Fedor Benevich, University of Edinburgh, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language

Sciences, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, Fe-
[email protected]

This is the accepted manuscript. The published version contains some minor
changes. For referencing, please use the published version exclusively.

A Case Study in Arabic Doxography: Šahrastānī’s Account of

Pythagoras and its Ismāʿīlī Background

Abstract

The Arabic scholarly tradition produced several doxographies and gnomologies of Ancient Greek
thought in Arabic language. In this paper, I will focus on al-Šahrastānī’s (d. 548/1153), al-Milal wa-l-
niḥal (Religions and Sects). Despite the popularity of the work and the scholarly attention it attracted,
the final evaluation of Šahrastānī’s doxography in terms of its method and sources still remains a
desideratum. I will avoid the generalizations inherent in the previous characterizations of the work.
Instead, I will focus on the chapter on Pythagoras, carefully reading it sentence by sentence,
attentively considering the philosophical import of each passage alongside its potential sources as
well as the traces of (and reasons for) Šahrastānī’s reworking them. I will argue that Šahrastānī
provides a systematic reconstruction of Pythagorean philosophy on the basis of the quotations and
paraphrases from previous doxographies and of what he considers as contemporary
Pythagoreanism (i.e. Ismāʿīlīsm). Religions and Sects will reveal itself both as a source for the Greek
philosophical tradition and as a source of information on the Arabic philosophical tradition as such.

Keywords

Šahrastānī – Pythagoreanism – post-Avicennian philosophy – Ismāʿīlīsm – Neoplatonism

Philosophers and historians of philosophy have always considered Arabic medieval philo-
sophical tradition as an important source for Ancient Greek philosophy. This approach to
Arabic philosophy has its beginning as early as Latin scholasticism, when translations from
Arabic into Latin provided access to Ancient philosophical texts that were not accessible to
medieval Europeans in their original Greek. Looking at contemporary scholarship, a similar
situation is apparent. Scholars’ interest in Arabic philosophy in the twentieth century flour-
ished mainly due to the so-called “Greek into Arabic” studies, focusing on the editions of
the Arabic translations of Greek philosophical texts produced in the course of the famous
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 2

Greco-Arabic translation movement. As some of these texts are not extent in Greek, the
Arabic scholarly tradition provided access either to hitherto unknown sources of Greek phi-
losophy or to additional information on the Greek philosophical tradition. One could men-
tion as examples of this merit to the Arabic philosophical tradition the Arabic translation of
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De providentia (lost in Greek) or Dimitri Gutas’ use of the Arabic
text for the new critical edition of Theophrastus’ Greek On First Principles.1
Next to the translation of entire philosophical treatises, the Greco-Arabic translation
movement produced several doxographies and gnomologies of Ancient Greek thought in
Arabic language. Four of them have already gained prominence: the Aetius Arabus, being the
Arabic translation of Ps.-Plutarch’s Placita philosophorum (henceforth PP); the doxography of
Ps.-Ammonius (henceforth PA); the compendium Ṣiwān al-ḥikma, to which we nowadays
have only partial access through later redactions (henceforth ṢḤ); and the voluminous dox-
ography of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Šahrastānī (d. 548/1153), al-Milal wa-l-niḥal (Re-
ligions and Sects).2 In this paper, I will focus on Šahrastānī’s doxography.
Šahrastānī’s Religions and Sects is later than the other three doxographies. Šahrastānī
composed it at the very beginning of the so-called “post-Avicennian period” when Arabic
philosophy has just become a mature, independent phenomenon. Thus, Šahrastānī presents
Greek philosophy from the position of his own developed intellectual tradition. In contrast,
the Arabic Ps.-Plutarch, Ps.-Ammonius, and the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma were produced in the course
of what one might rather call the formative period of Arabic philosophy – that is, in the
period before Avicenna (d. 428/1037) when Arabic falsafa is mostly characterized as primari-
ly adapting and reworking the Greek philosophical heritage.
Šahrastānī’s Religions and Sects attracted the attention of both medieval and contempo-
rary scholars. As Daniel Gimaret and Josef van Ess write, we have clear signs that the work
was exceptionally popular in Arabic Middle Ages: no less than seven accessible manuscripts
date back to the first fifty years after Šahrastānī’s death in 548/1153 – and there is a luxuri-
ous copy that was presented to Sultan Mehmet II (d. 888/1483) personally.3 The amount of
modern and editions and translations is also impressive for a work from the Arabic intellec-
tual tradition. Three editions were available to me: William Cureton (1864), Muḥammad
Badrān (1955), and Muḥammad Kīlānī (1961).4 The book was translated into Persian and Ot-

1
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Traité de la Providence; Theophrastus, On First Principles.
2
Daiber, Aetius Arabus; Rudolph, Die Doxographie des Pseudo-Ammonius; Dunlop, Muntaḫab Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma; for
bibliographical information on al-Milal wa-l-niḥal see fn. 4–6.
3
Gimaret, “Introduction,” 24–25; van Ess, Der Eine und das Andere, 864.
4
Unfortunately, none of them is completely reliable, and the text still awaits proper critical edition. Hence-
forth I will refer to Badrān’s edition (2nd edition in two volumes) as RS.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 3

toman in the Early Modern period.5 Several translations were also made into European lan-
guages. The first part of the book, about Muslim confessions, was translated by A. K. Kazi
and J. G. Flynn (English), Jean Claude Vadet (French), and Stanislav Prozorov (Russian), all in
the same year 1984; Carmela Baffioni translated the part about Greek philosophers into Ital-
ian. In addition, there are two translations of the work in its entirety: a nineteenth century
German translation by Theodor Haarbrücker and a more recent French translation by Dan-
iel Gimaret, Jean Jolivet, and Guy Monnot in 1986–1993. The latter translation was produced
under the aegis of the UNESCO and remains the most detailed and accurate study of the Reli-
gions and Sects until today.6
Despite the popularity of the work and the scholarly attention it attracted, the final
evaluation of Šahrastānī’s doxography in terms of its method and sources still remains a
desideratum. Previous studies are often rather general in character. Van Ess refers to the
earlier judgement of Hamilton Gibb that Šahrastānī offers us “den Anfang einer objektiven
vergleichenden Religionswissenschaft”7 and concludes on his own behalf that the Religions
and Sects are “ein ernstzunehmender Versuch, aus islamischer Sicht eine Geschichte der
antiken Philosophie zu schreiben.”8 Gutas, in a recent characterization, disagrees with
Baffioni’s appraisal of the work and her “lending of greater credibility” to it by himself de-
scribing Religions and Sects as “a markedly tendentious compilation.” Gutas continues: “[T]he
value to be attached to those parts of it which preserve material not extant elsewhere is to
be assessed only after al-Šahrastānī’s editorial intrusions and alterations have been thor-
oughly studied on the basis of a comparison of other passages with his sources that have
survived.”9 Similarly, Everett Rowson, in his introduction to al-ʿĀmirī’s Kitāb al-Amad, de-
scribes Šahrastānī’s method in a rather bitter voice, asserting that Šahrastānī “paraphrases
his source, sometimes radically, omits and condenses material, and occasionally expands
freely on a point.”10 Anna Izdebska, in a recent paper, characterizes Šahrastānī’s method as
“chaotic.” The Religions and Sects are “a selection from different sources of information col-
lected without much in the way of critical historical and philosophical evaluation.”11 Final-
ly, Jean Jolivet offers a more nuanced study of Šahrastānī’s method in the part of Religions

5
Van Ess, Der Eine und das Andere, 864.
6
Muslim Sects and Divisions (tr. Kazi); Les dissidences de l’Islam (tr. Vadet); Kniga o religijach i sektach (tr. Prozorov);
Baffioni, „Una ‘storia della filosofia greca’;” Livre des religions et des sectes (tr. Gimaret, Monnot, and Jolivet).
7
Van Ess, Der Eine und das Andere, 865.
8
Van Ess, Der Eine und das Andere, 872.
9
Gutas, „Popular Ethics, Practical Politics,” 670.
10
Rowson, A Muslim Philosopher on The Soul and Its Fate, 48.
11
Izdebska, “The Pythagorean Metaphysics of Numbers,” 370–371.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 4

and Sects devoted to Greek philosophy. Jolivet makes several very important observations,
such as Šahrastānī’s attempt to always follow the same structure in his presentation (biog-
raphy – theology – physics) or Šahrastānī’s view of the Greek philosophers from the per-
spective of theological issues like divine unity and free will. Jolivet also observes Šah-
rastānī’s use of earlier doxographies such as Ps.-Plutarch, the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma, and Ps.-
Ammonius, and judges that he puts too little thought into making the compilation of their
accounts compatible. Granting to Šahrastānī that he has certain grasp of the doctrines he
presents, Jolivet generally dismisses Šahrastānī’s “history of philosophy” as chronologically
confused and historically unreliable. Jolivet finishes by stating that Šahrastānī has a
“manière” of writing rather than a proper method.12
Following Gutas’ suggestion, in this paper, I will readdress the issue of Šahrastānī’s
method and sources. Only after a careful analysis of Šahrastānī’s modus operandi as a doxog-
rapher we are able to evaluate the merit of his Religions and Sects – and ask: Can we use it for
reconstructing otherwise inaccessible materials of Greek philosophy? Can we use it for re-
constructing spurious materials from earlier doxographies? If not, what else is the value of
this influential work?
In order to respond to these and similar questions, I will avoid the generalizations in-
herent in previous characterizations. Instead, I will suggest to focus on one particular chap-
ter from Šahrastānī’s œuvre, carefully reading it sentence by sentence, attentively consid-
ering the philosophical import of each passage alongside its potential sources as well as the
traces of (and reasons for) Šahrastānī’s reworking them. Although this approach will not
provide us with a picture of Šahrastānī as a doxographer in his whole work, we will gain a
more secure vision of his method and sources at least for one section of his work, thereby
providing a starting point for characterizing Šahrastānī’s doxography in other sections, so
that, after all or more parts have been considered, one might be able to formulate a general
judgment.
For the sake of this case study, I decided to choose the chapter on Pythagoras from the
second part of the Religions and Sects. Pythagoras always occupied a specifically legendary
position in the history of Ancient philosophy. In Late Antiquity, he was elevated to a level of
a quasi-saint from the side of Greek philosophy.13 Arabic doxographies see him as the sec-
ond beginning of the Greek philosophical tradition (obviously, next to Thales). 14 Since An-
tiquity, Pythagoras got mixed up with later Pythagoreans, and since Late Antiquity also

12
Jolivet, “Introduction,” 14–38.
13
O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived, 214.
14
ṢḤ 4.11–12.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 5

with Neoplatonism. Thus, for Šahrastānī, Pythagorean philosophy is rather recent and
somewhat alive, especially when compared to the philosophies of, for instance, Thales and
Empedocles. On the other hand, it is not as alive as Peripatetic (or Neoplatonic) mainstream
of the Arabic falsafa in the centuries before Šahrastānī. Pythagoras thus has a unique posi-
tion for Šahrastānī and it should be interesting to see how he deals with the complicated
situation around his heritage.
I shall analyze Šahrastānī’s account of Pythagoras in three steps. The first section situ-
ates the chapter on Pythagoras within the Religions and Sects and gives a brief outline of its
structure. The second section addresses the question how Šahrastānī uses previous dox-
ographies and how he attempts to clarify and rework the texts at his disposal. In the third
section, I shall specifically focus on Neoplatonic, Avicennist, and, most importantly, the
Ismāʿīlī background of Šahrastānī’s presentation of Pythagoras. As a result, I will argue that
Šahrastānī provides a systematic reconstruction of Pythagorean philosophy on the basis of
what he considers as contemporary Pythagoreanism (i.e. Ismāʿīlīsm).

