CoTeSCUP vs.
Secretary of Education (2018)
Summary Cases:
● CoTeSCUP vs. Secretary of Education
Subject: Political question doctrine vis-a-vis the Power of Judicial Review; Remedies of Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus; Exercise of power of judicial review; K to 12 Law was duly enacted; Prior
consultations conducted; Enrolled Bill doctrine; No undue delegation of legislative power; DO No. 31 is
valid and enforceable; Police power of the State; Non-self-executing constitutional provisions;
Compulsory Elementary and High School Education; K to 12 Basic Education Program is not being
retroactively applied; Right to select a profession or course of study; Mother Tongue as medium of
instruction; CMO No. 20 is constitutional; CMO No. 20 does not contravene any other laws; The K to 12
Law does not violate substantive due process; The K to 12 Law does not violate equal protection of the
laws; Other arguments against the constitutionality of the K to 12 Law; Policy issues
Facts:
The consolidated petitions under Rule 65 assail the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10533 (K
to 12 Law), RA No. 10157 (Kindergarten Education Act), and related issuances of the Department of
Education (DepEd), Commission on Higher Education (CHED), Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) and Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) implementing the K to 12
Basic Education Program.
As a background, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitution did not state that education at any
level was compulsory. This changed in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which made elementary
education mandatory. Section 2(2), Article XIV provides that the State shall “[e]stablish and maintain a
system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural
right of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age.”
Subsequent legislations implemented the policies stated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution like: RA No.
6655 (Free Public Secondary Education Act of 1988); RA No. 6728 and RA No. 8545 which
implemented the voucher system to provide tuition assistance for students in private high schools.
Under RA No. 8545, elementary education was redefined as the first six (6) years of basic education,
excluding pre-school and grade seven, while secondary education was redefined as the next four (4)
years after completion of basic education.
In 2000, at the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, 164 governments, including the Philippines,
pledged to achieve by 2015 six (6) Education for All (EFA) goals. In line with this, the DepEd undertook
the preparation of the Philippine EFA 2015 Plan of Action.
In 2012, the Philippine Congress, in realization of the country's EFA goals, enacted RA No. 10157
(Kindergarten Education Act) which institutionalized kindergarten education, which is one (1) year of
preparatory education for children at least five years old, as part of basic education, and is made
mandatory and compulsory for entrance to Grade 1. Subsequently, DepEd Order (DO) No. 32 was
issued as the Kindergarten Education Act's implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
Before the enactment of RA No. 10533 (K to 12 Law), the Philippines, joined only by Djibouti and Angola,
were the only countries in the world with a 10-year basic education system. The K to 12 Law expanded
the basic education from 10 years to 13 years, encompassing at least one 1 year of kindergarten
education, 6 years of elementary education, and 6 years of secondary education. Secondary education
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includes 4 years of junior high school and 2 years of senior high school education.
Apart from mastering core subjects, the additional 2 years of Senior High School will allow students to
choose among academic, technical-vocational, or sports and arts, as specialization, based on aptitude,
interest and school capacity. Hence, graduates of Senior High School under the K to 12 Basic Education
Curriculum (BEC) are envisioned to already be prepared for employment, entrepreneurship, or
middle-level skills development should they opt not to pursue college education.
To accommodate the changes brought about by the K to 12 Law, CHED Memorandum Order (CMO) No.
20, Series of 2013 was issued providing a revised General Education (GE) curriculum which is
outcome-oriented and categorized into: (a) Intellectual Competencies; (b) Personal and Civic
Competencies; and (c) Practical Responsibilities. This GE curriculum requires the completion of 36 units
as compared to the previous 63/51 units requirement.
Held:
I. Procedural Issues
Political question doctrine vis-a-vis the Power of Judicial Review
1. The OSG submits that the cases involve purely political questions which go into the wisdom of the law.
The Court disagrees.
