RESEARCH REPORT

TRANSNATIONAL
TENTACLES
Global Hotspots of Western Balkan
Organized Crime

WALTER KEMP
JULY 2020
TRANSNATIONAL
TENTACLES
Global hotspots of Western Balkan
Organized Crime

Walter Kemp

July 2020
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report is an output of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s
Civil Society Observatory to Counter Organized Crime in South Eastern Europe
(SEE-Obs).
SEE-Obs is a platform that connects and empowers civil-society actors in Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. It aims to enable
civil society to identify, analyze and map criminal trends, and their impact on illicit flows,
governance, development, inter-ethnic relations, security and the rule of law. SEE-Obs
supports civil society in their monitoring of national dynamics, and wider regional and
international organized-crime trends. SEE-Obs was launched as an outcome of the 2018
Western Balkans Summit in London, a part of the Berlin Process.
This report is based on data, information and analyses collected by civil-society actors
based in the Western Balkans, in particular by a group of 15 researchers and experts.
We thank them for their valuable insights and contributions, and constructive engage-
ment throughout the process. The research inputs were synthesized and analyzed by
Walter Kemp, with the support of Fatjona Mejdini, Ugi Zvekic, Fabian Zhilla and Kristina
Amerhauser.
This publication was produced with the financial support of the United Kingdom’s
Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Global
Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the United Kingdom.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Walter Kemp is Senior Fellow at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized
Crime (GI-TOC) and directs the Civil Society Observatory to Counter Organized Crime
in South Eastern Europe. Previously he was held a number of senior positions in the
Organization for Security and Cooperation and Cooperation in Europe, was vice pres-
ident of the International Peace Institute, and spokesman and speechwriter at the UN
Office on Drugs and Crime. He has written extensively on conflict prevention, the rela-
tionship between crime and conflict, as well as European security issues.

© 2020 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted

in any form or by any means without permission in writing from
the Global Initiative.

Cover design: Flame Design

Cartography: Paulina Rosol-Barrass

Please direct inquiries to:

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
Avenue de France 23
Geneva, CH-1202
Switzerland

www.globalinitiative.net
CONTENTS

Executive summary����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1
International hotspots�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 2
Context: Transplantation due to upheaval����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4

The communist period: Organized crime in Yugoslavia and Albania���������������������������������������������������� 7

Albania��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8
The Turkish connection������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9

War and its aftermath���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11

Criminals on the front line ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11
Sanctions and the ‘factory of crime’������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 12
An explosion of crime on the home front���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13
The Albanian pyramid collapses������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 15
Crime and conflict in Kosovo������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 15
Mafia state������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 16
Go straight or go abroad������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17
Albanians branch out������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19
Displacement and diaspora �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20

Western Europe��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22
Italy: Partners in crime ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24
Spain: From thieves to barons���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27
Netherlands: The ‘Joegomaffia’ �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29
Czech Republic����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32

South Africa ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 35

Importing criminals���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 35
Krejčíř and Gavric������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 36
Settling old scores������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 37
New players in new markets?����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39

Turkey: Gateway to the east���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 41

Close ties between Turkey and the Balkans ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 41
From suitcases to trucks ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 42
Attracting trade and investment������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 43
The ‘Balkan route’ for heroin������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 44
Cannabis and skunk �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 46
Smuggling of migrants ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 47
 Latin America�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 51
Roots of the cocaine groups ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 51
The attraction of Latin America ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 53
Right place at the right time�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 55
The role of the Western Balkan groups������������������������������������������������������������������������� 56
The routes and modalities ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 60
Other drug-trafficking methods������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 64
A winning business model ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 65

Australia������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 67

Balkan ‘mafias on the move’��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 70

Conclusions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 74
Characteristics of the groups������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 75
An unbeatable business model��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 76
Enabling factors ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 76
Law-enforcement cooperation �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 77
A multi-layered approach ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 78
The role of civil society ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 80
Violence and silence ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 80

Notes��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 81

Pristina, Kosovo. The war in Kosovo between 1998 and 1999 created not only 
a humanitarian tragedy, but also a fertile environment for organized crime.
© Pjeter Gjergjaj/EyeEm via Getty Images

iv TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
 T
he Western Balkans region is often portrayed as a hotspot of organized
crime. As illustrated in other publications by the Global Initiative Against
Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), the region is a transit corridor for
the trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings, and suffers from widespread
crime and corruption. From a global perspective, however, the Western Balkans is
relatively stable. It is a small market for illicit goods and services – the big money, as
some groups from the Western Balkans have discovered, is to be made elsewhere.

This report looks at global hotspots of criminal activity carried out by groups from
the six countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,1
Montenegro, North Macedonia2 and Serbia). The report does not claim to be compre-
hensive. Due to constraints, the main focus is on certain countries in Western Europe
and Latin America, as well as South Africa, Turkey and Australia. These countries
or regions were chosen because they give an indication of the types and variety of
groups involved, the criminal markets, the transnational nature of the links, as well as
the evolution of activities carried out abroad by criminal groups from the Western
Balkans. These are also places where the GI-TOC has local expertise. More attention
could be given to criminal groups from the Western Balkans that are active in Brazil,
Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Romania, the United States as well as northern Africa.
This will be the focus of a future report.

The report describes the push and pull factors behind how and why individuals from
the Western Balkans established criminal operations in various countries across the
globe. It also traces how certain groups from the Western Balkans have moved up
the value chain in the past 20 years, from small-time crooks and couriers to becoming
major distributors of drugs in networks that stretch from Latin America to Western
Europe and South Africa. The report also examines what links these groups maintain
with the Western Balkans. However, it should be borne in mind that while this report
is focused on criminal groups from the Western Balkans, one should not lose sight
of the fact that in most societies where these groups operate they are not the main
criminal group: local groups are.

 Podgorica, Montenegro. In recent years, Spain has become a key hub for criminal
groups from the country. © Aiman Suhaimi/EyeEm via Shutterstock

1
Most criminal groups The report builds on the GI-TOC’s efforts to map criminal activity at the global,
regional and local levels. It can also be considered a companion to the GI-TOC report
from the Western
Hotspots of Organized Crime in the Western Balkans (May 2019). As with the 2019
Balkans now carry study, this report is an output of the GI-TOC’s Civil Society Observatory to Counter
out their operations Organized Crime in South Eastern Europe. It is based on data and analyses collected
and shared by civil-society actors across the Western Balkans, as well as by experts
in hotspots outside (particularly investigative reporters) in the countries where criminal groups from the
the region. Western Balkans are active.

This report is based on open sources and interviews. Although it has benefited from
the local insights of contributors from all of the affected countries profiled in this
report, it is limited in its scope by the amount and type of information that is avail-
able. What is in the public domain usually reveals what has already happened and
what has been reported, which is usually only a fraction of what is really going on.
There is also an inevitable time lag in the process of analysis. While reports such as
this look at past developments, criminals are constantly adapting to take advantage
of new opportunities, discovering new markets and developing new techniques (such
as using so-called narco-jets, communicating via encrypted cellphones and laundering
their money in cryptocurrencies or in offshore havens). It is up to law-enforcement
agencies to be one step ahead.

This report was written at the end of March 2020, and at the time of writing it
was not clear how criminal markets would be affected by the COVID-19 crisis and
attendant restrictions on movement. Will there be more potential foot soldiers, new
hotspots of vulnerability, or perhaps less demand for drugs? The effect of the global
pandemic on the operations of the Western Balkans groups will be an issue the
GI-TOC’s Civil Society Observatory to Counter Organized Crime in South Eastern
Europe will be watching closely.

International hotspots
The Western Balkans is a relatively small market for organized crime. Most criminal
groups from the region now carry out their operations outside the region, particularly
in Western Europe and Latin America. Those hotspots are profiled in this report.

Despite occasional claims in the media, there does not seem to be a single, identifi-
able ‘Balkan cartel’, although certain groups do sometimes work with one another,
and there are also instances of multi-ethnic groups. Most criminal groups from the
Western Balkans tend to operate discreetly and efficiently in the global hotspots,
despite their reputation for violence. Most of the violence among the groups seems
to be related to the settling of scores either within their own ranks or with rivals.

Groups from the region are modern, dynamic and entrepreneurial, showing an ability
to adapt and innovate, and use technology to their advantage (for example, by using
encrypted forms of communication; exploring new routes and means of trafficking,
such as ‘narco-jets’ used to smuggle drugs; and laundering their money through

2 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
cryptocurrencies, offshore havens and into their home countries). They are report-
edly responsible for the financing, transportation and distribution of large amounts
of cocaine shipped from South America to Europe. Their ability to work with local
criminal groups and access cocaine at source, combined with their presence in major
European port cities, means that they are able to control the end-to-end supply of
cocaine.

The groups’ operational nous has allowed them to move up the value chain in several
countries over the past 20 years. In some countries (such as Italy, Spain, Ecuador, the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands), they have become major players, particularly
in the cocaine trade. The biggest market for the goods trafficked by criminal groups
from the Western Balkans is Western Europe.

Criminals moved to many of the hotspots analyzed in this report as a result of con-
ditions triggered by war and instability in the Western Balkans in the 1990s. With
the exception of Latin America, criminal groups from the Western Balkans are
active in countries where there are sizeable diasporas from the region, including the
Netherlands, Italy, Turkey and South Africa. It is important to note that although
the problem of organized crime in the Western Balkans has largely moved abroad,
the activities of these criminal groups are harmful to the reputation of the countries
where they are from, not least in the process of EU accession. In addition, some of
the underlying conditions of vulnerability that caused people to leave the Western
Balkans in the past still exist – namely, unemployment, lack of opportunities, frustra-
tion with their governments and the slow process of EU accession. If these issues are
not addressed, the ranks of criminals from the Western Balkans will be bolstered.

Addressing the threat posed by criminal groups from the Balkans will have to come,
in part, from the outside, namely in the shape of more effective international coop-
eration, tracking and seizing of assets, and the sharing of information, not least since
perpetrators tend to use multiple identities. Between 2018 and 2020, there have
been an increasing number of successful joint counter-narcotics operations, some of
them interdicting several tonnes of drugs. However, greater cooperation between
law-enforcement agencies in countries of supply and demand, as well as with their
counterparts from the Western Balkans, is needed.

Civil society, both in the Western Balkans and the diaspora, also has an important
role to play, given that it can strengthen a culture of lawfulness at home, boost resil-
ience among communities, and advocate for a society free from crime and violence.

For the international community – and governments in Western Europe in partic-

ular – the biggest challenge is to reduce demand for the goods and services being
provided by criminal groups from the Western Balkans and to reduce vulnerability in
countries such as Ecuador and Colombia, where the cocaine is produced. Otherwise
the tentacles of criminal groups – including those from the Western Balkans – will
continue to wrap themselves around the globe.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
 Context: Transplantation due to upheaval
The aftermath of the NATO Changes in the strategic environment can cause upheavals that have an impact
bombing of Pec, former on criminal markets and actors.3 These changes can give rise to a fertile climate
Yugoslavia, August 1999. for crime and corruption. As Federico Varese points out in Mafias on the Move,
© Scott Peterson/Liaison via
‘mafias emerge in societies that are undergoing a sudden and late transition to
Getty Images
the market economy, lack a legal structure that reliably protects property rights,
and have a supply of people trained in violence who become unemployed at this
specific juncture’.4 As will be illustrated in this report, such conditions existed in
Albania and many countries of the former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s.

As well as facilitating the emergence of criminal groups, episodes of conflict or

humanitarian crisis often result in population displacement, which in turn can
lead to what Varese describes as ‘transplantation’ of criminal groups. One classic
example of this is the transplantation of the Italian mafia from Italy to the United
States in the 1920s. Other examples include the transplantation of the Russian
mafia after the collapse of the Soviet Union or Ibos from Nigeria to different parts
of the world.

In the process of transplantation, criminal groups originating from the Western

Balkans took advantage of the political turbulence in countries that were also
experiencing dramatic changes in their strategic environment. Latin America was
(and still is) going through turbulent times, not least with the formal cessation of

4 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
almost 50 years of war in Colombia (the world’s biggest producer of cocaine) and Over the past 20 years,
unrest in Venezuela. Furthermore, weak governance and institutions in places
criminal groups
such as Ecuador and South Africa have enabled criminal groups at home and
from abroad to make inroads. This supports Varese’s point that it is easier for from the Western Balkans
criminal groups to be transplanted into areas where there are low levels of trust, have gone global.
civic culture/engagement and social capital. In such environments, resilience is
weaker and opportunities are greater for criminal protection.5

That said, this report also shows that criminal groups can penetrate well-estab-
lished markets in well-developed countries. This seems to be particularly the case
in countries where criminals can take advantage of a sizeable diaspora. In addi-
tion, it is important to remember that criminals do not necessarily move abroad
as part of a conscious strategy, but often as the result of unintended conse-
quences.6 Would the men fighting in the Balkan wars of the 1990s really have
imagined that 20 years later they would be negotiating cocaine deals in Brazil, or
acting as bodyguards in South Africa? Would young men growing up in some of
the poorest villages of Albania or Kosovo in the mid-1990s have imagined that
they would be major players in drug markets in London, Amsterdam or Rome?

Furthermore, as well as focusing on hierarchical mafia-style groups, it is import-

ant to look at serious criminal activities involving enterprising networks.7 This
report shows how people from the Western Balkans have created and responded
to opportunities to profit from illicit markets. Rather than transplanting well-
established operations from the Western Balkans to other countries, many of
the individuals and groups featured in this report have started out as small
players abroad and then worked their way up to becoming major actors in some
of the world’s biggest drug markets. The risk is that they transplant some of
their operations and influence back into the Balkans, particularly through money
laundering, and targeted assassinations. This can have a serious impact on the
political economy of the Western Balkans.

This report endeavours to show how, over the past 20 years, criminal groups
from the Western Balkans have gone global and are moving up the value chain
of criminal activity. The tentacles of this octopus now spread around the world:
from the supply of cocaine in Latin America to the streets of Western Europe;
from heroin-distribution routes in Turkey into Europe; from cannabis fields in
Albania to Turkey and the European Union (EU). The Western Balkans remains
the centre of this trade: as a region of transit; as a recruiting ground for the foot
soldiers of these groups; and as a safe place to hide out and invest or launder
one’s ill-gotten gains – but the main action is abroad.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
 THE COMMUNIST
PERIOD
ORGANIZED CRIME IN
YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA
6 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
 I
n order to understand today’s hotspots outside the Western Balkans, it is import-
ant to recall the history and evolution of criminal structures, markets and actors
within the region.

In the 1970s and 1980s, people living in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) had a relatively high standard of living compared to their peers in other
communist countries. They could also travel quite freely, and as a result, many
went abroad to work. The expectation of both those travelling abroad as well as
their employers was that they would only be there temporarily (hence the German
expression Gastarbeiter, or ‘guest worker’). Some even went as far as South Africa,
responding to that country’s campaign to entice white Europeans with job offers.8 In
other cases, people went abroad for seasonal employment.

Most Yugoslavs who went abroad were industrious, law-abiding, blue-collar workers
who were looking for a better future. But, as often happens when a large group
emigrates, this movement also created new possibilities for crime. As former
BBC correspondent Misha Glenny explains in his 2008 book McMafia, the large
Gastarbeiter community ‘provided the milieu in which less salubrious Yugoslav char-
acters could take refuge and disappear from police if necessary’.9 These characters
started on a relatively low rung of the criminal-activity ladder, engaging in racketeer-
ing and the burglary of luxury goods retailers, homes and safe deposit boxes.

Some of the more notorious characters who came to prominence in this time
include Milenko Mikanović Lazin, Rade Kotour, Goran ‘Majmun’ Vuković, and
Ljubomir Magaš, as well Željko Ražnatović, better known as ‘Arkan’. Between 1972
and 1983, Arkan amassed convictions or warrants in Belgium, the Netherlands,

  communist-era scene from Belgrade, the capital of the former Yugoslavia from 1918
A
to the country’s dissolution in 2006. © Toronto Star Archives/Toronto Star via Getty Images

7
 Sweden, West Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Italy, mostly for armed robber-
ies. Remarkably, he escaped from prison in five different countries.10 This first
wave of criminals regularly travelled back and forth between Western Europe and
Yugoslavia. When they came back home, they spent or invested their money, and
then would go on another ‘tour’ abroad.

This behaviour did not go unnoticed by the state security services. Indeed, criminals
were sometimes encouraged by the authorities to go abroad. They were even helped
with the paperwork and sometimes were provided with passports and other travel
documents. By facilitating their travel abroad, the security services prevented the
criminals from causing trouble at home. Such assistance also provided useful lever-
age for the security services, and criminals were often used for various assignments,
such as the assassination of political emigrants.11 For example, Đorđe ‘Giška’ Božović,
known as the ‘king of the Belgrade underworld’, was sometimes called on by the
secret service to eliminate political dissidents and state enemies. It is alleged, for
example, that he was the mastermind behind the assassination of Croatian political
dissident and businessman Stejpan Đureković in West Germany in 1983.12

Albania
The situation in Albania was different, given that the borders were closed between
1945 and 1990. Indeed, while Yugoslavia was one of the most open communist soci-
eties, Albania was one of the most restricted. In this highly controlled environment,
any illicit activity would have had to have the knowledge, if not the complicity of,
state officials.

Due to limited access to foreign investment as well as poor infrastructure, Albania’s

economy was one of the weakest in the communist bloc. Looking for opportunities
to raise hard currency, it seems that the Albanian regime could not resist an offer
made in 1966 to smuggle cigarettes.13 The plan was to smuggle US brands of tobacco
to Italy and then trade these cigarettes on to other destinations in Europe and the
Middle East.

The Swiss traders who made the offer had connections with the Italian mafia who,
for their part, were looking for new opportunities, not least when law-enforcement
operations in the Tyrrhenian Sea became more effective. According to a former
Italian anti-mafia prosecutor, mafia bosses such as Raffaelo Cutolo (head of Nuova
Camorra Organizzata) understood that the controls behind the Iron Curtain were
strong for political reasons, but not necessarily an impediment to criminal trafficking,
including cigarettes.

The Albanian government opened a free economic zone to serve as a transit point
for the contraband cigarettes that were arriving from the United States, as well as
founding a company called Albtrans, allegedly led by the Albanian Secret Service
(Sigurimi), which managed the operation within Albania for a commission of around
US$9 per box. It is believed that the Albanian government accrued around US$35
million through this scheme between 1968 and 1991.14 In this way, the Adriatic Sea,
which up to that point had been regarded as a ‘blue border’, became a lucrative new
gateway to the east for Italian criminal groups. In return, the Albanian regime gained

8 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
valuable networks, trade and hard currency. This was the origin of the ‘Balkan route’,
which would facilitate criminal activities for years to come.

The Turkish connection

Around the same time that the Italian mafia was looking east, Turkish traffickers were
looking west. Starting in the 1970s, criminal groups in Turkey established interna-
tional trade and transportation companies to facilitate heroin trafficking to lucrative
Western European markets. The Balkans was regarded as a low-risk route and was
used for transit and the temporary storage of drug shipments. Ethnic Albanians (who
were considered hard working and reliable) were favoured by the Turkish groups and
were often used as drivers and couriers.

For Turkish criminal groups, Yugoslavia was not considered a lucrative market, but
it was (like Bulgaria) regarded as a safe and useful meeting point to liaise and trade
with Italian and other criminal groups. When purchasing heroin, Italian groups would
also sometimes sell weapons and ammunition. Guns were in high demand in Turkey
in the 1970s due to the intense and violent rivalry between right-wing nationalists
and communists.15 However, a military coup in 1980 put a halt to the violence and
the new Turkish leadership subsequently cracked down on organized crime.16 Under
Operation Godfathers (Babalar Operasyonu), many major mafia leaders in Turkey were
arrested and sentenced to long prison terms. Some mafia leaders were executed in
mysterious circumstances by hitmen thought to be working on behalf of the so-called
‘deep state’. Others were able to escape the country, reportedly due to their clandes-
tine relationship with the Turkish state.17

In the 1980s, law-enforcement agencies in Western Europe also became more

vigilant against criminal groups from Turkey. Many Turkish nationals – including
politicians, intelligence officers and undercover police officers – were arrested for
heroin trafficking in Europe. But while Operation Godfathers in Turkey and more
effective law enforcement in Western Europe increased the risks for Turkish criminal
groups, they also created opportunities for those from the Balkans. With Turkey-
licensed vehicles under international scrutiny, traffickers frequently used vehicles
with Yugoslavian and Bulgarian licence plates instead. Turkish organized-crime groups
cooperated with passport forgers in Bulgaria to issue false passports for ethnic
Albanian drivers and couriers (from Yugoslavia) involved in drug trafficking.

The end of communism brought dramatic changes. In Albania, student demonstra-

tions in Tirana in December 1990 helped to end more than 45 years of isolation
which had been defined by the repressive regime of Enver Hoxha (1954–1985).
Change brought economic hardship, and political and social unrest, but it also created
freedoms that young people had never experienced. Many took the opportunity to
flee abroad. One of the most iconic images of the time is of thousands of Albanians
on the cargo ship Vlora entering the Italian port of Bari in August 1991. But as many
Albanians and Yugoslavs hoped for a better future, trouble was on the horizon.

THE COMMUNIST PERIOD: ORGANIZED CRIME IN YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA 9

WAR AND ITS
AFTERMATH
10 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
 T
he dramatic events of 1989 and 1990 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
also had an impact on Yugoslavia. The Communist Party broke up along national-
ist lines, and in 1991 Croatia and Slovenia declared independence. What followed
was a period of almost four years of on-and-off fighting, particularly in Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina, until the December 1995 Dayton Agreement. The region was rocked
by further instability with the collapse of a pyramid scheme in Albania in 1997, followed
by war in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. This section looks at the how these events con-
tributed to where, how and why certain hotspots of Balkan organized crime developed
outside Yugoslavia and Albania.

Criminals on the front line

When war broke out in 1991, criminals from the SFRY who had operated in Western
Europe in the 1980s returned home and were mobilized in paramilitary formations. With
the blessing of the regime, they were joined by common criminals, thugs and football
hooligans to help the war effort.18 As John Mueller describes:

The most dynamic (and murderous) Serbian units were notably composed not of
committed nationalists or ideologues, nor of locals out to get their neighbors, nor
of ordinary people whipped into a frenzy by demagogues and the media, but rather
of common criminals recruited for the task.19

The most notorious unit was the Serb Volunteer Guard, also known as Arkan’s Tigers.
They fought, raped and plundered, particularly in Eastern Slavonia, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina.20 There were also warlords such as Mladen Naletilić Tuta, a Bosnian Croat
who ran the Convicts Battalion, and Jusuf ‘Juka’ Prazhina, a Bosnian gangster whose
paramilitary unit was made up of gang members who helped to defend Sarajevo.21
These groups – although relatively small – were often in the vanguard of much of the
ethnic cleansing and other atrocities that were perpetrated during the war. Like typical

 Inhabitants of Prizren, Kosovo, hide behind a tank of the international Kosovo Force,
after Serbian snipers opened fire, June 1999. © Christophe Simon/AFP via Getty Images

11
 criminals, they offered ‘protection’ to those who Some of them nevertheless overplayed their hand
obeyed or paid. They wrapped their criminal activ- and created resentment among their own people.
ities in the national flag, thereby legitimizing their For example, in October 1993, Bosnian Muslims
actions in defence of the homeland while fomenting arrested two reputed gangsters within their own
ethnic hatred. As Mueller points out, what often ranks for extorting the very people they were
passed for ‘ethnic warfare’ was something far more supposed to be defending during the siege of
banal: ‘the creation of communities of criminal vio- Sarajevo. According to a report from the time, the
lence and pillage’.22 two (Ramiz Delalic also known as ‘Celo’ and Musan
While these thugs were feared by many, they Topalovic known as ‘Caco’) had led a campaign of
were idolized by others. As Warren Zimmermann murder, robbery and rape. Their gang had appar-
observes, ‘the dregs of society – embezzlers, ently monopolized the black market that accounted
thugs, even professional killers – rose from the for the city’s only trade, earning fortunes at a time
slime to become freedom fighters and national when most of Sarajevo’s inhabitants were spending
heroes’.23 Talking to The Wall Street Journal in 1993, their days scavenging for water and bread.25 In sum,
a journalist in Belgrade said: ‘the biggest heroes of the war made some criminals rich and others infa-
the war so far are criminals. I would say that there mous. It also gave young men fighting experience
are about 3,000 Belgrade criminals in Bosnia at the of the most ruthless kind, and it created lucrative
front … They are brave, imaginative and loyal to the markets for criminal activity.
people they work for.’ 24

Sanctions and the ‘factory of crime’

The international embargo imposed between 1992 As sanctions began to bite, the leadership in
and 1996 by the United Nations Security Council Belgrade increasingly turned to criminal markets to
created hardship in Yugoslavia and had knock-on keep the country running. As a journalist observed
effects on neighbouring countries, but it also at the time: ‘The black market is the main way of
created opportunities. As David Samuels points out: preserving the social peace in Belgrade. So the state
‘the invisible wall erected by the West kept the crim- is looking to work with it.’27 Slobodan Milošević’s
inal élites of Serbia rich and the rest of the defeated government merged law-enforcement agencies and
country poor’. 26
security services with organized criminals, not only
The black market assumed a crucial importance in to create productive relationships, but also to super-
facilitating the exchange of scarce goods. Croats vise the extensive black market and grey economies.
and Bosnians, for example, needed weapons, given Smuggling was both in the interest of the state, and
that they started at a disadvantage when most of in some cases run by the state.28 In a way, the illicit
the assets of the Yugoslav People’s Army went over business of the black market became legitimized. It is
to Serbia and Montenegro and a weapons embargo alleged, for example, that the Serbian State Security
had been imposed by the UN in 1992. Bosnians Service was funded, in part, by money earned from
besieged in Sarajevo needed weaponry, ammuni- the sale of goods (including drugs) that were seized
tion, fuel and goods to survive; Serbs needed fuel. by the customs agency.29 Furthermore, the leader-
There was also a vibrant market in stolen cars. ship in both Belgrade and Podgorica were involved in
Circumventing sanctions often required making cigarette smuggling, which was a valuable source of
deals with one’s enemies: Croats bought weapons hard currency. It is estimated that the Montenegrin
from Serbs, while Serbs bought fuel from Bosnians government was making US$700 million a year from
and Croats. the cigarette trade, mostly to Italy.

12 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
Sanctions put a heavy burden on some neighbouring and therefore new smuggling opportunities had the
states. As Glenny explains: ‘Not a penny of assis- unintended consequence of developing criminal
tance or compensation was offered to Yugoslavia’s economies in some neighbouring countries.
neighbours – they were all expected to shoulder the
In short, some of the characteristics of the eco-
costs of the West’s moral indignation. So the only
system of crime that still remain in many parts of
way they could pay for pensions, wages and health
the Balkans is the result of the war in Yugoslavia
care was by allowing the mob to shore up its control
and the international community’s response to it.
of the country’s main trading routes and claim igno-
As Glenny writes: ‘Somehow this orgy of war and
rance, helplessness or both. As the crisis deepened,
consumer excess had to be paid for … because the
so did this symbiotic relationship between politics
industry of sanctions-busting had now created a
and crime.’30
huge pan-Balkan network of organized crime … the
There was widespread oil smuggling across Lake easiest way of underwriting the affairs of state was
Skadar between Albania and Montenegro, as well through mafia business: drugs, arms, oil, weapons,
as by land across the border from North Macedonia women and migrants. The foundations for a factory
and Albania. Indeed, sanctions-busting and the fact of crime had been laid.’ 31
that the break-up of Yugoslavia created new borders

An explosion of crime on the home front

On the home front, organized crime flourished. Around 1992, a style developed among the young
Guns were widely available; war and sanctions had men engaged in criminal activity characterized by
ruined the economy and triggered hyperinflation. track suits, sports shoes, short hair, sunglasses and
In the first two years of the war, 300 000 young garish gold chains. ‘Diesel’ brand jeans were also
people left Yugoslavia; there were few opportunities popular, inspiring the name of this gangster look:
for those who stayed. As portrayed in The Wounds, a ‘dizelaši’.35 Aleksandar ‘Knele’ Knežević, who by his
1998 film by Srđan Dragojević, many young men felt teens was already one of Belgrade’s most notori-
abandoned and hurt. The only people with money ous gangsters, was a poster boy of the gangster
and power were the gangsters, either returning from culture and dizelaši style. ‘In a country gripped by
the West or profiting from the war economy. As one
observer said at the time, ‘you can’t do anything
by honest work. More and more young people are
making up their minds: death or glory’.32

But while many of the gangsters who had made

their reputation in the West in the 1980s joined
paramilitaries, young thugs had their moment of
glory in the big cities. As captured in a documentary
called See You in the Obituary, criminals, often on
drugs, were as bent on violence and notoriety as
they were on organized crime.33 As a result of vio-
lence between gangs – particularly from the New
Belgrade and Voždovac districts of Belgrade – the
number of murders in the capital doubled in the first
two years of the war. As one gangster at the time
said of Belgrade, ‘this is a small pond with too many
crocodiles in it’.34 Aleksandar ‘Knele’ Knežević

WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 13

 Cash machines and burglaries
In the early 1990s, criminals from the Western Balkan immigrants,43 predominantly ethnic Albanians
Balkans became notorious overseas for carrying out and some of them illegal entrants to the United
burglaries. This included bank robberies in Western States. But the group also recruited people with
Europe, and jewel heists. In the United States, police other ethnic backgrounds.44
were perplexed by a series of well-organized attacks
The group became such a menace that in the mid-
on jewellery stores and automated teller machines
1990s, the FBI launched a task force to take down
(ATMs).
the criminal ring.45 While the group seems to have
They started to notice that many of the perpetrators faded away by around the following decade, their
were from the Balkans, and therefore referred to the name was brought up in 2017 when it was suggested
group as YACS (Yugoslavs, Albanians, Croatians and that the theft of US$9 million worth of jewellery
Serbs).38 The YACS were observed as a mobile and from Kim Kardashian looked much like a technique
loose network of people, whose members would get used by the YACS.46 But this has not been confirmed
together to work on what appeared to be ad hoc but by official statements.
well-planned heists. The groups would then disperse
In recent years, a number of burglaries in Western
and reform for the next break-in. 39 A typical YACS
Europe have been attributed to nationals of the
heist would involve cutting holes through ceilings 40
Western Balkans, particularly Albanians. The so-called
to access a safe or an ATM, and disabling phone lines
Hawks are a small and mobile group of people, who
and security systems.41
come together to break into houses before they split
Unfamiliar with cultural characteristics of the again. They regularly travel back and forth between
Western Balkans and local Balkan languages, the the Western Balkans region and the EU. As noted in
police struggled to understand them. YACS would the section on Spain later in this report, this technique
often use fake identities, which made it even more seems to have been used to rob homes of footballers.
difficult to track them, and, when arrested, they Recently, a group of Albanians were caught in Australia
often carried a telephone number of a person who, after a series of ATM robberies, most of which bore the
after being contacted, would pay their bail. In the
42
hallmarks of the YACS and thefts in Western Europe.47
United States, nearly 300 suspected gang members The Albanian authorities take the problem so seriously
had been identified in 1998, who were generally that they have created an anti-Hawk unit.

war and complete societal breakdown, where wages had to be spent immedi-
ately because inflation could devalue them by the minute, gangsters such as
Knele were idolised because they were the only ones that could be seen living
the good life.’36 Knele lived fast and died young, murdered in mysterious cir-
cumstances in the Hyatt Hotel in Belgrade at the age of 21. He was among a
number of young criminals who were murdered in mafia-style killings, the per-
petrators of which were almost never found or arrested.37 Most criminals who
survived this violent period graduated to the higher echelons of crime after the
war or went abroad.

