A PROJECT REPORT

ON

“THE CONCEPT AND THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL JUSTICE”

Submitted in the partial fulfillment for the award of

MASTER OF LAW (LLM)

2021-2022

MATS University, Raipur

PROJECT GUIDE: SUBMITTED BY:

SHIVAKANT PRAJAPATI NIKHIL SAHU
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR MU21LLM1Y052
 APPROVAL CERTIFICATE

This is to approve that the work presented in the project titled “THE CONCEPT AND THE
DOCTRINE OF NATURAL JUSTICE” was carried out by NIKHIL SAHU and
submitted for the partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of
MASTER OF LAW in Mats University is the original work carried out under the guidance
and supervision of SHIVAKANT PRAJAPATI and that no part of this work has been
submitted elsewhere for the award of any degree or diploma.

SRIKANT MISHRA

Head of the Department

 CERTIFICATE FROM THE GUIDE

This is to certify that the project entitled “THE CONCEPT AND THE DOCTRINE OF
NATURAL JUSTICE” submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of MASTER OF LAW
to the MATS, Raipur, done by NIKHIL SAHU, ROLL No. MU21LLM1Y052 is and is an
authentic work carried out by her at SHIVAKANT PRAJAPATI MATS UNIVERSITY
under by guidance. The matter embodied in this project work has not been submitted earlier
for award of any degree to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature of the Guide

 EXAMINER’S CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that NIKHIL SAHU student of LLM 1st semester, MATS UNIVERSITY,
learning Center Raipur has submitted the project “THE CONCEPT AND THE
DOCTRINE OF NATURAL JUSTICE” for the partial fulfillment of the award LLM 1st
semester and has completed this project in scheduled time.

We approve the sincere work done on this project and the project report.

INTERNAL EXAMINER EXTERNAL EXAMINER

 DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE
I NIKHIL SAHU hereby declare that this project is record of authentic work carried out by
me during the academic year 2021-2022 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of
MASTER OF LAW to Mats University has not been submitted to any other university or
institute towards the award of any degree to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature of student
NIKHIL SAHU
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
With great pleasure I would like to present my sincere gratitude to SHIVAKANT
PRAJAPATI our teacher for helping me throughout my project and providing her guidance
to me. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank our H.O.D SRIKANT MISHRA,
coordinator of Mats School of Business Studies, for giving us this project which made us gain
practical knowledge in the field.

I express my heartiest thanks to the faculties for giving me an opportunity to work under their
guidance in their esteemed organization and providing me necessary resources for my
project.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all the respondents to whom I visited for giving
their support and valuable information which helps me in completing my project work. I
would also thank my institution and my faculty members without whom this project would
have been a distant reality.

I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me to make this project and
motivated me to complete it on time.

NIKHIL SAHU
LLM 1st Semester

2
[Abstract: The concept and the doctrine of Natural Justice and its appliance in judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative system are not new. It seems to be as aged as the system of
dispensation of justice itself. It has by now assumed the importance of being, so to say, "an
essential inbuilt component" of the mechanism, through which decision making process
passes, in the matters touching the rights and liberty of the people. It is no doubt, a procedural
requirement but it ensures a strong safeguard against any Judicial or administrative; order or
action, adversely affecting the substantive rights of the individuals. 'Natural Justice' is an
expression of English common law. This theory has also been developed with the significant
help of several philosophers. Later, when the democratic situation has maintained there in
various countries, such principles should be managed to support this democracy.

In this paper, I try to explore the concept of natural justice, the origin of natural justice, the
various principles of natural justice and also try to discuss the several cases by which such
principles are sustained in India.]
[Key words: Concept of Natural Justice, Natural Justice, Concept of Natural Justice in India,
Development of the principles of Natural Justice in India.]

INTRODUCTION

The concept and doctrine of natural justice and its appliance in judicial system is not new.
Indeed, it is applied in the judicial system to get a fair as well as just proceeding. Basically,
justice is of two types, namely, Legal Justice and Natural Justice. Legal justice refers to
justice governed by the law of the state and Natural Justice refers to moral justice and is
governed by the Laws of Equity. But both do not contain different meaning. Both have a co-
extensive meaning as well as application in the judicial system. The principles of natural
justice significantly stand behind the arguments based on which the legal judgment is passed.
So, in this sense, the application of the principles of the natural justice is only made to get a
fair as well as just proceeding in judicial system.

