Front Matter

Source: Communist and Post-Communist Studies , September/December 2014, Vol. 47, No.
3/4, Special Issue: STATUS AND EMOTIONS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
(September/December 2014)
Published by: University of California Press

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Communist and Post-Communist Studies
Communist and Post-Communist Studies is an international journal covering all communist and post-communist
states and communist movements, including both their domestic policies and international relations. It is focused on
the analysis of historical as well as current developments in the communist and post-communist world, including
ideology, economy and society. It also aims to provide comparative foci on a given subject (e.g. education in China)
by inviting comments of a comparative character from scholars specializing in the same subject matter but in different
countries (e.g. education in Poland or Romania). In addition to the traditional disciplines of history, political science,
economics and international relations, the editors encourage the submission of articles in less developed fields of
social sciences and humanities, such as cultural anthropology, education, geography, religon and sociology.

JOINT EDITORS
Lucy Kerner Luba Fajfer
University of California, Los Angeles US Agency for International Development
Center for European and Eurasian Studies Bureau for European and Eurasian Affairs
405 Hilgard Avenue RRB 5.10-042, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Los Angeles, CA 90095­-1446 Washington, DC 20523-2052

EDITOR EMERITUS
Peter Berton
University of Southern California, Los Angeles

EDITORIAL BOARD
Richard Anderson, Department of Political Science, UCLA Arnold Horelick, Carnegie Dowment for International Peace, 1779
Ivan Berend, Department of History, UCLA Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington
Ellen T Comisso, Department of Political Science, University of Philip G Roeder, Department of Political Science, University of
California, San Diego California, San Diego
Gregory Grossman, Department of Economics, University of Azade-Ayse Rorlich, Department of History, University of
California, Berkeley Southern California
Dale R Herspring, Department of Political Science, Kansas State Susan L Shirk, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US
University Department of State
Ivan Szelenyi, Department of Sociology, Yale University.
James Tong, Department of Political Science, UCLA

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

Attila Ágh, Department of Political Science, Budapest University of Boris Kapustin, Department of Political Science, The Moscow
Economic Sciences School of Social and Economic Sciences
Rorlich Azade-Ayse, Department of History, University of Southern Hisroshi Kimura, International Research Center for Japanese
California Studies, Kyoto
Oleg T Bogomolov, Institute for International Economic and Political
Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences Marie Lavigne, Department of Economics, Universite de Pau,
Archie Brown, St Antony’s College, Oxford France
Galia Golan, Department of Political Science, The Hebrew University Piotr Sztompka, Department of Sociology, Jagiellonian
of Jerusalem University, Krakow

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 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 261e268

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

Introduction
Tuomas Forsberg a, Regina Heller b, *, Reinhard Wolf c
a
School of Management, University of Tampere, Finland
b
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Germany
c
Department of Political Science, Goethe University Frankfurt M., Germany

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The importance of status concerns on Russia's foreign policy agenda has been increasingly
Available online 16 October 2014 observed. This preoccupation with status is particularly visible in Russia's relations with
the West. Although strong claims about status in Russian foreign policy are frequently
Keywords: made in public and private by researchers, journalists, politicians, diplomats and other
Russia commentators, such claims often lack any closer theoretical or empirical justification. The
West
aim of this introductory article is, therefore, to outline the basic components that form the
Status
research agenda on status. Status, if properly examined, helps us understand not only
Emotions
Identity
Russian foreign policy, put also present-day international politics and its transformation in
Foreign policy a broader sense.
In a first part, we identify the theoretical voids concerning the study of international status.
In a second part we outline the drivers and logic of status concerns, considering in
particular identity theories, psychological approaches and existing research regarding
emotions. The presented research agenda on status, derived from International Relations
and related theories, provides a well-structured tool-box for investigating the link between
status, identity and emotions in Russian foreign policy vis-a -vis the West. In a third part we
present the key questions rose by the contributors to this Special Issue and summarize
their main findings.
© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.

1. Introduction: Russia and the quest for status

Perhaps no other perspective has dominated current approaches to post-Cold War Russian foreign policy more than the
understanding that Russia's primary goal has been to restore and strengthen its position as a great power in world politics
(Kanet, 2007; Neumann, 1815e2007; Trenin, 2011; Tsygankov, 2005). During the Putin presidency Russian foreign policy has
turned particularly assertive with Moscow becoming even more sensitive to defend its interests, as well as its status in the
international arena. Russia's tough position in the current conflict in and over Ukraine, its determinedness to display political
and military power, while risking Ukraine's further destabilization, is a case in point. For some this is simply a sign of the
recurring struggle for power and security in the international anarchy, but for others the assertive turn in Russia's foreign
policy has more to do with identity and domestic politics. According to this view, Russia's behavior in the crisis is essentially
driven by its fear of loss of great power status. Indeed, many scholars have suggested that status concerns have become more
important than pure security and economic questions on Russia's foreign policy agenda (Heller, 2013). Others remind us that

* Corresponding author. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Beim Schlump 8, 20144 Hamburg, Germany.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.007
0967-067X/© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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262 T. Forsberg et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 261e268

this has been the case for centuries. In view of Richard Sakwa (2008), the historical “Russia Problem” is not about the security
dilemma but about how Russia is able to receive the status and respect from the West that it expects. Similarly, Iver Neumann
(2005) argues that Russia's main current problem in the European theatre may not be a question of security as such but
Russia's status in relation to other European powers.
Status questions have become particularly visible in Russia's relations with the West. The lack of genuine recognition of
Russia's great power status and equality with other Western great powers is often seen as a primary reason why Russia has
turned away from cooperating with the West on a number of issues (Tsygankov, 2012; Stent, 2014). Typically, status concerns
are seen as leading to suboptimal decision-making, because foreign policy becomes driven by emotions rather than rational
interests. For some, Russia's capricious and confrontational behavior is based on a psychological complex defined by its
obsession to being a great power. For others, Russia's emphasis on status is a rather natural reaction to Western disregard for
it after the end of the Cold War.
All this suggests that whether we believe or not that for Russia status has become more important than the alternative
foreign policy goals or that status concerns lead to irrational impulses, questions concerning status policies have to be taken
seriously both by academics as well as by politicians and diplomats. On the one hand, we need to study what Russia's concern
for status means for theories of international relations, while on the other hand, we should examine what kinds of new
insights the existing theoretical approaches on status and international relations can bring to the analysis of Russia's foreign
policy.
Scholars who want to apply theories, in particular Western theories, to Russian politics and Russian foreign policy, often
have to justify this against claims that Russia is sui generis and that knowledge of the historical and cultural background as
well as the current practical context are far more important to understand Russia than any theoretical sophistication. Yet, the
juxtaposition between theories and practical or empirical knowledge is futile. Theoretical and empirical approaches should
go hand in hand, and support each other. In fact, historically, many famous theoretical approaches to foreign policy analysis,
from operational code to strategic culture, have been developed in the context of Russian or Soviet studies, while empirical
analyses of Russian foreign policy have sought inspiration and conceptual tools from a variety of theories (Pursiainen, 2000).
Without theoretical reflection research on Russian foreign policy risks to remain a branch of area studies that relies on
descriptive approaches but at the same time is full of hidden commitments to dubious theoretical assumptions. Without
theoretical foundations, research often lacks either the critical edge or credibility. Strong claims about status and honor and
their role in Russian foreign policy are made in public and private by researchers, journalists, politicians, diplomats and other
commentators, but such claims often lack any closer theoretical or empirical justification, and they can be inconsistent with
each other.
Today, being a great power e and being recognized as one e is a foreign policy goal that appears more attractive than ever
to the Russian foreign policy elites. But status is also a dimension that, if properly examined, helps us understand present-day
international politics and its transformation in a broader sense. Status is not something that belongs to an archaic social
system and would lose its importance with time; it is not an item that applies only to a great power struggling with
modernization like contemporary Russia. In fact it is a concern for all states and actors in one way or another (Carvalho and
Neumann, 2014). Thus, focusing on status opens up a new research agenda not only in Russian foreign policy but also in the
study of International Relations more broadly. In order to be able to assess the role and relevance of status in Russia's e and
other states' e foreign policy, we first need to spell out the components that form such a research agenda.

2. Theoretical voids in the study of international status

The quest for status has always been seen as being an integral part of states' conduct in world politics, “the everyday
currency in international relations” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 31). Yet theoretical insights and implications of this old wisdom have not
been articulated with full clarity in International Relations (IR) Theory or Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). A cumulative research
agenda has been lacking. Indeed, for classical realists, status questions were key issues in international politics, but they did
not present a theory of prestige or status. Often the message about the importance of status was unclear or contradictory.
Despite highlighting the importance of prestige, Hans Morgenthau (1978 [1948]) for example, thought that prestige seldom is,
and should not be, a primary foreign policy goal.
For decades, status was not a salient research topic in the study of international relations. While structural realist and
liberal theoretical approaches focused on material interests of survival and economic gain (seeing status primarily as a
function of military and economic capabilities) constructivists emphasized the importance of identity and norms for state
behavior. Yet, status did not become one of the key concepts for the constructivist research agenda. Instead, identity was
primarily understood as a category defining appropriate roles and norms or as a self-concept which determines whether
others are seen as enemies or friends. Thus, constructivists had little to say about the way states would react to either af-
firmations of or challenges to their social rank.
The focus of constructivists on identity and norms provides, however, a general background for theorizing status in in-
ternational relations and foreign policy in a more sophisticated way. In so far as status is based on intersubjective un-
derstandings and not on objective attributes, it is a perfect example of social constructions in international relations (Onuf,
2013, p. 211). Constructivism today has many brands, but the focus on psychology in constructivist research is particularly apt
for capturing status (Shannon and Kowert, 2012). Moreover, many approaches associated with foreign policy analysis, such as

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 T. Forsberg et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 261e268 263

role theory (Holsti, 1970) and psychology of foreign policy making (George, 1969; Janis, 1972; Jervis, 1976), provide valuable
tools for thinking about status in international politics.
These theoretical approaches can be further deepened through incorporating insights from more substantive theories on
status found in other disciplines. Social identity theory and self-verification theory in social psychology have not yet been
thoroughly brought to bear on international relations. Recent progress in emotions research (Goleman, 1997; Kahneman,
2009; Pinker, 1999) has resulted in a re-animation of a neglected body of knowledge within IR about the emotional foun-
dations of human (foreign policy) behavior and helps us to further understand the significance of status for states and nations
as well as the importance of collective status attributions for individuals. Therefore we may need to turn to new research
dealing with emotions ranging from neuroscience to sociology that has recently become more prominent also in the field of
International Relations.
Theorizing status through such broad theoretical lenses implies that traditional IR theories which focus on the material
dimensions of power and economic gain, including the resulting dynamics of security and cooperation, do not fully exhaust
key dimensions and essential elements of status. Rather, status has to be conceived also as a matter of a positively
distinctive identity, identity verification and positive social attribution (Volgy et al., 2011, p. 6). As status concerns,
moreover, may give rise to behavior that is typically depicted as emotional or ‘irrational’, a better understanding of how
status and emotions are interconnected would help to understand apparent policy inconsistencies and would lead to policy
recommendations that differ from advice based on theories that do not differentiate status dynamics from security
dynamics.
In this vein, more systematic research on status in IR might advance our knowledge on a number of specific questions
which are highly relevant for policy makers:

 What are the status markers in today's world politics? Are they shared or contested by the key players?
 What determines the extent to which foreign policy elites pursue social status as an intrinsic goal that goes beyond the
acquisition of material capabilities or positions of authority instrumental for specific material interests?
 When can external status recognition (for example, access to a prestigious club of states, prestigious state visits) dampen a
state's quest for material capabilities or deferential treatment?
 When and to what extent can internal status verification, that is: a domestic consensus on a state's high rank, substitute for
external verification? And when do such self-assured discourses about a state's presumed position rather fuel the desire
for (more) external verification (and consequently angry reactions to alleged disrespect) or for an even higher interna-
tional status position?
 To what extent can different kinds of domestic institutions, such as specific forms of government, dampen the foreign
policy impact of wide-spread domestic anger about ‘foreign disrespect’?

3. Drivers and logics of social status (concerns)

So far, pertinent theories on social status at best provide rough guidance as to which factors might shape observed
behavioral patterns. Partly, progress on these issues has been constrained by the fact that different theoretical perspectives
capture divergent aspects of social status in IR. In order to set research on Russia's status aspirations into a wider perspective,
let us survey what the current knowledge on status in international relations contains.
Theories concerning status are difficult to summarize partly because there are a number of concepts that can be used in a
roughly interchangeable way but whose meanings in a closer examination overlap and differ in various ways. Along with
status, we can talk of esteem, honor, prestige, rank, reputation, respect, standing, even glory or social power. Our intention
here is not to discuss these conceptual differences that in some cases can be seen as crucial in detail, as from a general point of
view they are not always that essential.1
Status can be roughly defined as an actor's rank in a particular social group or within society at large. As such, it rests on the
latter's consensus concerning the relative position an actor occupies within a social field or hierarchy. In principle, any kind of
quality that a given group grades from ‘lower’ to ‘higher’ can serve as a dimension for status differentiations (Larson et al.,
2014; Dafoe et al., 2014). Status dimensions and their relative importance hence are socially constructed and often con-
tested. Usually, groups rank their members according to their position within structures of dominance efor example, au-
thority, subordination; abilities, such as control of material capabilities, task performance, or task performance expectations);
specific characteristics – educational background, personal rectitude, piety, gender; and affiliations with prestigious sub-
groups, like membership in a higher caste or in an esteemed club (Berger et al., 1998; Gould, 2003; Ridgeway et al., 1998;
Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Weber, 1968). Obviously, these broad dimensions frequently overlap or feed into each other, as
when greater material capabilities enable an actor to dominate others or when an excellent education grants access to a
prestigious club. Likewise, being accepted in the role of a great power does not only imply ‘membership’ in the ‘great power
club’ but also higher task performance expectations concerning the management of regional issues as well as habits of

1
We should also note that some of the nuances made between the usages of these terms are peculiar to the English language and in some other
languages key words of the status terminology may highlight somewhat different aspects. We have here chosen the English concept of status for the title,
mainly because it appears to be most generic of the terms.

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264 T. Forsberg et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 261e268

dominant behavior towards small states. That is why the degree of social recognition for the enactment of a certain role often
indicates a state's relative status.
Research on status indicates that social actors value a prominent status position for both instrumental and intrinsic
reasons. First, a higher rank implies greater social influence, and thereby better access to all kinds of socially allocated assets,
and second, it ‘just feels better’. It is not easy to define exactly, what the relative role of instrumental and intrinsic motivations
are in status desires. The most important thing is to understand that both dimensions matter. Those who base their thinking
on Abraham Maslow (1954) famous hierarchy of needs believe that self-esteem becomes important only when more basic
material needs have been sufficiently fulfilled, and realists think that this seldom is the case for states in international
anarchy. Yet, there is a number of researchers who suggest that people often struggle for status recognition for reasons of self-
esteem than for simply enhancing their material prospects (Honneth, 1996; Lebow, 2008; Lindemann, 2010; Ringmar, 1996;
Wolf, 2011).
The intrinsic value of status and self-esteem is loaded by emotions. Humans simply enjoy winning contests as well as
receiving polite or deferential treatment by significant others, and they like feeling part of a high status groups (Frank, 1986;
Rosen, 2007). Apart from its instrumental value, status then also has a strong emotional component which is routinely
affected by social interactions. Individuals experience positive emotions, such as satisfaction or gratitude, when their peers
acknowledge their achievements or positive qualities (and even more so when the latter are exaggerated), while they sense
anger when their status is not 'properly' recognized, that is, when it is not confirmed by others to be as high as they
themselves deem it (Stets, 2005). In the latter case, people feel denied the respect they are 'due' in light of their 'truly
deserved' social position. Anger is thus the typical instant reaction to perceived disrespect as is resentment vis-a -vis the
‘offender’ in the long run. In fact, this emotional response to perceived status violations is deemed resulting from one of the
few moral intuitions which are universal to human beings (Haidt and Joseph, 2004).
Although psychological research on status mainly deals with individuals or small groups, we have grounds to believe that
such findings also hold for larger groups or organized collectives, such as nations and states (Sasley, 2011). To be sure, strictly
speaking states lack both consciousness and feelings. However, they are constituted by individuals who, to a greater or lesser
extent, identify with “their” state and/or nation (Bloom, 1993; Druckman, 1994). In particular, they identify with their state's
symbols and with the personal representatives who act 'on behalf' of the state. Accordingly, a strong sense of belonging, a
“we-feeling”, shared by broad domestic groups can bring about a pervasive homogenization of perceptions, convictions,
norms, and political preferences. Recent empirical findings show that even identification with a large, amorphous group, such
as an “imagined community”, to use Benedict Anderson (1983) prescient term, makes people actually experience its emo-
tions, or to be more precise, the emotions they deem prototypical for group members. According to Intergroup Emotions
Theory (IET), “emotions pertain to an identity, and not to a biological individual” (Smith and Mackie, 2008, p. 436; italics in
original). Although the representatives of the state have an additional instrumental motivation in searching for status
recognition abroad, because it strengthens their legitimacy and popularity at home, it does not mean that they desire status
just for instrumental reasons. In fact, state leaders and other representatives are likely to feel emotionally about the status of
the state, because its international rank forms part of their own political identity. Consequently, both citizens and state
representatives may just as eagerly insist on gaining foreign recognition for their national status as individuals care for their
distinctive personal status (Honneth, 2012).
Seen against this background, it is hardly surprising that states and other international actors have always tried to improve
and defend their status (Lebow, 2008, 2010; Wohlforth, 2009; Paul et al., 2014). At times, status competition has led to wars
fought to clarify dominance relations. Thus, the French monarchy waged a long campaign to establish its diplomatic pre-
cedence over Habsburg Spain. In such conflicts, gaining recognition of one's higher position did not only satisfy a monarch's
'amour propre'. Prevailing in a conflict also enhanced the state's overall political influence as it set a highly visible precedent,
thereby entrenching social expectations concerning patterns of domineering and deferential behavior. Often then, fights over
relative social position involve high stakes (Gould, 2003). Although they are partly driven by emotional needs, contests over
dominance can also pay material dividends which make escalating investments not altogether irrational.
Usually however, states pursue their status ambitions with more peaceful means by trying to attain conspicuous approval
by (other) high ranking states. Just like most other social actors, states often seek access into high status groups, such as the
United Nations Security Council or the G-8, by imitating their members' qualities or behavior, that is, by acquiring the
accepted status markers. Thereby, they hope to become elevated to a higher status position, either by being offered official
membership or by becoming regarded as another associate of a prestigious informal group. Even when such strategies of
'social mobility' (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) fail, because the exclusive club remains closed to the aspirant, states still retain the
option to engage in 'social creativity', that is, they can try to propagate alternative status markers and, by implication,
alternative high-status ‘clubs’, which they can meet more easily (Clunan, 2009; Larson and Shevchenko, 2003, 2010). If both
kinds of strategies fail, ambitious states may apply force, or at least its ‘shadow’, to make intransigent others accept the aspired
status gain (‘social competition’).
Like other actors, states can be expected to be especially ‘touchy’ and act accordingly when their status appears to be under
threat, for instance, when others try to dress them down or fail to treat them in accordance to the status position which they
already hold or, to be more precise: believe to hold. As pointed out above, such attacks provoke 'righteous anger' as they
violate both an actor's sense of entitlement and some positive elements of what s/he deems to be its publicly accepted social
identity. Accordingly, it is to be expected that states which used to be commonly considered top rate powers become
especially 'prickly' when their high social rank is challenged. Fear of status decline provokes action for defending the current

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 T. Forsberg et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 261e268 265

status position, as the state representatives and citizens usually insist on continued recognition of the traditional rank of their
country (Onea, 2014). Moreover, status conflicts can be more conducive to violence than conflicts over material interests,
because of the masculine rules associated with the defense of honor (Spierenburg, 1998).
Finally, the severity of status conflicts also depends on the rules and nature of contemporary international society. As Ned
Lebow (2008) has pointed out, status competition is more common in societies which lack widely agreed rules for assigning
status. In the history of the Western states system such agreement has never been perfect. In fact, all kinds of state qualities
have gained acceptance as status markers at different times: economic wealth, guardianship of religious sites, military power,
various cultural achievements, 'civilized' institutions, political values, and others (Lebow, 2008; Luard, 1976; Schweller, 1999).
To the extent that war is increasingly held in ill-repute, other means of claiming status will become more prominent than war.
However, in most epochs there was at least a rough consensus about some important status criteria. In today's world, the
question of a country's status is thus not simply about its position within the system but also about what are the proper
criteria for judging its rank in it.

-vis the West

4. Tracing and understanding social status concerns in Russian policy vis-a

While we believe that all states care about their status, we think that the observations of the importance of status
particularly apply to post-Soviet Russia. In the modern era, Russia has been seen as a fringe member of the European society of
states. Following the end of the Cold War, it had to cope with the fact that it no longer had the position of a global superpower
bestowed with as much prestige as the former Soviet Union. But the Russian leadership did not think it had thereby become a
lesser power. Thus, Russia's Westpolitik is predestined for such an analysis, as the status hierarchy in the Russia-West
relationship has been in flux e and remains highly contested. If status is e and has been e a key driving force for Russian
foreign policy, we need to spell out what it means to present approaches and understandings of it. Status is easy to observe,
but it is also easy to ignore. Moreover, when starting to consider status as a driving force in post-Soviet Russian foreign policy,
there is a lot of confusion what its drivers and its functions are. Indeed, one of the paradoxes of Putin's foreign policy is that it
has been characterized pragmatic and status oriented at the same time, although usually one would assume that a pragmatic
approach would put status concerns aside.
The presented research agenda on status, derived from IR and related theories, provides a well-structured tool-box for
investigating Russian status policies, particularly in its relations with the West. We hope that we can explain some of the
existing puzzles and can better understand features of Russian foreign policy if we focus on status in a more nuanced way.
Typically, the status dimension has been seen as part of the causal complex that has complicated Russia's relations with the
West but we have been unable to specify how much and how exactly status matters in these conflicts. In order to clarify this,
the articles presented in this Special Issue address a couple of key questions and problems. Thereby, all authors try to develop
or apply theories and methods through which the link between identity, status and emotions can be captured in a more
rigorous and sophisticated way.
The first set of questions to be answered is related to the substance of Russian status concerns: What does a status claim in
a specific situation imply in the understanding of Russian policy elites? Or to put differently: What is the perceived mode of
social status-neglect? While many of the authors in this Special Issue do not question social status as an analytical concept
and use it according to existing psychological theories, others qualify it. Andrei Tsygankov uses the notion of “honor” (chest')
as an essential moral (and thus emotionally-laden) category tied to Russia's social rank and status, thereby going deeper into
the specifics of Russian thinking, feeling and perception.2 Regina Heller prefers to use the concept of “respect” in order to
highlight the relational dimension of Russian status concerns and claims.
In this context, it is also important to clarify, who puts forward status and recognition claims. Is it only the “angry man”
Putin who yearns after respect or is status a matter of collective concern and, if so, how do such moral judgments and
emotional beliefs influence foreign policy decision making? While Andrei Tsygankov concentrates on presidential speeches
(Putin and Medvedev), Regina Heller in her Kosovo study shows that it is not only and primarily the decision-makers who get
involved. Rather, we see emotions and moral judgments for respect and status claims disperse into society. Policy-makers, in
turn, can be affected by such emotions and need to react to them. Who, then, is the addressee of Russian status claims? Do
status-rhetoric and policies have a primarily domestic function or are they directed explicitly to external audiences? Most of
our authors agree in the assessment that Russian status claims are aimed at external status verification. Hanna Smith, from
the perspective of status inconsistency theory, puts forward the argument that even the two Chechen wars, usually seen as a
matter of domestic policy and regime stabilization e primarily served the function to prove greatpowerness to the outside
world. Merely Anne Clunan makes a case for viewing Russia's domestic audience as the key addressee for its status claims.
This leads to another aspect to be examined: We need to understand how ideas about Russia's role and (subjectively
rightfully deserved) status in international relations, and in the relations with the West in particular, are embedded in and
derived from collective identities, what their historical roots are and how and why such meanings change. Olga Malinova
points to the century-old debates about Russia's place in the world and its place in relation to European and Western societies.

2
Tsygankov elsewhere (2012) even sub-classifies the meaning of “honor”, as used by Russian political elites, into “vernost” (loyalty, operationalized as
‘honor-cooperation’), “dostoinstvo” (dignity, operationalized as ‘honor-defensiveness’) and “slava” (glory, operationalized as ‘honor-assertiveness’),
depending on the context.

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266 T. Forsberg et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 261e268

The West as the “significant other” has been the projection screen for Russian identity formation since the middle of the 18th
century, and ressentiment against the West related to a feeling of Russian inferiority, imperfection or simply “otherness” was a
key constituting and driving force here. According to Malinova, such historically rooted meanings persist even today and
shape moral assessments about Russia's role in the partnership. Mark Urnov asks what role the cognitive concept of
“greatpowerness”– that is, the collectively shared vision of Russia's status and role as a great power in the world– is playing in
today's Russia. He shows that this concept is gradually changing. But how and where does this process lead to and what does
it mean for cohesion in Russian society? Will Russia's society come closer together and be more resolute in reclaiming the
country’ great power status, for example, through the creation of a new Eurasian conglomerate, in which Russia will take over
the role of a ‘primus inter pares’ or will it deprive Russian society of the only remaining common ideational basis? Despite a
seeming unwillingness of many Russians to shake off anachronistic elements of the great power identity, according to Urnov
exactly this process is taking place. Moreover, though there are obvious tendencies to revive the country's “Eurasian” destiny
and the growing prominence of figures like Alexander Dugin who support this vision, Urnow's, though cautious, assessment is
that the ongoing transformation of the great power identity will eventually undermine domestic cohesion in the longer term.
Third, the authors touch the question of policy strategies that result from social status concerns. Social Identity Theory
(SIT) helps to understand how Russia chooses particular identities. Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko as well as
Anne Clunan suggest that the need for positive self-esteem can account for alternative identity choices. Applying SIT to in-
ternational relations, Larson and Shevchenko claim that states can choose between strategies of social mobility, social
competition, and social creativity when seeking for positive self-esteem. Clunan argues that historically derived aspirations
are central to identity building. Accordingly, her aspirational constructivism differs from structural constructivism that puts
emphasis on the international norms and self-other relations. In view of Larson and Shevchenko, Russia was not successful in
its social mobility strategy to join the West because the latter put too many obstacles in the Russian path to becoming an
accepted part of the West. Russia did not move to social competition but Putin tried the strategy of social creativity when it
sought partnership with the United States after the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2011. Clunan argues that Russia
seeks to join the West but on conditions that retains its positive self-esteem. Because Russian political elites saw the Western
counterpart as insufficiently respectful, they turned to the historical tradition of conceiving Russia as a great power in line
with the ‘statist’ ideology.
This directly leads to another question, namely how Russian status concerns and status policies directly affect the rela-
tionship with the West. What happens when the West ignores Russian self-defined status and what happens when the West
addresses Russian concerns? By addressing Russian ‘anger points’, our authors investigate how status issues lead to conflict
and whether status agreements have helped to avoid conflicts or to ease them up. When Russia has been more self-confident
with regard to its status, has it been more willing to adapt its security and economic interest, or has it become simply more
assertive and aggressive? Tuomas Forsberg looks at the status conflicts between Russia and the West from the cognitive
perspective and argues that Russia and the West are likely to agree on their relative status when military or economic issues
are at stake. Yet when the dispute deals with international norms and questions of justice Russia is more likely to interpret
Western action as violating its status and conversely, it is more likely to interpret its own action as enhancing its status when
defending values which differ from those of the West. Hanna Smith points out that Russia was more open to cooperation with
international and Western organizations in human rights issues in the Chechen wars when these organizations and their
requests were compatible with Russia's status. Vice versa, Regina Heller shows how perceived misrecognition of Russia's self-
defined status as an equal partner and self-determined great power during the 1999 Kosovo conflict spurred anger on the part
of Russian politicians, unleashing in (over-)emotionalized rhetoric and hyperbolic reactions. Andrei Tsygankov even sees a
recurring pattern in Russia's policy where Western recognition first promotes hope (and thus cooperative attitudes), soon to
be followed by frustrated status ambitions which then instigate fear and anger, until increased Western respect initiates yet
another hopeful period.
What follows from these analyses for practical recommendations? Tsygankov along with Larson and Shevchenko, in a tour
d'horizon, as well as Heller, in a more close-up analysis, show how the failure of the West to pay attention to Russia's great
power aspirations may provoke anger and negative sentiments that are conducive to discord and conflict. By contrast,
granting Russia more status and prestige, in particular in realms other than geopolitical and military competition, would
facilitate mutual cooperation. Forsberg concurs but stresses that perceptions matter: Russia tends to see that its status has
been undermined even when the Western leaders have tried to pay specific attention to Russia's status concerns. Anne Clunan
argues that policy-makers should be aware of the primary audience of the great power proclamations made by the Russian
leadership and understand that Russia thereby is not trying to substantially challenge the current international order and
undermine the West, even though it is prepared to take risks, such as the Georgian war (2008) and the conflict with Ukraine
(2014) that have created conflicts with the West.
Thus, seen from such a status theoretical perspective, it becomes understandable why Russia often had volatile re-
lationships with the European powers in the past and why Russia is now having them with the West, in particular with the
United States, but also with Western institutions such as the EU or NATO. Russians have increasingly insisted that their
nation's appropriate international rank should be on the same level as in the past. After all, given its large population, huge
territory, and vast natural resources, Russia used to dwarf almost any other state with regard to such traditional material
status markers. On the other hand, it always seemed to lack at least some of the cultural markers of the day, thus occupying a
highly ambiguous status position among the European great powers (Neumann, 2005). Since criteria for membership in the
‘Western club’ remained in flux, 'social mobility' proved to be a precarious status strategy for Russia. As Western diplomats

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 T. Forsberg et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 261e268 267

and decision makers failed to recognize Russia's subjective status position, the need to solve the status dilemma has grown in
importance.
The crisis in Ukraine exploded the status conflict between Russia and the West that had been growing all the time despite
periods of cooperation during the post-Cold War years. A detailed analysis of the Ukrainian crisis from the perspective of
social status would require another special issue. While the focus on social status concerns would not give any full expla-
nation to the crisis and to Russia's behavior in it, it is a factor that is likely to make many aspects more understandable. First, it
directs attention to Ukraine and its political choices as being crucial to Russia's future social status in the region. Secondly,
anger about the West and its perceived ignorance over Russia's social status during the past make Russia's resentfulness vis-
-vis the West and its attempts to create new ‘rules of the game’ in the relationship more comprehensible. Thirdly, Russia's
a
willingness to use military force and slide into taking huge political risks when destabilizing eastern Ukraine can from a social
status perspective, be understood as a ‘necessity’ in order to defend its social status e both in the region and in the relations
with the West. Hence, if we acknowledge that the role of status in the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis is crucial, so must it be
taken into account in any possible solution. So far, the West is willing to recognize Russia's status as a great power only in
terms of the existing normative order. It seems that this does not satisfy Russia. Because finding a half-way house is not easy,
the likelihood of a prolonged status conflict with the West would not be surprising.

Acknowledgment

The Guest Editors would like to thank all authors for contributing their ideas, which were exchanged and advanced in
seminars and conference panels held in Hamburg, San Diego and Helsinki and in many other informal meetings over the last
three years. The project profited immensely from the concentrated expertise within the research group, situated in between
IR, regional studies, history, sociology and social psychology. Without their commitment and patience, this Special Issue
would not have been possible. Special thanks also go to VolkswagenStiftung (AZ 85368) for funding of a kickoff workshop in
September 2011 in Hamburg, and the Academy of Finland for its support to the project on “Emotions in Russian Foreign
Policy” (2011e14) as well as to the Finnish Center of Excellence in Russian Studies e ‘Choices of Russian Modernization’
(2012e2017), in the framework of which a number of follow-up workshops and meetings took place.
We also thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and the editors of Communist and Post-Communist
Studies for giving us the opportunity to publish this Special Issue in their journal.

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 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 269e279

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

Russia says no: Power, status, and emotions in foreign policy

Deborah Welch Larson a, *, Alexei Shevchenko b
a
Political Science Department, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
b
Political Science Department, California State University, Fullerton, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Since 2003, Russian foreign behavior has become much more assertive and volatile toward
Available online 16 October 2014 the West, often rejecting U.S. diplomatic initiatives and overreacting to perceived slights.
This essay explains Russia's new assertiveness using social psychological hypotheses on
Keywords: the relationship between power, status, and emotions. Denial of respect to a state is
Emotions humiliating. When a state loses status, the emotions experienced depend on the perceived
Humiliation
cause of this loss. When a state perceives that others are responsible for its loss, it shows
Putin
anger. The belief that others have unjustly used their power to deny the state its appro-
Social identity
Status
priate position arouses vengefulness. If a state believes that its loss of status is due to its
own failure to live up to expectations, the elites will express shame. Since the end of the
Cold War, Russia has displayed anger at the U.S. unwillingness to grant it the status to
which it believes it is entitled, especially during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and most
recently Russia's takeover of Crimea and the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. We can also see ele-
ments of vengefulness in Russia's reaction to recognition of Kosovo, U.S. missile defense
plans, the Magnitsky act, and the Snowden affair.
© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.

Since 2003, Russian foreign behavior has become much more assertive and volatile toward the West, often rejecting U.S.
diplomatic initiatives and overreacting to perceived slights. Russia's war with Georgia in 2008 and its rapid takeover of
Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 have generated heightened Western concerns and a backlash against Russia's strategy in in-
ternational affairs. Does Russia's increased assertiveness mark the beginning of a policy of “balancing” against U.S. power? Is
Russia's tougher diplomacy a necessary corollary to the growing centralization of its domestic politics or a consequence of
Russia's improved economic position? Is it an integral part of an “energy superpower” strategy supposedly promoted by the
country's economic and political elites?
While Russian power is a patchwork of formidable strengths and glaring weaknesses, there is little doubt, as exemplified
by the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, that Moscow is “more than capable of playing the role of spoiler” in international politics
(Govella and Aggarwal, 2012, p. 136). Russia as a veto-wielding member of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council can
block intervention or economic sanctions against problem states. Russia is an important variable, a “wild card” in American
attempts to integrate China into the Western order. It is also a crucial player in the emerging competition over hydrocarbon
reserves in the Arctic region. Finally, Russia is an essential player in efforts to deal with global warming, energy security, and
instability in the vast Eurasian land mass that adjoins Europe and East Asia (Legvold, 2012).
Some realpolitik-inclined analysts (Shleifer and Treisman, 2011) view Russian tensions with the West as reflecting the
absence of shared interests. Russia's policy has been “purposeful, cautious anddeven when misguideddreasonably

* Corresponding author.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.003
0967-067X/© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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270 D.W. Larson, A. Shevchenko / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 269e279

consistent” (ibid., p.131). Russia's cooperation with the United States, however, has varied significantly, ranging from Vladimir
Putin's strategic assistance to the United States in the War in Afghanistan and the New START to Russia's exercise of its veto on
Syria and refusal to initiate a new round of arms reductions. At times Russia's overreacting to perceived slights has under-
mined Russian interests in attracting foreign investment to facilitate modernization.
In this essay we outline a theoretical framework for explaining ostensible shifts and vacillation in Russia's foreign policy.
Realism would expect Russia to assert its predominance in neighboring areas where it would come into conflict with the
United States and China. Liberals would attribute Putin's anti-American stance to his return to authoritarianism and domestic
repression and the corresponding need for an external enemy. A review of Russia's actions since the end of the Cold War,
however, does not lend support to either power or domestic politics as the main source of variation in Russian foreign policy.
Instead, Russia's stance toward the United States has been strongly influenced by the degree of external validation of its self-
image as a great power. Russia is striving for enhanced global recognition while at the same time retaining its national
identity. Russia reacts strongly, at times emotionally, to perceived humiliation and disrespect. We argue that a better un-
derstanding of Russia's status concerns is essential not only to understand Moscow's volatile behavior but to encourage its
cooperation in global governance.
Our theoretical argument derives from social identity theory (SIT) (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel and
Turner, 1979) in social psychology, which argues that social groups strive for a positively distinctive identity and offers hy-
potheses concerning the identity management strategies used by groups to enhance their relative position.
Extrapolating the identity management techniques predicted by SIT to status-seeking in the international arena, we argue
that states may enhance their relative standing by imitating more advanced states (strategy of social mobility), trying to
displace the higher-ranked state (strategy of social competition), or finding a new arena in which to be superior (strategy of
social creativity). Emotions accompanying aggrieved status (in particular anger and vengefulness) can explain the intensity of
social competition as well as the breakdown of social creativity efforts. We apply these theoretical insights to Russian status-
seeking since the end of the Cold War as a plausibility probe.

1. Explaining Russia's assertiveness

What explains Russia's abrupt shifts and prickly sensitivity to alleged slights and insults? Available theoretical explana-
tions account neither for the pattern of changes in Russian policy, nor for the tone of grievance frequently adopted by Russian
elites.
Russia's increased assertiveness might be viewed as the inception of long-awaited “balancing” against U.S. predominant
power. Russia's opposition to U.S. initiatives in the United Nations (U.N.) could be described as “soft balancing,” that is,
coalition-building and diplomatic bargaining within international institutions to constrain the dominant power (Layne,
2006). On the other hand, a genuine balancing strategy for Russia would entail competition with the United States for
predominant influence in Eurasia while forming an anti-U.S. coalition with China and other non-Western states, as advocated
by Russian Eurasianists, but Russia has avoided commitments to these states (Tsygankov, 2008, 2014). An even more
pessimistic interpretation argues that Moscow is trying to overturn the post-Cold War order, restore its position as a global
superpower, and reassert control over its lost empire in a modern guise (Bugajski, 2009; Lucas, 2014). While Russia's takeover
of Crimea and its behavior during the 2014 Ukrainian crisis seem on the surface to validate this “offensive realist” reading of
Russian foreign policy, Russia's determination to prevent further enlargement of NATO and its demand for a droit de regard
(historically, an intrinsic aspect of great power status in international politics), should not be confused with imperial
expansionism. Russia's aspiring for greater regional influence may lead to spoiler behavior, but not full-scale revisionism.
Others charge that Russia's assertiveness reflects the “energy superpower” strategy, an effort to use Russia's energy ex-
ports as an instrument of power and prestige (Baev, 2008; Goldman, 2008). It is difficult to see how Russian elites could
reasonably expect to carry out such a policy, given Russia's greater dependence on the European energy market (for two-
thirds of its foreign exchange revenue) than Europe's on Russian gas (about 25 percent of their imports) (Trenin, 2007, p.
107). Relative changes in the market price of oil and gas are imperfectly correlated with Russia's overall stance toward the
West. Russia's recent chilly relations with the United States coincide with the emergence of U.S. shale gas, which has lowered
the market price of gas (Herszenhorn and Kramer, 2013).
Another explanation rooted in the liberal tradition and popular among prominent Russia watchers views anti-
Westernism in Moscow's foreign policy as an attempt to distract public attention from the growing centralization of
Russia's domestic politics and shift towards authoritarianism, camouflaged as “sovereign democracy” or discourse about
national specificity (Shevtsova, 2007, 2010). Despite his anti-American rhetoric, though, Putin has continued the policy of
allowing U.S. military and supplies to transit through Russian territory to and from Afghanistan and has cooperated on
important geopolitical problems such as removing chemical weapons from Syria and negotiating the future of Iran's nuclear
program.
A number of scholars have attributed the deterioration of Russian relations with the United States and Europe to Russia's
desire to recover its status as a great power and reaction to perceived humiliations by the United States, going back to the
1990s when Russia's wishes on international security issues were ignored (Stent, 2014; Sakwa, 2011; Simes, 2007; Trenin,
2006; Tsygankov, 2008). Building on that insight, we attempt to place Russia's status aspirations within a well-developed
theoretical framework from social psychology that relates social groups' desire for status to their strategies for achieving a
positively distinctive identity e Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Larson and Shevchenko, 2003, 2010; Clunan, 2009).

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 D.W. Larson, A. Shevchenko / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 269e279 271

The next section discusses SIT and a typology of strategies by which states can improve their international standing. We
also introduce complementary research on emotions evoked by disrespect for status, depending on the target's attribution of
responsibility. In the third section, we apply this framework to the Russian elite's 1990s status frustrations. The fourth section
analyzes Putin's social creativity strategy, and the fifth discusses Putin's emotional reaction to the U.S. failure to accept Russia
as an equal. The sixth section reviews why President Obama's efforts to redress some of Russia's status grievances failed, only
to provoke more intense anger from Russia and anti-American rhetoric.

2. Identity, status and emotions

According to SIT, social groups strive to attain an identity that is both positive and distinctive (Tajfel and Turner, 1979;
Turner, 1975). Similarly, states are concerned with intangible needs for positive self-esteem and recognition as well as
power and wealth. A group assesses its relative standing through comparison to a reference group, one that is similar but
slightly superior (Brown and Haeger, 1999). If the group's standing is inferior on important dimensions, it may decide to
pursue an identity management strategy.
The group may try to emulate a higher status group (social mobility), compete with it for preeminence (social compe-
tition), or establish excellence in a different area (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Applied to international relations, states may
enhance their relative standing by imitating more advanced states, trying to outdo the higher-ranked state, or finding a new
arena in which to be superior.
To be successful, a strategy of social mobility requires that elite group boundaries be permeable to new members (Ellemers
et al., 1990; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). If elite group boundaries are impermeable (Ellemers, 1993) and the status hierarchy is
perceived as unstable or illegitimate, groups may turn to social competition (Turner and Brown, 1978). Social competition
aims at besting the higher-status group in its own domain, striving to be better on some comparative dimension (Turner,
1975). Similarly, states engage in social competition when they strive to have the most destructive weapons, acquire more
clients than the other, display advanced weapons in parades, intervene militarily against a weaker power, prevent the other
state from achieving particular goals or act as a spoiler to block collective efforts to restore regional stability.
If existing status distinctions appear to be legitimately based, or at least durable, groups may try to establish a new area in
which to be superiordsocial creativity. Groups may reevaluate what is ostensibly a negative trait as positive, as in the “gay
pride” movement. Or groups may identify a new area in which they are better than the established group (Lemaine, 1974). The
concept of “Asian values”dstressing that these states are more harmonious, orderly, and communitarian than the individ-
ualistic and materialistic Westdis an example of this. States may use social creativity to achieve prestige on criteria other than
those conventionally associated with being a great power (military capabilities or economic weight) such as regional lead-
ership, diplomatic influence, economic growth rate, cultural achievements, or norm entrepreneurship.
For a social creativity strategy to succeed, the higher-status group must accept the new value dimension as positive and
acknowledge that the lower-status group does indeed stand out on this dimension (Tajfel, 1978, p. 96e97) The higher-status
group is more likely to acknowledge the out-group's accomplishments if it believes that its own position is legitimate and
secure (ibid., pp. 89e90).
Refusal by the higher-status group to recognize a group's status claims shows disrespect (Wolf, 2011), which is likely to
result in an escalation of inter-group competition (Tajfel, 1978: 89e90) and increased hostility from the lower-status group
(Brown and Ross, 1982). Having one's self-esteem or dignity reduced is humiliating (Saurette, 2006).
Reactions to perceived humiliations and slights are likely to exhibit intense emotions. SIT provides a link between
individual-level psychological theories of emotion and collectivities such as states. SIT holds that when individuals identify
with a group, they experience actions toward the group as if aimed at them personallydsimilar to emotions experienced
when a favorite soccer team wins or loses. Members react emotionally to events that thwart or further group goals (Sasley,
2011; Smith, 1993, 1999).
Maintaining or improving group status is a fundamental goal. When a group loses status, the emotions experienced
depend on the perceived cause of this loss. When the group perceives that its own actions were responsible for loss of
status, it will experience shame and embarrassment (Kemper, 1978, p. 61). When others are perceived as responsible for
loss of statusdthrough humiliation, withholding approval or deference, denial of expected benefitsdthe group will
display anger (Kemper, 1978, p. 128). The emotion of anger or irritation often leads to offensive action tendencies against
the out-group (designed to harm either verbally or physically in retaliation for injuries to dignity and prestige). Belief that
the in-group is strong increases the level of emotion and the likelihood of offensive action (Mackie et al., 2000). Anger is
elicited by perception of injustice or illegitimacy. The purpose of an offensive reaction is not merely to deter repeated
humiliations in the future, but to restore power and status, to return the situation to a desired state of affairs (Shaver et al.,
1987; pp. 1077e1078).
A lower-status group may experience malicious pleasure or Schadenfreude at the misfortunes or failures of a higher-status
group, which is perceived to have mistreated it (Leach et al., 2003). Vengefulness is prompted by others' unfair denial of status,
and is intended to restore actors to their rightful positions (Barbalet, 1998, p. 136). Unlike anger, which is an acute emotion,
vengefulness may endure over an extended period of time, motivating retaliatory action on an occasion far removed from the
original provocation (Mackie et al., 2000). The influence of both anger and vengefulness on status-seeking efforts can be
illustrated by Khrushchev's desire to get back at the Americans for years of humiliating over flights of Soviet territory by spy

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272 D.W. Larson, A. Shevchenko / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 269e279

planes. When the Soviets shot down a U-2 spy plane less than two weeks before the 1961 Paris summit, Khrushchev decided
not to disclose the Soviet downing of the plane, wait for the United States government to come up with a false cover story
about the missing plane, and then embarrass Washington by revealing it to be false (Taubman, 2003, p. 446, 455, 458). After
exposing President Eisenhower's equivocation, Khrushchev demanded a personal apology, ending the summit before it began
(Fursenko and Naftali, 2006, p. 290).
A focus on status-seeking, as well as the emotions accompanying failure to win respect, helps to explain some of the shifts
in Russian foreign policy, beginning with the abandonment of Russia's immediate post-Cold War policy of trying to integrate
with the West, as we discuss below.

3. Yeltsin's diplomacy: from social mobility to social competition

The collapse of the Soviet Union threatened both the value and distinctiveness of Russia's identity. Russia suffered pro-
found internal and external identity crises, exacerbated by the difficulty of adjusting to the rapid decline in its status and loss
of its position as a superpower (Hopf, 2002; Trenin, 2002). At the root of difficulties in post-Cold War relations between Russia
and the West was Russia's self-conception as a great power and the West's refusal to accept that status.
In the early 1990s, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and other Russian liberals pursued a strategy of social mobility,
aspiring to be admitted to higher-status Western clubs such as GATT, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Group of
Seven (G-7), and even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (CIS, 1992). The Clinton administration, however, held off
admitting Russia into elite Western clubs until it was a stable, capitalist democracy (Stent, 2005, p. 265). The U.S. decision in
early 1994 to enlarge NATO to include former members of the Warsaw Pact indicated that Russia would not be admitted into
“civilization,” just as it appeared to be playing by the rules (Aron, 1998, p. 33). As consolation, Russia was invited into the
Partnership for Peace, established in 1994 supposedly as a transition to NATO membership, although it was unlikely that
Russia would ever graduate (Trenin, 2011, p. 104). Negotiations for Russia's membership were prolonged by insistence that
Russia should have a special status, above the other Eastern European states (Light, 1996). Although Russia was a member of
the Contact Group on the former Yugoslavia, beginning in August 1995, NATO carried out sustained bombing of Serbian
positions in Bosnia over Russia's fervent and loud opposition, prompting heated rhetoric from Boris Yeltsin about igniting “the
flames of war in Europe” (Lynch, 2001, p. 16).
Widespread dissatisfaction with Kozyrev's concessions to the West led to his replacement as foreign minister by Yevgeny
Primakov (Tsygankov, 2006, pp. 83e84; Trenin, 2002, pp. 273e275). From 1996 to 1999, Primakov used “multipolar” di-
plomacy to restore Russia's status by forming diplomatic partnerships to check the United States, a strategy of social
competition (Pushkov, 1998, 2000). Primakov tried to mediate on Iraq and Kosovo to establish Russia's centrality as a key
player (Lo, 2002, pp. 89e90, 107e108, 142). In the end, Primakov's balancing strategy did not restrain the United States from
enlarging NATO or carrying out military action against Iraq and Yugoslavia (Tsygankov, 2006, p. 106). The use of NATO to bomb
Yugoslavia, bypassing the United Nations Security Council where Russia had a veto, was regarded as particularly humiliating
(Baranovsky, 2000, p. 454e455), marking the end of the strategic partnership between Russia and the West for many Russian
elites (Antonenko, 2007). Russian elites were particularly concerned that NATO had abandoned its traditional defensive
strategy, asserting the right to carry out military actions outside its area of responsibility in the name of humanitarian
intervention (Torkunov, 2000). The change in Russian foreign policy was symbolized by the “Primakov loop” (Trenin, 2011, p.
105): when he learned of the Kosovo bombing, Primakov ordered his plane, which was headed toward the United States, to
turn around in midair (Goldgeier and McFaul, 2009, p. 253). Russians sought to regain respect and to throw the U.S. off balance
by sending 200 Russian peacekeepers to capture the airport of Pristina before NATO troops arrived, risking a dangerous
military clash between U.S. and Russian soldiers (Talbott, 2002, pp. 342e347).
At the end of the 1990s, Russian efforts to regain great power status seemed to be doomed to failure, with Moscow viewed
as an angry anachronism in world politics, making empty threats. Although Russia was invited to join the G-7 in 1997, largely
to mitigate Yeltsin's humiliation over NATO's enlargement, the organization was still “G-7 plus Russia,” because Russia was
only admitted to the political side rather than to the conference of finance ministers (Talbott, 2002, p. 124, 237). The West
declined to accept Russia as a member of the elite clubs of NATO and the EU, although Russians believed that their repre-
sentatives should be at least co-chairs (Trenin, 2006). In addition to the scope and complexity of economic and political
reforms required for Russia to be accepted, social mobility would have entailed Russia's imitation of the higher-status
Western states, a humiliating position for a former superpower.
To add insult to injury, Russia's image was further damaged by Yeltsin's numerous health problems and frequent erratic
behavior fueled by too much alcohol during foreign trips and dealings with foreign dignitaries. As Clinton's former Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (2002) reveals, U.S. officials sometimes took advantage of Yeltsin's drinking problem to gain
more concessions from Russiadperhaps a perfect metaphor for the Russian perception of its relations with the U.S. during the
1990s.
By the turn of the millennium, optimistic expectations that Russia would become a partner with the West were replaced
with disillusionment and the belief that Russia's interests had been ignored. Contrary to Yeltsin's and others' assumption that
Russia would assume the status of a coequal superpower with the United States, Russia was treated by the United States as a
defeated state and “junior partner” (Pushkov, 2007; Simes, 2007). The gap between Russia's self-image as a great power and
its reception by the West evoked anger and frustration among Russian elites. In this case, however, Russia did not pursue
social competition, but sought to achieve prestige in a different area than geopolitical might.