14 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
The Albanian pyramid collapses The foundations for a
Although Albania was not directly involved in the war, some Albanians profited from factory of crime had
smuggling. The profits, coupled with poor regulation of the banking system and been laid during the
dreams of easy money, fuelled a pyramid scheme in early 1996. Around two-thirds of
the population invested in such schemes to the point that liabilities were equal to the war in Yugoslavia.
half of the country’s GDP. The collapse of these pyramid schemes in 1997 created
not only economic instability but also social and political unrest. Riots broke out and
the state lost control over some cities, particularly those close to ports or along the
border with former Yugoslavia and Greece.48 Armouries were looted, flooding the
country with almost 600 000 weapons, including 226 000 Kalashnikovs. 49

In this breakdown of law and order (in which around 2 000 civilians were killed), some
people organized themselves into self-defence committees to protect themselves
from criminal groups.50 For others, hierarchically structured criminal organizations
filled the void of governance and provided protection. Some criminal groups hired
former members of the special forces and secret service to enhance their effective-
ness and carry out sophisticated criminal activities.51

Organized crime boomed in this environment. The number of criminal groups

increased in a very short period of time, as did the size of their membership.52 Drug
trafficking and car theft flourished, as did money laundering.53 Instability at home was
also compounded by the growing crisis in neighbouring Kosovo. It is believed that at
least 6 000 Kalashnikovs were smuggled from Albania to Kosovo before and during
the Kosovo War, while around 465 000 people fled from Kosovo to Albania. 54, 55, 56

Crime and conflict in Kosovo

The war in Kosovo between 1998 and 1999 created a humanitarian tragedy and
political upheaval, as well as a fertile environment for organized crime.57 Because
Kosovo was an unrecognized entity, during the war it needed assistance from abroad
in order to survive. As a result, in addition to political and financial support from
abroad (including from the diaspora), several criminal activities emerged, such as
smuggling of arms, oil, drugs and stolen cars, as well as corruption.58 These activities
built on informal networks and the grey economy, which had developed in response
to difficult socio-economic conditions in Kosovo in the 1990s.

Between 1999 and 2008, Kosovo was governed by the UN International

Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) – the real shift of governance to local
domestic authorities only started in 2005.59 Since 2008, Kosovo has been assisted
by the EU-supported rule of law mission (EULEX) to build rule of law institutions
and facilitate the process of integration of Kosovo into EU.60 In this post-conflict
context of state-building, weak institutions and poor infrastructure, powerful individ-
uals who had participated in the war and had strong connections with the diaspora
enhanced their wealth and influence by drifting between legal and criminal activi-
ties.61 Some also went into politics, and a few of these became involved in extraction
of public funds.62 Former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army were allegedly
linked to some criminal activities (such as petrol stations that were used for money

WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 15

 laundering).63 Others, particularly those in the so-called ‘protection’ business, added a
veneer of legitimacy to their activities by establishing private security companies.64

Despite the progress made in state-building, the central government of Kosovo to

this day has very little control over the north of the country, where the majority are
ethnic Serbs. The institutions of the north have limited power due to the slow pace
of self-administration, while the region is also the subject of a long-running dispute
between Belgrade and Pristina about the northern area’s status and borders. The
result is a grey zone that makes for a fertile environment for illicit activity.65 As the
2019 report of the European Commission on Kosovo dryly notes: ‘The situation in
the north of Kosovo with regards to organised crime continues to pose challenges for
law enforcement agencies.’66

Mafia state
As described above, during the wars in Yugoslavia, the Milošević regime became
involved in smuggling in order to survive and brought a number of leading criminals
into its ranks. This model continued after the war as well, including the smuggling of
drugs and weapons. As Glenny explains: ‘Organized crime and secret police worked
hand in glove in Yugoslavia; indeed it was often impossible to distinguish one from
the other.’67 Unlike in other countries of Eastern Europe, there was no lustration after
the war or the end of communism to prevent the continued participation of crimi-
nal actors in the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia government. The old leopards
simply changed their spots.

Serbian nationalist and war

criminal Željko Ražnatović,
better known as Arkan. Between
1972 and 1983, Arkan amassed
convictions or warrants in
Belgium, the Netherlands,
Sweden, West Germany, Austria,
Switzerland and Italy.
© Antoine Gyori/Sygma via
Getty Images

16
But Milošević’s position was unstable, both in terms of political power and control of Organized crime and
criminal markets. Assassinations increased, including of criminals such as Arkan and
secret police worked
opposition politicians such as Ivan Stambolic. Senior figures in the security services
played key roles in the contest for power between Milošević and the opposition hand in glove in
between 1999 and 2003. Their involvement was complicated by linkages between Yugoslavia; it was
the secret police and organized crime as well as the Special Operations Unit (JSO),
with it being alleged that members of the JSO were part of the notorious Zemun
often impossible to
clan. This criminal group, named after a district of Belgrade, emerged around 1993; distinguish one from
by 2001, when they abducted the well-known Serbian business-man Miroslav
the other.
Mišković, the Zemun clan were described as ‘one of the strongest European crimi-
nal organizations’, which for years had the protection of the state.68 Meanwhile, the
political momentum was shifting. Milošević resigned in October 2000 after a closely
fought presidential election. He was arrested in April 2001 and extradited to the
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague.69

Some of those who had switched allegiance from Milošević to the new Prime
Minister Zoran Đinđić, such as the head of the JSO Milorad ‘Legija’ Luković, began to
get nervous when Đinđić declared that he would crack down on organized crime, and
the ICTY came looking for Lukovic. As a result, it is alleged that a group of police –
some of whom had been paramilitaries during the war, as well as some with criminal
connections – assassinated Đinđić on 12 March 2003.70

The other half of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, namely Montenegro, was also
struggling with the legacy of the war, the crippling effect of sanctions and hyper-
inflation. One way of surviving was through the smuggling of cigarettes. Between
1994 and 2002, cigarette smuggling was carried out on an industrial scale. The illicit
business – estimated to bring US$700 million of hard currency annually – was done
in collaboration with Italian mafia groups. An investigation carried out by the Italian
authorities uncovered that the smuggling was state-organized and that at the top
of the illicit operation was the then prime minister of Montenegro, Milo Dukanović
(now the president of the country). They issued a warrant for his arrest in 2005.
While charges against Đukanović were dropped in 2009, the massive smuggling
operation opened the door to corruption and empowered local criminal networks
and their international ties. It also transformed Montenegro into an attractive des-
tination for Italian criminals. According to a former anti-mafia magistrate in Bari,
in the 1990s many major Italian criminals were hanging out in Montenegro: ‘Over
a hundred of the most dangerous Italian fugitives [are living] in a country of just
600,000. How is that possible?’

Go straight or go abroad
The assassination of Đinđić was a jolt to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In
response, a state of emergency was declared and in 2003 a major crackdown on
organized crime called Operation Sabre (Sabjla) was launched. More than 10 000
people were detained, with the investigation uncovering a murky tangle of relation-
ships between political and criminal groups, as well as between the security services
and organized crime. Several members of the Zemun clan were convicted for killings
and terrorist attacks. As a result, the criminal group was virtually dismantled, or at

WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 17

 CCTV footage of a member of the Pink Panthers gang during a jewellery heist.
© Facebook

The Pink Panthers: smash and grab

Pink Panthers is the name given by INTERPOL to an became third-grade citizens. They considered us
international network of jewel and watch thieves, savages. All this gives way to spite. And sometimes
consisting of around 200 members and so-called we are even out for revenge.’73
facilitators (and others), almost all of whom are from
The Pink Panthers seem to be more of a network
the Western Balkans. The network is responsible
than an organized-crime group with a specific
for some of the biggest and most audacious jewel
leadership or heads. According to someone familiar
heists ever, and has operated in numerous countries
with the group, ‘the Panthers’ organizational structure
and on several continents. According to different
is like an octopus’.74 There were more relevant
sources, the group is responsible for over €350
figures within the group who can be understood as
million in robberies of gold and diamonds. There
‘senior’ thieves, but they did not exercise any control
are suggestions that some of their operations may
over more junior members of the criminal network.
have been on behalf of clients in wealthy European
The heists were usually committed by local cells
countries.72
already present in the country or in neighbouring
Many members speak multiple languages, possess areas. However, thieves often returned home to
numerous passports and have had military training Montenegro (predominantly to Cetinje) or Serbia
and a violent past dating back to Yugoslavia’s wars. (particularly the city of Nis), where they remained
According to one person close to the group, part of ‘on call’ for future jobs. Many seem to have had
the original motivation of members of the group was contacts and apartments in Italy.75 A major operation
anger and revenge. ‘Yugoslavia used to be a country by INTERPOL in 2007 seems to have diminished the
whose passport was worth more than any other in network’s effectiveness, but there are indications that
Europe … Then suddenly it all turned around. We some members are still active.

18 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
least dispersed. According to reports, during Operation Sabre, the number of drug
dealers was reduced so dramatically that the price of narcotics increased significantly.

As Varese points out, ‘mafias move to new territories in order to escape state pros-
ecution, mafia wars, and internal disputes, or because they are ordered by the state
to move away’.71 Serbia after 2003 was a good example: the message from the gov-
ernment was go straight or go abroad. As we will see in some of the country case
studies below, many took the latter option, fleeing to Western Europe (particularly
Spain) and South Africa, often with fake documents and identities.

Albanians branch out

After elections in June 1997, the situation in Albania stabilized: a new government By 2001, Albanian-
was formed and a new president appointed. The new government started to crack
76
speaking groups
down on organized crime: in 2000, the Albanian government reported that it had
indicted 23 criminal groups involved in drug trafficking.77 Within Albania, arrests were active in heroin
were frequently made for human trafficking, smuggling of migrants, arms trafficking trafficking in several
and car theft.78
European countries.
Due to turf wars, more effective law enforcement and more opportunities to move
abroad, some Albanian criminal groups began to shift their operations to Western
Europe and Turkey. Indeed, by 2000, a large number of Albanians involved in illegal
activities had already left the country and established illicit enterprises abroad,
particularly in Greece, Italy, Switzerland and Germany. Around 10 600 Albanians,
including many criminals emigrated illegally to Apulia, Italy, in the early spring of 1997
alone.79 By 2001, Albanian-speaking groups (including groups from Kosovo and North
Macedonia) were active in heroin trafficking in several European countries such as
the Czech Republic, Belgium, Greece, Austria and Switzerland.80, 81 By 2005, they had
also begun trafficking heroin in the Nordic countries, mainly in Sweden.82 The usual
route was to purchase heroin from Turkish organizations and transport it to Western
Europe, particularly via Hungary.83

At around the same time (approximately 2001), Albania also became a source country
for cannabis sold in Europe after the major planting of cannabis in Albania in the
1990s.84 The country also became one of the main sources of herbal cannabis to the
Italian and Greek markets, and gradually also an important source of cannabis resin.85
Albanian crime groups were also involved in human trafficking in Belgium, France,
Italy and the UK, and particularly in Italy, where they worked closely with the Italian
mafia.86 Some of these collaborations would form the basis for future drug-trafficking
networks. There is also evidence that Albanians were involved in armed robberies in
Greece as part of mixed criminal groups composed of Greeks, Albanians, Romanians
and citizens from the former Yugoslavia.87 Within a short period of time, some
Albanian groups had moved up the ladder from being foot soldiers of more powerful
(Turkish and Italian) groups to becoming key players in the markets for drug traffick-
ing, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings in some parts of Europe.88

WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 19

 Displacement and diaspora
A major effect of the war in Yugoslavia that would In these large flows of people on the move, a small
contribute to hotspots of criminal activity abroad percentage were criminals. As Varese points out,
was emigration. As noted, the first wave of emigra- ‘assuming that a given proportion of a population
tion from Yugoslavia came during the 1970s and consists of criminals, the greater the migration of
1980s. The war caused a second bigger wave. In individuals from that population, the larger the
the 1990s, hundreds of thousands of people from number of criminals that will reach a new territory’.90
the region moved abroad, including those seeking
asylum. Tens of thousands went to countries such as Similar patterns have been witnessed in other

Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, and places in the past, for example Italians emigrating
hundreds of thousands to Germany. Similarly, insta- to the US after the Second World War. Diasporas
bility in Albania and Kosovo triggered an exodus in such countries as Germany, Austria and the
to Italy, Western Europe and Turkey. Indeed, it is Netherlands became a key link for criminal groups
estimated that several hundred thousand Kosovo from the Balkans, which took advantage of their
citizens live abroad. After the war, the slow pace of
89 new surroundings to engage in criminal activity. At
reforms in some Western Balkans countries led to a the same time, globalization offered new opportu-
‘brain drain’. There was a further wave of emigration nities, facilitating the movement of people, money
from Kosovo and Albania in 2015 when people from and goods – a development that was quickly
those countries joined the large group of refugees exploited by criminals operating in Latin America
and migrants on the move, mostly from Syria, into and South Africa.
Western Europe.

Instability in Albania and Kosovo triggered a large-scale exodus to Western Europe. Here Albanian refugees are seen
arriving in Bari, Italy. © Patrick Durand/Sygma via Getty Images

20 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
WESTERN
EUROPE
21
 W
estern Europe is the global hotspot where criminal groups from
the Western Balkans are most active, since it is the main market
for the sale of drugs. This section will provide a profile of their
activities in Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. It will look at
why and how criminal groups became active in these markets, and how they
have moved up the value chain from street-level criminals to major distributors.

Groups from the Western Balkans are now key traffickers of heroin, cannabis
and cocaine. They are particularly concentrated in places where there is a
sizeable diaspora, given that organized crime usually exploits its own commu-
nity first. The so-called Frankfurt Mafia, for example, is notorious for smuggling
heroin from North Macedonia to Frankfurt and Vienna (two cities where there
is a large diaspora).91 The group mostly comprises Macedonian citizens from
the town of Veles. According to police, the Frankfurt Mafia was able to pene-
trate the market quickly by selling high-quality heroin at what was described
as a reasonable price. Their profit in Vienna alone was estimated at €80 000
(US$105 000) a day.92 Between 2010 and 2013, police in Germany, Austria and
North Macedonia arrested some 450 people believed to be part of the ring.
In 2013, the Macedonian police arrested a further 60 Macedonian citizens in
relation to the Frankfurt Mafia.93 Despite these blows, the group is still active
and simply changed tactics.94

In another example, criminals from the Western Balkans have worked their
way up the crime ladder in Sweden. In the 1970s and 80s, a few – like
Arkan – were involved in bank robberies and extortion. The ‘Yugo Mafia’
(Juggemaffian, as they were known in Scandanavia) then moved into trafficking
of cigarettes, drugs and weapons. Weapons from former Yugoslavia, including
hand grenades, are said to be contributing to a growing spiral of violence in

 Western Europe is the main overseas drug market for criminal groups from the
Western Balkans. Here, German police officers crack down on drug dealing in
Frankfurt, where there is a large Macedonian diaspora.
© Boris Roessler/ Picture Alliance via Getty Images

22
 International
boundary
Brussels Capital
Amsterdam
Hamburg Izmir Town
Berlin
NETHERLANDS Migrant smuggling
Rotterdam Limburg
Antwerp GERMANY Synthetic drugs
Brussels
BELGIUM Frankfurt Prague Cannabis
CZECHIA
Le Havre Heroin
Paris Cocaine

BOSNIA
FRANCE AND
HERZEGOVINA
Trieste
Belgrade
ITALY KOSOVO
Sarajevo SERBIA
NORTH
MACEDONIA Black Sea
MONTENEGROPristina
Podgorica
av
a
Rome Bar Skopje
Br
sta Tirana
Co Durrës
Bari Istanbul
Madrid ALBANIA
Vlorë
Ankara

SPAIN Valencia GREECE

Gioia Tauro Athens TURKEY
Izmir

Piraeus
Gaziantep

Algeciras

Mediterranean Sea

FIGURE 1 Trafficking routes in Western Europe highlighted in this report

some Swedish neighbourhoods.95 Some of the ‘ex-Yugoslavs’, as they are sometimes

referred to, seem to also have links to biker groups in Sweden, Denmark and Norway.
One of the main criminal groups in Sweden was centred around Naser Dzeljilji, an
ethnic Albanian from Macedonia. The group, operating out of Gothenburg, was
involved in drug trafficking, extortion and armed robbery.96

Several heads of the Serbian mafia in Sweden have been killed in bloody feuds.
Dragan Joskovic, a close friend of Arkan, who was known as the gangster king of
Stockholm, was murdered at a racetrack in 1998 – apparently on the orders of a
former associate, Dragan Kovač. The latter was gunned down outside a Stockholm
restaurant a few months later. Joskovic was succeeded by Ratko ‘Cobra’ Đokić, who
was killed in May 2003. He was succeeded by Milo Sevo, nicknamed the ‘godfather
of Stockholm’.97 Sevo is reportedly a ‘businessman’ in Serbia today.

There also seems to be a Western Balkans connection to a daring heist of a cash

storage building in Stockholm in September 2009 known as the Västberga helicopter
robbery.98 Such audacious crimes and a colourful cast of characters has inspired a
number of Scandanavian crime thrillers and documentaries. More recently, there has
been at least one major operation against an Albanian criminal group, smuggling
1 650 kilograms of cocaine and heroin into Sweden and Denmark.99

A rather unusual example of criminals from the Western Balkans is the case of the
Culum brothers, Armin and Nermis, who emigrated to Germany from Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In 2004 they founded the United Tribuns Motorcycle Club, which is

WESTERN EUROPE 23
 known to be involved in human trafficking, pros- in illicit activities, in this case human trafficking and
titution and assassinations. In 2014, Germany trafficking of heroin, as well as cultivating and traf-
categorized the United Tribuns as a major threat to ficking cannabis.100 In the early 2000s, Albanians
national security. Numerous arrest warrants have slowly and efficiently took control of London’s large
been issued, leading the brothers to return to Bosnia, cocaine market.101 By 2015, they had clearly become
from where they continue to run their activities. major players in the capital as well as other commu-
In the United Kingdom, thousands of people from nities around the country. Not only are they active
Albania and Kosovo (including many from Albania in distribution, but Albanian gangs have a high profile
who falsely claimed to be from Kosovo) entered and formidable reputation in terms of selling drugs,
the country in 1999 and 2000. As in other émigré as well as extortion and armed robbery. One in ten
communities, a small percentage became involved foreign prisoners in the UK is now Albanian.102

Italy: Partners in crime

As noted in the earlier sections of this report, there the Albanians. Albanians are also said to be active
have been close links between crime groups in Italy in the cannabis market, not least the import of can-
and the Western Balkans since the 1980s. Some of nabis from their own country. But the big market
the earliest activities involved cigarette smuggling is cocaine. In the 1990s, Albanians were active in
with Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, and Italy was human trafficking to Italy before progressing to drug
one of the first countries where criminals from the trafficking. Initially the Albanians were the junior
Western Balkans made their initial steps up the crime partner to the Italians in this enterprise, but over the
ladder. Criminals from Yugoslavia arrived in the 1980s past two decades – thanks to their links to suppliers
and 1990s, often together with a wave of refugees of cocaine in Latin America and networks in Western
from the Yugoslav War, and became involved in European countries where there is a large Albanian
stealing luxury goods, such as clothes and watches. diaspora – they have moved up the value chain to the
For example, it is assumed that Milenko Mikanović point where they are, in some cases, equal partners
Lazin started his criminal activities in the 1980s. He with Italian mafia groups.
left Yugoslavia to work in Italy, where he first started
Italy’s east coast is a significant entry point for drugs,
robbing the houses of wealthy Italians. Later he
as is evident from the relatively high number of
teamed up with other criminals from the region and
seizures of drugs in cars in Bari and Ancona disem-
they started to cooperate in jewellery heists. It is
barking from ferries arriving from Durrës. Albanians
reported that police officers in Bosnia were aware of in Italy who are importing drugs along the coast of
his activities but never acted against him. Puglia have a double advantage: they have links to

In a second wave, Italy became a key focal point for their compatriots at the source of supply, and with

cigarette smuggling, in particular with Serbian and groups in Albania that can facilitate distribution. This

Montenegrin organized criminal groups. It has been gives them key leverage in terms of organizing major
shipments, setting prices, and acting as brokers and
reported that since the 2000s Serbs have been
mediators. They have become, in effect, route man-
closely cooperating with the Italian mafia, for whom
agers and decision-makers. They are also sometimes
they transport and distribute drugs throughout the
regarded as the enforcement arm of joint ventures.
country and Western Europe.
This is winning them respect among more well-
Concerning the trafficking of heroin in Italy, it appears established Italian groups. It is also winning them
that groups from the Western Balkans have consol- respect back home and causing concern among the
idated their links with Turkish groups. Indeed, the police. According to an Italian investigator, the merger
latter seem to have diminished their direct involve- of Italian and Albanian groups is a dangerous mixture:
ment in trafficking to Italy, leaving more space for ‘The men from the traditional mafia groups, especially

24 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
There have been close links between Italian criminal networks and those from the Western Balkans for four decades.
Here, Italian Carabinieri seize 800 kilograms of hashish. © Salvatore Laporta/KONTROLAB /LightRocket via Getty Images

the Calabrian mafia, joining with the ferocity of the them, they are valuable and no one can touch them
Albanian bosses, reach an even more devastating because they are under protection of the most pow-
dimension.’ 103
erful mafia groups. They don’t deal street drugs; they
are brokers and good ones, trusted ones’.
Some of these connections have been made in jail.
(As of February 2020 there were more than 2 300 The links between Italian and Albanian groups have
Albanians in Italian prisons.) Prison is often a start- been evident in a number of police operations
ing point for a life of crime rather than its end. For between 2019 and 2020. In Operation Sabbia 2 in
example, in prisons in the Puglia region, Albanian December 2019, nine suspects – seven of whom
criminals are coming in contact with the Italian were Albanian – were taken into custody by the
mafia. This was apparently the case with Arben Carabinieri as part of a crackdown on cannabis and
Zogu, who allegedly started the flow of Albanian- cocaine trafficking in Florence. In January 2019, an
controlled cocaine into Rome.104 He was jailed with Albanian and a Montenegrin were arrested along
Rocco Bellocco, boss of one of the most powerful with members of the Rome-based Casamonica Clan
‘Ndrangheta families, a situation that formed the as part of Operation Brazil Low Cost, which broke
basis of a valuable friendship. Indeed, it is alleged up a group supplying cocaine to Rome and Naples.
that Albanian and Italian groups are not only forming (The Albanian, Dorion Petoku, is allegedly the lieu-
alliances, but even integrated groups. This seems tenant of Arben Zogu.) The group was planning to
to be part of a trend in which some Italian criminal move 7 tonnes of high-purity cocaine from Brazil to
groups are happy to outsource activities and down- Europe by private plane. (The original plan was to fly
size their personnel, and let others work the streets to Rome, but they changed the destination to Sitten
with their permission. 105
According to a chief pros- in Switzerland.) The Montenegrin, Tomislav Pavlovic,
ecutor: ‘Albanians work with any group. They have had allegedly been in contact with Colombian groups
connections, they know how to get drugs and move during several planning visits to Brazil.106

WESTERN EUROPE 25
 On 1 August 2019, five Albanians, a Romanian and an Italian were arrested
as part of Operation Black Eagle. According to information resulting from the
arrests, cocaine from Colombia arrived in Rotterdam and was broken up into
smaller packages of between 15 kilograms and 50 kilograms, and then trans-
ported to Italy by Albanians in specially equipped double-bottomed cars (modified
at a workshop in Madrid reportedly run by Colombians who were paid between
€10 000 and €20 000, as well as with cocaine), as well as in vans and SUVs. The
drugs were then sold to Italian groups under the terms of established agree-
ments. A similar modus operandi was uncovered by Italian police in March 2018
when 15 people, including a number of Albanians, were arrested by police in
Bologna for a sophisticated trafficking operation from Belgium and Albania.107
There are many other similar cases.108

In December 2019, Italian police carried out a massive operation against organized
crime in Rome. It mainly targeted the Italian mafia, but a police officer involved in
the case said that ‘The new undisputed masters in the Roman drug world are the
Albanians. The Roman criminal world turns to buy from them white powder at
28 000 euros per kilo. Unbeatable price.’ In February 2020, as part of Operation
Erostrato, a group of 11 Albanians and Italians, known as the Mafia Viterbese, were
sentenced to a combined 135 years in prison for extortion and racketing in the
town of Viterbo. The bosses, apparently an Italian from Calabria and an Albanian,
have not been caught.

The links between An interesting illustration of the power dynamic between Albanian and Italian
groups can be seen in a case where Albanians, negotiating a deal with mafia groups
Italian and Albanian
in Sicily, apparently took two Sicilian affiliates as hostages to guarantee payment
criminal groups have for the supply. According to a member of the financial police, such hostage taking
been evident in a is quite normal between criminal groups, but when Albanians take Italians as hos-
tages, it shows how powerful they have become.109
number of recent
A spate of killings in 2019 and 2020 suggests that the lucrative cocaine market in
police operations. Rome is in the midst of a shake-up. On 7 August 2019, one of the masterminds of
crime in Rome, Fabrizio Piscitelli (also known as Diabolik) was shot in the head while
sitting on a park bench. In January 2020, Albanian drug dealer Gentian Kasa was
gunned down in front of his house in Rome. There is speculation that the murders
are an indication of a power struggle among groups involving Albanians and differ-
ent factions of the Italian mafia.110 It is therefore oversimplistic to see links between
Albanian and Italian groups as only harmonious and monolithic: there are clearly
some internal dynamics that are causing competition and violence.

An Albanian who has been living in Italy for many years described how his compa-
triots have moved up the value chain of crime: ‘I came when we were new. We all
remember a big ship in the port of Bari full of desperate people; today you come to
us looking for work. We have become more and more important not because we
are strong but because we served. Today there are a lot of drugs in Italy because
we know how to bring them in, not only from Albania but from all over Europe. We
risk a lot, something that today Italian people don’t want to do anymore … we are in
charge, but we always know who is in charge on the ground, we respect the Italians
and they respect us because we know how this business works.’

26 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
Spain: From thieves to barons
Groups from the Balkans came to Spain after the war in Yugoslavia. Their
attraction to Spain seems to have been the same as for other criminals (for
example, from the UK and Russia) operating out of places such as the Costa
del Sol, Costa Valencia and Costa Brava – namely, good weather, good loca-
tion, good infrastructure and good opportunities for money laundering. The
first criminal activities (in the early 2000s) were mostly assaults and robberies.
Some gangs (particularly of Albanians and Kosovars) seem to have special-
ized in breaking into industrial buildings. Such thieves were referred to as
‘butroneros’ (burglars) because they were adept at safe-cracking and evading
security systems. Others focused on breaking into and robbing luxury homes,
particularly those of professional footballers. Some groups also seem to have
been involved in trafficking weapons. As in other global hotspots, it seems the
criminals often operate with false documents and multiple identities and go
back and forth to their homelands. Indeed, the Spanish police consider them
itinerant groups.

Some of these groups then moved up the value chain, becoming involved
in drug smuggling (cannabis, heroin and cocaine). As a senior member of the
Spanish drugs and crime unit observed, ‘they have gone from being thieves
to barons’.111 Spain is an important gateway for cocaine smuggled from Latin
America, entering in containers at major ports (such as Algeciras and Valencia)
– often with ships of the Mediterranean Shipping Company. There are also
reports of crews, once their ship is in Spanish waters, throwing specially made
bags of drugs that contain a GPS beacon into the sea. The drugs are then col-
lected by sailboats and inflatable dinghies. This technique seems to have been
used by the group around Vinetu Cokovic (a Montenegrin citizen), who was
arrested by Spanish police in 2015 in an operation that netted 3.5 tonnes of
cocaine and €9.3 million in cash.112

Valencia seems to be a key hub for groups from Serbia and Montenegro.
Luka Bojović, the head of the infamous Zemun group (and a former member
of Arkan’s Tigers), was arrested there in February 2012 (on the basis of
an INTERPOL arrest warrant for several murders) along with two other
members of the Zemun clan, Vladimir Milisavljević and Siniša Petrić. Valencia
also played a key role in the evolution of the Kotor cartel. It was there that
around 200 kilograms of cocaine disappeared from the apartment of Goran
Radoman (a Montenegrin citizen) in 2014. A dispute about what happened
to the drugs set off a feud within the Kotor clan, dividing them into the rival
Škaljarski and Kavacki clans. Radoman was gunned down in February 2015.
This started a cycle of revenge that continues to this day.

