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 PROPERTY OF

■,-
ill

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rt

i 8 i 7 r^
ARTES SC1ENTIA VERITAS
LAN CIIAL
SCIENCE AND CULTURE SERIES
JOSEPH HUSSLEIN, S.J., Ph.D., GENERAL EDITOR

3r
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
BOOKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR

God and Intelligence

Religion Without God

Life of All Living

The Divine Romance

Old Errors and New Labels

Moods and Truths

Seven Last Words

The Way of the Cross

Queen of the Seven Sorrows

The Eternal Galilean

The Moral Universe (in preparation)

PHILOSOPHY
OF SCIENCE
BY

FULTON J. SHEEN, Ph.D., D.D., LL.D., Lirr.D.

AGREGE EN PHILOSOPHIE A l'uNIVERSITE DE LOUVAIN
AND

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

PREFACE BY

LEON NOEL, Ph.D.

AGREGE EN PHILOSOPHIE A l'uNIVERSITE DE LOUVAIN
RECTEUR DE L'lNSTITUT SUPERIEUR DE PHILOSOPHIE
A L'UNIVERSITE DE LOUVAIN

1934

THE BRUCE PUBLISHING COMPANY

MILWAUKEE
 Nihil obstat:

H. B. RIES,
Censor librorum

Imprimatur:
+ SAMUEL A. STRITCH,
Archiepiscopus Milwaukiensis

April 20, 1934

(Third Printing — 1935)

COPYRIGHT, 1934
THE BRUCE PUBLISHING COMPANY
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Matri Sine Labe Originali Conceptae
Admirabili Reginae Scientiarum
Duce Te Verba Mea Verbum Dei Patefaciant
 PREFACE
The sciences, in the education and in the intellectual life of the
American people, have an importance which is not counterbal
anced as it is in Europe, by a long and widespread literary cul
ture. It is natural that the marvelous advancements of American
industries, due to these sciences, should beget an unlimited con
fidence in the unbounded possibilities of the future. It is natural
also for one to be tempted, in the presence of their success, to
ask of them the solution of all problems, and to entrust to them
the realization of the complete happiness of mankind. This
temptation has been felt by the countries of the Old World at
various times during the past three centuries. They feel it even
today, especially among the masses to whom a modern democ
racy has bequeathed culture, a rapidly increasing
a superficial
material well-being, and an unmatched political power.
After half a century of the triumphal reign of the scientific
mentality, new tendencies have begun to manifest themselves
in the higher spheres of the intellectual world of Europe, and
among these tendencies the most important is the recognition of
the necessity of metaphysics. Political and social experiences have
proved to reflecting minds that the sciences alone cannot answer
all questions. Practically, they can serve the most destructive
forces as well as the most constructive ones; in a word, despite
their material progress, they can create unforeseen dangers which
might destroy society and civilization. Perhaps America, in turn,
is going through certain experiences of this kind. These experi
ences make one understand and grasp, with concrete vividness
and the convincing force of direct intuition, that there must be
something else in human life besides these poor material values
which ruin us by the very use we make of them; they also lead
man back to the esteem of spiritual values and principles which
must govern the pursuit of lower goods. But once a man recog
X PREFACE
nizes the existence and the dominating of spiritual
excellence
values, he must, of necessity, recognize also the authority of some
means of knowing, which leads us on to the possession and the
discernment of these values: for many this is religious belief, and
for those who lead an intellectual life, it is also philosophy and
metaphysics.
Nor it practical experience alone which restores interest and
is
credit to metaphysics; the progress of scientific intelligence itself is
bringing the best minds of our time to recognize it. The answers
which one gives to the enigmas of the universe, or to problems
of destiny, while relying exclusively upon scientific facts and
theories, can scarcely stand exact thinking. By placing in bold
relief the contradictions in which they end, one comes to realize
that they go beyond the possible limits of experience, which dis
own the theories themselves.
Kant's critique has already condemned this naive mistake and
it is not allowable to fall back into it again more than a century
after him. I believe that the best accredited representatives of
science have recognized this for a considerable length of time.
But that is not all. They have discovered that the methods of
science, as well as its results, create problems which science can
not answer by itself. Hence, the movement of a "critique of
science" in which, for approximately half a century, the greatest
figures of science have participated. But as soon as one begins
to criticize the sciences, one tends to put them in their place
within a larger cultural outlook of which they will be henceforth
only one aspect; one ends by passing judgment upon them in
the name of a higher and more enveloping wisdom. Thus the
critique of sciences necessarily merges into a philosophy.
Into what philosophy? The movement of the critique of sci
ences was rather closely connected with the renascent influences
of Kantian criticism, or even with the logical evolution of posi
tivism. It was, in its beginnings, far removed from the traditional
philosophy. However, it is some thirty years since the illustrious
physicist Duhem, in his fine book La Theorie Physique, put the
critique of science into relation with Thomistic thought. He
thus gave a valuable added impetus and direction to the move
ment of uniting sciences and traditional philosophy, which Leo
 PREFACE XI

XIII emphasized in his encyclical Aeterni Patris, and which

Cardinal Merrier so gloriously inaugurated at Louvain.
The sciences need philosophy; philosophy, in turn, needs the
sciences. On both sides, certain naive minds, too confident in
their own forces and satisfied with ideas entirely too superficial,
believed in the universal value of a single method. On both sides
a severe critique must lead each method back to its just limits,
and teach them to ask aid of the other methods and manners of
approach which, by their convergence, will permit the mind to
embrace the diverse aspects of reality. The traditional philosophy
has, at times, lacked this salutary critique; it has, at times, among
certain of its representatives, deluded itself concerning the re
sources of metaphysical reasoning by asking the latter to solve
certain problems upon which experimental research alone can
throw light. However, it is but fair to add at once that, as re
gards being naive, the first representatives of modern philosophy,
and a host of the representatives of science have, until very recent
times, been equally at fault. But the great masters of the tradition,
and particularly St. Thomas who is among the first, have for
mulated general principles of criticism, the application of which
will do away with these errors. These principles retain their full
value today; one can with profit connect them with the teach
ings of the presentmasters of the critique of the sciences, a
Poincare or an Eddington, in order to set exact limits to the
respective competencies of the physico-mathematical sciences and
of metaphysics. This is the task to which M. Jacques Maritain
recently gave his attention in his admirable book Les degrSs du
savoir, which deserves the widest diffusion. Before him, one of
our colleagues of Louvain, Dr. Fernand Renoirte, wrote some ex
cellent and profitable pages on the same topic.
Some time ago certain Neo-Scholastics believed that they could
simply take over the theories of various sciences, and then weld
them to the teachings of the ancient metaphysics, thus forming
a philosophy of the material world. At the same time the sciences
were undergoing radical transformations and, moreover, the
critics of science were changing completely the meaning of sci
entific theories, the ingeniously constructed edifice crashed like
a castle of cards and the effort toward reconciliation had to be
Xll PREFACE
made upon entirely new bases. By following the suggestions of
the critique of sciences, there is no longer any danger of making
such blunders; but the problem of bringing together the sciences
and metaphysics remains a task no less delicate than necessary.
One must use extreme prudence, first of all, when he transposes
into the framework of the science of today notions conceived in
terms of the physical notions of antiquity. The metaphysics of the
Middle Ages appears to us to be rather clear as long as it remains
far from the details of facts of sense, though, even then, deeper
study of history reveals to us each day new shades of meaning,
thereby modifying profoundly the over-simple notions which we
had at first hazily grasped. As for the physics of the ancients, it
is still very little known and the true meaning of it doubtless
often escapes us. Patient researches, hardly yet begun, will have
to be pursued for a long time before we shall be able to flatter
ourselves that we know exactly the meaning of the science of
the ancients, and the philosophy which they built upon it. The
other terminus of approach offers no less risk: it is difficult to
discern exactly whither scientific methods are tending, when one
considers them, not from the viewpoint of the practical, but from
the viewpoint of the value of reality which they attain, or seek
to attain. Many of those who study the sciences have never asked
themselves such a question, or else understood in a crude sense,
which leaves room only for the most naive replies. The philos
opher, on his side, even if he is conversant with the sciences, has
only an onlooker's knowledge of their results. He can easily make
a mistake concerning certain delicate niceties, and the scientists
themselves never fail to catch him at fault and to challenge his
judgment. Finally, specialists who construct a critique of their
own branch, in turn, are often lacking in philosophical precision,
and cannot be taken too literally. An exhaustive knowledge of
their specialty would be necessary to gauge the exact significances
of their statements. Moreover, the theories of science are changing
constantly; its methods are being constantly recast, and a judg
ment which was accurate yesterday may be inaccurate today.
This book aims at rescuing the reader from the childlike sim
plicity which takes the results of science for what they assuredly
are not, namely, a metaphysical view of the universe. It will re
veal to him questions which arise and which he may not even
 PREFACE Xlll

suspect. It will also show the reader in what direction the solu
tions are to be sought; it will not let him believe that these solu
tions have already been reached and consigned to formulas whose
entire content is crystal-clear effort, and which no longer call
for any progress or modification. Thus, every book on phi
losophy is an invitation to think, to seek, and to study. It belongs
to the reader to carry it on by his own personal work. May it
encourage many to do so. Were they but few in number, this
work would not have been written in vain.

Leon Noel
 PREFACE BY THE GENERAL EDITOR
Among the many books that issue from the printing presses of
the world there is found, every now and then, one that truly bears
a message. Such is the present volume. It comes to us from the

pen of one who is intimately linked with both the University of

Louvain and the Catholic University of America, Doctor Fulton
J. Sheen. Its message, although intended primarily for scientist
and philosopher, includes also that wider reading public, which
claims neither appellation, and yet is sincerely interested in things
of science and the problems of philosophy.
The obvious purpose of the book is to bring about a more in
telligent understanding between modern science and Scholastic
philosophy, to indicate the proper field of each, and the possibil
ities of a harmonious and effective cooperation for the utmost
promotion of truth throughout the world.
From the Catholic point of view its strongest justification will
be found in that striking address delivered by St. Paul before the
gathering of Athenian savants on the hill of the Areopagus. It is
the classical example of winning over one's hearers by starting
out with the truth which they accept: "For passing by, and see
ing your idols, I
found an altar also, on which was written: To
the unknown God. What therefore you worship, without know
it,

ing that preach to you."1

I

Today divergencies of thought have proceeded much farther

than in the period when the great Apostle of the Gentiles ad
dressed his audience of Epicureans, Stoics, and men mark in
of

that day. On the modern Areopagus of learning, our mound of

scientific investigation, the new Christian apostle will find him
by

self encompassed group of listeners no less eager for novelty

a

than were the Athenians of old. But their curiosity of quite

is

different nature. In that audience, as the speaker looks from face

'Acts xvii. 23.