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4. Putin's social creativity

Widespread realization of the futility of social competition encouraged the formation of a new foreign policy strategy, one
based on a more accurate and realistic assessment of the post-Cold War status hierarchy. Efforts at competing with the United
States had been humiliatingly fruitless, only accentuating Moscow's inferiority to Washington. Russia's possession of Soviet
status markers such as nuclear weapons and a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council were increasingly irrelevant in a
unipolar world where the United States was able to act unilaterally. Primakov's diplomatic balancing and partnerships with
other major powers merely registered Russia's current low standing while failing to generate new sources of Russian prestige
and legitimation in the post-Cold War system. In addition to its weak economy and declining military, in contrast to the Cold
War, Russia lacked a militant anti-Western ideology that might have attracted followers. In an era of peace between the
leading international powers, geopolitical competition (the most visible manifestation of social competition in the past)
remained largely subdued (Jervis, 2002). After recovering from the shock of unipolarity and having restored a modicum of
economic and political stability in the early 2000s, Russian leaders themselves realized that they did not wish to change the
international system but to achieve a higher status position within it. Accordingly, Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin decided
to seek status by identifying new areas where Russia could assume a prominent roleda strategy of social creativity.
Not surprisingly in light of Russia's stunning decline in the 1990s, Putin's principal foreign policy goal upon his election at
the end of 1999 was to restore Russia's great power status (Hanson, 2004; Lo, 2003; Mankoff, 2009, pp. 23e24). Putin seized
the opportunity provided by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States to reframe Russia's identity as
a partner with the West in the war on terror and to align with the United States (Lo, 2003, pp. 124e125, 128e129). President
George W. Bush and Putin declared their relationship a “strategic partnership.” Russia shared with the United States valuable
political and military intelligence about international terrorists, allowed U.S. planes to fly over Russian territory, acquiesced to
U.S. military bases in Central Asia, participated in international search and rescue missions, and gave increased assistance to
an anti-Taliban force in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance (Aron, 2002). Before the 2001 November U.S.eRussia summit,
Putin privately compared his relationship with Bush to that between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill during World
War II (Baker and Glasser, 2005, p. 135). This attempt at becoming a partner with the United States, however, required
validation by the United States.

5. Aggrieved status, emotions, and a crisis for social creativity

For social creativity to be successful, the dominant power must accept the aspiring state's efforts to attain recognition in a
new area. The Bush administration, however, did not regard Russia as an equal partner (Hanson, 2004, p. 173; Shevtsova, 2007,
p. 230), as became apparent with Bush's failure to consult with Putin before invading Iraq, a former Soviet client where Russia
had substantial financial stakes (Balmforth, 2003). Instead of showing respect for Russia's status as a regional power, with a
droit de regard in the post-Soviet space, the Bush administration supported “color” revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine
(2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), regime changes that were perceived as humiliating interference in Russia's backyard. The
Ukrainian “Orange Revolution,” in particular, was a shock and personal slap on the face for Putin, who had staked his personal
reputation on victory for the pro-Russian candidate, only to see the election results overturned as fraudulent by the Ukrainian
opposition and the West (Shevtsova, 2007, p. 230, 237e238, 240; Lo, 2008, p. 94; Mankoff, 2009, p. 117, 119, 123; Judah, 2013,
pp. 84e86).
Putin complained about the lack of respect showed to Russia, as in December 2004 when he compared the United States to
a “strict uncle in a pith helmet instructing others how to live their lives,” and in 2006 when he referred to the United States as
wolf “who knows who to eat and is not about to listen to anyone” (Shevtsova, 2007, p. 233). In his emotional and bellicose
February 2007 Munich address, Putin accused the United States of having “overstepped its national borders in every way,” as
evidenced by the “economic, political, cultural, and educational policies it imposes on other nations” (Putin, 2007). At a
Victory Day celebration in May 2007, Putin even obliquely compared U.S. policies to those of the Third Reich (Kramer,
2007a,b).
As the literature on status, power, and emotions would predict, emotions of anger and vengefulness associated with not
receiving due recognition led to offensive reactions, which were amplified by perceptions of the increased strength of the
lower-status party. Russian elites were more confident in making claims to great power status given the increase in the price
of oil from $27 a barrel in 2000 to $130 a barrel by mid-2008 (Stent, 2008, p. 1092). As the minister of defense Sergei Ivanov
wrote in 2006, “Russia has now completely recovered the status of great power that bears global responsibility for the sit-
uation on the planet and the future of human civilization” (Tsygankov, 2008, p. 49).
Russia reacted harshly to U.S. plans to deploy elements of its missile defense system, ostensibly directed at Iran, on Polish
and Czech territory in 2007dincluding threatening to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treatydin
part because the missile interceptors could be the basis for a larger system undermining Russia's nuclear deterrent (RFE/RL
Newsline, 2007) but primarily because Russia had once again been excluded from a major European security decision,
contrary to the prerogatives of a great power (Economist, 2007b, p. 70). The Russians felt that the United States had violated
its commitment not to deploy significant conventional military forces on the territories of states recently added to NATO, part
of the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act. The choice of the Czech Republic and Poland as the site of the initial deployment
heightened Russian ire over NATO's enlargement (Pikayev, 2009; Slocombe, 2008). Nevertheless, at the June 2007 G8 summit
in Heiligendamm, Germany, Putin offered to allow the United States to use the radar at Azerbaijan as part of a joint missile

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defense system, adding a newly built radar to the offer at a follow-up summit with Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine
(Economist, 2007a). The United States rejected Putin's offer of cooperation on the grounds that the radars were not technically
suitable. A month later, Putin suspended Russian cooperation with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (Kramer and
Shanker, 2007) and in August, he resumed regular strategic bomber patrols over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (Kramer,
2007a,b).
Russia's desire to assert its comeback on the international stage was encapsulated in the RussiaeGeorgia War (Sherr, 2009,
pp. 204e207). On August 7, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili launched an artillery attack followed by ground invasion
of the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, killing several Russian peacekeepers. Saakashvili had hoped to seize South Ossetia
as a fait accompli, before Russia had time to react. Russian troops subsequently occupied important towns of Georgia, apart
from South Ossetia, and the Russian Air Force destroyed much of Georgia's military infrastructure to teach the Georgians a
lesson (Trenin, 2011, p. 30).
Putin felt that Russia's status as a great power was threatened. Putin intervened in Georgia primarily to reassert Russia's
predominant interest in the area, which was endangered by the possibility of imminent membership for Georgia and Ukraine
in NATO. Saakashvili's foreign policy priorities were for Georgia to join Western security and economic structures and to
reassert control over the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Viewing Saakashvili as a model democratic
reformer (even after his November 2007 crackdown on the political opposition), the Bush administration encouraged his
efforts to restore Georgian territorial integrity instead of acting as an honest broker in resolving the “frozen conflict” (Cooley
and Mitchell, 2009). In April 2008, the NATO Summit at Bucharest promised Ukraine and Georgia eventual membership in
NATO (not a membership action plan), although Putin had joined the summit for the first time to express his objections in
person, informing Bush that this was a “red line” for Russia (Cooper et al., 2008; Asmus, 2010, pp. 134e135). The NATO-
Bucharest decision, a compromise between the French-German and U.S. positions, achieved the worst of both worlds,
angering the Russians without satisfying the Ukrainians or Georgians (Trenin, 2011, p. 28).
In addition to anger, vengefulness was an important factor in Russia's response to Georgia's attempt to take over the
disputed provinces. In February 2008, the West had recognized Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence without UN
approval, an action that Putin had strongly opposed. Russian diplomats had drawn comparisons between Kosovo and the
Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. If Kosovo could be independent, why not the breakaway provinces of
Georgia (Antonenko, 2007)? Georgian President Saakashvili was also aware of the parallels, cautioning EU leaders and U.S.
officials that Russia was likely to retaliate against Georgia if Kosovo were allowed to secede from Serbia without Russian
approval, but Western diplomats assured him that Russia was bluffing (Asmus, 2010, p. 100).
Shortly after the Georgian war, Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, although none of the
other states in the Commonwealth of Independent States followed suit, including even Belarus. Russia's emotional response
to Georgian defiance was costly. Although Russia easily won the war, foreign capital flight damaged the Russian economy, as
the benchmark Russian Trading System index fell by nearly fifty percent (Kramer, 2008a,b).
From the Georgian war onward, Russia would no longer tolerate further expansion of NATO or expansion of U.S. influence
into states of the former Soviet Union. Russian President Medvedev (2008) affirmed Russia's “privileged interests” in the post-
Soviet space. As noted by Lukyanov (2012), for Russia the war “was something approaching psychological revenge after a 20-
year geopolitical retreat, proof that Moscow can say no.”

6. Anger mismanagement

The Obama administration's policy to “reset” relations with Russia, inaugurated in February 2009, was based in part on
redressing injured Russian prestige and national pride. The term “reset” implied that the Obama administration was jet-
tisoning aspects of President Bush's foreign policy that were most objectionable to Russia, such as wooing countries in the
post-Soviet space or placing missiles and radars in former members of the Warsaw Pact, while cooperating with Russia on
issues of common interest. For Russian leaders the major appeal of the “reset” policy was the promise of a more equal
relationship with Washington. Since its possession of a sizable nuclear arsenal is one of the few remaining areas where Russia
and the U.S. are equals, the Russian side was pleased that Obama initiated negotiations for a new START agreement, signed in
spring 2010 and promptly ratified by the U.S. Senate and Russian Duma (Goldgeier, 2009, p. 23). START negotiations emerged
as an important vehicle for restoring Russia's status as at least a “quasi-superpower” (Economist, 2009, p. 23). Russian leaders
reciprocated by agreeing to open up an air corridor, allowing up to 4500 flights per year of U.S. troops and equipment to
Afghanistan. By spring 2011 twenty percent of American cargo and fifty percent of U.S. troops transited through Russia
(Economist, 2011). The Obama administration refrained from directly criticizing Russian treatment of dissidents or human
rights (Baker, 2009a).
The Russian leadership was also relieved by Obama's September 2009 decision to put on the back burner another
humiliating issueddeployment of the U.S. missile defense systems in Eastern Europeein favor of a four-phased system in
which the first phase would consist of smaller missile interceptors based on ships and aimed at Iranian missiles (Baker,
2009b). During her July 2010 tour of the former Soviet states, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized that the
United States would maintain good relations with Russia as well as with Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan (Economist, 2010b).
Russian foreign policy moved in a more constructive and pragmatic direction, as reflected in improvement of previously
tense relations with Poland and the Baltics, settlement of the marine border with Norway, greater reliance on soft power
instruments in its relationship with post-Yushchenko Ukraine, and presentation, as Medvedev termed it, of “a smiling face to

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the world” (Interfax, 2010). In addition to appreciation of the status accommodation aspects of the “reset,” Moscow's
cooperation was motivated by recognition of the dangers of dependence on natural resource exports and the need to
diversify, a realization that was brought home by the 2008e2009 financial crisis, and a goal that would require cooperation
with the West to obtain foreign investment and technology. Cooperation between Russia and the United States reached its
height in spring 2010, when Obama and Medvedev signed the New START Treaty in Prague (Baker and Bilefsky, 2010); U.S.,
French, and British troops were invited for the first time to participate in Moscow's annual May 9 Victory Day parade to
commemorate victory over Nazi Germany in World War II (Economist, 2010a; Barry, 2010); and Russia reached agreement
with other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council on the most severe sanctions yet against Iran's nuclear program.
Moscow later canceled the sale of advanced S-300 ground-to-air missiles to Iran (Sanger and Kramer, 2010).
Despite these promising beginnings, in 2011e2012 the reset entered a period of diminishing returns, largely because the
policy was focused on obtaining agreements on particular issues, without connection to a larger vision for the relationship. As
observed by Thomas Graham (2011), a former senior director for Russia in the Bush White House, the problem with the “reset”
was that it never had a coherent answer for “what the two countries should aspire to now so as to foreclose a return to
dangerous geopolitical rivalry and hold open the promise of mutually advantageous strategic partnership,” (Russia Profile
Experts, 2011). Aiming to assuage some of the symptoms of Russia's anger and frustration, the reset ultimately failed to
address the root causes of Moscow's grievances over its loss of status. As a recent study of U.S.eRussian relations notes, “a
central Russian objective has been to regain its status as a great power and be treated as an equal by the United Statesda goal
that was constantly frustrated” (Stent, 2014, p. xi).
In June 2011, the NATO-Russia Council, created in 2002 for joint projects and cooperation, rejected Moscow's idea of a joint
anti-missile system in favor of two separate systems linked by information exchange. To add to the humiliation, the U.S. and
its NATO allies turned down Russia's demands for legally binding guarantees and technical limitations to ensure that future
European ABM systems would not be directed against Russia (Ivanov, 2011). In a replay of the 2007 dispute, Russia reacted
angrily to Obama's decision to proceed with a European missile defense system that would entail putting missile interceptors
in Romania and Poland, including warning of a possible preemptive strike against missile defense sites (Clover and Dyer,
2012).
In his May 9, 2012 speech commemorating the anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany, President Putin, elected in
March, declared that Russia had “a great moral right” to the respect of other nations, because of its role in defeating Nazi
Germany. He informed President Obama that he would not be attending the G-8 summit meeting that the U.S. president had
moved to Camp Daviddso that Putin would not feel excluded from the subsequent NATO summit in Chicagodbecause he was
needed in Moscow to help select the new cabinet (the responsibility of Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev) (Cooper and Barry,
2012). This was a snub, perhaps in retaliation for Obama's failure to attend the AsiaePacific Economic Cooperation meeting in
Vladivostok. Humiliated and angered by the 2011e2012 domestic protests accompanying Putin's return to presidency, Putin's
team once again invoked the threat of Washington-sponsored “color revolutions,” at one point directly blaming the U.S.
Department of State and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton for sponsoring the opposition movement (Anishchuk and
Gutterman, 2013; Trenin, 2013a).
Even the triumph of Russia's 2012 admission into the WTO, after two decades of negotiations, was marred by Russian
status grievances. Russian political circles were predictably enraged by the decision of the U.S. Congress to replace the
obsolete Cold War-era JacksoneVanik amendment (which conditioned trade relations with the USSR on freedom of Jewish
emigration) with the December 2012 Sergey Magnistky Rule of Law Accountability Act (which denied visas to Russian officials
implicated in “gross human rights violations” and froze their U.S. assets), viewing it as intolerable interference in their do-
mestic affairs (Herszenhorn, 2012).1 According to Alexei Pushkov, chair of the Russian Duma's international affairs committee,
the Magnitsky Act reflected American “pure double standards.” Russia was castigated for its human rights practices while
authoritarian partners of the U.S., including China, continued to get a pass from Washington (Weir, 2013).
Russia responded tit for tat, first with a bill targeting political nongovernmental organizations receiving financial support
from the United States and prohibiting U.S. adoptions of Russian orphans. The latter provision was ostensibly designed to
protect Russian children from abuse by American parents, but attracted much opposition within Russia, including from some
members of Putin's cabinet (Economist, 2013). A day after the United States released the name of Russian officials subject to
sanctions Russia provided its own list of eighteen current and former U.S. officials who would be barred from entering Russia.
A spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Alexander Lukashevich, commented that the United States must realize that
it cannot conduct its relationship with Moscow “in the spirit of mentoring and undisguised diktat” (Barry, 2013).
Putin's resentment over the West's use of Russia's March 2011 abstention, rather than a veto, of a UN SC resolution 1973,
allowing the NATO air campaign against Gaddafi's troops in Libya, to promote “regime change” in that country contributed to
Russia's falling out with the West over the civil war in Syria, which broke out in 2012 (Economist, 2012). Tellingly, Putin
initially signaled his willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in stopping the war and leading the post-conflict peace process,
but insisted that this should be a cooperation of equals, a condition which Washington, despite the reset rhetoric, refused to
accept (Trenin, 2013b). By saying “no” to Western intervention in Syria and by supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in

1
The bill is named after Sergey Magnitsky, a lawyer for Hermitage Capital who had exposed large scale tax fraud committed by Russian law enforcement
and tax officials using the resources of the hedge fund. Magnitsky died in 2009 while in a pre-trial detention after being refused medical treatment.

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his military campaign against rebels Putin aimed at restoring Russia's status as an “indispensable power” in global politics and
earning the respect of China and other rising powers (Baev, 2013).
Russian status concerns and related emotions were prominently on display in the summer 2013 Russo-American spat over
the fate of Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency contractor, who fled the United States to Hong Kong and later
to Moscow after exposing the U.S. government's wide-ranging communications surveillance programs. While attempting to
avoid damaging relations with Washington (Putin publicly demanded that Snowden stop leaking information damaging to
the U.S. national security as a pre-condition of his stay in Russia), the Russian side ultimately could not afford to succumb to
American pressure to extradite Snowden due to considerations of prestige. The decision to grant Snowden temporary political
asylum in Russia was influenced by “Russian irritation at the U.S. presumption that the American justice system's demands
must be honored but that Washington is free to criticize and impugn the activities of Russian courts and law enforcement”
(Gvosdev, 2013). The Russian response was also in part driven by vengefulness. Putin could not resist the temptation to
embarrass the U.S. by exposing the hypocrisy of American democratic rhetoric and by positioning Russia as a genuine pro-
tector of civil liberties. As Putin declared, tongue-in-cheek to the laughter and applause of his audience in May 2014, “Russia is
not a country that extradites fighters for human rights” (Kremlin.ru, 2014). In the end, Russian (and American) status concerns
wound up contributing to a new low point in the relationship, leading to the U.S. decision to cancel the ObamaePutin meeting
originally planned at the sidelines of the September 2013 G-20 summit in St. Petersburg, the first time an American president
had called off a bilateral summit in decades (Baker and Meyers, 2013).
An opportunity for cooperation with the United States, however, unexpectedly presented itself when it became clear in
September 2013 that the Obama administration faced the likelihood of failing to secure congressional authorization for
punitive military strikes against Syria. Russian diplomats seized the moment by promoting a plan to place Syria's chemical
weapons under international control, thus helping the U.S. to save face by embracing a diplomatic solution to the crisis and at
the same time enhancing Russia's prestige as a world power broker (Baker and Gordon, 2013).
This episode of social creativity, however, could not prolong the life of the “reset” relationship. In addition to halting
further expansion of NATO, since the 2008 war with Georgia Russia has resisted the extension of the European Union's
economic domain to the former Soviet sphere. Moscow's distrust of the European Union was further provoked by the Eu-
ropean Union's Eastern Partnership Program, which was presented as a “civilizational choice” for post-Soviet statesda
characterization likely to be regarded as an insult by Moscow. At the same time, Putin, who had previously included Russia
within the European cultural sphere, started positioning Russia as a unique civilization, a genuine repository of traditional
Christian values in contrast to the moral decadence of contemporary Europe (Merry, 2014; Aron, 2014). Moscow applied
pressure on Moldova, Armenia, and Ukraine not to sign association and free trade agreements with the EU (which could
disrupt those countries' economic ties with Russia) in favor of joining a Russia-led customs union, the first step in Putin's
ambitious project for a Eurasian Union, an economic and civilizational project separate from the West (Herszenhorn, 2013).
As the Russian political class was basking in the triumph of the successful 2014 winter Olympics games in Sochidthe most
expensive Olympic Games in history, designed to celebrate Russia's resurgence as a great power and Putin's personal vanity
project (Herzenhorn, 2014)dthe biggest crisis in Russia's relationship with the West since the end of the Cold War struck.
When the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich, who had earlier declined to sign the EU partnership agreement under
Russian pressure, was toppled by the street protest movement and fled in the evening of February 21, 2014, Putin immediately
perceived his ouster as yet another “orange revolution.” He treated it not only as a geopolitical threat (since it raised the
possibility of Kiev's reneging on the 2010 agreement that allowed Russia to station its fleet in Crimea until 2042), but also as a
personal humiliation, which this time, a full decade after the first one, he was determined not to tolerate. While Russia
undoubtedly had contingency plans for sudden instability in Ukraine, as some Western analysts pointed out, Putin's sub-
sequent behavior can better be explained as “fundamentally driven by psychological impulses and highly emotional re-
sponses” to the crisis (Mendelson and Harvey, 2014), an “angry and ad hoc” reaction to the situation in Kiev (Sakwa, 2014).
The presence in the provisional Ukrainian government of several ultra-nationalists (a few of whom had publicly praised
Nazism and embraced the legacy of Stepan Bandera, the Ukrainian World War II nationalist leader who fought with the Nazis
against the Soviet army) and their immediate call for rescinding the status of Russian as a second language, later vetoed by the
interim president, along with other anti-Russian measures, gave Putin the ground to denounce the new provisional regime as
illegitimate, extremist, Russophobic, and pro-fascist (Kramer, 2014).
Within a week, Russian special operations forces and troops secured control over strategic locations across the peninsula,
while the Crimean parliament, partially disbanded and partially voting in the presence of the masked gunmen who were
under control of Sergei Aksyonov, alias “Goblin,” known for his connections with the mafia, declared independence from
Ukraine and scheduled a referendum on joining Russia (Reuters, 2014). Moscow first manipulated and then was quick to
recognize the fraudulent results of the referendum. On March 18, 2014, Putin and Crimean leaders signed a treaty of accession
making Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (the location of the Russian Black Sea Fleet) parts of the Russian Federation (Meyers
and Barry, 2014).
Putin's address to the country's political elite before signing the accession treaty was emotional and defiant in the face of the
threat of Western economic sanctions and Russia's expulsion from the G-8. Putin emphasized that after the Soviet collapse, the
Russian people became “one of the biggestdif not the biggestddivided nation in the world” and pledged to protect the rights of
compatriots abroad. He appealed to Russian history, pride, and glory, but also to shame over losing the former superpower
status by calling the loss of Crimea after the collapse of the Soviet Union an “outrageous historical injustice” which Russia had to
accept because it was simply too weak to protect its interests. He scorned the West for accusing Russia of violating international

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 D.W. Larson, A. Shevchenko / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 269e279 277

law and invoked the right of nations to self-determination to justify Russia's actions in Crimea. If Ukraine could secede from the
USSR and Kosovo Albanians were permitted by the West to separate from Serbia, then citizens of Crimea had the right to join
with Russia. The Russian president also revisited several themes of his 2007 Munich speech, lamenting the loss of stability in
international politics after the end of bipolarity and accusing the United States of attempting to rule by force. He recited the list
of state grievances over not being treated as an equal partner, ranging from the enlargement of NATO and the 1999 bombings of
Belgrade to the threat of sanctions over Crimea and continuing restrictions on Russian import of technologies and exports. In
short, in his view, Western behavior constituted a return to the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century policies of
containment, which Russia could no longer tolerate. By recognizing the interim Ukraine government, which quickly emerged
after the departure of Yanukovich, the United States and the EU had crossed a “red line.” “Russia found itself in a position it could
not retreat from. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard.” Like other countries Russia had its
“own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected” (Putin, 2014).
After taking over Crimea, Russia engaged in spoiler behavior designed to humiliate and destabilize Ukraine by providing
military, economic, and political support to the pro-Russian separatists in the Ukraine's south-east, the majority of whom
were Russian citizens, led by two former FSB (Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, the successor to the KGB) officers, Alexander
Borodai and Igor Girkin (with the nickname Strelkov), who later resigned (Buckley, 2014). Russia's overarching goal was
probably to force the Ukrainian authorities to accept federalization of the country, which would have weakened Kiev's control
over the southeast and eliminated the very possibility of future Ukrainian membership in NATO (Fenenko, 2014). Moscow
remained defiant when faced with the threat of Western economic sanctions, Russia's de-facto expulsion from the G-8, and
international outrage over the July 17, 2014 destruction of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 with 298 passengers on board over
eastern Ukraineda tragedy attributed to the pro-Russian separatists' inability to distinguish between a military target and a
civilian passenger jet, but also potentially implicating Russia, which was suspected of delivering powerful anti-aircraft
missiles to the rebels (MacFarquhar, 2014).
With the remnants of Russia's social creativity supplanted by what one journalist dubbed “the ideology of ressentiment”
over the loss of “imperial greatness” (Remnick, 2014, p. 61), U.S.eRussian relations increasingly appeared to be an escalating
rivalry, analogous to the nineteenth century Great Game between Russia and Britain for influence over Central and South
Asiadexcept for the asymmetric character of the twenty-first century versiondwith the U.S. and Russia competing for in-
fluence over such states as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia (Trenin, 2014). According to historian Geyer (1987, p. 205), the
Great Game for Russia was motivated by considerations of prestige and the desire to at least appear to be a great power.
Karaganov (2014), an influential Russian foreign policy expert, suggested a more troubling historical analogy to a Western-
imposed “velvet-gloved version of the Versailles policy” which “by pushing Russia into the periphery of global politics” had
unleashed “a kind of Weimar syndrome in Russia, a great nation whose dignity and interests were trampled underfoot.”

7. Conclusion

Although the danger of military conflict among major powers has dramatically receded in the post-Cold War era, states
continue to compete for status and prestige. The desire for status is particularly acute for Russia, which suffered a catastrophic
decline in its position in the 1990s and has viewed itself as a great power for centuries. Consistent with psychological research
and theory, Russia responded emotionally to perceived humiliation.
The Russian takeover of Crimea and the 2014 Ukrainian crisis illustrate the risk that continued Russian bitterness over its
loss of great power status could lead to a return of geopolitical competition. As Deng (2008, p. 292) observes in his study of
Chinese status concerns, “withholding due status recognition based on zero-sum power politics logic and negative
stereotype-driven categorization is a recipe for a traditional great-power struggle.”
Perceived humiliation and status dissonance better account for twists and turns in Russia's relationship with the West
than more conventional power or interest-based explanations. Russia was obstructionist and vocal in opposing U.S. policies in
the late nineties, when Russia's economy was on the verge of collapse. Since late 2011, Russia has been assertive and anti-
Western, despite lower energy prices and lessened European dependence on Russian gas. Contrary to the idea that Rus-
sia's policy reflects cold calculation of consistent national interests, Putin's emotional rhetoric and defiant reaction to Western
criticism discourages needed foreign investment in Russia's economy. Periods of U.S.eRussian cooperation have coincided
with efforts by U.S. policymakers to show respect for Russia as an equal partner, as in the initial phase of the reset policy. At
the same time, Russian elites are hypersensitive, and may overreact to perceived insults that were not intended as such.
Domestic politics within the United States is a complicating factor, as the Obama administration was unable to prevent
passage by Congress of the Magnitsky Act.
The literature on identity, status and emotions suggests that isolation and exclusion of emerging great powers will evoke
anger, vengefulness, and competition to supplant the dominant powers. Continued indifference to Russia's great power as-
pirations, especially in the former Soviet space, will encourage Russian elites' sense of injury and humiliation, possibly leading
to further conflict.

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 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 281e290

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

Historical aspirations and the domestic politics of Russia's

pursuit of international status
Anne L. Clunan 1
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6165, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: What determined Russia's national interests and grand strategy in the first decade after
Available online 7 October 2014 the Cold War? This article uses aspirational constructivism, which combines social psy-
chology with constructivism, to answer this question. Central to aspirational construc-
Keywords: tivism are the roles that the past self and in-groups, and their perceived effectiveness play
Aspirational constructivism in the selection of a national identity and the definition of national interests. This article
Foreign policy
explains why Russian political elites settled on a statist national identity that focused on
Identity
retaining Russia's historical status as a Western great power and hegemon in the former
Russia
Status
Soviet Union and in engaging the country in bounded status competition with the United
Social identity theory States.
Aspirations Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California.
International relations theory

As the Cold War ended and Russia transitioned to post-communist rule, practitioners and scholars feared that this process
would not occur peacefully. As early as 1992 and as late as 2005, Russians and Americans feared a “Weimar Russia” scenario,
where, similar to the fifteen years of the German Weimar Republic, the weakness of democratic institutions would pave the
way for revanchist nationalist control of Russia and a descent into war (Cheney, 1992; Kreisler, 1996; Radzikhovsky, 2005;
Yanov, 1995). Concerns over the internal consequences of Russia's “humiliation” and “defeat” in the Cold War led to calls
to sustain Russian democracy at all costs, and domestic and international concern over Russia's post-Soviet identity (Perry,
1998). At issue was whether Russia would accept its new, lesser position in the Western international order, a core
concern given the centrality of status and satisfaction to theories of great power war, power transition, and the possibility of
peaceful transformation of the international system (Wohlforth, 2009). The issue of state status and satisfaction is of ongoing
importance today, given concerns about U.S. decline, the rise of China and India, and not least, Russia's revision of its border
with Ukraine and support for rebels there.
Status and satisfaction, however, speak to a much broader debate in international relations theory about what states want.
Over the course of Russia's long “revolutionary decade”d1991e2004dRussia remained unsatisfied with its new status, but
its grand strategy took neither a revanchist nor an accommodating turn. Rather than accept its less powerful position, Russia
became more aggressive and assertive as it weakened in the 1990s, even while it kept seeking partnership with the West.
Russia swung from competition to cooperation, yielding constant concerns about a new Cold War with the West. So, what
determines Russia's national interests and grand strategy during and after shifts in the distribution of material power?
Answers to this question have immediate implications in other parts of the world, given power transitions underway in Asia
and elsewhere.

1
The views expressed here are those of the author, and do not reflect the views of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, or the
United States Navy.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.002
0967-067X/Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California.

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282 A.L. Clunan / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 281e290

Rationalist approaches to international politics generally assume Russian interests are pre-determined, not amenable to
change via social interaction, and will be pursued in a strategic manner; they are silent on the substance of those interests.
Within realism, predictions differ, though there is a general assumption that status is a national interest. Defensive realists
argue that Russia's decision to cooperate or compete would depend on whichever strategy maximized its security. Some
expect that Russia would be rapidly socialized into the new distribution of power, and accept its second tier status (Waltz,
1979). Offensive realists expect Russia to maximize its power, which usually begets hostile competition (Mearsheimer,
2001). Other realists argue that great power wars are most likely when one side is unsatisfied with its status (Gilpin,
1981; Wohlforth, 2009). Other scholars and policymakers focus on domestic politics and a nationalist backlash as the pri-
mary cause for concern in times of power transition (Cheney, 1992). In line with realist predictions about shifting material
capabilities, scholars and pundits in the early 1990s suggested that Russia would fight rather than cede its position in Europe
and Eurasia (Mearsheimer, 1990).
Much constructivist international relations scholarship suggests that Russia's post-Soviet interests and its status hinge on
its identity (Hopf, 2002; Larson and Shevchenko, 2003, 2010; Morozov, 2009; Neumann, 1996, 1999; Tsygankov, 2012). This
article uses an approach d aspirational constructivism (Clunan, 2009) d that combines social psychology with construc-
tivism to explain how Russia came to have these interests in bounded status competition. Aspirational constructivism uses
social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) to argue that political elites are psychologically motivated to create
national identities that promote collective self-esteem. These national self-images are psychologically based on political
elites' collective historical aspirations and value rationality regarding their country's international status and domestic po-
litical purpose. Proponents promote national self-images through identity management strategies. These strategies range
from assimilation into a desired ingroup, competition for social recognition from that ingroup, creatively inventing a new
dimension on which one's status is superior to that of the desired ingroup (van Knippenberg, 1989). A national identity only
becomes dominant if it passes tests of its “fitness”: Other political elites evaluate whether competing self-images and the
identity management strategies used to fulfill them possess historical validity and can be effectively enacted under current
conditions. If a candidate identity passes these elite fitness tests, it will define the country's national interest and shape its
behavior with respect to international status.
Central to aspirational constructivism are the roles that the past self and in-groups play in the selection of a national
identity and the definition of national interests. At the core of the argument is that the past national “self” forms a historical
reference point in elite evaluations of current competing national self-images. Elite collective memories of the high and low
points of the country's past create aspirations to replicate the best and avoid the worst in that history. These historical as-
pirations provide a benchmark of historical validity against which current national self-images are evaluated. Elites also
establish certain countries as desired in-groups or as out-groups. These in-group and out-group identifications also serve to
winnow the field of contending national self-images. A final test of fitness of a particular national self-image is whether it can
be enacted in current conditions. This evaluation is based on the psychological need to verify one's identity in the circum-
stances one faces, what psychologists refer to as verification of the self in context. As such, elites rely not only on historical
memory, but also on the perceived successes and failures of proponents of various national self-images in attempting to carry
them out (Clunan, 2009, pp. 36e46).
This article explains why Russian political elites settled on a statist national identity that focused on retaining Russia's
historical status as a Western great power and hegemon in the former Soviet Union in the turbulent decade after the Cold
War's end. It complements the contribution of Larson and Shevchenko in this issue, as it explains the domestic origins and
dominance of Vladimir Putin's status-driven national self-image that they detail. Elite aspirations to retain Russia's historical
status led Russian political elites quickly to reject the initially dominant liberal internationalist national self-image and
elevate to power a statist self-image advocated by the likes of Yevgenii Primakov and Putin. The majority of Russian elites,
including statists, generally identified Russia as being part of the West. Russian foreign policy as a result shifted rapidly from
following the West to competing for status with the United States within an overarching cooperative orientation towards the
West. This article explains why the radical Westernizer self-image failed, and the statist self-image succeeded in passing elite
fitness tests and the impact this had on Russia's post-Soviet foreign policy over the course of Russia's long revolutionary
decade, 1991e2004.
The domestic politics of Russia's international status during the critically important period of 1991e1993 is the subject of
the first section. The next two sections highlight how these early political struggles yielded a domestic political consensus
on Russia's status aspirations. This consensus centered on the domestic legitimacy of Russia's hegemonic position and
behavior in the former Soviet republics, and the illegitimacy of a status and of behavior that was subordinate to the West,
particularly the United States. The next section turns to how this domestic aspirations regarding Russia's status shaped
official definitions of the national interests over 1994e2004, while the penultimate section focuses on how the domestic
consensus on Russia's status helped elevate and consolidate the statist national self-images of Yevgeny Primakov and later
Vladimir Putin.

1. International status in Russia's domestic identity politics

The 1991e1993 period was a critical one in the domestic battle over of Russian national identity. Post-Soviet Russia
began its existence with liberal internationalists dominating the new government. Many of the key politicians who

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 A.L. Clunan / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 281e290 283

occupied the senior posts in the newly minted Russian Federation's executive branch advocated this radical Westernizing
national self-image (Arbatov, 1993; Checkel, 1992; Lukin, 1999; Rahr, 1992; Shlapentokh, 1998). They considered Russia's
historical quest for great power status to be a root cause of its previous authoritarian regimes and suppression of its people.
As such, they rejected efforts to uphold this status, as it would delay, even cripple, Russia's development as a Western
market democracy.
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev laid out the radical Westernizer identity management strategy of assimilation in 1992.
National interests would be premised on “our internal transformation,” not on transforming global politics or pursuing great
power status. He stated Russia's national interests as joining a Western path of political and economic development. “We
want democracy and human rights e he declared e not a ‘humane socialism,’ a normal market without ‘socialist’ or any other
reservations. This means that we, too, have finally chosen good health and prosperity. We want to return to a normal
development cycle, which we dropped out for 70 years.” (A Transformed Russia in a New World, 1992, pp. 85e89; Kozyrev,
1991).
For liberal internationalists, the past held little of legitimate value because of Russia's autocratic traditions and the
messianic and militaristic totalitarianism of Soviet rule. The nascent market democracy that was developing prior to the
Bolshevik Revolution was seen as the main source of historical legitimacy, as it comported with the goal of becoming a
“normal” e meaning Western e country that put the health and prosperity of its citizenry at the heart of the national interest.
Communist messianism led to “expansion and reckless confrontation with the outside world” as well as the exhaustion of the
economy (A Transformed Russia in a New World, 1992, pp. 85e89; Kozyrev, 1991). Russia now should reject that past and
focus on its national interest of becoming a market democracy. Kozyrev and his domestic counterpart, acting Prime Minister
Egor Gaidar, advocated a national self-image that stipulated unadulterated adoption of Western institutions and values and
cooperation with the West. “We can unhesitatingly follow the same road” as the West, Kozyrev said (A Transformed Russia in
a New World, 1992, pp. 85e89).
For Russian liberal internationalists, national self-esteem could only be enhanced by adopting the positive and distinctive
features of Western countries and rejecting Russia's past and its great power aspirations because they were the source of its
negative self-esteem. Once Russia became a member of the West, its greatness would stem from its ability to be a competitive
market democracy, similar to Japan or Germany. Despite their initial dominance, these radical Westernizers failed to lock in
their liberal internationalist national self-image as the foundation for Russia's new identity and its national interests. They
soon succumbed to the historical aspirations for great power status that all other political elites held (Clunan, 2009, pp.
45e56).
The elite consensus that liberal internationalism failed to pass tests of historical fitness was forged in 1992 and 1993 out of
the centrist and revanchist opposition to Kozyrev and Gaidar and the moderate Westernizer and statist critiques of their
programs (Arbatov, 1993, p. 24). Such widespread criticism reflected a broad consensus on the perceived legitimacy of Russia's
past international status and elite aspirations to retain it (Clunan, 2009, pp. 45e56).
The early demise of liberal internationalism was not inevitable. National-restorationist self-images were largely
marginalized in 1991 and 1992 because of their association with the USSR and with the failed putsch against Gorbachev in
August 1991. The coup attempt by Soviet hardliners served not only to further the disintegration of the Soviet Union but also
briefly made critique of radical democratization and liberalization illegitimate, thereby providing a honeymoon for reformers
(Lukin, 1999). Russian political elites were generally supportive of Yeltsin during this period. Based on a May 1993 elite survey,
the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) found “support for market reform and the development of
private property, [and] general support of President Yeltsin's policies.” Rather it was “specific criticisms of his foreign and
domestic political activities” that served as the first of the tests of fitness that the liberal internationalists failed to pass
(VTsIOM, 1994).
Nor could the liberal internationalists' fall be easily ascribed to a failure to respond to a worsening international envi-
ronment or perceptions of a hostile West, as realism might expect. Russian political elites e with the exception of the con-
servatives and hardliners who had been marginalized by their support for the attempted August 1991 coup e did not perceive
the West as a threat (Kullberg, 1993, p. 21). VTsIOM (1993, 1994) found that most Russian foreign policy elites in 1993 had
positive attitudes toward the West and the United States; only 1 percent viewed the United States as “enemy number 1.” The
same year, another poll of Russian political elites found that less than one in five political elites saw the United States as a
threat. Political elites identified the primary external threat as coming from the Middle East, followed by the former Soviet
republics and East Asia. Significantly, these results were replicated among military officers and members of the Communist
Party. Moreover, three times as many elites thought that domestic rather than foreign problems were the primary threat
Russia faced (Vox Populi, 1993). The overwhelming majority of elite respondents (86 percent) did not foresee an attack on
Russia in the near future; of this number, over a third said there was no likelihood at all. Only one-tenth thought such an
attack was likely (ibid., 1993). This view continued well into the post-Soviet period. Despite positive attitudes toward market
democratic reform, Yeltsin, and the West and an unthreatening international environment, liberal internationalists were
accused of betraying Russia's national interests in pursuing policies unbecoming to Russia's historical status (Karaganov,
1993; Kozhokin, 1992; Reddaway and Glinski, 2001). For many in the political elite, the liberal internationalist manner of
radical Westernization meant denying and rejecting Russia's past strengths and abandoning its history as a great power,
which involved the exercise of special rights and responsibilities in the former Soviet republics and Eurasia. By the spring of
1992, critics across the political spectrum had begun to attack liberal internationalist positions in foreign policy and radical
market reforms on the domestic front.

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2. The domestic validity of Russia's hegemonic status in the former Soviet Union

Policy toward the former Soviet republics emerged as one of two key tests of the historical fitness of liberal interna-
tionalism, the other being policy toward the West. Foreign Minister Kozyrev was criticized on all sides for being slow to realize
that the former Soviet republics should be the top priority of the Russian Foreign Ministry, as they formed the historical basis
for Russia's status as a great power and its distinctiveness as a Eurasian, rather than Western or Eastern, power. VTsIOM (1993)
found that “on the whole, the foreign policy establishment is for the restoration of Russia's great power status via preserving
her special place as a Eurasian power in the international relations system.” Liberal internationalists, particularly Foreign
Minister Kozyrev, were accused of abandoning their “compatriots” when violence broke out in March 1992 between Russian
speakers and the Moldovan authorities in Transdniestria and of doing nothing to stop the anti-Russian “apartheid” being
institutionalized in Estonia and Latvia (Malcolm, 1994).
The key shift in political elite discourse away from liberal internationalism took place in April 1992, when State Chancellor
Sergei Stankevich publicly broke with the Kozyrev-Gaidar line and joined national restorationists and statists in rejecting
assimilation into the West as the proper national mission for Russia (RFE/RL, 1991).2 In so doing, Stankevich launched the
decade-long debate on what the “Russian idea” or Russian national identity was. Stankevich drew a firm line on Russian policy
toward the FSU and criticized Kozyrev for being insufficiently “tough” on the “near abroad,” a term for the former Soviet
republics that heretofore had been used only in national restorationist discourse (A Transformed Russia in a New World, 1992,
p. 100). Stankevich clearly and starkly set Russia's historical role of dominating the former Soviet republics as the standard for
judging the legitimacy of Russia's foreign policy and for defining its interests in the former Soviet Union (Stankevich, 1992).
Rather than accept the judgment of the West's superiority and the clear implication of Russian inferiority, Stankevich
redefined Russia's Eurasian identity as positive and superior to that of the West. Furthermore, he linked that superiority to
Russia's historical status as a global great power and multicultural empire, the very things that liberal internationalism had
deemed to be negative. It was not enough for Russia to seek democratic modernization and assimilation into the Westernized
global economy; its traditions demanded a more global and differentiated role and status. Stankevich's discursive turn re-
flected a different identity management strategy e one of social creativity e than liberal internationalism's strategy of
complete assimilation into a superior West.
After Stankevich's break with liberal internationalism, the sources of Russia's positive distinctivenessdits collective self-
esteem e became a central axis around which the political discourse revolved. The issue was whether, in becoming more
Western, Russia would lose the positive features that had distinguished it from other countries: its great power status and
special role in the Eurasian heartland. Stankevich and others suggested that being like the West was not a sufficient source of
national self-esteem for Russia; given its notable history, national self-esteem required distinguishing Russia in positive ways
from the West. Such a desire to distinguish oneself positively is a core expectation of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel
and Turner, 1979). Stankevich's break with liberal internationalism prompted an eruption of public calls for a role that
emphasized Russia's historical status and its difference from the West, and a reorientation away from liberal internationalism
has followed (Bogaturov and Kozhokin, 1992; Goncharov, 1992; Malashenko, 1992; Simoniia, 1992; Vasil'ev, 1992).

3. The domestic illegitimacy of a status subordinate to the west

Policy toward the West proved a second key test of liberal internationalism's historical legitimacy for Russian political
elites. Overall they did not favor a “return to confrontation” (VTsIOM, 1993, 1994). However, given their aspiration for in-
ternational status, political elites soon found that following the West's lead was inappropriate at best and humiliating at worst
(Karaganov, 1992; Sestanovich, 1994). The majority of the political elite opposed the second-class status entailed in the liberal
internationalist self-image, as distinct from opposition to the West, or the United States per se (Malcolm, 1994, pp. 169e170).
Regarded as consistent with the liberal internationalists' overtly pro-American foreign policy orientation, this second-class
status led many in the political elite to distance themselves from pro-Western viewpoints. As moderate Karaganov (1993)
stated
A great deal of damage has been inflicted on the country (even if in an indirect sort of way) by the actions of our ultra-
liberals. Their readiness to automatically take for granted the opinions of the Western partners [while] disregarding the
deep psychological trauma and a sense of injury sustained by a majority of the members of the Russian elite, even
though traditionally pro-Western, over the downfall of the USSR, has led to a deepening of a split in the views on our
foreign policy. Worse still is the fact that the attraction of Western civilization as such has waned, even if partially.
The notion of Russia's “humiliation,” its illegitimate loss of its international status even though it had not been defeated in
war, was a persistent theme in conservative statist, national-restorationist, and neo-communist discourse. While recognizing
the continued importance of the United States to Russia, even moderates, such as Kozhokin (1992, pp. 41e42), charged that
“in dealing with the United States, Russia finds itself more and more often in the humiliating role of a suppliant. We may be
said to be asking the Americans to help us attain prosperity in return for following in the wake of their policy.” In its

2
Stankevich was a very prominent democrat; he had been a leader of the Interregional Deputies' Group (IRDG) in the Soviet Supreme Soviet who had
criticized Yeltsin for relying on Communist Party apparatchiks in his administration.

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 A.L. Clunan / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 281e290 285

acceptance of a second-class status relative to the United States, liberal internationalism was failing on the grounds of his-
torical aspirations to persuade Russian political elites that it sufficiently valued Russia's historical great power status and that
it was capable of effective enactment of that status.
In contrast, Westernizers, especially liberal internationalists, compared post-Soviet Russia to postwar Germany and Japan,
suggesting that as a defeated power it should recognize its guilt and repent in order to regain standing. In the liberal
internationalist view, Russia's new status was not as a humiliated power but as a newly minted member of the democratic
club that had to earn its stripes.3 Kozyrev (A Transformed Russia in a New World, 1992, pp. 85e89) and other liberal in-
ternationalists (Zagorskii, 1993) pointed to the experience of Japan and Germany in an attempt to justify their claim that the
universalism of market democracy was not just compatible with but necessary for national individualism and hence Russia's
uniqueness. These efforts were unpersuasive to most Russian political elites, because, as Stankevich (1992) put it, a status for
Russia comparable to Japan's was that of “the role of junior partner, which is not worth accepting.” Such second-tier status in
the international system was not worth having, as it did not conform to their aspirations for great power status on a par with
the status Russia had enjoyed in the past.
Russia's status relative to the United States therefore became the most important criterion in defining the fitness of na-
tional self-images. This historical status related not only to Russia's material capabilities but also to its past efforts to carve out
a model of development distinct from the West's. Moderate Kozhokin (1992) advocated statism as the historically legitimate
national identity that recognized “the Eurasian essence of Russia as a definite civilizational phenomenon.” This desire for an
inherent and positive distinctiveness from the West, one that cast Russia as equal to the West in non-material as well as in
material terms, pervaded elite discourse throughout the post-Soviet period. Such historical distinctiveness would allow
Russia to be compared to the United States and the West as an equal, rather than as a pupil. Even moderate Westernizers
criticized the liberal internationalist's stance on the legitimacy of Russia's past. While they believed that “there is no doubt
about the wisdom of choosing in favor of the Western model of economic and political development,” in their view, Russia's
Soviet and tsarist history was not completely unusable (Arbatov, 1993, p. 11). In the eyes of Russian political elites, maintaining
Russia's historical status was commonsense (Hopf, 2013).
The views of Russian political elites regarding the FSU and relations with the West from 1985 to 1993 provides compelling
evidence that historical aspirations weighed heavily in weakening the perceived fitness of the liberal internationalist national
self-image and shifting discourse toward statism and national restorationism. The major mistakes that the liberal in-
ternationalists and their New Thinking predecessors were accused of committing all related to the loss of Russia's historical
status. According to VTsIOM (1993, p. 33) surveys, the two major groups of elite complaints regarded the loss of the former
Soviet republics and subservience toward the United States. While neither anti-Western, nor anti-American: “the majority of
members of the elite [wanted] Russia and the USA to be equal partners [ravnopravnye partnyory] in the future” (ibid.). Most of
the political elite regretted the USSR's collapse, for which Boris Yeltsin and the liberal internationalists in his administration
were widely blamed (VTsIOM, 1993, 1994, pp. 38e41).
Russian political elites themselves emphasized the importance of the past in forging the “patriotic consensus” around
Russia's historical status as a great power. Observers and participants from across the political spectrum ascribed the
dominance of great power thinking among political elites to the “trauma” of having lost their past status (Trenin, 1999),
which led to a national “inferiority complex” (Karaganov, 1993). In arguing for Western understanding, liberals and
moderates wrote of the Russian elite's need for “psychological adaptation” to their changed position on the world scene
(Trenin, 1999).

4. The impact of status aspirations on official definitions of Russia's interests

By 1994, the liberal internationalists' national self-image had been discredited for: ignoring Russia's past greatness;
undermining the power and prestige of the Russian state; and being incapable to achieve the due image abroad under existed
Russian conditions. Most of the liberal internationalists had been removed from office and replaced with statists. In between
the extremes of liberal internationalists and national-restorationists, the center became dominated by the consensual
aspiration regarding Russia's international status as a great power and centrists and conservatives gained positions in gov-
ernment. Russian foreign and domestic policy shifted toward positions more in line with statist and national-restorationist
self-images. Westernizers' voices became fewer, as “democratic forces became discredited, confused and split” (Arbatov,
1997a, pp. 143e144, 1997b, p. 80). A common-denominator consensus had emerged among the elite: Russia was a global
great power and the rightful hegemon in the “post-Soviet space” (Holden, 1994; Prizel, 1998; Malinova, 2009).
From 1995 on, these common aspirations regarding Russia's international status were increasingly evident in official
policy. Mindful of the upcoming presidential elections, Yeltsin sacked his unpopular liberal internationalist foreign minister,
Andrei Kozyrev, in January 1996 and replaced him with a statist, Evgenii Primakov. Statists crowed at having brought about
Kozyrev's downfall (Karaganov, 1996). While Yeltsin and his economic advisors continued to stress cooperation with the

3
Good examples of both views were voiced at a conference on Russian national identity I attended in 1997 at the Carnegie Center in Moscow. A member
of the audience took the opportunity to vent his ire at Russia's “humiliation” at the hands of the West and the Russian liberals. A moment later, Fedor
Shelov-Kovedyaev, a prominent member of Kozyrev's team, leaned over to me (a presumably sympathetic Westerner) and asked, “What humiliation? I
don't think we have been humiliated, do you?”

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West, Russian diplomacy stiffened on the Russian diaspora, Bosnia, NATO enlargement, and e especially after Primakov's
appointment e international sanctions against Iraq, Cuba, Serbia, and Libya.

