Globalizing Civic Engagement

Globalizing Civic Engagement

Civil Society and

Transnational Action

Edited by
John D Clark

Earthscan Publications Ltd

London • Sterling, VA
First published in the UK and USA in 2003 by
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Globalizing civic engagement : civil society and transnational action / edited by John D.
Clark.- 1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-85383-989-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) - ISBN 1-85383-988-4 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Social movements-International cooperation. 2. Protest movements-International
cooperation. I. Clark, John, 1950-

HM881.G559 2003
303.48'4-dc21
2003007492

Earthscan is an editorially independent subsidiary of Kogan Page Ltd and publishes in associ-
ation with WWF-UK and the International Institute for Environment and Development

This book is printed on elemental chlorine-free paper

 Contents

List of Tables, Figures and Boxes vi

Preface vii
List of Contributors ix
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations xi

1 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action John Clark 1

2 Consumers Unite Internationally Tasneem Mowjee 29

3 Trade Unions in a Changing World: Challenges and Opportunities

of Transnationalization Diego Muro and Nuno Themudo 45

4 Campaign to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs Tasneem Mowjee 66

5 Jubilee 2000: Laying the Foundations for a Social Movement

Paola Grenier 86

6 The Age of Protest: Internet-Based ‘Dot Causes’ and

the ‘Anti-Globalization’ Movement John Clark and Nuno Themudo 109

7 World Social Forum: Making Another World Possible?

Günther Schönleitner 127

8 Campaign for a ‘Robin Hood Tax’ for Foreign Exchange Markets

Diego Muro 150

9 Conclusions: Globalizing Civic Engagement John Clark 164

References and Interviews 176

Index 188
 List of Tables, Figures and Boxes

TABLES
1.1 Characteristics of different transnational civil society forms 5
2.1 Key dates in the development of IOCU/Consumers International 35
5.1 Evolving status of Jubilee 2000 groups 103
7.1 Numbers participating in World Social Forums 129
7.2 Regional distribution of participation in World Social Forums 136
7.3 Types of participant organizations in WSF 2001 138

FIGURES
1.1 The organizational forms of selected CSOs and CSO networks 7
3.1 UK trade union membership as a percentage of total work force
(1985–1999) 46
3.2 Strike action in the UK (1965–1999) 47
5.1 Jubilee 2000 – evolution timeline 87
5.2 Points of influence of Jubilee 2000 106

BOXES
1.1 Chronology of major inter-faith initiatives 14
1.2 The Philippines code of NGO ethics 18
1.3 Amnesty International and its mandate dilemma 21
3.1 The international union movement 49
3.2 First International: workers of the world unite! 50
 Preface

Much has been written about how the era of globalization is impacting on the
worlds of business, economics and politics. Many in civil society have sought to
challenge or reform the management of global change, and a variety of social
movements and campaigns has come together to form a global protest movement
that is storming the institutions and principles of global governance. But little has
been written about how the technological and political opportunities of globaliza-
tion affect civil society itself – hence the motivation for this book.
It is clear that a wide array of civil society organizations – ranging from environ-
mental pressure groups and development charities to trade unions and churches –
are increasingly emphasizing international advocacy work and networking with
others. The benefits and the opportunities are clear; but there are many obstacles,
challenges and dilemmas along the path. In particular, there are issues of organiza-
tional structure and governance that crop up frequently, and challenges regarding
the culture and focus of networks as their memberships diversify. Moreover, new
communications technology is allowing new ways of working and new organiza-
tional forms to arise – in particular, the web-based campaigns (or ‘dot causes’).
Just as the ‘network age’ is transforming management theory in the private sector,
so, too, it creates imperatives in civil society to work in different ways and with
non-traditional partnerships.
This book surveys these issues. It is the result of a research project of the
Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics and Political Science
(LSE). The project started with a review of the issues through discussion with
leaders of a wide range of civil society organizations and consultation of the liter-
ature (published and internal) on those organizations’ strategic thinking. We next
held an international seminar at LSE bringing together practitioners from different
types of organization – North and South – and academics studying civil society.
This provided new insights, as well as better ideas as to where knowledge gaps lie.
Chapter 1 covers this preparatory stage. We then undertook a series of case studies,
investigating the experience of a number of transnational civil society endeavours
(Chapters 2 to 8). These studies used the same approach as the initial review and
probed the issues that it had brought to the surface. The final chapter summarizes
the projects’ main findings and offers some conclusions that are intended to be
of use to civil society practitioners, policy-makers and academics.
This project has been made possible by a generous grant from the Ford
Foundation, to whom go our sincere thanks. We also thank Helmut Anheier,
David Lewis, Lisa Carlson, Jane Schiemann and other staff at the Centre for
viii Globalizing Civic Engagement

Civil Society for their help and valuable suggestions, and we thank LSE itself for
being an accommodating host for this project. Thanks, also, go to many practi-
tioners and scholars who have contributed their valuable ideas and experience,
especially: Dave Brown, Ernst Ligteringen, Julie Fisher, John Foster, Petr Hlobil,
Lisa Jordan, Richard Langhorne, Alan Leather, Jan Aart Scholte, Salil Shetty,
David Stark, Rajesh Tandon, Sid Tarrow, Aurelio Vianna and Dennis Young. We
would also like to thank the participants at the LSE seminar of June 2001 for
their treasure chest of ideas, which we have ruthlessly plundered, and the many
people who generously gave their time to be interviewed or to give advice.
Finally, we would like to thank Jonathan Sinclair Wilson and his colleagues at
Earthscan – both for having faith in this project and for being flexible with slip-
ping deadlines for delivery of the final manuscript.

John Clark (editor), on behalf of all the contributors

Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics
March 2003
 List of Contributors

John Clark is currently Project Director for the High-Level Panel on United
Nations–Civil Society Relations, established by the secretary-general and chaired
by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (former president of Brazil). He worked for the
World Bank from 1992 to 2000 as manager of the NGO and Civil Society Unit
and lead social development specialist for East Asia. He then moved to the UK,
where he has served on a task force advising the UK prime minister on Africa and
wrote a book on globalization, Worlds Apart: Civil Society and the Battle for Ethical
Globalization (Earthscan, UK, and Kumarian, US, 2003). He was also visiting
fellow at the Centre for Civil Society, London School of Economics and Political
Science (LSE), where he manages the research project on which this book is
based. Prior to joining the World Bank he worked in non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) for 18 years, mostly in Oxfam GB. He is the author of three
other books, including Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Agencies
(Earthscan, UK, and Kumarian, US, 1991).

Paola Grenier is a Lord Dahrendorf scholar in the Centre for Civil Society, LSE,
researching social entrepreneurship in the UK. Prior to that she worked in Hun-
gary for two years on supporting the development of Roma communities, and
organizing the first European-wide conference on homelessness. Her background
in the UK voluntary sector is within the fields of homelessness, social housing and
regeneration, where she has been involved in management, fund raising, research
and policy development. Her research interests include leadership in voluntary
organizations and NGOs, organizational development, social entrepreneurship
and social capital.

Tasneem Mowjee has worked for WomenAid International, a small UK NGO

specializing in humanitarian assistance to the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus.
This led to a PhD on NGO–Donor Funding Relationships: UK Government and
European Community Funding for the Humanitarian Aid Activities of UK NGOs
from 1990–1997 at the Centre for Civil Society, LSE. Since completing the PhD,
she has been working as a freelance researcher, mainly on humanitarian-aid fund-
ing issues and the European Commission’s humanitarian policy.

Diego Muro is currently editor of the journal Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism
and is a doctoral student in the Department of Government, LSE. His research
focuses on civil society, nationalism and political violence.
x Globalizing Civic Engagement

Günther Schönleitner is a PhD student and Lord Dahrendorf scholar at the Centre
for Civil Society, LSE, researching civil society participation and local governance
in Brazil. He holds a first degree in law from the University of Salzburg (Austria)
and an MSc in development studies from the LSE. Prior to his doctoral studies,
he worked for eight years with an Austrian development NGO, first as a project
officer in Brazil and later as a country programme manager based in Vienna.

Nuno Themudo is part-time lecturer at the Centre for Civil Society, LSE, where
he teaches on the Masters course NGO Management, Policy and Administration.
He is completing his PhD thesis titled Managing the Paradox: NGOs, Resource
Dependence and Political Independence. His research interests include NGO and
non-profit management, information and communications technology and civil
society, and sustainable development.
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABONG Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations

ACTSA Action for Southern Africa (UK)
AGM annual general meeting
AI Amnesty International
AIDS acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ALOP Latin American Association of Popular Organizations
ALP AIDS Law Project (South Africa)
ANC African National Congress
ARV antiretroviral (treatment for HIV/AIDS)
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations
ATTAC (-I)
Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid
of Citizens (-International)
BC Brazilian Council (World Social Forum)
CA Consumers Association (UK)
CAP Consumers Association of Penang
CBJP Brazilian Commission for Justice and Peace
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CEO chief executive officer
CETIM Centre Europe–Tiers Monde
CI Consumers’ International
CIVES Brazilian Association of Entrepreneurs for Citizenship
CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation
CJG Centre for Global Justice (Brazil)
CNBB National Conference of the Bishops of Brazil
CODE-NGO Caucus of Development NGOs (The Philippines)
COICA Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon
Basin
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPT Consumer Project on Technology (US)
CS civil society
CSO civil society organization
CSR corporate social responsibility
CU Consumers Union (US)
CUT Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Brazilian Union Federation)
CUTS Consumer Unity and Trust Society (India)
DCN Debt Crisis Network
xii Globalizing Civic Engagement

DISHA Development Initiative for Social and Humanitarian Action

EC Executive Committee (World Social Forum)
EMH efficient markets hypothesis
EPZ export processing zone
ETA Basque separatist movement
ETUC European Trade Union Confederation
EU European Union
EURODAD European Network on Debt and Development
EZLN Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatistas National Lib-
eration Army, Mexico)
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionárias de Colombia
FOE, FOE-I Friends of the Earth, FOE-International
FPA Fundação Perseu Abramo
FSM Fórum Social Mundial (World Social Forum)
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas
G7, G8 the group of the seven largest economies (G8 = plus Russia)
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP gross domestic product
GMO genetically modified organism
GSK GlaxoSmithKline
GUF Global Union Federation
HAI Health Action International
HIPC Heavily Indebted Poorer Countries Initiative (IMF/World Bank
debt-relief programme for poor countries)
HIV human immunodeficiency virus
HRW Human Rights Watch
IBASE Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis
IBFAN International Baby Foods Action Network
IC International Council (World Social Forum)
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICEM International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General
Workers’ Unions
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICM International Council Meeting
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICRT International Consumer Research and Testing
ICT information and communications technology
IFBWW International Federation of Building and Wood Workers
IFI international financial institution
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGO international NGO
IOCU International Organization of Consumers Unions (precursor of CI)
IP intellectual property
 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations xiii

IRA Irish Republican Army

ISO International Standards Organization
ISTR International Society for Third Sector Research
ITS International Trade Secretariat (precursor of GUF)
JDC Jubilee Debt Campaign
JMI Jubilee Movement International
LSE London School of Economics and Political Science
MC Mobilization Committee (World Social Forum)
MCC Medicines Control Programme (South Africa)
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MG Minas Gerais (Brazil)
MR Millennium Review (ICFTU)
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières
MST Brazilian Landless Peasants Movement
NAFTA North American Free Trade Association
NGO non-governmental organization
NOP-FPA Núcleo de Opinião Pública – Fundação Perseu Abramo (Brazil)
OC Organizing Committee (World Social Forum)
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OI Oxfam International
PAIC programme of support for community initiatives
PGA People’s Global Action
PMA Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association (South Africa)
PRIA Society for Participatory Research in Asia
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSI Public Service International
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores (Brazilian Workers’ Party)
R&D research and development
ROAP Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (CI)
SAP structural adjustment programme
SM social movement
TAC Treatment Action Campaign (South Africa)
TCSN transnational civil society network
TNAN transnational advocacy network
TNC transnational corporation
TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement
TSM transnational social movement
TU trade union
TUAC Trade Union Advisory Committee (OECD)
TWN Third World Network
UERJ University of the State of Rio de Janeiro
UFMG Federal University of Minas Gerais (Brazil)
UFRGS Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (Federal University
of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil)
UMWA United Mine Workers of America
xiv Globalizing Civic Engagement

UN United Nations
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UN-GA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNI Union Network International
USP University of São Paulo
USTR US Trade Representative
VSO Voluntary Service Overseas
WCC World Council of Churches
WCL World Confederation of Labour
WDM World Development Movement (UK)
WEF World Economic Forum
WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions
WHO World Health Organization
WSF World Social Forum
WTO World Trade Organization
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature
 Chapter 1

Introduction: Civil Society and

Transnational Action

John Clark

Recent years have seen a strong and accelerating trend towards working more
actively across national frontiers within many segments of civil society. This shift
is particularly evident amongst civil society organizations (CSOs), who seek to
influence policies and practices of governments and international organizations.
The trend is due partly to need and partly to opportunity. Policies are increas-
ingly forged at supranational levels, either within inter-governmental bodies –
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) or the World Bank – or in regional blocs, such as the North American Free
Trade Association (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) or the Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Moreover, transnational corporations (TNCs)
have become increasingly able to dictate policy and shape our world. Hence the
pre-eminence of the nation state as the locus of policy-making has lessened. To
influence policy it is now necessary, rather than merely prudent, to act at those
international levels and coordinate advocacy across relevant countries. Modern
information and communications technology (ICT), cheap telecommunications
and air travel and the increased prominence of English as the lingua franca of
international communications provide the opportunities for transnational civil
society action.
Policy-influencing CSOs comprise development and human rights non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs), environment and other pressure groups, trade
unions, consumers’ organizations, faith-based and inter-faith groups and certain
professional associations. As with the private sector, each segment has seen the
emergence of ‘market leaders’, and these are generally CSOs that are either better
placed for, or have more energetically pursued, transnational networking. These
CSOs not only achieve greater credibility amongst policy-makers, but also
2 Globalizing Civic Engagement

apparently gain advantage over their competitors amongst potential supporters.

If we view civil society as a market-place of interests, ideas and ideologies, then it
is a fast-globalizing market and – as with other markets – transnational pioneers
reap the rewards.
Though there is evidence of decreasing associational activity amongst the
US public (Putnam, 2000), much of the world has witnessed an ‘associational
revolution’ over the past 20 years (Salamon, 1994), and a vibrant civil society
has emerged in many developing and transition countries where local political
realities previously denied this. Although still highly heterogeneous, there is now
more global uniformity in the distribution and composition of CSOs, though
not yet in their membership, resources and impact. This also drives the move
towards international networking.
This shift beyond a national focus to a transnational focus necessitates major
changes in the structure and governance of CSOs and is influencing both their
mandates and cultures. This chapter provides a review of these issues as they
affect a range of transnational civil society actors. It is based on interviews with
key stakeholders in major and illustrative CSOs and networks,1 a review of their
internal literature, conclusions of the London School of Economics and Political
Science (LSE) seminar and the case studies in following chapters. It looks, firstly,
at the various organizational arrangements that are used for transnational net-
working; secondly, it summarizes the key governance challenges – issues of rep-
resentation, legitimacy, accountability, leadership, decision-making and use of
name; thirdly, it surveys changes in focus, mandate and culture as CSOs increas-
ingly work transnationally; fourthly, it asks how this trend impacts questions of
membership and partnership, including the more regular tensions surfacing in
North–South partnerships. Finally, it offers some general conclusions, which
were also highlighted by the LSE seminar.
Various commentators have described how wide arrays of policy-oriented
CSOs are increasingly seeking to operate in transnational alliances with counter-
parts or like-minded civic groups in other countries (Keck and Sikkink, 1998;
Florini, 2000; Clark, 1999). This entails major challenges for CSOs. Amongst
diverse CSO networks,2 a remarkably similar spectrum of problems is encountered
and a new literature is beginning to address such issues (see Lindenberg and Bryant,
2001, on development NGOs).
There are interesting parallels with the private sector. Many CSOs (such as
consumers’ associations or development NGOs) are evolving from hierarchic or
unitary structures, where the identity of the CSO at national level is paramount,
towards network modes in which topic specialists from different countries collabo-
rate in opportunistic alliances with counterparts in other countries. The literature
on civil society and conventional organizational theory regarding NGO manage-
ment and behaviour offers little insight into these matters, though this is starting
to change (Anheier et al, 2001; Anheier and Themudo, 2002).3
The internet has enabled citizens to network with one another internation-
ally without the need for CSO intermediaries (at least those who can afford the
technology). As a result, a variety of web-mediated advocacy and protest cells
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 3

(‘virtual CSOs’) have arisen – we nickname these ‘dot causes’ – ranging from the
Nobel prize-winning International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to a
smorgasbord of protest groups (see Chapter 6).
Another feature of CSO dynamics in today’s fast-changing world is the
growing tendency to work with non-traditional partners in other segments of civil
society. NGOs, trade unions, faith groups, professional associations, think tanks
and social movements increasingly cooperate with one another. Oxfam Interna-
tional (2000), for example, is committed to working with others and learning from
the achievements of other movements to foster the notion of ‘global citizenship’
and global economic and social justice. Similarly, trade unions (TUs) increasingly
collaborate with human rights, environment and other NGOs in campaigns tar-
geting multinational companies or global industry umbrellas. Until recently, they
had tended to disdain NGO partnerships. And religious organizations increasingly
seek collaboration with those of other faiths.
Unions comprise the CSO category for which working transnationally is
most need-driven, since globalization is radically changing their environment
(see Chapter 3). The Millennium Review of the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), underway at present, seeks to modernize and inter-
nationalize the union movement – in particular, by overhauling the international
architecture of trade union networks and federations. Due to be completed by
2004, it seeks to identify TU priorities, structures and strategies to ‘increase the
strength of the trade union movement as an international campaigning and nego-
tiating force’, and to influence the structures and policies of inter-governmental
organizations (ICFTU, 2000 and 2001).
A relatively new and increasingly powerful force is that of transnational net-
works led by Southern or transition-country organizations such as Social Watch,
Third World Network and the recent campaign (led by the Treatment Action
Campaign (TAC) of South Africa) to press for cheaper generic drugs for poor
countries (Chapter 4).4 Some Southern or transition-country organization leaders,
however, are frustrated that progress is slow because Northern CSOs are reluctant
to hand over the reins (Chiriboga, 2001).

ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
Transnational networking necessitates structures that facilitate CSOs in different
countries working together; there are many organizational forms that can be chosen
for this. They are influenced by the legal traditions of the country where the CSO
or network is registered and by national laws applying to members or branches.
The spread of ‘civil law’ practices (such as US models for non-profit organizations
across Central and Eastern Europe) and the promotion by donors of more
enabling laws governing civil society is, however, leading to greater uniformity.
Three broad forms define the spectrum, each of which can be subdivided:
4 Globalizing Civic Engagement

• International CSOs: single, coherent organizations; major decisions are

reached globally by international boards; policies are implemented by global
secretariats or head offices; there is a global hierarchy of staff accountability.
Within this form there is considerable variation, depending upon the degree
of autonomy vested in the national branches or sections. It includes:
– Unitary structures: the equivalent of TNCs, these are CSOs with global
decision-making processes (albeit with some devolution). Examples
include the Catholic Church, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Plan
International.
– Centralized associations: these provide greater national autonomy; but
major decisions are made by global headquarters, which also control the
use of name and standards. Examples include Greenpeace and CARE.
– Federations: global boards (representing the member CSOs) make global
decisions in a framework of subsidiarity (considerable autonomy at the
national level). They are serviced by strong global secretariats, accountable to
the boards. Examples include Amnesty International (AI), CIVICUS (World
Alliance for Citizen Participation) and Consumers International (CI).
• CSO networks: these are collaborative arrangements formed for broad partner-
ship amongst like-minded organizations or cooperation on specific activities.
They may have international boards and secretariats; but most power and
implementation capacity remains with the CSO members. They comprise:
– Confederations: network members are fully independent but agree a set
of common ground rules and work together on specific activities where
there is mutual advantage. Examples include the World Council of
Churches, the ICFTU, Oxfam International (OI), Friends of the Earth
International (FOE-I) and international inter-faith networks (such as
the United Religions Initiative).
– Informal networks: CSOs come together around a common cause to
seek cooperation but with little agreed governance arrangements, leader-
ship or membership requirements. Examples include the ICBL and the
Jubilee 2000 movement for developing-world debt relief.
• Social movements: these comprise amorphous and fluid groupings of activ-
ists, CSOs and supporters in which the bonds are common grievances or
convictions, and shared goals for societal and policy change (rather than
structure). They connect people with causes through developing communities
of interest around shared conditions and include:
– Rooted movements: these are webs of citizens formed at the national
level to attack mutually experienced grievances. International exchange
and networking with counterparts in other countries can be powerful
for sharing ideas and boosting morale; but mobilization and analysis is
primarily at the national level. Examples include feminist, agrarian
reform, gay rights and civil rights movements.
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 5

– Transnational movements: where the policy changes sought are largely

determined by international governmental or corporate actors, move-
ments become more transnational in character, although the boundary
of this is not clear cut. Working internationally is not just for sharing
ideas and building solidarity but also for forging collective energy and a
globally coherent strategy around shared social change goals. Examples
include the human rights movement, the climate change movement and
the modern protest movement relating to globalization.

Each form has different ways of making decisions, handling leadership, communi-
cating internally, responding to governance challenges, and developing external
partnerships. These are summarized in Table 1.1. This chapter mostly deals with
the first two forms, which involve conscious efforts to work transnationally. Social
movements may exist in multiple countries, but they don’t use defined governance
procedures or structures to promote their aims (these are discussed more in Chap-
ters 5, 6 and 7). Two key variables influencing transnational citizen action are the
degree of decentralization, exemplified by the above organizational forms, and the
degree to which decision-making lies with volunteers and CSO members (via
elected committees of representatives) or with professional staff in international
secretariats. Do CSOs help citizens to achieve a voice for themselves or do they
speak for citizens? The former are more evidently representative and democratic;
the latter usually have swifter, clearer decision-making and may appear more pro-
fessional. There are other variables (such as whether a network is truly global or just
operates in a few countries; or whether the transnational activities represent a large
or small part of their members’ activities); but these are less relevant to our topic.

Table 1.1 Characteristics of different transnational civil society forms

International CSO International CSO Social Movement

(unitary) Network
Modes of decision- Defined vertical/ Defined but negoti- Not defined; organic;
making; structures hierarchical ated; horizontal can be leader ori-
ented or supporter
Clear institutional Cooperative; may be driven; depends on
structure structured or nature of movement.
unstructured
Different elements of
movement may make
different decisions
Leadership style or Single functional Multiple leadership Leadership likely to
features leadership in by small groups of be political rather
hierarchical structure core activists; delega- than managerial;
tion by defined net- shifts as different
work membership; factions and cliques
network plays cen- gain ascendancy
tralized coordination
function
6 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Table 1.1 Characteristics of different transnational civil society forms (Continued)

International CSO International CSO Social Movement

(unitary) Network
Communications, Vertical; institution- Horizontal, perhaps Ad hoc; sharing of
information – alized along hier- informal, spontan- views/analysis of
dissemination archical and functional eous, issue specific; movement thinkers;
lines; instrumental for intense information partly to inform,
core objectives of the exchange is core partly to build shared
CSO activity culture/language
Governance:
a Accountability Clearly defined – to Self-accountability, not No defined account-
board or managers; externally; the net- ability; subject to the
also to funders; work apportions tasks ‘market test’
moral accountability amongst members; (ie leaders need to
to members, reciprocity based on retain support
beneficiaries etc, but shared principles; through enthusing
this is vague reputation and trust rather than elections)
b Transparency Varies; most resist Often rather Highly transparent;
external sharing of opaque; information since membership is
critical evaluations or is shared with usually informal and
details of sensitive members only, self-selected, all
management or little to public information is open
board debates to everyone
c Representivity Membership; CSOs Varies; some require Of members/sup-
may represent their a consensus, others porters, but likely to
members, but vary a majority, others be informal; spokes-
in efforts to seek allow joint action by people reflect rather
views; may speak for sub-group of net- than represent a mass
clients or beneficiaries work public mood
Motivations for Identify with CSO; To help the mem- Shared grievances
participation share professional bers of the network; and convictions in
objectives; self-inter- shared discourse, context of perceived
est (eg career) values, causes opportunities
Nature of outside Strategic; well Horizontal clusters of Social movement
partnerships defined; on networks based on (SM) members may
pragmatic basis; shared goals; volun- identify with other
usually not dense; tary cooperation SMs, hence interac-
emphasis on CSO’s rather than leverage; tion; but a SM itself is
own work can be dense webs not sufficiently
defined institutionally
to have partners
Fixity/clarity of Clearly defined and Focus on single core Strategies likely to be
strategy institutionally issue; membership negotiated between
approved strategies; likely to be like- leadership, internal
but multiple accoun- minded; this helps it factions and external
tabilities can create to form clear, power- allies
internal problems of ful messages and
coherence well-targeted strategy
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 7

Figure 1.1 The organizational forms of selected CSOs and CSO networks

Figure 1.1 (borrowed from a framework suggested by Amnesty International,

2000) uses these two principal variables to present a taxonomy of transnational
civil society in four quadrants:
8 Globalizing Civic Engagement

1 strongly member-controlled; decisions taken largely locally (such as trade

unions or international peasants’ movements) (bottom left);
2 strongly member-controlled, but major decisions largely reached internationally
(such as Amnesty International or some of the new protest groups) (top left);
3 secretariat-driven (volunteers less powerful); decisions largely reached globally
(such as Greenpeace or Third World Network) (top right); and
4 secretariat-driven; decisions taken largely at local levels (such as most faith-based
organizations and consumers’ associations) (bottom right).

The figure is schematic and approximate, and is intended to illustrate a useful

CSO taxonomy rather than comment on the work of any organization.
Though all CSOs face the same organizational choices as they work in more
transnational and network modes, some general patterns emerge. Policy-oriented
NGOs have generally been fastest to adapt to these new approaches. They have
expanded the clout, resources and professionalism of their international secretariats
(although these may be decentralized) to become more effective global negotiators,
researchers and campaigners. Such NGOs operate in the issues, and the public
are urged to support them in this task. Trade union networks tend to emphasize
the provision of professional support to member unions at the national level,
including information exchange and basic coordination between their members;
ultimately, therefore, they see their role as supporting their rank and file members,
not the other way around. Faith-based networks can be very strong when uniting a
religion globally (the Catholic Church is an obvious example), but multi-faith
networks are generally weak. Faiths tend to be naturally hierarchical (at least at
the national level) and more competitive with respect to rivals than other types
of CSO. Hence, although there are clear issues uniting faiths, they tend to find it
easier to collaborate with secular CSOs than with other faiths. We now explore
these organizational choices by looking at specific examples.

NGOs working transnationally

Policy-oriented NGOs can be thought of as products of advanced democracy
that are generally not hampered by democracy. The majority do not have mass
memberships who take major decisions. Many (such as Oxfam) depend heavily
on public subscription; but the public are supporters, not members. Some, such
as Greenpeace and Consumers’ Association (UK) have ‘members’ but delegate
few powers to them regarding policies, programmes or selection of chief execu-
tives. Other NGOs may be influential but have little or no public base (such as the
New Economics Foundation, numerous think tanks and Focus on the Global
South). Only a few, such as Amnesty International, are membership organizations
in the sense that members control the NGO.
There is, therefore, a paradox. NGOs have recently emerged within well-
established democracies (North and South; East and West) as influential voices
in their special fields, and they are increasingly seen as plugging the deficiencies
in orthodox democracy created by globalization (Clark, 2003). They contribute
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 9

to democracy, but most influential NGOs are not, in themselves, democratic.

This is not to say that they don’t enjoy the enthusiastic support of their sub-
scribers and the wider public; however, they feel no obligation to sound out
those publics regarding the policies they advocate or to be accountable to them
for their campaign efforts. Hence, they can swiftly adapt their messages and
activities to accord with new realities or to seize new opportunities. They also
exercise great flexibility in forming alliances and refining their positions. They
greatly influence democratic processes, therefore, but are not themselves ham-
pered by cumbersome democratic deliberations.
Perhaps due to their subject matter, environmental groups have often been
fastest to change to the opportunities of working transnationally. Friends of the
Earth (FOE) provides a good example of a global network. FOE International
(FOE-I) started 30 years ago as a network of four Northern FOEs (from the US,
the UK, France and Sweden). FOE groups then started to form elsewhere, and,
more particularly, other environmental groups applied for FOE-I membership.
In the early 1990s, FOE-I decided to accelerate this trend (particularly in South-
ern or transition countries), and by 2001 the membership had expanded to 68,
with more than half being from these regions. Membership requirements
include being a truly national organization (ie working throughout the country);
maintaining grassroots as well as nationwide activities; independence from the
state, political parties, religions and ethnic organizations; working on a full range
of environmental issues; and adopting open and democratic structures, free of
sexism and discrimination. Only one FOE member is admitted per country.
FOE-I also has affiliates, which may be single-issue campaigns, research organi-
zations or international groups.
Combined, FOE’s network has over 1 million members, 5000 local groups
and a US$200 million budget. The international secretariat expanded from 1.5
in 1992 to 23 in 2001 (of which 15 are seconded by, and work within, national
FOE offices). The major international campaigns are shaped by FOE-I, serviced
by secretariat staff, and supervised by an FOE-I sub-committee comprising
senior staff from national FOEs. Usually there are two lead agencies – one
Northern, one Southern or transition country. There is, however, considerable
variation within the network. The majority of FOE-UK campaigns, for example,
now have a strong international dimension, while FOE Germany remains focused
largely on domestic issues.
Other leading environmental NGOs are more centralized. Greenpeace and
the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), for example, are, in effect, interna-
tional CSOs. Greenpeace is a centralized association headquartered in The
Netherlands with national and regional offices in about 40 (mostly Northern)
countries. Greenpeace International licenses the use of the name and coordinates
global programmes (Anheier, 2000). The international secretariat accounts for a
quarter of the global Greenpeace budget. WWF is a federation of semi-indepen-
dent national conservation organizations in Northern countries and some larger
developing countries. Members are serviced by a large Swiss secretariat (WWF-
International). To diversify and expand the Southern and transition country
10 Globalizing Civic Engagement

voices, since the mid 1990s they have included programme offices in the deliber-
ating processes; although, in practice, these have less weight, and the three big
offices (International, US and The Netherlands) dominate decision-making.
Environment and human rights NGOs deal with discrete issues and make
an interesting comparison. An array of environmental groups evolved and grew
during the 1970s and 1980s as public concern about environmental issues
emerged and coalesced into the environment movement. These groups both fed
this growing concern and benefited from it. Hence, the diversity of the sector
reflects differing styles and differing success rates in getting messages across. The
human rights movement, however, is largely the product of one NGO, Amnesty
International (AI), which grew in prominence as it demonstrated its expertise in
international law and mobilized public opinion (mostly in Northern countries)
about human rights abuses. It is only more recently that other large human
rights NGOs have formed and AI has faced tough competition. As a result, the
environment NGOs traditionally have a mixed attitude towards each other. On
the one hand, they are accustomed to cooperating, since they share an interest in
building the movement; on the other hand, they are highly competitive – con-
stantly striving to be seen as ‘leading the pack’, either by being first on a topic or
by being most radical. The traditional challenge for AI, conversely, has been to
demonstrate credibility to diplomats and politicians. It has worried less about
competition. Hence, it has been anxious to demonstrate that it has a strong and
growing base of thoughtful supporters, that it speaks for a growing constituency
and that it is scrupulously accurate. It has competed more with political apathy
and exigencies of diplomacy than with rival NGOs.
AI was established in 1961 and has always been a centralized federation of
national members (or sections), now numbering about 50. Its large international
secretariat in London services the sections and implements campaigns and poli-
cies agreed by the membership. During the last few years there has been a strong
growth of Southern or transition country members, who now comprise about
half the sections. AI’s main rival is Human Rights Watch (HRW), whose struc-
ture and history is very different. HRW is relatively new. Although its precursor,
Helsinki Watch, preceded it by many years as a specialist watchdog, HRW was
only established in 1988 as a global NGO. It is, in essence, a highly centralized,
US NGO with specialist sections (Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Africa Watch,
among others) and global outreach.
International development and humanitarian NGOs are virtually all driven by
their secretariats rather than their supporters. Their popular appeal has tradition-
ally been that they are able to provide help in situations of desperate need. For
Northern publics, they are vehicles for compassion, rather than self-interest or pol-
itics. Supporters want their preferred NGO to do more as a result of their support,
but don’t traditionally expect it to campaign on political issues, still less to speak on
their behalf. Hence, the NGOs’ structures generally evolve to maximize efficiency
as conduits of aid – improving aid targeting and publicizing their success in fight-
ing poverty. Most NGOs are international in that they have well-resourced offices
in their programme countries; but these report to the international headquarters
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 11

where major decisions are taken. Increasingly, NGOs have become dependent on
official funding (Clark, 1991) and, consequently, have come under pressure to
coordinate their programmes more assiduously to avoid duplication. Some have
also given increasing attention to research and advocacy activities. As a result, there
has been a strong tendency in recent years to build international networks of like-
minded NGOs.
Oxfam International (OI), for example, is a confederation comprising 12
national organizations in Northern (fund raising) countries. Their collective
budget was US$504 million in 1999, most of which goes to support the activi-
ties of 3000 partner NGOs in the South. The total budget of OI’s secretariat in
Oxford is about US$1.5 million, including a professional advocacy team in
Washington, DC, Brussels and Geneva and a Development Investment Fund.
OI has three main goals: programme harmonization, particularly in countries
where confusion may arise from various Oxfams running different programmes;
joint advocacy on agreed topics; and promoting a more unified public percep-
tion of what Oxfam does and stands for, or ‘branding’ (OI website: www.oxfam-
international.org).
Other NGO networks, such as CARE, Save the Children International,
World Vision, Plan International and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), are
somewhat similar. They are networks of donor agencies in Northern countries in
which there are varying degrees of centralization and programme harmonization.
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is
rather different. It is an umbrella organization of 178 national Red Cross or Red
Crescent societies who are bound by a set of global principles (the most contro-
versial ones of which are ‘neutrality’ and acting under the approval of the govern-
ment in question). The national members are autonomous (including in the
South), though most funding for Southern or transition-country activities
comes from international appeals. The IFRC secretariat in Geneva coordinates
the international appeals and other aspects of the network, represents national
societies at the international level, and works with national societies to plan and
direct major relief efforts. It has about 250 employees and mobilized US$230
million in 2001.

Trade union networks

Most unions (especially in industrialized countries) are facing enormous chal-
lenges in terms of declining membership, technology reducing the demand for
manual workers, greater mobility of capital and production, neo-liberal eco-
nomic policies, and increasingly ‘flexible’ labour markets throughout most of the
world (see Chapter 3). Employment policies (especially within TNCs) are
increasingly determined internationally. To be effective in protecting their mem-
bers’ interests, unions need to work internationally, and need to influence poli-
cies relating to labour markets. These are difficult challenges, however, at a time
when union membership in much of the world is declining and workers, espe-
cially young people, tend to find unions unexciting and old-fashioned. These
problems are particularly acute in Western Europe, but may be easing in the US
12 Globalizing Civic Engagement

where, for many years, the major unions have shifted tactics from traditional
member-service activities to campaigning.
Responding to these trends, there is currently a major regrouping of unions
underway internationally. While the powerful shift during much of the 20th
century was towards forging strong national-level unions out of workplace and
local unions, today’s pattern is towards stronger global alliances of national
unions by sector. Most teachers’ unions outside of communist countries, for
example, have federated into Education International, and 560 national-level
unions representing public-sector workers have formed Public Service Interna-
tional (PSI). Such Global Union Federations (GUFs) have existed for more than
a century; but their roles and influence have significantly changed of late (see
Chapter 3). They now emphasize international campaigning and negotiation
with both governmental agencies and multinational employers.
What distinguishes unions from other civil society sectors is that they take
their representative function much more seriously. They exist not just to serve
their members and speak for them, but to give them voice. Hence, the secretariats
at both national and international levels are loath to make policy statements unless
debated and ratified by their rank and file. This means that their participation in
policy debate is more cumbersome – a result of dry resolutions, rather than pithy
statements – and they usually don’t respond rapidly. However, when they speak
out they do so with the considerable authority of their huge memberships. They
tend to resent the more flexible NGOs, who – they feel – often command
greater attention of the media and policy-makers because of their ability to
respond swiftly and clearly, but who only speak for themselves.
The GUFs are decentralized to varying degrees. Hence, for example, PSI –
which used to be highly centralized – has opened a whole new set of offices in
the last six years. It is now the most decentralized GUF, with 4 regional and 20
subregional offices. All GUFs engage in macro-economic and other interna-
tional policy discussions and urge their member unions to realize the imperative
to work internationally in order to remain relevant. This includes working with
NGOs, academics and other non-traditional partners (see Chapter 3).

Transnational and inter-faith networks

Like trade unions, many religions have experienced declining membership and
mounting questions of relevance. In response, they increasingly engage in issues
of morality and society beyond narrow questions of faith. As a result, three
trends have emerged. Firstly, transnational, intra-faith networking has acceler-
ated; most religions now invest more in international coordination, exchange of
ideas and general cooperation. Secondly, religious leaders are increasingly willing
to join networks with secular organizations – for example, joining with environ-
ment, development or human rights groups to press for debt relief, action on cli-
mate change or the abolition of the death penalty. Thirdly, but least evident
until recent years, are efforts of inter-faith cooperation. As noted above, the tra-
dition of inter-faith competition has tended to deter partnerships between reli-
gions; but certain ramifications of global change – including heightened concern
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 13

about the role of religious divides in many of the world’s most serious conflicts
(not least since 11 September) – have catalysed new efforts to form partnerships
between faiths.
Most religions (excepting the Catholic Church, the Baha’i, etc) are locally
focused, are not based on global hierarchies and, hence, are not well suited to
international work. Furthermore, Cold War political constraints have made it
difficult, until recently, to discuss religious issues within the United Nations
(UN) and other international forums. New technology, cheaper travel, the end
of the Cold War and other globalization-related opportunities have, however,
expanded international cooperation within most religions, enhancing their
international vision and their concern about global policy issues. This has con-
vinced many faiths that the reforms they seek will not be forthcoming without
cooperation, in particular with other faiths. This is not universally accepted,
however, and at least one – the Catholic Church – is cautioning its members to
be wary of religious pluralism.
Until recent years, most inter-faith cooperation focused on matters that
affect groups directly, such as protecting the right to worship and specific ‘safe’
areas, such as education. Now, however, there are many initiatives promoting
inter-faith, international cooperation in wider subject areas. Although there was
an unsuccessful bid to form a ‘world parliament of religions’ as early as 1893,
and other efforts to promote better inter-faith understanding since, it was not
until 1970 that an international joint-faith venture was established to promote
the role of religions in peace-building (the World Congress of Religion and
Peace). Furthermore, it was not until the 1990s that inter-faith cooperation
started to take off. The two recent notable initiatives were the birth of the
United Religions Initiative in 1996 (launched at a major conference in San Fran-
cisco) and the establishment of the World Faiths Dialogue on Development in
1998 (whose driving forces are the leaders of the Church of England, the Ismaili
faith and the World Bank). Inter-faith activities today tend to concentrate on
issues of peace, sustainability, human rights, poverty, education and – more
recently – economic globalization.
The World Council of Churches (WCC) is an early, but narrow, example of
inter-faith networking – embracing, as it does, just Christian organizations. It is
a membership body comprising two-thirds of the Protestant churches by congre-
gation (or one third of the Christian faith). The Catholic Church is not a formal
member; but it cooperates actively with it. Though it is unlikely that many
churches consider themselves to be represented by the WCC, it is influential; in
particular, it has effectively challenged its members to address questions of eco-
nomic justice.
There also appears to be weak coordination between the inter-faith bodies
and the faith-based development organizations, such as Caritas, the Association
of Protestant Development NGOs and the Lutheran World Federation.
14 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Box 1.1 Chronology of major inter-faith initiatives

1893 First Parliament of World Religion, Chicago (150,000 participants)
1900 International Association for Religious Freedom (formed in Oxford)
1936 World Congress of Faith
1948 World Council of Churches formed (now comprises 300 churches in 120 countries)
1950 World Fellowship of Religions, India
1960 Temple of Understanding established
1970 World Congress of Religion and Peace (conservative, but truly inter-faith)
1988 Council for Parliament of World Religion established
1993 Centennial meeting of the 1893 Parliament
1993 International Inter-faith Centre established in Oxford
1996 United Religions Initiative, launched by Bishop Swing of San Francisco; this has
been a radical, high-profile, grassroots-oriented and fast-growing initiative
1997 Inter-faith centre set up in New York
1998 World Faiths Dialogue on Development
1999 Cape Town meeting of the Council for the Parliament for World Religion (decided
to stay as a council, rather than pursue the parliament concept)
2000 Millennium World Peace Summit, comprising 1000 senior religious leaders (little
consensus or agreed action, but showed growing interest in inter-faith networking)

Source: adapted from Boehle, 2001

Southern-led CSO networks

Though most international CSO networks are led by Northern groups, a num-
ber of strong Southern-based and Southern-led networks have emerged during
recent years. For example, Social Watch came together during preparations for
the World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995. It is a Uru-
guay-based alliance of largely Southern and transition-country development,
human rights, labour and women’s groups that raises macro-economic concerns
within international forums and acts as a citizens’ watchdog over social develop-
ment policies. It monitors the implementation of major commitments made by
governments and international agencies at UN summits, reports on this progress
(in particular, by publishing an annual Social Watch report) and provides a glo-
bal forum for NGO advocacy. Its global and country-level reports are highly
praised and it comprises very effective regional and national coalitions. Social
Watch seeks to bridge the South–North gap. A coordinating committee (com-
prising seven men and seven women – ten from Southern or transition countries
and four from the North) sets its policies while each national group is responsi-
ble for its own fund raising, although global funds are provided by Novib and
other Northern sources.
Groups such as Social Watch and Third World Network (a Penang-based
transnational network of radical intellectuals, activists and journalists that chal-
lenges globalization and related issues) seek to redefine the division of labour
between Northern and Southern or transition-country advocacy. Northern NGOs
tend to talk easily about ‘partnerships’; in reality, there is not the basis of equality
or even trust that such a term implies. ‘Development alliance’ might be a better
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 15

term, says Social Watch. Northern NGOs need to be discouraged from speaking
‘on behalf of’ Southern or transition-country people or NGOs, and should be
urged to form relationships based on cooperation rather than competition.
The Amazon Coalition provides another interesting illustration of a success-
ful Southern-led NGO network. The Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organi-
zations of the Amazon Basin (COICA) was set up in 1991 by Brazilian NGOs
(especially those representing indigenous people) to counter the neglect of social
issues in international NGO campaigning regarding the Amazon. It was largely a
reaction to US environmental groups having an influential voice on Amazon affairs
in the world at large, but portraying these purely in terms of rainforest and species
conservation, with little mention of the people who depend on Amazon resources.
COICA has managed to persuade many (but not all) Northern NGOs to broaden
their advocacy and has established its own lobbying office in Washington, DC
(Selverston-Scher, 2000).
There is similar transnational networking emerging in the former Eastern
bloc (Hlobil, 2001; Stark, 2001). The very rapid growth of civil society activity,
including transnational networking, in Central and Eastern Europe owes much to
the influx of new ICT, as well as to the dramatic rise of NGOs. Before 1989 there
were very few, and these only had access to the most basic technology – not even
photocopiers. Today, there are tens of thousands of NGOs in each country of the
region and these have full access to advanced ICT. While in the US e-business
was at the forefront of internet use, in this region NGOs have led the way.
Southern or transition country-based transnational networking tends to
emphasize regional, rather than global, collaboration due to common historical
links and shared needs. For example, the struggles for democracy in Latin America
or for reconstruction after civil war in Central America have led to the establish-
ment of regional networks. Whereas ten years ago these emphasized sharing best
practice and solidarity networks, they have recently become more policy-oriented.
However, few Southern or transition-country CSO networks are fully inde-
pendent of influence from their Northern counterparts. They mostly depend on
Northern funding, which sometimes presents dilemmas and creates pressure to
prioritize matters of Northern concern. For example, groups concerned about
trade issues in Latin America feel pressure to concentrate on the free trade area of
the Americas or the World Trade Organization (WTO), although what seems
more immediately relevant to them is the Colombia Plan. Southern or transi-
tion-country networks often experience confusion and mixed signals in relations
with their Northern partners. For example, on the one hand, they relate to pol-
icy and campaigning staff in policy advocacy; on the other hand, they relate to
project departments when it comes to funding. Frequently, departments within
the same NGO demonstrate poor communication and have different concerns.
Southern or transition-country networks also often experience internal tension
between their locally born and locally educated members, their locally born and
Western educated members, and between their local and ex-patriot staff.5
16 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Roles and financing of the international secretariat

As civil society networks focus more on transnational action, they generally
expand their international secretariats. Some (such as Oxfam, Amnesty Interna-
tional and Public Service International) have opened offices in cities that are
strategically important to their advocacy roles. Secretariat roles and responsibilities
vary significantly, however. Some represent their networks, advocating on their
behalf, while others simply facilitate the participation of their members in policy
discussions. There are various ways of financing secretariats. Some networks
have a standard membership contribution (typically, a percentage of the members’
income); some encourage in-kind contributions (staff seconded to work on
projects for the international network); and some seek funding from foundations,
governments or elsewhere.
Oxfam International has a burden-sharing approach in which the largest
members (UK and The Netherlands) bear most of the costs. CARE and Save the
Children members all pay 0.25 per cent of their incomes to the international
secretariats. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) members pay a negotiated sum
(ranging from 0.22 to 0.4 per cent of their income) to MSF-I. Friends of the
Earth-International (FOE-I) members pay 1 per cent of their ‘unrestricted
income’, plus 0.1 per cent of all other income to FOE-I (though up to half of
this fee can be in-kind contributions for Southern and transition-country mem-
bers). In the case of trade union networks, the member unions pay contributions
towards core costs, but sympathetic Northern governments often finance special
activities. And most inter-faith activities are financed through short-term grants
from foundations, wealthy individuals and some specialist church organizations
(such as the Unitarians). In North–South CSO networks, the Northern mem-
bers generally mobilize the funding for international campaigns. Southern and
transition-country members frequently complain that their Northern partners
jealously guard these funds (Jordan and van Tuijl, 2000).

GOVERNANCE ISSUES
Interviews with senior staff of major transnational civil society networks
(TCSN)6 have revealed a similar range of governance questions confronted across
all categories of CSOs. These issues are summarized below.

Issues of legitimacy and representivity

Though CSO leaders often give much attention to these issues, government and
corporate officials often level the most serious charge – questioning legitimacy –
when TCSNs rub up against powerful interests who think they wield dispropor-
tionate influence. The related charge is that they are not ‘representative’ in ways
that they purport to be. There is a growing literature on these issues (Edwards,
1996 and 2000; Clark, 1999 and 2003).
Mass membership can confer legitimacy; for example, the GUFs all represent
millions of workers (25 million teachers in the case of Education International).
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 17

The unions are proud of this, and often challenge NGOs with whom they dis-
agree to demonstrate their representivity. NGOs may have millions of members
(for instance, Greenpeace), as do other CSO networks (such as consumers associ-
ations). In practice, those members may be casual donors or subscribers with no
active involvement; they don’t recognize the CSO as speaking for them. Religions
have large memberships (even excluding passive members), but rarely seek to
represent their congregations on anything other than theological issues.
CSOs have other avenues in which to claim legitimacy (these issues are dis-
cussed more fully in Clark, 2003). Some, with virtually no grassroots base, are
widely seen as world authorities in their field. Some claim bona fides through
their participatory styles of work, their acknowledged experience or impact,
their local knowledge or their web of partners (for example, close Southern or
transition-country associates). Some also weight decision-making according to
their local membership. For example, Amnesty International apportions voting
shares in its international council according to the number of local groups in
each national section. Many CSO networks gain credibility because of internal
discipline, enforcing high standards of governance and ethics on their members.
AI and FOE, for example, have both suspended or expelled errant members.
Jordan and Van Tuijl (2000) argue that ‘political responsibility’ is a better
lens than legitimacy and representation. They describe four levels of political
responsibility in transnational NGO relationships:

• cooperative (joint management);

• concurrent;
• disassociated; and
• competitive (no sharing of information and no recognition of risks).

Accountability
This topic is also widely discussed in the literature on NGO management (see,
for example, Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Fowler, 1997). In looking at transna-
tional civil society networks (TCSNs), two specific questions arise. Does work-
ing in a TCSN entail greater discipline and, therefore, enhance a CSO’s
accountability (in other words, do the networks incorporate a self-regulation dis-
cipline)? There is considerable evidence that national networks of NGOs and
other CSOs often encourage higher standards of ethics and governance (for
example, The Philippines, Bangladesh and Palestinian NGO networks), and
there is some evidence that more formal transnational networks do the same, but
the evidence is sketchy. Secondly, does network membership strengthen or
reduce emphasis on accountability to rank-and-file members? It appears that
TCSN membership introduces stronger accountability to peers in other coun-
tries, perhaps (but not necessarily) at the cost of grassroots accountability; but
this can also insulate Southern and transition-country CSOs from Northern
donor pressures.
18 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Box 1.2 The Philippines code of NGO ethics

The Philippines has thousands of development and social-sector non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs). Their influence expanded in the mid 1990s after the government
devolved power to the local level, promoted community development and decreed NGO
involvement in all local councils, school boards and other local government activities.
NGO–government partnerships have generally been successful, as has network develop-
ment. The largest NGO network (the Caucus of Development NGOs, or CODE-NGO)
represents 3000 organizations; other CSOs have formed similar networks, and these net-
works cooperate amongst themselves.

In 1995 the NGO networks came together to agree a code of ethics for NGOs. This was
designed, in particular, to clarify the relationship between government, businesses and
NGOs and to ‘police’ NGO activities. Besides helping to identify which NGOs are doing
quality work (used to qualify NGOs for government tax concessions), this self-regulation
has checked a tendency of many NGOs to act as if they were ‘shadow governments’ or to
claim to be ‘better than government’.

The development of the NGOs’ Code of Ethics – which recognized the roles, responsibil-
ities and obligations of the non-profit sector and donor relationships – has enriched NGO
contributions through fostering a culture of sharing and responsibility, increasing NGO visi-
bility, strengthening the donor base and fostering a shift of work to a more global mode.

National CSOs are generally accountable to boards that comprise active sup-
porters, whereas TCSNs’ accountability may be oriented towards CEOs and
senior specialists of the member CSOs. TCSNs, therefore, are more removed
from the grassroots level. Some countries have CSO watchdogs and, occasion-
ally, parliamentary and press scrutiny of leading CSOs; but these rarely look at
the activities of TCSNs. Institutional funders (such as foundations and liberal
governments) are major supporters of many TCSNs and have structured
approaches to monitoring and evaluation. However, again this is a form of
upward, not downward, accountability. Many NGO networks admit, internally,
that their accountability mechanisms are weak. ‘In practice, lines of accountabil-
ity and implementation reports are poorly monitored and rarely challenged, and
there are limited tools for accountability’, says an internal report of one promi-
nent NGO network.
Few TCSNs have developed accountability mechanisms that emphasize
their Southern or transition-country members. Oxfam International now solicits
input from their Southern and transition-country staff in their monitoring and
evaluation activities, and is considering extending this to strategic Southern and
transition-country partners. Many practitioners are concerned that, while pro-
fessionalization of TCSNs can enhance advocacy effectiveness, this may be at the
expense of widening gaps between national- and local-level activists, and
between activists at national and international levels.
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 19

Leadership and decision-making

For sustainability and harmony, CSOs must feel in control of the networks to
which they belong. In order to be effective in influencing policy, they need clear
and strong leadership ensuring concerted advocacy. These needs can be contradic-
tory. Strong leadership is often resented by member CSOs, who may feel eclipsed.
The latter may prefer their networks to share information and coordinate activi-
ties, but not to direct anything. To what extent should networks serve or drive their
membership? Some members have criticized the leadership of both UK-based
Jubilee 2000 and French-based ATTAC (campaign for Tobin taxes) for being
too directive; but both have made remarkable achievements. It may be that suc-
cessful networks tend to have leaders who are more skilled in mobilizing and in
formulating mass-action strategies than in consensus building and coordination.
Strong network leadership must be balanced by decision-making procedures
that are endorsed by the members and are equitable. Amnesty International
(2000) declares seven principles of decision-making that most CSO networks
would subscribe to (empowerment; participation/inclusion; transparency; account-
ability; cohesion; effectiveness; and direction/prioritization). However, in prac-
tice, the dictates of the first five often work against the punchiness and speed
required by the last two. Voting patterns vary widely. Some formal TCSNs arrive
at consensus decisions; some take votes; some give greater voting power to their
larger members than to their smaller ones. This is often a vexed issue, particu-
larly when smaller members feel marginalized. In general, the networks agree
major decisions at international board meetings (larger networks, such as unions,
may have regional as well as global meetings), where executive committees are
also appointed for interim decisions. Some networks (for example, Oxfam Inter-
national) have found that their structure becomes more cumbersome as their
membership grows. Others (such as FOE-I) use a ‘sign-up’ approach in which
actions are agreed as options that members can adopt or not as they please
(reflecting a ‘voice-and-exit’ approach). Few long-established networks appear to
use the internet or video-conferencing extensively for decision-making (seeing
these more as media for exchange of information).
No network demonstrates the dilemmas of decision-making more clearly
than Amnesty International. Many within it, and friends outside, say that it is in
crisis because its decision-making, though democratic, is too slow and hide-
bound in procedure. Much hinges on the international council meeting (ICM)
of all sections, held every two years. This has become overtaken by long and
technical debates about mandate changes (see below) that are inaccessible to
most new or smaller members, especially if they aren’t fluent in the major lan-
guages. AI also has an executive committee that meets several times per year and
an annual meeting of section directors – but major decisions are not delegated to
these forums. Though ICMs allow for majority voting (and each section has
between three and eight votes, depending upon the number of local groups it
has), in practice, major splits are avoided. As a result, issues are often deferred if
consensus decisions cannot be reached. This has led to AI being bogged down in
20 Globalizing Civic Engagement

long and unclear debates about whether gay rights or landmines are suitable topics
for AI action (and, if so, whether these topics are conducive to full campaigns or
just educational exercises). AI leaders recognize that its decision-making has
become too slow for the modern age and too technical to maintain popular
appeal. The problem is in agreeing on the changes. This is currently a topic of
hot internal debate (AI, 2000).
AI’s major competitor, Human Rights Watch (HRW), has no such decision-
making bottlenecks. While AI is bound by its mandate (a charter of agreed
human rights interpretations that delineate what the organization can and can-
not do), HRW has no such restriction. It can adopt any human rights cause
(whether concerning a political, civil, economic or social right). HRW is also a
centralized organization, governed by a primarily US board. It is weak on partic-
ipation and empowerment, but has attained a reputation as one of the world’s
most effective human rights NGOs.
Jubilee 2000, in contrast, had a very informal decision-making structure. It
was, in reality, a UK network with a British board; but its appeal led to Jubilee
groups being set up throughout the world, most of whom elected to adopt the
same campaign targets and strategies. Throughout 1998–2000, Jubilee 2000 held
informal consultations in the margins of its international meetings, which were
also the occasions for South–South caucusing, and these resulted in mounting
internal tension and the emergence of different platforms (see Chapter 5).

Use of name and branding

Some networks (such, as Amnesty International and Greenpeace) require their
members to use their brand name, logo and a common house style. Some, such
as Oxfam International (OI), ask all members to set a timetable for incorporat-
ing the name ‘Oxfam’ within their national name (for example, Novib: the
Oxfam of The Netherlands). Other networks, such as Friends of the Earth-
International (FOE-I), are happy for their members to use completely different
names (for instance, WALHI in Indonesia). Conversely, the Jubilee 2000 name
is used in many countries but without a global agreement on what this entails.
Jubilee South (a network of Southern intellectuals with little grassroots base)
declared a more radical platform than Jubilee 2000 and asserted that it had a
better right to represent the Southern voice. The lack of name licensing had ben-
efits as well as problems – it helped to publicize the campaign name internation-
ally. Some networks (for example, OI and Save the Children) have taken legal
actions against those using their name without authorization.

FOCUS, MANDATE AND CULTURE

CSOs in transnational networks experience three pressures that lead to organiza-
tional tensions regarding focus and mandate: supranational forces pull CSOs
toward standardization and uniformity; sub-national forces pull toward decen-
tralization; and horizontal forces emphasize linking and coordination across geo-
graphic and sectoral frontiers.
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 21

Box 1.3 Amnesty International and its mandate dilemma

At its birth in1961 Amnesty International’s (AI’s) mandate was clear: the release of prisoners
of conscience (defined on religious or political grounds). During its first 30 years, there
were very few mandate changes to such issues as the death penalty, extra-judicial killings,
torture, cruel treatment and disappearances. However, there has been a mandate explosion
since 1990 (in particular as Southern and transition-country AI groups have proliferated),
and dozens of new clauses have been adopted, covering topics such as homosexuality,
female genital mutilation, armed opposition groups, laws on wars, human rights promotion
and education, forcible exile, fair trial, international criminal court and landmines. This now
means that the mandate, far from being a succinct mission statement reminding supporters
what the organization stands for, has become a legalistic tome that few in AI have a good
grasp of, and that is increasingly seen as a millstone, preventing AI from responding flexibly
to world events as they arise.

The ‘mission creep’ has far from ended. As more development interests have arisen and as
diverse specialist groups and networks have formed, new mandate changes are constantly
being proposed, particularly regarding social and economic rights. Proponents argue that
globalization has diminished the strength of sovereign nation states. Other actors – such as
international financial institutions – are gaining power; and armed opposition groups often
have de facto control over territories and their populations. Hence, they argue, it is no
longer sufficient for AI to focus on violations perpetrated by governments. Abuses arising
from extreme poverty and social exclusion increasingly occupy the human rights agenda.

