The Early Buddhist Notion of the Middle Path

Author(s): David J. Kalupahana

Source: The Eastern Buddhist , May 1979, NEW SERIES, Vol. 12, No. 1 (May 1979), pp.
30-48
Published by: Eastern Buddhist Society

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 The Early Buddhist Notion of the Middle Path

David J. Kalupahana

The relationship between the earliest form of Buddhism and the various
traditions that developed later has been a perennial problem in the history
of Buddhist thought. As is well known to students of Buddhist philosophy,
the different schools of the Abhidharma or scholastic tradition, in spite
of rather significant doctrinal variations among themselves, all claimed to
preserve the Buddha-word in its pristine purity. The Mahãyãna schools,
adopting philosophical standpoints very different from those of scholas-
ticism, upheld the view that theirs represent the true teachings of the
Buddha. Many a modern scholar, after aligning himself with one or the
other of these later philosophical developments, has endeavoured to draw
a close relationship between the school he has accepted and early Bud-
dhism. In the present paper, I propose to show that early Buddhism, as
embodied in the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Āgamas, which are
recognized by all the different schools as representing the earliest sources
for the study of Buddhism, is radically different from all these schools, at
least as far as their philosophical content is concerned.
Even though some of the later developed schools did not recognize all
the discourses included in the Nikayas and the Āgamas as being authori-
tative, fortunately there is at least one discourse that carried the stamp of
authority so much so that all schools of Buddhism, both Hînayâna and
Mahãyãna, studied it with veneration and respect. This is acknowledged
by even a prominent Mahãyãna philosopher like Candrakïrti.1 Moreover,
this discourse deals with the most fundamental doctrine in Buddhism and,
therefore, any difference that can be noted with regard to the interpreta-

1 Mãdhyamikavrtti ( Madhyamakakãrikãs ) (abbr. MKV ), ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin

(St. Pétersbourg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1903-13), p. 269: īdam ca sūtrarņ,
sarvanikãyepi paýiyaie.

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 MIDDLE PATH

tion of the ideas embodied here would indicate

between the early and later forms of Buddhism.
Kaccãyanagotta-sutta (Nāgarjuna calls it Kãtyãyan
cluded in the Samyutta-nikãya 2 and the Tsa-a-han
of this discourse, as found in the Pali Nikâyas, is

While the Exalted One was at Sāvatthi the ve

of that clan came to visit him, and saluting hi
side. So seated he asked the Exalted One, sayi
the phrase 'right view, right view.' Now how f
view?"

"This world, Kaccayana, usually bases [its view] on two

things: on existence (atthita) and on nonexistence ( rCatthitã ). Now
he, who with right insight sees the uprising of the world as it
really is, does not hold with the nonexistence of the world. But
he, who with right insight sees the passing away of the world as
it really is, does not hold with the existence of the world."

"The world, for the most part, Kaccayana, is bound by ap-

proach, attachment, and inclination. And the man who does not
go after that approach and attachment, determination of mind,
inclination and disposition, does not cling to or take up the stand,
[does not think]: 'This is my soul!' - who thinks: 'That which
arises is just suffering, that which passes away is suffering,' - this
man is not in doubt, is not perplexed. Knowledge herein is his,
not merely other-dependent. Thus far, Kaccayana, he has 'right
view.' "

" 'Everything exists' {sabbam atthi) : this is one extreme. 'Every-

thing does not exist' {sabbam rčatthī) : this is the other extreme. Not
approaching either extreme the Tathāgata teaches you a doctrine
by the middle [way] : Conditioned by ignorance dispositions come
to pass ; conditioned by dispositions is consciousness ; conditioned
by consciousness is the psychophysical personality; conditioned
by the psychophysical personality are the six senses ; conditioned

2 Samyutta-nikãya , ed. Leon Feer (London: Pali Text Society, i960), 2.16-17.
3 Taishõ Shinshü Daizõkyõ , ed. J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe (Tokyo : Taishö Shuppan
Company, 1924-34), 2.85c.

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 KALUPAHANA

by the six senses is contact; conditioned by conta

conditioned by feeling is craving; conditioned b
grasping; conditioned by grasping is becoming; co
becoming is birth; conditioned by birth is decay-and-
suffering . . . even such is the uprising of this entire
fering. But from the utter fading away and ceasing
(arises) ceasing of dispositions, and thus comes ce
entire mass of suffering."