The political question doctrine is "no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review"
under the expanded definition of judicial power of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Section 1, Article VIII
thereof authorizes courts of justice not only "to settle actual case controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
2. Thus, when a case is brought before the Court with serious allegations that a law or executive
issuance infringes upon the Constitution, as in these consolidated cases, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the Court to settle the dispute. In doing so, the Court is not judging the wisdom of
an act of a coequal department, but is merely ensuring that the Constitution is upheld. And, if after said
review, the Court does not find any constitutional infringement, then, it has no more authority to proscribe
the actions under review.
Remedies of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
3. That the assailed laws and executive issuances did not involve the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial
function is of no moment. Under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, the writs of certiorari and prohibition
are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, any act of any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Exercise of power of judicial review
4. The following requisites must first be complied with before the Court may exercise its power of judicial
review, namely:
(1) there is an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
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(2) the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a
personal and substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the act or issuance; (3) the question of constitutionality is raised at the
earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case.
Of these four, the most important are the first two requisites.
Actual case or controversy
5. An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference
or dispute since the courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions.
6. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," and a
question is ripe when the act being challenged has a direct effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had been accomplished or
performed by either branch of government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege
the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action.
7. These consolidated cases present an actual case or controversy that is ripe for adjudication. The
assailed laws and executive issuances have already taken effect and petitioners herein, who are faculty
members, students and parents, are individuals directly and considerably affected by their
implementation.
Legal Standing
8. Legal standing refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.
9. Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 216930 and 218465 include organizations/federations duly organized under
the laws of the Philippines, representing the interest of the faculty and staff of their respective colleges
and universities, who allegedly are threatened to be demoted or removed from employment with the
implementation of the K to 12 Law. Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 217752 and 218045 are suing as citizens,
taxpayers and in their personal capacities as parents whose children would be directly affected by the
law in question. Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 218123 and 217451 are suing in their capacities as teachers
who allegedly will be negatively affected by the implementation of the K to 12 Law and CMO No. 20
through job displacement and diminution of benefits; and as taxpayers who have the right to challenge
the K to 12 Law and CMO No. 20 as public funds are spent and will be spent for its implementation.
10. The Court finds that petitioners have sufficient legal interest in the outcome of the controversy. And,
considering that the instant cases involve issues on education, which under the Constitution the State is
mandated to promote and protect, the stringent requirement of direct and substantial interest may be
dispensed with, and the mere fact that petitioners are concerned citizens asserting a public right,
sufficiently clothes them with legal standing to initiate the instant petition
II. Substantive Issues
K to 12 Law was duly enacted
(a) Prior consultations conducted
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11. Petitioners' claim of lack of prior consultations is belied by the nationwide regional consultations
conducted by DepEd pursuant DepEd Memorandum Nos. 38 and 98, series of 2011. The regional
consultations, which aimed "to inform the public and to elicit their opinions, thoughts, and suggestions
about the K to 12 program," ran from February to March 2011 and were participated in by students,
parents, teachers and administrators, government representatives, and representatives from private
schools and private sectors. The Philippine Congress, in the course of drafting the K to 12 Law, also
conducted regional public hearings between March 2011 to February 2012. And even assuming that no
consultations had been made prior to the adoption of the K to 12, it has been held that the penalty for
failure on the part of the government to consult could only be reflected in the ballot box and would not
nullify government action.
(b) Enrolled Bill doctrine
12. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed is
conclusive not only as to its provisions but also as to its due enactment. The rationale behind the
enrolled bill doctrine rests on the consideration that "the respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the [Judiciary] to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
13. In Astorga vs Villegas, the Senate President himself, who authenticated the bill, admitted a mistake
and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider. In contrast
this case presents no exceptional circumstance to justify the departure from the salutary rule. The K to
12 Law was passed by the Senate and House of Representatives, approved by the President, and, after
publication, took effect on June 8, 2013. Thus, there is no doubt as to the formal validity of the K to 12
Law.
