K. S.

CHALAM

POLITICAL
ECONOMY
of CASTE
IN INDIA
SAGE was founded in 1965 by Sara Miller McCune to support
the dissemination of usable knowledge by publishing innovative
and high-quality research and teaching content. Today, we
publish over 900 journals, including those of more than 400
learned societies, more than 800 new books per year, and a
growing range of library products including archives, data, case
studies, reports, and video. SAGE remains majority-owned by
our founder, and after Sara’s lifetime will become owned by
a charitable trust that secures our continued independence.

Los Angeles | London | New Delhi | Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne

POLITICAL
ECONOMY
of CASTE
IN INDIA
 Thank you for choosing a SAGE product!
If you have any comment, observation or feedback,
I would like to personally hear from you.

Please write to me at [email protected]

Vivek Mehra, Managing Director and CEO, SAGE India.

Bulk Sales
SAGE India offers special discounts
for purchase of books in bulk.
We also make available special imprints
and excerpts from our books on demand.

For orders and enquiries, write to us at

Marketing Department
SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd
B1/I-1, Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area
Mathura Road, Post Bag 7
New Delhi 110044, India

E-mail us at [email protected]

Subscribe to our mailing list

Write to [email protected]

This book is also available as an e-book.

POLITICAL
ECONOMY
of CASTE
IN INDIA

K. S. CHALAM
Copyright © K. S. Chalam, 2020

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval
system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

First published in 2020 by

SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd

B1/I-1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area
Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044, India
www.sagepub.in
SAGE Publications Inc
2455 Teller Road
Thousand Oaks, California 91320, USA
SAGE Publications Ltd
1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road
London EC1Y 1SP, United Kingdom
SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd
18 Cross Street #10-10/11/12
China Square Central
Singapore 048423

Published by Vivek Mehra for SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd. Typeset in 10/12.5 pt ITC Stone Serif
by Zaza Eunice, Hosur, Tamil Nadu, India.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2020939491

ISBN: 978-93-5388-407-9 (HB)

SAGE Team: Rajesh Dey, Satvinder Kaur and Rajinder Kaur

 Contents

List of Tables��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� vii

Preface�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ix

Chapter 1. Caste Mode of Production:

Concept and Content�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1

Chapter 2. Colonial Approach to Hindutva and

Marxist Writing������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 33

Chapter 3. Caste and Economic Power in India����������������������������� 49

Chapter 4. Inequity in the Development of

Human Capital in India ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 59

Chapter 5. Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion

of Marginalized Castes���������������������������������������������������������������������� 79

Chapter 6. New Economic Policy: The Dvija Project��������������������107

Chapter 7. Caste and the Advent of Crony Capitalism

in India ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������123
Chapter 8. Judiciary and Deprivation of Social Justice ����������������139

Chapter 9. Social Barriers as Impediments of

Information Flow�������������������������������������������������������������������������������162

Chapter 10. Physical Alienation: Offences and

Atrocities against Scheduled Castes ��������������������������������������������173

Chapter 11. The Fragmented Assertion:

Divide and Rule��������������������������������������������������������������������������������194

Chapter 12. Globalization and the Future of Dalits

and Adivasis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������209

Chapter 13. Democracy, Dalit Rights and

the Paradigm Shift����������������������������������������������������������������������������234

Select Bibliography��������������������������������������������������������������������������254
About the Author ����������������������������������������������������������������������������265
Index��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������266

vi  Political Economy of Caste in India

 List of Tables

6.1 Macroeconomics Indicators 117

6.2 Top 10 Companies in India (` in Crores) 119

9.1 Respondents’ Knowledge about

the Incentives (in Percentage) 165
9.2 Communication Channels 167
9.3 Role Perception of Respondents about VEC
(in Percentage) 169
9.4 Decision-Makers in the Family (in Percentage) 171

10.1 Main Offences Committed against Scheduled

Castes in India during 1979–2016 179
10.2 Offences and Atrocities Committed against
Scheduled Castes in Andhra Pradesh during
1982–2016180
10.3 Number of Villages Represented in the
Commission in Andhra Pradesh 182
10.4 Discrimination against Scheduled Castes in
Andhra Pradesh (PCR), 2000–2001 184
10.5 Composite Index of Caste Discrimination 187
10.6 Incidence of Cognizable Crimes (IPC) against
Scheduled Castes in Andhra Pradesh
during 2000 190

11.1 Total Number of Existing Castes and Their

Percentage to Total Population in India 1991 197
11.2 Numerically Large Caste Groups, 2011 200
11.3 Post-matric Scholarship for SCs during
1993–1994 (Provisional) 202

viii  Political Economy of Caste in India

 Preface

The concept of mode of production (MOP) in political econ-

omy is an important academic topic for study and discussion.
Though it is considered as a Marxist approach in social sciences,
non-Marxists have also been using it salubriously in different
contexts. One of the most contested themes under MOP is the
Asiatic MOP, particularly in India. I have been following the
debates as a student of economics for more than four decades.
I have seen scholars, mostly historians, debating on the futility
of the concept in the Indian context. The engagement of econo-
mists in this debate is reduced to that of discussing relations of
production in the agriculture sector and some debating about
the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Curiously, very few
of the contenders have used it to understand the vexed question
of caste and the overwhelming influence of fundamentalism in
using the caste structure vigorously in the era of globalization. I
have written on the question of caste not only as an important
economic category in the socio-economic formation but also as
a dominant factor in excluding marginalized groups to benefit
from the so-called economic opportunities under globaliza-
tion and the resultant focus of social or political disruptions. I
thought why not I reflect on the situation using the concept of
caste MOP. My approach here is only experimental (of course
not randomized controlled trial) to provoke debate with a hope
that the issue might take centre stage in the intellectual tradi-
tions of India. I am always willing to learn and amend my argu-
ment; after all, it is a process of argument. I thank several friends
and activists who have encouraged me to publish it in English
when I made the presentation in groups in Telugu. My personal
assistant, Mr P. Meghanadh, has done an excellent job of bring-
ing all my papers together. I appreciate the forbearance of my
wife and the comforts she has extended in the preparation of
the manuscript at home. Mr Rajesh Dey of SAGE Publications
was quick in responding to my requests. I thank him and SAGE
Publications for encouraging me to publish with them.

x  Political Economy of Caste in India

 1

Caste Mode of
Production
Concept and Content

The study of political economy generally starts with a discus-

sion on the mode of production (MOP). The concept of MOP is
one of the brilliant contributions of Karl Marx to social sciences.
It is this approach that has carried integration among all social
sciences and facilitated the disciplines to move away from meta-
physical speculations. Kuhn’s1 work has further strengthened
the science of socio-economic discourse with his concepts of
pre-paradigmatic stage in research to that of a paradigm shift,
making countenance for social sciences episteme go beyond
verifiability and falsifiability. In this context, Marxism and the
concepts such as MOP, including Asiatic mode of production
(AMP), are open to scrutiny beyond a section of the so-called
vulgar Marxists. And now Marxism itself has become a reference
point along with J. S. Mill to resolve three disputes in social
science to bring unity among the disciplines. Martin Hollis has
identified the three disputes as ontological, methodological and
epistemological.2 In the ontological dispute, Marx contended
that action is determined by structure, and Mill insisted that
all phenomena of society arise from the actions and passions
of human beings. In the methodological dispute, the key
issues identified are necessity or regularity or laws of nature
to the particular or specific mechanisms. In the epistemologi-
cal dispute, Mill upheld empiricist view that knowledge is a
matter of experience, while Marx held the view of essentiality
of theory which allows knowledge of an underlying reality. In
fact, social sciences have gone beyond these disputes, resolv-
ing some and accumulating few others, to provide a cosmic
ground for social science discourse to continue as an endless
process. The contributions of Gramsci,3 Foucault4 and others in
the tradition of hermeneutics have further revolutionized the
scope and method of social sciences in the 21st century. The
disciplines of history and historiography are also equipped with
the science of the methodology of the subject. We are men-
tioning here the discipline of history as an important aspect
to grit MOP, particularly, AMP and feudalism that are being
extensively used in Marxist methodology. In fact, the Indian
Marxist historians from the time of Dange,5 Kosambi,6 Sharma,7
Prabhat Patnaik,8 Murzbaban Jal9 and others have continued
the debate. The MOP debate is an unending option that has
entered into discourses of left political parties. Economic and
Political Weekly has been publishing papers and issuing special
numbers on this issue since 1965, and a volume in 1990 was
published based10 on these papers.
Interestingly, very few of the historians and the first-­
generation scholars in India, unlike the Soviet,11 Frankfurt
school,12 ever raised the issue of the so-called queer concept of
AMP used by Marx himself. Except scholars, such as Harbans
Mukhia,13 Shakti Padhi14 and Murzban Jal, nobody ever can-
didly raised the relevance of AMP to India. In fact, it was blas-
phemy to refer to or speak about it and even Kosambi called
names for the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) Group that edited
Marx’s writings on India.15 Kosambi was perhaps the earliest
Marxist historian to debunk AMP by introducing the concept
of feudalism ‘from above and feudalism from below’. Though

2  Political Economy of Caste in India

Kosambi did not question the original formulation of Marx, he
used the above terms to beguile the concept of Asiatic Mode
of Production. The entire materialist historian group has sin-
cerely trolled Kosambi. In fact, Dange was more concerned
about the specificity of Marxian formulation to India in his
third preface to the ostracized book.16 We do not know much
about the political bickering of the left parties up to the 1990s
until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The findings of these
historians, however, did not enhance our understanding of
India by denying the Marxian concept of AMP. The allegation
that Marx never defined AMP and it was only aberration was
later contested by scholars.17 Anne M. Bailey noted that the
AMP concept was in the process of development over a period
of 30 years starting from the newspaper articles of Marx in the
1850s (critiqued by Kosambi) and down to his analysis of the
same in Capital Vol I. Scholars generally refer to the preface of
‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’ of Marx
for the basic structure of the concept of MOP.18 Maurice Dobb,
in his introduction to ‘the little book’, noted that, ‘Marx’s
theory of value was something more than a theory of value as
generally conceived: it had the function not only of explaining
exchange value or prices in a quantitative sense, but exhibiting
the historico-social basis in the labour—process of an exchange
of commodity—society with labor-power itself become a com-
modity’.19 It is here (little book) Marx once again referred to
AMP and the famous reference to ‘material productive forces of
society come into conflict with the existing relations of produc-
tion or this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms with
the property relations within the framework of which they have
operated hitherto’. Though the book started with commodity in
general, half of it is devoted to money. Marx, however, found
time to refer to patriarchy here. He said that,

under the rural patriarchal system of production, when spin-

ner and weaver lived under the same roof—the women of the
family spinning and the men weaving say for the require-
ment of the family—yarn and linen were social products,

Caste Mode of Production  3

 and spinning and weaving social labour with in the frame
work of the family.20

Again in the same-page footnote, Marx referred to ‘a careful

study of Asiatic, particularly Indian [emphasis added] forms of
communal property would indicate that the disintegration of
different forms of primitive communal ownership gives rise
to diverse forms of property’. Thus, Krader21 noted that Marx
brought out AMP in several stages. In his youth, Marx made a
fleeting reference to oriental despotism. In the second stage, he
addressed himself to oriental society as a whole, paying atten-
tion to the political and social characterization of the society
in his articles to New-York Daily Tribune. In the next stage, he
formulated the theory of the AMP in legal and political forms in
their economic relations. This was further developed in Capital
with specific reference to India and the unchanging nature of
Asiatic (caste) MOP.22
In order to understand AMP with reference to India, one
needs to understand the category of ‘caste’. Caste is considered
by social scientists as a unit of social stratification that places
its units and subunits in an order of high and low rank by
birth (more details are given later). Class, on the other hand,
is a Western notion being developed as a method of economic
stratification of society. Marxists have extended the concept
further with reference to labour value and creation of surplus
value. We discuss next caste mode of production (CMOP) as
a part of AMP that the Indian Marxists of a particular collec-
tive seem to have considered the category as an outcaste. It
appears that the ‘Brahminical over lordship has strangely also
seeped the established left through the form of ignorance of
the caste question’. It is strange to find that the narrative of
Brahminical over lordship model of Adishankara counter-
revolution that Murzban Jal23 narrated in his paper is not dif-
ferent from Marxist scholars who not only did not agree with
the perception of AMP, but also complimented the Indian
soul, race memory, the victory of ideals and the innate glory

4  Political Economy of Caste in India

of the four-caste system.24 Yet, they used the Vedic and Hindu
Epic sources to construct a materialist base of history without
referring to the dharmashastras to eulogize that there was no
slavery in India. Kosambi has noted that ‘Brahmin priesthood
have more humane observances’ as ideological superstructure
in his footnotes. This kind of materialist interpretation of his-
tory did not enhance our understanding of the ‘unchangeable’
nature of CMOP by which Dvijas kept on earning their rents,
and it also made the class analysis a mockery of the everyday
reality of life for generations of leftists to come. In fact, the
spirit of AMP as far as India is concerned was varna in the Vedic
period and later developed as a caste system with untouchable
castes and service castes who were forced to supply free labour.
Chalam25 raised the issue of AMP and the role of caste in India
with a critical review of literature on the subject in 1988. It was
noted that there were already nine theories of caste, and class
analysis had three streams along with Marxian classes based on
ownership of means of production. The Weberian class with
three categories based on power distribution and functional
theory built around core values of qualities, performances
and possessions are in use in social sciences. But neither the
Marxist nor the ordinary theories of class analysis made by
Indian scholars, who have experienced the tyranny of caste in
their everyday life, ever took it as a challenge to enlighten the
cadres who were fighting for economic justice in the streets and
in jungles about the ‘caste question’. Now the whole system of
left and democratic movement crumbled and we are witnessing
today in the streets how Dalits and sections of minorities (who
migrated from these castes) are lynched to shove that they are
supposed to provide symbolically free labour and not to go in
for secular jobs. However, Marx was not to be found fault for
this lapse, as it was abundantly made clear by him in his Capital
Vol I under section ‘Division of Labour in Manufacture and
Division of Labour in Society’ about the vagaries of Indian caste.
Unfortunately, the Indian critiques of AMP did not understand
the economic significance of this formulation.

Caste Mode of Production  5

What Is Mode of Production?
The discussion on the role of caste in economic transforma-
tion of India through globalization made us to assume that
a caste like MOP has been in operation in India. The MOP
debate in social sciences as noted above is a serious academic
exercise undertaken by scholars to understand the successive
stages of development of particular societies. There are several
competent Indian scholars of international repute who have
participated in this debate and enhanced the capacity of the
scientific world to understand the unexplored. In this context,
the debate on the Indian version of development is explained
here with the introduction of a new MOP as an illuminating
exercise. The economic structure of the Indian society during
the colonial period and the stagnant nature of this structure
were explained by Jairus Banaji and others26 in terms of a ‘colo-
nial MOP’. According to him, it is a residual category, a sort of
‘non-Europe’, which Marx believed that the ruling class was
subsumed in State. The construct was found to be essential as
the existing analytical tools of feudalism or state MOP were
found to be inadequate to explain the Indian situation. In fact,
the debate itself has opened new vistas in the area of political
economy of agriculture in India. Though Ashok Rudra, Alavi,
Gail Omvedt and others discussed the issue of class formation
in capitalist agriculture within the broad framework of MOP
in the same place, they were, however, unsuccessful to go
deep into the agrarian relations in the rural economy that was
based on caste divisions and jajamani. The edited volume by
Utsa Patnaik27 has contained papers that debated some of the
issues relating to third-world economies, including India, but
could not come out with an agreeable model to study India.
The debate on land reforms, feudalism and so on was not car-
ried further particularly after the globalization theories gained
momentum and marginalization of only Dalits and service
castes. It is in the tradition of explaining the unexplored area

6  Political Economy of Caste in India

of social formation in Indian society, an attempt is made here
to formulate the CMOP as an important analytical tool to
understand the Indian situation.
The concept of MOP as seen above is a dialectical method
through which the structure of institutions and their relation-
ships within a society can be explained in a historical outline.
Scholars have so far identified nine MOPs.28
They are (a) communal, (b) simple property, (c) independ-
ent peasant, (d) state (Asiatic), (e) slave, (f) feudal, (g) capitalist,
(h) socialist and (i) communist. Though MOP is a Marxist tool
developed by Marx himself, the concept has been adopted
by both Marxist and Non-Marxist scholars. It consists of four
important analytical parts. One, in the process of production,
people use different implements and tools, such as plough axe,
lathe, labour, and so on. This is known as means of produc-
tion. The second component is productive force. No machine
or a single factor can produce anything by itself. It requires the
power, skills, experience and knowledge to put the means of
production in motion. In the process of production, people nec-
essarily enter into certain social relations known as production
relations. This third component is dictated by the ownership
of the means of production. The fourth component is analysed
by Jairus Banaji by distinguishing relations of exploitation and
relations of production in his concept of colonial MOP. The
surplus is appropriated from the labourers in colonial mode
not as rent but rent in kind through extra economic coercion.
This relationship is only a relationship of exploitation and it is
a very important component to understand the MOP. All the
above four components are combined together in explaining
a historically determined society. The productive forces and
the relations of production together comprise the concept of
MOP. In each of the modes of production, a dominant class
emerges and controls the means of production. For instance,
in the state or Asiatic mode, state is the dominant category,

Caste Mode of Production  7

while in slavery, the slave is the dominant category. Land is
fundamental for feudalism as capital is for capitalism. Though
Marx had listed Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois
modes of production, now scholars are identifying independent
peasant and simple property, socialist, lineage, colonial, state
AMP, slave and so on modes. We are now using the dominant
socio-economic category of caste in India as MOP by studying
different phases of society within the Marxist mould. The stud-
ies of Frank, Amin, Weiskoff and other third-world economists
have brought out clearly that the characterization of some of
the Latin American countries as capitalist or pre-capitalist is not
a satisfactory explanation.29 They have significantly contributed
to the Marxist intellectual tradition by introducing dependency
theory along with the centre-periphery imagery to explain the
specific conditions of their societies. Ashok Rudra30 stated that
why two different concepts, that is, MOP and social formation,
are being used to describe the same phenomenon and surmised
that it was due to lack of clarity on the concept of MOP. He has
noted the disagreement between Gunder Frank and Laclau on
a single worldwide capitalist mode as a case of vast differences
among Marxists to capture the diversity of socio-economic
formations in different parts of the world.
In India, attempts were made by Marxist scholars and activ-
ists to make India correspond with other European societies in
its process of development by identifying similarities in these
societies without recognizing the specificities. In fact, Marx
himself was struck by the peculiarities of the Indian society
with the limited information available with him and called the
formation as an AMP. Later, economists and historians realized
the distinguishing features by introducing concepts, such as
colonial mode and Asiatic mode. Even these scholars have not
been able to succeed in capturing the whole process of produc-
tion in India. They hardly touch upon the rural India, particu-
larly, the caste system. Social anthropologists have studied these

8  Political Economy of Caste in India

problems as issues of social categories in village studies without
an explanation why do they survive even today?

Features of CMOP
It is necessary to identify the fundamental and differential
features of CMOP. In order to characterize the CMOP, we need
a dominant category to identify the mode along with other
components. Throughout Indian history, we come across the
category of caste (varna in the past) as a dominant player in
social and economic life. Marx has recognized the economic
influence of caste in manufacturing sector in India and recorded
its dominance in Capital Vol I in his main text. It is at the stage
of explaining division of labour and manufacture, Marx has
mentioned about caste system.
He said that

the whole mechanism discloses a systematic division of

labour, but a division like that in ‘manufacture is impossible’
[emphasis added], since the smith and the carpenter and so
on find an unchanging market, and at the most there occur,
according to the sizes of the villages, two or three of each,
instead of one.31

He has further elaborated by saying that

the law that regulates the division of labour in the com-

munity acts with the irresistible authority of law of nature
at the same time that each individual artificer, the smith,
the carpenter and so on conducts in his workshop all the
operations of his handicrafts in the traditional way but
independently and without recognizing any authority … this
simplicity supplies the key to the secret of the unchangeable-
ness [emphasis added] of Asiatic societies, an unchangeable-
ness in such striking contrast with constant dissolution and

Caste Mode of Production  9

 refounding of Asiatic States…. The structure of the economic
elements of society remains untouched the storm clouds of
the political sky.32

It can be noted from the above that the fundamental features

of a CMOP is its ‘unchangeable’ feature. It was recorded by Marx
himself while explaining the division of labour. It is striking
to notice that he has explained the above under a separate
section on ‘Division of Labour in Manufacture and Division
of Labour in Society’ to indicate the link between the two in
India. The importance of unchangeableness and its relation
within accumulation of capital is explained by Marx with an
interesting example.

On the whole, the labourer and his means of production

remained closely united, like the snail with its shell, and
thus there was wanting the principal basis of manufacture,
the separation of the labourer from the means of production,
and the conversion of these means in to capital.

Interestingly, Marxist historians who have picked some of his

ideas relating to unchangeableness did not comment on the
social division of labour in terms of caste as the principal reason
for this with the example of snail given by Marx himself. May
be some of the historians did not want to explain about the
economic significance of this in their writings or could not
get into the economic significance of accumulation of capital
and the ‘problem of caste snail’ as hurdle to tear asunder the
feudal system to usher in capitalism. Some scholars have written
extensively on transition from feudalism to capitalism and we
have noted above the debate on semi-feudal or colonial MOP in
India. Interestingly, unchangeableness is understood as stagna-
tion. In Economics, stagnation is different from unchangeable-
ness. Stagnation occurs when the rate of growth of the economy
remains slow with unemployment. But the unchangeableness is
a socio-economic character of labour in manufacturing sector as

10  Political Economy of Caste in India

noted by Marx. It remains the same irrespective of the change in
the structure of the economy. Employment in India in the past
seems to have not been studied properly in relation to caste-
based occupations that were by and large reservation of jobs
with little upward mobility of labour. Precisely for this reason
to maintain unchangeableness in the socio-economic forma-
tion, dharmashastras (for instance Manu Dharma) are called in
to brutally suppress any kind of breach to supply free labour
and services to the Dvijas. In a different context, Wittfogel33 has
elaborated in the ‘Oriental Despotism’ under dharmashastras
and grihya sutras to maintain total (caste) terror in India.
Anne Bailey edited a volume on AMP illustrated in the exten-
sive literature on the subject to show the relevance of AMP to
non-European societies, particularly, India (with its unique
caste system). The pre-capitalist socio-economic formations as
explained by most of the Indian Marxists looked at the lower
castes as either poor or working class, but never probed deep
why they remained like that for generations. It was Marx who
tried to understand the unchangeableness of manufacture with
unique division of labour, while the ‘chief inhabitant’ (the
Dvija), who is judge, police and tax-gatherer in one, the book-
keeper, who keeps the accounts of the tillage, who prosecutes
the economic elements of society remains untouched by the
storm-clouds of the political sky. Strangely this description
never attracted the attention of the (Dvija) Marxists who did not
bring in the role of the dharmashastras even as superstructure
and its economic base while critiquing Marx-AMP. Similarly,
several scholars who were looking at India, through a window
of their own, however, did not touch the ‘untouchable’. Some
even denied the existence of slavery in India. We can find in
the Indian history that the occupational mobility of certain arti-
san castes (some are now considered as other backward castes
(OBCs) and the conditions and lifestyles of the untouchables
have remained the same through ages, which Marx observed
from a distance and noted its ‘unchangeableness’ character.

Caste Mode of Production  11

Ambedkar34 recognized this and identified the untouchables
with slaves and related it with Hinduism. Had he used the
economic explanation of its existence, such as the MOP or
some other, he would have enhanced our understanding and
a solution could have been found. He said that

most parts of the world have had their type of what was
called the lowly. The Romans had their slaves, the Spartans
their helots, the British their Villains, the Americans their
Negroes and the Germans their Jews. So, the Hindus have
their untouchables. Slavery, serfdom, villainage have all
vanished. But, untouchability still exists and bids to last as
long as Hinduism will last.

While explaining the need for annihilation of castes, Ambedkar

noted,

Caste is not merely division of labour. It is also division

of labourers … it is an hierarchy in which the divisions of
labourers are graded one above the other…. This division of
labour is not spontaneous (as in Adam Smith), it is not based
on natural aptitudes.

It is almost like Marx, Ambedkar said that the greatest evil in

industrial system is not so much poverty and the suffering

that it involves as the fact that so many persons have call-
ings which make no appeal to those who are engaged in
them. …as an economic organization caste is therefore a
harmful institution subordinating man’s natural powers to
social rules.

This is one way of explaining the existence of untouchability

and discrimination. The unchangeableness of the conditions
of the Dalits (untouchables, service castes and artisans) needs
to be sought in the MOP. However, his explanation that castes
are stagnant classes (borrowing it from Ketkar) or division of

12  Political Economy of Caste in India

labourers does not directly explain the concept. Division of
labour as elaborated by Adam Smith and explained by Marx is
a practice where the process of production is divided into differ-
ent stages, like 18 sequences for pin making, and each process
is perfected by one. This raises productivity. But in India, each
occupation is held by a caste and the finished product is pro-
duced by the family or caste by following all the processes by
caste occupation (e.g. the carpenter caste or family makes legs,
base and top of a table as finished product, while in division
of labour, leg is made by one, top by another and the table by
some other). This does not allow any change as noted by Marx
above. Interestingly, this problem has not been considered by
Indian scholars for further study, perhaps limiting our under-
standing of CMOP.
No human being survives without food and it is to be
produced. Dalits or other socially marginalized groups are
involved in the process of production not only as food gath-
erers, but even remain the means of production. They never
refused to accept modern methods of production as some
historians characterized their backwardness, but the main-
stream society made them to survive without any change. It
is necessary here to bring in history. The Indus and Harappan
civilizations, which were basically urban and river valley in
origin have provided evidence on the lifestyles and social
institutions. There was no trace of untouchability and a group
of citizens living outside the mainstream. It was only after the
destruction (collapse) of the urban culture and the introduc-
tion of alien or Aryan ‘gram’ or village mode of living that
the caste system started developing as a gigantic social forma-
tion. But those who survived the onslaught remained outside
as an independent social group and those who opposed the
mainstream within its structure have also been thrown into
this category. As a result, Dalits emerged as a ‘residual’ or as
an experimental group. The social relations between the main-
stream and the untouchables have been maintained through

Caste Mode of Production  13

an MOP, otherwise they would have emerged as an independ-
ent social group as observed in the case of artisan communi-
ties in the mainstream. They are deliberately maintained as
untouchables. But social interaction continued to make use of
their productive forces. That is why, untouchables have found
to be surviving yet without any improvements in their living
conditions. As the productive forces play a dominant role in
the MOP, they are used, yet the developments in the main-
stream are restricted through extra economic coercion known
as caste restrictions. The productive forces of Dalits remained
constant as they were forbidden to enter the mainstream, enter
literate learning and own property. These three important
restrictions made them to stagnate with what they originally
possessed as an ‘indigenous community’. The situation did not
alter very much as anticipated by Marx in the British Raj. It
was said that the British, ‘fulfil a double mission in India: One
destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of Asiatic
society and the laying of the material foundation of western
society’.35 The British in fact recreated and strengthened the
caste discrimination by rediscovering their Aryan roots in
Hinduism and improved the productive forces of Brahmans
and other Dvijas. Therefore, we can see in India, the develop-
ment of different modes of production existing side by side
without any contradiction, but at the same time replacing one
after the other without any difficulty. As characterized in the
colonial MOP, the economy and the productive forces were
drained without affecting the mainstream elite. The colonial
mode as analysed by scholars did not identify the groups who
were responsible in collaborating with the British as ‘agents’
or managing agents. It was the same Dvija communities which
have acted as ‘collaborating elite’ by making use of English
education, technology, western culture and so on. At the same
time, the artisans, the Dalits have been exploited and their
capacities have been drained. However, no scholar of repute
has elaborated these peculiarities as unique features of India.

14  Political Economy of Caste in India

 The CMOP was sustained with the ‘Jajmani’ system and
the unequal exchange between different communities in the
village. Most of the social anthropologists have examined the
self-sufficient nature of the village. But the village was never
self-sufficient. It was the self-sufficient agriculture that was
sustained by the Dalit labour and the labour of artisan com-
munities in providing infrastructure for the self-sufficiency of
agriculture. There were interactions between villages (gramam)
and occasionally resulted in ‘sangramam’ (disputes) due to
unsettled issues. The remarks of some scholars that there was
no interaction among villages are not well founded. The rent
on caste is devised in a meticulous way through the restriction
of numbers of Dvijas. In the Hindu social order, there is no
possibility of entering the Dvijahood by others. One may aspire
or even use the symbols to call themselves with pseudonym
called ‘Viswa Brahmin’ and so on. But the change is never
accepted. The number of untouchables keeps on increasing
as it is a residual category and anyone can be thrown into it
(we are not entering into a debate on socially necessary labour
power to produce wage goods and the Malthusian theory
here). This has created surplus people and the premium has
remained constant, and a subsistence wage is paid. While the
Brahmins keep on enjoying a higher premium with all the
advantages, including their number, they have extracted rents
with the increase in the population and demand for their ser-
vices. One can see the constant and sometimes ever-increasing
demand for the services of Brahmins in Hindu order and their
entry to secular occupations in modern India. Therefore, the
occupation of the Brahmin remains untouched by others and
their mobility is unrestricted due to the premium. The Dalits
and others were pushed into 354 occupations, mostly into
lowly paid jobs in the post-independent period. Even today,
the untouchables are not allowed to share (a) crematorium,
(b) water and (c) shrines indicating the continuation of the
CMOP. The argument that some positions in public sector are

Caste Mode of Production  15

occupied by the Dalits through reservation is an indicator of
occupational mobility that is to be understood as an external
force (political) and not as an autonomous act of the CMOP.
Further, the number of such positions held by the Dalits is
estimated to be 1.01 per cent of the total Dalit population (15
per cent of 1.75 crore jobs in government) as compared to the
total control of the means of production and their upgradation
over a period of time by the Dvija communities. The situation
has not changed even after globalization. Out of $609,838
million foreign direct investment (FDI) proposals (by 2019),
no Dalit is benefited by the process of globalization as not
even a single individual was accorded FDI.36 All the benefits
of globalization, including shares in multi-national companies
(MNCs), disinvestments, scams and the like, are appropriated
by the Brahmins and other Dvijas indicating the strength of
the CMOP even in the 21st century. It is symbolically noted
that out of 100 board of directors of corporate bodies, 44.6
per cent are held by Brahmins, 46 per cent by Vaishyas and
the remaining by OBC and scheduled caste (SC) members.37
It reflects the reverse dividend profile of the country (Dvijas
include Brahmin, Kshatriya and Vaisya). It means the so-called
demographic dividend will help the dvijas in reverse propor-
tion to that of lower castes.

Characteristics of CMOP
The foregoing discussion on the nature of CMOP in India
can be summarized under the basic features or characteristics
noted below. Ever since the Portuguese recognized the divi-
sion of society consisting of different castes, the Indian caste
system has been commented by both ordinary travellers and
experts as a typical social category. It was only Marx who, in a
reference to division of labour in his Capital as noted above,
elaborated the economic significance of it as a distinctive AMP.
Unfortunately, it was never discussed in that light by the main-
stream Marxists, particularly the party functionaries, derogating

16  Political Economy of Caste in India

it as an aberration. However, it has received the attention of
scholars as it is a dominant category in all aspects relating to
India and can never be veiled. Apart from the studies of social
anthropologists, economists like George Akerlof38 have tried
to capture the apparently social category in a neoclassical eco-
nomic model of equilibrium to understand its significance in
economic operations in India. As Akerlof conducted studies in
Punjab, he knew the importance of caste and hiring practices
that lead to lower-level equilibrium once the other party learns
about the low ‘caste’ members and predicted that those who
do not follow the caste code will be known in the community
and will be treated as outcastes.

An outcaste in India is permitted to hold only scavenging

(or other polluting) jobs. He is not allowed to eat with caste
members, to touch them, or to touch their food, which in
the case of someone outcasted includes his own parents and
siblings. Of course, his own children will be outcastes and
will suffer the same prohibitions.39

Perhaps Akerlof is one of the few economists who had recog-

nized the economic importance of caste and the discriminatory
practices used in labour relations in India during 20th century.
Akerlof concluded that,

in a segregationist society they follow the caste code. While

not denying the possible returns to the arbitrageur and social
deviant, the models of statistical discrimination and caste
explain why economic rewards may favor those who follow
prevailing social custom; and in so doing, they give economic
reasons why such social customs may endure.

Though caste is not explained by Akerlof in the Marxian

MOP analysis, he has substantiated its economic value in
socio-economic transactions in India. We have cited the
study to show that caste is not just a super structure but an
infrastructure that links economic base with the so-called

Caste Mode of Production  17

super structure of beliefs, religion, ideology, institutions and
so on. Further, caste is characterized by Kane, Ambedkar and
others as division of labourers that has not fully captured
the economic significance as enunciated by Adam Smith as
a spontaneous realization of self-interest that Ambedkar has
partly admitted. The real issue is that ‘social division of labour
in essence is a vast network of interrelations among specialized
producers held together by the propensity to truck, barter and
exchange’.40 This is limited by the extent of market. In other
words, the characterization of caste as division of labourers
does not fully explain the discriminatory and unpaid labour
of untouchables and artisan castes in the process of produc-
tion. They are segregated, and codes and customs are imposed
not to rebel and demand wages or remuneration equal to that
of other caste labourers in the market. In fact, they are kept
outside the secular market. This is perpetuated in a systematic
basis under the paradigm of past karma and worth by birth
limited to few who are termed as twice born or Dvija, Brahmin,
Kshatriya and Vaishya. They are exempt from manual labour
and each caste is given a rank starting from Brahmin down to
the untouchable whose value starts with zero. Therefore, any
transactions between a Brahmin and others is always fixed
at a higher premium for the Brahmin. For instance, if an SC
labourer exchanges his product with another (say Xl and Yl)
with the same quantity of labour power, the exchange value
goes in inverse proportion (X1 α X2) to the status of untouch-
able. That is, if a Brahmin puts one hour of labour power and
produces a commodity (service), it can be exchanged with
a commodity produced with more than one hour of labour
power of others. In other words, the economic value of labour
power is determined in relation to the social and ritual status
of caste and the supply of labour is regulated by the system
of caste rules. It can be seen that while the labour supply of
Brahmin and other Dvijas are limited by prohibiting others to
enter, the SCs and artisans do not have any serious restrictions

18  Political Economy of Caste in India

to supply their labour. Thus, scarcity of Brahmin labour gives
him the opportunity to collect rent that enters into price of
commodity, while labour of Dalits does not matter. This is a
simple model of operation of CMOP that remained immutable
in a state that is regulated by caste. Caste plays a dominant
role in the creation of state apparatus, as caste itself is a state
like the class is a state in other societies.
Caste is ubiquitous and all pervasive from the post-Vedic
period.

The twice born were entitled to Vedic studies and investiture

with the sacred thread, and fourth varna or the Shudras were
excluded from it. They were meant to serve the higher orders
and were branded as born slaves. Thus, in the Greco-Roman
context the twice born can roughly be called citizens and the
Shudras non-citizens.41

The fifth varna seems to be not part of this scheme and had
remained outside as outcastes to serve the whole system,
including the fourth varna. R. S. Sharma concluded his study
that,

the process of state formation and social stratification gath-

ered momentum and assumed significance in the middle
of first millennium bc and later … primary producers were
gradually separated socially and politically from those who
collected and consumed taxes, tributes, gifts and so on. This
separation represented as division of labour, found juridical
and ideological articulation in the form of varna system,
which became the hallmark of state and society in post-Vedic
times.42

This has remained as an ‘unchangeable’ formation to use Marx’s

term, in the years to come, tinkering here and there. The rela-
tions of production in CMOP as noted above remained caste
based.

Caste Mode of Production  19

Marxian Political Economy and Caste
Though MOP is a Marxian concept, it has certain structural
interlinks that are not generally taken into consideration by
some experts and rely heavily on the production process for
their analysis. It is said that

the objective material relations that exist in any society

independently of human consciousness, formed between
all people in the process of social production, exchange, and
distribution of material wealth. Production is not possible
without relations of production—humans cannot produce
outside of a social structure, whether a nation or a family—
relations of production exist for all producers. The basis of
the relations of production is ownership of the ‘means of
production’.

When the means of production become public property, then

all people are able to exercise their freedom in relation to the
productive forces through the social and political structures
of society.43 In the Indian (caste-based) society, everything is
owned by the Dvijas, including the labourers as force of pro-
duction. This needs to be taken into consideration along with
other economic operations, such as exchange, distribution and
international division of labour.
The forces of production in such a system continue to be
Dalit labour power that is ranked zero. It gained momentum
with P. V. Narasimha Rao’s New Economic Policy (NEP) in
1991 and has become a strong and stable model after 2014,
repeating some of the past methods of regulation of the varna
MOP. The internal differentiation in each varna as invented
by some scholars and critiques is not a serious problem as the
Dvija constellation has always remained at the apex without
much change in their ranks, and some groups from among the
Shudras are co-opted in the modern period when they wanted
physical support. This happened by way of land reforms and

20  Political Economy of Caste in India

tenancy restructuring, keeping the untouchables away from
ownership of land in majority of the states (except Bengal and
Andhra Pradesh) after 1948. But the basic structure and asset
ownership of the dominant castes did not alter; may be some
Brahmins entered secular lucrative occupations after displaced
from Agraharas. Kshatriyas entered business, while Vaishyas
strengthened their hold over the economy with political
manipulations from the time of Bombay plan. In other words,
caste never retreated from its traditional role in keeping the
state, resources and lower castes under its control. This has
happened with the help of the following manoeuvring.

1. Discrimination and denial of right to own property

2. Untouchability and physical alienation
3. Offences and atrocities to create terror not to cross social
borders
4. Economic deprivation by denying access to public and
common property
5. Using judiciary as a source of deprivation of rights
6. Promoting division and fragmentation within to suppress
protest

We are going to discuss each one of the issues in the following

chapters to substantiate the uniformity and continuance of
CMOP in India as a socio-economic formation.

Caste and Class

CMOP assumes that at every stage of social and economic
development in India, caste has played a dominant role and
the European category of class is out of sync here. However,
the Marxist literature on classes that takes into considera-
tion the Hegelian ‘class in itself’ and ‘class for itself’ are being
understood as economic class situation and class consciousness,
respectively, can be related to caste. In fact, caste consciousness

Caste Mode of Production  21

as ‘caste for itself’ is taught to every sibling at home and as a
part of childhood formation, and the person realizes its impor-
tance first within as a social category and then draws rent in
public life (economic) as per his rank attached, as noted above,
that is, he or she gets into ‘caste in itself’ once encounters with
a dominant caste. Therefore, class analysis in India should be in
the form of caste so that the contradictions can be understood
and resolved. In fact, caste relations in the country, particularly,
in the rural areas are only production relations. The social
relations between Dalits, Adivasis and service castes are related
to production as they do not have any family or community
links except on the job. The dominant or to use Mao Zedong’s44
concept of primary contradiction is between the upper castes
and lower castes (as in bourgeois and the proletariat), and the
secondary contradiction is understood as one moves into the
larger space of occupying different places he or she gets in to
sub-caste and inter-caste and intra-caste contradictions (as in
Mao, the secondary contradiction between bourgeois and feudal
becomes primary if feudals threaten bourgeois progress and
the primary contradiction between bourgeois and proletariat
will be temporarily relegated to secondary contradiction). It
is noted that the relationship between primary and second-
ary contradictions is not static and they remain dynamic, as
secondary contradiction sometimes becomes primary, such as
the anti-Mandal or anti-reservation movements in India, and
becomes secondary once economic criterion is applied by the
judiciary (as advocated by a section of leftists for reservations)
in jobs to upper castes. These contradictions keep on changing,
but the primary contradiction of the upper caste or class and
the proletariat or social proletariat of lower castes remains to be
resolved at an appropriate stage. The major problem with class
analysis is that of categorization of classes into three divisions
as bourgeois, petty bourgeois and the proletariat, while castes
are around 5,000. There is a slow process of resolving some of
the secondary contradictions when groups of lower castes are
united to fight for their rights against the dominant castes.
Here, we may concede that all the Dvija castes are economically

22  Political Economy of Caste in India

dominant in terms of their resource base and command over
state for the last hundreds of years. In fact, the non-Brahmin
movement initiated by the lower caste peasants in the begin-
ning by Ezhavas in Madras and appropriated (?) by shudra
landed gentry was actually a peasant struggle against the landed
proprietary class who owned land in the form of Brahmadeya
(to Brahmins), Devadana (donated to gods) and Agrahara (settle-
ment of priests) for generations and held in common possession
that Marx was referring to. It was only after 1793, permanent
settlement of lands was allocated to individuals. Even after
such allocation, lower castes, particularly untouchables and
artisans, have remained attached labourers. There are several
institutional structures that caste system has developed, such
as the Jajmani, as an agency to distribute resources as per caste
ranks studied by social anthropologists. It is unusual to notice
some scholars did not recognize chattel slavery and analysed
class relations of production with sophisticated theoretical
framework that is by and large not directly related to facts
on the ground. The untouchables were not allowed to own
land for instance in Punjab until 1947, and in many parts of
India they were not sharecroppers, just ‘bonded labourers’.
It seems the experts take recourse like the NDA government
that denied the existence of untouchability in India at World
Conference against Racism (WCAR) 2001 by citing Art 17 and
declared that bonded labour is abolished by law. In fact, the
first bonded labour Act was passed by the British India govern-
ment under ‘The Bengal Bonded Warehouse Association Act
1838, Indian Slavery Act 1843 and later Payment of Wages Act
1936, Watandari Abolition Act, etc.’ only to mitigate chattel
slavery. They are all related to untouchable castes and Adivasis
who constitute around one-third of our population and in
some regions like Bengal more. It is likely that some scholars
may not be aware of the fact that there are two categories of
agricultural labourers, touchable and untouchable, in rural
India. They are given differential wages. It may be due to the
caste blind approach of class analysis by some Marxists who
tried to relate our social formation to the analysis of abolition

Caste Mode of Production  23

of serfdom through peasant class struggle. Some scholars, such
as Ramakrishna Mukherjee,45 who was critical to M. N. Srinivas
and Andre Beteille, recognized caste but tried to complicate it
by saying ‘caste in class’ that has cut across the caste hierarchy,
without providing empirical evidence as to how to accommo-
date the fifth varna and Adivasis (who are poor and marginal-
ized) in the threefold division of classes. Further, the emergence
of new petty bourgeoisie is characterized by Poulantazas46 as
those white-collar employees, technicians, supervisors, civil
servants and so on and now ICT and employees of the financial
institutions who are mostly drawn from Dvijas. As these jobs
exist in the private sector, they are not accommodated in class
analysis. The politicization of castes and the entry of Dalits in
civil service and modern occupations as noted above is limited
to about 1 per cent of their population, which may not alter the
traditional classification of castes as four varnas and an append-
age panchama and Adivasi in the Indian social formation, and it
needs to be reckoned with to grip the contemporary reality after
2014. The role of religion in India as a form of accumulation
of wealth in precious metals was recognized by Marx when he
referred to the Anantha Padmanabha Swamy temple in one of
his articles to New-York Daily Tribune around 1855. The strength
of religion and Dvija in getting financial and, thus, political
support came out openly when the Supreme Court abruptly
closed the remaining vaults after discovering lakhs of crores of
rupees worth of precious metals in vaults A, C and so on in the
Anantha Padmanabha Swamy Temple in 2012.47 The episode
of Martanda Varma who was the custodian of the wealth killed
42 rebels around the 1730s in his princely state and declared
them as outcastes signified the link between caste, religion and
accumulation of wealth in modern period.48 Thus, caste par-
ticularly the Dvija group controlling the wealth in the past and
appropriating public and private resources after 1991 resulted
in the emergence of crony capitalism, which is in essence caste
(upper) capitalism. Therefore, it is possible to examine the social
formation of CMOP with the category of caste.

24  Political Economy of Caste in India

 Scholars such as Anand Teltumbde 49 and others have
raised the dichotomous nature of social categories in India
as classes and castes leading to disastrous consequences in
fight against imperialism. Anand noted that, ‘these errone-
ous outlooks have bifurcated the movements of proletarians
in India into two parallel streams, viz., a communist move-
ment and a Dalit movement. In the ensuing debate, the two
sides, instead of seeking common grounds between them,
vehemently distanced themselves further.’ In other words,
the polemics of a century-old caste class in India did not
yield any positive ground for the unity among the oppressed
and perhaps have helped the Hindu stratagem of divide and
rule that became the order of the day by 2020. Instead, it
is necessary to incorporate not only the economic bearings
of different SCs and artisan castes as analogous and use the
same terms as castes not only to make clear that we are
addressing the objective reality, but also satisfy the subjective
experiences of majority of the population in India. Perhaps
the use of ‘class’ as an analytical category today satisfies none
other than the tiny minority of the Dvijas whether Marxist
or non-Marxist to hoodwink lower caste proletariat. In fact,
this did not help the experts and activists to relate the kind
of studies made in the West about the contemporary social
classes to India for arriving at a theory of praxis to halt
the onslaught of the united force of fundamentalism and
imperialism.

Caste and Race

The notions of race, caste, gender, nation, ethnic group,
indigenous people and so on have engaged the attention of
social scientists as serious issues of contemporary relevance for
quite some time at the international level. The notion of racial
superiority has brought unprecedented human suffering and a
world war during the last century. But, the humankind has not
learnt lessons. Racism and racial discrimination continued to

Caste Mode of Production  25

haunt both the gullible and the enlightened public resulting
in crisis in the society. Racial discrimination and the related
intolerances have brought an international upsurge when a
parliamentarian in the UK uttered something that evoked
racial feelings during the last week of April 2001. Yet, some
sociologists, particularly the Indian brand, refused to recognize
the fact that people still carry notions of racism and continue
to discriminate people on the basis of these false beliefs. The
argument that racism does not stand for scientific reasoning
even after human genome project only sounds academic,
but the fact of the matter is that people believe in wrong and
unscientific notions and act accordingly. That does not mean
that there is no discrimination based on racism. The United
Nations (UN) Human Rights Commission has published
reports of brutal killings in Germany, in the USA and in other
parts of Western Europe during 1998, 1999 based on racial
beliefs of people. It is in this context the UN has taken serious
note of it and geared the world to combat this human tragedy
through WCAR.
The concept of race is a European invention and caste is an
Indian social institution. There are several parameters, which
are common for both the categories. One important factor that
is common to both the categories is the concept of inequal-
ity based on birth and or descent. In fact, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racism (ICERD)
has clearly defined what discrimination is and how it is prac-
ticed. In article 1, para 1, it defines the concept of racial dis-
crimination as,

any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on

race, colour, descent or national ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or improving the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights
and fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.

26  Political Economy of Caste in India

The definition includes descent, ethnic origin and colour.
This is applicable to the Indian caste system devised by Indo-
Europeans to perpetuate slavery and discrimination against
the native populations who were called as Dasyus, Panchamas
and outcastes. There is now sufficient literature that indicates
almost all the Dalits belong to the native Indians (NIs) and
the non-Dalit Dvija populations belong to the Indo-European
Caucasian in terms of research in physical anthropology and
genetics. One study indicated that, ‘differences in social rank
between castes correspond to mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA)
distances between castes, but not genetic distances, as estimated
from y-chromosome data’.50
There is also an argument that racism spread from the tenets
of Hindu caste system as enunciated by Manu and popularized
by European Indologists during the 18th century. But, the Indian
government because of its own reasons has not reconciled to the
fact that caste discrimination exists even in the 21st century.
Interestingly, the international Dalit networks have succeeded
in establishing a common link wherever there is untouchability
based on descent and work. It is estimated that there are around
260 million people who are affected by this inhuman practice
of untouchability and discrimination based on birth in south
Asia. This belief, it is said, is widely disseminated by the Hindu
customs of purity and pollution. This is found to be prevalent
in countries where the Indian diaspora spread. It is observed
during WCAR at Durban that representatives from Nepal, Sri
Lanka, Malaysia, Thailand and Japan have formed into an inter-
national Dalit human rights network to fight against the evil
of caste discrimination. This has set aside the argument of the
Government of India that it is an ‘internal issue’. In fact, racism,
apartheid and so on are specific to certain countries, but they
are considered as a crime against humanity because of their evil
designs. Indian government knows about it. But the NDA regime
put up its arguments in consonance with their social philosophy
and not as per the secular traditions of the Constitution. It is

Caste Mode of Production  27

no more an internal problem as the Dalits of Nepal and India,
Barukuman of Japan with similar social disabilities and Dalits in
Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Thailand have joined together to fight
against this evil at the international forum. In fact, the Dalit
groups of Nepal who constitute around 15 per cent of the Nepal
population have succeeded in making the Nepal government to
recognize this problem and persuaded the government to make
a declaration at the Tehran conference even at the discomfi-
ture of the Indian government. The Bangladesh representative
spoke against caste in the government representatives’ session
at Tehran. The three-day meeting discussed the issues from vari-
ous dimensions and the issue of caste discrimination has been
incorporated not only under the theme, but it has gone into
other themes of the WCAR, including globalization, gender,
indigenous people and refugees. This has further strengthened
the issue of caste discrimination as an important point to be
discussed at Durban, South Africa, in August 2001. Interestingly,
the representatives who were elected by the non-governmental
organization (NGO) forum to represent various issues at WCAR
are found to be more in number for the caste issue out of the 20
from the South Asia Pacific at the Kathmandu meeting.51 The
argument that caste and race are two different notions and do
not qualify to get included in the agenda of WCAR did not carry
strength of conviction in its argument. ICERD has recognized
caste discrimination as an important form of discrimination in
1996 (CERD Doc A151/18). Further, the WCAR is concerned not
only about the discrimination, but even interested to probe into
the intensity of it through the observation of the practices which
indicate intolerance. Untouchability is an extreme form of
intolerance observed by many in India today. The government
of Andhra Pradesh has appointed Justice Punnaiah Committee
to enquire into this problem and the findings of the report have
further strengthened the veracity of practicing caste discrimina-
tion today (see Chapter 10).
The question whether caste discrimination be equated with
racial discrimination needs to be answered. What is the moral

28  Political Economy of Caste in India

sanction of the UN to discuss any form of discrimination, be
it racial, caste, ethnic or some other category? It appears that
its strength is derived from the universal declaration of human
rights in 1948, which has been accepted by many countries
including India. The first article in the declaration reiterates
that ‘all human beings are born free and equal’ and any form
of discrimination based on birth, sex, belief and so on is a vio-
lation of human right. If caste discrimination, for that matter
racial discrimination, is looked at from this background, it is
clear that any form of discrimination based on birth or work
is against the principle of equity. Since caste discrimination,
particularly the inhuman practice of untouchability, negated
the principle of equity as enshrined in the universal declara-
tion of human rights, it is same as that of racial discrimina-
tion. In fact, caste discrimination is much worse than racial
discrimination as the institution of caste carries an intoler-
ant practice of untouchability. No activist says that race and
caste are the same. But, the practice of discrimination based
on one’s birth in a race or caste is to be condemned. At this
stage, both are equated for condemnation for similar crime
against humanity.
Feminists have long been arguing to establish a link between
feminism and Marxism. It is alleged that the ‘Orthodox
Marxists’ consider race only as false. It is noted that conscious-
ness (Leonardo 2003) and Feminism can be subsumed under
modes of production. But studies by African–American Scholars,
Bowles and Gintis have proved that race plays an important
role in the creation of human capital and the resultant lifelong
earnings of racial social groups in the USA.52 Neo-Marxists like
Bourdieu53 and Lareau have developed concepts, such as cul-
tural capital, and habitus, to link economic capital with cultural
practices. Further, Hall,54 using Gramscian narrative, describes
‘relations of force’ as an important factor to be considered in
a social formation. Thus, caste as a socio-economic category
can be used as a set in MOP analysis as an approach to study
political economy of caste.

Caste Mode of Production  29

Notes
1. T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1970).
2. Martin Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction
(New Delhi: Cambridge University Press), 15.
3. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Note Books
(Chennai: Orient Longman, 1996).
4. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London:
Routledge, 1989).
5. S. A. Dange, India: From Primitive Communism to Slavery: A
Marxist Study of Ancient History in Outline (Delhi: People’s
Publishing House, 1958).
6. D. D. Kosambi, An Introduction to the Study of Indian History
(Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1956).
7. R. S. Sarma, Indian Feudalism (Delhi: Mac Millan, 1965).
8. Prabhat Patnaik, ‘EMS Namboodripad’s Perception of History’,
The Marxist 25, no. 34 (July–September 2009).
9. Murzaban Jal, ‘Marx and Ambedkar: Reflecting on the
Deflecting Indian Emancipation’, IIAS Review 11, no. 2 (2005).
10. Utsa Patnaik, ed., Agrarian Relations and Accumulation: The Mode
of Production Debate in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1990).
11. E. Varga, ‘La Situation Economic en Chine, International
Correspondence’, 16 December 1925.
12. K. A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total
Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964).
13. Harbans Mukhia, ‘Was There Federalism in Indian History’,
The Journal of Peasant Studies 8, no. 3 (1981): 273–310.
14. Shakti Padhi, ‘Asiatic Mode of Production and Indian History’,
in Readings in Political Economy, ed. K. S. Chalam (Hyderabad:
Orient Longman, 1999), 408–431.
15. Kosambi, An Introduction, 16.
16. S. A. Dange, India: From Primitive Communism to Slavery: A
Marxist Study of Ancient History in Outline, 3rd ed. (Delhi:
People’s Publishing House, 1972).
17. Anne M. Bailey and Joseph R. Llobera, eds., The Asiatic Mode of
Production: Science and Politics (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1981).
18. K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,
Introduction by M. Dobb (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977).