This discourse refers to two philosophical theories,

( atthitã , Sk. astitã, Ch .yu ^f) and nonexistence or non-B
nâstitã, Ch. wu yu There is no difficulty in iden
theories.4 The former is the traditional Upani§adic doct
which everything in this world is filled with ( pūrņa )
the ultimate ground of existence (astitva). It is the p
and substantial "self," variously known as Ātman o
the Buddha's criticism that this theory of "existence
in permanence (sassata, Sk. iaivat , Ch. cKang ch
doctrine of the Materialists who, in spite of their d
determinism (svabhãva-vãda), were considered to b
(ucchedavãdin) because they denied causality of moral b
over, the Materialists also denied the existence of a rea
Upani§adic thinkers acknowledge, and hence were p
"nihilists" (rčatthika-vāda). The Buddha, too, while
criticizing their conception of natural determinism,5 r
as being nihilistic primarily because of their denial of
responsibility. Buddha's reasons for rejecting both thes
be extremely significant.
The two extremes of existence and nonexistence - nam
tions of ceasing (nirodha) and arising (i uppãda ), respect
because they were contrary to the perceptions of on
things as they are. Arising and ceasing, no doubt, are e
therefore, the argument for the rejection of the two ex
Not only did the Buddha resort to empirical arguments
of the two metaphysical extremes, but also he rep

4 See my Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honol

Hawaii, 1975), pp. 5-53.
5 See my explanation of this problem in Causality , p. 41.

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 MIDDLE PATH

empiricist view. Thus, the "middle path" (majjhim

pratipat , Ch. chung tao Ť3Í) between the two ex
nonexistence is presented as causation or "d
{paticcasamuppãda) which explains the pattern acco
the world arise and pass away. The conception of "
enabled the Buddha to avoid the two metaphysical
causation, namely, (a) the potential existence of
hence the substantial connection between them
existence of the effect and hence the absence of a
the cause and the effect.
There cannot be any controversy regarding the message of the discourse.
It is a straightforward and unequivocal statement of an empriricist theory
of causation which steers clear of two metaphysical ideas of substantial
permanence on the one hand, and nihilistic impermanence on the other.
The "theory of dependence," in such a context, explains the causal rela-
tionship among impermanent factors of existence.
This was the "middle path" the Buddha claimed he discovered under
the Bodhi-tree. It was this philosophical middle position that was the basis
of the ethical path of "moderation" between the two extremes of self-
mortification and self-indulgence that constitute the subject of his first
discourse - the Dhammacakkapavattana-sutta.6 In the early discourses, this
middle path was never explained as something indefinable ( anirvacanlya )
or as indescribable ( avãcya ) in any way. The only remark made is that it
is "beyond the sphere of logic" ( atakkâvacara , Sk. atarkâvacara ), but for very
specific reasons. It was a doctrine "deep, difficult to perceive, difficult to
comprehend, but tranquil, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, intelligible
to the learned," yet a "matter not easily understood by those delighting in
attachment, those rejoicing in attachment."7 The argument seems to be
that if a person is excessively attached to a certain theory, no amount of
logic or dialectic could convince him of the truth of any other theory.
Hence, to those recluses and brahmans deeply immersed in metaphysical
views ( ditthi , Sk. dņti, Ch. chien JL), "dependent arising" or causal hap-
pening ( paticcasamuppãda ) was a difficult doctrine to accept. So much for
the "middle path" in early Buddhism.

6 Saijiyutta-nikaya 5.420.
7 Majjhima-nikãya, ed. V. Treckner (London: Pali Text Society, 1948), 1.167; Taishõ
i.777c-77Öa.

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 KALUPAHANA

The scholastic traditions which developed theories of

and atoms (param aņu) were faced with the rather difficu
causal continuity.8 One of the ways in which the schol
the problem of the continuity of the discrete mom
(dharma) was by accepting the dualistic theory of s
and qualities (lak$aņa) . They upheld that the qualitie
flux, changing every moment, while the substance r
throughout the three periods of time - past, presen
came to be known as the theory of "everything exists"
was upheld by the Sarvastivādins. It may be noted t
theory constituted one of the extremes referred to an
Buddha in the Kaccãyanagotta-sutta. The Sautrāntikas c
pains in refuting this doctrine of substance (svabhãva)
with the idea of "soul" or "self" (atman).9
How did the Sarvastivādins counter this criticis
reinterpreting the implications of the Kaccãyanago
Vibhãfãprabhãvrtti , a commentary on the Abhidharmad
in order to explicate the genuine Sarvastivāda point of
to the ideas expressed in the Abhidharmakośa with its S
we find this réévaluation of the Kaccãyanagotta-sutta .
points out that in the discourses the Buddha taugh
according to which (i) all component things (sarņsk
(šūnyāķ) of falsely conceived notions such as "person" (
cle consciousness" (ãlaya-vijnãna) and other such im
all component things are not empty or nonempty (a
and general characteristics (svasāmānyalakjaņa) . This im
cognition of a reality such as "person" (puruça) posi
school or by the "personalists" (pudgala-vãdin) of the B
"receptacle consciousness" (ãlaya-vijnãna) of the Yog
tribute to a theory of permanent existence (astitva) an
and general characteristics (svasāmānyalak$aņa) of dhar
the Sarvastivādins, would lead to nihilistic nonexistence

8 See Causality , pp. 67-88.

9 Sphutârthâbhidharmakosavyakhyã (abbr. Sakv) of Yaśomitra, ed
Publication Association of Abhidharmakosavyãkhyã, 1(932-36), p. 362
*° Abhidharmadipa with Vibhã$ãprabhãvftti , ed. P. S. Jaini (Pa
search Institute, 1959), p. 270.