XVI PREFACE BY THE GENERAL EDITOR

to face, he will find theists without belief in any Deity, sociologists

specializing in a study of religion without God, mental experts
whose psychology eliminates the soul, penologists and behavior-
ists of every shade of opinion yet firmly united in the solemn re
jection of freedom of the will, and exponents of countless philos
ophies whose one unchanging principle is the denial of all un
changing principles.
And yet among them all there can found one common start
be
ing point from which the modern disciple of Jesus Christ, and
Him crucified, can launch forth his discourse, certain of universal
assent — and that is science, in its most fundamental and unques
tionable facts. Here, then, is the Pauline approach for the Cath
olic philosopher of today.
The scientific hypotheses of our time, it is true, are often no
lessnumerous, fantastical, and contradictory than the thousand
and one cults and mysteries in vogue within the Greco-Roman
world during the lifetime of the great Apostle. What is needed,
therefore, is a clear distinction between hypotheses, theories, and
certainly established scientific data. All three have their proper
function, but there is need of carefully distinguishing between
them, as is practically never done by the multitudinous purvey
ors of popular science in our day. The people ask for bread and
they are given a serpent.
In the experimentally verified facts of nature, strictly ascer
tained, we possess the logical point for Scholastic philosophy in
its efforts to integrate its own great truths into the systems of our
day. That, in particular, is one part of the message of this book.
Scholastic philosophy, because it deals with universal and im
mutable principles, can apply them equally to the scientific data
of any century. It is ancient with Aristotle, medieval with St.
Thomas of Aquin, and modern with the illustrious Cardinal
Mercier, the Scholastic philosopher whose name especially has
won deferential response from the modern world.
Scholasticism, to be vital and dynamic, an influence for good
among the multitudinous trends and opinions of our age, must
take full cognizance of science. It must do more. It must adapt
itself to its ever-changing and emphasis, to what the author
stress
so fittingly calls, "the lyricism of science." Only so — in the fine
symbolism of Holy Scripture — can it develop to the full its
 PREFACE BY THE GENERAL EDITOR XVU

beauty and richness of foliage and fruit, that the birds shall nest
in its branches and the creatures of wood and field find shelter
within its quickening shade.
This, to be sure, does not involve the folly of seeking to rein
terpret the Scriptures themselves
according to every ephemeral
whim of scientific schools. Such a procedure can only merit the
disdain of thinking men. But instead, Scholasticism must vigor
ously and articulately prove itself to be suited to the scientific
spirit of our age and integrated into all its legitimate moods of
thought. For this purpose it must interest itself in the constantly
new scientific problems that arouse the intellectual conflicts of
the day. Only such an attitude on the part of its followers can
prove them faithful to the best traditions of their own great
historic leaders, the mighty Schoolmen, the glory of the Middle
Ages and of all time, whose hearts throbbed in response to every
pulsing of their age, and who chivalrously fought for truth as
ever knight for lady.
Born into our own empirical age — had that been their fortune
for better or for worse — they would doubtless have long ago
built up a philosophy of science with which men should have had
to reckon. We have improved vastly our scientific apparatus and
therefore have increased our scientific data, as the author well
remarks, but there is no evidence that we have made any similar
progress in the training of the intellect. Sound logic and accurate
reasoning have too often fallen into desuetude with a large pro
portion of the writers who purport to speak in the name of
science.
But however scientists may fail, Science herself can never betray
us. She is the daughter of Truth. Nothing can be more certain
than that all her findings — when there is question of true science
that merits the name — will redound to our own advantage, and
unfailingly have done in the past. The only challenge to the
so
Catholic metaphysician is that he must give the rightful inter
pretation to the data supplied him.
Philosophy, to echo the warning of the great Cardinal of Louv-
ain, cannot ignore science without being doomed to impotence;
she cannot withdraw herself into a splendid isolation without fall
ing into decay; she cannot hope perfectly to accomplish her mis
sion while failing to establish harmonious contacts with the chief
XV111 PREFACE BY THE GENERAL EDITOR

center of thought which the world today accepts — and that is

science, in the largest significance of the word, from sociology to
mathematics.
But science, no than philosophy, has her lesson to learn,
less
and here, too, the author is no less happy in his treatment. His
purpose is not to refute or dispute, but as elsewhere he tells us,
it is only to aid in bringing about the final arbitrament before the
Tribunal of Truth.
What is most important here to note is that experimental science
must not be permitted to usurp the sphere which of right can
belong to metaphysics only. The object of both is "being." But
where one treats it as specific, the other deals with it as universal;
where one speaks in terms of the phenomenal, the other confines
itself to the intelligible; where one considers essence as definite
and particular, the other studies essence as such; and finally,
where science is prepared to search out the secondary causes only,
philosophy reveals the primary. It alone, therefore, can speak
with authority on the ultimate problems of the universe: Who
made these things ? why were they made ? after what model ? out
of what ? Science supplies the data, philosophy applies to them its
immutable principles.
These are some of the great truths here impressed upon the
scientist. The snare to be avoided by him is the danger of con
fusing methods of science with theories of philosophy, and thus
coming to the unwarranted conclusion that by empiric methods
he can build up philosophy of science.
a complete
Physics and mathematics, selected by the author as the two
dominant sciences of the present period, are both excellent in
their respective fields, supplying experimental data and explain
ing their quantitative significance. But both are hopelessly astray
when they venture into the alien realm of metaphysics, declaring
that nothing exists except what can be made by them empirically
evident and measurable, when rashly they assume to pronounce
on morality and God. As a total explanation of the universe they
are obviously insufficient, since we have need of still a third
factor, the metaphysical, with the discussion of which this book is
particularly concerned. Applied metaphysics only is qualified to
consider the accumulated data of science and explain them in the
light of universal principles. To its interpretation of the empiric
 PREFACE BY THE GENERAL EDITOR XIX

facts discoveredin our day, it brings the reasoning of Aristotle

and St. Thomas, equally valid for all time, and thus begets the
philosophy of science. The one difficulty which here, perhaps,
arises in the modern mind the author thus promptly forestalls:
"There is very apt to be an unwarranted prejudice on the part
of modern scientists to the effect that simply because scientific
facts have changed, philosophical principles are inap
therefore
plicable to them, and that we are quite superior in our knowl
edge to the knowledge of the ancients and the Middle Ages. It is
to be granted that our facts are better, but it is not quite so certain
that our interpretation is better. If Aristotle could return to the
world today, he might astound it with his interpretation of the
new chemical and physical facts which have been revealed by
science."
And here let me repeat once more that not with couched lance
and flying pennons has the writer of this book entered the field to
tip the shield of any adversary. His purpose is purely irenic
throughout and eminently helpful. That purpose is to serve the
cause of science and philosophy alike, to help prepare the way for
a constantly more perfect cooperation, and to show the harmo
nious relations that must exist between the hypothetical laws of
science and the necessary laws of thought, as applied in a true
philosophy of science. The work now successfully accomplished
reflects most happily the true spirit of the Church, where she
stands in all her beauty, at the portals of Life, with arms extended
in greeting and lips that smile their welcome to philosophy and
science alike.
Joseph Husslein, S.J., Ph.D.
General Editor, Science and Culture Series

St. Louis University,

Feast of St. Robert Bellarmine, 1934.
 AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION
Any work on the philosophy of science can very easily be mis
understood. It is imperative, therefore, at the very outset to state,
first of all, what the book is not, and secondly what the book is.
It is not, in any a discussion of scientific methods. If it
sense,
were merely critique
a of science, it would follow the lines in
dicated by Pierre Duhem and Fernand Renoirte. Abstracting as
it does from this point of view, it offers no challenge to purely
scientific conclusions. Science has a right to be criticized only by
those who belong to the realm of science, and who are therefore
competent to pass sane and balanced judgments.
Furthermore, it is not a plea for a scientific justification of the
Scholastic position. In past years it was common for a certain
group of Scholastics to argue that the hylomorphic theory of
Aristotle was proved by modern investigation concerning the
atom. This book does not sympathize with such a view, nor
does it hail Einstein merely because his theory of relativity of
space and time smacks of the Scholastic doctrine that both are
inseparable from matter. Neither does it rejoice because Edding-
ton and Jeans have declared that God is a great Mathematician.
And the reason that it abstains from such seemingly happy con
junctions of modern science and Scholasticism is because the
Scholastic position in metaphysics does not depend for its support
entirely upon empirical science.
Rather this book purports to be a treatise on the philosophy
of science. It begins with an important distinction between a
method and a theory. A scientist, for example, may decide to
study the universe through a yellow glass; such would be his
method of approach. However legitimate that method may be,
it is quite another matter to say that everything is yellow. In such
a case hewould be converting a method into a theory. This work
attempts to analyze, from a critical point of view, scientific meth
ods that have been elaborated into philosophical theories. It re
XX11 AUTHORS INTRODUCTION
solves such exaggerations into two philosophies of science: the
physical theory, and the mathematical theory.
The physical theory of the philosophy of science, which is a
remnant of positivism, contends that since the method of science
limits itself only to the phenomenal order, therefore no other
knowledge is possible except the knowledge of phenomena. This
equivalently is a denial of metaphysics and in particular, a denial
of a knowledge of the transcendence of God.
The mathematical theory of the philosophy of science insists
that some higher discipline is needed to interpret facts of the
scientific order, and that such a higher discipline is the science
of mathematics. It contends that since the method of mathemat
ical physics is to study nature in terms of statistical laws, there
fore no higher knowledge is possible than that of mathematics.
After a presentation and criticism of both these theories, this
book hopes to prove that there still remains one other theory of
science; namely, the metaphysical, which the Scholastics called
the philosophy of nature. Briefly, this theory is that scientific facts
are capable of even a higher interpretation than the mathemat
ical, which interpretation is effected by the application of the
first principles of thought to scientific facts. These first principles,
such as the principles of identity, contradiction and causality,
though drawn from the sensible world, are nevertheless tran
scendent to it and universal in their application. They do not
supplant any purely scientific theory, but merely supplement it
by giving it a more profound knowledge of reality. In other
words, the scientific method gives a knowledge of reality in terms
of secondary causes, and the metaphysical theory of science in
the terms of primary and more fundamental causes.
The moral of this book is that the great verities of philosophy
do not depend in principle on the conclusions of empirical sci
ences: they are neither proved nor disproved by them. The exist
ence of God, for example, did not need to wait upon Jeans, who
found God to be a great Mathematician; nor did the philo
sophical doctrine of the freedom of the will depend upon Bohr's
elaboration of the Quantum Theory. In like manner, sound phi
losophy, while admitting the truth of the theory of relativity in
the scientific order, does not immediately lose its head and con
tend, as Lord Haldane has done, that all knowledge is relative;
 AUTHORS INTRODUCTION XX111