Furthermore, as AI works more closely with others (such as development non-governmental

organizations and unions), it is pressured into lending reciprocal support to their campaigns.
While the mandate determines its mainstay ‘oppositional work’ (campaigns on specific
human rights abuse), AI is greatly expanding its more general ‘promotional work’ (education
and campaigning in support of broad human rights). The growth of Southern sections has
also challenged AI’s founding principle against ‘working on own-country’ issues (designed to
ensure impartiality and avoid becoming embroiled in partisan politics). Southern members
find this anachronistic. For them, participation in AI only makes sense if they can work on
issues in their countries, and define human rights as the broad human rights movement in
what their country does.

Expanding transnational activities (especially by expanding Southern or transi-

tion-country membership) can precipitate a change in the focus and mandate of
established networks as new actors bring in new priorities that challenge the net-
work’s traditional style and culture. These challenges may lead to difficult choices,
and perhaps to shifts in the traditional support base. This, in turn, may lead to sig-
nificant changes in the organizational culture of both the network and constituent
CSOs. Amnesty International illustrates this most dramatically (see Box 1.3).
Southern FOEs, to give another example, have challenged their Northern
counterparts to halt their dialogue with oil companies – urging investment in
alternative energy generation – since they regard these companies as violators of
human rights, particularly regarding indigenous people. This has been a difficult
discussion, resulting in a compromise permitting continued dialogue but subject to
careful ground rules designed to avoid implying any endorsement of the company.
22 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Trade union networks have also been influenced by the growing weight of
their Southern and transition-country membership. Traditional union concerns
of collective bargaining within the formal sector, while still important, have been
supplemented by concerns about ‘flexibilization’ of labour contracts, part-time
workers, the informal sector and even macro-economic issues, such as structural
adjustment that impacts upon employment in the South.

Questions of culture and style

Changes in network membership and new working modes (made possible by
ICT) can trigger rapid cultural change in well-established networks. The South-
ern and transition-country members have influenced FOE, for example, in repo-
sitioning itself as a sustainable development movement rather than as an
environmental movement. And Amnesty International now has many interna-
tional special-interest groups, as well as local groups. These ‘networks within the
network’ represent population groups (such as doctors, lawyers, teachers and
youth), specific causes (for example, concerning the death penalty or homosex-
ual rights) or country interest. They act as pressure groups within AI, account
for some of its most effective campaigning, and are changing how AI operates.
However, they are not yet recognized in AI’s governance structure (currently
only local groups are counted, even though this mode of mobilization is becom-
ing outdated). Other TCSNs, such as FOE and Greenpeace, reveal a similar pat-
tern of internet-connected special-interest groups.
Network cultures also change as they become more dependent upon profes-
sional staff, rather than upon voluntarism. Increased transnational networking,
the serious (though sometimes hostile) response of institutions attacked by CSO
advocacy, and increased sources of funding all heighten TCSN professionalism,
leading more young people to consider careers in CSOs. Grassroots supporters
are reinforced by seeing ‘their’ CSO field as an effective lobbying team at inter-
national forums, but may find themselves relegated to raising funds and signing
petitions rather than being lobbyists themselves.

MEMBERSHIP AND PARTNERSHIP ISSUES

Though the sector is becoming more influential, many CSOs are experiencing
declining membership and a reduction in activists’ time. Working internationally
and developing non-traditional partnerships offer ways of increasing a CSO’s
clout, though tensions may arise due to the different cultures of the new part-
ners. In particular, as Southern and transition-country CSOs become more con-
fident, North–South tensions within TCSNs are becoming more evident. Some
networks seek to increase their influence or credibility by creating new members
in strategic ‘gap’ countries or by admitting associates or affiliates.
The whole discussion of membership within CSOs and their networks is
fraught with terminological difficulties. What is a member to some CSOs is a
supporter, or even a customer, to others. One can be a member of an interest
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 23

group in the same way as one can be a member of American Express because you
want a service the CSO provides. This is very different from, say, being a member
of the Catholic Church. Similarly, membership in a network can entail full com-
mitment (as in federations) or a single, perhaps peripheral, overlapping interest.

Non-traditional partnerships
Though partnership between like organizations is not new, a recent phenome-
non has been collaboration between organizations in different sectors. For exam-
ple, trade union networks increasingly work with NGOs; human rights groups
work with religious organizations; and CSOs work with academia, business
groups and even governments.
Such collaboration has been controversial for some trade unionists, who
regard unions as having a special status, representing mass memberships. They
think that this could be compromised by working with advocacy NGOs (see
Chapter 3). This is compounded by differences in style; most pressure groups
largely focus on opposing things, while unions traditionally have an eye to the
negotiating table and to brokering agreements. Conversely, some NGOs (partic-
ularly in the South) criticize unions for allowing labour and environment stan-
dards to be used as protectionist trade barriers.
Most faith-based organizations have little tradition of networking with oth-
ers, though this is now changing. Some, however, are alarmed at the trend
towards inter-faith activities. A September 2000 statement from Cardinal Ratz-
inger (responsible for the Vatican’s Doctrine of the Faith) expressed considerable
unease about religious pluralism; this was construed as a warning following the
Millennium Faiths Summit.
Amnesty International has also not found it easy to network with others. It
was, at first, suspicious and territorial when other human rights NGOs started
to form (such as Human Rights Watch), seeing them as competitors. It gradually
came to appreciate the value of partnership because it has helped to engender a
human rights movement that has elevated their issues in the political agenda. AI
now, often, has joint missions, statements and publications with others. Today,
AI frequently works with trade unions, religious groups, development NGOs
and others (for example, in the campaign for an international criminal court and
the coalition to stop child soldiers). Within the broader human rights move-
ment, however, AI is often seen as conservative – partly due to the mandate style
and partly because it does little on economic and social rights.
Collaboration can be problematic even within networks. For example,
Oxfam GB has traditionally determined its own campaign agenda and some-
times finds it difficult to follow the discipline of collaborating within Oxfam
International. And some close partners criticize OI for being a rather aloof sys-
tem that expects them to support its campaigns without reciprocating. Friends of
the Earth-International is more inclined to promote collaboration with others, but
leaves this up to national members and the lead agencies for specific campaigns
(generally, one Northern and one Southern or transition-country member share
the leadership of a campaign).
24 Globalizing Civic Engagement

The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has emphasized partnership
building (the subject of its 2001 annual meeting), in particular with the private
sector and large development agencies (including the World Bank, UN agencies
and CARE).

Membership and support base

All membership CSOs have stratified support; only a fraction of their membership
will be active. Hence, FOE-UK has about 100,000 members who provide the
NGO’s income. Of these, approximately 15,000 are members of the 200 local
groups; but of those, only about 2000 are real activists. As CSOs move into cam-
paigning or international alliances, they must think about the likely impact that
this will have on different categories of members, recognizing that the basis for
their legitimacy in the eyes of policy-makers is their overall membership, while
their ability to achieve change depends more upon their paid lobbyists and activists.
Some networks find that the characteristics of their members vary greatly
from country to country. For example, government staff belonging to Public Ser-
vice International (PSI) unions may be amongst the lowest paid in Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, but relatively
elite in developing countries. Oxfam International, however, has found that the
differences in the profile of supporters at its launch in 1994 have narrowed,
largely because the 12 members increasingly use common marketing ideas and
consciously seek to become a universally recognized ‘brand’.

North–South issues
Though policy-oriented CSOs in Southern and transition countries increasingly
look beyond their national frontiers – and therefore welcome opportunities to
join TCSNs – they often feel second-class citizens amongst their Northern part-
ners. They feel welcomed as sources of information and legitimization, but not
as equals. Vianna (2000) suggests that international campaigns (for instance, on
debt, the World Trade Organization, World Bank reform, tropical rainforests
and corruption) have established the importance of TCSNs, but the North–
South imbalance leads Northern NGOs to emerge as mediators between the glo-
bal and local levels due to their privileged knowledge of inter-governmental pro-
cesses. This makes ‘the civil society of the rich countries – especially the US –
more important politically than that of the poor countries’, potentially under-
mining Southern democratic processes. This is compounded by many NGOs
(such as Greenpeace, WWF and Transparency International) setting up South-
ern or transition-country branches, but retaining decision-making in their head-
quarters rather than decentralizing. Vianna (2000) calls for better standards of
transnational networking, with equality, reciprocity and exchange. This would
help Southern CSOs in ‘democratizing and strengthening national states’.
Jordan and van Tuijl (2000) develop a similar theme from their perspectives
in sympathetic Northern NGOs. They also flag North–South tensions in the
control of funding sources, in the failure to address communication and language
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 25

barriers, and in inadequate grassroots connections. WWF finds that North–

South splits occur over issues such as ivory or timber trade. Northern members
tend to emphasize species conservation and animal rights, while Southern mem-
bers emphasize sustainable use and social issues. The Northern partners are gen-
erally the grant makers on which Southern CSOs depend, hence easily influence
what is discussed and where.
In Brazil, for example, the campaign to reform the World Bank-funded
Planafloro project was initially driven by international NGOs with a few
national-level Brazilian NGOs. It therefore largely ignored the interests of the
indigenous people living in Rondonia. In 1991, local groups formed the Forum
of Rondonia’s NGOs and Social Movements, which came to play a leadership
role in the campaign – shifting it from a largely conservationist focus to a
broader thrust, incorporating social needs and promoting a programme of sup-
port for community initiatives (PAIC). Some international NGOs resisted this
diversion from a Green agenda and dropped out of the international campaign;
but most recognize the importance of PAIC’s productive projects. Initiatives like
this are transforming how CSOs around the world view ‘environmentally sus-
tainable development’ (Rodrigues, 2000).
In Mexico, Greenpeace, mindful of its internal North–South balance, sided
with its Latin American branches in asserting that Mexico’s tuna fishing tech-
nology no longer posed a threat to dolphins. Southern NGOs welcomed this as
a mature stance against ‘eco-imperialism’, but Greenpeace experienced a back-
lash in the US when Earth Island Institute (a purely US NGO and Greenpeace
competitor) denounced its rival as ‘anti-dolphin’. Internal wrangles followed
within Greenpeace, the support for Mexican partners was dropped, and Green-
peace USA lost members (Fox, 2000).
North–South imbalances are not all one way, however. The growth of
Southern and transition-country memberships can contribute to an elite drift.
For example, some African or former Soviet country environmental groups are
more academic and capital city-oriented than their Northern counterparts, and
have few grassroots supporters. Their voice in TCSN decisions outweighs what
would be warranted by dint of membership or scale of activities. For example,
about 95 per cent of Amnesty International supporters are from OECD coun-
tries; but almost half of the international council delegates are from elsewhere.
Northern and Southern or transition-country groups may also have campaigning
styles that clash or sit uneasily together. Southern and transition-country NGOs
tend to be more radical than their Northern counterparts, and more oriented
towards mass protests rather than letter writing or high-level lobbying. This can
be complementary, but it can also be a source of tension. Southern and transi-
tion-country trade unions have also brought new styles and priorities into inter-
national union networks.
An increasing concern amongst Southern and transition-country CSO lead-
ers is the impact that participation in transnational networks has on their sector.
Some argue that it provides a global platform for their advocacy and, hence,
strengthens their local work. Others worry that it distracts activists from local to
26 Globalizing Civic Engagement

(arguably more glamorous) international activities. Self-evidently, many South-

ern and transition-country CSO leaders spend an increasing proportion of their
time at international meetings, and their organizations may shift from a local
and practical to an international advocacy focus. Some Southern and transition-
country regional and national networks are better known in the North than at
home, and may be criticized by local peers as being out of touch. But, without a
doubt, participation in transnational networks can greatly strengthen local
efforts. For example the work of the Development Initiative for Social and
Humanitarian Action (DISHA) in India, analysing government budgets and
advocating pro-poor reforms in public expenditure, has been greatly strength-
ened by its participation in the International Budget Project. Similarly, the
Uganda Debt Network has been strengthened through participating in Jubilee
2000. In both cases, the TCSN has provided a global platform, international
recognition (thereby elevating their status at home), information (which may be
difficult to access locally) and methodological ideas. The benefit is two way:
these NGOs have also greatly strengthened the TCSNs.
North–South differences can be macro-political, due to very different analy-
sis of these issues, or micro-political, concerning the governance, culture, and
leadership of the network. They can also be meso-political, concerning the
structure of civil society. In the North, CSOs tend to be categorized as environ-
mental, human rights, labour or development groups, whereas in most develop-
ing countries these distinctions are unclear, and civil society tends to be divided
into the categories of membership organizations, social movements and NGOs.

CONCLUSIONS
Working transnationally and entering networks with non-traditional allies are
important disciplines for all major CSO categories in order to maximize effective-
ness in influencing policy, shaping public opinion and providing imaginative pro-
grammes and services. But these are difficult challenges for CSOs. The most
pressing policy issues with which they wrestle are horizontal in nature – they spill
over national frontiers and demand global remedies. Yet, like governments, their
structures are generally vertical and are based on national-level organization and
influence. To shift to transnational and horizontal modes of working poses major
challenges to established CSOs. Of these, six challenges are of great importance:

• Adopting the right structure: there are different models, ranging from the glo-
bal, unitary organization to the loosest, informal network. Which model is
most appropriate depends upon the context and relies upon critical balances
between formalizing a global network and retaining flexibility; between glo-
bal coherence and decentralization; between professionalism and volunta-
rism; and between forging a permanent alliance and temporary alliances for
specific purposes.
• Adopting bold policies and implementing them: this requires transnational decision-
making that is inclusive (especially of newer, weaker elements) and effective;
 Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action 27

leadership that is visionary but alert to all voices in the network; and balancing
democracy within the network by ensuring succinct, swift decisions.
• Ensuring North–South harmony: true transnational networking demands
high standards of ethics and respect, or ‘political responsibility’. The divi-
sion of labour between Northern and Southern or transition-country CSOs
needs to be mutually agreed; the former must accept a diminishing role as
Southern and transition-country CSOs become more powerful. Northern
CSOs must reflect hard on whether what they offer is what Southern or
transition-country colleagues want. Drawing them into global activities may
divert them from their domestic and regional priorities, and establishing
offices in Southern or transition countries can undermine indigenous CSOs.
• Defeating the barriers of geography: network leaders must use new technology
creatively to help ensure that far-flung voices are effectively engaged in deliber-
ations; they must help to ensure that all CSOs in the network have access to
this technology; and they must strive to overcome language barriers. Northern
CSOs are often well placed to assist South–South and South–East exchanges.
• Networking should promote internal as well as external reforms: as CSOs
become more powerful internationally, their own governance deficiencies
become Achilles heels. Effective transnational networks should encourage
frank debates about standards of ethics and should exist as forums for peer
review and self-regulation.
• Contributing to international democracy: TCSNs are achieving prominence
today because they enable citizens to have a voice in the transnational deci-
sions of governments and corporations. They also strengthen the account-
ability of inter-governmental organizations and processes. Some argue that
they only offer an interim solution – until new institutions of democracy are
built for the globalized age. Whether temporary or long term, TCSNs are,
in effect, vehicles of democracy and need a greater discipline in order to
demonstrate their own democratic credentials and transnational support
base. This is easier for networks that contain unions and other mass-mem-
bership CSOs when they can demonstrate that they have consulted their
members responsibly in developing their advocacy positions.

The following chapters illustrate how these issues are perceived, addressed or
ignored within a range of important transnational civil society networks.

NOTES
1 Particularly, Oxfam International (OI); Amnesty International (AI); Friends of the
Earth (FOE); the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF); the Lutheran World Fed-
eration; the International Council of Voluntary Agencies; Jubilee 2000; Participa-
tory Research in Asia (PRIA, India); the Latin American Association of Popular
Organizations (ALOP, based in Ecuador); the Caucus of Development NGOs
(CODE-NGO, The Philippines); the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU); Public Service International (PSI); Education International; Union
28 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Network International; the United Religions Initiative; and the World Council of
Churches (WCC); as well as participants in an international seminar on Transnational
Civic Society: Issues of Governance and Organization, London School of Economics,
June 2001.
2 We use the term ‘network’ broadly to include federated organizations such as Amnesty
International, formal networks such as Friends of the Earth International, informal
networks such as Jubilee 2000 and even looser CSO groupings that are the mobilizing
agents within common social movements.
3 Some aspects of network analysis and new approaches in organizational population
ecology are clearly relevant.
4 ‘Southern’ refers to developing countries; ‘transition’ to the countries of the former
Eastern bloc.
5 Manuel Chiriboga’s presentation to the international seminar on Transnational Civil
Society: Issues of Governance and Organization, London School of Economics,
June 2001.
6 See endnote 1.
 Chapter 2

Consumers Unite Internationally

Tasneem Mowjee

This chapter focuses on the international consumer movement – in particular,

Consumers International (CI), founded in 1960 as the International Organization
of Consumers Unions (IOCU).1 CI is an independent non-profit organization
that isn’t aligned with, or supported by, any political party or industry. It supports,
links and represents consumer groups and agencies, and is funded by fees from
member organizations and grants from foundations, governments and multilateral
agencies. In autumn 2000, CI had a membership of 263 consumer organizations
in 119 countries.
This chapter starts with a brief history of consumer groups until the IOCU’s
establishment, and then describes CI’s main objectives, as well as its structure and
governance, including a discussion of membership issues, such as North–South
tensions, and legitimacy questions. It then examines the impact of globalization
and information and communications technology (ICT) on CI and its external
relationships, particularly with businesses, and concludes with some thoughts on
CI’s future developments.

HISTORY2
Although the IOCU was established in 1960, the consumer movement dates
back to the formation of the US Consumers Union (CU) by Colston Warne in
1936 to test products and provide consumers with sound and unbiased informa-
tion in order to inform their choice. It produced Consumer Reports, a magazine
that promoted the concept of independent testing and provided consumers with
information. By 1957, its circulation had grown to 800,000.
As the magazine found its way overseas, people became interested in setting
up similar consumer groups elsewhere. The Consumers Association (CA – first
30 Globalizing Civic Engagement

known as the Association for Consumer Research) was established in the UK in

1956 with the active involvement of Lord Young. Its magazine Which? was first
published in October 1957. By 1959 there were three other consumer groups in
Europe – in The Netherlands, Belgium and France. The Australian Consumers
Association was started the following year.
Sim (1991) attributes this growth in Western consumer organizations to two
factors. Firstly, by the 1950s, mass production and greater affluence had created a
consumer society that urgently wanted objective and useful product information.
A CA interviewee agreed that while businesses were the first to spot global opportu-
nities in the post-war years, the consumer movement was not far behind. Secondly
was the ‘near missionary zeal of the early pioneers of the consumer movement’
(Sim, 1991: 3). Although the groups had little or no capital (depending upon
donations or loans from well-wishers), and were vulnerable to attacks from man-
ufacturers over their product ratings, they persisted and even provided support to
new consumer organizations in other countries. In 1952, CU established a grants
programme focusing mainly on consumer protection efforts in the US, but also
helped small groups abroad.
In early 1958, Elizabeth Schadee, member and then chair of the board of the
Dutch consumer organization, met with Caspar Brook, the first president of the
UK Consumers Association, to discuss joint product testing and how this would
save the organizations money and enable them to present a united front in the
face of potential corporate attacks. They realized that other consumer groups
might want to cooperate and formulated the idea of an international association.
The first step was a conference, in 1960, on product testing for consumers that
was attended by 34 people from 17 organizations in 14 countries. The conference
established an international technical exchange committee to supervise joint test-
ing of products, such as small cars and watches, and founded the IOCU, with a
secretariat in The Hague, whose functions were to:

• undertake comparative testing of consumer products;

• act as a clearing house for information on test programmes and results;
• regulate the use of ratings and reprint materials of member organizations;
• organize international meetings to promote consumer testing; and
• improve communication between member groups, especially via the IOCU
Bulletin.

The IOCU’s name was formally changed to Consumers International in 1994

(although the old name continued to be used for about three years in order to
maintain continuity). There were two main reasons for this change. Firstly, many
considered IOCU a somewhat old-fashioned and cumbersome name and thought
a better one was needed for the 1990s. Secondly, as its membership grew, mem-
bers increasingly felt that the name associated it with trade unions – an inaccurate
representation of its work.
 Consumers Unite Internationally 31

OBJECTIVES
Today, CI’s stated goal is to promote a fairer society by defending the rights of
all consumers, including poor, marginalized and disadvantaged people, by:

• supporting and strengthening member organizations and the consumer

movement in general; and
• campaigning at the international level for policies that respect consumer
concerns.
This section provides an overview of the development of these two objectives.

Supporting the development of consumer organizations

The early IOCU members attached great importance to supporting the develop-
ment of consumer organizations. At its third congress in Oslo in 1964, prompted
by a CA representative, delegates became concerned about Southern consumers.
The congress’s ‘Statement of General Aims’ called upon consumer groups in devel-
oped countries not to overlook the needs of consumers in developing countries.
The congress also adopted various resolutions that led to the establishment of a
working group and fund in order to promote and support Southern consumer
organizations.3
Support for Southern consumer organizations was strengthened when Anwar
Fazal, director of the IOCU’s first Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
(ROAP), became IOCU’s president. He is credited with transforming the IOCU
from a self-help collective to an outward-looking organization concerned with
promoting the consumer movement. Hence, for example, although sharing research
on product testing was one of the IOCU’s main functions when it was set up, it
has not conducted any work on this for 25 years.4
Currently, one reason for CI’s promotion of Southern consumer groups is its
belief that strong national groups and effective international advocacy go together.
In other words, the organization sees its two objectives as closely linked: CI needs
strong national organizations to inform global policy and advocacy. In the case of
a recent study on trade issues, it drew on various national studies of the impact on
consumers of World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements on agriculture and
services. CI also acknowledges that many decisions affecting all countries are not
taken by national governments individually but internationally. It tries, therefore,
to influence international decisions affecting consumers by promoting national
consumer organizations, which can lobby their governments when they are partici-
pating in international decision-making. Furthermore, the power of strong national
consumer organizations, apart from promoting the rights and interests of domestic
consumers, is being able to participate directly in international negotiations.
The support for Southern consumer groups provided by the IOCU’s original
members is still continuing. According to CI’s director-general, the larger and
wealthier Northern consumer organizations do not join CI to buy value-for-money
services but to express commitment to the global consumer movement. For
32 Globalizing Civic Engagement

example, the UK CA’s underlying philosophy is that proceeds from its magazine
should be spent on supporting the consumer interest, generally, in the UK or on
its general advocacy. Therefore, its membership of CI is part of its wider support
for the consumer movement. Other members have expressed their support for
Southern consumer groups more directly. CU in the US and Consumentenbond
in Holland have set up trust funds to support Southern consumer groups
directly. However, during the last decade there has been a shift away from repli-
cating Western-style consumer groups who chiefly undertake publishing work –
now not seen as a Southern priority – and towards greater support for commu-
nity-based work.

International protection and representation5

CI has, thus, been committed to the protection of Southern consumer interests
from its earliest days. In 1968, it amended its constitution (see below) and revised
its objectives with a key aim of representing consumer interests at the interna-
tional level, primarily at the United Nations (UN). This undoubtedly resulted
from the IOCU having received consultative status with the UN Economic and
Social Council in 1963. One early reason for seeking UN links was that the
IOCU thought that Southern consumer groups weren’t strong enough to
undertake effective representation on their own. The UN’s development objec-
tives broadly coincided with the IOCU’s objectives, and the IOCU believed that
the UN had the resources, influence and global reach to promote consumer
interests widely. The IOCU’s first representative at the UN, Persia Campbell,
was an eminent economist as well as a consumer advocate. She put forward the
consumer position on a wide range of issues, from free trade and the problems
caused by multinational corporations to product standards. One early success of
the IOCU’s advocacy work was the inclusion of consumer concerns in the UN’s
Declaration on Social Progress and Development.
During the early 1980s, following a global lobbying effort by CI members,
the UN General Assembly (UN-GA) mandated the creation of a UN List of
Products Banned, Withdrawn or Severely Restricted by Governments. At the time,
it was extremely difficult to find out what pesticides, pharmaceuticals and prod-
ucts were banned in Northern countries for safety reasons. Multinational corpora-
tions took advantage of this by ‘dumping’ such products in developing country
markets. The UN list was then used by consumer groups to remove hazardous
products from sale in countries such as Korea, Ecuador, Brazil and Mexico. In a
number of countries, it also helped to create systems for regulating hazardous
products.6 In April 1985, following ten years of persistent interventions by IOCU
representatives, the UN-GA adopted the most significant UN document on
consumer protection, the UN Guidelines on Consumer Protection. This was despite
fierce opposition from international corporations and even some industrialized
countries, such as the US.
With the UN guidelines as a starting point, CI has developed Model Con-
sumer Protection Laws in Latin America, the South Pacific and Africa. The need
for consumer laws is now recognized globally. Promoted by national consumer
 Consumers Unite Internationally 33

groups and CI’s regional offices, these model laws have been used as the basis for
national legislation in many countries. Most recently, several countries in Africa
and Latin America have introduced legislation following stakeholder meetings
promoted by CI.7
CI’s current director-general noted that it would be impossible to get the
UN to adopt statements like the UN guidelines now, but that these documents
established the foundation for CI’s campaigning during the 1990s.
In addition to the UN guidelines, CI’s work is guided by the Bill of Consum-
ers’ Rights. This emerged due to the political lobbying of US President Kennedy.
The president then made a historic speech to the US Congress on 15 March
1962. He argued that consumer rights were not distinct from human rights and
listed four basic rights. Subsequently, the consumer movement, after internal
debate, added four more. Together, these are the rights to:

• satisfaction of basic needs;

• safety and protection against hazardous products and processes;
• be informed and make informed choices;
• choose between a variety of products and services;
• be heard in the making and execution of policies;
• fair settlement of just claims;
• consumer education in order to acquire skills and knowledge to become an
informed and responsible consumer; and
• live in a healthy and sustainable environment.

In particular, the first and last of these emerged from Southern concerns and
reflected a widening of the consumer agenda. The Bill of Consumer Rights is dif-
ferent from the UN guidelines in that it has not been validated externally – it is
not something to which governments have agreed. However, it acts as an implicit
backdrop to the guidelines, addressing what governments need to do to ensure
that consumers enjoy these rights.
Although CI’s two main objectives have not changed significantly in recent
years, there have been changes in the specific issues that it addresses and in its pol-
icy positions, largely due to changes in trade rules. For example, CI’s stance on
trade negotiations emphasized trade liberalization during the 1960s and 1970s,
when it was heavily dominated by a small number of US and European organiza-
tions. But CI is now far more cautious about liberalization and it seeks to ensure
that it is in the consumer’s interest. This shift has been difficult for some members
whose national consumers perceive it as a restraint on the open market.

STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE

Most CI members are independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
About a quarter are from government agencies, standards bodies and other pub-
lic interest groups involved in consumer affairs. CI has three types of members:
full, affiliate and government affiliate. Both full and affiliate members must act
34 Globalizing Civic Engagement

exclusively on behalf of the interests of the consumer and be unconcerned with

commercial activities. A full member, however, must meet additional criteria. It
must not:

• be connected in any way with commercial or trading ventures;

• advance party political causes;
• accept advertisements in its publications;
• be profit-making; and
• be influenced or restricted by any subsidies that it receives.

A government affiliate is a government department, regulatory authority or anti-

trust agency, which is part of a government’s machinery. It must support and
complement independent CI members, be active on behalf of consumer interests
and be unconcerned with the advancement of commercial activities.
CI has a democratic structure in that full members have voting rights. These
rights are exercised for two principal purposes. One is to endorse, amend or add
issues to CI’s strategic policy statement. This statement, covering a wide range of
issues, is made at the World Congress, a three-yearly meeting of all CI members.
The other purpose is to elect the council, CI’s governing body, also during the
World Congress. The council was, at the outset, the IOCU’s sole governing body
and not elected by the general membership; but in 1968 the constitution was
changed. Although the council remained the governing body and IOCU founding
members retained the right to be represented on it, the majority of its members
would now be elected by a general assembly, comprising IOCU’s voting members.
Thus, the balance of authority shifted from the council to the voting members.
The general assembly also elects the president during the congress and adopts res-
olutions. The council meets once a year and, in turn, appoints an eight-member
executive committee, which meets every six months. The executive plays a very
direct role in policy development, selecting external partners and strategic planning.
The secretariat submits work plans to each executive meeting. CI’s president also
plays an active role in supervising and directing the organization.
Once the executive has set the strategic direction, CI’s staff worldwide are
responsible for implementing programmes. But the membership is also directly
and actively involved. Most CI delegations to international meetings comprise
members, either partly or entirely. So, both staff and members undertake its
advocacy work. Members are also engaged in campaigns and advocacy work with
their own governments. Finally, externally funded CI programmes all involve
some member participation.
As highlighted in Table 2.1, CI has established regional offices for Asia/
Pacific (ROAP), Latin America and Africa, and an office for developed and tran-
sition economy countries. From its inception, ROAP has undertaken a wide
range of innovative activities and coordinated global campaigns on the export of
hazardous products and pharmaceuticals. Sim (1991) attributes its success to
two main factors:
 Consumers Unite Internationally 35

Table 2.1 Key dates in the development of IOCU/Consumers International

1960 International Organization of Consumer Unions founded; secretariat in The Hague

1974 Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) established in Singapore; later
moved to Penang
1986 Regional Office for Latin America established in Montevideo
1989 Head Office and Regional Office for Europe/North America established in The
Hague
1992 Regional Office for Latin America relocated to Santiago
1993 Head Office and Regional Office for Europe/North America relocated in London
1994 Name change from IOCU to CI formally approved
Regional Office for Africa established in Harare, and Programme for West and
Central Africa in Dakar
1999 Creation of Office for Developed and Transition Economies in London
2000 ROAP relocated to Kuala Lumpur
Source: adapted from CI’s website: www.consumersinternational.org

• support (in the form of human resources, as well as testing) from several
IOCU members; and
• significant income from development aid.

A CA interviewee also attributed its success to the vision and activities of its first
regional director, Anwar Fazal.
All regions are represented on both the council and executive committee. CI
has about 75 staff members around the world reporting to the council and execu-
tive through the director-general. The bulk of CI’s staff are based in the regional
offices, since these are pivotal to the various CI priorities and enable CI to stay
in touch with its members. For example, each office has a team who works on
the trade agenda. At a practical level, the team is better equipped to deal with
members in local languages and enables CI to adjust to the cultural, economic
and philosophical differences in approaches in different parts of the world. CI
has a directors’ team, comprising the regional directors, who must collectively
agree on CI’s strategy.

Income
When the IOCU was founded in 1960, it had a budget of UK£5000, with CU
providing UK£2000 and the other four members of the original council each con-
tributing 1 per cent of their budgets. Other members paid UK£50 each. Today,
CI has an annual turnover of approximately UK£3 million. About one third of
this comes from fees, as members contribute a percentage of their income. The
rest comprises grants from governments, multilateral agencies, NGOs, trusts and
foundations. This represents a considerable change in income sources. About six
years ago, the proportions were the reverse, with two-thirds of income from
36 Globalizing Civic Engagement

members. According to the director-general, this is merely a reflection of ‘the

reality that the growth in the consumer movement has come from new and
small organizations’ so that CI has needed to find other sources of funding.

MEMBERSHIP: NORTH–SOUTH RELATIONS

CI has seen an explosive growth in its membership during the last 15 years, from
about 110–115 to around 260 members. As mentioned, CI’s work is very much
driven by members – based on building consensus on policy issues across a wide
spectrum of views from different countries. CI sees itself as operating differently
from most international NGOs because of this. It believes that this is positive and
adds to CI’s authority. However, it also means that the organization is ‘much less
light on its feet’. One member, the UK CA, acknowledges that it is not easy for
CI to operate by consensus. Many new members are small and lack resources,
although they are perceived as highly relevant. While CI is clearly keen on provid-
ing forums for members to provide input, it is difficult for it to respond to the
many diverse issues that members raise. Furthermore, there is sometimes a ten-
sion between the need to ‘do deals’ in international negotiations and to stay
within the mandate from members. This is not difficult in areas such as standard
making. Here there is an established cycle of meetings, it is clear what will be
discussed, and papers can be circulated in advance. But in other situations, issues
surface on the agenda more quickly and, in the middle of negotiations, CI repre-
sentatives may have to come back and check the position with the president.
There is a trade-off between being more responsive and speaking with the force of
CI membership. This generates tension between members who want CI to be ‘out
there, making statements’ and those who want the secretariat to check all positions
with them. Therefore, when the US president announced the imposition of high
tariffs on imported steel early in 2002, although the matter was fairly straightfor-
ward, CI had to be very careful not to make a strong statement without referring
back to its members because it did not have an existing policy on the issue.
The difficulty of this balancing act has led the CI secretariat to be criticized
for excessive emphasis on consensus building. The head of one CI member
argued that, like a good conductor, CI should be able to bring forward divergent,
heterogeneous viewpoints, but also be bold enough to refrain from taking a posi-
tion on an issue where there is no consensus. He maintained that CI’s inability to
provide leadership and convey the diversity of members’ views with clarity and
cogency had weakened members’ ability to come together on the WTO issue.
However, this may also be because the WTO and international issues are not a
priority for all members. Certainly, the Consumers Association of Penang (CAP)
claimed that it was not active in CI since its focus was on national issues, not the
international matters on which CI works. But trade is a small part of the agenda
of even some large members such as the CA.
 Consumers Unite Internationally 37

North–South relations
The substantial increase in CI’s membership has largely comprised small groups
from developing and transition countries, leading to some changes in the nature
of the network. According to CI’s director-general, the parallel availability of
technology has allowed for a policy-making process that includes the views of
Southern members on global issues such as trade, with the result that CI’s position
is not dominated by Northern members and that some policy positions have been
changed. Furthermore, CI has deliberately adopted a strategy of bringing Northern
and Southern members together to influence global institutions, increasing its
authority and leading to a cultural shift in the consumer movement’s representation.
CI members, like the UK’s CA, believe that larger members do not have a
disproportionate influence. They argue that, for example, the general statement
made at CI’s last World Congress in South Africa in 2000 was genuinely demo-
cratically discussed and ‘embodies some good values’. However, others acknowl-
edge a tension in the relationship between members from developed, developing
and transition countries. One reason for this is that the IOCU’s original constitu-
tion provided for permanent seats for the five founding members on the executive
committee (rather like the UN’s Security Council). Although these members
have relinquished this privilege, Southern members believe that they will always,
in practice, dominate the executive committee. This contributes to a sense of
inferiority amongst Southern members, while also potentially reducing the level
of fresh blood and ideas within the committee.
Also, as CI’s director-general pointed out, using the example of the bill of eight
consumer rights, while Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries pursue the ‘choice’ agenda, in developing countries ‘the empha-
sis is very, very strongly on access to basic needs’. Many of these organizations
deliberately choose not to work on the issues that affect the mass consumer. So,
there is a clear difference in the focus of these groups, both economically and
socially. Even when groups from both sets of countries work on the same issue,
there may be different emphases. For example, while food has always been on CI’s
agenda, in many developing countries, food security and access is more important
than safety. The head of the Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS), a South-
ern member of CI, supported this, arguing that the main task of Northern groups,
particularly in the US, is to promote consumption – hence, 4 million copies of
Consumer Reports are sold every year. Until recently, Northern members were
largely unaware of the issues of importance to the South.
Another problem is the different access to resources and ICT in the North
and South. One interviewee argued that, realistically, Southern members can con-
tribute little in fees. While Northern groups get their revenue from the sale of
magazines, Southern groups obtain their income mainly from donations (with
little coming from members). Since CI members are not allowed to take advertis-
ing from businesses in their magazines, to avoid compromising their independent
position, income sources for Southern consumer groups are further restricted
(although some – for example, in India – survive on advertising from public-owned
38 Globalizing Civic Engagement

companies). Nevertheless, as discussed below, CI gains its credibility as a global

federation because of widespread Southern membership.
Despite these obvious differences, CI members from the North and South
have maintained that, on trade issues at least, the main division in CI is between
reformist and radical organizations, rather than between groups from North and
South. Hence, at least two Southern members, CAP and CUTS, take very differ-
ent approaches on trade globalization. This is discussed further in the section on
the impact of globalization.

LEGITIMACY
All interviewees agreed that CI’s legitimacy and authority to speak on consumer
issues came, first and foremost, from the diversity of its membership. A CA staff
member noted that CI is connected to ‘a huge number of grassroots organiza-
tions’. It can play an important role in representing these groups internationally
because ‘governments are craving grassroots participation’, although they then
make this difficult by holding international meetings in places such as Rome and
Geneva, which are difficult for small groups to access. Despite the large numbers,
though, CI has maintained strict governance rules for member organizations
(regarding sources of income, for example). Members such as CA believe that
this further strengthens CI’s reputation as a legitimate organization.
Furthermore, the CI secretariat believes that the extensive participation of
members in its policy-formulation, advocacy and decision-making gives it a stron-
ger claim to legitimacy than many other NGOs. In addition, CI’s ability to convene
groups with a common agenda, cutting across geography, economics and social
development – through its consensus approach – means that it is able to project a
coherent message, ensuring that the voices of consumers are heard.
CI is also the only international body representing consumer interests. As the
head of CUTS pointed out, while there are a number of global bodies such as the
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Friends of the Earth (FOE) in the
environment movement, there are no challengers of CI in the global consumer
movement.

THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION AND ICT

The 1980s are…a period during which the movement has become
really global, being able to give an effective multinational response to
multinational issues (speech by Anwar Fazal, president of the IOCU,
at the 29th Annual Conference of the American Council of Consumer
Interests, Kansas City, 16–19 March 1983; cited in Sim, 1991).

Although interviewees did not believe that globalization was a new phenomenon,
they acknowledged that the development of the WTO during the 1990s had
raised new issues for the consumer movement. CI’s director-general argued that
 Consumers Unite Internationally 39

the trade agenda ‘spills over into everything’, including traditional CI issues such
as food safety standards. Therefore, CI has to re-examine these ‘because the
[WTO] rules now impinge on any kind of regulation that national governments
introduce. So, an overarching theme has emerged which, ten years ago, wasn’t
there in the same way, affecting practical things like international standards.’
Some of the new issues emerging include e-commerce and genetically modified
organisms (GMOs).
It is also interesting that some of the tension between members described
earlier stems from the difference in viewpoints regarding the WTO. As the head
of one CI member pointed out, there is no debate or controversy about promot-
ing the basic needs of consumers or their right to be represented at international
levels. However, it is different with economic issues. As noted above, two CI
Southern members have very different perceptions of the implications of trade
liberalization. The head of CUTS maintains that globalization itself is not new
but something that is inevitable, so ‘we need to make the best of it’ rather than
adopting a ‘futile’ anti-globalization stance. Therefore, CUTS has worked to bet-
ter inform other organizations about the issue and advocate government responsi-
bility for domestic policies. For example, it has produced a booklet on the Myths
and Realities of Globalisation and provided seminars and training to other con-
sumer organizations, NGOs, the media and academia. CAP, on the other hand,
believes that trade liberalization has proved to be nothing but problematic in
Malaysia. According to a senior staff member, it has resulted in the promotion of
excessive consumption and a credit culture through advertising and the develop-
ment of shopping malls. CAP perceives the growing dependence on credit as a
serious problem that is imbedding itself within Malaysian culture.
Although interviewees did not see globalization as a new phenomenon, as
reflected in Anwar Fazal’s speech, CI feels that the consumer movement itself
has become global. A staff member argued that ‘because of the word “con-
sumer”’, the movement is perceived as Northern. However, CI has always
believed that it is important that the consumer voice is heard in countries where
citizen voice is problematic; hence, it promotes measures to improve democracy
through participation. CI’s structure of regional offices also reflects the global
nature of the movement. For example, the Latin American consumer movement
initiated the development of CI’s Latin America office, without intervention by
the North. Another example of how consumer issues have become global is the
current development of consumer protection legislation in several African coun-
tries where such legislation never previously existed. This has emerged partly due
to CI’s work on the issue and partly because the governments concerned recog-
nize that it is an important part of the legal framework for market economies
and for development. Thus, the need to protect consumer rights has become
accepted far beyond Northern consumers’ rights to exercise personal choice.
In addition to geographical growth, there has been a change in the nature of
consumer organizations. Some, particularly in the North, are increasingly con-
cerned with ethical issues, leading to a change in emphasis, and some are now
more activist in their approach, partly because of the influence of Southern
40 Globalizing Civic Engagement

members. Unlike Northern consumer groups, these were not set up as information
providers and sellers of consumer services but grew out of community action,
with a focus on basic rights and opportunities. As a result, they tend to be activist.
However, some Northern members have also become more activist in their
market interventions. The UK CA is a good example. In the past, it relied largely
on influencing the market-place by providing information to consumers in order
to inform their individual choices (although it also worked with the government
on regulation). Recently, though, it has undertaken more direct action on car
prices, introduced its own credit card and become a very successful internet ser-
vice provider. Similarly, Belgian consumer groups have launched their own home
insurance services, resulting from a research project that concluded that consumers
don’t have adequate policies available to them. They then wrote a set of criteria
for what a policy should cover and wrote to insurance companies to ask if they
were prepared to offer such a policy at a good price. They now actively promote
these policies. Such actions are a way of using the power of membership to launch
a market-leading product that will influence the way in which the market operates.
According to a CA staff member, this is a necessary shift in its mode of operation,
not only to ensure that the organization remains relevant to members, but because
the previous tools for influencing the market no longer work. In addition, the
organization has realized that it was punching below its weight in bringing about
changes that are beneficial to consumers. The success of its campaign on car prices
showed that it is more powerful than it thought.
Despite such successes, there is a sense, within CA at least, that NGOs are not
always influential on international trade issues. According to one interviewee,
they may have been emboldened by the perception of their success at the WTO
ministerial negotiations in Seattle, however this is an illusion and Seattle was not
the watershed that people assume.
Another change affecting the way in which CI works has been the advent ICT.
Most interviewees believed that cheaper communication made networking easier.
A CA staff member felt that consumer groups would be genuinely empowered as
the cost of global communication fell sharply. The CI director-general stated that
he would ‘subscribe to the view that technology has transformed the way that
NGOs operate [and] engage in advocacy’, and influence international decision-
making. As noted above, CI has a consensus-building approach to decision-making.
Therefore, it has found the use of discussion listservs, the first of which was started
at the end of 2001, very helpful because they speed up the process and make it
more transparent, since everyone can see what has been said. It is also more effi-
cient to distribute documents electronically because the method is quicker and
more reliable than the post.
However, there have been some difficulties with new technology. Firstly,
there are barriers to access. Initially, there was a danger that only some Northern
members would be able to use the technology; but CI has been very careful to
ensure that all members have access before making extensive use of it (this
includes a programme in Africa to equip all member organizations with ICT).
Still, it is extremely expensive to access the internet in Africa, and there are places
 Consumers Unite Internationally 41

where the electricity supply frequently breaks down. Secondly, language is a dif-
ficult problem to overcome, particularly when dealing with lengthy documents.
Thirdly, it is difficult to cope with the volume of information. CI staff accepted
that information overload in international advocacy is not a new problem, espe-
cially in areas such as food standards where there has traditionally been much
consultation. However, the amount of correspondence generated through the
use of ICT is greater as people tend to contribute more than before. Finally, ICT
makes it possible for people with strong views to disrupt the process of consulta-
tion and discussion with aggressive and often ‘rather futile interventions’ that
‘put other people off’ and allow them to dominate the debate. Despite these dif-
ficulties, most CI members have strongly supported the use of ICT. Therefore,
CI is considering increasing its use of ICT and providing a members-only area
on the website.
Not all CI members are equally enthusiastic about ICT, however. For example,
although CAP has a website, it is not very active. It uses the internet largely to
download publications and information from other websites. CAP believes that
‘there is too much hype about ICT. There is an illusion that change and trans-
formation can be brought about through ICT and without mobilizing human
beings.’ While ICT has made it is easier to contact people around Malaysia in
order to give initial information and for national campaigns, CAP has found
that personal visits and discussions are crucial for mobilization.

NETWORKING AND PARTNERSHIP

CI has built partnerships with organizations outside of its structure ‘on a prag-
matic and flexible basis’ when it believes that there is a common agenda, that will
further the cause, and especially if it feels ‘comfortable’ with the organizations.
Often, these partnerships or alliances are built on an ad-hoc basis – for example,
at WTO ministerial meetings when groups tend to devise propositions and
events that are designed to get press attention. CI often has to decide whether to
join or not, and whether this would be consistent with its policy. Such alliances
are, by their nature, short term and temporary. On a longer-term basis, CI works
with groups such as the UK Trade Network, comprising highly influential NGOs,
in order to keep up to date on various issues. Another example where CI has
tried to build a coalition with other NGOs, business and academics is the World
Economic Forum’s agricultural task force.
CI builds alliances and coalitions because, individually, civil society organiza-
tions (CSOs) are limited in their effectiveness at the international level. Like other
CSOs, it constantly thinks about how to use alliances more effectively and to
which alliances it should formally commit itself, recognizing, from experience,
that wide-ranging NGO caucuses are difficult to maintain. As the director-general
jokingly pointed out, it is sometimes difficult enough to build consensus within
CI’s own membership! Therefore, CI has generally felt more comfortable in
associations where there are specific objectives, such as Jubilee 2000. CI’s overall
42 Globalizing Civic Engagement

strategy is to make selective agreements with organizations whom it knows and

who have sufficient authority and resources to have an impact.
In addition to joining alliances and coalitions, the organization has fostered
the development of specialist networks that are now well-known international
organizations in their own right. These are:

• the International Baby Foods Action Network (IBFAN), established in October

1979 in Geneva in response to concerns about the promotion of infant formula
in developing countries;
• Health Action International (HAI), formed in May 1981 in Geneva to cam-
paign for safe, affordable medicines following the IOCU’s early work on the
drug clioquinol, which was found to have serious side effects; and
• the Pesticides Action Network, set up in June 1982 in Penang ‘to halt the
worldwide proliferation of hazardous chemical pesticides’ (Sim 1991: 116).

Hosting what one interviewee described as ‘a whole wave of citizens’ move-

ments’ was a critical aspect of the IOCU’s work at the time. This is because they
enabled IOCU to move away from being an inward-looking organization, con-
cerned with meeting members’ needs, to one linking consumer interests to a far
larger agenda for creating a better world. As the interviewee pointed out, there
was a quantum leap in the concept of a consumer from that of ‘user’ to ‘maker’ –
one who shapes the world through the things they buy or use or, perhaps more
importantly, through the things they don’t buy or use. With the accompanying
widening of the concept of consumer protection to encompass a struggle for
human rights and development justice, the IOCU accepted a leadership role on a
whole range of issues, including environment and health. While many other
NGOs were single-issue organizations, the IOCU had a more holistic agenda
and, through these networks, could convene a wide range of groups. However, as
the networks grew and the IOCU chose to focus more on its own growing
agenda, it encouraged them to become independent. Recently, these networks
have represented CI in some campaigns, where the organizations involved work
very specifically on a particular issue. For example, HAI has been active in the
campaign for reducing the price of HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries,
and HAI and IBFAN have represented CI at the World Health Organization
(WHO).
Apart from other CSOs, CI has various dealings with business organizations
since they have a strong voice on all of the issues on which CI works. Occasionally,
it debates policy issues with businesses, particularly in international forums such
as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, which sends repre-
sentatives to the same international meetings as CI. Sometimes, on issues such as
agreements on the regulatory framework for electronic commerce, CI may agree
with the business community on what is appropriate. In some cases, CI operates
in parallel with the business world. For example, it has a secretariat for the Trans-
Atlantic Consumer Dialogue, set up to parallel the Trans-Atlantic Business Dia-
logue that puts policy propositions to the US and the European Union (EU).
 Consumers Unite Internationally 43

The Consumer Dialogue ensures that the consumer viewpoint is also conveyed on
trade and regulatory issues and in the discussions in which businesses are engag-
ing. But CI is also wary of business organizations, seeing them as predominantly
self-interested, not interested in the public welfare and usually approaching issues
from an opposite perspective. CI is very cautious about financial associations, in
particular, as it is conscious of a history of CSOs being variously coopted by the
business community.
CI members also have a range of relationships with the business community. For
example, CUTS has engaged with chambers of commerce – such as the Federation
of Indian Chambers of Commerce and the International Chamber of Commerce
in Paris – on policy issues. It also has a seat on the National Advisory Committee
on International Trade at the Indian Ministry of Commerce. Here, CUTS often
has common positions with business organizations, particularly regarding the
WTO. While the Indian government is often opposed to new WTO-related
proposals, CUTS and the business community have a different view. Despite
such common positions, relations with the business community can be frustrating
for CUTS because it has more radical ideas and is prepared to annoy the ministry
of commerce (which business federations avoid).
Other Southern consumer groups have had a far more antagonistic relation-
ship with companies. Two CA interviewees highlighted the fact that these groups
operate in a far more difficult and dangerous environment than Northern groups.
Not only can they face intimidation and the threat of imprisonment due to their
activities, but those exposing the illegal or dangerous activities of companies also
risk their lives. They gave the example of Thai consumer activists who were
machine-gunned when they uncovered the sale of unregulated pharmaceuticals in
Phuket. It is not surprising, therefore, if such groups are far more suspicious of,
and hostile to, business.
CA itself has a broader range of relationships with commercial organizations.
On the one hand, it has worked with them to provide special deals and specific
e-commerce services – while many CI members regarded such commercial activ-
ities with horror, some have adopted them. On the other hand, CA has been
active to prevent anti-competitive behaviour. In this, some businesses have shared
its position on the restrictions of business activities. Although these two sets of
activities make CA appear schizophrenic regarding business organizations, one
staff member argued that it has to both engage with and criticize them. He main-
tained that CA’s focus is on the outcome that it can achieve through a particular
relationship rather than on adopting a particular posture.

CONCLUSION: FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

With its widespread membership and its active representation of the consumer
voice at an international level, CI is an influential organization. According to one
CA staff member who was a council member a few years ago, CI has been the
most influential neutral NGO on a range of issues, such as the marketing of baby
44 Globalizing Civic Engagement

milk, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) rules of restrictive

business practices and the UN’s Codex Alimentarius. Its regional structure enables
it to be responsive to local situations, while forming the basis for international
advocacy. Interviewees from CI member organizations felt that the World Con-
gresses provide a valuable opportunity for the consumer movement to come
together and debate critical issues. Although its consensus-building approach has
been criticized and it is clearly difficult for the secretariat to balance the oppos-
ing views of members on controversial issues such as the WTO, the secretariat is
committed to this approach because of the authority it lends CI when it does
make statements.
According to CI’s director-general, the organization is likely to see two main
developments in the future. One will be a bolder stance in international cam-
paigning. This will involve making more substantial use of national members since
CI has already done the necessary capacity-building work with these organiza-
tions. The second will be to seek a higher profile in the way that it campaigns – in
particular, by building new but carefully selected alliances on important issues.
Although some members believe that CI can play a decisive role because of its
uniqueness, the secretariat believes that, acting alone, its influence on the world
is marginal. Finally, CI will also be exploring how to make greater use of tech-
nology to promote its campaigning.

NOTES
1 The name change from IOCU to Consumers International was formally approved
in 1994. Therefore, when referring specifically to the work of the organization prior
to 1994, this chapter refers to it as the IOCU.
2 This section is based on Sim (1991).
3 Based on Sim (1991).
4 According to a CA interviewee, the IOCU undertook testing because this was what
all its founding members did, and this was assumed to be the appropriate model for
an international consumer organization. However, it was recognized quite early on
that markets are very different, particularly in developing countries; so, it is neither
cost-effective nor useful for a worldwide federation of consumer groups to under-
take testing. Instead, there was agreement amongst members that the IOCU’s
unique selling point was its ability to focus on overarching issues and to support
forums that bring members together. Therefore, testing work is now carried out by a
separate organization, International Consumer Research and Testing (ICRT), based
in London. Although many of CI’s members belong to this as well, according to CI’s
director-general, this is for ‘hard-nosed’ commercial reasons. They pay a member-
ship fee to ICRT and participate in it in order to save money through the sharing of
test results amongst a lot of countries.
5 The historical description of the IOCU’s relationship with the UN is drawn from
Sim (1991).
6 Based on information on CI’s website: www.consumersinternational.org.
7 Described on CI’s website: www.consumersinternational.org.
 Chapter 3

Trade Unions in a Changing World:

Challenges and Opportunities of
Transnationalization

Diego Muro and Nuno Themudo

The world’s trade union movement is now in the greatest fight of its
life. We are in a struggle against a globalization that has no place for
the principles, values and standards we have fought for and established
over the last 200 years… Our job is to become…more effective players
in globalization. We must challenge its ideology, fight for democratic
governance of the global economy and curb the power and greed of
multinationals (Bill Jordan, ICFTU general secretary, 2000).

Trade unions live in contradictory times. Alongside other movements, trade

unions have been effective in raising awareness about ‘unfair globalization’ (Tar-
row, 2002). At the same time, the World Bank and other international institu-
tions are opening up to lobbying by unions since they are important civil society
actors representing the interests of a large membership (O’Brien et al, 2000). Yet,
this increased international prominence coincides with declining membership in
most industrialized countries. Aware of this downward trend, many leaders in the
trade union movement have urged restructuring it in order to consolidate its cur-
rent political clout and reverse membership decline. This chapter explores current
challenges facing the union movement, with an emphasis on challenges brought
about by accelerating globalization. Partly as a consequence of ‘globalization’,
unions are increasingly experiencing a need to transnationalize the movement,
which in turn brings about challenges and opportunities. In particular, this
chapter focuses on the Millennium Review, managed by the International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), as a strategic effort to deal with those
46 Globalizing Civic Engagement

challenges and, therefore, to become a stronger player in an emerging system of

global governance.

A CHANGING WORLD AND

THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION CHALLENGE

Trade union membership has been in decline for approximately 30 years. A recent
study of the International Labour Organization (ILO) points out that during these
years union membership has suffered a decline of 35.9 per cent in Central and
Eastern Europe, 19.4 per cent in Oceania, 19.0 per cent in Central America and
15.6 per cent in Western Europe (Gordon and Turner, 2000: 5). The decline is
particularly acute in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries, who have experienced the sharpest fall. In four G7 countries
(US, UK, Japan and Germany) union membership has fallen 30 per cent since
1980 (ICFTU, 2001). Figure 3.1 plots the recent decline in the UK. Similarly,
strike action has been falling in the same period, as shown in Figure 3.2.
The situation is dramatic compared to unions’ ‘golden age’ in the aftermath of
World War II. In the post-war settlement, unions were key players in the compromise
between labour and capital that drove economic growth and social improvement. By
the 1950s and 1960s, the unions of Europe, North America and the Pacific region
represented between one third and two-thirds of all workers (Western, 1997: 143).
However, since the 1970s various factors have weakened unionism, which has
often translated into worsening conditions for workers worldwide. US research,
for example, shows that de-unionization means lower wages (Rifkin, 1995: 168).
The causes for weakening unionization include at least five factors. Firstly,
increased competition worldwide forced OECD countries to reorganize production
from manufacturing (with strong unionism) to services (with weak unionism).
Privatization also contributed to a decline in membership (Western, 1997). In
the UK, for example, 60 per cent of public-sector workers are unionized, but just
19 per cent in the private sector.

Figure 3.1 UK trade union membership as a percentage of total work force

(1985–1999)
 Trade Unions in a Changing World 47

Figure 3.2 Strike action in the UK (1965–1999)

Secondly, with the growth of post-industrialism, unions’ traditional constituen-

cies have declined. They have traditionally represented full-time, formal-sector
workers with open-ended contracts for which they bargained to provide optimal
working conditions. The changing economy has increasingly incorporated women,
youth and immigrants into the workplace, often on a temporary or part-time
basis. Unions have not been well placed to represent the interests of these constit-
uencies, especially informal sector workers (Castells, 1996).
Thirdly, unions lost some major battles during the 1980s when governments
hostile to unions were in power. In the UK, Thatcher’s Conservative government
put in place a legal framework that reduced the ability of unions to coordinate.
The UK union umbrella – the Trades Union Congress – now represents just 7.8
million workers (around 30 per cent of the work force), 5 million less than in
1980 (Brook, 2002).
Fourthly, unions, like political parties, suffer from the weakening of main-
stream political processes. New forms of political participation, such as non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements, have attracted new
recruits who, traditionally, may have joined unions. The decline is particularly
pronounced among young workers. In 1983, in the UK, 44 per cent of 18- to
29-year-old workers were union members and 57 per cent in the 40-plus age
group, but the comparable figures fell to 18 and 33 per cent respectively by 1998.
Fifthly, capital is increasingly global while most labour remains stubbornly
national or regional (Moody, 1997). As a result, bargaining with employers has
become tougher. At the first sign of collective struggle by workers, employers can
shift production elsewhere where unions are weaker, wages lower and working
conditions are worse. Unions have, therefore, lost leverage, are keener to forge
‘partnership’ agreements with employers and are more reluctant to press their
demands aggressively for fear of job losses.
48 Globalizing Civic Engagement

The media and academics often portray these trends as features of ‘globaliza-
tion’. But unions are affected by ‘new’ as well as ‘old’ problems – such as the global
nature of capital. Describing the decline of unionism as the result of globalization
masks the fact that the picture is far from uniform. Many countries undergoing
strong ‘globalization’ have not experienced union decline. In Europe, for example,
the membership has remained stable in countries where unions were integrated
as social partners within state administration, particularly Belgium and the Scan-
dinavian countries. In South Africa, the rise of the national liberation movement
and the demise of the apartheid regime has triggered membership affiliation,
which rose from 39.3 per cent in 1988 to 58.4 per cent in 1993 (ILO, 2002).
Brazil, China, India and Malaysia have also seen union growth. There is a need,
therefore, to unpack the various processes loosely described as globalization or
global change in order to understand their influence upon the union sector and
the challenges that they create. They have brought threats but also new opportu-
nities, including cheapness of travel, e-mail, the internet, the establishment of
English as a lingua franca and the erosion of boundaries in general (see Chapter 1).
The development of international institutions and international rules and norms
have also facilitated the formation of transnational social movements (Tarrow,
undated), and the end of the Cold War has facilitated a rapprochement between
formerly antagonistic groups of nations.