1 The Section on Pythagoras: Place and Structure

Šahrastānī’s Religions and Sects consist of two major parts. These two parts correspond to the
twofold division of historical figures that Šahrastānī suggests in the first introduction to the
book. The first are the people of scriptural religions (ahl al-diyānāt wa-l-milal), such as the
Manicheans, Jews, Christians, and Muslims. The second are the people of “arbitrary beliefs”
(ahl al-ahwāʾ wa-l-niḥal or al-ārāʾ), as Jolivet and Gimaret render them. To these belong Greek
philosophers and their Arabic followers (known in the Arabic tradition under the general
title falāsifa) as well as the materialist dahriyya group, the Sabians (who venerate stars and
idols), and Indian philosophers (RS I.20.7–13). The criterion of this division is clear. The first
group considers religions that possess a scripture on whose authority they rely in under-
standing the nature of God and the world. The second group contains people that try to
grasp the reality based on their own reasoning alone. The title of the work corresponds to
those two groups: “religions” (milal) stand for the former group, “sects” (niḥal) for the lat-
ter.15
Van Ess has already described Šahrastānī’s secretarial numerical method of dividing Re-
ligions and Sects into sections and subsections.16 Hence, let us directly focus on the second
section of the second book, which is devoted to falsafa alone. This section includes:

15
More on the origins of this title and the notions of milal and niḥal see Gimaret, “Introduction,” 11–13.
16
Van Ess, Der Eine und das Andere, 871–879.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 6

(1) “The pillars of philosophy” (asāṭīn al-ḥikma),17 which are the Seven Sages
(2) “The principle philosophers” (al-ḥukamāʾ al-uṣūl [sic!])18
(3) The moderns (mutaʾaḫḫirūn)
(4) The philosophers of Islam that followed Greek philosophical role-model
(here Šahrastānī focuses exclusively on Avicenna)

According to Jolivet, these four groups ought to be reduced to three by combining the sec-
ond and the third group under the label of “original philosophers” or “the subsequent phi-
losophers.”19 Yet, in contrast to Jolivet’s suggestion, it seems more in line with Šahrastānī’s
own perspective to emphasize the close relation between the first and the second group. In
the introduction to the sub-section on the Seven Sages, for instance, Šahrastānī does not
regard it as necessary to draw a strict distinction between the Seven Sages and the repre-
sentatives of the second group, “who followed them” (RS II.65). Instead, he draws a dividing
line between the second and the third group – and this dividing line is Aristotle.
Šahrastānī clearly states that he is going to discuss “Aristotle and those who followed
him” in the third section (RS II.128.3). Still, the list of the names might surprise us. Apart
from true Aristotelians, such as Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Themistius,
we find names, such as Alexander the Great, Diogenes, the “Greek Sage” (the title for Arabic
Plotinus), Porphyry, and Proclus. But I do not think we should worry about this list too
much. If we carefully consider these names, leaving aside our contemporary understanding
of them, we can appreciate Šahrastānī’s logic. Alexander the Great famously was Aristotle’s
pupil. Even though the ethical rulings, which the tradition of gnomologia ascribes to him,
have nothing to do with Peripatetic philosophy, Alexander the Great still may be considered
as an “Aristotelian.”20 Diogenes, according to a famed anecdote, met Alexander, and Šah-
rastānī emphasizes their close relation, by occasionally mentioning the conversations be-
tween Alexander and Diogenes in his chapter on Diogenes (RS II.150–151). The application
of the label “Peripatetics” to the Neoplatonic philosophers Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus
could also be explained if we recall the whole story of the Arabic Plotinus, known mostly as

17
On this title see Jolivet, “Introduction,” 16.
18
On this title see Jolivet, “Introduction,” 18, most probably going back to the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma.
19
Cf. Jolivet, “Introduction,” 20 and 29. Jolivet mostly focuses on the special place of the Seven Sages among all
other philosophers and he fails to recognize any reasons for the division between “the principle philosophers”
and “the moderns.”
20
On these ethical rulings see de Fouchécour, Moralia, 69–73; see also Livre des religions et des sectes, vol. 2, 318 fn
1.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 7

the Theology of Aristotle, the importance of Porphyry’s logical Introduction to the Aristotelian
Organon, and the Arabic Proclus with both the Liber de causis and the defense of the world’s
eternity against the Christian Philoponus. As far as I am aware there did not exist any clear
differentiation between Peripateticism and Neoplatonism – common to our contemporary
understanding – within Arabic philosophy, at least at this time and this region.
Thus, Šahrastānī’s rationale for providing three groups in the history of Greek philoso-
phy is rather as follows: first come the “pillars of philosophy,” viz. the Seven Sages; and last
come the followers of Aristotle. In between these two, then, Šahrastānī opens a mixed bag
for everyone who is not covered by the two other groups: Plutarch, Democritus, Hippocra-
tes, Zeno, and others. Now, where does Pythagoras belong? Given our contemporary under-
standing of the list of the Seven Sages, one might expect to find Pythagoras in the second
group. As discussed in detail by Jolivet and Rowson, however, the lists of the Seven Sages
found in Arabic doxographic materials differ significantly from the list that we have nowa-
days. Accordingly, Šahrastānī mentions the following figures: Thales, Anaxagoras, Anaxim-
enes, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. This list corresponds to the one provided
by al-ʿĀmirī (as well as to what probably was their common source: Ps.-Ammonius and the
Ṣiwān al-ḥikma)21 and is not intended to mention the traditional Seven Sages of the Greek
literate tradition but rather to identify the most famous and most authoritative Greek phi-
losophers before Aristotle – and Pythagoras is one of them.22
I have divided the chapter on Pythagoras in the following sections (page and line num-
bers after the second volume of Badrān’s edition):

(1) 78.8–13: Biographical material. Pythagoras is reported to live at the time of

David. He also had personal mystical experience of the higher worlds.

21
Jolivet, “Introduction”, 15–16; Rowson, A Muslim Philosopher on The Soul and Its Fate, 47.
22
Much ink could be spilled on the connections and parallels which Šahrastānī draws between the Seven Sag-
es. One point that is relevant for the structure of the whole book is that at least some of them (for instance,
Empedocles, Pythagoras, and, through him, Socrates) are reported to be connected to the Abrahamic prophet-
ical tradition due to their acquaintance either with David or Solomon. Consequently, the distinction between
the first part and the second part Religions and Sects – i.e. between revelation and reason – is not as strict as
someone might have thought, at least with regard to early Greek philosophy; cf. RS II.72 (Empedocles) and
II.78 (Pythagoras). As noted by Jolivet, this idea is common in Christian apologetic literature, cf. Eusebius,
Praeparatio, 9.6.6.3–8.3. Second, one can easily recognize reoccurring doctrinal elements throughout the first
chapters on the Seven Sages. For instance, Šahrastānī likes to interpret Thales, Anaxagoras, and Anaximenes
as insisting on the doctrine of the unity of the prime matter (RS II.68, 70, 72). Moreover, all the Seven Sages are
said to advocate some sort of a Neoplatonic emanative system. In other words, Šahrastānī tries to formulate a
uniform tradition of pre-Aristotelian philosophy in the sections devoted to the Seven Sages.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 8

(2) 78.14–79.7: God is One in a specific sense. We cannot grasp divine essence;
it is beyond any attributes. Every creature understands God in terms of His
effects that it can observe in itself.
(3) 79.8–80.6: Three ways of dividing oneness in correspondence with emana-
tion hierarchy:
[A] (1) non-acquired: God; (2) acquired: everything else.
[B] (1) before eternity: God; (2) in eternity: First Intellect; (3) after eternity
but before time: Universal Soul; (4) in time: worldly creatures.
[C] (1) per se: God; (2) per accidens: (2a) principle of number not among
numbers and the numbered: Active Intellect; (2b) principle of number and
among numbers and the numbered: (2b-i) ones are its parts: numbers
themselves; (2b-ii) oneness is its attribute: the numbered being qua one:
numbers, genus, species, individual.
(4) 80.6–9: Oneness always accompanies existence. Everything existent has a
rank of existence in accordance with its closeness to oneness.
(5) 80.10–12: Numbers are immaterial separate forms.
(6) 80.12–15: Numbers are principles of existents which God creates as first.
The first among them is the one.
(7) 80.15–82.4: Mathematical section. Pythagoras is ambiguous on whether
one is a number or not. Numerological interpretations of numbers. The
theory of tetrad (1+2+3+4=10).
(8) 82.5–83.5: Correspondence between numbers and the stages of emanation.
[A] One corresponds to God, two to the First Intellect, three to Soul, four to
Nature. Everything else is composed out of them. Seven is elements plus
intellect plus soul; Ten is the Intellect plus the nine souls of the nine
spheres.
[B] One may also take the matter as one. Then everything is traceable to
the effects of soul (reason and power), intellect (guidance), and matter
(one).
(9) 83.6–20: Different kinds of principles. According to Pythagoras himself,
geometrical combinations and numeric proportions are principles as well.
According to some Pythagoreans, [A] precisely these geometrical propor-
tions are the principles; [B] letters that correspond to numbers are the
principles (Šahrastānī disagrees); [C] dimensions are the principle of bod-
ies.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 9

(10) 83.21–84.13: Epistemology. Relation between intellect, knowledge, opinion

and sense perception. A quotation from Avicenna, in order to explain this
relation and its correspondence to mathematical values.
(11) 84.14–85.5: The hierarchy of worlds. The higher world is full of simple
melodies. The lower world is its “residue” and consists of compound mel-
odies. The light from the higher world penetrates into the lower and keeps
it stable.
(12) 85.6–11: Psychology and ethics. Microcosm theory. Human corresponds to
the whole world. Human goal is to turn back to the highest world.
Through the refrainment of character, one may achieve the understand-
ing of the whole world.
(13) 85.12–86.3: Ethics. Souls consist of numerical and musical combinations.
That is why they get excited or thoughtless when we listen to music.
Through ethical refrainment and abstaining from the corporeal, souls ac-
tualize their harmonic perfection that was only potentially there in the
first place. The refrainment of character happens through following the
religious law (al-šarīʿa).
(14) 86.3–7: Summary. According to Pythagoras, everything consists of mathe-
matical combinations. Šahrastānī disagrees.
(15) 86.8–22: Impact-digression (1). Zeno and Chrysippus followed Pythagoras
in everything other than on the theory of soul.
(16) 86.23–87.3: Eschatology. The world also is in the process of return and will
come to an end when it reaches its final cause.
(17) 87.4–88.8: Impact-digression (2). Heraclitus, Hipassos, and certain other
unknown figures were Pythagoreans. The doctrines of Epicurus and
Democritus (without mentioning that they were Pythagoreans).
(18) 88.9–89.4: Ethical rulings. One should ascend to the higher world, in order
to overcome corruption and oblivion. One should follow the guidance of
intellect; it is the divine guidance. Pythagoras says of himself that he saw
the higher world.

These eighteen sections may be summarized in the following manner: First, Šahrastānī pro-
vides some biographical material and a depiction of Pythagoras as an ancient sage (1). Sec-
ond, he offers a chunk of theology (2). Third, he offers several sections describing the ema-
native hierarchy and the principles of being (3–9). Fourth, Šahrastānī passes on to present
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 10

Pythagoras’ theory of soul, hierarchies of worlds and a microcosm theory as well as the eth-
ical ideas that are based on it. Hierarchies of worlds are presented here no longer as a cos-
mological theory but as a means to establish the parallel between the soul and the world,
and to explain the process of “return” for souls (10–13). Then Šahrastānī sums up the gist of
the Pythagorean doctrine that everything is composed of mathematical objects and evalu-
ates it (14).
The rest of the chapter is somewhat confusing. There are two digressions that appar-
ently are supposed to present Pythagoras’ pupils, although Epicurus and Democritus are not
even claimed to be Pythagoreans (15 and 17). These two digressions are interrupted in the
middle with Pythagoras’ explanation of the perishing of the world on the basis of its being
also in the process of return (16). At last, the chapter ends with Pythagoras’ own claim that
he has observed the higher world of simple melodies through spiritual experience and with
his advice to other people to follow his example of obeying to the guidance of intellect (18).
Jolivet, in his introduction to the translation of the second part of Religions and Sects,
suggests that Šahrastānī usually follows the same systematic pattern in his presentation of
different philosophers: biography, theology, and physics or cosmology (with the latter
sometimes being more or less closely related to metaphysics, depending on the philosopher
in question). Jolivet adds that Šahrastānī still follows the same pattern when he presents
the doctrines of Aristotle and Avicenna at more length, and that Šahrastānī might owe this
pattern to his engagement with Avicenna’s Salvation (al-Naǧāt).23 Indeed, Jolivet’s structure
partially corresponds to the one we have just observed in the chapter on Pythagoras. How-
ever, it is in fact Šahrastānī himself who provides us with a clear systematic pattern that
corresponds even better to the main sections of the chapter on Pythagoras just identified
above. In his introduction to the section on falsafa, Šahrastānī writes:

Their falsafa-discussions focus on stating the unity of God the Exalted, how He
knows originated beings, and [then discussing] creation and the generation of
the world, and what the first principles are and how many they are, and what
the return (al-maʿād) is and when it happens. (RS II.65.7–9)

It is evident that Šahrastānī follows precisely this pattern when he presents Pythagoras’
philosophy. Jolivet’s claim that Šahrastānī owes this pattern to his engagement with Avi-
cenna’s Salvation is not convincing. Even though Avicenna’s Salvation has certain structural

23
Jolivet, “Introduction,” 36.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 11

familiarity with Šahrastānī’s pattern, it differs in other crucial respects. Avicenna, for ex-
ample, never discusses theology in the beginning. He puts psychology in the natural philos-
ophy part before theology and not after theology, as Šahrastānī presents it. Jolivet omits the
“return” part from the structure which he ascribes to Šahrastānī. However, the “return”
part is important, because it provides, together with the sections on theology, metaphysics,
and emanation, the typical Neoplatonic circle of the “precession and return” (al-mabdaʿa
wa-l-maʿād): first, Pythagoras’ theology; then, God’s creation of the world down to humans,
going through the level of first principles; and then, humans’ ability to reverse this process
through ethical refinement, in order to return to God. Hence, my hypothesis is that Šah-
rastānī follows the Neoplatonic pattern of the “procession and return”, instead of taking
Avicenna’s Salvation as his direct model. The obvious similarities between Avicenna and
Šahrastānī are explained simply by Avicenna partial adherence to the very same structure,
ending his metaphysics with a section on the “return.”24
I would like to end this section with the following observation. It is in any case remark-
able that Šahrastānī consciously provides a clearly defined systematic structure for the
chapters of his book. We have seen a similar situation when we were looking for the place of
Pythagoras in the whole project. There, again, Šahrastānī had clear distinctions between
different groupings of philosophers and theologians in mind. In structuring both the whole
book and individual chapters, Šahrastānī follows an explicit route that explains what he is
doing and why he is doing it. In the introduction of the whole book, he explains why he dis-
tinguishes between “religions” and “sects;” in the introduction to the second part, he ex-
plains the criteria for distinguishing between different stages in the history of philosophy;
in the introduction to the chapter on falsafa, he explains how he is going to proceed system-
atically in every chapter.
Consequently, in reading Religions and Sects, we are being confronted with a doxogra-
pher who has put quite some thought into his work and who is perfectly conscious of what
he is doing and of why he is doing it – even if his presentation may not always correspond
to our own expectations regarding the history of ancient philosophy.