or asWestermarck has done, that all morals are relative. It

repudiates the modern idea that philosophy is merely a synthesis
of points of view, for it contends that there is a concept large
enough to embrace the whole universe, which concept is objective,
and real; and that is the idea of being upon which all metaphysics
is grounded.
The light which has illumined this book has been the writings
of the "most learned of the saintly and the most saintly of the
learned" — Thomas Aquinas. The fact that this great mind has
given the best reflected expression to the common sense of all
times, and has therefore been most identified with what has been
called the philosophia perennis, in itself proves, that, despite the
passing moods of time, there is a philosophy which abides; de
spite the ephemeral theories of government in the history of the
world, it has always been necessary to retain the unchanging
principles of justice; despite the succession of scientific theories
from the days of Democritus to our own, it has always been nec
essary to use the principle that scientific hypotheses must be
tested by facts. In like manner, though the physical and biolog
ical facts in the writings of St. Thomas are as antiquated as those
of the Greeks, it nevertheless remains true that his principles of
philosophy are no more affected by these changes than the mul
tiplication table has been affected by them. The leading philo
sophical minds of our day are beginning to see the light: Pro
fessor Wilbur Marshall Urban of Dartmouth College recently
stated that philosophy is at the crossroads and must choose be
tween the Great Tradition of the philosophia perennis, which
leads to the ens realissimum, and the modern conception which
denies it by treating it as an illusion. Dean Inge has also changed
his views in his latest work, God and the Astronomers, when he
writes: "For I am convinced that the classical tradition of Chris
tian philosophy, which Roman Catholic scholars call the philoso
phia perennis, the perennial philosophy, is not merely the only
possible Christian philosophy, but is the only system which will
be found ultimately satisfying."
In this book there is not merely a question of quoting St.
Thomas as an authority, but rather of using his principles to help
settle our problems. There is no plea to go back to St. Thomas,
but rather to bring St. Thomas up to our time.
XXIV AUTHORS INTRODUCTION
The author wishes to express deepest thanks to Dr. Elizabeth
Salmon for valuable suggestions and helpful criticisms, and also
to Dr. Howard Shepston, and Mr. James Allen Nolan for valu
able aid in editing the book, and to Rev. Anthony J. Bomboliski
and Rev. Stanley A. Bowers for correcting the proofs.

Fulton J. Sheen
 CONTENTS
PAGE

Preface ix

Preface by the General Editor xv

Author's Introduction xxi

CHAPTER

I. The Historical Relation of Science and Philosophy 1

II. The Evolution of Physics 29

III. A Critical Appreciation of the Physical and Mathe

matical Philosophies of Science 51

IV. The Value of Sc1ence 65

V. The Scholastic Doctrine of Science 86

VI. Abstraction as the Condition of Metaphysics . .

105

VII. The Object of Metaphysics 125

VIII. First Principles of Metaphysics 148

IX. The Metaphysical Theory of Science 163

X. Relations Between Philosophy and Science . . .

179

Index 193
 CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL RELATION OF SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY

The purpose of this book is into the relations of

to inquire
philosophy and science. Owing to the great contempt for meta
physics in the world today, there is little or no attention paid to
this important question. If philosophers are interested in science,
it is principally because of its criteriological aspect or cognitional
side.1 As important as the latter inquiry secondary to the
is,

is
it

wider problem of the rational basis of science.

important to make, at the very outset, dis
It

extremely
is

tinction between philosophy of science.

scientific method and
a

A scientific method concerned only with the technique of in

is

vestigation, e.g., the empirical study of facts, the formulation of

hypotheses and their verification. Philosophy of science, on the
contrary, concerned not with the method of scientific proce
is

dure, but rather with the rational basis of the scientific facts. The
first seeks to describe in terms of the phenomenal, the other to
explain in terms of the intelligible.
may and does often happen that scientific method becomes
It

philosophy of science, or even philosophy. For example, there

a

are two scientific methods in vogue today: the physical method

of scientific inquiry and the mathematical method. The physical
method limits scientific inquiry to facts and their correlation in
terms of general law. The mathematical method believes that
a

by

the facts must be interpreted not only the common elements

JF. R. Tennant, Philosophy the Sciences, p. 33 ff.; H. Levy, The Universe

of

Science, p. 25 ff.; James Jeans, The New Background Science, p. ff.;

of
of

C. E. M. Joad, Philosophical Aspects Modern Science, p. 10.

of
2 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

in the facts themselves, but by mathematics. Of this combination,

mathematical physics was born. Both of these may be legitimate
methods of scientific procedure, but it is not the purpose of this
book to investigate them except indirectly.
It happens, however, that these two methods of scientific pro
cedure are sometimes erected into a philosophy of science. The
physical method becomes a philosophy when it asserts there is
no higher knowledge than the empirical knowledge of scien
tific phenomena. The mathematical method becomes a philos
ophy when it asserts that some higher knowledge is needed to
explain scientific facts, and that higher knowledge is mathematics.
On this theory the final explanation of things is to be sought in
the domain of mathematics.
The philosophy of science grounded on the physical method
of scientific inquiry will be called the Physical Theory, and the
philosophy of science grounded on the mathematical method of
scientific inquiry will be called the Mathematical Theory. As
scientific methods, both the physical and mathematical proce
dures are legitimate. Their relative merit is problem for the
a
scientists themselves to discuss. If this book were concerned with
scientific methods, it would follow the lines laid down by Poin-
care, and by Duhem in his La Thtorie Physique, and by Renoirte
in his articles in the Revue Neo-Scholastique of Louvain. In this
chapter, then, when reference is made to the methods of Duhem,
Poincare and others, it must not be assumed that the presentation
is critical. Our aim is merely to show how these methods were
converted by philosophers into a philosophical theory called
Pragmatism. The method is correct; only the theory is wrong.
The thesis of this book is that when these methods are erected
into a theory of a philosophy of science, they are insufficient as
a total explanation of the universe. The attempted proof will
take on such a form as this : There are not two, but three possible
philosophies of science: (a) the physical theory which limits the
explanation of the universe to empirical facts; (b) the mathemat
ical theory which attempts to explain scientific facts in the light
of mathematics; (c) the metaphysical theory of science which
explains scientific facts in the light of universal principles. In the
days of Aristotle and in the Middle Ages, the metaphysical theory
of science was known as the Philosophy of Nature.
 THE HISTORICAL RELATION 3

The third theory enjoys no prestige today because of the gen

eral neglect of the science of metaphysics and the overemphasis
on the problem of knowledge. The history of this divorce be
tween philosophy (particularly metaphysics) and science, which
threw the metaphysical theory into discard, engages us immedi
ately. In subsequent chapters, the first two theories will be crit
ically examined, and finally the metaphysical theory will be ex
plained and an attempt made to justify its acceptance.
This history of the relationship between science and philosophy
has passed through three principal phases and has washed upon
the shore of the modern world the two popular theories of sci
ence. The first of the phases is the Kantian, which separated
philosophy from science by making the conditions of physics
and mathematics a priori. The second phase was the Comtian.
Kant alleged grounds of incompatibility between science and phi
losophy. Auguste Comte held that if they are incompatible, they
should be divorced, and since philosophy was the sinner, it should
be rejected and science retained. Science, in his theory, became a
kind of grass widow, inasmuch as its purpose was merely to es
tablish laws concerning certain phenomena, without having re
course to philosophy, its former spouse. It is worth repeating here
that as a scientific method, the limitation of science to phenomena
and their laws is justified, but it is quite another thing to say that
philosophy knows nothing except facts. Such was the philosophy
of science Comte built upon a scientific method.
The third phase was Pragmatism. If metaphysics and science are
incompatible (Kant), then metaphysics should be ignored and
science should concern itself only with the empirical order
(Comte). In the divorce from philosophy, henceforward science
will no longer interest itself in the truth of its propositions, the
orems, and hypotheses, but only in their utility. The philosophy
constructed upon this scientific method was Pragmatism.
In the Middle Ages there was a distinction between a scientific
method and a philosophy of science, but not a separation. St.
Thomas, for example, commented at great length on the natural
sciences of Aristotle, but in each instance he used metaphysical
principles to judge them, and thus constructed what was known
as the Philosophy of Nature. The Scholastics were not adverse
to studying phenomena according to the empirical method, and
4 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

hence it is untrue to say that Bacon was the founder of that

method. The infinity of detailed scientific fact, mentioned in the
writings of Albert the Great, is a proof that without ever setting
down the theory of the empirical method, he actually utilized it
in fact. The assertion that Scholastics were opposed to the sci
entific method is due to the mental inability of some to grasp
the fundamental idea of the Scholastic philosophy of science — to
seize the intelligible behind the phenomena, rather than the
mathematical. The rational explanation is potential in phenom
ena. It is the duty of the mind to discover but not to create

it,

it
as Kant held.2
Since the aim of the Scholastics, in this philosophy of science,
rational in its study of phenomena, follows that the laws of
it
is

nature are not mere "commodious ways of expressing our

mental outlook," but rather objective laws of being. There

is
hierarchy among the various departments of knowledge, and
a

though mathematics may be used to explain the phenomena of

physics, remains nevertheless true that the basic rational ex
it

planation to be found in science from which all other sciences

is

borrow their first principles, namely, metaphysics. philosophy

If

and science were totally divorced and separated from one another,
the laws of science would be without any rational foundation.
The divorce of science and philosophy never actually took
place until the time of Kant. Like all great divorces, whether
they be marital or epistemological, had its antecedents in his
it

tory. The union of the sensible and the intelligible, so character

istic of Scholasticism, weakened under the overemphasis of the
sensible, on the one hand, and the intellectual, on the other.
There thus sprang up two currents of thought: one, the philos
ophy of physical fact; the other, the philosophy of the mathe
matical. One reduced the rational to the phenomena; the other
incorporated the phenomena under the rational. One marched
under the banner of posteriori; the other under the banner of
a

priori. One was the school of observers; the other was the school
a

of geometricians.
Hume was representative of the first group, inasmuch as he
made the real equivalent to succession of "impressions and
a

ideas," and held that thought was merely convenient instru-

a

JF. S. C. Northrop, Science and First Principles, pp. 30, 31.

