LAMSIS V.
DONG-E
G.R. No. 173021
October 20, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.
FIRST DIVISION
DOCTRINE:
There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the proceedings, of a
possible jurisdictional objection, and has every opportunity to raise said objection, but
fails to do so, even on appeal.
LEGAL BASES:
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time
of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties
or vested by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which
prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Exception: Laches
FACTS:
A conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel of land, denominated as
Lot No. 1, with an area of 80,736 square meters located along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio
City and is part of a larger parcel of land with an area of 186,090 square meters.
According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E, her family’s ownership and
occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-
ap. Upon Ap-ap’s death, the property was inherited by his children, who obtained a
survey plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square meter property, which included Lot No. 1.
On the same year, they declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of The
Heirs of Ap-ap. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1. Respondent is
seeking to recover its possession from petitioners.
Sometime between 1976 and 1978, Gilbert Semon, Margarita’s father, together with his
wife Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay
on a portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families. When Manolo Lamsis
and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners Delfin
Lamsis (Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions of Lot
No. 1. The heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the acts of their first cousins. When Gilbert
Semon died, his children extra judicially partitioned the property among themselves and
allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita, who tolerated her first cousins’
occupation.
It changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding their
occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof. Margarita filed a
complaint for recovery of ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against all
four occupants of Lot No. 1 before the RTC. Petitioners denied Margarita’s claims of
ownership and possession over Lot No. 1. According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is
a public land claimed by the heirs of Joaquin Smith. Both parties presented their
respective evidence to bolster their respective claims.
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found that it
preponderates in favor of respondent’s long-time possession of and claim of ownership
over the subject property. In the CA, it held that the respondent was able to discharge
her burden in proving her title and interest to the subject property. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners maintain that, under the IPRA, it is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over
land disputes involving indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA
8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was
instituted.
RULING:
No, the trial court has no jurisdiction to decide the case. However, as held in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the court’s lack
of jurisdiction.
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it."
In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence
of laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the
issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant
case who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this Court. At the time
that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in effect but the
petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the jurisdictional
value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into consideration. Hence,
the petitioners cannot invoke lack of RTC’s jurisdiction over the case by reason of laches.
COMMENT:
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the
proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by
the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of
the filing of the complaint. An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence.
SUBMITTED BY: CHARMAINE KLAIRE A. ALONZO
