Article 1173 (Negligence)
CECILIA YAMBAO, petitioner,
vs.
MELCHORITA C. ZUÑIGA, LEOVIGILDO C. ZUÑIGA, REGINALDO C. ZUÑIGA,
AND THE MINORS, HERMINIGILDO C. ZUÑIGA, JR., AND LOVELY EMILY C.
ZUÑIGA - both represented by their legal guardian, the aforenamed MELCHORITA
C. ZUÑIGA, respondents.
CECILIA YAMBAO filed a petition in SC to seeking to reverse and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 8, finding herein
petitioner, among others, liable for the untimely death of Herminigildo Zuñiga in a
vehicular accident and ordering her to indemnify his legal heirs, the respondents
herein. Also challenged in this petition is the resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated November 27, 2000, denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Cecilia Yambao is the registered owner of "Lady Cecil and Rome Trans"
passenger bus with Plate No. CVK 606, with a public transport franchise to ply the
Novaliches-via Quirino-Alabang route.
The respondents are the legal heirs of the late Herminigildo Zuñiga. Melchorita
Zuñiga is the surviving spouse, while Leovigildo, Reginaldo, Herminigildo, Jr., and
Lovely Emily are their children.
FACTS
At around 3:30 p.m. of May 6, 1992, the bus owned by the petitioner driven by her
driver, Ceferino G. Venturina accidentally bumped Herminigildo Zuñiga, a pedestrian
along the northbound lane of Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) that caused the
letters death in the hospital
Heirs of the victim, filed a Complaint against petitioner and her driver, Venturina, for
damages, alleging that Venturina drove the bus in a reckless, careless and
imprudent manner, in violation of traffic rules and regulations, without due regard to
public safety, thus resulting in the victim’s premature death.
The RTC judgment was in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering
the herein defendants jointly and severally, with Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co., and
Times Surety & Insurance Co. Inc. to the extent of their respective liabilities under
their respective insurance policies to pay the herein plaintiffs the following sums of
money:
1. ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Herminigildo Zuñiga;
2. ₱92,000.00 as funeral expenses;
3. ₱200,000.00 as moral damages;
4. ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
6. ₱5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
7. To pay the cost of the suit
Total 407K
to be paid by all the herein defendants and third party defendants within thirty (30)
days from receipt of this Decision.
The CA affirmed the decision of RTC
ISSUE
WON the petitioner is liable for any damages.
RULING
Here, The SC speaks through J Quisumbing, he further discussed the law governing
petitioner’s liability, as the employer of bus driver Venturina, is Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons
who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Thus, that the petition be DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated September 8, 2000, in CA-G.R. CV No. 52275, as well as its resolution dated
November 27, 2000, denying petitioner Cecilia Yambao’s motion for reconsideration
are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
Article 1174 (Fortuitous Event)
G.R. No. L-47379 May 16, 1988
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
respondents.
NPC seek to set aside the decision of Court of Appeals which adjudged the National
Power Corporation liable for damages against Engineering Construction, Inc.
FACTS
On August 4, 1964, plaintiff Engineering Construction, Inc., being a successful
bidder, executed a contract in Manila with the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA), whereby the former undertook to furnish all tools, labor,
equipment, and materials (not furnished by Owner), and to construct the proposed
2nd lpo-Bicti Tunnel, Intake and Outlet Structures, and Appurtenant Structures, and
Appurtenant Features, at Norzagaray, Bulacan, and to complete said works within
eight hundred (800) calendar days from the date the Contractor receives the formal
notice to proceed (Exh. A).
The project involved two (2) major phases: the first phase comprising, the tunnel
work covering a distance of seven (7) kilometers, passing through the mountain,
from the Ipo river, a part of Norzagaray, Bulacan, where the Ipo Dam of the
defendant National Power Corporation is located, to Bicti; the other phase consisting
of the outworks at both ends of the tunnel.
By September 1967, the plaintiff corporation already had completed the first major
phase of the work, namely, the tunnel excavation work. Some portions of the
outworks at the Bicti site were still under construction. As soon as the plaintiff
corporation had finished the tunnel excavation work at the Bicti site, all the
equipment no longer needed there were transferred to the Ipo site where some
projects were yet to be completed.