A changing trade union movement: the transnationalization

challenge
In historical terms, trade unionism is entering a new era. During the 19th century,
workers joined together in local factories to confront the power of industrialists. As
capital expanded to new boundaries, so did unions. In recent decades, capitalism
has finally expanded at a global level and has brought with it a new series of out-
comes that transcend national borders.
Unions now operate in a more international arena. As the power of states
diminishes, and as transnational corporations (TNCs) and international institutions
become more powerful shapers of working conditions and labour-market policy,
unions must engage with these actors. To influence TNCs, unions must ensure
collaboration across countries where the employer works. This implies not only
enhanced communications between national unions, but also decision-making
structures capable of signing global agreements and organizing coordinated protests
and strikes. In dealing with international institutions, especially the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO),
the unions use advocacy to shape labour-market policies at the international level.
In addressing wider social issues, unions are increasingly finding common
cause with advocacy NGOs and other social movements. They are shifting from a
‘partnership with management’ to ‘partnership with the poor’ (Moody, 1997).
In cooperating with NGOs, unions have incorporated new issues in their
agenda, such as development and human rights – for example, in campaigns
against child labour in which unions simultaneously protect children and their
members who face possible job loss to child workers.
 Trade Unions in a Changing World 49

Box 3.1 The international union movement

The pioneers of international cooperation were the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) –
world confederations of unions, uniting workers based on industry, craft or occupation.
The first was founded in 1889, and by 1914 33 ITSs had been established. In ensuing years
many of these confederations sought to enhance their power and reduce transaction costs
through merges. By 2002 there were just ten ITSs, and at this point they decided to call
themselves Global Union Federations (GUFs). Together with the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) they founded the Global Unions platform, which aims to
create a central point for the international union movement.

The ICFTU is the largest international umbrella of unions. Based in Brussels, it now represents
157 million members from 148 countries, and has three regional organizations: Asia/Pacific,
Africa and the Americas. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall the ICFTU has become the largest
and most powerful group of unions in the world. During the last decade it has managed to
attract unions from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and developing countries; hence, its
membership is now double its 1982 level. The ICFTU also has very close links with the
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee
(TUAC) to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Most CEE unions who joined the ICFTU formerly belonged to the World Federation of
Trade Unions (WFTU). During the Cold War, the union community was divided along
ideological lines – a Soviet-dominated WFTU and a Western-dominated ICFTU. Today, the
WFTU has withered to a marginal organization based in Prague. It retains active affiliates in
India, Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba and various other countries, and has good relations
with a number of smaller Asian and South American federations.

A third umbrella of unions is the World Confederation of Labour (WCL), representing over
26 million members, mainly from developing world countries, but also Western Europe –
particularly where Christian or humanist traditions are strong. Its membership remains
quite stable.

Finally, the Commonwealth Trade Union Congress links union national centres, represent-
ing over 30 million union members. Its London headquarters lobbies Commonwealth
institutions.

To adjust to a changing world, the union movement must make organizational

changes in order to remain relevant and effective. In an increasingly interdependent
world, the union movement must coordinate its members at international level
in order to defend their interests. As a union activist points out:

The challenge we face is that of bringing our policies and principles

together into a coherent whole, based on justice for the workers and the
poor. We face the challenge of articulating and proclaiming a powerful
alternative to the so-called Washington consensus. Globalization requires
global unionism (Madisha, 2000).

Current global economic trends force unions to search for a ‘cohesive global voice’.
To deal with increasingly transnational capital, labour must also act transnation-
ally. Cooperation between diverse unions is difficult due to structure, ideology,
50 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Box 3.2 First International: workers of the world unite!

The first initiative to create a ‘global voice’ came from Karl Marx himself. At the end of the
19th century, Marx organized the First International with the goal of organizing labour at
the European and American level. According to Marx, capitalism needed a ‘constantly
expanding market’ and effectively created a global economy understood as a single entity.
In the global economy, the interests of the working class were the same regardless of the
country to which they belonged. Hence, the transnational struggle of the working class had
to be based on solidarity and internationalism. The First International was followed by
other initiatives whose hallmark was international organization – demonstrating that the
transnational challenge has been evident since the birth of the union movement.

culture and differing levels of economic development, but can generate increased
collective power and a coherent voice worldwide. Unions, therefore, are trying to
make the most of the new opportunities offered by globalization while responding
to its threats. Will unions be able to meet this challenge? How can they adjust in
order to remain relevant?

Paths to transnationalization
In grappling with global change issues, the union movement increasingly strives
to act transnationally, such as by participating in the anti-globalization move-
ment, to which unions make an important contribution. For example, unions
mobilized about two-thirds of those taking part in the WTO demonstrations in
1999 (Tarrow, 2002). A second path has been the formation of transnational
networks of unions for specific actions (Kidder, 2002). One example is the pow-
erful dockers’ network, which managed to coordinate transnational action in
Spain, the UK and Canada against shipping companies in support of the Liver-
pool dockers (Munck, 2000).
A third path – the main concern of this chapter – involves strengthening for-
mal international umbrella organizations in order to coordinate transnational
action. With the end of the Cold War, it has become possible to create an all-
encompassing labour movement (Ashwin, 2000: 102). The ICFTU has become
the largest and most recognized platform for representing workers at global level,
having an unparalleled track record for lobbying international institutions. The
rest of this chapter focuses on the efforts of the ICFTU to become a truly global
organization, representing the union movement, according to its secretary general
(Ryder, 2002a). A central ingredient of this bid is the Millennium Review.

THE MILLENNIUM REVIEW

The Millennium Review (MR) was launched at the ICFTU’s 17th World Con-
gress in 2000 as an exercise to re-examine international trade unions’ work and
structures. The initiative was enthusiastically presented by the then general sec-
retary, Bill Jordan, as the ‘most radical review of the international trade union
movement since unionism was born’ (ICFTU, 2000b). The review seeks responses
to current processes of globalization, as Jordan pointed out:
 Trade Unions in a Changing World 51

Our movement does not yet have the ability to deliver the mobile global
solidarity need to match the flexible power of the TNC giants. So, congress
launched the Millennium Review…it involved 145 trade union centres
on all five continents. Its objective is to mobilize the resources of the world
trade union movement to respond to that phenomenon of globalization
(Jordan, 2000).

The ICFTU does not oppose globalization per se, but insists that it must be
guided in order to protect workers’ interests. It does not see globalization as inev-
itable or immutable, though it has made TNCs and the international financial
institutions more powerful. Globalization has also opened new ways of organizing
and fighting for workers’ rights in the global economy. Information technologies,
for example, give activists the opportunity to learn about campaigns or the prob-
lems of workers around the world and allow them to organize and promote action.
The MR epitomizes this ‘reforming view’ of globalization.
It involves extensive consultation internally and externally, and at national,
international, regional and sector levels. It also seeks dialogue with other organi-
zations sharing similar goals, such as the World Confederation of Labour (WCL).
The work has been carried out under the guidance of a group of senior union
leaders, including representatives from the ICFTU, affiliates, the regional orga-
nizations, the Global Union Federations (GUFs) and the Trade Union Advisory
Committee (TUAC).
The MR is an ongoing process with many faces, and the findings and recom-
mendations are expected to be presented to the ICFTU’s 18th World Congress
in 2004. Hence, at the time of writing, a conclusive picture of this process could
not be given. However, by consulting internal discussion papers, we can analyse
the challenges that the ICFTU perceives as facing the trade union movement.
The most concrete change triggered by the MR so far is the setting up of
Global Unions (see Box 3.1). Although this is in its initial stages, its creation
responds to a perceived need for a common identity. As Guy Ryder pointed out:

Global Unions is an important vehicle today for giving our movement

greater visibility. It is a way of getting across to trade unionists and to the
wider public who we are and what we are doing in a more attractive
and understandable way. It is also a platform for cooperation and for
joint actions of the type, which I think we need if we are actually going
to pack a harder punch in the world (Ryder, 2002a).

It is still unclear how much harder the ‘punch’ will be. So far, the Global Unions
project has involved the creation of a network (with closer GUF–ICFTU collabo-
ration), the establishment of a day of action (9 November) and a website for com-
munication with trade union bodies and the public, though no new structures are
envisaged. Although the intention is representation at international meetings, at
the time of writing union officials had only used the Global Unions title when
attending the 2002 World Economic Forum in New York and the 2001 WTO
52 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Ministerial Conference in Doha.1 It remains to be seen how much concerted

action will be possible under Global Unions, especially since the goals and tactics
of the different components may sometimes be incompatible.
The flexibility of Global Unions as a network, rather than as a formal organi-
zation, might, however, permit the participation of other international confedera-
tions of unions. As Tim Noonan has pointed out, the Global Unions are ‘more of
an evolutionary step than a major structural change’, and the main goal is to
‘increase communication between international trade union organizations’.2 New
opportunities have therefore emerged for greater cooperation with the WCL and the
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The ICFTU views this as positive
because these organizations share similar principles and interests (Ryder, 2002b).
The success of the Global Unions project as well as the broader MR will
depend upon their ability to produce viable responses to current threats to the
trade union movement. The ICFTU’s most pressing need is to strengthen link-
ages between national, sector, regional and international union activities, and to
organize internationally around issues of the global economy (ICFTU, 2001).
The MR also seeks answers to other challenges: restoring membership; attracting
young workers; supporting informal and unprotected workers; electing women
into leadership positions; establishing strategic alliances with NGOs; and coaxing
TNCs into global negotiations. Officially, MR objectives are divided under five
main headings:

• tackling the power of TNCs;

• the global economy and development;
• campaigning and communications;
• strengthening national union organizations, trade union democracy and
unity; and
• regional and constitutional issues.

These objectives fall into two inter-related themes: providing guidance for forming
new relationships with other actors (the external agenda) and the re-structuring
of the ICFTU (the internal agenda) (ICFTU, 2000a). We will start by discussing
the former.

CHALLENGES OF CHANGING RELATIONS

One key MR concern is to re-orientate the relationship between unions and other
actors in their environment – notably, international institutions, TNCs, and
NGOs – whose power has risen greatly during the past two decades. At the same
time, the state has retreated from traditional duties (for example, pensions and
service delivery). To address the challenges facing the movement, unions must
re-examine their relationships and their ‘partnerships’ with all power-holders of
relevance to labour.
 Trade Unions in a Changing World 53

Influencing TNCs
As employers become transnational, so must the bargaining of workers. Although
they continue to be largely constrained by territory and the laws of the host coun-
try, TNCs continue to show how flexible and mobile investments can be, in clear
contrast to labour. Thus, while the TNCs are happy to comply with national or
local legislation, the unions are increasingly pushing for global agreements that
apply to all workers. From the union perspective, influencing TNCs is the unions’
contribution to controlling a group of powerful and unelected agents of the global
economy – many of whom have a larger turnover than the gross domestic product
(GDP) of many countries.
Most TNCs treat workers differently in different countries. As a result, there
are clear incentives to increase the linkages between workers from different
countries in the same company to try and improve the working conditions of all.
Unions have responded by organizing the collection and exchange of informa-
tion, through solidarity campaigns such as boycotts or simultaneous strikes, and
through political lobbying (Ramsay, 2000: 26). Workers facing worse conditions
can learn from the bargaining strategies of the better-off. At the same time, the
latter want to ensure that employers do not move their jobs to countries with
worse conditions. One such case has been the formation of an ‘action network’ at
the mining giant Rio Tinto. Organized by a GUF, the International Federation
of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM), the network
aims at linking all workers and keeping them informed of the TNC’s activities.
In the absence of any international institution regulating TNCs, unions are
seeking to make them accountable for their actions, even threatening industrial
action when considered necessary.
When on strike, unions seek to galvanize the support of their members and
gain momentum even at the transnational level. One of the most interesting cases
is the coal strike organized in 1993 by the United Mine Workers of America
(UMWA) against Peabody Holding Co. Originally a dispute over secure jobs for
union members, the strike also reflected how TNCs and unions behaved in a
globalized economy (Zinn, 2000: 223). The UMWA took industrial action against
Peabody in the US in order to secure good conditions for their affiliates, but
realized that Peabody was a subsidiary of the TNC, Hanson plc, and that tran-
snational action was needed. Hence, the action broadened from US to Australia,
Colombia, South Africa and the UK, where the coal company had its headquar-
ters. In addition to this ‘action network’, the campaign attracted the support of
two International Trade Secretariats (since merged as ICEM) and the British
Trades Union Congress. The strike was supported by 18,000 workers, lasted
seven months and cost the company almost US$200 million. The dispute ended
in a favourable five-year agreement for the workers, which also strengthened the
position of the UMWA (Zinn, 2000: 236).
Although industrial action can be effective, it is a last resort against TNCs.
Strikes and boycotts are resource-consuming events, and unions prefer to seek
cooperation and negotiation where possible. One forum for cooperation has been
54 Globalizing Civic Engagement

the United Nation’s (UN’s) Global Compact, a neutral and voluntary forum to
discuss issues of business ethics. Launched in 1999, this is a values-based platform
designed to promote corporate social responsibility (CSR). Businesses are called
upon to support nine basic principles related to human rights (based on the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN covenants), labour standards
(based on the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work)
and the environment (based on the Rio Earth Summit principles). In general, the
GUFs support the compact because companies that subscribe to the principles,
standards and agreements of the UN are easier to scrutinize. However, the lack
of procedures for implementing and enforcing the principles, together with the
obstacles to monitoring the conditions of workers, are weaknesses. Therefore,
unions are sceptical of the Global Compact as companies could use it to improve
their image without changing their actions. Because the compact is voluntary,
there is still a need to build collective bargaining capacity at the transnational level.
Another example of collaboration between unions and TNCs is the mecha-
nism of the global (or framework) agreements. Promoted by GUFs, these press a
particular TNC to higher standards. They can involve governments and interna-
tional institutions, are often based on ILO standards, and can be applied to both
industrialized and developing countries. They help boost a sense of solidarity
among workers – a prerequisite for industrial action at the international level.
One such agreement was signed on 13 September 2002 in Johannesburg between
the mining company AngloGold, ICEM and the National Union of Mineworkers
of South Africa. This was the first such agreement in the mining industry and
committed AngloGold to promote a socially and environmentally sustainable
industry. The breakthrough was important as the media often characterizes this
industry as exploitative. The agreement also commits AngloGold and ICEM to
work in partnership for harmonious working relationships throughout the world.
Another GUF that has actively pursued global agreements is the International
Federation of Building and Wood Workers (IFBWW), who has reached similar
agreements with IKEA, Faber-Castell, Hochtief and Skanska (IFBWW website:
www.ifbww.org).
Transnational structures of the union movement have facilitated exchanges
between unionists in different countries with a common TNC employer. Some
employers, such as Vivendi, have agreed to enter global negotiations over their
employment policies (there were 12 such framework agreements as of 2001). The
food giant Danone has reached an agreement with the GUF representing workers
in the food and allied industries to develop cooperation in five areas, including
training, access to company information and promoting gender equality. Although
the 1991 agreement is global, the implementation is carried out unevenly at a
national or local level.
Whether by negotiating agreements, monitoring voluntary standards or sus-
taining transnational strike actions, unions face critical challenges in trying to
influence TNCs. Often, however, a preferred strategy is to influence international
rule makers.
 Trade Unions in a Changing World 55

Influencing international institutions

National governments and individual TNCs are not the sole determinants of
many of the issues that the ICFTU faces. In an interconnected world, interna-
tional institutions increasingly promote norms in all aspects of labour and social
security policy in ways that lead towards harmonized policy. The unions, there-
fore, perceive a strong need to be involved in their deliberations. By doing so,
they remain relevant and present themselves as a progressive force for the protec-
tion of workers at the international level. This includes working with the UN,
through the Global Compact, to produce a joint statement between the UN,
trade unions and TNCs that stresses the need for rules for the global economy
and the important role of international social dialogue between unions and
employers. It also involves taking part in the ILO’s recently formed expert panel
on the social impact of globalization.
The MR is encouraging unions to increase their lobbying of international
organizations. For example, a wide network of unions throughout Asia has
formed the Asia Labour Network on international financial institutions (IFIs) to
monitor the IFIs, educate workers about their significance, organize campaigns
to criticize them and engage them in dialogue. Union–IFI relations are typically
problematic, though most GUFs have dealings with the World Bank and keep
some sort of contact with other IFIs. Such is its interest in international institu-
tions that some within the ICFTU want to move its headquarters (at the moment,
in Brussels) to Geneva, where the ILO is headquartered, or Washington, DC,
home of the major IFIs (see ICFTU, 2001).
Some argue that this focus on the global economy has helped unions to renew
a movement that, according to Manuel Castells, was ‘historically superseded’
(1996). Although unions have realized this threat, they will continue to face their
traditional challenges. Declining membership remains a problem and interna-
tional solidarity is sometimes illusive. The international campaigns of Global
Unions only work ‘when they are backed up by the action of unions in the rele-
vant countries’ (Ashwin, 2000: 115). This is the case when implementing interna-
tional agreements. A weakness in lobbying international institutions is that most
international agreements are only voluntary and have weak enforcing mechanisms.
For example, during the late 1990s, India’s signature of ILO conventions made
the approval of progressive legislation desirable; but a fragmented union move-
ment is not capable of ensuring that these laws are enforced. Moreover, many
countries opt out of international agreements and employers can thus move to
areas where worker protection standards are lower. To increase their leverage,
unions are therefore seeking new alliances with other civil society actors.

Working with NGOs

Unions are increasingly conscious of other civil society organizations (CSOs).
During the Cold War, unions were suspicious of working with NGOs and other
CSOs, often accusing them of being ‘politically naïve idealists’ (Ashwin, 2000:
113). Caught up in the East–West divide, international unionism often failed to
56 Globalizing Civic Engagement

recognize the importance of issues such as the informal sector, gender and develop-
ment. All of this is now changing, and the ICFTU is keen to establish a dialogue
with these organizations. The MR highlighted the importance of developing such
strategic alliances when common goals are shared:

One modern development that trade unions should not ignore is the rise
of NGOs to become powerful lobbyists nationally and internationally.
The ICFTU should be ready to build relationships and alliances with
those NGOs whose principles and practice do not conflict with trade
unionism (ICFTU, cited in Ashwin, 2000: 114).

NGOs provide the unions with a useful model. Amnesty International, Greenpeace
and Oxfam International have demonstrated how much international advocacy
can achieve with very limited resources. NGOs often have higher profiles than
unions and are more successful communicators. As a result, we are now seeing a
range of joint union–NGO campaigns, targeting issues such as child labour and
export processing zones (EPZs).
This collaboration, however, also presents a challenge. NGOs often see unions
as preserving formal-sector jobs and wages in the North at the expense of others
who are more vulnerable. The fiercest differences have been with Southern advo-
cacy groups concerning the incorporation of labour standards within WTO rules.
Most unions want this (though they agree that sanctions aren’t appropriate for
enforcing social clauses). However, groups such as Third World Network and
Southern consumers’ groups are concerned that this would become a back-door
way of protecting Northern markets and that such clauses would hurt the very
workers about whom their proponents claim to be concerned. Unions reject such
criticism and accuse those promoting them of being elitist and lacking a mass base.
These major differences clearly make for an uneasy alliance, as does the
underlying conviction of many unionists that most advocacy NGOs don’t really
represent anyone other than themselves. Of course, this makes them more manœu-
vrable (such NGOs can make decisions at the top level while unions must refer
them back to their members), and so they have a powerful role in fast-moving
campaigns. However, union leaders feel the need to keep a wary distance. This
has been magnified by political and tactical differences since the 11 September
terrorist attack, particularly in the US. US unionists have strongly supported their
government’s war against terrorism, while the more radical NGOs, who have
been allies on issues concerning globalization, are seeking to direct the energy of the
protest movement into a peace movement against the US military response. These
differences have caused some analysts within the movement to ask whether such
cooperation has been shelved permanently or just temporarily (Davis, 2002).
As a result, cooperation with NGOs is dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and
is increasingly likely in the fields of human rights, development and gender. In
the past, campaigns on human rights have seen strong NGO–union cooperation,
while those in other areas have proved to be less harmonious. Other problems
might arise when re-examining issues of legitimacy and accountability.
 Trade Unions in a Changing World 57

Child labour campaigning is a good example of how the union movement

cooperates with CSOs, such as human rights and development NGOs. By working
with the Global March Against Child Labour, for example, unions have elevated
pressure against child labour and contributed to the new ILO Convention on
the Worst Forms of Child Labour and to the huge growth in public awareness of
the problem – thanks, also, to the strong media focus, coupled with outreach to
the broader community (Ryder, 2002a).

Widening mandate
Campaigning against child labour in South-East Asia entails changing the nature
of unions’ relationships with TNCs, international institutions and NGOs. But
it also signals a changing relationship with members. Unions are moving away
from the simple representation of existing members to addressing wider social
issues, such as development, gender and human rights. In fighting for social jus-
tice objectives, they are forging new relations with ‘the poor’ and those who
defend their interests.
Addressing wide social issues of the ‘global economy and development’ is a
major focus of the MR, reflecting:

…our genuine commitment to fighting poverty and promoting devel-

opment. We have done extensive work on development issues for many
years, campaigning for debt relief and sustainable development, fight-
ing to put the interests of all people at the centre of globalization
(Ryder, 2002a).

In an ever-integrated global economy, it is impossible to isolate the protection of

national trade union members from wider social issues, both at the national (for
example, migration) and international level (for instance, development).
Activism is no longer simply about conflict and negotiation with employers.
In a global market, unions’ roles are much wider – but these present important
new challenges. For example, while the rights of, and accountability to, members
is clear, what characterizes unions’ links with non-members? Can they claim to
represent ‘the poor’? The MR apparently recognizes the need to widen the man-
date of international union bodies and to form new relationships with external
constituencies; but it does not offer answers to these issues of accountability and
legitimacy – a potential weakness of the process.
Nonetheless, there is a belief underlying the MR that to be effective unions
need to combine representing member interests with wider social issues. They need
to integrate collective bargaining and member representation with advocacy. The
change in strategies toward greater international advocacy and cooperation with
other CSOs requires a change in structure, as well. How can nationally based
unions who are used to collective bargaining undertake effective international
advocacy? The change of tactics forces a change of structure: but what structure
is adequate for the task at hand?
58 Globalizing Civic Engagement

CHALLENGES OF CHANGING UNIONISM

Transnationalization also poses various challenges of internal organization, as rec-
ognized by the MR. Much of the union movement remains locally or nationally
based, with few transnational links. But the need to increasingly work at the
transnational level forces it to change the way in which it is organized – from
nationally based and disintegrated into an internationally integrated movement.

Strengthening transnational union solidarity

Such a transition requires strengthening transnational union solidarity despite
strong nationalist sentiments and a vast divide between ‘the West and the rest’,
or between North and South (Ryder, 2002a). Since Marx proposed international
solidarity as a guiding principle for ‘the workers of the world’, trade unionism
has long strived to be an internationalist movement. However, nationalism is a
difficult doctrine to beat. From World War I to the Cold War, unions have been
driven by nationalist motivations. Nationalism continues to feed on the sense of
community and shared culture that other forms of identity cannot provide, and
the nation state continues to be the most relevant territorial entity. Industrial
action continues to be organized largely at the national level – even workers take
strongly nationalistic positions in opposing globalization. Both in the US and
Western Europe, unions have often opted to push for protectionist policies, with
little concern about the potential negative consequences for workers in the South.
Textiles, steel and farming are examples.
In contrast, most transnational union bodies adopt an internationalist per-
spective: ‘Sisters and Brothers, our challenge is to forge unbreakable links in the
trade union’s chain of global solidarity’ (Jordan, 2000). Initiatives such as the
MR or the formation of Global Unions demonstrate that unions are making a
conscious effort to transnationalize and move beyond national boundaries, seek-
ing to reform globalization rather than oppose it.
However, they will not be able to fully erase nationalistic sentiments. The MR
needs to convince rank-and-file members that globalization should be reformed,
not opposed, and that increased transnationalization of the union movement is
crucial. Hence, international union bodies are at odds with those who actively
oppose globalization. The image of the French farmer José Bové wrecking a
McDonald’s branch while defending French agricultural products appeals to
many union members because of the clear and emotional logic of nationalism
and the excitement of direct action.
Even when transnational solidarity is strong, there are major differences in
culture, key challenges and organizing traditions between unions in different
parts of the world. Unions in the South may be more concerned with state repres-
sion or informal sector working conditions, while Northern unions may be more
concerned with health and safety or formal social safety nets. There are, similarly,
important cultural differences that render much of the work of Northern-based
international union bodies of doubtful value to the South.3
 Trade Unions in a Changing World 59

These differences are aggravated by the emergence of different union tradi-

tions in different parts of the world, particularly between North and South. US
and UK unions have traditionally organized around crafts and industries. French,
Italian and Spanish unions have organized around political parties. The Japanese
organize around specific companies. In the South, countries such as Brazil or
South Africa have organized unions around a ‘social movement unionism’
(Moody, 1997), which refers to the emergence of a social movement linking
trade unions, civil society and other sympathetic actors in a fight against poverty.
Despite this diversity of organizing traditions, most international union bodies are
organized by sector – such as the GUFs. As a result, they reflect a North European
organizational culture rather than that of many Southern countries.
Working across such different national and union cultures and traditions pre-
sents enormous challenges for international union bodies. This complexity requires
large resource investments, which may not be available while the heterogeneity
of the membership base compromises agreements about goals and strategies:

We have to work hard at reducing compartmentalization and making

trade unionists, at all levels, feel that what happens internationally is
something which involves them, which is directly relevant to them and
which they can influence (Ryder, 2002b).

It is unclear how the MR will address this problem. The Global Unions may
facilitate communication between union bodies with different organizational
cultures; but there is a danger that the cooperation will not be between ‘equals’.
Although there has been some consultation with Southern voices, the MR is an
initiative that is largely originated and carried out at the ICFTU headquarters in
Brussels. While this may be the most effective approach, there appears to be con-
siderable confusion and lack of awareness about the MR among Southern union-
ists, which contributes to a Southern perception of Northern domination of the
international trade union movement.4 Therefore, the education of members about
its vision of globalization is an important challenge for the MR – it needs to per-
suade members to downplay nationalism and participate in reforming globalization.

Strengthening transnational union work

The expansion of transnational union work requires the organizational growth of its
international structures. While most of the movement has experienced a fall in mem-
bership, transnational bodies such as the ICFTU have become stronger – having
risen by 85 per cent since 1982 as they have grown to encompass affiliates in a wide
range of former Eastern bloc and developing countries (ICFTU, 2001). Public Sec-
tor International (PSI) – the worldwide umbrella of 560 unions representing public-
sector employees (other than teachers) – has similarly had to cope with a tripling of
its membership during the last 14 years, as well as related organizational challenges.
Transnationalization implies increasing complexity. As unions forge new
transnational alliances, both within the movement and with external actors, inter-
national union bodies must ensure that they have adequate systems to cope with
60 Globalizing Civic Engagement

the growth of languages, cultures and tasks. For example, as unions step up their
transnational advocacy and seek to influence new targets, there are structural
pressures – such as establishing advocacy offices in Washington, DC, that target
the World Bank and the IMF.
To what extent should unions from different countries integrate their activities?
More integration producing larger union structures provides economies of scale,
greater bargaining strength and permits the development of specialist expertise,
which would be difficult to develop by smaller unions. Such expertise includes
information, communication, advocacy, management and legal knowledge – all
essential for international advocacy and coordination. Another critical area is
resource distribution. A larger and more centralized structure facilitates redistri-
bution between rich and poor areas, enhancing overall resource-use efficiency. At
the international level, redistribution can greatly facilitate the development of
unions in new regions or countries.
The merger activity amongst GUFs illustrates the increasing transnationaliza-
tion of the sector. When their job was largely to exchange information between
national-level unions and to ‘express solidarity’, it was adequate to have small
offices covering quite specific trades. However, as the tasks expanded to become
more proactive and demanding, GUFs needed to employ more professional staff
and to decentralize to regional offices around the world. Since they are resource
poor, this has required pooling effort through widespread mergers. Now, there are
just ten GUFs, some of whom embrace a wide range of related trades. This trend
is illustrated by the newest GUF, Union Network International, created in 2000
out of various earlier union umbrellas covering post and telecommunications,
insurance, banking and financial services, the retail sector, media, entertain-
ment, graphic design, and information and communications technology (ICT)
industries. It represents 15 million members and is, in effect, the union of the
‘new economy’.
Mergers also create new problems. Larger organizations tend to be more
bureaucratic and less flexible. Moreover, large union structures tend to face a
more heterogeneous membership and find it more difficult to maintain high
commitment and strong identity. Smaller unions are less bureaucratic and remain
closer to the grassroots level. They are thus more adept at fostering participation
and union identity. In order to remain flexible, therefore, delegation of authority
to local levels is important. Decision-making needs to be located where the best
information is. In flexible and heterogeneous working environments, this indicates
the local level. But centralization is important in order to coordinate the different
local units and to achieve economies of scale, bargaining strength and union sol-
idarity. The challenge is achieving sufficient integration at the transnational level
in order to capture the benefits of larger unions while retaining local autonomy.
The combination of contradictory pressures for centralization and decentrali-
zation, larger structures with flexibility and participation, and efficient resource
allocation encourages organizations to adopt hybrid structures (Anheier and
Themudo, 2002). Such structures include international federations and confed-
erations – based on the principle of subsidiarity where the affiliates are the main
 Trade Unions in a Changing World 61

power holders and the coordinating bodies exist to serve them. They can integrate
the strengths of hierarchical organizations and loose networks (Lindenberg and
Dobel, 1999), combining the economies of scale of a large organization with the
flexibility and responsiveness of local decision-making.
The confederation structure can be quite flexible, allowing unions to have
different levels of centralization depending upon the needs of the sector. PSI, for
example, represents nationally bound public-sector employees. International net-
working doesn’t strengthen their leverage over employers because, by definition,
the employers are at national level. Hence, PSI is highly decentralized, with 25
regional and subregional offices. Its work focuses more on sharing information
and advocacy within international institutions.
Therefore, the MR is examining ways of increasing transnational union unity
and revising the international structure to accommodate growth while remaining
flexible and effective.

Promoting democracy and participation

The advantages of restructuring are obvious: to take advantage of new opportu-
nities offered by globalization while avoiding the constraints of traditional struc-
tures. The increased extent and complexity of transnational work calls for
restructuring; but what structure works best? For membership organizations,
organizational theory identifies two key challenges resulting from organizational
growth: increasing effectiveness, on the one hand, and fostering democracy and
participation, on the other (Anheier and Themudo, 2002). As mentioned above,
to increase effectiveness, many union bodies are merging in order to take advan-
tage of economies of scale. But the choice of organizational structure has as much
to do with politics as economics. A leader of the ICFTU places much importance
on the ability to foster internal democracy:

The strength of the ICFTU, its value, is that it is a truly global organi-
zation. Its representativity has never been greater. You will not find
another example of a global organization which operates as effectively
and with such extensive internal democracy. This does not mean simply
being able to show that we have members in all the regions. What
really matters is that we are able to put together and implement policies
which reflect truly the views, the interests and the concerns of all our
members (Ryder, 2002a).

Federations and confederations also have the advantage of facilitating internal

democracy (Handy, 1989). However, extensive internal democracy slows deci-
sion-making. Hence, the international confederation structure enhances internal
democracy, but at the expense of faster and cheaper decision-making.
These dilemmas are compounded by organizational growth, adding new
decision-making layers. The structure of the ICFTU is far removed from its
shop-floor members (Moody, 1997). To influence an ICFTU decision, workers
must influence their shop-floor representatives, who must influence their local or
62 Globalizing Civic Engagement

national union, who must – in turn – influence their GUF, who must influence
the ICFTU. Therefore, few members, in practice, have any influence over the
transnational structures, as is recognized by the ICFTU leader:

To be successful internationally, we really have to work at putting

together a ‘singleness,’ a continuum of trade union actions that goes
from local to global. This can be difficult to achieve. Even people who
are active in the trade union movement in their own countries often
regard international trade union work as something separate or different.
Something in which they are probably not directly involved and may
not have real influence on (Ryder, 2002b).

Some of our interviewees agreed with this perception. This separation between
international structures and local members is greatest for Southern members
because of the distance and cultural differences. Many Southern unionists, while
satisfied with some aspects of the international bodies, criticize their propensity to
act as if they speak on behalf of the South without adequate consultation.5
International union bodies need to transnationalize further and to expand;
but as they do so, they risk becoming more bureaucratic and removed from the
grassroots – which could jeopardize their core support. They also need to ensure
that both Northern and Southern interests are properly represented before they
can claim any global representation.

Finding adequate resources

The growth of international union bodies requires new resources. Since they are
primarily financed by dues from member unions, they need to persuade these
members that such work is a priority; but they are also seeking new funding
sources in a resource scarce environment. The MR recognizes this challenge. The
newly reconfigured Global Unions need new resources in order to effectively
address global labour-market issues or to build up an international campaign for
workers’ rights. The problem is that while ICFTU and GUF memberships have
grown, most new members come from resource-poor developing and transition
countries. Therefore, the ICFTU’s income per individual member has declined
by 22 per cent since 1994 (ICFTU, 2001).
New resources appear to be more readily available outside of the union
movement (from the European Union (EU), liberal governments or various
foundations and international institutions). The MR, itself, has largely been
financed by donors. However, there is a risk that these new resources may con-
tribute to separating transnational bodies from their grassroots constituencies by
adding a new accountability to institutional funders, rather than union members,
hence increasing the democracy deficit.
Some individuals question whether tapping such funding sources is healthy
for the union movement. Martin and Ross (2001) argue, for example, that the
ETUC has only been possible because of EU funds (‘borrowed resources’), rather
than the movement’s own resources. Despite its important advocacy achievements,
 Trade Unions in a Changing World 63

they argue, the ETUC is distanced from the grassroots level. Tarrow (2001) gen-
eralizes from such experience and observes that proximity to global governance
structures commonly alienates the grassroots.
Limited sources, combined with increased demand for transnationalization,
leads to chronic resource shortage. The strong merger activity within the move-
ment is partly due to such shortages. Another likely outcome is increased competi-
tion within the union movement, perhaps impeding closer collaboration between
transnational union bodies.

What leadership?
A final area of challenges relates to the leadership of the transnationalization pro-
cess. Imaginative leadership is essential for building international umbrellas that
are as representative as possible of the whole movement and that are best suited for
responding effectively and equitably to complex world changes. To avoid leader-
ship being North-biased and unrepresentative of the movement as a whole, the
grassroots must be involved in the MR. With a strong tradition of social move-
ment organizing, can union rank-and-file participation be adequately engaged in
an international top-down initiative?
Moody (1997) argues that it can’t and that there are too many top-down ini-
tiatives in the international trade-union sector. Many unions try to avoid this by
concentrating on their own activities. Therefore, alongside the MR, there are var-
ious transnational bottom-up initiatives currently underway in the sector. Many
transnational networks and alliances are being formed or are growing and are
likely to become increasingly influential (Kidder, 2002). However, networks are
normally based on personal contacts or shared occupations, such as dockers’ net-
works or national networks. Although these initiatives don’t solve all of the chal-
lenges and dilemmas of transnationalization, they often attract strong grassroots
participation, in contrast to the more formal top-down initiatives.
MR organizers believe that top-down initiatives can promote member par-
ticipation. The ICFTU general secretariat has largely conducted the MR. By doing
so, the review has, effectively, gathered union leaders and opinion-makers who
are aware of international processes, while leaving out national unions and grass-
roots activists, who are often unaware of the review’s existence. This might be
unavoidable given the ICFTU’s 157 million members. As Giampiero Alhadeff –
secretary general of Solidar, a labour-rights NGO – has stressed, involving people
from the grassroots level in a global review might be ‘wishful thinking’.6
Maybe involving every rank-and-file union member in a global exercise is
unrealistic; but that does not legitimize just any top-down effort. In democratic
organizations, leadership issues cannot be separated from questions of internal
democracy. A top-down process will be successful if leaders are elected demo-
cratically and are representative of the grassroots. An international confederation
may have democratic processes based on national delegates; but how democratic
are these delegates? Within an international confederation, democracy is only as
strong as the democracy at national level. However, the latter may be biased or
entail little rank-and-file participation. This problem is illustrated – as is
64 Globalizing Civic Engagement

acknowledged by the MR – by the almost total absence of women in national

delegate positions, despite the fact that women comprise about 40 per cent of all
ICFTU members. Not surprisingly, women are also mostly absent from interna-
tional leadership positions within trade union bodies (ICFTU, 2001). Interna-
tional bodies cannot adequately represent rank-and-file members if national
bodies are themselves biased. To avoid that and to ensure leadership that truly
represents grassroots interests, they must see that democratic procedures are in
place not only at the international level, but also at the national and even shop-
floor levels.
As with other challenges, unions must strike a balance between contradictory
pressures. Therefore, while it is true that leadership must be representative and
democratic, democracy at the global level may be cumbersome and slow. Lobby-
ing and playing the ‘media game’ requires quick organizational deployments and
statements of position. Effectiveness often calls for fast decision-making. The
difficulty is deciding which decisions are to be taken by democratic processes
and which delegated to leaders.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
As we have shown, trade unions face many challenges concerning transnationaliza-
tion and adapting to a changing world. The flip side is that every challenge has the
opportunity to increase the strength of the movement. Many of these challenges
have counterparts in other international organizations and movements, which we
believe are particularly relevant in the international trade union movement.
One important response to these challenges is the MR undertaken by the
ICFTU and related union organizations. The Global Unions’ family is the largest
and, arguably, the most representative union umbrella in the world. Because of
their size and resources, the ICFTU and the GUFs are best placed to facilitate the
transnationalization and strengthening of the union movement towards a ‘single
and coherent voice’. The determination to do so is an indicator of where the
international trade union movement – or, at least, a large part of it – is going.
However, it is still too early to judge the impact of the MR. Because of the com-
plex nature of restructuring a large global organization, there is no guarantee that
it will adequately address all of the challenges that we present here.
As a top-down initiative, it risks reproducing traditional splits that have his-
torically weakened the movement – between ‘the West and the rest’, North and
South, nationalists and internationalists, formal and informal, top-down and
bottom-up initiatives, and between lobbying and protest. One way forward may
be to open up the dialogue as widely as possible: with its own members, with dif-
ferent international bodies, within different organizational levels, with the more
informal and bottom-up initiatives, such as the so-called ‘anti-globalization
movement’, and with the many transnational networks, created spontaneously.
There are encouraging signs that the Global Unions network is already trying to
do some of this.
 Trade Unions in a Changing World 65

Regardless of all the challenges described, the MR and the creation of Global
Unions are two of the most important initiatives taken by the international trade
union movement during the last few decades. They are also a sign of the unions’
ability to adapt and embrace the opportunities and challenges of globalization.

NOTES
1 Telephone interview with Giampiero Alhadeff, secretary general of Solidar, 29
November 2002
2 Tim Noonan, ICFTU director of campaigns, 27 November 2002
3 Interview with Luis Corral, executive director of political affairs, Trade Union Congress
of The Philippines, 23 October 2002, Manila
4 Telephone interview with Alan Leather, deputy general secretary of Public Services
International (PSI), 27 November 2002
5 Interview with Luis Corral, executive director of political affairs, Trade Union Con-
gress of The Philippines, 23 October 2002, Manila
6 Telephone interview with Giampiero Alhadeff, secretary general of Solidar, 29
November 2002
 Chapter 4

Campaign to Increase Access to

HIV/AIDS Drugs

Tasneem Mowjee

This chapter outlines the campaign undertaken by national and international

non-governmental organizations (NGOs and INGOs) to reduce the price of
HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries and thereby increase access to treat-
ment. After providing background information on the issue, the chapter high-
lights the cases of South Africa and Brazil, where there have been legal disputes
about the price of HIV/AIDS treatment but where the governments have
adopted very different approaches to improving access. Although the issues of
local production of medicines and patent protection have also arisen in countries
such as Thailand and India, this chapter focuses on the cases of Brazil and South
Africa because they offer an interesting contrast in the position of the government
and the role of civil society organizations (CSOs). The chapter then discusses
various aspects of the NGO campaign and concludes with a brief outline of the
future plans of the NGOs.

BACKGROUND
The World Health Report 2000 states that 11 million people a year die in poor
countries of infectious diseases. Of these, HIV/AIDS is the second largest killer –
responsible for 2.6 million deaths (pneumonia accounts for 3.9 million deaths).1
The HIV/AIDS pandemic is particularly acute in sub-Saharan Africa where the
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimates that 28
million of the 40 million people currently infected with HIV worldwide live. In
2001, AIDS killed 3 million people and is now the single leading cause of death
in Africa. Currently, it is estimated that one third of the world’s population lacks
 Campaign to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs 67

access to essential medicines (though in the poorest areas of Africa and Asia this
figure increases to half).2 While NGOs acknowledge that a number of factors
prevent people from obtaining life-saving medicines, price is one critical factor
in access to the antiretroviral (ARV) treatment necessary for combating HIV/
AIDS. In the US and Europe, ARV treatment costs US$10,000 per patient per
year. However, through the use of a number of strategies, the Brazilian govern-
ment has been able to reduce this to US$3000 per patient per year, which has
helped it to provide free treatment to 95,000 people.3
NGOs involved in the campaign have expressed concern that the World
Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) rules on intellectual property will increase the
cost of essential medicines and further restrict the access of poor people. Under the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, member
countries must grant patent protection to pharmaceutical patent holders for at
least 20 years. Under this agreement, most countries were obliged to pass national
legislation guaranteeing patent protection for 20 years by 2000, while least
developed countries were given until 2006 to comply (this was extended to 2016
by the Doha Declaration in November 2001). However, they are still required to
grant exclusive marketing rights to patent holders. WTO members who fail to
comply face the threat of trade sanctions, as determined by the WTO Dispute
Settlement Board (Oxfam, 2001). NGOs argue that restricting the right of gov-
ernments to allow the production and/or import of low-cost copies of drugs is
likely to reduce competition and thus increase the prices of essential medicines.4
For example, the introduction of generic ARVs into the global market since Sep-
tember 2000 is believed to have led to a dramatic reduction in prices. In Brazil,
generic production reduced ARV prices by around 80 per cent. By contrast, the
price of drugs not facing generic competition fell by 9 per cent.5 Thus, one of the
major aims of the campaign has been to have the TRIPS agreement interpreted
so as to protect the rights of Southern governments to develop appropriate public
health policies and to promote the access of poor people to treatment, particularly
for HIV/AIDS.
The TRIPS agreement does contain safeguards that permit governments to
modify patent protection to protect public health interests. These include com-
pulsory licensing and parallel importing. Compulsory licences permit the pro-
duction of generic products without the consent of patent holders, though the
latter are paid compensation. Licences may be issued by public bodies for various
reasons and are commonly used by developed countries such as the US.6 Both
private and public organizations can apply for compulsory licenses. When a pat-
ented product is sold at different prices in different markets, parallel importing
allows governments to import it from another country where it is being sold
more cheaply. For example, Mozambique can buy Bayer’s Ciprofloxacin in India
at one fiftieth of the price that Bayer charges in Mozambique, due to generic
competition. 7
The compulsory licence issue was highlighted by the anthrax terror campaign
following 11 September. The demand for Cipro (the Bayer drug to combat
anthrax) tripled when the first case was reported at a newspaper office in Florida,
68 Globalizing Civic Engagement

then doubled again after the outbreak spread to New York and Washington, DC,
as panic-buying set in.8 In mid October 2001, the Canadian health minister
announced that the government would override the Cipro patent (which did not
expire until 2004), and would order almost 1 million tablets of a generic version
of the drug from the Canadian firm Apotex, in order to build a national stock-
pile in case of biological attack.9 The US government came under pressure from
senators and consumer lobby groups to follow Canada's example.10 However,
Bayer greatly increased its production of Cipro and agreed a price with the govern-
ment, so the US did not issue a compulsory licence (although it could have
obtained the drug far more cheaply).11 Furthermore, the Canadian government
withdrew its licence a few days after issuing it.
Some press articles pointed out that the possibility of the use of compulsory
licensing by the US government undermined its strong stance on patent rights at
the WTO. The Guardian, for example, questioned:12

What constitutes a public health emergency? Three dead and a dozen

infected with anthrax is enough to prompt rethinking in Washington
about its previously staunch defence of drug companies’ patent rights…
Calls in Washington for the drugs industry to put people ahead of profits
during the current crisis must be raising some mirthless laughs in the
capitals of sub-Saharan Africa. With a real emergency on their hands –
25 million people infected with AIDS and 17 million already killed by
the disease – African governments have faced implacable opposition
from Washington in their quest for cheaper drugs. The US regularly
threatens trade sanctions on governments that consider importing or
licensing cheaper copies of patented remedies.

An Oxfam interviewee noted that the US government’s position on Cipro made

developing countries angrier about the US stance, but it also strengthened their
WTO bargaining position. This case also put the issue of TRIPS and pricing
policies back on the agenda before the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in
Doha. Following intense lobbying by NGOs involved in the campaign, as well
as Southern demands, Doha resulted in the adoption of a Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2) on 14 November
2001, stating:

…the TRIPS agreement does not, and should not, prevent members from
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating
our commitment to the TRIPS agreement, we affirm that the agreement
can, and should, be interpreted and implemented in a manner support-
ive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular,
to promote access to medicines for all.13

However, the declaration failed to resolve one issue – how countries with insufficient
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity can use compulsory licences. Developing
 Campaign to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs 69

countries had requested the WTO to authorize them to import generic medi-
cines; but the conference deferred the issue to the TRIPS council, which has
been unable to find a solution as of April 2003.14 There has also been concern
about the extent to which Southern governments will be able to use the flexibil-
ity provided by the declaration. This is partly due to the tentative language of
the declaration (the use of ‘should’ rather than ‘must’, or other stronger terms)
and partly due to Southern governments’ ‘fear of arm-twisting by the major gov-
ernments or by the pharmaceutical corporations’ (Raghavan, 2001). The cases
of Brazil and South Africa, described below, are widely regarded as examples of
such pressure being brought to bear.

THE BRAZIL EXPERIENCE

Brazil’s 1988 constitution establishes an integral right to health through preven-
tion and assistance. Therefore, Brazil has a public health system that provides
free services. The government’s policy of prescribing free ARVs – together with
information campaigns, voluntary testing and counselling – reduced AIDS mor-
tality by 51 per cent between 1996 and 1999, reduced the hospitalization rate by
80 per cent, sharply reduced the rate of mother-to-child transmission of the dis-
ease, and considerably lowered the incidence of HIV.15 The strength of the gov-
ernment’s commitment is reflected in its proposal to the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) that affordable access to HIV/AIDS
drugs be made a basic human right. This resolution was passed on 23 April 2001
by 52 of the council’s 53 voting members (with just the US abstaining). In order
to afford free treatment, between 1996 and 2000, the Brazilian government
strove to reduce the cost of ARV treatment by 80 per cent through the local
manufacture of generic drugs and bulk purchases of imported drugs (Oxfam,
2001a). Of the 12 drugs provided to patients, Brazil produces 8 as generics and
has negotiated a 70 per cent price reduction for 3 with the manufacturer Merck.
These achievements have led Brazil to be hailed as a model for other countries
by the United Nations (UN). Even a GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) interviewee praised
its political will. Nevertheless, pharmaceutical companies have accused the gov-
ernment of excessive price control and not respecting patent rights on treatments
for HIV/AIDS and other diseases. They have threatened to take legal action or
withdraw from the country (Oxfam, 2001b). In addition, the US government has
used trade sanctions and took Brazil to the WTO’s dispute settlement process.
The dispute between the two governments originated in a petition filed on
11 June 1987 by the US Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, complaining
of Brazil’s lack of patent protection for pharmaceuticals as an unreasonable prac-
tice that burdens or restricts US commerce. On 23 July the US trade representa-
tive (USTR) initiated an investigation and requested consultations with Brazil.
These brought no resolution. On 21 July 1988, the US president determined
Brazil’s policy to be unreasonable and directed the USTR to hold public hearings
on certain products exported from Brazil (held on 8–9 September). On 20
70 Globalizing Civic Engagement

October, President Reagan used Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Relations Act to
levy 100 per cent tariff increases on certain paper products and consumer elec-
tronics items. On 26 June 1990, the Brazilian government announced that it
would introduce legislation to provide patent protection for pharmaceutical
products and the process of their production by 20 March 1991. The USTR then
deemed Brazil to be taking satisfactory measures and, on 27 June 1990, the sanc-
tions were removed. However, the USTR announced that she would closely
monitor the Brazilian government’s efforts to enact such legislation.16
In 1993, the USTR placed Brazil on the Special 301 Priority Watch List due
to perceived deficiencies in Brazilian intellectual property (IP) law (Manoochehri,
2001). The US government publishes an annual Special 301 report that aims to
‘detail the adequacy and effectiveness of intellectual property protection’ in
other countries. This includes information on WTO disputes and reviews of
policies in various countries, and places countries on the Priority Watch List or
regular Watch List. According to Love (1999), countries are put on these lists by
having laws, policies or practices that the US government doesn’t like, considers
important and is trying to change through bilateral pressure. Simply being on
the list is regarded as a trade sanction because it implies that the US government
sees the country as an investment risk. However, Love (1999) argues that the gov-
ernment is likely to apply bilateral pressure on the topics mentioned in its list,
which Southern governments find difficult to resist.
Manoochehri (2001) describes how this pressure from the USTR prompted
the Brazilian government to enter into talks with the US in order to resolve the
dispute. By mid 1996, Brazil had passed legislation to give stronger patent
monopolies to computing and pharmaceutical firms. However, this stopped short
of what the USTR wanted, as it required pharmaceutical products qualifying for
patent protection to be partially produced locally within three years. Failing this,
the government could issue a compulsory licence (unless the patent holder can
show that local production is not feasible). Therefore, in January 2001, the US
submitted a request to the WTO to mediate its case that Brazil was in violation
of the TRIPS agreement.
WTO acceded to this request, but a dispute resolution panel was not
appointed. This has been interpreted as a sign of US reluctance to pursue the
case in the face of severe criticism from NGOs.17 According to an article in the
Guardian, ‘The dispute had become a symbol of perceived intimidation by the
US and pharmaceutical multinationals against developing countries that sought
to obtain cheaper and wider access to essential medicines’.18 Then, on 25 June
2001, at the start of a three-day UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/
AIDS, the US government withdrew its case. The USTR, Robert Zoellick,
argued that ‘litigating this dispute before a WTO dispute panel has not been the
most constructive way to address our differences, especially since Brazil has never
actually used the provision at issue’.19 Instead, the two governments agreed to use
the recently established US–Brazil Consultative Mechanism as a way of finding
‘creative solutions for trade and investment issues of mutual concern’. Under the
terms of the agreement, Brazil undertook to provide advance notice to the US
 Campaign to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs 71

government before applying against a US firm the specific provision in its law
that was the basis for the dispute.20
While the US presented the agreement as involving ‘consultation’, Brazil
insisted that it onl1 requires ‘talks’ in the context of an existing joint ‘Consulta-
tive Mechanism’.21 Hence, despite appearing to have caved in to pressure to
consult the US before applying the disputed clause, the Brazilian government
defiantly stated in its press communiqué that ‘Brazil maintains its conviction
that Article 68 is fully consistent with the TRIPS agreement and an important
instrument available to the government, in particular in its efforts to increase
access of the population to medicines and to combat diseases such as AIDS’.22
Though other Southern governments and NGOs welcomed the US govern-
ment’s withdrawal, many are concerned that no precedent was set. Furthermore,
James Love, of the US Consumer Project on Technology (CPT) and a leading
campaigner on the TRIPS issue, has argued that giving the US government the
right to be consulted on each compulsory licensing request ‘is not helpful… At
some point, we have to respect national sovereignty…let Brazil continue its dif-
ficult and costly efforts to treat poor AIDS patients’.23 However, according to an
interviewee from Oxfam’s Brazil office, the agreement was just a formality and
has not prevented the government from threatening to issue compulsory licences
without consulting the US. Although the threat was issued against a Swiss com-
pany, Hoffman la Roche, the patent for the drug is held by the US-based Merck
Sharp & Dohme. A direct threat to Merck had already resulted in an almost 70
per cent reduction in the price of its AIDS drug efavirenz.24 According to a Bra-
zilian government press release, six months of negotiations with Roche failed to
result in a satisfactory price reduction.25 Therefore, in August 2001, shortly
before the September WTO TRIPS council meeting to discuss the conflict
between health and patents, minister of health José Serra decided to override the
patent. Within a week, Roche had accepted the government’s demand to reduce
the price of the drug by a further 40 per cent and to save the Brazilian government
US$35.4 million per year.26
The Brazilian government’s decision to provide free AIDS treatment and its
stance against the pharmaceutical companies and the US government are in stark
contrast to the actions of the South African government. The pharmaceutical
companies have attempted to portray Brazil’s position as a result of domestic pol-
itics and the (unsuccessful) bid of the health minister, José Serra, to succeed Pres-
ident Cardoso;27 but interviewees suggested other reasons. According to the head
of one Brazilian NGO, the constitutional right to health has been an important
factor as it enables citizens to sue the government for treatment. This was the
product of a powerful health movement before HIV/AIDS became prominent.
Secondly, Brazil has had a tradition of promoting locally produced drugs for free
distribution and, again, the case of AIDS is an example rather than an exception.
Then, when the Brazilian parliament approved a law obliging the government to
treat all HIV/AIDS patients, it was implemented vigorously, partly due to the social
movement around AIDS in Brazil and to civil society organization (CSO) pres-
sure. When HIV was first found in Brazil, those infected were mainly intellectuals
72 Globalizing Civic Engagement

and artists from the middle classes who had a greater capacity to mobilize and
pressure the government. Television has also played a role in creating sensitivity
about the issue of AIDS by, for example, showing people dying of AIDS because
of inadequate hospital facilities. In addition, many government officials working
on the AIDS programme began their careers within NGOs and have, therefore,
been more activist in their approach. Finally, the forceful personality of the
former health minister, José Serra, led him to adopt a tough stance with both
pharmaceutical and tobacco companies.