 THE HISTORICAL RELATION 5

ment for handling experience, but was void of objective or meta

physical reality. Causality is merely an instinctive belief based
upon association, but is without any metaphysical implications.
Leibnitz was in agreement with Hume that universal and
necessary principles could not be proved empirically, but belong
to the Cartesian tradition which made physics an extension of
mathematics; he held that universal and necessary principles
drew their validity from pure reason. Leibnitz proceeded from
the a priori, and by an analysis of the infinite, descended to the
phenomena of the sensible order — a method which makes it
imperative to justify the existence of the phenomenal.
"Kant's task was to discuss these opposing views, and save as
much of Leibnitz's pure reason as Hume had left undamaged.
He starts from the ground common to both — that universality
and necessity cannot be reached by any empirical method. He
takes the validity of a priori thought from Leibnitz, but he ac
cepts from Hume the belief that the rational elements in it are
of a synthetic nature. The principles which lie at the base of
knowledge have therefore no intrinsic necessity or absolute au
thority. They are prescribed to human reason, and are verifiable
in fact; they are conditions of sense-experience, of our knowledge
of appearance; but not applicable to the discovery of ultimate
reality; they are valid within the realm of experience, but useless
for the construction of a metaphysical theory of things in them
selves. Kant's rationalism accepts the a priori which cannot be
shown to be more than relative to human experience.
"To Kant, the limits of scientific investigation are laid down
by the Newtonian methods of mathematical physics; thus alone,
he holds, can scientific knowledge be obtained. And such knowl
edge, he points out, is of appearance and not of reality. Kant's
restriction of scientific knowledge to that won by the methods of
mathematical physics is too narrow and would exclude much of
modern biology."3
Professor Frank Thilly, in tracing out the origin of the Kant
ian revolution, says:
"Kant believed that a new light had flashed on him. Just as
Copernicus imagines the spectator moving and the stars at rest,
so Kant tries the experiment in metaphysics, of presupposing that,
in the perceiving of objects, it is the objects that conform to the

*W. C. D. Dampier-Whetham, A History of Science (New York, 1930), p. 210.

6 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

perception, and not the perception that conforms to the objects.

Ifexperience is dependent on our minds, and something already
organized by the mind, according to its laws, then we have an
a priori knowledge of what we experience."4
Kant thus reached the conclusion that mathematics is necessary
and universal, because it is a creation of the mind,
of the i.e.,
perceiving and the understanding mind. Applying the conclusion
to philosophy, he said that we understand, space, time, and causal
relation because the mind relates things spatially, temporally, and
causally.
Such was the Kantian revolution. Up to this time it was held
that ideas adapt themselves to objects; for the Kantian tradition,
objects adapt themselves in some way to ideas. In the constitu
tion of knowledge, the mind contributes as much as it receives.
The raw material of experience is taken up and molded to a
pattern contained within the mind itself. Time and space are
no longer external to mind ; they are "forms of sensibility," while
the principle of causality and the categories of understanding are
mental principles by whose agency our manifold experiences at
tain to their unity and coherence of knowledge.
For Descartes, knowledge comes from the mind or from above,
in the sense that ideas are innate; for Hume, knowledge comes
from senses, or from below, in the sense that all ideas are group
ings of sensations. For Kant, knowledge comes both from above
and below, both from the inside and the outside, and here he
was close to the Scholastic position, but not close enough, for
he failed to see a connection between the inside and the outside.
Sensescannot give knowledge, for they cannot explain necessity
and universality; intellect alone cannot, for its forms are empty.
It needs the matter of knowledge furnished by the senses and
the forms furnished by reason. (For the Scholastics, reason does
not furnish forms; it finds them by abstraction. Hence, it bridges
the gap between the inside and the outside. Intellect is a light,
not a mold.) For Kant, the a priori, which is in the mind, fur
nishes its models to chaotic data of sense experience, and thus
renders science possible. It therefore, reality which modified
is,

is

4Kant's Copernican Revolution in Immanuel Kant (Open Court Publishing

Co.), p. 204 S.
 THE HISTORICAL RELATION 7

by mind, and not vice versa. Kant thus bore the fruit of Descartes'
bad thinking. Descartes believed that the intellect attains im
mediately and directly its thought, the Cogito, but not the reality.
It was, consequently, very easy for Kant to conclude that the
reality behind these representations must remain forever un
known.
This divorce of the phenomenal order and the intellectual, or
the scientific and the philosophical, finds its full development in
the Critique of Pure Reason, in which Kant treats three
questions:
1. How is Pure Mathematics possible? The answer to this
question constitutes Transcendental ./Esthetics.
2. How is Pure Physics possible? The answer to this question
constitutes Transcendental Analytics.
3. How is Metaphysics possible? The answer to this question
constitutes Transcendental Dialectics.
The last two parts were reunited by Kant under the form of
"Transcendental Logic," in which form it corresponds to the
separation of the sensible and the intellectual.
The first part, or the ^Esthetics, which has nothing in com
mon with art, disengages the a priori forms of sensible knowl
edge, namely, the forms of space and time, which furnish math
ematics with their object. ./Esthetics thus divorced mathematics
from reality, for it makes the condition of mathematics not the
real, but a mental form of space and time.5

""What, then, are space and time? Are they real beings? . . . Space is not an
empirical concept which has been derived from external experience. . . . Space
is a necessary representation a priori, forming the very foundation of all external
intuitions. . . . On this necessity of an a priori representation of space rests the
apodictic certainty of all geometrical principles, and the possibility of their con-
strution a priori. . . . Space is nothing but the form of all phenomena of the
external senses; it is the subjective condition of our sensibility.
"Time is not an empirical concept deduced from any experience, for neither
co-existence nor succession would enter into our perception if the representation
of time were not given a priori. . . . Time is a necessary representation on which
all intuitions depend. . . . On this a priori necessity depends also the possibility
of apodictic principles of the relation of time or of axioms of time in general.
"Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever. Space, as
the pure form of all external conditions, is a condition a priori of external
phenomena only. . . . Time is no longer objective if we remove that mode of
representation which is peculiar to ourselves and think of things in general. . . .
Time and space are therefore two sources of knowledge from which various a
8 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Just ruined mathematics by separating it from

as the ^Esthetics
objective and intelligible reality, and by locating it in the mind,
so too the Transcendental Logic ruined both physics and meta

physics by putting up a wall between them.8 This naturally made

priori synthetical cognitions can be derived. Of this pure mathematics gives a

splendid example in the case of our cognitions of space and its various relations.
. . . But these sources of knowledge a priori fix their own limits, in that they can
refer to objects only in so far as they are considered phenomena, but cannot re
present things as they are by themselves. That is the only field in which they are
valid; beyond it they admit of no objective application." Critique of Pure Reason,
F. Max Muller translation (New York, 1922), pp. 17, 19, 21, 24-27, 31.
'"That knowledge only is rightly called transcendental which teaches us that
the representations cannot be of empirical origin, and how they can yet refer a
priori to objects of experience. . . . On the supposition, therefore, that there may
be concepts, having an a priori reference to objects, not as pure or sensuous in
tuitions but as acts of pure thought, being concepts in fact, but neither of em
pirical nor esthetic origin, we form by anticipation an idea of a science of that
knowledge which belongs to the pure understanding and reason, and by which
we may think objects entirely a priori. Such a science, which has to determine
the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such knowledge, might be
called Transcendental Logic, having to deal with the laws of the understanding
and reason in so far only as they refer a priori to objects . . ." (Ibid., pp. 45-46).
At the present time there is less indication that philosophers are prostrating
themselves in adoration before the mere authority of Kant's system, and from one
scientific quarter and then another, there comes a protest against the distinction
between science and which his thinking effected. Professor Aliotta
philosophy,
says that the result of Kant's "arbitrary mutilation of knowledge banished from
the realm of true science to that of aesthetic contemplation all those forms of
judgment and all those categories of which the physical-mathematical sciences do
not make use of. He regards these sciences, with traditional rationalism, as the
true type of all knowledge; everything which cannot be comprised in their
schemes is therefore not considered true knowledge; is it not natural that we
should find ourselves face to face with insoluble antimonies, when trying to ex
haust all reality with inadequate categories, and applying the conceptual schemes
created by thought in order to render the physical world intelligible to totally
different phenomena?" (The Idealistic Reaction Against Science, p. 197.)
Much more to the point concerning the Kantian divorce of science and
philosophy, Dr. F. S. C. Northrop writes: "Kant saw the point of Hume's analysis
when he asked how mathematics is possible. Since he was a devout follower of
Newton, and the mathematical aspect of Newton's mechanics was what most im
pressed men at that time, this was the same as asking why science exists.
"Although Kant saw the problem, he pursued the wrong method in attempt
ing to solve it. Instead of returning to re-examine the premises which gave rise
to the difficulty to reject or amend them in the light of a new review of the
factual foundations of scientific knowledge, he mistook Hume's conclusion, which
was but the consequent of a hypothetical proposition, for a true categorical pro
position. Once having assumed that the physical foundations of experience give
rise to no necessary connections, he had no alternative but to locate the necessary
forms of experience in the mind. Science is possible, he said, because the mind
 THE HISTORICAL RELATION 9

a metaphysical theory of science impossible, by denying relation

ship between the two.
The Transcendental Logic treats of the understanding as it
creates physics in applying itself to experience, or invents meta
physics in isolating itself from experience. In the Preface to the
second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787), Kant clearly
says that :