5. The fitness of statist national self-images in post-Soviet Russia

In contrast to radical Westernizers, those espousing statist national self-images advocated rebuilding Russia's identity and
national esteem on the basis of its historical great power status and Russia's integration on that basis into the Western-
dominated international polity and economy. They insisted on reinstating, or reimagining the criteria by which Russia's
status in the world should be judged. Such reimagining constituted social creativity strategies, while the demands for social
recognition of Russia's existing great power criteria fall under social competition strategies (van Knippenberg, 1989). Those
employing social competition strategies regarding status would argue that their exclusion from or lesser status in a group was
unjust, that they deserve inclusion or elevation to a higher position, and that the “Other's” elevated position should be
decreased. Additionally, they emphasize that adjusting social recognition requires self-improvement (rather than competing
in a zero-sum fashion for material resources), since their goals and those of the desired in-group are not seen as mutually
exclusive. Russian statists, including Primakov and Putin, did not portray Russia and the United States or the West as having
necessarily incompatible interests; rather, as both countries were great powers, they shared the same goal of preserving
international order.
Foreign and then Prime Minister Primakov epitomized the great power aspiration, with his statist definition of Russia as
global great power in a multipolar world (Primakov, 1996). Primakov's stature across party and ideological lines as well as his
political survival and promotion after the fall of the Chernomyrdin government in March 1998, was both an indicator of elite
aspirations regarding international status and the “lowest common denominator” aspect of his statism.4 Primakov based his
foreign policy on the premise that “Russia, despite present-day difficulties, was and remains a great power. Her policy in the
outside world must correspond to this status” (Primakov, 1996). Russia's foreign policy orientation toward the West was to be
based on “equality,” not on “a partnership where one leads and another is led,” as Primakov declared in his first appearance
before the State Duma's International Affairs Committee (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 1996).
Primakov adopted a strategy of social creativity relative to the United States in order to gain domestic and international
recognition of Russia's status. The national interest was defined as maintaining Russia's global status by repeatedly pointing
out Russia's Eurasian geography and historical role in both Europe and Asia as a great power. Primakov sought to gain
recognition mainly through symbolic assertions of Russia's status. He signed declarations with China about their joint
commitment to a multipolar world and condemned U.S. unilateralism while doggedly pursuing Russia's “special relationship”
with NATO and equal status in other Western institutions. The government repeatedly stressed its inclusion in the Western
economic clubs (the London and Paris Clubs, in addition to the G-8) in an effort to prove to domestic critics that the other
powers recognized Russia's great power status. Primakov and his successors continuously used the UN Security Council to
remind the world of Russia's status as one of the five global powers with a veto (Primakov, 1996, 1997). Primakov's stance
epitomized the political elite aspiration regarding great power status.
Primakov made his social creativity strategy of a “multipolar world” e in which Russia played the starring role as system
stabilizer and upholder of international law e the calling card of Russian foreign policy. This was particularly so after the U.S.
intervention in Serbia over Kosovo (Clunan, 2009, pp. 174e175). He depicted the United States, with its emphasis on hu-
manitarian intervention, democracy promotion, and use of force without United Nations authorization, as acting in a manner
unbefitting a great power, as it was not fulfilling its duty to stabilize world politics. Russia, in contrast, was acting as a status
quo great power should, upholding international order and the established rules of a great power concert system (Primakov,
1997). To that end, Primakov declared a strategic partnership with China and generally pursued efforts to counteract
perceived U.S. efforts to erode Russia's status. Primakov also made Russia's dominance in the former Soviet republics a key
priority of foreign policy. Russia stepped up its opposition to NATO expansion and continued to pursue efforts to establish a
privileged relationship with NATO.
Primakov's social creativity strategy received broad support across party and ideological lines, thanks to both elite aspi-
rations regarding international status and the “lowest common denominator” aspect of his status-driven national self-image.
He was essentially a man for all seasons, respected for his professionalism. For the conservatives, he represented the face of
past Soviet power and prestige. For liberals and moderates, he offered the pragmatism and nonpartisan comportment that
Kozyrev had lacked. Primakov was perceived as restoring Russia's dignity on the international stage, and his social creativity
strategy therefore passed the elite test of historical fitness. His professionalism was a key factor in assessments of his ability to
successfully enact the status-driven identity he supported (Cast and Burke, 2002; Oakes, 2002). As Arbatov (1997a, p. 144)
phrased it, Primakov's cross-partisan appeal “testifies to the new minister's own professional prestige rather than to any
emerging consensus on Russia's external relations.” The Russian elite was content to separate their criticisms of domestic
policies from foreign policy so long as the latter was focused on the limited interest of great power status maintenance.
Primakov did not specify concrete national interests other than this.
In practice, Primakov's policy meant a rejection of the overtly hostile ideological and material conflict of the Cold War in
favor of competition to gain recognition of Russia's role as a global great power. As such, the main foreign policy disposition

4
This observation is based on my discussions with Lilia Shevtsova and Dmitrii Trenin during my work at the Moscow Carnegie Center in 1998.

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 A.L. Clunan / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 281e290 287

toward the West was a reflexive one of status competition, but within a framework of cooperation with the West. Russia was
to attend to “all azimuths” of the world more on principle than for objective interests (Primakov, 1997). In many areas, this
strategy impeded productive Russian cooperation with the West, as Russian officials reacted to perceived slights to Russia's
prestige rather than acting on more realistic assessments of Russian capabilities and needs.
Pursuit of status as a great power required competition with the United States, while identification of Russia as part of the
West mandated that such competition be bounded. This definition of the national interest e and Primakov's social creativity
strategy e continued into the Putin administration. The primary difference between the Primakov and Putin years lay in the
nature of competition, which shifted from symbolic to internal development, and in the level of official rhetoric, where the
constant assertions of Russia's great power status and rights were somewhat reduced. In addition to Primakov's social
creativity strategy, Putin sought to adopt a social competition strategy, one focused on Russia's internal development as the
key to its global recognition.
Putin, on becoming prime minister in 1999 and then president in 2000, followed Primakov's lead in offering something for
everyone, neither rejecting the West entirely nor denying the importance of Russia's past greatness. While the 2000 Foreign
Policy Concept stressed pragmatism and an international role commensurate to Russia's diminished means, the broad out-
lines of Primakov's social creativity strategy continued under the new president (Stepanov and Iusin, 2000). Despite the
widely touted “pragmatism” of Putin's foreign policy, it remained largely a reactive one, premised on recognition of Russia's
proper place in the international system and also laced with latent resentment of the United States for not sufficiently
recognizing that status. As one Russian analyst noted, Russia under Putin is still “covet[ed] respect” (Trenin, 2005).
Putin modified Primakov's social creativity strategy of a multipolar world to highlight Russia's “traditional” role as a joint
stabilizer of the international system that, in Russian eyes, had placed Russia on a par with the United States during the Cold
War. This theme appeared in Primakov's foreign policy as well but was especially evident in Putin's depiction after the attacks
of September 11, 2001, of Russia's joint responsibility with the United States to rid the world of terrorism. As Putin (2002)
declared
Russia is one of the most reliable guarantors of international stability. It is Russia's principled position that has made it
possible to form a strong anti-terrorist coalition… Our major goal in foreign policy is to ensure strategic stability in the
world. To do this, we are participating in the creation of a new system of security, we maintain constant dialog with the
United States, and work on changing the quality of our relations with NATO.
The desire here is to create a positive and distinctive role for Russia in which its status is equal to the United States, but
using as a criterion the attributes of a truly responsible and reliable stabilizer of world politics rather than material capa-
bilities. In contrast to the Soviet role in a “superpower condominium,” Russia's status is premised not on nuclear danger but
on jointly fighting common threats from non-state actors and thereby providing international stability for the rest of the
world.
The main difference between Primakov's and Putin's identity management strategies was that Putin more often argued
that the basis for such respect could only come through modernizing the Russian economy and strengthening the Russian
state. In Putin's statist national self-image, Russia's place was unquestionably among the advanced industrial countries of the
West, but as a country that retained its own distinct historical traditions. Putin offered a historically legitimate hybrid of
Russia's greatness with a Western emphasis on international economic standards. The result was statist developmentalism.
Putin advocated an identity management strategy similar to Primakov's, but one focused on the criteria for inclusion not only
in the great power club (Primakov's focus) but also in the Western global economy. His strategy incorporated Primakov's
social creativity but grounded Russian identity in social competition in order to be recognized as both modern and great.
Despite Putin's orientation toward the West and his pragmatism, his “idea” for Russia rested squarely on what he termed
“belief in Russia's greatness.” In emphasizing Russia's greatness, Putin was filling the psychological need to assert Russia's
distinctiveness from other, lesser, European countries. In Putin's self-image the efforts to preserve Russia's distinctive tra-
ditions, while accepting elements of Western capitalism and the demand of Russia's assumption of its rightful place among
the group of great powers and in the West, all while being not fully Western (Clunan, 2009).
Official foreign policy discourse until 2004 shifted away from Primakov's hostile rhetoric about countering U.S. power to
strategic cooperation and efforts to facilitate Russia's economic development (Trenin, 2004; Trenin and Lo, 2005, p.18). Putin
mollified domestic critics of this Western orientation with his strong statist position on restoring Russia's might, his skillful
manipulation of national symbols, and, most fundamentally, his unequivocal stand on squelching the insurgency in Chechnya.
While not everyone in political elite fully supported this change in foreign policy orientation, as Andrei Tsygankov persua-
sively argues, Putin moved away from merely asserting Russia's primacy e as Primakov had done e to actively building the
basis for its international status (Tsygankov, 2005, p. 134). Putin insisted at the turn of the century that Russia's role in the
world had to be based on its economic capabilities, not merely its military might and territorial expanse, a message that
appealed to Westernizers and Western-oriented statists.
Putin appealed to both liberal and moderate Westernizers by declaring he would strengthen the state by encouraging
state-led economic development conducted in cooperation with business and by liberalizing government regulation and
reforming the judicial system. At the same time, Putin argued that the purpose of modernization was to maintain Russia as a
great power, which earned him the backing of statists and national restorationists alike (Tsygankov, 2005, pp. 140e141;
Trenin, 2004). In foreign policy matters, Putin distanced himself somewhat from the multipolar rhetoric of Primakov but
sought to use Russia's energy and diplomatic resources to diversify and strengthen Russia's economy and international

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288 A.L. Clunan / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 281e290

political influence. He cultivated friendly relations with the leaders of Germany, China, and the United States. Even before the
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Putin adopted a more conciliatory posture toward the United States. In
contrast to previous Russian leaders, he reacted mildly to the 1999 and 2004 rounds of NATO expansion and U.S. determi-
nation to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. Putin did not support, however, the U.S. war against Iraq in
2003 and threatened to veto any UN security resolution authorizing the use of force. After the war, the political elite praised
Putin for carefully “stage-managing” the war with the United States and for raising Russia's status to that of “a privileged
security partner of the mightiest state in the contemporary world” (Karaganov, 2005, p.30).
Russian-Western relations were not severely damaged until 2004, a consequence not of the Iraq War, as some Western
realists (Ambrosio, 2005) claimed, but of the “color revolutions” in the former Soviet Union and the muted Western response
to the terrorist attacks in Beslan, Russia, that led to the death of over 300 hostages, half of them children (Ryzhkov, 2004;
Trenin, 2004, 2005, p. 5). Mutual recriminations over efforts to democratize the former Soviet republics mounted, and the
West again criticized Russia over Chechnya and its move toward authoritarianism (Coalson, 2005 Yasmann, 2004a,b).
Putin's strategy of social creativity and social competition, following on that of Primakov, was well received by political
elites. In 2001, 77 percent of Russian political elites believed that there had been positive changes in Russian foreign policy
in the preceding decade. These changes were attributed to the periods when statists asserted Russia's great power status.
Thirty-five percent of the political elite associated positive changes in Russian foreign policy with Putin's tenure as pres-
ident, while only 16 percent associated them with the early Yeltsin years. Twenty-five percent attributed the change to
Primakov's tenure (Gorshkov, 2001). A majority of the political elite agreed that Russian foreign policy corresponded more
to its national interests and was more balanced with regard to East and West. This agreement bridged the divide between
Westernizers and traditionalists favoring a Russian path of development, with more than half of the political elite accepting
these propositions e although the portion of traditionalists adopting this view exceeded the share of Westernizers by 10
points. Sixty-six percent rejected the premise that Russian foreign policy had become more confrontational with regard to
the West (ibid.).
The appeal of statist social competition and social creativity strategies becomes clearer in light of the finding that forty-six
percent of Russian political elites believed that “there is no direct connection between a country's economic potential and its
international position,” believing instead that it is related to military might, culture and educational levels (Schulze, 2001, pp.
25e26). Such views sharply contrast with Western views about the centrality of economic development to international
political influence. They do however correspond with social psychological expectations regarding the use of social creativity
and competition strategies to enhance self-esteem. This positive assessment appeared to stem more from elite testing of the
fitness of Putin's and Primakov's diplomacy and use of available resources to uphold Russia's status than from a material
change in Russia's international position. When asked what resources were available for strengthening Russia's international
position, the political elite most often chose the “new, more flexible and pragmatic style of Russian foreign policy,” which
narrowly edged out “more meaningful use of the natural resource potential of the country” (Schulze, 2001, p. 27).

6. Conclusion

Russia's national interests have not been defined on the basis of conventional costebenefit assessments, perceptions of
material threat, or the identities projected onto Russia by other countries. Aspirations to regain the international great power
status that Russians believe their country enjoyed during the tsarist and Soviet past were critical to the creation of its present
national identity and national security interests. As early as 1993, Russia's elite converged around a status-driven statist
national self-image that generated diffuse national interests in social, rather than material, competition for global status,
primarily with the United States. The rise of Vladimir Putin to the presidency did not bring a radical shift in Russia's definition
of its national identity or national interests. Rather Putin reflected and entrenched the elite's consensus that Russia's identity
was that of a global great power and that the state's strength and modernity are the core methods to attain the country's
interests. At the same time, elite identification with the West oriented Russian leaders towards joining the West, and pre-
vented an overtly hostile status-driven foreign policy. Dire predictions of aggressive and risky Russian behavior were not
fulfilled during the first post-Soviet decade, suggesting the importance of understanding the role international social status
plays in shaping states' behavior. Central to this absence of aggression was the lack of perceived direct threat to Russia's
historical status in the former Soviet Union. Once that status was seen as directly challenged, beginning in 2004 with the
“colored revolutions” and continuing through the 2013e2014 crisis over Ukraine's association agreement with the European
Union, Russia's behavior changed. Responses included Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, annexation of Crimea and armed
intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014.
The question of whether states are driven to compete for international status or prestige has important real-world im-
plications. This article has highlighted the importance of elite aspirations to restore Russia's historical great power status to
the definition of its post-Soviet national self-images and national interests. Such aspirations stoked fears that Russia would
take a revanchist tack in its relations with the outside world. Russian policymakers' constant proclamations of its great power
status and its efforts to keep its status on a par with the United States suggested Russia was embarked on a confrontational
course with the United States. This prompted repeated talk about “a return to the Cold War.” Drawing on recent research in
social psychology, this article suggests, however, that such declarations may well be directed primarily to a domestic audi-
ence, as they are efforts to enhance Russians' own sense of their country's self-worth e unless elites perceive a direct threat to
the survival of their country's historical status (Brewer, 1999, 2007). Policymakers need to look beyond the surface of such

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 A.L. Clunan / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 281e290 289

proclamations and behavior if they are to avoid misperceiving the sources and reasons for a country's pursuit of international
status e in this case, Russia's.
Promoting Russia's resurgence as a great power within the existing international order has been the domestically legit-
imate identity management strategy when Russia was weak, as it was throughout the 1990s, and as it grew stronger
thereafter. Russian political elites reject rapid and total Westernization and following a pro-Western line in foreign policy as
unbefitting Russia's greatness, even though most are positively inclined toward the West. For Western decision-makers, the
primary problem is that Russian political elites want to participate in the contemporary, Western-dominated international
society, but they view this society through a nineteenth-century lens rather than one that takes into account the impact that
democratization, economic liberalization, increasing interdependence, globalization, and softened sovereignty are having on
that society. Russian political elites view the countries of the former Soviet Union through this nineteenth century lens, as the
part of the historical basis of Russia's great power status and unique Eurasian form of development. Western encroachments
in this region are equated with loss of Russia's historical status and therefore threaten national self-esteem. It is not sur-
prising, from this perspective, that Russian policymakers would risk its relations with the West over countries that are
considered core to its identity as a great power, as it has done in its war with Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. It is in the
former Soviet Union, therefore, that Russia is most likely to compete with the West, and it is the only region where genuine
confrontation is likely. Such competition is unlikely to reach levels approaching that of the Cold War, as the Russian political
elites seek entry into the Western political order rather than replacing it with their own. However, Western policymakers
should expect Russian leaders to continue to make pronouncements about and take action to preserve Russia's historical
rights as a great power in the former Soviet Union.

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 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

Obsession with status and ressentiment: Historical

backgrounds of the Russian discursive identity construction
Olga Malinova
Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, The Higher School of Economics,
Nakhimovsky pr-t, 51/21, Moscow 117997, Russia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This article analyzes the role of ressentiment in the long-term historical process of Russia's
Available online 26 July 2014 collective self-identification vis-a-vis “the West”. It argues that ressentiment was persis-
tently generated by the structure of this relationship as long as Russia's aspiration for an
Keywords: equal status continually proved to be unrealistic. This induced different discursive stra-
Discursive identity construction tegies that are described by social identity theory (SIT) as social mobility, social creativity
Ressentiment
and social competition. As a motivating factor for the development of these strategies, on
Russian identity
the one hand, and a recurrent consequence of their invalidity on the other, ressentiment
Slavophiles
Social identity theory
became a considerable driving force of discourse about Russian identity.
Westernizers © 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.

Since the 1990s there is an ever growing number of publications considering national identity to be a significant factor in
international relations, with the case of post-Soviet Russia taking a prominent place (Clunan, 2009; English, 2000;
Godzimerski, 2008; Herman, 1996; Hopf, 2002; Larson and Shevchenko, 2003, 2010; Morozov, 2009; Neumann, 1999;
Casula, 2010, and others). This is hardly surprising: the case of the country (re)defining its national identity in the context
of large-scale political and social transformation is, as Anne Clunan has it, “as close to a natural experiment” for the study of
identity formation and national interests “as history ever offers” (Clunan, 2009, p. 1).
Most of the above mentioned authors focus on the relationship between the changes of Russian identity and the definition
of national interests and/or foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR.1 Russian identity is portrayed in the process of
transformation, so the emphasis is on the construction of its new versions that are often considered a result of a rational
choice of elites. Some authors also point out to traits of continuity that derive from more or less remote times, most often to
the widely shared notion that Russia is “naturally” destined for the role of a great power and its obsession with status in the
international arena (Larson and Shevchenko, 2003; Smith, 2012b; Tsygankov, 2012). Identity is predominantly considered a
matter of the rational choice of elites (political leaders and parties, foreign policy experts, “agents of intellectual change” and
others), though some authors confirm that “offered identity … must address popular concerns” (Godzimerski, 2008, p. 19).
But the question about mechanisms producing these new identities, rationally chosen by elites and acceptable for the
majority, is rarely discussed in this literature.2 The authors of recent works about Russian identity understand it as a socially

1
The most interesting case here is Gorbachev's “the new thinking” e the concept that had dramatically changed the official representations of collective
identity and caused decisive shifts of the foreign policy of the USSR (English, 2000; Herman, 1996; Larson and Shevchenko, 2003).
2
Anne Clunan tries to solve this problem by arguing that competing national self-images proposed by elites are assessed “in light of historical aspirations
e dominant memories of the high and low points in their country's past” as well as in terms of their effectiveness as “practical guides for the state, given the
prevailing international and domestic conditions” (Clunan, 2009, pp. 10e11). So, elites justify their ideas by appealing to “dominant memories” and the
common sense of their fellow citizens, which seems rather plausible.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.07.001
0967-067X/© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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292 O. Malinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303

constructed cognitive phenomenon that has developed under the impact of material/structural factors (Clunan, 2009; Larson
and Shevchenko, 2003, 2010) as well as changing norms (Herman, 1996); some authors also take into consideration the
available semantic repertoire/discourses that provide meanings for interpretation (Morozov, 2009; Neumann, 1999; Casula,
2010). Emotions are usually not considered a distinctive part of this picture, though when describing the change of identities
scholars often talk about “(un)satisfaction”, “self-esteem”, “aspiration”, “frustration” and other psychological states that
include emotional components.
Meanwhile, the emotional aspects could be actually indispensable for understanding how identities are constructed or
how they work in different political contexts. Socially shared notions about “us” and the “others” obviously include an
emotional dimension. And as soon as political scientists are more and more inclined to acknowledge that “emotion is
important to what and how people think” (Mercer, 2010, p. 6; cf. Sasley, 2011, p. 453), the task of integrating the emotional
dimension into existing theories of identity becomes urgent. Unfortunately, it hinges on the problem of firm record: the
effects of emotions on political behaviour are not easily observable. However, the analysis of discourses could be one possible
option for the integration of emotions into studies of identity in political science and international relations. It seems
plausible that long-term emotional attitudes are “condensed” in identity-related public discourses, in particular in discursive
practices of collective self-identification towards significant “others”, and could be detected in the texts. If so, discourse
analysis can reveal not only purposeful strategies rationally pursued by various actors but also emotional beliefs that imbue
and inform one's relationship with “others”.
This assumption is supported by the work of Donileen R. Loseke who studied an emotion discourse which is considered a
talk that seems to have “some affective content or effect” (Loseke, 2009, p. 497). Analyzing the “Story of September 11”,
crafted by President George W. Bush in his nationally televised speeches, she tried to reveal the emotional codes e that is,
cultural ways of feeling, correlating them to symbolic codes e that is, cultural ways of thinking, that could be associated with
the key elements of the rising narrative of the “war on terror” e victim, villain and hero. Loseke demonstrates how the skilful
manipulation of symbolic codes calls for emotions that correspond to particular emotional codes, that is, “cognitive models
about what emotions are expected when, where, and towards whom or what, as well as about how emotion should be
inwardly experienced, outwardly expressed, and morally evaluated” (Loseke, 2009, p. 500). Also there is a paper by Reinhard
Wolf providing a useful conceptualization of resentment in international relations that ends with an explication of indicators
of this emotional state that could be revealed in the discourse (Wolf, 2012). Thus there are solid reasons to look in this di-
rection, even if there are no readymade theories about “emotion discourse” yet.
The Russian case provides a good opportunity to explore the role of emotions in identity construction in a long-term
perspective as far as there is a well-documented intellectual tradition of co(relation) with the “other”, commonly described
as “the West”,3 which was constitutive for national identity. Proceeding from the conception of the historian of nationalism Liah
Greenfeld, who has demonstrated the role of psychological state called ressentiment in the development of Russian national
identity in the eighteenth e mid-nineteenth centuries (Greenfeld, 1993), I seek to reveal how this emotion contributed to
subsequent transformations of the discourse about Russian identity in a changing context. Doing so, I consider the relationships
between Russia and the West in broader terms, without reducing them to foreign policy issues, and try to demonstrate how an
interplay of political, cultural and social aspects of international status contributed to the construction of the Russian identity.
According to Greenfeld's conception, the import of “the foreign idea of nation” to Russia in the eighteenthenineteenth
centuries was accompanied by “a certain psychological factor which both necessitated a reinterpretation of the imported
ideas and determined the direction of such reinterpretation” (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 15). She called this factor “ressentiment”,
bearing on the conception elaborated by Max Scheler (who in his turn had adopted the term coined by Søren Kierkegaard and
Friedrich Nietzsche).4 Ressentiment refers to a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred
(existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings. In our context, ressentiment could be considered a reaction
to the object of imitation that is perceived as being superior. This reaction is determined by the structure of relationship that
implies both comparability between the subject and object of envy (feeling that “they” are not fundamentally different from
“us”) and actual inequality that permanently emphasizes an “our” inferiority. Greenfeld argues, that “the presence of these
conditions renders a situation ressentiment-prone irrespective of the temperaments and psychological makeup of the in-
dividuals who compose the relevant population” (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 16). According to her conception, ressentiment was “the
most important factor” of the crystallization of the matrix of Russian nationalism, and “the values which were to constitute
the Russian national consciousness and later be embodied in the Russian national character were a result of the trans-
valuation born out of this ressentiment” (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 250).
Later the idea of ressentiment (or resentment) as a factor of national identity was applied to some other cases (Munson,
2003; Weber, 1994); it was also used as a tool of analysis of Russia's foreign policy, though in a less sophisticated way
(Smith, 2012a,b).
Some authors use “ressentiment” as a synonym to the English word “resentment”. The others, however, insist on their
distinction. According to Meltzer and Musolf, “resentment” should be used for a short-term form of emotion that arises in

3
The term might have different meanings being used along with another cultural and geopolitical concept e “Europe”. The content of both terms
depended on particular context and evolved over time. But there is one important distinction: Russia is usually seen as a part of Europe (though in varying
senses), but it hardly could be considered an actual part of “the West”.
4
As a widely recognized convention, the French spelling of this term retained, pointing to its broad philosophical sense.

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 O. Malinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303 293

interpersonal situations and tends to be transitory, while “ressentiment” refers to a long-term emotional attitude that is more
likely to persist and to become intensified and might be shared by a group (Meltzer and Musolf, 2002). Fassin also considers
these emotions different “moral idealtypes” (Fassin, 2013, p. 250). According to his interpretation, “ressentiment as historical
alienation and resentment as ideological alienation characterize two forms of moral sentiments and modes of political
subjectivation”: the former “corresponds to a condition related to a past of oppression and domination”, and the latter
“amounts to a situation in which a social position generates frustration and acrimony” (Fassin, 2013, p. 249). For the purpose
of this article, I will follow Melzer and Musolf's distinction and interpretation, which seems much clearer to me than the one
suggested by Fassin.
This article contributes to the existing literature about Russian identity, analyzing the role of ressentiment in the long-term
historical process of collective self-identification vis-a-vis “the West”. I take Greenfeld's idea of ressentiment as a constitutive
factor of the Russian identity construction as a plausible assumption and apply it for the analysis of the major moments of
transformation of the discourse about Russia and “the West”. Doing so, I try to demonstrate how taking into account the
emotional dimension of relationship between Russia and the West helps to a better understanding of the dilemmas con-
nected to national identity construction. According to my argument, ressentiment was persistently (though not invariably)
generated by the structure of relationships with “the West” as long as Russia's aspiration for an equal status, that was
perceived as a matter of security and honour, continually proved to be unrealistic because of a lack of resources and changing
“rules” of the competition. The fact that a) Russia was powerless to change the score, and that b) its efforts did not meet due
recognition by the “other” induced the major actors of discursive identity construction e the educated elite e to different
strategies.
In terms of social identity theory, the latter could be classified as social mobility (approximation to the higher-status group
by assimilating its characteristics), social completion (pursuit for advantage where possible, without striving for convergence)
and social creativity (reevaluation of negative features of the lower-status group as positive or to finding some new dimension
in which the group is superior) (Clunan, 2009, pp. 47e48; Larson and Shevchenko, 2003, p. 79). However, as I try to
demonstrate, none of these strategies was quite successful under the given circumstances; failures of social mobility and
social creativity, as well as non-obviousness of success in social competition, just strengthened the ressentiment complex,
making the dilemma of choice between these strategies even more complicated. As a motivating factor for the development
of these strategies, on the one hand, and a recurrent consequence of their invalidity on the other, ressentiment became a
considerable driving force of discourse about Russian identity.
I start with a discussion of my approach to the study of the Russian identity construction as a discursive process that takes
place in time and make some propositions for a conceptualization of the role of ressentiment. In the following sections I
describe the role of ressentiment in shaping the binary opposition of Westernism and Slavophilism and analyze three mo-
ments of further transformation of the discourse about Russia and the West e at the beginning of the twentieth century, after
the October Revolution and during perestroika. As a conclusion I summarize the results of my analysis and make some
suggestions about prospects of the further evolution of the discourse about Russian identity.

1. The discursive construction of Russian identity as a historical process: ressentiment and strategies of collective
self-identification

The construction of Russian identity should be considered a historical process of a (co)relation with the “others” that
involves issues of status, comparison and assessment, mutual attitudes and emotional reactions. It depends on intersubjective
understandings, that is, results not only from “observable” differences and similarities but also from current modes of their
interpretation that take shape over time. So, identities come as discursive constructions (Wodak et al., 1999). This means that
what the classical authors of social constructivism called “theories about identity” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 194e200)
plays an important role in the process of identification, providing the frames of reference within which individuals and groups
gain and change their identities. By this term Berger and Luckmann meant not necessarily consistent doctrines but what
might be called the established discourses interpreting “the obvious” differences. Being shaped in time and space, discourses
about identities are mutable but inertial.
According to my argument, competing visions of national identity do not compose consistent intellectual traditions that
can be clearly discerned over time. Rather different ideas, narratives, metaphors, images form a kind of repertoire of meanings
to which all speakers appeal, pursuing different strategies in changing contexts. Distinctive models of collective identity5 that
compete in the public space in particular moments are the results of a more or less successful interpretation of this repertoire
as well as of efforts to refill it with new meanings. Those who are occasionally involved in the discursive representation and
contestation of identity are never quite free in their “constructivist” endeavour as far as the plausibility of their concepts
depends both on the actual context and on the available set of established ideas about “oneself” and the “other”.6 So, a
comprehensive study of the discourse about national identity should take into consideration the respective historical
background.

5
By this term I mean distinguishable and relatively stable sets of shared cognitive frames that shape the perceptions and representations of “our” group,
usually in correlation with some “others”.
6
This may be considered a broader version of criteria indicated by Anne Clunan (see above).

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294 O. Malinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303

There are also good reasons to suppose that steady emotional beliefs7 developed in the process of mutual experience play a
significant role in shaping “theories of identity” in elite discourse as well as in their being accepted by people at the mass level.
Emotions that are “condensed” in articulated models of collective self-identification vis-a -vis the “others” and work as
emotional codes (Loseke, 2009) facilitate their resonance with group beliefs. With the same token, emotions are easily fuelled
by referring to the familiar repertoire of meanings and could be used as a tool of mass mobilization.
Since the eighteenth century Russia strove to become a full-fledged member of the “club” of great European countries.
Scholars of international relation arguably consider this an aspiration for higher status and raising the collective self-esteem
(Clunan, 2009; Larson and Shevchenko, 2003) or to meet the established sense of honour (Tsygankov, 2012). This is true. But
the cultural aspect of the problem of status was no less important than political and military ones: judging about the in-
ternational status of their country “in European terms”, the Russian elite could not but acknowledge its cultural inferiority,
even if it proved to be strong and powerful on the battlefields and at the bargaining table. This problem took up a really
“existential” form in the first part of the nineteenth century when, under the influence of European Romanticism, the Russian
identity began to be reshaped according to nationalist templates (Walicki, 1989; Malinova, 2008). The prominent position of
Russia in the European concert of powers was not perceived by the educated elite as a sufficient matter for pride as long as it
was not complemented by the “original” contribution to the culture of humanity.8 Ironically, many contemporaries of
Pushkin, Gogol and Dostoevsky were convinced that Russian literature and “higher culture” in general were an imitation of
European models and were lacking genuine “originality” (samobytnost'). The awareness of cultural inferiority to the West, that
was considered to set the standards, aggravated ressentiment caused by a lack of due respect towards Russia as a European
great power. The international status of Russia as a leading power of the Holy Alliance also gave rise to different feelings:
while one part of educated Russians were proud of their country as “a bulwark of order”, the other felt ashamed that it
performed as “the gendarme of Europe”. But as far as any public discussions of foreign policy at that time were prohibited by
censorship, the cultural aspects of (co)relation to the West were in the fore.
So, the context for the construction of Russian identity vis- a-vis the West in the mid-nineteenth century provided all
necessary conditions for development of a ressentiment complex. According to Meltzer and Musolf, its noteworthy features are:
(1) protracted (chronic) character of the emotional experience, (2) powerlessness to take retaliatory action against its sources,
and also (3) a sense of being denied what we believe to be entitled to (Meltzer and Musolf, 2002, pp. 243e245). Being inte-
grated into the European intellectual space, educated Russians acknowledged the “backwardness”9 of their country that could
not be overcome in a moment. However, this was not considered a reason to deny any claims for a higher status, in political as
well as in social and cultural terms. Many of them felt deeply hurt by the unwillingness of the West to recognize Russia's actual
achievements (like its role as a “savior of Europe” in the war against Napoleon), its positive national traits (like magnanimity,
readiness to help, talent to learn quickly etc.) as well as its “right to be itself”. This logically contradictory attitude had a clear
emotional background e it was a typical ressentiment reaction. It was well expressed in the famous poem by Alexander Pushkin
“To the Slanderers of Russia” (“Klevetnikam Rossii”), written as a reaction to criticism of Russian politics by European parlia-
mentarians and to the threat of foreign intervention during the Polish uprising of 1831.10 It could also be found in the writings of
many of Pushkin's contemporaries e as I shall demonstrate further, the Westernizers were subject to this emotion, no less than
the Slavophiles. The Europeans were inclined to treat Russia as a “barbarian at the gates”, or at best as a “permanent pupil”, and
these frames, as Iver Neumann has demonstrated, were constitutive for their self-identification (Neumann, 1999).
According to Meltzer and Musolf, ressentiment “embodies an intense desire for revenge” and also “the inability of those
experiencing ressentiment to rebel against the agents of their unjust treatment” that lasts for a long time. It longs for retal-
iation, which often takes the form of “imaginary or symbolic revenge” as far as an actual improvement of the situation is
impossible (Meltzer and Musolf, 2002, p. 248). This is true in our case. The passionate desire to even the score and achieve a
craved status was realized by different strategies of identity construction which resulted in several competing models that
could be considered different ways to remedy ressentiment. My analysis of these models rests upon a classification elaborated
in social identity theory that has already been applied to the study of Russian foreign policy (Clunan, 2009; Larson and
Shevchenko, 2003, 2010).

7
According to Jonathan Mercer, “an emotional belief is one where emotion constitutes and strengthens a belief”. Or, in other words, “emotion constitutes
a belief when the belief's meaning changes without emotion” (Mercer, 2010, pp. 2e6). He considers nationalism, justice, trust and credibility the most
obvious examples of emotional belief. In this sense, different ressentiment-driven models of Russia's identity vis- a-vis “the West” could also be considered
emotional beliefs.
8
The following routine episode of journalist polemic of 1836 gives an example of such an attitude. The topic of discussion was an opera performance in
which there was a song of praise to “the Russian fist”. For several weeks the leading periodicals of two capital cities polemicized whether boasting with this
symbol of rough power was relevant for a country that aimed to be “European”. Articulating the new Romantic discourse, the editor of the “Teleskop”
magazine, Nikolai Nadezhdin, claimed that “if we really want to be Europeans … we should learn to respect ourselves and to value our national self”, so we
should not hesitate to boast with our fist, since it “is a comme il faut fist, or an ideal of the fist if we may say so” (Nadezhdin, 1972 [1836], pp. 441e442). But
his opponents, including his employee Vissarion Belinsky, strictly criticized his idea, expressing doubts that the rough force, as distinguished from
cultivated skills, could be an appropriate matter of pride (Belinsky, 1953 [1836], pp. 164e165 f).
9
Social, economic, cultural and political differences between Russia and the most advances “Western” countries were often described in terms of
“backwardness” because “the West” was perceived if not as a model, than as a source of social, cultural and technical innovations.
10
Referring to the events of 1831, Pushkin wrote: “… You hate us …/For what? Reply: is it because/On ruins of the flaring Moscow/We did not recognize
impudent will/Under whom you shivered?/Because we hurled into the abyss/The idol heavy-looming over kingdoms/And by our blood has gained freedom,
honour and peace for Europe?”

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 O. Malinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303 295

According to this theory, there are three identity management strategies for raising the self-esteem of the lower-status
group: (1) social mobility, (2) social competition, (3) social creativity. The first strategy presumes that the “other” is valued
and superior; it aims at joining the higher-status group by assimilating its characteristics. The second one supposes the
mobilization of resources for the fight against “whatever dimension of status the self feels is unfavorable” without striving for
convergence. The third strategy aims either at reevaluating the negative features of the lower-status group as positive or at
finding some new dimension in which the group is superior (Clunan, 2009, pp. 47e48; Larson and Shevchenko, 2003, p. 79).
All three strategies were used by the Russian elites in different periods, but only two of them e social mobility and social
creativity e formed consistent models of self-identification, the opposition of which turned to be rather stable.
They had taken clear shape in the 1840s, during the debates between the Westernizers and the Slavophiles, and were later
developed by the different currents of public thought for several decades in spite of changing context. And even now, the
historical terms “Westernizers” and “Slavophiles”11 are frequently mentioned as a frame of reference in the discussions of
contemporary Russian politics. As for social competition strategy, it was used occasionally by different actors, but it could not
be developed into consistent patterns as long as the system of values of the “other” was considered the only meaningful frame
of reference: on the “European” scale, Russia appeared inevitably “backward” in all significant dimensions except military
power. So, social competition lacked a logical consistency of the other two strategies and was realized in different ways,
according to context, until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had radically changed the perspective.
In spite of the alleged permanency of the discourse about Russian identity being structured by the binary opposition of
“Westernism”/social mobility and “Slavophilism”/social creativity, it was not immutable. There were at least three moments
of major transformation e at the beginning of the twentieth century, after the October Revolution and during perestroika. As I
try to demonstrate, these transformations resulted from more or less radical changes of the frame of reference for Russia's
positions vis-a-vis the West, caused by internal and external factors that were mediated by the ressentiment complex.

2. Westernism and Slavophilism as two types of ressentiment reaction

The strategies described above could be found in the Russian public discourse at least since the eighteenth century. But it
was only in the 1840s that two of them had developed into distinctive and steady models of self-identification, providing
different interpretations of Russia: either as a relatively “backward” but quickly developing part of Europe or as a society that
is fundamentally different from “the West” and assigned to follow “its own way”, which supposedly should help it to avoid the
problems that are intrinsic for the European path of development. These models took shape when the social creativity
strategy had found a firm ground in the consistent religious and philosophic doctrine of Slavophilism which in its own turn
facilitated the ideological consolidation of Westernism.12 As Andrzej Walicki (1989) perfectly demonstrated, these pair
models were based on distinctively different Weltanschauung. The position of the Westernists, who adopted the idea of
universal progress, considered individual activity and creativity to be the vehicle of development and interpreted the national
culture as the mould for some content that eventually to be shared by all mankind, appeared as liberal-progressist. Whereas
in the conceptions of the Slavophiles, who defended the idea of spontaneous development based on the natural principles of a
particular society, we can clearly perceive the features of conservative utopia (Walicki, 1989; Malinova, 2008).
It also might be said that classical Westernism and Slavophilism were two intrinsically consistent types of reaction to
ressentiment, caused by a situation in which Russia had found itself as soon as it had been integrated into the system of
European great powers (with a claim for equal status), while remaining a country with basically pre-modern economic, social
and political systems. Liah Greenfeld was right when she argued that “both Westernism and Slavophilism were steeped in
ressentiment” (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 265). But, in my opinion, she underestimated the differences of these two types of reaction.
According to Greenfeld, “both were Westernisms, for as philosophies of ressentiment both defined the West as the anti-model.
And both were Slavophilisms, for the model for them was Russia, which they idealized each in their own fashion, and whose
triumph over the West both predicted” (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 265).
This interpretation is more accurate concerning the Slavophiles than the Westernizers. First, it underestimates the fact that
in spite of disillusionment with the bourgeois West (especially after 1848) the Westernizers still considered Europe a leader of
progress and a model for imitation e in this point their position was definitely opposite to that of the Slavophiles. Second, it
misses that Westernism e at least in its original form e was rather critical towards the Russian “model”. This feature of the
Westernism of the 1840s contributed to the formation of a stereotypical image of the Westernizers as people who “disdained”
the Russian national culture, which was indeed wrong. With these additions, the differences between the two types of
ressentiment reaction were indeed quite “essential”. The underestimation of these differences brought Greenfeld to the
conclusion that, as far as “the ingredients of the Russian national consciousness … were already present by 1800”, “between
that date and 1917 the components of this living, self-proliferating whole were in many ways articulated, refined,

11
The latter term is more specific, as authentic Slavophilism was characterized by the specific religious philosophic doctrine and geopolitical vision that
were not shared by some other currents developing the same strategy of self-identification vis- a-vis the West. However, as far as these terms are habitual
for foreign readers, to characterize the long-term ideal typical models I will use the words “Westernism” and “Slavophilism” in quotation marks. Without
quotation marks, the same words refer to particular historical intellectual currents of 1840e1850s.
12
This argument refers to the Westernism and the Slavophilism as particular currents of public thought; it should be added that people who belonged to
these “camps” could occasionally resort to the strategy that was systematically used by their opponents.

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296 O. Malinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303

reconceptualized, and acted out e but never essentially modified” (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 260). However, as I try to demonstrate,
the discourse about Russian identity vis- a-vis the West underwent important changes both before and after 1917.
The lack of “due respect” towards Russia as a great European country and the gap between the desired status and actual
“inferiority” caused long-term emotional reactions that drove to different strategies, none of which could actually resolve the
problem of ressentiment. One possible strategy was to adopt ideals proclaimed by the West and to accept its leadership while
cherishing a hope that some day Russia will become equal to its “other” (social mobility implemented by the Westernizers).
The other option was to invent the alternative scale of values that allowed to criticize the experience (and partly e ideals) of
the West, representing “ourselves” as being superior (social creativity realized by the Slavophiles). The important condition of
this exercise was that the values “we” choose for reconceptualization must be shared by the “other” (in the case of the
Slavophiles it was Christian values added by a traditionalist critique of the bourgeois social order). There also was the third
way: to divorce from the significant “other” and to proclaim: “Let them go their way, we shall follow our own” (refusal from
competition). Such an isolationist strategy was sometimes claimed, but it was never taken seriously: being an actual part of
European politics, Russia could not escape the system of coordinates that called for comparison.
It is remarkable that in the writings of both the Slavophiles and the Westernizers there could be found not only various
explanations of historical reasons of obvious differences between Russia and “the West” but also emotional cues to the
irritating contrast between “our” sincere desire “to learn” from “the other” and “the other's” unwillingness either to recognize
our success or to pay due respect to our national peculiarity. As the Slavophile Alexey Khomiakov put it in 1845, “we have a
desire of human sympathy; we are always informed by warm concern to the fate of our foreign brothers, to their pains as well
as successes. But we never have found a due reply to this sympathy, to this friendly attitude: no single word of love and
brotherhood, almost no word of truth and impartiality. Always there is only one reaction e mockery and abuse; always there
is only one feeling e a mixture of fear and disdain” (Khomiakov, 1900 [1845], p. 3). Khomiakov saw the reason for this un-
fortunate demonstration of ill will in Europe's “unintentional annoyance” towards Russia as a “self-sustained power that is
getting equal rights in the community of European peoples”. For the thinker who advocated for social creativity strategy it
was quite logical to interpret a lack of due respect from the significant “other” as envy, indirectly confirming that it actually
perceives “our” distinctiveness and “our” power.
Less consistent were occasional ressentiment cues of Westernizers. For example, in 1839, in a much disputed reference
article about a couple of new writings devoted to the battle of Borodino, Vissarion Belinsky pointed to the specific role of the
state in Russian history and praised durable ties between the Tsar and the people that resulted from this circumstance. Being
convinced that this relation constitutes an important element of Russian identity, he gave a sharp answer, reproaching
imagined foreign “foes and envious critics” and “stupid reformers of mankind” who reject Russia's right to keep its “sub-
stantial foundations” while learning from more advanced Europe. Belinsky concluded his sudden philippic with a quotation
from the above mentioned poem by Pushkin “To the Slanderers of Russia” (Belinsky, 1953 [1839], p. 248). His article caused an
ardent debate among the Westernizers circle; but the main reason for it was not an expression of ressentiment but too
passionate nationalist self-appraisal and an undisguised eulogy of the Tsar.
Later, in a different political and intellectual context, one of the most outspoken critics of Belinsky's article, Alexander
Herzen was no less eager to criticize the Europeans for their casting slurs upon Russia during the Polish insurrection of 1863.
In spite of the fact that he himself was one of the most outspoken critics of the Russian authorities he wrote: “Though I do not
know if it is fair to blame the whole people and hold it responsible for what was done by its government” in the situation
when the other governments did nothing to help the Polish insurgents (Herzen, 1956, pp. 150e151). After the events of 1848
Herzen had changed his mind about the future of both Russia and Europe; his conception of “Russian socialism” was a
“progressist” version of social competition strategy (as opposed to the Slavophile's “conservative-traditionalist” one). It is
remarkable that it also was not immune of ressentiment. According to Herzen, “there was a time when the half-free West
looked proudly at Russia crushed under the throne of the Tsars, and cultivated Russia, sighing, gazed at the happiness of its
elder brothers. But this time has passed. The equality of slavery prevails” (Herzen, 1924, p. 277). As a person committed to the
idea of freedom, Herzen never gloated about this, but he could not conceal satisfaction from the fact that better socialist
prospects based on the peasant commune (obschina) had risen Russia's status, if only symbolically. Of course there were not
many people, even in the European socialist movement, who accepted his arguments.
Each of these strategies had both advantages and shortcomings. The Westernists' model of social mobility gave a hope to
achieve the ideal that had already visibly come to fruition in the West, even if it was considered imperfect in some aspects, the
followers had a chance to “improve the mistakes” of the leader. So, Russia's inferiority was associated exclusively with the
present, not with the future. But the Westernist strategy was connected with inevitable frustrations, not only because decade
after decade Russia could not “catch up with” its “other” who,13 besides, was not disposed to acknowledge its efforts, but also
because the repertoire of meanings associated with the West changed over time, the earlier cherished ideals thus becoming
problematic. Under such circumstances, Westernism was doomed to stimulate a ressentiment reaction as long as Russia's
progress was critically doubted or not sufficiently recognized by “the other”.
As for the Slavophile strategy, in spite of the fact that social creativity was more favourable for collective self-esteem, it
seemed less plausible, since its arguments were either turned to an ambiguous past (an idealization of the patrimonial type of

13
As Iver Neumann demonstrates, it was impossible also because “the rules of the game” changed each time when Russia (the “other” of Europe) was
close to demonstrating that it had learned its lesson (Neumann, 1999, p. 111).

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 O. Malinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303 297

authority and peasant commune, obschina)14 or associated with speculative ideas that evidently did not fit to realityda faith
in the “people,” that is, peasantry as the bearer of genuine spiritual principles lost by the West. Besides, Slavophilism was
rejected by many educated Russians for pragmatic reasons: it was obvious that, to be able to preserve the status of a great
power, which Russia was by no means ready to give up, it should keep learning from the West. Finally, the Slavophile strategy
also did not prevent ressentiment, since it could not guarantee that “the other” would ever agree with our criteria of success.
Actually, the writings of the Slavophiles and their allies give numerous examples of ressentiment reactions both to the
behaviour of “the West” and to “misunderstanding” demonstrated by the Russian public.
So, none of these strategies could be reliable for raising collective self-esteem. In a sense a persistent controversy between
Westernism and Slavophilism as an endless repetition of basically the same arguments and revealing the same problems also
contributed to the aggravation of ressentiment. The opposition of radically different visions of Russia and its future that flared
up on various occasions focused public attention to the problems that seemed to have no solution, at least in the present.
Nevertheless, two competing strategies dominated in the debates about Russia and Europe/the West almost until the end
of the nineteenth century. And participants of the discourse continued to represent their positions referring to the imagined
poles of Slavophilism and Westernism in spite of the dissolution of the original literary “parties”. Opponents often labelled the
new currents of thought that followed strategies of social mobility and social creativity by the old terms.
However, the scope of available models of national identity was never exhausted by this dichotomy. One of the alterna-
tives, the doctrine of Nicholas's I. Minister of Education, Sergei Uvarov, expressed by the triad “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and
Nationality”, was actively supported by the state authority for about twenty years. It was invented as early as in 1833, that is,
before the crystallization of binary opposition of Westernism and Slavophilism, and in comparison with the latter two it was
much more amorphous. The historian Nicholas Riasanovsky distinguished between two interpretation of Uvarov's triad by his
contemporaries that occasionally could contradict one another: the dynastic version that emphasized “autocracy” as a basis of
a peculiar Russian type of society, and the nationalist one that viewed “nationality” (narodnost') or “the people” as its genuine
driving force (Riasanovsky, 1969, pp. 124e148). Some interpretations of the principle of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Na-
tionality” fitted to the social competition strategy, as they supposed to claim for status in certain spheres, without striving for
convergence. A good example is Uvarov's description given in 1843. According to his understanding, during ten years under
his leadership the ministry of education “considered Russia matured (vozmuzhalaia) and worthy to not lag behind, but at least
next to the other European nationalities” (Desiatiletie, 1863 [1843], p. 107). The image of “matured Russia” was new (Miller,
2008, p.147); the dominating frame was that of “the young and quickly developing country”. It offered an opportunity to
represent Russia as being able to decide about its future independently and to make a selective choice of what was worthy of
being adopted from Europe. But this interpretation had met with a strong opposition by a significant part of the educated elite
who considered it a premature refusal of the social mobility strategy. Not only future Westernizers but also future Slavophiles
argued that in Russia “to develop the national at the expense of European innovations means banishing education”
(Kireevsky, 1998 [1832], p. 83). Besides, Uvarov's idea of “matured Russia” was not consistently developed by the other ad-
herents of the principle of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality”. Remarkably, many of their contemporaries and de-
scendants did not perceive this position as a separate one in the overall debate and associated it with Slavophilism, which of
course was wrong. So, the existence of different approaches did not abolish the domination of the binary opposition of
Westernism vs. Slavophilism.
A passionate desire to become “equal” with the European “other”, blended with the bitterness of recognizing one's own
“inferiority” and at the same time deep mortification of the lack of due acknowledgement of actual “successes” was a major
driving force for the Russian public discourse of the second half of the nineteenth century. The strict opposition of “West-
ernism” and “Slavophilism” (as it was noticed above, these terms are used as generic for different ideological currents
realizing strategies of social mobility and creativity) stimulated the representation of Russian identity in “either/or” terms and
thus left fewer opportunities for a systematic development of social competition. Though the latter, probably, could be the
most appropriate strategy under the circumstances of “catching up” with modernization, as it opened up prospects for
considering Russia similar to its significant “other,” under some aspects and being divergent under others. Thus it offered
more opportunities for manoeuvring. But as long as the discursive construction of Russian identity was dominated by the
binary opposition of “Westernism” and “Slavophilism”, the discourses realizing the social competition strategy were doomed
to be perceived through the lens of this dichotomy as “inconsistent Slavophilism” or “timid Westernism”.

