G.R. No.

L-10280             September 30, 1963

QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA
CHU TIAN, CHUA LIM PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee.

Sabido and Sabido Law Offices and Ramon T. Oben for petitioners-appellants.
Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No.
20037) denying the petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or
prohibition, certiorari,  and  mandamus filed by Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee
Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King. The
facts of the case, briefly stated, are as follows:.

On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the above-named petitioners
before the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of
$130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of
having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong and petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim
Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King, with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine
and United States Governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the
Central Bank, and Capt. A. P. Charak of the OSI, U.S. Air Force) in order to evade prosecution
for said unauthorized purchase of U.S. dollars.1

Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued
by the presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon their filing surety bond for P10,000.00
and cash bond for P10,000.00, herein petitioners-appellants were provisionally set at liberty.

On September 22, 1952, petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges
presented against them in the Deportation Board for the reason, among others, that the same do
not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that said Board has no
jurisdiction to entertain such charges. This motion to dismiss having been denied by order of the
Board of February 9, 1953, petitioners-appellants filed in this Court a petition for habeas
corpus and/or prohibition, which petition was given due course in our resolution of July 7, 1953,
but made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila (G.R. No. L-6783). The case was
docketed in the lower court as Special Proceeding No. 20037.

At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the respondent Deportation
Board from hearing Deportation charges No. R-425 against petitioners, pending final termination
of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.

On July 29, 1953, the respondent Board filed its answer to the original petition, maintaining
among others, that the Deportation Board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the
charges filed against petitioners and the authority to order their arrest; and that, while petitioner
Qua Chee Gan was acquitted of the offense of attempted bribery of a public official, he was
found in the same decision of the trial court that he did actually offer money to an officer of the
United States Air Force in order that the latter may abstain from assisting the Central Bank
official in the investigation of the purchase of $130,000.00 from the Clark Air Force Base,
wherein said petitioner was involved.

After due trial, the court rendered a decision on January 18, 1956, upholding the validity of the
delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for
the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the
security, welfare and interest of the State. The court, likewise, sustained the power of the
deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release
pending investigation of charges against him, on the theory that the power to arrest and fix the
amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport
aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Consequently, the petitioners
instituted the present appeal. .

It may be pointed out at the outset that after they were provisionally released on bail, but before
the charges filed against them were actually investigated, petitioners-appellant raised the
question of jurisdiction of the Deportation Board, first before said body, then in the Court of First
Instance, and now before us. Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the President to deport
aliens and, consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary power to
investigate, on the ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. In other words, it is
claimed, for the power to deport to be exercised, there must be a legislation authorizing the same.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of
Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor
(Sec- 37). With the enactment of this law, however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or
concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone, because
in its Section 52, it provides:.

SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the
entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation
therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven
hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).

Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) referred to above reads:.

SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power

residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands
 or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon
which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed
of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for
the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or
counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing
witnesses."

While it may really be contended that the aforequoted provision did not expressly confer on the
President the authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner
of Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down the procedure to be
observed should there be deportation proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided
for before the President can deport an alien-which provision was expressly declared exempted
from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the recognition,
and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive.
And the, exercise of this power by the chief Executive has been sanctioned by this Court in
several decisions.2

Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be
effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No.
613.

Petitioners contend, however, that even granting that the President is invested with power to
deport, still he may do so only upon the grounds enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 613, as
amended, and on no other, as it would be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an alien
may be deported upon an unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the unlimited
discretion of the Chief Executive. This contention is not without merit, considering that
whenever the legislature believes a certain act or conduct to be a just cause for deportation, it
invariably enacts a law to that effect. Thus, in a number of amendatory acts, grounds have been
added to those originally contained in Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as justifying
deportation of an alien, as well as other laws which provide deportation as part of the penalty
imposed on aliens committing violation thereof.

Be this as it may, the charges against the herein petitioners constitute in effect an act of
profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank
regulations — an economic sabotage — which is a ground for deportation under the provisions
of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The
President may therefore order the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are
shown to have committed the act charged.

There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is
clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a
"prior investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." The
first executive order on the subject was that of Governor General Frank Murphy (No. 494, July
26, 1934), constituting a board to take action on complaints against foreigners, to conduct
investigations and thereafter make recommendations. By virtue of Executive Order No. 33 dated
May 29, 1936, President Quezon created the Deportation Board primarily to receive complaints
against aliens charged to be undesirable, to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code and the rules and regulations therein provided, and make the
corresponding recommendation. 3 Since then, the Deportation Board has been conducting the
investigation as the authorized agent of the President.

This gives rise to the question regarding the extent of the power of the President to conduct
investigation, i.e., whether such authority carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien
complained of, since the Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the
same may be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board.1awphîl.nèt

Let it be noted that Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike Commonwealth Act
No. 613 wherein the Commissioner of Immigration was specifically granted authority, among
others, to make arrests, fails to provide the President with like specific power to be exercised in
connection with such investigation. It must be for this reason that President Roxas for the first
time, saw it necessary to issue his Executive Order No. 69, dated July 29, 1947, providing —

For the purpose of insuring the appearance of aliens charged before the Deportation
Board created under Executive Order No. 37, dated January 4, 1947, and facilitating the
execution of the order of deportation whenever the President decides the case against the
respondent. I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by law, do hereby order that all respondents in deportation proceedings shall file a
bond with the Commissioner of Immigration in such amount and containing such
conditions as he may prescribe. .

xxx     xxx     xxx

Note that the executive order only required the filing of a bond to secure appearance of the alien
under investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of the respondent.

