© Copyright Irish Journal ofSociology ISSN 0791-6035

Vol. 16.2,2007, pp. 11-26

Against unspoilt authenticity: a re-appraisal of Helmuth

Plessner's The Limits ofCommunity (1924)

ANDREAS HESS
University College Dublin

ABSTRACT Community rhetoric has made a strange comeback. More than

half a century after Arensberg and Kimball's study Family and Community
in Ireland (1940) hardly a day passes without a politician, social scientist or
public intellectual referring or appealing to some sense of community.
However, what appears to be a genuine search for meaning and an attempt to
make sense of social life also has its downsides - as Helmuth Plessner's
classic study The Limits of Community (1924) reveals. This article recon-
structs Plessner's main argument and locates Plessner's reflections in the
context of the relevant international debates. With explicit reference to recent
debates in Ireland the article warns against some of the non-reflective use of
community rhetoric.

KEYWORDS community and society, modernisation, limits of community,

Helmuth Plessner, philosophical anthropology

Introduction: The Strange Revival of Community Rhetoric

In 1940, two American anthropologists, Conrad M. Arensberg and Solon T. Kimball,
published their results of two years of field research, Family and Community in
Ireland. The book was soon to become a modem classic in the social sciences.
Modified and with six new chapters added, a second edition of the book appeared
in 1968. Because of the demand, the book was reissued in 2001. This new edition
carries a critical foreword by Anne Byrne, Ricca Edmondson and Tony Varley,
which offers a contextualisation of the original study. As is well known, Arensberg
and Kimball carried out their fieldwork in County Clare; however, the study title
suggested that their findings could also be applied to Irish society as a whole. As
the new editors point out, the study surely represented Clare and maybe was even
representative of rural life in the entire island, but was it also representative of
Irish society more generally at that time?
Sixty years after the first publication of the Arensberg and Kimball study one
has to ask why it is that the term 'community' has made such a comeback and has

II
12 IrishJournal ofSociology

become again a reference point for so many scholars?' Why do those who favour
its use - most prominently those who wear the label 'communitarians' with pride,
such as Amitai Etzioni and Robert Putnam - call not only upon the social sciences,
but upon a much wider audience to rejuvenate and strengthen communal ties?
Perhaps it is sheer populism in the sense that, having exhausted their professional
audience, the professed purpose of these social scientists is actually to get closer to
'the people' in their search for acclaim and acknowledgement. Or, maybe it is
simply that the social scientists in question want to serve power in order to boost
their status. In either case the encounters and links, for example, between such
social scientists as Putnam and Etzioni and politicians like the Clintons, Tony
Blair and Bertie Ahem, should not come as a complete surprise. Eventually, both
politicians and their social science advisors gain from such collaboration -
whichever way the political wind blows. In the worst case scenario our self-
appointed public intellectuals will sell a few more books while the politicians in
question will surely look as if they really cared, and in the best case, we can
assume that we will all be more enlightened.
How complex the relationship between politics and intellectuals has been and
continues to be can be seen in Richard Hofstadter's classic study, Anti-intellec-
tualism in American life (1962). At the time, Hofstadter sided neither with the
associates of power, sometimes also referred to as 'mental technicians', nor with
critics of power; instead he stressed that he could see positive and negative aspects
in both traditions. Such a balanced view might be perceived as appropriate for
American conditions, where the relationship not only between intellectuals and
power but also between communities and society always had, until recently (that
is, before the arrival of the Neocons), a different, shall we say, more democratic
history. However, in the case of Europe and its past it has been a different story
altogether.
It was first in the German context that the sociological debate about community
took place, more specifically, in the late nineteenth century Kaiserreich and then,
more pronouncedly, in the Weimar Republic of the late 1920s. More concretely, it
started with Ferdinand Tennies' sociological reflections in his 1887 book
Community and Society. In this well-known study, re-printed numerous times, the
author juxtaposed community and society.' Community, according to Tonnies, is
based upon and stems directly from the family and the 'natural' ties of the
individual. All other features derive from this fact. Direct communication is the
community's central feature; there is no differentiation of labour, apart from the
division of labour that depends on certain natural capacities; there are no links to
other social circles apart from the direct neighbourhood and immediate friends;
religion only serves the purpose of maintaining and strengthening the bonds of the
particular community, and 'natural law' is the only law that applies to the commu-
nity. A community can develop only to a certain extent, from the core to the
enlarged family; then to the tribe and finally to a Volk; it has also limits in that it can
develop in a spatial sense, but only to a limited degree - from the soil one is
 Against unspoilt authenticity 13