On the other hand, justice done to one should not seem injustice to another. So the
righteousness of a law is in maximizing the pleasure of the beneficiaries with minimized pain
to the others. Again, in contrary, law cannot permit the wretchedness state of mind of any
single one if it is transpired or happed to him due to any unworthy social as well as judicial
order. In that case, natural justice glaringly helps to elucidate this problem with a significant
introduction of the due process in the legal proceeding. It says that if the legal proceeding is
occurred as per the rules of due process, the judgment eluded from such proceeding shall be
considered as fair and just for all to uphold the rights and liberties. Thus, this concept reflects

3
a close connection between the legal system and the moral principles. Hence, now it can be
told that this moral justice (i.e., the natural justice and its principles) is essentially considered
as the backbone of the judicial process. Here, the expressions natural justice and legal justice
do not present as a watertight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be
secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this purpose, natural justice is
called in aid of legal justice.

But, interestingly, in spite of this kind of striking manoeuvre, the principles of natural justice
are not codified cannons, but instead of this, such principles are still considered as a postulate
which is introduced in the legal system by the judges. Actually, the principles of natural
justice have developed with the growth of civilisation, and the content thereof is often
considered as a proper measure of the level of civilisation and rule of law prevailing in the
community. They are the principles which are ingrained in the conscience of the human
beings. Justice is based substantially on natural ideas and values which are universal. What
particular form of natural justice should be implied and what its extent should be in a given
case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case and the
framework of the statute under which an action is taken. So, the expression „natural justice‟
has been interpreted to cover several rules of equity and fair play and is sometimes also
referred to as „substantial justice‟, „universal justice‟ and „fair play in action‟.

According to Aristotle, law inspired by reason is the natural law and whenever the general
preposition of legal law is found to work hardship to a particular case, equity must be applied
to mitigate and rectify the harshness. It‟s the natural law that provides the frame work of
principles and it is left to the legal law to supply flesh and blood to the legal system.

In the article, “ARISTOTLE, NATURAL LAW, and the FOUNDERS”, Michael Pakaluk
of Ave Maria University confers Aristotle‟s view regarding the definition of government, as
follows, -

“Aristotle says, that „a government where the laws alone should prevail would be the
kingdom of God.‟ This indeed shows that this great philosopher had much admiration
of such a government.”1

By incorporating such statement, Professor Michael Pakaluk wants to say that Aristotle, the
father of philosophy, at that time continuously preferred to introduce the proper meaning of

1
Michael Pakaluk, “ARISTOTLE, NATURAL LAW and the FOUNDERS”, available at
http://www.nlnrac.org/classical/aristotle last seen on 06.12.2017.

4
law to govern a state. In that case, he preferred the natural law and natural justice to subsume
the equity for delivering any judgment, -

“By „natural justice‟, Aristotle understood an equality (typically a proportionate

equality) that would be justified, ultimately, by appeal to something other than an
agreement or decision….”2

So, by and large the above, we can say that the natural justice is a legal philosophy used in
the determination of just or fair processes in legal proceedings. The principles of natural
justice imposes a code of fair procedure, including the right to be given a fair hearing and the
right to have a decision made by an unbiased decision-maker. The notion of natural justice
has developed as a common law concept; an obligation to provide a minimum level of
fairness when an individual‟s rights are affected in any of a broad range of factual scenarios.
The principles of natural justice have come out from the need of man to protect him from the
excesses of organized power.

2
Ibid.

5
 ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF NATURAL JUSTICE

It is said that principles of natural justice is of very early origin and was known to Greek and
Romans. The Principles were acknowledged as early as in the days of Adam and of
Kautilya‟s Arthashastra. In many cases, the expression of “Dharma” had similarity with
the principles of natural justice. In the Bible also, when Adam & Eve ate the fruit of
knowledge, which was forbidden by God, the latter did not pass sentence on Adam before he
was called upon to defend himself. Same thing was repeated in case of Eve.