No undue delegation of legislative power
14. In determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the
Court has adopted two tests:
(a) Completeness test: the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The
policy to be executed or implemented by the delegate must be set forth therein.
(b) Sufficient standard test: there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify
the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
15. Under the two tests, the K to 12 Law, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all essential
terms and conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the power delegated to the DepEd, CHED
and TESDA. The K to 12 Law (Section 2) adequately provides the legislative policy that it seeks to
implement. Moreover, scattered throughout the K to 12 Law are the standards to guide the DepEd,
CHED and TESDA in carrying out the provisions of the law, from the development of the K to 12 BEC, to
the hiring and training of teaching personnel and to the formulation of appropriate strategies in order to
address the changes during the transition period.
16. The fact that the K to 12 Law did not have any provision on labor does not make said law incomplete.
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The purpose of permissible delegation to administrative agencies is for the latter to "implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by 'filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity
or competence to provide. This is effected by the promulgation of supplementary regulations, such as
the K to 12 IRR jointly issued by the DepEd, CHED and TESDA and the Joint Guidelines issued in
coordination with DOLE, to address in detail labor and management rights relevant to implementation of
the K to 12 Law.
17. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the legislature
has found it necessary to entrust to administrative agencies, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them, the authority to provide direct and efficacious solutions to these
problems.
DO No. 31 is valid and enforceable
18. DO No. 31 did not add two 2 years to basic education nor did it impose additional obligations to
parents and children. DO No. 31 is an administrative regulation addressed to DepEd personnel providing
for general guidelines on the implementation of a new curriculum for Grades 1 to 10 in preparation for
the K to 12 basic education. DO No. 31 was issued in accordance with the DepEd's mandate to establish
and maintain a complete, adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national
development and pursuant to the Secretary's authority to formulate and promulgate national educational
policies, under existing laws.
19. More than a year prior to adoption of DO No. 31, DepEd conducted regional consultations and focus
group discussions, participated in by students, parents, teachers and administrators, government
representatives, and representatives from private schools and private sector.
20. Publication is not necessary for DO No. 31 to be effective. Interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, including the rules and guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the
performance of their duties are not required to be published. At any rate, DO No. 31 was already
forwarded to the University of the Philippines Law Center for filing in accordance with Sections 3 and 4 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 and took effect pursuant to said provisions.
Police power of the State
21. Police power is defined broadly as the State's authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. This all-comprehensive definition
provides ample room for the State to meet the exigencies of the times depending on the conditions and
circumstances. (Edu v. Ericta)
22. It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and
sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital
functions of governance.
23. The enactment of education laws, including the K to 12 Law and the Kindergarten Education Act,
their respective implementing rules and regulations and the issuances of the government agencies, are
an exercise of the State's police power. The State has an interest in prescribing regulations to promote
the education and the general welfare of the people.
Non-self-executing constitutional provisions
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24. Only self-executing provisions of the Constitution embody judicially enforceable rights and therefore
give rise to causes of action in court. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent
of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action.
25. All provisions of the Constitution are presumed self-executing, because to treat them as requiring
legislation would result in giving the legislature the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. And this could result in a cataclysm. (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS)
26. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court also ruled that Section 1, Article XIV on the right of all
citizens to quality education is also not self-executory. The provision "for the promotion of the right to
'quality education' was put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights. Further, Section 6, Article XIV on the use of the Filipino language as a medium of
instruction is also not self-executory. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this.
27. In Agabon vs. NLRC, Section 3, Article XIII, on the protection of labor and security of tenure, was
also declared by the Court as not self-executory. Section 3, Article XIII, does not automatically confer
judicially demandable and enforceable rights and cannot, on its own, be a basis for a declaration of
unconstitutionality.
28. Here, apart from bare allegations that the K to 12 Law does not provide mechanisms to protect labor,
which have no legal bases, petitioners have not proffered other bases in claiming that the right to protect
labor and/or security of tenure was violated with the implementation of the K to 12 Law. To be sure, the
protection of labor from illegal dismissal has already been set in stone with the enactment of the Labor
Code and the Civil Service Law.