SOUTH AFRICA’S EXPERIENCE

South Africa’s constitution charges the government with the responsibility of
making health care more accessible to the poor.28 On 31 October 1997, the
South African National Assembly passed the Medicines and Related Substances
Control Amendment Act No 90 of 1997 (the Medicines Act). This law amended
a 1965 act and contained a range of measures aimed at making medicines more
affordable and improved the functioning of the Medicines Control Council
(MCC). This was done in order to address existing inequities in the health system
that had persisted from the apartheid era and due to a long-term problem with
high drug prices.29 On 18 February 1998, the South African Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers’ Association (PMA) and 40 multinational pharmaceutical compa-
nies took legal action to have certain crucial sections declared unconstitutional and
to prevent the president and minister of health from implementing them.30 This
included Section 15C, which allowed for parallel importing and compulsory
licensing. According to the Aids Law Project (ALP), many of the contested mea-
sures were already standard practice in developed countries and complied with
the TRIPS agreement. They regard the legal action as an attempt by the PMA to
achieve a number of objectives, such as having the ambiguities in the TRIPS
agreement (particularly regarding parallel importation) interpreted in a restrictive
way and to deter other developing countries from similar action. Implementation
of the act was thereby stopped.
Between February 1998, when the PMA initiated legal action, and 10
November 2000, the date of the hearing, there were several developments. In
1998 the pharmaceutical companies succeeded in having South Africa placed on
the USTR 301 Watch List, though it was removed a year later following pressure
from AIDS activists in the US and demonstrations outside US embassies in
South Africa, led by Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a South African NGO
in the forefront of the campaign to promote access to HIV/AIDS treatment.
President Bill Clinton also signed an ‘executive order’ recognizing the rights of
African countries to pass legislation to promote better, more affordable, health
care without interference from the US, as long as it was TRIPS-compliant (as
noted by Heywood, 2001, although this did not extend to developing countries
in Latin America and Asia).
 Campaign to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs 73

In South Africa itself the court case stagnated. The pharmaceutical companies
benefited from this inertia because measures that would have drastically reduced
the price of many medicines (as well as their profitability) were delayed.
TAC was established in December 1998. Between 1999 and 2001, it fre-
quently held demonstrations demanding that the PMA withdraw the case.
Although it was unable to tackle the issue more directly (because it lacked the
capacity), TAC initiated other campaigns, such as a treatment literacy campaign
and a campaign to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS (see Soal,
2001). TAC also lobbied Pfizer Inc in 2000 to demand a price reduction of its
anti-fungal medicine Diflucan/Fluconazole. This led, in October 2000, to TAC
Chairperson Zackie Achmat bringing back 3000 tablets of a bio-equivalent
generic fluconazole (Biozole) from a trip to Thailand. At a press conference on
18 October, TAC announced the launch of its ‘Christopher Moraka defiance
campaign against patent abuse and profiteering’.31 This led to an outcry as the
public realized how generic competition could reduce drug prices. The issue
dominated news headlines for a week and led to television and radio discussions.
This not only helped to educate the public, but also to build sympathy and sup-
port for TAC across the social and political spectrum. In addition, although
TAC had technically broken the law, the MCC granted it an exemption to
import the generic medicine from Thailand for use by a clinic run by Médecins
Sans Frontières (MSF) in Cape Town. According to TAC, the campaign also
influenced the decision of Pfizer to donate Diflucan for use in the public sector.
TAC argues that its various campaigns also helped prepare South African civil
society for the broader mobilization required for the court case.
By early 2001, following the success of the defiance campaign, TAC decided
to intervene in the court case, the hearing of which had been set for March 2001
(though the South African government did not draw public attention to this).
On 11 January 2001, the PMA’s head of scientific and regulatory affairs, Maureen
Kirkman, informed TAC of the dates. TAC held discussions with senior lawyers
about whether it should aim to join as a party. It was advised that this would
seriously delay the hearing. Therefore, it decided to seek permission to intervene
as amicus curiae.32 This was endorsed by the TAC national executive committee,
which met on 15–16 January at a clinic run by MSF in Khayelitsha in Cape
Town. Spirits and confidence were high at the meeting, as TAC had just
imported a second batch of Fluconazole tablets from Thailand in the glare of
publicity (they were brought in by a local soap star).
TAC’s objective was to overcome the inertia around the case and to draw
international attention to the dates. At a press conference on 16 January, TAC
announced its amicus decision and started to mobilize an international campaign
demanding the withdrawal of the pharmaceutical companies. TAC called for a
Global Day of Action against the pharmaceutical companies on 5 March 2001,
the first day of the court case. This received significant attention from the local
and international media.
74 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Between January and March there was intense campaigning activity in

South Africa and abroad. TAC’s international allies mobilized support and some
INGOs put pressure directly on the companies and on Northern governments.
On 4 March, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and
TAC held an all night vigil outside the court, and TAC leaders used the opportu-
nity to have a workshop with the most senior officials of COSATU on the legal
and political issues posed by the case. On 5 March, 5000 people marched past the
Pretoria High Court and handed in a memorandum at the US embassy. There
were also worldwide demonstrations, and over 250 organizations from 35 coun-
tries signed a petition opposing the legal action; this was published on 8 March.
On 6 March the court gave the pharmaceutical companies until 28 March to
answer TAC’s founding affidavit. The government and TAC were then given
until 10 April to respond. The case was effectively postponed until 18 April. MSF
started an international petition that collected 250,000 signatures and proved
crucial in persuading the European Union (EU) and the Dutch government to
call for the case to be dropped.
TAC filed its arguments on 17 April. Faced with the solidarity of CSOs and
international public opposition, a number of the PMA member companies
started reconsidering their position. The damage to their reputation was high-
lighted by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s reported remark to President
Mbeki that the case had cast the pharmaceutical industry ‘in the role of evil
empire trying to thwart the Third World’s efforts to get affordable medicines’
(‘The Call that Won the Drugs Battle’, The Sunday Times, 22 April 2001). On
18 April, the PMA requested an adjournment and after 24 hours of intensive
internal negotiations its legal team announced that its clients were uncondition-
ally withdrawing their case against the government and would bear all costs
(except those of the amicus).
Despite this apparent victory in the court case, some have questioned what
was actually achieved. The withdrawal of the PMA meant that there would be
no binding legal precedent in the form of a judgement. In addition, it did not
follow that the government would actually implement the act to import cheaper
drugs and improve the access of AIDS sufferers to treatment (ICTSD, 2001).
Nevertheless, TAC argues that its intervention in the case and the interna-
tional campaign achieved a great deal. Firstly, the three-year legal battle that had
prevented the government from implementing the act had been resolved. Sec-
ondly, the international attention greatly strengthened support for the argument
that commodities such as essential medicines should be treated differently under
patent law. This was, undoubtedly, one of the factors resulting in the Doha dec-
laration described earlier. Thirdly, the case demonstrated how CSOs could help
to bring the world’s most powerful multinational corporations to account (see
‘Aids Charity Has Drug Makers on the Run’, Guardian, 18 April 2001). At the
national level, TAC’s campaign mobilized civil society and demonstrated that
alliances could be forged between lawyers, doctors and various other groups.
As the description of the PMA court case demonstrates, the South African gov-
ernment adopted a very passive stance compared to that of the Brazilian government.
 Campaign to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs 75

According to a TAC interviewee, this was because the government was ‘caught
between a rock and a hard place’. It wanted to be seen to be making medicines
more affordable, particularly for important constituencies representing poor people.
But there were splits in the government – especially at the senior level – about the
impact that this would have on big business’s perception of it. Furthermore,
TAC’s focus on ARVs and medicines relating specifically to HIV made the gov-
ernment uncomfortable (because of the dissident view of AIDS held by President
Mbeke and the minister of health).33

THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN

Numerous organizations have been involved in the campaign to reduce the price
of HIV/AIDS drugs. At the international level, these include NGOs such as
Oxfam, MSF, Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), CPT, Health Gap, Third
World Network (TWN) and Health Action International. At the national level,
TAC has been the leading NGO in South Africa, while there are a large number
of AIDS NGOs in Brazil (such as Associação Brasileira Interdisciplinar Aids and
Grupo de Incentivo à Vida de São Paulo). However, rather than a formal net-
work, this has been a loose coalition of national and international NGOs that
became involved in the campaign at different times (although some of the
INGOs, such as Oxfam, MSF and TWN, regard themselves as strategic allies,
undertaking joint actions around key WTO events). The NGOs have collabo-
rated when their interests coincided, particularly to share information and on
joint press releases or statements, and have worked on their own campaigns at
other times. There have also been strong personal links between individuals in
the larger organizations involved in the campaign. One example of cooperation
between NGOs was the Global Day of Action on 5 March 2001, called for by
TAC to mark the first day of the court case. TAC’s INGO allies – including MSF,
Oxfam, the Health Gap Coalition (in the US), and Action for Southern Africa
(ACTSA, UK) – then mobilized support. Demonstrations were held in 30 cities
around the world, including in Brazil, The Philippines, the US, the UK, Kenya,
Thailand, France, Italy, Denmark, Australia and Germany.
NGOs have had different reasons for becoming involved in the campaign.
For example, Oxfam has approached the issue as one of trade rather than health
(though it is working increasingly on the issue, Oxfam does not have programmes
specifically for people with HIV/AIDS). It has researched the impact of trade
rules on poor countries and has planned a trade campaign for several years (finally
launched in April 2002). It regards intellectual property (IP) as particularly cru-
cial in trade issues and access to medicines as a stark example of how trade rules
hurt poor people. Like Oxfam, TWN was interested in the broader issue of
TRIPS – development and the erosion of developing country sovereignty – not
just the public health aspect of TRIPS. MSF, on the other hand, became aware
of the restricted access to essential treatment through its direct experience with
HIV/AIDS programmes. TAC was established on 10 December 1998 (Human
76 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Rights Day) by AIDS sufferers who had lost friends and colleagues to the dis-
ease.34 The personal dedication to the cause is strengthened by TAC’s policy of
having people with HIV as its leaders. HIV-positive people have also been
spokespeople for TAC, as they can talk from direct experience, which is far more
powerful than charitable sentiments. Due to the individual nature of the NGO
campaigns and their different motivations, NGOs have their own names for their
campaigns. For example, Oxfam’s is known as the Cut the Cost campaign, while
MSF has a Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines.
According to an Oxfam interviewee, there has not always been total agree-
ment between the main NGOs on policy issues such as reform of TRIPS. Oxfam
has been keen to press for change and emphasized the overall development
aspects of the agreement, whereas MSF has focused more on strengthening the
health safeguards. Similarly, VSO has stressed the issue of pricing, rather than
patenting rules. There have also been situations when an NGO’s mandate pre-
cluded support for a particular position. Oxfam, for example, felt that it could
not argue against the patenting of genes unless it could demonstrate a clear
impact on poverty, as this was a religious/ethical issue. However, the Oxfam inter-
viewee argued that these were differences of emphasis and tactics and that there
has been substantial agreement on the overall campaign and no major tension
between the NGOs.
Organizations such as Oxfam, Consumers International (CI) and TWN
believe that NGOs are increasingly focusing on global rules because international
decision-making has become more centralized and more influential with regard to
the actions of national governments. This applies to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the International Standards Organization (ISO),
not just the WTO. Nor are global rules a recent phenomenon. As a WTO secre-
tariat staff member pointed out, government interest in intellectual property
protection dates back to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, signed in 1883. The TRIPS agreement was negotiated during the 1980s,
with the substance of the text agreed by 1991 (though the agreement was not
adopted until 1994). The fact that the EU, as a whole, rather than individual
member states, determines trade policy has also driven NGOs to work interna-
tionally. Therefore, NGOs such as Oxfam GB need to influence other European
governments besides the UK.

Relationships with governments

Some interviewees noted that the relationship of INGOs with Southern govern-
ments, not just other CSOs, played an important part in the campaign. Southern
governments have, historically, been wary of Northern NGOs because of the lat-
ter’s criticism of them on issues such as the environment, child labour and human
rights. However, on the issue of TRIPS and access to medicines, there has been a
coincidence of interest between many Southern governments and Northern and
Southern NGOs. As a result, an Oxfam interviewee believed that Southern gov-
ernments are more receptive to both domestic and Northern NGOs. The latter
have provided moral and technical support to Southern governments. According
 Campaign to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs 77

to an NGO respondent, this is because – in order to change the policy of a mul-

tilateral institution – lobbying Northern governments is insufficient. Southern
governments must want the change, as well. He argued that there was progress at
the ministerial conference in Doha because developing countries emphasized the
TRIPS and health issue. They were helped by public support for the campaign,
particularly in the North.
However, the relationship between Southern NGOs and their governments
has not always been cordial. In the case of South Africa, the relationship between
TAC and the government has been mixed. Although the media emphasized the
‘alliance’ between the two, TAC argues that, in reality, there was little contact
between them.35 On 1 February 2001, a TAC/ALP delegation met with the
director-general of the health department to discuss the pharmaceutical compa-
nies’ court case against the government. TAC received a positive response to its
request to join the case, although the final government position depended upon
consent from all of the respondents (including the president’s office, with which
the TAC has had a poor relationship, primarily due to President Mbeke’s views
on AIDS). However, the ministry of health realized that TAC’s intervention
would be just one step in its campaign for treatment access and that it would
increasingly criticize the government’s HIV policy. This has indeed been the case,
with TAC taking the government to the constitutional court on a treatment pro-
gramme to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV and winning the case.
After victory in the court case, TAC felt excluded by the African National
Congress (ANC) – for example, from acknowledgement at a ‘victory rally’ held
in Pretoria on 19 April. Similarly, while the minister of health congratulated the
INGOs, such as Oxfam and ACTSA, she apparently chided them in private for
working with TAC. This attitude may indicate a concern amongst ANC leaders
and some ministers that TAC had hijacked the court case and focused attention
on access to antiretroviral drugs. A TAC interviewee attributed it directly to sup-
port for the dissident view within the ANC, although he added that, in private,
there is much support for TAC amongst senior ANC leaders. He argued that it
is ‘the clique’ around the president that echoes his views on AIDS, which is the
source of much of the conflict.
In Brazil, where the government has been proactive in providing free treat-
ment to AIDS sufferers and where local NGOs play a vital role in service delivery,
the relationship between NGOs and the government has generally been good.
There are three levels of government in Brazil (federal, state and city), and the
federal government has funded NGO activities (from a World Bank loan, one
tenth of which was set aside specifically for NGOs). The federal government has
a department devoted to managing relations with AIDS NGOs, which means
that there is constant institutional dialogue regarding implementation. Since the
head of this department, as well as several other staff members, originally worked
for NGOs, they are sympathizers. The NGOs, for their part, supported the gov-
ernment when the US lodged its TRIPS dispute with Brazil at the WTO. They
organized public demonstrations in front of US consulates in major cities such
as São Paulo, Recife and Rio de Janeiro in 2001. They also met with the consuls,
78 Globalizing Civic Engagement

requesting them to drop the case against the government and arguing that local
production of medicines is important in a poor country such as Brazil, particularly
when the devaluation of its currency made the purchase of imported drugs even
more expensive. They also wrote statements and travelled abroad to defend their
government’s position. Furthermore, the NGOs held demonstrations before the
Doha ministerial, particularly outside of the Japanese and Canadian consulates
because these countries supported the US position.
Nevertheless, the relationship has had acrimonious moments. For example,
while AIDS NGOs in Brazil have endorsed government actions with which they
agreed (such as a recent campaign targeting gay people), they have not hesitated to
criticize it on issues such as the lack of research into the causes of AIDS mortality
and the impact of AIDS on different vulnerable groups. They have also used their
constitutional right to sue the government to secure access to newer and better
drugs. The government, too, has been critical of NGOs. During its dispute with
the US government, at a public conference, the coordinator of the AIDS pro-
gramme suggested that the NGOs had not been as supportive as the government
would have liked, and certainly not as constant in their support as INGOs. How-
ever, one interviewee attributed this criticism to a specific disagreement. The Bra-
zilian government had decided to place advertisements in US papers and wanted
the support of the Brazilian NGOs. Since the NGOs were not consulted at the
beginning or allowed to make any changes to the text of the advertisements, they
refused to participate.

Relationships with pharmaceutical companies

Since one aim of the campaign has been to get pharmaceutical companies to
reduce the price of HIV/AIDS drugs, NGOs have engaged in dialogue with, and
lobbied, the companies. For example, Oxfam has produced reports on the perfor-
mance of individual companies, such as GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Pfizer. It has
often been hard hitting, though it is keen to praise exemplars as well as to criticize
laggards. Although the report on GSK (published in February 2001) was discussed
with the company, a company representative said that they were disappointed with
it because they had already implemented many of the recommendations and had
told Oxfam that they would be implementing the rest. GSK subsequently pub-
lished its policy in June 2001 in a document entitled Facing the Challenge. Oxfam
has also undertaken publicity stunts, such as handing out medicine packets with
leaflets outlining the campaign at GSK’s annual general meeting (AGM), and
encouraged supporters to write to the GSK chair.
The NGOs have more often been in direct conflict with the pharmaceutical
companies, accusing them of profiteering at the expense of the lives of poor peo-
ple (as described in the South Africa case). The companies have responded by
underlining the importance of research and development (R&D) in producing
more effective treatments, as well as preventative drugs such as vaccines. A GSK
spokesperson explained:
 Campaign to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs 79

We’ve got an HIV/AIDS vaccine that is just going through human

clinical trials this year. It’s still five, seven, ten years from being avail-
able. That’s the issue with pharmaceuticals. It takes, on average, 10 to
15 years and costs, on average, US$800 million to do it. It’s very time
consuming, risky and expensive.36

However, he admitted that the companies had not been able to communicate ‘the
complexity of the R&D development process and the need for IP protection’ in
a way that countered the emotion of the accusations against them. The industry
has come to feel that ‘all the emotion is on the NGO side of the argument and
all the rationality is on the industry side’, so that it needs to counter NGO cam-
paigns with more emotion.
Nevertheless, both the NGOs and pharmaceutical companies have tried to
engage in dialogue. According to a GSK interviewee, the company consulted
NGOs such as Oxfam, MSF and VSO (as well as other stakeholders) regarding
its policy for developing countries and the role of donations. NGOs have met
with the companies to discuss specific issues. For example, Mark Heywood,
TAC’s deputy chairperson, met senior GSK representatives in November 2000
to discuss the need to resolve the pending court case between the pharmaceutical
companies and the South African government. Although the Brazilian govern-
ment has not included NGOs in talks with pharmaceutical companies regarding
prices, the NGOs took the initiative, in 1997, to arrange a meeting with compa-
nies such as Roche and GSK who had a monopoly on AIDS drugs. They
requested the companies to reduce their prices, but their proposal was rejected.
In addition to trying to influence pharmaceutical companies directly, NGOs
have worked with the media. A TAC interviewee pointed out that mainstream
media coverage of the campaign played a very important part in getting the com-
panies to withdraw from the court case. NGOs were able to work with the media
and provide an alternative line of argument, raising the case’s profile. The por-
trayal of the companies as putting profits before human lives in the international
media embarrassed them in their key markets and amongst their shareholders,
pressuring them into withdrawing.
A GSK interviewee highlighted the apparent favouring of NGOs over phar-
maceutical companies in the media. According to him, the company highlighted
a number of inaccuracies in Oxfam’s report at the time of its launch. Oxfam’s
response was, ‘Well, if you’re unhappy with things in there, go into the media and
criticize us, attack us for it because we want to generate as much publicity as pos-
sible about this issue.’ However, the company felt it was in a no-win situation:

Big, multinational drugs baron, GSK, cannot attack little old Oxfam in
the media because the best that will happen is that the media will ignore
it; the worst that will happen is that we’ll be lambasted for doing it.

In addition to the relations between NGOs and pharmaceutical companies

described above, a number of Brazilian AIDS NGOs have received funding from
80 Globalizing Civic Engagement

social programmes run by the companies (although some have refused such fund-
ing). The NGOs who have received funding have not reacted uniformly. While
some have remained activist and critical of the companies, others appear to have
become more supportive of industry interests. For a period, pharmaceutical com-
panies seemed to cease funding the NGOs, which some attributed to the NGOs’
defence of the government position. However, the companies still provide assis-
tance to NGOs.

Relationships with other groups

Some NGOs in the campaign have forged alliances beyond their traditional partners.
For example, Oxfam has obtained the support of ‘establishment figures’ in the media
who believe that WTO rules restrict the free market and that TRIPS supports
anti-competitive behaviour. Scientists such as Sir John Sulston, co-founder of the
human genome project, have supported Oxfam’s campaign because they have
experienced practical problems with patent rules. As a result, 12 Royal Society
members wrote to the Financial Times on the second day of Oxfam’s campaign,
stating that they shared its concerns about patent rules. The British Medical
Association and the Royal College of Nursing in the UK, as well as health workers in
other countries, have also supported the campaign, as have social investors. As ethical
investment has become more mainstream, the large financial houses have established
sections for this. As part of managing pensions and other funds, financial com-
panies undertake risk assessments, including reputational risk. Therefore, Oxfam
launched its report on GSK in London with the social investment community.
In addition, Oxfam’s position has been supported by some within the WTO
who are not allies, but who believe that the WTO should never have been given
responsibility for TRIPS (although it is too late to change this). Some within the
UK government, particularly the UK Department for International Develop-
ment, accept that TRIPS does not benefit developing countries and have ques-
tioned government policy (although others, such as staff within the patent office,
have been more sympathetic to corporate interests). Although Oxfam does not
have ‘moles’ within the pharmaceutical companies, it has received support from
people within the industry or retired people with inside knowledge of target com-
panies. Furthermore, a policy advisor to Glaxo before its merger with SmithKline
Beecham came to work for Oxfam, advising on corporate social responsibility
issues. However, an Oxfam interviewee regretted that it had not developed suffi-
cient contact with unions in the pharmaceutical companies as a mechanism to
present its arguments to staff.
TAC, too, has consciously engaged with a broad spectrum of organizations.
It has established a close working relationship with trade unions of teachers and
health workers. Before TAC was formed, its leaders worked for organizations
such as the AIDS Law Project (ALP). From 1994, this established relations with
the trade union movement, particularly because of ALP’s efforts to combat dis-
crimination in the work place and to improve access for people with AIDS to
employee benefits. Therefore, from the very beginning, TAC understood the
political importance of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
 Campaign to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs 81

as an ally. Despite some organizational problems, COSATU is still regarded as the

most organized, cohesive and justice-seeking CSO in the country. It also has 2
million members, many of whom are vulnerable to HIV, and therefore has been
a key TAC partner. However, it has not always agreed with TAC’s strategies.
According to a TAC interviewee, COSATU has been very critical of its defiance
campaigns and did not support its legal action against the government because it
believes that there are other ways of achieving the same objectives. Other South
African groups have also criticized TAC’s defiance campaign. The director of an
NGO, Africa Fighting Malaria, stresses that revenue generated from patents is
necessary for further R&D.37
One of TAC’s stated objectives is to ‘improve the affordability and quality of
health-care access for all’. As its campaign developed, TAC realized that it was not
going to improve access without improvements in health services and changes in
peoples’ attitudes to health. Therefore, it has deliberately built alliances with
organizations that boost South Africa’s capacity to provide health services. This
has included developing relations with junior doctors and medical organizations.
Health workers are critical for implementing AIDS treatment programmes; but in
South Africa, public health-care workers are poorly paid and work in terrible con-
ditions. Therefore, TAC believes, any campaign for treatment must stress invest-
ment in the health care system and better wages and conditions for doctors and
nurses. Not all health workers’ unions are members of COSATU as there are two
other union federations, and TAC also works with them. Its approach has been to
work through the public health system, which needs to be improved, rather than
promoting the creation of a parallel system for AIDS treatment. Additionally,
TAC has worked with organizations such as the HIV Clinicians’ Association and
the South African Medical Association in order to ensure medical rigour.
TAC has also worked with churches, particularly the Anglican Church and the
South African Catholic Bishops Conference (with the latter, it has temporarily
put aside differences on issues such as the use of condoms). TAC’s rationale is
that many individuals – particularly amongst the poor and those affected by
HIV – belong to churches, and so the latter can help to remove the stigma associ-
ated with HIV and convey information to large audiences. Churches worked
hand-in-hand with trade unions during apartheid. Today, TAC seeks to involve
them in tackling new social issues.

The role of information and communications technology

Information and communications technology (ICT) has played a key role in
helping NGOs to share information and coordinate their efforts, using individual
NGO websites as well as e-mail listservs such as ip-health. Organizations place
information about their activities on the listserv, which is immediately dissemi-
nated globally. The Consumer Project on Technology (CPT) website is particu-
larly well known for making a wealth of papers and documents available. TAC
has used its website to make court papers available immediately after filing. The
ability to supply accurate information has helped TAC to establish good relations
with the media. It has also enhanced transparency and accountability, which was
82 Globalizing Civic Engagement

important when the South African government accused TAC of being funded
by the pharmaceutical companies.
However, an NGO respondent pointed out that working internationally could
be time consuming and frustrating because of different time zones and getting
reports published in different languages. In addition, messages must resonate in
different languages and cultures. Therefore, a common message needs to be bal-
anced by diversity so that it contains the same core points, but sufficient flexibility,
in order to adapt to different contexts. Consultation with partner organizations to
agree the text of petitions or statements can also be time consuming and increase
transaction costs. However, this is balanced by a greater sense of ownership
amongst participating NGOs.

CONCLUSIONS
The effort to reduce HIV/AIDS drugs prices in developing countries worked as a
campaign in bringing together grassroots groups such as TAC and various Brazilian
NGOs with well-established INGOs. The network’s informal nature enabled the
organizations to cooperate on common interests while working separately on aspects
of individual concern. For example, while TAC focused on access to ARV treatment
and improving health care in South Africa, the INGOs developed wider campaigns,
such as trade (Oxfam) or access to essential medicines (MSF). NGOs have also tried
to ensure that their activities are complementary, so while the Consumer Project on
Technology (CPT) has disseminated vast quantities of information and numerous
documents through its website, others have drawn on this information for their
campaigning activities. Furthermore, while MSF has focused more on direct HIV/
AIDS work, the issue has been just one aspect of Oxfam’s wider trade campaign.
ICT also played an important role in bringing a wide range of organizations
together by enabling them to share information quickly and to make large quan-
tities of information available on websites.
However, the different emphases and activities meant that – without a clear
reason to come together, such as the South African court case or WTO events –
NGOs have tended to focus on different agendas and individual campaigns.
Oxfam, for instance, has had its trade campaign, while MSF has worked to pro-
mote research into new treatments for neglected tropical diseases. TAC is now
building on its legal successes – for example, by successfully promoting the
mother-to-child-transmission treatment case. It is now pressing for the measures
to be implemented. Furthermore, although the success against the Pharmaceuti-
cal Manufacturers’ Association (PMA) has contributed to ‘substantial, even dras-
tic, price reductions’, medicines are still priced beyond the means of most South
Africans. Therefore, TAC is launching a new legal case through the Competition
Commission, initiating an investigation into its allegation that the companies have
abused their patents, over-pricing medicines, aided by a lack of competition. To
start its pressure, TAC is requesting meetings with all of the major companies
operating in South Africa. Finally, because the attitude of the president and the
 Campaign to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs 83

health minister prevents an effective response to HIV/AIDS, TAC is working

towards getting a national treatment plan.
The cases of South Africa and Brazil are interesting because of the very differ-
ent approaches of the governments to both the pharmaceutical companies and
local NGOs. This chapter has explained these differences and how they have led
to different results – notably, that drug prices and levels of access to HIV/AIDS
treatment are very different in the two countries. This underlines the important
role of the state. In Brazil, local NGOs have not been invited by the government to
participate in talks relating to drug prices, so their direct role in the campaign to
reduce prices has been limited. Nevertheless, the proactive stance of the Brazilian
government has offered a different role to NGOs – supporting the government
in its position vis-à-vis the pharmaceutical companies and the US government.
The government has also established a national council to consult with NGOs
and academics, and has acknowledged NGOs’ roles in HIV/AIDS treatment
programmes (most recently, at the conference in Barcelona on HIV/AIDS, 7–12
July 2002). One Brazilian interviewee argued that ‘a strong government leads to
a strong civil society because they can work together’.
However, the relationship of Brazilian NGOs and their government is
changing. This is because funding from the World Bank loan will soon end and
NGOs will have to obtain funds from other public sources – more difficult, due
to government bureaucracy. Also, as the government has outsourced most AIDS
prevention and assistance activities to NGOs, they are greatly concerned about
how the change in funding will affect prevention activities, particularly of NGOs
who depend on public funds.
The case studies presented here also suggest that the INGOs – together with
the support they mustered from leading scientists, journalists, health professional
associations and politicians worldwide – have not only strengthened the cam-
paigns at the national level, but have enabled these to be springboards for launch-
ing a ‘generic’ campaign to modify WTO patent rules, allowing cheaper access
to life-saving drugs in all poor countries. The INGOs have not only facilitated
exchanges between grassroots activists working on a common issue internation-
ally – thereby greatly strengthening these national campaigns – but have also
used ground-level information from a few national campaigns to give greater
credibility to their global case. This therefore illustrates a powerful symbiosis
between the local- and global-level activists.

NOTES
1 Cited in ‘Cut the Cost: Patent Injustice – How World Trade Rules Threaten the
Health of Poor People’, Oxfam, February 2001; see www.oxfam.org.uk.
2 From the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) ‘Access to Essential Medicines’ campaign
website: www.accessmed-msf.org/index.asp.
3 Based on Oxfam (2001b); see References at the end of this book.
4 Cited in ‘Cut the Cost: Patent Injustice – How World Trade Rules Threaten the
Health of Poor People’, Oxfam, February 2001; see www.oxfam.org.uk.
84 Globalizing Civic Engagement

5 From the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) ‘Access to Essential Medicines’ campaign
website: www.accessmed-msf.org/index.asp.
6 Examples of US compulsory licences use are cited in the ‘Health GAP Statement on
Brazil’s Intention to Issue a Compulsory Licence for Nelfinavir’ (22 August 2001)
at www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/hgap-brazil08222001 and in a listserv message
from James Love, CPT, 24 August 2001 (see www.cptech.org/ip/health).
7 From the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) ‘Access to Essential Medicines’ campaign
website: www.accessmed-msf.org/index.asp.
8 Heather Stewart, Charlotte Denny and Andrew Clark (2001) ‘Bayer bows to pressure
on anthrax antidote’, Guardian, 23 October
9 According to Nick Mathiason, ‘Anthrax Antidote? We’ll Buy the Lot’, Observer, 21
October 2001
10 Based on Sarah Left (2001) ‘Row looming over anthrax drug patent’, Guardian, 22 October
11 Prices cited in Heather Stewart, Charlotte Denny and Andrew Clark (2001) ‘Bayer
bows to pressure on anthrax antidote’, Guardian, 23 October
12 ‘Patient rights versus patent rights’, Notebook in Guardian, 23 October 2001
13 Available from the WTO website: www.wto.org
14 Based on ‘Green Light to Put Public Health First at WTO Ministerial Conference in
Doha’, joint statement by MSF, Oxfam, Third World Network, CPT, Consumers
International, Health Action International and The Network, 11 November 2001.
Available from Oxfam News Releases on Oxfam’s website: www.oxfam.org.uk.
15 From the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) ‘Access to Essential Medicines’ campaign
website: www.accessmed-msf.org/index.asp; Oxfam (2001b); and joint NGO state-
ment by TAC, Oxfam and MSF on 31 August 2001 on ‘Discrimination in Media
Reporting on Brazil’, available from the CPT website: www.cptech.
16 Based on information from the CPT website: www.cptech.
17 According to an article from WTO Reporter (2001) ‘United States Drops WTO Case
Against Brazil Over HIV/AIDS Patent Law’, 26 June, available at www.cptech.org/
ip/health/c/brazil/bna06262001.
18 Peter Capella (2001) ‘Brazil Wins HIV Drug Concession from US: Complaint to
WTO on Patent Law Withdrawn’, Guardian, 26 June
19 Available at www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/06/01-46: press release by the Office of US
Trade Representative, Geneva, 25 June 2001
20 According to a USTR press release, 25 June 2001, ‘United States and Brazil Agree to
Use the Newly Created Consultative Mechanism to Promote Cooperation on HIV/
AIDS and Address WTO Patent Dispute’.
21 In ‘US Beats a (Tactical) Retreat over Brazil’s Patent Law’ by Chakravarthi Ragha-
van. Article first published in the South–North Development Monitor (SUNS); see
www.twnside.org.sg/title/tactical.
22 Text of communiqué available at: www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/brazilstate-
ment06252001.
23 In ‘US Beats a (Tactical) Retreat over Brazil’s Patent Law’ by Chakravarthi Raghavan.
Article first published in the South–North Development Monitor (SUNS); see
www.twnside.org.sg/title/tactical.
24 According to an article from WTO Reporter (2001) ‘United States Drops WTO Case
Against Brazil Over HIV/AIDS Patent Law’, 26 June, available at www.cptech.org/
ip/health/c/brazil/bna06262001, and ‘Ministry of Health Announces Compulsory
Licensing of Nelfinavir Patent’, Brazilian Ministry of Health press release available at
www.cptech.org/ ip/health/c/brazil/nelf08222001.
 Campaign to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs 85

25 ‘Ministry of Health Announces Compulsory Licensing of Nelfinavir Patent’, Brazil-

ian Ministry of Health press release available at www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/
nelf08222001.
26 ‘Roche and the Brazilian Ministry of Health Reach Agreement for Supply of HIV Drug
Viracept: Brazilian Government Honours Patent for Viracept’, Roche Press Release on
31 August 2001; see www.roche.com/med-corp-detail-2001?id=689; and Washington
Post (2001) ‘Swiss Company Agrees to Cut Price of AIDS Drug’, 1 September
27 According to Chakravarthi Raghavan, ‘US Beats a (Tactical) Retreat over Brazil’s
Patent Law’. Article first published in the South–North Development Monitor
(SUNS); see www.twnside.org.sg/title/tactical.
28 The description of the lawsuit between the pharmaceutical companies and the South
African government and the role of TAC is based on Heywood (2001).
29 See Heywood (2001) for a detailed description of the inequities in South African
health care and reasons for the high price of medicines.
30 The pharmaceutical companies included the five who lead in the HIV/AIDS field:
Merck & Co; GSK; Bristol-Myers Squibb; Roche; and Boehringer Ingelheim.
31 The campaign is named after a TAC volunteer who died in July 2000 from AIDS-
related illnesses that can be treated by Pfizer’s drug Diflucan (fluconazole).
32 The term ‘amicus curiae’ means ‘friend of the court’. In South Africa, to be admitted
as an amicus, the applicant must demonstrate that he or she can provide insight and
argument that does not already exist in court papers and that the input is not erro-
neous, vexatious or repetitive. Unless special permission is sought, the amicus must
confine himself or herself to points of law and not introduce new evidence that
might be disputed (Heywood, 2001).
33 According to Mark Heywood of TAC, the dissidents’ view has two main components.
Firstly, although they accept that acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)
exists, they believe that there is no hard scientific evidence that it is caused by HIV or
any other virus. President Thabo Mbeke argues that other factors, such as poverty,
cause AIDS. While TAC agrees that poverty worsens people’s immune systems, it
believes that it is nonsense to suggest that AIDS has no viral cause. Secondly, they
claim that ARVs are poisonous and are the cause of death, not a virus. President
Mbeke, in particular, has been responsible for popularizing these arguments, which
have impacted upon government health policy. Why the dissident view has wide-
spread support is discussed in Robins (2002).
34 For a full description of events leading up to TAC’s establishment, see Soal (2001).
35 Based on Heywood (2001).
36 It should be noted that industry estimates of R&D costs vary and have been disputed.
For example, an e-mail message from Professor Michael Davis ([email protected]
hio.edu), 28 February 2002, cited on the CPT website, says:
Ten years ago when I started working in this field, Pharma said it cost about
US$100 million per drug. About five years ago, they had upped that to US$200
million. Within a year or two after that, they were up to US$300 million and just
last year they were making the outrageous claim that it cost US$500 million.
Now, it costs US$800 million. Puhleeze, as they say! Before we go any further
with this, is it possible we could demand some audited numbers – audited by
somebody disinterested?

37 Richard Tren (2002) ‘The Boys from Brazil’, posted on the ip-health listserv on 25
February; see www.lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2002-February/002719.
 Chapter 5

Jubilee 2000: Laying the

Foundations for a Social Movement

Paola Grenier

Each campaign is finite, and there is always another campaign to enlist in

when the first fails or goes rancid. The realized impurity of a movement
can destroy the person who has identified himself with that movement;
but the impurity of a campaign can be taken in one’s stride: such impu-
rity is just what one expects of something finite and mortal (Rorty,
1998: 118–119).

INTRODUCTION: WHAT WAS JUBILEE 2000?

Jubilee 2000 has been hailed as one of the most successful global campaigns on
economic and social justice, focusing on debt relief for the poorest countries in
the world.1 This chapter is about how its origins as a focused and imaginative
campaign led to its prominence and successes, and at the same time sowed the
seeds for friction and conflict.
The public profile of Jubilee 2000 masks the complex development from a
small and informal campaign, based at Keele University in the north-west of
England, into a broad-based coalition with organizations active in 69 countries
and individuals in 166 countries. It mobilized millions of people and hundreds of
organizations, impacting on the policies, and thinking, of both national govern-
ments and multilateral institutions. Based on a biblical reference for debt relief as
a new beginning, Jubilee provided a spiritual message for the millennium. It was
a five-year campaign that played an important part in laying the foundations for
a broad and diverse emerging social movement concerning debt relief.
 Jubilee 2000: Laying the Foundations for a Social Movement 87

Jubilee 2000’s form is multidimensional, and has evolved over time. Jubilee 2000
was originally a UK-based campaign calling specifically for the ‘cancellation by
the year 2000 of the unpayable debt owed by the world’s poorest countries under
a fair and transparent process’ (Hanson and Travis, 1999; Barrett, 2000). This was
the founding aim of the Jubilee 2000 Coalition UK that brought together 110
UK organizations. The UK office also provided the inspiration and leadership
for the international campaign network – Jubilee 2000 – a loose transnational
network of organizations, groups and individuals with the common objective of
debt relief. The development of the international network was a stage in the emer-
gence of a transnational social movement, linking domestic and international
protests and engaging a range of actors who had not before been involved in
debt campaigning. Figure 5.1 (see p88) maps this evolution from a UK coalition
to an international network, and then to a broader and more diverse movement,
though at times the stages coincide and overlap.
The Jubilee 2000 Coalition UK and the campaign focus were all time-limited
and ceased to exist in those particular forms on 31 December 2000, after barely
five years of operating. By this point, commitments to bilateral and multilateral
debt relief totalled US$110 billion, and some actual relief (about US$12 billion)
had been obtained for 20 countries (Barrett, 2000: 38).2 Though this fell well short
of the original objective of relief of the unpayable debt for 52 countries, totalling
US$375 billion, it was still a significant achievement in terms of economic benefit
to some of the poorest nations. More significantly, the message of debt relief had
been widely adopted within the target institutions – the multilaterals and the G7
governments – as well as by many individuals and civil society organizations
(CSOs) internationally.
The winding up of the UK Coalition left a gap in terms of leadership and
coordination for the international network. Nevertheless, since the millennium,
CSOs, politicians and others have continued to campaign on debt relief, albeit more
loosely coordinated, within an emerging social movement with multiple messages,
rather than as a campaign with a single objective.
Jubilee’s rapid rise and short life make it an interesting and tightly delin-
eated example of the development of present-day transnational civil society.
This case study tracks the emergence and development of Jubilee 2000. It is
based on interviews with key leaders of Jubilee 2000 UK, questionnaires to
national campaigns, documents relating to Jubilee, press articles, internet sites
and observations at meetings. The following section focuses on the context of
debt as a global issue and the origins of Jubilee 2000 UK. The third section,
‘Forging the coalition’, looks at the creation of the broader coalition in the UK
and covers its development into a transnational network, as well as the chal-
lenges and opportunities that were experienced. The fourth section, ‘The end of
2000’, looks at the contentious way in which the campaign ended and provides an
overview of the forms in which Jubilee and the debt campaigns have continued
since 2000. The final section provides some concluding thoughts and comments
on Jubilee.
 88
Globalizing Civic Engagement

Figure 5.1 Jubilee 2000 – evolution timeline

 Jubilee 2000: Laying the Foundations for a Social Movement 89

THE CONTEXT AND ORIGINS OF JUBILEE 2000

Jubilee 2000 brought together the historical message of the biblical jubilee and
the principles behind that, with the particular context of the developing-world
debt crisis of the 1990s. This section looks at the issue of debt and how Jubilee
2000 evolved from an idea seeking to address the debt problems into an active
and organized campaign.

Debt as a global issue

The Jubilee concept was first conceived in 1990 as the debt owed by some of the
poorest countries was reaching a crisis (Dent and Peters, 1999). Following an
earlier crisis in 1982 when Mexico defaulted on its loans, there was some reform
of the debt regime, largely focusing on middle-income countries. The debts of
the poorer countries did not threaten the global economic system and were
therefore not a focus for reform. The development non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) noticed how those countries, mostly in Africa, were cutting basic
services and investment in infrastructure in order to service their debts – hence
creating severe social problems. Campaigns were mounted in the North and
South to raise awareness of this; but progress in changing policy was slow.3
Sovereign debt is a global issue, based on economic interdependence between
countries. The poorest countries’ debts were with the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), other multilateral institutions, and individual Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) governments. Debt, there-
fore, highlighted the roles, responsibilities and governance of the multilateral
institutions, as well as national governments. One of the challenges for debt cam-
paigners was a displaced accountability, where Northern creditors – largely the
G7 countries – were accountable to their own citizens and not to those in debtor
countries. This defined debt as a global issue requiring campaigning at both
national and international levels.
The global nature of the debt problem contributed to the way in which the
Jubilee campaign took shape. At its birth in the early 1990s, there was considerable
momentum and expertise behind debt campaigns in a few countries, especially
in the UK and The Netherlands, and international coordination was emerging –
though it was still limited.

The origins of Jubilee 2000

Martin Dent, a retired political scientist at Keele University, initiated the Jubilee
idea in 1990. At this very early stage some fundamental choices were made that
formed the philosophical and strategic basis for the future campaign (interviews:
Lovett and Dent; Dent and Peters, 1999). The focus was the one-off relief of the
unpayable debts of the poorest countries. It therefore avoided the moral hazards of
pressing for debt relief for countries who were able to pay, and also for recurring
debt relief for poorer countries. This was critical in obtaining credibility with the
financial institutions.
90 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Dent drew on the idea of jubilee, a biblical message that had already had sig-
nificant historical impact through the anti-slavery movement and US liberation:

And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout
all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof: it shall be a jubilee unto
you; and ye shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall
return every man unto his family Leviticus 25 (10).

Essentially, the jubilee message is to free all slaves, forgive all debts and return all
dispossessed land every 50 years. This was brought to life in a modern context as
a message of one-off debt relief (Dent and Peters, 1999). The millennium was
the obvious deadline; and the name Jubilee 2000 was born. The spiritual and
biblical nature of the message meant that Jubilee was more than a campaign tar-
get or slogan; it had an appeal with religious leaders (including the Pope and the
Archbishop of Canterbury) and churchgoers, as well as with the general public
(Jubilee 2000 Coalition, 2001).
During the early 1990s, Jubilee 2000 was a loose, informal and somewhat
chaotic group, of which Martin Dent, Bill Peters (a retired diplomat) and Isabel
Carter (of Tearfund) were the core individuals. Their main activities were attend-
ing conferences, writing letters and promoting a petition that started in 1990
with 200 students from Keele and came to have significant international impact.
Another key future determinant was that Dent started attending meetings of
the Debt Crisis Network (DCN) in 1991. This was an informal network of UK
development agencies that coordinated and shared information on debt cam-
paigning and, occasionally, partnered on specific campaigns. In 1994, Ann Pettifor
was employed by DCN to step up its work. Some people in the network recog-
nized the inspirational potential of Jubilee, though others thought it lacked cred-
ibility. The next stage, through 1995, involved Ann Pettifor working persistently
with Jubilee 2000 to develop the idea into a wider, more strategic campaign.

Establishing Jubilee 2000 as an organization

Jubilee 2000 was officially launched in April 1996 as a new and independent char-
ity. Isabel Carter was ‘almost entirely responsible for getting Jubilee 2000 off the
ground’ (interview: Pettifor). Feeling inspired by a vision from God, she formally
registered the organization with the Charity Commission, raised some funding and
found an office within Christian Aid (Hanson and Travis, 1999; Barrett, 2000).
Ann Pettifor was employed as part-time coordinator alongside her DCN role.
Within its first year, Jubilee 2000 gained high-profile support, with the Most
Reverend Desmond Tutu as its president. The campaign gained pace within the
churches, in particular. The petition became a powerful campaign tool as it mobi-
lized people and organizations both in the UK and internationally (Hanson and
Travis, 1999). In April 1997, Jubilee 2000 launched the 1000-day countdown to the
millennium in a widely reported central London event, attended by 400 activists
(Barrett, 2000). By this point, Jubilee’s potential became evident, and the devel-
opment agencies involved in DCN started taking Jubilee 2000 more seriously.
 Jubilee 2000: Laying the Foundations for a Social Movement 91

Jubilee’s founding characteristics and strategies shaped its future in three ways
and were the basis for the tensions that emerged. Firstly, its campaign message
involved framing debt remission in popular, understandable terms as a part of the
one-off celebration of the millennium. This attracted people and provided a power-
ful deadline around which to gain momentum and build urgency. It also led to dis-
agreements and disillusionment when the deadline came and not all of the debt
had been written off. Secondly, it was a broad collaborative effort that aimed to
mobilize mass support internationally for debt relief. It therefore encompassed a
diversity of opinions and vested interests that were difficult to hold together, even
at the beginning. Thirdly, Jubilee originated in the UK. While the wisdom of
extending internationally became quickly apparent, its UK origins were always
strongly present and Jubilee UK provided the leadership for the international
campaign. These three characteristics are explored in greater detail below.

FORGING THE COALITION

Following its successes in 1996–1997, Jubilee 2000’s priority was to rapidly
broaden its support base within the UK, while at the same time developing the
international Jubilee movement. This section looks at how Jubilee’s UK origins,
its collaborative nature and its focus on the millennium deadline fuelled internal
tensions, both in the UK and internationally.

Building the UK coalition

The successes of Jubilee 2000 led Ed Mayo, chair of DCN, and a few others to
start thinking about closer cooperation. In 1997, Jubilee 2000 merged with DCN.
This was a critical step in bringing together the Jubilee idea with the resources,
networks and expertise of the development agencies. The merged organization
restructured itself as an umbrella body and was renamed the Jubilee 2000 Coali-
tion UK. It was officially launched on 13 October 1997, consisting of 70 orga-
nizations (Hanson and Travis, 1999; Barrett, 2000).
The merged organization adopted a fairly standard organizational structure –
with staff, trustees, patrons, a president, an office and budgets. It was both a regis-
tered charity and a company, as is standard practice in the UK. As a coalition, it
had an organizational membership base, consisting of the UK development agen-
cies, the regional/local Jubilee groups in the UK and other coalition members.
Most significantly, the organization was formally British and the trustees were
therefore representatives of the UK coalition members.
The millennium became an important aspect of the organizational form, as
well as the campaign deadline. As is the case for many campaigns at the early stages,
it was considered important to avoid creating another NGO that would become
institutionalized when the original campaign deadline had passed (interviews:
Pettifor and Lovett; Bunting, 2000). Jubilee also wanted to work constructively
with the development agencies, and not to be seen as competing with them. The
solution was to establish a time-limited organization – ‘a short-life, temporary
92 Globalizing Civic Engagement

volatile entity’ – that would exist for the duration of the campaign until 31
December 2000 (Marks, 2000). Staff contracts therefore ran until that date:

The time limit – that was one of the really useful things. Although it
created stress and pressure, it also gave everyone the excuse: we can’t
worry about structures now, we can’t worry about getting the process
absolutely right; what we have to do is to build the pressure and get a
result because we haven’t got very long (interview: Lovett).

While deadlines are common in campaigns, marking such a clear end point for
both the campaign and the organization was to become highly contentious within
the Jubilee membership nationally and (especially) internationally.
As well as its time-bound nature, the Jubilee Coalition was collaborative and
heterogeneous. This was both a strength and a weakness, and gave rise to a number
of overlapping tensions. It brought increased legitimacy, resources and supporters,
at the same time as disagreement and competing interests and perspectives. This
was notable as organizational culture differences grew between Jubilee – the new
and small campaign group, that was highly flexible and personal in nature – and
the large, formal and well-established development agencies (interviews: Pettifor
and Owuso). In effect, Jubilee operated at a more grassroots level, with local activ-
ists breaking down the divisions between agencies at a local level and creating
unity from the bottom up:

The relationship with these institutions [the development NGOs] was

always complex because as institutions they are quite inflexible; they are big
ships and they can’t change their steerage very easily (interview: Pettifor).

In addition, while the development agencies were cooperating within the Jubilee
coalition, on the whole they worked independently and were often competing with
each other. Taken together, this meant that Jubilee was not a wholly cohesive
and collaborative effort, and there were many ongoing challenges in the internal
running of the campaign.
From its launch in 1997, the Jubilee Coalition quickly became a high-profile
campaign in the UK and, increasingly, internationally, gaining credibility with the
institutions and the people whom it was targeting. Highlights were the 70,000-
strong human chain formed around the G8 summit in Birmingham in May 1998;
the 50,000-strong protest at the Cologne summit in 1999; and the 65,000 e-mails
sent one day in the summer of 2000, resulting in the Italian government closing its
e-mail account (Barrett, 2000). In addition to these mass events, Jubilee also met
directly with policy-makers and political leaders, including UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair, the heads of the IMF and the World Bank, and leaders from the
South. It gained committed support from the Guardian newspaper, and was fea-
tured regularly in papers, magazines and on the radio.
However, Jubilee’s successes also deepened its tensions with the UK develop-
ment agencies. Even though the agencies were formally represented on its board,
 Jubilee 2000: Laying the Foundations for a Social Movement 93

the secretariat was the driving force behind what had become a popular and an
increasingly international campaign. As Jubilee became more successful, it was
seen, more often, as competing for funds, media coverage and public profile
(interview: Moulds):

They [some of the biggest aid agencies] have become anxious that the
success of the campaign weakens their profile among supporters and
fund raising (Bunting, 2000).

In terms of staff relationships, the policy experts in the development agencies had
misgivings about the way in which the coalition involved people without debt
expertise in its campaigning (interview: Pettifor). This raised concerns about
weakening the credibility of the agencies’ policy work, and whether efforts to
popularize the issue would erode good relations with the UK government, the
World Bank and the IMF. These tensions reflected the differences in organiza-
tional structures, culture and priorities mentioned earlier. There were also tensions
related to particular personalities and personal relationships: ‘What is this – a soap
opera or a political movement? Well, it’s both. And that is not necessarily bad’
(interview: Moulds).
As much as Jubilee depended upon the development agencies for support, it
also challenged their ways of working, their interests and their expertise, and
encountered jealousy and – at times – resistance. The following sub-section
examines the emergence of the international campaign and how the UK Coalition
provided leadership to this, as well as the emerging social movement.

Shaping the campaign internationally

The Jubilee 2000 Coalition UK inspired the international movement, developing
and providing leadership to the network of Jubilee campaigns in different coun-
tries. It was the three defining aspects of Jubilee outlined earlier – its popular
focused message; its diversity; and its UK origins and leadership – that made the
international campaign successful, but also led to the difficulties and problems
that made it increasingly difficult to hold together.
This first aspect is the systematic and astute way in which Jubilee 2000 UK
framed the issue of debt and created a highly targeted campaign focus:

Designing a campaign is like looking at a diamond. The specialists, they

look at the diamonds for two years before they cut them and then they
get the maximum reflection from the diamonds. So, you would have to
cut the problem in the way that would get maximum effect. And we
cut the debt problem to get maximum reflection (interview: Pettifor).

The campaign message stemmed from the original jubilee concept, first promoted
by Dent and Peters during the early 1990s – the one-off remission of the unpay-
able debt of the poorest countries. Politically, the message was positioned to ‘be
radical enough to mobilize people but not so radical that you were marginalized’
94 Globalizing Civic Engagement

(interview: Pettifor). It carefully presented debt in social, human and common-

sense terms that made it accessible and emotive for the general public in both
the North and South:

For me, what they did better than anyone else, better than their coalition
members, was this way of articulating the issue, often in very punchy
short sentences in a way that converted supporters (interview: Moulds).

Jubilee’s analysis emphasized the co-responsibility of the creditor and debtor

countries. Creditors had, at times, supported corrupt regimes and used loans to
pursue inappropriate commercial agendas, while debtors, occasionally, practised
bad economic management and, sometimes, corruption. Theirs was not a call for
debt ‘forgiveness’ but for debt remission and relief: ‘Our incurring of debt has not
primarily been our fault and hence “forgiveness” is not what we are seeking but
justice’ (Zambian church leaders, August 1998, in Barrett, 2000: 14).
The campaign targets were similarly carefully defined. Initially, Jubilee 2000
UK focused on the seemingly unaccountable World Bank and the IMF, although
recognizing that the G7 governments were the key decision-makers and financiers
behind them.4 The specific target for policy reform that was adopted was the
Heavily Indebted Poorer Countries Initiative (HIPC), launched in the autumn
of 1996, which sought debt relief for the poorest countries. HIPC followed from
the reformist stance adopted by the World Bank under its then new president,
James Wolfensohn, coupled with effective NGO campaigns on debt reform
(Scholte, 2001; Bauck, 2001). HIPC identified 42 of the poorest heavily indebted
countries as eligible for debt relief providing that they comply with economic
conditionalities or ‘structural adjustment programmes’ (SAPs). These condition-
alities were deeply resented in the South for requiring six years of compliance
with demanding, and often socially damaging, economic reforms before a
debtor received relief.
Jubilee 2000’s campaign objectives were to reform HIPC, including speed-
ing it up and extending it from 42 to 52 countries, as well as removing SAP con-
ditionalities. Implicitly, it sought to reform the institutions, rather than the more
radical approach of abolishing them (Scholte, 2001; Desai and Said, 2001).
These tight campaign demands were powerful for mobilizing public opinion; but
the reformist stance, together with difficulties in agreeing what alternative condi-
tionalities would be appropriate, became areas of disagreement and conflict in the
international coalition.
The international campaign that targeted the multilaterals was paralleled by
national campaigns. There was growing political will in some creditor countries
for helping poorer countries who couldn’t repay their debts (Bauck, 2001; Hut-
ton, 2000). The long history of debt campaigning in the UK was reflected by
the leading role that the UK government had played in promoting debt relief
under successive chancellors of the exchequer since 1987.5 Strong campaigns
developed in a similar way in Canada and The Netherlands, where campaigns
had been effective and governments were open to debt relief. In contrast, there
 Jubilee 2000: Laying the Foundations for a Social Movement 95

was minimal campaigning in Japan, whose government was politically the least
receptive to debt relief.
The second aspect of the international campaign was mobilizing mass support
for the message. Ann Pettifor, director of Jubilee 2000 Coalition UK, gave an
extraordinary impetus to developing the campaign internationally by addressing
meetings and conferences around the world. She was widely interviewed by the
media, prompting organizations and individuals to join. By 1998, over 60
national campaigns had been organized – 69 by the end of 2000:

The purpose of the coalition-building was simple: to harness the broadest

possible social forces to challenge the much more powerful forces of the
international financial institutions (Barrett, 2000: 6).

Jubilee worked largely through existing church and political networks. Its message
had a resonance in the South (interview: Owuso), and churches were particularly
important in mobilizing support. Its transnational nature gave it a powerful voice
and legitimacy with international institutions, the media and national governments:

It was an extraordinary coalition of groups, ranging from aid agencies

and churches to the British Medical Association, the music industry
and the Mothers’ Union. This formula was replicated in each country,
forming an enormous civil network which commanded considerable
respect at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
(Bunting, 2000).

The petition was the mechanism for signing up to the campaign and was a pri-
mary campaign focus (interview: Pettifor; Barrett, 2000). It gave Jubilee 2000 a
mandate, backed by millions of individuals, ‘to cancel the unpayable debt of the
most impoverished nations… We are looking for a new beginning to celebrate
the millennium’ (Jubilee Coalition, petition website). The petition reached 166
countries, breaking a world record with 24.2 million signatures, and enabled
activists to get involved in countries where there wasn’t a full-blown campaign.
The internet and e-mail were important tools for Jubilee in communicating
internationally, helping with consultation and decision-making (questionnaire
responses: Jubilee groups in Ireland, Zambia, Burundi, Cameroon and Ecuador).
Policy and research materials were ‘universally praised’ (Marks, 2000) and provided
Southern organizations, in particular, with dependable information and arguments.
Jubilee was a pioneer in using the internet as a campaigning and communication
tool, with its own website since 1995 (interview: Pettifor). Such early use may
have been to Jubilee’s advantage, predating the flood of information and e-mails
that has ensued (questionnaire response: Jubilee groups in Ireland).
The third aspect was that, formally, there was no central or lead organization,
though, in practice, Jubilee 2000 UK filled this role for various reasons. It was
the founder and originator of the Jubilee debt-relief concept; it initiated the
campaign, the petition and the international coalition; it was the best-resourced
96 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Jubilee (interviews: Pettifor and Lovett); it had a charismatic and highly committed
director (Jubilee 2000 Coalition UK, 2001) – ‘she was perceived in the move-
ment as the driving force, for better or for worse’ (interview: Lovett); it recruited
international figures and celebrities; and the major media and global institutions
related to the London office as the international mouthpiece. Even though it was
not formally elected as international network leader, it had a great deal of legiti-
macy in that position. Most tellingly, national groups generally followed its lead.
In spite of this, leadership of the campaign was increasingly contested, resulting
in serious rifts within the North and between North and South.
Jubilee 2000 UK set the basic campaign direction, the focus and the strate-
gies: ‘We had to make sure that it was exciting enough that everybody else would
want to be there’ (interview: Pettifor). It would then inform the international
network what events and activities Jubilee 2000 UK was undertaking, but left it
up to each group to decide whether to join in. This approach allowed an incredible
energy, resourcefulness and imagination to evolve – from blow-up ‘loan sharks’, to
rickshaw rides, trumpet calls and e-mail campaigns from mountain tops (Barrett,
2000). Every country and every group did things slightly differently, having
their own identity, as well as being part of a bigger whole.
The international campaign was boosted by two critical events. The first was
the promotion of Jubilee by the pop star Bono and the retired boxer Mohammed
Ali at the Brit Awards in February 1999. Through this televised show, Jubilee’s
message was broadcast internationally to millions of people; this gave the cam-
paign international popular recognition and took it to another level (interview:
Lovett). The second event was a significant breakthrough at the G8 summit in
Cologne in June1999, when US$100 billion was committed to debt relief. Both
of these events provided evidence of Jubilee’s effectiveness and heightened
Southern campaigners’ confidence in their involvement (interview: Owuso).
The process of crafting the campaign strategy was a daily challenge, at all
times seeking maximum opportunities internationally (interview: Pettifor). As the
campaign momentum grew, and as greater numbers became involved, internal
tensions came increasingly to the fore.

Success and growing tensions

This section explores the processes within the Jubilee movement, especially
North–South relationships, as these can be the most testing aspect of a transna-
tional coalition (Kekk and Sikkink, 1998). It then looks, in turn, at communica-
tions between Jubilee members, the structure and governance of the international
network, and pressures to develop greater Southern leadership.
Firstly, what were the communications challenges within Jubilee? Southern
campaigners were not directly involved in the formation of Jubilee 2000 UK
during 1996–1997 – it was a ‘British invention that then went worldwide’
(interview: Kewsi Owuso). Nevertheless, they were increasingly involved as the
campaign evolved. The North–South links were generally considered to be positive
and ‘enlightened’ compared with many other such NGO relationships (inter-
views: Lovett and Owuso).
 Jubilee 2000: Laying the Foundations for a Social Movement 97

A meeting in Rome in November 1998, attended by 38 Jubilee groups

(equally from North and South), provided the first major opportunity to air dif-
ferent national perspectives. There was extensive debate and dissension around
campaign objectives (Collins, 2001; interview: Pettifor). At the end, a statement
was agreed that, while generally consistent with earlier Jubilee 2000 UK state-
ments, put greater emphasis on creditors’ responsibility for supporting corrupt
regimes and for damaging conditionalities (Jubilee Call, website). Opinions vary
as to whether this meeting was a success or a failure. There was certainly signifi-
cant North–South friction, as well as healthy debate, with some serious disagree-
ment that was left unresolved.
Also debated was Jubilee’s reformist, rather than radical, stance. It sought to
change relationships between richer and poorer countries through existing frame-
works and opportunities, and did not advocate dismantling the World Bank and
the IMF (interview: Lovett). This created consternation with certain Southern
groups, who took a more radical, abolitionist position. These debates reflect the
tension between solidarity around campaign objectives and welcoming pluralism
and debate within the movement. Jubilee was both unifying and plural, though
this was difficult to sustain – ‘a social movement need not be rooted in a consensus
to achieve an effective solidarity’ (Grint, 1997: 291).
Apart from occasional meetings, such as in Rome and at summits, most com-
munication was by e-mail. While this was essential in facilitating international
communications, it was ‘impersonal’ and revealed the power and resource imbal-
ances between North and South (Collins et al, 2001: 143). These imbalances led
to concerns about the structure and governance of the network, which had always
been loose and transnational. The Rome meeting debated establishing a formal
international governance structure; but it decided against this largely because the
participants viewed Jubilee as a social movement for which high levels of regula-
tion and strict membership criteria would be inappropriate.
Jubilee 2000 worked with existing organizations and networks who chose
their own activities, expressing solidarity with the Jubilee message by signing the
petition (Barrett, 2000; interviews: Lovett and Pettifor). The particular benefits
of this were high levels of creativity and local ownership, as activities were locally
originated and resourced:

The informality of the more or less autonomous local, national and

international coalitions could have been a weakness. But, in the end, it
gave room for creative and spontaneous action and greater flexibility
(Barrett, 2000: 7).

However, the resulting loose and informal network at times proved a ‘messy and
entirely unsatisfactory way of working together’ (interview: Lovett). There were no
formal processes for consultation within the coalition, let alone global decision-
making. Internally, the Jubilee 2000 Coalition UK adapted its organizational
structure in its last year to give equal prominence to working with the interna-
tional network as the campaign focused on the G7 countries (interview: Owuso).
98 Globalizing Civic Engagement

It retained leadership of the international campaign and – even though it was

responsive to the global network – technically its primary accountabilities were
to its domestic coalition members.
In spite of these shortcomings, Jubilee 2000 created a ‘platform for the peo-
ple in the South to make their case’, rather than the more common pattern of
Northern agencies speaking on their behalf (Jubilee 2000 Coalition UK, 2001):

One thing which it [Jubilee 2000] did really well: it was always a very
dynamic interface between the work of the [Northern] agencies and
what we are doing in the South (Owuso, 2002).