It was only on January 5, 1951, when President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by
virtue of his Executive Order No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the
filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest
of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he
files a bond for his provisional release in such amount and under such conditions as may be
prescribed by the Chairman of the Board.

As has been pointed out elsewhere, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose
authority the President's power to deport is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the
power to arrest. But the Solicitor General argues that the law could not have denied to the Chief
Executive acts which are absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation
granted him, such as the authority to order the arrest of the foreigner charged as undesirable.
In this connection, it must be remembered that the right of an individual to be secure in his
person is guaranteed by the Constitution in the following language:.

3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art.
III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).

As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. v.
Villamiel, et al. (65 Phil. 230, 239), this provision is not the same as that contained in the Jones
Law wherein this guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution,
the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies
to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, a notable innovation in this
guarantee is found in our Constitution in that it specifically provides that the probable cause
upon which a warrant of arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after
examination under oath, etc., of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This
requirement — "to be determined by the judge" — is not found in the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not specify who will
determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer
may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the
warrant of arrest. Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful
whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the
purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative
investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and
administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having
committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge,
why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of
course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation,
either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the
warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such,
for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect
compliance of an order of contempt.

The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into
effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of
deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order
the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the
alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a
bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized
in the executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in
this proceeding - and nothing herein said is intended to so decide — on whether or not the
President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only, and
before a definitive order of deportation has been issued. We are merely called upon to resolve
herein whether, conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of
the alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the Deportation Board.

Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the
exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific
circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the
Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant
may be issued, conveys the intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon
conditions the determination of the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the
person issuing the same. In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue
or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect
that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of
discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power,
considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that
would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his
security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the
guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then guarantee a delegation of that implied
power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the people. The guarantees
of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.

We are not unaware of the statements made by this Court in the case of Tan Sin v. Deportation
Board  (G.R. No. L-11511, Nov. 28,1958). It may be stated, however, that the power of arrest
was not squarely raised in that proceeding, but only as a consequence of therein petitioner's
proposition that the President had no inherent power to deport and that the charges filed against
him did not constitute ground for deportation. .

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it
empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges
against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release
of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent
Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest,
decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, C.J., reserved his vote.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

Facts:
This is an  appeal from the  decision of the  Court of First Instance of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No.
20037) denying the petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, and
mandamus filed by Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy... alias Dy Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua
Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua,  and Basilio King.
Emilio L.  Galang charged the above-named petitioners before the Deportation
Board,  with  having purchased U.S. dollars  in  the total sum  of  $130,000.00, without the
necessary  license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of  having clandestinely
remitted the same to Hongkong;  and... petitioners Qua Chee Gan,  Chua  Lim Pao  alias Jose
Chua, and Basilio King, with having attempted to bribe  officers of the Philippine and United
States Governments   (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of  the Intelligence Division of the Central
Bank, and
Capt. A.  P. Charak of  the OSI, U. S. Air Force)  in order to evade prosecution for said
unauthorized purchase  of U. S. dollars:
Following the filing of said deportation charges,  a warrant  for the arrest of said aliens was
issued by the presiding member of the  Deportation Board.  Upon their filing surety bond for
P10,000.00 and cash  bond for P10,000.00, herein
 petitioners-appellants were provisionally set  at liberty.
At the instance  of petitioners and upon their filing a bond  for P5,000.00 each, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the respondent Deportation
Board  from hearing
Deportation  Charges No. R-425 against  petitioners,  pending  final termination of the habeas
corpus and/or  prohibition  proceedings.
The court, likewise, sustained the power of the  Deportation Board to, issue warrants of arrest
and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release... pending investigation of charges against him, on
the theory that  the  power  to arrest and fix the amount of the  bond  of the  arrested  alien  is
essential to and complement the power to deport aliens, pursuant to Section 69  of... the Revised
Administrative Code. Consequently, the petition was dismissed without costs.  Hence, the
petitioners instituted the present appeal.
the question of jurisdiction of the Deportation Board,... first before  said body,  then in the Court
of First Instance of Manila,  and now before us.
Issues:
contest the power of the President  to deport aliens and, consequently, the delegation to the
Deportation Board, of the ancillary power... to investigate,  on the ground that such power is
vested  in the Legislature.
In other words, it is claimed, for the power to deport to be exercised, there must be a legislation
authorizing the same.
that even granting that the President is vested with power to deport, still he may do so only upon
the grounds enumerated  in Commonwealth Act  No. 613, as  amended... that the arrest of a
foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation
Ruling:
valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation.
Executive  Order  No. 398, series  of  1951... is declared illegal... the order of arrest  issued by
the  respondent  Deportation Board is declared... null and void  and the bonds filed pursuant to
such order of  arrest,  decreed cancelled.   With the foregoing modification, the decision
appealed  from is  hereby affirmed.  No costs.  So ordered.
Principles:
the exercise of the power to  order  the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of  discretion
by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment
of the liberty  of such person is... warranted.
The fact that  the Constitution itself, as  well as the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by
which  the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make the issuance of  such warrant
dependent upon  conditions the
 determination   of  the existence  of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing
the same.  In other words, the   discretion  of  whether  a warrant  of arrest  shall issue or not is
personal to
 the one upon whom the authority devolves.
Indeed, an implied grant  of  power,  considering that  no express authority was granted  by the
law  on the matter under discussion,  that would serve as a curtailment or limitation on the
fundamental right of a person, such as his... security to life and  liberty, must be viewed  with
caution, if we are td give  meaning  toL the guarantee contained in the Constitution.
If  this  is so, then  a  delegation of  that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be... rejected as
inimical to the  liberties of the people.  The guarantees of human rights and freedom  can not be
made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.