2 Šahrastānī’s Doxographical Sources and His Approach to Them

Jolivet correctly identified that many of the sections listed above have direct correspond-
ences with Šahrastānī’s three main sources: the Arabic translation of Placita philosophorum

24
Cf. e.g. Avicenna, Healing, Metaphysics IX.1, 299 and X.1, 358.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 12

by Ps.-Plutarch, the early Arabic doxography by Ps.-Ammonius, and the later doxography
Ṣiwān al-ḥikma, to which Šahrastānī probably had access in its full form.25

a. Direct Quotations

When we look at how Šahrastānī deals with the doxographical material, one can see that he
sometimes, indeed, quotes it almost literally. This is particularly true of the last passage of
section (18) above but on the whole pertains to the entire chapter:

He said: whoever is such that there are multiple stages between him and his
Senior, is in the deficient rank of service. If body requires the governance of na-
ture for the sake of its well-being, nature requires the governance of soul for the
sake of completing its actions, and soul requires the rightful guidance of intel-
lect for the sake of choosing the best (and there is no beginning beyond the in-
tellect which would not be the divine guidance), then whoever seeks recourse by
the sound mind in the totality of [his] operations ought to observe [this begin-
ning] through the wisdom of being satisfied with his Senior. In contrast, follow-
ing the desires of body and being observant to the compulsions of nature, which
are lethal for the appetites of the soul, … is far from his Senior and is deficient in
his level. (RS II.88.21–89.4)

This is a literal quotation from the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma (cf. ṢḤ 8.26–9.5, §10), where the same
thought is also ascribed to Pythagoras, although it is not placed there in a distinct section
on Pythagoras but within the section devoted to Socrates.
In the section on the hierarchy of worlds (11), the first and the third passage almost lit-
erally correspond to the account of Ps.-Ammonius:

Er äußerte ferner: Diese Welt ist aus Someone26 also reports about Pythag-
den einfachen geistigen Melodien und oras that the world is composed out
den geistigen Zahlen gebildet und hat of simple spiritual melodies. One
von ihnen ihr Gepräge. Und weiter mentions that spiritual numbers are
sagte er: Die geistigen Zahlen sind not discontinuous. Rather they are

25
See footnotes in Livre des religions et des sectes, vol. 2, 201–212.
26
From here on, I highlight in bold the literal correspondences between Šahrastānī and his sources. I quote
Rudolph’s and Daiber’s German translations. All English translations, unless notified otherwise, are mine.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 13

nicht trennbar, sondern Zahlen, die united numbers that are divided from
eine Einheit bilden, teilbar zwar vom the side of the intellect yet not divid-
Intellekt aber unteilbar von Seiten der ed from the side of senses. (RS
Sinne. (PA XIV.7–8, 51.7–9) II.84.14–16)

(Ferner) äußerte er: Diese Welten sind Every world is below the first in rank.
unzählbar und wetteifern miteinan- Worlds have different degrees of
der in der Schönheit, Pracht und beauty, splendor, and rank. [85] The
Freude. Dabei steht jede Welt unter- last one is the burden of the worlds,
halb der ersten; die letzte aber ist nur their residue and their dust. That is
der Bodensatz der ersten Welt und ein why it is not properly assembled, nor
Überschuss von ihr, so dass nicht is the form properly united with mat-
mehr übrigbleibt außer Last, die sich ter. Every part of it can be separated
vervielfacht und sich weder verbin- from any other part; still, there is
den noch eine Einheit bilden kann. some little light in it from the first
Allerdings ist in ihr noch ein wenig light. Due to that light a kind of stabil-
Licht vom ersten Licht vorhanden, ity may be found in it. If there were
Jenes Licht ist es, was jenen Körper no that [light] then it would not be
festhält. Wäre jenes wenige Licht stable even for a single moment. That
nicht vorhanden, so bleibe jener Kör- rare light is the body of soul and in-
per nicht einen Augenblich bestehen. tellect which bares both of them in
Jenes wenige Licht aber ist der Fein- this world. (RS II.84.23–85.5)
körper der Seele und des Intellekts,
der sie beide in dieser Welt trägt. (PA
XIV.13–17, 52.4–9)

In both passages, Šahrastānī almost literally quotes his source, sometimes omitting some
insignificant wording or changing the order of sentences. The same procedure also applies
to the beginning of the section on the imperceptibility of God (2):

Er ist für den Intellekt und die Seele He can be perceived neither in terms
nicht zu erkennen. (Denn) Er steht of intellect nor in terms of soul. Intel-
über den hohen geistigen Attributen, lectual cognition cannot perceive
unerkennbar von Seinem Wesen her. Him, nor can the reasoning of soul
Vielmehr erfasst Ihn jede der Welten attribute [anything] to Him. He is
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 14

nur nach Maßgabe seiner Werke, die above any spiritual attributes. He is
in ihr zutage treten, so dass sie Ihn not perceptible [79] in terms of His
darstellt und beschreibt gemäß jenem essence. He can only be perceived in
in ihr sichtbaren Werk. (PA XIV.4–6, terms of His effects, creations, and
51.2–6) acts. Every world perceives Him to
the extent of the effects which mani-
fest His creation in it, so that it as-
cribes features and attributes to Him
to the extent that is specific for [this
world] in terms of His creation. (RS
II.78.15–79.2)

Again, Šahrastānī literally quotes his source. Here, instead of omitting sentences, he adds
some. These however are limited to alternative formulations of the same thought. Interest-
ingly, Šahrastānī uses this approach only with the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma and Ps.-Ammonius but
never with Ps.-Plutarch. Šahrastānī never quotes any significant amount of material from
Ps.-Plutarch. The only case when we can suspect him slavishly following Ps.-Plutarch is, in
fact, section (17), one of the two impact-digressions. As it has been correctly suggested by
Jolivet, the only reason why Šahrastānī adds information on Hippocrates, Hyppasos, Em-
pedocles, and Democritus into the chapter on Pythagoras is that in Ps.-Plutarch these sec-
tions immediately follow upon the section on Pythagoras (cf. PP 102–103).27 The same ap-
plies to the presence of the first impact-digression (15) and the very end of the second one
(17), where Zoroastrians and Indians are also said to be followers of Pythagoras (RS II.88.3–
8). Here, Šahrastānī adopts a similar logic when he reads Ps.-Ammonius (PA XVI–XVII, 55–
62). Zoroastrians and Indians are explicitly explained to be the followers of Pythagoras, but
Zeno and Chrysippus are not (PA XVII, 60–62). Yet, Šahrastānī may have inferred that they
are Pythagoreans because their section immediately follows upon that of Pythagoras.
Moreover, even the sequence of exposition in Ps.-Ammonius explains why Šahrastānī inter-
rupts his exposition of ethics and the “return,” and includes a digression on Pythagoras’
followers. Ps.-Ammonius, for instance, does the same (PA XVI.1–4, 55.5–10). Thus, the pres-
ence and the structure of the impact-digressions could be explained without difficulty
through Šahrastānī’s slavish adherence to his sources.

27
Jolivet, “Introduction,” 35.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 15

b. Paraphrases

Even though Šahrastānī sometimes copies the material from his doxographical sources
without any significant change, we can easily see that his preferred procedure is to para-
phrase (rather than quote). Šahrastānī is not just a compilator of different sources but a
thoughtful historian of philosophy actively creating his own vision of Greek philosophy.
Sometimes his paraphrases are harmless. In these cases, Šahrastānī tries to make better
sense – or to create a better story – out of his text. This applies for instance to the biograph-
ical material. In the following example, Šahrastānī takes inspiration on the biographical
material from the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma and on the evaluative judgement from Ps.-Ammonius:

One also mentioned that philosophy The view of Pythagoras, son of Mnes-
had a different beginning which is archus, from the people of Samos.
Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, from
the people of Samos. (ṢḤ 4.11–12)

Another one to whom wisdom was He lived at the time of Salomon, the
ascribed was Pythagoras. In Egypt, he prophet, son of David, may peace be
visited the companions of Salomon, upon him. He did take the wisdom
the son of David, may peace be upon from the source of prophecy.
him, when they arrived there from
the Levant. (ṢḤ 5.19–21)

Die Lehre des Pythagoras, des Weisen He is a noble sage (al-ḥakīm), and he
aus Samos, entsprach nicht (bloßer) has solid view and calm mind. (RS
Meinung, sondern geistiger Einsicht II.78.6–10)
in die Welten und das, was sich in
ihnen befindet. Seine Weisheit zeigte
sich in Italien. (PA XIV.1–2, 50.13–
51.1)

As can be seen here, Šahrastānī actively engages with his sources and assembles his account
of Pythagoras’ life from both the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma and Ps.-Ammonius. He omits the idea from
the Ṣiwān that Pythagoras can be labelled as the second beginning of philosophy but he uses
the information that connects Pythagoras with Salomon. Šahrastānī, however, does not
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 16

explicitly say that Pythagoras studied with Salomon and his companions, as the Ṣiwān al-
ḥikma does. As a result, his account also differs from that provided by al-ʿĀmirī, who, deal-
ing with the same source, emphasizes that Pythagoras studied with the Jewish wise.28 Still,
Šahrastānī is ready to grant the ideological gist of this story emphasizing that Pythagoras
acquired his wisdom from the “source (maʿdan al-nubuwwa) of prophecy.” This is also the
conclusion that al-ʿĀmirī draws: “[Pythagoras] claimed that he had acquired these sciences
from the niche of prophecy (miškāt al-nubuwwa)” – note the difference in terminology!29 Šah-
rastānī’s reluctance to portray Pythagoras as a student of Salomon could be explained
through the account of Ps.-Ammonius. There, Pythagoras is reported to have lived in Italy
(and not in Egypt). Faced with contradicting information in his sources, Šahrastānī appar-
ently decided to play safe, omitting both the information about Pythagoras’ life in Italy and
in Egypt while still emphasizing Pythagoras’ connection to the prophetic tradition.
The evaluation of Pythagoras personality is a thoughtful reworking as well. Ps.-
Ammonius praises Pythagoras for not having adopted mere opinions and for having ac-
quired his knowledge through direct observation of the higher worlds. This is reminiscent
of the traditional Platonic division between doxa and epistêmê. Šahrastānī however lives in
the post-Avicennian era of Arabic philosophy: nobody can claim epistêmê unless one also
provides demonstrations (as opposed to Platonic epistêmê for which one needs to observe
the higher world of Platonic Forms). Apparently, then, Šahrastānī is not ready to grant full
epistêmê to Pythagoras; he just had a very “solid” kind of doxa.
Šahrastānī shows the same approach to his doxographical sources on many other occa-
sions. Consider, for instance, the section on the microcosm (12):

Und er lehrte gleichfalls: Der Mensch He mentioned that the human being
ist die ganze Welt (im Kleinen). Wer in terms of his nature stands in corre-
seine Seele und seinen Leib richtig spondence to the whole world. It is a
formt, so dass er beide in den rechten microcosm; and the world is macro-
Zustand versetzt, der hat erkannt, human. For this reason his share in
woraus die Welt besteht und wie sie the intellect became more abundant.
komponiert ist, Wer hingegen die Whoever improves the setting up (ta-
Seele und seinen Leib vernachlässigt qwīm) of his soul and the refinement
und nicht auf sie achtet, ist nicht im- of his character (tahḏīb aḫlāqihī) and
stande, diese Welt und die Art, wie sie the purification of his states can

28
al-ʿĀmirī, al-Amad ʿalā l-abad 3.3, 71.
29
Ibid. 71.13.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 17

gebildet ist, zu erkennen. (PA XIV.20– achieve the cognition of the world
24, 53.16–54.3) and the modalities of its composition.
Yet whoever loses his own soul and
does not stay by its good in terms of
refrainment or setting up, departs
from the numbering of numbers and
the numbered, and loosens himself
from the [harmonious] tights of
measures and the measured; he gets
lost and neglected. (RS II.85.6–85.11)

The passage from the Religions and Sects obviously is a paraphrase of the text of Ps.-
Ammonius. Šahrastānī borrows the description of human as a microcosm from his doxo-
graphical source. His text however is a rather free paraphrase. One may notice for instance
a philosophically significant change from one text to the other when ethical conclusions are
drawn from the theory of microcosm. Ps.-Ammonius’ Pythagoras recommends refining
both our souls and our bodies in order to achieve perfection. Šahrastānī’s Pythagoras com-
pletely neglects the corporeal side of refinement. We should only care about our souls. This
innovation that Šahrastānī brings into his paraphrase is far from being an innocent inter-
jection into an ethical theory. Such a change reveals that Šahrastānī is consciously working
on the content of his sources. This time, he probably wants to bring Pythagoras in line with
the traditional intellectualist ethics of Neoplatonism.
On the whole, this is Šahrastānī’s main approach to his underlying doxographical
sources. He takes the basic information from them and systematically reworks it. We have
seen above that Šahrastānī quotes the beginning of the section (2) on the imperceptibility
of God almost without any change. However, his account of this Pythagorean doctrine is not
confined to mere quotation in its entirety:

Vielmehr erfasst Ihn jede der Welten Every world perceives Him to the ex-
nur nach Maßgabe seiner Werke, die tent of the effects which manifest His
in ihr zutage treten, so dass sie Ihn creation in it, so that it ascribes fea-
darstellt und beschreibt gemäß jenem tures and attributes to Him to the
in ihr sichtbaren Werk. (PA XIV.6, extent that is specific for [this world]
51.5–6) in terms of His creation. Existents in
the spiritual world are specified
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 18

through specific spiritual effects and

hence they ascribe features to Him
from the perspective of those effects.
Existents in the corporeal world are
however specified through specific
corporeal effects and hence they as-
cribe to Him features from the per-
spective of those effects. We do not
doubt that the guidance [to reasoning
about the Creator] is [limited] for an-
imals by the extent of effects for
which animals have natural propensi-
ty (ǧubila). And the guidance for hu-
mans is [limited] by the extent of ef-
fects for which humans are naturally
disposed (fuṭira). Everyone ascribes to
Him attributes from the perspective
of themselves and sanctify Him de-
parting from their specific attributes.
(RS II.89.1–7)

Šahrastānī first just reports the idea taken from Ps.-Ammonius that every world perceives
God in terms of the effects that it observes in itself as coming from God. Then, however, he
expands on this doctrine at length. Šahrastānī explains which worlds Pythagoras meant in
this quotation. There is the spiritual world and the corporeal world. Those that belong to
the corporeal world (animals) tend to conceive of God in terms of what they find in them-
selves as created by Him. The same applies to those who belong to the spiritual world (hu-
mans). Every species has its own natural disposition of how it conceives of God. Corporeal
beings ascribe corporeal attributes to God, whereas spiritual beings are capable of under-
standing Him as a spiritual entity. Šahrastānī simultaneously explains what the quotation in
Ps.-Ammonius is supposed to mean and formulates a hidden criticism against anthropo-
morphists. They do not understand that the way in which they conceive of God is just lim-
ited to the analogical reasoning they employ on the basis of their own attributes. In reality,
though, none of these attributes grasps the essence of God.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 19

Another striking example for Šahrastānī’s periphrastic method of explication, interpo-

lation, and correction is the second passage from the last ethical section (18):

Außerdem lehrte er: Alle Schönheit, He said: whatever in this world has a
die in dieser Welt besteht – denn es little amount of beauty is due to its
gibt doch Schönes in ihr –, ist eine being caused by nature. Whichever
Wirkung der Natur, Die Natur (also) worlds are above it are more splendid,
muss mitsamt den Formen, die in ihr nobler and more beautiful, until the
sind, schöner, prächtiger, vornehmer description arrives at the world of
und edler sein; und gleiches gilt auch soul and intellect and [then] it stands
für all das, was die Natur bindet. Was still, since no reason can describe
sich aber bei der Seele befindet, muss whatever is in them in terms of nobil-
wiederum (noch) edler, schöner, vor- ity, generosity, beauty, and splendor.
nehmer, und prachtvoller sein. Und Nevertheless you should strive and
ebenso ist auch das, was sich bei der attempt to connect to that world, in
Ursache befindet, schöner und vor- order that your remaining and perpe-
nehmer als jenes bei der Wirkung, bis tuity becomes continuous, after you
man schließlich zu der Ursache ge- dismiss corruption and oblivion.
langt, die Ursache ist, ohne über sich [Then] you get to the world which is
eine (weitere) Ursache zu haben. all beauty, all splendor, all joy, all
Wenn dem aber so ist, soll euer Trach- might and truth. Your joy and your
ten und Bemühen in dieser Welt da- please then will be perpetual without
rauf gerichtet sein, euch mit der Ers- interruptions. (RS II.88.14–20)
ten Ursache, welche die Ursache eu-
rer Ursache ist, zu vereinigen, so dass
euch, nachdem ihr vor dem verder-
ben und Vergehen in Sicherheit seid,
Bestehen und Fortdauer lange zutei-
len werden, ihr die Welt der wahren
Schönheit, der wahren Freude und
der wahren Hoheit erreicht und eure
Freude und eure Wonnen für immer
fortgesetzt und ununterbrochen sein
werden. (PA XVI.7–11, 55.13–56.8)
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 20

Both texts might seem to be very similar at the first glance. Both say that the only beauty
we find in this world comes from Nature. If one looks up, away from Nature to the higher
hypostases of the Soul and the Intellect, then one finds them even more beautiful and joy-
ful. Hence, the ethical conclusion is that we should try to unite with higher worlds, thereby
acquiring stability and perpetuity against the corruptibility of this world. Yet, there is a
significant difference between Šahrastānī and Ps.-Ammonius. The latter urges us to attempt
a reunion with the First Cause, i.e. to go beyond the realms of Soul and of Intellect. In com-
parison, Šahrastānī is far more humble. He does not mention the First Cause, i.e. God, at all.
At the most, we can strive to connect with the world of Intellect and Soul. Even in this re-
gard, Šahrastānī’s Pythagoras is more pessimist than that of his source. He dwells on the
idea of the imperceptibility of God from section (2) and now expands it on the level of both
the Intellect and the Soul. Ps.-Ammonius mentions with no word that the world of Intellect
and Soul might be inaccessible for our understanding.

c. Supplying Sources

Irrespective of whether Šahrastānī only had clarity in his mind – as probably in sections (2)
and (11) – or whether he, finding his source unconvincing, intentionally wanted to change
the sense of the presented doctrine – as in sections (12) and (18) – in all these cases he still
only paraphrases the text without using further sources. There are however several cases
where his method is different again. This primarily applies to section (6) and to the lengthy
mathematical commentary on it in the section (7):

He believed that the principles that He said: the principle of existents is

God – may He be exalted – created number and it is the first that the
first are numbers. (ṢḤ 4.12–13, §2) Creator – may He be exalted – has
Er war der Meinung, dass die Prinzi- created. The first among numbers is
pien die Zahlen sind. (PP I.3.8, 100.13– one.
14)
Er rechnete die Eins und die Zwei,
welche unbegrenzt ist, unter die Prin-
zipien. (PP I.3.8, 100.16)

Die Natur der Zahl laufe auf die Zehn [A] He has different views on whether
hinaus; denn bei allen Griechen und [one] belongs to numbers or not – as
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 21

bei allen Barbaren laufe die Zahl auf it was mentioned above – and he
die Zehn hinaus; und dann, wenn sie mostly tends to [say] that it does not
zu ihr (der Zehn) gelangen, kehren sie belong to numbers, and that numbers
zu der Eins zurück. Ferner behauptet begin with two.
er, dass die potentielle Zehn auch in [B] He says: [number] is divided into
der Vier und in den Viererzahlen ist. odd and even. The first simple num-
Die Ursache davon sei: wenn die Zah- ber is two. The first simple even num-
len von eins bis vier zusammenkom- ber is four. It may be divided into
men, wird die Zahl Zehn vollständig. equal [parts]. He did not make two an
Denn es wird, wenn eins und zwei even number, since if it were divided,
zusammengezählt werden und wenn that would be into ones, and one
dann zu diesem drei und zu der dar- would be among numbers. We begin
aus entstandenen Summe vier hinzu- numbers by two and even numbers is
gefügt wird, die Zehn vollständig. So one of their divisions, how can they
wie (folgendes gilt): die Zahl ist ent- be the same as [numbers]? The first
weder in Bezug auf die Eins in der simple odd number is three. He said:
Zehn oder durch die Zwei in der Vier; The division is thus complete. What-
daher behaupten die Pythagoräer, ever is beyond this division is some
dass in der Vier ein mächtiger Eid sei. sub-division.
Sie führen diesbezüglich einen Beleg- [C] Four is the end of numbers. It is
vers von dem Dichter an, da er sagt: perfection. That is why he used to
„Nein, bei der Wahrheit des Vierfa- swear by the tetrad: “No, by the truth
chen, das unsere Seelen regiert, wel- of the tetrad – that which governs our
ches ein Ursprung der ganzen Natur souls and that which is the source
ist, die ewig fließt.“ (PP I.3.8, 100.19– (aṣl) of perfection!”
101.2) [D] Whatever is beyond this, it is ei-
ther the odd even, or the odd odd, or
the odd odd even.
He used to call five the circular num-
ber, since whenever one multiplies it
by itself, the five always comes back
again.
He used to call six the complete num-
ber, since its parts equal its whole;
and [he used to call] seven the perfect
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 22

number since it is the sum of the odd

and the even, and it is another end;
[He used to call] eight the beginning,
being composed out of two evens; and
nine [is composed] out of three odds,
and it is another end; and ten is the
sum of number from one to four and
it is another end.
There are hence four ends for num-
bers: four, seven, nine and ten. Then
we turn back to one and say: eleven
(lit. “one and ten”) and so on. The
composites which are beyond four are
of six kinds: … (RS II.80.15–83.5)

One can easily imagine what happened here. Šahrastānī was reading the text of Ps.-Plutarch
and compiled it with the account from the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma. According to both, the principles
that God creates first are numbers. Several lines later Ps.-Plutarch adds that one and two
are among the principles. Putting two and two together, Šahrastānī concludes that one ac-
cording to this account must belong to numbers. This idea apparently let Šahrastānī worry,
as he himself was convinced that one is not among the numbers but is the principle of
numbers. In the last introduction to the whole book of the Religions and Sects, Šahrastānī
focuses on demonstrating his knowledge of arithmetic and numerology, as he is going to
use it for structuring the book, “lest it should be thought that since I am a jurist and a theo-
logian, I would be a stranger to its ways and lack understanding of its significance and its
symbolism.” (RS I.39.3–4, tr. Kazi) What follows upon this, is a lengthy presentation of a
mathematical theory which largely corresponds to the account we have just seen in the
chapter on Pythagoras. This parallel is already important in itself as Šahrastānī obviously
prefers his own mathematical source both in that introduction and then in the chapter on
Pythagoras over the mathematical passage that he finds in Ps.-Plutarch. The latter passage
may have inspired Šahrastānī to include a mathematical section and to mention the Py-
thagorean oath by the tetrad, but Šahrastānī preferred to quote from a source different
from Ps.-Plutarch’s own account of numbers. An accurate comparison of two passages and
the identification of its source in mathematical writings of the time lies beyond the scope of
this paper, although it could be of considerable interest for the historians of science.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 23

Šahrastānī raises the question of whether one is a number in the introduction to the Re-
ligions and Sects as well, mentioning that there is a disagreement on this subject between
scholars. As a solution, he suggests looking at the idea of oneness from different perspec-
tives. We will see in the next section which different divisions he suggests for oneness in
the introudction as well as in the chapter on Pythagoras. Regardless of these divisions, Šah-
rastānī concludes that most scholars believe that one is the cause of numbers and not a
number itself (RS I.41.2–3). This being the case, Šahrastānī cannot but raise the problem of
whether one is a number in the beginning of section (7), given that the logic of Ps.-Plutarch
suggests that one is in fact a number for Pythagoras. As a result, Šahrastānī ascribes the
idea that one is not a number to Pythagoras, although none of his doxographical sources
mentions it.
Šahrastānī’s method in sections (6) and (7) is a clear case of trying to explain and ex-
pand on his source. Instead of quoting the text literally, Šahrastānī raises the problem of
whether one is a number and inserts a completely different, and (in his view) much clearer,
explanation of tetrad and mathematical symbolism. We find another case, where Šahrastānī
employs the very same strategy in dealing with the text of Ps.-Plutarch. This is the section
(10), on epistemology:

Ebenso gilt auch: die Seele in uns ist Among that which Pythagoras said is
aus vier Dingen zusammengesetzt, that there are four natures, and souls
nämlich dem Verstand, dem Wissen, in us are [84] four as well: intellect,
der Meinung und den Sinnesempfin- knowledge, opinion, and senses. Then
dungen. Davon kommt jedes Hand- he combined number with the num-
werk und jedes Gewerbe, und dadurch bered and the spiritual with the cor-
existieren wir selbst. So ist denn der poreal.
Verstand die Eins; der Verstand näm-
lich (kann) als Einheit gedacht wer- The Master Abū ʿAlī l-Ḥusayn ibn Sīnā
den. Denn auch wenn die Leute zahl- said: „As an example of application of
reich sind, wobei sie in verschiedenen this doctrine [that numbers are prin-
Gegenden sind, und (einen) beinahe ciples] one may say: something’s be-
täuschen –, so wissen wird doch, dass ing one is different from its being ex-
wir sie im Verstand als einen einzigen istent or being a human. It is in itself
Menschen auffassen (können) … Die prior to either. No animal occurs as
Zweierzahl aber, die nicht begrenzt animal unless the meaning of oneness
ist, wird mit einem gewissen recht through which it becomes one pre-
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 24

zum Wissen gemacht. Denn jeder Be- cedes. If there were no [oneness], its
weis und jede Überzeugung und au- existence would not be possible.
ßerdem jedes Zusammenrechnen [Oneness] is thus the noblest, the
bringt dasjenige unter den Dingen simplest, and the first. This is the
zusammen, mit denen die umstrittene form of the intellect. Intellect must be
Sache verbunden ist. Und somit ist one from this perspective. Yet
das Wissen etwas anderes, was durch knowledge is below it in rank, since it
jene Dinge bewiesen und erkannt is through the intellect and from the
wird. und deshalb wird die Zweiheit intellect. It is like two which requires
zum Wissen gemacht. Die Meinung one and comes forth from it. Likewise,
aber wird zur Dreiheit gemacht, denn knowledge depends on the intellect.
die Meinung kommt einer Gruppe zu The meaning of [the statement]
und die Drei ist eine Gruppe. (PP I.3.8, “opinion and belief are plane num-
102.5–16) bers whereas sense-perception is a
solid number” is that since plane pos-
sesses three sides, it matches the na-
ture of belief which is more general
than knowledge in rank. The reason
for it is that knowledge depends on a
certain object of knowledge whereas
belief and opinion is attracted both to
the thing and its opposite. Yet sense-
perception is more general than belief
and it is “solid” – i.e. a body which has
four sides. (RS II.83.21–84.13)

