M eegahapola v.

O fficer-in-C harge, H arbour Police an d Another

CA . (Grero, J.) v 63

SRI LANKA STATE PLANTATIONS CORPORATION

v. *
THE PRESIDENT, LABOUR TRIBUNAL, GALlE AND OTHERS

COURT OF APPEAL
S. N. SILVA, J.
C.A. APPLICATION 1194/90
6 & 28 JUNE AND 5 JULY.1991

Industrial Law - Certiorari - Right o f State.Counsel to appear for a Corporation -

Industrial Disputes Act, Section 49.

Held:

The Sri Lanka State Plantations Corporation is established by law and is subject
to extensive control by the Government. It is set up with public funds, it manages
government land and its profits go to the public coffers. Although not a
government department it is not a private institution. It is an agency of the
government.

The Attorney-General can appear not only for the State but also for any organ
or agency of the government.

The government as the employer of the Attorney-General and his officers has
the right to decide the nature and extent of the work that should be performed by
them. The assignment of work by the employer to an attorney-at-law being an
employee can never amount to a denial of the right to equality.
 64 Sri Lanka Law R eports [1992] 1 SriL.R.

... . Thet Attorney-General and his officers appear not only in cases having a
positive State element but also in private law disputes, i.e., litigation involving
private rigffts,.ohijgatians and claims.

If there is a likelihood of a conflict of interest between the Attorney-General’s

statutory"powers and functions and his appearing in a particular case for a public
Corporation or other entity, that conflict should be brought to the notice of the
particular: Court which could rule on the propriety of the Attorney-General
appearing butfhis cannot be done on a hypothetical assumption.
v• ... '• r
Cases referred to: v

(1) The Land Reform Commission v. Grand Central Ltd. (1981) 1 SLR 250.

(2) The Ceylon Bank Employees Union v. Yatawara, 64 N.L.R. 49.

(3) Dahanayake v. de Si/va (1978-79-80) 1 Sri LR 41.

(4) Rajaratne v. Air Lanka Ltd. (1987) 2 Srj\L R 128.

(5) Amaradasa v. The Land Reform Convriission, 79 NLR 505.

(6) Vettivelu v. Wijeratne, 60 NLR 44.

(7) Dharmapala v. Selliah, C A -,L A 1 65/81 - C A minutes of 16.09.1982.

APPLICATION for writ of certiorari to quash decision of the President of the

Labour Tribunal.

K. C. Kamaiasabeyson, D.S.G. with K. Sripavan, S.S.C. and A. H. M. D. Navaz,

S.C. for petitioner.

R. K. W. Goonesekera with J. C. Weliamuna for 2nd respondent;:

No appearance for other respondents.

Curadvvult.
19th July, 1991.
S. N. SILVA, J.

The Petitioner Corporation has filed this application for a writ of

certiorari to quash the order dated 08-11-1990 made by the
President of the Labour Tribunal (the 1st Respondent). A copy of the
order has been produced marked 'Z'. The said order was made
 S ri Lanka State Plantations C orporation v. The President, Labour Tribunal, G alle
CA and O thers (S. N. Silva, J.) y 65

pursuant to a preliminary objection raised by counsel who appeared

for the 2nd Respondent, being the Applicant^for relief in case
No. G/17459, L.T. Galle.

The 2nd Respondent filed the application against the Petitioner

Corporation seeking relief in respect of the termination of his
services. An answer was filed to this application by an attorney-at-law
described as the Legal Officer of the Petitioner Corporation. On 31-
07-1990 when the application came up for inqufry a State Counsel
appeared for the Petitioner Corporation instructed by the Legal
Officer who filed the answer. Counsel for the 2nd Respondent took a
preliminary objection to State Counsel appearing for the petitioner
Corporation. Learned President heard submissions' OLbottf counsel
regarding the preliminary objection. A written submission was
tendered by counsel for the 2nd Respondent. -No written submissions
were tendered by State Counsel although.two dates were granted for
this purpose. Thereupon the President madfe' the order challenged in
these proceedings upholding.The preliminary objection raised by
Counsel for the 2ndlRespondent. Learned President sought to base
his decision on twp j^dgrpents of the Supreme Court. They are
judgment, in the case o f:# ie hand Reform Commission v. Grand
Central Ltd.(1) and, in the c&se of TheVeylon Bank Employees Union
v. S. B. Yatawara,(?>. On the basis of the Grand Central case judgment
learned President has come to a .finding that the Attorney-General
cannot appear .in a private case and that he could appear only on
behalf of the State. He has relied on the judgment in Yatawara's case
to hold that jn view of the provisions of sectioh:49 of the Industrial
Disputes Act proceedings cannot be instituted in the Labour Tribunal
against the-Stete. On these two grounds he arrived at the conclusion
that there is no occasion for the Attorney-General to appear before a
Labour Tribunal. He has also observed that if one party is permitted
to retain the services of the Attorney-General to represent that party,
the other party also should be afforded-a similar opportunity. If it .is
not so done there will be a violation of Article 12(1) of the Constitution
which enshrines the right to equality. Therefore he held that State
Counsel cannot be permitted to appear in the proceedings.