In terms of North–South relationships, the fact that the locus of leadership was in
the North was contentious. There were growing calls for more Southern leader-
ship – first at the Rome meeting and also at a South–South Jubilee 2000 meeting
prior to the 1999 Cologne G8 summit (Collins et al, 2001). However, there were
no governance processes in place to deal with this formally. Jubilee 2000 focused
on the campaign aims and on the deadline, and ‘lip service’ was paid to developing
Southern leadership (interviews: Lovett and Owuso). Jubilee 2000 UK remained
the voice of the global movement (interview: Owuso). There was a sense that
Jubilee was ‘created in the North by middle-class white people, which was then
offered’ to the South, though this was more problematic for some groups than
others (interview: Moulds), and quite remarkable leadership emerged in many of
the national campaigns – for example, in Uganda, Bolivia and Peru – which in
turn created regional hubs.
These tensions contributed to a serious conflict within the Jubilee movement,
centering on a leadership challenge from a network of individuals and groups in
Africa and Latin America known as Jubilee South. These were intellectuals and
left-wing political activists, some of who were present at the Rome meeting, though
some Southern groups also sought to distance themselves from Jubilee South’s
radical stance. The organization was later formalized at a meeting in South Africa in
November 1999. It took on the Jubilee name and adopted the Jubilee message;
yet, it sought to challenge the Jubilee 2000 campaign from within. It promoted the
illegitimacy of debt, called for reparations and the righting of colonial wrongs,
and presented a rejectionist position towards the global financial institutions. It
also envisaged a much longer campaign, without the millennium deadline:

The Jubilee concept, for some of us – if not all of us – in the South, has
a far-reaching meaning than the limited concept applied in the
North…a meaning that embraces the whole of the economic aspects of
our lives (statement at the South–South summit in South Africa, by
Mandlate, 1999).

Events in the US created the opportunity for Jubilee South to gain greater credibil-
ity and to challenge the Northern leadership. Congressman Jim Leach introduced
a bill into the US Congress in March 1999, promoting additional debt relief by
 Jubilee 2000: Laying the Foundations for a Social Movement 99

the US while retaining adjustment programmes. Jubilee 2000/USA supported

the Leach bill, and this proved to be highly contentious within the US, between
Southern and Northern campaigns, and within the Jubilee movement as a
whole. Southern groups had fiercely rejected SAPs at the Rome meeting, and
they therefore felt that their voice had been ignored by the Northern campaigns.
This gave Jubilee South legitimacy in voicing these concerns and in criticizing
the North in general, even though Jubilee 2000/USA was also criticized by other
Northern campaigns, including Jubilee 2000 UK. This was, essentially, an ideo-
logical clash, with Jubilee South taking advantage of the Leach bill to assert leader-
ship over the international movement, framing it as a clash between the North and
South and thereby undermining the leadership provided by Jubilee 2000 UK.
In fact, Jubilee 2000 UK worked hard to stop Jubilee 2000/USA from sup-
porting the Leach bill under the Jubilee banner, and went so far as to try to ‘unite
the whole world against the Americans’ (interview: Pettifor). Within Jubilee
2000/USA, there was ‘a rift that almost tore the coalition apart’ and, in the end,
it did not support the bill (Bauck, 2001). Jubilee was unable to fully resolve the
issue, as it kept its focus on the campaign deadline, and this became ‘the out-
standing division that was left at the end of 2000’ (interview: Lovett).
This situation was further complicated as Jubilee South gained profile and
credibility in the North as a genuine voice from the South, and it reflected
broader North–South iniquities:

If you are in Ghana and you see the slave forts, it’s a part of your heri-
tage. The idea that you are doing someone a favour by not paying these
debts is just outrageous. If only decent books of accounts had been kept,
what price, how much, would the North actually owe you – billions! So
you can very much understand their position and you can very much
understand the position of the people in the North who sit around
wisely and talk about political realities and conditionalities and all
that. And both are absolutely right (interview: Moulds).

The Jubilee Coalition UK had no control or legal rights over the use of the name
Jubilee or over who joined the network. When the Leach bill issue threatened to
tear the movement apart, intense social pressure was brought to bear. The form
of control was social, and was based on informal relationships and trust, rather
than on formal structures and hierarchies. This allowed for a more organic devel-
opment of the movement, including national and context-specific campaigns,
but also laid it open to power struggles, internal dissent and the pursuit of alter-
native agendas.
The strengths of Jubilee 2000 internationally as a broad-based, loose coalition
also proved to be its main weaknesses. The high level of autonomy and control
amongst network members fostered local ownership, creativity, initiative and
resource mobilization, and brought together a very diverse range of people and
organizations. However, as the campaign grew and gained the attention of the
media, global institutions and public opinion, there was increasing dissent around
100 Globalizing Civic Engagement

objectives, as well as internal power struggles and the pursuit of other agendas.
During 2000, Jubilee’s momentum became harder to control and was unfo-
cused. By the end of 2000, the Jubilee Coalition was clearly running out of time
as a unified campaign (Marks, 2000):

It was beginning to look like it was just about to fragment; you could
say just ‘hang on’. All those tensions you could actually just bottle for a
fixed period (interview: Moulds).

THE END OF 2000: FRAGMENTATION AND MOVING ON

The Jubilee 2000 UK Coalition and the international campaign that it coordi-
nated ended on 31 December 2000 amidst celebration of its successes and con-
fusion regarding its future. The campaign had reached a hiatus; thereafter, the
energy invested inevitably dropped off. This section focuses on that period, the
controversy surrounding its ending, and the ways in which campaigning has con-
tinued internationally, based on Jubilee’s achievements and legacies.

The decision to end

The deadline was an important feature for Jubilee 2000 in the UK and the mil-
lennium focus had a particular saliency in the UK, with its Millennium Dome
and Millennium Bridge. Yet, the millennium did not have the same significance
in many other countries, and the cultural assumption that it did created conflict
within the international network. Jubilee campaigns elsewhere promoted one-off
debt cancellation and did not envisage stopping at the end of 2000. Jubilee 2000
UK may not have been clear about this when encouraging groups to join (inter-
view: Owuso). As the deadline approached, there was growing disagreement
about winding up, even amongst people who had signed up to the original vision
(interviews: Pettifor and Lovett):

There has been an implicit assumption by the vast majority of those

involved in Jubilee 2000 South Africa that the campaign will continue
beyond the year 2000 (Dor, 2001).

There were strong reasons to end the campaign as it was originally conceived.
The deadline was inherent to Jubilee 2000’s identity and the way in which it had
developed; and the movement was displaying growing internal tensions and frag-
mentation pressures, making it difficult to sustain itself in its current form (inter-
views: Lovett, Pettifor and Moulds): ‘There was much recognition that the shared
vision is running out of time’ (Marks, 2000).
On the other hand, there were many reasons for it to continue. Jubilee 2000
was gaining ground and momentum, but had not achieved its full objectives –
‘people felt that the need to achieve the original aims was more important than
standing by the deadline’ (Marks, 2000).6 It had inspired an array of groups to
 Jubilee 2000: Laying the Foundations for a Social Movement 101

join the campaign, and these groups needed international coordination, informa-
tion and networking. In particular, the Southern groups gained an international
voice and access to expertise through the Jubilee coalition, and, in some cases, had
only got going in 2000.
On a personal level, emotional attachment and commitment to the cause
meant that many people were reluctant to let go and were experiencing a ‘grieving
process’ (interviews: Pettifor and Lovett):

If you compared Jubilee 2000 to a football team, it would be the only

football team that was in the lead at half time which decides to abandon
the game (Owuso, 2002).

The trustees of the Jubilee 2000 Coalition UK had been considering the issue for
about eight months prior to the end date. However, it was difficult to concentrate
on this as the millennium deadline loomed and the priority was to maximize
debt-relief commitments: ‘It’s very difficult to focus on the last chance and the
far horizon at the same time’; because of the loose nature of the international
coalition, there was no clear method for engaging activists more widely on this key
decision, resulting in a ‘contentious’ and ‘chaotic’ process (interview: Lovett).
There was a swift review, based on a written or e-mailed questionnaire, sent to UK
coalition members and the international network. While this did not allow for
detailed discussion, the strong and consistent message was that members wanted
coordinated campaigning to continue in some form (Marks, 2000).
The Jubilee 2000 Coalition UK was officially wound up, and the Jubilee
2000 campaign effectively ended, with the passing of the millennium; but three
new organizations were immediately created in the UK (see the following sub-
sections), reflecting the expressed desire for continuation. Many of the national
campaigns in the international movement also continued.

Legacies of Jubilee 2000

Jubilee 2000’s achievements and internal disputes left three legacies. At the time
of publication, the campaign’s transition from Jubilee 2000 is still underway,
and how it will develop in future years is uncertain.
Firstly, Jubilee 2000 was a focused campaign that nurtured an emergent
social movement with a broad composition and a diversity of aims within the
overall issue of debt. The ending of the campaign left the movement without
clear international leadership; but it did feature a number of diverse organizations
and people loosely networked regionally and globally (interviews: Pettifor, Owuso
and Lovett). Involvement with Jubilee had presented opportunities – particularly
in the South – for strengthening organizations, increasing expertise and heighten-
ing legitimacy, both at home and internationally. Jubilee bridged political divides
in the South as well as the North, enabling CSOs to play new and significant
roles in some of the political processes, especially in Africa (interview: Owuso):
102 Globalizing Civic Engagement

The Uganda Debt Network has used the knowledge and confidence
gained in its efforts to improve the terms of the HIPC arrangement for
Uganda as a basis to launch a campaign for greater transparency of the
national budget (Scholte, 2001: 98).

At the same time it has left the South with the legacy of a campaign that was
determined and defined in the North.
Secondly, there were the emotional legacies linked to controversy surround-
ing the winding-up controversy and the unresolved conflict with Jubilee South.
Feelings of betrayal were particularly strong amongst Southern organizations
who had not been so bound to the deadline. There was some confusion about
Jubilee’s aims and focus, following the conflict with Jubilee South, which
‘caused a huge split from which the movement has never really properly recov-
ered’ (interview: Pettifor).
The third legacy stemmed from Jubilee’s high profile, which generated a
perception that the campaign had succeeded in solving the debt problem.
Hence, since the end of 2000, it has been increasingly difficult to maintain the
profile and raise funding for ongoing debt campaigns, and the development
agencies have moved on to prioritize other campaigns, such as HIV/AIDS and
trade justice, where they believe they can make more of an impact (interviews:
Moulds and Lovett). Jubilee’s success also prompted government and multilateral
institutions to adopt the language of the debt campaigners (but not the spirit or
substance), and has resulted in new policies in the form of the enhanced HIPC
and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process. This has reflected
increased interest in ensuring that debt relief goes to poverty reduction, not in
helping developing world elites. However, many campaigners now regard HIPC
as fundamentally flawed and see the PRSPs as masking privatization agendas. As
a result, new campaigns are struggling to find ways of challenging debt policies
in ever more complex ways.

Post-2000 campaigning
Jubilee debt campaigns since 2000 are best understood as comprising an emer-
gent social movement, which manages to sustain a broad focus on debt but with
a dispersed, rather than centralized, leadership. As such, it is difficult to map
precisely its international presence and forms. There are, certainly, organizations
and coalitions who campaign on debt in many countries. There are formal,
informal and evolving networks between people and groups internationally,
regionally, around specific topics, and within broader development networks.
These are outlined below, focusing first on the UK and then internationally.

UK campaigns
The three follow-up organizations to Jubilee 2000 Coalition UK, created at the
end of 2000 and working on different aspects of the issue, have had an uncertain
time. Not only was the momentum diffused, but the political climate also changed.
 Jubilee 2000: Laying the Foundations for a Social Movement 103

Drop the Debt was a six-month campaign that focused specifically on the G8
Genoa summit in June 2001. In practice, changes in the Italian and US govern-
ments meant that there was much less political sympathy for debt cancellation
than anticipated, and the violence of the anti-globalization protests in Genoa
eclipsed the issue of debt and left a negative feeling for many campaigners (Ver-
dict on Genoa Summit, 2001). Drop the Debt ceased to exist as planned, with-
out having made tangible progress.
The Jubilee Debt Campaign (JDC) was formed in 2001 as a UK network of
agencies and local/regional groups working on debt – an equivalent to the origi-
nal UK Debt Crisis Network, closely linked with the development agencies and
with an office within War on Want. It plays more of a coordinating function than
providing leadership to the groups involved and has sought to clarify its role in
the wake of Jubilee 2000. It has developed campaign strategy, materials and an
improved website in order to provide support and coordination to the many
active local groups, and has struggled to obtain funding and media profile.
The third organization that was established was Jubilee Plus, which changed
its name in early 2002 to Jubilee Research. This is based within the New Eco-
nomics Foundation – an independent think tank – and provides policy analysis,
research and monitoring of debt. It also promotes particular policy agendas – for
example, around proposals for a national insolvency and arbitration process. Jubilee
Research also hosts the website for a nascent international network called Jubilee
Movement International (JMI).

National and international campaigns

Internationally, there remains a strong commitment to debt campaigning. From
various lists on websites and internet searches it is possible to identify 47 coun-
tries with ongoing Jubilee campaigns, compared with the 69 that existed at the
height of Jubilee (websites of Jubilee USA Network and JMI). It is striking that
almost all of the Northern campaigns have active websites, whereas the Southern
ones rarely do.

Table 5.1 Evolving status of Jubilee 2000 groups

Original members of Operating campaigns – Campaigns with

Jubilee 2000 August 2002 websites – August 2002
North 23 19 17
46 28 2 (+ 1 that is
South not current)
Total 69 47 19

Many national campaigns appear to have become more confident and effective
and have broadened their campaign priorities (interviews: Lovett and Owuso).
While there is much consensus regarding what the key issues are, they are multiple
and complex compared with the simple Jubilee aim. Many organizations continue
104 Globalizing Civic Engagement

to focus on HIPC, particularly given the very slow progress that has been made
since 2000. By September 2002, six countries had reached completion point,
only four more than at the end of 2000 (IMF and World Bank, 2002). A further
20 were due to receive debt relief within the next three years. Of those 26, it was
anticipated that between 13 and 22 will still have unsustainable debts after
HIPC, as measured by the debt ratios used by the World Bank and IMF, and
will require additional relief and support (Clarke et al, 2002; Denny and Elliott,
2002; IMF and World Bank, 2002). HIPC is increasingly considered ineffective,
and campaigns therefore tend to focus on other opportunities.
A second very common campaign theme in both the North and South is for
a fair and transparent arbitration process. The economic crisis in Argentina has
given this proposal a particular relevance, and the IMF and World Bank are
increasingly receptive to the idea.
The most notable difference between Northern and Southern groups is that
the latter mostly target their own country’s debt and directly related issues,
whereas Northern campaigns target creditor nations, generic debt issues and, in
some cases, form campaign partnerships with heavily indebted countries. At a
national level, debt is often associated with issues of economic and social justice,
such as corruption, poverty relief, HIV/AIDS, trade, reparations and the need
for sovereign insolvency laws:

A lot of the Southern campaigns in Africa and Latin America are driving
forward with the original vision, but obviously without the millennium
peg – mobilizing and pushing for debt cancellation, but also very much
focusing increasingly on their own governments to push for any proceeds
from debt cancellation to be used in the interests of ordinary people and
fighting poverty (interview: Lovett).

Importantly, campaigns in the less politically receptive Northern countries, such

as the US and Japan, seem to be growing in strength.
International coordination and networking remain ambiguous. Jubilee Move-
ment International is serviced by Jubilee Research in the UK, and is presented as
a Southern-led network. It has met twice: in April 2001 in Mali, when it was
formed, and in March 2002 in Ecuador. However, it is not considered particularly
strong or effective (interviews: Pettifor and Owuso). Jubilee South continues to
exist as a Southern network, and was active at the World Social Forum in Porte
Alegre in February 2002, though it is difficult to assess its current strength. The
African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) and a
similar network of debt campaigners in West African network, also exist, and there
may be an emerging Andean network. A handful of Northern and Southern groups
have created a network focusing on ‘odious debts’. Undoubtedly the strongest
regional network continues to be the European Network on Debt and Development
(EURODAD), which predated Jubilee and continues to operate out of Brussels.
While Jubilee campaigns continue, there is a clear lack of international lead-
ership and active coordination. The solution is thought to be the adoption of an
 Jubilee 2000: Laying the Foundations for a Social Movement 105

overarching campaign objective around which to mobilize internationally (inter-

view: Pettifor), and the question remains as to where the locus of leadership
would lie. But the lack of resources in the Southern groups remains marked, and
harshly illustrates the differing capacities between North and South to access the
globalizing world and to provide global leadership.
Jubilee 2000 elevated debt on the agenda of both CSOs and the official insti-
tutions. It has also sown the seeds for a potential global social movement, with
expertise, a language, campaigning skills, networks and a strong presence in both
the North and South. The remaining issue is whether the collective action that
was so apparent in Jubilee 2000 can be sustained in new forms in order to make
the shift from a transnational campaigning network, led from the UK, to a truly
global social movement with cycles of focused campaigning (Tarrow, 1998):

Membership in a movement requires the ability to see particular cam-

paigns or particular goals as parts of something much bigger, and as
having little meaning in themselves (Rorty, 1998: 115).

CONCLUSIONS
What is the nature and form of Jubilee 2000 and the ensuing Jubilee movement,
and to what extent is the movement an example of transnational activism?
Jubilee defines and refers to itself as an international movement, rooted in and
inspiring domestic change throughout the world (Collins, 2001; Marks, 2000;
Barrett, 2000; interviews: Pettifor and Lovett; JMI website). This is consistent
with Tarrow’s definition of a transnational social movement as:

…socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states,

engaged in sustained contentious interaction with power-holders in at
least one state other than their own, or against an international insti-
tution or a multinational economic actor (Tarrow, 2001: 11).

Jubilee was certainly engaged in contentious politics at the level of both the nation
state and multilateral institutions. The pattern of interactions are illustrated in
Figure 5.2, and show how national campaigns used their transnational links to
gain force domestically and with multilateral institutions. The problem, in this case,
is not that expressed by Kekk and Sikkink (1998) – domestic campaigns being
blocked from effectively challenging their national governments – but that cam-
paigns in debtor countries don’t have a direct way of challenging the creditor coun-
tries through existing national and international structures. As a result, the necessary
leverage to bring about change requires Northern activism and North–South
solidarity. This is an attempt to clarify the nature of the relationships between
the movement and global structures, as suggested by Tarrow (1998).
Whether the contentious interactions around debt relief will be sustained as
‘cycles of contention’ (Tarrow, 1998: 7) remains to be seen. This chapter there-
fore presents Jubilee and the debt campaigns as an emergent social movement,
106 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Figure 5.2 Points of influence of Jubilee 2000

rather than as an established one. Critically, will Jubilee be able ‘to tap more
deep-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity’ that are necessary for building a
sustainable social movement (Tarrow, 1998: 5)? For some, Jubilee did tap into a
notion of the ‘global citizen’ – someone who identifies with the world and seeks
to address inequalities and injustices (Barrett, 2000) as a response to globaliza-
tion and the increasing opportunities to travel, experience and learn about other
countries (Dent and Peters, 1999). However, international movements are
clearly not new phenomena. There is a long history of people who have linked
up, and supported each other, internationally on issues of social and economic
justice. If the notion of global citizenship has significance within Jubilee, it is in
marking a shift away from a paternalistic sense of the Northern countries pro-
viding support and resources to the Southern countries, and towards an under-
standing based on North–South equality. Jubilee did emphasize co-responsibility
between North and South, as well as justice rather than charity or forgiveness.
However, in practice it was hard to live up to these principles, and, at times,
Jubilee reflected the same ‘North–South imbalances that it criticizes…in terms of
access to resources, information and global decision-making’ (Collins, 2001: 147).
Another important way in which Jubilee created solidarity was through the
religious aspects of its message. Through congregations and the church-based
development agencies, Jubilee tapped into a sense of identity and solidarity based
on spirituality. The Christian churches were vital to Jubilee and, especially, to its
impact internationally, as were the messages from religious leaders. There are
strands within Jubilee that have the potential to create sustained North–South
solidarity around identities rooted in global citizenship and spirituality – potential
 Jubilee 2000: Laying the Foundations for a Social Movement 107

foundations for a sustained transnational social movement. But these are not yet
well formed, and it isn’t clear whether they provide strong enough solidarity.
Such solidarity could provide an indication of the emergence of de Senillosa’s
(1998) concept of a fifth generation of North–South NGO relationships. He
sees the proliferation of a range of different networks crossing North–South and
regional boundaries as a new stage in the evolution of these relationships, which
started with emergency aid, followed by providing development expertise and
technical assistance. North–South partnerships then ensued, followed by attempts
to empower the South through lobbying efforts in the North. In reality, Jubilee
2000 did not create wholly equal solidarity relationships between the North and
South. However, there are indications in the ongoing development of the move-
ment that different networks are slowly forming that could lead to greater equality.
But this is taking place within an environment in which Northern NGOs still have
far greater access to decision-makers, resources and communication technology.
Questions of identity and solidarity bring us to the processes underpinning
Jubilee – its leadership and governance. At the core of Jubilee 2000 was a tension
between the leadership of the campaign, based in the UK office, and its develop-
ment into a transnational movement. Within the UK, the organization and gov-
ernance were formalized; but there were still tensions – in particular, the
development agencies felt threatened by the international profile and funding
that Jubilee 2000 attracted. These agencies are made up of a cosmopolitan class of
well-educated and well-travelled development professionals. Jubilee, on the other
hand, was a popular movement under a broad banner, challenging global inequality
through debt relief. The organizational culture of Jubilee was markedly different
from that of the agencies: ‘Jubilee provided a space to be creative, to take risks…it
had a different feel and atmosphere’ (interview: Owuso). This striking difference
between the feel and organizational culture of Jubilee and the development agen-
cies, as a whole, illustrates the distinction that Tarrow (2001) draws between orga-
nizations engaged in ‘contentious politics’ and those that are more established
and have developed ‘routine transactions’.
Internationally, leadership was exercised through informal social processes
based on solidarity, personal relationships, trust and informal communications.
While Jubilee aimed at being a broad and diverse movement, the leadership was
not able to hold together the extremes of Jubilee 2000/USA’s support of the
Leach bill, with the leftist intellectual Jubilee South and its radical agenda.
Within the US movement, support for the bill could be justified due to the fact
that it opened a door to debt relief in a country whose government had consis-
tently opposed it. However, within the global movement this was unacceptable
because of the more widespread rejection of structural adjustment programme
(SAP) conditions. Grint (2000: 420) commented that ‘the trick of leadership –
and the real invention – is to develop followers who privately resolve the problems
leaders have caused or cannot resolve’. The conflict can therefore be seen as not
having been adequately dealt with by the membership because the movement
failed to overcome the inherent tensions between Northern and Southern
groups, resulting from the imbalances in resources and power. This weakness also
108 Globalizing Civic Engagement

reinforced, in some people’s eyes, Jubilee South’s position as a legitimate Southern

voice. Jubilee may have been ‘enlightened’ compared to many other North–South
relationships; yet, it was certainly not equal (interview: Owuso). The introduction
of more formal processes became inevitable, and since the end of 2000, and the
formation of new networks such as Jubilee Movement International (JMI), there
has been more attention to formal governance.
The problems faced by Jubilee are typical of an entrepreneurial approach that
needs to become more institutionalized. A conscious decision was made early on
to use the campaign as a way of building a social movement, rather than a formal
organization or network. The critical questions now are whether such a move-
ment can grow and gain force, and whether it can do this as a more equal move-
ment, expressing solidarity and justice between North and South despite its
history as a Northern-initiated campaign:

This is part of a living process. Those who follow us in this task must
have not just a specific legacy of debt forgiven, but also a living legacy
of a heightened consciousness among many people in the world of the
need to close the gap between rich and poor, in order to ensure a fairer
distribution of the world’s resources (Dent and Peters, 1999).

NOTES
1 The developing world debt crisis is largely regarded as being concerned with the
debts of developing country governments to foreign sources. This debt includes
debt borrowed from other governments or from inter-governmental institutions
(especially the World Bank and the IMF). Private debts through commercial institu-
tions are not very significant for the poorer developing countries.
2 Bilateral debt is between two national governments. Multilateral debt is lent by a multi-
lateral institution, typically the IMF or the World Bank, to a national government; the
richer countries provide the capital, as well as bilateral loans. Most significant are the G7
group of richest countries: the US, the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Japan and Canada.
3 This division into North and South is useful in illustrating the differing impacts of
globalization; but some countries do not fall neatly into one category or the other.
4 The G7 governments were key targets for Jubilee. Therefore, they organized protests
and campaigns around the G8 summits. The G8 countries include Russia, though
Russia was not a significant creditor or target for Jubilee.
5 The UK chancellor of the exchequer is the finance minister.
6 The amount of debt relief obtained by the end of the Jubilee campaign is difficult to
assess accurately. US$100 billion of multilateral debt was committed following the
Cologne summit, of which US$45 billion was new. About US$10 billion in bilateral
debt was also committed by G7 countries following Cologne. However, in terms of
debt relief delivered, by the end of 2000, two countries had reached completion
point and were receiving debt relief under HIPC and 20 countries were at the deci-
sion point. Looking beyond the end of 2000, even by the autumn of 2002, only six
countries had reached completion point, and, in most cases, the debts were again
considered unsustainable, even with relief. A further 20 countries were at decision
point, facing a similar debt sustainability problem.
 Chapter 6

The Age of Protest:

Internet-Based ‘Dot Causes’ and
the ‘Anti-Globalization’ Movement

John Clark and Nuno Themudo

INTRODUCTION: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE WAY OF THE WEB

Two new phenomena have emerged within civil society during recent years. Both
have important implications for development policy and practice. The first is the
birth of cause-promoting groups whose organizational realm falls largely within
internet space; we call these ‘dot causes’. The second is the growth of mass protest
against global capitalism that is often characterized by disruptive and sometimes
violent direct-action tactics. The emergence of dot causes and the anti-global
capitalism movement (hereafter called the ‘Movement’) are distinct; they are not
two sides of the same coin. However, they are concurrent, and there is a strong
link between them that merits study in order to better understand the distinctive
confidence, diversity and power of the Movement. This chapter explores how
they inter-relate.
There is a strong contemporary trend for civil society organizations (CSOs) to
build stronger and more formal transnational networks for international advocacy,
propelled by need and opportunity in the globalizing world. The growth of the
internet and information technologies is revolutionizing civil society advocacy
(see O’Brien et al, 2001; Smith, 1997) and is facilitating the formation of net-
works and coalitions (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Smith, 1997). These organi-
zational forms have lowered the costs of advocacy, enabling the entry of new
participants and increasing the potential for greater effectiveness, which offers
competition, as well as opportunities, to more conventional ‘bricks and mortar’
CSOs and new challenges to policy-makers. There are, to date, very few academic
110 Globalizing Civic Engagement

studies of this issue.1 We seek to address this gap by focusing on a new type of
advocacy network: the dot cause.
The term ‘dot cause’ can apply to any citizen group who promotes social
causes and chiefly mobilizes support through its website. Such groups fit Keck
and Sikkink’s (1998: 2) definition of ‘transnational advocacy networks’ as includ-
ing ‘those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound
together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchanges of informa-
tion and services’. In social movements, dot causes can be important mobilizing
structures, attracting new support, coordinating collective action and producing
and disseminating new framings, as is examined below.
As ‘virtual’ actors, dot causes arguably constitute a new type of organization
in the development arena. Some of the earliest examples were the Free Burma
campaign, starting in 1995, followed by campaigns against Shell in Ogoniland
and against McDonalds (O’Neill, 1999). The degree of virtualization and lack of
physical presence is exemplified by the anecdote that when the Coalition to Ban
Landmines (a dot cause) was awarded the Nobel Prize, it did not have a bank
account to receive the award money (Mekata, 2000). Although some dot causes
mobilize solely in ‘virtual space’ (such as Protest, OneWorld and IndyNews),
others combine it with local/national meetings (for example, the Association for
the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens – ATTAC – and
Globalise Resistance). In all cases, internet communications play a critical role in
resource and people mobilization, and in coordinating ‘real’ physical action,
such as street protests.
Their chief weaknesses are, firstly, that – in relying on the internet – they
have inherently weak mechanisms of information quality control and, secondly,
they do not (yet) offer an alternative to ‘face time’ in decision-making or design-
ing strategies for campaigns and events. They support, but do not replace, more
traditional advocacy and campaigning efforts, although they provide a central
meeting point for the concentration of social energy.
Dot causes can be networks of groups or individuals. They are often offshoots
of existing CSOs or umbrellas of CSOs who share common objectives. Internet
mediation of a global campaign can powerfully extend the reach of the core orga-
nizers of such campaigns. The best-known example of this is the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). This is a largely internet-mediated umbrella
of initially 50 (rising to several hundred) CSOs concerned with armaments, and
humanitarian and human rights issues (Mekata, 2000). Most of the practical
organization was conducted at the national or local level by the component
CSOs. However, the international coordination and common-strategy develop-
ment of ICBL enabled the whole to become much more than the sum of the
parts (and for this the network received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997). The suc-
cessful campaign to oppose an Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) proposed multilateral agreement on investment was, sim-
ilarly, an internet-mediated coordination of up to 600 non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) in over 70 countries throughout the world (Kobrin, 1998).
 The Age of Protest 111

When the primary participants in a dot cause are individual citizens, rather
than CSOs, however, different dynamics arise. The dot cause is no longer simply
a ‘wholesaler’, providing member CSOs with information and action ideas for
use with their constituencies. It now becomes a ‘retailer’ – directly communicat-
ing with the public and providing a deliberative space in which interested citi-
zens devise analysis and strategy. Dot causes are products of modern information
and communications technology (ICT) that facilitates and reduces the costs of
sharing information, linking together like-minded people and promoting events.
Since communications are pivotal, dot causes are transforming civil society advo-
cacy and will present growing challenges and opportunities for more conven-
tional ‘bricks-and-mortar’ CSOs, as well as for policy-makers.
One dot cause that attempts to draw links between web-activists and popular
movements is People’s Global Action (PGA), which sees itself as a coordination
mechanism, not an organization. It is not registered anywhere and has no spokes-
people, but it does have a manifesto. Its main activities are to coordinate anti-free
trade and anti-World Trade Organization (WTO) activities around the world, and
to organize a conference on these themes every two years. Its website is its main
point of contact with its supporters and the outside world. Globalise Resistance
and Reclaim the Streets are other dot causes that participate in the Movement.
Today’s protest Movement is historically the first social movement that has
dot causes as important mobilization structures. The next two sections discuss
some basic features that this creates. We then use a social movement analysis to
examine the emergence and growth of the Movement, and the role of dot causes
in it. We conclude by discussing the implications of our analysis and critical ques-
tions posed for academics, civil society and policy-makers.

THE ANTI-GLOBAL CAPITALISM MOVEMENT

The Movement now attracts much attention from the public, policy-makers and
academics alike. By bringing to prominence issues of globalization and global ine-
quality (Giddens, 2001), and by mobilizing thousands to protest against the cur-
rent regime of global governance, it played a major role in the collapse of the
1999 WTO ministerial negotiations in Seattle (Desai and Said, 2001b). The
Indian environmental activist Vandana Shiva argues: ‘a new threshold was crossed
in Seattle – a watershed towards the creation of a global citizen-based and citizen-
driven democratic order’ (Guardian, 8 December 1999). While the attribution of
policy changes to social movement action is plagued with uncertainty (Giuni,
1999), we believe that the Movement has already had an important impact upon
institutions of global governance and the development processes. The recent implied
support given by the German and former French prime ministers Gerhard Schroder
and Lionel Jospin to the Movement’s argument for a Tobin tax on foreign-exchange
transactions (Financial Times, 11 September 2001) illustrates this.
Inter-governmental organizations and their agendas are modifying in response
to pressure by global social movements (O’Brien et al, 2001). The fact that they
112 Globalizing Civic Engagement

engage at all with these movements demonstrates civil society power: global gover-
nance no longer rests solely with governments (O’Brien et al, 2001) but includes
actors such as social movements (Khagram et al, 2002).
Today’s protest movement fits the definition of a transnational social move-
ment, as ‘[a set] of actors with common purposes and solidarities linked across
country boundaries that have the capacity to generate coordinated and sustained
social mobilization in more than one country to publicly influence social change’
(Khagram et al, 2002: 5). It is extremely diverse (and, hence, generalizations have
to be used with caution) and combines a variety of organizational forms and ideo-
logical positions in relation to globalization. It has transnational sources of prob-
lems, transnational processes of collective action and transnational outcomes.
Moreover, it has been called a ‘movement of movements’ (Harding, 2002) because
it combines elements from older social movements, such as labour, environmental,
feminist, and peace movements (Desai and Said, 2001b), as well as NGOs, church
and neighbourhood groups. The Movement’s key organizational nodes, however,
are networks of individuals and organizations primarily interacting via the internet
(that is, dot causes).
The diversity means that the Movement is hard to define with precision, as
is its composition. Some key groups float in and out of its boundaries, depending
upon the issue at hand. Established NGOs such as Oxfam, Jubilee 2000 and
Friends of the Earth (FOE) would say they are not part of the Movement, though
they may have sympathy with it. They focus on many of the same issues and are
to be found at the same global events, often promoting similar arguments; but
they are often critical of the tactics and black-and-white analysis of the more
headline-grabbing direct-action components. Yet, there clearly is a symbiosis. The
mass protests have elevated the issues in the eye of the public, politicians and the
media, while the analysis of the established NGOs and trade unions have added
greatly to the Movement’s credibility. The combination of well-researched evi-
dence with mass mobilization and citizen outrage has proved compelling. Each
without the other would be unlikely to succeed.
This multifaceted nature leads to a terminological difficulty: the mainstream
press generally talks of the ‘anti-globalization movement’. Many prefer the title
‘anti-capitalism’ (for example, Desai and Said, 2001b). More recently, there have
been attempts by some within the Movement to base definitions on its proposals,
rather than on its oppositional character. Therefore, in the 2002 World Social
Forum (WSF; see Chapter 7), a declaration was approved by participants that the
Movement should strive for, and be called, the Movement for (Global) Peace and
Social Justice. Because of this terminological confusion, Klein (2001a) chooses
just to call it ‘the Movement’, which is also our preference.
Policy-makers have so far found it difficult to respond to the Movement.
They largely dismissed what some see as its precursor – the massive street protests
greeting the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank in Berlin in 1988, and in Madrid in 1994, since few in government
or the media took them seriously and closure of the meetings was not threatened.
However, since then, the disparate groups of protesters have come together, albeit
 The Age of Protest 113

loosely, to form a broad movement that has gained strength and attracted lively
media attention.
The turning point was the Seattle protest in 1999. Ironically, as discussed
below, the WTO negotiations failed largely due to rifts between governments
rather than the Movement’s persuasiveness or levels of protest. However, public
opinion largely credited the power of protest, which added to citizen support for
such protests (since they seemed effective), as well as to the resolve of policy-makers
not to allow this disparate movement to derail future global talks. This set the
battle stage for the 2001 summit meeting of the G7 countries in Genoa. Around
100,000 protesters took part and 20,000 police and military personnel were
deployed (Harris et al, 2001). Thus, the Movement attracted enormous attention.
A consequent strategy of policy-makers is to avoid, rather than curb, such
demonstrations. As a result, the 2001 WTO ministerial meeting was held in
Doha, Qatar.2 Protesters portrayed the use of an undemocratic venue as a ploy to
neutralize them, and it did, apparently, attenuate the demonstrations at the venue
itself. However, the whole negotiation process was closely monitored in ‘real time’
by activists, and was publicly disseminated via websites such as those of the World
Development Movement (WDM) and IndyNews (IndyNews website). These
alternative perspectives fostered a more critical citizen response than could have
been possible through using traditional mass media alone. Furthermore, national
demonstrations were held in more than 100 cities in 30 countries (Protest web-
site), mobilizing more people overall than Seattle did (George, 2002). Their
underlying message to policy-makers was that ‘you can run, but you can’t hide!’
The events of 11 September had an immediate curbing effect on the Move-
ment, taking a lot of its previously gained political space. Some protest events
were cancelled or turned into marches for peace, and some groups – strongly
critical of the US government – softened their tone or went into hibernation.
Not surprisingly, the media has dedicated very little attention to the Movement
since the war in Afghanistan (Taylor, 2002; George, 2002). There was some
early speculation of its terminal decline; but recent events reveal otherwise. In
particular, the mass participation of about 60,000 people and the global media
coverage of the second WSF show that it is far from dead. In the next section we
examine some of the key features of the Movement.

NEO-ANARCHISM AND THE LEADERSHIP DILEMMA

The methods of mobilizing any social movement influence its characteristics and
effectiveness, and vice versa (McAdam et al, 1996; Khagram et al, 2002). As will
be explored below, dot causes play an important role in the organization of the
Movement.3 And this, we argue, explains many of its characteristics, as well as its
rapid growth, particularly at the transnational level.
The internet provides much more than an exchange of information. It allows
conferences and conversations to be held instantaneously between North and
South, East and West, and from this a truly global movement has been spawned
(Harding, 2002). ‘The protest in Seattle was not an isolated, spontaneous event,
114 Globalizing Civic Engagement

but rather a conscious tactic of an increasingly coordinated and powerful move-

ment against globalization’ (Khagram et al, 2002).
The individual dot causes that are most prominent in the broader Movement
(such as Globalize Resistance, the Wombles and Reclaim the Streets, as well as
the coalitions organizing protests against the IMF, WTO or G8 meetings) are not
so much web-based organizations as organizational spaces. Based on the internet,
they are virtual meeting spaces for communities of interest, and facilitate identity
formation at a global level (see Warkentin, 2001). These dot causes, collectively,
offer a loose ideological framework (a rejection of global capitalism and today’s
structures of global governance); learning and exploration opportunities (especially
web-links to like-minded sites); illustrations of citizens’ actions (particularly, step-
by-step guides to direct action); the ability to bypass the traditional media; and
mobilization for large-scale events into which individual groups of activists can
plug their actions (such as the international protests and days of action).
In ‘virtual’ organizations, the lack of sustained physical contact reduces the
organization’s ability to generate trust (Handy, 1995). ‘The necessary trust to seri-
ously discuss agenda setting, strategies and risk management cannot be developed
by e-mail alone (if it is available)’ (Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2000: 2065). On the
other hand, the strength of a network is directly proportional to membership, fre-
quency of exchanges and the trust generated between network members (Keck and
Sikkink, 1998). Dot causes therefore need to find alternative ways of generating
trust and bonding, such as creating a network of ‘affinity groups’ who meet face-
to-face and developing a shared culture and language of ideological radicalism.
Unlike most CSOs and social movements, dot causes do not offer leadership
(or clear spokespeople), explicit political alternatives or detailed action strategy.
Herein lies the dilemma. To succeed, social movements usually need strong lead-
ership; yet, the internet medium – and the protest Movement that it has helped
to spawn – eschews strong leadership. Instead, the Movement celebrates equality;
followers are urged to be leaders, to think for themselves and to act as they
choose. ‘Arguably, the web helps those who so wish to defy leadership and formal
organization and, instead, promote their own initiatives’ (Scholte, 2001: 2). We
believe that this neo-anarchism (lack of leaders, common goals or unified strategy)
is an inevitable feature of the internet-mediation of citizens’ action, distinguishing
it from more traditional movements. For example, the goals and strategies of the
environmental and women’s movement of the 1970s and 1980s were well
defined, and many of its leaders are still household names today.
The nub of the dilemma is that the internet is a better medium for dissemi-
nating information and opinions than for building trust, developing coherence
and resolving controversies. Such dissemination is an essential starting point for
devising campaign strategies; but civil society has not yet discovered an alternative
to face-to-face meetings for planning strategy. It is common for dot causes to set a
date and place for a day of public demonstrations, and then encourage adherents
to come on a self-selecting basis to a planning meeting for the actual events – or
simply to get together with like-minded activists and devise something to bring to
the day of action. The outcome is more like a ‘carnival’ than an organized protest.
 The Age of Protest 115

To be more assertive would endanger the democratic characteristic of the Move-

ment. Since there aren’t conventional forums from which leadership can emerge
or be validated, it has made a hallmark of rejecting leadership. As networks, dot
causes offer a space for communication – not control – and any collective action
that ensues is the result of individual commitment and participation.
The extreme of leadership rejection is illustrated by one dot cause:

Who is in charge of Subversive Enterprises, International? No one…

Each member of Subversive Enterprises, International is responsible for
their own actions, and their own leadership… No one is higher than
anyone else. No one is lower than anyone else. We are a network, not a
bureaucracy. Feel free to consider yourself a member right now… The
only reason this ‘organization’ was formed, was that we hoped that
individuals like yourself (-selves) might be more encouraged to take
action if you knew that there were others out there like you, with similar
interests and goals. You want to start you own chapter/branch/franchise
of Subversive Enterprises, International? Go right ahead. We would
prefer that your agendas be somewhat compatible with ours, but anything
goes. (Subversive Enterprises International website).

Such inherent anarchism has three consequences for the Movement and its com-
ponents. Firstly, the most prominent figureheads are independent commentators
or ‘interpreters’ of the Movement, rather than leaders or spokespeople. Naomi
Klein, Lori Wallach, George Monbiot, Waldon Bello, Vandana Shiva and Noreena
Hertz are radical journalists and authors who are sympathetic to the demonstrators
but do not claim to ‘speak on behalf of’ the Movement, still less lead it. As dis-
cussed below, an important source of inspiration for the Movement is ‘Subcoman-
dante Marcos’ in Mexico, who has positioned himself as a poetic, philosophical
advocate of the Zapatista cause but energetically denies any pretension to leader-
ship (hence the lowly title he has assigned himself).
Secondly, though the infrastructure of the mass protests is well planned
(including training sessions in direct action; technical assistance in the manufac-
ture of giant puppets; legal services for those arrested; catering; accommodation;
and crèche facilities), the component events are left up to smaller groups of
activists, as is the choice of target (the specific injustice of global capitalism to be
resisted). The net effect is that these events, and the Movement more broadly, do
not promote one specific cause, as have other modern social movements – such as
women’s movements, the environment movement, peasants’ movements or gay/
lesbian rights movements. Its protagonists are not so much marketers of a ‘brand’
(a particular ideology or cause) as the organizers of a ‘protest mall’, a one-stop shop
for multifocused demonstrators – all and sundry are invited to come, browse and
participate in whichever stall most attracts them.
Thirdly, tactical schisms split the Movement. Many are strong advocates of
non-violence, eschewing damage to property and the use of physical force or
threatening behaviour. Conversely, others (such as Global Action) retaliate that
116 Globalizing Civic Engagement

these activists are irrelevant and promote the use of violent tactics (quaintly
described in one website as ‘projectile reasoning’) – claiming that nothing would
have been achieved at Seattle had it not been for the violence (Cockburn and St
Clair, undated). Being predicated on each activist group deciding for itself what
action to take, it follows that everything goes. There are no rules. Even though
the large majority might opt for non-violent activities, a few will often take the
violent course. Since the latter command most of the media attention and deter-
mine the policing strategy adopted for the overall event, the Movement has
become characterized by violence. This split over tactics was evident in Genoa
and has become more apparent in the aftermath of 11 September.
Much has changed in the Movement between the street protests of Berlin in
1988 and those of Seattle in 1999 and beyond. West Berlin’s conditions for pro-
test were extraordinary. The protest was considered the centre of the leftist and
alternative movements in West Germany, and 80,000 people demonstrated. The
next year, the IMF–World Bank meetings were held in Washington, DC, and
only a handful of protesters gathered (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992: 570). But ten
years later about 50,000 attended the Seattle protests (Financial Times, 4 Decem-
ber 1999) – the largest public demonstration in the US on an international issue
in a generation. More importantly, unlike a decade before, Seattle was followed by
other mass protests in Washington, DC, in 2000; Prague in 2000; Gothenburg
in 2000; Genoa in 2001; and Florence in 2002 – not to mention a myriad of
protests taking place during Mayday or the 2001 WTO ministerial meeting. In
Seattle, over 1500 groups lent support for the protests (The Economist, 11 Decem-
ber 1999), compared to around 133 in Berlin (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992). Inter-
estingly, both the Berlin and Seattle protests comprised mostly local and national
protesters; but Seattle attained an international character because groups
throughout the world could hear about it and participate indirectly via the web
(Nauthton, 2001). Between 1988 and 2002 the internet revolutionized commu-
nications. However, the role of the internet, in general, and of dot causes, in par-
ticular, in this growth and transformation remains largely unexplored. We will
now try to address this gap.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT ANALYSIS

From the rich theoretical landscape of social movement theory, we find the eclec-
tic approach of McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) most useful. McAdam et al
(1996) study social movements by focusing on three factors:

• the structure of political opportunities and constraints;

• the collective processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction
that mediate between opportunity and action (ie framing processes); and
• the forms of organization, informal as well as formal (ie mobilizing structures).

We discuss each in turn, although all of these factors are inter-related (McAdam
et al, 1996: 8–9).
 The Age of Protest 117

As mobilizing structures, dot causes may play a number of roles in the

Movement:

• helping to create a transnational awareness of shared interests or conflicts;

• providing a network outside of people’s neighbourhoods, social groups and
political allegiances;
• strengthening transnational collective identities and frames; and
• helping to identify political opportunities and resources at both national and
international levels (see Tarrow, 2001: 13).

We will show that the way in which dot causes play these roles have implications
for the definition of the Movement.

Political opportunities
Political opportunities refer to the ‘external conditions in the political sphere that
help [a movement’s] emergence and development’ (McAdam et al, 1996). Dot
causes seek out and exploit political opportunities to further their cause – partic-
ularly political pressure points that arise at international and national levels.
Four developments in the political opportunities structure have been of particu-
lar relevance.
The first is the increasing tension between governments concerning global
governance and the management of globalization. Divisions between North and
South, and between Europe and the US, have become manifest, as has a dwindling
public faith in the fairness of unrestrained markets. Widening disparities both
within and between countries has sharpened concerns about exclusion, and the
rapid contagion of economic crisis has called into question whether capital mar-
kets (at least) need more, rather than less, regulation (Stiglitz, 2002; Wade, 2001).
Secondly, the internet has allowed previously opaque processes of inter-
governmental negotiations to become demystified and accessible. Citizens now feel
quite well informed and empowered to intervene in these processes. Dot causes
provide the opportunity. They can communicate to wide audiences information
that would otherwise be politically ‘filtered’ by vested interests. By providing evi-
dence of poor performance and malpractice, dot causes have helped a more con-
fident movement capable of mobilizing thousands to grow.
Thirdly, throughout much of the world there is a profound loss of faith in
traditional institutions of democracy, particularly as citizens are increasingly con-
cerned that decisions affecting their lives are not taken in national parliaments
but in transnational governmental or corporate forums. This ‘democracy deficit’
presents a lacuna into which globally organized citizens’ movements seek to step
(Boggs, 2001; O’Brien et al, 2001).
Fourthly, there is a general reluctance of Western states to repress the protests.
Effective mobilization requires national as well as international political oppor-
tunity, and this varies widely across the globe. The Movement has, undoubtedly,
been stronger in countries of ‘tolerant regimes’ and sometimes ‘weak regimes’
with little propensity for repression (see Tilly, 1978).
118 Globalizing Civic Engagement

These four developments contributed to the drama of protests surrounding

the 1990 WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle. A failure of the European Union
(EU) and US trade negotiators to agree on basic objectives left the talks in disar-
ray. Those negotiators, together with other G8 counterparts, spent much time
behind closed doors trying to resolve their differences, leaving developing country
negotiators feeling angry and politically marginalized. The leading economies
preached free markets and the global good, but appeared to adopt strategies based
on narrow, short-term self-interest. In particular, it appeared that the US govern-
ment sought a fully open global market for its exporters, investors and service
providers, but was not prepared to relinquish any of its own protectionist policies
(Oxfam, 2002). The WTO appeared to both developing countries and citizens’
groups as a vehicle for global Americanization. The ensuing confusion – all but a
handful of negotiators were excluded from the pivotal deliberations – under-
scored CSOs’ condemnation of the governance of globalization (and of WTO
specifically), and appeared to confirm a widespread public alarm about the failure
of democratic institutions to affect decisions of life-shaping importance.
Against this unedifying backdrop, and the relative unwillingness of the US
Clinton administration to repress the protests, the Movement (broadly defined
to include the dot causes, NGOs and trade unions who urged their supporters to
demonstrate) staged the ‘Battle of Seattle’. The protesters’ deep conviction that
something was very wrong with the WTO process hit a chord. Disgruntled nego-
tiators from developing countries added credence to this case, as did the presence,
on the streets, of trade unionists, churchgoers, environmentalists and human
rights activists, alongside more anarchic protesters. That thousands of people
demanded justice and a new approach struck many as a prescient and appropriate
public response. And the violence perpetrated by some of the protesters, together
with police over-reaction, guaranteed global mass-media coverage. Globalization
became a clearly contested political issue.
Subsequently, almost any high-level inter-governmental meeting has been
seen by the Movement as a political opportunity to promote it. With relative ease
of travel (except to places where civil liberties are restricted and to meetings con-
vened at short notice), it has proved possible to mobilize thousands of people to
gather for counter-protests at these events. The guaranteed presence of journalists
from around the world – who are captives of the meetings, all thirsting for new
angles – provides plenty of opportunity to get alternative views across. And for
those seeking adventure, the prospect of disrupting the official meetings, if only
for an hour or two, provides an enticing goal. Thus, opportunities facilitate social
movement action; but this action also fosters opportunities (Tarrow, 1996).

Cultural framings
Cultural framings refer to the presence of shared cultural models that facilitate
mobilization. Social movements connect people with causes through developing
collective identities and a community of interest around a shared condition.
Framing, as McAdam et al (1996: 6) describe, is about ‘the conscious strategic
 The Age of Protest 119

efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of

themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’.
The roots of social movements lie in shared experience and a shared sense of
grievance (McAdam et al, 1996). In today’s Movement, the grievances are so
many and so diverse (ranging from worry about job security, corporate greed,
developing world debt and HIV/AIDS, to concerns of war ‘against terrorism’,
cultural take-over and environmental destruction) that there is little common
thread other than the conviction that the current globalization process lies behind
it all. This ‘cluster-of-movements’ characteristic (Desai and Said, 2001b) adds to
the plurality of visions and standpoints – a diversity magnified by it being a trans-
national movement. This loose definition of grievance, and the consequent lack
of consensus about goals, is a defining feature of the Movement.
In general, social movements tend to be anti-systemic (O’Brien et al, 2001)
and involve marginalized groups wanting some political change (see O’Brien et
al, 2000; Smith et al, 1997). Today’s Movement is strongly ‘counter-cultural’
(Kriesi, 1996: 158), organizing against a cultural template rather than for specific
public goods. What unites its different elements is not a demand for specific
reforms, but the rejection of ‘global capitalism’ and its influence on culture and
human relations (Klein, 2000). This is the Movement’s ‘master frame’ to which
all group and individual frames are pegged. There may be agreement on specific
injustices stemming from today’s management of globalization; but there is con-
siderable disagreement on the extent to which the current system is condemned
and – more so – on what should be put in its place. It is, as Subcomandante
Marcos has put it, a movement of ‘one big no and many small yesses’. As an
alternative and cheap new medium, dot causes have greatly contributed to this
ideological pluralism, giving voice to many previously unheard groups.
Although the Movement is defined by counter-cultural motivations, some
constituents have instrumentalist goals. Many within it strive for specific collective
goods, such as debt relief, cheap generic drugs for HIV/AIDS and the reduction
of carbon emission. These instrumentalist groupings tend to be more moderate,
while the more counter-cultural groups tend to be more radical. Because of their
low level of institutionalization, dot causes frequently populate the more radical
zone, while traditional CSOs tend to be more instrumental.
One of the most important influences for this new civil society dynamic has
been the Zapatistas National Liberation Army (EZLN) in Mexico. This popular
uprising has aspired not to speak on behalf of the indigenous people of Chiapas,
but to allow them to speak for themselves. It declares no leader (Subcomandante
Marcos describes himself as just a conduit through which the communities
express themselves). It has an inclusive and pro-democracy ethos, but beyond this
is highly plural. Every community decides for itself; the poorest peasant is the true
comandante (De Leon, 2001). Its central message is a new form of democracy
(akin to old anarchism). It puts great premium on skilful communications, partic-
ularly using the internet. Its messages are not dull polemics, but are witty, poetic,
spiritual and designed to be inspirational. ‘It is often said that the Zapatistas’ best
weapon was the internet; but their true secret weapon was their language’ (Klein,
120 Globalizing Civic Engagement

2001b). The Zapatista movement has directly influenced the anti-capitalist move-
ment worldwide through its frames and outreach. There are now estimated to be
45,000 Zapatista-related websites in 26 countries (Klein, 2001b).
With their ability to facilitate communications, dot causes have a pivotal role
in producing and disseminating critical or subversive framings, and in promoting
new collective identities, such as the Zapatista message. Mobilizing anger against
the ‘legitimacy gap’ of global governance institutions such as the IMF, the World
Bank or the WTO illustrates this. The Movement requires sustainable alternative
media that emphasize solidarity rather than self-interest. Dot causes that inhabit
the internet provide such media.
The paradox is that the strength of the Movement is also its weakness. Its
multifaceted nature and diverse strategies encourage and empower a wide diver-
sity of adherents; but these adherents connect personally with the Movement in
widely differing ways. The young middle class of the US or Europe might be
anxious about an approaching global environmental Armageddon, or feel alien-
ated from political processes over which they have no say. Trade union members
feel threatened by the drift towards flexible labour markets and the ease with
which transnational corporations shift production from one country to another.
Peasants in the South feel threatened by the pressure for agricultural markets to
be opened to (probably subsidized) foods from rich countries, while Northern
protectionism denies them the chance to export reciprocally. Southern factory
workers fear that introducing labour and environmental standards in world trade
will present an excuse for banning the importation of their products. Each group
within the broad Movement has its distinctive personal connection with the core
issue; but these connections are so diverse as to be frequently contradictory
(Desai and Said, 2001a).
For many, the internet has democratized communications. By providing an
alternative and cheaper medium, dot causes have helped to increase the pluralism
of the globalization debate. However, the stark inequalities of access to new infor-
mation technology – the digital divide – casts a shadow over the ability of these
networks to truly democratize communications at the global level. New frames
are being produced and disseminated; but there is a danger that they contain a
strong Western bias. Undeniably, however, dot causes represent a new form of
participation and increase the pluralism of political debate.

Mobilizing structures
Mobilizing structures comprise both conventional (formal and informal) and
‘virtual’ organizations and networks that facilitate collective action and social
movement formation. In the case of the Movement, they include both tradi-
tional CSOs, such as trade unions and environmental groups; but a pivotal role
is played by the new phenomenon of dot causes. These offer reduced costs of
communication, greater diversity of concerns, increased prospects for generating
widespread action of these concerns, and maximum outreach, including to new
constituencies. The ability to network in a society facilitates mobilization (Tilly,
1978), and dot causes undoubtedly enhance this.
 The Age of Protest 121

Dot causes gain influence by offering alternative mass media and sources of
information (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 19). To communicate, protest move-
ments rely on both traditional and novel mass communications. Until recently,
widespread dissemination was very expensive – either directly (paying for mail-
ings, posters or advertisements) or indirectly (newspapers that promote a radical
cause risk losing advertising revenue; television stations that are regarded as
politically biased risk loss of franchise; and political parties who champion fringe
causes risk loss of donations and members). Today, completely new channels are
available at very low cost, such as the dot causes and the alternative news web-
sites – for example, the Independent Media Centre (in English) or Nodo50 (in
Spanish). These are also more convenient, more convincing and more interactive
for a growing slice of the population, particularly the youth, than is the tradi-
tional mass media.
Hence, for the Mayday 2001 protests in London, millions of people received
information, as well as political propaganda, from the wide array of websites
promoting protests or direct action (including Mayday Monopoly, London
Mayday, Mayday Conference, the Wombles, Globalize Resistance, Direct Action,
Reclaim the Streets, People’s Global Action, Guerrilla Gardening, Primal Seeds
and anarchist sites). Groups seeking to change public opinion didn’t need news-
papers and other old means of communications to mobilize support; they were
betting on new communications, and they didn’t trust media that depend, directly
or indirectly, on capitalism.4
Dot causes bypass the ‘middle man’ of conventional social mobilization. Many
see little need for national or regional sections, local groups or other structures,
and there is a direct and two-way link from the organizers to the supporters – so
that the supporters become the organizers. Anyone can post their views and
experience, enter a chat-room and perhaps become part of the leadership; the
periphery becomes the core.
Dot causes tend to be highly horizontal, voluntary and extremely fluid –
traits that generate both strengths and weaknesses. Dot causes, having neither
the reputation of established CSOs to defend nor structured processes of public
accountability, may not have the same standards of ethics and accuracy. They
tend to promote single issues but collectively are quite plural. On any given cause
there are large numbers of websites or dot causes (usually hyper-linked) present-
ing a veritable market-place of causes and opinions. The strength of specific web-
sites depends upon their direct appeal (the test of the market). These traits shape
the type of movement generated. Disdain of leaders makes dot causes less vulner-
able to cooptation, but also reduces their ability to promote clear alternatives.
As a global cause, the Movement needs strong Southern participation, which
is only practicable via electronic communications, and through this the involve-
ment of Southern activists has increased (Warkentin, 2001). Although the internet
permits global mobilization, in practice there are still many physical, monetary
and cultural obstacles.
Unequal familiarity with new technology and access to resources leads to a
North–South tension. Many Southern activists see events such as Seattle and global
122 Globalizing Civic Engagement

social movements as very Northern (or US) dominated (O’Brien et al, 2001),
focusing primarily on issues of Northern concern (for example, the protection of
the US environment, US jobs and US markets; US citizens wanting to have clear
consciences about child labour; and reducing pressures for illegal migration).
They are angry that issues of concern to the South (such as the way in which agri-
culture is dealt with in WTO talks) are not addressed. And events that are largely
Southern organized (such as the citizens actions at the UN Conference on Trade
and Development – UNCTAD – meetings in Thailand in 2000 and the first
World Social Forum – WSF) attract very few Northerners.
Although information on the number of visitors to dot-cause websites is
scant, it is evident that many are very effective disseminators. The Mexican Zap-
atista movement claims that over 2 million visitors have visited its site, 1 million
in 2001 alone (EZLN website). ATTAC’s website received 16,000–20,000 hits
per hour during Porto Alegre in 2002. Normally, it gets over 1000 visitors per day
(George, 2002). An independent counter of site visitors claims that Nodo50.org
(a Spanish dot cause) has received 825,004 visits between September 1997 and
December 2001 (Nedstat website). Furthermore, there is a profusion of such dot
causes. Estimating numbers is difficult; but one indicator is that over 50,000 web
pages contain the term ‘anti-globalization’ (Google website). Dot causes also tend
to be well linked between them and to other websites. For example, ATTAC has
over 3000 internet links to its website (Google website).
Though not without difficulties, the Movement powerfully illustrates the
potential that dot causes have in bringing together actors who would not nor-
mally share the same stage (for example, the anti-landmines campaign). This is
partly because the internet enables the participation of CSOs from far-flung cor-
ners of the world (the ‘defeat of distance’); but also because this medium is par-
ticularly conducive to transient partnerships – the alliance of politically and
culturally very different CSOs for a specific, perhaps time-bound, purpose. This
‘blending of ideology’ is tacitly accepted for reasons of expediency because it
entails no commitment beyond the specific cause at hand, and because it entails
little impact on the component CSOs’ own style and support base. Depending
upon the task at hand, this can be both a strength and a weakness of dot causes.

CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

Dot causes are networks – mobilizing structures – that promote cultural framings
and exploit political opportunities in order to generate collective action. The
neo-anarchist nature of the Movement and the chaotic nature of the internet
combine to generate great variety. Dot causes can vary from an individual’s web-
site to the complex transnational sites of networks such as Ya Basta!
Though new, there are signs of tension within the governance and manage-
ment of dot causes, paralleling those found in traditional CSOs. The leadership
dilemma presents a particular problem for both dot causes and the Movement.
Where leaders are in evidence, they tend to be self-appointed, with poorly
 The Age of Protest 123

defined accountability and an unclear mandate, and their process decisions are
often resented. In the first WSF, many participants were angry with the strict
control of the organizers and with the fact that although anyone could organize a
workshop, only a chosen few (mostly white men in their 50s) got to speak from
the main platform. Klein speaks of the ‘yawning democratic deficit’ and describes
how some participants even staged a protest against the organizers (Klein, 2001c).
Decision-making tends to rest on fluid leadership and haphazard processes –
such as whoever turns up to a particular meeting. This may be fine when it comes
to organizing multicause protests or critiquing ‘the system’, but does not lend
itself to building consensus on alternatives (other than a vaguely defined new
grassroots democracy). There is agreement on what is wrong with the world, but
not on what should be put in its place. The two WSFs were intended to address
this gap but have had limited success in this regard (see Chapter 7).
However, the specific targets of injustice make powerful campaigns: unjust
trade, developing world debt and global governance. Through these, the Move-
ment is trying to influence the main players and rules of development.
Our exploration of the Movement and the dot causes that mobilize for it sug-
gests various questions for future consideration.

Questions for researchers

Some critical questions about dot causes and their role in the Movement deserve
further research.

How can theory account for the emergence of the Movement?

Most social movement scholarship suggests that transnational social movements
are hard to sustain (for example, Khagram et al, 2002; McCarthy, 1997; Tarrow,
2001); yet, today’s vocal and, apparently, durable protest Movement seems to
contradict this. We suggest that the roles of dot causes in the Movement provide
critical clues to help explain its strength and longevity.

What is the impact of the Movement and of dot causes on world development?
Business interests have traditionally had much more access to institutions of glo-
bal governance than CSOs, but this may be changing. Dot causes and other
CSOs have increased pluralism in development policy-making, demanding that
these institutions be accountable for the impact of their policies on women, the
environment, the poor and labour (O’Brien et al, 2001). How successful are these
demands? How is this changing global governance? Who is empowered to par-
ticipate? Are Southern concerns promoted as energetically as Northern interests?
As the profile of the typical internet user is young, white, male and English-
speaking, the contribution of dot causes to global democracy and pluralism is
inevitably limited (Scholte, 2001). Is a ‘digital divide’ emerging within global
civil society? Who chooses the agenda that is promoted?
124 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Can dot causes be effective, in the long run, with a weak local base of support?
Jordan and Van Tuijl (2000) argue that the ‘iron law of transnational advocacy’
is that NGOs must maintain their local links in order to be successful transna-
tionally. While some dot causes have ‘affinity groups’, they rely mainly on vir-
tual communications between members and between groups. Can, and should,
dot causes attempt to build geographically located constituencies? Can epistemic
communities replace geographical communities in advocacy and collective
action? Are dot causes more effective as wholesalers to other groups, or as retailers
to individual members?

Questions for civil society organizations

For many existing CSOs, the new virtual organizations pose many dilemmas and
questions.

Should they cooperate or distance themselves?

Expediency suggests cooperation with dot causes that share aims, concerns and
analysis on specific issues; but overall style and agreement on tactics are also
important. Most CSOs find that the informality and radical counter-cultural
stance of most dot causes makes structured cooperation difficult.

How compatible are the goals?

A social movement is more likely to be successful if its component groups share
compatible goals; otherwise, it will be split by internal dissent (McAdam et al,
1996). CSOs operating within the Movement must compare their own organiza-
tional goals with those of others in the Movement. If there is basic compatibility,
collaboration will be more sustainable.

Does the Movement’s radicalism open up or close down political space?

Because social movements normally try to influence policy on behalf of marginal-
ized and resource-poor groups, they frequently use disruptive tactics (McCarthy,
1997). Does such radicalism increase the potency of more moderate elements
within the Movement, at least in terms of their dialogue with officials, or does it lead
to officials developing a ‘bunker mentality’ regarding civil society? In the stretched
spectrum of political views, are traditional CSOs comfortable with no longer
being the radical David battling the Goliath of corporations and governments –
especially when the newcomers often depict them as being ‘part of the system’?

How serious is the tactical schism?

Different elements of a social movement must reach basic agreement on means
as well as goals. Those seeking to dialogue with policy-makers perceive a need to
distance themselves from both the carnival and carnage aspects of mass protests.
Yet, they know only too well that the popular appeal and the media attention
 The Age of Protest 125

generated by the Movement have elevated causes that they espouse beyond their
dreams, and that this opens up space for them to advance their proposals. Many
traditional CSOs find it difficult to decide whether to endorse demonstrations
and encourage their supporters to take part, knowing there may be violence and
attacks on property.
Some, such as Oxfam, find themselves critical of the critics: ‘the isolationist
and protectionist tendencies on display at Seattle, Washington and other public
demonstrations against the international order show that short-sightedness and
selfishness are not exclusive to politics, bureaucracy or business’ (Oxfam Interna-
tional, 2000). Jubilee 2000 and the World Development Movement (WDM)
have found that anarchist groups’ campaigns on developing world debt present
more problems than opportunities (for example, in Prague) as they constricted
the space for lobbying and made many supporters feel ‘used’ by the demonstra-
tors (Pettifor, 2001; WDM, 2001).
Friends of the Earth (FOE), however, welcomes the protests, though it does
not actually encourage its supporters to take part. How else, it asks, would we be
having such a wide debate about the WTO or genetically modified organisms
(GMOs)? FOE sees a symbiosis between protesters set on confrontation and
those striking deals with business. FOE benefits from the elevation of issues on
the public agenda, while the protesters draw credibility from FOE’s serious
research and policy analysis.
Some argue that closer links should be forged between protesters and cam-
paigning NGOs (Woods, 2000) and that a failure to do so will render these mass
anti-globalization protests a wasted opportunity – little more than ‘political tourism’.
It is important to recognize, Woods (2000) argues, that protesters and NGOs are
employing different tactics but that tactical diversity is essential. Others com-
ment, however, that in this age of civil society ascendancy, CSOs who engage in
transnational advocacy need to boost their own legitimacy and accountability (for
example, Florini, 2000). Forming close links with the radical fringe might fuel
the backlash of criticism to which CSOs are increasingly subject.

Questions for policy-makers

Dot causes and the Movement, in general, have done much to create the public
perception of a democratic deficit in institutions of global governance. On the
other hand, good relations with social movement organizations ‘may make for
smoother acceptance of an expanding governing role of [these] institutions’
(O’Brien et al, 2001: 20). Three critical questions for policy-makers are as follows.

How can the violence, disruption and negative press be contained?

A reliance on ever-stronger police and military presence adds to the media spec-
tacle and is, therefore, what the violent demonstrators really want; it also risks
loss of life and is expensive. Conversely, holding key international meetings in
locations that are hard for citizens to reach contributes to a sense of exclusion
and a widening gulf between decision-makers and the public. The ideal is to
126 Globalizing Civic Engagement

revert to easy-access locations, but with agreements reached with protesters to

cooperate with the police in order to ensure that no violence or property damage
occurs and to facilitate the arrest of violators. This necessitates responsibility on
the part of the protest organizers, but also calls for better discipline on the part of
policy-makers. No such deal could be possible without a quid pro quo of giving
more airtime, within the meeting itself, to civil society members and Southern
voices, and of giving more attention to social concerns.

How best to build dialogue with the Movement?

Though policy-makers in most countries now regularly talk with CSOs, this
tends to be about quite specific policy issues and is restricted to the more-estab-
lished CSOs. Policy-makers must recognize that there is a mounting popular
clamour for social justice and environmentalism to be inherent in the way that
globalization is managed. Hence, policy-makers need to engage at a senior and
serious level with CSO leaders, including those who play pivotal roles in shaping
public opinion – not just those with whom policy-makers feel comfortable.
Exclusion of prominent but radical voices will give the impression of a ‘divide-
and-rule’ tactic (though exclusion of those who continue to advocate violent or
highly disruptive tactics might be justifiable). Policy-makers need to work with
civil society in order to build a common view of what has been called ‘ethical glo-
balization’ (Clark, 2001).

Will the Movement match the challenges facing it?

Will the Movement grow in power or simply disintegrate? What will be the role
of dot causes in the future? It is too soon to tell; but whatever its course, the
Movement has already started a public debate that will have enduring conse-
quences for globalization and world development.

NOTES
1 For a survey of the brief literature on new technologies and civil society advocacy,
see O’Neill (1999), Warkentin (2001) and Naughton (2001).
2 The avoidance strategy has continued. For example, the 2002 G8 meeting was held
in Kananaskis, a remote area of Canada.
3 The evidence for this claim is diverse, including activists in the protest movement (for
example, Klein, 2000; Evan Henshaw-Plath in the Protest website); media analysis
(for example, Financial Times, 30 April 1998; The Economist, 11 December 1999; El
País website, ‘Anti-globalization’ section); government agencies (Canadian Security
Intelligence Service, 2000); as well as anti-globalization websites themselves (for
example, the IndyNews and Globalise Resistance websites).
4 To be sure, the Movement still needs the traditional mass media in order to reach a
wider public and to influence public opinion. But the growth of the internet has led
to the creation of an alternative communications medium with the potential to reach
thousands, or even millions, without using traditional mass media.
 Chapter 7

World Social Forum:

Making Another World Possible?

Günther Schönleitner

The World Social Forum (WSF) in 2002 in Porto Alegre was the second annual
international gathering of transnational civil society in counterpoint to the World
Economic Forum (WEF) of business leaders and the political elite in Davos. Its
emergence is, in various ways, remarkable. Firstly, its scale makes it one of the
most impressive and truly global examples of transnational civic activism. Sec-
ondly, it attempts to transform a heterogeneous global protest movement into a
positive-cause protagonist of global policy change, enabling the movement to
come together for the first time in order to define its own agenda rather than
merely reacting to agendas set by governments. The WSF sees itself as recasting
the WEF. Within two years, Grzybowski (2002) celebrates, they have become seen
as ‘anti-Porto Alegre’. Thirdly, the WSF functions as an intermediate structure
that inter-links citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs) from different
countries, playing a potentially crucial bridging role for the formation of transna-
tional social movements.
Yet, the WSF also reflects the tensions and contradictions inherent in forging
the collective endeavours of many heterogeneous civil society actors across country
boundaries. The WSF slogan – ‘another world is possible’ – is essentially empty.
This ‘other’ world could be better or worse than today’s, depending upon sub-
jective value judgements. The fact that the WSF has failed to present a positive-
value slogan epitomizes the dilemmas it faces in managing the tension between a
diversity of actors and values and clarity in defining alternatives to neo-liberal
globalization. This chapter describes how the WSF has responded to these ten-
sions and contradictions, the structures and governance it has evolved, and the
challenges it faces as it strives to become a truly global process.1
128 Globalizing Civic Engagement

The chapter is divided into six sections. The first examines the emergence of
the WSF and its founding mandate. The second discusses how this translated into
WSF’s organizational structures, and the tensions and dilemmas that appeared
within its evolution. The third section examines the WSF’s boundaries – who is
in and who is out – and describes the diversity of actors, highlighting the most
important internal divisions. The fourth describes four underlying functions of
the WSF, and how these aim to bridge the contradiction between maximizing
diversity and generating coherent alternatives to neo-liberal globalization. This
highlights a major internal schism between two camps with conflicting views on
the nature of the WSF project. The fifth section discusses efforts to transform the
WSF into a permanent and decentralized venture. The final section examines the
WSF’s organizational form, arguing that it currently combines elements of
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), transnational social
movements and networks; the likely evolutionary path will depend upon up-
coming decisions concerning its mandate.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE WORLD SOCIAL FORUM

The essential context of the WSF’s emergence is the international movement
against neo-liberal globalization and the rise of international bodies of global
governance. These geopolitical phenomena have intensified the globalization of
civic activism by expanding the scope of questions that can only be addressed by
working globally. The WSF charter explicitly states its opposition to neo-liberal
globalization as a defining characteristic of its participants. The anti-globalization
movement has clearly conveyed what it is opposed to, but has found it difficult to
explain what it actually stands for. Hence, the public perceive it to have a ‘char-
acter of protest and resistance, as if there were no alternative proposals’ (inter-
view: Tibúrcio).
The WSF was created to address this lack of a coherent alternative vision, and
to strengthen the proactive, rather than the reactive, capacity of the movement.
Any attempt to produce such alternatives in a closed circle of activists and intel-
lectuals would have been seen as illegitimate; it had to be a broad-based exercise.
But assembling global civil society for such a task would face formidable obsta-
cles. What would motivate and mobilize civil society actors to participate, with-
out attracting some but alienating others? What would make it exciting and
media worthy? How can one combine the unifying effects of confronting a com-
mon enemy with the less unifying task of visioning a ‘new world’? And who
would take the lead?
The idea to create a World Social Forum in opposition to, but inspired by,
the World Economic Forum, was born by Oded Grajew of CIVES, the Brazilian
Association of Entrepreneurs for Citizenship. It developed in discussions between
Grajew, Francisco Whitaker of the Brazilian Commission for Peace and Justice
(CBJP), linked to the Catholic Church, and Bernard Cassen of the Association
for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC-France;
see Chapter 8). It would build on the ‘anti’ character of the movement by using
 World Social Forum: Making Another World Possible? 129

‘anti-Davos’ as a unifying polarization. The metaphor of oppositions – eco-

nomic versus social; North versus South – of the two forums was highly sym-
bolic, galvanized the movement and attracted international media attention.
The forum idea was attractive because it is open ended:

In Davos…they haven’t reached agreements. They haven’t made decla-

rations. It has been a forum for thinking, and it has been successful.
Our intention is [similar], although [our]…perspective is to rethink
the world from the point of view of society (interview: Grzybowski).

A forum allows the huge diversity of civil society actors comprising the move-
ment to come together, while imposing minimal commitments and common
standards. The charter of principles defines the WSF as ‘an open meeting place
for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free
exchange of experiences, and inter-linking for effective action’. The response of
both civil society and the media to the WSF has been massive and growing, as
figures from the WSF secretariat attest (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 Numbers participating in World Social Forums

Delegates Registered civil society Countries Accredited

organizations (CSOs) represented journalists
WSF 2001 4702 13962 117 1870
WSF 2002 12274 4909 123 3356

When cautious estimates of the non-delegate participants (‘listeners’) are included,

these figures rise to 10,000 in 2001, and 50,000 in 2002. As Oliveira points out
in interview: ‘everything indicates that the diverse organizations of civil society
were potentially lacking such a space, because the idea spread like fire in the hay-
loft’. Why was the response so massive? The novelty of the WSF is that it pro-
vides a multi-issue arena for debate within civil society, for combining protest
with learning, for building bridges between themes and sectors, and for fostering
new networking opportunities.
A study on the WSF 2001 by the Fundação Perseu Abramo (FPA) suggests
that it may be this multifaceted character of the forum or, as Naomi Klein puts
it, a ‘strange hybrid’ of a model United Nations (UN) teach-in, political conven-
tion and a party (Klein, 2001: 2) that the participants liked. They cited the most
important reasons for participating as protesting against neo-liberal globalization
(34 per cent of respondents); listening to, and learning from, speakers and the
invited contributors (22 per cent); and exchanging experiences with activists of
common causes (19 per cent). At the same time, 72 per cent of respondents
found the forum to be ‘very important’ for formulating alternatives to neo-liber-
alism. However, fewer felt that it actually fulfilled this function: 47 per cent
found the WSF ‘very pro-positive’ and 27 per cent ‘more or less’ so. Unfortu-
nately, no such study is available on the second WSF.
130 Globalizing Civic Engagement

What triggered the WSF? It is part of a broader dialectic opposition to neo-

liberalism and a search for what might follow it (interview: Sader). It responds dia-
lectically to the WEF and to triumphalist proclamations of the ‘end of history’:

The difference of the WSF relative to Seattle is that it is not about spe-
cific negotiations; it’s about a perspective. Therefore, the WEF is the
counterpoint… If the WEF didn’t exist, would we? I don’t think so.
The counter-position is a law of life. [The WEF], in fact, proposed
counter-socialism. They were successful, but they have created an
enemy – us. In all social struggles you first create an enemy. Who will
we create over time (interview: Grzybowski)?

The impressive response to the WSF suggests that the lack of coherent ‘pro-’ posi-
tions has been a widespread concern among activists, and reflects the secular rise
of global civil society that ‘both feeds on and reacts to globalization’ (Anheier et
al, 2001: 7). The internet has been a major tool of mobilization. The WSF’s
website made information widely accessible in four languages. During the second
WSF, it received about 500,000 visitors per day (interview: Mondonça). The
registration of delegates and the planning of workshops were achieved through
the web; the e-mail bulletins keep delegates and others updated; and almost all
internal communication and external liaison has been done via internet and
mobile phones. Without modern information and communications technology
(ICT), the WSF would hardly be possible in its current form.
How can highly heterogeneous global forums instigate global policy change?
WEF played a significant role in promoting the neo-liberal agenda of the 1980s
and 1990s by forging an intellectual alternative based on neo-classical economic
theory and its faith in market mechanisms. The alternative the WSF is seeking is
based on less clear theoretical foundations, focusing on grassroots democracy
and citizen choice. It therefore must accommodate a heterogeneous movement
of, in Subcomandante Marcos’s words, ‘one big no and many small yesses’ (see
Chapter 6). How has the WSF designed structures, processes and activities to
generate such alternatives, and what tensions and contradictions have surfaced?

BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

The WSF was initiated by a heterogeneous group of eight Brazilian CSOs com-
prising the organizing committee (OC). It was assembled by Grajew and Whitaker
in order to build a strong Brazilian foundation for their idea (Whitaker, 2001). It
makes decisions through a principle of consensus and includes a social movement,
a union federation, a federation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the
Brazilian branch of ATTAC, an organization linked to the Catholic Church, an
association of progressive entrepreneurs, a research institute, and a human rights
organization.3 The WSF secretariat is accountable to the OC and currently
comprises ten administrative staff in São Paulo. The WSF does not have a legal
identity; all contracts are concluded in the name of the Brazilian Association of
 World Social Forum: Making Another World Possible? 131

Non-Governmental Organizations (ABONG), and the brand ‘World Social Forum’

has been registered – in Brazil and internationally – in the name of ABONG.
The OC has spawned 34 mobilization committees (MCs) in 28 countries,
19 regional MCs in Brazil, and has helped to create the Brazilian Council (BC),
comprising approximately 100 CSOs. However, both the mobilization commit-
tees and the BC only have consultative functions. Some OC members complain
that the BC makes more demands (for example, for travel tickets) than sugges-
tions and practical contributions, and they devote little time to it (interview:
Grzybowski). The MCs contribute considerably by mobilizing support and dis-
seminating information about the WSF. Some Brazilian MCs sought participa-
tion ‘in the direction of the forum’ (interview: Marques), and want the OC
transformed into an elected body (FSM-Comité Mineiro, 2002). As one MC
representative put it: ‘The forum must not be owned by some people because
they have invented it’ (interview: Marques). The OC has resisted this as unwork-
able ‘democratism and assemblyism’.
The OC perceives itself as a facilitator of a horizontal process, rather than
the executive leadership of the forum. According to the WSF charter, the forum
does not represent anybody; nobody should exert leadership or speak on its
behalf. As the WSF is not meant to be a decision-making body, there are no final
declarations or approved positions. In practice, the OC has been much more
than the organizer of two forums. It has played a political role in establishing the
methodology, drafting the ‘charter of principles’, choosing the conference venue,
defining the thematic ‘axes’ and, at least in 2001, selecting conference panellists.
The lack of transparency and participation in decision-making on these issues
prompted criticism in 2001. Klein reports that ‘fierce NGO brand wars were
waged behind the scenes…and frustrated delegates began to do what they do
best: protest’ (Klein, 2001: 5). There was, for instance, a protest march of the
youth against the OC. In the 2002 forum, the organizers largely managed to
avoid such disharmony. Not only has the charter of principles (drafted after the
first WSF) made the rules more transparent, but the OC also created a more rep-
resentative international body, thereby reducing its own autonomy. Surprised by
the response to the first WSF, and recognizing the need to ‘globalize’ the forum
in order to give it continuity, it set up an international council (IC) in June
2001. It also introduced some procedural changes, including ‘huge attempts to
integrate the youth much better’ (interview: Codas).
The IC currently comprises the eight OC members, about 70 big regional
and global CSO ‘networks’ (mostly federations or umbrellas) invited by the OC,
and other groups who organize international events (for example, the protests
against the Free Trade Area of the Americas – FTAA – in Montreal, the Genoa
Social Forum and the Rio+10 Parallel Conference in Johannesburg). National-
level organizations are excluded in order to avoid ‘the logic of nation states’ that
is seen as potentially harmful to an essentially global process. The IC’s composi-
tion is left open and fluid so that it can redress remaining regional and sectoral
imbalances. Critics suggest that such openness is potentially undemocratic: ‘There
participates who comes, and there comes who has the money.’
132 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Initially proposed as just a consultative organ, the IC quickly asserted its role
as a ‘protagonist in orienting the political guidelines, and in defining the strategic
directions of the WSF’ (WSF/OC, 2001), reducing – in principle – the OC to
issues of organization. However, the IC is a large international body whose meet-
ings are costly (and, hence, rare), the discussions are time consuming, and the
participation of its members often fluctuates. So far, the IC has held four meet-
ings in June 2001 (in São Paulo), October 2001 (in Dakar), January 2002 (in
Porto Alegre) and April 2002 (in Barcelona). The IC also works by consensus,
but representation carries real influence: ‘Either your opinion is legitimized by a
network, a campaign or an organization, or [it] doesn’t have any weight… What
you represent gives force to what you say’ (interview: Codas). The absence of an
elected leadership clearly limits the protagonist role of the IC, and keeps the OC
de facto in charge. Some OC members have expressed reluctance to transfer this
role to the IC ‘as long as [it] doesn’t construct within itself a core team…[com-
mitted to] these values, methodology and principles’ (interview: Oliveira).
The election of an executive committee is widely seen as a necessary step in
making the IC operational and in shifting power to it from the OC, hence democ-
ratizing the forum. However, some resisted this, fearing that the IC would become
an arena for power disputes (interview: Whitaker). This tension divided both the
OC and the IC. At the Barcelona IC meeting, the two camps reached a prelimi-
nary compromise by creating three temporary working groups on methodology
and themes, communications, and internal regulation. The latter will outline
‘mechanisms to extend participation in the IC’ and propose internal rules for the
functioning of the IC and its meetings (WSF/OC, 2002).
Legitimizing the structure demands the transfer of the political functions
from the OC – a self-selected club of Brazilian CSOs – to an international body
that is more representative of the movement that the WSF aims to serve. Yet, the
IC’s size necessitates delegation, which may trigger power disputes that the
smaller OC managed to avoid. Hence, many IC members preferred to maintain
the Brazilian OC, even when the WSF is organized outside of Brazil, redefining it
as an ‘organic and political secretariat’ (interview: Oliveira) – of, and legitimized
by, the IC (interview: Mendonça). Mendonça reports that: ‘we [the OC] have
the support of the large majority in the IC… Many ask us not to give up this
responsibility. Otherwise it won’t work’. Thus, the Barcelona meeting reconfig-
ured the OC but did not resolve questions about the IC’s legitimacy; it remains
an unelected body whose representivity is questioned. The IC member Nicola
Bullard (Focus on the Global South) stresses:

We need to establish some criteria for who is on the IC… We need some
discussion about representivity, about ensuring that we have a regional
balance…that we are genuinely representative (Bullard, 2002).

Not surprisingly, in this debate there has been a split between social movements,
with grassroots constituencies, and NGOs. The legitimacy of the NGOs on
both the OC and the IC has been questioned. A group of union leaders with the
 World Social Forum: Making Another World Possible? 133

Brazilian Union Federation (CUT) union leaders issued an open letter in which
they ‘deny any legitimacy or authority to the NGOs to speak in the name of the
exploited and oppressed’. Sader considers NGOs as part of the process, but
stresses that the protagonist role lies: ‘much more with social and civic move-
ments’. He perceives some NGOs to be less democratic than traditional right-
wing parties, who at least hold elections. He asks: ‘How can we wish to govern
the world more democratically, when we put [such NGOs] into directing posi-
tions? When they question us about our legitimacy they are right’ (interview:
Sader). Donor–recipient relations compound the problematic cohabitation of
NGOs and social movements in the IC. Bullard points out that some organiza-
tions ‘have an ambiguous role; they are perhaps NGOs but they are also funders.
What’s the role of organizations like Focus, which is not a mass organization or
a social movement’ (Bullard, 2002)?
A further question of representivity concerns the IC’s relation to the wider
anti-globalization movement. Whitaker stresses that the IC does not represent
the whole movement; therefore, improving representivity (such as by electing an
executive committee within the IC) is the wrong approach. ‘We don’t intend to
represent anybody. We don’t want to build up any power as a forum’ (interview:
Whitaker). Yet, if the raison d’être of the IC is not representation, one might
wonder why it exists at all. Not to represent means that either all decide or no one
decides. If some decide for all without representation, this is autocracy. Indeed,
some OC members appear to favour autocracy in order to shelter a horizontal
process from the power dynamics of representative democracy. ‘This type of
management should not be directly influenced by eventual political or ideological
divergences among the actors, because the methodology itself presupposes the
maintenance of diversity’ (interview: Oliveira).
Others, however, prefer the road of representation. Sader asserts: ‘We have to
have more democracy. The forum is not consulted on anything.’ This camp
argues for new mechanisms of consultation, consensus-building and even voting.
‘We want to introduce internal referenda, consultations by computer, everybody
voting’ (interview: Sader). Certainly, this demands the formalization of the WSF
as a democratic body; however, this would create problems. Firstly, there have to
be clear boundaries between those who are in and out, those who have a right to
vote and those who haven’t. This would make it less of an ‘open meeting place’.
Secondly, the voting mechanism would have to cope with the enormous diversity
of organizations. As Codas points out, there is a ‘union federation with millions
of members, and a group of five environmentalists in the Atlantic forest. Would it
make sense [if] the votes of both are equal’ (interview: Codas)? Thirdly, it would
drive at least some minority positions out of the WSF. As Patty Barrera of Com-
mon Frontiers Canada points out, ‘it ends up closing off discussions – it creates
a situation where you either fit in or you don’t’ (cited in Block, 2002).
The ‘institution-building’ of the WSF is work in progress and will have
important implications for the forum’s legitimacy and accountability. Both issues
have been barely discussed so far within the WSF for three main reasons. Firstly, the
organizers take the rising participant numbers and the increasing international
134 Globalizing Civic Engagement

media interest as confirmation of their legitimacy. Secondly, the WSF is increas-

ingly recognized by politicians and international officials, such as the then UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) Mary Robinson, who
assured the second WSF that ‘the world is listening to the forum’ (cited in
Block, 2002). And thirdly, the issues of accountability and legitimacy are, in
effect, delegated to the participating CSOs and movements, since the WSF itself
doesn’t officially issue statements or act on anybody’s behalf: ‘Our legitimacy
comes from the organizations… Our function is to facilitate this space, not try to
change the dynamic of the movements’ (interview: Mendonça). And yet, the
WSF does intend to exert influence. Oded Grajew of CIVES, the Brazilian Asso-
ciation of Entrepreneurs for Citizenship, emphasizes: ‘we expect to influence the
world agenda’ (cited in Block, 2002). Thus, to the extent that the WSF does gain
influence and impact upon issues of global governance, questions about legiti-
macy are bound to arise.
As Clark points out, NGO legitimacy can rest on various foundations, such
as positive achievements, expertise, representivity, partnerships and values (in
Edwards and Gaventa, 2001: 26). Yet, for a forum that promotes a broad-based
global process to make ‘another world possible’, representivity is key to its legiti-
macy. This is exactly why the legitimacy of NGOs on the OC and the IC is being
questioned. Heinrich of CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation)
perceives a ‘rather profound basis of legitimacy’ deriving from the diversity of
CSOs, mass-based movements and the large number of people participating in
the WSF, as well as the expertise many of them bring (interview: Heinrich). This
is true; but whether the quantity and diversity of participants confers legitimacy
on the WSF depends upon the extent to which it can show that it is in line with
the collective will of these actors (that is, its degree of accountability). What are
these mechanisms of accountability?
Formal voice mechanisms are restricted to the relatively few organizations
who are on the OC and the IC. As a result, some participants have resorted to
informal means, such as the protests at the first WSF. Dissatisfied participants can
also exit. Yet, in some respect the WSF is a provider of ‘unique’ services, which
means that those who exit would have to create another forum in order to obtain
these services. This is a major barrier to exit from the WSF that may explain why
protests and rising numbers of participants co-exist. Dissatisfied groups may
choose to exit within the forum by holding their own extra-official events:

If they are not satisfied with any space of discussion and deliberation,
they have the right to create their own event within the forum… It’s up
to you to mobilize the forces around the world…and realize a big sem-
inar or conference, even bigger than the events prioritized by the OC.
Yet, if one wants to change the big discussion ‘axes’, you can propose
that, but…within the existing channels that are the council and the
committee’ (interview: Oliveira).
 World Social Forum: Making Another World Possible? 135

Such forms of ‘internal’ exit keep these actors within the forum. It is in the
forum’s interest to minimize exit because its relevance depends upon broad-based
adherence: ‘The forum legitimizes itself by its capacity to express…movements
that are external to it and, simultaneously, internal’ (interview: Codas) – hence,
the ‘permanent and systematic efforts’ (interview: Codas) to globalize the WSF,
and to attract the maximum part of the anti-globalization movement. The WSF –
like the WEF – has, in essence, adopted a market approach, rather than embrace
representative democracy. The political entrepreneurs on the OC and the IC
create a ‘space’ and offer services that they subject to the ‘market test’ of whether
their targeted clientele participates. Nevertheless, to the extent that the WSF is
not just about providing services and attracting participants, but about formu-
lating and advancing an inherently political project, demands arise for legitimiz-
ing it democratically. This is why the IC was created. The dilemma facing the
WSF is that the voice exercised by many leads to the exit of some. A majority
voting for reformism would drive the radicals out of the forum. Thus, there is a
trade-off between the goals of strengthening ‘voice’ and minimizing ‘exit’. This
derives from the heterogeneity of actors, as well as an underlying contradiction
concerning the mandate of the forum.

DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES

This heterogeneity has important implications for the way in which the WSF
operates, and for arising tensions. In order to understand these better, we need
to identify the boundaries. Who participates and who doesn’t? How do the
main actors relate to each other? And how are internal divisions and tensions
addressed? The WSF, by its charter, is a civil society forum; but it does not repre-
sent all civil society, globally. Firstly, it excludes CSOs who are not opposed to
neo-liberal globalization, as well as those who are opposed to globalization but
belong to the political right (for example, nationalists). The WSF is clearly a
forum of the left. In 2001, 8 per cent of the WSF participants said that they
belong to the extreme left; 60 per cent to the left; 13 to the centre left; and 7 per
cent to the centre. Only 1 per cent said that they belong to the centre right; 2 per
cent to the right; and 1 per cent to the extreme right (NOP-FPA/FSM, 2001).
Secondly, the WSF clearly excludes armed forces, terrorist networks and civil
society segments who oppose globalization by violent means. However, the orga-
nizers find it hard to control access to such large events and fear the unautho-
rized entry of such groups, as well as infiltration by opponents who may try to
discredit the forum by provoking violence (interview: Mendonça). Fortunately,
both forums in Porto Alegre were, generally, very peaceful events. In some cases,
the organizers apparently found it difficult to bar armed groups, such as Mexico’s
Zapatistas National Liberation Army (EZLN); but, in the end, they maintained
their principle:
136 Globalizing Civic Engagement

[We rejected] cases like ETA [the Basque separatist movement], [the]
IRA [Irish Republican Army], of course. But what about the EZLN?
They call themselves an army. We said no, not as an army, because this
opts for armed struggle. We were also thinking of FARC [Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionárias de Colombia – a Colombian guerrilla move-
ment], some Arab groups… So it is quite tense to control that, because
they seek ways of entering (interview: Grzybowski).

In fact, FARC did manage to participate in a seminar on peace in Colombia,

invited by the Teachers’ Association of the Federal University of Rio Grande do
Sul (UFRGS), although the OC published a note distancing itself from this invita-
tion. While some delegates defended violent means in order to ‘counter the vio-
lence of neo-liberal policies’, the large majority agreed with Vittorio Agnelotto
of the Genoa Social Forum, who considered the violence in Genoa ‘counter-pro-
ductive and harmful to the entire movement’ (Sivaraman, 2002b).
Thirdly, the WSF has not been globally representative due to wide regional
imbalances. The study by NOP-FPA (2001) on the first WSF shows the regional
distribution of delegates in 2001, as presented in Table 7.2. The 2002 figures are
from the WSF secretariat.

Table 7.2 Regional distribution of participation in World Social Forums

WSF South Western Central North Africa Asia Not

America Europe America America identified
2001 60.70% 12.40% 0.40% 2.50% 1.90% 1.80% 20.20%
2002 70.05% 18.80% 2.48% 4.39% 1.97% 1.95% 0.34%.
Source: adapted from NOP-FPA (2001)

Despite efforts to attract delegates from more countries, the WSF in 2002 main-
tained its Latin American predominance. More than half of the delegates (55 per
cent) came from Brazil alone.
Fourthly, the WSF – unlike the WEF – excludes those who pursue or com-
mand state power (that is, political parties and governments). This has caused
tensions and inconsistencies. Including ‘civil’ society and excluding ‘political’
society cuts across the very movement that the WSF intends to serve. The ten-
sions arise not only because some perceive the ban on governments and parties
to be a self-inflicted weakening that the movement can ill afford. There are also
fundamental divisions concerning the nature of the WSF project. Some see it as
a unique global meeting place of civil society without control by governments,
parties and political movements. To them, political action is incompatible with the
WSF’s horizontal, pluralist, non-hierarchical paradigm of political transformation
(Whitaker, 2002). Others resent the liberal concept of a civil society who polar-
izes itself against the state, rather than aiming to transform it; for them, global
transformation entails seeking and gaining state power, rather than just strength-
ening civil society. A group of Brazilian union leaders made this split explicit,
 World Social Forum: Making Another World Possible? 137

boycotting the official conferences and workshops of the WSF, and denouncing
the ‘trap of civil society’ since this concept ‘erases the borders between social
classes’ and between ‘the exploited and the exploiters’. By playing down conflicts
and contradictions, they argue, this approach ends up with the inverse of democ-
racy, which recognizes contradictory interests within society. The friction line
between the two camps is probably close to the NGO–social movements divide.
This demarcation has also led to inconsistencies. Porto Alegre was chosen to
host the WSF not due to its local civil society, but because of pioneering govern-
ment policies, such as participatory budgeting (interview: Sader). Moreover, the
left-wing Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), the Brazilian Workers’ Party, who was
then running both the city and the state, granted considerable infrastructure and
logistical support. In 2002 they spent Reais (R$)2.3 million, or about US$1 mil-
lion on the forum, a sum they claim to recover through increased tax revenues.
Both PT governments set up a joint executive committee (EC) that, together
with the OC and the WSF secretariat, organized the logistics locally. Although
the governments did not interfere with substantive planning, they did ensure that
the state government’s logo appeared on all of the posters and materials. This
caused disgruntlement with the organizers and confusion with participants regard-
ing the WSF’s non-governmental character (interview: Lyra). The parallel forums
of local authorities and parliamentarians – and the participation in the WSF of the
state governor, Olívio Dutra, and PT’s presidential candidate, Luís Inácio Lula da
Silva – reinforced this ambiguity. The latter spoke at the forum to thousands of
participants, invited by his NGO, who had organized four workshops. On the
other hand, the OC barred the participation of Belgian Prime Minister Guy Ver-
hofstadt and the vice-president of the World Bank, Mats Karlsson. Grzybowski’s
phone call with the former is illustrative. The prime minister asked:

‘Don’t you speak for the forum?’ I said, ‘No, but I am on the OC.’ ‘But
can’t you make a decision?’ ‘No, there is a pact among us. I can tell you
what the criteria are. If I look at these, you aren’t invited.’… I told him
that he could come as an observer… He said, ‘As an observer, I don’t want
to.’ I said, ‘Then don’t come.’… ‘Well, then I want to participate as a
delegate.’ ‘Do you have a CSO?’ ‘No.’ ‘Then you can’t.’ ‘Then I will create
one.’ ‘Do you sign the charter of principles?’… It was a crazy discussion. I
wasn’t taking any decision, I just informed him about the rules. He didn’t
understand that; he understood it as a veto (interview: Grzybowski).

Who actually does participate in the WSF? Unfortunately, there are no statistics
yet available for the WSF in 2002. The Fundação Perseu Abramo (FPA) study on
the first WSF showed that 51 per cent of the participants in 2001 were aged 35
to 59, and 22 per cent were 25 to 35 years old. In addition, 50 per cent were
white and 38 per cent were coloured; 53 per cent were male and 47 per cent
were female; 73 per cent had begun or finished university education; and 75 per
cent were trained in social sciences. Table 7.3 shows the categories of CSOs to
which the participants (that is, the delegates and listeners) said they belonged.
138 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Table 7.3 Types of participant organizations in WSF 2001

WSF 2001: Types of participant organizations Percentage

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 25%
Trade unions / professional associations 22%
Social movements 13%
Educational institutes 10%
Political parties 10%
Governmental agencies 4%
Foundations 4%
Entrepreneurial associations 2%
Religious organizations 1%
Others 8%
Source: adapted from NOP-FPA/FSM (2001)

Within and across these categories there is a huge diversity of actors and view-
points that eventually generate tensions and contradictions. As Grzybowski points
out, there are movements that are ‘global by origin’, based on inherently global
problems or values, such as the feminist, environmental and human rights move-
ments, and other more recent ‘anti-globalization’ movements. He believes that the
‘fusion’ of both strands explains the power of Seattle, Genoa and the WSF (inter-
view: Grzybowski).4 However, the relationship between these camps is more likely
to be a fragile alliance than a fusion, one in which the members agree on some
points but disagree on others. There are those, such as Susan George of ATTAC,
who want another globalization, which – according to Grzybowski – is the domi-
nant view within the forum. And there are those who want de-globalization, such
as Walden Bello of Focus on the Global South, or the Third World Network.
There are anti-capitalists and reform capitalists. The former, for instance,
oppose ATTAC’s campaign for the Tobin tax because it ‘doesn’t interfere in any
way with the logic of capitalism’ (interview: Marques). Sharp differences also arise
concerning questions of whether to reform or abolish the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
the desirability of a world government (Sivaraman, 2002a). The anti-capitalist
camp partly overlaps with the alternative camp, as espoused by its luminaries such
as Naomi Klein. Proposals from this strand include a ‘gift economy’ (Genevieve
Vaughan), webs of local initiatives (David Korten) or replacing the ‘pyramids of
power’ by ‘concentric circles of compassion’ (Vandana Shiva) (all cited in Gillbank,
2002). Moreover, there are inter-sectoral tensions across categories of CSOs. There
was a widely felt tension between the union movements and other civil society
groups. The unions feel a strong need for cross-sector networking and ‘going
international’, in response to the structural changes provoked by neo-liberalism
(interview: Codas). But their relationship with the NGO camp is far from easy:
 World Social Forum: Making Another World Possible? 139

What did the unionists do? A union forum within the WSF! They dis-
cussed four days among themselves. It was…politically a very big
error… So, you see the internal problems of the forum (interview:
Grzybowski).

Some tensions derive from divergent values or interests, such as those between
religious groups fighting against abortion and feminists defending it (interview:
Codas). In addition, there are intra-sectoral tensions (for example, between Green-
peace and Friends of the Earth) that are partly rooted in ideological, political or
strategic divergences, and partly because they compete for funds, publicity and
supporters in limited ‘markets’. Finally, there are intra-movement tensions, such
as the split within the developing world debt campaign between Jubilee 2000 and
Jubilee South (see Chapter 5).
The WSF has responded to these tensions by embracing plurality at the
expense of unity. It has adopted a ‘laissez-faire’ approach, allowing the diverse
actors to stage their own seminars, extra-official events and parallel programmes
(for instance, a march against FTAA, a manifestation on Argentina or the debt tri-
bunal), even if the WSF hasn’t reached a consensus on these issues. As Grzybowski
(in interview) puts it:

Plurality is sine qua non. If the WSF tries to unify, and give direction to
the anti-globalization movement, it will be reduced. If it loses the char-
acteristic of a forum, it dies. It will only persist if it maintains plurality,
and an almost anarchic space of dialogue between the diverse actors.

DESIGNING ACTIVITIES
How does the WSF balance the contradiction between maintaining plurality and
fostering convergence around coherent alternatives? What are the mechanisms
through which the WSF, as Chomsky (2000) puts it, ‘offers opportunities of
unparalleled importance to bring together popular forces from many and varied
constituencies from the richer and poor countries alike, to develop constructive
alternatives’? The WSF aims at promoting political alternatives along four broad
thematic ‘axes’:

• the production of wealth and social reproduction;

• access to wealth and sustainability;
• civil society and the public arena; and
• political power and ethics in the new society.

The WSF’s usefulness and success depend upon whether it affords opportunities
for doing what can’t be done better otherwise – for example, via the internet or
through existing civil society channels. There are four core functions of the
forum: linkage, exchange, education, and planning/coordination.
140 Globalizing Civic Engagement

The linking function of the WSF

The WSF brings together people and groups who rarely meet otherwise due to
geographical, sectoral, cultural, ideological and other barriers. It facilitates inter-
national cooperation among CSOs, and the creation or expansion of global net-
works and alliances. Although dialogue and information exchange take place
through the internet, the construction of effective cross-sectoral and transnational
networks and alliances requires the building of mutual trust, cooperation, com-
mon ground and rapport through face-to-face contacts – hence the importance of
the forum as a morale booster. Delcio Rodrigues, a former director of Greenpeace
in Latin America, affirms that the WSF ‘was also a party and we really needed a
party’ (Block, 2002). Of course, one should not overestimate the possibilities of
a five-day annual event to create trust. As Powell (1990: 305) points out: ‘each
point of contact in a network can be a source of conflict as well as harmony’.
Moreover, the forum’s diversity potentially erodes trust:

The more homogenous the group, the greater the trust; hence, the easier
it is to sustain network-like arrangements. When the diversity of par-
ticipants increases, trust recedes, and so does the willingness to enter
into long-term collaborations (Powell, 1990: 326).

As some OC members have come to realize, it is not easy to encourage the creation
of heterogeneous networks. They point out that, although some actors may feel the
need for articulating with others, ‘many come to the forum to hold their own inter-
national meetings’ (interview: Mendonça) and end up speaking mostly to them-
selves. This happened, for instance, with the trade union movement, ATTAC, Via
Campesina, Jubilee South and the feminist movement. In 2002, the OC and the
IC tried to curb this by introducing changes in the process for conferences and
seminars. Unlike the first WSF, the second forum concentrated all conferences and
workshops of a thematic ‘axis’ within a single day in order to encourage the activists
of a specific sector to attend events on other topics during the rest of the forum.
The second forum also limited the duration of sector-specific seminars to two days
in order to encourage people to mix up with participants from different groups.

The exchange function of the WSF

The WSF is, effectively, a market-place for (sometimes competing) causes and an
‘ideas fair’ for exchanging information, ideas and experiences horizontally. This
operates through the workshops that any accredited organization can offer (in
2002 there were 621 such workshops). The workshops allow for ‘idea shopping’
in ‘niche markets’, such as very specific questions, localized topics, international
‘local–local’ exchange, and links to global campaigns. The workshops attract
many people because there is an event for everyone. For some individuals, ‘the
core of the forum isn’t the conferences, but the workshops’ (interview: Whitaker).
Those more concerned with results, however, worry about the fragmenting effect
of the workshops that ‘disperse the view of the whole’ (interview: Oliveira).
 World Social Forum: Making Another World Possible? 141

The educational function of the WSF

A core objective of the WSF has been to promote a global view. Some define the
forum as a sort of ‘open university’ that attempts to bring together issue-specific,
global civil-society actors – working, for example, on financial transactions, tax-
ation, debt, food sovereignty, land reform and sustainability – in order ‘to think
more broadly, and to construct together a more ample perspective’ (interview:
Grzybowski). The forum promotes a broader view, demonstrating ‘how from a
perspective of the whole, the women can assume the campaign of Jubilee, or
Jubilee the campaign of Via Campesina…strengthening every specific campaign’
(interview: Grzybowski). In addition, it also encourages debates across disciplin-
ary boundaries (for example, between ecology and economics). As Grzybowski
stresses, environmentalists tell us that global capitalism is not sustainable; but
finding solutions implies rethinking economics (interview: Grzybowski).
The main tools of this ‘open university’ are the conferences, 27 of which
took place in 2002. In 2001, the panel speakers for each conference were experts
invited by the OC. This changed in 2002 because of criticisms concerning trans-
parency and consistency; more importantly, the organizers felt that the ‘networks’
themselves had to speak. In 2002, the IC delegated the organization of each
conference to a member organization working on the respective topic. These
‘pushing networks’ presented their proposals, which were then discussed by
debaters. Moderators coordinated the debates and produced syntheses. At the end
of each thematic day there were press conferences where the theme syntheses were
presented. In this ‘open university’ approach, concrete and common proposals
are intended to emerge. The linking, exchange and educational functions of the
forum are assumed to eventually create the basis for integration and the emer-
gence of a coherent alternative. Grzybowski, who analysed and synthesized the
results of all ‘axes’ for the IC, asserts:

As a whole, we are on a good way; but there are weaknesses… We have

to reinforce peace a little. On environment, we are very divided; we
have to seek convergence… On the debt issue, we made some progress.
But maybe we have to organize a specific forum about debt trying to
achieve more convergence… It’s easier if you can say, there are some
proposals that seem to be consensual… But how can I speak of the
Tobin tax as a proposal of the WSF? It was presented, it’s legitimate;
but it’s one among various proposals (interview: Grzybowski).

The WSF’s planning and action-coordination function

During the forum, the WSF hosts a world ‘summit’ of the anti-globalization
movement and serves as its headquarters. The broad movement is, of course, frag-
mented and heterogeneous; as a result, coordination and action planning occur
largely at a sub-forum level. The 96 issue-specific seminars partly facilitate this –
some of them follow up prior events, such as the Durban conference on racism, or
prepare future events, such as the Rio+10 Conference (interview: Mendonça). The
142 Globalizing Civic Engagement

forum also fosters new networks and joint initiatives. The 2002 WSF, for instance,
saw the launch of Media Watch International, a ‘referendum’ on FTAA, and a
joint campaign of environmentalists and peasant organizations (Via Campesina)
to have seeds and water declared a ‘human heritage’ (interview: Mendonça). The
coordination function was evident in the agenda of events and campaigns that
occurred throughout the year and ‘that was agreed upon between the diverse
movements that participated in the WSF, and that was publicly pronounced at
the end of the forum’ (interview: Oliveira).
Thus, there is some methodological guidance towards convergence – although,
on the whole, the forum celebrates plurality and does not take decisions or adopt
proposals that are binding for all. Otherwise, the slender consensus, limited to
opposing neo-liberal globalization, would break down as various internal groups
seek to push their particular concerns onto a common agenda. The WSF has
built on a ‘pluralist-anarchic’ approach, emphasizing autonomy and diversity, and
seeking to inter-link, strengthen and empower global civil society through a long-
term and unguided, but ever growing (and not necessarily converging), pedagogic
process of consciousness-building and mobilization that ultimately transforms
national and global governance. The WSF has, therefore, avoided the agony of
negotiating over words and phrases of final declarations, and allowed the various
factions of the movement to get along with each other by putting common
views above divergence. Yet, its weakness is that it cannot convincingly articulate
an alternative to neo-liberalism:

We are well behind in the formulation of this alternative. And one of

the reasons is that the structure of the forum itself is fragmented…
There is a proposal on trade, another on debt or the financial system.
But the sum of that does not add up to an economic project for the
world. This has to be a global project, from which you will deduce
what to do with trade, etc. So the format itself was bad. It repeated this
segmentation of themes (interview: Sader).

The WSF encourages both homogenous and heterogeneous cooperation and

networking. Thus, it is designed to produce ‘bonding’, as well as ‘bridging’,
social capital amongst global civil society. This may facilitate, but does not itself
generate, substantive convergence. The problem is how to resolve incompatible
interests and values. As a mere ‘catalyst’, the forum risks reproducing existing
divisions, contradictions and conflicts within civil society globally, retaining an
emphasis on specific, parochial and often contradictory proposals without ever
integrating the fragments into an overarching and plausible alternative. This lim-
itation reduces the WSF’s potential as an interlocutor on the global stage, possi-
bly restricting it to what Sader (in interview) calls an ‘eternal accumulation of
forces within civil society without ever fighting for a political alternative’.
‘Pluralist anarchists’ question the very desirability of convergence: ‘We want
to rebuild the world from its diversity’ (interview: Whitaker). Yet, the shortcom-
ings of their approach have caused proponents of a ‘strategic political’ strand to
 World Social Forum: Making Another World Possible? 143

envisage a more representative structure in which the IC would more actively

facilitate the development of alternatives. Sader suggests that the IC should
nominate commissions for drafting initial proposals and for developing them
through regional and thematic forums (interview: Sader). This view also perceives
the WSF as a platform for collective political action. Klein, for instance, warned
about turning ‘the WSF into yet another big meeting bereft of any impact on the
real world’, asserting that the ‘alternative is not civil society but civil disobedience’
(Sivaraman, 2002b). For this strand, the forum is an embryonic global interloc-
utor. It points to its growing recognition (for example, by the UN secretary gen-
eral) as a ‘legitimate space of dialogue about world problems’. Proponents also see
the emergence of a new power that is still diffuse and lacks adequate organs. For
them, the WSF offers a ‘real possibility for the self-organization of civil society,
and for using its weight globally and nationally’ (interview: Oliveira).
Remodelling the WSF as a platform for collective action rather than reflection
implies the need for a representative decision-making structure and formalized
leadership. Who would talk to UN or government officials, in whose name and
with whose mandate? Thus, there is a ‘schism’ of two conflicting views. For the
first, the essence of the WSF is to provide a space for free horizontal interaction
of civil society actors without exerting authority, representing or committing the
participants. The second view seeks to link ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society and aims
to legitimize the forum through representative democratic structures so that it
becomes an effective interlocutor and emerging counter-power on the global stage.

TURNING AN EVENT INTO A PROCESS

The first WSF was celebrated as an event that ‘symbolically broke the idea that
neo-liberal policies are a product of an almost natural and unquestionable force
to which all would have to surrender’ (interview: Oliveira). Yet, it barely started
to construct the aimed-for alternative. This would require a sustained process far
exceeding an annual global event. In the IC, there has been much discussion on
how to design events that facilitate a process of movement-building from the
bottom up (Bullard, 2002). As Sader (in interview) points out, the WSF project
cannot merely be an intellectual exercise. It must combine theory with concrete
social movements. This link has been a traditional function of parties; but their
potential is limited on the international level. Thus, the challenge for the WSF
has been to create organizational structures capable of accommodating and facil-
itating a dynamic process of movement-building on a global scale.
As a result, it has faced a basic tension. If the forum were to build strong ties to
the grassroots level, mobilizing local activists and social movements to participate
more intensively, it would have to decentralize itself to the regional level, at least.
On the other hand, regional decentralization could risk the forum’s essentially glo-
bal characteristic. This tension divided the WSF. The OC opted for decentraliza-
tion and was against holding another forum in Porto Alegre. The IC, on the other
hand, emphasized that a global process required a centralized forum every year:
144 Globalizing Civic Engagement

They [the OC] desperately tried not to hold it in Porto Alegre. They
went to India…[but] it didn’t work. So they changed position saying
that…there will be multipolar forums in various continents (inter-
view: Sader).

At its meetings in Dakar and Porto Alegre, the IC agreed by consensus to com-
bine an annual global forum and a series of decentralized forums preceding it.
Thus, prior to the third WSF, there will be regional and thematic forums, prob-
ably in Florence, Hyderabad, the Mediterranean, the Amazon, and Oceania,
each carrying the name ‘World Social Forum of Porto Alegre, held in X’. Each
will also focus on specific or regional topics, while contributing also to common
WSF themes (interview: Whitaker). All those using this brand must observe uni-
form rules defined by the IC. However, it is not yet clear how they will link to the
global forum – the source of another schism. Is the global–regional split about
‘maximizing the synergies between the different levels of action, different sectors
and different regional groups’ (Bullard, 2002) and about fostering convergence
within the global forum? Or will ‘every regional forum be an event in itself’ and
the WSF ‘not a final convergence of regional forums’ (interview: Whitaker)? The
IC’s work group on methodology and themes is charged with proposing ways of
how the continental, thematic and global forums are to inter-relate.
Some experiences with decentralized forums have already highlighted the risks
that the regional and global forums face. The African Social Forum in Bamako,
Mali, was stimulated by the OC to boost African participation in the WSF process.
It was organized autonomously and led to a substantial increase in the African
delegation at the second WSF. However, the Africans ignored the OC’s method-
ology, producing a final declaration. The Amazonian Social Forum in Belém,
Brazil, suffered considerable interference by the state government of Pará (inter-
view: Mendonça). The Genoa Social Forum was a ‘product’ of the first WSF
(interview: Codas), but was organized without Brazilian participation (inter-
view: Mendonça) and is ‘closely linked to the communist movement which
wants to monopolize it. This is unacceptable’ (interview: Grzybowski). The risks
of being controlled by governments and/or captured by factions within the move-
ment also haunt discussions about moving the global forum to India in 2004.
As the OC was ‘persuaded’ by the IC to give continuity to a centralized annual
forum, it tried to maximize international mobilization by siting WSF 2003 in
India and WSF 2004, perhaps, in Africa. The OC sent a delegation to India to
discuss the viability of this with the Indian committee, which felt that 2003 was
too early. Therefore, WSF 2003 will again be held in Porto Alegre; but the intent
is to hold WSF 2004 in India, probably in Kerala or Bangalore. Nevertheless,
according to Grzybowski, the problem is that the Indian committee wants:

…an autonomy we can’t give, because that would mean that it falls
into the hand of regional governments… They say, either we control it,
or we won’t hold the forum. So we won’t hold it there, from my point
of view. We can’t accept government control (interview: Grzybowski).
 World Social Forum: Making Another World Possible? 145

Another problem refers to India’s civil society, which is diversified but, perhaps,
too fragmented to construct a coalition strong enough to host the WSF: ‘If one
joins in, the other won’t’ (interview: Grzybowski). This suggests some basic con-
ditions for future forum locations: a tolerant or supportive, but not politically
interfering, government; a democratic environment with a free press; and a
developed civil society capable of building a common platform broad enough ‘to
make sure that no one ends up owning the forum’ (Bullard, 2002).
Both the decentralization of the WSF to the regional level and the migration
of the annual global forum to different continents, are – essentially – mobiliza-
tion strategies to globalize the WSF process. Yet, there are some voices who sug-
gest that the IC should take on more responsibility for mobilization. Some think
it should more forcefully encourage the creation of mobilization committees
around the world. Others think that the IC should stimulate participation
directly by deepening contacts, and should encourage cross-sponsorship schemes
for funding the participation of, for example, Eastern Europeans by Western
Europeans (interviews: Grzybowski and Mendonça). Yet, such deliberate strate-
gies accentuate the need for ‘guardians of the process’ (Bullard, 2002) who ‘guar-
antee the methodology, values, charter of principles and political culture [that the
forum] is beginning to develop’ (interview: Oliveira).
As Oliveira emphazises, the WSF will need ‘a centre that systematizes, syn-
thesizes, and accumulates the experiences… [It] must not be diluted along 70
networks, or by constantly migrating. It would lose its meaning.’ Thus, the IC is
likely to opt for maintaining the WSF secretariat in São Paulo, as well as the peri-
odical return of the forum to Brazil every two or three years. But, most impor-
tantly, the decentralization and globalization of the WSF is bound to recast even
more clearly and urgently the need for addressing the central institutional ques-
tions concerning the role, legitimacy and representivity of the OC and IC, as
well as the nature and mandate of the WSF process.