working on, to the larger Gau or Mark, and from there to the village. The com-
munity will always be bound to self-sufficiency and sustainability.
'Society' is conceived of differently. Here, everything seems to be based on
impersonal relationships and artificial bonds and is, in fact, based on separations:
separation from the family, the soil and close associations. Societal existence no
longer depends on what we produce with our own hands; the development from
simple forms of co-operation to manufacturing, and, finally, to industrial produc-
tion leads to the separation of labour and modern class formation, including
competition, unequal and unjust trade, covered by, and legitimated through legal
contracts and procedures and a system of laws. In the end, Tonnies sums up the
differences between community and society in two equations. 'Community' equals
family life, unity, Volk, communal and rural life, non-differentiated life, religion,
church, household economy and agriculture. In contrast, 'society' equals urban,
metropolitanlife, national life, politics, state, cosmopolitan life (as in public discourse
and intellectual life), and, last but not least, modern trade, industry and science.
Tennies' work stands here very much in the classical tradition, squeezed
between earlier observations made by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in
America (1835-40 and 1994) and a later theorisation and elaboration by Georg
Simmel in his Soziologie (1908; parts of the book appeared in an American essay
collection entitled On Individuality and Social Norms, 1971) and Emile Durkheim
in The Division of Labour (1893 [1984]), particularly in those passages where
processes of social differentiation were described. However, in Tocqueville
communities were not seen as entities opposed to society; instead community and
society were regarded as smaller and larger entities that formed part of a model
consisting of concentric circles, building up from the local to the national level
and thus constituting a continuum rather than an opposition or contradiction.
Similarly, Simmel's distinction between communication in small groups and
interaction in larger social groups, and particularly Durkheim's juxtaposition
between primitive and modern society and the two corresponding forms of
mechanical and organic solidarity stressed the fluid or processual dimensions,
allowing for the possibility of permeability of both community and society. In
contrast to such conceptualisations, Tonnies' distinction appeared to be rather
static, based on two ideal types that did not reach out to each other but were rather
seen as being in opposition to each other.
On first inspection and in terms of the sociology of knowledge one might think
that Tennies' model reflected the intellectual backwardness of German society at
the time. However, this would be a much too simplistic view or interpretation,
particularly since German society at the time underwent a rapid modernisation that
was also reflected in an extraordinary intellectual achievement. It is much more
likely that the sociologist's essay represented a unique constellation that in
German is called Ungleichzeitigkeit, a word for which there is no good English
translation. The German terms refers to the fact that two things can happen at the
same time but that they are not necessarily in harmony with each other. Furthermore,
14 Irish Journal ofSociology

the use of the term can suggest that one feature or occurrence is linked to another
one and responds to it, yet in unconscious or unexpected ways. The historian Fritz
Stern, amongst others, has described such a process in the context of the late
nineteenth century in his book, The Politics ofCultural Despair (1961). He shows
that the ideological and intellectual forerunners ofNational Socialism responded to
the modernisation process, yet they did so inadequately by referring to and
sympathising with pre-modern assumptions about race and culture.
Can a similar claim also be made against Tonnies, who, after all, was a known
supporter of social democracy? Probably not. However, what we can assume
though is a common language and strong intellectual currents - not necessarily
academic in nature, although examples of where the two discourses overlap are
plentiful in nineteenth century German history - to which even social democrats
were responding. Thus, the sociologist's conceptualisation of an opposition
between community and society was perhaps highly responsive to the ideological
currents of his time. However, the sociologist's distinction responded in what
appears now, in hindsight, to have been an inappropriate way, namely in a true
gleichzeitig fashion where it would have been important to be consciously
ungleichzeitig, in short - a challenge to the times and the dominant paradigms, not
in agreement with them.

Plessner's intervention
There are, however, thinkers who can be singled out for having had a more acute
sense of the times and who now appear as having been truly exceptional in their
awareness and prescience. They were the early seers and prophets of the disastrous
political direction that Germany was to take in the 1930s. Sociology claims only a
handful of such thinkers, most of them have come to be regarded as sociological
classics, even though some of them were not consciously sociologists by profession
(such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx). On occasion, we also stumble
across forgotten classic works that need to be unearthed or excavated. In the
context of our discussion about the usefulness of the term 'community' one such
thinker and intellectual was Helmuth Plessner.
Plessner (1892-1985) was first and foremost a philosophical anthropologist,
yet he also took a deep interest in sociology and sociological discussions. In a 40-
page self-description of Plessner, now part of the collected works,' the author
charts his educational path from Wiesbaden childhood, to his university years first
in Freiburg, later Heidelberg (where he moved in the Max Weber circle and where
he met Georg Lukacs) and Gottingen (where he made the acquaintance of Georg
Husserl, his first PhD supervisor) and via Erlangen to, finally, Koln (where he
wrote his Habilitation on a philosophical anthropological topic with Max Scheler
and where he was briefly employed as a lecturer). The autobiographical account
also includes a description of the author's time in the Netherlands including the
time of the Nazi occupation. Plessner was of Jewish origin and a renowned critic
 Against unspoilt authenticity 15