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 MIDDLE PATH

Specific characteristic {svalakfaņa) of a dharma is

stance" ( dravya , svabhãva) which was looked upon
"ultimate reality" (paramârtha sat).11 When the
"substance" {svabhãva) as an "ultimate reality," the
ing the Sarvastivāda conception of dharma.12 It
that in the eyes of the Sarvastivādins the doctrine
of the Mãdhyamikas was none other than a the
nihilism ( nâstitva ). Thus, for the Sarvastivādins,
tioned in the Kaccãyanagotta-sutta are the Yogâcâr
consciousness" {ãlaya-vijnãna) and the Mädhyam
tiness" {śUnyata).
Although the Sarvastivādins made a determined a
their doctrines from those of the Sânkhya, Yog
yet the recognition of an enduring substance {svabh
as the ultimate reality of things {dharma) as oppos
characteristics {laksaņa or sāmānyalak$aņa) placed t
"substantialists" {sad-vãdi) .13 For this reason, the
through substance {svabhãva) was not at all diff
theory of causation {satkãryavãda) of Sańkhya.14 T
recognized the theory of causation with twelve fa
Kaccãyanagotta-sutta , but their theory is so closely
ception of substance that it is no longer the empir
in early Buddhism but a metaphysical view of the
In contrast, the Sautrāntikas, while upholding
{ k$aņa ), vehemently denied the existence of any
{svabhãva or dravya) . The Sautrāntikas, who refuse
rate moments, static {sthiti) and decay { jarã ), but

11 Abhidharmakosabhãsya , ed. P. Pradhan (Patna: K. P.

1967), p. 341 : Kãyarri svasãmãnyalaksanãbhyãm parīk$ate, vedan
evaifim svalak§aņarņ. Sāmānyalaksaņarņ tu anityatã samskftānār
9 nãtmate sarvadharmāņārri. Saku , p. 524: paramârthasat svalakfa
dravyataķ svalakļaņatah sad dravya sad iti. See ibid., p. 529, sva
12 See MKV, pp. 260-261, where the heat of fire {agner au
stance" {svabhãva) as well as "specific characteristic" ( svalak
13 In fact, the Sarvastivādins claimed themselves to be
see Vibhāļāprabhāvrtti, p. 258.
14 See Causality, pp. 148-152.

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 KALUPAHANA

one characteristic ( ekam eva lak$aņam),ls certainly wou

concept of "specific characteristic" (svalakfaņa) which w
the permanent and eternal substance (svabhãva, dravya
who recognized the nonconceptual grasp of the exte
first moment of perception ( pratyakça), they upheld,
"specific characteristics" (svalakfaņa)16 without identif
stance (svabhãva). (This confirms our view, state
the Sarvastivādins, the nihilists - nâstika - were re
Mädhyamikas, and not the Sautrāntikas) .
The Sautrāntika denial of substance ( svabhãva ) should
the faithful representatives of early Buddhism - hence
the upholders of the tradition of the discourses ( sūtra
were, no doubt, non-substantialists. But, unfortunat
non-substantiality ( anātmavāda, niķsvabhāvavāda) was pr
ground of a metaphysical theory of moments and henc
to account for causality (pratityasamutpãda) . This theory
tary phenomena compelled them to accept a caus
involved metaphysical assumptions. They maintained
phenomenon arises during one moment and passes away
during the next, without enduring even for one mom
no substantial existence.18 This view shared all the salien
nonidentity theory of causation (asatkãryavãda) of t
Not only did the theory fail to account for the momen
effect, but also it implied the complete annihilation ( v
immediately after its arising. Thus, while the Sarva
explain causation in the background of a theory of mom
a substantialist position, the Sautrāntika doctrine of
(anatrila^ niķsvabhāva) placed them in the position
(ucchedavãdí) .
It is now possible to examine the "middle path" as

1 5 . Abhidharmakosabhãsya, p. 76, attributes this view to some

but Yaśomitra identifies the school as the Sautrāntika; see Sakv, p
iti Sautrãn't]ikãh.
16 See T. I. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic 11 (New York: Dover
17 Sakv , p. ii.
18 Siksãsamuccaya , ed. C. Bendall (St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences,
1897-1902), p. 248: iti hy abhūtva bhavati bhütva prativigacchati svabhãvarahitatvãt ; see also
Causality , pp. 151-154.

