Lessons from Ukraine: Armoured Fighting Vehicles

euro-sd.com/2023/01/articles/29152/lessons-from-ukraine-armoured-fighting-vehicles/

24. January 2023

As the war in Ukraine rages there have been multiple attempts to draw lessons from the
conflict. The multitude of social media platforms carrying footage from the conflict have
made it feel uniquely accessible and given many an insight into war that is otherwise
difficult to gain without becoming a combatant.

This has empowered many to draw analysis from the conflict and seek to apply them to
war as a whole. However, it is important to exercise caution on two fronts. First of all,
conservative estimates indicate that there are more than 200,000 combatants in this war,
and whilst there is a lot of footage available it does not cover the full experience of the
enormous front line. It is consequently a limited form of information, that in any case lacks
context, and so should be regarded as only part of the story. For instance, no quantity of
videos showing tanks falling prey to anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) can serve as
evidence that the tank has had its day.

The images of Russian defensive lines showing tank obstacles reflective of WW2 are indicative of the
prominent role played by armour in the Russo-Ukrainian war. (Photo: Ukrainian MoD)

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The second is the peculiar nature of this war. Russia and Ukraine had both attempted to
modernise their forces since 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, but neither had
taken considerable strides away from the artillery-centred doctrines that they inherited
from the USSR. Russia had realised some of its late Soviet ambitions – not least the
principle of being able to target an enemy’s critical national infrastructure, whilst also
modernising its fleet of armoured fighting vehicles (AFV), but it remained an artillery army
with a lot of tanks. Researchers from the Roya United Services Institute (RUSI), a think-
tank based in London, who had visited Ukraine before and during the war observe that
there were some Ukrainian units with command tents that most NATO officers would
recognise, but that the majority of units were not far removed from their Soviet
predecessors. In addition, both sides actually entered the war with a near numerical parity
in artillery systems – it was the availability of munitions that separated them. Because of
this, both sides represent fairly unique militaries that would have very little in common
with the majority of armed forces around the world. This means that some aspects of the
war are likely of limited value for those writing doctrine and lessons learned, because they
arise from unusual situations and would be very unlikely – perhaps even impossible – to
replicate in any other war.

Take for example, Russia’s enormous expenditure of artillery ammunition, which reached
20,000 rounds per day at some points. This aspect of the war seems to highlight the need
for lots of artillery ammunition and large mechanised formations capable of providing this
level of fires whilst withstanding the attrition that comes with it. The reality is that there are
few militaries that can produce this kind of battlefield effect, and even fewer that would
actually choose to. It is a costly process requiring enormous reserves of ammunition and
personnel. It works for the Russian forces because that is how they are trained to fight,
and it compensates in no small way for a certain lack of tactical proficiency. If one is
considering the possibility of war with Russia, then this is an important aspect of the war
to consider, but its applicability to other conflicts is questionable.

So, with this warning in mind, are there any lessons for the employment of AFVs from the
war in Ukraine that are sufficiently general to be applicable to a broader audience than
those that must prepare to potentially face the Russian military? There are some aspects
that can be drawn upon to arrive at potentially useful recommendations, however, it is
equally difficult to assess whether these lessons are fundamentally new, or revisions of
past conflicts. It is most probably more useful to fold observations from Ukraine into a
broader understanding of 20th and 21st century warfare, than resting solely on the
outcomes of this specific war. Where possible, this article will try to do this, providing
broader contextual analysis to assess whether these lessons are fundamentally new. It is
fitting to start by assessing an age-old debate through the lens of Ukraine – has the tank
had its day?

