High Enlightenment I
High Enlightenment I
Seminar (08-02-2016)
In the seminars, the book “Du Contrat Social” (1762) by Rousseau is read and discussed.
Rousseau
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was born in Geneva, which was a protestant republic at the
time. Although he didn’t have any formal education, he was able to educate himself, partly due to his
father’s1 library.
Rousseau became active in Paris in the 1750’s. By then he was quite known already. In the seminar,
three reasons are given for this:
Rousseau could be considered as the “odd one out” in the Parisian milieu. Apart from being Swiss,
Rousseau was also (on a personal basis) a very strange man! Voltaire, among many others, despised
him, and the feeling was mutual. He even managed to get in an argument with David “Le Bon David”
Hume, who has said that Rousseau was “the strangest man he ever met”.
Rousseau was the first philosopher in the Enlightenment who shifted attention (from science and
religion) to the political realm2. According to him, this realm was the “real problem”. This is apparent
from the first phrase from The Social Contract: “Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains.”
1
Rousseau’s father, Isaac Rousseau, was a watchmaker, and also known to be a rather peculiar man. When
Jean-Jacques was ten years old, Isaac was forced to leave Geneva after fighting a duel.
2
At this moment in the seminar, someone asked if Montesquieu couldn’t be considered the first political
philosopher. Prof. van Bunge’s answer to this, was that Montesquieu was much more “timid”.
Enlightenment
In the 2nd half of the 18th century, political demands were developed in the Enlightenment. Rousseau
was “L’Homme de la Situation”, the man in the right place at the right time, in this political edge.
Values of the Enlightenment in the late 17th and early 18th century:
• Equality, tolerance. Europeans had enough of the religious wars tearing up the continent.
• Appreciation of the natural sciences. Before the Enlightenment, science was not a societal
force, but now, it gained authority. This is a new phenomenon.
• Common admiration of classical antiquity. For example, Cicero was often quoted, Hume died
“like a Roman”, and architecture was based on antiquity. Until 1750, with classical antiquity
was meant Roman antiquity. After 1750, Greece was “discovered”. The admiration for
classical antiquity comes with a problem: how is it possible to admire antiquity while
considering oneself modern, like the philosophers of the Enlightenment?
Back to Rousseau
The first French Revolutionists admired Rousseau, and often referred to his work. He was seen as the
intellectual author of the revolution. In 1794, Rousseau was re-buried in the Pantheon, among other
French greats. The link between Rousseau and the French Revolution is dangerous: his work were not
a blueprint for the revolution. There is a risk of teleology: a reason or explanation for something in
function of its end, purpose or goal. Was the French Revolution, and the toppling of the Anciènne
Régime, the purpose of the French Enlightenment? In other words, was something bound to happen
(after Rousseau’s writings)? Most historians don’t think so. The writings of Rousseau helped
revolutionaries to justify their actions, the writings provided them with arguments. When the French
Revolution turns nasty, it becomes tricky to rely on Rousseau’s writings.
On contract theories
When looking at a theory, you should ask yourself: “What question does it answer? “ In contract
theories, the question is “Why are there societies?” The traditional answer to this is Natural Law.
Think of Aristoteles’ ζῷον πολιτικόν. Closely related to natural law, is the theory of divine right (“God
wanted Kings to rule over society”). These natural theories were destroyed in 1651 by Thomas
Hobbes.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), also known as The Monster of Malmesbury, was a materialist, and
possibly an atheist. In his book Leviathan (1651), Hobbes looks at man in a state of nature, and
comes to the conclusion that man fights each other, for two reasons:
However, we’re not just desiring beings, but also reasonable beings: we are able to think about our
future. It is reasonable to leave the state of nature, and enter the state of law. In this state of law
we…
This state of law, however, is artificial. It is a ruse. He thought there were no such things as “good” or
“bad”. We consider what we like good, and we consider that which is harmful bad.
John Locke (1632-1704) picks up Hobbes’ theory, but makes it more “accessible”. In 1690, Locke
wrote two treatises of government. According to these treatises, God wants us to respect, even in
nature, four aspects of life:
Locke says it is nearly impossible to protect property without authority: the desire of neighbors is
infinite. We need laws to protect what is ours. The main purpose of the state is protection. Yet there
is a possibility of abjuration (the denying of a King), in case he (or she) fails in his task (for example,
the English Glorious Revolution in 1688).
The opening line of the book is: “Man is born free, but everywhere he lives in chains”. The way we
live does not correspond with our nature. “Man, by nature, are free, and equal” (note: liberté,
égalité). Rousseau returns to the distinction between a state of nature and a state of law. Why is man
free by nature? According to Aristotle, some men are natural slaves. There has also always been
slavery throughout history. Rousseau is opposed to this. The main question is, how to maintain
liberty, or rather, how to live in a state without losing your original liberty? We have to establish a
state that’s closest to our nature, and enter a social contract.
Volonté générale (general will): The will which expresses the most general will shared by all. When
subjecting to this will, in the end, you subject to yourself: your interest is the general will. This way,
freedom and equality (liberté et égalité) are preserved. It is important not to confuse the general will
with the volonté de tous (will of all). The latter is sum of the will of all people. Keeping notice of this
distinction is important in “unlocking” The Social Contract.
Lecture (11-02-2016)3
The Times
The High Enlightenment starts around 1750: something changes, the temperature rises. Voltaire gets
angry, and starts using clandestine manuscripts. In the 1750’s, the French censorships gets in trouble.
Up until then, they were pretty successful, but this success collapses: the market floods with radical
material. Some censors even start collaborating with radical authors.
In 1747, the first radical materialistic book is published: L’Homme Machine, by Julien Offray de La
Mettrie.
In 1751, The Encyclopédie sur les arts et les sciences is published, edited by Diderot and D’Alembert.
Due to problems with censorship, the Encyclopédie was republished in 1772. Many articles in the
Encyclopédie were critical of the church and the courts.
In 1715, Louis XV (1710-1774) succeeds Louis XIV at the age of 5. At first he is loved, and has the
nickname Louis le bien aimé, however, later he is disgusted. Despite being successful in wars, he was
a clumsy diplomate. He also failed horribly at having the nobility pay taxes (the nobility argued that
they put their lives on the edge for France, and therefore should not pay taxes). Louis XV also had a
mistress, Mme De Pompadour, who was hated by the public, and caused a lot of rumors (like the
later Marie Antoinette). The declining popularity of Louis XV was one of the instigators of the rising
of temperature during the High Enlightenment.
Materialism
We make a distinction between natural philosophy (D’Holbach) and political philosophy (Rousseau).
The oldest school of Greek philosophy, is that of the pre-Socratics, such as Epicurus (341-270 BC) and
Lucretius (99-55 BC), whose work “De rerum natura” was rediscovered in 1417. These philosophers
from a long materialistic tradition, posed materialistic questions.
18th century materialists make two claims:
Because of Christianity, De rerum natura had been lost for a long time, due to claims of materialism,
and the denial of providence and a mortal soul. The phrase ‘All we are is dust’ was a source of
consolation to Epicurus and Lucretius. Without a soul, there is no reason to dear death, since there
will be no judgement. Lucretius explains this in five steps:
3
There might be some overlap in information between the seminar and the lecture.
4. When something is not bad for us, it would be irrational to fear it.
5. Fear of death is irrational.
The above reasoning is supposed to lead to a state of ‘ataraxia’ (Αταραξία): a robust state of
tranquility, characterized by enjoying freedom from stress and worry.
According to Cicero, the point of philosophy is to prepare people for dying.4 Lucretius’ script was
recovered, largely in German monasteries (written in beautiful Latin!). It would contribute a lot to
the first atheist movement. In the 1650s, Theophrastus redivivus was published, being the first
explicitly atheist philosophical script after the Middle Ages. Articulated atheism as we know it now,
became thinkable in the 1650s, and Lucretius played a major role.
This atheism was immediately countered by Descartes (1596-1650) and Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655).
These thinkers were however amazed by Lucretius. This shows in, for example, Descartes’ notion of
res extensa. Descartes’ substance dualism led to problems: how do the two ‘states’ interact with
each other? In 1747, Julien de La Mettrie’s L’Homme Machine is published. In this book, La Mettrie
returns to Cartesianism, but ‘skips’ res cogitans. According to La Mettrie, two things are necessary:
D’Holbach
• Le Système de la Nature (1770), consisting of two volumes, the first of which consists of a
completely materialist approach to nature. Matter is different, changing compounds of
matter. The nature of matter depends on its atomic composition. Man is nature, and
thoughts are properties of matter in motion.
• La Morale Universelle (1776)
4
I don’t know why this is mentioned, but it’s in my notes at this point. Same goes for other information that
might seem random.
• Éthocratie (1776)
D’Holbach says (in the 1st part of Le Système de la Nature) that material properties are in themselves
immaterial. We don’t know how these depend on matter, for example, how they produce memory. If
there is no such thing as a body (e.g. in death or before being born), there is no such thing as a soul.
The only reason to believe in a soul is religion.
In the 2nd part of the book, D’Holbach tries to answer the question of why it is that the notion of
there being no thought when there is no body has escaped us for so long. The reason for this, is that
we have all been blinded by theological spiritualism! This is a myth, and so is God, the immaterial
soul and free will. D’Holbach exemplifies the moment where Deism (God ‘left’ after creating the
world, Voltaire: ‘we need Christian morals’) crumbles: Christian morality is considered harmful, an
obstacle to achieving happiness. It’s important to note that in the 17th and 18th centuries, atheism
was considered to be a moral attitude. D’Holbach marks the point of ‘full-fledged’ atheism. What
does a full and happy life look like, according to D’Holbach? He solves moral problems with the help
of Hobbes and Spinoza. There is a psychological role in behavior, according to Hobbes’ law of self-
preservation. To realize happiness (acc. to D’Holbach), we first have to remove sources of ignorance.
For example, the ignoring of nature will result in the denial of Man’s general interests.
This impressed quite a few 19th-century philosophers, such as Marx and Nietzsche, however, in his
own time, D’Holbach failed to reach a wider audience. Goethe reminisces about reading D’Holbach in
Wahrheit und Dichtung (1811-14, book XI), at the height of romanticism: he couldn’t understand how
this was such a dangerous book, because he thought it was loathsome, and terrible. A whole
generation of German intellectual was disgusted by D’Holbach. Quote: “D’Holbach treats of nature,
as if it were a corpse, an object of scientific inquiry.” (In romanticism, there was a large significance
to nature, and it should be encountered spiritually. Actually, it is quite difficult to define
romanticism.) At the end of the 18th century, the thinkers were no longer in Paris. Thinkers such as
Goethe, Herder and Wiland were fascinated by another thinker: Rousseau. This marks a shift in
attention to politics.
1. Rousseau is a product of the French Enlightenment, but when he is active he has left it
already, and marks the start of something new.
2. He is also associated closely with the French Revolution. In 1794, 16 years after his death, his
remains are placed in the Pantheon of Paris.