"Mathematics and physics are the two theoretical sciences of

reason, which have to determine their objects a priori."''
Thus were mathematics and physics divorced from the sen
sible by making the conditions of their existence a priori; thus,
too, did metaphysics become divorced from empirical science and
concrete reality by making its conditions mental a priori forms.
Such is the penalty of making philosophy nothing more than
epistemology.
If we pass on through the different epistemological theories of
the nineteenth century, we find the Kantian tradition somewhat
modified or emphasized. Though not directly influenced by
Kant, Auguste Comte accepted the essentials of his doctrine. Kant
had put up a wall between physics and reality, not only by
making the conditions of that science internal and subjective,
but also by separating metaphysics from the practical world of
action. According of Pure Reason, we cannot
to the Critique
know the nature of things in themselves, but only their appear
ances. These appearances are the phenomena which constitute
the object of science. Kant thus conserved the idea of "being in
itself" or the numina, but his followers soon abandoned it.
Comte, for example, based his whole system of positivism on the
abstention from all metaphysics. Just as Kant had separated the
metaphysical and the practical moral world in his two critiques,

constitutes the formal character of experience, and the mind can think only in
terms of certain necessary forms. This divorced philosophy from science by shift
ing the interest from physical and meta-physical to unverifiable epistemological
issues, and left modern philosophical thought poverty-stricken before the existence
of the possibles" (F. S. C. Northrop, Science and First Principles, pp. 285-286).
In a more critical manner still Bertrand Russell freely expresses himself to the
effect that: "Kant deluged the philosophical world with muddle and mystery,
from which it is only now beginning to emerge. Kant has the reputation of being
the greatest of modern philosophers, but to my mind he was only a mere mis
fortune" (An Outline of Philosophy, p. 83).
'Ibid., pp. 684-692.
10 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Comte now separated metaphysics and the practical world of

science by denying entirely the very existence of metaphysics.
Comte's teaching allowed no difference between philosophy and
science. Science is philosophy. All real knowledge depends on
facts; and the purpose of philosophy is to group facts, or as he
the totalisation de fexpirience. Above all things else,
it,

put

it
never concerns itself with causes. "The Positive Philosophy,"

by
says itsfounder, "is distinguished from the ancient nothing
so much as its rejection of inquiring into causes, first and final;
and its confining research to the invariable relations which con
stitute natural laws."8
Having outlawed the metaphysical elements in science as be
longing to the second stage of the infancy of the race, Comte
limited philosophy to discovering the laws governing the con
stant relation between facts. He thus propounds his doctrine:
"As to the scientific nature of these laws, our ignorance of any
thing beyond phenomena compels us to make distinction which
a

does not at all interfere with our power of prevision under any
laws, but which divides them into two classes, for practical use.
Our positive methods of connecting phenomena
by
one or
is

— that of similitude or that of succession

other of two relations
a

— the mere fact of such resemblance or succession being all that

we can pretend to know; and all that we need to know; for this
perception comprehends all knowledge, which consists in eluci
something else — in now explaining and
by

dating something
by

now foreseeing certain phenomena means of the resemblance

or sequence of other phenomena. . . . Every inquiry for causes
and modes of production involves the tendency to absolute no
tions. Mental immutability being thus discarded, the relative
. .
.

philosophy directly established: for we have been thus led to

is

conceive of successive theories as accelerated approximations to

ward reality which can never be rigorously estimated — the best
a

theory being, at any time, that which best represents the aggregate
of corresponding observations, according to the natural course
by

well understood scientific minds. . ."9

.

Such conception of science which forbade the introduction

a

"Auguste Comte, Positive Philosophy, Martineau's translation, p. 799.

'Op. cit., pp. 803, 805.
 THE HISTORICAL RELATION II
of the metaphysics of causality equivalently stated that all science
should be orientated toward action. As Stuart Mill said, it meant
establishing a sort of arithmetic of sensible impressions. Science,
therefore, has not for its object a knowledge of the world which
really exists, but the establishing of laws involving our sensible
impressions and our need of action.
One of the very curious phases of the positivistic emphasis on
phenomena was its distrust of what Comte called "detailed in
vestigation." In order to establish laws of phenomena, Comte
held that nature must not be observed too closely lest the study
of detail should reveal phenomena which escaped the law. Re
search of this kind he reprobated as "incoherent and sterile," and
called it "puerile curiosity, fostered by vain ambition." Thus
freed from microscopic detail, it was very easy for him to elab
orate his three laws concerning the theological stage and the
metaphysical stage, which were treated as primitive phases of
humanity, and which were held to have been replaced by the
positivistic or perfect phase.
The net result of the Kantian and Comtian outlook on the
universe was the pragmatist theory that science is autonomous
and self-contained, and the criterion is not truth but utility. The
positivistic rejectionof the metaphysical explanation of things
was the generally accepted theory of all scientists during the
nineteenth century. Once this was taken for granted, the problem
was no longer, what is the relation of philosophy and science,
but rather, what is the value of any scientific law? The general
answer to this question was the pragmatic theory of the philos
ophy of science. The pragmatists, while not accepting the ideas
of Comte, nevertheless started with exactly the same point of
view as regards science. Comte had said that foresight came from
science and the purpose of foresight was action. This was really
nothing pragmatism before the coining of the word.
less than
For the pragmatists, human action is the sole and real end of
philosophical inquiry. Philosophy, like science, is only a collection
of hypotheses, introduced for the usefulness of the ensemble,
or for economy of thought. These hypotheses are only com
modious conventions destined for use. Though their arguments
are not identical nor their starting point the same, it is never
theless true that the conclusions of practically all the schools of
12 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

pragmatism are the same. The pragmatist philosophy was based

upon a scientific method which limited scientific inquiry to the
formulation of useful and commodious laws. As a scientific
method there is much to commend this view for, as we shall
show later on, the conclusions of sciences are mostly contingent
and not absolutely necessary. Philosophers, however, were not
long in seizing upon this scientific method and making a phi
losophy of science out of it. They held that there is no such thing
as Truth, that all laws are merely approximations, and that the
useful is the true. To understand the basis of the pragmatist
philosophy of science, one must pass in review the various
purely scientific theories which were elaborated into philosophies,
even by some of the scientists themselves.
Ernest Mach is one of the important scientists who held that
the laws of science have no ontological value but are used merely
for purposes of "mental economy." Their task is to serve as a
guide for man in the intricate maze of facts, but never to reveal
the innermost nature of things. According to this author, three
periods must be distinguished in the evolution of science. The
first, experimental, the second, deductive, and the third, formal.
Only the first is in direct contact with reality. The second sub
stitutes images for facts, and at this point scientific work becomes
something subjective. In the third period, all objectivity is elim
inated. Scientific results are arranged in a framework with no
other view than that of convenience and utility. Science is not
interested in sounding the depths of reality, nor in discovering
the innermost nature of things, nor the objectively valid laws
working in phenomenon; it strives only to avoid mental toil and
thus to economize efforts of thought.10 The world thus con
ceived by Mach is an artificial theory of his own which reduces
the whole complex scientific world to a mosaic of sensations. It
is in a great measure due to the influence of Mach that scientific
men no longer take up a dogmatic attitude toward their theories
— an attitude which characterized positivism in its earlier forms.
Poincare, like his colleague in Germany, was led to deny ob
jective value in the conclusions of science. The two fundamental
principles of Poincare, despite his criticism of Kant, are essen

'0Cf. Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung, p. 78.

 THE HISTORICAL RELATION 13

tially Kantian, namely, the creative freedom of the mind, and the
essentially conventional character of natural and even mathemat
ical sciences. Science, for Poincare, is relative to man, and some

it;
what like the conception Claude Bernard had of namely,

a
demonstration of an idea already existing in the mind.11 When
Poincare speaks occasionally of the "true nature of things,"

is
it
generally with an indulgent smile, for he denied that science
makes known to us the true nature of things.12
Poincare went so far as to prove that in the realm of geometry
there do not exist any principles possessed of universal and ob

by
jective value; they are merely conventions established the mind,
which have become more or less habitual. One geometry just

is
as true as another, but one may be more suitable than another.
Hence, the ideal of science the attainment of knowledge, which
is

entirely of our own creation, subject to us, and contained with

is

in us. Its mission not to attain some external necessity, but

is

rather to elaborate what he has called "commodious conventions."

Science purely relative to man, kind of artificial product, the
is

natural result of agreement. The question: "Is the Euclidean

geometry true?" had no significance for Poincare, for there no is
such thing as one geometry being more true than another. It
can be only suitable to its purpose.13 In like manner, the question
of the existence of ether of little account; the really important
is

ether existed and this

is,

thing that everything happens as

if

hypothesis convenient for the explanation of natural phe

is

nomena.14
The case of Duhem little different from that of Mach and
is
a

Poincare for the very simple reason that Duhem was philo
a

sophical realist and modern Aristotelian. His contention was

a

that physical theories had any explicative value at all, they must
if

refer to something distinct from appearances. Physical experience

the translation of phenomena into symbolic language, and the
is

law the creation of the mind or symbol. He often repeats

is

that scientific theories can have only symbolic value, and he

a

"Claude Bernard, Introduction Vitude de expirimentale

la

medicine pp.
a

36-37-
"La Valeur de Science, p. 266.
la

"Science et Hypothise, p. 90 S.
uIbid., p. 245 S.
14 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

terminates a study on the physical terms of antiquity with this

conclusion: "Despite Kepler and Galileo, we believe today with
Osiander and Ballarmin that the hypotheses of physics are only
metaphysical artifices destined to save phenomena."15 Duhem
gives two reasons for denying an explicative value to physical
theory. First, if they had metaphysical value they would suppose
the existence of a thing in itself, and thereforewould be bound
up with metaphysical theory, and hence, subject to all the vicis
situdes of metaphysics. Secondly, they have not an explicative
and real value, because they are elaborated by our reason, and
hence, they belong only to the ideal world.16 Both of these argu
ments are invalid. The first argument, which is undoubtedly
Comtian, asserts that we cannot have any certitude in meta
physics, for metaphysics is essentially changing. The second ar
gument rests on a presuppositioncontrary to common-sense phi
losophy; namely, that an ideal deduction can have no objective
value. Proceeding further than Mach, Duhem contends that a
scientific theory is not merely an economic presentation of laws,
but a classification at the same time. And the distinctive feature
of classification is the usefulness of the theory.17
Somewhat akin to Duhem, in the sense that he does not con
demn all metaphysics, but rather denies an objective value to
science, is LeRoy, who writes that "our calculations cannot be
true in the strict sense of the word, but they are efficacious; their
success is less the success of our work than it is of our action."18
Similar theories which deny the objective validity of scientific
laws or relegate them to purely subjective and commodious ex
pressions have been propounded by M. Boutroux,19 and Milhaud.20
Boutroux hoped, in his own words, "to demonstrate that science
does not necessitate the rigid dogmatism and determinism that
so often shelters under its name." In order to prove this point,
he started with the principle that reality is contingent, or a free
form of the possible. The whole universe is contingent, and

"Essai sur la Notion de Theorie Physique de Platon a Galilee, p. 140.