Tanks

A search for meaningful quotes to title this section returned nothing satisfying, this is
because the end of the tank is not near and attempts to suggest as much tend to conflate
the destruction of something with futility in using it. There is a tired old adage which goes:

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“A tank is like a dinner jacket you don’t often need one, but when you do, nothing else will
do.” The reality is that tanks are like paper napkins, you don’t always need one to protect
your dinner jacket, but when you do use one it is very valuable and good at its job. Once
you have used it, you might fold it up and put it in your pocket to use another day, or it
might get ruined in the process and you will throw it away. Tanks have been used
extensively by both sides in the Ukraine war, an impressive mix of T-62s, T-64s, T-72s, T-
80s and T-90s in various states of modernisation have made battlefield appearances,
some of them for the first time. They have been put to use in a number of ways that are
worth exploring in an effort to understand where lessons might be drawn.

Whether used for direct or indirect fire, tanks provide a readily-available form of effective and accurate
lethality. If they cannot be countered by infantry, they are likely to inflict a lot of harm. (Photo: Ukrainian
MoD)

Tank on tank combat is relatively common, however, the dispersed nature of the
battlefield means that at times when both sides are assuming defensive positions, it is
often a single tank engaging one other. Engagements in this context can be observed to
happen at very close ranges and it is interesting to note that the explosive reactive
armour (ERA) arrays fitted to tanks on both sides frequently necessitate two shots for a
successful engagement. The first with a high explosive round to remove the ERA, the
second with a kinetic energy round to penetrate the tank and kill the crew. From here it is
tempting to draw an ostensibly simple conclusion: Tanks will require two shots to kill an
opposing tank. However, there are multiple aspects of this equation that are unknown.
The first is the type of ammunition being used by Ukrainian and Russian tank crews.

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Many early Soviet armour piercing fin stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) ammunition
types (such as the ubiquitous 3VBM-9 ‘Zakolka’) employ a steel projectile, carrying a
tungsten slug behind an armour piercing cap. Monobloc depleted uranium penetrators
like the 3VBM-13 ‘Vant’, were introduced relatively late in the Soviet Union and solid
tungsten carbide projectiles such as the 3VBM-17 ‘Mango’ only in 1986. They were often
confined to high-priority units operating tanks like the T-80. The older rounds produce a
muzzle energy of around 6 MJ, while the newer varieties such as Mango can achieve
similar levels of kinetic energy, but the greater hardness and density of their projectiles
when compared with steel natures (7.8 g/cm3 vs 17g/cm3 for tungsten) makes them
more effective at penetrating the complex armours found on tanks. However, if they are
compared with modern western natures of ammunition – even in this simplistic fashion –
there is an interesting disparity. According to the late Professor Ogorkiewicz, the L44 and
L55 120 mm smoothbore guns that arm most NATO tanks are capable of producing 9.8
MJ and 12.5 MJ in muzzle energy respectively. Whilst this not the only deciding factor
behind APFSDS lethality, it suggests that Western tanks are significantly more lethal in
tank warfare than their Russian or Ukrainian counterparts.

The T-90A shown here is fitted with the Shtora-1 active protection system that defends against some
types of guided missiles from the frontal arc of the tank. The tanks have been used both in Ukraine,
Syria, and Iraq with varying degrees of success reflecting the importance of effective tactics and
employment. (Photo: Ukrainian MoD)

ERA primarily defeats kinetic energy rounds by momentum transfer, it requires the use of
thicker and heavier front flyer plates than is typical for high explosive anti-tank (HEAT)
rounds as the projectiles they are countering are heavier and larger, according to Paul
Hazell, Professor of Impact Dynamics in the School of Engineering and Information
Technology (SEIT) at UNSW Canberra. Essentially, the weight and force of the flyer plate
changes the course of the APFSDS penetrator and may even shatter the rod into smaller
pieces. However, the armour behind the ERA must be considerable to absorb the impact
of those fragments. As most NATO guns fire ammunition natures that are generally
longer, and capable of producing much higher muzzle energy as a result of their typically
greater projectile weights (and in the case of L55 guns, higher projectile velocities as