There is another interesting link between Spain and Balkan criminal groups
worth mentioning. In January 2015, a helicopter with around 900 kilograms
of hashish on board – reportedly from Morocco – crashed close to Malaga.
The pilot was a major in the Albanian armed forces.113 This was not an isolated

WESTERN EUROPE 27
 The port of Valencia is a key gateway for cocaine smuggled into Europe by Western Balkan groups.
© Blom UK via Getty Images

incident: there seem to be a steady stream of While Albanians, Serbs and Montenegrins are
helicopters and light aircraft moving drugs between usually associated with cocaine trafficking, it is
Morocco and Spain, although the level of engage- interesting to note that in December 2019 two
ment of pilots from the Balkans is unclear.114 citizens of North Macedonia were arrested as part
of an operation that disrupted an attempt to traffic
There are signs that North Africa is a new fron-
700 kilograms of cocaine to the Balkans from
tier for criminal groups from the Balkans. Cocaine Madrid. Interestingly, Spanish authorities do not
trafficking through the region is increasing, as wit- consider criminal groups from the Balkans a high
nessed by two major seizures in Algeria in 2019.115 risk. According to statistics from 2017 and 2018,
In August 2018, 11 Montenegrins were arrested people from the Western Balkans account for only
on a ship (sailing from the Canary Islands to 1 per cent of those involved in criminal activity. It
Turkey) with 20 tonnes of hashish after their vessel has been suggested that some of the major players
was noticed by Italian authorities to be behav- have moved their operations to Dubai.119 This may
ing suspiciously off the coast of North Africa.116 be in reaction to a significant increase in violence
Furthermore, there are indications that cigarettes in the Costa del Sol in 2018.120 That said, despite
and drugs are being smuggled via Libya to the their relatively small numbers, criminal groups from
Balkans,117
as well as smuggling of weapons from the Western Balkans seem to be big players in the
Serbia to Libya.118 Spanish underworld.

28 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
Netherlands: The ‘Joegomaffia’
In the Netherlands, references to criminals from the gangsters was Serbian Sreten Jocić, also known as
Balkans started to appear in police investigations ‘Joca Amsterdam’. In 1993 he was charged in the
in the early 1990s. Most of the business at that Netherlands with attacking a police officer. He fled
time (particularly between Serb and Dutch criminal to Bulgaria, but was eventually caught and served
groups) revolved around the smuggling of weapons his sentence. In 2010 he was sentenced to 15 years
from former Yugoslavia, sometimes in exchange in prison for the 1995 murder of his rival Goran
for synthetic drugs such as ecstasy. Some of these Marjanović.
Joegomaffia, as they are referred to in Dutch slang, While some Albanians had been involved in human
had emerged out of the community of refugees trafficking in the 1990s and, more recently, the
who had arrived after the war, while others came in smuggling of migrants (for example from Dutch
and out of the country. Among the latter category ports to the UK), after 2010 they became more
were hitmen from the Balkans. According to crime active in the drugs trade. (It is perhaps no coinci-
journalist Wouter Laumans, around the year 2000 dence that 2010 was the year when visa-free travel
organized crime groups in the Netherlands hired to the Netherlands was made possible.) As noted in
people from Serbia to carry out assassinations: other hotspots profiled in this report, there is a clear
‘In the criminal world their reputation was clear: trend in Albanians moving up the crime ladder over
a “Joego” was a true professional when it came time. Indeed, while they seemed to have entered the
to carrying out a hit job.’ One of the most feared Dutch market on the coat tails of Italian groups, by

WESTERN EUROPE 29
 The Netherlands has 2020 they appear to be formidable players in their own right. Indeed, some infor-
become a hub for the mation points to the fact that Albanians are now running transatlantic operations
indoor cultivation of of their own.
cannabis distributed by
Albanian groups across The Netherlands is attractive for criminal groups from the Balkans because of its
Europe © FlickrVision via location and facilities as a logistics hub, particularly through the port of Rotterdam
Getty Images and Schiphol airport. As a global distribution point for perishable goods (particularly
flowers, fruits and vegetables), Dutch companies are experienced at quickly moving
large volumes of trade. But this speed and efficiency also mean that many containers
are not controlled. This is an ideal setup for smuggling drugs.

As observed later in the section on Latin America, ports in the Netherlands and
Belgium (such as Rotterdam and Antwerp) are often used for importing major
cocaine shipments from Ecuador, Brazil and Colombia – in 2017, seven people
were arrested and dozens of kilograms of cocaine were seized from a shipment
from Ecuador. In the drug business, the Albanian groups in Netherlands are often
referred to a ‘uithalers’ – literally ‘pickers’ – in other words, the people who collect
drugs, particularly cocaine and heroin, from the ports and distribute them across
north-western Europe. Many of the Albanian organized-crime networks operating
out of the Netherlands (and Belgium) use their position as a platform for trafficking
cocaine to the UK, Europe’s biggest cocaine market.

30 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
Quiet Albanians Albanian organized-
It would be misleading to refer to these groups as an Albanian cartel. Rather, there
crime groups are said
are thought to be around 15 active Albanian criminal groups in the Benelux coun-
tries with ties to three to four Albanian organized-crime groups settled in Latin to play a leading role
America with direct access to the wholesale cocaine market. The average group in in the Amsterdam
the Netherlands has around 10 to 15 members. While they tend to prefer to work
with people they know (either from the same clan or same city or region), there is a underworld.
trend in recent years towards multi-ethnic groups. In terms of distribution of canna-
bis, Albanian organized-crime groups reportedly cooperate closely with Dutch, Italian
and Moroccan criminal organizations.121 They also seem to have benefited from gang
wars between Moroccan-origin criminals.122 They are said to play a leading role in the
Amsterdam underworld.123

In September 2018, two leading members of the Bajri clan were arrested in Rotterdam
for drug trafficking, arms smuggling, prostitution, extortion, operating illegal lotteries
and gambling.124 And (as described above in the section on Italy) in August 2019, the
Italian police arrested 17 people who were part of an Albanian gang trafficking nearly
200 kilograms of cocaine from the Netherlands to Italy.125

Officially, the number of Albanians in the Netherlands is very small – around

1 200. But it is assumed that there are many more in the country who are there
unofficially, some using forged passports from other EU countries (particularly Italy
and Greece), as well as others who are seasonal.126 According to one study by a public
prosecutor, there may be close to 40 000 Albanians in the Netherlands. Most of them
are clustered around Amsterdam and Rotterdam, but there is also a large community
in Limburg in the south of the country.127 This region, which is conveniently close to
Belgium and Germany, has become a hub for indoor cultivation of cannabis estimated
to worth approximately €200 million per year.128 For example, in Operation Albania
in May 2019, 30 suspects were arrested in the Limburg area, of whom 25 were
Albanians.

The groups operating around Limburg appear well organized and well informed. They
bring with them cannabis-production know-how from Albania (which they learned
from the Dutch in the first place). Indeed, this seems to be part of a wider trend. As
the Albanian authorities crack down on cannabis cultivation at home, Albanian orga-
nized-crime groups have shifted their expertise overseas, not only to the Netherlands
but also to Belgium, the UK and Turkey. The Albanian groups also seem to arrive
with, or have access to, significant funds, judging by the number of houses they have
bought in the Limburg area, often using cash. A prosecutor from Limburg observed: ‘It
surprised me how accurately they can pinpoint the weak spots in our social structures.
They know how to use a fake identity card to rent a house illegally. They know how
to use Dutch public notaries, they know how to use real estate agents to buy houses,
their methods are very refined, they know exactly what they are doing.’129

The Albanian groups are not considered violent, nor do they draw attention to them-
selves since this would be bad for business. According to a public prosecutor, even
when arrested, Albanians remain quiet, and very often during their trials ‘they don’t
talk at all’.130

WESTERN EUROPE 31
 The Tito and Dino Cartel
One of the most formidable groups from the Western They keep their connection to Bosnia through money-
Balkans operating in the Netherlands is the Tito and laundering activities (although after the money is laun­
Dino Cartel. It is led by Edin Gačanin, who left Bosnia dered in Bosnia it is transferred back to Dutch bank
during the war together with his family and moved to accounts). In addition, they have also opened companies
Breda. His organization involves many family members in Spain and the Netherlands, probably for the purpose
and persons from his old neighbourhood in Sarajevo, of money laundering. The cartel is deeply rooted in Latin
who allegedly still have close connections to politicians America, the US and Europe, and they have connections
and businessmen in Bosnia. Gačanin started out in to Sri Lanka and Hong Kong (where shipments organi­
the drug business by supporting a local criminal, Elvis zed by the cartel were also discovered). Gačanin is
Hodžić, to organize and transport cocaine from Peru understood to be currently living in Dubai.131 His group
to Europe. Today, the group has close connections to is said to have close links with Dutch-Moroccan, Italian
the Colombian and Peruvian cartels. For example, it is and Irish syndicates (some have even called it a ‘super
assumed that some members of the Tito and Dino cartel cartel’) that are reportedly importing 30 tonnes of
are currently present in Truillo, Peru, working with the cocaine annually through the ports of Rotterdam
four local cartels, arranging deals and preparing the and Antwerp.132
shipments for Europe.

Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is a good example of how coun- There are several reasons why the Czech Republic
tries going through rapid but flawed transitions to was an attractive place for aspiring criminals, partic-
the market economy are attractive for mafias on the ularly from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
move. 133
The focus of this case study is mostly on Firstly, its geographical proximity to Western
economic crime rather than trafficking. European countries. Secondly, the vulnerability of
Czech authorities to corruption.134 Thirdly, it was
After the Velvet Revolution of 1989, the Czech very easy for foreigners to open a bank account
Republic went through a rapid process of post- and register a company in the country – even
communist transition, including a voucher privat- under the name of a third person.135 As a result of
ization scheme. During this process of political this, one could obtain permanent residence in the
and economic transformation, a weak regulatory Czech Republic more readily than in other central
system and a criminal-justice system unfamiliar European countries, which was a goal for members
with dealing with new methods of organized crime of organized-crime groups.136 Notable figures from
created a market for protection, a vulnerability to the world of Balkan organized crime who have
corruption and opportunities for money laundering. registered companies in the Czech Republic include
Although some criminal groups were present in Darko Šarić, Andrija Drašković, Milan ‘Lemon’
the Czech Republic before 1989, the chaos of the Narančić, Ismet Osmani and Qazim Osmani, as well
1990s opened up a vacuum in which it was rela- as Borislav Plavšić.137, 138 Indeed, the Czech Center
tively easy for criminals to use the momentum of for Investigative Reporting discovered in 2015 that
system change for their own purposes. dozens of companies established in Prague had ties

32 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
and were used as money-laundering machines by Albanian-speakers, on the other hand (from Kosovo,
several powerful Balkan organized-crime groups Albania and North Macedonia) have been more
involved in drug trafficking, murder and the smug- involved in street-level crime, including the trafficking
gling of cigarettes. of people and drugs, particularly in towns close to
Since the 1990s, Czech authorities have been the border with Germany.142 Some such groups are
predominantly focused on tackling the growth of currently under investigation due for VAT and insur-
organized-crime groups from the former Soviet ance-based scams.143 That said, there have also been
Union, which were deemed more dangerous than some big players, most notably Princ Dobroshi. An
Western Balkan groups. This meant that criminal ethnic Albanian, Dobroshi was a major drug trafficker,
groups from the Balkans were able to operate com- moving heroin along the Balkan route via the Czech
paratively unnoticed in the Czech Republic. 139
To this Republic to the Nordic countries. He was arrested
day, knowledge on this topic, even among experts in Prague in February 1999, and deported to Oslo
who focus on combating organized crime in the (where he had escaped from prison in 1997). He was
country, remains relatively poor. paroled and deported for ‘good behaviour’ in January
Well-connected people from the Balkans estab- 2005. It is said that he moved back to Kosovo.144
lished themselves in Prague. A good example is Another reason that the Czech Republic has become
Jordan Mijalkov, the father of Sašo Mijalkov, who a hotspot for criminal groups from the Balkans is
became the head of the Secret Service of the gambling. Since the early 1990s, the country has
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under been used by organized-crime groups for mon-
the government of Nikola Gruevski, which was ey-laundering activities through gambling facilities
brought down after accusations of mass wiretap-
and devices. According to the former Deputy
ping emerged in 2015. Jordan Mijalkov was the first
Finance Minister, Ondřej Závodský, gambling in the
Interior Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic
Czech Republic was not regulated by law until 2017.
of Macedonia. He was also a representative of the
Before the reform of the gambling sector, the Czech
Yugoslav company Makoteks in Prague in 1980s.140
Republic had more than 6 000 gambling spots and
While little information can be confirmed about
more than 70 000 registered slot machines.145 The
Jordan Mijalkov’s activities in Prague, his son Sašo,
industry therefore attracted a broad variety of people
while holding a post of secret police chief, failed to
with criminal backgrounds, including Qazim Osmani
disclose assets, including real estate worth around
(who helped found the gambling company Banco
US$2 million and links to many construction compa-
Casino).146 However, according to Pavla Holcová,
nies, in which his partners, including the Sparavalo
there is currently less of a need to use gambling busi-
brothers, Dejan and Vojislav, held interests.141
nesses as money-laundering tools.147 This is due to
Such individuals developed good contacts in politics
the improved position of the Western Balkan orga-
and the business community. Indeed, the fact that
nized-crime structures based in the Czech Republic
the position of key people from the Balkans in the
within global organized-crime networks.148 They can
narcotics, gambling and real-estate businesses has
use international networks to launder money instead
remained relatively unchanged over the past few
of keeping it in the Czech Republic.
decades suggests that these players feel comfortable
in Czech society due to their contacts. And the more To summarize, the engagement of criminal groups
established they become, the better their connec- in Western Europe shows how they took advan-
tions with local administrations when it comes to, for tage of opportunities and managed to muscle into
example, real estate, public tenders and the construc- well-established criminal markets. As the next section
tion business. demonstrates, they were also moving elsewhere.

WESTERN EUROPE 33
 SOUTH AFRICA
34 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
 I
n 2018 and 2019, South Africa was wracked by a series of assassinations. It emerged
that many of the perpetrators and victims were from the Western Balkans, particu-
larly Serbia. This section shows how the legacy of the past can catch up with those
who try to flee it. It also suggests that South Africa may be becoming a hotspot for
drug smuggling for groups from the Western Balkans.

Importing criminals
The Yugoslav community in South Africa is estimated to number more than 10 000.
Some members of the community are descendants of people who emigrated from
Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s. Others are part of a second wave that left after
the breakup of Yugoslavia and the transition to democracy in South Africa in the mid-
2000s. Many of these were skilled professionals, such as doctors or accountants, but
others were criminals or former militants on the run. As one local expert put it, ‘We
literally imported criminals.’ 149 A Serbian journalist from The Telegraf comments on the
ease with which these criminals could establish themselves in South Africa:

Most of them are honest, hard-working people, but also criminals managed to
infiltrate them and continued their job abroad. It was easy for them to enter
South Africa without any strict control. South Africa was opened for people
from Eastern Europe, so they used their chances. They often came with sig-
nificant sums of money and so it was easy for them to start business. They’re
highly adaptable, they will not hesitate to get involved [in] any type of crime, with
any local organization or a mobster regardless of their religion, skin pigment or
nationality. They came with a criminal knowledge of drug smuggling, racketeering,
extortion, robberies, murder and theft.150

South Africa is an attractive environment for criminals from the Western Balkans, given
that its distance from their home region makes it hard for law-enforcement authorities
to track them down (not least because of weak channels of communication, poor infor-
mation sharing and a lack of bilateral extradition treaties). At the same time, South Africa
is considered to be a good place to do business, whether legal or illegal. It has well-es-
tablished financial systems, good infrastructure, and is plugged into global supply chains

 Serbian assassin Dobrosav Gavric at the Cape Town Magistrates Court for proceedings
for his extradition to Serbia in February 2012. Gavric was convicted of the murder of
Arkan in 2008 and had fled Serbia to live under a new name in South Africa.
© Nardus Engelbrecht/Gallo Images via Getty Images

35
 and markets. However, the criminal-justice system is stolen passports, as an enabling factor for the influx
weak, corruption is rife and there is a ready market for of criminals from Eastern Europe into South Africa.154
protection.151 According to one analyst, corruption and Because the majority of organized-crime players who
even state capture make South Africa attractive for arrive in the country use false identities, it is unclear
criminal syndicates.152
Furthermore, ‘the high murder how many there are in South Africa. Police sources
rate enables them to easily get away with planned indicate that investigations had homed in on nine
assassinations as the police are overwhelmed’. 153
individuals as of January 2020, although the network is
Others point to a lack of controls, for example on believed to be ‘much bigger’.155

Krejčíř and Gavric

Two prominent criminals arrived in South Africa in but he was later charged with Arkan’s murder. It
2007: Czech fugitive Radovan Krejčíř and Dobrosav became clear to Gavric that Arkan’s allies wanted to
Gavric from Serbia. kill him and that ‘evidence was being manufactured to
secure his conviction and imprisonment’ and ‘he had
Between 2007 and 2013, Krejčíř established himself
no choice but to flee Serbia’.
as a mafia boss in South Africa, allegedly corrupting
low-level and senior commanders in the South African According to intelligence sources, the false identity
Police Service. He was also associated with numer- that Gavric assumed belonged to another Serbian
ous underworld assassinations, although he is yet to who also used to live in Johannesburg and who also
be convicted of murder. He was finally convicted of walked with a pronounced limp. Using this false iden-
attempted murder and kidnapping, and is currently tity, Gavric was able to secure official South African
serving a 35-year prison sentence. He has attempted documentation, a business licence, a gun licence
via the courts to be extradited to the Czech Republic. and a driving licence. He even opened a restaurant
in Johannesburg and was able to set up an import–
As a result of Krejčíř’s prominence in criminal circles
export business. Gavric apparently developed close
in South Africa, he attracted a variety of fugitives
relations with local criminals, cashing in on the repu-
from the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Lebanon and
tation of violence among Balkan criminals.
Serbia to work for him. One of them was Veselin
Laganin, a Serbian who was murdered in his apart- Gavric’s true identity became public in March 2011
ment in Johannesburg in 2013 shortly after Krejčíř’s after he was wounded in the assassination of Cape
arrest. Krejčíř’s ability to manipulate law-enforcement Town underworld boss Cyril Beeka. Gavric was
agencies sent a signal to others abroad that South driving Beeka’s vehicle at the time of the incident.
Africa was a potential market for them.156 (It appears that Gavric provided Beeka with protec-
tion and information on organized-crime networks
Gavric’s arrival in South Africa in 2007 was much more
from Eastern Europe and Serbia, while Beeka offered
low key. Indeed, he lived under the pseudonym ‘Sasa
Gavric protection from state agencies.) Gavric was
Kovacevic’ in Johannesburg for four years without
arrested for possession of cocaine and for having
intelligence agencies being aware of his presence in
false documents under the name of Sasa Kovacevic.
the country. He had good reason to hide his identity.
His application for asylum was turned down and he
According to an affidavit presented to the Western
remains in prison in Cape Town as his protracted fight
Cape High Court, Gavric was a member of the Serbian
to avoid extradition to Serbia continues. Gavric’s legal
Police Force assigned to the Serbian Crime Prevention
process has highlighted the weaknesses in the South
Unit, which performed duties including the protection
African criminal-justice system. A process that should
of VIPs.157 Gavric was present when Željko ‘Arkan’
have taken three months has taken nearly nine years
Ražnatović was assassinated on 15 January 2000 in
– the documentation has disappeared twice and had
the lobby of the Belgrade Intercontinental Hotel. He
to be resubmitted.
himself was shot in the incident: a stray bullet pierced
his spine, leaving him with a pronounced limp. Gavric Another example of South Africa providing a refuge
claimed he was not responsible for the assassination, for Serbians on the run is the case of fugitive Darko

36 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
Imprisoned Czech organized-crime syndicate kingpin Radovan Krejcir at the Palm Ridge Magistrates Court,
Johannesburg, December 2013. © Moeletsi Mabe/The Times/Gallo Images via Getty Images

Šarić. According to media reports and sources within avoid detection by using their network of contacts
the Serbian community, it is believed that Šarić was with corrupt police. It was also understood that Šarić
hiding in Gauteng province around 2012/2013. At had a close connection to Krejčíř, hence his decision
the time, Šarić was one of the world’s most-wanted to come to Gauteng.158 Once authorities got wind of
drug smugglers. It is thought he was living under his presence in the area and began investigating, he
an alias and local crime bosses were helping him to fled South Africa.

Settling old scores

In the period of 2018–2020 there were at least indicating a background in paramilitary or military
nine murders and two assassination attempts in organizations.159
the Johannesburg area involving Serbians with
The spate of killings seems to be a settling of old
backgrounds in organized crime or paramilitary orga-
scores. As Milica Vojinovic explains, those who
nizations. Most of these incidents bear a remarkable
came to South Africa came several years ago and
resemblance to one another and share similar char-
acteristics in the way they were carried out. In most their relationships are based on historical net-

cases, the targets have been unsuspecting and often works.160 ‘They are mostly older criminals who were
driving vehicles. There are usually two shooters on active in Serbia in the 1990s. These are mostly old
a motorcycle, both wearing helmets to hide their school guys who were last active in Balkans in the
identities. The shooter is the passenger, carrying an beginning of 2000’s.’ It has become clear that a
automatic weapon, who opens fire, shooting numer- number of Serbians who have been killed in South
ous bullets before speeding off. From CCTV footage Africa between 2018 and 2020 had an associa-
of these incidents, the assassins appear to display tion with Gavric, formed part of his network and
military training and precision in their execution, originally came to South Africa because of him.

SOUTH AFRICA 37
 South Africa is an Most notable is Milan ‘Miki’ Đuričić, who was shot dead in Strijdom Park (a suburb of
Johannesburg) in April 2018. He too was wanted by police in Serbia for participating in
attractive environment
Arkan’s murder with Gavric. It is believed that Đuričić had been hiding in South Africa
for criminals from the for around three years and had a Belgian passport at the time. Reports suggest that he

Western Balkans. had a small business involving hotels but that he was also involved in human trafficking
and the drug trade.

Darko Kulić, who was shot in Randburg (close to Johannesburg) in July 2018, was also
associated with Đuričić, and may have been killed because he had information on who
murdered Đuričić. Kulić fought in The Serbian Guard paramilitary group during the
Yugoslavian civil war in the 1990s before allegedly becoming involved in organized
crime and making a life for himself and his family in Johannesburg. He had also been
friendly with South African-Montenegrin businessman George ‘Hollywood’ Milhajevic,
who was gunned down in Bedfordview in September 2018. They may have been in
business together or may have arrived in South Africa because they already knew their
countrymen, who could assist with their integration. In September 2017, a man named
Ivan Djordjevic (a friend of Gavric) was shot, but not killed, at a KFC restaurant near
Bedfordview. He was assassinated in April 2019 when two masked gunmen tailgated
him and opened fire with a semi-automatic assault rifle. There is speculation that his
death is related to the disappearance of a shipment of a tonne of cocaine.161 In both the
Djordjevic and Kulić killings, the cars used by the shooters had been dumped nearby and
set alight. The shooters fled in alternative vehicles.

Some believe that the shooters are brought in from Serbia for each job, coming in and
out in a matter of days. Others, however, speculate that the assassins are local. They
may have been drawn either from Cape gangs, ex-Zimbabwean or Mozambican military,
or from the taxi industry. As documented in Mark Shaw’s book Hitmen for Hire, there is
a vast pool of resources for assassinations within South Africa.162

There is no definitive explanation for this upsurge in violence, as there have been no
arrests and no court proceedings. Local law-enforcement intelligence is also poor as a
result of the erosion of state agencies over the past decade of state capture. However,
interviews and media reports suggest two theories. The first is that the murders may
be some form of retribution for the 2000 murder of Arkan. This stems from the fact
that many of those killed have been hiding in South Africa for several years, often under
pseudonyms, and were connected to the network around Gavric. It has been suggested
that their true identities were revealed and they were marked for assassination. Some
see a link to information peddler George Darmonovic’s arrival in Serbia around 2016
and the releasing of intelligence around who was in South Africa and where exactly
they could be found. He seemed to have had good relations in the Serbian underworld
as well as with intelligence agencies in Serbia and South Africa, and passed informa-
tion between these communities. This seems to have made him a marked man. In May
2018 he was shot and killed outside a court in the New Belgrade district of the Serbian
capital by two men on a motorcycle, less than two weeks after Đuričić was killed.

The second theory is that the murders have been precipitated by the drug trade –
either a fight between warring factions of Serbs over control of drug-transport
routes or over money not paid for a shipment. Although evidence of this is slim, it
has been suggested that it could be an extension of the ongoing war between the two
Montenegrin groupings, the Kavacki Clan and Škaljarski Clan.163 It could be a combina-
tion of both theories – drugs coupled with revenge.

38 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
There are considerable doubts about whether the interests for criminals to eliminate one another.
South African Police Service has the capacity and But this approach could backfire. Lack of prosecu-
capability to make arrests or break the syndicate. In tions and lengthy legal processes, such as in the
fact, many of those interviewed said they believed Gavric case, could send the message that criminals
that the police were deliberately failing to act, so that can act with impunity in South Africa. This could
‘the Serbs can kill each other’. The belief is that there well encourage their criminal enterprise and attract
is no will to solve the cases because there has been other countrymen to a land of opportunity to expand
very little collateral damage and it is in the country’s the network.164

New players in new markets?

It appears that there is a new generation of criminals With the Colombian cartels under pressure from inter-
from former Yugoslavia who are involved in the drugs national policing organizations and trying to establish
trade in South Africa. There have been no arrests, new routes, they could be looking to step up opera-
no interrogations and no court proceedings, making tions in South Africa. Two examples provide evidence
it difficult to glean any information. However, South of this trend. In March 2017, a sailboat was stopped by
Africa has emerged as a key transit point in the estab- Portuguese coast guards in the Atlantic Ocean, 600
lished drug routes used by cartels to traffic cocaine, miles from the Azores. During the search, 400 kilo-
and it is well established that Serbian networks are grams of high-purity cocaine was found. Information
major players in the continental cocaine trade. A subsequently emerged that the cocaine had been
senior police officer suggested that cocaine is brought loaded in South Africa. The boat was registered in
in through the Port Elizabeth and Durban harbours, Trieste and it appears that that was the intended
moved to Gauteng (where it is repackaged), and is destination. The results of the investigation are still
then sent on to further destinations. It might be the unknown, but it is believed that Montenegrin citizens
case that cocaine travels from South America to South organized the transport of this shipment of narcotics.
Africa and enters Europe via Turkey. In 2019, a Montenegrin, Marko Bozovic, was arrested
in South Africa on suspicion of involvement in the
Alternatively, South Africa may be a transit point on
smuggling of 807 kilograms of cocaine from Venezuela
the route to lucrative markets such as Australia. In the
to Europe. He is now in prison in South Africa. During
past there have been several arrests, which suggests
his arrest, police found a South African passport.166
attempts to set up drug routes between the two
countries – such as Krejčíř’s attempt to ship metham- In short, the case of criminals from the Western
phetamine to Australia in 2013 and a case in 2019 Balkans in South Africa shows the enduring wounds
where a cocaine shipment was discovered hidden in and legacy of war and instability in former Yugoslavia.
construction equipment being sent from South Africa While the men who emigrated cannot really be consid-
to Australia, with media reports linking this cargo to ered a criminal group, it shows how they tried to escape
a Serbian syndicate operating in South Africa. There justice and a life of crime at home (mostly in Serbia)
also appear to be attempts to develop the domestic and how it caught up with them. It also demonstrates
market for drugs: according to an underworld secu- vulnerabilities in the criminal-justice system in South
rity boss, Serbians in South Africa are buying cocaine Africa that would allow such characters to enter the
from Colombians and bringing it to South Africa to country, enable them to operate freely, and yet not be
sell, using locals as runners to distribute the narcotics. able to resolve their murders. Most worrying for the
There is also intelligence that laboratories have been future, South Africa appears to be a hotspot for a new
established in South Africa to manufacture drugs and generation of criminal groups from the Western Balkans
then export them. 165
involved in global cocaine-trafficking networks.

SOUTH AFRICA 39
 TURKEY
GATEWAY TO THE EAST

40
 T
urkey is a key hub for the trafficking of heroin as well as the
smuggling of migrants. This section looks at the engagement of
Western Balkan criminal groups in Turkey, as well as the inter­
action between Turkish and Western Balkan criminal groups.

Close ties between Turkey and

the Balkans
Criminal groups from the Western Balkans have had links to Turkey since
the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, people from the region were used
as drivers and couriers to traffic drugs, and the Balkans was a region for
transit, repackaging and onward distribution. Several cases show that
‘Yugoslav Albanians’, as they were described (in other words, from Kosovo
and North Macedonia), were involved in helping to traffic heroin and mor-
phine base from Turkey via Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to Italy.167 As described
earlier, there was also smuggling of weapons.

