Republic of the Philippines

SANDIGANBAYAN
Quezon City

SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,

-versus- SB- 15 -CRM-O 135

For: Violation of Section 3 (e) of
R. A. No. 3019

ISAIAS B. UBANA II,

BERNADETTE EUDELA
NIEVA and LEONARDO V.
REVIJIELTA,
Accused,

x---------------------------------------- x
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
SB-15-CRM-0136
-versus- For: Falsification

PRESENT:
ISAIAS B. UBANA II and
BERNADETTE EU])ELA PONFERRADA, J., Chairperson
NIEVA, MIRANDA,
Accused, MUSNGI',
FERNANDEZ, B. 2 , &
PAHTMNA3, JJ.

Promulgated:
lIP 06 2017 JAI

x---------------------

'Special Member of the 6 1 Division as per A.O. No. 124-2017 dated April 4, 2017.
2 Special Member of the Special 61h Division as per A. 0. No. 8-C-2017 dated August 23, 2017.
Special $4ember of the Special 6th Division as per A. 0. No. 8-C-2017 dated August 23, 2017.

-Afr'
RESOLUTION 2
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al,,
SB- 15-CRM-0 135-0136

RESOLUTION

MIRANDA, J:

This resolves: 1) accused Leonardo V. Revuelta's (Revuelta) Motion to

Dismiss dated January 29, 2017; 2) the Prosecution's Comment-Opposition
dated February 23, 2017 (Re: accused Revuelta' s Motion to Dismiss dated
January 29, 2017); 3) accused Revuelta's Reply dated March 10, 2017 (to the
Comment-Opposition dated February 23, 2017 with Prayer to Admit); and 4)
accused Isaias B. Ubana II (Ubana) and Bernadette Eudela.Nieva's (Nieva)
Manifestation dated March 14, 2017.

In his Motion to Dismiss, accused Revuelta claims that his right to the
speedy disposition of his case was violated after the Office of the Ombudsman
took more than six (6) years to terminate preliminary investigation of these
cases. He invokes the immediate dismissal of the case filed against him for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 following Supreme Court rulings
on the violation of the constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases.

In its comment-opposition, the Prosecution through the Office of the

Special Prosecutor (OSP) attributes the time it is taking to 'prosecute these
cases to the submission of the following additional evidence by the
complainants: 1) Commission on Audit's (COA) audit observation
memorandum on September 25, 2011; and 2) COA's fact-finding
investigation report on October 11, 2011. The OSP claims that in view of this
supervening event, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon had to
first ascertain the existence and authenticity of said documents before
resolving the complaints against accused Revuelta. The OSP asserts that
accused Revuelta was not unreasonably prejudiced as he was previously given
all the opportunity to submit controverting evidence during the preliminary
investigation. In fact, after the Ombudsman found probable cause for violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against him, accused Revuelta sought a
partial reconsideration' of the said resolution.

In his Reply, accused Revuelta describes as unsatisfactory the

explanation of the Prosecution in the conduct of preliminary investigation. He
claims that the period of alleged delay should be reckoned from the
commencement of the fact-finding investigation until the filing of the
informations in Court, not from the order requiring him to submit his counter-

' Order dated January 12, 2015, Records, vol. 1, pp. 25-26.
RESOLUTION 3
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-i 5-CRM-0 135-0136

affidavit. He asserts that it is not his duty to invoke and follow-up the
prosecution of his case.

In a Manifestation dated March 14, 2017, accused Ubana and Nieva

adopted the Motion to Dismiss filed by their co-accused Revuelta. They also
sought the dismissal of the Falsification case against them.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On March 16, 2009, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
received a Complaint-Affidavit dated March 9, 2009 from Justiniano N.
Calvario, Guillermo 0. Maulawin, Jesus A. Astillo, Oscar A. Aguirre and
Albelio C. Reyes (Complainants) charging Isaias Ubana, Municipal Mayor of
Lopez, Quezon with Malversation, Falsification and Violation of R.A. No.
3019.1 Said complaint-affidavit alleged irregularities in the procurement and
deliveries of glass wares and plastic wares to recipient barängays in the
municipality.6 On March 23, 2009, the complaint-affidavit was docketed for
fact-finding investigation.'

On April 9, 2009 and August 13, 2009, the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon directed the Municipal Accountant of Lopez, Quezon and COA LGS-
Cluster of Lucena, respectively, to submit documents relevant to the
investigation. 8 On August 28, 2009, the fact-finding investigation was
terminated and the case was re-docketed as a criminal case.

On November 9, 2009, the said criminal case was assigned to Graft

Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) J.S. Ong (Ong) for preliminary
investigation. On November 23, 2009, GIPO J.S. Ong received the records of
the case. 10

The preliminary investigation ensued against accused Ubana being the

only respondent in the case. On November 16, 2009, the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon issued a subpoena to accused Ubana for the
submission of his counter-affidavit. 12

Complaint-Affidavit dated March 9, 2009, Records, Vol. 1, pp.27-28.