of the Nazis - he had published at least two books with political content, one on
community (that is mainly the subject of this article) and one about the German
Sonderweg. His work made him a declared enemy of the Nazis and would have put
him, in the case of discovery and arrest, in great danger. However, with the help of
his Groningen colleagues and friends he managed to survive in the Dutch
underground. After the war, Plessner continued as a professor in Groningen for a
few years before accepting a position in sociology at Gottingen University where
he became for a brief spell also President of the university. Later, Plessner was
elected President of the German Sociological Association. Towards the end of his
academic career Plessner spent time as a visiting professor at the New School for
Social Research and later at the University of Zurich. During his lifetime Plessner
published half a dozen books and numerous scholarly articles, most of them of a
philosophical and anthropological nature. However, as pointed out above briefly,
Plessner is mostly known for his book Die verspdtete Nation (Delayed Nation),
which he published in 1935. A new edition of that book was published in 1959; it
was heavily debated then and has been responsible for one of the most interesting
post-war academic and intellectual discussions that continues until this day,
namely whether it is justified to speak about a Gennan Sonderweg, a special path
to modernity.
The book that we are interested in and that deals with community had been
published a decade earlier. The Limits of Community - A Critique of Social
Radicalism, was first released in German in 1924. It only appeared in English
three quarters of a century later, in 1999. In this short book - the re-printed German
paperback version is only 145 pages, the American edition is about the same
length but also includes a forty-page long explanatory foreword by the translator
and editor - Plessner was guided by such questions as: How useful is the term
'community' really when applied to modem conditions? What purpose does the
use of the term serve in understanding contemporary social processes? Are there
constellations when the reference to 'community' is not helpful but rather obscures
societal conditions? And finally, what can we learn from the juxtaposition between
society on one side and community on the other?

Plessner's philosophically and anthropologically inspired critique

In the foreword Plessner explicitly refers to the distinction and famous juxta-
position first made by Tennies (1999: 41). Since then the concept of community
has had a remarkable career. It has been used in the wider discussion about politics
and morality, especially by the German youth movement that had developed and
gained political momentum by means of the promise of uniting the two concepts
again. However, Plessner warns against singling out Marxist thought in the Weimar
Republic as the only 'official' inheritor of that youth movement (p. 42ff.). He
points to a much wider sentiment and broadly shared conviction in German culture
by which the promotion of the community concept has actually become the means
16 Irish Journal ofSociology

by which it is possible to overcome and replace 'official' politics. Such thinking,

argues Plessner, is dangerous, particularly since it appeals not so much to reason as
to the habits of the heart. As the author explains, the always appropriate use of
reason may be limited to the few, but nobody wants to appear to be heartless (p. 42).
Plessner here takes issue with the kind of radical thinking that believes that the
only remedy lies in putting extreme beliefs into action. This reasoning can best be
described as being directed against all traditional values and apparently sensible
compromises (p. 48). It tends to culminate in a passionate and romantic myth; it
also appears to be remarkably limitless or timeless in that it appeals to the
connectedness between a 'here-and-now' radical activism and a better future,
which nobody has as yet experienced. Such radical thinking appeals to the
impatient, the lower classes and to youth. Radicalism for Plessner also operates
with dualisms or Manichean good-bad perceptions, which see conflict and open
resistance as the only answer and way forward. Small steps, that which is condi-
tioned, meekness and other signs of traditional values and virtues are discounted as
not being of principled status and as not participating in the project of violent
destruction of the old ways and radical replacement through the new. Eventually,
a gap develops between real life and the constant anticipation and promotion of
an alternative future, between existence and a particular form of constant radical
anticipation. In the words of Plessner, there is plenty of insufficiency awareness,
actually to such an extent that '(t)or the proponent of radicalism, to live and to
have a guilty conscience ... are one and the same' (p. 48). As a consequence, the
radical who adheres to thoroughness and totalities only gets into a state of constant
suspicion, wanting to get rid of anything that resembles fun, entertainment or
everything that appears to be frivolous. Against the presumed frivolity, but very
much in the logic ofthe final purpose, a 'restless rationalism' is mobilised. Equipped
with his newly acquired perceptive 'skills' of reality the radical sees himself as the
only one who knows where he is going, thus also going farthest (50). In the end this
radical attitude leads to a rejection of the reality principle in favour of an idea that,
by its very nature, knows no limits. As Plessner rightly stresses, there is an element
of cleanliness and purity here; not only does such thinking lead to a
misapprehension of reality but also to a neglect of rational means-ends thinking.
The ends now begin to justify the means because the radical tends to think
seriously that "one can purify the effects by purifying the factors" (p. 52).
For Plessner, the origins of such radical attitudes in Germany lie in a peculiarly
Lutheran way of thinking (pp. 54ft). To be Lutheran meant first and foremost to
live one's values in a non-mediated fashion, a demand that naturally has to clash
with reality. As Plessner further explains, such clashes and contradictions are
usually not experienced by Catholics because the Church as an institution literally
'bears the cross' and functions as the big mediator, 'softening' the impact for
individual believers; for the Calvinist the problem does not exist either because
there is always a chance that God might redeem the sinner; so, only for the Lutheran
does the conflict between conviction and reality constitute a problem. According to
 Against unspoilt authenticity 17