As in some other hotspots, Turkey has a large diaspora from the Western
Balkans. Most of this population dates back to displacement and popula-
tion transfers between the Balkan Wars of the 19th century and the First
World War, and in various waves of emigration after the foundation of the
Republic of Turkey in 1923.168, 169 According to one estimate, 1.8 million
people emigrated from the Balkans to Turkey between 1923 and the early
1990s, followed by several tens of thousands more as a result of instability
in former Yugoslavia and Albania in the 1990s.170, 171 Some of these immi-
grants from the Balkans lived in relatively poor neighbourhoods where
they made connections with the Kurdish street dealers in metropolitan
cities of Turkey, such as Istanbul and Izmir.

 Turkish armed force members keep guard during a people-smuggling operation in

Bodrum, October 2013. Connections with drug-trafficking networks are being used
for human trafficking and smuggling of migrants by Western Balkan groups.
© Ali Balli/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

41
 During the war in Yugoslavia, Turkish criminal cent correlation between Afghan opium production
groups largely avoided the Western Balkans. But by and Turkish heroin seizures.172
the end of the 1990s, Albania, North Macedonia,
The main interaction between Balkan and Turkish
and Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged as tempo-
groups was in the Western Balkans (and Bulgaria)
rary storage locations for the increased volume of
rather than in Turkey. The region was regarded as a
heroin that was flowing through the region towards
safe meeting place. Although they were not on their
Western Europe due to increased opium cultiva-
home turf, the Turks were the senior partner in this
tion and heroin production enabled by the war in
asymmetric relationship.
Afghanistan. Indeed, research has found a 93 per

From suitcases to trucks

In the early 1990s, Balkan immigrants in Turkey the Netherlands and Colombia. He made a fortune
started a ‘suitcase trade’ between Turkey and their from the illicit narcotics trade in a very short time.
country of origin. They bought licit products at He then invested heavily in the gambling sector and
cheaper prices in Istanbul and sold them at higher was one of the owners of the Sheraton Hotel Casino
prices on Balkan markets. They were able to travel in Istanbul. Albanian Sami was convicted and sen-
between the countries due to Turkey’s lenient visa tenced to four years in prison for establishing and
policy towards citizens of Western Balkan nations. leading a criminal network.
This was not serious organized crime, but the
Balkan traffickers have benefited from the heroin
suitcase trade was soon exploited by Turkish and boom in Afghanistan over the past 20 years. Turkish
West Balkan trafficking groups for the smuggling and West Balkan criminal groups are known to
of cigarettes and drugs.173 Indeed, while some used process the transported heroin to cut down its
suitcases, others used trucks, and ethnic Albanian purity and consequently increase their profits. At
apprentices soon mastered the art of illicit trade the eastern entry points, the purity of heroin is
from their Turkish supervisors. They took advan- usually over 70 per cent, while it drops below 50 per
tage of the growing number of Albanian immigrants cent in western provinces.174 This indicates that the
in Western Europe to expand their underground purity of heroin is reduced to make higher profits.
networks. Soon ethnic Albanians (particularly from In 2015, the total gross profit made by opiate traf-
Kosovo) were engaged all along the value chain: fickers in South East Europe was estimated to be
buying loads from Turkish groups, trafficking the US$1.7 billion per annum.175
drugs (often via Bosnia and Herzegovina and North
At the same time, a growing market for cannabis,
Macedonia), and distributing them through their
ecstasy and synthetic drugs in Turkey created
diaspora in Western Europe.
opportunities for Western Balkan nationals to bring
One example is Sami Hoştan, also known in the these drugs from Europe to Turkey in exchange for
criminal underworld as the Arnavut (Albanian) heroin. Furthermore, high taxes on cigarettes in
Sami. His family emigrated to Turkey from North Turkey created a large demand for much cheaper
Macedonia. According to Turkish security institu- illicit cigarettes brought from the Balkans.176 Indeed,
tions, Hoştan was smuggling large amounts of drugs it is said that some heroin-trafficking groups
between Turkey, South America and Europe. He had switched to the illicit cigarette trade due to higher
shady ‘business partnerships’ with drug networks in profits and lower risks of imprisonment.177

42 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
Attracting trade and investment
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and them to travel freely between Turkey and their
Yugoslavia, Turkey was looking for new investments. country of origin at will.
In the early 1990s, laws were passed to make it
In 2018, the Turkish government announced a new
easier to travel to and invest in Turkey. One of the
citizenship policy that facilitated a further influx
side effects was that it became easier for Western
of organized-crime networks into the country.
Balkan criminals, posing as businessmen, to travel
According to the new regulation, whoever brings
to and trade in Turkey, and even to obtain Turkish US$250 000 to Turkey will be granted citizen-
passports and launder money. Reciprocally, it got ship without any questioning of the source of the
easier for Turkish citizens to get passports and visas money.179 This policy is attractive to people with
from the Western Balkan countries. illicit incomes, some of whom have apparently

As of 2020, citizens of all Western Balkan coun- bought luxurious properties, especially in Istanbul
and Izmir, which both function as coordination
tries can stay in Turkey for up to 90 days without
centres for regional illicit trade.180
a visa.178 They can use their national ID cards, and
their passports are valid for five years in Turkey In the past 20 years, there has been a big increase
even after their expiration. Reciprocally, Turkish cit- in commercial activity between Turkey and Western
izens can stay in Western Balkan countries without Balkan countries, thanks to a series of agreements
a visa for 90 days. The free-travel regime creates that have liberalized trade (see Figure 2). Some
ample opportunities for criminal groups to carry criminal groups, in both Turkey and the Western
out trans-regional trafficking schemes. Moreover, Balkans, have exploited this openness by setting up
many of the immigrants from the West Balkan shell companies to cover large shipments of drugs,
countries have double citizenship, which allows cigarettes and weapons.181

1 000
900
Trade in US dollars (millions)

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
Albania Bosnia and Kosovo Montenegro North Serbia
Herzegovina Macedonia

Imports 2000 Imports 2019 Exports 2000 Exports 2019

FIGURE 2 Turkey’s bilateral trade with the Western Balkan countries (US dollars)

SOURCE: Turkish Institute of Statistics, Foreign Trade Statistics, 3 April 2020, https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/
disticaret.zul?param1=4&param2=0&sitcrev=0&isicrev=0&sayac=5808

TURKEY: GATEWAY TO THE EAST 43

 The ‘Balkan route’ for heroin
The so-called Balkan route is best known for the flow of heroin from Afghanistan via
Iran into Turkey and then the Western Balkans. From there, the drugs are sent to the
major markets (the Netherlands, Germany, UK, France and Spain). Since the 1970s,
large volumes of heroin have been produced in Turkey using morphine base brought
from Iran and Afghanistan. The precursor chemical needed to make heroin from
opium – namely acetic anhydride – is supplied from the Czech Republic, Russia and
Germany.182 This production of heroin has enabled Turkish organized-crime groups to
become the dominant heroin suppliers to Europe.

Turkish groups produced high-quality heroin (70–97 per cent purity) using their
intergenerational experience.183 Possession of production facilities, transportation
companies and distribution rings in Europe allowed the Turkish groups to dominate
the European heroin market for decades. It is estimated that the annual turnover of
the illicit drug trade was around US$50 billion in the mid-1990s.184 Another estimate
puts the annual turnover of the illicit drug trade in Turkey at around US$15 billion by
2014.185 This number has possibly increased since 2014 given the significant growth
of the domestic drug market and transregional illicit trade. The volume of the heroin
trade can also be gauged by the high number of heroin-related detentions, cases and
seizures (see Figure 3).

30 000

25 000

20 000

15 000

10 000

5 000

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

cases suspects seizure (kg)

FIGURE 3Heroin-related detentions, cases and seizure amount (kilograms), Turkey,

2012–2018

SOURCE: TUBIM, Turkish Drug Report 2019, Ankara, 2019

44 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
Criminal groups from the Western Balkans mostly make heroin deals in Istanbul, Izmir, Groups from the
Tekirdag, Edirne and, to a lesser extent, in Gaziantep. 186
In many cases, they exchange
Western Balkans
amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), ecstasy and skunk brought from Europe for
heroin brought from Iran. have steadily
Often ethnic Albanians do not directly transport heroin to Western Europe. Instead moved up the value
they repackage and reprocess the heroin purchased from Turkish and Iranian syn-
chain of criminal
dicates, often reducing the purity before shipping the Afghan heroin to Western
Europe.187 They sometimes temporarily store heroin in warehouses in Western Balkan activity in Turkey.
countries. For instance, the Macedonian Ministry of the Interior reported disman-
tling a criminal organization in February 2019 in partnership with the United States’
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The group was systematically involved in
trafficking of heroin and cannabis from Turkey to North Macedonia, Albania and then
to Switzerland and Western European countries. The group was also running labs to
produce ATS.188 There is also evidence of heroin being transported via Kosovo.189

A recent development suggests a possible evolution in trafficking patterns that

may reflect a growing confidence among ethnic Albanian traffickers. It seems that in
some cases they have been attempting to bypass Turkish drug networks by estab-
lishing direct connections with Iranian heroin suppliers. For example, seven Albanian
nationals were arrested along with 250 kilograms of heroin as part of a case against
a multi-ethnic syndicate (involving Iranians) that systematically trafficked heroin from
Turkey to the Netherlands and Germany. Units from the Turkish Police Department of
Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime (KOM) arrested another group of seven Albanians
during five investigations that led to the seizure of 82 kilograms of heroin, 5 kilograms
of opium, 6 kilograms of chemical precursors and 450 grams of cannabis.190 For their
part, Iranian networks seem to be trying to establish a foothold in the Western Balkans.
This has potentially wider implications for security in the Balkans.191

Heroin traffickers are said to use at least 18 different routes from Turkey to European
markets. The primary locations for heroin trans-shipments are the Netherlands,
Germany, Albania and Moldova.192 In addition to land routes, investigations in Turkey,
Greece and Albania indicate that Turkish-Albanian networks are taking advantage
of Turkey’s 174 seaports and thousands of marinas along the coast of the Black
Sea, Marmara, Aegean and Mediterranean for trafficking of cannabis and heroin.
The primary origin of maritime-based drug transportation has been South America
and the Middle East, while the shipments out of Turkey have been destined for the
Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the UK, Greece and Italy.193 Since 2015, Turkish
agencies have seized a large volume of drugs from maritime vessels that were under
the control of Albanian crime syndicates. Generally, security control in marinas is lim-
ited.194 Indeed, they appear to be the weakest link of border control between Turkey
and EU countries, with luxury yachts and speedboats used by Albanians arriving and
departing without proper scrutiny.

Some drugs are also shipped by air. Recently, African groups have started to smuggle
drugs through Turkish airports.195 West African groups have apparently been recruit-
ing West Balkan air couriers to transport heroin and cocaine to European markets
via Turkey.196

While heroin is clearly a problem, Turkey has also become a growing market for
European ecstasy since the 1990s, some of which is trafficked through the Western

TURKEY: GATEWAY TO THE EAST 45

 Turkish police officers inspect heroin packages during a seizure in December 2018.
© Kemal Ozdemir/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

Balkans.197 Groups from Kosovo have been a substance (brought from China) used in metham-
involved.198
There are also indications that some phetamine production.199 The multinational crime
nationals from the Western Balkans are involved syndicate was composed of Turkish, Uzbek, Iranian,
in the production of methamphetamine in Turkey. British and Albanian citizens. Furthermore, there are
For instance, when the Istanbul narcotics division indications that Turkey is being inundated with new
dismantled a meth lab in Beykoz in 2018, they psychoactive substances (NPS).200 It is not clear to
seized 9 kilograms of methamphetamine, 350 000 what extent Western Balkan groups are involved in
ecstasy tablets and 1 100 kilograms of metilamin, the NPS trade.

Cannabis and skunk

Cannabis is by far the most prevalent drug in Turkey’s Cannabis trafficking between Turkey and the Balkans
domestic market. Turkish law-enforcement agencies generally occurs in large quantities, and Turkish and
seized 177.5 tonnes of cannabis in 2017 and 80.7 Balkan authorities have made several cannabis sei-
tonnes in 2018. 201
Skunk, another cannabis-based zures exceeding 1 tonne. There is no official data on
drug (produced in Albania), is also popular: 11 tonnes the number of cannabis traffickers from Western
of the drug were seized in 2018, an increase of 530 Balkan countries, but some observations can be made
per cent compared to the previous year. 202
It is antic- about the involvement of Albanians trafficking canna-
ipated that demand for skunk will continue to grow bis to Turkey. Firstly, Albanians ship large volumes of
in Turkey, especially in big cities. 203
cannabis on maritime vessels to Turkish ports on the

46 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
Aegean coast. They often exchange the cannabis for heroin, which is then transported
back along the same maritime route. Secondly, an increasing number of Balkan nation-
als, mainly Albanians, are involved in trafficking of skunk.204 Turkish authorities have
seized record levels of skunk since 2016 and experts believe that a significant quantity
of the skunk is supplied by the Albanian networks.205

Indeed, some Albanian groups have turned the Adriatic Sea into a maritime highway
of drug trafficking. One of the most notorious traffickers is Albanian Met Kenani,
who shipped large quantities of drugs using maritime vessels. In March 2018, a joint
investigation of Istanbul and Mugla police departments led to a seizure of around
1 100 kilograms of skunk on two luxury speedboats. A total of 13 arrests were made,
including of Kenani.206 This was one of many large drug busts linked to Kenani’s
network that took place in the space of a couple of years. In 2017, Turkish authorities
seized 2.1 tonnes of cannabis, allegedly from the same network. In 2018, a court in
Tirana issued an arrest warrant for 18 members of the network for drug trafficking
along two routes: Turkey–Greece–EU countries and Turkey–Macedonia–Albania–EU
countries.207 On 26 January 2018, Greek police seized 1 586 kilograms of cannabis
and apprehended nine Albanians and four Greeks who worked for the same crime
syndicate.208 In March 2018, Istanbul counternarcotics police busted a storage facility
and arrested a Turkish individual with 24 kilograms of skunk and 214 roots of canna-
bis.209 Police reported that the Turkish individual was working for Kenani, who also
apparently started to produce cannabis and skunk in various locations in Turkey. This
indicates that Albanian groups not only trafficked the drugs to the Turkish market but
also established greenhouse production facilities in the country.

The arrest of Kenani did not stop the flow of cannabis. In December 2018, Turkish
customs officers on the Greek border seized 1.5 tonnes of hashish from a truck that
was transporting soybeans.210 Three people were arrested, including an Albanian
national who was driving the truck. In July 2019, the Istanbul counternarcotics divi-
sion busted an international organized-crime group that regularly trafficked skunk
from Albania to Turkey, and seized 525 kilograms of skunk.211 In October 2019, Greek
police launched an investigation into an Albanian trafficking group that trafficked
large quantities of marijuana from Albania to Turkey via Greece. Joint interdictions
of Greek police, Coast Guard and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency
(Frontex) led to the seizure of 1 172 kilograms of raw opium. The Albanian group
was using speedboats to deliver cannabis to several cities on the Turkish coastline.
Investigations revealed that Albanians were using uninhabited Greek islands for
temporary storage of the drug.212 Investigators noted that the Albanian group was
exchanging heroin for cannabis in Turkey and transporting cannabis back home along
the same route.

Smuggling of migrants
Thus far, most of the hotspots described in this report have focused on the involve-
ment of criminal groups from the Western Balkans in drug trafficking. In the case of
Turkey, since 2015 the smuggling of migrants has also been a prominent and lucrative
criminal activity.

TURKEY: GATEWAY TO THE EAST 47

 In the past, there has been some level of irregular migration from the Western
Balkans to Turkey: the Turkish authorities identified 4 676 illegal immigrants from
Albania and 3 060 from Yugoslavia between 1995 and 2012.213 But this has been
far surpassed by the number of refugees and migrants coming via Turkey to the
Western Balkans since 2015. As of March 2020, there are around an estimated
4 million Syrian refugees and migrants in Turkey, many of whom would like to move
on to the EU. However, Turkey has been under pressure to stem the flow of people
reaching EU countries and tighter border controls have been introduced. This has
created opportunities for smuggling and trafficking networks, including some from
the Western Balkans.214

Most of the human smugglers operate out of three cities in western Turkey: Istanbul
(21 per cent), Izmir (19 per cent) and Aydin (17 per cent).215 These cities are the coor-
dination and transportation hubs for both maritime and land-based human-smuggling
schemes. According to information gathered for this report, migrants coming from
the Middle East, Central Asia and South West Asia follow six major land and sea
routes to access their final destinations in Europe. Three of these routes go via the
West Balkan countries:

■ Turkey–Greece–Albania–Italy–Western Europe (an old land route)

■ Turkey–Bulgaria–Serbia–Bosnia and Herzegovina–Slovenia–Austria–Western
Europe (an old land route)
■ Turkey–Greece–Albania–Montenegro–Bosnia and Herzegovina–Croatia–Slovenia
(a new sea/land route)

In addition, there are reports of a maritime route from Turkey to Italy and Spain,
which is apparently facilitated by Albanian groups.216 Albanian-Turkish smuggling net-
works use yachts to transfer well-off migrants from Turkey to Greece and Italy. Only
a few of these leisure vessels have been interdicted along the Aegean, Mediterranean
and Adriatic maritime routes over the last five years.

Migration along some stages of these routes is done with the help of smugglers from
Western Balkan countries.217 For example, the Albanian police reported dismantling
a network that was smuggling Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi people to Western Europe
through Greece, Albania, Montenegro and Croatia across the mountainous terrain
in the Balkans. The network was led by a Turkish national who cooperated with
Albanian individuals.218 There are also apparently Arab networks that rely on Balkan
criminal networks to carry out local communications, transportation and criminal
procedures beyond the Turkish borders.219

Connections among some well-established drug-trafficking networks are being used

for human trafficking and smuggling of migrants.220 Operation Limit by the Albanian
police, undertaken in cooperation with Greece and the Southeast European Law
Enforcement Centre (SELEC), revealed that an Albanian drug-trafficking group ‘orga-
nized and facilitated illegal passage of migrants of Middle East origin from Greece to
Albania and then to Montenegro’.221 The Albanian police arrested 57 members of the
network on charges of large-scale drug trafficking and human smuggling.

On the western borders of Turkey, Turkish smuggling networks cooperate with

Arab, Albanian, Greek and Bulgarian networks who hire trafficking professionals

48 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
who specialize in passport forgery, transportation, interpretation and immigration Human smugglers
regulations from Moldova, Iraq, Syria, Morocco, Albania, Greece and Macedonia
exploit the loose
for the transportation of migrants and refugees to the European hinterland. 222
According to experts interviewed for this report, the prices quoted to migrants immigration regime
range between €3 000 and €8 000 for transportation into the Schengen Area, between Turkey
going up to US$30 000 for the trip to the US and Canada.
and Western
Human smugglers exploit the existing loose visa and passport regime between Turkey
and Western Balkan countries, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina. As of 2020,
Balkan countries,
Turkish individuals can travel to Bosnia with national ID cards. Many Syrians and especially Bosnia
Iraqis obtained Turkish ID cards through legal and illegal ways. Some of them have
and Herzegovina.
already obtained Turkish citizenship due to foreigner-friendly policies of the Turkish
government. Others purchase national ID cards from criminal networks that special-
ize in forging documents.223 An ID card can be obtained for around US$1 000 on
the black market. It has been observed that documented immigrants travel to Bosnia
from Istanbul airport as tourists, and from Bosnia they find other channels to move to
Western Europe.224

Established human-smuggling networks in Bosnia facilitate the onward journey of

these immigrants. In June 2019, Elbasan Police conducted Operation Tranzit against
an Albanian–Turkish migrant-smuggling network. The operation led to an arrest
of eight members of the crime syndicate, seven of whom were Albanian and one
Turkish. The group was assisting the illegal border crossing of immigrants from Turkey
to Greece and then onward to Albania and Montenegro.225

Albanian human traffickers have also been involved in the smuggling of migrants
from Turkey and the Middle East to Italy, Spain and the UK. In March 2019, the
Italian Carabinieri arrested seven people, including Italian, Albanian, Colombian and
Turkish nationals, on human-trafficking charges in Modena, Italy.226 The Albanian
member of the network was also charged with the possession of drugs and weapons.
Investigations revealed that the organization was illegally transporting Turkish citizens
to Italy and Europe, charging from €3 000 to €5 000 per individual. Investigators
reported that the network transported about 30 people, mainly from Turkey, within
a six-month period. In August 2019, the Albanian police arrested 19 Albanian and
Turkish citizens who were attempting to travel from Tirana to London with stolen IDs
and forged documents.227 The network was smuggling Turkish citizens to the US, UK
and Canada with fake documents.

To summarize, groups from the Western Balkans – particularly Kosovo and Albania
– have steadily moved up the value chain of criminal activity, both in Turkey and
with Turkish groups that have links to the Balkans. As ethnic Albanian networks
spread across Europe, they were able to cut down on the number of intermediaries
by purchasing the heroin from Turkey and delivering it to their distribution networks
in the UK, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. More recently, Albanian networks
have begun to supply large quantities of cannabis and skunk to the Turkish domestic
market using Adriatic and Aegean sea routes. There is also a lucrative market in ciga-
rette smuggling, and groups from the Western Balkans are involved in the smuggling
of migrants from Turkey.

TURKEY: GATEWAY TO THE EAST 49

 LATIN AMERICA
50
 L
atin America has become an El Dorado for criminal groups from the Western
Balkans. This section traces how a few entrepreneurial criminals from the
Western Balkans came to the region around 2008/09 to enter the cocaine
business, and how in the decade since they have become successful emissaries
between local suppliers and established criminal groups, and more recently major
brokers and distributors. A special focus is put on Ecuador and Colombia.

In the period between 2008 and 2020, Latin America became a hotspot for criminal
groups from the Balkans. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the world’s supply
of coca and cocaine has increased and demand remains high, especially in the lucra-
tive European market and Australia. Secondly, there has been a disruption in terms
of supply in Colombia in the wake of the 2016 peace agreement with the Colombian
insurgent criminal group FARC (which controlled many of the areas where coca is
cultivated), creating opportunities for criminals from the Western Balkans to establish
connections with new suppliers. Thirdly, there are relatively low risks in trafficking
from Latin America due to the pervasive climate of corruption, a number of legal
loopholes, instability in some key countries (such as Venezuela) and collusive port
officials at both ends of the supply chain. As a result, some entrepreneurial criminals
from Albania, Montenegro and Serbia have gone to the source countries of cocaine
to become involved in distribution.

Roots of the cocaine groups

The first indications (at least in open sources) of links between mafias in Eastern
Europe and Colombian cartels came in 2001. That year, three Albanians were
arrested as part of Operation Journey, the DEA’s two-year, multinational initia-
tive against Colombian maritime drug-trafficking. That same year, the first criminal
cocaine-trafficking group in Albania was discovered. Police arrested six members of
the group, including two people who at the time worked in the Prosecutor’s Office

 A farmer in Bolivia dries freshly harvested coca leaves. Between 2008 and 2020, Latin
America became a hotspot for criminal groups from the Balkans, largely on the back of
rising demand for cocaine. © Georg Ismar/Picture Alliance via Getty Images

51
 NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
GERMANY
CZECHIA
International
FRANCE ITALY
boundary
SPAIN
GREECE TURKEY Quito Capital
Cali Town
Cocaine shipping routes
Western Balkans

Medellin
Pereira
Bogota
Cali
Manta
COLOMBIA
Quito
Guayaquil ECUADOR
Machala
PERU
Trujillo
Lima BRAZIL
Callao
Brasilia

Santos

Johannesburg AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AFRICA
URUGUAY
Montevideo Cape Town

FIGURE 4 Cocaine trafficking from Latin America to Western Europe, South Africa
and Australia

in Tirana. Operation Journey confirmed that this group had had contacts with the
Medellín Cartel in Colombia since 1999 and was part of a worldwide network of
cocaine trafficking.228 This link may be explained by the fact that the Albanian mafia
has close relations with the Italian mafia, which in turn has historical relations with
the Colombian cartels.

But the main action seems to have started around 2008/09, when Darko Šarić
became involved in drug trafficking from Latin America to Europe. Šarić first
attracted attention in 2009 when Uruguayan police, acting on a tip from US and Serbian
anti-drug officials, seized a Europe-bound yacht carrying more than 2 tonnes of co­­
caine on the La Plata river, which separates Uruguay and Argentina. Subsequently,
490 kilograms of cocaine – packed in balloons – was found in a house in Buenos
Aires that was connected to Šarić’s group.229 Šarić apparently had good contacts
with the Colombian Los Rastrojos group led by Wilber ‘Soap’ Varela, who was
killed in Venezuela in 2008.230 Some of Šarić’s accomplices who were caught con-
fessed that Šarić’s network was shipping drugs from Colombia, Uruguay and Brazil
to Eastern Europe. This was just the tip of the iceberg in what would be revealed
as a multi-million-dollar business that earned Šarić the nickname ‘Cocaine King’.231
Two years later, in April 2011, police confiscated a shipment of 2 tonnes of cocaine
in Uruguay that came from Colombia and was ultimately destined for Europe. A
Serbian citizen was arrested.

52 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
In 2008/09, around the same time that Šarić was the shipments of bananas to Europe to smuggle
making inroads in Latin America, Arbër Çekaj, drugs.233 Others soon followed the example of Šarić
an Albanian, entered Ecuador and established a and Çekaj, with seizures, arrests and news stories
banana-trading company.232 This turned out to indicating the increasing engagement of people from
be fruitful business as, within just a few years, the Western Balkans in cocaine trafficking from
Çekaj became Albania’s biggest drug dealer, using Latin America.234

The attraction of Latin America

As the source of one the world’s most lucrative the arrival of criminal structures from the Balkans,
drugs – cocaine – Latin America has an obvious the Middle East and Asia to use this major port.236
attraction for criminal groups from the Balkans.
Around the same time, the incorporation of the
Colombia is the leading producer of coca leaf in the
concept of universal citizenship into the new con-
world and the largest exporter of cocaine, followed
stitution (amended in 2008) allowed foreign visitors
by Peru and Bolivia. This is, however, nothing new.
of any nationality to visit Ecuador for up to 90 days
What is interesting is how groups from the Western
without a tourist visa: this period can be extended
Balkans got involved in a business that has long
by an additional 90 days, allowing visitors to be in
been dominated by Colombian and Italian groups. To
Ecuador legally for six consecutive months.237 For
better understand how, when and why some coun-
those who illegally stay in Ecuador, the maximum
tries of Latin America became hotspots for criminal
fine is only US$800. This makes it a user-friendly
groups from the Western Balkans it is worth looking
environment for criminals ‘visiting’ from the Balkans
at the place where Çekaj, among others, seems to
(and elsewhere).
have found an entry point, namely Ecuador.
Several sources consulted for this report cited
Ecuador corruption of the judicial system as another enabling
In organized crime, as in real estate, location is factor for the penetration of foreign criminal groups
everything. Ecuador is situated between Colombia into the country. Indeed, in at least two cases involv-
and Peru, which produce around 90 per cent of the ing criminals from the Western Balkans, traffickers
world’s cocaine. Between 1996 and 2006, Ecuador were given reduced sentences or not punished at
was considered Latin America’s most unstable all. For example, in 2014, eight Ecuadorians, two
democracy. This was illustrated by the fact that it Albanians and one Kosovar were captured as part
had eight presidents within a decade, three of them of Operation Balkans and accused of storing large
being ousted by Congress and street protests. Other quantities of drugs in Guayaquil to send to Europe,
factors that make Ecuador attractive to international but despite the severity of the charges, the Kosovar,
organized-crime groups include its porous borders, Remzi Azemi, was released within a month of his
weak laws and the ease with which it is possible to arrest. In November 2018, an Albanian and a Greek
change one’s identity and purchase fraudulent docu- were arrested in an anti-narcotics operation on the
ments, such as ID cards and passports. Ecuadorian coast and charged with drug trafficking,
along with six Ecuadorians. When the case went to
Another contributing factor was the closure in
trial, the First Court of Penal Guarantees convicted
2009 of the US military base in the coastal city
the Ecuadorians but let the foreigners go free.238
of Manta.235 For a decade, the US had carried out
A similar situation seems to exist in Colombia, which
anti-drug-trafficking operations from the base.
has one of the highest rates of judicial impunity
According to a former director of intelligence of the
in Latin America (it appears in fifth place in the
Ecuadorian army, the closure of the base facilitated
impunity ranking of Transparency International).

LATIN AMERICA 53
 Cocaine concealed in crates of bananas imported from Colombia is seized in Berlin in
January 2014. Arbër Çekaj became Albania’s biggest drug dealer, using shipments of
bananas to conceal smuggled drugs. © Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images

According to the Transparency Organization for Colombia, of every 100 crimes com-
mitted in the country, only six are punished (in other words, an impunity rate of 94
per cent). This suggests that Colombia is a safe haven for criminals.

Another feature that makes Ecuador attractive to organized crime is dollarization.

Ecuador, which adopted the US currency in 2000 following a banking crisis, therefore
now has a strong currency, but it also has a low level of bancarization (the availabil-
ity of bank services to the general public). For example, in 2018, 48.1 per cent of
Ecuadorians did not use any financial services, according to a survey by the Central
Bank of Ecuador. In other words, a large amount of cash remains outside the formal
banking system, which makes it hard to trace financial flows and easy to launder
money (for example, through construction and real estate). In addition, there is no law
in Ecuador that provides for the seizure of assets from drug traffickers. As a result,
according to a police source, ‘criminals serve two or three years in prison and then go
out and enjoy their money’. 