3. The first moment of transformation: the turn of the twentieth century

It was not earlier than at the turn of the twentieth century that this binary opposition became less salient, partly because of
the generation change, but much more due to the fruits of modernization which had started in the 1860s. The obvious success
of economic modernization enlarged the psychological distance between pre-reform and modern Russia. In the years of the
revolution of 1905e1907 economic modernization was supplied by certain steps towards political “Europeanization”: Now

14
The historical imagination of the educated public significantly evolved throughout the nineteenth century, partly approving and partly disapproving the
Slavophile's claims. In 1860e1890s the latter have got a specific turn in the ideas of the Populism (narodnichestvo). The Populists considered the peasant
commune (obschina) a “natural” nucleus for development of socialism and hold that Russia could move along this path (that seemed to them inevitable)
easier than the other European countries.

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298 O. Malinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303

Russia had political parties, parliament, more liberal censorship and others. Even if practically all political groups were not
satisfied with the results of the first Russian revolution, it irreversibly changed the character of the political process. The issue
of Russia's European identity was overshadowed by more urgent problems; the internal “others,” that is, ethnic minority
groups of the empire, now played a much more significant role in the discursive construction of Russian identity than the
external ones.
This induced to see the “Western experience” with different eyes: the new social practices called for a more concrete
knowledge of the “other's” experience. As Sergei Bulgakov, a Russian philosopher and an Orthodox priest, wrote in 1915, “as
long as Russia gets more civilized and in this sense more Westernized”, the religious attitude towards Europe as being an idol
that was typical for former Westernism is substituted by a “more sober and practical attitude that is more just”. Though
Bulgakov admitted that “the elements of this practical and bourgeois Westernism are still in opposition to religious West-
ernism with its faith in the Promised Land” (Bulgakov, 1915, pp. 37e38). Of course, still Russia lagged, in many senses, “behind
Europe”, and “the other” was not eager to recognize its relative success. So, there still was a fertile ground for ressentiment. But
the ongoing changes created a new perspective for correlation: the obvious differences between modern and “old”, pre-
reform Russia made the “Westernizer's” metaphor of a “young country” that in the nearest future would be able to
become equal to the “civilized” European nations more plausible. As long as the Russian “originality” (samobytnost') was
embodied in more modern forms, it had lost its former connotations with “backwardness” (otstalost'); its preservation was
not so tightly connected with the rejection of foreign borrowings.
The changes in the available repertoire of meanings also played a significant role in the evolutionary transformation of the
discourse: a critical reassessment of the Western experience (often made in terms of Western critical theories, like Marxism)
weakened the positions of “romantic” “Westernism” but also made obsolete “Slavophilism” with its conservative utopia. Of
course, this did not mean that disagreements about assessment of various aspects of European experience had disappeared.
But now the competing interpretations were not strictly polarized: the distinctive opposite camps had dissolved and been
replaced by a continuum of different interpretations, most of which used “hybrid” strategies. Greenfeld's proposition that
“one could be a Westernizer in the morning, a Slavophil in the afternoon, and criticize after dinner” (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 270) is
true for the beginning of the twentieth century, not for the beginning of the nineteenth.
The new position of Russia in the European system of great powers also contributed to this change. At the end of the
nineteenth century Russia had turned away from its traditional strategic collaboration with Germany and entered into alli-
ance with France and Great Britain. This brought changes to the established mental maps of Europe that became especially
obvious with the beginning of World War I. The fact that Russia entered into the war on the side of France and Great Britain
against Germany stimulated a partial reconsideration of the frame of reference for the Russian identity construction. It could
no longer be opposed to “the West” as a whole; Russia should be reconceptualized as belonging to one part of Europe in
opposition to another. The most obvious way of reorganizing the established repertoires of meanings was to transfer negative
notions about “the West” onto Germany and to find some features of cultural commonality with Britain and France and/or
pragmatic reasons for solidarity with them. This was actually done by many publicists involved into the debate on “the
meaning of the war” that took place in 1914e1915 (Malinova, 2009b).
The need for a reconsideration of the images of friends and foes by all appearances brought back the old discussions and
even facilitated the rise of a new philosophical current called neo-Slavophilism. It was an intellectual exercise by individual
intellectuals (Vladimir Ern, Sergei Bulgakov, Vasily Rozanov and Viacheslav Ivanov) rather than a consistent political doctrine
developed by a group. Remarkably, these writers did not follow the original Slavophile pattern of social creativity but tried to
combine different strategies (Malinova, 2009b). Departing from the Slavophile critique of an “inorganic” development of
“new Europe” that betrayed its Christian roots and felt into philistinism,15 the neo-Slavophiles, each in his own manner,
developed the idea of “the other”, “genuine” Europe with which Russia could collaborate without giving up its identity. The
convergence with the West was claimed not as a result of an assimilation of the elements of “the other's” identity but because
of its reinterpretation in the context of the war that “opened” “the true face of Europe” (a kind of inversed social mobility).
This made urgent the Slavophile messianic idea of Orthodox Russia as a facilitator of the spiritual “revival” of Europe (social
creativity).16 However, while talking about the solidarity of Russia and Europe the neo-Slavophiles insisted on their “deepest
spiritual difference” that should be preserved (Bulgakov, 1915, p. 29) and viewed their collaboration as an interaction of equal
and mutually complementary elements (social competition). So, the neo-Slavophile approach could be qualified as a com-
bination of three strategies.
The same was true about their critics. For example, Semion Frank criticized the neo-Slavophile principle of “the other
Europe” not because he disagreed with the idea that “the meaning of the war” derived from an opposition of religious and
philosophical principles demonstrating themselves by modern practices but because he objected to the ascription of these
principles to certain countries and peoples. He wrote that “the war is not between the West and the East but between the
advocates of law and advocates of power, between the custodians of the shrines of human spirit e including the contributions
of the German genius e and their denigrators and destructors” (Frank, 1914, p. 132). He argued not for the traditional

15
In Bulgakov's words: the war “removes the cover of philistinism from European man … and a medieval knight who turned to be not dead but hidden in
the European burger comes to the eyes of the astonished world” (Bulgakov, 1915, p. 22).
16
According to Vladimir Ern, in this war “Russia for the first time during the centuries of its existence enters into the organic convergence with Europe”
and helps it “to tame the beast that Europe had cultivated from its own depth …” (Ern, 1915, pp. 46e47).

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 O. Malinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303 299

“Westernist” perspective of gradual obliteration of differences but against a univocal identification of the opposite “princi-
ples” with West and East. So, there is no West and no East, there is a common arena of the struggle of different principles
created by European culture, and Russia enters this arena as an equal participant in the world war of good and evil. In a similar
vein, Nikolai Berdiaev argued that the war changed the established notions of West and East and thus “once and for all brings
Russia to the circle of world life and make it enter Europe as its organic integral part” (Berdiaev, 1917, p. 76). He confirmed that
up to then “Europe did not accept Russia” but pointed out that the latter “also had not realized yet that it can give something
to Western Europe” (Berdiaev, 1917, p. 76). Both approaches opened up good prospects for a social competition strategy by
locating Russia not vis-a -vis but inside Europe.
Remarkably, the neo-Slavophiles and their critics agreed on two principle things: first, that finally Russia was entering Europe
as its organic integral part, and second that both “Westernism” with its “immature and dreamy attitude towards the West” and
“Slavophilism” with its tendency of “isolation in Eastern complacency” had become irrelevant (Berdiaev, 1917, p. 76; Bulgakov,
1915, p. 43). The distance between the two sides of the debate obviously was much shorter than it had been several decades
before. This fact could be considered an evidence of actual transformation of the discourse about Russian identity at the
beginning of the twentieth century. Instead of the strict opposition of two models of identity focused on social mobility and
social creativity, we see a wide spectrum of representations of Russia and its “other”, realizing different approaches.
Of course this did not mean that Russia's relationship with the West ceased to be ressentiment-prone. But the changes in
the perception of Russia's status, based not only on its military might but also on the steady progress of its economic, social
and even political development, opened a way for a reconsideration of the frame of reference for the correlation with “the
West”. As a result, all three strategies of collective self-identification vis-a-vis Europe in the elite discourse were modified.
This created a prospect for overcoming the vicious circle of “Westernism” and “Slavophilism” with their dilemmatic either/or
thinking and for changing the function of ressentiment in this discourse. According to Meltzer and Musolf, in spite of the
negative view shared by many scholars, “ressentiment may issue in action when the condition from which it derives becomes
defined as mutable and defeasible, that it, when corrective action is received to be practicable” (Meltzer and Musolf, 2002, pp.
249, 251). To my mind, the evolutionary transformation of the discourse about Russian identity confirms this assumption: as
soon as a desire to even the score ceased to look unreasonable, ressentiment became not only a cause of powerless malice but
also a factor stimulating development efforts.
At the same time, the experience of World War I confirmed that ressentiment framed by established discourses about “the
other” can be easily mobilized at the mass level, in the particular case e against the German enemy. Eric Lohr perfectly
demonstrated in his book how the existing repertoire of meanings about the West was used for constructing the image of the
“internal other” in the campaign against foreign enemy during World War I (Lohr, 2003).

4. The second moment of transformation: redefinition of “us” and the “other” after the Bolshevik Revolution

However, this evolutionary trajectory of transformation of Russian identity was broken in 1917. The Bolshevik Revolution
had dramatically changed the frame of reference for collective self-identification. Looking back, we can see that the estab-
lishment of the Communist regime drew an insuperable line between Russia and its Western “other”: however significant the
differences between Russia and Western Europe had been before 1917, the case of the USSR was definitely exceptional: it was
the only country that went such far with the Communist experiment. Of course the contemporaries of the October Revolution
could hardly foresee this development, but many of them felt that the world had entered into an era of radical social
transformation, and Russia turned out to be in its centre. So, the 1920s were marked by numerous attempts to redefine
Russian identity.
-vis the West on the
First of all, this concerned the official discourse of the Bolsheviks. A redefinition of Russia's status vis-a
ground that it was the first country where the socialist revolution had won happened not at once. In the first years of the new
regime Russia was represented as still being a “backward” country that only “coincidently” (and temporary, before the victory
of the revolutions in the more “developed” countries) had become the first on the road to socialism. Only in 1924, when
Joseph Stalin proclaimed the course of “building socialism in one country”, the formula of correlation with “the West” was
redefined: Soviet Russia became an “advanced” country. Of course, the new definition was not shared by “the West,” at least it
never dominated there,17 which left grounds for ressentiment. But for the domestic use this was not that important: according
to the official Soviet ideology, this conflict of interpretations should be seen as a predictable effect of the ideological struggle.
So, the new formula of collective identity apparently offered a good solution for the problem of ressentiment.
The model of collective identity developed in the Soviet official discourse was a combination of social creativity and social
mobility that also supposed social competition on many practical issues. It represented Russia not as “the pupil” but as “the
leader” of social progress (though one acknowledged its relative economic and cultural “backwardness” that should be
overcome), that is, it developed a “Westernist” logic of (successful) social mobility. By describing the opposition of the USSR
and its Western “other” in class terms18 it interpreted the differences as being fundamental and insuperable, which was
typical for the “Slavophilist's” strategy. In the logic of social creativity Russia was pronounced “better” than the capitalist

17
Though according to research by Iver Neumann there were different competing ways of representing Soviet Russia in interwar Europe, the picture was
not black-and-white (Neumann, 1999, ch. 3).
18
Actually the cultural distinctions were also present in this discourse, especially since the mid-1930s, but they played a subdominant role.

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300 O. Malinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303

countries because it claimed to build a more advanced social order. However, this claim should be confirmed by the capability
of the Communist regime to overcome its opponents in various ways, which called for the social competition strategy that
after 1945 was ideologically framed as the principle of “peaceful coexistence of two world systems”. The official Soviet model
considered “the West” a heterogeneous social world, composed of class enemies and class allies. But as far as class properties
were attributed to the whole states, the geographic coordinates of “the other” were located even more definitely than before.
It resulted in an unprecedented securitization of the discourse about the Western “other” in the official Soviet discourse. In
the course of Soviet transformations Russia seemed to be successfully solving the problem of equal status; after World War II
it turned into a world superpower with solid international authority.
Still there were some important problems that did not allow for discarding the ressentiment complex as an essential
element of Soviet identity. First, contrary to the declarations, the comparison with “the West” in many instances revealed
Soviet actual economic and cultural inferiority e the interpretation of such facts was a permanent matter of the official
propaganda. Second, the new frame of reference used by the Bolsheviks was not shared by the “other” and became a matter of
ceaseless ideological struggle. Finally, the securitization of the discourse about “us” and “the West” facilitated an instrumental
use of ressentiment for the mobilization of solidarity against the “capitalist camp”. This was conducive for the development of
the whole arsenal of conspiracy theories representing the West as a hostile “other” who wanted to destroy Russia. As a result,
it significantly transformed the repertoire of meanings for the imagination of the “other”.
A redefinition of Russian identity “by the results of 1917” took place not only in the official discourse. After the end of the
civil war the main centres of opposition moved beyond the borders of Russia, but during the 1920s there were more op-
portunities for an exchange of ideas than later, after the 1930s. The problem of the Russian revolution that called for a
reinterpretation of our relationships with “the West” became one of the most discussed issues in emigrant literature; it
resulted in new interpretations of Russian identity (Malinova, 2009a, ch. 2).
The most innovative one was developed by the doctrine of Eurasianism (evrasiistvo) (Laruelle, 2008). The Eurasianists
defined Russia as a self-reliant cultural world that was located between Western Europe and Asia and was neither European
nor Asiatic but a synthesis of both. As far as the Eurasianists wanted to break the patterns created by “imitative” “Westernist”
thinking, they especially accentuated the “Asian” aspects of Russian collective identity. At the same time they criticized the
Euro-centric concept of progress and cultural imperialism of “the West”. The October Revolution was interpreted in their
writings as a culmination of the westernization of Russia and at the same time as its final point. As Petr Savitskii wrote, in spite
of the declared aims that were connected with Europeanization, the revolution actually “signified Russia's escape from the
frame of European being” and its stepping on its own, original way (Savitskii, 1922, p. 14).
It was the most decisive attempt to find a solution for the problem of ressentiment by a total escape from the Western-
centric frame of reference.19 But it was easier to proclaim this than to fulfil it: there was an evident lack of cultural mate-
rial for creating an alternative, that is, equally meaningful frame of reference. The Eurasionists had to rest their claims on
heterogeneous “facts” such as the geographical space and unique combination of peoples who inhabit it, Orthodox Chris-
tianity and the Soviet experience. Being critical towards it, the Eurasionists found some of its innovations worth considering;
in particular this concerned the new political forms that they found superior in comparison with Western parliamentary
democracy. Of course, this model of identity remained an intellectual experiment e it could not have any significant influence.
Besides, the further evolution of the Soviet regime and the establishment of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany dispelled
the illusions of the young Russian emigrants about “the ideas” the new Russia brought to the world.
Remarkably, both the Bolshevist and the Eurasianist models of collective self-identification towards “the West” proved
Russia's superiority over “the West” by changing the established criteria of comparison with “the other”, that is, they
developed a social creativity strategy. While being “anti-Westernist” in their general orientation, they borrowed meanings
from both the “Westernist” and the “Slavophilist” repertoires. This confirms the transformation tendency of the nineteenth-
century discourse based on the opposition of two major strategies of collective self-identification.
However, after 1917 this process followed a different pattern: instead of a multiplication of various strategies that were
non-dogmatically used according to context there was the intrusion of a particular ideologically consistent pattern by means
of state propaganda. Since the early 1930s at the latest the official Soviet model of “the progressive socialist country” was
totally dominating the USSR and later “the socialist camp”. The other competing models of collective identification had no
opportunity to be explicitly represented in the public discourse, though still they were developed in emigration and
samizdat.20 The decades-long domination of the official model not only allowed for the marginalization of the opposition of
“Westernism” and “Slavophilism” but also for representing the further modernization of Russia as a “development on the

19
It should be mentioned that this escape could be perceived as possible not only because of the change of the structure of the relationship between “us”
and the “other” caused by the October Revolution, but also because of the shifts in imagination of the West after World War I. The Eurasionists' critique of
the European culture, being original in many points, was a part of the new intellectual trend that was neatly grasped by the title of the book of Oswald
Spengler e “ The Decline of Europe”.
20
Of course it would be wrong to say that the opposition of “Westernism” and “Slavophilism” had completely disappeared in the Soviet period. During the
thaw (ottepel') of the 1960s it came back in a certain sense. The main issue of controversy that took place partly in official magazines but mostly in samizdat
was a critique of the Soviet system from the point of view of Russian nationalism. But as far as the ideology of the latter was very close to conservative
“Slavophilism” and “the West” was seen as the external enemy, the discussions about “the Russian national renaissance” in a certain sense fitted to the long
discourse about collective identity. They definitely must be considered the source of “Slavophilist” ideas that were actively developed during the period of
perestroika.

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 O. Malinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303 301

basis of our own resources”, hence, for discarding the problem of “borrowings” from the “other's” achievements. However, the
collapse of the Communist project not only made the model of “the progressive socialist country” irrelevant but also led to
revival of the sharp binary opposition of the conflicting models of collective identity.

5. The third moment of transformation: perestroika

Ideological shifts coming along with perestroika opened a way for a new round of redefining the collective identity. At first
innovations were brought to the official discourse. The conception of “new thinking” proclaimed by Mikhail Gorbachev gave
an opportunity to reinterpret the Western experience in terms of “human values” (obshchechelovecheskie tsennosti). Of course,
it did not cancel the principle of class struggle but made it possible to consider the same things “good” or “bad”, depending on
the chosen perspective e the humanitarian or the class one. Since 1987 the former “bourgeois” concepts like “the rule of law”
(pravovoe gosudarstvo), “parliamentarism”, “division of powers”, “human rights” and others were added to the vocabulary of
official ideology. The covering of the “Western” experience by the media also had changed. This paved the way for an apparent
“revival” of the opposition of the new “Westernizers” and “Slavophilists”.
Late-Soviet “Westernizers” and “Slavophilists” differed greatly from their pre-revolutionary forerunners. Their intellectual
background relied not as much on the legacy of historical debates about “the originality” of the Russian culture (late Soviet
intellectuals were not much familiar with them) than on a critical revaluation of the results of Soviet modernization.
New “Westernism”21 gained shape in the process of a reassessment of the Communist experience; it framed contemporary
reality by binary categories (totalitarianism/democracy, ideological control/freedom, administrative-command system/
market) that pushed to see the differences between the USSR and “the West” as being “principle”, hence removable only by a
total rejection of the present state of society, a radical version of social mobility. It was much more similar to the Soviet official
model than to one of liberal “Westernism” of the nineteenth century with its idea of a gradual surmounting of differences. But
in spite of the former it considered the differences between the USSR and the West negatively. New “Westernism” was critical
about the national past.22 It supposed that “to come back to the road of civilization” Russia needs to radically change its
historical “archetypes” and to follow the path indicated by “the West”. At the same time it was full of illusions that the fact of
acknowledging the wrongness of the Soviet experience and the readiness to develop along “the Western” way should be
appreciated by the “other”. So new “Westernism” was fraught with ressentiment.
Besides, it was obviously traumatic for the collective self-esteem. At the end of the 1980s the ideas of the new “West-
ernizers”/“Democrats” were receiving support as far as the prospect of “like the West” seemed attractive to many people. But
at the beginning of the 1990s, when the difficulties of reforms had brought disillusionment of the ideas of market and de-
mocracy, “the Westernizers” were more and more considered nihilists who were trying to impose values that were “alien” to
Russia. So new “Westernism” played a significant role in launching the pendulum of ressentiment reaction: from idealization
of the West to envy and hatred.
The conceptions of the new “Slavophiles” also were not free of shortcomings. This “camp” was rather heterogeneous. In the
years of perestroika it included both the adherents of “the Russian national renaissance”, who called for a return to the values of
pre-revolutionary Russia, and the “national-Bolsheviks” who considered Soviet Russia a continuation of the great empire and
considered the military achievements of the USSR victories of the “Russian spirit”. They were united by the desire to protect “the
national values” which were insulted by the “Westernizers” and by shared commitment to the idea of a “special way” of Russia. At
the end of the 1980s a critical attitude towards Soviet history, or at least to some of its periods, particularly to “TrotskyisteStalinist
terror” against the Russian people, dominated among the new “Slavophiles'” camp.23 Many of its adherents shared the conviction
that the roots of the October Revolution derived not from Russian history and culture but from Western Marxism that had been
taken to an inappropriate soil. At the same time not all opponents of new “Westernism” were ready to share the thesis of Alexander
Solzhenitsyn that “the twentieth century was desperately lost by our country” (Solzhenitsyn, 1990, p. 26). The crisis of the
Communist regime made the task of constructing an appropriate utopia based on “our glorious past” rather problematic. For those
who saw their ideal in pre-revolutionary, patriarchal Russia it was clear that the “Russia we have lost”24 had gone, and probably
forever. And those who saw the roots of tradition in the “great Russian state” were not yet ready to accept the Stalinist pastdthe
alliance of “imperial nationalists” and “Communists” took place later, after the collapse of the USSR.
At the end of the 1980s/the beginning of the 1990s new “Westernism” met wide support in Russian society. “The West”
was considered an ideal of “normal society” that should be taken as a model. It was a period of the desecuritization of the
discourse about the Western “other”. It was remarkable that at that time the West was more than ever enthusiastic about
Russia's development. It was a short period when social mobility seemed to be able to supersede ressentiment. However, later

21
In terms of that time its adherents were roughly called “the Democrats”.
22
By the words of Igor' Kliamkin, “we did everything in our own way, not as “they” did. We not just lagged behind and ran after, we ran in a different
direction, not along the highway laid by those who went forward but along the Russian country roads and tracks, shaking at potholes and dreaming of a
Russia that would fly away like the bird-troika” (Kliamkin, 1987, p. 156).
23
The “Stalinists”, whose position was proclaimed in the famous letter by Nina Andreeva published in “Soviet Russia” in March 1988 at that time were not
considered by the majority of “Slavophilists” a part of their camp. It should be reminded that the letter by Andreeva was directed not only against the
“cosmopolitism of the left liberals” but also against “traditionalists” who were charmed by the image of pre-revolutionary Russia and did not understand
“the historical meaning of October for the fates of the Fatherland” (Andreeva, 1988, p. 2).
24
This was the title of a film about pre-revolutionary Russia, produced by Stanislav Govorukhin.

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302 O. Malinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303

disillusionment with reforms and with the absence of real support by “the West” soon provided a fertile ground for the
“Slavophilist” ideas (Malinova, 2012).
So, in the context of perestroika the opposition of “Westernism” and “Slavophilism” had “come back”. In the 1990s it
significantly determined the structure of the Russian political spectrum (Malinova, 2009a, ch.3, Malinova, 2009c). Was it a
“natural revival” of a “traditional pattern” after the collapse of Soviet ideology? In my opinion, the pattern of controversy
between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers does not explain this turn. The evolution of the discourse about Russia and “the
West” in the twentieth century clearly demonstrated the tendency to dissolution of the binary opposition of “Westernism”
and “Slavophilism” as soon as the context allowed for a redefinition of the frame of reference. So, this opposition was not
“inescapable”. The new models of collective identity raised from the different context determined by the collapse of the
Communist ideology: when glasnost' opened the way for a change of the established images of the USSR and “the West”,
“Westernism” and “Slavophilism” appeared as two types of ressentiment reaction to the collapse of a habitual vision of “us”.
The whole ideological construct that was a pillar of the belief in Russia's superiority over its “other” (if not in all spheres)
quickly crumbled to dust. Under these circumstances, orientation at the experience of the West, reconsidered in available
terms of the Cold War binary system, was the most evident alternative to “Real socialism”. And following the same logic of
ressentiment, the reactions to the “Westernist” self-reproaches followed the pattern of “Slavophilism”.
So, as soon as with the collapse of the Communist ideology the perception of status had rapidly changed e instead of the
“leader of social progress” the USSR turned to be a “looser” that since 1917 had several times chosen the wrong way e and
there was no “readymade”, equally established alternative theory of identity that could provide a basis for a new theory of
identity, “Westernism” and “Slavophilism” as intrinsically consistent strategies of dealing with ressentiment happened to be
the most “obvious” substitute for the former official model of identity.

6. Conclusion

As I have tried to demonstrate, ressentiment was a significant factor shaping the discourse of Russian identity vis-a -vis the
West for quite a long time. Since the mid-nineteenth century the structure of the discourse about Russia and Europe/the West
was determined by the opposition of Westernism and Slavophilism that could be considered intrinsically consistent types of a
ressentiment reaction to the situation in which Russia had found itself. The former demanded social mobility, that is,
approximation to the standards of “the other” by adopting its achievements, while the latter demanded a reinterpretation of
differences for the benefit of Russia in the logic of the social creativity strategy. However, none of these strategies could be
effective under conditions of permanent structural inequality that became the major dominant of the public discourse, which
partly was a consequence of its particular conceptualization by the Westernizers and Slavophiles.
The discourse structured by their binary opposition had transformed only at the beginning of the twentieth century, with
the relative success of modernization and the change of Russia's position in the international system: the distinctive opposite
camps had dissolved and been replaced by a continuum of interpretation using different strategies with more emphasis on
social competition, that is, pursuit for advantage where possible, without striving for convergence. It did not discard the
problem of ressentiment but switched its function, making it not only a cause of powerless malice but also a factor stimulating
efforts for development.
The second major transformation of the discourse took place after 1917. The official Soviet model of national identity
represented Russia not as “the pupil” but as “the leader” of social progress. At the same time it represented the Western
“other” in class terms and stressed the fundamental differences between “them” and “us” (to “our” benefit). However, this
symbolic redefinition of the relationship with the “other” still left grounds for ressentiment because it supposed a competition
over multiple dimensions that revealed the USSR's inferiority, besides there was still a recognition problem, as far as the West
did not share the criteria according to which “we” were better.
The third transformation was launched by perestroika. It brought back the binary opposition of new “Westernism” and new
“Slavophilism” that can be considered a situational reaction to ressentiment induced by the collapse of the official Soviet
model of identity that took the form of an opposition of social mobility and social creativity based on the existing repertoire of
meanings left by the Cold War ideology.
So, what can we learn from applying the ressentiment hypothesis to the analysis of the historical process of Russian identity
construction? First, emotions actually matter for identity construction, and long-term emotional attitudes, like ressentiment,
can be revealed in public discourses. Second, ressentiment was a permanent factor of the Russian identity construction
because of a) the structure of relationship with the significant “other” (asymmetry of development that became an unsolvable
problem as far as Russia craved for equal status), b) the necessity to assess Russia according to the changing standards set by
the West (dominance of the West in determining the frames of reference). The Soviet experience of a symbolic redefinition of
the frame of reference was relatively effective (at least for a certain time), not only because it was a successful implementation
of social creativity but also because the dominance of the official ideology was secured by the Iron Curtain. Third, the analysis
of the transformations of the discourse on Russia and the West reveals that it turned to a more “productive” pattern of social
competition added (but not dominated) by the other strategies a) when the anxiety about status, perceived in complex terms,
as a combination of hard and soft power, was not too high, b) when the reinterpretation of the frame of reference allowed for a
symbolic relativization of Russia's actual inequality to the West. As soon as these conditions were not met, ressentiment
reactions became more acute, which strengthens discourses using social mobility and social creativity strategies that his-
torically were framed as being radically opposed to each other.

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 O. Malinova / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 291e303 303

This allows for some suggestions concerning the prospects of the ressentiment driven discourse about Russian identity.
After 1991 Russia officially adopted “the Western” values of market economy, democracy and the rule of law as its aims, which
dooms it to a long and difficult period of “pupilhood”. At the same time it is not ready to give up on the idea of “equalness” to
the Western great powers. The tension between these two aspirations should become a source of negative emotions even if
the transition to democracy had been successful. While it is not, the situation becomes even more ressentiment-prone. In this
context, the securitization of the discourse about the relationship with the West increases the probability of a binary op-
position scenario. At the same time, a diversification of strategies with the emphasis on social competition is more feasible if
the Russian elite will be able to support it with social creativity, allowing for representing Russia as being “superior” according
to some criteria that are shared by its “other”.

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 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

‘Greatpowerness’ as the key element of Russian

self-consciousness under erosion
Mark Urnov
National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Faculty of Politics, Moscow, Russia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The article analyzes changes in attitudes to and interpretations of Russian ‘greatpower-
Available online 29 October 2014 ness’ (velikoderzhavnost') between the years of 2000 and 2014, that is to say during
President Putin's period of rule. The concept of Russia as the great power was changing
Keywords: during this time in two respects: first, there was an increasing reticence of self-
Greatpowerness assessments; second, we observe prioritization of protecting the country's own, mostly
Russia
regional, interests as opposed to expansion which would be characteristic of a great power.
Status
Moreover, this period clearly demonstrates contradictions and dangers, engendered in the
Resources/capabilities
Set of images
process of losing self-perception as that of the great power. The readiness of Russian po-
Set of roles litical elite to part bit by bit with the status of the great power and to go to the status of a
Hard power regional power is combined (as the events around Ukraine have shown) with unwilling-
Soft power ness to sustain the new status of the country with the help of the capabilities of a soft
power. Lack of these, as well as of the skills in their use, and finally, a desire to raise the
rating of trust in the government with the help of “a small victorious war” have formed the
basis for the aggressive upsurge towards Ukraine. In the absence of serious hard and soft
capabilities, the splashes of aggressiveness in Russian foreign policy and of anti-Western
sentiments in domestic political life are unlikely to have any lasting effect. They are
able, however, to generate extremely negative long-term consequences for the country.
© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.

The expression ‘greatpowerness’ (velikoderzhavnost') denotes one of the most important components of Russian
self-consciousness: a belief that Russia is or has to be a great power. This belief profoundly affects the feeling of national
identity, the political attitudes of Russian citizens, and the content of the Russian government's political decisions. The serious
changes of its content and emotional intensity, occurring from time to time, are usually connected with significant changes in
the overall political situation of the country. For instance, the idea lost its attractiveness to Russian mass consciousness
roughly in the mid-1910s (Russian defeat in war with Japan and upheavals of the first Russian revolution of 1905) and up to
the mid-1920s (the consequences of WWI, second and third Russian revolutions of 1917 and the civil war). This was
accompanied by massive territorial losses. A mighty tidal wave of greatpowerness followed, which ended in the mid-1950s
and was marked by an equally powerful strive for territorial and political expansion.
This article, concentrating on the period between 2000 and 2014, presents an analysis of official views and utterly
aggregated public opinions, that is, positions reflecting society as a whole, without taking into account the fact that views of
different social groups may vary. The main sources providing official views were: Foreign Policy Concepts (FPC) and National
Security Concepts (NSC), published in 1997e2013; The Concept of the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the
Russian Federation (RF) until 2020, published in 2008 (CLTSED 2020); The National Security Strategy of the RF until 2020,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.10.001
0967-067X/© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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306 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322

published in 2009 (NSS 2020), The Military Doctrine of the RF 2010 (MD, 2010), and V. Putin's and D. Medvedev's speeches
and articles. The views of the public were taken from the databases of Levada-Center, the Russian Public Opinion Research
Center (WCIOM), the Foundation for Public Opinion (FOM), and the World Values Survey project (WVS).
The paper consists of three parts: the first part is devoted to theoretical aspects of the concept of a great power, namely to
its four main structural components (status, power capabilities, set of images and set of roles)1; the second deals with the
dynamics of Russia's self-perception at the official level, and the third part e with the dynamics of Russia's self-perception in
the public opinion of the country.

1. Structural components of the concept of a “great power”

In its most general form, the concept of a great power adopted by Russian/Soviet and post-Soviet political culture is largely
consistent with the interpretation of the term proposed by Max Weber in the 1920s, which has since been broadly accepted.
For Weber “the great powers, usually ascribe to themselves and usurp an interest in political and economic processes over …
the whole surface of the planet” and “are held to have a responsibility of their own for the way in which power and prestige
are distributed between their own and foreign polities” (Weber, 1946, pp. 161, 172).2
This definition is well suited for theoretical reasoning, but for an empirical analysis it is too general and thus has to be
operationalized. For the purpose of this study, we argue that the concept of a great power consists of a set of four inter-
connected structural components: the status of a country, its power capabilities, its set of images and its set of roles.
Let us now specify the semantic contours of these four components, which will be used to analyze the dynamics of Russia's
self-perception in the international system.

1.1. Status

“Status” denotes the position of a country on an international “honor/prestige” scale. The concern is not with prestige in
general, but with a specific sort of “honor/prestige” which Weber once called “power-oriented prestige” (Weber, 1946, p. 160)
and which nowadays e taking into consideration the growing importance and popularity of the concept of a soft power e
would rather be called “power- and influence-oriented prestige”. The status of a great power refers to a country's position at
the top of the scale.
The dependency of a country on its resources, its sets of images and roles, is discussed in almost all works dedicated to the
problem of status in international relations. The influence of status on the other three components of the concept of a great
power gets much less attention. Meanwhile, such influence e especially in the case of great powers e exists and adds self-
contained political significance to the status in both the eyes of the elite and public at large (Linton, 1936; Sabrin, 1968, p. 546;
Turner, 1968, p. 555; Weber, 1946, p. 180).
In addition, the great power status provides its citizens with positive individual and collective self-esteem and, therefore,
is an important factor in shaping and affecting national identity (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990; Mercer, 1995, p. 242; Westle,
2011, p. 1132) and unity. This last circumstance makes it extremely attractive for authorities as a tool of domestic policy.

1.2. Power resources/capabilities

Diversity in a country's power resources leads to different taxonomies. For this study, the most interesting grouping seems
to be Nye's distinction between hard and soft power resources. This grouping allows us to better discern the “facial features”
of the country and to clarify in which of the two foreign policy genres its potential is higher: suppression or attraction (Nye,
2008, p. 29, 2011, p. 19). The set of a country's hard power resources most often includes the elements outlined by Waltz
(1979, p. 131): the size of its population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, politi-
cal stability and competence.
The soft power resources of a country are more intangible and may therefore be more numerous. Research studies and
existing soft power indexes give an idea of the main groups of these resources: the quality of a country's political institutions
(government fairness and accountability; public trust in government; low level of social inequality, and others); the quality of
its economy (competitiveness, attractiveness of its goods and services, capability for innovation, low level of corruption and of
shadow economy; good investment climate and so on); human development (health, education, reputation for competence);
national character (for example, openness, friendliness); national morale; the extent of a country's cultural appeal (national
heritage and contemporary culture; influence of the national language throughout the world); quality, reputation and
attractiveness of a country's system of education; attractiveness of a country to live and to work in (structure of migration, low
level of brain drain); a country's commitment to global issues (democracy, justice, poverty, environment, and others); the
strength of a country's diplomatic network; the effectiveness of a country's leaders on the global stage, and other resources.3

1
Their differences will be discussed later.
2
Similar interpretations of the term ‘great power’ can be found in most English-language and Russian dictionaries and encyclopedias.
3
Composed according to the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice_areas/roper_pam/nbi_index/), McClory
(2011), Morgenthau (1948, pp. 113e180), Nye (2008, 2011).

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 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322 307

It is important to keep in mind that while speaking about status, images and roles we are dealing with concepts which in
Herrmann et al.'s terminology belong to the area of “perceived” phenomena (Herrmann et al., 1997, p. 403; Waltz, 1979, p. 98).
Resources per se do not automatically belong here. To be turned into capabilities, country's resources have to be “legitimized”
through domestic and external evaluations of their relative strength/importance in comparison with the resources of other
countries.

1.3. Set of images4

Following Boulding (1959, pp. 120e121),5 “image” will be understood here as “the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative
structure” of a country/nation and of “its international environment”, thus influencing its behavior. Let us consider five
characteristics of the set of images which are most important for this study:

 Images depict objects in a figurative style, as opposed to an analytical one, and thus tend to be value-oriented6 and multi-
semantic. Among other things, images can be filled with new understandings of roles.7
 The cognitive content and emotional intensity of a country's image may change over time, reflecting the country's life cycle
regarding this or that status. The main phases of the life cycle of a great powers, using Volgy et al.'s (2010) terminology, are
the “underachiever phase” (when the country is entering the status), the “consistent phase” (when the country maintains
the status with cognitive and emotional image characteristics being more or less stable), and the “overachiever phase”
(loss/weakening of the previously positive image/“image degeneration” e that is, cognitive image characteristics are
becoming petty, and emotional characteristics are enfeebling). One of the indicators of the image “degeneration” process is
its evolution towards a mirror image (Bronfenbrenner, 1961), revealing a disturbance in the mechanisms of identity
formation based on the country's own culture and a replacement of these mechanisms by imitative ones. This weakening
of identity can turn into a process of negative identity formation (Buchanan, 1968, p. 58; Erikson, 1968, pp. 61 62).
 Image has a time dimension. It can emphasize an object's characteristics from the past, the present or the future. Weber,
when writing about the time dimension of status, stresses that orientation towards the past or present is typical of
positively privileged status groups, while orientation towards the future is common among negatively privileged strata
(Weber, 1946, p. 190). Later Boulding (1959, p. 122) argued that a reliance on the past is of paramount importance for image
formation. If these statements are correct, the orientation to the future can indicate either the country's dissatisfaction
with its current status or the absence of a reliable basis for a desirable image of the past, as well as an aspiration to
compensate such an absence with attractive pictures of the future, which can be easily drawn by PR-specialists.
 A set of images can include different levels of generalization e from highly generalized images (overall images, “meta/
super-constructions”), being part of worldview and ideological beliefs (Herrmann et al., 1997, pp. 403e404), to “fractional”
ones, reflecting various specific traits of the country and its external surroundings.
 A set of images can contain contradicting components. In this respect it does not differ from a set of roles, so possible role
conflicts/incompatibilities, pointed out by Cantir and Kaarbo (2012, pp. 8e19), Holsti (1970, pp. 235, 302, 303, 306e308)
and Merton (1968, pp. 431e434), are also applicable to images. In the case of a great power, contradictions in the set of
images, as well as in the set of roles, seem to be not only an unavoidable but also a necessary condition of status retention.
Such incompatibility reflects conflicting demands of numerous competing domestic and foreign interest groups, different
factions of public opinion, political parties, mass movements, as well as contradictions between new socio-economic
needs and traditional policies. Finally, it may be caused by shifts in the socio-economic and political system of a coun-
try e owing to different paces of change in different parts of the system, and to different social, economic, and political
obligations of policymakers.

1.4. Set of roles

Following Merton (1968, pp. 422e434), we will use the term “set of roles” to refer to a collection of expected behavior
patterns associated with the status of a country. The “set of roles” for a great power refers to “a broad but typical range of
diplomatic behaviors and attitudes”, “a crude summation of the general orientation of the government towards the external
environment”, or “the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, actions” (Holsti, 1970, pp. 233, 234, 245) associated
with the status of a great power. In our analysis we will deal only with the roles combining the traits of “role-conception”
(Holsti)/“role expectation” (Sarbin) and “role-action” (Sarbin).

4
The term “set”, offered by Merton (1968, pp. 422e440) for analyzing roles, seems to be applicable for image research as well.
5
Similar image interpretation are provided by Cottam (1977), Deutsch and Merritt (1965), Herrmann et al. (1997), Herrmann (2003), Scott (1965).
6
For example, a supplier of armament to Third World countries can be described in image language as a supporter of military struggle against impe-
rialism/for freedom and democracy etc.
7
A classic example of filling an old image with new roles can be found in Koestler's “Darkness at Noon”, which main character Rubashov, an old
Bolshevik, explains to Belgian dockers that Soviet oil supply to fascist regimes [new role] is a condition to support “the Country of the Revolution” [old
image] (Koestler, 1941, pp. 37, 39).

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308 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322

1.4.1. Role conception (role expectation)

For Holsti “role conception” means a set of potential behavior performances, conceived by policymakers one-sidedly, as
opposed to “role performance,” that is, the actual “foreign policy behavior of governments” (Holsti, 1970, pp. 245e246). In
order to distinguish between these two aspects of role-activities Sarbin uses the terms “role expectation” and “role enact-
ment” (Sabrin, 1968, pp. 546e547).
We limit this analysis to the potential role activity due to the fact that this very activity is a part of a country's self-
perception, which is the focus of our study.

1.4.2. Role-action
According to Sarbin, “if viewed as actions, role expectations are codified as in a job description: the occupant is expected,
for instance, to call the roll, open the window, secure the doors. If viewed as qualities, role expectations are codified in
adjectival terms; for example, the occupant is expected to be warm, friendly, outgoing, sincere, and cautious” (ibid., p. 547).
The exclusion of role qualities from the study is necessary to differentiate roles and images. The role-qualities, reflecting
emotionally charged and iconic types of object perception and containing value-based interpretations of behavior, turn out to
be practically identical with the images described above. Therefore, to avoid confusion, the term “role” is used here only in
relation to role-actions.8
A set of roles, consisting of the potential role-actions, can be presented as a set of expected behavioral strategies and
activities formulated in a language close to the language of political decisions e in contrast to the language of images e that is
to say in a much more analytical than figurative style.
Despite this difference between roles and images, similarities can also be seen. For example, both can be subject to
different levels of generalization as well as conflicting positions. As a generalized characteristic of a country's role-activities
one can use a combination of three indicators/positions on the three following scales:

“Rivalry-Competition-Collaboration Scale”. The interpretation of the term “rivalry” is borrowed from Vasquez (1996, pp.
532e533), who defines it as a “relationship characterized by extreme competition,” one of the main features being
“psychological hostility” that naturally arises “from persistent disagreement”.
“Social Creativity e Social Conformism Scale”. The term “social creativity” is borrowed from Westle, who defines it as an
activity aiming at changing the rules of the game: the dimension of comparison, the evaluation of compared attributes and
others (Westle, 2011, p. 1135). “Social conformism” is used here as an antonym of “social creativity”.
“Expansion-Isolation Scale” (according to Weber)/“Activity-Passivity Scale” (according to Holsti). Weber (1946, p. 161) wrote:
“for general reasons of ‘power dynamics’ per se, the great powers are very often expansive powers; that is, they are asso-
ciations aiming at expanding the territories of their respective political communities by use or the threat of force or both.
Great powers, however, are not necessarily and not always oriented towards expansion” and can “quite deliberately” limit
their “political expansion for the sake of isolation”. Holsti (1970, pp. 283e288) proposes roles typology (active-passive roles)
corresponding to Weber's types of power dynamics of the great powers, as well as one of the possible ways to quantify the
ratio of active and passive roles in the policy of a country, and thus specify the position of the country on this scale.

2. Dynamics of Russia's self-perception (2000e2014)

2.1. Official views on the Country's status

The abandonment of the term “great power” is the main conspicuous change of the period under analysis. Official doc-
uments published after 2006 never use this term.9
It was Putin who during the first term of his presidency initiated the waiving use of the term “great power” when referring
to Russia. This was a response to the negative reaction of Western politicians and experts to the appearance of the term
“energy superpower” in Russian media. In late December 2005, Putin was speaking at a meeting of RF Security Council about
the necessity for Russia to become a leader of world energy and an “initiator” and “trend-setter” in energy innovations and
new technologies, as well as a frontrunner in the field of research for the preservation of resources (Putin, 2005).
A representative of the Kremlin-friendly public relations community Dmitriy Orlov capitalized on this speech by coining the
term “energy superpower” and announcing it to be the “new strategy of Russian development, proclaimed by Vladimir Putin”
(Orlov, 2006). However, this term was promoted only by a small number of Orlov's colleagues in the public relations arena;
most energy experts were far more cautious (RES, 2006). Meanwhile, Western customers of Russian energy supplies felt
alarmed, viewing it as an expression of Russia's intention to put Western Europe under its control (Spiegel, 2006; Wall Street
Journal, 2006; Washington Post, 2006). As a result, Putin e for whom, at least that time, pragmatism in the relations with

8
According to this understanding of the roles, the roles identified by Holsti (1970, p. 276) as “revolution-liberator”, “liberator supporter”, “defender of
faith”, “developer” and so on, would rather represent images.
9
We refer to the sources mentioned before. They include: Foreign Policy Concept of the RF 2008, 2013, Concept of Long-term Socio-Economic Devel-
opment of the Russian Federation for the Period up to the year 2020, National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the Period up to the year 2020,
Military Doctrine of the RF 2010, Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly 2006e2012.

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 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322 309

foreign partners apparently gained the importance of an ideological construct e abandoned this neologism eight months
after it had appeared, along with the traditional nomenclature of a great power.10
However, the desire to appease Western consumers of Russian energy resources was not the sole cause to reject the term,
and its less frequent use can be found much earlier, almost since the beginning of Putin's presidency, at least in official
documents,11 and especially in the programs of federal TV and radio channels (see Fig. 1).
Perhaps one of the main reasons for the limited use of the terminology in 1999e2013 e that is, before the open phase of
Ukrainian crisis (the annexation of Crimea, a support of separatists in the South-East Ukraine) e could be the desire, quite
reasonable in PR logic, to eliminate the conflict between Russia's claims to the status of a great power, in spite of the obvious
deficit in hard and soft capabilities,12 and the position of Western elite who believe that this weakness deprives Russia of that
status (Trenin, 2006, pp. 218e299). This type of “perceptions conflict” strongly exacerbates negative assessments of the
position of the country seeking status in the international system (Bryant, 1982, p. 377).
The political elite of the Yeltsin era also understood the vulnerability of the country's capabilities. Yet they were unable to
abandon the term ‘great power’,13 partly because of the elite's political romanticism and partly because they did not want to
recognize the connection between the fall of the USSR and Russia's loss of its greatpowerness. Putin's elite, much more
pragmatic that time and not associating themselves with the process completed by the disintegration of the USSR, could
afford to be more flexible in their verbal behavior. They tried to temper (if not to eliminate) this conflict in perception and
minimize the negative consequences for the country by rejecting the controversial term. In 2014, the use of the term ‘great
power’ increased significantly, but did not reach the level of 1999. There is no simple explanation here of why. Perhaps one of
the reasons of such ‘caution’ in the use of this term was a reluctance to scare the neighbors, particularly Belorussia and
Kazakhstan, where Russia's actions towards Ukraine were taken, mildly speaking, somewhat nervously. We confine ourselves
here to these vague remarks. A detailed analysis of Russian propaganda at that period of time deserves special research,
clearly going beyond the scope of this paper.

2.2. Power capabilities of the country

Official evaluations of the country's hard and soft power capabilities are contradictory, and their generalized, optimistic
estimations go hand in hand with concrete estimates that are much more critical.

2.2.1. Generalized evaluations

It is affirmed that Russia “has significant potentials and resources in all areas of life”, “for ensuring itself a worthy place in
the world”; that “Russia objectively continues to play an important role in global processes by virtue of its considerable
economic, scientific, technological and military potentials and its unique strategic location on the Eurasian continent”; that
Russia is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and a member of “a whole range of influential international
organizations, regional structures, and mechanisms for inter-state dialogue and cooperation”; and that it has “rich cultural
traditions”. The importance of soft power capabilities in order to secure the country's dignified position in the world is
specifically emphasized.14

2.2.2. More concrete evaluations of particular capabilities

2.2.2.1. Hard power capabilities. Major traits.

Human potential Low life expectancy, low levels of health among the population (as a result of, for instance, increased
alcohol and drug abuse), the prospect of a significant reduction in population of working age and an increase of the per-
centage of elderly people; brain-drain; shortage of qualified personnel; “non-competitiveness of the elite”.15

10
During the meeting with the participants of the third International Discussion Club “Valdai” (September 9, 2006) Putin said: “I would prefer to move
away from the terminology of the past. Superpower was the word we used during the Cold War. The idea of “powerness”, “superpowerness.” Why should
we keep using them now?/ … /If you've noticed, I have never referred to Russia as an energy superpower./ … /We do not need any kind of superpower
status. What's more, I think that this status, this idea, is being deliberately stirred up in the public awareness and in the media as an attempt to revive
echoes of the “evil Soviet Union” and to portray today's Russia in this light, and this is something I consider unacceptable” (Valdai, 2006).
11
The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation 2000 (NSC, 2000) as well as The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2000 (FPC,
2000) repeat the “pre-Putin” NSC 1997 formula almost verbatim: Russia is “a great power and one of the influential centers of a forming a multipolar
world” (NSC, 2000, Div. II), (FPC, 2000, Div. I). Some modifications of the 1997 document can, however, be evidenced in NSC 2000. The statement: “the
development of equal partnership with the other great powers e the centers of economic and military might” is dropped from the list of main components
of the country's directions in foreign policy; the need to “ensure the safety of its great cultural wealth” loses the specification “great” and turns into the
need of “the preservation of the cultural wealth of all the peoples of Russia …” (NSC, 1997, Div. I, IV; NSC, 2000, Div. IV).
12
Evaluations of Russia's resources/capabilities problems in official documents during Putin's period of rule see below.
13
“The conviction of most Russian ruling establishments that Russia has to be viewed as a great power remained unchanged during the 1990s. Lukin
(Russian ambassador to the USA in 1992e1993) ironically commented on this position: “Call Russia a great power, and then do what you want” (Trenin,
2006, pp. 231e234).
14
These traits were outlined in numerous sources: (MD, 2010, Div. III), (FPC, 2000, Div. I, II, III), (FPC, 2013, Div. I, II, III, IV), (NSC, 2000, Div. I), (NSC, 1997,
Div. IV), (NSS 2020, Div. IV), (SLTSED 2020, Div. I).
15
(NSC, 2000, Div. III), (NSS 2020, Div. IV), (Putin, 2012a,e,f), (SLTSED 2020, Div. I).

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310 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322

Fig. 1. Use of the term “Russia e a great power” on Russian federal TV and radio channels 1999e2014. (In percentage to the total number of publications at the
same period of time). Source: Calculation based on the data of INTEGRUM.

Armed forces Discrepancy between the “resource support for the Armed Forces and for other branches of troops; and the
tasks of their organizational building, development and use”16; significant lagging behind of the Russian defense-industrial
complex compared to most developed countries in terms of technology and investment.17
Primary resources “The growing strategic risk of exhaustion of the country's most important mineral resources” (NSS 2020,
Div. IV).
Economics “Malformed” structure of the economy: “raw materials export model does not ensure the development of
human potential and the required rate of economic growth”, “the backlog in the production of high-tech and highly
processed products”, poor infrastructure (transport, energy, water); most integrated structures are globally non-
competitive, lowly capitalized and unstably profitable (NSC, 2000, Div. IV; NSS 2020, Div. IV; Putin, 2012b,c,h; SLTSED
2020, Div. II).