Ibid
Comment-Opposition dated February 23, 2017, Records, Vol. 2, pp. 132-147, 7.
8 lbid
9 Comment-Opposition dated February 23, 2017, Records, Vol. 2, pp. 132-147, 8.
10
Ibid
U Comment-Opposition dated February 23, 2017, Records, Vol. 2, pp. 132-147,11.
'2 Supra, 9.
RESOLUTION 4
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-i 5-CRM-0 135-0136

On December 17, 2009, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon unloaded

the case to GIPO Albert Almojuela (Almojuela).' 3

On Janu&y 5, 2010, accused Ubana filed a Motion for Extension of

Time to Submit Counter-affidavit. 14 On January 26,2010, for the second time,
accused Ubana sought an extension of time to submit his counter-affidavit. 15
This was opposed by the complainants on February 3, 2010.16 On February
101, 2010 9 accused Ubana filed his third Motion for Extension of Time to
Submit Counter-affidavit. 17 After filing three (3) Motions for Extension of
Time to Submit Counter-Affidavit, accused Ubana finally submitted his
Counter-Affidavit dated February 18, 20 10, 11 or three (3) months and two (2)
days from the date of issuance of the subpoena.

On April 18, 2011, the case was re-assigned to GIPO Expedito Allado,
Jr. (Allado, Jr.). 19 In a Memorandum dated September 12, 2011, GIPO Allado,
Jr. sought the inclusion of accused Revuelta and Nieva, and co-respondents
Abelia Norada Villasenor (Villasenor), Hermes Arche Argante (Argante), and
Esmeraldo L. Erandio (Erandio) in the case. 20

On September 21, 2011, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued an

order directing accused Revuelta and Nieva, and co-respondents Villasenor,
Argante, and Erandio to submit their counter-affidavits. 2'

• Accused Revuelta and Nieva failed to submit their counter-affidavits

despite personal receipt of the order to file the same. 22 From the foregoing,
the investigatory process against accused Revuelta and Nieva started only
when they were impleaded as co-respondents in the case on September 12,
2011 or two (2) years, five (5) months and twenty-six (26) days after the filing
of the complaint-affidavit, or one (1) year, five (5) months and three (3) days
after the start of the preliminary investigation against accused Ubana.

Pending resolution of the case, complainants submitted the COA audit

observation memorandum on September 25, 2011 and COA fact-finding
investigation report on October 26, 2011.23 On September 25, 2012, the
' 3 lbid
' 4 1d
' 5 1d
' 6 1d
' 7 1d.
18 Counter-Affidavit dated February 18, 2010, Records, Vol. 1, pp.46-81.
19
Comment-Opposition dated February 23, 2017, Records, Vol. 2, pp. 1 32-147, 9.
20 Jbjd
21 1d
22
Supra, 11.
23 Ibid.

-A
RESOLUTION
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-i 5-CRM-0 135-0136

complainants sought the admission of said documents as additional

evidence.24

This prompted the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to re-evaluate the

records .21 On March 4, 2013, the case was transferred to Ombudsman-Zero
Backlog Unit (ZBU) for continuation of the preliminary investigation. 26 The
Ombudsman-ZBU then issued an Order dated July 15, 2013 directing the
accused and their co-respondents to submif their comments on the said COA
audit observation memorandum and fact-finding report submitted by the
complainants.27

Within the period July 24, 2013 to August 6, 2,013, accused Ubana and
Nieva and their co-respondents, filed separate motions seeking an extension
of time to submit their comments. 21 On August 27, 2013, accused Ubana and
Nieva and their co-respondents, submitted their comments on the COA
memorandum and report. 29

On August 30, 2013, the Ombudsman-ZBU directed COA to produce

a certified copy of its report in the case. 30 Dissatisfied with their 2011 reports,
COA' s Fraud Audit Office conducted another fact-finding investigation
which resulted in a 2013 Fact-Finding Report. 3 ' On September 6, 2013,
complainants filed a motion for the immediate resolution of the case. 32

On August 18, 2014, a draft resolution finding probable cause for

Violation of R.A. No. 3019 against accused Ubana, Nieva and Revuelta, and
for Falsification against accused Ubana and Nieva, and dismissing the charges
against respondents Villasenor, Argante and Erandio for lack of probable
cause, was submitted for approval by Assistant Ombudsman Leilanie
Bernadette C. Cabras (Cabras) to Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales
(Carpio-Morales). ' On August 20, 2014, Ombudsman Carpio-Morales
approved the said draft resolution. 34

24 Comment-Opposition dated February 23, 2017, Records, Vol. 2, pp. 1 32-147, 12.
25
Ibid
26
Id
27

28 Comment-Opposition dated February 23, 2017, Records, Vol. 2, pp. 132-147, 10.
29
Ibid
30 1d
"Resolution dated August 18, 2014, Records, Vol. 1, pp. 8-24, 11-12.
32 Supra, 28.
13 Resolution dated August 18, 2014 recommending the filing of the criminal charges for Violation of Section

3(e) of R.A. 3019 against accused Ijbana, Nieva and Revuelta, and for Falsification against accused Ubana
and Nieva, and dismissing the charges against respondents Villasenor, Argante and Erandio for lack of
probable cause.
Ibid.
RESOLUTION 6
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB- i 5-CRM-0 135 -0136

Thereafter, accused Ubana, Nieva and Revuelta sought a partial

reconsideration of the same. 35 This was denied by the Ombudsman on January
30 1 2015. 16 Thereafter, the OSP filed the informations in these cases before
this Court on July 1, 2015, or five (5) months, nineteen (19) days after the
denial of their motion for partial reconsideration.