Plessner, German philosophy and at a later stage, the new radicalism, inherited this
restless style of thought. Nothing is experienced as easy, particularly in the realm
of politics. An extreme attitude emerges that always wants to overcompensate in
spirit and in theory for what does not work out in real life, hence the
methodological thoroughness, the strange and sometimes bizarre inclination
towards a •discipline of ends' , maybe best expressed in the wilful acceptance of a
logic in which 'one must anticipate the principles determining one's success in
order to achieve happiness in the world' (57).
Plessner here sees a parallel with Rousseau and a misunderstood Marx, that if
only we could return (or move fast forward) and reach again a natural state, the
Ursprung, the root of all causes, an unspoiled community, we would be better off.
In the meantime, however, all conflicts are regarded as originating from modem
society, which in tum is seen as essentially capitalist. Since all evil seems to stem
from modem societal relationships, the question that arises for radical thought and
action is this one: Is it actually possible to identify a way of living that is
unspoiled, non-mediated, 'direct' and 'authentic' - something that resembles the
Ursprung, the original non-alienated state?
Plessner argues that it is the term 'community' which is currently employed and
en vogue [the author refers here to the time of writing, that is the 1930s - AH],
which is the logical outcome of such reasoning about immediacy and authenticity.
Community seems to be the remedy for the coldness of modem societal relations
and the alienated forms of living. What modem radicalism demands in order to
overcome such conditions is to reduce social distance. What is needed according to
community advocates, are constellations in which one is allowed to 'be true to
oneself' and which permit the development of 'authentic personalities'. As
Plessner stresses, Nietzsche has often been seen as the philosophical creator and
propagandist of such a radical 'subjective' tum. Yet Plessner believes that neither
Marx nor Nietzsche can actually be held responsible for the rhetoric of unspoiled
identities and the jargon of authenticity, particularly not when such ideas appeal
exclusively to a younger generation or a youth movement (p. 75). Also, for both
thinkers the relationship between means and ends was always a rational and
calculated one in which the order between means and ends was never fully
reversed; theirs was not the sad Prussian-Lutheran Weltanschauung in which
seriousness was more important than play and authoritarian leadership more
important than democracy. Furthermore, Marx and Nietzsche never defended a
return to nature. Both saw technology as something that society could make use of,
a necessity (although not always used to the benefit of all). In contrast to Marx and
Nietzsche, being anti-technology and not favouring the enormous, and, to a certain
extent artificial in-between space that technology has helped us to create - in
short, that larger and also more abstract entity that we have come to call 'society',
the new rhetoric of community promotes a return to an immediacy and unspoiled
authenticity where there is no social distance between humans - a paradise that
never was.
18 Irish Journal ofSociology

For Plessner, the modems seem to be facing a dilemma, accepting either a

morality of the masters, a Herrenvolk ideology in other words, or following the
moral appeal of an unspoiled community (p. 65ft). In Plessner's own time and
experience such seemed indeed to have been the popular choice, either siding with
the powerful and mighty as in the case of fascist regimes such as Spain and Italy (at
the time of writing National Socialism had not yet emerged) or siding with
Bolshevism and becoming a sympathiser of Russia. Where Plessner was strongest,
however, was in developing a critique of both community projects, criticising in
particular the cult of the Fuhrer, a form of totalitarian leadership which both types
of communities had allowed to emerge (p. 66ft). For Plessner this was a trend that
was, in a way, almost natural and a logical result of all 'true' communities that
fulfilled the emotional needs that emerge if and when close 'natural' or cultural
ties are propagated. Indeed, when blood relations become the norm - and for
Plessner they do so inevitably in all small communities -, passion and emotion
begin to run high. Logically then, when love of the community is demanded, the
love for the individual becomes sidelined or replaced by something else. The
question arising from this is then: 'Is it actually possible to love an individual and
a community at the same time?' Plessner's own answer is worth quoting here:
'One can love only something individual that stands before one in concrete form
and, reaching through it, the grasp hold of something general. What does it mean
when I love my people, land, humanity, the world? It means to have an intention to
love that does not need to be cooler than a sincere erotic impulse' (p. 88). In other
words, it is unlikely that one can 'love' beyond the individual dimension. Plessner
concluded: 'The greater the distance between the supporters of the required
relationship oflove and the more intangible the object oflove becomes, the more
difficult it will be to create a real form of love and, thereby, a real form of
community' (p. 88t).
However, in community-based thinking such warnings are regularly dismissed.
Things operate differently in close-knit communities; love now becomes 'other-
directed' and looks for its fulfilment in other directions that often reach beyond
clearly marked community circles - a 'love' for the 'national community', 'the
people', 'humanity', or a leader is then imminent. Plessner certainly does not want
to make us think that love cannot be directed at something abstract. All he doubts
is whether that love can actually address all the elements or individuals included in
the abstraction. What becomes clear now is the true limit to community: 'The
chance of its actualisation decreases with the probability of love - with growing
distance to individual reality' (p. 90).
This is often the moment when a rationalisation of conviction kicks in and a
true ideology begins to develop. Plessner refers here particularly to the project of
national Bolshevism. However, in its appeal to rational ideas - such as overall
justice - Russian-type communism surely differs from more traditional forms of
communitarian ideology in that it is a community that is mainly occupied with a
substance (justice and fair distribution). This ideology is clearly in contrast -
 Against unspoilt authenticity 19