In the ancient time, all powers of a state including executive, legislative and judiciary power
were maintained by the king. Hence, the development in the all spheres of these powers was
just in the hand of the king. State was nourished by the discretion of the king. So, king‟s
personality, cleverness, intelligence, kindness and brainpower were played very important
role for increasing the size and regime of the state. In that case, the support of the common
people was also necessary to hold that kind of big State for a king. If the king could not hold
any kind of cleverness, intelligence, kindness, brainpower and personality, the people support
was not there. Therefore, the king was bound to reform or create the code of law to maintain
peace as well as uniformity of the State.

In ancient India, although the concept of “Dharma” was there from very beginning, but
Emperor Ashoka was furnished such concept with the moral ideas of Buddhism. He made a
lot of rules in his edicts. But, among them, some rules are important which contain this idea
that what should be the nature of justice. To define that, Ashoka showed great concern for
fairness in the exercise of justice, caution and tolerance in the application of sentences, and
regularly pardoned prisoners, -

“It is my desire that there should be uniformity in law and uniformity in sentencing. I
even go this far, to grant a three-day stay for those in prison who have been tried and
sentenced to death. During this time their relatives can make appeals to have the
prisoners' lives spared. If there is none to appeal on their behalf, the prisoners can
give gifts in order to make merit for the next world, or observe fasts.”3

3
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edicts_of_Ashoka last seen on 06.12.2017.

6
 “In the twenty-six years since my coronation prisoners have been given amnesty on
twenty-five occasions.”4

Similarly, the great Babylonian king Hammurabi also wrote regarding the obligations of
officials that, - “a judge who reaches an incorrect decision is to be fined and removed from
the bench permanently.”5 So, undoubtedly, it can be said that the principles of natural justice
is not a new concept. Besides, we can also say that it is also not a concept which has been
made by the human beings. It is that kind of concept which has been derived from our core
moral conscience.

Later, the concept was more furnished by Aristotle. He reasonably told about the application
of the natural justice. Although he never talked against the monarch formation of a king, yet
he wanted to reform the mode of justice at that time with inclusion of the political
philosophy. In that case, Aristotle‟s works, “Nicomachean Ethics” and “The Politics”
illustrate the close link between legal and political philosophy.

In “Nicomachean Ethics”, Aristotle argued that law supports a virtuous existence, advances
the lives of individuals and promotes the „perfect community‟. He proposed people should
employ practical wisdom or active reason in order to behave in a way that is consistent with a
virtuous existence. Aristotle defined justice as a state of mind that encourages man to perform
just actions.

In “The Politics”, Aristotle proposed the law should function to promote the „perfect
community‟. For Aristotle, the ideal political entity was a polis or city state ruled by a balance
of tyranny and democracy, a combination which creates the most stable state. Aristotle also
suggested people are „political animals‟ and are naturally suited for life in a city state. So, to
promote them, fair procedure is necessary in the judicial system.

Aristotle‟s view as to the principles of natural justice was later more equipped by the other
philosophers so that it became more acceptable to the modern democratic situation.

4
Ibid.
5
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_of_Hammurabi last seen on 04.12.2017.

7
 PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE

The principles of natural justice can be said to be the principles or rules of fair play. Natural
justice is a concept of common law and represents higher procedural principles
developed by the courts, which every judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative agency
must follow while taking any decision adversely affecting the rights of a private
individual. Natural justice implies fairness, equity and equality. While the term natural justice
is often retained as a general concept, it has largely been replaced and extended by the
general duty to act fairly. The principles of natural justice concern procedural fairness and
ensure a fair decision is reached by an objective decision maker. The opportunity to be heard
by an impartial decision maker is the heart of the rules of natural justice and procedural
fairness. Maintaining procedural fairness protects the rights of individuals and enhances
public confidence in the process. The principles of natural justice were derived from the
Romans who believed that some legal principles were natural or self-evident and did not
require a statutory basis. Generally no provision is found in any statute for the application of
the principles of natural justice. Hence, the implementation of the principles of natural justice
is totally depended on the discretion of the Court. Then, the question then arises as to whether
the adjudicating authority is bound to follow the principles of natural justice. The answer of
this question is said by the Supreme Court of India, in Manohar S/o. Manikrao Anchal v.
State of Maharashtra and others6, as follows, -

The adjudicatory process essentially has to be in consonance with the principle of

natural justice, including the doctrine of audi alteram partem, i.e., no one should be
condemned unheard and the another doctrine of nemo debet esse judex in propria
causa sua, i.e., no one should be a judge in his own cause, and recording the reasoned
decision are the basic elements of natural justice.

