature and the media planet, or the planet betrayed us. While one can ask
whether it is possible for a lump of rock to betray any-
Did the planet betray us? Or did we betray the planet? thing, let alone ‘us’, the personification of nature he uses
evokes both our power over nature (the capacity for us to
(Trailer for the film An Inconvenient Truth)
betray the planet) and fear of nature (the possibility that
In each of the examples discussed so far, the idea of what it is going to betray us).
is and is not natural forms a critical bone of contention. Parallels with religious stories of God punishing
The way in which different positions are represented is humans are hard to ignore. But before we laugh too much
important in understanding how certain ideas become at the polytheistic beliefs of ancient civilizations that saw
dominant. For example, the idea of wilderness is insepa- nature as a world inhabited by gods, we should remem-
rable from its representation in landscape painting and, ber that the US National Hurricane Center continues an
more recently, photography. But how does this process old tradition of giving names to hurricanes. Such disas-
work out in the mainstream media? ters are also commonly referred to as ‘acts of God’ by
It is possible to identify two dominant constructions politicians and insurance companies. The BBC website
of nature that animate media discussions of environ- offers some clues as to what nature may have been tak-
mental change: fragility and violence. The first is closely ing revenge for, claiming that the levees surrounding New
related to the emergence of environmentalism, which is Orleans were a ‘snub to nature’. Statements like this beg
concerned with the health of the planet that human- the question of whether it is actually possible to offend
kind depends upon for its survival. While the idea of water and wind, and if so, how water and wind would
caring for the planet seems quite normal to us now, be able to seek revenge. Representations of these disasters
this idea only emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Denis as somehow being the ‘fault’ of nature distract attention
Cosgrove (1994) argues that the environmental mindset from the political, economic and social causes of human
was shaped by the release of photographs of the earth loss.
taken during the Apollo Space missions in 1968 and 1972
(see Introduction, Plate 1). Splashed across newspapers
and television, pictures of the earth from space had a
12.5.1 Environmental knowledge and the media
huge cultural impact. Never before had the planet upon Climate change and natural disasters are pervasive, invad-
which we live been viewed as a single object, and the ing our TV screens and monopolizing newspaper column
image of an orb hanging in space seemed to show the inches. And everyone seems concerned, from movie stars
planet at its most vulnerable, as a finite, isolated island like Angelina Jolie to politicians like David Cameron.
in a sea of nothingness. Books were written likening Never has nature been so hot a topic.
the earth to a ‘spaceship’, replete with life-support The media is a critical sphere in which knowledges
systems that require managing and conserving. The about nature are produced and consumed. The wild-
image of the earth became the leitmotif for Western life documentaries that are broadcast into our homes

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 Chapter 12  Social constructions of nature    259

reproduce notions of Africa as a great wilderness, going

to great lengths to capture scenes in which people and 12.6 Conclusions
evidence of people are absent (Davies 2000). This is an
increasingly difficult task given the level of tourist traf-
12.6.1 Nature: a dangerous idea?
fic and numbers of indigenous peoples that are found
across many African savannah areas. Wildlife films This chapter started by asking what nature is. Geographers
have been edited for years to present only heterosexual have sought to answer this question in a range of ways,
animals, and TV shows like ‘Meercat Manor’ go out suggesting that nature is a social construction that varies
of their way to liken animal behavior to that found in between places and periods. Rather than lessen its impor-
typical human families. The Internet represents a huge tance, the idea that nature is an idea reveals its power to
source of scientific knowledge but is largely unregu- dictate how we should behave, how we should live and how
lated, producing a range of conflicting claims about we should value and use the environment. It justifies the
the state of nature. For example, popular environmen- exploitation of certain people while validating the luxuries
tal websites vary wildly in their estimates of biodiver- of others. It has been used to persecute homosexuals and
sity loss (Ashlin and Ladle 2006 provide a salutary tale legitimize genocide. Nature is indeed a dangerous idea.
concerning the unreliability of information from the At the beginning of the chapter it was argued that
Internet). social constructionists seek to demonstrate two aspects
The media has assumed increased importance in shap- of nature: first how ideas of nature do not represent some
ing how people understand environmental issues. This external ‘truth’ but, rather, come to reflect the cultural,
is nowhere felt more strongly than in relation to climate political and spiritual beliefs of a society; and second, the
change, which has generated a huge amount of media ways in which ideas of nature are used to advance spe-
coverage (Boykoff 2007) concerning whether or not we cific political viewpoints. In light of the case studies, this
are to blame and if so what should be done about it. picture has become more complex. As dominant cultural
While scientists have become increasingly certain that norms and preferences influence ideas about nature, so
changes to the earth’s atmosphere are being caused by these arguments about nature are then used to support
humans (IPCC 2013), action has been slow to follow. An dominant cultural norms. Geographers seek to reveal the
Institute for Public Policy Research report has claimed circularity of this process in order to expose repressive
that the representations of climate change in the media ideologies and open up new political possibilities for soci-
are unhelpfully alarmist, focusing on thrilling headlines ety and our relationship to the environment.
that prevent the public from understanding what they can
do about the problem (Ereaut and Segnit 2006). Based
on research that analyzed more than 600 newspaper arti-
12.6.2 The challenge
cles, and 90 TV and radio excerpts, the report identified The idea of nature remains central to the challenges fac-
the dominant construction of nature driving the climate ing society in the twenty-first century. The growing prior-
change debate as ‘alarmist’. Such articles focus on the ity attached to climate change by leading political figures
overwhelming size of the problem, and its potentially means that debates concerning how we should live, who
disastrous effects. By focusing on the terrible, unstop- should make sacrifices and how change should be managed
pable forces of nature, alarmist constructions represent a are becoming ever more pressing. The increasing influence
form of ‘climate pornography’ that seeks to thrill rather of biotechnology as a major global industry raises ques-
than increase understanding or engender action. This tions concerning how far we should manipulate biology
construction distracts us from what we can actually do to our benefit, and whether or not knowledge about our
to tackle environmental change. It is particularly destruc- genes will reveal some essential truths of human existence.
tive to the campaign of ‘small actions’, which empha- The idea of nature looms large in all these debates, and
sizes how small changes to behaviour can help combat will continue to do so. You will see people talking about
climate change (and save money in the process). The nature every day on the TV, in newspapers and around
report suggests that the small actions campaign is ren- you in everyday life. Think about what people mean when
dered impotent by the sheer scale of the alarmist claims. they use the word. What characteristics are they attribut-
As the primary interface between the majority of the ing to nature? What are they excluding? What political and
population and environmental issues, the way in which social arguments are they supporting through their appeal
ideas of nature are communicated has a decisive impact to nature? Be critical of how nature is used; the power to
on how people understand and respond to environmental refute dominant presentations of the world and our place
challenges. in it is the power to create a different world.

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 260    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

Learning outcomes Macnaghten, P. and Urry, J. (1998) Contested Natures, Sage,

London. This book covers a range of social science approaches
Having read this chapter, you should be able to:
to nature, focusing on the ways in which representations and
● Understand nature as a social construction. social constructions of nature underpin broader debates.
● Recognize that perceptions of nature vary across Robbins, P. (2004) Political Ecology, Blackwell, Oxford. This is
time and space. an accessible introduction to the major work on the politics of
environmental science, showing how various scientific fields
● Identify basic constructions of nature in cultural
have unwittingly reflected the cultural assumptions of those
representations. doing the science.
● Understand the political power of different repre-
sentations of nature.
● Critique ideas and concepts such as the ‘limits to Useful websites
growth’ and desertification.
● Appreciate how science is used to make arguments www.sierraclub.org/john_muir_exhibit Interesting
­website containing information and quotes concerning how
about human ‘nature’.
­wilderness became a valued idea in the USA, focusing on
● Understand how the media uses ideas of nature to John Muir, the ‘grandfather’ of the wilderness movement.
report environmental issues. www.nhm.uio.no/besok-oss/utstillinger/skiftende/against-
nature/index-eng.html  The website of the Natural History
Museum of Norway for the ‘Against nature?’ exhibition, which
Further reading was the first ever to focus on this subject and explore its
­cultural and scientific significance.
Castree, N. (2005) Nature, Routledge, London. This book www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwCHAhMu0Fg Documen-
covers the major theoretical approaches to nature that tary film titled The Truth about Gay Animals. The comments
­geographers have used through time. posted below present insights on how we construct nature as
Castree, N. (2011) Making Sense of Nature, Routledge, a mirror for our own beliefs.
­London. This book focuses on the ways in which nature is www.nytimes.com/2012/05/23/world/asia/fed-by-indians-
represented and the implications of these representations for monkeys-overwhelm-delhi.html?_r=0  This article from the
how we act towards the environment. New York Times reports on the scourge of monkeys invading
Demeritt, D. (2002) What is the social construction of Indian cities. Note the dispute over which agency should be
nature?, Progress in Human Geography, 26, 767–90. This dealing with them that revolves around whether they can still
paper reviews the literature on the social construction of be classified as ‘wild animals’ or not. The monkeys here are
nature in human geography. disrupting our received categories of nature.
Hinchliffe, S. (2007) Space for Nature, Sage, London. This www.earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Study/Desertification 
book explicitly tries to go beyond ideas of representation NASA website with an interesting take on the desertifica-
and social construction to outline other approaches to tion myth in the era of GIS. The attempts to identify whether
­understanding and engaging with nature. desertification is or is not occurring confound our understand-
Hulme, M. (2010) Why We Disagree About Climate ings of nature that are based upon the idea of equilibrium.
Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. This www.genome.gov/10001772 Information on the Human
book suggests that climate change is not a simple prob- Genome Project. Lots of outlandish rhetoric about how
lem waiting for a solution, but that it is an environmental, the HGP will reveal the secrets of our inner universe and
cultural and political phenomenon which is understood ‘nature’s complete genetic blueprint for building a human
in different ways by different people. The book develops being’, revealing a view of nature as something mechanical
this argument to show that climate change requires us that can be simply ‘built’.
to ­re-shape the way we think about ourselves, our socie- www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnjx6KETmi4  The trailer for
ties and our relationship to the environment and planet on An Inconvenient Truth. Climate porn at its best! Notice the
which we depend. images and wording. Does it ‘shake you to your core’?

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 Geography, culture
and global change

Chapter 13

Cheryl McEwan and Shari Daya

Topics covered
■ A definition of culture
■ The ‘cultural’ and ‘spatial turns’ in the social sciences
■ An evaluation of the extent of cultural globalization
■ The relationships between place and cultural identity
■ Cultural production and consumption
■ Progressive ways for geographers to think about culture

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 262    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

(see Chapter 19), and cultural constructions of social

13.1 What is culture? relations of gender, ethnicity and class that shape peo-
ple’s lives (e.g. Nelson and Seager 2004). However, the
This chapter explores some of the challenges posed by current popularity of culture is not simply a trend in
and for culture in the twenty-first century. First, however, academe, but is reflective of a broader cultural turn in
it is necessary to define what is meant by culture. This (Western) society as a whole.
is a complex and difficult task. By the 1950s, for exam- The world has changed fundamentally in the past
ple, there were over 150 different academic definitions of three decades and these changes are deeply cultural
culture. As Mike Crang (1998: 1) argues, despite sound- in character. For example, enormous changes have
ing like the most airy of concepts, culture ‘can only be occurred in ‘advanced’ economies since the early 1980s
approached as embedded in real-life situations, in tem- (the decline in manufacturing, the growth of services,
porally and spatially specific ways’. Cultures are part the feminization of the workforce, increased flexibil-
of everyday life. They are systems of shared meanings ity – all characteristic of ‘post-Fordism’, as discussed
that people who belong to the same community, group in ­Chapter 3). However, as cultural theorist Stuart Hall
or nation use to help them interpret and make sense of (1996: 233) argued, if ‘post-Fordism’ exists, it is as much
the world, and to reproduce themselves. These systems of a description of cultural as of economic change. Florida
meanings are often based around such things as religion, (2002) characterizes this as a shift from an industrial to a
language, ethnicity, custom and tradition, and ideas about creative age, with 40 per cent of people in the US and UK
‘place’, which can exist on a number of different spatial economies now working in ‘creative’ sectors of science,
scales (local, regional, national, global, among communi- technology, culture, arts and entertainment, and creative
ties, groups or nations). Cultures are one of the princi- economies burgeoning in cities as diverse as New York,
pal means by which identities are constructed. They give Shanghai and Bangalore. Culture has increasingly been
us a sense of ‘who we are’, ‘where we belong’ – a sense brought into governmental and economic spheres, with
of our own identity and identity with others. Cultures creative economy initiatives developed for a number of
are embodied in the material and social world and are years for small towns and small- and medium-sized cit-
dynamic rather than static, shifting and changing histori- ies as well as rural regions in the UK, Australia, New
cally through processes of cultural mixing, diffusion and Zealand and Canada (Christopherson and Clark 2007;
transculturation (discussed below). Christopherson 2008). These initiatives hinge on the
Cultures are also socially determined and defined and, arts and community cultural activities, including festi-
therefore, not divorced from power relations. Dominant vals and special events, which are believed to contribute
groups in society attempt to impose their ideas about to community identity, increase community pride and
culture and these are challenged by other groups, or foster participation in local economies. Creative indus-
subcultures. The latter might include various types of tries, it is argued, boost the local economy by attracting
youth culture, gang culture, and different ethnicities or tourists, employers and a workforce who appreciate the
sexualities, where identities are organized around dif- sense of community that they generate.
ferent sets of practices and operate in different spaces Cultural and creative industries have also recently
from dominant cultures (Crang 1998). Culture makes the become a policy priority in international development.
world meaningful and significant. Geographers suggest Global trade of creative goods and services reached a
that we should think of culture ‘not as a thing, but as record of US$624 billion in 2011, more than doubling
a relationship’ (Mitchell 2000: xviii) or as a process in from 2002 to 2011 (UNCTAD), with a 12.1  per cent
which we are all involved. Cultures include those social annual growth in export of cultural products from coun-
practices that produce meaning, as well as those practices tries in the global South. Cultural industries (audiovisual
that are shaped by those shared meanings. products, design, new media, performing arts, publishing
and visual arts) are thus one of the most rapidly growing
sectors of the world economy and a highly transforma-
13.1.1 The ‘cultural turn’
tive one in terms of income generation, job creation, and
Culture has generated a great deal of interest in recent export earnings. A recent report (UNESCO 2013) argues
years, for academics, policy makers, and at the popular that unlocking the potential of the creative economy is a
level. Geographers have turned their attention towards means for promoting the overall creativity of societies,
cultural explanations of global, national and local phe- affirming the distinctive identity of the places where it
nomena, exploring issues such as the cultural embed- flourishes and clusters, improving quality of life, and
dedness of economic processes (e.g. James 2007), the enhancing local image and prestige. Culture is increas-
relationship between cultures, identities and consumption ingly viewed as core to local creative economies in the

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 Chapter 13  Geography, culture and global change     263

global South and vital to forging new development path- the rise of ‘cultural tourism’ (Gibson 2009). In southern
ways. This is illustrated by cities such as Cape Town, Africa, for example, many ‘cultural villages’ have sprung
designated World Design Capital 2014; Johannesburg, up in rural areas to showcase local traditions and sell
actively promoted as a world-class African city of culture crafts. These villages are intended to change the relation-
through arts festivals and city-wide cultural events; Rabat, ship between consumers in the global North and peoples
labelled Moroccan Capital of Culture; Gwangju (South in global South, being less exploitative of the latter in
Korea), Yokohama (Japan) and Quanzhou (China), each economic terms and supposedly fostering greater cultural
designated an East Asian City of Culture in 2013; and exchange. However, as Saarinen (2007) points out, these
Hue (Vietnam) nominated ASEAN City of Culture in cultural villages have developed largely in response to
2014. In all these cities, culture is seen as a major lever what tourists want; communities package and sell a ver-
for increasing tourism and investment, as well as, often, sion of their culture that fits with Western ideas of what
achieving social development, urban regeneration and African culture should be.
economic growth at both the urban and national scales.
This is clearly an instrumental view of culture, which
many in the arts might wish to resist, and brings with
13.1.2 The ‘spatial turn’
it the danger of the commodification of culture while There has also been a ‘spatial turn’ in explanations in
leaving structural inequalities untouched (discussed in cultural and social theory. The world is changing fast, and
Section 13.5.3), but as we shall see culture is also seen as the rate of change is probably greater than ever before.
a route through which to foster inclusive social develop- Fast-developing technologies such as the Internet and
ment, and to create dialogue, understanding and respect satellite communications mean that the world is becom-
between peoples (UNESCO 2013). Culture is thus a ter- ing more global and more interconnected. The increased
rain in which politics, culture and the economic form an speed of transport and communications, the increasing
inseparable dynamic (Radcliffe 2007). intersections between economies and cultures, the growth
Modern consumption is also a cultural process and of international migration and the power of global finan-
also depends overwhelmingly on image (for example, cial markets are among the factors that have changed
the marketing of food and drink products and fashion everyday lives in recent decades. There is no historical
clothing) (see Plate 13.1). Movements around the world equivalent of the global reach and volume of ‘cultural
of images, symbols, modes of thought and communica- traffic’ (Held et al. 1999) through contemporary telecom-
tions are unparalleled in terms of their volume, speed munications, broadcasting and transport technologies.
and complexity. As computer technology, video imagery The challenge for geographers is to find ways of under-
and electronic music demonstrate, the material world of standing and interpreting these changes.
commodities and technologies is profoundly cultural. In Culture can be said to operate at three spatial scales:
addition, culture has become increasingly commodified; local, national and global. Two main interpretations have
in other words culture is being translated into material dominated discussion. The first highlights the global
goods that can be marketed and sold. We can see this in aspects of change. At its simplest, this approach sug-
gests that it is possible to identify processes of cultural
­homogenization – the idea that everywhere is becom-
ing the same – dominated by the USA and most eas-
ily recognized in terms such as ‘Coca-Colonization’,
‘McDonaldization’ and ‘Hollywoodization’ (Jackson
2004) (see Chapter 19). This cultural globalization
involves the movement of people, objects and images
around the world through telecommunications, language,
the media industries, radio and music, cinema, television
and tourism. The second interpretation places emphasis
on the local and the localization of people’s everyday lives
and experiences. Instead of homogenization, emphasis is
placed on the diversity of culture, on the ways in which
global brands such as Coca-Cola or McDonald’s are rein-
Plate 13.1  Image marketing is central to popular terpreted locally so that they take on different meanings
consumption: the world of commodities is profoundly in different places. The emphasis here is on the intercon-
cultural. nectedness of global and local processes. For example,
(Luciano Mortula/Shutterstock) although the same event can be witnessed simultaneously

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 264    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

around the world (e.g. an incident broadcast in a CNN day and the Gregorian calendar) and products (e.g.
news report, or an international sporting event), this event the motor car, television) from advanced countries,
will be interpreted differently in different places. Further- and their worldwide adoption (‘Westernization’,
more, locality does not necessarily refer to the opposite of ‘Americanization’, ‘modernization’). This is believed
globality. For example, some environmentalists imagine to create global cultural convergence – people around
the world as a locality, a ‘global village’. Cultural theo- the world are becoming increasingly similar in terms
rists have a growing interest in how increasing globaliza- of consumption, lifestyle, behaviour and aspirations
tion, especially of cultural production and consumption, (see Case study 13.1). It can be perceived positively
affects people’s sense of identity and place at both local (as ‘modernization’ or ‘development’) or negatively (as
and national levels (Goss 2006). Thus a geographic or spa- ‘cultural imperialism’, where ‘we’ assume that others
tial perspective has become central to studies of culture in the world should aspire to be like ‘us’).
more widely. These are some of the concerns that form 2. The mixing, or hybridization, of cultures through
the focus of this chapter. Subsequent sections explore in greater interconnections and time–space compres-
more detail ideas about a global culture, examine ways of sion (the shrinking of the world through transport
rethinking local cultures, and explore progressive ways of links and technological innovation), leading to a new
thinking about cultures in contemporary contexts. universal cultural practice. This challenges the notion
of unidirectional ‘Westernization’ and allows us to
consider how Western cultures have influenced and
13.2 Towards a global culture? are also being influenced by this mixing of cultures.
Flows of music, food, ideas, beliefs and literature
continue to percolate from around the world into the
13.2.1 Imagining a global culture cultures of the West. Consider, for example, cultural
Processes of cultural globalization have a very long influences from the East: the global phenomenon of
history and are not peculiar to contemporary times. Korean K-Pop (Psy’s ‘Gangnam Style’ was a global hit
Through global patterns of trade and migrations, and in 2012); Japanese sushi being sold in North American
through the spread of religions and empires, people, and European supermarkets; the popularity of tradi-
objects and ideas have been circulating for centuries (see tional Chinese medicines (such as acupuncture) and
Chapters 1–3). However, contemporary globalization is martial arts (such as karate, aikido and judo), which
distinctive in extent, form, rapidity of change, intensity originate in East Asian spiritual traditions; the increas-
and impact. Some commentators suggest that the idea of ing popularity of the thirteenth century Persian poet
a global culture is becoming as meaningful as the idea of Rumi or the teachings of Jewish Kabbalah.
national or local cultures, with different places and cul-
In reality, both these processes are flawed explanations
tural practices around the world converging and becom-
for what is happening today. If a global culture exists, it
ing ever similar. As Shurmer-Smith and Hannam (1994:
is far from a product of unidirectional ‘Westernization’.
76) argue, a global culture might be the product of two
However, alternative ideas about cultures mixing to pro-
very different processes:
duce a universal global culture are also problematic. Cul-
1. The export or diffusion of supposedly ‘superior’ cul- tures are mixing, but this does not necessarily mean we
tural traits (e.g. Western time-frames – the 24-hour are all becoming the same.

Case study 13.1

The globalization of culture: commodity chains through which they are produced
some examples and sold. Through multiple media including maga-
zines, television, blogs and websites, trends travel
Fashion rapidly across the world. The production, distribu-
Clothing is globalized both in terms of the cultural tion and consumption of clothing have a particular
identities to which different items appeal (‘African’ geography. Fashion design happens mainly in ‘global
prints, ‘Indian’ embroidery) and in terms of the global cities’ in the West, while the labour of cutting and

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 Chapter 13  Geography, culture and global change     265

sewing is concentrated in the developing world. promoting locally produced, organic food and ‘slow’
These divisions of labour illustrate the uneven dis- food have emerged in many places. Similarly, con-
tribution of the benefits of global cultural industries: sumer recognition of the often exploitative nature of
while Western designers and models are glamorized food production in developing countries has boosted
and often handsomely rewarded, factory workers in sales of fair trade and other ‘ethical’ products in
Asia and Africa typically work long hours under harsh Western supermarkets. While these movements aim
conditions for meagre pay (Crewe 2008). This une- to break down unjust social divisions, we should also
venness manifests not only along geographical lines pay attention to the ways in which they may reinforce
but also along lines of gender. While men dominate or re-shape identities of class (organic, ‘slow’ and
the design industry, women are the main targets and fairly traded foods typically cost more) and under-
consumers of fashion and also make up the major- standings of ‘Third World’ producers as ‘other’ (Cook
ity of clothing factory workers (see Dwyer 2006). et al. 2010).
This unevenness was exposed most dramatically by
the collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Dhaka, Tourism
Bangladesh in April 2013, killing over a thousand Tourism is one of the most obvious forms of glo-
people, mainly women garment workers. The disaster balization. Until relatively recently, the geography of
exposed the appalling pay and working conditions tourism has been skewed, dominated by people of
of Bangladeshi women making clothes for brands all classes from developed countries (North America,
such as Benetton, Mango, Primark and Walmart, and Western Europe, Japan and Australia). However,
prompted protests at flagship stores in Europe and domestic and outbound tourism is now burgeoning in
North America. emerging economies with rapidly expanding middle
classes. For example, in the past decade, Chinese
Food domestic tourism had a continuous increase of
Food has perhaps the longest history of globaliza- around 10 per cent each year, and outbound tourism
tion of any cultural artefact. Spices, tea, and sugar increased by 18 per cent from 2012 to 2013
are just three of the commodities whose trade have (www.travelchinaguide.com/tourism/ [accessed 15
shaped our modern global economies. The globali- January 2015]). Domestic tourism in Brazil has more
zation of food cultures is exemplified in the idea, than doubled since 2004 (http://riotimesonline.com/
famously put forward by the British Foreign Secre- brazil-news/rio-business/domestic-tourism-rises-with-
tary, Robin Cook, in 2001 that chicken tikka masala middle-class/ [accessed 15 January 2015]). Tourism
was now the British national dish (The Guardian can be exploitative, particularly through the growth
19/04/01). Equally, as India's own economy has of international sex tourism and the dependency of
boomed since the 1990s, that country's rapidly grow- some developing economies on the exploitation of
ing middle classes increasingly demand the local women. However, it is a form of international cultural
availability of ingredients and dishes that they have exchange that allows vast numbers of people to expe-
sampled elsewhere. Fast food and convenience food rience other cultures and places. It also locks specific
corporations are only too willing to fill this gap, and in places (tourist destinations) into wider international
the last five years chains including McDonalds, Krispy cultural patterns. For example, the English Lake
Kreme, Taco Bell and Burger King have all expanded District ‘only really became part of England when
or announced their plans to do so within the Indian many visitors, especially artists and writers, travelled
market. Even as demand increases for exotic and to it from the metropolitan centre at the end of the
more convenient foods, the environmental and politi- eighteenth century onwards’ (Urry 2005: 80). Many
cal geographies of what we eat have increasingly key English writers became known as ‘Lake poets’
come under discussion. Growing consumer aware- even when they were not from the area, and poets
ness of the environmental impacts of food production such as Wordsworth and Coleridge became tourist
and travel (food miles), and the potential health risks attractions, ‘locking’ the Lake District into a relation-
of mass agriculture and genetic modification have ship with broader ideas of landscape, literature and
in many societies contributed what Jackson (2010a) romance, which persists today as people from all over
calls ‘an age of anxiety’. In response, movements the world travel to the area on literary tours.

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 266    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

The enormous Indian film industry is very different to the

13.2.2 Debunking global culture? global film industry (dominated by Hollywood) in terms
A different departure point for discussing global culture is of its level of informality, fragmentation and patterns of
that there is no such thing. Ideas about a singular global investment, reflecting contingent structural, cultural and
economy, politics and culture imply some sort of world- geographic conditions (Mukherjee 2008), but it too has a
wide commonality that does not exist. First, the image of global audience, particularly among the Indian diaspora.
rampant cultural imperialism by the West, and especially Similarly, there is a mosaic of urban and national scenes
the USA, is flawed since apparent cultural sameness is lim- across Asia involving the production and consumption of
ited in scope, located only in the consumption of certain putatively Asian cultural products, such as the Hong Kong
products and media images. The possibilities of ‘Westerni- and Korean film industries, Cantopop and Mandarin pop,
zation’ eroding centuries of local histories, languages, tra- Japanese manga and anime productions, and animation
ditions and religions are far-fetched and people in different and digital media industries. The Nigerian movie indus-
parts of the world respond to these images and products try (Nollywood) is increasingly popular with audiences
in different ways. On the one hand, many millions of peo- across Africa, to the extent that some film-makers and
ple are not able even to access the Internet. For example, in intellectuals elsewhere across the continent are critical
2009, there were on average only about 4 Internet users per of what they see as the ‘dumping’ of these rough-and-
1,000 people in Bangladesh and about 40 per 1,000 people ready videos in their national markets and the ‘pollution’
in Malawi, compared with 770 per 1,000 in the USA and of their own cultural spaces (UNESCO 2013). Paradoxi-
905 per 1,000 in the Netherlands (CIA World Factbook cally, the circulation of these diverse cultural products is
2014). There is no single global culture in part because of often enabled by apparently homogenizing technological
the unevenness of globalization. On the other hand, it is platforms such as YouTube and Facebook (see Case study
also important to acknowledge the cultural dynamism and 13.2). What is certainly clear, however, is that given the
assertiveness of countries and peoples around the world. significant growth of the middle classes in countries such

Case study 13.2

Culture and social networking they incorporate new information and communica-
tion tools, such as mobile connectivity, blogging and
Since their introduction in the early twenty-first cen- photo/video-sharing.
tury, social network sites (SNSs) such as MySpace, The question of whether and how much cultural
Facebook, Bebo and Cyworld have attracted mil- differences impact upon the way people respond to
lions of users, many of whom have integrated these and interact with social networks is an important one.
sites into their daily practices. At one level, we might It could be argued, for example, that networks such as
think of the globalization of SNSs as evidence of Facebook mainly reflect and accommodate values and
an emerging global culture. However, while the tech- norms prevalent in Western cultures, which explains
nological phenomenon has a global reach (with the why they were at first more successful in countries such
caveat outlined previously that millions of people still as the UK, USA and Canada than elsewhere. However,
do not have access to the Internet), the ways in which the design and use of SNSs also varies in different
people around the world make cultural responses to locations and are often adapted to local cultural norms,
SNSs are complex and multiple. As Boyd and Ellison tastes and preferences. For example, the page design
(2007) argue (see also Miller 2011), while their of SNSs varies from place to place, with greater use of
key technological features are fairly consistent, the pastel or muted colours and emoticons on South-east
cultures that emerge around SNSs are varied. For Asian sites, in contrast to the bolder, darker colours used
example, most sites help maintain pre-existing social by sites in Europe and North America. Different cultural
networks, but others enable strangers to connect with expectations around privacy and personal modesty also
each other based on shared interests, political views shape the use of SNSs. For example, some users are
or activities. Some sites deliberately cater to diverse often uncomfortable with posting pictures of themselves,
and heterogeneous audiences, while others attract preferring to use avatars. Therefore, while technologies
people based on common language or shared identi- such as SNSs become increasingly global, local and
ties, such as ethnic, sexual, religious or nationality- national cultural norms continue to shape how people
based identities. Sites also vary in the extent to which use social networking.

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 Chapter 13  Geography, culture and global change     267

as Brazil, Nigeria, India and China, the notion of West- 13.2.3 Rethinking global culture
ern global cultural dominance is becoming increasingly
anachronistic. Instead of imagining a global culture that is erasing local
Second, some theorists would argue that national and national cultures, we can think of local, national and
cultures remain stronger than global cultures. This is global as three important, interconnected spatial scales
borne out when we consider the many conflicts occur- at which culture operates. Those aspects of culture that
ring throughout the world along the geopolitical fault- operate at the global level are ‘third cultures’ (Feather-
lines of national cultures (the ongoing conflict between stone 1995: 114). National institutions are no longer in
Pakistan and India is but one example of this). For complete control of cultural globalization and ‘third
the past 200 years, nation-states and national cultures cultures’ (sets of practices, bodies of knowledge, con-
have monopolized cultural power (state television ventions and lifestyles) have developed in ways that have
is one example of a national institution influencing become increasingly global and independent of nation-
national cultures within national territorial bounda- states. Phenomena such as patterns of consumption,
ries). At the end of the twentieth century, this balance technological diffusion and media empires are part of
began to change, with international telecommunica- these third cultures, and transnational and multinational
tions and media corporations challenging the centrality corporations are the institutions that make them global.
and importance of national cultures. However, it In this sense, global cultures exist but only as third cul-
could be argued that despite these changes a great deal tures, outside national and local cultures, yet intersecting
of ­cultural life is still organized along national and on both these scales in different ways around the world.
­territorial lines. Acknowledging that ‘our’ global view might be very
Third, if culture is a system of shared meanings, then different from that of people elsewhere, living in very dif-
looking at the world today there are clearly many sys- ferent contexts, is also important. It is clear that multiple
tems of shared meanings and many different cultures. global cultural networks exist, such as those connecting
People in different places use different techniques and the overseas Chinese with their homeland, or those link-
technologies to reproduce culture, such as oral histo- ing Islamic groups around the world. These networks
ries, literature or television and cinema. These tech- disrupt any notion of a singular global culture. Power
niques have different patterns of dispersion, penetration and inequality bring into question the idea of global
and scale. Therefore, some cultures are more likely to cultures. As Massey (2009) argues, a power geometry
become globalized than others – those reproduced exists, which gives people with different access to power
through television, cinema and increasingly through different notions of what global means. New institu-
digital media platforms have a greater range and speed tions (like global media corporations) for the production,
of dispersion than those reproduced through oral his- transmission and reception of cultural products are cre-
tories. However, this does not mean that globalized ating infrastructures supporting cultural globalization,
cultures completely erode localized cultures; the ways including electronic infrastructure (radio, television,
in which these different cultures intersect is important. music, telecommunications, digital platforms), linguistic
Those ‘things’ (products, symbols, corporate entities) infrastructure (the spread of bi- and multi-lingualism,
that have become global signifiers are clearly globalized particularly the dominance of English), and corporate
(they are recognized the world over), but the ways in infrastructure (producers and distribution networks).
which people around the world make cultural responses As we have seen, these new institutions often operate at
to them are complex and multiple (see Case study 13.2). scales beyond the nation-state, and they are sites of power
Globalization of products and symbols does not nec- in the production of culture. The ownership, control
essarily equal Westernization. For example, Japanese and use of these institutions remain uneven across and
consumer goods do not sell on the back of exporting within countries (Held and McGrew 2007), thus creating
Japanese culture but on a market strategy based around ‘power geometries’ that are centred overwhelmingly on
the concept of dochaku (‘glocalism’). This involves a the West. People have very different experiences of cul-
global strategy not of imposing standardized products ture because of their different locations in the world and
but of tailoring Japanese consumer products to specific their relationship to these sites of power. Mapping this
local markets. These goods are, therefore, both glo- power geometry, identifying sites of power and revealing
balized and localized. Consequently, how intersections the marginalization of some peoples around the world
between cultures are played out at local levels is of sig- by cultural globalization are increasingly significant. Of
nificance, and this suggests that imagining a universal equal significance are forms of resistance, such as cul-
global culture is quite problematic. ture jamming (Dery 2010) by anti-consumerist social
movements. This involves tactics such as media hacking,

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 268    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

information warfare, satire, ‘terror-art’ and graffiti to ‘new claims to the – usually exclusive – character of
invest advertisements, newscasts and other media arte- places, and who belongs there, are being made.’ We see
facts with subversive meaning, or to refigure logos and this in contemporary Western Europe, North America
product images in order to challenge what is considered and Australia, where ‘asylum seekers, migrants, Muslims,
as ‘cool’. Another form of resistance is exemplified in militant youths, pan-handlers, carriers of transmissible
‘buycotts’, the purchasing of oppositional products aim- diseases’ (Amin 2010: 10) are increasingly racialized and
ing to provide a socially acceptable alternative to a more viewed as threats to established value systems and ways
powerful brand. A good example of this is Mecca Cola, of life. Similar problems have also emerged in countries
marketed in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and Africa such as South Africa, which experienced a dramatic rise
as providing a means of expressing solidarity with Mus- in xenophobic violence in 2008 that persists today (Dod-
lims worldwide (Littler 2008). Promoted as an alternative son 2010). Therefore, modern life is characterized both
to the archetypal American product Coca-Cola, Mecca by decentralization and globalization of culture and by
Cola purports to offer consumers a way to subvert what the resurgence of place-bound traditions. Following this,
the company sees as American imperialism, especially as the impact of the new global context on local cultures has
displayed in the support offered by the USA to the Israeli two, possibly contradictory, outcomes.
occupation of Palestine and the US invasion of Iraq in
2007. It is also important, therefore, to take account of
the ways in which marginalized peoples might be empow-
13.3.2 Negative sense of culture
ered by engaging with, and perhaps transforming, the Where global processes are perceived to pose a threat to
new institutions driving cultural globalization. local culture, there might be an attempt to return to some
In summary, global processes are occurring, but they notion of the exclusivity of culture. At the extreme, this
do not produce a universal global culture, they are not might take the form of exclusivist nationalism or even
distributed evenly around the world and are not uncon- ‘ethnic cleansing’. Reactions to the perceived threat to
tested. Global cultural processes are not simply a result local cultures include nationalistic, ethnic and funda-
of a unidirectional ‘Westernization’, since culture flows mentalist responses, which also entail a strong asser-
transnationally. A number of different global cultures tion of local cultures, such as reviving or inventing local
exist as ‘third cultures’ – in patterns of consumption, traditions and ceremonies. These can create a level of
flows of knowledge, the diffusion of technologies and local fragmentation, with a parochial, nostalgic, inward-
media empires that operate beyond, but connecting with, looking sense of local attachment and cultural identity.
the local and national scales. In this sense, cultures are thought of as bounded, with
very clear definitions of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in the
creation of a sense of belonging, and producing geogra-
13.3 Reinventing local cultures? phies of exclusion (Sibley 1995).
For example, English rural areas are often conceptual-
ized as the preserve of culture and identity (see Chapters
13.3.1 Locality and culture 11 and 12). This idea is mobilized through the myth of
It has often been assumed that there is a simple relation- the ‘rural idyll’, in which rural village communities are
ship between local place and local culture. Places were portrayed as neighbourly and close-knit, with villagers
thought of as having a distinct physical, economic and perceived as having a deep-seated sense of local identity
cultural character; they were unique, with their own complemented by strong feelings of belonging (Garland
traditions and local cultures that made them different and Chakraborti 2006), and in which rural cultures are
from other places. It is clear, however, that processes of thought of as timeless, unchanging and unaffected by
globalization are also posing serious challenges to the global processes. This cosy vision of a peaceful country-
meaning of place. Places and cultures are being restruc- side excludes many people who live in rural areas, but
tured. According to Massey and Jess (1995a: 1), ‘on the do not fit this stereotype. Different notions of rural idyll
one hand, previous coherences are being disrupted, old create similar exclusions in other countries; for exam-
notions of the local place are being interrupted by new ple, Canada’s rural idyll is embedded within the colonial
connections with a world beyond’. The appearance of legacy of a white settler society (Cairns 2013). The myth
7–11 stores in the rainforests of northern Thailand is one of the English rural idyll deems travellers, environmen-
example of how even the remotest of places are becom- tal protesters, hunt saboteurs, people with alternative
ing increasingly internationalized, in this case through lifestyles and people from minority ethnic communities
tourism. ‘On the other hand’, Massey and Jess continue, to be ‘outsiders’ and a threat to local cultures (Garland

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 Chapter 13  Geography, culture and global change     269

and Chakraborti 2004). The pervasiveness of this myth cultural identity and its boundaries. Women are often the
of the white rural idyll made headlines in the UK in a intergenerational transmitters of cultural traditions, cus-
recent controversy over the cast of popular TV drama toms, songs, cuisine and the ‘mother’ tongue, primarily
Midsomer Murders, set in a fictional Cotswolds village. through their role as mothers. This is especially true in
When questioned about the all-white cast, the producer minority situations where the school and the public sphere
described the programme as the ‘last bastion of Eng- present different and dominant cultural models from that
lishness’ and stated ‘We just don't have ethnic minori- of the home. Recent controversies over the Islamic veil, for
ties involved. Because it wouldn't be the English village example, have seen countries across Europe wrestling with
with them’ (in Pool 2011). As Garland and Chakraborti issues of religious freedom, civil rights, women’s equality,
(2006, 2009) argue, the perpetuation of this myth secular traditions and escalating fears of terrorism. France
obscures and marginalizes the experiences of minority banned Muslim headscarves and other ‘conspicuous’ reli-
ethnic residents who often feel excluded from village gious symbols at state schools in 2004, and in 2010 made
life. Moreover, their research suggests that conflation it illegal in public places to wear any clothes designed
of rurality with notions of Englishness and ‘whiteness’ to hide the face. Belgium passed a similar law in 2010,
serves to reinforce this marginalization and can also lead banning any clothing that hides the wearer’s identity in
to racist victimization. The ‘rural idyll’ is thus a selec- public places. Turkey, a secular Islamic country, banned
tive representation, exclusive in its class, race and status the wearing of head-scarves in all civic spaces in 2005 but
connotations, is profoundly conservative and demands amended the ruling in 2008 to allow women at universi-
conformity. It is based on a very inward-looking sense ties to wear scarves tied under the chin. The Italian par-
of place and culture (see Plate 13.2). liament approved anti-terrorist laws in July 2005, which
Conservative reactions to change can be thought of make covering one’s features in public – including through
as a kind of cultural fundamentalism through which the wearing the burqa – an offence. The Dutch cabinet backed
process of cultural change is often bitterly contested. a proposal in 2006 to ban the few dozen Muslim women
Gender plays an important role in this. Women are often who choose to wear the burqa from doing so in public
considered as guardians of the borders of culture (Yuval- places on grounds that it disturbs public order, citizens
Davis 1997). They not only bear children for the collec- and safety. In the United Kingdom in 2010, the Conserva-
tive, but also reproduce it culturally. In closed cultures, tive MP Philip Hollobone proposed a law to regulate
the control of women’s sexuality is seen as imperative to wearing in public garments that cover the face, calling
the maintenance of the purity of the cultural unit; women the burqa offensive. The debates over Islamic dress reveal
are discouraged from marrying outside their cultural and some of the issues that can arise when marginal, minority
ethnic group. Ethnicity and culture, therefore, are seen cultures are seen to clash with the norms and expectations
to be one and the same. In addition, symbols of gender of the majority population, which in turn raises questions
play an important role in articulating difference between about the possibilities and challenges of multiculturalism
cultural groups. Women’s distinctive ways of dressing as opposed to integration and/or assimilation (discussed
and behaving very often come to symbolize the group’s below in Section 13.4).

Plate 13.2  Exclusion in the

countryside: travellers and
other minority groups are often
excluded from shops and
public houses, marking their
position as ‘outsiders’.
(Boston Globe/Getty Images)

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 270    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

Societies do not evolve smoothly from closed, bounded tolerant of difference). Increasing interconnectedness
perceptions of culture to more open, dynamic notions. means the boundaries of local cultures are seen to be
The question of cultural power, identity and resistance more permeable, susceptible to change, and difficult
also needs to be considered. For many groups, cultural to maintain than in the past. Rather than everywhere
survival is seen to depend on a closed idea of culture, with becoming the same, some nation-states have reconsti-
strongly marked boundaries separating it from ‘others’. tuted their collective identities along pluralistic and
The controversies over Islamic dress, and the continu- multicultural lines, which take into account regional and
ing sectarianism and possible threats of terrorism that ethnic differences and diversity. In Europe, this involves
still exist in Northern Ireland despite recent progress, re-creation and invention of local, regional and sub-
are examples of different cultures, religions and national state or new ‘national’ cultures (for example, the cul-
identities colliding with each other. Elsewhere the mix- tural renaissance of the Basques and Catalans, or the
ing of cultures under the impact of globalization is often cultural assertiveness of minority ethnic communities
seen as threatening and as weakening the sense of cultural in cities such as London, Paris and Berlin). The 2014
identity. Immigration is seen as a particular threat, cre- Scottish independence referendum saw Scots vote nar-
ating a revival of ethnicity that cuts across the political rowly to stay within the United Kingdom, but also saw
spectrum. Examples include the ‘little England’ reaction the emergence of a powerful civic nationalism – gener-
to closer European integration, encapsulated by the rise ally a non-xenophobic nationalism (although paradoxi-
of the UK Independence Party, which campaigns on a cally not without occasional anti-English sentiment) that
platform of UK withdrawal from the European Union purports to be based in values of freedom, tolerance,
and imposing strict controls on immigration. Migrants equality and rights – as opposed to ethnic nationalism
to Britain have become scapegoats for almost every con- based in notions of cultural sameness. Thus, what can
temporary problem, from the squeeze on public finances be perceived as destruction of local cultures by globaliza-
and services, the declining economy, and the increasing tion might in fact be the means of creating new senses
numbers of working poor. Similar attitudes are evident of locality and nation. This still involves notions of local
in post-apartheid South Africa, where since 1994 African and national identity, but recognizes both the differences
immigrants have been associated with illegality, criminal- between cultures and their interconnectedness, taking
ity and a struggling welfare system, in both political and account of the positive aspects of cultural mixing and
public discourse. According to one commentator, ‘The increased cosmopolitanism. This new sense of identity
poor and the vulnerable – especially those who do not is based on notions of inclusion rather than exclusion.
share the same language or customs or religion – have This is not to say, of course, that all people within
always been a politically convenient scapegoat for a soci- the same place will share the same culture and the same
ety’s various ills. It’s the oldest trick in the book’ (Fraser sense of locality. Within these more culturally pluralis-
2014). It is also a means of turning those most affected tic and cosmopolitan locales, different class factions,
by economic downturns and government austerity meas- ages, genders, ethnicities and religious groupings mingle
ures (e.g. working and lower middle classes) against together in the same sites, consuming the same television
other increasingly marginalised groups. This trend can programmes and products, but in highly uneven ways.
be observed in the rise of neo-fascism across Europe, These groups often possess different senses of affiliation
also characterized by anti-immigration and racism. Per- to places and localities, possess different cultural identi-
ceived threats to religious identities have also witnessed ties and belong to different cultural groupings (Feather-
the strengthening of Islamic and Christian fundamental- stone 1995: 97). A progressive sense of culture does not
ism around the world. These phenomena are not all the foresee the locale as a ‘melting-pot’, where everything
same, but they do share a response to globalization that becomes the same, but rather recognizes the different
involves a closed, fixed, bounded and often place-specific experiences of people, and that increasing interconnec-
definition of culture, and a strong resistance to changes tions might create new, dynamic and exciting cultural
heralded by cultural globalization. forms. An understanding of this is crucial to the creation
of a progressive notion of place and culture, which recog-
nizes cultures as fluid, dynamic, open and interconnected,
13.3.3 Positive sense of culture and accepts that older local cultures might decline as new
A more positive response to global processes would be ones emerge.
to imagine cultures as fluid, ever-changing, unbounded, In summary, localities are important in maintain-
overlapping and outward-looking – akin to Massey’s ing cultural difference, but can also be sites of cultural
(1994: 151) ‘progressive sense of place’. This involves mixing and transformation. Ideas about culture can be
people being more cosmopolitan (free of prejudice and negative (bounded, fixed, inward-looking) or positive

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 Chapter 13  Geography, culture and global change     271

(progressive, dynamic, outward-looking). Bounded, fixed of unemployment, discrimination in housing and jobs
notions of culture can lead to localized resistance, rac- markets, and police harassment (see Chapter 10); the
ism, nationalism, and even ‘ethnic cleansing’. Progressive 2011 London riots have been blamed on racism, classism
ideas about culture involve the recognition of differences and economic inequality that are seen as linked to crimi-
between cultures, the interconnectedness of cultures and nality, breakdown of social morality and gang culture.
their constant evolution. In contrast, a more progressive idea of culture (and its
manifestations in ethnicity, gender and sexuality) might
be developed through the concept of hybridity. Hybrid-
13.4 Multi- and hybrid cultures? ity breaks down barriers, adhering to neither the ‘melt-
ing pot’ nor ‘mosaic’ idea of cultural mixing, but rather
seeing different cultures coming together and inform-
13.4.1 Hybridity ing each other in different ways to produce something
One of the major contemporary challenges concerns entirely new. This process has a long historical trajectory.
what we do with the concept of culture in the changing Indeed, some argue that cultures have always been hybrid
global scene, where nation-states are forced to tolerate forms and processes – they have never existed in isolation
greater diversity within their boundaries. Some want to from other cultures, and thus have always been subject to
see national identity as homogeneous and assimilatory – change and influences from elsewhere (Werbner 1997: 15).
in other words, different cultures are subsumed into the One of the most obvious places we can observe
dominant culture (the ‘melting pot’ idea) (see Case study hybridity is in popular mass culture, an immediate
13.3). Denmark, for example, is highly assimilationist example being popular music. Innovations in music have
and has one of the toughest policies on immigration in always involved the fusion of different styles to create
Europe. Others call for the acceptance of ethnic plural- new sounds and rhythms. Rock-and-roll, rhythm-and-
ism and the preservation of minority ethnic cultures as a blues and Latin jazz are obvious examples. We might also
legitimate part of the national project. This is the politics think of recent and contemporary forms of music that
of multiculturalism, which instead of thinking of dif- fuse different styles, such as ‘trip hop’, which emerged in
ferent cultures as being absorbed by dominant cultures, the 1990s; ‘post-trip hop’, which has since integrated trip
relies more on a notion of a cultural mosaic, or a ‘patch- hop with other genres, such as ambient, R&B, breakbeat,
work quilt’ of cultures. Each culture is recognized as dif- drum ‘n’ bass, acid jazz and new age; ‘nu metal’, which
ferent and distinct, but these differences are understood from the late 1990s until around 2005 combined heavy
and valued. Sweden, for example, rejects Denmark’s metal with other genres such as grunge and hip hop; and
assimilationist model in favour of multiculturalism. electro house, which fuses house music with several other
Multiculturalism might seem more progressive, but it electronic dance music subgenres and came into promi-
can sometimes reinforce difference because culture is seen nence between 2000 and the present. Theorists such as
as essentially connected to race, and racial difference as Barthes (1972), Bourdieu (1984) and Bakhtin (1984) see
rooted in biological difference. (These ideas are no longer popular hybridity as an exciting challenge to, or subver-
considered acceptable; anti-racists have demonstrated sion of, dominant cultures and the exclusive lifestyles of
that ‘race’ is socially constructed and has little basis in dominant elites. Such popular mixings and inversions,
biology (Price 2010). We could just as easily have ‘races’ like the subversive elements of youth cultures (Hebdige
of blue-eyed and brown-eyed people.) Multiculturalism, 1979; see also Hammett 2009; Carr 2010), are hybrid in
therefore, still relies on a negative notion of bounded the sense that they bring together and mix languages and
cultures. It might suggest tolerance, but often results practices from different and normally separated domains.
in segregation and ghettoization. The United Kingdom They have the potential to disrupt dominant cultures by
and Netherlands, for example, have tended towards mul- their ‘out-of-placeness’.
ticulturalism but have increasingly witnessed tensions In many ways hybridity is related to the notion of
surrounding the lack of integration of some Muslim transculturation. Transculturation describes one of
communities. The murder of Dutch film-maker Theo the key cultural processes that operate between hitherto
Van Gogh in 2004, the London bombings in July 2005 sharply differentiated cultures and peoples who are forced
and the attacks on satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo (usually by the processes of imperialism or globaliza-
in Paris in 2015 – all by apparent ‘home-grown radical tion, and primarily through migration) to interact. This
Islamists’ – are seen by some to represent the failures of interaction often takes place in profoundly asymmetrical
multiculturalism. Similarly, the 2006 riots in the suburbs ways in terms of relative power between different groups.
of Paris were seen as a product of the deep alienation of However, communication technologies that enable simul-
poor, largely immigrant communities facing high levels taneous connections and transactions between people in

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 272    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

Case study 13.3

Bounded or hybrid national culture? Even protectionist policies towards language are
flawed; as with culture more generally, language is
Nationalists around the world cling to a notion of always hybridised and evolving. Most sentences in ‘Eng-
bounded cultures that make them distinct from others. lish’ contain words that derive from German, French,
One effect of globalization has been resistance in the Spanish, Latin, Nordic and Celtic languages. One legacy
form of increased nationalism to what is perceived to of British imperialism has been the incorporation of ele-
be the erosion of national cultures. Increased mixing ments of the languages of the colonized into everyday
of cultures is seen to pose a threat to the survival of English. Words from Indian languages, for example,
national cultures. Nationalists seek to preserve the punctuate English, including Hindi (bangle, bazaar, cara-
symbols of nationhood, such as language, lifestyles van, cot, jungle, juggernaut, pajama, pundit, shampoo,
and cultural forms, in the face of what are perceived thug), Sanskrit (atoll, aubergine, avatar, bandana, candy,
to be sweeping changes. However, cultures are not cash, dinghy, karma, sugar), Tamil (catamaran, curry,
unchanging; a fundamental flaw in nationalist ideology mantra, pariah), and Urdu (bungalow, khaki). Technologi-
(especially ethnic nationalism) is the adherence to a cal innovation introduces not only new words, but has
notion of static culture, and its reliance on a mythical the capacity to alter grammar: verbalising nouns (adding
history of the origin of the nation. For example, Eng- endings to nouns that turn them into verbs, such as ‘tex-
lish nationalists define Englishness as distinct, which ting’, ‘emailing’, ‘googling’, ‘interfacing’) is now common-
is used to justify anti-immigrationist ideas, anti-Euro- place in British English. Such hybridity within national
peanism and, in some cases, racism. But who are ‘the languages provides evidence for the ways in which cul-
English’? After the last ice age many communities tures have always been dynamic and mutually influential.
settled Britain and Ireland from all over Europe. They Similar myths of origin and notions of bounded cultures
lived and fought with each other and in a short space exist elsewhere in the world. In some places protectionist
of time produced a mixed group of people who even- policies emanate from deeply contradictory ideas (anti-
tually called themselves English. The islands have immigrationist views in the USA and Australia, for exam-
been subject to waves of invasion and settlement (e.g. ple). In other places notions of bounded culture have
Celts, Romans, Anglo-Saxons, Vikings, Normans). led to conflict (for example, between Georgia and South
England has always been hybrid; peoples and cul- Ossetia in 2008, between the Tamil separatists and the
tures have mixed and evolved together. Some English Sri Lankan state in 2009, and the continuing struggle by
nationalists avoid thinking about this point by arguing Kurdish nationalist organizations, some of whom seek to
that the final invasion (by William the Conqueror in create an independent nation-state of Kurdistan, consist-
1066) marks the origin of England and Englishness ing of some or all of the Kurdish areas in eastern Turkey,
(Anderson 1983). This myth is also flawed. William the northern Iraq, north-western Iran and northern Syria,
Conqueror spoke no English. Whom did he conquer? while others campaign for greater Kurdish autonomy
He conquered ‘the English’. For many nationalists within these existing national boundaries). The idea of
the founding father of England is French! It is also no nationhood, based on fixed, bounded and unchanging
small irony that one of the symbols of Englishness, cultures, is an ideological creation that masks profound
the monarchy, changed its official name to Windsor cultural divisions of gender, race, class and religion within
in 1917 from Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, thus hiding its a nation-state (see also Chapter 22), and ignores the fact
German origins. that, in reality, all cultures are hybrid and dynamic.

even remote parts of the world are creating the possibil- Tswana university students in South Africa and students
ity for more democratic forms of intercultural exchange. in an Australian university (Klopper 2010) promoted a
For example, intercultural exchange between schools and better understanding of their own and other musical tra-
universities in different parts of the world is increasingly ditions – the centrality in African cultures of music to
popular, facilitated by digital technologies. This has ena- tradition and oral histories, its inseparability from other
bled such things as intercultural music-making, which performance arts and its links to joy and shared experi-
promotes knowledge of and respect for cultural diversity, ence, in contrast to the technical training and individual
as well as stimulating creativity of hybrid musical forms. mastery of classical music by Western students (which
One example of an intercultural exchange between classical musicians might point out also becomes joyful

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 Chapter 13  Geography, culture and global change     273

and shared when played in an orchestra). Digital and throughout history (see Case study 13.3) and it may be
communication technologies (video, on-line chat rooms that new technologies simply speed up the process and
and web-cams) also allowed the students to collaborate enhance the possibilities. However, for those who aspire
in making music together. As Klopper (2010: 48) argues, to bounded notions of culture and refuse this idea of per-
such technologies ensure that ‘cultural boundaries are no petual hybridity, cultural mixing is felt to be threatening
longer geographically dictated’. and a deliberate challenge to social order. In reality there
Despite the illusion of boundedness, cultures have are no fixed cultures in modern nation-states, but some
always evolved historically through borrowings, appro- people cling to ideas of pure or impure cultures. For oth-
priations, exchanges and inventions. Cross-fertiliza- ers, however, hybridity remains the site of revitalization,
tion of cultures is endemic to all movements of people resistance and fun (see Case study 13.4).

Case study 13.4

Hybridity/diaspora – some examples clip at www.youtube.com/watch?v=nuVSB67IDgg),

sparking a craze in Brazil, and inspiring the formation
Samba-taiko in São Paulo, Brazil of over 150 taiko groups in which young Japanese and
Samba-taiko is a hybrid form of music, combining the non-Japanese Brazilians come together through music.
percussion styles of Japanese taiko (meaning ‘big Through a shared tradition of percussion, it appears
drum’) and Brazilian samba, and a recent style of music that a truly Japanese-Brazilian cultural rapport, particu-
emerging out of the Japanese diaspora in Brazil. Taiko larly among young people, is emerging after a century
performances are highly visual, visceral, and energetic of cultural disconnect.
in dynamics, rhythm, and movement, with dramatic Source: adapted from Sybert (2014)
full-body choreography and highly stylized strokes and
arm movements. Solo taiko has its origins in ancient Cuban Santería
rituals, linked to Buddhism and everyday life. Taiko Santería is an example of a syncretic (hybrid, mixed)
ensemble drumming is a relatively recent development religion. It is based on West African religions brought by
in Japanese musical culture, which has allowed it to be slaves imported from what are now Nigeria and Benin
appropriated and developed independently in Japanese to the Caribbean to work the sugar plantations. These
migrant communities in both North and Latin America. religions were suppressed by the European planta-
São Paulo, home to the largest Japanese diaspora, tion owners and in Cuba slaves were forced to convert
has become the site of an emerging hybridization of to Catholicism. However, they were able to preserve
Brazilian and Japanese percussion instrumentation and some of their traditions by fusing together various West
styles, which is also changing function of this music African beliefs and rituals and syncretizing these with
as cultural identity. Samba is a central part of Brazilian elements from Catholicism. One factor enabling this
national identity (brasilidade), referring to both the musi- process was that many of the orishas (primary gods)
cal style and the place or circle in which the music is shared many of the same characteristics of Catholic
placed, either in the home (casa) or in the street (rua). saints. This enabled slaves to appear to be practising
A popular idiom used to refer to ‘playing badly’ is ‘the Catholicism while practising their own religions. This has
Japanese in the samba’, which is symbolic of a wider evolved into what we know today as Santería, the Way
exclusion of the Japanese diaspora from the notion of of the Saints, whose traditions are transmitted orally
brasilidade. After a century of immigration, people of from generation to generation. Despite suppression by
Japanese descent in Brazil are not considered ‘Brazil- Fidel Castro's Socialist Revolution since 1961, its influ-
ian’ in popular discourse, and are regularly referred to ence is pervasive in Cuban life. Devotees are found in
as ‘Japanese’. Samba-taiko originated in São Paolo most households, Yoruba proverbs litter Cuban Span-
with Setsuo Kinoshita, the first taiko professor in Brazil, ish, and high priests (babalawos) offer guidance based
who began teaching both taiko and samba in an effort on ancient systems of lore. Today, with less religious
to help Brazilian-Japanese students deal with exclusion persecution, Santería is experiencing a rise in popularity
and internalized racism, and to become more comforta- and is part of an emerging Cuban youth culture. Similar
ble with their dual identities. In 2003, Kinoshota and his syncretic religions are found in Haiti, Puerto Rico and
students began performing their innovations in hybrid other Caribbean and Latin American countries.
samba-taiko styles (see, for example, Kinoshita's video Source: adapted from Betts (2002)

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 274    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

13.4.2 Diaspora images to attract investment in the form of business and

tourism. Hybrid culture is perceived as creating economic
Related to the idea of hybridity is the notion of diaspora. advantage. With increasing deindustrialization in Europe
This term was originally used to refer to the dispersal of and North America, and many countries in the global
Jewish peoples, but is now used in reference to the long- South by-passing an industrial age to fast-forward to a
term settlement of peoples in ‘foreign’ places that follows knowledge- and service-driven economy, cultural strate-
their scattering or dispersal from their original homeland. gies have become key to the survival of cities. Examples
It refers to a modern condition where a sense of belong- include the international marketing of cultural/religious
ing is not derived from attachment to territory, and where festivals such as Mardi Gras in Sydney or New Orleans,
different peoples mix together through the processes of Gay Pride Festivals in Toronto, Cape Town or London, or
migration (forced or free). European imperialism and the importance of ‘Chinatowns’ and other ‘ethnic’ districts
associated processes of globalization have set many of to tourism in cities throughout the world (see Plate 13.3).
these migrations in motion. Diasporas are classic contact Ironically, hybridity is in danger of becoming just another
zones – spaces in which two cultures come together and marketable commodity. For example, treating the political
influence each other – where transculturation or hybridi- work of some British-Asian bands as marketable, hybrid-
zation takes place. Diasporic identities are at once local ity trivializes black political activity and leaves problems
and global and based on transnational identifications of class exploitation and racial oppression unresolved. As
encompassing both ‘imagined’ and ‘encountered’ com- Hutnyk (1997: 134) suggests, to focus on hybridity while
munities (e.g. Irish-Americans belong to an imagined ignoring (or as an excuse for ignoring) the conditions in
international community of people who have ‘Irishness’ which this phenomenon exists (the commodity system,
in common, but whose identities are also informed by global economic inequality, inequitable political rela-
the communities in which they live in the USA). In other tions) is problematic in that it maintains the status quo.
words, diasporas are a direct challenge to the idea that Hybridity and difference sell, but in the meantime the mar-
there is a simple relationship between place and culture. ket remains intact, power relations remain unequal, and
They transgress the boundaries of the nation-state and marginalized peoples remain marginalized. Moreover, as
provide alternative resources for constructing identity culture is subsumed into capitalism, those marginalized
and fashioning culture. peoples who might be capable of oppositional politics are
The concept of diaspora space allows us to think of also subsumed under the rubric of hybridity.
‘culture as a site of travel’ (Clifford 1992), which seriously The notion of hybridity, therefore, can be problem-
problematizes the idea of a person being a ‘native’ or an atic. In some Latin American countries, cultural elites
‘insider’. Diaspora space is the point at which boundaries and nation-states have appropriated the hybrid mestizo
of inclusion and exclusion, of belonging and otherness, (mixed) identity, making it dominant. This has been
of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are contested. As Brah (1996: 209) seen to be oppressive of ‘Indian’ populations, who have
argues, diaspora space is ‘inhabited’ not only by those in turn been accused of ethnic essentialism (or empha-
who have migrated and their descendants, but equally sizing their racial difference) because of their desire to
by those who are constructed and represented as indig-
enous or ‘native’. In the diaspora space called ‘England’,
for example, African-Caribbean, Irish, Asian, Jewish and
other diasporas intersect among themselves as well as
with the entity constructed as ‘Englishness’, thoroughly
reinscribing it in the process. Like notions of hybridity,
the concept of diaspora is important since it allows for
the recognition of new political and cultural formations
that continually challenge the marginalizing impulses of
dominant cultures.

13.4.3 S elling hybridity and the commodification

of culture
In today’s world, culture sells. Hybrid cultures, in Plate 13.3  Chinatown in San Francisco: ‘ethnic’
­particular, sell. Cities are now constructing themselves districts are promoted as major tourist attractions in
as ­cosmopolitan, and hybridity has become a form of many ‘global’ cities.
­‘boosterism’ – where city authorities create marketing (Jeff Whyte/Shutterstock)

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 Chapter 13  Geography, culture and global change     275

protect their cultures (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996). In producing defensive and exclusionary actions and atti-
the West, ideas of hybridity are currently popular with tudes, and why are the latter so difficult to transcend? Is
highly educated cultural elites, but ideas about culture, the sheer pace of change in cultural globalization produc-
ethnicity and identity that develop in poverty-stricken ing these reactions?
underclass neighbourhoods are likely to be of a differ- To summarize, hybridity and diaspora are examples of
ent nature (Friedman 1997: 83–4). Evidence of racial more progressive ways of thinking about culture. It could
tensions in many North American and European cities be argued that all cultures are always already hybrid; they
points to the fact that class and local ghetto identities are never pure, have always evolved and changed through
tend to prevail, with little room for the mixing pleaded time and through contact with other cultures, and they
for by cultural elites. Such fixed notions of identity are continue to evolve. In today’s world, hybridity is being
produced and perpetuated in wealthy areas too. In Cape commodified, which might make it less radical. However,
Town, where urban segregation persists 20 years after the despite this, it has the potential to democratize culture
end of apartheid, several violent, racist incidents in pub- and to allow us to rethink culture in ways that are more
lic spaces in predominantly white neighbourhoods made tolerant of difference. Finally, cultural hybridity needs to
newspaper headlines in 2014. The global, cultural hybrid, be understood in the context of growing global uncer-
elite sphere is occupied by individuals who share a very tainty, xenophobia and racism.
different kind of experience of the world, connected to
international politics, academia, the media and the arts.
In the meantime, the world becomes more polarized in
terms of wealth, and heads towards increasing balkani- 13.5 Conclusion
zation where regional, national and ethnic identities are
perceived as bounded, threatened, and in need of pro- In this chapter it is suggested that there are two apparently
tection. As Bhabha (1994) reminds us, hybridity is an contradictory tendencies in thinking about cultures – the
insufficient means through which to create new forms attempt to secure the purity of a culture by conceptualiz-
of collective identity that can overcome ethnic, racial, ing it as strong, fixed, bounded, permanent and homoge-
religious and class-based antagonisms – it sounds nice in neous, and the hybridity of most cultures. Culture is thus
theory, but does not necessarily exist outside the realms a contested concept. A progressive way of thinking about
of the privileged. culture is to reject the idea of boundedness and inter-
As Stuart Hall (1996: 233) argued, we should not view nal cohesion. In the modern world especially, culture is a
the current fashionability of hybridity in a wholly nega- meeting point where different influences, traditions and
tive light. Even as cultures are increasingly commodified, forces intersect. There is, therefore, a continual process of
we should not forget the potential for the democratiza- change in cultural practices and meanings. Globalization
tion of culture in this process, the increased recognition is undermining closed, fixed ideas of culture and leading
of difference and the diversification of the social worlds to new ways of conceptualizing cultures (transcultura-
in which people now operate – the case of samba-taiko tion, contact zones, hybridity and diaspora). However,
in Brazil (Case study 13.4) is but one example. This plu- the fact that cultures are not fixed or homogeneous does
ralization of social and cultural life expands the identi- not mean that we will stop thinking of them in this way.
ties available to ordinary people (at least in the advanced As Hall (1995: 188–9) argues, this is because some people
economies) in their everyday working, social, familial and need ‘belongingness’ and the security that closed concep-
sexual lives. For Bhabha (1994: 9), the interconnections of tions of culture provide.
different cultural spaces and the overlapping of different Despite this, recent years have witnessed a decentring
cultural forms create vitality and hold out the possibility of culture, with nation-states increasingly superseded by
of a progressive notion of culture. transnational institutions that are producing cultural glo-
We thus need to think about the place and meaning of balization and greater cultural diversity. There has also
cultural hybridity in the context of growing global uncer- been a shift in the awareness of the cultural capital of the
tainty, xenophobia (fear of foreigners) and racism. Why West, and an understanding of the cultural dominance
is cultural hybridity still experienced as an empower- of developed countries. At the same time, there are now
ing, dangerous or transformative force? Why, on the one more voices talking back, reflecting the cultural asser-
hand, is difference celebrated through a consumer mar- tiveness of marginalized groups and making us aware of
ket that offers a seemingly endless choice of identities, new levels of diversity. Even though most people remain
sub-cultures and styles yet, on the other hand, hybridity physically, ideologically and spiritually attached to a
continues to threaten and shock? Conversely, why do bor- local or a national culture and a local place, complex
ders, boundaries and ‘pure’ identities remain important, cultural flows and networks ensure that it is becoming

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 276    Section 3  Society, settlement and culture

increasingly impossible for people to live in places that ideas and cultural forms are still considered superior and
are completely isolated and disconnected culturally from have become hegemonic, or dominant. Similarly, one’s own
the wider world. Thus, cultural positioning (on the basis of gender, ethnicity, class,
location, sexuality, stage in life cycle, ability) also influ-
if there is a global culture it would be better to con- ences understandings of local cultures. The same processes
ceive of it not as a common culture, but as a field in operate at local levels; dominant cultures marginalize oth-
which differences, power struggles and cultural pres- ers on the basis of ethnicity, sexuality, gender and religion.
tige contests are played out . . . Hence globalization However, as we have seen, those dominant cultures also
makes us aware of the sheer volume, diversity and produce resistances that have the potential to create new
many-sidedness of culture. ways of thinking about culture.
(Featherstone 1995: 14) The challenge is to confront the limits of ‘our’ knowl-
edge, to recognize other worlds, to acknowledge the legit-
This points to a ‘more positive evaluation by the West imacy of other cultures, other identities and other ways
of otherness and differences’ (Featherstone 1995: 89). For of life. Accepting ‘cultural translation’ (Bhabha 1994)
Massey and Jess (1995b: 134), globalization is not simply involves understanding the hybrid nature of culture, the
a threat to existing notions of culture, but a ‘stimulus to influence of marginal cultures on dominant cultures, and
a positive new response’. that people in marginal cultural systems at local, national
People around the world have different cultures and sys- and international levels are also active in creating their
tems of meaning, but we cannot avoid reading the world own systems of meaning. They do not simply absorb
from within our own cultures and interpreting it through ideas from, or become absorbed into, more dominant
our own systems of meaning. Understandings of global cultures. It is possible to develop cosmopolitanism in the
culture for the majority of the readers of this book are fil- twenty-first century that is global, sensitive to cultural
tered through the logic of the West (Spivak 1985). Western difference, and dynamic.

Learning outcomes
Further reading
Having read this chapter, you should be able to:
Anderson, J. (2010) Understanding Cultural Geography:
● Understand the complexities of culture; it is a Places and Traces, Routledge, London. This book provides a
process, rather than a thing, and subject to change broad-based overview of cultural geography, arguing that its
essential focus is place. The book presents specific chapters
over time.
outlining the history of cultural geography, as well as the
● Demonstrate ways in which cultures operate at methods and techniques of doing cultural geography and
local, national and global levels. focuses on topics such as corporate capitalism, nationalism,
ethnicity, youth culture and the place of the body.
● Discuss examples of global cultural processes and
Anderson, K., Domosh, M., Pile, S. and Thrift, N. (eds) (2003)
how these are filtered through localities to contest
Handbook of Cultural Geography, Sage, London. This book
notions of a singular global culture. offers an assessment of the key questions informing cultural
● Discuss examples of negative (closed, bounded), or geography and contains over 30 essays. It is an invaluable
resource for students looking for an assessment of major
positive (progressive, hybridized) local cultures.
issues and debates and the breadth, scope and vitality of
● Critique and utilize concepts such as hybridity and contemporary cultural geography.
diaspora as a progressive way of thinking about Atkinson, D., Jackson, P., Sibley, D. and Washbourne, N.
culture. (eds.) (2005) Cultural Geography: A Critical Dictionary of
Key Ideas, London: I.B.Tauris. A broad-ranging collection of
● Reflect on your own cultures of knowledge, and mini-essays on topics germane to the themes of this chap-
the ways in which these condition your ideas about ter, including globalization/globality, travel/tourism, diaspora,
global, national and local cultures. hybridity, colonialism/postcolonialism.

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 Chapter 13  Geography, culture and global change     277

Duncan, J.S., Johnson, N.C. and Schein, R. (eds) (2004)

A Companion to Cultural Geography, Blackwell, London. Useful websites
A comprehensive introduction to cultural geography, with
32 chapters written by leading authorities in the field and
www.culture.gov.uk  The official website of the UK govern-
covering debates about cultural theories, nature/culture,
ment’s Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). An
culture and identity, landscapes and colonial/post-colonial
animated site that includes information about the role of the
geographies.
DCMS, and government policy towards media and arts, herit-
Nayak, A. and Jeffrey, A. (2011) Geographical Thought: age, libraries and museums, sport, the National Lottery and
An Introduction to Ideas in Human Geography, Routledge, tourism. Also has links to other useful sites in each category.
London. This book is not labelled as cultural geography, but www.unesco.org/culture/pdf/creative-economy-report-2013.
it develops many of the themes identified in this chapter. pdf  The latest report and web-documentary from the United
Students of cultural geography will find the chapters on Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
the ‘Cultural Turn’, ‘Geographies of Sexuality’, ‘Ethnicity (with the United Nations Development Programme) on the
and Racialisation’, ‘Postmodern Geographies’, ‘Postcolo- creative economy and its relationship to economic and social
nial Geographies’ and ‘Emotions, Embodiment and Lived development.
Geographies’ of interest. http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/CreativeEconomy/Statis-
Shurmer-Smith, P. (ed.) (2002) Doing Cultural Geography, tics-on-world-trade-in-creative-products.aspx UNCTAD
Sage, London. This is a good book for those students think- Global Database on Creative Economy, including lots of
ing of undertaking projects or writing dissertations in cultural ­useful statistics.
geography. It explains the theory informing cultural geography www.adbusters.org/home  An example of ‘culture jamming’.
and encourages students to engage directly with theory in www.un.org/womenwatch  The official United Nations
practice. Internet Gateway on the Advancement and Empowerment
Murray, W.E. and Overton, J. (2015) Geographies of Glo- of Women, and part of the global phenomenon of
balization, 2nd edition, London, Routledge. A lively textbook ­cyberfeminism, which might be considered an example of
providing a useful introduction to geographies, theories and a ‘third ­culture’. Has useful links to other sites advancing
histories of globalization. The chapters on globalizing cultural women’s rights through new technologies.
geographies and progressive globalization are pertinent to For an introduction to Cuba’s hybrid cultures see
readers with interests in cultural geographies of globalization. www.afrocubaweb.com.

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M13_DANI2950_05_SE_C13.indd 278 01/04/16 8:45 am
 Section 4

Production, exchange and consumption

Edited by Peter Daniels

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 The idea of going ‘global’ is often associated with consumers also creates food security challenges
the economic aspects of human geography. The (Chapter 15). Symbols of the Fordist era, such as
geographical outcomes are increasingly a function massive production plants, have been replaced by
of links and dependencies that extend far beyond industrial districts made up of networks of firms,
the local or national; reflecting diverse and dynamic small and large, that form distinctive nodes of produc-
interactions between places and people distributed tion such as the Third Italy or the City of London.
worldwide. The recent shift in the global economic
Yet, large firms are as influential as ever in shaping
centre of gravity towards China or India is a good
the geographies of production and consumption
example. Many of the symptoms of ‘globalization’
(see Chapters 14, 16 and 17). Transnational cor-
are most obvious in the sphere of consumption
porations (TNCs) often command more financial
(Chapter 19); Apple (USA) or BMW (Germany) are
resources than many national governments and
universal brands, although not equally accessible
exercise significant influence on economic deci-
everywhere. This is also the case, although per-
sions, investments in infrastructure, or regulation
haps less obvious, in the context of global food
by nation-states as well as international organiza-
production and consumption (Chapter 15).
tions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Consumption is both a consequence, and a driver,
of the globalization of production. The shift from Consumption and production are mediated by

production systems largely focused on national the circulation of finance capital (Chapter 18).

markets to those organized as sophisticated National governments, companies, or individuals

global production chains and networks has accel- require finance to execute investment strategies

erated (see Chapter 16); including food chains or (companies) or purchasing decisions (house-

networks (Chapter 15) that vary in complexity and holds). Advances in information technology have

geographical coverage for different products. The greatly increased the global circulation of finance,

search for new suppliers or markets as national and also enable innovation in the financial instru-

opportunities become saturated adds to network ments traded on stock, commodity, or currency

complexity. Improved access to information via exchanges in London, New York, Shanghai or

the Internet, cable and satellite services has also, ­Singapore. Yet again, however, the flows of finance

metaphorically, made the world smaller. capital mediated by such financial centres are
spatially uneven, to the significant disadvantage of
During the first quarter of the twentieth century
marginalized nations, regions and groups.
Fordist methods of production fulfilled demand for
high-volume, low-cost, standardized products, fol- This section demonstrates how the geography of
lowed by a shift towards post-Fordist production the economy simultaneously incorporates global
systems based on greater flexibility, specialization, and local economic perspectives. They are insepa-
customization, strategic alliances (see Chapter 16), rable even though there have been some important
even more fragmented divisions of labour and shifts in modes of production and mechanisms of
expertise (Chapter 17) and horizontal rather than consumption over time and across space. Some of
vertical integration of production. The trend was the causes and the consequences of the uneven
led first by manufacturing and then by the rise economic development that results are highlighted.
of service industries (see Chapter 17). Localities An overview of the contributions suggests that
have reasserted their role as a focus for produc- there are many important issues, questions and
tion (Chapter 14) although an increasing discon- challenges that economic geographers can use-
nection between, for example, food producers and fully address as the twenty-first century unfolds.

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 GEOGRAPHIES OF THE ECONOMY

Chapter 14

Peter Daniels and Andrew Jones

Topics covered
■ the changing nature of economic geography
■ the rise of the global economy
■ a geographical approach to economic processes
■ Places and localities in the global economy
■ a new global informational economy?

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 282    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

T he economy is everywhere. It is a set of human activ-

ities and institutions linked together in the produc-
tion, distribution, exchange and consumption of goods
different resources, climates, or levels of accessibility.
Thus the major sub-discipline of economic geography ‘is
concerned with the spatial organization and distribution
and services. Wherever we happen to live, work or play of economic activity, the use of the world’s resources, and
our daily existence requires us to make decisions that the distribution and expansion of the world economy’
have an economic basis. Yet, we tend to take for granted (Stutz and de Souza 1998: 41). While the geographi-
the ways in which society determines how the scarce cal distribution of economic activities is influenced by
resources at its disposal are used to provide for its historical, political, social, and environmental factors
material needs and to produce wealth. The news media the outcomes arise from spatial interaction in that it
regularly cover the economy: the balance of trade, the is not possible for all the actors in the economy to be
located at one point in geographical space. During the
unemployment rate, consumer spending, trends in
early twentieth century economic geography was termed
house prices, the relocation of jobs to other countries,
‘commercial geography’: a largely factual compilation of
or the prospects for the global economy. Sections on
the way in which different commodities were produced
business and the economy in the ‘quality’ daily newspa-
and exchanged around the world. Commercial geog-
pers, specialist weekly business publications, or 24-hour
raphy sought, for example, to analyze the factors that
satellite television channels are exclusively devoted to affected where particular commodities such as coal or
news and information about economic affairs. iron ore were produced. Gradually the emphasis shifted
You may have noticed that ‘economies’ or ‘economy’ towards explaining observed variations in the location
are often preceded by adjectives such as: global, local, patterns of commodity production and trade with the
market, command (or redistributive), capitalist, infor- transformation from commercial to economic geography
mal, subsistence, mixed, Internet, information, new, or consolidated when explanations for the location of eco-
space economy. There are clearly many different kinds of nomic activity were derived from neoclassical economics
‘economy’ depending on the starting point for analysis; for ­(Spotlight box 14.1). This is an early example of how eco-
example, an informal economy signifies how it is organ- nomic geography has used ways of thinking and modes
ized while a digital economy signifies something about the of analysis used by other disciplines, in this case econom-
medium used to undertake economic transactions. Eco- ics, to inform its own agenda. Neoclassical economics is
nomic geographers are interested in the space economy; the study of the allocation of scarce resources amongst
the way in which the organization of geographical space alternative ends when there are several alternative out-
reflects the behaviour, values, and actions of actors (indi- comes. Interestingly, one of these is the maximization
viduals, firms, institutions) that comprise the economy. of social welfare that is based on the idea that the eco-
Each actor operates from or occupies some unit of space: nomic basis of society determines the form of its social
a field for a crop, a room used by a self-employed person institutions. We will see later that the social basis of the
working from home, a building of several thousand square economy is very much part of contemporary analyses of
metres for a corporate call centre, a site of several hundred geographies of the economy.
hectares used for vehicle production in Korea or Japan, In the meantime, economic geography as a sub-dis-
or an area of hundreds of square kilometres occupied cipline has undergone various transformations since
by a sheep station in the Australian outback. The house- the mid twentieth century (see Scott 2004). During the
holds providing the labour required for producing goods 1950s and 1960s economic geographers led the way in
and services also require space in which to live and are, the testing of theories and ideas, using numerically-based
in turn, a major source for consumption of the outputs quantitative methods and modelling that were seen to be
from production that are accessed via informal and for- rigorous. However, by the 1970s a different political econ-
mal transactions and trading. The challenge for economic omy approach emerged within the sub-discipline that
geographers is how to analyse and explain the geographi- made extensive use of Marxist-based interpretations of
cal patterns of economic activity at different scales, how economic change and its socio-economic consequences
they change over time and the relationships between them. (Harvey 1982; Swyngedouw 1982). Analysis of economic
crises such as the global oil shortage of 1973 or the debt
crisis of the early 1980s focused on issues of regional ine-
14.1 T he changing nature of economic quality, manufacturing decline and social justice (Blue-
geography stone and Harrison 1982). In the 1980s the growth of
political economic interests was also accompanied by
The uneven distribution of economic activities is plain empirical and theoretical analysis of some new and sur-
enough to see. It can be explained by the fact that differ- prising economic growth in places previously regarded
ent parts of our planet are, for example, endowed with as peripheral or outside the mainstream. In Europe, for

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 Chapter 14  Geographies of the economy    283

Spotlight box 14.1

Models of economic location The main criticisms are the unrealistic nature of the
assumptions and the oversight of many other factors
There has been much interest in economic geography in that have an impact on the geography of economic
theories or models that help to explain the development activity such as changes in the technology of produc-
of economic activities within a spatial context. Neoclas- tion and consumption or the variety of ways in which
sical economic theory was first used by Von Thünen in businesses are organized.
1826 (Hall 1966) to model patterns of agricultural land The limitations of neoclassical models encouraged
use and later applied to industrial location (Weber 1929) the development of alternatives. The behavioural model
and for explaining the distribution of services and of set- also attempts to arrive at generalizations but the focus
tlements (Christaller 1966). In these and numerous other is shifted to the role of the individual as the principal
cases the objective is to generalize about patterns of explanation for spatial patterns. The motives, opinions,
economic activity. However, such is the complexity of the preferences and perceptions of the individuals making
real world that it is necessary to make some assump- location decisions are incorporated
tions: decision makers behave in a sensible (or rational) However, behavioural models have been criticized
fashion; they possess complete and correct knowledge for being overly descriptive. In response, a structuralist
(often referred to as perfect knowledge); everyone is approach makes use of a more holistic way to explain
attempting to maximize profits; competition is uncon- the location of economic activity and how it changes.
strained; economic activity takes place on a uniform It is based on the premise that behaviour is shaped
land surface. The key assumption is that distance is the or constrained by wider processes in the social, politi-
main influence on decision-making by households and cal and economic spheres. Notions of culture and of
businesses with the resulting spatial patterns of eco- class rather than individual ideas determine the spatial
nomic activity explained by examining the relationship structure of economic activity. It is not enough to explain
between distance and transport costs. The outcome of patterns of economic activity; rather, it is necessary to
this approach is an ideal or optimal pattern of land use examine the ‘hidden’ mechanisms or processes (e.g.
or industrial location. social, political) that underpin economic patterns.

example, these included the proliferation of small-scale, geography within another social science discipline –
skilled production units to form new industrial districts namely, economics. The Nobel Prize winning econo-
in north-east Italy, Emilia and central Italy collectively mist Paul Krugman advocated what became known as
known as the Third Italy (Brusco 1990). Economic geog- ‘the new economic geography’ (NEG) (Krugman
raphers also began to analyze the changing nature of 2000; Fujita and Krugman 2004). This provoked a
manufacturing production in the world economy, par- response from geographers who have argued that NEG
ticularly the rise of new flexible kinds of post-Fordist is really economic geography as opposed to ‘geographi-
production systems (Amin 1994) in North America and cal economics’ (Martin 1999a). Economists claim that,
Japan (Gertler 1992). This period witnessed a marked methodologically, NEG belongs to them but economic
increase in the international division of labour, led by geographers claim that economists have finally acknowl-
multinational corporations (Fröbel et al. 1980), which edged the role of space (geography) and moved it from
became but one of the trends symbolic of globalization the edges of their discipline into the mainstream of eco-
and international economic interconnectedness. The way nomic theory; away from the ‘wonderland of no dimen-
in which production processes, labour and transnational sions’ (Sheppard and Barnes 2000: 3). To avoid confusion,
corporations were becoming increasingly caught up in the rest of this chapter will use ‘geographical economics’
complex global production networks (GPNs) became to refer to this strand within economics.
an increasingly central concern for economic geographers The second development is the impact on economic
(Dicken 2015) and we will return to this theme later. geography of the ‘cultural turn’ within human geogra-
The 1990s saw two parallel developments that have phy (Barnett 1998; Cook et al. 2000c). This ‘new eco-
diversified both the nature and disciplinary reach of nomic geography’ as practised by human geographers
economic geography. The first is the dramatic revival increasingly recognized the importance of ‘social’ and
of quantitative and modelling approaches to economic ‘cultural’ factors when interpreting the ‘economic world’

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 284    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

(see Chapter 19 for a discussion of the links between different concepts for understanding the spatial nature
culture and the consumption of goods and services). It of the economy and economic activity. In the 1990s, for
is argued that lifestyles, beliefs, languages, ideas, imagi- example, economic geographers developed an increasing
nations and representations interact with the economic interest in the (spatial) nature of relations between differ-
to produce culturalization of the economy rather than ent economic actors (Bathelt and Glückler 2003). Yeung
the economization of culture. For example, goods and suggests that economic geography underwent something
services incorporate cultural attributes into their design, of a ‘relational turn’ that is ‘concerned primarily with
marketing, packaging and potential benefits to users. the ways in which socio-spatial relations of actors are
Material possession of a good (car, camera, smartphone) intertwined with broader structures and processes of
or consumption of a service (tourism, fast food, finan- economic change at various geographical scales’ (Yeung
cial transaction) is only part of the experience (a real 2005: 37). Central to this shift is a realization that eco-
as well as an imagined event) of using or being seen to nomic geographers need to better understand how power
use or to consume. Consumption of goods and services shapes economic action. Global production networks
involves beliefs about what it says about us as individu- (GPNs) encapsulate many of these features (see Chap-
als or groups: social or job status, image or wealth (see ter 16 for a detailed discussion of their geographies). A
­Chapter 19). Economic geographers have previously rec- second thread to the NEG has followed on from this,
ognized cultural factors when using terms such as ‘social- focusing broadly on the nature of economic practices and
ist economy’, ‘Chinese family production networks’, or how their spatiality affects economies (Jones 2014). This
the various ‘corporate cultures’ encountered in transna- sociological perspective in economic geography has also
tional corporations (TNCs); but only recently have they been concerned with the significance of power in relation,
considered the economic and the cultural to be inter- for example, to how transnational firms are managed or
twined rather than worthy only of separate study. how knowledge practices spread innovations through
We could conclude the overview of NEG here but it firms and industries (Amin and Cohendet 2004). This is
is worth loitering a little longer to consider some further also related to a third strand of NEG that has looked
issues. For example, is it too simplistic to talk of ‘eco- beyond the boundaries of geography to work in eco-
nomic geography’ rather than ‘economic geographies’? If nomic sociology, cultural and technology studies as a way
the economy is shaped, at least in part, by social relations to develop what has been termed a ‘cultural economy’
(that are by their very nature complex) and exchanges approach (Amin and Thrift 2004). Economic geographers
that reflect multiple variations in the value associated in this area have ranged into new industries and areas of
with the production, consumption, or circulation of a the economy that have been previously ignored – notably
good or service, then ‘are the geographies constituted creative sectors such as fashion design, music, or com-
through peoples’ struggle to construct circuits of value puter games software. The cultural economy approach
sustainable across space and time’? (Lee 2006: 417) As Lee has also brought a fresh perspective to the traditional
points out, if societies cannot do this in ways that allow concerns of the economic geographer, such as the grow-
them to make a living they can only materially repro- ing body of work on financial and other kinds of mar-
duce themselves with great difficulty. In this sense, there kets that seeks to understand them as produced through
is more than one economic geography. the interactions between networks of social actors, their
Another important issue is the way that the NEG performances, power relations and technological devices
has spawned new strands of work around a range of (Berndt and Boeckler 2009).

Spotlight box 14.2

Perfect competition prices. This is because everybody has access to all the
information they need, all products are the same, and
The intensity of competition among firms encourages firms earn only the base minimum profit. If firms earn
efficiency and helps to keep prices low. The ultimate excess profits (more than the base minimum) other firms
expression of this is perfect competition. In these purely will enter the market. This will continue to happen until
theoretical circumstances the actions of any one individ- profits are driven down so that only normal profits are
ual buyer or seller have a very limited impact on market made.

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 Chapter 14  Geographies of the economy    285

NEG is therefore also about how to theorize economies, A second mechanism for resolving the economic prob-
economic actors and their geographies. The scope that lem is a command economy in which a key objective is
this provides for a healthy, on-going debate can be illus- redistribution of wealth based on public ownership of the
trated using a set of basic propositions that are assumed factors of production. Prior to its demise during the late
to be true when we conceptualize a capitalist economy 1980s countries such as the former Soviet Union, Poland,
(Hudson 2004). First, there should be a variety of concepts Hungary and East Germany used central political author-
of a capitalist economy that reflect the diversity of the ity to prepare directives setting production targets for a
flows of people or knowledge, for example, in space and defined period (say three or five years) for the types, and
time that make up economies. Second, the concepts used quantities of goods and services to be produced. In order
should not be constructed on the basis that there are sepa- to achieve the targets and to distribute the output the
rate economies; rather, they should necessarily be treated centralized direction of national economic development
as interrelated. Third, economic behaviour and practice is is combined with control over the allocation of human
undertaken by individuals or subjects possessing knowl- and physical resources. Some countries such as Cuba and
edge and skills, although not in the sense that everyone has North Korea continue to use this approach for solving
complete knowledge and skills, as in perfect competition the economic problem. Capitalist countries may use this
(see Spotlight box 14.2). Therefore, and fourth, economies mechanism during national emergencies (e.g. wartime) in
are a social construct incorporating the full range from the order to mobilize resources quickly.
informal habits of individuals to the formal institutions The market is the third approach to solving the eco-
of the state. Fifth, individual and collective behaviour in nomic problem. In contrast to command economies,
a capitalist economy is influenced by, and its structures market economies rely on decentralized decisions by
and institutions based on, long-term social relationships. consumers and by firms about the quantities of goods to
Finally, capitalist economies are reproduced using vari- produce, the prices to charge, and how, when and where
ous governance institutions that exist because capitalist exchange transactions take place. Generalizations about
economies are formed via social relations and practices the modern market system and its outcomes are actu-
that are competitive and not natural. ally quite difficult because decentralized decision-making
You may recall from the beginning of this chapter that creates complexity; for example, professional economists
there are many different kinds of economy; the capitalist can rarely agree about the significance of the latest unem-
economy is but one among many and you should con- ployment figures, the impact of a change in bank inter-
sider whether conceptualizations such as the one above est rates, or the likely impact of a steep rise in crude oil
are likely to be the same, or different, to those applied to prices on the stability of the global economy.
an informal, alternative, digital, or knowledge economy? Economies that operate by voluntary exchange in a
free market that is not in some way managed or con-
trolled by a central authority do not in practice exist.
Most developed nations are mixed economies in that they
14.2 What is the economic problem? allow markets to drive most of their economic activities,
using regulations and government intervention to ensure
Each of us has a variety of needs and wants that, when stability and efficient economic operation. Market/mixed
they are combined, comprise demand for goods and ser- economies are now in the majority, with fast emerging
vices. The resources available to fulfil this demand are economies such as China making big strides in the same
finite. The economic problem (Heilbronner 1972) is how direction.
to devise a system that combines the physical and human Within such capitalist economies most of the
resources needed to produce and distribute the output of resources and the means of production are controlled by
goods and services to attain given ends, such as the maxi- a relatively small proportion of individuals and firms who
mization of social welfare. Possible solutions are numer- are seeking to improve their economic well being through
ous but they can be distilled to just three mechanisms competition (see Spotlight box 14.2). If we assume that
(Dicken and Lloyd 1990). The first of these is tradition there is more than one producer of a given good or ser-
in which the allocation of resources to production relies vice, each is seeking to create the most favourable value
on a set of ‘rules’ based on convention or past practice, (such as lower price, better quality, superior design, or
such as the handing down of land from father to eldest efficient after-sales support) so as to retain or enhance
son. Given the contemporary interest in the relationship its share of the market.
between the economic and the social, it is notable that The principle of freedom of action may be para-
traditional solutions to the economic problem incorpo- mount but, in practice, market economies incorporate
rate socially determined norms. regulation by national governments and/or international

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 286    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Spotlight box 14.3

Transnational corporations (TNCs) many other ways, such as franchising, licensing or

joint ventures, of achieving a presence in markets
The definition of a TNC is that it: outside the home country;
● controls establishments/economic activities in at ● organizes aspects of its operation across national
least one other country apart from its home country; borders at the global-scale, rather than duplicating
● possesses an ability as a result of its size or the its activities in each national economy where it is
ownership of particular knowledge or skills to move present.
its operations and its resources quickly between
You may well encounter a related term: multinational
international locations, i.e. it is relatively footloose;
corporation (MNC). This suggests a firm that has prem-
● can exploit or take advantage of differences
ises or production plants in several countries. TNC is
between countries, regions or cities around the
therefore a much more all-embracing term than MNC;
globe in factor (land, labour, capital) and non-factor
there are many more TNCs than there are MNCs and
(information, knowledge, regulation) endowments;
they provide the basis for a more realistic assessment
● owns and controls overseas activities, although this
of the scale of international investment.
is not a prerequisite for TNC status since there are

institutions. In the interests of equity, society needs to amongst their own establishments and between coun-
control the behaviour of those who own the means of tries. There are few parts of the world that are not in
production; the market is not necessarily the most effec- some way affected by the activities and decisions of
tive and equitable way to allocate its rewards. Thus, most TNCs and, for some countries, it makes the difference
countries have a national organization that monitors and between inclusion as opposed to exclusion from the eco-
adjudicates company acquisitions and mergers in an nomic mainstream.
attempt to avoid the development of monopolies, i.e. a
market situation in which there is only one provider of a
particular product or service. The absence of economic 14.3 What are economies?
competition will allow a monopoly to sell a lower quan-
tity of a product at a higher price than firms in a purely
So far we have considered the economy in more or less
competitive market, leading to monopolistic profits.
abstract terms, although we have made reference to vari-
Because of the increasing integration of national econ-
ous ‘actors’ such as individuals, households, companies,
omies and firms (see later in this chapter), the actions
government departments, national governments, and so
of individual national governments are complemented
on. In order to help economic geographers to measure
by groupings of nation-states such as the North Ameri-
and interpret the processes and interactions that help to
can Free Trade Area (NAFTA), Asia-Pacific Economic
shape spatial patterns of economic activity, it is neces-
Cooperation (APEC) or international institutions such
sary to simplify the complexities of real economies into
as the World Trade Organization (WTO) that regulate
manageable categories or groupings.
and facilitate trade flows of goods and services and the
One of the most common approaches to generalizing
movement of labour.
the structure of economies is to divide them into four
One of the key targets for cross-border control and
broad economic sectors:
regulation are transnational corporations (TNCs)
which serve markets and operate production plants or 1. Activities engaged in the exploitation of natural
distribution facilities that extend well beyond their home resources, such as agriculture, fishing, mining and oil
countries (see Spotlight box 14.3) (see also Chapters 16 extraction, form the primary sector. Although still
and 17). The distribution of TNCs varies by industry a significant share of activity in the less developed
sector and by country; most are small relative to a lim- economies, this sector is declining overall. Some of
ited number of very large global TNCs. But they gener- the output from the primary sector has limited use
ate significant flows of capital, knowledge, information, and value until it has been transformed in some way
expertise, products, raw materials and components to become part of usable goods.

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 Chapter 14  Geographies of the economy    287

2. Whether the transformation takes place near the the twenty-first century. The share of the tertiary and
source of the primary commodity or after transfer to quaternary sectors in the total economy has expanded
a location some distance away it requires a secondary steadily for at least a hundred years and they now
sector (or manufacturing). This sector is still expand- account for four out five jobs in countries such as the
ing in some less developed economies and the emerg- USA, Canada, Britain, Hong Kong or Australia.
ing economies but contracting (share of employment
Another useful way for tracking change in economic
or gross domestic product, GDP) in most devel- structures is the distinction between white-collar and
oped countries. The outputs from the manufacturing blue-collar occupations. The former are salaried profes-
sector may be immediately suitable for final use by sionals (such as doctors, lawyers or airline pilots) and
consumers, or they may be components for incorpora- employees engaged in clerical or administrative occu-
tion in other final products. pations performing tasks that are mentally rather than
3. The outputs of the secondary sector require distri- physically demanding. Blue-collar workers, on the other
bution to the places and markets where they can be hand, tend to earn hourly wages for performing skilled
assembled, consumed, or purchased (Plate 14.1). The or unskilled tasks in factories, construction, or technical
tertiary sector, which includes wholesale and retail installation work. An intermediate category, the pink-col-
trade, transportation, entertainment and personal lar worker, is also sometimes used to distinguish women
services, fulfils this role. Improvements in transport mainly engaged in white-collar occupations that do not
and telecommunications and their integration follow- require as much professional training or who perform
ing major advances in computing technology since the tasks to which lower prestige is attached. In line with the
early 1980s have transformed the operation and reach increasing share of the tertiary and quaternary sectors,
of firms in both the secondary and tertiary sector. The the proportion of white-collar workers has continued to
growth of international purchasing by firms and indi- grow in advanced Western economies and this shift has
viduals via the Internet is symbolic of these changes. become increasingly evident in emerging economies dur-
4. A fourth, quaternary, sector has increasingly been ing the twenty-first century.
identified as a separate grouping which includes
banking, finance, business and professional services,
the media, insurance, administration, education,
and research and development. These intellectual
14.4  geographical approach
A
services assemble, transmit and process the informa- to ­economic processes
tion, knowledge and expertise used by activities in the
other three sectors to enable them to adjust effectively One of the benefits of analyzing the structure of econo-
and efficiently to the changing geographic, economic, mies is that it enables economic geographers to meas-
social and cultural parameters of doing business in ure the dynamics of change and whether, and how, it
has impacts at different spatial scales. These dynamics
occur at all levels of analysis: from small rural localities
to the largest metropolitan areas, from peripheral to core
regions, from least developed to most developed econo-
mies. This is not new or surprising but during the closing
decades of the twentieth century it was dominated by
changes that will shape the economic agenda well into
the present century (such as more flexible production
systems, see Chapter 16; or the changing nature of work,
see Chapter 17).
As we have already noted, the share of country
employment in the secondary sector has been declining
steadily; by 2007 it directly supported only one in four
jobs in the OECD countries (Table 14.1). The primary
sector, already a very small part of the economy in devel-
Plate 14.1  Global flows of goods rely heavily on oped countries, is contracting further as improved crop
containers shipped through specialized ports, such disease resistance and better fertilizers enhance farm
as Oakland in California, before being transferred to productivity. Meanwhile, the tertiary and quaternary
trucks for region- or nation-wide distribution. sectors have expanded and diversified as rising standards
(cdrin/Shutterstock) of living and disposable incomes have boosted demand

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 288    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Table 14.1  Distribution of employment, by sector (%), selected OECD countries, 2002 and 2012

Country Agriculture Change Industry Change Tertiary Change

2012 2002 2012 2002 2012 2002

Australia 31 4 −1 21 21 0 761 75 1
Czech Republic 3 5 −2 38 40 −2 59 56 3
Germany 2 3 −1 28 32 −4 70 65 5
Greece 13 16 −3 17 23 −6 70 62 8
2 2 2
Japan 4 5 −1 25 30 −5 70 62 8
2 2 2
Korea 7 9 −2 17 27 −6 76 63 9
Poland 13 19 −6 30 29 1 57 52 5
Sweden 2 2 0 20 23 −3 78 75 3
United Kingdom 1 1 0 19 24 −5 79 75 4
2 2 2
United States 2 3 −1 17 22 −5 81 76 5
Notes: Agriculture = hunting; forestry; fishing.
Industry = mining and quarrying; manufacturing; construction; and public utilities.
Tertiary = wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels; transport, storage and communications; financing; insurance,
real estate and business services; community, social and personnel services.
1
2009
2
2010
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators [accessed 4 Janu-
ary 2015]

for tourism, travel or private health services. The produc- even ten years ago (Plate 14.2). Economic globalization,
tion of goods and services also now incorporates more however, cannot be separated from the social, politi-
knowledge-intensive services that are heavily weighted cal and cultural context in which it is embedded which
towards the employment of engineers and scientists (see means it is not really ‘a unified phenomenon’, more a
Chapter 17). These activities are growing most rapidly in ‘syndrome of processes and activities’ (Dicken 2007: 8).
the newly industrialized countries such as China or Bra- We shall return to consider this in more depth shortly.
zil that are ‘catching up’ with economies where services ● Informationalization denotes the increasingly central
already provide more than 70 per cent of total employ- role of information in production and consumption in
ment (see Table 14.1). the world economy. The sociologist Manuel Castells
There are numerous historical, political, social and (2009) argues that we now live in an era of a global
institutional explanations for structural and functional informational economy, where information (or knowl-
changes in economies. However, from an economic edge) is the key input to economic activity whatever
geographers’ perspective it is useful to think about the the industry. The rise of a whole range of new infor-
geographical nature of the processes of change that are mation and communications technologies (ICT) and
occurring in the contemporary global space economy. At the development of the Internet are, of course, key
least five interconnected and overlapping processes are enablers of this process.
worth identifying when exploring how the world econ- ● Neoliberalization is used as a shorthand term to
omy (and within that, individual national economies) is describe the spread of a complex set of political and
evolving in the twenty-first century: policy trajectories that lead to greater liberalization
● Globalization refers (in economic terms at least) to of international trade and financial markets, reduc-
the integration across national boundaries of mar- tions in government spending and a greater role in the
kets, finance, technologies and nation-states in a way economy for the private sector.
not witnessed in the past. It has enabled nation-states, ● Tertiarization/quaternerization is used to describe the
TNCs, as well as individuals, to extend their reach on-going development of the global service economy.
(markets, travel) across the globe faster, further, deeper The proportion of GDP and employment in advanced
and at lower cost than could ever have been imagined, economies in service-sector activities continues to rise,

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 Chapter 14  Geographies of the economy    289

Plate 14.2  Globalization has been accompanied by increasing geographical concentration of corporate control
as symbolized by the density of office development and the skyline of Manhattan, New York City.
(T. Paul Daniels, Bromsgrove)

and this is now also happening in less developed econ- not divert us from the reality that there are persistent vari-
omies (see Chapter 17). ations in the levels of participation of different parts of
● Financialization refers to the growing importance the world (Figure 14.1).
and centrality of financial capital in all geographical Globalization may be far from smoothing economic
regions and industry sectors in the global economy; it inequalities but if we assume for the moment that ‘every
is also used to describe the growing power of finance country may not feel part of the global[ization] system,
and financial logics (see Chapter 18). but every country is being globalized and shaped by it’
(see Friedman 1999, 2005), then what are the symptoms?
These processes impact and affect different parts of
The first is the pivotal role of knowledge. The informa-
the world economy in different ways, and with different
tionalization of economies (Castells 2009) means that
consequences. They form, however, the basis for develop-
production processes themselves are dependent on knowl-
ing an understanding of why economic development is
edge as the key input that creates value. For manufactured
uneven at the global scale, and how it is likely to evolve.
goods, for example, it is the design, marketing and cus-
We now turn to consider in more depth how these pro-
tomer support experience that makes products successful
cesses have led to the emergence of an increasingly glo-
and makes firms’ profits. And because the creation and
balized world economy that requires analysis as an entity
exchange of knowledge tends to be embodied in people
rather than as a collection of many smaller economies
(see also Chapter 17) rather than machines, national
restricted to nation-states or regions.
economic health relies more than ever on ‘producing’ an
educated and skilled workforce.
Second, technology has become transnationalized,
14.5 The rise of a global economy especially amongst knowledge-intensive economic
activities such as financial services or information and
Earlier conceptions of globalization suggested a con- communications technologies (ICT). This does not nec-
vergence of economic, social and cultural values across essarily mean better access to the factors of production;
the localities, regions and nations that come together as the increased complexity of the opportunities created by
the ‘global economy’. However, as Dicken (2015) argues, advanced technology means that only those individuals,
whilst ‘there are undoubtedly globalizing forces at work, companies and institutions with the resources to manage
we do not have a fully globalized world economy’. Glo- high technology can really take advantage.
balization is ‘reflected in’ and ‘influenced by multiple Third, there has been a marked increase in the power
geographies, rather than a single global geography’ and influence of finance through a range of financializa-
(Dicken 2015: 7). As all the other chapters in this section tion processes. Finance capital now takes many forms and
of the book show, we should beware of regarding globali- moves almost seamlessly and with great speed, especially
zation as producing convergence or uniformity. Rather, between the world’s stock, currency, commodity and
‘globalization’ is convenient shorthand for capturing futures exchanges located in ‘global cities’ such as Tokyo,
ideas about an integrating global economy, but it should New York, London and Hong Kong (see Chapter 18).

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 290    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

35

Population
30
Share of global wealth
25

20
%
15

10

0
China India Africa Other Asia Europe North Latin
Pacific America America
and
Caribbean

Figure 14.1  World population and wealth, by region (%), 2010.