30  Political Economy of Caste in India

19. Ibid, 11.
20. Ibid, 33.
21. L. Krader, ed., The Ethnological Note Books of Karl Marx (Assen:
Von Gorcum, 1972).
22. Baily and Llobera, Asiatic Mode of Production, 37.
23. Jal, ‘Marx and Ambedkar’, 48.
24. Kosambi, An Introduction, 12.
25. K. S. Chalam, Education and Weaker Sections (New Delhi: Inter
India Publications, 1988), chap. 3.
26. Jairus Banaji, ‘For a Theory of Colonial Mode of Production’,
in Agrarian Relations and Accumulation: The Mode of Production
Debate in India, ed. Utsa Patnaik (New Delhi: Oxford
University, 1990); Jairus Banaji, Theory as History: Essays on
Modes of Production and Exploitation (Leiden/Boston, MA: Brill,
2010).
27. Patnaik, Agrarian Relations.
28. James Russell, Modes of Production in the World History (London:
Routledge, 1989).
29. Bailey and Llobera, Asiatic Mode of Production.
30. Ashok Rudra, ‘Class Relations in India Agriculture’, in Agrarian
Relations and Accumulation: The Mode of Production Debate in
India, ed. Utsa Patnaik (New Delhi: Oxford University, 1990),
251–267.
31. Karl Marx, The Capital Vol I (Moscow: Progressive Publishers,
1977), 338.
32. Ibid.
33. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism.
34. B. R. Ambedkar, Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, Vol.
1, ed., Vasant Moon (New Delhi: Dr Ambedkar Foundation,
1942).
35. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘British rule in India’, in
Selected Works, vol. I (Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers,
1969), 88–93.
36. Ministry of Industrial Development, Govt. of India Fact Sheet,
FDI.
37. D. Ajit, Han Donker and Ravi Saxena, ‘Corporate Boards in
India—Blocked by Caste?’, Economic and Political Weekly, 47,
no. 32, 11 August 2012.
38. George Akerlof, ‘The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race
and Other Woeful Tales’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90,
no. 4 (November 1976): 599–617.

Caste Mode of Production  31

39. Ibid.
40. Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect (Hienmann
Educational Books Ltd, 1968), 40, chap. 2.
41. R. S. Sharma, Material Culture and Social Formations in Ancient
India (Delhi: MacMillan India, 1992), 163.
42. Ibid., 166.
43. MIA: Encyclopedia of Marxism, Glossary of Terms.
44. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Writings of Mao, August 1937. www.
marxist.org/reference/archive/Mao
45. Ramakrishna Mukherjee, ‘Caste in Itself, Caste and Class, or
Caste in Class’, Economic and Political Weekly 34, no. 27 (3 July
1999): 1759–1761.
46. Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London:
New Left Books, 1975).
47. R. Krishna Kumar, ‘Treasures of History’, Frontline, 29 July
2011. https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/arti-
cle30176370.ece
48. Jake Halpern, ‘The Secrete of the Temple: The Discovery of
Treasure Worth Billions of Dollars Shakes Southern India’, The
New Yorker, 23 April 2012.
49. Anand Teltumbde, Anti-Imperialism and Annihilation of Castes
(Thane: Ramai Prakashan, 2005).
50. Michael Bamshed, et al. ‘Genetic Evidence on the Origins of
Indian Caste Populations’, Genome Research 11, no. 6 (June
2001): 994–1004. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC311057/; David Reich, ‘The Collision That Found India’,
Caravan (1 October 2018).
51. K. S. Chalam, Caste Discrimination as an Issue before WCAR
(Hyderabad: Centre for Dalit Studies, 2001).
52. Zeus Leonardo, ‘The Unhappy Marriage between Marxism
and Race Critique: Political Economy and the Production of
Racialized Knowledge’, Public Futures in Education 2, nos. 3–4
(2004): 483–493.
53. P. Bourdieu, ‘Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction’,
in Power and Ideology in Education, ed. J. Krabel (New York:
Oxford, 1977).
54. S. Hall, ‘New Ethnicities’, in Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies,
ed. David Morly Kuan Hsing Chen (New York: Routledge,
1996).

32  Political Economy of Caste in India

 2

Colonial Approach to
Hindutva and Marxist
Writing

The ideas and concepts relating to Hinduism, varna, caste,

atma, dharma and so on that are popular today among the
informed citizens seem to have been influenced by the writ-
ings and documents prepared by the East India Company
and the British India colonial elite. Most of the Indologists,
including Indian Marxists, relied on some of their sources
from these writings on India. It is time that one should look
at the sources and the purpose of such material in the context
of attempts of internationalizing certain ideas that are against
the identity of NIs (Dalit and others).1 It is noted by scholars
like Kosambi,2 Basham,3 Kulke4 and Jha5 that several bands of
alien uncivilized groups or races entered India in the process
of their search for settled life here in the past. It is perhaps due
to the fact that India is strategically and geographically located
in the Southern hemisphere in such a manner that the most
diversified and naturally sustainable resources are available here
both in temperate and cold climates to sustain any form of life.
It is this unique advantage of India in the world that did attract
human immigration from different areas of the ancient world.
However, the scholars and Indologists have been concentrating
only on those who had migrated from the Mediterranean region
and Central Asia, basically for two reasons. First, most of the
experts, including those who were trained by them, have come
from the so-called Indo-European background. Second, among
the groups who have migrated into the country, the bands that
have come from the West are notorious and ruthless in morals
and also in their modes of cruel repression of enemies (it is still
displayed in the cruelty of Talibans). Therefore, the aliens who
are called as Aryans had developed the competence and con-
nection, continuously arriving into the country from the time
of panchajanas (Yadus, Turvasus, Anus, Dhruyus and Purus) down
to kushans and Europeans.6 It appears that the aliens had been
invited with open hands by those who settled here, considering
them as their long-lost kin. Unfortunately, the so-called NIs did
not have any friendly contacts outside the country like that of
the Maya and Inca people. The Africans had the advantage of
colour and compose to easily connect with their brethren in
any part of the world while the dark and brown NIs were shy
of such contacts. It is increasingly believed that none of the
alien faiths, mostly Aryan or Indo-European, did protect either
physical extinction or social or cultural alienation of NI in the
past. The same is true even in the modern period. The literacy
rate was just 0.53 per cent when the enlightenment project of
untouchables started in the 19th century, which now stands
at 66 per cent. The conditions have changed since the time of
B. R. Ambedkar who was supported by two princely states of
Baroda and Kolhapur, and now no one is uttering about the
upliftment if not amelioration of the poor NIs. The reason being
that Dalits have developed a 15 per cent reservation syndrome
of infighting among themselves for the crumbs of reservation,
forgetting the democratic right of getting proportional repre-
sentation in every aspect of public and private endeavours in
the country. It is necessary to understand the background of

34  Political Economy of Caste in India

the present backwardness of certain castes that are called as SCs
and OBCs, the constitutional categories that are given special
protection under the Constitution. This has happened due to
the legal framework developed by colonial rulers who looked
at the caste discrimination, sati and other social practices as
archaic under Hinduism.
The notion of Hindutva or Hinduism seems to be a colonial
discovery, as the term did not exist either in the puranas or in
the Vedic corpus as per some scholars. Noted historians like
Romila Thapar7 have analysed that the term was manufactured
by the pundits in the 19th century based on the mission-
ary presence in India. In fact, the so-called Boston Brahmin,
Ananda Coomaraswamy (defender of Suttee), has explained
in his book ‘The Dance of Siva’ that ‘Indian philosophy is
essentially the creation of the two upper classes of society, the
Brahmins and the Kshatriyas’.8 Radhakrishnan9 has ardently
lived to this description through his colossal rewriting of Indian
philosophy under the benevolent guidance of his missionary
teachers. There is perfect understanding among the votaries of
both the religions that there is a hidden Vedanta in Christianity
and hidden Christ in Hinduism.10 This is basically the opin-
ion of the colonial masters who under the influence of their
missionaries developed a sceptical view of Indian philosophy
and Religion. But, they have not done any sympathetic study
of the NI belief systems and have considered all the religious
practices of natives (and not the Brahminical component) as
superstitious and black magic and so on. Some of the mission-
aries have studied the belief systems of the lower caste people
and untouchables and considered all of their beliefs not only
irrational but barbaric to be condemned by a civilized society.
Henry Whitehead, one of the missionaries who had published
on ‘Village Gods of South India’,11 categorically called the
belief systems of the lower castes as archaic and uncivilized
and wanted that the believers are to be relieved of this so that
Christ can replace the vacuum. He has narrated how in Telugu

Colonial Approach to Hindutva and Marxist Writing  35

districts SCs have destroyed idols and erected cross. In some of
their writings and reports, it is found that their ultimate aim
was to create space for conversion and this would be possible
once their small gods and goblins, mostly village goddesses are
considered as trivial so that spiritual space would be created
for the Abrahamic pantheon to enter. The materialistic world
view and practices of Lokayata, Ajivikas, Tantrics and so on are
dissented as local and heretical. It seems the same kind of opin-
ion was held by some of the Muslim scholars who considered
that the lower castes did not possess any tangible faith and
were longing for a spiritual solace that was provided by Islam.
The lower castes of East Bengal, mostly animists, joined Islam
not out of coercion but by their own volition to relish equal-
ity. Thus, the NIs are deprived of any spiritual or materialistic
identity of their own as if they are barbarians, believed then
and even now.
The analysis of the belief systems of the natives by the com-
pany officials seem to had the support of the local clergy who
were their translators and contrived to make their beliefs and
faith were distinctly different and superior from the natives
and untouchables. Though the so-called Sanatana Dharma
was in existence as per the Vedic scholars, it did not speak
about the local and native systems of faith or socio-religious
practices. If there were any references to such phenomenon, it
was deliberated out of contempt. Sanatana as endless or Anadi
refers to something that is alien to Aryan and, therefore, is
not part of the Dvija categories that were according to some
adherents, the main inhabitants of the country (later some of
the epistemics appropriated). This was true even at the time of
Muslim and European onslaughts. Interestingly, none of the
so-called Hindu critiques have pointed out any contradictions
in their metaphysics and practices. No one has ever raised how
an animal could be despised at one stage and became an Avatar
at another. How the names of places and Gods, such as Agni
and Indra, keep changing from time to time and place to place

36  Political Economy of Caste in India

and the pundits interpret as per their convenience to make the
gullible to worship in the name of puranas and get rewarded.
They never thought that there was no unanimity among the
Shaivas, Vaishnavas, Advaitas, Dvaitas and Vishishtadvaita and
try to bridge the gap under the garb of abstract reasoning and
overwhelm with state support. Interestingly, all of them parade
in tandem and remain pious and twice born despite of several
inconsistencies in their behaviour and paradoxes in their dhar-
mashastras. There is no uniformity even in the dharmashastras,
as there is a difference between North and East, South and
West. It is precisely for this reason and to bring standardization,
Macaulay, a Tory, was brought to India. Yet, the hegemony of
the Brahmin pundit continued as if they alone preserved the
values of Vedic religion or what is called way of life. It was not
Hinduism or Hindutva as depicted by some scholars now, but it
was alleged to be pure Brahminism (not Brahmaism). Hinduism
as propagated by a section of the militant Hindu organizations
today consists of several practices assimilating from the natives,
while the converted natives and their missionaries disown the
foundations. That is why the devout Brahmin as well as the
convert despises the practices of the NI beliefs as superstition,
but do not dare to question the contradictions in Hinduism.
Jyothi Rao Phuley12 started the denigration and questioned the
prima facie of the Bhats and simultaneously indicated the sac-
rifices of NIs like Bali Raja in the 19th century while Ambedkar
critiqued Rama and Krishna.13 Very few of the mainstream
scholars of Indology or South Asian studies seemed to have
observed the distinction between Brahminism and Hinduism
in the first phase and Hindutva in the later stages. The recent
language jingoism in the name of Hindusthani or Hindi as the
only language of India originating from Sanskrit that should
be promoted as a national language, if not official language,
is another aspect of so-called Indo-European project. It is said
that there was no language like Hindi before the 16th century
except Persian or Urdu with Indo-European connection and the

Colonial Approach to Hindutva and Marxist Writing  37

British promoted khari boli of North East of Delhi as Hindusthani
in public affairs. Therefore, the fundamentalists wanted only
Hindi to be promoted even in states, such as Maharashtra where
Marathi is hardly found in their communication.14 The so-called
Maratha pride is never seen using the people’s language and
only observed in a cursory manner at the time of taking oath of
office of government. It is alleged that Hindi as an offshoot of
Sanskrit is being used as a symbol of hegemony by few groups
who continue to practice a language full of Sanskrit even in the
South. There is no contradiction between English and Hindi as
many of them know the ‘virtue’ and ‘Varchus’ are the same and
lend their support even from the opposition camp to protect
the hegemony.
The so-called Indo-European term for Sanskrit was coined
by Thomas Young in 1813 was most likely influenced by the
local linguists and William Jones.15 But linguists in general
say that Afro-Asiatic languages are ancient followed by Pre-
Anatolian and Proto-Indic in the form of Vedic Sanskrit. It
seems the technique of Srauta tradition/oral recitation to
inherit the language without leakages for thousands of years
with the introduction of grammar first time in history to codify
it around fourth century bc is unique. But its relation with
Avestan lingua and its European origin is now being confirmed
by genetic studies.16 If we look at the Indo-European language
speakers in retrospect, it would indicate how they were very
brainy in foreseeing the importance of language and had oper-
ated through grammar to regulate the culture in their own
terms. It is brilliant of Dignaga the fourth century ad Buddhist
Philosopher to critique the discovery of grammar as a method
to control thought process of common people.17 It is still the
same in India, as none of the local dialects/languages were pro-
moted and some appropriated. Interestingly, a particular social
group and their adherents are the only ones who defend the
Hindutva and Hindi in various forums, including the horrid
social network/Internet. This has exposed the one-side view or

38  Political Economy of Caste in India

egocentric elucidations of the defenders of fundamentalism.
The media that had been under the authority of traditional
literati class from time immemorial is inconspicuous by its
absence on these issues.
There seem to be some kind of a craving for the esoteric
India in the past that was perhaps built by bands of vagrants
in their travelogues who explored the mysteries of the unique
country from time immemorial. It is due to the biodiversity in
its geography and passive nature of the inhabitants who never
bothered about outlandish invasions of any kind. It seems they
have given way for aliens to enter without much resistance
and with accommodative spirit. We do not have yet a com-
prehensive history and pre-history of the country recording
the developments at the grassroots. Though the Indus Valley
Civilization was brought into focus only in the 20th century
by colonial explorers/archaeologists, no finality is reached.
We do not know what is holding the assertion to declare that
Sanskritized Hinduism was alien or Indo-European, such as
the genetic studies on haplogroup R1a1a establishing ancestral
north Indians (ANIs) as Caucasus/European (noted above).
There seem to be an anxiety among the Indo-Europeans that
once the Indus Valley or Saraswati Civilization is popularized,
the ancient Egypt, Greek, Iran and Sumerian either would
become unimportant or parallel which perhaps they do not
wish to happen. This is also convenient for the fundamentalist
apologetics of India who try to link the NI culture and civi-
lization with their alien cultural pedigrees. It is at this stage,
history has become once again a force to reckon with both
in academics and in public life. Though some of the Marxist
historians declared that they are following relations of pro-
duction thesis to ascertain the type of society prevailing in
different periods, they have, however, ultimately come to the
conclusion that do not debunk fundamentalists, as noted in
the previous chapter.

Colonial Approach to Hindutva and Marxist Writing  39

 The colonial rulers, including William Jones, were not
interested to confront the onslaught of Vedic or so-called
Brahminical Hinduism of the few with whom they had trans-
acted in the process of governance. They were not interested
perhaps in converting them as long as they served their pur-
pose and were interested in proselytization among the poor
untouchables and artisans. Some had allegedthat they wanted
untouchables be kept as servants and menials in the household.
Those who had embraced them for purposes of sharing power
and prestige (mostly Dvijas) of a ruling class were hugged,
assimilated and perhaps became Anglicans. They sailed together
and the question of alien faith did not isolate them, and, in
fact, colonial officers helped to collect and translate the ancient
texts into English. We have today prestigious universities in the
West offering courses on Hinduism with chairs mostly seized
by Dvijas. It is reported that USA alone has 500 Hindu places of
worship with billions of dollars’ worth of properties and lobbies
in the senate and white House in the USA. In other words, the
apparently open conflict between Hindu fundamentalism and
Christian faith depicted by a section of the media is not coming
in the way of capitalist expansion.18 It is an open invitation
now with direct command of the policies by the few chenchas
of MNCs but pose Christian baiting to divert attention of the
public. There seems to be a similar understanding with the
Muslim bhadralok taking part in active politics of the right.
This is happening perhaps due to the internal differentiation
of each religious group divided on the basis of the origin of
their caste alignments. This was deliberately promoted by the
colonial powers or at least one could see that they knew it and
kept inconspicuous.
It is interesting to find that Sharad Patil, a Marxist by train-
ing and bahujan by persuasion, with profound scholarship in
ancient literature has continued the discourse by analysing
the caste conflicts within Brahmin domain in Maharashtra
among Chitpavan and Saraswat and Deshastha to show how
the debates were subjective. He said,

40  Political Economy of Caste in India

 if the revivalism of non-Chitpavan brahmins, such as
Bhandarkar, led them to take anti-Brahminic and pro-
Kshatriya stand on the problem of the origin and develop-
ment of Indian philosophy, the revivalism of Chitpavan
Brahmins such as Kane led them to take anti-Kshatriya and
pro-Brahminic stand on the same problem.19

The Upanishads are known as up-ni-sad as secrete knowledge

in the ancient past. This phenomenon could be construed as
the covert technique of borrowing the knowledge systems of
the NIs by the aliens and cultured it as a thought in Sanskrit
language that was guarded by the chosen few through rote
memory (Sanskrit seems to be a code language that was kept
on refined and reformed by select few as sanskara bhasa). It
was, thus, given a status by the mainstream society as it is now
being paraded as Brahminical wisdom in a secure language. In
the case of Lokayata or Charvaka philosophy as a rustic reaction
to the alien and debasing schools of thought and practices as
were current at that time, seemed to have been questioned by
Jabali, Makkali Ghosal, Kapalika, Ajitakesa Kambal and others
in the epic tradition. The above formulation is supported by an
authority on History of Indian Philosophy by S. N. Dasgupta,
through his elucidations on the subject. He said that

it may therefore be presumed that a good number of

Atharvanic hymns were current when most of the Rigvedic
hymns were not yet composed. By the time, however, that
the Atharvaveda was compiled in its present form, some new
hymns were incorporated in it, the philosophic character of
which does not tally with the outlook of the majority of the
hymns.20

This suggests that several ideas, notions, scientific practices were

adopted from the NIs. This was further supported by the stud-
ies of D. P. Chattopadhyay,21 K. B. Krishna,22 Sharad Patil and
others. It is disheartening to note that the kind of scholarship
that we had in our country to make an objective analysis of the

Colonial Approach to Hindutva and Marxist Writing  41

facts of the matter particularly with reference to philosophy is
being slowly disappeared. It seems the post-modern scholars
consider these issues petty and have not done much on the
origin of the Indian thought rather they appear to be secure
and comfortable with the European and Anglo-Saxon discourse
studies. Further, some of the Indian scholars have accepted the
damaging nomenclatures ascribed to the NI thought and prac-
tice as ‘Little culture’ by American social anthropologists with
their limited field work knowledge in cities, such as Chennai.
It is also accused that some of the anthropologists themselves
were misguided by the same inherited Brahminical scholarship
(with English education) that had called the native thought as
useless and stupid. A section of the English-educated enlight-
ened Brahmins who carry democratic spirit in their enquiry
seem to have started epitomizing Savarkar as a proponent of
Hindutva. But Savarkar who was under the regime of the British
used the same colonial categories to elucidate his ideas of
Hindutva with little credit to NIs. Commoners in the rural areas
and illiterates in the urban bastis were never bothered about
what Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Dayanand and others thought
about their gods or practices. It was for the educated and the
political workers, Hindutva and the so called cultural nation-
alism was a concern during elections. Therefore, it is alleged
that no permanent or structured organizations has emerged
from the so-called left or secular organizations to encounter
the organized robust Hindutva. However, the fundamentalist
ideas are not very popular among the common people of non-
Dvijas whose religious practices are sporadic until the advent of
militant Hindu missionary work during the last half a century
perhaps with tacit support of the ruling elite. It is irony that
the Shudras, particularly the OBCs, who were denounced as half
animals and wretched by the priest class are now made to carry
them on their heads. Yet, the democratization of education and
the written word had enabled a minuscule number of scholars
to protest against this adharma and recorded the significant
contributions of the NI thought. Their number is very small

42  Political Economy of Caste in India

and insignificant as of now, but it needs to be recognized and
promoted for the benefit of posterity and diversity in India.
The colonial inquiry into the social structure of the country
was recorded as they understood it when they first entered
the country and perhaps translated into their own culture of
classes in the beginning. Later some anthropologists have tried
to identify the groups with mistaken identity of Aryan origin
of some of the Dvijas as pronounced by William Jones as their
long-lost kin. But they never looked at the folks, the untoucha-
bles, and artisans and so on who were in distant contact in
their everyday life. It was perhaps the missionaries who were
searching for gaps in the spiritual life of the common man for
an opportunity to proselytization got influenced by the upper
caste accounts of the practices of the lower castes demonizing
them as barbarian. Why is it that they have not adopted similar
attitude towards the contradictions in the Brahminical rituals?
In fact, they have eulogized the scriptures and traditions as the
greatest contributions of human will and translated them into
European languages. The protagonists of Hindutva seem to
have not been ashamed of or embarrassed to use the colonial
epithets of Jones and Lord Curzon who had said that India was
the original country of Indo-Europeans. Now the same rhetoric
is repeated time and again both in India and elsewhere. But,
Indologists like Schlgel,23 Muller,24 Weber25 and Muir26 con-
tradicted the idea and have elaborated the common ancestry
of Aryans (North West India), Persians, Greeks, Romans and
Germans as one that might have originated in central Asia.
In fact, Muir in his monumental 5 volume work on ‘Original
Sanskrit Texts on the Origin and History of the People of
India, their Religion and Institutions’ explained the systems
with authentic citations from Vedic literature and published
them in 1860. B. R. Ambedkar has used extensively this work
in his studies and cited him authoritatively. Therefore, it is
not true that caste, as per some sociologists, was created by
the colonial powers through census in 1881. In fact, there
have been always a section of the learned men who stood for

Colonial Approach to Hindutva and Marxist Writing  43

truth and one among them is Kamalakar Bhatt whose Sudra
Kamalakaram was compiled in the 19th century to indicate
how castes are created in a matrix form explaining the inter-
mixing of varnas through anuloma and viloma forms of mar-
riages.27 Interestingly, the number of castes among the Dvijas
have remained the same or reduced through caste consolida-
tion, whereas the number of lower castes multiplied through
a process of subdivision and fragmentation of each social
group. However, it is not uniform throughout the country. The
number of castes is low in the North and Northeast India and
higher in number as one moves from North to South or the
route through which the Aryan incursion of the South took
place from Varanasi down to Kanyakumari. Both the colonial
masters and the modern scholars rely on their source material
as the British India documents speak about untouchables or
SCs when it comes to the question of social division in Hindu
India, but not so much of other castes like the backward castes
(BCs) and castes in other faiths in India. This has limited the
scope and depth of analysis of social transformation in India
particularly after independence. The democratic process of
first-past-the-post electoral system in electing leaders to govern
people has strengthened the caste cleavages making caste as
an important factor to consolidate power on the basis of unity
among the ruling castes and division and despair among the
lower castes to keep the traditional varna system in order. It
is interesting to notice that those who fought against the so-
called Brahminical social order have assimilated their values
and ultimately succumbed to their charm and became their
protectors by the end of the 20th century. The trend reminds
of a system that was perhaps in vogue in the past in keeping
the majority under check through the process of division and
subdivision among the masses the so-called ‘divide and rule’
a technique unique to India.
The issue now is how to annihilate caste and reduce caste-
based discrimination in public and private life of Indians. How

44  Political Economy of Caste in India

is it possible? The issues that Phuley, Ambedkar to some extent
and Lohia encountered in the past were different from what is
observed today. The economic system was not so strong, dis-
sipated and was under the control of the state to manipulate for
the benefit of the masses. Now the system is under the control
of a few private players consisting of the Dvija conglomerate
with co-option of upper caste Shudras through bureaucratic
and media manipulation to herald crony capitalism (They are
reported to have emerged as the vishwa guru with command
over the economic, political and cultural resources not only to
sustain the Brahminical order, but also to expand on a world
scale, such as that of Hitler with compromises with Jews.).
The Dalits and BCs who are entering into the private sector
lost their identity, and the younger generation under the lure
of Western and market enchantments do not intend to link
with their past. There was a systematic process of acculturation
of non-Dalit masses to accept the hegemony of Brahminical
Hindutva over a period of time. The emergence of present
dispensation as per some analysts is not a sudden outcome. It
has a long history.
In fact, D. R. Bhandarkar in his lectures at Madras University
in 1940 perhaps for the first time explained the Aryanization,
Brahminization and Indianization.28 He has noted ‘What
Hellenism was to Asia minor, Syria, Iran and Babylon,
Aryanism, that is, the Aryan Culture, proved itself to India
and greater India’.29 He has explained with literary sources
how Aryans became Brahminized and carried ‘the historical
memory from the time of ‘Rigveda’, the cow was considered
sacramental efficacy … shared with their Iranian brothers …
old Avestic literature and even in the mind of the modern
Parsi.30 Interestingly, the colonial masters and their agents
propagated that the land of the Baratas (Baratavassa)—or ‘land
of the Baratas which (I) have proved to be the original form of
the name Brit-ain’.31 Though Waddle argument was not taken
seriously by some historians, the Hindu fundamentalists are

Colonial Approach to Hindutva and Marxist Writing  45

arguing that Aryans migrated from Saraswati valley. This is not
new as Curzon long ago popularized the same opinion that was
noted by Muir32 and others (noted in previous chapter).
The influence of Marxism on Indian scholars can be for-
mally traced to B. R. Ambedkar who studied Marxism and
Post-Marxian Socialism as a paper for his degree course in
Columbia University during 1913–1916. M. N. Roy had
excellent links with the international communist movement,
including Lenin, and wrote on Marxism. K. B. Krishna wrote
dissertations in Harvard on Hindu (Indian) materialism and
imperialism among others in the 1930s. He taught Marxism
to political detunes in the prison after he landed in India
and was sent to jail after some time. K. B. Krishna, the first
generation Marxist scholar, who had written on the material-
ist traditions of India did not get adequate attention by the
established party functionaries. His writings have seen the
light of the day only during the centenary year in 2006. But
the crop of historical writings from the time of D. D. Kosambi
and other professional historians who claimed to have used
dialectical historical materialism or MOP to understand India
from primitive times to the present cataleptically dropped the
caste particularly the untouchables and their contribution
to material production. In fact, the volume of literature on
the MOP and the materialist interpretation of Indian society
produced by historians outwitted the economists who are sup-
posed to examine the forces of production and their role in
the relations of production that is generally seen in our caste
transactions both under jajamani in the past and the reincar-
nation of the same after 1990 with the advent of Dvija-based
capitalism in India. We have noted the reservations expressed
by Prabhat Patnaik and Murza ban Jal (previous chapter) about
the limitations, if not lapses of Marxist scholars in grappling
with reality that created perhaps space for the present dispen-
sation to occupy.33

46  Political Economy of Caste in India

Notes
1. Mahatma Phule’s description of shudras and ati shudras as
native to India and Bhats or Brahmins as aliens in his Gulamgiri
is well known that D. N. Jha noted that he was the first to term
the Aryans as aliens.
2. Kosambi, Introduction to the Study.
3. A. L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India (Delhi: Rupa, 1970).
4. H. Kulke and D. Rothermund, A History of India (Delhi: Rupa
& Co, 1986).
5. D. N. Jha, Ancient India in Historical Outline (Delhi: Manohar,
2018).
6. K. S. Chalam, ‘Native Schools of Thought and Dominant
Philosophies in India’. Center for Studies in Afro-Asian
Philosophies, Nagarjuna University, Guntur, Lecture Series 1
(2012).
7. Romila Thapar, Early India (Delhi: Penguin, 2003).
8. Ananda Coomaraswamy, Dance of Shiva (New York: The
Sunwise Turn, 1904, reissued 2003), 4.
9. S. Radha Krishna, Indian Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press; Vol. I, 1923; Vol. II, 1927).
10. K. M. Banerjea, The Relation between Christianity and Hinduism
(Calcutta: Oxford Mission Press, 1881).
11. H. Whitehead, Village Gods of South India (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University; Kolkata: Associated Press, 1921, reprint 2014).
12. Joythi Rao Phuley, Gulamgiri [Slavery] (New Delhi: Gautam
Book Center, 2007).
13. B. R. Ambedkar, Babasaheb Writings and Speeches, Vols. 3–5
(Delhi: Ambedkar Foundation, 2010).
14. Home Minister of India, Shri Amit Shah who spoke about the
introduction of Hindi in all states at the Hindi Divas meeting
in 2019 retracted his statement when Tamils, Kannadas and
others reacted to this proposal.
15. Thapar, Early India.
16. Reich, ‘Collision That Found India’.
17. Rahul Sankrityayan, Darshan and Digdarsan (Kolkata: Chirayat
Prakashan, 1989).
18. The recent ‘Howdy Modi’ Programme in Houston on 22
September 2019 is a continuation of the legacy built in the

Colonial Approach to Hindutva and Marxist Writing  47

 USA. It is strange that none of the events that protested against
the programme were reported in Indian media as per The Wire,
September 2019.
19. Sharad Patil, Dasa Sudra Slavery II (Pune: Sugawa Prakashan,
1999), 230–231.
20. S. N. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vols. 1–5
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).
21. D. P. Chattopadhyay, Lokayata (Delhi: People’s Publishing
House, 1959).
22. K. B. Krishna, Studies in Hindu Imperialism (Guntur: Dr K. B.
Krishna Birth Centenary Celebration Committee, 2007).
23. K. W. F. Schlegel, German Indologist 1772–1829 published on
the language and wisdom of India.
24. Max Muller, India: What It Can Teach Us (London: Funk &
Wagnalls, 1883).
25. Max Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and
Buddhism, Reissued (Delhi: Munshiram M, 2000).
26. J. Muir, Original Sanskrit Texts on the Origin and History of People
of India, 5 volumes (London: Trubnes & Co, 1860).
27. Kamalakar Bhatt, Sudra Kamala Karanm, Telugu Translation
(Vizianagaram, 1891).
28. D. R. Bhandarkar, Some Aspects of Ancient India Culture (Madras:
Madras University, 1940).
29. Bhandarkar, Aspects of Ancient India, 25.
30. Ibid., 72.
31. L. A. Waddell, The Indo-Sumerian Seals Deciphered (London:
Luzac & Co, 1925), 10.
32. J. Muir, Original Sanskrit Texts on the Origin and History of the
People of India, Their Religion and Institutions (London: Trübner,
1868).
33. The allegation that Marx relied on colonial sources for his
analysis is not supported by facts. Marx had used both East
India Company Documents and other writings, including
German, French and so on, sources to arrive at certain conclu-
sions. In fact, he has used his dialectical method of induction
under the framework of a structured theory to scrutinize caste
and other features of India that are not being referred to. There
is likely scope for misunderstanding or understatement.

48  Political Economy of Caste in India

 3

Caste and Economic

Power in India

We have seen how a section of social scientists overlooked the

caste question in economic analysis and in MOP debates in the
previous chapter. We discuss below the economic power of
caste in India. Caste has surfaced once again as an important
unit of social and political mobilization. The NDA occupied
the seat of power in Delhi symbolizing the re-emergence of
a new category of alliances of upper castes. It is very clear
now that some middle castes and the Dvija collective have
determined to get the resources and opportunities distributed
among themselves. No significant move has been made to
uphold the spirit of the Constitution to provide opportunities
to the ‘backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the
state, is not adequately represented in the services under the
state’. Already, the Supreme Court gave a judgement which
appears to strengthen the spirit of the NDA with regard to
reservations and atrocities (see Chapter 8). The fourth part of
the Constitution is made infructuous; it may be repealed in
due course as indicated by statements of some political par-
ties. At the same time, the first thing that the NDA coalition
did in co-opting the opportunist elements among the Dalits
is by extending political reservations to Schedule Castes (SCs)
and Schedule Tribes (STs) for another 10 years. This will help
strengthen the NDA in getting political support from these
sections. The traditional Hindu tactics of co-option is being
enacted once again. That is the reason why 100 and odd MPs
belonging to SCs and STs do not have any voice in a parliament
of several coalitions. They do not have either social or politi-
cal power. But, a group of 10 or 15 MPs belonging to upper
castes or Dvija collective can wield positions of cabinet berths
and can get contracts worth rupees hundreds and thousands
of crores. How is this happening? Is it due to the fact that the
power of these castes is higher than that of others? How did
they get this power? This needs to be probed.
The concept of ‘power’ in social sciences is understood as
the capacity of a subject to have his own way. Power takes
into account the social relationship between two individuals
or groups of individuals. Power is always exercised through
domination and subordination. It depends upon the histori-
cal setting, social structure, nature of the state and economy.
Economists have neglected analysing the nature of power
until Galbraith developed the theory of countervailing power
as a socio-economic phenomenon.1 Some economists have no
doubt discussed about it as a technical relation in the theory of
competition. There are theories that discuss about the monop-
oly power in capturing the market demand and so on. But what
is important here is that power appears in varied forms. J. Pen2
classifies seven categories of non-economic power, such as (a)
physical power: threat of use of physical force, (b) personal
power: personal ascendancy, father–child relationship, (c)
social power: respect for the social position of the subject, (d)
administrative and organizational power: based on the rules
of an organization and administrative body, (c) state power:
based on the sanctions which the state has at its disposal, (d)
legal power: legal relationship based on an agreement, and
(e) political power: this is the exercise of power by citizens in
respect of the state.

50  Political Economy of Caste in India

 In the theory of power, social scientists have analysed how a
person’s power over another person is affected in terms of the
behaviour pattern. In order to analyse it, the constituents of
power need to be examined in terms of the base, means, scope
and amount. The base of power is considered as the resources,
such as economic assets, constitutional prerogatives and mili-
tary force. The means of power is exercised through specific
actions, such as promises and threats. The scope of power lies
in the specifications of the subject. The amount of power is
measured in terms of the increase in the probability of perform-
ing some specific action.

Economic Power
Economic power has been defined in terms of the economic
situation. J. Pen defined it by saying that

in which the subject who has a series of unsatisfied wants

is faced with the relatively scarce means of satisfying these
wants. In this situation, economic power can be exercised if
the means on which the subject must rely for the satisfaction
of his wants are in the hands of another subject.3

For example, if the resources are in the hands of A, then A is

powerful, as B depends on A. But, the dependence of power on
resources is not a simple preposition. It needs to be analysed
in terms of power structures, such as liberal democratic state,
patriarchal family, capitalist economy and the caste system.
These power structures influence not only the base, but even
the means of power. Our concern here is to examine up to
what extent caste system as a power structure influenced the
base and means of economic power in India. It is very difficult
to analyse this problem in the Indian context, as there are very
few studies available now to undertake this exercise.
No economist has so far examined the Indian caste system
as an economic power relation. It is always considered as a

Caste and Economic Power in India  51

social institution wielding no economic power. But, the past
experience in the country in terms of ascendancy of certain
castes and the subjugation of several other castes as dependents
has not been analysed in the purely economic terms. Attempts
have been, however, made to measure power in terms of con-
centration of economic resources.4 In an attempt to measure
the power monopoly of big business houses, three criteria have
been followed that include (a) the share of the largest compa-
nies in industrial output, (b) concentration of ownership of
capital and (c) concentration of management of companies
in the economy. Though similar attempts have been made by
economists to measure the economic power even after NEP,
no attempt seems to have been made to examine the social
background of the people who wield this economic power. It
is noted by the commission that four business houses, Birla, J.
K., Tata and Shreeram had an approved investment of 39 per
cent of the total in 1964–1966. None of them was from lower
castes. The proportion of the group in the power structure of
the state has increased in NDA II.
Caste has been considered as an economic asset of a group of
individuals in the Indian context. It is a property. The value of
the property is raised or reduced directly in proportion to the
ritual status in the social order of the Hindu society. Wiser,5 a
Christian missionary, has attempted to measure the economic
relations between different castes considering the ‘jajamani’
system in a village in 1935. No serious attempt has been made
by social scientists to measure the economic power as defined
above, in terms of the Indian caste system. No one has ever
bothered to examine why the upper castes particularly the Dvija
castes of Brahmin, Kshatriya and Vaisya have always remained
in the higher echelon of economic power and the Dalits at the
lower rung. Some attempts have been made in the West by
sociologists to examine the social background of top decision-
makers in the corporate sector. The study of C. S. Wilson and
T. Lupton brought out clearly the

52  Political Economy of Caste in India

 connections between directors of merchant banks, and
between merchant banks and directors of the Bank of
England. Nor is it surprising that we find that positions in
certain firms are occupied by adjacent generations of the
same family....
What might seem surprising is that kinship connections of
this kind have persisted through many changes in the scale
and functioning of banking, in the organization of industry
and, in the complexity of politics.6

What is found in the English system of kinship relations is

inherently naturalized in the Indian caste system.
The development of the elite class from among the Dvijas
and more particularly among the Brahmins took place during
the 1960s. In fact, the criteria used by M. N. Srinivas7 to call
a caste dominant are not appropriate to capture all castes
in a village or region, because landholdings are no more an
important base for economic mobility. It is now subsidized
higher education, access to banks and credit institutions,
contracts, public sector sales outlets and so on that make
a caste dominant. The opportunities created by the public
sector of Nehruvian era were systematically grabbed by
the educated Dvijas. That is why Periyar called the bank
nationalization as bank Brahminization. There is nothing
wrong in it, because Brahmins were the only group that
was eminently qualified at that time to enter into public
sector. Several of the Indian doctors, engineers, scientists
and technocrats migrated to the USA, the UK and other
industrialized countries. Most of them got absorbed in the
multinational companies and developed close contacts.
Some of them have also occupied important positions in
Fund Bank institutions. In other words, a separate caste, a
universal dominant caste, crossing across the narrow geo-
graphical boundaries of state emerged like that of Zionism.
A Pandit of Kashmir, a Shastri of Tamil Nadu and a Sharma

Caste and Economic Power in India  53

of Uttar Pradesh carved out a pan-Indian collectivity. They
have started teaching Hindi and Sanskrit to local Americans
and revived the Vedic rituals in New York, Delhi, London
and elsewhere to ‘share common culture and way of life’. For
the first time in the history of India, Brahmins as a group
started entering into economic sphere and have been using
the bureaucracy for the accumulation of capital, human and
physical. The tycoons of public sector started ploughing the
money into private coffers.8 They have used their positions
for contacts with multinationals to establish units in India
either in their name or with a benami to start with. Once the
blood of the public sector unit is totally sucked, they left it.
Several of the neo-rich industrialists of the pre- and post-
liberal period belongs to this genre. They are supported by
NRIs. The formation of this internationalized elite has been
taking place, not out of isolation of the nationalist pan-
Aryan or Vedic revivalism in India and abroad. In fact, one
should not forget the fact that more amount of money and
bricks for Ram temple poured into India from the USA and
other developed countries in the 1990s. This could not have
been possible without a systematic networking. The so-called
pseudo religious secularists (sarva dharma samabhava type) in
Congress, some United Front constituents and others did not
take this trend very seriously. It was this universal dominant
caste with pan-Aryan identity that wanted the country to
be liberal. It was they who wanted Narasimha Rao to open
up the economy. It was ultimately they who appropriated
the opportunities created in the economy. The small con-
glomerations of regional entities became pygmies or Balis
once the Virat or Brahmin capitalist with his 1,000 faces
and hands came on to the horizon. They have started sur-
rendering to the Brahmin one after the other to seek refuge
in him. Vaishyas being the traditional trading community
have been co-opted into the new corporate-Hindutva alliance
and started ‘shock and awe’ to capture economic power.9

54  Political Economy of Caste in India

Caste as an Oppressive Force
Race is used in the West, particularly in the USA, to inten-
sify discrimination and segregation. This is done not on the
premise of social and psychological advantages. It is perpetu-
ated according to P. A. Baran and P. M. Sweezy9 to gain eco-
nomic advantages in the capitalist America. Baran and Sweezy
have listed five economic interests in the existence of Negro
sub-proletariat.

1. Employers benefit from divisions in the labour force which

enable them to play one group off against another, thus
weakening all.
2. Owners of ghetto real estate are able to overcrowd and
overcharge.
3. Middle- and upper-income groups benefit from having at
their disposal a large supply of cheap domestic labour.
4. Many small marginal businesses, especially in the service
trade, can operate profitably only if cheap labour is available
to them, and
5. White workers benefit by being protected from Negro com-
petition for the more desirable and higher paying jobs.

The situation in India is not different from what has happened

in the USA. Here the Dalits take the role of Negros. Interestingly,
India entered the liberal capitalist frame in the 1990s to per-
petuate the differences between Dvijas and Dalits. The rulers in
1990 realized that the feudal system was not giving economic
benefit as the influence of power was limited largely to social
sphere. Therefore, the economy was linked to the international
market and the market forces are brought in to develop sev-
eral agencies to exercise economic power. It is the capitalist
MOP that perpetuated the CMOP in India without any serious
problems of adjustment. K. S. Chalam noted this phenomenon
in the 1992 and has provided empirical evidence in 2017 to
substantiate his argument.10

Caste and Economic Power in India  55

Caste as a Source of Economic Power
Caste has been used as a source of social and economic power
ever since it was discovered in the Indian soil. The Dvija castes
have used caste as property of the group of people who inherit
a particular caste by birth. The Dvija caste power per se as
domination is exercised through social action. The social action
in India is implemented through the operation of upper caste
cleavages. These cleavages have been in existence in India as
they do in the English society (mentioned elsewhere) in a subtle
manner before 1990. It is a known fact that all public sector
undertakings, particularly the powerful banking sector, is under
the control of ‘Brahmin power’. It is difficult to explain how
the financial institutions used by an ordinary person, such as
Harshad Mehta, to the extent of thousands of crores of rupees
remained unpunished for a long time.11 Why is it that civil serv-
ants in the administrative cadre, belonging to lower castes, such
as SCs and STs, are punished some allege, for smaller offences?
The NEP has provided opportunities to the upper castes
to consolidate their social and economic power by deals and
mergers. The public money in the form of forced savings of the
middle castes and Dalits is being diverted to private individuals
belonging to upper castes in the name of disinvestment. The
recent publication of 100 rich persons in India by an agency
does not contain even a single person belonging to Dalits. The
emergence of upper caste multi-caste corporations (MCC) in
metropolitan centres in the area of financial companies, agri-
business and other sectors are providing unlimited opportuni-
ties only to the Dvija castes and similar opportunities are denied
to Dalits and Adivasis. The issue of merit became a smoke screen
to deny opportunities to bahujans. This is happening because
of the fact that caste has re-emerged as a powerful economic
weapon after the NEP. It is systematically planned to leave the
urban service sector and the unremunerative traditional agricul-
ture to the Dalits and artisan castes and capture all the coveted

56  Political Economy of Caste in India

investments by the upper castes. Even the UPA I ‘telecom scam’
is a pointer to indicate the exercise of power by upper castes
in India. It is not strange to find the reasons how upper caste
investors emerge as billionaires overnight without any initial
investment while similar opportunities are not available for
equally qualified and talented Dalits and bahujans. This dif-
ference in opportunities and market efficiency is to be found
not in the abilities of the persons but their social background
of belonging to different castes. The present economic poli-
cies of all the political parties as mentioned in their election
manifestos clearly indicate that they are interested in market
efficiency through privatization. The policies will definitely
provide opportunities to Dalits and others not in the primary
and secondary sectors of the economy, but in the tertiary sector,
particularly in the service sector. The traditional caste system
provided space for the non-Dvijas, particularly Dalits and ser-
vice castes (who are supposed), to serve the Dvijas.
Now the space created by service sector will be filled by the
Dalits and BCs. In other words, the varnashrama dharma will be
recreated in the 21st century where 90 per cent of the popula-
tion should serve around 10 per cent of Dvijas (more detail is
given in Chapters 6 and 7).

Notes
1. K. J. Garbraith, American Capitalism: The concept of Countervailing
Power (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1952).
2. J. Pen, The Wage Rate under Collective Bargaining (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 91–105.
3. J. Pen, ‘Bilateral Monopoly, Bargaining and the Concept of
Economic Power’, in Power in Economics, ed. K. W. Rothschild
(Halmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), 110.
4. R. K. Hazari, Industrial Planning and Licensing Policy (New Delhi:
Government of India, 1967).
5. Wiser William Henricks, The Hindi Jajmani System (Lucknow:
The Lucknow Publishing House, 1936).

Caste and Economic Power in India  57

 6. C. S. Wison and T. Lupton, ‘The Social Background of Top
Decision Makers’, In Power in Economics, ed. K. W. Rothschild
(Halmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979).
7. Hazari report noted how the select few Industrial houses
captured the investments in priority sectors and all of them
belong to either Bania or Brahmin caste.
8. Prabat Patnaik, ‘Decoding the Corporate Hindutva Alliance’,
The Hindu, 3 October 2019.
9. P. A. Baran and P. M. Sweezy ‘The Socio-Economic Background
of the Negro Question’, in Power in Economics, ed. Rothschild
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971).
10. K. S. Chalam, Economic Reforms and Missing Safety Nets
(Mumbai: Vikas Addyankendra, 1999).
11. Pravin Palande, Economic Milestone: Stock Market Scam, 1992
(India: Forbes, 20 August 2011).

58  Political Economy of Caste in India

 4

Inequity in the
Development of
Human Capital in India

Education and Schooling are two different concepts that are

alien to the social life of lower castes for a long time. It was
only during the British India, government schools were thrown
open to all.1 Education being a component of the concept of
human capital is as old as the discipline of political economy.2
It is a common knowledge of every parent that children with
more education earn higher incomes than those who have
less education. But it was Adam Smith, the father of political
economy, who discussed about the economic behaviour of
an educated man in his ‘Wealth of Nations’.3 He has said that
‘a man educated at the expense of much labour and time to
any of those employments which require extraordinary dex-
terity and skill, may be compared to one of those expensive
machines. The amount earned through work which he learns
to perform must be expected over and above the usual wages of
common labours that will replace to him the whole expenses
of his education with at least the ordinary profit of an equally
valuable capital’.4 Though scholars in economic discipline
date the concept implicitly to Sir William Petty,5 it was, how-
ever, Adam Smith who had explicitly explained the economic
value of education. Alfred Marshall6 who was familiar with the
definition of capital of Irving Fisher, ‘as simply any stock at
any given point of time that yields a stream of services whose
value is calculated by capitalizing the income flow’,7 did men-
tion about economic value of education in the first edition of
his ‘Principles’. But later, he dropped the idea, thinking that
the individual is his own inalienable property in a non-slave
society and, therefore, cannot be compared with a machine.
It is, however, realized that human beings cannot be treated
as produced means of production in the full sense that capital
goods are considered. Because a non-slave society prohibits
people from contracting to deliver their future services, ‘free’
people must keep their human wealth tied up in the form of
labour services and cannot hedge against unforeseen changes
in the future demand for their services.8 But, the situation has
undergone a change in the hands of neoclassical economists,
such as T. W. Schultz, the noble laureate. The concept is further
strengthened with the indulgence of modern economics and
management experts who consider ‘human beings’ as experts
and skilled personnel and can be traded in the market in the
name of body shopping, franchise players and so on.
Thomas Piketty in his Capital in the Twenty-first Century
argued against the concept of human capital as, attributing a
monetary value to the stock of human capital makes sense only
in society which it is actually possible to own other individuals
fully and entirely.9 It is exactly for this reason Marshall dropped
the idea in the later edition of his ‘Principles’. However, Piketty
has attributed other reasons as well since the concept does not
explain inequality in the USA after 1980. He was of the opinion
that ‘if the supply of skills does not increase at the same space
as the needs of technology then groups whose training is not
sufficiently advanced will earn less’. But some scholars with
Marxist persuasion did not agree with Piketty for assuming

60  Political Economy of Caste in India

some neoclassical assumptions like full employment and his
assumptions of capital investment in each country and so
on.10 However, Prabhat Patnaik agreed with the diagnosis of
the capitalist system that created and widened inequalities.
Daniel Kuehn11 and Murphy and Topel12 have contended that
even if we use human capital as distinguished from that of
labour the inequalities can be measured. Thus, the theory of
human capital that gave birth to the popular human develop-
ment Index (HDI) and the United Nations Organization (UNO)
reports has provided sufficient ground that the provision of the
constituents of human capital including education that takes
a share of two-thirds of its weight in HDI is very important for
development. We have noted the reservations and limitations
of the concept of human capital expressed by scholars above.
However, the fact remains that it is an important concept to
reckon with to understand the historically deprived castes who
were structurally denied access to it. Denial of education, par-
ticularly formal schooling to a select few based on their birth, is
crucial to understand how systematic the CMOP in India was.
We have selected education here to substantiate our argument
to understand the unique character of education. Education
is considered as an important item of investment that leads
to both consumption expenditure and investment benefits
simultaneously. The investor gets consumption benefit in the
form of psychic income. At the same time, it provides invest-
ment return through a stream of life-long earnings. It is to be
noted that the consumption and investment effects of educa-
tion are inseparable, and investors are invariably conditioned
by social, cultural and other factors. However, T. W. Schultz13
has observed that the consumption element in education in
modern times seems to be of minor importance and the future
consumption element is consistent with an investment view
of education. It was T.W. Schultz again who made an attempt
to link the concepts of physical capital and human capital in
his study on ‘Investment in Human Capital’. He is regarded as

Inequity in the Development of Human Capital in India  61

the pioneer of the theoretical study with his estimate of stock
of human capital in the USA for 1900 and 1957 and its over-
all contribution to growth. There are several such studies on
every country today linking education, as one of the important
investments in human capital, to economic growth, measured
in gross domestic product (GDP).

Human Capital and Human Development

The concept of human development evolved in 1990 by the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is different
from human capital. The concept is defined as, ‘the process of
enlarging the range of people’s choices, increasing their oppor-
tunities for education, health care and income and employment
and covering the full range of human choices from sound physi-
cal environment to economic and political freedom’.14 Human
development is used as an alternative measure of GDP to meas-
ure development. It is the end of human capital, while human
capital is a means to achieve human development. Concepts
such as social capital, finance capital and cultural capital are
being used by social scientists to convey the stream of benefits
that one gets once these are acquired. It seems the concept of
social capital is being used to explain the caste networks of
social relations which are characterized by norms of trust and
reciprocity that lead to outcomes of mutual benefit in India.
It is more pronounced in India after liberalization particularly
among the Dvija castes.

Human Capital Formation

T. W. Schultz in his presidential address to the American
Economic Association in 1961 identified five major categories
as investment in human capital.15 They are (a) health facilities
and services broadly conceived to include all expenditures
that affect life expectancy, strength and stamina, and vigour

62  Political Economy of Caste in India

and vanity of people; (b) on-the-job training, including old
style apprenticeship, organized by firms; (c) formally organ-
ized education at elementary, secondary and higher levels;
(d) study programmes for adults that are organized by firms,
including extension programmes, notably in agriculture; and (e)
migration of individuals and families to adjust to changing job
opportunities. Gary Becker, who has produced a monograph on
‘Economics of Discrimination’,16 in 1957 constructed a general
theory of investment in human capital based on conventional
neoclassical capital theory. He has provided the methods to
calculate costs of education and training and the total returns
as the present value of the income differentials occurring in
each period during the active life of workers in the relevant
occupation. He has concluded in his study that the increased
supply of skills in the USA during the past century was induced
by higher returns to education. He has developed the theory
under the neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition,
marginal ‘product equals wage at equilibrium’, technical pro-
gress as neutral and so on. The empirical studies have so far
provided four important measures of human capital. They are
all related to education.
The measures of human capital are (a) The number of
school years adjusted for a length of year. It is also necessary
to adjust the content, structure and type of education, (b) the
productivity of earnings of appropriate members of the labour
force with weight for years of schooling, (c) the present value
of the expected lifetime income yield of education, and (d) the
costs of education measured with base year prices, including
the earnings forgone or opportunity cost. The stock of human
capital can be estimated by using any one of the measure-
ments. (e) There are several limitations in the measurement of
human capital. The difficulties pointed out by Professor Joan
Robinson17 with reference to the measurement of physical
capital are equally applicable to the concept of human capital.
However, economics by now have accepted the above measures

Inequity in the Development of Human Capital in India  63

as a useful tool to estimate the stock or flow of human capital
in terms of educations and training provided in a country. The
stock of human capital is measured on the basis of data on the
education already attained by people during a period of time,
while enrolments at different levels of education are considered
as a flow of human capital. There are several issues involved in
the measurement of these concepts as pointed out by scholars
like Sen,18 Bowman,19 Scaffer20 and others. It can be seen from
the survey of literature on the concept of human capital that
investment in duration and training is given primacy over other
aspects of investment in people. Therefore, human capital is
broadly equated with education, though expenditure on health
and migration would equally contribute to the flow or stock
of human capital. Education is broadly defined as formal or
informal schooling, including time spent on research, extension
and other activities of higher education.