So, even though there is no strait jacket formula in application of the natural justice, but the
principles of natural justice are very much essential in the judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative system to prevent such authorities from doing injustice. However, justifying
this writing, we can divided the principles of natural justice into two categories, -

1. Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua (i.e., no one should be made a judge in his
own cause); and
2. Audi alteram partem (i.e., no one should be condemned unheard).
6
AIR 2013.

7
These principles are those rules or principles which have been laid down by the Courts as
being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure
that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making
an order affecting those rights. These principles are introduced to halt the misusing of power
which is vested to their respective bodies or authorities. In other words, administrative
authorities, ministers, public officers, local government authorities, judges and so on are
expected to observe the principles of natural justice whenever they act judicially. In Kesar
Enterprises Ltd. v. State of U.P.,7 it has been held by the Court that the aim of the rules of
natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice.

7
AIR 2011.

8
 THE RULE AGAINST BIAS

The principles of rule against bias is based on or derived from a Latin maxim, “nemo debet
esse judex in propria causa sua”, which means, “no one should be made a judge in his own
cause”. This principle is one of the two pillars of natural justice. The principal requirement of
this rule is that the person who judges - whether he is a judge or an administrative authority-
should be impartial and free from any kind of bias. He cannot adjudicate a cause in which he
himself has any kind of interest. It is only if he is neutral that he can decide the matter
objectively.

This object should be required not only for upholding the unbiased or impartial form of the
judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority, but also for endorsing or sustaining the
just form of such authorities. If a judge or adjudicating authority is biased either in favour of
one party or against the other, he cannot be expected to do justice in the matter. Such a person
is disqualified from adjudicating and since such proceedings stand vitiated, any decision
taken by him is liable to be set aside.

To explicate the importance or significance of the requirement of this principle in the judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative system, Professor M.P. Jain says, -

“The reason of underlying this rule is that bias being a mental condition there are
serious difficulties in the path of proving on a balance of probabilities that a person
required to act judicially was in fact biased. Bias is the result of an attitude of mind
leading to a predisposition towards an issue. Bias may arise unconsciously. It is not
necessary to prove existence of bias in fact, what is necessary is to apply the test – what
will reasonable person think about the matter? Further, justice should not only be done
but seem to be done. Therefore, the existence of actual bias is irrelevant. What is
relevant is the impression which a reasonable man has of the administration of
justice.”8

8
Prof. U.P.D. Kesari & Dr. Aditya Kesari, “LECTURES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW”, Twentieth Edition,
2014, pp. 178. See M.P. Jain, “Evolving Indian Administrative Law”, pp. 78.

9
  Kinds of bias:

Bias is usually of three kinds:

1. Pecuniary bias;
2. Personal bias;
3. Bias as to subject-matters.
1. Pecuniary bias: Pecuniary bias is one of the essential kinds of the rule against bias. A
series of consistent decisions in English Courts have laid down the rule that the
pecuniary interest, howsoever small, will invalidate the proceedings. Judicial approach
is unanimous and decisive on the point that any financial interest, howsoever small it
may be, would vitiate administrative action. The disqualification will not be avoided by
non-participation of the biased member in the proceedings if he was present when the
decision was reached. So, a great eagerness is there in the mind of the English judges
against the pecuniary interest, because, such interest, howsoever slight, is considered as
a good ground to invalidate the whole proceeding.
We can understand such principle in a better sense by the Dimes v.
Grand Junction Canal9 case. Such case is still considered as a crucial as well as
pertinent instance of the pecuniary bias. In this case the appellant was engaged in
prolonged litigations against the respondent company. Against a decree passed by the
V.C. Dimes he appealed before the Lord Chancellor, who gave a decision against him.
It later came to knowledge of the appellant that Lord Chancellor had a share in the
respondent company. In appeal, their Lordships of House of Lords held that though
Lord Chancellor forgot to mention about the interest in the company by mere
inadvertence, yet the interest was sufficient to invalidate the decision given by the Lord
Chancellor. The Indian Courts also invariably followed the decision in Dimes’ case.