3. Rousseau could be considered the 1st “hippy”, meaning he invents the notion of a counter-
culture.
Rousseau was born in Geneva, in a Calvinist milieu. His father had a library, which enabled Rousseau
to be self-taught. At the age of 15, Rousseau is ‘adopted’ by a 28 year old Baroness: Rousseau
becomes her ‘toyboy’ (as eloquently stated by Wiep). At the age of 25 Rousseau ‘gets money’ (how is
not mentioned, nor very important) and starts traveling. He writes music, and later on, writes the
musical entries for L’Encyclopédie. He enters a contest by the Académie de Dijon, in which the
question “What does progress in arts and sciences mean for our ethics?” is posed. According to
Rousseau, the arts and sciences have estranged Man from its natural goodness and liberty, and
society poses harmful ‘chains’ on Man.
In his 1st discourse, Rousseau uses historical arguments. One of these arguments is based on the
competition between the ancient Athenians and Spartans. According to Rousseau, these ‘barbaric’
Spartans (recall 300, then tone down the image) were superior. They also won over Athens.
For another argument, Rousseau uses Germania (+/- 98 AD), written by Publius Cornelius Tacitus, a
book considered to be ‘dangerous’. This is a Roman book, on Northern Europe (that is, Europe to the
north of the Alps). Romans were scared of the Germans: Germany was “not Rome”. Tactius wrote an
analysis of the, more or less, 30 tribes of Northern Europe: this was a mirror to the decay in Rome.
These ‘barbarians’ might have been barbaric, but at least they were prepared to die for their liberty.
They were savages, but they had virtues, like the Romans’ forefathers. This book brought the myth of
man untainted by civilization, and the ‘mythology’ of the German (the book was also used by Himler
in the 2nd World War). Using these examples, Rousseau launches his concept of the ‘noble savage’:
this is the first step to writing Du contrat social.
Rousseau studied how the transition from the state of nature to the state of law happens according
to Hobbes. According to Hobbes, life in the state of nature is short, nasty and brute. Before the
establishment of a state, Man is pushed forward by desire: self-preservation. The ‘will’ knows no
bounds. The means, however, are limited. Naturally, war (over property) will erupt (homo homini
lupus, man is a wolf among men). But, man is also a reasonable being, able to calculate the future.
Thus we develop a notion of law, and good and bad (what we dislike is evil, what we like is good).
Thus, we enter a state of law: we draw a contract. We ‘hand in our swords’, and create an authority
(a sovereign).
According to Rousseau, Hobbes’ ‘transition’ is based on a misunderstanding. The notion of property
doesn’t exist in the state of nature (quoth Rousseau). Also, according to Rousseau, Man is not just
equal, Man is also good. Only in the state of law, qualifying people as rich or poor, evil comes to life.
In nature, people use, and do not own. The answer to the problem, is the source of the problem.
This begs to question: is a state with respect for our natural state possible?
Rousseau questioned the very idea of ownership, and this made him the ‘odd one out’ (his views
were, for example, quite different from those of D’Holbach, host of the salons). He was also the odd
one out because of his behavior; he had problems with Voltaire and Hume, and even managed to be
disliked by Diderot. Rousseau thought the behavior of the philosophes was artificial (the jokes, the
wigs, the shoes). He thought they were alienated from their true selves, and that the goings on in the
salons was a masquerade.
In 1762, Rousseau has become seriously famous. His book Julie is an international bestseller. He is
very well known for the first line of Du contrat social: “Man is born free, but lives in chains.” He
thinks civilization has created inequality. How to take back our equality? Society must be the
authority. Rousseau wants to attain as much personal liberty as possible, without saying “Fuck the
law” (quoth Wiep). How is this possible?
A. Subject yourself to the volonté générale, the general will. Note that his is quite different from
the volonté de tous, which is the sum of all wills! The general will is directed at the interest of
all, of the community.
B. Next, give up your particular personal interests for a moment. Then, realize that the general
will serves your interest as well. In the general will, you subject yourself to yourself as a
member of society. Everyone who is not prepared to do so should be forced: forced to
realize that there only is freedom in subjection, and unconditional surrender. Everyone is
equally powerless. The power of the sovereign is absolute, only the sovereign can serve the
bien public and the volonté générale. Therefore, we need to find a lawgiver, able to defend
our individual liberty against outside forces.
The social contract is a political analysis. Another work of Rousseau, also published in 1762, is Émile:
a novel about the education of one single boy. This book is more or less the ‘other way round’: a
book on how to educate a human as a free being, in a state, while remaining true to the self. The
notion of the authentic self is used, the “true me”. It is weird Rousseau would write such a book,
because he gave all his five children away to an orphanage. He admitted to this himself is his
Confessions (“about a true human being”). Rousseau comes with a message from antiquity, more
specifically stoicism: follow your nature, and never order a child to learn something. Watch the child
patiently in nature, and give it something when it needs something. Wait long to teach the child how
to read. (This is quite different from the Christian notion of paradise: we come from paradise, but the
fall comes, and the rot sets in. There are similar stories in Greek mythology. In these stories, the
Golden Age is always at the beginning of creating, and afterward, we’re always in decline.)
Possibly Rousseau’s most influential novel was Julie, a sentimental novel. It was very popular, due to
the start of a culture of sensibility. In this culture, there is a new awareness of the ‘depth of the
human soul’. People get fascinated by the emotional side of human nature. Grown men and women
start to faint and cry in public, which is considered to be a sign of good taste. Rousseau tapped into
this. He received letters from all over Europe, telling him his readers cried during the novel, and
asking question like “How did it end with such-and-such?” This type of emotional fiction is something
new. Something is changing, and Rousseau knows what: people develop a strong sense of empathy, a
social virtue, allowing people to experience the joy and pain other people feel. In Émile, Rousseau
writes empathy is one of the main social values.
By the end of the 18th century, emotions were considered very important. Public executions, for
example, were banned, because the public couldn’t stand them any longer. According to Professor
Lynn Hunt (1945), the culture of empathy was a crucial element for the development of human
rights. This culture was created in novels, and used by Rousseau. Another example of this, are the
first sustained efforts to fight slavery. In the USA, for example, the argument against slavery is tipped
by the book Uncle Tom’s Cabin. This is all a part of Rousseau’s legacy. Partly because of Rousseau,
German Idealism begins, and Romanticism too.
Between 1430 and 1833 philosophers used the history of philosophy to define philosophy and to
better philosophize themselves. The history of philosophy has been studied with renewed vigor since
1926, when Emile Bréhier stated his newly developed method rejected Hegelian constructs. In 1979,
Giovanni Santinello work studies around 160 historians of philosophy. This new historical approach,
enabled us to see how the retelling of philosophy’s history created philosophy as we now know it,
and how the history of philosophy raised question for philosophers.
In the 15th and 16th centuries, the history of philosophy drew on a variety of traditions, using
recovered texts that ranged from Plato to the Kabbalah. In the 18th century, these texts were still
important for shaping the philosophy canon, even though many of the texts were found to be
forgeries. In the 19th century, said texts were part of the discussion too.
In 1432 Ambrogio Traversari’s Latin translation of Diogenes Laertius’ “Lives of Eminent Philosophers”
made Epicurean philosophy available. This Epicurean philosophy was reworked by Pierre Gassendi,
resulting in the first coherent and rigorous system of natural and moral philosophy, rejecting the
Aristotelean concept of matter. The information supplied by Diogenes was used by Bayle in his
Dictionaire, comparing them to new and conflicting facts found in the 17th century. He did this using
the technique of historical skepticism, examining discrepancies among sources. From this, we can
conclude it is important to be aware of multiple sources that were drawn upon for the
characterization of a philosopher and his philosophy. Diogenes claimed philosophy started with the
Greeks. The discussion over this claim involves debate over the nature of philosophy itself.
Neoplatonists claim philosophy started in the east, pointing at a continuity of a philosophical
tradition. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, in a variety of this tradition called “concordist”, held that it
was not possible to follow only one philosophical sect but that true philosophy must understand the
historical development that had caused the flowering of the various philosophical schools and their
doctrines.
In Renaissance and 17th century discussions of history of philosophy there was a universal belief that
‘sapientia’, meaning wisdom or philosophy, began with the Hebrews, Zoroaster or Hermes
Trismegistus. A different version of this belief can be found among Aristoteleans. The Jesuit Francisco
Toledo (1532-1592) based his notion of the development of philosophical knowledge on Aristotelian
logic, opposing Neoplatonists, who held there was one truth in philosophy since the beginning of
time. According to Toledo, mankind first wanted to place all things under one concept, however
later, though mover from the general to the particular. Basic to the notion of philosophical progress
is a definition of human nature that permits human thinking to develop. Toledo was interested in
differences among philosophers, not similarities. He also though philosophy did not begin with the
Greeks, but with Adam and the patriarchs, who brought wisdom to Egypt, &c.
Not everyone was happy with the new interest in Greek philosophy, which was, after all, pagan.
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s cousin, Gianfrancesco, thought that because the Greeks had not had
revelation, they were “lit by the excessive fire of self-love”. He also attacked the prisca theologia5 of
Orpheus and Hermus Trismegistus, because it was a philosophy aimed at obtaining knowledge of
5
Prisca theologia staat voor een soort universele wijsheid die zou zijn voorafgegaan aan de christelijke traditie.
10
things, not wisdom, as Pythagoras advocated. Gianfrancesco praised the Sceptics because they
clearly identified Greek philosophy. Gianfrancesco also held that the uncertainty of pagan philosophy
made it impossible for a Christian to follow its thought.
In 1723, Brucker wrote an anti-Platonic critique: “Historia philosphia doctrinae de ideis”. This first
complete history of a philosophical doctrine studied the concept of “idea”, and criticized the notion
of both a prisca theologia or prisca sapientia6, defending knowledge based on perception. In the 17th
century, both history of philosophy and philosophy were written as the history of philosophy of one
philosophical sect. The writer Gassendi reworks and develops the formula used by Toledo to explain
the historical development of logic (but does not see its highest point in Aristotle). Gassendi saw
Francis Bacon as a hero of modern logic, because of his inductive reasoning and rejection of
syllogistic reasoning. He also condemns Descartes because of his dogmatism, and holding that
perception gives false information about the material world. Furthermore, Gassendi’s comment that
the Kabbalah was not Scientia was the beginning of an important distinction between the sapientia
of the priest and the sapientia, or philosophia, of the philosopher (a distinction later developed by
Thomasius and Brucker). Georg Daniel Morhof’s “Polyhistor philosophicus” (wr. 1692, pub. 1708)
rejected both prisca theologia and prisca scientia completely. Interested in the new science, he
rewrote the history of philosophy to give the new scientific tradition a history.