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well), it stands to reason that the ‘two shot’ trend observed in Ukraine is not a general
lesson that can be applied across the board. However, it is worth noting that tests of
1980s NATO ammunition natures showed that they were generally ineffective against
Kontakt-5 ERA. So, perhaps it is worth delineating between older natures of ammunition,
and the newer ones built upon the greater understanding of Soviet armour gleaned after
the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The end of a tank rarely indicates that violence it managed to inflict until that moment. Basing analysis
solely on images of destroyed Russian tanks is therefore unlikely to produce reliable information
regarding the vehicle’s effectiveness, or its place within the totality of the battlefield. (Photo: Ukrainian
MoD)

In other contexts, tanks are used to provide both direct and indirect fire support against
infantry formations. Ukrainian tanks are even fitted with a sight especially for this purpose
and Russian tank crews have practiced this art with direction from Orlan-10s. It is not
therefore new as far as a skillset is concerned, but its application in Ukraine is interesting
– if only for the challenge it represents to infantry positions. A New York Times report on
fighting near Izyum states the following:

“Tanks in particular have become a serious menace, fighters said, often coming within a
mile of the battalion’s positions and wreaking absolute havoc. Already this month, 13
soldiers with the battalion have been killed and more than 60 wounded.”

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A RUSI report on the initial lessons of the war indicates that Ukraine was able to employ
its tanks as a mobile reserve. In effect, their indirect fire enabled them to act as artillery
and armour simultaneously and engage Russian forces at opportune moments. They
were reportedly accurate out to ranges of 10 km and required very little time for
adjustment of their fire.

The absence of other tanks and paucity of anti-tank weapons – as well as the limited
range of the latter – mean that tanks can be very destructive in the right circumstances.
Indeed, Syrian tanks are known to have caused hundreds of casualties in a single
afternoon of fighting because of the absence of any anti-tank weaponry. The absence of
tanks has been felt in other conflicts, too. Coalition troops fighting in Afghanistan would
often be pinned down by the firepower of Taliban forces, leading them to rely upon attack
helicopters and close air support to extract themselves from the firefight. The presence of
a tank in this circumstance – as well as other AFVs with medium calibre cannons – would
completely reverse this disparity in firepower. In Panzer Ace, the published memoirs of
Richard von Rosen, a German tank commander in World War 2, Rosen retells occasions
where Soviet anti-tank guns would be quickly silenced leaving their infantry at the mercy
of the armoured formations and leading to heavy enemy losses.

Tanks are also a critical element of offensive operations, and it is abundantly clear that
failing to support them with infantry and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) will lead to them
being isolated and destroyed. However, as an element of an offensive operation they are
absolutely critical because of the protection they offer. As mentioned above they are
decisive in engagements against infantry formations in part because they require
specialised tools to defeat them. This makes them central to effective offensive
operations as they require effort and focus to kill, and in many cases will require more
than one successful hit. They are, regardless of the images of tanks being destroyed,
hard to stop, and they can be catastrophic for infantry without the right tools.

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 The BMP-2 is used by both sides in the Russo-Ukraine war, and has been known since entering
service in the 1980s for its ability to suppress and defeat infantry targets. (Photo: Ukrainian MoD)

It follows that tank supremacy is a relatively constant aspect of warfare. If an infantry

ATGMs
ATGMs have proliferated rapidly even within the Russian armed forces. They have moved
from an extremely expensive asset assigned to commanders and a few others in the
Soviet army, to something that is likely to be found in almost every section. The
Ukrainians started the war with a healthy arsenal of domestically-developed ATGMs such
as the Stugna-P from the Luch Design Bureau. The influx of western weapons like FGM-
148 Javelin and NLAW served to distract much of the focus from Ukraine’s own
capabilities, but have nonetheless proven themselves to be valuable assets despite
minimal training. The lethality of ATGMs against armoured vehicles is a well-understood
aspect of the modern battlefield. The way in which the high explosive anti-tank (HEAT)
warheads that arm most ATGMs work, means that they are very difficult to stop. The tip of
a HEAT jet can reach speeds of 10 km/s, although it may only be 2-3 mm in diameter, and
depending on the overall warhead diameter, many modern HEAT warheads can penetrate
over 1,000 mm of solid steel. Despite such capabilities, even successful hits do not
always lead to penetration or the vehicle’s destruction. Israeli forces operating Merkava