Source: Extracted from World Bank Development Indicators data, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator [accessed 17
December 2014]

Electronic trading has ensured volatile and fast-changing many of the original mortgage borrowers were unable
financial markets that can transform the economic pros- to repay the loans. This triggered a financial crisis with
pects of companies and, more importantly, of national or many banks suddenly being exposed to huge losses, or
regional economies very quickly indeed. Equally, over the even going bankrupt in the case of Lehman Brothers and
last couple of decades many new kinds of financial capi- Bear Stearns in the USA. In Europe, governments had to
tal and financial firms have appeared replacing older and intervene to prevent even large banks like Halifax Bank
more traditional forms of finance for economic activity. of Scotland (HBOS) and former building societies like
This has not always been regarded as a positive develop- Northern Rock from going bust. The ‘contagion’ that
ment, however, with financialization processes seen by this financial crisis triggered, and the subsequent eco-
many within and beyond economic geography as creat- nomic recession, penetrated every corner of the world
ing greater instability and risk in an increasingly interde- economy and demonstrates how finance has bound the
pendent global economy (c.f. Harvey 2009). world economy ever more closely together.
The most recent example of this is, of course, the A fourth symptom of globalization is the emergence
global financial crisis and economic downturn that of global oligopolies, that is, markets dominated by a
began in 2007 and has led to an on-going period of low small number of suppliers of a product or service (Case
growth and global economic uncertainty. The recent study 14.1). For a market sector in which there are very
recession was the deepest economic downturn in the few buyers the term oligopsony has been coined. This is
world economy since the Second World War, and was the converse of an oligopoly; for example, just six com-
transmitted initially through increasingly globalized panies in the USA own the majority of movie theatres so
financial markets. It began in the United States where that a film distribution company has very few negotiating
banks and other financial firms got into trouble after alternatives. A similar story exists in many industries; the
developing new forms of finance around the housing majority of drugs are increasingly made by a diminish-
industry. The financial industry sold on household mort- ing number of very large pharmaceutical companies like
gages as new kinds of financial ‘debt’ products (known GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer, and in the airline industry,
as mortgage-backed securities) that were sold on in mergers continue apace with even large airlines like Brit-
global financial markets. Banks across the globe bought ish Airways, American Airlines and Iberia seeking to
these new products, and banks in other countries (the merge. There is now a sense in which corporate and eco-
UK, for example) also sold their mortgage debt on in a nomic survival requires ‘going global’. The fifth symptom
similar fashion. This had had the effect of making mort- of globalization is that the power of individual nations to
gages cheap in countries like the USA and the UK, but regulate their own economic development or to exercise
when their economies began to slow, it became clear that a strong influence on the outcome, for example, of trade

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 Chapter 14  Geographies of the economy    291

Case study 14.1

An oligopoly: Nestlé manufacturer of sweets and chocolates, and has

increased its dominance of the ice-cream sector by
Nestlé is a Swiss-based company founded in 1866 merging the Nestlé Ice Cream Company with the
that is now the top-ranking food and beverage pro- leading US company (Dreyers) in 2003. In addition to
ducer in the world with sales of over US$100 billion food products, Nestlé is involved in cosmetics (it has
in 2007. It employs 265,000 and has factories and a large stake in L'Oréal), nutritional supplements and
operations in almost every country in the world. eye care. Its long-term strategy is to continue expand-
Nestlé has achieved this position by acquiring other ing worldwide, especially into emerging markets such
related companies and brands; in 2001 it purchased as China, India, Latin America and Russia where, for
Ralston Purina, making it the leading pet food manu- example, in 2007 it invested US$120 million in a new
facturer in the world; it purchased the leading French coffee-processing plant.
bottled water producer (Perrier) in the late 1990s to Other oligopolies include Coca-Cola, Pepsico,
become number one for that product, the UK choco- Pearson, Interbrew and Gillette. For these leading
late maker Joseph Rowntree in 1998 (Kit Kat) and oligopolies the key objective is to protect or to acquire
Novartis Pharmaceutical in 2007 (Ovaltine). It now world-class brands. There are currently some 40 con-
owns eight further French waters including Vittel, as sumer brands worldwide with sales in excess of one
well as regional brands like Buxton in the UK, that billion dollars annually (Coke, for example, sells over
are sold in 37 different countries in 2010. Nestlé is US$15 billion). The companies with these exceptional
the leading producer of instant coffee (Nescafé was products are growing and expanding internationally at
the first instant coffee on the market), and a major more than 10 per cent per annum.

agreements has been diluted by the rise of transnational of employment and migration. In order to understand
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund better the uneven consequences of the emergence of an
(IMF) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) that increasingly globalized world economy, we consider, in
coordinate, steer and even regulate aspects of the world this section, two aspects to this unevenness: trade and
economy. Nation-states have also increasingly organized foreign direct investment.
themselves into regional trading blocs to facilitate easier
and greater volumes of trade. The European Union
14.6.1 Uneven trade
(EU) is one, but such regional economic arrangements
have grown in importance in the last 20 years elsewhere. Trade in the world economy refers simply to the buying
Examples include the North American Free Trade Agree- and selling of goods and services between actors in dif-
ment Area (NAFTA) and the Association of Southeast ferent localities. As the world economy has globalized,
Asian Nations (ASEAN). total trade has grown enormously but trade benefits
some localities and not others depending on the nature
of their economies. Whilst growth in total world trade
stalled during the 2007–9 economic downturn, the long-
14.6 Global uneven development: term trend has been one of expansion. In 2013, world
the examples of trade and trade measured in terms of goods exports amounted to
foreign direct investment US$18.3 trillion, while exports of commercial services
were worth US$4.7 trillion (WTO 2014b). Much of this
In light of the many processes of integration and inter- trade at the level of nations is concentrated between the
connectedness in the world economy, it thus makes sense wealthier countries in the global economy, although in
to talk of a ‘global economy’. However, it is also impor- the last decade developing countries like China and India
tant to realize that economic globalization has been and have experienced huge trade growth, with China’s trade
continues to be highly uneven. It produces a range of surplus becoming an increasing source of tension in
global economic geographies whether you are consider- international politics (see Section 14.9).
ing the complex spatial form of the global city networks Globalization processes have made understanding the
that are key in controlling global economic operations, or idea of trade increasingly difficult, however. Conven-
new kinds of global labour markets that shape patterns tionally, trade was measured at the national level with

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 292    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

nation-states counting how many goods and services they Organization (UNWTO) divided country arrivals in
exported and imported. However, globalization processes 2013 into leisure, recreation holidays (568 million), busi-
have complicated this in a number of ways. For one thing, ness travel (152 million), and visiting friends and rela-
a growing proportion of world trade is different parts of tives, religious purposes, health treatment and so on
the same large transnational firm ‘trading’ with another (367 million). Apart from demand for land, air and sea
part – this undermines the historical assumption that transport services, such large-scale flows also represent
trade ended in the consumption of a product or service. tourism receipts at a large number of destinations.
Another issue is the nature of what is traded, with not Whether travelling on business or for leisure, visitors
only services but also new digitized products (e.g. soft- spend on accommodation, food and drink, local trans-
ware, music, film) hard to measure because they are sold port, shopping, entertainment and so on. In many cases
and bought in different parts of the global economy. this trade in tourism creates much-needed employment
The uneven impacts of international trade in certain and other economic development opportunities, often
markets have over several decades led to the emergence of in those less developed regions that have been largely
a growing civil society movement to promote ‘fair trade’ bypassed by some of the other symbols of participation
amongst, in particular, the rich countries of the global in the global space of flows (Table 14.2). Tourist desti-
North and developing countries of the global South. The nations such as the Caribbean islands, Thailand, Bali,
argument is that the power of oligopolies in the global the Maldives or Fiji are benefiting from comparative
economy has forced down prices for basic commodities advantage (Spotlight box 14.5) as well as the concept
such as tea, coffee, sugar, cocoa and cotton that are often of competitive advantage, which is the advantage that
produced in poorer countries with the result that the pro- a country or a business has over its competitors because
ducers (often small farmers) are penalized by low prices. of the quality or superiority of its products or services
Fair trade initiatives and campaigns for ‘trade justice’ which will persuade other countries or customers to buy
thus seek to create a range of market-based mechanism to from it rather than from competitors (Porter 1990). The
deliver better terms of trade to producers in low-income latter is a more useful way of explaining how individual
countries (see Spotlight box 14.4) (see also Chapter 16). nations participate in the international tourist market in
We can illustrate the growth and development of that it incorporates differences in values, cultures, histo-
world trade in the contemporary global economy ries and institutions as well as variations in endowments
with the example of the worlds’ largest industry – of the factors of production that make some tourist des-
namely, tourism. The United Nations World Tourism tinations more appealing than others.

Spotlight box 14.4

Fair trade? the emphasis had shifted to commodities like coffee,

cocoa, sugar and cotton.
The idea of fair trade has its root in the 1940s and In 1998, four organizations (Fair Trade Labelling
1950s, but it was in the 1960s that a number of non- International, the International World Fair Trade Asso-
governmental organizations based in developed coun- ciation, the Network of European Workshops and the
tries began to argue that the rise of large multinational European Fair Trade Association) that had all been set
firms and free market capitalism was not necessarily up to achieve a more equitable trading system for pro-
beneficial for the poorest people in the world, most of ducers in developing countries formed an organization
whom lived in the global South and worked in agricul- called ‘FINE’ with the aim of together promoting fair
ture. MNCs (now TNCs), along with the tendency for trade in a coherent way. FINE produced a common defi-
oligopolies to form in many industries, meant that small nition of fair trade as ‘a trading partnership, based on
farmers and commodity producers in poor countries dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks greater
received a very low price for their goods. The fair trade equity in international trade’ and also which contributes
movement thus developed with the goal of rebalancing ‘to sustainable development’.
these trading relations and giving poor producers in Fair trade products have now achieved more market
developing countries a fair price for their products and penetration in richer countries than at any point previously
produce. The fair trade movement started with fairly with, for example, major supermarket chains like Tesco and
priced ‘handicraft goods’ in the 1960s, but by the 1980s coffee retailers like Starbucks selling fair trade products.

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 Chapter 14  Geographies of the economy    293

Table 14.2  International tourist arrivals and receipts, world regions 1990 and 2013

Region International tourist arrivals (million) Tourist receipts (US$ billion)

1990 2013 Share (%) 2013 Share (%)

Europe 266 563 51.8 489 42.2

Asia and the Pacific 56 248 22.8 359 31
Americas 93 168 15.5 229 19.8
Africa 15 56 5.1 34 3
Middle East 10 52 4.7 47 4.1
World 439 1,087 100.0 1,159 100.0
Source: United Nations World Tourism Organization (2014) World Tourism Highlights, 2014 Edition, UNWTO, Madrid

Spotlight box 14.5

Comparative advantage of many countries since the 1980s. There is a nagging

concern, however, that comparative advantage is not
Comparative advantage explains the tendency for coun- reflected in actual patterns of world trade. We would
tries (or regions/localities within countries) to specialize expect the biggest flows to be between the countries
in certain goods and/or services even if they have the with the largest cost differences. It seems that con-
ability to fulfil their needs from domestic production. As sumer tastes and geographical proximity are actually
long as countries or regions specialize in those prod- more important than cost differences. This explains the
ucts and/or services in which they have comparative fact that the vast majority of trade is between countries
advantage, they will gain from trade. Advantages can with relatively small cost differences, often involves simi-
stem from spatial variations in, for example, mineral or lar rather than different goods (such as cars, electrical
land resource endowments, from variations in the edu- goods of all kinds, certain kinds of business services
cational levels of the labour force, in access to markets, such as management consulting),and occurs on a ‘near-
or differences in levels of technology. For comparative est neighbour’ basis. Well over half of EU goods and
advantage to work effectively it is necessary to assume services trade takes place between the member states
a system of free trade, hence the significance of the while Canada and Mexico are the major trading partners
trade liberalization that has been high on the agenda of the USA.

14.6.2 Foreign direct investment shocks such as the global economic crisis between 2007
and 2010; outflows from the developed economies
Another indicator of the integration of the global econ- exceeded US$1.1 trillion a year prior to 2007 but had
omy is foreign direct investment (FDI). In the context fallen back by 2010. An earlier slowdown of the world
of our example of tourism, the development of many economy in 2000–1 caused a decline in corporate cross-
international tourist destinations relies on FDI, which is border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) which make up
defined as the acquisition by an individual or enterprise a large part of FDI activity, but by 2006 M&A activity
resident in one country of assets (such as hotels, restau- once again reached a record high with deals worth US$4
rants and clubs) located in another. World FDI inflows billion before a significant decline again in the 2008–10
and outflows for developed and developing economies period (OECD 2009). FDI between developed countries
fluctuate from year to year in line with the performance is more important than FDI into developing countries.
of world, regional or individual national economies However, some of the biggest inflows in recent years,
(Table 14.3). Overall, flows have been increasing in real although still a relatively small proportion of the total,
terms since 1990, with the developed economies generat- have been recorded by the newly emerging economies of
ing outflows of FDI in excess of US$935 billion in 2010, Central and Eastern Europe and by the BRICS (Brazil,
or just over 75 per cent of the world total. FDI fluctuates Russia, India, China and South Africa).
year on year and is particularly vulnerable to economic

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 294    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Table 14.3  FDI inflows and outflows, developed and developing economies, 1990–2010

$US (million) 1990 2000 2010

Developed economies Inflows 172,516 1,138,040 601,906

Outflows 229,584 1,094,728 935,190
Balance (I-O) −57,068 43,312 −333,284
Developing economies Inflows 34,868 257,617 573,568
Outflows 11,914 134,914 327,564
Balance (I-O) 23,054 122,703 246,004
World Inflows 207,455 1,402,680 1,243,671
Outflows 241,498 1,232,117 1,323,337
Note: FDI inflows and outflows comprise capital provided (either directly or through other related enterprises) by a foreign
direct investor to an FDI enterprise, or capital received by a foreign direct investor from an FDI enterprise. FDI includes the fol-
lowing components: equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans.
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Major FDI Indicators (extract from table at http://unctad.org/sections/
dite.dir/docs/WIR11_web%20tab%202.pdf [accessed 8 January 2015])

TNCs contribute significantly to FDI activity. To summarize, the globalization of economies has
Although the number and size of developing coun- strengthened the role of market forces while, as a result
try TNCs is now increasing, most FDI inflows result of advances in telecommunications and transporta-
from the activities of developed country TNCs and over tion technology, it has eased some of the constraints
60 per cent of their investments are made in other devel- on interaction imposed by space and time. With the
oped economies. Outflows from developing and transi- real cost of international telecommunications declining
tion economies (particularly BRICS) are now increasing steadily over the past 25 years, global financial integra-
as TNCs from these countries evolve into major regional tion has strengthened and has been accompanied by
and even global players. For those countries able to diversified opportunities for new kinds of international
attract it, FDI helps to secure access to capital, tech- trade, especially in services, and enabled easier transfer
nologies and organizational expertise. The net effect is of the technology and innovation that encourages eco-
modernization of infrastructure, an increase in industrial nomic development and participation. The importance
capability and an improvement in the quality and breadth of non-government organizations, TNCs, and regional
of much-needed financial, business and professional ser- trading blocs such as the European Union, ASEAN and
vices. China, a vast potential market comprising more NAFTA for shaping the economic geography of globali-
than one-fifth of the world’s population, was closed to zation has also been greatly enhanced and will continue
FDI until the mid-1980s but is now one of the leading to increase.
recipients. Prior to an economic downturn during the late
1990s, almost two-thirds of the FDI flows to developing
countries went to Asia (excluding Japan). These flows
to Asia have subsequently recovered, but whilst there
14.7  laces and localities in an
P
has been some increase in the last decade, much of the uneven global economy
African continent continues to be bypassed for any form
of FDI, even though many of its countries are resource- While the geography of economies accommodates a
rich. With the exception of South Africa and a few West global dimension, this is not at the expense of individ-
African countries such as Nigeria which have seen some ual localities. Indeed ‘it is the combination of national
growth (UNCTAD 2009), consumer-purchasing power is and intensely local conditions that fosters competitive
low and average incomes per capita are at best growing advantage’ (Porter 1990: 158). Localities are subdivisions
slowly and not in a way that will raise the consumption of within nations, such as cities or regions or places that
major consumer goods to a level that justifies the invest- often have a particular economic identity because of the
ment attention of most TNCs. kinds of activities that take place there. Rural districts

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 Chapter 14  Geographies of the economy    295

or subdivisions that specialize in the production of very foreign exchange trading was undertaken in London; it
particular kinds of wine (Bordeaux region, France), dairy was the second largest global centre for legal services, and
products (Jutland region, Denmark) or woollen goods in 2009 it handled 45 per cent of the total global market
(Wales), for example, are also included. Many are identi- turnover in company equities (shares) that took place in
fied as named territorial units while others are industrial exchanges other than the companies’ domestic (or home
districts or agglomerations whose identities are derived market) exchanges.
from specific economic activities, such as Motorsport These are just a few of the indicators of the unique
Valley (Pinch and Henry 1999) in southern England, Sili- localization of highly dynamic entrepreneurial, innovative
con Valley in California or the light industrial districts of and international economic activities in one very small
the Third Italy. Although these are often highly special- space. There is clearly something about the environment
ized and self-contained localities with systems of govern- in such localities that facilitates their competitiveness. For
ance and regulation that fit their particular needs, they the City of London local factors such as high quality pro-
are inextricably linked with the wider national and global fessional and support services, a skilled and diversified
economic system. labour force, a focus on leading soft and hard infrastruc-
These local economies and ‘industrial clusters’ thrive on ture, and a consistent, politically neutral legal system that
the dynamism, innovation and ‘untraded interdependen- is widely used and understood globally help to place the
cies’ (knowledge and information that circulates through City ahead of its global competitors (Tokyo, New York,
the transfer of key workers between firms or via social and Frankfurt) (TheCityUK 2014) (see also Table 14.4). It is not
other networks) that are made possible by proximity. Even just about economic advantages; quality of life, cosmopoli-
TNCs, that are now often portrayed as being ‘placeless’ tan cultures, linguistic diversity, and a fair and just busi-
because their operations are so extensive and relatively ness environment are some of the social/cultural factors
mobile, started from businesses that were nurtured in a that also help us to understand how such localities work.
particular locality with its own economic and other charac- On the basis of its prominent international status, firms
teristics to such an extent that the locally shaped attributes operating from the City of London are able to attract the
of such firms are carried through into their organization most skilled foreign workers who meet its needs both for
and transformation into TNCs (Dicken 2015). Economic highly educated staff offering very specialized knowledge
geographers have, for example, sought to understand how as well as for more routine occupations in hotels and cater-
the proximity of firms in clusters produces ‘regional inno- ing, transport services, or office servicing.
vation systems’ where the concentration of firms or sectors It has been argued that increased localization and
into one locality is argued to be instrumental in produc- agglomeration effects are thus a crucial converse out-
ing competitive success through innovation in the global come of wider globalization. Whilst London (and
economy (Asheim et al. 2007). not just the City of London) is a leading example,
An outstanding example of the synergy between local research on global cities more widely suggests that to
and global processes is the City of London. This one- some extent all of them are experiencing similar trends
square-mile (259 hectares) district and the areas that and that economic success in localities is increasingly
fringe it in central London provided employment for affected by the complex mixture of place-based fac-
392,000 workers in 2013 (Department of the Built Envi- tors. National governments have responded to these
ronment 2014). The special characteristic of the City in ideas with policies aimed at giving localities greater
particular is that the majority of its business activities are autonomy over the institutions and instruments that
knowledge-intensive services. These include commercial they put in place, using the insights gained from
banks and insurance companies, international banks, detailed knowledge of local networks, to capitalize on
sophisticated private and corporate banking, firms oper- their economic advantages or to create economic and
ating in the foreign exchange, securities, commodities, social environments that will attract new investment.
shipping and derivatives markets, fund management, One very influential idea is that the economic success
corporate finance, professional advisory services (legal, of cities and other localities is increasingly depend-
accountancy) that are associated with the City’s finan- ent on skilled knowledge workers who undertake (in
cial-services complex, as well as advertising firms and a broad way) the creative aspects of economic activ-
other highly specialized activities. Furthermore, a large ity in the global information economy (Florida 2002).
proportion of these activities are owned or managed by Attracting this new ‘creative class’ has been argued to
non-UK enterprises to such an extent that it is sometimes be a crucial component of any policies introduced by
said that the City has stronger links with Europe and the local government or other institutions that are seeking
rest of the world than it has with the rest of the United to develop strategies for strengthening regional eco-
Kingdom. In 2013 more than 41 per cent of all global nomic development (see Spotlight box 14.6).

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 296    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Table 14.4  Rank of top ten financial centres by factors of competitiveness, 2013

Business Financial sector Reputational

Rank Human capital environment development Infrastructure factors

1 London (−) London (−) London (−) London (−) London (−)
2 New York (−) New York (−) New York (−) New York (−) New York (−)
3 Hong Kong (−) Hong Kong (−) Hong Kong (−) Hong Kong (−) Hong Kong (−)
4 Singapore (−) Singapore (−) Singapore (−) Singapore (−) Singapore (−)
5 Tokyo (+1) Zurich (−) Tokyo (+3) Tokyo (+1) Tokyo (+2)
6 Zurich (−1) Tokyo (+2) Zurich (−1) Zurich (−1) Zurich (−1)
7 Boston (−) Geneva (−1) Boston (−) Boston (−1) Boston (−1)
8 Geneva (−) Boston (−1) Seoul (+7) Geneva (−) Geneva (−)
9 Frankfurt (−) Chicago (+1) Geneva (−3) Washington DC (+5) Toronto (+4)
10 Chicago (+2) Frankfurt (−1) Chicago (+1) Chicago (+1) Chicago (+1)
Note: () denotes change in rank since GFC13; (−) denotes ‘no change’.
Source: Yeandle and Davies (2013), Table 11, p. 35.

Spotlight box 14.6

The importance of a ‘new creative class’ dramatists. The key argument Florida makes is that it is
in today’s global economy these segments of the workforce that are the major driv-
ers of growth in today’s global economy, and American
The American social scientist, Richard Florida, suggested (and hence other) cities and regions need to focus on
the idea of a new creative class in his book The Rise attracting and supporting these groups.
of the Creative Class published in 2002. Florida’s initial The concept of the creative class has had enormous
concern is the role in the US economy of what he identi- influence amongst policy practitioners beyond the USA
fies as a new class of creative workers that comprises since it was proposed, but it is not uncontroversial. Eco-
some 40 million people (about a third of the workforce). nomic geographers (amongst others) have been critical
Using the standard occupational classification, Florida of the idea in a range of ways, including the view that
divides this creative class into three groups, the two major the concept has no causal mechanism (it is more about
ones are the ‘super-creative core’, which covers a wide description than about any process) (Peck 2005) or
range of occupations (science, engineering, education, that empirical research has found little sense of identity
computer programmers, research, arts, design) that cre- amongst those people supposedly in these groups, with
ates products and consumer goods, and the ‘creative membership being based more on educational achieve-
professionals’, who are essentially more conventional ment than any measure of creativity (Markusen 2006).
knowledge-based workers in finance, legal services, However, workers that could be classified in this way are
healthcare and education. A third, much smaller, group an increasing feature worldwide, including in emerging
comprises the bohemians, including artists, writers and economies across Asia and South America in particular.

population) at the end of 2014 (ITU 2014), up from two

14.8 The rise of a new global billion in 2010 (Table 14.5). E-commerce was already
digital economy? expanding at the end of the 1990s but it is now grow-
ing and diversifying even more rapidly, led by business-
In many respects the interaction between localities and to-business (B2B) and business-to-customer (B2C)
the global economy is shaped by the so-called digital transactions by service sector activities such as telecom-
economy. It is estimated that there were three billion munications, information technology, publishing and
Internet users worldwide (almost 43 per cent of the total the media, travel and tourism, retailing, transportation

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 Chapter 14  Geographies of the economy    297

and professional services like management consultancy, eliminate the effects of friction of distance on economic
industrial design and engineering. Although consumer interactions. But this will require a truly global network
sales attract the publicity (such as the phenomenal of telecommunications and computer infrastructure that
growth of eBay or Amazon), much of the expansion of is accessible to all, and increasingly it seems likely that the
e-commerce is between and within businesses. Global unevenness persistent in the material economy will be a
B2C sales topped US$1 trillion for the first time in 2012 feature of the digital one too. As the data in Table 14.5
with the USA alone accounting for US$365 billion but show, some national economies are yet to be ‘plugged in’
are dwarfed by B2B transactions estimated at US$.7 tril- to the Internet. To be excluded is to widen the gap that
lion by 2020, led by Chinese firm Alibaba accounting for already exists between those countries ‘inside’ and those
twice the combined ecommerce transactions of Amazon ‘outside’ the global digital economy. A networked readi-
and eBay. The potential for growth in direct cross-border ness index (Figure 14.2) reveals wide differences in the
sales to consumers is substantial as Internet access (see geographical distribution (number, density and process-
Table 14.5), user confidence, payment systems, Inter- ing power, for example) of the computers, telecommuni-
net/Web security, and mechanisms for tracking transac- cations networks and software required to participate in
tions for levying taxes and duties, continue to improve. the global economy. However, Africa’s digital economy
Furthermore, the development of new so-called ‘Web deficit may be rectified much more rapidly than expected
2.0’ technologies have again transformed the nature of with the expansion of cellular (mobile) telephony. Cell
Internet usage itself, with the rise of ‘real-time’ streamed phones not only offer voice services but also technolo-
data and increased storage capacity online. Social net- gies that bypass the need for a computer to access the
working businesses such as Facebook offer new but still World Wide Web so that as early as 2001 Africa was the
underdeveloped e-commerce opportunities, and the rapid first world region where the number of mobile subscrib-
proliferation of mobile web devices (Apple’s iPhone, for ers exceeded the number of fixed-line subscribers. Access
example) means that online commerce is a rapidly chang- to mobile phones opens up all kinds of economic and
ing sector both in terms of hardware and software (see social benefits such as better access to information about
Case study 14.2). crop prices, guidance and support from government insti-
Apart from the numerous legal, regulatory, security tutions on how to run small businesses, accessing bank
and other challenges it presents, the global digital econ- services without the need to travel (including money
omy is likely to be accompanied by new geographies of transfers), or keeping in touch with family and friends.
the economy. Just as the Industrial Revolution generated A second challenge posed by the digital economy is
significant economic and social changes (both positive the demand for human resources. More jobs will be cre-
and negative) in the form of new jobs, new industries and ated by the digital economy than will be lost but they are
new industrial regions, so will the digital economy stimu- generally in higher-skilled and better-paid occupations.
late its own revolution. Perhaps the Internet will finally In order to fill new digital-economy jobs, economies

Table 14.5  Internet usage, by world region, 2014

Penetration
Internet usage (% of total Usage Population 2014 Usage growth
Region (000s)1 population) (% of world) (% of world) 2000–14 (%)

Africa 297,886 26.5 9.8 15.6 6,499

Asia 1,386,188 34.7 45.7 55.6 1,113

Europe 582,441 70.5 19.2 11.5 454

Middle East 111,180 48.3 3.7 3.2 3,304
North America 310,322 87.7 10.2 4.9 187
Latin America/Caribbean 320,313 52.3 10.5 8.5 1,673
Oceania/Australia 26,790 72.9 0.9 0.5 252
World total 3,035,749 42.3 100.0 100.0 741
1
6 June 2014
Source: International Telecommunications Union (2014), www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm [accessed 12 December 2014]

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 298    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Case study 14.2

Facebook versus Google? cellphones. In this latter area it competes with Apple, but
it is in the lucrative area of online web advertising where
One of the most dramatic developments in the global Google makes most of its money, it also competes with
economy since the turn of the century is the contin- a relative newcomer, Facebook. Famously founded
ued rise of new media and web industries. During the by Mark Zuckerburg in his Harvard dormitory in 2004,
late 1990s, the so-called ‘tech boom’ led to the rapid Facebook has grown spectacularly and had overtaken
rise (and equally rapid demise) of many new firms in Google in terms of visitors to its website by mid-2010.
web-based software whose success was built on the Facebook’s product is of course its social networking
emergence of e-commerce and new software for the software that is based on Web 2.0 technology, giving
World Wide Web that had increasing technical capac- users a personal profile they manage themselves. In
ity. However, since the turn of the century, this new era May 2012, Facebook listed on the stock exchange at a
of ‘Web 2.0’ has produced another phase comprising value of US$104 billion, still the largest recorded value
a mixture of new and existing firms enjoying meteoric of any public listed company. By June 2014 it had 1.3 bil-
success. No companies exemplify this more than lion active users worldwide.
­California-based rivals Facebook and Google. The very rapid growth of companies like Google and
Founded in 1998 by two Stanford PhD students, Facebook reflects the global penetration of the Internet
Larry Page and Sergey Brin, Google is a software in the contemporary global economy, and the potentially
company that has become the dominant web search vast commercial revenues that new forms of web adver-
engine. Now based in California’s Silicon Valley, and at tising and product sales may generate. The ongoing
more than a decade old in today’s digital economy, it is a challenge for both companies is how to generate com-
long-standing player. Google has developed its business mercially viable business models in a digital world where
beyond web-search into online advertising, and perhaps technology moves at break-neck speed, and new com-
most importantly a range of software products that petitors seek to break-in with new innovations almost
include the Android operating system for third-generation continuously.

5.4–7.0 (best)
5.0–5.4
4.0–5.0
3.3–4.0
1.0 (worst)–3.3
Not covered

Figure 14.2  The Networked Readiness Index, 148 countries, 2013.

Source: compiled from data at: www3.weforum.org/docs/GITR/2014/GITR_OverallRanking_2014.pdf [accessed 12 December 2014]

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 Chapter 14  Geographies of the economy    299

everywhere need to retrain existing workforces and to this has become much more pronounced. China’s rate
train future workers. History suggests that the response of economic growth since 1995 has rarely fallen below
to this challenge will be uneven; comparative advan- 5 per cent per annum. Despite the economic crisis during
tage will enable some economies and some localities to the late 1990s other Asian economies have also enjoyed
respond more quickly and effectively than others. Per- sustained growth during the first 15 years, surpassing
haps less certain is how this will modify existing spatial the growth rates of the traditional developed countries
patterns of economic development. A digital economy, in Europe and North America. Equally important to the
for example, enables a wide range of purchasing and ‘re-balancing’ of the global economy towards the East, is
banking transactions to be undertaken from home via the geographically uneven impact of the global economic
the telephone, laptop computers, televisions, or on the downturn of 2007–10. Whilst the formerly wealthiest
move using mobile phones that provide access to Internet industrialized economies of the G7 (USA, UK, Canada,
services. An international door-to-door delivery time of France, Germany, Japan and Italy) in the global North
24 hours or much less is now commonplace, depending suffered declines in GDP of up to 9 per cent from their
on the type of good or service, whether it is required just 2006/7 peaks, economies in Asia suffered far less with a
in time, or the location of the supplier. Moreover, cross- much more short-lived recession (and in some cases con-
border transactions and payments are as easy as those tinued positive growth).
made to the local supermarket or bookstore. With shop- The result is a dramatic transformation that by 2010 had
ping sites on the Internet presenting themselves as ‘vir- reached a critical turning point whereby the G7 no longer
tual malls’ and encouraging users to place their selections account for the lion’s share of global GDP. In the period
in ‘baskets’ or ‘carts’, they are attempting to replicate between 2000 and 2010, the share of global GDP accounted
offline retail outlets. More than 75 per cent of Internet for by the G7 countries declined from 72  per cent to
users shopped online for books, travel, banking and a 53 per cent (IMF estimate for 2011). In 2013, the economy
wide range of goods in the USA and 85 per cent in Aus- of countries like the UK struggled to breach 0.5 per cent.
tralia and New Zealand in 2013. This, combined with Compare this to the Chinese government’s attempts to
trends such as increased working from home or telework- manage a much higher growth rate of 7.7 per cent in 2013
ing, whether self-employed or as an employee of a TNC, that continues a trend that makes it the globe’s second-
points to the potential for significant changes. largest economy after the USA. China’s economic power
The challenge for economic geographers is how has thus not only increased over the last decade, but has
to understand the ways in which the digital economy even eclipsed almost all the formerly ‘rich’ countries of
impacts on the structure and pattern of economic activi- the G7. Whilst, because of its enormous population,
ties at different scales, on the structure of localities and GDP per capita still places it as an upper middle-income
their relationship with the global economy, or on the rela-
tive importance of nations and TNCs in regulating or
influencing the outcome.

14.9 Global re-balancing:

the eastward shift
We end our overview of the geographies of economy
with a consideration of probably the most pressing
question that economic geographers can address in the
first half of the twenty-first century: the re-balancing
of the geography of the global economy away from the
historical pattern of economic activity that has long
been dominated by North America and Europe. In
short, the key issue is the progressive ‘shift eastwards’ Plate 14.3  The demolition of older dwellings to
in terms of the centre of gravity for growth and output makes way for numerous new high-rise residential
in the global economy. areas is a major feature of the rapid economic
Whilst there has been a longstanding trend since the transformation of cities across China such as
1980s for significant growth in the formerly ‘less devel- Chongqing, Guangzhou or Shanghai.
oped’ economies of Asia, since the turn of the century (Pyty/Shutterstock)

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 300    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

rather than a high-income country, China is no longer not be pertinent at present to refer to an eastward shift in
accurately described as a developing economy; many terms of GDP, there are signs that the general rebalancing
parts of its coastal regions are highly developed even if away from the global North comprises a complex pattern
large areas of its inland provinces remain poor and agri- of haves and have-nots.
cultural. To a lesser extent, as there remains considerable The implications of this shift in economic power for
poverty in many areas, a similar transformation has also understanding the economic geography of the global
been occurring in India around the key metropolitan cen- economy are enormous. It seems likely that Asian econ-
tres of Delhi, Mumbai and Bangalore. With annual GDP omies will continue to grow more strongly than many
growth ranging between 3.5–7 per cent between 2004 and economies of the global North over the next decade, and
2014, India’s rapid economic growth has also led to the political unrest notwithstanding in central Asia and Rus-
emergence of a new middle class (some 24 per cent of the sia, the trajectory of the BRICS economies appears one
population in 2010) with rising incomes and increasingly of continued significant growth in the coming decades.
employed in the tertiary sector. Moreover, historic divisions between the nature of the
Furthermore, annual growth rates across the globe economies in the global north and south are also eroding
seem set to continue this re-balancing beyond just Asia. as tertiary and quaternary industries take hold to at least
Increasingly economic geographers have become inter- some extent in many economies of the global South. The
ested in other growth nodes in the former south. A new questions that face economic geographers are no longer
focus has been the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, therefore so much about the impact of developing econo-
China, South Africa) economies, but transformations are mies that become more developed, but rather about the
also evident in other parts of the global South – in Tanza- effects of a fundamental further geographical shift in the
nia (east Africa), or in small but increasingly prosperous centre of gravity of the global economy away from the
Costa Rica and Panama in Central America. While it may advanced industrial economies of the West.

Learning outcomes global production networks (GPNs), nation-states and the

rapid developments in information and communications tech-
Having read this chapter, you should be aware of:
nology, drawing on fields outside geography such as political
● The nature and changing concerns of economic science and economics.
geography as a sub-discipline. Knox, P., Agnew, J. and McCarthy, L. (2014) The Geography
● The importance of economic restructuring and the of the World Economy: An Introduction to Economic Geog-
raphy, 6th edition, Taylor and Francis, London. A synthesis
shift from manufacturing to services in the contem-
of the factors shaping the development of contemporary
porary economy.
economic patterns in market-oriented and centrally planned
● The significance of globalization processes in the economies. Strong emphasis on interdependence of eco-
structure and spatial development of the world nomic development at different spatial scales, from local
economy. through national to international.
● The major role performed by transnational corpora- Mackinnon, D. and Cumbers, A. (2011) Introduction to
tions in trade, foreign direct investment and other Economic Geography: Uneven Development, Globaliza-
indices of globalization. tion and Place, 2nd edition Pearson, London. Explores the
wide range of approaches and models that are debated
● The challenges posed to economic geographers about and used by economic geographers. Focuses on
by the rapid growth of the global informational globalization, uneven development and place. Covers more
economy and its potential for changing established conventional topics such as regional development and
patterns of economic activity. labour markets alongside an introduction to economic top-
ics that are subject to rapid change such as consumption,
information and communications technologies and tourist
Further reading geographies.
Murray, W.E. and Overton, J. (2014) Geographies of Globali-
Dicken, P. (2015) Global Shift: Mapping the Changing zation, 2nd edition, Routledge, London. An eminently read-
­Contours of the World Economy, 7th edition, Sage, London. A able exploration of the idea that as globalization marches on,
broad-ranging overview of the evolution of internationaliza- geography and its core principles matter more than ever for
tion and the globalization of economic activities. Focuses on understanding the process, its challenges, and its impacts on
the complex interaction between transnational corporations, places from the local to the global scale.

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 Chapter 14  Geographies of the economy    301

Directorates-General (DGs) sites within the Commission

Useful websites (Industry, Transport, etc.) useful starting points for monitor-
ing economic development patterns, problems and policies
across the European Union.
www.ilo.org/global/lang-en/index.htm International Labour
Organization. Provides documents and statistics on a wide www.oecd.org Organization for Economic Cooperation and
variety of employment and labour market issues for individual Development. Represents mainly the developed economies
countries and on a comparative basis for countries around and provides free documents, summaries of OECD economic
the world. surveys and statistics.

www.un.org United Nations. Reflects the wide-ranging www.unctad.org/en/Pages/Home.aspx United Nations

responsibilities of the United Nations but includes a useful Conference on Trade and Development. Focuses in particular
section on global economic and social development, includ- on the interests of less developed countries in relation to
ing an annual report on trends and issues in the world econ- international trade and foreign direct investment. Publica-
omy. Links to other websites. tions, statistics and links to related websites.

www.wto.org  World Trade Organization. Offers a wide range www.weforum.org  World Economic Forum. Brings together
of documentation and statistical material about global trends political, business, academic and other leaders in collabora-
in trade in goods and services, regional aspects of trade, elec- tive activities to shape global, regional and industry agen-
tronic commerce and background research and analysis on all das. Identifies challenges, solutions and actions, supported
aspects of world trade. Links to related websites. with reports and statistics that are a valuable resource for
­economic geographers.
www.ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm The European Commis-
sion. Readers of this chapter will find the links to the various

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 GEOGRAPHIES OF FOOD
PRODUCTION

Chapter 15

Damian Maye

Topics covered
■ thinking about food
■ Geographies of food production and global supply
■ alternative geographies of food
■ food security
■ the ethical foodscape

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 Chapter 15  Geographies of food production    303

obesity and diet, often tied to socio-spatial inequalities

15.1 Thinking about food in terms of wealth and education (for a critical review
of these issues, see Guthman 2011). Food also has cul-
This chapter introduces some debates about the chang- tural significance. Thus, ‘food shapes us and expresses
ing nature of food provision and presents ideas and case us even more definitively than our furniture or houses
studies to prompt critical reflection. Food has become a or utensils do’ (Visser 1986: 12). Think, for example,
topic of great interest to human geographers in the last about the different places associated with eating food
decade or so (see, for example, Cook et al. 2006, 2008, (e.g. roadside café, Burger King, a Michelin-starred res-
2011; Morgan et al. 2006; Maye et al. 2007; Goodman et taurant) and the different behaviours associated with
al. 2010; Sage 2012; Maye and Kirwan 2013; Hopma and them. There are also cultural associations between dif-
Woods 2014; Friedberg 2014) and the chapter begins by ferent cultural groups and ethnic or national cuisines
identifying its value as a tool for geographical analysis. (e.g. the favourite dish in the UK is Tikka ­Masala –
The chapter examines the changing nature of agri-food this curry dish originated in the first Indian restaurants
production systems and shows how the way food provi- in Soho, London in the 1970s and exemplifies the cross-
sioning is conceptualized, framed and debated changes cultural origin of some foods), as well as a range of cul-
over time. Analysis of past debates about industrial agri- tural images used to market and sell food. Finally, the
culture and more recent calls for the ‘sustainable intensi- economic significance of food is enormous: for instance,
fication of global agriculture’ (Beddington 2010) reveals one only has to think about the investment and the num-
important differences in terms of external pressures that ber of people involved in the production, processing
in part shape restructuring processes, even if the main- and retailing of food. In the USA, for example, almost
stream mantra remains essentially productivist. This 10 per cent of US Gross Domestic Product is food-related.
more recent period of agri-food restructuring is charac- Thus it is quite easy to make a case as to why food
terized by the need for an effective rather than exploita- matters as an object of study in human geography. How-
tive use of resources, in response to growing concerns ever, tracing material and metaphorical associations with
about the depletion and rising costs of energy supplies, food is less obvious because they are connected together
population growth and climate change. in complex ways and often ‘hidden’ as incidental parts
Such a ‘mode of thinking’ is significantly influenced of everyday life. For example, drinking a cup of coffee
by past events and a realization that energy-greedy pro- has numerous social and geographic connotations (Gid-
duction systems that propelled food systems in the 1980s dens 2001): it has symbolic value (as part of day-to-day
and 1990s are no longer workable or sustainable (Jarosz life); it is a drug (caffeine provides ‘extra lift’, but coffee
2009; Harding 2010). Food has thus become a touch- drinkers would not be seen as ‘drug users’); it represents
stone for wider environmental discourses. As Harding past social and economic relationships (e.g. in terms of
(2010: 4) puts it, ‘feelings about eating and not eating are colonization, mass consumption); and it is a symbol of
more immediate than thoughts about rainforests; like the globalization and world trade links (e.g. global brands
energy or water embedded in the produce we buy, many like Nescafé and Starbucks). Geographers argue that
fears, including fundamental ones about life and death, one cannot separate these localized, mundane acts from
destruction and incorporation, are already embedded larger social settings that extend around the world. This
in food’. As we shall see later in this chapter, these feel- realization about the need to trace ‘connections’ between
ings, fears and anxieties (Jackson 2010a) have been com- food production and consumption, sparked in part by
pounded by recent global price increases and the trends on-going public debates about obesity, food risks and so
that food analysts suggest they reflect. on, has become central to agri-food studies and has been
First though, it is useful to think about food more given further impetus more recently by debates about
generally and to consider why we – as humans – relate food security and the interdependence of food systems
to it in the ways Harding and others (e.g. Belasco 2008) with wider environmental and socio-economic systems
suggest that we do. The first point to note is that food (Maye and Kirwan 2013; Hinrichs 2014).
extends well beyond its obvious biological significance A key feature of geographical research in this area
as the protein for sustaining life. It is something that involves thinking about where and how food is produced,
one relates to on a very human scale – it reflects who how it is retailed and how and where it is consumed. The
we are. According to Atkinson (1991) food is a ‘liminal routes traced by particular foodstuffs from ‘farm to fork’
substance’ that links humans and nature. It also reveals are often referred to as a ‘food chain’ (or ‘network’) and
important social, cultural and economic geographies. geographers have attempted to ‘map’ the system of connec-
On the social side, there are inequalities in terms of food tions for different products, which may vary both in com-
access, good nutrition and the reported problems with plexity and geographical coverage. Hartwick (1998: 425)

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 304    Section 4 Production, exchange and consumption

defines food chains as ‘significant production, distribution countries are reportedly linked together in ‘highly indus-
and consumption nodes, and the connecting links between trialised and increasingly globalised networks of insti-
them, together with social, cultural and natural condi- tutions and products, constituting an agri-food system’
tions involved in commodity movements’. Geographers (Whatmore 1995: 37).
have thus adopted the supply chain metaphor to literally The global food economy is not new. For example,
trace and follow the nature of ‘connections’ for particu- Friedmann and McMichael (1989) argued that relations
lar commodities (Cook et al. 2006). The food chain is not between agriculture and industry have historically been
a new concept but it has been re-cast as a ‘food system’, more global than generally thought. Using the concept
‘food circuit’, ‘food network’ or ‘food convention’ (see, for of food regimes, they linked international patterns of
example, Maye and Ilbery 2006; Morris and Kirwan 2010). food production and consumption to the development of
Despite the varied terminologies, the food chain continues the capitalist system since the 1870s. They identified three
to have symbolic and applied values. food regimes, each one representing the modern food sys-
Food, therefore, is a geographical topic. This includes tem of its time (see Spotlight box 15.1). Thus, there has
its role in society and economy, and the food chain can been a global dimension to the geography of food supply
be used as an overall organizing framework to explore for some time and, as we will see later in the chapter, the
geographies of food production. The rest of the chapter food regime concept is now being reapplied in the context
is divided into four parts: first, past and present modes of the ‘new food crisis’ (McMichael 2009; Sage 2013).
of global food supply are examined, including the chang- The main criticism of this conceptualisation is its view
ing nature of global food chains; second, some of the of the globalization of agriculture as a logical progres-
ways in which producers and consumers are beginning sion (similar in this respect to modernisation theory). In
to establish alternative systems of food provision are reality, it is much more unstable. Take the fast food chain
outlined; third, debates about food security are exam- McDonalds for example, often heralded as symbolic of
ined, including its definition and interpretations about global mass food consumption. Its global presence is in
how food should be produced now and in the future; and fact atypical of the complex and highly uneven process
finally, the chapter summarizes some recent food chain of globalization that has reshaped food production since
trends and discussions about the ethics of food produc- the post-war period. Much less contentious in these
tion, recognizing the need for geographers to continue to debates is identifying the key agents involved. FitzSim-
critically interrogate the conceptual foundations of food mons (1997), among others, identifies TNCs as the pri-
production and supply. mary agents of globalization in the agri-food sector; to
her mind, they sit at the centre of webs of relations that
link farming, processing and marketing. Food retailing
in Europe and America is concentrated in the hands of a
15.2  eographies of food production
G few supermarkets and these agents also play an important
and global supply role in developing regulatory systems that ensure their
dominance over the supply of key food products. It is also
This section examines farming, food production and agreed that TNCs and corporate retailers played signifi-
global food supply. It outlines some of the ways geog- cant roles in the ‘industrialization’ of farming and food
raphers and other food analysts have framed global production activities, which, initially at least, were mostly
food production until relatively recently. Two processes concentrated in the developed world.
are significant: the industrialization of farming and the
­ lobalization of food supply. After introducing some
g
concepts, case studies of global food commodity chains 15.2.1 Industrialized agriculture in the developed world
in different parts of the world are explored and then some Encouraged by governments as a response to food short-
questions are raised, particularly about the relationship ages and the need to raise productivity after the Second
between agricultural productivity, food governance and World War, ‘industrial farming has dominated . . . agri-
trade. Globalization is often defined in terms of the culture in the EU and North America since the 1950s’
integration of systems among geographically dispersed (Millstone and Lang 2008: 38). This system of farming is
places (see Dicken 2015). Crucially, this process of global particularly prominent in livestock (i.e. meat, dairy, and
integration has been guided by powerful transnational eggs production) and is designed to maximize productiv-
corporations (TNCs), institutions and actors, which in ity in the shortest timeframe (Sage 2012). Key features
this context led to a new political economy of agricul- of the industrial model of farming include a specializa-
ture, epitomized by the mass production of manufactured tion of labour, product specialization and intensification,
food. Despite inequalities, developed and developing and assembly-line type production. It has led to three

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 Chapter 15  Geographies of food production    305

Spotlight box 15.1

Global food regimes since the 1870s by intensive forms of capital accumulation, the second
regime incorporated developed and developing nations
First regime: pre-industrial (1870s–1920s) into commodity production systems. Agricultural sur-
This involved settler colonies supplying unprocessed pluses and environmental disbenefits undermined this
and semi-processed foods and materials to the met- phase of production in the 1970s.
ropolitan core of North America and Western Europe.
Characterized by extensive forms of capital accumu- Third regime: post-industrial (1980s onwards)
lation, the main products were grains and meat. The This regime refers to the crisis surrounding industrialized
regime slowly disintegrated when agricultural production farming systems and involves the production of fresh
in developed countries competed with cheap imports fruit and vegetables for the global market, the continued
and trade barriers were erected. reconstitution of food, and the supply of inputs for ‘elite’
consumption in developed countries. Characterized by
Second regime: industrial (1920s–1970s) a flexible form of capital accumulation, this regime is
This regime relates to the productivist phase of agri- dominated by the restructuring activities of agribusiness
cultural change, focused on North America and the TNCs and corporate retailers.
development of agri-industrial complexes based Source: based on Robinson (2004), as derived from Friedmann
around grain-fed livestock production. Characterized and McMichael (1989)

important food production trends in the developed world: shifted towards the largest firms. FitzSimmons also iden-
first, the concentration of agricultural production on a tified a process of vertical disintegration, whereby seg-
limited number of large-scale farms; second, an increase ments of the production process were subcontracted out
in capital expenditure on major agricultural inputs like to smaller scale growers. The second example is poultry,
chemicals; and third, a growth in the processing and man- a key product when it comes to integrated production
ufacturing of food. These developments explain why it systems and the first livestock sector to industrialize.
is now vital to view farming in the wider context of an Constance et al. (2013) provide a historical analysis of
agri-food system, where the production sector itself is poultry production and processing in the United States.
inextricably linked to various ‘upstream’ (input supplies) They show how the locus of production activity shifted
and ‘downstream’ (processing, distribution and market- from the North-east, where it started in the 1930s, to
ing) industries. In many cases, the food supply system is the South by the 1950s. Underemployed farm labour, a
also dominated by large agribusinesses which, accord- favourable climate, lower wages and less unionization,
ing to Davis and Goldberg’s (1957) seminal work, are the cotton-crop failures, and the stabilization of feed prices
sum of all operations involved in the manufacture and were key factors that made the South an attractive place
distribution of farm supplies, the production operation to locate. A model of vertically-integrated production,
of the farm, storage, processing and distribution of farm based on contract production and non-union labour, was
commodities and items made from them. These agribusi- developed. In a bid to increase market share, a number
nesses often develop commodity chains beyond national of mergers and acquisitions took place in the 1980s
boundaries (Wallace 1985; McMichael 2009). and 1990s, leading to a process of horizontal integra-
A number of studies have charted the industrializa- tion and industry consolidation that created regional
tion of agriculture, especially in the United States. Two monopsonies. This model of a few very large vertically
brief examples are presented here. The first is the Sali- integrated poultry farms anchoring agro-industrial dis-
nas Valley in California where lettuce production was tricts is efficient in that it produces low-priced chicken
transformed between 1950 and 1980 by two key things: for consumers, but it has also been criticized as a system
intensification, as a result of a shift to more investment of asymmetrical power relationships that marginalizes
in intensive crops, increased labour productivity and contract producers, workers in processing plants, and
intensified planting; and restructuring, whereby large rural communities.
farms dominated sales (FitzSimmons 1986). By 1978, the In these and other examples, it is often the non-
ten largest grower-shippers in the region sold 65 per cent farm sectors of the agri-food system that have become
of all lettuce. Over time, therefore, power and control most industrialized and dominated by TNCs. This has

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 306    Section 4 Production, exchange and consumption

occurred through two processes (Goodman et al. 1987): in newly agriculturalizing countries because of low-cost
appropriationism, where certain agricultural inputs labour, government support (via structural adjustment
are replaced by ‘industrial’ alternatives (e.g. synthetic programmes), good global communication links and
chemicals replacing manure); and substitutionism, the ability to produce high quality/value products for the
which focuses on outputs rather than inputs and is con- developed world market. There are a number of detailed
cerned with the increased utilization of non-agricultural accounts of the export trade in high-value foods (see, for
raw materials and the creation of industrial substitutes example, Freidberg 2004; van der Ploeg 2010).
for food and fibre (e.g. sweeteners for sugar). Agri-food The example used here is salmon farming in Chile. It
systems are different from other production systems is mostly located in Chiloe, a large island that runs along
because agriculture is bound by biological processes the southern third of the Chilean coast and is charac-
and cycles, and the essential aim of appropriationism terized by a mild, rainy climate and protected inlets.
and substitutionism is to ‘replace’ nature. Agribusiness Since the 1990s, the salmon farming industry has been
TNCs also attempt to increase their influence over farm- growing rapidly; in 1987 Chile produced 2,000 tonnes
ing indirectly through a process of formal subsumption, of Pacific salmon, but did not produce any Atlantic
where arrangements or contracts are made with farm- salmon (Phyne and Mansilla 2003). By 2000 Chile pro-
ers to provide ‘raw materials’ for their value-adding food duced 17 per cent of the world’s Atlantic salmon and
manufacturing activities. Agricultural industrialization is also dominated the global production of Pacific salmon.
also increasingly global in scale, where food commodity At its peak, in 2006, Chile contributed 38 per cent of
chains lengthen and producers become ‘distanced’ from the world’s salmon trade and was the leading exporter
consumers. of farmed salmon after Norway (Iizuka and Katz 2015).
The overall key pattern of agricultural industrializa- However, the sector suffered decline in 2007 as a result of
tion is concentration in particular sectors, regions and a salmon disease crisis, which decimated stocks (Atlantic
individual countries characterized by large farm busi- salmon stocks dropped from 400,000 tonnes in 2005 to
nesses that have adopted intensive farming methods and 100,000 tonnes in 2010). Figure 15.1 shows a simplified
become integrated into global food networks. In the model for the salmon aquaculture supply chain which
European Union, for instance, 80 per cent of agricultural starts when eggs are hatched and the fingerlings raised
production is concentrated on less than 20 per cent of near the hatchery; once fingerlings become smolts, they
farms in particular ‘hot spots’, including East Anglia, the are raised in smolt-rearing facilities in fresh-water cages;
Paris Basin, southern Netherlands, and Emilia Romagna after a period of 12 months they are shipped to sea-water
in north-east Italy. In response to various issues in the cages and raised for a further 12–18 months (thanks to
developed world market, a key feature of TNCs and new feeds, this grow-out stage is reducing rapidly); har-
major retailers has been their attempt to relocate the pro- vested salmon enter processing plants (with automated
duction function of the agri-food system to new agricul- feeding systems and where labour is most concentrated)
tural spaces, often in less developed countries (LDCs). and are prepared by standards set in Japan and America.
This shift was associated with the intensive production of Over 80 per cent of the product is sold to Japanese and
high-quality, high-value food commodities. American retail markets.
This case study shows how the Chilean salmon farm-
ing industry is inserted into a ‘buyer-driven’ com-
15.2.2 Developing world agriculture
modity chain, where major distributors and retailers in
Goodman and Watts (1997) argue that the classic export export markets shape the nature of production. Power is
commodities (e.g. coffee, tea, sugar, cocoa) associ- at the retail end of the chain rather than the production
ated with the LDCs have been complemented by high- end. Essentially, the industry is characterized by govern-
value foods, including fruits, vegetables and shellfish. ance from lead firms and external authorities (Iizuka and
By the 1990s, 24 low-middle income countries annually Katz 2015; cf. van der Ploeg 2010). In the middle part of
exported over US$500 million of high-value foods; the salmon supply chain there is also clear evidence of
just five countries (Brazil, Mexico, China, Argentina concentration and squeezing, with forward integration
and Kenya) accounted for 40 per cent of such exports by feed giants and increasing concentration of produc-
from the LDCs. The growth in high-value food exports tion by foreign and domestic firms. At the production
reflects various things, including: technical changes in end of the chain, benefits are skewed in favour of those
the food industry, the liberalization of world trade, and in management positions. Grow-out sites and process-
dietary changes in the developed world, with high-value ing plants are where most local people work. Wages are
foods produced to satisfy consumer tastes. Agribusiness low and the working conditions poor, with 80 per cent
TNCs are also attracted to high-value food production of plant workers being female. Analysts of the sanitary

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 Chapter 15  Geographies of food production    307

Hatcheries

Cage Suppliers Smolt-rearing facilities (12–18 months) Feed Suppliers

Cage Suppliers Grow-out sites (12–18 months) Feed Suppliers

Processors (fresh, frozen, smoked and value-added)

Distributors and Wholesalers

Retailers

Consumers

= Flow of the commodity

= Direction of the regulatory influence
= Suppliers at the point of production

Figure 15.1  A simplified model of the salmon aquaculture supply chain.

Source: Phyne and Mansilla (2003); Iizuka and Katz (2015).

crisis that severely damaged the sector in 2007 argue it apace (Gardner 2013) and is criticised because countries
was the result of overexploitation and overconcentration focus on growing for the global market at the expense of
of fish farms (Iizuka and Katz 2015). In this example, and staple products required for the domestic market. The
in others cited, global food production raises significant Brazil case shows a continued focus on global demand,
questions, especially in terms of who truly benefits. but in this instance the emphasis is on growing bulk food
commodities like soybeans, as well as expanding its beef
markets, with increasing reliance on GMO technology
15.2.3 Global food production hubs and the from abroad to develop resistant beans, an innovation
diffusion of governance innovations which farmers want but environmentalists reject on the
Recent studies of global agriculture (e.g. Gardner 2013) grounds that these forms of bioeconomy ‘lock in’ Brazil
reveal sustained and increasing regional spatial concen- to certain, technology-reliant, ways of farming.
tration for certain food/crop types. North America and Certain types of productivist, intensive farming sys-
Europe are now important areas for maize and wheat tems have relocated to ‘peripheral’ regions to take advan-
production. China and India collectively grow a quarter tage of local conditions (for example, cheaper labour,
of the world’s wheat and over half the global produc- land). Also significant is the diffusion of the vertical
tion of rice. A large proportion of the world’s animal integration food governance model to other countries
feed is produced in South America, North America and around the world. Processes of agricultural industri-
Eastern Europe. Not all of these systems will be highly alization and globalization are therefore more complex
industrialized but most are, or will be, moving rapidly in than a shift from core to periphery. The model of poul-
that direction. try production developed in the US South, for example,
A key trend in food production concentration is the around agro-industrial districts, has since been adopted
rise of newly agriculturalizing countries (NACs). and applied elsewhere as a low-cost production system.
This idea is not new (Friedman 1993), but Spotlight box The outcome of this diffusion process is the creation, by
15.2 introduces a case study of Brazil to show how some transnational agribusinesses, of a global poultry agri-
NACs are attempting to become new global food produc- food complex that targets the best production areas and
tion hubs. NACs were originally associated with world the most profitable consumer markets. These complex
trade in high value foods. This process has continued governance arrangements include powerful US companies

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 308    Section 4 Production, exchange and consumption

Spotlight box 15.2

The rise of Brazil as a ‘global farm’ legislation and started to import it (illegally!) from Argen-
tina. Its use became so widespread that the Brazilian
Brazil is rapidly overtaking other countries in food pro- president signed a law in 2003 to legalize it. The law
duction and exports. In particular, Brazil is emerging as was designed to better control imports and to protect
the world’s lead producer of beef, a commodity that is Brazilian seed companies. Brazil now has 21 types of
being consumed in growing quantities globally every GM plant approved for use in the field. GM soya makes
year. In the past decade, Brazil quadrupled beef exports, up 70 per cent of the Brazilian soya market.
overtaking Australia as the world’s largest exporter. The Brazil currently relies on GM products developed
rise of Brazil as a ‘global farm’ is also about a second abroad, although in 2010 its biosafety commission
commodity: soya beans – it’s the country’s largest food approved the first transgenic seed to be developed by
crop, with an estimated value of US$17 billion in 2008. Brazilian scientists. At the moment transgenic crops
Soya was mostly grown in the south of Brazil until used in Brazil help farmers to fight against weeds and
the 1960s. Since then plant breeders and agricultural insects – they do not increase the amount of food pro-
scientists have developed varieties that can grow across duced by individual plants. Pro-GM scientists argue
most of the country. It is now competing with the USA to more productive varieties could eventually take pressure
be the world’s largest soya exporter. Transgenic crops off the Amazon rainforest, which has been extensively
are also important. The first GM soya plant – a herbi- cleared to make way for agriculture. Producing for a
cide-resistant bean, developed and sold by Monsanto global market thus offers economic benefits but it can
(a US-based company) – was approved for cultivation also come at a significant cost.
in 1998. A judge later issued a moratorium to block
the use of the seed but Brazilian farmers ignored the Sources: Tollefson (2010); Sage (2012)

like Tyson, who have joint-venture poultry operations influence of food policy in shaping patterns of global
all over the world, but also companies like JBS, which food production and supply. This is an area that has also
is Brazilian-owned and is now the largest multi-protein faced significant criticism.
processor in the world. International trade in food has expanded dramati-
cally in recent decades. Between 1961 and 1999, there
was a four-fold increase in the amount of food exported
15.2.4 Trade patterns, food policy (Millstone and Lang 2008). In 2012, the USA and the EU
and global governance dominated agricultural exports (16 per cent and 14 per
Agricultural industrialization is thus extending its global cent respectively) and imports (12 per cent and 17 per
reach; it is also clear that large-scale agribusinesses and cent respectively) (Gardner 2013). However, the pat-
corporate retailers have successfully linked regional tern of world food trade is changing. The simple two
economies and food sectors to a global system of food way north-south world trade exchange has now become
production and consumption. However, these systems much more complex. In recent years, for example, devel-
of provision also raise questions about, for example, oping countries have increased production of staples
their suitability for LDCs, especially their contribution (e.g. wheat, maize) and now export to each other, as
to sharp inequalities in income, productivity and tech- well as exporting high value fruit, vegetables and meat
nology compared to the sector producing staple foods to Europe and North America. As noted earlier, trade in
(i.e. foods that are eaten regularly and provide a large high value foods has increased rapidly. China and other
proportion of a population’s energy and nutrients, such BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa)
as cereals or tubers) and the unsustainable nature of agri- are increasingly involved in world food trade.
cultural practices often favoured by agribusiness TNCs. One of the drivers of this process has been the World
Questions also abound about the logic and impacts of Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO’s Agreement
industrialized farming, particularly in relation to food on Agriculture promoted trade liberalization through
production, fair trade and environmental responsibil- reductions in agricultural subsidies, tariffs and import
ity. We turn now to look in more detail at the role and quotas. More than 150 countries are signatories of

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 Chapter 15  Geographies of food production    309

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (FMs), box schemes, community supported agriculture,
(Carolan 2011). However, concerns have been voiced buying-groups and food cooperatives, and home deliver-
about the unfairness of global trade because of the ies (Renting et al. 2003; Kneafsey et al. 2008; Little et al.
continued use of national subsidies and tariffs. For 2010). In 2012, 7.8 per cent of US farms were marketing
example, a number of trading blocs exist that have sig- foods locally, for example (USDA 2015). This interest is
nificant power when it comes to how food is traded. often seen as a response to the environmental and socio-
These regional trading blocs sit below the GATT/WTO economic disbenefits associated with agricultural indus-
governance structure and include the North American trialization and global food supply.
Free Trade Agreement (an agreement between the USA, Many authors have referred to the distinctions drawn
Canada and Mexico) and the European Union (which between ‘conventional’ and ‘alternative’ agri-food sys-
comprises 28 countries). Effectively these arrangements tems (see Table 15.1). Binary opposites such as ‘qual-
promote patterns of bilateral food trade and also influ- ity’, ‘embedded’, ‘sustainable’, ‘traditional’ and ‘natural’
ence how food is grown and traded, because they distort characterize alternative food production systems (Ilbery
markets. Developed nations use direct or, as is now more and Maye 2005). In reality, these binary opposites are
common, indirect or de-coupled payments (i.e. the not as simple and clear-cut as this. For example, while
payment is deemed non-trade distorting because it is organic food may be regarded as ‘alternative’, most
independent of production levels) to support their farm- organic sales still occur through ‘conventional’ super-
ers. As Carolan (2011: 20) remarks, ‘these payments still markets. Interest in the alternative food economy has
shield producers from low prices . . . they make farmers also led some geographers to proclaim the emergence of
deaf to market signals, allowing them to continue to ‘alternative geographies of food’, which revolve around
(over)produce and profit even when the costs of produc- changing production and consumption relations that give
tion exceed what the market is willing to bear’. rise to new regional and local food ‘complexes’. It has
What this tells us is that free trade is rarely fair. At been argued, for example, that alternative geographies
the time of writing the latest debate in this area con-
cerns the development of the Transatlantic Trade and
Table 15.1  Distinctions between ‘conventional’ and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) deal. This is still being
‘alternative’ food supply systems
negotiated, and hotly debated, but if it goes ahead it will
effectively create a trading area that would stretch as far Conventional Alternative
as Alaska to the Black Sea. It is proposed that standards
Modern Post-modern
between the United States and the EU will be harmonized
across a plethora of issues, including animal welfare, food Manufactured/processed Natural/fresh
safety and public services. Lobbyists argue the process is Mass (large-scale) Craft/artisanal
undemocratic and designed by and for big corporations. production (small-scale) production
Many argue it will also inevitably lead to a reduction in
Long food supply chains Short food supply chains
standards on both sides. If approved, TTIP is likely to
significantly influence how and where food is produced Costs externalized Costs internalized
and traded globally in the future. Rationalized Traditional
Standardized Difference/diversity
Intensification Extensification
15.3  lternative geographies of food:
A
concepts and case studies Monoculture Biodiversity
Homogenization of foods Regional palates
One important way to respond to some of the above Hypermarkets Local markets
criticisms is to establish alternative food networks Agrochemicals Organic/sustainable
(AFNs). There has been a huge resurgence of interest farming
within many developed market economies in foods of
Non-renewable energy Reusable energy
local and regional provenance (Watts et al. 2005; Maye
and Kirwan 2010; Tregear 2011; Goodman et al. 2012; Fast food Slow food
Rippon 2014). These include consumer initiatives like the Quantity Quality
Slow Food movement and fair trade, as well as a growth
Disembedded Embedded
in food purchases from ‘alternative’ supply chains rather
than supermarket outlets, including farmers’ markets Source: based on Ilbery and Maye (2005)

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 310    Section 4 Production, exchange and consumption

of food may be associated with agriculturally peripheral important role consumers could play in improving the
regions because such regions have, ‘.  .  .  for a variety lives of impoverished producers. Fair trade is now avail-
of reasons, failed to fully engage with the productivist able in most European supermarket chains, with some
conventions that have predominated in the agri-food sys- products achieving 15 per cent of the national market
tem in the second half of the twentieth century’ (Parrott share. It is, quite rightly, a global success story and fair
et al. 2002: 243). Goodman (2003) draws a comparison trade consumerism is celebrated as enabling better eve-
between American and European alternative food prac- ryday ethical practice. The success of these networks
tices, conceptualizing US alternatives more as social and depends upon the ability and willingness of Northern
oppositional movements, in contrast to the EU’s more consumers to pay redistributive premiums for such com-
endogenous interventions, linked to historical and cul- modities. Some fair trade organizations have started to
tural traditions of product and place. compete on price, lowering premiums paid to produc-
One can equally talk about alternative geographies ers and aggressively pursuing ‘mainstreaming’ strategies.
of food in a global sense, notably through the interna- This parallels developments in organic farming where
tional fair trade and organic food movements that chal- some have argued that organic supply chains have become
lenge exploitative relations in agri-food systems. These ‘conventionalised’ (especially in terms of rent structures,
networks offer ethical and ecological possibilities that the size of businesses controlling production, conven-
counter some of the negative externalities associated tional patterns of marketing and distribution), suggest-
with conventional food supply (Maye et al. 2007). Inter- ing that it is often very difficult for alternative economies
national trade often appears as a remote concern, but to maintain their differences from the global capitalist
when commodity prices fall it has devastating impacts economy (Guthman 2004; Goodman et al. 2012).
on the livelihoods of millions of small producers. The Spotlight box 15.3 provides a summary of two con-
prices paid for coffee, for example, have not increased in cepts central to an understanding of the development
real terms in the last 40 years, whereas the costs of inputs of ‘alternative geographies of food’. These and related
like fertilizers and machinery have. Low coffee prices in concepts will be examined further below, via some
the early 1990s had catastrophic impacts on the lives of empirical case studies; hopefully, they will also help you
millions of small farmers, mostly in LDCs, who were to think critically about the blurring between ‘conven-
producing coffee at a loss. However, despite the positive tional’ and ‘alternative’ systems of food provision. A
benefits of fair trade and organic foods, both sectors have simple ‘alternative geography of food’ does not exist.
been subjected to recent debates about ‘mainstreaming’ The processes affecting ‘alternative’ food chains are
and ‘conventionalisation’. complex. We explore some of these issues using three
Fair trade offers an alternative to overcome the injus- case studies that attempt to ‘reconnect’ food production
tices of free trade, guaranteeing producers a fair price. It and consumption and make a statement about the alter-
was started some 50 years ago by development agencies native food economy, especially in terms of the nature
and charities like Oxfam and Traidcraft who realized the of the food chain.

Spotlight box 15.3

Conceptualizing AFNs: key concepts al. (2000) identified two further types of SFSC: spatial
proximity and spatially extended. The former is where
Short food supply chains (SFSCs) products are sold through local outlets in the region,
The key characteristic of SFSCs is that foods reach the locality or place of production, so that the consumer is
final consumer having been transmitted through a supply immediately aware of the locally embedded nature of
chain ‘embedded’ with value-laden information concern- the product at the point of retail. In contrast, the latter
ing the mode of production, provenance and distinctive occur when products are sold to consumers (e.g. via the
quality assets of the product. In many cases, the number Internet) who are located outside the region of produc-
of nodes between the primary producer and the final tion and/ or have no personal knowledge of the area.
consumer will also be minimized (Renting et al. 2003).
While this ‘re-connection process’ is best demonstrated Social embeddedness
through forms of direct marketing and thus face-to-face This propagates the idea that economic behaviour is
contact between producer and consumer, Marsden et embedded in, and mediated by, a complex and extensive

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 Chapter 15  Geographies of food production    311

web of local social relations. In the case of local (‘alterna- embedded in a range of contrasting ways and so there
tive’) foods, both economic (e.g. price, markets) and social are different degrees of embeddedness in all food supply
(e.g. local ties, trust) relations are vital for success (for systems (Winter 2003). Nevertheless, social interaction
details see Hinrichs 2000). By stressing the role of social between producer and consumer can make the difference
relations in generating the trust necessary for economic between success and failure for local food businesses.
transactions, it is easy to make the false assumption that This can take the form of acknowledgement, attention,
social embeddedness relates just to alternative food respect, friendship and sociability, often subsumed within
systems. In reality, all economic relations are socially the concept of ‘regard’ (Sage 2003; Kirwan 2006).

15.3.1 Quality food (Watts et al. 2005; Ilbery and Maye 2010). This is often
One of the dominant features of AFNs, particularly defined as a process of relocalization, in which locally
in Europe, has been the attempt to link ‘product and distinctive quality food products (see Plate 15.1, for exam-
place’ in order to add value to agricultural products ple) are transferred to regional and national markets as a

Plate 15.1  Speciality cheese

from Italy.
(MARKA/Alamy)

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 312    Section 4 Production, exchange and consumption

mechanism to provide a valuable economic stimulant and in all these examples is the direct nature of the supply
reduce the deleterious impact of national and EU sub- chain and the important social and economic benefits
sidy reforms and increasing trade liberalization. In other that accrue from these types of food transaction. This
words, quality and locality are inextricably linked. In par- is illustrated in Plate 15.2, which shows the direct inter-
ticular, regional speciality food products have been linked action between producers and consumers at a farmers’
to particular places in this way, especially via a formal market. To help explore some of these processes in more
system of quality food labels and the establishment of detail, the second case focuses on an organic meat pro-
regional speciality food groups. The most notable exam- ducer business (Ilbery and Maye 2005).
ple of this is the Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) The organic farm and on-farm butchery is located
and the Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) qual- in the Northumberland uplands. Established in 1998,
ity labels introduced by the European Union in the early the business produces and retails a range of organi-
1990s to ‘protect’ and ‘promote’ food and drink products cally reared meat products, using local branding and
with a recognizable geographical origin (Rippon 2014). traceability. The business supply chain is reproduced
Groups of producers in Europe can thus apply for either in Figure 15.2 and records both the upstream inputs
a PDO label (product originates from a specific place and coming into the business and the downstream links in
is linked to its natural environment) or PGI label (linked terms of how and where final products are sold. This
to place, but not necessarily in terms of raw materials). ‘whole chain’ approach extends previous conceptuali-
These labels protect producers from attempted copies sations of SFSCs which focused only on downstream
and act as a marketing device. These changes have been elements of the supply chain (cf. Marsden et al. 2000).
interpreted as symbolizing a quality turn (Goodman Most of the inputs coming into the farm are from local
2003), with particular emphasis on specialist food pro- suppliers. Constructed to add and retain value from pri-
duction, especially in ‘marginal economies’. mary production, the business sources some cattle, sheep,
In terms of geography, the UK already has 60 PDO/ pigs and poultry from other organic farms in the region.
PGI labels. Specialist cheeses dominate the PDOs, indi- All livestock are slaughtered at the (organically accred-
cating that these are made exclusively from local raw ited) abattoir at Whitley Bay in North Tyneside, Tyne
materials (e.g. Stilton cheeses). In contrast, drinks domi- and Wear (about 20 miles from the farm), and then deliv-
nate the PGIs. The sales value of British Geographical ered to the on-farm butchery to be processed and pack-
Indications in 2010 was €5.506 billion and food and aged for retail. Businesses like this have to ‘dip in’ and
agricultural products comprised €1.059 billion (Rippon ‘dip out’ of ‘conventional’ supply chains because of the
2014). There are now more than 595 PDOs and 601 PGI ways in which the dominant agri-food system is currently
designations in the EU, with a southern concentration structured. The meat products are sold through various
in places like France and Italy (over 150 each, including SFSCs, for example direct sales, local/regional specialist
cheeses, wines and meats, such as Parmigiano-Reggiano, food shops and caterers, and mail order. Meat sales over
Roquefort and Champagne) and Greece and Portugal the Internet are minimal. Over time, the business reduced
(over 80 each), compared with limited numbers in north- sales output at farmers’ markets and stopped supply-
ern member countries (e.g. Finland, Denmark and Ire- ing (specialist) butchers in the region in favour of more
land). This implies that regional/speciality food has more
cultural significance in some European societies than in
others (Parrott et al. 2002). Protected status thus provides
cultural benefits by preserving place-based identities.
They also provide exclusive control over geographical
names, allowing businesses to exploit the positive ideas
that consumers have about particular territorial names
(Rippon 2014). Some countries have developed this form
of market premium more than others.

15.3.2 Direct food

Studies of the local food sector in the USA, UK and other
parts of Europe typically include some of the archetypal
examples noted earlier, especially farmers’ markets, box
schemes, farm shops and on-farm butchers (Watts et al. Plate 15.2  Selling food direct via a farmers’ market.
2005; Maye and Kirwan 2010; USDA 2015). Significant (Daniel Korzeniewski/Shutterstock)

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 Chapter 15  Geographies of food production    313

Input suppliers

Game and Beef Rare breed Organic O Straw

poultry and lamb organic pigs feed T
H
Local Estates The Farm, Otterburn Agricultural Miller, Kelso E Local Farms
Farm, N. Yorkshire Local Organic Farms College, Durham R
Farm, N. Yorkshire
I Vets
N
P
U Local
T
Abattoir S Butchering
materials
Whitley Bay
Newcastle

THE BUSINESS
Beef and lamb AII meat types
Organic Hill Meat

Abattoir Smokery

Whitley Bay Stocksfield

Retailers Farmers' Direct

Caterers Mail order
(specialist) markets delivery

Northumberland, Northumberland, Northumberland, Northumberland, National

Regional Newcastle Edinburgh, Newcastle Regional

Commercial customers

Consumers

Figure 15.2  Business supply chain diagram for organic hill meat producer.

‘stable’ alternatives (e.g. independent retail and catering). organization began in November 1994, seeking to edu-
Thus the producer adjusts the supply chain in a bid to cate the public about the consequences of the industrial
establish as much control of it as possible. agricultural system and to persuade more people to par-
ticipate in local, sustainable alternatives. It argued that
industrial agriculture had eroded soils, made water unfit
15.3.3 Community food
to drink, and increased pesticide resistance in insects;
Attempts to relocalize food production and establish the food system had become so centralized that citizens
‘alternative’ supply chains also extend beyond farm- lacked control over their food choices. For KCFC, the
based production. This is an important point. The final industrialized food system was unhealthy, unjust, unethi-
case study of the Kansas City Food Circle (KCFC) is an cal and economically unviable.
example of a community food scheme (Hendrickson The explicit political alternative that emerged from
and Heffernan 2002). KCFC is presented as a (local) site this critique was an attempt to create a local, organic
of resistance within an industrialized food system domi- food system where consumers can get seasonal, fresh
nated by global corporations like Con Agra, Cargill, food at a price that supports farmers who use sustain-
and Monsanto whose food chain arrangements are typi- able practices. The KCFC thus connects all actors in the
fied by joint ventures and strategic alliances. The KCFC food system in a way that sustains and returns control

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 314    Section 4 Production, exchange and consumption

to local communities. Effectively, the KCFC is about and community-based forms of innovation and alter-
creating a new kind of community that recognizes the ity (otherness). There is certainly evidence to support
interconnectedness of people through the production and the need for a broader range of AFNs. Kirwan et al.’s
consumption of food. The Circle continued to grow, with (2013) analysis of the Local Food programme in Eng-
30 organic growers in the region surrounding Kansas City land, for example, looked at the types of organization
signing up to supply food, and roughly 600 consumers. responsible for running local food projects and found
The trust-based relationships that the KCFC is trying to that by far the most common were registered charities,
cultivate between farmers and consumers mirror those followed by a range of community groups and schools.
reported in other similar studies (see, for example, Kneaf- Renting et al. (2012) introduce ‘civic food networks’
sey et al. 2008; Little et al. 2010). (CFNs) as a useful way to conceptualize new modes of
food governance and contemporary sources of innova-
tion within agri-food networks. It is an attempt to con-
15.3.4 Critiquing and redefining AFNs
ceptualize new types of consumer-producer cooperation
Given the range and diversity of work on ‘alternative in food networks (i.e. ‘second-generation AFNs’) where
geographies of food’, these mechanisms of food supply consumers play an active role. These networks are often
can also be critiqued, especially in terms of the privilege organized by civic groups (NGOs, charities, etc.) and the
assigned to terms like ‘local’ and ‘alternative’. Geogra- concept is intended to complement rather than replace
phers and other agri-food researchers are thus asking previous conceptualisations of AFNs and SFSCs. Exam-
what is ‘alternative’ about the alternative food economy ples include consumer co-ops, solidarity buying groups
(see Whatmore et al. 2003; Maye et al. 2007; Goodman of local and organic foods, CSAs and collective urban
et al. 2012). This critique is evident in the critical tone gardening initiatives. The key argument is that the role
of the ‘conventionalisation thesis’ introduced earlier, of civil society as a governance mechanism for agri-food
which raises important questions about the alternative networks has increased in significance compared to mar-
status of some fair trade and organic food chains. Watts ket and state actors. As we will see in Section 15.4, these
et al. (2005) distinguish between ‘weaker’ and ‘stronger’ debates about AFNs have been further unsettled by recent
alternative systems of food provision. The former place increases in, and volatility of, global food prices alongside
emphasis on quality and the labelling features of locality concerns about food availability. The scale of the discus-
food networks (i.e. the product is key), whereas the latter sion has therefore shifted from the regional and the local
focus on the revalorized and embedded characteristics of back to the global.
local food networks (i.e. the supply chain/network and
nature of relations are key). In the three examples of
AFNs, the first case study falls within this weaker clas-
sification, whereas the other two are stronger because of 15.4 F ood security: questions of scale,
their emphasis on establishing alternative production- definition and interpretation
consumption networks. It is beyond the scope of this
chapter to enter into debates surrounding the definition Some of the challenges associated with food security
of terms such as ‘local’, ‘locality’ and ‘regional’ (see Maye have been usefully discussed earlier in this book (see
and Kirwan 2010, Goodman et al. 2012); nevertheless, Chapter 7). It merits attention here too because it is sig-
it is important to also note that the literature is divided nificantly re-shaping how we think about global food
about whether ‘quality’ or ‘local’ is more important in production. Food security has commonly been associ-
local food production. Winter (2003) used the concept ated with developing countries in recent decades. Given
of defensive localism to suggest that the turn to local the choice and daily availability of foods in supermar-
is more important than a turn to quality based on, for kets and restaurants, it is easy to see why the thought of
example, organic or ecological principles. The turn to food shortages or supply chain disruptions might not be
local is not just about alternative food systems; instead, uppermost in peoples’ minds in most developed market
it can cover different forms of agriculture and a range of economies. However, there is now recognition that the
consumer motivations. food system and issues associated with securing food
Goodman et al. (2012) suggest that ‘first-generation’ supplies need urgent attention (Maye and Kirwan 2013).
AFNs (regional PDO/PGI locality foods, organic agri- The reason why political interest in food worldwide
culture, local food networks that involve farmers’ mar- has suddenly arisen is easy to explain: global food prices
kets, CSAs and box schemes) are now being renewed and have increased significantly in recent years (House of
complemented by a ‘second generation’ of relocalization Commons 2009). The significant price spike was in late
initiatives, many of which involve collective, non-market 2007, when the price for basic food staples rose sharply

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 Chapter 15  Geographies of food production    315

on international commodity markets (the price for wheat scarce natural resources. Various environmental and
rose by 50 per cent and for rice by 20 per cent, for exam- resource challenges require urgent consideration, notably
ple). The price spike was unusual in one important way the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions produced by
in that ‘[it] applies to almost all major food and feed the food system, the need to reduce dependency on fos-
commodities, rather than just a few of them’ (Chatham sil fuels, and the need to reduce the depletion of natural
House 2008: 2). High prices in agricultural markets are resources and ecosystem services on which food depends
not uncommon, but increases across such a range of food (especially soil and water) (House of Commons 2009: 13;
commodities are. Sage 2013). Any response to the above crisis is not simply
The escalation in food prices had some well-docu- about producing more food; it is about doing it in a way
mented impacts, notably a series of violent protests and that is sustainable and uses resources less exploitatively.
demonstrations that were witnessed in different parts of Increases in food production will thus need to be achieved,
the developing world, including the ‘tortilla riots’ in Mex- making an effective, rather than exploitative, use of
ico. Some countries (e.g. Argentina) also imposed trade resources (Ilbery and Maye 2010). This has been described
restrictions to limit the amount of food being exported elsewhere as ‘an unprecedented double challenge’ (House
to protect national food supply. The price spike affected of Commons 2009: 13). The following sub-sections con-
households in developed nations such as the UK in less sider two aspects of this debate: first, how the term food
dramatic ways, via food inflation. Prices for oils and fats security is defined and for whom; and secondly, some ways
in the UK rose by 29 per cent in the year to July 2008, food analysts suggest we respond to the challenge.
meat by 16.3 per cent, bread and cereals by 16 per cent,
vegetables by 11.1 per cent and fruit by 10.7 per cent (Bar-
ling et al. 2008, quoted in House of Commons 2009).
15.4.1 Food security for whom?
Although less dramatic, these impacts served to underline The emphasis in much of the discussion on the current,
‘our global interdependency and demonstrated the politi- perceived ‘global food security crisis’ is about the need to
cal and social importance of affordable food’ (Chatham produce more food (i.e. food availability). There is rec-
House 2009: 5). ognition that increases in production must be consistent
The factors that contributed to the increase in food with systems that are sustainable and that we produce
prices at this time are widely reported and include poor food that consumers want. However, this policy places
harvests, the use of food crops for biofuels, especially too little emphasis on broader understandings of food
maize in the USA, rising energy prices, which led to security, which include questions about access and utiliza-
high prices for fertilizers and fuel, changes in demand tion as well as availability (Maye and Kirwan 2013). The
for certain foods (e.g. growing demand for more meat standard definition of food security is that given by the
in China), export bans and speculation (Jarosz 2009). United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization in its
There is still on-going debate about whether food price 1996 World Food Summit Plan of Action:
rises will be sustained longer term, or whether what
Food security exists when all people, at all times, have
was experienced in 2007 was merely a blip (see Gard-
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and
ner 2013). Food prices have fallen again in international
nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food
commodity markets, but they remain volatile. Industry
preferences for an active and healthy life.
analysts suggest higher and more volatile food prices are
set to stay (von Braun 2009). (quoted in Ericksen 2008: 234)
Addressing the consequences of higher food prices is
Food security has multiple meanings for different peo-
only part of the challenge. Constraints on global food
ple and organizations and varied scales of interpretation
supply are also influenced by longer-term trends, notably
(global, national, regional, local, the household). It can be
changing global patterns in diet and world population
viewed as a ‘master frame’ with several distinct claims to
pressures. Population expansion is a particularly signifi-
ownership or, in other words, there is ‘contested ownership
cant driver of the long-term increase in food demand,
behind the apparent consensus on food security’ (Mooney
with predictions that the world may need to feed over
and Hunt 2009: 470; see also Maye and Kirwan 2013;
nine billion people from 2050. Projections suggest that
Hopma and Woods 2014). Three collective action frames
95 per cent of this growth will occur in the developing
that encompass food security as a master frame have been
world. At the World Food Security Conference in Rome in
suggested by Mooney and Hunt (2009) and these are:
June 2008, it was estimated that food production needed
to increase by 50 per cent by 2030 and to double by 2050. ● Food security associated with hunger and malnutrition;
Undercutting all of this discussion is an increased aware- ● Food security as a component of a community’s devel-
ness of the risks posed by climate change and increasingly opmental whole; and

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 316    Section 4 Production, exchange and consumption

● Food security as minimizing risks in industrialized underpinning the response to the current ‘global food
agricultural production in terms of the risk of ‘normal security crisis’. This is described by Godfray et al.
accidents’ and ‘intentional accidents’ associated with (2010) as ‘sustainable intensification’. The essence
agri-terrorism. of this idea is that we need to achieve higher yields
from the same acreage without damaging the envi-
These collective action frames are grounded in the
ronment. In a similar vein, the UK Government’s
US experience and identify the different perspectives
Chief Scientist, John Beddington (2010: 61), argues
and interests on one seemingly consensual social prob-
that we need ‘a new, “greener revolution”’ (original
lem. It also distinguishes between relatively tame institu-
emphasis). Advocates of this approach claim that sci-
tional responses and much more critical viewpoints and
ence and technology have time and again provided
positions. This resonates with earlier material in this
huge increases in yield growth when required. Impor-
chapter in which weaker and stronger variants of alter-
tant areas to focus upon in this context include, for
native food networks are identified as part of a critique
example, crop improvement, smarter use of water
of neoliberalism (Watts et al. 2005). Crucially, Mooney
and fertilizers, the introduction of novel non-chem-
and Hunt (2009: 493) do more than simply identify a
ical approaches to crop protection, the reduction of
plurality of framings by locating ‘this process within an
post-harvest losses and more sustainable livestock
ordered, yet contentious, multi-organizational political
and marine production. Projects and initiatives are
field of differential power wielded by various insiders
also emerging to meet the challenge to produce more
and outsiders’.
food (or they are at least marketed in this food crisis
context). One example is the development of modern
15.4.2 Three food security ‘action frames’ hydroponic schemes. A state-of-the-art version now
exists in the UK, called Thanet Earth (see Spotlight
This sub-section outlines three illustrative action frames
box 15.4), and such schemes are well known in The
that are emerging outwith the US experience:
Netherlands and California. Another highly contro-
1. Sustainable intensification. There has been a versial example is the proposal to build the UK’s first
strong science-oriented or techno-centric discourse ‘super dairy’. Plans were originally submitted for an

Spotlight box 15.4

Is the future hydroponic? Thanet Earth terms of water, for example, produce is grown on blocks
of rock wool about a meter off the ground and surplus
Hydroponic schemes are a well-established feature of water drains into long trays underneath the blocks and
the California and the Netherlands agro-foodscape. A from there to lagoons, along with rainwater off the
state-of-the-art version also now exists in Kent, called roofs, to be pumped around again. Thanet Earth is also
‘Thanet Earth’. It is owned by a consortium of Dutch clever in terms of its energy strategy, using a system
growers and Fresca, a fresh-produce agglomerate. called combined heat and power. On other issues it is
The consortium bought 90 hectares of land and has also virtuous – minimal pesticide use and preserving
assembled three gigantic glasshouses, with planning biodiversity – but it scores less well in terms of labour,
permission for another four. with very few indigenous British workers among the
In 2009, Thanet Earth’s first year in production, 2.5 workforce who harvest the crop, although such labour
million tomatoes left the glasshouses for the sorting issues are not uncommon in other, smaller-scale, horti-
area in an average week and the cucumber and pep- cultural enterprises.
per harvests peaked at half a million and three-quarters So could Thanet Earth-like growing models poten-
of a million a week (Harding 2010). This amounts to tially bring Britain to self-sufficiency in ‘salad’? The
about 2 per cent of UK demand and the target is to sup- paradox is that it is not just about growing more food;
ply 4 per cent of all tomatoes, cucumbers and peppers it is also about getting people to eat the right type and
consumed in the UK. balance of foods. As Harding (2010: 7) puts it: ‘A larger
Thanet Earth is heralded as an example of low-­ query hanging over hydroponic growing in the UK is
carbon horticulture on a grand scale. As Hardy notes, it quite what it solves until we all start eating many more
scores well in terms of certain facets of sustainability. In tomatoes, cucumbers and peppers.’

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 Chapter 15  Geographies of food production    317

8,100 cow dairy herd on a single farm in Lincolnshire. hunger from their streets’ (Morgan and Sonnino 2010:
The scheme, including a revised proposal (for a 3,770- 222). Urban food security policy in both cities is focus-
cow herd), was eventually withdrawn in response to ing on two key dimensions of the problem: food pro-
continued opposition from the Environment Agency duction and food access. For the former, new planning
(the regulator managing UK freshwater systems), as dispensation for urban agriculture allows the city to
well as animal welfare groups and local residents. feed itself from within (as in London) or from neigh-
bouring areas (as in New York). For the latter, both cit-
2. Waste. This example is about making better use of ies have used the school meal service as the main food
what we already have (i.e. we need to be less wasteful). access scheme for children, with New York actively
There is growing realization that we are eating beyond promoting the consumption of fresh food in poor dis-
our means and that food chain dependency on imports tricts via schemes like Green Cart.
creates vulnerability. This approach is captured well
The last of these three indicative examples articulates
in Stuart’s (2009: xxii) text, Waste, where he argues
a wider definition and framing of food security beyond
‘industrialized nations need to learn what it means to
that conceived in the pages of agricultural trade journals
live in scarcity – because the appearance of infinite
and the sustainable intensification mantra (i.e. not just
abundance is an illusion‘. The essence of his argument
about availability of food but also concerned with access
is that we can increase food supply and reduce envi-
and utilization). As Mooney and Hunt (2009) suggest,
ronmental consequences by reducing waste within the
these framings exist side-by-side as part of a multi-organ-
food supply chain. In the USA, for example, around
izational political field of differential power networks
50 per cent of all food is wasted. In Britain, we create
that constitutes food security.
up to 20 million tonnes of food waste per year. The
Japanese dispose of food worth ¥11 trillion [US$101.6
billion] annually. Food is treated as a ‘disposable com-
modity’ throughout the developed world (Stuart 2009:
15.5  onclusion: the ethical
C
xvi). We waste food at all stages of the food chain, foodscape
from production and harvesting through to post-pur-
chase by the consumer. Waste may arise due to poor This chapter has reviewed the changing nature of food
handling, poor storage, cultural perceptions, retailer production, especially in the context of developed mar-
demands, consumer ignorance or sheer laziness. Stuart ket economies. The important contributions that geog-
(2009: xix) argues that we can turn this wastefulness to raphers have made to debates concerning the long-term
our advantage in that ‘the world’s mountain of surplus sustainability of agri-food systems have been highlighted.
food is currently an environmental liability – but it is Such a broad assessment is always partial in its cover-
also a great opportunity’. Efficiency measures could age, but it shows how geographers have examined differ-
create savings and help the fight against hunger. Sal- ent systems of food production in different spatial and
vaging food would also help tackle global warming. temporal contexts. Different types of production system
In Europe, for example, more than 30  per cent of have attracted particular research attention at certain
Europe’s greenhouse gas emissions come from food. times. A good deal of the research in the late 1970s, 1980s
If food waste was halved, emissions would be reduced and early 1990s examined industrial agriculture and the
by 5 per cent or more. There are now a number of industrialization of the food system. The capitalist mode
social movements, national and global campaigns and of production still prevails and large agri-food compa-
food chain initiatives emerging to promote awareness nies and corporate retailers have developed considerable
about reducing different forms of food waste, includ- power and effectively exert control over the entire food
ing Feeding The 5000. supply system. Geographers and others are continuing
3. The urban foodscape. Burgeoning prices for basic food- to provide valuable insights into these processes, as evi-
stuffs and concerns about the security and sustainabil- denced through the salmon farming studies in Chile and
ity of the agri-food system are also raising awareness Friedberg’s (2014) recent work on the technopolitics of
of the pressures facing urban areas and their need to Life Cycle Assessment footprints. Techniques like foot-
grow as well as consume food. For example, in a study printing are increasingly used by food corporations as
of the evolution of food strategies in London and New new forms of governance that demonstrate and at the
York it is argued that both of these world cities are same time construct how sustainability is defined.
being forced to think anew about food security so that Despite these efforts, there is dissatisfaction with the
‘despite being highly developed sites of global capital- performance of the food system. Since the late-1990s,
ism, [they] have not managed to banish the spectre of much attention has been placed on alternative and local

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 318    Section 4 Production, exchange and consumption

food systems. Farmers and other producers have devel- ethical. This applies particularly to foods labelled as
oped ‘alternative’ forms of agriculture, based on ter- alternative. Many of these more ethical foods are equally
ritorial association and direct consumer contact, and a part of conventional food systems and many foods
geographers continue to actively examine these modes that we label ‘conventional’ or ‘ordinary’ have their own
of production. In some cases, these systems of provision implicit moralities and ethical relationships and mean-
directly challenge ‘mainstream’ forms of food provision. ings so that ‘the ethics of ethical foodscapes can thus be
They represent ways of growing and procuring food that ambiguous, slippery and consist of a number of inter-
are different in terms of scale and operation. Debates woven layers’ (Goodman et al. 2010: 1783). This means
about food security are also attracting renewed attention that we need to break down dualistic characterizations
from food policy analysts, geographers and other agri- of ‘alternative’ foods as uniquely ethical and conven-
food researchers. This threat to ‘global food security’ is tional foods as unethical. We also need greater critical
not new and many food analysts have in fact predicted it analysis of our assessments of ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’,
for some time. Crucially, the new emphasis is forcing a whether in terms of practical indicators, material prac-
re-think about the way we produce food, where and how tices or acceptable food politics. The current ‘food crisis’
we produce food, and how we value food. Much of this offers an excellent opportunity to carry out closer food
is still to be worked out, but we are already seeing how system examinations of what constitutes ‘goodness’ and
the ‘crisis’ is forcing different actors in the foodscape to ‘badness’. How and where should we grow food? Do we
reposition their alliances (Maye and Kirwan 2013). want our cities to be places where we grow (more) food?
This debate is also forcing us to re-conceptualize food Should we challenge methods of growing food that pro-
systems and the way in which we assess whether they mote so-called ‘sustainable intensification’? What about
are a sustainable and ethical way of food provisioning. the role of local food systems in the future?
As Hinrichs (2014: 143) argues, the present context of Finally, new debates about ‘sustainable diets’ (i.e. how
intertwined and intensifying economic, environmental diets impact and could be changed to improve the sus-
and climate change challenges and crises means we must tainability of the planet) and the emergence of ‘less meat
enlarge our thinking about food systems change and sus- initiatives’ (Morris et al. 2014) raise significant socio-eco-
tainability transitions. McMichael (2009) argues that the nomic and ethical questions, including their potential to
food regime concept is a useful way to do this because it contribute to a transition towards more sustainable forms
not only reveals the structured moments and transitions of meat production, provisioning and eating. As a more
in the history of capitalist food relations, but also of capi- general concluding point, it is suggested that an emphasis
talism itself (see also Sage 2013). In these terms the ‘world on food ethics in a context of growing uncertainty about
food crisis’ is thus a consequence of industrial capital- food supplies is a highly fruitful means by which to exam-
ism’s long-term over-dependence on fossil fuel, combined ine food production geographies. A better understand-
with the inflation-producing effects of biofuels offsets, ing of food production geographies and capacities will
financial speculation activities, and the concentration also help to ameliorate social and ecological inequalities.
and centralization practices of agribusiness capital. The material presented in this chapter suggests the era of
Another example relates to ‘ethical foodscapes’, where endless food may be winding down. Our habits will have
‘morality is a key and growing currency in the provision- to change because, as the food writer Felicity Lawrence
ing of food in much of the post-industrial North and (2008; quoted in Harding 2010: 3) puts it, ‘they simply
beyond’ (Goodman et al. 2010: 1783). While all food has cannot go on. We are now entering a period of rapid tran-
ethical implications, some food has taken on the con- sition’. Human geographers are well placed to provide
notation of being, often in quite particular ways, more analytical insight into transitions to food sustainability.

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 Chapter 15  Geographies of food production    319

Learning outcomes Millstone, E. and Lang, T. (2008) The Atlas of Food,

2nd edition, Earthscan, London. A good introductory text that
After reading this chapter, you should have:
reveals the often surprising ways we make, process, ship,
● An understanding of the importance of food trade and eat foods.
to modern economies and societies and what Sage, C. (2012) Environment and Food. Routledge, London.
is meant by a food chain and its application in This book provides a very good introduction to food and envi-
ronment relations, including ecological impacts of different
different contexts.
agri-food systems.
● An awareness of how and why the agri-food system
Stuart, T. (2009) Waste: Uncovering the Global Food
has become globalized – especially the dominance
Scandal. Penguin Books, London. An excellent text on the
and spatially uneven penetration by transnational way we treat food as a disposable commodity and have,
agribusinesses. in effect, created our own global food crisis. It also offers
● An awareness of the emergence of quality-based solutions to fix it.
commodity food production in some parts of the
developing world and the reasons why this has
happened. Useful websites
● An understanding of ‘alternative food networks’,
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/index_en.htm This web link
including some of the main reasons why they have
is the Directorate General (DG) responsible for Agriculture
arisen, how they are conceptualized and case study and Rural Development, and is part of the official (and much
examples to explain their diverse character. bigger) website of the European Union. This DG site contains
● An appreciation of recent debates about food information on the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, key
security and ethics and a sense of how these speeches and policy papers, statistics and links to member
issues disturb and unsettle notions of ‘goodness’ state sites.
and ‘badness’ in relation to food production and www.defra.gov.uk The site of the UK government’s
provisioning more generally. Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The site
contains information on UK agricultural policy (including the
● An ability to begin to think critically about most recent round of mid-term reforms), statistics and links
geographies of food production. to other government departments, non-ministerial depart-
ments and NGOs. Similar sites exist for other national gov-
ernments (see, for example, www.usda.gov, home of the US
Further reading ­Department of Agriculture, including useful details about the
US farm bill).
Friedberg, S. (2004) French Beans and Food Scares: Culture www.sustainweb.org The site for Sustain – the alliance
and Commerce in an Anxious Age, Oxford University Press, for better food and farming, an NGO umbrella organization
Oxford. A comparative case study of global food commodity which campaigns for more sustainable food chain practices.
networks, tracing the supply of green beans for two cultur- Contains information about various projects Sustain are
ally specific trade links – France/Burkina Faso and England/ working on and a raft of challenging position papers and
Zambia. responses to various food-related topics.
Gardner, B. (2013) Global Food Futures, Bloomsburg, www.soilassociation.org This site is home to the UK
­London. This book provides a very useful account of the ‘new organization dedicated to promoting organic food and farm-
food crisis’ from an economic perspective, including detailed ing. The site contains an online library with useful papers on
overviews of world agricultural trade and production. various topics, including local/regional food schemes, food
Maye, D., Holloway, L. and Kneafsey, M. (eds.) (2007) and farming policy, GMs and animals and food security, as
­Alternative Food Geographies: Representation and Practice, well as a ‘links’ page which lists other useful websites related
Elsevier, Oxford. This book examines debates and practices to food and farming. You can also visit their consumer web-
surrounding efforts to establish ‘alternative’ systems of site, http://why.organic.org, which contains useful information
food provision, with studies from Europe, North and South about the nutritional benefits of organic food.
America, Australia and Africa. www.fairtrade.org.uk Site for the Fairtrade Foundation.
Morgan, K., Marsden, T. and Murdoch, J. (2006) Worlds Contains information about the fair trade movement, products
of Food: Place, Power and Provenance in the Food Chain, sold, suppliers, etc.; it also has a useful resources section
Oxford University Press, Oxford. This book provides a review with links to downloadable position papers and case studies.
of agri-food networks, including so-called ‘conventional’ and For those interested in ethical consumerism more broadly,
‘alternative’ food networks, with case studies from Italy, the see also www.ethicalconsumer.org, which examines the
UK and the USA. ethical credentials of individual products/organizations.

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 320    Section 4 Production, exchange and consumption

www.fcrn.org.uk/ Site for the Food Climate Research Global Food and Farming Foresight study and contains
­Network. Its aim is to better understand how the food system v­ arious reviews and outputs from the study, which reported
contributes to greenhouse gas emissions, which includes in 2011. It also contains a link to other relevant Foresight
researching and promoting ways of reducing emissions. It is ­studies, including one about the future of land use in the UK.
a fantastic resource for those interested in questions about www.feedbackglobal.org/ Site dedicated to campaigning
food security and sustainability, with resources, case studies, against the global food waste scandal. It contains links to
interviews and a link to an email list. ­on-going campaigns, including Feed the 5000, and a s­ ection
www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-­ about ‘food waste facts’, which includes a video link to
projects/global-food-and-farming-futures Site for the ­Tristram ­Stuart’s excellent TED talk.

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 THE GEOGRAPHIES OF GLOBAL
PRODUCTION NETWORKS

Chapter 16

Neil M. Coe

Topics covered
■ defining and identifying production networks
■ spatial divisions of labour
■ the governance of production networks
■ Production networks in their institutional contexts
■ reshaping production networks through ‘standards’ and
‘codes’

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 322    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

or Café Coffee Day in India; and Gloria Jean’s or Dome

16.1 E ngaging with global in Australia. There is a strong chance that the ­coffee beans
production networks were roasted and processed by one of just ten American
and European firms – a mixture of large ­transnational
corporations such as Nestlé, Mondelez and D.E. Mas-
Imagine the scene. We could be in San Francisco,
ter Blenders 1753, and a few big coffee roasters such as
­Shanghai, Sheffield, Singapore or Sydney, or many other
Smucker’s, Strauss, Starbucks and Tchibo – which handle
places besides. A student – having just been to a lecture
some 40 per cent of the world’s coffee each year. Equally,
and en route to her evening job in a restaurant – stops for
the laptop used by our student may well be made by either
a drink in a café. After choosing from the extensive menu
Hewlett Packard (HP) or Lenovo, which between them, at
of coffee options, she takes a window seat and boots up
the end of 2014, accounted for 39 per cent of the global
her laptop computer, instantly connecting to the free
market share. Indeed, just five companies – HP, Dell, and
wifi the café offers for its customers. Essay assignment
Apple (US), Lenovo (China), and Acer (Taiwan) – account
in hand, the student starts surfing the Internet, looking
for almost 70 per cent of laptop sales worldwide.
for the reading materials and background information
Why are these observations interesting? In short,
she will need. Every so often, she pauses, takes a sip of
because both the cup of coffee being consumed and the
­coffee – an iced caffè mocha or some such like – and gazes
laptop being used are the end result of far-reaching global
out at the street . . . 
production networks, which are in turn ­dominated by
On the one hand, what is being described here is a unique
powerful corporate interests of various kinds. Almost
consumption event, an individual lost in her thoughts as
all the commodities that we consume have complicated
she consumes her coffee and uses her laptop at a particular
histories and geographies and yet, as a system, capital-
time and in a particular place (see C ­ hapter 19). And yet,
ism seems to conceal these. The purchase of commodities
on the other hand, the two central non-human artefacts in
such as coffee or computers with money serves to discon-
this particular story – the coffee and the ­laptop – may have
nect producers and consumers, meaning many consumers
remarkably similar economic geographies and histories,
are unaware of the nature of the ­production system that
wherever the event is taking place.
has enabled those commodities to be available to them.
For example, the coffee bar in question might be a
This poses profound challenges to both conscientious
branch of Starbucks, with annual revenues of US$16.4
consumers actively curious about the ­history of the com-
billion making it the world’s largest coffeehouse chain,
modities they consume (see Chapter 19), and economic
serving millions of customers every day in some 20,500
geographers who want to understand connections and
cafés across more than 60 countries (as of January 2015).
interdependencies within the global economy. In reality,
It is one of many other similar chains offering their own
even drinking just one cup of coffee links the consumer –
standardized take on the continental European coffee
albeit unknowingly in most cases – to hundreds of thou-
house experience: for example, Caffè Nero, Costa Coffee
sands of workers involved directly or indirectly in its
or Coffee Republic in the United Kingdom; Caribou Coffee
production through complex global webs of connections.
or Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf in the United States; Barista

Plate 16.1  A common scene – but what stories

lie behind these everyday products?
(KieferPix/Shutterstock)

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 Chapter 16  The geographies of global production networks    323

This chapter is therefore about how we, as economic then consumes it. Consumption, in turn, is not just a
geographers, can explore and understand the inherent single act of purchase, but an ongoing process that may
variability of global production networks. In what fol- include maintenance, repair, waste disposal, recycling and
lows, we will look in turn at four generic dimensions of the like. This basic model holds whether it is a physical
all global production networks, namely their organiza- good – such as a television or bicycle – being produced,
tion, geography, power relations or ‘governance’, and or a service such as a haircut or insurance policy, with
institutional context. We will use the contrasting exam- the difference coming in the relative balance of tangi-
ples of the coffee and laptop global production networks ble and intangible elements in the production chain (see
as illustrations of these various dimensions. In the final ­Chapter 17). While simple chains can be thought of in
section of the chapter we will look at ongoing attempts linear terms, in reality (as Figure 16.1 shows) they are
to reshape production networks through the implementa- enmeshed within much wider networks of relationships
tion of different kinds of standards and codes of conduct. involving a broad range of other functions that are nec-
essary for economic activities to take place: for example,
research and development, market research, technologi-
cal inputs, logistics services, advertising, legal services,
16.2 P
 roduction chains, accounting, personnel management, software, security
production networks . . .  and so on. In turn, these inter-firm relations are embed-
ded in broader financial and regulatory systems that may
Every economic activity can be thought of as a produc- bring non-firm entities such as the state and its many
tion chain – a linked series of value-adding activities institutions into view. In this chapter we use the term pro-
(see Figure 16.1). In very simple terms, material and non- duction network to refer to the full mesh of relationships
material inputs are combined and transformed through that lies behind any economic activity.
some kind of production process, leading to a new good Production networks vary greatly in their complexity.
or service that needs to be delivered to the customer who At one end of the scale is the single farmer who grows

FINANCIAL SYSTEM
(investment capital, credit, banking)

Technology inputs: research, design, quality control, product and

process technologies
Energy inputs: electricity, oil, coal, gas, nuclear energy and renewables

Inputs Transformation Distribution Consumption

Service inputs: procurement, accountancy, insurance, human resources,

legal, advertising, marketing, sales, maintenance
Logistical inputs: movement of materials, products, people and information

REGULATION, COORDINATION, CONTROL

Flows of materials and products

Flows of information (including customer orders)

Figure 16.1  A generic production network.