Compulsory Elementary and High School Education
29. Petitioners argue that the legislature, in making kindergarten and senior high school compulsory,
expanded the constitutional definition of elementary education.
30. The Constitution is clear in making elementary education compulsory; and the K to 12 Law and
related issuances did not change this as, in fact, they affirmed it.
31. The Constitution did not curtail the legislature's power to determine the extent of basic education. It
only provided a minimum standard: that elementary education be compulsory. By no means did the
Constitution foreclose the possibility that the legislature provides beyond the minimum set by the
Constitution. the definition of basic education have been expanded by the legislature through the
enactment of different laws, consistent with the State's exercise of police power.
32. There is nothing in Article 26 of the UDHR that would show that the State is prohibited from making
kindergarten and high school compulsory. The UDHR provided a minimum standard for States to follow.
Congress in fact, it went beyond the minimum by making kindergarten and high school compulsory. This
action of Congress is, in turn, consistent with Article 41 of the CRC which provides that "[n]othing in the
present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the realization of the rights
of the child and which may be contained in: (a) the law of a State party; or (b) international law in force
for that State.''
33. The enactment of the K to 12 Law was the manner by which the Congress sought to realize the right
to education of its citizens. Absent any showing of a violation of any Constitutional self-executing right or
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any international law, the Court cannot question the desirability, wisdom, or utility of the K to 12 Law as
this is best addressed by the wisdom of Congress.
K to 12 Basic Education Program is not being retroactively applied
34. Petitioners claim that the 2 additional years in high school should not have been applied retroactively
in violation of Article 4 of the Civil Code, and that students who had already began schooling prior to
2013 or upon the passage of the K to 12 Law already acquired a "vested right" to graduate after the
completion of 4 years of high school.
35. The K to 12 Basic Education Program is not being retroactively applied because only those currently
enrolled at the time the K to 12 Law took effect and future students will be subject to the K to 12 BEC
and the additional two 2 years of senior high school. Students who already graduated from high school
under the old curriculum are not required by the K to 12 Law to complete the additional 2 years of senior
high school.
36. More importantly, BP Blg. 232 does not confer any vested right to 4 years of high school education.
BP Blg. 232 or RA No. 9155 does not preclude any amendment or repeal on the duration of elementary
and high school education. In adding 2 years of secondary education to students who have not yet
graduated from high school, Congress was merely exercising its police power and legislative wisdom in
imposing reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education, in compliance with its
constitutional duty to promote quality education for all.
Right to select a profession or course of study
37. There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and its IRR and the right of the senior high school
students to choose their profession or course of study. The senior high school curriculum is designed in
such a way that students have core subjects and thereafter, they may choose among four strands: 1)
Accountancy, Business and Management (ABM) Strand; 2) Science, Technology, Engineering and
Mathematics (STEM) Strand; 3) Humanities and Social Sciences (HUMSS) Strand; and 4) General
Academic (GA) Strand.
38. Petitioners have failed to show that the State has imposed unfair and inequitable conditions for
senior high schools to enroll in their chosen path. The K to 12 Program is precisely designed in such a
way that students may choose to enroll in public or private senior high schools which offer the strands of
their choice. For eligible students, the voucher program also allows indigent senior high school students
to enroll in private institutions that offer the strands of their choice.
Mother Tongue as medium of instruction
39. Petitioners argue that the use of the MT or the regional or native language as primary medium of
instruction for kindergarten and the first 3 years of elementary education contravenes Section 7, Article
XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which expressly limits regional languages simply as auxiliary
media of instruction.
40. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm that MT or regional languages may be
used as a medium of instruction. It was never the intent of the framers of the Constitution to use only
Filipino and English as the exclusive media of instruction. Congress has the power to enact a law that
designates Filipino as the primary medium of instruction even in the regions but, in the absence of such
law, the regional languages may be used as primary media of instruction. The Congress, however, opted
not to enact such law. On the contrary, the Congress, in the exercise of its wisdom, provided that the
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regional languages shall be the primary media of instruction in the early stages of schooling. Verily, this
act of Congress was not only Constitutionally permissible, but was likewise an exercise of an exclusive
prerogative to which the Court cannot interfere with.
41. When the government, through the K to 12 Law and the DepEd issuances, determined that the use
of MT as primary medium of instruction until Grade 3 constitutes a better curriculum, it was working
towards discharging its constitutional duty to provide its citizens with quality education. The Court, even
in the exercise of its jurisdiction to check if another branch of the government committed grave abuse of
discretion, will not supplant such determination as it pertains to the wisdom of the policy.
42. There is no conflict between the use of MT as a primary medium of instruction and the right of
parents in rearing their children. While Section 12, Article II grants parents the primary right to rear and
educate their children, the State, as parens patriae, has the inherent right and duty to support parents in
the exercise of this constitutional right. In other words, parents' authority and the State's duty are not
mutually exclusive but complement each other. In the matter of education, a parent is always the first
teacher. The language first learned by the child or his "mother tongue", which the child understands best
and hence, an effective tool for further learning, is first and foremost taught by the parent. The inclusion
in the K to 12 Program of the MT as a medium of instruction and a subject in the early years of learning
is, therefore, not intended to curtail the parents' right but to complement and enhance the same.
43. Despite the provision on the use of MT as primary medium of instruction for kindergarten and Grades
1 to 3, Filipino and English remain as subjects in the curriculum during the earlier stages of schooling
and will later on be used as primary medium of instruction from Grade 4 onwards. In other words, in
addition to the MT, the basics of Filipino and English will still be taught at the early stages of formal
schooling; and should the parents, in the exercise of their primary right and duty to rear their children, so
desire to give additional Filipino and English lessons to their children, they have the absolute right to do
so. Nothing in the K to 12 Law prohibits the parents from doing so.
Academic freedom
44. This Court has defined academic freedom for the individual member of the academe as "the right of
a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or
publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that
his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political,
economic, or academic establishments."
45. The Court does not agree with petitioners (faculty from HEI ) that their transfer to the secondary level,
as provided by the K to 12 Law constitutes a violation of their academic freedom. Convergence of
security of tenure and academic freedom does not preclude the termination of a faculty member for a
valid cause. Civil servants, like petitioners, may be removed from service for a valid cause, such as
when there is a bona fide reorganization, or a position has been abolished or rendered redundant, or
there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service.
Hence, petitioners' contention that the law is unconstitutional based on this ground is specious.
Free public education in the elementary and high school levels
46. Petitioners' argument that the establishment of the voucher system will result in the de facto
privatization of senior high school is not only speculative, it is also without any basis. The voucher
system is one of the mechanisms established by the State through RA No. 6728, to promote and make
quality education accessible to all Filipino citizens. The program was later expanded through RA No.
8545. In the K to 12 Law, the benefits under RA No. 8545, including the voucher system, were made
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applicable to qualified students under the enhanced basic education, specifically to the qualified students
enrolled in senior high school. The establishment and expansion of the voucher system is the State's
way of tapping the resources of the private educational system in order to give Filipinos equal access to
quality education. The Court finds that this manner of implementing the grant of equal access to
education is not constitutionally infirm.
CMO No. 20 is constitutional
47. Petitioners assert that CMO No. 20 is violative of the Constitution because the study of Filipino,
Panitikan and the Philippine Constitution are not included as core subjects.