Two ways of reacting to the endless possibilities among the different philosophies were skepticism
and eclecticism. Piere-Daniel Huet writes about no philosophical system being completely satisfying,
therefore advocating a modified skepticism, guided by the skepticism of the Church Fathers. On the
other hand, philosophers of history who exposed a method of eclecticism, which selected specific
tenets from among the doctrines of various philosophers to find a new and correct philosophy,
sought to find order in the variety. The most influential of these was Brucker, who wrote both a
history of truth as a history of error. He also traced the history of philosophy by testing philosophers
for their method of natural philosophy, criticizing Plato because his concept of “Idea” was not based
on sense perception. Brucker was a real historian, and he studied how discrete concepts were tested
and developed through time. It was evident to him that it was not until philosophers constructed
their systems based on their own thought that philosophy could develop as it should have.
Tennemann, follower of Kant, wrote “Geschichte der Philosophie” (1798-1818) and “Grundriss”
(1812). Tennemann was the first to impose a systematic view of how thought had functioned in
philosophy on the history of philosophy, classifying philosophers between the dogmaticists and
critical sceptics. He said philosophy began when people began to form an unclear notion but
philosophy only began through self-knowledge and abstract reason.7 For him, humanity was impelled
to seek a systematic completeness of thought. He also described skepticism as an ongoing critique of
dogmatism, running through the whole history of philosophy, in contrast to Brucket, who thought
that the skepticism of, for example, Bayle, could lead to either Catholic dogmatism or atheism.
Brucker and Tennemann also had different views on Descartes. The first saw him as a natural
philosopher, the latter as a metaphysician. We have come to a radically different tradition here.
6
Prisca sapientia: sacred wisdom and also the ancient wisdom that was revealed to Adam and Moses directly
by God.
7
Deze vreemde zin heb ik letterlijk uit Popkin overgenomen.
11
Rather than having newly recovered texts open up philosophy and with it philosophical
possibilities, we have a philosophical view remolding the past.
12
Seminar (15-02-2016)
When reading Rousseau, make sure you keep noticing the difference between amoral and immoral,
the first being having no sense of moral, like nature, the latter being having a sense of moral but
going against it.
Political Philosophy
One way of doing political philosophy is describing what an ideal state looks like (e.g. Plato’s
Republic). Rousseau is not presenting us with said image. What he is trying to do, is to formulate a
new political language, to point the way towards improvement, and to assess the current situation.
Writing a book on politics is an intervention. This again raises the question if the French Revolution
was bound to happen. Van Bunge doesn’t think so, for example, it could have been averted if Louis
XVI was cleverer.
We look at England.8 There is a civil war from 1642 to 1651, and in 1660, the restoration starts.
Thomas Hobbes (also mentioned in Week 1), like Rousseau, has an idea for an indivisible strong
sovereign. During the English civil war, regicide (the killing of a king) took place. At the time, the king
was considered to be a semi-mythological figure, whose “royal touch” could even cure people from
certain diseases. Hobbes however, wanted to get rid of the sovereign’s weak foundation, and
thought it doesn’t have to be a king.
To create a political language, Rousseau coins a number of concepts, like the meaning of sovereignty
&c. A bit like Spinoza’s definitions at the beginning of his Ethica. Rousseau succeeds in using these
coined terms, since his language becomes the language of the masses. A 2nd tip in reading Rousseau:
try to pick one or two crucial lines from each section (this doesn’t work for all philosophical works,
like Plato’s Dialogues).
Grotius (Hugo de Groot, 1583-1645) makes an argument in favor of slavery. This is wrong according
to Rousseau, because Grotius’ argument is based on the notion of the right of the strongest: an
illegal basis.
Another reading tip: when you encounter a line you cannot understand, just READ ON. This will often
happen when reading ancient texts (even Van Bunge has this problem!).
Rousseau introduces a political language that is also used by Marx (e.g. Alienation/Verfremdung).
The understanding of a new concept can lead to changes in worldview.
Jacob Talmon (1916-1980) wrote a book on the origins of totalitarianism, in which he criticizes
Rousseau. Although Rousseau’s philosophy is aimed at liberating the individual, it ends up being the
blueprint of the totalitarian state. A lesson to be drawn from this: “As soon as somebody tells you
what’s good for you, be alarmed” (quoth Talmon).
8
To look at the development of the tradition of political philosophy Rousseau also dabbles in.
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The Times
Most historians tend to regard the Enlightenment as a unitary movement, yet cultural historians
rather point out various Enlightenments, instead of just one. At the time of the Enlightenment,
French was the lingua franca, even Dutch novelists often published exclusively in French. However,
French culture and language was sometimes met with hostility. Young intellectuals in “Germany” are
getting frustrated. “Deutschland” didn’t exist yet as such, and neither did the Holy Roman Empire
exist anymore, because it disintegrated. At the heart of the HRE, there was Austria, where German
was spoken. In the German lands, however, people start to ignore the Emperor. All over Germany,
attempts are made to establish small states, and head towards modernization. Princes start to
establish and cultivate universities, in order to professionalize the middle class. These princes also
start supporting culture, like journals, music &c. The professions that are most in demand, are
lawyers and theologians, because of their guiding function. The Dutch republic, in the 18th century,
was an urban society; Germany was not. Driven by a need for modernization, German princes start
copying the cultural offensive of Louis XIV. In the 18th century, Germany starts to recover from the
Thirty Years War (1618-1648)9. Universities start doing well. They adopt the German vernacular10,
and abandon Latin as some of the first universities. Although Latin gives access to the antiquity, it no
longer gives access to science, which is written in the vernacular. France, then Gaule, had been part
of the Roman Empire, Germany had not (this accounts for the language-difference). Also, Germany
broke away from the Catholic Church in 1517, during the Reformation.
On Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), a professor of law at a minor German university, in five points:
1. He held his lecture Discours welcher Gestalt man denen Fransozen im gemeinen Leben und
Wandel nachahnen sollte on the 31st of October, 168711, on copying French culture.
2. He argues for the separation of state and church (in Germany, one had to follow whatever
religion the prince subscribed to).
3. He was one of the 1st opponents of the witch-craze (which is not a medieval, but an early
modern phenomenon!), and he lectures publically against it.
4. He argues for reforms in penal law. For example, he is against torture: it doesn’t help in
finding the truth.
5. He became most famous for rediscovering the tradition of natural law.
9
The Thirty Years' War was a series of wars in Central Europe between 1618 and 1648. It was one of the
longest, most destructive conflicts in European history. Initially a war between Protestant and Catholic states in
the fragmenting Holy Roman Empire, it gradually developed into a more general conflict involving most of the
great powers of Europe, becoming less about religion and more a continuation of the France–Habsburg rivalry
for European political pre-eminence. (Wikipedia)
10
A vernacular or vernacular language is the native language or native dialect of a specific population,
especially as distinguished from a literary, national or standard language, or a lingua franca used in the region
or state inhabited by that population. (Wikipedia)
11
On the 31st of October, Reformation day is celebrated in Germany, remembering the start of the
Reformation on that day in 1517, when Luther pinned his 95 theses on the door of the All Saints Church in
Wittenberg.
14
Thomas Hobbes had tried to destroy natural law in his book Leviathan. According to him, there are
“no laws in nature.” Anthony Pagden (1945) argues we had to get rid of natural law, in order to
develop human science theories. Often, natural law theories were used in a conservative stance: If
God created nature, he would have done so with a reason, there is no 2nd hand nature. From this
Leibniz concludes we live in the best of all possible worlds. This is a conservative argument. Like this,
slavery was defended with natural law theories. Siep Stuurman (1946) argues that natural law
theories were crucial in coming up with Enlightenment ideas: there is also a left-wing use of natural
law theories. For example, Christian Wolff’s (1679-1754) lecture, Oratio de Sinarum philosophia
practica in Halle, 1721, on the philosophy of the Chinese. Wolff studied Confucianism. Wolff
concluded, that from a moral point of view, the Chinese demonstrated that we do not need a
Christian tradition to distinguish between good and bad. It is a reason-based philosophy. If nature is
morally charged, the morale is findable through reason. From this, Wolff concluded there is no need
for religion, and that the similarities between cultures are far more interesting than the differences.
If natural law holds everywhere, it must hold for all human beings. This tolerance of other cultures
can also be seen in Pierre Bayle, who thought it a mistake to think of “kaffirs” as immoral beings,
because of the natural sense of equity. This argument was used to argue against the slave-trade.
Aufklärung
The German Enlightenment is also known as the Aufklärung. Lawyers played a large role12. Lutheran
theology rejected the authority of the Catholic Church, for example when it comes to interpretation
of the scripture. Especially Pietism (Pietismus)13 did much to prepare many tenants of the
Aufklärung. This movement was somewhat similar to puritanism. We consider three characteristics
of the Aufklärung:
Many German princes were fearful of Pietists. The secular authorities were scared too: it was never
clear whether or not radicals would obey, there was no trust. Yet, slowly, Pietism was accepted, and
the face of Lutheranism changed gradually.
J.J. Semler (1725-1791) and J.J. Spalding (1714-1804) headed a liberal theology. This differs from
what is happening in France, since it is a fight against a different church. Semler coined the principle
of accommodation: it is a mistake to take the scripture literally, it should be a continuing attempt of
accommodation when applying it in daily life. According to him (Semler), the Bible is a series of
stories by God, directed at his people. Just stories, and fables, so do not take them literally! It’s
somewhat like Roman rhetoric (e.g. Cicero). In rhetoric, the way a message is brought across is
important. The first ‘lesson’ in doing so, is to accommodate oneself to the capacities of one’s
audience. When the Bible brings us the phrase “Christ is God becoming a man”, we need
accommodation, because this is just a way of speaking.
12
This, again, seems like a random statement in my notes.
13
Pietism was an influential movement within Lutheranism that combined the 17th century Lutheran principles
with the Reformed emphasis on individual piety and living a vigorous Christian life. (Wikipedia)
15
The Aufklärung was not a clash between science and theology! This can
also be seen in examples from other countries, such as the deeply
religious scientist Newton. Science and religion only become a problem in
Darwin. The idea of a clash between the two comes from the Counter
Enlightenment. Just before his death, Lessing had a long talk with
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819). Here, Lessing stressed the
importance of irrational tendencies in man. He also admitted to be a
secret admirer of Spinoza (1632-1677), who was regarded as a dangerous atheist at the time.
Spinoza was the first philosopher who turned atheism into a clever system. Jacobi was shocked! He
started to study Spinoza feverishly, and published works on Spinoza, which resulted in the
Pantheismusstreit (1785- ). In his work, Jacobi concludes that rationalism leads to atheism, and that
Spinoza was the most extreme rationalist. No wonder he ended up an atheist! Jacobi’s work was
often disputed, and called irrationalism.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) was very much impressed by Spinoza! He, and Johann
Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803), read Spinoza very differently than D’Holbach did. They found
Spinoza fascinating because of his “all is one” idea: man lives in nature, and nature is God, so man
lives in God. If man reaches a philosophical understanding of nature, this leads to intellectual love of
God (this was ignored by D’Holbach). These ideas became very popular in Germany.