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 MIDDLE PATH

Mãdhyamika school of Buddhism. The doctrines

schools, Sarvâstivãda and Sautrāntika, undoubted
diate philosophical background of Mãdhyamika t
two schools with their theories of causation provi
for the Mãdhyamika dialectic , Mãdhyamika ph
considered a mere reaction to these two schools
school at least in its undeveloped form, had indepe
Nãgârjuna organized it into a coherent system.
is represented by the Prajnãpãramitã literatur
Vajracchedikã-prajnãpãramitã .
Here we need to digress a little from the discuss
The concept of Buddha is the most important t
Prajnãpãramitã literature. Buddha Gotama was a
discourses of the Pali Nikãyas and the Chinese Ā
evidence of that.19 He influenced the life and t
India during his time to such an extent that sup
to be attributed to him, not only after his deat
alive. These qualities - intellectual, moral, and even
him to the position of a divine being {deva) in t
The result was that the followers themselves b
real nature of the Buddha's personality. When the
Buddha's personality was raised, the Buddha him
was neither a man {mantissa), nor a water spirit {ga
demoniac spirit {yakkha), nor even a god {deva) or
was only a Buddha.20 Similar questions were bei
turies after his death, during the reign of Aśoka,
century bc,21 thus, it became one of the most
topics of discussion in the history of Buddhist tho
The passing away of the Buddha created a big
his followers and admirers. The Mahãparinibbãnasu
incidents in the last days of the Buddha's life s
perpetuate the memory of the Buddha, the Buddh

19 See article on "Buddha," in Encyclopedia of Buddhism, v

20 Ańguttara-nikąya , ed. R. Morris and E. Hardy (Lond
2.38-39; Taishõ 2.28a-b.
21 Kathãvatthu , ed. A. C. Taylor (London: Pali Text Soc

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 KALUPAHANA

to his followers four places of pilgrimage.22 The desire

lowers to have the Buddha as an object of worship
development of the conception of an eternal spiritual bo
of the Buddha.
In the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas, the question whether the
Buddha exists after death was regarded as a metaphysical question and was
left unanswered. It was left unanswered not because, as some Buddhist
scholars seem to think, the Buddha continued after death in a transcenden-
tal form, hence indefinable and indescribable, but because there was no
way of knowing ( na pamāņam atthi ) on the basis of personal experience
whether he continues or not.23 But in the Mahayana tradition, especially
as embodied in texts like Mahãvastu , Lalitavistara , and Saddharmapuņtfarīka -
sütra , Buddha came to be looked upon as one who remained forever ( sada
sthita ),24 and his pannirvāņa came to be considered a mere illusion.25 The
Buddha became a supramundane and immortal person. His body
(rüpakäya) could not represent his real nature. Therefore, the V ajracchedikã
maintains: "The Tathāgata is not to be recognized by means of the marks
on his body."26 The real body of the Buddha is the spiritual body
( dharmakãya ). The Buddha's real body is not only spiritual but cosmic as
well. While the spiritual body is identified with all the constituents of the
universe (sarva-dharma) , it is also considered to be the same as ultimate
reality ( tathatã ). Running through the entire Prajnāpāramitā literature is
the conflict between the nondual {advaya) absolute reality, the dharmakãya ,
and the pluralistic phenomenality. To resolve this conflict we find the
V ajracchedikã adopting the all important standpoint that ultimate reality
is beyond description.
This digression from the discussion of the middle path is necessary to
understand the Madhyamika position. The Madhyamikas, as their name
implies, claim to follow the middle path. But the first Mahayana text

22 Dígha-nikãya, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter (London: Pali Text

Society, 1903), 2.140.
23 See my Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analyńs (Honolulu: University Press of
Hawaii, 1975), chapter 7; also Causality , pp. 178-180.
24 Saddharmapuruļarika-sūtra , ed. U. Wogihara and C. Tsuchida (Tokyo: Seigo Kenkyu-
kai, 1934-1936), P- 271-
25 Ibid., p. 272.
26 Vajracchedikã Prajftãpâramitã, ed. and tr. E. Conze, Sene Orientale Roma xin (Rome:
Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1957), p. 56.