Source: Dicken (2015), Figure 3.3c

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 324    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

one particular kind of vegetable and transports it to a In sum, every production network constitutes a unique
local market for sale at harvest time. Conversely, a com- constellation of activities performed via complex com-
plicated manufactured product such as a car mobilizes a binations of internal and external network connections.
wide range of skills and technologies to bring together The first step in understanding any production system,
the thousands of components that comprise the finished therefore, is to map out the key participants and the
product. The next step is to think about who undertakes nature of the relationships that connect them.
the different activities in a given production network. The coffee production network is relatively straight-
Hypothetically, every single function might be carried out forward and is represented schematically in Figure 16.2.
by one huge firm, which would coordinate the production Even so, coffee travels a long way and changes hands sev-
network through its internal management hierarchy (a eral times on the journey from bean to cup. The major
vertically integrated system). Equally, every single func- participants in the network are depicted by boxes, and
tion might be undertaken by separate firms, meaning the transactions that move coffee in its different forms
that the production network would take the form of a between participants are shown by arrows. Coffee flows
series of external, inter-firm relationships (a vertically through the network from the growers, who in effect
disintegrated system). In reality, all production networks begin the system, to the consumers who represent the
fall somewhere between these extremes. In a context of end point. Coffee – which comes in two main types, Ara-
increased global competition, however, the dominant bica and Robusta – is generally grown on small farms or
trend has been for firms in many sectors to focus on their estates in the tropical countries. Once basic processing
core activity or ‘competency’, while seeking non-core has extracted the ‘green’ coffee beans from picked coffee
inputs via external relationships. For some commenta- cherries, they will pass in 60-kg bags from an exporter
tors, this trend is part of a broader shift from Fordist to to a consuming country importer, trader or broker, then
more flexible post-Fordist production systems. on to a roaster or instant coffee manufacturer, and then
These increasingly important external networks can finally to a consumer via either a supermarket shelf or
take on many forms: café of some kind. These relationships are essentially
‘arms-length’ market connections, with prices being
● Markets: some inputs – usually of low value and set by international commodity markets such as the
standardized – will simply be purchased by firms on New York Board of Trade (Arabica) and the London
the open market. In this case, there is no long-term International Financial Futures and Options Exchange
relationship between the two parties and firms can (Robusta). We will see later, however, how the roles of
readily switch between suppliers. these various participants have evolved over time.
● Subcontracting: this involves firms buying inputs that In contrast, laptop computers are the outcome of a
have been made, under contract, to meet their own much more complicated production network that brings
specific requirements. The stability of the relation- together hundreds of different components into the fin-
ship will vary according to the formality and length ished product. It is estimated, for example, that a laptop
of the contract. Subcontracting may involve the entire may contain around 2,200 separate parts (Dedrick et al.
manufacture of a particular good or service, known 2010). The personal computer (PC) industry is therefore
as commercial subcontracting, or it may take the form a complex network of firms involved in a wide range of
of a firm buying in particular inputs that it does not different industry segments – from microprocessors and
have the skills or capacity to produce cost-effectively other electronic components to applications and systems
‘in-house’– industrial subcontracting. software providers – and covering a wide range of activi-
● Strategic alliances/joint ventures: this is where firms ties: R&D and design, manufacturing, assembly, logistics,
come together to create a new corporate entity in distribution, sales, marketing, service and support. How
order to undertake a particular task, for example these various functions are split between different compa-
costly joint research. In many other respects the par- nies has changed over time. Historically in the computer
ticipating firms may still remain competitors. industry, vertically integrated giants such as IBM, HP and
● Franchising and licensing: here, firms allow a company Siemens operated in all the industry segments and carried
(the franchisee or licensee) to sell their product or ser- out the key functions of product innovation, manufactur-
vice in a particular territory under given terms and ing and customer relations internally.
conditions, and in return for a set fee. Franchising is Since the advent of the PC, however, a much more
very common in the service sector (including fast food, complex ‘tiered’ network has evolved in which most
retailing, coffee shops, etc.), allowing rapid geographi- companies concentrate on one particular market seg-
cal expansion. ment, for example, assembling PCs, or making circuit

M16_DANI2950_05_SE_C16.indd 324 04/04/16 4:01 pm

 Chapter 16  The geographies of global production networks    325

Consumer

Retailer Restaurant
Supermarket Café

Consuming countries
Roasted/
instant coffee Roaster
Instant coffee
manufacturer

Broker

Green coffee International trader

State agencies and

Private exporters
marketing boards

Producing countries
Intermediaries
Co-ops/Traders/Agents
Dry cherry or
parchment
Coffee growers

Links disappearing
due to liberalisation

Figure 16.2  The coffee production network.

Source: adapted from Ponte (2002), Figure 1 and Talbot (2004), Figure 2.1

boards or disk drives (see Figure 16.3). The PC can now logistics operations that turn components into finished
be described as a modular product, whereby 10 to 15 products on customer doorsteps. As Curry and Kenney
relatively self-contained sub-components (e.g. keyboard, (2004: 114) suggest, ‘a PC assembler is, in many ways,
monitor, hard drive, etc.) are brought together and assem- more a logistics coordinator than a manufacturer’.
bled, an attribute that facilitates the disintegration of the Most laptop assembly operations, therefore, are sub-
production network across separate firms. Branded PC contracted to contract manufacturers (CM), and increas-
companies now focus primarily on design and customer ingly, to a particular form of subcontractor known as
relations, ‘outsourcing’ the remainder of the production the original design manufacturer (ODM) who will also
process to other firms. This system reflects the nature of contribute to the design process. In the case of contract
the PC as a standardized product assembled from compo- manufacturers, a branded PC firm is likely to employ
nents that can be produced in a wide variety of locations its own, on-the-ground design and development teams
by a broad range of firms. Only limited value is added throughout the production process to supervise sub-
by assembling a PC: in most cases PC firms add value contractors: this is the model preferred by Toshiba and
through customer relationships, either directly through Lenovo (the leading Chinese manufacturer), for example.
their own direct sales and service relationships (e.g. help With an ODM, however, the PC maker may take primary
desks, repairs, etc.) or indirectly through their branding, responsibility for design, but it will then pass a product
marketing and quality assurance practices. They also specification on to the ODM for final development and
extract value from the network through coordinating the manufacturing; HP and Apple operate in this way and

M16_DANI2950_05_SE_C16.indd 325 04/04/16 4:01 pm

 326    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Customers

Resellers

Tier 1
Distributors/
Branded PC company
logistics providers
e.g. Dell, Lenovo, HP

Branded
PC firms
purchase Core Tier 3 suppliers
Tier 2 directly
e.g. hard disk drives,
ODM/CM
flat screens, central
e.g. Quanta, Compal
processors (chips)

Other Tier 3 suppliers

ODMs may
e.g. cases, keyboards,
purchase
battery, motherboards,
some Tier 4
power supply, cables,
parts directly
connectors

Tier 4 and below

suppliers Components,
e.g. plastic parts, subassemblies
keyboard caps, screws,
Completed
capacitors, resistors
laptops

Figure 16.3  The laptop PC production network.

Source: adapted from Foster et al. (2006), Figure 2

this is currently the most common model in the industry. Figure 16.3) is itself a significant sector involving ­several
In yet another model, smaller PC vendors without the tiers of firms and assemblers spread across East and
scale to undertake their own design activity may simply South-east Asia. It is to these complex, on-the-ground
purchase generic ‘off-the-shelf’ products from ODMs to geographies of production networks that we now turn.
be labelled and sold under their own name. Backwards
relationships from branded PC firms to ODMs may also
extend forwards to the customer through the delivery and 16.3 G
 eographies of production
servicing of laptops on behalf of PC vendors. Overall,
the result is a highly responsive and efficient production
networks: spatial divisions of
system in which an order via a branded PC company’s labour
website can be dispatched by an ODM within 48 hours.
It is important to bear in mind that Figure 16.3 only It goes without saying, of course, that the production
provides a limited window on what is, in reality, a highly networks described above do not exist on the head of a
complex network connecting together hundreds of firms pin, but rather connect together, and indeed partly con-
and tens of thousands of workers. For example, the hard stitute, real places within the global economy. Every pro-
disk drive industry (see ‘Core Tier 3 suppliers’ box in duction network requires a spatial division of labour,

M16_DANI2950_05_SE_C16.indd 326 04/04/16 4:01 pm

 Chapter 16  The geographies of global production networks    327

which refers to the way in which certain elements of the Massey’s conceptual apparatus is still extremely
production process are concentrated in particular places. ­ owerful today, although her study – which was pri-
p
The concept of the spatial division of labour is elucidated marily about intra-firm and intra-national divisions of
particularly well by Massey (1984) who explored how these labour – needs to be extended in two important ways.
spatial variations are both created and exploited by the First, as we have already noted, spatial divisions of
ongoing restructuring of capitalist firms in their pursuit labour can be constructed through combinations of
of profit. After examining the spatial restructuring of the intra-firm (internal), and increasingly, inter-firm (exter-
UK economy in the 1960s and 1970s, her key argument nal) networks. Second, we need to apply these ideas at
was that under conditions of increased global competition, the international scale. One of the defining character-
corporations were increasingly looking to separate spa- istics of the world economy over the past two to three
tially the control functions performed by managerial work- decades has been the dramatic increase in the number
ers from the execution functions undertaken by manual of transnational corporations (TNCs) organizing their
workers. In its most simple form, low-skilled manual tasks spatial divisions of labour at the international scale. It
were tending to locate in peripheral areas, while manage- is now difficult to think of a production network that
rial and R&D tasks were concentrating in core cities and does not have at least some international elements, even
their surrounding regions. Massey argued that, over time, if it is just seen in the sourcing of one or two inputs,
different layers of investment fan out across the economic or a limited export market for the final good/service.
landscape, redefining the nature of relationships between Global production networks, as we will call them here,
places as they gain or lose different kinds of activities. have become one of the most important organizational
Different spatial divisions of labour arise from varia- features of the contemporary global economy. Spotlight
tions in corporate structures which, at a simple level, can box 16.1 considers different attempts to conceptualize
be divided into cloning and part-process structures. In the nature of international divisions of labour at differ-
the cloning structure, the production apparatus is simply ent points in the global economy’s evolution.
replicated in different localities, with ultimate control We can make three further arguments about the geog-
residing at a headquarters, usually sited in the firm’s ini- raphies of global production networks:
tial place of origin. In the part-process format, there is a
technical division of labour between branch plants, with ● First, their geographical complexity is increasing, ena-
components being made in one location and passed on bled by a range of developments in transport, com-
to another for final assembly. The different stages of the munication and process technologies. As we shall see
production process will have varying requirements, and shortly, the assembly of a laptop requires components
hence tend towards different kinds of location. manufactured at places all across East Asia.

Spotlight box 16.1

Conceptualizing global divisions (e.g. coffee from Brazil, copper from Chile, gold
of labour? and diamonds from South Africa) for the industri-
alized economies of the ‘core’ (Western Europe
It is helpful to distinguish between three separate and the USA). High-value manufactured goods
attempts to conceptualize international spatial divisions were exchanged between the industrialized coun-
of labour, which broadly coincide with different phases tries, and some were exported back to developing
of development of the global economy. countries.
● First, it is possible to identify the traditional interna- ● Second, from the 1960s onwards, a new inter-
tional division of labour (IDL) that took shape by national division of labour (NIDL) started to
the nineteenth century and prevailed largely unal- emerge in which European, North American and
tered until the 1950s. The IDL essentially depicted Japanese TNCs created labour-intensive export
a trading system – shaped initially by global trading platforms in so-called ‘newly industrializing econo-
empires, and later by the rise of the USA as an mies’ (NIEs) (especially in East Asia and, to a
economic power – in which the developing world lesser extent, Latin America) in response to falling
or ‘periphery’ was largely relegated to providing profit rates in the core countries. Crucially, the sys-
raw materials and agricultural plantation products tem depended on new technologies that allowed
➜

M16_DANI2950_05_SE_C16.indd 327 04/04/16 4:01 pm

 328    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

➜ production fragmentation, thereby creating tasks India, to access their domestic markets; significant
that could use, often young and female, semi-skilled outward investment by NIE transnational corpora-
or unskilled workers in the periphery. Two kinds of tions, e.g. from South Korean giants such as LG
technology were important: process technologies and Samsung; continued high levels of investment
that allowed the subdivision of the manufacturing between developed economies and the emergence
process into simple and self-contained tasks, and of complex international divisions of labour in the
transportation technologies such as jet aircraft and service sector. The contemporary global economy
containerized shipping that allowed the efficient is clearly not characterized by one single type of
shipment of both components and finished goods. IDL but rather many different forms. Rather than
● Third, it has become clear that in recent decades a disappearing, the traditional IDL and the NIDL
new global division of labour has emerged that is remain important in a range of industries (e.g. natu-
far more complex than the system depicted in the ral resources and clothing/toys, respectively) and
NIDL model, which does not capture, for example: have subsequently been overlain by, and have inter-
how the range of NIE economies has broadened acted with, newer and more complex international
and deepened considerably, particularly in Asia; divisions of labour. For more on these debates, see
increasing investment into NIEs, such as China and Coe (2011).

● Second, the geographic configurations of global pro- 90 per cent of the global trade (Figure 16.4). The geography
duction networks are becoming more dynamic and of production is shaped by the ecology of the coffee plant
liable to rapid change. This flexibility arises, first, from which requires a consistently warm and wet climate, mak-
the use of certain ‘space-shrinking’ information and ing it most suitable for growing in tropical highland areas.
communication technologies and, second, from organ- The production geography is not static, however. Most
izational forms that enable the fast spatial switching notably, exports of Robusta coffee grown in the central
of productive capacity (Dicken 2015). In particular, highlands of Vietnam have expanded dramatically over the
the increased use of subcontracting and strategic alli- last two decades – rising from just 100,000 tonnes in 1990
ance relationships (noted above) allows firms to switch to 1.3 million tonnes by 2012 and remaining at or around
contracts between different firms and places without that level ever since – creating an over-supply in the global
incurring the costs of moving production themselves. market and putting severe downward pressure on prices. As
● Third, we need to connect these ideas about the geo- a result, coffee growing is an increasingly marginal practice
graphical extensiveness and complexity of global produc- for growers across Central and Latin America and Africa.
tion networks with notions concerning the geographical The consumption of coffee has a long history linked to
clustering of economic activity. Not all the connections colonial expansion by Europeans, which served to both
within the system can be ‘stretched out’ across the global spread the taste for coffee, particularly from the sixteenth
economy; some interactions will need to take place within century onwards, and spread coffee c­ ultivation from its
the same locality because of the sheer intensity of trans- supposed origins in present-day Ethiopia to the band of
actions or because of the importance of place-specific tropical countries shown in ­Figure 16.4 (Topik 2009). The
knowledge to the activity concerned. From this perspec- key commodity markets and international traders and
tive, global production networks need to be seen as the roasters are, however, all based in the USA and Europe
organizational forms that connect clusters together. (see Figure 16.2).
Turning to the geography of the laptop production net-
Let us now move on to apply these ideas to our two work, the majority of the world’s laptops are produced by
products. The global map of coffee production and con- Taiwanese firms. All branded manufacturers – such as HP,
sumption is not very complicated. Growing coffee involves Acer, Apple and Toshiba – rely on Taiwanese ODM firms
several million farmers, who ultimately support the con- for manufacturing and product development. In 1998, Tai-
sumption of an estimated 2 billion cups of coffee every wanese companies accounted for 40 per cent of a world
day. The vast majority of coffee production takes place in market of 15 million units; this rose to 72 per cent of the
tropical countries while most of the consumption occurs 46 million laptops produced in 2004, and 94 per cent of the
in the wealthy markets of North America, Western Europe 195 million laptops produced in 2011. By the end of 2014,
and East Asia. Some 8.5 ­million tonnes of coffee were pro- the top five Taiwanese manufacturers (see Table  16.1)
duced in 2014, of which 6.7 million tonnes, or nearly 80 per alone produced 34.6 million (or 75 per cent) of the 46 mil-
cent, were exported. Although over 50 countries currently lion laptops shipped worldwide that quarter. Production
produce coffee, the top 12 exporters account for more than is also growing faster than the PC market as a whole; in

M16_DANI2950_05_SE_C16.indd 328 04/04/16 4:01 pm

 Chapter 16  The geographies of global production networks    329

Coffee
(million tonnes)
2.18

1.0

Exports 0.5

0.1
Imports

Figure 16.4  The top twelve coffee producing (exports) and consuming (imports) countries, 2014.
Source: data from www.ico.org [accessed 8 February 2015]

2005, one in three PCs sold globally was a laptop, while However, these geographies are also far from static.
by 2014 nearly six in ten PCs were laptops. The industry ­ aiwanese electronics firms have been moving production
T
can change incredibly rapidly, however, with both desktop ‘offshore’ – to South-east Asia, Europe and, most impor-
and laptop PC shipment levels under threat of being over- tantly, China – since the early 1990s. There are now two
taken by tablet devices by 2015, the production of which key PC clusters in China: the Shenzhen area of Guang-
has mushroomed since the release of the first iPad in 2010. dong province (in the south of the country), specializing
As Table 16.1 suggests, each leading laptop vendor tends to in desktop machines, and the Shanghai/Suzhou/Yangtze
contract with two or three Taiwanese firms, arrangements River delta area, home to the laptop PC industry (see
which in the cases of HP and Apple account for upwards Figure 16.5). Before 2001, the Taiwanese government pro-
of 90 per cent of their total global laptop production; for hibited its laptop manufacturers from undertaking final
Japanese companies such as Sony, Sharp and Toshiba, the assembly in China. When this restriction was lifted, the
proportion tends to be somewhat lower (50–70 per cent). ODMs moved collectively, and incredibly rapidly, to the
Taipei – and the nearby region of Hsinchu where many Shanghai area: in 2001 only 5 per cent of Taiwanese laptops
Taiwanese high-tech firms are based – is therefore a critical were produced in China but by 2004 the figure had shot
node in the laptop production network. up to 80 per cent, and it is now almost 100 per cent. The

Table 16.1  Top five Taiwanese laptop PC manufacturers, 2014

2014 shipment Second largest

Company (millions) Largest client client Third largest client

Quanta Computer 48.5 HP Apple Inc Asustec

Compal Electronics 43.1 Lenovo HP Dell
Wistron Corp 21.0 Dell Lenovo Hewlett-Packard
Inventec Corp 18.5 HP Dell Lenovo
Pegatron Corp 9.8 Asustec Toshiba Acer
Source: http://world.einnews.com/article/212643959/YtHuloncE0J-bEKD [accessed 18 February 2015].

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 330    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

lower costs of land, labour and facilities on the mainland

allowed the firms to build giant factories, expand output
and reduce costs through scale economies. The produc-
tion levels involved are quite staggering: in 2014 the lead-
ing Taiwanese producer Quanta was manufacturing just
under 4 million laptops per month at its Chinese plants.
The offices of these firms in Taiwan remain responsible
for product development, technology research, materials
procurement, financial management and marketing (Sax-
enian 2006). In this way, a new intra-firm spatial division
of labour is added to the system depicted in Figure 16.3.
Many Taiwanese component suppliers had already relo-
cated to the region by 2001, and now almost all the parts
Plate 16.2  A female worker assembling electronic
needed to make a laptop are manufactured in the Suzhou
devices in a Chinese factory.
area. Initially, the highest-value components such as the
(ArtWell/Shutterstock)
central processor, hard drive and displays continued to be
made overseas by Japanese, Korean and US companies,

Kunshan
CHINA Compal, Elite, Twinhead,
Chongqing Wistron, Mitac, Clevo

Shenzhen
TAIWAN
Suzhou
Asus, Uniwill
Ya
n gtz
e Ri
ve
r

Taihu
Lake

Shanghai
Quanta, Inventec
Wujiang
FIC, Arima

0 25 km

0 15 miles

Figure 16.5  The laptop manufacturing cluster, Yangtze delta region, China.
Source: based on Yang (2006), Appendix 2

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 Chapter 16  The geographies of global production networks    331

but over time many firms such as the US hard disk drive meet HP’s logistical requirements. Quanta and Inventec
manufacturer Seagate and chip firm AMD have themselves have likewise established manufacturing bases in the city.
established production facilities in the Shanghai region. As these trends continue, the geography of global laptop
Moving the entire supply chain to the Shanghai region in construction is once again being reworked.
this way allowed the Taiwanese firms to overcome deficien- While the laptop global production network has a
cies in the Chinese logistics and distribution sectors. The relatively concentrated geography around the key nodes
scale of the undertaking should not be underestimated: of Taipei/Hsinchu and Shanghai-Suzhou, the PC indus-
by 2005 some 3,300 Taiwanese firms had already invested try generally has a somewhat more disparate geography.
US$26 billion in Suzhou alone. Several of the transnational We can use the case of Dell as an example. There are
computer brand manufacturers (e.g. Toshiba, Samsung three distinctive elements to Dell’s business model. First,
and Sony) also have bases in the region. the company only sells direct to its customers, bypassing
More recent developments suggest that these geogra- almost entirely distributors, resellers, and retailers (see
phies are once again in flux, driven both by rising costs Figure 16.3). Second, unlike some PC manufacturers, Dell
in the coastal provinces and strong growth in the Chinese chooses to undertake a significant proportion of the final
domestic market for IT products and services of all kinds. assembly of both desktop and laptop computers itself,
In line with many other kinds of manufacturing activities allowing customers to specify the components included in
in China, since 2010 significant levels of PC production a particular product line (a process that can be thought of
have started to move to inland provinces. In particular, as ‘mass customization’). The proportion of final assem-
the massive inland city of Chongqing in Sichuan province bly has been declining over time due to competitive pres-
(see Figure 16.5) has rapidly become an important site of sures, however, with some laptops now made entirely
PC manufacturing involving both branded PC firms and by ODMs and some arriving in Dell’s factories semi-
Taiwanese ODMs. In 2010, for instance, HP and the Tai- assembled (the so-called ‘two-touch’ approach).Third, it
wanese motherboard company Foxconn jointly opened has aggressively used the Internet to establish not only
two facilities in the city capable of manufacturing 20 mil- its system of direct sales, but also the procurement and
lion laptops a year. The companies were attracted by the assembly operations, thereby dramatically reducing its
low labour, land and logistics costs as well as the city’s inventory of components. Figure 16.6 illustrates how Dell
free trade zone. They were also able to benefit from a dis- services its global market by using a series of regional
counted corporate tax rate of 15 per cent (down from the production and service clusters (Fields 2004). Such clus-
usual 25 per cent), while the city authorities also prom- ters are an integral part of the global space economy (see
ised to extend the second runway of the local airport to Spotlight box 16.2).

Dublin BRACKNELL
Limerick Lodz
Halle
Bratislava
Montpellier
Reno
Nashville Lebanon Dalian
Oklahoma City Casablanca Kawasaki
Winston-Salem
ROUND ROCK Chandigarh Shanghai
Miami Hyderabad Xiamen
Austin Gurgaon Taipei

Bangalore Manila
Chennai
Panama City
Penang
Kuala Lumpur SINGAPORE

São Paulo
Eldorado do Sul

HEADQUARTERS
Design centre
Manufacturing and
distribution facility
Business centre

Figure 16.6  Dell’s global production network, mid-2009.

Source: data from www.dell.com [accessed 22 June 2009]

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 332    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Spotlight box 16.2

Types of clusters in the global economy software and biotechnology. Examples include
Silicon Valley in the USA and Cambridge, United
There is a wide variety of different kinds of clusters in Kingdom.
the global economy, created through different historical 4. Flexible production hub-and-spoke clusters. In these
processes, and bound together by varying combinations clusters, a single large firm, or small group of large
of both traded and untraded interdependencies. Traded firms, buys components from an extensive range
interdependencies are created by firms co-locating in a of local suppliers to make products for markets
cluster alongside suppliers, partners and customers with ­external to the cluster. Examples include Boeing in
which they have formal trading relationships. Untraded Seattle, USA, and Toyota in Toyota City, Japan.
interdependencies are the less tangible benefits of being 5. Production satellite clusters. These clusters
located in the same place, for example the emergence ­represent congregations of externally owned
of a particular pool of specialized workers. In particular, ­production facilities. These range from relatively
clusters can facilitate patterns of intense and ongoing basic assembly activity, through to more advanced
face-to-face communication – and thereby transfers of plants with research capacity. Examples are to
important forms of intangible knowledge – between peo- be found across the export processing zones
ple working in the same or closely related industries. (ePZs) of the developing world – the Shanghai
We can think of at least eight significant types, each ­laptop ­cluster would also fall into this category.
performing different roles within the global system: 6. Business service clusters. Business services
­activities such as financial services, advertising,
1. Labour intensive craft production clusters. These
law, accountancy are concentrated in leading cities –
are often found in industries such as clothing where
such as New York, London and Tokyo – and their
firms are involved in tight subcontracting networks
hinterlands.
and often use high levels of immigrant labour and
7. State-anchored clusters. Some clusters have
homeworkers. Examples include the garment pro-
­developed because of the location of government
duction districts of Los Angeles, New York and Paris.
facilities such as universities, defence industry
2. Design intensive craft production clusters. These
research establishments, prisons, or government
refer to dense agglomerations of small- and medium-
offices. Examples include agglomerations that have
sized firms specializing in a particular aspect of
developed because of government research invest-
the high-quality production of a good or service.
ment (Colorado Springs, USA; Taejon, South Korea)
­Examples include the renowned towns and districts
and universities (Oxford/Cambridge, United Kingdom).
of the Third Italy including Prato (textiles), Santa
8. Consumption clusters. There are also strong
Croce (leather goods) and Sassuolo (ceramics).
­propensities to cluster – often in central urban
3. High-technology innovative clusters. These
areas – in a wide variety of consumer service
clusters tend to have a large base of innovative
­activities including retailers, bars and restaurants,
small- and medium-sized firms and flexible, highly
and cultural, leisure and tourism facilities.
skilled labour markets in sectors such as computer

These ‘lead’ firms are able to define which other firms

16.4 T he governance of production can join the network, the roles they perform, and the
networks financial and technological conditions under which they
perform those roles – despite not directly owning them.
This shaping of global production networks by power-
So far we have exemplified the various actors within
ful corporations through inter-firm relations is known
production networks, the functions that they undertake,
and where they are located. The next step is to explain as governance.
how such production networks function, and more spe- Governance can take different forms. A useful
cifically, the way in which some firms use their power ­starting point is the distinction between networks that
over other firms to control or ‘drive’ the overall system. are p ­ roducer-driven and those that are buyer-driven

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 Chapter 16  The geographies of global production networks    333

Producer-driven networks
Retailers and
Manufacturers Distributors
dealers

Domestic and
foreign subsidiaries
and subcontractors
Buyer-driven networks

Overseas Home market

Branded
Traders
companies

Factories

Overseas
Retailers
buyers

Primary connections
Secondary connections

Figure 16.7  Producer- and buyer-driven production systems.

Source: from Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, Gereffi, G. Copyright © (1994) by Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz. Reproduced
with permission of ABC-CLIO, LLC

(Gereffi 1994; see Figure 16.7 and Table 16.2). Producer- of leading TNCs, and manifests itself in the ability to
driven networks tend to be found in sectors where large exert control over ‘backward’ linkages to raw material
­industrial corporations play the central role in controlling and component suppliers, and ‘forward’ linkages with
the production system, for example in capital- and tech- distributors and retailers. High levels of profits are
nology-intensive industries such as aircraft, automobile secured through the scale and volume of production in
and semiconductor manufacturing. Power in these net- combination with the ability to drive technological devel-
works is exercised through the headquarters operations opments within the production system. The automobile

Table 16.2  Producer-driven and buyer-driven production networks compared

Form of economic governance

Producer-driven Buyer-driven

Controlling type of capital Industrial Commercial

Capital/technology intensity High Low
Labour characteristics Skilled/high wage Unskilled/low wage
Controlling firm Manufacturer Retailer
Production integration Vertical/bureaucratic Horizontal/networked
Control Internalized/hierarchical Externalized/market
Contracting/outsourcing Moderate and increasing High
Suppliers provide Components Finished goods
Examples Automobiles, computers, aircraft, Clothing, footwear, toys, consumer
electrical machinery electronics
Source: adapted from Kessler and Appelbaum (1998)

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 334    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

industry provides an excellent example of producer- network – and indeed the constituent relationships
driven networks. Leading assemblers such as Toyota and within it – may change over time because of a wide range
Ford coordinate production systems involving literally of factors, both internal and external to the system. In
thousands of subsidiaries and tiers of subcontractor particular, firms and/or particular regions may seek to
firms around the world, as well as extensive global net- improve their position within the global production net-
works of distributors and dealers. work through pursuing upgrading strategies.
Buyer-driven networks, by comparison, are charac- At first glance, comparing coffee and laptops would
teristic of industries where large retailers (e.g. Wal-Mart seem to provide a nice contrast between buyer- and pro-
or Tesco) and brand-name merchandisers (e.g. Nike or ducer-driven networks. The coffee network is ‘clearly
Reebok) play the central role in establishing and shaping buyer-driven and coffee roasters play the lead role in
the network, with production activity itself often located determining the functional division of labour along the
in developing countries (see Figure 16.7). This form of chain. In other words, roasters define the key terms of
global production network is common in labour-intensive participation directly for their immediate suppliers and
consumer goods sectors, such as clothing, footwear, toys indirectly for other actors further upstream’ (Gibbon and
and handicrafts. Production is usually undertaken using Ponte 2005: 83). Roasters capture about 30 per cent of the
tiered networks of subcontractors that supply finished value that is added in the coffee production network, but
goods subject to the specifications of the powerful buy- retailers (22 per cent) and international traders – such
ers. These buyers in turn extract substantial profits from as Neumann and Volcafe – also do well (8  per cent).
bringing together their design, sales, marketing and finan- The result is that at least 60 per cent of the economic
cial expertise with strong brand names and access to large value derived from coffee goes to developed country
consumer markets. firms, although some estimates put the figure as high as
The notions of producer- and buyer-driven networks 80 per cent (Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001). The domination
are ideal types that allow us to get an overall impression of by these actors is in large part a simple story of con-
how a particular system functions, and in turn, who ben- centrated market power and economies of scale: the top
efits most from the way it functions. In reality, however, four international coffee traders account for 40 per cent
the governance of global production networks is highly of the global trade; as noted in the introduction to this
complex and variable both within, and between, different chapter, the top ten roasters handle about 40 per cent of
economic sectors. We can think about this complexity in the world’s coffee; and the top 30 global grocery retailers
three ways. First, there may be other forms of govern- account for about one-third of global coffee sales. Roast-
ance that seem to better characterize the overall nature of ers, for example, reap the economic benefits of buying the
a particular production network. For example, in some beans in bulk and having captive suppliers that depend
contexts it might be useful to think of relational forms on their purchases. Even so, the coffee network is not
of governance that fall in between the producer- and as buyer-driven as networks driven directly by supermar-
buyer-driven models (Gereffi et al. 2005). These can be ket chains (e.g. fresh fruit and vegetables) or by retailers
thought of as close inter-firm relationships that develop and branded marketers (e.g. clothing and footwear). To a
on a more even footing. In others, it might be trading degree, the strong coffee roasters/brands are able to coun-
firms – such as the Japanese giant trading firms, the so- teract the huge buying power of the retailers, meaning
called soga shosha – or intermediaries that drive the net- that influence is shared. Ideal-type buyer- and producer-
work. In the Internet era, for example, there is evidence driven chains, then, should perhaps be seen as the ends of
that new forms of ‘infomediaries’ with extensive access a spectrum rather than discrete categories.
to online consumer information (e.g. Google, AOL, etc.) Typically, as noted in Table 16.2, the computer indus-
may play increasingly important roles in production net- try has been seen as a capital-intensive producer-driven
works (Gereffi 2001). Second, when we look at the detail network dominated by vertically integrated giants such
of a particular production network, it is important to as IBM. However, the computer industry has changed
recognize that there may be a variety of governance types beyond recognition over the past 25 years as the PC has
in operation between the various actors within the overall increasingly become a mass-market standardized prod-
system. A study comparing the PC production networks uct. The branded PC companies continue to drive the
in the Yangtze and Pearl River delta regions of China, global production network, taking the decisions that
for example, found that in reality governance relations drive the whole system and coordinating the activities
are extremely complicated and, indeed, varied signifi- of the other main players. But their role has changed
cantly within the same industry (Yang and Coe 2009). over time. Leading manufacturers like HP and Apple
Third, governance regimes are not static, but need to be have increasingly focused on final assembly, design
seen in dynamic terms. The nature of a production and branding, with the vast majority of production

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 Chapter 16  The geographies of global production networks    335

outsourced to Asian subcontractors, thereby sharing the rates significantly higher than any other participants
characteristics of the lead firms in buyer-driven systems in the industry. ‘Power . . . resides, therefore, in what
such as clothing and shoe production. Over time, there is ­getting made and mobilizing networks of support
has clearly been a shift in the governance characteristics for those products rather than in how that product is
of the PC industry. itself produced – emphasizing the place of intellectual
However, it is possible to make another argument property holders in securing the rewards . . . within the
relevant to the PC sector. The branded PC marketplace system’ (O'Riain 2004: 645). These arguments are sup-
has become increasingly competitive over recent years ported by detailed research into the gains associated
as the standardization process has progressively reduced with manufacturing a HP laptop computer (Dedrick
profit margins for even the leading firms. The result has et al. 2010). The study found that while Microsoft and
being ongoing consolidation and rationalization, with Intel secured net profits of 36 and 31 per cent respec-
several large brands being swallowed up by competitors tively, and key component manufacturers in the range
(e.g. Compaq by HP, IBM by Lenovo). O'Riain (2004) of 4 to 12 per cent, HP themselves only made a profit
has suggested that we might think of the PC network of 4 per cent, with the assembler (i.e. ODM) making an
(and others like it) as falling into another governance even lower profit rate of 2.4 per cent. These pressures
category – the technology-driven network, in which it are forcing the Taiwanese ODMs to branch out from
is control over technical standards which is critical for laptop ­manufacturing into other segments, for instance
exercising power over the system. In that sense, it is the Pegatron is moving into tablet production while Inventec
firms that set the dominant architectural standards for and Quanta are expanding production of data servers. In
PCs in terms of software (Microsoft’s operating sys- Case study 16.1 we use the case of the iPhone to consider
tems) and hardware (Intel’s computer chips) that benefit more broadly the issue of who gains from electronics
most from the production network and secure profits global production networks.

Case study 16.1

Who gains from electronics global US$178.96 that Apple paid for an assembled iPhone
production networks? The case of the 3 to see where the money ultimately went shows that
iPhone 3 U$172.46 went to component manufacturers, leaving
just US$6.50 to be accrued in China by Foxconn for
As with laptop computers, the final assembly of many product assembly (see chart below). For example, the
leading smartphones also takes place in the coastal
provinces in China. The Apple iPhone 3 (available from
2009 to 2012) provides an interesting case in point
iPhone manufacturing cost
(Xing and Detert 2010). It was primarily assembled by
distribution by country (%)
Taiwanese manufacturer Foxconn at its huge produc-
tion complex in Shenzhen, China. Trade data records
that, in 2009, 11.3 million iPhones were shipped to the
USA from China at an average cost US$178.96 each, Germany
a trade flow of US$2.02 billion worth of goods. How- 16.8
Other
ever, that presents a somewhat misleading picture. 26.8
If you were to disassemble the iPhone 3, you would
Korea
find that eight other companies, none of which are
12.8
based in China, supplied the key manufactured com-
ponents assembled by Foxconn. The most important,
by value, were provided by Toshiba (Japan), Samsung US 6.0
(Korea) and Infineon (Germany); the other five main Japan
suppliers were in the USA, Germany and Japan. 33.9
Toshiba, for instance, contributed the touchscreen China 3.6
and the flash memory, while Samsung manufactured
the all-important microprocessor. Unpacking the
➜

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 336    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

➜ flash memory provided by Toshiba alone accounted elsewhere. Ultimately, of course, the biggest share of
for US$24.00 of the total, with this firm accruing the value from an iPhone is captured by Apple itself;
around one-third of the total manufacturing costs of the ‘mark up’ on the iPhone creating a US retail price
the iPhone. The US–China trade deficit created by of US$300+. The wider lesson here is that assessing
iPhone shipments is therefore much smaller than it first who gains most from global production networks –
appears, and a more realistic assessment of China’s either in terms of firms or places – is not a simple
contribution to the manufacturing process of iPhone process but requires a detailed understanding of the
becomes possible – essentially it is operating as a configuration of such networks and how they touch
low-wage assembly location for components created down in particular places.

Returning to coffee, we can start to appreciate the com- The next step was to develop design capacity, as we have
plexity and dynamism of global production networks. already noted, becoming ODMs (original design manu-
The coffee production network is not static in organi- facturers) through a step known as product upgrading.
zational and governance terms. It can no longer simply Next, some firms have taken things further and started to
be understood as a sequence of market transactions. manufacture and sell PCs under their own brand, thereby
Three changes illustrate this point. First, the roasters becoming OBMs (original brand manufacturers) through
are increasingly concentrating on their roasting, blend- functional upgrading. Acer, for example, started out as
ing and branding activities, employing coffee traders to one of Taiwan’s main electronics suppliers, producing
source coffee and manage their supply networks for them, various computer products for international buyers. Over
along with undertaking the steaming of certain kinds of time, it separated off its OEM activity, leaving it to focus
beans. These are particularly important roles in a coffee on the marketing and R&D activities of its own brand
network which is increasingly concerned with coffee qual- laptops. Acer’s rise to the very top of the industry was
ity testing and assurance, and reflect the establishment confirmed by the purchase of two large US PC brands,
of more long-standing, relational connections between Gateway and Packard Bell, in 2007 and 2008 respec-
roasters and traders. Second, international traders are tively. Asus followed a similar path, spinning off much
vertically integrating their operations by buying export of its manufacturing activity into the now independent
firms in producing countries in order to ensure secure and Pegatron. In reality, however, these categories may not
high-quality supplies. This serves to consolidate the posi- map neatly onto individual firms, many of which will
tion of traders within the system and potentially increase combine both OEM/ODM and OBM activities. In some
further the value captured by developed-country firms. cases, firms may be able to use their expertise to shift into
In turn, the potential for developing countries’ producers entirely new production networks (e.g. from laptops to
and processors to upgrade their activity is restricted by the smartphones) in a shift termed chain upgrading (Kap-
fact that roasting and final processing ideally needs to be linsky 2005).
undertaken near final markets. Third, growing consumer Two further points should be noted here. First, there
demand for new kinds of specialty, organic and fair-trade is no automatic or simple progression along this upgrad-
coffees has opened up some direct connections between ing path. These shifts reflect changing strategies on the
producers and smaller roasting houses, potentially at least part of Taiwanese firms in response to changing market
improving the financial returns for the coffee farmers con- conditions. As PCs have become ever more standardized
nected to these new networks. We shall return to this issue commodities, however, OEM and ODM producers have
in the last section of the chapter. increasingly been squeezed for cost savings by branded
In terms of the laptop production network, at the PC firms. They have tended to respond in one or more
same time as branded PC firms have retreated from of four different ways: moving into original brand man-
manufacturing activity, Taiwanese manufacturers have ufacturing themselves; making more components them-
evolved or upgraded to take on new roles and, as a result, selves as a way of cutting costs (i.e. vertically integrating
now occupy much more significant positions within the their activity); trying to cut costs through production
production network. Many Taiwanese firms started relocation within China; or by expanding in new but
out as simple assemblers of components for PCs. Over related product segments such as tablet computers. Sec-
time, they moved – through what is known as process ond, the successful ongoing upgrading of Taiwanese
­upgrading – into the manufacture and assembly of PCs electronics firms is not only due to firm strategies and
sold under the brand names of other firms (i.e. they inter-firm networks. It also reflects a range of deliberate
became OEMs – original equipment manufacturers). strategies pursued by the Taiwanese state to develop the

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 Chapter 16  The geographies of global production networks    337

industry since the early 1970s, for example: the estab- in particular places (e.g. trade policy, tax policy, environ-
lishment of the Hsinchu Science Park; direct investment mental regulations and so on), while the latter refers to
in early key players in the sector including UMC (United the rather less tangible, and often place-specific, ways of
Microelectronics Corporation) and TSMC (Taiwan doing business that relate to the social, economic and
Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation); and steer- political cultures of particular places.
ing developments in the industry through its agencies Again, we can use the examples of coffee and laptop
such as ERSO (Electronics Research Service Organiza- production to illustrate these arguments. First, the coffee
tion), ITRI (Industrial Technology Research Institute) production network demonstrates the importance of for-
and CETRA (China External Trade Development Coun- mal institutional frameworks at the national and global
cil). These reveal the importance of also considering the scales. From 1962 to 1989, the international trading of
institutional context of production networks, a topic to coffee was governed by a series of International Coffee
which we now turn. Agreements (ICAs) managed by the International Cof-
fee Organization (ICO), a supra-national organization
made up of representatives of a wide range of coffee
importing and exporting countries. The ICAs combined
16.5 T he institutional context of price bands and export quotas to provide a coffee trad-
production networks ing system that was widely credited with both raising
and stabilizing coffee prices. During this period, many
So far we have focused almost entirely on the production exporting countries established coffee marketing boards:
network as a mesh of intra- and inter-firm connections. government institutions that controlled markets, moni-
Production networks are also shaped by a wide range of tored quality and acted as a link to exporters and inter-
extra-firm relationships that (as we saw in Figure 16.1) national traders (see Figure 16.2). Such boards provided
are an integral part of the system and may incorporate a an important protection for farmers and growers from
wide range of non-firm entities (e.g. supranational organ- the vagaries of the international coffee market. In 1989,
izations, the state, labour unions, business associations, however, the ICA was not renewed in the face of rising
etc.). Expressed slightly differently, every relationship in a production levels and low-cost competition from non-
production network is shaped by its institutional context. member exporting countries.
We can unpack the complexity of these institutional The ending of the ICA regime has dramatically altered
contexts in two ways. First, institutional context is signifi- the balance of power in the coffee chain, as the now mar-
cant at various spatial scales. At the sub-national scale, ket-based coffee trading system has led to lower and more
local governments may seek to stimulate particular kinds volatile coffee prices. Its demise has served to concentrate
of economic activity in their locality, for example by pro- power in the hands of consuming-country firms, and in
viding low-rent premises for small high-tech businesses. particular the small group of roasters introduced earlier.
At the national scale, nation-states still wield a huge The collapse of the ICA has meant that coffee-producing
range of policy measures to try to promote, and steer, countries are no longer cooperating, but are in fact com-
economic growth within their boundaries (Dicken 2015). peting with each other, resulting in overproduction and a
Increasingly important in an era of globalization are drop in prices which the roasters have been able to benefit
measures designed to promote (or restrict) movements of massively from, a process exacerbated by the fact that
traded products, investment and migrants across national consumer coffee prices have not dropped in a similar way,
boundaries. At the macro-regional scale, regional blocs but have in fact risen significantly. At the same time, the
such as the European Union or the North American Free national coffee marketing boards in the exporting coun-
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have considerable influence tries either have been eliminated, or have retreated into
on trade and investment flows within their jurisdiction. a restricted overseeing role that has left them marginal-
At the global scale, supra-national institutions like the ized within the production network (see dotted lines in
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Interna- ­Figure 16.2). As a result of these changes to the inter-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) increasingly determine the linked international and national institutional contexts,
regulatory frameworks for global trading and financial millions of coffee farmers worldwide are exposed to price
relationships. Even a relatively simple global production fluctuations on the global coffee market. On occasion,
network will, therefore, cross-cut and connect a wide this can result in farmers receiving less for their coffee
range of institutional contexts. Second, it is important beans that it costs to grow them.
to distinguish between formal and informal institutional What this story shows is how changing institutional
frameworks. The former relates to the rules and regula- frameworks can impact on all the other dimensions of a
tions that determine how economic activity is undertaken global production network. In terms of its basic structure,

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 338    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

the demise of the ICA has led to the bypassing of a pre- appear to be more entrepreneurial than non-migrants,
viously important actor, namely the coffee marketing and are active players in Taiwan’s burgeoning venture
boards. In terms of changing geographies, the rapid growth capital markets. Not all are permanent returnees, how-
of exports from Vietnam was both a cause of the ICA’s ever: some have instead become the ‘new argonauts’ of
demise and at the heart of the subsequent overproduction. the global economy (Saxenian 2006), criss-crossing the
The expansion of production in Vietnam – strongly sup- Pacific on a weekly or monthly basis and facilitating con-
ported and marshalled by the government – also shows the nections between firms, suppliers, clients and investors
significance of national institutional factors. Overall, in in the two high-tech clusters. What these migrant flows
governance terms, the post-ICA regime has enabled a fur- serve to demonstrate is that global production networks
ther concentration of power in the hands of roasting firms. in industries such as the PC sector are more than just for-
The laptop industry is similarly affected by multi-scalar mally regulated firm-to-firm connections – they are also
regimes of formal institutional relationships. For exam- constituted by broader personal and knowledge flows.
ple, as we have seen, rules governing outward investment
from Taiwan to China were crucial in determining the
timing of shifts in laptop production, and the fact that, 16.6  eshaping global production
R
for geopolitical reasons, direct flights between Taipei and networks?
China only restarted in 2008 had a significant impact on
the practicalities of investment. Moreover, the role played
We now have an appreciation of how to identify, analyze
by municipalities such as Kunshan, Suzhou and Wujiang
and explain global production networks. But what if vari-
in setting up industrial parks and actively courting invest-
ous actors – and in particular, we as consumers – want
ments from Taiwanese ODMs was crucial in helping the
to try to change how a production network is structured
Shanghai region steal leadership in the Chinese PC indus-
and operates? In an increasingly media-saturated and
try from the longer-established Guangdong cluster (Yang
interconnected world, awareness has grown in consum-
2009). Similar mechanisms underpin the more recent pro-
ing countries of the social, economic and environmental
duction shifts to Chongqing. Here, however, we will use
conditions under which commodities are produced. This
the laptop industry to open a window on a range of other
has seen a rise of so-called ethical consumption, whereby
less formal connections that are integral to the success of
interventions surrounding the consumption stage are
Taiwan’s electronics industries. More specifically, there is
designed to improve conditions at points ‘upstream’ in
now increasing recognition of the significance of migration
the production network (see also Chapter 19). There are a
flows of skilled engineers between Taiwan and California
number of forms such intervention may take. Perhaps the
for driving the economic success of both high-tech regions.
simplest form of consumer campaign is to boycott – that
Hsu and Saxenian (2000) describe the development of a
is, not purchase – the products of a particular company.
transnational technical community linking Hsinchu and
We can also think of corporate campaigns that seek to
Silicon Valley. For several decades now, Taiwanese migrants
target highly visible corporations by mobilizing informa-
to Silicon Valley – in combination with those from India,
tion regarding violations against workers or the environ-
China and other parts of Asia – have played an important
ment, such as were targeted at the sweatshop operations of
part in the continued dynamism of the Californian region
sportswear giants like Nike and Reebok in the late 1990s.
through their entrepreneurial activity and links back to
Increasingly, however, the development of various kinds
Asian markets and supplier firms.
of benchmarks or standards – against which various end
However, the more recent reversal of this standard
products and their production processes can be measured –
‘brain drain’ phenomenon has seen thousands of US-
are an increasingly important part of production network
educated engineers returning to Taiwan – reaching a
regulation within the global economy (see Figure 16.8).
peak of 5,000 per year in the mid-1990s – and playing
The world of standards and codes has very rapidly
a pivotal role in transforming it into a high wage and
become a broad and varied one. There are seven dimen-
skill economy. ‘These returnees to Taiwan, many of
sions to this complexity:
whom had worked for at least a decade in the United
States, brought with them not only technical skill but 1. They may be applied to different facets of the pro-
also organizational and managerial know-how, intimate duction system, for example environmental, social or
knowledge of leading-edge IT markets, and networks of labour conditions or rates of economic return.
contacts in the United States technology sector’ (Sax- 2. They may take a variety of forms: a code of conduct, a
enian 2006: 149). Return migrants have taken on lead- label on a finished product, a tightly specified techni-
ing roles in Taiwan’s technology sector: they are highly cal standard, a set of voluntary initiatives or a combi-
represented in the management cadre of leading firms, nation of some, or all, of these forms.

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 Chapter 16  The geographies of global production networks    339

Consumers in
developed countries

Civic
activism

Dominant buyers: brand name

traders and corporations

Control over 'Self-regulating'

schedules and codes of conduct
standards

Producers/exporters

Subcontractors/suppliers

Social
compliance
officers

Full-time workers/part-time workers/

temporary workers in industrial
zones in developing countries

Direction of supply
Direction of control
Direction and compliance with codes

Figure 16.8  New modes of regulating production networks.

Source: adapted from Sum and Ngai (2005), Figure 1

3. They may apply to a particular chain (e.g. beef), a sec- In terms of our two case studies in this chapter, we
tor (e.g. fresh meat), or be generic (e.g. all fresh foods). will focus exclusively on coffee, as these kinds of initia-
4. They may be developed by firms, NGOs, trade unions tives are more prevalent and developed in buyer-driven
or international organizations, and usually by a com- sectors characterized by labour-intensive production –
bination of some, or all, of these institutions. e.g. shoes, garments, food stuffs, etc. A wide range of
5. The certification or accreditation of the standards – schemes seeking to promote sustainable coffee produc-
that is, judging whether they have been met – may be tion currently exist (Table 16.3). The eight listed schemes
undertaken by public or private, and profit or not-for- clearly illustrate the degrees of variation just described.
profit organizations. For example, they may apply primarily to environmen-
6. They will range from the voluntary (e.g. seeking ‘Fair tal or economic conditions (Bird-friendly vs. Fair Trade,
Trade’ status for a product) to the mandatory (e.g. respectively); involve a label or be primarily a code of
safety standards for plastic toys). conduct (Fair Trade vs. Utz Kapeh); and be global or
7. They are inherently geographical, in terms of both the regional in their coverage (Organic vs. Bird-friendly).
territory in which they apply (often the place of con- Moreover, schemes may be initiated by companies
sumption) and the places in which the effects are felt (e.g. Starbuck’s CAFE – Coffee and Farmers Equity –
(usually places of production). Practices), civil society organizations (e.g. Fair Trade) or

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 340    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Table 16.3  Certification schemes for sustainable coffee

Actors or organiza-
Year tions setting the Geographic
Name established standards Characteristics coverage

Organic 1972 The International Advocates for the princi- Global

Federation of ples of organic agriculture (800 affiliates in
Organic Agriculture across the four pillars of 117 countries)
Movements (IFOAM) health, fairness, ecology
and care
Fair Trade 1988 Fair Trade Labelling Minimum guaranteed price Global
(in Netherlands) Organizations Inter- paid to registered small
national (FLO) farmers’ organizations that
match standards on socio-
economic development
Rainforest Alli- 1996 Rainforest Alliance Certifies farms on the basis Primarily Latin
ance certified of sustainability standards; America
(shade-grown) covers environmental pro-
tection, shade, basic labour
and living conditions, and
community relations
Utz Certified 1997 UTZ Certified (The Includes standards on envi- Global
Netherlands) ronmental protection and
management, and labour
and living conditions
Bird-friendly coffee 2000 Smithsonian Minimum standards on veg- Latin America
(shade-grown) ­Migratory Bird etation cover and species
Center (SMBC) diversity needed to obtain
use of label; also covers
soil management
Nespresso AAA 2003 Nestlé Corporation Designed to help farmers Global
Sustainable Quality adopt best practices in rela-
Programme tion to coffee quality, sus-
tainability and productivity
Starbucks CAFÉ 2004 (guidelines Starbucks Designed to ensure high- Global
(Coffee and Farmer established in Corporation quality coffee, protect the
Equity) Practices 2001) environment, and promote
fair relationships between
farmers, workers and
communities
Common Code 2005 4C Association To achieve baseline levels Global
for the Coffee (Germany) of social, ecological and
­Community (4C) economic sustainability for
all types of coffee produc-
tion systems
Source: adapted and updated from Daviron and Ponte (2005), Table 5.11, and Neilson and Pritchard (2009), Table 6.1

multi-stakeholders organizations (e.g. 4C) encompassing for only 15 per cent of the coffee purchased (e.g. between
a range of domains. A growing proportion of global cof- 28–35 per cent of coffee certified as Fair Trade, Rainfor-
fee falls under these schemes which are rapidly becoming est Alliance and Utz Kapeh at the point of production
mainstream: while the overall level was estimated at just was sold as such). This discrepancy suggests two things:
1 per cent of total production in 2003, by 2013 the various first that there is a ceiling to market demand for gener-
schemes accounted for 40 per cent of global coffee pro- ally more expensive certified coffee, and second that the
duction. Interestingly, however, certified coffee accounted schemes overlap, with the same coffee having multiple

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 Chapter 16  The geographies of global production networks    341

16.7 Conclusion
Returning to where we began, we now understand far
more about the global economic interconnections and
exchanges that enable the student in the café to drink a
coffee and surf the Internet on her laptop computer. We
could tell similar, yet at the same time profoundly differ-
ent, stories about the smartphone in her jacket pocket,
about the jeans she is wearing, about the machine that
brewed the coffee, the furniture in the café and so on.
Whether the student in question is aware of the complex
‘back stories’ of the commodities around her is uncer-
Plate 16.3  A shade-grown organic coffee plantation
on the western slopes of the Andes in Ecuador. tain: as economic geographers, however, it is beholden
(Dr Morley Read/Shutterstock)
on us to unravel those stories and their implications for
the people and places across the globe that they connect.
This chapter has provided us with a framework and
certifications (e.g. there is significant overlap between a language for exploring and understanding these eco-
Organic and Fair Trade coffee). nomic geographies. Sophisticated global production
Such schemes have certainly initiated improvements in networks lie behind nearly all of the products and ser-
the social, economic and environmental conditions of the vices that we consume on a daily basis. These can be
coffee growers that are enrolled in them. Growers of certi- understood as the meshes of intra-, inter- and extra-firm
fied Fair Trade coffee, for example, are guaranteed a pre- relationships through which material and non-tangible
mium above the market price, and their product may fetch inputs are transformed into consumable outputs of many
significantly more in certain market conditions. And yet kinds. They provide the organizational glue that con-
we need to add some significant notes of caution, such as nects together the disparate local clusters of economic
the fact that the majority of the world’s coffee farmers are activity that constitute the ‘on the ground’ reality of the
still labouring outside the jurisdiction of these schemes global economy. As a result of recent shifts associated
which are voluntary in terms of participation. Addition- with increased competition, technological change, and
ally, as we just saw, producing certified coffee does not trade and foreign investment deregulation – for which
necessarily mean the coffee will be sold as such. And we globalization is often used as shorthand – global pro-
need to ask who pays for, and who benefits from, the cer- duction networks in general have arguably become more
tification process? The rise of standards-based schemes geographically extensive, disintegrated and dominated
has fuelled the emergence of a new category of commod- by developed-country buyers. Ultimately, however, each
ity chain participant, the independent auditor – such as global production network has its own unique organiza-
Scientific Certification Systems (SCS), for example, who tional structure, geographical configuration, governance
audit the Starbucks scheme – many of whom themselves regime and institutional context. In this chapter we have
are profit-seeking firms. The costs of auditing long and used just two examples, namely the coffee and laptop
complicated production networks are significant, and computer production networks, to explore some of this
firms will vary in their ability and willingness to meet inherent variability in the configuration of global produc-
these costs. In many instances, buying firms will expect tion networks.
suppliers to meet the extra production costs. Farmers What this chapter has also demonstrated is the futil-
involved in certified organic coffee production in Oax- ity of seeking to understand the contemporary global
aca State, Mexico, for example, may pay between 10 and economy and its workings without adopting a geo-
30 per cent of their gross receipts to certify their produce. graphical perspective. Lead firms in global production
This serves as a significant barrier to entry and only the networks use uneven geographies – taking advantages
best organized and most well-funded farmers can turn in differences in labour costs and skill levels, for exam-
organic production into a profitable enterprise (Muters- ple – and in turn reshape those uneven geographies
baugh 2005). Together, these points suggest that we need through their investment and disinvestment decisions.
to look carefully and critically at initiatives to alter the Today’s global economy is undoubtedly more compli-
nature of global production networks; there is always the cated and interdependent than ever before: it is the task
risk that, in certain contexts, they will serve to enhance of the economic geographer to unravel and explain this
the very injustices and inequalities they seek to diminish. complexity.

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 342    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Learning outcomes South India, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. A fascinating account

of changes within the South Indian coffee and tea industries.
After reading this chapter, you should understand:
Particularly strong at revealing the institutional dimensions of
● How all economic activities can be conceptualized the production networks.
as a form of global production network. Yang, C. (2009) Strategic coupling of regional development
● That global production networks have distinctive, in global production networks: redistribution of Taiwanese
personal computer investment from the Pearl River Delta
yet changeable, geographical forms.
to the Yangtze River Delta, China, Regional Studies, 43,
● That global production networks exhibit a range of 385–407. A detailed study of the development of the
governance regimes according to the types of firms ­Taiwanese laptop industry in and around Shanghai.
involved.
● That the range, complexity and efficiency of global
production networks is heavily shaped by multi-
scalar institutional contexts of different types. Useful websites
● How attempts can be made to reconfigure
www.globalvaluechains.org This site contains a wealth
­production networks by introducing various kinds
of conceptual and empirical material on global value
of ­standards and codes of conduct. chains.
● The importance of a geographical perspective gpn.nus.edu.sg/index.html The website for the recently
for understanding the organization of the created Global Production Networks Research Centre at the
­contemporary global economy. National University of Singapore.
unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20
Report/World_Investment_Report.aspx The United Nations
Further reading Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website
provides free access to the annual World Investment Report
Coe, N.M. (2012) Geographies of production II: a global on foreign investment trends. The 2013 edition focused on
production networks A-Z, Progress in Human Geography, specifically on global value chains.
36, 389–402. Provides a useful overview of the current state www.unido.org The United Nations Industrial
of, and challenges facing, geographical research into global ­Development Organization (UNIDO) website offers a wide
production networks. range of data and reports on different commodity chains
Coe, N.M., Kelly, P.F. and Yeung, H. (2013) Economic Geog- and the potential they offer for economic development in
raphy: A Contemporary Introduction, 2nd edition, Wiley, New different localities.
Jersey. A clear, engaging and student-friendly introduction to www.oecd.org/sti/ind/global-value-chains.htm The
contemporary economic geography. ­Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Dicken, P. (2015) Global Shift: Mapping the Changing (OECD) has a range of useful information on global value
­Contours of the World Economy, 7th edition, Sage, London. chains across different industries and countries.
Now in its seventh edition, this remains far and away the best www.goodelectronics.org/about Excellent website about
textbook on the structure, evolution and geography of the labour conditions in the electronics industry.
global economy. www.ico.org/index.asp The website of the International
Massey, D. (1984) Spatial Divisions of Labour, Macmillan, Coffee Organization provides a range of information on
London. This landmark book theorizes, and exemplifies, the the coffee industry and, in particular, its evolving regulatory
concept of spatial divisions of labour. A second edition was structures.
published in 1995 with a new concluding chapter. www.fairtrade.org.uk The UK’s Fairtrade Foundation is one
Neilson, J. and Pritchard, B. (2009) Value Chain Struggles: of the most well-known attempts to improve the economic
Institutions and Governance in the Plantation Districts of returns offered to commodity producers.

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 SERVICE ECONOMIES, SPATIAL
DIVISIONS OF EXPERTISE AND
THE SECOND GLOBAL SHIFT

Chapter 17

John R. Bryson

Topics covered
■ defining services
■ services capitalism
■ service employment versus output
■ the body, the personality market and emotional labour
■ the division of labour
■ spatial and gender divisions of labour
■ spatial divisions of expertise
■ the second global shift

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 344    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

O ther chapters in this book explore the environmen­

tal implications and inequalities of wealth crea­
tion at a variety of spatial scales. This chapter is about
decisions of all kinds; this is enabled by manufactured
technologies such as computers. Many manufacturing
firms now produce hybrid products that blend service
the large and complex capitalist economic system and, and manufacturing tasks (Bryson and Rusten 2011), for
in particular, the ongoing shift from manufacturing example smartphones combine a good, the phone, with
to services that is being experienced by a range of a service, an advanced operating system that links the
economies (Plate 17.1). Put another way, it is a shift phone to a complex array of web-based services (Bry­
towards various forms of expertise- or knowledge- son and Rusten 2011). This implies that a post-industrial
intensive employment in economies that are increas­ society is not inevitably a post-manufacturing society; it
thrives on the relationship between production, manufac­
ingly structured around experiences (Sundbo 2015).
turing and services in which the latter are just part of a
Services support all aspects of everyday living –
much more complex production process. Economic geog­
logistics, communications, dining, entertainment,
raphers should explore production in the round rather
education – and have become an important compo­
than exploring aspects of manufacturing and service
nent of international trade. In 2013 the value of world
activities in relative isolation.
exports of commercial services was US$4.6 trillion, This chapter begins by defining services and placing
or 20 per cent of total trade (WTO 2014: 24–5). The them within the context of the overall production system.
export of commercial services had increased from The continued development of this system over time (and
US$1439 billion in 2000. space) reflects the ongoing process of economic speciali­
The focus here is on understanding some of the zation that has in turn driven the continuous extension of
dynamics of expertise-intensive service work, with the the division of labour, which is ‘one of the foundational
important caveat that the complexity of the modern features of what capital is about’ (Harvey 2014: 112) and
economy makes it problematical to view service activities the development of a new spatial division of exper-
as a distinct and separate category from manufacturing. tise. The division of labour refers to the disaggregation
One consequence is that the other chapters in this section of complex activities into discrete tasks that comprise
that cover aspects of manufacturing, finance, knowledge- a continuous extension of the division of labour and
intensive services, and even consumption, should be seen the development of a new spatial division of expertise.
as part of an integrated whole. Isolating finance, manu­ The latter is a key concept that will be examined in more
facturing or food production processes from a range of detail in the second part of this chapter where the ways
service functions overlooks the multiple interconnec­ in which service expertise is integrated into complex
tions between them to form a complex and integrated production systems are explored. The chapter concludes
production system. The flows of money and finance that with an introduction to some of the characteristics of
take place around the world in the twinkling of an eye services offshoring/reshoring, global sourcing or the rise
are manipulated and coordinated by service workers,
of the second global shift (Bryson 2007).
or more specifically knowledge workers. They convert
information into knowledge that then informs investment

17.1 Defining services

A walk through a supermarket highlights the role that
marketing, advertising and packaging design services
play in our society. Simple products incorporate quanti­
ties of visible and often invisible service expertise; the
former as advertising campaigns and the latter as the
logistics services that ensure that raw materials and
completed manufactured goods are transported and dis­
tributed efficiently to producers and consumers. Much
of the service expertise hidden within products arises
from the constant search for product differentiation. In
the economically developed market economies, the vast
Plate 17.1  An open plan office typical of the kind of majority, often more than 75 per cent, of all jobs involve
space used by many service industries. some form of service work (Bryson et al. 2004; Bryson
(Monkey Business/fotolia) and Daniels 2015a, 2015b). Furthermore, in Europe,

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 Chapter 17  Service economies, spatial divisions of expertise and the second global shift     345

North America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, as regionally, nationally and internationally. They are also
well as parts of the developing world, some 90 per cent heavily wrapped within and around the production pro­
of new jobs are created in services (Table 17.1). As a cesses of manufactured goods as well as other services;
result, the economies and societies of these countries they add value by smoothing the relationship between
appear to revolve predominantly around service activi­ production and consumption, for example via market
ties and the experience of service work. Indeed, schol­ research, product design, development and testing and
ars and policy makers generally accept that developed advertising (Bryson and Rusten 2011) (Spotlight box
market economies are now dominated by various forms 17.1). Services can be exported either directly via transfer
of service work, ranging from extremely well-paid law­ across borders or direct representation of the provider in
yers and merchant bankers to less well-paid hotel and another country or indirectly through the incorporation
retail workers. Services contribute to economic growth of a service into a product or another service which is
in a variety of ways; for example, they are traded locally, then exported.

Table 17.1  Employment in manufacturing and service, 2012 and 2013 (all persons)

Service employment Manufacturing employment

2012 2013 2012 2013

Australia 8,685,688 8,819,650(+) 948,107 921,999(−)

Austria 2,884,525 2,896,000((+) 660,075 651,125(−)
Canada 13,635,730 13,847,730(+) 1,785,517 1,734,217(−)
Chile 5,047,329 5,189,401(+) 881,428 882,185(+)
Czech Republic 2,876,650 2,935,525(+) 1,299,075 1,285,275(−)
Denmark 2,089,800 2,097,375(+) 333,825 325,000(−)
Finland 1,817,000 1,796,775(−) 356,725 350,300(−)
Germany 28,145,600 28,613,100(+) 7,917,050 7,839,925(−)
Hungary 2,520,425 2,567,350(+) 803,100 823,175(+)
Ireland 1,416,250 1,431,950(+) 208,775 213,125(+)
Italy 15,687,580 15,496,130(−) 4,207,650 4,128,775(−)
Japan 44,771,670 45,230,830(+) 10,317,500 10,390,000(+)
Korea 17,184,430 17,502,510(+) 4,104,900 4,184,017(+)
Netherlands 6,917,800 6,941,775(+) 771,700 768,225(−)
New Zealand 1,624,250 1,667,150(+) 245,875 247,675(+)
Norway 2,005,625 2,017,400(+) 239,125 228,775(−)
Poland 8,890,500 8,949,050(+) 2,905,800 2,968,675(+)
Slovak Republic 1,379,500 1,417,825(+) 570,325 539,475(−)
Slovenia 562,100 549,550(−) 206,475 203,200(−)
Spain 13,244,230 13,017,480(−) 2,223,900 2 118 675(−)
Sweden 3,651,500 3,712,900(+) 537,925 524,900(−)
Switzerland 3,360,250 3,402,425(+) 576,275 581,325(+)
United Kingdom 23,511,900 23,917,420(+) 2,886,775 2,913,900(+)
United States 115,675,200 116,593,800(+) 14,686,420 14,869,080(+)
Source: OECD (2014b)

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 346    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Spotlight box 17.1

Services and the production process and related services or supporting services, for exam-
ple finance packages linked to the purchases of goods
The creation of any product or service requires ser- (cars, furniture).
vice expertise to be embedded in different parts of The production process can be divided into five parts
the production process – pre-production, during pro- with each part requiring different forms of service knowl-
duction and post-production or consumption (Figure edge and expertise:
17.1) (Bryson and Daniels 2015b). Pre-production
1. Pre-manufacturing – product development,
involves understanding the design process, including
research & development, design, product testing,
market research and the ability to innovate; it may be
market research, finance.
applied to the design of a production process as well
2. During manufacturing – finance, quality control,
as to an actual product or service (Bryson and Rusten
stock control, purchasing, safety, management,
2011). The development of services may require the
continuity/contingency planning, testing, etc.
creation or modification of a process, for example the
3. Selling – logistics, distribution networks, marketing,
systems that support a financial services transaction or
finance.
the check-in process at an airport. Services incorpo-
4. During product and system utilization –
rated into the production process are concerned with
maintenance, leasing, finance, etc.
achieving its efficient management, for example per-
5. After product and system utilization – waste
formance management of a manufacturing process,
management, recycling, etc.
queue management at leisure parks or call monitoring
in call centres. Post-production incorporates marketing Source: Bryson et al. (2004)

– Product
–R&D development
– Engineers – Production design – Marketing
– Designers – Quality control – Advertising – Servicing
– Market – Purchasing – Trade fairs – Software
research – Management – Exhibitions – Updating
– Testing – Consultants – Consultants product

DESIGN DESIGN MANUFACTURING CIRCULATION PACKAGED CONSUMING

PRODUCT
PROCESS PROTOTYPE PROCESS PRODUCT CUSTOMIZING

– Material – Material – Packaging

– Finance – Finance – Transportation
– Expertise – Technical – Warehouse
knowledge – Shops
– Land/Machines – Finance

PRE- DURING SELLING/

MANUFACTURING MANUFACTURING DISTRIBUTION CONSUMPTION

Figure 17.1  The production process.

Source: Bryson et al. (2004), p. 52

During the 1970s economists tended to consider primary differences between goods and services begin­
services as ‘immaterial goods or simply as goods’ (Hill ning with the observation that a diverse selection of ser­
1977: 315). But services are not goods; they exhibit a vices, the shipment of goods by a transport firm, vehicle
range of characteristics that fundamentally distinguish repair, painting and decorating, the cleaning of a house
them from goods. Hill (1977) identified some of the by servants, hairdressing and dentistry, actually share a

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 Chapter 17  Service economies, spatial divisions of expertise and the second global shift     347

common set of characteristics. For Hill the two defining classification of service activities incorporates six differ­
characteristics were the way in which services brought ent types:
about:
1. Consumer services that provide services for final end-
1. A change or transformation in the condition of a good users, for example retailers, opticians, hotels and retail
or person. banks.
2. A change that is the result of the activity of another 2. Producer and business services that provide interme­
individual or firm. diate inputs into the activities of private- and public-
sector organizations.
Hill used these principles to construct what is con­
3. Services incorporated in to manufactured goods. This
sidered to be the classic service definition: ‘A service
includes goods that are leased to provide services, for
is defined as a change in the condition of a person, or
example, Rolls-Royce, the British engine manufac­
of a good belonging to some economic unit, which is
turer, leases engines to provide ‘power-by-the-hour’
brought about as the result of the activity of some other
(Bryson 2010: 698).
economic unit, with the prior agreement of the former
4. Public services provided directly by the state or
person or economic unit’ (Hill 1977: 318). While very
indirectly by the private sector and not-for-profit
useful, this definition also highlights one of the primary
organizations.
problems with the category of services, namely that in
5. Not-for-profit organizations working beyond the con­
many instances the consumer often only observes or
fines of the state (Bryson et al. 2002).
experiences the production or performance of the service
6. Informal services or unpaid service work, which is usu­
(Sundbo 2015). This simultaneous production and con­
ally predominantly undertaken by women, and which
sumption, and even co-production of a service, creates
is a vital element of peoples’ daily lives.
confusion between the process of producing it and the
final end process of consumption. This added complex­ Each of these categories includes a heterogeneous col­
ity may be confusing but fundamental to the distinction lection of service functions. It is not proposed to cover
between goods and services should be the realization that them all in this chapter. Rather, the focus here is pre­
the delivery of the latter does not result in the exchange dominantly on knowledge-intensive services (second in
of ownership of a material product. The output of the list above). This reflects the increasing importance
many services is ephemeral or non-material, for exam­ of a group of distinctive activities that have exhibited
ple attendance at a lecture or viewing/experiencing a live dramatic growth rates in both the numbers of firms
theatrical performance. It is often suggested that software established and their contribution to employment crea­
could be considered as a material service since it is can tion. It incorporates key sectors such as legal services,
be stored on a computer device, but this overlooks the accountancy, market research, management consultancy,
fact that the software provider does not transfer complete design and technical consultancy. All these services make
ownership of the software to the user: most of us own the an important contribution to economic development.
software under licence from the service provider. This is They contribute directly to the creation of added value;
different from the way in which ownership of a laptop they contribute to a national economy’s balance of
computer or a mobile phone is physically transferred ­payments through exports; and they have also experi­
from the seller to the purchaser. enced dramatic growth rates in employment as well as
It is important not to become too distracted by new firm formation.
attempts to arrive at a precise definition of service activi­
ties. Nevertheless, their classification is an important
activity for those engaged in measuring the economy, for
example national statistical agencies. It is far too easy
17.2 T wo common misconceptions
to become preoccupied with systems of classification at about service economies
the expense of understanding the changing dynamics of
capitalism. In any event, such is the pace of economic It is far too easy to assume that manufacturing no longer
change that classifications have to be continually modi­ matters in economies that are dominated by service
fied to incorporate the development of new types of work employment. Many service jobs are highly visible within
or the on-going ‘extended division of labour’ (Sayer and the economy, as a visit to a local shopping centre satu­
Walker 1992; Bryson 2009). rated with service experiences shows. In contrast, manu­
All attempts to classify services must accommodate facturing employment remains largely invisible since the
the complexity and diversity of the business activi­ production process is almost always isolated from the
ties involved (Illeris 2007). For our purposes a simple consumption of the product (Bryson et al. 2008; Bryson

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 348    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

et al. 2015). This separation of the production process

from the moment of consumption is atypical of many
service-based economic relationships. The dominance
of the latter and the apparent recent shift from manu­
facturing has led to two common misconceptions about
service employment and it is to these that we now turn
our attention.

17.2.1 Services as old as the Industrial Revolution

It is a common mistake to assume that the transformation
of economies towards services is a phenomenon of the
twentieth century. The social sciences have paid too little
attention to the role services played during the Industrial
Revolution or earlier. A good example is the development
of London in the nineteenth century as the command and Plate 17.2  Clerks at work in a US Government office,
control centre of the British Empire. A detailed analysis c. 1915.
(Everett Historical/Shutterstock)
of London’s fire office registers between the years 1775
and 1825 concluded by noting that the
(Hyde 1973). As the United Kingdom and the United
service industries made no less contribution to the States were becoming industrialized societies they were
British economy during the Industrial Revolution simultaneously being transformed into service econo­
than manufacturing, and that nowhere was this more mies; the growth of manufacturing employment went
true than in London. Its service economy was on a hand in hand with the growth of service employment.
very large scale, serving the nation as a whole as well
as the capital . . . London’s service industries under­
pinned both its own and the national manufacturing 17.2.2 P roductivity and services and the myth
and commercial infrastructure and at the same time of ­service economies
contributed to the new ‘commercialisation of leisure’. Since the nineteenth century the employment structure
(Barnett 1998: 183) of many countries has steadily shifted away from manu­
facturing to service employment. This shift should not be
During the late eighteenth century London was already equated with the demise of manufacturing or the com­
being transformed into an important world city; a pro­ plete displacement of manufacturing with service work.
cess that has continued to the present and which has fur­ Many national economies (Germany, Italy; see Table
ther enhanced its status as a global city (see ­Chapter 14). 17.1) are still dominated by the development, design,
Deane and Cole (1962: 166, 175) calculated that in 1851 manufacture and sale of goods; the absence of manufac­
some 45.3 per cent of the United Kingdom’s national turing within a national economy would present serious
income was derived from service activities (trade, trans­ problems since everyday life as well as service work is
port, housing, the professions and the civil service) as the supported by a complex array of manufactured prod­
structure of employment changed dramatically as a result ucts – clothes, toasters, cars, clocks, toothpaste, tissues,
of technological innovation and the increasing maturity deodorant, laptops and toys (Bryson and Rusten 2011).
and extension of the capitalist system. Growth occurred Some of these products can of course be traded between
in occupations that facilitated the exchange of goods and countries but many need to be manufactured or custom­
services between producers and consumers (Plate 17.2). ized locally, for example products that are difficult or
Between 1881 and 1901 the number of business clerks impossible to transport (perishable foods, commercial
increased from 175,000 to 308,000; bank officials from air-conditioning systems) or production processes that
16,000 to 30,000; and insurance officials and clerks from require close contact between producers and consumers,
15,000 to 55,000 (Marsh 1977: 124). During the nine­ for example, customized alterations to machine tools or
teenth century the expansion of international trade was the co-innovation of new products (Bryson et al. 2008).
restricted by financial problems until it was enabled and Since products can be traded for services, it is pos­
supported by the introduction of bill markets and bank­ sible to argue that manufacturing no longer needs to
ing facilities of the kind associated with the flow of tea be undertaken in service-dominated economies. Nev­
and silk from China to Europe between 1860 and 1890 ertheless, many services support and are supported by

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 Chapter 17  Service economies, spatial divisions of expertise and the second global shift     349

manufacturing activities, for example the complete between work practices and new technologies (such as the
removal of manufacturing from the West Midlands introduction of people-facilitated, as well as automated,
(United Kingdom) would reduce the client base of local call centres) but is either non-existent or extremely low
service companies by 25 per cent (Daniels and Bryson in, for example, medical services, teaching and the crea­
2005: 3). It has also become apparent that a national tive industries. It is very difficult for a dance company
economy that is over-reliant on products that are manu­ to achieve productivity improvements; it involves putting
factured elsewhere is increasingly exposed to many differ­ on more performances, using fewer dancers, or increas­
ent types of risk. First, since the 2008 financial crisis and ing the speed of delivery to enable two performances to
global recession manufacturing firms in Germany and the be given during the time previously devoted to a single
UK have proved to be more resilient than many service performance. This is a good illustration of the fact that
firms with increases in employment, output and exports many service occupations are labour-intensive (Moretti
(Markit 2011). Over-reliance on products manufactured 2013: 63) and often involve face-to-face interactions
abroad also has implications for health and safety. In between service providers and clients for which produc­
August 2007, for example, Mattel, the world’s largest toy tivity improvements are difficult to achieve. As a result,
company, issued a product recall for 436,000 toys made overall productivity improvements in the service side of
in China that were painted with lead-based paint and the economy have, as a general rule, lagged behind manu­
18.2 million toys that were designed with small magnets facturing with the implication that this differential partly
that could become detached. This type of product recall explains the shift from manufacturing to service work.
provides American toy manufacturers with a competitive The significance of this reasoning can be demonstrated
advantage as they are able to market their toys as ‘Made with reference to UK manufacturing exports, which
in America’ (Rusten et al. 2007) and as ‘100 per cent kid- amounted to £230 billion or 46 per cent of total exports
safe’ (Martin 2007). in 2013 (Rhodes 2014). Yet manufacturing directly
After the Second World War, manufacturing employ­ employed only 2.62 million workers, with a further 3
ment encountered gales of creative destruction (Schum­ million jobs dependent on the sector. A major problem
peter 1942) that eventually culminated in, what some is that official definitions of manufacturing employment
commentators have termed, the crisis of Fordism (Gaffikin do not include jobs and activities that depend on, or are
and Nickson 1984). This led to an ongoing reduction in closely allied to, manufacturing such as design or market­
manufacturing employment and a shift towards a diverse ing activities undertaken by specialist ‘service’ providers.
collection of service jobs. The difficulty is that scholars Recent research has identified that some of the highest
and policy makers tend to equate such a decline of (often) paid services are tied to manufacturing, for example
high-profile manufacturing firms with a contraction in research and development, design and finance (Sisson
manufacturing overall. In practice it does not mean that 2011). One difficulty with analyzing the shift towards
countries in Europe and North America, for example, service-dominated economies is that activities that were
have been transformed into service economies; it is essen­ once undertaken in vertically-organized manufacturing
tial that a distinction is made between adjustments to the firms have been outsourced and are now purchased on
employment composition of an economy and changes in the market (Levinson 2013).
economic output (productivity). These two indicators of On average, UK manufacturing output has grown by
economic change are not necessarily related, or they are 1.4 per cent a year since 1948, but it contracted during the
related in unexpected ways. economic downturns of the early 1970s, 1990s and fol­
Especially important is that the types of productivity lowing the 2008 economic downturn. The overall rate of
improvements that have been achieved by manufacturers output growth has been at a much slower rate than other
through automation and process improvements are not sectors of the British economy (Hardie and Banks 2014).
necessarily achievable by service providers. The category Thus, although the gross added value (GVA) created by
‘services’ includes an extremely diverse group of business manufacturing increased by 26 per cent over the period
activities: from very highly paid professional occupations 1992 and 2003 (Figure 17.2), it was actually lower than
(lawyers, surgeons, bankers) to very poorly paid occu­ the rate achieved in other sectors of the economy. Service
pations (janitors, waiters). The common denominator sectors were growing at a much faster rate even though
is that, unlike manufacturing, many of these occupa­ in absolute, rather than relative, terms manufacturing’s
tions rely on people-based skills or what is commonly contribution to the overall economy increased over this
termed ‘embodied labour’ (Bryson et al. 2004; Bryson time period. It is important to recognize that a restruc­
and Daniels 2015a). In these circumstances the chal­ turing of economic activity is taking place; new types
lenge of improving productivity is considerable. It is at of economic activity such as information management
its highest and still increasing where there is interaction or digital services (e.g. website design) are flourishing

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 350    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

10.0
Agriculture 1992
10.1

13.4 2003
Mining & quarrying
22.3

115.9
Manufacturing
146.1

14.9
Electricity, gas & water supply
17.1

30.0
Construction
60.9

79.6
Wholesale & retail trade
154.1

45.1
Transport & communication
78.3

131.1
Financial intermediation
310.9

37.8
Public administration
50.3

Education, health & 65.4

social work 125.7

22.1
Other services
51.8

0 100 200 300 400

£ billion (excluding FISIM)1

Figure 17.2  Comparison of gross value added in the UK at current basic prices by industry
between 1992 and 2003.
1
FISIM = Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured
Source: from Mahajan, S. (2005) Input-Output Analysis: 2005, p. 23, Office for National Statistics, London. Office for
National Statistics licensed under the Open Government Licence v.1.0

alongside the development of innovations in well-estab­ cent in market research and management consultancy
lished services such as insurance, banking and retailing. (Figure 17.2 and Table 17.1). In 2004, computer services
Such restructuring arises from, first, the externalization alone accounted for 2.9 per cent of total GVA (£30.0 bil­
of previously in-house services to independent providers lion). It is clear then that the recent growth of the UK
and, second, the continuation of an extended division economy has been led by service industries; they com­
of labour based upon the development of new services, prise all of the top ten fastest growing industries between
technologies and business models. The latter arises from 1992 and 2004, for example. An inexorable decline in
the growing complexity that accompanies many service manufacturing employment has therefore been offset by
innovations as service providers seek to refine product employment gains in services.
differentiation in the marketplace. While the shift towards services is ongoing the
While most of the key manufacturing sectors have economy continues to be integrated in complex ways
therefore declined in relative terms, and some in abso­ and it is important to identify and explore some of the
lute terms (for example, footwear, knitted goods, leather interactions between manufacturing and service activi­
goods, man-made fibres, wearing apparel), the service ties. The question is ‘How does this perspective affect
sector has expanded, whether measured by employment our interpretation of employment gains in services at
or GVA. In the United Kingdom between 1992 and 2004 the expense of manufacturing?’ After all, the employ­
GVA increased by 381.5 per cent in computer services, ment roster of a manufacturing company can be largely
252.2 per cent in other business services and 266.2 per made up of individuals working on activities such as

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 Chapter 17  Service economies, spatial divisions of expertise and the second global shift     351

marketing, advertising, management, accounting and experiences must be co-created as part of an interaction
purchasing. This returns the analysis to the definition between service producers and consumers delivered by
of manufacturing and services. On the one hand, we can people rather than by machines. Unlike manufacturing, it
suggest that part of the shift towards service employ­ is difficult, and in many instances impossible, to replace
ment reflects a transfer of service tasks that were pre­ service workers with machines and this means that pro­
viously undertaken within manufacturing firms to ductivity improvements are difficult for those services
external service providers. On the other hand, we can that rely on people-based expertise. This is an important
suggest that ‘although the objective of manufacturing point given that some service activities can certainly be
industry is the production of commodities many people codified and replaced with relatively simple computer
employed in manufacturing are not directly employed in programs. A good example is an application for a mort­
the actual production process’ (Crum and Gudgin 1977: gage that can be processed by a computer using simple
3). Questions then follow about the wisdom of dividing rule-based logic such as a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer,
the economy into service and manufacturing activities for example, related to the value of the property or the
(Daniels and Bryson 2002; Bryson and Rusten 2011). In income of the applicant(s) (Levy and Murnane 2004:
1971 every two production workers needed to be sup­ 16–17). Yet it is very much the case that such simple rule-
ported by rather more than one non-production worker based software cannot replace many service jobs because
(Crum and Gudgin 1977: 5); the term non-production is they require complex pattern recognition such as reading
used to identify people within a manufacturing firm who body language in service encounters.
are not directly involved in the actual production process The importance of face-to-face contact in the simulta­
(managers, designers, sales team, research scientists). neous production and consumption of a range of services
Since Crum and Gudgin’s research, there have been plays an important role in differentiating the new world
two major organizational changes to production pro­ of service work from that of manufacturing (McDowell
cesses. First, knowledge has become more important as 2009). At the centre of interactive service relationships
well as being increasingly combined or embedded within are three important elements: client interaction, an indi­
products and services. Second, the production of goods vidual’s reputation, and embodied knowledge. In this ser­
and services has increasingly required the blending of dif­ vice age, the workplace is increasingly conceptualized as
ferent types of expertise that include processes involving a stage upon which employees must execute an aestheti­
shop-floor workers (manufacturing as well as services) cally pleasing performance. Service employment is not
and a complex array of service and management exper­ simply about the exchange of goods or services but is a
tise. All these different types of expertise can be organ­ complex skill in which presentation, communication and
ized within a manufacturing company or, alternatively, display are integral to success (Bryson and Wellington
by buying in the activities provided by many separate and 2003: 60). It follows that for some service jobs, appear­
independently owned service firms. These relationships ance, the body and accent matter (McDowell 2007) and
between manufacturing and services can be measured as this implies that service economies have within them
‘multiplier’ effects whereby jobs in one sector create jobs cohorts of people who do not possess the desired bodily
in other sectors. For example, Bivens (2003) has estimated attributes to meet the expectations of employers and per­
that in the United States business services have an employ­ haps customers (Bryson and Wellington 2003). McDowell
ment multiplier of 1.63: that is, every business service job argues that in the United Kingdom this group includes
creates 1.63 jobs elsewhere in the economy. Manufactur­ white working-class males who find it difficult to obtain
ing jobs have an employment multiplier of 2.91 and jobs well-paid service work.
in transportation a multiplier of 1.66. The high multi­ The academic literature on service work is heav­
plier for manufacturing highlights that the production of ily influenced by Arlie Hochschild’s (1983) important
goods creates jobs in other manufacturing firms, as well work on the commercialization of emotions in face-to-
as in transportation, business services and retailing. face service encounters. Hochschild was inspired by C.
Wright Mills’s (1959 [1951]) classic work, White Collar.
Mills was the first sociologist to explore the complexity
and diversity of service work in his analysis of the new
17.3 The body, services and emotional American middle class. Mills developed the concept of
labour the ‘personality market’ to describe the ‘shift from skills
with things to skills with people’ (1959: 182); central to
The classic definition of services developed by Hill (1977) this shift is the enhanced importance of the psychologi­
highlights the importance of people-based expertise in cal dimensions of service work. In this account of the
the creation of services. This implies that many service new world of work, men and women ‘are to be shaped’

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 352    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

(1959: 183) and their personalities managed, by them­ not surprisingly, is highly visible in interactive business
selves and by others. service occupations and, in particular, the ‘professional
Horchschild developed Mills’s work by undertaking managerial classes’.
theoretically grounded research into the commercializa­ The importance of the body and image in service
tion of the body and the feelings of male and female economies has led to a new occupation, that of image
flight attendants and debt collectors. Central to this consultancy or impression management. Image con­
analysis is ‘emotional labour’, a concept that describes sultants are employed by individuals and firms to alter
the management of employees’ feelings during social the surface appearance of the body. Image consultants
interaction in the work process (Hochschild 1983: 137). provide seminars and one-to-one consultations directly
The best example is the emphasis placed on providing related to the restructuring of professional employees’
a ‘service with a smile’ to show customers that they are bodies. According to Wellington and Bryson (2001: 940):
valued. Hochschild reveals that much face-to-face inter­
active service work (flight attendants, debt collectors, KPMG [the accountancy firm] employs image consult­
waitresses, secretaries, fast-food operations) involves ants on a monthly basis primarily to provide employ­
having to present the ‘right’, managerially prescribed, ees with a ‘confidence boost’, and also to provide staff
emotional appearance or mask to the customer or client, with a ‘bonding experience’. The accountants Coop­
and that this involves real labour. In these occupations ers and Lybrand as well as Ernst and Young hire image
workers are faced with the dilemma of how to identify consultants to provide seminars in personal presen­
with their work role without it becoming part of their tation for their audit teams. These seminars exam­
identity. ine ways of increasing credibility and projecting the
Service employees have to depersonalize the work right image when undertaking client audits and when
by ‘surface acting’ and ‘deep acting’. In surface acting pitching for new business. Price Waterhouse employed
‘we deceive others about what we really feel, but we do image consultants to instruct potential partners in
not deceive ourselves’ (Hochschild 1983: 33); the body dining etiquette and in the art of looking, acting and
not the soul is the main tool of the trade; the smile on sounding like a partner of a major global accountancy
the face of the worker is a false smile, but it is still a company. Note the use of the terms act and art and
smile. In emotional labour a smile becomes attached to the link to the literature on flight attendants.
the feelings that a company wishes to project rather than (Taylor and Tyler 2000)
being attached to its usual function – to show a personal
feeling (Hochschild 1983: 127). In deep acting the ‘act’ The literature on emotional labour suggests that in the
is no longer an act but becomes part of the individual’s service economy employees have to develop skills in deal­
persona. It is about persuading employees to be sincere, ing directly with people. The implication is that extrovert
‘to go well beyond the smile that’s just “painted on”’ personalities may have little difficulty in fitting into this
(Hochschild 1983: 33). Unprecedented efforts are being new world of service work, but that introverts may experi­
made by employers to control employees not simply in ence some challenges. It is important to remember that in
terms of what they say and do at work, but also how they many instances facing-based work that is heavily involved
feel and view themselves. In deep acting the disjunction in emotional labour will be supported by back office or
between displayed emotions and private feeling is severe out-of-client-sight supporting labour. This suggests that
and potentially psychologically damaging. The danger is a new division of labour is developing that links front and
that deep acting becomes part of the worker’s person­ back office workers together. The concept of emotional
ality and is used beyond the workplace. If this occurs labour also highlights the importance of proximity in the
then the new ‘emotional proletariat’ (Macdonald and co-creation of services (Bryson 2007). Developments in
Sirianni 1996) might find it difficult to ‘interpret and take information and communications technology continue
appropriate action in response to bodily signals’ (Shilling to transform the relationship between geography and
1993: 119). Hochschild’s account of male debt collectors economic activity. In 1970, Tobler famously identified
highlights how the display of aggression required by debt what he termed ‘the first law of geography; everything is
collectors can spill over into personal relationships with related to everything else, but near things are more related
wives and children. According to Bryson and Welling­ than distant things’ (1970: 236). This ‘law’ draws atten­
ton (2003: 62), ‘active involvement in “emotional labour” tion to the importance of the localization of relation­
renders employees’ appearance and personality a form ships of all types – social, economic, financial, service,
of “adjudicated cultural capital” that can be recruited, etc. Tobler’s first law is important for understanding ser­
managed, manipulated and utilized to buy the hearts and vices: all expertise, knowledge and emotional labour is
minds of consumers’. The commodification of image, determined by its geographical context.

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 Chapter 17  Service economies, spatial divisions of expertise and the second global shift     353

arithmetic in which he noted that one of the greatest

17.4  ervices and the spatial division
S English clockmakers of the seventeenth century, Thomas
of expertise Tompion (1639–1713), produced watches via a complex
division of labour in which ‘one man [sic] shall make the
The division of labour is a key concept for understanding Wheels, another the Spring, another shall engrave the
the organization of work under capitalism and the shift Dial-place, and another shall make the Cases, then the
towards service activities. In 1776 Adam Smith published Watch will be better and cheaper, than if the whole work
The Wealth of Nations, in which he established the foun­ be put upon one man’ (Petty 2004[1678]: 16).
dations of economic theory. For Smith, Adam Smith’s theory makes no explicit reference to
geography. The obvious extension of the division of labour
the greatest improvement in the productive powers is to incorporate geography into the process, and this
of labour, and the greatest part of the skill, dexterity, leads to a spatial division of labour (Massey 1984). Once
and judgement with which it is anywhere directed, or a production process had been subdivided into its com­
applied, seem to have been the effects of the division ponent parts it is a comparatively simple step to construct
of labour. warehouses or offices dedicated to a particular part of the
production process, such as consignment assembly and
(Smith 1977: 109)
packing for despatch or a marketing function. The spatial
To illustrate the importance of the division of labour, division of labour began with manufacturers establishing
Smith explores pin-making, suggesting that an individual specialist units that were contiguously located, but soon
without knowledge of the production process would be developed into a more dispersed spatial division of labour.
unable to make even one pin in a day. The production Different parts of the production process were located
process of pin-making can be divided into 18 distinct close to sources of raw materials, the market, or cheap
operations: from the drawing out of the wire to the mak­ or skilled labour. Very quickly, some regions and coun­
ing of the pin head. If one person performs all of these tries came to specialize in particular types of economic
tasks, then they might make 20 pins in a day. If, however, activity. For example, a (international) division of labour
individuals specialize in particular tasks, by introducing soon developed between the industrial countries (core)
a division of labour, Smith shows how ten people could producing manufactured goods and the non-industrialized
make 48,000 pins in a day (Bryson and Henry 2005). countries (semi-/periphery) supplying raw materials and
Adam Smith’s division of labour is based on his obser­ agricultural goods as well as a market for manufactured
vations of specialization within factories. There is no rea­ products. This spatial division of labour can occur within
son, however, why its principles should not be applied to service or manufacturing firms (Bryson et al. 2004) (Case
the services production process, not least to the ways in study 17.1). One location (a major city such as London)
which new service activities are identified and firms devel­ is used for the headquarters (HQ), another for research
oped to create a market for the provision of new forms and development (R&D), yet another (a peripheral region,
of services. It is worth noting that the division of labour South Wales, or a country, China) for the manufacturing
was extremely well known prior to Adam Smith’s work. branch plant, and sales and service centres will be distrib­
In 1678 Sir William Petty published an essay on political uted over the globe (Bryson and Rusten 2008).

Case study 17.1

ICT and business process outsourcing and for the developed world: now, many such branch
factories in the Philippines and India plants process data and/or interact with customers
located thousands of miles away.
Developments in ICT have made the transfer of Data-processing factories, for example, in the
service jobs to low-cost locations possible (Bryson Caribbean or Philippines are linked via cable and
et al. 2004; Bryson 2007). What is occurring is an satellite with service workers in Ireland, the Dominican
intriguing ongoing international division of labour, Republic, Jamaica, Mauritius and the United States. To
but with a difference; it used to be that branch plants Freeman this development ‘signals an intensification of
in developing or less developed countries were only transnational production and consumption – of labour,
associated with the assembly of products designed by capital, goods, services and styles’ (2000: 1). In 2013,
➜

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 354    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

➜ who are desperate for well-paid employment in a coun-

try where the national average wage is £300. It has
been estimated that the Philippines has 350,000 call
handlers compared to 330,000 in India; Philippine call-
centre workers speak English without an accent (Walton
2015) but wage costs are also between 50–80 per cent
less than in the USA, UK and Canada. In the United
Kingdom, call centres are staffed by students and tem-
porary workers and are considered to be twenty-first
century sweatshops with high staff turnover rates and
low salaries (£12,000–15,000). In India, they are desir-
able places, regarded as ‘hip and funky places to work,
somewhere to hang out with like-minded, outward-look-
ing young people’ (Spillius 2003: 44). In the 1990s the
call-centre industry did not exist in India, but by 2003,
1,500 Indian call-centre providers employed 102,000
young people in the ‘remote services’ industry; the
industry is growing by 70 per cent a year (Spillius 2003:
41). The increasing maturity of the offshoring market is
seeing growth in the Philippines, Poland, Romania and
Mexico and the continued existence of small centres
(Caribbean, Guatemala). Nevertheless, higher-value
service work, for example mobile app development,
remains located in developed market economies.
Plate 17.3  A call centre where business is Deciding to offshore a service function is a difficult
outsourced from Western companies in New Delhi, decision. Cost might be the most important driver,
India. but for some firms this might mean the provision of
(Sherwin Crasto/Reuters/Corbis) a less than satisfactory service to clients. There is
a continual attempt by companies to reduce costs
the Axiem Corporation established a business process and the offshoring of services, at the moment, plays
outsourcing (BPO) facility in Mandaluyoing City, Philip- an important role in this process and this create dis-
pines. The company employs over 200 providing data advantages for clients and staff. In 2011 staff at an
entry, call centre services, accountancy and IT services Orange call centre located in England were told that
to clients from Australia, New Zealand, Europe, USA they could retain their jobs if they relocated to the
and Asia. It is worth emphasizing that this example Philippines (Walton 2015).
highlights the shift away from the provision by offshore Offshoring is a complex process that involves an
BPS providers of relatively simple data entry to the on-going reorganization of the relationship between
provision of more knowledge-based services such as service functions, place and space. The first decade of
accountancy including taxation. this century was associated with the rise of service off-
Call-centre operations are labour-intensive, labour shoring. The current decade has seen ‘onshoring’ or the
accounting for over 65 per cent of their running costs. return of previously offshored functions to relatively high
In the 1990s, in the United Kingdom, American Express cost locations. In July 2011 Santander, UK, announced
and British Airways (BA) transferred their customer that it had returned all its call centres in India to the UK
services divisions from the United Kingdom to Delhi and because of customer complaints. The banks noted that
then Bombay. BA was attracted by India’s large pool of customers were frustrated in dealing with offshore call
English-speaking graduates who could be employed on centres and that this rapidly turned into dissatisfaction.
starting salaries of between £1,500 and £2,500. India Quality issues have played an important role in the new
has dominated the market for the provision of English- process of ‘return onshoring’. India has also experienced
speaking call centres, but is being challenged by coun- higher wage inflation whilst high unemployment rates in
tries like the Philippines. Every year India produces 2 the UK have increased staff retention and reduced the
million graduates, mostly taught through English, and cost differential related to training and wages.

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 Chapter 17  Service economies, spatial divisions of expertise and the second global shift     355

Within geography, the division of labour concept is to distinguish between corporate strategies that affect
traditionally associated with deskilling, branch plants production workers and those that involve expertise or
of manufacturing companies, and the ongoing develop­ forms of creative work. A spatial division of expertise
ment of an international division of labour, mostly asso­ distinguishes between the spatial organization of exper-
ciated with textiles and clothing, automotive, electronics tise (non-production activities, advanced business and
and to a much lesser extent services (Dicken 2015). It professional services (BPS) and management functions)
has been noted earlier in this chapter that the services and the spatial organization of production (Bryson
literature increasingly emphasizes the importance of and Rusten 2005, 2006, 2008). It reflects the distinction
emotional labour and embodied expertise in service rela­ between production and non-production activities within
tionships and production (Hochschild 1983; Fineman manufacturing (Crum and Gudgin 1977). The concept of
2000; Warhurst et al. 2000; McDowell 2007, 2009). The a spatial division of expertise shifts the focus of analysis
concept of a spatial division of labour therefore needs to the places where expertise is produced and consumed;
to accommodate the increasing centrality of embodied it also exists within and between international business
expertise in the economy (Wellington and Bryson 2001; service firms and manufacturing firms. The building
Bryson and Wellington 2003). There has also been a shift blocks of these ‘expertise’ economic systems are dis­
in the nature of particular forms of work. Some types tributed in a complex mosaic that reflects the ways in
of high-paid work, for example, are moving away from which all firms (from micro- to large transnational) try to
delivery by labour that is controlled by capital and regu­ maximize profitability. The spatial division of expertise
lated by company law to a situation in which control, or is informed by the social division of labour, which gives
more correctly power, in the ‘employment’ relationship is considerable emphasis to relationships between people
transferred from the employers to the employed experts. and to the joint supply and co-production of service
These are the most important asset ‘owned’ or managed knowledge/expertise.
by expertise-intensive firms; such walking, highly mobile The development of a spatial division of expertise has
resources leave their firms’ offices each evening and may, important implications for the geographies of service
or may not, return next morning. This contrasts with as well as manufacturing companies (Case study 17.2).
manufacturing where owners of capital exercise most of Companies, and even governments, increasingly develop
the power in the relationship with their employees. The services (as well as products) using production processes
rise of expertise-intensive occupations has shifted power designed to exploit differential comparative advantages.
away from employers to employees. Indicative of this This is not an entirely new process; earlier international
‘new order’ are the difficulties experienced by firms try­ divisions of labour were based on core countries produc­
ing to manage business service professionals and the con­ ing and exporting manufactured goods whilst peripheral
troversial role of staggered bonus payments and golden countries exported raw materials. This was the first manu­
handcuffs for staff retention in, for example, investment facturing division of labour, or the first global shift (Dicken
banking (Leicht and Fennell 1997; Alvesson 2000). 2015). The evolution into a spatial division of expertise
The spatial division of labour has continued to evolve came later. The comparative advantage for services is
and is increasingly centred on the expertise that is located derived from a different form of raw material, that is, a
within or outside client companies. This is not to sug­ highly educated and expert labour force and, importantly,
gest that the spatial division of ‘production’ labour is language skills. It is to the geographies of the new spatial
still not important, but it is now conceptually useful division of expertise that we now turn our attention.

Case study 17.2

Boeing’s new spatial division symbiosis that is developing between manufacturing

of expertise and services is changing the geographies of produc-
tion in complex ways, creating new business models
It is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish that capitalize on service/manufacturing expertise and
between manufacturing and service companies repositioning expertise as a key source of competitive
(Daniels and Bryson 2002). Many physical products advantage. There are many examples, but perhaps one
contain embedded services, for example software, or of the most dramatic is found in the aerospace industry.
In 2002, Boeing, the American manufacturer, began
are supported by service agreements. The increasing
➜

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 356    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

➜ 2008, 2011). This was in response to airline’s new con-

cern with fuel efficiency rather than extra speed.
For Boeing the Dreamliner manufacturing pro-
gramme represented a new way of designing and
manufacturing a complicated product that requires an
extended, complex supply chain. Before the Dream-
liner programme, Boeing followed a build-to-print
model. Over 1,000 companies in Boeing’s supply chain
were provided with detailed part specifications and
they only became involved with the aircraft programme
towards the end of the design and development pro-
cess. These companies provided parts that Boeing
assembled into subsystems and then aircraft. In this
Plate 17.4  The first Boeing 787 Dreamliner takes production model, Boeing was responsible for the
shape in the assembly plant in Everett, WA, USA. detailed design of the complete plane. For the Dream-
(AP Photo/John Froschauer/Press Association Images) liner, Boeing was responsible for the overall design of
the plane, for systems integration and final assembly,
developing the 787 Dreamliner, a new aircraft with a but detailed design work was transferred to a net-
range of 8,500 nautical miles that carries between 200 work of global partners. The result was a new spatial
and 300 passengers (see Bryson and Rusten 2006, division of expertise that was constructed around

Companies
U.S. Japan Italy

Boeing Fuji Alenia Fixed Trailing Edge

Nagoya, Japan
Spirit Mitsibushi Wing
Nagoya, Japan
Main Landing Horizontal
Vought Kawasaki
Gear Wheel Well Stabiliser
Nagoya, Japan Foggia, Italy
A
Centre Wing Box Aft Fuselage
Nagoya, Japan Charleston, SC
(Fuji)

41 43 44 46 47 48

Centre Fuselage B
Forward Fuselage Forward Fuselage
Wichita, KS Nagoya, Japan Grottaglie, Italy
A
Tail Fin
Puget Sound

A
Everett Foggia
41 Wichita B 46 Grottaglie
43 44
Nagoya Charleston, S.C.