While foreign criminal groups started to infiltrate Ecuador, the state had few
resources to identify them and counteract their activities. According to a former
senior Ecuadorian intelligence official, the main focus during the government of
Rafael Correa (2007–2017) was political intelligence rather criminal intelligence.
Furthermore, the country focused mostly on collaboration with the US in the fight
against organized crime (for example, through an agreement renewed in 2019) rather

54 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
 than international cooperation, mutual legal assistance and intelligence exchange.
This problem is not unique to Ecuador. For example, Colombia has no extradition
treaties with any of the six Western Balkan countries.239

Law enforcement is also handicapped by the fact that Ecuador is one of the few
countries that does not hold a database with visitor fingerprints and photographs.
This makes it very hard to track passports, not least when criminals use more than
one alias. A lack of understanding of Balkan languages and criminal groups is another
handicap. While many Serb and Albanian criminals operating in Latin America are said
to speak fluent Spanish, very few of the national police forces have experts on Balkan
crime or languages.240

And it seems it is not only the police who find it hard to identify the ethnicity of
people from the Balkans. Apparently Colombian drug traffickers often refer to any
Eastern European counterpart as a ‘Russian’.241 One of the most notorious criminals
from the Balkans, Miro Niemeier Rizvanovic, was known as ‘El Ruso’ (‘The Russian’)
despite being of Bosnian and German origin.

Right place at the right time

Having made inroads into the Latin American market in the early 2000s, criminals
from the Balkans had the good fortune to be in the right place at the right time
during a shake up in the cocaine market. A major factor was the peace process
in Colombia. During negotiations between the Colombian government and FARC
between 2012 and 2016, the area of coca crops began to increase significantly after

250 000

200 000

150 000

100 000

50 000

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

FIGURE 5 Hectares under coca cultivation in Colombia, 2008–2019

SOURCE: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Colombia: Monitoreo de territorios afectados por cultivos
ilícitos 2018, August 2019, p 22, https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Colombia/Censo_cultivos_
coca_2018.pdf.

2012 LATIN AMERICA

2013 2014 55
 historical lows had been achieved under a major eradication offensive led by the
military (see Figure 5). According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),
the number of hectares under coca cultivation more than quadrupled between 2013
and 2019, from 50 000 hectares in 2013 to 212 000 hectares in 2019.242 Potential
pure cocaine production, meanwhile, rose to a staggering 951 tonnes.243 This was due
to the reduction of the anti-narcotics offensive and the manual eradication of crops;
the suspension of aerial spraying programmes by order of the Constitutional Court
in 2015; and the increase in planting due to the expectation of voluntary crop-
substitution programmes that would bring monetary benefits to farmers.

In 2017, after the signing of the peace deal, the FARC began to withdraw from the
territories it occupied. This created a power vacuum that other criminal actors began
to fill, attracted by a lucrative business that was left without an owner. Among those
new actors were criminal gangs, FARC dissidents who rejected the peace agreement
and structures of other small Marxist guerrillas, such as the National Liberation Army
(ELN), the ‘narco’ arm of the nearly extinct Popular Liberation Army.

At the same time, the cocaine that had been kept in stock since the start of the peace
negotiations started to flood the market. Given the abundance of cocaine, Colombian
cartels and groups in Brazil such as the First Capital Command (PCC) were looking for
new markets and partners.244 Groups from the Western Balkans were well positioned
to help.

The role of the Western Balkan groups

Authorities have As described in the earlier section on Western Europe, by the early 2000s, Serb
and Albanian criminal groups had forged close contacts with Italian mafia groups,
identified at least
which were the main distributors of Colombian cocaine in Western Europe. They
four groups from the used these contacts to play a key role as intermediaries or brokers between the
Western Balkans Latin American suppliers and the European distributors. Indeed, in some cases they
moved up the value chain to become key distributors themselves. Some enterprising
that have connections Serbs and Montenegrins (such as Darko Šarić) seem to have even tried to cut out
to Colombian cartels. the middlemen altogether by trafficking drugs via sailboats or small planes from Latin
America to Europe and even Africa.

After the fragmentation of the Colombian cartels in the 1990s, intermediaries

who could connect Latin American producers to European consumers and coor-
dinate shipments of several tonnes became key actors in the criminal world.245
Entrepreneurs from the Western Balkans helped to fill that niche. They saw oppor-
tunities abroad, were under pressure from law enforcement at home, could tap into
growing networks in Western Europe, and had the skill set, brains and guts to do it.
A good example of this new wave of criminal entrepreneurs is ‘El Ruso’, who allegedly
developed a close working relationship with Dairo Antonio Úsuga (also known as
‘Otoniel’), head of the Gulf Clan, the largest drug-trafficking organization in Colombia.
His job became to coordinate drug shipments by sea from Colombia and Brazil to
Europe and Asia.246 He helped link Colombian cartels with Albanian, Kosovar and
Calabrian mafias.247

56 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
Since around 2008, Albanians have been coming to Latin America as emissaries of While cocaine is
Italian mafia groups, such as the ‘Ndrangheta and the Camorra, as well as representa-
still being shipped
tives of mafia groups from other European countries such as Greece and Spain. They
also apparently have their own links with the Turkish and Moroccan mafias for the across the Atlantic,
distribution of narcotics in Europe. Their role, according to a source, focuses primarily lockdowns have
on the internal distribution of the drug, especially at the service of Italian and Spanish
mafias, which have older links with Colombian cartels. created bottlenecks
According to police sources in Ecuador and Colombia, these emissaries usually come in distribution in
‘with a mission that was sponsored and led by the people in the destination coun- Europe.
tries in Europe’. They usually pose as businessmen and tourists and speak Spanish
very well, which facilitates their connections to local crime groups. The job of these
emissaries is to make contacts, negotiate deals (including prices), arrange the ship-
ments and dispatch the drugs. The more deals they make, the better their network of
contacts. At the same time (if the deal goes well), their value to the group back home
increases since they become the eyes and ears of their bosses in Europe. It is not yet
clear how the work of emissaries from the Western Balkans has been affected by the
COVID-19 crisis, although it can be surmised that restrictions will make it difficult to
travel back and forth, and riskier to move money. While cocaine is still being shipped
across the Atlantic, lockdowns have apparently created bottlenecks in distribution in
Europe as well as difficulties in paying for cocaine deliveries.248

In Colombia, emissaries reportedly meet up with local mafias in cities such as Pereira,
Medellín, Cali, Pasto and Cúcuta. Police have also identified a few cases in which
Western Balkan brokers have travelled to production areas in Colombia such as
Tibú in the province of Norte de Santander (on the border with Venezuela), which is
controlled by the ELN, or to Tumaco in the province of Nariño (close to the border
with Ecuador) where multiple armed actors converge, among them groups that broke
away from the FARC. In an incident in April 2020, a Serb – Dejan Stanimirovic (also
known as ‘Marcos’) – died under strange circumstances in the company of a former
Colombian paramilitary leader, Jose Vicente Rivera Mendoza, also known as ‘Soldado’,
in Guamal, Colombia.249 He was apparently known to several Western European
police forces, who had been observing him for almost a decade under suspicion of
coordinating drug shipments from Latin America to Europe.250

In Ecuador, Guayaquil and the El Oro province seem to be the main meeting places.
In Peru, it has been reported that a Serb group has established direct contacts with
family clans that produce cocaine in the valley of the rivers Apurimec, Ene and
Mataro, and transport it to Lima and the coast. 251 As noted in the case study on the
Netherlands, the Tito and Dino clan has also allegedly been trafficking drugs from
Peru.

Police have detected a pattern in the movements of such emissaries: they stay
between eight days and one month; they travel frequently in groups of three people,
often with Spanish or Italian citizens (who have a history of contacts and understand
Spanish better); and often carry fake documents. The reason for travelling as a trio
has a practical purpose: when cocaine shipments are negotiated, local cartels often
require that a person from the organization remains in Colombia both to verify the
quality of the shipment and also to serve as ‘insurance’ or a guarantee to ensure that
the buyer pays the entire amount once the shipment is delivered.

LATIN AMERICA 57
 THE GROUPS
It is sometimes said that there is a ‘Balkan cartel’ In the last decade, authorities have identified the
operating out of Latin America. Such a description existence of at least four groups or cells from the
is too monolithic. Rather, there seem to be a Western Balkans – often with links to families or
wide range of actors from the Western Balkans small towns back home – that have connections
(particularly Albania, Montenegro and Serbia) to Colombian cartels and cocaine trafficking from
involved in cocaine trafficking from Latin America. Colombia. It is unclear if all of these groups still
They sometimes work with each other and operate, not least since at least two lost their bosses.
occasionally seem to have internal disputes, but
generally seem to operate quietly and efficiently.

Grupa Amerika
Grupa Amerika (which started on the streets of they have evidence that Jakšić created a criminal
Belgrade in the 1990s) apparently specialized in the structure to obtain cocaine in Peru and Ecuador.252
logistics and transportation of cocaine (and heroin) In January 2019, Smail Šikalo (from Bosnia) of the
between Colombia and North America and Europe. Grupa Amerika was arrested as part of a drug bust
The group was led by Mile Miljanić and his second- that seized 1.5 tonnes of cocaine.253 In April 2019,
in command was Zoran Jakšić. In July 2016, Jakšić a member of the Amerika clan, Veselin Raicevic, was
was captured in Peru and accused of sending drugs arrested in Belgrade.254
from South America to Europe. Investigators say

The Šarić Group

The Šarić Group was named after its boss Darko criminal organizations in cash for several tonnes
Šarić, who in 2018 was sentenced to 15 years of cocaine. 257 There also seems to be a link to the
in prison in a Serbian tribunal. 255, 256 Šarić (who PCC in Brazil. Two major drug seizures in August
came to public attention through Operation and September 2016 at the port of Santos involved
Balkan Warrior in 2009, which seized 2.7 tonnes (among others) a Serb called Božidar Kapetanović
of cocaine in Uruguay) appears to be one of (also known as ‘Judo’) who, according to the
the first movers from the Western Balkans in Brazilian police, is suspected of being part of the
establishing contacts in Latin America. His group Šarić Group. The latter’s right-hand man Miroslav
was responsible for transporting large shipments Jevtic – also known as Felipe – (also Serbian)
of cocaine from Latin America to Europe via was arrested by the Brazilian authorities for drug
the Balkans. According to Serbian police, Šarić trafficking and suspicion of money laundering,
was organizing two shipments of cocaine a including using Bitcoin. 258 In 2019 he was sentenced
year. Šarić was allegedly able to pay Colombian to 17 years in prison.

The Sreten Jocić Group

The Sreten Jocić Group is named after its boss, a Turkey and Germany. It is reported to be responsible
prominent Serbian mafia figure who is also known for organizing large shipments of cocaine from
as Joca Amsterdam. The group operates in the Colombia and via the Caribbean, especially in Aruba.
Western Balkans, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Austria, It apparently enjoys close cooperation with Albanian

58 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
groups in Western Europe. Jocić’s group is responsible operations, including drug trafficking operations from
for directly working in Colombia with Colombian Colombia, are overseen by lesser group authorities and
cocaine manufacturers and sellers to move cocaine to a widespread network of well-organized teams’.260 This
European ports via routes including the Canary Islands, seems to have contributed to the group’s resilience,
according to one assessment. 259
Jocić is reported to have even after Jocić was arrested in April 2009 and found
visited Colombia in 1996. According to one assessment: guilty in connection with two contract murders.
‘Despite Jocic’s strategic control over the group, tactical

The Berane Clan

The Berane Clan has been mainly involved in drug they are still active. Several prominent members of the
trafficking, especially cocaine smuggling from South clan were indicted in Montenegro in 2004 for smuggling
America particularly Venezuela and Colombia, according 200 kilograms of cocaine from Venezuela to Serbia
to the same previous source.261 Very little is known through Italy’s port of Gioia Tauro and Montenegro’s
about the group, and it is not known to what extent port of Bar.262

Albanian and Montenegrin groups

As noted earlier, there are also several Albanian conditions within the country. While these jobs are
organized-crime groups involved in trafficking cocaine relatively lucrative, some Montenegrin seafarers seem
from Latin America to Europe. They have found a niche tempted to earn the equivalent of an annual salary in
as key distributors between Latin American cartels one trip by helping criminal groups to traffic cocaine. 264
and Italian mafia groups, and – as noted in the case In February 2020, several Montenegrin crew members
of the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries – were arrested when 5 tonnes of cocaine were seized
are increasingly involved in retail. The most successful from a ship off of Aruba. Four Montenegrin sailors
Albanian groups have now accumulated around a were arrested in Philadelphia in June 2019 for their
decade’s worth of contacts and experience. They involvement in trafficking almost 20 tonnes of cocaine
generally comprise between 15 and 20 members, from Latin America. In 2015, five Montenegrin sailors
are flexible, quick to adapt, politically well connected, were arrested after organizing a shipment of cocaine
have strong financial power, and are reputed to deliver that was dropped from a cargo ship off the coast of
good quality at a competitive price. These groups are Spain and collected by yachts. A year later, another
relatively autonomous, but interact with wider criminal Montenegrin was sentenced to six years in prison for
networks if expedient. Albanian groups operating in dropping off 261 kilograms of cocaine from a cargo
Latin America are considered more sophisticated than
ship that werepicked up by fishermen off the Dutch
those operating solely within Albania or that have links
coast. And in March 2020, a Montenegrin crew
to only one organization in a neighbouring country.263
member was arrested and 500 kilograms of cocaine
When mentioning the role of groups from the Western seized on a Montenegrin bulk carrier (the Budva)
Balkans, it is worth highlighting that seafarers from in Hamburg that had travelled from Santos, Brazil
Montenegro seem to play a disproportionate role in via Casablanca. 265 As described in the section on
crewing ships involved in drug trafficking. According South Africa above, they have also been arrested for
to one estimate, 7 000 Montenegrin sailors work trafficking cocaine in yachts. 266 In April 2019, it was
for global maritime companies. Jobs in international even reported that 50 kilograms of cocaine was found
shipping companies are considered attractive to on a training ship of the Montenegrin navy moored in
Montenegrins given the difficult socio-economic the Adriatic port of Tivat. 267

LATIN AMERICA 59
 Some of these emissaries come and go to the region, often using two or more names
to enter a country. According to a police intelligence agent in Colombia: ‘When
they come, they don’t touch a gram of cocaine, they only make contact to define
the business form.’268 This view was echoed by a top prosecutor at the General
Attorney’s Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación) who specializes in counter-narcotics:
‘They come without money and they leave without drugs. There is no way to catch
them in flagrante.’269

That said, some of the emissaries (for example, in Ecuador) seem to spend time in the
country and are not afraid to live luxurious lifestyles. One prosecutor quoted by the
Ecuadorian media stated that Albanians involved in drug trafficking pose as entrepre-
neurs, frequent high-end hotels and bars, spend a lot of time in gyms and own luxury
goods that cannot be accounted for. If they rent apartments, it is usually in private
developments with security services. They receive money through bank transfers
and manage large sums. They generally do not own property in the country, but rent
high-security houses in expensive areas.270

Over the past decade, groups from the Balkans have inserted themselves into the
local criminal networks in Ecuador, particularly in the cities of Guayaquil and Machala
where the drugs are stored and from where they are trafficked. They seem to have
become the senior partners in the relationship with their local counterparts. That
said, there are also apparently partnerships between Albanian and Ecuadorian
mafias that have teamed up to traffic cocaine and split the profits. Criminals from the
Western Balkans pay Ecuadorians to carry out their orders and undertake the various
tasks that their illegal businesses require, like guarding the shipments, transporting
the containers, and concealing the drugs in the containers with the complicity of port
officials. They also seem to be able to stay out of jail, which suggests that they either
keep their hands clean or have enough resources to make significant bribes.

While these emissaries usually belong to the ranks of middle command in their
native country, once in Ecuador they are promoted to be leaders of the crime group
in that country. Still, they seem to maintain close contacts with the criminal net-
works in the Western Balkans and with the diaspora in Western Europe, increasingly
through encrypted cellphones. When Dritan Rexhepi, a dangerous fugitive wanted by
INTERPOL in three European countries, was arrested in 2014, he attempted to smash
his cellphone by throwing it to the ground.

The routes and modalities

Most of the cocaine shipped from Latin America to Europe is transported in con-
tainers on big ships. Indeed, 90 per cent of the cocaine that enters Europe comes
in containers in large merchant ships that dock in ports such as Antwerp, Algeciras,
Le Havre, Rotterdam and Hamburg.271 Shipments of cocaine are usually concealed
in containers of fresh fruit (particularly bananas) as well as frozen fruit pulp from
Colombia and Ecuador.272 The drug packages are apparently wrapped in carbon to
avoid detection. Because such shipments are perishable and need to be moved
quickly, there are fewer controls at the ports of entry.

60 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
Sometimes the drugs are concealed in the containers at the farm that produces  amburg: customs officers inspect
H
the agricultural products, sometimes on the way to the port and sometimes at the a container ship; 90 per cent of
port. Apparently, the most frequent modality is to break the security seals of the the cocaine that enters Europe
arrives in vessels such as this;
containers carrying licit goods and to place the drugs inside. At the destination,
only 2 per cent of them worldwide
accomplices are told the serial number of the container loaded with the cocaine, the are checked.
drugs are recovered and false seals are placed on the container doors to cover up © Christian Charisius/Picture
the break-in.273 The fact that this is possible suggests high levels of corruption within Alliance via Getty Images
the security of the ports, both outbound and inbound. Apparently, a truck driver
(in Guayaquil) can earn up to US$10 000 for re-routing a container, while a forklift
operator (in for example Antwerp) can earn between €25 000 and €75 000 for
making sure the load is safely unpacked.274 Prosecutors mention that cartels can offer
between US$500 000 and US$1 million to customs authorities to let a shipment pass
without control.

Based on data about seizures, it would appear that the volume of cocaine heading for
Europe is considerable. Indeed, the amount of cocaine seized in Europe has reached
historic highs. In 2017, there were 104 000 seizures (mostly of small amounts) for a
total of 140.4 tonnes. The amount of cocaine seized was 20 tonnes more than the
previous historic record of 2006 and doubled the amount seized in 2016. Most of
the cocaine seized in Europe in 2017 was in Belgium (44 752 kilograms), followed by

LATIN AMERICA 61
 Spain (40 960 kilograms); France (17 500 kilograms); A considerable quantity of drugs is coming directly
Netherlands (14 629 kilograms); and UK (5 697 from Colombia. In the past, most of it has been
kilograms), according to an EU report. 275
Drugs have destined for the US. However, according to an intel-
even washed up on the shores of the Black Sea. Two ligence source with the Colombian police, Europe
Serbs were arrested in March 2019 after almost a is now the final destination for 60 per cent of the
tonne of cocaine was discovered in an abandoned cocaine that leaves Colombia. Of the total amount
ship, and in packets along the Romanian coastline. 276
of cocaine that enters Europe, almost 70 per cent is
The purity of cocaine in the EU market also reached trafficked by groups associated with criminal groups
its highest level in 10 years. 277
The cocaine that from the Western Balkans, according to the same
washed ashore in Romania, for example, reportedly source.280 But this number should be taken with
had more than 90 per cent purity.278 some caution.

Venezuela is the ‘most prominent country of origin Balkan criminal groups are also allegedly involved in
for direct cocaine shipments to Europe’, according drug trafficking in the port of Callao, Peru. Serbian
to a 2011 UNODC report, with most of the drugs mafia groups are said to be working with local crim-
coming from Colombia. From 2006 to 2008, more inal organizations (‘chalaco’) to smuggle the drugs
than half of all Europe-bound drug shipments in cargo ships destined for Europe.281 These local
intercepted in the Atlantic had departed from groups, also known as ‘ninjas’ because of their dex-
Venezuela. There is not much information on the terity, are notorious for jumping on trucks and ships
operation of Western Balkan groups in Venezuela. to stash cocaine within shipments of wine, nuts or
One recent exception is the seizure of 5 tonnes of vegetables. In 2019, it was reported that drugs were
cocaine on a ship close to Aruba in the Caribbean loaded on a ship (the MSC Gayane) when it was off
in February 2020. The ship sailed from Suriname, the coast of Peru. The second mate, Ivan Durasevic
docked at Guaranao in Venezuela and was heading from Montenegro, told investigators that he had
for Thessaloniki, Greece. Several Montenegrin crew been recruited by the ship’s chief officer to help
members were arrested for drug trafficking. 279
at least two other crew members and four people

18

16

14

12
Metric tonnes

10

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

FIGURE 6 Drugs seized in Ecuador bound for Belgium, 2014–2020

SOURCE: Local news and national Ecuadorian police website

62 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
wearing ski masks haul bales of cocaine aboard the The route from Ecuador to Europe, particularly
Gayane from smaller ships that approached it shortly to Belgium, seems to be popular with traffickers
after it left Peru. 282
He was to be paid US$50 000 (see Figure 6). According to one analyst, criminal
in cryptocurrency for his effort.283 When the ship, groups operating in Ecuador favour the port of
which was heading for Rotterdam, was searched in Antwerp due to low tariffs and the ease of onward
Philadelphia in June, police found almost 20 tonnes transport. Indeed, a review of the stated destina-
of cocaine (worth more than US$1 billion) – the sec- tions of cocaine shipments seized at Ecuadorian
ond-biggest drug bust in American history.284 ports revealed that the majority were destined for
Antwerp. On 8 January 2020, Belgian authorities
As noted in relation to the Šarić Group above, there reported that in 2019 a record amount of almost
is also a link between Western Balkan criminal 62 tonnes of cocaine had been seized in Antwerp,
groups and the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) Europe’s second largest port. Of this haul, 17 per
smuggling cocaine from the Brazilian port of Santos cent (10.5 tonnes) originated in Ecuador, which,
to Western Europe, including to ports in northern according to the Belgian Ministry of Finance,
Europe and Gioia Tauro, one of the largest ports in ranks as one of the top three exporters of cocaine
the Mediterranean which is known to be infiltrated to Antwerp, along with Colombia and Brazil.286
by the ‘Ndrangheta. According to an AFP press report, Antwerp port’s
general manager, Kristian Vanderwaeren, commented
Uruguay seems to be gaining in popularity as a
to the VRT public broadcaster that ‘Belgian customs
point of departure for drugs. In 2019, the number
can currently only control one to two per cent of the
of drug seizures in the country doubled compared
millions of containers arriving at the Flemish port’.287
to the previous year. At least three major seizures
of cocaine have been made in ships that have origi- Ecuador has eight main ports, of which Guayaquil
nated or stopped over in Uruguay, and a major drug seems to be a hotspot for groups from the Western
bust on a private jet originating from Montevideo Balkans. For example, as part of Operation Balkans
was made in 2019. 285
in June 2014, 11 people, including Ecuadorians,

35

30

25
Metric tonnes

20

15

10

0
2016 2017 2018 2019

FIGURE 7 Tonnes of drugs seized in Ecuadorian ports, 2016–2019

SOURCE: National Directorate of the Antinarcotics Police of Ecuador

NOTE: Data available until 25 September 2019

LATIN AMERICA 63
 Albanians and Kosovars, were arrested in
Guayaquil. The investigation revealed that the
gang had its operations centre in that city, from
where they planned to ship drugs to Europe. In
another case, from May 2019, an Albanian-led
gang was arrested in the coastal province of El
Oro. From there, the criminal group sent drugs to
Europe by hiding the contraband in shipments of
agricultural products. According to a local security
Drugs raid finds 403m of cocaine
expert, Ecuador’s ports lack scanning equipment.
The luxury yacht “Dances with Waves”
which was seized off the west coast of As a result, only 1 per cent of containers are
Ireland, yesterday carrying a huge haul
of cocaine, is escorted into the harbour
subjected to random police checks with trained
at Castletown Bere in Co. Cork. (Photo dogs.288 Lack of controls is allegedly compounded
by Niall Carson - PA Images/PA Images
via Getty Images) by high levels of corruption within ports.289

Between 2016 and 2019, police seized almost

63 tonnes of drugs in Ecuadorian ports (see
Figure 7). But compared to the estimated volume
passing through the port, this is probably less
than 10 per cent of the cocaine that is intended
for Europe, where one gram of the drug can
retail for 20 times as much as in Ecuador.290

Other drug-trafficking
methods
Drugs move in other ways as well. Small cargoes
are sent with human couriers travelling on
commercial flights to Europe, for example from
Guayaquil and Quito airports. A relatively new
method seems to be charter flights, or so called
‘narco-jets.291 For example, in April 2018, two
Albanians were arrested after 1 000 kilos of
cocaine and more than US$1.5 million were
discovered on a charter flight from Colombia
to Madrid.292 In July 2019, Michael Dokovich,
a citizen of Montenegro of Albanian origin,
was arrested after 600 kilograms of cocaine
was seized in a private Gulfstream jet in Basel,
Switzerland, that had come from Uruguay (with
a stopover in Nice).293 His right-hand man, Pero
‘Pjer’ Šarac, was also arrested after visiting South
America three times in 2018 to allegedly orga-
nize cocaine shipments.294 This operation, known
Some Balkan traffickers favour yachts for shipping drugs.
Here a luxury yacht containing cocaine is intercepted off the
as Operation Familia, which was organized by the
Irish coast. © Niall Carson/PA Images via Getty Images US DEA and EUROPOL, resulted in 16 arrests.

64 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
Interestingly, five of the arrests were made in Asia, where it is alleged that ‘Balkan It is sometimes
traffickers’ facilitated and coordinated the maritime trafficking of multi-kilogram quan-
said that there is
tities of cocaine, mostly in Hong Kong and Macao.295
a Balkan cartel
Some Balkan traffickers seem to favour the use of yachts.296 A Greek and an Albanian
were arrested in Guayaquil in 2018 for attempting to traffic drugs to Europe and operating out of
Australia in a sailboat. Darko Šarić used yachts, and the use of yachts has also been Latin America. Such
noted in the case studies of South Africa and Turkey. A number of people from the
Western Balkans (particularly Serbs) have been arrested in recent years for smuggling
a description
cocaine on yachts (referred to a narcovelero) from Latin America to Europe via the is too monolithic.
Azores and/or Canary Islands. For example, in May 2015, four Serbs were arrested in
the Azores when 1 150 kilograms of cocaine was seized in their boat.297 In July 2019,
797 kilograms of cocaine were seized just off the Azores in a boat apparently charted
by a Serbian criminal group.298 It also appears that, since at least 2018, Australia is
starting to be a target destination for cocaine coming from Ecuador.

A winning business model

In short, in the past decade, Latin America has become a hotspot for drug trafficking
for groups from the Western Balkans. Recent information suggests that this trend
will continue. For example, according to an anti-narcotics source in Ecuador, 160
Albanians entered Ecuador in 2018, of whom 20 were potential drug traffickers, while
a Colombian police source said they have detected an ‘unjustified increase’ in the
entry of citizens from Albania to Colombia. Entry points may also further diversify: in
January 2020 Albania and Guyana (which borders Brazil and Venezuela) signed a visa
waiver agreement. 299

Demand and supply of cocaine remain high, although seizures also seem to be
rising. It is not clear if this is because of more effective law enforcement or simply a
reflection of the increased volume in circulation. The vulnerabilities exploited by the
Western Balkan criminal groups in Latin America do not appear to be going away any
time soon, nor is the volume of container traffic to Western Europe likely to decline
(even in light of the COVID-19 pandemic).

Criminal groups from the Western Balkans have clearly established a reputation
for being efficient and reliable. They also have the necessary fear factor. This
has enabled them to develop good relations with suppliers in Latin America and
increased their leverage in distribution networks, using ports in Western Europe
where they have accomplices. Being able to buy straight from the source in Latin
America and sell directly to users in Western Europe enables them to control the
entire value chain. This allowed them to increase purity, slash prices and corner the
market. For example, it has been reported that in the UK Albanian groups were able
to procure cocaine from Colombian cartels for about £4 000 to £5 500 a kilogram,
at a time when rivals thought they were getting a decent deal using Dutch whole-
salers selling at £22 500 a kilogram.300 They are also clearly opportunistic, seeking
out new partners, routes and markets; new modes of delivery; and creative ways
to launder their money (including through cryptocurrencies). In short, they seem to
have found a winning business model.

LATIN AMERICA 65
 AUSTRALIA
TENTACLES DOWN UNDER
66 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
 A
ustralia has the highest per capita consumption of cocaine in the world. It
is a lucrative market. In recent years, there has been in marked increase in
drug trafficking from Latin America via the Pacific islands to Australia.301
There is some evidence of people from the Balkans involved in drug trafficking in the
region, as exposed in a major bust of cocaine in New Zealand in 2017.302 It would not
be surprising, based on the modalities of groups from the Western Balkans in other
parts of the world, that this could be a route that will be exploited.

According to one Australian police source, ‘Balkan organised crime is now the biggest
threat to Australia, so entrenched and disciplined and influential in local communities,
it has made it a serious challenge to crack.’303 However, according to an expert in
Australia’s Criminal Intelligence Commission, while there is a small amount of Western
Balkan organized crime in the country, ‘other ethnic and non-ethnic groups have a
much greater presence in Australia’.304

As in other global hotspots, Western Balkans criminal groups in Australia seem to

have evolved out of a diaspora that emigrated from Yugoslavia in the 1980s and early
1990s. It is alleged that members of the Zemun clan hung out in Australia for a while,
before and after Operation Sabre.

A major criminal group in Australia apparently centred around ethnic Albanian Vaso
Ulic (who has dual Australian and Montenegrin citizenship). In its prime, this group is
reported to have smuggled six tonnes of drugs a year to Australia, South Africa and
China. Like Western Balkan criminals in other parts of the world, Ulic started out as a
small-time crook on Sydney’s infamous ‘golden mile’, and within 20 years had become
the kingpin of drug smuggling in Australia (known as the Montenegrin Escobar), with
close ties to key players in the Australian underworld. Ulic fled Australia in 2005
when Australian police moved to question him about nine unresolved contract killings
and a major drug seizure. But it is alleged he remained influential from his home in

 Serbian Hells Angels boss and former Bandido gang member Zeljko Mitrovic was murdered
by his meth cook in Sydney in 2013. © Getty Images

67
 ‘Balkan organized Montenegro. He was arrested in August 2017 on suspicion that from July 2007 to
May 2008, he was the leader of a criminal organization that smuggled 60 kilograms
crime is now
of methamphetamine from other countries to Australia. He was released in 2019.
the biggest
Members of the Serbian community in Australia are also key players in the country’s
threat to Australia.’ biker (or bikie) gangs. It is alleged that some of the so-called ‘Balkan Bandidos’ met
as children at dances at the local Serbian Orthodox church. Indeed, the son of the
former priest is now a key powerbroker in the Bandidos gang.