"La Theorie Physique, pp. 32, 269.
"Op. cit., pp. 32, 269 ff.
"La Science Positive et la Liberie in Bibliotheque du Congress International de
Philosophie de 1goo, Vol. 1, pp. 338, 339.
"De la Contingence des lois de la Nature, p. 170.
"G. Milhaud, Le Rationel, pp. 44-74.
 THE HISTORICAL RELATION 15

whatever happens in it happens neither necessarily nor acciden

tally, but contingently or freely. The laws of nature have no ab
solute existence, no iron necessity; they are much more to be re
garded as the fixed and artificial picture of a model that is essen
tially a living and moving reality.
Gaston Milhaud, like many of his contemporaries, sought to
overthrow empirical positivism by insisting on the fundamental
reality of the mind, but mind conceived in the Kantian sense.
The knowledge of nature is symbolic, and there is no necessary
connection between the phenomena and our fictions.
In retrospect, it may be said that two general opinions on the
value of science were dominant at the beginning of this century.
One opinion held that the formulas of science are not absolutely
true or false, either because they are commodious or useful meth
ods of manipulating reality (Boutroux, Milhaud, Poincare) or
because a scientific hypothesis is nature interpreted by mind. The
pure fact is quantity; the interpreted fact is quality. There is in
tuition in science (Bernard, Duhem, Mach, LeRoy). Scientific
laws were not judged as true or false, but were judged only by
their usefulness. Laws were like curves on a graph sheet. In one
year the curves would be described in such and such a manner,
and in another year in a totally different manner.
Whatever may be said of the scientific theories here advanced,
we may not overlook the fact that any scientific theory which
holds that we cannot know the objects of experience implies in
tellectual suicide. But in the realm of pure scientific method,
there is little or no concern either with the intimate nature of
things or with absolute truth. Scientific laws are only approxi
mations.
But the error consisted in converting a method into a content,
by constructing a pragmatist philosophy of science, which held
that all knowledge beyond the empirical is impossible, that the
search for truth is vain and illusory, and that there is no higher
discipline to interpret the conclusions of science than the experi
mental verification. With pragmatism the divorce between phi
losophy and science became complete. Science is philosophy, or
better still, pragmatic science is pragmatism.
16 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Modern Tendencies
History thus reveals the gradual divorce of philosophy and sci
ence, and the recognition that science has no concern about the ul
timate truth of its laws except their utility. Two types of philos
ophy of science emerge: the physical and the mathematical.
Both have in common the repudiation of metaphysics as an in
terpreter of facts, the first, directly, by making the empirical or
der the explanation of itself; the second, indirectly, by making
mathematics the explanation.
The physical theory has kinship with the Ionian view of sci
ence, which regarded the real as physical. The mathematical
theory has fellowship with the Platonic view of science, which
looks upon the real as mathematical (formal).

The Physical Theory

The physical theory has some relation to positivism inasmuch

it,
as it denies science has a superior principle which illumines
while limiting the field of its observation to phenomena. Profes
sor F. C. Northrop likens to the pre-Platonic science, which
S.

it

treats of all relations, except spatial ones, as varying effects of

matter or atomic motion.21
Rather, the physical theory of reality embraces those who deny
the possibility of any description other than that found within
the sensible order, and the right of philosophy to apply any of
science. The upholders of
by

its principles to the data furnished

the physical theory were right in protecting against the post-
it

" Science and First Principles, p. 10.

This same author would make Einstein typical of this theory, because like the
early Greeks, he reduces space-time to matter. "For only one conceives of
if
is
it

nature as physical system containing both physical objects called reference

a

frames, and rods, and clocks, and real motion, that the basis exists for the type
of temporal which Einstein's theory introduces" (Ibid., p. 71).
relativity
Unquestionably, Einstein does make his explanation repose upon matter, or the
physical, but there tremendous mathematical background in his theory, and
is
a

he should hardly be classified in this group. one thing to reduce space and
It
is

time to matter, and quite another thing to hold, as the Positivists and Neo-
is
it

positivists do, that the explanation of everything to be found in matter and its
is

relations. The Scholastics taught that space and time were bound up in some way
with matter, but they were not Positivists.
 THE HISTORICAL RELATION V]

Kantian idealists, who declared that the philosopher performs his

task without any regard to experience, but their reaction led to
extravagances of their own. Some physicists, such as Tait and
Maxwell, considered themselves profaned by entering into the
metaphysical temple to battle against their opponent's principles.
In in his Scientific Papers, Maxwell alludes
an address contained
to the "den of the metaphysician, strewed with the remains of
former explorers, and abhorred by every man of science." The
followers of Maxwell assert, in keeping with the Positivist spirit,
that the scientific method is the sole approach to reality and the
realm of all possible knowledge, and that there are no reasonably
propounded questions that science cannot hope to answer, and
no problems worth discussing to which its method is inapplicable.
The tenets of the physical theory of philosophy of science are:
i. The experimental method alone is valuable and scientific.
2. It
embraces within its scope the totality of accessible truth.
3. The concrete is the unique form of the real, i.e., all knowl
edge which departs from that which is empirically given is with
out objective value.
4. Experiment and experience are the only reasons for the
mind's adherence to any proposition whatsoever.
Dr. d'Abro of Yale is typical of this revived Positivistic outlook.
He is right in asserting that only a physicist and a mathematician
know how to handle scientific facts, but exaggerates that role
when he says that they are better fitted to discuss the philosoph
ical significance of the facts than philosophers; and certainly he
is very unscientific when he identifies the vague with that which
transcends experience. "Thus it may be realized that a discussion
of the philosophical significance of the discoveries of physical and
mathematical science must be left to the theoretical physicists and
to the mathematicians. They alone, in view of their wide knowl
edge of facts and their mastery of the rigorous mathematical
mode of thinking, are in a position to co-ordinate the apparently
If,

disconnected results furnished by experience and by reason.

then, superphilosophy to be attained, would appear that
is

it
a

the most successful results would ensue from work of collab

a

oration between the scientists of the various branches of knowl

edge. Such collaborations are continually in progress.
18 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

"But it should be remembered that whatever transcends the

sphere of the special sciences transcends it precisely because it is
vague and only dimly apprehended."22
Bertrand Russell, in like manner, is a protagonist of the phys
ical theory to the extent that he outlaws the philosophical con
ditions of all scientific study, namely, order and unity: "I think
the universe is all spots and jumps, without unity, without con
tinuity, without coherence or orderliness, or any of the other prop
erties that governesses love. ...
Of unity, however vague, how
ever tenuous, I see no evidence in modern science considered as
a metaphysic. . . . Order, unity and continuity are human inven
tions just as truly as are catalogues and encyclopaedias."23
In theory is a proclamation of the
a general way, the physical

sovereignty of experience, and a glorification of the empirical

factor in the acquisition of knowledge. All that is nonempirical
is vague, and what is not concrete is unreal. Experience alone
discovers the fact and, what is more, the law governing the facts
is likewise drawn from experience and is therefore without any
transcendental value.

The Mathematical Theory

The physical theory holds that the explanation of the physical
is to be found in the physical; the mathematical holds that the
explanation of the physical is to be found in the mathematical.
By mathematical is here meant not only the idea that algebraic
and geometrical symbols best describe reality, but also that na
ture itself is made up of these ideal rational forms which belong
to mathematics. The former theory directly denied any philo
sophical principles; this one denies such principles only indirectly.
It admits that some higher science must be used to interpret the
cosmos than the science of physics and contends that such a sci
ence is mathematics; hence, the fondness for mathematical inter
pretation."The present tendency of physics is toward describing
the universe in terms of mathematical relations between un
imaginable entities."24 "The cleavage between the scientific and

BA. D'Abro, The Evolution of Scientific Thought from Newton to Einstein,

p. 384.
"The Scientific Outlook, pp. 95, 97, 98.
"J.W. N. Sullivan. The Bases of Modern Science, p. 254.
 THE HISTORICAL RELATION 10

is,
the extra-scientific domain of experience believe, not cleav

a
I
age between the concrete and the transcendental, but between the
metrical and non-metrical."25 Sir James Jeans goes further
and says that not only science, but the whole external universe
metrical. "The fined truth about a phenomenon resides in the
is

mathematical description it; so long as there no imperfec

is
o£
tion in this, our knowledge of the phenomena complete."

is
(Italics ours.)26 Professor Lenzen, tells the same story: "In tradi
tional physics, physical quantity particular, which has

is

a
a

a
magnitude to which number can be assigned. In contem ...
a

porary physics coming to be recognized that the essential

is
it

thing the number assigned to the magnitude. In practice we

is

by

replace the concept of magnitude that of number; thus when

we use =— we substitute numbers."27 In other words, mathe-

v

matics the science which best reveals the secrets of nature. "It
is

inevitable that the picture which modern science draws of the

is

external world should be mathematical in its nature. could not It

be other. The essential point not that the picture mathemat
is

is

ical, but that particular kind of mathematical picture suc

is
a

cessful and this with kind of success such as not shown by,
is
a

let us say, the aesthetic. . . The

. secret of nature has yielded to
the mathematical line of attack."28
Just how the physical, concrete world becomes mathematical
is

Professor Eddington: "Let us then examine

by

described for us
by

the kind of knowledge which handled we

If

exact science.
is

search the examination papers in physics and natural philosophy

for the more intelligible questions we may come across one be
ginning something like this: 'An elephant slides down grassy
a

hillside. . . The experienced candidate knows that he need not

.'

pay much attention to this; only put in to give an impression

is
it

of realism. He reads on: 'The mass of the elephant two tons.'

is

"Arthur Eddington, The Nature the Physical World, p. 275.

of

"The Mysterious Universe, pp. 150-151.