The above-stated incidents can be summarized in a table as follows:

INCIDENT DATE
A Complaint-Affidavit dated March 9, 2009 for March 16, 2009
Grave 'Misconduct and Dishonesty, Violation of
R.A. 3019 and Falsification against accused Ubana
was received by the Office of the Deputy.
Ombudsman for Luzon
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon March 23, 2009
evaluated the said complaint-affidavit.
The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon directed the April 14, 2009
Municipal Accountant of Lopez, Quezon to submit
documents relevant to the case.
The Municipal Accountant of Lopez, Quezon wrote May 14, 2009
a letter to the Ombudsman for Luzon in response to
the said order.
The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon directed the August 13, 2009
C'OA LGS-Cluster of Lucena to submit documents
relevant to the case.
The COA LGS-Cluster of Lucena submitted the August 18, 2009
documents required by the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon.
The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon terminated the August 28, 2009
fact-finding investigation. The complaint was re-
docketed as Case No. OMB-L-C-09051 7-1 against
accused Ubana.
The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon assigned the November 9, 2009
(received by GIPO
case to GIPO J.S. Ong for preliminary investigation.
Ong on November
23 5 2009)
The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a November 16, 2009
subpoena directing accused Ubana to submit his
counter-affidavit.
The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon unloaded the December 17, 2009
case to GIPO Almojuela.

Supra, 4.
36
Jbjd
RESOLUTION
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-i 5-CRM-0 135-0136

Accused Ubana filed a Motion for Extension of Time January 5; 2010

to Submit Counter-Affidavit.
Accused Ubana filed his 2nd Motion for Extension of January 26, 2010
Time to Submit Counter-Affidavit.
Complainants filed their Opposition to Accused February 3, 2010
Ubana's Motion for Extension.
Accused Ubana submitted his 3' Motion for February 10, 2010
Extension of Time to Submit Counter-Affidavit.
Accused Ubana submitted his Counter-Affidavit February 18, 2010
dated February 18, 2010.
The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon re-assigned the April 18, 2011
case to GIPO Allado, Jr., of EIO- Bureau B.
GIPO Allado, Jr. requested the inclusion of accused September 12, 2011
Revuelta, Nieva, and co-respondents Villasenor,
Argante, and Erandio in the preliminary
investigation.
The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a September 2 1,2011
subpoena to accused Revuelta requiring the
submission of his counter-affidavit.
The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a September 21, 2011
subpoena to accused Nieva, and co-respondents
Villaseflor, Argante, and Erandio requiring the
submission of their counter-affidavits.
Complainants submitted the COA audit observation September 25, 2011
memorandum as an additional evidence in the case.
Respondents Villaseflor, Argante, and Erandio filed October 24, 2011
a Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Counter-
Affidavit.
Complainants submitted the COA fact-finding October 26, 2011
investigation report also as an additional evidence in
the case.
Respondents Villaseflor, Argante, and Erandio November 22, 2011
submitted their Joint Counter-Affidavit dated
November 17, 2011.
Complainants filed a Motion to Admit the COA September 25, 2012
memorandum and report as additional evidence with
Motion to Issue Subpoena to COA.
The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon remanded the March 4, 2013
case to the Zero Backlog Unit (ZBU) for
continuation of the preliminary investigation.
The Ombudsman-ZBU issued an order to the July 15, 2013
accused and their co-respondents requiring the
submission of their comment on the COA
memorandum and report.
RESOLUTION ni
L!J
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-i 5-CRM-0 135-0136

Accused Ubana and Nieva, and co-respondents Various dates

Villasenor, Argante, and Erandio filed several (July 24, 2013 to
Motions for Extension of Time to File Comment on August 6, 2013
the .COA memorandum and report.
Accused Ubana filed a Motion Requesting Copies of August 11,2013
Annexes attached to the COA report.
Accused Ubana and Nieva, and co-respondents August 27, 2013
Villasenor, Argante, and Erandio submitted their
comments.
The Ombudsman-ZBU issued a subpoena to COA August 30, 2013
requiring the submission of the certified true copy of
its report.
Complainants filed a Motion Requesting Copies of September 6, 2013
Recent Orders with Manifestation seeking the
immediate resolution of the case.
Assistant Ombudsman Cabras submitted for August 18, 2014
approval her draft resolution 37 to Ombudsman
Carpio-Morales.
Ombudsman Carpio-Morales approved the draft August 20, 2014
resolution in these cases.
Ombudsman Carpio-Morales denied the Motion for January 30, 2015
Partial Reconsideration filed by accused Ubana,
Nieva and Revuelta.
The OSP filed the informations in these cases with July 1, 2015
the Sandiganbayan.

DISCUSSION AND RULING

A review of the records will show that the Motion to Dismiss lacks
merit and should be denied.

The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article III

of the Constitution which states:

Section 16 All persons shall have the right to a speedy

disposition of their cases before alijudicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

37 Supra, 33.
RESOLUTION
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-i 5-CRM-0 135-0136

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited

to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party
to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice. 38

The concept of "speedy disposition of cases", like "speedy trial", is,

however, relative or flexible, such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient . 31 These rights are deemed violated only when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays,
or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive, a long time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. 40

The right to speedy disposition of cases is consistent with delays and

depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory. 4 '
The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible,
result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and either in
a plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendants being pronounced liable under
an ex parte judgment. 42

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan 43 the Supreme Court held that in

,

determining whether that right to speedy disposition of cases has been

violated, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the length
of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

Based on the records, it took the Office of the Ombudsman six (6) years,
three (3) months and fifteen (15) days from receipt of the anonymous
complaint on March 16, 2009, to file the information with this Court on July
1, 2015.

However, said period spent by the Office of the Ombudsman to

terminate its investigation and file the informations in Court is not without
valid reasons. More importantly, a big part of this period is not attributable to

38
The Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154155, August 6, 2008.
39 De la Peña v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001.
° Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991
'"Supra, 38.
42
Dansal v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 126814, March 2, 2000.
G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004.
41
RESOLUTION 10
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-i 5-CRM-0 135-0136

the Office of the Ombudsman but to causes beyond its control and to the
accused themselves.