maybe not in form but at least in terms of content - to those traditional nationalist
forms of community, which are based on assumed 'natural' ties or blood relations.'
We have reached the core of Plessner's argument, its main substance being
perhaps best summarised as follows: community-based thought and action,
independent of type, does not allow for a meaningful distinction between private
and public. As a matter of fact, the very idea of community demands giving up the
idea of privacy all together, particularly since love and attention are geared not
towards individuals (apart from a Fuhrer maybe) but usually to the entire commu-
nity. Community-grounded thinking is equally disrespectful of the public sphere,
which usually begins where intimacy and privacy end, allowing for the possibilities
of encounters that community-based thought and action do not believe exist in the
first place. As in the case of love, all action is usually geared towards the commu-
nity. Since everyone is supposedly connected to everyone else, there is then no
need for a public sphere. However, one can always encounter, even in community-
based thinking, the vision of a larger entity, a 'public' that either consists of other
communities or a larger humanity. As Plessner rightfully points out, light needs
darkness in order to exist. The same logic also applies to the concept of
community, which is always in need of something larger than itself in order to
make sense. Of course, in the end such a paradoxical vision cannot become reality;
loving all and appealing to a humanity-wide connectedness or 'oneness' would
make the very idea of the community absurd.'
Plessner supposes that, in the end, all humans find themselves caught in a
dilemma that evolves around the antagonism between the tendency to deal with
the real and the attraction to illusion. Real existence and the human spirit con-
stantly contradict each other and, according to Plessner, there is no simple way of
avoiding the tension. There seems indeed to be no easy solution to the apparent
contradiction. Having said that, there is of course a larger social framework, which
allows us to live with our contradictions for better or for worse. This societal
framework however, can only function if we accept two simple pre-conditions,
firstly, the capacity to live with contradictions (which in tum presupposes a sense
of acknowledgement or understanding of an apparently unsolvable conflict), and,
secondly, the acknowledgment of the benefits of that delicate social space that
allows for social distance and that protects us from the constant threat of the terror
of intimacy.

From Critique to Constructive Alternative

The second half of Plessner's book (pp. 103-95) is devoted to the question of what
contributes to the proper functioning of a public sphere that tolerates contradic-
tions and social distance. Apart from the acceptance of the preconditions referred
to briefly above, this public sphere needs some 'ingredients' to function properly.
For Plessner these 'ingredients' are politeness or tact, a benign attitude vis-a-vis
playfulness and a readiness to accept and follow some of the more sensible social
ceremonies and rituals. They all contribute to protecting the individual as an
20 Irish Journal ofSociology