2. Personal bias: Personal bias is also an important kind of the rule against bias.
Basically, personal bias has always been matter of judicial interpretation. It can be
claimed that no other type of bias came for judicial scrutiny as much as this type at
least for a full century. In the other words, personal bias can also be responsible to
invalidate a whole proceeding. Such kind of bias mainly arises from a certain

9
1852 3 HLR 759.

10
 relationship or from the growing dependability of the human relations. This bias can be
of two types, -
a. Where the presiding officer has formed the opinion without finally completing
the proceeding;
b. Where he is interest in one of the parties either directly as a party or indirectly as
being related to one of the parties.
We can decipher such principle through a suitable case. In Manek Lal v. Prem
Chand10, the respondent had filed a complaint of professional misconduct against
Manek Lal who was an advocate of Rajasthan High Court. The Chief Justice of the
High Court appointed bar council tribunal to enquiry into the alleged misconduct of the
petitioner. The tribunal consisted of the Chairman who had earlier represented the
respondent in a case. He was a senior advocate and was once the Advocate - General of
the State. The Supreme Court held the view that even though Chairman had no
personal contact with his client and did not remember that he had appeared on his
behalf in certain proceedings, and there was no real likelihood of bias, yet he was
disqualified to conduct the enquiry. He was disqualified on the ground that justice not
only be done but must appear to be done to the litigating public. Here, actual proof of
prejudice was not necessary. Reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of such
kind of bias is sufficient.

3. Bias as to subject-matters: Bias as to the subject-matters is also an ineluctable kind of

bias in the rule against bias. It is also a principle by which a whole proceeding can be
invalidated. In this principle, a judge may have a bias in the subject-matter which
means that he is himself a party, or has some direct connection with the litigation, so as
to constitute a legal interest. In that case, the smallest legal interest shall disqualify the
judge. Therefore, the members of legal or other body, who had taken part in
promulgating an order or regulation, cannot afterwards sit for adjudication of a matter
arising out of such order, because, they become disqualified on the ground of bias.
We can comprehend this principle by a case. In Andhra Scientific Co. Ltd. v.
Sheshagiri Rao and another11, an inquiry was conducted by the General Manager of a
factory against some workmen. The Managing Director took over the inquiry in the

10
AIR 1957.
11
AIR 1967.

11
matter at a later stage, when it became necessary to examine the General Manager as a
witness and decided the case. The Managing Director himself produced the evidence
actively for the purpose of security or conclusion against the workmen. Further,
General Manager and Managing Director, though both were different persons, yet
constituted in substance practically one entity and gave the decision. The Court held
that the inquiry officers were disqualified to hold the enquiry as it was a clear violation
of the rule against bias.

12
 THE RULE OF HEARING

The rule of hearing is basically based on a Latin maxim, “audi alteram partem”, that means,
“no one should be condemned unheard”. This principle is the second and an important
principle of the natural justice. Audi alteram partem is the basic concept of the principles of
natural justice. It means that both sides must be heard before passing any order. It signifies
that no man can be condemned without a hearing. It is a fundamental principle of natural
justice that before an order is passed against a person, he should be given an opportunity to be
heard in the matter. The application of this principle is not confined to judicial process strictly
so-called but it takes within its sweep all quasi-judicial functions and to certain extent even
administrative acts. To give every citizen a fair hearing is just as much a canon of good legal
procedure. In Union of India v. T.R. Verma12, Justice Venkataraman Aiyar also observed:

“Rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing
all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be
taken in his presence and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining
the witnesses, examined by the party and that no materials should be relied on against
him without his being given an opportunity of examining them”.