16
Let’s take a look at Jacobi’s closest opponents: Goethe and Herder. Goethe was disgusted by
D’Holbach, he thought he turned nature into a corpse. Goethe was even through with French
philosophy. The willingness of German philosophers to take another look at “toter Hund” Spinoza,
shows a desire for depth. French Enlightenment philosophers, like Voltaire, were considered
shallow. In German philosophy, the period of Sturm und Drang took the stage (1770-1790). German
philosophers looked for depth in nature and the human soul. Nature is no longer considered a
‘corpse’, but is approached in a more spiritual way. It became beautiful, more so than science. This
was not only happening in Germany. Europeans started to enjoy walking in the woods, visiting
beaches and climbing mountains such as the Mont Blanc, which used to be considered foolish.14 This
also marks the start of a culture of sensibility. Crying and fainting in public were considered good
taste. Books such as Rousseau’s Julie and Goethe’s Das Leiden des jungen Werther (1774) became
popular. We name three reasons for Rousseau’s popularity in this period:
Could Rousseau (whose works appeared in the 1750’s and 1760’s) have been the instigator of Sturm
und Drang (which began around 1770)? Possibly.
Germans wanted to find their own voice. They opposed the universalist French culture (keep in
mind, Rousseau was Swiss). According to Herder, the French universal values were an imperative
attempt to turn the world into France. This is not good, because people live in communities with
specific values. Johann Gottlied Fichte (1762-1814), in his lecture Reden an die deutsche Nation in
Berlin, 1807, wanted German to be the main language of philosophy. By the middle of the 18th
century, the German classicist Johann Winckelmann (1717-1768), author of Geschichte der Kunst des
Alterthums (1764), revolutionized the study of antiquity. He held that all Roman art and culture was
stolen from the Greeks, but that the Greeks did it much better. Greek sculpture was considered
beautiful and pure (think of all those abstract white marble statues) by Winckelmann. It shows man
at the beginning of culture, untainted and pure, according to universal values. This idea had a huge
impact, and raised a question for many German intellectuals: if French culture comes from the
Roman Empire (France being called “the eldest daughter of Rome”), could there be an ancient
connection between the Germans and the Greeks? Many young German intellectuals considered
this to be true at the time (this thought is even visible in the works of Martin Heidegger!). Back to
the Pantheismusstreit: Spinoza was studied as a deep philosopher, with a pantheist view of nature
(opposed to D’Holbach’s corpse-view).
14
At this point, Wiep mentions “The Book of Beaches” by Alain Corbain. However, that’s probably not that
important for the exam.
17
Why not let’s take a look at dates. Jacobi wrote his book on Spinoza in 1785.
Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) Kritik der Reinen Vernunft was published in
1781. This was the start of German Idealism15. Kant also wrote books on
ethical philosophy and aesthetics, resp. Kritik der Praktische Vernunft (1788)
and Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790). Three comments on Kant and the
Pantheismusstreit:
18
Aufklärung is man’s release from its self-indulged nonage (“onmondigheid”). Man has
liberated itself, by criticizing intolerance &c., but only to the extent we are free to be critical.
This pre-supposed the existence of a public domain, where we can express ourselves
without being afraid of our safety. Kant felt Germany was not there yet. Jürgen Habermas’
(1929) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962) goes back to Kant. It
presents the public sphere as the 18th century product of the bourgeoisie. Public opinion
became a force to be reckoned with. Habermas tries to turn Europe into an emancipation-
project of the middle class. Tim Blanning (1942) demonstrated this not to be true: the 18th
century public domain was a network of journals, cultural institutions &c., not created by the
middle classes, but by the courts. At first it was not inhabited by the middle class at all, but
by the nobility, the church, the anciènne régime &c. There was nothing emancipatory about
the public sphere as such, it was an attempt by the nation to strengthen the hold on the
nation. Kant came with a more important notion, being cosmopolitanism: “The idea that all
human beings, regardless of political affiliation, are, or can or should be, of the same, single
community.” The word comes from the Greek stoics, and was used in the Roman Empire:
whether you were born in Athens, Lutetia or Valentia, you were a Roman citizen under Pax
Romana! This cosmopolitan idea disappears, until it resurfaces in the Republic of Letters17, of
which Erasmus was a member too. These were civis mundi, citizens of the world. Europeans
starts discovering all cultures across the globe. We found out we are not alone, in Europe! In
the 17th century, the republic of letters is gradually replaced by the salons &c. A wide variety
of humanity is embraced:
A. This made it possible to exploit the many question posed by first contact.
B. This made it possible to explore the question of universal monarchy18.
C. This helped the early 18th century intellectuals to develop a notion of truly human
rights.
This insight requires a new urgency due to:
I. Expansion of world-wide trading networks, making contact with the other side of the
globe.
II. A stream of books describing and depicting the World to Europe. An example of this:
Jean-François Bernard & Bernard Picart : Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de
tous les peuples du monde, 10 vols (1723-1743). This is a description of literally all
religions of the world. This shows that for all humans, being religious is part of who
we are. Another example is Abbé Raynal’s (& Denis Diderot) Histoire des deux Indes
(1770).
17
The Republic of Letters (Respublica literaria) is the long-distance intellectual community in the late 17th and
18th centuries in Europe and America. It fostered communication among the intellectuals of the Age of
Enlightenment, or "philosophes" as they were called in France. The Republic of Letters emerged in the 17th
century as a self-proclaimed community of scholars and literary figures that stretched across national
boundaries but respected differences in language and culture. These communities that transcended national
boundaries formed the basis of a metaphysical Republic. Because of societal constraints on women, the
Republic of Letters consisted mostly of men. As such, many scholars use "Republic of Letters" and "men of
letters" interchangeably. (Wikipedia)
18
A Universal Monarchy is a concept and a political situation where one monarchy is deemed to have either
sole rule over everywhere (or at least the predominant part of a geopolitical area or areas) or to have a special
supremacy over all other states (or at least all the states in a geopolitical area or areas). (Wikipedia)
19
The world was discovered! Kant, the recluse, picked up on this, and used it in Zum ewigen
Frieden (1795). The notion that we all inhabit the same planet, and are all human beings, is
the only way to end war and make peace. Bear in mind Kant’s embrace of the cosmopolitan
idea: this became very popular in France (also bear in mind the historical events taking place
in 1789, which is also Kant’s time).
20
Popkin, pp 472-480
Christian Thomasius and Christian Wolff (pp472-475)
Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754) are sometimes characterized as
“the two founders of the German enlightenment.” They both taught at the University of Halle, and
had a number of followers, who developed the systems of their masters in different and often
independent ways. The Thomasians (being Pietists) strongly opposed Wollf’s rationalist philosophy
on religious grounds. They are better characterized as critics of the Enlightenment, even though
Thomasius himself was not as radical as most of his followers.
Wolff studied theology and philosophy widely, but his true love was
mathematics. He became a professor of mathematics and natural
philosophy at Hale. At the time, he also corresponded with Leibniz, and
was influenced by his philosophy (although they clearly had their
differences)19. Wolff soon became the most influential philosopher in
Germany before Kant. Wolff defined philosophy as a “science of all
possible objects, how and why they are possible.” He also claimed that
existence is nothing but he “complement of possibility,” but he did not
mean that we could dispense with experience: experience, or historical
knowledge as he also calls it, remains the foundation of all philosophizing. Philosophy, investigating
why things are the way they are and thus going far beyond experience, must be careful never to lose
itself in mere possibilities. Wolff’s philosophy was meant to be a marriage of reason and experience,
and even if this was not necessarily a marriage of equals, Wolff still considered reason and
experience partners. In Halle, Wolff soon came into conflict with the Pietists, mainly because of his
endorsement of Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony. Ultimately, the Pietists got Frederick
William I, king of Prussia, to expel Wolff from Prussia. The principal occasion for this, was Wolff’s
lecture “On the Practical Philosophy of the Chinese” in 1721, discussed earlier in the text on the
lecture. In this, he made a point not very different from Thomasius, whom did not enter the dispute.
Wolffian philosophy became the dominant force in German universities after 1720, and after the
19
In Popkin wordt de relatie tussen Wolff en Leibniz uitvoerig beschreven, maar dat lijkt me minder relevant
voor het tentamen.
21
death of Frederick William I Wolff returned to Halle. Only after the middle of the century his
influence started to fade, due to the influence of British philosophers.
Mendelssohn’s most important work on aesthetic theory is Übert die Empfindungen, On the
Sensations (1755). Here he tries to incorporate views from French and British philosophers into
German metaphysics. In doings so he remains guided by Baumgarten’s “logic of the lower cognitive
faculty”: beauty cannot be found in things themselves, but is a subjective perfection found through
sensation. Artists give the spectator/reader an uplifting sensual perception of an object
(Idealschönheit, ideal beauty). Another theory is that of mixed sensation, vermischte Empfindung, to
show how sensations mixed with pain can be pleasurable, like in a tragedy. Mendelssohn’s aesthetics
are firmly embedded in his metaphysics. He, for example, wrote an essay critiquing Hume. His
writings are often derived or adapted from the tradition of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics, but
Mendelssohn often gave them a twist. Kant is also very much indebted to Mendelssohn. In his most
important writings in metaphysics, Mendelssohn tries to prove the existence of God and the
immortality of the soul, and presents arguments against the materialism and sensationalism of his
French contemporaries.
A lot of attention was drawn by Mendelssohn being a Jew. Contemporaries wondered if his views
were compatible with Christianity, or if Mendelssohn might actually be a Christian (Mendelssohn has
20
In 1740 Frederick II, known as Frederick the Great, came to power in the Kingdom of Prussia. Under the rule
of the philosophically-oriented Frederick II, Berlin gave birth to an intellectual renaissance in which it became
one of the most important centers of the Enlightenment in Europe. The city was an important book and press
location, as well as the new home of many drama groups. Later, it hosted a National Theatre, the Academy of
the Arts and the Academy of Sciences. (Wikipedia)
22
stated in response to this that he believes in the truth of Judaism). A public attempt to convert
Mendelssohn by J.C. Lavater gave rise to the so-called Lavater Afäre, which revealed some of the
contradictions inherent in the German Enlightenment. Though most Enlightenment philosophers
professed tolerance and faith in the power of reason, many of them could not overcome their
religious upbringings.
Another dispute, in Mendelssohn’s last years, was with Jacobi, mentioned earlier in this text. In 1785,
Jacobi published his book On the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn, in which, as
mentioned earlier, he talks about Lessing being a Spinozist. Jacobi argues that (the dangerous)
Spinozism was the necessary outcome of all rational philosophy, and that true philosophy had to be
founded on faith. Mendelssohn was called on to defend himself by defending his friend (Lessing) and
his way of philosophizing. In this debate, Mendelssohn emphasized the importance of a principle of
orientation in metaphysics, namely common sense (rational philosophy), which he didn’t think was
contradictory to true philosophy. This defense however was considered ineffective by most, even
Kant felt Mendelssohn put too much trust in the power of reason. Kant believed that we can neither
prove nor know the kinds of things that Mendelssohn thought demonstrable, and he argued instead
for a mere rational belief.