2.2.2.2. Soft power capabilities.

Level of corruption Systemic corruption prevailed even in the armed forces and the defense-industrial complex (NSC, 2000,
Div. III; NSS 2020; Putin, 2012b,c,f; SLTSED 2020, Div. II). The fight against corruption is not only of legal but of political nature
(NSC, 2000, Div. III). “The results of anti-corruption struggle are inadequate to its scale” (SPOCP, 2013).
Business High risks for entrepreneurial activity (due to corruption, administrative barriers, insufficient protection of
property rights, and others), underdeveloped corporate culture, weak self-organization and self-regulation in business, low
level of competition in a number of market segments (SLTSED 2020, Div. II; Putin, 2012c).
Innovation Weak innovation activity, the development of cutting-edge technologies is lagging behind, insufficient coor-
dination of education, science, and business. Insufficient involvement of Big Business in innovative projects, and in Research &
Development (NSC, 2000, Div. III; NSS 2020, Div. IV; Putin, 2012c; SLTSED 2020, Div. II).
Inequality Deep social stratification, high level of regional disparity, inadmissible level of income differentiation e as a
source of social tension (NSC, 2000, Div. III; SLTSED 2020, Div. II; Putin, 2012e).

16
Precise wording: “One of the main tasks of military planning is:/ … /c) to achieve an accordance between resources support for the Armed Forces and
other troops and the tasks of their organizational building, development, and use” (MD, 2010, Div. III).
17
(NSC, 2000, Div. III). According to Putin “[the most developed countries] invest tens of times more into defense [than Russia does], and “the domestic
Defense-Military Complex has omitted several modernization cycles”. (Putin, 2008, 2012f,g).

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 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322 311

Quality of Education Out-of-date programs and teaching methods in secondary schools, which thereby cease to function as
a social lift (instead, they reproduce and cement social differentiation). Non-competitiveness, low prestige and low quality of
higher education; the existence of “a large number of higher education institutions, including the state ones, which directly
violate the right to get decent knowledge; discrepancy between the structure of government funded higher education and the
real needs of labor market (Putin, 2012c,e).
Government accountability, government effectiveness Low government effectiveness; poor quality of public administration;
unequivocal punitive bias of the judicial system; poor quality of democratic institutions (Medvedev, 2013; Putin, 2012d,h;
SLTSED 2020, Div. II).
Foreign investment The investment attractiveness of Russia is lower than that of competitor countries, especially regarding
long-term investments (Putin, 2012c).
Environmental awareness and action These include: worsening of ecological situation in the country; poor ecological
legislation (Medvedev, 2008a; Putin, 2011; NSC, 2000, Div. III).

2.3. Set of images

2.3.1. Image of the country

The rejection of the epithet “great power” is by no means an expression of a fading desire to see Russia as a great country. It
is just that the explicit claim to the status of a great power has been replaced by an implicit one e through an image con-
taining attributes of greatness.18 Meanwhile, the image of a great power in its scale and emotional richness as presented in
official documents of the Putin period, is the most reticent in the line of growingly restrained images of Soviet and post-Soviet
times. Some recovery of the rhetoric during the late Yeltsin period and in Putin's time in comparison with Gorbachev's
presidency demonstrates the oscillatory nature of the downward trend of the image dynamics: the image-formulas of the
Putin period reflect the tendency to limit the use of superlatives while describing Russia. The only feature the superlative
continues to be applied to is the size of the territory e “the largest Eurasian power” (FPC, 2000, Div. II; FPC, 2008, Div. II). In all
other representations the country ceases to be the “best” and becomes “one of the” best: “one of the world's economic
powers”, the country having “the status of a mighty economic power”, the country with a “centuries-old history and rich
cultural traditions” and so on (NSC, 2000, Div. I; SLTSED 2020, Div. I).
Herewith, the emphasis is laid upon the future and not upon the present position of Russia. When referring to the future,
the country is presented as “one of the world leading powers of the XXI century, getting top-rank positions in the global
economic competition, firmly ensuring its national security and human rights of its citizens”, the country belonging to “the
leading five countries in terms of GDP level”; being “one of the world leaders in technological progress, quality of life, and
influence over global affairs” (NSS 2020, Div. I; SLTSED 2020, Div. I, V).
It should be noted that the omission of the word “great” in relation to Russia in official documents on foreign policy by no
means excludes using it in a less official context for home consumption. It is suffice to turn to some speeches of Putin and
Medvedev, where they used the terms “a great nation”, “great culture”, “a great country”, “the great motherland”, “great
Russia” (Medvedev, 2010; Putin, 2013, 2014a,b), and once - in Putin's speech e “a great power”, though not as a characteristic
of today's Russia, but of the country created by “our fathers and grandfathers” (2014c).

2.3.2. Image of international system

The official image of the international system is similar to that of the country's capabilities: optimistic general pro-
nouncements about the international situation come along with a growing concern over the state of affairs at the concrete
level of description.

2.3.2.1. Generalized statements. In Russia's Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 the global situation was characterized by the
“growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure of the world, dominated, in terms of economy and power,
by the United States” that “challenges and threats Russian national interests” (FPC, 2000, Div. II). In the Concept of 2013 the
evaluation of the situation becomes less dismal. The main characteristic of international relations is described here as “the
formation of a polycentric international system” which takes place against the background of “reducing the possibility of the
historical West to dominate the world economy and politics”, and of dispersing “the world's strength and development
potential, of its shift to the East, especially the AsianePacific region” (FPC, 2013, Div. II). This situation is said to create op-
portunities to improve Russia's position in the world.

2.3.2.2. More concrete statements

 The number of negative characteristics of the world political system mentioned in FPC 2013 reached 30 in comparison to
14 in FPC 2000.
 Principles of interaction with the outer world declared by FPC 2013 have become more defensive in comparison with FPC
2000. “Maximum transparency” disappears from the list of the principles of foreign policy and is replaced by just

18
In Westle's terms this transformation could be described as using social creativity in a strategy of the country's political identity formation (Westle,
2011, p. 1135).

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312 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322

“openness”; “mutually beneficial pragmatism” turns into just “pragmatism”, supplemented by “independence” and by the
foreign policy course being “determined by the national interests”.19
 In 2008e2014 the notion of the main military threat was clearly set. In Russia's National Security Concept of 2000 the list
of international threats was headed by “the striving of particular states and intergovernmental associations to belittle the
role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and the OSCE” (NSC, 2000,
Div. III). In 2008 Putin said that the world had entered a new arms race; that NATO countries required Russian unilateral
enforcement of agreements; that NATO was approaching Russia's borders, and that there was no constructive response to
Russia's concerns (Putin, 2008). In the National Security Strategy published in 2009 the first position on the list of military
threats was occupied by “the policies of a number of leading foreign countries, directed at achieving absolute superiority in
the military sphere” e arms, missile defense system, and others. The Military Doctrine 2010 fixed the attention on “the
pursuit to endow the NATO force potential with global functions, carried out in violation of the norms of international law,
and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, using
among other things the Bloc expansion” (MD, 2010, Div. II).

An important impetus to increasing official concern over the international climate described above is of domestic origin:
the weakening of one of the key soft power capacities, namely, public trust in the government and its policy. A steady decline
of confidence in the federal government e specifically in Putin's e can be observed from 2008 and up to February 2014, that is,
up to annexation of Crimea. After that the situation has radically changed. Both ratings have risen sharply and almost reached
the level of 2008 (see Fig. 2).
To appreciate the significance of the confidence factor one should take into account that in the system formed during
Putin's period of rule there were no formal institutions that could function as a built-in political stabilizer and that the
population's confidence in Putin was and still is the only serious political stabilizer of this system. The weakening of this
stabilizer is a powerful factor that induces authorities to rally the population by using an extremely enduring Cold War
stereotype: the perception of the West, and of the U.S. in particular, as the source of danger.20 Before 2014 the efforts to revive
these stereotypes were relatively moderate and therefore not effective enough. Events in Ukraine (expulsion of Yanukovych,
and a clearly formulated resolution to become a part of the EU) have given rise to a sharp increase in Russian anti-Western
propaganda and deliberately rough style of political behavior: annexation of Crimea, a threat of military intervention in
Ukraine, support of separatists in the south-east of the country. However it is quite possible that this combination of words
and deeds was not purposely conceived as a tool to increase trust in Putin and his policy, but was e at least initially e no more
than an emotional reaction of the ruling group and especially of Putin to “the loss of Ukraine”. But howbeit, it turned out to be
very effective. To what extent its effect is stable is still to be seen.
Finally, a glance at the recent past renders the current situation a bit less dramatic. For sure, currently it is not the “honey-
moon” period comparable to Yeltsin's era, when the Russian president was referring to the heads of all the leading states as
“friends.” But neither it has reached the height of the Cold War, when the West was presented in the USSR as evil incar-
nation.21 The current depiction of leading Western countries is somewhere in between these poles and looks like cold
pragmatism rather than Cold War e “partners whose interests don't always coincide, and sometimes are opposite.”22

2.4. Set of roles

In the long run, the official concept of Russia's role-playing activities is clearly changing from a setting based on Russia's
rivalry with the major powers of the world to a setting based on competition and cooperation. Under Putin competition e if
assessed according to the “ExpansioneIsolation”/“ActivityePassivity” scale e is increasingly shifting towards “Isolation/
Passivity”. Sometimes the “Return of Crimea”, support of “anti-Kiev” forces, unprecedentedly intensive and hostile anti-
Western and anti-Ukrainian propaganda in the government media are regarded as indicators of radical changes in Russia's
set of roles. But all these things, no matter how impressive they are, should not be misleading. It is not a turn to an expansion
strategy of a great power but rather a splash fight to protect “the last frontiers” of an overachiever (in Volgy's terms) deprived
of soft power capabilities. The point is that Ukraine's reorientation to the West is regarded by the Russian political leadership
as a blow, undermining at least two of its key foreign policy settings: (a) the strengthening of the dominant position of Russia

19
According to FPC (2000, Div. II), Russian foreign policy “is based on consistency and predictability, on mutually advantageous pragmatism. This policy is
maximally transparent; it takes into consideration the legitimate interests of other states and is aimed at seeking joint decisions”. According to FPC (2013,
Div. I), the country's foreign policy should be based on “respect for independence and sovereignty, pragmatism, transparency, multi-vector approach,
predictability and non-confrontational protection of national interests”.
20
The negative evolution of the image of the West's in foreign policy documents is reinforced by legislative initiatives, focused on the fight against
“foreign agents” from among disloyal NGOs, the expansion of the concept of high treason, the limitation of orphan adoption by foreigners, and others.
21
Here is one of the many USA characteristics popular in the USSR in the early 1950s, that is, at the height of the Cold War: “American “scientists”-
cannibals offer all kinds of projects and means to annihilate the working population of the globe” (Stepanian, 1950. p. 272). Outstanding is that in this
sentence the word scientists is quoted, while the word cannibals is not.
22
One of Putin's evaluations of the interest-conflict between Russia and Western WTO members well conveys this style: “Our partners are all very
intelligent, fine-looking and educated people, who know how to speak gallantly and to lay out their position civilly. It always sounds convictional, liberal,
and market-like; but to make them agree to step even 1 mm back is impossible, unless we are ready to sacrifice the minimum of a half-meter of our own
interests”(Putin, 2013).

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 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322 313

in the CIS countries, including Russian position at the Black Sea, and (b) the protection of the domestic political situation from
Western influence. These settings are discussed below.
Russia's set of roles as identified in official documents of the Putin period is similar to the view of the country's capabilities
and to its image in the international system. The breadth and optimism of generalized statements coexists with the reticence
in the wording of more concrete positions.
In the government's declared generalized statements (all of them were expressed before the Ukrainian crisis and thus do
not reflect new realities) the Russian role set is coherent with the position of a prosperous great power, which increases its
influence on the world system. This involves “actively promoting international peace and universal security and stability for
the purpose of establishing a just and democratic system of international relations”; “facilitating the development of a
constructive dialogue and partnership relations between civilizations”; promoting the “development of a positive, well-
balanced and unifying international agenda and the settlement of global and regional problems” (FPC, 2013, Div. I, II).
Meanwhile, on a more concrete and practical level, politics are concentrated not so much on an expansion of “the great
power” but on protecting the country's own (mostly regional) interests. The most important tools of this “defensive” task
solving (inasmuch as they can be reconstructed from the content of Foreign Policy Concept 2013) are:

- The strengthening of the dominant position of Russia in the CIS countries; that is in the region of its traditional influence,
in the immediate vicinity of the country's borders.
- The protection of the domestic political situation from Western influence.
- The ensuring of the continuation of a veto-player role23 in the world system (the only possible position of equality with the
more powerful countries).

2.4.1. Strengthening the dominant position in the CIS countries

Russia's attention to the CIS countries has increased substantially since 2000 and has brought them to the fore on the list of
Russian foreign policy priorities. In Part IV of the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept (“Regional priorities”), 12 percent of the text is
dedicated to the CIS countries. This share has increased to 22 percent in the corresponding part of the Foreign Policy Concept
2013. Consequentially, the CIS countries are the most copiously represented in this part of the document, moving the EU
countries to the second place (the share of the text dedicated to the latter in the 2013 document in comparison to the
document of 2000 has decreased from 28 to 19 percent). Herewith, an emphasis on the integration in the CIS has grown
substantially. In 2000 the integration was mentioned only twice and not quite optimistically (first e as the different-speed
and different-level integration in the framework of the CIS; and second by referring to the union with Belarus: “the high-
est, at this stage, form of integration of two sovereign states”). By 2013 the number of integration references has increased to
eight, and the statements have become significantly more promising: “great capacity for integration in various spheres”,
“intensification” and “further development” of the integration processes in the economic, political and defensive spheres, “the
transformation of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union” with
the transformation of the latter into a “model of association open to other states”.

2.4.2. Protection of the domestic political situation from the influence of the West
The main source of concern for the Russian political elite was the language formally adopted by the UN in 2005 regarding
the “responsibility to protect.” A comparison of the Foreign Policy Concepts of 2000 and 2013 gives an idea of the amount of
concern this caused.

 In the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept a danger of “interference in internal affairs” was mentioned only once, and in most
general terms.24 The 2013 Concept mentions it seven times and in a much more detailed manner.25
 In 2000 Russia was intending “to win respect for human rights and freedoms around the world on the basis of respecting the
norms of international law”. In 2013 the country was going to complete the same task through “an equal and constructive
international dialogue with due regard for the ethnic, cultural and historical characteristics of each state” [italics are added e MU].
 In 2000 the passage of the Foreign Policy Concept dedicated to the human rights issue was entitled “Human rights and
international relations”. In the document from 2013 the title of that same passage was changed whereby human rights
moved to the second place (“International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights”), and the intention proclaimed
in 2000 “to continue bringing legislation of the Russian Federation in conformity with Russia's international obligations”
disappeared from the text.

23
The term “veto player” is used here according to Tsebelis (2002).
24
“The attempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state as the fundamental element of international relations generate a threat of arbitrary interference in
internal affairs.”
25
This problem is mentioned in the context of the “destructive” use of “soft power”, human rights concepts, the “responsibility to protect” principle, and
the development of information and communication technologies. Non-interference is seen as one of the most important conditions for the stability of
international relations; it has been affirmed that the relations with the U.S. should be based on this principle, that the U.S. is expected to follow this
principle in its “actions in the international arena”, and that Russia will be building its own policy in the Middle East and North Africa according to this
principle.

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314 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322

Fig. 2. Dynamics of support for Putin and evaluation of the state of the country (2007e2014) Positive answers e negative answers in % of the total number of
respondents. Source: LEVADA.ru.

 In the passage “The Rule of Law in International Relations” (appeared only in CFP 2013) about 65 percent of the text is devoted
to efforts against the “revision of generally accepted norms of international law”, “arbitrary interpretation” of international
legal norms and principles, such as “respect for the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity and the right of peoples
to self-determination”, as well as to ensuring the effectiveness of the use of a veto in the UN Security Council.

The theoretical basis of defense against the “responsibility to protect” e an antithesis of cultural universalism e is an
appeal to the “civilization,” used to legitimize states' own interpretation of human rights. While the Foreign Policy Concept
2000 did not contain this factor, it is mentioned 14 times in the concept of 2013.26

2.4.3. Securing Russian veto

The term “veto player role”, taken from the language of game theory, translates into the language of foreign “multi-vector
policy” implemented in a situation of “decentralization of the global system of governance” or establishing a “polycentric
model of the world, reflecting the world's diversity and variety” (FPC, 2013, Div. II). The text of the Foreign Policy Concept of
2013 gives some reasons to consider the following lines of activities as the main ways to solve these problems: building up
asymmetrical relations with the EU and the USA; participation in each and any influential international organization,
providing the possibility to play on contradictions and disagreements between traditional and new e “Western” and
“Eastern” e world centers of political, economic and military power; active exploitation of possibilities provided by the status
of a permanent member of the UN Security Council (veto power).

 FPC 2013 orients the country towards “genuine Russia-EU integration” e no clause like this existed in FPC 2000 or in
CLTSED 2020. Another change in the Russia-EU relations proposed by FPC 2013 is the absence of special sections dedicated
to the Baltic and East European countries as found in FPC 2000. Apparently, the competition with the EU for influence over
the former “socialist camp” territories is a thing of the past, and Russia now sees these countries as a genuine part of the

26
Mentioned among others are: the growth of the “cultural and civilizational diversity of the world”, “the increased emphasis on civilizational identity” as
“the reverse side of the globalization processes”, the necessity ”to intensify efforts to forge partnership of cultures, religions and civilizations in order to
ensure a harmonious development of mankind”, the necessity of “collective leadership by the major states of the world which, in turn, should be
representative in geographical and civilizational terms” for “ensuring sustainable manageability of global development”.

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 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322 315

integrated Europe. In respect to the relations with the USA, no kind of integration is mentioned while a deep interest to
“strengthen ties in all areas … based on the principles of equality, non-interference in domestic affairs and respect for each
other's interests” is emphasized in every possible way. Aside from objective factors that perplex RussiaeUS relations in
comparison with the relations between Russia and the EU, the asymmetry of the role sets in relation with the two “halves”
of the Western world demonstrates an aspiration e wide-spread in contemporary international politics e to play upon
contrarieties existing between the participants of the political process.
 According to FPC 2013, Russia is expected to establish collaboration with the APEC, ASEAN, BRICS, BSEC, CBSS, EU, G8, G20,
RIC, SCO, SCM, and others in the framework of the “active development of relations with leading … alliances throughout
the world”. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov said that Russia's participation in “international alignments and
organizations” is oriented towards “increasing the effectiveness of these multifaceted formats' input into strengthening
global governance” (Lavrov, 2013).
 The importance to preserve the status of a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a veto power is emphasized
in practically every Russian foreign-policy document and does not require further comments.

3. Public opinion

The range of opinions in Russian society largely resembles the official positions and is sometimes more optimistic about
Russian future as a great power. This is not surprising, given the fact that, firstly, the overwhelming majority of Russians are
not interested in politics and receive information from the federal TV-channels that are stringently controlled by the state,
and, secondly, public confidence in these news outlets continues to be great.27 The majority of Russians, therefore, uncritically
accept the information-cliche
s translated by the pro-government mass media,28 which are inclined to smooth over problems
and to embellish official information.

3.1. Status of the country

When it comes to judging Russia's status in the world, public opinion is a little more optimistic than views expressed in
official documents. In 2008e2011 the share of Russians considering their country a great power or a country having all
necessary attributes of such was quite large: 45e60 percent (FOM, 2008, p. 3; PO, 2011, p. 20). By 2014 the opinion has become
even more prevalent and has reached roughly 55e65 percent of Russians (FOM.ru; Levada-Center Archive, March 2014). The
growth was triggered most likely by the events in Ukraine. According to the Levada-Center, in March 2014 about 80 percent of
Russians believed that “the joining of Crimea to Russia suggests that Russia is returning to its traditional role of a great power
and asserts its interests in the post-Soviet space” (Levada-Center Archive; March 2014).

3.2. Power capabilities

3.2.1. Hard power capabilities

The sole component of hard power capabilities, more or less thoroughly assessed through public opinion polls, is military
power. The attitude towards the army in Russian society generally corresponds to “world standards”. According to World
Values Survey (WVS), in the second half of the 2000s the share of Russians having “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence
in the national armed forces was equal to 67 percent (as compared to 67 percent for the 15 most-developed countries, 60
percent for 10 West-European countries, and 82 percent for the USA).29 In April 2014 about 50 percent of Russians believed
that over the past two years the country's defense capability has increased; the opposite opinion was shared by 7 percent
only; it is the sole aspect of the country's life where the positive assessments take such clear preference over the negative ones
(Levada-Center Archive, April 2014).

3.2.2. Soft power capabilities

These assessments are much more detailed than those of hard power capabilities, but are for the most part negative.
Russia's capabilities to influence international relations are evaluated controversially. According to the Levada-Center, the
share of respondents believing that Russia has a “very strong” or “rather strong” influence on international affairs increased

27
According to the Ledava-Center, in 1997e2011 the share of Russians interested in politics “largely” and “to a large extent” fluctuated between 8 and 15
percent, and of those interested “to a largest extent” e between 1 and 5 percent (PO, 2011, p. 34). In March 2014 the share of Russians who expressed their
strong willingness to actively participate in politics was equal to 2 per cent, the share of whose “somewhat ready” to actively participate in politics reached
17 percent, while the share of respondents preferring not to be involved in politics was 75 percent, 70 percent of whom were not interested in politics for
one reason or another (Levada-Center Archive, March 2014). According to the report of FOM.ru, in 2011e2013 television was the main source of news
information for 89e92 percent of Russians. According to WCIOM.ru, 88 percent of Russian citizens receive political information from the Federal TV, and
the share of those trusting TV equaled 77 percent in 2012.
28
In other words, the prevailing type of perception of media-messages in Russia today is the “dominant code” (Hall, 1980) e that is, recipients uncritically
assimilate the very meanings the message-producers want them to perceive.
29
The 15 most developed countries are: Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. The 10 most developed West-European countries: Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Netherland,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Calculations are based on World Values Surveys Databank.

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316 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322

from 51 percent in 2003 to 57 percent in 2007, and to 69 percent in 2010 (HSE JESDA). But in April 2014 the percentage of
those thinking that over the last two years the position of Russia in the international arena has become better and of those
saying that it has become worse was almost equal: 37 against 33 percent (Levada-Center Archive, April 2014).
Meanwhile, FOM in 2012 witnessed a decrease in the number of Russians who believe that the country's influence in the
world has declined: from 60 percent in 2008 to 48 percent in 2012. But in 2014 it declared that in 2004e2014 the share of
those believing that Russia “in its decisions acts on its own and does not depend on the leading Western countries”, has
increased from 33 to 52 percent, while the share of the supporters of the opposite opinion has declined from 54 to 33 percent
(FOM.ru).
Russia's capabilities to make living and investment in the country attractive. As claimed by the Levada-Center, in 2008 more
than three-quarters of Russians were dissatisfied with the level of corruption and the quality of education, and about 80
percent were concerned about “what is happening now in the country in the field of ethics and morality” (HSE JESDA). In 2011,
answering the question about the changes that had been taking place in society during the previous 12 years, more than half
of the respondents reported a decline in the following fields: morals and everyday culture (63 percent), system of education,
health-care, transport, housing services and utilities (61 percent); social security (53 percent), life safety and legal protection
(51 percent) (PO, 2011, p. 18). In 2013, 80 percent of Russians called the level of corruption in Russia “high” (FOM.ru).
In March 2014 the share of those thinking that “the theft and corruption in the country's leadership” are now more than it
was 10e12 years ago is equal to 32 percent of respondents, compared to 7 percent of people holding the opposite opinion. The
share of respondents believing that the situation has not changed was about 53 percent. Just the same distribution of po-
sitions was registered in the assessments of the impact of bureaucracy on the country: over the last 10e12 years it has
increased e 32 percent, decreased e 7 percent, unchanged e 53 percent (Levada-Center Archive, March 2014).
The assessments of the living standard are far from being positive. In February 2014 the respondents of the Levada-Center
pointed out as the most pressing problems of the country: price increase (69 percent), poverty (51 percent) and growth of
unemployment (33 percent). The assessments of the living standard dynamics suggest that Russians do not see any notable
changes in this area. The share of respondents who believe that over the past two years the living standards of Russians have
improved was equal to 28 percent against 32 percent saying that the standards have lowered, and 38 percent claim that they
have not changed.
In the assessments of business conditions and the brain drain problem the share of those noting either improvement or
worsening of the situation was roughly the same and equal to 54e57 percent (Levada-Center Archive, April 2014).
Against the backdrop of such assessments one can see a sharp increase in public confidence in Putin and his government's
policy. According to FOM, during December 2013eFebruary 2014 the percentage of Russians satisfied and dissatisfied with
the “actions of the government in the last month” was almost equal (about 48 and 45 percent), but in June 2014 the portion of
the dissatisfied fell down to 29 percent, and that of the satisfied increased up to 64 percent. The growth of public trust in Putin
and his policy according to the Levada-Center is shown in Fig. 2.
We assume that these startling rapid changes in the attitude of the public towards Putin and the Kremlin leadership as a
whole can be accounted for by the psychological effect of a “small victorious war” in Crimea, that is, the reaction to a
“medicine” which is much more dangerous than effective.
The main danger here is that a support like that is based on the burst of aggressive emotions and thus requires a more or
less constant aggressive actions against external and/or internal enemies. But campaigns of that sort are at best very resource-
demanding and at worst utterly destructive. Taking into account the fact that today Russian resource capabilities are quite low
(Urnov, 2014), the strategy of aggressive rally can lead quite quickly to tragic consequences for the country.

3.3. Set of images

In Russian public opinion descriptive and normative characteristics of the country's images essentially differ from one
another. The descriptive vision, reflecting an actual situation, primarily focuses on hard power capabilities. The normative
one, revealing what people want to see (what Russia has to be like in their opinion), focuses on the soft power potentials of
the country.

3.3.1. Image of the country

The descriptive component of the country's image can be seen in the structure of the responses to open questions proposed
by FOM in 2008.30 Approximately three-quarters of all responses referred to capabilities that can be attributed to the hard or
soft power of the country.31 60 percent were about hard power (25 percent about Russia's military power and 20 percent
about the “vast territory” of the country and its natural resources).32

30
Those respondents who claimed that “modern Russia can/cannot be considered as a great power” were asked to explain their position (FOM, 2008).
31
The remaining 25 percent of the responses are either statements like Russia “was, is, and will be a great power” or meaningless answers (“difficult to
say”). The criteria of ascribing the answers to hard or soft power capabilities were taken from McClory (2011, pp. 28e34), Morgenthau (1993, pp. 113e180),
and Waltz (1979, p. 131).
32
Calculations are based on (FOM, 2008, pp. 3e7).

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 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322 317

The normative component can be seen in the respondents' answers to the questions “which attributes/qualities define a
great power?” and “what kind of Russia they need” (see Table 1).
As seen from Table 1, in 2001e2012 “comfort” (soft power) was about three times more popular than “might” (hard
power).
In March 2014, answering the question “What is vital now to provide Russia with a worthy place among the most
developed countries?”, 60 percent of Russians pointed out “a sustainable economic development through the use of new
technologies and the growth of labor productivity”; 15 percent e “a raise of living standard at least up to the European
average level”; 12 percent e “more export revenues from oil, gas and other raw materials”, and only 8 percent indicated, “not
to restrain expense for strengthening our military power” (Levada-Center Archive, March 2014).
In these questions “comfort” and “might” were not in opposition to one another: more “might” did not mean less
“comfort” or vice versa. When such an opposition was implemented into the questions, the number of “might” followers was
somewhat lower. In 2003e2011, in answering the Levada-Center's question: “What kind of Russia do you prefer to see: a) The
country with a high living standard, even if it is not one of the strongest countries in the world or b) The great power which
other countries respect and are somewhat scared of?” the ratio of the first and the second positions was more or less steadily
equal to 6:4 (PO, 2011, p.20). In 2014, this ratio became equal to 1:1 (48:48 percent) (Levada-Center Archive, March 2014).
Only when respondents are deprived of any such alternative and have to approve or disapprove the idea of restoring the
greatness of the country, based primarily on its armed forces, this idea gets the majority's support. In 2011 the share of
“definitely yes” and “rather yes” answers to the question “Do you support the opinion that Russia should reestablish its status
of a great empire?” was equal to 78 percent, with 40 percent of those answering “definitely yes” (PO, 2011, p. 21).
The Russian population's preference for greatpowerness based on soft power is not a result of current social dissatisfaction.
The roots of the problem go deeper. This choice demonstrates a steady tendency of the “privatization” of Russian con-
sciousness and of the proliferation of consumer/hedonistic values. As far as one can tell from the poor and fractional so-
ciological data of the Soviet period, the predominance of individualist components and of consumer ethics in Russian mass
consciousness became notable as early as in the Brezhnev era (Grushin, 2006, pp. 611e691; Urnov, 1982). Apparently, the
displacement of the “warrior ethics” by the “welfare rather than glory” principle e the tendency that, according to Nye (2003,
p. 5), is typical of post-industrial modern democratic societies - can be observed in Russia. This tendency affects Russian
public opinion; the traditional and significant for the realism/neo-realism criterion of a great power - “strength for war”)33 e
is being replaced by “strength for peace and well-being” criterion. Consequentially, Russians express their preference of
greatness as based on soft, rather than on hard power. The imperial character of Russian mass consciousness e which Levada
(1993, p. 21) and his colleagues considered among the fundamental patterns of the Homo Sovieticus political consciousness e
is weakening dramatically.
At present, the observed tendency formed quite a strong syndrome of “individualist paternalism”: a combination of
extreme individualism and equally extreme paternalistic expectations of the role of the state. In everyday language it can be
expressed as follows: I owe society and the state nothing, but society and the state are bound to guarantee my well-being
(Urnov, 2012a,b). According to the WVS, in 2006 Russia vs. the U.S had twice as many firm supporters of income
inequality (49 percent vs. 25 percent) and by three timesdin the number of firm supporters of the opinion that “the gov-
ernment should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” (60 percent vs. 20 percent).34 In
2002e2012, in choosing between two “principles of social order” e priority of individual interests vs. priority of state in-
terests e the vote ratio was steadily 7:3 in favor of the former position (PO, 2012, p. 27). Herewith, the denial of the priority of
state interests by no means implied denial to press demands on the state; on the contrary, it was accompanied by a growth in
such demands. Between 1989 and 2012 the share of Russians believing that they cannot demand anything from the state,
because “our state gave us everything” or because “our country is now the kind of state which needs our help, even if it will
cost us sacrifice” went down from 42 to five percent; meanwhile, the share of those believing that “we can demand more”
from the state or that “we should make the state serve our interests” increased from 36 to 53 percent (ibid., p. 41).
The presence of the “welfare rather than glory” principle in Russian mass consciousness can be seen even against the
backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis. In April 2014, under a massive anti-Ukrainian propaganda in government media and a
prevalence of mass belief that joining Crimea means a regaining of Russia's position of a great power, the idea of a legitimacy
of the Russian troops entering Crimea and other regions of Ukraine was supported only by half of Russian respondents (54
percent, including 19 percent of “definitely yes” and 35 percent of “rather yes” support). The ratio of people ready to
“personally bear the cost of joining Crimea” was significantly lower: 5 percent of “fully ready”, and 12 percent of “largely
ready” against 30 percent of “not ready at all”, 29 percent of “not quite ready” and 24 percent making various empty
statements (Levada-Center Archive, April 2014). These figures relate to the specific situation in Ukraine. Meanwhile, in the
questions, which do not indicate any particular country but refer “in general” to countries violating the rights of Russians,
positions of Russian respondents are much less warlike than in the case of Ukraine. Answering such a question, proposed by
Levada-Center in April 2014, the overwhelming majority of the respondents (about 75 percent) preferred that for these

33
“The test of a power is then the test of strength for war” (Taylor, 1954, p. xxiv). According to Modelski, a great/major power “must be capable of winning
a major war”(Modelski, 1972, p. 149).
34
Calculations are based on data of WVS databank. For more details see Urnov (2012b, p. 208).

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318 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322

Table 1
The popularity of the idea of a great power and the vision of the country's greatness in Russian public opinion (2001e2012).

2001 2002 2012

Which of the statements better corresponds with your vision of the country's greatness?
The greatness of the country is based on its leading position in the world, the size of 21 25 29
its territory, and the ruling position of my people on its own land
The greatness of the country depends on how its people live, their living standards, 79 75 71
equality of rights and opportunities for all its nationalities e these things define the
leading position of the country in the world
What kind of Russia do you need?
A mighty military power where the superiority of the state's interests, its prestige and 22 30 22
status in the world have a preponderant position.
A country comfortable for living, where human interests, prosperity and development 78 70 78
opportunities hold the first place

Source: LEVADA.ru.

countries Russia should use peaceful means (economic and political pressure and sanctions) and only 8 percent said that
Russia should use its troops (Levada-Center Archive, April 2014).

3.3.2. Image of international system

A typical feature of today's Russian mass consciousness, linking it with the official worldview, is a growing anxiety in
assessments of Russia's relations with the outside world. The share of Russians believing that contemporary Russia has
enemies increased from 40 percent in the 1990s to around 70 percent in 2000s. The share of those believing in the existence
of “a military threat to Russia from other countries” has also increased: in 2000e2006 its average was 43 percent; in
2007e2013 it slightly exceeded 50 percent (PO, 2012, pp. 198, 201). In March 2014, 35 percent of Russian respondents
admitted that they are always or often beset by fear of a new World War, and 47 percent believed that a new Cold War is a
great threat to Russia (Levada-Center Archive, March 2014).
This growing anxiety is to a considerable extent the result of the strengthening of Russians' negative perception of the
West as a whole, and, first and foremost, of the U.S., the only country that more than half of the Russians (about 60 percent)
consider stronger than Russia in military terms (Levada-Center poll of 2002 e HSE JESDA). According to the Levada-Center,
the index of the Russians' attitude towards the U.S. (difference between positive and negative assessments) has decreased
from 30 percent in 2000e2006 to 10 percent in 2007e2012. The share of Russians seeing the U.S. among the “countries most
hostile to Russia” has increased from 23 percent in 2005 to 35 percent in 2012, while the portion of respondents referring to
the U.S. as to a friend/ally of Russia has dropped from 11 to 2 percent. The share of those claiming that the “Russian gov-
ernment should pursue rapprochement with the U.S. in the near future” has declined from 24 percent in 2012 to 14 percent in
March 2014 (PO, 2012, pp. 200, 207; Levada-Center Archive, March 2014).
The prevailing opinion is that mass media is the main factor in the growth of an anti-American mood. This is correct. As
mentioned above, most Russians are inclined to consume TV and radio broadcasts uncritically. Yet, it has to be taken into
account that in 1998e2013 not the growth of anti-American but the drop of pro-American mass media publications was
observed (see Fig. 3).
Thus, the negativism was growing not due to criticism but due to a declining favorable attitude in respect to the U.S. We are
inclined to consider this an evidence of strength of anti-American stereotypes, deeply rooted in the generations of Russians
prior to Gorbachev's perestroika and “coming back to life” or revived when the pressure of positive information weakened.
In 2014 the situation in Russian mass media changed. That year, in Russian federal TV and radio broadcasts there was a
sharp increase in the number of message presenting the USA as a source of provocations, an imperialist, anti-Russian force
threatening Russia, etc. In April 2014 the flow of such messages peaked (their number was 30 times higher than in January).
As a result, the index of public attitudes towards the United States has fallen from 10 in 2013 to 21 in March and to 56 in
July 2014 (Levada-Center Archive, March, July 2014). Later the flow of negative publications somewhat weakened but still
remained much stronger than at the beginning of the year: in May and June the number of negative messages about the USA
was 14 and 12 times higher, respectively, than in January.35
The attitude of Russians towards the European Union has also become more negative. In 2003e2006 the index of the
attitude towards the European Union e calculated by the Levada-Center in the same year as the index of the attitude towards
the USA e was around 55. In 2007e2012 it was at approximately 45. In March 2014 it became negative, equal to 4, and in
July 2014 it reached 33 (Levada-Center Archive, March, July 2014).
Replying to the question: “How the majority of developed countries are looking at Russia today?”, 3 percent of re-
spondents said that these countries see Russia “as a friend”, 26 percent e “as a partner”, 40 percent e “as a competitor” and 16
percent e “as an enemy” (ibid.)

35
Quantitative characteristics of the Russian federal media information flow in 2014 were kindly calculated for us by A. Smolyanski, a CEO of the In-
formation Agency Integrum World Wide with the use of the Intergrum information service, and we express him our profound gratitude for this friendly
assistance.

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 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322 319

There was also a decrease in the number of Russians who considered certain West European countries friendly: for
Germany the drop was from 23 to 17 percent; for France from 13 to 9 percent; and for UK it remained at the low level of 5 to 3
percent between 2005 and 2012 (PO, 2012, pp. 200, 207, 210).
The negative attitude towards the West was growing together with the popularity of the opinion that Russia “should not
pay attention to Western criticism”. In 2007e2012 the support of this opinion grew from 38 to 50 percent (ibid., p. 202). In
2013e2014 this question was not asked, but taking into account the dynamics of indexes of the attitude towards the USA and
EU, this position also became worse than before. The proliferation of these positions was facilitated by the weakness of
Russians' European identity. According to the Levada-Center, in the 1990s and 2000s the share of Russians considering
themselves a “European people belonging to the history and culture of European society” did not exceed one-third of the
respondents (HSE JESDA). In FOM inquiry of 2013, about 60 percent of respondents claimed that Russian and European values
and culture “differ significantly” (FOM.ru).

3.4. Set of roles

In this sphere the growing negativism towards the West manifested itself by the decreasing popularity of the idea of
integrating Russia into “Western” organizational structures. The share of firm supporters of Russia joining the EU has dropped
from 23 percent in 2000 to 8 percent in 2012. In 2002e2012 the percentage of those thinking that a friendlier relationship
with NATO “agrees with the interests of Russia” declined from 48 to 25. At the same time the share of those considering it
necessary to “confront NATO enlargement, to create defensive unions counterbalancing NATO” has increased from 14 to 23
percent, and the share of respondents preferring “nonparticipation in any military alliances” increased from 22 to 36 percent
(PO, 2012, pp. 209, 210). In March 2014 the share of Russians believing that Russia had reason to fear the NATO countries, was
equal to 62 percent (Levada-Center Archive, March 2014).
Such moods have also affected Russian's attitude towards the WTO; from 2002 to 2012 the share of respondents who
believed that joining this organization “agrees with Russian interests” dropped from 53 to 38 percent (PO, 2012, p. 211).
Meanwhile, the growing rejection of “institutionalized” integration in the Western world took place against the background
of a high and stable popularity of the idea that Russia should “strengthen mutually beneficial relations with Western
countries”. From 1999 to 2012 the share of those supporting this opinion demonstrated very weak oscillations and on average
hovered around 70 percent (ibid., p. 202). However, in 2014 the situation seems to be changing. In March 2014 the share of
respondents, who think that for Russian economy it would be better “to strengthen ties with China, India and other large
developing countries”, was equal to 46 percent versus 23 percent who believe it was preferable “to strengthen ties with the
developed Western economies, such as the G8 countries”, and 19 percent assumed that Russia would better serve as a
“bridge” between these two groups of countries (Levada-Center Archive, March 2014).

Fig. 3. Messages of Federal TV and radio treating the US as an enemy or a friend. (Percentage in total number of messages transmitted by 35 Federal TV and Radio
Channels.) “USA-friend” e messages linking the USA with the following concepts: friend, ally, partner, help, trust, cooperation, security. “USA-Enemy” e messages
linking the USA with the following concepts: enemy, adversary, conflict, aggression, pressure, lack of confidence, danger. Source: INTEGRUM.

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320 M. Urnov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 305e322

4. Conclusions

The period of 2000e2014, that is the period of Putin's presidency,36 is extremely interesting from the theoretical and
practical points of view. The concept of Russia as a great power has been changing during this period in two respects: first,
there is an increasing reticence of self-assessments; second, we observe the prioritization of protecting the country's own,
mostly regional, interests compared to the expansion of a great power. Moreover, this period conclusively demonstrates
contradictions and dangers engendered in the process of losing self-perception as that of a great power. Russian official
documents, examined above, indicate the readiness of the country's political elite to part bit by bit with the status of a great
power and to go to the status of a regional power.
At the same time, the events around Ukraine have shown that Russian political elite is not ready to sustain the
emerging new status of the country with the help of the capabilities of a soft power. Several causes of such lack of
readiness exist and there is no doubt that some traces of cultural inertia can be found here. The present political elite of
Russia was raised within Soviet imperial political culture, where the hard power was considered as the main, if not the
only, real factor in international politics, while the soft power was perceived at best as a complementary component and
at worst as a PR-decoration. Furthermore, in this culture there existed a deeply rooted look at Soviet republics (now e the
so-called post-Soviet space, or CIS) as the younger brothers of Great Russia. But the problem does not boil down to the
cultural traditions only. The other, and perhaps more important cause is that the formation, accumulation and use of the
capabilities of a soft power in the country today require deep political and economic reforms e democratization of po-
litical life, active struggle against corruption, and others ethe changes that may threaten the present political elite with
the loss of power. The fear of the elite to lose power is, in our view, the main factor destroying the already small resource
basis of soft power in Russia.37
Lack of soft power capabilities, as well as of the skills to use them, and a desire to raise the rating of trust in the government
with the help of a “small victorious war” have formed the basis for the aggressive upsurge towards Ukraine. The emergence of
such upsurges, which e before the Ukrainian crisis e seemed, at least to the author of this paper, highly improbable, rep-
resents one of the most important lessons of the crisis, and it has to be taken into account while analyzing political processes
in any low-institutionalized society.
The second equally important lesson of the Ukrainian crisis is the relative ease of recovery of anti-Western stereotypes in
Russian mass consciousness and the effectiveness of their use to maintain the government's popularity.
In the absence of serious hard and soft capabilities, the splashes of aggressiveness in the foreign policy and of anti-Western
sentiments in domestic political life are unlikely to have any lasting effect. However, they are able to generate extremely
negative long-term consequences for the country. In the international relations it is the loss of confidence in Russia on the
part of other countries, the growth of the country's isolation and technological backwardness, and thus the loss of prospects
for modernization, not to mention the growing economic and political dependence on China. In domestic policy it is an
aggravation of the struggle within the political elite that does not guarantee a “democratic alternative's” victory, but
significantly increases the risk of nationalism and growth of xenophobia (Urnov, 2005, pp. 52e53; Urnov, 2012b, pp.
221e223), territorial separatism, and thus an accelerated destruction of the Russian national identity. By “territorial sepa-
ratism” we mean massive reorientation of personal and group identity from the country to one's own region e to “little
homeland” (territory of inhabitance), and thus a gradual destruction (or at least weakening) of the feeling of common
belonging. This process is now quite visible in Tatarstan, Siberia, the Far East and North Caucasus (Allenova, 2011; Doushin
and Sagalaev, 2008; Gerasimenko, 2012; Putilov, 2012; Tourovski, 2012). It is impossible to say at the moment whether
these dynamics can be halted, whereby Russia can survive as an integrated country in its current borders.
Taking into account the fact that Russia is a nuclear power and has plenty of hazardous production facilities on its territory,
it is important not to underestimate these dynamics.

Acknowledgment

The paper was written in the context of the National Research University Higher School of Economics Fundamental
Research Program.

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 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 323e331

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

Status conflicts between Russia and the West: Perceptions

and emotional biases
Tuomas Forsberg
School of Management, University of Tampere, Finland

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This article looks at the status conflicts between Russia and the West and asks: why do these
Available online 16 October 2014 conflicts exist despite attempts to avoid them? If status conflicts refer to merely a symbolic
recognition, then they should arguably be easier to solve than conflicts stemming from
Keywords: competition for power and resources. Yet, status conflicts can be difficult to solve even when
Emotions they were not conceived as zero-sum games. The article argues that status conflicts cannot
Europe
be understood without the interplay of perceptions and emotions. First, what really matters
Foreign policy
is not objective status but perceptions thereof and there seems to be a gap how Russia and
Perception
Russia
the West perceive status in general. Secondly, the perceptions of when status is gained or
Status lost seem to be emotionally loaded. Russia is more willing to understand its relative status
United states when military or economic issues are at stake, but if the dispute deals with international
norms and questions of justice Russia is more likely to interpret Western action as violating
its status and conversely, it is more likely to interpret its own action as enhancing its status
when it is defending such values differently from the West.
© 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California.

1. Introduction

When, for example, looking at Russia's behavior in the ongoing Ukrainian crisis, it is easy to claim that status concerns are
extremely important for the Russian leaders in the Kremlin. Other examples of the Kremlin's recent actions that seem to make
sense, in terms of status, range from significant issues of international diplomacy to smaller events of celebrity politics.
Indeed, the quest for status can be seen as being typical for Russia and its foreign policy for a much longer time. The idea of
greatpowerness is understood as forming the core of Russia's state identity throughout centuries, including what we can
observe today (Clunan, 2009; Hopf, 2002; Oldberg, 2007; Omelicheva, 2013; Smith, 2012; Trenin, 2011). As it was famously
proclaimed by the Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov (1996): “Russia always was, is and will be a great power; ” or as
more recently was stated by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (2012): “I am convinced that Russia simply cannot exist as
a subordinate country”. In particular, status concerns play a key role in Russia's relations with the West that is considered
historically as the primary “other” to Russia (Neumann, 1996). Status and honor have often been regarded as motivations for
Russia either to go to war, or to cooperate with the Western partners and also explain why their relationships were difficult
(Tsygankov, 2012; Wohlforth, 1998). Prominent scholars claim that the key problem in the mutual relationships is not about
security, but rather about how Russia receives the status and respect from the West that she expects (Monaghan, 2008;
Neumann, 2008; Sakwa, 2008; Stent, 2014; Tsygankov, 2012).
Status can be seen as a factor that sometimes helps avoid conflict because it tells who should have priority. More often
though it is seen as causing conflicts and impeding cooperation, especially when material interests are at stake, in this case it
adds an intangible, emotionally loaded dimension. In relations between Russia and the key Western states and their political
institutions, “the West” (Bavaj, 2011), a status conflict emerges when Russia perceives that she deserves a status recognition

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.006
0967-067X/© 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California.

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324 T. Forsberg / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 323e331

from the West and the West fails to deliver it. This propels Russia to take angry action that forces the West to take Russia into
account but this situation, again, does not increase the level of trust in the relationships.
Many researchers have argued that if the importance of recognizing status and showing respect to Russia were correctly
understood by the West, such conflicts, or overreactions at the minimum, would be avoided. Deborah Welch Larson and
Andrei Shevchenko (2010, p. 93) have contended that Russia and China ‘have been more likely to contribute to global
governance when they believed that doing so would enhance their prestige’. Vincent Pouliot (2010, p. 239) suggests that ‘if
NATO wants Russia to play by the rules of the security-from-the-inside-out game, it should provide with enough cultural-
symbolic resources to have a minimally successful hand in the game’. In view of Jeffrey Mankoff (2007, p. 133), ‘Russia that
is sure of itself and its standing in the world is likely to make a more stable, predictable partner for the West’. Stephen Cohen
(2012) argues that ‘the guiding diplomatic tenet must be recognition of Russia's parity with the United States as a sovereign
nation and legitimate great power’. In most cases, these authors at least implicitly suggest, recognizing Russia's status as a
great power would not be too demanding since showing respect is symbolic politics and does not require giving up any
essential material interests.
There is, of course, another group of scholars who also see that many problems in Russia's relations with the West stem
from status concerns, but they believe that the policy of the West, in so far as it would acknowledge Russia's status concerns,
would not satisfy Russia's identity needs. Instead, such status moves would lead to endless clashes, because no reasonable
balance could be found. It is Russia's responsibility to accommodate its status aspirations to the new circumstances. For
example, Hannes Adomeit (1995, p. 65) contended that self-assured and self-confident states would behave rationally,
whereas Russia that is obsessed with its lost great power identity possesses many irrational, unpredictable, contradictory
traits in its foreign policy. For Donald Jensen (2014), the United States' approach to Russia in 2013 ‘was too Russia-centered,
thereby encouraging the Kremlin's delusion that Moscow is a global power with comparable status to Washington’. The key
solution to the status conflict in the view of this more hard-liner group of scholars is that Russia should give up its futile
aspiration to be a great power. In fact, status politics may lead to a self-reinforcing cycle. When the West tries to compensate
policies that Russia claims have undermined its status by showing Russia more respect and awarding higher status, it sends
mixed signals. When Russia believes that the West really thinks that it deserves a higher status, behavior that violates Russia's
status appears even more intentional and directed against Russia.
This article argues that status politics is more complicated than about withholding or granting status according to some
real or imagined criteria. Moreover, neither granting nor withholding status automatically resolves status conflicts. This is
because status conflicts do not emerge merely from a gap between perception and objective reality but between two per-
ceptions. Russia perceives that it has not received the status recognition it deserves and the West believes it has already
respected Russia. The basic problem is not that the West purposefully ignores Russia or undermine her status when it is able
to do so, in other words, that it shows disrespect independently of material or other interest at stake. Rather, Russia and the
West have diverging conceptions and perceptions of status.
How these mechanisms function depends on many cognitive and emotional elements that will be explored in this article. I
will look first at the role the perception of status play from theoretical standpoint; and then examine the role the status
perception play in Russia's relations with the West in reality. I will make two broad points in support of my analysis. First, the
key Western leaders have most of the time, at least from their own perspective, wanted to pay attention to Russia in order to
minimize problems related to status. Yet, from the perspective of the Russian leaders, their experience has been opposite.
Second, there are divergent perceptions between Russian and Western leaders and political commentators of whether Russia
in key international contexts has gained or lost her status. Both of these gaps in perception contribute to the ‘status dilemma’
between Russia and the West.
I will base my analysis on statements and comments that can be found in memoirs, research literature and newspaper
sources. Such an analysis can be objected on the ground that it is not clear when the perceptions stated are the real per-
ceptions or they are just politically motivated statements of the situation. Yet, memoirs and official statements are directly
indicative of status granting. Although such a gap between private and public thinking may exist, it should not be exaggerated
a priori: on the contrary, in practice public statements often seem to reflect genuine perceptions (Mastny, 1996, p. 9). A
number of anonymous background conversations with policy-makers and analysts both in Russia and in the West support
this view. Moreover, the cases discussed here will not constitute any systematic final test of the claims above, but they serve as
an illustrative or tentative plausibility probe of the existence of the psychological mechanisms in perceiving status in the
relations between Russia and the West.