REFLECTIONS ON ORGANIZATIONAL FORM

Considerable confusion surrounds the WSF’s definition. The charter calls it an
‘open meeting place’. Various proponents label it a ‘movement’, a ‘movement of
movements’, a ‘network’ or even a ‘parallel summit’ since it is a ‘stage on which
emerging global social movements are struggling to organize, confront global
powers and develop their own political project’ (Pianta 2001: 189).
While notions of space or stage are too static for the forum’s dynamic substan-
tive process, the concept of a transnational social movement (TSM) captures its
dynamism and goal-orientation. The definition by Smith et al (cited in Cohen
and Rai, 2000: 8) seems to depict the WSF well: TSMs ‘involve conscious efforts
to build transnational cooperation around shared goals that include social change’.
However, social movements generally form around shared grievances and convic-
tions in the context of perceived opportunities. Therefore, doesn’t the diversity
and heterogeneity of the forum – from gay rights to fighting dams – make it
meaningless to describe it as a social movement? The only common denominator
146 Globalizing Civic Engagement

is a dislike of how the world is run. Tarrow’s (2001) definition (see Chapter 5) fits
better by focusing on political contention rather than goals. But even this
doesn’t apply to WSF since its contentious interaction isn’t sustained through
collective claim-making and political leadership (Tarrow, 2001:10). Though the
WSF stands in opposition to the WEF, international financial institutions (IFIs)
and the WTO, it has no dialogue with them or authors any policy papers or
political actions. Some regret this, though recognizing its inevitability:

Many people are against discussing with the WEF, the World Bank, the
IMF or the WTO. I am in favour. We have to discuss. But if you take
this to the forum, there is either an impasse or you vote, and those who
are against don’t come to the forum any more. Hence, there is no solu-
tion. What is the solution we have adopted? The forum is not an orga-
nization… I don’t express the opinion of the forum but my own as
director of IBASE [the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic
Analysis] (interview: Grzybowski).

To some extent, this is just a question of formal versus informal leadership:

‘There are people who talk and get attention, and others who don’t. Of course,
there are leaders. The press highlights them. But it’s not formalized’ (interview:
Sader). These informal leadership positions are constructed within the specific
movements, campaigns and activities that populate the forum:

Walden Bello is a leader; who will dispute that? Bernard Cassen is a

leader. João Pedro Stédile is a leader, clearly. Bové is a leader. They
assert themselves in the movement through their capacity of proposing,
negotiating, disputing and directing movements (interview: Sader).

Clearly, these leaders do influence and direct the destiny of the WSF – for exam-
ple, on the IC. But none of them has, so far, asserted leadership over the forum
as a whole. Contentious interaction with its logical targets does happen for issue-
specific movements and the broader movement against neo-liberal globalization.
These overlap with, and are part of, the forum, but are not identical with it.
Even the strategic political strand perceives the WSF more as serving the
movement than directing it; but this strand would like to see the forum engage
in contention:

There has to be something more active and offensive, not just reaction
and response, not just criticism… We have to take the initiative to
change the agenda. And we need the organs that put this agenda forward
(interview: Sader).

Thus, the WSF may seek to become a movement itself, or maintain a service
function for the separate anti-globalization movement. The viability of the first
option depends upon the degree of substantive convergence and acceptance by
 World Social Forum: Making Another World Possible? 147

the actors involved. These are political decisions to be taken by the OC, the IC
and the participants, in general. Whitaker alerts: ‘Neither the IC nor the OC
command. If they want to command, I am off and, like me, thousands will
leave’ (interview: Whitaker).
Many see the WSF more as a network than a movement: it provides social
coordination, distinct from both hierarchies and markets, and horizontal links
between actors based on reciprocal exchange, collaboration and trust. Networks
typically form to allow a variety of actors, possessing complementary resources
or capabilities, to realize gains by pooling them (Powell, 1990: 303). Networks
are informal and ‘lighter’ than organizations, and meet the need for fast access
to, and dissemination of, reliable information and know-how, flexibility, rapid
adaptation to change and trust (Powell, 1990). They are ‘open structures, able to
expand without limits’ (Castells, 1996: 470). Thus, some characteristics of net-
works seem to suit the WSF well. Networks have little hierarchy (hence, they
accommodate diversity); are open and dynamic structures (as a result, they
readily accommodate transnational social movements; these often go together, as
Tarrow (2001: 12) points out); and have rapid growth potential, suitable for the
process of ‘globalizing’ the WSF.
The forum bears some similarity to transnational advocacy networks
(TNANs), defined by Keck and Sikkink (1998) as ‘those relevant actors working
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common
discourse and dense exchanges of information and services’. For them, the ‘core
of the relationship is information exchange’, whereby non-traditional actors
‘mobilize information strategically’ in order to ‘transform the terms and nature
of the debate’ and to influence policies that seek to ‘persuade, pressure and gain
leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments’ (Keck and
Sikkink, 1998: 2). Thus, like TSMs, TNANs involve political contention, but not
necessarily through mass mobilization. And the concept of TNANs also implies
‘shared values’ and common issues on which activists campaign.
The WSF is too heterogeneous in values and issues to be a TNAN, and
doesn’t engage directly in advocacy; but it does share certain features, as it empha-
sizes the horizontal exchange of information or ideas. Yet, the WSF is also a ser-
vice provider. Its mass events require centralized coordination, mobilization, rule
setting, conference organization, planning, facilitation, systematization and con-
trol. This demands more central-level institutionalization – akin to an INGO –
than we would expect with a network.
‘Rethinking the world’ from the perspective of heterogeneous civil society
actors requires something like a ‘world parliamentary process’ if it is to generate
coherence. In an embryonic form, the WSF is precisely performing such a role.
Yet, in this sense, it is no longer a network but a deliberative political arena. Net-
works often comprise diverse actors ‘working on an issue from a variety of insti-
tutional and value perspectives’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 3). Nevertheless, there
must be a shared understanding of what the common enterprise is. This is likely
to require a more clearly defined positive cause, rather than just a negative one of
opposing neo-liberal globalization.
148 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Diversity and substantive convergence remain conflicting principles, which

is why the pluralist-anarchic strand questions the desirability of convergence
and, implicitly, rejects the objective of generating coherent alternative policies –
a founding rationale for the WSF. Thus, the present tension within the WSF
concerning its organization and governance is essentially a question of mandate.
The WSF currently combines elements of three organizational forms. It
shares with INGOs a defined institutional structure that governs the formal pro-
cess; it shares with TSMs the mass mobilization (hence, an undefined member-
ship); and it shares with networks the horizontal interaction, consensual decision-
making and informal leadership. The resulting tensions can only be resolved by
addressing the underlying question of mandate. If the WSF opts for a ‘civic’
mandate, it may evolve into an INGO or into a core network of political entre-
preneurs, offering facilitation services for the ‘anarchic’ horizontal interaction of
a broad range of global civil-society networks and movements. This would be a
‘market’ process without aiming at a coherent project and political contention.
If the WSF opts for a ‘political’ mandate, it is likely to develop more defined
modes of representation and political leadership, integrating an advocacy role and
evolving towards a TSM, becoming – perhaps – as Chomsky hopes, ‘a new inter-
national of global social justice movements’ (cited in Ker, 2002). In this case, it
would certainly become less diverse, but blur the boundaries between civil and
political society.

CONCLUSIONS
The World Social Forum is affected by three basic internal tensions:

• the contradiction between ‘market-based’ political entrepreneurism versus

democratic representation;
• a civic versus a political project; and
• diversity versus convergence (which derives from the second tension).

Is it essential to resolve these tensions? Could the current structure progress

indefinitely? After all, the WSF has organized two successful forums with global
impact. Yet, the very dynamics of the forum make continuity in its current struc-
ture unlikely.
WSF’s objectives are global; hence, it must achieve true global participation
in order to have legitimacy as a world project. This ‘globalization’ will further
increase its diversity, reducing the likelihood of convergence. This puts the WSF
at a crossroads. It can either abandon the objective of developing coherent alter-
natives or the goal of maximizing diversity. Secondly, the decentralization of the
forum is likely to require – paradoxically – a stronger global centre if it is to
remain a global process rather than a series of regional processes. Such a centre
will probably need clearer legitimization than currently exists – where the OC
selects the IC and this, in turn, legitimizes the OC. Thirdly, the WSF has defined
itself in dialectic opposition to the WEF, and has raised expectations accordingly.
 World Social Forum: Making Another World Possible? 149

If it restricts its mission to being purely a meeting place of civil society, it may risk
losing momentum and constraining its impact. After all, the anti-globalization
movement that the WSF seeks to serve is, essentially, a political movement.
Fourthly, as the WSF gets better known, and opportunities for participation
in global governance arise, it will have to rethink how long it can afford to remain
silent. The more credible the opportunities, the more acute will become the inter-
nal divergences regarding the nature of the project. Fifthly, the WSF is under a
self-inflicted pressure to deliver an alternative project for the world. As Immanuel
Wallerstein (2002) puts it: ‘People want to know where to move. We must begin
to think of offensive action. That requires deciding things that have not been
decided in Porto Alegre up to now. What is our programme?’ Thus, the tensions
discussed above are likely to deepen. Their resolution depends both on the relation
of internal forces (for example, NGOs versus social movements) and the opportu-
nity structure that a rapidly changing world provides for considering alternatives.

NOTES
1 The institutionalization of the forum is an ongoing process. This chapter was written
in March 2002. Some of the questions it addresses might have been resolved or recast
at the IC meetings in Barcelona in April 2002; in Bangkok in August 2002; and in
Florence in November 2002. The chapter is based on interviews with key represen-
tatives of the WSF’s organizing committee (OC) and the international council (IC),
complemented with media reports, official documents, a quantitative research on the
first WSF, the author’s participation in the second WSF and a literature review. Inter-
views, conducted in Portuguese or German, were translated by the author.
2 This figure is an estimate by the WSF secretariat because the number of organizations
registered in 2001 is unreliable due to multiple entries.
3 These comprise the Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations
(ABONG); the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of
Citizens-Brazil (ATTAC-Brazil); the Brazilian Commission for Justice and Peace
(CBJP); the Brazilian Association of Entrepreneurs for Citizenship (CIVES); the
Centre for Global Justice (CJG); the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT: a Bra-
zilian Union Federation); the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis
(IBASE); and the Brazilian Landless Peasants Movement (MST).
4 Reference to Seattle and Genoa relates to the protests that took place during the
World Trade Organization ministerial negotiations in those cities.
 Chapter 8

Campaign for a ‘Robin Hood Tax’

for Foreign Exchange Markets

Diego Muro

My proposal is to throw some sand in the wheels of our excessively efficient

international money markets (James Tobin, 1918-2002).1

Traditionally, the introduction of any new tax produces strong public resistance.
Yet, the 21st century’s birth is witnessing a hitherto unknown phenomenon: a
popular clamour for the introduction of a new tax – one applying to money mar-
kets. James Tobin, US Nobel laureate in economics, originally proposed the tax in
1978, arguing that a small levy on short-term international money transfers would
substantially reduce financial speculation and instability. Currency trade today
amounts to US$1.2 trillion a day, and a very small tax on this could also raise vast
sums that could be used to finance development projects in the poorest countries
of the world. Tobin’s idea, mostly forgotten for 30 years, was resurrected during
the late 1990s and has become a totem of the anti-globalization movement.
The organization that has been most effective in campaigning for the Tobin
tax has been a French-based non-governmental organization (NGO), the Associ-
ation for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC)
and the international movement that it has spawned. Born in France in 1998,
ATTAC has grown to become a transnational network present in almost 40
countries, with an estimated global membership of 100,000 people.2 Although
ATTAC exists in other continents, it has a strong European character. Since its
first international meeting in Porto Alegre in 2002, for example, the international
movement has decided to focus on a European campaign (where the implemen-
tation of the tax seems more likely). In this campaign, ATTAC France holds a
hegemonic position and acts as the movement’s leader due to the pioneering role
 Campaign for a ‘Robin Hood Tax’ for Foreign Exchange Markets 151

of the French association in providing an ideological foundation for the whole

movement and some of its most prominent figures.
ATTAC is an interesting case study for a number of reasons. It has grown
enormously while maintaining a flexible and horizontal network structure; it has
demonstrated the power of clear proposals and prominent spokespeople with
good media access; and, as a social movement, it has managed to attract wide sup-
port for its powerful views about globalization and how a Robin Hood tax could
curb its excesses.
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first describes the birth of
ATTAC France and its ideology. Secondly, it describes how ATTAC became a
transnational network. Thirdly, it explores its global actions and the debates aris-
ing from organizing at the international level. Fourthly, it analyses the tensions
that ATTAC faces as a network and discusses some of the organizational debates
within it. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the chapter’s findings.

THE GENESIS OF ATTAC FRANCE:

‘DISARMING THE MARKETS’
The concept of ATTAC came from a 1997 newspaper editorial entitled ‘Dis-
arming the Markets’, written by the director of Le Monde Diplomatique, Ignacio
Ramonet. His inspiration was the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s
that produced the depreciation of the bhat and the collapse of the stock market
in Thailand and other countries in the region. The social impact of the financial
crisis was harshly felt in these societies through unemployment, wage cuts, debt,
reduced government spending, falling living standards and increased poverty
(Hayward, 1999: 2). Regardless of the real causes of crisis, says Heikki Patomäki,
(2001: 25) the irony is that the so-called ‘Asian tigers’ had been praised during
1994–1996 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for
their ‘sound macro-economic fundamentals’ and, yet, now stood accused of prac-
tising ‘crony capitalism’ (Patomäki, 2001: 25). Thus, with the Asian crises in
mind, Ramonet’s editorial analysed the ‘absolute freedom of movement of capi-
tal’ and the negative consequences this has for democracy. As he pointed out:

…hundreds of billions of dollars are stashed away out of reach of the

tax authorities for the benefit of powerful individuals and financial
institutions. All the major banks in the world have branches in tax
havens and make a tidy profit of their activities (Ramonet, 1997).

The damage caused by these flows of capital could be remedied, said Ramonet,
by the introduction of:

…a new worldwide non-governmental organization, Action for a

Tobin Tax to Assist the Citizen (ATTAC) [which] could exert formidable
pressure on governments to introduce the tax at last, in the name of
universal solidarity (Ramonet, 1997).
152 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Shortly after the publication of Ramonet’s editorial, Le Monde Diplomatique

received hundreds of letters, indicating the interest that it had provoked. In the
following months, the newspaper’s staff engaged in a wide-ranging debate and
came to play a prominent role in the founding of ATTAC France.3 Hence, on
the 16 March 1998, Le Monde Diplomatique invited various associations, trade
unions and journalists to discuss the setting up of ATTAC. Participants shared in
drafting the statute, and ATTAC France was officially born on 3 June 1998 as the
Association Pour une Taxation sur les Transactions Financiers Pour l’Aide aux
Citoyens. The organization was initially an aggregation of 10 individuals and
representatives of 47 organizations, such as NGOs, trade unions and newspapers,
and envisaged a complex structure comprising a general assembly, administrative
council, a bureau and a college of founding members, and a scientific council.4
The organization was soon opened to individual subscription and members.
Today, ATTAC France is organized in 250 local communities and claims 35,000
members. It has seven permanent members of staff in Paris and the decision-mak-
ing is highly decentralized. Through the use of e-mail and the internet, the central
office often engages in debate with local communities. As an organization, ATTAC
combines a top-down approach, by which its members are informed of activities
through a bulletin and e-mail list, and a bottom-up decision-making process, as the
local communities propose ideas and engage in national debate about the future
of the organization. ATTAC, says Vice-President Susan George, ‘is organized
like a fractal’.5
The rapid success and establishment of ATTAC France owes much to the
role played by Le Monde Diplomatique. The newspaper was instrumental in cre-
ating the organization and, more importantly, provided ATTAC with a cohesive
ideology, some of its leaders and an excellent platform to disseminate its propos-
als. It is a widely respected monthly journal on political and current affairs, with
editions in 20 countries. It is for the international left what The Economist is for
free-market adherents. Although the newspaper does not explicitly support
ATTAC in its pages, the links between the two are strong. Bernard Cassen, director-
general of Le Monde Diplomatique is, at the same time, president of ATTAC
France. The newspaper has also urged its readers to join ATTAC. In terms of
ideology, it has provided the NGO with a rich body of ideas. It argues that our
increasingly interconnected world is a stage in which democracy is losing the
battle with capitalism. According to Le Monde Diplomatique, the main enemy of
the Tobin tax is the consensus of neo-liberals and the political elite, or pensée
unique, who have a blind faith in the ‘invisible hand of the market’ and the vir-
tues of free trade. As Bernard Cassen has explained, ATTAC’s objective is ‘to
extirpate the virus of economic liberalism from the brains of the people, and [to]
counter the position maintained by politicians that there is only the neo-liberal
way to manage the economy’ (cited in Wainwright and Juniper, 2002).
The tension Cassen describes is not new and has been identified by other
authors, including the scholar from Princeton Richard Falk, who has referred to
the dichotomy between global market forces and oppositional responses as ‘global-
ization from above’ versus ‘globalization from below’ (Falk, 1998: 100). Falk
 Campaign for a ‘Robin Hood Tax’ for Foreign Exchange Markets 153

sees the organizations promoting ‘globalization from below’ as counteracting the

pressures to privatize and ‘marketize’ the production of public goods. ATTAC
would be, in his view, an organization that tries to ‘reinstrumentalize the state to
the extent that it redefines its role as mediating between the logic of capital and the
priorities of the peoples’ (Falk, 1998: 109). According to Desai and Said (2001:
65), the perception civil society has of global finance has led some organizations to
think, firstly, that liberal democracy is lagging behind neo-liberal economics, or
even being threatened by it; and, secondly, that the abandonment of nation state-
based answers to the contradictions of capitalism – be they the welfare state in the
North or state-sponsored development or superpower patronage in the South –
is generating pockets of extreme poverty in both rich and poor countries.
Following from this analysis, ATTAC would like states to introduce a tax on
the most favoured sector of economic globalization – the financial markets. The
rationale for such a measure, says ATTAC, is that since the early 1970s the levels
of financial transactions have massively increased and often dwarf those in the so-
called ‘real economy’. In the foreign exchange market, often more than US$1500
billion in different currencies are traded in a day, thanks to the security and speed
of fibre optics and modern computers. ‘With telephones and computer links,
foreign-exchange trading today occurs through a round-the-clock market that
connects dealing rooms in London, New York, Tokyo, Zürich, Frankfurt, Hong
Kong, Singapore, Paris and Sydney’ (Scholte, 2002: 6). Much of this foreign-
exchange trade relates purely to speculation and hedging, rather than to interna-
tional trade. While international trade has always been the reference and key
source of demand for foreign exchange, speculation has grown from over 10 times
world trade flows in 1979 to over 50 times today (Held and McGrew 2000: 209).
This has led some scholars to talk about ‘the global casino of high finance’, where
actors gamble day and night, sometimes with disastrous consequences (Strange,
1986: 2). These new ‘gamblers’ observe the flaws of foreign-exchange markets and
use that information (or its inefficiency) to speculate against currencies.6
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) scholars describe
those pushing ‘globalization from below’ as comprising four groups: supporters,
isolationists, alternatives and reformists (Desai and Said, 2001: 64–75). The sup-
porters consist of businesses and their associations, media outlets, rightist think
tanks and others who believe that there is no alternative to market-driven capital-
ism (such as the Chamber of British Industry, the Wall Street Journal and Thomas
Friedman). The isolationists are the so-called anti-globalization campaigners who
consider globalization and capitalism as synonymous and promote instead deglo-
balization or localization (such as Friends of the Earth (FOE), the Landless Peasants
Movement in Brazil (MST) and Noam Chomsky). The alternatives are concerned
with the political and cultural consequences of capitalism and do not defend a
particular agenda but a ‘way of life’ (such as the Zapatistas of Mexico (EZLN) or
the UK-based Reclaim the Streets group). Finally, the reformists, who account
for the majority of movements and organizations, are made up of groups who do
not want radical change but a ‘social democratic’ agenda. Desai and Said (2001)
include in this group organizations such as Oxfam (OI), Jubilee 2000 and ATTAC.
154 Globalizing Civic Engagement

The latter group of organizations has singled out the finance industry for
moral condemnation and attempts to promote a creative and positive counter-
proposal, framed ‘into a broader ethical context’ (Clark, 2001: 25). In the case
of ATTAC, its reformist proposal is the introduction of an international tax on
foreign currency transactions. The tax would charge all foreign transactions a flat
rate of between 0.05 and 0.5 per cent. The tax is aimed at hitting speculative
transactions, while leaving long-term foreign-exchange transactions virtually
unaffected. The revenues obtained from the tax could be phenomenal (up to
US$100 billion a year) and could be used to fund sustainable development. The
idea has, until recently, been largely ignored or accused of being unrealistic. How-
ever, the scientific committee of ATTAC, as well as many independent econo-
mists, have argued determinedly that the tax is feasible and could be practically
implemented. They have developed an impressive body of evidence to defend
their thesis.7 The symbolic importance of the Tobin tax is clear: a tax on money
markets would transfer the money raised from bankers and traders, mainly in the
North, to developing countries. Seen in the context of civil society against global
capitalism, the measure has been described as a ‘Robin Hood tax’ that would
take the money from the ‘bad guys’ and give it to the ‘poor guys’.8

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ATTAC-INTERNATIONAL

In December 1998, at the invitation of ATTAC France, the platform Interna-
tional Movement ATTAC (henceforth, ATTAC-International or ATTAC-I) was
created.9 The idea was to promote a ‘democratic control of financial markets and
their institutions’ at the international level by linking existing national ATTACs.
During the previous months, ATTACs had been created in countries where Le
Monde Diplomatique was published (and Ramonet’s 1997 article had been read).
The founding goals of ATTAC were ‘to reconquer the space lost by democracy to
the sphere of finance, oppose any new abandonment of national sovereignty and
create a democratic space at the global level… It is simply a question of taking
back, together, the future of our world’.10 ATTAC-I took the form of ‘a network,
with neither hierarchical structures nor a geographical centre’.11 Being a network,
says ATTAC’s founding charter, allows a flexible structure with no ‘central secre-
tariat (which would require heavy financial resources and would also be opposed
to the organization’s democratic ethos) or usual communication means (which
required too much time and cost too much)’.12
According to the literature on organizational practices, networks have ‘hori-
zontal patterns of exchange, interdependent flows of resources and reciprocal lines
of communication’ (Powell, 1990: 296). They provide an informal structure, an
absence of hierarchy and flexibility that other organizational models don’t; they
are ‘flat’ organizations, in contrast to vertically organized hierarchical forms. Net-
work members come together because they are all working towards a common
goal. The horizontal character of networks also allows flexible participation from
the ‘nodes’ that might be at very different stages in their campaigns. ATTAC-
International is a forum in which ATTACs – at different levels of development –
 Campaign for a ‘Robin Hood Tax’ for Foreign Exchange Markets 155

can learn from one another, share information, exchange speakers, coordinate
joint activities and prepare international action. Members of ATTAC-I have com-
mon values, worldviews and a shared single goal, but no commitment to collec-
tive action or joint decisions.
The initiative to create ATTAC was enthusiastically welcomed, partly because
it came at a time when financial markets were being scrutinized by the public and
the media, following crises in East Asia and elsewhere, as well as public protests
in Seattle and Washington, DC. Public opprobrium, amongst other targets, cas-
tigated currency speculation for its role in these crises. Furthermore, ATTACs in
other countries (or their equivalent – not all used the same name) were beginning
to chart up successes. This was the case, for instance, with the Canadian group
who managed to take the issue to a debate in parliament. In the words of Maude
Barlow, chairwoman of the Council of Canadians, a currency tax ‘presents a criti-
cal opportunity…to reclaim some of the sovereignty we’ve lost as a result of eco-
nomic globalization’ (cited in Stecher and Bailey, 1999). There were parallels with
the successful NGO network against the multilateral agreement on investment.
Although these examples indicated that change was, indeed, possible, ATTAC
could not find role models for large-scale international events. The coordination
of the network via informal means, a loose structure and a large number of social
actors would be a disadvantage (Thompson et al, 1998: 15). The use of new infor-
mation and communications technology (ICT), however, certainly helped the
work of ATTAC; its web page (www.ATTAC.org) was its centrepiece in the gath-
ering and exchange of information. However, ICT did not allow for all members
to participate equally, and the organizational work had to be done by the leader-
ship of each national ATTAC. The network relies on ‘representatives’ or ‘electronic
ambassadors’ for the dissemination of information down to the supporters.
Language was another basic problem relating to international meetings.
ATTAC-I comprises people from more than 20 linguistic groups; this makes
decision-making processes very cumbersome. The preferred languages are English,
French and Spanish (Spanish and Portuguese were dominant in ATTAC’s first
international meeting, which took place at the World Social Forum (WSF) in
Porto Alegre). Although English is slowly taking hold as a lingua franca in many
social movements and civil society networks, the charismatic leadership of ATTAC
France has been able to deter this process within ATTAC. However, the lack of a
common language clearly impedes rapid and effective decision-making. According
to Laurent Jessover of ATTAC France, it depends on ‘armies of translators’ to make
itself understood.13 In France alone there are 650 translators who occasionally
help ATTAC in its day-to-day work.
Although the network comprises horizontal structures and no hierarchy, the
reality is that ATTAC France is the reference point for all ATTACs and the
acknowledged authority on the technical issues. ATTAC-I is clearly, in effect, a
French-led network. ATTAC France also leads for the network in issues of name
or ‘branding’. When a country, region or city wants to start its own ATTAC, it is
ATTAC France that gives the approval due to its founding authority. It permits the
new organization to use the name and add it to the French web page (ATTAC.org),
156 Globalizing Civic Engagement

hence linking it to all the other national organizations. Updating the ATTAC-I
web page is compiled in France (although each national organization is expected
to update the information about itself), as is the e-mail newsletter that goes to all
members, Sand in the Wheels. ATTAC France also plays a prominent role in coor-
dinating international activities. Thus, although ATTAC-I is a network compris-
ing about 40 countries from Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe, it has a de
facto central secretariat – ATTAC France.14 This leadership is also partly due to
the fact that France and Germany are the only ATTACs with permanent mem-
bers of staff (France has seven; Germany has four); but, more significantly, the
true celebrities of the movement are French-based. People such as Susan George,
Bernard Cassen and Ignacio Ramonet have managed to bring ATTAC’s concerns
to the attention of the media and are respected for having done so.
However, not everyone is pleased with the way in which ATTAC has presented
its ‘pedagogical and informative movement’. James Tobin himself accused the
campaign of having ‘abused’ his 30-year-old idea of a tax on currency exchange.
Although the proposal takes Tobin’s work almost in its entirety, ATTAC’s views on
issues of global financial architecture could hardly differ more from Tobin’s views
(Lichfield, 2001). He was a great supporter of the IMF and the World Bank, even
though he himself never envisaged a single global entity collecting the tax and
deciding where and how to spend it. Furthermore, to a large extent he accepted
capitalism as the system that offers welfare to a majority of people; in his last year
of life, he wrote avidly to distance himself from the movement that uses his name:

I support free trade… I support the World Bank and the IMF and the
World Trade Organization (WTO) that these movements hate (cited
in Lichfield, 2001).

Today, leaders of ATTAC talk about a ‘Tobin-type tax’ and continue to lambaste
the World Bank and the IMF. ATTAC promotes not only a currency exchange
tax but also other ‘democratic issues’, such as the reform of ‘unregulated institu-
tions’ of global governance, ecological issues and faults with ‘the hegemonic eco-
nomic model of neo-liberalism’.
To sum up, since 1998, ATTAC has expanded both its geographical focus and
its mandate. A large number of countries have founded their own chapters, prima-
rily in Europe but also in South America, Africa and Asia. At the same time, the
organization has expanded to other issues beyond the taxation of money markets.
It has also made considerable headway in persuading significant political leaders
and opinion-makers to look carefully at the case they advance, especially as popu-
lar indignation about corporate sleaze and speculation is mounting globally. Its
biggest triumph, to date, was gaining the support of the former prime minister of
France, Lionel Jospin. In the UK, Labour Chancellor Gordon Brown has stated
publicly that it is time to think again about whether the Tobin tax or something
like it might be a feasible proposition. ATTAC-I has secured influential parliamen-
tary debates and motions in Argentina, Belgium, Chile, France, India, Ireland,
Spain, Uruguay and the European parliament.15
 Campaign for a ‘Robin Hood Tax’ for Foreign Exchange Markets 157

GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION: THINK GLOBAL, ACT

GLOBAL; THINK LOCAL, ACT LOCAL

ATTAC describes itself as a ‘movement for popular education turned towards

action’ and a campaign for international democracy.16 Its campaign focus has
broadened from the Tobin tax to other issues, such as closing down tax havens,
cancelling developing world debt and the reform of international institutions.
This expansion of mandate has enabled ATTAC to benefit from the momentum
of the anti-globalization movement. As two leaders in the UK newspaper the
Guardian noted, ATTAC has ‘snowballed rapidly into a more general movement
for global social justice’, providing ‘the nearest thing to continental coordina-
tion’ (Wainwright and Juniper, 2002).
One of the events that boosted the media profile of ATTAC was the World
Social Forum (WSF) held in Porto Alegre, Brazil. ATTAC was one of the main
organizers, promoters and active participants of this forum (see Chapter 7) and
convened its very first international meeting in the second WSF in February
2002. Until that point, ATTAC had been concentrated in Europe and mainly
focused on public education, regarding issues of finance, and the promotion of
the Tobin tax as a measure to curb the excesses of currency speculation. How-
ever, due to the increasing number of national ATTACs, it was felt that more
international coordination was needed. In Porto Alegre, the focus was a Euro-
pean campaign to implement the Tobin tax. Basing its decision on the work of
the scientific committee of ATTAC, as well as the work of economists such as
Rodney Schmidt and Paul Bernard Spahn, ATTAC decided that a Tobin tax at a
European level was feasible and that the European Union (EU) should be
pressed to initiate the tax. Since then, the European ATTACs – to date the most
numerous and better organized – have cooperated closely. Shortly after WSF
2002, ATTAC held its first European meeting in Barcelona in March 2002,
coinciding with the EU summit. Although there is, as yet, no single, definitive
European campaign, the synergies and level of interaction between national
ATTACs have increased greatly, partly due to the relatively short distances and
widespread use of ICT throughout Europe. In other parts of the world, such as
Africa, Latin America or Asia, coordination has not reached the same levels.
One of the problems facing the international campaign is the very different
starting points of ATTACs in different countries. They have different preferences
for issues, working methods and structures that must be constantly adapted to
the local culture. According to Patomaki (2001: 180):

There is no point in speculating on the possible emergence of a universal

consent for the Tobin tax… Any significant grouping of countries can
proceed quickly, despite the resistance of some of the major centres.

Maximizing flexibility allows each national centre to decide what issues they
think are important and want to work on, how best to build up the image domes-
tically, and how much attention to give to the international arena. Activists do
158 Globalizing Civic Engagement

not necessarily see the resulting lack of coherence or unified strategy as a bad
thing. The fact that the international campaign is ‘a network, with neither hierar-
chical structures nor a geographical centre’ seems to suit the different concepts of
ATTAC across the European countries.17 In the words of Christophe Ventura,
spokesperson for ATTAC:18

We are a network without any bureau or control centre. The only thing
we ask people, if they want to build an ATTAC, is to do it on the plat-
form, nothing else… Concretely, our coordination is a political one. It
means that we work together on concrete campaigns and themes. For
example, each ATTAC mobilizes in its country on the GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] issue. All of us are autonomous and
there is absolutely no vote in our meeting. We are working by discussion
and consensus on proposals. There is no obligation for nothing; but,
honestly, for the moment, we have never seen an ATTAC who didn’t
want to campaign on one of our goals.

However, many suspect that it is just a matter of time before ATTAC seeks to gal-
vanize effort around a single strategic campaign. To date, ATTAC France actively
defends the ‘loose network’ model; but it is not clear how much other countries
agree with this. During the ATTAC Europe meeting in Barcelona, grassroots
members of ATTAC Spain actively accused the organizers from both Madrid and
Barcelona of ineffectiveness. It was notable, for instance, that national ATTACs
from some of the very active countries were absent (such as Germany, Sweden
and Finland). It transpired that they had only been informed of the meeting some
days before hand. Complaints about the organization of the event continued
throughout the meeting and illustrated the frustration felt by many about the
absence of any central or global direction.
It is unclear how long ATTAC France can continue to be the de facto leader
when it has not been formally given this responsibility and when there are no
governance procedures in place to do so. This debate brings other governance
questions to the fore, such as who is accountable for the actions of ATTAC
France? Susan George replies that: ‘ATTAC France is only accountable to its
members, to nobody else’.19 But what about its accountability for matters con-
cerning the international movement? Through this it influences far more than
its own membership. Should only the national membership have a say when the
affairs of one national ATTAC has implications for groups in other countries?
Governance and leadership issues are particularly vexed regarding questions
of international action, such as ATTAC’s role in the creation of the WSF in Porto
Alegre. ATTAC-I now plans to hold an international meeting annually, initially
coinciding with the WSF, while European and other regional meetings might
occur more often. The host country designs the agenda and plans the meeting.
However, as could be seen in the first ATTAC Europe meeting in Barcelona, the
preparatory committees barely knew about the proposals from different countries,
the circulation of documents was poor and the attendance was low. Although
 Campaign for a ‘Robin Hood Tax’ for Foreign Exchange Markets 159

the internet could have been widely used to circulate documents, this had not
been done because no group had truly assumed responsibility. In the event, who-
ever made most noise had their motions approved – though the fact that 70 per
cent of the attendance was Spanish called into question the legitimacy of this as
an international decision-making forum. While other networks may have too
much procedure, the opposite is the case with ATTAC. It may be bound by a
common goal, but its real nature is displayed in the variety and peculiarity of
each national structure.
On the other hand, its loose structure allows the movement to emphasize a
campaign based on changing attitudes and practices, rather than on fixed norms.
Dialogue with opponents is seen as unproductive and ATTAC generally favours
more direct confrontation activities. From this perspective, many in the move-
ment see the Tobin tax as a symbol of totemic value, a measure of whether
authority takes seriously or rejects a popularly demanded reform. Thus, ATTAC
members fear that, through the negotiations they have precipitated, their pro-
posals might become watered down. As Claudio Jampaglia from ATTAC Italy
has pointed out:20

One of the interesting things [about] ATTAC is that it is not interested

in power. So, we don’t need to be elected, and so on. We are not ‘lobby-
ing’ in the traditional way. We want a conflict/discussion with institu-
tions. We can demonstrate that their policies are unreasonable…but we
are not interested in dealing with them.

The wariness of meeting with politicians was exemplified by Bernard Cassen.

When Jacques Chirac, the French president, invited Cassen to dine before the
2002 presidential elections, although he thought ‘maybe we are about to change
the direction of the debate in France the way we want it to be’, he avoided the
meeting, arguing that Chirac’s personal agenda was too charged (Godoy, 2000).
Because of President Chirac’s support for neo-liberal economic and social pro-
grammes, meeting him would not have influenced policy and could have embar-
rassed ATTAC’s left-wing membership. As Florini has pointed out, networks
remain powerful as long as they maintain their credibility (Florini, 2000: 214). In
this case, Cassen preferred to make sure that the Tobin tax was not associated with
a particular politician and, therefore, passed over the chance to gain a powerful
ally. In Germany a similar episode illustrated ATTAC’s reluctance to work with
politicians. In August 2001, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, MEP and co-founder of the
Green party, criticized his own party for ignoring the anti-globalization move-
ment, thereby estranging young voters. The party, at the time in the ruling coali-
tion government, invited ATTAC Deutschland to assist its policy development;
but ATTAC refused on the grounds that the party still supported ‘neo-liberal eco-
nomic policy’.21 ATTAC has taken an all-or-nothing approach to political parties;
it will only support those that subscribe to the Tobin tax campaign. For others,
ATTAC prefers to ‘make their lives as impossible as we can’, says Susan George.22
160 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Many in the wider anti-globalization movement accuse ATTAC of not chal-

lenging capitalism, just ‘smoothening it’, thereby possibly even helping to spread
global capitalism. However, in an era in which there is little global public space
for transnational movements to operate, the possibilities for ‘emancipation’ are
seriously weakened (Cohen and Shirin, 2000: 16). Revolutionary politics has
declined and alternative and reformist visions have risen – or, as Susan George
put it, ‘caviar is not on the menu, only noodles’. Meanwhile, ATTAC’s member-
ship and support continue to grow (though global membership data are unreli-
able). Sociologically speaking, ATTAC members come from the middle-class left
and (particularly in the Parisian suburbs) the working class; but the movement
remains quite bourgeois.23 Distinctions between anti-globalization activists in
Europe have been pointed out by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, enfant terrible of May
1968, who divides them into the ‘old, ultra-left ideologies that are hiding inside
the movement and young people who are in favour of democratization of the
market’.24 Cohn-Bendit, himself a member of ATTAC, would include ATTAC
in the second group.

ATTAC: NETWORK OR MOVEMENT?

In 2001, the German weekly Der Spiegel pointed out that ‘for the first time, a
truly international generation of protestors is turning the heat on politicians and
the heads of multinational corporations – and justly so. The global economy,
powerful and at the same time prone to crisis, needs new rules’.25 Such media see
the emergence of transnational civil-society advocacy as a potential international
actor to counterbalance the global economy and, perhaps, make political change
happen. But will this new, amorphous actor become institutionalized? In the
view of Cohn-Bendit, ‘if the globalization movement became more clearly a
political vehicle, and less obviously a transmission belt for international public
opinion, its implosion would become a risk’ (cited in Vinocur, 2001). ATTAC,
like other organizations born during the 1990s, faces the challenge of globalizing
its proposals, language, ways of communicating and decision-making.
As it stands, ATTAC-International is a platform where ATTACs from differ-
ent countries meet and decide international action. But this international net-
work arises from nationally based constituencies where the social movement is
the real attraction, not the international network. In order to survive and become
more effective, ATTAC will have to deal with at least three tensions. The first
relates to decision-making processes and the style of leadership; the second to
ATTAC’s structure, particularly in relation to accountability and transparency
issues; and the third to the character of the membership.
Regarding leadership and decision-making, ATTAC-I both benefits and suf-
fers from the network’s informality, making the coordination of international
activities a difficult task. In an international meeting, decisions must be reached
by consensus, and no one can impose decisions on other members. Yet, in this
apparently leaderless system, clear leaders emerge, in practice. This is what Claudio
Jampaglia, from ATTAC Italy, refers to as ‘the French spirit’. Figures such as
 Campaign for a ‘Robin Hood Tax’ for Foreign Exchange Markets 161

Susan George, Ignacio Ramonet, Bernard Cassen or Manu Chao (lead singer of
Mano Negra) are de facto, if not formally, appointed leaders. They are the faces of
the movement for the media, and they are as necessary for ATTAC as pedalling
is for a bike. Hence, ATTAC France’s leadership is, in effect, the leadership of
ATTAC-International as a whole.
The second tension concerns the debate about structure. The bigger ATTAC
becomes, the more problems it has regarding governance and accountability.
Such problems imply the need for clearer institutionalization; but the leaders of
ATTAC France are very cautious about creating permanent structures. The trade-
offs are obvious, says Christophe Ventura: ‘Although this would entail more coor-
dination between all the nodes, just one single strategy would be imposed by the
top, and this might not be able to be followed by the peripheries’.26 Whether
this resistance to institutionalization is partly due to the fear that ATTAC France
might either lose or formalize its leadership of the network is a matter of specu-
lation. For the present, it leaves the national ATTACs working independently
from each other, without a central secretariat imposing any strategy, discourse or
organization. They all share core values and follow what is seen as the ‘natural
leadership’ of ATTAC France. Similarly, every national ATTAC is organized dif-
ferently and varies enormously in membership. However, the low level of insti-
tutionalization negatively affects ATTAC’s prospects for promoting an effective
international campaign.
The third tension concerns the nature of membership. People join groups
such as ATTAC because they like its goals and identify with its ethos. Susan
George suggests that the Tobin tax campaign is successful because ‘who likes
bankers anyway?’ People join ATTAC ‘because the bastards have gone too far. The
bastards will take us back to the 19th century. Nowadays, more and more people
are realizing about world injustice.’ From this perspective, ATTAC’s single-issue
campaign is not the main goal, but the means to revealing the deeper systemic
injustices. According to Bernard Cassen, the campaign for the Tobin tax should
not be seen:

…as a panacea, but [as] a practical and symbolic means of taking back
the initiative from pure market forces and asserting the values of soli-
darity. ATTAC is a movement of popular education, more a process
than a specific goal (cited in Gillespie, 2000).

CONCLUSION
Transnational social movements tend to be headless organizations that come
together, transforming themselves into ‘a community’ (Anheier, Glasius and
Kaldor, 2001). ATTAC has many characteristics of a transnational movement
and aspires to be one. It has certainly managed to arouse the imagination of
many people; but it has not managed to become a single transnational commu-
nity. It remains unclear whether this transformation would be possible within
such an informal network.
162 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Since 1998, ATTAC has grown and evolved rapidly from being a French
organization to an international platform. The growing public awareness in many
countries of the problems of global capital and contemporary finance owes much
to its effectiveness. However, ATTAC faces many dilemmas due to the changing
nature of its transnational network. Among the most important are challenges to
establish clearer leadership, a clearer mandate, a common campaign platform
and a more strongly developed network structure. Finally, ATTAC will have to
debate whether it wants to promote a new sort of internationalism that concerns
broad issues of global economic justice, or whether it is going to concentrate on
being an NGO who works for the implementation of a ‘Robin Hood tax’.

NOTES
1 James Tobin (1978) ‘A Proposal for Monetary Reform’; also reproduced as an appen-
dix in Patomäki (2001).
2 The data was provided by ATTAC Germany.
3 Interview with Christophe Ventura.
4 The 10 citizens were Manu Chao, René Dumont, Viviane Forrester, Gisèle Halimi,
Bernard Langlois, Daniel Mermet, René Passet, Ignacio Ramonet, Jacques Robin
and Philippe Val. For the list of organizations and other founding information see
ATTAC France’s web page: www.ATTAC.org/france/index.html.
5 Interview with Susan George.
6 Surajaras and Sweeney have showed how outdated the efficient markets hypothesis
(EMH) is – the dominant paradigm in financial economics since the mid-1960s.
The EMH argues that speculators cannot make consistent profits using simple,
mechanical buy-and-sell rules because the market is efficient. However, they have
shown how financial markets can be inefficient and differences in access to informa-
tion may be used by speculators to anticipate, detect and/or provoke trends in prices
(Surajaras and Sweeney, 1992: 3, 255–256).
7 See the work by Rodney Schmidt (1999) and Paul Bernard Spahn (1996).
8 See War on Want and the New Economics Foundation (2001) ‘The Robin Hood
Tax’, London (www.waronwant.org).
9 See www.ATTAC.org/fra/inte/doc/naissanceen.
10 See www.ATTAC.org/fra/inte/doc/plateformeen.
11 From ‘An International Movement for Democratic Control of Financial Markets
and Their Institutions’, www.ATTAC.org/fra/inte/doc/naissanceen.
12 From ‘An International Movement for Democratic Control of Financial Markets
and Their Institutions’, www.ATTAC.org/fra/inte/doc/naissanceen.
13 Interview with Laurent Jessover.
14 The list as of 2002 comprised Andorra, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium,
Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland,
France, Hungary, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Mali, Morocco,
The Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Quebec, Russia, Senegal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia and Uruguay.
15 See Merino (2001) and Gillespie (2001) ‘Tobin Tax on Capital Movements Attracting
Growing Support’. The Irish Times, 1 September. For an updated list of countries
who support the Tobin tax, see www.waronwant.org.
 Campaign for a ‘Robin Hood Tax’ for Foreign Exchange Markets 163

16 See New Scientist (2002) ‘Globally Local’, 27 April.

17 From ‘An international Movement for Democratic Control of Financial Markets
and Their Institutions’, www.ATTAC.org/fra/inte/doc/naissanceen.
18 Interview with Christophe Ventura.
19 Interview with Susan George.
20 Interview with Claudio Jampaglia.
21 Suddeutsche Zeitung (2001) ‘ATTAC Rejects Co-operation with Green Party, 23
August.
22 Interview with Susan George.
23 Interview with Susan George.
24 Vinocur (2001) ‘War Transforms the Anti-Globalization Crowd’, International Herald
Tribune, 2 November.
25 Der Spiegel (2001) no 30.
26 Interview with Christophe Ventura.
 Chapter 9

Conclusions:
Globalizing Civic Engagement

John Clark

Various forms of global civic action are emerging in response to both the opportu-
nities and threats posed by global change. These are the new and fast-moving tec-
tonic plates of associational activity. They present great challenges to civil society
and policy-makers alike. This book has explored many examples of this phenom-
enon in order to assess the effectiveness of these experiences, the organizational
and governance challenges experienced and what general lessons can be deduced. It
is hoped that these findings are of use to civil society leaders, to policy-makers who
have to respond to civil society pressure and to academics studying civil society.
One of the clearest, but not very helpful, conclusions from our case studies
is that the sheer diversity of civil society actions makes generalization dangerous.
While civil society organizations (CSOs) in very different sectors face similar chal-
lenges as they prioritize transnational ways of working, they respond to them in
diverse ways. No grand unified model can be sketched; no dogmatic lessons can
be drawn. Perhaps this is to be expected. Our starting point was to study a wide
range of case studies – from established charities pressing for better access to life-
saving drugs and century-old international trade union structures, to web-based
campaigns (‘dot causes’), the modern protest movement and the World Social
Forum (WSF; see Chapter 7). But such diversity is a hallmark of civil society.
Accepting this caveat, the common challenges experienced present civil soci-
ety leaders and policy-makers with a set of choices, conundrums and dilemmas.
This chapter summarizes these as a set of critical questions to be wrestled with.
Finally, it hazards some suggestions as to its future course.
 Conclusions: Globalizing Civic Engagement 165

DOES TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY OFFER

A CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE?

The imperative for transnational action is felt strongest by CSOs who seek to
influence policy and public opinion, since policy is increasingly formed in inter-
national forums or set by internationally determined norms. This was the starting
premise of Chapter 1 and is well illustrated by our case studies.
Policy-makers should offer a more credible and open-minded response than
they have hitherto done. Governments, inter-governmental organizations and
transnational corporations (TNCs) will find that the gulf between them and pop-
ular opinion (including much of the media) will widen and become more conflict-
ing unless they make determined effort to engage critics in serious and genuine
debate. They must respond to the mounting concern that today’s democracy
doesn’t reach into forums where important decisions are increasingly made (as
described in Chapter 1) – the ‘democracy deficit’ in global governance. National
parliaments, political parties, media and watchdogs have little sway over interna-
tional decisions – hence, the growing public view that critical decisions driving
globalization are made by unaccountable bureaucrats or corporate chiefs, in shadowy
global institutions, who are unresponsive to citizens. And campaigning CSOs,
who are aware that the international institutions are governed by governments,
argue that G7 governments (answerable to Northern publics) dominate these
institutions, while the impact of their actions is most acutely felt in poor countries.
All traditional concepts of democracy are based on nation states. Yet, there is
a burgeoning civil society agitation for modulating global governance by some
equivalent international democracy, however difficult this will be to achieve. In its
absence, many civil society activities, not least the environment movement, dem-
onstrate the importance of international pressure. How to respond to the protest
movement is a particular challenge for governments. Holding international meet-
ings that are protected by ever stronger policing will erode public credibility, as
will retreating to undemocratic or difficult-to-reach venues.

WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF WORKING

TRANSNATIONALLY?

The CSOs and networks we explored confirm that working internationally

enhances their civic effectiveness and is of increasing importance – although this
is hardly surprising since we selected transnational actors for our study. However,
the rationales for working transnationally vary. Some – such as Consumers Inter-
national (CI), most trade union networks and specific social justice campaigns –
primarily seek to influence TNCs. For this to occur, it is necessary to build coa-
litions with activists in the parent country, in countries where there are impor-
tant markets, and in countries that best demonstrate the issue at hand. Similarly,
networks such as Jubilee 2000, as well as environmental or human rights groups,
seek to influence governments (and, perhaps, inter-governmental organizations);
166 Globalizing Civic Engagement

they also need coalitions that embrace countries where the impact is most evident
and where most influence is curried. For all of these groups, a conscious decision
is necessary to invest in transnational action. With dot causes, however, this is
not the case because of the universality of the web. Apart from language barriers,
there is no cost difference between working nationally and internationally. The
Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens
(ATTAC) is a hybrid. It is both a web-mediated international campaign and also
a powerful social movement in France, organizing national or local events (with
smaller social movements in other countries).
The benefits of working transnationally are well illustrated by the campaign
to reduce the prices of drugs for HIV/AIDS (see Chapter 4). It would have been
unlikely to succeed as a purely national venture of AIDS patients in South Africa,
echoed in a few other developing countries. Trade and patent policies are largely
determined by governments in the US and the European Union (EU), where the
big pharmaceutical companies are based; Southern voices are weak. Northern
decision-makers are only sensitive to public opinion on their home turf or in very
big markets. Furthermore, many of the issues are highly technical. The campaign
succeeded because grassroots CSOs in many Southern countries joined with
influential Northern counterparts, and were supported by internationally renowned
scientists and the leading health professionals’ associations. Together, they com-
prised an irresistible movement for change since they combined grassroots testi-
monials and top-quality science, the perspectives of professionals as well as
victims, the moral imperative and international credibility.
However, it is not a one-way street. Working transnationally has major costs
and requires discipline. Unless the structures are in place and the governance
processes are modified for this new way of working, it is likely to be fraught with
frustrations for all parties. The culture and practices of CSOs who set out on this
course will probably change – not just the targets of the international engagement.

TRANS-SECTOR MAY BE AS IMPORTANT AS

TRANSNATIONAL – BUT IS IT WORTH IT?

Our studies suggest that, though it is less immediately obvious, forging non-tra-
ditional alliances and broad-based coalitions is just as important as working inter-
nationally. Though CSOs find it easiest to work with like-minded counterparts at
home or abroad, in order to maximize impact they are seeing a need to climb out
of their institutional silos and form cross-sectoral partnerships. Different CSO
sectors contribute different skills and political strengths to advocacy. However,
while broadening the base adds clout and injects energy, it also heightens difficul-
ties in achieving convergence around coherent policy proposals. The more genu-
inely global and multi-stakeholder the network, the more difficult it becomes to
achieve convergence. The World Social Forum (WSF) illustrates this. Some sup-
porters see it as the first global political platform; it has developed campaign slogans
that are powerful and forward-looking (‘another world is possible’; movement
 Conclusions: Globalizing Civic Engagement 167

‘for global economic justice and peace’). However, in practice, the WSF has not
managed to construct a holistic, alternative political vision.
Cross-sector partnerships can create other problems, such as differing levels
of political responsibility. For established CSOs (for example, unions or mass-
membership non-governmental organizations – NGOs), their international credi-
bility is as important as their membership, while dot causes and new campaigns
can gamble their reputation on an adventurous publicity bid. Therefore, partner-
ships between the two are risky for both sides. The former may emerge with a
dented reputation; the latter may be frustrated by lost opportunities or cautious
strategies. This is particularly evident in the approaches of unions, NGOs (includ-
ing J2000) and churches to the global protest movement (see Chapter 6). Some
openly give support and help to mobilize protesters (greatly adding to its credi-
bility and to the size of the protests), while others who pursue similar campaigns
are at pains to avoid being associated and may speak out against the global protest
movement. They are particularly keen to distance themselves from the tactics of
disruption and violence. These issues have become more vexed since 11 Septem-
ber. Mass-membership CSOs (especially US CSOs) feel a strong need to condemn
violence of all kinds, and even to moderate their criticism of governments.
Cultural clashes frequently result as partnerships diversify a network’s base.
There have been angry exchanges between trade unions and NGOs, for example,
and the WSF has seen major differences between constituents, angry walkouts
and even protests staged against organizers. Non-traditional partnerships are not
always very deep; they may be formed for mutual legitimization rather than true
cooperation. In the second WSF, many participants spent most of their time clus-
tered into interest groups rather than talking cross-sectorally, to the disappoint-
ment of the organizers. WSF and many elements of the global protest movement
are beset by clashes over focus (whether to tackle specific issues such as debt or
the whole system), strategy (whether to articulate a political platform or simply
oppose the system) and tactics (whether to use direct action, what forms of media
to use, and whether to engage in dialogue with officials).
When networks diversify geographically, culture clashes can also arise. How-
ever, if a core concern unites the network, different global perspectives can
strengthen it – though they may be difficult to reconcile, at first. For example, CI
moved from an emphasis on product-testing to being a political voice for con-
sumers worldwide as a result of expanding from a Northern clique to a global
umbrella (see Chapter 2). Similarly, Friends of the Earth shifted focus from envi-
ronmentalism to sustainable development; and the Global Union Federations
(GUFs) – whose culture and strategy derive greatly from their origins within
Western European trade unionist traditions – now tackle issues that they previ-
ously ignored, such as casual work and the informal sector (see Chapter 3).
Traditional civil society needs to construct both international strategies and
effective partnerships with CSOs in other sectors in order to achieve optimal
impact. This entails trade unions and environment groups in the North appreci-
ating, for example, why Southern NGOs resent the inclusion of social and envi-
ronmental conditions in trade deals. It also entails traditional CSOs carefully
168 Globalizing Civic Engagement

deciding how to relate to the protest movement. Identifying too closely might
lead to loss of membership and credibility; too great a distance might alienate
them from potential supporters.

HOW TO TACKLE THE HORIZONTAL–VERTICAL

CONUNDRUM?

The previous two dilemmas reflect the same core challenge: how do CSOs – par-
ticularly long-established ones – move into the ‘network age’? To date, where
CSOs have grown in size and power, it is usually because (as in the business
world) they have been models of ‘vertical integration’ – keeping to their areas of
expertise and growing through evolving hierarchical structures. However, the
imperative in our globalizing world is horizontal integration – working in a diver-
sity of disciplines, as well as countries. How CSOs are run domestically influences
their success in responding to this challenge. Those who are unswervingly vertical
in structure find it most difficult to form horizontal partnerships.
The larger and longer-established CSOs find this transition most difficult.
Their leaders have probably been trained in management skills for growth and
for running hierarchies. Their institutional cultures and norms, and what their
supporters or members expect of them, have been moulded by their history;
these things are difficult to change quickly. Hence, it is often easier for new entries
to work in these new ways. They may be smaller, at least initially, and they don’t
have the institutional baggage of the traditional CSOs. Groups such as ATTAC
(see Chapter 8) are therefore able to capture the imagination and support of ide-
alistic students, leftist intellectuals, the development lobby, radical churchgoers
and rank-and-file workers. Its membership is increasing rapidly while traditional
mass-membership CSOs often face decline.

IS THERE A DEMOCRACY PARADOX?

Transnational civil society networks (TCSNs) challenge the lack of democracy in
international decision-making; but some are starting to ask: ‘How democratic
are we ourselves?’ Democratic CSOs use participatory approaches in their own
decision-making, embrace pluralism (not ignoring voices that are different from
the leadership’s), are clear whom they represent (members or supporters), and
can demonstrate the legitimacy of this representation.
As CSOs and networks grow in size and scope, these things become more
cumbersome. Some – especially federations such as CI, Amnesty International
and the GUFs – evolve their board and management processes accordingly, but
inevitably discover a trade-off between member participation and efficiency –
particularly where membership is geographically and culturally diverse. Small
networks (such as those cooperating for lowering the price of AIDS drugs, or
joint union–NGO campaigns against child labour) face less difficulty but are
limited to specific and shared purposes. Others, such as J2000 and ATTAC (see
 Conclusions: Globalizing Civic Engagement 169

Chapters 5 and 8) are, in effect, founder-led. While trust in the de facto leader-
ship remains strong, their decision-making can be swift and imaginative. How-
ever, growth can take them to a point where internal divisions manifest; at this
stage, governance becomes contested and competing strategies and leaderships
emerge. Unitary or centralized associations (such as Human Rights Watch or
Greenpeace) face less difficulty because they have hierarchies and single boards
to which national sections are subservient.
There appears to be a democracy paradox. Transnational civil society is a
response to the democracy deficit in global governance. In the absence of global
parliaments, it fosters public debate, informs the media and alerts politicians
throughout the world to its analysis and alternative perspectives. But in this
‘CNN age’ there is a considerable premium on being the first to stake a position
in response to a new situation or on having the simplest, sharpest critique. Care-
fully qualified remarks or positions that are announced after the press pack has
moved on to new issues don’t make the headlines. Hence, CSOs who are best
equipped to challenge the democracy deficit may often be, ironically, those who
are less democratic themselves or who represent few people.
This relates to the controversies about CSOs’ legitimacy, representivity and
leadership. Specifically, many networks purport to be global. Yet, Southern
members see them as largely North-driven; the leadership of CSO networks is
often contested; Southern voices at global forums often represent small organiza-
tions who are better known to donors and Northern partners than to any
domestic constituency (Northern CSOs may also be small cliques); and founda-
tions and bilateral donors have strong influence within TCSNs because they are
major providers of funds, obviating the need for large due-paying memberships.
Mass-based Southern CSOs are usually primarily concerned with local or
national issues; it is generally the more intellectual, capital, city-based, donor-
funded CSOs in the South or in transition countries who engage in TCSNs. An
alternative perspective is that CSOs who engage in TCSNs find it easier to
mobilize external funding, providing they have staff with relevant management
and communications skills, and therefore don’t need to mobilize large domestic
constituencies.

WHOSE VOICE GETS HEARD?