"The Nature the Physical Theory, pp. 29-30.
of

"Sir James Jeans, "The Mathematical Aspect of the Universe," Philosophy,

January, 1932, p. 12.
"The ultimate elements into which the theoretical physics of today seems to
resolve the world are neither ontological nor phenomenal; they constitute fic
a

tional or descriptive scheme." F. R. Tennant, Philosophy the Sciences, p. 141.

of
20 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Now we are getting down to business; the elephant fades out of

the problem and a mass of two tons takes its place. What exactly
is this two tons, the real subject-matterof the problem?
"Never mind what two tons refers to; what is it? How has it
actually entered in so definite a way into our experience? Two
tons is the reading of the pointer when the elephant was placed
on a weighing machine. Let us pass on. 'The slope of the hill is
60 degrees.' Now the hillside fades out of the problem and an
angle of 60 degrees takes its place. What is 60 degrees? There is
no need to struggle with mystical conceptions of direction; 60
degrees is the reading of a plumbline against the divisions of a
protractor.
"And so we out of the problem and
see that the poetry fades

by the time the serious application of exact science begins we are

left only with pointer readings. If then only pointer readings or
their equivalents are put into the machine of scientific calcula
tion, how can we grind out anything but pointer readings? The
question presumably was to find the time of descent of the
elephant, and the answer is a pointer reading on the seconds' dial
of our watch.
"The essential point is that, although we seem to have very
definite conceptions of objects in the external world, those con
ceptions do not enter into exact science and are not in any way
confirmed by it. Before exact science can begin to handle the
problem, they must be replaced by quantities representing the
results of physical measurement. . . .
"I should like to make it clear that the limitation of the scope
of physics to pointer readings and the like is not a philosophical
craze of my own, but is essentially the current scientific doctrine.
It is the outcome of a tendency far back in the last
discernible
century, but only formulated comprehensively with the advent of
the relativity theory."29
It is not to our present purpose to discuss the validity of either
the physical or mathematical theory as philosophies of science,
but merely to indicate their existence. A remark, however, that
cannot be repeated too often is that both the physical and mathe
matical methods of science are sound within certain limits. It is

"A. S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, pp. 251-254.

 THE HISTORICAL RELATION 21

the philosophy built upon them which is unsound, limiting

knowledge either to (a) physical phenomena, or (b) the mathe
matical interpretation of these phenomena.
According to both theories, the physical and the mathematical,
philosophy and science are in idea-tight compartments, or on two
distinct levels with no connecting link between the two. Since
philosophy has no certitudes of its own, but only those which
arise from the facts, or mathematics applied to facts, then there
are but two possible routes of development.
The first type of philosophy, built in part upon the physical
theory, is to synthesize the sciences as an expression of individual,
personal attitude toward life. The second type of philosophy,
built upon the mathematical theory, is to develop a kind of phil
osophical mysticism with mathematics as its infused principle of
sanctification.

Philosophy as a Synthesis of Sciences

"To take the generally accepted results of the various sciences,"
Morris R. Cohen tells us, "and to weave them together into a pic
ture of reality, seems to many the readiest and safest way of philos
ophizing."30 And this is precisely the method many philosophers
follow today. Harry A. Overstreet, for example, anxious to find
a background for the synthetic character of philosophy, says that
"reality is relatedness." Hence, "our task is to discover that re-
latedness, or, where it still lies within the limbo of possibility, to
bring it into being."31 But not all philosophers synthesize in the
same manner, and hence one must not look for truth but only
for "points of view." This makes philosophy equivalent to the
enumeration of personal points of view, and Professor Overstreet
is not unwilling to embrace this confusion worse confounded:
"Today, on the contrary, in one outstanding philosopher after
another, we find the forceful expression of points of view in line
with these newer trends. In Whitehead, for example, we discover
a definite break with mechanistic views and the formulation of
an organismic conception of reality. In Lloyd Morgan and S.
Alexander we are given, as over against the entropic philosophy

"Reasonand the Nature of Things, p. 147.

"The Enduring Quest, pp. 148-149.
22 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

of materialism, the view of a world in which there is a nisus to

ward higher levels of being. In Santayana we find a naturalism
that is nevertheless Platonic in spirit; in Woodbridge a realism,
not of the particularistic type prevalent in the nineteenth century,
but which brings to expression the best of Platonic and Aristo
telian universalism. In Dewey we find a realization both of the
essential creativeness and the generative inter-relations of life. In
the soldier-statesman-philosopher, we have the reasoned Smuts,
belief, based upon the examination of the scientific processes, of
a universe moving toward the development of more widely func
tioning wholes. In Boodin, Sellars, and Spaulding we find a phi
losophy of 'creative synthesis.' In Montague we discover a stim
ulating new expression of what he calls a Promethean religion,
the religion animated by the spirit of creative innovation and
advance. And so we can dimly perceive the outlines of the new
philosophy of life that is doubtless to animate the coming decades
of the century."32
Professor Alfred North Whitehead leans to this view of phi
losophy in defining philosophy as "the ascent to the generalities
with the view of understanding their possibilities of combination.
The discovery of new generalities thus adds to the fruitfulness of
those already known."33

"Op, tit., pp. 275-276.

"Adventures of Ideas, p. 302. The synthesis of the science, as developed by
this author, is not always easy to grasp. It is interesting to note that he often in
veighs against "the vagueness of philosophical terminology" (e.g., p. 294). Just
how closely he approximates vagueness, the reader can judge for himself. "The
distinction between 'appearance and reality' is grounded upon the process of self-
formation of each actual occasion. The objective content of the initial phase of
reception is the real antecedent world, as given for that occasion. This is the
'reality' from which that creative advance starts. It is the basic fact of the new
occasion, with its concordances and discordances awaiting coordination in the
new creature. There is nothing there apart from the real agency of the actual
past, exercising its function of objective immortality. This is reality, at that
moment, for that occasion. Here the term 'reality' is used in the sense of the
opposite to 'appearance.'
"The intermediate phase of self-formation is a ferment of qualitative valuation.
These qualitative feelings are either derived directly from qualities illustrated in
the primary phase, or are indirectly derived by their relevance to them. These
conceptual feelings pass into novel relations to each other, felt with a novel em
phasis of subjective form. The ferment of valuation is integrated with the physical
prehensions of the physical pole. Thus the initial objective content is still there.
But it is overlaid by, and intermixed with, the novel hybrid prehensions derived
 THE HISTORICAL RELATION 23

Leon Brunschvicg would, in like manner, limit philosophy to

the history of science. The mind, according to his philosophy, is
in constant progress. Because our increasing knowledge trans
forms things, the study of philosophy must be the study of the
various mental transformations of reality in the course of history.
Reality is essentially dynamic. All philosophical systems must be
interpreted in the light of science. The logic of Aristotle is
founded on his biological classification; the Discourse on Method
is inseparable from Cartesian physics; infinitesimal calculus makes
clear the monadology of Leibnitz. Philosophy consequently is
only science transformed and crystallized.34
In addition to this general view that philosophy is the synthesis
of the sciences, there are not wanting those whose philosophy is
built upon one particular science. Professor Whitehead believes
that the religion of philosophy must be the religion of the new
physics. "Science suggests a cosmology; and whatever suggests a
cosmology suggests a religion."35 E. H. Brightman and H. E.
Barnes believe that the new science makes it imperative for phi
losophy to revise its God.36 H. Weldon Carr bases his philosophy
on physics and does not see how we can reconcile "the principle
of constant velocity with God."37 His philosophy is built upon
the theory of relativity. "When it was first formulated," he
writes, "it was generally put forward as a methodological prin
ciple applicable only within the sciences concerned and with no
relation whatever to any question of general philosophical or

from integration with the conceptual ferment. In the higher types of actual oc
casions, propositional feelings are now dominant. This enlarged objective content
obtains a coordination adapting it to the enjoyments and purposes fulfilling the
subjective aim of the new occasion. The mental pole has derived its objective
content from the physical pole and by the immanence of the
alike by abstraction
basic Eros which endows with agency all ideal possibilities. The content of thc
objective universe has passed from the function of a basis for a new individuality
to that of an instrument for purposes" {Ibid., pp. 269-270).
"Les Etapes de la Philosophie Mathematique , p. 460 fF.
"Religion in the Maying, p. 141.
"The great point to be kept in mind is that normally an advance in science will
show that statements of various religious beliefs require some sort of modification"
(Science and the Modern World, p. 257).
"Bertrand Russell, The Scientific Outlook, pp. 101-133; E. H. Brightman, The
Problem of God, p. 31; H. E. Barnes, "Does Science Require a New Concept of
God?" Philosophy, March, 1929, p. 886.
T'
Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics, p. 74.
24 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

metaphysical theory. . . . The general principle of relativity now

proposed by Einstein is acknowledged, however, to concern the
most fundamental philosophical concept of the nature of the
universe. The new principle is that every observer is himself the
absolute, and not as has been hitherto supposed, the relative cen
ter of the universe. There is no universe common to all observers
and private to none."38 Viscount Haldane makes the same sci
entific theory the basis of his philosophy of knowledge: "What
is truth from one standpoint may not of necessity stand for truth
in another. Relativity depending on the standard used, may in
trude itself in varying forms."39
S. Alexander builds his philosophy upon space-time, and makes
Space the body of God, and Time His soul. Deity is a variable
quality, and world grows in time, deity changes with it.40
as the
William L. Montague prefers to take the new Emergent biology
as the basis of his philosophy and even his gods. "Deity may be
destined never to emerge into existence. . . . But there is possibil
ity that even finite beings may in turn achieve it."41
These are but a few specimens of a philosophy which is no
longer conscious of its own intrinsic worth, and which sees no
higher mission in life for itself than applying the categories of
the material to the spiritual, of the physical to the mental, and
the spatio-temporal to the eternal.

Philosophy as Mysticism
This type of philosophy, discontented with the positivistic out
look and the physical theory of nature, looked to a more spiritual
and even mystical mission for philosophy. One of the methods
of this type consists in limiting the extent of intellectual knowl
edge by claiming that its concepts distort reality, and then seek
ing another route to reality. The escape is sought through a psy
chological intuition by which we return and live amidst the im
mediate data of consciousness. Such is the method of Henri
Bergson for whom intelligence is the organ of philosophy.42

"The General Principle of Relativity, pp. 21, 23, 154, 155.