Figure 17.3  Spatial divisions of labour and expertise in the design and fabrication of Boeing’s 787
Dreamliner aircraft.
Source: Bryson and Rusten (2008)

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 Chapter 17  Service economies, spatial divisions of expertise and the second global shift     357

capitalizing on Boeing’s own internal design and man- Japan, Italy and the USA are assembled before being
agement expertise combined with that of its partners flown to Everett for a final assembly process that nor-
distributed around the globe. This expertise is a com- mally takes only three days. This is both a conventional
bination of research and development with industrial spatial division of ‘production’ labour, with finished parts
design inputs developed in centres of excellence that travelling from one supplier to another down the chain,
support high-tech engineering activities. This new spa- and a spatial division of ‘embodied’ expertise. This is
tial division of expertise was based on the recruitment an example of an expertise-rich production system
of around 50 Tier 1 suppliers or partners and these in which conventional shop-floor manufacturing work-
suppliers sourced parts from Tier 2 suppliers that ers play a relatively minor role. Some 3,600 engineers
included parts from Tier 3 suppliers. were directly employed by Boeing in the design of the
This new model represented a radical alteration to Dreamliner, with the majority of these positions based at
the way Boeing designed and manufactured aeroplanes; the company’s Everett plant (Washington, USA) (Gates
most of the manufacturing was undertaken at factories 2005). A further 670 engineers are employed by Spirit
owned and managed by Boeing’s partners; the only Aerosystems, Wichita (Kansas, USA) and 570 in Japan.
major part of the Dreamliner’s airframe made by Boeing The Dreamliner was three years behind schedule
was the vertical tail. Boeing’s key partners include three when it made its first commercial flight in October 2011.
major Japanese manufacturing companies (Kawasaki The development programme was delayed due to dif-
Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Fuji ficulties with the engineering, supply chain problems
Heavy Industries) and Alenia Aeronautica, an Italian and a 58-day labour strike in 2008. The new production
company. The Japanese companies were responsible process based on global outsourcing (a new global
for the design and production of the Dreamliner’s wings; production network) proved to be flawed. Some of the
the first time Boeing had outsourced the most important partners in the Dreamliner’s supply chain experienced
part of an aircraft. Initially, the Japanese wing design major capacity problems and there were technical and
team worked closely with Boeing’s design team and was quality difficulties. In 2009, Boeing spent US$1 billion to
based at Boeing’s Everett facility in Washington State acquire a plant located in North Charleston, SC, owned
(USA). This team then returned to Japan to concentrate by Vought Aircraft Industries that makes parts for the
on the development of the detailed designs for the wing 787’s rear fuselage. There had been difficulties with this
while the Boeing design team shifted focus to concen- supplier that was causing a bottleneck in the Dream-
trate on systems integration. liner supply chain. Boeing employed additional staff at
In this way the Dreamliner combined Boeing’s ‘ser- Everett to overcome many of the difficulties the com-
vice’ expertise (design, development, system integra- pany faced as it tried to complete this new aircraft. The
tion, project management) with that of its partners. production of the Dreamliner highlights the importance
Once assembled in the Kawasaki plant the completed of the interplay that occurs between manufacturing and
wing box are transported by barge to Nagoya’s new services as companies develop new spatial divisions of
Centrair airport and from there flown to Charleston, labour. The Dreamliner’s development programme was
South Carolina, in modified 747 cargo freighters (Fig- delayed due to engineering difficulties and problems
ure 17.3). Charleston is the main fuselage hub in this coordinating and managing Boeing’s new approach to
spatial division of expertise; sections manufactured in working with suppliers.

an evolving spatial division of expertise. In the popular

17.5 The second global shift media or in political accounts this trend is known as ‘ser­
vice offshoring’ (see Case study 17.1), a term developed
The traditional view of services is that they were pro­ in the Anglo-American context that should be used with
duced and consumed locally; they were regarded as hav­ considerable care. Services can indeed be ‘offshored’
ing limited export potential. As we noted earlier in this but this is a less than helpful and even misleading term
chapter this reflects the way in which services were con­ when applied to the transfer of work from, say, France
ceptualized in traditional economic theory. Today, how­ to Eastern Europe. Outsourcing can occur at many dif­
ever, services are exported and companies are increasingly ferent spatial scales – from the local to the international
adopting business models that involve combining service whilst the term ‘offshoring’ describes the international
expertise, activities and functions located in different outsourcing of service functions. Perhaps the best term
parts of the world. In other words, companies are devel­ to use would be ‘international outsourcing’ rather than
oping competitive advantage through the development of offshoring.

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 358    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

The concept of service outsourcing emerged during offshore services market would reach US$252 billion in
the 1990s, but only became of major concern during this 2010. This activity is included within commercial services
century. Between January and May 2004, there were 2,634 exports; the top five exporters in 2013 were the United
reports in American newspapers that focused on service States (14.3 per cent of the world total), the UK (6.3 per
outsourcing (Amiti and Wei 2004: 4). Journalists tended cent), Germany (6.2 per cent), France (5.1 per cent) and
to focus on the fear of job losses as service outsourcing China (4.5 per cent). If the European Union is treated as
had the potential to strip jobs out of the American labour single entity then it becomes the top exporter of com­
market and relocate them to lower-cost production loca­ mercial services (US$891 billion, 25 per cent of the world
tions. Service offshoring is based on the concept of out­ total). The top five importers of commercial services in
sourcing, a term that describes the process by which a 2013 were the United States (9.8 per cent of the world
firm procures a material or service input from another total), China (7.5 per cent), Germany (7.2 per cent),
organization. France (4.3 per cent) and the UK (4.0 per cent) (WTO
Service offshoring was made possible by developments 2014: 27).
in ICT. During the late 1980s and early 1990s pioneer Service offshoring is not easily analyzed because ser­
companies experimented with offshoring service func­ vice tasks can be traded in four ways (United Nations
tions on the basis of opportunistic searches to reduce 2002: 1):
costs and also in response to sequential learning (Lewin
and Peeters 2006). In the early stages, relatively simple Mode 1: cross-border supply occurs when suppliers of
business processes related to finance, accounting and services in one country supply services to consumers in
information technologies were offshored. As experi­ another country without either supplier or consumer
ence of offshoring these functions has accumulated, it moving into the territory of the other.
has encouraged firms to include more technically com­ Mode 2: consumption abroad refers to the process by
plex processes and higher value-added tasks. Offshoring which a consumer resident in one country moves to
was originally developed by business units within firms another country to obtain a service.
interested in cutting costs but it has become a stand­
ard business process and another management tool or Mode 3: commercial presence occurs when enterprises in
approach sold by management consultancy firms to their an economy supply services internationally through the
clients and also heavily marketed by providers of offshore activities of foreign affiliates.
services. Mode 4: presence of natural persons describes the process
Service offshoring occurs when firms shift production by which an individual moves to the consumer’s country
to foreign locations. The objective may be to reduce costs, to provide a service, whether on his or her own behalf or
to service a foreign market, to reduce exposure to coun­ on behalf of his or her employer.
try risk, or to access skilled labour. An additional factor
influencing the location of offshore service centres is the Three of these modes are concerned primarily with
requirement to provide a 24-hour service to customers service transactions between residents and non-residents.
or an extended service beyond standard working hours. Mode 1 involves the provision of services that require
The cost of providing such services can be high as late- no direct contact with customers but procedures must
shift workers expect higher wages or extended ­holidays. be developed to overcome cultural barriers that exist
Advanced call-routing and networking technologies between countries. Recently, there has been a particular
­enables companies to mitigate this by implementing a interest in Mode 3, whereby enterprises supply services
‘follow-the-sun’ geographical policy. By locating call internationally through the activities of foreign affiliates
centres open 8–12 hours per day in widely separated (Bryson et al. 2004). For services, the Mode 3 ‘method of
time zones, companies can use automatic call routing serving foreign markets is particularly important because
to provide clients with a 24-hour/7-day-a-week service. it is often the only method that permits the close and
Country risk is removed when a company is able to shift continuing contact between service providers and their
the provision of a function between facilities located in customers necessary to compete effectively with indig­
different countries. enous firms’ (United Nations 2002a: 54). In this instance
Global data on service offshoring and inshoring is dif­ the provision of services through foreign direct invest­
ficult to find (Amiti and Wei 2004); inshoring describes ment represents a type of captive offshoring or offshoring
the amount of outsourcing that a country receives. In without outsourcing. Captive offshoring enables a firm
2008, estimates of the size of service offshoring ranged to retain control over its assets, intellectual property and
from US$101 to US$157 billion (Gereffi and Fernandez- core business processes. Trade in services must address
Stark 2010: 6) and in 2008 the OECD estimated that the cultural differences between countries that restrict the

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 Chapter 17  Service economies, spatial divisions of expertise and the second global shift     359

ability of service providers to export standardized ser­ not require face-to-face interaction with consumers
vices. Modes 3 and 4 enable service providers to local­ or clients. Second, the inputs and outputs required to
ize provision to take into consideration local cultures deliver the service must be capable of being traded or
and client expectations. Modes 1, 3 and 4 involve what transmitted with the assistance of ICT (OECD 2005:
is commonly termed ‘service offshoring’ or more cor­ 12). Third, some service activities are not fixed in space
rectly ‘service global sourcing’. This is encapsulated by and can be provided either as a form of foreign trade
the concept of a ‘second global shift’ (Bryson 2007). or by the temporary relocation of a service worker to a
The first global shift involved the relocation of manu­ client’s premises, for example management consultancy
facturing employment to low-cost production locations or various forms of auditing. Fourth, specialist services
while the second implicates services in this process. There can be provided from central locations with consumers
have been three distinct phases to the second global shift. travelling to avail themselves of the service. In many cases
First, during the early 1990s IT programming, testing and such services would be provided within the confines of a
network support activities were outsourced and then nation-state, but some are being consumed by a form of
globally sourced. Second, during the late 1990s global service-based travel, for example education (secondary
sourcing diversified into the provision of back-office and and tertiary), plastic surgery and a whole range of other
call-centre functions and also the development of com­ surgical procedures.
puter applications. Third, during the early years of this During the 1980s India began to develop capability
century full service centres emerged that provide a wide and capacity in the provision of offshore services. It was
range of administration, process, contact and support triggered by three events. During the late 1980s some of
functions. the key chip designers employed by Texas Instruments
The second global shift highlights the potential for in America were Indian and Texas let them return home
transferring service work from developed economies to to work for them from there using early forms of ICT.
low-cost locations, and it has provoked a major policy In 1989, Jack Welch, the then Chairman of the Ameri­
debate, or even panic, in the USA and Europe (Parker can conglomerate General Electric (GE), visited India
2004; Blinder 2006). For example, Forrester (a consul­ and realized that it offered a pool of talented individu­
tancy company) has estimated that 1.1 million Western als who could be of benefit to GE. A team was sent to
European jobs will move offshore during 2005–15 and India and GE set up a joint development project with
that two-thirds of these jobs will originate from the an Indian engineering company, Wipro. Second, during
United Kingdom (Parker 2004). Perhaps the best estimate the late 1990s the Y2 computer crisis, or the millennium
comes from an analysis of occupational data for several bug, provided India with clients interested in computer
OECD countries which suggests that around 20 per cent remediation. When computers were originally designed,
of total service employment has the potential to be geo­ to save memory their clocks used six digits for dates –
graphically footloose as a result of rapid developments in two for the day, two for the month and two for the year.
ICT (van Welsum and Reif 2005: 6). Ultimately, the only When the year 2000 arrived there was a risk that comput­
types of service jobs that will be safe are those for which ers would not recognize it, but would think that it was
face-to-face interaction is absolutely essential (Levy and the year 1900. The resulting need for Y2 upgrading was
Murnane 2004). tedious work and many American and European compa­
The development of service offshoring represents a nies commissioned Indian companies for the task. This
new type of international division of labour, but with a allowed the Indian computer industry to enter the global
difference. It is various forms of service activity, ranging marketplace for the provision of computer services, an
from call-centre-based work to back-office administra­ opportunity they would build upon when the Y2 work
tion that is being relocated to low-cost locations rather was replaced by the e-commerce or dot-com boom. The
than manufacturing or assembly activities. This new form dot-com boom led to investment in undersea fibre-optic
of trade involves low-value call-centre-type activities as cable, but the dot-com bust that followed meant that the
well as high-value services such as legal work, account­ cost of using this cable was virtually nil and this vastly
ancy, design, business analysis, and equity research (Table increased the number of American companies wanting
17.2). Using high-speed fibre-optic cables and undersea to outsource service activities to India (Friedman 2005:
telephone lines data scanned in Britain or America is 106–10).
transmitted to a low-cost offshore location to be pro­ Outsourcing services to companies located in other
cessed in back offices or used in call centres. countries comes with a number of risks attached to lan­
A number of factors influence the decision to send guage, culture and the quality of the provided service.
a particular service activity offshore. First, it must be Unlike the first ‘global shift’, the geography of the sec­
capable of some degree of standardization that does ond global shift is determined by the educational and

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 360    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Table 17.2  Service jobs that have been sent offshore from the United Kingdom

Customer-facing – constant contact between

­producer and consumer Back office – business process outsourcing

Call centres Business services

Customer services Accountancy
Out of hours claims (call centre) Legal services
Back office administration Finance
Back office processing Human relations
E-commerce IT provision
Credit control Business systems
Internet services Graphics and architectural services
Internet claims Document production
IT helpdesk Underwriting
Rail timetable enquiries Technical lists
Equity research
Business analysts
Legal secretaries
Software development
City analysts
Transcription services (voice and shorthand)
Copy-editing
Management of University programmes
Computer-based learning
Website design and management
Source: after Bryson (2007)

language abilities of service workers located in foreign service suppliers to relate to customers located in other
locations that may also perhaps, but not always, be lower- countries (Figure 17.4).
cost locations (Bryson 2007). For the English-speaking An implication is that countries which developed
world this means that potential suppliers must be able to extensive empires during the nineteenth century may have
provide English-speaking employees in other countries, inadvertently laid the foundations for the emergence of
while France, Norway or Sweden, for example, require foreign competitors who are able to exploit the benefits
a pool of staff fluent in French, Norwegian or Swedish. associated with their acquired or imposed non-native lan­
Language and culture plays a much more important part guage. This is a form of ‘post-colonial twist’ in that the
in this global shift than they did during the development various trading and political empires encouraged the use
of an international division of manufacturing labour. of a common language and, in many cases, common legal
This means that countries with relatively localized lan­ and educational systems (Bryson 2007). It is therefore not
guages may be protected from the global sourcing of ser­ surprising that countries such as the United Kingdom and
vices whilst countries with more widely spoken ‘global’ the United States that are part of a globalized language
languages (such as English, Spanish or French) will grouping may be most at risk from companies choosing
almost certainly participate in the second global shift. to deliver services from lower-cost locations either by
Therefore the geography of the second global shift is also establishing their own operations via a process of foreign
different from the first; it is more constrained by language direct investment or by subcontracting the activities to a
as well as cultural nearness, that is, the ability of foreign third party and often foreign service provider. Whether

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 Chapter 17  Service economies, spatial divisions of expertise and the second global shift     361

Countries where English is a lingua franca or widely spoken

Figure 17.4  Language as a factor in the geography of outsourcing countries where English is a lingua franca or
relatively widely spoken.

this is a ‘real’ threat will depend on whether the avail­ and Technology Agreement (ITA) was concluded in
ability of lower-cost services will actually enhance the 1996 and this removed duties on IT products included
competitiveness of other parts of the developed market in the agreement. The ITA facilitated major growth in
economies, leading to future innovation and wealth-crea­ the export and import of IT services. India has become
tion opportunities. It is also important to remember that the predominant location for the offshoring of software
the second global shift does not just involve the transfer services (Table 17.3). In 2009, India exported US$33 bil­
of jobs from high- to low-cost economies but it is also lion of computer services and other developing countries
a two-way process in which service providers based in (Philippines, Malaysia and Costa Rica) have experienced
low-cost locations must also establish branch offices in significant growth in IT exports. The export of IT ser­
developed market economies. Service offshoring is a com­ vices in some developing countries has been growing at
plex process involving the development of firms that have much greater rates than developed economies so that
the ability to provide service functions from a number the Philippines, for example, has experienced dramatic
of different locations. This type of transnational service growth with IT exports increasing from US$89 million
firm can develop out of the activities of firms located, for in 2005 to US$1.9 billion in 2010; an annual growth rate
example, in the United States or United Kingdom (devel­ of 85 per cent (WTO 2014: 92)
oped market economies) or in India or China (developing Service offshoring represents a stage in the evolv­
or transition economies). ing global geography of production. It was driven by
The evolving geography of service offshoring is com­ developments in ICT and also salary differentials. The
plex as the geography differs by the task that is offshored threat of offshoring service jobs from the US and Europe
and by sector. Technological innovations, the Internet, exerted a downward pressure on salaries rather than
and the language and IT skills of the workforce have facil­ leading to major job losses in developed market econo­
itated the offshoring of information technology services. mies. Developments in computer coding, new algorithms
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Information and industrial robots have perhaps displaced many more

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 362    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Table 17.3  Top five exporters and importers of computer services by economy grouping, 2005–10 (% and US$
thousand)

Exports Imports

Value Growth Value

(US$ ’000) p.a (%) (US$ ’000) Growth p.a (%)

2005 2010 2005–10 2005 2010 2005–10

Least developed
countries (LDCs)
Bangladesh 18,557 37,440 15 3,792 4,873 5
Uganda 32,825 37,407 3 22,191 32,679 8
Mozambique 121 5,237 112 2,659 691 -24
Tanzania 265 4,634 77 4,597 9,561 16
Samoa n.a. 972 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other developing
economies
Israel 4,528,500 7,699,500 11 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Philippines 89,000 1,928,000 85 62,000 109,000 12
Malaysia 435,260 1,453,770 35 379,295 1,206,030 34
Costa Rica 254,378 1,216,190 37 10,721 20,844 14
Hong Kong, China 207,000 812,000 31 371,000 488,000 6
Developing country
G20 members
India n.a. 33,383,179 n.a. 1,048,870 2,175,840 16
Russian Federation 374,570 1,273,280 28 378,620 1,637,450 34
Argentina 235,210 1,237,340 39 190,730 445,356 18
Brazil 80,223 195,100 19 1,656,840 3,414,480 16
Korea, Republic of n.a. 149,000 n.a. n.a. 170,600 n.a.
Developed economies
Ireland 19,369,000 37,196.458 14 378.063 752,273 15
Germany 8,415,411 15,304,988 14 8,587,027 14,066,711 10
United Kingdom 8,476,394 9,952,424 3 3,339,921 5,256,661 10
United States 3,554,000 8,771,000 20 2,000,000 18,394,000 56
Sweden 2,608.025 6,813,995 21 1,384,166 2,341,998 11
Source: after WTO (2014: 92)

call-centre operators in developed market economies that call centre or any business activity are constantly chang­
service offshoring. In 1998, Jack Welch, the then chief ing. Salary differentials narrow and may be replaced
executive of General Electric, noted that ‘ideally, you’d by a concern with the quality of service provided. In
have every plant you own on a barge to move with cur­ 2012, KPMG International noted that there was a revo­
rencies and changes in the economy’ (The Economist lution underway in business services that might mean
2013: 11). The factors that influence the location of a ‘the death of outsourcing’ as we know it (Justice 2012).

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 Chapter 17  Service economies, spatial divisions of expertise and the second global shift     363

Outsourcing is considered as playing an important role

in developing new processes and technologies, reducing 17.6 Conclusion
cost, accessing new sources of talent and transforming
business through working with new partners. Neverthe­ The history of economic development is one of increased
less, KPMG notes that different firms have very differ­ economic specialization combined with the development
ent attitudes to the provision of services. Some firms of new and often complex geographies. All this repre­
consider sales and general administration as technical sents and reflects the constant working through of new
necessities that must be managed to reduce costs whilst divisions of labour and new ways of maximizing wealth
other firms consider these business functions as part of creation. The development of service-dominated econ­
a differentiation strategy in the marketplace. This is to omies represents a working through of the division of
highlight the important role core services play in build­ labour but it is worth remembering that it is important
ing market share and reflects a shift away from a focus to differentiate between employment and output. All ser­
just on cost control. Some business activities that used to vices must be supported by manufactured products and
be outsourced and offshored, such as data management all manufactured products are supported by services.
and the analysis of Big Data are increasingly considered The implication is that we have an integrated economy
to be strategic business processes that are best under­ in which the worlds of production (services and manu­
taken in-house. facturing functions), finance and consumption combine
The global sourcing or offshoring of services does not to produce local, national and international economies.
have to entail the supply of services over large distances. The spatial division of expertise and the related second
It may occur as ‘near-shoring’ or the relocation or provi­ global shift continue to evolve and have the potential to
sion of services over short distances and often between rework the national and global dynamics of the capitalist
locations on the same continental land mass (Gál 2009), economic system. Employment that was considered to
for example the ‘near-shoring’ of American services to be safe from foreign competition is suddenly exposed to
Canada. Services can now be supplied on-shore, near- business models that operate by blending together differ­
shore and offshore. Presented in this manner these may ent forms of expertise related to differential comparative
appear as simple alternatives but in many instances firms advantage. This may enhance productivity improvements,
have developed ‘blended delivery systems’ that capitalize leading to new innovations, but it also has the potential
on the place-based advantages of coupling or blending ‘to undermine the service-based solution to the employ­
activities located in a variety of different locations: home ment crisis that is still being experienced by many devel­
country, near, far (Bryson 2007). oped regional economies’ (Bryson 2007).

Learning outcomes ● Economic production is a story of economic

Having read this chapter, you should understand: specialization and the continual reworking of the
division of labour.
● Different ways in which services have been
● A spatial division of labour occurs with the geo-
defined and conceptualized by economists and
graphical separation of production tasks, for exam-
geographers.
ple, writing, printing, binding and distributing a book.
● The concept of a ‘personality market’ or emotional
● The development of a concept of a spatial division of
labour highlights the importance of embodied
expertise draws attention to the development of new
labour, or skills with people, in the world of service
corporate strategies that are founded upon exploiting
work.
comparative advantage based on expertise.
● Appreciate that as the United Kingdom and the
● Different economic geographies can be explained
United States became industrialized societies
by distinctive combinations and patterns of spatial
they were simultaneously transformed into service
divisions of labour and of expertise.
economies.
● Services were conventionally conceptualized as local
● Service economies should not just be identified by
untraded activities. The rise of the second global
measuring employment, but should also take into
shift or service offshoring highlights one of the latest
consideration gross value added (GVA).
developments in the capitalist economic system.

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 364    Section 4 Geographies of the economy

of labour amongst service activities and occupations as well

Further reading as the role of ICT in altering the geographies of production
systems.
Bryson, J.R. (2007) A ‘second’ global shift? The offshoring or Bryson, J.R. and Rusten, G. (2008) Transnational corpora-
global sourcing of corporate services and the rise of distanci- tions and spatial divisions of ‘service’ expertise as a competi-
ated emotional labour, Geografiska Annaler, 89B(1), 31–44. tive strategy: the example of 3M and Boeing, The Service
Bryson, J.R. and Daniels, P.W. (eds) (2015) The Handbook of Industries Journal, 28(3), 307–23.
Service Business: Management, Marketing, Innovation and Gál, A. (2009) ‘Future Bangalores? The increasing role of
Internationalisation Industries, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. ­Central and Eastern Europe in services offshoring’, available at:
Bryson, J.R., Daniels, P.W. and Warf, B. (2004) Service http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1334165.
Worlds: People, Organizations, Technologies, Routledge,
London. The most recent account of the different divisions

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 GEOGRAPHIES OF MONEY,
FINANCE AND CRISIS

Chapter 18

Manuel B. Aalbers and Jane Pollard

Topics covered
■ money and finance in economic geography
■ the relation between globalization and financialization
■ geographies of the financial crisis
■ global monies and local monies
■ occupy Wall street and other responses to crisis

Money is simultaneously everything and nothing, everywhere but

nowhere in particular.
(david harvey 1985b: 167)

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 366    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

T his chapter explores the social, economic, politi-

cal and geographical attributes of money, finance
and crisis. Many accounts of money and ‘the global
the ‘real economy’. As Davies (2002: 30) argues, the his-
tory (and geography) of the evolution of money reveals
‘unceasing conflict’ between borrowers, keen to expand
financial crisis’ are written by economists or finance the quantity of money in circulation, and lenders, keen to
specialists, who pay little attention to its geographi- limit the supply of money and, at all costs, preserve the
cal anatomy. Is finance something that we should quality of monies in circulation. Managing this conflict
think about geographically? Money can certainly or, more accurately, reacting to financial crises resulting
be placed, whether it’s in your pocket, your bank from it, has been and still is the mission of various regula-
account or in the stock market, but only in the first tory authorities.
case is your money a physical object. As the Harvey
quote suggests, money can be a difficult subject and
many contemporary debates about globalization 18.1 Money and finance in geography
stress the increasingly integrated, global machina-
tions of the financial system in which ‘virtual’ or Although we may be used to thinking of money as pri-
‘digital’ monies can be moved around the globe at marily an economic phenomenon, geographers and other
the touch of a button. One of the purposes of this social scientists are now recognizing that money is satu-
chapter is to persuade you of the existence and rated with cultural, social and political significance. In
importance of different geographies of finance that this section, we examine some of the social-geographical
together contribute to an understanding of the so- aspects of money. We focus initially on money and power,
called ‘global financial crisis’. before moving on to consider the financialization of
Novelists, filmmakers and social theorists alike have society and the geographies that connect individuals and
grappled with money’s contradictory characteristics. groups in different places and times. We also examine
Money can be everything and nothing, everywhere and some of the arguments concerning the globalization of
nowhere; money can be the root of all evil and a source money and finance, before outlining some of the prob-
of independence and freedom. Even simple questions lems with this view.
like ‘what is money?’ present some difficulties. Davies Many of the social and cultural aspects of money
(1994: 29) suggests that money is ‘anything that is are related to its role as ‘the very incarnation of social
widely used for making payments and accounting for power’ (Harvey 1982: 245). Again, however, we confront
debts and credits’. Historically, a wide range of items the contradictory qualities of money. As a means of
including beads, shells, whales’ teeth, cattle, salt, skins, expressing social power money has both desirable and
tobacco, beer, gold and silver have been used as money. less desirable qualities. Leyshon and Thrift (1997) talk
Such variation suggests that rather than asking what of two discourses about money: one of suspicion and
money is, we should perhaps ask what functions does one of liberation.
money perform? This question reveals the important To understand the discourse of suspicion, we can
economic functions of money and finance and their turn to the work of Georg Simmel (1978: 277), for whom
status as a source of social power. This is illustrated money is ‘the most perfect representation’ of the ten-
through a geographical reading of the financial crisis dency to reduce quality to quantity. As a store of value
that started in 2007 and ended in . . . well, we are not so and unit of account money transforms social relations –
sure about when the financial crisis ended or will end, ­qualitatively different commodities and experiences – into
as it has mutated from a subprime mortgage crisis and an abstract quantity, namely their price. In contemporary
a foreclosure crisis into a banking crisis, an economic capitalism, money has become the mediator and regula-
crisis, a political crisis, a sovereign debt crisis and a tor of economic relations between individuals, a meas-
euro crisis. ure of wealth and a means of expressing social power.
We are used to thinking of money and finance ‘oiling All manner of social, political and cultural issues – from
the wheels’ of commerce and also being a measure of healthcare, housing, education, leisure and sports, the
worth or value. Yet these two facets of money and finance environment, and so forth – are debated not in terms
can be contradictory. As a store of value, it is desirable of what they are worth, but in terms of how much they
for money to be a stable, fixed representation of value. are worth in the sense of what can be afforded. Money
As a medium of circulation and as a form of capital – ‘affects our very ideals of what is good and beautiful
money that is thrown into circulation with the intent of and true’ (Mitchell 1937: 371). Money, in this sense, has
generating more money – it is desirable to have money ­corroded the importance of other meanings and meas-
freely available as credit, divorced from its moorings in ures of ‘value’.

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 Chapter 18  Geographies of money, finance and crisis     367

Yet there is also a discourse of liberation that accom- 18.1.1 Global monies?
panies money. First, money provides a degree of individu-
ality, freedom, security and independence for those that Many geographers, particularly those working in a
hold it. This is especially true in societies like the UK political economy tradition, have argued that capital-
where laws regarding private property buttress ideologies ism appears to be speeding up and spreading out (Harvey
of liberty, equality and freedom. The idea that money is 1989; Massey 1994). Capitalism is seen to be spreading
empowering and liberating is central to the desire to pos- out in that more people in different countries and regions
sess money, to work for it, to accept it as payment and to are becoming bound up with the logics of contemporary
save and invest it. Second, as Simmel (1991: 20) argues, capitalism. It is also speeding up in that the pace of life
money ‘creates an extremely strong bond among mem- seems to be increasing in different parts of the globe.
bers of an economic circle’; people have far more connec- In Spotlight box 18.1, we noted the ability of money to
tions to other people in modern, monetized societies than transform qualitatively different commodities and expe-
was the case in feudal society. Through the division of riences into an abstract quantity, a price. This has led
many theorists to argue that money is a vehicle for the
labour in capitalist societies (see Chapter 2), money links
homogenization of space, for making different spaces
people together in offices, factories, homes and shopping
more similar. While there are ongoing debates about the
malls in different parts of the world. Money may in some
extent to which capitalism is generating a global culture
senses be corrosive of social bonds, but it also creates
(see Chapter 13), it is difficult to argue with the conten-
a community that can forge new connections and hold
tion that financial markets in different countries have,
people together.

Spotlight box 18.1

The functions of money temptation for banks and other lending institutions to
create large volumes of credit. Any sudden loss of con-
● Money is a unit of account: it is the base of fidence in the quality of credit, as happened in the Wall
­economic accounting systems. Street Crash of 1929 (see Plate 18.1) or in the recent
● Money is a measure of value: it is the commodity global financial crisis (from 2007), can trigger financial
against which the values of other commodities can panics and devaluation as depositors, investors and
be calibrated and compared on the same scale. financial institutions flee from credit moneys and seek
● Money is a store of value, in that you can sell a out safer havens.
good for a certain amount of money and then use
that money to buy something else at a later date.
Money thus allows for the separation of the sale
and purchase of commodities over space and
time if it is a reliable store of value. Preserving this
­ability of money to store value is one of the reasons
why governments are so concerned about the
­phenomenon of inflation.
● Money is a medium of exchange and circulation.
● Money is a means of payment and a standard for
deferred payments.

These different functions of money often come into con-

flict with each other. As a store of value, governments,
firms and individuals alike want monies to maintain their
value and hence their purchasing power, between differ- Plate 18.1  The Wall Street Crash 1929: the stock
ent times and spaces. As a medium of circulation, how- market collapse of October 1929 brought the 1920s
ever, it is important for money to be extended as credit. boom to an end and led to widespread bank failures,
Banks create credit – and thereby money – by bankruptcies and drastic reduction in the availability
extending loans to individuals, firms, governments of credit.
and . . . each other. During economic growth, there is (Bettmann/Corbis)

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 368    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

since the mid-1970s, become more interconnected (Har- We could extend the example by thinking through how
vey 1989; Martin 1994) and homogeneous. job losses in any other place would also have been felt by
When we talk about the globalization of finance, how- those not in paid work. For those in households depend-
ever, we are talking about more than just the growth of ent on the wages of someone made redundant there
international financial transactions, or the growing pres- would be further belt-tightening or a search for alterna-
ence of multinational companies in domestic financial tive sources of income. For the unemployed, job losses in
markets. Globalization implies: the area might mean more competition for any new jobs
that are created and so forth.
a strong degree of integration between the different
national and multinational parts . . . the emergence
of truly transnational banks and financial compa- 18.1.2 Forces for globalization and financialization
nies  .  .  .  that integrate their activities and transac- The organization of monies into different financial mar-
tions across different national markets. And above kets can appear dauntingly complex. In addition to the
all, it [globalization] refers to the increasing freedom financial jargon describing different products and mar-
of movement, transfer and tradability of monies and kets, the ‘global financial system’ can sometimes seem
finance capital across the globe, in effect integrating like something ‘out there’, a fast-moving, volatile ‘thing’,
national markets into a new supranational system. running out of control, increasingly uncoupled from the
(Martin 1994: 256) ‘real’ economy and operating beyond the regulatory
reach of any one nation-state (Langley 2003). This global
The emergence of this supranational system coincides sense of money and finance can be difficult to grasp and
with the increasing difficulties faced by nationally based sometimes it is difficult to understand just how its machi-
regulatory authorities like the Bank of England or the nations affect us. For example, how did the US housing
US Federal Reserve. The ‘discourse of suspicion’ we men- and subprime mortgage crisis that started in 2007 change
tioned earlier rears its head in many popular represen- the lives of people not only in the United States, but also
tations of ‘global finance’ as a ‘global financial casino in other continents (see Section 18.2)?
staffed by faceless bankers and hedge fund speculators The global financial crisis is often framed as one
who operate with a herd mentality in the shadowy world caused by unscrupulous financial practices in both
of global finance (Korten 1998: 4). This kind of discourse the global financial command and control centres
was also prevalent in the UK in 2008: Alex Salmond, First (­London, New York and so forth) and the daily life of
Minister of Scotland, argued that ‘spivs and speculators’ consumer banks and their customers. There is a feel-
were putting ‘the quality of life and jobs of hundreds, ing that finance is now playing a bigger part in both the
thousands and millions of people across the world at risk economy at large (the Economy with a capital ‘E’, that
through “short-trading”’ – where investors make money is measured in ‘gross domestic products’, stock indices
by betting that the price of shares in a company will fall and other statistics) and the economy of daily life (the
(cited in McIntosh and Maddox 2008). Whether or not many economies with a lowercase ‘e’, i.e. how individu-
you agree with these views, it is true that the degree of als and households go about in their personal lives) have
integration of the financial system profoundly shapes become more financialized. The burgeoning literature on
and connects the lives of people thousands of miles away financialization tries to answer the who, what, how, why,
from each other. In this sense, Leyshon (1995) talks of when and where questions of the presumed financializa-
money being able to ‘shrink’ space and time, bringing tion of the E/­economies. Financialization can be defined
some (but not other) parts of the globe relatively closer as ‘the increasing dominance of financial actors, markets,
together through the working of financial markets. A practices, measurements and narratives, at various scales,
good example of this is considered in Case study 18.1, resulting in a structural transformation of economies,
which describes how the fates of property developers in firms (including financial institutions), states and house-
Bangkok (Thailand) ultimately affected the fortunes of a holds’ (Aalbers 2015).
bartender, Graham Jones, in Whitley Bay (UK). The fates The ‘-ation’ part of financialization suggests that
of individuals and companies in Britain and Thailand it is not a state or end result but an action, something
are connected through the workings of foreign exchange that is produced. Many financialization scholars situ-
markets that, in turn, link national currencies to the com- ate the beginning of this most recent bout of financiali-
petitiveness of different nation-states. zation in the 1970s with the rise of neoliberalism (see
This example highlights only some of the interconnec- ­Chapter 8), the crisis of Fordist capitalism in the West (see
tions between changes in the value of the Thai baht and ­Chapter 3), the breakdown of the Bretton Woods sys-
how these affected businesses across Asia and Europe. tem (see Section 18.1.3) and other developments. Others

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 Chapter 18  Geographies of money, finance and crisis     369

Case study 18.1

From Bangkok to Whitley Bay . . . 4 The hotel

Siemens and its contractors, like Mitie, were the ­single
1 Devaluation in Thailand, July 1997 biggest sources of business for the Stakis Hotel.
In 1997, several property companies collapsed The hotel responded to the closure by switching their
in Thailand; property prices and the stock market market focus. As the flow of German executives and
started to fall. Currency speculators, already nervous their UK contractors slowed and then ceased, the hotel
about slowing growth in the region, started to sell the sought to attract more families.
baht (Thai currency) as they expected the currency
to be devalued. In July, the baht was devalued. As 5 The taxi firm
a result, Thai exports became cheaper and, to stay Foxhunters, a taxi firm, had a contract with Siemens
competitive, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and that generated more than a dozen runs a day, usually
the Philippines allowed their currencies to fall sharply. to the Stakis Hotel, the airport or the university. Since
Some Korean firms who needed foreign currency August, Siemens business had dried up and 85 ­drivers
to pay off loans started dumping cheap microchips, were chasing work for 50. Despite working longer
forcing microchip prices down from US$10 a unit to hours, drivers’ takings were down by between £100
US$1.50. and £200 a week. Drivers started to economize by
bringing in their own lunches and by cutting down their
2 Factory closure in North Tyneside, trips to the local pub.
UK, 31 July 1997
Rapidly falling semiconductor prices meant losses 6 The local pub
of £350 million for German electronics company Takings at Cameron’s had fallen by £600 a week since
Siemens. Siemens semiconductors were produced August. The landlord, who blamed the Siemens shut-
at plants in Tyneside (UK), Taiwan, Germany, France down for the reduced trade, cut his opening hours.
and the USA. Managers in Munich announced plans Attempts to drum up more trade by price reductions
to close their £1.1 billion plant in North Tyneside had little effect. The landlord was hoping for more
that employed 1,100 people and had opened only in ­business around Christmas. He and his partner had
1994. less money for spending on their leisure activities,
which included visiting places like Whitley Bay.
3 The cleaning company
The Siemens factory provided 10 per cent of 7 Graham Jones, bartender in Whitley Bay,
­business in the North East for Mitie, a cleaning October 1998
­company. One-third of the workforce of 90 people Graham was fired from his job at a pub in Whitley Bay;
were facing redundancy and their boss had his salary there was not enough business to occupy two bartenders
bonus cut 10 per cent, in line with the loss of work in the public bar.
from Siemens. Source: adapted from Carroll (1998)

have pointed at financial deregulation and the associated to some scholars, we have been here before, e.g. in the
changes on Wall Street and the City of London in the run-up the 1929 Wall Street Crash that was followed by
1980s, including technological developments (see below) the 1930s depression, and financialization thus should be
and the growing volumes of money that pension funds understood as a recurrent phase in capitalist development
seek to invest. The decline of communism and the fall of (Arrighi 1994).
the USSR (see Chapter 3) at the end of that decade are To illustrate the financialization argument, differ-
also mentioned as contributing factors, in part because ent authors cite different statistics to show that a whole
they discredited non-capitalist alternatives and under- range of financial markets have grown rapidly since the
wrote how neoliberal and financial discourses became 1970s. In the USA finance has become the dominant
dominant (Aalbers 2015). More generally speaking, source of profits since the 1990s (Krippner 2011), but
financialization is part of and key to structural trans- this can be witnessed in most OECD countries. For
formations of advanced capitalist economies. According the EU27, Eurostat (2011) has calculated that the FIRE

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 370    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

(finance, insurance and real estate) sectors together con- to firms and consumers. Online providers, without the
tributed 29 per cent to GDP. Even in Germany, which is costs of maintaining the bricks and mortar associated
often said to have a less financialized economy, the FIRE with a high street presence, provide insurance, banking,
sectors contributed more to GDP than manufacturing pension and other financial products to firms and con-
(30 per cent and 20 per cent respectively). Financial assets sumers with access to Internet technologies.
held by institutional investors as a percentage of GDP Third, and closely related to developments in tech-
grew rapidly in all OECD countries and now represent nology, there have been innovations in tradable financial
more than 200 per cent in countries like the USA and products that have made it easier and faster to move
UK and around 100 per cent in countries like Germany money around the globe. Derivatives are one example
and France, increasing three- (US) to tenfold (France) of this kind of innovation. Derivatives are contracts
between 1980 and 2001 (Deutschmann 2011). By con- between two entities that specify rights/obligations based
trast, the wage share of national income has fallen across on (hence ‘derived’ from) the performance of some other
the board, although less so in countries with strong currency, commodity or service. They often include
labour unions (Epstein and Jayadev 2005). Geographers swaps, options, futures and mortgage-backed ­securities
have repeatedly stressed that financialization is an inher- (see also Section 18.2.2 and Spotlight box 18.4). They
ently spatial phenomenon that should be much more cen- can be used to hedge against risk, or to provide leverage.
tral to economic geographic analysis. Local, national and In the 1970s, financial derivatives were created to allow
macro-regional institutions act as filters of how finan- financial managers to deal with currency risk, but since
cialization plays out and is perceived. that time they have become increasingly sophisticated
How has this financialization of the economy and glo- and extended to more markets. Since 1997, for exam-
balization of money come about? There is a range of fac- ple, energy suppliers, transport agencies, construction
tors to consider here. First, through the 1980s and 1990s, companies, wine bar owners and other firms exposed to
different governments and international institutions, like weather risk (the possibility that weather could have an
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have pursued adverse impact on their profits and cash flow) have been
neoliberal, free market policies and encouraged the dereg- able to purchase weather derivatives contracts to protect
ulation of financial markets (by eliminating exchange and themselves against this risk (Pollard et al. 2008). With this
capital controls) and the liberalization of flows of capital extension, however, there has been the proliferation of
across national borders. purely speculative trading of such financial instruments –
Second, there have been advances in telecommuni- and the development of other much more complex con-
cations and computing technologies. Computers have tracts. The derivatives’ market has grown exponentially
transformed payments systems. For hundreds of years, between 1990, when the market was almost too small to
payments and transfers of money were completed in measure, and 2006 when the number of outstanding con-
cash – coins and notes – and written down in ledgers. tracts added up to US$370 trillion (BIS 2008).
Coins and notes were superseded by cheques that in turn Innovations in computing and software technologies
have been superseded by electronic monies that can be and in financial instruments are fundamental to argu-
moved around the world at the speed of light. Semicon- ments about the growing financialization of the economy
ductor chips in computers mean that consumers in many alluded to earlier; this is an argument that asserts that
countries can use credit and debit cards to pay for goods. the speculative accumulation of capital has become an
In some countries, computer chips are now embedded end in itself in contemporary capitalism, that the finan-
in plastic ‘smart’ cards to allow the use of ‘electronic’ cial system has come to feed on itself, so to speak, rather
or ‘digital money’, or, more accurately, electronic rep- than supporting firms and industries and other elements
resentations of currencies, to pay for groceries, public of the ‘real’ economy (Strange 1999). Round the clock
transport or lunch at the university cafeteria. Finally, trading of financial instruments in different places and
there are the systems of communication, using earth- time zones opens up opportunities for speculation and
orbiting satellites, that are integral to the operation of arbitrage, which is the ability to profit from small differ-
computing systems, e-mail, the Internet and other forms ences in price when the same financial product is being
of communication that are used by banks, governments traded on more than one market. One indicator of how
and other financial players. These innovations have made growth in the international financial system is outpac-
24-hour trading possible as high-speed computers link ing the growth of the ‘real’ economy is provided by for-
stock markets in different countries. New communica- eign exchange trading data. According to the Bank for
tions and software technologies have also spawned the International Settlements the daily turnover of foreign
proliferation of financial websites, information providers exchange trading in 1973 was US$10–20 billion, roughly
and intermediaries able to provide financial information twice the amount necessitated by world trade. By 2004,

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 Chapter 18  Geographies of money, finance and crisis     371

daily trade in foreign exchange averaged US$1.9 trillion, 18.1.3 Debunking global monies
roughly ninety five times that necessitated by world trade.
By April 2010, daily trading volumes had reached US$4 A rather different departure point for talking about the
trillion (www.bis.org/publ/rpfx10.htm). For individual ‘globalization of finance’ is to argue that the financial
consumers with access to the appropriate technology system is not really global at all, that it is more like
there are now on-line financial bookmakers encouraging a web of connections between different financial sys-
clients to enjoy spread betting (and possibly tax-free prof- tems, some of which are bound together more tightly
its) on price movements of stocks, stock indices, curren- than others. This argument has developed because the
cies, interest rates, commodities and even house prices. idea of a ‘global financial system’ is problematic for
These, then, are some of the ways in which money has several reasons.
become more global since the 1970s. But what motivates The first problem stems from the simple observation
such changes? What motivates the implementation of ‘free that ‘global finance’ is largely the province of North
market’ policies, the development of new technologies and America, Europe and parts of Asia, most notably Japan,
financial instruments like derivatives? For those working Hong Kong, Singapore and, more recently, China; it is
in a political economy tradition, like David Harvey (1989), an idea centred on the experiences of the West. Many
the motivation for these changes is the search for profit. parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America are not only not
Capitalism is fundamentally about the accumulation of included in ‘the global financial system’; they are being
surplus. Competition drives capitalists to seek out new actively excluded as banks refuse to lend money until out-
markets, new products and to reduce the turnover time of standing debts have been repaid. There is what Massey
capital (see Spotlight box 18.2). In different parts of the (1993) describes as power geometry at work when some
globe, finance is the language through which the impera- commentators describe the financial system as ‘global’.
tives of capitalism are being communicated. For some financial workers in New York, London, and
So, there is a very strong economic rationale for the glo- Tokyo, international finance may be regarded as ‘global’
balization of money. And it is difficult to argue with the in the sense that all countries and regions of the globe
contention that money has become more globalized since deemed creditworthy and capable of producing profits
the 1970s, that it has, increasingly, connected people in dis- have been included; sub-Saharan Africa, however, ceases
tant places and homogenized financial space. For Richard to exist in such a conception of ‘the global’.
O'Brien (1992) the growth of the international financial Second, and resulting from this geographical concen-
system is tantamount to ‘the end of geography’, the notion tration of the management of ‘global finance’ in North
that geography is becoming relatively less important America, Europe and parts of Asia, some currencies cir-
because money, in its different forms, is able to overcome culate more widely and have greater spatial reach than
the friction of distance and link distant places together. others. The Japanese yen, the euro and most especially
Others argue that this view is too simple, that geography the US dollar are very useful in international markets
remains critical to our understanding of global finance. We because they are accepted as forms of payment, unlike,
now turn to consider these views in more detail. for example, Indian rupees. For that reason, the US dollar

Spotlight box 18.2

The circulation of money as capital MSCS

{LP}
S P S C′ S M′ S . . .
{MP}
In capitalist societies, the circulation of money as capital
is as follows. From left to right in the equation, money (M) The purpose of production in capitalist societies is
is invested by producers to purchase commodities (C), to produce profit and accumulate capital. The turnover
namely labour power (LP) and the means of production time of capital is the amount of time it takes for money
(MP), say pieces of wood and wood-cutting machinery. to complete this circuit. The shorter the turnover time,
Labour power and the means of production are com- the more often money can be lent out and the more profit
bined in production (P) to make more commodities (C′), can be made. Producers therefore have a very strong
in this example, let us say chairs, which are then sold incentive to, where possible, reduce the turnover time
for more money (M′) than was originally invested (M). of capital; time is money.

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 372    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

is also the most popular as a global reserve currency, that are motivated by ecological concerns, the desire for com-
is, as a store of value (see Spotlight box 18.1). Histori- munity development and social cohesion, and the desire
cally, the country that occupies a dominant economic to construct alternative local economic geographies as a
and political position has underwritten the soundness of form of resistance against the global spread of capitalism
the international financial system and had its currency (Lee 2000).
accepted internationally as the currency in which com- Third, as Martin (1999b: 6) argues, for all the talk
modity prices are quoted and payments made. Before of ‘global finance’, there remain different geographical
the Second World War, Britain and the pound sterling circuits of money that form the ‘wiring’ of an econ-
fulfilled this role; after the Bretton Woods conference in omy, along which ‘currents’ of wealth, consumption and
1944, the US dollar became the key international cur- power are conveyed. He identifies four geographies of
rency. More recently, as the economic dominance of the money: locational, institutional, regulatory and public.
USA has declined, the yen, the euro and the Chinese ren- The locational geography refers to the location of differ-
minbi have become relatively more important in interna- ent financial institutions and markets. Financial institu-
tional markets. tions and specialized functions (like foreign exchange
So, some currencies, like the US dollar, are truly markets) tend to be agglomerated in large urban centres,
international while some others are national. There are with London, New York and Tokyo sitting at the top
estimated to be over 4,000 local currencies in operation of the global hierarchy. Different countries also have
around the globe that facilitate exchange only within very different institutional geographies, in that they organ-
specific spatial and social contexts. For example, Local ize their financial institutions and markets in distinct
Exchange Trading Systems (LETS) are associations whose ways. In parts of Asia, Latin America and Africa, banks
members list their services needed/offered in a directory and other community-based financial institutions like
and trade with each other in a local unit of currency; Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs)
for example, ‘bobbins’ in Manchester and ‘solents’ in (see Spotlight box 18.3) are important in organizing and
Southampton (Williams 1996). Since their establishment funding economic activity. ROSCAs take different forms
in Canada in 1983, LETS schemes have spread to Europe, in different regions and vary with the class, gender and
Australia, New Zealand and North America, allowing ethnicity of their members (Ardener and Burman 1995).
members not only access to credit, but also the chance to One of the attractions of ROSCAs for men and women
engage in productive activity to earn such credit. Some in Ghana and elsewhere is the speed with which news of
local currency schemes are devised in times of hardship to hardship or an emergency can be spread, and the order
allow local people to trade goods and services when they of rotation of the fund changed, to help out a member
are unemployed and have little money. Other schemes in trouble (Ardener 1995).

Spotlight box 18.3

Rotating Savings and Credit also existed in Scotland and parts of northern England.
Associations (ROSCAs) Members, usually ranging in number from a few to sev-
eral hundreds, make regular contributions, in cash or in
A ROSCA is ‘an association formed upon a core of par- kind, to a fund. The fund, or part of it, is then given to
ticipants who agree to make regular contributions to a each member in turn, depending on age, kinship senior-
fund which is given, in whole or in part, to each con- ity, or by rules established by the organizer.
tributor in turn’ (Ardener 1995: 1). ROSCAs are known In addition to encouraging regular savings and pro-
by different names, depending on their form and scale, viding small-scale capital and credit for their members,
the social classes of their members and their location. many ROSCAs have strong moral and social dimensions.
In South India they are known as kuris, chitties or chit Trust, social solidarity and responsibility are emphasized
funds, in Cameroon as njangis or tontines, and in Suri- and members have an interest in ensuring that no mem-
name as kasmoni, a word probably derived from ‘cash ber defaults on regular payment. Some ROSCAs are
money’. women-only and their potential to empower women, by
ROSCAs were well developed in China, India, Viet- giving them greater control over income and credit, has
nam and parts of West Africa and the Caribbean by attracted the attention of anthropologists, sociologists
the end of the nineteenth century. Variants of ROSCAs and feminists (see Ardener and Burman 1995).

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 Chapter 18  Geographies of money, finance and crisis     373

These varied institutional geographies are products, in perspective, to arrive at a geographical understanding of
turn, of contrasting regulatory geographies. There are a the global financial crisis. The concepts of globalization
wide range of supranational, national and regional reg- and financialization that were discussed in the previous
ulatory agencies that govern the workings of financial section are central to such a geographical understanding.
institutions and markets. As Martin (1999b: 9) observes, We start in the USA where local housing problems turned
into a national crisis, that then became a trigger for the
[M]oney has had a habit of seeking out geographical
global financial, economic and political crisis.
discontinuities and gaps in these regulatory spaces,
escaping to places where the movement of financial
assets is less constrained, where official scrutiny into 18.2.1 Subprime lending in the United States
financial dealing and affairs is minimal.
Real estate (houses, offices, factories, malls, etc.) is, by
Offshore financial centres like the Bahamas, Cayman definition, local as it is spatially fixed. Mortgage lend-
Islands, Jersey and Guernsey are attractive because of ing, however, has developed from a local to a national
their low tax rates and minimal regulation. But countries market and is now increasingly a global market. An
like Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the Nether- understanding of the financial crisis is ultimately a spa-
lands are also key centres in moving money around the tialized understanding of the linkages between local and
world in order to minimize tax payments. Some of that global. Housing bubbles, faltering economies and regula-
behaviour is legal, but some of it is illegal. tion together have shaped the geography of the financial
Finally, when Martin (1999b) discusses public geogra- crisis on the state and city level in the USA. Subprime
phies, he refers to the role of states in distributing monies and predatory lending have affected low-income and
across regions in the form of goods and services, infra- minority communities more than others and we therefore
structure, health, education and so forth, and in trans- not only see a concentration of foreclosures, or property
ferring monies in the form of various social and welfare repossessions, in certain cities, but also in certain neigh-
programmes. bourhoods (Aalbers 2009; Immergluck 2009).
The default and foreclosure crisis that was at the root
of the financial crisis has hit US households across the
country, but people in some states and cities are more
18.2 The global financial crisis likely to be in foreclosure (see Case study 18.2). The rise
in default rates started some years ago in the American
The financial crisis that started in 2007–8 and continues Rustbelt (the North-east and Mid-west of the USA,
to drag on and mutate in various ways and places can be regions most heavily affected by deindustrialization
characterized as a global crisis since it affects most sec- processes) where housing prices went down and unem-
tors of the economy and most places around the world ployment went up. The combination of lack of employ-
(Aalbers 2009). The fact that one can mention sectors or ment and falling housing prices is perilous. People who
places that are not affected much by the crisis, should not lose their job in an area of high unemployment not only
be seen as proof that this is not a global crisis. It is merely have a smaller chance of finding a new job within a few
proof that some sectors and places have not yet been fully months, but they also more likely to be unable to pay off
integrated into the global capitalist system or that they their mortgage loan and might then be faced with nega-
are not seen as safe havens to switch investment to. This tive equity, a situation that occurs when the amount
is ‘only’ the third global crisis of capitalism; it follows of the outstanding loan is larger than the market value
the 1930s Depression (with the Second World War as its of the house for which the loan is provided. As a result
aftermath) and the post-1973 crisis that had been build- lenders will see higher foreclosures as a direct result of
ing up throughout the 1960s. The current global crisis default, compounded by the fact that homeowners with
was the culmination of various economic disruptions financial problems in declining housing markets are less
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s; these included likely to sell their house which would have enabled them
more localized events such as the first subprime crisis in to pay off their loan.
the late 1990s in the USA, the late 1990s Asian and Rus- The rise of subprime lending started in the early
sian financial crises, the Argentine crisis at the dawn of 1990s, often in the poorer parts of Rustbelt cities.
the new millennium, and the explosion of the dot-com Increasing default rates led to a first subprime mortgage
bubble in the early 2000s. crisis in 1997–8, ten years before the second subprime
This section discusses the global financial crisis from crisis (Ashton 2009; Immergluck 2009). Subprime mort-
a geographical perspective. We look at it not only from gage lending had been growing fast, from about US$35
an economic but also from urban and political geography billion (5 per cent of total mortgage originations) in

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 374    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Case study 18.2

Foreclosure cities and neighbourhoods as foreclosure’s ground zero, has also seen a rapid
in the USA increase in crime (Christie 2007).
Subprime, and in particular predatory, loans fre-
Up to 2006, the top ten foreclosure cities almost quently result in mortgage foreclosures at the individual
exclusively consisted of Rustbelt cities. In 2007, when level and housing abandonment at the neighbourhood
the crisis started, the list was a mix of Rustbelt and level (Immergluck 2009; Squires 2004). It is not just
Sunbelt cities, but since 2008, the top ten foreclosure defaulting borrowers that are hit; in addition, there are
cities is entirely made up of Sunbelt cities, although severe spillover effects on housing prices, crime and
Rustbelt city Detroit occasionally makes it back to the neighbourhood decline. Besides borrowers and neigh-
top ten. There are several such foreclosure lists and bourhoods, cities are also hit hard because their tax
they look slightly different, but generally speaking cities income goes down in line with property foreclosures
in California made up more than half of them between and lower real estate prices, while their expenses
2008 and 2010. Since 2011, cities in Florida have increase as a result of foreclosures and property
increasingly taken the lead. The differences across the crime (Dymski 2010; Immergluck 2009). Local govern-
USA are huge: in 2008, at the height of the foreclosure ments around the USA have cut expenditures on edu-
crisis, the foreclosure rate in Stockton, CA – the ‘fore- cation, infrastructure and social services. The public
closure capital’ – was almost 100 times as high as in school system in California alone faces a loss of US$4
Richmond, VA (Aalbers 2009). Although some cities in billion in funding in 2009. Many cities in these states,
the Sunbelt are now hit harder than those in the Rust- but also in countless others, are facing lower incoming
belt, on a neighbourhood level the Rustbelt still tops taxes (in particular real estate taxes) and cuts in fund-
the foreclosure lists. On the list of most foreclosed zip ing of schools, social services, garbage collection, infra-
codes, four are now in Detroit, while the Slavic Village structure, etc. One complication in the USA is that local
in Cleveland has the most foreclosure filings. From governments as well as many states are not allowed
the 1950s onwards, redlining and suburbanization to run a deficit. While the national government tries to
(see Chapter 3) hit this neighbourhood hard. Due to stimulate the economy by spending more, municipali-
a combined economic and foreclosure crisis, demand ties and many states that are faced with decreasing
for housing has fallen so dramatically that one can revenues also have to cut back on expenses. This is a
now buy many homes in the Slavic Village for under significant development. State revenues in New York,
US$30,000; on eBay you could even buy one for less a state that in no way presents a worst-case scenario,
than US$5,000. The Slavic Village, now referred to went down 36 per cent in one year (fiscal year 2007–8).

1994 to US$600 billion (20 per cent) in 2006 (Avery et Subprime lending is often defined as lending to a bor-
al. 2006), 75 per cent of which was securitized (see Spot- rower with poor credit, but this would be a misrepre-
light box 18.4). The growth of subprime lending halted sentation of the essence of subprime lending, which is
for a few years in the late 1990s as a response to the first lending at higher fees and interest rates whether or not
subprime crisis, but picked up again after 2000 when the borrower actually has bad credit (Aalbers 2012a).
subprime loans were no longer exclusively targeted at Some estimates suggest that more than half of the
borrowers with low credit scores but re-designed to be subprime loans went to prime borrowers (Brooks and
sold to middle-class borrowers, in particular in the Sun- Simon 2007).
belt, i.e. the South and South-west of the USA, regions Housing prices can go down because of structural
that had seen above-average economic growth since the stresses in economies such as those of the Rustbelt, but
1970s. As a result, the fastest increases in defaults and also because they have been growing rapidly in the way
foreclosures since 2007 were not in the Rustbelt but in typical of many cities in the Sunbelt. Housing prices in
the Sunbelt where housing prices had been rising fast- the Sunbelt were simply more inflated than elsewhere in
est and subprime loans were more common. In Nevada the USA: the housing bubble was bigger and more likely
and a few other states subprime loans accounted for to burst. However, some local and regional economies
more than 30 per cent of the loans originated in 2006. in the Sunbelt also showed signs of a declining economy.

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 Chapter 18  Geographies of money, finance and crisis     375

Spotlight box 18.4

Securitization the secondary mortgage market is to increase the

exchangeability and liquidity of mortgages through
● Securitization is the process of transforming the rationalization and standardization of mortgage
localized, non-standard and opaque assets like features and characteristics.
mortgages into transparent and liquid securities ● Fannie Mae was founded in 1938 to buy and sell
that people can easily exchange on global markets. mortgages as an expedient to stimulate capital
Securitization is designed to reduce the uncer- investment in the residential construction industry
tainty of buying and selling atypical assets (leases, that had collapsed because of the Great Depres-
homes, loans, etc.) by transforming them into sion. A related purpose of Fannie Mae was to
marketing investments that have common features stimulate cash flow to enable mortgage banks, sav-
and characteristics. Securitization has been used ings and loan associations, and commercial banks
as a tool to obtain funding for lenders by liquefying to make new loans. In 1949, Fannie Mae expanded
assets and to reduce regulatory capital holdings. As its activities to include buying and selling mortgages
a mechanism for easing the spreading and trading guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA).
of risk, securitization seeks to homogenize diverse The Housing Act of 1968 removed Fannie Mae
commodities and weaken the institutional buffers from the federal budget and privatized the agency
between local, national and global markets. Secu- as a shareholder-owned company. In 1981, Fannie
ritization may also be used to transform mortgage Mae issued its first mortgage-backed security. The
default risk into a range of low-risk notes (that were economic downturn caused by the subprime crisis
comparable with the risk rating of sovereign debt) motivated the federal government to put Fannie
whilst creating a smaller range of high-risk debt. Mae under conservatorship on 7 September 2008.
● Secondary mortgage market: The market where ● Freddie Mac is a government sponsored enterprise
investment banks, financial institutions and the two (GSE) of the US federal government. The US
major government-sponsored enterprises – the Congress created the FHLMC in 1970 to attract
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, investors to finance housing through an expanded
or Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mort- secondary mortgage market. Freddie Mac buys
gage Corporation (FHLMC, nicknamed ­Freddie mortgages on the secondary market, pools them,
Mac) – repackage mortgages as securities to sell and sells them as a mortgage-backed security
to institutional investors in national and global to investors to increase the money available for
capital markets. While the secondary mortgage new home purchases. In response to the savings
market originated during the 1930s, it was not until and loan crisis, the Financial Institutions Reform,
the 1980s that Congress passed several ­statutes Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)
to encourage the securitization of relatively ­illiquid revised the regulation of Freddie Mac and made
assets, such as mortgages, and attract new the Federal Department of Housing and Urban
sources of investment to finance real estate. Unlike Development the supervisory agency of the GSE.
the primary mortgage market, where the source of The economic downturn caused by the subprime
profit is the payment of the mortgage to the bank crisis motivated the federal government to put
that originated the loan, the source of profit in the Freddie Mac under conservatorship on 7 Septem-
secondary mortgage for securitized mortgages is ber 2008.
the sale of mortgage pools that contain hundreds
or thousands of individual mortgages. The goal of Source: adapted from Aalbers (2012a)

Furthermore, high economic growth equated with a high lending. As Wyly et al. (2009) have shown, states like
rate of new construction and more homeowners who had North Carolina, New Mexico, Massachusetts and West
recently bought a house, thereby increasing the pool of Virginia regulate a wide range of practices related to
possible victims of falling housing prices. Finally, several foreclosure rules, prepayment penalties and other things.
states in the USA have tightened their own regulations New Mexico, for example, introduced the Home Loan
in an effort to minimize the many excesses of subprime Protection Act (2003).

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 376    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

18.2.2 The globalization of the crisis and mortgage markets is global in scope and also affects
other credit markets. The crisis does not just hit invest-
The current financial crisis originates in local housing and ment banks on Wall Street, European banks and pension
mortgage markets, but it affects financial markets and eco- funds that bought MBS, but also individual investors
nomic sectors around the world (Aalbers 2009; Engelen and cities and towns around the globe (Case study 18.3).
and Faulconbridge 2009; French et al. 2009). A few decades Cities and towns around the globe have been hit by the
ago most mortgage lenders were local or regional institu- financial crisis. There are cities in Greece, Spain, Ireland
tions. Today, most mortgage lenders are national lenders and Iceland that have all been severely hit, but also cities
who tap into the global credit market. This is not so much in countries that seem to have weathered the financial
because lenders are global financial institutions – most crisis, whether they are located in Germany, Turkey, Bra-
lenders are national in scope – but because they com- zil, China or Australia. In some way, the crisis is felt in
pete for the same credit in a global market. In the past most economic sectors and in most places around the
the idea was that in the wider credit market it would be world. The only partial inclusion of, for instance, China
easy for mortgage lenders to get funding, as mortgages in the global capitalist system has meant that produc-
were considered an ideal investment for low-risk investors. tion growth was slowed down but not that the country
Cheaper credit, in return, would result in lower interest entered a recession. Yet, the rapid increase in the num-
rates on mortgage loans. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, ber of vacant luxury apartments in Chinese cities sug-
two government-sponsored enterprises that were meant gests that Chinese capitalism is also feeding local and
to spur homeownership rates for low- and middle-income national real estate bubbles – bubbles that have resulted
households, had already introduced securitization in the in a crisis of real estate and may lead to a larger eco-
1960s. Securitization enables mortgage lenders to sell their nomic crisis in China and likely elsewhere. It is crucial
mortgage portfolio on the secondary mortgage markets to to link the spatial and temporal dimensions of local and
investors (see Spotlight box 18.4). global crises alike.
In 2007, when foreclosure and default rates were ris- Cities, pensions funds, banks and individuals around
ing and housing prices were falling, the credit crisis was the world had invested in MBS or the financial institu-
inevitable. It was clear that investing in mortgages was tions that went down in this crisis such as the US Lehman
not as low risk as people thought. The value of mortgage- Brothers or the Icelandic Landsbanki. Narvik (see Case
backed securities (MBS) fell even more dramatically. This study 18.3) illustrates well how connected the world has
was not only the case because many people had mortgage become in the twenty-first century. It also illustrates very
loans that were granted without down-payments, but also well that the world is not flat: the old geography of local
because MBS were sold on the basis that they would pro- housing markets has not been replaced by a global hous-
vide high returns. These were partly based on high inter- ing market, but by a chain that starts with the local (a
est rates and not just on the value of the house, and partly mortgage loan on a particular property), turns national
on speculation, which increased the value of MBS beyond (through lenders), then global (in the MBS market) and
what they were actually worth. In sum, not only were then reverts to the local again (via the effects in places like
risks underestimated, returns were also overestimated. Narvik). Nearly everyone in North America, Europe and
It now becomes easier to understand why the impact Australia, and many in Asia, are in some way involved in
of partly local and partly national problems in housing

Case study 18.3

Narvik, Norway home and a child-care facility. Instead, the city has cut
the budget and as a result several small rural schools
The example of Narvik in the far north of Norway is will be closed, budgets for elderly care have been cut,
widely discussed (e.g. Aalbers 2009; Pani and Holman the city is behind payments to civil servants, and the fire
2013). The city council of Narvik (population: 18,000) department will cease their 24-hour/7-day-a-week ser-
and three small, nearby municipalities had invested vice and switch to day-time service (in a city with mostly
US$78 million of the revenues of a nearby hydroelectric wooden houses). The Norwegian state has declared it
plant in MBS and other products offered by investment will not help Narvik and other municipalities, as it does
banks – they lost most of it. The city’s investments were not want to set a precedent by which the national state
meant for the construction of a new school, a nursing has to bear the losses of local authorities.

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 Chapter 18  Geographies of money, finance and crisis     377

While in the past a mortgage bubble or a housing bub-

ble would affect construction firms and homeowners, the
recent bursting of these bubbles affects the economy not
just through homeowners (of which there are also many
more these days), but also through financial markets.
Because lenders are now national in scope this no longer
affects only some housing markets, but all housing mar-
kets throughout a country. In addition, secondary mort-
gage markets are global markets, which means that a crisis
of mortgage securitization implies that investors around
the globe, and therefore economies around the globe, are
affected. Housing bubbles, faltering economies and regu-
lation together have shaped the geography of the financial
Plate 18.2  Occupy Wall Street (2011), a grassroots
crisis at the state and city level in the USA. Subprime and
response to the financial crisis.
predatory lending have affected low-income and minority
(Spencer Platt/Getty Images)
communities more than others and we therefore not only
see a concentration of foreclosures in certain cities but
this crisis, often as passive investors, e.g. through pensions also in certain neighbourhoods, often those places inhab-
funds or investments by local governments. We may not ited by low-income and minority groups that have been
all be capitalists now (as a saying goes), but most of us are excluded by earlier rounds of exclusion and exploitation.
investors, whether we want – or know – it or not. Yet, the meanings of globalization, not unlike the causes
It took surprisingly long before the financial crisis and consequences of this crisis, remain geographically
resulted in mass demonstrations. The streets of Dublin uneven. It is important to understand that cities are an
remained almost empty after the government had bailed essential element in both, and that the fates of places like
out the banks at the expense of its citizens. Cutbacks in Stockton and Narvik are not only related to each other,
Greece and Spain have resulted in many demonstrations, but also to those of Wall Street and Raffles Place (Singa-
but it was the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement that pore’s financial district). The space of places is intrinsi-
resulted in something more akin to a global grassroots cally linked to the flow of spaces.
response to the financial crisis, even though OWS itself Are the geographies of money, finance and crisis merely
was inspired by revolts throughout the North and South a specific case of geographies of the economy? As should
Mediterranean region (Aalbers 2012b). be clear after reading this chapter, money, finance and cri-
sis are also attached to political geographies. First, finan-
cial institutions don't exist outside the political sphere but
lobby to get what they want and what they don't want.
18.3 Conclusion: placing finance They do not simply want less regulation, but sometimes
more regulation to enable them to innovate/destruct. This
Financial markets have become increasingly globalized is not only something that happened in the decades prior
since the 1970s, although truly ‘global’ markets are con- to the financial crisis, but also something that continues
centrated in a select number of major financial centres and is undermining re-regulatory efforts. Second, states,
located in global cities (Sassen 1991). There remain dis- in particular, though not exclusively in the USA, have
tinct regional, national and supranational geographies failed to protect their citizens. Financial institutions have
of money, such that the ‘global financial system’ can be been able to prey not only on homeowners and pension-
conceptualized as a web of intersecting networks, some ers but also on businesses and the people who depend on
fast, some slow, some long, some short. These financial them for their livelihoods. States are complicit in the crisis
networks connect different geographies of employment, because they have facilitated financial innovation/destruc-
technology, regulation, government policies, leisure tion. Years of neoliberal restructuring, albeit in different
trends and so forth. Such a conceptualization allows us to forms and intensities, have yet to be replaced with more
understand how the fates of property developers in Thai- consumer protection and financial regulation. The funda-
land affected Graham Jones in Whitley Bay. It is impor- mental question of what state/market relations should be,
tant to remember then that when we talk about ‘global has hardly been addressed. There is no simple answer and
finance’, we are not talking about a machine operating it is of course heavily politicized (as it should be), but the
‘out there’, but a socially, economically, culturally and Occupy movement and others, including insiders from the
politically constructed network of relations with which financial sector, have pointed to the under-regulation and
we engage, in some way, shape or form, on a daily basis. under-policing of financial institutions.

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 378    Section 4  Production, exchange and consumption

Learning outcomes www.money.cnn.com/ The US-based CNN financial website,

like the Financial Times site, contains numerous links to busi-
After reading this chapter, you should be aware that:
ness, financial and market news, by country, sector and firm.
● Money has geographical, economic, cultural, www.worldbank.org/ The World Bank website is home to
social and political significance and mediates our a host of information on World Bank publications, research,
­experiences of social relations. data and related organizations.
www.bis.org/statistics This site, maintained by the Bank for
● The ‘global financial system’ is a socially
International Settlement, provides sources of banking data
­constructed web of intersecting networks operating
and statistics.
at different speeds and over different distances. www.imf.org/ The home page of the International Monetary
● There are distinct urban, national and suprana- Fund. This site provides a wealth of information about the
tional networks of money and this is reflected in the IMF and its mission in addition to country information.
­geographies of the financial crisis. www.occupywallst.org The home page of Occupy Wall
Street.
● There are many causes and consequences
www.grameen-info.org/ The website of the Bangladesh-
of the financialization of the economy and the
based Grameen Bank. It has information on the mission of
­globalization of money.
Grameen Bank and how it works, together with material on
other microcredit schemes.

Further reading www.ecb.int/home/html/index.en.html A site dedicated to

European central banking issues.
Aalbers, M.B. (ed.) (2012) Subprime Cities: The Political www.creativeinvest.com The site of Creative Investment
Economy of Mortgage Markets, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Research, a US-based firm specializing in ‘socially
This is a collection of essays on the global financial crisis, ­responsible’ investment and providing many links on women
written by geographers, sociologists, political scientists and and minority-owned financial institutions.
economists. www.cdfa.org.uk/ The site of the CDFA, the trade association
for Community Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs) which
Leyshon, A. and Thrift, N. (1997) Money Space: Geographies
are designed to be sustainable, independent financial institu-
of Monetary Transformation, Routledge, London. This is a
tions that provide capital and support for individuals/organiza-
compilation of Leyshon and Thrift’s essays on money.
tions in disadvantaged communities or under-served markets.
Martin, R.L. (ed.) (1999) Money and the Space Economy,
http://blog.mint.com/blog/finance-core/a-visual-guide-
Wiley, Chichester. A wide-ranging collection of essays
to-the-financial-crisis/ A visual guide to the recent US/
­covering geographies of banking, financial centres, money
UK subprime financial crisis, illustrating the complex links
and the local economy, and money and the state.
between consumers, housing markets, credit ratings, financial
Sassen, S. (2001) The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, instruments, banks and crisis.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. This book looks
https://youtu.be/qOP2V_np2c0 Geographer David Harvey
at the growth and internationalization of the financial system
explains the Crisis of Capitalism with the help of animations
and its effects on the economic base and social structure of
created by Cognitive Media.
its three ‘command centres’, London, New York and Tokyo.
http://tegenlicht.vpro.nl/backlight/money-and-speed.
html Documentary on the so-called ‘flash crash’ in 2010,
the fastest and deepest US stock market plunge – and
Useful websites ­recovery – ever.
http://tegenlicht.vpro.nl/backlight/quants.html Documentary
www.ft.com The Financial Times website contains useful
on ‘quants’, the math wizards and computer ­programmers
links to financial and other firm, sector and country data, as
who designed some of the financial products that contributed
well as breaking news stories.
to the global financial crisis.

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 CONSUMPTION AND ITS
GEOGRAPHIES

Chapter 19

Ian Cook and Philip Crang

Topics covered
■ economic geographies of consumption
■ Branding and marketing geography
■ Local geographies of consumption
■ consumption and geographies of (dis)connection

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 380    Section 4  Geographies of the economy

as an important interest, alongside concerns with the

19.1 E conomic geographies geographies of production and finance.
of consumption However, even as consumption is economically vital,
it is not purely economic. Indeed, this is one of the main
If production refers to the economic process of making reasons why so much effort and expense is devoted to
goods and services, then consumption refers to their commercial practices of retailing, advertising, market-
utilization. Consumption is vital to capitalist economies. ing and branding. Consumption is not a simple matter
Without consumption, capitalist ways of organizing eco- and goes well beyond the limited transactional moment
nomic life simply could not function. Businesses need the of purchase. Any sale has a ‘back story’, the predisposi-
sales generated by consumption in order to realize value tions that shape our buying of this or that. Any sale also
from their production processes. However, consumption has an ‘afterlife’, as we use what we have purchased. If
does not just happen as a matter of course. It does not fol- we reflect back on our opening definition of consump-
low production as night follows day. The sales that busi- tion – the utilization of the products of human labour –
nesses require involve huge organizational efforts. Those then we see how purchase is but the start of an on-going
efforts are of crucial importance to capitalist economies; story concerned with the active use of the things we buy.
they are not just ‘afterthoughts’ that try to sell what has If we think of consumption as being about how we use
been made but key components that shape the wider products then we begin to sense that whilst consump-
economy and its geographies. Thus, retailing is a large tion is central to economics it is not reducible to it. How
economic sector devoted to the fostering of consump- we use things is implicated in an array of other issues:
tion and, in many cases, retail capital exercises profound the way we conduct our daily lives, our management of
organizational power within the systems of commodity household and family affairs, our senses of self-identity,
production (Wrigley and Lowe 1996). More generally, our moral senses of how our lives ought to be and of
marketing, advertising and branding are now recognized how we ought to relate to others. This is one reason why
as strategically central to contemporary economies. This consumption has been something of an enigma to main-
importance reflects their vital mediating role between the stream economics (Douglas and Isherwood 1996).
worlds of the producer and the consumer (Jackson and Our suggestion, then, is that consumption is a vital
Taylor 1996; Nava et al. 1997; Nixon 1997; Hackley 2010). economic process, but not limited to a narrowly defined
In parallel, discourses of consumption – that is, framing economic realm. In particular, it extends into our wider
thought and action through a focus on ‘the consumer’ – culture. Consumption is cultural as well as economic; it is
have come to dominate organizational theory (du Gay ‘cultural-economic’ (Amin and Thrift 2004). One has to
1996), spreading out across not only private enterprise approach consumption not through a narrow economic
but on to marketized public services. The consumer has geography but through a wider ‘cultural-economic geog-
become a key figure, perhaps the key figure, in governing raphy’ if one is to understand its causes, characters and
political economic life. Research in economic geography consequences. The cultural character to consumption has
has responded to these trends, recognizing consumption been pursued in various ways that, in turn, relate to var-
ied emphases on what is meant by culture. For some, this
means emphasizing the adoption of goods within exist-
ing status structures and patterns of class distinction, so
that consumption is regulated by, and reproduces, socially
structured and inherited cultural tastes (Bourdieu 1984).
What we consume both reflects and creates what sort of
class position and cultural identity we have. Others high-
light the role of commodities within the private dream
worlds of consumers, so that consumption is more about
fulfilling our culturally inflected fantasies and desires
than conforming to socially structured tastes (Camp-
bell 1987). And still others, focusing on more mundane
forms of consumption, like household provisioning and
food shopping, attend to how the things we buy enact
domestic relations of love and care. From this perspective,
Plate 19.1  ‘The consumer: at the heart of economic consumer culture is about concretizing our relationships
geographies’. to our nearest and dearest and forming domestic ‘moral
(1000 Words/Shutterstock) economies’ (Miller 1998).

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 Chapter 19  Consumption and its geographies    381

Another way of framing the cultural character to on or up. Both that embodied sense of comfort, and
consumption is to emphasize that often what we are his response, are far from innate. Nor are they subject
consuming is not only material goods but images, mean- solely to crude economic forces of price. As Elizabeth
ings, feelings and experiences. A close to hand example Shove has demonstrated, our senses of things like com-
may help to illustrate the point. Think a little about the fort are not fixed, but change historically and between
clothes you are currently wearing. Clothes are material cultures (Shove 2003; Shove and Walker 2014). Philip,
goods. In capitalist societies most of our clothes are for example, grew up in a house without central heat-
products of industrialized systems of production and ing; back then, if he was cold during the day he either
consumption. Notwithstanding the supposed renaissance moved to a room that had a heat source in it (an open
of crafts like knitting, we rarely make our own clothes. fire or the cooking range) or put on more clothes. Now,
Now, for sure, clothing fulfils some basic material needs like most households in the UK, he has got used to a
such as warmth, but it does much more than that (Miller normal domestic environment close to 20°C and the
2010). Clothing can be a language, through which we say energy consumption that goes along with that. Now
something about who we are. It is likely, for example, when he feels cold he turns on the heating. His habits and
that your clothes speak to aspects of your identity such as embodied senses of comfort have changed in conjunction
your gender or your age. They may do this through their with transformations in domestic infrastructure such as
material form – what type of clothing they are (blouse or central heating. This may seem pretty inconsequential,
shirt?; skirt or trousers?), what cut and shape they are, after all Philip only flicked a switch. But, as Shove says,
what fabric or colour – and through their associations it ‘acquires more sinister overtones when we recall the
with particular retailers and designers – what brand they
are, whether they are new or second-hand or ‘vintage’,
and so on. And clothes do not just convey an image; they
help to make us who we are through their role in our
embodiment. Clothes do indeed maketh the man and
woman. What we wear shapes how we carry ourselves,
maybe even how we feel. An old pair of sweatpants for
‘slobbing out’ at home; high heels to feel glamorous; a
suit, to be professional; there are lots of examples that
illustrate how what we wear shapes how we comport
and feel about ourselves. What about you? What are you
wearing right now? What do your clothes say about you?
How do they make you feel?
Not all the consumption we undertake is as self-con-
scious as when we choose what clothes to buy and wear.
Another way of thinking about consumption as cultural
(as well as economic) is to emphasize its relationship to
somewhat taken for granted habits and technologies. This
has become known as a ‘theories of practice’ approach
to consumption (Warde 2014). Here, the emphasis is not
so much on how we can express our social and cultural
identities through consumption, but rather more on how
routine practices of consumption come to be and come
to be taken for granted.
Another ‘close to hand’ example can illustrate the
approach. While writing and editing this part of the
chapter in his study at home this morning, one of us,
Philip, got cold, and in response turned on the central
heating. He is now buying additional gas. He is also, to a
small measure, further depleting the quantity of a non-
renewable energy resource. He is doing so because his
own sense of comfortable domestic ambient tempera- Plate 19.2  ‘The iPhone. Do you really need
ture was disturbed, and because he has become used to one?’
responding to a feeling of cold by turning the heating (urbanbuzz/Shutterstock)

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 382    Section 4  Geographies of the economy

global environmental costs of maintaining what we now Indeed, here consumer culture is cast as a way of life that
think of as comfortable conditions indoors’ (Shove 2003: is brought into being in order to ensure that mass produc-
28). It is quite likely that as you read this chapter you may tion is accompanied by the appropriate levels of mass
also be in a centrally heated or air-conditioned building consumption. All in all, in such accounts consumers are
and thus part of a conventionalized consumption prac- portrayed as rather sad and pacified figures whose cul-
tice of ambient temperature and artificial climate con- tural lives are subordinated to the economic priorities of
trol. You too may need to feel comfortable to work well. producers (see Spotlight box 19.1).
You too may be undertaking a mundane, habitual act of On the other hand, it is possible to see consumer cul-
energy consumption that has wider implications. You too ture as less passive, as less controlled, as less subordi-
may be embodying how consumption is shaped by taken nate. Here the emphasis is not on consumers being made
for granted cultural norms and practices that co-evolve to consume, but on consumers using the things they buy
with socio-technical systems like domestic heating and for their own ends. In this perspective, consumption is
energy supplies. less the death of the commodity, the end point of an
Our argument, then, is that consumption is: (a) an economic chain that began with the commodity’s pro-
important topic for economic geography; and (b) one duction, and more the commodity’s resurrection. Here,
that tends to require approaches that are, in various consumption is seen as involving the ‘culturalization
ways, ‘cultural-economic’ in character. In turn, this begs of the economy’. In this spirit a range of research has
the question of the kind of relationships between cul- stressed how consumers can creatively rework the prod-
ture and economy generated through consumption. For ucts being sold to them, giving them new meanings in
some, the predominant trend is for economic, commer- the process, and using them as launch pads for their own
cial imperatives to dominate and degrade our cultural symbolic and practical creativity (Willis 1990). A classic
lives: a so-called ‘economization of culture’. Famously, example is the Italian motor scooter and its histories of
the philosopher Herbert Marcuse argued that in capital- consumption in the UK (Hebdige 1987). Having been
ist societies ‘false needs’ are produced (Marcuse 1964), originally aimed in the post-war years at a market of
with consumption promoted by a wanting and requir- young, urban women in Italy, in the United Kingdom the
ing of far more than is materially necessary (Plate 19.2). Lambretta and Vespa scooters became a central identi-
More specifically, numerous studies have debated the fier of the ‘Mod’ subculture. Initially attractive to Mods
role of advertising in stimulating consumption, creating for its Italianicity and design aesthetics, by the late
desires for products that would otherwise not exist (for 1960s the scooter was increasingly symbolically recast
a classic study in this vein, see Packard 1977). According and materially customized to act as a subcultural icon
to this portrait, then, it is economic forces that dominate. opposed to the British, brute masculinity of ‘Rockers’

Spotlight box 19.1

Don Slater on consumerism as the end ‘Consumer culture’, in this perspective, is merely an
of culture ersatz, artificial, mass-manufactured and pretty poor
substitute for the world we have lost in post-traditional
Consumers are often cast as ‘irrational slave[s] society. In fact, it is the antithesis and enemy of culture.
to trivial, materialistic desires who can be In it individual choice and desire triumph over abiding
­manipulated into childish mass conformity by social values and obligations; the whims of the present
­calculating mass producers. This consumer is take precedence over the truth embodied in history, tradi-
tion and continuity; needs, values and goods are manu-
a cultural dupe or dope, the mug seduced by
factured and calculated in relation to profit rather than
advertising, the fashion victim . . . yuppies who would
arising organically from authentic individual or communal
sell their birthright for a mass of designer labels.
life. Above all, consumerism represents the triumph of
Ostensibly exercising free choice, this consumer
economic value over all other kinds and sources of social
actually offends against all the aspirations of modern
worth. Everything can be bought and sold. Everything
Western citizens to be free, rational, autonomous
has its price. ‘Consumer culture’, therefore, is a contra-
and self-defining.
diction in terms for much of modern Western Thought.

(Slater 1997: 33) (Slater 1997: 63)

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 Chapter 19  Consumption and its geographies    383

and their motorbikes (Plate 19.3). The scooter became reflecting on the process of branding, the circulation of
part of a culture that its original designers had no brands, and the implications of both for cultural and
knowledge of and certainly did not control. Designed geographical difference. Second, in examples ranging
as a form of transport for urban women in post-war from shopping centres to nightclubs, we foreground
Italy, the Italian motor scooter actually enabled a novel the local contexts of consumption, reflecting on how
form of working class culture and youthful masculinity they can both represent the strategies of commercial
to be created in the UK. interests, designed to promote and regulate consump-
More recently, commentators have placed renewed tion, and stage the remaking of places into forms that
emphasis on these forms of consumer creativity. In par- accord to different cultural logics than those of com-
ticular, some have argued that consumers are increas- merce and economic rationality. Third, we turn to the
ingly becoming ‘prosumers’, not just using products connections between consumers and producers forged
supplied to them but making them anew or completing through consumption. The everyday acts of consump-
them (Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010). Digital culture is often tion we undertake in particular places are dependent
cast as central here, leading to product forms where con- upon wider networks of provision. The last part of the
sumers are also producers. Think of a smartphone. It is chapter therefore reflects on these networks and what
made and supplied with a range of capacities but it is the we consumers know about them. In so doing, it offers
consumer who completes and develops these: download- a critical consideration of ideas of a (geo)ethical con-
ing apps, creating a music library, and so on. In turn, sumption and the kinds of worldly knowledge fostered
how consumers use their smartphones becomes central to through our lives as consumers.
digital economies. Taking photos, making videos, down-
loading and using apps like Instagram and Twitter, build-
ing up contacts, friends and followers . . . putting these 19.2  randing and marketing
B
together through the smartphone helps to make a new
media economy in which consumer practices (what we
geography
do), cultural identities (how we present ourselves) and
social networks (who we share this with) become mon- Today’s consumer landscapes are populated with brands
etized (see Pfaff 2010). (Arvidsson 2006). From renowned exponents of brand
In weighing up these relations between economy and development (like Apple or Nike), to globally recognized
culture in consumption this chapter focuses on three brands (like Coca-Cola and McDonald’s) and more
geographies. First, we focus on ‘brands’ as a crucial locally specific brand names (like Marks & Spencer, Aldi
component of contemporary economic geographies, or Lidl in Western Europe), brands mark out both what
and where we consume. Pike defines a brand as an ‘iden-
tifiable kind or variety of good or service . . . constituted
of values or “equity” . . . such as associations, awareness,
loyalty, origin and perceived quality’ (2009a: 619). In many

Plate 19.3  Originally designed to be a stylish mode

of travel for Italian women, the Italian motor scooter
became a crucial component of the British Mod
subculture. The meaning of things we consume are Plate 19.4  ‘Nike: Just do it’: Nike’s advertising helps
not simply controlled by those who design them, but to establish the Nike brand’s sign value, associating
are remade through their consumption. the brand with the power of athletics and exercise.
(ermess/Shutterstock) (Joshua Rainey Photography/Shutterstock)

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 384    Section 4  Geographies of the economy

areas of the economy, analysts see a shift in emphasis away 2004) – as bywords for a consumerist homogenization and
from material manufacture and towards the fashioning of cultural imperialism (Plate 19.5). In a fascinating analysis,
branded ‘signs and spaces’ (Lash and Urry 1994) that are the sociologist George Ritzer (2004) sees brands as part of
oriented to commercially profitable consumption. a new global culture of ‘nothingness’. As he puts it: ‘The
According to Robert Goldman and Stephen Papson social world, particularly in the realm of consumption, is
(1998), Nike are exemplary here, illustrating a wider shift increasingly characterized by nothing. In this case, “noth-
towards a ‘sign-economy’ in which brands are central to ing” refers to a social form that is generally centrally con-
both production and consumption. For them, Nike do not ceived, controlled and comparatively devoid of distinctive
so much make and sell sportswear as make and sell the substantive content . . . we are witnessing the globalization
Nike brand, constituted through the sign and typography of nothing’ (Ritzer 2004: 3, 2). In turn, brands are associ-
of the Nike name, the logo of the ‘swoosh’, advertised ated with designed commercial spaces, ‘brandscapes’ and
‘philosophies’ such as ‘Just do it’, and retail spaces like ‘non-places’, characterized by a lack of substantive differ-
‘Niketown’. Nike adverts work to present the brand and ence, which makes them amenable to global distribution.
its values. Rather than focusing on specific products and For Ritzer, consumption tends to produce empty forms
their material qualities, Nike adverts have tended to focus and spaces, devoid of ties to particular times and places.
on portraying Nike in relation to wider ideals of empower- McDonald’s the brand is delivered through McDonald’s
ment and self-realization (‘Just do it’). The now ubiquitous outlets that look and feel the same around the world.
strategy of celebrity brand ambassadors and representa- Others are less sure that the result of global brands is
tives was pioneered by Nike, as a means to associate the global homogenization. Indeed Ritzer himself accepts that
brand with sporting achievement in general, specific sometimes branded nothingness is reworked into ‘some-
impressive figures (from Michael Jordan to Serena Wil- thing’ through how it is received in particular times and
liams) and wider sporting and style cultures (in particular, places. Consumer culture does not float above the world
American black cultures). For Nike, Goldman and Pap- in some abstract space of capital or modernity. Global
son suggest, the brand is now supreme; the material good products land and take root in particular places and times.
and its production are simply a means to that end. Nike In so doing, such forms of global consumer culture not
sportswear and its other physical products are the vehicles only impact on their surroundings; they are also shaped
to mobilize the brand. So, Nike sub-contract manufacture; by them. Anthropological studies in particular have devel-
they do not make Nike stuff themselves. Sure, Nike execu- oped this theme, exploring how globally distributed facets
tives are concerned about the physicality of Nike products, of consumer culture – whether particular goods, styles or
but this is less in terms of them as manufactured goods cultural orientations – are locally incorporated. Take, for
than in terms of them as outcomes of a ‘design’ process example, one of the exemplars of homogenizing Ameri-
that materializes brand and sign value within the product. can consumer culture: McDonald’s restaurants. They are
Goldman and Papson document how Nike invest far more famed for their uniformity; the same decor, the same basic
in advertising and promotion (around 10 per cent of annual menu (with very small variations, such as McSpaghetti in
revenues) than in physical infrastructure (around 3 to 5 the Philippines or the Maharajah Mac in India), and the
per cent; and this includes facilities such as the ‘Niketown’ same service style the world over. And yet, McDonald’s
retail outlets) (Goldman and Papson 1998: 13). Nike’s busi- may not be just a force for cultural homogenization. This
ness and its corporate geographies are constructed to be
market-led and market-leading. In emphasizing the brand
and its brand values, Nike is consumption focused.

19.2.1 Branded geographies of nothingness?

Economic geographers have now begun to pay attention
to brands (see in particular Pike 2009a, 2009b, 2011). One
key area of interest is the relationship between brands and
cultural and geographical differences. For some, brands
are powerful forces of homogenization in the world. It is
hard to miss the worldwide spread of products and brands
such as McDonald’s, Coca-Cola or Starbucks. Indeed,
such brands have entered academic language – in the form
of theses on the ‘McDonaldization of society’ (Ritzer Plate 19.5  Coca-colonization?
2000) or of ‘Coca-colonization’ (for a critique see Flusty (meunierd/Shutterstock)

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 Chapter 19  Consumption and its geographies    385

was certainly Watson’s (1997a) conclusion, based on stud- His conclusion is that there is indeed a two-way
ies of the consumption of McDonald’s in East Asia (see interaction:
Case study 19.1). These studies found that McDonald’s
McDonald’s has effected small but influential changes
has been localized, indigenized and incorporated into tra-
in East Asian dietary patterns. Until the introduction
ditional cultural forms and practices, even as it has played
of McDonald’s, for example, Japanese consumers
a part in the ongoing dynamism of those traditions. As
rarely, if ever, ate with their hands . . . this is now an
Watson poses the question:
acceptable mode of dining . . . [However,] East Asian
Does the spread of fast food undermine the integrity consumers have quietly, and in some cases stubbornly,
of indigenous cuisines? Are food chains helping to cre- transformed their neighborhood McDonald’s into
ate a homogeneous, global culture better suited to the local institutions. [For example,] In the United States
needs of a capitalist world order? . . . But isn't another fast food may indeed imply fast consumption, but this
scenario possible? Have people in East Asia conspired is certainly not the case . . . [in] Beijing, Seoul, and
to change McDonald’s, modifying this seemingly Taipei . . . [where] McDonald’s restaurants are treated
monolithic institution to fit local conditions? . . . [Per- as leisure centers, where people can retreat from the
haps] the interaction process works both ways. stresses of urban life.
(Watson 1997a: 5–6) (Watson 1997a: 6–7)

Case study 19.1

Consuming McDonald’s in East Asia local institution in the sense that it has blended into the
urban landscape . . . McDonald’s is not perceived as
McDonald’s outlets have colonized much of East an exotic or alien institution’ (Watson 1997b: 87, 107).
Asia, from their arrival in Hong Kong in the 1970s to
their growth in metropolitan mainland China since the
1990s. However, just how McDonald’s is consumed
varies across the region. In Beijing, for example,
McDonald’s lost its American role as a place of fast
and cheap food. Instead, Yan suggests, it became a
middle-class consumption place, somewhere for a
special family outing where ‘customers linger . . . for
hours, relaxing, chatting, reading, enjoying the music’
(1997: 72). McDonald’s here is seen as American,
but Americana means something stylish, exotic and
foreign, resulting in the meanings and experiences of
McDonald’s in Beijing being very un-American. In con-
trast, in Japan, whilst there is a similar leisurely use of
McDonald’s, it is not a place of exotic social prestige,
but a youth hangout, a place where someone in a busi-
ness suit would be out of place (Ohnuki-Tierney 1997).
In Hong Kong (Watson 1997b), where McDonald’s was
introduced in the 1970s, its restaurants were initially
patronized by adolescents seeking to escape products
associated both with China and with Hong Kong’s per-
ceived provincialism. However, by the 1990s McDon-
ald’s had become routinely local, just another mundane
part of the Hong Kong landscape: ‘[t]oday, McDonald’s
restaurants in Hong Kong are packed – wall to wall – Plate 19.6  McDonald’s in Beijing: American
with people of all ages, few of whom are seeking an fast food becomes exotic, stylish Americana.
American cultural experience. The chain has become a (Joseph Sohm/Shutterstock)
➜

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 386    Section 4  Geographies of the economy

➜ Hence the meanings and practices of consuming campaigns’ (Caldwell 2004: 5). Whilst initially perceived
McDonald’s – often cast as an icon of global homog- and promoted as an exotic American import, more
enization – vary from place to place. Melissa Caldwell’s recently McDonald’s has become Russian, explicitly mar-
work (2004) on McDonald’s and consumer culture in keted as ‘Nash Makdonalds’ (which Caldwell translates
post-Soviet Moscow reinforces the argument. In Russia as ‘our McDonald’s’). Since the mid-1990s, Russian con-
too McDonald’s has been indigenized or ‘domesticated’, sumer culture more generally has evidenced a patriotic
and not just at the level of everyday practice. Counter- enthusiasm for goods understood as ‘Nash’. This Nash
intuitively, McDonald’s – which as outsiders we might ideology entangles notions of national space with those
read as an American export to Russia – has come to be of everyday familiarity and trust. McDonald’s in Moscow
understood by consumers in Moscow as an ‘authenti- has embraced this ideology and has thus been trans-
cally Russian product’, to the extent that eating there is formed from American exotica to both mundane familiar-
seen as responding to ‘nationalist-oriented consumer ity and imagined Russianness.

19.2.2 Brands and their geographical entanglements particular in the case of a pizza product line that Viking
Foods wanted to establish as meaningfully Norwegian to
Not only does the consumption of branded products dif- their Norwegian consumers. This meant branding and
fer from place to place, but also ideas of cultural and producing what they term a ‘folkepizzaen’ (which one
geographical difference – what we might call ‘imagina- might translate as ‘the Norwegian people’s pizza’).
tive geographies’ (Driver 2014) – are produced and sold More generally, you are probably familiar with a range
within brands themselves. Pike sees this as part of the of examples of such branded place association. Think,
‘geographical entanglement’ of brands, how brand val- for example, about the bottled waters that appeal to place
ues and equity ‘are imbued to varying degrees and in imagery to differentiate a somewhat generic commodity:
differing ways by spatial connections and connotations’ Highlands water from Scotland, French mineral water from
(2009a: 619). Taking the example of Newcastle Brown Evian, Fiji Water (‘straight from the isolated and idyllic Fiji
Ale (a beer brand) (Plate 19.7), Pike (2011) shows how Islands without ever being touched by man’), and so on (on
the meanings of the brand are bound up with imagina- water branding see Wilk 2006; for the case of marketing
tions of its geographical origin (sometimes framed as
Newcastle, sometimes framed as the North, sometimes
framed as England). An iconic Newcastle landscape, with
the bridge over the Tyne, still adorns Newcastle Brown
Ale’s logo and packaging. These imaginations are also
related to the product’s spatial movements around the
world; for example, in the American market, where sales
now outnumber those for the UK, Newcastle Brown Ale’s
particular local origins are less important than a looser
sense of it as an English and an ‘urban’ product. Others
too have noted how geographical images are a resource to
be used in projects of brand making and differentiation.
Marianne Lien, for example, narrates a fascinating case
study of frozen pizza marketing in Norway, as one com-
pany (given the pseudonym Viking Foods) differentiates
its product lines through geographical associations (Lien
2000). Some of these are predictable and none too sub-
tle: one pizza line is ‘made Italian’ and more ‘authentic’
through packaging that references Il Tricolore’s green,
white and red, and uses Italian place names and lan-
guage; another line is ‘made American’, more ‘modern’
and more oriented to a youthful market with a packag-
ing that incorporates images of the stars and stripes, Plate 19.7  A geographically entangled
American football helmets, cowboys and the Statue of brand: Newcastle Brown Ale.
Liberty! But other positionings are more complicated, in (urbanbuzz/Shutterstock)

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 Chapter 19  Consumption and its geographies    387

Fijian water see Connell 2006 and Kaplan 2007). Or con- There are a number of implications of these associa-
sider products that associate themselves in some way with tions between consumption and imaginations of cultural
imagined geographical areas such as the tropics or the rain- and geographic difference. For a start, it means we need
forest, often to claim some ‘natural’ qualities (for a critical to broaden the critique of consumer culture beyond a
analysis of a ‘rainforest’ perfume see Slater 2004; on ‘tropi- debate over its tendencies for homogenization (making
cal fruit’ see Cook et al. 2004). Or there are the brands everything and everywhere the same) to consider capi-
that draw upon national identities in framing their brand talist processes of ‘heterogenization’ (making things
equities: for example, the likes of Paul Smith and Burberry and places ‘different’ as a marketing process). In Naomi
presenting their Britishness within the fashion economy Klein’s terms, we need to recognize the emergence of
(Goodrum 2005); or car brands like Alfa Romeo (claiming a ‘market masala’, where differences become part of
Italian passion) or MINI (with its fascinating marriage of capitalist consumer culture (Klein 2000). For some com-
British quirkiness and Germanic efficiency). mentators, such as Klein herself, it is the politics of incor-
This interest in the ‘geographical entanglements’ and poration that are key here. Capitalism, via consumer
‘placing’ of brands (Pike 2009a) builds on longer stand- culture, increasingly absorbs forms of difference, whether
ing arguments. Central here is research on ‘brandscapes’ cultural, geographical or political, that might seem in
and themed environments, that focuses on how imagina- opposition to it. Oppositional voices need to find ways
tive geographies shape the making of consumption spaces either to resist or to use this incorporation for their own
(Klingmann 2007). In Disneyland and Disney World, for ends (see also McGuigan 2009; Mukherjee and Banet-
example, the amusements and other consumption oppor- Wieser 2012).
tunities are not just randomly arrayed, but organized into For others, capitalist heterogenization is not so much
distinct imaginative geographies: Frontierland, themed a top-down process of incorporation as it is a diverse
on the American West; Adventureland, themed on land- range of ways in which difference becomes commodi-
scapes of European colonialism and imperialism; and so fied and consumption acts as a space for cross-cultural
on (see Gottdiener 1982; Wilson 1992; Bryman 1995). This encounters and translations (Jackson 1999). In this per-
is a pattern to be found in many large shopping centres, spective a range of other issues come to the fore. How,
most famously the huge West Edmonton Mall in Canada for example, are consumer cultures implicated in present
(Crawford 1992; see also Goss 1999a) but also in more and past circulations of different material cultures, and
recent developments such as the Mercato Mall in Dubai. with what effects on national cultures? What kinds of dif-
The promotional text on the Mercato Mall website gives a ferences are fostered or discouraged within consumption
good sense of the geographically and historically themed and what are the implications of this for the wider poli-
experience on offer: ‘Mercato is ideally located in the heart tics of identity? What options are there for both produc-
of Jumeirah, one of Dubai’s most prestigious residential ers and consumers to express and develop their cultural
areas. Much more than just a shopping mall, Mercato identities through commercial cultures? Such questions
epitomizes the very best in Italian architecture and trans- have shaped a set of research projects by Philip Crang
ports you back to the Renaissance period. Home to pic- and colleagues on the presence of South Asian ‘stuff’
turesque cobbled streets, charming piazzas and authentic in British consumption cultures, especially of food and
Tuscan and Venetian features, Mercato on Jumeirah Beach fashion. Drawing on wider conceptual reflections on the
Road offers a unique and incomparable ambience, not relations between commodity cultures and transnational-
to mention a thoroughly enjoyable s­ hopping and leisure ity (Crang et al. 2003) these studies have looked at topics
experience’ (http://mercatoshoppingmall.com). Whole such as: how ‘Asian’ and ‘Eastern’ difference is presented
urban areas can extend this sort of themed consump- and commodified in contemporary British food market-
tion landscape; the Las Vegas strip being perhaps the best ing (Jackson 2002) and fashion design and retail (Dwyer
known. Indeed, Gottdiener (1997) goes so far as to posit and Crang 2002; Dwyer and Jackson 2003; Jackson et
that consumer culture has produced a general ‘theming of al. 2007); and how these contemporary fashions for
America’, so that theme parks become models for what is South Asian styled goods relate to past colonial histo-
happening across the urban landscapes outside them. Sack ries in which South Asian materials (such as cotton, or
(1992: 98) agrees that consumer culture is marked by a pro- the boteh/Paisley pattern) were central to British cultures
duction of ‘pseudo-places’. As part of a wider time–space of design, fashion and dress (Crang and Ashmore 2009;
compression, Harvey (1989) sees a general trend towards Breward et al. 2010).
highly packaged, and indeed simulated, experiences of cul- More generally, we have long argued that consumer
tural and geographical difference, such that microcosms of cultures can act as arenas of geographical knowledge,
the whole world are encountered in particular consump- in which understandings of both the origins of what we
tion spaces. consume and our own places in the world are played out

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 388    Section 4  Geographies of the economy

event, that says they were thinking about you (Miller

1998); the birthday present; and so on.
This entangling of economic and social relations
through consumption is not limited to domestic space. It
is also true of public spaces of consumption. Here com-
modity culture is implicated in our forms of public social-
ity and in how we relate to our immediate environments,
our local places. By way of illustration, we start with the
places where people go shopping.