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tanks were deployed to Lebanon in 2006, and were subject to multiple successful ATGM
impacts, with more than 50 tanks being hit. Of the 50 hits, 21 tanks were penetrated
leading to 10 vehicles suffering casualties. It is therefore possible for modern tanks to
withstand high levels of ATGM attacks without the crew or vehicle becoming
incapacitated, this is largely thanks to improvements in survivability such as trading
flammable hydraulic fluid-based turret control systems for electric motors, safer
ammunition storage and other modifications.

This image shows a disabled Israeli M48 Patton tank reportedly near a bunker of
the Bar Lev Line in the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt’s use of ATGMs in the Yom Kippur
War drove a number of lessons within the US military. (Photo: ublic Domain Image
from Military Battles on the Egyptian Front by Gammal Hammad, via Wikimedia
Commons)

So, what can we learn about ATGMs from Ukraine? Combining Ukraine with other
conflicts it is apparent that the healthy penetration characteristics of modern HEAT
warheads do not neatly translate into definite kills – against heavily armoured vehicles at
least. Ukraine mostly confirms that tanks remain survivable, and other conflicts confirm
that some are more survivable than others. One element of the War in Ukraine that is
perhaps unique, however, is the sheer mass of ATGMs. They are present in such
numbers that units feel comfortable using them to engage bunkers, trucks, light armoured
vehicles, personnel, and any other target that can be justified. This free-spirited use of
ATGMs is not new, it was common for forces deployed to Afghanistan to use Javelin as a
form of long-range precision strike as opposed to close air support or artillery. It reflects a
wider truism of militaries and war; troops will most likely use the most effective and safest
tool they have to hand, not the cheapest or hardest. However, there is a lesson to be
observed in the mass of ATGMs and how they impact armoured operations.

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ATGMs were first used in a concerted and massed fashion during the 1973 Yom Kippur
War, that oft-studied conflict has impacted the US and other militaries quite considerably.
The Egyptian and Syrian forces used 9M14 Malyutka ‘AT-3 Sagger’ missiles and attained
penetration rates of 60% when the target was successfully hit. This led to an average of
two deaths per vehicle. In response, Israeli vehicle survivability advanced considerably
thereafter, leading to reduced casualties per successful penetration. Egypt had massed
its Malyutkas, stripping them from reserve units and allocating them to frontline infantry in
anticipation of an Israeli armoured counterattack in response to the crossing of the Sinai
River. The Malyutka crews had also spent three years practicing with their weapons to
ensure that they were as capable as possible. However, the Israeli forces obligingly
deployed their armour in ‘penny packets’ (small groups) without infantry support,
prompting the Egyptian chief of staff to remark in his diary that he had not expected the
Israeli forces to be so cooperative. So, the Yom Kippur war served to illustrate that
massed ATGM deployments could blunt a massed armour advance, but also reinforced
the lesson already known from World War II (arguably even WWI), that armoured vehicles
alone were vulnerable.

The Merkava Mk IV is fitted with the Trophy Active Protection System (APS) to provide enhanced
protection from against RPGs and ATGMs. (Photo: Michael Shvadron, Israel Defense Forces, via
Wikimedia Commons)

So, is the massed use of ATGMs in Ukraine proving anything fundamentally different? Is
there anything outside of the established understanding of combined arms doctrine that
can be accounted for? US Army publications on combined arms manoeuvre note that “no
single arm can be decisive,” making combined arms operations essential to defeating the

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enemy. It stands to reason that any observations on the efficacy of ATGMs – or any
combination of weapons and tactics for that matter – against formations consisting only of
tanks are unhelpful, and do not meaningfully add to our understanding of modern warfare.