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 MIDDLE PATH

which refers to the middle path and which

Mãdhyamikas themselves is the Kãiyapaparivarta of
is a formative text of the Mahãyãna school that
with great respect by most Mahãyãna teachers and
to our understanding, a statement of the transitio
to Mãdhyamika. Here we come across what appea
the Kaccãyanagotta-sutta , but with a different in
of these versions is more faithful to the original
reads :

"[Everything] exists," Kaśyapa, is one extrem

does not exist," Kaśyapa, is the second extreme.
two extremes, Kaśyapa, is the middle path,
correct perception of things.27

The middle path is further defined in terms of

causation in its progressive and regressive ord
version, the Kāšyapaparivarta> though an extreme
text, seems to vouch for the authenticity of the K
found in the Pali Nikãyas and the Chinese Ā
Nikãya and Agama statement, the two metaph
jected and a middle position embodying a ca
phenomenal world is presented.
The second version found in the Kašyapaparivarta
middle path between two extremes, is very differ
statement reads :

"Self" ( ãtma ), Kaśyapa, is one extreme. "No-self" ( nairãtmya ) is

the second extreme. In between these two extremes is the middle
position that is formless, nonindicative, supportless, noumenal,
signless, and nonconceptual. This, Kaśyapa, is called the middle
path, the correct perception of things.28

Although the two extremes, "self" and "no-self" may relate to the two
extremes, existence and nonexistence mentioned in the Kaccãyanagotta-
sutta , yet the statement as such is conspicuous by its absence in the Nikãyas

27 Kašyapaparivarta of the Ratnaküta-sütra , ed. A. Staël-Holstein (Shanghai: Commercial

Press, 1926), p. 90.
28 Ibid., p. 87.

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 KALUPAHANA

and the Āgamas. There is no doubt that this second ver

tion attempting to explain the development of the
Hindu schools as well as Sarvāstivāda accepted a theor
or something bordering on a theory of "self," the Sa
Buddhism adamantly held on to a theory of "no-se
niķsvabhāva). Naturally, the Mahãyãna doctrine of ultim
in the early Mahãyãna with the Buddha's spiritual body
the "middle" position. But this middle position is no
transcendental; hence the use of the negative character
In the Múlamadhyamakakãrikã , Nãgârjuna refers to th
sütra (i.e., Kaccãyanagotta-sutta) and maintains that
Buddha rejected the two extremes of existence (ast
(nâsti).29 A faithful disciple like Candrakirti was, there
look at this Kãtyãyanâvavãda-sUtra. After observing th
studied in all the schools of Buddhism, he quote
Kaccãyanagotta-sutta in some original version (not in th
version mentioned above).30 But when he had to comme
path he ignores all the versions which refer to the twe
causation and switches on to the second version from t
that has very little in common with the Kaccãyanagott
describes the middle path in negative terms.31
The Kaiyapaparìvarta , therefore, is an invaluable text
of the most controversial subjects in the history of
namely, the transition from early Buddhism to Mahãyã
ing a statement of an empirical theory of causation
background of two metaphysical ideas, it also puts fo
of a linguistically transcendent middle path, thereby r
Prajnāpāramitā doctrine of the indefinable and ind
reality.
Let us examine this "transcendentalism" in more detail. Transcenden-
talism, as pointed out earlier, developed gradually in the Mahãyãna
tradition in connection with the conception of Buddha and reached its
culmination in the Prajnāpāramitā literature. On the other hand, the
Abhidharma scholiasts, engrossed with the doctrines of moments and

29 Múlamadhyamakakãnkã 15.7.
30 MKVy pp. 269-270.
31 Ibid., p. 270.

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 MIDDLE PATH

atoms, presented metaphysical theories of causa

explain the phenomenal world. Both these tren
of the futility of depending on linguistic convent
of explaining reality (paramârtha) , except as a me
The Mãlamadhyamakakãrikã represents one deter
the reality of arising (i utpãda ) and ceasing ( niro
been necessary if one were to hold on to the M
dharmakãya as the eternal and permanent reality,
paramârtha sat, etc. Fortunately for Nāgarjuna, th
Sautrāntikas had created a "conflict in reason"
in such a metaphysical way that he either had to
of things on the basis of an underlying substance o
(i.e., the satkaryavada of the Sarvastivādins) or
substance and therefore arising too (i.e., the l
Sautrāntika asatkãry avãda) . The theory of m
Nāgarjuna to accept arising and passing away w
stance.

Not only was he unable to explain arising and passing away, h

not in a position even to accept relativity as embodied in the state
"When this exists, that exists" (asmin satidam bhavati)?2 This means
tion of any sort could not be explained without falling into one of th
extremes, existence and nonexistence. It is this selfsame idea th
Candrakīrti was attempting to substantiate by repeatedly quoti
quatrain from what was known to him as A navataptahradapasamkram
sütra :

Whatever is born of causes is unborn for it has no arising through

substance. That which is dependent on causes is empty. He who
understands emptiness is diligent.33

This is supplemented by two quotations, (a) from the Majnuśripariprc

and (b) from Äryadhyäyitamufti-sütra. These quotations are found at t
of his commentary to the very important chapter of the Kãrikã
"Examination of the Noble Truths" (. Ãryasatyaparikfã ).34 Both quot

32 Múlamadhyamakakãrikã i.io.
33 MKV , pp. 239, 500, 504 ' yah pratyayair jãyati sa hy ajãtojno tasya utpãdu svabhãv
yah pratyayâdhînu sa sùnya uktoļyaķ sünyatärp. jānati so ' pramattaķ š
3* MKV, pp. 516-517-

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 KALUPAHANA

explain the manner in which one should try to com

Noble Truths. The latter maintains:

By him, Manjuśri, who has seen all dharmas as unborn, unsatis-

factoriness is understood. For him who has seen all dharmas as
unproduced, arising is eliminated. By him who has seen all
dharmas as completely extinguished, nirvana is realized. By him
who has seen all dharmas as absolutely empty, the path has been
cultivated.