A related dilemma is the vexed question – in transnational, multisectoral alliances –
of who speaks for whom. How can claims towards representivity be gauged? This
question has three variations. Firstly, which CSOs are most legitimate? Advocacy
NGOs often have excellent communications skills and are generally respected by
the media and others who shape public opinion; but their legitimacy is chal-
lenged from within civil society as well as from outside. Trade unions have
charged them with just speaking for themselves and with promoting elite and
Northern concerns at the expense of the world’s workers. Mass organizations
have challenged the prominence of NGOs within the organizing of the WSF
170 Globalizing Civic Engagement

(though the initiative largely came from the Brazilian NGO association, who
even owns the name ‘World Social Forum’) – arguing that they are not legiti-
mate spokespeople for the exploited and are undemocratic. In many networks
there is a tension between democracy and political entrepreneurship.
Secondly, does the network truly speak for a global constituency? Interna-
tional networks are often represented by Northern spokespeople since they have
easier access to international institutions and the world media. But this is increas-
ingly resented in the South (though it should be added that grassroots Southern
CSOs often equally resent their policy-oriented, capital city peers, who they think
are far removed from ground reality). Many networks that purport to be interna-
tional (even global) are, in reality, overwhelmingly biased towards the North or
to one region. Even Southern-initiated ventures display a regional bias. For example,
participants in the WSF are largely from Brazil and its neighbouring countries.
Southern trade unions agree with their Northern counterparts that an urgent
review is needed of the roles of their international structures; but it appears that
they feel rather left out of the Millennium Review currently underway (see
Chapter 3) and question its relevance to their needs.
Thirdly, who decides who has a right to speak? It is increasingly common to
hear Southern voices in international forums, but they are usually handpicked
and financed by Northern partners. Southern consumer groups, for example,
usually don’t have the mass base of their Northern counterparts but are assisted
and financed by Northern partners. Similarly, considerable resentment has been
voiced towards the WSF organizers for their subjectivity in choosing who gets to
speak in the plenary sessions (including judgements about which politicians are
allowed a platform – such as the new president of Brazil – and which are denied –
such as the prime minister of Belgium).

HOW BEST TO ENGAGE THE MEDIA?

Websites reach global audiences at negligible cost, short-circuiting the need for
mainstream media in many mobilization and dissemination activities. However,
they are not a total substitute. The latter usually have more stringent quality con-
trol (although, perhaps, with a political bias) and are studied by policy-makers.
Hence, CSOs – particularly those seeking to reform policies and engage decision-
makers in dialogue –usually thirst for media coverage. But how can they get it?
Protests – particularly large and aggressive ones – are reported; but is it the
issues or just the violence that is described? Journalists covering dull inter-gov-
ernmental meetings may simply be looking for a spicy news story to give variety
to their reportage. The liberal media have become increasingly fond of advocacy
NGOs and give fuller coverage of their campaigns (often covering the substance),
and they generally give greater prominence to NGOs’ arguments in disputes with
official or corporate targets. But unchallenging reportage may encourage sloppy
research on the part of the NGOs. CSO leaders need to focus on the credibility
and integrity of their sector, as a whole, and not just on the column inches
achieved for the particular issue at hand.
 Conclusions: Globalizing Civic Engagement 171

IS A TECHNOLOGY DIVIDE REPLACING

THE GEOGRAPHIC DIVIDE?

The emergence of transnational civil society at the time of a global communica-

tions revolution is no coincidence. Cheaper travel and information and commu-
nications technology (ICT) are clearly enabling factors, as is the increasingly
widespread use of English in international networks (in regional networks, other
languages are often more important). But while new communications have
opened the door of Northern-led civil society to Southern voices, these voices are
mostly of the well educated, the digitally connected and the Western oriented.
Others have scarcely noticed the new opportunities or choose to remain with
traditional local roles. Moreover, the barriers of geography remain severe, as do
issues of class, culture and language. ICT has democratized communications for
some, but by no means for all (see, in particular, Chapter 6).
ICT has other limitations. While it permits extremely cheap, instantaneous
exchanges of information and is a powerful tool in mass mobilization and
research, few CSOs have found ways of using it for building trust within their
networks and, therefore, for making key decisions or resolving conflicts. Ensuring
the quality of information posted is also problematic. Those networks that rely
most on the internet (particularly the dot causes and groups such as ATTAC and
WSF) find it difficult to evolve strategy or to clearly define what exactly they
stand for. As a result, contemporary campaigns (particularly the components of
the global protest movement) find it relatively easy to describe what they are
against, but extremely difficult to prescribe viable alternatives. On the other
hand, CSOs who make great use of the web (starting with the Free Burma Cam-
paign and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines) can reach out more
widely than they previously dreamed of; demystify official processes; organize
events swiftly and cheaply; appeal to the younger generation; and present new
conduits for challenging or strengthening global governance.

HOW AND WHEN TO ENGAGE THE SYSTEM?

The partnership issue that is most difficult for diverse networks to resolve is how
to relate to governments, inter-governmental organizations and TNCs. In general,
CSOs with a mass base, particularly those with broad support, and CSOs with a
strong research and analysis capacity are most confident at engaging – and,
indeed, cannot afford to appear to stand against the system. The Global Union
platform, for example, is clear that it is no longer sufficient to organize collective
bargaining with individual employers on behalf of its members; it needs to influ-
ence the policy environment of the labour market internationally. As a result, it
needs to engage with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the
World Trade Organization, the International Labour Organization and the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development, as well as with the major
TNCs. Some transnational CSOs, such as the GUFs and CI, are traditional
172 Globalizing Civic Engagement

engagers and see negotiation as one of their principal roles. However, they now
find that some of their newer Southern members are challenging the apparent
cosiness of this relationship and want a much sharper edge.
Tension often arises between TCSNs and Southern governments. This stems
from conflicting aspects of solidarity. On the one hand, those campaigning on
macro-issues promote global justice and, hence, express solidarity with Southern
societies, including governments. On the other hand, those concerned about
vulnerable people promote local justice – and the greatest obstacle to this may be
the national government.
This ambivalence is reflected in the divided attitude of Southern govern-
ments towards civil society. Some (such as in South America, Central and Eastern
Europe, or mature democracies) generally welcome civil society in all its diversity,
while others deride CSOs as largely Western constructs or resent their power and
resources. Much depends upon the cause in question. Until recently, most inter-
national CSO campaigns have created resentment (such as human rights cam-
paigns, and opposition to large dams or child labour). Lately, governments have
begun to see symbiosis with CSOs in many campaigns. They have, generally, wel-
comed the role of transnational civil society in seeking debt relief, increased aid
and trade/economic justice. They primarily support its effort to lower the price of
AIDS drugs (although the South African government resents the pressure that the
success of this campaign has put on their health service to provide these drugs)
and they support some objectives of international trade union campaigns (though
they are keen to avoid being seen as anti-TNCs). On other issues they remain
largely silent (such as on the Tobin tax campaign, since most governments are
keen to encourage foreign direct investment and worry that currency controls
may be a deterrent) or are hostile (such as many environmental or human rights
campaigns, as well as the anti-global capitalist movement).
TNC–CSO engagement is also controversial for all parties. Most TNCs keep
as far away from advocacy CSOs as possible, and CSOs who engage often find
themselves criticized by peers in their networks. However, the experience of the
HIV/AIDS campaign and some GUF experience show that critical engagement
can help to check the power of a TNC. There is also evidence that TNCs may
benefit by being ahead of their rivals in making reforms or engaging with their
critics. Hence, many are now engaging with NGOs in exercises of ‘corporate
social responsibility’ or in serious dialogue with their critics.

WHEN DO CAMPAIGNS BECOME MOVEMENTS?

Chapter 1 described three different broad civil society forms found in transna-
tional action – the international CSO, the transnational network and the social
movement. Our case studies have shown that these forms may not be rigid. In
particular, networks may broaden and evolve into social movements, as was the
experience of J2000 and ATTAC. When this happens, the original, clear goal
(such as reducing the debts of the poorest countries to affordable levels, and
 Conclusions: Globalizing Civic Engagement 173

introducing a Tobin tax on currency transactions) becomes blurred and broadened.

What becomes more important is the growing community of activists who share
a conviction that there is injustice in the current order and who develop a shared
language to convey this.
Various social movements and campaigns, whose only common denominator
is a link to issues of globalization, have coalesced in today’s global protest move-
ment. The flimsiness of this common base yields definitional problems. It isn’t a
movement in the traditional sense. Its causes are multiple and shifting (for example,
in some countries it has morphed into a campaign against a war with Iraq).
Indeed, it has been well described as a ‘movement of movements’. Likewise, its
events are usually called ‘protests’; but they also have the characteristics of politi-
cal conventions, mass lobbies, teach-ins and carnivals. They appear to be global;
yet, the different regional constituents may have very different cultures. For
example, the Latin Americans celebrate pluralism and want the WSF to simply
be a forum in which civil society speaks for itself, while the Africans, at their
regional social forum, passed resolutions and agreed a final declaration.
The plethora of dot causes within the protest movement mobilize large
numbers for it, but also appear to inject characteristics of uncertainty. It is highly
diverse; it isn’t clear who is in and who isn’t; it has no common focus or strategy;
its tactics range from violence to non-violence and from rejection of authority to
engagement; it has no recognized leadership; and it provides an infrastructure
for protest (rather than direction) through its ‘days of action’, where anything
goes and all groups participating decide for themselves the cause, the argument,
the action and the tactics.

THE WAY AHEAD

There has been a strong international dimension to social movements since the
campaign against slavery; but the phenomenon we have been exploring – civil
society networks working across national boundaries in integrated transnational
activities – is a quantum leap from this. It is clearly at an early stage in what will
be an influential career. It faces challenges both from within and outside of the
establishment. Our review of experience suggests that the degree to which it is
able to withstand these challenges and play a decisive role in reshaping the pro-
cesses of democracy and policy deliberation depends upon how the sector
addresses six contradictions inherent in its ascendancy.
Firstly, there are strong advantages to forming cross-sector networks; however,
these heighten risks of cultural and tactical clashes. Most CSOs are culturally
attuned to their peers (even their rivals) and, hence, usually practice vertical inte-
gration. Horizontal integration with other types of CSOs (who have different
priorities and ‘languages’) may be a more important skill in today’s world, but
one that most CSOs haven’t learned. The dialectic is between achieving the
energy possible in a broad movement (evidenced, for example, by J2000’s
growth out of a development NGO and grassroots church network) and main-
taining the clear message that is possible in a close partnership.
174 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Secondly, the increased influence of civil society in shaping policy is largely

due to a deficit in conventional democracy; yet, the most influential CSOs are
often not those who represent large constituencies or who are studiously demo-
cratic in their decision-making. As the sector becomes more powerful, and as
policy-makers and the media become more sophisticated in responding to civil
society, it is likely that the challenge to demonstrate representivity will become
stronger. This might elevate the stature of those mass-membership organizations
who are also internally democratic (such as the GUFs, CI and Amnesty Interna-
tional), putting a premium on such organizations finding swifter ways of reaching
decisions without sacrificing democracy. This needn’t mean that smaller or non-
membership organizations lose influence. But they might need to demonstrate
representivity in other ways, such as through participatory research, widespread
consultations or opinion polling. It is particularly important that TCSNs learn
ways of ensuring equity for Southern and non-English speaking voices.
Thirdly, new currents in civil society tend to reject leadership, seeing it as
antithetical to democracy. However, the CSOs who have achieved most in influ-
encing policy or, indeed, in delivering services demonstrate that effective, demo-
cratic decision-making requires leadership – albeit of the right sort. The rejection
of leadership in some networks and social movements may stem not so much
from an idealistic deference to democracy but from a recognition that there are
no governance arrangements in place for authenticating the leadership selection.
In this absence, de facto leaders emerge (those individuals who speak on plat-
forms around the world); but because they are not called leaders, there is no pres-
sure to account for why these spokespeople have been selected and by whom.
Fourthly, today’s protest movement has mobilized millions because it
embraces so many causes that are loosely in opposition to the current economic
order. But no movement can make an impact unless it articulates an alternative
and convinces public opinion of its case. A critical challenge for TCSNs, gener-
ally, is to assert what they stand for, rather than what they are opposed to. The
protest movement has no collective manifesto, despite the efforts of some WSF
leaders, other than its opposition to neo-liberalism. There are signs that it is
starting to reject violent tactics and to engage more in dialogue; but this might
alienate much of its support base. Will it lose its sharp edge and become more
reformist – will it, perhaps, start looking a bit grey in the temples? Resolving such
internal tension is vital if it is to become more than a medley of protests, perhaps
growing but defined just by opposing the establishment.
Fifthly, new communications technology can narrow the North–South gulf
in transnational civil society; but it may be widening the gulf between capital
city-based and grassroots CSOs. ICT offers immense opportunities not only for
international networking, but also for mobilizing new constituencies in campaigns
and social movements. However, it isn’t universally available and very real barriers
of geography remain. A sophisticated class of global civil-society activists may be
emerging, who is also losing its connection with the grassroots. A digital divide
may be reinforcing, not eliminating, the geographic divide.
 Conclusions: Globalizing Civic Engagement 175

Sixthly, the resources conundrum: CSOs, particularly mass organizations,

are usually self-financed through membership dues; but transnational advocacy
networks are largely financed by international NGOs, foundations and bilateral
aid agencies. Is the tail wagging the dog? Does the ready availability of funds for
international work, and the increasingly frequent international gatherings on glo-
bal policy issues, distort civil society – especially in the South? This ready funding
may distract Southern and transition country CSOs away from national priorities
towards topics that are of greater interest in the North. It might make it easier to
form a CSO who addresses global rather than national issues, on top of which
are seductive travel opportunities. Conversely, working transnationally may help
Southern CSOs to enhance their advocacy capacity, achieve greater influence
with their national governments and strengthen solidarity links internationally.
What is important is that Southern CSOs are in the driving seat and that equal
partnerships emerge.
These issues relate to questions of civil society governance. Even at a national
level, it is hard for a CSO sector – for example, NGOs – to resolve the gover-
nance challenges that it faces. There are few cases of effective self-regulation;
increasingly, governments, parliaments and even donors are devising ways of giv-
ing seals of approval or disapproval. This trend is dangerous; if official bodies
started categorizing firms in this way, it certainly wouldn’t be tolerated (other
than for branding law-breakers). This indicates that civil society itself needs to
give much more attention to effective codes of conduct, certification schemes,
internal policing mechanisms and independent watchdogs. With transnational
and multisectoral civil society, these issues are even more intractable – but it is
critical that TCSNs address them, at least in facing head-on the organizational,
governance, strategic and tactical challenges described in this book.
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CHAPTER 1
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AI’s Decision-Making Processes and Structures’, Paper submitted to all AI sections
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Anheier, H (2000) ‘Notes on Decision-Making and Accountability in International
NGOs’, Mimeo, London: London School of Economics
Anheier, H, Glasius, M and Kaldor M (eds) (2001) Global Civil Society 2001, Oxford:
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Anheier, H and Themudo, N (2002) ‘Organisational Forms of Global Civil Society:
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Chiriboga, M (2001) ‘Constructing a Southern Constituency for Global Advocacy: The
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Clark, J (2003) Worlds Apart: Civil Society and the Battle for Ethical Globalization, London:
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 References and Interviews 177

Hlobil, P (2001) ‘East–East Skill-Sharing and East–West Collaboration’, Paper presented

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Adopted by OI’s board, November, Melbourne
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Interviews
Charles Secrett, director, and Tony Juniper, director designate, Friends of the Earth UK
(FOE UK)
Marieke Torffs, Friends of the Earth International (FOE-I)
Gordon Shepherd, Jenny Heap and Gonzalo Oviedo, World Wide Fund for Nature
International (WWF-I)
Dave Bull, former director, Amnesty International (AI) UK
Roger Clark, former Africa director, Amnesty International (AI)
Patti Whalley, deputy director, Amnesty International (AI)
Robert Archer, International Council for Human Rights Policy
Ernst Ligteringen, former director, Oxfam International (OI)
Justin Forsyth, policy director, Oxfam GB
Ed Schenkenberg, International Council of Voluntary Agencies
Rajesh Tandon, Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA)
Manuel Chiriboga, Latin American Association of Popular Organizations (ALOP)
Ann Pettifor, Kwesi Owuso and Adrian Lovett; Jubilee 2000 UK
Kumi Naidoo, director, CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation)
Florian Rochat, Centre Europe–Tiers Monde, Geneva
178 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Peter Prove, Lutheran World Federation

Martin Robra, World Council of Churches (WCC)
Wendy Tyndale, World Faiths Dialogue on Development
Josef Boehle, United Religions Initiative
James Howard, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
Alan Leather and Mike Waghorne, assistant general secretaries, Public Service Interna-
tional (PSI)
Phil Boyer, Union Network International (UNI)
Bob Harris, former general secretary, Education International
Tony Hill, United Nations NGO Liaison Service
Peter Utting, UN Research Institute for Social Development

CHAPTER 2
Sim, F G (1991) IOCU On Record: A Documentary History of the International Organisa-
tion of Consumers Unions 1960–1990, Yonkers, New York: Consumers Union of
United States Inc

Interviews
Julian Edwards, director-general, and Jayanti Durai, Consumers International (CI)
Phil Evans and Allan Asher, Consumers Association (CA), UK
Pradeep Mehta, Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS), India
Mohideen Abdul Kader, vice-president, Consumers Association of Penang
Anwar Fazal, former president, International Organization of Consumers Unions (IOCU)

CHAPTER 3
Anheier, H and Themudo, N (2002) ‘On Governance and Management of International
Membership Organisations’, Centre for Civil Society Working Paper, London School
of Economics, London
Ashwin, S (2000) ‘International Labour Solidarity after the Cold War’ in Cohen, R and
Rai, S M (eds) Global Social Movements, London: Athlone Press
Brook, K (2002) ‘Trade Union Membership: an Analysis of Data from the Autumn
2001’, Labour Market Trends, July, pp343–355
Castells, M (1996) The Rise of the Network Society, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers
Davis, R (2002) ‘Anti-globalization Activists and Unions Can Still Work Together’,
ATTAC Newsletter, no 121, March
Gordon, M E and Turner, L (2000) Transnational Cooperation among Labor Unions,
New York: Cornell University Press
Handy, C (1989) The Age of Paradox, Boston: Harvard Business School Press
ICFTU (2000a) ‘Launching the Millennium Review: The Future of the International
Trade Union Movement’, Congress Statements, www.icftu.org
ICFTU (2000b) ‘The Millennium Debate: The Review for Change’, ICFTU Online
Bulletin, www.icftu.org
ICFTU (2001) Background report to the 117th meeting of the ICFTU executive board,
Appendix, 117EB/E/7, Brussels: ICFTU
IFBWW website: www.ifbww.org
 References and Interviews 179

ILO Bureau of Statistics (2002) ‘Statistics of Trade Union Membership’, Mimeo, October,
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Congress, 20 September
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Review, 6 April, at www.cosatu.org.za/speeches/2000/wm000406
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180 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Interviews
Giampiero Alhadeff, secretary general, Solidar
Luis Corral, director for political affairs, Trade Union Congress of The Philippines
Alan Leather, deputy general secretary, Public Services International (PSI)
Tim Noonan, director of campaigns, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU)
Annie Watson, director, Commonwealth Trades Union Congress

CHAPTER 4
Heywood, M (2001) ‘Debunking ‘Conglomo-Talk: A Case study of the Amicus Curiae
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the conference on Health, Law and Human Rights: Exploring the Connections, An
International Cross-Disciplinary Conference Honouring Jonathan M Mann, 29
September to 1 October 2001, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
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Paper on GlaxoSmithKline, Oxford: Oxfam
Oxfam (2001b) ‘Drug Companies versus Brazil: the Threat to Public Health’, Oxford:
Oxfam
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Extent?’ Reproduced from the South-North Development Monitor (SUNS), vol
5009, www.twnside.org.sg
Robins, S (2002) ‘Race, Cultural Identity and Aids in South Africa’, The Sunday Inde-
pendent Newspaper, South Africa
Soal, J (2001) ‘Treatment Action Campaign: an Overview’, www.tac.org.za

CHAPTER 5
Barrett, M (ed) (2000) ‘The World Will Never Be the Same Again’, December, Jubilee
2000 Coalition and World Vision, UK
Bauck, A (2001) ‘Oxfam and Debt Relief Advocacy’, from the Electronic Hallway, Uni-
versity of Washington, Washington, www.hallway.org
Bunting, M (2000) ‘Special Report: Debt Relief – 2000 Deadline Brought Sense of
Urgency’, Guardian, 28 December
Clark, J (2001) ‘Ethical Globalization: the Dilemmas and Challenges of Internationaliz-
ing Civil Society’ in Edwards, M and Gaventa, J (eds) Global Citizen Action, Boul-
der, Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Clarke, M, Vanderslice, M and Joyner, K (2002) ‘Determined to Fail: the Heavily
Indebted Poor Country Initiative’, Report from Jubilee USA Network
 References and Interviews 181

Collins, C, Gariyo, Z and Burdon, T (2001) ‘Jubilee 2000: Citizen Action across
North–South Divide’ in Edwards, M and Gaventa, J (eds) Global Citizen Action,
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Denny, C and Elliott, L (2002) ‘Short Wants G7 Top-Up for Poor’, Guardian, 27 September
Dent, M and Peters, B (1999) The Crisis of Poverty and Debt in the Third World, Alder-
shot: Ashgate
Desai, M and Said, Y (2001) ‘The New Anti-capitalist Movement: Money and Global
Civil Society’ in Anheier, H, Glasius, M and Kaldor, M (eds) Global Civil Society
Yearbook 2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press
de Senillosa, I (1998) ‘A New Age of Social Movements: a Fifth Generation of Non-
Governmental Development Organizations in the Making?’ Development in Practice,
vol 8(1): 40–53
Dor, G (2001) ‘Discussion paper on strategy, organisation and structure’, Jubilee 2000
South Africa; http//aidc.org.za/2nd_conference/discussion_paper
Edwards, M (2001) ‘Introduction’ in Edwards, M and Gaventa, J (eds) Global Citizen
Action, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Grint, K (1997) ‘Alternative Leadership’ in Grint, K (ed) Leadership: Classical, Contem-
porary, and Critical Approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Hanson, I and Travis, A (eds) (1999) Breaking the Chains: the New Jubilee 2000 Debt
Cutter’s Handbook, London: Jubilee 2000 Coalition
Hutton, W (1999) ‘The Jubilee Line that Works’, Observer, 3 October
IMF and World Bank (2002) ‘Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative: Status of Imple-
mentation’, Paper presented by staff members of the IMF and World Bank, 21 September
Jubilee 2000 Coalition (2001) ‘Learning Points’, 9 March, Report of Jubilee UK core
team meeting to ‘identify and capture the key learning points from their experience
in the coalition’, London: Jubilee 2000 Coalition
Kekk, M and Sikkink, K (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in Interna-
tional Politics, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press
Mandlate, Bishop Bernadino (1999) ‘The Meaning of Jubilee and Debt’, Paper presented
at the South–South Summit Johannesburg, 18 November, www.jubileesouth.org/
news/EpklpAlplpXSLTNoNP.shtml
Marks, N (2000) ‘Jubilee 2000 UK: Report on Assessment of Future Needs Survey’, Presented
at the September board meeting of Jubilee UK, London: New Economics Foundation
Owuso, K (2002) Speech at the Jubilee Debt Campaign Annual General Meeting, March 2002
Rorty, R (1998) Achieving Our Country – Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press
Scholte, J (2001) ‘The IMF and Civil Society: An Interim Progress Report’ in Edwards,
M and Gaventa, J (eds) Global Citizen Action, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Tarrow, S (1998) Power in Social Movements and Contentious Politics, second edition,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Tarrow, S (2001) ‘Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International
Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, vol 4: 1–20
Verdict on Genoa Summit, (2001) Comments by Adrian Lovett (director, Drop the Debt),
Ann Pettifor (director, Jubilee Plus), Ben Niblett (Leeds Jubilee 2000 Network), Ches-
ter Jubilee Group, campaigners in Africa, David Malin Roodman (senior researcher,
Worldwatch Institute) and Hilary Benn (parliamentary under secretary of state,
Department for International Development), and reports from Oxfam, World Devel-
opment Movement, Jubilee Movement International and Nick Buxton (campaigner
with Jubilee 2000); see: www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/news/Commentary.htm
182 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Websites
Jubilee 2000: www.jubilee2000.org.uk
Jubilee 2000 Coalition Petition: www.jubilee2000uk.org/jubilee2000/petition
Jubilee 2000 South Africa: www.aidc.org.za
Jubilee Call, from Jubilee Rome Meeting, 17 November 1998:
Jubilee Debt Campaign: www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk
Jubilee Movement International (JMI): www.jubileeplus.org/jmi/main
Jubilee Plus/Jubilee Research: www.jubileeplus.org
Jubilee South: www.jubileesouth.org
Jubilee USA Network: www.j2000usa.org

Interviews
Martin Dent: co-founder, Jubilee 2000; board member of Jubilee Debt Campaign
Adrian Lovett: deputy director, Jubilee UK; director of Drop the Debt
Tim Moulds: board member, Jubilee UK; staff member of Christian Aid
Kwesi Owuso: Africa Desk, Jubilee UK and Jubilee Plus; co-director of Southern Links
Ann Pettifor: director, Jubilee UK; director of Jubilee Research

Questionnaires and meetings

Brief open questionnaires were sent on 26 February 2002 and 1 March 2002 via e-mail
to 67 Jubilee groups listed on the JMI website: www.jubilee2000uk.org/jmi/jmi-
contacts/jmi-contacts. Of these, 35 bounced back, probably due to out-of-date
addresses or groups that no longer existed in that form. It was difficult to judge exactly
how many active Jubilee groups existed at that point. Seven organizations sent back
the questionnaires from: Burundi, Cameroon, Ecuador, Ireland, Japan, Korea and
Zambia. Groups in Austria and France sent reports and other information.

The author is grateful to Jubilee Debt Campaign for allowing her to attend their AGM
on 16 March 2002 at the Trades Union Congress in London.

CHAPTER 6
Adams, J (2002) ‘WSF2002: Hopes for a True International’ in Znet Visions Strategy
Watch at www.zmag.org/content/VisionStrategy/AdamsWSF.cfm
Boggs, C (2001) ‘Economic Globalization and Political Atrophy’, Democracy and
Nature, vol 7(2): 303–316
Business Week (2001) ‘When Demonstrations Turn Violent’, 6 August; www.business-
week.com/magazine/content/01_32/c3744018.htm
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (2000) Anti-Globalization – a Spreading Phenom-
enon, Report no 2000/08, www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/200008_e
Clark, J (2001) ‘Ethical Globalization: the Dilemmas and Challenges of Internationaliz-
ing Civil Society’ in Edwards, M and Gaventa, J (eds) Global Citizen Action, London:
Earthscan
Cockburn, A and St Clair, J (undated) ‘So Who Did Win in Seattle? Liberals Rewrite
History’, www.webdsi.com/jbrite/news/so_who_did12-16.htm
 References and Interviews 183

De Léon, J P (2001) Our Word Is Our Weapon: Selected Writings by Subcomandante Marcos,
New York: Seven Stories Press
Desai, M and Said, Y (2001a) ‘The New Anti-Capitalist Movement: Money and Global
Civil Society’ in Anheier, H, Glasius M and Kaldor, M (eds) Global Civil Society
2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Desai, M and Said, Y (2001b) ‘Global Civil Society and Global Finance’, Public lecture
at the London School of Economics, 28 November, London
Financial Times (1998) ‘Network Guerrillas’, 30 April
Financial Times (2001) ‘UK at Loggerheads with France Over Tax on Speculators’, 11
September; www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/glotax/curtax/2001/0913uk.htm
Florini, A (ed) The Third Force: the Rise of Transnational Civil Society, Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
George, S (2002) Presentation during a debate on Globalization and Civil Society, London
School of Economics, 14 February, London
Giddens, A (2001) ‘The Future of Global Inequality’, Public lecture, London School of
Economics, 21 November, London
Giuni, M (1999) ‘How Social Movements Matter: Past Research, Present Problems,
Future Developments’ in Giugni, M, McAdam, D and Tilly, C (eds) How Social
Movements Matter, Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press
Handy, C (1995) ‘Trust and the Virtual Organization’, Harvard Business Review, vol
73(3): 40–50
Harding, J (2002) Presentation during the public debate Globalization and Civil Society,
Organized by ATTAC UK, London School of Economics, 14 February, London
Harris, P, Walsh, N P, Bright, M and Carroll, R (2001) ‘You Could Sense the Venom
and Hatred’, The Observer, The Globalisation Debate – Observer Special Report:
Globalisation, 29 July; www.observer.co.uk/focus/story/0,6903,529074,00.html
Jordan, L and Van Tuijl, P (2000) ‘Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO Advo-
cacy’, World Development, vol 28(12): 2051–2065
Keck, M and Sikkink, K (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in Interna-
tional Politics, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press
Khagram, S, Riker, J and Sikkink, K (2002) ‘From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational
Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics’ in Khagram et al (eds) Restructuring
World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms, Minneapolis,
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press
Klein, N (2000) No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies, New York: Picador
Klein, N (2001a) ‘Signs of the Times: Protests Aimed at Powerful Symbols of Capitalism
Find Themselves in a Transformed Landscape’, The Nation, 22 October
Klein, N (2001b) ‘The Unknown Icon’, Guardian, 3 March
Klein, N (2001c) ‘A Fete for the End of the End of History’, The Nation, 19 March, see
www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/eng/bnaomi.asp?l=eng
Kobrin, S (1998) ‘The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations’ Foreign Policy, no112: 97–109
Kriesi, H (1996) ‘The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in Relation to
their Political Context’ in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds) Comparative
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and
Cultural Framings, New York: Cambridge University Press
McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (1996) ‘Introduction: Opportunities Mobilizing
Structures and Framing Processes’ in McAdam et al (eds) Comparative Perspectives
on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural
Framings, New York: Cambridge University Press
184 Globalizing Civic Engagement

McCarthy, J (1997) ‘The Globalization of Social Movement Theory’ in Smith, J, Chat-

field, C and Pagnucco, R (eds) Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics:
Solidarity beyond the State, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press
Mekata, M (2000) ‘Building Partnerships toward a Common Goal: Experiences of the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines’ in Florini, A (ed) The Third Force: The
Rise of Transnational Civil Society, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace
Naughton, J (2001) ‘Contested Space: the Internet and Global Civil Society’ in Anheier,
H, Glasius, M and Kaldor, M (eds) Global Civil Society 2001, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press
O’Brien, R, Goetz, A M, Scholte, J A and Williams, M (2000) Contesting Global Gover-
nance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
O’Neill, K (1999) ‘Internetworking for Social Change: Keeping the Spotlight on Corporate
Responsibility’, Discussion Paper No 111, United Nations Research Institute for
Social Development, Geneva
Oxfam International (2000) ‘Towards Global Equity: Oxfam International’s Strategic
Plan, 2001–2004’, Adopted by the Board of Oxfam International, November 2000,
Melbourne
Oxfam (2002) Rigged Rules and Double Standards, Oxford: Oxfam
Pettifor, A (2001) ‘Post Genoa and Beyond’, www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/news/
Commentary.htm
Scholte, J A (2001) ‘New Citizens Action and Global Finance’, Note for seminar on
Transnational Civil Society: Issues of Governance and Organization, London School
of Economics, 1–2 June, London
Shiva, V (1999) ‘This Round to the Citizens’, The Guardian, 8 December ; www.guard-
ian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,3939018,00.html
Smith, J (1997) ‘Characteristics of the Modern Transnational Social Movement Sector’,
in Smith et al (eds) Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity
beyond the State, Syracuse: New York: Syracuse University Press
Smith, J, Chatfield, C and Pagnucco R (eds) (1997) Transnational Social Movements and
Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press
Stiglitz, J (2002) Globalization and its Discontents, London: Allen Lane
Tarrow, S (1996) ‘States and Opportunities: the Political Structuring of Social Move-
ments’ in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds) Comparative Perspectives on
Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural
Framings, New York: Cambridge University Press
Tarrow, S (2001) ‘Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International
Politics’ Annual Review of Political Science, June, vol 4: 1–20
Tilly, C (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution, New York: Random House
The Economist (1999) ‘Will NGOs Democratise, or Merely Disrupt, Global Gover-
nance?’, 11 December
Wade, R (2001) ‘Global Inequality: Winners and Losers’, The Economist, 28 April
Warkentin, C (2001) Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet and Global Civil Society,
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield
World Development Movement (WDM) (2001) Report on the G8 summit, Genoa:
www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/news/Commentary.htm
Woods, A (2000) ‘Global Protest or Political Tourism: After Prague, Where Next?’ Mimeo,
personal comment, Bretton Woods Project, London
 References and Interviews 185

Websites
Zapatistas National Liberation Army, Mexico (EZLN): www.ezln.org
Google: www.google.com
IndyNews: www.indynews.org
Nedstat: www.nedstat.com
Protest: www.protest.net
Subversive Enterprises International: www.geocities.com/Heartland/2484/intro.htm

CHAPTER 7
Anheier, H, Glasius, M and Kaldor, M (2001) ‘Introducing Global Civil Society’ in
Anheier et al (eds) Global Civil Society 2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Block, J (2002) ‘Today, Porto Alegre. Tomorrow…? Can the World Social Forum Have
a Meaningful Impact without a More Formal Structure?’, 6 February: www.mother-
jones.com/web_exclusives/features/news/ world_social_forum
Bullard, N (2002) Interview on the Porto Alegre meeting of the International Council of
the WSF, 15 February: www.attac.org
Castells, M (1996) The Rise of the Network Society, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers
Chomsky, N (2000) ‘Why the World Social Forum?’, Text written for the WSF launching
in Porto Alegre and reproduced in the newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo, 10 September,
Library of Alternatives: www.worldsocialforum.org.br
Cohen, R and Rai, S M (eds) (2000) Global Social Movements, London: Athlone Press
Edwards, M and Gaventa, J (eds) (2001) Global Citizen Action, London: Earthscan
FSM-Comité Mineiro (2002) Um Outro Mundo é Possível – e Necessário, Pamphlet
Gillbank, M (2002) ‘Other Worlds are Possible: 60.000 Can’t be Wrong?’ IPS Terraviva:
www.ipsnews.net
Grzybowski, C (2002) ‘Uma Nova Agenda Global em Construção’: www.worldsocialfo-
rum.org.br
Keck, M E and Sikkink, K (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in Interna-
tional Politics, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press
Ker, R (2002) ‘WSF: Anti-Globalization Movement Comes of Age’: www.worldsocialfo-
rum.org.br
Klein, N (2001) ‘A Fete for the End of the End of History’, The Nation, 19 March
NOP-FPA/Núcleo de Opinião Pública-Fundação Perseu Abramo (2001) ‘Fórum Social
Mundial de 2001: Perfil sócio-demográfico dos/as participantes, avaliação da orga-
nização e dos conteúdos cobertos, e opinões a respeito de alguns temas discutidos’,
Relatório de Pesquisa, Fórum Social Mundial, unpublished
Pianta, M (2001) ‘Parallel Summits of Global Civil Society’ in Anheier et al (eds) Global
Civil Society 2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Powell, W W (1990) ‘Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization’,
Research in Organizational Behaviour, vol 12: 295–336
Sivaraman, S (2002a) ‘Global versus Regional versus Local’, IPS Terraviva, 15 February:
www.ipsnews.net
Sivaraman, S (2002b) ‘The Alternative Is not Civil Society, but Civil Disobedience’, Ter-
raviva, independent daily of the second World Social Forum, 4 February
Tarrow, S (2001) ‘Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International
Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, vol 4(1): 1–20
186 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Wallerstein, I (2002) Speech at the second World Social Forum, 15 February: www.attac.org
Whitaker, F (2001) ‘World Social Forum: Origins and Targets’: www.worldsocialforum.org.br
Whitaker, F (2002) ‘Lessons from Porto Alegre’, Text revised from a communication to
the Episcopal Pastoral Commission of CNBB, 19 February, Brasília: www.worldso-
cialforum.org.br
WSF/OC (2001) ‘Report on the First Meeting of the International Council,’ June:
www.worldsocialforum.org.br
WSF/OC (2002) ‘Report of the World Social Forum International Council Meeting in
Barcelona’, 28–30 April, WSF secretariat, São Paulo

Interviews
Volkhart Finn Heinrich, CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation)
Maria Dirlene Trindade Marques, Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG)/Mobili-
zation Committee (MC) – Minas Gerais (MG)
Carlos Tibúrcio de Oliveira, Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for
the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC)/Organizing Committee (OC)
Emir Sader, University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)/International Council (IC)
Cândido Grzybowski, Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis (IBASE)/
Organizing Committee (OC)
Maria Luiza Mendonça, Centre for Global Justice (CJG)/Organizing Committee (OC)
Gustavo Codas, Brazilian Union Federation (CUT)/International Council (IC)
Pe Luíz Bassegio, Grito dos Excluídos/International Council (IC)
Carla Lyra, World Social Forum (WSF) Secretariat
Francisco Whitaker, Brazilian Commission for Justice and Peace (CBJP), National Con-
ference of the Bishops of Brazil (CNBB)/Organizing Committee (OC)

CHAPTER 8
Anheier, H, Glasius, M and Kaldor, M (eds) (2001) Global Civil Society 2001, Oxford:
Oxford University Press
Clark, J (2001) ‘Ethical Globalization: The Dilemmas and Challenges of Internationaliz-
ing Civil Society’ in Edwards, M and Gaventa, J (eds) Global Citizen Action, Boulder,
Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Cohen, R and Rai, S M (eds) (2000) Global Social Movements, London: Athlone Press
Desai, M and Said, Y (2001) ‘The New Anti-Capitalist Movement: Money and Global Civil
Society’ in Anheier et al (eds) Global Civil Society 2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Falk, R (1998) ‘Global Civil Society: Perspectives, Initiatives, Movements’, Oxford
Development Studies, vol 26(1): 99–110
Florini, A M (ed) (2000) The Third Force: the Rise of Transnational Civil Society, Washing-
ton, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Gillespie, P (2000) ‘Idea of Transnational Tax on Currency Speculation Taking Off’,
The Irish Times, 24 June
Godoy, J (2002) ‘France-Politics: French Politicians Flock to Porto Alegre’, Inter Press
Service, 25 January
Hayward, H (1999) Costing the Casino: the Real Impact of Currency Speculation in the
1990s, War on Want: www.waronwant.org
Held, D and McGrew, A (2000) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture,
Cambridge: Polity Press
 References and Interviews 187

Lichfield, J (2001) ‘Economic Guru Shuns Anti-Global Movement’, Independent, 11

September
Merino, S (2001) La Tasa Tobin: Tres Años de Historia, Buenos Aires: Ediciones Continente
New Scientist (2002) ‘Globally Local’, 27 April
Patomäki, H (2001) Democratising Globalisation: the Leverage of the Tobin Tax, London:
Zed Books
Powell, W W (1990) ‘Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization’,
Research in Organisational Behaviour, vol 12: 295–336
Ramonet, I (1997) ‘Disarming the Markets’, Le Monde Diplomatique, December: www.en.
monde-diplomatique.fr/1997/12/leader
Schmidt, R (1999) ‘A Feasible Foreign Exchange Transactions Tax’: www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/
publications/messenger/tobin1
Scholte, J A (2002) Governing Global Finance, GSGR Working Paper No 88/02, January:
www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/CSGR/wpapers/wp8802.pdf
Spahn, P B (1996) ‘The Tobin Tax and Exchange Rate Stability’, Finance and Development,
vol 33(2): www.worldbank.org/fandd/english/0696/articles/0130696.htm
Der Spiegel (2001) No 30
Stecher, H and Bailey, M (1999) Time for a Tobin Tax? Some Practical and Political Argu-
ments, Oxfam GB Discussion Paper, Oxfam
Strange, S (1986) Casino Capitalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd
Suddeutsche Zeitung (2001) ‘ATTAC Rejects Co-operation with Green Party’, 23 August
Surajaras, P and Sweeney, R J (1992) Profit-Making Speculation in Foreign Exchange
Markets, Oxford: Westview Press
Thompson, G, Frances, J, Levacic, R and Mitchell, J (eds) (1998) Markets, Hierarchies
and Networks, London: Sage Publications
Tobin, J (1978) ‘A Proposal for International Monetary Reform’, Eastern Economic Journal,
vol 4(3–4): 153–159
Vinocur, J (2001) ‘War Transforms the Anti-Globalization Crowd’, International Herald
Tribune, 2 November
Wainwright, H and Juniper, T (2002) ‘Ante Upped’, Guardian, 13 February
War on Want and New Economics Foundation (2001) The Robin Hood Tax, London:
www.waronwant.org

Interviews
Susan George, vice-president, Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for
the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC) France
Claudio Jampaglia, ATTAC Italy
Bruno Jetin, Scientific Committee of ATTAC France
Laurent Jessover, ATTAC France
Matti Kohonen, ATTAC London
Dr Jonathan I Leape, London School of Economics (LSE)
Steve Tibbet, War on Want
Christophe Ventura, spokesperson for ATTAC
 Index

ABONG see Brazilian Association of Non- armed forces 135–136

Governmental Organizations ARV see antiretroviral treatment
access 37–38, 40–41, 66–85, 117, 120, Asia Labour Network 55
121–122 Association for the Taxation of Financial
accountability 6, 17–18, 89, 133–134, 158 Transactions for the Aid of Citizens
action (ATTAC) 7, 150–162, 165
HIV/AIDS campaign 73–75, 77–78, 83 associational activity 2
industrial 53–54 ATTAC see Association for the Taxation
legal 69–71, 72–73 of Financial Transactions for the Aid of
networks 53 Citizens
WSF coordination 141–143 attitudes 171
see also activism, mobilization autonomy 7
activism awareness 71–72, 73–74, 95, 96, 112, 162
dot causes 111, 113, 114–116, 118, 122
Jubilee 2000 92 Belgium 40
Southern countries 40, 43 benefits 164–165
trade unions 53–54, 57 Berlin street protest, 1988 116
transnational 105 biblical messages 90
WSF 127 bilateral pressure 70–71
see also action, mobilization; protests; Bill of Consumers’ Rights 33
radical approaches bottom-up approaches 152
affiliate membership 33–34 branding 20
affinity groups 114, 124 Brazil 25, 69–72, 77–78, 82–83, 130–131
Africa 89 Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental
agreements 54, 55 Organizations (ABONG) 130–131
AI see Amnesty International Brit Awards, 1999 96
AIDS see HIV/AIDS drugs campaign broad-based coalitions 165
alternatives Brook, Caspar 30
globalization 153, 173 bureaucracy 60
ICT 170 business 42–43, 54
WSF 142, 143, 148, 149
Amazon Coalition see Coordination Body of CA see Consumers Association
Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon campaigns
Basin ATTAC 150–162, 157
Amnesty International (AI) 7, 10, 17, 19–20, CI 44
21, 23 HIV/AIDS drugs 65–85
anarchism see neo-anarchism Jubilee 2000 85–108
anthrax terror campaign 67–68 movement contrast 172–173
anti-globalization movement 50, 103, 109– North–South partnerships 25, 104
126, 127–149, 157 protests 125
antiretroviral (ARV) treatment 67 Canada 155
arbitration processes 104 CAP see Consumers Association of Penang
 Index 189

capital 47 COSATU see Congress of South African

CARE 7, 16 Trade Unions
Carter, Isabel 90 costs 165–166
Cassen, Bernard 152, 159, 161 counter-cultural motivations 119
Central Europe 15 CPT see Consumer Project on Technology
centralization 4, 7, 9–10, 62–63 credibility 99
see also decentralization cross-sector networks 173
chambers of commerce 43 CSR see corporate social responsibility
child labour 57 cultural aspects 22, 118–120, 157,
CI see Consumers International 167, 173
Cipro 67–68 CUTS see Consumer Unity and Trust Society
citizenship 106
civic mandates 148 DCN see Debt Crisis Network
cluster-of-movements 119 de facto leaders 174
coalitions 15, 41–42, 75, 87–88, 91–100, 166 see also figureheads; spokespeople
codes of ethics 18 deadlines 88, 91–92, 100
COICA see Coordination Body of Indigenous debate 19–20
Organizations of the Amazon Basin Debt Crisis Network (DCN) 90, 91
collaboration 91, 92, 124 debt relief campaigns 86–108
committees for mobilization 131 decentralization 5, 60–61, 143–145,
communications see information and commu- 148, 152
nications technology see also centralization
competition 10, 46, 67–68, 73 decision-making
compulsory licenses 66–67, 70, 71 ATTAC 152, 160–161
conditionality 94 centralization 60, 76
confederations 4, 61 CI 35
Congress of South African Trade Unions consensus-building approach 19–20, 36,
(COSATU) 81 40, 44
consensus building approaches 19–20, 36, democratic 61–62, 174
40, 44 governance 19–20, 165
Consumer Project on Technology (CPT) organizational forms 5, 7
81, 82 WSF 131, 143
Consumer Unity and Trust Society see also voting
(CUTS) 37, 38, 43 democracy
Consumers Association (CA), United deficit 117, 165, 169–170, 174
Kingdom 7, 40 dot causes 120
Consumers Association of Penang (CAP) international 27
36, 41 networks 168–169
Consumers International (CI) 7, 29–44, 164 NGOs 8–9
control 7–8 trade unions 61–62, 63–64
see also leadership WSF 133, 137
convergence 142–144, 148, 165 Dent, Martin 89–90
cooperation developing countries 31–32, 66–85,
ATTAC 157 118, 120
dot causes 124, 125–126 see also Southern countries
HIV/AIDS drugs campaign 75, 82 development 10–11, 107, 123
inter-faith 12–14 dialogue 79, 126, 146, 159, 174
non-traditional partners 3, 23–24, 166 see also negotiation
Southern-led networks 14–15 digital divides 123, 174
trade unions 49–50 55–57 displaced accountability 89
UN’s Global Compact 53–54 dissemination of information
coordination 15, 103–104, 141–143, ICT 81–82, 114, 121, 122, 130, 131
157–158 organizational forms 6
Coordination Body of Indigenous Organiza- divergent interests 138–139, 149
tions of the Amazon Basin (COICA) 15 diversity 129, 145, 148, 164, 171–172
corporate social responsibility (CSR) 54 dot causes 3, 109–126, 166, 173
190 Globalizing Civic Engagement

Drop the Debt 103 Global Union Federations (GUFs) 12, 49, 54,
drugs 66–85 60, 64
Global Unions project 51–52, 64, 171
e-mail see ICT; internet; websites governance
East Asian financial crisis 151 ATTAC 158
Eastern Europe 15 CI 33–36
education 141 global 117, 165, 169
effectiveness 61 Jubilee 2000 97–98, 107
emergent social movements 105–106 national level 175
employers 53 organizational forms 6
endorsement 96, 126 transnational networks 16–20
equality 24, 27, 37, 106, 174 governments
establishment figures 80 AIDS/HIV campaign 74–75, 76–78, 83
ethics codes 18 attitudes 172
Europe 15, 48 CI 34
exclusion, WSF 135–136 decentralized forums 144–145
exit 134–135 global governance 117
EZLN see Zapatistas National Liberation partnerships 18
Army Grajew, Oded 128
grassroots level 25–26, 38, 143, 166, 174
faith-based organizations 7, 8, 23, 81 Greenpeace 7, 9, 25
Falk, Princeton Richard 152–153 GSK see GlazoSmithKline
federations 4 GUFs see Global Union Federations
figureheads 80, 115
focus HAI see Health Action International
anti-globalization 112, 115, 119 hazardous products 32
ATTAC 157 Health Action International (HAI) 42
CI 37 health care systems 82
Jubilee 2000 90, 93, 95, 100 Heavily Indebted Poorer Countries Initiative
trade unions 48 (HIPC) 94, 102, 104
transnational networks 20–22, 25–26 heterogeneity 59, 60, 92, 127, 145, 147
FOE see Friends of the Earth HIPC see Heavily Indebted Poorer Countries
FOE-I see Friends of the Earth International Initiative
foreign exchange markets 150–162 HIV/AIDS drugs campaign 66–85, 166
founding members 37 horizontal integration 168, 173
fragmentation 100–105 HRW see Human Rights Watch
framing 118–1120 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 7, 10, 20
France 150–154 humanitarian agencies 10–11
Friends of the Earth (FOE) 7, 9, 21, 125
Friends of the Earth International IBFAN see International Baby Foods Action
(FOE-I) 16, 23 Network
full membership 33–34 ICBL see International Campaign to Ban
funding Landmines
international secretariats 16, 175 ICFTU see International Confederation of
NGOs 11 Free Trade Unions
pharmaceutical industry 79–80, 83 ICT see information and communications
southern-led networks 15, 175 technology
trade unions 62–63 IFRC see International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies
G8 summits 96 ILO see International Labour Organization
generic production 67–69, 73 income 35–36, 37–38
Genoa summit meeting, 2001 103, 113 India 37–38, 43, 55, 144–145
geographical aspects 167, 171 industrial action 53–54
George, Susan 152, 161 informal approaches 4, 146
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) 78 information
Global Compact, United Nations 54, 55 anti-globalization movement 121, 122
 Index 191

exchange 53, 110, 111, 140 WSF 131–132, 143, 146

international advocacy 41 see also control
product 30 legacy of Jubilee 2000 101–102
see also dissemination of information legal action 69–71, 72–73
information and communications technology legislation 32–33, 39
(ICT) legitimacy
access 37–38, 117, 120 ATTAC 159
advocacy 109 CI 38
AIDS/HIV campaign 81–82 democracy 169–170
ATTAC 155 governance 16–17
CI 40–41 Jubilee South 99
equality 171, 174 WSF 132–134, 135, 148
Jubilee 2000 95 liberalization 33, 39
transnational networking 15 linkage 140
see also dot causes; internet; websites listservs 81
institutionalization 55, 161 lobbying 55
instrumentalism 119 local issues 62, 97, 98, 124, 143–144
integration 61, 168, 173 loose network model 158, 159
intellectual property rights 67, 68, 69, 70, 75
inter-faith cooperation 12–14, 16 mandates 20–22, 57, 76, 148, 157
inter-sector tensions 138–139 Marcos, Subcomandante 115, 119
internal democracy 61 markets 1–2, 135, 150–162
International Baby Foods Action Network Marx, Karl 40
(IBFAN) 42 Mayday 2001 protests, UK 121
International Campaign to Ban Landmines Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 16
(ICBL) 110 media 79, 118, 125–126, 129, 152, 170
International Confederation of Free Trade membership
Unions (ICFTU) 45–46, 49, 64 accountability 18
International Federation of Red Cross and Red ATTAC 152, 160, 161
Crescent Societies (IFRC) 11 CI 33–34, 36–38
International Labour Organization (ILO) 55 democracy 174
International Organization of Consumers funding 62
Unions (IOCU) 29–44 heterogeneity 59, 60
internationalism 58 legitimacy 16–17
internet 2–3, 40–41, 95, 109–126, 130 NGOs 8–9
see also dot causes; ICT; websites roles 7, 19, 22–26
intra-sector tensions 139 support 24
IOCU see International Organization of Con- trade unions 11–12, 45, 46–47, 61
sumers Unions Mexico 25, 115, 118–120, 122
isolationism 153 Millennium Review (MR), ICFTU 3, 45–46,
50–52, 57, 64
Jubilee 2000 7, 20, 86–108, 165–166 mining industry 53, 54
mobilization
labour conditions 54, 56, 57 anti-globalization movement 120–122, 174
Le Monde Diplomatique, France 152 cultural framing 118–120
Leach bill 98–99 internet 111, 112, 113, 117, 130
leadership Jubilee 2000 86, 91, 93, 95–96
ATTAC 155–156, 158, 160–161 WSF 131, 145
democracy 169, 174 see also action; activism
dot causes 114–116, 122–123 Model Consumer Protection Laws 32–33
governance 19–20, 36 motivations 119
Jubilee 2000 95–96, 97–100, 107 Movement for Peace and Social Justice 112
organizational forms 5 movements 105–106, 109–126, 119, 145–
post-Jubilee 2000 104–105 147, 160–161, 172–173
religious 12 MR see Millennium Review
trade unions 63–64 MSF see Médecins Sans Frontières
192 Globalizing Civic Engagement

multi-faith networks 8 Oxfam 23, 75–76, 78, 80, 82, 125

multi-issue approaches 129 Oxfam International (OI) 7, 11, 16, 18, 20, 23

name licensing 20 participation

national aspects anti-globalization movement 121–122
ATTAC 154 CI member 34
consumer organizations 31 organizational forms 6
debt crisis 89 trade unions 47, 50, 61–62
democracy 165 transient 122
governance 173 WSF 129, 136–138, 148, 149
Jubilee 2000 94–95, 103–105 partnerships
WSF 131 CI 41–43
nationalism 58 cross-sector 166–167
negotiation 171–172 diverse networks 171–172
see also dialogue NGO and government 18
neo-anarchism 114–116 non-traditional 23–24
networks organizational forms 6
action 53 southern-led networks 15
ATTAC 150–162, 160–161 patents 67–68, 69, 80
CI 41–43 People’s Global Action (PGA) 111
cross-sector 173 Pesticides Action Network 42
democracy 168–169 petitions 90, 95
Jubilee 2000 87, 104 Pettifor, Ann 90, 95
organizational forms 4–8, 5–6, 22 PGA see People’s Global Action
trade unions 50–65 pharmaceutical industry, NGO
transnational 1–2, 3, 12–14 relationships 78–80, 83
WSF 127–149, 147 Philippines 18
NGOs see non-governmental organizations Planafloro project, Brazil 25
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 8– planning 141–143
11, 18, 55–57, 76–80, 132–133 pluralism 119, 123, 139, 142
non-traditional partnerships 3, 23–24, 166 policy 1–2, 8, 12, 26–27
North–South relations political aspects
access to resources 121–122 anti-globalization movement 112–113
CI 37–38, 39 ATTAC 156, 159–161
globalization and governance 117, 118 dot causes 117–118, 123, 124, 125–126
ICT 174 influence of civil society 174
Jubilee 2000 96–100, 102, 104, 106, Jubilee 2000 102
107–108 mandates 148
networks 14–15, 16 North–South partnerships 26
partnerships 24–26, 27 participation 47
spokespeople 170 responsibility 17
trade unions 56, 58–59 WSF 136–137
see also relationships; Southern countries; post-industrialism 47
tensions post-Jubilee 2000 campaigns 102–105
poverty 57
OI see Oxfam International power 47
one-off approaches 91 prices 67, 71, 73, 82, 83
organizational aspects private sector 2
ATTAC 154–155, 161 privatization 46
CI 33–36 product information 30
Jubilee 2000 91–92, 97–98, 107 professionalism 22
trade unions 49, 50–65 protests 109–126, 170
transnational networking 3–16, 26 see also activism
virtual 114 PSI see Public Sector International
WSF 130–135, 145–148 public health 67–85
ownership 98 Public Sector International (PSI) 59
 Index 193

radical approaches 97, 98, 119, 124 standards 54, 56

see also activism strikes see activism; industrial action
Ramonet, Ignacio 151 structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 94,
reformist approaches 27, 97, 153–154, 99, 107
160, 174 structure see organizational aspects
regional issues 34–35, 44, 143–144, 170 subsidiarity 60–61
relationships Subversive Enterprise International 115
AIDS/HIV campaign 80–81 support
Jubilee 2000 92 AIDS/HIV campaign 75–83
NGO 76–80, 83 consumer groups 31–32
non-traditional 166 globalization from below 153
North–South 106–108 government 77–78, 83, 172
trade unions 52–57 Jubilee 2000 95
WSF 138–139 membership 24
see also North–South relations; tensions
religions see faith-based organizations TAC see Treatment Action Campaign
representivity tactics 115–116, 124–125
democracy 169–170 taxation 150–162
governance 16–17 technology see information and communica-
organizational forms 6 tions technology
social movements 174 tensions
trade unions 64 ATTAC 160–161
WSF 132–133, 134, 136 cross-sector relationships 166, 173
resources 37–38, 60, 62–63, globalization dichotomy 152–153
121–122, 175 Jubilee 2000 91, 92–93, 96–100, 102
responsibility 17, 94, 167 North–South 24, 56, 58–59
restructuring 61, 64 solidarity 172
rights 10, 20, 33 WSF 127, 132, 136, 138–139,
see also intellectual property rights 143–144, 148
Rio Tinto 53 see also North–South relations; relationships
Robin Hood tax 150–162 terrorism 56, 67–68
rooted movements 4 Third World Network (TWN) 7, 75, 76
Tobin tax 150–162
SAPs see structural adjustment programmes top-down approaches 63, 64, 152
Save the Children 7, 16 trade 33, 39, 75
Schadee, Elizabeth 30 trade unions (TUs)
Seattle protest, 1999 111, 112, 116, 118 AIDS/HIV campaign 80–81
secretariats 7, 9–10, 12, 16 dot causes 120
September 11 113, 116 mandate challenges 22
social movements 4–6, 7, 59 non-traditional partners 3
Social Watch 7, 14 non-traditional partnerships 23
solidarity 58–59, 97, 106–107, 172 organizational aspects 7, 8, 11–12, 16
see also relationships transnationalization 45–65, 165
South Africa 54, 72–76, 77, 80–83 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Southern countries Rights (TRIPS) 67, 68, 76, 80
attitudes 172 Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue 42–43
consumers 31–32 trans-sector approaches 166–168
funding 175 transient participation 122
mandate challenges 21 transition-countries see developing countries;
networks 3, 14–15 Southern countries
see also developing countries transnational aspects
special-interest groups 22 activism 105
speculation 153, 154 advocacy networks 147
spiritual messages 90 corporations 53–54
spokespeople 170 costs and benefits 165–166
staff 35 movements 4
194 Globalizing Civic Engagement

networks 1–2, 3–27, 12–14 WCC see World Council of Churches

organizational forms 5–6 WCL see World Confederation of Labour
trade unions 48–65 WDM see World Development Movement
transparency 6 websites 41, 103, 110, 121–122,
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), South 130, 170
Africa 72–76, 77, 80–83 see also dot-causes; ICT; internet
TRIPS see Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec- WFTU see World Federation of Trade Unions
tual Property Rights women 64
trust 114, 140, 171 World Confederation of Labour (WCL) 49
TUs see trade unions World Congress of Religion and Peace 13
TWN see Third World Network World Council of Churches (WCC) 13
World Development Movement
Uganda 102
(WDM) 125
UMWA see United Mine Workers of America
World Federation of Trade Unions
unionism see trade unions
(WFTU) 49
unitary structures 4, 5–6
World Social Forum (WSF) 123, 127–149,
United Kingdom 40, 87–93, 102–103
157, 166–167
United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) 53
United Nations (UN) 32–33, 54, 55 World Trade Organization (WTO)
United States of America (USA) 69–75, CI 38–39
98–99 intellectual property rights 67, 68
USA see United States of America Seattle protest 111, 113, 118
TRIPS 80
vertical integration 168, 173 World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 9–10,
violence 115–116, 125–126, 135, 174 24
virtualization 110, 114 WSF see World Social Forum
voice 5, 134–135 WTO see World Trade Organization
voluntarism 22
voting 19, 34, 133 Zapatistas National Liberation Army (EZLN),
see also decision-making Mexico 115, 119–120, 122