The Petitioner has stated in this application that “pursuant to a

Cabinet decision, Heads of Corporations, Government Owned
66 S ri Lanka Law Reports- [1992] 1 S riL R .

business Undertakings and Government Owned Public Companies

were required to hand over the legal work of the said institutions to
the Attorney-General's Department". It is further stated that in view of
this TOquirement the petitioner referred all its legal work including the
matter in question to. the Attorney-General. The Petitioner has further
stated that the: Corporation is. a State Agency and is entitled to be
represented by the Attorney-General and his officers acting in their
official, .capacity. ;lt is also pleaded that the order deprives the
Petjtione&of a right to be represented at the hearing before the
Labour Tribunal,.
'• ' V -

, Learned Deputy Solicitor-General (who appeared in support of the

application without any objection being raised by counsel for the 2nd
Respondent) Srtfbmittegjhat the decision of the Divisional Bench of
the Supreme Court in the Grand Central case is not authority for the
proposition that the Attorney-General can appear only in a case to
which the State is a party. it was submitted that the Supreme Court
held that the Attorney^General cahnot appear in his capacity as an
Attorney-at-law so long as he holds the office of Attorney-General
and that he will be heard by courts only in. hfs capacity as Attorney-
General. It was also submitted that the decisfon in Yatawara's case is
only to the effect that the Bank of Ceykm is!, not a Government
Department. That, the said decision is riot authority for the
proposition that the Attorney-General and his. officers cannot
represent a party before a Labour Tribunal. That, when the Attorney-
General or any of his officers appears before a Court or Tribunal he
enjoys the same status as that of ah attorney-at-law and an objection
could be raised to such an appearance only on the same grounds
that an objection could, be raised to any other attorney-at-law. Such
an objection could be raised on the basis that there is a clear conflict
of interest between the~atforheyTat-law and the petty whom he seeks
to represent or drithe ground of a specific prohibition in law. It was
submitted that the ground should be clearly established and not
founded on a hypothetical basis. The order of the learned President
does not contain any such basis on which an objection could be
founded and it was submitted that the order is illegal and contrary to
the principles of natural justice.

Learned Senior Counsel for the 2nd Respondent sought to justify

the order on the grounds relied upon by the President. However,
 S ri Lanka State Plantations Corporation v. The President, Labour Tribunal, G alle
CA and Others (S. N. Silva, J.) '67

learned Counsel conceded that the Attorney-General could represent

a Public Corporation, being a State Agency Where “a state element is
necessarily involved” in the litigation. That, in the absence-of "a
positive state element" in the litigation the Attorney-General:.cannot
appear for a Public Corporation... It was subm itted that' such a
restriction is necessary to avoid a possible confJict;of Interest: As
regards an application before a'Labour Tribunal; it was submitted that
the State will not be a party to such an application; in view ^ s e c tio n
49 of the Industrial Disputes Act and the decisiori.in Yataw&ate case.
The dispute related to a contract of employment be%eeh‘ the
Petitioner Corporation and the 2nd Respondent. Therefore it was
submitted that it is a private dispute not involving an^' “State element"
and that the Attorney-General and his officers cannot .appear for. the
Petitioner in such a dispute. It was also submitted thafthe decision of
the Cabinet of Ministers pleaded by the Petitioner cannot be relied
upon and the decision does not. have t.heEffect of attributing a “State
element” into what is essentially a private dispute.