So, this principle is applied to the all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative actions to
ensure fair play and justice to affected persons. However, the doctrine is not the cure to all
ills in the process. Its application depends upon the factual matrix to improve the judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative efficiency, expediency and to mete out justice. The
procedure adopted must be just and fair.

 Kinds of the rule of audi alteram partem:

The maxim, “audi alteram partem”, has many facts. Two of them are:

1. Notice;
2. Hearing.

1. Notice: It is an accepted principle that notice must be given to the party or parties
before the proceedings start. If it is not served to the party, the whole proceeding can be
12
AIR 1957.

13
 invalidated. Basically, notice is the starting point of any hearing. Because, unless a
person knows the formulation of subjects and issues involved in the case, he cannot
defend himself. And if any one party in a proceeding cannot defend himself, it is strictly
against the rules of natural justice. Hence, in Vikramaditya Jain v. Union of India and
others13, the Court has been observed that the notice must be given to the party before
the proceedings start.

2. Hearing: Under Indian law, the requirement of hearing is an essential aspect of judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings. Any order passed by the judicial or
quasi-judicial or administrative authority without reasonable opportunity of being heard
is illegal and must be set aside. According to such principle, in Mahadayal Prem
Chandra v. Commercial Tax Officer14, when the Sales Tax Officer depended entirely
on the advice of his senior and assessed the appellant without showing him the senior‟s
opinion and giving him an opportunity to state his point of view against the same, the
Supreme Court quashed the assessment proceeding.

 Exceptions of the rule of hearing:

There are some exceptions of the rule of hearing (i.e., audi alteram partem). They are as
follows, -

a. Where the functions of the authority is policy oriented;

b. Where the functions of the agency concerned are held to be administrative or
discretionary;
c. Where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the
taking of prompt action, specially action of a preventive remedial nature;
d. Where disclosure of relevant information to the party affected would be prejudicial to
the public interests.

13
AIR 1999.
14
AIR 1956.

14
 DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE IN INDIA

The rules of natural justice are neither fixed nor formally prescribed in any code. They are
better known than described. They are easier proclaimed than defined. These principles
ensure that the decisions of the public authorities are not only fair, but are also seen to be fair.
Fair play is ahead of public policy, lining all administrative procedure. The aim of natural
justice rules is to secure justice, and to prevent miscarriage of justice.
Such delineation of the application of the principles of natural justice is just same in the
Indian judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. In maximum time, the
implementation of the principles of natural justice is depended on the discretion of the Court.
Although, there are some provisions in the Indian Constitution as well as in some Acts for
enacting such rules, but still such rules are considered as the “judge-made” or the “judge-
determined” notions. In India, there are several cases by which these principles have been
enforced in the Indian scenario, as follows, -

1. In Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education)

Higher Secondary School15, the appellant party Rattan Lal Sharma was appointed
Principal of a co-educational higher secondary school in Datarpur in district
Hoshiarpur (Punjab). The appearing respondent has constituted three members
Managing Committee of the school. One of the members of the Committee was the
teacher-representative Maru Ram. The Managing Committee served on the applicant
a charge-sheet containing twelve charges including a charge looked by the said
teacher member of the Committee in respect of certain financial irregularities. The
Committee held an inquiry; and the said teacher member deposed against the
appellant in support of the charge of financial irregularity leveled by him; and then
ignoring the participation of the appellant participated is the deliberation of the
Committee as well. The Committee found the Charges including that of the financial
irregularity established; and took follow-up action, dismissing the appellant. The same
was confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner and affirmed by the Commissioner. The
appellant protested; and moved the Supreme Court by a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution. He submitted that the inquiry conducted by the Managing
Committee was vitiated, and action taken by the Committee and appointed by the
Commissioner to the proposed punishment was bad in law as being violative of the

15
AIR 1993.

15
 principles of natural justice, and by being bias practised by the teacher a member of
the Committee also by the Committee. The respondent submitted that the impugned
action was administrative and so was its summary approval without any proceeding
by the Commissioner. It was further submitted that the action in the instant case was
administrative; and the rules of natural justice did not apply. No bias could be
attributed to any of the respondents. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal with costs
against the appearing respondent. In that case, the Supreme Court also observed that
the rules of natural justice were foundational and fundamental concepts of law, which
are considered a part of the legal and judicial system.

2. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India16, the petitioner Kraipak and others with him were
the Gazetted officers in the Forest Department of the Jammu and Kashmir
Government. They desired to be selected for the newly constituted Indian Forest
Service under the Indian Administrative Service Act, 1951. They could not be
selected for the said service due to serious irregularities practised in the selections.
Consequently, they challenged the recommendations of the Union Public Service
Commission, and the follow-up action of the Government of India on such
recommendations. They contended that the procedure adopted for the selection was
unfair and biased. On the other hand, the respondent Union of India disputed the
allegation of bias and urged that nothing unusual happened to the prejudice of the
appellants. Further, it contended that the selection process was purely administrative
and the rules of natural justice had no application whatsoever. The Supreme Court
rejected the respondents‟ contentions; and held that although the selection proceedings
were administrative, the rules of natural justice applied.

3. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India17, the petitioner was issued a passport on June
1, 1976 under the Passport Act, 1967. On the 4th of July 1977, the petitioner received
a letter dated 2nd July, 1977, from the Regional Passport Officer Delhi intimating to
her that it was decided by the Government of India to impound her passport under
Section 10(3) (c) of the Passport Act, 1967 "in public interest". The petitioner was
required to surrender her passport within 7 days from the receipt of that letter. The
petitioner immediately addressed a letter to the Regional Passport Officer requesting

16
AIR 1970.
17
AIR 1978.

16
 him to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons for making the order as provided in
Section 10(5). A reply was sent by the Government of India, Ministry of External
Affairs on 6th July, 1977 stating inter alia that the Government decided "in the
interest of the general public" not to furnish her copy of the statement of reasons for
the making of the order. Aggrieved by it, she filed a writ petition challenging the act
of the Passport authorities, and also challenging the validity of Section 10(3) (c) that it
was against Articles 14, 19(1) (a), 19(1) (g) and 21. The Supreme Court in this case
gave a judgement in favour of Maneka Gandhi and stated several rules to support the
application of the principles of natural justice. The important rules are as follows, -

a. In this case, Justice Bhagwati observed: “The fundamental rights represent the basic
values cherished by the people of this country since the Vedic times and they are
calculated to protect the dignity of the individual and create conditions in which every
human being can develop his personality to the fullest extent. They weave a “pattern of
guarantee” on the basic structure of human rights, and impose negative obligations on
the State not to encroach on individual liberty in its various dimensions.”
b. Article 21 protects the right of life and personal liberty of citizen not only from the
executive action but from the legislative action also.
c. The expression „personal liberty‟ in Article 21 is of widest amplitude and it covers a
variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them
have raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional protection
under Article 19.
d. Section 10(3) (c) was violative of Article 21 since it did not prescribe „procedure‟
within the meaning of that Article 21. Section 10(3) (c) was violative of Articles 19(1)
(a) and 19(1) (g) since it imposed reasonable restrictions.
e. The Passport authority did not follow the principles of the natural justice in issuing
orders against Maneka Gandhi. They had not followed “audi alteram partem”. They
simply tried to avoid under the pretext of „public interest‟. But they did not show what
public interest is going to be protected by impounding the passport of Maneka Gandhi.
If the public interest was a real one, they might have disclosed it in the order itself.
f. Thus the administrative procedure should generally conform to the rules of natural
justice. In case an administrative action should affect the private interests, rights,
freedoms and personal liberty, or is otherwise adjudicatory in character the obligation
to act judicially in accordance with “procedure established by law‟ and in the

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 absence of the statutory procedure in accordance with „due process‟, adherence to
rules of natural justice is simply unavoidable. Thus, subsequently, such rule is being
followed by the judiciary and the quasi-judiciary bodies alone with the administrative
bodies.