This is the very opposite of the argument in the early discourses where
things were considered to be unsatisfactory primarily because they are
impermanent {anicca), which is a synonym for arising and passing away
(uppãdavayd) ,35 As the eight negations indicate, not only arising ( utpāda )
and ceasing ( nirodha ), but also permanence ( šāšvata :) and annihilation
(i uccheda ), identity ( ekârtha ) and difference ( nãnârtha ), coming {agama)
and going ( nirgama ) are concepts not applicable to reality.36 Thus not
only the metaphysical concepts like permanence and annihilation, but
even nonmetaphysical concepts like arising and ceasing cannot be applied
to reality. The Praj ñapar ami tā doctrine of the indescribability of ultimate
reality finds perfect philosophical justification here. The nature and
function of language appear in a different light. Conventional terms
(. sammuti ), which in early Buddhism were symbols agreed upon by popular
consent to denote the various experiences or combinations of experiences,
are now looked upon as deceptive veils ( varaņa ) concealing in every way
{somantad) the true nature of things: hence samvrti .37 Even the dichotomy
between knowledge and the object of knowledge {jñanajñeya) (not subject
and object) is valid only at this level. Ultimate reality is free from such
dichotomy.38 This ultimate reality {paramârtha) is independent, peaceful,
nonconceptual, and is to be experienced {vedya - not "known," jñeya) for
or within oneself {pratyãtma) by the wise one. It cannot be indicated [as
this or that] nor can it be known {na jrnyate) .39
Thus, the Madhyamikas deny the ability to know ultimate reality as an

35 Sarpyutta 1.191» 3.146; Taishõ 2.153c.

36 MKV, p. 3.
37 Ibid., p. 492.
38 Ibid., p. 493; see also p. 135.
39 Ibid.

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 MIDDLE PATH

objective phenomenon. The dichotomy between kn

is emphatically denied. But the possibility of realizi
reality within oneself is recognized. This seems als
very important chapter on the "Examination of El
of the Mãlamadhyamakakãrikã which emphasize
object (draftavya-upašamá)*0 rather than the pacif
upasama ), implying thereby that the latter could
achieving the former. This also explains the basic
Buddhism and Mädhyamika thought as far as an
concepts is concerned, namely, the concept of pra
The term papañca in early Buddhism is under
Hence, papañcopasama as a definition of nibbãna im
obsessions. A person who has eliminated these
not only to know things in the external world as
but also to use the linguistic conventions (sammut
their limits, i.e., without using them to designate
perience. For example, he will be able to use th
ãtman ) as a reflexive pronoun without implying b
transempirical entity, permanent and eternal.
eliminated the root of all obsessions, namely,
papañcavüpasama becomes a synonym for ditthi-vü
all views," where ditthi refers to the manner of s
is not necessary to attain draąlaoyopaśama or pacifi
the complete elimination of the object from on
the Mädhyamika system, since there is a recognit
( paramârtha ) which is nonconceptual ( nirvikalpa
ventional (samvrti), prapañca comes to mean conce
this reason, the Madhyamikas will not be able to e
of "object," hence dra$tavyopaśama. It is extremel
this pacification of the object is presented by Nāg
tion between the two extremes of existence ( as
(nastitva)š How far this position is related to the
the object ( ãlambana ) is not real seems to be an i
In the light of what has been stated above, I p
meaning and significance of the Mülamadhyamaka
middle path. It runs thus :

40 Mülamadhyamakakänkä 5.7.

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 KALUPAHANA

Whatever dependent arising is, that we call emptine

emptiness) is a dependent concept and that itself
path.