Lastly, Mendelssohn also tried to reform Judaism. He thought Jews could accept modern Western
culture without abandoning ancient and original Judaism. He also advocated a secular and religious
education for Jews, and tried to transplant ideas from the Enlightenment into Jewish culture. He also
argued in favor of Jews being given full civil rights.
23
Seminar (22-02-2016)
Rousseau’s Du Contrat Social contains a balancing act between Liberté and Égalité. Rousseau is in
favor of private property, but the state needs to keep the differences in private property among
citizens small. Furthermore, we talk today about Rousseau’s “violent” assessment of Grotius (which
spills over into a lecture of republicanism), and Rousseau’s assessment of democracy, which is
notated in the summary on The Social Contract.
Rousseau on Grotius21
Grotius, also known as Hugo de Groot, was born in Delft, and was one of the icons of the Dutch
Golden Age. In the past few decades, he has been rediscovered as a “major philosopher”, although
Van Bunge doesn’t agree. Grotius wrote on law, but was also a theologian. He never wrote about
natural philosophy, and also had no epistemology nor metaphysics, but was a clever professional.
We consider the Dutch Republic at the time. In 1618/1619, violent quarrels erupted, and the Dutch
Republic was torn apart. At the Synod22 of Dordrecht, two fractions came to clash: “liberal”
remonstrants versus contraremonstrants. They quarreled on predestination23. This dispute started in
1605, back then still academic and theological. Over time however, it gained a political edge, and
spilled over into the domain of politics. The contraremonstrants where backed by the Prince of
Orange, and the remonstrants were backed by the liberal regents. This lead to a civil war, on the
brick of kicking out the Spaniards! This was a political trauma in the Golden Age. Grotius was on the
side of the liberals, but they lost (the Prince of Orange stages coup as stadholder, a sort of general).
Grotius was locked at Slot Loevestein, but manages to escape in a bookcase, as persona non-grata,
and flees to Paris, where he becomes one of the leading intellectuals. He dedicates his work to the
French King, Louis XIII. This was incomprehensible to people like Rousseau, who struggled to remain
autonomous. People in Amsterdam where amazed too, since France was a bitter enemy of the Dutch
Republic.
Grotius makes a fundamental error according to Rousseau. According to Grotius, when a monarchy is
established people subject themselves to a king. By subjecting to a king however, says Rousseau, the
subject to a king turns himself into a slave. This is impossible according to Rousseau! Man is born
free, and self-subjection would be a contradiction. It is strange Grotius would write this in a time in
which people wondered how it could be that the Dutch Republic (so without a king) could be so
successful!
Republicanism
We consider the term “Republicanism”, a school of political thought. This term has a very specific
meaning. Quentin Skinner, John Dunne and John Pockocke (all three academics of this age) gave the
21
Ik heb geen idee in hoeverre dit relevant is voor het tentamen, maar achtergrondinformatie kan nooit
kwaad.
22
Kerkvergadering.
23
Predestination, in theology, is the doctrine that all events have been willed by God, usually with reference to
the eventual fate of the individual soul. Explanations of predestination often seek to address the "paradox of
free will", whereby God's omniscience seems incompatible with human free will. In this usage, predestination
can be regarded as a form of religious determinism; and usually predeterminism. (Wikipedia)
24
term republicanism new meaning. Researches were worried about liberalism as a political ideology.
These days, liberalism is dominant, but has many shortcomings, especially morally: liberalism
demands very little of us. It forgets its history: liberalism grew from a rich tradition of republicanism.
It would be good to re-invigorate liberalism, and make it more social and more moral, by returning to
its roots. Rousseau is part of the republican school of thought.
The birthplace of republicanism is the Northern-Italian republics, like Firenze, Milan and Venice.
Venice was ruled by a doge, selected from a restricted number of families. The longer a family lived
somewhere, the more eligible they were. Why is Venice so special, so “magical”? When did it
originate? When the Roman Empire fell apart, huge chunks of the Western-Roman elites moved to
places where the “barbarians” (Christians) wouldn’t come.24 This was Venice, established in the midst
of marshes. It was a difficult place to get into, and an ideal place to hide. In the 6th, 7th and 8th
centuries, the ancient elites re-established their authority in the marshes, and were pretty successful
in establishing an empire, to the republican traditions of ancient Rome. Roman descendants had the
“right” to pose as republicans, and the “right” to rule themselves (this was the Roman concept of
liberty). The plebs also had access to the political arena: common people had representatives
(“tribunes”, also described in Rousseau). One could live on welfare and be represented in the senate.
It was possible to be a republican in a city-state. According to Machiavelli (1469-1527) in Il Principe
(1516 according to Van Bunge, however published in 1532 according to other sources), “it is allowed
to lie to your people as long as they don’t find out,” in order to guarantee political stability. “Make
sure people like you.” This can be seen as some sort of PR. Machiavelli was one of the founders of
the republican school of thought.
In order to rule oneself, one needs a particular “catalogue of values”, devoted to the public good, res
publica. Only the rich were autonomous, so one had to enter politics when rich, and devote himself
to the public good. Again: Rousseau is part of this republican tradition. Republicans live in the bien
public.
24
This story is “half-myth, but probably true.”
25
The French Revolution was a chain of events which had a huge influence on the Enlightenment (and
was also hugely influenced by it). Revolutionaries claimed to be the spokesmen of the
Enlightenment. It would, however, be naïve to consider the Enlightenment as the sole cause of the
French Revolution. Revolutionaries read texts from the Enlightenment and came together, debating
French institutions and the church. Salons (like that of D’Holbach) were only accessible to the elite, or
otherwise one had to be especially rich, clever or witty. But the salons were just the tip of the
iceberg. This lecture, we consider the French Revolution in three phases.
First phase
The South of France was still convinced by the status of the monarchy and the church in the second
half of the 18th century. However, both church and court suffered structural shortcomings. We
consider two of these problems:
1. Lack of representation (from farmers &c.). France was controlled by the nobility, they filled
the parliaments, provincial high-courts, the army and the church. There was an États
généraux26, consisting of three parts: (1) the state, (2) the church, and (3) the other 89% of
the population. The last time the king called this advisory body together, was in 1614.
2. Since the late 17th century, the French Catholic Church was divided over Jansenism27. The
church lost its authority. This was also due to non-structural events, not further specified in
the lecture.
On the 5th of May 1789, a new General Estates was called together, because of the approaching
financial meltdown, due to the support for the American Revolution, and the refusal of the 1st and 2nd
estates to give up their privileges. No agreement could be reached, resulting in political deadlock.
Louis XVI did next to nothing, “but nothing”. Meanwhile, food-prizes got out of control, especially
bread became extremely expensive. There was famine in the countryside. In May and June, the
French government was practically invisible. On the 17th of June, 1789, declared itself the National
Assembly, an assembly not of the estates, but of the people. On June 20th, they took the Tennis Court
Oath, in which the 3rd estate declared it would not leave the court until a new constitution was
drawn up. By the end of June, in Paris, rumors started to circulate. Slowly, violence creeps in. The
25
Dit college, net als het college in week 4, ging zó snel en was zó chaotisch, dat sommige informatie misschien
dubbel genoteerd staat, en de volgorde soms niet helemaal logisch is.
26
In France under the Old Regime, the Estates General or States-General (French: états généraux), was a
legislative and consultative assembly (see The Estates) of the different classes (or estates) of French subjects. It
had a separate assembly for each of the three estates, which were called and dismissed by the king. It had no
true power in its own right—unlike the English parliament it was not required to approve royal taxation or
legislation—instead it functioned as an advisory body to the king, primarily by presenting petitions from the
various estates and consulting on fiscal policy. The Estates-General met intermittently until 1614 and only once
afterwards, but was not definitively dissolved until after the French Revolution. (Wikipedia)
27
Jansenism was a Catholic theological movement, primarily in France, that emphasized original sin, human
depravity, the necessity of divine grace, and predestination. The movement originated from the posthumously
published work of the Dutch theologian Cornelius Jansen, who died in 1638. Through the 17th and into the
18th centuries, Jansenism was a distinct movement within the Catholic Church. (Wikipedia)
26
National Assembly grows, starting to resemble the actual estate. Elite troops start to join the
National Assembly in early July.
The beginning of the French Revolution is difficult to pin down to a single moment. Often seen as this
moment, is the storming of the Bastille, a prison, on July 14th, 1789. By then, Paris was already in
chaos for a few days, it was surrounded by troops. On the 11th of July, Louis XVI sacked his finance
minister, a liberal, which was enough for crowds to take to the streets. On July 14th, in the morning,
about a 1000 men and women, assisted by the National Guard, led by Lafayette, attacked La Bastille,
housing ammunition to arm the population of France. The prisoners were released, and the director
was seized and beheaded (afterwards, his head was carried through the streets on a pike). On a side
note, there were only seven prisoners in the Bastille: four mad men, two sex offenders, and one
crook. Neither the King nor the National Assembly had any idea of what was going on! They get told
the next day, and the King withdraws his troops from Paris. The National Assembly takes over, and
the government loses control over the capital. Large portions of the population get armed, and
members of the Anciènne Régime flee. The army turns out to be divided; many officers start to
ignore orders. In August (still 1789), Louis XVI is placed under house-arrest. The King is brought to the
Palais des Tuileries. Also in August, the Abolition of Feudality and the Declaration of the Rights of
Man take place. The first phase of the French Revolution is now well underway! On the 20th and 21st
of June, 1791, Louis XVI tries to flee, but he fails: he is arrested in Varennes.
Second phase
In August 1792, panic hits Paris. There are rumors of foreign troops approaching, and the National
Assembly falls apart, and is concerted into the National Convention in September 1792. This marked
the beginning of the Reign of Terror, and Robespierre (who loved Rousseau’s writings) was in control.
Liberty had to be imposed, and terror was justice. The King is arrested. In January 1993, King Louis
XVI is trialed, and he and his family are executed. “He who wants the ends, also wants the means.”
There was a radicalization and emergence of violent factions (such as the ‘jacobins’; ‘sans-cullotes’;
‘montagnards’, etc.), resulting in c. 50,000 executions. From 1793 to1796 there was a civil war in the
Vendée, resulting in c. 200,000 casualties. Revolutionaries felt besieged by both internal and external
forces.
Paranoia takes over. There are conspiracy theories, and we witness the rise of the public domain, if,
for example, the free press. Fun fact: the concept of left/right in politics comes from the French
Revolution! The progressives sat on the left side of the tennis court, the conservatives on the right
side. Conspiracy theories were a part of right-wing politics from the outset. The Enlightenment and
Counter Enlightenment was the birthplace of many conspiracy theories (like the internet is now). A
lot of these were “new world-order” conspiracies: Freemasons, Jews, Illuminati, bankers, foreigners
&c. These were already the habitual culprits in the second half of the 18th century for the right wing.