However, the efficacy of ATGMs has arguably been maintained from 1973. It is apparent
that advancing against an enemy with only one or two tanks and a small contingent of
infantry, when ATGMs are present is unlikely to yield results, mostly because the large
quantity of ATGMs makes the defenders well-placed to defeat the most threatening
element of that force package. Yet and at the same time, we must consider the shape of
the Ukrainian battlespace. It has been observed by many that neither side appears
capable – or willing – of forming much more than a company-sized battle group for
offensive operations. In any other scenario this would amount to ‘penny packet’
deployments, but in Ukraine this might be a result of both attrition and the enormous size
of the front line being fought over. It means that the defender may only have to destroy or
disable a few vehicles in order to deter the attacker from proceeding, which in turn
magnifies the effect of ATGMs.

So, whilst the need for effective counter-ATGM tactics clearly remains and should be
forefront in the minds of armoured forces, there is a question of scale. If the scale of
attacking forces is greater, then the density of ATGMs required to exert an effect would
have to increase commensurately. It cannot, therefore, be taken for granted that ATGMs
represent the same level and type of threat across the spectrum of conflict. Active
Protection Systems (APSs) such as Trophy and Iron Fist would likely return MBTs to a
high level of survivability in sub-peer conflict scenarios. Such scenarios often involve
urban warfare, which can make combined arms manoeuvre difficult because of a lack of
space or scope to do so. However, ATGM uses in these conflicts tends to be restricted to
one or two per engagement, alongside shoulder fired weapons like the RPG-7. In peer
conflicts APSs will also help tanks to maintain survivability, but countering massed
ATGMs will depend on the force’s ability to suppress ATGM teams and supporting armour
with infantry or vice versa.

In sum, Ukraine suggests that ATGMs remain lethal against armour, somewhat justifying
the interest in APSs. Combined arms manoeuvre remains critical for survivability against
these threats, and their massed use can make armoured formations risky to employ.
Ukraine once more raises the question of how the scale of ATGM use impacts a
formation. It is less about the lethality – this is already well-understood – but rather a
question of how ATGMs concentrated in a small area can impact a formation, and what
adaptations are needed to counter them. One further consideration which should be
factored into ‘lessons learned’ assessments, is how representative the fighting in Ukraine
is of broader developments on the modern battlefield.

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A US Marine fires a Javelin ATGM from a HMMWV. The weapon has captured the limelight in Ukraine,
despite operating alongside a large quantity of Ukrainian ATGMs.
(Photo: USMC/SSgt Reece Lodder)

Cannons, Cannons, Everywhere

From these limited examples, it is possible to argue that the tank’s status is not
fundamentally changed by the war in Ukraine and ATGMs remain a problem, although not
insurmountable. In many ways, these ‘lessons’ were well understood, Ukraine provides a
convenient streetlight under which analysts may look. There is, however, one aspect of
the war that is worth labouring, if only for the fact that it has received less attention during
past wars than things like air defence or the utility of airpower, and that is the role of the
medium calibre cannon. Both sides have employed the 2A42 Shipunov 30 mm cannon
that arms BMP-2s, BMD-2s, and the 2A72, a lighter derivative that can be found on BTR-
82As and Russia’s BMP-3 and BMD-4M vehicles. Ukraine also employs a locally
manufactured version on its BTR-3 and BTR-4 wheeled IFVs. The cannons are prolific
and have shaped combat for both sides, see for example this account from a Ukrainian
fighter:

“Russian BTR vehicles I think are worse than tanks. The gun on them fires faster and
they carry soldiers. If we see a BTR there are soldiers near it. If we see a tank sometimes
it is alone and easier to destroy. Wounds from these are horrible. A whole leg can be
removed. A shot to the body makes someone almost explode. They are easy to destroy
but not good to fight directly.”

The power of the cannon is ferocious. The 2A72 is capable of firing 500 rds/min and in
the BMP-3 is stabilised in both axes and connected to a fire control system that enables
good accuracy at range. The high rate of fire is partially a result of the weapons being gas

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operated. In fact, the rate of fire can increase as the barrel heats up, as heat loss from the
propellant gases is reduced, leading to higher pressures that in turn cycle the weapon’s
operating mechanisms faster.