48. As discussed above, the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication is still subject to
provisions of law. The Court has also held that all sections in Article XIV pertaining to arts and culture
are all non-self-executing, which includes Section 14 on Filipino national culture and Section 18 on
access to cultural opportunities. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc) The Court also ruled that Section
17, Article II on giving priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports, and
Section 2, Article XIV on educational values, are non-self-executing. These constitutional provisions are
only policies that may be "used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws." The Court reiterates that they do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
49. As regards Section 3(1), Article XIV, the Court agrees that there is indeed a constitutional mandate
that the study of the Constitution should be part of the curriculum of educational institutions. However,
the mandate was general and did not specify the educational level in which it must be taught. Hence, the
inclusion of the study of the Constitution in the basic education curriculum satisfies the constitutional
requirement.
50. The changes in the GE curriculum were implemented to ensure that there would be no duplication of
subjects in Grade 1 to 10, senior high school and college. Thus, the allegation that CMO No. 20
"removed" the study of Filipino, Panitikan and the Constitution in the GE curriculum is incorrect. It must
be emphasized that CMO No. 20 only provides for the minimum standards for the GE component of all
degree programs. Therefore, HEIs are given the freedom to require additional Filipino or Panitikan
courses to these minimum requirements if they wish to.
CMO No. 20 does not contravene any other laws
51. As claimed by petitioners, CMO No. 20 violated: (a) Section 14 of RA No. 7104 or the Commission
on the Filipino Language Act because it interfered with the authority of the Commission on the Filipino
Language (CFL) on matters of language, and thus, CMO No. 20 should have retained the 9 units of
Filipino in the GE curriculum, as proposed by the CFL; (b) RA No. 7356 or the Law Creating the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts because the non-inclusion of Filipino and Panitikan as subjects in
the GE curriculum is a violation of our "duty to preserve and conserve the Filipino historical and cultural
heritage and resources."; and (c) BP Blg. 232 or the Education Act of 1982, specifically, Section 3 on the
role of the educational community to promote the social and economic status of all school personnel and
Section 23 on the objectives of tertiary education which includes a general education program that will
promote national identity and cultural consciousness.
52. It must be noted that nothing in these laws requires that Filipino and Panitikan must be included as
subjects in the tertiary level. Further, it is within the authority of the CHED to determine the GE
distribution requirements. The Court also reiterates that the study of Filipino and Panitikan can easily be
included as courses in the tertiary level, if the HEIs wish to. Thus, petitioners' arguments that CMO No.
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20 violates the aforementioned laws must fail.
The K to 12 Law does not violate substantive due process
53. Substantive due process requires an inquiry on the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the
rights of the person to his property. Hence, two things must concur: (1) the interest of the public, in
general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the intervention of the State; and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive on individuals.
54. The K to 12 Law does not offend the substantive due process since the law's declaration of policy
itself reveals that the objectives of the law serve the interest of the public and not only of a particular
class. All students are intended to benefit from the law. The basic education curriculum was restructured
according to what the political departments believed is the best approach to learning, or what they call as
the "spiral approach."
55. The means employed by the law are commensurate with its objectives. The restructuring of the
curriculum with the corresponding additional 2 years in senior high school were meant to improve the
quality of basic education and to make the country's graduates more competitive in the international
arena.
The K to 12 Law does not violate equal protection of the laws
56. The students of Manila Science High School (MSHS) aver that the decongestion of the originally
existing basic education curriculum and the lengthening of the basic education cycle should not be made
to apply to them because "[they] are gifted and thus are advanced for their age, with the capability to
learn better and faster compared to other high school students. Because of their higher mental
capabilities, they neither need decongesting nor a longer period of time or any spiral approach. In
essence, petitioners are saying that the K to 12 Law did not make a substantial distinction between
MSHS students and the rest of the high school students in the country.
57. The K to 12 Law did not violate the equal protection clause. Valid classifications require real and
substantialdifferences to justify the variance of treatment between the classes. The MSHS students did
not offer any substantial basis for the Court to create a valid classification between them and the rest of
the high school students in the Philippines. Otherwise stated, the equal protection clause would, in fact,
be violated if the assailed law treated the MSHS students differently from the rest of the high school
students in the country. The MSHS students are, after all, high school students just like all the other
students who are, and will be, subjected to the revised curriculum.