The Stock of Human Capital in India

There are various studies available on the measurement of
stock of human capital in India. The study conducted by a
young European scholar on the stock of human capital and
economic growth in Japan, Indonesia and India for the period
1890–2000 is fascinating.21 It is found that the value of stock of
human capital in India was $81.64 billion US dollars in 1890
compared to $2.4 billion in Indonesia. In 1895, Japan had a
stock of human capital of $120.8 billion compared to India with
$84.1 billion, a difference of around $40 billion. By the time
India attained its independence in 1947, Japan had a value of
$2,090.8 billions while India had only $224.5 billion. It is found
that the increase in the stock of human capital between 1895
and 1947 was 166.9 per cent in India while it was 1630.7 per
cent in Japan. The value of the stock was doubled in Japan with
$4,805 billion between 1947 and 1980 while it was a five-time
increase in India ($1,037 billion) during the same period. The

64  Political Economy of Caste in India

stock of human capital was found to be $8,641 billion in 2000
in Japan while it was $2,064 billion in India.
Economists have established that the rate of growth of an
economy is related to the availability of human capital in a
country. Therefore, the rate of economic growth of India and
Japan are found to be very diverse as were their stock of human
capital. It is very interesting to see that India had invested
heavily on education, during the post-independence period up
to 1980 when education, including higher education, research
and training, in the quality institutions was subsidized by the
state.22 This is the period in which the elite of the country were
educated at the cost of ignorant masses, particularly those who
have not seen the doors of higher education.23 The policy of
education in India seems to be lopsided and prejudiced against
some groups and heavily inclined towards few. It is here that
we can reflect whether education was universal from the
beginning of the East India Company rule in India or paro-
chial from the beginning? What is the modernist project of
the British? Whether the criticism that Lord Macaulay system
of education had replaced indigenous education is misplaced
or genuine? What has happened to the policy of education
that made only 16 per cent of the population literate by the
time we attained independence? What is the social base of
the underdevelopment of education of certain social groups
who have remained poor, ignorant and disadvantaged? A brief
account of the history of our educational policy will throw
light on the problem.

A Brief History of Educational Policy

There are several scholarly studies on the history of education
in India emphasizing that the modernist project in education
was ushered in through the so-called Anglican or English edu-
cation.24 But only a few of these studies have indicated that

Inequity in the Development of Human Capital in India  65

education was available to all castes or social groups during
different periods of Indian history. Except the ‘beautiful tree’
of Dharmpal25 that recount the spread of universal education
in the 18th century, no study has supported the argument that
education was universal in pre-British India. It is strange that
no critical study on the educational policy of ancient period
particularly with reference to Buddhist principles of equality
of access to viharas and the Muslim education of Madarasas
for common folk vis-à-vis the unlettered classes or castes
has been made available. Though the study of Radhakumud
Mookerji26 mentioned about the availability of knowledge of
Samkhya and non-Vedic agamas to all castes and women, it
was based on evidences from scriptures and studies of scholars,
such as A. B. Keith.27 They are not based on historical data.
According to the travelogues of Hiuen Tsang28 and I-Tsing,29
admission into university education was based on entrance
examination of high standard. It was secular education and,
therefore, no distinction of caste was observed at Nalanda. We
have evidences from medieval period that great saint poets,
such as Ravidas,30 Kabir,31 Thukaram,32 Vemana33 and others
from lower castes, have composed great libertarian poetry.
They were all literate emancipators and educators.34 Then, why
the literacy rates of non-Brahmins, particularly the so-called
SCs and backwards, were found to be low during the British
period and thereafter?
The educational policy of the East India Company was pri-
marily aimed to educate Indians in English to be interpreters
between the company and the people they governed. This
created a modern educated class. But social reformers like
Jyotirao Phule35 had to contest this policy before the Hunter
Commission in 1882 as it was not made democratic.36 He was
the first leader in modern India who demanded universal pri-
mary education. The British India government had tried some
changes thereafter. But the re-organized education had nei-
ther destroyed the oriental learning nor provided a restrictive

66  Political Economy of Caste in India

curriculum for the elite particularly in the colleges and insti-
tutes of higher learning sponsored by them. The curriculum and
syllabus used in most of the colleges during the period consisted
of both the traditional Vedic education and English education
that was prevalent in contemporary England. Several leaders
and scholars, including Ram Mohan Roy,37 Gandhi,38 Nehru,39
B. R. Ambedkar40, S. Chandrasekhar,41 Jagdish Chandra Bose,42
C. V. Raman,43 Tagore,44 Meghnad Saha45 and several scientists,
were trained by them. It was this system that has produced the
first three Indian noble laureates. Interestingly, some scholars
while appreciating the liberal education of the British critiqued
it by saying that it was introduced to exploit India46. If that
was so, why the policies and reforms that were attempted by
the government after independence have not substantially
overhauled the system? The state has invested in public higher
education at the cost of primary and secondary education. It is
clear from the allocation of funds for different levels of educa-
tion during the plan period 1951–2010.47 This is also reflected
in the estimates of stock of human capital noted above.

National Policy of Education

The major concern of the post-independence period was to
rebuild India. The University Education Commission (1948–
1949)48, the Secondary Education Commission (1952–1953)49
and the Kothari Commission (1964–1966)50 made several rec-
ommendations to realize the socialistic pattern of society. A
national policy of education was declared in 1968. The policy
has deliberately proclaimed that it was for national develop-
ment. The first sentence of the report had emphasized that the
future of India would be shaped in the classrooms. The commis-
sion spoke about free and compulsory education, equalization
of educational opportunity, common school, science education
and research, education for agriculture and industry, establish-
ment of new universities with adequate funds, education of the

Inequity in the Development of Human Capital in India  67

minorities, distance (correspondence) education, examination
reforms and above all a new educational structure of 10 + 2 +
3. This was for the first time a comprehensive review of educa-
tion from nursery to university research covering almost every
aspect of education was made. The commission has utilized
the services of great educationists of the time involving both
American and Russian experts. It was in this report a progressive
direction of investing 6 per cent of GDP on public education
was made. The commission report was extensively debated in
all forums throughout the country. Intriguingly, it is still being
debated indicating how the sage advice of the commission was
trivialized.
The emergence of the 21st century was considered by all
developed societies as an opportunity to reform their existing
systems of education. India has also reflected and introduced
the challenge of education in 1986.51 A programme of action
based on the recommendations of the 1986 policy was formu-
lated. Thereafter, two review committees headed by Acharya
Ram Murty52 and N. Janardhana Reddy53 made about 100
suggestions for implementation. The 1986 policy document,
in fact, has honestly looked at every weakness of our system
and made comprehensive recommendations for a technologi-
cal society. The recommendations and advice of the commit-
tees were kept aside while the Ambani and Birla committee54
was made to recommend privatization of Higher Education
in 2000. A knowledge commission was appointed under the
chairmanship of a technocrat Sam Pitroda in 200655 to make
recommendations to reform higher education for a knowledge-
based economy. The planning commission has incorporated in
its Eleventh Five-Year Plan some programmes for an inclusive
education. Finally, the Right to Education Act was passed in
2009. The implementation of the Act will have far-reaching
consequences for massification of higher education in future.
Thus, the national policies of education in India have a long
list of expert advice almost on every aspect of education during

68  Political Economy of Caste in India

the post-independence period. Therefore, we cannot say that
there was no intention or policy to reform education in India.
They are always available in print.

Westernization of Higher Education

Sociologists have developed the concepts of modernization,
Westernization and even Sanskritization to describe how the
Indian society has undergone the process of change. Srinivas56
has brought in the concept of Westernization in 1962. It was
noted by him that English as a medium of instruction and
opening of schools to all with the secular orientation of educa-
tion among other things has brought Westernization. He has
elaborated the concepts of Westernization and Sanskritization
as opposite notions in understanding the process of social
change. The concepts can be applied to education. But, the
system of higher education that was prevalent during the East
India Company, after independence in 1968 or 1986 or 2010
has almost remained the same. In fact, the use of English as a
medium of education and the clamour for American slang is
widened today than ever before. A number of courses, such
as business management, fashion technology, soft skills,
Information Communication Technology (ICT) and other
courses that are popular and in great demand in the USA,
Australia and other English-speaking countries were introduced
not only in the private sector and in non-formal educational
institutions, but even in university departments and in deemed
universities.57 A cursory look at the courses designed by the
deemed universities and private institutes and the twining
programmes of Western universities with Indian institutes
clearly indicate the deep involvement of Indian higher educa-
tion with American sentiment. The state has remained helpless
spectator if not a facilitator. The issue is how these reforms or
developments are taking place in education if there is already
a national policy? Do the above-mentioned developments

Inequity in the Development of Human Capital in India  69

and the declared and undeclared policies that are forthcom-
ing correspond with Indian ethos or Western sentiment or
a continuation of the East India Company project of mod-
ernization? Those who are interested in Indian education or
at least indigenization of education have ever tried to change
the trend? It appears that all those who are benefited by the
system either in the past or in its present form have facilitated
it to continue while debating vociferously against it. The elite
and the governing classes or social groups who are benefited
by English education have perhaps taken the education to its
logical end-Westernization? Why do the disadvantaged groups,
such as Adivasis, Dalits and service castes have still remained
outside the system of higher education, particularly in the qual-
ity institutes, established in the private sector? Why has the
disparity between Adivasis, Dalits and the Dvijas remained the
same? What is the role of judiciary in facilitating social justice
in education? These are some of the questions that need to be
addressed in light of the theories of social justice.

Disparities and Divides

The development of education in India over the years is closely
associated with the structure of society. The inequitable instinct
is manifested here. India was literate to the extent of 10 per
cent in 1931, of which the literacy rates for SCs and tribes were
only 1.9 per cent and 0.7 per cent, respectively.58 The disparity
between SCs, tribes, service castes and others has remained the
same in terms of literacy rates. The gap is much wider if the
enrolment rates in quality institutes are considered. The dispar-
ity has increased during the last one decade due to the emer-
gence of private sector where the so-called reserved categories
do not have access. The policymakers have been emphasizing
on the creation of equality of opportunity in education, a term
seems to have been derived from the American experience to
bridge the gap. It is pointed out by scholars that the concept of
equality of opportunity is possible within a stratification that

70  Political Economy of Caste in India

has high degree of inequality with a tall and narrow pyramid
of society. But India has a graded social inequality and it is
structurally built into the caste system. Further, the term oppor-
tunity contains a grain of colonial arrogance as if someone is
providing a chance to some other to gain entry into education
even though they do not deserve it. The American experience
is related to settlers and natives. Therefore, the educational
opportunities were created there to reduce the racial inequali-
ties between African Americans and whites. Thus, their entry
into education is not a right may be charity.
Though, the educational differences have slowly declined
due to the opportunities created, the class inequalities have con-
tinued to exist and have in fact raised the so-called status anxi-
ety. It is pointed out by scholars, such as Murray Milner Jr59 that
it is through redistribution of wealth and income rather than
through equality of opportunity in education that inequalities
can be reduced. It is an illusion to reduce inequalities through
education. On the other hand, the distribution of income
would sufficiently create equality of opportunity in education
and eliminate inequalities both in education and income. It is
established by research studies both in the USA and India that
the educational performance of students is broadly influenced
by the prestige of the college and the socio-economic status of
the students. Therefore, the so-called merit is not just based on
the numerical marks obtained in an examination, but due to
a host of other contributing factors that need to be taken into
consideration in judging the worth of a candidate.60
The concepts of merit and efficiency have a historical
context. I think they are not timeless concepts. Some of the
present-day business houses were considered inferior to the
English or European corporations before independence. They
were provided with state support and protection in the initial
period to achieve the present commanding heights in their
own fields. In fact, the strategy of planning adopted in India
has transformed several feudal lords into capitalists. This has

Inequity in the Development of Human Capital in India  71

facilitated the abolition of varna category at least among the
Dvijas to transform them as upper classes. It is made possible
by providing opportunities to utilize their capital, both physi-
cal and human. The state support for education and subsidies
for industry helped them to emerge as great economic players
over a period of five decades.61 But this did not percolate down
to lower castes and they have remained as castes both in rural
and urban areas. This is recognized by the planning commission
through the identification of the social divides in the Eleventh
Five-Year Plan.62 In fact, the divides are so flagrant that it is
the creamy layer in each caste, particularly among the Dvija
castes, that are stonkingly benefitted by the state policies. The
recent media reports about the Wealth of the top 100 or 500
billionaires or the occasional outbursts of scams in the parlia-
ment show the inequality of distribution of opportunities.63
This has once again shown that equality of opportunity is an
illusion. The concept may be useful to employ it as an ideologi-
cal smokescreen, but may not help reduce inequalities. In other
words, Matsyanyaya is in operation in modern India. Is it in
harmony with the social justice rhetoric of a democratic state?
There are several studies to prove that the rate of return on
higher education from Adivasis and Dalits are higher than that
of other categories due to minimum opportunity cost of educa-
tion. Naturally, the returns, particularly the social returns from
education of the reservation groups, will be maximized, if the
limited opportunity is given to them; of course, the institu-
tions will take care of remedial measures to bring them on par
with their peers. This is fait accompli in rate of return studies
on education.64 The principle should guide the educational
policy of the government in the formation of human capital
in India. Education and training are the important sources or
means through which a person can enter into an organized
service in a modern society. In fact, education is essential for
survival. The history of education in India has shown that some
social groups have remained outside the formal system and,

72  Political Economy of Caste in India

therefore, persisted for ages as underdeveloped. It is necessary
that they are brought into the mainstream. But social litigation
has prevented the state to formulate radical policies of reform.
We have scrutinized (Chapter 8) some relevant theories of
justice to be adopted by the state so as to help in formulating
a sound social policy.

Democratization of Education and Derision of

Knowledge
The social philosophy of India in the past and its continuation
in different guises today consist of several dichotomies. One of
the blatant dichotomies can be seen in the government policy
on education. It is a known fact that the non-Dvijas were denied
not only formal education and even access to dharmashastra
in the past. In the modern period, it was Jyotirao Phuley who
fought with the East India Company to provide access to
schooling to Shudras and Atishudras (Dalits) through his memo-
randum to Hunter Commission in 1882. We have noted from
the previous section the history of struggle for democratization
of education in India that became a right only in 2010. The
ruling castes, if not the political class, are intelligent enough
to enact laws to satisfy the anxious low-caste groups and work
quite opposite to nullify the results to maintain a status on. This
is visible in the educational policies of the union and state gov-
ernments except states, such as Kerala. Even in Kerala and West
Bengal, scholars have pointed out the ‘systematic exclusion’65
of lower castes in educational pursuits.66,67 Studies undertaken
by Chalam have established that the process of inequality con-
tinues in education at all levels, particularly in quality higher
educational institutions. But the data collected by government
sources show that the social gap is being reduced between lower
castes and others. This is the real dichotomy in education.
In order to satisfy the constitutional and social obligations,
enrolments and retention through non-detention system are

Inequity in the Development of Human Capital in India  73

obtained. The Association for the Study of Higher Education
(ASHE) Report indicates that the GRE is 25.8 per cent for general
and almost the same for SC, ST and others.163 Interestingly, 11
per cent of the enrolment or nearly 42 per cent are in distance
education mode. The quality of education and the knowledge
base of the students from these institutes is miserable with few
exceptions. Kanti Bajpai68 noted that the language and math-
ematical skills are tragic as half of our class 5th students can
read text of class 2 and 40 per cent students in class 8 can do
long division. Most of the reservation category students who are
pushed into government colleges get the BTech, BA and even
PhD degrees, but the knowledge base as seen from their test
scores of public examinations is appalling as the institutes in
which they study are in need of trained teachers, infrastructure
and a systematic teaching–learning process which the govern-
ments do not wish to improve. It means that they satisfy the
constitutional obligation of providing places in educational
institutional, but do not care to improve the knowledge base.
The dropout and pushout rates at higher educational institu-
tions, such as the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), the
Indian Institutes of Management (IIMS) for Dalit, Adivasis and
other socially marginalized sections, speak for itself as several
young boys and girls committed suicide.69

Notes
1. Government of India, Compilation on 50 Years of Indian
Education 1947–1997 (New Delhi: Ministry of Human Resources
Development, 1947). http://www.nic.in
2. M. Blaug, An Introduction to Economic of Education (New York:
Penguin, 1976).
3. Adam Smith, An Enquiry with the Nature and Causes of Wealth of
Nation, ed. Edward Cannan (London: Methuen & Co., 1904).
4. Ibid.
5. William Petty, Essay Concerning the Multiplication of Mankind,
2nd ed. (1698).

74  Political Economy of Caste in India

 6. A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, vol. 1, ed. Sh. Guillebaud
(London: Macmillan, 1906).
7. I. Fisher, The Nature of Capital and Income (MacMillon, 1906).
8. Blaug, Introduction to Economic of Education.
9. Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University, 2014), 163.
10. Prabhat Patnaik, ‘Capitalism, Inequality and Globalization:
Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century’, Marxist,
April–June 2014.
11. Daniel Kuen, ‘Human Capital in the Twenty First Century’,
European Journal of Comparative Economics 15 (2018): 3–9.
12. Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, ‘Human Capital
Investment and Economic Growth’, Journal of Labour Economics
34, no. S2 (February 2016): S99–S127.
13. T. W. Schultz, ‘Investment in Human Capital’, American
Economic Review 21 (1961): 4.
14. UNDP, Human Development Report, 1990 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991).
15. UNDP, 1990.
16. Becker Gary, The Economic of Discrimination (Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press, 1957).
17. Joan Robinson, The Accumulation of Capital (London:
Macmillan, 1956).
18. A. K. Seth, ‘Economic Approaches to Education and Manpower
Planning’, Indian Economic Review (April 1966).
19. Mans T. Bronar, ‘Human Capital: Concepts and Measure’,
in The Economics of Higher Education, ed. Selma J. Muslins
(Washington, 1962).
20. H. G. Schoffer, ‘Investment in Human Capital: Confute’,
American Economic Review L11, no. 4 (1961).
21. Bas Leevwen Van, ‘The Role of Human Capital in Endogenous
Growth in India, Indonesia and Japan, 1890–2000’,
International Economic History Conference, Helsinki, August
2006.
22. K. S. Chalam, Introduction to Educational Planning and
Management (New Delhi: Anmol, 2004).
23. Chalam, Education and Weaker Sections.
24. K. S. Chalam, Modernisation and Dalit Education: Ambedkar’s
Vision (Jaipur: Rawat, 2008).

Inequity in the Development of Human Capital in India  75

25. A. Dharampal, The Beautiful Tree: Indigenous India Education in
Eighteenth Century (New Delhi: Biblia Impex, 1983).
26. Radhakumud Mookerj, Ancient India Education: Brahminical
and Buddhist (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989).
27. A. B. Keith, The Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and
Upanishads: A History of Sanskrit Literature, 2 vol. (New Delhi:
Moti Lal Banarasidas, 1924).
28. Huen Tsang, a Chinese scholar came to study Buddhism in
India in 633 ad.
29. I-Tsing, a Chinese Buddhist who lived in India during 671–695
ad.
30. Ravidas was a 15th-century mystic of the Bhakti movement
from North India. He was from a poor shoemaker family.
31. Kabir harmonized Hindu and Muslim philosophies and was
a predecessor of Guru Nanak. He belonged to 1440–1518. He
was a low-caste mystic.
32. Thukaram, a prominent Marathi sant who contributed 4,500
abhangs. He belonged to the period 1577–1650.
33. Vermana belonged to the 14th-century Andhra. He composed
poetry in simple language with satire on the existing social
system and norms.
34. Gail Omvedt, Seeking Begumpura Navayana (New Delhi:
Navayana Publishers, 2008).
35. Phooley Jyoti Rao, Gulamgiri, trans. N. D. Phadke (Mumbai:
Government of Maharashtra, 1999).
36. Government of India, Hunter Commission, 1882. http://www.
education.nic.in
37. Ram Mohan Roy was the leader of social reforms in India. He
promoted English education.
38. M. K. Gandhi, Mahatma and father of India, brought freedom
from the colonial rule.
39. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India, a modernist
and true scholar.
40. B. R. Ambedkar, finally was called the father of the nation by
the people of India and Dalits, a constitution maker (as per a
survey conducted by a TV channel).
41. S. Chandrasekhar, a Noble laureate in physics.
42. Jagdish Chandra Bose, a scientist, the father of radio science
and plant research in India.
43. C. V. Raman, a Noble laureate.

76  Political Economy of Caste in India

44. Rabindranath Tagore, a great poet and the first Noble laureate
of India.
45. Meghnad Saha, a great scientist who started the Indian science
movement.
46. Bipin Chandra, Modern India (New Delhi: NCERT, 1980).
47. Chalam, Educational Planning.
48. S. Radhakrishnan, The University Education Commission.
www.education.nic.in
49. Government of India, Secondary Education Commission.
www.education.nic.in
50. Government of India, ‘Kothari Commission Report, 1968’.
www.education.nic.in
51. Government of India, ‘Challenge of Education, 1986’. www.
education.in
52. Government of India, ‘Acharya Rammurty Committee Report’.
www.education.nic.in
53. Government of India, ‘N. Janardhana Reddy Committee
Report’. www.education.nic.in
54. Government of India, ‘Ambani and Birla Report on Education’.
www.education.nic.in
55. Government of India, Knowledge Commission. www.educa-
tion.nic.in
56. M. N. Srinivas, Caste in Modern India (Bombay: Asia Publishing
House, 1962).
57. The Ministry of HRD has abolished the grant of deemed uni-
versity status to more than 45 institutes on the ground that
they have not been able to fulfil the standards and norms as
prescribed by University Grants Commission (UGC).
58. Government of India, Education in India. www.education.nic.
in
59. Murray Milner Jr., The Illusion of Equality: The Effects of
Education Opportunity on Inequality (Sanfransico, CA: Jossey
Bass, 1972).
60. The SAT scores in the USA are being commented as the smoke-
screen to eliminate the poor and the underprivileged blacks
and other minorities to enter into higher education.
61. U. Tataji, ed., Fifty Years of Planned Development in India
(Visakhapatnam: Andhra University Press, 2005).
62. Government of India, Eleventh Five Year Plan: Inclusive Growth
(Delhi: Planning Commission, 2010).

Inequity in the Development of Human Capital in India  77

63. The Times of India has published a series of scams during the
budget session of parliament in 2010.
64. Smrutirekha Sinshari and S. Maheswaram, ‘The Changing
Rates of Return to Education in India: Evidence, from NSS
data’, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore,
2016 paper 538.
65. ‘Systematic Exclusion: Why Kerala’s School and Colleges Have
Few Dalit Teachers’, Scroll in 5 October 2019.
66. Geetha B. Nambissan, ‘Equality in Education: Schooling of
Dalit Children in India’, Economic and Political Weekly 3, no.
10/17 (1996): 1011–1024.
67. Government of India, All India Survey of Higher Education,
2017–2018 (Delhi: GOI, 2018).
68. Kanti Bajpai, ‘Educating for Growth’, The Times of India, 5
October 2019.
69. Abhinav Malhotra, ‘Dalit Student Commits Suicide at IIT
Kapur Hostel Room’, The Times of India, 18 April 2018.

78  Political Economy of Caste in India

 5

Economic Deprivation
and Social Exclusion
of Marginalized Castes

Caste in India is a multidimensional category not easily

amenable to a single disciplinary knowledge. It has been in
existence for several centuries with ups and downs for differ-
ent castes with a steady growth only for the Dvijas. The Dvija
project is in supreme command of the social and economic
dimensions of the country now and, therefore, is in the saddle
of political power. But, majority of the castes particularly the
ex-untouchables or adi-Hindus/adi-dharmi, service castes and
the converts from these castes to Islam and Christianity are still
on the margins of the society with crony capitalism co-opting
groups that subscribe to Manu philosophy of graded inequal-
ity. It is now found that the Manu ideology and the Capitalist
ideology are in sink without any contradictions as both believe
in the merit of inequality and discrimination. We are going to
examine here how this has affected the living conditions of
the most marginalized social group, fisher folk who are still in
the stage of food gathering with mechanization and capitalist
entrenchment in deep sea fishing.
Caste as a Source of Deprivation
Caste is considered by a section of scholars as a social category
at the most as a class without defining the boundaries of each
caste or class. The use of terms likes ‘class in itself’ and ‘class
for itself’ may not directly guide our understanding of caste
through economic scrutiny. Therefore, caste is to be considered
as an MOP where the economic significance of each vocational
caste, their skills, the unchangeableness of the skill (as used
by Marx in Vol. I) would help us to ponder over why certain
castes remain backward while few others flourish irrespective
of the type of economy and society in which they function.
Though we have around 5,000 castes that have become mutu-
ally exclusive due to the tyranny of ‘Manu Dharma’ reinforced
by successive Dvija regimes, the economic status of the so-called
Dalits, ex-untouchables, service castes and artisans, which is
categorized and called with different names, had remained
backward.
Caste is being used as a source of exploitation as each caste
in the social and economic system, particularly in the rural
and semi-urban areas, carry a rank and value. The caste system,
including its original version of varna, is so rigid that any
subversion is dealt with severe penalty including death. One
may mention cases of how Shudras changing ranks or some
lower castes crossing boundaries with state support, but the
proportion of such cases is found to be less than 1 per cent
and do not have any impact on the annihilation of castes. In
fact, there are studies to prove that the social norms have eco-
nomic basis to keep the value of the Dvija high and the lower
caste lesser in value not only in social relations, but also in
economic transactions (previous chapters). The recent lynch-
ing of Dalits, Muslims and lower castes is a significant display
of caste (state) power to force them to supply cheap labour
and accept the social obligation to serve the upper castes. It is
also a harsh warning to them not to enter the leather and beef
business of around `60,000 crores of exports. The produces of

80  Political Economy of Caste in India

these communities are devalued by labelling them even in a
capitalist market with discrimination and violence, often seen
to be projected as communal violence. The economic under-
current in these transactions is disguised in social and cultural
stances that need to be deciphered for a proper understanding
of economic basis of caste.
The concept of deprivation is being used by social scientists
ever since the paradigm of human rights has emerged as an
issue of public discourse. Scholars such as John Rawls, Amartya
Sen and the constitutional experts, including some enlightened
judges of Indian apex court, upheld the view that it is the duty
of the state to protect inalienable rights of the citizens for they
have surrendered their liberty to the state anticipating protec-
tion. Thus, ‘human right’ is an important constituent of human
existence not only in terms of Thomas Paine’s elucidation of
natural right, but also under the aegis of UNO mandate. Now
several independent nations do strive to reach out the people
through the paradigm of rights. The development goals pre-
scribed by UNO, including the present sustainable goals, are
described within this broad framework. Therefore, the idea of
deprivation is necessarily obliged to answer questions of rights.
We are concerned here about the economic deprivations meted
out to a backward fisher community; an index of deprivation
specific to the living conditions of fishermen of North Coast
of Andhra Pradesh is developed here.

Economic Deprivation
Economic deprivation is defined as the lack of sufficient income
for people to play roles, participate in the relationships, and
take part in the accepted behaviour expected of them by the
society. Economic deprivation is a state of income inequality
wherein income generated by one individual is not enough
to cover his basic needs. It has increased the gap between the
rich and the poor, where the rich become richer and the poor

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  81

become poorer. The economic resources on the coast, includ-
ing fish, marine underwater resources, mangroves, reefs, and
ecology, which the traditional fisher folk used to possess, are
now alleged to be denied due to special economic zones (SEZ)
and other liberalization policies. This is so because the rich have
the financial means to create more wealth, while economically
deprived people, on the other hand, barely have enough for
subsistence. Peter Townsend1 has pioneered a relative depriva-
tion approach to poverty that covered a wide range of aspects
of living standards, both material and social. For Townsend,2
individuals, families and groups in the population can be said
to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the
types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living
conditions and amenities which are customary or at least widely
encouraged or approved in the societies to which they belong;
their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the
average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded
from ordinary patterns, customs and activities.
Measures of deprivation are not the same as measures of
income—they are related to how people live. Deprivation
is the consequence of a lack of income and other resources,
which cumulatively can be seen as living in poverty. The rela-
tive deprivation approach to poverty examines the indicators
of deprivation. Townsend developed a list of 60 indicators of
style of living for a survey into standards of living in the UK in
1968/1969, which was later revised.
The lack of or non-participation in the provision of adequate
food, clothing recitation, education, health, social relations and
environment at home is considered as deprivation. A ‘score’ for
different forms of deprivation could be ascertained and related
to household income. Townsend has kept on working on the
theme and improved his method of calculating Deprivation
Index. We have taken the improved method of calculation of
indices used in 2010.

82  Political Economy of Caste in India

Indicators of Deprivation for Fisher Folk
We have identified some specific indicators or factors that
inhibit fisher folk to actively participate in economic and social
interaction in the coastal region. As noted above, we have taken
the Rights Approach as a feature that shows how the prevail-
ing situation fails to provide opportunity to the fisher folk to
exercise their natural right, such as fishing, in the sea. Fisher
folk on the coast are a distinct community and, therefore, we
need to identify their immediate problems of existence and
identity. Therefore, we have selected the following indicators
to estimate the fisher folk multiple deprivation index (FMDI).
While accepting some select indicators of Townsend, we have
added the following indicators for our study of fisher folk of
north coastal Andhra Pradesh.

1. The main source of living is fishing in the sea and their right
to do so is well protected by the government. But due to
over-exploitation and industrialization on the coast, fishery
resources have been dwindled. This has resulted in the fisher
folk returning empty-handed after going into the sea, which
is a violation of their natural right. It happens not once
but several times in a month. We have noticed how many
times in a month a fisherman returned empty handed as an
indicator of deprivation.
2. The income of the fisher folk depends upon fishing for
those who go for fishing and for others who are employed
in organized and unorganized sectors. Therefore, per capita
income is considered as a factor of deprivation if it is below
the poverty line.
3. The government has passed the Right to Education Act,
making it compulsory and free education up to the upper
primary level of eight years of schooling. Those who do not
complete or remain outside of this norm as a percentage of
total are considered as deprived of education.

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  83

4. Healthcare is an important item of expenditure for the poor
particularity fisher folk who live on the coast, away from
the mainstream society. It is expected that government
would provide facilities, such as hospitals, health centres in
their habitations so that the expenditure on healthcare of
the family be minimized. We have considered how many
patients as proportion of total sufferers are going in for
government doctors as an indicator of deprivation from
healthcare.

Economic exploitation and deprivation are interrelated. We

have taken into consideration the assets held by each house-
hold, income from different sources, such as wages, selling of
milk, remittances from abroad, rents and income from agricul-
ture. Fishing is a collective effort on the high seas. Even after
landing, the boat needs the support of 10 people to anchor it on
the shore as it weighs heavy. It is a known fact that a minimum
of four males are necessary for fishing in an ordinary boat and
if the size is bigger and a high horsepower (HP) motor is used,
they may need more people either as partners or wage earn-
ers to do fishing. Trawler fishing is different, and we have not
come across such owners among the fisher folk in our sample
study area. We are providing empirical data culled out from
a research study funded by Indian Council of Social Science
Research (ICSSR) and conducted by Institute for Economic and
Social Justice, Visakhapatnam. The study was undertaken in 3
districts of Srikakulam, Vizianagaram and Visakhapatnam on
the coast of Bay of Bengal.

Average Monthly per Capita Income

Per capita income has been used as a measure to learn about
the economic status of a person or family if the income is
expressed per household. The average per capita household
and per person income in each mandal is estimated from the

84  Political Economy of Caste in India

study. There are certain limitations in reading the data as we
have estimated the per capita income as an average of the
total number of people in each mandal and district. It is only
an average that may not be directly related to every member
of the household, as some members may be getting more than
the average while some may be getting less than the average
amount. It is noted that the region’s average household income
per month is `8,244, the highest being observed in Srikakulam
Mandal and the lowest in Nakkapalli Mandal. The average
income brackets of `960 and `960 to 1,500 are estimated to
show that those who get less than this income are either under
poverty line or just at the border. Generally, poverty levels are
estimated on the basis of expenditure per capita. Experts and
government statisticians have been using monthly per capita
expenditure (MPCE) as a measure and have been revising the
amount at different periods of time, such as `25 per capita per
day once or `32 per capita per day in rural area and `47 per
capita per day in urban areas on the basis of certain criteria as
in 2014. Once the nutritional values of food items have been
considered to determine whether a person is above or below a
certain per capita some items have been given up and few essen-
tial items of expenditure for sustenance, such as gas, electricity,
clothes, festivals and alcohol are considered here for fisher folk.
Therefore, it is assumed that people who are getting less than
`920 per capita per month are poor and those who are in the
range of `920–1500 do experience the same conditions.

Income from Non-fishing Activities

Fisher folk are now forced to enter into non-fishing activities,
as fish resources are dwindling due to over-exploitation. It was
noted in the previous sections that the proportion of fisher
folk who are going in for fishing is limited to one-third of
the population. They are seeking alternative sources of earn-
ings to sustain. Those who are near the urban areas, such as

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  85

Pedagantyada Mandal of Visakhapatnam, Srikakulam, are able
to get into informal sector, but those who are in the rural areas
are getting into other jobs for wages or do petty jobs to earn
something. As we have already explained in the previous chap-
ter on occupational shift of the fisher folk, we confine here only
to explain the earnings. The data need to be read with caution
as the number of households involved in different jobs may not
add to the total as the same household may be doing different
jobs at the same time as secondary job/occupation. The purpose
of the data noted above is to explain how the fishermen are
getting different types of income doing non-traditional jobs.
Therefore, the incomes of different categories of jobs do not
add up to the average income arrived. An aggregate income
show how in each mandal incomes of fishermen vary. The
present table shows incomes earned by different categories of
people doing different jobs. It shows the average earnings of
that particular job only.
Fishermen going in for fishing need not necessarily be in
their own boats, it can be in others’ boats for (a) wage and (b)
sharing of catch. It is noted that 14 per cent of the households
go in for fishing with their own boats. The average income of
the family is estimated at `127,074 per annum. The average size
of the family is 4 and it comes around `31,000 per capita per
year. It is found that the highest amount of `181,305 income
is recorded in Vajrapukotturu of Srikakulam district and the
lowest is from Nakkapalli with `52,562. Fishermen who are
going for wage in others boats is estimated at `150,842 and
only 61 households or 6.6 per cent are in this category. The
highest and lowest in this category is same as the previous one.
There are many who go in for fishing as part of a group and
they share the catch as per tradition. It is noted that the aver-
age income from this is `100,598 per annum. The highest and
lowest amounts in the region differ widely under this category.
It is now possible to compare the average income of a fisherman
family, which is higher if he goes for a wage in a boat or ship

86  Political Economy of Caste in India

and is lower if he goes for a sharing method of earnings from
his catch. We have noted the earnings of some households from
agriculture, rents and so on, but the proportion of households
and the income is meagre. The average income from a house-
hold going in for services is `115,158. The ranks have changed
here. Srikakulam Mandal fishermen are getting `175,597, the
highest and the lowest is from Nakkapalli `25,907. About 27
per cent of the households involve in petty business and the
average earnings are `48,945. Vajrapukotturu again comes first
with `56,992. It is noticed that fishermen go for jobs or fish-
ing in other areas or countries and send money back home.
One hundred and ten households have such people remitting
money. The average amount of remittances from outside/
abroad is `19,290. Vajrapukotturu comes first with `18,809
here. The information gathered from the households clearly
indicate that it is better for a fisherman to go for wages in a
boat/ship rather than do it on his own or share it with others.
This also indicates that the fisher folk are slowly disappearing
as independent operators with their own boats as fishing is
becoming a serious and costly business with new technology
and fibre-mechanized boats with costly machines which they
cannot afford.

Average Savings and Income

The data from the households is culled out to estimate the
average annual and monthly income and to find out the
net disposable income after deducting savings from income.
The average yearly income is estimated at `96,118 from all
sources, and the highest is noted from Srikakulam district.
However, the average monthly income is recorded as highest
from Srikakulam with `10,309 and the lowest with `6,692 is
found in Pusapatirega. The average savings from among the
635 household or 68 per cent of the household is 6,229. We
have also found that the total income from all the households
as reported by them comes to `89,198,076. Out of which

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  87

`3,955,700 are saved. The savings are being put in banks as
deposits by 15 per cent only and the remaining householders
are using the savings to buy fishing gear, gold and so on. We
have asked about their perception about their economic status
based on their income and social standing. It is reported that
around 20 per cent consider themselves as very poor and 56
per cent as poor, together making it 76 per cent. Twenty-two
per cent of the fisher folk consider themselves as average and
only 2 per cent perceive that they are rich. These figures seem
to be as close to truth as we see from our expenditure data
presented in the next section.
It is reported that 90 per cent of the households have bank
accounts, may be due to Jan Dhan scheme. The total savings of
the sample households amount to `3,433,100 that works out
to be `4,097 as average savings. Only two households reported
that they have invested in shares and the amount is `140,000.
Four households reported that they have cooperative bank
accounts. Interestingly, 17 per cent of households put their
money in chit funds. Around 11 per cent have Life Insurance
Corporation (LIC) accounts and only 1 person has post office
savings; 9 households reported that they go to local pawnbro-
kers. Interestingly, 81 per cent are members of self-help groups
(SHGs) and some NGOs are working among them to popularize
the habit of savings and thrift.

Highly Indebted Fisher Folk

The expenditure habits of people of low socio-economic status
in general and the isolated fisher folk in a particular area typical
in terms of their ecological conditions are often conditioned
by their culture of poverty. After independence, the Reserve
Bank of India conducted the first All-India Rural Credit Survey
in 1951 to understand the indebtedness and credit needs of the
people and found the high incidence of rural indebtedness. The
National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) has been conducting
surveys on debt and investment occasionally and the latest 70th

88  Political Economy of Caste in India

survey of 2013 indicated the average amount of debt per house-
hold. The average value is expressed separately for cultivators
and non-cultivators in rural area. It is estimated that the value
of debt for cultivators is `110,438 and that for non-cultivators
is `87,938. Further, it is noted that the incidence of debt is
31.4 per cent in rural areas. The data is cited here to show the
circumstances of debt among fisher folk in our study region.
The indebtedness of fisher folk in the region and the sources
of debt are obtained from the study. We have observed that
there are 10 centres of sources of debt for fisher folk. They are
(a) institutional loans from commercial banks, (b) rural banks,
(c) cooperative banks, (d) Development of women and children
in rural areas (DWCRA) or SHG, (e) money lenders or pawnbro-
kers, (f) traders or fish market brokers, (g) friends and relatives,
(h) microfinance and call money dealers, (i) chits and (j) others.
Every household of the fisher folk is involved in some kind
of engagement with loans or debt. They are considered to be
perpetual borrowers in the sense that they keep on borrowing
from one source or the other to clear some persistent lender.
There can be restriction in a formal institutional lending, such
as a bank, but in informal sources, where the interest rate is
high, there seems to be no limit.
We have noticed in our study that there is more number of
households reporting as debtors than the households indicating
that at least 10 per cent of them are repeaters. A total of 63 per
cent of the borrowers are from SHG groups followed by 40 per
cent borrowers from friends and relatives. Loans taken from
banks are limited to 5 per cent and nearly half of that comes
from other sources, such as microfinance and brokers. However,
the situation seems to have improved due to the presence of
some NGOs encouraging SHG, DWCRA and formalizing the
channels of repayment and repeat of loan.
The data on outstanding amount of loan (as estimated in
the study cited above) show that an amount of `141,910 per
household is the highest and is from informal source of friends

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  89

and relatives as estimated in the study cited above. Next comes
`127,683 from banks and the lowest amount is that from SHG
with `25,881. There are other sources in between. Similarly, the
outstanding amount to be paid to the lenders is found to be
maximum amount of `267,026 being recorded for banks, fol-
lowed by `128,516 from the category of friends and relatives,
and that from others come within these ranges. In other words,
the average debt is `73,881 and the outstanding loan is `62,790.
These amounts are close to the all-India averages arrived at by
the NSS survey for 2013.
The rates of interest at which they take loans suggest the
pressure of their needs to go for a debt. The rate of interest
varies from 9 per cent to 72 per cent in the region. Banks charge
reasonable rates of interest within 24 per cent. The data show
that 2.6 per cent of the debtors take loan at 12 per cent and
less than 1 per cent of the household take loan at 24 per cent.
The rate of interest is very high if it is from non-institutional
sources, such as friends, where 32 per cent of households take
loan at 24 per cent and some 13 families’ borrowed at above
25 per cent. There is one household in Srikakulam district who
has barrowed at 72 per cent interest. We have also culled out
information about the reasons that prompted them to borrow.
It is noted that 41 per cent reported that they borrowed the
money to meet the consumption needs of the family, 15 per
cent reported that they borrowed it for business and 13 per
cent borrowed for education of children, 10 per cent borrowed
to meet health expenditure and only 11 per cent took loans to
buy gear and so on for fishing. This is a reflection of the erratic
conditions of their habits of savings and expenditure that needs
to be further probed to find out solutions for their indebtedness.
We can notice from the data on income, savings, investment
and expenditure of fisher folk revealing some inherent mecha-
nism. The fisher folk do not have control over their items of
expenditure, particularly the culture specific items, such as fes-
tivals, alcohol, menarche, consumption and other conspicuous

90  Political Economy of Caste in India

items, that are not directly related to improve their productivity
as fisher folk. The indebtedness show the trend of low-income
groups tending to go for loans from whatever source that is
available without considering the price, that is, interest on loans
that make them bonded borrowers. It is a vicious circle and
difficult for certain families to come out of it if they are caught
again by natural calamities and forced to become paupers.

Marketing of Fish by Fisherwomen

Selling of fish in the market, curing and processing are done by
fisher folk women. Even if the family is not going for fishing as
a primary occupation, fisherwomen go for selling fish, engage
in processing and other allied activities either in a formal centre
or informally in a nearby fish market. The price of fish is still
determined in the traditional form of higgling and bargaining.
The popular adage in civilized conversations referring to mar-
ketplace is the term used ‘it is not a fish market’ suggesting that
it is most archaic and unorganized. It also shows how the toiling
fishermen product is priced and exploited like the tribe’s minor
forest products, such as tamarind, nuts and so on, are appropri-
ated at a very ridiculous price. There are broadly two categories
of sellers in the fish market. The women of the families going
for fishing get the product directly to the market and the other
type is one where women from non-fishing families acquire fish
through formal and informal contracts from the fisher folk and
sell it in the market. It is noted that 91 per cent of fisher folk in
rural area directly market them as seen from Nakkapalli, while
this figure is 12 per cent in Peda Gantyada of Visakhapatnam
city. It is around 55 per cent in Srikakulam district. Those who
do not market their fish through their family members give it
to merchants and others.
They get the fish from other family members. Their figure
is about 80 per cent, while 4 to 21 per cent reported to have
acquired fish through contractors and very few from brokers.

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  91

The interesting part of the table is given at the second part on
how the weight/quantity of fish is measured. It is noted that
in less than 5 per cent of the cases, fish is weighed in kilo-
grams. In 97 per cent cases in Nakkapalli Mandal and in the
same proportion in other areas except in Pedagantyada, fish is
bought in bulk quantity in baskets. The role of the middleman,
contractor and so on who provide loans and short-term hand
loans use the situation to determine the price. Though 80 to
90 per cent cases in rural mandals of Nakkapalli, Bhogapuram
and Srikakulam fix the price themselves, still 10 per cent of
the price is a prerogative of the contractor cum money lender.
Sometimes, they become the price leaders in terms of deciding
the price to be followed by others. As noted in the second part,
the price of fish, a perishable good, is determined immediately
after landing at the respective centres. The role of the contrac-
tor and the middleman cannot be wished away. This shows
that the pricing of fish both at the landing and in the informal
market still rely on tradition. But when we go to a fish selling
unit in a super market, the price is predetermined and is higher
than what we see at the landing centres. This unorganized
nature of marketing of fish deprives the fisher folk the proper
remuneration to their labour leading to exploitation and non-
remunerative prices.

Poverty among Marine Fisher Folk

Poverty estimates have become a routine exercise by scholars
whenever they embark upon economic analysis of a group,
class, caste or state or a nation. This is being done in India
ever since Dandekar and Rath brought out a monograph
using nutritional levels, linking it to per capita expenditure
in the 1970s. The government has been using the statistics for
policy formulation and in providing assistance or subsidies
to the poor. Therefore, poverty lines are being drawn based
on sample surveys conducted by agencies, such as NSSO on
a regular basis. Economists, mostly statisticians, are involved

92  Political Economy of Caste in India

in the explanations and argue as to the quantity and quality
of the measure, dimensions and so on with little regard for
human element, such as diversity and ecology of the people
living in different ecosystems in the deliberations. Fisher folk
have been living in utter destitution, particularly those who
are away from urban areas and in remote places due to several
factors of mindless development projects on the coast. We
have estimated per capita income and expenditure from the
survey data. It is necessary to know how much money out of
their earnings goes in for food and non-food due to several
leakages in the households or fisher folk’s behaviour pattern
and habits and customs. We cannot rely simply on their state-
ment of earnings to measure poverty. Before we examine the
items of expenditure, the sources of income and expenditure,
we need to identify that expenditure of fisher folk household
involves the following:

E = ∑i − (s + ea + ef + lr) + d

where E is the per capita expenditure, i is the per capita income,

s is the savings, ea is the expenditure on alcohol, ef is the
expenditure on festivals, lr is the loan repayment, and d is the
debt or hand loan.
In other words, the per capita expenditure of a fisherman is
not determined on the basis of his earnings through income
from fishing, wage labour or regular job, but he has the habit
of borrowing from different sources to meet the traditional
customs like performing or participating in a jatara (festival),
performing puberty (menarche) function of a daughter and
attending to such functions in relatives homes that are custom-
ary by tradition. This signifies their identity as an important
element of their life. The expenditure and income of fisher folk
and other lower-caste households from traditional families are
not generally interrelated. They do not know how to adjust
their expenditure to the source of income and the pawnbrokers
and call money sharks are always present in the habitations to

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  93

help them to get hand loans or debts at a short notice, mostly
for consumption purposes.
If there are few households among the fisher folk who would
have taken loans for construction of a house or extension of a
room or buying a boat, they are guided by their will and not
by community traditions. We have identified the sources of
income apart from the primary occupation of fishing. As noted
earlier, the occupation of fishing is dwindling due to several fac-
tors and excessive exploitation of marine and living resources
of the coast. There are only 30 per cent of the families going
for fishing as a primary occupation and the rest depend upon
other activities. Therefore, family income includes income not
only from fish catch, but also from other sources, such as wages
by labourers, income from agriculture, working outside and
remitting money home and others, as well as women serving
either as labourers or housemaids.

Studies on Poverty in India

Ever since Dandekar and Rath studied the levels of poverty
on the basis of nutritional value translated into expenditure,
there has been a big debate in the academic circles about the
methods of estimation of poverty in India. The World Bank
teams were also involved in the debate. World Bank criteria
of $1.25 per capita per day expenditure translated as `45 did
not define the items. The 9th plan has commissioned study
on below poverty line (BPL) families and listed criteria of 13
indicators that included landlessness, indebtedness, literacy,
clothing, sanitation, housing and so on to arrive at the number.
Reviewing the reports, the Ministry of Rural Development has
appointed a Committee under N. C. Saxena to suggest measures
to estimate poverty. After reviewing all the hitherto studies,
Saxena has proposed 10-point criteria based on 5 indicators
with weightage to consider a household as poor or non-poor.
They are (a) SC, ST with weightage 3 and BC with weightage 1,

94  Political Economy of Caste in India

(b) landlessness with weightage 4, (c) below primary education
with weightage 1, (d) tuberculosis (TB) patient with weightage
1 and (e) age above 60 with weightage 1. Based on the score,
it is suggested that those who get the maximum score will be
included first as BPL family and so on. Saxena has arrived at a
figure of 50 per cent as the proportion of poor in India that is
higher than that reported by the Tendulkar Committee. After
examining all the issues, we have noticed that the fisher folk on
the coast do come automatically under poor category as they are
landless, illiterate, and under BC and SC categories. Therefore,
we have made a preliminary scouting of the data to know
whether any of the fisher folk possess sufficient land to come
under the category and the results are discussed below. Finally,
we have decided to take the per capita household expenditure
that is devoid of any superficial items and contains just items
for survival, which are taken to estimate the poor. Therefore,
the data from the study indicate the actual figures of the poor
among the fisher folk. It is different from the poverty defini-
tion of nutrition criteria given by some economists. According
to Saxena, the concept given by some is a kutta–billi criteria as
the amounts are just sufficient for dogs and cats to survive and,
therefore, he included shelter, clothing, education, medicine
and so on in his concept of poverty. In fact, the data on MPCE
of fisher folk indicated exactly the same and nothing more than
that. Therefore, we have taken the food and non-food items of
expenditure to estimate the poor.
The per capita expenditure per month MPCE on food and
non-food items of fisher folk in the study area are obtained.
We have followed the NSS method in presenting the data
after culling it from the survey data. The data is presented
in rupees at the current prices. It is noted that the average
per capita expenditure of the study area is `248.75. There are
slight variations among the mandals. The highest amount of
`270.54 is found in Pusapatirega and the lowest of `230.60 is
reported from Nakkapalli. We have also given the breakup of

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  95

expenditure on each item. Rice, the staple food, constitutes
24 per cent, while fish, eggs and so on constitute 20 per cent
of the total food expenditure (we have imputed the price of
fish consumed by those who use it from their own catch).
Interestingly, alcohol constitutes 12.2 per cent and it varies
from 7 per cent in Pedagantyada to 24 per cent in Nakkapalli.
It is noted that expenditure on festivals and customs include
on average around 12 per cent spent on alcohol in the same
mandal. In other words, unproductive expenditure either on
alcohol or festivals is a menacing preference of fisher folk. We
have estimated MPCE for non-food items, including the item
on festivals, which is being considered by them as an issue
of identity and therefore essential. Some of the items noted
are derived from the NSSS survey. The highest expenditure of
`293 is noted in Pedagantyada mandal and the lowest is from
Pusapatirega. The former is part of an urban area while the latter
is from rural setting. The total per capita per month expenditure
for food and non-food items is given at the end of the table.
It is noted that the average expenditure comes to `486.12; in
Pedagantyada, spending is more at `527.34 and Bhogapuram
has the lowest spending of `425.96.
It is noted that non-food items of expenditure, such as alco-
hol, medicines and festivals, constitute a major component of
the total per capita expenditure. We have estimated that they
constitute 25 per cent and 28 per cent of total non-food items
respectively. The total expenditure on these items is 26 per cent
of the total MPCE. Had government schemes of free education,
healthcare and prohibition are implemented effectively, the
fisher folk would have crossed poverty.
The data indicate the average expenditure obtained from
928 households with a population of 3,792 of the sample.
Therefore, we have rearranged the data in class intervals by
taking into account the per capita per day expenditure fixed by
the Rangarajan committee on poverty. The norm of `32 makes

96  Political Economy of Caste in India

it `960 per month to determine those who are below that norm
as poor. We have also taken the next category of `961–1500 for
those who are on the margin and to account for the current
prices as the norm was given in 2014. In fact, the expenditure
on festivals puts them under this category. It is noted that 61.31
per cent of the population in the study area fall below poverty
category. However, there are variations; a population of 73.53
per cent in Bhogapuram and only 32.67 per cent in Nakkapalli
come under this category. But, if the norm of `961+ is taken,
93 per cent of the population in Nakkapalli come below the
poverty line.
It is noted that if both the categories are combined, around
92 per cent of the fisher folk are categorized under BPL. The
Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute (CMFRI) study on
East Coast of Andhra Pradesh in 2010 has concluded that 93
per cent of the fisher folk of north coastal Andhra Pradesh
come under BPL.3

Regression Results
We have run a simple regression to test the reliability of our
above figures.

Pe = a + β1Fe + β2d + β3Pi

where Pe is the per capita expenditure, Fe is the per capita food

expenditure, d is the per capita debts or hand loans, Pi is the
per capita income, and β is the dependent variable.

Pe = 258.531 + 0.970 + 0.002 + 1.587

(–0.347) (1.822)* (1.236)* (0.148)**
Ṝ2 = 0.556

*Significant at 5%.
**Significant at 10%.

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  97

 The results of regression as noted above show that the model
explains 56 per cent of the per capita expenditure, and the coef-
ficients are significant.