The record shows that on November 4,1967, typhoon 'Welming' hit Central Luzon,
passing through defendant's Angat Hydro-electric Project and Dam at lpo,
Norzagaray, Bulacan. Strong winds struck the project area, and heavy rains
intermittently fell. Due to the heavy downpour, the water in the reservoir of the Angat
Dam was rising perilously at the rate of sixty (60) centimeters per hour. To prevent
an overflow of water from the dam, since the water level had reached the danger
height of 212 meters above sea level, the defendant corporation caused the opening
of the spillway gates." (pp. 45-46, L-47379, Rollo)
ISSUE
WON the National Power Corporation is liable for damages against Engineering
Construction, Inc
HELD
The SC speaks GUTIERREZ, JR., J. It is clear from the appellate court's decision
that based on its findings of fact and that of the trial court's, petitioner NPC was
undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only
at the height of typhoon "Welming" when it knew very well that it was safer to have
opened the same gradually and earlier, as it was also undeniable that NPC knew of
the coming typhoon at least four days before it actually struck. And even though the
typhoon was an act of God or what we may call force majeure, NPC cannot escape
liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage. As
we have ruled in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, (144 SCRA 596, 606-
607):
Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of
the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which
results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must
be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and human agencies are to
be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the
effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the
participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to
act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it was, and removed from the
rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).
Thus, it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of
God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the
immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for
loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct by which the loss or damage may have been occasioned. (Fish &
Elective Co. v. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129; Tucker v. Milan 49 O.G. 4379; Limpangco
& Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co., 34 Phil. 594, 604; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).
Furthermore, the question of whether or not there was negligence on the part of NPC
is a question of fact which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
and will not be disturbed by this Court unless the same is clearly unfounded. Thus, in
Tolentino v. Court of appeals, (150 SCRA 26, 36) we ruled:
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 47379 and G.R. No.
47481 are both DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
Eastern Shipping v. CA, 234 SCRA USURIOUS TRANSACTION
G.R. No. 127135 January 18, 1999
EASTERN ASSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION (EASCO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TEOFISTO L. CALUMPANG, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 40, and
VICENTE TAN, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and is GRANTED. The
legal interest rate to be paid by petitioner EASCO to the private respondent is 6%
per annum on the amount due corresponding to the period from June 26, 1981 to
August 24, 1993; and 12% per annum beginning August 25, 1993 until the money
judgment shall have been fully paid. No pronouncement as to costs
FACTS
On April 9, 1981, private respondent Vicente Tan insured his building in Dumaguete
City against fire with petitioner Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation (EASCO)
for P250,000.00. On June 26, 1981, the building was destroyed by fire. As his claim
for indemnity was refused, private respondent filed a complaint for breach of contract
with damages against petitioner. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dumaguete
City, to which the case was assigned rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff [private respondent Vicente
Tan] and ordering defendant [petitioner EASCO].
1. To pay plaintiff the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos
representing the fire insurance claim of plaintiff plus legal rate of interest from June
26, 1981 until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as attorney's
fees;
3. To pay plaintiff all expenses incurred when he went to Manila with his lawyer
regarding his insurance claim;
4. To pay plaintiff Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) Pesos as moral damages
and Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages.
ISSUE
WON the Defendant to pay immediately to plaintiff the unpaid balance of interest of
the principal amount of P250,000.00 equivalent to 6% per annum from June 26,
1981 to September 30,1994
RULING
The SC speaks through J Mendoza and further discussed that when an obligation,
regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts,
is breached, the contravener can be held liable for damages. The provisions under
Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of
recoverable damages.
With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which
may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the
rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of
the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of
the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be
so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained).
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rare of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision is AFFIRMED with the only MODIFICATION
that petitioner is ordered to pay interest on the amount due at the rate of 12% legal
interest per annum from August 25, 1993 to September 30, 1994.