19.3.1 Shopping and place

Shopping centres (or malls as they are more commonly
Plate 19.8  Eating into Britishness: by what process
do these ‘Indian’ restaurants become ‘British’? termed in North America) are routinely cast as the cathe-
(Michaelpuche/Shutterstock)
drals of our consumerist age, symbols of our worship
of commodity culture. But what goes on inside a shop-
ping centre, and what does this tell us about the kinds
(Cook and Crang 1996). Think, for instance, of how food of places being produced in the world of consumption?
marketing presents geographically referenced cuisines One response would be that in shopping centres we
(Indian food, Chinese food, Italian food, Mexican food, are manipulated into behaving in certain ways, and espe-
and so on). Here, a mundane realm of consumption is cially into buying things, by the power of the shopping
also a setting in which ideas of cultural difference and centre as a place. It is certainly the case that shopping
mixture are played out, as retailers and restaurants pre- centres are in part designed according to a ‘merchandise
sent consumers with ‘the world on a plate’ (for a sample plan’ (Maitland 1985: 8) that tries to maximize the expo-
of work on food geographies see Cook et al. 1999, 2000a, sure of consumers to goods. In older shopping centres
2008; Duruz 2005; Monrreal 2008). and malls this plan tended to be understood in quite
mechanical terms. Shopping centres were seen as func-
tional ‘machines for shopping’. ‘Generator’ stores are
used to pull us to the shopping centre in the first place,
19.3 Local geographies of consumption and once we are there ‘magnet’ stores every 200 metres or
so make sure we do not just pop in and out, but explore
Earlier we suggested that consumption involves the exten- every part of it. Here, then, ‘the public mall [is defined]
sion of the economy into realms of life that we might as essentially the passive outcome of a merchandising
not usually think of as economic, into our wider ‘cul- plan, a channel for the manipulation of pedestrian flows’
ture’. This is also true at the more immediate scale of
our own everyday economies. When we buy goods we
take them home; we ‘domesticate’ them. In consuming
things, we make them part of household relations; we
live with them and their lives become shaped by ours
(Gregson 2007). They become part of what we might call
‘moral economies’, insofar as: ‘[t]he household is a moral
economy because the economic activities of its members
are defined and informed by a wider set of cognitions,
evaluations and aesthetics, which themselves are defined
and informed by the biographies of the household and its
members’ (Silverstone et al. 1992: 11). The language here
may be unfamiliar, but we all have experiences of how
economic goods become part of something else, some-
thing more than economic, in their consumption: the toys Plate 19.9  The Mall of America, Bloomington
that become childhood companions and then symbols of Minnesota: 40 million visitors a year experience not
our childhood and its end (a narrative powerfully mined just shops but also an aquarium, fun fair and outdoor
by the makers of Pixar’s Toy Story movie trilogy); the lit- theme park.
tle ‘treat’, bought by a loved one in a mundane shopping (Jeffrey J Coleman/Shutterstock)

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 Chapter 19  Consumption and its geographies    389

(Maitland 1985: 10). There are well-known tricks to Take the case of Bert, 78 years old, and a regular visitor
make us behave as the shopping centre management and to a shopping mall in New England (USA):
its shops want: escalators arranged so we have to walk
I come here at quarter to eleven and I leave at twenty
past shop fronts or merchandise when going between
minutes past one . . . I do this five days a week, except
floors; hard seats so we do not linger too long without
I missed one day this year . . . And I have my lunch
getting up and seeing some more potential purchases; no
here at noontime . . . I move every half-hour. I go from
water fountains so we have to buy expensive drinks (see
here down to where the clock is, I go down in front of
Goss 1993).
Woolworth’s, then I come back again and go up there
In more recent shopping centres, however, the manip-
and take my bus by the front of JC Penney.
ulation may be more subtle. Increasingly, retail planners
and developers see their job as providing spectacular (Quoted in Lewis 1990: 126)
places that people will want to spend time in. This is
For Bert, the mall is not a place to shop, but some-
partly because research suggests that the longer people
where sheltered to go outside his house, a chance to meet
stay the more on average they spend; but it also stems
up with friends. For the mall management there is the
from intensified competition between shopping centres,
option of evicting these low-spending visitors, but eject-
such that each one needs more than just the usual shops
ing old people forcibly on to the pavement is hardly good
to attract us in the first place – everything from fountains
public relations. Instead, and as part of wider moves to
to funfairs (see, for example, Goss 1999b on The Mall
see malls as the new civic centres, Bert’s mall has actually
of America). Here, then, the manipulation of shoppers
established its own walking club for the elderly, with over
is less mechanical and more ‘affective’. The hope is to
300 members, for whom the doors open at 6 a.m., rather
excite, inspire, relax and please. Jacob Miller’s (2014)
than 9 a.m. when shops open.
study of the Abasto mall in Buenos Aires, Argentina
Adolescents also use the mall as a meeting place,
is an excellent up-to-date exploration of this issue. Of
somewhere to hang out. They also spend very little.
course, as Miller notes, these are promotional intentions
‘Suburban kids come to malls to look around, meet and
rather than shoppers’ experiences. As Chaney (1990)
make friends, and hang out – because there is nowhere
puts it in his review of the MetroCentre in Gateshead,
else to go’ (Lewis 1990: 130). Or as Ed and Tammy, self-
north-east England, the designer’s utopian impulses
confessed ‘mall rat’ and ‘mall bunny’ respectively, put it:
to produce a place of perfection often result in rather
underwhelming, ‘subtopian’ forms. Nonetheless, there [Gesturing around himself] I met all these people here.
is much here to be taken seriously. There is the attempt I’ve met lots of other people, too. One place where you
to produce a fabricated space in which the individual can always find someone . . . 
consumer can be made to feel like consuming (see Goss
(Ed; quoted in Lewis 1990: 130)
1999a). There is the emphasis on creating an internal,
closed-off, privately owned but partially public envi- I used to come here every Saturday from 11 am to 9.30
ronment, divorced from the harsh exterior world, not pm and just walk around with my friends, like Gina
only climatically but also socially, through the operation here, and just walk around and check out the guys.
of security systems that ensure the absence of anyone
(Tammy; quoted in Lewis 1990: 130)
who might threaten this consumer paradise or disrupt
the pleasure of the shopper. There is the emphasis on Unlike the elderly, the mall is less indulgent of these
managing how malls make us feel, their affective quali- teenagers. There are constant skirmishes with the secu-
ties and atmospheres, as part of the commercial work of rity staff over how long ten people can share one Coke
retail capital (Miller 2014). at the food court, and some mall rats and bunnies get
Such shopping centres recognize that there is much banned altogether.
more to going shopping than buying things (Glennie and So what are we to make of our trip to the mall? What
Thrift 1992). Shopping is in part about experiencing an does it tell us about the local geographies of consump-
urban space, seeing and being seen by other shoppers. It tion? Well, it certainly tells us that place matters to con-
is a social activity. Malls seek to manage this social expe- sumption. But how? Here the answer is more ambivalent.
rience. The street gets recast as a purified space of lei- In part what we see is a pseudo-public space symbolizing
surely consumption, cleansed of ‘nuisances’ that inhabit and enacting claims for consumption to be all there is
the ‘real’ streets, like ‘street people’. However, this fash- to civic life, making citizens consumers in a very con-
ioning of the mall can be disturbed. Retail spaces can be crete way. In this light, shopping centres illustrate how
reclaimed by those who use them. Leading the charge are place can produce both acts of consumption and people
a mixed assortment of senior citizens and adolescents. as consumers. Yet in shopping centres one also sees the

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 390    Section 4  Geographies of the economy

small-scale, trivial resistances that people enact, their practices, of memorable performances. For Borden, this
refusal to be just consumers in the sense of purchasers, contests the commodified logic that underpins contem-
their determination to use this space for their own ends. porary urban space.
And that too has a wider symbolism, signalling the pos- However, these sorts of performative engagements
sibility that consumption is rarely just about what we are with place can also be reclaimed as commodities. The
being sold, but also about fulfilling our own needs for business theorists Joseph Pine and James Gilmore talk
social affiliation, participation and place making. more generally about the emergence of an ‘experience
economy’ focused on the production and consumption
of memorable experiences (Pine and Gilmore 1999; see
19.3.2 E conomies of experience: skateboarding also Sundbo and Sorensen 2013). Place is again central
and dancing here; this is a theatrical economy, in which places are the
Shopping is not just about buying goods, then; it is a arenas in which certain kinds of social performances can
placed experience. More generally, a range of research be developed. Consumption is the undertaking of those
has framed consumption as experiential. For some, this performances. Clubs (in the sense of nightclubs) are
involves understanding consumption as a resistant act in exemplary.
which we, as consumers, creatively use the places made In London alone there are over 500 club nights on offer
for us. Writing from the discipline of architecture, Iain every week. In Britain the industry has a turnover of £1.8
Borden (2001) pursues this approach in a study of skate- billion per annum, and it is estimated that 42 per cent of
boarding, space and the city. Paying particular attention the population now visit a club once a year, 42 per cent
to ‘street skating’, he argues that skateboarders remake of 15–19-year-olds at least once a month (Mintel 2004,
urban spaces designed for other purposes: sometimes 2006). Although the industry has suffered some decline in
explicitly symbolic monumental space (e.g. town halls, the UK (Robinson 2013), urban and regional economies
national theatres, historical monuments, tourist attrac- have developed based on thriving club scenes: in Berlin, as
tions); but more often everyday spaces of neglect, the clubbers jet in on low-cost carriers from across Europe; in
left-overs of rational, economically focused planning (e.g. Ibiza, as a youthful tourist market is targeted; in Goa, as
mini-roundabouts, the spaces under bridges and urban international ‘trance freak’ tourists join Indian youth in
highways, mini-malls). Thus spaces of public, official sometimes uneasy dancing crowds (Saldanha 2002). But
symbolism and of arid architectural functionality become what are such economies actually selling? Ben Malbon
the stages for energetic practices of place consumption. (1997, 1999) argues that clubs are spaces of play. This
Handrails become tools for ‘ollie nose grinds’; cement should really not need saying. It is patently obvious that
banks opportunities for ‘shredding’. Skaters consume people go to clubs to have fun. It is also patently obvi-
the city with their boards, recomposing it in the process. ous that this fun is achieved through a variety of means.
Skateboarding enacts a way of consuming the city that Through enjoyment of the music; through an enjoy-
precisely emphasizes use over commercial or other val- ment of being part of a crowd of people with whom,
ues. The city becomes a site of play, of skillful embodied temporarily, one can feel at one; through the feelings of
competency and bodily expressiveness that dancing can
give you; through the sharing of a special place and time
with friends; through behaving in ways one cannot in
other social situations, for example at work. Perversely,
though, this fun needs to be taken seriously. We need to
understand the playfulness of such consumption. We
need to analyze the complicated micro-spatial practices
through which this play is enacted; the ways in which one
gets to feel, and enjoy being, part of the clubbing crowd;
the ways in which one dances so as to lose oneself in the
music. We need to grasp the importance of place to play-
ful consumption; the ways in which one has to be in the
right place, with the right music and the right crowd,
to have these feelings of exhilaration, communality and
vitality; the way that in such consumption ‘the empha-
sis is placed on the near and the affectual: that which
Plate 19.10  Party People @ Club Amnesia, Ibiza. unites one to a place, a place that is experienced among
(PhotoSmart/Shutterstock) others’ (Maffesoli 1996: 128). And we need to appreciate

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 Chapter 19  Consumption and its geographies    391

the wider significance of such playful consumption for social structure that produces the coffee, the economic
our productions of local experience, such that consumer impact of coffee production on the Colombian economy,
culture is not just made up of atomistic, avaristic indi- or the way coffee growing affects the Colombian environ-
vidual consumers, but also facilitates temporary, some ment’ (Sack 1992: 200). Such ignorance, he argues, makes
would say ‘neo-tribal’, gatherings, through which people it impossible for consumers to behave responsibly in rela-
come to feel part of something bigger than themselves tion to those involved in commodity production and dis-
(see Maffesoli 1996: 72–103). tribution. Unless we know about the origins of the goods
Clubbing is, then, a place-specific practice of con- we consume, then we lack the necessary understanding to
sumption. Whereas in the shopping centre or with street assess the impacts of our actions as consumers; without
skateboarding senses of communal belonging tend to be such understanding of consequences, responsible action
forged by those occupying space for purposes other than is impossible. Thus, modern consumption’s disconnected
those for which it was designed, in clubs that commu- geographies make it deeply amoral.
nal belonging is the very product that people are buying. One critical response to such ignorance and amoral-
Clubs may be distinctive places of consumption, charac- ity is to see consumers as blinded by a veil that is draped
terized by an exceptional emotional and bodily intensity, over the things we consume, through a process of what
but they also point to wider trends within the so-called Marx called ‘commodity fetishism’. In this portrait the
‘experience economy’ towards localized places of theatri- true history or biography of a product, and its basis in
cal consumption. the productive work of others, is obscured to consumers.
Instead, one is confronted by advertising imagery that
seeks to associate the product with other fantasy worlds.
The critical response to this situation is often to punc-
19.4  onsumption and geographies
C ture these fantasies with some sharp shafts of reality, to
of (dis)connection ‘de-­fetishise’ the commodity. Writing in the 1990s, Elaine
Hartwick points to the startling incongruities and ine-
In this final section of the chapter we discuss the wider qualities that such a puncturing can bring to light:
implications of our everyday practices of consumption.
Our focus in particular is on how consumers are both Michael Jordan, basketball player extraordinaire,
connected to, but often feel disconnected from, the other receives US$20 million a year to endorse Nike; Philip
people and places involved in providing the things we Knight, cofounder and chief executive officer of Nike,
consume. is worth US$5.4 billion; Indonesian workers are paid
Consumption may often feel mundane, or perhaps not US$2.40 a day and Vietnamese workers are paid
serious enough to matter that much, but it has profound US$10.00 a week to make the sneakers . . . The Walt
political and economic implications. In the words of Disney Company is publicly criticized for its treat-
Danny Miller, the figure of ‘the consumer’ has become a ment of Haitian workers making Pocahontas shirts
sort of ‘global dictator’: ‘Today, real power lies unequivo- for 28 cents an hour; Disney’s chief executive officer
cally with us, that is the waged consumers of the First makes US$78,000 a day.
World’ (1995: 10). In consequence, opposing the study of (Hartwick 1998: 423)
consumption because so many in the world are not afflu-
ent consumers is profoundly misplaced. Quoting Miller Hartwick’s suggestion is to approach consumption in
again, ‘The acknowledgement of consumption need not terms of ‘commodity chains’. Here she draws on a much
detract from the critique of inequality and exploitation, wider body of scholarship (see Hughes and Reimer 2004)
but this critique is foundering precisely because the enor- to argue for what she terms a ‘geoknowledge’ of con-
mous consequences and attractions of consumption are sumption, one that traces back the stuff we consume
left out of the analysis’ (ibid.: 21). A fundamental chal- through the links in a provision chain, eventually con-
lenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion economic necting consumers to producers. Such knowledge, she
forms that fulfil those attractions of consumption, but argues, allows a ‘geoethics’ of consumption, attuned to
deal too with its consequences. the politics of the economic systems upon which con-
sumption depends.
Smith’s account of Starbucks Coffee shops makes a
19.4.1 Dis-connections similar ‘de-fetishisation’ argument. He highlights how
In Robert Sack’s view, we consumers are profoundly igno- unfairly traded coffee sees only 25 per cent of the retail
rant of the geographies of provision that bring goods to price returning to the producing country, with even
us: ‘A shop that sells Colombian coffee does not reveal the less going to those who actually cultivate the crop (the

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 392    Section 4  Geographies of the economy

smallholders, waged workers and seasonal pickers). He them. A recent example is the letter found in a Saks Fifth
contrasts the stylish coffee-shop culture that a brand like Avenue shopping bag in New York from Tohnain Emma-
Starbucks epitomizes with the lives of those who produce nuel Njong, a Cameroon national making them in a Chi-
coffee. For the women who pick the coffee beans, their nese prison who wanted a consumer to know about the
working day begins somewhere between three and four terrible conditions in which he was forced to work and
in the morning. Getting back home at six in the evening, to help his story to be told (Kelleher and Cook 2014b).
they still have evening meals to prepare, water to fetch Finally, there are the apparently accidental traces of
from the river, a family to feed and clear up after. Few live producers’ work that are left in and on commodities
in houses with electricity or running water. They face a for consumers to discover. Perhaps the most famous of
major health hazard from the pesticides used on the cof- these happened in 2009, when photos of a quality control
fee plants (M.D. Smith 1996: 512–13). Other academic worker in a Chinese electronics factory were found on a
accounts profess a more open reading of the juxtaposi- new iPhone when it was first turned on by a consumer
tions of different moments and places in a commodity’s in the UK. He posted them online with a note asking if
life (see Cook and Woodyer 2012). Cook’s ‘followings’ of anyone else had found photos like this on their phones.
foods – particularly the papaya - provide vivid examples The story then went viral with countless people around
of what is possible here (Cook et al. 2004, 2006). the world posting their opinions about who she was, why
It is not just academic accounts that look to make the photos had been taken and left on the phone, and
apparent the often hidden relations between the produc- what would happen to her now she could be identified as
ers and consumers of commodities. The spoof shopping having left them there (Cook 2011d).
website followthethings.com documents over 60 exam- Naomi Klein (2000) notes how the power of global
ples of ‘follow the thing’ work by journalists, filmmak- brands, combined with their concern for their sign
ers, artists, activists and others. There are a number of values, has generated a political response – a ‘brand
serious documentary films here including: Dziga Ver- ­boomerang’ – in which the meanings being promoted
tov’s (1924) Kino Eye, which involves reverse-action in marketing discourses are contested by other stories,
sequences following beef steaks back to pasture lands in often centred on the social relations of production. In
Russia (Cook 2011a); and Mark Phillips’ (1997) Mange recent years, these contestations have increasingly taken
Tout, which follows a UK supermarket buyer as he vis- place online via websites, blogs and social media-based
its a farm producing mangetout peas in Zimbabwe and ‘marketing’ strategies working in parallel to those used
asks packing house workers to trim them differently ‘for by corporations (Baringhorst et al. 2009). Using relatively
the consumer’ (Cook 2011b). There are bitingly funny non-specialist on- and offline tools and networks, jour-
activist films, like Amnesty International’s (2006) spoof nalists and activists have been able quickly and vividly
Teleshopping advert in which shopping channel demon- to highlight, hijack and call into question large corpora-
strators show how easy it is for children to buy and kill tions’ neglect of the health, safety and wages of farmers,
people with AK-47 rifles (Livingston 2011), and Emily factory workers and others making their branded goods.
James’ (2002) film The Luckiest Nut in the World, in This work is said to be responsible for some corporations’
which an animated American peanut sings country and apparent turn towards more transparent and ethical busi-
western songs about the international trade rules which ness practices. One notable example is what happened
favour him over other nuts grown commercially outside after the Hong Kong based NGO Students and Scholars
the USA (Cook 2011c). Against Corporate Misbehaviour (SACOM) hijacked
There are commodities reworked and made afresh Apple’s carefully planned launch of the iPad in 2010 (see
by artists and activists. Examples include: the bottles of Case study 19.2).
‘B’eau Pal’ mineral water (‘bottled at source’) produced
by the Bhopal Medical Appeal and the YesMen in 2009
19.4.2 Ethical Consumption
for delivery to the UK headquarters of Dow Chemical
whom they wanted to pay compensation to the victims These academic, journalist, activist and other attempts
of the 1984 Bhopal chemical factory explosion (Parkin at reconnecting consumers and producers speak to a
2013); and the labels found in Primark clothing in 2014 wider consumer movement, that of ‘ethical consump-
saying ‘Degrading Sweatshop Conditions’ and ‘Exhaust- tion’. Here, consumption is explicitly cast in relation to
ing Hours’ which were believed to have been sewn in to wider provisioning systems and their human and non-
them by an artist/activist who then returned them to the human participants, of which the consumer is a part (for
store for re-sale (Kelleher and Cook 2014a). There are a general introduction, see Lewis and Potter 2011). Green
the ‘real’ letters found in commodities that were written consumerism, fair trade, vegetarianism and other animal
by the people who made them to the people who bought welfare concerns would be principal strands.

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 Chapter 19  Consumption and its geographies    393

Case study 19.2

Timeline: the iPad – ‘a gadget to blogs – like boinboing.net. Readers submit hundreds of
die for?’ online comments in response, and these reviews are
read, commented upon, and written about worldwide.
San Francisco, 27 January 2010: at an invitation- USA, 3 April 2010: the iPad goes on sale. Reports
only event, Apple CEO Steve Jobs unveils a thin, describe people queuing for days to be the first to get
light, aluminium and glass ‘multi-touch’ tablet media one in store. Customer reviews quickly appear online
player called the iPad. It is, he claims, a ‘magical and and in the press.
revolutionary device’ which ‘creates and defines an San Francisco, 3 May 2010: Apple announces that
entirely new category of devices that will connect one million iPads have been sold. Jobs states that
users and their apps and content in a much more ‘Demand continues to exceed supply and we’re working
intimate, intuitive and fun way than ever before’ (in hard to get this magical product into the hands of even
Apple 2010a). A video of his presentation is posted on more customers’ (in Apple 2010b).
the Apple website, YouTube and elsewhere, and the Hong Kong, 25 May 2010: SACOM publish a report
iPad features in news stories worldwide. and lead a group of protesters performing traditional
Online, 31 March–1 April 2010: iPads distributed Chinese funeral rights at the headquarters of the Fox-
to a small, select ‘inner circle’ in advance of their sale conn Corporation. The report details a series of ten
are reviewed in mainstream North American media suicide attempts (eight ‘successful’) since the begin-
­outlets – like Time magazine – and on specialist ning of 2010 by young factory workers employed by

Plate 19.11  ‘A gadget to die

for’: The Independent, 27 May
2010, when news of the new
iPad launch and the suicides
of the workers who made them
became front page news in the
UK.
(The Independent)
➜

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 394    Section 4  Geographies of the economy

➜ Foxconn in Shenzhen City’s Longuhua Science and Hong Kong, 8 June 2010: SACOM declares this
Technology Park. Foxconn is China’s biggest exporter day the ‘Global Day of Remembrance for Victims of
and, with 300,000 assembly workers, this is the largest Foxconn’, protests outside a Foxconn shareholder
factory in the world. Local press reports attribute the meeting, and hands over a petition endorsed by ‘more
suicide attempts to ‘overwork’, ‘too much pressure’ and than 5,000 organizations and individuals from over 100
‘unstable emotions’ resulting from the factory regime. countries’ (SACOM 2010 np).
TV news bulletins in China show security camera foot- Shenzhen, 9 June 2010: Foxconn is reported to be
age of one 24-year-old victim ‘walking unsteadily out ‘employing psychologists, punchbags for prostrated
onto the roof of a Foxconn building on the way to her workers . . . and safety nets around its roofs to stop
death’ (Moore 2010). An ongoing series of TV news workers leaping from them’ (Harding 2010, np).
reports about ‘Foxconn suicides’ – in Chinese, English Shenzhen, 10 June 2010: Foxconn pay rises
and with English subtitles – are posted on YouTube. By encourage workers in other Chinese factories to strike for
the time SACOM’s report is published, Foxconn work- higher pay.
ers at Longhua Park have already assembled two mil- Shenzhen, 11 June 2010: Foxconn is reported to
lion iPads (alongside Nintendo Wiis, Nokia cellphones have recruited monks and social workers to help work-
and other popular consumer electronic devices). The ers with their problems, and to have compelled workers
report suggests that Apple’s marketing campaign to sign contracts promising not to sue Foxconn as a
and the enthusiastic take-up of iPads by US consum- result of ‘any unexpected death or injury, including sui-
ers contributed to the suicides by sending ‘extreme cide or self-torture’ (Malone and Jones 2010 np).
pressure all the way down to [Apple’s] Chinese suppli- USA, 12 June 2010: an Apple fan called Mike Daisey
ers’ (Chan 2010: 5). returns from talking to Foxconn workers in preparation
UK, 27 May 2010: the front page of a UK national for a monologue show about Steve Jobs and concludes,
newspaper brings the two strands of this story together ‘It’s painful to realize that these things you love so much
in a starkly visual way (Hickman 2010a). Beneath the have blood on them’ (in McKeon 2010 np).
headline – ‘A gadget to die for?’ – is a photograph of China, 6 July 2010: Chinese factory workers are
two objects in a spotlight. They're the same size and reported to have been following this press cover-
shape. One is an iPad. The other is a framed photo of age online, to be coordinating strike action via social
a young Chinese man. The text beneath one reads, networking websites, and to be gaining pay rises as a
‘This is the iPad, the most eagerly awaited consumer result of their actions.
product of the year, available in the UK from tomorrow’. UK, 16 July 2010: journalist Leo Hickman (2010b,
The text beneath the other reads, ‘This is Ma Xiang- np) argues that Apple is no longer the ‘creative, edgy
qian, driven to suicide, the latest victim of “inhuman” innovator that launched the iPod in 2001’, and that
conditions in Asia’s electronics factories’. His suicide is the reputation of the ‘entertainment and information
detailed in SACOM’s report, and his family takes this colossus’ has crumbled.
framed photograph with them to protest and mourn Washington DC, 20 July 2010: the premiere of
the Foxconn deaths. Hundreds more mainstream and Mike Daisey’s The Agony and the Ecstasy of Steve
online media stories link the iPad to the ‘Foxconn sui- Jobs takes place in the Wooly Mammoth Theatre. This
cides’ over the following days, weeks and months. becomes a controversial, high-profile critique of Jobs’
Worldwide, 28 May 2010: after delays caused by company. Two years later, one reviewer describes it
massive sales in the USA, the iPad goes on sale in as ‘the play that shook Apple and has compelled labor
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, reforms in China’ (Anonymous 2012, np).
Spain, Switzerland and the UK (Apple 2010c). Similar China, 22 July 2010: Foxconn workers are reported
scenes, stories, reviews, comments and discussions to have been offered two pay rises in June which could
are reported in the press. more than double their pay, the company increased
San Francisco, 2 June 2010: Jobs claims the its prices to clients to cover increasing wage costs,
Foxconn factory is not a ‘sweatshop’, that its suicide the wave of strikes in China’s coastal industrial cit-
rate is lower than the USA’s, and that Apple is ‘on top’ ies continued, and Foxconn was said to be increasing
of the situation (Beaumont 2010). A worker dies there automated production and moving low-margin produc-
after working a 34-hour shift. tion to new, lower-wage factories inland.
Shenzhen, 3 June 2010: Foxconn raises basic The story continues . . . 
Shenzhen factory wages by a third. Source: edited version of Cook et al. (2010)

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 Chapter 19  Consumption and its geographies    395

In ethical consumption, being a consumer is not political fields where the interests of a range of interest
opposed to being a political actor or a citizen. Rather, groups have to be negotiated and may compete. Produc-
consumption is seen as a realm for political agency. ers may, and do, find ethical regulation an imposition
However, the motivations, forms and implications of upon them by powerful consumer interests; corporate
such agency cannot be assumed. Ethical consumption is actors, such as supermarket retailers, may use ethical
not as simple as correcting the ignorances and amoral- concerns to reinforce their role of speaking for consum-
ity of most consumers through more accurate informa- ers and dictating terms to producers (Cook et al. 2000b;
tion about the origins of products. This is so in at least Freidberg 2003). The politics of ethical consumption are
three ways. complex.
First, we have argued that consumption is an arena for Third, a preoccupation with the dark side of consump-
the production, circulation and reception of geographi- tion – to put it crudely, with suffering, injustice, and our
cal knowledges. It is tempting for Geography academics responsibility for it – is too partial. Rather than articu-
and students to respond by looking to export the factual lating worlds of consumption and production, it can end
knowledge of our subject to this everyday arena, in order up dismissing worlds of consumption and their positive
to correct the ignorances that we all operate under as con- possibilities altogether. It is not a coincidence that Hart-
sumers. But that, we suggest, is both too easy – offering a wick’s (1998) commodity chain approach pays no atten-
very simplistic account of both geographical knowledge tion to consumption per se. The danger of that limited
and the politics of consumption – and impossibly diffi- view is that consumption is framed as unequivocally bad.
cult, given the complex histories and geographies of the That is neither true, as hopefully the discussions earlier in
multitude of things we consume (Cook et al. 2007). Just this chapter have demonstrated, nor terribly attractive in
think, for example, about how many component parts shaping political action. Particularly if one’s own worlds
your mobile phone has, how many hands those parts and of production, as a worker, are thoroughly unrewarding –
their constituent materials have been through. To detail admittedly not usually the case for academic critics of
these would take many thousands of words; to find out consumption, but true for many others – then giving up
about them many hours, days, maybe even months of all the pleasures of consumption is pretty hard to stom-
research. Even the most committed ethical consumers ach. Certainly the last three decades in Western politics
therefore rely on shorthand rationales, whether that be suggest that failing to recognize the genuine senses of
guidance from those judged to be experts on appropri- autonomy and creativity that consumption can facilitate
ate ethical actions, recognized audits of ethical standards is a sure way to alienate those very same workers in whose
(e.g. through certification schemes such as Fairtrade, name one wishes to re-centre the world of production
organic or animal welfare), or adverts that present ethi- (Miller 2001).
cal products (with their carefully managed, and often The pleasures and responsibilities of consumption do
romanticized, representations of producers; see Wright not have to be opposed in this way. There are connections
2004 and Zick Varul 2008). Ethical consumption is not to be made. Early empirical research on ethical consum-
about a simple transparency; it still involves the repre- ers in London challenged any sense of ethical consump-
sentation of commodity production and its relations to tion as joyless moral prescription (Bedford 1999), instead
consumers (Goodman 2004). emphasizing the positive pleasures gained through such
Second, studies of ethical consumption also suggest consumer movements: the feelings of achievement, the
that its existent forms stem as much from personal his- senses of empowerment, the forms of sociality fostered
tories and collective organizations of political action as (see also Barnett et al. 2011: 153–80). What is more, much
they do from the decisions of better informed consum- routine consumption has a moral core, centred on caring
ers (Barnett et al. 2005, 2011; Clarke et al. 2007; Clarke for one’s nearest and dearest. Ethical consumption looks
2008). In consequence, ethical consumption practice is to extend the reach of such a consuming sensibility. We
as much a matter of political organization, and collec- consumers are both global dictators and local freedom
tive regulation, as it is of individual product choices. In fighters. Understanding and inhabiting those two roles in
turn, those forms of regulation operate within complex conjunction remains a significant challenge.

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 396    Section 4  Geographies of the economy

Learning outcomes Society and Space, 16, 423–37. A pithy comparison of the
advertising imagery used to sell gold and the ways in which
After reading this chapter, you should have:
that gold is produced. Argues for a knowledgable and ethical
● An understanding of the importance of consump- connection of consumers and producers.
tion to modern economies and cultures. Mansvelt, J. (2005) Geographies of Consumption, Sage:
● A sensitivity to the continuing importance of cultural London. This is an excellent textbook that develops and
extends the account of consumption begun in this chapter.
and geographical difference within contemporary
Miller, J.C. (2014) ‘Malls without stores (MwS): the affectual
consumer cultures.
spaces of a Buenos Aires shopping mall’, Transactions of the
● An understanding of the character of public space Institute of British Geographers, NS 39, 14-25. Building on
fashioned within the worlds of consumption. earlier work, this study provides an up to date account of retail
● An understanding of the connections that exist space geographies, focusing on how malls are engineered to
between worlds of consumption and production, create atmospheres conducive to consumption and the limits
and of how ethical and political consumption looks to such commercial ambitions of environmental control.
to address these.
● An ability to think about the geographies of your
own everyday consumption practices. Useful websites
www.followthethings.com Opened in October 2011. This
Further reading website is run by Ian Cook and collaborators, and collects,
researches and showcases work that seeks to understand
Barnett, C., Cloke, P., Clarke, N. and Malpass, A. (2011) Glo- consumption and its complex geographies using a ‘follow the
balizing Responsibility: The Political Rationalities of Ethical thing’ approach.
Consumption, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. This book argues for www.adbusters.org This website presents examples of
understanding ethical consumption as a political phenom- ‘culture jamming’, i.e. re-workings of well known advertising
enon, based on empirical research in the UK. campaigns, as well as magazine and blog materials devoted
Cook, I. et al. (2004) Follow the thing: papaya, Antipode, to contesting the cultural power of corporate promotional
36(4), 642–64. An engaging narration of the lives connected culture.
through the travels of this tropical fruit from its Jamaican ‘pro- www.exchange-values.org This website presents Shelly
duction’ to its UK ‘consumption’. This article attempts to show Sacks’ artwork Exchange Values in an online format. The
the complexity of ‘defetishisation’ research. artwork presents audio testimony from banana farmers in
Hartwick, E. (1998) Geographies of consumption: a com- St Lucia, who speak to you, a banana consumer, about their
modity chain approach, Environment and Planning D: hopes and concerns.

M19_DANI2950_05_SE_C19.indd 396 31/03/16 7:15 pm

 Section 5

Political geographies:
geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship
and governance

Edited by James Sidaway

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 Those who have reached this section after reading expressed in the form of the political geography of
other chapters should already be aware that many nations and states and their boundaries (the focus
elements of geography touch on political issues. of Chapter 22), Chapter 21 stresses that territoriality
Such ‘politics’ may not be confined to those things operates in myriad ways and at local scales: for
that are usually designated by the term: govern- example, in the manner in which particular areas
ments, elections, referendums (or the lack of within many cities become associated with differ-
them), political parties, revolutions, territorial con- ent ethnicities (as in the history of urban ghettos
flicts and so on. Rather, readers will have noticed and city ‘quarters’ or other places that are seen
that debates about culture, economic change, his- as being overwhelmingly white – such as many
tory, changing gender relations and many other rural areas in Britain) or, more widely, in the ways
things described in this text are also political. They that some spaces are seen as public and oth-
are political in the sense of being about power, ers private or as male and female. Readers will
albeit at different levels and in lots of different therefore find many connections with earlier sec-
ways. So, in an important way, all geographies are tions of the book here. Chapter 22 introduces the
political geographies. Though focused on geopoli- historical and geographical variability of nations
tics territory, nation-states and global governance, and states. It stresses that neither the nation nor
the chapters that follow aim to bring that home. the state is to be taken at face value. Or in other
Chapter 20 examines the meanings of geopolitics. words, it examines how nation-states are complex
It will explore how geopolitics has been defined in symbolic systems that crucially depend upon par-
different times and places: including South Amer- ticular visions and associations of territory, place
ica in the second half of the twentieth century, Ger- and space. Chapter 23 focuses on citizenship: the
many, some other European countries and Japan relationship between individuals and political units
before and during the Second World War as well (largely, but not only states).
as through the Cold War confrontation between
The last chapter in the book should be read in
the Soviet Union and the USA, the ‘global war
tandem with the others in this section. Its consid-
on terror’ of the 2000s to contemporary debates
eration of the geographies of global governance
about the rise and role of China; all building on
also connects with many others in the book. In
the moment when geopolitics was first established
particular, it is easy to see how Chapter 24 relates
as a way of understanding (and indeed seeking to
to issues of population, resources, development
influence) world politics, in early twentieth-century
and the environment that are considered in Sec-
Europe. As the chapter describes, when consider-
tion 2. In the relationships with culture, nature and
ing what geopolitics might mean today and in the
cities, the links to Section 3 are evident, but so too
future, these pasts are mobilized and reworked.
are those with the economic and financial geog-
Chapter 21 examines ‘territory’; the ways that raphies described in Section 4. And it is not hard
human individuals and social groups claim or to appreciate how the present and future of all
are assigned to particular areas: in short, the the issues considered in this section derive from
human territorial strategies which regulate, demar- the historical geographies examined in Section 1.
cate and divide social and political spaces, and Such interconnections are part of what makes a
their uses. Whilst this is perhaps most clearly geographical approach so inviting and exciting.

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 Geopolitical traditions

Chapter 20

James Sidaway, Virginie Mamadouh and

Chih Yuan Woon

Topics covered
■ Origins and history of geopolitics, critical perspectives and
‘popular geopolitics’
■ Diversity and dissemination of geopolitical discourses
■ Changing ‘World Orders’

Few modern ideologies are as whimsically all-encompassing, as roman-

tically obscure, as intellectually sloppy, and as likely to start a third
world war as the theory of ‘geopolitics’. Popularized at the beginning
of the twentieth century by an eccentric British geographer, Sir Halford
Mackinder, geopolitics posits that the earth will forever be divided into
two naturally antagonistic spheres: land and sea. In this model, the
natural repository for global land power is the Eurasian ‘heartland’ – the
territory of the former Russian empire. Whoever controls the heartland,
wrote Mackinder, will forever seek to dominate the Eurasian landmass
and ultimately the world.
(Charles Clover 1999: 9)

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 400    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

the introduction to a critical collection on ‘rethinking

20.1 Introducing the idea of a geopolitics’ explained:
­geopolitical tradition the word ‘geopolitics’ has had a long and varied his-
tory in the twentieth century, moving well beyond its
Geopolitical rhetoric is more popular than ever. Writ- original meaning in Kjellén’s work . . . . Coming up
ing in the (London-based newspaper) Financial Times with a specific definition of geopolitics is notoriously
in May 2015, China’s ambassador to Britain began his difficult, for the meaning of concepts like geopolitics
article on how China’s growing power and investments tends to change as historical periods and structures of
should not be seen as threatening, with a note about how world order change.
‘A century ago, Sir Halford Mackinder, the British geog-
rapher and politician credited as the father of western (Ó Tuathail 1998: 1)
geopolitics’ had coined ideas about power and space in In other words, exactly what is meant by the term
Eurasia that ‘captivated generations of geo-strategists ‘geopolitics’ has changed in different historical and geo-
who saw Eurasia as the “heartland” of the world’s most graphical contexts. However, a good way to begin to
populous and pivotal region’ (Liu 2015: 9). understand something about this idea of a tradition of
Ambassador Liu noted that new Chinese proposals for geopolitics is to look at some of the people, places and
enhanced transport and trade links connecting Europe ideas associated with one of its most significant appear-
and Asia were being misinterpreted by some as confirm- ances, in the ideology of the right-wing dictatorships
ing Mackinder’s theories. Instead he stressed the shared that ruled many South American countries in the 1960s,
benefits of ‘development and prosperity’ from Chinese 1970s and 1980s. In most cases they had come to power
initiatives, arguing that ‘the Chinese mind is never pro- through military coups and became more concerned with
grammed around geopolitical or geoeconomic theory’ internal security (patrolling the towns and country as a
(op cit.). Some beg to differ, however, and as the closing kind of police force and running the wider government)
section of this chapter details, Chinese actions are fre- than with fighting or preparing to fight wars with other
quently interpreted through geopolitical lenses. countries.
But what does geopolitics mean? Our answer is Consider the case of Chile. On 11 September 1973,
that whilst the term can and does refer to many things, the elected left-wing government of Chile (headed by the
and is much in vogue, it is important for students of communist President Salvador Allende) was overthrown
geography (a subject with which geopolitics has often in a brutally violent coup led by the head of the armed
been associated) to understand that geopolitics is com- forces General Augusto Pinochet (Plate 20.1). Pinochet
monly associated with particular ways of writing (and and his generals ruled Chile with an iron fist. All opposi-
thinking) about space, states and the relations between tion was crushed and thousands of people were rounded
them. Often this takes the form of mapping, emphasiz- up by the armed forces. Many ‘disappeared’ into secret
ing the strategic importance of particular places (as in military jails. Hundreds of these prisoners were tor-
Figures 20.1 or 20.3). Geopolitics in this sense often sees tured and murdered. The use of torture became a rou-
itself as a tradition: that is, something conscious of its tine instrument of state. For the next 17 years, Chile was
unfolding historical development and with a sense of ruled by Pinochet and his cronies who imposed a new
important founders (and certain key texts written by ‘neoliberal’ economic and political model (of the form
them). Many of those who write about this tradition or that is described in Chapter 8) and murdered any signifi-
see themselves as working within or extending it usually cant opposition. Pinochet finally stepped down as head
trace its origins to the late-nineteenth-century writings of state in 1990, when democracy was restored, but not
of a conservative Swedish politician Rudolf Kjellén. before he had entrenched himself as a senator (in the
Kjellén is reputedly the first person to have used the parliament) for life; he died from heart failure in 2006,
term ‘geopolitics’ in published writings (see Holdar aged 91.
1992; Tunander 2001). But beyond this idea of a found- The ideology of the military regime in Chile (like
ing moment when the geopolitical ‘tradition’ begins those elsewhere in South America) was intensely nation-
with the first use of the term by Kjellén, things start to alist. More importantly it was a particular conservative
get complicated. The ‘tradition’ divides, fractures, mul- form of Chilean nationalism. The nation was held to be
tiplies and finds itself translated into many languages sacred and the military were rescuing this ‘sacred body’
and cropping up in everything from the writings and from communists, subversives and so on (i.e. anyone
speeches of American politicians to texts written by who opposed the military vision of ultra-nationalism
Brazilian generals and Russian journalists. All these and order and the neoliberal economic and social model
reinvent and rework the ‘tradition’ as they go along. As which was now imposed). It is in this nationalism and

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 Chapter 20  Geopolitical traditions    401

space’ (a certain amount of resources and land) for the

nation to thrive is particularly evident in South American
geopolitics. A certain reading of Charles Darwin’s idea
of a struggle for the ‘survival of the fittest’ is therefore
transferred to the realm of states. Drawing upon con-
servative German writings of the nineteenth and early
twentieth century and with this organic notion of the
state in mind, geopolitics claims to identify certain laws
that govern state behaviour and that, once identified, can
be a guide for those charged with furthering and protect-
ing the ‘national interest’ (or at least a certain definition
of the latter).
It is not difficult to see how this idea could appeal to
South American military dictators, for it gives the mili-
tary, equipped with the supposedly scientific study of
geopolitics, a special mission. In other words it legiti-
mizes their rule. Moreover, the organic idea was extended
further to legitimize the extermination of those whom
the military defined as enemies of the state. People
labelled as communist or subversive, indeed all those who
oppose the military dictatorship, can be compared with
a disease or cancer which threatens the lifeblood of the
state-organism and is best ‘cut out’, that is, eliminated.
The otherwise unthinkable (the murder of thousands of
Plate 20.1  General Pinochet: geopolitics in action.
people in the name of the wider welfare of the nation-
(SIPA PRESS/Rex Shutterstock)
state) is made to seem natural and a good thing, since it
serves the longer-term interest of the health and power
of the ‘living being’ that is the state (see Hepple 1992 for
conception of the nation as a kind of sacred body that an exploration of this). With the ‘cancer’ of subversion
geopolitics enters the picture. A few years before the coup, and disloyalty eliminated, the ‘state-body’ can go on to
Pinochet had published an army textbook on geopolitics. grow and thrive.
Intended mainly for use in Chilean military academies,
the 1968 textbook indicated that Chile’s future dictator
took the subject very seriously. For Pinochet, geopoli-
tics was a science of the state, a set of knowledges and 20.3 Brazilian national integration
programmes to perfect the art of statecraft, that is to
strengthen the state in a continent and wider world in Aside from Chile (and neighbour Argentina, of which
which it was held to be in competition with others. The more will be said in Section 20.4), perhaps the most
starting point and the heart of Pinochet’s textbook and important expressions of geopolitics in South America
of the wider bleak tradition of geopolitics that it presents were in Brazil. The military in Brazil overthrew the demo-
is an organic theory of the state. cratic government in 1964 and stayed in power for the next
20 years. Although never as despotic as the regime led by
Pinochet (or similar military governments in Argentina
and Uruguay), the long years of military rule gave the
20.2 The organic theory of the state Brazilian generals a chance to elaborate and impose a
geopolitical vision on the country. One of the most evi-
This idea is at the core of most South American geopo- dent aspects of Brazilian geopolitics is the idea that state
litical writings and of the wider geopolitical tradition. In security requires a measure of national integration. The
summary, it holds that the state or country (and the sense vast scale of Brazil, the difficulty of travel across its Ama-
of nation that goes with it) is best understood as being zon ‘heartland’ (the world’s largest tropical rainforest)
like a living being. Like any living organism, it therefore and the fact that it shares borders with every other South
needs space to grow and it will be in competition with American country except Chile and Ecuador gave the
other living beings. An idea that the state needs ‘living geopolitics of the Brazilian generals a special sense of its

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 402    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

Area of detailed map

10

12
4
15

5
9 11

6
2
3

8 1
14 13
7

Figure 20.1  National integration in Brazilian geopolitics: Amazon development poles. The shaded areas
represent the 15 ‘development poles’ where financial resources would be concentrated and concessions offered
to mining, settlement, industrial, lumber and agricultural development resources.
Source: Hecht and Cockburn (1989: 127)

national mission and an obsession with the potential for have also moved into the Amazon region in search of
the country to be a great power (known in Portuguese as land and freedom. They are fleeing from the oppression
Grandeza). The associated sense of the urgency of the and landlessness they themselves face in the north-east
integration of Brazil required the extension of a network of Brazil, where the vast majority of the land is still in
of highways across Amazonia and the settlement of its the hands of an elite class. Of course, in the geopolitical
lands by farmers and ranchers. It is this geopolitically visions of the Brazilian generals, this population move-
inspired vision, combined with a highly corrupt system ment was seen as overwhelmingly positive, reinforcing
of patronage and favours to those close to the regime, the Brazilian population of the Amazon and redistrib-
that underlies the enclosure and division of Amazonia uting what they regard as marginal ‘surplus’ people in
into private lands (some larger than European countries the process (in much the same way that the coloniza-
such as Belgium) and the accompanying transformation tion of the ‘wild west’ was seen as the advance of civi-
or destruction of the tropical rainforest (see Hecht and lization and America’s ‘manifest destiny’ in the United
Cockburn 1989; Foresta 1992) (Figure 20.1). States). At the same time this has defused some of the
Although the Brazilian military have been back in the political pressures for land reform in north-east Bra-
barracks for more than three decades and Brazil is again zil. In all this we can see how Brazilian geopolitics was
a lively democracy, the long-term consequences of this implicated in a complex web of social and environmental
geopolitically motivated (and economically profitable) transformations.
strategy have been disastrous for many of the indige-
nous peoples of Amazonia. They have found themselves
forced off land that was traditionally theirs, sometimes
murdered or attacked by ranchers, the state and settlers, 20.4 Antarctic obsessions
and disoriented by the arrival of a frontier culture of
violence, destruction and consumption. Poor peasants, An interest, at times an obsession, with the last unex-
particularly from the impoverished north-east of Brazil, ploited continent of Antarctica is evident in much South

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 Chapter 20  Geopolitical traditions    403

American geopolitics. Antarctica is also prominent in Atlantic], but also to. . .  national sovereignty, patriot-
geopolitical writings from Argentina, Chile and Uruguay ism, and pride. This is a particularly touchy combi-
and also appears in Peruvian, Brazilian and Ecuadorian nation after the humiliating defeat of the Malvinas/
geopolitical texts (see Dodds 1997). To understand what Falklands conflict. The Argentine National Antarctic
this amounts to and what forms it takes necessitates Directorate has professors of Antarctic geopolitics on
some understanding of Antarctica’s exceptional politi- its staff. Through the media, maps, and postage stamps
cal geography. Antarctica has a unique territorial status, and the centralized educational system, Argentines
in so far as it has no recognized state on its territory. are constantly taught and reminded that there is an
Everywhere else in the world forms part of the patch- Argentine Antarctic just as much as there are Argen-
work of states that we learn to be familiar with and take tine Malvinas. The need to assert Argentine rights in
for granted. Antarctica is a stark reminder that there is the Argentine Sea, islands, and Antarctica is linked to
nothing natural or inevitable about this. The absence of dreams and national projects of Argentine greatness.
recognized states in Antarctica reflects the inhospitability
and remoteness of the continent, the only one without an
indigenous human population. Although the plankton-
rich waters around Antarctica were exploited for seal and 20.5 Heartland
whale hunting in the nineteenth century, it was not until
the twentieth century that exploration of the interior
Although Antarctica and the South Atlantic are signifi-
began. Even today, Antarctica has only a non-permanent
cant components of Argentine (along with Brazilian and
population (at any time) of a few hundred scientists. This
Chilean) geopolitics, the former also looks beyond other
presence, plus the relative proximity of the continent to
Argentine frontiers. In particular, Argentine geopoliti-
South America and the possibility of exploitable min-
cal writers together with some Brazilians and Chileans
eral resources, has led to a series of territorial claims.
have taken a particular interest in the security of Bolivia.
Although Argentinean writers had already represented
They have scripted Bolivia (a relatively impoverished
Antarctica as an extension of the southern Argentine area
land-locked mountainous country, which has borders
of Patagonia, the British made the first formal claim in
with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Peru) and
1908. In turn, parts of this claim were ‘granted’ to Aus-
proximate areas of its neighbours as a key strategic con-
tralia and New Zealand. France and Norway made claims
tinental heartland (see Kelly 1997). Control of Bolivia,
in the 1930s and 1940s, followed shortly by Argentina and
in this vision, would be a vital key to a relative domi-
Chile. After 1945, the USSR and the USA also established
nance in the South American continent. That Bolivia has
a wide network of bases, although without staking for-
a strong revolutionary tradition and was for many years
mal claims to territory. The claims made by Argentina,
characterized by chronic political instability has rein-
Chile and the United Kingdom overlapped – and fore-
forced the tendency of the other South American coun-
shadowing the British–Argentine conflict over the Falk-
tries to meddle in Bolivian politics. Indeed, during the
lands/Malvinas, British and Argentine forces exchanged
years (1976–82) when Argentina was last ruled by a geo-
fire in Antarctica in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the
politically obsessed military junta, the Argentine armed
context of this potential for conflict and growing pos-
forces were actively involved in supporting a Bolivian
sibility of Cold War confrontation (on the Cold War, see
military government. This activity took the form of the
Section 20.7), a United Nations Treaty in 1959 agreed that
kinds of brutal suppression and frequent murder of those
all claims would be (forgive the pun) ‘frozen’ for at least
(trade union leaders, dissidents, opposition members and
30 years, and the continent reserved for scientific (not
leaders) who opposed the military government and its
commercial or military) use. The Treaty was extended in
economic and social strategies. The idea of Bolivia as a
1991. But prior to then, it was not clear what the future
‘heartland’, control of which would be a kind of magic
status of the continent would be. Even today, the Treaty
(geopolitical) key to domination of South America,
merely defers the issue of claims.
links back to one of the best-known genres in classical
Argentina is the South American country with the
(European) geopolitical thought. For although the South
largest claim (Figure 20.2). The Argentine claim has also
American countries have seen some of the most signifi-
become central to geopolitical discourse there. As Child
cant expressions of geopolitical discourse of modern
(1985: 140–1) explains in a study of geopolitics and con-
times, geopolitics originates in Europe and it is to some
flict in South America:
examples of European geopolitics, including the idea of
For Argentine geopolitical writers, the subject of Ant- heartland, that we now turn.
arctica is not only linked to tricontinental Argentina [a The designation of a heartland was first made by
power in the South American continent and the South that British geographer (and strongly pro-imperialist

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 404    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

SOUTH
AFRICA

S O U T H AT L A N T I C O C E A N

aim
Cl
Norwegian
Cl
ai
e

m
tin

m
ai
en

Cl
g
Ar

h
tis
Bri
laim
n C

im
Chilea

Cla
A N TA R C T I C A

n
alia
str
Au

Anta
h

c
rctic Circle en
Fr laim
C
n
l ia
tra
Aus im
New Cla
Zealand Claim

S O U T H PA C I F I C O C E A N

AUSTRALIA
0 1000 miles

0 1000 km

NEW ZEALAND
Permanent Ice Shelves

Figure 20.2  Claims on Antarctica.

Source: adapted from M.I. Glassner, Political Geography, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1993, p. 498. Copyright © 1993 John Wiley & Sons Inc. This
material is used by permission of John Wiley & Sons Inc.

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 Chapter 20  Geopolitical traditions    405

conservative politician) Halford Mackinder. In what Mackinder’s writings reflect his place and time. Mack-
has since become a widely cited article first published in inder, writing from the vantage point of imperial Britain,
1904 following its presentation to the Royal Geographical is concerned to identify threats and dangers to British
Society (RGS), Mackinder argued that the age of (Euro- power. At the time when Mackinder presented his paper
pean) geographical exploration was drawing to a close. to the RGS, Britain was the pre-eminent world power.
This meant that there were hardly any unknown ‘blank’ It still seemed that way to Mackinder in 1919 when he
spaces left on European maps of the world. According wrote about the ‘Heartland’. But British imperial politi-
to Mackinder, the consequence of this closing of the cians, like Mackinder, were aware of the growing power
map, this end of the centuries-long task of exploration of the United States of America, Germany and Russia. In
and discovery, was that political events in one part of the fact, potential British imperial competition with the latter
world would invariably affect all others, to a much greater in Asia provided a key context to Mackinder’s work. As
extent than hitherto. There would be no more frontiers Peter Taylor (1994: 404) explained:
for Europeans to explore and conquer. Instead, the great
Behind every general model there is a specific case
powers would now invariably collide with one another.
from which it is derived. For the heartland model this
Mackinder called this end of European exploration ‘the
is particularly easy to identify. Throughout the second
post-Columbian age’ and the closing of frontiers, the
half of the nineteenth century Britain and Russia had
emergence of a ‘closed political system’.
been rivals in much of Asia. While Britain was consoli-
Given that this was the case, Mackinder claimed to
dating its hold on India and the route to India, Russia
identify the places of greatest world-strategic signifi-
had been expanding eastwards and southwards pro-
cance, control of which would give any great power a
ducing many zones of potential conflict from Turkey
key to world power. In his 1904 paper, he termed this the
through Persia and Afghanistan to Tibet. But instead
‘pivot area’. With Mackinder’s address to the RGS and
of war this became an arena of bluff and counter-
his subsequent article came a series of maps, the most
bluff, known as the ‘Great Game’. . . . Mackinder’s
frequently reprinted one of which claims to describe ‘The
presentation to an audience at the Royal Geographi-
Natural Seats of Power’ (Figure 20.3). As Ó Tuathail’s
cal Society would not have seemed so original as it
(1996a: 25) critical account of Mackinder argues:
appears to us reading this paper today . . . . Put simply,
Mackinder’s January 25 [1904], address to the Royal the heartland model is a codification and globaliza-
Geographical Society, ‘The Geographical Pivot of His- tion of the Great Game: it brings a relatively obscure
tory’, is generally considered to be a defining moment imperial contest on to centre stage.
in the history of geopolitics, a text to which histories
Not only does this envisage the world in a particular
of geopolitics invariably point.
way, as a ‘stage’, but it sees only select key actors as the
One of the key formulas in Mackinder’s notion of significant figures at play. These are the European pow-
geographical determinism is his identification of a ‘pivot ers (plus Russia). Other peoples and places are merely
area’ or ‘heartland zone’ in east-central Europe, control the backdrop for action by White Men. The taken-for-
of which would be a kind of magic key to world domi- granted racism of Mackinder’s model, in which only
nation. Reworking the ideas of his 1904 article after the Europeans make history, is also that of European imperi-
First World War, Mackinder refined this notion and alism and that of the bulk of wider European geographi-
penned a formula that encapsulated it: cal and historical writings of the time (see Chapter 3).
Yet, although Mackinder’s 1904 paper is very much
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. a product of its time and Mackinder’s own conservative
world-view, it has proven durable and has been integrated
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. into rather different contexts, which saved it from the rel-
ative obscurity that it deserves as a turn-of-the-century
Who rules the World-Island commands the world. imperialist text. The transfer of the discourse of ‘Heart-
land’ to Bolivia by South American codifiers of geopoli-
(Mackinder 1919: 4)
tics has already been noted. In addition, ‘Heartland’ was
According to this (simplistic) formula, ‘rule’ of the appropriated by German geopolitics in the 1930s and
eastern portion of Europe offered the strategic path to 1940s and formed part of the backdrop to Cold War
that of the African–Asian–European continents (which American strategy from the late 1940s through to the
together constitute what Mackinder terms the ‘World- last decade of the twentieth century. Today it is widely
Island’) and hence a dominant position on the world read and debated in Russia and other countries of the
scene. former Soviet Union, such as Ukraine (Wilson 2002) and

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 406    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

Figure 20.3  ‘The Natural Seats of Power’ according to Mackinder (1904).

M20_DANI2950_05_SE_C20.indd 406 01/04/16 8:58 am

 Chapter 20  Geopolitical traditions    407

Uzbekistan (Megoran and Sharopova 2012). The next terms, in Italy under the fascist dictator Benito Musso-
two sections of this chapter will examine aspects of Nazi, lini, geopolitical journals saw themselves as serving and
Fascist and Cold War geopolitics in greater detail. expressing the aspirations of the fascist state to establish
a new Roman Empire across the Mediterranean (Figure
20.5) (Antonsich 2009). However, it is the German geo-
20.6 Nazi and Fascist geopolitics politics of this epoch that has become the best-known. In
Germany, organic notions of the state had already been
popularized by conservative nineteenth-century academ-
The formal tradition of writing about space and power
ics. Moreover, Germany was characterized by extreme
under the title of ‘geopolitics’ also found fertile contexts
political and economic turbulence in the decades follow-
in Italy, Portugal, Spain and Japan. Influenced and sup-
ing its defeat in the 1914–18 World War. This combina-
ported by Nazi Germany, all these countries (together
tion provided a fertile environment for the elaboration
with Hungary and Romania) saw the rise and victory of
and circulation of a distinctive geopolitical tradition. In
ultra-nationalist or Fascist governments (often through
Ó Tuathail’s (1996a: 141) words:
violent struggle or full-scale civil war with democratic
or communist forces) (see Chapter 3). In each case geo- After the shock of military defeat and the humilia-
political debates were crucially negotiated through other tion of the dictated peace of Versailles, the Weimar
cultural and political debates about race, nationalism, Republic proved to be fertile ground for the growth of
the colonial pasts and futures, supposed national ‘mis- a distinct German geopolitics. Geopolitical writings,
sions’ and destinies and the European and global politi- in the words of one critic, ‘shot up like mushrooms
cal contexts. In Portugal, for example, the right-wing after a summer rain’.
dictatorship argued that it was bringing Christianity and
civilization to the territories it had acquired in Africa and The main features of these writings (which they
Asia, even projecting these onto a map of Europe to show shared with a wider German revanchism, later codified in
that – if the African territories controlled by Portugal Nazism) were a critique of the established ‘World Order’,
were taken into account (Figure 20.4), then Portugal was and of the injustices imposed on Germany by the victors.
not a small country (Sidaway and Power 2005)! In similar German claims were often presented graphically in maps

Surface of the Portuguese

Colonial Empire
Compared with the principal
countries of Europe

Portugal (Cont.) 89.106 Km2

Azores 2.392 Km2
Madeira 870 Km2
m2
Cape Verde 3.930 K
m2
Guinea 36.126 K
S. Tomé and Principe 971 Km2 A N G O L
m2 A
Angola 1.255.755 K
m2
Mozambique 756.112 K
Portuguese India 3.806 Km2 Guin
m2 ea
Macau 14 K IQUE
m2 Timor OZAMB
l
tuga

Timor 18.989 K M
Goa

2.168.071 Km2
Por

Total

Spain (Cont.) 505.202 Km2

France 560.968 Km2
England 244.734 Km2
Italy 308.717 Km2
Germany 477.00 Km2

Total 2.096.639 Km2

Figure 20.4  Portugal is not a small country. Henrique Galvão, 1934.

Source: adapted from Sidaway and Power (2005)

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 408    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

Figure 20.5  Italian living space in the Mediterranean Region.

Source: Geopolitica, 3 (1939) p. 161. Reprinted in Antonisch (2009)

that were widely circulated (see Herb 1989: 97). Like the broader Nazi ideology and strategy continue (see Heske
variants of the geopolitical tradition that were developed 1986: 87; Bassin 1987; Ó Tuathail 1996a; Natter 2003).
amongst right-wing and military circles in Italy, Portu- Paul Gilroy (2000: 39), however, reiterates the connec-
gal, Spain and Japan, German geopolitics also asserted tions between racial, early ecological and geopolitical
an imperial destiny. Indeed, as Agnew and Corbridge thinking:
(1995: 58–9) explain: ‘The Nazi geopoliticians of the
connected in profound ways to the notions of Leben-
1930s came up with formalized schemes for combining
sraum (living-space) that figured in but were not cre-
imperial and colonized peoples within what they called
ated by the racist population policies and agricultural
“Pan-Regions”.’
and scientific planning of the Nazi period . . . [and
In this vision, notions of racial hierarchy were blended
to] the geo-organic, biopolitical and governmental
with conceptions of state ‘vitality’ to justify territorial
theories of the German geographers Friedrich Ratzel
expansion of the Axis powers (see O’Loughlin and van
and Karl Haushofer and the early-twentieth century
der Wusten 1990) (Figure 20.6). In Europe, related con-
geopolitican Rudolf Kjellén. These writers supplied
ceptions of the need for an expanded German living-
important conceptual resources to Nazi racial science,
space were used as justification for the mass murder
helping it to conceptualize the state as an organism
of occupied peoples and those who did not fit into the
and to specify the necessary connections between the
grotesque plans of ‘racial/territorial’ purity. The practi-
nation and its dwelling area.
cal expression of these was the construction of a system
of racial ‘purification’ and mass extermination. At least In the United States in the 1940s, German geopolitics
6 million Jewish people were murdered in concentration became the subject of lurid tales and depictions, cropping
camps together with millions of others: disabled people, up in media, military and government ‘explanations’ of
gays and lesbians, gypsies and political opponents. His- Nazi danger. Popular magazines, such as Readers Digest,
torical debates about the role and relative significance would inform Americans of the ‘scientists behind Hit-
of German geopolitics within the Holocaust and within ler’ describing German geopolitics as the key to Nazi

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 Chapter 20  Geopolitical traditions    409

EUROPE

NORTH
AMERICA
JAPAN

AFRICA

INDIA

SOUTH
AMERICA

AUSTRALIA

Densely settled areas

Demarcate different Pan-Regions

Figure 20.6  ‘Pan-Regions’ as envisaged in Nazi geopolitics.

Source: O’Loughlin and Van der Wusten (1990) ‘Political geography and the pan regions’, Geographical Review, 80, adapted with permission
of the American Geographical Society. Copyright © American Geographical Society, 1990

strategy. And whilst the relative significance of the Ger- once the minority Jewish and Gypsy populations there
man geopolitical tradition in the wider genocidal ultra- had been murdered and the majority Slavic population
nationalism of German Fascism was certainly overstated enslaved (see Rössler 1989 and Barnes and Minca 2013).
in such accounts, we should see geopolitics as a particular The defeat of the Axis powers in 1945 (culminating in
expression of wider academic and intellectual involve- the use of American atomic weapons against the civilian
ment and complicity in authoritarian state power, war- populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan) and
making and genocide. Much more widely, beyond the the lurid wartime depictions of Nazi geopolitics in the
geopolitical tradition per se, academic geography was United States dealt something of a blow to the formal
deeply implicated in these activities. Exploring this, Nat- tradition of geopolitics. In the 1990s, however, right-
ter (2003: 188) notes how wing geopolitics returned – in Russia and Ukraine for
[T]he work of disciplinary historians of geography example, where references to Nazi-era concepts (such as
has demonstrated the extent to which the demarca- Grobraum, ‘larger space’) and associated racist and anti-
tion of geography seems inseparable from the history Semitic ideologies have become influential within some
of war, imperialism and quests for national iden- contemporary geopolitical thought (Ingram 2001; Wilson
tity. . . . Geopolitics, thus, would mark a particular, 2002; O’Loughlin et al. 2005). Moreover, references to
but in no way separable (and hence containable) geo- geopolitics had continued through the 1950s to the 1970s
political deployment of geo-power. in both Spain and Portugal (see Sidaway 1999, 2000; Sida-
way and Power 2005), where Fascist regimes remained in
An example of this wider complicity was the way in power to the mid-1970s, as well as in Turkey (especially
which the models of ‘Central Place Theory’ (an abstract when it too was under military rule through part of the
model of the ideal spatial distribution of towns), which 1960s, and again in the early 1970s and early 1980s). On
were developed in Germany by Walter Christaller in the Turkish example, Pinar Bilgin (2007: 753) argues that:
the 1930s, were elaborated with the express purpose of
providing planners with a model of German settlement Constructed through texts authored by military
to impose on conquered territories of Eastern Europe, geopoliticians, and disseminated through a variety

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 410    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

of institutions including compulsory military ser-

vice (with access to all males 18+ years of age), the 20.7 Cold War geopolitics and the
National Security Academy (proving in service train- ­logics of containment
ing to high level civil servants and journalists), and the
compulsory high-school course ‘National Security’, The Cold War is used as a shorthand description of
Turkey’s geopolitical discourse has allowed the mili- the conflict (which to many seemed to be a conflict for
tary to play a central role in shaping domestic political world domination) between the ‘communist’ East, led
processes but also make this role seem ‘normal’. by the USSR, and the ‘capitalist’ West, led by the USA
In addition, as this chapter has detailed, geopolitics from around 1949 to around 1989. This was not simply
has been influential in recent decades in a number of a rift between two great powers, but a complex ideologi-
South American countries, especially in the 1970s’ and cal conflict, which often appeared to be about different
early 1980s’ epoch of military rule through much of the ways of life and contrasting social systems (the bureau-
continent. These regimes (and plenty of others) were cratic ‘command economies’ based on predominantly
integrated into the US-led anti-communist network of state ownership of the means of production, with a rul-
allies. In a policy that became known as containment, ing class drawn from the bureaucracy; and the capitalist
the USA aimed to encircle and block the potential expan- economies based on predominantly private ownership,
sion of Soviet power and influence beyond the immediate with a ruling class drawn from a bureaucracy controlled
borders of the USSR and the pro-Soviet states installed by by the owners of capital). It was also a conflict in which
the USSR in the Eastern European territories that it had direct military confrontation between the two great pow-
occupied during its Second World War battle for survival ers was avoided. Hence the metaphor of Cold, that is,
against Nazi Germany. In the allied countries (and as an ‘poor, frozen or frosty’ relationships, but short of all-out
expression of this strategy of containment), the functions ‘hot’ war, involving direct exchanges of missiles, bombs
of geopolitics, in particular its ‘strategic vision’ and claim and so on. In part this avoidance of direct conflict arose
of ‘scientific’ objectivity, continued to operate or were because both powers were conscious of the enormous
displaced into other disciplines and branches of knowl- stakes, armed with nuclear, chemical and biological
edge, including geography and the expanding subject of weapons as well as vast arsenals of increasingly high-
International Relations. This displacement of strategic tech ‘conventional’ armaments. By the 1960s, they were
knowledge was particularly evident in the United States, each capable of destroying virtually all human life sev-
which by 1945 was the greatest power that the world had eral times over. Moreover, neither could attack the other
ever seen, constituting over half of the world economy without being sure that the enemy would not still pos-
and (until the recovery of the Soviet Union and its own sess enough undamaged nuclear weapons to retaliate,
development of atomic weapons in 1949) possessing a a ‘balance’ of terror known, appropriately enough, as
virtually unrivalled military capacity. MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction). Instead, conflict
took the form of the continual preparation for war (as
in ‘civil defense’ preparations, see Plate 20.3) plus proxy
wars in what became known as the (originally not pro-
West, not pro-East, but contested) ‘Third World’ and
many other political, economic and cultural forms of
competition. That is, it was a conflict conducted by every
means except direct military confrontation between the
superpowers.
Of course there was no shortage of indirect confron-
tation and preparation for war. Europe was divided into
two armed camps and split down the middle between
Soviet and American zones of influence by a fortified
military and ideological frontier that became known as
the ‘Iron Curtain’. Whilst Europe was characterized by
Plate 20.2  The gateway to the Auschwitz an uneasy stability and balance of terror, by the 1970s
concentration camp. The Nazi regime used the term ‘geopolitics’ had been revived (or rediscovered)
concentration camps to execute their policy of by US national security advisers Henry Kissinger and
racial/territorial ‘purification’. Zbigniew Brzezinski (see Hepple 1986; Sidaway 1998)
(Caminoel/Shutterstock) to refer to the strategic vision deemed necessary to

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 Chapter 20  Geopolitical traditions    411

China remained a force to be reckoned with and opposed

American support for Taiwan. Thousands of American
troops stationed in South Korea were just a short dis-
tance from a hostile communist North Korea. By the
early 1980s, American concern about the security of oil
supplies from the Persian Gulf region had escalated to
the extent that the then US President Carter declared that
it was of vital importance to the USA (see Spotlight box
20.1). In this world of superpower competition, geopoli-
tics again found its moment and expression in the visions
of the national security advisers and American generals.
More widely, American leaders and policy makers
declared that the Soviet Union had to be encircled and
Plate 20.3  The cold war came to American cities: a
contained. The metaphor of disease (containment) was
nuclear shelter.
mixed with that of ‘dominoes’ – if one country (say Viet-
(karenfoleyphoto/fotolia)
nam or Cuba) had ‘fallen’ to Soviet control or influence,
then it could (like a chain reaction) ‘infect’ other proxi-
circumvent the sense of growing Soviet power, particu- mate ones. The irony of this (which is equally present
larly in the Third World, where a wave of successful revo- in the formal geopolitical tradition) is that in the name
lutions had brought left-wing, pro-Soviet governments of security and strategy, the real complexity of human
to power. One of these was in Cuba, but by the end of geographies in the places (such as Vietnam or Chile, or
the 1970s, there were also pro-Soviet governments in the Afghanistan, Nicaragua or the Persian Gulf) that are
countries of Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea) deemed strategic is sometimes obscured or erased. Forget
where the United States had been unable to defeat com- about the complex details of the people, culture and soci-
munist insurgencies despite a massive military effort, in ety. What matters is the ‘strategic value’ of the place, or
the African countries of Angola and Mozambique, in the political identity of its government as an ideological
the Arabian country of South Yemen and in Afghanistan and strategic friend or foe. At times this could take quite
as well as in the small Central American state of Nica- extreme forms, as with US National Security Advisor
ragua. Although China had moved away from its close Robert McNamara (previously head of Ford, and later
alliance with the Soviets by the early 1960s, communist head of the World Bank):

Plate 20.4  (left) Containment in action: the aftermath of napalm bombing on a Vietnamese village by
US-backed (anti-communist) South Vietnamese forces. (right) ‘Containment’ explained: US Secretary of State
for Defense briefing journalists during the Vietnam war.
(© Bettmann/CORBIS)

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 412    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

Spotlight box 20.1

The Carter Doctrine: contexts and sought to roll back Soviet influence in places like Afghan-
consequences istan and elsewhere in the Third World where pro-Soviet
regimes had come to power, rather than simply contain
In late 1979, the USSR invaded Afghanistan. For the the USSR and its allies). Under the Reagan Doctrine,
Soviets, this meant supporting a communist govern- vast quantities of weapons were channelled to rebel
ment in a neighbouring country, who had come to power forces fighting the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan.
just a couple of years before (in a coup, after several Amongst those who took part in the anti-Soviet struggle
years of political instability) and were facing rebellion in Afghanistan and through which the armaments were
and resistance in the Afghan countryside (already being channelled was Osama Bin Laden – later to turn against
fostered by the Pakistani and US intelligence agencies). the United States, whom he came to regard as intent on
For strategists in Moscow, the invasion would secure dominating the Muslim world (Coll 2004).
the USSR’s southern flank, especially from the grow-
ing perceived threats from a new Islamic radicalism: the
USSR had millions of Muslim citizens in its Central Asian
territories, and feared that the Islamic revolution in Iran
and the insurgency in Afghanistan might influence them
and threaten Soviet power and stability. However, for
the USA – at least to those in influential positions, like
US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski – this
marked a new phase of Soviet expansion and a failure
of containment. In tandem with the Islamic revolution in
Iran which overthrew the Shah (who was an American
ally and whose rise to power in the 1950s was orches-
trated by the USA and Britain) was the second jump in oil
prices in a decade, and American concern over the secu-
rity of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region grew.
Brzezinski and the American media had already starting
talking about the region as ‘an arc [or crescent] of crisis’
(see Sidaway 1998) (see Plate 20.5, which shows how
the influential Time magazine represented these ‘geo-
political dangers’). And soon after the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan the US media started to describe it as the
first Soviet step towards the Middle East, and President
Carter announced that any threat by an outside force to
the Persian Gulf was a matter of direct American stra-
tegic interest and would result in a military response.
This commitment became known as the Carter Doctrine,
Plate 20.5  ‘The Crescent of Crisis’ as depicted on
taking its place amongst a succession of other US Presi-
the front cover of Time Magazine,15 January 1979.
dential geopolitical doctrines: such as Truman in 1947,
(From TIME, 15 January 1979 © 1979 Time Inc. Used under
who set out the overall commitment to containment, to license. TIME and Time Inc. are not affiliated with, and do not
(after Carter) the Reagan Doctrine in the 1980s (which endorse products or services of, Licensee.)

Robert McNamara was, of course, the leading speci- they are always looking for ‘the facts’, but usually
men of homo mathematicus – i.e., men who behave the wrong ones. They miss reality, for they never get
and believe other men [and, we might suppose, women close enough or related enough to another society
too] behave primarily in response to ‘hard data’, usu- to do more than count things in it. If you relate to a
ally numbers (infiltration rates, ‘kill ratios’, bomb country as a military target you do not need to know
tonnage). Like the classic private eye on television, anything about it except details as are easily supplied

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 Chapter 20  Geopolitical traditions    413

by reconnaissance satellites, spy ships, secret agents, modern art in the second half of the twentieth century
etcetera. You need never know who the victims of your became intertwined with Cold War geopolitics. More
attack were. Your task is merely to assess the results generally, art and politics have frequently been inter-
of what you have done and this is done by counting twined. The Nazis (and their leader Adolf Hitler, who
bodies, destroyed factories, enemy soldiers. was a failed artist of minimal talents) detested modern
art, condemning it as decadent. Other dictators, such as
(Barnet 1973: 119)
Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union from the
Such logic is seemingly far removed from the promi- mid-1920s till his death in 1953, were also wary of mod-
nence of maps in the formal geopolitical tradition. Yet ern art and favoured a garish realist style, depicting heroic
we can see that, in both the kind of thought present in smiling workers and peasants. Meanwhile, and especially
McNamara’s mind and in classical geopolitics, there are in the years between the two World Wars, Paris became
moments when the myriad complexity of the world is the centre of production of modern art. The American
reduced to a simple black and white representation, be it Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stepped in after 1945
numerical or cartographic. to fund and promote American modern art, bankrolling
major exhibitions and tours, to demonstrate the creative
artistic culture of the United States.
Of course, the Cold War was waged too in every-
20.8 Cold War geopolitics in art and thing from science fiction comics and action movies and
culture and ‘popular geopolitics’ thrillers (in which good Americans, like Rambo, and the
occasional heroic Brit, like James Bond (Plate 20.7), faced
Few works of art explicitly refer to geopolitics. A famous and defeated totalitarian, alien and frequently commu-
one that does is Geopoliticus Child Watching the Birth nist enemies) to chess (where ‘Soviet Man’ could demon-
of the New Man by the Catalan painter Salvador Dalí. It strate intellectual superiority and training) and Olympic
was painted in 1943 in New York, during his stay in the sports (in which the Soviet, Chinese, East Germans and
United States from 1940 to 1948 (Plate 20.6). The paint- Bulgarians invested enormous resources in training and
ing is generally read as representing the rising of the USA drug-enhanced muscles, to ‘prove’ the superiority of the
as the new world power during the Second World War. communist system in the Olympic stadiums). Heroic men
The crushing of Europe is seen as a representation of its (and sometimes women) were invoked. Each one seeking
diminishing role in international politics and the oversize to outdo the other, rather like men on sports fields or in
of Africa and South America as a growing importance street fights might (see Spotlight box 20.2). The ‘Space
of the (former and remaining) colonies. More widely, Race’, to build and launch artificial satellites and then to
however, the art world and, in particular, the course of put men into space and reach the moon became a military,
technical and a cultural expression of the Cold War – full
of moments of national superpower pride, media specta-
cles and the basis of tales of heroic and daring American
and Soviet men in space (Carter 1988). We might thus
write of a ‘popular geopolitics’ to designate how geo-
political concepts are reflected in and take on meaning
through popular culture: from art and literature, through
film to comics, sport, computer games (Power 2007) or
the Internet (Dodds 2006) and more traditional media
like magazines, newspapers, radio and television. Car-
toons and comic books have received ample attention in
studies of such popular geopolitics – and continued to
proliferate after the Cold War (Plate 20.8): see the article
by Dittmer (2005) listed in the further reading for this
chapter. Even more radically removed from the circles of
policy makers are the studies that contest the bird’s eye
views of classical geopolitics and that firmly refocus the
Plate 20.6  Geopoliticus Child Watching the Birth of attention upon the impact of geopolitical policies and
the New Man by Salvador Dalí, 1943. practices in the everyday life of regular people. Femi-
(Superstock/Getty © Salvador Dali, Fundació Gala-Salvador Dalí, nist geopolitics have offered the most powerful avenues
DACS, 2016) towards such analyses (see Spotlight box 20.2).

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 414    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

Plate 20.7  Cold War

in cinema: James Bond
(007) saves the West from
communists and criminals.
(© 2005 Topfoto)

Spotlight box 20.2

Feminist geopolitics disappearance of many public services, etc). Address-

ing more acute situations, Jennifer Hyndman (2007,
As in other academic fields, feminist scholars brought 2010) discusses the politics of body counts in the
social struggles into academia to question taken-for- American intervention in Iraq and the fate of child
granted assumptions in geopolitical research and, more soldiers in different geopolitical context. Another line
generally, in political geographical scholarship. Bringing of research has been the inquiry into the militariza-
issues of emancipation and empowerment, and their tion of the lives of soldiers and their families, not only
counterparts subordination and oppression, to the fore, in wartime but also in military bases, for example as
feminist approaches problematized the state-centric epitomized by the pioneering and prolific work of femi-
approach of geopolitics, its elitism (as it is concerned nist scholar Cynthia Enloe (1983, 1989, 1993, 2000,
with the visions and the behaviour of those in power), 2004, 2007). As such, feminist geopolitics also exam-
and its abstract, disembodied view of politics. They ines environmental geographies of militarization (such
question, for example, the definition of security in terms as pollution by weapons in and around the battlefields
of state security, undermine the idea of a national inter- and test sites – see Woodward 2004, 2005). Rachel
est that would give clear direction for the conduct of Pain (2009, 2014) has addressed the geopolitics of glo-
foreign policy, and scrutinize by contrast how foreign and balized fear. She questions the hegemonic discourse
military policies affect the everyday life of people on the about globalized fear and security that has become
agenda. After all, if a state is more secure, does it auto- pervasive in the West and serves to justify the US led
matically mean that the people it rules are? And whose wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the intensification of
security? Of ruling elites, or the state? Or security from surveillance practices. She foregrounds the uneven
disease, detention or from violence in the home? distribution of the insecurities of everyday life among
Fiona Smith (2001), for example, showed how the people, and how much less attention and less means
end of the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and are devoted to the reduction of everyday insecurity and
German reunification were received with mixed feeling widespread forms of domestic violence that she calls
by people whose life was highly disrupted by the institu- ‘everyday terrorism’ than to the terrorist attacks that
tional changes (disorientation, massive unemployment, remain exceptional.

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 Chapter 20  Geopolitical traditions    415

geopolitical ‘models’ now attempt to offer explanation

and impose meaning on contemporary events.
Amongst the most influential of these was the dis-
course of New World Order, articulated by then US
President George Bush (senior) in the early 1990s. In
Bush’s vision, what is called the ‘international commu-
nity’ (the member states of the United Nations, led by the
USA, but with financial and military support from key
allies such as Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan)
would act as a kind of global police force, intervening
where and when they felt necessary to maintain or restore
‘order’. Both the 1990–1 Gulf War and the 1999 conflict
with Yugoslavia were justified and conducted (in part) in
the name of building such a ‘New World Order’. But it
was his son, President George W. Bush, who was left to
articulate a new American strategy (which became the
Bush Doctrine, of pre-emptive attack on states that may –
it was claimed – threaten the United States or harbour
Plate 20.8  Captain America: geopolitics in action. terrorists) in the aftermath of 9/11. And even this was,
(Everett Collection/Rex Shutterstock) arguably, partially within a long American geopolitical
tradition of overthrowing overseas regimes during and
before the Cold War, which has its roots in the rise of
American power in the Pacific and Americas in the late
20.9  ew World Order, the Long War,
N nineteenth century and has some deeper roots in the colo-
Cold Peace and beyond nization of the continent (Kinzer 2006). Even well before
9/11 and the Bush administration’s strategic reactions to
The notion of the Cold War faded with the collapse of it, critics had pointed out that, as Booth (1999: 49) put it,
the USSR and associated communist allies between 1989 the New World Order ‘means the New World [gives out
and the early 1990s, leaving the United States as the sole the] Orders’. That is, the United States was seeking global
effective global military superpower. Yet this Western military hegemony and with the Soviet resistance out of
and American ‘victory’ quickly produced a certain sense the way, at first there seemed little, save its own ‘public
of disorientation. This had been evident before, as the opinion’ (or perhaps, economic limits?) to stop it.
so-called ‘bipolar’ world of the early years of Cold War Others stressed that such apparent American mili-
confrontation in which Washington and Moscow were tary superiority and rhetoric counted for less than might
the main political, economic and ideological points of appear at first sight, and that what continued to be evi-
orientation became progressively more ‘multipolar’ from dent in the post-Cold War world was enhanced economic
the 1960s onwards. That is, as Western Europe and Japan (and in some ways, cultural) competition between blocs
recovered from wartime devastation and as Communist or great powers. In this vision, American power is poten-
China split on ideological grounds with the USSR, the tially contested by Russia and more notably China. But
sense that the world was divided into just two superpower the terms of the ‘contest’ not simply in conventional mili-
points of orientation lessened. But the sensation of geo- tary and strategic terms (though these continue) than in
political complexity was to grow precipitously once one competition for markets, productivity and profit. A world
of the established ‘poles’ (Soviet communism and pro- of ‘geopolitical’ competition is, it was argued, being par-
Soviet regimes in Central and Eastern Europe) collapsed tially displaced by ‘geoeconomic’ competition (for an
at the start of the 1990s. Having a clearly demarcated and example, see Luttwak 1990). In the USA (and beyond),
identifiable enemy – as both sides had in the Cold War this was also sometimes interpreted as an impending
– offered contrasting but apparently solid ideas of iden- ‘supposed clash of civilizations’ (e.g. Huntington 1993),
tity, purpose and common cause that has faded in a post- between that of the ‘West’ and, for example, societies
Cold War world. If the Cold War embodied a relatively oriented to alternative belief systems such as (Chinese)
coherent geopolitical map (East against West, with the ‘Confucianism’ or ‘Islam’. Although superficially quite
allegiance of the Third World as one of the prizes), the different, notions of geoeconomic competition and a
post-Cold War world has been characterized by a diver- clash of civilizations both betray a sense that the relative
sity of maps and scripts. A variety of interpretations and military dominance of the USA at the end of the Cold

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 416    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

War may not in itself be enough to preserve America’s Levant, its ethnic-confessional cleansing policies and the
sense of leadership, power and world-historical destiny succeeding wars in Northern Iraq and in Syria, have been
in the context of a complex ‘multipolar’ world. Cer- at the fore of renewed debate about geopolitics in the
tainly it quickly faced multiple challenges, as attempts United States and elsewhere. Who would have predicted
to implement visions of ‘A New American Century [of these two or three decades ago? And what forms will such
leadership]’ (www.newamericancentury.org) mutated debates take in 20–30 years’ time?
into an open commitment to what the US Department
of Defense, in the form of National Security Strategy
documents, called (and codified in the February 2006
Defense Review as) ‘The Long War’ with the ‘global war
20.10 Conclusions: shifting
on terror’ (GWoT) taking the centre stage once occupied hegemonies?
by communism. However, as Buzan (2006: 1102) argued,
despite the prominence of the global war on terror in Despite early post-Cold War proclamations about the
these texts, it could not define contemporary US grand great prospects for a more peaceful and secure New World
strategy overall: Order, the world soon came to appear to American strate-
gists (and many others) as more ‘disordered’ and unpre-
US grand strategy is much wider, involving more tra-
dictable. So on one level, the apparent simplicity of the
ditional concerns about rising powers, global energy
great power and Cold War confrontations, let alone demar-
supply, the spread of military technology and the
cated and fixed ‘heartlands’, have been replaced by the
enlargement of the democratic/capitalist sphere. US
sense of a world of proliferating uncertainty and threats.
military expenditure remains largely aimed at meet-
Indeed, the scares, anxieties and insecurities that revolve
ing traditional challenges from other states, with
around (non-state) terrorism activities in different parts of
only a small part specifically allocated for the GWoT.
the world have greatly reinforced this – from the loose and
The significance of the GWoT is much more politi-
amorphous terrorist networks of Al-Qaeda to the transna-
cal  .  .  .  the main significance of the GWoT is as a
tional threats posed by Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq.
political framing that might justify and legitimize US
But this is not to suggest that traditional state-centred
primacy, leadership and unilateralism, both to Ameri-
powers have fallen under the global geopolitical radar.
cans and to the rest of the world.
Contrary to that, there have been widespread debates
A few years later, Clark (2011: 20) noted how: (especially in the ‘West’) that the remaining superpower
(i.e. the USA) will have to contend with the challenges
President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strat-
presented by emerging players on the geopolitical scene.
egy . . . described ‘a dynamic international environ-
Notwithstanding notions of the European Union (EU)
ment in which different nations are exerting greater
as a distinctive geopolitical actor (Bachmann and Sida-
influence’ and ‘emerging powers in every region of the
way 2009; see also Spotlight box 20.3) it is, however, the
world are increasingly asserting themselves’. . . . Offi-
concern over whether China is set to replace America as
cial US projections up to 2025 paint a broadly similar
the next global hegemon that have garnered widespread
picture. These highlight the trend towards multipo-
attention (see Mearsheimer 2010; Luttwak 2012). Indeed,
larity, associated with a greater diffusion of power
given the proliferating discourses pertaining to China ‘on
internationally.
the rise’, it is worth reflecting deeper on the geopolitical
Meanwhile, as Sakwa (2015b: 565) describes: ‘An logic underpinning such claims and the associated reac-
extended period of “cold peace” settled over relations tions within China.
between Russia and the West, although punctuated by That China is often viewed through the lens of ascend-
attempts by both sides to escape the logic of renewed ancy is hardly surprising: there is an impressive list of
confrontation’. By the mid-2010s, this cold peace was economic growth credentials, not to mention its sheer
starting to look more like a reproduction of Cold War advantage of size in both area and population. But more
practices (Sakwa calls this ‘mimetic Cold War’) but with- crucially, the series of assertive actions that have char-
out the deep ideological divide. This, plus fears about acterized Chinese foreign policy since 2008 – including
cybersecurity, geoeconomic shifts, the assassinations China’s extensive territorial claims in the South China
of Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders, the conflict Sea (see Chapter 24 on global governance) as well as its
between Russia and Ukraine in the east of the latter, the new doctrine of defending ‘core interests’ ( )
2011 war in Libya, and the ensuing wars between fac- in Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet – have come to serve
tions in that country and in post-revolutionary Egypt, as testaments of a China that is intent on extending
the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and the and consolidating its growing geopolitical influence (Li

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 Chapter 20  Geopolitical traditions    417

2010; Swaine 2010). However, China has been quick to at the hands of foreign powers are routinely invoked by
dismiss such actions as emblematic of its irredentist and Chinese elites through maps (see Figure 20.7) to shape
expansionist geopolitical ambitions. Chinese leaders have and defend imaginative geographies of China’s geobody
constantly maintained that its contemporary geopolitical (Wang 2012).
engagements are in line with its purported idea/strategy But as Hughes goes on to caution, this seemingly prag-
of ‘peaceful rise’ ( ) and its so-called ‘aggressive matic approach adopted by China can be easily exploited
behaviors’ are no more than justified acts (as per global by variants of what he calls ‘geopolitik nationalism’ that
norms) to preserve its ‘territorial integrity’ ( ). currently infuse popular Chinese political writings (see
According to Hughes (2011), such a reasoning constitutes also Lei 2005). As opposed to a defensive strategy, these
the Chinese state’s ‘pragmatic nationalism’ which care- works hinge on a geopolitik view of international rela-
fully traverses the duality of conveying China’s status as tions as the struggle for survival to exhort for strong lead-
a responsible global actor whilst simultaneously attempt- ers and a militaristic China. For instance, Wolf Totem
ing to fuel a recognition and respect of the nation’s sover- ( ) describes China as an entity with a personality
eign space. The latter is achieved through a ‘cartography that can only function properly if it strikes the right bal-
of national humiliation’ (Callahan 2010) whereby his- ance between the ‘sheepish qualities’ of the Han and the
toric and contemporary instances of humiliation ( ) ‘wolfish traits’ of the northerners, with the latter being

Figure 20.7  One of the maps documenting China’s Century of National Humiliation. The shaded areas on the
map represent the loss of China’s territory between 1895-1945 as a result of Japanese invasion.

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 418    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

‘somewhat greater’ (Jiang 2004: 375). The strategic impli- barriers and a US Navy that can block access to imports,
cations for China then, is to become a ‘sea wolf’, emulating as the world’s hegemon sucks up the world’s resources
models such as Genghis Khan and the Japanese pirates of like a giant leech. It is interesting to note that a sense of
old, so as to satisfy its need for lebensraum ( ). The moral exceptionalism pervades these Chinese texts, which
need for China to defend its living space is also addressed is reminiscent of arguments used by 1930s and 1940s Ger-
in Zhang Wenmu’s (2009) China’s Maritime Rights man geopolitik thinkers to claim that their own country’s
( ). Zhang (ibid: 109) looks to Alfred Mahan’s expansion is aimed at restoring equilibrium in an unjust
ideas about sea power to develop a ‘naval theory with spe- international order. Thus, China’s ‘rise’, as many of these
cial Chinese characteristics’ in order to uphold China’s Chinese scholars argue, will be different because it is built
interests which are threatened by a combination of EU trade on a ‘humane power’ ( ) rather than the ‘hegemonic

Spotlight box 20.3

The EU as a geopolitical actor civilian power: its weight in regional and global politics
is derived from its economic, political and cultural influ-
The European Union (EU) incrementally developed a ences, not from its military power (Bachmann and Sida-
new type of geopolitical role. At the beginning of the way 2009). As the largest single market and the largest
1950s, France and West Germany aimed at constructing economy in the world (if the economy of the 28 mem-
new collaborative institutions between Western Euro- ber states is taken as one), with a large regulatory and
pean states in an effort to prevent a fourth major con- normative power, it greatly influenced a wide array of
flict between themselves after the French Prussian war countries with strong ties with it, economic or otherwise.
of 1870–1, the Great War of 1914–18 and the Second The civilian power of the EU is projected particularly
World War of 1939–45; these collaborative institutions strongly in the so-called European neighbourhood, the
later evolved into the European Union. countries bordering the EU, some of them applicants
The first effort to collaborate more formally was the to become EU members at some point, like the Balkan
establishment in 1952 of the European Coal and Steel countries and Turkey, with others encouraged to become
Community (ECSC) by six member states: France, West ‘good’ neighbours’ like North Africa, Ukraine and the
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Nether- Caucasus. These policies more than once reveal the
lands. This was a limited and technical form of integra- contradictions between the EU’s principles and its
tion, but economically and militarily crucial. Coal was actions, for example when it implements a restrictive
still the major source of energy then and steel was key migration policy and externalizes the control of its exter-
to manufacturing and weapons industry. The geopolitical nal border to neighbouring countries who do not respect
idea behind the proposal of the French Minister of For- human rights, let alone the rights of asylum seekers and
eign Affairs Robert Schumann was articulated by high- migrants in transit (see for example Bialasiewicz 2012
ranked civil servant Jean Monnet who had worked during for the relation with Gaddafi’s Libya).
the world wars and in the postwar reconstruction at col- Although the ENP policy is conceived as benevolent
laborative efforts between the allies to improve their war in Brussels, it is perceived as threatening in Moscow,
and reconstruction logistics. The idea of a technical and and it has proven particularly divisive in Ukraine where
technocratic approach was successful and the role of a conflict about signing the Association Agreement with
the Community has spilled over to many other economic the EU was the catalyst of massive protests that evolved
and social activities and enlarged to include 28 member into a civil war and the disintegration of the state, with
states: including many former communist states that had the Russian annexation of the Crimea and an ongoing
been precluded from joining during the Cold War. war in the Donbas(s), including the shooting-down of a
The EU remains, however, an extraordinary geopolitical commercial airliner – flight MH17 from Amsterdam to
actor as it does not have its own army and it has to Kuala Lumpur – on 17 July 2014 above Eastern Ukraine.
coordinate its diplomatic services, the European External The confrontation between Russia and the EU (and the
Action Service (EEAS) and its foreign policies with that USA) has brought about a revival of geopolitical narra-
of its member states. tives both from the Cold War period and from the 1930s
The content of its geopolitical representations is and the disastrous appeasement policies towards Hitler’s
worth underlining. The EU is primarily conceived as a ambitions (Sakwa 2015b).

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 Chapter 20  Geopolitical traditions    419

way’ ( ) of the ‘West’. Moreover, as Agnew (2010a), manner of private actors. There is no easy or predictable
Reid and Zheng (2008) and Zeng et al. (2015) have rightly end to this uncertain situation and new challenges – climate
pointed out, China, as with any other country in the world, change – complicate the global scene. New and old chal-
does not operate in a vacuum and has to negotiate its rela- lenges and shifting patterns and forms of power, resistance
tions with other states, international organizations and all and domination are expressed in space and time.

Learning outcomes of perceptions of threats and dangers. However,

Having read this chapter, you should understand: the ability of any new single geopolitical ‘big picture’
(such as ‘the war on terror’) to inherit the mantle of
● That the term ‘geopolitics’ has been associated with the Cold War was limited.
a wide variety of texts and contexts.
● There is a flourishing debate about the geopo-
● However, geopolitics is frequently associated with
litical impacts of rising Chinese power, Western
the sense of a self-conscious tradition of writing
responses and the geopolitical dynamics and con-
about and mapping the relations between states,
sequences of other conflicts, latterly in Eastern
geography and power.
Ukraine, Iraq and Syria.
● This is usually traced to the early twentieth-century
writings of Rudolf Kjellén and Halford Mackinder.
● One of the key features of this tradition is the idea Further reading
that the state resembles a living organism which
requires living space and will compete with others A century after its original publication, Mackinder’s (1904)
(the organic theory of the state). paper was reprinted in The Geographical Journal (Volume
● The oppressive military regimes in South America 170, Number 4, December 2004), along with a set of com-
(notably Argentina, Brazil and Chile) during the mentaries and reflections.
1960s and 1970s elaborated and applied a variety Agnew, J., Mamadouh, V., Sharp, J. and Secor, A.J.
(eds) (2015) The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political
of the geopolitical tradition.
­Geography, Wiley Blackwell, Malden MA and Oxford. The
● However, it also proliferated in a number of chapter by Sami Moisio on Geopolitics/Critical Geopolitics
­European countries and Japan, particularly will deepen your understandings. However, at more than
between the two world wars. 500 pages, the 37 chapters cover other themes introduced
● The rise and eclipse of the Cold War have pro- in this section and indicate the vitality and breadth of
duced wide and deep geopolitical transformations. ­political geography.

● Since this proliferation of geopolitics was most evi- Dittmer, J and Sharp, J. (2014) Geopolitics: An Introductory
Reader, Routledge, Oxford and New York. Probably the best
dent in Fascist states, the defeat of the Axis pow-
place to begin to follow-up this chapter.
ers in 1945 signified its relative decline as a formal
Dodds, K. (2014) Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 2nd
tradition, although it continued in Fascist Spain and
edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Like other books in
Portugal and in South American military circles. this series of very short introductions, the first chapter is free
● Beyond the self-conscious tradition of geopolitics, to download.
similar forms of thinking about territory, states and Dodds, K., Kuus, M. and Sharp J. (2013) The Ashgate
power have proliferated in many disciplines and Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics, Ashgate, Farn-
countries. Indeed, we can also think of ‘popular ham. A good way to go deeper into the histories and present
geopolitics’ – whereby everyday culture (such as of geopolitics.
cinema) contains and expresses wider geopolitical Two accounts by historians that offer startling insights into
narratives. the geopolitics of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Both
were enabled by the opening of archives since the decline of
● This has been particularly evident during the Cold
the Cold War:
War, when broader geopolitical discourses suffused
Jersild, A. (2011) The Soviet state as imperial scavenger:
many aspects of art, science, culture and daily life. ‘Catch Up and Surpass’ in the transnational socialist bloc,
● Since the decline of the Cold War, there was a pro- 1950–1960, The American Historical Review, 116(1), 109–32.
liferation of geopolitical visions of the ‘New World Snyder, T. (2010) Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and
Order’, amongst them a more complex cartography Stalin, Basic Books, New York. An account of millions

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 420    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

murdered in the name of geopolitical projects. Snyder’s book Finally three papers that take critical scrutiny of geopolitics in
is not a light read or good bedtime reading: it is the stuff of different directions:
nightmares. Larsen, H.G. (2011) ‘The need and ability for expansion:
Good ways into feminist critiques of geopolitics are: conceptions of living space in the small-state geopolitics of
Gudmund Hatt’, Political Geography, 30(1) 38–48. The fasci-
Hyndman, J. (2003) Beyond either/or: a feminist analysis
nating case of a Danish geographer who became entangled
of September 11th, ACME: An International E-Journal for
with Nazi geopolitics.
­Critical Geographies, 2(1), 1–13 (free to download at:
www.acme-journal.org). But see too: Sidaway, J.D. (2010) ‘One island, one team, one mission:
geopolitics, sovereignty, “race” and rendition’, Geopolitics,
Ó Tuathail, G. (1996) An anti-geopolitical eye: Maggie
15(4), 667–83. How colonial, Cold War and post-Cold-War
O’Kane in Bosnia, 1992–3, Gender, Place and Culture,
geopolitics interact in the Indian Ocean.
3(2), 177–85.
Van der Wusten, H. and De Pater, B. (2013) How German
For an introduction to popular geopolitics (and with reflections geopolitics passed through the Netherlands, 1920–1945: a
on geopolitical traditions more widely): case study in the geography of one of geography’s projects.
Dittmer, J. (2010) Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 104(4),
Rownman and Littlefield, Lanham. 426–38.