Multiple Deprivations of Marine Fisher Folk

We have adopted the UK method of estimation of deprivations
here. The English Indices of Deprivation 2010 are measures
of multiple deprivations at the small area level. The model
of multiple deprivations, which underpins the Indices of
Deprivation 2010 is based on the idea of distinct domains of
deprivation which can be recognized and measured separately.
These domains are experienced by individuals living in an area.4
People may be counted in one or more of the domains, depend-
ing on the number of types of deprivation that they experience.
Each domain represents a specific form of deprivation experi-
enced by people and each can be measured individually using
a number of indicators. Seven distinct domains have been iden-
tified in the English Indices of Deprivation, namely, Income
Deprivation, Employment Deprivation, Health Deprivation and
Disability, Education Skills and Training Deprivation, Barriers
to Housing and Services, Living Environment Deprivation
and Crime. Individual domains can be used in isolation as
measures of each specific form of deprivation. They can also
be combined, using appropriate weights, into a single overall
Index of Multiple Deprivation, which can be used to rank every
small area in England according to the deprivation experienced
by the people living there. Along with two supplementary
indices, Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index and
Income Deprivation Affecting Older People Index, they form
the English Indices of Deprivation. These statistics allow the
most- and least-deprived areas of the country to be identified
as well as provide information about the issues faced by people
living in different parts of the country. The Townsend score is a
summation of the standardized scores (Z scores) for each vari-
able (scores greater than zero indicate greater levels of material

98  Political Economy of Caste in India

deprivation). The Townsend score was considered the best indi-
cator of material deprivation available. The variables that make
up the Townsend score are combined together in an overall dep-
rivation index, with each variable being given an equal weight-
age. The variables selected are direct indicators of deprivation,
that is, they represent the condition or state of deprivation. Z
scores express each variable in terms of its mean value in the
population and its standard error. If this were not done then
variables with longer scales would have more weightage than
variables with shorter scales in the overall score. For example,
the number of children in a household could vary from 0 to
10, while the number of cars could range from 0 to 3. Simply
adding these together would give children more weightage
than cars—standardization is intended to avoid this problem.
This index has been the most widely used and has been consid-
ered as one of the best indices available. We have adopted the
methodology to estimate the MDI for each village, mandal and
district of our sample study. However, we have given different
weights to the variables as explained earlier based on the type
of index we have selected for the marine fisher folk.
Z score formula:

X −
Z=


where X is the score, µ is the mean and σ is the standard

deviation.
We have noted in the beginning the concept of economic
deprivations experienced by the marine fisher folk of north
coastal Andhra Pradesh. The weighted Z scores for each item
of deprivation and the sum of it is adjusted for 100 as multiple
deprivations is noted. Each item is given a weightage depending
upon its importance. Fishing is given a weightage of 50, income
25, education 15 and health 10. The results show that depriva-
tions are uniform among all the mandals with little variation

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  99

from combined score. However, Nakkapalli has a higher score
of 74.97 on education while Srikakulam in health issue scored
differently. The aggregate score of 74.97 and the same for all
the mandals clearly indicates that marine fisher folk of north
coastal Andhra Pradesh are subjected to multiple economic
deprivations. (However, there are villages, such as Rajayyapeta,
Bangaramma peta in Nakkapalli rural mandal and strangely all
the three villages of urban Pedagantyada mandal have scores
less than the regional and district average scores.)

Social Exclusion
Economic deprivations generally lead to social exclusion if the
group is on the margins of the society, such as the marine fisher
folk. In the present study of north coastal Andhra Pradesh, the
fisher folk are found to live and subsist far away from the main-
stream society. We have noted in the previous chapters that
fisher folk suffer from several discriminations. The village level
survey of the 26 villages on the coast of North Andhra provide
us information about the kind of infrastructure available to
show that they are physically excluded from the mainstream
society.
Social exclusion is a complex and multi-dimensional pro-
cess. It involves the lack of or denial of resources, rights, goods
and services, and the inability to participate in the normal
relationships and activities, available to the majority of people
in a society, whether in economic, social, cultural or political
arenas. It affects both the quality of individual and the equity
and cohesion of society as a whole.
Social exclusion is defined as a multi-dimensional process in
which various forms of exclusion are continued. Participation
in decision-making and political processes, access to employ-
ment and material resources and integration into common
cultural processes denied are part of social exclusion. When

100  Political Economy of Caste in India

combined, they create acute forms of exclusion that find a
spatial manifestation in particular neighbourhoods.
This concept of social exclusion has been extensively put into
practice in Indian society. Here, ‘social exclusion’ is based on
caste, patriarchy and gender. The obvious excluded are those
of caste and community groups along with gender. Exclusions
are of two forms, one is exclusion from access to or denial of
rights to various services, such as health, education, housing
and water; sanitation is also more recently included as an essen-
tial service. The other form by exclusion is that of deprivation
of the right to express ones’ views of representation and voice
as per Hirschman (1970).5 It can be passive or active exclusion
as explained by Amartya Sen (2000).6 Social inequality, isola-
tion and discrimination are the hallmarks of social exclusion.
Inequality is essentially relational and can be the basis for a
form of deprivation linked with poverty, experienced by the
specifically disadvantaged, marginalized weaker sections of
Indian society, including the marine fisher folk of different
geographical and ecological zones across the country.

Isolated Villages
The village level survey collected information on availability
of 31 items of minimum infrastructure facilities in the habita-
tions from the head of the village either panchayat president or
community leader. The multiple Index of deprivations of each
village scores is also estimated for the study. It shows wide vari-
ations in the region. It is noted that drinking water is available
in 100 per cent of the villages. In the Vizianagaram district, 60
per cent of the villages do not have primary schools within the
habitation while the figure is 30 per cent in Visakhapatnam.
No residential school is located within the habitation in any of
the villages and they are required to go long distances of about
14 km to get their children admitted in BC welfare hostels
or ashram schools. Ninety per cent of villages in Srikakulam,

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  101

75 per cent in Vizianagaram and none in Visakhapatnam rural
have primary health centres within the village. But, health
subcentres are present in 40 per cent of the villages. Even pri-
vate hospitals are not available in majority of the villages and
they need to travel 11 km to get healthcare. Drainage system
is not available in 56 per cent of the villages. Interestingly,
community toilets are not available in 80 per cent of the vil-
lages. Interestingly, 66 per cent of the villages have an arrack/
alcohol shop. However, a commercial bank office, cold storage
and so on that are essential facilities for marine fisher folk are
not available in any of the villages.
The participation of fisher folk in group activities, such as
cultural meets and political participation in decision making
process, is obtained from the village heads and presented in
the report.7 We have ascertained how they interact with non-
fishing community in the process of fishing through the partici-
pation of non-fishing community. It is reported that 30 per cent
in Srikakulam district and 12.5 per cent in each in Vizianagaram
and Visakhapatnam reported positively. It is noted that all the
villages do have community meetings and the frequency of
meeting as monthly, quarterly and so on vary from village to
village. Though the fisher folk are interested in cultural activi-
ties, community halls are available in 38 per cent of the villages
only. And there are no restrictions for non-fisher folk to visit
their habitations or families. Cyclone shelters are not available
in all the villages but available only in select villages.
The concept of social exclusion as noted above is a complex
issue. We have noted on the basis of the village data that most
of the villages are socially excluded from the mainstream soci-
ety in terms of social and economic transactions as they are on
the coast near the sea. However, most of the villages or habita-
tions of the fisher folk are single community-based or single
occupation-based habitats. Though some villages near the city
are found to be mixed in nature, they are however inhabited
by socially and educationally BCs and their locality becomes

102  Political Economy of Caste in India

a slum in course of time. In the city of Visakhapatnam, there
are around 750 slums and almost all the habitations of the
fisher folk out of this number are declared slums. Therefore, it
is found that in such multi-caste mixed villages or slums, social
exclusion as a process is difficult to understand. The govern-
ment schemes, such as DWCRA, skill development training,
social welfare schemes of self-employment, are provided to all
the inhabitants irrespective of the sub-caste. It has helped to a
large extent to make the womenfolk come together to transact
and interact to develop social communication among differ-
ent sub-castes. However, it is doubtful to what extent other
groups or castes do interact with them to shun social exclu-
sion. We have provided data on how many members are there
in DWCRA groups. The membership is found to be around 90
per cent in rural areas, such as Vajrapukotturu with 91.8 per
cent, and lowest membership is observed in the city, such as
Pedagantyada with 72.9 per cent. All of them have invariably
noted that they have joined the groups for getting a loan. But
very few, a negligible proportion of 0.4 per cent in Srikakulam
and 1 per cent in Pedagantyada, reported that they attend caste
meetings.
Social inclusion of a group expects that they participate in the
conduct of collective activities, such as political participation,
cooperative society, NGO/community-based organization (CBO)
activities. Data from the study noted above show that around 60
people or 6.5 per cent are active in cooperative society for eco-
nomic benefit, such as getting a loan. It is strange to notice that
only four people in Srikakulam district have reported that they
participate in activities of political parties. A total of 20 people,
mostly from Vajrapukotturu, known for its community-based
activities, reported that they are active in CBO/NGO activities.
Important processes of collective actions, such as political par-
ticipation, CBO, cultural gatherings and so on, where there shall
not be any distinction based on social or economic background
indicating the spirit of inclusiveness, is found to be absent in
the villages of fisher folk of North Andhra Pradesh. The recent

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  103

collective effort of marine fisher folk of North costal Andhra
Pradesh with a demand to get their community a ST status
was received with rude shock. The tribal groups are up in arms
against fisher folk claiming that they should not be included in
the ST category of Andhra Pradesh. The social reality of exclu-
sion has come out in open when none of the leaders of political
parties looked at the congregation of fisher folk and the whole
movement got dissolved gradually after a month.

Conclusion
The case study of marine fisher folk, a listed backward class/
caste in Andhra Pradesh but an SC on the same coast a few miles
away in another state, is cited here to show that the economic
deprivation and social exclusion of certain castes is perpetual
whether it was in the past or in the present. The system of MOP
seen as pre-capitalist or capitalist does not change the socio-
economic status of the lower castes. The changes and alterations
of ranks of certain castes in the new economy are only limited
to non-bahujan castes or Dvijas and few upper Shudras. The
lower castes continue to remain on the margin and subsist in
the traditional mould.
The economic status and social resilience of the marine fisher
folk studied here has given us insight that the economic status
of the sample population has not improved over a period of
time. We have used standard methods of estimation of poverty
in terms of MPCE and developed a new methodology to esti-
mate the multiple deprivations that the fisher folk suffer in our
study area. It has come out clearly that the fisher folk of north
coastal Andhra Pradesh spread in the three districts have almost
the same characters and are subjected to economic exploitation
in terms of determination of prices for their products and in get-
ting meagre income as traditional fishermen. Those who have
gone for mechanization seem to have not improved their fate
as marine and living resources on north coastal Andhra Pradesh

104  Political Economy of Caste in India

started dwindling due to excessive use of mechanized methods
of fishing and over-industrialization on the coast mostly by
the non-fisher folk caste. Most of the owners of trawlers and
mechanized boats are non-fisher folk. The data on indebtedness
of fisher folk have indicated that every household has one or
the other kind of credit taken from institutions or mostly from
friends and relatives. Therefore, the income and expenditure
figures do not match as major chunk of income goes for repay-
ment. The culture of profligacy among fisher folk is so vile that
they remain perpetual barrowers.
The multiple deprivation indices calculated for the study
region based on right to fishing on the sea and other parameters
have shown that they all are deprived in the same manner and
not without any distinction as rural and urban dwellers. Poverty
levels estimated on the basis of per capita expenditure have
shown that 93 per cent of them are living BPL, a comparable
statistic arrived by CMFRI for coastal Andhra Pradesh. We have
tried to see how the community is interacting with outside the
world to learn about the process of social exclusion. It is noted
with regret that social exclusion of the villages in terms of dis-
tance and infrastructure remained the same with some sprinkles
of government schemes, such as public distribution system,
primary school and so on, coming within the habitations.
Interestingly, more number of habitations is served by alcoholic
shops than by healthcare centres. However, mixed habitations,
particularly in urban areas, show that majority of the women-
folk join DWCRA to get loans, which may be for consumption
purposes. In that process there is a likelihood of inclusive
communication within the community, but their external and
durable benefit leading to social inclusion need to be studied
further. In other words, the marine fisher folk of north coastal
Andhra Pradesh are subjected to multiple deprivations and
are socially excluded from the process of development in the
civilized society. The recent upsurge of fisher folk demanding
ST status for the community received little attention from the

Economic Deprivation and Social Exclusion of Marginalized Castes  105

public in general and OBCs in particular to which they belong
now. The study indicates that caste is predominantly used here
to discriminate and deprive the basic rights of a social group
on the caste basis. The data noted in the text are drawn from a
study conducted with ICSSR support, which consists of about
400 pages, and the tables are available with the author.

Notes
1. P. Townsend, P. Phillimore and A. Beattie, Health and
Deprivation: Inequality and the North (London: Croom Helm,
1988).
2. Ibid.
3. CMFRI, ‘Marine Fisheries Survey: Andhra Pradesh’, Delhi, 2010,
Summary, 4.
4. Ibid.
5. A. O. Hirschman, Bias for Hope-Essays on Development and Latin
America, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 1971.
6. A. Sen, Social Exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny,
(Mandaluyong, Philippines: Asian Development Bank), 2000.
7. K. S. Chalam and U. Tataji, Marginalization Economic Deprivation
and social Exclusion of Marine Fisher folk of North Costal Andhra
Pradesh, Vol. I and Vol. II, (Visakhapatnam: Institute for
Economic and Social Justice, 2016. ICSSR funded.

106  Political Economy of Caste in India

 6

New Economic Policy

The Dvija Project

‘I reincarnate myself when dharma is in danger’—asserted

Lord Krishna in the Bhagavad Gita. It is said that he has so far
reincarnated 10 times to restore peace and caste tranquillity.
During the Kaliyuga and particularly after the mlecchas left
the Aryavartha, the caste order seems to have been disturbed.
It is only to restore the order; successive governments in the
Republic have been trying to implement policies that corre-
spond to the dharma, the order in society.
The social order in the Indian society reckons with the
varnashrama dharma in which the four varnas shall always
perform their assigned duties so as to keep equilibrium. The
first three varnas are called the Dvijas, the twice born, and the
fourth varna is put in a position to serve the Dvijas. Therefore,
they are called the Shudras. There are several layers among
the Shudras and they are manipulated and ordered to work as
per the requirements of the Dvijas. The panchamas, the fifth
category has always been outside the order as an experimental
group. Keeping this social structure in view, several attempts
have been made to develop the socio-economic conditions of
the people. Interestingly, those who have migrated to other
faiths over centuries ago have not behaved very differently and
therefore fit into the varnadharma. There seems to be an agenda
hidden or public according to which the social and economic
processes take place in India. Unless one understands this, it is
very difficult to analyse any developments in the country, be it
contemporary or historical. An attempt is made here to analyse
how the NEP has reinforced the varnadharma.

Caste as Property
Caste in the Indian subcontinent is considered as an important
social category. But, caste is hardly analysed by social scientists
as an economic category. Though its manifestation is social, its
essence is found to be purely economic. In fact, the first social
anthropologist, H. W. Wiser, who examined caste and intro-
duced the concept of ‘Jajmani’ for the first time in the 1930s,
had analysed the transactions among different castes in a vil-
lage and found them as purely economic. The real transactions
between Brahmins and Kshatriyas, the ‘Dvijas’ and other servile
castes, and the servile castes and untouchable castes were found
to be purely economic in nature. He even estimated the values
of products and services transacted between castes in Kalimpur
village. It was clearly established that the Brahmin gives only
intangible service and takes the highest value of goods and
services from others. At the lowest level, the untouchable pro-
vides the maximum value in terms of goods and services and
in return receives the lowest value. If these values are translated
as returns from each caste’s property, the concept of caste as an
economic category will be clear. Marx has mentioned that social
relations are always embedded in economic relations. These
relations are nothing but property relations. In this context,
caste needs to be understood as property in India. However,
considering the Hindu caste as property has certain limitations.
The character of property as a thing to exchange with others or
sell it to outsiders is very much limited here. Therefore, caste

108  Political Economy of Caste in India

is to be considered as communal possession and not as private
property. Wiser has mentioned in his study that caste was a
corrupted form of ancient system of the custom of communal
ownership directed by the Panchayat. In other words, caste is
a Hindu category of property where the Brahmin possesses the
highest value and the lowest value is assigned to untouchables.
Viewed from this angle, caste system as described by Ketakar
and adopted by Ambedkar is not just division of labourers. In
the division of labourers, the individual labourer is considered
as a unit of analysis. But the Indian caste system is a division
of groups of people, each being assigned with a particular duty
and economic value. That is why, the members of families in
a caste produce finished goods and not parts of a good. This is
generally understood as division of labour in economics. The
castes being economic entities accumulate these values over a
period of time. But, the Hindu super structure, which has been
protecting this economic caste base, did not allow the non-
Dvija castes to accumulate and capitalize their value. The Dvija
castes of Brahmin, Kshatriya and Vaisya are given the right and
opportunities to education, assets, weapons and so on, which
naturally accumulate (may be primitive accumulation) capital
over a period of time and improve their value of human capital.
But it is denied to the Shudras and untouchables. As a result,
the social manifestation of unequal exchange between castes
is now synthesized as property relations.
Caste being a property of a group of people can be utilized
for the advantage of the members of the group. This has also
been used for the exploitation of others and also empowering
of one’s own group. These concepts have been used here to
understand the economic power of the dominant Dvija castes,
particularly Brahmin and Bania castes, in India today.
In a modern democratic society, the struggle among differ-
ent political groups is aimed ultimately to distribute resources.
Those who are the winners in the race will have control over
the resources and provide opportunities for their supporters to

New Economic Policy  109

have access to these. In the Indian situation, the Brahmins have
remained arbiters and enjoyed the patronage of both the win-
ners and also the runners. Kautilya, the Brahmin intellectual had
laid a strong foundation for a Brahminical political economy
as distinguished from Western political economic theory much
before Western economic theory emerged. The basic principle
on which Kautilya laid his political economic theory is that
every person is dishonest as against the Western idea that man
is rational. He mentioned in his Arthashastra how the state
should get revenue and how it should spend the money. In the
hierarchy of the state, the ministers, who were in general drawn
from among the Brahmins, came first and then the purohits
enjoyed the highest status. He had even gone to the extent of
saying that the king can cheat gullible people in getting revenue
for the exchequer. Kautilyan principles have been followed by
almost all the kings in the country till the emergence of urban
economy. The vaishyas have cooperated with the king in car-
rying out the internal and external trade. Thus, the Dvijas had
the opportunity to run the state in the past and in the present.

The Dvija Project

Dvijas as the twice born are basic pillars of the Indian society.
There is absolute understanding and cooperation among the
three groups to maintain equilibrium. It is found sometimes,
that one category among the three is benefited, and it is their
unwritten denotation that the other will not grudge. In times
of crisis, they get united and share the pillage. This is abun-
dantly clear in the economic reforms of post-independence
period. There seems to be at least one adjustment and reform
in a period of one decade starting with the first five-year plan.
Each adjustment made the Dvija groups to modernize and
mend to the changing times. They get dispensed among dif-
ferent groups and platforms and argue and speak differently
ultimately to benefit the Dvijas. For instance, the abolition of

110  Political Economy of Caste in India

privy purses made the Kshatriyas to turn out as capitalists, the
public sector modernized the Brahmins, the license raj ben-
efited the Vaishyas and so on. This is the Dvija project which
has been in operation for quite some time. There are, however,
certain aberrations here and there when some upper Shudras
tried to climb the ladder in the guise of a Dvija. In such cases,
they are either thrown out of the system or absorbed depending
upon the circumstances and the strength of the beholder. The
economic reforms or the so-called NEP required to be analysed
from this perspective to draw meaningful conclusions.
It is said that after the advent of direct Dvija rule in 1947,
India had abundant educated and skilled manpower to manage
the affairs of the economy at that time. And around 90 per cent
of these people came from Brahmin families. B. R. Ambedkar in
his statement concerning the state of education of the depressed
classes in the former Bombay Presidency submitted to the
Indian Statutory Commission 1928 data to prove that more
than 50 per cent of the enrolment in collegiate education was
from Brahmins.1 The unemployment rate among the educated
was very high during the 1930s and the 1940s. Therefore, Nehru
thought that these educated unemployed should be utilized for
nation building. He was influenced by the British Labour Party
Policy of industrialization and socialism. The Soviet model of
commanding heights of public sector was adopted by Nehru.
He modified the Soviet model to suit the Indian situation with-
out nationalizing the means of production. Naturally, almost
all the public sector undertakings were managed and operated
by the then educated Brahmins. All important sectors of the
economy were brought under the control of the bureaucracy
through its License Permit Raj. The Brahmins started migrat-
ing from rural areas to urban centres leaving some of their
lands and assets behind. Villages were deserted by Brahmins.
In order to provide some relief to these people, land reforms
were introduced when most of the Brahmins sold away their
lands. Those who did not sell their lands and assets and clung

New Economic Policy  111

to the tradition of priesthood had suffered. (The internal dif-
ferentiation among Brahmins is not discussed here.) But most
of them have converted their agricultural rural property into
urban property. In this process some lands transferred into the
hands of the hard-working Shudras and others. Some of them
mostly the upward mobile Shudras, such as Reddy, Kamma,
Mudaliar and so on, in the south occupied some positions of
power in politics and contracts.
Majority of the Brahmins have started occupying modern
secular jobs and enjoyed the highest security and economic
privilege in the country. Planning was introduced in the
country in the 1950s and investments to the extent of several
thousands of crores during the plan periods were basically man-
aged and enjoyed by the Brahmin and Dvija bureaucrats. Public
property was slowly converted into private property through
black money, scandals, bribes and other economic crimes. By
the end of 1980, most of the upper castes acquired properties
worth crores of rupees in the form of urban property, real estate,
shares in private companies, and they were also in a position to
develop an independent economy. Several studies in the area
of social economy of Tamil Nadu revealed that the reservation
policy of the DMK government weakened job opportunities
to Brahmins. This made enterprising Brahmins, such as T. V.
S. Iyengar, Sundaram Finance and so on, to develop private
enterprises with public money (bank credits, investment capital,
licenses and so on) from the centre. An impulsive observation of
all our metropolis and urban areas reveal that posh localities and
government-developed estates are occupied by the upper castes.
All the banks in the country are either managed or owned by
them. The recent non-performing assets (NPAs) of public sector
banks and the frauds reported in the media indicate the nexus
of upper castes.2 Bank frauds are different from NPAs as noted
by Raghuram Rajan, RBI governor in his note to parliament
(as cited in the above paper of Ashwini Manikandan). Further,
public higher education helped them to become most lucrative

112  Political Economy of Caste in India

NRIs. Most of the NRIs today are from Dvija groups. The Mandal
Commission report has provided data on the numerical strength
of the Brahmins in the Indian Bureaucracy and the time-to-time
updates given in the parliament on the queries from members.
Meanwhile, the license raj helped the few to develop inde-
pendent industry at the cost of public sector.3 Some SC and STs
have started entering into public sector employment through
reservations to challenge the hegemony of Dvijas. In the south,
OBCs have also joined the ranks of secular job seekers in the
modern public sector. The Dvijas who have swelled private
offers with public money thought that it would not be benefi-
cial anymore if they continued in the public sector. They envis-
aged that it becomes risky if the public sector continues further
as the Dalits, Adivasis and OBCs are emerging as a formidable
force. The results of research and development (R&D) of public
institutions have been slowly passed into private individuals
or corporate bodies. The Official Secrets Act is being used by
the bureaucrats to syphon off money and other resources for
private gains. The so-called insider trading now popular in
share market was inherent in the leakages of public policy for
the Dvijas. This made the public sector dry and inefficient. The
jolt given by the Dvijas public sector tycoons, such as Krishna
Murthy, Harshad Mehta, Ketan Parekh, RBI, SEBI personnel
and others, show the nexus between them and their control
over the economy. The anti-Mandal clique perhaps thought
that it is difficult to fight the massive bahujans if the struggle to
control the economy is made an internal issue and conspired
to link it with international market. The alleged international
manoeuvring for an Aryan hegemony by combining Germany,
Russia and India4 is only a move to curb the emerging bahujan
power and to get international support to crush the indigenous
bahujan majority. The NEP and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) must be seen in this context. This is the Dvija project in
operation in an era of liberalization. The Cambridge project on
‘Caste and the Indian Economy’ undertaken by Kevin Munshi5

New Economic Policy  113

substantiated the above argument with data by saying ‘aggre-
gate evidence indicates that there has been convergence in
education, occupations, income and access to public resources
across caste groups in the decades after the independence.6 It
has been made possible in the garb of liberalization, privatiza-
tion and globalization.

What Is New Economic Policy?

Liberty, the concept on which the whole edifice of NEP is built
today was first enunciated by J. S. Mill to enhance individual
choice and for the organization of production. Mill never advo-
cated liberty for the sake of exploitation and profit making. The
economic reforms of the Government of India in 1991 based
on the principle of liberty, however, consisted of broadly two
kinds of policies. First one was the stabilization policy, which
was implemented in response to a payments crisis in 1991 as
India was running a current account deficit of around $10 bil-
lion and the reserves were down to two weeks of imports. The
second policy was the structural reforms, which were initiated
in the early 1980s but slowed down later and again vigorously
pursued as a package of economic reforms in 1991. The stabi-
lization policy, which was purely on account of trade deficit
and earlier policies of the government, was embarked upon
as an inevitable strategy to come out of the crisis. In fact, the
economy as a whole was not that bad and it was growing at
5.5 per cent just before the economic reforms (1980–1990) as
compared to 3.6 per cent of the previous period (1965–1980).
However, the economy slipped into a crisis in the later part of
1990 due to several factors that were not purely economic in
nature. The liberal licensing policy of allowing foreign auto-
mobile manufacturers to start production of two wheelers and
four wheelers that consume oil forced the country to import
more oil straining the foreign reserves. It has been argued that
India had entered the decade of nineties with large internal

114  Political Economy of Caste in India

and external imbalances, which made the economy highly
vulnerable for any kind of shocks. It is further elaborated
that the gulf crisis added a serious blow to the system and its
foreign reserves dropped dramatically and the international
credit ratings placed India at a very low position particularly
between August 1990 and July 1991. This situation has forced
the government to adopt an adjustment strategy by borrowing
heavily from the international agencies.7 It has devalued its
rupee three times during a period of two months and instilled
confidence in foreign funding agencies and borrowed heavily
from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Along with these changes, the country has also agreed to follow
the economic prescriptions dictated by these agencies. Though
the government may say that it is pursuing a structural reform,
it was in fact providing opportunities to control the economy
through market. Therefore, the following prescriptions were
implemented.

1. In the realm of trade policy, the new policy replaced import

licensing.
2. In the area of industrial policy, the system of licensing that
regulated the entry and the expansion of firms was elimi-
nated. The industrial policy of 1956 and 1980 that envisaged
‘commanding heights’ for public sector was given up.
3. In the area of public sector, the exclusive reservation of
certain key industries has been curtailed and foreign invest-
ment in these areas has been openly invited.
4. Some of the public sector units are open for private initia-
tive by slowly converting the equity and allowing private
enterprises and business houses to hold the equity of public
sector, including defence.
5. Reduction of fiscal deficit is envisaged by way of reducing
aggregate expenditure in areas, such as the so-called unpro-
ductive items, which generally create scope for new jobs.
6. Encouraging the economy to link itself with global markets
to improve competitiveness and efficiency.

New Economic Policy  115

Macroeconomic Indicators
Despite the adverse effects of the policy, the government has
vigorously implemented it, as there was no constructive oppo-
sition from political groups. It appears that there is almost an
agreement among all the Dvijas spread in all political parties
on this. Therefore, NEP continues. As seen from Table 6.1, the
macroeconomic indicators show the results of the economic
reforms. It is found that the economy is growing at an aver-
age rate of around 7 per cent after 1992–1993. It has slowed
down after the NDA-II regime. The increase is found to be
more in manufacturing and in services sectors. The inflation
rate is now brought down to the single digit level from that
of 12 per cent in 1990–1991. The fiscal deficit is also brought
down to around 3.5 per cent of GDP from that of 8.3 per
cent in 1990–1991. The savings and investment ratios as a
per cent of GDP have, however, remained less than the pre-
NDA period. The current account deficit remained at −2.5 per
cent of GDP, though it is found to be less than what it was
in 1990–1991 (3.2%). There are fluctuations over the years.
But the government is able to manage with the flows in the
invisibles particularly due to expatriate remittances. All these
modest achievements of the economic reforms can be attrib-
uted to the sacrifices made in terms of the reduction in the
domestic capital formation and the external debt remaining
around 50 per cent of GDP. The fiscal deficit is covered by
disinvestment of some of the profit-making public sector units
and in reducing public expenditure on social sectors, such as
education, health and welfare programmes. The impact of
these changes needs to be examined in detail with reference
to the socially disadvantaged groups who are more vulnerable
than any other marginalized sections in the world. Out of the
super 100 firms reported in Business India, none appears to
be owned by a Dalit or Adivasi. The manifestation of caste
power in terms of emergence of crony capitalism is discussed
in Chapter 7.

116  Political Economy of Caste in India

 TABLE 6.1  Macroeconomics Indicators
  1990– 1991– 1992– 1993– 1994– 1995– 2001– 2010– 2017–
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 2002 2011 2018

1. GDP (annual percentage change) 5.2 0.5 5.3 6 7.2 7.1 5.4 8.5 6.9
Agriculture and allied sectors 4.2 –1.8 6.1 3.6 4.6 –0.1 5.7 8.3 5
Manufacturing 7 –1.2 4.2 8.5 10.2 13.6 3.3 7.6 5
Services 4.3 4.1 5.5 7.3 7.5 8.8 6.5 12.2** 8.1
2. Inflation (percentage per annum) 12.1 13.6 7 10.8 10.4 4.4 7 8.87 4.3
3. Broad money M3 (annual percentage increase) 15.1 18.5 11.2 18.2 14.9 13.2 11.2 16.5 9.2
4. Reverse money (annual percentage increase) 19.7 12.9 10.4 15.6 5.7 19.6 5.6 15.45 10
5. Gross domestic investment (percentage to 27.7 23.4 24 23.6 26 27.4 24.0* 37 29.8
GDP)
6. Gross domestic saving (percentage to GDP) 24.3 22.8 22.1 23.1 24.9 25.6 23.4* 34 30.5
7. Gross domestic capital formation 27.7 23.4 24 23.6 26 27.4 26.3 36.8 28.6
8. Current account Deficit (percentage to GDP) –3.2 –0.4 –1.8 –0.5 –0.9 –1.7 –0.5 –2.6 –2.4
9. Fiscal deficit (percentage to GDP) 8.3 5.9 5.7 7.4 6.1 5.8 5.5 4.8 3.5
10. India’s external debt (percentage to GDP) 30.4 41 39.8 35.9 32.7 28.7 22.3* 50.6 49.1

Source: Economic Survey of India, Government of India, Various Issues.

Notes: *Relates to 2000–2001; **Trade, hotel and cement.
Manifestation of the Dvija Project
in the Stock Market
The opening of the economy to global opportunities is a
spout for the Dvijas to publicly acknowledge and declare their
build-ups. In fact, the so-called technology transfer or foreign
technology agreements and FDI approvals, all without any
exception, benefited the Dvijas with a few spillovers to upper
Shudras from regional groups. During the last two decades,
investment approvals with a projected investment of `18.54
lakh crores are reported in the FDI factsheet of the ministry of
commerce and industry for the year 2017.8 Out of this, around
50 per cent came from Mauritius and Singapore, indicating the
dubious nature of FDIs. These collaborations and technological
transfers have taken place through informal sources. A Dvija
NRI with the tacit approval of the foreign collaborators nomi-
nated his kith and kin as a promoter in India. The promoter
with the help of brokers and fraudulent operators entered
the stock market and manipulated the capital market to their
advantage. For instance, if the Infosys hold about 29 per cent
and Wipro 84 per cent of their shares, respectively, then the
market capitalization naturally benefit them. Speaking on such
manipulators Mr A. K. Gupta, Deputy Director, CBI said:

The gullible public and the inefficient banking system pro-

vide ample opportunities for the financial institutions to
play and squander the public funds. The overheated stock
market and the laxity of the financial institutions and the
watchdogs like SEBI are the other major contributory factors.
The modus operandi is fairly simple. The investors are lured
to part with their savings by promises of unrealistic returns.
The banks and financial institutions are made to part with
their funds either by misrepresentation or through forgery or
by simply corrupting the bank officials. The funds are placed
at the disposal of scamsters who use these in the stock market
operations. As the bubble bursts, which is inevitable, every-
one becomes a loser. Investigation, arrest and prosecution

118  Political Economy of Caste in India

 deter them for some time but in due course new scamsters
and new scams emerge.9

The so-called boom in software technology and the clamour for

body shopping is said to result in the current crisis in IT-related
services. It is reported that during the boom period, shares
of even loss-making companies commanded with premium.
Another major scandal of the initial period was that the pro-
moters, especially multi-national companies (MNCs), issued
preferential shares at prices far lower than the then prevailing
market prices. All the operators in the stock market belong to
the Dvija castes and manage the moneys of first-generation
non-Dvija investors. In the USA, the stock market operators
are professional managers; however, in India, caste, family and
primordial relations entered the market. The data in Table 6.2
indicate the shares of different categories of shareholders
in market capitalization. It is found that out of `8,221,592
crore total market capitalization as on April 2015, `2,428,669

TABLE 6.2  Top 10 Companies in India ( ` in Crores)

Market Capitalization
Category 2015 2019

1. Tata Consultancy 509,837 775,130

2. Reliance Industry 285,051 893,819
3. ONGC 278,994 179,268
4. HDFC Bank 258,157 680,047
5. ITC 257,137 309,066
6. Coal India 242,137 129,139
7. Infosys 23,160 277,648
8. Sun Pharma 229,765 97,604
9. SBI 210,037 246,408
10. Hindustan Lever 183,101 454,913

Source: Author (estimates based on BSE data sources).

New Economic Policy  119

crores or 29 per cent are held by top 10 companies, which has
remained almost the same even in 2019 when it has reached
`14,002,664 crore. The total turnover of the stock market in a
year is estimated to be `2,880,990 crores in the year 2000–2001,
which is higher than that of the gross national product (GNP)
during the year and it remains almost the same in 2019. The
data presented by RBI show that it is only the West and Central
India that hold the key. This indicates the economic size of the
stock market and the Dvija project.
A new generation of journalists, academics, economic con-
sultants, chartered accountants and so on has emerged during
the post-liberalization period. The single point agenda of these
people is to eulogize the benefits of liberalization and the effi-
ciency of the market. Majority of these consultants are involved
in government policymaking helping their own social groups
to get benefitted. Few years ago, the government of the Dvijas
has created a separate ministry of disinvestment to take control
of the public sector units, where the poor and the Dalits have
invested their future through the government. No one knows
how the ownership of the private sector enterprises (PSEs) are
transferred and to whom? Even the profit-making organizations
are transferred to private individuals or companies. Invariably
all the new owners are either the Dvijas or MNCs with Dvija
control.10 A new brand of MCCs have emerged with the Dvija
agenda. Some academics like Bardhan,11 Corbridge and Harris12
and Jenkins13 have recognized the fact that caste interests have
played a role in the NEP in the backdrop of mandal and bahujan
upsurge. However, no serious evaluation and discussion on
the issues raised by the academics has taken place either in the
mainstream academic discourse or in the media.
According to the NEP, market is given the supreme position
in the allocation of resources to various sectors and groups. It
is generally claimed that those sectors and groups, which are
found to be efficient and competitive, would alone survive and
those which are weak would perish in the market.14 When this

120  Political Economy of Caste in India

market strategy is translated into practice, it would be clear
that those sections and sectors, which have been given impor-
tance in the policy formulation and implementation, will get
strengthened.15 They alone would stand in the competitive
world now. And those sections/sectors which are given help or
subsidy for sustenance would not be in a position to compete
in the market. It means that the reservation groups will have
to face a greater challenge than others.
The impact of the Dvija project in India is already experi-
enced by the Dalit and service castes. First time in the history of
this country, Brahmins have taken control over the economic
resources along with Banias and therefore total control over the
country. The God of the Dvijas reincarnates again and again to
restore the social order in which the supreme position of the
Dvijas is ensured. The NEP is one such act of the God supreme.
Naturally, the Dalits and service castes are thrown into the
emerging service sector that serves the Dvijas. Therefore, the
varnashrama dharma is restored. The Dvija project is fructified
within the CMOP.

Notes
1. Ambedkar, Babasaheb Writings and Speeches, Vol. 2.
2. Ashwin Manikandan, ‘Why Indian Bankers Are Hesitant to
Report Frauds’, The Economic Times, 9 October 2019.
3. R. K. Hazari, Hazari Committee Report on Industrial Planning and
Licensing Policy (Delhi: Planning Commission, 1966).
4. K. S. Chalam, Economic Reforms and Social Exclusion (Delhi:
SAGE Publications, 2011); B. Karl Blind, ‘Does Russia represent
Aryan Civilization?’ The North American Review 571 (June 1904):
801–811.
5. Kevin Munshi, Caste and the Indian Economy (Cambridge, UK:
University of Cambridge, June 2017).
6. Ibid, abstract.
7. S. Corbridge and John Hariss, Reinventing India: Liberalization,
Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Polity
Press, 2000).

New Economic Policy  121

 8. Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
Factsheet on FDI, 2017.
9. Alternative Economic Survey, 2001–2002, 124.
10. M. N. Panini, ‘The Social Logic of liberalization’, Sociological
Bulletin 44 (1999), 33–62.
11. Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development in India
(Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1998).
12. Corbridge and Harris, Reinventing India.
13. Jenkins Rob, Democratic Politics and Economic Reforms in India
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Atul
Kohli, ‘Politics of Economic Liberalization in India’. World
Development 17, no. 3 (1989), 305–328.
14. Anne O. Krueger, Economic Policy Reforms and the Indian
Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
15. Prabhat Patnaik, ‘Notes on the Political Economy of Structural
Adjustment’. Social Scientist 22 (1994), 4–17.

122  Political Economy of Caste in India

 7

Caste and the Advent

of Crony Capitalism
in India

The East Asian miracle eulogized by some group of economists

in the 1997 has evoked interest in the growth trajectory of Asia.
Some scholars argued that corruption and rent seeking can be
damaging to growth in some countries, but not others; this
impels us to have a clearer understanding what kind of corrup-
tion and rent seeking affect economic performance.1 David C.
Kang2 who published a book on crony capitalism has earlier
discussed the concept within the paradigm of neoclassical eco-
nomics about the efficiency of market in a capitalism system.
He was of the view that if there is a balance of power among a
small and stable number of government and business actors,
crony can actually reduce transaction costs and minimize dead
weight losses.3 This theoretical position did not hold good
when Hunter Lewis4 published his study on crony capitalism in
America, depicting stories of how private interests enter govern-
ment’s policymaking to save Goldman Sachs and fail Lehman
Brothers during the 2008 crisis. Back home, Paranjoy Guha
Thakurtha5 published an online book on the Indian version
of crony capitalism with reference to Ambanis in natural gas
allocations of KG-D6 (Krishna Godavari exploration). However,
all these studies did not look at crony capitalism as a subset of
capitalism, which is an avatar of capitalist exploitation based
on the theory and practice of private property protected by
institutions, such as judiciary, legislative and executive wings
of modern capitalist state. Lenin in his Imperialism, the Highest
Stage of Capitalism has elaborated on the role played by indus-
trial cartels, finance capital, monopolist business companies
and their social linkages and had anticipated crony capitalism
in the 21st century.
The operation of CMOP as a universal system of economic
and social structure was guarded by the varna and caste forma-
tions at different periods of history. It is in this context that
economic reforms in India were officially declared through
the revised industrial policy declared on 24 July 1991 with a
statement by P. V. Narasimharao asserting that ‘the sky is the
limit’ for foreign investments. There are studies to indicate the
positive impact of reforms and few critical appraisals evaluating
the depraved influence of the policies on the socio-economic
status of the underprivileged and the value system or ethos of
India. In fact, it was considered by many as an extension of
capitalist expansion by the neoliberal forces in a post-colonial
setting. We are, however, concerned here how it has imported
and strengthened crony capitalism in India.
Capitalism is said to be an economic system based on the
merit and creation of opportunities that sustain it, the protago-
nists assert. Critiques, however, say it is relied on extraction
of surplus value from labour and exploitation of resources
probably by deceit. The notion of capitalism had entered
India with the English. There are now different varieties of
concepts of capitalism in use in academic discussions (J. W.
Baumol and others listed oligarchic, state-guided, big-firm and
entrepreneurial capitalism). The classical economists, including
Adam Smith, regarded capitalism as a natural form of economic

124  Political Economy of Caste in India

organization based upon human’s propensity to truck and
barter in his or her own self-interest. They said the laissez-faire
system of economic institutions will make the people achieve
welfare for all. Marx contested this. He gave an elaborate analy-
sis of the system in his magnum opus Das Kapital. Nevertheless,
Marx did not explain directly what capitalism is? He has used a
different method known as MOP to explain the different stages
of socio-economic formations. Since the concept of capitalism
is popularly known through the writings of Marx, it is better
to look at his formulation. Edward Avelling,6 his son-in-law, in
the abridged edition of Capital reduced the formula to M-C-M’.
It means that the capitalist goes to the market with his capital
M and buys the labour C to produce and sell the commodity
in the market at a price M’. The difference between M and
M’ is surplus value that is extracted from the labourer. The
capitalist and the labourer belong to two different antagonistic
classes. The dynamics of the capitalist system depends on the
drive for surplus value, including the expansion of production
for the market. The antagonistic contradictions of capitalism
give rise to class struggles between the working class and the
bourgeoisie.
The development and resilience of Capitalism in the 21st
century (despite the prediction that it will disappear) has
facilitated it to take different shapes and forms. In 1998, the
capitalist system had undergone a terrible crisis in the East Asian
economies. Scholars have started analysing it as a financial crisis
and it was attributed to what is called cronyism prevailed in
these economies as noted above. Few families and their cronies
captured the state in these countries, particularly in Philippines,
South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand. The cronies with the sup-
port of the bureaucracy get favours, such as permits, licenses
to exploit natural resources and tax concessions, to remain
successful in business. It is necessary to link capitalism as dis-
cussed above with cronyism as witnessed in the East Asia to
arrive at the concept of crony capitalism. Crony capitalism in
state-run systems, including state socialism, in Soviet Union

Caste and the Advent of Crony Capitalism in India   125

had collapsed under its weight, which broadly might come
under this category.
There seem to be four essential conditions to sustain crony
capitalism.

1. The presence of opportunistic capitalists manipulating

things in their favour rather than depending upon free
competition.
2. Crony intellectuals or experts to defend and eulogize the
significance of capitalism as a viable system.
3. The pliable bureaucrats who can crawl when the minister
says bend the rules in favour of the few cronies.
4. A section of the media that survive on the spoils of the
system and brazenly bring distorted stories to influence the
public opinion in favour of crony capitalists. Crony capital-
ism takes place in the form of collusion, forming cartels,
avoiding taxes or getting tax cuts and restricting others to
enter the closely knitted networks of business.

It is in this context we can look at how the 20th century experts

looked at it. Among many scholars, Hobson7 is one who has
analysed about the concept of imperialism as an oligarchy of
few capitalists (cronies) who spread it to other countries due
to the problems of mis-distribution of wealth in their own
counties. It was Lenin8 who had systematically studied the
economies of the West in the early part of 20th century to
present imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. Lenin’s
explanation of imperialism is relevant here to understand the
concept of crony capitalism as he was anticipating that such a
thing would happen in future. If we look at the characteriza-
tion of imperialism by Lenin, we come across five important
issues.

1. The merging of bank capital with industrial capital would

form finance capital and creation of financial oligarchy.

126  Political Economy of Caste in India

2. The concentration of production and capital has created
monopolies, which play a dominant role in emerging
economies.
3. The export of capital as distinguished from export of
commodities.
4. The formation of international monopolist capitalist asso-
ciations to apportion the world among themselves (cronies)
and
5. Expansion and distribution of territorial division of labour
among the biggest capitalist powers of the world.

This characterization of imperialism, particularly the emergence

of finance capital through the operation of share markets,
international financial institutions and so on, needs to be inter-
preted as crony capitalism as they were facilitated through the
cronies and not due to free competition. We have witnessed
today the phenomenon called insider trading, Wall Street
operations and so on. They are all part of crony capitalism.

Caste-based Cronyism
Crony capitalism is not new to modern India. The genesis was
weaved with the formation of the East India Company of few
Individuals who were closely related in England. It was the
members of the company’s families who were posted as offic-
ers to plunder India and take the booty back home as family
income. After independence, the government has realized that
there was concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. The
Hazari Committee,9 Mahalanobis Committee,10 Monopolies
Inquiry Commission11 and so on appointed by the government
during 1965–1969 have brought out the fact that the wealth
was in fact concentrated in few business houses. Some of it
might have been trashed in Swiss banks. The License-Permit
raj was manipulated by the cronies in their favour and did not
allow others to enter business. It is the same business houses

Caste and the Advent of Crony Capitalism in India   127

and their extended families that are involved in the so-called
soft scams of share market, spectrum license, oil and gas, coal
and mining, body shopping and so on after liberalization.
The non-traditional business families who have just acquired
political power seem to have manipulated it to secure natural
resources, real estate and so on in the name of permits and
licenses for their cronies. The greatest advantage for the crony
capitalism to thrive in India is the primordial relations of castes.
This has strengthened the operation of crony capitalism with
emotional appeal to castes in power. (But, one should realize
that the cronies are not going to benefit the entire caste, but
only few families in the caste.) This neophyte would facilitate
the division of society to plunder without organized resistance
that helps to maintain orthodoxy even in the 21st century. The
sooner we appreciate the folly of caste politics and corporate-
sponsored democracy to reinforce crony capitalism, the better
for the country as a whole to realize the constitutional goals of
socialism, secularism and democracy.
Crony capitalism as analysed by experts under neoclassical
framework looked at it as a source of saving of transaction
costs. Cronyism in India is ubiquitous in its presence as caste
relations in all transactions, be it economic or social. Some of
our scholars who had looked at the material base of our caste
system did not throw light on the exchange relations and the
differential terms of trade between lower castes and upper
castes. Therefore, it has always been upheld and protected by
the ruling castes, mostly the Dvijas. The supply and demand
for labour and the products available in the market did carry
a caste tag to regulate prices, wages and returns. Therefore,
the surplus value that is so crucial in Marxist theory of capital-
ism could not be located here, as it is hidden under the caste
rank. It was found to be a convenient structure to be used for
the sustenance of political and economic power irrespective
of who the ruler was. Caste system had continued regardless
of the dynasty, including Gupta, Mughal, British or some-
one else. No ruling elite tinkered with it, lest the virat purush

128  Political Economy of Caste in India

might crumble and create chaos. There were few intermittent
changes. It was only some groups of people from the lower
castes who tried to move the ladder of caste when there was
some opportunity, but they soon reduced to a position that
was not far from the original, as there was total prohibition
to enter the privileged Dvijahood. It was perhaps never found
to be a serious problem in transactions as the size of the
population at any category was so huge, particularly at the
lower levels. Thus, caste-based cronyism was cultivated and
promoted.

Inequality Widened through Trade

One of the important characters of crony capitalism is its reli-
ance on trade and money. We know that money (including
usury), banking and trade are traditionally confined to a par-
ticular social group in India. We have seen above that Hazari
committee reported that four traditional businesses or Bania
families had appropriated all the regulated licenses during
1960s. Thus, crony in India means caste networks, mostly
the Brahmin, Bania, Kshatriya and Dvija group, appropriating
anything. India has adopted a model based on foreign trade
replacing its earlier model of import substitution after 1991.
The volume of trade and value went up several times during
the liberalization period and the so-called FDIs and foreign
institutional investors (FIIs) are invested in sectors that are
not identified as priority areas but are easy prey of political
manipulation. The rate of growth and the sectorial contribu-
tions of GDP clearly show the trend in the Indian economy
after the 1990s. The impact of trade on the economy and
society are evaluated by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD).12 The striking feature of
the UNCTAD report on trade and development for 2012 is that
it is dedicated to ‘policies for inclusive and balanced growth’
and devoted a separate chapter on how international trade has
widened inequalities, in general, and in developing countries,

Caste and the Advent of Crony Capitalism in India   129

in particular. Those who are familiar with the liberalization
policies in India around 1990s do remember how vigorously
some economists have championed free trade. Interestingly,
neither the supporters nor the admirers have ever looked at
the experiences in our neighbouring Southeast and Far East.
But, for reasons better known to the elite of the political and
bureaucratic executive, we have continued to follow the pre-
scriptions of the West, particularly the Washington Consensus
model. It has given an impression that globalization means
contacts with a dozen countries, mostly English-speaking,
and the cultural goods packaged and popularized through the
media. Unfortunately, we know very little about China, Japan,
Korea and other countries whose manufacturing goods are used
every day. In other words, Western model, mostly American
model of capitalist development, was popularized among cer-
tain serial groups. The ICT revolution and the educated upper
castes’ migration to the West is reflected in the remittances and
culture of economic liberty, as a virtue has been popularized at
home. This has to a large extent led to the political decimation
of secularism and the emergence of religious fundamentalism
both as a value and culture of discrimination. The apathy of
the intellectual class mostly drawn from the same milieu kept
reticent on violence against the disadvantaged based on the
birth of a person.
Against this background, the 2012 report has implications for
India. It is reported that the merchandise trade of the world has
declined from 5.5 per cent in 2011 to 3.5 per cent in 2012. The
growth rate has declined sharply from 4.1 per cent in 2010 to
2.7 per cent in 2012, mostly due to the growth rates of devel-
oping countries and China (developed countries confined to
less than 2.5%). Financial frauds and low demand in developed
countries have lowered exports from developing countries,
including India. Except gold, all mineral exports have declined
during the period. The report has analysed the so-called Kuznets
curve indicating that in the beginning inequalities increase

130  Political Economy of Caste in India

and after some time, with increase in productivity, disparities
decline, which seems to have failed. On the contrary, Dani
Rodrik and Alesina13 have proved that inequalities in primary
income would hamper growth. It is supported by historical
data that the share of wages in the national income of the UK,
the USA and Japan was around 60 per cent for a long period
to sustain growth.
This went against the rhetoric that liberalization of labour
laws to reduce wage rigidities in the Third World would affect
development. After a review of the theories, the report has come
to the conclusion that,

these alternative views, by challenging the conventional

wisdom that rising inequality is the normal result of devel-
opment within market economies, may contribute to a new
understanding of the functioning of a market economy,
and can lead to a paradigm shift towards a pattern of eco-
nomic development that is both more equitable and more
efficient.14

The report has noted that the trade between the advanced and
the developing countries has caused inequalities in the latter.
The estimates of proportion of top quintile share of income
to the bottom quintile show that inequalities are higher in
developing countries than in developed countries, such as the
UK. It is supported by the Gini ratios (measure of inequality)
ranging from 35 per cent in the USA to 50 per cent in Malaysia,
and India coming in between with 32.5 per cent.
India’s trade with the developed and developing counties
has a huge component of micro small and medium enterprises
(MSME) products. The annual report of the ministry of com-
pany affairs shows that around 65 per cent of the overseas trade
products of MSME are drawn from OBC, SC and ST. However,
they remain only as vendors and the trade is organized by the
Gujarati Banias, Marwari and Parsi business houses.

Caste and the Advent of Crony Capitalism in India   131

Caste and Economic Inequalities Reinforce
One wonders how the iniquitous structure in India could be
maintained so long without any change. There were, how-
ever, some revolts in the form of Sramana traditions (Ajivaka,
Buddhist, Jain and so on) that altered social positions in the
middle for some period. But they were restored and the hegem-
ony of the Dvija continued. (It is said that since the time of Adi
Shankaracharya when counter-revolution was initiated in the
8th century ad, there is a continuous stability in the social order
as per B. R. Ambedkar.) Scholars, including Imtiaz Ahmad,15
Reny Delage,16 Kenneth Ballhatchet,17 have noted that caste dis-
tinctions prevail even among Muslims and Christians in India.
The economic status and the social position of a caste in
India broadly correspond to each other’s. There are several
studies on the inequalities among different castes in relations
to education,18 economic opportunities,19 wealth20 and pov-
erty.21 K. S. Chalam in his studies has empirically proved the
gap between SC, ST, OBC and others with the coefficient of
inequality in education. The economic opportunities for the
socially marginalized castes have been denied in terms of the
allocation of funds under special component plan and so on.
Comparing

‘the population share of a given caste group in a given wealth

decile, its share in population, Bharati found that forward
caste is relatively more represented in top 10 per cent and
middle 10 per cent of the population where almost 90 per
cent of the wealth is concentrated. SC, ST and Muslims are
relatively more represented in the bottom 50 per cent. This is
true in the case of land worship, education and other param-
eters of property. Baroah and others empirically proved that
compared to high caste households, households for others
groups (OBC Hindus, SC, ST, Muslim and high caste Muslim)
were not as well endowed with assets, but even when they
did have comparable assets these were rewarded at lower rate
than that obtained by HC households’.