The fact-finding investigation of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon,

which lasted from March 16, 2009 to August 28, 2009, or five (5) months and
twelve (12) days, should not be attributed to the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. The time spent by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in issuing the
subpoena duces tecum to the Municipal Accountant of Lopez, Quezon and
COA LGS-Cluster of Lucena City, and the receipt of the documents relative
to the complaint from April 14, 2009 to August 18, 2009, or four (4) months
and four (4) days, should be excluded. The period of compliance of these
government agencies is beyond the control of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. Neither the Deputy Ombudsman nor accused Ubana can be faulted for
this period.

The period from August 28, 2009 to January 5, 2010 orfour (4) months
and eight (8) days, was used by the Deputy Ombudsman to formally charge
accused Ubana, assign the case to a GIPO and issue an order to accused Ubana
requiring the submission of his counter-affidavit. There is no inordinate delay
here because the Deputy Ombudsman acted promptly on the case from
formally charging accused Ubana to assigning the case to a GIPO for
preliminary investigation.

The period from January 5, 2010 to February 18,2010, or one (1) month
and thirteen (13) days, is attributed to accused Ubana. During this period, he
contributed to the alleged delay when he asked for several extensions of time
to submit his counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. He filed
three separate motions for extension of time to submit his counter-affidavit on
January 5, 2010, January 26, 2010 and February 3, 2010. He only submitted
his counter-affidavit after three (3) months and two (2) days from the issuance
to him of the subpoena.

From the time he first sought an extension of time to file his counter-
affidavit until the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause for these
cases, accused Ubana neither objected to any delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation against him nor sought to expedite its resolution.

Accused Ubana cannot claim to be prejudiced by a delay he too is

responsible for. Delay of the accused's own making cannot be oppressive to
him.44 In Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Supreme Court held that if the

See Dela Rosa v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 116945, February 9, 1996.
u G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991.
/

-r "0
RESOLUTION 11
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-15-CRM-0 135-0 136

long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation was not solely
the prosecution's fault, but was also due to incidents attributable to the
accused and his counsel, the right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases
is not violated.

The period from February 18, 2010 to September 21, 2011, or one (1)
year, seven (7) months and three (3) days, should be attributed to the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. During this period, the case was unloaded from GIPO
Almojuela to GIPO Allado, Jr., for reasons unstated. At this point, GIPO
Allado, Jr. requested the inclusion in the case of accused Revuelta and Nieva,
and co-respondents Villasenor, Argante, and Erandio. On September 21,
2011, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued orders to accused Revuelta
and Nieva, and co-respondents Villasenor, Argante, and Erandio requiring the
submission of their respective counter-affidavits. The Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon's actions were put on hold pending the submission by accused Nieva
and Revuelta of their respective counter-affidavits. During this period, again,
accused Ubana neither questioned any delay nor sought the separate resolution
of his case.

However, the above period of two (2) years, five (5) months and
seventeen (17) days from March 16, 2009 to September 21, 2011, should not
be counted in the case of accused Revuelta and Nieva.

Prior to this period, accused Revuelta and Nieva were not subjects of
any investigation related to alleged irregularities and ghost deliveries of glass
wares and plastic wares to recipient barangays in the Municipality of Lopez,
Quezon. In fact, the complaint and preliminary investigation were first
initiated against accused Ubana only.

Accused Revuelta and Nieva were only impleaded as co-respondents

when the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ordered their inclusion in the case
on September 12, 2011 upon the recommendation of GIPO Allado Jr.
Thereafter, on September 21, 2011, they were required by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon to submit their respective counter-affidavits. Thus,
there is no proof that they endured any vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delay during this period because they had not undergone any investigative
proceeding before September 12, 2011.

In The Ombudsman v. Jurado, 46 the respondent was not included in the

original complaint as one of the parties charged with violation of the Tariff
and Customs Code. It was only after the report and recommendation of the

46 Supra, 38.
RESOLUTION 12
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-i 5-CRM-0 135-0 136

Fact-Finding Bureau (FFB) of the Ombudsman that he was criminally and

administratively charged. The period prior to the FFB's report and
recommendation was not included in the determination of whether or not his
right to speedy disposition of case was violated. The Supreme Court ruled that
there were no vexations, capricious, and oppressive delays because the
respondent was not made to undergo any investigative proceeding prior to the
report and findings of the FFB.

The period from September 21, 2011 to September 6, 2013, or one (1)
year, eleven (11) months and sixteen (16) days, should not be visited upon the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the, accused. The Complainants' late
submission of additional documents, i.e., the COA audit observation
memorandum and fact-finding report, relative to the- case was beyond the
Deputy Ombudsman's control. The verification and further evaluation of
these new documents with the COA is inevitable. During this period, the COA
was also given an opportunity to conduct another fact-finding investigation
which resulted in their 2013 Fact-Finding Report. These incidents are beyond
the control of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the accused.