2. Status, perceptions and foreign policy

The representatives of the realist theory in IR have an ambivalent view of the role of status in international politics. On the
one hand, it is seen as important and often driving politics more than mere material concerns. But on the other hand, many
realists seem to think that status just reflects more fundamental material concerns of national interests. Classical realists said
many things about status e or related concepts such as prestige, respect, honor, standing, or reputation e but did not have any
proper theory of it. Hans Morgenthau (1978, p. 85) talked a lot of the importance of prestige, but then concluded that it is
rarely the primary objective of foreign policy and it should not be. From Raymond Aron (1962, pp. 76e77) we can learn that
‘glory’ leads to extremes but a man full of glory should be unaware of his fortune or indifferent to it in order to be entirely
worthy of it.

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 T. Forsberg / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 323e331 325

If we summarize the existing knowledge of status and related concepts in international relations, we can contend that
status is important for the states for several reasons (Onea 2014; Paul et al., 2014; Steele, 2008; Volgy et al., 2011; Wolf, 2011;
Wood, 2013b). If a state has been granted high status, it cannot be ignored in international negotiations and its interests are
often seen as more legitimate. High status provides a robust basis for ‘soft power’. But high status is also important purely for
reasons of self-esteem because it sustains a positive self-image. Self-esteem in international relations does not necessarily
have to do with the dimensions of power, or power understood in the traditional way. Yet, grouping states into great powers,
middle powers and lesser powers is the most typical way of categorizing states that no state can escape. Moreover, a high
international status of a nation is often an important aspect of the identity of its citizens.
States thus have a clear incentive to achieve a higher status position. If status positions are hierarchically ordered, this
would naturally lead to a conflict between the status seekers and the status granters. However, states also have an incentive to
grant status to others or at least, not to violate the status of others (Wolf, 2011). If a state freely grants status to another state, it
will, in theory, lead to appreciation and gratitude and a growing sense of mutual trust and solidarity. These are important
assets in international politics. If granting status is mostly symbolic politics, states should not be risking a conflict for status
reasons but think about how the other state and its leaders can save their face. The classical realist wisdom is that ‘there is
courtesy: seeking not diplomatic “victories”, “triumphs” or successes, all of which imply a defeated antagonist, but agree-
ments which suggests common achievements; or perhaps seeking victories which come without being noted’ (Wight, 1991, p.
187). George Kennan (1951), in particular, advocated these principles in the US foreign policy towards Russia. According to
him, the United States should bear in mind the national greatness of Russia, and give Russians “the feeling that we are on their
side, and that our victory, if it comes, will be used to provide them a chance to shape their own destiny in the future to a
pattern happier than that which they have known in the past” (Kennan, 1951, p. 138).
Of course, some ways to give status are costly if they involve granting access to institutions, for example. When material
interests are at stake, the gap in expected and granted status can easily emerge. This kind of conflict has a status dimension,
but it is not puzzling that we find a conflict because then status is directly connected to material interests. We can still try to
discern what the status dimension in such conflict is by bracketing the material stakes.
A genuine status conflict emerges when a state's international status does not correspond to the status level it thinks it
deserves. Such conflicts are typical for great powers or aspiring great powers, because the higher the actor perceives himself
being in the hierarchy, the likelier it will emphasize differences in status (Alexander, 1972). In other words, here the conflict
emerges because of discrepancy between the subjective self-perception and the intersubjective status position in the group.
In these cases, the severity of the status conflict depends on the way status is conceptualized. If the question is about status
hierarchy, status conflicts are reminiscent of zero-sum games and difficult to solve. But if the status conflict deals with
recognition and belonging to a group, then the conflicts are more likely to be positive-sum games and solvable. Although
states would not lose anything if they grant status when it involves only symbolic stakes, they may still refuse to do so for
ideological or normative reasons. They are after all free to choose who fits to the community they are forming.
But status conflicts are not automatically solved, even when they would be framed as positive-sum games. Status conflicts
can also emerge on the basis of a discrepancy between self-perception of deserved and the equally subjectively perceived
level of received status that is granted by others. Even when the other parties are willing to grant a higher status to the state in
question, it may not perceive the actions as such. The underlying psychological question is how states interpret often
ambivalent information about their status granted by others. One possibility is that they interpret this information so that it
confirms their pre-existing beliefs about their status. Belief theories would expect this to be the case. As Robert Jervis (1976, p.
343) notes, we are prone to alter our perceptions so as to protect or enhance our self-esteem. According to the theory of self-
verification, people tend to create and interpret social reality in the manner that verifies their self-conception (Swann, 1983).
Self-verification theory does not tell whether your self-identity is positive or negative but according to the theory of self-
enhancement, people tend to interpret their social environment in the manner that constructs a positive self-conception.
Yet, it is also possible to derive from cognitive theories a tendency to interpret information about one's status position
negatively even when the self-image is positive. If the one thinks that the others never show respect, then he or she is likely to
perceive the behavior of others in light of these expectations. Moreover, because states as well as other human groups tend to
overestimate their own importance in the behavior of the others, they are likely to perceive situations where their status has
been neglected as an attempt to undermine their status rather than as an event not related to their status at all. As a result,
people may conclude that they have been given less status than those that are granting status have intended. If this is the case,
status conflicts are almost unavoidable, though if this gap in perceptions is made known, they are easier to mitigate. So-
ciological and psychological research does not give clear answers to which tendency prevails. In fact some studies indicate
that the gaps are not too big in either direction but that individuals are rather skillful in their ability to read accurately their
status in the given group (Anderson et al., 2006).
From the history of Russian (and Soviet) foreign policy we know many episodes that highlight the importance of un-
derstanding the role of perceptions and emotions in questions related to status. Russian or Soviet representatives have often
believed that they have gained or at least successfully defended their status in cases where the Western leaders and other
observers have interpreted Russian behavior as strange. For example after his legendary shoe-drumming performance at the
UN General Assembly meeting in December 1960, Nikita Khrushchev explained to the Politburo that he had acted successfully
whereas Khrushchev's demonstration raised rather different attitudes in the West (Fursenko and Naftali, 2006, p. 320). Yet,
the perceptions can also err towards the other direction. When President George Bush invited Gorbachev to Camp David in

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326 T. Forsberg / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 323e331

1990 in order to show greater respect to his guest, the Soviet leadership first interpreted the invitation to the ‘summer cottage’
as an insult.
This brings us back to the question of what determines the appropriate level of a state's status aspirations. There are two
potential sources. The first is the attributes deemed relevant for status the state has relative to other states that may possess
higher, equal, or lesser status. The second source is status aspirations that have historical origins in the domestic discourses of
the nation. Anne Clunan (2009) argues that this is the case with Russia. Some believe that status becomes more important in
the cases of ontological insecurity (Ringmar, 1996; Steele, 2008). Valeria Kasamara and Anna Sorokina (2012, p. 288) think
that ‘the Great Power pathos is compensatory to the respondent's insecurity, mistrust of other and the aggressive and un-
friendly atmosphere in Russia’.
A related question is whether a state that is confident about its status is more or less likely to start a conflict. Theoretical
suggestions here are not always clearly articulated, but the tendency is to assume that a state that is confident with its status
is less likely to launch a conflict for status reasons (Lindemann, 2010). If the status-holder is not confident about its status, it is
assumed, it is more likely to react to the status challenges posed by the states of a lower rank that a confident state could
ignore. Moreover, it is not self-evident in which box we should put Russia. For Andrei Tsygankov (2012) Russia's foreign policy
becomes assertive, when internal confidence is strong but Western recognition is weak. Maria Raquel Freire (2011), by
contrast, sees Russia as an ‘overachiever’ in terms of status, in other words, the other states have granted more status to Russia
than it actually deserves and that is why Russia has become more assertive.
If states have a tendency to aspire for higher status, when and how do they accept status loss? One answer to this question
is that they accept status loss when they have to, and when efficacy tests are univocal. Perceptions thus matter only to a
degree and are important in situations when information is ambiguous. Social identity theory would expect that states as
other human groups would then try other strategies to enhance their positive self-esteem. Another potential answer is that
states are willing to downgrade their status in the past in order to feel positive about their present status. It is politically safe
and identity wise to think that status losses took place in the past, when the current leaders were not responsible for them. So
in Russia, Putin's regime can accept that status loss took place under the Yeltsin era, but it is hard to acknowledge that any
present action would have damaged Russia's status.
Although IR scholars have been dealing with status and related questions, a more detailed research agenda looking at the
role of these issues has been developing slowly. Status concerns create many dilemmas to which there are no self-evident
answers. The rest of this article looks at how such dilemmas have shaped Russia's relations with the West. How has
Russia perceived the changes in its status and the policies of the West from the perspective of status? Have the attempts to
compensate status violations been successful? Russia can be a fruitful case for considering these theories and assumptions
about the role of status, although stronger generalizations would require more comparative research. Nevertheless, the
significance of status has often been emphasized in Russian foreign policy but claims about it have often remained
unspecified.

3. Perceiving the West's willingness to grant status to Russia

Russia's status aspirations seem to have produced a prolonged status conflict with the West in the post-Cold War era. For
the West, a status conflict with Russia has not been a desired effect of its policies. At the end of the Cold War and thereafter the
key Western actors did not want to conduct policies that had undermined Russia's status. “We have not responded with
flamboyance or arrogance e I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall” assured President Bush the Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev (Zelikow and Rice, 1995, p. 127). Chancellor Kohl was grateful and supportive towards Russia and built a
personal friendship with both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. The EU was very careful not to antagonize Russia during the early stage
of their relationship (Haukkala, 2010). The West did, however, perceive the world in terms of their values and conducted
policies that reflected this.
In the Russian perspective, by contrast, the policies of the West undermined Russia's status. Russia and the West did not
share the same view as to how much status Russia deserved but even more importantly, they did not perceive their mutual
actions in the similar way. Russia regarded foreign policy of the West as purposefully undermining her status. In view of
Karaganov (2010, p. 7), ‘the West has treated Russia like a defeated adversary ever since an internal anti-communist revo-
lution brought about the end of the Soviet Union’. Some American diplomats and politicians may think alike, but typically
they put the blame on the preceding or the succeeding administration. The former US ambassador to Russia Jack Matlock
(2010, p. 170), for example, has argued that ‘the Clinton administration dealt with Russia as if it no longer counted, even
in European politics’. Defense Minister Robert Gates (2014, p. 158) also admits that ‘when Russia was weak in the 1990s and
beyond we did not take Russian interests seriously’.
In particular, Russia felt that her status was undermined when NATO decided about its enlargement. This is an important
episode to look at because interpretations of the motives and commitments not to enlarge NATO have been formative to the
image of the West in Russia. In Russia's perspective, not only NATO's expansion did demonstrate that the old enemy images of
Russia were still alive in the West but it also discarded Russia's status in being able to participate in the European security
architecture on an equal footing and violated previous agreements by the Western leaders that NATO would not expand after
German unification (Primakov, 1999).
The Western leaders saw the motivation of NATO's enlargement differently. It did not reflect old enemy images but the
vision of Europe whole and free and it was based on common norms agreed upon in the Paris OSCE charter including the

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 T. Forsberg / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 323e331 327

commitment of ‘fully respecting each other's freedom of choice’. Neither a formal commitment to refrain from enlarging
NATO nor a veto right was given to the Russian leaders (Kramer, 2009; Sarotte, 2014). But Russia and its concerns were not
entirely ignored either. President Clinton tried to reassure Yeltsin that ‘NATO enlargement is part of a means to achieve our
shared goal of a more stable Europe. And that goal includes a close cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, to which I am also
committed’ (Asmus, 2002, p. 140). Clinton ‘emphasized that the U.S. had no intention in sidelining Russia and instead
underscored how much the two leaders had already accomplished’ (Ibid., p. 146). Clinton (2004, p. 750) told Yeltsin that ‘a
declaration that NATO would stop its expansion … would make Russia look weaker, not stronger, whereas a NATO-Russia
agreement would boost Russia's standing’. Russia was not, indeed, satisfied with the Partnership for Peace scheme
because it put Russia into a similar position with its former Eastern European satellites. Yeltsin stressed that problems can be
solved by the two presidents: ‘to Yeltsin anything was possible if only he could talk one on one with his friend whose name he
pronounced “Beeel”’ (Albright, 2003, p. 254). As a form of compensation, to reassure Russia that it was not left out but
respected, a NATO-Russia Founding Act was concluded and Russia was offered a seat at the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint
Council. Clinton also promised to support Russia's membership in G8, the WTO and other international organizations.
Russia did not see the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as any major act of goodwill (Forsberg, 2005). It
committed itself to the work of the PJC only half-heartedly but expected that the Council would give Russia a chance to
influence NATO's agenda and decision-making. This did not happen but Kosovo conflict in spring 1999 caused a renewed
status conflict between Russia and NATO because Russia was not able to influence decisions about NATO's war on Kosovo.
Strobe Talbott (2002, p. 340), the deputy secretary of the state, recalls how in the talks on the post-conflict stability force with
the Russians the key questions were ‘all variations of the same theme: Did the U.S. and its allies respect Russia? Were we
prepared to treat Russia on the basis of equality?’ Russia was again compensated after Kosovo War for the neglect that it had
suffered in the run-up and during the war. In the Kosovo Force (KFOR) operation Russia was given a special arrangement in
the command structure but not a sector of its own. Moreover, NATO representatives tried hard to reestablish broken relations
and to assure Russia that her views are taken seriously.
A new NATO-Russia Council was established in 2002. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair, among others, wanted that the
new forum would reflect the idea of ‘equality’. In his memoirs, he explained that ‘one thing I did get completely’, was how
important respect was for Putin's Russia (Blair, 2010, p. 244). Meanwhile Germany's Chancellor Gerhard Schro €der (2006)
whose government had backed both Kosovo war as well as NATO's second round of eastern enlargement, elevated Russia
to an European nation, a democratic state and a global player. Putin (2000, p. 177) had clearly stated that he did ‘not see any
reason why cooperation between Russia and NATO shouldn't develop further; but I repeat that it will happen only if Russia is
treated as an equal partner’. The idea was that the parties avoided the format of 19 þ 1 in order to Russia feel equal with the
other members in the NRC.
Yet, Russia was not fully satisfied with the new council either. The same kind of pattern of establishing a special
arrangement with Russia that then created both expectations as well as disappointment could be found when Russia was
invited to join the group of major industrial powers G7. The Western leaders had invited the Soviet and Russian leaders to G7
meetings already in the early 1990s and started to talk about Russia's inclusion in the club. The invitation to join G7 formally
was issued in 1997 in the context of the decision about NATO's first post-Cold War enlargement (Gilman, 2007). On the basis
of its economic criteria Russia would not have merited the inclusion in the group of major economic powers in 1997 or before:
the decision was largely seen as purely political. When Russia then was not invited to G7 meetings, a status conflict emerged
because Russia has been given the signal that it belongs to the club. For Russia, the decision to invite her to join G7, despite
Russia having not fulfilled the criteria, was not seen as a sign of good-will of the Western powers, since the membership was
conceived as something that Russia had rightfully, even if belatedly, deserved.
By contrast, the format of 7 þ 1 was uncomfortable to Russia. In view of Yeltsin (2000, p. 131) ‘it kept Russia feeling like a
student taking an exam. This was unacceptable. I thought that there should be no double standards’. In Yeltsin's perception
Russia was not invited earlier as a full member to the G8 only because Japan wanted to extract political concessions. Russia's
ambivalent status in the G8 also caused conflicts because of raised expectations of its position. When Russia was not invited to
the ministerial meeting of the G7 countries in February 2010 in Canada, the former strongly protested. Russian foreign
ministry saw the decision as incorrect and reflecting the old stereotypes (RIA Novosti, 2010). Such an argumentation gave
grounds to believe that had Russia not been invited to the G8 in the first place, the G7 meeting without it had been seen as less
insulting. On the other hand, right after his inauguration in May 2012, President Putin decided not to attend the G8 meeting,
although the hosting Obama had decided to move the meeting from Chicago where a NATO summit was held right after the
G8 meeting. He wanted to disconnect the two meetings and make it status wise easier for Putin to attend the G8 meeting. But
for Putin, according to the Kremlin watchers, the most relevant reason for his cancellation was that the White House had
announced that Obama would not participate at the AsiaePacific Economic Cooperation summit (APEC-2012) which Russia
was hosting in September of the same year in Vladivostok.
The status conflicts between Russia and the West have thus not disappeared during the Putin era despite the overall view
that Russia is a rising power with a growing international significance. George W. Bush (2010, p. 195) first put ‘a high priority
on personal diplomacy’ with Putin when they met in June 2001, but then he revised his opinion of Putin and was not willing to
engage with him. Putin felt this change and during his first encounter with President Obama, the Russian president reportedly
complained for almost an hour about the disrespectful treatment he had received from George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice
(Mann, 2012, p. 186). Yet, the problems did not disappear with Obama either. A telling incident was when the US Ambassador
to Moscow Michael McFaul snapped at a Russian journalist that Russia “turned out to be a wild country!” When this was

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interpreted in the Russian media as insulting the ambassador quickly apologized and blamed his poor Russian: “Did not mean
to say ‘wild country’. … I greatly respect Russia”, he added (Joffe, 2012).

4. Perceiving Russia's performance and status in international relations

Russia and the West do not only perceive differently the level of status that Russia has received, they also differ in their
perceptions about what factors or actions contribute to Russia's status. Many instances, however, seem to lead to parallel
views of how Russia's status is conceived. For both Russia and the West traditional yardsticks of power in international politics
were Russia's growing GNP, its energy resources and military build-up. These have been factors that have conceived as
strengthening Russia's position as a great power. International crises and related military and diplomatic action are, however,
often more difficult to assess in a similar way. Often they constitute crucial test cases of Russia's status that can be looked at
more closely in order to discern to what extent the perceptions in Russia and in the West differ.
In most cases, whether the West likes it or not, Russia's diplomatic interventions and use of military power, when suc-
cessful, have been seen as improving Russia's status internationally. In particular, both Russian and Western commentators
believed that the war in Georgia in August 2008 strengthened Russia's status. Sergey Karaganov (2010, p. 7), for example,
argued that ‘it was only after the West encountered an armed rebuff in South Ossetia that it stopped its expansion’. For
Stratfor's George Friedman (2008), the Russian invasion of Georgia announced that the balance of power had shifted. Russia's
diplomatic intervention in the Syrian crisis also seems to be positively evaluated both in the West as well as in Russia
(Lukyanov, 2013a). Not only did the Russian commentators see Russia scoring ‘a brilliant diplomatic victory’ (Golts, 2013),
Western commentators similarly regarded that ‘Russia gains clout with Syria initiative’ (White, 2013), ‘Russia is emerging as a
great power’ (Murray, 2013) or that it ‘has helped reassert Russia's role’ (Sly, 2013).
The perceptions of Russia and the West of Russia's status changes are more diverse when Russia attempts to prevent the West
from making decisions on the international level or when it tries to demonstrate its presence by using military force less suc-
cessfully than in the Kosovo War. Russians typically do not count such failures as status losses. Rather, Russian representatives
believe that in such cases Russia's inaction would demonstrate its lesser status and think that even a failed attempt is better in
status terms than no attempt at all. Even the drastically failed attempt during the Kosovo War to seize the Prishtina airport was
seen positively by the Russian commentators as an effective demonstration that Russia is not ‘a lackey’ as discussed in Heller (this
issue). For Yeltsin (2000, p. 266) it was a ‘sign of our moral victory in the face of the enormous NATO military, all of Europe and the
whole world’. On the other hand, the Western leaders saw the Prishtina episode not as a moral statement but rather as a sign of
Russia's unpredictability as a partner (Clark, 2002). For Albright (2003, p. 423), the event was “farcical”. On the basis of it, the West
became frustrated with Russia and was less willing to show respect. As Iver Neumann and Vincent Pouliot (2011) have argued,
‘Moscow's quest for equal status prompted quixotic practices that were often dismissed by Western countries'.
Indeed, Russia has often not registered when it has lost status in the eyes of the Western partners. The OSCE Istanbul
Summit in 1999, where a Charter for European Security and Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty was signed,
was generally regarded in the West as one where Russia had to accept that it was bound by the OSCE rules and the CFE Treaty.
Yet, for Yeltsin (2000, p. 348) ‘the summit was an important international victory for Russia’. Another case where Russian and
Western perceptions starkly differed was the “Bronze Soldier” dispute in Estonia in AprileMay 2007. Russia protested against
the removal of the Soviet Era statue in Tallinn from the center to a nearby cemetery. Russian representatives argued that it
violated the rights of the Russian minority and was a sign of Estonian glorification of fascism. Members of the nationalistic
youth organization Nashi, supported by the Kremlin, demonstrated in Moscow and blocked the Estonian embassy (Myers,
2007). Official Estonian websites underwent cyber attacks, presumably launched from Russia. Russian leaders believed
that it had given a lesson to Estonia that the rights of the Russian minority and the sanctity of the war time memorials cannot
be violated. From the Western perspective, however, diplomatic harassment that constituted a violation of the Vienna
convention and the alleged cyber-attacks decreased Russia's status, and the lesson to do with the memory issue towards
which the West had shown some initial understanding was lost in the diplomatic crisis.
A third example of diverging perceptions of Russia's status between Russia and the West was Russia's decision to recognize
Abkhazia and Ossetia as independent states in August 2008 after the Russo-Georgian war. The West held the decision irre-
sponsible and interpreted Russia's difficulty in getting any of its closest partners to recognize these break-away republics as a
significant set-back and status loss. Professor Lincoln Mitchell of Columbia University, for example, argued that Russia's
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was “clearly a diplomatic defeat for Russia. It reveals a Russia that is more isolated
than Russia would want to let on” (Whitmore, 2009). “In terms of comparative diplomacy, the Russian independence
recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia looks extremely weak to the considerably greater number of nations recognizing
Kosovo's independence” (Averko, 2012). For Russia, by contrast, the recognition of the break-away republics had again “given
a lesson” to the West, or at least to those countries that had recognized the independence of Kosovo. One year later, after the
recognition Medvedev assured that he did not regret the decision that was irreversible. Five years after the act Putin (2013)
reasoned that “Russian Federation's difficult but correct 2008 decision to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia was decisive for giving these two young countries the chance to choose their own future”. Finally, Russia's proposal of
an European security treaty was an attempt to enhance Russia's status in the European security system but it turned out to be
more a loss to Russia's status, since it did not get much positive support from the West (Tsygankov, 2014). The Western
commentators regarded it as a non-starter as the key interlocutors neglected Medvedev's treaty initiative and tried to address
Russian concerns within existing structures such as NATO and the OSCE (McNamara, 2010; Weitz, 2012).

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 T. Forsberg / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 323e331 329

Similar debates and differences in perception can be traced when looking at the two recent major issues on the diplomatic
agenda. As noted above, Russia's role in mediating an international solution to the Syrian crisis in September 2013 was widely
seen as a positive sign and as a proof that Russia is back in the game. Yet this reading was much more common and wide-
spread in Russia than in the West. Noteworthy is John McCain's (2013a) comment that by allying with world's most offensive
tyrannies Putin is not enhancing Russia's global reputation but destroying it.1 Similarly, the refusal of Ukraine to sign the
association agreement with the EU in November 2013 was regarded by many Russians as a diplomatic victory for Russia and a
further sign of its improved status. Yet, the perceptions were different in the West. The outcome did not improve Russia's
status but it was a pyrrhic victory or a ‘lose/lose outcome’ (Wood, 2013a). In reviewing the achievements of the past year
Fyodor Lukyanov (2014), a Chairman of Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, concludes that ‘Russia
certainly has improved its standing’. Putin's nomination as the most influential person by the Forbes magazine in November
2013 was seen as underlining this image (Lukyanov, 2013b). Former US Ambassador to Moscow, Stephen Sestanovich, in turn,
argued that Putin's diplomatic tools are getting weaker and the recent record should be a problem for Putin. In his view,
Russian officials portray their moves regarding Syria as a huge success because these officials simply cannot speak of the
Russian initiatives in any other terms (Barmin, 2013).
If Russian leaders do not perceive any of their actions as lowering the county's status, when they do accept a status loss? If
they never accept a status loss, the expectations would be constantly rising and become sooner or later totally out of touch. It
seems that Russian leaders have accepted status loss in two occasions. First is constant information about Russia's material
power resources that can be deemed objectively in some relative terms. Second, Russian leaders seem to accept that its status
has been lower in the past in order to justify the present: they exaggerate Russia's low status in the 1990s in order to create
the impression that its status during the Putin era is higher than during the Yeltsin era. Conversely, the West may admit that
Russia's status has been rising during the Putin era but they do not admit that a lower status in the past had resulted from
Russia's own action.

5. Conclusions

This article has discussed the conflicts between Russia and the West that arise from interpretation of Russian international
status. It asked why such conflicts exist despite attempts the avoid them. If the essence of status conflicts is just a symbolic
recognition of a country's international standing, then they should be easier to solve than problems stemming from
competition for power and resources. Yet, status conflicts often arise as unintended outcomes of interaction and could be
difficult to solve because of perceptions and emotional biases attached to them.
The article does not intend to address the issue of whether Russia has received too much or too little respect from the
West. Instead it suggests that status conflicts cannot be understood without the interplay of perceptions and emotions. First,
the article argues that what really matters is not so much an objective status but rather perceptions thereof and there seems
to be a gap of how Russia and the West perceive Russian status and in particular Western acts in honoring or ignoring it.
Secondly, the perceptions of when status is gained or lost seem to be emotionally loaded. Although not much can be said
without studying the issue more systematically, it seems that Russia is particularly concerned with status issues if the dispute
deals with emotionally loaded issues, such as NATO enlargement or Kosovo War. Conversely, the West is more likely to
interpret Russia's action as not enhancing its international status when it is defending international values differently from
the West.

Acknowledgment

I want to acknowledge the financial support of Academy of Finland to the project on “Emotions in Russian Foreign Policy”
(2011-14) as well as to the Finnish Center of Excellence in Russian Studies e ‘Choices of Russian Modernization’ (2012e2017)
that have made this research possible. I would also like to thank participants in the seminars and conference panels in
Helsinki 2012, Naantali 2013, Mainz 2013, Toronto 2014 and Frankfurt 2014 (Anette Freyberg-Inan, Deborah Welch Larson and
the co-editors of this special issue in particular) for comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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This statement is somewhat contradictory because at the same time he (McCain, 2013b) also declared that the deal with Syria ‘gave Russia a position in
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 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 333e343

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

Russia's quest for respect in the international conflict

management in Kosovo
Regina Heller
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Beim Schlump 83, 20144 Hamburg, Germany

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This article examines the emotion-based status-seeking logic in Russia's foreign policy vis-
Available online 16 October 2014
-vis the West, presenting the example of Russia's reactions to NATO's military campaign
a
against Serbia in 1999. It is argued that Russian assertiveness in combination with
Keywords: expressive rhetoric must be understood as a result of the ruling elite's need to have
Anger Russia's identity and self-defined social status as an equal great power in world politics
Kosovo
respected by its Western interaction partners. Russia's reactions to NATO's intervention,
NATO
which was not authorized by the UN Security Council, must be read as a strategy coping
Respect
Russia
with the emotion anger about the perceived humiliation and provocation of status denial
West and ignorance by the West. We find various elements of such a coping strategy, among
them the verbalization of the feeling of anger among Russian political circles and the
media; uttering retaliation threats, but no ‘real’ aggressive, retaliatory action; minor and
temporary activities aimed at restoring Russia's image and status as an influential an equal
power. On the surface, the Kosovo episode did not result in any visible break or rift in the
RussianeWestern relationship. However, emotionally it has lead to a significant loss of
trust in the respective partner on both sides.
© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.

1. Introduction1

For several years now, the debate about Russian foreign policy goals, especially in its relations with the West, has been revived.
Since Vladimir Putin's coming to power in 2000, Russia's policy has become much more confrontational, oscillating between
assertiveness on the one hand, at times reminiscent of the Cold War era, as most recently in the conflict in and over Ukraine 2014,
and the wish to cooperate with the West on the other. This also comes along with a language permeated with harsh, uncom-
promising rhetoric, angry verbal protests and emotional overtones from Russian politicians and diplomats whenever they deem
Russia's international status and role as an influential power not adequately respected by the West. Is Russia's foreign policy and
rhetoric an expression of classical realpolitik, of power projection and great power balancing, limiting U.S. influence in Europe and
maintaining its spheres of influence in the post-Soviet space (Aksenyonok, 2008; Ambrosio, 2005), as neo-realists (Waltz, 1979)
would predict? Strikingly, in many instances, Russia does not make strategic use of the asset status it constantly claims and
defends as a means of material power projection. Rather, in many instances, status claims remain on a rhetoric level. Moreover,
Russia's assertiveness seems risky and costly with regard to the maintenance of stable and good relations with Western partners.
Is Russian assertiveness, then, a function of domestic power consolidation, as liberal theorists (Moravcsik, 1997) would
presume? Many argue that Putin uses nationalistic rhetoric, anti-Western sentiments in Russian society and images of Russia

1
This article is based on a paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention in San Diego 2013. The article is a substantially revised
and updated version of this paper. For more ideas see also: Heller (2013).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.001
0967-067X/© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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334 R. Heller / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 333e343

as a great power in order to strengthen his own position in the political system of the country (Pribylovsky, 2013). However,
the liberal explanation also falls short of some peculiarities: The recourse and reference to Russian greatpowerness is not an
exclusive phenomenon that occurred only when Vladimir Putin came to power for the first time. In fact, this specific foreign
policy characteristic is a constant factor, driving post-Soviet Russian foreign policy behavior towards the West, and we can
observe it already since the mid 1990s, when the Russian elites found a consent on Russia's identity as a great power in
international relations. The narrative of Russia as a great power in world politics, thus, seems to be deeply rooted in the
identity of the elites and is not only a pawn in domestic power struggles but seems to serve more fundamental, social and
emotional, identity-stabilizing functions.
In this paper I argue that neither neo-realists nor liberals are fully correct with their explanations of Russian foreign policy
behavior vis-a
-vis the West. Russian assertiveness in combination with the expressive rhetoric must be rather understood as a
result of the ruling elite's deeper-layered, emotion-based judgment that Russia's identity and self-defined social status as an
equal great power must be respected by its Western interaction partners. Each time this self-concept is denied, Moscow reacts
angrily, both verbally and with concrete actions, laden with emotions and thus following other logics than those that are
predicted by rational choice theories. In order to show that this respect-seeking logic is a constant feature of Russian foreign
policy, I chose a case from the pre-Putin era, namely Russia's reaction to the 1999 NATO air campaign against Serbia. I hy-
pothesize that the West's denial of Russia's self-defined social status as an influential and equal power in world politics in the
Kosovo case was an emotion-evoking factor, while the actions and rhetoric on the Russian side can be read as emotion-driven
attempts to restore its self-defined and self-allocated status in the relationship. The West was harshly, and for months, criticized
for its military intervention in Kosovo, executed without a mandate from the United Nations. Angry verbal outrage from the
Russian leadership, the country's political class, also mirrored in the media, showed a broad consensus on the opinion that the
West's decision had been inappropriate in terms of respect for Russia's self-defined identity and international role. A number of
activities followed, which appeared like contorted maneuvers and provocations, not rational, well-calculated policy: starting
with Prime Minister Primakov's demonstrative U-turn during his flight to Washington in the first night of NATO's air campaign
and ranging to the coup de main-like seizure of Pristina airport by Russian paratroops a few months later.

2. Status, respect and emotions e understanding Russian foreign policy from a social-psychological perspective

2.1. The role of social respect

From the perspective of social psychology, Russia's foreign policy vis-a
-vis the West, its inconsistencies and assertiveness,
are expressions of the attempt to regain the social status in international relations it occupied during the Cold War. Scholars of
social psychology believe that individuals, groups and states strive for a positive position (status) as members of a social
community (Tajfel, 1978). They are concerned about their status not because it provides them with power assets, but because
it provides them with a “positively distinctive identity” (Welch Larson and Shevchenko, 2010, p. 66). Consequently, the
character of social behavior in groups respectively in any social interaction is subject to the acknowledgment of this self-
defined rank by others (Taylor and Brown, 1988). This is, of course, not to say that rational motives do not play any role at
all in status-relevant issues. As Steve Wood points out, status (or in his words prestige) “is distinct but not isolated from
power: material, social or imagined” (Wood, 2013, p. 387). Vice versa, prestige, that is, the “recognition of importance” (Wood,
2013, p. 388), constitutes an important basis of being and acting as a great power.
Social respect is a form of acknowledgment of social status e and, thus, respect claims are active requests to acknowledge
this status. According to Wolf (2011), (social) respect refers to the evaluative dimension of social status; the subjectively
defined adequate recognition of one's self-conception and value. This means that respect includes two aspects: the wish to be
respected and the moral judgment that this treatment is just and appropriate. Social respect “is an attitude we expect others to
show by the way they treat us” (Wolf, 2011, p. 113). Speaking of respect expectations seems, thus, conceptually more adequate.
Wishing and moral judging, in turn, are two cognitive elements which constitute and are tied to emotions (Haidt, 2001). Being
respected, thus, is socially and emotionally important, as this acknowledges the ‘self’ in its subjectively defined identity, rank
and status in a social relationship (Stets, 2005; Wolf, 2011; Tiedens, 2001). Although this logic of respect is derived from
individual psychology, it can be assumed that it applies also to larger groups, thus also to states. It does so through shared
identities and the reproduction of emotional and cognitive practices by group members (Sasley, 2011). It can be assumed that,
when respect for a state's identity and status definition is refused or challenged, actors who identify themselves with this
identity tend to react emotionally. In other words: the denial of social status in a specific situation when its approval is
important for maintaining self-esteem can trigger an emotional reaction.

2.2. The emotional dimension of status denial

The literature suggests anger to be a typical emotion that emerges and shapes a relationship when social status is denied,
that is, when A refuses recognition of status to B (Kemper, 1978; Isbell et al., 2006; Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Scherer, 2005).2

2
Other emotions connected to status loss are shame and contempt (Kemper, 1978; Neckel, 1991). Shame is a “self-condemning” emotion; the blame for
status loss is attributed to oneself. Contempt is experienced when the other is perceived as being socially inferior.

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 R. Heller / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 333e343 335

Anger in this context must be understood as a moral emotion, that is, it results from a moral evaluation and subjective
judgment of A about (real or perceived) unfair treatment or the (real or perceived) violation of a right through B (Hutcherson
and Gross, 2011). Thus, anger is an “other-condemning” emotion that puts the ‘blame’ for status loss on the “other” in social
interaction. Status denial or ignoring status is seen as a provocation.
Anger triggers a number of reactions, all of which have the function of coping with the emotion anger (Averill, 1983;
Novaco, 1997). First of all, anger triggers the urge to communicate the experienced feeling.3 Usually, anger is verbally
expressed through spontaneous (and usually temporarily limited) angry verbal outrage, defiance and protest (Kemper, 1978;
Rosen, 2005; Tiedens, 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2008). In this context, retaliation and revenge threats, which are commonly
expressed under anger against the instigator, usually remain on a verbal and symbolic level and are not carried out, as they
reflect the felt impulses rather than the urge to respond with ‘real’ action. When people decide to act, aggressively, under
anger, such action is primarily symbolic (Averill, 1983, p. 1147). It stems from a feeling of frustration and a more general wish
to act against the other (Mackie et al., 2000), to change the situation, for instance through jeopardizing, obstructing or
spoiling social interaction (Welch Larson and Shevchenko, 2010, p. 70) or through retreat from interaction. Thus, angry people
may change their assessments and evaluations of the gains resulting from a given mode of social interaction. Following this
swing of assessment of self-interests they break with established practices and rules and behavioral norms of interaction
(McDermott, 2004, p. 15). From the outside, such action occurs costly, sometimes risky, even useless, if the addressee does not
change its attitude.
Moreover, angry persons may engage in impression management or self-deception about their intentions and emotions,
usually in the form of post-hoc rationalizations, that is, the conscious or unconscious presentation of false arguments that
make plausible and argue “for the good” of offensive behavior under the influence of anger (Averill, 1983, p. 1150). Finally, if
the frustrating situation is subjectively enduring, the feeling of anger continues to glow below the surface, or can even be
spurred, constituting an invisible stimulus for diffusion and actualization in the future (Nussbaum, 2001). Such effects of
anger can be observed through venting of anger in repeated arousal (abreaction) over time or engaging in rumination about
the frustrating situation, which then in turn can e if the inner emotional conflict is not being solved e transform into more
permanent resentment-driven behavior (Barbalet, 1998, p. 126).
Methodologically, any analysis of the relationship between status and emotions must take these various effects into ac-
count (Denzin, 1984). This requires the integration of the following elements: a) reconstructing the situation in which the
emotions are being produced, that is, a tracing of the interaction between the emotion-experiencing “self” (A) and the
respect-denying “other” (B) and b) making use of hermeneutic, phenomenological and in general more interpretative
methods (Elkins and Simeon, 1979; Hitzler and Honer, 1997) in order to understand the link between emotional action and
the emotional meaning such an action carries (Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008; Crossley, 1998). For the purpose of this paper, on
a rhetoric level I will identify verbal expressions of a feeling of anger and disregard of Russia's foreign policy identity, put
forward by relevant Russian foreign policy-makers and officials, as well as its mirroring by the Russian media. Changes in
assessment of the situation, for example, expressed through risky or costly action, as well as the patterns of their justification
can also give evidence of emotions.

3. Russia's quest for respect in the international conflict management in Kosovo 1999

3.1. Social status concerns in Russian foreign policy of the 1990s

Concerns and debates about post-Soviet Russia's international status have gained momentum already in the early 1990s.
With the end of the bipolar system, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Socialist systems in Eastern Europe,
Russia e as the mainland of the former Soviet Union e lost its status as a superpower and had to define itself anew. The lively
debate among Russian elite groups about the country's national identity, emerging around this time, reflected this wish to
find a new role in the world. Despite all the different approaches and views, a common denominator became apparent,
namely the idea that Russia should resurrect as a great power in international affairs (Freire, 2010; Sakwa, 2011; Trenin, 2011).
This perception rested not least on the fact that Russia, being the Soviet Union's legal successor, preserved a number of
material attributes and resources constituting a great power4: The permanent seat with a veto right in the United Nations
Security Council still provided the country with important channels of influence in world politics. Russia's nuclear arsenal and
the international arms control treaties in force put Russia on par with the United States. Russia also still exerted significant
influence in the post-Soviet region, albeit not as a regional hegemon any longer.
Given its weak material potential, Russia's great power ambitions in the 1990s were fairly exaggerated (Adomeit, 1995).
Especially the permanent political and economic crisis of the 1990s made Russia internationally weak, not least in military
terms. Next to this ‘real’ weakness, the foreign policy elites in Russia increasingly perceived a status-asymmetry with the West,
the roots of which laid in the West's dealing with Russia's transformation and the changing security environment in Europe.

3
While anger as an emotion is an internal, “multi-dimensional complex of reflected and non-reflected knowledge, representations and processes”, the
feeling of anger “is the conscious, subjective experience of [the] emotion, which can be communicated through words” (Schwarz-Friesel, 2014, p. 48).
4
Essentially these are military and economic resources, as well as geopolitical influence (both regional and global) and the ability to exert leadership
through the agenda-setting (Volgy et al., 2010, pp. 1e6). Another criterion is the recognition by other actors of the international system (Levy, 1993).

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336 R. Heller / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 333e343

Firstly, Russia was massively forced into the role of a ‘policy-taker’ by Western partners after it had e voluntarily e introduced
democracy and market economy in the early 1990s. But Russia apparently was expected to take over the ‘right’ model of
democracy; Russian specifics and variations to this model were not tolerated. Western actors and institutions even made their
support for Russia's transformation conditional to this ‘right way’ to democracy.5 The political elites saw themselves pushed
into the role of a junior partner, scholar, or, even worse, a petitioner (Simes, 1998) e a role incompatible with the idea of a
great power. Secondly, Western states and institutions increasingly dominated the international security architecture after
the end of the Cold War, also in such fields where Russia occupied the status of an equal before. Instead, for instance, of
turning the OSCE into a leading institution on military security in Europe (Kobrinskaya, 1995), NATO's influence increased. The
North-Atlantic Alliance spread to Europe's East and broadened the scope of its activities, particularly by military crisis
intervention and peacekeeping tasks. NATO's ascent, moreover, levered the political function and role of the UN as the in-
ternational authority, legitimizing force and implicitly also Russia's status as an influential and equal player.
While, on the one hand, aiming at close ties with the Western civilized community (Sakwa, 2011), a key goal of Russian
foreign policy, on the other hand, was to prevent the international community from taking any decision that would
consolidate NATO's role as a regulative factor in European security matters, thereby further degrading and marginalizing
Russia in international politics.6 One of the guiding objectives in Russian foreign policy since 1995, therefore, was the attempt
to emerge as a ‘balancing force’ against US and Western dominance in international security and to push back NATO. This so-
called patriotic turn or ‘national consensus’ (Arbatov, 1997), with Russia moving from a purely ‘Atlanticist’ position to more
traditional ideas of ‘strategic interests’, ‘spheres of influence’, military strengths and geopolitics (Primakov, 1997), is a result of
the changing global security environment on the one hand and the perception in Russia that these changes will have negative
repercussions for the country's social status in the international order on the other.

3.2. The dynamic of the international conflict management attempts: Russian overconfidence vs. Western determinedness

Despite the ruble crisis in 1998 and Russia politically and economically hitting rock bottom, the Russian establishment and
leadership perceived Moscow's role in international security on the eve of the millennium as fairly strong, influential and
broadly constructive. A statement from then-Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov of January 1999 demonstrates this self-perception.
Last year Russia managed not only to retain the status of one of the key players in the international arena, but also to
strengthen it. Our dynamic and well-balanced foreign policy is an important stabilizing factor in international affairs.
Most countries recognize that the resolution of major modern problems is impossible without Russia's direct partic-
ipation and without taking its interests into account (Ivanov, 1999).
In line with this self-perception, Moscow tried to play an active and crucial role in the international conflict management
in Kosovo. The conflict was internationalized in 1998, after the violence perpetrated by Serbian forces against the Kosovar
population had intensified. Russia was primarily involved as a member of the UNSC and as a member of the Balkan Contact
Group e a role similar to the one it had been playing in the peaceful settlement of the war in Bosnia a couple of years earlier.
Russia had been perceived by the international community as a traditional ally of Serbia, raising hopes that due to its special
ties Russian diplomacy could exert pressure on the Milosevic regime to stop the violence in the province of Kosovo. However,
the experience from Bosnia had shown Russia's limited influence on Milosevic and the limits of Moscow's diplomatic ac-
tivities (Heller, 1998).
Moscow's position in the Kosovo conflict management showed strong signs of pursuing an own agenda. In the UNSC,
Moscow repeatedly deviated from Western approaches to settling the conflict. For instance, in March 1998 Russia impeded
the adoption of a UN resolution, imposing a trade embargo on Serbia as a reaction to a crackdown of ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo by Serbian troops. After internal consultations and negotiations Western members of the Contact Group finally won
Russia to support at least an arms embargo. With the trade embargo failing, the West unilaterally introduced trade and visa
restrictions against Serbia. Moscow's position particularly differed in the question of what role NATO could play. While in
1995 Russia internationally supported NATO's first out-of-area mission in Bosnia, Russian diplomats now categorically
rejected any involvement of NATO in the management of the crisis in Kosovo.
All these developments on the international scene coincided with a politically precarious situation for Russia at home. In
1996 the ultranationalist LDPR and the Communist Party had achieved a majority in the latest Duma elections and, given
severe economic and financial problems, the Yeltsin government had lost its popularity among the Russian population.
Following their victory, then-Prime Minister Primakov had started to negotiate a coalition with the conservative communists
in order to overcome the economic crisis in Russia and the domestic political paralysis of that time. The Yeltsin administration,
thus, seemed highly dependent on good relations with the nationalist opposition and had to reconcile with its positions. The

5
For instance, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Russia and the European Union of 1997 included a non-compliance clause
which authorizes the treaty parties to unilaterally undertake “appropriate” steps in cases where essential elements of the treaty e from the EU's
perspective particularly the rule of law, democracy and human rights protection e are not implemented (European Union/Russian Federation, 1997, Art
104).
6
This position was, although in a more modest way, in essence already formulated in Russia's Foreign Policy Concept of 1993 (Russian Federation, 1993).
As Richard Sakwa (2011, p. 963) writes, the elites early on defined Russia as an equal. They did not perceive Russia “[…] as a defeated power, obligated to
defer to the United States and its allies”.

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 R. Heller / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 333e343 337

next parliamentary elections were due in December 1999, the next presidential elections in 2000, and the nationalistic
opposition seemed as strong as rarely before.
When in May 1998 Kosovo experienced a serious escalation of Serbian-led hostilities, US representatives appeared to be
toying with the idea of an international military intervention against Serbia, namely through a mandate for NATO. Then US
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, with a view to increasing the pressure on Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, raised
the idea that the United States would also consider a military intervention by NATO in Kosovo e even without Russian consent
in the UN e if Serbian aggression did not stop. The US Secretary of State concluded: “If force is required, then we will not be
deterred by the fact that Russians do not agree with that.” (cited in Simes, 1998, p. 14)
As had been already the case in the context of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russian ultranationalist and communist
forces in turn started to agitate against NATO and the West and intensified their nationalistic rhetoric. These forces heavily
relied on negative stereotypes of an “aggressive NATO” and US international dominance on the one hand and the historical
Russian-Slavic brotherhood which had to be defended against common enemies on the other.7 It was basically the nation-
alists who introduced the notion of “NATO aggression” when characterizing the West's position on how the international
community should end the violence in Kosovo. At the same time the nationalistic opposition discredited the Russian gov-
ernment and President Yeltsin in particular, blaming him of being too pro-Western and too passive about the West's in-
tentions in Kosovo (Popov, 1999). In 1998/99 the nationalists were able to influence the public discourse and public opinion in
Russia. Opinion polls revealed that the majority of the Russian public was against NATO's intervention in Kosovo, albeit not
interested in any military involvement in the crisis (Brovkin, 1999; Quiring, 1999).
As a result, Russian diplomacy was even more directed at preventing the NATO option and pushing a ‘diplomatic solution’.
Moscow's peace talk initiative in June lead to the deployment of the international verification mission (KDOM) but in parallel
provided the Serbian leadership with significant breathing space to sent more troops to Kosovo (Troebst, 1999). This outcome
was perceived by Western diplomats and politicians as a big diplomatic failure and showed, once again, the Serbian un-
willingness to move towards peace. Moreover, Russia's limited political influence on Serbia became obvious and a NATO
intervention an even more realistic option. At the same time Western actors hoped that Russia, having been ‘cheated’ by the
Serbs, would now move towards a UN mandate for the Alliance (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1998). Moscow, however, continued to
reject any such expectations and hopes. Instead, it favored a role for the OSCE and even threatened to reduce cooperation with
the West within the NATO-Russia Council if the course of action moved any further towards a “NATO solution” (Fitchett, 1998).
The peace talks that took place in Rambouillet, France, marked the last stage in the dynamics in the run-up to the NATO air
campaign in spring 1999. During the talks the Western allies pushed for an additional arrangement to complement the peace
deal, according to which NATO should be responsible for the military implementation of the peace agreement (Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia/Republic of Serbia/Kosovo, 1999). Russia objected, arguing that Serbia would not agree to such a
regulation. Moscow's ‘moral’ support for Milosevic, in turn, made the Serbian leadership even more adamant about not
accepting the provisions of the peace agreement. A peaceful settlement became less and less likely and a military strike
against Serbia carried out by NATO nearly unavoidable. Finally, in the night from March 24 to 25, 1999, NATO acted upon its
repeated warnings and started an air campaign against Serbia without a mandate from the UN. A Russian resolution initiative
to stop the bombings, introduced by Russia in the UNSC shortly after, was turned down en bloc by the NATO members in the
forum. This meant that for the time being the UN as a conflict resolution mechanism e and with it Russia e was out of the
game.

3.3. Coping with disrespect: emotional reactions as an attempt to restore Russia's social status

3.3.1. Russia's foreign policy elite united in anger

The days and weeks after the first NATO air strikes were accompanied by widespread verbal protests and expressions of
discontent and anger from the Russian government as well as from various actors and groups across the political camps
within Russia e an emotional state of mind which Russian political commentator Maksim Yusin (1999) back then charac-
terized as “close to a psychosis” that not only reflected the ultra-nationalists’ and communists' “battle against the hated West”
but rather echoed a consensus and high degree of resonance among high-ranking representatives from the political envi-
ronment, encompassing government members, communists and nationalists, as well as leaders of the democratic parties and
regional representatives (Korsunski, 1999; Ulyanov, 1999).
In the cacophony of statements and assessments we find basically two different lines of argumentation connected to the
condemnation of the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia: i) statements referring to its moral and political inappropriateness and
ii) references to the NATO air campaign as a direct threat to Russia. Both lines are argumentatively e partly directly, partly
more indirectly e connected with the claim to adequately respect Russia, its political principles and international position.
Already in the evening of March 24th, President Boris Yeltsin appeared on Russian television with a statement announcing
the beginning of NATO actions in Yugoslavia and, at the same time, condemning the strikes as “strikes against the

7
Such notions can be found, for example, in the Russian newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya, considered close to the Communist Party. For instance, the leader
of the Communist Party, Gennadi Zyuganov, proclaimed in one of his articles: “Serbian brothers e we are with you!” (Zyuganov, 1999). See also Safronchuk
(1999).