132  Political Economy of Caste in India

Measured by head count ratio (HCR) with their shares in
the total number of households, the ST households made a
disproportionately large contribution to rural poverty (24%
versus 11%) and SC, mostly BC and high-caste Muslims, made
a disproportionately large contribution to urban poverty. On
the other hand, high-caste Hindus and others groups made
a disproportionately small contribution to rural and urban
poverty.22 In other words, low-caste Hindus or the converts to
Islam and other faiths have been denied the economic oppor-
tunities even under capitalist model of development that was
introduced in the name of liberalization in 1991. An Oxfam
study on widening gaps23 in India has produced empirical evi-
dence, such as Gini coefficients of income, percentage share of
wealth by decile group, status of education and health and so
on, which found that the migrated groups are disadvantaged
in the access to wealth and basic services resulting in widening
gap between lower castes and others. Presenting the data on
percentage share of wealth by decile groups during 1991 and
2012, the report concluded that top 10 per cent held more than
50 per cent of the wealth during the period. Citing Forbes 2012
report, it is noted that top 1 per cent of the population of the
country had `96.2 lakh cores. The net worth of 68 billionaires
was 5.7 lakh corers and the wealth held by 100 billionaires
increased from $49 billion in 2004 to $479 billion in 2017,
increased almost by 10 times. None of the above billionaires
are drawn from SC, ST or OBC (or serially marginalized Dalits,
Adivasis and service castes). We do not need more than this
to substantiate that the primordial social groups in India are
reinforced in the process of accumulation of wealth by the
few. However, some experts are shy of accepting this reality,
which may be due to want of a theoretical framework or social
inhibition (some prejudice).
The concept of patrimonial capital introduced by Thomas
Piketty,24 which is inherited by a generation through parental
bequeath in the West is almost similar to our caste system that

Caste and the Advent of Crony Capitalism in India   133

perpetuates inequalities by birth. He has also noted the role of
crony capitalism in the West in perpetuating economic inequal-
ities. In fact, Marx has mentioned about the fictitious capital
in his Capital Vol III, which was elaborated by Cedric Durand
how it is engulfing the international economy to its brim.25
The concept of crony capitalism gained currency after the 2008
American financial crisis was captured by the Economist a year
before to translate the phenomenon into numbers with assis-
tance from Morgan Stanley, Ruchir Sharma26 and others. They
have listed 10 rent-thick sectors, such as (a) casinos, (b) coal,
palm oil and timber, (c) defence, (d) deposit-taking banking
and investment banking, (e) infrastructure and pipelines, (f)
oil, gas, chemical and other energy, (f) ports, airports, (g) real
estate, construction, (h) steel and other metals, (i) mining and
commodities, and (j) utilities and telecom services, to estimate
the size of the wealth beyond these sectors as obtained by
cronies as a proportion of GDP. It is reported that India had a
rank of 6 in 2007 and 9 in 2014 and the same is maintained in
the year 2018 among 25 countries listed. Though the concept
is not accepted universally as a phenomenon, some called it
only a crisis in capitalism, such as Jack Farmer and Chiranjibi
Sen, claiming that it is not pro-business but only an emerging
phenomenon27 in India.
The crony capitalism is caste capitalism in India. In excep-
tion, there may be one or two individuals as agents of the big
cronies, but no one from the socially marginalized castes has
emerged as a crony capitalist or a rent seeker in India. We have
noted in the previous sections about the conditions of crony-
ism in India and found that they are not conducive for lower
sections to enter the club as they do not have the following
characters.

1. Collusion
2. Involvement in Public policy
3. Caste cartels

134  Political Economy of Caste in India

4. Tax evasion
5. Smuggling the results of state-funded research
6. Control over banking and financial instillations
7. Diverting the attention of the people through parochialism,
jingoism and so on
8. Getting bureaucratic cronies in plum posts
9. Media and mafia patronage

Strengthening Existing Socio-economic

Formation
The base superstructure imagery in the Marxist domain to
describe caste as noted by Murzban Jal in Chapter 6 is a unique
character in India. Some of them put forward sophisticated
arguments that caste is a superstructure that would disappear
once the economic base is removed.28 And the counter argu-
ments by Dalit groups and others that discrimination prevails
even after obtaining economic status.29 The fact that commu-
nist parties split on caste question is a testimony of the failure
of the theory of class analysis relevant to socio-economic for-
mation in India. It is strange that Dalits and non-Dalits within
the ideological spectrum of Marxism are divided accusing each
other for not recognizing their point of view. This is once again
a dichotomy that prevailed in the left and radical movements
in India, while the cadres from lower castes (except pockets of
forest dwellers) almost left the Left and created void. This is a
serious problem of academic challenge to study, analyse and
resolve the clash. It appears that the problem arises due to our
failure to recognize the structure of socio-economic formation
in India that is different from the West though the compo-
nents of MOP might remain to be the same. It may also be
due to the failure to recognize the caste groups on the top and
bottom, which correspond to the exploiter and the exploited,
while some in the middle groups are petty bourgeois in India.
In fact, there are very few studies to analyse and explain what

Caste and the Advent of Crony Capitalism in India   135

castes constitute what classes. In the West, Poulantzas’s type
of study on classes in contemporary capitalism was outlined
while it is hardly attempted in India. The recurrence of Janus-
faced socio-economic formation time and again is the crux of
the problem. It appears that accepting the lower and the Dvija
castes as the two countervailing groups in place of classes or
parallels might solve some of the riddles in MOP debate. It
is not accidental or strange to find the same socio-economic
formation in 2020 in the form of crony capitalism helping the
Dvija and draining the Dalit. The so-called middle castes are
not monolithic as some castes are included in SCs while some
castes such as Arzal Muslim and Dalit Christian, are included
as OBC converts in different states of India, which is a problem
to be resolved.
Crony capitalism in India has facilitated the capitalist class
to grow in leaps and bounds not by the efficiency of the market
mechanism or the innovations that they brought in, but by
sheer manipulation of the economic operations restricted to a
select group. The cronies are investing in political parties and
some individuals act as their proxies once they are in power and
accumulate wealth in the form of contracts, licenses and per-
mits, all in the name of democratic decision-making. Majority
of the judgements of the courts, as they are superstructure insti-
tutions of the system, are helping to legitimize such activities of
the state as public policy. This is not rent-seeking behaviour of
the public servants as noted by few bourgeois economists, since
the capitalists are directly involved in the political process and
converting it as a business model, a model of the 21st-century
capitalism under the direction of the World Bank, WTO, IMF
and so on. As mentioned above, the socially and economically
deprived lower classes have remained poor, while the rich and
few corporates or business houses, all coming from the higher
castes or Dvija group with neo-feudal relations, are thriving
under crony capitalism, which is only an extension of capitalist
exploitation and nothing more or less.

136  Political Economy of Caste in India

Notes
1. Musthaq Khan and Jomo K. S., eds., Rents, Rent-seeking and
Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge Press, 2000).
2. David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in
Korea and Philippines (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2009).
3. David C. Kang, Transaction Costs and Crony Capitalism in
East Asia, Working paper 02-11 (Dartmouth: Tuck School of
Business, May 2002).
4. Lews Hunter, Crony Capitalism in America (Edinburg: AC2
Books, 2013).
5. Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, Gas Wars: Crony Capitalism and the
Ambanis, 2014, sold by Asia Pacific-Amazon.
6. Edward Avelling, Student’s Marx with Introduction by K. S.
Chalam (Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 2018).
7. John A. Hobsen, Imperialism: A Study (New York: James Pott
and Company, 1902).
8. Ibid.
9. Government of India, Hazari Committee on Industrial
Planning and Licencing, 1968.
10. Government of India, Mahalnobis Committee on Economic
Power, 1964.
11. Government of India, Subimal Dutt Committee on Monopolies
Enquiry, 1967.
12. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2012: Policies for
Inclusive and Balanced growth (Geneva, New York: UNDP,
2012).
13. Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik, ‘Distributive Policies and
Economic Growth’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, no.
2 (1994): 465–490.
14. Ibid.
15. Imtiaz Ahmad, ed., Caste and Social Stratification among Muslims
(Delhi: Manohar, 1973).
16. Remy Delage, ‘Muslim Castes in India’. www.booksandideas.
net/Muslim-Castes-in-India.html
17. Kenneth Ballahat Chatt, Caste, Class and Catholicism in India
1789–1914 (London: Curizon Press, 1998).
18. Chalam, Education and Weaker Sections.

Caste and the Advent of Crony Capitalism in India   137

19. Chalam, Economic Reforms.
20. Nitin Kumar Bharti, Wealth Inequality, Class and Caste in India
1961–2012 (France: Paris School of Economics, 2018).
21. Vani Barooah, Dilip Diwakar, Vinod Kumar Mishra, Ajaya
Kumar Naik, and Nidhi S. Sabharwal, Caste Inequality and
Poverty in India: A Reassessment (Delhi: Indian Institute of Dalit
Studies, 2016).
22. Ibid.
23. Oxfam, India Inequality Report (Delhi: Oxfam India, 2018).
24. Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2014).
25. A. Cedric Durand, Fictitious Capital: How Finance is Appropriating
Our Future (London: Verso, 2017); ‘Our Crony Capitalism
Index’, The Economist, 15 March 2014.
26. ‘Our Crony Capitalism’, The Economist.
27. Jack Farmer, ‘The Myth of Crony Capitalism’, Socialist Review,
February 2012; Chiranjeebi Sen, Curbing Crony Capitalism in
India, Azim Premji University, April 2017 Working Paper.
28. The Caste Question and Its Resolution: A Marxist Perspective
(Chandigarh: Advanced Institution of Marxist Studies, 2013).
29. Sukhadeo Thorat, Anuradha Banerji, Vinod K. Mishra, and
Firdaus Rizvi, ‘Urban Rental Housing Market’, Economic and
Political Weekly 27 (2015): 47–53.

138  Political Economy of Caste in India

 8

Judiciary and
Deprivation of
Social Justice

Modern judiciary as a law enforcement agency in India began

with the advent of East India Company rule. It began with
the mayor’s courts under the Royal Charter of 1661 and the
Supreme Court of Fort Williams in Calcutta in 1774 to usher
in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Macaulay and James Stephen
codified law. James Mill wrote that India’s traditional legal
systems had to disappear in order to service the needs of
modern society based on competitiveness and protection of
individual rights and freedoms.1 Earlier, dharmashastras and
caste codes were used as per the whims of the kings and priest
class based on religious prescriptions. In other words, the major
function of the codes appeared to be to maintain varnadharma
and graded inequality. Though the Anglo-Saxon legal system
brought uniformity among different regions of the country,
the judiciary and the structure of the courts has remained
problematic. Judiciary as a part of superstructure of a bourgeois
society as formulated by Marxist scholars is supposed to protect
the interests of the ruling classes (castes) in a modern society.
Gramsci on the conception of law noted that, ‘if every state
tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilization and
citizen (and hence of collective life and of individual relations)
and to eliminate certain customs and attitudes to disseminate
others, then the law will be its instrument for this purpose’.2
This is, in fact, what Mao Tse-Tung was also emphasizing about
the role of superstructure that includes judiciary, education,
culture and so on. He wrote

in the development of history as a whole it is the material

things and social distance that determines social conscious-
ness at the same time. We also recognize and must recognize
the reaction of social consciousness on social existence and
the reaction of superstructure on the economic foundation….
When superstructure (politics, culture and so on) hinders the
development of economic foundation, political and cultural
reforms become the principal and decisive factors.3

We are examining the role of judiciary within the broad

framework of MOP approach here as an academic exercise. We
have respect for Indian judiciary and the apex court that gave
landmark judgements, and the analysis is in no way intended
to lessen the esteem of judiciary.
The structure and the process of delivery of justice in India
have not undergone any change in terms of caste bias and
privileges enjoyed by the upper caste ever in the era of globali-
zation. This strengthen the argument that judiciary by and
large has remained as a superstructure to protect the existing
socio-economic structure in India despite constitutional provi-
sions. This may be due to the weak academic and intellectual
background of some of the judges and the advocates who are
alleged to be in collision with the bench in some cases belong-
ing to some social background. Kiruba Munusamy argued that
there is rampant corruption and caste discrimination in the

140  Political Economy of Caste in India

Indian judiciary.4 In fact, an analytical study by Marc Galanter
and Nick Robinsen5 about the kind of nexus between judges and
advocates and the phenomenon of ‘different judges deciding
the same point of law as part of differently constituted benches
reaching different results’ exist in India. Listing the top ‘grand
advocates’ and their annual incomes, Galanter and Robinsen
noted that,

the powerful role of social networks in acquiring clients and

setting up a practice helps perpetuate the disproportionate
presence of certain ethnic and religious groups in the profes-
sion. For example, in Madras Brahmins dominate the upper
ranks of bar because of their tight networks and long-standing
proficiency in English…. Despite repeated enquiries, we could
not identify any scheduled caste, scheduled tribes or other
background class advocates who were regarded as part of the
elite structure of lawyers.6

The same is reflected in the bench and naturally in the orders

that they pass, as we see below in some cases. The discrimina-
tion did not end up here. Judges who are promoted to the
higher judiciary from the socially marginalized groups, such
as Justice Dinakaran, are alleged to be victimized and hounded
both by the judiciary and the more socially badmouthed media
in India. Even judges of the Supreme Court, including the chief
justices, were accused as corrupt. Prasanth Bhushan echoed
by Shanti Bhushan categorically stated that out of 16 to 17
chief justices, half have been corrupt as of 2009.7 Out of the
three constitutional structures, such as Union Public Service
Commission (UPSC) and Election Commission of India, it is the
higher judiciary that is being perceived as corrupt, discrimina-
tory, incapable of coming to grip with the changing times to
shed its social bias. It is in this context we need to look at the
changes brought in by the legislature through amendments to
Constitution and the outcome.

Judiciary and Deprivation of Social Justice   141

Amendments to the Constitution
The Constitution of India was amended 124 times so far. The
Constitution was amended three times within five years of
its adoption. Therefore, B. R. Ambedkar in his parliamentary
debates in the Rajya Sabha on 15 September 1954 has said that,

I do not know of any constitution in the world which has

been amended so rapidly and if, I may say so rashly, by the
government in office…. Is the constitution not different in
any sense from an ordinary law? Is it merely a scrap paper
to be amended at whim of anybody? I have been noticing
the great contempt or the low regard or respect which the
government has for the constitution.8

Thus, the chairman of the drafting committee himself was disil-

lusioned with the attitude of the elected governments towards
the Constitution. But, the sad part of the storey is that not only
the legislative wing of the government, but even the judici-
ary seems to have the same attitude towards the provisions of
the Constitution, particularly with reference to the economic
and social clauses. Therefore, one need not wonder that the
onslaught on the Constitution will remain perpetual and eter-
nal. Let us look at the history of the process of erosion of the
constitutional morality and the context in order to understand
the reasons for the amendments.

Concept of Private Property

It is necessary to take into consideration the growing needs of
the modern state in its attempt to amend a written constitu-
tion. But, that does not mean that the state can rush for a con-
stitutional amendment without exhausting first the available
alternative means to achieve an economic or social objective.
In fact, it is alleged by scholars that the elected governments
are slowly becoming agents of interest groups or representa-
tives of class interests rather than demonstrating the vision of

142  Political Economy of Caste in India

an enlightened society. The contradictions were present even
during the framing of the Constitution particularly with refer-
ence to the right to property. Before Article 31 was dumped in
1978 through the 44th amendment, there was great debate in
the Constituent Assembly. Ambedkar noted that there were
three groups within the congress party supporting the use
of article to their advantage. It was Jawaharlal Nehru who
was against compensation. But Mr Pant was interested in the
zamindari abolition and Sardar Patel was arguing for full com-
pensation. Therefore, Ambedkar himself was interested in the
first amendment to the Constitution to facilitate land reforms.
But, the landed interests seem to have entered the mindset of
the judiciary and created problems for the effective implemen-
tation of economic programmes that led the Mrs Gandhi gov-
ernment to amend the Constitution to bring Article 300 A and
drop Article 31. This was necessitated due to the needs of the
emerging society. In fact, Ambedkar has agreed with the idea
of an evolving nation of Thomas Jefferson and quoted him in
his parliamentary debates. It is said that ‘each generation as a
distinct nation, with a right, by the will of the majority to bind
themselves … each generation has a right to determine the law
under which it lives’.9 Here one must underline the difference
between the will of the majority and the whimsies of the major
lobbies that in general came from the propertied classes.
In this context, we may find how Ambedkar as a vision-
ary realized the limitations of constitutional provisions and
anticipated the contradictions in our social and economic life.
Therefore, he gave a social and economic agenda in his ‘States
and Ministries’ as he thought that some of his ideas could not
be brought under the Constitution due to the competing groups
in the Constituent Assembly. He wanted that agricultural land
be nationalized and the commanding heights of the economy
be placed under the control of the public sector. Perhaps, he was
expecting that some of his dreams would be realized through
the implementation of the provisions of the Constitution. But,
the executive and judiciary, two important pillars of Indian

Judiciary and Deprivation of Social Justice   143

democracy, which are delegated with the responsibility of
translating the provisions of the Constitution into reality seem
to have failed. It is a well-known fact that the special bench
of the Supreme Court in the case of Bank nationalization Act
1969 struck down the Act on the grounds that it did not meet
certain principles of adequate compensation. It is not only in
the case of bank nationalization but even in the area of other
economic issues; the Supreme Court seems to have remained
always with the property classes. It is strange that neither the
courts nor the intelligentsia have ever looked at the concept of
private property in India. They have simply adopted the princi-
ples as observed in the Anglo-Saxon countries, particularly the
USA, where the conditions are different. India never had the
concept of private property before the permanent settlement.
The laws in the USA are alien to India as they were framed by
the settlers to get legal sanction of grabbing property of the
natives without the moral authority. The NIs who were basi-
cally the Adivasis and Dalits kept outside the purview of land
settlement during the British regime both in the princely states
and the British India government. Even the land held by these
sections obtained through the alienation proceedings are now
being taken away by the government using the principles of
‘eminent domain’. The compensation paid to the displaced
people is based on the colonial Land Acquisition Act 1894. Even
in the calculation of valuation of compensation to the owner
of the property, the economic principles of law of diminishing
marginal utility is not considered and the value of the property
of a zamindar, a rich peasant or a small farmer are considered as
similar. This is a great flaw in the Indian legal system. Further,
the value of the property is now converted into liquid form in
stocks and shares. The intensity of this kind of conversion and
their transfer to other countries has increased several-fold after
1991. The judiciary seems to have not commented much on
these issues and, in fact, allowed privatization of public proper-
ties much against the spirit of the Constitution and Directive
Principles of State Policy.

144  Political Economy of Caste in India

 The story of private property in India is a fairy tale. We are
concerned here how the judiciary is responsible in creating the
titles and the legislative wing in reconstituting new dimension
to right to property with interpretations by the apex court.
It is always the ruling castes or classes that are benefitted by
such interpretations starting from the Kesavananda Bharathi
case and concept of basic structure of the Constitution. Rakesh
Shukla10 has analysed how the right of the poor are overlooked
and the interests of mathadpathis and Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act (FERA) violators protected. Citing former law
minister Shivasankar, who had remarked that ‘Mathadi Pathis
like Kesavananda Bharathi and Zamindars like Golaknath
evoked a sympathetic cord nowhere in the country except
in the supreme court of India’, Jaivir Singh11 has elaborately
discussed how the right to property is dropped and a new
provision is made in the Constitution and the role of the
judiciary in protecting the rights to property at the time of
bank nationalization and in the process of interpreting 1894
Land Acquisition Act. As Jaivir is trained in economics, he has
brought in the theory of Coase (the Nobel laureate) and other
economists in understanding the role of transaction costs as
the costs establishing and maintaining properly rights. But very
few judges sitting on judgement have expertise in economic
and social issues and, therefore, rely on linguistic facility to
arrive at a conclusion unlike the American and European judges
who are now well grounded in these disciplines. (The problem
seems to have been addressed after the five-year integrated law
course was designed.)
The mineral rich areas of the country are located in the
Eastern and Western Ghats and in tribal areas. The Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition and
Rehabilitation Act 2013 and the Scheduled Tribes and Other
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act
2006 are two important legislations that made the life of the
tribes, SCs as victims due to excess litigation. It is reported that
there are around 1,200 laws relating to land in the country as it

Judiciary and Deprivation of Social Justice   145

comes under state list.12 About two-thirds of the total litigations
in the Supreme Court relate to landed property (including the
infamous Ayodhya dispute 2019). All these laws did not come
to the rescue of the victims, mostly the socially marginalized
and displaced, but help the upper caste litigants to escape. There
are several rights, such as right to education and right to food,
which are observed in breach rather than in operation due to
litigation and over-indulgence of judiciary in the matters. The
privatization of higher education was protected by the judiciary
and some of the judges became targets of corruption charges
due to medical admissions involving crores of rupees, which
speaks about the status of judiciary. However, there are brilliant
judges and judgements under the category of public interest
litigation (PIL) that keep the esteem of judiciary in haven.
The issue of compensation and right to life are becoming
serious issues in the process of rapid economic development.
The state is increasingly considered as an agency of a class or
caste as articulated by activist scholars, which would be seized
of limited vision about the future victims with new paradigm of
governance. The Dalits and Adivasis are now left with limited
opportunities in a growing private sector and their displace-
ment from the existing sources of livelihood, such as land,
traditional skills and other sources (with an agenda of capitalist
expansion), will be double marginalized. It is in this context,
the provisions of the Constitution need to be ingeniously and
effectively interpreted by the judiciary to protect the common
man in general and the Dalits and Adivasis in particular. In an
era of judge-made law replacing constitutional wisdom, the
ingenuity and enlightened outlook of the judiciary is the last
resort for the victims. Otherwise, the dominant groups and
the propertied classes who are increasingly getting into the
legislature will make and unmake constitutional amendments
to suit their self or class interests. This may be kept in mind
by the judiciary in pronouncing judgements on constitutional
issues so as to restrict the vested interests not to mend or amend
constitutional wisdom.

146  Political Economy of Caste in India

Social Justice and Indian Constitution
Social justice is generally understood as equality and the
absence of injustice. Amartya Sen13 in his book The Idea of Justice
has identified three components of a theory of justice.

1. A theory of justice must include ways of judging how to

reduce injustice and advance justice rather than aiming only
at characterization of perfectly just societies.
2. There is a need for a reasoned argument with oneself and
with others in dealing with conflicting claims.
3. The presence of remedial injustice may well be connected
with actual lives rather than with institutional shortcomings.

Though Sen was evaluating the relevance of John Rawls’14

theory of ‘justice as fairness’, in the book, he was at the same
time indicating the Indian concepts of justice. He was very
clear in not mentioning social justice here, because he knew
that the concept of social justice was alien to Indians. However,
he noted the early Indian jurisprudence of ‘Niti’ and ‘Nyaya’.
Niti is related to organizational propriety as well as behavioural
correctness. ‘Nyaya’ is concerned with what emerges and how,
and in particular the lives that people are actually able to
lead. Quoting from Mahabharata, and Gita, ‘Niti’ according
to Sen is consequent-independent, while ‘Nyaya’ is reasoning
in an ethical or political evaluation of human lives. Sen has
not fully explained the context and the text of Bhagavad Gita
in his book on the dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna on
‘Niti’ and Nyaya. Krishna was asking Arjuna here to perform
his duty as a Kshatriya which was independent of any conse-
quence. Interestingly, it is here in Bhagavad Gita (Chapter 18,
Sloka. 41–44) that the duties and functions of the varnas are
explained as inborn qualities, which Sen has omitted conspicu-
ously to avoid controversy. Because it is common knowledge of
every Indian that ‘niti’ is related to ‘Jati’ and ‘Nyaya’ is related
to ‘dharma’. The common man understanding of Niti–Nyaya

Judiciary and Deprivation of Social Justice   147

seems to be a little different from the academic elucidation of
Sen. Here dharma is or to be implied as varnashrama dharma
and it is not based on reason. Therefore, the concepts are of
limited help to clarify social justice from the tradition of Indian
jurisprudence?
We may examine here John Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ that
has revolutionized liberal thinking about equality. Rawls
theory can help us to solve the age-old dichotomies of social
justice. Rawls original position is an imagined situation of
primordial equality when the parties involved have no knowl-
edge of their personal identities. It is in the state of ‘veil of
ignorance’ the principles of justice are chosen unanimously.
The following principles of justice will emerge in the original
position.

1. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme

of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar
scheme of liberties for all.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two condi-
tions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity,
and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged members of society.

Thus, the principles of social justice enunciated by Rawls make

sure that public opportunities are open to all, without anyone
being excluded or handicapped on grounds of say, race or eth-
nicity or caste or religion. The second part is concerned with
distributive justice as well as overall efficiency, and it takes the
form of making the worst-off members of the society as well off
as possible. These principles can be used to argue for the distri-
bution of opportunities in higher education among different
social groups in India. However, our intellectuals and activists
can still argue that by admitting reserved category students in
higher education, they are denied fair opportunity. I think the
argument here can be little extended by saying that in matters

148  Political Economy of Caste in India

of social opportunity, we cannot compare two human beings
in India as the same in terms of flesh and blood. They are two
individuals as members of a social group called ‘caste’ within
the boundaries of a state. Each one is representative of a history,
social norms, characteristics and other factors that are not the
same between the two. Therefore, it is not related to two human
beings, but two individuals representing two social groups or
castes with different endowments and they are to be treated
differently. In fact, the problems of distribution of resources or
spaces arise due to limited resources and unlimited demand for
them. This is purely an economic problem. It can be solved in
such a way that the scarce resources are to be allocated to those
individuals from whom the society gets the highest marginal
returns to maximize the total benefit.

Elusive Social Justice in Apex Court

The socially and educationally deprived sections of the society
have reposed greatest confidence in the Constitution with the
belief that it will come to their rescue in times of impinge-
ment. Therefore, the evaluation of the process of constitutional
support to the poor and underprivileged and socially and his-
torically marginalized groups can be attempted in terms of the
judicial activism in social laws. It is in this context, the Supreme
Court judgement pronounced by Chief Justice Y. K. Sabharwal
and four other Hon’ble judges evoked wide publicity and dis-
cussion in the media.15 However, some of the observers and
intellectuals have been saying that once the State has accepted
and executed the lopsided judgement delivered in the case of
Mandal Commission (Indira Sawhney case 1993), it is inevitable
to expect a judgement of this kind for SC and STs also. Some
scholars of social jurisprudence have commented that our
judiciary has remained by and large a Hindu feudal Institution
and there is no surprise if they adhere to those values. It is said
that the same is abundantly reflected in the majority of cases
where upper caste orthodox Hindus deliver the controversial

Judiciary and Deprivation of Social Justice   149

judgements on social issues. The Supreme Court has so far not
represented the people of India or the democratic principles for
which the Constitution stands for, and in its shadow, it sur-
vives. It is irony that none of the judgements relating to social
jurisprudence contain an element of basic principles of justice
nor a reference is made about the developments that are taking
place in the world of knowledge in legal profession. Most of
the time they represent simply a few statements devoid of any
intellectual vision generally expected in a subject of this kind.
It is generally expected that a constitutional bench sitting on
a judgement will shape the destiny of millions of people and
will be guided by principles of justice. The basic tenet of justice
is ‘fairness’. It is also true that the learned judges cannot take
shelter under ‘the veil of ignorance’. They are all learned and
experienced judges and they know the dynamics of Indian soci-
ety. They are also aware of the fact that scholars, such as John
Rawls who has maintained that the background ‘conditions
of justice’ need to be taken into consideration while making
an analysis of a case. But, unfortunately, in most of the cases,
including the recent judgement on creamy layer, there is no
profound scrutiny of the issues involved or any intellectual
inputs are put in coming to terms with the reality of the Indian
society. It is very strange that the learned judges have often not
seriously read the provisions of the Constitution and are guided
by the popular opinion of the educated elite who constitute a
minority in the Indian society and the opinions are sometimes
reflected through the bar. It is clear from the judgement, which
speaks of constitutional requirements as backwardness, inad-
equacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency
in Article 16 of the Constitution. However, Article 16, including
Articles 16(4A) and 16(4B), is an unconditional provision to
provide equality of opportunity to majority of the population
of the country who have been denied opportunities because
of the operation of the dharmashastras (which were upheld by
traditional priesthood). It is found that the learned judges in

150  Political Economy of Caste in India

the Mandal Commission judgement and also in some land-
mark judgements, such as Golaknath, have been protecting
the dharmadhipatis and their traditional roles. They have cre-
ated precedents. They are all judge-made legal provisions, but
they have never gone through the scrutiny of the democratic
legislative process. Like many traditional religious institutions,
the Supreme Court is upholding those precedents as tenets of
law, as they are convenient both to the judiciary and to the
ruling classes.
The flaw in the legal process of the apex court is inherent
as the Supreme Court is considered as above board and is not
publicly accountable. In most of the cases, it is alleged that the
learned judges are not even accountable to their conscience as
some of their pronouncements are deliberately done without
reference to the facts of the cases and actual constitutional posi-
tion. It is clear from the Indira Sawhney case that a deliberate
quantitative restriction of 50 per cent reservation is imposed
while Article 335 speaks about the maintenance of efficiency
of administration while considering the claims of members of
SCs and STs who constitute 22 per cent of the population. And
how can a 50 per cent ceiling be imposed on the reservation
for the 22 per cent population? Article 335 is not related to the
reservation of OBCs. The case of backward classes arises at a
separate Article only after the appointment of a commission to
investigate the conditions of backward classes under Article 340.
Therefore, the Mandal judgement appears to be a misreading
or one can allege that it is a deliberate attempt to distort the
constitutional provisions relating to caste-based reservations.
In the judgement relating to the creamy layer, the Hon’ble
Chief Justice and the other members of the bench, it is alleged,
have been citing their own judgements as set of guidelines of
law to substantiate their arguments. This is definitely a bad
tradition devoid of any ethical or theoretical substance. It
seems there is a growing literature relating to precedents and
their limitations.

Judiciary and Deprivation of Social Justice   151

 The founding fathers of the Constitution knew the back-
ground conditions of social justice in India while making
Articles 15 and 16. These two Articles are fundamental in
protecting the interest of the socially and educationally back-
ward classes of citizens and or SCs and STs. One must see the
historical conditions under which the first amendment to the
Constitution was made to incorporate Article 15(4). This arti-
cle mentioned about two distinct groups of backward classes
of citizens. It is elementary knowledge that we cannot read
Articles 14 and 15 together. Article 14 relates to any person
and this person can be a citizen or a non-citizen, a child or
anyone, whereas Articles 15 and 16 speak about citizens in a
group. Therefore, the learned judges should have considered
the distinction between an independent person and a citizen
in a group. The rights of a person are individual in nature,
whereas the special provisions conferred on a citizen under
Article 15 and Article 16 relate to the entire group. If, one is
inclined to read more in Article 15(4), it is clear that it is an
open-ended category as far as backward classes of citizens
are concerned. It is the duty of the National Commission for
Backward Classes to study, scrutinize and classify any person
in a group as backward classes. There is no restriction. That is
the reason why in certain states Brahmins and so-called upper
castes are also classified as backward classes, based on the
yardsticks used to classify them as backward classes. But in the
case of SCs and STs, it is a closed-ended category as the clas-
sifications of SCs and STs were made before the Constitution
came into existence. There is a long history about the clas-
sification of the SCs and STs. There is one single test which is
very significant in classifying SCs as a separate category, that
is, untouchability. Apart from other 10 classifying tests, none
of them is applicable for other social categories like backward
classes. SCs are only a unique category. Similarly, STs both in
the schedule V and VI areas are those who are isolated from
the mainstream society. They cannot be grouped with any
other category. It is strange that the learned judges have not

152  Political Economy of Caste in India

considered this unique nature of constitutional categories
of people as separate entities and put them together as one
erroneously to arrive at a 50 per cent quantitative limitation
for reservations. There is no legal or theoretical justification
in lumping SC, ST and OBC together. Even if one considers
50 per cent as a quantitative restriction to ensure efficiency,
it is possible to argue that the efficiency levels of open cat-
egory candidates, which ranges above 50 per cent efficiency
will be more than the efficiency levels of the below 50 per
cent reserved category. In other words, if the total efficiency
levels of all the open category candidates are aggregated, there
will still be enough places for the below category candidates
to extend it to even 70 per cent as the elite believe that the
open category of 10 per cent are so efficient. This will take
care of the efficiency of administration. In fact, the reverse
is happening in administration as the reserved categories are
carrying the brunt of work while the open category officers
boss over. Further, the creamy layer is applied only to the dis-
advantaged groups and similar creamy layer is not applied to
open category candidates in employment that creates a blatant
discrimination against them. This is nothing but varnadharma
of feudal era which the learned judges of the apex court appear
to uphold. This was not the intention of the founding fathers
of the Constitution.
It is instructive to find from the legal history of advanced
societies that when judgements on social issues are pro-
nounced, a lot of discussion, thinking and expert advice is
taken as it has far-reaching implications for the society at
large. It is the intellectual competence and the willingness
of the learned judges that makes them to be broad based and
visionary in outlook to foresee the future of a country. It is
the incapable way to use the language of the Constitution
and incapacity of a judge to see the large implications of the
constitutional provisions that make the judgement trivial. It
is always found in the legal literature that the legal luminaries

Judiciary and Deprivation of Social Justice   153

have been dynamic in their pronouncements to make the
society progress by providing enough scope and opportuni-
ties for the majority of the oppressed to advance, even by
creatively interpreting some of the static provisions of a writ-
ten constitution. Unfortunately, in most of the judgements,
particularly during the last two decades, the judgements deliv-
ered by learned judges of the Supreme Court of India appear
to be narrow and backward, bending to uphold the traditional
feudal values. The 124th amendment to the Constitution on
12 January 2019, providing 10 per cent reservations to upper
castes with less than `8 lakhs annual income, did not evoke
any dissent though poverty among others is less than 5 per
cent in most of the states and the economic criterion is only
used as an alibi (it is also true in the case of some Marxists
who supported the argument without empirical evidence that
attracted the rebuke of lower castes).16 This is a blemished
trend as the prestigious institution owes its existence to the
majority will of the people and if the majority of the people
do not repose confidence in the institution, the institution
will collapse, but not the Constitution. As the Constitution is
a gift of the democratic process and a social contract, it shall
always prevail. But the contemporary history of judiciary
speaks differently.

Precedent, Plagiarism and Some Flawed Orders

It is boasted that the doctrine of separation of powers, which is
a theoretical model based on Roman, British and the American
traditions, was adopted for India. However, the allegation that
the legal minds and fraternity who contributed in the drafting
of the Constitution were a little inclined to provide supremacy
to judiciary stands. It can be noticed in the form of exhaustive
clauses and articles relating to judiciary, including the salary and
perks along with the third schedule describing its details, while
such advantage is deprived of other constitutional authorities.
They are meticulous. In fact, the provisions in the Constitution

154  Political Economy of Caste in India

in terms of number of articles formulated by founding fathers
are almost the same for the parliament and judiciary (Articles
43 and 41, respecively). This is anticipated as the learned judges
under whose shoulders the providence of the underprivileged,
the deprived and the marginalized is placed are expected to
entail them with their wisdom. Yet, by default or design the
framers did not infuse democratic spirit into the processes of
judicial decisions that might have triggered the present crisis.
In fact, the first generation of legal minds after independence
due to their commitment to fair play have collectively lived up
to the expectations until the 1970s.
The judgement in the case of Criminal Appeal No. 416 of
2018 delivered on 20 March 2018 by honourable judges of the
apex court can be taken for an academic detour. The guiding
spirit or principle of Indian Constitution is justice—social, eco-
nomic and political. Notwithstanding the 42nd amendment to
the Constitution, Sri Shivasankar’s interpretation and action as
Minister for Law and Justice, the judiciary is made fragile by
the learned judges themselves through their interpretations and
personal opinions expressed as judgements with least regard for
the so-called constitutional morality or spirit, particularly with
respect to justice as fairness. As noted above, John Rawls and
Amartya Sen have elaborated on the theory and idea of justice,
such as with reference to caste-based iniquitous society. It seems
the Niti–Nyaya dichotomy and its application to India has not
touched the conscience of our learned judges. There is a general
feeling among the academic fraternity of legal education and
governance that the amount of time and resources used by
some learned judges on important issues, such as privatization
of public sector units, caste-based reservations and SC/ST atroc-
ity cases, that affect large sections of society are inadequate. It
is often seen that the popular beliefs of the elite of the society
(to use a popular phrase of the court ‘creamy layer’ of minority)
are carried into the courtrooms rather than reflecting on the
efficacy, prudence and the needs of an evolving society with
empathy. Sometimes, they are cold-hearted and as a matter of

Judiciary and Deprivation of Social Justice   155

fact orders disposing of the cases with impunity. Let us look at
the case of Sri Bhaskar Karbhari Gaidwad, an employee of the
College of Pharmacy, Karad, Maharashtra, the respondent No.
2 of case on Prevention of Atrocities (POA) Act 1989 and how
it is interpreted in the above order of learned judges.
The above judgement contains 89 pages consisting of 2,401
lines, out of which 1,620 lines are citations as precedents from
65 cases. It means nearly 68 per cent of the judgement is lifted
or borrowed from previous proceedings. If the wisdom of the
amicus and other mentions are also included, it comes to
three-fourths of the written order, leave alone their relevance
and verisimilitude. The conclusion part of it includes the
warning in Para 83 that, ‘any violation of direction (iii) and
(iv) will be actionable by way of disciplinary action as well as
contempt’. Direction III above is about arrest of public servant
with the approval of appointing authority, and IV is prelimi-
nary enquiry to be conducted by a deputy superintendent of
police (DSP) to find allegations are not frivolous or motivated
under Atrocities Act. As the Constitution under Article 141
conferred that law declared by the Supreme Court to be bind-
ing on all courts, it becomes operational with prospective
affect making the essence of 1989 POA Act infructuous. The
SCs of North India who have been subjected to several heinous
crimes intensely and continuously for the last few years found
the judgement adding fuel to fire. It is common knowledge
of every literate person how the atrocities on the Dalits are
perpetuated near Delhi, but unfortunately it did not reach the
portals of the Supreme Court which otherwise is very proac-
tive. The interesting part of the judgement is that the learned
judges cited Article 21 to substantiate their reasoning.

In the present context, to balance the right of liberty of the

accused guaranteed under Article 21, which could be taken
away only by just fair and reasonable procedure and to check
abuse of power by police and injustice to a citizen, exercise

156  Political Economy of Caste in India

 of right of arrest was required to be suitably regulated by
way of guidelines by this Court under Article 32 read with
Article 141 of the Constitution. Some filters were required to
be incorporated to meet the mandate of Articles 14 and 21
to strengthen the rule of law.

It is further noted that, ‘thus, unless this Court laid down

appropriate guidelines, there will be no protection available
against arbitrary arrests or false implications in violation of
Article 21 of the Constitution.’ We have checked the sentence
twice before citing it here, as we knew about Article 22 that
deals with, ‘protection against arrest and detention in certain
cases’ and not necessarily Article 21 ‘protection of life and
liberty’ that requires procedure established by law. In this case
Article 22 seems to be relevant and not that of 21. In fact, Article
21 should have been used to protect the Dalit victims. In fact,
the learned Judges have totally ignored Article 17, abolition
of untouchability, the basis on which POA has evolved over a
period of time. We may give benefit of doubt to learned judges
as they were under moral pressure to protect an ignorant officer
Dr Mahajan, the appellant a non-SC person who refused permis-
sion to file charge sheet against two non-SC officers who were
alleged to be responsible for committing the atrocity on Sri B.
K. Gaidwad the complainant. This case appears to be simple
but trivial. In the whole judgement of 89 pages, there appears
to be over-dependency on the submissions of the deponent and
his counsel along with the amicus’s comparative table of the
provisions of the Act and their application here. The amicus
is supposed to be an expert in the area of the subject given to
him, but the analytical aspects in relation to the constitutional
morality and its impact on the future of the society are solely
that of the judges who pass the orders.
It is noticed in some of the judgements that the honourable
judges, may be due to heavy work and pressure, rely on the
so-called precedents and cite passages from different sources
verbatim to fill not less than 100 pages in each case. The

Judiciary and Deprivation of Social Justice   157

conclusion and the operation part contain few sentences, and
sometimes there appears to be lot of confusion as to which part
is analysis and which part is direction. In a lighter vein, we
can say that, without which there will be less business for the
legal professionals. However, we need to understand that the
scrutiny of facts and material on record considered by a judge
to deliver the judgement should contain reasonable, just and
rational account that correspond to the details of the case based
on submissions made. It should not appear to be a prejudged
dispute more so when it is a constitutional matter. The learned
Judge of our apex court is not a technocrat to achieve Pareto
optimality, where ‘goods are allocated in such a way that it
is impossible to redistribute them so that at least one person
is better off and nobody is worse off’. Even the fallacy of this
theorem that is cited quite often by a section of the elite who
argue for efficiency was exposed by Nobel Laureate Amartya
Sen. He revealed that,

a society in which some people lead lives of great luxury

while others live in acute misery can still be Pareto optimal if
the agony of the deprived cannot be reduced without cutting
into the ecstasy of the affluent. He adds that a state can be
Pareto optimal and still be sickeningly iniquitous.

It is cited here in the context of a section of the judiciary

defending the clause of equality before law in a structurally
iniquitous society and tries to preserve social division on
grounds of technical efficiency, even if it is against the basic
spirit of the Constitution. There can be some legal matters
where software can be used to decide the matter purely on
the facts of the case. However, here is a constitutional matter
with enormous social implications that essentially involves the
competence, capacity and candour of the person who delivers
the judgement.
Para 41 of the above judgement speaks about law spreading
casteism and cited not only Articles 14–16 but also referred

158  Political Economy of Caste in India

to B. R. Ambedkar to substantiate their reasoning, which may
be a false or coarse logic to ignore Articles 17 and 22 and rely
on their chosen precedents and articles. In paragraph 72, the
learned judges asserted that ‘harassment of an innocent citizen,
irrespective of caste or religion, is against the guarantee of the
Constitution. This Court must enforce such a guarantee. Law
should not result in caste hatred’. There is no dispute with this
ideal. But the way in which data are interpreted and situations
cited to illustrate an erroneous point is perhaps bad in Law. It
is noted in several publications of legal luminaries that ‘prec-
edent’ or principle of stare decisis needs to be used cautiously
and infrequently to achieve the objectives of predictability,
stability, fairness and efficiency and not to avoid the challenge
of delivery of justice. The distinction between two categories
of horizontal and vertical precedents, the former adhering to
its own precedent and the latter derived from a higher court,
is hardly observed in some of the judgements. The citation of
case law and the mushrooming of legal consulting firms and
professionals made the job of a judge easier compared to her
predecessors who did not get the support of computer-assisted
documentation. Yet, the present generation of judges have
problems of plagiarism as the legal support system, if incapa-
ble and dubious, might throw him into a cauldron of copying
ideas and paragraphs that might end up in a condition of fal-
laciously reasoned, inadequately considered and badly argued
judgement. That is not good either for the judiciary or for
the clients and even for a progressive nation. In the academic
world, authors and scholars were penalized for copying others’
studies either inadvertently or intentionally without giving
credits to the original author in a thesis or research paper. They
are dubbed as plagiarists and frauds due to the rules of the game.
We hardly come across such issues in the judiciary where simi-
larly placed judges cite each other. If an analysis is made to cor-
relate the socio-economic and ideological background of each
judge and the content of judgements passed following a linear
path resulting in regression in society, what does it signify?

Judiciary and Deprivation of Social Justice   159

Marxists simply dismiss judiciary, as a part of superstructure
protecting the ruling class may not help us to understand the
process of class suppression even in seats of justice delivery?
In fact, the powers and functions prescribed for the Supreme
Court are not absolute, as it is repeatedly noted ‘unless parlia-
ment by law otherwise provides’. There seem to be no headway
in the present SC/ST atrocity judgement like all other previous
cases relating to the socially and educationally marginalized.17
Why should the parliament go to sessions every time and bring
an amendment to suit the whims of select judges? It is neces-
sary to understand to what extent the judgements are advisory
and orders are binding? The whole exercise has unfortunately
exposed the system when the same court recalled the directions
in October 2019. The Indian judiciary is not democratized while
enjoying all the benefits of parliamentary democracy and not
even remotely mentioning about Article 312 and made the
parliament lick its wounds in the appointment of judges.
How is it possible? There may be an implicit agreement
between the benches of the judiciary and benches of parlia-
ment on all important issues relating to the economic and
social development of the country to subvert the ideals of the
founding fathers of the nation while pretending to do justice.
Are the birds of the same feather flocking together or upholding
the varna dharma need to be reflected?

Notes
1. David Skuy, ‘Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code of 1862:
The Myth of the Inherent Superiority and Modernity of the
English Legal System Compared to India’s Legal System in the
Nineteenth Century’, Modern Asian Studies 32, no. 3 (1998):
513–557.
2. Gramsci, Selections, 246.
3. Mao Tse-Tung, ‘On Contradiction’, in Collected Works I, 326.
4. Kiruba Munisamy, ‘The Nausciating Nepotism and Caste-Based
Discrimination That Exists in Indian Judiciary’, The Print, 11
April 2018.

160  Political Economy of Caste in India

 5. Marc Gallanter and Mick Robinson, ‘India’s Grand Advocates:
A Legal Elite Flourishing in the Era of Globalisation’, Harvard
Law School Research Papers 2013-No 15, November 2013.
6. Ibid., 16.
7. Prashanth Bhashan, ‘My Honest and Bona Fide Perception’,
Outlook 9 December 2009.
8. Government of India, Parliamentary Debates (Rajya Sabha), Vol.
I 7B (New Delhi: GOI, 1954).
9. Ibid.
10. Rakesh Sukla, ‘Rights of the Poor: An Overview of Supreme
Court’, Economic and Political Weekly 55, no. 10 (2006):
3755–3759.
11. Jaivir Singh, Unconstituting Property: The Deconstruction of Right
to Property in India (New Delhi: Centre for the Study of Law
and Government, JNU, 2004).
12. ‘Court Battles Underline Completing of India’s Myriad Land
Laws’, Business Time, 10 July 2019.
13. Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2011).
14. Rawls John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1994 revised).
15. Case No. Writ Petition 61 of 2002 delivered on 19 October
2006, popularly known as the Nagaraju case.
16. Ajaj Ashraf, ‘“The Supreme Court Has Erred”: Former Madras
HC Judge K Chandru on EWS and Maratha Reservations’,
Caravan, 20 July 2019.
17. The Hindu ‘A Sound View: On Supreme Court recalling its
verdict diluting SC/ST anti-atrocities law’, (Editorial), The
Hindu, 3 October 2019.

Judiciary and Deprivation of Social Justice   161

 9

Social Barriers as
Impediments of
Information Flow

K. E. Boulding once remarked that, ‘it is certainly tempting to

think of knowledge as a capital stock of information, knowl-
edge being to information what capital is to income’.1 Thus,
the economic value of information and knowledge has been
a source of great debate in economics of education for the last
several decades. Sociologists have also been emphasizing on the
need to improve social communication for development. The
advent of electronic media and the monopoly of these sources
by MNCs has created a hiatus between information haves and
information have-nots. While the issue of digital divide is
attracting the attention of social scientists at the global level,
the traditional division between the untouchables and others
in India during the 21st century seems to have attracted very
little attention. Technocrats and policymakers who are trained
in the modern methods of intervention and management,
care little for the flow of information from groups like Dalits.
Communication seems to be very important in decision-making
process of development planning and the information flows
are the life blood of communication. However, in traditional
societies, such as India, the barriers to free flow of information
is not only limited by technical rigidities, but even the social
institutions, such as caste, gender and others, limit the com-
munication. It is the responsibility of the decision-maker and
the information expert to understand these rigidities in order
to democratize communication. An attempt is made in this
chapter to examine to what extent simple and known gov-
ernment social programmes are communicated to the target
groups. As the Dalits are an alienated community and the social
intercourse between Dalits and others appear to be limited in
public sphere, it is assumed that the free flow of information
is limited by social taboo.
The data for the study is culled out from a study under-
taken by the author for District Primary Education Programme
(DPEP), government of Andhra Pradesh. The sample study is
undertaken in 19 rural districts covering 1,520 samples. All the
sample households belong to SC category.

Reasons for Educational Backwardness

The educational backwardness of SCs is examined here on the
basis of primary data collected from the household survey. It is
generally held that several incentives and schemes are thrown
open to Dalits to improve their educational opportunities.
It is also believed that despite all these schemes, Dalits have
remained backward in literacy and educational development.
But, the fact of the matter is that many of the schemes are not
known to them. The communication channels and the demo-
cratic institutions in the rural areas, including the recent Village
Education Committee (VECs), are found to be ineffective. The
conclusions based on primary data are supported by the quali-
tative information obtained from the focus group discussions.
Some of the details are given here.

Social Barriers as Impediments of Information Flow  163

Incentives Known to Dalits
School education up to the age of 14 is compulsory according
to the directive principles of the Constitution and now right
to education. The Government of India and the state govern-
ments have been providing different categories of incentives
to promote elementary education. As the item of school edu-
cation comes under state list, the state government has also
taken interest in the development of school education. The
socially and educationally disadvantaged groups, such as SCs,
are provided with hostel or residential facility, clothes, books
and so on free of cost. The impact of these items of incentives
varies from region to region and from caste to caste. Here, we
have presented information as to what extent these incentives
are known to the target groups. We have collected data relat-
ing to the respondent’s knowledge about different categories
of incentives, adequacy of the item of incentive, the quality of
the item and its timely supply to the target group. The data are
provided in the Table 9.1.
It is found that only 23 per cent of the respondents are
aware of the scheme of scholarships for SCs. However, 55.3
per cent of the total respondents are aware of the supply of
rice as an incentive for sending children to school. But, only
12.5 per cent are satisfied with the adequate supply of rice
and its quality is found to be good among 25 per cent of the
respondents. Not even 21 per cent of the respondents con-
sider that rice is supplied on time. In total, 41 per cent of the
respondent’s know about the supply of free textbooks, but
only 18 per cent are satisfied with the supply and 90 per cent
complained that they are not supplied on time. Many people
(around 90%) are not aware of schemes, such as mid-day
meals, free stationery and free clothes. It is very interesting to
find that 95 per cent of the SCs who are sending their children
to school are not aware of the existence of hostels for SC chil-
dren. The data suggest that the government schemes are not
reaching the target groups, and therefore the expected results

164  Political Economy of Caste in India

TABLE 9.1  Respondents’ Knowledge about the Incentives (in Percentage)
Name of Knowledge Quantity Quality Supply
Sl. No. Incentive Yes No Sufficient Insufficient Good Not Good Timely Delay

1. Scholarships 23.7 76.4 2.6 97.4 6.4 93.6 4.2 95.8

2. Mid-day meals 6.3 93.7 2.3 97.9 2.6 97.4 1.6 98.4
3. Free clothes 16.3 83.7 5.1 94.9 4.9 95.1 3.1 96.9
4. Free textbooks 41.2 58.8 18.5 81.5 16.7 83.3 11.2 88.8
5. Free stationery 9.4 90.6 3.3 96.7 2.5 97.5 1.4 98.6
6. Rice 55.3 44.7 12.5 87.5 25.1 74.9 21.0 79.0
7. Hostel facility 6.2 93.8 1.7 98.3 1.4 98.6 0.7 99.3

Source: Author (estimates based on BSE data sources).

are not realized as the schemes are not known to the people.
Even if schemes, such as rice and free text books, are known,
they are considered to be poor in quality and are not reaching
the target groups on time for motivating them to send their
children to school.

Communication Channels
The Dalits or SCs are an isolated community. Though they live
in the same village, they are always kept on the outskirts of the
village for generations. They do not have established channels
of communication with the mainstream society except when
they are required for their labour power and the upper castes
come to the basti to order them to work. Therefore, the general
development of education and literacy in the rural areas has
very little impact on the development process of the Dalits. In a
modern society, community development means that one can
move up the ladder or get to know about the subsidies, govern-
ment projects, and so on. Even the existence of a school and the
need to send their children to school requires communication;
otherwise, the Dalits hesitate to send their children to school,
as they are treated as untouchables.
We have collected information both from school-going
and non-school-going respondents about the communication
channels that they use in general and in education sector in
particular. We have identified 18 modern channels of commu-
nication and the data are presented in Table 9.2. It is found that
the traditional channel of ‘dandora’ is still the most prominent
channel both among the school-going and non-school-going
respondents. Television (TV) and radio are being used by less
than 10 per cent of the respondents. However, the non-school-
going respondents are more favourable to radio and TV than
the school-going respondents. The village officers, including
the teacher, constitute less than 10 per cent of the means
through which the SCs receive information. It is interesting to
find that 11.7 per cent among school-going and 10.5 per cent

166  Political Economy of Caste in India

TABLE 9.2  Communication Channels
School- Non-school-
Sl. going going
No. Source of Communication Respondent Respondent

1. Villagers/neighbours 11.7 10.5

2. Village president 6.4 5.1
3. Local caste leaders 4.5 5.9
4. Gram panchayat members 1.7 3.6
5. Village officials 1.2 6.2
6. School teacher 6.4 2.5
7. MRO/MDO/RI 5.3 5.7
8. Print media (newspapers, etc.) 4.1 3.0
9. Radio 5.3 9.3
10. Television 6.6 13.6
11. Posters 0.4 0.1
12. Dandora 14.0 10.4
13. TV, poster, dandora 11.0 2.2
14. TV and radio 5.5 4.3
15. Radio, newspaper 0.7 0.8
16. Radio, neighbour 1.3 0.4
17. TV, radio, villagers 0.1 0.1
18. Radio, officials 0.1 0.1
19. Others 11.4 16.2
Total 100.0 100.0

Source: Author (estimates based on BSE data sources).