The left wing, at that time, reveled in stories about sexual depravity in the Jesuit Church and
Versailles, involving children and blood: paranoia takes over. Robespierre banned the Roman
Catholic Church, and tried to establish his own “church of the supreme being”, but failed. In 1793, he
also tried to establish a new calendar, which, of course, also failed. In July 1794 Robespierre was
guillotined, marking the end of the Reign of Terror.
27
In 1795, the Directoire was established, and normality somewhat returned. This marks the end of the
French Revolution. It is important to know about the timeline of the French Revolution, and to notice
that this is a chain of events, not a single moment, and that this chain of events has a very chaotic
nature. The chaos made a sudden take-over possible. The revolutionaries were able to keep the
population of Paris on their side, it was quite an imaginative community. Philosophical arguments
were involved, and the French Revolution brought an end to the Anciènne Régime. Its legacy
included the export of for example a legal system, and a registry office (numbers on houses, last
names) through Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon was a product of the Revolution. He rose to power
in 1799 when he staged a coup, abolishing the Directory. Critics of the Enlightenment from the 18th
century onwards focused on the state of chaos.
Counter Enlightenment
Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821), author of Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg (1821), was a French count
from the Savoie, a French region in the Alps. He is a product of the 18th century Counter
Enlightenment, which was the view of the majority until the last quarter of the 18th century (only
then the philosophes start to dominate opinion. The Counter Enlightenment played a crucial role in
identifying the Enlightenment, it invented the Enlightenment as a movement. We consider four ways
the Counter Enlightenment regarded the Enlightenment:
De Maistre even drew up lists of people who met these characteristics and should be murdered! The
Counter Enlightenment (CE) battled with what they saw as ‘forces of destruction’, from a right-wing
ideology. The left-wing Liberté, Égalité et Fraternité was met with the right-wing King, God and
Country. The CE was conservative, and resisted change. But the 18th century CE also aimed for
something new, it had its own agenda, and its own ideals. Rousseau was popular both on the left and
right. The reason for his popularity on the right, was that he was skeptical about reason. Secondly,
Rousseau was critical of materialism (think of his notion of amour propre). Thirdly, Rousseau
recognized the importance of religion, for keeping together the social fabric. The majority of the CE
authors has been forgotten (they were no class acts), until De Maistre appeared.
28
Next, the philosophes took it for granted that if we knew these natural laws, we’d be able to create a
prefect society. According to De Maistre, the state of liberty is a mistake. “Nature is not
harmonious.” Because man is natural, man is insatiable and violent. Nature is not harmonious, but a
constant battlefield, permanently violent. If there is such a thing as a natural destiny, it is to kill. We
are nature’s most blood-thirsty warrants. Man being a rational a sociable being is a myth, man is just
on top of the food-chain. De Maistre wondered, why are Enlightenment philosophers unable to see
this fact? Why did they make such mistakes? De Maistre’s answer: because those philosophers made
a stupid mistake early on by adopting a curious method.
28
According to some, Bacon is also the secret author of Shakespeare’s work, but this is very probably BS.
29
things. Plato makes a comeback at the end of the 18th century in European philosophy, due to the
longing for depth (as described in week 2).
Like Plato, De Maistre is skeptical about the idea of freedom. The only possible way for man to live
together, is for man to obey. Here De Maistre describes an authoritarian society, and becomes a bit
macabre, almost obscene! He praises the guillotine, and thinks the executioner (de beul) is the most
important civil servant. De Maistre has an obsession with blood! He makes a slightly pornographic
description of blood dripping down the scaffold. He thought there was no other option than to
exterminate the enemies of the state, and even made lists of candidates for execution. Nature is
violent itself, and all fail to see life is irrational. Life is not comprehensive, from which De Maistre
concludes natural philosophers are the most dangerous of all!
A. The idea of a hereditary monarchy is absurd, yet it is used all over the world.
B. Christianity is an absurd religion, so absurd and irrational, “you can’t make that up”.
C. De Maistre is an extreme fideist29. How to reconcile his views with the views of the Church?
De Maiste is impressed with the idea of the The Fall: Adam is kicked out of paradise, resulting
in the idea of original sin. From this, De Maistre draws that man is born evil, and therefore
must be subjected!
What is the French Revolution from De Maistre’s perspective? God himself had decided to punish
France, the Reign of Terror was divine retribution. The King was too liberal (!), and the Anciènne
Régime was punished because it was too soft. It was punished for its leniency, and its tolerance. The
first crucial mistake, according to De Maistre, was to let the French Protestants leave the country
(like Bayle). We should have killed them all! Now, how could De Maistre’s ideas be considered
modern? Well, because of…
From this, Isaiah Berlin concludes De Maistre has been born too early rather than too late.
29
Fideism is an epistemological theory which maintains that faith is independent of reason, or that reason and
faith are hostile to each other and faith is superior at arriving at particular truths (see natural theology).
(Wikipedia)
30
Burke
A. He was one of the few Brits who thought the United States
actually deserved independence.
B. He was from Ireland.30
C. He opposed the execution of homosexuals.
D. He opposed imperial tendencies, especially in India.
Burke knew France well at an early stage, and wasn’t very upset about the fall of the Bastille. In
August 1789, he thought all would be well. He thought the National Assembly was okay, but changed
his mind in November. During a sermon in London, a man compared the French Revolution to the
Glorious Revolution of England (briefly mentioned in the seminar of week 2). Burke got angry: during
the Glorious Revolution, no blood was spilled, while the French Revolution didn’t recognize any
authority but its own! When a band of cruel ruffians arrested the French King, Burke was shocked.
The King’s personal bodyguard was slaughtered, which was an act of barbarianism: this was Burke’s
humane assessment. In June 1790, Burke was convinced the French Revolution would end in tears
and chaos. He was not against progress, but against revolution: he was pro-evolution. In Britain,
Kings and parliament had always worked together. The French Revolution, according to Burke, was a
coup d’état in the name of abstract principles (like universal human rights). There is no such thing as
man in general (recall Berkeley). According to Burke, the church provided political stability, and was
not to be attacked. Burke predicted correctly that the “political experiment” of the French Revolution
would end in tyranny, and that democracy could only work in small societies.
30
This probably isn’t a very good example of why Burke is a liberal, but it’s in my notes like this. It probably has
something to do with him being autonomous, and being a member of the British Parliament.
31
The last few decades, feminist writings have often made a point about histories not being about the
achievements of women. In philosophy, the assumption that women made no historical mark has
been persuasive, and despite overwhelming evidence that its’s false, it persists. The writer will
explain why this assumption has persisted, and try to make a dent in it.
Histories of philosophy used to contain only occasional murmurings of women (such as Xanthippe,
Socrates’ wife). But now, we know that there have been female teachers and writers of philosophy
from the pre-Socratics to the current century. They have participated with men in discussion of the
important philosophical issues of their times. What was women’s role in philosophy, and why is it so
unknown?
Something we do know, is that during the ancient period at least twenty-one women studied, wrote
and/or taught philosophy. At least three of these were considered to have lead, headed or co-
headed schools of philosophy. These women are mentioned in surviving works or biographies of
contemporary male philosophers. There are seventeen ancient women known to have been
philosophers. During the middle period, many women in convents learnt to read and write Latin and
took part in large restoration and preservation projects. This was the time of famous women
philosophers who were revered in their day and later forgotten or reclassified as purely theological
writers. At the end of this (medieval) period, women whose writing fits within the scope of early
modern philosophy also made their mark.
With the start of the modern period in philosophy (Descartes), increasing numbers of women ─ not
only from convents, but from the nobility, lower aristocracy, and petite bourgeoisie ─ took up the
pen and wrote philosophy. Not infrequently, the topics women philosophers wrote about concerned
the implications of modern scientific or “rational” philosophy and science itself for women. The
French and American Revolutions stirred many women philosophers to write in the defense of
women and nonwhites. Female philosophers of this period also wrote on many of the same issues
that engaged their male counterparts. They dared to assume some knowledge, some expertise in
philosophy, often to the contempt of the authorities.
In the 20th century, women first were admitted to universities. Women who did philosophy at the
turn of the century through the end of World War II sometimes did it as a second profession. It may
have been easier for women to obtain advanced degrees in and to be successful finding academic
employment and professional success in disciplines other than philosophy, but each of these women
wrote philosophical works that were considered important by their peers. If “by their works shall
they be known” is an important criterion of morality, is it not also an important criterion of
philosophy in general?
Women philosophers around the year 1900 had few educational opportunities in philosophy and
regularly faced blatant sex-discrimination. When women did get through the doors, they contributed
much to the professional societies that are the backbone of philosophical research and writing.
Women from then until now have been active participants in these societies and used them to try
out new ideas and new interpretations of very old ideas. Still it often happened that ideas from
women were ascribed to other, male philosophers (like what happened to Constance Jones). While
32
she lost her idea (a philosopher’s most valuable possession!) to a male, other women philosophers
became known primarily for their association with males. Being in the company of men was
sometimes a ticket to a reputation in philosophy, but just as often it became an excuse for summary
dismissal by historians.
At least two hundred women philosophers lived and left written works of philosophy during the past
few millennia, which is likely an underestimation, due to lack of illiteracy among women in medieval
times, reducing opportunities for women to read and write philosophy. Yet, in any historical period
and in any specialty area of philosophy, we find female practitioners. Also, these women were known
and respected by the “malestream” philosophic community. Then why are women barely mentioned
in philosophy’s historical canon? The only explanation is bias against women philosophers from
historians and scholars who knew better, but instead chose to bias their histories. Bias accounts for
the silence about women philosophers, until now.
For many current philosophers, the history of philosophy is seen as a “brief introduction to the
history of human stupidity,” which lasted until Russell, Wittgenstein and Heidegger came along. And
once that happened, then why should one look back to a deluded past? Along with this attitude,
there has been a general view that historical research about previous philosophers is of quite limited
value unless it illuminates their arguments. By contrast, in the early 19th century, Hegel and Cousin
made the history of philosophy the core of philosophical study. By seeing how philosophy had
developed, one could then find the best or the better philosophy of the present age.
Why is so-called creative philosophy so hostile to studying its history? One key element in this
hostility stems from the fact that philosophy, unlike other human intellectual or cultural activities,
sees itself as timeless. It seeks TRUTH, and it does not matter where and when this may take place.
Philosophers, doing philosophy, act as if the texts they philosophize about need nothing beyond the
text to understand them. But regarding what we are currently doing in terms of previous historical
developments, can underline what is new, interesting and important about present work and point
out possible future lines if inquiry. Philosophical work only does this to some extent, solving or
resolving problems posed by previous historical figures. But as soon as a historian asks whether the
actual historical figure said or meant what is claimed he or she said, an antihistorical outlook is put
forth. All that matters is the study of arguments. This becomes a kind of intellectual chess game
going on outside of historical time and space.
But who is to decide what arguments should be studied? Curricula are being revised as new
philosophical perspectives become dominant and as new thinkers are taken as important
philosophers. There is also a continuing increase in available philosophical texts to be studied.