58. The Court disagrees that the right granted by Article 3(3) and (6) of Presidential Decree No. 603, or
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to education commensurate with their abilities, was violated when the
revised curriculum under the K to 12 Law was applied to them. The law is being merely applied to the
whole segment of the population to which petitioners belong. Further, the basic education under the K to
12 was intended to meet the basic learning needs of the students and it is broad enough to cover
alternative learning systems for out-of-school learners and those with special needs.
59. The K to 12 Law explicitly recognized the right of schools to modify their curricula subject to the
minimum subjects prescribed by the DepEd. The IRR mandates that the Basic Education Program
should include programs for the gifted and talented, those with disabilities, the Madrasah Program for
Muslim learners, Indigenous Peoples Programs, and Programs for Learners under Difficult
Circumstances. The K to 12 IRR also allows the acceleration of learners in public and private
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educational institutions. Therefore, the remedy of petitioner students is with MSHS and/or DepEd, and
not with this Court.
60. Petitioners also challenge the K to 12 Law on the ground of violation of the equal protection clause
by arguing that private schools are allowed to offer extra and optional curriculum subjects in addition to
those required by the K to 12 Law and DepEd Orders, and thus, rich families will tend to enroll their
children in private schools while poor families will be constrained to enroll their children in English
starved public schools. The Court cannot declare the law invalid based on this ground. Even before the
passage of the K to 12 Law, private educational institutions had already been allowed to enhance the
prescribed curriculum, considering the State's recognition of the complementary roles of public and
private institutions in the educational system.
Other arguments against the constitutionality of the K to 12 Law
(a) Section 2(1), Article XIV
61. Petitioners argue that DepEd's use of global competitiveness as justification in the policy shift to K to
12 is not relevant to the needs of the people and society, as not everyone will be working abroad, thus,
violating Section 2(1), Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
62. Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV are merely statements of principles and policies. As
such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly
define and effectuate such principles. The K to 12 Law is one such law passed by the Legislature to
bring the said guiding principle to life. The question of what is 'relevant to the needs of the people and
society' is, in turn, within the sole purview of legislative wisdom in which the Court cannot intervene.
(b) Section 4, Article XIV
63. The partnership between DepEd and CardNo, an Australian corporation, in the implementation of the
K to 12 curriculum, allegedly violates the constitutional State duty to exercise reasonable supervision
and regulation of educational institutions mandated by Section 4, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
64. The Framers of the Constitution were explicit that the State supervision refers to external governance,
as opposed to internal governance which was reserved to the respective school boards.
65. Petitioners are mistaken in applying Section 4(2) in relation to Section 4(1), Article XIV as they deal
with completely different matters. The restrictions expressed in Section 4(2) only refer to ownership,
control, and administration of individual schools, and these do not apply to the State's exercise of
reasonable supervision and regulation of educational institutions under Section 4(1). Hence, there is
nothing under the provisions of the Constitution which prohibits the State to forge a partnership with a
foreign entity, like CardNo, in the exercise of this supervision and regulation of educational institutions.
(c) Section 2, Article XIV
66. It is asserted that the K to 12 Law violates the constitutional duty of the State to provide adult citizens,
the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills as
commanded by Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. As previously discussed,
Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is not a self-executing provision. Furthermore,
DepEd has already put in place programs to address the needs of indigenous peoples, Muslim children,
adult learners, PWDs, out of school youth and other sectors of society in keeping with the aforesaid
constitutional provisions, in line with the K to 12 Law.
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Policy issues
67. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is
not for the Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Stated otherwise, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. When the validity
of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether
it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power.
68. The Court, despite its vast powers, will not review the wisdom, merits, or propriety of governmental
policies, but will strike them down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and/or
(2) grave abuse of discretion. For having failed to show any of the above in the passage of the assailed
law and the department issuances, the petitioners' remedy thus lies not with the Court, but with the
executive and legislative branches of the government.
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