Note: The overlapping is due to the design of the schedule and each
source is independent of the other.

among non-school-going respondents still receive communica-

tion through villagers and neighbours. It is observed that the
mainstream leaders and the development functionaries are still
guided by social barriers in communicating with Dalits about
development programmes. This shows the isolation of the Dalit

Social Barriers as Impediments of Information Flow  167

community from the mainstream society, which may be one of
the reasons why majority of Dalits still remain illiterate.

Role Perception of Respondents about VEC

Village Education Committee (VEC) as a method of decen-
tralization of school administration was conceived as a cost-
effective method by the World Bank experts. In a democratic
set up, the functioning of the grassroots level committees need
to be emphasized. Keeping this in mind, the Government of
India adopted the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments
to enable the gram panchayat and local body institutions to
participate both in developmental and welfare activities. The
government of Andhra Pradesh is one of the earliest to make
use of these to develop school education. The Ramakrishna
Rao Committee was appointed to recommend the establish-
ment of VECs for the better management of schools. The gov-
ernment of Andhra Pradesh has passed an Act to implement
these recommendations and the VECs were formed to look
after certain functions of the school. It is assumed that these
committees will be able to generate funds, resources and sup-
port the development of education in the villages. It was also
thought that the involvement of the SCs in the VEC would
help in strengthening not only the effective management of
the school, but also the effective participation of the students
in the schools. Therefore, one member in the VEC is reserved
for SCs and STs. It is, however, very disturbing to find from the
survey that only 36 per cent of the respondents of parents of
school-going children are aware of the existence of VEC, while
the number is much lower in the case of non-school-going
respondents (with only 25 per cent knowing about it). It is
quite clear that the respondents whose children are going to
school are well aware of the committee than the non-school-
going respondents. Keeping this in mind, we have analysed
the role perception of the respondents about VEC. The data
are presented in Table 9.3.

168  Political Economy of Caste in India

  
Role Perception of Respondents about VEC (in
TABLE 9.3
Percentage)
Sl. School Non-School
No. Role of VEC Going Going

1. Collection of funds 7.5 6.1

2. Giving donation 3.3 4.6
3. Discussion with govt on school 11.8 11.0
4. Donating land 2.2 2.0
5. Protecting school 7.0 5.2
6. Repairing school buildings 5.5 7.5
7. Supervision of mid-day meals 5.0 6.6
8. Appointment of voluntary teacher 4.5 4.6
9. Supervision of school administration 7.5 5.8
10. Ensuring regularity of teacher 13.5 16.5
11. Ensuring good teaching 15.5 14.7

Source: Author (estimates based on BSE data sources).

In the table, information relating to the respondents who are

aware of the VEC is analysed. The table also shows the respon-
sibilities of VEC as perceived by the respondents. Among the
school-going respondents, less than 10 per cent consider the
role of the VEC in only to get resources for the development of
the school. It is interesting that around 30 to 35 per cent of the
respondents consider that the role of the VEC is to supervise the
teacher and school administration. Strangely, the same propor-
tion of respondents even among non-school-going respondents
considers the same as important. It appears that there is a mis-
conception about the role of VEC among the respondents. At the
same time, there are some people who are willing to give funds,
resources and time for the development of school in the village.

Decision-makers in the Family

It is generally considered that the decision to send the child
to school, work or attend to siblings is decided by the head

Social Barriers as Impediments of Information Flow  169

of the family who is normally the eldest male member of the
family. As the SCs are still in a matriarchal family set up, the
decisions are still taken in consultation with other members of
the family, including women. The data relating to the decision-
makers with reference to different activities are presented in
Table 9.4.
It is found that the role of the grandparents in the family is
almost wiped out in taking decisions on important issues relat-
ing to the family, except the marriage of the granddaughters. As
far as the school-going respondents are concerned, the father in
38 per cent of cases takes decisions about the admission of the
girls’ enrolment, and the same is the case with the admission
of male child. However, father plays an active role in the sense
that around 45 per cent of the fathers among the respondents
take decision as to the engagement of the child as a labourer.
Even in the case of attending meetings and taking loans, the
male member in the family takes the decision. It is also true in
the case of non-school-going respondents.
As far as the role of the mother in the family is concerned,
in 20 to 30 per cent of the cases, mother takes the decision for
keeping children at home to assist her. In all other cases, the
role is limited. Interestingly in 30 to 50 per cent of the cases,
both the parents (including mother) are collectively involved in
taking decisions even in the case of admission or withdrawal or
putting children in jobs, including marriage of the daughters. It
shows that remnants of matriarchal forms of family organiza-
tion among the SCs still persist. Therefore, it is necessary that
both the male and female members among the SC are to be
motivated in sending their children to school.

Conclusion
The above analysis of knowledge, communication and decision-
making process among the Dalit families regarding schooling
of their children is really amazing. Contrary to the popular

170  Political Economy of Caste in India

TABLE 9.4  Decision-Makers in the Family (in Percentage)
Grand
Father Mother Parents Parents Children Others Total
S. No. SG NSG SG NSG SG NSG SG NSG SG NSG SG NSG SG NSG

1 Girl child 37.9 35.8 5.8 10.0 44.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 8.9 9.5 100 100
enrolment
2 Male child 35.7 36.6 10.3 11.8 43.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 7.6 7.9 100 100
enrolment
3 Withdrawing 34.7 36.7 7.6 8.6 38.2 0.8 0.5 4.6 4.6 4.1 15.1 12.0 100 100
child from
school
4 For assisting 32.5 31.3 27.3 26.6 21.6 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 20.9 19.3 100 100
mother
5 Engaging in 43.6 43.8 7.1 10.4 27.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 21.5 19.5 100 100
farm labour
6 Wage labour 42.8 43.4 5.5 6.1 29.5 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.1 20.9 2.7 100 100
7 Daughter 33.0 32.1 6.4 6.8 33.7 7.9 6.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 18.7 17.9 100 100
marriage
8 Attending 53.4 52.8 5.5 5.8 23.2 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 16.6 18.3 100 100
meetings
9 Others 48.0 45.8 5.7 7.1 29.9 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 15.9 17.6 100 100

Source: Author (estimates based on BSE data sources).

Note: SG—school going children’s family; NSG—non-school going children’s family.
opinion about the knowledge of the government incentives
among the Dalits, the study revealed that the information is not
within the reach of the Dalits. The Dalits as an ex-untouchable
social category is still found to be away from the social com-
munication network. The social barrier or taboo in speaking to
them and sharing the necessary information on development
programmes appears to be in operation. The data have clearly
shown that very few functionaries, including the village offic-
ers, are communicating with the Dalits about government
programmes. This calls for a review of the existing sources of
information and the institutions of communication of devel-
opment programmes. It appears that the use of technology
in breaking this barrier through effective implementation of
media in the rural areas, in general, and inaccessible habita-
tions of Dalits, in particular, is essential to reap the results of
modernization. Though the study was undertaken a decade
ago, the broad inferences that arise from this sample study is
that information flow has a social barrier, one more condition
to facilitate CMOP.

Note
1. K. E. Boulding, ‘The Economics of Knowledge and the
Knowledge of Economics’, American Economic Review 56, no. 2
(1966): 1–13.

172  Political Economy of Caste in India

 10

Physical Alienation
Offences and Atrocities against
Scheduled Castes

SCs are the most vulnerable social group in the Indian soci-
ety. They are vulnerable both as an economically and socially
deprived segment and also as a physically and psychologically
dispossessed category to be despised by the non-SCs. It is
not only the so-called Dvijas who abhor them as untoucha-
bles, even the Shudras, OBCs and sometimes those who have
migrated to other faiths and creeds from this category treat
them with contempt. The Hindu ethos and to a large extent
the Indian ethos makes a person to look for someone who
is seen as inferior to him to establish his relative position in
the society. Perhaps, it is because of this phenomenon that
the iniquitous caste system is perpetuated. Interestingly, one
cannot establish one’s caste absolutely without reference to
others. It is to demonstrate the fact that one belongs to a
particular caste; each individual practices certain customs,
norms and mores that are said to be the exclusive property of
the caste. Some castes and individuals use physical symbols,
such as tilak or marks or dress code, to distinguish themselves
from others. But in a majority of cases, caste is exhibited only
in terms of certain practices, such as untouchability. In fact,
untouchability is not a typical attribute of the Dalits alone.1
But the practice of untouchability is essential condition for the
existence of Hindu caste system and without which it is dif-
ficult to maintain the social order. That is why all the authors
of dharmashastras and grihya sutras, such as Apastamba, Manu,
and Gautama, who have codified Hindu dharma had attributed
different values to different castes. Naturally, caste system
demands that these values are to be imbibed by the beholder.
As caste system is an intangible social practice, its presence
can be seen when it is practised. Untouchability is one very
important physical attribute that is being naturalized by every
Hindu much less the Indian.
The nature of untouchability and caste atrocities against
SCs in India is not confined to rural areas. Its presence is very
much appalling in metros, such as Bangalore. It was reported
in November 2018 in Deccan Herald that as many as 207 cases
were filed in Bangalore Urban and 9 in rural Bangalore in
2017. The city stands second in SC/ST atrocities.21 The distress-
ing part of the news is that only 42 are reported as convicted
cases out of 1,108 cases. The case is cited here to indicate
that offences against Dalits are not a bygone phenomenon.
It is kicking every day, as a crime is committed against Dalits
every 15 minutes; three women raped and two murdered as of
2017. Then, why are these atrocities committed? As noted in
Chapter 1, CMOP prevails under the conditions of ‘shock and
awe’ and alienate them from mainstream. This is a technique
being perpetuated to link Hindutva with corporate capital-
ism.3 In order to provide an empirical reality of the atrocity at
the grassroots, we have given below a study conducted by the
author based on the data provided by Justice Punnayya during
20014 in Andhra Pradesh. This is the first report that generated
data at district level.

174  Political Economy of Caste in India

Offences versus Atrocities
The SCs or Dalits are subjected to various kinds of humiliations,
ill treatment and physical abuse by the non-SC community.
They have been doing it as a matter of right and social sanc-
tion for ages. Therefore, these acts are never considered as
legally punishable offences in the Hindu code. It is only on
the advent of a democratic and civil society that these offences
were recognized as crimes by the mainstream society. Several
leaders of the Dalits must have fought against them, but they
were neither recognized nor recorded in the past. In the 1850s,
the British for the first time banned the inhuman practice of
untouchability. Once it is banned, anyone who is found to be
practising it is said to be an offender. The legal lexicon defines
an offence ‘as an act or omission punishable by law’. Thus, the
British has for the first time introduced the concept of offence
for acts of inhuman treatment meted out to untouchables or
Dalits. The Indian Constitution under Article 17 prohibited
the practice of untouchability. Later the government passed
the Protection of Civil Rights (PCR) Act 1955 and it was further
amended in 1976. The PCR rules were passed on 15 September
1977. The chronology of events relating to this Act shows how
the government sluggishly acted towards the implementation
of PCR Act 1955. Even after the passing of the rules, the imple-
mentation of the Act was very lukewarm and the provisions of
the Act were related only to petty issues belonging to untouch-
ability. But the number of Dalits who were persecuted, raped,
humiliated, looted and killed by the non-SCs had increased
during the 1970s and 1980s in the country. Major incidents,
such as Kilvenmani, Kanchikacherla, Karamchedu, and several
other ghastly incidents took place in the country and the PCR
Act was found to be very inadequate to deal with such cases.
The culprits were booked under Indian Penal Code (IPC) only.
Therefore, the government has passed the SCs and STs (POA)
Act 1989 on 11 September 1989. The major purpose of the Act
was to prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against

Physical Alienation  175

the members of SCs and STs to provide for special courts for
the trial of such offences and for the relief and rehabilitation of
the victims of such offences. A new term is added to the legal
lexicon, ‘atrocity’. The offences against Dalits that come under
PCR Act 1955 were different from the offences that are booked
under this Act. The Act has defined atrocity as one commit-
ted by whoever, not being a member of SC or ST, causing any
of 15 kinds of damages (both physical and psychological) to
the SCs and STs. It has further identified 7 categories of legal
implications that cause injury to Dalits and also come under
atrocity. The rules for the POA Act, including the schedule of
punishment and relief to victims, were passed on 31 March
1995. Thus, the crimes against SCs and STs are broadly catego-
rized under two groups.
Under the IPC

1. Murder
2. Hurt
3. Rape
4. Kidnapping and abduction
5. Dacoity
6. Robbery
7. Arson
8. Others (other classified IPC crimes)

Under Special Laws

1. PCR Act 1955

2. The SCs and STs (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989

The incidence of above crimes was booked under different

sections by the police. They were finally consolidated by the
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, and the same
data are being supplied to various agencies that prepare reports
on the status of Dalits in India. Therefore, the concept of

176  Political Economy of Caste in India

atrocities with reference to SCs is of recent origin. This may be
kept in mind while analysing the data on atrocities.
There are different government and non-government organi-
zations that publish data on atrocities or crimes or offences
on Dalits. But the source of information for all these is the
same. The crime bureau records of Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India is the source of information on crime,
including various categories of crime on Dalits. The Ministry of
Welfare (now Social Justice and Empowerment), Government
of India has been publishing the following reports that contain
data and information on Dalits.

1. Annual Reports of the Ministry

2. Annual Report on PCR Act
3. Report of National Commission for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (earlier Commission for SCs, and STs)

and chapters on crime against weaker sections in ‘Crime in

India’, and reports of the ministry of Home Affairs, Government
of India. Some NGOs who are working in the area of human
rights do also publish occasional reports on atrocities on Dalits.
The above reports provide data on an all India basis with
reference to individual states. Thus, we can have secondary
data on atrocities on Dalits on Andhra Pradesh. But, the data
relating to each district in the state can be obtained only from
the records of the Department of Home Affairs of the state.

Approach of the Study

As the study is basically concerned about the atrocities of
Dalits in Andhra Pradesh, the data relating to various crimes
against them as recorded in the crime bureau are obtained.
We have found a lot of discrepancy in the data. Though the
source of information is the same, the presentation of data in
terms of the concepts of PCR Act and POA Act are found to be

Physical Alienation  177

different. Therefore, we have approached the problem through
alternative sources of information. The government of Andhra
Pradesh has appointed a commission on untouchability under
the chairmanship of Justice K. Punnayya. The committee has
visited all the districts in the state and collected a lot of infor-
mation. The committee has produced a report of three volumes
containing rich information on offences and atrocities. So far,
no one has attempted to use the information for a statistical
analysis to test the validity of data presented in the reports of
the Government of India. We have culled out the data from
these reports and employed simple statistical tools not only to
establish the validity of data, but also to examine the source of
the significant determinants of crime against Dalits.

Crimes against Dalits in Andhra versus India

The relative position of Andhra Pradesh vis-à-vis other States
and the all India status of crimes against Dalits is examined
here. We have examined the atrocities relating to SCs only and
it does not include STs. The main offences committed against
SCs in the country, including atrocities registered under various
sections of PCR and POA, are included in the data in Table 10.1.
The data are for a period of three decades from 1979 to 2016.
It can be seen that the offences and atrocities against SCs have
increased from 13,975 in 1979 to 33,908 in 1994 and 42,212
in 2016, which are an increase of 20 times in a period of four
decades. The number of people murdered has increased from
388 in 1979 to 546 in 1994 and has declined to 505 in 1999
and again increased to 799 in 2016. There is no decline in the
number of cases of rapes against SC women. They are continu-
ously increasing from 430 in 1979 to 992 in 1994, 1,000 in 1999
and 2,693 in 2016. Some data relating to murders during the
period 1966 to 1970 are available and not presented in Table
10.1. The annual average of these years is found to be 370.
The total crimes, including offences against SCs, in the period
are estimated to be 847 per year. Perhaps no civilized society

178  Political Economy of Caste in India

  
Main Offences Committed against Scheduled
TABLE 10.1
Castes in India during 1979–2016
Crime
Category 1979 1983 1993 1994 1995 2016

Murder 388 525 510 546 571 799

Grievous 1,441 1,362 NA 4,542 4,544 1,149
hurt
Rape 430 641 798 992 873 2,693
Arson and 1,013 982 369 533 500 1,957
rioting
Other 10,703 11,324 23,296 27,295 26,509 34,853
offences
Total 13,975 14,834 24,973 33,908 32,997 42,212

Source: Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of India and National

Crime Records Bureau, New Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs.

in modern period has witnessed such a raze of crime against

a particular social group merely on the basis of the birth of a
person in a community.
The relative position of Andhra Pradesh can also be found
in terms of the number of crimes reported per lakh of the SC
population. It is not proper to report and analyse the absolute
number of crimes against SCs in each state as the presence of
the SC population in each of the state in India is not uniform.
Therefore, the incidence of atrocities can be expressed in
terms of the cases per lakh of the SC population. The National
Commission for SCs and STs in its fifth report presented such
data.5 In absolute terms, Uttar Pradesh has recorded the highest
number of 10,492 cases in 2016 followed by Bihar with 5,944
cases, Rajasthan with 5,134 cases, Madhya Pradesh with 4,922
cases, Andhra Pradesh with 2,424 cases, Gujarat with 1,494
cases and so on. But if we express the cases in terms of a lakh
of population, the first rank goes to Rajasthan with 755 cases

Physical Alienation  179

per lakh of population, second rank to Madhya Pradesh with
683 cases and Andhra Pradesh comes as sixth in the list in 2016.
Interestingly, the cases pending trial from the previous year in
2016 are reported as 18,131 out of 38,670 in 2015. It means
almost 50 per cent of cases remain on files, and the conviction
data are reported to be around 15 per cent.
The data relating to the offences and atrocities committed
against SCs in Andhra Pradesh are presented in Table 10.2. It is
observed that there is a substantial rise in the number of crimes
in the state during the period 1982 to 2016. The number of

 
Offences and Atrocities Committed against
TABLE 10.2 Scheduled Castes in Andhra Pradesh during
1982–2016
Category 1982 1983 1993 1994 1995 2016

Murder 16 11 29 16 25 25
Hurt 8 26 – 307 516 10
Rape 17 25 38 36 64 90
Kidnapping and – – 7 10 22 12
abdication
Assault on women* – – 0 0 0 303
Robbery – – 1 1 3 1
Arson 13 5 1 5 12 11
PCR Act cases – – 277 238 265 446
SC&ST (POA) Act – – – 307 519 1,371
cases
Other offences 159 114 325 282 338 155
Total 213 181 678 1,202 1,764 2,424

Source: Department of Social Welfare, Government of India and NCRB,

Ministry of Home Affairs Notes:
Note: *Added in 2016.

180  Political Economy of Caste in India

cases of murder has increased from 16 in 1982 to 25 in 2016.
The number of cases booked under PCR Act was not shown
separately in 1982 and we have data separately for PCR and POA
from 1994. The data show a lot of inconsistencies. Though the
number of total cases has increased from 213 in 1982 to 1,880
in 1997 and 2,424 in 2016; there is no uniformity in other
cases under PCR and POA. It is only to examine the consistency
in these cases that we have approached alternative sources of
information on crimes against Dalits.

Reliability of Data
We found that the data presented by government agencies are
not reliable, as these cases are booked by the police on the basis
of complaints from victims. In majority of the cases, FIRs or
cases are not recorded. Therefore, the number of cases reported
either in the National Commission or crime against Dalits pre-
sented by government sources is found to be under reported.
Some attempts have been made by some NGOs, such as the Kula
Vivaksha Vyathireka Porata Committee (committee to fight
against caste discrimination) and A.P. Human Rights Watch.
But the data of these agencies are secondary in nature as they
cull out this information from newspaper clippings, occasional
surveys and so on. They do not have data on all the districts of
Andhra Pradesh6 and do not possess any official significance.
The government of Andhra Pradesh has appointed Justice
K. Punnayya to enquire into the problems and incidence of
untouchability in Andhra Pradesh in 2000. This is an official
committee and has visited all the districts in the state and
received representations and complaints from the Dalits. The
cases have been narrated and reported as appendices to the
report. Therefore, we have culled out the data from the report
and presented them in quantitative figures. Before taking up
the analysis of this data, we have tested the validity of the
data of the districts. We have calculated the Chi-square as
0.91 between the total villages in each district and the data

Physical Alienation  181

  
N umber of Villages Represented in the
TABLE 10.3
Commission in Andhra Pradesh
Total
No. of Number of
Represented Petitions
Total Village Presented
Sl. No. of to the to the
No. District Villages Commission Commission

1. Adilabad 1,750 32 105

2. Anantapur 965 312 316
3. Chittoor 1,550 531 663
4. Cuddapah 980 93 313
5. East Godavari 1,412 81 227
6. Guntur 733 505 625
7. Karimnagar 1,103 49 110
8. Khammam 1,241 233 850
9. Krishna 1,005 68 243
10. Kurnool 990 357 316
11. Mahbubnagar 1,557 908 694
12. Medak 1,265 139 121
13. Nalgonda 1,158 193 256
14. Nellore 1,207 125 373
15. Nizamabad 921 45 173
16. Prakasam 1,103 297 324
17. Ranga Reddy 1,055 224 297
18. Srikakulam 2,088 232 318
19. Visakhapatnam 4,273* 221 521
20. Vizianagaram 1,551 275 218
21. Warangal 1,998 147 467
22. West Godavari 908 109 409
Total 30,813 5,176 7,939

Source: Justice Punnayya Committee Report, Government of Andhra

Pradesh, Hyderabad.
Note: *Most of the villages are tribal villages with 5–10 habitations.

182  Political Economy of Caste in India

on offences reported by Dalits from the villages and found
it statistically significant. Then we have considered the data
on various issues of atrocities reported in the report as valid.
In Table 10.3, the data are presented to show the volume of
cases reported to the commission in relation to the number
of villages in a district and the villages that are represented to
the commission in each district. It is found that out of 30,813
villages, 5,176 villages or 6 per cent of the total villages in the
state are represented. We consider this as a significant sample
of the population of SCs in the state. It can also be seen that
the number of petitions submitted by Dalits to the commis-
sion in each district is in relation to the size of villages in the
district. Therefore, it is taken as a representative sample of
cases of Dalits in the state. After confirming that the data are
reliable and scientific, we have culled out the cases that come
under PCR and reported in Table 10.4. We have collected data
relating to 4 important cases of untouchability and discrimina-
tion reported in the years 2000–2001. We have taken the cases
of (a) restriction of temple entry, (b) two glasses system, (c)
restriction of dhobi/barber and (d) restriction of wells for drink-
ing water. If we compare the data of this report to the data
presented by the Ministry of Home Affairs through their crime
records, we will find that they are totally under-reported. If
the data of Table 10.4 are compared with the data in Table
10.2 relating to the year 1999 on PCR cases, it is found that
the records of police show that there are only 266 cases.7 In
the case of the Punnayya Commission, it is reported as 6,605
cases. This does not include cases which are not reported due
to lack of information, inaccessibility and so on. We can take
this to even out the cases that are over-reported or repeated
from the previous years. The data show the atrocious nature of
under-reporting of cases of discrimination and untouchability.
Though we have data on crimes, such as murder and rape,
from the same report, we have not considered them here due
to the legal issues involved. We have reported in Table 10.6,
the data on crimes as per the records of the police.

Physical Alienation  183

TABLE 10.4  Discrimination against Scheduled Castes in Andhra Pradesh (PCR), 2000–2001
Sl. Temple Entry Two Glasses Dhobi/Barber Wells/Pumps
No. District Restricted System Restricted Restricted Total

1. Adilabad NR NR NR NR NR
2. Anantapur 222 222 222 222 222
3. Chittoor 233 233 233 233 233
4. Cuddapah 24 24 24 24 24
5. East Godavari 25 25 25 25 25
6. Guntur 181 181 181 181 181
7. Karimnagar 9 9 9 9 9
8. Khammam 77 77 77 77 77
9. Krishna 6 6 6 6 6
10. Kurnool 335 335 335 335 335
11. Mahbubnagar 836 836 836 836 836
12. Medak 80 80 80 80 80
13. Nalgonda 187 187 187 187 187
14. Nellore 50 50 50 50 50
15. Nizamabad 18 18 18 18 18
16. Prakasam 75 75 75 75 75
17. Ranga Reddy 260 260 260 260 260
18. Srikakulam 53 53 53 53 53
19. Visakhapatnam 40 40 40 40 40
20. Vizianagaram 51 51 51 51 51
21. Warangal 51 51 51 51 51
22. West Godavari 16 16 16 16 16

Source: Justice Punnayya Committee Report, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.

Note: NR—not reported.
 The data on the practice of untouchability, which attracts
PCR Act, as reported to the Punnayya Commission by the
SCs in Andhra Pradesh show the nature and magnitude of
the problem. It is clear that out of 6,605 cases only around
260 are reported in official records. In other words, the under-
reporting of untouchability cases is around 96 per cent in
Andhra Pradesh or we can say that only 4 per cent of the cases
of incidence of untouchability are booked. We do not have
the data to show how many of the guilty among them are
ultimately convicted.

Composite Index of Caste Discrimination

Caste system in India ascribes different values to different
castes. This can be found across all castes. Some castes are dis-
criminated in private sphere, some are in public life and Dalits
are discriminated everywhere. This is because of the low value
attributed to the life of a Dalit. This discrimination is practised
in several ways. But in a civilized society, certain minimum
human relations are expected to be exchanged between indi-
viduals who are equal in physical terms. But this is found to be
not valid in India. The Dalits8 are discriminated even in simple
human gestures, such as giving drinking water and treating
all human beings as equal before God. In order to find out
how the Dalits are discriminated on the basis of their birth, a
statistical estimate is made on the basis of the data culled out
from Punnayya Commission Report. As the number of cases in
each item of discrimination is not uniform and the severity of
injury varies from one incidence of discrimination to another,
we thought of estimating a composite index of discrimination.
Out of the 4 events of discrimination reported in Table 10.4, we
have taken two important events, temple entry and two glasses
to represent discrimination across districts. These two events
are reported in all the districts in the state. We have assigned
two-thirds weight to temple entry and one-third weight to
two-glass system to estimate the composite index. The indices

186  Political Economy of Caste in India

are presented in Table 10.5 along with the illiteracy rates and
incidence of general poverty and agriculture labourers among
Dalits in each district. The value of composite index shows the
magnitude of discrimination. It is found that the composite

TABLE 10.5  Composite Index of Caste Discrimination

Composite SC General SC Ag.
Sl. Index of Illiterate Poverty Lab
No. District Discrimination (%) (%) (%)

1 Adilabad 11.33 75.74 77 23.51

2 Anantapur 211.33 74.32 62 35.43
3 Chittoor 209.33 64.72 62.4 35.97
4 Cuddapah 23.33 67.65 54 37.87
5 East Godavari 23.67 60.11 51 35.44
6 Guntur 143.33 62.51 56.6 42.14
7 Karimnagar 6.33 75.1 53 36.17
8 Khammam 66.33 68.39 58 35.47
9 Krishna 5 59.84 47 40.43
10 Kurnool 290.67 71.92 50.5 37.23
11 Mahbubnagar 754 85.49 65 47.97
12 Medak 74.33 82.73 58 25.72
13 Nalgonda 165 75.4 58.5 37.65
14 Nellore 43 64.94 48 37.54
15 Nizamabad 15.67 80.46 42 32.98
16 Prakasam 81.33 68.61 53 43.36
17 Ranga Reddy 244.67 69.94 58 26.01
18 Srikakulam 65.33 68.99 60 34.85
19 Visakhapatnam 61 55.27 58.8 19.37
20 Vizianagaram 61.33 71.46 55 31.81
21 Warangal 41 72.74 48.5 25.85
22 West Godavari 15.33 59.26 46.9 42.57

Source: Author (estimates based on BSE data sources).

Physical Alienation  187

index is not uniform across the districts. It may be related to
the economic status of the people represented by their poverty
and economic calling. Therefore, we have run the following
regression to test the determinants of discrimination.

The determinants of discrimination

CID = β0+ β1 ill + β2 Pov + β3 Aglab

where CID = Composite index of caste discrimination

Ilt. = Rate of illiteracy among SCs
Pov = Percentage of population below poverty line
Aglab = Percentage of agriculture labour among SCs
β1, β2, β3 are coefficients to be estimated.
We have obtained the following results.

CID = β0 + 0.331 β1 + 0.440 β2 + 0.445 β3  R–2 = 0.45

  (1.82) (2.14)     (2.46)

Figures in brackets are t values. They are statistically found

significant.
The above results show that the model is statistically sig-
nificant as it is explaining 45 per cent of the variations. Out of
the three variables, poverty among the people and incidence
of agricultural labourers among Dalits are found to explain
strongly the prevalence of caste discrimination than illiteracy.
They are also found to be statistically significant. It is interest-
ing to observe from these results that economic factors are
still contributing for the prevalence of caste discrimination in
Andhra Pradesh. We have also estimated correlation coefficients
between CID and the percentage of the Christian population as
a stimulant for discrimination. We found that there is no rela-
tion between the two. The correlation coefficient between CID
and the percentage of the SC population in a district is found
to be 0.52. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the above
model of regression is valid in explaining the determinants of
caste discrimination.

188  Political Economy of Caste in India

The Most Affected Districts in Andhra Pradesh
Andhra Pradesh is touted as a highly sophisticated and modern-
ized state in India. But the conditions in the districts particu-
larly in the four regions of the state are in bad shape and are
not uniform. We have therefore obtained data on incidence of
cognizable crimes (IPC) against SCs in Andhra Pradesh for the
period 1998–2001 for each district to find out which district
is the worst hit in terms of crime against Dalits. The data are
presented in Table 10.6. In order to even out the high and low
incidence across the events, we have calculated the four-year
average for each incident. On the basis of the four-year average
of two important crimes, murder and rape, we have identified
eight districts whose average is found to be more than four.
They are Adilabad, Chittoor, Guntur, Kurnool, Mahaboobnagar,
Medak, Nellore and Warangal. In order to arrive at the actual
districts that observe untouchability and discrimination, we
have looked at the index of discrimination presented earlier. We
found that Anantapur, Nalgonda and Ranga Reddy are the worst
affected districts in caste discrimination. Finally, the following
districts are found both in crime and caste discrimination as
the worst-affected districts.

1. Chittoor
2. Guntur
3. Kurnool
4. Mahaboobnagar

Interestingly, two of the above districts are from Rayalaseema

region, while the other two districts represent one each in
coastal Andhra and Telangana. There is not even a single dis-
trict in any of the crimes from north coastal Andhra Pradesh
in the dubious distinction where the average crime is found to
be less than 1.
The statistical analysis clearly demonstrates that the
data reported by the government agencies is totally

Physical Alienation  189

  
Incidence of Cognizable Crimes (IPC) against Scheduled Castes in Andhra Pradesh
TABLE 10.6
during 2000
Sl.
No. District Murder Rape Hurt Arson Other IPC Total

1. Adilabad 1 10 14 0 40 65
2. Anantapur 0 0 36 0 30 66
3. Chittoor 2 4 7 0 26 39
4. Cuddapah 1 1 27 1 45 75
5. East Godavari 2 3 4 0 3 12
6. Guntur 3 4 48 4 63 122
7. Karimnagar 0 3 6 0 2 11
8. Khammam 2 2 5 0 12 21
9. Krishna 2 6 7 0 18 33
10. Kurnool 6 2 59 1 53 121
11. Mahaboobnagar 5 5 8 1 15 34
12. Medak 1 4 4 0 2 11
13. Nalgonda 2 3 4 0 8 17
14. Nellore 0 1 6 0 21 28
15. Nizamabad 0 2 6 0 23 31
16. Prakasham 0 2 17 2 28 49
17. Ranga Reddy 1 2 1 0 13 17
18. Srikakulam 0 1 11 1 9 22
19. Visakhapatnam 0 1 5 0 12 18
20. Vizianagaram 0 3 0 1 3 7
21. Warangal 3 6 15 0 43 67
22. West Godavari 1 6 7 1 20 35
Total 33 72 298 12 491 901

Source: Author (estimates based on BSE data sources).

under-­represented both in the data on atrocities and also on
offences against Dalits. The regression results indicate that eco-
nomic factors are still found to be major determinants of crime
against Dalits. There seems to be no respite in the number of
cases of atrocities, including mob lynching of Dalits, after NDA
II came to power at the centre, which substantiates our above
empirical results from a report of a southern state supposed to
be a progressive state.

Conclusion
Caste discrimination and crime against Dalits is an age-old
practice in the Indian society. Attempts have been made by
government through acts of law to fulfil the constitutional
obligation of providing protection to Dalits and to abolish
untouchability. There are several studies that highlighted the
kind of caste problems that prevail in India. It appears that there
are very few attempts to test the significance of these incidents
in terms of empirical evidence. This study is a modest attempt
to fill the gap though we realize some of its weaknesses. It is
found that the cases reported by the government and the SC
and ST commissions are absolutely under-reported, as they
may be providing reports on the basis of 5 per cent of the cases
booked. The incidence of caste discrimination is found to be
related to the economic deprivations of Dalits in the distribu-
tion of land and other assets. It may be considered that these
factors might provide self-respect and self-esteem to reduce the
prevalence of crime and discrimination against Dalits in India,
in general, and Andhra Pradesh, in particular.
The empirical study is presented here to show that the
practice of untouchability and crime against the marginalized
community prevails even in the 21st century to make them
physically alienated from the mainstream and at the same time
supply labour at lower wages. The data from the National Crime
Records Bureau (NCRB) as revealed in the PCR Act cases noted

192  Political Economy of Caste in India

above speak about the offences and also reflect the transactions
in rural economy.

Notes
1. R. Rakshita, ‘Bengaluru City Stands Second in SC/STs Atrocities’,
Deccan Herald, 13 November 2018.
2. Ibid.
3. Patnaik, ‘Decoding the Corporate Hindutva’.
4. Government of Andhra Pradesh, Report of the Single Member
Commission of Enquiry to Enquire into the Practice of Untouchability
against, Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Punnaiah Commission), Vols.
I–III (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2001).
5. National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes, Government of India, 1994, p. 155.
6. We have consulted the conveners of the NGOs who have col-
lected the data and found that they have certain gaps in data.
7. We do not have data on PCR cases for the year 2000 and there-
fore we have considered the 1999 data. This is not an extreme
year as seen from Table 10.2, the number has never crossed 280.
Whenever we use the term Dalit in this paper, it may be taken
as Scheduled Castes.
8. We have consulted the conveners of the NGOs who have col-
lected the data and found that they have certain gaps in data.

Physical Alienation  193

 11

The Fragmented
Assertion
Divide and Rule

Political economy of caste looks at how the class formation

takes place over a period of time and the social antagonisms
that restrict the process to transform groups (castes) into classes.
In this context, caste ideology perpetuated by reactionary forces
seriously do dent the process of ‘class in itself’ or ‘class for itself’
of the oppressed class due to segmentation in society.
The division of society based on one’s Karma and guna
(Chapter 4 sloka 13) as enunciated in Bhagavad Gita and
elaborated by generations of Hindu pundits time and again
has reminded a classical myth in India. It is now devoid of any
practical use and the graded inequalities have been used by
the Dvija political class to perpetuate privileges for themselves.
No entry for those from non-Dvija who satisfy the myth to
enter the privileged position is allowed. It has been used as a
convenient structure to divide the major chunk of Shudras and
Dalits and unite the Dvija to rule. There are around 2,100 castes
among OBCs and 1,284 among SC categories, while the Dvija
got restricted to the broad three sub-divisions within. This has
to a large extent facilitated the CMOP. Therefore, wherever
an attempt is made to get the exploited sections united, God
descend on earth to restore the caste order as avatar (Gita 4.6).
You can see this happening today with million karyakartas work-
ing to protect the dharma. It was dismissed by some as imagina-
tion, but it is reported to be happening everyday even today.
The massacre of mahars in Bombay on the desecration inci-
dent and the death of two malas in a lathi charge in Hyderabad
in 2013 indicate the growing fury against an emerging Dalit
assertion. The situation in the southern districts of Tamil Nadu
pose a much serious threat to the formation of a cohesive social
force to fight against historical injustices perpetuated among the
lower castes in India. It is an irony that the backward classes who
claim allegiance to Periyar EVR, the legendary figure of social
revolution in southeast Asia did not allow the legitimate con-
stitutional right of Dalits to assemble in Chennai. A Dalit was
elected as the president of the country as a part of the golden
jubilee celebrations of independent India signifying a symbolic
achievement, which appears to be elusive due to the sporadic
incidents of suppression of Dalits, simultaneously. These inci-
dents do also convey the false and fragmented consciousness
among the Dalits. It is not an outburst of a sudden upheaval. It
is a logical outcome of a policy pursued by successive govern-
ments in different parts of the country that lead to the breach
of caste solidarity among the SCs and STs. The social tensions
created among lower castes and between castes and minorities
in the recent past are a serious concern for those who wish to
look at the class formation and social revolt. This phenomenon
indicates a malady that still haunts Indian ethos. Unless it is
checked and corrected, the future of India in the era of liberaliza-
tion appears to be bleak, particularly for those who wish to see
sustainable development. An attempt is made here to examine
some of the internal challenges of the emerging Dalit assertion.
The British officials have coined the term ‘Scheduled
Castes’ during the early part of this century particularly in the

The Fragmented Assertion  195

Government of India order 1936. All the untouchable castes
were referred to as depressed castes even by B. R. Ambedkar
and have been identified and noted as SCs from 1931 census
onwards. The Government of India notified for the first time
the list of SCs under the Constitution order 1950. The list of
castes notified in 1950 have since been amended and new
castes have been added from time to time. It appears that the
government has not modified substantially the criteria used by
the British in identifying the depressed castes (SC and OBC) in
1931. The same criteria of untouchability, distance from the
Brahmins, illiteracy and so on, numbering around 10 factors
have been used to identify a caste and bring it under the sched-
ule of the Constitution to give the constitutional safeguards. A
number of castes have been deleted and some are reorganized
in each census. The data are generally presented in the social
and cultural tables of the census of Government of India. So
far, the data relating to these aspects for 1991 are not available.
However, we are making the analysis on the basis of the census
data of 1981 and other secondary sources. As we have informa-
tion on the characters of each sub-caste from 1981 census, the
analysis is restricted to 1981 and assume that it remains valid
for other years.

Increase in the Population of SCs

The number of SCs and their absolute population has been
increasing over a period of time. It is found that there are
1,081 castes under the list of SCs entered in the schedule of the
Constitution in various states and Union Territories of India in
1991. The proportion of the SC population to the total popula-
tion has also increased from 15.75 per cent in 1981 to 16.48
per cent in 1991 and to 16.63 per cent in 2011. Similarly, the
number of STs listed in the schedule of the Constitution amounts
to 545, and their population is estimated at 8.08 per cent of the
total population in 1991 and stands at 8.63 per cent in 2011.
The data presented in Table 11.1 show the state-wise details.

196  Political Economy of Caste in India

TABLE 11.1  Total Number of Existing Castes and Their Percentage to Total Population in India 1991
SC Pop. to ST Pop. to
Sl. Name of the No. of Castes Total Pop. (%) No. of Tribes in Total Pop. (%)
No State/UT in SC Category 1991 2011 ST Category 1991 2011

1. Andhra Pradesh 59 15.93 16.41 33 6.31 7

2. Arunachal Pradesh 16 0.47 0.4 12 63.66 68.79
3. Assam 16 7.4 7.15 14 (Kukees 36) 12.82 12.45
4. Bihar 22 14.55 15.99 30 7.66 1.28
5. Chhattisgarh 94 – 12.82 – – 30.62
6. Goa 5 2.08 1.74 5 0.03 10.23
7. Gujarat 30 7.41 6.74 29 14.92 14.75
8. Haryana 37 19.75 20.17 – – –
9. Himachal Pradesh 56 25.34 25.19 8 4.22 5.71
10. Karnataka 101 16.38 17.15 49 4.26 6.95
11. Kerala 68 9.92 9.1 39 1.1 1.45
12. Madhya Pradesh 47 14.55 15.62 46 23.27 21.09
13. Maharashtra 59 11.09 11.81 47 9.27 9.35

(Continued)
 TABLE 11.1  Continued
SC Pop. to ST Pop. to
Sl. Name of the No. of Castes Total Pop. (%) No. of Tribes in Total Pop. (%)
No State/UT in SC Category 1991 2011 ST Category 1991 2011

14. Manipur 7 2.02 3.41 33 34.41 40.88

15. Meghalaya 16 0.51 0.58 14 85.53 86.15
16. Mizoram 16 0.1 0.11 14 94.75 94.43
17. Nagaland – – – 5 87.7 86.48
18. Orissa 93 16.2 17.13 56 22.21 22.85
19. Punjab 37 28.31 31.94 +– – –
20. Rajasthan 59 17.29 17.83 12 12.44 13.48
21. Sikkim 4 5.93 4.63 2 22.36 33.8
22. Tamil Nadu 76 19.18 20.01 36 1.03 1.1
23. Tripura 32 16.36 17.83 19 30.95 31.76
24. Uttar Pradesh 66 21.05 20.7 5 0.21 0.57
25. West Bengal 59 23.62 23.51 38 5.59 5.8
26. India 1,284 16.2 16.63 645 8.2 8.63

Source: Author (estimates based on BSE data sources).

Note: Same castes might appear in different states.
 It is noted that Karnataka has the largest number of 101
castes followed by Orissa with 93 castes. Goa and Dadra Nagar
Haveli have fewer than 10 castes each. Punjab with 31.94
per cent has the largest proportion of the SC population to
the total population in the state in the country followed by
Himachal Pradesh with 25.19 per cent and West Bengal with
23.51 per cent in 2011. These data do not indicate the socio-
economic status of each caste within the SC population in a
state. Therefore, we have identified castes, which are dominant
in each state in terms of their population. It is found that each
state has the predominance of one or two castes in terms of
number. Therefore, castes which account for more than 10
lakhs of population are identified and listed in Table 11.2. The
data relating to these castes are available from the 2011 census.
As per the 2011 census, the proportion of the SC population
in the rural areas has marginally declined from 79.6 per cent
in 2001 to 76.4 per cent in 2011. In other words, Dalits are
predominantly rural based and agrarian in character.

The Dominant Castes among SCs

The data show that there are 22 dominant castes in the country,
which have accounted for about 56 per cent of the total SCs as
per 2011 census. There are, however, more than 1,000 other
small castes, which account for the remaining 44 per cent. The
problem is also similar among the STs. The socio-economic and
educational development of these 22 castes has been discussed
in a cursory manner by various social scientists and even by
Dalit leaders during the last five to six decades.
The problem today, however, is that some kind of differentia-
tion is taking place not only among the 22 dominant SCs vis-à-
vis dominant and small castes. This can be attributed largely to
the ruling classes in the country who have been systematically
co-opting the dominant castes in each state through identifying
and encouraging leaders only among the dominant SC castes for

The Fragmented Assertion  199

TABLE 11.2  Numerically Large Caste Groups, 2011
% of Pop. Each Caste to Total SC 2011 in
SC in the States, 2011 State Lakhs

Pod West Bengal 24.5

Namasudra West Bengal 35.04
Dusadh Bihar 49.45
Adi Dravid Tamil Nadu 72.42
Chamar Punjab 20.7
Chamar Bihar 49
Mahyavanshi Gujarat 16.08
Musahar Bihar 27.25
Chamar Madhya Pradesh 53.68
Chamar Haryana 24.29
Mahar Maharashtra 80.06
Badgi West Bengal 30.58
Rajbanshi West Bengal 38.01
Mazhab Punjab 26.33
Adikarnataka Kamataka 29.2
Meghaval Rajasthan 30.6
Mala Andhra Pradesh 55.7
Chamar Uttar Pradesh 224.9
Dhobi Uttar Pradesh 24.32
Madiga Andhra Pradesh 67.02
Pasi Uttar Pradesh 65.22
Kori Uttar Pradesh 22.93

Source: Author (estimates based on BSE data sources).

the benefit of electoral politics. They have done this deliberately
through various government welfare programmes, such as pri-
vate social welfare hostels, 1RDP scholarships and other kinds of
subsidies. These programmes have benefitted mostly the cluster
of families of the leader of the dominant caste in the region. For

200  Political Economy of Caste in India

instance, Jagjivan Ram for chamars in the North and Sanjeevaiah
for malas in the South can be cited as examples (some people
allege the same for mahars in relation to Ambedkar). Though
the leadership among the dominant Dalit castes has helped in
articulating the problems of the Dalits in general, they have not
been able to bring out the problems of the small and minor-
ity castes among the Dalits. They have also failed to develop a
strategy of development suitable to other sub-castes among the
SCs. This does not mean that they have neglected the interests
of the Dalits in general. As the leadership of the Dalits during
the post-Ambedkar period was under transition, they had no
opportunity to study, analyse and understand the problems of
the 1,000 and odd castes in India. Therefore, in all the develop-
ment policies for SCs, a uniform and identical national strategy
has been followed without reference to the specific problems of
each caste in a region and the regional dimensions of the caste.
In fact, there are several castes in the country, which are
peculiar to a region and similar castes are not found outside
the region. Therefore, the general policies pursued by the
government never addressed the specific requirements of the
small castes. The rural–urban disparity index presented for
each dominant caste by Y. K. Agrawal and Sarika Sibu1 in their
study on SCs have shown that there are variations among the
22 numerically dominant caste. However, the proportion kept
on changing from census to census due to the change of cat-
egory of castes. For instance, in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the
governments have shifted some castes from BC list to SC list.2
This disparity is, however, declining marginally over a period
of time.
Even the benefits drawn by castes in each state is not uni-
form. It is found that the SCs in a state who have a historical
advantage over other states have been found more advanced
compared to the latter. In Table 11.3, we have presented the
number of post-matric scholarships drawn by each state in
the country during 1993–1994 (we have access to data for this

The Fragmented Assertion  201

  
Post-matric Scholarship for SCs during 1993–
TABLE 11.3
1994 (Provisional)
% of SC
Sl. No. of % to Population
No. State and UT Beneficiaries Total to Total India

1. Andhra Pradesh 132,380 9.89 7.6

2. Assam 41,453 3.09 –
3. Bihar 120,611 9.01 9.7
4. Goa 130 0.01 0.02
5. Gujarat 66,871 4.99 Feb-30
6. Haryana 13,313 0.99 2.3
7. Himachal Pradesh 2,678 0.22 1
8. J&K 1,965 0.15 0.5
9. Karnataka 106,333 7.94 5.3
10. Kerala 45,090 3.36 2.4
11. Madhya Pradesh 77,097 5.76 7
12. Maharashtra 187,708 14.02 4.3
13. Manipur 755 0.05 0.02
14. Meghalaya 124 0.01 0.01
15. Orissa 24.972 1.86 3.7
16. Punjab 19,916 1.48 4.3
17. Rajasthan 32,744 2.44 5.6
18. Tamil Nadu 118,250 8.83 8.4
19. Tripura 3174 0.38 0.3
20. Uttar Pradesh 243,826 18.21 22.4
21. West Bengal 85,610 6.39 11.5
22. Daman and Diu 130 0.01 –
23. Dadra and Nagar 50 0.01 –
Haveli
24. Delhi 9,648 0.72 1
25. Pondicherry 1,466 0.11 –
Total 1,311,347 100 100

Source: Annual Report of the Ministry of Social Welfare.

202  Political Economy of Caste in India

year only and is being used here to highlight the point). The
post-matric scholarships are considered here as an indicator
of social and educational advancement of Dalits as it helps to
promote them to enter into the elite and also makes a Dalit to
participate in the modern sectors of development, including
bureaucracy, political power and so on. It is found that states,
such as Andhra Pradesh (9.89%), Gujarat (4.99%), Karnataka
(7.94%), Kerala (3.36%), Maharashtra (14.02%), are cornering
most of the post-matric scholarships, which are in excess of
their proportion in the SC population of the country, namely,
Andhra Pradesh (7.6%), Gujarat (2.3%), Karnataka (5.3%) and
Maharashtra (4.3%), respectively. States, such as West Bengal,
Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab, Orissa and Bihar where the
largest concentration of SCs are present are not in a position
to fully avail the benefits. This shows that there are regional
inequalities which accentuate the inequities among the dif-
ferent castes of SCs further. These differences indicate the
inequity in the distribution of benefits among the SCs living
in different states. This also brings to light that the SCs living
in backward states, such as Bihar and Orissa are further mar-
ginalized by being inhabitants of a backward state. If we go
further deep into the problem, it will be clear to us that among
the fifth sub-castes, the rate of growth of social and economic
mobility is very fast among some castes and is much slower
among the marginalized sub-castes. For instance, in Andhra
Pradesh, the madigas are relatively backward compared to malas
of Costal Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. In fact, some kind
of patronage has been developed by the few advanced groups
among their families. This has given the upward mobility to
few groups or cluster of families in a caste. Nandu Ram3 has
pointed out in one of his studies that the upward mobility
among the SCs has created educated middle class elite. But,
they are suffering with ‘status anxiety’ for not being accepted
by their peers in forward community, while their unfortunate
brethren among the Dalits are still languishing to enter into a
civilized mainstream.

The Fragmented Assertion  203

Intra-caste Differentiation as an Emerging
Phenomenon
The location of a caste in a region within a state has both advan-
tages and disadvantages. The castes that are placed in histori-
cally advanced states, such as Maharashtra where Babasaheb
Ambedkar started the social revolution had an advantage over
states, such as Bihar and Orissa where the Buddhist revolution
is now almost a matter of history.
Therefore, people inhabited in Bihar or Orissa are relatively
at a disadvantage compared to Kerala, Maharashtra or Gujarat.
The SCs, particularly the numerically small castes located in
the backward states, are double marginalized. This kind of
double marginalization is also possible within a state in dif-
ferent regions. People living in high fertile and irrigated areas
will have continuous sources of income and employment
compared to people living in dry and high land areas. The SCs
who are spread in different regions of a state do also acquire
the same qualities. The backwash effects of the development
of certain dominant SCs result in the underdevelopment of
several small and marginalized castes within the region. The
sub-castes among the SCs who have obtained the benefits
of the welfare programmes and education are able to utilize
the advantages of modem technology in becoming more
advanced. This will further strengthen the gap between the less
developed and the socially and economically advanced domi-
nant castes. But the disparity between the dominant and the
marginalized castes is more pronounced than the gaps among
the advanced. There are very few studies at the sub-caste level
to substantiate this point. But, a case study of a state, such as
Andhra Pradesh might throw some light on this problem to
recognize the internal contradictions among the castes that
has resulted in the differentiation among the sub-castes over
a period of time. These indicators are to be presented and
studied for each sub-caste to avoid homomorphic policy. The
recent developments in the economy through liberalization

204  Political Economy of Caste in India

and market orientation will further widen the gap and alienate
the disadvantaged among the backwards creating a gulf that
might result in the creation of another world within the 4th
world. Even the missionaries that have worked among the
Dalits could not bring them together; rather, they have suc-
cumbed to intra-caste rivalries by promoting each denomina-
tion in a particular caste (for instance Baptists among madigas
of Andhra).