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 Territory, space and society

Chapter 21

David Storey

Topics covered
■ The creation of territories
■ Territoriality and territorial strategies
■ Social processes and spatial relations
■ Territories and class, race, gender, sexuality
■ Leisure, work and home space
■ Geographies of security and resistance

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 422    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

published in 1986, Robert Sack cautions against deter-

21.1 Territory and territoriality minist views of human territoriality as a basic instinct
and emphasizes instead its role as a geographic and
We live in a world where we are regularly confronted with political strategy. For Sack, territoriality is ‘the attempt
signs reminding us of where we can or cannot go, and by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control
how to behave when we are there. We may be barred, people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and
admonished, instructed or warned through signs telling asserting control over a geographic area’ (Sack 1986: 19).
us ‘keep out’, ‘authorized personnel only’, ‘no trespass- He draws attention to the means through which territo-
ing’, ‘keep off the grass’ and so on. These are everyday rial strategies may be used to achieve particular ends. In
reminders of how control of space facilitates various essence the control of geographic space can be used to
forms of social control (Plate 21.1). The global politi- assert or to maintain power, or, importantly, to resist the
cal map provides us with the most obvious formalized power of a dominant group:
manifestation of this territorialized mode of thinking.
Territoriality, as a component of power, is not only
However, this macro-scale territorialization is accompa-
a means of creating and maintaining order, but is a
nied by a myriad of much more micro-scale, often less
device to create and maintain much of the geographic
formal, variants. In everyday usage, territory is usually
context through which we experience the world and
taken to refer to a portion of geographic space which is
give it meaning.
claimed or occupied by a person, a group or an institu-
tion. In this way it can be seen as an area of bounded (Sack 1986: 219)
space. Following from this, the ways in which individuals
or groups lay claim to such territory can be referred to In this way territoriality is deeply embedded in social
as ‘territoriality’. Territories and territorial strategies are relations and territories, rather than being natural enti-
bound up with attempts by individuals or groups to wield ties, result from social practices and processes and are
power, or to resist power imposed on them. However, as produced under particular conditions and serve specific
will be seen, these somewhat simplified definitions mask ends (Delaney 2005). Sack (1986) argues that territoriality
considerable complexity. involves a classification by area whereby geographic space
It is sometimes assumed that humans have a natural is apportioned. However, territories are more than mere
tendency to behave in a territorial manner: to claim space spatial containers; they link space and society conveying
and to prevent others from encroaching on ‘our’ terri- clear meanings relating to authority, power and rights
tory. Considerable debate has occurred over the extent to (Sassen 2006; Delaney 2009). David Delaney has defined
which territorialization and territorial behaviour should a territory as ‘a bounded social space that inscribes a cer-
be seen as a ‘natural’ or ‘social’ phenomenon, a debate tain social meaning onto defined segments of the mate-
echoing wider long-standing arguments over the relative rial world’ (2005: 14). These geographic spaces convey
influence of nature and nurture, a division that many see messages of political power and control which are com-
as somewhat blurred (see Whatmore 2014). In his land- municated through various means, most notably through
mark book Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History, the creation and maintenance of boundaries that divide
those ‘inside’ from those ‘outside’; separating ‘us’ from
‘them’. Space is controlled and territory facilitates clas-
sification, communication, enforcement and exclusion
through boundary-making. This may have important
implications, through constraining, restricting or limit-
ing mobility, for example.
While Sack’s work focused usefully on territoriality as
a political strategy, more recently Stuart Elden has drawn
attention to the concept of territory itself. He argues that
debates on territoriality have tended to take the idea of
territory for granted so that they ‘conceptually presup-
pose the object that they practically produce’ (2010: 803).
In The Birth of Territory (2013) and in other writings,
Elden suggests that the concept is bound up with particu-
lar ways of thinking about geographic space; ways which
Plate 21.1  No trespassing. reflect notions of power and control. He persuasively
(labalajadia/fotolia) argues that territory is contingent and the relationships

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 Chapter 21  Territory, space and society    423

between people, place and land have been understood dif- useful political functions. Territoriality and the produc-
ferently in different historical and geographic contexts tion of territories can be seen as devices that tend to reify
so that our ways of thinking about geographic space are power so that it appears to reside in the territory itself
more historically and temporally specific than we might rather than in those who control it. Attention is thereby
otherwise imagine. Within this, Elden argues that our deflected away from the power relationships, ideologies
contemporary ideas of territory emerged alongside devel- and processes underpinning the maintenance of territo-
opments in cartography and spatial calculation. Territo- ries and their boundaries. In this way, as Delaney argues,
ries are more than simply land; instead territory can be ‘territory does much of our thinking for us and closes off
viewed as what Elden calls a ‘political technology’, related or obscures questions of power and meaning, ideology
to the measurement of land and the control of terrain. and legitimacy, authority and obligation’ (2005: 18). Once
Territory can be seen as something calculable, mappable created, territories can become the spatial containers in
and controllable. As such, it is suggested that both ter- which people are socialized through various social prac-
ritories themselves and their boundaries (concepts which tices and discourses so that territoriality can be seen as
we tend to take for granted) reflect a distinctive mode ‘a primary geographic expression of social power’ (Sack
of social and spatial organization which is dependent on 1986: 5). As Paasi (2003) suggests, a number of important
particular ways of thinking about space. The Swiss geog- dimensions of social life and social power are brought
rapher Claude Raffestin (2012) views territoriality as a together in territory. There is a material component such
process produced by the various relationships between as land, a functional element associated with control of,
individuals and groups and their wider social environ- or attempts to control, space, and a symbolic compo-
ment. While he emphasizes the meanings of space for nent associated with people’s social identity. The spatial
individuals rather than the functional attainment of par- is not simply the outcome of the social but the two are
ticular goals, the ways in which spatial practices become intrinsically bound up together (Delaney 2009). Painter
solidified allows for the utilization of territory in stra- (2010) argues that territory is an effect or an outcome
tegic ways (Murphy 2012). The features of territoriality of a set of practices and networks of inter-connections.
identified by Sack (1986), in allowing classification and Such things as the collection and production of regional
differentiation, are thus a product of the way in which statistics and the devising of regional economic strate-
space is imagined and territories are in effect politicized gies, reproduces a sense of delimitation, contiguity and
space; mapped and claimed, ordered and bordered, meas- coherence to the idea of regional divisions. The social,
ured and demarcated. cultural and political are brought together so that people
If territories reflect a particular way of thinking about identify with territories in such a way that they can be
space, then this points to the importance of maps in seen ‘to satisfy both the material requirements of life and
solidifying and legitimizing these spatial units. Rather the emotional requirements of belonging’ (Penrose 2002:
than neutral depictions of supposed geographical reali- 282). Notwithstanding the evolution of a more globally
ties, a more critical analysis suggests that maps have interconnected world, territory continues to retain both
always been useful weapons in larger political projects an allure in terms of identity as well as a strategic value
associated with territorial claims, and counter-claims (Agnew 2010b; Murphy 2013). This is reflected in a vari-
(Harley 1988; Black 1998; Crampton 2014). Mapping of ety of ways such as preferential claims to jobs on the basis
territory itself functions so as to enhance power send- of nationality (Ince et al. 2015).
ing out messages signifying control over portions of geo- The creation and imagining of territories and the
graphic space. Maps of the British Empire conventionally utilization of territorial strategies can be observed at
depicted Britain’s overseas territorial possessions in pink, a variety of spatial scales. The most obvious (and regu-
conveying information while simultaneously proclaiming larly contested) expressions of territoriality are man-
power over roughly one quarter of the planet’s land area. ifested at the level of the state, currently the world’s
Advances in cartography altered the ways in which space dominant form of political organization (see Chapter
was considered and led to attempts to apportion and 22). Political maps of the world display this territorial
control it. The military and political underpinnings of configuration of bordered spaces in a way that leads
cartographic developments and the consequent role of us to view it as ‘natural’ and this impression of solid-
mapping (in both practical and symbolic terms) in the ity engenders a very state-centred view of the world in
creation of colonial territory was a key element in the which territory is viewed as a mere canvas on which
imposition and maintenance of political control (Smyth political processes play out (Kadercan 2015). However,
2006; Hewitt 2010). the state system is a political and geographic construct
While being mindful of the complexity of ideas sur- that displays considerable dynamism. In recent decades
rounding territory and territoriality, it is clear they serve the number of states has risen dramatically, consequent

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 424    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

on state collapse (many associated with the fall of products. Rather than seeing identities as rigidly defined,
communism) and secessionist nationalism. Clearly, it is more useful and realistic to regard them as unstable,
secessionist ideologies (Basque, Kurdish or Scottish relational and contingent. Consequently the chapter is
nationalism for example) are premised on the construc- concerned with raising questions about who is ‘allowed’
tion of a territory, politically detached from the state(s) to be in particular spaces and who is barred or discour-
to which it currently belongs. Elsewhere, groups such as aged from being there. In doing so, it sheds light on the
‘Islamic State’ (in Iraq and Syria) and Boko Haram (in ways in which space is conceived, used and organized,
Nigeria) are utilizing the control of space in the pursuit and highlights the idea that identity is both a social and
of ideological objectives. The emergence of quasi-states spatial phenomenon. The chapter also highlights the use
such as South Ossetia (officially part of Georgia) and of territorial strategies in both managing and policing
Transnistria (formally belonging to Moldova) reflect a specific issues, and also in resisting particular forms of
means of territorial construction through opting out of domination.
larger spatial-political entities (Blakkisrud and Kolstø
2011; O’Loughlin et al. 2011). Ultimately territorial sov-
ereignty is relative, contingent and never complete. It is 21.2 Territoriality, race and class
useful to think in terms of effective sovereignty wielded
by both states and quasi-state actors and deployed
21.2.1 Class and territorial segregation
across a range of territorial contexts where sovereign
power does not necessarily stop at the border (Elden Societies are seen to be marked by clear inequalities:
2009; McConnell 2010; Kadercan 2015). The effective between rich and poor; between property owners and
sovereignty of many states is reduced through various those who are not; between those who own and con-
processes and global flows, alongside the widening trol resources; and between those who are paid work-
range of non-state actors who might be seen to exert ers or are unable to obtain a job. These social divisions
power across networks rather than over rigidly bor- (together with race, ethnicity, gender and others) not only
dered territory (Agnew 2005a). More broadly, some have reflect inequality, they are also deeply spatialized. What
begun to suggest that jurisdiction and sovereignty are have been termed social enclaves emerge and these are
not inextricably dependent on territory and boundaries, frequently manifested spatially. For example, most cit-
suggesting a need to think in terms of broader concep- ies appear to have distinct residential neighbourhoods,
tualizations associated with religious law or ideas of colloquially defined as ‘rich’ or ‘poor’, ‘working class’
natural law, for example (Miller 2013). or ‘middle class’. These spatial divisions are reflected in
Apart from these state and sub-state examples, ter- ideas that some people come from ‘the wrong side of
ritorial configurations exist at a variety of spatial scales. the tracks’ and everyday discourses of ‘good’ and ‘bad’
Although these may be less obvious and may often seem areas within cities. These latter zones are often viewed
more vaguely defined with less clear-cut boundaries, as separate spaces inhabited by many people who are
these ‘informal’ divisions run through a wide range of marginalized not just in social and economic terms, but
social, cultural and political issues concerning race, class, also spatially. Moreover, discourses of securitization,
gender and sexuality so that what can be termed spatial operationalized through the deployment of various tech-
enclaves of varying degrees of permanence are regularly nologies, often leaves many people relatively immobile
created and sustained (Sidaway 2007). The remainder of and spatially confined, reflecting what sociologist Bryan
this chapter explores some of these examples, demon- Turner (2007) has referred to as an ‘enclave society’. Parts
strating how particular social practices are spatialized of cities may become synonymous with high unemploy-
and the ways in which territories are constructed, con- ment, crime and related negative images. Their residents
tested and used to achieve particular outcomes. While the suffer discrimination and inequality, while being sub-
examples are arranged under distinct headings, it should jected to negative stereotyping and often harsh policing.
be abundantly clear that many of the issues raised are Such areas may come to be characterized as dangerous
interrelated (and also overlap with earlier chapters in neighbourhoods inhabited by people pathologized as an
the book and others in this section). Identity is a highly underclass. These feelings of alienation and animosity
complex and contested term. People have more than one fuel an intense stigmatization of both residents and the
single identity: gender, sexuality and ethnicity cross-cut places in which they reside. The stigmatization of place
each other in a system of overlapping identities. Ethnic tends to be self-reproducing, serving to further reinforce
groups and classes are not immutable but are social con- class and ethnic divides.
structs. In other words, they vary in time and space and Forms of segregation arise and are reinforced
are not simply natural categories, but human (or social) through various mechanisms, particularly the housing

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 Chapter 21  Territory, space and society    425

market which effectively determines who can afford quite different uses and symbolic meanings (Plate 21.2).
to live where. The ‘poor’ cannot afford to live in ‘rich’ In South Wales, for example, the regenerated Cardiff
areas and the rich are generally unlikely to want to Bay area has been transformed from a place associated
reside in close proximity to poorer run-down neighbour- initially with the export of coal and subsequently with
hoods. Nevertheless, attempts to regenerate older work- industrial decline and decay. Other UK cities like Glas-
ing class areas tend simply to reshape the geographies gow, Liverpool and Birmingham continually engage in
of class rather than eliminate them. Gentrification is processes of re-imagination. Such processes are some-
where parts of the urban area experience regeneration times entwined with attempts to claim a ‘prize’ that may
or renewal, resulting in more affluent residents moving further enhance the city’s profile and boost its image,
in and displacing the original predominantly working- such as being crowned European Capital of Culture.
class inhabitants. Driven in part by economic processes The scale and extent of contemporary developments in
and in part through consumer choice, it serves to rein- global cities like New York and London, where a super-
force economic divisions within society, thereby per- rich elite engages in intense investment and conspicuous
petuating the idea that some households do not belong consumption, has led to the coining of the term super-
in particular places. Linked to this, it is argued that the gentrification (Butler and Lees 2006). These attempts to
role of urban ‘gatekeepers’ (such as estate agents) may purify urban space have led to the displacement of some
play a key role here in altering (or endeavouring to main- urban residents while others are rendered homeless. In
tain) the social composition of particular areas (Shaw cities such as San Francisco fragile lives are lived out on
2008). Gentrification reflects broader socio-economic the streets amidst an atmosphere in which the homeless
processes and the resultant residential territorializa- are seen as a blot to be removed rather than a mani-
tions can be seen as an expression of both demand for festation of a systemic problem. Homeless people are
housing (from homeowners) and supply of capital (from criminalized and medicalized so that urban space can be
financial institutions). It serves to highlight how broader cleansed and put to more profitable uses (Gowan 2010).
global processes play out alongside (and are implicated Class-based segregation is rendered even more obvious
in) the destruction and reconstruction of local territo- through the long evident phenomenon of urban gating
rialized identities (Butler 2007). The major regeneration (Atkinson and Blandy 2006; Glasze et al. 2006; Bagaeen
schemes undertaken in recent decades in older industri- and Uduku 2010). The apparent rise in the numbers and
alized and dockland areas in cities throughout Europe varied forms of gated communities within urban areas in
and North America reflect this transformation from various parts of the world in recent years could be inter-
manufacturing and working-class residential spaces into preted as a very obvious manifestation of attempts to
service sector zones with middle-class residents. Dock- control and limit access to portions of geographic space.
land and waterfront areas, like other ‘regenerated’ urban The creation of residential fortresses where security
zones, have been transformed into different places, with guards patrol the perimeter of walled residential zones in

Plate 21.2  Former Docklands

in London.
(Justin Kase/Alamy)

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 426    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

an effort to exclude those seen as ‘undesirable’ has been gating in its various guises touches on vitally impor-
repeated and deepened in many other cities in order to tant questions of the privatization of previously public
exclude those seen as not belonging there, so maintaining space, inclusion, exclusion and the territorialization
the ‘undefiled’ and ‘exclusive’ nature of the neighbour- of social life (Lemanski and Oldfield 2009; Rosen and
hood. The level of ‘fortification’ of these developments Razin 2009). Extremely exclusive forms of gating can
is quite varied ranging from perimeter walls, gates and be recognized in places such as Dubai, Malaysia and
barriers, through the limiting of non-residential access Singapore. Pow (2011) points to the creation of micro-
by intercoms and associated ‘screening’ devices, to more territories (facilitated by state incentives) inhabited by
perceptual barriers or codes deterring access (Plate 21.3). a global elite who enjoy the specific environment while
Individual streets, where homes are owned by super-rich cocooned and protected from the outside world, though
global elites, may be subject to private security and moni- they are intimately connected to it in many other ways
toring, as in parts of London. The general population is via work, travel, media and so on. Paradoxically, such
prevented, or at least discouraged, from traversing such mini-territories, though bordered and separated, func-
spaces (Gentleman 2014). tion as inherently transnational spaces.
The idea of gating can be seen as a consequence
of two inter-connected factors: security and prestige.
21.2.2 Ethnicity, ‘race’ and space
Though not strictly the preserve of the better-off, dis-
courses of safety and security serve as a useful rationale In the same way that class is mapped onto space, so too
for developers to design, build and promote spatially is ethnicity. Ideas of race are firmly embedded in everyday
exclusive housing often surrounded by security fences discourses but racial and ethnic categories are social con-
and with highly limited public access regulated by inter- structions rather than innate biological realities. While
coms and other ‘screening’ technologies which have race can be questioned as a problematic and dubious
come to be regular features in contemporary landscapes form of social classification there is no doubt that rac-
of power. These territorial strategies work in ways which ism and ‘race thinking’ are very real social phenomena
ensure a particular residential mix and may well serve to (Saldanha 2011). Kobayashi and Peake argue that race is
link together both racial and class divisions. These ten- socially constructed but that ‘racialization’ is ‘the pro-
dencies have been facilitated by technological advances cess by which racialized groups are identified, given ste-
in recent decades through geodemographics and the reotypical characteristics, and coerced into specific living
use of postcode data and associated marketing strate- conditions, often involving social/spatial segregation and
gies of companies who are keen to identify particular always constituting racialized places’ (2000: 293). While
types of consumer, and link these to geographic areas. issues linked to ‘race’ are clearly social phenomena, they
In this way residential homogeneity is both reflected and are often manifested spatially. Amongst the most rigid
reproduced. The social and the spatial are inextricably examples of racialized space was that devised under
linked as ‘gated minds’ are translated into gated places the apartheid system in South Africa from the late 1940s
(Landman 2010). While the forms it takes may vary through to the early 1990s: a territorial system that
somewhat according to place-specific circumstances, enhanced and entrenched the political, economic and
social power of a minority white population over non-
white populations. Both nationally and at the more local-
ized level of individual urban areas, space was divided on
racial lines. Non-white people were ‘placed’ in locations
not of their own choosing in order to entrench minor-
ity white power. In this way, there was a legal transposi-
tion of inequality on to geographical space. This spatial
arrangement was designed to ensure greater degrees of
control over the majority black population and is a clas-
sic example of the utilization of a territorial strategy to
attain political objectives. At localized levels, there was a
racialization of space with buses, public toilets and other
amenities reflecting this divide. A racial ideology was
mapped on to the South African landscape. Although
Plate 21.3  Security gates on gated residential apartheid ended in the early 1990s, after a long struggle
development. for democratic rights for all in South Africa, its legacy
(EyeMark/fotolia) means that a division of space based on the racial and

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 Chapter 21  Territory, space and society    427

class lines reinforced during the apartheid era has left depicted as untrustworthy and are subject to a range of
enduring marks on the social landscape. discriminatory practices (Shubin 2011). Yet travellers
Elsewhere, nationalist conflicts may give rise to also have nuanced notions of community, territory and
attempts to create ethnically pure spaces through the belonging amidst movement that may parallel, as well
forcible removal of ethnic ‘others’. The phenomenon of as clash with, those of more ‘settled’ communities (see
ethnic cleansing in parts of the former Yugoslavia during Convery and O’Brien 2012).
the 1990s is a striking example of an attempt to ‘purify’ Leaving aside these overt and coercive examples, it is
territory of those deemed to belong to other ethno-cul- clear that many cities exhibit high degrees of ethnic seg-
tural groups in an apparent attempt to justify territorial regation. In most US cities and European cities, for exam-
control in the name of the nation (Case study 21.1). In a ple, the elites and middle class are disproportionately
not unrelated manner, the generally negative stereotyp- white, reflecting the coincidence of class and ethnic seg-
ing of gypsies in much of Europe has led to consider- regation (Crump 2004). These patterns of exclusion and
able discrimination, with gypsies seen as an undesirable inclusion and attendant territorialities reflect the complex
‘other’, as a consequence of which they are effectively intersections of race, class and ideology. In considering
de-territorialized; they are seen not to belong anywhere these spatial concentrations of ethnic groups in urban
and active attempts are made to exclude them from cer- areas, it might be argued that individuals choose to locate
tain spaces. In recent years there have been attempts to in such areas for a variety of reasons. In brief there are a
exclude gypsies from France through ‘repatriation’ of combination of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ factors; for some
ethnic Roma (gypsy) people to Romania and Bulgaria, there are attractions such as ‘being amongst one’s own’,
a flagrant breach of EU policy on freedom of move- while others may feel driven to seek sanctuary from a rac-
ment between member states. Collective expulsion was ist, hostile society. Clustering offers feelings of defence,
justified through a security discourse that portrayed the mutual support and a sense of belonging and community.
Roma as a threat to French society, culture and identity This in turn may be a useful means through which group
(Bărbulescu 2012). Broader issues emerge here in rela- cultural norms and heritage may be preserved. Cluster-
tion to groups which pursue nomadic lifestyles and who, ing also produces spaces of resistance whereby external
consequently, are subject to considerable public oppro- threats, whether to cultural norms or of physical attack,
brium. Attempts by gypsies and other traveller groups may be reduced. However, these arguments should not
to use particular spaces are often resisted by settled detract from the fact that residential clustering is often
residents. As a group they are partly de-territorialized, more a function of necessity rather than free and uncon-
simultaneously belonging everywhere and nowhere, strained choice. The idea that people may choose to
their mobility juxtaposed to the settled nature of place- cluster is to ignore the fact that quite often no easy alter-
based communities. The mobile lifestyles of some are natives are available. Discriminatory ideologies of race
seen as unnatural and those who practice them are often work to exclude people from particular areas through the

Case study 21.1

Ethnic territorial cleansing the former federal state. Viewed from the outside it is
easy to argue that such a strategy is both dangerous
Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early and simplistic. However, for those directly involved the
1990s, violent conflicts erupted in Croatia, Bosnia- control of territory was seen as an essential element
Herzegovina and, later, Kosovo. These ethno-national in the conflict. Despite the region’s complex multicul-
conflicts were characterized by attempts by various tural history, reductionist interpretations of identity
groups to eradicate other ethnic groups from ‘their’ led to attempts to assert territorial control through
territory. This strategy was built on an essentialist the elimination of ‘others’. Nationalist rhetoric, and
version of defining ethno-national identity and, quite the associated desire to control particular portions
literally, clearing the territory of those possessing of territory in the name of a specific group, hardened
a supposedly ‘different’ identity. Armed movements divisions which were of relatively minor significance
claiming to be representing Serbs, Croats and Bos- only a few years previously when Yugoslavia was a
nians (predominantly Muslims) tried to carve out federal (and communist) republic under one-party
spaces which they could call their own in the ruins of rule. Once the conflict was underway, however, it
➜

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 428    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

➜ became impossible to reverse, as the conflict drew lauded in many circles, critics have argued that it is
upon and reinforced group identities and compet- inherently unstable and that it also reinforces ethnic
ing territorial claims underpinned through reference divisions rather than rising above them (Figure 21.1).
to historical myths and forms of boundary-making, The partition of territories and ‘transfer’ of popula-
particularly within Bosnia. In order to achieve peace, tions has occurred in many other situations of territo-
areas were mapped and information gathered on the rial, ethno-cultural, national and state conflict. Greece
various ethno-national groupings living in different and Turkey in the early 1920s, India and Pakistan in
localities. In this way territory was designated ‘Serb’, 1947, Palestine and Israel in 1948 and Cyprus (whose
‘Muslim’, ‘Croat’, and so on, with lines dividing towns northern part was occupied by Turkey in 1974) are all
and cities into different zones. After a number of examples. Understanding them requires critical attention
failed alternatives, the Dayton Agreement of 1995 not only to the details of each case, but also to the con-
divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into two autonomous cepts (territoriality, the political geography of nations and
units: a Muslim-Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb states and geopolitics) and background that are consid-
Republic (Republika Srpska). While this solution was ered both in this and the other chapters in this section.

Hungarian, 1.9 Other, 3.9

Austria Montenegrin, 2.5
a
Yugoslav, 5.4
Hungary Macedonian, 5.9
Serb,
Albanian, 7.7 36.3
Slovene, 7.8 Croat,
Slovenia
19.7
Ljubljana Muslim, 8.9
Zagreb a
Yugoslavs are those persons who listed
themselves as such in the 1981 census.
They are dispersed across the country.
Croatia Vojvodina
(autonomous
province) Romania

Belgrade

Bosnia and
Hercegovina
Serbia

Sarajevo
28p5.717
Adriatic
Italy Sea Montenegro
Kosovo Bulgaria
(autonomous
Albanian Montenegrin
province)
Bulgarian Muslim
Croat Serb
Hungarian Slovak
Macedonian Slovene
Macedonia
No majority present

Based on opstina data from 1991 census. Albania

0 100 Kilometers
0 100 Miles Greece

Figure 21.1  Majority ethnic groups within Yugoslavia in 1991.

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 Chapter 21  Territory, space and society    429

operations of the housing market and other processes, linked to immigration, smuggling and security are seen
thereby translating social exclusion into geographical as priorities. The manner in which policing is carried
exclusion (see Knox and Pinch 2010). out also reflects ideas of territory and territorial control,
We should also be mindful of the fact that much ranging from police having particular ‘beats’ or zones of
discussion surrounding issues of ‘race’ and ethnicity responsibility to the spatial tactics employed by police,
in Western societies tends to assume ‘whiteness’ as the for example funnelling street marches and protests along
norm. As McGuinness (2000) argues, much progressive agreed routes. Policing of space does not just regulate
research itself falls into this trap with a focus on non- that space, it also plays a role in the social construction
white groups, tending to deflect attention away from of space and shapes the ways in which particular spaces
white ethnicity. One consequence is that relatively little are imagined (Herbert 1997, 2006).
attention is given to ‘white spaces’. Ideas of white flight While traditionally policing has been seen as the
to the suburbs (in response to the evolution of ‘black’ purview of state forces, in recent years, and in many
ghettos) and the creation of ‘white’ territories are them- countries, the nature of policing has become ever more
selves elements in the racialization of space. Similarly complicated, with an expanding array of agencies with
the construction of rural Britain as a relatively ‘white often overlapping geographic and authoritative remits
space’ reflects deeply embedded ideas associated with (Yarwood 2007). The increasing array of non-state (pri-
belonging, rurality and with national identity (Hollo- vate) actors engaged in forms of policing also brings with
way 2005; Journal of Rural Studies, 25(4), 2009). Such it a series of additional territorializations, with private
constructions can have serious implications for those security firms patrolling office blocks and shopping
who do not (or are seen not to) ‘fit in’ with the dominant malls, or controlling access to pubs and clubs, as well as
assumptions and ethos. Recent debates over immigra- running security screening at many airports and ports.
tion into the UK and other Western European countries, These sometimes create various tensions over authority
fuelled by populist right-wing politicians, have tended and power, including attempts to prevent people taking
to focus on supposed ‘swarms’ of asylum seekers and photographs in certain spaces. The advent of citizen-
‘illegals’, and ‘hordes’ of Eastern Europeans (Gilmartin based groups such as Neighbourhood Watch also rests
2008; Storey 2013a). While much of this is inaccurate on notions of local territories, with people encouraged
and misleading, the nature of the comments suggests to report suspicious behaviour. Current government
that countries should increasingly seal themselves off strategies in the UK and elsewhere appear designed to
from invasions from ‘outside’ by those who do not deepen trends towards greater community control, the
‘belong’ there. These arguments are often (misleadingly) broadening of policing partnership arrangements and a
bound into security discourses emphasizing the need to significantly enhanced role for private security provid-
protect the country and its citizens. Territory, terror- ers. Recent years have also seen an increasing range of
ism and identity become inextricably linked in debates security measures deployed in various contexts at places
calling into question who has the right to be in certain such as airports, national monuments and so on, which
places and who has not. Additionally, countries are highlight tensions over the securitization of public space
seen to extend their border controls well beyond their thereby placing constraints on freedom of movement
own territory with immigration personnel screening while increasing levels of public surveillance (Benton-
passports in foreign airports in order to interdict those Short 2007).
deemed ‘illegal’ (Mountz 2009). Policing is about more than simple law enforcement, it
is also about the regulation and endorsement of specific
values and moral codes (Mawby and Yarwood 2011). In
addition to territorializations associated with the polic-
21.3  eographies of security,
G ing of space, there are those which endeavour to exclude
policing and protest individuals or particular forms of behaviour from cer-
tain spaces. In the United Kingdom, Anti-Social Behav-
Given the territorializations noted above it is worth iour Orders (ASBOs) and related instruments provide a
exploring the ways in which space is policed. Fyfe initially controversial example of bringing a territorial approach
drew attention to the geographies of policing in 1991. to dealing with particular behaviours that are seen to con-
One elementary version of this is the division into police stitute a nuisance. They can be used to prevent specified
forces with responsibility for particular regions: West individuals from being in particular places, streets, and
Mercia police in the UK and so on. Linked to this are so on, or to prevent individuals from repeatedly engaging
ideas of particular spaces in which special units operate in specified behaviours such as aggressive begging, dis-
such as harbours and airports, where specific concerns turbing neighbours or drunkenness in public places. They

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 430    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

have proved controversial, seen by some as the criminali- exemplify a trend towards socio-spatial design whereby
zation of certain social behaviours (Squires 2008). What territorial strategies associated with crime prevention
they clearly do is suggest the idea that certain forms of effectively exclude those not wanted. Some people are
behaviour are not allowed in public space and they can be effectively barred from certain areas – a policy of territo-
punished with territorial exclusion. What is also clear is rial containment enforced through increased surveillance
that they tend to be imposed on people in certain types of and architectural design features. In part, these forms of
place, mainly areas of public housing in UK cities (Painter exclusionary policing reflect broader geographies of fear
2006). Similar so-called ‘bubble’ laws in the USA also and the perceived risk of crime associated both with spe-
function to exclude people behaving in certain ways from cific groups and with specific geographic spaces (Pain and
specific places (Mitchell 2005). Regardless of our view of Smith 2008). Increasingly space is patrolled by private
the rights and wrongs of such moves, and whether they security companies whose remit is territorially circum-
might be deemed successful even on their own terms, they scribed. In cities such as Cape Town in South Africa this
raise important geographical questions related to what is produces a patchwork of fragmented spaces patrolled by
meant by ‘public’, who is allowed to be where, and how different companies, leading to displacement of undesira-
people are expected to behave (Cameron 2007). bles from certain streets and commercial zones (Paache
Of course the ultimate spatial sanction for law- et al 2014).
breaking is imprisonment. In all societies, those who While space is policed, it is also used to facilitate pro-
are convicted (or even in some cases simply accused) test, as marches, demonstrations, sit-ins or rallies happen
of criminal offences may also be excluded by territorial in specific places. However, state authorities can delimit
confinement (this is a key function of prisons) or con- (or try to) where and when these may take place. Many
trols on their movement. Geographers have displayed countries honour the right to use public space to protest
an emerging interest in what have been termed carceral and permission to march through the streets is granted,
geographies with explorations of the geographic distribu- though in most instances there is a requirement that routes
tion of systems of incarceration and the experiences of must be pre-agreed and these events are generally heavily
these (Moran 2015). In the USA, the prison population policed. In the UK in recent decades anti-war protests,
has quadrupled in recent decades, so much so that a new as well as demonstrations by student groups opposed to
extended geography of prisons and incarceration can be higher fees for university education, have taken place in
critically mapped (Gilmore 2007; Martin and Mitchel- London and other cities. The Occupy Movement (see
son 2009). In the current geopolitical climate, territory Case study 23.4 in Chapter 23) is a good example of a
and territorial strategies are deployed in intriguing ways. protest organized with a specific spatial dimension. Pro-
The US prison camp at Guantánamo Bay (on the island tests against global social and economic inequality and
of Cuba) is outside the territorial United States and the wider capitalist system emerged in 2011. Individuals
its ambiguous territorial status has proven an effective and groups were motivated by opposition to austerity
excuse in allowing the indefinite detention without trial measures seen to affect the more vulnerable within society
of its inmates who are simultaneously subject to interro- while ignoring the deep-seated structural issues and the
gation by US military authorities (see Reid-Henry 2007). wider global financial architecture that enriched a minor-
At a more micro-scale, taken alongside the privatiza- ity at the expense of the majority. Using slogans such as
tion and ‘gating’ of residential zones, the proliferation ‘we are the 99%’, these protests tapped into a collective
of covered shopping malls can be seen as the erosion of feeling of unfairness and injustice. The initially spontane-
shared urban street space and its replacement with privat- ous happenings saw an occupation of public space, itself
ized, more exclusionary spaces of consumption. Where a clear political statement, but the spaces themselves were
once streets were open to a broad public, there are now symbolically chosen. Wall Street in New York (where the
privatized spaces whose owners (invariably resorting to protests first emerged) is the US financial hub. Protest
security firms who take on some police powers) can evict then spread to many other cities in the USA and other
those seen to behave inappropriately or who simply look countries. The London version was initially intended for
‘out of place’. The shopping mall has become a privat- the stock exchange building, but heavy security meant
ized and highly regulated space in which people may it concentrated in the open space outside the nearby St
be excluded by virtue of their appearance or behaviour Paul’s Cathedral at the edge of the city’s financial heart.
(Staeheli and Mitchell 2006). Shopping complexes are Occupy and other social movements were simultaneously
considered private space into which people are ‘invited’ globally connected while being grounded in place. These
rather than having any automatic right to be there. These protests, while drawing attention to serious global issues,
‘secure’ shopping centres, office blocks and apartment also highlight the right to protest and the right to do so
buildings, complete with gates and intercom systems, within particular spaces.

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 Chapter 21  Territory, space and society    431

feminist thought and practice have resulted in significant

21.4 Territoriality, gender and sexuality advances with regard to equal rights for women. While
this can be seen within the arena of legislation in many
countries associated with equal pay and related issues, it
21.4.1 Gendered spaces is also reflected in terms of spaces. Thus, the heightened
As with race and class, issues of gender are mapped on visibility of women in public space reflects the changing
to space in various ways and the implications of gender status of women. Phenomena such as ‘reclaim the night’
are seen to be as important as other political, social and marches demonstrate the overt use of a spatial strategy
economic factors in the structuring of spaces and places. to make a political and human point. While particular
In its most simple form this is reflected in the sexist groups may find themselves excluded from certain spaces,
notion that ‘a woman’s place is in the home’. The home those spaces can also be reclaimed (Plate 21.4).
has tended to be seen as a space of reproduction juxta- Historically, the gender division of labour tended
posed to the workplace as a space of production (Laurie to confine women to the private realm, leaving men
et al. 1999). Underpinning this are ideas that distinguish to inhabit (much of) the public domain. This view of
between sex as a biological fact and sex as gender, which women as playing a subordinate role has in the past been
refers to the socially constructed roles of both male and reflected in discriminatory attitudes and practices, par-
female identities. In emphasizing the role of social con- ticularly in relation to women in the paid workforce, with
ditioning, the argument is that as individuals we are not active discouragement through lower wages, if not actual
biologically predetermined to be more suited to some exclusion, from many jobs. These views are predicated
roles rather than to others. on the undesirability of women going out to work. It can
One reason for the relative absence of women in par- be argued that this ascribing of women’s role, through
ticular places is overt discrimination or active discour- delimiting the spaces in which women were encouraged
agement in the sense of certain activities or pursuits not to appear, is another spatial expression of power. In
being deemed suitable for women. Historically, women other words, the confining of women to domestic space,
who transgressed these boundaries were often portrayed and their exclusion from male territories, was a key ele-
in a negative light, an idea reflective of notions of ‘good’ ment in male control (see Little 2002). With increasing
and ‘bad’ women. Women out alone at night might be female participation in the workforce and a raft of equal
seen as not conforming to what is expected of them. A opportunities legislation in many countries, such a gen-
crucial aspect of the relationship between women and eralization may appear to have lost some of its validity.
place centres on the perception of some specific places as Nevertheless, the division between a (largely) male pub-
‘unsafe’. Many women do not feel safe in certain public lic sphere and a (largely) female private sphere still has
places, most notably darkened streets. As Valentine (1989) considerable resonance in many societies (although the
suggested, women transfer a fear of male violence into a extent of this is itself immensely geographically variable
fear of certain spaces, which has profound implications across the world).
for the ways in which men and women negotiate their Where women enter the workforce, they may still
way through urban areas. Clearly, the various strands of encounter territorial divisions in the workplace. Thus,

Plate 21.4  Reclaim the Night

march.
(Chris Scott/Getty Images)

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 432    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

Spain (1992) documents the ‘closed door’ jobs of managers Geography, 25(8), 2006; Browne et al. 2007). At its most
(mainly men) and the ‘open floor’ jobs of manual workers elementary level this has seen the mapping of gay and
(who may be predominantly women in certain countries/ lesbian ‘zones’ in selected cities. It is fair to point out
regions/sectors). Employers may locate in particular local- that such spaces are not as easy to identify as, say, areas
ities (or countries) in order to take advantage of what they inhabited predominantly by a particular ethnic group.
see as an available (and exploitable) workforce based on It is equally obvious that, in the main, these are not
prevailing wage levels or skills and assumptions about strictly demarcated areas. Rather, they are zones where
gender roles (Hanson and Pratt 1995). The presence of gay people may feel more at ease through being accepted
women in the armed forces periodically provokes debate rather than rejected, scorned or ignored (or worse) by
over the supposed appropriateness of women performing their neighbours. The mapping of ‘gay territories’ runs
such roles. The deaths of female soldiers in recent years the risk of focusing on what some see as deviant behav-
in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been depicted in iour as well as essentializing sexuality and reinforcing a
especially poignant terms in the media while the appro- gay/straight dichotomy. Nevertheless, the fact that those
priateness of women being engaged in military activity in who identify themselves as gay and lesbian do, in some
a war zone, rather than being at ‘home’ playing the key instances, become associated with particular (usually
role in bringing up children is never far below the surface. urban) spaces, suggests that another form of territorial
In Iraq and Syria in 2014–15, Islamic State’s recruitment behaviour may be evident. A concentration of visibly gay
of young women (expected to perform support roles, restaurants, bars and clubs results in the creation of what
rather than ‘front line’ action) has also provoked sets of Castells calls ‘a space of freedom’ (1997: 213). Places such
responses which reflect the perceived ‘abnormality’ of as the Castro District of San Francisco (Plate 21.5) and
women participating in violent actions. Social processes the more spatially confined ‘gay village’ in Manchester
reproduce attitudes that tend to ‘naturalize’ a gendered serve as important examples, while the city of Brighton
division of labour in which women perform certain func- has acquired an image as the ‘gay capital’ of the UK
tions which are acted out in specific spaces, for exam- (Browne and Lim 2010).
ple ‘home-making’ and child-rearing in domestic space.
Socially constructed gendered difference is inherently also
spatialized. Within the arena of sport and leisure, gender
stereotyping remains prevalent. While there are undoubt-
edly marked changes, gendered ideas and practices about
leisure activities and, hence, separate spaces for men and
women, are still common. Such social practices are built
upon ideas of what is or is not acceptable behaviour for
men and women to engage in (built on socially or cultur-
ally constructed notions of masculinity and femininity)
and where. Stereotypes of women spending leisure time
shopping while men attend sporting events, or watch them
on television at home or in pubs, have a self-perpetuating
quality. Within most Western societies, deep-seated ideas
about woman’s role as homemaker, cook, cleaner, child-
rearer, and so on, mean that women have often been his-
torically presumed to ‘belong’ in some rooms and spaces
more than others. While such ideas have been challenged
(and in many cases transformed), they sometimes endure.
All these reflect territorial expressions of power whereby
the designation or apportionment of space within the
domestic sphere reflects the relative status or roles of the
individuals concerned.

21.4.2 Sexuality and space

Plate 21.5  Rainbow flag: a symbol of gay, lesbian,
The idea of places territorialized by particular groups bisexual and transgender pride flying in the Castro
on the basis of sexual orientation has begun to receive District of San Francisco.
more academic attention in recent years (see Political (Oksana Perkins/fotolia)

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 Chapter 21  Territory, space and society    433

The construction of such zones may arise for reasons of urban regeneration or place promotion is problematic.
similar to those associated with ghettos and other forms The complex intersections between different identities
of segregated space. Castells (1997) has argued that can create specific tensions which play out in different
there are two key factors: protection and visibility. The ways in different places. For example, the ways in which
first of these is fairly obvious. The idea of ‘strength in gay and lesbian identities are interconnected with pro-
numbers’ may make people feel safer from homophobic cesses of gentrification through which they take on a spa-
‘gaybashers’. Visibility may have an emancipatory effect tial dimension is apparent in places such as the Marais
through which identification as gay or lesbian within a district in Paris where tensions between ‘old’ and ‘new’
culture that is predominantly straight (heterosexual) and residents and within the ‘gay community’ emerge (Siba-
in which a straight discourse dominates, may work to lis 2004). Similarly, the intersections of sexualized and
nullify views that see homosexuality as deviant or abnor- racialized identities in post-apartheid Cape Town serve as
mal. Gay neighbourhoods become a means of asserting another useful insight into how issues of identity play out
identities. The significance of San Francisco’s gay area in specific contexts (Tucker 2009). The relations between
was reflected in that community’s ability to gain politi- class, capital, sexual identity and place may be manifested
cal representation. In obtaining power over territory they in various complex ways. Sexual citizenship becomes
also gained political representation and San Francisco has implicated in wider processes of urban transformation
become recognized as something of a ‘gay capital’ of the while sexualized spaces may continue to be quite highly
United States with a somewhat more liberal attitude. In regulated (Bell and Binnie 2004). The perception of gay
this way, the designation of ‘gay territories’ plays a crucial spaces as the effective preserve of white gay males may
role in raising awareness of gay people and issues and lead to the emergence of different types of ‘queer’ neigh-
also provides a means by which some degree of power bourhoods. As Nash (2013) highlights, Toronto’s gay vil-
and self-confidence can be attained. Celebratory events lage is effectively incorporated into the wider image and
such as ‘gay pride’ marches can be seen as an assertion of social, economic and political structures of the city. In
citizenship rights through staking a claim to public space. this way, it has been argued both gay identities and the
Conversely, heightened visibility may render people tar- spaces associated with them have become increasingly
gets for homophobic assault, both verbal and physical. commodified.
The examples of gay and lesbian spaces suggest another It might be argued that it is acceptable to be openly
important point, that of the temporality of territory. The gay in an area so designated but in other spaces and soci-
longevity of these spaces may be quite brief as the ‘scene’ eties the pressure to keep this identity hidden may well
moves to somewhere else. Lesbian spaces may be very persist. While gay spaces may allow for more open expres-
short-lived in time, whether caused by the transience of sions of sexual identity, homophobic assaults on sexual
lesbian bars/clubs or the even more short-term phenom- minorities reflect contested place meanings (Sumartojo
ena of lesbian or gay evenings. 2004). Openly gay behaviour may be accepted or toler-
Of course, such places and events may be inextricably ated in some places but may remain decidedly unaccep-
bound up with factors that extend well beyond the realm table elsewhere. Here of course there are profound links
of identity. ‘Gay spaces’ have often been associated with between the small-scale (often neighbourhood or urban)
an economic imperative as the importance of the ‘pink territorialities and the wider policies of the city or state
pound (dollar, or euro)’ in aiding urban regeneration concerned. Many countries still criminalize gay sexuality
has frequently added a strong commercial angle to these and almost everywhere sexual mores and regulations are
developments. As with ‘ethnic’ spaces, one consequence highly territorialized.
may be the ‘co-option’ of the identity in order to present
an ‘acceptable’ image of the group concerned which feeds
into broader strategies of place promotion. Not surpris-
ingly, some activists have expressed disquiet over the 21.5 Work, rest and play
appropriation of such events and their dislocation from
their original social and cultural roots and from their We can recognize two important social tendencies that
original territorial base. The fact that Manchester’s ‘gay bolster territoriality: the wish by people to have space of
village’ and San Francisco’s Castro District are firmly on their own and the wish by others to exclude people from
the tourist trails of their respective cities may be lauded certain spaces. We have already seen ample evidence of
as an acceptance of identities previously scorned but it the latter in this chapter. Even in what might appear to be
can also be seen as a commercialization of that identity very mundane or innocuous ways, the apparent claim to
which may, to some extent, serve to further ghettoize it. territory seems to manifest itself. At its most elementary
The instrumental use of an identity for wider purposes level, the assertion of territoriality is reflected in claims

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 434    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

to private property. Thus, people desire to mark their women and younger people within this domestic space,
own home, to adorn it in their chosen style (influenced as discussed earlier (McDowell 1999). While the home is
of course by social trends, technologies and fashions) commonly depicted as a refuge from the outside world it
and, in various ways, to mark it out as theirs. Homeown- may also be a site for domestic violence and fear (Squire
ers are generally keen to stamp their personality on their and Gill 2011). Similarly teenagers may view the home
home through the ways in which they choose to deco- as somewhere to escape from. In any event, the emphasis
rate it, alterations to layout, choice of colour schemes, on the domestic idyll may have highly exclusionary con-
furnishings and so on. This personalizing of space is sequences (Delaney 2005).
further manifested through such things as the display of Even within buildings territorial behaviour can be
paintings, posters or photographs and the collection and recognized. As we have seen, the idea of the kitchen as
arrangement of ornaments. The geographer Jean Gott- a ‘woman’s place’ is one example of this. The domestic
man suggested that people ‘always partitioned the space home in many different cultural contexts is often spatially
around them carefully to set themselves apart from their divided, not just in terms of gender but also in terms of
neighbours’ (1973: 1). This manifestation is commonly age, with certain spaces being designated for women or
interpreted as being symptomatic of our inherently ter- for children (Spain 1992). The banning of children from
ritorial nature. This emphasis on the centrality of the some rooms and the proprietorial attitude towards one’s
home also has a broader cultural and political signifi- own room in a house are other examples of this. In the
cance. Symbolic connections are often made between the home, space is even being claimed at the level of ‘my chair’,
domestic home and the nation whereby images of the ‘my place at the table’ and so on. There are also distinc-
former are seen to give material meaning to the latter. tions amongst those allowed in, with differential access
The home is seen in some ways to be at the heart of the for close family and friends on the one hand and more
nation. In times of war, for example, people have been casual acquaintances on the other. Even then, friends may
encouraged to fight for the ‘homeland’ and the defence be welcomed into the living room but are less likely to be
of ‘hearth and home’. invited into the more ‘private’ spaces such as bedrooms
Private property is regarded by many as an outcome (Morley 2000). In any consideration of the home, we need
of human territorial behaviour and it represents a claim to be mindful that it is not a straightforward and unam-
to space that is reinforced by the legal system of many biguous entity. While for some it conjures up feelings of
countries. However, as Alland points out, it might well comfort and security, for others it may be a place of dis-
be the case that ‘private property is the child of culture comfort, alienation and tension (Blunt and Dowling 2006).
and develops into a major preoccupation only with the For some the home may come to feel like a prison – quite
evolution of complex society’ (1972: 64). It follows that literally so for those sentenced to home imprisonment or
we need to be careful to avoid the trap of translating a the many others subject to degrees of curfew, control and
need for personal space into an ideological claim for house arrest. Home is therefore a social construction in
the sanctity of private property. The centrality of the which social identities are (re)produced but which conveys
family home, encapsulated in such phrases as ‘home, different meanings to different people.
sweet home’, glosses over the fact that the privacy which Equally, in workplaces some areas and rooms can
many of us associate with the home is comparatively only be entered by staff of a certain level and are out of
recent and is specific to some societies. Where ‘domes- bounds to more junior staff (Case study 21.2). These can
tic’ space is limited (or for those who find it constrains be interpreted as managerial strategies designed to ensure
them), life may be lived in the street (or perhaps the mall a particular outcome; staff know their ‘place’ and can be
or car), much more evidently than the ‘behind four walls’ more effectively controlled, sometimes through very obvi-
lifestyle many take as ‘natural’. We need to be mindful ous visual intrusion. Hanson and Pratt (1995) reveal how
of social, ethnic and geographic differences in the ways companies reproduce social segregation through spatial
in which the home is conceived. In the United Kingdom, practices within the workplace whereby different sets of
the notion of private home space was initially quite a workers inhabit different parts of the factory and rarely,
middle-class idea which has since permeated the rest of if ever, meet. Thus, office staff may be located downstairs
society (Morley 2000). in ‘cubicles’ separated by room dividers, with sales staff
Hegemonic ideas of the home within Western socie- and management upstairs in individual or shared offices
ties, exemplified by such notions as the home being an while production staff are located in an entirely separate
‘Englishman’s castle’ or associated with ‘The Ameri- part of the building. Socializing between workers often
can Dream’, can be argued to have led to an ignoring reflects their spatial segregation with limited social con-
of internal tensions and, in particular, a consideration tact between them. Work hierarchies are reflected in the
of the different positions, roles and experiences of men, spatial arrangements of the workplace. These practices

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 Chapter 21  Territory, space and society    435

Case study 21.2

Playgrounds and lecture halls recourse to other discourses such as that of health
and safety – prohibiting access to spaces deemed
There has been a growing interest recently in the dangerous or hazardous (Thomson 2005).
geographies of younger people (see Holloway and In a similar vein we might take the example of the
Valentine 2000; Leyshon 2008; Yarwood and Tyrrell university teaching room. Here a lecturer may exert a
2012) and as an example of micro-scale territoriality strong degree of territorial control; occupying a space
it is instructive to consider the space of the school at the top of the room while controlling (or trying to)
playground. Thomson (2005) suggests that while chil- who else may speak and when they may do so. Even
dren’s behaviour is clearly spatialized in a wide vari- in highly interactive and more student-led sessions, a
ety of ways, it might be thought that the playground lecturer, by virtue of their status, continues to exert con-
is ‘their’ space in which school children can enjoy a trol over the space. She or he can ‘command’ the room
degree of freedom to engage in a range of activities and walk around it in ways which students cannot (or
as distinct from the constraints imposed in the more are discouraged from doing). However, such control has
formalized and controlled spaces of the classroom very obvious temporal constraints. What the students
or other parts of the school buildings and grounds. and lecturer may regard as ‘their’ room is usually limited
However, while play spaces can be seen as eman- to a regular time-tabled slot. Before and after that time,
cipatory they are simultaneously regulating. Thom- their right to be there is denied as other lecturers and
son’s research indicates that on closer inspection students take over the space and control it. Your geog-
the playground displays two key criteria associated raphy lecturer is unlikely to walk into a lecture theatre
with territories and territoriality. First, it remains heav- during a biochemistry class and commence to speak
ily controlled by adults (teaching staff) who delimit to the assembled students. (Well, they might try to do
the times it can be used and the activities which are so but they would be met by a bewildered reaction and,
permitted there. Second, it often contains internal ter- more than likely, a phone call to security!) (Plate 21.6).
ritorial divisions in the sense of discrete spaces for
different types of ‘play’ activity – sports, etc. What is
also obvious of course is that children themselves
will often endeavour to claim their own territory within
the larger space of the playground with groups ‘hang-
ing out’ in particular places. In addition it is equally
apparent that these spatial practices are open to
contestation. Rival groups of children may ‘compete’
for spaces within the playground. What is also appar-
ent is the manner in which children may try to test or
push the spatial boundaries imposed by teachers and
supervisors through such actions as encroaching on
grass playing pitches and so on. Another important
dimension of this (in addition to classification, com-
munication, enforcement and resistance) is the way Plate 21.6  University lecture theatre.
in which the control of territory is masked through (Matej Kastelic/Shutterstock)

have clear outcomes. They may render it difficult for resent others ‘invading’ their space (unless invited!). This
workers to organize through physically keeping them can be interpreted as a territorial claim to a portion of
separate and through engendering a sense of difference geographic space. While this might be taken as reflecting
between different sections of the workforce. a natural tendency, it is worth noting that the amount of
Taking the idea of territory down to its most elemen- space needed appears to vary from one society to another,
tary level, the desire for personal space can be seen as a fact noted long ago by Hall (1959). For many young peo-
a form of territorial behaviour. Humans like to have a ple, their own room, apartment, etc., may seem like a ‘nat-
pocket of space around them that is ‘theirs’ and they ural’ ambition, but for many of the world’s inhabitants

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 436    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

such a desire is completely unobtainable. For those liv- Territorial thinking, the production of territories and the
ing in overcrowded conditions, the amount of personal employment of territorial strategies are bound up with
space available is extremely limited. For a homeless per- maintaining power or with resisting the imposition of
son, their ‘own’ space may be limited to a hostel bed in power by a dominant group. While forms of exclusion can
central London, a doorway in downtown Manhattan, or be consolidated and reinforced through territorial prac-
a small patch of pavement in the Tenderloin district in tices, they can also be resisted through similar means. The
San Francisco (Gowan 2010). Nurture, culture, power and examples provided in this chapter are evidence of the ways
politics all need to be considered where the complexities in which social relations are expressed through spatial
and diversities of human territorialities are concerned. patterns and they highlight how these geographies help
Sport provides an example of an activity in which terri- in turn to shape social relations. Social phenomena such
tory and space are of obvious importance. Sport is deeply as class, racial or gendered identities invariably embody a
connected to questions of place and identity with some territorial component. Territorial strategies are often used
sports intrinsically connected to particular places, Gaelic to control and police those who are defined as ‘out of
games in Ireland being a classic example (Storey 2012a). (their) place’. In this way particular ideologies are trans-
Particular spaces are required for sports and these range posed on to space. People are confronted with wider prac-
from formal arenas and large stadia down to the level of tices through their use of space or through the ways in
the street or indeed to a corner of a room, depending on which they are allowed to use space. Power relationships
the sport. Sports grounds and facilities occupy areas of take on a spatial dimension, even at the most mundane
urban and rural space and we can consider these in rela- and everyday level. Issues of identity, particularly within
tion to wider ideas of inclusion and exclusion. Issues of multi-cultural societies, have a spatial expression as social
gender or ethnicity may be important here and the main- divisions (associated with class, ethnic, religious, gender
tenance of men only rules at some sports facilities results or other factors) are given material form through spatial
in a highly gendered division of recreational space. Sports divisions. The examples used here demonstrate the spa-
such as football and rugby thrive on inter-place rivalry and tialization of wider ideas and they show how people are
fans come to closely identify with their sporting ‘home’. kept ‘in their place’ whether through overt mechanisms or
In some instances this rivalry may be at a relatively local- more subtle means. Social boundaries are often commu-
ized, yet highly intense, scale such as that between Arsenal nicated through space. This can have serious implications
and Tottenham Hotspur football clubs in north London. with some groups of people effectively treated as ‘second-
In some cases wider social issues may overlay geographic class (or indeed as non-) citizens’ denied full rights in the
rivalry, as with Celtic and Rangers football clubs in Glas- society in which they find themselves, confined to spatial
gow, Scotland where sectarian division between Protestants enclaves which become characterized as dangerous and
and Catholics is part of the cultural context for the antipa- threatening spaces. Social and spatial exclusion has the
thy between supporters. At a still more micro-scale fans effect of denying full access to those rights often thought
will occupy different sections of a ground, usually related of as inalienable for all people everywhere. Many territo-
to security considerations designed to keep ‘home’ and rial strategies have deeply discriminatory and exclusion-
‘away’ supporters apart. In some cases minorities of sup- ary outcomes giving rise to social and spatial exclusion.
porters may try to ‘take’ the home section of ground while They can be used to deny people effective participation
visiting fans sometimes like to be seen to assert control in society through restricting choice, mobility and pos-
over some bars and streets in the ‘host’ city or town, a ver- sibilities to participate. However, as indicated earlier,
sion of territoriality of very short duration. In sport itself just as dominant ideologies can be reinforced through
territorial strategies of dominating the pitch, or areas of territorial practices, they can also be resisted. Territorial
it, may be a fundamental tactic. In rugby endeavouring to strategies are useful mechanisms in the assertion of iden-
keep play in the opposition’s half is a normal tactic while tity. Spatial concentrations within particular geographic
tennis players may wish to dominate the court as a means areas make visible people and issues that might otherwise
of dominating their opponent. remain unseen. They can be used to draw attention to
exclusionary practices and to assert the right to be equal
citizens. In doing so, this demonstrates the ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ dimensions to territoriality; it can be both a
21.6 Conclusions force for oppression and also one for liberation. Particular
strategies can be used to assert an identity and territori-
The idea of territory reflects a way of thinking about ally transgressive acts can be employed to reclaim space
geographic space while territorial strategies are utilized and, hence, to assert basic rights. While many people
in conflicts concerned with social power and identity. do not necessarily freely choose their ‘place’, they may,

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 Chapter 21  Territory, space and society    437

nevertheless, identify with their immediate neighbour- and territories provide a material expression of the fusion
hood or locality. This sense of identity can in turn be of meaning, power and social space (Delaney 2009). In
converted into forms of action aimed at obtaining par- other words, power permeates society and this is some-
ticular outcomes. The formation of community or resi- thing which is marked in and expressed through a range
dence groups reflects feelings of belonging or attachment of human geographies. As the next chapter details, the
to a particular place. It follows that notions of territory nation-state has come to be a key container of power and
are connected with ideas of social power. The claiming an expression of human territoriality. As such, nation-
of space is a political act whether it occurs in the ‘public’ states are frequently contested, not only by other states,
or ‘private’ arena (and the categorization and demarca- but also by those acting in the name of other loyalties and
tion of these areas is a key expression of territoriality) other scales and ideologies of belonging.

Learning outcomes The work of Stuart Elden extends earlier thinking on the nature
of territory and the relationships between territories and geo-
Having read this chapter, you should understand:
graphic space. In particular, he stresses the necessity of thinking
● How social issues linked to class, racism, ethnicity, historically about how territory has evolved. See, in particular,
identity, gender and sexuality are mapped on his history of the concept: The Birth of Territory (University of
Chicago Press, 2013) and also Elden, S. (2010) Land, terrain,
to geographic space and become the basis for
territory, Progress in Human Geography, 34(6), 799–817.
territorial strategies.
Two reader-friendly introductions to the intersections between
● Some of the ways in which social inequalities and politics and geography, providing very good examples of
differences are manifested spatially. some of the themes covered here, which also contain lots of
● How territorial practices are used to exert control material relevant to other chapters in this section (for exam-
through the policing of space at macro- and ple, on the territorial state and geopolitics) are:
micro-scales. Jones, M., Jones, R., Woods, M., Whitehead, M., Dixon,
● How territorial strategies can be useful mechanisms D. and Hannah, M. (2015) An Introduction to Political Geogra-
phy: Space, Place and Politics, 2nd edition, Routledge, London.
for groups to promote their identities and rights and
Painter, J. and Jeffrey, A. (2009) Political Geography, 2nd edi-
to resist exclusionary practices.
tion, Sage, London.
● The ways in which many aspects of everyday life There are a range of useful social and cultural geography
are reflected in spatial practices and relationships. texts dealing with many of the concerns of this chapter.
These can be read with a view to the complex operations and
manifestations of territoriality:

Further reading Anderson, J. (2015) Understanding Cultural Geography.

Places and Traces, 2nd edition, Routledge, London.
Sack, R. (1986) Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History, Del Casino, V.J. (2009) Social Geography: A Critical Introduc-
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. As outlined in this tion, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester.
chapter, Sack’s book has become a classic geographic text Horton, J. and Kraftl, P. (2014) Cultural Geographies: An Intro-
on territory and territorial behaviour, setting it firmly within a duction, Routledge, London.
‘social’ rather than ‘natural’ framework. For commentaries For two contrasting cases (one on territoriality in a school
revisiting Sack’s book more than two decades after its origi- playground, another on parades), both drawing on Sack, see:
nal publication, see Classics in human geography revisited, Thompson, S. (2005) ‘Territorialising’ the school playground:
Progress in Human Geography, 24(1), 2000, 91–9. deconstructing the geography of playtime, Children’s Geogra-
Delaney, D. (2005) Territory: A Short Introduction, Blackwell, phies, 3(1), 63–78 and O’Reilly, K. and Crutcher, M.E. (2006)
Malden. Parallel politics: the spatial power of New Orleans Labor Day
Storey, D. (2012b) Territories: The Claiming of Space, 2nd parades, Social and Cultural Geography, 7(2), 245–65.
edition, Routledge, London. On policing and security, see: Yarwood, R. and Paasche,
These both build on Sack’s work and deal with territory and T. (2015) The relational geographies of policing and security,
territoriality in social and political contexts. Storey’s updated Geography Compass 9(6), 362–70.
book contains many more case studies of territoriality than can For a more specific focus on urban gating see: Bagaeen, S. and
be considered here. Delaney’s book also offers a good survey Uduku, O. (eds) (2010) Gated Communities. Social Sustainabil-
(and some critique) of Sack’s ideas and lots of case studies. ity and Historical Gated Developments, Earthscan, London.

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 438    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

This is an interesting collection of chapters casting light on On social movements, protest and activism see the useful
sexuality and space: insights provide by the following:
Browne, K., Lim, J. and Brown, G. (eds) (2007) Geographies Arenas, I. (2014) Assembling the multitude: material
of Sexualities: Theory, Politics and Practice, Ashgate, Alder- ­geographies of social movements from Oaxaca to Occupy, Envi-
shot. See also the book by Andrew Tucker (2009) Queer ronment and Planning D: Society and Space, 32(3), 433–49.
Visibilities: Space, Identity and Interaction in Cape Town, Chatterton, P. and Pickerill, J. (2010) Everyday activism and
Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, and the commentaries on it by transitions towards post-capitalist worlds, Transactions of
Ward et al. in Political Geography, 29(8), 2010, 454–62. the Institute of British Geographers, 35(4), 475–90.
For a useful examination of the complex natures and Halvorsen, S. (2015) Encountering Occupy London: boundary
meanings of home: making and the territoriality of urban activism, Environment
Blunt, A. and Dowling, R. (2006) Home, Routledge, London. and Planning D: Society and Space, 33(2), 314–30.

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 The place of the nation-state

Chapter 22

James Sidaway and Carl Grundy-Warr

Topics covered
■ The ubiquity and geographical diversity of nations and states
■ Interpretations of nationalism as a territorial project
■ Relationships between nations, states and territory
■ Challenges to territorial states
■ Transnational identities and borderlands
■ Geologic and fluid claims by states

The territory of a nation is not just a profane part of the Earth’s

surface. It is a constitutive element of nationhood which gener-
ates plenty of other concepts and practices directly related to it:
for example, the concepts of territorial integrity and political sov-
ereignty; border control, conflict, invasion and war. It defines and
has some control over many other national affairs, such as the
national economy, products, industry, trade, education, administra-
tion, culture and so on. Unarguably, the territory of a nation is the
most concrete feature of a nation for the management of nationhood
as a whole. For a theoretical geographer, it is the territoriality of a
nation . . . For people of a nation; it is a part of SELF, a collective
self. It is a nation’s geo-body . . . . The geo-body, the territoriality of
a nation as well as its attributes such as sovereignty and boundary,
are not only political but also cultural constructs.
(Winichakul 1996: 67)

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 440    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

22.1  istorical and geographical

H
­variability of states
Although it is also other things, notably a provider of
services, a system of regulations, ideologies, legal regula-
tions and police powers (‘law and order’), flows of capi-
tal (budgets, taxation and government spending) backed
up by the threat of discipline and violence (for example,
armed forces), the state can be interpreted as a form of
community. As earlier chapters (in particular those in
Section 1) have shown, forms of human community and
their attendant territorialities (see Chapter 21) have been
extremely variable historically and geographically. Plate 22.1  The state as a system of organized
The contemporary system of states, in which all of violence: armed forces.
the land surface of the earth (with the partial exception (TheStockCube/fotolia)
of Antarctica as is detailed in Chapter 20) is divided into
state units, whose outlines become familiar to us from
maps and globes, is after all fairly new. In the early twen- made for and on behalf of them deserve critical examina-
tieth century, the borders between many of today’s states tion. However, this is not an easy task. For, as Benjamin
were only vaguely defined, and more recently large areas Akzin (1964) pointed out over half a century ago, to dis-
of the world were ruled by colonial empires or dynastic cuss nations, states and nationalism is to enter a termino-
realms (the Austro-Hungarian in Central Europe, Otto- logical maze in which one easily and soon becomes lost.
man in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, and Claims to nationhood frequently involve the blending of
Ch’ing empire in China, for example). Alternatively, the ‘tangibles’ and ‘intangibles’ in a unique brew that may
concept of nation-statehood was simply not in the politi- contain such volatile ingredients as ‘blood’, language,
cal vocabulary. In the latter cases, ethnically, linguistically ‘race’ and religion. A fundamental goal of nationhood is
or religious specific groups owed allegiance to the impe- to generate a strong sense of belonging associated with
rial order rather than to a defined nation. That is, loy- a particular territory. In practice it may prove difficult to
alty would be foremost to the empire and any sense of distinguish between ‘the nation’ and other human col-
national or ethnic identity would be a local or ‘private’ lectivities, but as Walker Connor (1994: 93) puts it, ‘what
matter. ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe
Such imperial visions are no longer dominant and is’. This chapter will indicate some pathways into the
today few formal colonies and no large-scale dynastic maze of tangibles and intangibles surrounding the term
empires remain (see Chapter 3). Therefore the territories nation-state. It begins with an account of ‘nations’ and
that were once ruled as part of, for example, a Japanese, nationalism before returning to the relationship of these
British, French, Ottoman (Turkish), Portuguese or Rus- to states.
sian empire are today mostly divided into self-avowed and
recognized sovereign states. They possess the same appa-
ratus of statehood (leaders, flags, capital cities, adminis- 22.2  ations as ‘imagined’ political
N
trations, postage stamps, seats at the United Nations and communities
so on) that the former imperial powers have. Moreover,
the global map of states continues to change. In recent
One of the most influential and suggestive critical stud-
decades, some have disappeared as separate states (like
ies of nations and nationalism was a book by Benedict
the former East Germany and South Yemen), whilst oth-
Anderson (1983) entitled Imagined Communities: Reflec-
ers have split into two or sometimes many component
tions on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. He
parts (like the former USSR, Ethiopia, Sudan and Yugo-
begins with a reminder of the ubiquity of nations and
slavia), and others have been subject to violent fragmen-
nationalism:
tation fuelled by civil unrest, internal and external power
plays using coercive force (such as Syria and Somalia). Almost every year the United Nations admits new
All this reinforces the point that states, like other com- members. And many ‘old nations’ once thought fully
munities, particularly the ‘nations’ with which they are consolidated find themselves challenged by ‘sub’-
associated, are not to be taken at face value. The claims nationalisms within their borders – nationalisms

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 Chapter 22  The place of the nation-state    441

which naturally dream of shedding this subness one of higher-level collectivities not directly but only by
happy day. The reality is quite plain: the ‘end of the era virtue of their membership of lower-level bodies.
of nationalism’, so long prophesied, is not remotely in
In many parts of the pre-colonial world, sovereignty was
sight. Indeed, nationness is the most universally legiti-
not based upon fixed boundaries and territorial control
mate value in the political life of our time.
per se. For instance, much of North Africa and the Mid-
(Anderson 1983: 3) dle East had very different forms of political sovereignty in
Although enormously variable between, say, Nepali, pre-modern times. According to George Joffé (1987: 27):
Israeli, Singaporean, Nicaraguan, Vietnamese, Eritrean, political authority was expressed through communal
American, Greek, Turkish and Irish versions, the ide- links and was of varying intensity, depending on a series
ology of nationalism holds that everyone will have a of factors involving, inter alia, tradition, geographic
primary identity with a particular ‘nation’. Such commu- location and political relationships. The underlying
nities should be able to express themselves in a state; that consideration, however, was common throughout the
is, they should enjoy what is called ‘sovereignty’ within region and involved a concept of political sovereignty
certain geographical boundaries. ‘Sovereignty’, which that derived from Islamic practice. The essential con-
is a term of long vintage and was previously associated dition was that ruler and ruled were bound together
with royal dynasties (the sovereign monarch), shifts to through a conditional social contract in which the ruler
the ‘people’ of a ‘nation’, and even if a royal figurehead could expect loyalty in return for enduring the condi-
is retained, she or he will have to become in some way a tions in civil society for the correct practice of Islam.
‘national’ symbol. However, it is important to remember
that territorial sovereignty as depicted on the world polit- Not surprisingly, many of the colonially inspired geo-
ical map of today is of relatively recent origin (see Section metrical boundaries that define the modern states of the
22.3), that more differentiated forms of sovereignty and Middle East and North Africa have limited relation to
other territorialities have existed in the past, and that sov- pre-colonial political landscapes. They have faced post-
ereignty is continually being challenged in various ways. colonial challenges, by nationalists who argued they did
Examples of quite different conceptions of sovereignty not coincide with where national borders should be and
in the past are abundant in many parts of the world, from by those who refute them in the name of confessional
medieval Europe to most parts of the pre-colonial world. (religious) identity, most dramatically the leaders of the
The labyrinthine world of medieval times in Europe was self-declared Islamic State that emerged in Iraq and Syria
at some levels intensely ‘local’, involving much smaller in 2014. Similarly, in many pre-colonial Asian states, the
communities and political units than today, although emphasis of sovereignty was not on the territorial limits
these were usually a ‘part of a complex hierarchy of polit- of control ‘but on pomp, ceremony and the sacred archi-
ical or cultural entities, such as the Church of Rome, the tecture of the symbolic centre’ (Clarke 1996: 217). In the
Hanseatic League, or the dynastic Habsburg Empire’ (J. classical Indianized states of South and South-east Asia,
Anderson 1986: 115). Sovereignty was not rigidly territo- sovereignty was often focused on rulers who claimed divin-
rial as it mostly is with modern nation-states (see Chap- ity, and further eastwards, emperors held the ‘mandate of
ters 1 and 2). As James Anderson (1995: 70) explained: Heaven’, and the mandarins’ right to exercise their author-
ity was derived from their being ‘superior men’ (Sino-Viet-
Political sovereignty in medieval Europe was shared
namese, quan-tu; Chinese chun-tzu) ‘who acted according
between a wide variety of secular and religious institu-
to Confucian ideals’ (Keyes 1995: 195). But it would be
tions and different levels of authority – feudal knights
too simplistic to think of sovereignty purely in terms of
and barons, kings and princes, guilds and cities, bish-
emperors, kings, queens, chiefs and so on, as ruler-ruled/
ops, abbots, the papacy – rather than being based on
state-society relations in pre-modern societies were often
territory per se as in modern times. Indeed the territo-
complex, hierarchical, shifting and not based on strict ter-
ries of medieval European states were often discontin-
ritoriality. O.W. Wolters (1982: 16–7) described the scheme
uous, with ill-defined and fluid frontier zones rather
of power relations in South-east Asia as mandala (a San-
than precise or fixed borders. Then the term ‘nation’
skrit word that defies easy translation, but which refers to
meant something very different and non-political,
a political apparatus that was without fixed boundaries,
generally referring simply to people born in the same
but which rested on the authority of a central court):
locality. Furthermore, the different levels of overlap-
ping sovereignty typically constituted nested hierar- [The] mandala represented a particular and often
chies, for example parish, bishopric, archbishopric unstable political situation in a vaguely definable geo-
for spiritual matters; manor, lordship, barony, duchy, graphical area without fixed boundaries and where
kingdom for secular matters. People were members smaller centers tended to look in all directions for

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 442    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

security. Mandalas would expand and contract in 1996). Through the twentieth century, the ideology of
concertina-like fashion. Each one contained several nationalism (and the associated idea of nation-states)
tributary rulers, some of whom would repudiate their became one of the dominant and most widespread influ-
vassal status when the opportunity arose and try to ences on politics across the world, arguably becoming a
build up their own networks of vassals. key (or the key) manifestation of modern territoriality.
Occasionally nationalisms recognize that the state
Territories of pre-modern kingdoms were often dis- itself may be multinational (as in British nationalism,
continuous, with outer tributaries and chiefdoms often which contains English, Scottish, Welsh, northern Irish
paying tribute to more than one authority at the same protestant and catholic, and other affiliations due to gen-
time, and with areas of sovereign ambiguity, particu- erations of migrants and mixed religious, ethnic groups
larly in heavily forested zones, high mountain areas, over time becoming part of the United Kingdom), but in
and remote regions. In a sense, the vast mountain ‘fron- so doing, the wish is usually expressed that somehow a
tiers’ of the mainland South-east Asian massif, South- more inclusive national identity will evolve or has evolved
west China, Himalaya, and Afghanistan, have variously which coincides with the boundaries of the state. Britain,
retained certain ‘frontier’ ‘resistance’ and ‘refuge’ char- China, Switzerland, South Africa, Nigeria and the United
acteristics well into the era of modern nation-states (refer States of America are all cases where different versions
to Case study 22.2). of the claim and goal of an inclusive ‘national identity’
This system of tributary relationships carried its own that supposedly unites disparate ‘sub-nations’ or com-
forms of obligations, sanctions and allegiance. Manda- munities have been asserted. All have been challenged
las created complex geographies of power, ‘a polycentric and contested, sometimes peacefully through political
landscape-seascape’ (Friend 2003: 18), including smaller process (referenda, debate and elections), but often vio-
chiefdoms paying tribute to more than one ‘overlord’ at lently by those who would wish to secede, eliciting rounds
the same time. Initially, the multiple sovereignties of the of repression and violent response. Often, the assertion
region were very confusing to the European imperial pow- of a particular dominant nationalism in a territory has
ers in the region who were eagerly trying to carve out their required the suppression of or conflict with other national
own spheres of unambiguous control. As Theodore Friend claims on the same territory (the emergence of the state
(2003: 21) notes in relation to the making of Indonesia: of Israel is a clear example of this; and in turn the pro-
The Netherlands required centuries to unify Indonesia ject of a national home for Jewish people in the land of
in their own fashion: first for mercantilist advance- Palestine is in part a reaction to the genocidal extremes
ment of trade and then for nineteenth-century motives associated with German and other European national-
of geographic empire . . . How could so few succeed isms earlier in the twentieth century). As a result many
over so many? The answer: because only a handful of ‘national’ communities that assert a claim to statehood
mandalas had to be overcome, each caring little about have been denied this (see Case study 22.1, for example).
the others or knowing nothing of them. The Dutch Others remain contested. Myanmar, for example, has wit-
brought a layer of assiduous modernity to political nessed over five decades of protracted ethno-nationalist
vacuums strung throughout a vast archipelago. Geo- struggles, particularly between successive military regimes
graphically disconnected and culturally discordant but holding power in the predominantly ethnic-Burman heart-
now administratively centralized, the Netherlands East lands, and various movements in the provinces that are
Indies was for the length of one human generation the seeking either greater political autonomy within a federal
first comprehensive empire that region had ever known. structure or complete independence. Indeed, for many
years, large tracts of northern and eastern Myanmar are
Although significant vestiges of such territorial struc- patched together by a series of fragile ceasefires and nat-
tures remain, today they have mostly been displaced by ural resource joint ventures between the ruling military
nation-states with fixed (though sometimes disputed) junta and various ethno-political parties, companies and
boundaries. Sometimes the new geography was imposed warlords. Specific armed political groups, such as the Wa
by the colonial powers, but indigenous polities were also United State Party, have effective authority over sections
active in transforming the political map, such as China’s of the Burma–China and Burma–Lao border areas, which
long quest to have political control over numerous stub- provide examples of de facto territorial power by ‘shadow
born non-Han ethnic polities in the vast south-western state’ organizations (Grundy-Warr and Dean 2011). Thus,
frontier (Giersch 2001), and in Siam in the late nineteenth the political-legal integrity of ‘the Union of Myanmar’ has
century, where the Siamese Court began to employ ‘mod- been contentious. Following the Myanmar national elec-
ern’ political cartography backed up by military power to tions in November 2015, in which the National League for
determine the sovereign limits of the kingdom (Winichakul Democracy (NLD) party led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi

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 Chapter 22  The place of the nation-state    443

Case study 22.1

A nation across states? The back several decades’. The lands predominantly
Kurdish case inhabited by Kurds came to be divided between
four states (see Figure 22.1): Iran, Iraq, Turkey and
Gerard Chailand (1993: 4) claimed that: ‘the Kurd- Syria (there are also smaller Kurdish communities in
ish people have the unfortunate distinction of the former Soviet Union – Armenia, Azerbaijan and
being probably the only community of over 15 mil- Georgia – and significant Kurdish diaspora popula-
lion persons which has not achieved some form of tions in Europe, especially in Austria, Germany and
national statehood, despite a struggle extending Scandinavia).

Ankara

T U R K E Y

Tehran

SYRIA

LEBANON
IRAN

Damascus Baghdad

IRAQ

JORDAN

ARABIA

Regions historically inhabited by the Kurdish Nation

Figure 22.1  Regions historically inhabited by the Kurds.

Source: after Chailand (1993: ix)
➜

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 444    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

➜ Yet frequent attempts on the part of the states in the allied Kurdish nationalist movement that had hitherto
region to eradicate Kurdish identity and nationalism were sought a state in the eastern part of Turkey now officially
not able to quash either the widespread sense of Kurd- seeks a democratic con-federal settlement. The future
ishness or the often violent struggle in pursuit of a Kurd- status of these territories and relationships between
ish nation-state. After years of struggle, which became them and their neighbours (which include the insurgent
interconnected with the Cold War, regional rivalries and ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq and Syria that was established in
then the American-led wars with Iraq in 1991 and 2003, 2014, the Turkish state, which will be a century old in
the northern part of Iraq – which is predominantly Kurd- 1923, Iran and the weakened central governments in
ish – is now an autonomous region. Since 2013, autono- Iraq and Syria) remain uncertain and pose challenges
mous Kurdish cantons have also emerged in northern to established concepts of nationhood, sovereignty and
Syria, in the wake of the wider civil war there whilst the territory (Paasche and Sidaway 2015).

won a decisive majority, thus replacing effective military national identities within a multinational state (such as
rule since 1962 with a fledgling democracy, there are likely Scotland in the United Kingdom or Quebec in Canada)
to be peaceful changes to the political landscape, although become the basis for claims that they should enjoy full state-
key ethnic parties and ethnic armed organizations still hood. In many cases too, either the central state or some
prefer a federal nation-state to a union where politics other community with another affiliation resists. There
is dominated by the ethnic Burman or Bamar majority are numerous examples of this, including the complex
population. Globally, there a numerous other examples case of Northern Ireland, where most Catholics (Repub-
of de facto states (Pegg 1998; Bacheli et al. 2004), such as licans) would wish to see the province united with the rest
Somaliland (Srebrnik 2004), Abkhazia (O Loughlin et al. of the Irish Republic (which itself successfully broke away
2011) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Nav- from the British colonial empire earlier in the twentieth
aro-Yashin 2005, 2012), as well as bi- or ‘multinational’ century). Most Protestants (Unionists), who claim descent
territories, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dahlman and Ó from settler populations from England and Scotland, wish
Tuathail 2005; Ó Tuathail and Dahlman 2006). Such cases to remain part of a ‘United Kingdom’ (see Case study 21.4).
reveal the truly complex nature of the historical, cultural The Irish case is just one of dozens of situations
and political geographies that complicate and sometimes where conflicting nationalist and confessional (religious-
contradict territorial nation-statehood. cultural) logics collide, often with violent consequences.
Two ‘multinational’ communist countries, namely There is clearly something very powerful going on,
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, sought to regulate whereby nationalist visions are linked with particular ter-
nationalism by assigning citizens to one of a number of ritories and conceptions of state. Yet, as Anderson (1983:
constituent national identities. This sometimes involved 3) recognizes:
inventing nationalities to rationalize and simplify more
But if the facts [of the existence of many and some-
complex tribal and religious identities, whilst asserting
times conflicting nationalisms] are clear, their expla-
that these should be subservient to an overarching sense
nation remains a matter of long-standing dispute.
of Soviet or Yugoslav identity which coincided with the
Nation, nationality, nationalism – all have proved
boundaries of the USSR or of Yugoslavia. So, for exam-
notoriously difficult to define, let alone analyse. In
ple, in the USSR, people could be declared on their iden-
contrast to the immense influence that nationalism
tity documents as having one of a number of officially
has exerted on the modern world, plausible theory
recognized nationalities (Uzbek, Latvian or Russian, for
about it is conspicuously meagre. Hugh Seton-Wat-
example), but they would also and supposedly above all
son, author of by far the best and most comprehen-
be citizens of the USSR. In due course, it was in part
sive English-language text on nationalism, and heir
because of local nationalist challenges to wider Soviet
to a vast tradition of liberal historiography [theories
and Yugoslav affiliations that the USSR and Yugoslavia
of history writing] and social science, sadly observes:
collapsed in the early 1990s.
‘Thus I am driven to the conclusion that no “scientific
Many of those self-identified nations without their own
definition has existed and exists”.’
state (the Kurds are an example, see Case study 22.1; as
are Palestinians, Basques, Karen and Tibetans, to name a Readers may wish to ‘prove’ Seton-Watson’s observa-
few) claim either the right to one or at least a high level of tion for themselves, by trying to come up with a univer-
self-rule or autonomy. And frequently, smaller recognized sally valid definition of a nation. Faced with this task,

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 Chapter 22  The place of the nation-state    445

Case study 22.2

Zomia: highland resistance to nation- connected but often antagonistic co-evolution of hill
building and state-making and valley across much of Zomia. He argues that
‘Zomia coheres as a region not by political unity, which
The map refers to a vast mountainous region of approxi- it utterly lacks, but by comparable patterns of diverse
mately 2.5 million square kilometres, spanning the agriculture, dispersal, mobility and egalitarianism’ (Scott
boundaries of ten recognized nation-states, and sprawl- 2008: 12). Scott (2009) reveals that, over long periods
ing across the designated ‘world regional area’ limits of of time, many groups of people viewed the uplands as
‘South Asia’, ‘Central Asia’, ‘East Asia’ and mainland economic, cultural and political ‘refuges’ from interfering
‘South-east Asia’ (Figure 22.2). This transnational high- and hierarchical lowland state authorities. Thus, histori-
land zone is called ‘Zomia’ (based on a Tibeto-Burman cally, many people migrated to these areas in order
term ‘zomi’), a term invented and proposed by historian to escape, evade or resist state interference. These
Willem van Schendel (2005: 284–5), who argues that spaces of state ‘evasion’, ‘resistance’ and ‘refuge’ were
‘much of Zomia resisted the projects of nation-building ultimately partitioned into various national geo-bodies
and state-making of the countries to which it belonged’. following the nineteenth and early twentieth century
Part of the reason for this are the great many dispersed rivalries and boundary-making activities of imperial
‘national minority’ groupings, such as Naga, Akha, Lahu, powers, and the adoption of modern political geogra-
Hmong, Lisu, Shan and Kachin, as well as numerous phy by dominant indigenous polities, and subsequent
other groups, each with their own peculiar socio-ecolog- post-colonial nationalist elites (Winichakul 1996).
ical adaptations to highland life, and cultural, linguistic The arbitrary and abrupt nature of geopolitical
and religious affinities that are distinct from dominant boundaries generated tensions between central states
‘national’ languages and religions. Similar communities and the upland groups, who have frequently been
(the four towns indicated on the map) – just a short dis- regarded as suspicious, backward, primitive and unco-
tance apart – fall into four states and macro-regions. operative ‘minorities’, and, occasionally, as security
James C. Scott (2009) has produced an ‘anar- threats by lowland state authorities (van Schendel
chist history of upland Southeast Asia’, revealing the 2005; Michaud 2009; Scott 2009). In the modern

CENTRAL ASIA

EAST ASIA
1
4 2
3

SOUTH ASIA
Sea
ina
Ch

h
ut
So

SOUTHEAST ASIA
Ind
ia n
Ocea
n
‘Zomia’
1 Zayü
Figure 22.2  A map of 2 Gohaling
Zomia. 3 Sakongdan
0 1000
Source: adapted from van 4 Dong km
Schendal (2005b)
➜

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 446    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

➜ history of these nation-states, Zomia has been char- ‘Zomia’ is part of a new conceptual map proposed
acterized by ‘a high incidence of regionalist and sepa- by scholars to address relative academic neglect in
ratist movements, “non-state spaces”, and discursive ‘area imagination’, which helps us to break free of our
battles around concepts such as “tribe” and “indigenous rigid national geographic imaginaries, particularly with
people”’ (van Schendel 2005: 285). Central territorial regard to the histories, ethnographies and geographies
states have sought to extend administrative control of mobile groups (Ludden 2003), the politics of place
into the uplands of Zomia through various ‘develop- and belonging of so-called ‘minorities’ (Michaud 2010),
ment projects’, forced resettlement of highland groups, and the complex interrelated, transitional and transient
campaigns aimed to extend settled farming into higher dimensions of borderscapes (Rajaram and Grundy-
lands, religious conversions, spatial extensions of Warr 2007). We need to be critical of reifying ‘national
central bureaucratic administration and infrastructure geo-bodies’ and pay attention to myriad pre-existing
such as roads, making these ‘spaces of evasion’ more and contemporary transnational social and political for-
accessible over time. mations that challenge the map of nation-states.

students will often work through a long list of character- is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.
istics ascribed to nationality. But it seems that exceptions Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible,
can always be found. Language is a favoured criterion, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of
but then many languages are spoken by more than one people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such
‘nation’ (English is an example) and some ‘nation-states’ limited imaginings.
(Switzerland, Belgium or Mozambique, for example)
Within all this is a profound territorial link between
contain substantial communities speaking different lan-
the nation and the state. The state claims to be a sov-
guages. Religion is sometimes chosen, but the same objec-
ereign expression of the nation – bound to it and to a
tions apply. Ethnicity and ‘race’ turn out to be problematic
particular place. That is, it has territorial limits. The
criteria, favoured by racists of all stripes, and often part
nation-state has a geography, which is charted, demar-
of the basis for national identities, but susceptible to the
cated, mapped and represented to the ‘national popula-
obvious and undeniable point that everywhere is much too
tion’ in their school atlases and geography lessons. Such a
mixed up historically and genetically for such categoriza-
system of ‘national’ geographical representation is always
tions to be watertight. Besides, some nationalisms have
combined with an historical vision, a grand narrative
come to celebrate their multiracial and multicultural com-
of ‘national history’, often assuming that the nation is
position, as in the ‘melting pot’ United States or the ‘rain-
ancient, even primeval.
bow nation’ of South Africa. ‘Culture’ usually crops up as
Yet Anderson and other critical accounts of national-
a criterion. Yet (as Chapter 13 has indicated), cultures are
ism stress that it is very much a modern ideology. For what
always (though of course to varying degrees) heterogene-
makes mass nationalism possible are certain socio-eco-
ous and contested. Think, for example, of age, gender,
nomic and technical transformations, notably the arrival
class and other variations and the coexistence of multi-
of media and national educational systems. Schooling,
ple sub-cultures and identities (which, as Chapter 21 has
newspapers, and later radio and television all help to
shown, are often related to distinctive ‘local’ territoriali-
promote and popularize the idea that people belong to
ties) that characterize every supposedly ‘national society’.
and share in the nation. Whilst others have emphasized
All this leads Anderson to declare that nations are in
the longer historical roots of many nationalisms in pre-
a sense ‘imagined communities’. This imaginary status
modern ethnic affiliations (for example, Smith 1988),
is not to deny that they are not in a sense real to those
for Anderson and most other critical observers, what is
who feel they belong to them. Indeed, Anderson (1983:
striking is nationalism’s relative modernity. Even where
6–7) feels that:
nationalists imagine the nation as ancient, such an imagi-
In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages nation is itself more often than not predominantly a nine-
of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even those) are teenth- and twentieth-century phenomenon. At a pinch,
imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not nationalism might be traced to the seventeenth century.
by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which But the ideology of the nation-state was not anywhere
they are imagined . . . Finally, it is imagined as com- very evident before then. So whilst someone might talk
munity, because regardless of the actual inequality about a thousand years (or more) of, for example, Eng-
and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation lish or British, Korean or Indian national history, they

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 Chapter 22  The place of the nation-state    447

century, which, considering the repeated political and

cultural realignments within the space we now label
‘Thailand’, seems only a little more bizarre than its
neighbour on the shelf, a history of the Soviet Union
from palaeolithic times to World War II.
There has been a strong tendency to see nations and
nationalisms as essentially being derived from American
and European prototypes. It is important to challenge
the idea that nationhood is a nationalist project originat-
ing in the West that was simply implanted onto the rest
of the world without significant transformations in the
various cultural, ethnic and religious contexts it touched.
Plate 22.2  ‘Nation’ imagined as race. African, Middle Eastern or Asian variants of nationalism
(Everett Historical/Shutterstock) or constructions of statehood are far more than simply
colourful (or failed) replicas of the European–American
conveniently forget that English or British, Korean and model(s). To be sure, imported idioms and motifs from
Indian nationalisms are relatively modern concepts, much Europe and America have been important; for example,
less than a thousand years old. the official state language in a fair number of former
The tendency for nationalists is to ‘reinvent the past’, to colonies is that of the old colonial power. And European
pick out selective moments from the past, or to manipulate (and less often United States) imperialism has provided
history (Hobsbawm 1996), whether this is in banal ways an important backdrop to the trajectory of nationalisms
through the national curriculum of schools or through in Africa and Asia, not least because the anti-colonial
deliberate propaganda to mobilize the masses. Whilst his- nationalists themselves were often educated in Western
tory is undoubtedly significant, the nationalist brew would institutions and adopted concepts such as self-determi-
be incomplete without ancestral connections to ‘home- nation, national liberation and territorial sovereignty
land’ and to particular places. In other words, territory in their political struggles against the colonial powers.
is central to nationalism, and this is often why whenever Yet whilst ‘globalizing’ capitalism and especially impe-
there are divergent nationalist claims to one piece of land, rialism are part of the picture, African, Middle Eastern
extreme violence often follows. Indeed, the terrible forms and Asian nationalisms are also (like those of Europe
of so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’ witnessed in the former and the Americas) rooted in local historical trajectories.
Yugoslavia in the 1990s are illustrations of recent nation- In many cases these are of much longer vintage, often
alist extremism and the significance of historical imagina- based on sophisticated cultural, religious and ethnic tap-
tions concerning territorial-political and cultural identity. estries, some of the main patterns of which have subse-
Nationalist narratives and claims are not always linked quently been appropriated or (re)invented as pre-colonial
to such violent actions. At times they may be rather more ‘national’ histories.
rhetorical or theatrical. Graham E. Clarke (1996: 231–2) Thus, we should perhaps think in terms of multiple
raises a particular Nepalese example: histories and geographies of nations and states, and
not just of particular European or American modular
[I]n the 1960s in Kathmandu the sole national newspa-
forms. The influential Bengali intellectual Partha Chat-
per carried articles, no doubt read tongue in cheek by
terjee (1993) has persuasively argued against the imagin-
some educated Nepalese, arguing that since Lumbini,
ing of Indian national identity through the lens of the
the birthplace of the historical Buddha (Gautama),
colonial power and stresses the ‘essential’ inner or spir-
was located some few five miles north of the current
itual domains of culture that were never colonized, never
southern border, that Buddha was therefore Nepalese
European. Furthermore, there are different coexisting
and not Indian.
national voices or ‘fragments’ – among women, peasants,
All of this relates to the important issue of how we elite, castes, outcasts, and so on – each with its separate
deal with things like space and identity in history. As discourse. As Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv (1996:
Morris-Suzuki (1996: 42) writes: 32) put it:
The nation . . . casts a long shadow backwards on our When the national idea entered Asia it could not be
vision of the past, and channels our perceptions into a implemented without mediation, hence transforma-
particular spatial framework. In my bookcase, I have tion, by indigenous agencies in particular settings.
a volume on the history of Thailand since the tenth There were existing and alternative ideas with which

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 448    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

European-style nationalism interacted and inter- inferior to men, or as requiring the protection of natu-
mixed  .  .  .  the nationalist ideas were invested with rally more powerful men, frequently provided the prior
local qualities, meanings and nuances which could backdrop to depicting hierarchies (between dominating
not be found in Europe. People had their own views and dominated classes, for example) within the nation as
on what constituted a legitimate social order, and such natural, like those of a family. A similar conception pro-
views could not be ignored by the modernizing leaders vided part of the racist justification for overseas colonies.
of the anti-colonial struggles. Peoples subject to colonial domination were often repre-
sented in such racist terms as being equivalent to ‘families’
As well as different cultural ‘forms of the nation’,
of black ‘children’ ruled by a ‘benevolent’ white father.
we may also consider different gendered perspectives of
nationalism and nation-states. Although Chatterjee’s
(1993) arguments are quite specific to the South Asian
case, they do reveal the coexistence of different voices,
men and women, and this relates to the point about
22.3 Constructing boundaries:
nationalism and constructions of nation-statehood upwards and outwards
invoking different conceptions of ‘manhood’ and ‘wom-
anhood’ more widely. Although there are immense histor- States come in diverse shapes and sizes. But they all have
ical and geographical variations of this, there is a general boundaries (which, if they have a coastline, also extend
tendency for women to be seen as particularly important into the sea and are governed by international protocols:
transmitters of ‘national culture’ (for example, in the idea see Stienberg 2001). The extract from Winichakul (1996)
of a ‘mother-tongue’ language) (Yuval-Davis 1997) and quoted at the start of this chapter noted how the ‘ter-
as somehow the embodiment of the nation. McClintock ritoriality’ of the modern nation-state is of a bounded
(1994: 352) thus notes that: space: ‘a certain portion of the earth’s surface which
can be easily identified’. Pre-modern dynastic realms
Nations are contested systems of cultural represen-
and empires could make do with loose boundaries. But
tation that limit and legitimize people’s access to
modern nation-states have felt it necessary to demarcate
the resources of the nation-state, but despite many
their boundaries, to iron out perceived irrationalities and
nationalists’ ideological investment in the idea of
anomalies, sometimes by going to war. In short, they have
popular unity, nations have historically amounted
sought to nationalize and unify ‘their’ space and ‘their’
to the sanctioned institutionalization of gender dif-
(national) populations and render them into known, sur-
ference. No nation in the world grants women and
veyed and defensible sovereign territory and communi-
men the same access to the rights and resources of
ties. They also seek to order and frame ‘nature’. In The
the nation-state.
Nature of the State, Whitehead et al. (2007) examine why
Moreover, particular ideas of the ‘family’ are central a two-dimensional view of states is problematic, through
to most imagined communities: foregrounding state-nature relations. A number of key
issues emerge from ‘excavating the political ecologies
Nations are frequently figured through the iconogra-
of the modern state’ (the subtitle to their book). They
phy of familial and domestic space. The term nation
cite the way that the Netherlands emerged as a nation-
derives from [the Latin] natio: to be born. We speak of
state through a dual process of building a global empire
nations as ‘motherlands’ and ‘fatherlands’. Foreigners
(extending to the Americas and South-east Asia) and
‘adopt’ countries that are not their native homes and
reclaiming land from the sea as an example of how the
are naturalized into the national ‘family’. We talk of
regulation of nature is folded into a nation-state project.
the ‘Family of Nations’, of ‘homelands’ and ‘native’
But similar examples can be found elsewhere in both
lands. In Britain, immigration matters are dealt with
pre-modern and contemporary states. Elden (2013: 49)
at the Home Office; in the United States, the president
likewise points to the significance of ‘the political tech-
and his wife are called the First Family. Winnie Man-
nology of territory’ with its associated ‘biometrics and
dela was, until her recent fall from grace, honoured
geo-metrics’ used to ‘secure the volume’ in terms of both
as South Africa’s ‘Mother of the Nation’. In this way,
state security as well as environmental resource exploita-
despite their myriad differences, nations are symboli-
tion. In other words, state territory extends upwards into
cally figured as domestic genealogies.
airspace and downwards into geological resources. For
In several European nationalisms (including ‘British’) example, Biggs (2010) examines how successive states in
one significance of this is that the sexist notion of women Vietnam (pre-colonial, French colonial, national, regional
(usually grouped with children) supposedly as naturally and superpowers, such as the US during the Vietnam

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 Chapter 22  The place of the nation-state    449

War) have tried to extend their territorial, political and many wars, homicides and excesses, as a conse-
economic power over the ‘fluid, volatile environment’ of quence of which the lands of both [kingdoms] have
the Mekong delta. What he reveals is that nation-nature been looted, burnt and ruined, weighing heavily on
are constantly in some sort of flux, and that with every God . . . [and] because of our sins, risking the danger
effort to contain, harness and transform nature, there of losing them and them falling into the hands of our
are many ways in which the ‘serpentine force’ of the enemies in the faith and most gravely [causing] the
Cuu Long (Nine Dragons, the Vietnamese name for the violation of God’s will and injury to the holy church
Delta) is never entirely under full state control. Sea-level of Rome and Christendom.
change, salt water intrusion, flooding, and siltation are all
(Cited in Martíñez 1997: 15; our translation)
processes of change that require actions that make state-
nature relations central to the logic of the nation-states, Moreover, the actual demarcation of the Portuguese–
but also exceed their capacity and power. Spanish borderline had to wait until the nineteenth and
The rise of geopolitics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two formal delimitation treaties set
twentieth centuries represented a particular expression out an agreed frontier and established mechanisms for
of these state-territorial rationalities (as Chapter 20 its physical demarcation on the ground. But gone are
explored), with lots of ideas about nature folded into ‘amens’ and references to ‘the will of God’. Instead, the
the arguments, but state rationalities have wider forms treaties (the first of 1864 for the northern half of the bor-
and deeper roots. The nineteenth-century invention and der and the second of 1926 for the southern half of the
refinement of statistics (state-istics = the science of the border) make reference to the need to impose order and
state) and demography (demos = people, graphy = writ- well-defined demarcations, to ‘eliminate the anomalous
ing) and the establishment of geography (geo = earth, situation in which, in the shadow of ancient feudal tradi-
graphy = writing) as a university discipline and field of tions’ (Tratado de Limites 1866: 1; our translation), some
research are all part of this regime of knowledge and frontier areas (including a number of villages) were rec-
power where people are surveyed and made into subjects ognized as shared or common lands with usage rights by
of nation-states. For states with land boundaries the communities of both states/‘nationalities’. Following the
occupation and official demarcation of the frontiers is treaties, such areas were divided and the border, where
an important part of this process. not demarcated by a river, was marked on the ground by
Consider the example of the border that is often recog- rectangular boundary stones every few hundred metres
nized as the oldest, more or less stable, still-existing bor- (although it took a couple of decades to put in place all
der in the world, that between Spain and Portugal. The the boundary markers and resolve local conflicts and dif-
mutual recognition of the border between Spain and Por- ferences over the ‘fine-scale’ division of lands). In other
tugal is usually traced in modern Spanish and (particu- words, the Portuguese-Spanish case indicates how the
larly) Portuguese history to the Treaty of Alcañices signed epoch of modern nationalism (i.e. the nineteenth and
on 12 September 1297 (in fact, the date on the Treaty is 12 twentieth centuries) saw what James Anderson (1995:
September 1335, but amongst other things, our conven- 71) called:
tions for counting years have altered since). The Treaty
has acquired something of the status of a foundational a territorialisation of politics, with a sharpening of
text. In other words, it is interpreted as a kind of proof differences at the borders of states and of nations
of the ancient historical basis of the nations concerned. between ‘internal’ and ‘external’, ‘belonging’ and ‘not
Yet the treaty was not signed in the name of states or belonging’, ‘us’ and ‘them’.
‘nations’. Named after the Templar castle in which it was
By the same logic, or an extreme extension of it,
sealed and witnessed, the text of the treaty of Alcañices
minorities who do not ‘fit in’ sometimes have to be moved,
begins with the words ‘In the name of God. amen.’ and
murdered or deported – or, in the euphemisms of our
is signed in the presence of the Templars and other holy
times, ‘cleansed’ (see Sibley 1995). This has been associ-
orders by those who describe themselves as:
ated with, for example, Nazi racial territorial visions of
by the grace of God the King of Portugal and the a Europe cleansed of Jews and Gypsies and an expanded
Algarve and by the grace of God the King of Castille racially pure Germany. The Nazi Holocaust represents an
and Leon, extreme case. But ‘cleansing’ or ‘purification’ of national
space, amounting to the expulsion or murder of people
and has as its subject:
defined as ‘foreign’ or ‘alien’, has been widespread in
towns, castles and lands, town boundaries, divisions the twentieth century. There are examples from all con-
and orderings . . . [disputes over which] have caused tinents: the creation of modern Turkey whose Armenian

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 450    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

population were slaughtered in the second decade of the

twentieth century (and which still has not resolved the
status of its Kurdish minority); the creation of Israel in
the 1940s, which was accompanied by the flight of indig-
enous Palestinian Arabs from territories deemed part of
the new Jewish national state; the system of reservations
for native Americans in the USA and Canada; the vio-
lent exchange of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh populations
which accompanied the 1947 partition of India; the 1974
partition of Cyprus; the wars of the 1990s in the for-
mer Yugoslavia (see Case study 21.2); and the partition
of Ireland. These logics have also produced calls for the
modification of boundaries, sometimes resulting in vio-
lence and war. No continent has been without examples
of such conflict and violence and it is probably impossible
to find a state which has not at some time expelled people
or murdered them in the name of some nation or other.
Yet each nationalism must also be unique, establishing
itself as different from others (even if the apparatuses of
flags and anthems are superficially similar), constructing
a sense of self against others who are defined as outside
the imagined community. We will return to borders and
borderlands in Section 22.5.

22.4  ation-states as symbolic

N
systems
Plate 22.3  Representing the limits of the ‘nation-
state’: boundary patrols.
As we have seen, the state is the bureaucratic expression
(David R. Frazier Photolibrary, Inc./Alamy)
of nationalism. This is not to say that a widespread sense
of nationalism inevitably precedes the state. Indeed, what
is often termed the state apparatus (everything from regu-
lations governing schools, to tax inspectors and politi- bureaucratic actions are its most commonplace ritu-
cians) seeks to foster national subjectivities out of the als. There are other such everyday rituals: Hegel saw
frequently ambivalent and disparate array of identities the reading of the morning newspaper as the secular
contained by its boundaries. If, as has been argued by replacement of prayer.
many, nationalism is akin to religion, then the state
There are indeed many public rituals of nationality
becomes its symbolic structure. When examining the
and statehood: coronations and remembrance days, mili-
superficially quite different cases of Australia and Sri
tary parades, national holidays, national prowess (or the
Lanka, Bruce Kapferer (1988) claims that nationalism is
lack of it) at football or the Olympics, swearing in of gov-
itself a religion, owing to the fact that, as with most reli-
ernments, state funerals. (Football in the United Kingdom
gious-like beliefs, nationalism demands the recognition
is also revealing of the complexity of British nationalisms,
(his word is ‘reification’, which means something more
and the existence of separate Scottish, English, Welsh and
than this) of an all-encompassing entity (the nation). The
Northern Irish squads is a testimony to the limits to ‘Brit-
nation fulfils the role of a sacred cause, something greater
ishness’ and the endurance or ‘revival’ of other national
than any individual and something which may be worth
affiliations.) In all these rituals, the nation is reaffirmed
dying for. The nation is the God or deity of the religion
and the state performed and made to seem omnipresent,
of nationalism and the state is its theology or temple.
historical and real. Dramatic cultural or political events
Moreover, as Herzfeld (1992: 37) notes:
(as well as notable national sporting occasions, such as
Every bureaucratic action affirms the theology of the soccer World Cup or Olympic successes) covered by the
state. Just as nationalism can be viewed as religion, media reinforce senses of national community. The events

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 Chapter 22  The place of the nation-state    451

of 11 September 2001 were thus narrated in the United competing authority structures take over. For instance,
States as an ‘attack on America’. It is also said, for exam- Helander wrote about the complex power situations in
ple, that virtually every adult American alive at the time Somalia affecting every single aspect of daily life, where
can recall where they were on hearing the news of the ‘any opinion expressed or action performed must always
assassination of US President John F. Kennedy in 1963. be positioned in the political landscape’ of rival clans,
Whilst his funeral, like that of Diana Spencer in 1997, warlords, and issues of ethnic, religious and cultural iden-
became a global media spectacle, it was represented and tity. In the contexts of atomistic and antagonistic power
felt most acutely as a kind of national loss. struggles we need to appreciate the local power configu-
But the nation-state also demands (like all effective rations that enable communities to continue with every-
religions) personal commitment and more minor ritual- day life in the absence of a meaningful state apparatus.
istic acts, many of which rest on a geographical imagi- Helander was critical of international organizations that
nation of inside and outside, belonging and otherness tend to act too rashly in countries such as Somalia, often
(see Taussig 1997). The anthropologist Michael Herzfeld distributing massive sums of inappropriate aid according
(1992: 109) examines this theme and is worth quoting at to the ‘shifting agendas of foreign donors’ and frequently
some length: without great familiarity with the nuances of the ‘local’
human, cultural and political landscape. Such perspec-
Nationalist ideologies are systems of classification.
tives would clearly be even more applicable in situations
Most of them are very clear about what it takes to
of failed international interventions creating uncertain
be an insider. That, at least, is the theory. In practice,
and extremely dangerous regime changes, unpopular
however, divergent interpretations give the lie to such
occupations, and an almost complete absence of any
essentialist claims, as to take one prominent and cur-
form of security for large segments of the population.
rent example, in the debate currently waging in Israel
This happened in parts of Iraq after the US-led invasion
about the definition of a Jew. Such taxonomic [nam-
to depose the government of Saddam Hussein in 2003
ing] exercises . . . are central to the very existence of
and in Libya following uprising against Kaddafi and
the nation-state. All other bureaucratic classifications
Western-led intervention to enable his overthrow in 2011.
are ultimately calibrated to the state’s ability to dis-
Arguably this was also the situation in Afghanistan in the
tinguish between insiders and outsiders. Thus . . . one
1980s, after the Soviet Union invaded to prop up a com-
can see in bureaucratic encounters a ritualistic enact-
munist government in the capital city who faced rebellion
ment of the fundamental principles upon which the
in the more conservative countryside. Afghanistan then
very apparatus of state rests. Seen in these terms,
became a focus of Cold War geopolitical conflict (as was
arguments about the number on a lost driver’s license
detailed in Chapter 20), laying the basis for many more
or an applicant’s entitlement to social security do not
years of confrontation, subsequent interventions (by the
simply challenge or reinforce the power of particular
United States and its allies) and enduring state failure. In
functionaries of state. They rehearse the logic of the
such situations, we may actually have to ask, ‘What kind
state itself.
of State? Where and who are the authorities?’
Not only that, but the whole exercise of state power
gets taken for granted as the natural order of things. Only
when many of those activities which are ascribed to the
state are no longer carried out (in situations of war, for
example) or when a person finds themselves on the wrong
side of a state-sanctioned category (the wrong side of
the boundary, the wrong side of the law) is the power
(a power over life and death and thousands of lesser
things) and the universality of the symbolic order of ‘the
state’ revealed. The state claims the monopoly over these
things. And for others to exercise judgment and to punish
or to kill is ‘to take the law into their own hands’. These
things are reserved for the territorial state. But what if
there is no state? Or as cultural anthropologist Bernhard
Helander (2005: 193) asks: ‘Who needs a State?’ There
are parts of the world where any semblance of effective Plate 22.4  Suvarnabhumi airport, Thailand –
state sovereignty has become so scattered, fragmented passport control signage.
or ineffective in practice that other forms of rule and (TCJ2020/Shutterstock)

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 452    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

22.5  overeigntyscapes:
S
­‘shadows’, ‘­ borderlands’
and ‘transnationalisms’
We have seen that the geographies of ‘nations’ and states
do not always coincide (consider again the Kurdish case,
described in Case study 22.1), and that national territo-
rial histories are insufficient to account for ethno-histories,
transnational identities and human mobilities (as illustrated
in Case study 22.2). Thus sovereignty is rarely without
contradictions or challenges from other states, potential
states and nations. But how else might we think about the Plate 22.5  War-making and with it a sense of shared
challenges to sovereignty and the historical and geographi- struggle can be productive of national identity.
cal complexity of nations? One way might be to think of (Vacclav/fotolia)
political landscapes as ‘soveriegntyscapes’ (Sidaway 2003;
Sidaway et al. 2005) containing varieties of countervailing
but revived subsequently in new forms. We should try
tendencies, fragmented state sovereignty, ambiguous forms
to avoid overly dualistic perspectives of ‘trans-border’ or
of sovereign control, and situations (such as Somalia, as
‘transnational’ flows, such as ‘domestic/foreign’, ‘internal/
noted above) where state authority may have collapsed
external’, ‘legal/illegal’, because by doing so, we would
or been replaced by various contending de facto forms
be perceiving flows entirely from rigid state-centred
of authority. Even when we consider the state as strong
and fixed territorial positions. Even if we just consider
and central, we may view sovereignty as being ‘graduated’,
state practices such as the enormous efforts of the US
whereby, as Aiwha Ong (1999: 217) observed, ‘states make
federal authorities in trying to keep ‘illegal aliens’ ‘out’
different subject populations, privileging one gender over
(Plate 22.3), there are many more countervailing actions
the other, and in certain kinds of human skills, talents and
at official, quasi-official, unofficial levels, trying to make
ethnicities; it thus subjects different sectors of the popula-
sure that as many people ‘get in’ because of their enor-
tion to different regimes of valuation and control.’
mous contributions to economic sectors (Andreas 2000).
A variation on the theme of ‘shadow networks’ is to
Why is such work of relevance to ideas about ‘nation’
consider myriad cross-border connections between peo-
and the ‘nation-state’? It is precisely the very everydayness
ple that somehow circumvent or subvert state-centred
of many cross-border interactions, movements and con-
rules and regulations. In some contexts, such as the Euro-
nections that raises big questions about the impression of
pean Union, cross-border links are actively fostered and
solidity of spatially fixed notions of nationhood. Despite
promoted (along with a common market and internal
attempts to police them (indirectly resulting in the death
freedom of capital and personal mobility) with the aim
of thousands of migrants in the recent decade as they
of fostering a supranational (beyond nation) community
seek to cross those fortified land-frontiers or are smuggled
(Kramsch and Hooper 2004). In other cases (such as the
across dangerous maritime ones), the southern border of
USA–Mexican border) or places where there is large scale
the United States and the maritime and land frontiers of
‘illegal’ movement of people and goods, state power is
many southern and eastern member states of the Euro-
defied or subverted. In this regard, Abraham and van
pean Union exhibit similar porosity. Migrations have
Schendel (2005) draw upon a critical distinction between
also produced significant transnational social networks,
what states define as ‘legal/illegal’ and what ordinary
for example amongst Hispanics in the United States or
people perceive as ‘licit/illicit’. Thus many transnational
Maghrebis in Europe or British and other Europeans in
movements of people, commodities and ideas are illegal
the settler-colonies of Australia and New Zealand.
because they defy the norms and rules of formal politi-
cal authority, but they are quite acceptable, ‘licit’, in the
eyes of the participants in these transactions and flows.
Here the authors were not so concerned with the flows
22.6  onclusions: the place of the
C
associated with big syndicates, but with the many ‘micro- nation-state?
processes’ and transactions that form ‘everyday transna-
tionality’ in borderland spaces (van Schendel 2005: 55). There have never been so many states as there are today.
Such transactions may involve kinship and family net- In the nineteenth century a wave of new states (coun-
works that were partitioned by superimposed boundaries, tries such as Argentina, Mexico, Bolivia) emerged in

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 Chapter 22  The place of the nation-state    453

the Americas in revolt against Spanish and Portuguese particular has shown itself to be able to coexist with
empires. These American prototypes and the USA itself states and nations and in symbiotic relationship with
(which dates from 1776) provided an example to nation- them. In other words, they reinforce each other. Moreo-
alists elsewhere in the colonial world. But it was not ver, ‘globalization’ is not only massively uneven (as we
until the twentieth century that most of Africa and Asia have seen in earlier chapters) but as likely to produce local
could escape direct colonial domination. This frequently backlashes as a universal culture of, say, the same fast
required violent ‘national-liberation’ struggles against food, drinks and soap operas and political orientations
entrenched resistance from the colonial powers and everywhere in the world. That is, the technologies of capi-
white settler populations and in due course, the United talism (particularly media) provide the preconditions for
Nations became a key arbiter of such post-colonial pro- strengthening, rather than undermining, imagined com-
jects. In the decades between about 1945 and 1975, doz- munities of nationalism, while states still act to fine-tune
ens of new ‘sovereign’ states emerged in place of the old the regulatory frameworks for continued capital accu-
colonial map. The end of the Cold War saw a fresh crop, mulation (resorting where needed to force to suppress
as the Soviet Union was succeed by 15 recognized sov- opposition). States still enact laws about business, trade
ereign states (and more that went unrecognized or are unions, property rights and so on. Everywhere, buying a
contested, such as Transnistria, along Moldova’s border property or land or setting up a legal business requires
with Ukraine) and there have been several secessions some kind of registration with the state. No amount of
since, yielding some universally recognized new states globalization has ended this. However, instead of further
(such as Eritrea and South Sudan or most of those that entering the large and complex debates about the impacts
succeed Yugoslavia) as well as others that are not univer- of ‘globalization’ on nations and states, let us return to
sally recognized, such as Kosovo and some that operate as the conception of the state as a symbolic system, and as
de facto states without any formal international recogni- a complex of representations. The historian-philosopher
tion (such as Somaliland). and activist Michael Foucault (1979: 29) (see too Spot-
Yet, for many years the demise or decline of the state light box 24.2) argued in one of his most famous essays
has been discerned or predicted, and such claims have of that:
late become even more common in discourses about ‘glo-
We all know the fascination which the love, or hor-
balization’. These usually argue that the growing scale
ror, of the state exercises today; we know how much
and power of transnational flows, particularly of capi-
attention is paid to the genesis of the state, its his-
tal (but also of people, ideas and religious affiliations,
tory, its advance, its power and abuses, etc. . . . But the
technologies and so on) is subverting the capacity of the
state, no more probably today than at any other time
state and weakening national identities. The nation-state
in its history, does not have this unity, this individual-
is often described as being ‘hollowed-out’ or ‘eroded’. In
ity, this rigorous functionality, nor, to speak frankly,
this view, the state no longer has the power to command,
this importance; maybe after all the state is no more
for example, the society and economy inside its bounda-
than a composite reality and a mythicised abstraction,
ries that was once attributed to it. And such a ‘hollowing
whose importance is a lot more limited than many of
out’ is sometimes seen to point the way to a post-national
us think.
world (or some kind of shared global culture in which
national cultures are replaced by a more hybrid, but com- Hence, to recognize the state as, in part at least, a
mon global mixture). symbolic system is also to recognize that, as Rose and
Yuval-Davis (1997, reprinted in Brenner et al. Miller (1992: 172) argue: ‘“the state” itself emerges as an
2003: 322) pointed to the lack of congruence between historically variable linguistic device for conceptualizing
nations and states, arguing that there is often a lack and articulating ways of ruling’. In other words, things
of ‘overlap between the boundaries of state citizens like the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’ are made real mainly in
and “the nation”’, which requires us to have a much certain words, texts (including maps) and deeds, that is,
more ‘multi-layered’ notion of people’s citizenship in language and action. The nation-state is an histori-
needs, ‘because people’s membership in communities cally specific way of governance that links land, nation,
and polities is dynamic and multiple’. And, as we have population and polity. Think again of the staging of
seen, in recent years, the sovereignty of many states has those national sporting, political and cultural occasions,
also been questioned through imperial ‘interventions’ which bring the nation home, and the more mundane or
in the name of humanitarian intervention or the ‘war bureaucratic acts of state, such as the display of maps in
on terror’. schools and public buildings or the action of showing a
Others object that transnational forces of ‘globali- passport or filling in a form with your national (insur-
zation’ are really nothing new and that capitalism in ance, social security, registration or identity) number.