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338 R. Heller / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 333e343

international community” and a “tragic and dramatic” decision (Yeltsin, 1999).8 In this statement Yeltsin's tone is very
moving, heavily addressing the obvious ‘immorality’ of the Western decision. In another communication, issued by the
Kremlin press center the same day, Yeltsin is quoted more angrily and openly, speaking of “naked aggression” of the West
against Yugoslavia, thereby adopting the nationalist's formulations, and announcing “adequate measures, including military
ones, to defend itself and the overall security of Europe” if the situation in Kosovo were to worsen (Yusin, 1999, p. 1). He
explicitly referred to NATO's obvious attempts to act as a “world police in the 21st century”, but added that “Russia will never
agree to this” (Yusin, 1999, p. 1).
A few days later Foreign Minister Ivanov appeared in a Special Session of the State Duma discussing the NATO air strikes,
where he reconfirmed the Russian government's perception and position. In his speech he equally referred to the events as an
“act of aggression” and spoke of a “genocide” caused by the NATO intervention. He furthermore blamed the West for being
“cynical” when characterizing the air strikes as a “humanitarian intervention” (Dumskoe Obozrenie, 1999a; RFE/RL Newsline,
1999c) and warned that “Russia might respond to NATO air strikes by helping to rearm the Serbs”, despite U.N. sanctions
against Yugoslavia, a warning he had issued already days before in the course of a Russian Security Council meeting (Radio
Svoboda, 1999).
Ivanov's official government statement in the Duma was followed by a number of shorter declarations from the Duma
faction leaders, who showed unusual unity on the issue and support of the government in its assessment of the events.
Gennady Zyuganov from the Communist Party asserted that “America and its satellites began a total war” against Yugoslavia,
drawing a comparison to “fascist” strategies which the US “had started to use already in Iraq”, while the leader of the ultra-
nationalists, Vladimir Zhirinovski, urged for retaliation: “[…] we need to act in the same way America is acting […]” (Radio
Svoboda, 1999). The Russian Regions deputy group in its statement explicitly referred to Russia's status and prestige being at
stake in this situation. Deputy Morozov said
We are ready to support the government's efforts to counteract American attempts for hegemony in the world. Any
attempt to build a unipolar world carries a real danger for new military conflicts. Therefore, by protecting Yugoslavia,
Russia protects its own national interests and its place in world politics […] Russia's fight to prevent Yugoslavia‘s
bombardment is not only a matter of the state's prestige and Slavic solidarity, but the only possible line of action for a
country that knows what war means. (Dumskoe Obozrenie, 1999b)
The statements from the leaders of the moderate democratic factions sounded somewhat more modest, however also they
were critical in their general assessment of the events. Vladimir Ryshkov (NDP) and Grigori Yavlinski (Yabloko) equally
condemned NATO's decision. Ryshkov expressed the party's displeasure that the Western alliance “crushed its own ideals”.
Yavlinski underlined that “any activity that ignores Russia in Yugoslavia is doomed to fail” (Dumskoe Obozrenie, 1999b).
A couple of discussions held in Moscow in the course of events more explicitly reflect an apparent urge to seek retaliatory
measures, particularly by the hardliner circles, but also on the part of the military. After the start of the NATO air campaign
Duma and Senate representatives in their first Special Session on the Kosovo events put forward concrete suggestions of how
to react to the current situation. In press interviews LDPR and KPRF deputies suggested to return missiles with nuclear
warheads to Belarus, send volunteers to Serbia or Russian warships to the Adriatic Sea (Yusin, 1999). During the session itself
the deputies “[…] put forward several ideas, including overturning the arms embargo against Serbia, integrating Yugoslavia
into the planned Russo-Belorussian Union” (RFE/RL Newsline, 1999a; Sadchikov, 1999). Statements, for example, from the
speakers of the Foreign Policy Committee and the Committee on Security Policy as well as from Krasnoyarsk Governor
Alexander Lebed, made concrete suggestions on how to halt the bombings, for example, by supporting Ivanov's warning that
Russia might leave the UN arms embargo and support Serbia with the proliferation of arms and even considering the delivery
of S-300 antiaircraft missiles (Dumskoe Obozrenie, 1999a). This Special Session ended with a vote on a resolution condemning
the air strikes which passed the floor nearly unanimouslyd346 ‘in favor’; 7 ‘against’ (Dumskoe Obozrenie, 1999c; Whitmore,
1999). An equal rhetoric was used by representatives from the Russian military, who “practically urge an open confrontation
with NATO” as their voices “started to sound louder and louder” and who were not disavowed neither by the Foreign Ministry
nor the government (Marsov and Ulyanov, 1999). For instance, Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of General Staff, considered a number
of military steps and “did ‘not rule out the possibility’ of Russia's using nuclear weapons to defend the country's territorial
integrity […]” (Skorobogatko, 1999). Other military representatives announced that the Russian forces would immediately be
put in a state of alert (Falichev, 1999).

3.3.2. Signaling discontent through symbolic action

The reactions within Russia were not limited to angry rhetoric but also encompassed by notifications of concrete actions in
order to cope with the Western-dominated course of events in Kosovo. They can be subdivided into three groups: a) such that
resulted in a temporary disruption of current interactions with the West; b) more confrontational signs of saber-rattling, including
the dispersion of the emotional state of mind of Russia's policy makers into policy areas not directly connected with the Kosovo
issue; and c) concrete activities to reconstruct Russia's damaged status in the international Kosovo crisis management.
The first and immediate reaction to the NATO air campaign came in the form of then-Prime Minister Primakov's famous
‘U-turn over the Atlantic’. During a flight to Washington, primarily for diplomatic talks with the IMF about a loan for Russia

8
Yeltsin used the same wording on April 30, in his Annual Address to the Federal Assembly (President of the Russian Federation, 1999).

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 R. Heller / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 333e343 339

amounting to 4.8 billion dollars, Primakov was informed on the evening of March 24 about NATO starting air strikes against
Serbia. As it was reported, after receiving the news he instructed his pilots to immediately turn around and return to Moscow.
With this decision Primakov neglected the initial purpose of the visit, that is, to negotiate money deal for the Russian
economy, while, on the other hand, directly infringing diplomatic propriety and offending the US government, even though
the Prime Minister's visit to Washington was not even mainly or primarily scheduled with the official US representatives.
However, particularly among more moderate voices there were doubts that Primakov's provocative decision to drop the
negotiations was taken instantly and that “[n]obody was too surprised when Mr. Primakov returned” (Portnykov, 1999). A
calculated move or not e Primakov's decision was mirrored in Russia in extremely emotional terms. Supporters, such as
Moscow's Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, backed the decision, basically underlining their support for the government's “right and moral
obligation” to visibly “demonstrate that the immediate and real intentions of NATO with regard to Kosovo are totally inad-
missible” to Moscow (Luzhkov, 1999). The Duma factions aligned themselves behind the Russian Premier in a way that was
commented in the parliamentary newspaper from that day in the following way: “Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov was
forced to interrupt his visit in the US. A continuation would have meant an act of national humiliation.” (Parlamentskaya
Gazeta, 1999)
Criticism was also voiced, however very moderate. Grigory Yavlinsky from the liberal party ‘Yabloko’ criticized Primakov's
U-turn as “razzle-dazzle” and “pointless”, although he also expressed discontent with the US and the NATO air strikes and
characterized them as “bulldozer-style” policy (Ulyanov, 1999). Former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemzov brought the
various assessments over the appropriateness of the step to the point, quoted by Interfax to have said that
[…] Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's decision to put off his visit to the United States over the developments
in Kosovo was ‘politically quite appropriate,’ but may give rise to a range of new economic problems for Russia […] In
particular, talks with the International Monetary Fund are very likely to fail now, following which the ruble will
inevitably plunge, prices will rise and people will become even poorer (Interfax, 1999).
Liberal newspapers were more explicit, however not very loud in their criticism. A commentary from the newspaper
Kommersant contended that the government had traded-off millions of dollars to support Russia in the financial and eco-
nomic crisis against “communist-style demagogies” (Kommersant-Vlast, 1999). Izvestiya, in an article entitled “Prestige is
more precious than money”, was even more explicit: “A break in relations with America and with NATO will cost us more than
it will cost the West.” (Bovin, 1999) The Russian Military's newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, turned this discord of opinion upside
down, valuing Russia's political principles much higher than the financial and economic gains from the IMF talks: “Maybe the
U-turn carried out by the prime minister's plane has deprived the country of billions of dollars, as Kommersant is maintaining,
but on the other hand, everyone has realized the resoluteness of Russia's both moral and political stance on the Yugoslav
issue.” (Karapetyan, 1999)
Not least, the Russian Prime Minister himself was quoted on his way back to Moscow: “We will not peddle our political
principles.” (Der Spiegel, 1999) The most obvious sign that Primakov's move was primarily a symbolic one is the fact that the
canceled meeting between Primakov and IMF director Michel Camdessus was rescheduled in Moscow already for the next
day (Bo € rse online, 1999).
President Yeltsin and his cabinet members thereafter reiterated that, despite such a provocative move, the government did
not intend to take any “extreme” measures in reaction to the NATO attacks and that it did not intent to isolate Russia from the
West (Dumskoe Obozrenie, 1999a), but that it was rather interested in a “united and prospering Grand Europe without
delimitative lines” (President of the Russian Federation, 1999). Foreign Minister Ivanov, for instance, underlined that the
Russian government did not intend to move towards a confrontation with the West but in essence called for esteem and
respect of its position in the relationship: “Russia was and remains adherent to relations with all countries that are equal in
rights […] But the bombings on Yugoslavia have seriously damaged the mutual relationship between Russia and the US. But
this should not mean that Russia closes the door for constructive cooperation with America.” (Dumskoe Obozrenie, 1999a)
The suspension of ongoing relations with NATO by the Russian government can be seen in this light. In one of his first
statements after the beginning of the air campaign President Yeltsin announced that the Russian mission at NATO was to be
called back to Moscow (RFE/RL Russian Service, 1999) and that the decision to open a NATO mission in Moscow was to be
postponed. Moreover, Russia withdrew from the invitation to participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Already
weeks prior to the NATO bombings President Yeltsin had repeatedly threatened the West that Russia could stop its dialogue
with NATO should the West continue its course of military involvement in Serbia. The steps were justified by the “heavy
stroke on the cooperative atmosphere in Europe and in the world” (Dumskoe Obozrenie, 1999a).
More signs of emotionality in Russia's reaction to NATO's military intervention can be traced through activities aimed at
restoring Russia's image as a constructive world power and enhancing its social status as an equal player in the crisis
management in Kosovo, insisting in being consulted on an equal footing and bringing to bear its habitual role and weight.
Russia again initiated a number of attempts, albeit unsuccessful ones, after March 1999, of bringing the United Nations back in
the conflict resolution. A mediation attempt with Serbia, initiated by Russian Premier Primakov, remained fruitless. While the
Russian leadership itself was reported assessing the initiative as “timely”, and its results as “very important steps forward”
(Quiring, 1999), Western politicians described the Russian position and moves as being “without substance” and “inappro-
priate as a basis for a political solution” (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1999). Apparently, as much as Russia tried to edge out NATO,
the West opposed Russia's attempts to bring the UN back in, apparently long since determined to mandate NATO for up-
coming peacekeeping tasks. After the talks in Belgrade, Primakov scheduled a meeting with the German Chancellor in Bonn.

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340 R. Heller / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 333e343

Its result was devastating for Russia, as a German commentator writes: “[…] NATO's representative needed only one hour to
explain that they would only agree to negotiations under fixed conditions. Hard-faced, Russia's premier […] left the chan-
cellery and the equally hard-faced EU Council President Gerhard Schroeder.” (Gra €fin Do € nhoff, 1999)
Russia, in turn, opposed the deployment of NATO as a peacekeeping force in Kosovo for quite a while. In May 1999,
surprisingly, Moscow agreed to a NATO force “in essence” (RFE/RL Newsline, 1999c). As a result, the West invited Russia
to the G7 meeting in Cologne in June, where a common peace plan was to be worked out. In this meeting the Russian
delegation,9 led by special emissary Victor Chernomyrdin, insisted in the re-involvement of the UN in all further in-
ternational peace regulation activities in Kosovo. Secondly, Serbia's territorial integrity should remain untouched, a
scenario neither preferred by the West. Russia remained unsuccessful with its position to end the NATO bombings
already prior to a visible withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. Most importantly, the delegation made its approval
conditional upon Russian participation in the NATO KFOR/SFOR troops. While the West principally agreed to Russia's
participation, it refused Chernomyrdin's claim to assign the Russian troops a “special status” by a) leaving the Russian
soldiers out of NATO's structure of command, and b) granting Russia a separate sector (CNN News, 1999). Reportedly
upon direct order from President Yeltsin, the Russian delegation accepted the West's conditions. When it returned from
the consultations with the G7, its members were domestically blamed for “betraying Russia's interests” (Sysoev, 1999a).
What followed was the coup de main-like seizure of Pristina airport by Russian troops on June 12, 1999. The military
leadership ordered an armored column of 200 Russian soldiers with tanks to head from nearby Bosnia to the airport in
Pristina immediately before the British-led NATO forces were to arrive there (Sysoev, 1999b). The Russian initiative nearly
caused an armed clash, “virtually stealing their [NATO's, R.H.] victory”, as one commentator wrote at the time (Shukla,
1999). The day was well chosen in symbolic terms: On June 12, Russia celebrated its ‘Independence Day’. As Russian
General Leonid Ivashov, then-military representative to NATO and one of the guiding spirits of this operation, reported in
an interview, the Russian Generals had been angry about NATO's diktat and persuaded President Yeltsin to give his
approval to this unorthodox step. Allegedly, their main argument was that if Russia had given in to NATO, this would have
meant a bitter defeat for the country. In his justification in the press, Ivashov also stated that the consequences of giving in
to NATO's conditions would have been worse than the dissonances with the West, emerging from the Pristina coup, “first
and foremost for the prestige of the country […] We defended our right and our interests” (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1999).
According to him, also the general staff had assessed the risks and costs of this move as being fairly low compared to the
gains (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1999).
The Pristina precedent put Russia in a position of being able to re-negotiate its role in the peacekeeping mission. In fact, at
the meeting of the newly renamed G8 forum the West, avoiding any further confrontation, agreed to the deployment of
Russian forces according to Chernomyrdin's initial proposal. However, Russia did not make use of this situation of strength in
a way that would have satisfied its initial objectives and ended with a highly negative balance: Of the initial objectives e an
‘exclusive’ Russian sector with 10,000 soldiers e none materialized. Of the 10,000 Russian soldiers initially suggested, Russia
ended with less than half (3,600). Moreover, the Russian contingent was ultimately distributed among three NATO sectors
plus the strategically unimportant airport in Slatina (ORT e Russian State Television, 1999).10 In practice, it played only a
minor role in the overall KFOR mission e both in numbers and in strategic terms.
The Pristina seizure was at first received in Russia with appreciation. Vladimir Lukin, a liberal political activist and a
member of the Duma at that time, contently stated that the measure was important in terms of showing the West that it could
not treat Russia as a “lackey” (Charodeev, 1999). However, after the initial euphoria among the Russian establishment, quite a
different and obviously more rational assessment and weighing of the events prevailed: The Pristina coup was soon char-
acterized as “adventurism”, “thoughtless”, “not considering the consequences” and materially and symbolically costly, as its
outcomes apparently resulted in the opposite of what had initially been the goal. The military was blamed of having
consciously provoked a near miss clash with NATO. Moreover, in the course of the Russian deployment it became obvious that
the Russian soldiers were reportedly hardly able to control their sector without support from NATO units (Brovkin, 1999). As
journalist Konstantin Borovoy concisely brought to the point: “Primakov's plan to disrupt NATO and to enhance Russia's role
in international relations has notably lead to Russia's fall and NATO's rise in international politics.” (Borovoy, 1999)

3.3.3. After the storm: what effects on the overall relationship?

The dissonances between Russia and the West, which were connected to the international conflict management efforts in
Kosovo, seemed to be of a highly situational nature and did not cause any visible rift in the overall relationship. Russian
politicians as well as Western representatives quite smoothly turned back to normal ‘day-to-day’ politics and interaction. The
interaction with NATO, that had been stopped by the Russians and characterized as irreparable, was quickly taken up again
(Korbut, 1999). Western actors, in turn, reacted to the Russian claims and endeavored to take Russia ‘back on board’ in order to
smooth down feelings of resentment and grievance. This attempt was expressed by the agreement on joint post-conflict
peacekeeping in Kosovo as well as by the West's invitation to Russia to join the G7.

9
In addition to Viktor Chernomyrdin the delegation consisted also of military representatives, among them were General Leonid Ivashov, military
representative to NATO, and General Viktor Zavarzin, commander of Russia's IFOR/SFOR troops in Bosnia (Pankov, 1999).
10
Although the Russian command was allowed to refuse decisions from NATO (Barachova, 1999; RFE/RL Newsline, 1999b), in practice a common co-
ordination of commands was inevitable.

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 R. Heller / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 333e343 341

Yet, these efforts were more of a symbolic than substantial nature. Russia's participation in the renamed G-8 was, for
instance, reduced to the political meetings, while the country remained excluded from important decision making structures,
particularly from the meetings of the ministers of finance. At this time, the symbolic value of the West's ‘embracement’ and
Russia's upgrade as one of the politically most influential nations apparently suited the Russian needs. Also, the Russian
government started to communicate a completely different assessment of the conflict in Kosovo. Already in August 1999
newly-appointed Prime Minister Yuri Stepashin said that Milosevic had been the main driver for the escalation of violence in
the Serbian province (Fossato, 1999).
It is most reasonable to assume that maintaining social status and its insignia, as well as receiving demonstrations of
symbolic respect from the West were more important than the concrete material outcomes and gains. However, in the longer
run Russia remains dissatisfied with its e real and/or perceived e status in the relationship. Ever since the Putin adminis-
tration has reacted extremely angry when the West showed signs of disrespect for the country's interests, similar to the
experiences in Kosovo: issues like exclusion from decision-making, implicit blames of moral inferiority and status asymmetry.
The emotional experiences virtually ruminate in the minds of the Russian elites and can be reactivated any time and any
occasion where Russia's status in world politics is subjectively at stake. A first manifest expression of enduring rumination
over the negative emotional experience of disrespect was certainly Putin's complaints about Russia not being consulted by
the West at the Munich security conference in 2007. In his memorable speech, he particularly referred to American plans to
setup a missile defense shield for Europe in Poland and the Czech Republic and discussions about a possible NATO mem-
bership for Ukraine and Georgia, blaming the US for once again ignoring Russian security interests and spurning once again
over the idea of cooperative security for Europe (President of the Russian Federation, 2007).
Thus, Russia's current anger about the lack of respect by the West has a “narrative structure” (Nussbaum, 2001) and is not
least the result of a socio-emotional learning process. Considering that the subjective experience of humiliation and disre-
spect during the Kosovo affair has been inscribed into the elites' memory this way, it is not far from realistic to assume that
this has, in more general terms, contributed to a moral re-assessment of the West, resulting in a more distanced stance in the
overall relationship. As Russian policy-makers experienced more situations of Western disrespect in the 2000s, the negative
emotion was reactivated and consolidated, paving the ground for more resentment-driven elements to influence Russian
foreign policy towards the West. How powerful this ruminating emotional experience of disrespect was and still is reveals in
more recent statements from Russian decision-makers, who explicitly link their arguments to the disrespect narrative and
display more resentment against the West. For example, in August 2008 Russia's ambassador to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin (2008),
underlined that after the Russian-Georgian war the West “[…] has now started to look at Russia differently e namely with
respect e and I consider this to be Russia's key diplomatic achievement”. Yet, rumination over disrespect is obviously not
limited to rhetoric, but has a forceful impact also on current Russian foreign policy formulation and practice. Western at-
tempts to move into what Russia perceives as its natural sphere of influence e its post-Soviet neighborhood e via inclusive
strategies put forward by the European Union and NATO and directed at the neighboring countries such as Ukraine or Georgia
have certainly spurs more resentment and e as we can see right now in Ukraine e aggressiveness in Moscow. As President
Putin has put his perception on status recognition in his speech after the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the West
“betrays us”, “does not consider our concerns”, “thinks that it is always right” and, regarding Western engagement in Ukraine,
has ultimately “crossed a red line” (President of the Russian Federation, 2014). It is a geographical, a political but, as I have
tried to show, to a significant extent also an emotional red line.

4. Conclusion

Russia's reactions in the 1999 Kosovo case are an ample demonstration of emotion-led respect-seeking policies vis-a
-vis
the West from the pre-Putin era. The analysis has shown that not only since Putin's coming to power the political elites have
nourished the wish to be recognized by the West in their self-defined identity as a great power but that this identity and
desire have been forming up and dominating the assessments of Russia's correct treatment already during the 1990s. The
Kosovo case unraveled a significant mismatch between this self-concept on the one hand and the real course of events,
culminating in NATO's self-mandated military intervention in Kosovo, on the other. In the eyes of the Russian elites NATO's
self-authorized military intervention minimized if not negated, and thus morally disrespected, Russia's identity as a
constructive and constitutive part in international crisis management and European as well as international security matters.
The West's increasingly uncompromising stance to solve the conflict militarily as well as its partly negative attitude towards
Moscow's diplomatic initiatives contributed to a perception of unjust status denial on the part of Russian policy makers.
Strong domestic nationalism spurred discourses of Western aggression and domination, highly resonant with the feelings
expressed in Russia in the aftermath of NATO's air campaign.
Russia's reactions to NATO's intervention must be read as corrective actions to cope with the perceived humiliation and
provocation of status denial and ignorance by the West: Angry verbal outrage from the Russian leadership and the country's
political class showed a broad consensus on the moral judgment that the West's decision had been inappropriate, as it
ignored Russia's self-assigned international role and identity as an influential player in world politics. This consensus is valid
even beyond the hyperbolic nationalistic rhetoric and propaganda. We find various elements which are part of a strategy
coping with anger: angry arousals in the Russian political circles and the media, including uttering of retaliation threats;
attempts to express anger and frustration about the West through symbolic action, aimed at re-establishing Russia's social
status in world politics, as well as rationalization and impression management strategies.

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342 R. Heller / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 333e343

All in all, Russia's reactions did not result in a substantial restoration of the country's great power status but rather in a
symbolic recognition of Russia's identity by the West. At least the Russian elites were able to uphold the feeling of inclusion
and the emotionally important image of an influential power for some time. Likewise, on the surface, the Kosovo episode did
not result in any visible break or rift in the RussianeWestern relationship. However, there are in fact negative effects on both
sides: The West on its part lost trust in Russia as a partner and became more cautious about cooperation with Russia. Russian
policy-makers, on the other hand, ever since view the relations with the West through the prism of Kosovo. Russian actors
experience revitalizations of emotions activated during the events from 1999 whenever they see themselves excluded and
treated unequally, thereby reproducing the well-known ruptures and irritations in the relationship as well as laying the
foundations for more resentment-driven politics which we can observe in the more recent past, starting with the Georgian-
Russian war in 2008 and culminating in the current Ukraine crisis. From this point of view, the Kosovo episode has turned into
a paradigmatic and referential event shaping the emotional foundations of the current RussiaeWest relations.

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Further reading

Lindemann, T., 2010. Causes of War. The Struggle for Recognition. ECPR Press, Colchester.

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 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 345e354

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

The frustrating partnership: Honor, status, and emotions in

Russia's discourses of the West
Andrei P. Tsygankov a, b
a
Department of Political Science, San Francisco State University, USA
b
Nizhny Novgorod State University, Russia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This paper analyzes Russia's presidential discourses and emotions of the West from March
Available online 16 October 2014 2008 to December 2012. By studying the languages of inclusiveness and exclusiveness in
annual addresses to the Federation Council and public statements, I have identified several
Keywords: distinct stages in the Kremlin's emotional evolution from fear to hope to frustration: the
Emotions initial fear (March 2008eJune 2009), hope (September 2009ethe late 2010), and frustra-
Foreign policy
tion (since the early 2011). The Russia's emotional shifts are shaped by the country's
Honor
historically established social relations with the West and are not to be reduced to the
Medvedev
Putin
dynamics of power and prestige/status. Russia's deep emotional connection to the West as
Russia well as Russia's own concept of national honor are the two factors that drive the nation's
Status leaders' complex actions, feelings, and rhetoric. Russia displays emotions of hope each
time it feels that its honor is being respected and those of frustration, fear and anger when
in the eyes of Kremlin its identity/honor as not recognized.
© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.

1. Introduction

Russia and the Western nations continue to feel uneasy about each other's intentions. From the issues of stabilizing
Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe to those of strategic stability and human rights, Russian and Western
leaders frequently disagree on the main essence of the issues and that disagreement is partly shaped by different beliefs and
emotions regarding what they view as a “good” and “virtuous” course of action vis-a
-vis each other.1 What further com-
plicates the picture is that Russia's actions and emotions fluctuate e and not necessarily in response to changes in Russia's
material capabilities or structure of the international system, as some scholars would expect. Understanding the formation of
Russia's actions and emotions behind them therefore remains an important challenge to scholars and policy-makers.
This paper selects for an investigation discourses and emotions of the West as displayed by Russia's presidents from March
2008 to December 2012. This period is important for both methodological and political reasons. Methodologically, selecting it
for a closer investigation assists us in establishing a broader pattern of Russia's emotional shifts as reflected in the country's

1
For a short sample of scholarship on identity, beliefs and emotions in international politics, see Clunan (2009), Crawford (2000), Fattah and Fierke
(2009), Haas (2005), Harkavy (2000), Hopf (2002), Klein (1991), Larson and Shevchenko (2010), Lebow (2003), Lo €wenheim and Heimann (2008),
Mercer (2010), Saurette (2006), Steinberg (1991), Tsygankov (2012b), Wolf (2011). My knowledge on relationships between emotions and Russia's
foreign policy has been enhanced by participation in the workshop on “The subjective dimension of Russia's Partnership with the West: Filling Theoretical
and Empirical Voids,” organized by Regina Heller, Tuomas Forsberg and Reinhart Wolf, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of
Hamburg, September 15e16, 2011.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.004
0967-067X/© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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346 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 345e354

Table 1
The emotional cycle of RussiaeWest relations .

Hope / Frustration / Fear & Anger / Hope

history e from hope to frustration and fear and back to hope. Politically, the period is also important. Despite some expec-
tations associated with the rise of Dmitri Medvedev, his presidency did not produce a stable emotional or political envi-
ronment for RussiaeWest relationships. As the paper shows, despite the common perception of Medvedev as being more pro-
Western and liberal than his patron Vladimir Putin, Medvedev's rhetoric reflected largely the same emotional dispositions
and therefore need to be understood in terms of historically enduring social patterns in the RussiaeWest relations. The
Medvedev, a putinist and a frustrated critic of the West, may be viewed as a crucial case for establishing a theoretically potent
interpretation of Russia's international discourse.
My main basis for studying Russia's official discourses of the West includes annual presidential addresses to the Federation
Council and public statements on prominent foreign policy issues. Three of those issues suggest themselves as especially
visible and important: European security, Missile Defense System, and, more recently, instability in the Middle East. When
studied across time and issues, public speeches and statements are helpful in capturing underlying emotions of the state
leaders. By studying the relative prominence of language used for denoting inclusiveness versus exclusiveness in Russia's
discourses of the West, I have identified several distinct stages in Russia's presidents' emotional evolution from fear (March
2008eJune 2009) to hope (September 2009ethe late 2010), to frustration (the early 2011eDecember 2012). Historical ex-
amples, ethical lessons, metaphors, predicates, and adjectives used by Russian presidents show their emotional dispositions.
I argue that these emotions have roots in Russia's historically peculiar relations with Europe or the West as its significant
other. Russia's deep emotional connection to the West, as well as Russia's own concept of national honor are the two factors
that continue to drive the country's leaders' complex actions, feelings, and rhetoric. Russia displays emotions of hope each
time it feels that its honor is being respected and those of frustration, fear and anger when in the eyes of the Kremlin its
identity/honor is not recognized.
The following three sections address the formation of Russia's emotions towards the West, the Kremlin's discourses from
fear to hope and frustration, and their explanation from perspective of social constructivism. Conclusion summarizes the
findings and implications.

2. Honor and emotions in Russia's foreign policy

2.1. Emotional patterns in Russia's Westpolitik

Scholars of Russia's foreign policy often observe the Kremlin's emotional swings and intensity of Russia's public rhetoric
regarding its relations with the West. Across history, the Russians initiated multiple projects of cooperation with their
western neighbors, starting with Alexander I's Holy Alliance in the early 19th century and up to Mikhail Gorbachev's New
Thinking and Boris Yeltsin's Integration in the late 20th century and Vladimir Putin's War on Terror and Dmitri Medvedev's
Modernization Alliances in the early 21st century. Emotionally, each of these projects involved hope to engage the West in
projects of common significance and build lasting institutions of international peace. However, hope frequently turned into
frustration with what Russia saw as the other side's unwillingness to reciprocate and, ultimately, mistrust and fear that the
Western nations indeed aim to undermine Russia's sovereignty and security. Sustained fear and mistrust on occasions turned
into anger2 and anger-shaped policies of abandoning cooperative initiatives and adopting patterns of defensive or assertive
behavior (Tsygankov, 2012a). On other occasions fear and mistrust subsided, generating new feelings of hope and new at-
tempts at cooperation (this emotional cycle is presented in Table 1).
Emotions of hope and frustration are identifiable through Russia's public statements. In Gorbachev's missionary language:
“We are all passengers aboard one ship, the Earth, and we must not allow it to be wrecked. There will be no second Noah's
Ark” (Gorbachev, 1987, p. 12). To Yeltsin, hope was tied to Russia's integration with Western economic and political in-
stitutions, which the Russian leader presented in dramatic tones e either there will be a success or the West too will suffer
greatly. For instance, in addressing a joint session of the United States Congress in June 1992, Yeltsin expressed hope for a
massive external assistance by directly linking it to success of Russia's reforms: “There will be no second try … If we [that is,
you Americans] do not take measures now to support Russia, this will not be a collapse of Russia only, it will be a collapse of
the United States, because it will mean new trillions of dollars for the arms race” (cited in Breslauer, 2002, p. 157). To Putin
(2002), hope served as the emotional basis for engaging the West in fighting terrorism and preserving global stability, for
which, he believed, “Russia and the United States bear a special responsibility.” Finally, Medvedev's main hopes were in
getting the United States and Europe interested in modernizing Russia's economy and improving RussiaeNATO security
relations.

2
Anger results from a sustained build-up of frustration and fear that produce the perception of mistreatment by others. Lasting perception of threat may
further turn anger into hate. As Master Yoda famously put it to Anakin Skywalker, “Fear leads to anger. Anger leads to hate. Hate leads to suffering.” (Star
Wars, 1977)

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 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 345e354 347

However, each time the Kremlin's hopes failed to be validated, its public language describing relations with the West
visibly changed from hope to frustration, fear, and anger. Gorbachev and Yeltsin could not hide their disappointment with lack
of Western assistance and later, with the decision to expand NATO. For example, Yeltsin's foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev
reported his frustration by warning in the early 1994 of “the chauvinistic new banners that flap in the Washington wind”
I must say, sadly, that in these confused days sometimes we are neither understood nor adequately supported by our
natural friends and allies in the West. Even at this critical moment in Moscow, when democracy needs all the help it can
get, we hear Western threats to reduce economic cooperation with Russia … it appears that some Western politicians,
in Washington and elsewhere, envision Russia not as an equal partner but as a junior partner. In this view a ‘good
Russian’ is always a follower, never a leader (Kozyrev, 1994).
Putin's transformation is even more instructive. From someone who courted President George W. Bush in the early 2000s,
hoping to strengthen relations with the United States, he evolved into a frustrated and occasionally angry politician convinced
that the other side is primarily interested in undermining Russia. On one occasion, he responded to accusations of those
experts “who do not understand what is happening in our country” by saying: “Hell with you” (cited in Foglesong, 2007, p.
227). In his Address to the State Duma in May 2006, Putin (2006) spoke of “Comrade Wolf” who “knows whom to eat” and
doesn't listen to anyone else, a clear reference to the US attempts to put pressure on Russia. He objected to the American
democracy promotion rhetoric by saying that it resembled to him the way colonialists had talked a hundred years earlier
about how the white man needed to “civilize ‘primitive peoples’” (Myers and Kramer, 2006). In January 2007, Putin delivered
his strongest critique of American “unipolarity” at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. Such criticisms of the United
States as seeking to preserve global hegemony became common in Putin's public statements especially when delivered for a
non-American audience.

3. Approaches to Russia's emotions

There are at least two approaches to Russia's emotions. The first approach tends to view emotions as a generally adequate
public display of the leaders' objectives and a signal of their intentions. The second approach presents emotional statements
as deployed strategically to pressure other nations for concessions. Both versions agree that emotions should be read in the
context of international competition for power, status, and prestige. In this respect Russians are no different from Chinese or
other rising powers seeking to improve their political standing in the world. Their public display of hope or frustration should
be interpreted in terms of their ability to achieve progress or fail to accomplish expected political outcomes. We should then
expect that emotions of hope will be sustained as long as Russia improves its political standing, and that emotions of frus-
tration and fear will surface each time when Russia's political standing fails to improve.
In practice, however, emotional patterns and changes in standing are difficult to match. There are examples when Russian
leaders are hopeful even when Russia's political standing does not improve or does not come close to matching that of the
other side. For instance, before 2005 Putin sought to avoid challenging the United States and its dominance in the world. He
remained hopeful for improving ties with the U.S. even after the latter unilaterally withdrew from the ABM treaty. The key
emphasis of Russia's National Security Concept was then not on resisting “unipolarity”, but on fighting economic decline,
organized crime, corruption, terrorism and separatism. On the other hand, the Kremlin may be sometimes visibly frustrated
and angry with the West even though Russia's status and prestige are not challenged. Suffice is to recall Russia's emergence
from the Second World War as an essential member of the coalition which defeated Hitler. Such status did not satisfy Stalin
who insisted on the Western nations respecting Soviet sphere of influence and ultimately on converting East European states
to “socialist.” As Martin Malia (1999, p. 360) wrote, from a realpolitik perspective, the Kremlin should have been satisfied with
“a reasonable security alliance of East European states with the Soviet Union” without demanding that these states adopt a
communist “social system.”
In addition, Russia frequently demonstrates intense, even heated rhetoric while addressing to the West. Whereas China
prefers to hide its emotions, Russian leaders tend to express their hopes and frustrations loudly and openly. To scholars of
emotions, this aspect of Russia presents another challenge. How should we understand why Russia uses a strong language by
presenting Western nations at one time as “brothers” and “friends” while at other times castigating them for “betraying” the
established principles and agreements?

4. Motivating factors behind Russia's emotions: status versus honor

Scholars of status study emotions by following a country's gains and losses in international prestige and deference. While
gains are associated with satisfaction and generally positive sentiments, losses may lead to negative emotions such as anger,
vengefulness, or shame (Larson and Shevchenko, 2014). This perspective moves us beyond considerations of material power
and security and is helpful in highlighting factors of external recognition and prestige. For example, it helps us understand
motivations and dynamics behind rising powers' assertive international policies. However, the perspective may not be suf-
ficient for explaining nuances of an individual country's behavior and emotions because each of them has its own set of local
values and culturally-specific relations with the outside world. Russia's identity or sense of honor is not limited to protection
of state international status/prestige in the eyes of other states, but also includes a distinctive idea of national self, or a system
of nationally held meaningful beliefs. The latter consists of a distinctive concept of spiritual freedom, the notion of a socially

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paternalistic state, and commitment to protecting cultural allies from abuses at home and from abroad. For instance, as the
largest Orthodox Christian power, Russia felt responsible for the livelihood of those Orthodox Christians who reside outside
the Russian state (Tsygankov, 2012a, chap. 3).
While holding these special values, Russia expects acceptance by the West as one of its own. Unlike China or other rising
powers, Russia and its rulers identify with the Europe or the West as its “significant other”. Russian rulers view Europe as a
unity in diversity regime, in which Russia's locally specific values would not be seen as undermining the continent-wide
beliefs, such as Christian origins, respect for sovereignty, and socially responsible state. For example, even while being
critical of the European states' policies, Putin (2012b) commonly presents Russia as “an inalienable and organic part of Greater
Europe.” The West has created the meaningful environment in which Russia's rulers defended their visions of national honor
and interests (Neumann, 1996; English, 2000). Russia has historically sought to be recognized as the Western “other” and to
modernize following the West's lead. Russia's claims to be a part of the Western world reflected a domestically strong
motivating force in Russia's foreign policy. Russia's divided political class has contained a vocal pro-Western group which
seeks to shape the country's foreign policy. The strength of identification with Western civilization explains why historically
Russia has sought to achieve its objectives in cooperation with Western, especially European, nations. Russia has always been
responsive to the behavior of the West and, with progressive leaders in the Kremlin, prepared to mend fences and pursue
cooperation, rather than confrontation. This identity connection explains Russia's deep emotional engagement with the West
and the identified emotional swings and rhetorical intensity frequently displayed by the Kremlin.
The identity/honor perspective differs from that of status and prestige in allowing more room for a culturally-specific
interpretation of a country's actions and display of emotions. It highlights two, rather than one, motivating factors e
external recognition and internal values/idea of the self. Both factors require external/Western validation, but in a different
way. Whereas the prestige aspect requires the external validation of Russia's power, the internal values aspect demands that
Russia's actions be validated by external and domestic audiences as morally legitimate. Other differences between honor and
status involve value judgment and hierarchy (see Table 2 for a summary). Honor claims rest on explicit moral judgment of
self-other interaction e “honorable” behavior as opposed to “dishonorable” one or “insulting” e and, like “face”, require full
recognition or rejection by the significant other. Unlike China, Russia cannot be satisfied with symmetrical gain in economic,
political, or military areas of development. In its relations with Europe, Russia also wants integration and recognition of
values. On the other hand, status depends on discourse of equality and does not require recognition of special values. Status is
also hierarchical or competitive in the sense that one state may attain more status than another (Forsberg, 2014; Larson et al.,
2014).
Because of the domestic honor dimension, Russia cannot act only on the basis of external recognition. Although Moscow
needs such recognition, it also depends on domestic support and displays emotions of hope when it feels positive reactions at
home and abroad. On the other hand, it is possible for Russia to display emotions of frustration, fear and anger even when the
external recognition of status is in place.

5. Russia's discourses of the West: hope, frustration, and fear

Russia's emotional evolution toward the West includes the familiar expressions of fear, hope, and frustration. Although
these emotional developments are not sharply separated in time and often coexist and overlap, distinct historical periods may
be associated with dominance of a particular emotion. On three prominent issues e European security (ES), Missile Defense
System (MDS), and instability in the Middle East e an emotional trajectory of Russia's presidents has been similar. The
language used by Russia's presidents in their annual addresses to the Federation Council and other statements signals change
from hope to frustration. This language evolved through stages of the initial fear (March 2008eJune 2009), hope (September
2009ethe late 2010), and frustration (the early 2011eDecember 2012).

5.1. Fear

Medvedev's initial emotional disposition after assuming power is difficult to separate from that of Putin. Around 2005 e
partly in response to Russia's fear of the United States' policy of regime change in Iraq and the former Soviet region e Russia
adopted a more assertive stance. The Kremlin also introduced the concept of energy superpower to capitalize on Russia's
natural resource advantage and position the country as a global player and a maker of new global rules. Fear and frustration
also materialized in Russia's criticism of the United States' unilateralism and hegemony in international relations. In response,
the Kremlin did not call for any concerted effort to undermine the U.S. global position, but instead defended the notion of
collective leadership and multilateral diplomacy (Review, 2007).

Table 2
Status and honor compared.

Status Honor
Motivating factors External recognition of status External recognition of the self's identity & values
Moral reasoning Demand for equality Demand for recognition of values
Social hierarchy Competitive (more/less) Not competitive (yes/no)

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 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 345e354 349

The attitude of external fear and vulnerability was accompanied by display of internal confidence. Even the deep economic
crisis did not initially alter the generally optimistic assessment of Russia's position by the country's officials. In Medvedev's
own words, “Russia is totally different now and it has gone through a transitional period, it is developing confidently and
steadily, and it has reached a qualitatively new level of long-term, strategic development” (Interfax, 2009). Russia's new
National Security Strategy up to the year 2020 published in May 2009 has provided a long list of potential threats to the
country's security, but it has stated in its preamble confidence in the country's ability “to reliably prevent internal and
external threats to national security and to dynamically develop the Russian Federation and to turn it into a leading power in
terms of technological progress, people's quality of life and influence on global processes.”3
Medvedev's first address to the Federation Council was delivered in November 2008 and captured the described com-
bination of external fear and internal confidence. He assured his fellow Russians that the global financial crisis will not affect
their living standards and economic and political rights. The foreign policy part of the speech was devoted to explaining
Russia's position on the military conflict with Georgia in August 2008 and blaming the United States for not listening to
Russia's security concerns. The emotion of fear was on display when Medvedev (2008) expressed his belief that the other side
was: “testing” Russia's strength and confidence. “… from what we have encountered in the last years, that is, the construction
of a global air defence system, the encirclement of Russia with military bases, NATO's unstoppable expansion and other
‘presents’ to Russia e one can get a firm impression that our strength is being tested.”
To counter the identified “threat”, Medvedev announced that Russia would keep three regiments of the missile division
deployed in the western part of the country on combat duty and may deploy short-range nuclear missiles Iskander in the
western region Kaliningrad. He also promised not to be drawn into an arms race, but instead rely on developing multilateral
organizations and diplomacy. He further explained that Russia was “forced to take these measures” (Medvedev, 2008).
We have told all our partners on more than one occasion that we are interested in positive cooperation, we want to act
against common threats, we want to take part in joint actions. But they, unfortunately, do not wish to listen to us … I
would like to stress: we have no problems with the American people. We have no innate anti-Americanism. And we
hope that our partners e the new US administration e will make a choice in favor of fully fledged relations with Russia
(Medvedev, 2008).
The emotion of hope was also present, although not dominant in the speech. The president expressed hope in develop-
ment of multilateral institutions and Russia's advanced participation in G-8, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRIC, APEC,
and other organizations. It is in this context of finding new solutions and creating new security institutions that the president
mentioned his initiative to sign a treaty on ES in order to “create absolutely clear rules of behaviour that are understandable to
all, to put in place a single approach for solving problems and to come to agreed positions for creating reliable instruments for
control over armaments” (Medvedev, 2008).4 In the same paragraph, Medvedev spoke of the importance of uniting the “Euro-
Atlantic space” with Russia, the European Union and the USA as members.

5.2. Hope

An emotional disposition of Russia's president changed after his summit with the U.S. President Barak Obama in Moscow,
July 2009. By the time Obama traveled to Russia, he had already proclaimed his desire to “reset” relations with Moscow and
establish a new security framework between the two countries. In the meantime, Russia had woken up to the global financial
crisis's negative effects and rediscovered its insufficiently diversified economic structure. In September 2009, Medvedev
(2009a) published an article “Go, Russia!” with a highly critical assessment of the country's domestic conditions. By point-
ing to “a primitive economy based on raw materials and endemic corruption”, “semi-Soviet social sphere, fragile democracy,
harmful demographic trends, and unstable Caucasus”, the new president posed a rhetorical question “if Russia cannot relieve
itself from these burdens, can it really find its own path for the future?” His proposed solutions included the modernization of
the economic and the political systems, technological changes, and strengthening the judiciary to fight corruption.
Such was the context in which Medvedev (2009b) delivered his second address to the Federation Council in November
2009 which marked an emotional shift from fear to hope in relations with the West. There is a striking absence of any
criticism toward the United States and Western countries. There is no mentioning of the MDS problem separating Russia from
the U.S. On NATO and ES, there is the statement that although Russia is not the alliance's member, “we need to take decisions
jointly to strengthen Europe's security. We need a joint reliable platform.” The entire tone of the address is one of hope and
adaptation, rather than frustration and fear. Medvedev continued with the task of modernizing the country he set out earlier
and he planned to dedicate his foreign policy to modernization as well. “Our relations with other countries should be focused
on the task of modernizing Russia. We mustn't, as they say, puff out our chests … We are interested in the flow of capital, new
technologies and modern ideas” (Medvedev, 2009b). He further insisted that the effectiveness of the entire foreign policy
must be “judged by a simple criterion: Does it improve living standards in our country?” (Medvedev, 2009b).
The similar disposition of hope persisted throughout much of 2010 and generally colored Medvedev's third address to the
Federation Council in November of the same year. The president made no mention of lacking progress on solving the MDS

3
The full Russian text of the strategy is published on the website of the Russian Security Council at: http://www.scrf.gov.ru.
4
The treaty was proposed in Berlin in June 2008 when Medvedev gave a speech on Europe “from Vancouver to Vladivostok.”

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issue and continues to emphasize Russia's readiness to proceed jointly with the Western partners. To clarify his position, he
refers to his participation in a summit with NATO, Lisbon, in which he presented his ideas on forming a joint MDS. In addition
to Lisbon, Medvedev appealed to the European audience with his vision of a new comprehensive security treaty during the
Munich Security Conference in October 2010 and expressing hope to have a “worthy global response” to his idea (Bennhold,
2010). At home, the president further highlighted the need to establish “modernization alliances” with the United States and
other Western nations (Medvedev, 2010). Official documents too began to reflect the new vision. The Foreign Ministry
document prepared for the president in February 2010 sought to strengthen Russia's economic position. By reflecting the
realities of the global financial crisis, the document builds on Medvedev's notion of “modernization alliances” and provides
detailed recommendations for attracting Western investments and creating favorable conditions for Russia's technological
modernization (Programma, 2010).
At the same time, in the second half of 2010 the context of RussiaeWest relations begun to change. In his third address to
the Federation Council, Medvedev (2010) first issued a warning that a new arms race may take place should Russia and the
Western nations fail to agree on a “full-fledged joint mechanism of cooperation” on MDS. By the end of the year, the president
also showed signs of frustration with lack of acceptance of his initiative on ES. Although Western nations welcomed Russia's
efforts to reach out to Europe, they offered only general support and remained wary of Medvedev's initiative (Kanet and
Freire, 2012; Moshes, 2012; DeBardeleben, 2012; Kropatcheva, 2012). At the end of 2010 addressing the participants of the
OSCE summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, Medvedev expressed disappointment with the lack of international support and
acknowledged that two-and-a-half years of discussions did not lead to any breakthrough. Citing the power of stereotypes, he
said his initiative may have appeared ahead of its time and would have to wait before being considered in the future (RIA
Novosti, 2010).5 Russia's hopes to move the issue of RussianeGeorgia war to the back burner and engage the Western na-
tions in a joint security policy proved futile.

5.3. Frustration

Since 2011 the Kremlin's frustration with the West became more visible. In Medvedev's (2011b) forth address to the
Federation Council in December, he described foreign policy objectives differently than before. Although the president
credited Russia's international efforts with conclusion of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the United States and
ongoing dialogue on the establishment of a new ES architecture, he also pointed to a new “geopolitical situation.” His tone on
MDS was visibly less hopeful than before. Medvedev referred the audience to his statement on the issue delivered on
November 23, 2011 and stated that “we are open to a constructive dialogue and specific work with our partners if they learn to
listen to us” (emphasis is added e AT) (Medvedev, 2011b).6
The statement on MDS to which the president referred was the toughest to date in assessment and most detailed in
proposed response to the U.S./NATO plans. After recalling all his proposals to create a joint MDS, Medvedev (2011a) expressed
his frustration with the other side
Regrettably, the USA and other NATO partners have not showed enough willingness to move in this direction. Rather
than showing themselves willing to hear and understand our concerns over the European missile defence system at
this stage, they simply repeat that these plans are not directed against Russia and that there is no point for us to be
concerned. That is the position of the executive authorities, but legislators in some countries openly state, the whole
system is against Russia.
But our requests that they set this out on paper in the form of clear legal obligations are firmly rejected. We do hold a
reasonable position. We are willing to discuss the status and content of these obligations, but our colleagues should
understand that these obligations must have substance and not be just empty words. They must be worded not as
promises and reassurances, but as specific military-technical criteria that will enable Russia to judge to what extent US
and NATO action in the missile defence area correspond to their declarations and steps, whether our interests are being
impinged on, and to what extent the strategic nuclear balance is still intact. This is the foundation of the present-day
security.
Medvedev therefore returned to the notion of strategic balance and expressed his frustration with the West for not un-
derstanding the Kremlin's concerns. In response, he revived the threat of deploying Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad Region
and promised a series of other steps, including possible termination of further arms control measures and withdrawing from
the concluded START treaty (Medvedev, 2011a).
Throughout 2012 and especially after his return to presidency, Putin placed the emphasis on Russia's insecurity as a result
of the West's actions. In October 2012, he announced that Russia would not renew the NunneLugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program, which experts viewed as a response to the U.S. insistence on continuing with its MDS program. Although

5
Already in September, speaking at Yaroslavl forum, Medvedev said that the attitude to the very idea of European Security treaty has changed in the past
two years and unfortunately not for the better. He attributed the main reason for such pessimism to European countries' satisfaction with the status quo
and “jealousy” on part of the United States (Bessonov, 2010).
6
It is important to note that this sentence and any references to “geopolitical situation,” as well as Medvedev's previous statement on MDS, were not
included in English translation of the address.

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 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 345e354 351

Table 3
Examples of Russia's contrasting statements and emotions.

Fear Hope Frustration

“Our strength is being tested” (Medvedev) Russia expects a “worthy global response” “They, unfortunately, do not wish to listen
“They have been preparing [a revolution] for us, (Medvedev) to us” (Medvedev)
and now they will try even harder to implement “We are open for a dialogue” (Putin) “We did warn that … it would be wrong to
it” (Medvedev) try to achieve anything by force, otherwise
chaos would ensue” (Putin)

Putin expressed willingness to cooperate on non-proliferation issues, he said that a more pressing priority was to address the
U.S. MDS plans in Europe (Herszenhorn, 2012). In his December 2012 presidential address, Putin (2012a) insisted on Russia's
“geopolitical relevance” which the country must increase further.
Russia must not only preserve its geopolitical relevance e it must multiply it, it must generate demand among our
neighbours and partners. I emphasise that this is in our own interest. This applies to our economy, culture, science and
education, as well as our diplomacy, particularly the ability to mobilise collective actions at the international level. Last
but not least it applies to our military might that guarantees Russia's security and independence.
Putin (2012a) further insisted on preservation of a “new balance of economic, civilizational and military forces” and
instructed the government to pay more attention to development of patriotic and military education.
In addition to ES and MDS, Russia and the West opened a new front of tensions and disagreements over the Middle East.
The trajectory of Medvedev's emotional evolution on this issue was similar to those on ES and MDS, although the timing was
different. In February 2011, he described the Arab revolutions as “instigated by outside forces” and alerted the Russian
government to the threat: “Let's face the truth. They have been preparing such a scenario for us, and now they will try even
harder to implement it” (Freedman, 2011). However, in March 2011 Medvedev instructed the Russia Ambassador to the
United Nations to abstain on the UN Security Council Resolution (No. 1973) on Libya allowing the no-fly zone to take place.
The president even publicly reprimanded Putin who called the resolution “defective and flawed” and “allowing everything.”
Medvedev called Putin's statement (without calling his name) “unacceptable” (Freedman, 2011).7 Yet in several months, in
another reversal, Medvedev opposed Libya-style resolution on Syria. By explaining his position in public, the president
referred to the Libya resolution and said he was “convinced that a good resolution has been turned into a piece of paper to
cover a senseless military operation … If my colleagues asked me to abstain from voting so that they could bomb targets [in
Libya], I would have certainly instructed [Russian] officials at the UN differently,” Medvedev said (Astakhov, 2011).
In February 2012 Russia acting jointly with China, vetoed the Syria resolution in the UNSC out of fear that such resolution
would lead to a military intervention and regime change in Syria, as it happened in Libya. Instead, the Kremlin pushed for
negotiations between Bashar al-Assad and the military opposition. In May 2012, the Kremlin moved closer to accepting a
possible removal of Assad, but not at the cost of dismantling the Syrian regime (Tisdall, 2012). In his meetings with president
of the United States and president of Turkey in June and December, respectively, Putin, again, expressed concern about
instability in the country and the wider region after Assad. Russia also strengthened ties with those within the Syrian op-
position interested to work with the Kremlin (Brooke, 2012). As Western nations and several Syrian neighbors moved to
support Syrian military opposition, Russia held them responsible for reneging on the earlier deal (Kostin, 2012) and insti-
gating instability in the world. As Putin said commenting on the Middle Eastern changes, “Our partners just can't stop. They
have already created chaos in many territories, and now they are continuing the same policy in other countries, including
Syria. … We did warn that prudent action was needed and that it would be wrong to try to achieve anything by force,
otherwise chaos would ensue. And what do we see today? Chaos prevails” (RT, 2012).
Table 3 provides examples of Medvedev's contrasting emotions and statements.