Deficiencies in the Emergence of Dalit and

Bahujan Formation
Though the ruling classes have been pursuing a policy of
preferential treatment among the Dalit castes favouring those
who have been helping them, the emergence of intra-caste
differentiation is not entirely due to their machinations. They
have utilized the internal contradictions and iniquitous nature
of the caste system for their advantage. The problem of intra-
caste differences approach to have been existing from the time
of Ambedkar. It seems that Ambedkar started his social move-
ment as a leader of mahars and slowly realized the deficiency
of his movement when mangs started alienating from him.
He changed his strategy and adopted a universal approach of
inclusiveness that attracted jatavs of North India and namas-
udras of Bengal. But the differentiation among the Dalit castes
at that time was not as much pronounced as it is today. It is
due to the iniquitous distribution of benefits among the sub-
castes and regions and also due to the constant promotion
of a particular caste by the ruling classes. The emergence of a
preferred layer consisting of extended families and people from
developed regions is also responsible for shrinking opportuni-
ties for other marginalized groups. The role of the left parties in
the promotion of Dalit and Adivasi development within welfare
state programmes is subjected to criticism in terms of weakness
in their theory and practice in Bengal and Kerala. The role of
SCs in educational development and their representation in

The Fragmented Assertion  205

educational institutions in both the states is a subject of Dalit
bashing.
However, the elite among the Dalits have started articulating
the problems of the Dalits as a whole in recent times. The issues
of the Dalits have been surfaced and are being discussed con-
tinuously at various levels due to the constant efforts of these
elite. Interestingly, the interest groups among the Dalits are
using Ambedkar and Jagjivan Ram as symbols of mobilization.
But, mobilization never crossed the boundaries of sub-caste and
region. The mobilization of the Dalit forces across the country
became more pronounced cutting across the language, region
and sub-castes during the Mandal agitation. This was made
possible because of the support from the other backwards who
also used Ambedkar as a symbol of revolt. The Mandal agitation
provided opportunities for the ruling classes, particularly the
enemies of the Dalits, to identify the strong and weak points in
the movement. They have identified that the Bahujan forma-
tion of the Dalit masses and the backwards is not uniform and
universal. There are internal differences and dissensions that
could be used to alienate one from the other based on emo-
tional appeals as seen in Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar before elections.4 The issue of sub-caste division is against
the spirit of the Constitution that considers SC is a single caste
under Article 341, which was upheld by Supreme Court.
The socio-economic and cultural ethos of different castes is
not uniform. No attempt seems to have been made to study
the diversities and uniqueness of each caste in participating in
the Bahujan formation. It appears that no intellectual section
has emerged even in the Bahujan Samaj Party (except that of a
few bureaucrats) to analyse and articulate these problems on a
continuous basis.5 The slogan of capturing power by the brute
majority of the number is spread across the country without
considering the specific requirements of each caste and also
tribe. Politics may be a number game but social reform and
amalgamation of different castes as a mass is not equal to the

206  Political Economy of Caste in India

sum that aggregates the parts. It is something more than that
as all the parts are not equal in size and quality. This has been
realized by the ruling classes who are now trying to encourage
one sub-caste against another by applying the same traditional
tactics of calculated disparities and slogans. It appears that
the castes that are now in the saddle of power will break the
solidarity of the SCs, which was built on the emotional issues
of untouchability and exploitation using the same language
and methodology. The Dalits have started fighting with each
other. Sometimes, it is orchestrated by the ruling classes who
ultimately wanted to prove that each sub-caste among the
Dalits is also a minority and may not be equivalent to that of
any Dvija caste. Therefore, the slogan of minority ruling the
majority according to them does not arise, as Indian democracy
today is an oligarchy of castes.
The above distorted social formation needs to be corrected.
The Ambedkar’s slogan of political democracy in principle
can be translated as social democracy6 put into practice at all
stages. In a country, such as India, social democracy should
provide opportunities for each caste small and big to equally
participate in the decision-making process. This is possible
when the leadership learns from history and also from social
reformers, such as Kabir, Phooley, Ambedkar and Periyar,
first in bringing people, that is, castes together. The strategy
to develop a mala sale cannot be the same as for a madiga as
their existential problems are different. It is also necessary to
change the uniform policy of the government in providing the
same kind of prescriptions for different problems of the Dalits.
A rational criterion, such as the disparity index and regional
inequalities, needs to be considered for each caste among
the SCs in dispensing state aid. A political upsurge without a
social reform movement shall remain as a lacklustre crusade.
Therefore, a mass movement first among the Dalits to bring the
feeling of brotherhood and solidarity through inter-marriage,
inter-dinning and more than that recognizing the existence of

The Fragmented Assertion  207

each sub-caste as a unique cultural entity needs to be built into
their ethos to thwart the attempts of ruling classes to bring a
counter-revolution much before the beginning of a social revo-
lution of bahujans in India. If the counter-revolution succeeds
as it happened in the past, it will totally usurp the inalienable
rights of the Dalits.

Notes
1. Agrwal Yash and Sarika Sibu, Educating Scheduled Cases (New
Delhi: NIEPA, 1994).
2. ‘U.P. Government Gives Assent to Include 17 Other Backward
Castes in S.C. List’, The Times of India, 22 December 2016.
3. Nandu Ram, The Mobile Scheduled Castes: Rise of New Middle Class
(Delhi: Hindusthan Publishing, 1985).
4. ‘U.P. Government Gives’, The Times of India.
5. Rajashekhar Vundru, ‘Mayavathi: The Woman Inside’, South
India Journal of Social Sciences (June 200): 3–10.
6. B. R. Ambedkar, Babasheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, Vol
3, ed. Vasant Moon (New Delhi: Ambedkar Foundation, 2010).

208  Political Economy of Caste in India

 12

Globalization and the

Future of Dalits and
Adivasis

No one is born hating another person because of the colour of his

skin, or his background, or his religion. People must learn to hate
and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love, for love
comes more naturally to the human heart than its opposite. Man’s
goodness is a flame that can be hidden but never extinguished.’
—Nelson Mandela

Globalization as a method of economic integration is as old

as colonialism. It has been used in different meanings and
contexts. Several scholars are counter-posing globalism to
imperialism. Globalization is generally referred to as cross-
national flow of goods, investment, production and technol-
ogy. It relies heavily on technological innovations in the area
of information technology. In fact, the idea of global market
became operational with the advent of satellite channels and
Internet. However, this globalization is not entirely different
from the concept of imperialism. As imperialism is a phase of
the capitalist expansion on a global scale, some scholars are not
willing to use the term and rather prefer to use globalization.
But globalization as defined above needs to be linked with
the historical concepts of colonialism, neo-­colonialism and
imperialism. They are all interrelated. Colonialism emerged as
a part of imperialism in the 19th century through territorial
division of labour. It is established through violence, exploi-
tation of labour and unequal exchange. Several dependency
theorists have conceptualized centre-periphery imagery on
the basis of the concept of imperialism. There was a great
debate on the origin and development of imperialism as a
part of capitalist development in economics literature. But
the debate is now reopened after the popularization of the
concept of globalization. It is argued that globalization is not
an independent phenomenon and it is to be understood as a
part of imperialism.
The British India government wanted to introduce gold
exchange standard in trade as the leading authorities of that
time including J. M. Keynes were supportive of this. Ambedkar
had critically examined this theory, including Keynes proposal
on the ground that lower exchange rate increase export and
boosts internal.1 This will benefit the trading classes and harm
the poor. If this is reinterpreted along with his proposals in
‘state and minorities’ today, Ambedkar2 would have argued for
protection and against globalization.
Imperialism has three phases of development. The first phase
was organized around the conquest of the Americas in the
framework of mercantilist system of Atlantic Europe. ‘The net
result was the destruction of the Indian civilization and their
Hispanicization–Christianization or simply the total genocide
on which the USA was built.3
The second phase of imperialist devastation was based
on the industrial revolution and manifested itself in the
colonial subjection of Asia and Africa in the name of open-
ing of the markets. The capitalist civilization from 1500
to 1950 with breaches here and there developed first-class

210  Political Economy of Caste in India

technological potential and military traditions for capitalist
accumulation.
The third phase of devastation of the world by imperialist
expansion, encouraged by the collapse of the soviet system
and the regimes of popularist nationalism in the third world,
is contemporary in nature. It is founded on ‘duty to intervene’,
‘rights of peoples’ and ‘humanitarianism’ to exploit the labour
reserves in the periphery. The objectives of dominant capital
are still the same. It is superficially called as globalization. But
the quality of imperialism is enriched with ideas, such as eco-
nomic reform, liberalization, privatization and transnational
corporations.
There seems to be a difference between the first two phases
of imperialism and the globalization process of imperialism. In
the first two phases, there were no international institutions
to guide and control the operations. But with the advent of
Bretton Woods institutions and, particularly, after the establish-
ment of WTO in 1995, imperialism is coordinated and super-
vised through these institutions. The invisible hand, which
was supposed to be operating for the international division
of labour in the first two phases, has been taken over by the
Keynesian interventionist institutions to restore what is called
distortions in global market? Further, the discovery of corpora-
tion as a form of business organization with semi-democratic
principles reduced the negative image of capitalism in the
popular discourse.

‘According to most advocates of the globalization theory,

we are entering a new epoch of interdependency in which
stateless corporations transcend national frontiers, spurred
by a third technological revolution and facilitated by new
information systems … the nation state is an anachronism,
movements of capital are unstoppable and inevitable, and the
world market is the determinant of the macro- and micro-
political economy’.4

Globalization and the Future of Dalits and Adivasis  211

Thus, the transnational corporation has emerged as a new tool
unlike the East India Company which was confined to the
shareholders within the boundaries of a nation state.
The emergence of transnational corporation has facilitated
the ‘global approach’ of finance capital. ‘Globalization rep-
resented freedom for the corporation to set itself wherever it
wanted for as long as it wanted, to produce whatever it wanted,
buying and selling with least possible number of restrictions
as far as labour laws and social conventions were concerned’.
This globalization is understood by many in the context of
the expansion of corporate capitalism. Even corporate capital-
ism is overwhelmed by finance capital. It is on the basis of the
experience of these corporations, the American business schools
coined the term ‘globalization’ to indicate the global approach
of these corporations. Majority of these corporations offer a
variety of financial services and enter into exchange markets
even if majority of their operations continue to be in indus-
try. It was estimated that more than $1,400 billion changed
hands everyday on currency markets in 1996. As a result, the
corporations have become the policeman, judge and jury of
the world economy, which is very worrying given their ten-
dency to see events and policies through the distorting prism
of fear and greed (Financial Times, 30 September 1994). The
over-accumulation of capital has been accompanied by a real
potential of production of commodities in terms of excessive
productive capacity. As a result, much of the capital accumu-
lated from new super-profits is not invested productively. This
capital flows into real estate and stock markets for speculation
and for merger and take over-operations. It is said that this
phenomenon is responsible for the financial crisis in the South
East Asia in 1997.
It is found that 70 per cent of international trade and 75 per
cent of FDI are controlled by MNCs. According to a UNCTAD
report in 1995, 37,000 MNCs and their 2 lakh subsidiaries have

212  Political Economy of Caste in India

assets worth $5,000 billion. Of which, 200 biggest MNCs have
a total turnover equivalent to more than a quarter of the sum
of the entire world’s GDP. The turnover of General Motors
($132.4 billion) is higher than the GDP of Indonesia ($126.4
billion) or Denmark ($123.5 billion). The five biggest MNCs
had a turnover of double the size (526.1 billion) of the GDP
of South Asia ($297.4 billion) in 1995. James Tobin has shown
that every day more than 90 per cent of international financial
transactions are purely speculative and, therefore, called for a
proportional tax on all international currency transactions to
spend the amount on projects of social justice. It is estimated
that a 0.5 per cent Tobin tax would bring $1800 billion in the
year 1995. These figures are quoted here to indicate the poten-
tial of corporate capitalism in the 20th century. Further, these
corporations are unevenly distributed across the continents. It
is found that out of the 500 biggest corporations of the world,
244 originate in the USA, 46 in Japan, 173 in Europe and the
rest in other countries.5 By early 2018, global debt stocks had
risen to nearly $250 trillion, three times global income from
$142 trillion a decade earlier.6 It is noted

the digital revolution has the misfortune of unfolding in a

neo-liberal era over the last four decades; a mixture of finan-
cial chicanery, unrestrained corporate power and economic
austerity has shredded the social contract that emerged after
second world war and replaced it with different set of rules,
norms and policies at the national, regional and international
levels. This has enabled capital to escape from the regulatory
oversight expand into new areas of profit making and restrict
the influence of policymakers.7

It is necessary to identify the tools through which globaliza-

tion or imperialism is able to operate. Most of these tools are
acquired by the system during the 20th century, particularly
after the information revolution. It is observed that the follow-
ing are important tools of imperialism.

Globalization and the Future of Dalits and Adivasis  213

1. Media (both print and visual)
2. Capital (both finance and investment)
3. Military power (ever-expanding defence budgets)
4. World Bank and IMF (the voting pattern favourable to the
USA)
5. WTO [Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)]
6. The structural reform package consisting of
(a) trade liberalization, (b) liberalization of banking system,
(c) privatization of public sector, (d) tax reform (VAT),
(e) land privatization, (f) labour market reforms, (g) trade
unions, (h) pensions, (i) social safety nets to alleviate poverty
and (j) good governance.

The above tools of imperialism, Samar Amin has said, have

helped to develop five important monopolies in the imperialist
centres (Samir Amin, 2001). They are as follows:

1. The monopoly of technology with the support of the state,

especially of military spending
2. The monopoly of the control of global financial flows
3. The monopoly of access to the natural resources of the
planet
4. The monopoly in the field of communication and media,
homogenizing world culture and opening up of new means
of political manipulation
5. The monopoly of weapons of mass destruction

Globalization or imperialism in the third phase is three decades

old now. It has been implemented in about 100 less developed
countries of various sizes and dimensions. The impact of the
implementation of the package of structural adjustment seems
to be non-uniform. Depending upon the context, the nature
of the society, economy and polity, the costs and benefits
of globalization vary. There are several studies undertaken
by international agencies, such as UNCTAD, UNDP, World

214  Political Economy of Caste in India

Bank and individual scholars assessing the impact of these
policies pursued during the last two decades. In some of the
Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina and
Indonesia, harsh military dictatorships were pursued to sustain
the reforms. Somalia a pastoral economy was self-sufficient in
food until the 1970s and introduced the reforms package in
1980. The civil society was subjected to a breakdown and the
US military got involved in 1993. Today Somalia languishes as
one of the poorest countries in the world. The story of Asian
tigers, including (the American and Japanese market centre)
Singapore, is quite interesting. The countries are now slowly
recovering from the 1997 currency crisis. The crisis in the civil
society due to the failure of reforms in Argentina is still fresh
in our minds. The success of Chinese version of reforms and
further fragmentation of East European countries after the
implementation of the reforms need to be studied afresh. The
experience of India with the second phase of reforms with a
regime with religious fundamentalism as its background is
undergoing convulsions.
The political and social fallout of the economic globalization
is responsible for the shrinking role of the state and the social
consequences of it. The privatization of public sector is essen-
tially a political act with no additional gain in terms of creation
of new jobs, high rates of savings or investment or the devel-
opment of new productive forces. Privatization of the existing
public sector units through outright sale, disinvestments and
transfer to private individuals, corporations and MNCs has
deep-rooted maladies. The process of privatization has involved
corruption and transfer of properties worth billions of dollars at
throwaway price without proper legislative sanction and public
auction. Several workers lost their jobs due to voluntary retire-
ment scheme (VRS), pushing them to a new class of urban poor
or low-paid informal workers. The increased prices of services,
electricity, transport and so on accompanying privatization
have decreased living standards for wage and salary workers,
while increasing profits for the private monopolies that have

Globalization and the Future of Dalits and Adivasis  215

taken over the public ones.8 The public sector units were estab-
lished in countries, such as India, to build infrastructure and
occupy commanding heights of the economy. This was made
possible because of the sacrifices of the poor who have post-
poned their current needs to a future date by foregoing their
education, health and welfare. The same public sector units are
now being transferred to the rich and possessed creating inter-
generational transfers of a different kind. This has deprived the
poor in general and Dalits in particular.
Globalization seems to have not increased the competitive
edge of developing countries as 78.5 per cent of the world
income is held by Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries and the remaining got
distributed among the less-developed junior partners in trade.
How can a less-developed country of the periphery with low
capital base and high interest rates will be able to compete with
an imperialist centre and gain out of the trade. It may benefit
few individuals in the periphery through a collaborating elite.
Commenting on the links between centre and periphery Karl
Deutsch9 has said that

the centre of the centre of course, gets all the advantages.

The periphery of the centre gets less than the centre, but … it
gets a rake-off …. In the periphery countries, the middle class
will become somewhat reactionary. According to the Galtung
theory, they are likely to be bought by the imperial system
and to make up its bridgehead in their native countries. The
middle classes of Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro and Santiago de
Chile, who completely accept the West European and North
American standards of consumption … live about as well as,
or better than middle class persons who live in the advanced
countries. But the poor of Brazil, Argentina and Chile are poor
by the grim standards of the poor Latin America.10

The inequalities among world’s people and within countries

among different groups of people are found to be increasing
during the third phase of imperialism or globalization. Citing

216  Political Economy of Caste in India

from a recent study of Milonovic, the Human Development
Report 2001 mentioned that

in 1993 the poorest 10% of the world’s people had only

1.6% of the income of the richest 10%. The richest 1% of
the world’s people received as much income as the poor-
est 57%. The richest 10% of the US population (around 25
million people) had a combined income greater than that
of the poorest 43% of the world’s people (around 2 billion
people).

Similarly, the ratio of the income of the richest 20 per cent to

that of the poorest 20 per cent grew from 34 to 1 in 1970 to
70 to 1 in 1997. Technology, the hallmark of globalization,
has not been used effectively to reduce these inequalities.
Further, it has intensified the digital divide. The Human
Development Report 2001 has introduced a new Technology
Achievement Index (TAI) to identify the inequalities among
countries in the area of creation of technology, diffusion of
recent innovations, diffusion of old innovations and human
skills. It is said that

many countries are using the latest technology competitively

in manufacturing industries as shown by their success with
high-tech exports. Of the 30 top exporters, 11 are in the
developing world, including Korea, Malaysia and Mexico.
But in sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab states and South Asia
high-tech exports still account for less than 5 per cent of
the total.11

Interestingly, India’s place in this ranking is found at 63 out

of the 72 countries ranked in 2001 and it stands at 130 with a
value of 0.638 out of 189 countries in 2019.
Now, we can turn our attention to the developed metropolis
to examine the impact of globalization among different social
groups within. It is estimated that in the USA, the difference in
the life expectancy between a White male and Black male was

Globalization and the Future of Dalits and Adivasis  217

8 years in 1970 (White 68 years and Black 60 years) and the dif-
ference is increased to 10 years in 2000.12 Similarly, the infant
mortality was 10.9 for Whites and 22.2 for Blacks in 1980. There
is a slight decline in the disparity in 1994 with the infant mortal-
ity of Whites remaining at 6.6 and Blacks at 15.8. The inequality
in the educational attainment of Whites, Blacks and Hispanics
is found to be much higher at the collegiate level, though it is
declining over a period of time. It is reported that 10.3 per cent
of White males had four years or more of collegiate education
in 1960 and the percentage has increased to 26.9 per cent in
1996. Only 2.8 per cent of the Blacks had similar education in
1960. The percentage has increased to 12.4 in 1996. Among
Hispanics, 7.8 per cent population had four years of collegiate
education in 1970 and it is found at 10.3 in 1996. Though there
is a difference in the rate of growth in the educational attain-
ment between Blacks and Whites, the gap remains. In the area of
money income and unemployment rates, the disparity remains
much wider. The percentage of Black families earning between
$10,000 and $49,000 has dropped, while the percentage of those
with earnings of $50,000 and above has increased.

The difference in family median income among Whites,

Blacks and Hispanics is still in the double digits. One of the
most encouraging developments in recent years has been
the steady decline in unemployment rates for Blacks and
Women…. By the end of 1998, the US department of labour
reported the unemployment rate for African Americans
reached an all-time low of 7.9 per cent. A combination of
factors has contributed to this: overall expanding economy,
greater job skills and educational training of Blacks, and
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws on employment and
voluntary implementation of fair employment practices by
private industries and public agencies.13

The situation in Brazil, one of the earliest to enter globalization

in the periphery appears to be different. It is said that Brazil
in 1999 ranked after only Sierra Leone with the second most

218  Political Economy of Caste in India

unjust income distribution in the world; income concentration
consistently increased over time. Racial groups do exist in Brazil
and people are discriminated on the basis of their colour. It is
observed that in the income hierarchy, race is the first deter-
mining factor and then gender. White women in Brazil have
privileged position compared to Black men and Afro-Brazilian
women

‘Income disparities among racial groups exist regionally …

the north and north east, where African Brazilians are the
large majority, have the lowest income and economic activity
levels in the country and the highest inequality rates (Gini
index) … average family income by region confirms that the
regions with majority Afro-Brazilian populations are by far
the poorest – Blacks generally earn less than half as much
as Whites. White men earn almost four times as much as
Afro-Brazilian women, who earn less than half the value of
White women’s average income. About 26 percent of Blacks,
compared to 16 percent Whites, earn less than the minimum
wage, while one percent of Blacks as opposed to four percent
of Whites earned more than 10 times the minimum wage.
Educated African Brazilians earn less than Whites with same
education, and in higher income brackets Whites receive
about 5.6 times more income than Blacks.14

On the positive side, the network age promoted by globali-

zation has contributed greatly to the acceleration of human
progress. It has given tremendous resilience to capitalism. In
1975–1999, per capita average income quadrupled in East Asia
and the pacific, growing 6 per cent a year. The growth rate in
South Africa exceeded 2 per cent. India and China with one-
third of the world population are growing at 8 per cent and 3.2
per cent a year, respectively. OECD countries are growing at 2
per cent a year raising already high incomes to an average of
more than $22,000 (PPP). The average incomes in developing
countries during 1975–1998 have almost doubled from $1,300
to $2,500 (PPP).

Globalization and the Future of Dalits and Adivasis  219

Contrast Between Centre and
Periphery Imagery
The above two contrasting experiences of different racial
groups in the metropolis and in the periphery have provided
evidence to draw a strategy of empowerment of the poor. It is
in this background the position of Dalits in the contemporary
society is to be examined. The Dalits of India for the first time
in Indian history had an opportunity to share their experiences
of discrimination and affirmative action at the Durban world
conference against racism in September 2001. The Dalit repre-
sentatives have aptly listened to the agonizing and enlighten-
ing episodes of representatives of similar people elsewhere in
the world. The Durban Conference has also made it possible
to the world civil society to discern the pathetic conditions of
250 million Dalits in the world. In the process of exchange of
ideas, experiences and agonies, the Dalits have gathered some
evidence as to the sincerity and honesty in implementing
programmes of emancipation of the marginalized groups in
different societies. Naturally, they are struck by the innovative
ideas as no scholar or activist of repute belonging to non-Dalit
categories has ever discussed about those experiments in India.
This intellectual vacuum has resulted in the enthusiastic over-
tures in India when some of those who attended the Durban
Conference15 have returned back home. The Bhopal Conference
was one such occasion where intellectuals and activists of differ-
ent hues met and exchanged ideas for an agenda of Dalit eman-
cipation. This is only a first step in a long march. However, this
has attracted unprecedented response both from the left- and
right-wing intellectuals and activists. But in none of the writ-
ings, any innovative and creative idea came up for discussion
except repeating the traditional Marxist polemics. Even these
writers did not crave for reading and learning about the latest
developments in their ideological positions at the international
level. However, the debate is interesting and historical since it
has reopened the vexed issues of Dalit emancipation in an era
of globalization.

220  Political Economy of Caste in India

 It is necessary at this stage to assess the historical legacy of
the Dalit movement in order to understand their future. The
socio-political situation during the first quarter of the 20th
century was charged with revolutionary upsurge that promoted
egalitarian ideology and democratic values. The principles of
liberal democracy, the gift of the English utilitarian to Indian
masses, had influenced several leaders, including Ambedkar.
The success story of Bolshevik revolution had promoted the
ideology of socialism. At the same time, a section of the con-
servative Brahminical Hindu minority started a movement to
recreate puranic India.
The adherents of the egalitarian principles used to express
sympathy with the issues raised by Ambedkar along with the
British bureaucracy who were trained by the utilitarian schol-
ars in the UK. This has helped Ambedkar to push his agenda
of Dalit emancipation. In this process, he has succeeded in
creating constitutional safeguards for caste-based reservations.
The programme of reservations in public sector employment
has resulted in the creation of a section of Dalit job holders who
have been able to enter the civil society. If the Ambedkar project
of Dalit emancipation and total liberation of Dalits from social
and economic oppression is alive today, it is because of the work
undertaken by some of these educated Dalits. Therefore, one
must remember here that there are two categories of intellectu-
als among the Dalits. The organic intellectuals, the Gramsci’s
category of intellectuals who are committed and have been
working among the Dalits for their emancipation, are differ-
ent from the lumpen intellectuals who act as the agents of the
mainstream social order with short-term and immediate gains
and perks. There is also an elite category which is a part of the
mainstream elite formation. There is hope today only in the
organic intellectuals and their creative work for the emancipa-
tion of Dalits.
The Dalits are today interested in working with these organic
intellectuals. They are now searching for alternatives and

Globalization and the Future of Dalits and Adivasis  221

projects to work with for the overall development of the com-
munity. A critical evaluation of the work and progress made
during the 20th century should enable us to understand the
weaknesses of the movement. Religious reform movements and
their contribution to Dalit emancipation can be mentioned
here. But, the basic aim of all religious reform movements of
the previous centuries appeared to be developing a Dalit person
who was equal before God along with others. Therefore, some
of these movements tried to bring the alienated untouchables
nearer to the mainstream society at least in theological terms
within the Hindu fold. The two central Asian religions, Islam
and Christianity, tried to emancipate the Dalit by developing
him as an independent self-sustained individual. These move-
ments have enabled the Dalit to develop his self-consciousness
but failed to bring social consciousness. The social reform was
not an important issue on the agenda of the independence
movement, though Gandhi and few others have tried to make
it a point in their social agenda (after the threat of Ambedkar
as a leader of the Dalit masses). The last phase of Ambedkar’s
movement in religious conversion as a project of cultural iden-
tity brought some change and development in some pockets of
Maharashtra, and it never became an all India programme after
his death. The recent developments in Buddhism as a religious
emancipatory project of some Dalit activists need to be evalu-
ated to what extent it has alienated or assimilated the Dalit with
the mainstream society. Ironically, there is a total absence of
any kind of ‘social reform movement’ after independence. The
progress achieved by Dalits as a part of the radical left move-
ment and the enormous human sacrifices made by the Dalit
community need to be assessed separately.
The Dalits of India are not a homogeneous community (see
previous chapter). There is also no pattern in the distribution
of the population among different states (see previous chapter).
Half of the Dalit population live in Uttar Pradesh (3 crores),
West Bengal (2 crores), Bihar (1.5 crores), Tamil Nadu (1.10
crores) and Andhra Pradesh (1.5 crores). But, the Ambedkar

222  Political Economy of Caste in India

movement and Dalit consciousness is much stronger in states,
such as Maharashtra (11%), Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh,
where the Dalits constitute less than 20 per cent of the popu-
lation. Interestingly, Dalits constitute around one-third of the
population in Punjab (28.3%) and one-fourth in Himachal
Pradesh (25.4%). It appears that the future success of Dalit
movement depends upon the consciousness of the Dalits in
larger states where it is now weak.
The little progress made so far by the Dalits in the post-
independence period was confined to one or two dominant
castes in each state. It is identified that around 25 castes out
of 1,091 castes in the country have cornered majority of the
assistance declared by the government.16 There are inequalities
within each caste as some families among the beneficiaries have
formed into a lobby and diverted some of these benefits to their
members. This has created problems of intra-caste differences
that led to separatists’ struggles within the Dalit community in
states, such as Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, and Karnataka.
One of the weaknesses of the Dalit movement appears to be
its adherence to the popularization of Ambedkar as a personal-
ity and emancipator without explaining his emancipatory pro-
ject. The issue of Adivasis is discrete as left extremism is found
in some pockets of the fifth schedule areas and inter-tribal
hostilities do exist in several others. The Ambedkar movement
and its petty leadership failed to digest his ideology and never
translated it into an action programme. (We have limitations
of comprehending this at all India level. This is based on some
experiences of Andhra Pradesh.) Therefore, we have in every
village, Ambedkar Associations but no Dalit organizations.
There are limitations for Ambedkar associations to take up the
issues of the Dalits in totality. There is also the failure of Dalit
intellectuals to assess the development process of Ambedkar
movement and have failed to provide a concrete programme
of action to the activists. They have also remained as members
of the same bandwagon. No attempt seems to have been made

Globalization and the Future of Dalits and Adivasis  223

by some of the Ambedkarite organizations at the state or centre
level to give directions to the activists. The SC and ST employ-
ees associations are confined only for the implementation of
reservations within each establishment and never emerged as
a body to provide guidance to the activist. No attempt seems
to have been made to develop a self-respect or social reform
movement among the Dalits. The Dalits are never constituted
an organic whole. Each subcaste has its own social and cultural
identity. The only common identity that has emerged during
the last half a century is developed around Ambedkar, as an
emancipator. This is to be further strengthened with innovative
interpretations for practical work. It is also necessary to develop
the Dalit epistemology which is deep rooted in ‘Tantra’, the
original scientific approach to life by the natives. This has been
destroyed by the British during the colonial period and a major
chunk of it was appropriated by the Brahminical Hinduism and
Buddhism. The culture of poverty that existed among the Dalits
for ages has strengthened certain traits and behaviour patterns,
which are inimical for the development of Dalit emancipation.
There are several factors contributing to these decadent drift in
the Dalit movement.
The Brahminical preparation to encounter modernization
and the Dalit emancipatory movements started from almost
the same year from Maharashtra in the year 1925. Now the
Sangh Parivar is in the saddle of power to dictate terms to
the majority and continue to enjoy the hegemony. The Dalit
parivar has remained today what they were in 1925, still dal-
iting for equality of opportunity. There are several non-Dalit
castes which have mobilized their caste resources and fought
against the Brahminical forces and have recorded as upper
castes without any support from outside and government. The
emergence of Nadars in Tamil Nadu as a ruling class from that
of a low social status in modern India is only one example.17
The upward mobility of some Sudra castes, such as Kamma,
Reddy, Vakkaliga and Yadav, of the south need to be studied

224  Political Economy of Caste in India

and emulated by Dalits as these groups are influenced by the
Dravidian movement.
It is irony that the Dravidian movement so assiduously built
by the non-Brahmin stalwarts is ultimately rested under the
tutelage of its enemy for a long time to change the discourse
in Tamil Nadu.18 It is here that one needs to ponder over the
weaknesses of the whole Dravidian movement because the
weaknesses have also been reflected in the Dalit movements
in the formative years. The upper castes or the so-called
Srinivasan category of ‘dominant castes’ in South India carved
the Justice Party to fight against the hegemony of Brahmins in
the South, particularly in the Madras presidency (which became
divided and formed parts of the four South Indian states). The
dominant castes are said to be dominant in a region ‘when it
preponderates numerically over other castes, and when it also
wields preponderant economic and political power’. Some of
the dominant castes have started upward mobility and con-
tinued to have their sway in political front until the Dvija rule
under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to occupy Delhi.
The fundamental flaw in the formation of the anti-Brahmin
Dravidian ensemble consisting of not only the South Indian
states in geographical terms, but also the OBC, Muslim, SC
and ST categories in cultural terms have been reduced to that
of communal category without positioning itself just against
the pan-Aryan Dvija identity. It is this flaw that weakened the
whole reform project, including the Dalit emancipation as a
part of the whole movement.
The erosion of Dravidian identity started during the time of
Periyar EVR when the Dalits and small depressed BCs alienated
from the DK. Perhaps Periyar realized this and seems to have
expressed his agony with his closest followers. But, the DK and
the DMK were later hijacked by the emerging dominant castes
in Tamil Nadu and reduced the Dravidian movement to that
of a conduit for political power. In the north, the anti-Brahmin
movement started within the Dvija castes. Ram Manohar Lohia

Globalization and the Future of Dalits and Adivasis  225

and some of his contemporaries, such as P. S. Deshmukh, R. L.
Chandrapuri, and Karpoori Thakur, initiated the BCs movement
as a parallel to the Dravidian movement in south. Though, the
North Indian BCs movement established contacts with the
South Indian movement and even invited Periyar to visit Bihar,
no systematic attempt was made to integrate the North Indian
anti-Brahmin struggles with the Dravidian movement. It was
only after the Mandal Commission and the post-Mandal situa-
tion, the non-Brahmin leadership realized the need for a united
and all-India character for the anti-Brahmin struggles.19 The
socialist–BCs movement, which was projected for some time
as an anti-Brahmin movement was not homogeneous. There
were two streams within it. The upper caste socialist stream
who wanted to achieve equality without caste reservations and
the BC socialists with an agenda to achieve socialism through
caste reservations. Interestingly, the upper caste non-Brahmins
have achieved upward mobility both in economic and social
sphere and, therefore, in political front through a protracted
fight against Brahmanism. They have displaced Brahmins from
positions of political power at the regional level. This has also
provided them with opportunities to consolidate the regional
aspirations. The emergence of regional parities signifies these
developments. It was these regional parties that played a sig-
nificant role in the short-lived United Front. Most of these
regional parties represented the interests of the dominant castes
of the region, such as Vanniyar, Vokkaliga, Kamma, Yadava, Jat
and similar castes. These dominant castes have formed into an
oligarchy with the common minimum program as an agenda
for governance. Similar to the 18th-century Whig oligarchy
of Great Britain, the dominant caste oligarchy of India consti-
tuted of unprivileged feudal and middle classes with backing
from aristocracy. It was during the leadership of Walpole, the
British Whigs wanted to increase the base of the party. It was
later appropriated by the Tories and the Whig oligarchy came
to an end. It is exactly the same way the dominant caste oli-
garchy at the centre collapsed when the Hindutva nationalism

226  Political Economy of Caste in India

(pan-Aryan) appropriated the dominant castes. However, the
reasons for the dominant castes to surrender to the Hindutva
are said to be historical and diverse in nature.20 The Dalits with a
national character have failed to join in any of the regional out-
fits and the so-called all India Bahujan Samaj Party is reduced to
that of a regional party. Unlike that of the regional dominant
castes, the Dalits do not have an oligarchy to fall back.
The development of the elite class from among the Dvijas
and more particularly among the Brahmins took place during
the 1960s. In fact, the criteria used by M. N. Srinivas to call a
caste dominant are not appropriate to capture all castes in a
village or region, because landholdings are no more an impor-
tant base for economic mobility. It is subsidized higher educa-
tion, access to banks and credit institutions, contracts, public
sector sales outlets and so on that make a caste dominant. The
opportunities created by the public sector of the Nehruvian
era were systematically seized by the educated Brahmins. That
is why Periyar called the bank nationalization at that time as
bank Brahminization. There is nothing wrong in it, because
Brahmins were the only group that was eminently qualified
at that time to enter into public sector. Several Indian doctors,
engineers, scientists and technocrats have migrated to the USA,
the UK and other industrialized countries. Most of them got
absorbed in the multinational companies and developed close
contacts. Some of them have also occupied important positions
in fund-bank institutions. In other words, a separate caste, a
universal dominant caste crossing across the narrow geographi-
cal boundaries of state emerged, such as that of Zionism. A
pundit of Kashmir, a Shastry of Tamil Nadu and a Sharma of
Uttar Pradesh carved out a pan-Indian collectivity. They have
started learning Hindi, Sanskrit and revived the Vedic rituals in
New York, Delhi, London and elsewhere ‘to share common cul-
ture and way of life’. First time in the history of India, Brahmins
as a group started entering into economic sphere and have
been using the bureaucracy for the accumulation of capital,
human and physical. The tycoons of public sector have started

Globalization and the Future of Dalits and Adivasis  227

ploughing the money into private coffers. They have used their
positions for contacts with multinationals to establish units in
India either in their name or with a binami to start with. Once
the blood of the public sector unit is totally sucked, they leave
it. Most of the media houses are owned and operated by the
Bania–Brahmin combine. Several of the neo-rich industrialists
of the pre- and post-liberalization period belongs to this genre.21
They are supported by non-resident Indians (NRIs). The forma-
tion of this internationalized elite has been taking place without
isolation from the nationalist pan-Aryan or Vedic revivalism in
India and abroad. In fact, one should not forget the fact that
more amount of money and bricks were said to be poured into
India from the USA and other developed countries. This could
not have been possible without a systematic networking. The
so-called pseudo-religious secularists (sarva dharma samabhava
type) in Congress, including some United Front constituents
and others, did not take this trend very seriously. It was this
universal dominant caste with pan-Aryan identity who wanted
the country to be liberal. It was this group who wanted the
economy to be opened up for global opportunities. It was
ultimately they who appropriated the opportunities created
in the economy. The small conglomerations of regional enti-
ties have started their own political outfits to bargain power.
The power is ultimately used to get economic opportunities
in the post-liberalization period. In the whole process of the
so-called globalization of Indian economy, Dalits remained as
untouchables once again.
Dalits are now concentrated mostly in the agriculture sector
and a few in urban informal sector. Both the sectors are not
remunerative. Further, the proportion of income from the
agriculture sector to the total GDP is declining over a period of
time. Yet, a greater number of Dalits depend on it. This implies
that a greater number of people are distributing lesser amounts
of income. They are caught in a vicious circle of low productiv-
ity, high concentration and declining income. Even the Bhopal
declaration is not clear about the strategies to bring them out

228  Political Economy of Caste in India

of this vicious circle. Unlike the hidden agenda of several caste
groups, the Bhopal Dalit agenda is open and clear. This is for
the first time after the death of Ambedkar, Dalits have expressed
their aspirations and intentions. Interestingly, no political
party or group has ever indicated a specific programme for
the amelioration of the Dalits until the Dalits themselves did
it in January 2002. The broad state-of-the-art radical models
of liberation on a global scale do not work now and the Dalits
are not sure how long should they wait? The experience of the
Dalits in the country during the last 50 years has not provided
any evidence of its operation and its successful completion.
The operation of the CMOP both in the rural and urban areas
is evident. This will not allow any of the models to operate.
The CMOP and the capitalist expansion are not contradictory.
Both the modes have developed resilience to survive in an era
of globalization. In fact, the caste system is the most suitable
form of social organization eminently suitable to the operation
of mechanics of globalization. The caste system has provided
the ‘bridge heads’ in the form of Dvija castes emerging as agents
of MNCs and slowly co-opting other dominant castes as part-
ners of MCCs. As the founders of critical school, Horkheimer,
Adorno and others have proved that capitalism has improved its
‘integrative trend’ and dominance over political apparatus for
planned capital accumulation. They have shown that there was
total inter-dependence between Nazi party and big business.
Similarly, the fundamentalist forces in India have absorbed
the elements of globalization and strengthened it. There is no
evidence that the Dvija castes are ever excluded from it, while
all the Dalits are now outside its orbit. Do the Dalits afford to
remain outside the system forever and allow the Dvijas alone
to get benefited?

The Future of Dalits and Adivasis

The future of the Dalits and Adivasis depends upon the way
in which they organize themselves. It is a fact that most of the

Globalization and the Future of Dalits and Adivasis  229

caste-based welfare organizations in the organized sectors are
named as SCs and ST welfare associations, which have almost
the same issues for redressal. They have also common prob-
lems of discrimination, marginalization and displacement in
all the development projects. The typical Indian social system
made the Dalits and Adivasis ostracized and socially excluded
from the mainstream civil society. Now the trend appears that
they have already been alienated from the economic sphere.
Therefore, the Dalits will remain as one of the most vulnerable
group in the world to bear the brunt of globalization. This will
subject the Dalits to ‘soft genocide’ the harsher version of which
the Indians had experienced during the first phase of imperial-
ism in the Americas. What are the lessons the Blacks, Hispanics
and others have learnt to survive in such hostile conditions?
Do the Dalits have any parallels here?
It appears that the Dalits have not developed any strategies
of their own for the survival and development of the com-
munity in the 21st century. The Blacks in America and some
lower castes in India have proved that through the mobilization
of the community resources, it is possible to break the social
and economic barriers. One must be very clear here that the
people of America and their experiences are different from the
American government. If someone emulates the models of the
Blacks or Hispanics, it does not mean that he/she is following
the American government. In this context, the success story
of black-owned business in America is cited as an example in
recent discussions. The emergence of black-owned business
is not a state-sponsored or capitalist charity. It is purely a
community-based long-drawn struggle that made it possible
for the blacks to emerge as an important economic group
during 1980–2000. It is observed that the black-owned business
increased by 7.3 per cent and their employment capacity grew
by 11 per cent annually during the above period. ‘Assuming
the current growth rate can be sustained through the first
decade or next century, black-business, will number well over
2 million’.22 This impressive growth in business is not due to

230  Political Economy of Caste in India

(as some people in India think) the opportunities created by
the benevolent white government. It is purely on the basis of
the community mobilization and the leadership qualities of
the first black mayor, Maynard Jackson, who got elected to the
city of Atlanta in 1973.

In 1975, Atlanta established the country’s first minority busi-

ness affirmative action plan at the local level. Its significance
resided in the fact that it was not tied to a federal mandate
and its goals greatly exceeded those proposed at the federal
level. Over a quarter of a century later, the Atlanta metropoli-
tan area has the nation’s faster growing black-most successful
cadres of black business owners.23

Today blacks occupy around six important sectors, including

transport, construction, and services, as a formidable force.
Perhaps, the federal government has supported it later with
diversity provisions. However, these affirmative actions were
not left free without challenging them in the courts and the
blacks are now continuing their legal battle without losing
ground in business. Do we have any such accounts in India? A
mere mention of it attracts onslaught by several people as if it is
an illegitimate and anti-caste activity. People still think (perhaps
unconsciously) that how could a Dalit do business and enter
secular positions other than their caste-based occupations? Will
the Dalit business operators emerge as black bourgeoisie, such as
that of the red bourgeoisie? We are not sure. But Brahmins and
some non-Vaisyas have made use of opportunities created by
liberal economic policy and have emerged as the new capital-
ists.24 The euphoria created by a group of Dalit entrepreneurs
after the union government declared a vendor policy of accom-
modating 4 per cent reservation in public sector procurement
has not yet produced one billionaire. But one thing appears to
be clear. If the Dalits, including Adivasis, fail to mobilize their
caste resources and organize themselves effectively to get their
share in all economic activities, soon they will be reduced to
that of the original ‘panchama’ category of the varnashrama

Globalization and the Future of Dalits and Adivasis  231

dharma and be permanently excluded from the mainstream
society under the CMOP. Will they allow it to happen or fight
against it depends upon their ingenuity and creative work of
the leaders of the oppressed in the years to come.

Notes
1. S. Ambirajan, Dr. Ambedkar’s Contribution to the Indian
Economics (Chennai: Dr. Ambedkar Centre for Economic
Studies, University of Madras, March 1999).
2. Ambedkar, Babasaheb Writings and Speeches, Vol. I.
3. Samir Amin, ‘Imperialism and Globalisation’, Monthly Review,
June 2001.
4. James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked:
Imperialism in the 21st Century (Delhi: Madhyam Books, 2001).
5. Michel Chossudovksy, The Globalization of Poverty (Goa: Other
India Press, 1997).
6. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2018 (Geneva:
UNCTAD, 2018).
7. Ibid., I.
8. Petras and Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked.
9. Karl Deutsch, ‘Theories of Imperialism and Neo-colonialism’,
in Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism, eds. Steven J. Rosen
and James R. Kurth (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1974).
10. Ibid., 27.
11. UNPD, Human Development Report (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2001), 42.
12. Thomas D. Boston, Affirmative Action and Black Entrepreneurship
(London: Routledge, 1999).
13. Charles Hamilton, Lyn Huntlay, Antonio Sergio Alfredo
Guimaraes, and Neville Alexander, eds., Beyond Racism: Race
Inequality in Brazil, South Africa and the United States (Dallas:
Lynne Reinner-Public Press, 2001).
14. Ibid.
15. Government of Madhya Pradesh, Charting a New Course for
Dalits for the 21st Century (Bhopal: Government of Madhya
Pradesh, January 2002).
16. K. S. Chalam, ‘Intercaste and Intracaste Differentiation among
Dalits in India’, Occasional Paper, SRTRI Pochampally, 1997.

232  Political Economy of Caste in India

17. Robert L. Hardgrave, Nadars of Tamilnadu: The Political Culture
of a Community in Change (Mumbai: Oxford University Press,
1969).
18. Aprameya Rao, ‘Downhill Goes the Dravidian Movement’,
Qrius, 14 July 2014. https://qrius.com/downhill-goes-dravidian-
movement/
19. K. S. Chalam, Caste-based Reservations and Human Development
in India (New Delhi: SAGE, 2007).
20. K. S. Chalam, Social Economy of Development in India (New
Delhi: SAGE, 2017).
21. Aakar Patel, ‘When Will the Brahmin–Bania Hegemony End?’
Livemint, 28 August 2009.
22. Boston, Affirmative Action.
23. Ibid.
24. Harish Damodaran, India’s New Capitalists: Caste, Business and
Industry in Modern Times (Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

Globalization and the Future of Dalits and Adivasis  233

 13

Democracy, Dalit
Rights and the
Paradigm Shift

The caste mode production and the determinants under which

it has been operating in India discussed in the previous chap-
ters brought out issues for discussion by scholars. The concept
and its application to India along with primitive accumula-
tion, relevance of classes, social relations, the hegemony of
the functioning capitalists in the garb of Dvija and so on are
discussed to give primacy of the caste category as an analyti-
cal term to understand the Hindu system of production and
its survival even in post-industrial society, which are to be
gripped to delve deep into the political economy of caste. The
transition debate particularly the one between Maurice Dobb
and P. Sweezy1 seems to be still valid to understand how in
India the so-called feudalism did not transform into Western-
type capitalism. Instead, the caste-based crony capitalism has
emerged that makes the concept of caste of MOP appropriate
as its predecessor. Thus, transition from CMOP has resulted in
caste crony capitalism and not the Western or classical mode
of capitalism to exploit wage labour to generate surplus value.
We may draw the attention of scholars to the development of
ideas, such as ‘accumulation by dispossession’ analysed within
the Marxian idea of primitive accumulation.2 In fact, primitive
accumulation is more relevant to a caste-based society, such as
India, where the major chunk of the society are excluded or
dispossessed from the mainstream production relations through
displacement of ‘the whole class of people from control over the
means of production, at first through legal acts, but ultimately,
as in the enclosure legislation in Britain the rough actions of
the state’.3 The sentence from David Harvey study cited here is
aptly fit into caste model of production in India.

Accumulation by Social Exclusion

We have noted in previous chapters how the SCs, STs and
service caste are physically and socially excluded from the
mainstream production process. One wonders how the
economy could survive by excluding the major sections of
population. It here lays the magic of CMOP. The excluded
castes are brought under the production relations with lower
ranks and assigned functions that are ascribed by birth. At any
stage of development in India either the Dvija group or Dalits
or Adivasis constitute a substantial quantity of population that
would not have made operations difficult. The institution of
untouchability discussed below is like that of the ‘enclosure’
movement used in Europe to transform agriculture to create
surpluses and reinvest to usher in capitalism. However, social
exclusion is a permanent non-negotiable enclosure that
would not allow the labourers or working class to cross their
ranks, lest they might be lynched. The proportion of Dalits
and Adivasis in any of the modern sectors of production,
particularly the information and communications technology
(ICT), technology-based units, financial sector and so on is
very low. Further, as Durand4 noted, ‘a situation where profits
take place without accumulation through financialization of

Democracy, Dalit Rights and the Paradigm Shift  235

trade and creation of fictitious capital is in place now.’ As we
have seen before, the role of the lower castes in these sectors is
marginal and the Dvijas combine is dominant. David Harvey
in his study noted, it is not pre-history of capitalism and is
an ongoing process. It can encompass everything, including
taking away the rights of these sections’ access to land and
livelihoods.
The role of the agriculture sector in the Indian economy is
still substantial with around 16 per cent contribution to GDP
unlike in other countries. Interestingly, the share of the sector
in GDP was around 59 per cent in 1950–1951 and has slowly
declined. But the proportion of agriculture labourers among
the SCs is increasing from around 50 per cent in 1951 to 71
per cent in 2011. The inverse relationship between agriculture
sector contributions to GDP and proportion of agriculture
labourers among Dalits is the real paradox of social exclusion.
In other words, the economic base of SCs is related to primi-
tive accumulation and the social relations of discrimination,
untouchability and displacement are, therefore, reproduced
even in modern caste-based capitalist production system. This
needs to be understood and changed in a modern democratic
capitalist economy. It is ‘precarious working class’ that is
found to be the reserve army only among Dalits and Adivasis
in agriculture sector. But caste and sub-caste cleavages are a
deterrent to form a generalized proletariat as noted by Samir
Amin. This is not unique to India as Hymer Stephen noted on
the basis of multiplication of proletariat across the countries,
‘thus the competitive cleavages between workers often reflect
lines of race, creed, color, age, sex and national origin which
make working class consciousness more difficult’.5 It is in this
context, Jomil Jonna R. and John Bellamy Foster brought to
light the concept of working class ‘precariousness’ as noted
originally by Marx and elaborated by Hymer once again in the
21st century.6 The industrial reserve army is growing due to
casualization, informalization of labour and other techniques
used by multinational corporations. This appears to be true in

236  Political Economy of Caste in India

the case of Dalit, Adivasis and service castes in India, particu-
larly the growing reverse army of agriculture labourers, among
Dalits noted above.

Democracy as a Transitional Phase

Though India had ushered in a constitutional form of democ-
racy in 1950, it had already experimented with the election pro-
cess of selecting representatives of the people through 1935 Act.
The constituent assembly has decided to provide representation
to SCs and STs to represent the categories in proportion to their
population in the state for a period of 10 years under Article
330. However, it has been extended continuously on political
and social grounds from time to time. Elections are only one
aspect of democratic form of government where decisions are
being taken by the elected representatives. The history of the
SC and ST political reservations is a mixed bag. The provisions
of double member constituencies and the representation of
Dalit and Adivasi issues in the legislative started vanishing one
after the other.7 Democracy as Ambedkar noted as ‘one value
and one vote’ became one vote and several values making the
Dalits and Adivasis to remain relatively backward and the gap
between them and others as noted in the previous chapters
continued to widen with Dvija rule in its full form implement-
ing varnashrama dharma. Therefore, Dalits and Adivasis can
consider the present form of capitalist democracy where they
are given certain guarantees through fundamental rights along
with others in a temporary phase. It is proved beyond doubt
that 70 years of independent rule has only made a tiny section
of the Dalit and Adivasi class of educated elite realize their
democratic rights. But most of the rights are seen in breach
rather than in operation in terms of the increasing incidence
of atrocities. Therefore, Dalit and Adivasi rights are to be inte-
grated with human rights so that others who are in the same
economic deprivation are made to come together to liberate
from repression: social and economic.

Democracy, Dalit Rights and the Paradigm Shift  237

Concept of Human Rights
The rights of man basically arise out of the Western moral
conviction that every human being is sacred. The secular
version of human rights arises out of the experiences of the
humanity with the brutality of religious practices and as
dialectic of Protestantism and science. The claim that every
human being is sacred means that only people who are really
human beings and other people, such as women, tribes, Dalits
or Muslims, are not truly human. Michael J. Perry in his book
on ‘The Idea of Human Rights’ says that ‘this is because, the
first part of the idea of human rights—the claim that every
human being is sacred—is the claim that every member of
the species Homo sapiens is sacred (or at least every born
member); it is the claim that the sacredness of a human being
(Homo sapiens) does not depend on his or her race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion national or
social origin, property, birth or other status’.8 This language
of the universal declaration of human rights in Article 2 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) appears
to have been influencing the ideology of human rights in
several countries. Human rights in India is defined as the
right relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity guaranteed
by the Constitution.
The idea that some humans are sacred, and others are not,
indicates that there are pseudo humans or sub-humans. Caste
being the predominant unit of social and political status and
therefore connected to economic mobilization need to be
given due weightage in the Indian version of class formation.
This ideology suits the Indians, particularly the Hindu ethos.
In India, the status of an individual is religiously determined
by the birth of the person in a caste. Therefore, the ritual
status of the individuals is determined by the religious lead-
ers. The moral code, the basis on which human relations are
maintained in India appear to be unequal. They are unequal
as the ideas of inequality, fraternity and democracy have

238  Political Economy of Caste in India

different meanings in the Indian situation. The basic structure
of the society is based on graded inequality, first sanctioned
by the religious scriptures and internalized by individuals by
practice. It is in this context, the rights of the Dalits play a
very significant role in universalizing the human rights. The
mere declaration of human rights and the bill of rights com-
prising of (a) universal declaration of human rights (1948), (b)
the international covenant on economic, social and cultural
rights (1966) and (c) the international covenant on civil and
political rights (1966), may not ensure the rights to Dalits
in India. The Dalits are treated as sub-humans and even as
non-humans by the mainstream society for a long time in
human history. The slaves in the USA and in other European
societies were better placed in terms of certain minimum
access to civilized life, such as education and training. But
in India even those minimum needs of human beings were
denied to Dalits. It is in recognition of this discrimination,
the Constitution of India restored some of the basic rights
through constitutional provisions, such as Article 17 (aboli-
tion of untouchability).9

Untouchability as a Form of Intolerance

When we look at human rights from the point of view of
universal equality among humans, we come across certain
limitations in societies, such as India where untouchability
is still practised. The Dalits of India who constitute the major
segment of Indian society are also called as untouchables.
Untouchability has three dimensions: unseeables, unapproach-
ables and untouchables. It is a practice that keeps a section of
the society physically away from the mainstream in all social
transactions except in using their labour for production. It is
sanctioned by dharmashastras and implemented by the society
with religious fervour from historical times. However, it is not
practised in the same rigour in all the regions of the country.
Its intensity is severe in the Aryan mainland and is found to

Democracy, Dalit Rights and the Paradigm Shift  239

be non-existent in northeast. It was the Europeans who called
the indigenous people of this country as Dravidians, Dasyus,
Asuras and untouchables on the basis of the dharmashastras and
Hindu practices. In the Hindu ritual status, each caste is given
a social rank. The highest rank is given to the Brahmin and the
Dalit or the SC person is ascribed a zero rank at the bottom.
These ranks are ascribed to different castes based on birth and
they are permanent. The place of dwellings, the food and their
social relations are dictated by the dharmashastras. Manu, the
law giver of the Hindus whom a section of the ruling elite in
India revere with respect even today had codified the conduct.
B. R. Ambedkar citing Manu tells us that ‘if the Hindu observed
untouchability it is because his religion enjoins him to do so’.
Manu, the architect of Hindu society said, ‘If one who (being
a member of the chandalas or some other low caste) must not
be touched, intentionally defiles by his touch one who (as a
member of twice born caste) may be touched (by the other
twice born persons only) he shall be put to death’ (Manu X 56
cited by Ambedkar, Vol. V, p. 91). One might say that these are
only provisions in ancient Hindu order, but may not be relevant
now. Ambedkar has cited cases of extreme form of the practice
of untouchability during his lifetime and cited court judge-
ments upholding the practice of untouchability during 1950s.
Even after independence and the abolition of untouchability
in the Constitution and several Acts made to punish the guilty,
the practice of untouchability is still prevailing both in rural
India as well as in urban India as noted in previous chapter.
The British rulers have defined it and recorded it in the census
enumeration. It was in 1911 census; they laid the following
tests to mark off the untouchables from that of touchables. The
untouchables are those who

1. Denied the supremacy of the Brahmins

2. Did not receive the mantra from Brahmin or another rec-
ognized Hindu guru
3. Denied the authority of the Vedas

240  Political Economy of Caste in India

 4. Did not worship the great Hindu gods
5. Were not served by good Brahmins
6. Have no Brahmin priests at all
7. Have no access to the interior of the ordinary Hindu temple
8. Cause pollution
9. Bury their dead
10. Eat beef and do not revere the cow.