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 454    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

present in everyday life’. According to Painter (2006: 753)

therefore:
Behind each of these registration numbers, licenses
and certificates are yet more documents and records
held in state archives tracking employment, earn-
ings, criminal convictions, academic performance,
visits to doctors and hospitals, ownership of vehi-
cles and landed property and numerous other fea-
tures of individuals’ ‘private’ lives. If weighed down
by anxieties about the scope of the state’s knowl-
edge of us, we repair to the local pub for a drink,
we will find that the state decides when and where
the pub can open, the possible sizes of our serving
of beer, how much of its price goes in tax . . . how
our drinks are labeled . . . hygiene required in the
pub kitchen and the minimum wages paid to the
staff.
He might have added that in many places states
(including the USA during the 1920s’ ‘prohibition’ era)
have outlawed the sale or production of alcohol alto-
gether and that all states seek (with varying degrees
of coercion and persuasion and success) to regulate
or proscribe the consumption of other intoxicants. In
this, as in other aspects of their regulatory, ideological
and coercive power, perhaps nation-states exist above
all as systems of actions and beliefs – an ‘imagination’
Plate 22.6  Identifying citizenship. if you like – which must be continually re-enacted, re-
narrated and re-imagined as territorial sovereign spaces
in order to seem important and real to us. Just as they
The political geographer Joe Painter (2006: 753) called have been here. And as they will be should you go to
this ‘prosaic stateness’, ‘the mundane practices through a pub, or perhaps even to a café, classroom or canteen
which something which we label “the state” becomes instead.

Learning outcomes ● Such national imaginaries contain a geography, a

Having read this chapter, you should understand that: mental map of national space and its boundaries.
● Nation-states embody particular ways of governing
● Nations, nationalism and states are complex histori-
population, nature, territory and economy: these
cally and geographically variable phenomena.
modes of governance are variable in space and
● Nationalism is an ideology (a system of beliefs) time (the role of the state has and continues to
which holds that people have a primary identity to a change) – and new modes and scales (such as the
particular nation and that such communities should supranational project of the European Union) of
be able to express themselves in a geographically governance have emerged.
defined state.
● National imaginaries are also gendered, for exam-
● Nations can be understood as a kind of imagined ple in the idea of mothers as key transmitters of
community. They are imagined because not all ‘national culture’ to the next generation.
members of a national community can know each
● States can be understood as complex symbolic
other.
systems.

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 Chapter 22  The place of the nation-state    455

For an argument about (and case-study exemplifying) how

Further reading state borders can productively be studied, see:
Megoran, N. (2006) For ethnography in political geography:
Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the experiencing and re-imagining Ferghana Valley boundary
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London. A revised closures, Political Geography, 26(10), 622–40.
(third) edition (2006) is available. Readable and rewarding. It For two engrossing studies of border-making in South-east
is worth comparing Anderson (who stresses the modernity of Asia, see:
nations and nationalism) with another theorist who argues that
Baird, I.G. (2010) Different views of history: shades of
many nations do have much deeper historical roots:
irredentism along the Laos-Cambodia border, Journal of
Smith, A. (1988) The Ethnic Origin of Nations, Blackwell, Southeast Asian Studies, 41(2), 187–213.
Oxford.
Harris, I. (2010) Rethinking Cambodian political discourse on
For a rejoinder to Anderson that stresses the roles of colonial territory: genealogy of the Buddhist ritual boundary (sīmā),
history and the United Nations in crafting nation-states, see: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 41(2), 215–39.
Kelly, J. D. and Kaplan, M. (2001) Represented Communities: The second one of these is particularly suggestive on how
Fiji and World Decolonization, University of Chicago Press, deep-seated cultural and political practices interact with
Chicago, IL. modern assumptions of sovereignty to produce a situa-
Nairn, T. (2003) [original 1977 reprinted 1981] The Break-up tion where: ‘From Independence onwards the status of the
of Britain, Common Ground Publishing, Altona and Big national border has grown into a grand obsession and Cam-
Thinking Edinburgh (2003 edition). The earlier editions can bodia’s political elites have, usually as a means of whipping
usually be found in libraries and a section of the 2003 one up nationalist sentiment and the fear of being swallowed
is also online. A classic study of the twists and turns of the up, chanted the same basic mantra to the effect that the
British state and its English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish allies border is continually being violated by neighbouring states’
and opponents. It is worth reading in tandem with Gilroy, P. (pp. 216–17).
(2002) [originally 1987] There Ain’t no Black in the Union For more general reviews of scholarship on borders:
Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation, Routledge,
Diener, A. C. and Hagen, J. (2009) Theorizing borders in
London (2002 edition).
a ‘borderless world’: globalization, territory and identity,
Taylor, P.J. and Flint, C. (2007) Political Geography: World- Geography Compass, 3(3), 1196–216. See too their (2012)
Economy, Nation State and Locality, Prentice Hall, Harlow. Borders: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press).
Now in its fifth edition, this text may be consulted for further For a guide to further literature, see: Sidaway, J.D. (2015)
ideas on most political geography topics, including a treat- Mapping border studies, Geopolitics, 20(1), 214–22.
ment of nations and nationalism.
For accounts of death and suffering at the external borders
For accounts of how borders are changing, yet sometimes of the EU, see:
attitudes towards them as somehow ‘natural’ persist, compare:
Van Houtum, H. (2010) Human blacklisting: the global
Amoore, L. (2006) Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in apartheid of the EU’s external border regime, Environment
the war on terror, Political Geography, 25, 336–51. and Planning D: Society and Space, 28, 957–76. Since
Fall, J.J. (2010) Artificial states? On the enduring geographi- this was published, the scale of death and suffering has
cal myth of natural borders, Political Geography, 29, 140–7. increased.

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 The geographies of citizenship

Chapter 23

Richard Yarwood

Topics covered
■ Citizenship
■ Nation-state
■ Activism and active citizenship
■ Human Rights

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 Chapter 23  The geographies of citizenship    457

23.1 Introduction: citizenship and place

Citizenship matters. Without it you are unable to access
easily many basic rights such as education or welfare ben-
efits. It is a precondition of being able to work and move
legally within and between countries. Being a citizen may
also foster a feeling of belonging or even a sense of duty
and a desire to serve a wider community. Citizenship is
also geographical; it is something that is only given mean-
ing when it is put in a spatial context. You are a citizen of
a place, be it a formally recognized country or an informal
community. You may also see yourself as a citizen of the
Plate 23.1  Citizenship is most often associated with
world, keen to engage in international politics or actions membership of a nation-state.
aimed at tackling global issues such as climate change or (Jan Mika/Shutterstock)
unfair trade. At the same time, local places and sites pro-
vide a context for you to act as a citizen, be it through Yet, these seemingly straightforward statements belie
voting, writing to a councillor or simply taking part in that citizenship is a contested idea (Spotlight box 23.1).
many aspects of everyday life. This said, citizenship often It is far from a universally agreed concept and, instead, is
operates in the background of life, subtle and unremark- continually being disputed, renegotiated and redefined.
able until it is disturbed. Perhaps you only consider it when Take, for example, the citizenship tests that have been
presenting a passport at a border control (Plate 23.1) or if introduced by many countries to prescribe what would-be
your rights are threatened in some way. When this slumber- citizens should know about the daily life, history, politics
ing giant is awoken, it can provoke protest, activism and and tradition of their adoptive state. The Australian test
even revolution. No wonder, therefore, that geographers tends to focus on European and Aboriginal histories with
are starting to take the idea more seriously and examine little attention given to the significance of Asian influ-
its social and political significance. ences on Australian daily life. In the UK politicians have
Citizenship traditionally referred to the relationship debated the relative merits of including questions on the
between an individual and a political unit. With this UK’s history over ones on current political-legal struc-
association comes an obligation for a person to fulfil tures. And in any case, can a series of multiple-choice
particular duties and the state to assure certain rights. questions really get the essence of what it means to be a
For example, in some states a citizen has an obligation citizen? More often they advocate a particular view of cit-
to undertake national service, perhaps in the form of izenship, usually reflecting rather prescribed nationalistic
military duty. In turn, citizens have recourse to certain ideas. Despite efforts to fix citizenship through tests, the
political, social and civic rights that are determined and idea is far too evasive to be captured in this way. Similarly,
enforced by national and international law. policies that have introduced various citizenship ‘lessons’,

Spotlight box 23.1

Defining citizenship? sense of how individual and collective action helps to

shape the world in which we live’. Understandings of
Citizenship traditionally refers to a person’s relationship citizenship require consideration of the ways in which
with a nation-state. It defines who is or isn’t a member political structures shape, and are shaped by, personal
of a country and the rights and duties associated with identities, institutional structures, everyday actions and
that membership. But citizenship refers to more than symbolic landscapes. Barker (2010) refers to citizen-
a set of laws that define a person’s rights and duties ship as an ‘unstable outcome of ongoing struggles’. It
in relation to a nation-state. Anderson et al. (2008) is therefore difficult to pin down, both as a concept and
describe it as ‘people’s senses of belonging in rela- a lived reality. It is the contested, multiscalar and, per-
tion to places near and far; senses of responsibility haps, ephemeral nature of citizenship that makes it of
for the ways in which these relations are shape; and a interest to geographers.

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 458    Section 5 Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

‘duties’, ‘service’ and ‘charters’ have been criticized for action, and an ‘active’ citizen who responds to govern-
following a particular vision of citizenship. Yet what is ment calls to undertake voluntary work to replace ser-
viewed as ‘good’ or acceptable citizenship is subject to vices once provided by the state (Spotlight box 23.2).
contest (Staeheli 2011). There are stark differences, for These contrasts are important as different norma-
example, between ‘activist’ citizens who seek to challenge tive theories of citizenship can be used to evaluate gaps
governments, often through civil disobedience or direct between what rights citizens are entitled to and the gap

Spotlight box 23.2

Electoral geographies, citizenship and

beyond
Formal structures of government and governance reveal
much about citizenship and the ability of individuals to
engage with decision making and democracy at local
and national scales (Plate 23.2). Universal suffrage is
considered a key political right, and the right to vote has
been fought for, sometimes using other civil rights includ-
ing freedom of speech and the right to protest (see Case
study 23.1, for example). It would be naïve, though, to
assume that a universal right to vote implies equality
amongst citizens. Geographers have critically examined
electoral systems and the social and political outcomes
of their organization (Johnston 2005). In some cases,
electoral boundaries can be manipulated through prac-
tices such as gerrymandering (altering electoral bound-
aries to suit particular political parties) to influence the
outcome of elections. Governments may also seek to
allocate goods and services to particular places to solicit
or reward support. Plate 23.2  Voting in elections is an important
Other authors have examined how minority groups political right, yet many groups, including women
continue to be excluded from electoral politics (Secor and the young, are frequently under-represented in
electoral politics.
2004). Women, for example, are under-represented in
(Asianet-Pakistan/Shutterstock)
positions of power; the young are less likely to vote and,
conversely, parties may favour welfare benefits aimed at as business . . . we will continue to scorn representative
older votes, such as free travel on public transport, as democracy, and will chose to shop and protest rather than
they are deemed more likely to vote and, hence, influ- vote’ (Hertz 2001: 212). Others have argued that as many
ence the outcome of an election. It has been suggested citizens do not participate in any political actions, a closer
that a disenfranchisement of some groups from electoral focus on social citizenship is required (MacKian 1995).
politics has contributed to a stratified decline in electoral Much attention has been given to new structures of
turnout. In the UK’s 2015 General Election, the come- governance that combine governmental and non-gov-
dian Russell Brand stated he would not vote in protest ernmental organizations and whether they offer ‘active
against a political system that has created a ‘disillusioned citizens’ new or better opportunities to participate more
underclass’ and encouraged young people to do the fully in local decision making (Painter and Jeffrey 2009).
same (although he later changed his mind and voiced his Other geographers have paid attention to actions out-
support of the Labour Party). Other commentators have side formal political structures that seek to challenge
also questioned who politicians are serving and whether rather than comply with state readings of citizenship.
multi-national cooperations now have more influence than The scope, nature and significance of these actions
democratically elected politicians. Noreena Hertz com- ranges from local, tactical protests to globalized cam-
mented, ‘as citizens we must make it clear to govern- paigns that use space as part of a broader strategy of
ment that unless government focuses on people as well resistance (Spotlight box 23.3).

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 Chapter 23  The geographies of citizenship    459

between these in reality. We might assume, for example, warrior, a patriarch and an owner of slaves. Although
that all citizens should be treated equally but many peo- contemporary citizenship aims to be inclusionary and
ple continue to be excluded from full citizenship in de jure more equitable, exclusion continues to cast a ‘long
(legal) or de facto (actual) terms on the basis of race, sex- shadow’ across the concept (Bellamy 2008). For example,
uality, gender, disability, age, wealth and other forms of despite universal suffrage in the West, the geographies of
social labelling (Smith 1989b). Studies of citizenship not elections reveal much about social difference and power
only draw attention to social inequalities but the political (Spotlight box 23.2).
structures that cause it and, significantly, how they can Contemporary citizenship emerged with and continues
be challenged and changed. For example, the language to be strongly associated with the Western nation-state
of rights may be used to contest racism, exploitation in (Turner 2012) and, for most, is simply conferred by birth
the workplace, or poor access to services (Tonts and Lar- within the territory of a state (jus soli or ‘law of the soil’)
son 2002). New forms of political engagement, such as or through family or ethnic descent (jus sanguinis or ‘law
women’s cooperatives in the majority world, can form of the blood’) (Bauder 2014). These categories can be
a platform for new voices to be heard and empowered. subject to contest. In 2004, a referendum in the Repub-
Understandings of geography and citizenship are lic of Ireland led to an amendment of its constitution to
deeply and mutually intertwined. Citizenship ‘marks a remove citizenship from any future Irish-born children of
point of contact between social, cultural and political immigrant parents (Tormey 2007). The favouring of jus
geography’ (Smith 2000: 83) and challenges us to think sanguinis over jus soli reflected concerns about a perceived
across our various sub-disciplines. At the same time, citi- increase in immigration, especially by asylum seekers, and
zenship requires an appreciation of geography. Its multi- ‘baby tourism.’ Tormey (2007) suggested that the refer-
scalar nature (Painter 2002) means that ‘geography as a endum succeeded as its advocates successfully positioned
discipline is uniquely placed to work through what citi- citizenship as ‘a moral regime’ with foreign nationals,
zenship may mean at a wide diversity of levels’ (Askins their offspring and foetuses as ‘suspect patriots’.
and Fuller 2006: 4).This chapter explores the exciting Being a citizen of a country contributes to its sense of
relationship between geography and citizenship across a national identity and is an important part of state-build-
series of spaces from the local to the global. It starts by ing (Jones et al. 2004). It confers a sense of membership
considering the nation-state, which is still seen by many that, like membership of any organization, determines
as the bedrock of citizenship. what someone is entitled to (rights) and what he or she
is expected to contribute (duties). Precisely how citizen-
ship has been defined and practised has varied over time
and space, reflecting a state’s political and social history
23.2 Bounded citizenship (Case study 23.1).
T.H. Marshall’s (1950) key essay ‘Citizenship and
Citizenship has been described as a bounded concept social class’ outlined the growth of civil, political and
(Isin 2012). This is in two ways. First, citizenship is social rights over time in Britain (Table 23.1). Marshall
widely defined as membership of a political community noted that the development of a national set of rights
that has formally recognized boundaries (Smith 2000). brought with it a shift in the geographical focus of citi-
In other words, citizenship is territorial and bound into zenship, from the local to the national. Thus, national
the dimensions of a particular geographical unit. Second, institutions and bureaucracies replaced local charities in
citizenship might be thought of as ‘social glue’ that binds the provision of social rights. Marshall argues that as the
people to each other and a territory. It promotes feelings institutions responsible for these rights became remote,
of belonging, identity, duty and entitlement. citizens needed to employ experts or intermediaries to
Over time, the territories of citizenship have changed recognize and realize the rights afforded to them. Offices
(Painter and Philo 1995). The idea originated in the Clas- of the welfare state, for example, advise upon and deliver
sical period, which, in turn, influenced ideas and practices (or increasingly deny) social benefits to those in need of
of citizenship in the West (Bellamy 2008). Greek citi- them. It has been suggested that this has led to a ‘thin’ or
zenship, for example, was associated with the territory passive form of Liberal citizenship, one where the citizen
of a particular city-state and could not be transferred expects rights to be delivered to him or her by the state
to another. The duties of citizenship were onerous and rather than contributing to their delivery (Desmoyers-
required an active contribution to public life through Davis 2001). Other forms of citizenship have developed
political, civil, legal and military service. Classical citi- in other places. Republican models, for example, have led
zenship was exclusive: to be a citizen of Athens was to to ‘thicker’, more active form of citizenship that places
be male, over 20, born to an Athenian citizen family, a greater emphasis on the duties of citizens. These ideals

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 460    Section 5 Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

Case study 23.1

The complex citizenship of Hong Kong This said, there is also a strong faction that supports
closer ties with Beijing.
In 1997 Hong Kong ceased to be a Crown Colony of In September 2014, Hong Kong’s Central District
the United Kingdom and reverted to the authority of and other areas of the city were occupied by students
the People’s Republic of China. In accordance with the protesting for democratic reform. More precisely, the
1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, which guaranteed protests centred on proposals to reform the election
continuity in its capitalist economy and lifestyle for 50 of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive in 2017. Although
years after the hand-over (Kean 2010), Hong Kong has the principal of universal suffrage had been agreed
been run as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of by the Chinese Government, in August 2015 Beijing
China. ruled that voters would have a choice of three pre-
Under British rule, efforts were made to pacify the approved candidates. This prompted the formation of
people of Hong Kong in light of ‘Maoist’ influences the ‘Occupy Central’ movement to campaign for pan-
from mainland China: citizenship was regarded by democracy. Their actions were essentially part of a
many ‘as a matter of holding passports and enjoy- tactical protest in aid of specific rights, and so differs
ing some degree of civil liberties’ (Shiu-Hing 2001: from the wider Occupy movement (Case study 23.4),
127). After 1984 more Hong Kong residents began to which sought wider reforms of the capitalist economy.
demand and apply rights of political participation. In Both, however, used the tactical occupation of symbolic
part this reflected a feeling by many citizens who felt space to bring supporters together and draw maximum
that self-determination was being denied to them by attention to their causes.
both the British and Chinese states. Occupy Central held marches, conducted an unof-
Yet many of Hong Kong’s residents, particularly the ficial ballot (in which nearly 800,000 people voted to
skilled or wealthy, have sought to use citizenship as a oppose the reforms) and proposed an occupation
personal strategy. There has been large-scale immigra- of the Central District on 1 October 2014, China’s
tion to countries that offered dual citizenship, such as National Day. In the event, the occupation was
Canada or Australia, especially in times of perceived prompted by students who had organized a boycott
crisis. This form of transnational citizenship is seen by of lectures. As numbers grew, Occupy Central activ-
some as offering ‘an escape route’ if the autonomy of ists joined the students. There were efforts to break
the region is ever threatened. Pivotal events have led to up the occupation by riot police using tear gas. In
periods of net emigration, including the signing of the response, protestors deployed umbrellas, usually
Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, the Tiananmen carried as protection against the sun, which soon
Square massacre in 1989, the outbreak of the SARS became the symbol of the movement. The robust
virus in 2003 and the global financial crisis in 2009. Yet response by authorities also prompted greater num-
Hong Kong also experienced immigration from China bers to join the protests and a largely peaceful stand-
that became the subject of progressively tighter legisla- off occurred with the authorities. Indeed, the BBC
tion. Currently some ‘one-way’ permits are offered to reported how polite and well-ordered the event was
those from China with skills and qualifications in the with protestors acting as ‘good citizens’ by tidying
information technology and financial service sectors litter, doing homework and apologizing for the disrup-
rather than those who might become a burden upon tion. Although illegal, the protest was ‘allowed’ to take
the welfare system. place relatively peacefully, reflecting Hong Kong’s
The current citizenship of Hong Kong is complex. autonomous position. Protests by students in Tianan-
In de jure terms Hong Kong citizens are citizens of men Square in 1989 were violently repressed by the
China but the ‘one county, two systems’ paradox Chinese security forces with the loss of an estimated
means that Hong Kong’s citizens enjoy political and 2,000–3,000 lives. These events remind us that rights
civil rights that have not been afforded to citizens in are rarely given away but represent the outcome of
the rest of China – such as the right to travel, protest struggle between citizen and state.
and read a free press. Many citizens identity more Hong Kong’s position as a global city made direct
strongly with Hong Kong than China, refusing to intervention from the Chinese government less likely:
acknowledge the Chinese national day and resenting to do so would damage a valuable and develop-
political interventions from Beijing (Degolyer 2001). ing territorial and trading asset. While occupations

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 Chapter 23  The geographies of citizenship    461

occurred in various places in Hong Kong, the main

one centred on the Central Financial District. This
was not only to cause maximum disruption to global
business but also because the area had become
strongly associated with Hong Kong’s emergent post-
colonial identity (Law 2002). The symbolic space
(Plate 23.3) of the Central District was subverted
using street art, slogans and a sense of carnival
to draw attention to Occupy’ Central’s demands.
Over time, people dissipated from the protest sites
although there were interventions from Hong Kong’s
police. The situation remains fluid and it remains to
be seen how protestors and the authorities (of both
Plate 23.3  The Occupy Central protest in Hong
Hong Kong and China) will respond in the longer term
Kong. The site of the protest was chosen for its
to popular demands for democratic reform in Hong
symbolism as well as its connections with the global
Kong. economy and, thus, media.
(coloursinmylife/Shutterstock)

Table 23.1  The development of rights in the UK

Timescale Significance Evidenced in

Civil rights 18th century ‘Necessary for individual freedom-liberty of the person, free- Courts and
dom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property ­judicial system
and to conclude valid contracts and the right to justice’.
Political rights 19th century ‘The right to participate in the exercise of political power, as Parliament and
a member of a body invested with political authority or as an local government
elector of the members of such a body’.
Social rights 20th century ‘A modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to Education, social
share to the full the social heritage and to live the life of a civi- welfare provision
lised being according to the standards prevailing in the society’
Source: after Marshall (1950[1992]), all quotes on p.8

reflect a wariness of state power and, instead, favour to marry, work or travel without the permission of the
self-governance and self-determination at the local level. state; sale of alcohol, land and property was prohibited;
Republican citizenship is significant in the USA (Staeheli mobility was restricted; and parents had no legal rights
2005), where participation is encouraged through town- over their children. Other forms of Imperial Citizenship
hall meetings, religious congregations, and participation attempted to provide equal rights for colonized peoples.
in voluntary and civic groups (Turner 2002). Prior to 1983, Citizens of the UK and Colonies had the
Both of these models are based on the experiences of right to work and live in Britain as well as to hold a Brit-
Western countries and ideas of citizenship have tended ish passport and vote in UK elections. Ultimately, though,
to reflect European values (Isin 2005: 35). This is in part Imperial Citizenship was unable to reconcile forms of citi-
because the nation-state emerged from the European geo- zenship based on kinship and community (found in many
political arena. As European powers colonized other parts non-Western countries) with individualistic notions of
of the world, the European model of state-citizenship was citizenship based on political rights (Gorman 2006).
imposed on them (Isin 2002, 2005). The nature of Imperial In many places, tensions remain between forms of citi-
Citizenship ranged widely. At the one extreme were exclu- zenship based on nation-states and other associations based
sionary and paternalistic ideas. Thus indigenous Austral- on kinship, tribes and belief. This has led Isin (2012: 567)
ians were not granted citizenship until 1968 (when they to conclude that it is now ‘difficult to imagine citizenship
were also included in the census for the first time). Prior merely as nationality or membership in the nation-state’. It
to this indigenous Australians were wards, not citizens, is important to move beyond Western definitions and lin-
of the state and with very few rights. They were unable guistics to appreciate how citizenship plays out in different

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 462    Section 5 Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

cultural settings. McEwan argues that the concept of citi- new forms of transnational citizenship (Samers 2010).
zenship is ‘unable to recognize either the political relevance Transnationalism, as the name suggests, recognizes
of gender or of non-western perspectives and experiences’ that ideas and practices of citizenship cross national
(2005: 971). Her work in South Africa draws attention to boundaries and flow between their borders, rather than
the ways in which marginalized people, including women, being confined by them. By implication, the nation-state
the young and unemployed youths, have carved out alterna- becomes less significant in the determination and regula-
tive spaces away from traditional, male-­dominated political tion of citizenship (Case study 23.2).
assemblies from which they can be heard. Other authors Yet, transnationalism has also prompted responses
have also pointed to the growing importance of places from nation-states. States experiencing net emigration
above and between nation-states to citizenship (Desforges have attempted to redefine citizenship for their own
et al. 2005), as the next section examines. advantage. Mexico, for example, has sought to extend
citizenship to emigrants in order to benefit economically
from its citizens who have moved abroad (Escobar 2006).
Indeed, more people than ever before hold dual citizen-
23.3 Beyond boundaries ship (Sassen 2002), reflecting a response by states to claim
mobile citizens as their own.
For some groups of people wider opportunities to travel, Many states have also sought to reassert national
work and live between states have led to what has been sovereignty and citizenship. In many countries quo-
termed ‘transnational’ citizenship, which draws on the tas on numbers of migrants, stringent border security,
rights and identities of more than one country (Ho 2008). the streamlining of removal processes, confinement of
In 2013, there were over 231 million migrants on a global asylum seekers, citizenship tests, a lack of welfare sup-
level and, between 2000 and 2013, these numbers increased port and the withdrawal of rights to work all represent
by 2.2 per cent (UN 2013). Migration has not only acceler- a fortification of state boundaries and make it harder
ated but has become increasingly differentiated, with mul- for migrants to achieve citizenship. Such policies have
tiple forms and entry points reflecting social difference at a sought to stratify citizenship and migration. Samers
global scale. On the one hand, this so-called ‘Age of Migra- (2010) identifies a continuum that encompasses full citi-
tion’ (Castles and Miller 2009) has loosened the moorings zens of a single nation-state; dual, transnational and
of citizenship from the nation-state but, on the other, has cosmopolitan citizens with varying rights and duties;
led to increased efforts to assert the significance of the denizenship; and, finally, illegal residents and aliens
nation-state as the primary determinant of citizenship. with few or no rights.
It has been argued that new and significant forms of In contrast to the ‘super rich’, ‘super-mobile’ citizens,
international migration and mobility are indicative of temporary and ‘illegal’ migrants can suffer economic

Case study 23.2

Transnational citizenship in the political participation and the growth of employment

­European Union markets across Europe (Favell 2003). Strüver (2005)
also found that regular cross-border movements of
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty established the precedent Dutch citizens living in a German border town ­identified
of European Citizenship that was awarded to citizens as being transnational European citizens rather than
of its member states in addition to their already-held of one nation. In some circumstances ­transnational
national citizenship. This meant, for example, that a citizenship has allowed physical, imaginative and
citizen of France also became a citizen of the Euro- ­communicative travel between countries to the
pean Union super-state (Ferbrache and Yarwood extent that it is getting harder to distinguish places
2015). With this status came the right for most EU of ­origin from places of settlement. Instead, they
citizens to live, work and move between the states of are ­simultaneously linked in economic, cultural and
the EU (most but not all: following expansion in 2004 ­emotional ways (Ho 2008).
and 2006 many member states restricted the right of There is, however, growing resistance to this form
citizens from accession states to migrate and work in of transnational European citizenship, witnessed by
their territories). European citizens availing themselves a surge in right-wing populist political parties that are
of these rights have contributed to the development seeking to withdraw their nation-states from Europe
of transnational business networks, wider forms of and European political influence.

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 Chapter 23  The geographies of citizenship    463

exploitation social hostility with few rights. The United

Nations Refugee Agency has estimated that there are ten
million people without a state, with no legal recourse to
education, travel, work, healthcare and even a home as these
often depend on having formal identification. Statelessness
can arise from changes in state borders and instances where
a person’s parents have migrated to a state that does not
permit nationality to be passed to children. States may also
seek to revoke citizenship as, for example, has been dis-
cussed recently by some Western states in response to those
who have travelled to support terrorist organizations.
Transnational practices and ideas have opened up the
possibility of new spaces of citizenship but this form of
citizenship remains the preserve of a few. If, as Cresswell
(2009) contends, the right to be mobile is an significant
aspect citizenship, then it continues to be denied to many.

23.4 Local citizenship: activist citizens

Mobility is an important signifier of citizenship but, for
many people, citizenship is something that is played out
in the localities where they live. Staeheli (2005: 196–7) Plate 23.4  Neighbourhood Watch is a voluntary
comments that ‘while nation-states may be where the crime prevention scheme in the UK that has embodied
formal standing as citizen is vested, it is largely through state-led ideas of active citizenship. It has found favour
localities that the horizontal bonds of citizenship oper- largely in middle-class areas.
(Bikeworldtravel/Shutterstock)
ate’ to mobilize citizens and create identity. Thus, vot-
ing in local elections, writing to counsellors, engaging in
planning enquiries, participating as governors of schools (Desforges et al. 2005). This can lead to a view that sees
or campaigning for local services all offer opportunities local communities, rather than deeper social or politi-
for citizens to engage with the running of affairs in their cal forces, as the cause and solution of local problems
locality and, in doing so, to exercise their political and (Rose 1996). Depending on how communities respond,
civic rights. they may be judged and rewarded with, or denied, further
Increasingly citizens are also expected to have a duty to funding (Desforges et al. 2005).
participate in their localities (Cheshire and Woods 2009). In another development, many charities have been
Over recent years many Western neoliberal governments obliged to ‘professionalize’ their activities in order to
have developed policies aimed at encouraging ‘active citi- win government funding or contracts (Milligan and Fyfe
zenship’ or voluntary activity to provide or support local 2005). This is so much so that large, cooperatist charities
services. Examples include involving local citizenry in have emerged that get most of the their funding from
policing (Yarwood and Edwards 1995) (Plate 23.4), the government rather than private donations. Jenifer Wolch
provision of health care (Barnett and Barnett 2003), wel- (1990) referred to this as ‘the Shadow State’, reflecting
fare (Conradson 2003) and housing (Yarwood 2002). New that voluntary groups now do the government’s work but
Zealand has followed these principles to such a degree appear separate from it.
that it has been regarded as ‘a social laboratory of the Governments pursuing active citizenship poli-
world’ (Tennant et al. 2008: 26). cies have been criticized for passing the buck of wel-
The impact of these reforms has been geographi- fare provision to the voluntary sector, reflecting a shift
cally uneven, reflecting differences in local participation from Liberal to more Republican forms of citizenship
and community leadership. Some communities, usually (Case study 23.3). This said, those who volunteer often
middle-class ones, are better placed to organize and help do so out of an ethical desire to help others rather than
themselves. This may lead to more parochial forms of government policy or institutional mission statements
citizenship in which vocal, well-organized and compli- (Cloke et al. 2007). Places such as soup kitchens give
ant local communities are granted more rights and duties volunteers opportunities to act on personal, political,
than residents who are unable or unwilling to volunteer religious and altruistic beliefs.

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 464    Section 5 Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

Case study 23.3

Food banks: the dilemma of ethical reliance on local charity. The growth of food banks not
citizenship only points to the uneven terrain of citizenship, where
the right to food seems unobtainable to many, but
There has always been a ‘moving frontier’ between the also a view that the voluntary sector are being given
state and voluntary sector in the provision of social increased responsibility, even for fundamental issues
welfare (Mohan 2003). Its position varies over time and such as hunger (Plate 23.5).
space but, recently, it has been argued that the frontier That said, many of those who volunteer to provide
has shifted away from the state and towards the third welfare are far from neoliberal policy dupes or apolo-
sector as a result of neoliberal reforms that have seen gists but, instead, act out of concerns driven by beliefs
governments withdraw from the provision of social or ideals. Indeed, the space of the food bank or soup-
welfare. These debates have been encapsulated by run allows citizens to act on personal ideals of care.
a growing reliance on charity-run food banks in many Cloke et al. (2007: 1095) have termed this a form of
countries. ‘ethical citizenship’ in which people volunteer ‘because
Food banks originated in North America but are now they wanted to rather than because they felt obliged
found in most parts of the world. They are run by chari- to’. In some cases, these activities have been viewed
ties with the aim of distributing food directly or indirectly as a form of resistance by drawing attention to gaps
(via other charities) to people in need. in welfare provision and challenging the state policies
In many countries there has been a phenomenal (Conradson 2003; Staeheli 2013). In Philadelphia, for
increase in the numbers of people asking for support example, there has been a long-standing conflict
from food banks, especially following the 2007 reces- between organizers of soup-runs and the Mayor, who
sion. In the UK, the Trussell Trust estimate that they has repeatedly tried to ban them from public places.
provided 913,138 people with food in 2013–14, com- Although volunteering has become increasingly politi-
pared to 25,889 in 2008–9 (see Trussell Trust website, cized, the ethics and motivations of individual citizen-
www.trusselltrust.org/stats). The charity established its volunteers remains important. An emphasis on the
first food bank in 2004; it now has 423 with an average individual citizen (Staeheli 2011, 2013) and acknowl-
of two new ones opened each week. The European edging his or her political and ethical entanglements
Food Banks states that it distributed 402,000 tons of with community, however imagined, is crucial to under-
food to 5.7 million people in 2013. According to Freedom standing how local places are shaped by citizen action.
America, one in seven families rely on food banks and
associated food distribution programmes.
Food banks are intended as an emergency
response to those without food. In the UK, food is
only distributed to people who have been referred to a
food bank from professionals such as doctors, social
workers, the police or the Child Support Agency. This
entitles them to three days of food that is intended
to fill a gap caused by, say, a delay in welfare pay-
ments. Although food banks are intended as a stop-
gap measure to supplement rather than replace the
welfare state, critics have suggested that an insidious
creep is occurring towards these kinds of charities
providing more permanent forms of welfare (Cooper Plate 23.5  Soup kitchens and food banks offer
et al. 2014). For many, the increasing enrolment of opportunities for people to act upon ethical and
food banks into the state welfare provision represent humanitarian convictions but may also reflect the
an abrogation of government responsibility (Cloke state’s withdrawal from social welfare provision.
2011) and a shift away from universal rights towards (Radiokafka/Shutterstock)

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 Chapter 23  The geographies of citizenship    465

free-trade and deregulation have diminished the power

23.5  ctivist citizens and
A of state governments and, consequently, the significance
transnational networks of electoral politics. As some multi-national corpo-
rations now have more power and wealth than many
Active citizenship has been criticized for promoting duties nation-states, they are more likely to respond to custom-
over rights, volunteering above political participation ers than citizens. In response, activist citizens have devel-
and, implicitly or otherwise, supporting the neoliberal oped new forms of political action (Jones et al. 2004)
roll-back of the state. By contrast, it is possible to trace that operate outside conventional political channels.
a range of ‘deviant’ actions that also use local sites to Direct action, protest and consumer pressure are used
challenge state and corporatist power to assert social and to pursue economic, social, political and environmental
political rights. In contrast to active citizenship, which is goals (Routledge 2003).
largely focused on changing neighbourhoods, activist citi- NSMs are characterized by fluid alliances between
zenship is global in its concerns and reach (Parker 1999) diverse sets of people with various identities, affili-
(see Spotlight box 23.3). ations and motivations that find expression in a par-
The growth of ‘New’ Social Movements (NSMs) ticular campaign or form of resistance. Thus, a protest
reflect a feeling, popularized in books such as No Logo against the use of child labour might be supported by
by Naomi Klein (2001), that conventional politics is faith groups with a concern about social justice; trade
failing to fulfil citizens’ political rights. It is argued that unions seeking to improve employment rights; NGOs

Spotlight box 23.3

Active and activist citizens Table 23.2  Citizen protest and action

Gavin Parker (1999) illustrates clearly the difference Activist Littoral zone Active
between ‘active’ and ‘activist’ citizenship (Table 23.2).
‘Active’ citizenship operates at spatial scales below the
‘Deviant’ citizen · ‘Good’ citizen

nation-state – neighbourhood, community and locality

‘Protest’ · ‘Participation’

are emphasized – but generally in support of the state ‘Negative’ · ‘Positive’

and its policies. Hence Parker describes them as ‘good’
in the sense that they obey laws and use formally rec-
Outside · Inside

ognized channels for action.

Direct action · Due process

By contrast, activist citizens challenge the state and Unstable · Stabilized

other institutions. They often mistrust authority and feel Illegal/not Legal/
obliged to voice their concerns outside its formal appa- legitimized · legitimized
ratus using various forms of direct action that range in
intensity, duration and legitimacy; from violent direct
Visible · Obscured

action to mundane acts of everyday consumption. Engin Source: after Parker (1999)

Isin (2008: 38) summarizes these differences in citizen-

is, of course, hugely subjective and reflects political and
ship aptly:
ethical standpoints. It reminds us that citizenship is not
we contrast ‘activist citizens’ with ‘active citizens’ who a static term but a contested one.
act out already written scripts. While activist citizens Although Table 23.2 is useful in drawing out different
engage in writing scripts and creating the scene, active types of citizen action, it should not be thought of as a
citizens follow scripts and participate in scenes that
rigid binary. People may display both kinds of behav-
are already created. While activist citizens are creative,
iour, depending on spatial and political context. One
active citizens are not.
thing that is remarkable about New Social Movements
They are labelled ‘deviant’ in the sense that they may is their ability to enrol a range of citizens, from Anarchist
depart from the law. What constitutes ‘good’ citizenship to Zapatista, into specific causes.

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 466    Section 5 Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

Case study 23.4

The Occupy movement

The Occupy movement started in Wall Street, New York
in September 2011. Using the slogan ‘We are the 99%’,
the Occupy movement drew attention to the dispropor-
tional amount of wealth held by just 1 per cent of the
population. Inspired in part by popular uprisings against
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East (referred to in
the media as the ‘Arab Spring’), but using global activ-
ist networks and social media, other occupations were
established in 952 other cities in 81 countries. Occupa-
tions centred on the spaces associated with or close to
urban financial centres including La Defense in Paris,
the Beurs World Trade Centre in Rotterdam and Dame
Street in Dublin. All were organized, peaceful, leaderless Plate 23.6  Occupy Wall Street was one site in a
and informal, establishing agreed norms of behaviour global protest by activists seeking to draw attention
and cooperation. Sites were linked electronically and to social and economic inequality. The Guy Fawkes
used commons symbols, notably the ‘We are the 99%’ mask became a world-wide symbol of the movement.
logo and Guy Fawkes masks (Plate 23.6) based on the (Daryl Lang/Shutterstock)
film V for Vendetta. Globally coordinated days of action
were used to show solidarity and mirror the international faith groups, politicians, academics and musicians.
reach of the corporations and individuals they opposed. Marxist geographer David Harvey spoke at a number
As well as wealth redistribution, Occupy also called of meetings, encouraging anti-wealth (as opposed to
for a reform of banking, a reduction in the political influ- anti-poverty) protests. By the end of 2012, protestors
ence of corporations, an end to austerity measures, job had been evicted from their sites by governments using
creation and democratic reform. Camps were supported legal injunctions enforced by the police. The Occupy
by a wide range of interest groups that had a common movement continues to exist as an informally organized
grievance with laissez-faire capitalism and its conse- global network that draws attention to the inequalities
quences. These included trade unions, activist groups, caused by modern capitalism.

with a focus on protecting young people; Marxists

seeking to resist free-trade capitalism and so on. These 23.6 Citizenship and everyday places
alliances extend across borders as activists in different
countries share information and coordinate actions. The study of active and activist citizens implies that
These often crystallize in specific sites chosen for their citizenship involves some form of conscious engagement
symbolic meaning or potential to maximize the impact with politics and/or wider society. Yet, for many people
of a protest (Case study 23.4). citizenship is something that is rarely thought about; it
Peter Jackson (2010b: 139) also contends that glo- might be acknowledged when crossing a border, reflected
balized flows of ideas and cultures are leading to a form upon when living in another country or drawn upon when
of transnational ‘cultural citizenship’. Faith, politics, rights are lost. Sara MacKian (1995: 212) has argued that
ethnicity and cultural practices may, for example, play a more attention should be given to citizens who are simply
greater role in shaping identity as a citizen than loyalty to living out their daily lives rather than choosing ‘to sit on
a nation. Desforges et al. (2005: 444) sum up these trends committees or to shake boxes on flag days’.
succinctly and optimistically: Geographers have turned their attention to the
it is the connections to strangers without – living, importance of everyday spaces, such as shops, parks and
working and dying – in other places that form some schools, to the practice of citizenship in daily life. Painter
of the most important, and potentially liberating, and Philo (1995:195) have argued that:
new geographies of citizenship in the contemporary If people cannot be present in public spaces (streets,
world. squares, parks, cinemas, churches, town halls) without

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 Chapter 23  The geographies of citizenship    467

feeling uncomfortable, victimized and basically ‘out memorials in public spaces (Baker 2012). In the second
of place’, then it must be questionable whether or not half of the twentieth century, the advent of postcolonial
these people can be regarded as citizens at all. states in the wake of the decline of European imperial-
ism led to the proliferation of such national symbols and
As was noted in the discussion of territoriality in rites of citizenship – such as national anthems, school
Chapter 21, women, for example, may sometimes feel and university systems, armies, as well as passport agen-
excluded from some public spaces, especially at night, cies and embassies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union
due to the threat of sexual assault; gay people may feel it (see Chapter 20) yielded 15 successor states, each new
necessary to hide their sexuality in ‘public’; and religious, state had to establish norms, laws and symbols of citizen-
‘racial’ or ethnic difference may be the target of victimi- ship, often raising thorny questions about who belonged
zation, verbal or physical assault. In addition, those with and who would be refused citizenship and deemed a ‘for-
physical disabilities may be unable to access sites, young eigner’, since borders and citizenship rules had changed,
people can be excluded from public space by curfews and even though they might still be living in the place where
the elderly may find it harder to find employment. they were born.
Although legislation has been enshrined to ensure Although the study of citizenship has traditionally con-
equality, there is often a gap between de jure (legal) cerned itself with political engagement in public spaces, it
rights and whether these are manifest in daily life (de is clear that citizenship is about more than this. Citizen-
facto) (Smith 1989b). To take one example, Bell and Bin- ship is also about the way that people engage with spaces
nie (2000: 10) suggest that ‘all citizenship is sexual citi- on an ‘ordinary’ basis (Steaheli et al. 2012). Although the
zenship’ but it is often assumed to ‘hetronormative’ (i.e formal rules and regulations that define citizenship are
heterosexuality is the hegemonic norm) (Bell and Binnie important, so too are the everyday negotiated practices
2006). Sexuality impacts on the right to marry or form that constitute belonging to a particular state or commu-
civil partnerships; practice religion; work, including ser- nity. Thus, interactions in schools, homes, shops, nurs-
vice in the military; migrate; travel; adopt children; par- eries and community groups help to establish migrants
ticipate in public events; and express national identity. and their families as visible and valuable citizens in wider
Even where legislation has improved the rights of sexual society (Bauder 2014). For example, Dominican immi-
minorities, for example in countries where same-sex mar- grant shopkeepers were able to overcome anti-immigra-
riage is legal, homophobic abuse may still occur on a de tion sentiments in predominantly African-American and
facto level and in particular institutional settings. Hub- Puerto-Rican neighbourhoods of Philadelphia through
bard (2013), for example, outlines how two gay men were daily negotiations with customers. Practices included flex-
excluded from a London pub despite national legislation ible pricing, stocking ‘boutique’ services and allowing the
to ensure equality in terms of sexuality. shop to be used as a site of interaction between ‘old’ and
Some geographers have also drawn attention to the ‘new’ groups of residents (Pine 2010).
importance of non-public spaces in the formation of citi- The emphasis on cultural as well as political forms of
zenship. Feminist scholars, for example, have noted that citizenship have reflected a spatial shift in its study, from
domestic spaces have often been ignored in the study of central, political spaces to everyday and sometimes mar-
citizenship yet provide an important context for establish- ginal places. Indeed, Bullen and Whitehead (2005: 499)
ing and asserting women’s and children’s rights (Lister consider that the:
2003; Chouinard 2009). Institutional spaces can also be
important as they can attempt to shape the practice of contribution of geography to the study of citizen-
what is viewed as ‘good citizenship’. Schools and youth ship has been . . . a changing spatial focus concerning
groups (Pykett 2009; Mills 2013) are particularly signifi- where citizens are to be found – from the town hall to
cant here, sometimes reflecting a view that children are the ghetto; the public square to the private home; the
‘citizens in making’ (rather than citizens already) that city to the edge community.
need instruction so that they will be useful to society.
Landscapes reflect citizenship idea through the order-
ing of buildings, monuments, open spaces, vistas and
views (Jones et al. 2004); this is often linked to ideas of 23.7 Conclusions
the nation-state (as Chapter 22 documented). In France,
for example, through the twentieth century, the idea of This chapter has introduced the idea of citizenship and
a national identity was strengthened by the flying of a examined its significance across a range of geographi-
national flag (the tricolour), the use of the Gallic Coq as cal scales. Although traditional associations between
a national symbol, the construction of state buildings in individuals and the nation-state continue to have sig-
prominent urban spaces and the erection of national war nificance, it is clear that citizenship is more than this.

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 468    Section 5 Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

A person’s identity as a citizen is not simply a reflection of political and social geography within variously and
of national belonging but, rather, is shaped by a whole fluid spaces and places.
series of local and global cultural influences that are (Yarwood 2014)
played out on a daily basis upon a range of scales (Jack-
It does so across a multiple and coexisting range of
son 2010b). It is a fluid idea that is not only defined by
scales, from the global to the local. Thus, a householder
political engagement but, for some, is political engage-
who chooses to recycle goods is simultaneously engaging
ment (Isin 2002). At the same time, others have also
with his or her state though the local council (who may
pointed to citizenship as being simply able to participate
provide a recycling service), as well with global initiatives
in everyday life, often in a political ways. This diversity is
to improve sustainability, and at the same time is acting
what makes the study of citizenship of interest to geog-
in the private space of his or her home.
raphers. It pulls together social, cultural and political
Geographers have not only engaged with citizenship
geographies to produce rounded, but not holistic, views
academically but have also performed them through per-
of society and space. To quote from my own book,
sonal and varied forms of political and social engage-
Citizenship:
ments (Fuller and Kitchen 2004). The inclusion of
The idea of citizenship underpins concerns between citizenship in introductory textbooks such as this marks
individual identity and performance and understand- a recognition of its essential geography (Anderson et al.
ings of broader political structures that shape, and 2008: 39). To paraphrase Cloke et al. (2005: 603): citi-
are shaped, by these contexts. It offers a chance to zenship matters, you matter, your citizenship matters.
bridge the personal and performative aspects of the Having been introduced to geographies of citizenship,
cultural turn with the structural and institutional foci how and where will you practise citizenship for yourself?

Learning outcomes Desforges, L., Jones, R. and Woods, M. (2005) New geogra-
phies of citizenship, Citizenship Studies, 9, 439–51.
Having read this chapter, you should be able to:
Painter, J. and Philo, C. (1995) Spaces of citizenship: an
● Show how ideas of citizenship are contested over introduction, Political Geography, 14, 107–20.
time and space.
Staeheli, L. (2011) Political geography: where’s citizenship?,
● Illustrate the significance of citizenship to Progress in Human Geography, 35, 393–400.
­contemporary society using a range of international
The journal Citizenship Studies provides multidisciplinary
case studies.
perspectives on citizenship. There is no dedicated journal to
● Appreciate how geography and citizenship are geography and citizenship but special issues of geography
linked. journals on citizenship have included:
● Demonstrate how citizenship is played out at Political Geography, 14(2) (1995) The spaces of
­various scales, from the local to the global. citizenship.
Journal of Historical Geography, 22(4) (1996) Geographical
education and citizenship.
Further reading
Urban Geography, 24(2) (2003) Cities and citizenship.
For much more on the geographies of citizenship: Space and Policy, 9(1) (2005) Geographies of citizenship.
Yarwood, R. (2014) Citizenship, Routledge, London. Citizenship Studies, 9(5) (2006) New geographies of
These journal articles provide critical and thoughtful citizenship.
­discussions on the importance of studying citizenship using
Political Geography, 25(8) (2006) Geographies of sexual
geographical perspectives:
citizenship.
Anderson, J., Askins, K., Cook, I., Desforges, L., Evans,
ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies,
J., Fannin, M., Fuller, D., Griffiths, H., Lambert, D., Lee, R.,
7(2) (2008) Geographies of everyday citizenship.
MacLeavy, J., Mayblin, L., Morgan, J., Payne, B., Pykett,
J., Roberts, D. and Skelton, T. (2008) What is geography’s Geography, 95(3) (2010) Designing identity: exploring
­contribution to making citizens?, Geography, 93, 34–9. c­ itizenship through geographies of identity.

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 Chapter 23  The geographies of citizenship    469

Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 30(1) The following texts provide good introductions to different
(2012) Citizenship without community. political formations of citizenship:
Any student of citizenship should study Marshall’s classic Bellamy, R. (2008) A Very Short Introduction to Citizenship,
essay and responses to it: Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Marshall, T. (1950) Citizenship and Social Class, Pluto, Isin, E and Turner, B (eds) (2002) Handbook of Citizenship
­London, 3–54. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Studies, Sage, London.

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 Global governance

Chapter 24

Klaus Dodds and Chih Yuan Woon

Topics covered
■ Defining and understanding governance
■ The relationship between governance, territory and power
■ The governance regimes for maritime spaces and their
associated environments

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 Chapter 24  Global governance    471

24.1 Conceptualizing governance

The term governance, derived from the Greek verb
kubernan, suggests notions of steering and/or piloting.
Governance as a term is, on the face of it, a source of
reassurance. Actions involving steering and piloting con-
note a sense of in-control, predictability and stability.
But there are occasions where the very institutions and
structures that (partially) govern our lives (such as inter-
national regulations) appear powerless and inadequate to
cope with the events at hand. For example, in June 2013,
Singaporean and Malaysian officials reported extreme
Plate 24.1  Typhoon Haiyan, Philippines 2013.
levels of air pollution, with forest fires in neighbouring
(fotomuhabiri/fotolia)
Indonesia widely blamed for creating a transnational haze
over South-east Asia. It was not the first time a pollution
haze has affected those countries, as in 1997–8 and 2006 states to extend their role and may become catalysts in
when once again Indonesian illegal logging practices and the reordering of society and politics. It has been argued
associated forest fires were cited as the primary source that only war offers greater potential to achieve such
(Jones 2006). Even though these affected nations have reconfigurations (Guyot-Réchard 2015).
entered into a legally binding agreement, via ASEAN Moreover, there are other ways in which governance
(the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), to inter- manifests itself. For scholars working in fields like politi-
vene against the haze problem, the seeming inability of cal geography and related disciplines such as Interna-
the Indonesian government to control management prac- tional Relations (IR), governance refers to a system of
tices in large and remote forested areas of the archipelago rules, norms, codes, regulations and compliance mecha-
stimulated intense debates about an apparent lack of and nisms designed to regulate human activity, especially at
forms of national governance as well as the inability of the global level (Herod et al. 1998; Held and McGrew
regional treaties in governing individual states’ actions 2002; Sparke 2006). However, the mere identification
(see Nurhidayah et al. 2014). Moreover, it also raised of ‘global governance’ presents an important challenge
questions about complicity and whether neighbouring to dominant strands of IR and their depictions of the
countries, via their companies, were involved in attempts international arena which focus on states, as the domi-
to circumvent restrictions on burning (Varkkey 2014). nant actors, and how they ‘navigate’ and ‘steer’ their way
Likewise, when severe disasters such as flooding and in the global arena in order to maximise their interests
earthquakes affect communities, we gain further insights (Donnelly 2000; Goldin 2013).
into what the geography (and lack) of governance looks However, critics of this view (which is known as real-
and feels like – it can be devastating, as the people of the ism in IR) argue that states, societies and markets are
Philippines discovered when typhoon Haiyan struck and embedded and implicated with one another, across a
killed over 6,000 people in November 2013 and devas- range of geographical scales. It is apparent, moreover,
tated vast swathes of the country and its infrastructure that even if states remain the primary political actors
(Plate 24.1). Whilst it is easy to attribute blame to ‘natu- there is not only a great deal of variation within the inter-
ral’ weather phenomenon, claims abound that the dys- state community but also a range of other organizations
function of proper governing mechanisms (e.g. absence facilitating, respecting and obstructing ‘global govern-
of a clear disaster preparedness program and political ance’ (for earlier reflections on colonial governance, see
corruption that distorts relief missions) also accentu- Chapter 8). The list would include non-governmen-
ated the (unequal) impacts of the disaster (see Keister tal organizations, inter-governmental organizations,
2013). Over 1 million people were left homeless and corporations and/or criminal cartels. Likewise, it no
some 6 million were displaced. In its aftermath, over 40 longer seems plausible to adhere to a rigid distinction
countries supported the UN effort alongside an array of between the domestic and the foreign. As John Agnew
non-governmental organizations in attempting to both (1994) rightly cautions, such a domestic/foreign polar-
respond to the initial destruction and implement recovery ity constitutes the ‘territorial trap’ whereby there is a
and rebuilding programmes as well as to support the dis- neglect of the changing significance and meanings of
placed (McCall 2014). The relationship between natural states in different historical-geographical circumstances.
catastrophes and governance is complex therefore and Indeed, states might well continue to enjoy formal sov-
disasters have also frequently offered opportunities for ereignty over their national territories, but they are

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 472    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

also deeply affected by the contemporary transnational

flows and global capital markets. The financial crisis of
2008–10 (and subsequent ‘austerity’), for example (see
Plate 24.2), duly demonstrated how the notion of the
state as a territorial container was being challenged, while
ideas pertaining to the safeguarding of ‘national econo-
mies’ and ‘national interests’ were constantly (re)pro-
duced by political leaders and senior figures in financial
authorities like the Bank of England, US Federal Reserve
and European Central Bank who were eager to convey the
impression that they were in ‘control’.
We might, at this stage, make a fundamental distinc-
tion between two kinds of political-territorial world
orders. There is an idealized order, which in the inter- Plate 24.2  Financial crisis, 2008.
national system is composed of states, which enjoy de (Toby Melville/Reuters)

jure sovereignty over their national territories. This

intricate link between sovereignty and territory is often points, namely the Arctic and the South China Sea where
traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) between there is no shortage of material pertaining to states and
European sovereigns, whereby there is an international political leaders eager to perform, protect and exclude
codification of the basic principles of territorial integrity, in the name of governance (as detailed in Chapter 20). It
border inviolability and supremacy of the state. Alter- might seem odd to investigate maritime spaces but in doing
natively, there is a functional order that is rather more so we will be able to reflect on how governance has been
complicated which holds the de facto view that states, for understood and implemented in watery environments. In
example, do not enjoy complete and absolute authority so doing, we recall that 70 per cent of our planet is com-
over their territorial domains. This might manifest itself posed of water and that the seas and oceans are complex
in all kinds of ways from an inability to impose law and spaces claimed by coastal states, traversed by commercial
order on parts of their ‘national territory’ (as described traffic, fished and exploited for its resources, and enrolled
in Chapter 22) to an inability to stop others interfering in legal frameworks, strategic planning and defence
with the territorial integrity of a country (for example, in arrangements by local states, international organizations
2014, Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula and destabi- such as the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, and
lized eastern Ukraine, with many observers arguing that extra-territorial powers alike.
Russia was seeking to extend its international borders Initially, we consider why there has been an upsurge of
into Ukrainian territory). As John Agnew (2005b; 2009) reflection on global governance, with due reverence given
claims, sovereignty is never complete and/or absolute – to some relevant contextual and theoretical perspectives.
rather than assuming sovereignty as fixed and naturally Thereafter, the governance of the Arctic and the South
tied in to the nation-state and territory, attention should China Sea are used as examples of how the regulation of
be given to how sovereignty can function on different these maritime spaces have become embedded in an ever
geographical scales and can be shared by multiple actors more complex matrix of states, non-governmental organ-
(Jessop 2002; Brenner 2004). izations, and international governmental bodies includ-
In this chapter we explore a number of themes and ing the United Nations (see Spotlight box 24.1). Finally,
issues germane to a discussion on global governance mind- the chapter concludes with how governance questions
ful of those idealized and functional senses of world order. remind us of the importance of accountability, access
But we will do so from some potentially unusual vantage and authority in the contemporary world.

Spotlight box 24.1

United Nations Nations, to facilitate ‘cooperation in international law,

international security, economic progress, social pro-
The UN has 193 member states, a figure that includes gress, human rights and achievement of world peace’
the vast majority of the world’s sovereign states. Estab- (UN website). The League of Nations was an inter-gov-
lished in 1945, it was meant to succeed the League of ernmental organization whose primary goals, as stated

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 Chapter 24  Global governance    473

in its Covenant, included preventing war through collec-

tive security, disarmament and settling international dis-
putes through negotiation and arbitration. However, the
onset of the Second World War demonstrated that the
League had failed in its primary purpose. There were
many reasons for this failure. The USA had refused to
join – following political debate and lack of consensus
over the League in the US Senate. It has also been
pointed out that the structural weakness of the organi-
zation – many decisions required the unanimous con-
sent of the entire Assembly which made conclusive
and swift action difficult – culminated in its eventual
demise (see Gill 1996; Pollock 2003). The inspiration
for the formation of the UN thus stems from the wish Plate 24.3  UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon.
(kisa kuyruk/Shutterstock)
for a more effective organization for the managing of
world affairs.
Headquartered in New York, the UN has six major The organization is funded by assessed subscrip-
elements: the General Assembly (the debating cham- tions from member states. The regular two-year budget
ber), the Security Council (addressing resolutions per- of the UN and its specialized agencies are funded by
taining to peace and security), the Secretariat (providing assessments – the General Assembly approves the
support for the UN), the UN Trusteeship Council (inac- regular budget and determines how much each member
tive), the International Court of Justice (based in The state has to give. This is broadly based on the relative
Hague), and the Economic and Social Council (promot- economic capabilities of various countries, as evalu-
ing international economic development and coopera- ated by their Gross National Income, taking into account
tion). There are also other major agencies associated adjustments for external debt and low per capita income
with the UN, including the World Health Organization, (UN website). Given that the Assembly has established
the World Food Programme and UN Children’s Fund. the principle that the UN should not be overly dependent
The current Secretary-General is the former South on any one member to finance its operations, there is a
Korean diplomat, Ban Ki-Moon, who took over the post ‘ceiling’ rate, setting the maximum amount a state can
in 2007 (see Plate 24.3). contribute to the budget.

24.2 Theorizing global governance

In the last decade or so, terms like governance have
become associated for many Western viewers with tel-
evision reports of political leaders, global corporations
and international financial organizations such as the
World Bank (see Chapter 8). G7/8/20 meetings around the
world in places like Genoa, London, Seattle and Toronto
further cement an impression of the rich and powerful
gathering to manage the world (see Plate 24.4). In close
proximity, it is common to find individuals and social
movements taking to the streets of those aforementioned Plate 24.4  Recent G20/G7 meeting.
cities protesting against global economic and political (Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)
integration, and highlighting the persistence of inequal-
ity (Klein 2007). The Occupy movement, a social move- purpose of drawing attention to how governance gets
ment of anti-austerity protestors, has targeted particular made in and through particular places.
sites of international governance and in particular the But global governance is increasingly being theorized
European Central Bank and World Bank, for the explicit through the optics of climate change as well, especially

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 474    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

as it relates to how contemporary capitalism is complicit ‘worldwide peace and prosperity’. Premised on a market-
in continued environmental degradation, greenhouse gas driven approach in shaping the political and economic
emission and fossil fuel production and consumption. priorities of the state, neoliberalism is unequivocally
In her provocative book, This Changes Everything, the represented as a force that will lift the whole world out
Canadian author Naomi Klein (2014) argues that our of poverty as more and more communities embrace and
ability to act decisively with regard to climate change partake in the workings of the capitalist global economy
mitigation is constrained by ideological and structural (Tickell and Peck 2003). Thus, the critics complained that
forces. She argues that, ‘we have not done the things that underlying claims to good governance was actually a dis-
are necessary to lower emissions because these things ciplinary impulse (a form of governmentality, see Spot-
fundamentally conflict with deregulated capitalism ... light box 24.2) in which governments and their national
We are stuck because the actions that would give us the populations were trained to operate in new ways, with
best chance of averting catastrophe – and would benefit the incentive being that they were more likely to attract
the vast majority – are extremely threatening to an elite additional aid and investment (Larner 2003; Watts 2003).
minority that has a stranglehold over our economy, our In this sense, governance came with certain caveats and
political process, and most of our major media outlets’ stringent conditions.
(Klein 2014: 18). For this critic, governance is effectively It was no accident that good governance debates and
‘captured’ by self-interested political and financial elites. structural adjustment coincided with the decline of the
All of this placed further pressure on those attending the Cold War and the intensification of a sense of global
2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris to secure interdependence (see Chapter 8). To put it bluntly, North-
meaningful progress on greenhouse emission reduction. ern states were still eager to control further aid packages,
In discussing global governance, we need to address while at the same time take advantage of new economic
two different constituencies. First, we should provide opportunities in emerging markets, especially with the
some contextual detail to these aforementioned activi- demise of the Soviet Union and Cold War networks and
ties. Why, for example, is it now so common for high-level relations (see Chapter 21). For Southern states, espe-
meetings between the G7 and G20 to attract such pro- cially those with weak economies and limited control
tests, violence and even death? Second, how have theo- over their national territories, these kinds of demands
rists explored the nature of governance with reference were accepted as part of what was termed ‘structural
to world order? Who, for example, benefits from good adjustment’. For instance, many Latin American nations
governance? including Mexico, Argentina and Brazil implemented
In an earlier phase, the 1980s and 1990s, governance both internal and external changes (notably privatization
was a subject matter more often reserved for discus- and deregulation and the reduction of trade barriers) in
sions of the global South (Sheppard and Nagar 2004; the 1980s so that they could qualify for loans from IMF
Slater 2004). Indeed, as Williams et al. (2009: 3) rightly and the World Bank to ‘save’ their debt-ridden econo-
note, this period has seen the global South being con- mies. Furthermore, international institutions asserted
stantly represented ‘as a collection of place and peoples further control in the late 1990s when the subject matter
in need of external (i.e. Northern) intervention’. Under of corruption was addressed. Countries such as Kenya
the euphemism of ‘good governance’, it was argued by that were judged to be aberrant for a period of time had
international institutions like the World Bank and leading funding support suspended (see Chapter 17).
states such as the USA that public decision making would In the aftermath of the 11 September 2011 attacks
be better served if state bureaucracies were reduced, on the United States, this good governance trend was
legal systems reformed, accountability improved, for- supplemented by further financial and military pres-
mal democracy and democratic institutions entrenched sures. Fearful of a repeat of 9/11, the USA led attempts
and market led reforms implemented. For the critics by the international community to control more closely
of good governance, these reforms were empowered by financial flows and, at the same, intervene in the global
a neoliberal economic vision, which placed a premium South if concerns were expressed that some countries
on a reform package designed to make Southern econo- and regions might harbour terrorists and their terror
mies more ‘accessible’ to foreign direct investment and networks. This concern for ‘quasi-states’ (as Intera-
corporations (Harvey 2005). As Roberts’ et al. (2003: tional Relations theorist Robert Jackson (1993) had
887) put it, neoliberal idealism, bolstered by the ‘simple termed them) and ‘weak states’ manifested itself in the
master narrative about the inexorable force of economic invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and surveillance and
globalization’ upheld the idea that the universal exten- other military initiatives elsewhere. For example, the
sion of the virtues of openness, transparency and inte- firm belief that Philippines’ susceptibility to transna-
gration inherent in free markets would ultimately bring tional terrorist networks due to its government’s weak

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 Chapter 24  Global governance    475

Spotlight box 24.2

Governmentality

Developed by the French philosopher and historian

Michel Foucault (see Plate 24.5) in a series of essays
delivered at the College de France in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, it addresses the ways in which subjects are
governed via a series of techniques and rationalities.
In so doing, it considers how governments attempt to
manage their populations. Foucault himself described it
as the ‘art of government’ and suggested that authori-
ties might control populations in a manner whereby
particular understandings of how to behave and act
become simply accepted without contestation. Neo-
liberal governmentality, for instance derives its power Plate 24.5  Michel Foucault.
in part from the image of the absentee state and the (Jean-Pierre Fouchet/Getty Images)

acceptance of market mechanisms as the best way to

allocate resources. However, as Peck (2004) cautions,
the practical content of neoliberal reform strategies is are organized, financed or co-opted by national govern-
often quite ‘interventionist’, albeit in different ways. In ments or international agencies, many of which deliver
his words, neoliberal imperatives are always melded services and operationalize discourses that were once
with ‘a range of paternalist, authoritarian, developmen- the privileged province of nation-states and their local
talist and socio-democratic state form, together with outposts, signifying that the clean lines once imag-
the concomitant ascendancy of (appropriately elastic) ined to exist between the national state and the off-
notions of governmentality’. Hence beyond the clichés shore world, or between bureaucracy and civil society
of more market/less state, the neoliberal script actually have become increasingly complicated (Ferguson and
suggestively encompasses a wide range of proactive Gupta 2002; Brenner et al. 2003). What this means is
state strategies designed to refashion state–economy that there is no one simple outcome to neoliberal gov-
relations around a new constellation of elite, manage- ernmentality, comprising a series of unified and fully
rial and financial interests. In this formulation, there integrated market-oriented policies; the focus is placed
is a restructuring (rather than ‘rolling back’) of state instead on how these ‘neoliberal’ processes are medi-
responsibilities and spatialities – contemporary phe- ated and played out in different historical-geographical
nomena like the proliferation of NGOs, many of which circumstances.

control over peripheral islands with ongoing separatist Making sense of these kinds of changes has attracted a
insurgencies has led to the USA deploying armed forces range of theoretical perspectives, and we can only briefly
(in tandem with those of the Philippines) in the name review the major ones. For disciplines such as Interna-
of dealing with such potential threats (Glassman 2005; tional Relations (IR), a consideration of governance is
Woon 2009). Thus, it can be seen that countering ter- never far removed from the central concern of order.
rorism, promoting market-led reform and geopolitical For a theorist such as Hedley Bull (1995), order in world
realignment in the aftermath of the Cold War have all politics was epitomized by ‘concerns [for] the pattern
played their parts in reshaping contemporary global or disposition of international activity that sustains the
governance. For the critics, including the protestors that elementary, primary or universal goals of the system and
gathered at some G20 meetings (and those in the Occupy society of states’. These goals included: the preservation
movement, which was examined in Chapters 21 and 23), of the system, the maintenance of peace, and the uphold-
these transformations have deepened market hegemony ing of the sovereign independence of states. For other the-
and arguably reduced the capacity of many countries to orists, order has also been understood as embracing both
manage their own affairs. the production and preservation of stability and regular

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 476    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

patterns of behaviour within the system of states and, as others that the prevailing system should be preserved.
a consequence, the promotion of cooperative behaviour This approach has enjoyed renewed popularity in recent
(Elster 1989). years because of interest in the growing importance of
This understanding of order remains influential but China (connected with the debates described in the clos-
the nature of that order might, and indeed does, vary ing section of Chapter 20) and debate about whether
over time and space. For some theorists, the long-term this might lead to a new hegemonic power replacing Pax
stability of any world order depends on the role of a Americana. Some have argued that a decline of Ameri-
hegemonic party (Gilpin 1989, Cox 2001). In this con- can power and the rise of new challengers might be seen
ception, hegemony, denoting the political, economic, not simply as a putative transition from one hegemon to
cultural and especially ideological dominance that one another, but a change in the very nature of hegemony,
group, state or class has over others, is widely seen as the from one of states closely connected with their ruling
necessary condition for harnessing stability in the global classes to a more dispersed pattern (see Figure 24.1),
arena. Hegemony is not simply domination, but relates whereby ‘What binds these diverse regions and actors
to the capacity to persuade others that the system as a together is a shared commitment to an ideology of mar-
whole is also in their interests. As such, interest is devoted ket economics and a growing recognition that territorial-
to the role of the United States in the post-1945 era in ity alone is not a secure basis for economic or geopolitical
shaping and maintaining a new international economic power’ (Agnew and Corbridge 1995: 205–7).
and political order based on ideas such as free trade and Others have explored world orders on the premise
economic liberalization. While a hegemonic state might that stability is ensured by a so-called balance of power.
enjoy extraordinary military and other power capabili- This is largely based on what IR calls a realist under-
ties, its influence lies in part in its capacity to persuade standing of world politics, which posits that states are

B
USA A USSR
L
A
N
C
Western E
Japan A B C D E
Europe
O Eastern Bloc Countries
F

P
Non-Socialist Third World Socialist Third World
O
W
E
R = flashpoint

Major core regions

and institutions
(including IMF)
of market-access
capitalism

Secondary city regions

within market-access
capitalist world economy

Outposts of
market-access
capitalism
Figure 24.1  Diagrammatic
Circuits of capital representation of
Provisional circuits hegemony during (above)
of capital and (below) after the
Cold War.
Source: based on Agnew and
­Corbridge (1995)

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 Chapter 24  Global governance    477

constantly in the processing of negotiating their relations (2000) claim that EU possesses a multi-level governance
with one another, and that this occurs against a back- system is premised on the observation that overlapping
drop in which there is no single overreaching authority competencies among multiple levels of government and
(the UN is itself an expression of the member states, not the interaction of political actors across those levels exist
above them). The international system is judged to be within the regional bloc. Concurring that member state
anarchical because there is no effective world govern- executives, while powerful, are only one set among a
ment. So, as a consequence, states have to coexist with variety of actors in the European polity, Leitner et al.
one another, sometimes uneasily. In so doing, if there is (2002), on the other hand, exemplify how transnational
a stable world order then it is likely to be balanced by networks among cities and regions in the EU are good
two or more states acting as restraining influences. So, examples of new political relations emerging across
according to this concept, the Cold War era was com- national boundaries, but situated at subnational politi-
paratively stable because the Soviet Union and the USA cal scale. According to them, the ‘horizontal collective
counterbalanced one another. What matters under this action among cities and regions, forged around a com-
approach is a concern for power projection and the eco- mon agenda of mutual advantage [crosses] – and may
nomic and military strengths of states. Of course these challenge – the hierarchical relations between different
different forms of power and governance may coexist, scales of political governance (local, regional, national
albeit with the emphasis between them and their relative and supranational)’ (Leitner et al. 2002: 296–7) (see too
significance evolving. Chapter 14 and Spotlight box 20.3).
As we have noted, from this vantage point, the United Subsequent work informed by the Kantian tradition
Nations is not considered to be any kind of substitute has investigated further the manner in which like-minded
for the absence of world government. Fundamentally, the states create international regimes for the purpose of
UN is a collective of individual member states, which cur- sharing certain rules, values and norms in the apparent
rently stands at 193. Realists tend to be sceptical about absence of a world authority. Indeed, the initial justifi-
the nature and scope of the authority of this international cation put forth by the Bush administration to invade
body. This scepticism is in part rooted in the experiences Iraq in 2003 was premised on the claim that the country
of the League of Nations, which proved unable to prevent possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). How-
conflict in the inter-war period, and the experience of the ever, when these alleged WMDs were not found on Iraqi
Cold War where the superpowers both routinely margin- soil, the argument shifted to the notion that the Saddam
alized the UN when it did not suit their purposes. Crit- regime was a dictatorship, and abusive of human rights
ics of contemporary US foreign policy would also note (see Dalby 2003; Flint and Falah 2004). In both cases,
that the Bush administration was eager to by-pass any while many members of that American administration
restraints imposed by the UN General Assembly when it were sceptical of the UN, they still wanted nonetheless
came to seeking authorization for the US-led invasion of the imprimatur of the UN Security Council. And the
Iraq in 2003. subsequent arguments about the legality of the US-led
Finally, other scholars have considered how states invasion of Iraq were rooted, on all sides, in competing
work together to create something akin to an interna- arguments about international law and the scope of exist-
tional society. Mindful of a lack of world government ing UN resolutions addressing Iraq’s behaviour regarding
and inspired by the writings of Immanuel Kant (Spot- weapons of mass destruction and human rights abuses.
light box 24.3) and his studies of ‘perpetual peace’, these The debate was also mired in accusations that Iraq’s sub-
analysts consider how governance is addressed through stantial oil reserves were an important strategic consid-
restraint and cooperation. How do sovereign states eration within the Bush administration (see Chapter 5
seek to avoid confrontation and exercise restraint? One and Le Billon and El Khatib 2004).
answer is by building ‘thick relationships’ that empha- Governance, in this sense, is a shared if imperfect pro-
size mutual interdependence and universally accepted ject in which states (and the emphasis often remains on
norms. For these authors, the creation of the United these actors) seek to embed and develop an international
Nations and later regional blocs such as the European society. For Kantians, the existence of democratic/repub-
Union (EU) is emblematic of this trend of seeking to lican states was considered to be critical to the long-term
promote interdependence and cooperation. In particu- viability of such an international society not least because
lar, the EU has frequently been utilized as a case study it was believed that democracies were less likely to wage
to exemplify how multi-level governance has functioned war on one another. But in a world where not all states
to enable the formation of interlocking and collabora- are democracies (and the democratic spectrum is a broad
tive networks between various nation-states (Paasi 2003, one), theorists disagree about what kinds of conditions
2009; Bialasiewicz et al. 2005). For instance, Sbargia’s improve stability and order.

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 478    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

Spotlight box 24.3

Immanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant (see Plate 24.6) was an eighteenth-cen-

tury philosopher who wrote an essay in 1795 entitled
‘Perpetual peace: a philosophical sketch’. Kant outlines
what he calls some ‘preliminary articles’ necessary for
more pacific relations between states including ‘No
independent states, large or small, shall come under
the dominion of another state by inheritance, exchange,
purchase, or donation’. He then outlined what he called
three definitive articles which would provide the neces-
sary foundation for peace itself: every state should be
republican, the ‘law of nations’ would function amongst
a federation of free states and a law of world citizen-
ship would be based on universal hospitality. Kant talked
about republican not democratic states, which would be
defined by representative government and that legis-
lature will be separated from the executive branch of
the government. He also does not regard that repub-
lican governments are sufficient by themselves to pro-
duce peace; rather he envisages some kind of league
of nations and freedom of emigration that would be
necessary to manage human affairs (Archibugi 1995;
Kleingeld 2004). It is perhaps unsurprising then that
observations have been made that the EU is in some
ways Kantian, given how its regional structures and inte-
grative (economic and immigration) policies are largely
Plate 24.6  Immanuel Kant.
indicative of Kant’s model of a ‘federation’ of states
(Juulijs/fotolia)
(Elden and Bialasiewicz 2006; Wolin 2010). This is con-
trary to the USA’s (generally realist) view of the world, Balibar (2003), was most clearly seen in the post-9/11
in which the absence of an effective world government era whereby (the majority of) Europe’s attachment to
signifies that the USA has to take the lead in maintaining international laws and norms to deal with ‘terrorism’
peace and order in an otherwise anarchical geopoliti- is contrasted to America’s enhanced world role in this
cal scene. Such a distinction, according to scholars like transformed security condition.

At a systemic level, there is broad agreement that the were to further entrench a particular global order – one
development of multilateral institutions and institution- that is perhaps best understood as a neoliberal one,
alized cooperation has been tremendously important in empowered by shared values, norms and rules designed
shaping contemporary global governance. Whether it is to ease global exchange. But the notion of ‘shared’ should
expressed through the United Nations and/or organi- not blind us to the fact this is an imposed project. Gov-
zations such as the World Bank and IMF, states and ernance, as Richard Ashley (1987) once noted, is via
non-state actors alike are embedded in a whole raft of imposition – imposing rules, silencing others and their
obligations and restraints ranging from global human knowledge, practices and projects.
rights to international trade law and intellectual prop- Whatever understanding of governance we choose
erty rights. While the United States might be unrivalled to adopt, it is never divorced from fundamental ques-
as a military power, it is also deeply dependent on others tions of power and knowledge. The manner in which
for its economic and financial stability. Indeed, as noted the world appears to be organized and managed is not
earlier, the effects of the ‘good governance’ developments a natural condition of global life. The prevailing global

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 Chapter 24  Global governance    479

economic order, based on neoliberal capitalism and good the EU. One event often cited as transformative in that
governance strategies, is a human creation. The rules, regard was the 2007 planting of the Russian flag on the
norms and values selected to regulate that order are bottom of the central Arctic Ocean. Images of an under-
also imposed. This in turn shapes public debate about, water submersible gently dropping the titanium flagpole
for instance, feasible policy options. Some policies and into place were widely circulated in national and global
practices appear more ‘reasonable’, such as cutting public media networks (Dodds 2010). For Russian audiences, the
spending in the aftermath of a financial crisis, and those flag planting exercise was widely interpreted as indica-
that seek to challenge those policies are often presented as tive of national prowess and technological sophistication
iconoclastic and disruptive, such as activists, students and even if the expedition itself was privately funded by a
trade unionists. The prevailing norms and mechanisms Swedish benefactor. For others, including senior Cana-
of governance work to promote particular agendas, and dian political officials, the expedition and flag planting
geographers are increasingly mindful of how those ‘struc- ceremony was judged to be provocative and unnecessary.
tures’ of governance impact, in highly differential ways, While international lawyers noted that such an activity
upon communities and places around the world. had little to no international legal significance, political
Let us now turn to the case studies of the Arctic and scientists and journalists were penning evaluations of
South China Sea to find some evidence of how institu- the resource and strategic significance of the Arctic in
tions, networks and processes associated with governance the post-Cold War era, while raising the spectre of un-­
shape these two increasingly contested oceanic spaces. governability (Anderson 2009; Emmerson 2010; Spotlight
We focus on these two examples not to suggest that they box 24.4 and Chapter 5).
are in any way unique or exceptional. Rather, in line with This flag planting episode brought to the fore both
growing acknowledgements that seas and their associated the changing geopolitical representation of the Arctic
maritime geographies can provide important geopolitical and, relatedly, the governance of the Arctic, and specifi-
insights (Steinberg 2001; Steinberg and Gerhardt 2015), cally the role of international cooperation between and
we argue that there is plenty of evidence to be gathered beyond states. Six years after the flag planting episode,
about how their governance works, according to prevail- however, the geographical imaginaries surrounding
ing norms and values associated with the contemporary the Arctic were altered substantially when five ‘Asian
neoliberal economic and political order. states’ namely China, India, South Korea, Japan and
Singapore became observers to the Arctic Council and
in so doing encouraged a broadside of media commen-
tary reflecting on the growing role of these countries
24.3 Governing the Arctic Ocean and what that might mean for cooperation and indeed
competition (see Solli et al. 2013). Almost inevitably,
In the last decade, the changing physical conditions in the China’s role in the Arctic was scrutinized most closely
Arctic region have generated scores of commentaries (see, with concern raised by some that Chinese financial and
for example, Johnson 2010; Young 2012), and captured political investments might destabilize existing govern-
the attention of states and other organizations including ance arrangements.

Spotlight box 24.4

Defining the Arctic as ‘Arctic states’, namely Canada, Denmark/Green-

land, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and
Definitions of the Arctic region vary from those based the United States. Of those eight, five are described as
on biological, climatic and/or geographical factors, such Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Denmark/Green-
as the Arctic Circle and/or political criteria. The Arctic land, Norway, Russia and the United States) because
Council’s definition includes all oceans and territories of their geographical proximity to the Arctic Ocean and
north of the Arctic Circle and adjacent territories in Sibe- the rights they acquire under the terms of the United
ria and North America, and southern oceanic regions in Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
the Atlantic and Bering Strait (see Figure 24.2). All eight Source: http://web.arcticportal.org/uploads/UQ/3a/UQ3aTSHhcNfq8-­
members of the Arctic Council are typically described OjsuoQtg/CAFFpolitical.jpg
➜

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 480    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

➜
Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region
180 ° E / W
)
3'N
6°3
(6
le
rc
Ci
tic c
U Ar
SA

13
°W

5
5

°E
13

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I
C

S
A

e
N

S
d
i
R
A

U
v
o
s
D

R
n
A

North
m

90 °W 90 °E
Pole
o
L
G

ee
r
(D

E
N
nl
M an
A
R d
K
)
45

°E
°W

45

RUSSIA
NORWAY

FINLAND

I CE SWEDEN Polar stereographic projection

L AN
D
0 nautical miles 400 at 66°N
0°E / W

0 kilometres 600

Internal waters Norway claimed continental Straight baselines

Canada territorial sea and shelf beyond 200 nm (note 3)
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) Russia territorial sea and EEZ Agreed boundary
Potential Canada continental shelf Russia claimed continental
beyond 200 nm (see note 1) shelf beyond 200 nm (note 4)
Median line
Denmark territorial sea and EEZ
Norway-Russia special area (note 5)
Denmark claimed continental shelf
350 nm from baselines
beyond 200 nm (note 2) USA territorial sea and EEZ
Potential Denmark continental shelf Potential USA continental shelf
beyond 200 nm (note 1) 100 nm from 2500 m isobath
beyond 200 nm (note1)
(beyond 350 nm from baselines)
Iceland EEZ
Overlapping Canada/USA EEZ
Iceland claimed continental shelf
Eastern Special Area (note 7) Svalbard treaty area
beyond 200 nm (note 2)
Norway territorial sea and EEZ / Fishery zone Unclaimed or unclaimable
(Jan Mayen)/Fishery protection zone (Svalbard) continental shelf (note1)

Figure 24.2  Map of the Arctic.

Source: based on map produced by the International Boundaries Research Group (IBRU) at Durham University. Original and notes are
at: www.durham.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic

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 Chapter 24  Global governance    481

The two strands (i.e. geopolitics and governance) are of underwater, drifting ice and aerial surveillance opera-
closely inter-related because debates over polar govern- tions of the kind depicted in films such as Ice Station
ance have followed on from a sense in which the Arctic is Zebra (1968) and The Hunt for Red October (1990) (see
in a state of physical and geopolitical flux (Johnson 2010; Plate 24.7). One immediate consequence of such activi-
Dodds and Nuttall 2015). To put it simply, during the ties was to ensure that the Arctic Ocean was a highly
Cold War, while the Arctic was indisputably a frontline militarized space with little to no evidence of coopera-
between the USA and the Soviet Union, it was a region tion among the Soviet Union and the four coastal states
in which the presence of thick sea ice acted as a physical in particular, namely the USA, Canada, Denmark and
barrier to movement and extra-territorial interest – it was Norway. With four out of the five Arctic Ocean coastal
a space of ‘thin governability’. The Arctic Ocean, while states being members of NATO, this sense of the Arctic
accessible, was not characterized by the kind of accessi- as a geopolitical frontline was well founded.
bility that might have been taken for granted in the other As the Cold War declined, the dominant geopolitical
maritime spaces such as the Mediterranean and South representation of the Arctic shifted. In part, this was due
China Sea. Both the Soviets and the US navies developed to the improvement of relations between the previously
polar strategies predicated on the belief that each side opposing sides. After Mikhail Gorbachev’s noted speech
would seek to contain the movement of their enemies’ in 1987 calling for the Arctic to be a ‘zone of peace’, con-
submarine fleets in particular and were not concerned certed efforts were made to improve relations between the
about Korean, Chinese and Japanese shipping operators, five Arctic Ocean coastal states and neighbouring coun-
for example. tries such as Finland, Iceland and Sweden. One manifesta-
The dominant Cold War conceptualization of Artic tion of this rapprochement was the creation in 1996 of the
security was, therefore, based on containment (as part of Arctic Council (AC), which was designed to improve coop-
the wider Cold War geopolitics examined in Chapter 20) eration over matters of mutual concern including environ-
rather than territorial transgression. As part of this con- mental management and shipping. Polar governance was
tainment exercise, both sides conducted an assortment entering a new phase but a period nonetheless dominated

Plate 24.7  Posters from the films Hunt for Red October (1990) and Ice Station Zebra (1968).
(Courtesy of Everett Collection/Rex Shutterstock)

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 482    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

by states and their security-led agendas. Hence, rather than as fishing, tourism and trans-polar shipping routes, with
a straightforward ‘rolling back’ of the state, contempo- their apparent promise of cutting thousands of nautical
rary governmentality functions through a restructuring of miles for those seeking to move freight from East Asia to
state’s role and responsibilities – participation in an inter- Europe (Powell 2008).
state forum whereby negotiations of positions and agendas This interest in spatial administration manifests itself
are made vis-à-vis other relevant actors. in the interest shown by political actors, including the
The AC is an intergovernmental organization. It is European Union (EU), in examining a variety of govern-
intended to aid and abet Arctic states in areas of common ance options. At present, Arctic Ocean governance is
interest. Notably, all parties agreed that any discussions shaped by three key factors – the Arctic Council, the Law
involving military and security matters would be avoided of the Sea and a host of regional regimes such as fisheries
even though the Cold War was considered to be finished. agreements. The Arctic Council (AC) is a soft-law institu-
On a more progressive note, however, indigenous peo- tion, meaning that it is largely advisory and lacking in a
ples and organizations such as the Sami Council were permanent secretariat, for example (McIver 1997; Bloom
invited to be permanent participants of the Arctic Coun- 1999). It does not have any legal competence. It cannot
cil. Underlying the creation of the Arctic Council was a demand that member states restrain from, for example,
sense in which the members involved recognized that the drilling offshore for oil and gas. Organizationally, the
logic of containment was neither sufficient nor desirable Arctic Council has attached to its permanent member-
in the changed geopolitical circumstances. Instead the ship so-called observer states such as Britain, and now
Arctic has been understood as a weakly governed space new observer states such as China, South Korea and Sin-
needing effective spatial administration. gapore. These ‘observer states’ cannot shape the agenda
Apart from the apparently obvious point that the super- of the annual meetings but they are allowed to attend a
powers were no longer so threatening to one another (with certain amount of the formal business of the member
the Arctic as a major theatre of operations), a key driver states and contribute to the work of the AC. Permanent
of change has been the spectre of climate change (Johnson participants such as indigenous peoples’ groups (e.g.
2010; Steinberg and Gerhardt 2015). While serving as an Inuit Circumpolar Council, Sami Council, Aleut Inter-
indicator of global environmental change, melting sea ice national Association) also attend the meetings of the AC
was widely identified as indicative of greater accessibil- but do not have voting rights.
ity in a political and material sense. Politically, the Arctic Since its creation in 1996, the AC arguably demon-
Ocean has attracted more interest from national govern- strates something that is considered axiomatic by realist
ments, corporations, scientific communities, indigenous scholars, namely that states tend to veer towards self-
peoples and media networks. The 2007 flag planting epi- interested behaviour. One of the central reasons why the
sode coinciding as it did with satellite images of an appar- AC is a soft-law institution is that the five Arctic Ocean
ently ice-free North West Passage encouraged a maelstrom coastal states in particular were reluctant to agree to a
of media speculation about an apparent ‘scramble for the more substantial treaty-based international regime, as
pole’. Materially, a more accessible Arctic Ocean raises found in Antarctica. Notwithstanding concerns about
the spectre of further resource extraction in areas such as the growing accessibility of the Arctic Ocean, and the
oil and gas (see Plate 24.8), alongside other activities such mounting interest from parties geographically remote
from the region, the states concerned have sought to
improve and indeed strengthen cooperation with one
another in specific areas such as shipping, search and
rescue, and environmental cooperation.
The United States and Russia have at times been reluc-
tant to strengthen the remit of the AC. Smaller states
such as Norway, Denmark and Sweden have shown
a willingness to strengthen the AC. Between 2006 and
2012, the three Nordic countries agreed to create a semi-
permanent secretariat in Tromso, which later became
permanent in 2013 onwards. This move to improve the
coordination and networking capacity of the AC was, in
very large part, driven by growing interest in the forum
from outside parties. As the Arctic states recognized at
Plate 24.8  Oil/gas extraction in the Arctic. a ministerial meeting in Greenland in 2011, there was
(Leonid Ikan/fotolia) more of a need to be seen to be generating more ‘Arctic

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 Chapter 24  Global governance    483

governance’. A new legally binding measure on search of square miles of seabed. The implications for the Arctic
and rescue was signed and in 2013 another agreement on Ocean are considerable – it is likely that the five coastal
oil spill response was also negotiated at the same time states will enjoy collectively sovereign rights to explore
new observers were admitted with new rules and criteria and exploit the natural resources of virtually the entire
governing their behaviour were published. maritime region and anything left over will be classified
The second major element in the governance of the as ‘The Area’ and thus under the auspices of the Interna-
Arctic Ocean lies in the provisions of the Law of the Sea tional Seabed Authority.
Convention (LOSC) (see Plate 24.9). For the five Arctic So the notion that there is a wild ‘scramble for
Ocean coastal states, the LOSC regulates large sways of resources’ in the Arctic Ocean is misplaced in one sense.
the Arctic Ocean by acknowledging a series of jurisdic- There is no ‘scramble’ because there is no need to ‘scram-
tions exists, ranging from the 12 nautical mile wide ter- ble’ (Dodds 2013). In 2008, the five Arctic Ocean coastal
ritorial sea, the 24 nautical mile wide contiguous zone states in the so-called Ilulissat Declaration re-affirmed
and a 200 nautical mile wide exclusive economic zone in their commitment to respect the Law of the Sea as the
which coastal states enjoy sovereign rights when it comes primary mechanism for ensuring cooperation in the Arc-
to the exploitation of resources (Steinberg 2001; Dodds tic Ocean and thus rejecting calls for any kind of Arctic
2010). As Article 56 notes: Treaty. Non-coastal states, under the terms of LOSC,
In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: enjoy rights of innocent passage in these particular mari-
time zones, subject to some regulatory rights of coastal
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
states. Innocent passage, under Article 19 of the LOSC,
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
is defined as:
resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to
subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the eco- the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.
nomic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such Such passage shall take place in conformity with this
as the production of energy from the water, currents Convention and with other rules of international law.
and winds
This right to innocent passage, alongside a growing
Moreover, under Articles 76 and 77, coastal states can commercial interest in trans-polar shipping routes, in large
seek to extend their sovereign rights over extended conti- part explains the interests of the EU, South Korea, Singa-
nental shelves (ECS). Interested parties, including all the pore, Japan and China, for example. The EU Commis-
Arctic Ocean coastal states barring the USA (which has sion in 2008 outlined the EU’s interests in the Arctic and
not acceded to the LOSC), have (or will have) submitted the European Parliament called for the EU Commission to
geological and oceanographic materials to the Commis- develop an Arctic policy in 2009. Shipping and fishing have
sion on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) based been identified as core interests, and Denmark, Finland
within the United Nations in New York. If accepted by and Sweden are EU member states, and, at one stage, it
the CLCS, coastal states are allowed to identify ECS and was even possible that Iceland might have emerged as a
extend their sovereign rights over potentially thousands fourth EU member state with distinct Arctic interests.
The third element shaping contemporary Arctic Ocean
governance is a patchwork of national and regional
fisheries management organizations such as the North
East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, the North Atlantic
Salmon Conservation Organization, the North Atlantic
Conference and the North Atlantic Fisheries Ministers’
Conference. With the ‘opening up’ of the Arctic Ocean in
the coming decades, as a consequence of sea ice thinning,
a number of Arctic states and others including the EU
Commission have called for further multilateral mecha-
nisms to be developed for the purpose of managing Arctic
fisheries. One suggestion in particular has been to cre-
ate an Arctic Regional Fisheries Management Organiza-
tion for the purpose of coordinating such efforts across
Plate 24.9  Signing of the Law of the Sea the Arctic Ocean. In 2014, the five Arctic Ocean coastal
Convention in 1982. states held a meeting in Greenland to discuss the need to
(UN Photo) develop in advance agreement on how to manage central

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 484    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

Arctic Ocean fisheries, if and when this maritime area the Danish government agreed, after a referendum in
becomes more accessible and more attractive to commer- 2008, to further autonomy and the awarding of resource
cial fishing, especially if fish stocks migrate northwards rights to the population there. So oil and gas exploration
due to warming waters further south. off the coast of Greenland in the future might provide a
Looking ahead, the future governance of the Arctic new revenue stream for eventual independence from Den-
Ocean is likely to be largely determined by, on the one mark, as might aluminium smelting – but this is contro-
hand, the continued existence of the AC and, on the other versial, with critics fearing that Greenland will become
hand, by the provisions of the LOSC. Neither Russia nor dependent on multinational corporations and their strat-
the United States appears willing to act in hegemonic ways, egies, not to mention the whimsical nature of global mar-
although Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine in 2014 kets (Nuttall 2008). Moreover, indigenous groups help to
raised the possibility that a new ‘Cold War’ might once unite the native peoples who may be artificially divided
again encapsulate the Arctic region. They and smaller Arc- by national territorial borders so that a platform is avail-
tic states such as Norway and Denmark/Greenland benefit able for them to articulate their concerns. A good case in
from this ‘pooling’ arrangement and there has been a great point is the Inuit Circumpolar Conference whereby Inuit
deal of governance talk emphasizing how the Arctic should living in USA, Russia and Canada often come together
be ‘contained’ and or ‘insulated’ from crises further south. to actively elicit responsibility on the part of the Arctic
The eight Arctic states have effectively agreed to abide states to deal with the issue of climate change so that a
by particular rules, customs, values and norms, while sustainable living environment can be made available to
at the same developing their own national strategies for the indigenous communities (Osofsky 2006/2007).
‘their’ part of the Arctic. They have also been emphatic
in their rejection of a proposal by the EU Commission
in 2008 to create an Arctic Treaty, along the lines of the
1959 Antarctic Treaty. One reason for this initiative was 24.4 Governing the South China Sea
to encourage the Arctic states to collaborate more closely
with extra-territorial actors such as the EU and to work The Arctic Ocean and the South China Sea are very differ-
towards transforming the Arctic Ocean into a zone of ent in terms of their geography, climate and geostrategic
peace and cooperation. For the five Arctic Ocean coastal importance. Yet there has been no lack of comparisons
states there is little or no apparent incentive to agree to made between these two seascapes, primarily because of
any further treaty development. Each, in their different their commonality stemming from the presence of rich
way, is eager to protect its sovereign rights in the Arc- natural resources and the competition to exploit them
tic Ocean without neglecting to cooperate in areas of (VanderZwaag and Vu 2012; Storey 2013b; Taylor 2014).
mutual interests such as fishing. But all of this can also Indeed the South China Sea – the second largest semi-
be a delicate project as issues such as energy exploitation, enclosed sea in the world which is bordered by China and
shipping and fishing alongside military/strategic consid- eight other ASEAN states – is not only a crucial con-
erations all have the capacity to be divisive. duit for more than a quarter of the world’s trade volume
Contemporary governance in the Arctic Ocean (Schofield 2009) but it is also home to a large number of
reminds us of two things. First, states do tend, as real- assets, notably maritime living resources as well as oil
ists would note, to articulate their interests in the Arc- and gas reserves (Rosenberg 2009; Nguyen Dang 2013).
tic in national terms. An emphasis on national security, Whilst the presence of valuable resources in the Arctic
resource control and maritime surveillance is common to and the South China Sea have arguably led to disputing
all the major policy pronouncements of the five coastal claims in these two regions, the scope of such claims has
states (e.g. Canada’s Northern Strategy of 2007). Second, differed greatly, however. In the whole of the vast Arctic
however, states and non-states are able to cooperate with area, there is only one piece of territory that is being dis-
one another and to create regimes and mechanisms (albeit puted: Hans Island, a 1.3 km2 atoll in the Nares Straits
with limited powers) to encourage information exchange, that is claimed by both Denmark and Canada. The sce-
cooperation and negotiation. The establishment of inter- nario in the South China Sea is far more complex, whereby
national norms and conventions help to arbitrate the multiple parties contest entire archipelagos. The Paracels,
different interests of relevant parties so that issues per- a group of some 30 small islands, reefs and shoals situ-
taining to the Arctic can be debated and resolved in a ated to the central north of the South China Sea, forms
peaceful and orderly manner. Third, indigenous groups the subject of a bilateral dispute between Vietnam and
and organizations have become more active in demanding China (including Taiwan). Further south, China, Taiwan
greater autonomy in terms of regional governance and and Vietnam assert sovereignty over all the atolls in the
future resource exploitation. In Greenland, for example, Spratly Islands, while the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei

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 Chapter 24  Global governance    485

claim part of the group. A more recent island sovereignty considered in the closing section of the chapter – and it
dispute, which has nevertheless garnered international was originally confirmed by China in 1947 with 11 dashes
attention, is that between China and the Philippines over entitled ‘Locations of the South China Sea Islands’ (Xue
the ring-shaped Scarborough Reef, which comprises sev- 2014). The Chinese authorities subsequently removed
eral rocks to the North of the Spratly Islands. Similarly, two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1953. Although
for maritime boundary disputes, the situation in the South China has never officially clarified what the nine-dash
China Sea has proved much more challenging as compared line denotes, it appears that Beijing is not only claiming
to the Arctic. The two disputed areas in the High North of sovereignty over the atolls within the line but also ‘histor-
the Arctic (between Canada and America in the Beaufort ical rights’ to maritime resources. In 2013 Zhiguo Gao –
Sea and between Canada and Denmark in the Lincoln Sea) a Chinese judge on the UN’s International Tribunal on
are relatively small and neither has generated serious fric- the Law of the Sea – published a co-authored academic
tions in bilateral relations. However, in the South China article which argued that the nine-dash line was justified
Sea, China’s maritime boundary claims have been expan- under international law and had ‘become synonymous
sive, overlapping with the EEZs of all the littoral states. with a claim of sovereignty over the island groups that
In analyzing the multiple disputes in the South China always belonged to China and with an additional Chinese
Sea, many commentators have pointed to China’s uncom- claim of historical rights of fishing, navigation, and other
promising stance as being the main source of the prob- marine activities (including the exploitation of resources,
lems. In justifying its claims, China has often referred mineral or otherwise) on the islands and in the adjacent
back to official Chinese maps to indicate a discontinuous waters’ (Gao and Jia 2013: 108). However, the nine-dash
nine-dash line that encloses approximately 80 per cent line significantly cuts into the maritime claims of the
of the South China Sea (see Figure 24.3). This U-shape Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam,
line first appeared in a map in 1914 drawn by Chinese who argue that it violates their sovereign right to develop
cartographer Hu Jin Jie (Zou 1999) – part of the claims maritime resources provided for under the LOSC.

These two lines were

removed in 1957 when China
China’s Central
Communist Party ceded Taiwan
Bailongwei Island in
China’s archipelago to
the Hanoi goverment.

Philippines
Thailand
Laos

Cambodia

Vietnam

Brunei

Malaysia
Singapore
Indonesia

0 500 1000 km

Figure 24.3  Map of China’s ‘nine-dash line’.

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 486    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

To negotiate these territorial and boundary disagree- Marine Seismic Undertaking (JSMU) between oil corpo-
ments, several governing frameworks have been concevied rations of China, the Philippines and Vietnam in 2005.
and adopted, but they are not without their limitations. Once hailed as a ‘historic event’ or a ‘breakthrough’
As with the Arctic case, contestants in the South China in the cooperation amongst the actors involved in the
Sea have vowed to settle their differences in accordance Spratly Islands dispute, the JSMU is stillborn, however.
with the LOSC. However, China’s commitment to exist- No concrete results were being registered and no follow-
ing international legal regimes has remained question- up actions have been undertaken upon the completion
able. For instance, few non-Chinese legal experts believe of the project. According to Schofield and Storey (2011),
that the nine-dash line promulgated by China is compat- the shortcomings of such a cooperative venture are fully
ible with the LOSC, and in January 2013 the Philippines revealed insofar as it is a highly sensitive issue, with
formally challenged such a cartographic imagination of claimant states remaining adamant that they have undis-
the South China Sea. Despite China’s refusal to partici- puted sovereignty over the area in question.
pate in the proceedings, the case is ongoing and the Arbi- Summarizing the preceding discussion, it can be
tral Tribunal is set to issue a verdict. However, even if seen that there are significant differences in the ways
the Tribunal rules that the nine-dash line is incompatible in which the Arctic states and South China Sea claim-
with the LOSC, Beijing seems set to ignore the ruling, ants approach their maritime disputes. As pointed out
leaving the problem unsolved. in the previous section, Arctic actors have subscribed to
The governance of the South China Sea has also been the principles of neoliberal governmentality by appeal-
approached through the diplomatic, cooperative route, ing to and relying on international laws and conventions
whereby official negotiations have been taking place to govern and address their disagreements in an orderly
between ASEAN and China. The initial result of this manner. This resolution pathway has proved to be unten-
process is the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Par- able in the South China Sea, however, given that coopera-
ties in the South China Sea, which serves as a confidence tion through legal and developmental regimes is arguably
building measure to prevent possible conflicts that might marred by what realists describe as the maximization of
arise from island disputes in the area. The implemen- individual state’s interests and agendas. Under such cir-
tation of this political document, however, is long and cumstances, it is hardly surprising that pessimistic over-
daunting (it took nine years for ASEAN and China to tures have emerged to characterize the future of politics
agree to the Guidelines for the implementation of the in the South China Sea. Specifically, there have been con-
Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China tentions that the rapid modernization of China’s navy
Sea), with many scholars questioning its effectiveness in and the expansion of its civilian maritime agencies will
reducing tensions over the disputed islands (see Nguyen allow the Beijing government to increase its presence in
2003). ASEAN is now urging China to negotiate a Code the South China Sea and bring coercive pressures to bear
of Conduct in the South China Sea, which is expected to on the smaller claimants. The rise of Chinese military
be binding and contain more stringent compliance mech- power will in turn provide a catalyst for regional mili-
anisms, but this has been met with lukewarm responses tary modernization programs, notably in Vietnam and
from Chinese officials. The fundamental problem here the Philippines (Bateman 2014). Others have argued that
is that Beijing rejects multilateral talks vis-à-vis the some ASEAN states such as the Philippines may hinge
ASEAN forum, insisting instead that disputes can only on the USA’s ‘pivot’ to Asia Pacific to create a common
be resolved bilaterally – that is between China and each front with America so as to counterbalance China’s
of the claimants on a one-to-one basis. However, many assertive actions in the South China Sea (Bhattacharaya
ASEAN members are extremely wary about direct bilat- 2014). But as Storey (2013b) rightly points out, such mili-
eral engagements with a big regional player like China taristic initiatives do not get to the root of the problem
because of the asymmetrical power relations involved. and getting the USA involved in the South China Sea
Lastly, a more proactive governance approach coming will only provoke a more belligerent and uncooperative
in the form of joint development of resources have been China. The key then is to return all parties to the negoti-
mooted. According to this ‘solution’, claimant states will ating table, so that a sustainable and plausible governing
put aside their territorial claims to engage in a coopera- framework can be derived to resolve the disputes in the
tive undertaking in the exploration and exploitation of region. Such a framework, according to Storey, has to
resources (particularly hydrocarbon ones). On the sur- be outcome-­oriented rather than process-driven and will
face, such a proposal is attractive given that it will help need to factor in a cooperative ethos through adherence
to ease tensions by creating a win–win situation through to international legal regimes, especially the LOSC, as
all parties having access to the valuable maritime assets. well as establishing effective conflict management and
A practical implementation of this approach is the Joint crisis-prevention mechanisms.