individual. Ceremonies, rituals and play provide protection for the individual soul
or spirit which is now sheltered and through careful rules protected from the
sometimes not-so nice features of reality; in short, the individual is under consi-
derable less pressure to live up to those features of reality. Equally, through role-
playing the individual can now see whether he is able to cope with the demands of
social reality. Ideally speaking, the individual now becomes able to situate him or
herself properly, s/he can accept and respect her or himself and can become
accepted and respected by others. Playfulness, ceremonies, rituals, diplomacy, tact
and even hypocrisy - they all contribute to the creation of a public sphere and help
to maintain that stage which allows the individuals to play roles and to keep up
necessary appearances (for example, wearing the appropriate mask in the right
play), which in turn create space and distance - and the freedom to choose. They
become a way of dealing with, trying out and surviving in the presence of a larger
public, a larger audience, actually any larger group of people - yet without being
totally consumed by that larger entity. Individuals can thus become part of society
without the constant fear of eradicating what makes them unique as persons. In
the poignant words of Plessner, '(t)he person generalises and objectifies himself
and the role it plays through a mask behind which he becomes invisible up to a
point without fully disappearing as a person' (p. 133). In a sense, Plessner argues
for a back-and-forth process - he himself calls it an oscillation - which allows us
to move from our immediate social surrounding and private sphere to communicate
with the larger, more abstract, even anonymous sphere without giving up our
individual personality and features.
Having pointed out the general societal benefits of the public sphere and how it
helps individuals to live and find their way in society, Plessner also points towards
what is institutionally needed in order to keep the public sphere alive. If society is
indeed that open system between non- or unconnected people, apart from the basic
rules ofthe game referred to previously, how are they institutionally guaranteed and
protected? To that question Plessner answers as follows: First and foremost, it is
important to accept and maintain the distance between values and their realisation.
As has already been pointed out, Plessner hypothesises that there exists an unsolv-
able tension between norms and reality. The acceptance of that tension does not
demand that values are never fulfilled, it only warns us to forget about the very
distinction between norm and reality. This warning is even more important when
it comes to group pressure. Plessner here shows his true liberal colours and argues
that there should be an acknowledged societal limit in terms of having to conform
to social pressures, particularly if the individual is not fully convinced or happy
with what is proposed collectively. Diplomacy is of course the art of preventing
such situations from arising or becoming a big societal problem." Secondly, there
are those political dimensions and frameworks without which no public sphere can
exist. How can we come to or reach any decisions if we are forever entwined in tact
and diplomacy? Surely, there has to be leadership and majority decision-making
unless one lives in a communist dreamland or some other society where everything
 Against unspoilt authenticity 21

is always decided by collective decision. It is at this stage Plessner's democratic

credentials and the democratic state and lawful and constitutional procedures
come in - not as a substance or bourgeois conspiracy but in its regulating capacity,
as a system of preventions, which allow open communication to take place and
drawing boundaries where such communication seems to come under threat.

Plessner's Critique in Comparison

It should have become clear from this summary that there are major differences
between Tonnies and Plessner. Tennies clearly sets communities apart from
societies and he shows if not sympathy for the former, at least a certain regret for
what has been lost in the modernisation process and the development towards
modem society. In contrast, Plessner shows the dilemmas, contradictions and risks
that any such sentiment or even return to community thinking involves." As
Cornelius Bickel in a review of the thinkers' perceptions of each other has
stressed, the two were remarkably respectful in their critique despite their obvious
differences, maybe a true sign of politeness as described by Plessner in his book."
Bickel explained their differences mainly in terms of overall approaches. Tonnies
was concerned with reiner, that is 'pure' sociology, an ideal-type, rather abstract
style of sociology. In contrast, Plessner had always had a sense of tragic loss that
underlay the development of modem society. For him, something unrecoverable
had been lost in the modernisation process and there was no natural state, no
original community to return to. To him, it made more sense to mourn the loss of
immediacy, and, to move on, than to dream about a return to unmediated and
unspoilt forms of life.
The discussion of Plessner's Limits of Community never ceased. We can read
this as a true achievement in the sense that the book has really reached the status of
a modem classic. The renowned publisher Suhrkamp has, apart from the ten-
volume paperback edition of the collected works, even issued a paperback edition
of Grenzen der Gemeinschaft? At the same time Suhrkamp also published a
collection of essays related to Limits of Community. 10 The contributions include
studies of theoretical affinities, sometimes with a personal touch as in Axel
Honneth's piece on the relationship between Plessner and the legal theorist Carl
Schmitt (a one-time propagandist of National Socialism but nevertheless earlier
admired by Plessner), in Zdzislaw Krasnodelskis's reflections about the origins of
European totalitarianism and their treatment by Husserl and Plessner, or in the
parallels of the work of Norbert Elias and Plessner, as pointed out in the
contribution from Karl-Siegbert Rehberg."
The collection also included provoking thoughts on Plessner such as in
Helmuth Lethen's and Joachim Fischer's response to Lethen." While Lethen's
contribution praised Plessner's Limits of Community as a critique of the new
inwardness (Innerlichkeit) that had emerged in the Weimar Republic and as a liberal
defence of modem societal conditions, Fischer's contribution pointed to the fact
22 Irish Journal ofSociology

that Plessner's critique was also open to misinterpretation or giving potentially