A leading member of the Hell’s Angels in Australia, Zeljko Mitrovic, was of Serbian
descent. In 2013, he was killed by his former meth cook – and buried in the ceme-
tery of the local Serbian orthodox church. In 2014, Bosnian-born Senad Catic (also
a former member of the Bandidos who had had several brushes with the law) was
arrested for allegedly leading a multi-million-dollar methamphetamine syndicate
that may have laundered profits through Bitcoin. Another former member of the
Bandidos, Bogdan Cuic, was extradited from Serbia to Australia in 2016 to face
charges for a drug-related murder. Despite the fact that there is no extradition treaty
between Australia and Serbia, the Australian police praised the cooperation that they
had with the Serbian authorities.305

Between September 2011 and April 2012, three men with Balkan backgrounds were
killed in Wollongong’s southern suburbs. All three are said to have been involved in
drug trafficking.306 Two of the men (Saso Ristevski and Goran Nikolovski) had known
each other and had previously served jail time after the pair were caught by police
with a large quantity of cocaine in 2004.307

Ethnic Albanians are also infamous in the Australian drug market. One example is
Daniel Kalaja, whose father had emigrated from Albania to Australia in the 1970s.
Kalaja moved up from being a cannabis distributor in Melbourne to running a
synthetic-drugs empire on the Gold Coast. 308 He was a big player until he was
arrested in 2010. In 2012, Australian police deported an Albanian man, Leonard
Gjeka, who was reputed to be an enforcer for biker gangs in South Australia. 309

68 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
BALKAN ‘MAFIAS
ON THE MOVE’ 69
 B
efore concluding, it is worth looking at how the different hotspots in this
report relate to the Western Balkans. The main observation is that there is
no one single nexus that coordinates the activities of various criminal groups
from the Western Balkans that are active abroad. There is no one motherland of
crime in the Western Balkans, nor a mastermind from the region behind the activities
of different Western Balkan groups. However, the region has a history and socio-
economic conditions that have created push factors that have exported criminal
activity. And it has a political economy, in some cases even criminal governance,
that create pull factors for some individuals and groups to seek or offer protection,
develop networks, and to launder dirty money.

One of the main links between global hotspots and the Western Balkans is logistical.
The region’s location has been an important crossroads, for example for heroin traf-
ficking along the Balkan route, or as a key hub for smuggling migrants. Since around
2010, the region has become a key hub for trafficking of cocaine. In the past decade,
there have been a number of seizures in Montenegrin and Albanian ports such as Bar
and Durrës that indicate that these ports are being used as trans-shipment points for
cocaine coming from Latin America, which is then being sent on to major markets in
Italy and Central Europe.

Another major impact is the laundering of the profits of crime through the region.
This seems to have a particular impact on real estate and construction – driving up
prices despite no increase in incomes. Other popular money-laundering methods are
through the tourism industry, gambling, call centres, currency-exchange offices and
remittances. This is an issue that requires further study, and one that the GI-TOC will
be looking at in a forthcoming report.

Some groups are repatriating cash in bulk shipments hidden in specially made compart-
ments in cars and SUVs. There are also indications that some of the more sophisticated
groups are laundering their proceeds directly in Western Europe, in offshore havens
or in cryptocurrencies. While the Western Balkan countries have adapted their laws

 Budva, Montenegro. Over the last decade, there have been several drug seizures in

various Balkan port towns on the Adriatic. © Velveteye via Shutterstock

70
against money laundering and illicit financial flows to meet European standards, the
reality on the ground is often described as being very different. It will be interesting
to see the impact of this money on economies – not least in the Western Balkans – if
there is a liquidity crisis as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

On the basis of this report, it is hard to judge the impact of global hotspots on the
political economy of the Western Balkans. On the one hand, it is clear that the eco-
system of corruption, political impunity and weak criminal justice in the Western
Balkans creates a roof that protects some of the big players. On the other hand,
some of these actors are undesirable for some political leaders. Conversely, some
people interviewed for this report indicate that it is safer and easier for a criminal
group to run a business outside of the Western Balkans where they do not have to
worry about the control and patronage of local authorities or exposure to locally
based criminal groups. It may seem counter-intuitive, but it appears that there are
times when the umbrella of political cover, which was identified as being so important
in hotspots of organized crime in the Western Balkans, can be a liability for groups
that have made it big abroad.310

Regardless of how close or intentional the links are between criminal groups from
the Western Balkans operating abroad and leading figures back home, the repu-
tation of countries of the Western Balkans suffers from the activities of criminal
groups in global hotspots. Many of the clichés that the region had to live with in the
1990s persist today in part because of the activity of Balkan criminal groups abroad.
Indeed, the threat posed by Western Balkan criminals in some countries such as the
Netherlands has been used as an argument against EU accession.

It is hard to judge the extent to which criminals from the region divide their time
between the global hotspots and the Western Balkans. There are indications from
several of the case studies that, at a senior level, brokers come and go. Some lieuten-
ants are more embedded in the community where they operate or, as in the case of
Latin America, travel the regions as emissaries. There are also indications of seasonal
criminality, where members of the group will travel to complete certain assigned tasks
and then return home.311

Some of the most successful criminals from the Balkans (such as Darko Šarić) seem to
have taken advantage of networks in the ‘Yugosphere’312 of the Western Balkans and
combined them with the opportunities afforded by global hotspots. Another example
is Naser Kelmendi (a Kosovo Albanian with Bosnian citizenship). The Kelmendi
organization has allegedly been involved in drug trafficking (particularly heroin), the
smuggling of cigarettes, money laundering and loan sharking. The core of Kelmendi’s
criminal group is composed of his close family members (i.e. sons, cousin and his
associates). It is believed that this organization has significant influence in Kosovo,
and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Montenegro, North Macedonia, Croatia,
Serbia, Germany and the US.313 Kelmendi was charged by the Basic Court of Kosovo
on various counts of criminal activity (including aggravated murder), but sentenced to
only six years in prison for drug trafficking in 2018.314

Criminals operating in global hotspots tend to return to the Western Balkans. It has
been noted that some of the Pink Panthers seem to have retreated to the Western
Balkans between their smash-and-grab operations, or the case of hitmen who travel

BALKAN ‘MAFIAS ON THE MOVE’ 71

 Some of the most from the Western Balkans for a hit and then return home again. As illustrated in
this report, there are also cases of criminals returning from hotspots to lie low,
successful Balkan avoid exposure to law-enforcement agencies in the hotspot where they are active,
criminals have eliminate their adversaries, or to find a safe haven after being indicted abroad. In an
inverse to Varese’s argument, some, who have made their careers in the hotspots,
taken advantage
have transplanted themselves back to the Western Balkans. Surely more could be
of networks in the done by states in the Western Balkans to make it riskier for wanted criminals to
‘Yugosphere’ of the come and go.

Western Balkans and In addition, there may be a risk that groups from the Western Balkans operating in
global hotspots may bring some of their problems and know-how back home with
combined them with them, along with their profits. For example, partners from abroad could seek to
the opportunities make inroads into the Balkans – could this attract the wrong kind of foreign invest-
ment, and the wrong kind of people?
afforded by the
Furthermore, if some of the money is laundered in the Western Balkans in ways
hotspots.
that create businesses that are not highly regulated (for example, the tourism
industry, casinos and the entertainment industry), could this create an environment
where other players may also follow suit? Could this act as a magnet for criminal
groups from Asia, the Middle East, Turkey or Russia? Or murky foreign investors
who could take advantage of limited regulation mechanisms – as was noted in
the case study of the Czech Republic in the early 1990s? It is also worth asking if
cyberspace could one day soon become a (virtual) global hotpot for criminals from
the Western Balkans.315

Finally, while some criminal groups have profited from the war in the Middle East
through the trafficking of weapons and the smuggling of migrants, there has also
been a boomerang effect, given that there is popular discontent with the growing
number of migrants and concerns about the return of foreign fighters and radical-
ization. In the future, it will be important to look at not only how organized crime
from the Western Balkans is exported globally, but also if (and how) foreign orga-
nized-crime groups move into the Western Balkans.

72 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
CONCLUSIONS
73
 T
his report has set out to show where there are global hotspots of activ-
ity by criminal groups from the Western Balkans. It has looked at case
studies in Latin America, Western Europe, Turkey and South Africa, and
touched on Australia.
There are some similarities between these hotspots, but also important differ-
ences. Many of the hotspots are linked to a legacy of the dramatic events that
took place in Yugoslavia and Albania in the 1990s, but others have more to do
with more recent developments and opportunities that have opened up because
of political changes and globalization. Most hotspots have sizeable diasporas
of people from the Western Balkans, but some do not (such as those in Latin
America). Some hotspots have relatively weak institutions and criminal-justice
systems, or were attractive to criminal groups during a time of transition, but
others (such as Western Europe, Australia and Turkey) do not.

Almost every hotspot identified in this report is linked to the drug economy;
either supply (in Latin America), transit (Turkey) or distribution and retail (Western
Europe and Australia). Smuggling of migrants and cigarettes has also been high-
lighted, particularly in the case of Turkey.

South Africa is an outlier. It seems to have been a hotspot in 2018 and 2019
because of a settling of old scores among a small group of people somehow con-
nected to the assassination of Arkan. Yet there are indications that it is becoming
a hotspot for the trafficking of cocaine, including with the involvement of groups
from the Western Balkans.

In most hotspots, the criminal groups from the Western Balkans have moved
up the value chain in the past 20 years. Men from small towns in the Western
Balkans (including from hotspots identified in an earlier report by the GI-TOC)
are now organizing multiple-tonne shipments of cocaine from the jungles of

 The new generation of Western Balkan traffickers have become tech savvy in a bid to
evade law-enforcement. © Millenius/Shutterstock

74
Latin America through some of Europe’s busiest ports to the streets of its capitals. Today there is a
Sailors from small Balkan ports are using yachts to ship drugs to South Africa and
generation of younger,
Australia, or migrants from Turkey to Western Europe. Brokers from the Western
Balkans are cutting deals with some of the biggest Latin American cartels, the professional criminals
Italian mafia and well-established Turkish criminal groups. They are now in the who are adept
premier league of crime.
at using technology.
Most of the criminal activity in the hotspots is non-violent. Again, South Africa is the
outlier, but that seems to be because of bloody infighting related more to vendettas
than competition over a criminal market. There has also been some recent violence
in Italy, which suggests competition with groups that may be taking issue with the
ascendency of Albanian networks in major cocaine markets such as Rome. The other
notable exception is violence associated with the bloody feud between the Škaljarski
and Kavacki clans. But with the exception of a few hits in Western Europe, this vio-
lence mostly occurs in Serbia and Montenegro rather than the hotspots abroad.

Characteristics of the groups

It is difficult to make generalizations about the criminal groups from the Western
Balkans operating in global hotspots, partly because there is no uniform model and
partly because of a dearth of information. It is clear, however, that there is no Balkan
cartel or even an Albanian mafia. Such descriptions suggest a degree of organization
and cohesion that does not exist. Rather, there are a number of groups and networks
that sometimes cooperate with one another and/or with local partners.

Western Balkan criminal groups operating in global hotspots are seldom ethnically
homogeneous, although Albanian groups have traditionally preferred to work with
people from their own clan or community. There is also still a tendency for criminals
from the Western Balkans to work with others from the region. But cases exam-
ined in this report suggest that criminal groups from the Western Balkans operating
abroad are highly adaptive and are willing and able to work effectively together with
people of a wide range of nationalities.

The lack of violence displayed by groups from the Western Balkans suggests that
they are either pragmatic and have found ways to get along with local partners and
other groups, or they feel confident in their ability to control certain markets. The
latter can be attributed in some cases to alliances with powerful partners, a repu-
tation for violence, sufficient resources to ensure impunity in countries with weak
criminal justice systems, as well as a protective umbrella back in their home country.

Some members of these groups – particularly from Serbia and Montenegro – still
have a legacy from the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, but many of that generation of
criminals are either dead, in jail or out of the game. The exception is in South Africa,
where there happened to be a cluster of people (mostly over 50 years old) with con-
nections from the early 2000s who, paradoxically, wanted to escape their past.

There are others who are part of a ‘second generation’ who either left the Western
Balkans as children, or who were born abroad. In some cases, they have links to

CONCLUSIONS 75
 groups from the Western Balkans, but in other cases they are branded as Balkan
criminals, even though their only link to the region is their family name.

Today there is a generation of younger, professional criminals who have good

language skills, are adept at using technology, park their money offshore or in cryp-
tocurrencies, and profit from globalization. They have gone from the Yugosphere
to being citizens of the world. They are the global equivalent of what used to be
referred to in the Balkans as ‘controversial businessmen’. The new generation of traf-
fickers have become tech savvy to avoid law-enforcement surveillance. For instance,
they use GPS for deliveries of drugs or to navigate trafficking routes. They use sat-
ellite phones, Voice over Internet Protocols (VoIP), and encrypted internet-based
communications that are hard to intercept. And they are active on the darknet and
increasingly use cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, that are hard to trace.

An unbeatable business model

One of the most striking conclusions of this report is the upward mobility of crimi-
nal groups from the Western Balkans. Within 20 years, they have gone from being
small-time couriers or crooks trying to escape instability and underdevelopment to
becoming big-time distributors in some of the biggest drug markets in the world.
They have positioned themselves close to the source of the world’s biggest supplies
of cocaine and heroin, and – in the case of Albanians – are sometimes even the
producers of cannabis. They are also active in the retail trade, particularly in Western
Europe due to access to various ports in the EU such as Antwerp, Amsterdam,
Hamburg, Valencia, Algeciras and Piraeus.316, 317 They also have links to street-level
distributors, including compatriots from the Western Balkans. This allows them to
drive down prices, pass the savings on to consumers, deliver good quality at a fair
price, and thereby knock out the competition. As a business model, it is unbeatable.
If they continue to play it right, this business model will continue to be lucrative
because supply and demand for cocaine, heroin and cannabis are high.

The development of this niche as an end-to-end service provider has not developed by
chance. Criminal groups from the Western Balkans have shown a willingness to take
risks and to seek out and exploit opportunities, for example using new routes and new
technologies. They have built the respect of local partners on both ends of the supply
chain. They have shown themselves to be innovative, entrepreneurial and adaptive.

Enabling factors
This report has highlighted a number of factors that have enabled criminal groups
from the Western Balkans to operate abroad. As noted, in some cases it is weak
governance and corruption in countries where they operate. Another factor is their
ability to use several identities and therefore avoid detection.

Limited container security is a problem, either due to corruption or the sheer volume
of containers going through some ports. It is quite possible that some of the illicit
goods are being shipped through free economic zones: this makes them hard to
interdict. In some cases, weak border and customs control, as well as lax maritime
security, are making smuggling relatively low risk.

76 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
As mentioned, technology is an enabling factor for A key consideration is that some of the underlying
the groups described in this report: for example, factors that made people from the Western Balkans
the use of encryption, cryptocurrencies and GPS vulnerable to organized crime in the 1990s still
tracking. The financial system also seems to be an exist: lack of employment opportunities, corruption,
enabler for the flow of money of some of these inequality, frustration with the domestic political
groups. How else could it be possible to move and situation and the slow process of EU accession. If
invest so much money? Do banks and real-estate these are not addressed, there will continue to be a
companies really know their customers? pool of young people in the Western Balkans or the
diaspora willing to risk a life of crime.

Law-enforcement cooperation
While criminals from the Balkans demonstrate the several other members of the group were arrested
benefits of transnational cooperation, this report on 10 March 2020. This shows how EUROPOL
also shows that law-enforcement agencies can work can facilitate the exchange of information, provide
effectively together. Operation Balkan Warrior was coordination support and analyze operational
a joint operation between the DEA, the Serbian information against its databases to give leads to
intelligence agency and police in Uruguay and investigators. This approach has also been applied
Argentina that helped take down Darko Šarić in to countering the trafficking of human beings and
2010. There have been several other successful cigarettes, as well as smuggling of migrants in the
operations involving law-enforcement agencies Western Balkans.
from the US, Western Europe, Latin America and
Eurojust is helping countries of the Western
the Western Balkans. SELEC has proven to be a
Balkans to strengthen capacity and provides assis-
useful coordination mechanism for carrying out
tance in prosecuting cases. More generally, since
joint investigations. Part of SELEC’s added value is
prosecution is often the weakest link when dealing
that Turkey is a member.
with cases of serious organized crime, the support
There has also been good cooperation at sea, such of other countries can be helpful, including extra-
as the drug bust in February 2020 off the coast dition. In some cases, liaison officers from police
of Aruba that was part of a joint operation between departments in the Western Balkans have been
Serbian, Montenegrin, Dutch and British law- placed in countries of origin to help identify sus-
enforcement agencies. Indeed, between 2018 and pects and help with analysis. Such cooperation has
2020, the number and size of drug busts seemed proven successful.
to be in­­creasing, either as the result of greater
Bilateral cooperation is also necessary. A good
cooperation between law-enforcement agencies
example is the cooperation between Italian and
or as a reflection of an increased volume of traf-
Albanian law-enforcement agencies, including joint
ficking, or both.
operations. Italy, together with the US and a number
EUROPOL plays a key role. On 11 March 2020, of EU countries, has also been supportive of the
for example, EUROPOL announced that it had process of reforming the Albanian criminal-justice
helped to dismantle a large Balkan criminal network system. There has also been cooperation in the
that was trafficking drugs, mainly cocaine, from context of the EU’s Instrument for Pre-Accession
Latin America to Europe. A complex international Assistance, which provides EU candidates with
investigation, launched in 2017, intercepted a financial and technical help. In some cases, this has
catamaran smuggling 840 kilograms of cocaine led to successful operations against organized-crime
being shipped from the Caribbean to Europe. 318
groups as well as seizures of criminal assets. The
Four crew members of Bosnian, Montenegrin and investigations carried out have covered the entire
Serbian nationalities were arrested in 2018, and spectrum of organized-crime manifestations – from

CONCLUSIONS 77
 trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs to by making more effective use of the UNODC–World
terrorism and money laundering – and have been Customs Organization Container Control Program.
conducted both in the Western Balkans and in the And there is an urgent need to improve mutual
countries of the EU, as well as sometimes in other legal assistance between countries of the Western
countries. Cooperation with the EU could be even Balkans and global hotspots where criminal groups
more effective if countries of the Western Balkans from the Western Balkans are active.
had access to the Schengen Information System. This
Since criminal groups are financially motivated, and
would enhance and speed up the ability of police and
given that money is the source of their strength,
border guards to identify persons of interest.
more needs to be done to look at the financial flows
INTERPOL plays a key role in terms of coordinating of Western Balkan groups operating abroad. To
joint actions. For example, in January 2020 it led increase risks and reduce benefits, greater cooper-
a major operation against human trafficking and ation is needed in tracking money laundering and
the smuggling of migrants in the Balkans called recovering stolen assets. The legal frameworks
Operation Theseus. As a result, 72 suspected traf- exist in the UN Convention against Transnational
fickers and 167 migrant smugglers were arrested, Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the UN Convention
89 victims of human trafficking were rescued and against Corruption (UNCAC). The key is practi-
2 000 migrants identified.319 INTERPOL’s Red Notice cal cooperation. Otherwise this money could be
system is also crucial for identifying criminals.320 It used to buy power, or pervert national economies.
is interesting to note that INTERPOL had an entire Indeed, if there will be a liquidity crisis as a result
project devoted to tracking the Pink Panthers. of the COVID-19 virus, the leverage of criminals
More could be done, particularly in terms of enhanc- with significant amounts of cash could have a major
ing cooperation between law-enforcement agencies influence on business and politics. In short, if Balkan
in countries of supply and demand, and also by crime has gone from the inside out, a large part of
involving colleagues from the Western Balkans. the solution will have to come from the outside
There is also a need for a greater focus on maritime in – through international cooperation. As an Italian
security (particularly through intelligence-led oper- prosecutor said, ‘just as they ally themselves with
ations), and tackling container security, for example, each other, so we must cooperate together’.

A multi-layered approach
Dealing with the impact of criminal groups from donors have a role to play as well in addressing the
the Western Balkans operating abroad will require factors that cause underdevelopment, marginalization
responses at different levels. Within the Western and brain drain. This could become even more acute
Balkans it is important to strengthen the resilience of in relation to the economic fallout of COVID-19.
society against the factors that enable crime
to prosper. This would reduce hotspots of crime Western European countries have a key role to play
at home and abroad. The reform of the criminal- in reducing demand for the goods and services that
justice system in Albania is a good example. It may are fuelling crime in the Western Balkans. Indeed,
be slow and arduous, but this is an opportunity to with the exceptions of Australia and South Africa,
bring in a new generation of criminal-justice officials, all of the trafficking flows that criminal groups from
and to build greater integrity and trust in the system. the Western Balkans are profiting from are directed
More broadly, in all countries of the region, it will at the EU and the UK. While some critics and
be important to have effective institutions, not only sections of the media may sound the alarm about
good legislation. And it is vital to create more jobs criminal groups from the Western Balkans, few point
and viable livelihoods, particularly among vulnerable out that they are the delivery service for Western
groups (such as the youth) in vulnerable regions. Here Europe’s illicit markets.

78 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
 arajevo, capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Much of Western Balkan organized crime has gone from the ‘inside out’.
S
© Boris Stroujko/Shutterstock

Furthermore, leaving countries from the Western Balkans without a European per-
spective is not going to improve the situation. People from the Western Balkans who
wanted to move to the EU are already there – including criminal groups, as high-
lighted in this report. If some of them turned to a life of crime because of a system
that they feel let them down, why deepen the vulnerabilities of that system? Instead,
the challenge should be to address the conditions that created the vulnerability in the
first place.

It is a tall order, but more should also be done to strengthen resilience in countries
of supply. Countries that are major markets for Latin American cocaine have a self-
interest in strengthening criminal-justice systems and sustainable development in
countries such as Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. Furthermore, addressing the issue of
criminal groups from the Western Balkans without reducing the market forces that
keep them in business will simply see them replaced by groups from somewhere else.
Indeed, as noted in many of the hotspots examined in this report, they are not the
major players in the drugs trade.

CONCLUSIONS 79
 The role of civil society
Civil-society actors both in the Western Balkans young people across the Western Balkans vulnera-
and abroad have a key role to play. They should ble to either going abroad or joining criminal groups
continue to push for effective governance and (or both).
institutions, and promote a culture of lawfulness. Co-nationals in the diaspora have a stake in promot-
And they should work with governments to ensure ing a culture of lawfulness because the activities of
that there is space and freedom to give a voice to criminal groups in their midst gives them a bad name
those – particularly in the media, civil society and too. Most members of the diaspora do not benefit
concerned citizens – who believe in a society free from the criminal activity of their compatriots, and
of crime and corruption. Otherwise, disillusionment some even suffer from it. Indeed, many of them left
with politics and a lack of faith in future opportu- the Western Balkans because of crime and instabil-
nities in the formal economy will continue to make ity – they do not want it on their doorstep again.

Violence and silence

Finally, it is important to keep the spotlight on the lack of disaggregation of data on the basis of eth-
issue. Criminal groups profit more by silence than nicity, limited knowledge of the Western Balkans,
violence. Although attention is often focused on the use of multiple identities by the perpetrators
criminal groups when there is violence, this is usually (including through passports from EU countries), and
a sign of competition or disruption in a market, the view that criminals from the Western Balkans
whereas a highly efficient market is one that oper- are not a major threat to the country in question.
ates smoothly in silence. Nevertheless, perhaps this report can contribute to

Thus far there has been little understanding of a greater understanding of the roots, characteristics

the role of Western Balkan groups outside of their and impact of this problem in order to help stimulate

home region, as well as the links between them. This remedial action.
report has had the advantage of being based on
In conclusion, this report shows the role of groups
information from experts (including journalists, aca-
from the Western Balkans in hotspots around the
demics and members of civil society) in the global
world. More action is needed to reduce the supply
hotpots, and a wide range of sources.
and demand of the goods that these groups deliver,
That said, in many cases the providers of that infor- and to disrupt their activities. Otherwise the tenta-
mation noted that there is a lack of data and analysis cles of criminal groups – including those from the
about the role criminal groups from the Western Western Balkans – will continue to wrap themselves
Balkans play in organized crime. Problems include a around the globe.

80 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
NOTES
1 References to Kosovo made throughout this report are made 14 See a full documentary prepared by Ferdinand Dervishi, ABC
without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with Story, the Contraband of Cigarettes, 13 November 2016,
UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=poPq5cryFNg.
declaration of independence. 15 Uğur Mumcu Silah Kaçakçılığı ve Terör. İstanbul: Tekin Yayıne-
2 Throughout this report the name ‘North Macedonia’ is used, vi, 1994.
although for most of the period under discussion it was 16 Mahmut Cengiz, The Illicit Economy in Turkey: How Criminals,
known as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Terrorists and the Syrian Conflict Fuel Underground Markets.
3 James Cockayne, Hidden Power: The Strategic Logic of Organi- Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019.
sed Crime. London: Hurst, 2016, p 298. 17 Uğur Mumcu, Papa-Mafya-Ağca. Ankara: Uğur Mumcu Vakfı
4 Federico Varese, Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime Yayınları, 2020.
Conquers New Territories. Princeton: Princeton University 18 See Norbert Mappes Niediek, Balkan-Mafia: Staaten in der
Press, 2011, p 193. Hand des Verbrechens – Eine Gefahr fur Europa. Christoph
5 Ibid., p 22. Links Verlag, 2003, pp 37–47.
6 Federico Varese, Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime 19 John Mueller, The Banality of ‘Ethnic Conflict’, Quarterly
Conquers New Territories. Princeton: Princeton University Journal: International Security, 25, 1, 42–70, p 49.
Press, 2011, p 21. 20 See Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction
7 See Chapter 1 of Letizia Paoli, The Oxford Handbook of Orga- of Yugoslavia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997, pp
nized Crime, Oxford University Press, 2014. 184–186; Norbert Mappes Niediek, Balkan-Mafia: Staaten in
8 See Isidore Jack Donsky, Aspects of the immigration of Euro- der Hand des Verbrechens – Eine Gefahr fur Europa. Christoph
peans to South Africa 1946-1970. M.A. thesis, University of Links Verlag, 2003, pp 37–42.
Johannesburg, 1989: ‘The immigrant was financially assisted 21 John Mueller, The banality of ‘ethnic conflict’, Quarterly
at every stage of his migration move, from transportation, Journal: International Security, 25, 1, 42–70, p 50.
reception in South Africa, accommodation, employment 22 Ibid., p 53.
placement and assimilation.’ 23 Ibid., p 51.
9 Misha Glenny, McMafia: Seriously Organised Crime. London: 24 Blaine Harden, Fast life, flashy end for Belgrade mobster,
Bodley Head, 2008, p 53. The Washington Post, 21 November 1992, https://www.
10 It emerged at his trial that he was an agent of the secret washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/11/21/fast-li-
service. See Glenny, p 53. fe-flashy-end-for-belgrade-mobster/87289547-9458-427c-
11 See Bozidar Spasic, Lisica koja govori (‘Fox Speaking’). Auto- -84d1-8561f66a68f0/.
-Komerc, 2000. 25 John F. Burns, Two gang leaders in Sarajevo face crackdown
12 See Norbert Mappes Niediek, Balkan-Mafia: Staaten in der in Bosnia, The New York Times, 27 October 1993, https://
Hand des Verbrechens – Eine Gefahr fur Europa. Christoph www.nytimes.com/1993/10/27/world/2-gang-leaders-in-sa-
Links Verlag, 2003, pp 31–32. rajevo-face-crackdown-in-bosnia.html.
13 Panorama Gazette Ish drejtori Albtrans: Pse Enveri lejoi kontra- 26 David Samuels, The Pink Panthers, The New Yorker, 5
banden e cigareve nga Shqiperia (Former director of Albatrans: April 2010, p 10, https://www.newyorker.com/magazi-
Why Enver allowed the smuggling of tobacco from Albania, ne/2010/04/12/the-pink-panthers.
Part I), 16 November 2016, http://www.panorama.com.al/
ish-drejtori-i-albtrans-pse-enveri-lejoi-kontrabanden-e-ciga-
reve-nga-shqiperia/.