Anyone revising, interpreting, editing or translating these texts needs a great deal of historical
training, not just an eye for arguments. Unpublished writings of philosophers keep appearing. Some
of this material throws significant light on texts already studied, so that it is not just timeless
arguments that are the philosophical corpus but revised and emended texts. Further, additional
information on authors of philosophical arguments keeps being discovered in various archives. Even
the most ahistorical philosopher will find him- or herself using this growing body of information, in
analyzing and evaluating arguments.
33
Many thinkers wrote their philosophical works over many years and during changing conditions in
their worlds. Is it possible to see the arguments they make separately from the time and
circumstances of the author, who has a developing and changing intellectual life and perspective?
We need historical guideposts to place material in an intellectually meaningful perspective.
The present-day ahistorical philosophers, who deplore the study of history of philosophy, are,
nonetheless, themselves historical personages. No matter how hard they try, they cannot avoid
being in history and part of some historical developments. The quest for truth goes on in human
history, carried on by various people in many different times, places and cultures. The “fear” they
have, the author thinks, comes from two sources, one seeing one’s own philosophical achievements
as part of previous developments, and hence probably to be followed by other developments; and
the other, the traumatic possibility that even our thoughts are relative, only to be understood in
terms of historical and cultural features. The ahistorical philosopher cannot escape his historical
existence, yet he believes his thoughts can and that placing his thoughts “in context” can only have
damaging results.
It has been claimed that the history of philosophy is actually just repetition and annotation of a basic
set of ideas formulated in the ancient Greek and Hellenistic worlds. But basic ideas need to be
constantly adapted and interpreted to the changing human world and changing human concerns.
This can be done best through a historical appreciation of what has gone on in the history of
philosophy, rather than by a rejection of the prior history and prior understandings.
Why are philosophers so different, compared to other disciplines when it comes to the appreciation
of its history? Mostly they acted as if they are in the so-called ivory tower, unaffected by social and
political forces. They may be dealing with different sorts of problems that seem to change very little
over the centuries, but these are problems that concern human beings in history. At the present
moment, a lot of what philosophers used to do in action and reaction to society has become the
province of literary critics, political scientists, sociologists and scientists. Perhaps understanding the
problems of philosophy and its position over the centuries in terms of the history of philosophy will
enrich and improve the ongoing doing of philosophy and aid us in appreciating where we are and
where we may be going intellectually.
34
Seminar (29-02-2016)
Democracy
The advantages of a monarchy in a large country is that it can make quick decisions, and act
forcefully. A big government is much weaker. When in crisis, the Romans picked one man to rule as a
dictator, temporarily. This, however, is a huge risk! Just look at Julius Caesar, who never gave up his
dictatorship. Many people at the time thought a law-giver must be semi-divine. “God has no faults,
and is all perfect” (Mill, On Liberty, 1859).
The individual
Rousseau ignores the liberal issue of individuals. The importance of this issue comes from a jump
from classical liberalism to 19th century liberalism. According to Rousseau, people who don’t
subscribe to the general will have to be forced to do so. In the 19th century, liberals thought we need
safeguards for the individual. How to deal with people who don’t subject to the general will,
according to Rousseau? What is the general will, and the public good? How to prevent a majority
from using the general will to force a minority to conform? What role is there for the individual?
Shouldn’t political philosophy protect the individual? Rousseau’s autobiographical Confessions is a
“story about a modern individual”. It seems The Social Contract does very little to protects the
individual. The golden rule (one should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself) has no
content. It’s like a formula that cannot be implemented. It is only applicable in daily life (the example
of traveling by train is mentioned), but it’s not suitable for ruling a country. It might work in the
private world, but not in the political world, Van Bunge says. He also says, that people don’t
necessarily identify their own interest, like the general will, but that’s what makes us interesting
(Wiep, for example, is a heavy smoker, and continues to do so even though he knows it’s not in his
interest in the end).
In dictatorships, people are forcefully subjected to the general will. This in paternalistic from a liberal
point of view (“join us, and become boring”). A final remark on representation: Rousseau changed his
mind, in Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne (1772). For Poland, he argues in favor of a
representative democracy. When Rousseau, like in this work, makes a genuine proposal for
government, he thinks twice: there is a difference between mere philosophy and putting forward a
35
foundation of legislation (these considerations, however, were ignored). Rousseau also wrote a
constitution for Corsica, an island he much admired.
Religion
Rome is often used as an object of comparison in The Social Contract. The civic religion is a lesson
derived of Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy, Livy being a Roman historian, writing about Rome itself.
The success of Rome was in it being the main object of the state religion. According to Machiavelli,
we would have to turn the res publica into the main object of the official cult. This is at odds with
Rousseau’s personal views. In Emile for example, Rousseau promotes faith, but also says religion is
not founded on books. Why does Rousseau not want a religion founded on books? Because of
interpretation! There are no scientific sects. “Science unites, religion divides”. The problem with such
a kind of religion, is that it has no room for miracles, making the resurrection of Christ impossible!
Does Rousseau’s civic/natural religion open up to, for example, Buddhists and Hindu’s? There is a
problem of cosmopolitanism in Rousseau (which again, makes him different from his
contemporaries). Rousseau likes patriotism, and is a patriot himself. The greatest virtue in Rome, was
to be a patriot. How is it possible to be a patriot, and embrace cosmopolitanism at the same time?
How far does patriotism reach? These are questions we should keep in mind while reading Rousseau,
and studying the Enlightenment in general.
36
The modern philosophy of science was born in the German word. In the book, Nietzsche’s (1844-
1900, author of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, 1882) perspective is also presented. Nietzsche was a
great admirer of the Enlightenment. Horkheimer and Adorno were impressed by Nietzsche’s notion
of the will to power: a theme picked up from Schopenhauer (did Nietzsche really think it was
essential to all humans though?). The western will to know &c. is just a part of a far more dominant
will to dominate. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, Francis Bacon was clear on the reason why
science mattered so much: knowledge is power! We know something once we grasp how it works,
and make it able to work for us. Nature is an enemy, but it can be turned into an ally. Horkheimer
and Adorno held that Bacon’s often “aggressive” approach to nature shows that Enlightenment
wasn’t aimed at liberation, but subjection: power. A Marxist addition: When is a scientist happy? He
(or she) wants to establish laws, reduced to mathematical formulas. The desire to turn nature into an
31
Net als het college in week 3, ging dit college erg snel en was het vrij warrig, waardoor de informatie soms
misschien niet helemaal volledig is of in een vreemde volgorde genoteerd staat.
32
The Frankfurt School (German: Frankfurter Schule) is a school of social theory and philosophy associated in
part with the Institute for Social Research at the Goethe University Frankfurt. Founded during the interwar
period, the School consisted of dissidents who were at home neither in the existent capitalist, fascist, nor
communist systems that had formed at the time. Many of these theorists believed that traditional theory could
not adequately explain the turbulent and unexpected development of capitalist societies in the twentieth
century. Critical of both capitalism and Soviet socialism, their writings pointed to the possibility of an
alternative path to social development.
33
Deze willekeurige informatie tussendoor schrijf ik over uit mijn aantekeningen.
37
object of countability doesn’t suit the philosopher. A philosopher should wonder about ideas. Only
Kant started “denken zu denken”. The Enlightenment should have…
The philosophical poverty of this instrumentalism is the betrayal of the true purpose of the
Enlightenment. It failed to come up with a proper moral philosophy. The essential “moral”
philosophers, are like Machiavelli: a drive for self-preservation seems to be the final product of the
enlightenment. Marxism becomes popular as a reaction to self-preserving capitalists. The self-
preserving capitalist streak becomes worse after the rise of mass-media (more instrumentalism,
moral egoism and manipulation through popular culture). Adorno and Horkheimer, in the USA, saw
the introduction of national television, and the of Hollywood and newspaper conglomerates.
Together, these branches of culture make up a culture-industry, about to betray the masses. Adorno
gives two reasons:
1. Mass media constantly confirms the political status quo. For instance, it keeps feeding the
American Dream, instead of showing an alternative status quo. People fall victim to the
capitalist dream-factory.
2. The situation has become dangerous since the mass-media (being controlled by capitalists)
not only controls bodies, but minds too: a Traumfabrik, which strangles individual
imagination. The authors worry about speaking and color in movies. They thought Hollywood
has no idea what art actually is, and that it shouldn’t reproduce things as they are!
The dream of the exploited would be to become like the exploiters. American laborers turned into
conformists. Western culture would fail to create meaning. People would just say, “Here we are now,
entertain us.”
By far the most disputed subject of the Dialektik, is the Holocaust. The authors saw the Holocaust as
the most disgusting product of the Enlightenment, whereas the most historians would rather point to
the Conservative Revolution in Germany after the Great War. Horkheimer and Adorno give two
indications of the connection between the Enlightenment and the Holocaust:
This topic has been hotly debated, and takes part in the debate on the roots of totalitarianism35.
34
Also known as the law of excluded middle. In logic, the law of excluded middle (or the principle of excluded
middle) is the third of the three classic laws of thought. It states that for any proposition, either that
proposition is true, or its negation is true. (Wikipedia)
35
Totalitarianism is a political system where the state recognizes no limits to its authority and strives to
regulate every aspect of public and private life wherever feasible. Totalitarian regimes stay in political power
through an all-encompassing propaganda campaign, which is disseminated through the state-controlled mass
38
Other Critics
According to Popper, the state should not mingle with everyday life.
Popper, Adorno, Talmon, and also Ernst Cassirer, Jonathan Israël &c, are all Jewish. They also shared
a Rouseauian observation: that the Holocaust could take place in Western civilization36. This led them
to ask questions on the moral implications of culture as such. Enlightenment is always a construction,
a narrative, established afterwards. This narrative however, has fundaments in reality: it makes
sense! Once philosophers started to reflect of the Enlightenment, they started to reflect on
Modernity. What does Modernity amount to? The Enlightenment serves as a mirror, and is turned
into a philosophical abstraction.
However, this rationalist development comes with a problem: loss of meaning! A probable
consequence that the old enchantment might return, for example in the form of nationalism (to give
life meaning and direction). Man is vulnerable to political ideology for a meaningful existence,
media, a single party that is often marked by political repression, personality cultism, control over the
economy, regulation and restriction of speech, mass surveillance, and widespread use of terror. (Wikipedia)
36
I’m not sure why this is a Rousseauian observation.
39
because of desire for a new “Utopia”. The Europeans are the first to experience the incapability to
produce meaning. In a philosophical sense, the Enlightenment failed as a moral tradition. Yet, Europe
remained the “moral continent”: look at the treaty of Versailles, or the Russian Revolution (they had
no patience for Enlightenment!).
Current Issues38
Historians increasingly felt like the concept of one Enlightenment was too cruel to caption the whole.
French philosophers in the second half of the 20th century criticized the Western notion of rationality.