Yaķ pratityasamutpādaķ iünyatäm tām pracakąmahe. Sã prajñaptir

upãdãya pratipat saiva madhyamã .41

Candrakïrti's assistance in unravelling the rather abstruse meaning of

this quatrain is extremely valuable. We have already referred to the
Madhyamika argument that whatever is caused or is dependently arisen
is really uncaused or unborn because it does not arise as a result of
"substance" ( svabhãvenânutpatti ). Causation cannot be explained without
admitting a substance. But a substance does not exist in reality. Therefore,
causation or dependent arising is empty. But what about this emptiness
{¿ünyatä) itself? Is emptiness {¿ünyatä) an empty and misleading concept
(, samvrti ), like "substance" (svabhãva)? This is the last thing the
Madhyamikas would want to admit. In fact, a major portion of the
chapter on the "Examination of the Noble Truths" ( Aryasatyaparlkąa ) is
devoted to a refutation of the view that "emptiness" {¿ünyatä) is "nothing-
ness" or "nihilism" ( nâstitva ). Thus, the Madhyamikas are forced to accept
at least one concept that is "dependent" or "denotative" (i upãdãya
prajñapti ), and that is ¿ ünyatä . Sünyatä is not a mere empty concept {samvrti)
but the ultimate truth {paramartha satya ), and therefore, the use of the term
upãdãya prajñapti instead of samvrti to refer to it (although of course, the
terms sammuti , in its original meaning, and paññatti were used synonymously
in early Buddhism). It is identical with tathatã , dharmakãya , Buddha, and
even pratityasamutpãda (in spite of the earlier criticism), all of which were
transcendental and hence described in negative characteristics only. It is
also what has to be experienced or felt ( vedya ) for oneself {pratyãtman)
with the attainment of perfect enlightenment {samyaksambodhi) .
Does this mean that "emptiness" {iünyatä) is substantial? The
Madhyamika reply will certainly be in the negative. Emptiness is not
substantial in the same way as substance is substantial. Similarly, emp-
tiness is not empty in the same way as substance is empty. Emptiness is
empty of conceptual proliferation {prapañcaJünya) and, therefore, non-
conceptual {nirvikalpa) . This is the significance of another oft-quoted
statement defining ultimate reality:

41 Ibid., 24.18.

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 MIDDLE PATH

Independent, peaceful, conceptually nonproli

ceptual, nondiversified - this is the charact
(tattva).

Aparapratyayam šāntam prapañcair aprapañcitam nirvikalpam

anãnârtham etat tattvasya lakfaņam ,42

Now we are in a position to analyse the nature of the middle path

( madhyamã pratipať) referred to in the quatrain quoted earlier. Of the two
extremes, there seems to be no difficulty in identifying the first, i.e.,
existence (astitva). For Nāgarjuna and for all the Mädhyamikas, "exis-
tence" meant the existence of a substantial entity (an ãtma or svabhãva) in
phenomena {dharma). "Nonexistence" ( nâstitva ), therefore, would mean the
absence of any such substantial entity, in other words, absolute nonexis-
tence or nihilism. The middle path that steers clear of these two extremes is,
therefore, the reality ( tathatã,paramârthasat ) that transcends all linguistic ex-
pression {samvrti). This explains the Madhyamika, or even the Mahãyãna,
characterization of the middle path with negative epithets such as form-
less, nonindicative, supportless, noumenal, signless, nonconceptual. This is
not at all different from the philosophy of the Prajnāpāramitā which em-
phasizes the linguistic transcendence of ultimate reality (paraâmrthasatya) .
T. R. V. Murti is credited with having written the most authoritative
account of Madhyamika philosophy. His interpretation, therefore, has in
some way or other influenced the understanding of the doctrines of this
school. Unfortunately, in spite of the excellent analysis of Madhyamika
ideas by Murti, one mistaken interpretation on his part has prevailed in
the Western understanding of Madhyamika philosophy. The mistaken
interpretation is of the following quatrain :
Existence and nonexistence are two extremes;
Purity and impurity - these too are extremes ;
Therefore, having given up the two extremes,
The wise one takes no position in the middle.
Astīti n astīti ubhe 'pi antã
śuddhi aiuddhîti ime 'pi antã
tasmãd ubhe anta vivarjayitvä
madhye 'pi sthãnam na karoti paņditaķ .43