Article 1176
G.R. No. 176479 October 6, 2010
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
PEDRO P. BUENAVENTURA, Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) assails the Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
Respondent Pedro P. Buenaventura and his first wife (now deceased) owned a
townhouse unit in Casa Nueva Manila Townhouse, Quezon City. On December 27,
1994, they obtained a loan from petitioner. As security for the loan, they mortgaged
the townhouse to petitioner. Under the loan agreement, respondent was to pay
RCBC a fixed monthly payment with adjustable interest for five years. For this
purpose, respondent opened an account with RCBC’s Binondo branch from which
the bank was to deduct the monthly amortizations.
On April 19, 1999, respondent received a Notice of Public Auction of the mortgaged
townhouse unit. He wrote Atty. Saturnino Basconcillo, the notary public conducting
the auction sale, demanding the cancellation of the auction sale. However, the
notary public proceeded with the public sale on May 25, 1999, where RCBC
emerged as the highest bidder. The Notary Public’s Certificate of Sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds on September 28, 2000.
On September 18, 2001, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City a complaint for Annulment of Sale and Damages against RCBC, notary
public Saturnino Basconcillo, and the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City.
Respondent prayed that the RTC (1) annul the extra-judicial foreclosure and sale of
the property; (2) cancel the Certificate of Sale; and (3) direct the payment of
₱170,000.00 as actual damages, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, ₱70,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus ₱2,500.00 for every court
appearance of his counsel, and the costs of the suit.
RCBC failed to timely file an Answer and was declared in default.
ISSUE
WON RCBC contention in
RULING
In this case the SC speaks through NACHURA, J. Art. 1176. The receipt of the
principal by the creditor, without reservation with respect to the interest, shall give
rise to the presumption that the said interest has been paid.
The receipt of a later installment of a debt without reservation as to prior
installments, shall likewise raise the presumption that such installments have been
paid.
Respondent’s passbooks indicate that RCBC continued to receive his payments
even after it made demands for him to pay his past due accounts, and even after the
auction sale.
RCBC cannot deny receipt of the payments, even when it claims that the deposits
were "not withdrawn." It is not respondent’s fault that RCBC did not withdraw the
money he deposited. His obligation under the mortgage agreement was to deposit
his payment in the savings account he had opened for that purpose, in order that
RCBC may debit the amount of his monthly liabilities therefrom. He complied with his
part of the agreement.
This bolsters the conclusion of the CA that respondent had no unpaid installments
and was not in default as would warrant the application of the acceleration clause
and the subsequent foreclosure and auction sale of the property.
The SC DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
Article 1177
GOLD STAR MINING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
MARTA LIM-JIMENA, CARLOS JIMENA, GLORIA JIMENA, AURORA JIMENA,
JAIME JIMENA, DANTE JIMENA, JORGE JIMENA, JOYCE JIMENA, as legal
heirs of the deceased VICTOR JIMENA, and JOSE HIDALGO, respondents.
From an affirmance in toto by the Court of Appeals of a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, specifically the portion thereof condemning Gold Star Mining Co.,
Inc. to pay Marta Lim Vda. de Jimena, et al., the sum of P30,691.92 solidarily with
Ananias Isaac Lincallo for violation of an injunction this appeal is taken.
FACTS
Ananias Isaac Lincallo bound himself in writing to turn to Victor Jimena one-half (1/2)
of the proceeds from all mining claims that he would purchase with the money to be
advanced by the latter.
This agreement was later on modified (in a 1939 notarial instrument duly registered
with the Register of Deeds of Marinduque in his capacity as mining recorder) so as
to include in the equal sharing arrangement not only the proceeds from several
mining claims, which by that time had already been purchased by Lincallo with
various sums totalling P5,800.00 supplied by Jimena, but also the lands constituting
the same, and so as to bind thereby their "heirs, assigns, or legal representatives."
Apparently, the mining rights over part of the claims were assigned by Lincallo to
Gold Star Mining Co., Inc., sometime before World War Il because in 1950 the
corporation paid him P5,000 in consideration of, and as a quitclaim for, pre-war
royalties.
On several occasions thereafter, the mining claims in question were made subject-
matter of contracts entered into by Lincallo in his own name and for his benefit alone
without the slightest intimation of Jimena's interests over the same.