In reply, learned, deputy.Solicitor-General submitted that the

character or nature, of the litigation is irrelevant to the question
whether the Attorney-General-and his officers should be permitted to
appear. It was submitted that the material consideration is the identity
of the litigant, and. that there could be np objection whatever to the
Attorney-General and his officers appearing in their official capacity
for a Public Corporation set up, and controlled by the Government or
an entity in which the Government.-has total financial interest. It was
further submitted that, as the recognized agent of the Government in
civil actions, the Attorney-Gener-afappears iri cases that are
essentially: "private disputes" involving-.no “state element” whatever.
Therefore, a question of “positive state element" could not be
introduced to deny a right of repreSeritatiori’tC the Attorney-General
and his officers appearing for a Public Corporation. Further that if
such a precondition is introduced Cpur.ts and Tribunals will have to
hold a preliminary inquiry to ascertain the nature and the extent of the
State’s interest in the litigation before permitting the Attorney-General
and his officers, to. appear. That, such a procedure is unprecedented,
unworkable and without any legal basis.
The Petitioner Corporation was established by the Ceylon State
Plantation Corporation Act No. 4 of 1958. Its members are appointed
68 Sri Lanka Law Reports [1992] 1 Sri L.R.

by the appropriate Minister and an officer of the Genera! Treasury

and an officer of the' Department of Agriculture are official members
of the Corporation (section 3(1)). The Minister is empowered to
remove any member without assigning reason (section 3(5)). The
power Of appointing and removing the Chairman of the Corporation is
vested, in the Minister (Section 4( 1) and (5)). At the time it was
initially set up the only objects were to develop, maintain and manage
plantations approved by the Minister on lands as may be alienated to
the Corporation and to undertake the management of any planted
crowrri.land (section 3(5))' Even after the amendment of the objects
effected by Act No. 49 of 1979 it is seen that substantially the objects
remain the management and administration of land alienated too
vested in the Corporation by the Government. The initial capital of the
Corporation is; determined by Parliament and paid out of the
Consolidated Fund and may be increased upon resolution of
Parliament (section 7). The profits of the Corporation will be paid into
a general or special reserve-.and the balance as may be determined
by the Corporation with the approval of the Minister is paid to the
Deputy Secretary to the Treasury to be credited to the Consolidated
Fund (section 8). Thus it is seen that the Corporation is established
by law and subject to an extensive control by the Government. It is
set up with public funds, it manages government land and its profits
go to the public coffers. The Petitioner Corporation is similar in this
respect to the large number of Public Corporations that were set up
from the mid 1950s. The Government Sponsored Corporation Act
(C ap. 181) enacted orv 14*04-1955 and the State Industrial
Corporations Act No. 49 of 1957 constitute the early legislation that
provided for the establishment of these Corporations. Over the years,
a large number of Corporations have been set up under various
statutes. The Constitution of 1972 in section 90(1) required the
Auditor-General to audit the accounts of Public Corporations and
subm it annual reports to the National State Assembly. This
Constitution also provided that officers of the ^Corporations should
take the oath of allegiance in schedule ‘B’ to the Constitution (section
133(1)). In the Constitution of 1978 there is a definition of the phrase
“Public Corporation" in Article 170. This definition, which is based on
the definition contained in section 22 of the Finance Act No. 38 of
1971, is as follows:

“ “Public Corporation” means any corporation, board or other body

which was or is established by or under any written law other than
 S ri Lanka State Plantations Corporation v. The President, Labour Tribunal, Galle
CA an d Others (S. N. Silva, J.) 69

the Companies Ordinance, with funds or capital wholly or partly

provided by the Government by way of grant, loan or otherwise."

It is to be noted that the two ingredients of'the definition are :

(1) the manner of establishment, that is, by or under any- written

law other than the Companies Ordinance;

(2) the sources of the funds or capital, that it should be. provided
wholly or partly by the Government.

Article 154(1) requires the Auditor-General to audit the accounts of all

Public Corporations. He is required to report on such audit to
Parliament within ten months of the close of each financial year.
Article 165(1) requires every officer of a Public Corporation to take
the oath of allegiance provided for in5ti}e 4th Schedule. The 6th
Amendment to the Constitution requires them in addition to take the
oath set out in the 7th Schedule-'