The period from September 6, 2013 to August 20, 2014, or eleven (11)
months and fourteen (14) days, is attributable to the Office of the
Ombudsman. The period spent by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in
finishing the preliminary investigation and drafting the resolution in these
cases is eleven (11) months and twelve (12) days. The Resolution dated
August 18, 2014 recommending the filing of a case for Violation of R.A. No.
3019 against accused Ubana, Nieva and Revuelta, and for Falsification against
accused Ubana and Nieva, and dismissing the charges against respondents
Villasenor, Argante and Erandio for lack of probable cause, was approved by
Ombudsman Carpio-Morales after two (2) days. There is no inordinate delay
here because the Office of the Ombudsman spent less than a year in
terminating the preliminary investigation from the date of the last pleading
filed on September 6, 2013. This period is justified because the Office of the
Ombudsman needed to ensure that the proper, correct, and strong cases are
filed against the accused. In fact, the accused benefited from this lapse of time
because the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause only for
violation of R.A. 3019 and falsification and dismissed all the other criminal
and administrative charges against them.

The period from August 20, 2014 to January 30, 2015, or five (5)
months and ten (10) days, is attributed to the accused because of the exercise
of their right to procedural due process. During this period, accused Ubana,
Re: vuelta and Nieva sought to assail the finding of probable cause against them
beore the filing of the informations in Court. The Office of the Ombudsman
RESOLUTION 13
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB- 15-CRM-0 135-0136

cannot be faulted for granting them sufficient opportunity to exercise said

right.

The period from January 30, 2015 to July 1, 2015, or five (5) months
and one (1) day, is attributable to the Office of the Ombudsman. This period
is, however, justified because the OSP reviewed the cases again and made
sure that only those cases that could stand the rigors of trial would be filed.
On the other hand, accused Nieva benefited from this lapse of time because
the OSP filed an information for only one (1) count of falsification instead of
the seven (7) counts recommended by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon.

Based on the foregoing, the total period of six (6) months and twenty-
three (23) days, is attributed to accused Ubana, and the period of five (5)
months and ten (10) days, to accused Nieva and Revuelta. This period should
be excluded from the time spent by the Office of the Ombudsman to terminate
the fact-finding and preliminary investigation, respectively, and for the OSP
to file the corresponding informations in this Court.

The total period of two (2) years, four (4) months and twenty eight (28)
-

days should also be excluded from the computation of the period attributed to
the Office of the Ombudsman. As explained above, this period covers those
incidents beyond the control of the Office of the Ombudsman and the accused.

Subtracting the periods attributable to the accused and those beyond the
control of the Office of the Ombudsman, the total period it took the Office of
the Ombudsman to finish its fact-finding investigation and preliminary
investigation, and for the OSP to file the corresponding informations is only
three (3) years, three (3) months and twenty-six (26) days in the case of
accused IJbana, while eleven (11) months and five (5) days in the case of
accused Nieva and Revuelta.

In People v. Sandiganbayan,47 the Supreme Court held that any delay

in the investigation and prosecution of cases must 'be duly justified and the
State must prove that the delay in the prosecution was reasonable, or that the
delay was not attributable to it. Under the circumstances and as previously
discussed, said period is justified, acceptable, and not capricious, oppressive
and vexatious.

'
G.R. Nos. 199151-56. July 25, 2016.

P*101/ ~V.
RESOLUTION 14
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-i 5-CRM-0 135-0136

The accused cites the ruling of the Supreme Court in Coscolluela48 to

claim that it is not their duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case and
that it is the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same
within the bounds of reasonable timeliness.

Contrary to the claim of the accused, the ruling in Coscolluela is

inapplicable in this case. In Coscolluela, the accused could not-have sought
the speedy resolution of their case because they were completely unaware that
the investigation against them was still on-going. They were only informed of
the resolution and information against them after the lapse of six (6) years, or
when they received a copy of the said information after its filing with the
Sandiganbayan. In this regard, the Supreme Court held that they could have
reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have already been
terminated.

Accused Revuelta's Motion to Dismiss dated January 29, 2017, which

was adopted by accused Ubana and Nieva, was the first instance that they
objected to the alleged delay in the prosecution of these cases.

Accused Revuelta filed said motion with this Court on January 30, 2017
only, or one (1) year, six (6) months and twenty-nine (29) days after the filing
of the informations in Court, or at least five (5) years, four (4) months and
nine (9) days after the issuance by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon of the
order to submit his counter-affidavit. In the case of accused Ubana and Nieva,
they filed their manifestation adopting Revuelta's motion to dismiss, on
March 14, 2017, or one (])year, eight (8) months and thirteen (13) days after
the informations were filed with this Court, or at least seven (7) years, three
(3) months and twenty-eight (28) days after the issuance of the order to submit
his counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation as regards accused
Ubana, and five (5) years, four (4) months and nine (9) days as regards
accused Nieva.

Accused Ubana, Nieva and Revuelta knew of the investigation against

them because they received orders from the Office of the Ombudsman to
submit their counter-affidavits and comments to the proceedings. In accused
Revuelta's case, he did not participate in any of the proceedings before the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon despite personal receipt of orders to submit
counter-affidavit and comment on the COA reports. All three filed a motion
for partial reconsideration to the resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon but none invoked their right to the speedy disposition of their case in
said motion. When the informations against them were filed in this Court, they

48 G.R.No. 191411, July 15, 2013.

RESOLUTION 15
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-15-CRM-0135-0136

even waited for more than a year before seeking the dismissal of these cases.
Accused Ubana, Nieva and Revuelta slept on their right and did not object to
this lapse of time despite actual knowledge of the pendency of criminal
charges against them. Their failure and negligence to assert their right to the
speedy disposition of the cases against them within a reasonable time is an
abandonment or waiver of such right. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura
subveniunt. The laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. 49

The Court also believes that the accused were not unduly and
excessively prejudiced by the length of time spent by the Office of the
Ombudsman in terminating the preliminary investigation. The accused did not
suffer any pre-trial incarceration because he was neither incarcerated nor
preventively suspended before and during the fact-finding, preliminary
investigation, and trial of this case. 50 In fact, they immediately posted bail on
July 7, 2015, or six (6) days after the filing of the informations in this Court.