81
 27 Blaine Harden, Fast life, flashy end for Belgrade mobster, 45 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 67, 11, 1998, https://www.hsdl.
The Washington Post, 21 November 1992, https://www. org/?view&did=464222.
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/11/21/fast-li- 46 While serving his last prison sentence, Pavle Stanimirovic
fe-flashy-end-for-belgrade-mobster/87289547-9458-427c- decided he would like to become a ‘story teller’; see https://
-84d1-8561f66a68f0/. www.thedailybeast.com/an-ex-pink-panther-on-his-old-
28 Marko Hajdinjak, Smuggling in Southeastern Europe, Centre -crew-blamed-for-robbing-kim-kardashian.
for the Study of Democracy, 2002, https://seldi.net/filead- 47 John Silvester, How the ATM gang’s wild Australian tour ran
min/public/PDF/Publications/Smuggling_in_SEE.pdf out of road, The Age, 14 February 2020, https://www.theage.
29 Ibid., p 13. com.au/national/victoria/how-the-atm-gang-s-wild-australian-
30 Misha Glenny, McMafia: Seriously Organised Crime. London: tour-ran-out-of-road-20200212-p54049.html
Bodley Head, 2008, p 43. 48 Christopher Jarvis, The rise and fall of Albanian’s pyramid
31 Ibid., p 46. schemes, International Monetary Fund Finance & Development,
32 Aleksandar Knezevic and Vojislav Tufegdzic, See You in the 37, 1, 2000, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fan-
Obituary, B92, 1995, based on a book by the same authors dd/2000/03/jarvis.htm.
entitled The Crime that Changed Serbia. 49 Fabian Zhilla and Besfort Lamallari, Organized crime: Risk
33 Ibid. assessment in Albania. Tirana: Open Society Foundation for
34 Ibid. Albania, 2015, p 64.
35 Track tops would be tucked into jeans or track bottoms, 50 Christopher Jarvis, The rise and fall of Albanian’s pyramid
which would in turn be tucked into socks. According to Aleks schemes, International Monetary Fund Finance & Development,
Eror, ‘This detail was pioneered by Aleksandar ‘Knele’ Kneže- 37, 1, 2000, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fan-
vić,…who is said to have done this to prevent his gun slipping dd/2000/03/jarvis.htm.
from his waistband, down his leg and dropping onto the 51 One of the most notorious criminal organizations, known
floor should he ever be forced to run and take cover from as the Gang of Lushnja, was founded by Alfred Shkurti (also
opposing gunfire. Tucking your track top into your trousers known as Aldo Bare), a former officer of the 326 Special unit.
also causes it to puff up, making its wearer look bigger and See Fabian Zhilla and Besfort Lamallari, Evolution of the Alba-
tougher.’ Aleks Eror, Dizelaš: the ‘Serbian gopnik’ style that nian organized crime groups. Tirana: Open Society Foundation
defined the 90s is making a comeback, The Calvert Journal, for Albania, 2016, p 25, http://www.osfa.al/sites/default/files/
https://www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/8931/dizela- evolution_of_the_albanian_organized_crime_groups.pdf#over-
si-serbian-gopnik-style-90s-comeback. lay-context=ngjarje/prezantim-studimi-evoluimi-i-strukturave-
36 Aleks Eror, Dizelaš: the ‘Serbian gopnik’ style that defined -te-organizuara-kriminale-ne-shqiperi.
the 90s is making a comeback, The Calvert Journal, https:// 52 Fabian Zhilla and Besfort Lamallari, Organized crime: Risk
www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/8931/dizelasi-ser- assessment in Albania, p 23.
bian-gopnik-style-90s-comeback. 53 Council of Europe, Organised crime situation report 2001,
37 One theory is that these men were killed by secret service Strasbourg, December 2002, p 30, https://www.coe.int/t/
assassins. See Smuggling in Southeast Europe p. 25 dg1/legalcooperation/economiccrime/organisedcrime/Re-
38 Janet Kelley, Crooks rip ATM out of floor, intruders steal port2001E.pdf.
machine from Brecknock store, 26 February 2008, Lancaster 54 Fabian Zhilla and Besfort Lamallari, Organized crime: Risk
Online, https://lancasteronline.com/news/crooks-rip-atm- assessment in Albania, p 64.
-out-of-floor/article_08eb5442-6e1e-5bd1-a9b6-e7e4b- 55 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, U.S.
475f8be.html. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 2000 –
39 Tom Callahan, F.B.I. Slows, but hasn’t stopped, wily safecra- Albania, June 2000, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a-
ckers, The New York Times, 15 November 1998, https://www. 8cb48.html.
nytimes.com/1998/11/15/nyregion/fbi-slows-but-hasn-t- 56 BBC World Service, Global Crime Report: Interview with
stopped-wily-safecrackers.html. an arms smuggler, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/pro-
40 Geoff Manaugh, The rise and fall of fall of an all-star crew of grammes/global_crime_report/crime/armssmuggler.shtml.
jewel thieves, The Atlantic, 17 December 2019, https://www. 57 According to a list created by the Belgrade-based Huma-
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/12/rise-and-fall- nitarian Law Centre and the Humanitarian Law Centre
-all-star-heist-crew/602977/. Kosovo, last updated November 2014, 13 517 people were
41 Robert W. Frank, Security beat: State-of-the-art burglars killed or reported missed between January 1998 and 31
burn ‘safe’ safes, JCK, 1 June 1997, https://www.jckonline. December 2000, including civilians and members of armed
com/magazine-article/security-beat-state-of-the-art-bur- forces during Kosovo War, while 800 000 people (ethnic
glars-burn-safe-safes/. Albanians and Serbs) are said to have left Kosovo. See Milka
42 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 67, 11, 1998, https://www.hsdl. Domanovic, List of Kosovo War Victims Published, Balkan
org/?view&did=464222. Transitional Justice, 10 December 2014, https://balkaninsi-
43 Some of these criminals would come from the same village. ght.com/2014/12/10/kosovo-war-victims-list-published/.
44 Tom Callahan, F.B.I. Slows, but hasn’t stopped, wily safecra- See also CIA Factbook entry on Kosovo: https://www.cia.
ckers, The New York Times, 15 November 1998, https://www. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html.
nytimes.com/1998/11/15/nyregion/fbi-slows-but-hasn-t- The UNHCR quotes a lower figure, see https://www.unhcr.
stopped-wily-safecrackers.html.

82 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
 org/3e2d4d50d.html. For key UN Security Council on the 72 David Samuels, The Pink Panthers, The New Yorker, 5
political solution to the Kosovo crisis, see Resolution 1244 of April 2010, p 11, https://www.newyorker.com/magazi-
10 June 1999. ne/2010/04/12/the-pink-panthers.
58 Christopher Tütsch, Kosovo’s burdensome path to economic 73 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nKOhNs4Mqag.
development and interethnic coexistence, Working Paper, 74 David Samuels, The Pink Panthers, The New Yorker, 5 April
FAST Risk Profile Kosovo 4, Swiss Peace, 2005, p 11, https:// 2010, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/04/12/
www.files.ethz.ch/isn/13723/WP_4_2005_kosovo_sicher. the-pink-panthers, p 14.
pdf. 75 Ibid., p 12.
59 See Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2007, pp 349–372, 76 OSCE–ODIHR, Albania: Parliamentary Elections June 29,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2007/ 1997, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14029?downlo-
kosovo. ad=true
60 EULEX, What is EULEX?, https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?pa- 77 Council of Europe, Organised crime situation report 2001,
ge=2,16. Strasbourg, 2002, p 94, https://www.coe.int/t/dg1/legalcoo-
61 Ivan Briscoe and Megan Price, Kosovo’s new map of power: peration/economiccrime/organisedcrime/Report2001E.pdf.
governance and crime in the wake of independence, Nether- 78 In 2000 there were 74 arrested persons in Albania accused
lands Institute of International Relations, 2011, p 14, http:// for stealing of vehicles, around 1 800 illegal arms seized
www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4156~v~Ko- in Albania, 117 women trafficked and 13 819 migrant
sovo_s_New_Map_of_Power__Governance_and_Crime_in_ smugglings.
the_Wake_of_Independence.pdf. 79 Russell King and Julie Vullnetari, Migration and Development
62 See, for example, the case of former member of parliament, in Albania, Working Paper C5, Sussex Centre for Migration
Azem Zyla, an ex-commander of the KLA: Matthew Beinart, Research, December 2003, p 9, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/
Kosovo: Ex-KLA Commander Indicted on Organized Crime Units/SCMR/drc/publications/working_papers/WP-C5.pdf.
Charges, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 80 Council of Europe, Organised crime situation report 2001,
26 October 2016, https://www.occrp.org/en/27-ccwatch/ Strasbourg, December 2002, p 82, https://www.coe.int/t/
cc-watch-briefs/5744-kosovo-ex-kla-commander-indicte- dg1/legalcooperation/economiccrime/organisedcrime/Re-
d-on-organized-crime-charges. See also the case of Avni port2001E.pdf.
Berisha: Adelina Ahmeti, Aktakuza ndaj ‘Tarkan’-it, deklaratat e 81 European Cottee on Crime Problems (CDPC), Report on the
Agron Mustafës shfajësuan Nazim Sahitin, kallxo, 24 May 2018, Organised Crime Situation in Council of Europe Member
https://kallxo.com/shkurt/ekskluzive-aktakuza-ndaj-tarkan-i- States – 1998, Strasbourg, 1999, p 26, https://www.coe.
t-deklaratat-e-agron-mustafes-shfajesuan-nazim-sahitin/. int/t/dg1/legalcooperation/economiccrime/organisedcrime/
63 Alexandros Yannis, Kosovo: The Political Economy of Con- Report1998E.pdf.
flict and Peace-building, in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sher- 82 EUROPOL, OCTA 2006: EU Organised Crime Threat Asses-
man (eds), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond sment, The Hague, April 2006, p 7, https://www.europol.
Greed and Grievance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003, p 181. europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/octa-2006-eu-
64 See an analysis of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) of or- -organised-crime-threat-assessment.
ganized crime activity in the Balkan area: BND Kosovo intelli- 83 Council of Europe, Organised crime situation report 2001,
gence report, 22 Feb 2005, via Wikileaks, https://wikileaks. Strasbourg, December 2002, p 23, https://www.coe.int/t/
org/wiki/BND_Kosovo_intelligence_report,_22_Feb_2005. dg1/legalcooperation/economiccrime/organisedcrime/Re-
65 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, port2001E.pdf.
Hotspots of organized crime in the Western Balkans, May 84 Ibid., p 28.
2019, pp 24–27, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ 85 EUROPOL, European Union Organised Crime Report 2004,
uploads/2019/05/Hotspots-Report-English-13Jun- The Hague, December 2004, p 13, https://www.europol.
1110-Web.pdf. europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-
66 European Commission, Kosovo 2019 Report, Brussels, May -organised-crime-report-2004.
2019, p 4, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlarge- 86 Council of Europe, Organised crime situation report 2001,
ment/sites/near/files/20190529-kosovo-report.pdf. Strasbourg, December 2002, p 4, 3https://www.coe.int/t/
67 Ibid., p 48. dg1/legalcooperation/economiccrime/organisedcrime/Re-
68 Reference in Maja’s addition paper on the Zemun clan. port2001E.pdf.
69 He died in prison in March 2006. 87 Ibid., p 47.
70 See Norbert Mappes Niediek, Balkan-Mafia: Staaten in der 88 EUROPOL, European Union Organised Crime Report 2004,
Hand des Verbrechens – Eine Gefahr fur Europa. Christoph The Hague, December 2004, p 7–8 https://www.europol.
Links Verlag, 2003, pp 44–53, and Hugh Griffiths, Balkan europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-
reconstruction report: A mafia within the state, Transitions -organised-crime-report-2004.
Online, 28 March 2003. 89 Countries hosting the largest numbers of Kosovars include
71 Federico Varese, Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime Germany (250 000), Switzerland (150 000), Austria (50,000)
Conquers New Territories. Princeton: Princeton University the United Kingdom (50 000), the Scandinavian countries
Press, 2011, p 190. (50 000), the Benelux countries (50 000), Italy (more than

NOTES 83
 20 000). See also Ardiana Gashi and Amir Haxhikadrija, 106 Floriana Bulfon, Wie ein Sieben-Tonnen-Koks-Deal in Sitten
Social impact of emigration and rural-urban migration in geplatzt ist, Swissinfo.ch, 12 February 2019, https://www.
Central and Eastern Europe: Final Country Report: Kosovo, swissinfo.ch/ger/wirtschaft/drogenkriminalitaet_wie-ein-sie-
April 2012, p. 7–8, . ben-tonnen-koks-deal-in-sitten-geplatzt-ist/44739298.
90 Federico Varese, Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime 107 Auto modificate e linguaggio criptato, così la cocaina arrivava
Conquers New Territories. Princeton: Princeton University dall’Albania: 15 arresti, Bologna Today, 28 November 2019,
Press, 2011, p 16. http://www.bolognatoday.it/cronaca/albania-droga-opera-
91 Reports suggested that the group was able to earn €80 000 zione-casper-arresti-polizia.html. There have been a number
in Vienna alone every day. Kerry Skyring, Police in three of similar operations since in the Bologna area.
countries take on ‘Frankfurt mafia’ drug ring, Deutsche Welle, 108 Italy and Albania: 43 arrests for drug trafficking, Eurojust, 12
24 December 2010, https://www.dw.com/en/police-in-thre- December 2018, http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/Pres-
e-countries-take-on-frankfurt-mafia-drug-ring/a-14735371. sReleases/Pages/2018/2018-12-12.aspx.
92 Ibid. 109 Interview with a colonel of the Guardia di Finanza of the
93 Sinisa Jakov Marusic, Macedonian nabs gangsters linked to special unit against organized crime, February 2020.
Frankfurt mafia, Balkan Insight, 20 September 2013, https:// 110 Marco di Risi, Roma, pusher ucciso in strada al Nuovo Salario:
balkaninsight.com/2013/09/20/macedonian-police-swoops- aveva capito di essere finito in un agguato, Il Messaggero, 27
-on-drug-lords/. January 2020, https://www.ilmessaggero.it/roma/news/
94 ‘Frankfurter Mafia’ weiterhin aktiv: 13 Personen in Haft, Kronen roma_omicidio_nuovo_salario_gentian_kasa_ultime_noti-
Zeitung, 14 May 2013, https://www.krone.at/361605. zie-5009500.html.
95 See the following article in The New York Times, 3 March 111 Interview with one of the heads of the Central Organized
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/03/world/euro- Crime Brigade, Madrid, 10 February 2020.
pe/sweden-crime-immigration-hand-grenades.html. 112 Alberto Pozas, Ochenta años de cárcel y casi cien millones
96 Jeffrey Fleishman, Midnight sun has a dark side, Los Angeles en multas para los narcos de Vinetu Cokovic, 24 September
Times, 10 December 2006, https://www.latimes.com/archi- 2017, https://cadenaser.com/ser/2017/09/19/tribuna-
ves/la-xpm-2006-dec-10-fg-mafia10-story.html. les/1505830248_585223.html; see also F. Javier Barroso,
97 Ibid. Una pachanga de fútbol permite desarticular una red de ‘narcos’,
98 Evan Ratliffe, Lifted, The Atavist Magazine, 2011, https://ma- 30 June 2015, El País, https://elpais.com/ccaa/2015/06/30/
gazine.atavist.com/lifted. madrid/1435665134_755996.html
99 Albanian drug smuggling gang dismantled in Europe-wide 113 Gjergj Erebara, Albanian pilot dies transporting drugs to
operation, EU-OCS, 3 JULY 2019, https://eu-ocs.com/alba- Spain, Balkan Insight, 29 January 2015, https://balkaninsight.
nian-drug-smuggling-gang-dismantled-in-europe-wide-ope- com/2015/01/29/albanian-army-pilot-may-have-died-while-
ration/. -transporting-cannabis-in-spain/.
100 Gang jailed after 7,500 cannabis plants seized, BBC News, 6 114 Daniel Verdú, The mystery of Spain’s abandoned drug
June 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-south-east- helicopters, El País, 30 June 2015, https://english.elpais.com/
wales-27741781. elpais/2015/06/29/inenglish/1435568070_393000.html.
101 Mark Townsend, Kings of cocaine: How the Albanian mafia 115 Matt Herbert, The butcher’s bill, GI-TOC, 2018, https://glo-
seized control of the UK drugs trade, The Guardian, 13 Janu- balinitiative.net/the-butchers-bill-cocaine-trafficking-in-nor-
ary 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/13/ th-africa/.
kings-of-cocaine-albanian-mafia-uk-drugs-crime 116 Italy seizes 20 tons of hashish hidden in ship fuel tanks,
102 See https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/9668851/foreign-pri- DW, 9 August 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/italy-seizes-
soners-albanian-gangsters-drugs/. -20-tons-of-hashish-hidden-in-ship-fuel-tanks/a-45018092.
103 Marco di Risi, Roma, pusher ucciso in strada al Nuovo Salario: 117 Mark Micallef, Shifting sands: Libya’s changing drug traffi-
aveva capito di essere finito in un agguato, Il Messaggero, 27 cking dynamics on the coastal and desert borders, back-
January 2020, https://www.ilmessaggero.it/roma/news/ ground paper commissioned by the EMCDDA for the EU
roma_omicidio_nuovo_salario_gentian_kasa_ultime_noti- Drug Markets Report, 2019, https://globalinitiative.net/
zie-5009500.html. wp-content/uploads/2019/11/EDMR2019_BackgroundRe-
104 Giampiero Calapà, I nuovi ‘re di Roma’: narco-albanesi e port_Libya.pdf.
eredi Senese & Casamonica, Il Fatto Quotidiano, 1 October 118 Ivan Angelovski, Kidnap deaths spotlight Serbia-Libya arms
2019, https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/in-edicola/artico- deals, Balkan Insight, 23 February 2016, https://balkaninsi-
li/2019/10/01/i-nuovi-re-di-roma-narco-albanesi-e-e- ght.com/2016/02/23/kidnap-deaths-turn-spotlight-on-ser-
redi-senesecasamonica/5488784/. bia-libya-arms-deals-02-22-2016/.
105 Vincenzo Scalia, From the octopus to the spider’s web: The 119 Interviews with head of the Central Anti-Drug Intelligence
transformations of the Sicilian mafia under postfordism, Unit from the Judicial Police of the Civil Guard, Madrid, 18
Trends in Organized Crime, 13, pp 283–298, https://link.sprin- February 2020; interview with one of the heads of the Cen-
ger.com/article/10.1007/s12117-010-9106-9. tral Organized Crime Brigade, Madrid, 10 February 2020.

84 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
120 Patricia Ortega Dolz and Nacho Sánchez, Narco warfare on 137 Pavla Holcová and Stevan Dojčinović, Balkánští narkobaroni
the rise on Spain’s Costa del Sol, 11 December 2018, El País, v Praze – Život a dílo Darko Šariće, Investigace.cz, 20 January
https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2018/12/10/inenglish/ 2016, https://www.investigace.cz/balkansti-narkobaroni-v-
1544440625_847219.html. -praze-zivot-a-dilo-darko-sarice/.
121 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 138 Kurzy.cz, MIZZORA s.r.o. v likvidaci - obchodní rejstřík, úplný
An assessment of the extent of Albanian(-speaking) organi- výpis, https://rejstrik-firem.kurzy.cz/rejstrik-firem/DO-
sed crime groups involved in drug supply in the European -64578518-mizzora-s-r-o-v-likvidaci/.
Union: characteristics, role and the level of influence, 2019, 139 Miroslav Nožina, Mezinárodní organizovaný zločin v České
p 10. http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/attach- republice. Prague: Themis, 2003.
ments/12102/EDMR2019_BackgroundReport_Albanian- 140 Lidovky.cz, Makedonie, balkánské jablko sváru. Chapadla pro-
SpeakingOCGs.pdf. tivládních bouří sahají i do Česka, 19 May 2015, https://www.
122 Daniel Boffey, Netherlands becoming a narco-state, warn lidovky.cz/svet/makedonie-balkanske-jablko-svaru-chapadla-
Dutch police, The Guardian, 20 February 2018, https://www. -protivladnich-bouri-sahaji-i-do-ceska.A150518_174600_ln_
theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/20/netherlands-becomin- zahranici_msl.
g-a-narco-state-warn-dutch-police. 141 Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP),
123 Janene Pieters, Albanians play leading role in Amsterdam The landlord spy, 8 May 2014, https://www.occrp.org/en/
underworld: Police, NL Times, 18 April 2018, https://nltimes. investigations/2437-the-landlord-spy.
nl/2018/04/18/albanians-play-leading-role-amsterdam-un- 142 According to an interview with an investigator of the Czech
derworld-police. Police specializing in organized crime (Prague, 6 February
124 See https://www.telegraaf.nl/nieuws/2592956/kopstukken- 2020).
-albanees-misdaadsyndicaat-opgepakt-in-rotterdam. 143 According to a personal interview with an police investigator
125 Jan-Willem Navis and Vincent Triest, Kopstukken Albanees on 3 February 2020 in Liberec.
misdaadsyndicaat opgepakt in Rotterdam, De Telegraaf, 24 144 Profil – Princ Dobroshi bosi i mafias shqiptare të drogës, i njohur
September 2018, https://eu-ocs.com/albanian-cocaine-smu- me nofkën ‘peshkaqeni’, Insajderi, https://insajderi.com/profil-
ggling-gang-dismantled-in-italy/. -princ-dobroshi-bosi-i-mafias-shqiptare-te-droges-i-njohur-
126 It is worth noting that Albanians rank second in terms of -me-nofken-nofken-peshkaqeni/.
arrests for identity fraud at Schipol airport. 145 Hospody a benzinky s hracími automaty ‘vychcípají’ do roku
127 According to a local journalist, many of the Albanians in and 2019, doufá odcházející náměstek Závodský, iROZHLAS, 19
around Limburg come from one town in Albania, namely December 2017,https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/
Lushnjë. zavodsky-herny-automaty-rozhovor-namestek-dvaci-
128 Interview with prosecutor in Limburg, 27 February 2020. tka_1712191235_miz.
129 Ibid. 146 According personal interview with Ondřej Závodský
130 Interview with public prosecutor, Amsterdam, 26 February on 10 February 2020 in Prague. See also Pavla Holco-
2020. vá and Stevan Dojčinović, Balkan organized crime sets
131 Koen Voskuil and Yelle Tieleman, Bundelen cokekartels de kra- up in Prague, Organized Crime and Corruption Repor-
chten in Dubai?, Algemeen Dagblad, 18 October 2019, https:// ting Project, 23 November 2015, https://www.occrp.
www.ad.nl/binnenland/bundelen-cokekartels-de-krachten- org/en/investigations/4632-balkan-organized-crime-
-in-dubai~aaec6071/?referrer=https://www.google.com/. -sets-up-in-prague; and Ministerstvo spravedlnosti
132 The Netherlands’ most wanted drug trafficker arrested in České republiky, Sbírka listin, https://or.justice.cz/ias/ui/
Dubai, EU-OCS, 17 December 2019, https://eu-ocs.com/ vypis-sl-detail?dokument=14189593&subjektId=535296&s-
the-netherlands-most-wanted-drug-trafficker-arrested-in- pis=79243.
-dubai/. 147 According to an interview with Pavla Holcová, 13 February
133 Federico Varese, Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime 2020.
Conquers New Territories. Princeton: Princeton University 148 Ibid.
Press, 2011, p 194. 149 Interview with Chad Thomas, Chief Forensic Investigator at
134 This vulnerability to corruption in the Czech Republic was IRS Forensic Investigations.
dramatized in the 2017 BBC series ‘McMafia’, based on 150 Interview with Milos Lazic conducted in April 2019 as part of
Misha Glenny’s book of the same name. See David Stubbs, investigation for News24.
McMafia recap – series one, episode three, The Guardian, 151 According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2019,
7 January 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-ra- released in January 2020 by Transparency International (TI),
dio/2018/jan/07/mcmafia-recap-series-one-episode-three- South Africa has improved marginally from a score of 43
-james-norton. in 2018 to 44 in 2019, and is ranked 70/180. This places it
135 Pavla Holcová and Stevan Dojčinović, Balkánští narkobaroni squarely among countries deemed to have a serious corrup-
v Praze – Život a dílo Darko Šariće, Investigace.cz, 20 January tion problem and not doing enough in their anti-corruption
2016, https://www.investigace.cz/balkansti-narkobaroni-v- efforts.
-praze-zivot-a-dilo-darko-sarice/. 152 Email interview with Gareth Newham, head of Governance,
136 Miroslav Nožina, Mezinárodní organizovaný zločin v České Crime and Justice at the Institute for Security Studies, 29
republice. Prague: Themis, 2003, p 114. January 2020.
153 Ibid.

NOTES 85
 154 Interview with forensic consultant Paul O’Sullivan, 23 Janu- 173 Interview with a former KOM investigator, 6 February
ary 2020. 2020. The Turkish Police Department of Anti-Smuggling
155 Interview with senior Hawks officer, January 2020. and Organized Crime (KOM) launched an operation under
156 Interviews with Crime Intelligence and Hawks police mem- the name of Suitcase in early 2000s. Southeast European
bers, January 2020. Cooperative Initiative (SECI) was used as an information-ex-
157 Judgment in the Western Cape High Court, Gavric v Re- changing platform in this project. Investigations revealed that
fugee Status Determination Officer, Cape Town and Others couriers of various ethnicities, including Africans, were used
(3474/13), 6 April 2016, http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ by the Turkish-Albanian drug networks to transport drugs in
ZAWCHC/2016/36.html. suitcases.
158 Interview with senior member of Serbian community, Janu- 174 Turkish Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction
ary 2020. See also Vincent Cruywagen, Whistle-blower links (TUBIM), Turkish Drug Report 2013, Ankara, 2014.
Serbian drug lords, SA gangs, IOL, 16 January 2012, https:// 175 See UNODC, Drug Money: The illicit proceeds of opiates
www.iol.co.za/news/whistle-blower-links-serbian-drug- trafficked on the Balkan route, 2015, https://www.unodc.
-lords-sa-gangs-1213613. org/documents/rpanc/Publications/other_publications/
159 Mandy Wiener, Bryanston hit captured on CCTV, News24, Balkan_route_web.pdf, p 9.
10 April 2019, https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/ 176 Derya Gültekin-Karakaş, Market-oriented transformation
News/watch-bryanston-hit-captured-on-cctv-20190410. of tobacco sector in Turkey, Turk Toraks Derg, 15 (2014)
160 Email interview with Milica Vojinovic, January 2020. pp 71–91.
161 Graeme Hosken, Was Marc Batchelor slain for a ton of 177 Behsat Ekici, Country Report of Turkey: Illicit Markets and State
cocaine?, Times Live, 21 July 2019, https://www.timeslive. Response in Turkey, Siracusa International Institute for Crimi-
co.za/news/south-africa/2019-07-21-was-marc-batchelor-s- nal Justice and Human Rights, 2018. See also KOM, Annual
lain-for-a-ton-of-cocaine/. Report 2016, Ankara: KOM Publications.
162 Mark Shaw, Hitmen for Hire: Exposing South Africa’s Under­ 178 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Visa regime for foreign
world. Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publish­ nationals, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/yabancilarin-tabi-oldugu-vi-
ers, 2017. ze-rejimi.tr.mfa.
163 Interview with senior Serbian community member, January 179 Presidential Decree 106, Turkish Official Newspaper, Resmi
2020. For more on the clan war, see  https://www.occrp.org/ Gazete, 1 September 2018.
en/balkan-cocaine-wars/. 180 Interview conducted by a former law-enforcement officer, 2
164 Interview with senior member of Serbian community, Janu- February 2020.
ary 2020. 181 Uğur Mumcu, Papa-Mafya-Ağca. Ankara: Uğur Mumcu Vakfı
165 Interview with Hawks officer, January 2020. Yayınları, 2020.
166 Montenegrin Escobar arrested with 807 kilograms of co- 182 Skype interview with a former superintendent at Istanbul
caine: Drug has arrived from Venezuela!, Telegraf, 18 March Narcotics Division, 19 February 2020.
2019, https://www.Telegraf.rs/english/3052657-montene- 183 Cengiz Erdinç, Overdose Türkiye: Türkiye’de Eroin Kaçakçılığı,
grin-escobar-arrested-with-807-kilograms-of-cocaine-drug- Bağımlılığı ve Politikalar. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004.
-has-arrived-from-venezuela. See also Behsat Ekici and Adem Çoban, Afghan heroin and
167 Çokuluslu Kaçakçılık, Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 3 July 1983, Turkey: Ramifications of international security threat, Turkish
https://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/katalog/192/say- Studies, 15, 2, pp 341–364.
fa/1983/7/3/6.xhtml. According to the Cumhuriyet Newspa- 184 Frank Bovenkerk and Yucel Yeşilgöz, Türkiye’nin Mafyası.
per archives, Hanefi Aslan, Ivan Galic, Maral Angelo, M. Ali İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000.
Karakafa, Fevzi Ozdemir and Ahmet Erdem were the primary 185 Behsat Ekici, International drug trafficking and national se-
traffickers along the route going from Turkey to Italy via curity of Turkey, Journal of Politics and Law, 7, 2., pp 113–126.
Yugoslavia. See also Uğur Mumcu, Papa-Mafya-Ağca. Ankara: 186 There has been hardly a single seizure made from West
Uğur Mumcu Vakfı Yayınları, 2020. Balkan traffickers in eastern border provinces such as
168 Kemal H. Karpat, Osmanlı Nüfusu (1830-1914): Demografik ve Hakkari, Van and Sirnak.
Sosyal Özellikleri. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Tarih Vakfı 187 Interview with a former inspector at KOM Headquarters,
Yayınları, 2003. 2 February 2020.
169 Filiz Doğanay, Türkiye’ye Göçmen Olarak Gelenlerin Yerleşi- 188 North Macedonian Ministry of Interior, Strategy Plan,
mi, Ankara: DPT.YBM, 1997. February, 2019, https://mvr.gov.mk/Upload/Editor_Upload/
170 Bilal, N. Simşir, Türkiye ve Balkanlar, Balkan Türkleri, in 190313-SP-2019-2021-finalen-sajt.pdf.
Balkanlarda Türk Varlığı, Balkan Araştırmaları Dizizi 9, ed. Erhan 189 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction,
Türbedar. Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi National Report: Kosovo, 2014, p 33, http://www.emcdda.
Yayınları, 2003. See also Peter Alfrod Andrews, Türkiye’de europa.eu/system/files/publications/847/National_Report_
Etnik Gruplar. İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1992. Kosovo_2014_EN_483865.pdf.
171 H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Balkanları’ın 190 See TUBIM’s annual national drug reports, 2012–2018.
Majus Talihi Göç. Istanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları, 2001. 191 Iranian crime syndicates are often clandestine offspring of
172 Behsat Ekici, and Adem Çoban, Afghan heroin and Turkey: the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which the
Ramifications of an international security threat, Turkish US designated a terrorist organization in April 2019. See
Studies, 15, 2, pp 341–364. Mahmut Cengiz, The Illicit Economy in Turkey: How Criminals,