In this passage, Ps.-Plutarch’s Pythagoras is bringing in numerology into epistemology. In-

tellect, i.e. the subject of knowledge, corresponds to one; knowledge itself corresponds to
two; opinion stands for three; and Ps.-Plutarch forgets to comment on sense-perception.
Šahrastānī takes the passage from Ps.-Plutarch as a starting point but neither quotes it lit-
erally nor paraphrases its explanation of the epistemological numerology. Instead, Šah-
rastānī looks for an explanation in another source. In contrast to the mathematical section,
where Šahrastānī’s source remains unclear, here he refers us explicitly to Avicenna. As has
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 25

been correctly identified by Jolivet, the numerological explanation of the epistemological

levels is a literal quotation from Avicenna marginal comments on Aristotle’s De anima.30

d. Result

To conclude the present section, in speaking of Šahrastānī‘s stance towards other dox-
ographies as sources for his own work, one should abstain from simplified and generalized
claims about his procedure as either slavishly following his predecessors’ texts or, con-
versely, as being completely independent and voluntarist in his writing. We have seen that
Šahrastānī’s method includes three different ways of dealing with the doxographical mate-
rial. The first is, indeed, literal quotation. The second approach is paraphrasing. This ap-
proach includes two ways of dealing with the text: harmless rewording and reconstruction
without distorting the intention of the original text, on the one hand, and thorough modifi-
cation of the philosophical content of the underlying theory, on the other. Last but not
least, the third approach amount to taking inspiration from previous doxographies without
quoting any significant amount of their text. Instead Šahrastānī looks for other sources on
the same subject, either thinking that they are more reliable or more reasonable. Based on
these observations, it should be concluded that we ought to say neither that we could never
use Šahrastānī for the reconstruction of previous doxographies nor that Šahrastānī’s Reli-
gious and Sects is completely a secondary work to Ps.-Ammonius, Ps.-Plutarch, and the Ṣiwān
al-ḥikma. Instead, one is required to decide in each case specifically which line of analysis
Šahrastānī follows and how his text is to be dealt with.

3 The Neoplatonist and Ismāʿīlī Background

The striking fact about the Religions and Sects’ chapter on Pythagoras is that the sections that
have direct correspondence to previous doxographies form only half of the text. Sections
(3)–(6), (9), (13)–(14), and (16) have either no or only minimal (e.g. one or two words) corre-
spondence to the text of Ps.-Ammonius, Ps.-Plutarch, and the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma. The natural
question is what are Šahrastānī’s sources for these sections. Unfortunately, it is hardly pos-
sible to identify Šahrastānī’s direct sources for those sections. It ought to be highlighted
that I do not suggest that any of the parallel texts that I will refer to in this part of my paper

30
Avicenna, In Arist. De Anima, ed. Badawī, 116.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 26

are Šahrastānī’s direct sources. My only aim is to identify the background historical context
and doxographical reasons for including those sections in the chapter on Pythagoras.

a. Neoplatonism

Anna Izdebska argued in her recent paper on Šahrastānī’s account of Pythagoras that Šah-
rastānī’s approach is similar to that of Ps.-Ammonius. Šahrastānī intends to align Pythago-
reanism with a certain kind of creationist monotheistic Neoplatonism.31 This explanation
certainly allows us to interpret at least some lines that Šahrastānī adds to his doxographical
sources. First and foremost, this concerns Šahrastānī’s repeated idea that God has numeri-
cal correspondence with oneness in Pythagoras. This is how he starts the account of Py-
thagorean theology:

His position on metaphysics (lit. divinalia) is that the Creator is one, yet not in
the same manner as [particular] “ones”. He does not fall under number. (RS
II.87.14–15)

This passage is probably influenced by Ps.-Ammonius. There, the exposition of Pythagoras’

doctrine also starts with the statement “God is one” (PA XIV.3, 51.2). However, in calling
God “one” Šahrastānī has a bigger agenda behind him than Ps.-Ammonius, who immediate-
ly drops the topic. As mentioned in the previous section, the idea that “one” in a certain
sense does not fall under numbers, is Šahrastānī’s own preferred view which he professes in
the introduction to the whole Religions and Sects. There we find a direct correspondence to
the quoted passage:

In the first sense “being one” is a part of numbers, in the second sense it is the
cause of numbers, and in the third sense an aspect pertaining to numbers. But
none of these three meanings of one is applicable to God. God is one a way dif-
ferent from that which other things are one. (RS I.40.23–41.1, tr. Kazi)

Drawing a distinction between different senses of “being one” Šahrastānī states that in call-
ing God “one” we do not even employ the second sense – as one might have thought on the
basis of the passage from the chapter on Pythagoras alone – in which one is not a number

31
Izdebska, “The Pythagorean Metaphysics of Numbers,” 365–371.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 27

but, more precisely, the cause of numbers. Instead, God is one in a completely different,
non-mathematical sense. What is that one and where does it come from? It is quite obvious
that Šahrastānī employs here the idea of the famous God-One of Neoplatonism. He contin-
ues dwelling on it in the first division of oneness in section (3) and in the section (4):

Then he said: Oneness (waḥda) is divided into [1] oneness that is not acquired
from anything else; this is the oneness of the Creator – may He be exalted: one-
ness of the conception of everything; oneness of providential judgment about
everything; oneness from which all [particular] “ones” among existent as well as
the multiplicity in them comes forth; [2] it is also divided into oneness which is
acquired from something else; it is the oneness of creatures. (RS II.79.8–11)

Oneness cannot separate from existents. This oneness is acquired from the one-
ness of the Creator – may He be exalted – and it necessarily attaches to all exist-
ents even though they are multiple in themselves. The nobility of any existent is
tantamount to oneness in it: everything which is further afar from multiplicity
is nobler and more perfect. (RS II.80.6–9)

Both passages develop the same doctrine. God is one in a special sense. It means that He is
the source of oneness in the world. His oneness applies to His knowledge and providence:
God knows the world in one single act of conception. Indeed, oneness also applies to multi-
ple existent creatures, yet in another sense. Here oneness must go hand in hand with being
existent. All these elements strongly remind us of Neoplatonic doctrines of one and being,
even in their original version of Plotinus, at least as interpreted by Lloyd Gerson.32 The Ara-
bic Neoplatonic tradition continued the same understanding in the writings of al-Kindī:
“Since unity is accidental in all things, then, not in the true One, as we have already said.
The true One is one essentially.”33 Nonetheless, I would not go so far as to suppose any di-
rect connection between Šahrastānī’s account of Pythagoras and al-Kindī or any other Ara-
bic Neoplatonist. All the elements that we saw in sections (2), (3), and (4) that understand
God as the One in a very specific sense seem to be common-knowledge Neoplatonism and
need not any direct source.
There is another element in Šahrastānī’s report of Pythagoras that is strongly reminis-
cent of Neoplatonism: the hierarchical tetrad of emanation One – Intellect – Soul – Nature.

32
See Gerson, Plotinus.
33
al-Kindī, On First Philosophy 20.3, 54 (tr. Adamson).
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 28

It appears both in Šahrastānī’s paraphrases of Ps.-Ammonius (RS II.88.14–20, since Ps.-

Ammonius has already Neoplatonized Pythagoras himself)34 and in his own accounts that do
not have any doxographical parallels (RS II.82.5–83.5). The emanative tetrad (as opposed to
the more famous traditional Neoplatonic triad One – Intellect – Soul) is a commonplace in
Arabic Neoplatonism35 and one could easily suppose that Šahrastānī tries to interpret Py-
thagoras through the lens of Arabic Neoplatonism pursuing a systematic goal.

b. Ismāʿīlīsm

A simple Neoplatonic hypothesis does not suffice to explain other passages in the chapter.
The divisions of oneness in section (2), the correspondence between the emanative tetrad
and numbers in section (8), the use of letters in correspondence to numbers as principles in
section (9), and many other elements of Šahrastānī’s presentation of Pythagoras are far
from being a mere kind of common-knowledge Neoplatonism. We should look for another,
related though distinct, source here. My central hypothesis is that this source that informed
Šahrastānī’s conceptions is Neoplatonic Ismāʿīlīsm.
Let us first look at the section (3), for instance, the last division of oneness that it offers:

[Pythagoras] may also divide oneness in a different way. One says: Oneness is di-
vided [1] into oneness per se and [2] oneness per accidens. [1] Oneness per se be-
longs to the principle of everything alone, from which [particular] items of one-
ness in terms of numbers and the numbered come forth. [2] Oneness per accidens
is divided into [2a] the oneness of whatever is the principle of number and is not
among numbers; and [2b] into that which is the principle of number yet is
among numbers. The former is like being one of the Active Intellect, since it is
not among numbers and the numbered. The second is divided into [2b-i] that to
which [oneness] belongs as its part – since two is composed out of two ones, and
likewise every number is necessarily composed out of ones, so that so long as
the number increases, its relation to the one becomes smaller – and [2b-ii] that
to which [oneness] belongs as its necessary concomitant and not as its part,
since no number or the numbered is ever free from oneness which necessarily
attaches to it. “Two” or “three” are one in terms of their being “two” and
“three”. Likewise, the numbered among composites and simples is one either in

34
Rudolph, Die Doxographie des Pseudo-Ammonios, 208.
35
See e.g. Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 29

terms of genus, or in terms of species, or in terms of individual. For instance,

substance qua being substance without qualification, human qua being human,
and some concrete individual – such as Zayd – qua being that concrete individu-
al: [they all are respectively] one. (RS II.79.17–80.6)

Šahrastānī offers the following division of oneness in this passage on behalf of Pythagoras.
First oneness is divided into oneness per se, i.e. the oneness that occurs to its subject in vir-
tue of itself, and the oneness per accidens, i.e. the oneness that occurs to its subject in virtue
of something else, for instance, in virtue of that to which it occurs per se. We have already
seen this kind of division above as well as in al-Kindī: this is still a common idea of Neopla-
tonism that oneness belongs to God, the One, in virtue of Himself, and to everything else
through Him. Further divisions of oneness are however unusual for Neoplatonic sources.
The oneness per accidens is further divided into the oneness taken as the principle of num-
bers and that which is not the principle of numbers. These are two conceptions of the one
that Šahrastānī also mentions in the fifth introduction to the Religions and Sects on his own
behalf (RS I.40–41). Its main idea is that if we take one as the principle of numbers, the cause
of their existence, i.e. as the prime in the numerical progression of numbers ad infinitum,
then this one is not among numbers itself. We can however also take one in two other sens-
es in which it will be related to numbers, and this is [2b]. The first of them is to take one as
parts of numbers: one can divide four into four ones. The other sense of oneness relates to
the idea of unity. It belongs to everything in the world to be “one” in the sense of repre-
senting a certain unity. The unity may hold in terms of individuals (Socrates), genera (hors-
es and humans are one in being animals), species (Socrates and Plato are one in terms of
being humans). Even numbers themselves bear this kind of unity. Although four stands for
four ones in one perspective, in another perspective it still has unity as an entity “four” as
opposed to “five.”
This division of oneness presents a developed metaphysical system. The last descrip-
tion of oneness is most reminiscent of the analyses of oneness in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Δ.6,
1015b16–1017a7, and the tradition that depends on it, such as the senses of oneness in al-
Fārābī and Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī.36 However, what interests me most now is the other disjunction
that was mentioned only briefly, [2a]. In this sense, oneness is taken as the one which is the
cause of numbers. Šahrastānī says that its ontological correspondent is the Active Intellect.
This strikes me as unusual. First and foremost, should not God, the One, be the ontological

36
al-Fārābī, On one and unity; Ibn ʿAdī, Maqāla fī l-tawḥīd.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 30

correspondent of one? As God is the principle and cause of the universe, so is one the prin-
ciple of numbers. However, Šahrastānī rejects this parallel. We have seen above that he re-
fuses to parallel God to one as the principle of numbers. He said both on his own behalf in
the introduction and on behalf of Pythagoras that God is one in a sense which is beyond
even the sense of one as a principle. Here, he follows this idea: one as the principle of num-
bers is something posterior to God. It corresponds to the Active Intellect. This brings us to
the second problem about the parallel between the one as principle and the Active Intellect.
This parallel presupposes that the Active Intellect is the cause of everything in the world
and apparently the immediate outcome of God’s own creative activity. This again is very
unusual for the ontology of Active Intellect in Arabic philosophy. Usually, the Active Intel-
lect is the tenth, i.e. the last in the hierarchy of intellects. It immediately precedes the cor-
poreal world and is the source of the emanation of form, but it is not the cause of every-
thing. Instead, falsafa distinguishes between the First Intellect, which is the direct effect of
God’s creation and the Active Intellect, which is the last among the series of ten intellects.37
Šahrastānī obviously dismisses this model in the quoted passages.
In order to comprehend this extraordinary passage more fully, we need to investigate
its background and, thus, turn to Ismāʿīlī authors of the eleventh century: Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-
Kirmānī (d. ~ 411/1020) and Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow (d. 481/1088). As already described by Paul
Walker and Maria De Cillis, one of the main points of the ontological system of Kirmānī is
that the real “one” of all existents, that deserves its name, is the Intellect, which was creat-
ed (in a very special sense of the word) by God.38 It is this Intellect that has the numerical
correspondence to the one:

Creation which is the creator is the first thing whose existence is such that, if we
seek beyond it, we do not find anything for whom the name of thingness or the
name of existence is appropriate, since [the first created] is the end from which
things begin and are ranked in existence. The principle from which existents
come forth has among the rankings of existents the rank of the one among
numbers. It is the one due to its being the first among existents, such as one’s
being the first among numbers. (Kirmānī, Rāḥat al-ʿaql III.3, 179.6–11)

In this passage from his central work the Quietude of Intellect, Kirmānī describes the status of
the First Intellect. It is both the first created thing and the cause of the creation of every-

37
See e.g. Davidson, al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect.
38
Walker, Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī; De Cillis, Salvation and Destiny in Islam.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 31

thing else. God, who is beyond the First Intellect in rank, cannot be described and under-
stood in any way, not even under the notion of Creator or also of existence. Therefore “Cre-
ator” properly applies to the First Intellect. It is this First Intellect that corresponds to the
number one, since “one” has the same relation to numbers as the First Intellect to every-
thing created: it is their principle and cause. This is the traditional Ismāʿīlī doctrine that
avoids establishing any causal relationship between God and the world, and instead pur-
ports this relationship between the First Intellect and the world.39 It is evidently this doc-
trine that Šahrastānī has in mind both when he speaks on his own behalf in the introduc-
tion to the Religions and Sects and on behalf of Pythagoras in section (3): the First Intellect is
the One, God is beyond being one in every sense.40
The text which is even closer to Šahrastānī’s analysis is Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow’s Twin Wisdoms.
It contains a chapter which is fully devoted to the notion of the one and its further numero-
logical and ontological correspondences. It starts as follows:

Among the ancient philosophers and sages, Pythagoras was a master of the sci-
ence of numbers; he was the lord of arithmetic. Here is what this wise philoso-
pher had to say: “The sensory world is imagined; the order of the world rests on
number. The world has its beginning from One and that One is the world’s mak-
er who brought the multiple world forth out of One … The emergence and the
existence of numbers come by means of the number one; it is the cause of num-
ber. The meaning of number is that which can be counted, and such is this world
which is a divisible substance. Divisibility implies multiplicity; hence, the emer-
gence of a world which is quantifiable and multiple comes about by means of
the One, who is both its cause and its creator. None of the philosopher denies
that God is one. (Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow, Ǧāmiʿ 145.9–146.5, tr. Ormsby 135–36)

Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow presents a natural reading of Pythagorean theology which also stands in
correspondence with Neoplatonist theology. God is the One; He is the cause of the world
just as one is the cause of numbers. Following the inner logic of the Twin Wisdoms, Nāṣer-e
Ḫosrow does not criticize this position too harshly. However, in what follows, while pre-
senting the Ismāʿīlī view on this subject, he offers a significant modification to this system.

39
Walker, Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī, 93.
40
The fact that Šahrastānī agrees in the introduction to Kirmānī’s theology may speak in favor of his much
debated Ismāʿīlīsm (cf. Madelung, “Introduction: al-Šahrastānī, Ismāʿilism and Philosophy”).
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 32

He argues that God is not the one properly speaking. If God is not the one, who is the one
then?

They hold further that the First Existent is that essence with which oneness is
united. It is the Universal Intellect which the philosophers call “the Agent Intel-
lect” and which is the beginning of all beings. They term this Intellect “the one”
(wāḥid) since it is the nomen agentis (fāʾil) of [the noun] “oneness” (waḥda) and its
designation is by virtue of the oneness of the one – that is, it is made-one to-
gether with oneness. Since the one is one by virtue of oneness, it is not an abso-
lute one but rather a multiple one is its very nature and essence. (Nāṣer-e
Ḫosrow, Ǧāmiʿ 148.1–6, tr. Ormsby 137)

In this passage, Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow explicitly aligns the Universal Intellect, i.e. the second after
God, with the one. His main idea is that when we analyze “the one” we distinguish between
a subject of analysis and “oneness” that is predicated of it. Although this oneness does not
exist by itself, and hence cannot be perceived as a proper cause of the one, still the one be-
comes manifold in a certain sense through it. Therefore, God, who is absolutely simple,
cannot be called the One. The One is the First Intellect.
Moreover, Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow explains that this Universal Intellect he is talking about
(which of course is a twin of the Neoplatonic Intellect), corresponds to what philosophers
called the Active Intellect. Thus, the Active Intellect is the One. Although Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow
denies that one can properly call God the One, he still seeks to find a way for using this no-
tion in application to God. He says that reasonable people call God “the pure One” (yekī-ye
maḥḍ) and this is as far as we can get on the path of understanding God’s unity.41
With this, we achieve a full correspondence to what we saw in section (3) of the chapter
on Pythagoras. The Creator, the One in the sense of being the principle of numbers, is the
Active Intellect, which is the first in the order of creation. God might be also called “one”
but in a different, more elevated sense.
This is the first evident parallel between Ismāʿīlī teaching and Šahrastānī’s presentation
of Pythagoras. The second parallel may be found in the same section, the second division of
oneness:

41
Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow, Ǧāmiʿ 148.17, tr. Ormsby 138.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 33

He may also say: the unqualified oneness is divided into oneness before eternity,
oneness in eternity and oneness after eternity. [1] Oneness before eternity is the
oneness of the Creator – may He be exalted. [2] Oneness in eternity is the one-
ness of the First Intellect. [3] Oneness which is after eternity yet before time is
the oneness of Soul. [4] Oneness which is in time is the oneness of elements and
composites. (RS II.79.11–16)

This is a completely different approach to the idea of oneness. In fact, it has very little to do
with oneness as such at all. Šahrastānī merely describes different levels of the emanative
system in terms of unities that belongs to each of them. There is a unity of the Creator, a
unity of the Intellect, a unity of the Soul, and a unity insofar as it belongs to worldly things.
In order to distinguish between different stages of emanation, he uses the idea of eternity
and time. God is before eternity; the Intellect is in eternity. The Soul is after eternity but
still before time. Finally, the world is in time. The triad of God – Intellect – Soul and the cor-
respondences that Šahrastānī draws to time and no-time levels immediately reminds us of
Neoplatonism. There, the Intellect exists in eternity, because it is comprehending all ideas
at once. The Soul in contrast discursively proceeds from one idea to another and therefore
is in time. God, the One, might be considered as being beyond eternity, since it is beyond
being at all.42 One should be careful here, though. The problematic idea which undermines
the parallel between main-stream Neoplatonism and Šahrastānī’s Pythagoras is that Soul is
“after eternity but before time.” This is rather unusual given that the Soul should be in
time, not before time. However, if we consider that Šahrastānī’s source might have been
Neoplatonic Ismāʿīlīsm in particular and not just any kind of Neoplatonism, we find an ex-
planation for this idea there as well. In his Twin Wisdoms, Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow says the following:

Regarding eternity, they say that it is the continuance of the eternal substance.
The first eternal substance is the Universal Intellect whose continuance is for-
ever. Just as eternity lies within the bound of the Intellect, so does time lie with
the bound of the Universal Soul; that is to say, the cause of eternity is the Intel-
lect, just as the cause of time is the Soul … If the continuance of the living-
mortal creature is transient in time, the continuance of what is living and im-
mortal – which is the Soul and the Intellect – must necessarily be eternal, not

42
On Time and Eternity in Neoplatonism see Gerson, Plotinus, 115–24.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 34

temporal; and the name for that is “eternity.” (Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow, Ǧāmiʿ 117.10–
118.4, tr. Ormsby 113)

Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow explains how eternity and time relate to the Intellect and the Soul. The
Intellect is the cause of eternity, the Soul is the cause of time. However, both are eternal.
Although this is not entirely the same idea as we saw in Šahrastānī, such a theory may ex-
plain why Šahrastānī places the Soul before time and after eternity. If the Soul is in a sense
eternal itself and is the cause of time, how can we say that the Soul is in time? We find a
similar picture in an earlier Ismāʿīlī author Abū Yaʿqūb al-Siǧistānī (d. ca. 361/971). Accord-
ing to the reconstruction of Paul Walker, Siǧistānī distinguishes between three aspects of
eternity. One pertains to God, the other to the Intellect, and the third to the Soul. 43 Again,
even though the Soul is the cause of time, it is considered itself to be in eternity, which
might have given inspiration to Šahrastānī’s formula “after eternity but before time.”
Following the course of text, jumping over section (4), which just is common-
knowledge Neoplatonism, and section (5), since it only states the numbers are Platonic
Forms for Pythagoras which may just be some common knowledge Pythagoreanism, 44 and
sections (6) and (7) which I addressed in the previous part of the paper, we arrive at section
(8):

He said: These are the sources of existents. He then connected number with the
numbered and measure with the measured and said: [2] the numbered which
has duality is the source of the numbered and its principle – this is the Intellect.
There are two ways of considering it: one way with respect to itself, its being
contingent by itself; and the other way with respect to its creator, its being nec-
essary through it. Hence the [number] two corresponds to it. [3] The numbered
which has three-ness is Soul, since one adds a third way of consideration to the
former two. [4] The numbered which has four-ness is nature, as one adds the
fourth way of considering to the former three. And this is the end – i.e. the end
of principles. Whatever is after is among composites. Every composite existent
has elements, soul, and intellect, [this] being either themselves or [their] effects,
so that it results in seven. One counts the numbered in the [following] manner
so that it results in ten: one counts the intellect and nine souls with their

43
Walker, “Eternal Cosmos and the Womb of History,” 361–362, see also De Cillis, Salvation and Destiny in Islam,
142–143.
44
Cf. Avicenna, Healing, Metaphysics VII.2, 245.1–3.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 35

spheres, which are their bodies and their separate intellects, like substance and
nine accidents. In general, one learns the state of existents from numbers and
first measures. The Creator – may He be exalted – knows all existents through
having conception of causes, which are numbers and measures. They do not
change and hence His knowledge does not change. (RS II.82.6–17)

In this passage, Šahrastānī presents an emanative tetrad of being and numerical corre-
spondents to it. God is one, the Intellect is two, the Soul is three, and the Nature is four.
How seven comes out of four elements put together with two effects of the Soul and of the
Intellect is not entirely clear (maybe existence is counted as an additional effect which
comes from God). In any case, ten results from the sum of the First Intellect and nine
spheres. This kind of numerical explanation of all level of existents is strikingly Pythagore-
an in spirit. However, none of doxographies that Šahrastānī used for writing his Religions
and Sects contains any similar series of numbers and correspondent levels of being. By con-
trast, such lists are very common to Ismāʿīlī literature. Just right after the aforementioned
discussion of the one and oneness, Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow passes on to aligning numbers to the
different stages of the emanation hierarchy. One is God, two is Intellect, three is Soul, four is
matter, five is nature, six is body, seven are spheres etc.45 The same series can be found in
the famous Ismāʿīlī compendium Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ, first ascribed to Pythagoras, and then fully
reproduced with further options for different number correspondents on behalf of Ismāʿīlīs
themselves.46 As already noted by Daniel De Smet, Kirmānī’s analysis of beings in the Quie-
tude of the Intellect also is full of numerical explanations of different levels of creation: “Le
Kitāb al-Rāḥat al-ʿAql est en fait une gigantesque ‘theologie arithmologique’ de tradition
néopythagoricienne.”47 Even earlier Ismāʿīlīs such as the aforementioned Siǧistānī are in-
terested in numerology as well. In his Wellsprings of Wisdom, he does not mention the whole
series but only discusses the meaning of numbers one, four, and ten. Interestingly, ten is
interpreted here in the same way as Šahrastānī interprets the relation between the Intellect
and the nine spheres: one substance put together with nine accidents.48
Two important remarks should be made on this parallel between Šahrastānī’s section
(8) and the Ismāʿīlī obsession with finding numerical correspondents to all levels of crea-
tion. First, as opposed to the division of oneness in section (3), here God comes forth as the

45
Nāṣer-e Ḫosrow, Ǧāmiʿ 149–151, tr. Ormsby 138.
46
Iḫwān, Epistle 32b.1, tr. Walker et al., 28–32, Epistle 51a, tr. Madelung et al., 402–414.
47
De Smet, La Quiétude De l’Intellect, 297.
48
Siǧistānī, Wellsprings, tr. Walker, 47.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 36

one, and the Intellect as two. Second, there is an important difference between Šahrastānī’s
series and that of the Ismāʿīlīs. Šahrastānī counts Nature as four. In the lists that I have just
mentioned, matter always figures as four and nature as five. The reason for this is that in
the Ismāʿīlī emanative hierarchy matter emanates first from the Soul, and only then the
emanation of Nature occurs.49 In fact, the only case when I could identify the same series of
emanation and numerical correspondents is Abū l-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī (d. 381/992), whom we
have already mentioned above, indicating the similarities between his biography of Pythag-
oras and that of Šahrastānī. In his other treatise al-Fuṣūl fī l-maʿālim, al-ʿĀmirī presents the
same series as Šahrastānī with Nature as the fourth element in emanation. 50 I can only
speculate on the exact relation between ʿĀmirī’s Fuṣūl and Šahrastānī’s text. Šahrastānī may
have had direct knowledge of al-ʿĀmirī or they both may have shared a common source.
Yet, without relying on speculation on further sources, one might propose a systematic ex-
planation. The tetrad One – Intellect – Soul – Nature is a traditional tetrad of Arabic Neopla-
tonism (and that is why it appears in the Neoplatonic ʿĀmirī). Šahrastānī has already im-
ported it into his presentation of Pythagoras from his doxographical sources. This might
have forced him to reformulate the Ismʿaīlī emanative pentad with matter before soul back
into the more traditional Arabic Neoplatonic tetrad with soul before matter. However it
may be, Šahrastānī certainly includes section (8) into his presentation of Pythagoras with
an eye to an Ismāʿīlī “theologie arithmologique.”
As correctly noticed by Jolivet,51 section (8) was probably inspired by Šahrastānī’s read-
ing of Ps.-Plutarch:

Und er glaubte, dass das eine dieser Prinzipien die wirkende, spezielle Ursache
ist, nämlich Gott – mächtig und erhaben ist er – und der Verstand. Das andere
aber sei die Materie (al-ʿunṣur), welche von ihm die Beeinflussung aufnimmt. Aus
ihr sei die Welt entstanden, welche durch den Gesichtssinn wahrgenommen
wird. (PP I.3.8., 100.17–18)

Ps.-Plutarch mentions God, Intellect, and matter as principles and this gives Šahrastānī an
occasion to include the whole emanative hierarchy with numerical correspondents into his
presentation. Šahrastānī’s inspiration from Ps.-Plutarch becomes especially clear through
the fact that section (8) continues with discussing the special role of matter. Here, rather

49
See e.g. De Cillis, Salvation and Destiny in Islam, 100.
50
ʿĀmidī, Fuṣūl, 102.
51
Šahrastānī, Livre des religions et des sectes, vol. 2, 205 fn. 13.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 37

unusually, Šahrastānī suggests counting matter as the one and the source of unity (RS
II.82.18–83.5). The passage is difficult and confusing, especially as the text is probably cor-
rupt, so I will not dwell on it at length. I would only like to mention that if Pythagoras is
here made to agree with Anaximenes, who also considered matter to be the one, then this
might suggest that Šahrastānī is effectively trying here to incorporate Pythagoras into his
project that I mentioned in the first section of the paper: Thales, Anaxagoras, and Anaxime-
nes would all hold to the doctrine that there is one principle of everything in the sense that
the prime matter is one.52
There is a further argument in favor of explaining Šahrastānī’s procedure in section (8)
as an attempt to provide a systematic analysis. If we turn back to the first passage of the
section in which Šahrastānī’s Pythagoras draws correspondences between numbers and the
different levels of the emanative hierarchy, we find two elements that have nothing to do
neither with Pythagoreanism nor with Neoplatonism. These elements are, first, the expla-
nation of the twofold character of the Intellect, and second, the final remark on how God
knows existent things. The Intellect is twofold because, on the one hand, its existence is
contingent in itself, and, on the other hand, it is made necessary because God, the Necessary
Existent, made it necessary. This explanation is a good portion of Avicennian philosophy.
Avicenna, for instance, explains the nature of the First Intellect in this way, and Šahrastānī
is perfectly aware of Avicenna’s theory.53 Although certain common elements can be found
in Kirmānī, too, this theory as such cannot be ascribed to Ismāʿīlīs.54 The same applies to the
explanation of how God knows existent things. Although the issue of how to interpret Avi-
cenna’s own theory of God’s knowledge of particulars is still debated, the solution was clear
for Šahrastānī: God knows particular temporal individuals through knowing their causes. 55
Now, Šahrastānī ascribes the same doctrine to Pythagoras. This might be based on his un-
derstanding of how the Intellect knows particulars in Ismāʿīlī thought, which likewise relies
on causation in their explanation. Kirmānī, for instance, thinks that the Intellect knows
particulars through being their cause.56 However, Kirmānī’s theory is intertwined with the
Neoplatonist idea that the Intellect unites with the objects of its knowledge, which is entire-
ly absent from Šahrastānī’s account.57 One may thus wonder what Šahrastānī’s reasoning
would be for importing Avicennian theories into his account of Pythagoras. My hypothesis

52
Cf. footnote 22 above.
53
See e.g. Šahrastānī, Muṣāraʿa (tr. Madelung and Mayer), 59.
54
Cf. De Cillis, Salvation and Destiny in Islam, 47–48.
55
Benevich, “God’s Knowledge of Particulars,” 15.
56
De Cillis, Salvation and Destiny in Islam, 92.
57
De Smet, La Quiétude De l’Intellect, 186.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 38

is that he is interested in the systematical completeness of the theory. Thus, in order to fill
gaps and supply details, he invokes the best analytical tool present to him in his days, Avi-
cenna’s philosophy.
Consequently, the inspiration that Šahrastānī receives from Ps.-Plutarch for section (8)
is minimal. His real interest is in Ismāʿīlī numerology and/or a systematic analysis. The
same applies to the next section (9):

[Principles are numbers] and propor- He said: Since the geometrical combi-
tions which are in them. He called nations are arranged according to
them combinations and he called the numeric proportions, we count them
compositions out of them “elements” among principles as well.
and he also called them geometrical
objects. (ṢḤ (2), 4.13–14) [A] A group of Pythagoreans ended up
by believing that principles are geo-
[Die Prinzipien sind die Zahlen] und metrical combinations in accordance
die Ebenmäßigkeiten, die in ihnen with numerical proportions. For this
liegen. Er nannte sie „Zusammenset- reason, heavenly motions resulted in
zungen“. Und das aus deren Gesamt- having proportionate musical mo-
heit zusammengesetzte nannte er tions, which are the noblest among
"Elemente". Ferner bezeichnete er sie motions and the finest among combi-
als Geometrien. (PP I.3.8, 100.14) nations.
[B] Then they turned from this to
words so that a group of them ended
up by believing that the principles are
letters (ḥurūf) and terms which are
abstracted from matter. They placed
A in correspondence to one, and B in
correspondence to two and so on. – I
do not understand, basing on which
tongue and language they made this
possible. For tongues differ from one
town or village to another. [I do not
understand either] which kind of
composition [of letters they meant].
Compositions also differ, and simple
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 39

letters differ in them as well, so like-

wise the composites. Yet numbers are
not like this. They do not differ at all.
[C] A group of them ended up believ-
ing that the principle of body are
three dimensions and body is com-
posed out of them. They placed the
point in correspondence to one, line
in correspondence to two, plane in
correspondence to three and body in
correspondence to four; they ob-
served these correspondences in
compositions of bodies and multipli-
cations of numbers. (RS II.83.6–83.20)

Šahrastānī’s point of inspiration may have been either the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma or Ps.-Plutarch or
both since they present the same idea. Šahrastānī only summarizes their account in one
sentence and then proceeds at length with material which was entirely absent from his
doxographical sources. Notably, he does not even pretend here to report the theory of Py-
thagoras himself. Instead he talks about Pythagoreans. Based on the original idea of Py-
thagoras that proportions and geometrical combinations may be principles as well, they
develop further ideas that are presented in sections [A–C]. The identification of the source
for [A] and [C] remains a desideratum for further study. As for [B], Šahrastānī’s source is Ne-
oplatonic Ismāʿīlīsm again. Kirmānī, whom we mentioned for the doctrine of taking the In-
tellect as the one, also ascribes letter values to the principles in his Quietude of the Intellect.58
However, as opposed to counting the Intellect as the one and considering God beyond
worldly oneness, which he accepted in his introduction to the Religions and Sects, Šahrastānī
clearly dislikes the idea of letters as principles. Although this is a doxography, which means
that the author is not supposed to raise his own opinion and evaluate doctrines, Šahrastānī
cannot but comment that this theory is not tenable. Šahrastānī’s criticism reminds the
reader of his critique against nominalism in his theological treatise Nihāyat al-aqdām. One
cannot introduce entities on a merely linguistic basis as languages and names vary. 59 We
encounter the same critical approach in section (13):

58
See e.g. Kirmānī, Rāḥat al-ʿaql 4.1, 205.
59
Benevich, “Šahrastānī’s Metaphysics,” 330–333.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 40

[Pythagoras] may have almost gone in this exposition of combinations so far as

to say that there are only combinations in the world; bodies and accidents are
combinations; souls and intellects are combinations. This exposition is however
very hard to [accept]. Indeed, that to which he tended and on which he relied
was the supposition of the combination on the basis of the combined and [the
supposition] of the magnitude on the basis of the measured. (RS II.86.3–7)

This passage is a conclusion that Šahrastānī draws from reporting the Pythagorean
worldview. It is not a quotation from any source. It is Šahrastānī’s own analysis of the core
idea of Pythagoras. According to Šahrastānī, if one follows Pythagoras’ logic, one ends up by
saying that all things that exist in the world are combinations of mathematical objects.
Again, Šahrastānī loses his doxographic objectivity for a moment. He evaluates this theory
by saying that it is unconvincing and hard to believe. Then, he diagnoses Pythagoras’ mis-
take. The latter was analyzing the cases when we really have mathematical combinations
(e.g. when a longer measure is construed out of shorter ones) and extrapolated it onto all
other cases. The underlying verdict of this diagnose is that Pythagoras should not have
done it.
Two passages from the whole chapter on Pythagoras remain for analysis: section (13)
and section (16). Both passages support my hypothesis that Šahrastānī imports a good por-
tion of Neoplatonic Ismāʿīlīsm into his account of Pythagoras. Section (13) runs as follows:

He may say: the human soul [consists of] numerical or musical combinations.
This is why soul is in proportion to musical proportions. When it enjoys hearing
them, it becomes thoughtless, when it exists in accordance with listening to
them, it is excited. Before its connection to bodies it was created out of those
first numerical combinations. Then it connected itself to bodies. So, when ethi-
cal refinements are in accordance with nature (fiṭra), and souls abstract them-
selves from external proportions, [the soul] connects to the world [of musical
combinations], it joins their communion in a more beautiful and perfect way
than it had in the first place. For the combinations were at first deficient in re-
spect of being potential; yet, through exercise and effort in this world, one
reaches the outmost perfection, going [86] from the potential term to the actual
term.
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 41

He said: the religious rules (al-šarāʾiʿa) that were imposed in terms of prayers
and the duties of charity as well as other ways of religious service are due to the
correspondence of these proportions to spiritual combinations. (RS II.85.12–
86.3)

Šahrastānī states in this passage on behalf of Pythagoras that our souls consist of mathe-
matical compositions. There is an argument for this based on empirical observation: souls
are influenced and become excited through music. That must be a sign that there is a cer-
tain natural familiarity between our souls and musical harmonies. That is why through the
refrainment of our character, when souls abstract themselves from corporeal hindrances,
they can join the higher world, which also consists of the musical combinations of the same
type. In that latter state souls will reach a more perfect state than they had at first. It is not
clear whether Šahrastānī means that the state before souls were connected to bodies or
rather the state after they were connected to them was less perfect. In any case, the perfec-
tion was only potentially there in either state and may be achieved through the refinement
of character. Yet, how can we refine our character? The response follows in the next pas-
sage. We are referred to the religious law, the sharia (šarīʿa). The sharia in itself corresponds
to mathematical proportions and combinations. By following the rule of the sharia, we put
ourselves in the necessary proportions and achieve a harmony so that we can connect to
the higher world of mathematical objects.
This section is a continuation of the ethical rulings of section (12), which in its turn was
a paraphrase from Ps.-Ammonius. Although inspired by Ps.-Ammonius, the text of section
(13) has nothing to do with it. Rather its source is again Neoplatonic Ismāʿīlīsm. One may
consider for instance the following passage from Kirmānī:

Everything what we said about dissolution and the [returning] ascent to the One
Stable Thing to which all things ascent may be verified by that which follows
from His creation of the world of [religious] foundation (ʿalam al-waḍʿ), which is
the prophetic creation. The covenant witnesses to us that [the world of religious
foundation] is in equilibrium and correspondence to divine creation. For we
have analyzed that through which the perfection of the human soul as well as
its life and its subsistence is in actuality into that from which it comes to be and
exists; and we found that it may be analyzed into multiple things which are sub-
sumed under two: [1] The first is the religious law (al-šarīʿa), which contains its
pillars that are customs of service by knowledge and action: the first acquires
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 42

forms for the soul, the second sets them up (taqwīmuhā). It relates to the perfec-
tion of the soul in the same manner as the macrocosm, which contains spheres,
elements, stars, and their natural powers, relates to the body of the human and
his soul. These multiple [features] are in equilibrium with the prophetic crea-
tion and correspond to it. [2] The second is the imam, who embraces the terms
on which the religious law is consecrated. (Kirmānī, Rāhat al-ʿaql I.3, 163.18–
164.6)

Kirmānī is reasoning in favor of the Neoplatonic “procession and return” circle for the
whole world. In its favor he suggests to look at humans. Their ascent, i.e. return, consists in
the adherence to religious laws through knowing them and acting in accordance with them.
This is the case, because religious laws relate to human souls in the same way as the macro-
cosm relates to concrete humans. The latter idea apparently means that as knowing and
following religious laws brings harmony to the human soul, so the regulation of the macro-
cosm puts concrete humans with their bodies and souls into their appropriate places, too.
The main idea of this passage is that the world of religious foundations, i.e. the world of
humans’ souls and religious laws that set them up, stands in direct correspondence to the
macrocosm.
We have seen above that Šahrastānī borrows the idea of human soul as a microcosm
from Ps.-Ammonius in section (12). There it rather had epistemological consequences: by
knowing ourselves we know the world. No wonder, that looking for further explanations of
this idea Šahrastānī turns to his Ismāʿīlī sources given that they are known for the same
theory. From their interpretation of the ethical consequences of the correspondence be-
tween human souls and the whole world, he imports the most important element from the
religious point of view: the religious laws that correspond to the laws of the universe. If we
want our souls to be set up properly in correspondence to the whole world, we must follow
the religious law. Šahrastānī employs contemporary Ismāʿīlī doctrine, because its basis ap-
proximates what he finds in his doxographical sources about the doctrine of Pythagoras.
In a similar manner Šahrastānī uses Ismāʿīlī sources for section (16):