An M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle from 5th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade
Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, moves into position to conduct a firing systems check at the
Presidenski Range, Trzebian, Poland, September 2017. The Bradley’s medium-calibre cannon has
proven itself in multiple conflicts for its rate of fire and lethality. (Photo: US Army photo by Staff Sgt.
Wallace Bonner)

The firepower of these cannons means that they can be used to dominate infantry
formations from a distance, and they are also reasonably potent, which means they can –
in a desperate situation – impart damage onto a tank. Both of these uses for the medium
calibre cannon have been observed in Ukraine and it is apparent that infantry formations
fare poorly against cannons if they are not supported. They also play an important role in
urban warfare as they are capable of suppressing positions from ranges that are likely to
be beyond the reach of the standard shoulder-fired anti-armour weapons carried by
infantry formations.

This is not a completely novel trend either. US forces in Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003
used the 25 mm M242 that armed the M2/M3 Bradley IFV to great effect, even disabling
dug-in T-62s with shots through the roof of the turret. They were invaluable in urban
combat, providing rapid and demoralising direct fire against infantry in buildings and
through walls if necessary. The UK similarly used its 30 mm RARDEN cannons to good
effect – albeit in a few limited examples – during the Falklands War in 1982. Cannons
were also used as a form of precision direct fire in Afghanistan where they served to
quickly suppress Taliban forces, and similar outcomes have been reported by French

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forces fighting in Mali. Ukraine does, however, show the absolutely critical utility of these
weapons in a peer conflict. Many previous uses for these weapons have involved unequal
fights with one side perhaps better equipped and trained than the other, or other
complicating factors that suggest the benefits of the weapons might not be universal.
Their use in Ukraine shows that they are an extremely lethal and useful weapon, which
explains in part why most AFVs in NATO now carry them.

The important takeaway is the need to understand the risk generated by vehicles that do
not carry cannons, encountering those that do. How, for example, will the UK’s fleet of
Boxers fare in a peer war if they are not equipped with medium calibre weapons? If
nothing else, the medium calibre cannon is an eminently useful weapon. It can be used to
engage a broad variety of targets and confers decisive lethality upon infantry formations.
Arguably, this was already known – or at least suspected – but the Ukraine war has
proven it to be true in a high intensity peer on peer environment.

Conclusion

Although at the time of writing and publication, the Ukraine war was approaching a year in
duration, it is still not clear that there are any neatly defined lessons for AFV operators. At
present, it is fair to argue that Ukraine is providing data, that in some cases can be
analysed to become knowledge. But it has not yet reached the point where the
knowledge can be considered information or wisdom. The above indicates that careful
consideration is required to ensure that ‘new’ lessons are not simply old lessons
relearned. Perhaps a more considered approach would see the nature of combat in
Ukraine assessed alongside previous analysis of other conflicts, to arrive at a set of
combat truths around which militaries can build their doctrine and AFV requirements.

There are of course some lessons to be learned from Ukraine. For instance, the impact of
drones upon the battlefield is far-reaching. Although again, there is a need to discern that
which is fundamentally new about the war in Ukraine, and that which has been seen
before. There are lessons for cyber warriors around the effort and resources required to
protect national data from determined and focused cyber-attacks. There are also lessons
to be relearned about deterrence and the nature of inter-state competition, and the role
that armed forces ultimately play. For AFVs, it is not clear – in this author’s opinion – that
Ukraine has demonstrated any lessons that are fundamentally new to the world of
armoured warfare. Novel and inventive tactics using legacy systems have proven fruitful,
as is often the case in war, and unimaginative tactics have been punished, but it seems
unwise to argue that every tactic employed by Ukraine, or every experience of a Russian
armoured group is universally binding. Nevertheless, it should serve as a potent reminder
of the scale of effort and commitment required to maintain armoured forces and send
them to war, as well as the absolute central role that they will play.

Sherman Karpenko

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