The accused were also given all the opportunity to present their
defenses during the preliminary investigation. In fact, the accused benefited
twice from the actions of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and
the OSP; First, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause for violation of R.A. 3019 and falsification only and dismissed
all the other criminal and administrative charges against them. Second, the
OSP, after a judicious evaluation of the case, an information for only one (1)
count of falsification was filed instead of the seven (7) counts recommended
by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

The accused's heavy reliance on the rulings of the Supreme Court in

the following cases is misplaced.

In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,5 the inordinate delay of almost three (3)

'

years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was due to political

motivation and blatant departure from procedures prescribed by law in the
conduct of preliminary investigation. Also, the long delay in resolving the
preliminary investigation was not justified by the records.

In Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 52 petitioners therein received a

memorandum from the Tanodbayan recommending the filing of Information
against them after four (4) years from the time they were directed to submit

49 Eduarte v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 121038, July 22, 1999.

50
See Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, Note 41.
51
G.R. No. L-72335, March 21, 1988.
52 0.R.No. 130191, April 27, 1998.

.fr,
Ab
RESOLUTION 16
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-15-CRM-0135-0 136

their comments on a civil complaint and the Special Audit Report of the COA.
Petitioners therein were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation
as they were unaware that they were being investigated. They were not served
copies of the complaint-affidavits and not given the chance to file their
counter-affidavits.

In Lopez v. Sandiganbayan, 53 the preliminary investigation was

resolved close to four (4) years from the time all the counter and reply
affidavits were submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. During this
interval, no incidents presented themselves for resolution and the delay could
only be attributed to the inaction on the part of the investigating officials.
Unlike in these cases, the Complainants' late submission of COA audit
observation memorandum and fact-finding report during the preliminary
investigation resulted to verification and further evaluation of these new
evidence with the COA.

In Enriquez v. Office of the Ombudsman, 14 inordinate delay was present

because the Ombudsman did not resolve the administrative and criminal cases,
against petitioners therein even though the investigation of the said cases had
long been terminated with the accused's formal offer of evidence. Due to the
Ombudsman's inaction for more than four (4) years, petitioners therein filed
a motion to seek the dismissal of the cases against them. The Ombudsman,
however, neither resolved the said motion nor informed petitioners why the
cases remained unresolved.

InAngchangco v. Ombudsman, 55 the Ombudsman's inaction for six (6)

years violated the right of petitioner therein to due process and the speedy
disposition of the cases against him despite the filing of several motions for
early resolution. The actions of petitioner therein show his vigilance in
asserting or prtecting his rights to due process and the speedy disposition of
cases. This is not the case with the accused because they failed and neglected
to assert their right to the speedy disposition of the cases against them at the
earliest possible opportunity.

In Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman, 16 the Ombudsman failed to give

any valid reason why it took six (6) years to resolve the complaints against
petitioner therein.

G.R. No. 140529, September 6, 2001.

G.R. No. 174902-06, February 15, 2008.
G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997.
56
G.R. No. 129978, May 12, 1999.

fri
RESOLUTION 17
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-i 5-CRM-0 135-0136

In Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan,57 petitioner therein was deprived of his

right to speedy disposition of the case because it took the Special Prosecutor
six (6) years to file the Information with the Sandiganbayan without any
justifiable reason.

In Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 58 there was delay in the trial of the case

because from the arraignment of petitioner therein, there was an unexplained
interval or inactivity of close to five (5) years in the Sandiganbayan. A long
period was allowed to lapse without the case being tried.

In People v. Anonas, 59 the accused therein was arrested without warrant

of arrest and was not afforded a formal investigation. The trial court ordered
a re-investigation that was only terminated after four years. Accused,
therefore, was prejudiced by the delay, having to be confined for more than
four oppressive years for failure of the investigating prosecutors to comply
with the law on preliminary investigation.

In People v Sandiganbayan, 6° there was no sufficient justification

tendered by the State for the long delay in bringing the charges against the
respondents therein before the proper court. The insufficiency of the evidence
to establish probable cause and the State's dependence on the ratification of
two treaties related to the charge are not reasonable justifications for the delay.

In Commodore Torres v. Sandiganbayan, 6 ' petitioner therein asserted

his right to speedy disposition of his cases at the earliest possible time. He
claimed that he was prejudiced by the delay in the resolution of the cases
against him because he had already retired from government service for
fifteen (15) years when he was included in the preliminary investigation. This
deprived him of the ability to adequately prepare his case as he no longer had
any access to records or contact with any witnesses in support of his defense.

In People v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 62 the delay of fifteen (15) years in

the filing of the informations impaired the accused's right to adequately
defend himself because the witnesses who could testify on the case may no
longer be found or available. The Supreme Court did not accept the reasons
invoked by the Ombudsman in justifying delay such as the "thorough review"

G.R. No. 108595, May 18, 1999.

G.R. No. 139571-72, March 28, 2001.
G.R. No. 156847, January 31, 2007.
60
G.R. No. 188165 & 189063, December 11, 2013
61
G.R. No. 221562-69, October 5, 2016.
62 Supra, 47.
RESOLUTION 18
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-i 5-CRM-0 135-0136

of the Initial Resolution through the different levels of their office before its
approval and the transfer of the Ombudsman to their new office at that time.