Thus, Lincallo and one Alejandro Marquez, as separate owners of particular mining
claims, entered into an agreement with Gold Star Mining Co., Inc., the assignee
thereof, regarding allotment to Lincallo of 45% of the royalties due from the
corporation. Four months later, Lincallo, Marquez and Congressman Panfilo
Manguerra, again as owners, leased certain mining claims to Jacob Cabarrus, who,
in turn, transferred to Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc., his rights under the lease
contract. By virtue of still another contract executed by these lessors on 29 February
1952, 43% of the royalties due from Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc., were
agreed upon to be paid to Lincallo.
As early as August, 1939 and down to September, 1952, Jimena repeatedly
apprised Gold Star Mining Co., Inc., and Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc., of his
interests over the mining claims so assigned and/or leased by Lincallo and,
accordingly, demanded recognition and payment of his one-half share in all the
royalties, allocated and paid and, thereafter, to be paid to the latter. Both
corporations, however, ignored Jimena's demands.
Payment of the P5,800 advanced for the purchase of the mining claims, as well as
the one-half share in the royalties paid by the two corporations, were also repeatedly
demanded by Jimena from Lincallo. Acknowledging Jimena's contractual claim,
Lincallo off and on promised to settle his obligations. And on 14 July 1952, Lincallo
promised for the last time, to settle everything on or before the 30th day of the same
month.
Lincallo, however, did not only fail to settle his accounts with Jimena but transferred
on 16 August 1952, a month after he promised to pay Jimena, 35 of his 45% share in
the royalties due from Gold Star Mining Co., Inc., to one Gregorio Tolentino, a
salaried employee, for an alleged consideration of P10,000.00.
On 2 September 1954, Jimena commenced a suit against Lincallo for recovery of his
advances and his one-half share in the royalties. Gold Star Mining Co., Inc., and
Marinduque Iron Mines, Inc., together with Tolentino, were later joined as
defendants.
On 17 September 1954, the trial court issued, upon petition of Jimena, a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining Gold Star Mining Co., Inc., and Marinduque Iron
Mines Agents, Inc., from paying royalties during the pendency of the case to Lincallo,
his assigns or legal representatives. Despite the injunction, however, Gold Star
Mining Co., Inc., was found out to have paid P30, 691.92 to Lincallo and Tolentino.
Said corporation claimed later on (on appeal) that the injunction had been
superseded and/or dissolved on 25 May 1955 by the trial court's grant of Jimena's
petition for a writ of preliminary attachment "to supersede the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued." But as the grant was conditioned upon filing of a bond
to be approved by the trial court, no writ of attachment was issued because the bond
offered by Jimena was disapproved.3
Jimena and Tolentino died successively during the pendency of the case in the trial
court and were, accordingly, substituted by their respective widows and children.
ISSUE
WON the Court of Appeals and Court of First Instance of Manila Decisions, erred in
condemning Gold Star Mining Co., Inc. to pay Marta Lim Vda. de Jimena, et al., the
sum of P30,691.92 solidarily with Ananias Isaac Lincallo.
RULING
The SC ruled through REYES, J.B.L., J.: states that Borrowing the Spanish maxim
cited by Jimena's counsel, "el deudor de mi deudor es deudor mio," this legal maxim
finds sanction in Article 1177, new Civil Code which provides that "creditors, after
having pursued the property in possession of the debtor to satisfy their claims, may
exercise all the rights and bring all the actions of the latter (debtor) for the same
purpose, save those which are inherent in his person; they may also impugn the acts
which the debtor may have done to defraud them (1111)."
From another standpoint, equally valid and acceptable, it can be said that Lincallo, in
transferring the mining claims to Gold Star (without disclosing that Jimena was a co-
owner although Gold Star had knowledge of the fact as shown by the proofs
heretofore mentioned) acted as Jimena's agent with respect to Jimena's share of the
claims.
Under such conditions, Jimena has an action against Gold Star, pursuant to Article
1883, New Civil Code, which provides that the principal may sue the person with
whom the agent dealt with in his (agent's) own name, when the transaction "involves
things belonging to the principal."
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is
affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant, Gold Star Mining Co., Inc.