disastrous advice. For example, Plessner's insistence on the benefits of playing
roles and wearing masks could also lead to a type of behaviour that propagates
coldness and indifference and resembles the closed protection of an impenetrable
armour. This armoured personality is only capable of reaching out to the other
person in order to hurt while being simultaneously protected against outside
influence or 'penetration'.
Perhaps the best modem defence of Plessner's ideas can be found in Richard
Sennett's book on The Fall ofPublic Man (1976) that was, as the revealing subtitle
suggests, directed against the 'tyranny of intimacy'. In his study Sennett argues
that the rhetoric of the community is indeed counterproductive, particularly if we
take into account that most of the population in the western world lives and works
in an urban or a semi-urban environment. Sennett shows that it would indeed be a
disaster if we lost that public sphere which has emerged in such urban settings and
which allows for modem individualism and personal freedom. More specifically,
Sennett argues against what he sees as trends toward re-feudalising the public
sphere: the promotion of the close-knit family and community encouraging the
controlling and the manipulating effects of intimate relationships.
In a similar way Albert O. Hirschman (1995) has criticised the new commu-
nitarian way of thinking. With direct reference to Plessner's work he points out
that most communitarian projects are usually directed towards the elimination of
any real confrontation and conflict. In contrast to such limited visions, Hirschman
sides with Lewis A. Coser in pointing towards the functional and, indeed
sometimes creative, uses of conflict. However, whether conflict functions as
'glue' or as 'solvent' cannot be determined in advance; "it must be brought down
to earth", writes Hirschman (p. 242). A 'steady diet of conflict' might indeed be a
good thing; it makes society learn to manage diverging views. Contrasting with a
communitarian rhetoric, which stresses 'communal spirit' and tends to avoid
conflict and fears the pluralism of opinions like the plague, we should embrace a
form of 'muddling through' as a normal and accepted way of dealing with conflict
and confronting problems openly. In Machiavellian terms 'Patience here,
impatience there, and other varieties of virtu and fortuna' are required (248).
Hirschman 'cannot see much point' but does 'see some danger in lumping all of
this together by an appeal to Gemeinsinn' (ibid).

Conclusion: The Irish Context

If we take into account the rapid modernisation process that took place and that
continues to take place in Ireland it must be strongly emphasised that a return to
community rhetoric will induce most of the contradictions to which Plessner
refers. 13 Agreed, Ireland has certainly not experienced the political monsters that so
much of Europe endured during the early twentieth century. However, Ireland has
not been immune and has certainly produced its own grubby version of soft
 Against unspoilt authenticity 23

totalitarianisms. Some of these actually persisted unchallenged for decades. Most

obviously, children and other vulnerable people were often exposed to systematic
incarceration combined with physical abuse, often of a sexual nature and denied
any real education in industrial schools and orphanages run by clerics. These
people's stewardship was not subject to any real control, and their doings were
systematically shielded and ratified tacitly by Catholic leaders and the State.
Furthermore, it could only happen because a good number of citizens also looked
away, did not want to know or could simply not be bothered.
Authoritarianism and bullying were commonly hidden behind appeals to the
interests of an imagined virtuous and loving community and a noble native
tradition under siege from unbelievers and foreigners. More recently, Irish commu-
nitarian totalitarianism took the form of a mafia-like golden circle within the
political elite which mouthed slogans about nationality and community while
siphoning off funds and planning permissions in a distinctly hyper-individualistic
way, as the findings of the Mahon and Moriarty tribunals have demonstrated.
Charles Haughey and Fianna Fail were very keen on community values; that
particular rhetoric provided a wonderful camouflage for the predatory actions that
ultimately have had a deleterious impact not only on the quality oflife ofIreland's
inhabitants and citizens, but on the general standing of public life in the Republic.
Because of the vulnerability of the Irish system to such abuses, it is clearly the
light of the public sphere that is urgently needed rather than any return to an
imagined and over-idealised communal past.
On the other hand, half-way through their modernisation process, Irish people
seem to be pretty good at wearing masks and assuming roles in ways, which
Plessner argues, help when conducting oneself in societal affairs. Thus, if it is
actually true that the Irish have the most important cultural resource for surviving
in this allegedly alienated modem world of ours, a question suggests itself: why
should they want to go back into a world of allegedly loving community and
imagined unspoilt authenticity? Perhaps a very traditionalist and reactionary anti-
individualism lurks behind a sociological rhetoric of the caring community and love.

Notes
I shouldliketo thankTomGarvinand the anonymous reviewers for theircriticalcomments
and suggestions.