In the case of Dahanayake v. de Silva (3), the Supreme Court held

that the Petroleum Corporation must necessarily be considered an
agent of the State and- that a, contract entered into with the
Corporation for the distribution of its products should be considered
a contract entered into by the Corporation on behalf of the State for
the purpose of construing the provisions Of-section 13(3)(c) of the
Soulbury Constitution. Later, in a series of cases the Supreme Court
has considered whether the action of public Corporations and other
State Agencie.s.'Should be considered executive or administrative
action in relation to Articles 17 and 126 of the Constitution. Different
tests have been adopted that emphasise the functions of the
particular Corporation and/or the controkpf the Corporation, in
relation to and by the Government. It is seen that the interpretation
given to the phrase "executive or administrative action” has been
considerably.expanded over the years. In the case of Rajaratne v. Air
Lanka Ltd. (4), it was held that the action of Air Lanka Ltd. in relation to
a matter of appointment to a post of Flight Engineer is executive or
administrative action. Atukorale, J. stated (at page 134) "the question
therefore arises as to what is meant by the expression executive or
administrative action. Our Constitution contains no definition of this
 70 S ri Lanka Law Reports [1992] 1 SriL.R.

expression. The trend of our decisions, however, has been to

construe this expression as being equivalent to actions of the
government or of an-organ or instrument of the Government". After an
exhaustive analysis- of the provisions with regard to capital of the
compipy, the appointment of its Directors, the functions and the
manner-in which these functions w e re previously performed,
Atukorale, J. stated as follows: ••

"AU the above circumstances enumerated by me show that Air

Lanka is=no ordinary company. It has been brought into
existence by the government, financed almost wholly by the
governmentvand managed and controlled by the government
through its oWti nominee Directors. It has been so created for
the purpose of ta rry in g out a. function of great p ub lic
importance which was, once carried out by the government
through the agency of' a statutory Corporation. In reality Air
Lanka is a company formed by the government, owned by the
government and controlled by the government.

The juristic veil of corporate personality donned by the

company for certain purposes cannot, for the purposes of the
application and enforcement of fundamental rights enshrined in
Part III of the Constitution, be permitted to conceal the reality
behind it which is the government. The brooding presence of
the government behind the operations of the company is quite
manifest. The cumulative effect of all the above factors and
features would, in my view, render Air Lanka an agent or organ
of the government. Its action can therefore prope rly be
designated as executive,or administrative action within the
meaning of Articles and 126 of the, Constitution. The
petitioner has thus established that he is entitled to relief under
Article 126(4)”,

The learned President Of the Labour Tribunal in his order raised the
question whether the Petitioner Corporation is a “private institution" or
a "government institution". He sought to answer this question solely
with reference to section 49 of the Industrial Disputes Act and its
interpretation as given by the Supreme Court in Yatawara's case
(supra). Section 49 of the Industrial Disputes Act states that the
 Sri Lanka State Plantations Corporation v. The President, Labour Tribunal, Galle
CA an d O thers (S. N. Silva, J.) 71

provisions of the Act shall not apply "to.or in relation to the Crown or
Government, in its capacity as employer or to-or in relation to a
workman in the employment of the' Crown or the Government”. ..In
effect this provision excludes-^he application of the Industrial
Disputes Act in relation to situations where a contract of employment
exists between the Governm ent and one of its o ffice rs and
employees. There is a general ju te of interpretation contained in
section 3 of the Interpretation Ordinance, that "no enactment shat! in
any manner affect the right of the Crown unless it is therein expressly
stated or unless'it appears by necessary implication that the Crown is
bound thereby” . The provisions of section 49 of the Industrial
Disputes Act are no more than a restatement of this general rule of
interpretation, in relation to the Act. In Yatawara's case (supra), a
reference to arbitration was challenged on the basis that the Bank of
Ceylon is a party to an arbitration and that the reference is bad in law
in view of section 49 of the Industrial Disputes Act. In relation to this
objection Sansoni, J. came to a finding that the Bank of Ceylon is not
a Government Department and that the reference is not defective.

The provisions of section 49 of the decision in Yatawara’s case,

relied upon by learned President are not helpful to. identify the true
character of the Petitioner Corporation. The learned President has
failed to take into;account:the reality of there being a large number of
statutory Corporations dnd entities set up by the Government,
performing functions that would.:otherwise; be performed by the
Government, and controlled by the Government. He had also failed
to take into account the fact that in view of the financial investments
made by the Government in these Corporations and entities, under
the Constitution, Parliament exercises, control over them through the
Auditor-General. The ^employees of these Corporations and entities
do not have any contracts of employment with-the Government and,
certainly the Industrial Disputes Act appJiesi.il relation to them.
However, the character of the Corporations and entities cannot be
determined solely by this fact. In the decisions Of the Supreme Court
referred to above these Corporations have been described as
agencies of the Government and in certain instances their action has
been considered as executive or administrative action. Therefore
although they are not Government Departments they cannot be
considered as private institutions. In relation to the Petitioner
 72 S ri Lanka Law Reports [1992] 1 Sri L.R.