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 Chapter 24  Global governance    487

contemporary issues can no longer be confined within

24.5 Conclusion the limits of national territorial boundaries nor can a
singular state authority adequately deal them with. A
In both the Arctic and the South China Sea, the govern- good case in point is the regulation of ‘global commons’
ance regimes are changing in large part because of their (e.g. oceans and the atmosphere) whereby the role of
further integration into the contemporary neoliberal the international community is essential in collectively
world order. But this is throwing up tensions between governing the resources that are vital to the sustenance
states and non-state organizations. In the Arctic, a lim- of life. Alternatively, concerns have also been raised
ited number of coastal states are attempting to cement with regards to the trans-national impacts arising from
their sovereign rights, while others such as China are increased mobilities of people, goods and corporations
eager to ‘open up’ the Arctic Ocean to trans-polar in this globalizing era. It is then hardly surprising that
shipping routes and resource exploitation. In the South inter-governmental organizations such as the UN and EU
China Sea, a ‘more assertive’ China is widely viewed as have functioned as governance regimes in facilitating dia-
reshaping interactions and dynamics amongst claimant logues and meaningful cooperation to tackle these ‘prob-
states, thereby raising critical questions for multilateral lems’. For instance, the cross-border danger posed by
governance in the region. International law and pro- infectious diseases such as the deadly Ebola and Middle
tocols are emerging as increasingly important mecha- East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreaks in recent
nisms for ensuring that these potential flashpoints are years has led to the reiteration of the importance of the
addressed in an orderly manner. And by orderly, we UN, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and states
mean not only in a non-violent manner but also in in coordinating joint efforts to deal with such dangers.
ways that minimize disruptions to commercial activi- More widely, NGOs have frequently become key agents
ties and investment. Following Foucault, this is in line in networks of governance. A good example would be the
with neoliberal governmentality whereby international protests enacted by Greenpeace to critique the lacklus-
conventions help to arbitrate the different positions tre commitments of many states in dealing with climate
and interests of states so that consensual partnerships change. In this sense, governance is never emblematic of
and collaborative efforts can be harnessed to deal with a natural state of affairs. It is a complex social process
various issues pertaining to these two maritime spaces. that involves multiple actors often with conflicting agen-
Without suggesting the determinacy of such an out- das. This makes governance a highly contested endeavour
come, sovereign states in the Arctic and the South China and closely bound up with issues of power – it is not
Sea have also been eager to remind international audi- only capable of being supported but can also be resisted,
ences that they are determined to protect their interests, rejected or even overthrown.
militarily if necessary. As the previous chapters reminded us, therefore, we
But debates about governance should not be restricted are talking here in large part about how we, as human
to states alone and their sovereign rights. One danger beings, choose to organize our affairs. Ideas about space,
of focusing on world order and global governance is place, knowledge, power, international relations, govern-
that we give states a kind of privilege they don’t merit. ance and order are critical here and embedded within
States and their claims to sovereignty don’t just exist – human cultures. Those ideas are then put to work and
they are actively produced. Likewise claims to govern- continue to inform and influence the ways in which we
ance are just claims – they will have to be constantly understand the world around us including our relation-
negotiated with other state and non-state actors in the ship with others. All of this is, of course, profoundly
global arena. This is especially pertinent given that many geographical.

Learning outcomes ● In the 1980s and 1990s governance was strongly

Having read this chapter you should understand: associated with reforming government and
economy in the global South, especially in the light
● The term governance and the manner in which it of concerns over debt.
has been understood within geography and related
● Governmentality is a term developed in the writ-
disciplines such as International Relations.
ings of Michel Foucault addressing the ‘art of
● The term international order and how we might make government’ and the way in which populations are
a distinction between functional and idealized orders. organized and managed.

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 488    Section 5  Political geographies: geopolitics, territory, states, citizenship and governance

● The Arctic is undergoing a fundamental ‘state Dodds, K. and M. Nuttall (2016) Scramble for the Polar
change’ and provides an interesting example of Regions? The Contemporary Geopolitics of the Arctic and
evolving governance and changing physical proper- Antarctic Polity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. This
book addresses contemporary geopolitical challenges fac-
ties of the Arctic (e.g. melting sea ice) are provok-
ing the Arctic and Antarctic, and how resource exploitation
ing different debates about future governance. and speculation are placing further pressures on governance
● The governance of the South China Sea through legal arrangements.
regimes, joint development efforts and diplomatic Emmerson, C. (2010) The Future History of the Arctic,
negotiations has met with widespread obstacles. Bodley Head, London. An accomplished account of the
● Future governance will depend on future govern- geopolitical dynamics at play in the contemporary Arctic.
mentalities and how ideas about space, power, Hayton, B. (2014) The South China: The Struggle for Power
knowledge and order are mobilized. These relate to in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven.

changing forms and patterns of hegemony. Huang, J. and Billo, A. (eds) (2014) Territorial Disputes in
the South China Sea: Navigating Rough Waters, Palgrave
Macmillan, New York. An edited volume that disentangles the
legal, historical and governance aspects of the South China
Further reading Sea territorial and boundary disputes.
Steinberg, P., Tasch, J. and Gerhardt, H. (2015) Contest-
Agnew, J (2005) Hegemony: The New Shape of Global ing the Arctic: Rethinking Politics in the Circumpolar North,
Power, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, PA. A very I.B. Tauris, London. A survey of how the Arctic region has
good overview of how the international system has evolved been drawn into intense debates about sovereignty and
especially in the post 1945 era. stewardship.

See too this paper for an argument for the importance of Wu, S. and Hong, N. (eds) (2014) Recent Developments
thinking about power and authority beyond the conventional in the South China Sea Dispute: The Prospect of a Joint
focus of many on the exclusive role of states: Development Regime Routledge, Abingdon. An excellent set
of essays that consider the future possibilities for governing
Agnew, J (1994) The territorial trap: the geographical
the South China Sea.
assumptions of international relations theory, Review of
International Political Economy, 1(1), 53–80. On Foucault:

Fifteen years on from the original publication, a set of essays Crampton, J. and Elden, S. (eds) (2007) Space, Knowledge
published in Geopolitics revisited Agnew’s arguments. As the and Power: Foucault and Geography Ashgate, Aldershot.
introduction to that set notes: A compendium that highlights geographical readings of
Foucault, with notions such as governmentality, power,
Attempts to anchor states (both heuristically and practi- knowledge and discourses duly interrogated.
cally) within readily definable territorial boundaries tend to Huxley, M. (2008) Space and government: governmentality
obscure the intensity of the very trans-border flows which and geography, Geography Compass, 2(5), 1635–58.
themselves secure the functioning of those states within Rose-Redwood, R. (2008) Governmentality, geography and
their claimed territorial unit. the geo-coded world, Progress in Human Geography, 30,
(Reid-Henry 2010: 753) 469–86. Two useful papers that summarize how Foucault’s
notion of governmentality has been engaged by geographers.
See: Reid-Henry, S. (2010) ‘The territorial trap fifteen years
A range of writings on governance:
on’, Geopolitics, 15(4), 752–6, as well as other essays in the
Goldin, I. (2013) Divided Nations: Why Global Governance
special section of Geopolitics that this introduces.
is Failing, and What We can do About it, Oxford University
On the Artic and South China Sea:
Press, Oxford. A powerful polemic from an author who was
Anderson, A. (2009) After the Ice: Life, Death and Politics in involved in global governance projects and offers a thoughtful
the New Arctic, Virgin Books, London. Written by a former reflection on what needs to change to make globalization
editor of New Scientist, this book explores likely changes to sustainable.
the Arctic in the next 20–30 years.
Klein, N. (2007) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disas-
Borgerson, S. (2007) Arctic meltdown, Foreign Affairs, 87, ter Capitalism, Metropolitan Books, New York. An argu-
63–77. An influential essay, which set the tone of much of ment about how economic and natural disasters are used
the alarmist debate about potential changes to the Arctic. to reshape states and societies in ways that favour the
Dodds, K (2013) The Ilulissat Declaration (2008): The Arctic powerful.
States, ‘Law of the Sea’, and Arctic Ocean, SAIS Review, 33, Kjaer, A. (2004) Governance: A Key Concept, Sage, London.
45–55. The article considers why the Arctic coastal states felt A short accessible guide to some of the different meanings
it necessary to issue a declaration affirming their sovereignty associated with the term governance.
in the maritime Arctic.

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 Chapter 24  Global governance    489

Sinclair, T. (2004) Governance: Critical Concepts in Political

Science, Routledge, London. A very clearly written account of Useful websites
the concept of governance by a political scientist.
Sparke, M. (2006) Political geography: political geographies www.un.org/  The official website of the United Nations.
of globalization (2): governance, Progress in Human Geogra-
www.europa.eu/   The official website of the European
phy, 30, 1–16. A good review article on how governance has
Union.
been conceptualized within political geography, with particular
www.globalgovernancewatch.org/  The right-wing
focus on issues of neoliberalism, power and globalization.
­American Enterprise Institute runs a Global Governance
Taylor, P.J. (2005) New political geographies: global civil
Watch.
society and global governance through world city networks,
www.globalgovernance.eu/  The home of the Global
Political Geography, 24, 703–30. An analysis of the
Governance Institute, an independent think-tank based in
intersections between a variety of networks: state agencies,
Brussels.
NGOs and cities.
www.eui.eu/Projects/GGP/Home.aspx European University
Whitman, J. (ed.) (2009) Palgrave Advances in Global
Institute Global Governance Programme.
­Governance, Palgrave, Basingstoke. This explores the
­different ways of understanding global governance www.arctic-council.org/  The home of the Arctic Council.
depending in part on whether one addresses the role of the www.tni.org/  The Transnational Institute, a network of
state, economic sectors, international organizations and scholars and activists originally set up with support from the
­non-state actors. Institute of Policy Studies, www.ips-dc.org/.

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M24_DANI2950_05_SE_C24.indd 490 06/04/16 5:09 pm
 Glossary

Balkanization  progressive subdivision of a region into

A small political units.
Abjection  the process by which we seek to repress that
Bands  societies of hunter–gatherers typically number-
which we regard as unclean, improper, impure or dan- ing up to 500 individuals. See Spotlight box 1.1.
gerous. In geographic terms, abject material tends to be
located in marginal spaces which become repositories Billion thousand million.
for those things which are regarded as threatening the
social body. Biodiversity  the variability among living organisms
from all sources including terrestrial, marine and other
Active citizenship  voluntary action, often at the in- aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of
stigation of governments, aimed at improving local which they are part; this includes diversity within spe-
communities. cies, between species and of ecosystems.
Activism political activism that is strategic in nature and Biomass plant and animal residue burnt to produce heat.
may go beyond conventional or formal political channels.
Biosphere  that part of the earth’s surface, extending
Agglomeration  the concentration of productive activi- from the uppermost part of the earth’s rocky core (litho-
ties in a particular region. sphere or geosphere) to the lower atmosphere, including
Agribusiness  large-scale, capital-intensive, agricul- the hydrosphere. The biosphere corresponds to and sus-
tural businesses incorporating supply, production and tains the domain of life.
processing capacities. Biotechnology a branch of technology concerned with
Agri-food system the highly integrated system of agri- the industrial production of living organisms and their
cultural production which involves both upstream (e.g. biological processes.
suppliers) and downstream (e.g. processing) industries.
Birth rate number of babies born per thousand popula-
Alternative food networks  a reaction to conventional tion per year; known as the crude birth rate.
(e.g. supermarket-dominated) food chains, in which
Bottom-up development economic and social changes
local and/or organic foods are marketed through alter-
brought about by activities of individuals and social
native outlets such as farmers’ markets, box schemes
groups in society rather than by the state and its agents.
and home deliveries.
Anthropocentric  a way of understanding the value of Bounded  applied to the behaviour of decision makers
the environment which prioritizes humans as having the whose access to information, for example, is constrained
most value. In other words the environment is only use- by financial resources or time. They also have a limited
ful as a resource for humans. In this approach humans capacity to process the information that they are able
do not have any responsibility to ensure the environ- to obtain and they will also be constrained (bounded)
mental sustainability of our actions. by the environment within which their behaviour is tak-
ing place. Bounded cultures may be regarded as reac-
Apartheid  the policy of spatial separation on racial tions to perceived threats to local cultures, entailing a
grounds employed in South Africa under National Party strong assertion of the latter. These can create a level
rule between the late 1940s and early 1990s. of local fragmentation, with a parochial, nostalgic,
inward-looking sense of local attachment and cultural
Appropriationism  the replacement of agricultural in-
identity. Bounded cultures generally involve very clear
puts with industrial alternatives. It forms a key process
definitions of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in the creation of
in the industrialization of the agri-food system.
a sense of belonging.

B Brand boomerang  where the stories companies add

to their goods through branding are contested by other
Balance of payments (BOP)  the difference in value stories – often about the social relations of production –
between a country’s inward and outward payments for brought to public attention by journalists, NGOs, film-
goods, services and other transactions. makers, artists, activists and others.

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 492    Glossary

Branding  an important means by which the worlds of in emission-reducing projects in the developing world.
the producer and the consumer are mediated; marketing Part of the aim is to aid economic growth in developing
and advertising that adds to a company’s goods stories countries without a commensurate increase in green-
of particular associations, awarenesses, loyalties, ori- house gas emissions. At the same time this benefits the
gins and perceived qualities. See commodity fetishism. industrialized countries; such assistance is often cheaper
than reducing their own emissions.
Brundtland Report  published in 1987, it adopted the
position that it was possible to pursue economic growth Climate change  a change in climate that is attributed
without compromising the environment and introduced directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the
the first widely used definition of sustainable develop- composition of the global atmosphere and which is in
ment: ‘development which meets the needs of the present addition to natural climate variability observed over
without compromising the ability of future generations comparable time periods. Includes temperature rise, sea-
to meet their own needs’. level rise, precipitation changes, droughts and floods.
Buyer-driven commodity chain  a chain in which the Climate migration  a subset of environmental migra-
nature of production (e.g. salmon farming) is shaped or tion whereby persons or groups of persons are forced
driven by powerful ‘downstream’ actors such as distrib- to move because of gradual changes in the natural en-
utors and retailers. vironment, such as extreme weather events, droughts,
water scarcity or sea-level rise (see also environmental
migration).
C
Cluster  a localized concentration of similar and inter-
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy of the European linked economic activities.
Union.
Cold War a period extending from 1945 to the late 1980s
Capital money put into circulation or invested with the during which two ideologically opposed blocs emerged
intent of generating more money. See Spotlight box 18.2. within the world system, both with nuclear capabilities.
Capitalism  an historically specific economic system in The first was headed principally by the USA while the
which production and distribution are designed to ac- other was dominated by the Soviet Union.
cumulate capital and create profit. The system is charac- Command economy  an economic system character-
terized by the separation of those who own the means of ized by state-led central planning of economic activity
production from those who work for them. combined with the simultaneous suppression of market-
Chiefdom  social formation based on societies charac- type relations.
terized by the internal and unequal differentiation of Commodity a good or service produced through the use
both power and wealth and organized around the prin- of waged labour and sold in exchange for money.
ciple of kinship. See Spotlight box 1.3.
Commodity fetishism  how the relationships between
Citizenship  traditionally used to describe the relation- the lives of commodities’ consumers and producers are
ship between an individual and a nation-state, including made invisible by advertising imagery which places their
what rights and duties he or she can expect. The defini- meanings, values and qualities in other imagined geog-
tion now encompasses wider, more fluid and often con- raphies. See also follow the thing.
tested relationships with other political units.
Communism a political theory attributed to the works of
City-states  urban regions having political jurisdiction Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Communism is charac-
and control over a specific territory. A form of social terized by the common ownership of the means of produc-
organization associated with some of the earliest states. tion. The foundations for full communism were supposed
Civic food networks  food networks that are run and to be laid during a transitional period, known as social-
organised by civic groups (e.g., charities, NGOs). ism. The Soviet Union was the first state to be ruled by
an avowedly communist government, from 1917 to 1991.
Civilization  refers to an advanced form of social de-
Community food scheme  a site of resistance to the
velopment characterized by such things as urban life,
commercial activity, writing systems and philosophical industrialization of agriculture, in which the local com-
thought. munity retains control and where consumers get sea-
sonal, fresh food at a price that supports farmers who
Class  social distinctions between groups of people use sustainable practices.
linked to their material conditions and social status.
Comparative advantage  in economic geography, re-
Clean development mechanism (CDM)  a mechanism fers to an advantage held by a nation or region in the
whereby industrialized countries can earn credits towards production of a particular set of goods or services. See
their own greenhouse gas reduction targets by investing Spotlight box 14.4.

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 Glossary    493

Competitive advantage exists when a firm can deliver invest advertisements, newscasts and other media arte-
the same benefits as competitors but at lower cost (cost facts produced by powerful agencies and organizations
advantage). A firm may also deliver benefits that are with subversive meaning.
greater than those of competing products (differentia-
tion advantage).
D
Conditional reserve  those (mineral or ore) deposits
that have already been discovered but that are not eco- DDT  a chemical pesticide banned by many countries in
nomic to work at present-day price levels with currently the 1970s as a pollutant, which is a probable human car-
available extraction and production technologies. cinogen and causes damage to internal organs.

Consumption a cultural-economic process; a placed and De-coupled payments  subsidy payments made to
place-creating experience. The utilization of goods and farmers (e.g. CAP single farm payment) that are not
services produced by economic processes, fostered by the linked to production levels.
retailing sector through marketing, advertising and brand- Deep ecology  An environmental approach which asks
ing. A process which, for every consumer, has a ‘back us to consider humans not only as part of nature but of
story’ – what shaped our buying of this or that – and an equal value to non-human entities. This is a holistic vi-
‘afterlife’ – how we actively use the things we buy. A pro- sion whereby all human and non-human entities are in-
cess implicated in many other aspects of our lives, includ- terconnected and interdependent. A holistic perspective
ing our senses of self-identity and caring relationships with enables us to understand that if we upset one element, it
others near and far. A process involving not only shopping will have an impact on all other elements.
but also entanglements in sociotechnical systems that pro-
duce our heating and lighting, for example. Defensive localism  a process where consumers pur-
chase local foods to support local farmers and the local
Contact zone the space in which transculturation takes economy, irrespective of their quality and whether they
place – where two different cultures meet and inform are produced organically or conventionally.
each other, often in highly asymmetrical ways.
Deforestation the removal of forests from an area.
Containment the Western strategy of encircling the So-
viet Union and its allies during the Cold War. Deindustrialization refers to a relative decline in indus-
trial employment. It may also refer to an absolute de-
Core  according to Wallerstein, the core refers to those cline in industrial output as well as employment.
regions of the capitalist world economy characterized
by the predominance of core processes associated with Demarginalization  the process whereby a marginal or
relatively high wages, advanced technology and diversi- stigmatized space becomes ‘normalized’, and its popula-
fied production. See Spotlight box 2.1. tion incorporated into the mainstream.
Counterurbanization  population increases in rural Demographic transition model  traces the shift from
areas beyond the commuting range of major urban areas. high birth and death rates to low ones.
Cultural capital  the possession of taste, style or attitude Dependency  a viewpoint or theory of development
that can be converted, in many instances, into financial which argues that global inequality is explained by the
capital. In the post-industrial economy, where ideas are a patterns of exploitation of the periphery by the capitalist
global currency, cultural capital is a lucrative commodity. core, established during the colonial period and perpetu-
ated by neo-colonial economic relations in recent times.
Cultural dupe  a type of consumer described in some The dependency theorists’ recommendation for poorer
accounts as being pacified and seduced by advertising, countries is to de-link from the global economy.
an easily manipulated person following materialistic de-
sires. See also prosumer. Dependency approaches explanations of the the eco-
nomic development of a state that are shaped by politi-
Culture  a system of shared meanings often based cal, economic or cultural influences that are external to
around such things as religion, language and ethnicity that state. Typically dependency involves two sets of
that can exist on a number of different spatial scales states described as dominant/dependent, centre/periph-
(local, regional, national, global, among communities, ery or metropolitan/satellite.
groups, or nations). Cultures are embodied in the ma-
terial and social world, and are dynamic rather than Depopulation  the reduction of population in an area
static, transforming through processes of cultural mix- through out-migration or a reduction in the birth rate
ing or transculturation. See Spotlight box 13.1. below the death rate.
Culture jamming  tactics such as media hacking, infor- Derivatives  contracts between two entities that specify
mation warfare, ‘terror-art’ and graffiti, which aim to rights/obligations based on (hence ‘derived’ from) the

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 494    Glossary

performance of some other currency, commodity or Economies of scale occur when mass production of a
service. They often include swaps, options, futures and good (product) results in a lower average cost for each
mortgage-backed securities. They can be used to hedge item. Economies of scale occur within a firm, such as
against risk, or to provide leverage. using expensive equipment more intensively, or outside
the firm as a result of its location, such as the availability
Diaspora  literally, the scattering of a population; origi- of a local pool of skilled labour or good transport links.
nally used to refer to the dispersal of Jews in AD 70, now
used to refer to other population dispersals, voluntary and Edge city (exopolis)  a term referring to an area with
non-voluntary. Evokes a sense of exile and homelessness. city-like functions usually arising on the edge of an al-
ready urbanized area or conurbation and heavily de-
Diaspora space  the spaces inhabited not only by those pendent on fast communications systems. Edge cities
who have migrated and their descendants, but also by those are regarded as symptomatic of the most recent phase
who are conceptualized as indigenous or ‘native’. Similar of urbanization.
to contact zone – a meeting point of different cultures.
Electronic/digital money  a payment system in which
Discourse  social and cultural theorists understand dis- money is stored on a card and can be used to make, typi-
course to be the dominant meanings that are attached to cally small, purchases, often simply by briefly holding
a linguistic term or utterance. the card at a contact point. Many universities and large
Displaced persons  refugees who have no obvious companies use such cards in their canteens and for other
homeland. services. Increasingly, public transport companies use
these stored-value contactless smartcards as well, e.g.
Division of labour  the separation of tasks in the pro- London’s Oyster Card.
duction process and their allocation to different groups
of workers. Emerging markets refers to those markets that are per-
ceived to have a substantial growth potential. The term
is often used in relation to selected countries of the for-
E mer Soviet Union, Asia, Latin America and Africa.

Earth Summit the UN Conference on Environment and Emotional labour workers are expected to display cer-
Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. A total of tain emotions, often in line with the goals of their em-
178 countries negotiated a global strategy centrally con- ployer or organization, as part of their job.
cerned with sustainable development. Empire  an extended territorial political unit or state
Ecocatastrophism  the prediction of impending envi- built up, often by force, under a supreme authority. Em-
ronmental disasters, often as a result of human actions. pires usually involve rule over alien or subject peoples.

Ecocentrism  a way of understanding the value of the Energy mix the balance between various sources of en-
environment which critiques the priorities of anthro- ergy in primary energy consumption.
pocentrism and suggests that non-human entities have Energy ratio the relationship between energy consump-
intrinsic value. tion and economic growth in an economy:
Ecological democratization  an approach that sug-
gests that the only way to achieve environmentally sus- Rate of change in energy consumption
Energy ratio =
tainable practices is to value participation and justice in Rate of change in economic growth (GDP)
environmental decision-making. Thus, this approach

requires extensive citizen participation and the develop-
A value greater than 1 indicates that the amount of en-
ment of democratic institutions to tackle environmental
ergy required to create an additional unit of GDP is in-
issues at all scales.
creasing; a value less than 1 suggests the reverse.
Ecological modernization  an environmental manage-
Entitlements  the set of all commodity bundles over
ment approach that argues that economic growth does
which a person can establish command given the legal,
not need to be slowed to ensure environmental protec-
political, economic and social arrangements of the com-
tion. It does not undermine the limits to growth thesis
munity in which they live.
entirely, but suggests that we can ‘reorient’ economic
growth and use technological solutions for environ- Environmental Kuznets Curve  illustrates the hypo-
mental problems, thus overcoming the environmental thetical relationship between measures of environmental
impact of growth. It is a very weak interpretation of degradation and per capita income. Shaped rather like
sustainable development that allows for a reformist an upside-down U, the curve shows environmental deg-
response where the current dominance of free-market radation (e.g. pollution) increasing with rising wealth
capitalism is not challenged. up to a certain point, beyond which higher income per

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 Glossary    495

capita leads to a reversal of damage. There is evidence Fertility rates  the number of live births per thousand
that this theory applies to some environmental problems women of child-bearing age.
but not others.
Feudalism a hierarchical social and political system com-
Environmental migration defined by the International mon in Europe during the medieval period. The majority
Organization for Migration as persons or groups of per- of the population were engaged in subsistence agriculture
sons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progres- while simultaneously having an obligation to fulfil certain
sive changes in the environment that adversely affect duties for the landholder. At the same time the landholder
their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their owed various obligations (fealty) to his overlord.
habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily
or permanently, and who move either within their coun- Financial exclusion  the processes that prevent disad-
try or abroad. vantaged social groups from gaining access to the finan-
cial system.
Environmentalism  a broad term incorporating the
concerns and actions in aid of the protection and preser- Financialization refers to the growing influence of cap-
vation of the environment. ital markets, their intermediaries and processes in con-
temporary economic and political life.
Ethical consumption  where consumption is seen as a
realm for political agency, a process that is not only gen- Follow the thing an approach whose aim is to appreci-
erated by consumers being informed about the origins ate the social relationships between producers and con-
of commodities, but also by consumers’ diverse personal sumers by tracing the lives of individual commodities
and collective histories of wider ethical reflection and from farm to fork, from factory to home, etc. See also
behaviour. A process which looks to extend consump- commodity fetishism.
tion’s ‘close to home’ caring relationships to those mak- Food chain  the route traced by particular foodstuffs
ing the things we buy and share. from ‘farm to fork’. Food chains involve a number of
Ethnicity  refers to the process through which groups production, processing, distribution and consumption
are recognized as possessing a distinct collective cultural nodes, and the connecting links between them.
identity. See also race and racism. Food desert  a place, usually in inner cities or remote
EU European Union. rural areas, where access to fresh, affordable and
healthy food is poor.
Exchange  the process of interchange of goods and ser-
vices between individuals, groups and/or organizations, Food miles  a term used to describe the distance that
whether involving money or not. Can also refer more food travels from the point of production to the place of
broadly to social interactions. consumption. As well as distance, the mode of transport
(e.g. air vs. ferry freight) is an important consideration.
Export processing zone  a small closely defined area
which possesses favourable trading and investment con- Food regimes distinct relationships discerned between
ditions created by a government to attract export-orien- patterns of international food production and consump-
tated industries. tion and the developing capitalist system.
Food security when all people, at all times, have physi-
cal, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and
F nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food
Factors of production  refers to those elements neces- preferences for an active and healthy life.
sary for the effective functioning of the production pro-
Fordism  a regime of accumulation involving mass
cess and typically includes land, labour and capital.
­ roduction and consumption. Named after Henry Ford
p
Fair trade  attempts to overcome the injustices of free (1863–1947), Fordism is known for a differentiated
trade by guaranteeing producers a fair price and thus ­division of labour, assembly-line production and afford-
improving their lifestyles. Coffee, tea, bananas and able mass-produced consumer goods.
chocolate are among the major fair trade products.
Fordist or ‘organized’ capitalism a form of capitalism
Fascism  a term used particularly to describe the na- that reached its zenith during the period 1945 to 1973.
tionalistic and totalitarian regimes of Benito Mussolini It was characterized by the dominance of extractive
(Italy, 1922–45), Adolf Hitler (Germany, 1933–45) and and manufacturing industries, large-scale manufacture,
Francisco Franco (Spain, 1939–75). mass-production and a significant level of state involve-
ment. See Spotlight box 3.1.
Fast food  a quick and accessible way to eat food; epit-
omized by McDonald’s, it is usually eaten out of the Foreclosure or repossession is a legal process in which
home and out of our hands. a lender attempts to recover the balance of a mortgage

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 496    Glossary

loan from a borrower who has stopped making pay- multinational corporations that control the activities and
ments, ultimately resulting in the sale of the house or organization of the global economy, and which are often
apartment used as the collateral for the loan. conspicuously clustered in their downtown business dis-
tricts. Global cities are also characterized by increasing
social polarization as a result of a growing division in
G occupational and income opportunities, with growth in
Gated communities  residential developments pro- both high-skilled and low-skilled employment.
tected by a range of mechanisms such as security gates, Global production networks  the extensive webs
walls, private security guards and intercom systems. of intra-, inter- and extra-firm connections through
Gemeinschaft  a form of community said to be com- which commodities are produced, distributed, sold and
mon in traditional societies (as distinct from industrial consumed.
societies) and associated with notions of stability and Global warming  an increase in the temperature of the
informal personal contact. Earth’s surface caused by trapping infrared radiation in
Gender refers to socially constructed ideas of difference carbon dioxide, increased amounts of which are pro-
between men and women. duced by burning fossil fuels.

Gender division of labour  a division of labour con- Globalized or ‘disorganized’ capitalism  a form of
structed around gender in which particular tasks and capitalism identifiable since the mid-1970s. It is char-
occupations are deemed to be male or female activities. acterized by a relative decline in the importance of ex-
tractive and manufacturing industries, together with a
Gendered space  the ways in which certain spaces are relative increase in the importance of services. There is
seen to be occupied exclusively or predominantly by ei- also an increasing tendency for the production process
ther males or females. to be dominated by small-scale and flexible forms of or-
ganization. See Spotlight box 3.3.
Genetic modification (GM)  human manipulation of
genetic material (plant, animal and human) to create al- Globalization  a contested term relating to transforma-
tered organisms. tion of spatial relations that involves a change in the re-
lationship between space, economy and society.
Gentrification  the process by which middle- and upper-
class incomers displace established working-class commu- GM See genetic modification.
nities. Often associated with new investment in the built
Governance the way in which power operates through
environment, gentrification may be small-scale and incre-
mental (i.e. instigated by individual incomers), or be associ- the relationships between different organizations.
ated with major redevelopment and regeneration schemes. Green revolution a large increase in crop production in
developing countries achieved by the use of fertilizers,
Geographies of exclusion  the spatial processes by
pesticides and high-yield crop varieties.
which a powerful grouping consciously seeks to dis-
tance itself from other less powerful groupings. Greenhouse gases  gases that trap thermal radiation
in the Earth’s atmosphere, acting as a kind of blanket,
Geopolitics a term that has been used to refer to many
leading to warming of the global climate system. Com-
things, including a tradition of representing space, states
mon greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide, methane
and the relations between them; also emphasizing the
and nitrous oxide.
strategic importance of particular places.
Gross domestic product (GDP) the value left after re-
Gesellschaft  a form of association common in urban-
moving the profits from overseas investments and those
based industrial societies (as distinct from traditional
profits from the economy that go to foreign investors.
societies) and associated with non-permanent and utili-
tarian social relationships. Gross national product (GNP) a broad measure of an
economy’s performance; it is the value of the final out-
Ghetto  refers to very high concentrations of people
put of goods and services produced by the residents of
drawn from a particular ethnic or cultural background an economy plus primary income from non-residential
living in specific parts of an urban area. The term is now sources.
commonly associated with notions of deprivation, un-
employment and social exclusion.
Global cities  the term ‘global city’ was popularized
H
by the sociologist Saskia Sassen in her 1991 book The Heartland  identified by the British geographer Halford
Global City and is taken to refer to a small number of Mackinder (1904) as the zone in East-Central Europe
cities that serve as the command and control centres and Siberia, control of which would be a key to world
of the global economy. These cities possess a concen- domination. The term has since been appropriated by
tration of financial and business services linked to the Latin American geopolitics.

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 Glossary    497

Hegemony  term derived from the work of Antonio Indigenous peoples  those peoples native to a particu-
Gramsci which refers to the ability of a dominant group lar territory that was later colonized, particularly by
to exert or maintain control through a combination of Europeans.
overt and subtle mechanisms.
Industrial revolution a term that is often taken to refer to
Heritage  according to UNESCO, ‘heritage is our legacy the marked transformation of productive forces, initially
from the past, what we live with today, and what we within the British economic system, between the mid-
pass on to future generations. Our cultural and natural eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. It resulted in the
heritage are both irreplaceable sources of life and inspira- movement of Britain from a largely rural-based economy
tion’. In human geography the focus is often on rural and to one that was dominated by manufacturing and indus-
urban heritage landscapes, frequently regarded as playing trial production. Such a transformation resulted in sub-
a formative role in the maintenance of national identity. stantial social, political as well as economic changes.

Heterogenization  the way in which social forms that Industrialization of agriculture  (see also agribusi-
are conceived, controlled and put in place by cor- ness) a process whereby methods commonly associated
porations – e.g. McDonald’s restaurants – become with the manufacturing industry are increasingly in-
multiply localized in different places and cultures – corporated into farming, e.g. specialization of labour,
e.g. McDonald’s in Russia. See also homogenization. ­assembly-line production systems.

High-value foods  includes such foods as fruit, vegeta- Infant mortality rate (IMR)  number of deaths of per-
bles, poultry and shellfish. World trade in high-value sons aged under 1 per 1,000 live births.
foods has increased markedly during the past two Informal economy  those parts of the economy which
decades. operate beyond official recognition and outside formal
Homogenization  the effects that some academics say systems of control and, often, of remuneration.
consumer culture has on places around the world. So- Informal settlements  also known as shanty towns or
cial forms conceived, controlled and put in place by squatter settlements, these are sections of a city where
corporations – e.g. McDonald’s restaurants – which are poor people have moved in, often illegally or unoffi-
said to be the same wherever they are located. See also cially, and have constructed improvised housing using
heterogenization. informal means and scrap materials: often plywood cor-
rugated metal and sheets of plastic. They are usually
Horizontal integration  occurs when two companies,
built on the periphery of cities and often do not have
within the same industry and at the same stage of pro-
proper sanitation, electricity, or other services. Informal
duction, merge.
settlements are mostly found in the major cities of devel-
Hybridity  refers to groups as a mixture of local and oping nations in the global South and result from a com-
non-local influences; their character and cultural attrib- bination of intense rural to urban migration pressures
utes are a product of contact with the world beyond a coupled with a lack of provision of affordable housing
local place. See Case study 13.4. for low-income urban households.

Hypersegregation  a term used to describe extreme Inherent value  the value something has for someone,
residential segregation, such as that experienced by Afri- but not as means to a further end.
can-Americans in the USA. Instrumental value  the value which something has for
Hypothetical resources  those resources that might
someone as a means to an end.
be expected to be found in the future in areas that have International division of labour a term referring to the
only been partially surveyed and developed. tendency for particular countries and regions of the globe
to specialize in particular types of economic activity.
I International Monetary Fund (IMF)  international fi-
nancial institution that originated from the 1944 Bretton
Imaginary geographies  the ideas and representations
Woods Conference. Its main roles include regulating in-
that divide the world into spaces with particular mean-
ternational monetary exchange and controlling fluctua-
ings and associations. These exist on different scales
tions in exchange rates in order to alleviate balance of
(e.g. the imaginaries that divide the world into a de-
payments problems.
veloped core and less developed peripheries, or the im-
agined divide between the deprived inner city and the Intrinsic value simply the value something has. No ap-
affluent suburbs). peal needs to be made to those for whom it has value.
Imperialism  a relationship of political, and/or eco- Islam a monotheistic religion founded by the prophet Mu-
nomic, and/or cultural domination and subordination hammad in the seventh century AD. Today there are two
between geographical areas. predominant divisions within Islam, the Sunni and Shi’i.

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 498    Glossary

Islamophobia  a prejudice against those who identify Marxism regards capitalism as an inherently unjust
as Muslim, fuelled by post-9/11 discourses of Islamic system with the capitalists (those who own the means
fundamentalism and terrorist threat. Taking a variety of production) exploiting the proletariat (those who
of forms in the urban West, this can be interpreted as must sell their labour in order to live). It aims to replace
merely the latest inflection of a long-standing Orien- capitalism with a fairer system, socialism maturing into
talist discourse that contrasts Western democracy with communism.
Arab ‘barbarism’.
Mega-cities  giant metropolises with populations of at
least 10 million people. Also used by Manuel Castells
K to describe large cities in which some people are con-
nected to global information flows while others are dis-
Kondratieff cycle  a term used to describe the cycles of
connected and information poor. This use of the term
boom and bust evident within the capitalist system since
serves to highlight the problems associated with mega-
the mid-eighteenth century. Named after the Russian
cities in that they are large, highly unequal and beset
scholar N.D. Kondratieff.
by problems such as slum housing, pollution and urban
Kyoto Protocol the agreed outcome of a meeting of 160 sprawl, but also often lack the economic and political
nations in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 whereby many devel- power of global cities and therefore the resources to ad-
oped nations agreed to limit their greenhouse gas emis- equately address their problems.
sions relative to the levels emitted in 1990.
Merchant capitalism  refers to an early phase of capi-
talist industrial development dominant in the larger
L urban regions of Europe from the late fifteenth century.
Merchants were the principal actors engaged in both
Legitimacy  with regard to nation-states, a term mean- the provision of capital and the movement and trade of
ing that the majority of people accept the rule of law of goods (predominantly bulky staples such as grain and
the governing political organizations. manufactured goods).
Less developed countries (LDCs)  countries at a dis-
Mergers  occur when two firms agree to form a new
advantage in today’s global competitive environment company.
because their comparative advantage in cheap labour or
natural resource endowments has become subordinated Modernism  a term typically associated with the twen-
to knowledge-based factors. LDCs suffer from poor tieth-century reaction against realism and romanti-
productive capacities and competitiveness. cism within the arts. More generally, it is often used to
refer to a twentieth-century belief in the virtues of sci-
Life expectancy (at birth)  average number of years
ence, technology and the planned management of social
of life expected on the basis of age-specific mortality
change.
schedules for the specified year.
Modernity  refers to a period extending from the late
Limits to growth the belief that there are natural limits
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries (in the case
to economic growth, which if exceeded will lead to envi-
of Europe) to the mid to late twentieth century char-
ronmental catastrophe.
acterized by the growth and strengthening of a specific
Local Agenda 21 (LA21)  the implementation by local set of social practices and ways of doing things. It is
administrations of sustainable development practices as often associated with capitalism and notions such as
defined in Agenda 21, an outcome of the Earth Summit, progress.
Rio de Janeiro, 1992.
Monopoly  in theory, exists in an industry when one
Locality a place or region of sub-national spatial scale. firm produces all the output of a market; in practice var-
ies between countries. In the United Kingdom, for ex-
Low impact living (LIL)  a deep green vision where hu-
ample, any one firm that has 25 per cent of the market is
mans minimize their environmental impact in all aspects
considered to hold a monopoly.
of their daily lives.
Monopsony  in theory exists in an economy when one
M firm or individual purchases all of the output in a given
sector. An agribusiness company can gain a geographi-
Market-based states  modern states where the market cal monopsony over a given area through the use of con-
is the dominant means by which land, labour, capital tracts that prevent sale of produce to other parties.
and goods are exchanged and has a major influence over
Moral panic  a term describing periodic episodes of
social and political organization.
concern about the threat of a particular group to the
Marxism  a form of socialism and mode of analysis nation-state. Moral panics are normally fuelled by sen-
derived from the teachings of Karl Marx (1818–83). sationalist media reporting, and are generally diffused

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 Glossary    499

by the state through policies which aim to counteract New World Order  the notion of a Western-led post-
this imagined threat. Cold War structure of global power, which sanctions
intervention.
More developed countries (MDCs)  countries with
significant competitive advantages in today’s globaliz- Newly agriculturalizing countries (NACs) developing
ing economy. They have well-developed, increasingly countries (e.g. Brazil, China, Kenya) where productiv-
knowledge-based and strongly interconnected manu- ist farming systems have relocated, particularly for the
facturing and service sectors that provide a significant production of high-value foods for export.
proportion of employment and contribute to significant
national and individual wealth. Indices such as literacy Newly industrialized countries (NICs)  countries
levels, incomes and quality of life are high and these where there has been a relatively recent and significant
countries exercise considerable political influence at shift away from primary activities towards manufactur-
the global scale. Examples are the United Kingdom, the ing production. Examples are South Korea and Mexico.
United States, Germany and France.
NGO non-governmental organization.
Multiculturalism  refers to a belief or policy that en-
Non-governmental organization (NGO)  an organiza-
dorses the principle of cultural diversity and supports
tion formed by members of the public and one that has
the right of different cultural and ethnic groups to re-
no government connections.
tain distinctive cultural identities. It has often been criti-
cized for being too symbolic and not politically radical Non-renewable (stock) resources  those resources,
enough in challenging racism. mainly mineral, that have taken millions of years to
form. Their availability is therefore finite as there is no
N possibility of their stock being replenished on a time-
scale of relevance to human society.
Nationalism  the ideology and sentiment of belonging
to a ‘nation’ and the claim that the ‘nation’ should be
expressed in a ‘state’. O
Nation-state and state  a symbolic system of institu- Overpopulation  used to suggest that the finite re-
tions claiming sovereignty over a bounded territory. sources of a particular area will run out if the popula-
tion expands beyond a given point. Similar to the idea
Negative equity  is when the amount of an outstand- of a carrying capacity, that there is a limit beyond which
ing loan is greater than the market value of the asset for environmental degradation occurs.
which the loan was provided, e.g. a house.
Neoliberalism  an economic doctrine promoting mar- P
ket-led growth, deregulation and the privatization of
state-owned enterprises. Palaeolithic the stage in the development of human so-
ciety when people obtained their food by hunting, fish-
Neo-Malthusian  the belief that environmental prob- ing and gathering wild plants, as opposed to engaging
lems are a consequence of population growth, following in settled agriculture. Also referred to as the Early Stone
the arguments set out by Thomas Malthus in the late Age.
eighteenth century.
Participatory democracy  a form of governance that
New economic geography (NEG)  an economic geog- encourages involvement of all people in political deci-
raphy that recognizes the importance of culture as an sion-making, as opposed to representative democracy.
influence on economic processes and outcomes. In this
way it draws attention to the culturalization of the econ- Passive solar heating the use of sunlight to heat build-
omy in contrast to the economization of culture. ings through building design. This involves collecting
sunlight through south-facing windows made of special
New industrial districts (NIDs)  areas that specialize
glazing, using building materials with high heat storage
in a particular industry because of external economies
capacity (e.g. brick walls and tile floors), and other de-
which result from specialization.
sign features that help to absorb and transmit heat, and
New international division of labour (NIDL)  the protect from overheating.
global shift of economic activity that occurs when the
Pastoral nomadism a form of social organization that
process of production is no longer constructed primarily
around national economies. is based on livestock husbandry for largely subsistence
purposes. Pastoral nomads are characterized by a high
New social movements  fluid and informal groupings level of mobility which allows them to search continu-
of political activists. They may encompass a diversity of ally for new pastures in order to maintain their herds of
interests, backgrounds and political viewpoints. animals.

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 500    Glossary

Patriarchy system of gendered power relations through Poverty  the condition of possessing an income insuffi-
which men exercise power over women. cient to maintain a minimal standard of living. Defini-
tions of poverty are culturally specific, and thus relative
Peasant  the term has had a number of different inter-
to the social norms and expectations endemic to a given
pretations over the years and in different parts of the nation-state. However, the condition of absolute pov-
world. In general it usually refers to those individuals erty (i.e. lacking the income to maintain a minimum
whose livelihood is largely dependent on the land and diet) is acknowledged worldwide.
on rural subsistence-type activities. The term ‘peasant’
is usually reserved for those living in organized states, Power geometry  the ways in which different social
thus distinguishing them from band and tribal members, groups/individuals are placed in relation to the forces of
and so on. globalization, enabling some to benefit and others to be
disadvantaged.
Periphery  according to Wallerstein, refers to those re-
gions of the world capitalist economy characterized by Predatory lending  a sub-set of subprime lending; a
low wages, simple technology and limited production. type of price discrimination making use of unsuitable
loans designed to exploit vulnerable and unsophisti-
Peri-urban  those areas of land lying at the edge of cated borrowers.
urban areas and forming an interface between urban
and rural areas. These areas are often referred to as Prehistoric societies societies that have left no written
rurban zones or the rural-urban fringe and are char- records.
acterised by the intermingling of rural and urban
Primary energy  the energy in the basic fuels or energy
land uses. The term originates from the French word
sources used, e.g. the energy in the fuel fed into conven-
périurbanisation.
tional power stations.
Permaculture  an environmental approach inspired
Primary sector  comprises economic activities that ex-
by nature’s patterns to create sustainable human habi- ploit naturally occurring resources.
tats. It is based around three core principles – earth
care (working with nature and designing systems that Pro-environmental behaviour (PEB)  behaviour that
draw upon natural systems for inspiration), people care reduces the negative impact of one’s actions on the natu-
(looking after ourselves on a community and individual ral and built world, compared to alternatives.
level through cooperation and mutual support) and
Proto-industrialization refers to the early phase of cap-
fair shares (ensuring we only consume our share of the
italist industrial development in Europe. Characteristics
earth’s resources).
of this period include a significant level of rural-based
Personal space the apparent desire by humans to have industrial activity and a low level of technological ap-
a pocket of space around them and into which they tend plication in the production process.
to resent others intruding without invitation.
Prosumer  a type of consumer who not only uses com-
Political economy  an approach to social study that modities supplied to them, but completes them, crea-
emphasizes the political/social construction and conse- tively reworks them and/or makes them anew. See also
quences of economic activity. cultural dupe.
Post-Fordism production system comprises a mix of Proven (proved) reserves those deposits of a resource
different ways of organizing production at a number of that have already been discovered and are known to be
spatial scales. Common to all these types of production economically extractable under current demand, price
is some form of flexible production. and technological conditions.
Postmodernism a philosophy that holds that the traits
associated with twentieth-century modernism, such as Q
belief in the possibility of managing social change ac-
Quality of life  a composite measure that reflects indi-
cording to sets of agreed principles, are now in retreat
vidual preferences that include, for example, education,
in the face of increasing individualism, pluralism and
health, entertainment, living environment.
eclecticism.
Quality turn  the idea that local/alternative foods are of
Post-productivist transition  a term used to describe
higher quality than products produced under conven-
the movement away from productivist agricultural
tional farming systems; in this way, quality is inextrica-
systems. This new phase of agricultural production
bly linked to locality.
is characterized by extensive and diversified pat-
terns of farming and the growing importance of non-­ Quaternary sector  economic activities, mainly busi-
agricultural activities in the countryside, for example, ness enterprises, involved with the processing and ex-
recreation. change of information.

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 Glossary    501

Resource a substance in the physical environment that

R has value or usefulness to human beings and is economi-
Race  refers to the division of human beings into sup- cally feasible and socially acceptable to use.
posedly recognizable groups based predominantly on
Retroliberalism an approach to economic policy visible
physical characteristics.
in parts of the Western world in the 2010s that sees a re-
Racialized space  the ways in which certain spaces are turn to classical liberal views concerning the central role
seen to be occupied exclusively or predominantly by a of the nation state in facilitating the free-market, mod-
particular ‘racial’ or ethnic group. ernizing the infrastructure of the economy and increas-
ing the global reach of domestic corporations through
Racism  practices and attitudes that display dislike or trade diplomacy and aid.
antagonism towards people seen as belonging to par-
ticular ethnic groups. Social significance is attached to Right to Food a human right recognised in the Univer-
culturally constructed ideas of difference. sal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It
Refugees  persons who flee to a foreign country to es- requires signatory governments to respect, protect and
cape danger or persecution because of war, or religious fulfil their citizens’ rights to adequate and sufficient
or political reasons. food consistent with cultural traditions.
Relational approaches  a term referring to a range of
Romantic movement  artistic, literary and philosophi-
approaches that are concerned more with the network
cal movement that originated in the eighteenth century
as a unit of analysis than the spatial unit. Despite con-
as a backlash against industrialization.
siderable diversity between approaches, relational ap-
proaches focus primarily on the connections that exist Rurality functionalist, critical political economy and so-
between places and things. Particularly influential in re- cial representation approach for distinguishing between
cent iterations of urban and economic geography. rural and urban economy and society.
Relocalization (of food)  refers to the renewed inter- Rural–urban fringe  refers to the zone where rural
est in foods of local and regional provenance, in which and urban land uses meet and intermix around the
the link between ‘product’ and ‘place’ is emphasized edges of urban areas. While some regard the rural
and often formalized through a system of quality as- urban fringe as a transition zone between the city and
surance or quality labels. Such locally distinctive qual- the countryside, others argue that it represents a dis-
ity food products are sold in regional and national tinctive landscape type in its own right. This zone has
markets. long been regarded as problematic in planning and
Renewable energy  energy sources such as winds, management terms. It is typically regarded as lacking
waves and tides that are naturally replenished and can- aesthetic quality and being dominated by the func-
not be used up. tional landscape elements of the urban infrastructure,
the transport and distribution networks of the city and
Renewable (flow) resources  those resources that are low-grade rural land.
naturally renewed within a sufficiently short time-span
to be of use to human society. The continued availabil-
ity of such resources is increasingly dependent upon ef- S
fective management. Second global shift  offshoring of service functions;
Replacement rate  number of babies that an average the first global shift involved the offshoring of manufac-
woman should have to replace her generation, given turing functions.
prevailing levels of mortality (2.1 per woman in post-
Second industrial revolution  a term sometimes used
transition societies).
to account for the profound technological and accom-
Representative democracy  a form of governance panying social changes that affected industrial capital-
that limits involvement of people in political decision- ism from the late nineteenth century. During this period
making to representatives often voted into positions of Britain’s industrial might was challenged by Germany
power by the broader public. and the USA.

Residential segregation  the ways in which, most ob- Secondary mortgage market  the market where in-
viously in urban areas, housing patterns can be observed vestment banks, other financial institutions, and the two
where people live in areas divided along class or ethnic major US-government sponsored enterprises, Freddie
lines. In some instances this is conscious policy, in oth- Mac and Fannie Mae, repackage mortgages as securities
ers it results from the interaction of social and economic to sell to institutional investors in national and global
processes. capital markets.

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 502    Glossary

Secondary sector  comprises economic activities that recognises that individuals and groups participate in the
transform primary sector outputs into useable goods. creation of their realities through the way in which they
perceive things and events.
Securities tradable financial assets of any kind. Include
bonds and banknotes (debt securities), company and Social embeddedness  the idea that economic behav-
other stocks traded (equity securities), futures, options iour is embedded in, and mediated by, a complex and
and swaps (derivatives). Most securities are traded on extensive web of social relations. Trust and regard are
exchanges regulated by national jurisdictions such as examples of such social relations.
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or
the Financial Conduct Authority (UK). Social exclusion the various ways in which people are
excluded (economically, politically, socially, culturally)
Securitization  the process of taking localized, non- from the accepted norms within a society.
standard and opaque assets like mortgages and trans-
forming them into transparent and liquid securities that Social movement  comprised of individuals, groups
can be easily exchanged on global markets. and organizations united by a common purpose or
goal.
Semi-periphery according to Wallerstein, refers to those
regions of the world capitalist economy which, while ex- Spatial divisions of labour  the concentration of par-
ploiting the periphery, are themselves exploited by the ticular sectors or production tasks in specific geographic
core countries. Furthermore, they are characterized by areas.
the importance of both core and peripheral processes. Spatial interaction  a term used to indicate interde-
Sense of place the feelings, emotions and attachments pendence between geographical areas. Covers the move-
to a locality by residents (past or present), which may be ment of people, goods, information and money between
articulated in art, literature, music or histories, or may places.
become part of individual or group memory. Spatial relations  the ways in which people are con-
Services  work done as an occupation or business for nected across geographic space through economic, so-
other individuals or businesses that brings about a cial, cultural or political processes.
change in the condition of a person or of a good belong- Speculative resources  those resources that might be
ing to some economic unit which does not produce or found in unexplored areas which are thought to have fa-
modify physical goods. vourable geological conditions.
Sexuality  refers to social differences linked to sexual State  a political unit having recognizable control
identity and behaviour. (claiming supreme power) over a given territory. Unlike
Shopping  the experiencing of retail spaces, seeing and earlier social formations like bands and tribes, states
being seen by other shoppers within them, a social activ- have always based their power on their ability to control
ity that may or may not involve buying things. a specified territory and its inhabitants.
Simulacrum  a copy without an original. An example Stigma  a term describing the condition of possessing a
might be Disneyland’s ‘Main Street’, which represents ‘spoiled’ or discredited identity.
an ideal American high street, but is not modelled on
Structural adjustment programmes  loans designed
an original.
to foster structural adjustment in LDCs by promoting
Slow food promoted as an anti- ‘fast food’ culture, slow market-led growth and a reduction in government inter-
food aims to decelerate the food consumption experi- vention in the economy.
ence and celebrate the cultural connections surrounding
Structuralism  a theory, evolved in Latin America in
local cuisines and traditional products. The slow-food
the 1940s and 1950s, which argues that the relative posi-
movement aims to embed food in the local territory and
tion of a given economy vis-à-vis the global economy is
culture.
a function of the nature of the manner of insertion of
Social construct a social concept or idea (such as race, that economy historically. Changing the fortunes of an
class, gender or age) that is institutionalized and nor- economy therefore requires state intervention to alter its
malized within a culture to the extent that people be- structure.
have as if it were a ‘real’ or a pre-social given.
Studentification  an increase in the student population
Social constructionism  a sociological theory of in a residential area, principally associated with student
knowledge which claims that meanings and truths are renting in the private sector, though also associated with
established socially through habitual use and institu- newly built off-campus accommodation developed by
tionalization. In opposition to realism, which regards private investors. A widely noted phenomenon in those
truths as pre-given and objective, social constructionism countries where students in higher education tend to live

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 Glossary    503

away from home, it is sometimes associated with gentri- sustainability. As sustainability discourses have prolif-
fication, but has markedly different social and environ- erated it is fair to say that the meaning of sustainabil-
mental outcomes. ity and sustainable development have become less clear
and subject to political manipulation. The terms have
Subculture  a subdivision of a dominant culture or an
come to invoke a degree of cynicism amongst many
enclave within it with a distinct integrated network of radical/critical geographers.
behaviour, beliefs and attitudes.
Sustainable intensification  This term is attributed to
Substitutionism refers to the increased use of non-agri-
concerns about global food security. It evokes the idea
cultural raw materials characterized by the replacement that there is a need to achieve higher yields from the
of food and fibre with industrial alternatives. It forms same acreage without damaging the environment. Ad-
a key process in the industrialization of the agri-food vocates argue this can be achieved through science and
system. technology innovations.
Subprime loan a high-cost loan designed for borrowers
with poor credit or higher default risk, but also sold to T
borrowers with a good credit history.
Territoriality  a term used to describe an expression of
Subprime mortgage  loan to someone who may, as a ownership and control by an individual, group or state
result of unemployment or divorce for example, find it over a particular area of land in order to achieve par-
difficult to maintain regular repayments. These loans ticular ends.
are offered on less favourable terms, such as a higher
interest rate, in order to cover the higher credit risk. Be- Territory a recognizable region (area of land or sea) oc-
cause many sub-prime loans were packaged into mort- cupied and controlled by an individual, group or state.
gage-backed securities that ultimately defaulted they
Tertiary sector  comprises economic activities engaged
contributed to the 2007 financial crisis.
in enabling the exchange and consumption of goods and
Subsumption  a process whereby an agribusiness TNC services (often referred to as the service sector).
increases its control over farming by offering contracts
Third World  a rather vague term used to describe
to farmers to provide ‘raw materials’ for its food-manu-
those regions of the world in which levels of develop-
facturing activities.
ment, as understood by such measures as GDP, are
Suburbanization, suburbs  suburbanization describes significantly below those of the economically more
the growth of areas on the fringes of major cities. advanced regions. The term is increasingly seen as an
Whilst residents of metropolitan regions have often inadequate description of the prevailing world situa-
tended to work within the central urban area, they have tion since it disguises a significant amount of internal
frequently chosen to live in satellite communities called differentiation.
suburbs and commute to work via car or mass transit
TNCs see transnational corporations.
systems. Suburbs are therefore most frequently viewed
as residential areas, either being part of a city or sepa- Traceability in economic geography refers to the ability
rate residential communities within commuting dis- to determine the origin of agricultural foodstuffs.
tance of a city. In physical form they represent a mix of
urban and rural elements and most have a lower popu- Tradition an inherited, established or customary way of
lation density than inner city neighbourhoods. Often thinking, behaving or doing something, characteristic of
considered dull and homogeneous in character, more persons in a particular family, group or society.
recently research has highlighted the diverse and chang- Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
ing nature of suburbs with an increasing range of urban (TTIP)  a proposed free trade and investment agreement
populations and activities evident in outer or edge of between the European Union and the United States.
city locations.
Transculturation  the ways in which subordinated or
Sustainability, sustainable development  terms marginal groups select and invent from dominant cul-
whose usage and meanings have grown exponen- tures; although such groups cannot control what ema-
tially in recent years since their original discussion in nates from the dominant culture, they do determine to
the 1987 Brundtland Report. At their most basic they varying extents what they absorb into their own and
refer to the idea that development can continue in ways what they use it for.
that respects the needs of future generations. There is
considerable debate though concerning how sustain- Transgression  a term describing actions that breach
ability and these needs can be defined and measured. social expectations of what is appropriate in a particular
Often sustainability has come to refer to economic or place. Deliberate transgression may thus constitute an
social sustainability rather than just environmental act of resistance.

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 504    Glossary

Transnational corporations (TNCs)  major business marginal groups whom they portray as taking it from
organizations that have the power to coordinate and them. In practice, this is promoted by urban policies pro-
control operations in more than one country. They are moting law and order on the city streets and excluding
the primary agents of globalization in, for example, the those who do not fit in with the middle-class consumer
agri-food sector. See Spotlight box 14.2. ambience vital to the success of urban gentrification.
Transnationalism  multiple ties and interactions link- Urbanization  refers to the increasing importance of the
ing people or institutions across the borders of nation- urban relative to the total population. It is initially stimu-
states and measured, for example, as flows of capital, lated by the movement of people from rural to urban areas.
people, information and images.
Travellers  formerly referred to as ‘gypsies’, persons V
that are nomadic in lifestyle living in mobile homes of
Value-adding activity  sequential steps in a production
various types that are moved around from time to time.
process that enhances the saleable value of a commodity.
Tribe a type of social formation usually said to be stim-
Vertical disintegration  a process whereby segments
ulated by the development of agriculture. Tribes tend
of the production process (usually in a vertically inte-
to have a higher population density than bands and are
grated business) are subcontracted out to smaller-scale
also characterized by an ideology of common descent or
producers.
ancestry. See Spotlight box 1.2.
Vertical integration  occurs when firms at different
stages of the production chain merge together.
U
Underclass a term referring to poorer, more marginal-
ized groups in society who are seen to experience multi-
W
ple deprivation. World Bank  international financial institution es-
tablished in 1944. Its main role is to provide develop-
Urban myths  long-standing partial, at times stereotypi-
ment funds to LDCs in the form of loans and technical
cal, images or impressions of the urban that are deeply
assistance.
ingrained within cultures and present throughout differ-
ent historical periods. Often constructed in opposition to World systems theory  Immanuel Wallerstein’s con-
rural myths and implicated in moral debates about differ- ceptualization of the changing nature of the world
ent ways of life associated with the rural and the urban. socio-economic system into three distinct historical
categories.
Urban revanchism literally, the process of ‘revenge’ by
which middle-class citizens take back the city from the WTO World Trade Organization.

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 INDEX    547

Index

Note: page numbers in bold refer to agri-food systems 305, 491 Asia
definitions in the glossary and rurality 230 age structure of population
Alliance for a Green Revolution in 103
Africa (AGRA) 165, 166 population growth 81, 82, 85
A alternative food networks (AFNs) resources from 42
abjection 491 309–14, 491 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Aborigines (Australia) 20, 22, 152 community food 313–14 (APEC) 286
absolute poverty 208 critique of 314 Association of Southeast Asian
Absolutism, Age of 41 localism of 312 Nations (ASEAN) 291
active and activist citizenship 463, quality in 311–12 South China Sea 486
465–6, 491 short food supply chains 310, 312 asylum seekers 217
activism 491 social embeddedness 310–11 Australia
adventure tourism 238 whole chains 312 as penal colony 47
advertising, rurality in 237, 238 Americas: population growth wilderness and conservation
Afghanistan 101, 451 81–2 debates in 151–2
Africa Amerindians, managing landscape
age structure of population 250
102, 103 Anglo/North American/Australian
B
famine in 158 (ANAA) tradition, rurality balance of payments (BOP)
HIV/AIDS 96–7 in 227, 229–30, 239 491
imperialism in 47–8 animal rights movement 74 balance of power and governance
population growth 81, 82, 85 animals 476–7
and slavery 42, 44–6, 82 and homosexuality 255–6 Balkanization 491
under-5 mortality rate 96 and human nature 254 bands 23, 24, 491
ageing populations 102 Antarctica 402–3 Bandung conference (1955) 174
agglomeration 491 claims on 404 Bank for International Settlements
agribusiness 240–2, 305, 491 anthropocentric approach to the (BIS) 370
agriculture environment 135, 491 banking crisis (2008) 72
appropriationism in 306 antiretroviral medication 98 banking industry and central
commercialization of and Anti-Social Behaviour Orders business districts 56
rural–urban drift 235 (ASBOs) 429 banlieues (Paris), poverty in
concentration of 306 apartheid 218, 426–7, 491 212–13
distribution of 27 ape behaviour 255 behaviour of apes 255
and human settlement 25–8 appropriationism 306, 491 behavioural models of economic
and industrialization 50–2 Arctic Council (AC) 479, location 283
industrialization of in developed 481–2, 484 Belarus, energy dilemmas 130
world 304–6 Arctic Ocean Bengal famines (1942–43, 1972–73)
political economy of 304 governance of 479–84, 487 157–8, 161
regions 28 and Cold War 481 Berlin Wall, fall of 71
restructuring of in developed cooperation within 482–3 Biafran war (1960s) 47
world 305 definitions 479 billion 491
substitutionism in 306 indigenous peoples in 482 biodiversity 491
subsumption in 306 map of 480 loss of 73, 136, 143
see also food Argentina 404 biomass 116, 491

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 548    INDEX

biosphere 73, 491 economic rise of 72, 299–300

biotechnology 491
C education 91–2
birth rates 85–7, 491 Cambodia, famine in 161 energy dilemmas 131
birth rate 491 canal network (Great Britain) 50 famine in 96, 158, 161
government incentive schemes capital 366, 492 foreign aid 175
102 circulation of money as 371 as hegemon 416–19
blue-collar occupations 287 turnover time of 371 and Hong Kong citizenship 460
Boeing: spatial division of expertise capitalism 20, 492 miners 108
at 355–7 changes, early twentieth century nuclear energy in 116
Boko Haram 74 60–2 population growth 81, 82
Bolivia 403, 405 characteristics of states under 38 renewable energy in 117
military government in 403 colonial commerce 44–5 South China Sea 484–6, 487
borderlands 452 colonial politics 46–7 and United States 72
Botswana, life expectancy 97 colonial society 45–6 urbanization 194
bottled water, marketing 386–7 and consumer culture 387 see also BRICS
bottom-up development 178, 491 definitions 38–9 Chipko Andalan movement 147
boundaries disorganized 71 cider industry, Hereford 242
of former colonies 441 and economic cycles 38–9 cities 28–33
and nation-states 448–50 Eurocentrism 39 administration of 191–2
and territoriality 422 globalized 70–1 connectivity of 195–6
bounded citizenship 459–62 and imperialism 47–8 cultural diversity in 201–3
bounded cultures 268, 271, 272, 491 industrialization 48–54 defining 191–2
boycotting 338 and Marxism 39 diseconomies of scale in 232
brand boomerang 392, 491 and nation-states 453 gated suburbs in 201
branded geographies 383–8 transition from feudalism 40–1 global 196, 197
of nothingness? 384–6 and urbanization 54–6 growth of 193, 194
branding 492 US, origins of 180 ecological crises and 203
geographical entanglements world expansion of 42–7 internal structure of 196–8
386–8 world systems theory 39 and mega-cities 193–5
brandscapes 387 capitalist economies 285 postmodern 192
Brazil and economic problem 285 poverty and inequality in 200–1
as ‘global farm’ 307, 308 captive offshoring 358–9 resilience 203
military government in 401–2 carbon offsetting 149 sociology of 191
population movements 402 Carbon Rationing Action Groups sustainability of 200, 203
Samba-taiko 273 (CRAGs) 148 see also urbanization
see also BRICS carbon trading 148 citizenship 492
brewing industry (Great Britain) 52 Cardiff Bay redevelopment 425 active and activist 463, 465–6
BRICS 182–4 Caribbean, age structure of beyond boundaries 462–3
Brighton (England) 432 population 103 bounded 459–62
British empire (1914) 68 Carter Doctrine 412 cultural 466
Brundtland Report 140, 492 censuses 82–3 defined 457
Bulmers cider 242 central business districts 54, 56, 57 dual 462
Burma, as state 442–4 Central Place Theory 409 electoral geographies 458
business-2-business (B2B) chain upgrading 336 and everyday places 466–7
transactions 296–7 chemical industry 61 ethical 464
business-2-customer (B2C) Chernobyl disaster (Ukraine) 115 Hong Kong 460–1
transactions 296–7 chiefdoms 23, 25, 26, 29, 492 Liberal 459, 461, 463
business service clusters 332 Chile local 463–4
buycotts 268 military government in 400–1 and place 457–9
buyer-driven commodity chain 306, salmon farming 306–7 Republican 459–61, 463
492 China tests 457
buyer-driven production networks coal in 118 transnational 462
332–4 communist government of 67 transnational networks 465–6

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 INDEX    549

city-states 492 commodity 492 conventionalization of alternative

civic food networks (CFNs) 314, commodity fetishism 391, 492 food networks 310, 314
492 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Copenhagen Accord (2009) 144, 145
civilization 28–33, 492 492 core in world systems theory 39, 493
class 492 communication, advances in 61 Corporate Social Responsibility 149
and territoriality 424–6 communism 65–7, 492 counterurbanization 230, 231–3, 493
class-divisions in cities 54–6 failure of 67 countryside
Clayoquot Sound (British community, state as 440 cultural consumption of 237
Columbia) 251 community food schemes 313–14, as landscape 252
clean development mechanism 492 marketization of 239
(CDM) 144, 492 comparative advantage 492 Countryside Alliance (UK) 236
climate change 73, 134, 138, 143, 492 in agriculture 243 cross-border supply in offshoring 358
and Arctic Ocean 482 in trade 292, 293 Cuba
and ‘climate porn’ 259 competitive advantage 38, 493 Guantánamo Bay 430
and energy consumption 126–8, in trade 292 Santería 273
130 computer laptop production and cultural capital 493
and food prices 315 consumption networks 322, of students 215
and governance 473–4 324–6, 334–5, 336–7, 338 cultural citizenship 466
implementing a convention on clusters, China 331 cultural construct, nature as 250–3
144–5 move to Shanghai area 329–31 cultural consumption of
and natural disasters 99 in Taiwan 328–31 countryside 237
climate migration 99, 492 conceptual approach to rurality cultural diversity in cities 201–3
cloning as spatial division of labour 228, 229 cultural dupe 493
327 conditional reserves 111, 493 cultural fundamentalism 269
clustering 427, 492 connectivity of culture 263 cultural geographies of rurality 230
coal consumerism 382 cultural homogenization 384–5
reserves 119 consumption 493 cultural hybridity 271–3, 275
use of 118, 119 branding and marketing cultural imperialism 384
Coca-Cola 384 geography 383–8 cultural issues of poverty 213
coffee production and consumption and central business districts 56 cultural shifts in rurality 237–40
networks 322, 324, 325, 328, as cultural economy 380–2 cultural stereotypes
334, 336, 337–8 defined 380 of HIV/AIDS sufferers 216
certification schemes 339–41 economic geographies of 380–3 and poverty 213–17
global map 329 and the environment 149 of students 213–15
Cold War 67, 492 geographies of disconnection culture 493
aftermath 415 391–5 bounded 268, 271, 272
alliances in 411 and ethical consumption 392–5 changes in 262–3
and Arctic Ocean 481 inequality and exploitation conservative reaction to 269
end of 71 from 391 collective identities in 270
geopolitics of 410–11 local geographies of 388–91 commodification of 274–5
in art and culture 413–15 experience 390–1 connectivity of 263
colonial commerce 44–5 shopping and place 388–90 and consumption 263
colonial politics 46–7 marketing and culture 263 contact zones of 274
irrational boundaries of 69 themed environments of 387 as contested concept 262, 275
colonial society 45–6 consumption abroad defined 262
colonialism and development in offshoring 358 diaspora of 273, 274
179–82 consumption clusters 332 and economic geography 283–4
command economy 492 contact zone 493 end of 382
and economic problem 285 containment policies 410–13, 493 global see global culture
commercial presence in offshoring contract manufacturer (CM) 325 homogenization of 263
358, 359 Convention on Climate Change hybridity of 271–3, 275
commercialization of emotions 144, 145 selling 274–5
351–2 conventional food networks 309, 312 and language 272

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 550    INDEX

culture (Continued) Detroit (USA) 193 ecological modernization 139,

and locality 268, 270 development 171–3 141–2, 150, 494
and music 271–3 concepts of 176–9 ecology and politics 253–4
negative sense of 268–70 dependency approach to 172, economic crash (1929) 96
positive sense of 270–1 178–9 economic crises
and power relations 262 and foreign aid 173–6 and economic downturn (2007–
and sectarianism 270 historical geography of 179–82 present) 290, 366, 373–7, 472
and social networking 266 modernization approach to 172, oil shortages (1973) 282
spatial dimensions 263–4 176–8 economic development
and travel 274 ‘rising powers’ and emergence cyclical characteristics 38–9
culture jamming 267–8, 493 of new ‘Southern’ donors and energy resources 126–30
182–4 see also development
and Third World 173–6 economic geography
D trickle-down effect of capitalism changes in 282–5
dancing 390–1 177, 178 eastward shift 299–300
DDT 142 US, origins of 180 economic location models 283
death rates 85–7 diaspora 494 and economic problem 285–6
crude 493 of culture 273, 274 economic processes 287–9
decolonization 181 diaspora space 494 and transnational corporations
de-coupled payments 309, 493 digital money see electronic/digital 283–286
deep ecology 135, 137, 493 money uneven development 291–4
Deepwater Horizon drilling direct food 312–13 see also economies
platform 108, 111 disabled people, socially excluded economic location models 283
defensive localism 314, 493 215 economic shifts in rurality 240–4
deforestation 136, 143, 493 disconnection of consumption multifunctional rural worlds
deindustrialization 493 391–5 243–4
and cultural change 262 discourse 494 post-productivist economies
Dell Computers production disease, demographic impact and 242–3
network 331 geography of 96–8 productivist economies 240–2
demarginalization 493 Disneyland/Disney World 387 economies
and poverty 224 disorganized capitalism see defined 286–7
Democratic Republic of Congo, globalized (disorganized) digital economy 296–9
refugees 101 capitalism eastward shift 299–300
demographic shifts in rurality displaced persons 494 employment distribution by
231–5 division of labour 38, 494 sector 288
demographic transition model 85–8, under capitalism 366 global, rise of 289–91
493 dockland spaces 425 and knowledge, growth of 289
birth and death rates in 85–7 dormitory zones 233 new creative class 296
de-peasantization 235 dual citizenship 462 sectors 286–7
dependency 493–4 Dutch Cape Colony 47 and uneven development 291–4
in rural economies 243 Dutch East India Company 43 economies of experience 390–1
dependency approach to economies of scale 64, 494
development 172, 178–9, edge cities 192, 199, 494
493
E education 90–2
depopulation 493 Earth First! 146, 147 egalitarians 137–8
rural 231, 233, 235, 239 Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro, electoral geographies 458
of largest populations 235 1992) 143, 144, 494 electricity industry 61
in Niue 234 Ebola crisis (2013–15) 73, 487 electronic/digital money 370, 494
derivatives 370, 493 ecocatastrophism 139, 494 embodied expertise in services 355
desertification 143 ecocentrism 135, 494 embodied labour 349
as myth 253–4 ecological crises and city emerging markets 494
design intensive craft production growth 203 emotional labour 351–2, 494
clusters 332 ecological democratization 153, 494 empire 494

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 INDEX    551

empirical approach to rurality 228 Europe feminist geopolitics 414

energy dilemmas 130–1 age structure of population 102, 103 fertility and population growth 84,
energy mix 494 Industrial Revolution in 52–4 88
energy ratio 494 population growth 81, 82, 85 and demographic transition 87–8
energy resources refugees 101 fertility rates 83, 84, 495
abundance of 129–30 European Common Agricultural total 504
alternative sources 114–18 Policy 243, 252 feudalism 495
categories 114 European emigration (1881–1910) 51 European 33
and climate change 126–8 European feudalism 33 transition to capitalism 40–1
and development 126–30 European Union (EU) 291, 309, fictive places 237–8
dilemmas 129–30 337, 495 Fiji 239
production and consumption, as geopolitical actor 416, 418 financial centres, ranking of 296
changes 119–26 and multi-level governance 477 financial derivatives 370
security of 125–6 transnational citizenship 462 financial development 289–90
entitlements 494 exchange 495 financial exclusion 495
environment exclusions from culture 268–9 financial markets 367–8
changes, and rurality 230 exopolis see edge cities financialization 366, 495
complexity of scale 142–6 experience, economies of 390–1 forces for 368–71
and consumption 149 Exploration, Age of 42 flexible production hub-and-spoke
and environmentalism 134 export processing zone 495 clusters 332
and limits to growth 139–42 flexible production systems 324
and meat in diet 165 floriculture 241
responsibility for 142–6
F flow resources 109, 110
and society, relationships with Facebook 297, 298 follow the thing 495
150–2 factors of production 495 food
strategies for change 146–50 factory system of production 49, 52–4 access to 166–8
valuing 134–9 fair trade 241–2, 292, 310, 495 provisioning programs 168
environmental futures 153 false needs 382 via self-production 167
environmental justice 150–1 famine alternative networks 309–14
environmental knowledge, media in Africa 158 availability 163–6
on 258–9 in Bengal (1942–43, 1972–73) changing nature of provision 303–4
Environmental Kuznets Curve 157–8, 161 connections 304
(EKC) 141–2, 494 in Cambodia 161 conventional vs alternative
environmental migration 99, 495 in China 96, 158, 161 networks 309
environmental myths of nature 253–4 in Ethiopia 158, 160, 161 cultural globalization of 265
desertification 253–4 in Haiti 159 displacement effect of 168
science, power of 253 in Ireland (1845–52) 157, 160, ethical foodscape 317–18
environmentalism 142, 495 161–2 exchange entitlement regimes 161
reformist and radical approaches in North Korea 161 global production hubs 307
to 146 Fannie Mae 375, 376 globalization and
Eritrea 101 Fascism 65, 495 industrialization of 304–9
ethical citizenship 464 Fascist geopolitics 407–10 governance innovations 307
ethical consumption 338, 392–5, 495 fashion, cultural globalization of high-value exports 306
ethical foodscape 317–18 264–5 interaction between producers
ethical value chains 241–2 fast food 495 and consumers 312–13
Ethiopia, famine in 158, 160, 161 fatalists 138 quality of 311–12
ethnic cleansing, Yugoslavia 427–8, Federal Home Loan Mortgage right to 168
447 Corporation (FHLMC, security see food security
ethnic segregation in UK 218 Freddie Mac) 375, 376 traceability of 312
ethnicity 495 Federal National Mortgage trade patterns, food policy and
Eurocentrism 39 Association (FNMA, Fannie global governance 307–9
colonial commerce 44–5 Mae) 375, 376 see also agriculture; alternative
and world expansion 42–3 feminism movement 74 food networks; hunger

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 552    INDEX

food aid 168 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power global divisions of labour 327
Food and Agriculture Organization plant (Japan) 108, 115, 116 global financial crisis
(FAO) 158, 160, 161, 162 functional upgrading 336 (2007–present) 290, 366,
low food consumption, causes 162 functional world political order 472 373–7, 472
food banks 464 global money 367–8
food chains 303–9, 495 debunking 371–3
and rurality 230
G global North, rural population
short chains 310, 312 gated communities 201, 496 change 231
whole chains 312 and territoriality 425–6 global oligopolies 290–1
food deserts 211, 495 in Uruguay 222–3 global patterns of urbanization
food miles 495 gay and lesbian zones 432–3 192–5
food prices, escalation of 314–15 gay rights movement 74 global production networks (GPNs)
food regimes 304, 305, 495 Gemeinschaft 496 322–3, 496
food security 160, 314–17, 495 gender 496 chains and networks 323–6
action frames for 315–17 and cultural fundamentalism 269 clustering 328, 332
defining 160–3 and nation-state 448 consumer campaigns against 338
prices, escalation of 314–15 see also women dynamic changes 328
and small farms 167 gender division of labour 496 in economic geography 283, 284
sustainable intensification 316–17 gendered spaces 431–2, 496 geographical complexity of 327
urban foodscape 317 General Agreement on Tariffs and governance of 332–7
waste 317 Trade (GATT) 63, 182, 309 institutional context of 337–9
for whom? 315–16 genetically modified (GM) foods regulating 338–9
food system stability 168 165, 243, 247, 308, 496 spatial divisions of labour 326–32
Fordism 63, 495 gentrification 220–4, 496 structural change to 338–41
change to post-Fordism 324 and rurality 230 global South
and post-Fordism 70 and territoriality 425 governance in 474
in rural agriculture 241 geo-codes 5 rural development, neglect of
Fordist (organized) capitalism 62–4, geographical circuits of money 372 236, 240
70, 495 geographical imagination 6, 8 rural population change 231
foreclosures 373, 374, 495 geographies of exclusion 496 global warming 496
foreign aid and development 173–6 from culture 268–9 see also climate change
‘Southern’ donors 183–4 geopolitics 400–1, 496 globalization 5–6, 496
foreign direct investment (FDI) 293–4 in Cold War 410–11 beginnings of 61
foreign exchange, trade in, growth in art and culture 413–15 and capitalism 70–1
of 370–1 living space, need for 401 of cultural tourism 265, 274
fossil fuels 113–14 Natural Seats of Power 405, 406 of culture 263
Foxconn 393–4 geothermal energy 117 diffusion of 264
France Germany distinctiveness of 263–4
Charlie Hebdo attack (2015) 74 empire of (1914) 68 mixing of 264
empire of (1914) 68 Green Party 146 and economic growth 288
late feudal period 32 organized capitalism in 62 of financial system 366, 367–8
rurality in 236 ‘parents’ money’ law 102 of food supply 304
franchising networks 324 Gesellschaft 496 forces for 368–71
Freddie Mac 375, 376 ghetto 496 and rurality 228, 230, 231
free market trade 71 ghettoization in cities 56 and world governance 471
Friends of the Earth 134, 146–7 global cities 196, 197, 496 globalized (disorganized) capitalism
fuels 113–26 Global Climate Coalition 149 71, 496
carbon intensity 120 global culture 264–8 Glorious Revolution (Great Britain,
efficiency 120 contested 267–8 1688) 41
energy mix, changing 118–19 existence challenged 266–7 Google 298
production and consumption, multiple cultures 267 governance 496
changes 119–26 scale of 267 of Arctic Ocean 479–84, 487
security of 125–6 global digital economy 296–9 basis of 471–3

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 INDEX    553

defined 471
domestic/foreign polarity of
H I
policy in 471 Haiti, famine in 159 idealized world political order 472
food production 307–9 heartland 403–7, 496 image consultancy 352
of global production networks in German geopolitics 405 imaginary geographies 497
332–7 hegemony 476, 497 of minorities 216–17
and governmentality 475 China 416–19 Imperial Citizenship 461
of South China Sea 484–7 heritage 35, 497 imperial states 440
and terrorism 474–5 heterogenization 387, 497 imperialism 47–8, 497
theories of 473–9 hidden others in rural world 239 end of 68–9
and balance of power 476–7 hierarchists 138 and nation-state 447
constituencies 474 high-technology innovative clusters impression management 352
and hegemony 476 332 India
quasi-states 474 high-value foods 497 Bengal famines (1942–43,
sharing of values, norms and Highland Clearances (Scotland) 51 1972–73) 157–8, 161
rules 477–9 HIV/AIDS 97–8 economic growth 300
and structural adjustment 474 in Africa 96–7 education 91–2
governmentality, Foucault on 475 and life expectancy 97 energy dilemmas 131
Great Britain cultural stereotypes of sufferers 216 food aid 168
brewing industry 52 Holocaust 449 green revolution in 164
canal network 50 Homo erectus 23 nuclear energy in 116
class-divisions in cities 54 homogenization 497 offshoring in 359, 361
ethnic segregation in 218 homosexuality population growth 81, 82
industrial housing in 55 in animals 255–6 see also BRICS
Industrial Revolution 52 and citizenship 467 Indian Mutiny (1857) 47
low-impact living 140–1 Hong Kong, citizenship of 460–1 indigenous peoples 22, 497
maternity pay 102 horizontal integration 497 environmentalism 151, 152
migration 102 in farming 305 US 180
nuclear energy in 116 Human Genome Project 256 individualists 137–8
offshoring from 360 human geography 2–3 industrial housing (Great Britain)
paternity leave 102 approaches 11–12 55
population and coalfields 62 changing worlds 3–7 Industrial Revolution 52–4, 497
population growth 82 origin and evolution of 7–11 services old as 348
poverty in 208–12 human nature, constructing industrialization 48–54
renewable energy in 117 254–8 of agriculture 50–2, 304, 497
rights, development of 461 human societies, classification of in developed world 304–6
in Roman times 31 22–3 canals and turnpikes 50
Scotland independence hunger changes, early twentieth century
referendum (2014) 74 food banks 464 60–2
South Asian culture in 387 in human history 157–8 and energy consumption 126,
textile industry in 49–50 present scale of 158–60 127–8
Great Depression (1929–33) 68, 96 numbers of 158, 159 factories 49, 52–4
Greece, refugees 101 hunter-gatherers 20, 22, 23–5 proto-industrialization 48–50
Greek colonization of distribution 21, 23, 27 railway networks 51
Mediterranean 29, 30 Hurricane Katrina (New Orleans, and rural–urban drift 235, 240
green revolution 163, 164, 165, 496 2005) 257 inequality 207
greenhouse gases (GHG) 113, 130, hybridity 497 in cities 200–1
131, 144–5, 496 of culture 271–3, 275 infant mortality rate (IMR) 95–6,
Greenpeace 487 selling 274–5 497
gross domestic product (GDP) 496 hydropower energy 117 influenza pandemic (1914–19) 96
gross national product (GNP) 496 hypersegregation 219, 497 informal economy 497
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba 430 hypothetical resources informal settlements 200, 497
gypsies 427 111–12, 497 and regeneration 223

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 554    INDEX

information and communication population growth 83–5

technology (ICT) 353–4, 358
J population share by region 85
and financial globalization 370 Japan, earthquake and tsunami transferring services to 359
information and economic growth (2011) 99, 108 see also global South
288 Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking liberal capitalism 60–2
inherent value 497 (JSMU) 486 challenges to 64–7
of the environment 134, 135, 137 joint venture networks 324 Liberal citizenship 459, 461, 463
inshoring 358 Jordan, refugees 101 liberal democracy 71
institutional disinvestment in people Libyan revolution 5
211 licensing networks 324
institutional geography of money 372
K life expectancy 94–6
instrumental value 497 Kangbashi (China) 193, 194 in Africa 96–7, 98
of the environment 134, 135, 137 Kansas City Food Circle (KCFC) at birth 498
International Council for Local 313–14 and disease 96–7, 98
Environment Initiatives Kenya, flooding of Somali refugee and natural disasters 98
(2002) 143 camps (2007) 99 and war 100
international division of labour knowledge, socially constructed 9 limits to growth 139–42, 498
(IDL) 327, 353, 359, 497 Kondratieff cycle 38–9, 498 in nature 249
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Kurds 443–4, 450 liquefied natural gas (LNG) 114,
63, 182, 291, 337, 370, 497 Kuznets cycles 54 120–1
and BRICS 183 Kyoto Protocol 144–5, 498 Liverpool (UK) 193
International Relations (IR) and Local Agenda 21s (LA21s) 143, 498
governance 471, 475, 476 local citizenship 463–4
Internet usage, by world region 297
L local culture 263, 267
intra-firm division of labour 327 La Rance Tidal Power project ethnic districts 274
intra-national division of labour (France) 117 exclusions from 268
327 labour intensive craft production reinvention of 268–71
intrinsic value 497 clusters 332 local economies 294–6
of the environment 134, 135, Lake District (UK) 250–1 Local Exchange Trading Systems
137 landholding and rural–urban drift (LETS) 372
Inuit (Arctic lands) 20 235 local government, development of 54
Inuit Circumpolar Council 482, landscape localism
484 and countryside 252 and culture 268, 270
iPad 393–4 as cultural construct 251–3 defensive 314
iPhone 335–6 management of 253 and global economy 294–5
Iran landscape painting 251–2 locality 498
life expectancy 100 language locational geography of money 372
refugees 101 and culture 272 London (UK)
Iraq in service offshoring 359–60, 361 as financial centre 295
invasion of 477 and the state 446, 447 as global city 196, 197
life expectancy 100 Latin America, age structure of long networks 243
refugees 101 population 103 Los Angeles (USA) 198–9
Ireland 444 Laws of the Indies 46 low impact development (LID) 498
Irish potato famine (1845–52) 51, Lebanon, refugees 101 low impact living (LIL) 140–1, 153
157, 160, 161–2 lecture halls as space 435
Islam 69, 497 legitimacy 498
and cultural fundamentalism 269, less developed countries (LDCs) 498
M
271 agriculture in 306–7 McDonald’s 384–5
fundamentalism 74 agri-food systems in 306–7 in East Asia 385–6
radicalism in Middle East 412 birth and death rates in 86–7 in Russia 386
Islamic State 416, 432, 441 comparative advantage in mainstreaming of alternative food
Islamophobia 498 agriculture 243 networks 310
Italy, birth rate incentives 102 foreign direct investment by 293–4 malaria 98

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 INDEX    555

Manchester (England) 432, 433 geography of 366–73 National Air and Space
mandala 441–2 and power 366 Administration (NASA) 6–7
Maori wars (1860s) 47 reducing quality to quantity 366 national cultures 263, 267
marginalization and poverty 207–13 worlds of 367–8 hybrid 272
market-based states 26, 498 Mongol empire 29 national identity 442–4
market networks 324 mongrel cities 201–2, 203 National Parks 250
marketing geographies 383–8 monopoly 498 nationalism 499
markets and economic problem monopsony 498 and ritual 450–1
285–6 in cider industry 242 as religion 450
Marxism 39, 65–6, 498 moral economies 388 and the state 446–7
and rurality 230 moral panic 498 state as bureaucratic expression
meat and environment 165 more developed countries (MDCs) of 450
media, on nature 256–9 499 natural disasters
on environmental knowledge birth and death rates in 86, 87 demographic impact and
258–9 comparative advantage in geography of 96, 98–9
on natural disasters 256–8 agriculture 243 media on 256–8
mega-cities 193–5, 498 foreign direct investment by natural gas 114
Mercato Mall (Dubai) 387 293–4 production and consumption
merchant capitalism 40, 498 industrialization of agriculture in 121, 123
mergers 498 304–6 reserves 119–21
micro-publics in cities 202–3 population growth 83–4, 85 trade movements 123
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome population share by region 85 use of 118, 119
(MERS) 487 transferring services from 359 natural limits to growth 249
migration see also global North, rural natural resources 108–13
age structure of population 102 population change availability 110–13
and citizenship 462–3 mortality 94–6 classification of 109–10
and Irish potato famine 51 see also death rates continuum 110
and population change 92–4 multiculturalism 271, 499 definition 108–9
push and pull factors 92–3 multifunctional rural worlds scarcity 112, 113
trans-Atlantic 46 243–4 Natural Seats of Power 405, 406
military governments multinational enterprises see nature
in Bolivia 403 transnational corporations challenge of 259
in Brazil 401–2 music and culture 271–3 as cultural construct 250–3
in Chile 400–1 Mutually Assured Destruction landscape 251–3
in South America 400, 410 (MAD) policy 410 wilderness 250–1
in Turkey 409–10 Myanmar, as state 442–4 defined 247
Millennium Development Goals environmental myths of 253–4
(MDGs) and human society 247
on development 172
N humans excluded from 254
on environmental sustainability Narvik (Norway) 376 humans’ place in 256
110 nation and state, distinctions 453 and media 256–9
on food and hunger 159–60 nation-state 69, 499 pre-human existence of 247
on under-5 mortality rate 95–6 as bureaucratic expression of and science 253
modernism 498 nationalism 450 as social construct 247–9, 259
modernity 231, 498 and citizenship 459–62 Nazi geopolitics 407–10
modernization approach to cross-border connections racial policies 408, 449
development 172, 177–8 between 452 Nazism 65
modular products 325 gendered perspectives of 448 ideology of 65
monasteries, dissolution of 40 as imagined communities 440–8 racism in 65
money shadow powers and networks near-shoring 363
discourse of liberation 367 in 452 negative equity 373, 499
discourse of suspicion 366 as symbolic system 450–1 neoclassical economic theory
functions of 366, 367 and territoriality 446, 447 282, 283

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 556    INDEX

neoliberalism 71–2, 499 periphery in world systems theory

and alternative food networks
O 39, 500
315 Occupy Central movement 460–1 peri-urban zone 192, 500
and economic growth 288 Occupy movement 377, 430, 460, permaculture 153, 500
and rurality 230, 231 466, 473 perpetual peace (Kant) 477, 478
and urban poverty 201 Oceania, age structure of Personal Carbon Trading (PCT)
in world governance 474, 475 population 103 148
neo-Malthusianism 142, 499 offshoring 354, 357–63 personal space 500
Nepal earthquake (2015) 99 oil 114 petroleum prices, trends 124–6
Nestlé 291 production and consumption pink-collar occupations 287
networked readiness index 121–4 place
297, 298 reserves 119–20 local geographies of 388–90
new creative class 296 trade movements 122 and local geographies of
new economic geography (NEG) use of 118–19 shopping 388–90
283, 499 oligopsony 290 place-making 237–8
new industrial districts (NIDs) 499 onshoring 354 playgrounds as space 435
new international division of labour organic theory of state 401 pluriactivity in rural areas 240
(NIDL) 327–8, 499 Organization for Economic Poland, birth rate incentives 102
New Orleans 44–5 Cooperation and policing, geographies of 429–30
New Social Movements (NSMs) Development (OECD) 175 political ecology 253
465–6, 499 Organization of Petroleum political economy 500
new towns 63 Exporting Countries of agriculture 304
New World Order 415–16, 499 (OPEC) 111, 124 and money 367
Newcastle Brown Ale 386 organized capitalism see Fordist rural geography in 229, 230
newly agriculturalizing countries (organized) capitalism political shifts in rurality 235–7
(NACs) 307, 499 Oriental 39 political sovereignty 441
newly industrialized countries original brand manufacturer politics and ecology 253–4
(NICs) 499 (OBM) 336 population growth 80–5
Niagara Falls 250 original design manufacturer and demographic transition 85–8
Nigeria, Boko Haram 74 (ODM) 325–6, 336 and economic development 83–5
Nike 384 original equipment manufacturer and fertility 84, 88
NIMBY 216 (OEM) 336 global 88–92
Non-Alignment Movement, The Outdoor Recreation Party NZ and migration 92–4
174 235–6 over time 80–2
non-governmental organizations outsourcing services 357–63 see also demographic transition
(NGOs) 172, 499 risks attached 359–60 model
and environmentalism 143 overpopulation 142, 499 population pyramids 102, 103
non-renewable (stock) resources Portugal
109, 110, 499 boundaries 449
North America, age structure of
P geopolitics in 407
population 102, 103 Pakistan, refugees 101 Portuguese empire (1914) 68
North American Free Trade palaeolithic 499 post-Fordism production system
Area (NAFTA) 286, 291, Palestinian Arabs 450 70, 500
309, 337 part-process as spatial division of alternative systems 324
North Atlantic triangular trade 43 labour 327 change from Fordism 324
North Korea, famine in 161 participatory democracy in culture 262
Norway 146, 499 in economic geography 283
maternity pay 102 passive solar heating 499 external networks 324
Narvik 376 pastoral nomads 20, 21, 499 postmodern cities 192
paternity leave 102 patriarchy 500 postmodern rurality 230
pizza marketing in 386 Pax Americana 72–3 postmodern urbanization 198–200,
nuclear energy 114–16 peasant communities 20, 34, 500 201
use of 119 perfect competition 284 postmodernism 500

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 INDEX    557

post-productivist rural economies protest, geographies of 429–30 representative democracy 146, 501
242–3 proto-industrialization 48–50, 500 Republican citizenship 459–61, 463
post-productivist transition 243, 500 proven (proved) resources 110–11, 500 residential segregation 501
poverty 500 public geography of money 373 resource 501
in cities 200–1 punctuated equilibrium 88–92 resource impact 129
and institutional disinvestment Restoration (Great Britain, 1660) 41
211 retroliberalism 501
rurality 230, 239
Q and rurality 231
and social exclusion 213–17 Qaddafi family 5 rich neighbourhoods 208
and urban segregation 207–13 quality food 311–12 Right to Food 501
power geometry 500 quality of life 500 riot and unpopular estates (UK)
in agriculture 305 urban social geography 207–8 social characteristics 211
in culture 267 quality turn 500 social inequality 212
in economic geography 284 in food supply 312 road traffic accidents 99
and money 366, 371 quasi-states, governance in 474 Roma 427
in nation-states 441 quaternary economic sector 287–8, Roman Britain 31
and territoriality 423, 426 500 Roman Empire 29, 32–3
power relations and culture 262 and economic growth 288–9 Romantic movement 501
pre-capitalist societies 34–5 Rotating Savings and Credit
predatory lending 500 Associations (ROSCAs) 372
prehistoric societies 500
R Ruhr region (Germany) 52
pre-industrial period 22–3 race 28, 501 rural cultures 268–9
and agriculture 25–8 and environmental justice 151 rural depopulation 231, 233, 235, 239
chiefdoms 23, 25, 26, 29 exclusions on 217–20 of largest populations 235
cities and civilization 28–33 and racism 47 in Niue 234
heritage of past 35 nation imagined as 446 by region and development group
pre-capitalist societies 34–5 and segregation 45–6 232
states 23, 26 as social construct 217 rural social space 237
pre-modern states 26 and territoriality 426–9 rural territorial space 237
presence of natural persons in and urbanization 56 rural–urban drift 233–5
offshoring 358, 359 US capitalism and development, rural–urban fringe 192, 501
primary economic sector 286, 287 origins of 180 rurality 501
primary energy 500 racialized space 501 changing geographies 229–31
primary sector 500 racism 47, 501 as concept 227–8, 229
prisons 430 of Nazism 65 definitions 228–9
private property 434 railway networks 53–4 economic shifts in 240–4
producer-driven production Great Britain 51 empirical approach to 228
networks 332–3, 334 recycling 149 and hidden others 239
product upgrading 336 refugees 100–1, 501 multiplicity of 228
production process and services 346 flooding of Somali refugee camps perceptions by urban consumers
production satellite clusters 332 in Kenya (2007) 99 237
productivist rural economies 240–2 regulatory geography of money 373 pluriactivity in 240
protectionism in 242 relational approaches 501 in political economy 229, 230
pro-environmental behaviour (PEB) relative poverty 208 shifts in 231–44
135–7, 500 religion 34, 46 cultural 237–40
proletarianization 235 fundamentalist movements 74 demographic 231–5
prosumers 383, 500 nationalism as 450 economic 240–4
Protected Designation of Origin relocalization 311–12, 314, 501 political 235–6
(PDO) 312 renewable energy 501 as social construct 228, 230
Protected Geographical Indication renewable resources 109, 110, 114, Russia 66, 409
(PGI) 312 115–18, 501 annexation of Crimea 130
protectionism in productivist rural use of 119 energy dilemmas 130–1
economies 242 replacement rate 88, 501 nuclear energy in 116

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 558    INDEX

Russia (Continued) and production process 346 soup kitchens 464

and Ukraine 72 productivity and 348–51 South Africa
see also BRICS second global shift 357–63 apartheid in 426–7
Rwanda spatial divisions of expertise 344, segregation under 218
life expectancy 100 353–7 life expectancy 97
massacres (1990s) 47 settlements see also BRICS
and agriculture 25–8 South America
distribution of 283 heartland of 403, 405
S Roman Empire 33 military governments in 400,
Salinas Valley, California 305 sexuality 502 410
salmon farming, Chile 306–7 and citizenship 467 self-government in 47
Samba-taiko (Brazil) 273 and space 432–3 South China Sea
San Francisco (USA) 432, 433 shallow ecology 135 governance of 484–7
Santería (Cuba) 273 shopping 502 map of 485
scarcity local geographies of 388–90 South Korea, education 91
of natural resources 112, 113 shopping malls 388–90 sovereign states 440
and unequal distribution 249 as regulated space 430 sovereignty 441
science short food supply chains (SFSCs) fragmented 451
cultural factors in 253 310 graduated application of 452
and nature 253 short networks 243 sovereigntyscapes 452
second global shift 501 Sierra Club (USA) 250 Soviet Union 66–7
second industrial revolution 501 Silent Spring (Carson) 142 collapse of 69, 415
secondary mortgage market 375, silk trade 42 foreign aid 173, 174–5
376, 501 simulacrum 237, 502 as multinational state 444
secondary sector 287, 502 skateboarding 390 space, policing 429
securities 370, 502 slavery 42, 44–6, 82 Spain, boundaries 449
securitization 375, 376, 502 US capitalism and development, spatial division of expertise 344,
security, geographies of 429–30 origins of 180 353–7
segregation 45–6 slow food 502 at Boeing 355–7
and territoriality 424–6 social abjection 215 spatial division of labour 326–32,
self-supporting cultures and poverty social construct 502 355, 502
223–4 economies as 284 spatial interaction 282, 502
semi-periphery in world systems nature as 247–9, 259 spatial organization of production
theory 39, 502 rurality as 228, 230 355
sense of place 502 social constructionism 248–9, 502 spatial relations 502
service offshoring 354, 357–63 social division of labour 355 speculative resources 111, 112, 502
and language 359–60, 361 social embeddedness 502 spice trade 42
service outsourcing 357–63 social exclusion 502 sports grounds and facilities 436
services 344, 502 and poverty 213–17 Starbucks 384, 391–2
blended delivery systems 363 and race 217–20 state-anchored clusters 332
classification of 347 and territoriality 425–6 statelessness 463
defining 344–7 social geography 207 states 23, 26, 502
distinguished from goods 346 social movement 502 and capitalism 38
distribution of 283 social networking 297 colonial politics 46–7
as emotional labour 351–2 and culture 266 as communities 440
employment changes 348–51 society and environment, early forms of 29
employment in 345 relationships 150–2 market-based 26
face-to-face contact in 351–2 soil erosion 254 multinational makeup 442–4
fastest growing sectors 350 solar energy 117 and nation, distinctions 453
gross value added by 350 Somalia organic theory of 401
and Industrial Revolution 348 famine in (2011–12) 158 pre-modern (regulated) 26
as labour-intensive industries 349 life expectancy 100 Roman Empire 33
myth of 348–51 refugees 99, 101 variability of 440

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 INDEX    559

stigma 207, 502 personal space 434, 435–6 transnational technical communities
of HIV/AIDS sufferers 216 sexuality and space 432–3 338
and race 220 space, personalizing 434 transnationalism 504
stock exchanges 43 work, rest and play 433–6 transport
stock resources 109, 110 terrorism and governance 474–5 advances in 61
strategic alliance networks 324 tertiary sector 287–8, 503 and urbanization 55
structural adjustment programmes and economic growth 288–9 travellers 427, 504
306, 502 textile industry 48–50, 52 triangular trade, North Atlantic 43
and governance 474 changes, early twentieth century tribes 23, 25, 28, 504
structuralism 502 60–1 trickle-down effect
in rural economies 243 Thanet Earth 316 of capitalism 177, 178
structuralist approach to economic themed environments of of urban regeneration 222
location 283 consumption 387 Turkey 409–10, 449–50
studentification 213–15, 502 Third World 171–2, 503 refugees 101
students, socially excluded 213–15 concept and definitions of 173 turnpikes (Great Britain) 50
subcontracting networks 324 decolonization of 181 twentieth century capitalism, early
subcultures 262, 503 and development 173–6 changes in 60–2
subprime lending 366, 373–5, 503 industrialization of 70 twenty-first century, early 71–4
substitutionism 306, 503 and non-alignment 174 economic challenges 71–2
subsumption 306, 503 peasantry, decline of 239 banking crisis 72
suburbanization/suburbs 503 (re)emerging powers within inequalities in 72
Sudan 182–3 environmental challenges 73
civil war 47 slum estates in 210 geopolitical challenges 72–3
refugees 101 Soviet power in 411 security challenges 74
sustainability/sustainable stereotypes of 171 value and identity challenges
development 140, 503 Three Mile Island (USA) accident 73–4
of cities 200, 203 (1979) 115 twin towers’ terrorist attack (9/11)
sustainable diets 318 tiered network 324 6, 74, 125, 451, 474
sustainable intensification 303, 503 tourism 292–3
Swaziland, life expectancy 97 for adventure 238
Syria cultural 263
U
life expectancy 100 cultural globalization of 265, 274 Uganda, life expectancy 97
refugees 100, 101 rural 238, 239 Ukraine 409
traceability of food 312, 503 Chernobyl disaster 115
trading networks 43 civil war 72
T tradition and economic energy dilemmas 130
Tasmania, old-growth logging problem 285 underclass 504
136–7 Transatlantic Trade and Investment uneven development 291–4
technology and economic growth Partnership (TTIP) 309, 503 foreign direct investment 293–4
288 transculturation 271–3, 503 localities within 294–6
technology-driven production transgression 503 trade 291–3
networks 335 into better spaces 223 United Kingdom see Great Britain
territoriality 503 transnational citizenship 462 United Nations
and class 424–6 transnational corporations (TNCs) Convention on the Law of the
and nation-state 446, 447 61, 62, 504 Sea (LOSC) 479, 482, 483,
and its peoples 29 in economic geography 283, 286 484, 485, 486
and power geometry 423, 426 in food supply 304, 305–6 and world governance 472–3, 477
and race 426–9 foreign direct investment by 294 World Tourism Organization
and social exclusion 425–6 in global production networks (UNWTO) 292
territory 422–4, 503 333 United States
class and segregation 424–6 global trade by 292 and China 72
ethnicity and race 426–9 in rural agriculture 241 class-divisions in cities 56
gendered space 431–2 transnational economies 70 ethnic segregation in 218–20

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 560    INDEX

United States (Continued) and nation-state 448

food insecurity in 157, 160
V in ROSCAs 372
foreign aid 173–4, 175 value-adding activity 504 and territoriality 431–2
organized capitalism in 62 value chains, ethical 241–2 as transmitters of culture 269
race, native lands and the origins vertical disintegration 504 see also gender
of US capitalism and of farming 305 workplace 431–2, 434–5
development 180 vertical integration 504 World Bank 63, 167, 182, 504
railroads in 54 and BRICS 183
subprime lending 373–5 World Food Summit, Rome (1996)
textile industry 52
W 162
urban foodscape 317 Wall Street Crash (1929) 367, 369 world systems theory 39, 64, 504
urban myths 190, 504 wars, demographic impact and and rurality 230
urban resilience 203 geography of 96, 99–101 World Trade Organization
urban revanchism 223, 504 water 110 (WTO) 286, 291, 308–9,
urban segregation Way of St James (Camino de 337, 504
and cultural stereotypes 213–17 Santiago) 10–11 Information and Technology
and poverty 207–13 wealth, regional share of global Agreement (ITA) 361
urbanization 54–6, 504 290 World War One 68, 96
business centres 54, 56, 57 West Africa, famine in (2012) 158 World War Two 66–7, 68, 96, 99
class-divisions in 54–6 Western Europe, coalfields in 52–3
connectivity of urban areas 195–6 white-collar occupations 287
defining 191–2 wilderness
Y
global patterns of 192–5 and conservation debates in Yosemite Valley National Park
growth of 193, 194 Australia 151–2 250
housing 54, 55, 56 as cultural construct 250–1 Yugoslavia
and local government 54 contesting 251 ethnic cleansing in 427–8, 447
new towns 63 wildlife documentaries 258–9 as multinational state 444
postmodern 198–200 wind energy 117
and race 56 Windscale (UK) nuclear accident
and rurality 231 (1957) 115
Z
rates of 231 women Zambia, life expectancy 97
and transport 55 and cultural fundamentalism Zimbabwe, life expectancy 97
see also cities 269 Zomia 445–6
Uruguay, gated communities in 222–3 education 90, 91 Zulu rebellion (1879) 47

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