I It takes a simple Google search to see how popular the rhetoric of community has
become. A general search under 'Ireland' and 'community' produces the astonishing
numberof 45,000,000 hits, while 'Ireland' in combination with 'society' produces about
half that number, 23,300,000 - still a pretty good showing. While it is probablyfair to say
that a general search with Google samples all kinds of references that make it into that
limited public realm that is the world-wide web, more refined search machines such as
Google Scholaror Google Book Search also show a significant numberof hits; however,
24 Irish Journal ofSociology

they do so in a different fashion. While the search for 'Ireland' and 'community' with
Google Scholar results in 261,000 hits, a much higher number (466,000) can be found for
'Ireland' and 'society'. A similar pattern emerges from a Google Book Search, where 5,669
entries can be found under 'Ireland' and 'community' but almost the triple number
(19,100) for 'Ireland' and 'society'.
Of course, the three search engines capture all kinds of references for which they were
meant to look out for and for that very reason our findings should not be over-interpreted.
However, the diverging results still invite speculation. It seems that the wider public that is
captured in the more general Google search prefers the use of the term 'community'. This
appears to be in contrast to those scholars and writers and their work, surely including also
a significant number of social scientists and their publications, who are more likely to be
found by Google Scholar and Google Book Search. They seem to be much more reluctant
to use the term 'community'. Instead they prefer the word 'society'.
These numbers date from December 2006. I should add here that results for slightly
different search options such as 'Irish' (instead of 'Ireland') in combination with 'commu-
nity' and 'society' show similar findings and do not show a different pattern.
2 Here I draw directly on a chapter from A. Hess (200 I) Concepts ofSocial Stratification:
European and American Models (200 I: 45-8). It should also be noted that in an earlier
translation of'Tonnies's book 'society' was freely translated as 'association'. Newer editions
have changed the title again to Community and Society.
3 The collected works of Helmuth Plessner have been published by the German publisher
Suhrkamp and are available in a ten-volume paperback edition (2003). The boxed set
comprises some 3,867 pages. The biographical essay can be found in vol.lO of that edition,
Schriften zur Soziologie und Sozialphilosophie, pp. 302--42.
Three biographical studies are currently available; acknowledged now as the standard
biography is Carola Dietze Nachgeholtes Leben. Helmuth Plessner 1892-1985: Eine
Biographie (2006). Christoph Dejung's Plessner: Ein deutscher Philosoph zwischen
Kaiserriech und Bonner Republik (2003) is also informative and readable; the third study is
more an intellectual biography focusing on the intellectual environment and relationships of
Plessner: Kersten Schussler Helmuth Plessner - Eine intellektuelle Biographie (2000). A
revealing, more personal account is available from Plessner's wife, Monika Plessner. In Die
Argonauten aufLong Island (1995) she describes the (not always happy) encounters that the
Plessners had with Hannah Arendt, Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer and others.
4 In this context Plessner is well aware of one particular appealing view that functions
independently of whether the community is one of supposedly shared values or one of
supposedly 'natural' belonging. That view consists of the simple assumption that
communities usually last longer than individuals' lives. However, such a view also has its
clear disadvantages. It demands loyalty beyond what an individual is able to offer in terms
of solidarity during a lifetime - hence the limitless and sometimes fanatic call for solidarity
with a given community beyond an individual's lifespan.
5 Of course, particular religious communities have followed that path, appealing in
particular to the needy, the weak, the suffering, the unhappy, in short, all those who want to
be released from their miserable (shall we say 'earthly') existence. However, such
'Christianity of the catacombs' (Plessner) admirable as it may be, has its own limits - not at
least the one set by real time (as opposed to that time frame called eternity) and because of
its appeal to that unique medium called the soul (to which, almost by definition, there are
 Against unspoilt authenticity 25

only a limited number of earthly solutions but an infinite and unknown number of
'heavenly' solutions).
6 Diplomacy applies more to the official side of social contacts, while tact, as referred to
earlier, applies more to smaller groups or settings and is a sensible way or method of finding
out whether one is directly hurting people or not. Both diplomacy and tact allow for a part-time
withdrawal from self-occupation and self-absorption and to give the other person his due.
7 Tennies first reviewed Plessner's community book in 1926 for the journal Kolner
Vierteljahreshefte fiir Soziologie (5 (4): 456-8). Plessner reviewed a new edition ofTonnies 's
Community and Society for the Kolner Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie and Sozialpsychologie in
1955 (7: 410-14).
8 Cornelius Bickel (2002) 'Ferdinand Tonnies und Helmuth Plessner', in Wolfgand
Essbach et al. (eds) Plessners 'Grenzen der Gemeinschaft', 183-94.
9 Helmuth Plessner (2002) Grenzender Gemeinschaft: Eine Kritik des sozialen Radikalismus.
10 Wolfgang Essbach et al. (eds) Plessners Grenzen der Gesellschaft: Eine Debatte, (2002).
II All three in ibid: pp. 21-8 (A. Honneth), 248-74 (Z. Krasnodebski) and 213--47 (K.-S.
Rehberg).
12 Both in ibid, pp. 29-62 (H. Lethen) and 80-102 (1. Fischer).
13 Applying, for example, Plessner's specific critique of Luther and German Protestantism
to Ireland hardly makes any sense, not even in the case of Northem Ireland.

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