Unlike in the foregoing cases, the facts of these cases do not evince
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation. Due regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. The bare allegation that it took the Office of the
Ombudsman more than six (6) years to terminate the investigation and file the
necessary informations does not suffice. As earlier stated, a mere
mathematical reckoning of the time spent for the investigation is not sufficient
reason to conclude that arbitrary and inordinate delay attended the prosecution
of these cases.

This Court is not unmindful of the duty of the Ombudsman under the
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 to act promptly on complaints brought before
it. Such duty, however, should not be mistaken with a hasty resolution of cases
at the expense of thoroughness and correctness. 63 Judicial notice should be
taken of the fact that the nature of the Office of the Ombudsman encourages
individuals who clamor for efficient government service to freely lodge their
Complaints against wrongdoings of government personnel. A steady stream
of cases reaching the Ombudsman inevitably results. Naturally, disposition of
those cases would take some time. 64

In Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, 65 the Supreme Court held that it is the

judicious and deliberate determination of all the pending incidents of a case,
with a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the requirements of
procedural due process, that should be the primordial consideration in the full
resolution of a case, more than the mere convenience of the parties or of the,
courts, so that justice and fairness would be served thereby.

In Datukan Guiani v. Sandiganbayan,66 the Supreme Court held:

"The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed

to him by the Constitution but the same shall not be
utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity
of fairly indicting criminals. While accused persons do
have rights, many of them choose to forget that the
aggrieved also have the same rights. It secures rights to
a defendant but it does not preclude the rights of public
63
Supra, 42.
Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No. 146368-69, October 23, 2003.
65
G.R. No. 166606, November 29, 2005.
66
G.R. No. 146897-917, August 6, 2002.
 RESOLUTION 19
People v. Isaias B. Ubana II, et al.,
SB-i 5-CRM-0 135-0136

justice. A party's individual rights should not work

against and preclude the people's equally important right
to public justice."

The interests of the private complainants must be equally considered in

thern prosecution of criminal cases. Justice should not be dispensed to the
accused alone. It must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one
hand, and the State and offended party, on the other. In these cases, the
complainants sought the immediate resolution of the case before the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon on September 6, 2013.

- The protection under the right to a speedy disposition of a case should

not operate to deprive the government of its inherent prerogative in
prosecuting criminal cases or in generally seeing to it that all who approach
the bar of justice be afforded a fair opportunity to present their side. 67

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss of accused Leonardo V.

Revuelta, which was adopted by accused Isaias B. Ubana II and Bernadette
Eudela Nieva, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

KARL MIRANDA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: I A4.J!

RODOLI ?ERRADA
Associate Jstice
MICHAEL
1+
ui
Associ
MUSNGI

R. FERNANDEZ LOR uj
Justice Assoc*
t J -- -

67 Suprci, 42.
 DISSENTING OPINION
MUSNG1 J.: .: .

• Respectfully, I dissent. .

Section 16,. Article HI of the . 1987 Philippine Constitution

provides, thus: . . .

"Section 16 All personS. shall-,have the right to a speedy disposition

of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bOdies." .

The Supreme Court discussed the right of the accused to speedy

disposition. of cases: and the correlative obligation, of the Court to
protect such right in the. case of Corpuz vs. SandigaAbäyan, 1 to wit

'The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy

disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding. criminal prosecution suspended
over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in. the
adminiStration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial .of criminal cases. Such right to a
speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is. violated only when .
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied
such right is riot susceptiblé by precise qualification The concept of
a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.' . . . . . . . .

While, justice is administered with dispatch, the essential

ingredient is orderly, expeditiOus and not mere .seed. It cannot , be
definitely said how long . is too long 'in a system where justice is
supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays. , and
depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it
does. not preclude, the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne
'in mind that the rights given to th&accused by the Constitutiori and
the Rules of Court are shields, hot weapons; hence, courts are to
give meaning to that intent..'

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights

of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy
trial cases on an ad hoc basis.' . . .

Li ndetermining whether the 'accused has been deprived of his

right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four
factors must be considered: (a) length of delay: (b) the reason
for the delay; (C) the defendant's assertion of his right: and (d)
prejudice to the defendant Prejudice shoUld be assessed in the
light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was
designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial.
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to

I G.R. No. 162214, 11 November2004. .

 Criminal Case No. SB -15-CRM-0135 16 ,0136
People vs Ubana II, et al.
DISSENTING OPINION
Page 2of5
X ------------------ ----------- x

trial; and to. limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of
these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately, to prepare his case skews the fairness of the
entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses. are
unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the
accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged, by
restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud I of anxiety,
• suspicion and often, hostility: His financial resources may, be drained,
his'association is curtailed, and he is subjected' to public obloquy.'

'Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears

• the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The
passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do
not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or
exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such
right Shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
prosecuting, criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
• . government to sustain its right to try the accused despite adelay, it
must show two things: . (a) that the accused suffered, no serious
prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable
delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably
• attributable to the ordinary, processes of justice.' .

'Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or

justification of the State for such delay.. 'Different weights should be
- assigned to different reasons. or justifications invoked by the State.'
For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper
or prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily ,against the.
State. Also it is improper for the prosecutOr to intentionally delay to
gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to -harass or
prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load, of . the
prosecution or a missing witness should bel weighted less' heavily
against the State. Corollarily, Section 4, Rule 119 of the,
Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the. factors fOr granting a
continuance."2 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)

After a careful perusal of the instant motion and the records of

this case, It can be readily seen that the right tothà Speedy disposition
of cases of accused Leonardo V. Revuelta,' Isaias , B. Ubana. II, and
Bernadette Eudela Nieva ("Revuelta, et al.") haè been violatèd

First, it IS undeniable from the records of the case that it took the'
Office of the Ombudsman ("OMB") six (6) years, three (3) months, and
fifteen . (15) days to conclude its fact-finding and preliminéry.
investigation, and to file the Information before this Court on 01 July.
2015.

2 'G.R. No. 1-37007, '20 July 1987 ' . .

 :
Criminal Case No. SB -15-RM0135 to 0136
People vs. Ubana II, et al.
DISSENTING OPINION.. . .•.
Page 3óf5 . .. .
-. - - ---- ------ x
-

Second, the explanation propounded by the prosecution is

unreasonable. All circumstances surrounding the attendant delay in
the : fact-finding and preliminary investigation conducted against
accused Revuelta, et al. are attributable to the OMB. The prosecution
cannot wash its hands clean and just.. indiscriminately point fingers to
other government agencies as the cause Of this delay. . *

In the case of Cosco!Iuela vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 the Supreme,

Court emphasized that it is the duty of the Ombudsman to act with
reasonable dispatch on the cases entrusted to it, thus

"Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the

mantle of the Constitution, mandated to be. the 'protector of the
people' and as such, required to 'act promptly on complaints filed in
any, form or manner against officers and employees Of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
in order to promote efficient service This greatresponsibility cannot
be simply brushed aside by ineptitude. Pre- isely, the Office of the
Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through ,
the partiOulars of case but also to resolve the same within the , proper
length of time. its dutifUlpe.rformance should not only b gauged by
the quality of the assessment but also by the reasonable promptness
Of its dispensation.'

xxx

'Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of

cases s not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch
in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of
thecitizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for .
an indefinite time. Akin to the right.-to Speedy trial, its "salutary
objective' is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherWise; of having his guilt
determined within the shorteét possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he
may . interpOse. This looming., unrest as well as the tactical
disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed
against the...State'änd in favor of the individual."

The OMB is and should not be bound by the action or inaction of

other government agencies in promptly disposing of cases before it. It
'must be. vigilant in complying with its 'mandate as protector of the
people, including the accused. . . .

3 G.R;No. 191411, July 15,. 2013.

 Criminal Case No. SB -15-CRM-0135 to 0136
People vs. Ubana II, et al.
DISSENTING OPINION
Page 4 of 5 I

x- - ---- -- ---- --- ---- -- -- - -- ---------- -

The OMB should not have just .sat idly by while waiting for other
• government agencies to comply with the subpoena duces tecum it
issued and for the Commission On Audit ("CON') to complete another
fact-finding investigation. The COA has a separate. mandate from the
OMB. The latter should have completed its fact-finding and preliminary
investigation with dispatch in accordance with its constitutional
mandate. Hence, it is submitted that the period of two (2) years, four
(4) months, and twenty-eight (28) days within which the COA
conducted another 'fact-finding investigation should be included in',the
compütàtion of delay attributable to the OMB.

The prosecution also failed to expound, on the reassignments of

these cases to different Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officers
• . "("GIPO").' The case was initially assigned by the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon to GIPO J.S. Ong on 09 November 2009 for preliminary
investigation. On 17 December 2009, the case was unloaded to GIPO
Albert Almojuela. Thereafter, or on 18 April 2011, the case was finally.
reassigned 'to' GIPO Expedito Allado. In all, these reassignments.
•'
consumed a period of more than One (1) year for reasons unstated by
the prosecution. .

Lastly, although accused . Revuelta, et al., were accorded

procedural due process, it cannot be gainsaid that they have been
prejudiced by the delay, in the disposition of their cases. The vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delay attendant in these. cases has been
pernicious to the preparation of the accused's defense.

The most serious interest of the accused, which is 'protected by

the right to speedy disposition of cases is the limitation on the
possibility of impairing his/her defense. A pending and ,prolonged
disposition of a case against the' accused causes anxiety, hostility,
additionalexpenses, and restriction on his person and well-being. The
passage of time in the conduct of the investigations weakens the
defense of the accused.. In this case, inordinate delay has., already
• caused tactical disadvantage in the preparation of accused Revueltá,
.et al.'s defense. Hence; it was erroneous for the prOsecution to state
that the perceived delay in the fact-finding and preliminary investigation
proceedings before the- OMB did not prejudice the accused

*
 Criminal Case No. SB 45-CRM-0135 to 0136
People vs. Ubana ii, etal.
• DISSENTING OPINION
• Page5of5 (.
--------------------- -

The case of corpuz vs. Sandiganhayan, 4 is instructive, thus:

"In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right
to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors
must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay;
(c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the
defendant Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the
interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to
protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial Incarceration;
to minimize anxiety and 'concerns of the accused to trial; and to
limit the possibility that his defense will . be impaired. Of these,
the most serious is the last, because the inability of a dófendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system. There is also prejudice If the defense witnesses are
unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even
if the accused Is not imprisoned Prior to trial, he is still
• disadvantaged by restraints on

his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and

• often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his
association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy."
(emphasis supplied)

• ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss dated

29 January 2017 filed by acóused Leonardo V. Revuelta and adopted
by accused Isaias B. • Ubana II and Bernadette Eudela Neva in their
Manifestation dated 14 March 2017.

MICHAEL F • • L MUSNGI •.
Associate Ju ice

4 Supra note 1.