Around the year 2000, the concept of Enlightenment returned. Massive piles of books were
published on the Enlightenment! It was back in the public domain as a topic of discussion. Three
reasons are given for this:
1. By the end of the 20th century, many philosophers grew tired of modern French philosophy
(“vanguard” post-modernism). For a large part, it continued on the work of Adorno and
Horkheimer. In the late 1990’s, Foucault and Deleuze passed away, and Guatarri was
criticized in an increasingly mean way. Alan Sokal, a professor of mathematics, wrote an
37
This might not be the complete title of said review.
38
As if we weren’t going fast enough before, Wiep decides to speed things up a little at this point.
40
Jonathan Israel
Jonathan Israel caused a “sensation” in 2001 with the publication of his work
Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750.
First, the research of Israel was focused on economic history of the Dutch
Republic. He was struck by some facts:
A. During the 17th century, the Dutch Republic was the most literate
nation.
B. In the 17th century, the Dutch Republic was the center of European
book production and trade.
C. The Dutch Republic was by far the most tolerant nation in Europe,
including toleration towards Jews.
D. It was a Republic in the 16th century already, ruled by the middle-class and merchants.
From this Israel concluded, that maybe the Enlightenment had already started in the Dutch Republic
much earlies, and the “old” view of the start is the wrong place and the wrong time? The real
39
This part is VERY vague in my notes. Therefore, a small summary of this paper from Goodreads:
George Washington was inaugurated as president in 1789 with one tooth in his mouth, a lower left bicuspid.
The Father of His Country had sets of false teeth that were made of everything but wood, from elephant ivory
and walrus tusk to the teeth of a fellow human. Darnton shows in this title that the Enlightenment had false
teeth also - that it was not the Father of the Modern World, responsible for all its advances and transgressions.
In restoring the Enlightenment to a human scale, Darnton locates its real aims, ambitions and significance. So
too with the French Revolution, another icon of the 18th century, approached here through the gossip, songs
and broadsides that formed the political nervous system of Paris during the ancien regime. Figures that we
think we know - Voltaire, Jefferson, Rousseau, Condorcet, even historians themselves emerge afresh in
Darnton's hands, their vitality, if not their teeth intact.
41
revolution, is caused by Spinoza. Just look at the contents of his work. Spinoza is the first truly
modern thinker, for several reasons:
Israel has something to prove, since Spinoza’s books were forbidden at the time (it’s difficult to be
the instigator of a movement like that). But shouldn’t we conclude then, that Spinoza had touched a
raw nerve? This is in line with how Bayle reacted to Spinoza: in his Dictionnaire, the largest entry is
on Spinoza. Bayle was amazed by Spinoza, and called him the first systematic atheist. Next, Israel
destroys the notion of Spinoza as an isolated philosopher. Spinoza was surrounded by devoted
friends and followers! But they had to be careful, because of the authorities. Israel managed to delve
up many Spinozists: it was a movement! This movement started to affect intellectual life in England,
Germany and France. In France, Spinoza was especially influential. According to Israel, there is a link
between Spinoza and Bayle, the clandestine authors, Diderot and D’Holbach. After his 2001 work,
Israel published follow-ups (Enlightenment Contested (2006), Democratic Enlightenment (2011)), in
which he says that “all that was good in the French Revolution came from Spinoza, and all that was
bad from Rousseau.” This perspective awoke furious debate among experts!
1. What are we to make of Israel’s insistence that it was philosophy that served as the main
engine of the Enlightenment? Van Bunge thinks Israel is right. The new sciences emerged
only in the 20th century. Is it really true that people mainly act on their insights?
2. How should we feel about Israel’s crucial distinction for dynamics of the Enlightenment, once
we recognize it was the outcome of a clash between three parties:
a. The radical Enlightenment itself (atheists, Diderot, D’Holbach)
b. The moderate Enlightenment (not atheists but deists, like Locke, Voltaire, Newton
and Hume)
c. The Counter Enlightenment (De Maistre), versus A and B.
Does this distinction work? In which sense is Spinoza part of group A, and Hume part of
group B?
3. How much sense does it make to connect the 18th century Enlightenment to our sense of
Modernity? According to Israel, the Enlightenment is still only half-way. Israel’s answer: We
need more Enlightenment rather than less. Do the 18th century conceptions of modernity still
fit our age? Now, we might feel modernity is a problem.
42
We consider three people who could be considered anti-Enlightenment philosophers, who fought
against Kant or went beyond him: Giambattista Vico, J.G. Hamann and Johann Herder.
Vico
Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) was born in Naples. In his major work, The
New Science (Scienza nuova, 1725) he originally refuted important
thinkers of his time, but also presented his positive new theory, which
became the main issue of the book after Vico was forced to rewrite it. His
vast erudition and brilliant new conceptions were not appreciated until
generations later. Vico had initially been impressed by the Cartesian
revolution, but after studying ancient history, literature and law, he
developed an anti-Cartesian view of truth and of what humanity could
understand in term of a new philosophy of history. Human creativity
unfolds in historical development, and it is in term of the linguistic,
literary, social, and civic worlds that people create the significant truths that are to be discovered.
The “new science” is the way to discover these and to understand the truths of human creativity and
development. Ancient Hebrew culture could only be understood in Divine terms, but for the others,
imaginative research has to take place, conceiving the inner psychology and consciousness of people
in previous ages. Vico envisioned a general development of humanity, in several stages. In each
stage, human consciousness creates the human world and its various characteristics, including its
own language. We can know these in a more certain way than mathematics or modern science, since
we create them. We can know them through their causes. He saw a repeating, cyclical development,
and gave birth to what was later called “historicism”: The view that human achievements can only be
studied, understood, and evaluated genetically, in terms of how they came to be. There is no
universal, no independent human nature, only human developments in progress.
Herder
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inferior intellectually to Caucasians. He was also opposed to political nationalisms that tried to take
over other cultures and dominate them. There was no objective study of human nature. European
scientific achievements were part of their development, but not necessarily part of any other.
Herder, like Rousseau, even had some preference for what his contemporaries considered the
primitive or the less civilized.
Hamann
Eighteenth-Century Racism
During the Age of Reason, new theories were developed that form the basis for modern racism.
Racial definitions of groups, such as Jews, extended to new groups that were to play important roles
in European affairs, such as Native Americans and Africans. Some saw the natives of newly
discovered areas as less than human, others wanted to protect them. These conflicting views led
Pope Paul declaring in 1537 that all peoples of the world are human, but this did not prevent
Europeans from their ongoing conquest of the New World and its inhabitants. Around 1600, some
hardy souls suggested that the Indians had an origin separate from the biblical world. Such a view
was heretical, since it denied that the Bible was the complete history of mankind.
The scientific eighteenth century dealt in great detail with natural explanations for the varieties of
mankind. The explanations for the differences among peoples fell into two kinds:
1. Degeneracy theories, which saw people starting off the same (as white Europeans), and then
some degenerating factor changed the color of people’s skin, due to climate and other
factors.
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2. Theories of fixed, unchangeable differences, not only in skin color, but also in mental or
spiritual capacities.
Out of the discussion of these factors, people such as Voltaire were able to offer a secular racism.
Buffon, one of the thinkers offering the first theory, thought that in ten generations everybody could
be transformed into Europeans, by adhering to European climate, nutrition &c, thus eliminating
racial differences. The most forceful presentation of least racist view of the time was of French abbé
Henry Grégoire (1750-1831), who defended rights of Jews and blacks during the French Revolution.
He believed that, through upbringing, all people could become mentally and culturally equal
regardless of their racial ancestry.
In contrast, Hume, Jefferson, Kant and others insisted on the permanent inferiority of people of
color. As an empirical scientist, Hume claimed to be generalizing from known and accepted facts
when writing about the inferiority of other races. He was impervious however, to not only the two
black professors in European universities, but also blacks around him. When their talents were
demonstrated to him, Hume was either oblivious or unimpressed. He never changed his view about
blacks. Hume’s views were quoted over and over again in America by defenders of slavery and
opponents of abolition. Thomas Reid was an opponent of Hume’s racist views. Another of Hume’s
opponents was James Beattie (whom Hume called “a silly bigot”), who pointed to existing black
intellectuals and also contended that if social conditions were changed, blacks would have the
opportunity to develop. Beattie insisted upon the unity of mankind and of commonality of human
nature that would make everybody equal under like conditions. James Ramsay, another follower of
Reid, taking on Hume, argued that Negroes could have the same abilities as whites if they had the
same life-conditions. He insisted that secondary qualities of people – size shape, and color – are not
criteria of intelligence.
A generation after Hume, Thomas Jefferson offered a somewhat toned-down version of Hume’s
contention in Notes on the State of Virginia (1784). Grégoire (mentioned earlier in this summary),
sent Jefferson a copy of his book on intellectual achievements of blacks but Jefferson dismissed the
examples given in this book (stating he had known one of them, and describing him as “not very
bright”). Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-1794) tried to convince Jefferson of a plan for gradual
emancipation of black slaves over a forty-year period, educating and training them for a coequal
place in society, thinking instant abolishment of slavery would bring grave difficulties. Jefferson was
unwilling to entertain this gradualist proposal.
Kant developed a theory that what constituted the conception of humanity itself was based on
feeling. He thus declared that the “African has no feeling beyond the trifling” and therefore barely
has character, is barely capable of moral action, and is a lesser human being. Kant was not just
making an empirical hypothesis, like Hume, but was offering a “transcendental” basis for the
distinction between whites and blacks. And in doing so, Kant established what was to be a most dire
way of considering racial differences for the next two centuries: Apparent differences between racial
groups were conceived of as essential differences that could never be overcome.
Around the early 1800s, with emerging nationalism, theories about the essential nature of a people
(such as Germans, French &c.) were put forth, precluding any outsider from becoming a member of
such a group. This led to atrocities such as the Holocaust. In contrast, Grégoire and Condorcet
offered two different bases for claiming the equality of all people:
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• Grégoire, a Jansenist, thought people should eliminate all human conditions that impeded
equal treatment of all people. We are all God’s creatures.
• Condorcet, thought religious considerations were outmoded, and held that now we can see
the human condition scientifically and rationally, we can see that all persons have natural
rights, which include the natural right to be free.
However, Grégoire and Condorcet were both thoroughly Eurocentric. In their ideal future, Jews and
blacks and other non-European groups would become just like the best Europeans. At the end of the
18th century, more universalist views began to emerge, such as Herder, claiming each racial group
has its own “idea”. Each will have its own history and destiny. Hegel, on the other hand, contended
that Africa has no history and no idea of history. The Humboldt brothers, one having traveled all
across the Americas and Russia, the other having studied all languages he could study, concluded no
civilization or culture is better than any other; they are just different, and should be appreciated as
such. This cultural relativism was offered as an antidote to Europocentrism and European superiority.
The eighteenth-century discussions of the philosophical basis for understanding the varieties of
mankind contained the basis for the new secular anti-Semitism that became so pervasive in Europe
and the irremediable racism that condemned the Africans, the America Indians, and other groups to
permanent underclass status in a new European-dominated world.
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