4. In State of Madras v. V.G. Row18, the Government of the State of Madras, acting
under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1908, issued a notification, and dated 10
March, 1950, declaring the Society an unlawful association. The notification stated:
“Whereas in the opinion of the State Government the Association has for its
object interference with the administration of law and the maintenance of law
and order, and constitutes a danger to the public order.” The notification was not
served; and the Secretary of the Society or any other persons associated with that
body was not given any opportunity of warning before the order was passed.
Following the Gazette publication of the notification the office of the Society was
searched articles lying therein was seized and its funds forfeited. The membership of
the Society was made an offence. The Society could, if it liked, make a representation
against the action taken and then the government could make a reference to an
advisory board. There was no provision for any inquiry or hearing before the passing
of the order. The Secretary of Society challenged the order alleging that it denied him
the freedom of association under Articles 19(1) (c) and 19(4); and contended that the
Act and the order were void for putting unreasonable restrictions on the freedom. The
Supreme Court, as did the Madras High Court, declared the impugned statutory
provision, and with it the notification void under Articles 19(1) (c) and 19(4). Chief
Justice Sastri observed, -

“….the vesting of authority in the executive Government to impose restrictions….

without allowing grounds of such imposition, both in their factual and legal aspects,
to be tested in a judicial inquiry, is a strong element which….must be taken into
account in judging the reasonableness of the restrictions….on the exercise of the
fundamental right….no summary and what is bound to be a largely one sided review
by an advisory board even where its verdict is binding on the Executive government
can be substituted for a judicial inquiry. The formula of subjective satisfaction of the

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AIR 1952.

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 government….with an Advisory Board thrown in to review the materials on which the
government seeks to override a basic freedom….may occur as reasonable only in very
exceptional circumstances and within the narrowest limits, and cannot receive judicial
approval as a general pattern of reasonable restrictions….”

Apart from the above cases, there are various cases in India by which the principles of natural
justice have been enforced. So, in the Indian scenario, the rules of natural justice should be
followed. The non-observance of the rules of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man;
and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. The
parameter of natural justice in any particular case must depend upon the nature of the right
affected, the scheme and policy of the given statute, circumstances of the case as also the
nature of power jurisdiction of the administrative authority.

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 CONCLUSION

To sum up, one finds that initially the principles of natural justice used to be applied to courts
of law alone but later on from judicial sphere it extended, to the tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial functions and then to the statutory authorities and the administrative authorities, who
have upon them, the responsibility of determining the rights, liberties and obligations of the
people. In normal conditions, an action or a decision, - judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative, is affecting the rights of an individual is unthinkable. In the present day,
without affording hearing by an unbiased and impartial authority that must act objectively
and must also give out his mind, as to what weighed in decision making process, by
incorporating reasons to support the decision or, to say so, by giving a speaking order. This is
necessary for a society, which is governed by Rule of law; and the principles of natural
justice promote the notion of the Rule of Law. How substantive laws are applied and rights
are determined is a question not less important, to say it again, the principles of -natural
justice are great humanizing principles intended to invest law with fairness to secure justice
and to prevent miscarriage of justice.

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 Bibliography

Books:

1. M.C. Jain Kagzi. “The Indian Administrative Law”. Universal Law Publishing. 2016.
2. Prof. U.P.D. Kesari & Dr. Aditya Kesari. “LECTURES ON ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW”. Central Law Publications. 2014.

Articles:

1. Bernard Yack. “Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice”. Political

Theory, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 216-237. Sage Publications, Inc.
2. Kannan Srinivasan. “The Supreme Court and Its Chief”. Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 1/2 (Jan. 3-10, 1987), pp. 23-25.
3. B. A. Hepple & B. A. H. “Natural Justice”. The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 27,
No. 1 (Apr., 1969), pp. 13-16. Cambridge University Press on behalf of Editorial
Committee of the Cambridge Law Journal.
4. Hari Nair. “Interpreting 'Natural Justice'”. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 46,
No. 39 (SEPTEMBER 24-30, 2011), pp. 4-5.

Website-sources:

1. Michael Pakaluk, “ARISTOTLE, NATURAL LAW and the FOUNDERS”, available at

http://www.nlnrac.org/classical/aristotle last seen on 06.12.2017.
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edicts_of_Ashoka last seen on 06.12.2017.
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_of_Hammurabi last seen on 04.12.2017.

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