6. Explaining the Kremlin's emotional shifts: inferiority complex or sibling rivalry?

Some observers assess Russia's emotions and behavior in terms of their relations to the country's ability to meet its in-
ternational objectives of power and status. For instance, some of these observers presented Medvedev's rhetoric and pro-
posals regarding Europe and MDS as a tactics to drive a wedge between Western countries and undermining cohesiveness of
existing Western institutions (Bugajski, 2010; Kulhanek, 2010; Stratfor, 2011; Weitz, 2012). In this interpretation, Russia
continued its traditional diplomacy to divide the European continent by practicing selective deals and coercive diplomacy
toward its members. The underlying motive behind this divide-and-conquer policy is to catch up with Western powers or
even beat them at their power/status game. In psychological terms, this suggests that Russia is driven by inferiority complex
and seeks to address its insecurity by competing with the strongest (the West).
This approach is valid yet insufficient. In particular, it omits from consideration Russia's desire to be recognized by the
West not only as a power but as a legitimate system of values and institutions. In Medvedev's words, Russia and the West

7
Medvedev also recalled Russia's Libya Ambassador for criticizing Moscow's decision (Zavtra, 2011).

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Table 4
Western recognition and Russia's emotional dispositions.

Western support/influence at home Russia's emotional disposition

Low Fear
Rising Hope
Declining Frustration

shared the same values but they have to assure that the “values [were] understood in the same way” (ITAR-TASS, 2008).
Although the notion of a great power is a part of Russia's honor/identity complex, it only comes into play when Russia and the
Western nations begin to mistrust each other and diverge from their attempts to cooperate. Each time Russia and the West are
engaged in common international projects, Russian leaders depend on the Western nations' recognition for continuing with
movement toward the West. The fact that Russia's identity has powerful Western roots is proven by presence of a strong and
vibrant pro-Western group (Westernizers) within the Russian political class. However, statist and nationalist groups are at
least as powerful in influencing the leadership. In this domestic identity competition between pro-Western and independent
groups, the state needs all the external support it can get. To preserve power, the politically savvy leadership will only support
Westernizers and pro-Western international agenda so long as it feels a sufficient support from the Western nations. As soon
as that support begins to decline, the discourse of hope will begin to be replaced by those of frustration, fear, and anger. Given
Russia's perception of the West as its significant other, the discourses of fear may become especially intense and bitter by
appearing entirely irrational and resembling sibling rivalry. The underlying motive for the latter is sense of betrayal, rather
than merely humiliation as in the case of inferiority complex.
Table 4 summarizes the relationships between external recognition of Russia's concerns/aspirations and its emotional
developments.
In order to demonstrate the honor/identity expectations behind Russia's discourses, we therefore need to match the Kremlin's
emotional and linguistic shifts to the amount of support its concerns and aspirations receive abroad (West) and at home.

6.1. Low Western support / Russia's fear

Immediately after his arrival to power, Medvedev got little support from the Western nations. The conventional wisdom in
Western capitals was that the new president will continue in Putin's locksteps and will not initiate a serious movement
toward the West. Europe and especially the United States were engaged in active efforts to promote democracy across the
globe, which Russia predominantly viewed as a threatening and destabilizing development. In the United States the presi-
dential candidate Senator John McCain campaigned on the platform of putting additional pressures on Russia for its non-
compliance with Western policies and human rights standards.
Against Western critics' expectations, such external environment served to undermine pro-Western voices inside Russia
and strengthen the discourses of fear, anger, and frustration. The Kremlin's ideologists and theorists sympathetic to the
official agenda have developed the concept of “sovereign democracy” insisting on need for Russia to protect its path of
development and resources. The discourse of sovereign democracy became dominant even though Medvedev (2006) indi-
cated his lack of support for it. In the context of a booming economy, fear translated into assertive foreign policy which
culminated in Putin's speech in Munich in February 2007 and Russia's intervention in Georgia in August 2008. Within the
foreign policy community, a new consensus emerged that an assertive style suited Russia well at the moment (Review, 2007).
Russia sought to actively shape the international relations by challenging actions of others, particularly the United States, if
they were “unilateral” and disrespectful of international law. At the same time, Russia insisted that its claims and aspirations
were not inconsistent with Western values and that, by upholding values of sovereignty and law, Russia was in fact a better
member of the Western community than others (Tsygankov, 2007).

6.2. Rising Western support / Russia's hope

Russia's new hopes for improving relations with the West may be linked to attempts by Western nations to recognize
Russia. Medvedev's emphasis on building ES and MDS jointly with the West emerged and developed in the context of the
latter's cautious support. Both European leaders and the newly elected president of the United States indicated their desire to
improve security relations with Russia. Medvedev's own attempts to reach out to the Western leaders can be traced at least to
his speech in Berlin in June 2008 when he first proposed a new pan-European security treaty.
In the international context of rising Western support, Medvedev's discourse of hope found a stronger support at home. It
particular, it resonated with Westernizers, who supported the president's ES initiative as helpful for integrating Russia with
European institutions. For example, the Institute of Contemporary Development, a liberal think-tank headed by Igor Yurgens,
issued a wide-ranging report describing Russia's aspired future in the 21st century (Rossiya XXI veka, 2010). The report
presented the country as bound to the European Union by shared values, security interests, and visions of world order.
Westernizers also challenged the traditional discourse of fear by arguing that neither MDS nor Middle Eastern revolutions
threaten Russia. Instead, they advocated a strong cooperation with the West based on a joint understanding of security threats
(Anisimov and Siletsky, 2011; Golts, 2011). Many Statists also supported Medvedev on the ground of strengthening strategic

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 A.P. Tsygankov / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 345e354 353

ties with the West in the context of Russia's internal weakness and the rising China problem (Khramchikhin, 2009; Suslov,
2010). Some of those who had previously been behind Putin's assertive stance now embraced Medvedev, whom they
viewed as someone with sufficient support of Putin.

6.3. Declining Western support / Russia's frustration

Finally, the Kremlin's growing frustration reflected in various speeches and public statements after the second half of 2010
and cannot be separated from the West's declining support for Medvedev's policy initiatives. Germany and France agreed
with the need to address the vacuum of European security, but did not find Russia's proposals satisfactory. NATO Secretary-
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said he saw no need for the new legally binding security treaty “because we do have a
framework already” (Bridge, 2010). The United States was equally dismissive. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
found that a new European treaty was unnecessary e the position that Medvedev was described as reflecting “a certain envy”
among “our American partners” (RIA Novosti, 2010). Washington expressed full confidence in the NATO-centered security
system in Europe and pressed ahead with building MDS separately from Russia. In the late 2012, the U.S.eRussia relationship
suffered from a crisis over the Magnitsky Act. While repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the U.S. Congress passed the
Magnitsky Act, which denies visas to Russian officials, presumed responsible for human rights violations and freezes their
assets. The Russia's State Duma retaliated by passing the “Anti-Magnitsky Act,” which targets U.S. citizens whom Russia
considers to be violators of human rights, and banning the adoption of Russian children by the U.S. citizens.
In this international environment, the domestic influence of Westernizers began to decline. As the Kremlin grew critical of
the West's handling of security issues and the Middle Eastern crisis, even Westernizers expressed criticisms of Western
policies. As Dmitry Trenin (2011) noted, “Beyond Afghanistan, and to some extent Iran, the United States … it is basically
ignoring Russia, whose presence and influence there are considered negligible.” The assessment by Statists was even harsher.
“Russia considers the reset to have fostered significant concessions to the United States e wrote Andranik Migranyan (2011).
These include the compromise on Libya, the help in Afghanistan and the pressure on Iran.” “What did Russia get in return [for
its concessions]? e echoed Alexei Pushkov (2011). Nothing but changes in nuances of the dialogue. There are more smiles and
handshakes now than there were before.” The discourse of frustration and fear was back.

7. Conclusion

The Russia's emotional shifts, as demonstrated by Russia's presidential discourses during 2008e2012 e from fear to hope
and frustration e are therefore largely shaped by the country's historically established social relations with the West and are
not to be reduced to dynamics of power and prestige. Behind these relations are the persistent factors of Russia's honor and
identity/recognition by the Western nations. The Russians have not defined their system of values as anti-Western and want
to be included within the West as a community of values. However, in their foreign policies, they have had to simultaneously
relate to Western nations and domestic/local population. The difficulty of bridging this external/internal divide explains both
the complexity of Russia's emotions toward the West and their frequent intensity.
Such explanation suggests the difficulty of finding an emotional balance in Russia's relations with the West and even the
tendency of these relations' progression toward an especially bitter escalation. As it is known from psychological research on
relations among relatives, family quarrels may be particularly difficult to resolve or contain. What psychologists call sibling
rivalry has a tendency of escalating into intense and bitter conflict or even siblicide. Scholars of RussiaeWest relations must
therefore consider the possibility of such escalation. The RussiaeWest confrontation over Ukraine is an example of it. In response
to Ukrainian revolution in February 2014 backed by the United States and the European Union, Russia annexed Crimea and
engaged in supporting military resistance in eastern Ukraine. The language of Russia's officials toward the United States and
NATO betrays deepening frustration and controlled anger. For example, in his Crimea speech on March 18, 2014, Putin (2014)
directly accused Western nations of “constantly trying to sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position,
because we maintain it and because we call things like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything.
And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally.”
If sibling rivalry is a useful metaphor for describing RussiaeWest relations, then it suggests a different behavioral re-
sponses than the one from the inferiority complex perspective. The latter e consistently with the logic of defensive realism e
proposes that Russia, much like China, should be given more stakes in the international system to satisfy its claims of status
and persuade it to act as a responsible, not a revisionist, power. To counter this logic, aggressive realists have argued that
Russia would simply pocket such “concessions” and emerge as even more revisionist than before. The sibling rivalry
perspective suggests, however, that sharing power/status may not be sufficient e what required is a process of extending to
Russia a social recognition and including it as an equal participant in various economic, political, and security projects. The
family quarrel metaphor implies that Russia and Europe are culturally interdependent and may only progress in their re-
lationships if they learn to respect each other's values.

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 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 355e363

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

Russia as a great power: Status inconsistency and the two

Chechen wars
Hanna Smith
Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The article examines Russia as a great power from the point of view of status inconsistency
Available online 16 October 2014 theory. Applications of the theory to Russia have focused on the status accorded to Russia
in diplomatic representation and membership of key international organizations, which
Keywords: suggests that Russia is a ‘status overachiever’ in that it has an international status that is
Chechen wars greater than its actual capabilities would warrant. However, this article focuses on Russian
Great power
perceptions of the country's status internationally, especially as reflected in the actual
Recognition
experience of membership in international organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe) and
Russia
Status inconsistency
relations with the EU in the context of the two Chechen wars. The article demonstrates
that, at least according to Russian assessments, Russia is accorded lower status in these
organizations than the great power status which most Russians believe should be theirs.
While concluding that status inconsistency is a useful tool for explaining Russian foreign
policy behavior, the article notes that differing assessments of what Russia's level of status
recognition is pose challenges for status inconsistency theory.
© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.

1. Introduction

Russia's status as a great power in world politics arguably has not been stable (Haukkala, 2008; Neumann, 2008a,b).
Different wars and domestic political situations have changed Russia's status as a recognized great power by others in the
outside world. But independent of the actual views of others, as Thomas Ambrosio has put it, ‘Russia seeks to be respected as a
great power because of deep seated beliefs about its own identity and its place in the world’ (Ambrosio, 2005a, p. viii). It will
be argued that such greatpowerness (velikoderzhavnost) plays an important part in Russian foreign policy. At different
historical times it has had different effects, sometimes pulling Russia closer to Europe and the Western world and sometimes
pushing Russia away from them. Greatpowerness has also had effects on Russian domestic political decision-making. In this
article the effect of greatpowerness on Russian relations with the Western world will be examined through the two Chechen
wars and in the framework of status inconsistency theory.
The fall of the Soviet Union is an unprecedented case of the loss of status ranking. Huge Empires have come and gone in
the past, but in other cases the decline of Empires has been a long, drawn out process. While internal divisions and loss of
authority by the ruler have played a part in the end of the Mongol, Roman, and Ottoman empires, their eventual demise was
also brought about by military defeats, leaving little or no vestige of the former imperial power behind. In modern times,
perhaps only the disintegration of the great overseas Empires of Spain and Great Britain can be compared with the end of
the Soviet Union in that gradual internal decline was accompanied by rebellion in the peripheries of Empire. In the case of
Britain, a state which still had some claims to great power status was left after the end of Empire, but even this differed
from the case of Russia in that the Empire was not lost all at once, the heartland was left intact and thriving, and the formal

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.005
0967-067X/© 2014 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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356 H. Smith / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 355e363

hegemony of the imperial power over its former colonies was recognized in the role of the monarch and the Common-
wealth. By the time its empire was dismantled, Great Britain was one of the major powers in a multipolar world, whereas
the Soviet Union stood as the sole rival to US global hegemony in the bipolar Cold War world. The sudden loss of this status
by one superpower, while the other increased its status, was a humiliating experience for Russia. Russian foreign policy has
been studied from many angles, and the factor of humiliation connected to the fall of the Soviet Union has been referred to
many times and cited in much research. However, the effect of the loss of status which led to the feeling of humiliation has
been less studied.
This article will start by looking at how status and status inconsistency has been dealt with in academic literature. It will
then proceed to look at how, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation clearly regarded Russia as the rightful
heir to the USSR. The Chechen wars are then looked at in the light of this situation. The wars in Chechnya in part represented
an attempt by Russia to achieve status consistency. The two Chechen wars each, however, had different outcomes in terms of
status, and not always the ones that were intended. The starting point of this argument is that the fall of the Soviet Union
resulted in the loss of Russian status from the point of view of the West, but in the eyes of Russia in the longue duree of Russian
history, Russian status has remained consistent. The actions taken in regard to Chechnya are viewed as a case of maintaining
status consistency by proving through actions the ability of Russia to act as a great power.
Status is one important part of being a great power. Status is the factor that is acquired through recognition by others.
Various scholars have attempted to provide objective definitions of a ‘Great Power’, but even if a country meets these
objective criteria and feels itself to be a great power, this is no guarantee that this status is recognized by other countries or
that the country enjoys great power status in world politics. Vogly, Corbetta, Grant and Baird have suggested that status
attribution matters in three different ways: a country that is a great power is expected to be visible and important in major
issues and conflicts in international politics; a great power is more involved in international politics than others; and claims to
great power status are valued domestically to the extent that such claims can become critical to holding office (Volgy et al.,
2011, p.10).
Volgy et al. (2011, pp.10e12) have also made a difference between status-consistent and status-inconsistent powers. They
then divide the status inconsistent powers into two: underachievers and overachievers. Their definition (op. cit. p.11) of
status-consistent powers views the great powers as having additional capacity to engage in a wide variety of pursuits ranging
from cooperative to coercive ones. The status-consistent power may undertake costly measures with the expectation that
they will be successful and run a lower risk of failure externally and negative consequences domestically. The status-
inconsistent power's approach to international politics is different from the approach of a status-consistent power. This is
an important distinction and plays a role when examining Russia's status in world politics.
The status-inconsistent underachievers are great powers that have capabilities and desire to act as major powers, but still
do not have full recognition by others. The underachievers are likely to seek a more visible role for themselves in world
politics but run a risk that their efforts are undermined by lack of legitimacy and respect. The overachievers are states that do
enjoy great power recognition but lack the critical material means associated with major powers. The expectation is that the
approach of overachievers is more constructive in international affairs. They are afraid of losing the status they have and
therefore act more on the basis of smaller but safer gains than taking high-risk action (Volgy et al., 2011; pp. 11e12). In
examining Russia, this article introduces a new category e a country that believes itself to be a great power, but does not have
all of the capabilities of a great power according to certain definitions, and which only enjoys limited recognition as a great
power internationally.
Small and victorious wars have always been a way of maintaining or establishing a certain status. Count Plehve's famous
remark that Russia needed a ‘short, victorious war’ in 1904 is the best known case of status motives playing a major role in
triggering warfare, but such motives are not unique to Russia. Bismarck's short and victorious war with Denmark over
Schleswig and Holstein in 1864 was important in establishing Prussia as a major power in European affairs, while Napoleon
III's involvement in the Crimean War in 1853e1855 has been explained by his being ‘eager for a military victory to solidify
support for his regime’ (Merriman, 2004, p. 753). Likewise, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in May 1982 ‘seeking to
reverse a decline in its popularity at home’, but with the perverse outcome that a British victory ‘encouraged a burst of
patriotism, boosting the Prime Minister's [Margaret Thatcher] standing at home’ (Merriman, 2004, p. 1295). In the case of the
Falkland Islands one can also argue that if Argentina had been victorious, that would have boosted its international status too.
With its victory Great Britain revived its flagging international great power status.
In these examples, it was the domestic popularity of the government that gained the greatest boost from successful wars.
But France, Great Britain, and especially Prussia were also able to act with more confidence and influence in international
affairs, at least for a while after these wars. In the case of Chechnya, however, the effect of this strategy was not the recognition
of Russia as an undisputed great power by the Western world, but in fact almost the opposite. In domestic discourse, however,
the first Chechen war reinforced feelings of Russian greatpowerness, the self-perception that Russia was, is, and will be a great
power. Even if the Russian military was not that successful in the warfare, Russia's failings combined with Western criticism
reinforced the domestic arguments about the need to show others that Russia was a great power. This was also given as a
reason for the second war in its early stages. Through the reinforced feeling of greatpowerness, Russia started to play a more
assertive role in world politics. It was important that one way or another Russia as a great power would be part of and play a
role in different international crises. Russia tried to execute this in the Kosovo case but failed (see Regina Heller in this Special
Issue). The second and more successful case, clearly indicating a reversal of the trend of trying to secure alignment with the
US, first and foremost was the war in Iraq, as Ambrosio has shown (Ambrosio, 2005b, p.1202).

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 H. Smith / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 355e363 357

2. Status inconsistency?

The early 1990s was a watershed between the old and the new order in world politics. The effect that the fall of the Soviet
Union and the rejection of communism had on international relations can be compared to the situations which followed
major wars, especially when the focus is on the great powers. These effects have been widely examined and then re-
examined. However an argument can be made that most of such studies were carried out with focus on the international
system in general, not on a specific country. There is also a large body of literature on Russian foreign policy directions from
the early 1990s but not from the point of view of lost status/status inconsistency.
Most of the Russian foreign policy literature concentrates on analyzing Russia from the point of view of change and
continuity (Donaldson and Nogee, 2005; Lo, 2002; Trenin, 2007). Change is linked by such authors mostly to changes in
leadership, but there are also other external factors that can impact on new foreign policy directions. Some writers have
argued that wars have a tremendous impact and that rethinking on the part of the Russian leadership has resulted. Sometimes
foreign policy formation has been influenced by outside factors and domestic challenges simultaneously.
Russian great power identity is one of the factors that has been identified in nearly all the literature on Russian foreign policy
as a major feature. But exactly the way of how great power identity effects Russian foreign policy's formation and priorities is
little studied. For Russia there was no inconsistency in claiming the Soviet Union's mantle of a great power (if not a superpower),
since great power status can be maintained even in the face of some internal weaknesses given the size of the country, its
nuclear weapons and the country's history with a long tradition of belonging to European and global great power politics.
A country needs to have something to offer to be recognized in international politics. To become a major power, a Great
power, a country needs to have resources for it, both military and economic, and it needs to have co-optive and coercive
powers, attractiveness and recognition by others (Levy, 1981; Neumann, 2008a; Nye, 1990). However in the case of Russia, one
can ask if self-perception is also an important part of the picture.
In relation to the theoretical literature on status inconsistency, Maria Raquel Freire has identified the USSR and Russia as
status-inconsistent underachievers and overachievers respectively in the international system, marking their evolution and
influencing the course of their foreign policies (Freire, 2011, p. 57). From her analysis Freire draws the conclusion that today's
Russian Federation is an overachiever, enjoying a Great power status without having the capabilities of a Great power (ibid., p.
74). Status-inconsistency led the USSR, initially, to overextend itself militarily, including engagement in such failed ventures
as the Korean War, and later to engage in costly demonstrations of technological superiority in order to affirm its status. Under
Putin and Medvedev, the Russian Federation's position as a status overachiever led to a concentration on establishing her role
as the hegemonic leader of the group of post-Soviet states (Freire, 2011; pp.58e74).
Freire's argument is interesting and convincingly argued. The assessment that Russia was an underachiever up until 1981
and has been an overachiever since is, however, highly dependent on measurable variables such as GDP and diplomatic
contacts. Thus it runs in the face of the more widely accepted picture that the Soviet Union's status as one of the two world
superpowers during the Cold War was based on both recognition and capabilities, and therefore the status of the USSR was
consistent from 1945 to 1991. The view that from the beginning of the 1990s Russia's capabilities were at all times low but that
the international community continued to treat Russia for a while as a major power is problematic. In the Western approach
to treating Russia as a major great power, there are many mixed signals and inconsistencies.
A different, but less measurable, way of looking at status is to consider how a country (whether the general population,
political elites, media and others) thinks that others perceive it, in comparison to national self-perception. International
developments since the fall of the Soviet Union show that Russian self-perception has always been one of Russia belonging to
the great powers, but Russians at least feel that it has not been recognized as such by the West. At the beginning of the 1990s
Russia took it for granted that others would treat Russia as a great power but gradually started to feel, even as its capabilities
increased, that this was not the case. This is a central argument of this article, and rests on the fact that Russia measures the
ways it is viewed by others according to experience, rather than the formal role given to Russia in international organizations
such as the UN. Thus the self-perception of status is in contradiction to how Russia believes it has been perceived by others.
Russia sees itself as a great power but because it feels it is not treated as such by the West, it sees itself as an underachiever, in
contradiction to Freire's view of Western perceptions. By focusing on formal markers such as a place on the UN Security
Council and membership of the G8, Freire argues that Russia is viewed as a great power internationally, thus making it an
overachiever. By contrast the Russian focus is more on particular instances where Russia is not accorded the same status as
other powers in global decision making, or where its interests appear to be ignored. Thus the Russian impression is that Russia
is not consistently treated as a great power by other great powers and by international organizations. When the self-
perception of a state is in discord with how the state is perceived by others, the potential for conflict grows. This is one of
the major factors that link status with conflict.
The concept of status-inconsistency has its origin in sociology. The status-inconsistency argument sees that countries may
diverge on a number of status dimensions which are considered salient for decision makers. ‘For example, a country may rank
relatively high on economic and/or military capabilities (i.e., achieved status) but may be accorded little prestige (i.e., ascribed
status) by the international community. Under such conditions of rank disequilibrium, it is plausible that a nation's decision
makers would evidence a strong desire to change the status quo, and failing to do so, to engage in conflict and violence’ (Volgy
and Mayhall, 1995, p. 68).
In the late 1960s and in the 1970s there emerged a body of international relations literature devoted to the relationship
between conflict and status inconsistency. Maurice East (1972), Manus Midlarsky (1969), Harald von Riekhoff (1973), and

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358 H. Smith / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 355e363

Michael Wallace (1973) found in their studies a link between status inconsistency and violent conflict (war). James L. Ray
(1974) came to the conclusion that the link is not clear. Some later research on the topic came to a mixed conclusion.
Depending on different time periods there was a link between status inconsistency and violent conflict (Gochman, 1980;
Volgy and Mayhall, 1995). As Jonathan Renshon has noted, research relating to status inconsistency and conflict suffered
from a lack of theoretical foundations. The research was often linked to sociology and/or psychology. Furthermore the limited
size of the data did not help to sufficiently test the hypothesis convincingly (Renshon, 2013. pp. 4e5).
By using network-based measures of international status, Renshon came to the conclusion that status deficits are
significantly associated with an increased probability of war initiation, that state actors are more sensitive to regional status
concerns than competitions within an undifferentiated global hierarchy and that conflict initiation does in fact provide status
benefits. Renshon's case study is German foreign policy during the period of Weltpolitik 1898e1912. Similarly to Russian
foreign policy, the German foreign policy had been described as ‘prestige hungry diplomacy’ (Renshon, 2013, p. 30).
Academic literature on Russian foreign policy clearly illustrates that Russia's quest for being a Great Power has figured
strongly in international relations as well as being an important part of the domestic agenda. Margot Light has argued that
‘Russia was clearly not a superpower; indeed, it was questionable whether it was a great power. Yet to ordinary people, as well
as to politicians, it was unthinkable that Russia could be anything less than this. The insistence that Russia should be regarded
as a great power became an important theme in foreign policy statements and discussions and it remains an important driver
of foreign policy’ (Light, 2010, p. 229). However in the Russian case the picture is not so much one of a quest to become a great
power, as it is about trying to reconfirm to others what is a central belief in Russian identity. As Russians see the situation, it is
not that there is inconsistency or a deficit in Russia's status, which is formally recognized in international organizations and in
diplomatic representation, but a certain insecurity resulting from the practices of other powers and institutions in their
relations with Russia.

3. The first Chechen war

In the early 1990s it seemed that Russian foreign policy was properly focused on integration with the West. Expectations
were high. One key element for a ‘new’ rift between Russia and the West was a question of ‘who won the Cold War?’ The
Russian view is well put by Konstantin Kosachev, a chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs and a respected
diplomat: ‘Judging objectively, however, it was the Russians who really won the Cold War e they not only freed themselves
from totalitarianism, but they also delivered other peoples from it. For a period of time, we considered this subject closed,
regarding any discussions as to who was the winner as absolutely unimportant. We attached primary importance to our
“bright common future”’ (Kosachev, 2007). This view is in line with the Russian view of itself as a great power even at a time of
weakness and supports the fact that the West saw Russia's status as in decline.
The Soviet Union had been the second superpower in the world. No other country apart from the United States could claim
that status and still cannot. Russia had been one of the European great powers before the October 1917 revolution. The tradition
of belonging to the group of influential countries in international politics is a long one in Russia. Foreign minister Kozyrev has
often pointed out that in spite of Russian weaknesses Russia is a world power: ‘ … Russia, even if it is going through a period of
difficult transition, remains as a world power, not only because it has nuclear weapons and a complete military capability, but
because it even has the latest technology, not to mention its natural resources and geostrategic location’ (Kozyrev, 1994, p. 186).
The first serious challenge to the Russian Federation's status in world politics came from within. The tiny republic of Chechnya
in the Russian North Caucasus took literally president Yeltsin's encouragement in 1991 to the Russian regions to ‘take as much
sovereignty as you can swallow’. However they had missed the significance of the word ‘can’. Yeltsin later explained that the
word ‘can’ should have shown that there was a limit, and if you cross the limit there will be consequences (Colton, 2008, p. 289).
It should be noted that the Chechen regime headed by Dzhokar Dudayev did not initially ask for independence from Russia, but
for a favorable deal between Chechnya and the center. Dudayev's challenge to Russian status as a great power came on two fronts
e first, it attempted to put the weakened center into a negotiating situation, and second, with the demand for independence it
questioned the sovereignty of the state, the Russian Federation that had been born from the ashes of the Soviet Union.
In international diplomatic terms, the first decision to use force in Chechnya was itself very peculiar, given that at that time
Russia was building bridges, especially towards Europe, through international institutions, and the invasion risked to jeop-
ardize the progress already made. The year 1994 looked very positive in terms of foreign policy opportunities for Russia. In
March the IMF approved a loan worth US$ 1.5 billion to Russia and so indicated the West's keen interest in trying to keep
Russia on course to a market economy. Russia became a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme in 1994. In the
summer of 1994 Russia had signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in Corfu, when Yeltsin himself
stated ‘Our country has made a strategic choice in favor of integration into the world community and, in the first instance,
with the European Union’ (Yeltsin, 1994, p. 1). In July the same year Andrei Kozyrev attended the G7 meeting in Naples and
there were hopes in the Russian camp of the G7 becoming the G8. Russia was also in negotiations over membership of the
Council of Europe. The current towards Russian Western integration was strong. Russia also signed two OSCE documents
which committed her to giving advance notice of troop movements and to take measures to minimize civilian casualties: the
Vienna document on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) and the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military
Aspects of Security. These documents were signed at the Budapest summit on 5 and 6 December 1994 just some days before
the first military offensive against Chechnya. The launch of the Chechen war violated both these agreements, and the nature of
the whole case broke general OSCE norms and rules (Pursiainen, 1999; pp. 135e136).

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The decision for the full-scale military operation was however already made on 29 November, thus before the Budapest
summit. Just as he was speaking in Budapest, Yeltsin was aware of what would follow. Since both of the commitments un-
dertaken in the Budapest summit were violated by Russia in its military operation, two alternative conclusions relating to
Yeltsin's appearance in Budapest can be drawn; that he did not see any connection between Chechnya and the Budapest
summit, or that he saw Russia's internal affairs as not to be included in these commitments. The first reason suggests
inexperience in international multilateral commitments and their meaning; the other–Russian arrogance in international
cooperation. Great powers have different rules than others.
Launching the war in Chechnya in late 1994 was one of the first significant signs that the Russian power elite at that time
was prepared to defend its Great power identity. Two and a half years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin had declared in
August 1994 that the danger of Russia falling apart had passed (Colton, 2008, p.287). This made it also possible to take a risk in
Chechnya since other similar situations were not in sight. Interestingly the decision to go to war in Chechnya in 1994 appeared
to go against the 1993 Russian constitution, which recognized that obligations under international law must be followed e
pacta sunt servanda (article 15.4). As the result of a Duma initiative during 1995 a court case in Russia raised the question of
whether the Chechen war was unconstitutional but President Boris Yeltsin was cleared.
The question of why Boris Yeltsin chose to launch an invasion of Chechnya when he did has been widely discussed, without
any consensus emerging. Matthew Evangelista's list of reasons runs as follows: the historical and structural legacy of the
Soviet system; strategic arguments; domino theory and spill-over effect; leadership politics; personalities and elite battles
(Evangelista, 2002). Other authors mention the social structure and love of freedom of the Chechens; Dudaev's or Yeltsin's
personality; and oil and oil transit. Treisman goes through these explanations and argues that most of the explanations
relating to the first Chechen war are relevant but not enough to cause a war. He adds that Chechnya was seen as an easy way to
boost Yeltsin's declining popularity. Furthermore it seemed rather clear that some of the Kremlin hardliners favored military
action to strengthen the image of the Russian state and the role of the military in Russia. Treisman comes to the conclusion
that one of the main reasons was the security situation in the region. Too many mistakes had been made on both sides, by
Dudayev losing control in Chechnya and so raising a pure security threat and by Yeltsin letting himself be drawn into the
conflict and by letting Chechnya cross the line of attempts at sovereignty (Treisman, 2011; pp. 284e296).
In Treisman's account there is an interesting detail. According to Treisman, Yeltsin had not decided whether or not to use
military force in Chechnya before Dudayev paraded a captured tank crew before the press, threatening to execute them (ibid.,
p. 294). This public humiliation of Russian military personnel was in the end too much and even if the army was not ready, the
decision was taken. Thereby to the list of explanations of why the first Chechen war happened can be added Russian honor
and the status that comes with it, not only at home but also abroad. The idea that one of the reasons for the launch of the first
Chechen war was notions of status is supported by accounts of some of the discussions that took place in the build-up to war.
Yury Kalmykov, Minister of Justice until he resigned over the decision to use force in Chechnya, later recalled the key meeting
of the Security Council on November 29, 1994. Parallels were drawn with the American lightning invasion of Haiti a couple of
months before. Sergei Stepashin, head of Federal Counterintelligence, stated that a number of more realistic options for
solving the Chechen crisis were available. The chain of events suggests a sudden momentum behind a decision which was
dedicated to the use of force per se rather than based on any analysis of outcomes (Gall and de Waal, 1998; pp. 160e163).
There is also an argument that it was the Russian armed forces that had a direct interest in starting a war to boost its prestige
(Seely, 2001, p. 206). While there is enough secrecy surrounding the decision to invade to make its causes unclear, there
would seem to be a number of factors at work. But the traditionalist ‘realist’ explanations have been found wanting, and the
theory that the war had something to do with prestige, either at home or internationally, both fits the course of events and the
little eyewitness evidence that is available.
However it is questionable whether the war in the first instance did actually help to restore honor and status. Vladimir Lukin,
Chairman of the State Duma's Committee on International Affairs, claimed in 1995 that Russian foreign policy was at its lowest
levels since 1982. He saw the Chechen crisis as resulting in a total loss of fear and/or respect of Russia in the eyes of the world
(Portansky, 1995, p. 20). Interestingly Lukin sees that fear and respect are both important in international relations. Even if a
great power is not respected but is feared, it does then have an important position and a say in world affairs.
Surveys of public opinion in Russia in the first Chechen war showed quite clearly that in the public view the military
activities lowered the respect of Russia in world politics. After two years of the war, 51% of respondents thought so, while only
11% believed that the war would gain some respect for Russia. In the same poll 74% of respondents saw the war as a tragedy for
the whole of Russia. Furthermore 63% were against the war in Chechnya, while only 23% were supportive (FOM, 1995). One of
the biggest fears was that Russia would lose out badly economically, since its image had suffered in the eyes of the West. The
interesting contradiction in public opinion is that during 1993e2000, despite the humiliating failures of the Russian military
and the worry about what the war in Chechnya had done to Russia's image in the world, the army was the public institution
that enjoyed more trust than any other public institutions in Russia (Sperling, 2001).
It was not just the Russian public which considered that Russia had lost respect internationally. Reactions in the West
echoed those in Russia. The invasion and especially the way force was used, were seen as a tragedy for the whole of Russia and
also badly damaged Russia's image in the West. The positive foreign policy atmosphere of 1994 quickly turned sour. The
Russian application to the Council of Europe was held up for a second time because of the Chechen war. The first pause had
happened due to the storming of the Russian White House in October of 1993.
With the European Union similar problems started to occur. The ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment, signed in Corfu in June 1994, was temporarily suspended by the EU in early 1995. According to Jackie Gower: ‘The action

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by the European Parliament in suspending the ratification of the PCA for several months in 1995, owing to its concern about
the violation of human rights in Chechnya, demonstrated that political conditionality is no empty threat’ (Gower, 2000, p. 74).
The aim of the so-called Interim Agreement between Russia and the EU was to precede the PCA and ease and accelerate the
implementation of the PCA's trade and commercial portions. The agreement was very important for Russia but also for the EU
trade partners. It covered trade regulations, as well as a number of aspects of customs, standardization, competition and
protection of the rights to intellectual property. From the Russian side the agreement was seen as an agreement to remove
numerous discriminatory restrictive measures. Furthermore, the EU was not able officially to label Russia a ‘transition-
economy,’ a term which was viewed in Russia as a political tool in EU trade relations. Aleksei Portansky in Finansovye izvestia
wrote: ‘The entry into force of the interim agreement between the Russian Federation and the EU is also of considerable
psychological and political significance for Moscow, since it relieves the unpleasant feeling of isolation that has intensified in
connection with the war in Chechnya’ (Portansky, 1995, p. 12). But the Interim Agreement that should have entered into force
in March 1995 was postponed due to the conflict in Chechnya. In March 1995 representatives of the EU troika (France,
Germany, and Spain) traveled to Moscow and laid down four conditions for implementing the Interim Agreement: a cease-
fire, progress in the political settlement of the crisis, free access for humanitarian aid, and the establishment of a permanent
OSCE mission in Chechnya (Pursiainen, 1999, p. 150).
As already mentioned, since OSCE commitments were violated by the launch of the war, the OSCE had formal reasons to
become involved. All the reactions from the Western European side and from the United States pointed out that Yeltsin had
agreed in Budapest to commit Russia to the principles that in case a use of force cannot be avoided ‘the armed forces will take
due care to avoid injury to civilians or their property’ (Hollis, 1995; pp. 807e808). Naturally this cast a shadow over all
agreements between Russians and any Western partners. Could Russia be trusted?
The Russian response came already in January 1995. In Rossiiskiye vesti an article from the Russian Foreign ministry called
the international reactions to the Chechen war hasty and declared Russia's readiness to constructively cooperate with in-
ternational human rights and humanitarian organizations. Furthermore it accused the West of being unfair: ‘… to our regret,
such rhetoric [Western reactions] evokes memories of the recent and very sad past in our relations with the West. In a
number of instances we are observing a syndrome in which chronic reflexes are being triggered and long standing stereo-
typical ways of reacting to events associated with Russia are returning’ (Rossiiskie vesti, 1995).
The first Chechen war showed some internal insecurities and the inability of the Russian leadership to deal with the
difficult situation in the North Caucasus through the traditional responses available to a great power when faced with a
colonial uprising.1 The military failings caused growing unpopularity with the leadership, but did not shake the conviction
that Russia was a great power. The experience also revealed that the West was not convinced about Russia's transformation
after the fall of the Soviet Union. This led to a significant learning period for Russia: Russia had entered into a relationship with
a number of international organizations and had not expected the Chechen war, regarded as an internal matter, to become an
obstacle to those relationships. The feeling prevailed that these organizations would not treat other, recognized, great powers
in the way Russia was being treated, hence reinforcing the feeling that Russia was not recognized by others as a great power.

4. The second Chechen war

The first Chechen war ended with the Khasaviurt ceasefire agreement at the end of August 1996. At the beginning of that
year some changes were also made in the Russian foreign ministry. Yevgeny Primakov was appointed foreign minister of
Russia. This change was seen as a defeat of the so called Westernizers, the group that argued strongly for Russia benefiting
from integration and cooperation with the West. Foreign minister Kozyrev was portrayed as belonging to the group of the
Westernizers. Upon becoming foreign minister in 1996, Yevgeny Primakov declared his motto to be ‘Russia was and remains a
great power. Her foreign policy should correspond to that status’.
From 1996 to 1999 the Russian policy was mainly characterized as passive. The Khasaviurt agreement included talks
between Russia and Chechnya about the status of Chechnya in the future. But the matter was never seriously discussed in the
talks that were held (Jonson, 2000, p. 2). Violence increased in the region and the central government chose not to support
Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, elected in 1997. In retrospect it is easy to see that Russia was never seriously ready to
consider the status of Chechnya to be anything else than a part of Russia.
The planning of the second Chechen war began well before August 1999, even if the shot that started it was fired from the
side of the Chechen rebels lead by Shamil Basayev by making a foray into Dagestan. In March 1999 the kidnapping of an
interior ministry official made the Minister of the Interior Sergei Stepashin call for a new mission in Chechnya. Plans regarding
Chechnya had already begun in early 1999 (Evangelista, 2002, p. 73). It was also clear that the military had its own agenda
relating to Chechnya: ‘Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin gathered a group of combat generals (Konstantin Puli-
kovsky, Gennady Troshev, Viktor Kazantsev, Vladimir Shamanov) driven hard by the desire to take revenge for the humiliating
defeat in 1996’ (Baev, 2004). In Daniel Treisman's view the incidents that began the second war had been planned for months
on both sides (Treisman, 2011, p. 298).
The view that planning for the second Chechen war was under way already in early 1999 is also supported by the then
Prime Minister Putin's claim made during his first meeting with President Clinton in the summer of 1999 that al-Qaeda had

1
Cerwyn Moore has suggested that the Chechen wars and Russian policy in Caucasus could be best viewed through post-colonialism’s lenses in ‘Russia's
post-colonial war(s)’, EuropeeAsia Studies, 2008, Vol. 60, Issue 5, pp. 851e861.

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 H. Smith / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 355e363 361

troops in Chechnya and that they were planning operations against Russia (Council of Foreign Relations (2004)). Furthermore,
the fight against terrorism was also raised in the CIS summit in Minsk in June 1999. By bringing the Chechen issue linked with
the threat of international terrorism to the international tables, Russia was also making the international community aware
that something was going on in the Russian North Caucasus again.
The timing of the second Chechen war made far more sense than the first one, given the international climate. The ar-
guments deployed by Russia were parallel to those of NATO and the United States on Kosovo. The bombings of Kosovo and
Serbia in the summer of 1999 marked a significant change in attitudes in the international arena. The Russian military used
the bombing as an argument for their own actions: ‘If NATO can shell civilian objects in a sovereign country for the sake of
political aims we can do the same in our own country’ (Pain, 2000, p. 22). It seems that while the main reasons for launching
the war were internal to the Russian Federation, the precise timing was provided by NATO. This rhetorical framework, of two
great powers doing what they see as best for world order, suited the Russian home audience.
The Kosovo case earlier in 1999 showed that Russia could not stop the USA in international matters. Some in Russia saw the
Serbian defeat to be also a Russian defeat (Yuryev, 2003). This was a blow to Russian national self-esteem and perhaps one of
the reasons for Yeltsin's grip on power diminishing. The Kosovo bombings also became a watershed in Russia-West relations.
But for the Russian armed forces the year 1999 was labeled the ‘golden year of the Russian military’. With their fierce
statements about Kosovo they had already gained some influence, the military doctrine was going to be rewritten and more
funds were made available for it. In late October 1999, Defense Minister Igor Sergeev said that troops would never leave
Chechnya (Busza, 1999). The military officers were fostering a myth that if the civilian leaders had not intervened during the
first war, there would have been a totally different outcome (Kramer, 1999). It seemed that the public and political estab-
lishment, as well as economic elite, was behind the strengthening of the Russian military. After all, a strong military is the
main symbol of a great power. Anatoly Chubais, widely known for being pro-Western, commented on the Chechen inter-
vention: ‘I really do believe that the issue being decided in Chechnya today is not the Chechen problem but something
incomparably more important than that e in Chechnya, the Russian army is being reborn … . Now, for the first time in all
these years, the army is regaining its proper status. And this fact, in my view, should be welcomed by democrats and non-
democrats alike e by all segments of the political spectrum.’ (Kommersant, 1999).
Chubais' statement reflects well the specific and important feature of the second Chechen war. Russian society was united
for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union in its views relating to Chechnya.
The initial international reactions to the second Chechen war were strong, perhaps in some ways stronger than during the
first war, but it could be argued that they were more symbolic then anything else, even if the list of ‘threats’ was this time
longer and more carefully thought through. Interestingly all criticisms also included confirmation of Russia's territorial
integrity and her right to fight against terrorism.
In his speech of November 1999, the EU's external relations commissioner Christopher Patten made it clear that the three
main bodies of the EU - the Council, the Parliament and the Commission - had reached a consensus on condemning all kinds
of acts of terrorism (this clearly referred to Chechnya as well), while at the same time condemning the use of strong military
force, and the fact that political solutions were being disregarded as well as the human consequences of military action. He
did, however, stress the fact that Europe should not make the same mistake they had made in 1917, by isolating Russia from
European affairs (Patten, 1999). Patten addressed directly to Russians the point that they should understand that the situation
in Chechnya was putting a strain on Russia-EU relations, that it would have an impact on the acceptance of Russia by the
international community and on Russia's credibility as a political and economic partner (ibid.).
After initially voicing strong criticism, by the second half of 2000 the international community, even before the events of 9/
11 that changed the situation even further, started to tone down its statements. This shift was not linked to any noticeable
improvement in the situation in Chechnya (although according to the Russians the war had officially finished). Rather, by
2001 it started to be clear that tough language seemed to have little effect on Russia and that the West was not ready to
jeopardize the relationship they had already established by threatening concrete measures. This appeared to be the stand not
only of the EU but of other international organizations, on the basis that it is more dangerous to isolate Russia than it is to let it
have its way, and it seems that Russians have understood that this is how it stands e Russia could push the limits of inter-
national tolerance to a very high degree.
The situation was different than with the first Chechen war mainly for two reasons. Firstly, there was not the same level of
internal opposition to the war that could be supported from outside. National unity had given a boost to Russian self-
confidence and Russian great power identity had found its place in Russian domestic discourse. This had its effect on
Russian international relations. Secondly, the second Chechen war was portrayed as a war on terrorism. Hence it was more
difficult for outside criticisms to be formulated. The actual situation was not fully clear for the outside world and the benefit of
doubt was given to the Russian argument. As Strobe Talbott, the foreign policy advisor to the US president, has summarized
the US position.
The West had neither the desire nor the means to engage diplomatically in the Chechen conflict, much less intervene
militarily … . They [Chechens] had indisputably e and it seemed, deliberately e brought down the wrath of Russian
armed forces on their people. That meant there was little we could do but cite Russia's obligations under various in-
ternational covenants to protect civilian life and call on Moscow to let representatives of the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe into Chechnya to help deal with the refugee crisis and monitor the behavior of the Russian
troops (Talbott, 2002, p. 357).

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5. Conclusion: the price of status

The fall of the Soviet Union was clearly a blow to Russian status in world politics. However, it also seemed that from the
Russian point of view, the status that had fallen down was that of the Soviet Union not of Russia. In the Western world's eyes
Russia's status had changed, in the Russian view it had not. Russian great power identity, greatpowerness,2 had therefore to be
proved to the outside world. This can be observed in Russian foreign policy behavior, and could be predicted by the status
inconsistency theory. ‘Many aspects of a nation's interactions with others appear to be affected by its rank position, hence if a
nation lacks a clear, unequivocal ranking, these interactions may become less predictable, increasing misperceptions and
tension’ (Wallace, 1971, p. 32).
The academic literature on status inconsistency, much of it predating the Soviet collapse, draws attention to changes in
both the actual ability of a state to project great power status, and possible gaps between that ability and the perception of
status. From the Russian perspective, Russia since 1991 can be viewed as a status underachiever in that it has not consistently
been recognized as a great power internationally, while at the same time greatpowerness has been assumed, for historic and
geopolitical reasons, as given for the population and political elites of Russia. This gap between greatpowerness as a part of
self-identity and the actual status of a state in international politics has not been so well studied in specific cases. Russia
clearly fits this picture.
This article has shown that this status inconsistency is not just an academic category, but has been understood by Russia's
political leadership and has informed important aspects of domestic and foreign policy. One of the probable reasons for
launching the first and second Chechen wars was to close this gap and impress on the international community that the
Russian Federation had indeed inherited the great power mantle of the Soviet Union. In the case of the first Chechen war, this
attempt had perverse consequences for Russia. In the first place, opinion polls showed that in the eyes of the Russian pop-
ulation, the war had actually diminished Russia's status. But this was due to the unforeseen military failures of the Russian
armed forces in Grozny and the Caucasus mountains.
In the second place, Russia's conduct of the war initially decreased its standing in the eyes of the international community
e because it appeared to violate international agreements that Russia had only recently signed up to, and because the war was
carried out with disregard to human rights and the welfare of the civilian population. On this last count, Russia's pursuit of
great power status did not take account of the norms and values which feature in several academic definitions of what
constitutes a great power, and which were important in the eyes of European and other Western actors. This crucial feature of
the RussiaeEurope relationship in particular involves fuller investigation of the European notions of great power status,
which is beyond the scope of this article.
The case of the second Chechen war was different. While still displaying a deficit with regard to human rights, Russian
politicians succeeded to some extent in circumventing such criticisms by adopting the discourse of the War on Terror, a
discourse which gained even greater resonance after the events of 9/11 2001. Crucially, Russian society was much more united
behind the war than in the earlier case, and it was not marked by the same level of military failures. For these reasons, in-
ternational organizations were far less critical and it could be said that Russia went some way towards achieving the status
recognition that it had sought when launching the first Chechen war. The international context had changed, not just with the
War on Terror, but also with the NATO action in Kosovo, and at the same time it seems that Russia had learnt from earlier
mistakes.
While Russia has achieved increased status, it still suffers from Western norms of democracy and human rights which the
West, by and large, sees Russia as falling short on. Whether the adoption of agreed norms should be considered as a part of
actual capacity or a part of status is an interesting question for status inconsistency theory. At least, there are different views
of Russia's status. This mismatch is one of the reasons why, far from building on the international consensus that appeared to
be emerging in the early 2000s, Russia has been found diametrically opposed to predominant positions in the US and Europe
on a range of issues from Iraq to Syria, to Ukraine. Status inconsistency remains, then, an important analytical tool for un-
derstanding Russian foreign and domestic policy behavior as well as a concept which, in different forms, is understood and
addressed by Russian political elites.
This article has, however, exposed some deficiencies in the theory of status inconsistency. The theory rests on measuring
two factors e the actual capability that a country has, and the status it has internationally. Once these are established, it is
then a straightforward judgment as to whether or not they match up with each other. Perhaps the most obvious problem,
which is not discussed here, is the assumption that there is an objective means of observing whether a country has the actual
capabilities to act as a great, medium, small, or whatever power. Uncertainty over this measurement means that the question
of whether Russia, after increasing its status in the course of the second Chechen war, was moving in the direction of status
consistency or status-inconsistency as an overachiever remains a debatable one. A more intriguing difficulty arises over
measuring status. Status is about perceptions, but there are also perceptions of perceptions. It may be that Western politicians
and academics alike consider that, because of its position in the UN Security Council and the G-8, and the large numbers of
diplomatic representations in Moscow, Russia is recognized as one of the leading powers in the world. But this article has

2
I have defined greatpowerness as a state's self-image as one of the dominant powers in the world which can have a variety of impacts on that state's
behavior. Such behavior can be observed across a wide range of activities and includes measures not only to confirm great power status to the citizens of the
state itself, but also to obtain and continually reaffirm the recognition of that status by the international community, and especially by other great powers
(Smith, 2014, p.45).

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 H. Smith / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (2014) 355e363 363

shown that most Russians attach equal significance to the experience with other organizations, notably the OSCE and the EU,
as well as to the specific issues such as Kosovo and Libya. Above all, the Chechen wars threw into relief the attitude of other
powers towards Russia. They have concluded that Russia has not been treated as a great power by the West. Russia thereby
presents challenges to the theory of status consistency which have yet to be fully worked through.

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