Corporation, the provisions of the Incorporating Statute referred to

above clearly show that it is an institution in respect of which the
Government has control and a complete financial interest. It manages
government land. Therefore adopting the test of the extent of control
or that of the nature of functions or the extent of financial interest, the
Petitioner Corporation should be considered an agency of the
Government, and not a private institution, as assumed by the learned
President.

The ne«.t basis of the learned President’s decision is that the

Attorney-General could appear only on behalf of the State. He has
sought to draw this inference from the decision in the Grant Central
case (supra). In the Grand Central case, an objection was taken to
the Attorney-General appearing for the Land Reform Commission in
his private capacity as an Attorney-at-Law and not in his capacity as
Attorney-General. The objection was upheld by this Court and
affirmed by the Supreme Court. There was no determination by this
Court or by the Supreme Court as to the type of cases in which the
Attorney-General or any of his officers could appear in his official
capacity. With reference to this matter the Chief Justice observed (at
page 255) that the Attorney-General’s “right to practise his profession
as the Chief Law Officer of the State in all Courts in the Island has not
been denied. Indeed, it has been conceded in no uncertain terms".
Therefore the decision in the Grand Central case is certainly not
authority for the proposition that the Attorney-General can appear
only for the State. The observation made by the Chief Justice (at
page 261) that the “image of impartiality will be tarnished if the
Attorney-General takes part in private litigation arising out of private
disputes” has to be understood in relation to the finding in the case
that the Attorney-General can appear only in his official capacity. The
fact that the Chief Justice did not contemplate an impropriety in the
Attorney-General appearing in his official capacity for any organ or
agency of the Government is clearly borne out by the observation (at
page 254), “If it .(.The Land Reform Commission) was an organ or
agency of Government the Attorney-General could have, and would
have marked his appearance in his official capacity”. Thus it is seen
that both grounds relied upon by learned President to uphold the
objection are without basis.

I have to now consider the ground urged by (earned Counsel for

the 2nd Respondent that the Attorney-General and his officers could
 S ri Lanka State Plantations Corporation v. The President, Labour Tribunal, Galle
CA and Others (S. N. Silva, J.) 73

appear for a public Corporation only in litigation having a "positive

state element” and the observation made by the learned President
with regard to a possible infringem ent of A rticle 12(1) of the
Constitution.

The Attorney-General is the chief law officer of the State. He holds

a paid office under the Republic. He is appointed by the President
and is a public officer in terms of the Constitution. He could not be
categorised a judicial officer and in relation to his functions he comes
within the Executive of the country; Similarly the legal officers of the
Attorney-General's Department are Attorneys-at-Law who hold paid
offices under the Republic. The power of appointment, dismissal and
disciplinary control in relation to them finally reft with the Cabinet of
Ministers. Therefore, primarily, the government decides as to the
particular work that will be handled by the Attorney-General and his
officers. From about 1974 to 1978 upon’ a decision of the Cabinet of
Ministers the Attorney-General and his officers handled all the legal
work of the Public Corporations and other entities referred to above,
without any objection being raised in any Court as to their right to
represent these entities. In the case of Amaradasa v. The Land
Reform Commission(6), the Additional Solicitor-General with several
other officers of the Attorney-General’s Department appeared for the
Land Reform Commission and the Hon’ble Minister who were
respondents to the application. This case was heard before a
Divisional Bench of the Supreme Court without any objection or
observation being made, with regard to the right of the Additional
Solicitor-General to represent the Land Reform Commission.

Subsequently, the Cabinet of Ministers decided that the Attorney-

General and his officers should not appear for Public Corporations.
This decision is referred to in the judgment in the Grand Central
case. It appears that now the Cabinet of Ministers has reversed that
decision and directed that the legal work of the Public Corporations
and other entities referred in the petition should be handled once
again by the Attorney-General and his officers. Certainly, no one
could deny the Government’s right as the employer to decide the
nature and the extent of the work that should be performed by its
employees. The right of any person to engage the services of an
Attorney-at-Law is well recognised. This engagement may be to
 74 S ri Lanka Law Reports [1992] 1 S ri LR .

appear in a particular case or to handle the legal work as an

employee. The assignment of work by the employer to an Attorney-at-
Law being an employee could never amount to a denial of the right to
equality. In any event, it is seen that the 2nd Respondent has retained
an Attorney-at-Law of his choice to appear for him. He has not
complained of an infringem ent of the right to equality, by the
Government. In those circumstances the observation ^ the President
in this respect is misconceived.