It is on the basis of the above tests, the census of SCs and

STs has been undertaken in India. The proportion of the
untouchables to the total population has been increasing
in the Indian society from 1911 to 2011 census. One needs
to understand why the majority of the Indians still practice
untouchability. It is observed not only among the Hindus, but
even among the Muslims and Christians and in other faiths.
That is the reason why it is prevalent among the communi-
ties which are influenced by Hindu India, such as Nepalese,
Japanese and Thais. Sociologists have tried to identify the
reasons within the ideology of purity and pollution. Based
on the concepts of ‘Jatidharma’ and the practice of ‘Jajmani
system’, sociologists have tried to explain the hierarchy of
castes. They have identified the priestly transactions with God
as one of the causes of the emergence of the idea of purity.
It is also said that any waste product from a human, animal
or divine body is impure. This is carried, they said into the
dietary practices of the Hindus. Some sociologists who see
in Hindu customs a rationale have identified some Vedantic
ideas, such as trigunas—satogun, rajogun and tamogun—as the
virtues that helped the Hindu Dvijas to practise purity and
pollution. Some of them even tried to justify one’s rank in the
social order on the basis of the kind of food they eat, making
Brahmin the superior as he eats satvik food and so on. But
they have failed to explain why the Vaisya who eats the same
satvik food remains next to a Kshatriya who eats, in fact, food
that instils rajogun. Interestingly, most of the sociologists,
including Dumont, Srinivas, Inden, Marriott, Andre Beitte,

Democracy, Dalit Rights and the Paradigm Shift  241

et al., who wanted to rationalize the great virtues of Hindu
practices of caste discrimination were guided by the ‘nonsen-
sical belief’ (to use Andre Beitte words) of the superiority of
the Aryan practices over the lifestyles of indigenous Indian
population. Therefore, one aspect of caste discrimination, the
practice of untouchability, itself is a sufficient ground to take
up the case of Dalits as a human rights violation. Some OBC
castes in the South, such as dhobi, barber and fisher folk, are
listed under SCs in several states in the North. Therefore, here
Dalit includes some OBCs.
The value of graded inequality as practised by some groups to
consider some humans inferior by birth needs to be denounced
in modern society and in democratic polity. This is possible
with the provision of constitutional guarantee and interna-
tional support for a human rights movement. Apart from civil
and cultural rights that come under the broad framework of
human rights, in a country, such as India, human rights are to
be emphasized to make the common people understand the
significance of being human and the responsibility of state to
protect them. There is a need to advance a human rights move-
ment among the Dalits and Adivasis to make them realize their
constitutional guarantees.

The Strong and Weak Aspects of

Dalit Movement
The Dalits of India are not a homogeneous community. There
is also no pattern in the distribution of population among
different states. It is noted that a little more than half of the
Dalit population (20.13 crores) lives in Uttar Pradesh (4.13
crores), West Bengal (2.14 crores), Bihar (1.10 crores), Tamil
Nadu (1.44 crores) and Andhra Pradesh (1.4 crores) in 2011.
But, Dalit consciousness is much stronger in states, such as
Maharashtra (11%), Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh where
the Dalits constitute less than 20 per cent each of the state

242  Political Economy of Caste in India

population. Interestingly, Dalits constitute around one-third of
the population in Punjab (31.90%) and one-fourth in Himachal
Pradesh (25.4%) and Bengal. It appears that the future success
of the Dalit movement depends upon the consciousness of the
Dalits in larger states where it is now weak.
The little progress made so far by the Dalits in the post-­
independence period was confined to one or two dominant
castes in each state. It is identified that around 22 castes out of
1,091 castes in the country have got major share of the assistance
declared by the government (see chapter 2). There are inequali-
ties within each caste as some families among the beneficiaries
have formed into a lobby and diverted these benefits to their
members. This has created problems of intra-caste differences
that lead to separatist struggles within the Dalit community in
states, such as Andhra Pradesh, Haryana and Karnataka.
One of the weaknesses of the Dalit movement appears to
be its adherence to the popularization of personalities, such
as Ambedkar, as an emancipator without explaining his
emancipatory project. The Ambedkar movement and its petty
leadership failed to digest his ideology and never translated
it into an action programme. Somewhat jaundiced studies on
the Dalit formation by scholars and populist writers did not
really capture the reason for internal differentiation that is
built into the system.10 They failed to understand that it not
unique to Dalits alone. There are limitations for Ambedkar
associations to take up the issues of Dalits in totality. There
is also the failure of Dalit intellectuals to assess the devel-
opment process of Ambedkar movement and have missed
to provide a concrete programme of action to the activists.
Some of them have also remained; it is alleged as members
of the same bandwagon. No attempt seems to have been
made by the Ambedkar organizations at the state level to
give directions to the activists. Some Dalit activists endure
as commodities due to poverty. The SC and ST employee
associations are confined only for the implementation of

Democracy, Dalit Rights and the Paradigm Shift  243

reservations within each establishment and did emerge as a
body to provide guidance to the activist. No attempt seems to
have been made to develop a self-respect movement among
the Dalits as the Dalits never constituted an organic whole.
Each sub-caste has its own social and cultural identity. The
only common identity that has emerged during the last half
a century is developed around Ambedkar, as an emancipator.
This is to be further strengthened with innovative interpre-
tations for practical work. The kind of interpretation of the
works of Marx and Engels by Lenin and Mao had not taken
place in case of Ambedkar and other emancipators. It is also
necessary to develop the Dalit epistemology, which is deep
rooted in ‘Tantra’, the original scientific approach to life by
the natives. This has been destroyed by the British during the
colonial period and a major chunk of it was appropriated by
the Brahminical Hinduism and Buddhism. Dalits are now left
as disconnected and disengaged group with little empathy to
secure their rights as humans. Adivasi areas in some pockets
are different due to Maoist campaigns.

The Culture of Poverty

The culture of poverty that existed among the Dalits for ages
has strengthened certain traits and behaviour patterns which
are inimical for the development of Dalit rights movement.
There are several factors contributing to these. The following
are some important factors.
(a) Illiteracy and ignorance, (b) hatred and jealousy
towards fellow Dalits, (c) lack of leadership qualities, (d) lack
of vision for future, (e) lack of caste consciousness, (f) lack of
survival skills, (g) easy prey to upper caste machinations, (h)
multifarious leadership, (i) lack of habits of savings, (j) indul-
gence in panchamakaras (matysa, mamsa, mudra, maithuna
and madya), (k) succumb to short-term material benefits,
(l) lack of discipline, (m) considering caste reservations as

244  Political Economy of Caste in India

ultimate liberation, (n) lack of unity and (o) in fighting on
petty issues.
The Brahminical preparation to encounter modernization
and the Dalit emancipatory movements were started in 1925
from Maharashtra. It was also during this period the com-
munist party was activated. Now experts comment that the
Sangh Parivar is in the saddle of power to dictate terms to the
majority and continue to enjoy the hegemony. The left is in
disarray. There are several non-Dalit castes which have mobi-
lized their caste resources and fought against the Brahminical
forces and have recorded as upper castes without any support
from outside and government. The emergence of Nadars in
Tamil Nadu as a ruling class from that of a low social status
in modern India is only one example. The upward mobility
of some Shudra castes such as Kamma, Reddy, Vakkaliga, Jat
and Yadav, need to be studied.

Dalits Rights as Human Rights

The instruments of UN human rights, such as human rights
bodies, conventions and protocols, have limited application
in India as India did not sign some of the treaties. This calls
for an international campaign for the declaration of the rights
of Dalits as human rights. This is essential to consider the
rights of the Dalits to enforce within the framework of the
Constitution through human rights organizations, such as the
National Human Rights Commission and the State Human
Rights Commission. A special campaign to declare Dalit
rights as human rights is necessitated due to the fact that
the international community and the UN system of human
rights treaties do not recognize problems, such as untouch-
ability, which is unique in the Indian context. The right to
land, education, basic health services, drinking water, shelter,
right to work and so on is basic for life sustenance. But these
basic rights are denied to the Dalits in India because of their

Democracy, Dalit Rights and the Paradigm Shift  245

alienation from the mainstream. It is in this context, that a
charter of Dalit rights has been drafted as human rights by a
group of Dalit intellectuals and social activists. They include
the following.

1. Dalit rights are human rights.

2. The denial of basic needs of the Dalits is a gross violation
of Dalit human rights.
3. There should be inclusion of caste discrimination and
untouchability in the international convention on racial
discrimination.
4. The perpetrators of untouchability should be severely pun-
ished according to the provisions of SC/ST Atrocities Act
and rules.
5. Full protection should be provided to Dalits in the
Panchayat Raj institutions and other democratic institu-
tions of the country.
6. The land usurped by the state and private bodies, be
restored to the Dalits.
7. Reservations to Dalits in all private bodies and organizations.
8. Special measures be taken for the protection of the rights
of Dalit women.
9. Dalits, irrespective of their religious faith, be considered as
SCs.
10. They should have the right to freedom of thought and
expression.
11. A white paper be placed in the parliament on atrocities
against Dalits and reservation facilities be actually granted
to Dalits from 1947.
12. Dalit’s human rights be explicitly and constitutionally guar-
anteed in the Asian countries where they are domiciled.

Keeping the paradigm of human rights as a transitional phase

to educate the socially and economically marginalized to get
united under the banner to discard caste inhibition to form a

246  Political Economy of Caste in India

coherent class of exploited, the social proletariat, the following
programme of action is indicated.

The Agenda and the Programme of Action

The past experiences of the Dalit movement and the present
socio-economic situation in the country, enable us to prepare
an agenda. An agenda is a list of programmes to be imple-
mented during a period of time. But, the strategy to implement
such an agenda is more important than the agenda. Therefore,
it is necessary now to work out an agenda along with the strat-
egy to implement it.
The programme of action can be broadly divided into short-
term and long-term strategies. The short-term programme
should concentrate on the organizational issues and mobiliza-
tion of resources for self-development and community involve-
ment. The long-term strategy should always aim to capture
political power and economic development. (The following
approach is only an indicative outline.)

Short Term
Concentrate on Dalit Formation
Though people eulogize about the unity of Dalits, there is no
apt understanding among the sub-castes and even within a
caste about the need to form a Dalit identity. No systematic and
concerted effort has been made by any organization to form
all the SCs as one identity. Mahars and mangs, malas, madigas,
chamars, pasis, and so on, each sub-caste has its own identity.
The democratic process of understanding each other’s exist-
ence and their requirements needs to be built to form a Dalit
society first, may be a Bahujan Samaj or reservation of army
of proletariat as a continuation of this. A separate Dalit cul-
tural centre needs to be established with the single purpose of

Democracy, Dalit Rights and the Paradigm Shift  247

bringing a fusion of all sub-castes around the original theory of
Mulavasi or broken men, Dravidian or non-Aryan racial theory
of cultural identity. Most of the Dalits are prized fighters of the
upper castes and have been practising martial arts from time
immemorial. It can be revived for the sake of cultural identity.
The cultural centre can concentrate on the traditional Dalit
art, music and literary activities. Religion and religious identity
did not help much in the formation of Dalit identity so far. In
fact, it may act as counterproductive as Dalits are spread into
several faiths during the last 400 years and this will create intra-
religious conflict within the Dalit formation. The Dalits who
were converted into different faiths have remained as separate
entities, unlike that of the upper castes whose caste identity is
always maintained despite their conversion.

Educational Development
The literacy rate among the Dalits, particularly the female lit-
eracy, is very low. The excessive dependence on the government
on the educational development of the Dalits resulted in the
underdevelopment of many and capturing of all the positions
and places by some. The original Phule–Ambedkar project
of people’s education movement at the grassroots or habita-
tion level needs to be revived. It is also necessary to educate
the parents to allow their children to learn and also inform
them about the availability of opportunities and government
schemes, such as hostels and scholarships, to enable them to
continue their studies. Except in one or two states, Dalits in
the rural areas in a majority of the states do not have access to
this information (see Chapter 9). A majority of the Dalits and
Adivasis are opting for liberal arts and science courses which
have no job market. Therefore, the Dalit organizations should
develop self-help groups at the habitation level to educate the
children both in formal and non-formal streams. Education
does not mean the three Rs (reading, writing and arithmetic)

248  Political Economy of Caste in India

alone. Computer literacy and technical knowledge are impor-
tant for survival in the 21st century. The educated Dalits must
take the responsibility of transferring their knowledge to rural
masses. It is necessary to start technical institutions on a vol-
untary basis with the support of government, NGO and com-
munity support. No Dalit in the rural and semi-urban areas is
able to start a workshop or repair shop on his own because of
lack of technical skills and other support services. The Muslim
and OBC categories are now in a position to give necessary guid-
ance on this as many of them belong to the artisan categories.
Some Dalit sub-castes do also come from certain artisan castes,
such as weavers and bamboo workers. The skills of these groups
need to be strengthened with additional inputs and support.
This can be further elaborated.

Economic Support Programmes

The Protestant ethic in the west resulted in the development
of an industrial economy and economic development. But
the Dalits who are termed by Ambedkar as Protestant Hindus
never concentrated on their economic self-sufficiency. A small
section of government employees has emerged in recent years
with some economic base. But, majority of them use their
unearned incomes in conspicuous consumption, drinking,
debauchery and luxurious living. This will not help the Dalits.
Majority of the Dalits live in rural areas and depends upon
agriculture. Land reforms have become redundant in the main-
stream left programmes. Therefore, Dalits need to develop
their own strategies for the distribution of surplus land and
other common property resources in the rural areas with the
support of parties and groups who share their strategy. Here,
one must be very cautious to the fact that the income and
jobs from agriculture sector are declining, while the service
sector is fast expanding. In addition to agriculture, there are
several agro-based industries that are coming up in the rural

Democracy, Dalit Rights and the Paradigm Shift  249

areas. Dalits do not have access to these even as labourers, as
they do not have the skills. It is necessary to develop coop-
erative effort with the support of government and schemes,
such as horticulture, fish farming, dairying and hundreds of
such schemes to make the Dalits economically self-sufficient.
The habit of thrift and savings need to be inculcated by using
the schemes, such as DWCRA. Simple and easy to implement
entrepreneurial skills are to be inculcated among the Dalits. It
is necessary to develop projects for getting financial support
from commercial banks and financial institutions rather than
from the SC corporations who give petty loans that do not
sustain a project. The experiences of Punjabi Dalits in this area
can be explored. Some lumpen Dalit youth work as brokers
in the slums and rural areas for the upper caste contractors.
They need to be liberated and made independent contractors
to work with government construction programmes under
reservation scheme. The experience of the African Americans
in the USA through the provisions of section 8(a) of Small
Business Act in getting government contracts needs to be
studied. It is estimated that the African Americans with 74
per cent high school degrees are now spread in 5 important
industries in the USA. These economic programmes are sug-
gested as a short-term measure to develop certain skills of eco-
nomic empowerment. This does not mean that the Dalits are
interested in privatization. Their emancipation lies with the
nationalization of means of production and creation of equal-
ity of opportunities. The Dalits have suffered social exclusion
for centuries and they should not be subjected to economic
alienation in the 21st century.

Health and Family Welfare

Most of the Dalits suffer from several diseases due to unhygienic
living conditions. A band of health workers are to be trained to
educate the Dalits on health and family planning.

250  Political Economy of Caste in India

Long-term Project of Dalit Emancipation
The long-term project of Dalit emancipation is a serious issue
that needs to be examined under a sound theory of liberation.
However, we are giving below certain stray ideas that can be
examined for a serious discussion.

Political Power
It is always repeated in Ambedkar meetings that the Dalits
must not remain as the ruled forever, and they should emerge
as the rulers of the country. The experiences of Ambedkar
during his lifetime as a defeated political leader after 1951 and
the short-lived Mayavathi government in Uttar Pradesh are
two examples available before the group. On the other hand,
the Adivasi uprisings and their concerted effort to get a sepa-
rate identity made them to wield power. They have achieved
two independent states for themselves. Dalits as flag bearers
in liberation and semi-liberation struggles and the material
benefits obtained vis-à-vis the sacrifices made by them need
to be assessed by the theoreticians to develop a theory of Dalit
empowerment. The emergence of the oligarchy of Shudra non-
Brahmin castes and Dvija castes as the present ruling formation
at the centre and in some states show one of the ways through
which how minorities can also emerge as rulers. However,
the amount of organizational support, the perseverance and
the strategic moves these castes have made are to be studied
carefully to launch a Dalit empowerment strategy. The ruling
castes in power never split, but the Dalits are always willing to
fragment and remain as commodities in the political market.
How to change this situation? The caste identity needs to be
protected and knitted around some kind of a homogeneity and
inclusive of all the deprived. This requires continuous presence
of political workers with total commitment to the Dalit cause
in the Dalit habitations. For this, it is necessary to recruit a
band of workers in each tehsil/mandala and at the district

Democracy, Dalit Rights and the Paradigm Shift  251

headquarters. There are no organizational structures for the
Dalits at the district headquarters and at the state level except
a few loose formations.

Economic Independence
The Dalits have been subjected to social and economic oppres-
sion. But, the Dalit leadership has given priority to social
persecution by neglecting the more important base of this
oppression, the economic power. The Dvijas have realized this
and started entering into economic base after the economic
reforms. They are now in commanding heights of the economy
by creating few scams and modifications in economic policies
and with an understanding with the international capital. The
emergence of middle castes, such as Naidu, Reddy, Gowda,
Yadav, Kammas, in cornering contracts and public sector sales
outlets needs to be carefully studied. If a strategy can provide
economic emancipation for the entire community with little
bloodshed, why not copy it? This may be difficult, but not
impossible. For instance, the emergence of Kammas as an organ-
ized hard-working community from that of an agrarian labour
to that of political and economic power took around 5 decades
of hard work and discipline. The economically developed Dalits
in different parts of the country can form into a separate group,
such as the Kammas or Marwaris or Jats, who help their own
community clientele in the economic emancipatory project.
This requires a consciously developed Dalit or bahujan group.
It is possible to identify at least a few dozens of ex-bureaucrats
who have resources and access to power to lead the group. There
are several schemes that are thrown open for Dalits and Adivasis
to achieve economic self-sufficiency. This is necessary because
the political power can be sustained only with economic power.
Both are mutually interrelated.
The ultimate aim of this formation is to socially and eco-
nomically empower the Dalits and Adivasis to liberate the

252  Political Economy of Caste in India

castes that are under social enclosure. The social and economic
inequalities will disappear once the base of the exploitative
MOP is dismounted. It is not automatic. It requires enormous
moral courage and ideological commitment to bring all the
exploited under a platform with Dalits and Adivasis remaining
a vanguard.

Notes
1. Rodney Hilton, The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism
(London: Verso, 1978).
2. David Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital (London: Verso,
2010).
3. Ibid., 293.
4. Durand, Fictitious Capital.
5. Hymer Stephen, ‘The Multinational Corporation and the Law
of Uneven Development’, in Introduction to the Sociology of
Developing Societies, ed. H. Alavi, T. Shanin and Teodor Shanin
(London: Macmillan, 1982).
6. R. Jamil Jonna and John Bellany Foster, ‘Marx’s Theory of
Working Class Precariousness—Its Relevance Today’. Monthly
Review 1 April 2016.
7. Rajasekhar Vundru, Ambedkar, Gandhi and Patel: The Making
of India’s Electrical System (New Delhi: Bloomsbury, 2018).
8. Perry J. Michael, The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
9. K. S. Chalam, Introduction to Human Rights and human
Development (New Delhi: Uday Publication House, 2018).
10. Yengde Suraj, Caste Matters (Delhi: Penguin, 2019).

Democracy, Dalit Rights and the Paradigm Shift  253

 Select Bibliography

ADRF. Progress towards Inclusive Sustainable Development in India:

A Study of Dalits and Adivasis in 2030 Agenda. Delhi: Asia Dalit
Rights Forum, 2017.
Ahir, D. C. The Legacy of Dr. Ambedkar. Delhi: B. R. Publishing
Corporation Publication, 1990.
Ahlawat, S. R., ed. Economic Reforms and Social Transformation.
Jaipur: Rawat, 2008.
Aiyangar, K. V. R. Aspects of Social and Political System of Manu
Smriti. Lucknow: Lucknow University, 1941.
Alavi, H. Feudalism and Capitalism in Indian Agriculture. Mimeo,
1975.
Ali, S. N. Geography of Puranas. Delhi: People’s Publishing House,
1966.
Altekar, A. S. State and Government in Ancient India. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidas, 1949, Reprinted 1977.
Althusser, L. Reading Capital. Paris: New left Books, 1965.
Ambedkar, B. R. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, 17
Volumes. New Delhi: Ambedkar Foundation, 2010.
Anderson, Perry. Arguments within English Marxism. London: Verso,
1980.
Anna, Arendt. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt
Bruce, 1950.
Arjun, Appadurai. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of
Globalization. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Bagchi, A. K. The Political Economy of Underdevelopment. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Bailey, Anne M., and J. R. Llobera, ed. The Asiatic Mode of Production:
Science and Politics. London: Routledge, 1981.
Banaji, Jairus. ‘For a Theory of Colonial Mode of Production’.
Economic and Political Weekly 7, no. 52 (1972): 2498–2502.
———. Theory as History: Essays on Modes of Production and
Exploitation. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010.
Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar. Decolonization in South Asia: Meanings of
Freedom in Post-Independence West Bengal, 1947–1952. London:
Routledge, 2009.
———. From Plassey to Partition and After. Delhi: Orient Black Swan,
2014.
Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar, and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury. In
Search of Space: The Scheduled Caste Movement in West Bengal
after Partition. Kolkata: Mahanirban Kolkata Research Group,
February 2014.
Banerjee, Sumanta. ‘Pitfalls of Neo-nationalism’. Economic and
Political Weekly, 40, no. 33 (2005): 3629–3631.
Baran, P. A. The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1957.
Barua, B. M. The Ajivakas. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1920.
———. Pre-Buddistic Indian Philosophy. Calcutta: Calcutta University
Press, 1921.
Basham, A. L. The Wonder That Was India. Delhi: Rupa and Co,
1981.
———. History and Doctrines of Ajivikas: A Vanished Indian Religion.
London: Luzac & Co., 1951; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 2002.
Basu, K. ‘Discrimination as Focal Point: Markets and Group
Identity’. Forum for Social Economics 46, no. 2 (2017): 128–138.
Baxi, Upendra. Inhuman Wrongs and Human Rights: Unconventional
Essays. New Delhi: Har Anand, 1994.
———. The Future of Human Rights. New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2010.
Bayly, Susan. Saints, Goddesses and Kings: Muslims and Christians
in South Indian Society, 1700–1900. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1989.
Bell, D. The Coming of Post-industrial Society. New York: Basic Books,
1973.
Béteille, A. Caste, Class, and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification
in a Tanjore Village. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1965.

Select Bibliography  255

Bhalla, G. S. and G. K. Chadha. Green Revolution and Small Peasants:
A Study of Income Distribution among Punjab Cultivators. New
Delhi: Concept Publishing House, 1983.
Bhattacharya, N. N. India Religious Historiography. Delhi: Munshiram
Manoharlal Publishers, 1996.
———. History of the Tantric Religion. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal
Publishers, 1999.
Blaug, M. Economic Theory in Retrospect. London: Hieman, 1981.
Bob, C. ‘Dalit Rights Are Human Rights: Caste Discrimination,
International Activism, and the Construction of a New Human
Rights Issue’. Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2007): 167–193.
Buchanan, J. M., and G. Tullock. The Calculus of Consent: Logical
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan, 1962.
Carswell, G., and G. De Neve, ‘Litigation against Political
Organization? The Politics of Dalit Mobilization in Tamil Nadu
India’. Development and Change 46, no. 5 (2015): 1106–1132.
Chacko, M. Priyaram. Caste, Business and Entrepreneurship in South
India. New Delhi: Kanishka Publishing House, 1991.
Chakrabarti, Anjan, and Stephen Cullenberg. Transition and
Development in India. London: Routledge, 2013.
Chalam, K. S. Education and Weaker Sections. New Delhi: Inter
India, 1988.
———. Readings in Political Economy. Hyderabad: Orient Longman,
1999.
———. Caste-based Reservations and Human Development in India.
Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2007.
———. Economic Reforms and Social Exclusion. Delhi: SAGE
Publications, 2011.
———. Social Economy of Development in India. Delhi: SAGE
Publications, 2017.
———. Introduction to Human Rights and Human Development. New
Delhi: Uday Publishing House, 2018.
———, ed. Relevance of Ambedkarism in India. Jaipur, Rajasthan:
Rawat, 1993, 2nd ed. 2018.
Chalam, K. S., and C. S. Rao. Science and Civilization. Andhra
Pradesh: Andhra University Press, 1998.
Chattopadhya, K. P. Ancient Indian Culture Contacts and Migrations.
Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1970.

256  Political Economy of Caste in India

Chattopadhyaya, D. P. Lokayata: A Study in Ancient India
Materialism. Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1959.
———. Indian Atheism. Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1969.
———. What Is Living and What Is Dead in India Philosophy. Delhi:
People’s Publishing House, 1976.
Childe, Gordon. The Aryans: A Study of Indo-European Origins, New
York: Alfred Knof, 1926.
Cohen, Gerry. Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence. Oxford/
Princeton: Clarendon Press, 1978.
Colletti, Lucio. From Rousseau to Lenin; Studies in Ideology and Society.
Translated by John Merrington and Judith White. New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1974.
Corbridge, S., J. Harriss, and C. Jeffrey. India Today: Economy, Politics
and Society. London: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
Cunningham, Alexander. The Ancient Geography of India. London:
Trubner & Co., 1871.
Damodaran, H. India’s New Capitalists: Caste, Business, and Industry
in a Modern Nation. Basingstoke, UK and New York: Palgrave,
2008.
Daron, Acemoglu, and James A. Robinson. Why Nations Fail: The
Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London: Profile Books,
2013.
Das, A. C. Rig Vedic India: Cultural History of India as Depicted in Rig
Veda. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2003.
Das, Kornel, and Giridhar Gamango. Lost Jain Tribes of Trikalinga
(Koraput & Bastar). Maniguda, Orissa, 2010.
Das, S. K. The Economic History of Ancient India. Allahabad: Vohra
Publishers, 1980.
Denison, E. F. The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States and
the Alternatives before Us. New York: Committee for Economic
Development, 1962.
Derret, L. D. M. Religion, Law and State in Ancient India. London:
Faber and Faber, 1968.
Deshpande, A. The Grammar of Caste: Economic Discrimination
in Contemporary India. Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2017.
Deshpande, A., and T. Weisskopf. ‘Does Affirmative Action Reduce
Productivity? A Case Study of the Indian Railways’. World
Development, 64 (2014): 169–180.

Select Bibliography  257

DeVries, Willem A. Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity. New York:
Cornell University Press, 1988.
Dirks, N. B. Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern
India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Doniger, Wendy. The Hindus: An Alternative History. Penguin: New
York, 2009.
———. On Hinduism. Aleph Book Company: Delhi, 2013.
Downs, A. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper,
1957.
Dunn, Joseph P. The Fall and Rise of Asiatic Mode of Production.
London: Routledge, 1982.
Durant, Will. The Story of Philosophy. New York: Washington Square
Press, 1953.
Forrester, Duncan B. Caste and Christianity: Attitudes and Policies
on Caste of Anglo-Saxon Protestant Missions in India. New Jersey:
Curzon Press, 1980.
Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge,
1989.
Frank, A. G. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America:
Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil. New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1967.
Frankel, F., and M. S. A. Rao, eds. Dominance and State Power in
Modern India: Decline of a Social Order, 2 Vols. Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1990.
Fuller, C. ‘Misconceiving the Grain Heap: A Critique of the Concept
of the Indian Jajmani System’. In Money and the morality of
exchange, edited by Parry and M. Bloch, 33–63. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Fuller, C., and H. Narasimhan. Tamil Brahmans: The Making of a
Middle-class Caste. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
2014.
Gadgil, D. R. Origins of Modern Indian Business Class. New York:
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959.
Giovanni, Arrighi. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and
the Origins of Our Times. London: Verso, 1994.
Gowri, Viswanathan. Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity and
Elite. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from Prison Note Books. Hyderabad:
Orient Longman, 1996.
Guérin, I., B. D’Espallier, and G. Venkatasubramanian. ‘The Social
Regulation of Markets: Why Microcredit Fails to Promote Jobs

258  Political Economy of Caste in India

 in Rural South India’. Development and Change 46, no. 6 (2015):
1277–1301.
Gunnar, Myrdal. Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations.
New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968.
Hardgrave, Robert. The Nadars of Tamilnad: The Political Culture of
a Community in Change. Berkeley, CA: University of California,
1969.
Harnecker, Marta. Rebuilding the Left. Delhi: Danish Books, 2007.
Harriss-White, B. Dalits and Adivasis in India’s Business Economy:
Three Essays and an Atlas. Gurgaon, India: Three Essays
Collective, 2014.
Harvey, David. A Companion to Marx’s Capital. London: Verso,
2010.
Hazlehurst, Leighton W. Entrepreneurship and the Merchant Caste
in a Punjabi City. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1966.
Heinrich, Michale. An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl
Marx’s Capital. Delhi: Akaar, 2013.
Hindess, B., and P. Q. Hirst. Pre-capitalist Modes of Production.
London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.
Hobsbawm, E. The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century.
London: Michael Joseph, 1994.
Hobson, J. A. Imperialism: A Study. Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press, 1965.
Hoselitz, Bert F. Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth. New York:
Free Press, 1960.
Human Rights Watch. Broken People: Caste Violence against India’s
‘Untouchables’. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.
Hutton, J. H. Caste in India: Its Nature, Function and Origin. Bombay:
Oxford University Press, 1969.
ICRIER. FDI in Retail Sector, India (2005–2007). New Delhi: Govt.
of India Publication, 2008.
Iyer, L., and T. Khanna, A. Varshney. ‘Caste and Entrepreneurship
in India’. Economic and Political Weekly 48, no. 6 (2013): 52–60.
Jaffrelot, C. India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in
North India. London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2003.
Jha, D. N. Ancient India: A Historical outline. Delhi: Manohar
Publishers, 2018.
Jodhka, Surinder S., and Katherine Newman. ‘In the Name of
Globalisation: Meritocracy, Productivity and the Hidden
Language of Caste’. Economic and Political Weekly 42, no. 41
(13–19 October 2007): 4125–4132.

Select Bibliography  259

Jurgen, Habermas. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions towards
a Discourse Theory of Ethics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.
Kahn, J. S., and J. R. Llobera, eds. The Anthropology of Pre-capitalist
Societies. London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press: 1981.
Kain, P. ‘Marx’s Dialectic Method’. History and Theory 19, no. 3
(1980): v294–312.
Kane, P. V. History of Dharmasastra, Vol I 1930, Vol II 1941. Pune:
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
Keane, D. Caste-based Discrimination in International Human Rights
Law. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007.
Khilnani, Sunil. The Idea of India. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2004.
Kosambi, D. D. An Introduction to the Study of Indian History.
Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1956.
———. Myth and Reality. Bombay: Popular, 1962.
———. The Culture and Civilization of India. Delhi: Vikas Publishing
House, 1997.
Kulke, Herman, and Dieter Rothurmund. A History of India. Delhi:
Rupa and Co., 1991.
Kuppuswami, Alladi. The Constitution What It Means to the People.
Hyderabad: Gogia Law Pub., 1996.
Laclau, E. ‘Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America’. New Left
Review, no. 67 (May–June 1971): 19–38.
Lenin, V. I. Development of Capitalism in Russia. Moscow: Lenin’s
Collected Works.
Lipton, M. Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World
Development. London: Temple Smith, 1976.
Little, I. M. D. Boom, Crisis and Adjustment: The Macroeconomic
Experience of Developing Countries. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1993.
Lohia, Ram Manohar. Collected Writings of Ram Manohar Lohia,
9 vol., edited by Mastram Kapoor. New Delhi: Anamika
Publishers, 2011.
Ludowyk, E. F. C. The Footprint of the Buddha. London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1958.
Lutz, Mark A. Economics for the Common Good. London: Routledge,
1999.
Mandel, Ernest. An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory. New
York: Young Socialist Alliance, 1967.
———. Late Capitalism. New York: Humanities Press, 1975.
Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vols. I–III.
Internet Archive.

260  Political Economy of Caste in India

Mehta, P. L., and Neena Verma. Human Rights under the Indian
Constitution. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Pub, 2000.
Mishra, Chandra Vinay. Reservation Crisis in India. Delhi: The Bar
Council of India Trust Publication, 1991.
Misra, H. Apasthamba: Grhya Sutra. Varanasi: Chowkhmba, 1971.
Mosse, D. The Saint in the Banyan Tree: Christianity and Caste Society
in India. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012.
Muir, J. Original Sanskrit Texts on the Origin and History of the People
of India. Trübner: London, 1868–1871.
Munshi, K., and M. Rosenzweig. ‘Traditional Institutions Meet
the Modern World: Caste, Gender, and Schooling Choice in
a Globalizing Economy’. American Economic Review 96, no. 4
(2006): 1225–1252.
Narsu, P. Laxmi. A Study of Caste. New Delhi: Samyak Prakashan,
1922.
———. The Essence of Buddhism. New Delhi: Samyak Prakashan,
1993.
Naval, Viyogi. The Founders of Indus Valley Civilization and Their
Later History. New Delhi: Blumoon Books, 2006.
Nayyar, Deepak. Trade and Globalization. Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2008.
North, D. C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Nove, Alec, and D. M. Nuti. Socialist Economics. Baltimore, MD:
Penguin, 1972.
Omvedt, Gail. ‘Capitalism and Globalization Dalits and Adivasis’.
Economic and Political Weekly XL, no. 47 (2005): 4881–4885.
———. Seeking Begumpura: The Social Vision of Anticaste Intellectuals.
New Delhi: Navayana, 2008.
Panikkar, K. M. Geographical Factor in Indian History. Bombay:
Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1959.
Parvathamma, C. Scheduled Castes and Tribes. New Delhi: Ashish
Publication, 1984.
———. Reservation: A Pie in the Sky. Hunsur: Deed Publication, 1999.
Patil, Sharad. Dasa-Sudra Slavery P-II. Pune: Sugawa Prakashan,
1991.
Patnaik, Utsa, ed. Agrarian Relations and Accumulation: The Mode of
Production Debate in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Posner, R. A. The Economics of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1981.

Select Bibliography  261

Poulantzas, Nicos. Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London:
New Left Books, 2000.
Prakash, A. Dalit Capital: State, Markets and Civil Society in Urban
India. New Delhi: Routledge India, 2015.
Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy, 2nd ed. Oxford: University
of Oxford, 2009.
———. The Philosophy of Hinduism. Delhi, 2016.
Rao, V. Lakshman. Industrial Entrepreneurship in India. Allahabad:
Chug Publishers, 1986.
Richard, Garbe. Philosophy of Ancient India. Chicago, IL: Open
Court, 1899.
Saiyadain, M. S. and A. Monappa. Profile of Indian Managers. New
Delhi: Vidya Vahini, 1977.
Sankalia, H. D. Pre-history and Proto-history of India and Pakistan.
Bombay: University of Bombay, 1962
Saraswati, Swami Dayanand. The Light of Truth or An English
Translation of Satyarth Prakash, trans. Thompson, E. P. The
Poverty of Theory and Other Essays. London: Merlin Press, 1978.
Sayana, Madhava. Sarva Darsana Sangraha, ed. V. S. Abhayanakar.
Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1924.
Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New
York: Harper, 1942; London: Routledge, 2013.
———. History of Economic Analysis. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1954.
Sekher, Bandopadhyay. Caste, Protest and Identity in Colonial India:
The Nama Sundras of Bengal. London: Routledge, 1997.
Sen, Amartya. Inequality Reexamined. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1995.
———. Development as Freedom. Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1999.
———. The Idea of Justice. New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2011.
Shah, A., J. Lerche, R. Axelby, D. Benbabaali, B. Donegan, J. Raj,
and V. Thakur, Ground Down by Growth: Tribe, Caste, Class and
Inequality in Twenty-first-century India. London: Pluto Press,
2018.
Shamasastry, R., ed. Kautilya’s Arthasastra. Mysore: Mysore Printing
and Publishing House, 1924.
Sickligar, P. C. Atrocities on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes:
Prevention and Implementation. Jaipur: Mangal Deep Pub., 2002.

262  Political Economy of Caste in India

Singh, K. B. Scheduled Caste Welfare: Myth or Reality. New Delhi: A.
P. H. Publication, 2003.
Singh, S. K., and A. K. Singh. OBC Women Status and Educational
Empowerment. Lucknow: New Royal Book Co., Pub., 2004.
Singh, Subhash Chandra. Social Justice and Human Rights in India.
New Delhi: Serials Pub., 2006.
Srivastava, Deepak. Globalization, Privatization and WTO with
Reference to India. New Delhi: Sarup & Sons Pub., 2003.
Stein, M. A., ed. Kalhaṇa’s Rājataraṅgiṇī. (Bombay, 1892),
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Stiglitz, J. E. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: Norton,
2002.
Sundar, N., and T. Madan, eds. The Scheduled Tribes and Their
India: Politics, Identities, Policies and Work. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2016.
Taylor, John. From Modernization to Modes of Production. London
and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1979.
Teertha, Swamy Dharma. The Menace of Hindu Imperialism. Lahore:
Harbhagwan, Happy Home Publications, 1942.
Teltumbde, Anand. B. R. Ambedkar: India and Communism. Delhi:
Left Word, 2017.
Thapar, Romila. The Past and Prejudice. New Delhi: National Book
Trust, 1979.
———. Early India: From the Origins to ad 1300. Delhi: Penguin,
2002.
Timberg, Thomas A. The Marwaris: From Traders to Industrialists.
New Delhi: Vikas, 1978.
Trautmann, T. R. Aryans and British India. Delhi: Yoda Press, 2004.
Tucker, Robert C. Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. Cambridge,
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1961.
Upadhya, C. ‘Employment, Exclusion and “Merit” in the Indian
IT Industry’. Economic and Political Weekly 42, no. 20 (2007):
1863–1868.
van der Veer, Peter. Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in
India and Britain. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001;
New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001.
Ward, Rev W. A View of the History, Literature, and Religion of the
Hindoos: Including a Minute Description of Their Manners and
Customs, and Translations from Their Principal Works, Vol. I, 3rd
ed. London: Black, Parbury, and Allen, 1817.

Select Bibliography  263

Wheeler, Mortimer. Early India and Pakistan. London: Thames and
Hudson, 1959.
Williamson, J. G. ‘Democracy and the Washington Consensus’.
The World Development, 21 August 1999.
Witsoe, J. Democracy against Development: Lower-caste Politics and
Political Modernity in Postcolonial India. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 2013.
Wittfogel, K. A. Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total
Power. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1957.
Wood, Allen W. Karl Marx. New York: Rutledge, 2004.
Yujiro, Hayami, and Yoshika Godo. Development Economics. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005.

264  Political Economy of Caste in India

 About the Author

K. S. Chalam is a well-known political economist and edu-

cationist, and a former member of the Union Public Service
Commission, New Delhi. He has been the Vice Chancellor
of the Dravidian University, Kuppam, Andhra Pradesh. From
1976 to 2005, he taught in the Department of Economics,
Andhra University, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh. He is
known as the founder of the Academic Staff College Scheme in
the country and was its first director. He was on the Planning
Board of the Madhya Pradesh government from 2002 to 2004.
He was the recipient of the UGC Young Social Scientist Award
in Economics in 1984.
Dr Chalam has authored Caste-based Reservations and Human
Development in India (2007, SAGE Publications) Economic Reforms
and Social Exclusion: Impact of Liberalization on Marginalized
Groups in India (2011, SAGE Publications), Social Economy of
Development in India (2017, SAGE Publications) and around 20
other publications in English. He has also edited Governance in
South Asia: State of the Civil Services (2014, SAGE Publications).
He has travelled widely and has participated in and chaired
sessions at various national and international conferences. He
was associated with the National Human Rights Commission,
New Delhi, as a Special Rapporteur.
 Index

Adivasis concept of Feudalism, 2

future, 229–33 edited by Anne Bailey, 11
agenda, 247 issues raised by K. S.
Ambedkar movement, 223 Chalam, 5
Andhra Pradesh, 178 Marxian concept, 3
caste discrimination queer concept, 2
most affected districts, spirit, 5
188–92
crimes against Dalits, bank Brahminization, 53
178–81 bank nationalization, 227
offences Bank Nationalization Act
atrocities committed 1969, 144
against Scheduled belief system
Castes, 181–86 analysis, 36
Anglo-Saxon legal system, 139 lower castes, 35
apex court native Indians (NI), 35
elusive social justice, Bengal Bonded Warehouse
149–54 Association Act 1838,
flaw in legal process, 151 23
Aryans, 34 Bhopal Conference, 220
Aryanization, explained by Brahmin
D. R. Bhandarkar, 45 Brahminization, explained
Asiatic mode of production by D. R. Bhandarkar,
(AMP), 3 45
caste, 4 Dvija, 109
 hegemony of pundits, 37 discrimination, composite
Hinduism, 37 index, 186–88
Dvija, 109
Cambridge project economic asset, 52
Caste and Indian Economy, economic power in India,
113 55–57
capital, 16 India, 79
Capital in the Twenty-first Indian Economy,
Century, 60 Cambridge project, 113
capital Indian subcontinent, 108
patrimonial, 133 Marxian political economy
social, 62 and, 20–21
capitalism, 124 MOP, 80
development and resilience non-Dvija, 109
in the 21st century, oppressive force, 55
125 politicization, 24
economists regarded, 124 question, 5
notion entered India, 124 race, 25–29
capitalist ideology, 79 socio-economic and cultural
case ethos, 206
Criminal Appeal No. 416 of source of deprivation, 80–81
2018 delivered on 20 source of economic power,
March 2018, 155 56–57
marine fisher folk, 104 source of exploitation, 80
caste, 4, 49 system, MCCs, 229
caste mode of production treatment as property,
(CMOP), 4 108–10
assumes, 21 ubiquitous, 19
caste and class, 21–25 colonial inquiry, 43
characteristics, 16–20 colonial mode of production
features, 9–16 concept, 7
unchangeable, 10 colonialism, 210
Jajmani system, 15 communication
nature, 5 channels, 163, 168
operation, 124 decision-making process,
caste 163
Ambedkar’s narration, 12 Indo-European language
Anand Teltumbde raised the speakers, 38
dichotomous, 25 Sanskrit language,
argument on race, 28 41

Index  267
composite index educational development,
caste discrimination, 248–49
186–88 health and family wel-
Congress Socialist Party (CSP), fare, 250
2 Dalits, 15
corruption and rent seeking, concentrated mostly in agri-
123 culture sector, 228
crony capitalism, 125 deficiencies in emergence of
advantage, 128 formation with bahu-
analysed by experts under jans, 205–8
neoclassical framework, entry in civil service and
128 modern occupations,
caste 24
based, 127–29 future, 229–33
essential conditions to sus- not homogeneous commu-
tain, 126 nity, 222
India and capitalist class, process of production, 13
136 productive forces, 14
inequality widened through strong and weak aspects of
trade, 129–31 movement, 242–44
Lenin’s explanation of weaknesses of movement,
imperialism, 126 223
cultural nationalism, 42 democracy
culture of poverty, 244–45 explained by Ambedkar, 237
transitional phase, 237
Dalit movement deprivation, 81
agenda and programme of economic, 81–82
action, 247 economic exploitation, 84
long-term agenda and pro- fisher folk, 98–100
gramme of action indicators for fisher folk,
economic independence, 83–84
252–53 isolated villages, 101–4
political power, 251–52 multiple indices, 105
short-term agenda and pro- Peter Townsend’s approach,
gramme of action, 247 82
concentrate on Dalit for- social exclusion, 100–1
mation, 247–48 dharmashastras and caste
economic support pro- codes, 139
grammes, 249–50 discrimination
ICERD’s definition, 26

268  Political Economy of Caste in India

division of society democratization and deri-
based on one’s Karma and sion of knowledge,
guna, 194 73–74
Dravidian movement, 225 development in India
erosion, 225 association with structure
Mandal Commission, 226 of society, 70
Durban Conference, 220 disparities and divides,
Dvija castes, 109, 173 70–73
benefitted by state policies, national policy, 67–69
72 training, 72
Brahmin, 52 Westernization of higher
economic power of domi- level, 69–70
nant, 109 educational backwardness
emergence of oligarchy, 251 reasons, 163
operators in stock market, communication channels,
119 166–68
opportunities, 56 decision-makers in
social capital, 62 family, 169–70
Dvija project, 79, 110–14 incentives known to
development of elite class, Dalits, 163–66
227 role perception of
manifestation in stock respondents about
market, 118–21 VEC, 168–69
New Economic Policy, educational policy
114–21 East India Company, 66
history, 65–67
economic deprivation, 81–82
defined, 81 feminism
economic exploitation link with Marxism, 29
deprivation, 84 subsumed under MOP, 29
economic power, 51 fisher folk
caste as source, 56–57 average monthly per capita
defined by J. Pen, 51 income, 84–85
education, 59 average savings and income,
component of concept of 87–88
human capital, 59 economic status and social
concepts of merit and effi- resilience, 104
ciency, 71 healthcare, 84
decline of educational dif- highly indebted, 88–91
ferences, 71 income dependency, 83

Index  269
 income from non-fishing development and inequities
activities, 85–87 in India, 59–74
indicators of deprivation, formation, 62–64
83–84 measures, 63–64
main source of living, 83 stock in India, 64–78
marine, multiple depriva- human development
tions of, 98–100 alternative measure of GDP,
marketing of fish by fisher- 62
women, 91–92 definition, 62
poverty among marine, evolution, 62
92–94 human rights
concept, 238–39
globalization, 209 Dalits rights, 245–47
attention to developed Hunter Commission, 66
metropolis, 217
competitive edge of devel- imperialism
oping countries, 216 conquest of the Americas in
future of Dalits and framework of mercan-
Adivasis, 229–32 tilist system of Atlantic
network age promoted, 219 Europe, 210
political and social fallout, devastation of world, 211
215 industrial revolution, 210
situation in Brazil, 218 monopolies, 214
Gramscian category of tools, 213
­intellectuals, 221 incentives
known to Dalits, 163–66
Hinduism respondents’ knowledge,
Brahmins, 37 164
colonial rulers, 40 Indian Constitution
K. B. Krishna’s dissertations 124th amendment, 154
on materialism, 46 amendments, 142
Sanskritized, 39 fourth part, 49
Vedic, 40 principle, 155
Hindutva social justice, 146–49
colonial approach and under Article 17, 175
Marxist writing, Indian economy
41–46 role of agriculture sector,
Savarkar, 42 236
human capital, 62 Indian history
categories, 62 category of caste, 9

270  Political Economy of Caste in India

Indian Marxists, 33 economic reforms,
Indian Penal Code (IPC) cat- Government of India
egories of crime against in 1991, 114
Scheduled Castes, 176
Indian Slavery Act 1843, 23 Manu ideology, 79
Indianization Maratha pride, 38
explained by D. R. Marxian political economy
Bhandarkar, 45 and caste, 20–21
Indira Sawhney case, 151 Marxism
Indo-European influence on Indian schol-
language speakers, 38 ars, 46
project, 37 link with feminism, 29
Indus and Harappan civiliza- means of production, 7
tions, 39 mode of production (MOP), 6
industrial policy, 124 colonial, 6
insider trading, 113 concept, 7
intra-caste differentiation, 204 concept by Karl Marx, 1
feminism subsumed under,
Jajmani system, 15, 108 29
judiciary productive forces, 14
deprivation of social justice, types, 7
139–61 modern judiciary, 139
formulated by Marxist multi-caste corporations
scholars, 139 (MCCs), 229
modern, 139
justice National Commission for SCs
principles, 148 and STs in its fifth
social, principles enunciated report, 179
by Rawls, 148 native Indians (NI), 34
belief systems, 35
Kautilya neoclassical economic model
Arthashastra, 110 of equilibrium, 17
Kothari Commission (1964– New Economic Policy, 111,
1966), 67 114–16
Dvija project, 118–21
laissez-faire system, 125 economic reforms of the
Land Acquisition Act 1894, Government of India
144 in 1991, 114
liberal licensing policy, 114 liberty, 114
liberty prescriptions, 115

Index  271
non-Brahmin Protection of Civil Rights
castes emergence of oligar- (PCR), 175
chy, 251 defined atrocity, 176
movement, 22 pseudo religious secularists, 54
non-Dvija castes, 109
fundamentalist ideas, 42 race
notion of Hindutva or argument on caste, 28
Hinduism, 35 caste as an oppressive force,
55
patrimonial capital, 133 invention, 26
Payment of Wages Act 1936, racial discrimination, 25
23 argument, 26
per capita income, 84 related intolerances, 26
average monthly, 84–85 superiority, 25
political economy, 194 tenets of Hindu caste
poverty system, 27
India, studies, 94–98 reservations
lines, 92 public sector employment,
marine fisher folk, 92–94 221
power, 50, 52 Right to Fair Compensation
categories of non-economic and Transparency in
version, 50 Land Acquisition and
categories on the basis of big Rehabilitation Act
business houses, 52 2013, 145
defined by R. K. Hazari
as concentration of Sanatana, 36
economic resources by Sanskrit language, 41
R. K. Hazari, 52 code language, 41
economic, 53–54 higher education, 69
Galbraith’s theory, 50 Indo-European project, 37
pre-capitalist socio-economic Indo-European term by
formations, 11 Thomas Young, 38
private property concept, origin of Hindi, 37
142–46 symbol of hegemony, 38
contradictions, 143 Scheduled Castes, 152, 173
limitations of constitutional crimes categories, 176
provisions, 143 dominant castes among,
role of Ambedkar, 143 199–3

272  Political Economy of Caste in India

 implementation of reserva- social justice
tions, 224 elusive in apex court,
increase in population, 149–54
196–99 Indian Constitution,
Indira Sawhney case, 146–49
151 principles enunciated by
offences Rawls, 148
atrocities committed stabilization policy, 114
against in Andhra stare decisis, 159
Pradesh, 181 status anxiety, 203
committed against in
India, 179 Technology Achievement
versus atrocities, Index (TAI), 217
175–78 The Idea of Justice
post-metric scholarship for components of theory of
the SCs during 1993– justice, 147
1994, 205 The Structure of Scientific
term coined, 195 Revolutions, 1
Scheduled Tribes, 141, 152 theory of Coase, 145
implementation of reserva- Theory of Justice by John
tions, 224 Rawls, 148
Indira Sawhney case, 151 transnational corporation
PCR Act, 175 emergence, 212
Traditional Forest Dwellers
(Recognition of Forest unchangeableness
Rights) Act 2006, 145 CMOP, 10
schooling, 59 importance, 10
Secondary Education socio-economic character of
Commission (1952– labour, 10
1953), 67 University Education
social barriers Commission (1948–
impediments of information 1949), 67
flow, 162–70 untouchableness
social capital, 62 occupational mobility, 11
social exclusion occupations categories, 15
accumulation, 235, 237 Upanishads, 41
deprivations, 100–1
forms, 101 varnas, 107

Index  273
Village Education Committee Watandari Abolition Act, 23
(VEC), 168 Wealth of Nations, 59
role perception of respond- Weberian class, 5
ents, 168 Westernization of higher edu-
Village Gods of South India cation in India
belief systems of lower role of M. N. Srinivas, 69
castes, 35 number of courses included,
Viswa Brahmin, 15 69
Sanskritization, 69

274  Political Economy of Caste in India