42 Ibid., 18.9; see also MKV, pp. 491, 493.

43 MKV, pp. 135, 270.

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 KALUPAHANA

The conclusion which Murti arrives at on the basis of this statement is

expressed in the following quotation: "It may be thought that in avoiding
the two extremes, the Mãdhyamika takes a middle position between the
two. No; he does not hold any middle position. Or, the middle position is
no position."44 This analysis seems to be the basis of the very popular
view: "Mãdhyamika position is no position ."
Unfortunately, Murti's seems to be a rather strange conclusion. To say
that one should give up two extremes and also the middle position is not
tantamount to saying there is no middle position. If it does, it certainly
seems to be a confusion ( viparyãsa ) not only of linguistic usage but also of
logic. It is one thing to say that one should not grasp on to a middle
position; yet another to say that there is no middle position. In fact,
strange as it may seem, Murti himself then goes on to say, on the basis of
the passages from the Kašyapaparivarta and the Mãdhyamikavrtti quoted
earlier, that the middle position is transcendental in that it is beyond concept
and speech.45 This interpretation of Mãdhyamika philosophy by Murti
has caught the fascination of many a Western scholar who got involved
in the study of the Chinese Buddhist tradition, especially Ch'an or its
Japanese counterpart, Zen. Ch'an is generally understood as denying any
form of transcendentalism even though it seems to contribute to a theory
of linguistic transcendence of ultimate reality. The influence of
Mãdhyamika thought on the development of Ch'an goes uncontroverted.
Therefore, Murti's interpretation of Mãdhyamika philosophy as a doctrine
of "no position" has received wide acceptance, especially because it
harmonizes with the current interpretation of Ch'an.
In addition to the above unwarranted analysis of the Mãdhyamika
statement, the interpretation of Mãdhyamika philosophy as one of "no
position" seems to stem from the undue emphasis on, or, more specifically,
the wrong understanding of the purpose of, the reductio ad absurdum
( prãsangika ) method adopted by Nãgârjuna. It is true that in the refutation
of the two extremes of existence and nonexistence Nãgârjuna utilized the
reductio ad absurdum method of not accepting any one of the views, but
merely using one to refute the other. His use of this method was confined
to a refutation of the phenomenal reality only . But he does not appear to
have used it in order to reject the two truths, phenomenal or conventional

44 The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 129.
45 Ibid. ; see note 4.

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 MIDDLE PATH

(samvrti) and ultimate (paramârtha) , though th

taken to constitute two extremes like "purity"
to in the above quatrain quoted from Candrakīr
emphatically asserted the existence of ultimate real
sat) though he held it to be beyond conceptual thi
existent or nonexistent, falls under the category o
In conclusion, it may be said that the last m
Buddhism - Yogâcâra as represented in the Madh
tion of the Middle Path and the Extremes) of Maitr
existence (sat) of the middle position between the t
(sat) and nonexistence ( asat ).46 Existence, for the
ideation" ( abhütaparikalpa , i.e., ideation with
phenomena). Nonexistence was of substance (dr
tween these two extremes, says Vasubandhu in
bhaąya, is existence (sattva) of emptiness (śUnyata),
between absolute emptiness (ekântena śUnya) an
(ekantenaśUnya) . This, according to Vasubandhu, is
Praināpāramitā statements such as: "All is neither empty nor non-
empty."47
This analysis of the middle path creates another problem. If absolute
emptiness is one extreme and absolute nonemptiness is another, what
could be the middle position? The Madhyamikas maintained that the
middle position is nonconceptual and therefore, indefinable and inde-
scribable. But for the Yogâcârins, this is existence, i.e., transcendental
existence (paramârtha sat). If so, what remains is the phenomenal which
the Madhyamikas had treated under the conventional (samvrti). For the
Yogâcârins, this is not a sensible position, for the phenomenal is not
always identical with the conventional considered to be absolutely empty
(śUnya) . On the one hand, there are conventions that are absolutely empty,
hence abhütaparikalpa , i.e., mere conceptual construction. There are, on
the other hand, conventions that embody phenomenal reality. This
third level of truth or reality is substantial (dravyataķ sat), although it is
not identical with the Sarvastivāda "substance" (svabhãva). It is compara-

46 Madhyântavibhãga 1.2. See Madhyântavibhãgabhãsya , ed. G. M. Nagao (Tokyo:

Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), p. 18: na sûnyam nâpi câsûnyam tasmât sarvarņ vidhiyate
satvãd asatvãt satvãc ca madhyamã pratipac ca sã.
47 Madhyântavibhãgabhãsya , p. 18.

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 KALUPAHANA

ble to the Sautr antika conception of "specific characteris

(discussed above).48 The recognition of this third level of
seems to have been prompted by the need to accomodate t
reality which the Mãdhyamikas denied when they conside
(except those such as iünyatä indicating the ultimate reali
and unreal. Hence the Madhyântavibhãga statement re
degrees of truth - (i) sat or existence, i.e., ultimate rea
sat), (2) asat or nonexistence, i.e., emptiness with reg
{svabhãva) or self ( ãtman ), i.e., conceptual constructi
existence, i.e., existence of specific characteristics (sv
These were the very same degrees of truth embodied in t
triad - (1) the ultimate ( parinifpanna ), (2) the conceptual
and (3) the relative ( paratantra ), respectively. This middle
unique in that it is not a middle position between two rej
but a third position.
These different interpretations of the middle path in th
schools would certainly enable the unprejudiced schol
manner in which the Buddhist doctrine underwent develo
out the centuries since its first enunciation by Siddhâ
Buddhagayâ.

48 Sakv, p. 524: Trìvidharri hi Yogâcarãnãrp, sat , paramârtha sarjW

Dravyataķ svalak$aņatah sad dravya-sad iti. Note the nonuse of the ter
dravya , although, defining the Sarvāstivāda conception, Yaáom
svabhãva evaißrji svalak§aņarji (see note 11).

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