The submission of learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent that

the Attorney-General and his officers could appear for a Public
Corporation or otjjer entity only in litigation having a “positive state
element” assumes that the Attorney-General and his officers do not
appear in litigation involving only private rights, obligations and
claims when they represent, in their official capacity, the Government,
Ministers and public officer.® In relation to civil actions section 25(a)
of the Civil Procedure Code’ provides that the. Attorney-General is the
recognised agent of the Government. Section 463 of the Civil
Procedure Code empowers the Attorney-General to get himself
substituted as a party defendant in any.abtibn filed against a Minister,
Parliamentary Secretary or a public officer.. In the case of Vettivelu v.
Wijeratne(6), and of Dharmapala v. Selliah(7), (decided after the Grand
Central case) it was held that an officer of the Attorney-General’s
Department can appear for a public officer-In a civil action without
recourse to the procedure in section 463. The majority of these civil
actions filed against the Government, Ministers and public officers
are based on causes of actions involving private rights, obligations
and claims and could be aptly described as private law disputes.
These causes of actions do notrelate to matters involving public law.
Hence there is no basis whatever to insist that the Attorney-Genera!
and his officers .could appear for public Corporations and other
entities only in litigatioh involving a “positive state element”. Learned
Counsel did not elaborate as to what is meant by this requirement of
a “positive state element” . The submission was that it excludes
disputes such as the one in issue which relates to a contract of
employment between the Petitioner Corporation and the 2nd
Respondent. This contract, of employment is no different from the
contract of employment between the Government and one of its
officers. There is no public law element in either situation. In the
 Sri Lanka State Plantations Corporation v. The President, Labour Tribunal, G alle
CA a n d Others (S. N. Silva, J.) 75

circumstances I am of the view that the distinction drawn between the

two, upon what is termed a “positive state element” is without any
basis whatever, l am also inclined to agree with the submissiorv-of
learned Deputy Solicitor-General that if such a precondition is
introduced, in every case where the Attorney-General or his officers
appear for a Public Corporation in their official capacity, a separate
inquiry will have', to be held to ascertain whether there is a “positive
state element” ,in the matter. Such a precondition and procedure is
totally inconsistent with the provisions of section 41 of the Judicature
Act which gives a right to a party to be represented by an Attorney-
at-Law of his choice.

Learned Counsel submitted that a “positive State element” should

be present for the Attorney-General and his officers to appear in
order to avoid a conflict of interest. \t is indeed correct that the
Attorney-General has several Statutory powers and functions
specially in the public law area of Constitutional and Criminal Law.
The powers and functions in Criminal Law matters are such that in
these matters the Attorney-General and his officers could appear
only for the prosecution' If there is a likelihood of a conflict of interest
between the Attorney-Geoerars statutory powers and functions and
his appearing in a particular case for a public Corporation or other
entity, that conflict should be.drought to the notice of the particular
Court. The Court will then go into the question whether there is a
likelihood of a conflict of interest and if so satisfied make order, in the
exercise of the inherent power;-that the Attorney-General cannot
appear for such Public Corporation or entity in the particular case.
Such a decision should be madeLin relation to the facts and
circumstances of the particular caseV t am inclined to agree with the
submission of learned Deputy Solicitor-General that, such a decision
cannot be based on a hypothetical assumption, In this instance there
is no material whatever from which an inference.could be drawn that
the statutory powers and duties of the Attorney-General would result
in a conflict of interest if a State Counsel appears for the Petitioner
Corporation in the Labour Tribunal. The order of the learned President
of the Labour Tribunal that State Counsel cannot represent the
Petitioner Corporation is without any legal basis and is contrary to the
provisions of section 41 of the Judicature Act. It is also contrary to the
principles of natural justice being an ingrained requirement in our
76 S ri Lanka Law Reports [1 9 9 2 ] 1 Sri L.R.

judicial proceedings since it effectively denies a right of hearing to

the Petitioner Corporation. Hence, I am of the view that the order has
an error of law which goes to jurisdiction. I accordingly issue a Writ of
Certiorari as prayed for in prayer ‘B’ to the prayer of the petition. In
the particular circumstances of this case I would make no order for
costs.

Certiorari issued.