86 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
 Terrorists and the Syrian Conflict Fuel Underground Markets. Balkans and Turkey. The operation was coordinated with
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019. In October 2019, Albanian SELEC and the Greek law enforcement agency. Investiga-
police announced that they had dismantled a terrorist cell tions revealed that the group was producing cannabis in
run by an IRGC’s Quds Force operative. According to the Albania and trafficking the substance to Greece, Turkey and
statement made by the Albanian police agency, the cell was EU countries. See Albanian State Police, Raporti ditor i ngjar-
collecting evidence in partnership with drug traffickers and jeve, 12 September 2019, https://www.asp.gov.al/raporti-di-
planned to undertake suicide attacks against dissidents of tor-i-ngjarjeve-policia-e-shtetit-12-shtator-2019/.
the Iranian regime in Europe. See Albanian State Police, Dre- 206 Hürriyet Daily News, Turkish court to try Albanian ‘drug
jtori i Përgjithshëm i Policisë së Shtetit, Ardi Veliu, së bashku me kingpin’ caught in Turkey’s west, 2 April 2018, https://www.
Drejtorin e Drejtorisë së Antiterrorit Gledis Nano, në deklaratë hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-court-to-try-albanian-drug-
për mediat, për parandalimin e një sulmi terrorist, 23 October -kingpin-caught-in-turkeys-west-129673.
2019, https://www.asp.gov.al/drejtori-i-pergjithshem-i-polici- 207 Albanian State Police, Operacioni ‘Precizioni’, 18 të arrestuar
se-se-shtetit-ardi-veliu-se-bashku-me-drejtorin-e-drejtorise- për përfshirje në grup kriminal të trafikut të narkotikëve, 12
-se-antiterrorit-gledis-nano-ne-deklarate-per-mediat-per-pa- May 2018, https://arkiva.asp.gov.al/index.php/forca-e-ligjit/
randalimin-e-nje-sulmi-terrorist/. 14245-operacioni-precizioni-18-te-arrestuar-per-perfshirje-
192 Behsat Ekici and Adem Coban, Afghan heroin and Turkey: -ne-grup-kriminal-te-trafikut-te-narkotikeve.
Ramifications of an international security threat, Turkish 208 Ibid.
Studies, 15, 2, pp 341–364, https://www.tandfonline.com/ 209 Habib Atam, Arnavut baronun seracısı yakalandı, Sözcü, 29
doi/abs/10.1080/14683849.2014.926668. March 2018, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2018/gundem/arna-
193 Ibid. vut-baronun-seracisi-yakalandi-2318325/.
194 Behsat Ekici, Country Report of Turkey: Illicit Markets and State 210 Sputnik News, İpsala Gümrüğünde 1.5 ton esrar ele geçirildi,
Response in Turkey, International Institute for Criminal Justice 28 December 2018, https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/
and Human Rights, Syracuse, 2018. 201812281036846447-ticaret-bakanligi-ipsala-sinir-kapisi-
195 Behsat Ekici, African transnational threat to Turkey, African -esrar/.
Security Review, 22, 3, pp 123–144, https://www.tandfonline. 211 Habib Atam, Çocuk Yorganına bile uyuşturucu koymuşlar, Sözcü,
com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2013.793206. 22 July 2019, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2019/gundem/co-
196 Ibid. cuk-yorganina-bile-uyusturucu-koymuslar-5242672/.
197 Turkey has been a growing market for European ecstasy 212 Greek police crackdown on wide Albania–Turkey drug traffi-
since the 1990s. In 2018, Turkish authorities conducted cking network, Tirana Times, 1 October 2019, https://www.
a joint investigation with their Bulgarian counterparts. As tiranatimes.com/?p=143209.
a result, Bulgarian authorities seized a total of 500 000 213 Halil Akbaş, Göçmen Kaçakçılığı: Genel Bir Değerlendirme,
ecstasy tablets near its border with Serbia. The ecstasy was Oğuzhan Ömer Demir and Bahadır Küçükuysal (eds), Organi-
transported from the Netherlands to Turkey through West ze Suçlar. Ankara: Adalet Yayınevi, 2013.
Balkans. See Habip Atam, Bulgaristan/Sırbistan Sınırında uyuş- 214 Interview with a former member of Turkish Coast Guard, 1
turucu operasyonu, Sözcü, 24 December 2018, https://www. February 2020.
sozcu.com.tr/2018/gundem/son-dakika-bulgaristan-sirbis- 215 Yavuz Kahya and Murat Sever, Türkiye’de Göçmen Kaçakçıları.
tan-sinirinda-uyusturucu-operasyonu-2837472/. Ankara: Karınca Yayınları, 2013.
198 EUROPOL, 2004 European Union Organised Crime Report, 216 Interview with a former member of Turkish Coast Guard, 1
The Hague, December 2004, p 21, https://www.europol. February 2020.
europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union- 217 M. Zeki Bodur, Ege Denizinden Yapılan Yasadışı Göç ve Göçmen
-organised-crime-report-2004. Profilleri, Göçmenlerin Geleceğe Yönelik Beklentiler ve Öngürüler,
199 Çetin Aydın, İstanbul’da Zehir Baskını! Türkiye’de İlk kez ele Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi, 6, 12, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/
geçirildi, Hürriyet, 7 May 2018, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ pub/guvenlikstrtj/issue/7531/99191.
gundem/istanbulda-zehir-baskini-turkiyede-ilk-kez-ele-geci- 218 Benet Koleka, Albania busts gang trafficking migrants into
rildi-40828338. EU, arrests eight, Reuters, 13 June 2019, https://www.
200 Behsat Ekici, Country Report of Turkey: Illicit Markets and State reuters.com/article/us-albania-migrants-trafficking/alba-
Response in Turkey, International Institute for Criminal Justice nia-busts-gang-trafficking-migrants-into-eu-arrests-eight-i-
and Human Rights, Syracuse 2018. dUSKCN1TE2RW.
201 TUBIM, Turkish Drug Report 2019, Ankara, 2019, http:// 219 Yavuz Kahya and Murat Sever, Türkiye’de Göçmen Kaçakçıları.
www.narkotik.pol.tr/kurumlar/narkotik.pol.tr/TUB%- Ankara: Karınca Yayınları, 2013.
C4%B0M/Ulusal%20Yay%C4%B1nlar/2019-TURKIYE- 220 Mahmut Cengiz, Turkiye’de Organize Suç Gerçeği ve Terörün
-UYUSTURUCU-RAPORU.pdf. Finansmanı. Ankara: Seçkin Yayınevi, 2015.
202 Ibid. 221 Albanian State Police, Raporti ditor i ngjarjeve, 12 September
203 Interview with a former superintendent in Istanbul Narcotics 2019, https://www.asp.gov.al/raporti-ditor-i-ngjarjeve-poli-
Division, 16 February 2020. cia-e-shtetit-12-shtator-2019/.
204 Ibid. 222 Stavros Tzimas, People traffickers having field day at Evros
205 TUBIM, Turkish Drug Report 2019, Ankara, 2019. For exam- border, ekathimerini.com, 24 November 2019, http://www.
ple, Albanian police conducted an operation, code-named ekathimerini.com/246798/article/ekathimerini/news/people-
LIMIT against an international criminal network that was -traffickers-having-field-day-at-evros-border.
trafficking drugs and smuggling immigrants throughout the

NOTES 87
 223 Yavuz Kahya and Murat Sever, Türkiye’de Göçmen Kaçakçıları. including Albanians and Kosovars. In the same month, during
Ankara: Karınca Yayınları, 2013. an INTERPOL operation in Ecuador, Albanian Dritan Rexhepi
224 Nilüfer Narli, Human trafficking and smuggling: The process, was captured with 277 kilograms of cocaine that were being
the actors and the victim profile, in Trafficking in Persons trafficked from Guayaquil. Kosovar Remzi Azemi was also
in South East Europe: A Threat to Human Security. Vienna: Aus- captured. In January 2015, Albanian police seized a little
trian Federal Ministry of Defence (BMLV), 2006, pp 9–38. over 100 kilograms of cocaine in Xibrake, 45 kilometres from
225 Albanian State Police, Elbasan – Finalizohet operacioni i koduar Tirana: seven Albanians and two Colombians were arrested.
‘TRANZIT’, 13 June 2019, https://www.asp.gov.al/elbasan-fi- In February 2018, 613 kilograms of cocaine was seized by
nalizohet-operacioni-i-koduar-tranzit/. police in the Albanian port of Durrës. In September 2019,
226 ANSA, Italy: Seven arrests for human trafficking in Modena 137 kilograms of cocaine from Ecuador was seized in the
province, infomigrants.net, 25 March 2025, https://www. port of Durrës. In the same month, 617 kilograms of cocaine
infomigrants.net/en/post/15889/italy-seven-arrests-for-hu- allegedly destined for Albania and packaged with the logo of
man-trafficking-in-modena-province the Elbasan football team was seized in a rural area in Brazil.
227 Alice Elizabeth Taylor, Albanian man arrested in Italy after 235 The lease of the Manta Air Base was not renewed by the
fleeing Albania on human trafficking charges, Exit News, 19 Ecuadorean government.
August 2019, https://exit.al/en/2019/08/19/albanian-man- 236 Interview with former director of intelligence of the Ecuado-
-arrested-in-italy-after-fleeing-albania-on-human-trafficking- rian army, Quito, 24 January 2020.
-charges/. 237 Interview with the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences
228 Courrier international, Deux barons de la drogue tombent à (FLACSO) academic and security researcher Freddy Rivera.
Tirana, 1 October 2003, https://www.courrierinternational. 238 This decision was later appealed by the Prosecutor’s Office,
com/article/2001/02/15/deux-barons-de-la-drogue-tom- which investigated the case.
bent-a-tirana. 239 According to information from the Colombian Ministry of
229 Bojana Jovanovic and Stevan Dojčinović, Saric Case: From Justice (obtained through a freedom of information request
international investigation to second judgement, KRIK, 5 by GI), from 2000 until 2019, Colombia had not requested
December 2018, https://www.krik.rs/en/saric-case-interna- the extradition of any person from the six Western Balkans
tional-investigation-second-judgement/. countries. In 2019, the Colombian government requested
230 Geoffrey Ramsey, A look at one Serbian kingpin’s Latin the extradition of a person from the Republic of Serbia for
America connections, InSight Crime, 30 May 2012, https:// the crimes of ‘trafficking, manufacturing or carrying drugs’,
www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/a-look-at-one-serbian- but the name of the person and its nationality remains
-kingpins-latin-america-connections/. protected.
231 Bojana Jovanovic and Stevan Dojčinović, Saric Case: from 240 A hacienda manager who met Arbër Çekaj in Guayas repor-
international investigation to second judgement, KRIK, 5 ted that the Albanian spoke perfect Spanish. An Ecuadorian
December 2018, https://www.krik.rs/en/saric-case-interna- prosecutor who has conducted several investigations invol-
tional-investigation-second-judgement/. ving Albanians confirmed that they tend to speak Spanish
232 On 4 April 2015, Arbër Çekaj attempted to insert four boxes very well, but pretend not to understand the language when
of cocaine into a shipment of bananas destined for Albania, giving a statement in the Public Prosecutor’s Office. See
but workers alerted the authorities. Plan V and Organized Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP),
Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), El Mayor This is how the Albanian mafia operates in Ecuador.
narcotraficante Albanés hizo negocios en Ecuador, 13 Decem- 241 ‘If the person comes from Europe, is blond, white and speaks
ber 2019, https://www.planv.com.ec/investigacion/investi- anything other than English or French, they will consider
gacion/el-mayor-narcotraficante-albanes-hizo-negocios- him simply a Russian,’ said a mafia lawyer who spoke with GI
ecuador. under the condition of anonymity.
233 In 2015, Çekaj was summoned to appear in an Ecuadorian 242 UNODC, World Drug Report 2019, Vienna, June 2019,
court for drug trafficking. Despite the criminal proceedings, https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2019/.
the Albanian was able to continue visiting Ecuador until 243 Christine Armario, US Report: Colombia coca production still
2018, when he was arrested in Germany for smuggling the at record high, The Washington Times, 5 March 2020, https://
largest shipment of cocaine ever seized in Albania. www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/mar/5/us-report-
234 There have been numerous examples of large cocaine ship- -colombia-coca-production-still-at-record/.
ments being seized by the authorities, highlighting the scale 244 Leonardo Goi, Traficante bosnio relacionado con Los Urabeños
of the Albanian–Latin American drug-trafficking connection. es capturado en Italia, InSight Crime, 3 May 2017, https://
In 2011, Albanian citizen Dhimitraq Harizaj was sentenced es.insightcrime.org/noticias/noticias-del-dia/traficante-bos-
to prison for drug trafficking after being caught shipping 200 nio-relacionado-urabenos-capturado-italia/.
kilograms of cocaine from Colombia to Albania. In November 245 Ibid.
2013, 184 kilograms of cocaine were seized in a container 246 Ibid.
destined for the Albanian port of Durrës. In May 2014, 247 El Ruso was captured by Colombian police in 2016 in the city
90 kilograms of cocaine were seized in the port of Guayaquil of Cartago (Valle), along with 11 others accused of forming
destined for Durrës. In June 2014, 250 kilograms of cocaine a transnational network dedicated to cocaine shipments.
in a container that originated in Ecuador were seized at the However, he managed to flee, apparently bribing doctors
port of Bar, Montenegro, leading to the arrest of 11 people, and judicial officials, as reported by Análisis Urbano, a press

88 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
 agency. Niemeier Rizvanovic was recaptured in April 2017 in 264 Blaž Zgaga, While cocaine jet-setter Michael Dokovich fights
Civitavecchia, Italy. He was extradited to Colombia in August his extradition to Croatia, the Balkan Cartel is on the rise,
of the same year and mysteriously released in March 2018. Nacional, 13 November 2019, https://www.Nacional.hr/
He was killed in October 2018 in Colombia, near Pereira, a while-cocaine-jet-setter-michael-dokovich-fights-his-extradi-
city that has become a crossroads for the cartels. tion-to-croatia-the-balkan-cartel-is-on-the-rise/.
248 Luis Rendueles and Vanesa Lozano, Un narco español: ‘Vamos 265 See BalkanInsight, 4 May 2020, https://balkaninsight.
a tener que vender arena’, La Opinión de Murcia, 19 April 2020, com/2020/05/04/montenegro-ship-sails-from-germany-af-
https://www.laopiniondemurcia.es/sucesos/2020/04/19/ ter-cocaine-bust/.
narco-espanol-vender-arena/1108178.html. 266 Blaž Zgaga, While cocaine jet-setter Michael Dokovich fights
249 One theory is that he died playing Russian roulette; see his extradition to Croatia, the Balkan Cartel is on the rise,
https://www.kurir.rs/crna-hronika/3440163/dve-verzije-ho- Nacional, 13 November 2019, https://www.Nacional.hr/
ror-price-ostavice-vas-bez-daha-srbin-poginuo-u-kolumbiji-i- while-cocaine-jet-setter-michael-dokovich-fights-his-extradi-
grajuci-ruski-rulet-a-onda-je-usledio-rat tion-to-croatia-the-balkan-cartel-is-on-the-rise/.
250 Serbio muerto en Meta era señalado de integrar el cartel los 267 Montenegrin authorities seize drugs on navy training
Balcanes, El Tiempo, 2 April 2020, https://www.eltiempo.com/ ship, Reuters, 19 April 2019, https://www.reuters.com/
justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/serbio-muerto-en-casa-de-ex- article/us-montenegro-drugs/montenegrin-authori-
jefe-para-era-buscado-por-narcotrafico-480244. ties-seize-drugs-on-navy-training-ship-idUSKCN1RV0XQ.
251 Shirley Avila, Unos 23 clanes familiares acopian cocaína para 268 Interview with police intelligence agent, Bogotà, 11 February
mafias serbias, Perú21, 31 March 2018, https://peru21.pe/ 2020.
lima/narcotrafico-peru-23-clanes-familiares-acopian-co- 269 Interview at General Attorney Office headquarters, Bogotà,
caina-mafias-serbias-informe-401607-noticia/?ref=p21r; 5 March 2020.
and Jacqueline Fowks, El cultivo de coca en Perú se despla- 270 See Plan V, 15 December 2019, https://www.planv.com.ec/
za a las fronteras con Brasil y Bolivia, El País, 28 November investigacion/investigacion/asi-opera-la-mafia-albanesa-ecu-
2018, https://elpais.com/interNacional/2018/11/27/ameri- ador.
ca/1543344243_444001.html. 271 Informe Europeo sobre Drogas 2019: Tendencias y novedades,
252 Peru Interior Ministry, #QueEllosSeCuiden, Capturan a narco- Oficina de Publicaciones de la Unión Europea, Luxembourg.
traficante buscado por la DEA e integrante del Clan América en 272 There are also recent reports of cocaine being hidden in
Cusco, 20 September 2018, https://www.gob.pe/institucion/ shipments of scrap metal and asphalt.
mininter/noticias/19171-queellossecuiden-capturan-a-narco- 273 Blaž Zgaga, While cocaine jet-setter Michael Dokovich fights
traficante-buscado-por-la-dea-e-integrante-del-clan-ameri- his extradition to Croatia, the Balkan Cartel is on the rise,
ca-en-cusco. Nacional, 13 November 2019, https://www.Nacional.hr/
253 Serbian drug clan ‘America’ fell on its knees because of a while-cocaine-jet-setter-michael-dokovich-fights-his-extradi-
Bosnian: Smuggling of 1.5 tons of cocaine from Peru to tion-to-croatia-the-balkan-cartel-is-on-the-rise/.
Belgium prevented, Telegraf, 9 January 2019, https://www. 274 Ibid.
Telegraf.rs/english/3022272-serbian-drug-clan-america-fell- 275 Informe Europeo sobre Drogas 2019: Tendencias y novedades,
-on-its-knees-because-of-a-bosnian-smuggling-of-15-tons- Oficina de Publicaciones de la Unión Europea, Luxembourg.
-of-cocaine-from-peru-to-belgium-prevented-photo-video 276 See BalkanInsight, 27 March 2019, https://balkaninsight.
254 See KRIK, 14 April 2019, https://www.krik.rs/uhapsen-vese- com/2019/03/27/romania-arrests-two-serbians-in-major-co-
lin-raicevic-meda-bitan-clan-grupe-amerika/ caine-bust/.
255 Profile: https://www.reportingproject.net/peopleofinterest/ 277 Informe Europeo sobre Drogas 2019: Tendencias y novedades,
profil.php?profil=54 Oficina de Publicaciones de la Unión Europea, Luxembourg.
256 Serbian court convicts Saric of drug smuggling, Balkan- 278 See BalkanInsight, 27 March 2019, https://balkaninsight.
Insight, 10 December 2018. com/2019/03/27/romania-arrests-two-serbians-in-major-co-
257 Organization attributes sheet, Matthew B. Ridgway Center caine-bust/.
for International Security Studies, Pittsburgh University. 279 See BalkanInsight, 26 February 2020, https://balkaninsight.
258 See NoticiasR7, 19 August 2018, https://noticias.r7.com/ com/2020/02/26/montenegrin-crew-of-cocaine-ship-arres-
sao-paulo/porto-do-po-pcc-e-mafiosos-dos-balcas-dividiam- ted-in-caribbean/.
-o-mesmo-doleiro-19082018; see also Portal do Bitcoin, 19 280 Interview, police intelligence HQ, Bogotà, 11 February.
May 2019, https://portaldobitcoin.com/justica-brasileira- 281 See https://elcomercio.pe/lima/policiales/prenan-nin-
-condena-a-17-anos-de-prisao-minerador-de-bitcoin-envol- jas-callao-droga-contenedores-puerto-video-noticia-
vido-com-o-pcc/. -507257-noticia/. Among those arrested are Zoran Jaksic
259 Organization attributes sheet, Matthew B. Ridgway Center (Serbian) in 2016, David Cufraj in 2017 (Serb citizen born in
for International Security Studies, Pittsburgh University. Kosovo who grew up in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Smail
260 Ibid. Sikalo (Bosnian) arrested in 2019.
261 Ibid. 282 Three other members of the crew who were arrested are
262 Vuksan naručio 200 kilograma kokaina, Blic, 25 December also from Montenegro.
2004; see also Monténégro: Coke en stock au port de Bar, Le 283 Annie Todd, US: 16.5 tons of cocaine seized in historic
Courrier de Balkans, 23 January 2005. bust, OCCRP, 19 June 2019, https://www.occrp.org/en/dai-
263 Fabian Zhillia and Besfort Lamallari, Organized crime threat ly/10004-us-16-5-tons-of-cocaine-seized-in-historic-bust.
assessment in Albania, Open Society Foundation.

NOTES 89
 284 Jeremy Roebuck, Two charged in 16-ton, $1B Philly port 301 Kate Lyons, The new drug highway: Pacific islands at centre
cocaine bust, ‘one of largest seizures in U.S. history’, The of cocaine trafficking boom, The Guardian, 24 June 2019,
Philadelphia Inquirer, 18 June 2019, https://www.inquirer. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/24/the-new-
com/news/cocaine-seized-philly-port-drug-bust-cargo-ship- -drug-highway-pacific-islands-at-centre-of-cocaine-traffi-
customs-and-border-protection-20190618.html; see also cking-boom.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-shippings-record-co- 302 Benn Bathgate, Big jail terms for country’s largest ever
caine-bust-11563960604. cocaine haul, Stuff, 5 February 2020, https://www.Stuff.co.nz/
285 See InsightCrime, https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/no- national/119226504/big-jail-terms-for-countrys-largest-ever-
ticias-del-dia/redada-en-europa-apunta-a-uruguay-como- cocaine-haul.
-punto-de-transito-de-cocaina/ 303 Australian criminals created global drug cartel: Report,
286 About 62 tonnes of cocaine were seized in Belgium in 2019, Business Standard, 1 June 2015, https://www.business-stan-
10.5 tonnes of which came from Ecuador; see https://www. dard.com/article/news-ians/australian-criminals-created-glo-
eluniverso.com/noticias/2020/01/08/nota/7681320/cerca- bal-drug-cartel-report-115060100793_1.html.
-62-toneladas-cocaina-se-incautaron-belgica-2019-105-to- 304 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, by email,
neladas. 29 April 2020.
287 Ibid. 305 Joshua Robertson, Alleged former bikie extradited from
288 Telephone interview with Ricardo Camacho, expert and Serbia to Australia over Brisbane murder, The Guardian,
consultant on security issues, 20 February 2020. 12 May 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/austra-
289 Interview with Col. Mario Pazmino, former director of intelli- lia-news/2016/may/12/alleged-former-bikie-extradit-
gence of the Ecuadorian army, 24 January 2020. ed-from-serbia-australia-over.
290 Telephone interview with Ricardo Camacho, 20 February 306 Ava Benny-Morrison, Police link slain Balkan criminal to
2020. Melbourne organised crime figure, The Sydney Morning
291 El misterioso albanés detrás de nuevo ‘narcovuelo’ de Colombia Herald, 10 December 2015, https://www.smh.com.au/nation-
a Madrid, El Comercio, 6 May 2018; Saisie de cocaïne à Bayon- al/nsw/police-link-slain-balkan-criminal-to-melbourne-organis-
ne: les coulisses de l’opération B-52, Le Parisien, 3 December ed-crime-figure-20151209-gljqkn.html.
2016; Gironde: Plus d’une tonne de cocaïne saisie, 23 personnes 307 Nick Ralston, Goran Nikolovski was ‘lured’ to his death:
interpellées, 20 Minutes, 20 November 2017. police, Illawarra Mercury, 14 July 2017, https://www.illawar-
292 See RCN Radio, https://www.rcnradio.com/judicial/cayo-en- ramercury.com.au/story/4791200/closing-in-police-now-say-
-espana-otro-cargamento-de-cocaina-procedente-de-co- goran-nikolovski-was-lured-to-his-death/.
lombia. 308 David Murray, Operation Warrior: the inside story of the
293 Blaž Zgaga, While cocaine jet-setter Michael Dokovich fights defeat of Daniel Kalaja’s huge drugs empire, The Sunday Mail,
his extradition to Croatia, the Balkan Cartel is on the rise, 4 November 2012, https://www.couriermail.com.au/news/
Nacional, 13 November 2019, https://www.Nacional.hr/ queensland/operation-warrior-the-inside-story-of-the-defeat-
while-cocaine-jet-setter-michael-dokovich-fights-his-extradi- of-daniel-kalajas-huge-drugs-empire/news-story/cc2ceedafac
tion-to-croatia-the-balkan-cartel-is-on-the-rise. e2083a47e94c0025538f5.
294 Ibid. 309 Peter Jean, Adelaide gangster Leonard Gjeka deported
295 Balkan cartel trafficking cocaine around the globe in private to his native Albania, The Advertiser, 31 December 2014,
planes busted, EUROPOL, 25 July 2019, https://www. https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/ade-
europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/balkan-cartel-trafficking- laide-gangster-leonard-gjeka-deported-to-his-native-albania/
cocaine-around-globe-in-private-planes-busted. news-story/f18b6cc9bcbbfbb421af476c42955fdf.
296 Incautan récord en España de 8,7 toneladas de cocaína llegada 310 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime,
de Colombia, France 24, 25 April 2018. Hotspots of organized crime in the Western Balkans, May
297 See Safe Communities Portugal, https://www.safecommu- 2019, https://globalinitiative.net/oc-western-balkans/.
nitiesportugal.com/judicial-police-carries-the-largest-seizu- 311 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction,
re-of-cocaine-ever-in-the-azores-and-holds-five-men- An assessment of the extent of Albanian(-speaking) orga-
-%E2%80%93-street-value-around-euros-300-million/. nised crime groups involved in drug supply in the Europe-
298 Interceptado un narcovelero con 797 kilos de cocaína,2 Sep- an Union: Characteristics, role and the level of influence,
tember 2019, El Día, https://www.eldia.es/multimedia/fotos/ 2019, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/attach-
sucesos/2019-09-02-167530-interceptado-narcovelero-ki- ments/12102/EDMR2019_BackgroundReport_AlbanianSpe-
los-cocaina.html. akingOCGs.pdf.
299 See https://www.minfor.gov.gy/featured/guyana-and-alba- 312 See Tim Judah, Yugoslavia is dead, long live the Yugosphere,
nia-sign-visa-waiver-mou/ LSEE – research on South Eastern Europe, November 2009.
300 Mark Townsend, Kings of cocaine: How the Albanian mafia 313 See OCCRP, https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/
seized control of the UK drugs trade, The Guardian, 13 503-naser-kelmendi-from-kosovo-inmate-to-sarajevo-busi-
January 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/ nessman. Kelmendi started his criminal activity in 1980 by
jan/13/kings-of-cocaine-albanian-mafia-uk-drugs-crime. smuggling textiles and gold into Kosovo from Turkey. Then
his organization nurtured during the 1990s embargo of the

90 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES
 UN to the former Yugoslavia where his criminal group smug- Justice. Around 13 defendants have been arrested from the
gled oil, tobacco, drugs and later on arms during the Kosovo United States and six other countries: Australia, the United
war. Kelmendi appeared in the radars of law enforcement Kingdom, France, Italy, Kosovo and Serbia.
agencies for drug trafficking in 2008 316 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction,
314 See BalkanInsight, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/02/01/ An assessment of the extent of Albanian(-speaking) organi-
naser-kelmendi-verdict-02-01-2018/ sed crime groups involved in drug supply in the European
315 Since 2013, access to the internet in Kosovo based on Union: Characteristics, role and the level of influence, 2019,
households is 84.8%, and on users 76.6%, similar to the EU p 13, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/attach-
average. This high access to internet has created a fertile ments/12102/EDMR2019_BackgroundReport_AlbanianSpe-
ground for cybercrimes to increasingly develop in organized akingOCGs.pdf.
forms. According to one Kosovo expert, cybercrime was one 317 Balkanweb, 700 kg kokainë nga Ekuadori drejt Shqipërisë/
of the ‘fastest growing criminal activities and a real threat’ Media greke zbardh skemën: U zbulua nga një telefonatë ano-
since 2010. The characteristic of this crime is that most of nime. Kush ishin porositësit, 8 October 2019, https://www.
the perpetrators live outside Kosovo. On top of the Kosovars balkanweb.com/700-kg-kokaine-nga-ekuadori-drejt-shqipe-
list of cybercrimes is Ardit Ferizi. He was just 19 years old rise-media-greke-zbardh-skemen-u-zbulua-nga-nje-telefona-
when he was arrested for cybercrimes, he committed on te-anonime-kush-ishin-porositesit/.
behalf of ISIS in 2016. Another case is that of Besart Hoxha, 318 The operation was led by Montenegro and supported by
25, and Liridon Musliu, 26. In February 2018 the US Depart- EUROPOL, and law-enforcement authorities from Austria,
ment of Justice indicted 36 defendants, and requested the Croatia, France, Portugal, Serbia and Slovenia.
extradition from Kosovo of Hoxha and Musliu for alleged 319 INTERPOL, Balkans: Operation Theseus busts human traffi-
roles in transnational criminal organizations responsible for cking and migrant smuggling rings, 22 January 2020, https://
more than $530 million in losses from cybercrimes. They www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2020/Balkans-
gathered evidence that this group has victimized millions -Operation-Theseus-busts-human-trafficking-and-migrant-
in all 50 states and worldwide in one of the largest cyber smuggling-rings.
fraud enterprises ever prosecuted by the US Department of 320 On INTERPOL’s list of 381 most wanted criminals, 160 are
Albanians.

NOTES 91
 ABOUT THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE
The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime is a
global network with over 500 Network Experts around the world.
The Global Initiative provides a platform to promote greater debate
and innovative approaches as the building blocks to an inclusive
global strategy against organized crime.

www. globalinitiative.net

92 TRANSNATIONAL TENTACLES