One asked Pythagoras: why do you believe in the end of the world? He said: Be-
cause it will reach the [final] cause [87] for which it has been there. If it reaches
[that cause] its motion will stand still. Most among higher entities are melodic
combinations. This is similar to when one says: Glorifying and sanctifying is the
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 43

spiritual food; and the food of all existents is that out of which they were creat-
ed. (RS II.86.23–87.3)

As I mentioned in the first part of this paper, starting from section (10) and (11), Šahrastānī
focuses on the “return” part of the Neoplatonic circle (apart from the impact-digressions in
sections [15] and (16)). Now, in passage (16), he reports Pythagoras’ view on the return of
the whole world. The movable world will perish because it will reach its final end, the high-
er world of melodic mathematical objects. It is not quite clear how the two last sentences
connect to the previous idea. Apparently, they mean that the world moves for the sake of
glorification and sanctification of the higher world. These are its “spiritual food.” That is
why the world will stop moving when it reaches and unites with the object of its glorifica-
tion.
A parallel text that can shed some light on Šahrastānī’s sources here is, again, Kirmānī’s
Quietude of the Intellect:

The first moved mover, one of the two emanations, has its goal and the second
perfection – through which it subsists in sanctifying, glorifying, and praising [it]
and in which it has its pleasure, joy, and its remaining and perpetuity – in the
intellectual grasp of that which precedes it in existence in terms of the First
Mover which is the Created and the First Existent. (Kirmānī, Rāḥat al-ʿaql III.7,
199.5–9)

Although Kirmānī does not mention the perishing of the world in this passage, he definitely
defends the same theory as Šahrastānī’s Pythagoras. The first moved mover, which stands
in parallel to Šahrastānī’s “the world,” has its final end in the higher world of the First Intel-
lect. The First Intellect is described here as the first (unmoved) mover, the first created
thing and the first existent. The subsistence of the first moved mover (i.e. the world) con-
sists in glorifying the Intellect and when it reaches it, it achieves perfection. Again, Šah-
rastānī draws on Ismāʿīlī material in his presentation of Pythagorean doctrine.

c. Results

With this, I can conclude the analysis of the sources for the passages in the Religions and
Sects’ chapter on Pythagoras which do not have clear parallels in any doxographies availa-
ble to us. Anna Izdebska was right in her suggestion that Šahrastānī sometimes neopla-
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 44

tonizes Pythagoras in his report. This, however, happens only rarely, predominantly in the
first passage of section (3) and in section (4). Far more important to Šahrastānī’s account of
Pythagoras is the Ismāʿīlī background. Most of section (3), sections (8) and (9), and sections
(13) and (16) stand in clear correspondence with the doctrines that we find in Ismāʿīlī
sources of the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries. The closest parallels may be found
in Kirmānī’s school of Ismāʿīlīsm, as I found most parallels to Šahrastānī’s sources in their
writings (especially taking the First Existent, the Intellect, as the One is a characteristic par-
allel). I am not claiming that any of the passages quoted above were direct sources of Šah-
rastānī’s text – there is too little evidence for this. However, the doctrinal similarities between
the Ismāʿīlīs and Šahrastānī’s Pythagoras, as well as the peculiarities of their theories in
contrast to common-knowledge Neoplatonism or Aristotelianism is striking – so much that
they make me suggest that Šahrastānī was actively envisaging contemporary Ismāʿīlīsm
while composing his account of Pythagoras.
One may naturally ask why Šahrastānī decided to use Ismāʿīlī doctrines to complement
the material that he found in the doxographies of Ps.-Ammonius, Ps.-Plutarch, and the
Ṣiwān al-ḥikma. The response is quite simple: Šahrastānī apparently thought that Ismāʿīlīs
are contemporary Pythagoreans. We find the following statement in the Ismāʿīlī compendi-
um Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ:

As for the Pythagorean sages, they gave everything its due consideration when
they said that existents are in accordance with the nature of number, as we shall
explain somewhat later in this epistle. This is the doctrine of our noble Breth-
ren, may God aid them with a spirit from Him. (Iḫwān, Epistle 51a, 402, tr. Made-
lung et al.)

The “Brethren of Purity” openly admit here that they are Pythagoreans. As noted by Anna
Izdebska, the earlier contemporary of Šahrastānī, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī (d. 505/1111) like-
wise believed that Ismāʿīlīs are Pythagoreans.60 The fact that Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ should be con-
sidered as Islamic Pythagoreans was specifically emphasized by Yves Marquet.61 It has re-
ceived criticism from the side of De Smet.62 De Smet is certainly right that we cannot talk
here about Pythagoreanism as such, i.e. Hellenistic Pythagoreanism. What we are dealing
with, instead, is a strongly Neoplatonized version of Neopythagoreanism, as De Smet him-

60
Izdebska, “The Attitudes of Medieval Arabic Intellectuals,” 39.
61
Marquet, Les “frères de la pureté”, pythagoriciens de l'Islam.
62
De Smet, “Yves Marquet, Les Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ et le Pythagorisme.”
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 45

self seems to admit when he speaks about the “théologie arithomologique” of Kirmānī. 63
There is hence no wonder that Šahrastānī included Ismāʿīlī material into his account of Py-
thagoras. This material still is “Pythagorean” in his view. Šahrastānī approaches his account
of Pythagoras in terms of “school thinking.” Even if he does not find a certain view explicit-
ly ascribed to Pythagoras in his sources, he still can add this material to his report, since the
school of Pythagoras, as Šahrastānī knows it, adheres to this view.
This “school” approach might strike contemporary historians of philosophy as unrelia-
ble. It would be on a par to ascribing the view of contemporary Neo-Aristotelians to Aristo-
tle himself. However, there is an additional point in Šahrastānī’s defense. One of the reasons
why Šahrastānī decided to include Ismāʿīlī material into his account of Pythagoras might
have been the close connection that existed between his doxographical sources, such as Ps.-
Ammonius and the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma, and the Ismāʿīlī texts. It has been recently discussed
whether and how Ps.-Ammonius influenced Ismāʿīlī thought and/or vice-versa.64 Without
getting into this debate, allow me to mention that, for example, the connection between
sections (12) and (13) speaks in favor of that kind of influence. In short, the reason why Šah-
rastānī feels entitled to report an Ismāʿīlī doctrine of religious law and microcosm in section
(13) on behalf of Pythagoras is the fact that the Pythagorean doctrine of microcosm as pre-
sented in Ps.-Ammonius and in section (12) has already influenced the Ismāʿīlīs. In other
words, the Ismāʿīlī Pythagoras still is Pythagoras for Šahrastānī even if it is mediated
through their own tradition.
The same might be suggested for the Ṣiwān al-ḥikma. The only passage that Šahrastānī
quotes from this doxography in full, the final section (18), already bears certain Ismāʿīlī fea-
tures with its notions of “guidance,” hierarchy of ranks, and the idea of the “return” to the
Senior (RS II.88.21–89.4). On the whole, then, Šahrastānī’s doxographical logic works as fol-
lows: if your reliable source A ascribes to your author the doctrine D1 that you can also find
in you other source B, which openly admits that it follows the lead of that author, but also
professes certain connected doctrine D2, then you are entitled to quote both D1 and D2 in
your report of that author. This is the main line of Šahrastānī’s method in relation to his
secondary sources.

63
De Smet, La Quiétude De l’Intellect, 297, 309.
64
De Smet, “La Doxographie Du Pseudo-Ammonius” and Esots, “Pseudo-Ammonius’ Ārāʾ al-falāsifa.”
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 46

4 Conclusion

On the basis of this case study devoted to the chapter on Pythagoras from the Religions and
Sects, Šahrastānī’s doxographical method has revealed itself as being very manifold and so-
phisticated. Šahrastānī either quotes other doxographies literally, or paraphrases them
with no significant changes, or paraphrases them changing the content, or just takes inspi-
ration from them while looking for other secondary sources. He receives his secondary in-
formation either from common-knowledge Arabic Neoplatonism, or from Avicenna, or –
most and foremost – from Neopythagorean Neoplatonic Ismāʿīlīsm. It is hardly possible to
summarize this diverse method. Maybe the best way to assess its guiding principle would be
to say that Šahrastānī’s main goal is systematic completeness. In the first section of the paper,
I presented Šahrastānī’s view on the structure of the chapters in the sense of the Neopla-
tonic “procession and return.” Šahrastānī uses all his options in order to fulfill his promised
table of contents. He supplies relevant material, systematically rephrases and reanalyzes it
in order to fit it into the schema, and invokes additional sources for lacunae that his doxo-
graphical source left in the targeted structure of chapters.
I agree with those assessments from the preceding secondary literature that treat Šah-
rastānī as a thoughtful historian of philosophy who takes his job very seriously. For Šah-
rastānī, systematic analysis is the most important aim of his work. We have seen how Šah-
rastānī uses Avicennian philosophy in order to explain specific features of the Neoplatonic
Ismāʿīlī doctrine that he presents in section (8). We have also seen that he sometimes goes
so far with his systematic philosophical interest that he forgets about the objectivity of a
doxographer. In sections (9) and (14) he cannot help but express his wonder how anyone
reasonable could hold to those strange philosophical views. This is in line with Šahrastānī’s
brief remark in the first introduction to the whole book. There, he dwells on the idea that
philosophical theories have a certain inner systematic opposition to each other, and that
there can be only one truth, given that two opposed sentences cannot be true at the same
time (RS I.20.18–19). Basing on this approach, history of philosophy becomes, first and
foremost, a systematic history of philosophy for Šahrastānī. For this approach it seems less
relevant what an author really has said but rather what his doctrine implies. This corre-
sponds well to Šahrastānī’s “school thinking.” Even if Pythagoras himself did not express
literally the same ideas as Ismāʿīlī Neopythagoreans, their theory is developed within the
tenets of his doctrine, and therefore systematically represent the same corpus of philosoph-
ical thought as Pythagoras himself, in contrast, for example, to Aristotle and the Aristoteli-
ans on the other side. An attentive reader of the chapter on Pythagoras from the Religions
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 47

and Sects might notice that several passages do not even start with the typical formula for
doxographies, “he says …”; instead Šahrastānī writes: “He may say” (RS II.79.11, 79.17, 82.18,
85.12, 86.3). Another study should carefully track Šahrastānī’s usage of this formula
throughout Religions and Sects. Preliminarily, however, I would suggest that Šahrastānī
marks his preferred interest in systematic philosophical analysis with this formula. It is not
relevant what the author really said; it is crucial what he might have said and what logically
follows from his doctrine.
These general observations might still leave the contemporary historian of philosophy
dissatisfied. After all, the question prevails: can we use Šahrastānī as a reliable doxograph-
ical work for the reconstruction of Ancient Greek philosophical thought that was lost for us
in original writings? My response is twofold. First, although Šahrastānī heavily reworks his
sources and certainly adds material which in our contemporary notion is anachronistic and
out of place, one cannot dismiss the whole Religions and Sects as a possible source for un-
known information about Ancient Greek authors. We have seen that at least sometimes,
Šahrastānī fully and carefully quotes his sources slavishly following the very word of the
underlying text. The task of identifying these passages is difficult, given that one first needs
to rule out possible influences from later sources or Šahrastānī’s own considerations on the
subject. This task however is not impossible.
Second, even if one dismisses the Religions and Sects as a source for Greek thought, it
does not mean that one should not give any merit to this work at all. Šahrastānī’s own phil-
osophical analysis as well as his presentation of contemporary philosophy is useful for ex-
ploring Arabic philosophy as such. For instance, speaking of the chapter on Pythagoras,
Šahrastānī’s insertion of Ismāʿīlī thought into the account of Pythagoras gives additional
support to the thesis that Ismāʿīlīs actually are Islamic Pythagoreans. Šahrastānī’s short
summaries of the core ideas of Ismāʿīlī philosophy help understand how contemporaries
saw the philosophical content of their beliefs: numerology, emanative hierarchies, corre-
spondences between microcosm and macrocosm, and – last but not least – the transcend-
ence of God even beyond the notion of the One. Šahrastānī’s own systematic analysis helps
the historians of his own period. By looking at how a post-Avicennian philosopher under-
stands and analyzes previous philosophies, we gain a better understanding of how a post-
Avicennian philosophical mind works.
I started this paper with mentioning that the studies of Arabic philosophy originated
from the interest in Arabic tradition as a source for the Greek tradition. However, this peri-
od of scholarship is already over. The studies of the last decades on Arabic philosophy have
sufficiently demonstrated the merit of this philosophical tradition as such. Following this
Benevich A Case Study in Arabic Doxography 48

new line of approach to Arabic philosophy, even if one neglects Šahrastānī as a source for
the Greek philosophical tradition, the Religions and Sects remain an important source of in-
formation on the Arabic philosophical tradition.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Andreas Lammer and Mareike Jas for inviting me to write this contribution
for the present volume and their useful suggestions regarding its first draft.

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