"The Reignof Relativity, p. 14.
"Space, Time and Deity, Vol. 2, p. 399.
"Essays in Honor of ]ohn Dewey, pp. 272, 273. Cf. John Haynes Holmes in
My Idea of God, p. 122.
"For a refutation of this anti-intellectualist position, cf. F. J. Sheen, God and
Intelligence.
 THE HISTORICAL RELATION 25

Another method, and a more recent one, envisages philosophy

as a mystical approach to reality. It is grounded on the new sci
entific attitude toward reality. The effect of mathematical physics
has been to replace familiar conceptions about the universe with
scientific symbols. The physicist started out with the idea that
things are more or less what they seem, but gradually he has dis
covered that the obvious features of nature must be rejected. He
finds that instead of standing on an immovable earth, lifting his
head toward heaven, he is hanging by his feet on a globe, travel
ing through space many miles per second. In a more general
at
way, the physicist finally divorced himself from expecting that
electrons and quanta must in fundamental respects be like ma
terial forces found in the world round about him. So he finally
came to substitute symbols for familiar concepts. As Professor
Eddington reminds us: "The synthetic method by which we
build up from its own symbolic elements a world which will
imitate the actual behavior or the world of familiar experience
is adopted almost universally in scientific theories. Any ordinary
theoretical paper in the scientific journal tacitly assumes that this
approach is adopted."43 This peculiar outlook on physics makes
the object of physics not so much the concrete thing as the sensa
tion, not so much the thing measured as the measurement. It
breaks away from "the common standpoint which identifies the
real with the concrete."44 Sir James Jeans states the same thought
in these words: "Science came to recognize that its only proper
objects of study were the sensations that the objects of the ex
ternal universe produced on our senses. The dictum esse est per-
cipi was adopted whole-heartedly from philosophy — not because
scientists had any predilection for an idealist philosophy, but be
cause the assumption that things existed which could not be per
ceived had led them into a whole morass of inconsistencies and
impossibilities. Those who did not adopt it were simply left
behind, and the torch of knowledge was carried onwards by
those who did."45 This explains the twofold way of regarding
the table of which Professor Eddington makes so much in the
introduction of his work. Table No. 1 is the table of the layman;

a0p. cit., p. 249

"Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, p. 275.
"The Mathematical Aspect of the Universe, p. 11.
26 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

table No. 2 is the table of the scientist. The first is a substantial

thing; the second is a field of influences. Since reality is handled

in terms of mathematics, knowlege, according to the mathemat
ical physicist, is concerned with a world of shadows, inasmuch as
it holds itself aloof from all familiar conceptions.
When this scientific approach is made a philosophy, it becomes
mystical. Any mathematical outlook on the universe is very apt
to identify the real with the numerical. This was the tendency
of Pythagoras, who taught that the universe in its fundamental

is,
form, numerical and methodical. In the Greek world, the lead
ing scientists concluded that the real rational rather than phys

is
ical, and that nature reveals itself as system of logical or mathe
matical forms rather than a
collection of moving physical atoms.
a

Since mathematicalforms are not observed in nature, and as

Plato said, are subjected but are not contained in the world of
observation, follows that their source also must be found in
it

some abstract realm. That perhaps why almost all mathemat

is

ical physicists who become philosophers, end as Platonists, or be

lieve in some kind of Platonic mysticism.
is,

There undoubtedly, some comparison between the mathe

matical forms of the modern mathematical physicist and the
abstract forms of Plato. As Dr. Northrop says: "We can under
stand also why Plato left his academy to mathematicians, why
he placed over the door of that school in philosophy the words,
'only mathematicians need enter here.' He was merely saying
that no one need hope to master the first principles unless one
is

acquainted with the fundamental conceptions of the leading sci

ence of the day."46
Hence, not singular to find today that that mathematical
is
it

physicist, A. S. Eddington (who says that "the relativist theory

of physics reduces everything to relations," i.e., the structure,
is
it

not the material which counts) ends his great work, The Nature
the Physical World, with
chapter on mysticism.
of

But what relation has mysticism to the new mathematical

theory? has the relation of theory of knowledge.
It

parallel
a

Sense experience does not reveal the scientific structure of thing;

a

there world of difference between table No. and table

is
a

"Science and Firet Principles, p. 14.

 THE HISTORICAL RELATION T]
No. 2.Scientific knowledge does not give us knowledge of Real
ity, which is known by something far more immediate in char
acter. Reality is of an entirely different order than either the
familiar world or the scientific world: the world known by sci
ence and the world known by sensory experience give merely
phenomenal aspects of it. Our rational knowledge of things is
an incomplete knowledge from the outside. There is another kind
of knowledge which comes to us in certain moments of aesthetic
experience when we enter into communion with a thing from
within. Our own spiritual experience, which we know otherwise
than as a schedule of pointer readings, gives us a clue to that
which must ever be excluded from science; namely, the inner
reality of the universe. "We have," says Eddington, "two kinds
of knowledge: symbolic and intimate."
"The first is the scientific and rational knowledge which has
been developed for analysis. The intimate knowledge will not,
he holds, submit to analysis, or rather when we attempt to analyze
lost. A defense of the mystic might run some
it,

its intimacy
is

thing like this. We have acknowledged that the entities of physics

can from their very nature form only partial aspect of the
a

How we with part? cannot be

It

reality. are to deal the other

said that that other part concerns us less than the physical en
tities.Feelings, purpose, values make up our consciousness as
much as sense-impressions. We follow up the sense-impressions
by

and find that they lead into an external world discussed sci
ence; we follow up the other elements of our being and find
that they lead — not into world of space and time, but surely
a

somewhere. . . . We have then to deal with those parts of our

being unamenable to metrical specification, that do not make
contact — jut out, as were — into time and space. By dealing
it

with them do not mean make scientific inquiry into them. The
I

first step to give acknowledged status to the crude conceptions

is

in which the mind invests them, similar to the status of those

crude conceptions which constitute the familiar material world.
"The mystic, haled before tribunal of scientists, might per
if

haps end his defense on this note. He would say, 'The familiar
material world of everyday conception, though lacking somewhat
in scientific truth, good enough to live in; in fact, the sci
is

entific world of pointer readings would be an impossible sort of

28 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

place to inhabit. It is a symbolic world and the only thing that

could live comfortably in it would be a symbol. But I am not a
symbol; I am compounded of that mental activity which is from
your point of view a nest of illusion, so that to accord with my
own nature I have to transform even the world explored by my
senses. But I am not merely made up of senses; the rest of my
nature has to live and grow. I have to render account of that
environment into which it has its outlet. My conception of my
spiritual environment is not to be compared with your scientific
world of pointer readings; it is an everyday world to be com
pared with the material world of familiar experience. I claim it
as no more real and no less real than that. Primarily it is not a
world to be analyzed, but a world to be lived in. . . .'
"We all know that there are regions of the human spirit un
trammelled by the world of physics. In the mystic sense of the
creation around us, in the expression of art, in a yearning towards
God, the soul grows upward and finds the fulfillment of some
thing implanted in its nature. The sanction for this development
is within us, a striving born with our consciousness of an Inner
Light proceeding from power than ours. Science can
a greater
scarcely question this sanction, for the pursuit of science springs
from a striving which the mind is impelled to follow, a question
ing that will not be suppressed. Whether in the intellectual pur
suits of science or in the mystical pursuits of the spirit, the light
beckons ahead and the purpose surging in our nature responds."47
If now it be asked what is the justification for these new types
of philosophy, new gods, new morals, new ethics, and new reli
gions which have been born of them, the answer unmistakably
is: science has changed our outlook on the universe. The assump
tion here is that because science changes its clothes, therefore
philosophy must change its complexion. But has science greatly
changed in its method and content ? Granted that it has changed,
does it follow that philosophy should adjust itself entirely to the
new science ? The first of these questions will be answered in the
next in the affirmative: science has undergone great
chapter
changes. The remainder of the book will be devoted to answer
ing the second question.

"Op. cit., pp. 323-24, 327-28.

 CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS

The principal reason alleged for a new philosophical outlook on

the universe is based upon the changed conceptions of science. The
nature of the universe is discovered to be quite different from
what it was previously supposed; hence, the philosophy based
upon such a universe must be revised. Such is the common ar
gument of those who demand a new philosophical vision.
It would be sheer folly to retort that science has not changed,
for no one familiar with the new physics would deny it. The
argument for a new philosophy must be met on other grounds
than those of denial of new scientific conceptions. But before
passing on to the metaphysical side it is not without profit to
dwell briefly upon some of the changed notions in physics. Such
a review is equivalent to admitting that physics has undergone
a "revolution."1 It suffices for our purpose to indicate the changes
as regards (a) matter, in (b) mass, in absolute space and absolute
time, and (c ) the mathematical background of both.

Changed Conception Concerning Matter

The Greeks resolved the universe into four principal elements:
air, earth, fire, and water. The ultimate in the material order was
called an atom, the etymological derivative of which was some
thing that could not be cut.It was thought that any material
body could into smaller and smaller pieces, until finally
be cut
one arrivedat something indivisible and tiny which was called
the atom. The four-element theory continued until the seven
teenth century.

W. N. Sullivan, The Nature n.

'J.

Physical the Universe,

of

p.

29
30 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

But in 1661, Robert Boyle, in his work entitled The Sceptical

Chemist, rejected the four-element theory, and suggested that
matter was divided into two classes, compounds and elements,
and that some elements have an affinity for others, which made
possible the marriage of elements in a compound. The four-
element theory, however, did not receive its final death blow until
the days of Anton Lavoisier, who brought the number of ele
ments up to thirty-three.
In John Dalton, in his New System of Chemical Philos
1808,
ophy, formulated the idea of relative atomic weights with hy
drogen, the lightest of the elements, as the basis of the system. In
181 1, Amadeo Avogadro clarified the notion of the atom. Up to

this time, the word atom was used loosely to refer both to the
atoms of elements and their compounds, e.g., an atom of hy
drogen and an atom of water. Avogadro reserved the word atom
for particles comprising chemical elements, while their union in
compounds was called a molecule. Thus, two atoms of hydrogen
and one of oxygen form a molecule of water.
At the close of the nineteenth century, matter was supposed to
consist of atoms which were unbreakable and indestructible, and
of the same nature throughout, like jelly. Clerk Maxwell called
them "the foundation stones of the universe." Physicists, chemists,
and philosophers regarded them as permanent bricks out of
which the universe was made. More than a hundred years ago,
Prout suggested that atoms might be structures, but his theory
was dismissed. The test he appealed to proved fallacious. The
idea was received at the end of the last century by J. J. Thomp
son who, in 1897, showed that these so-called unbreakable struc
tures, or
bric\s or billiard balls could have fragments chipped off
them. His experiment led to the conclusion that the atom is
made up of electrons which carry negative charges of electricity
and positive charges, or positively charged matter, distributed in
some way then unknown.
Sir Ernest Rutherford's experiment in 191 1 showed that within
the atom is a very minute center of force, a "stone in the atomic
plum." This nucleus has a diameter of only about ten thousandth
that of the atom, but it has practically all the mass of the atom.
 THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 31

This nucleus is positively charged, so that it neutralizes electri

cally the negatively charged electrons, which make up the rest
of the atom. Thus the chemical properties and the nature of the
atom depends upon the central nucleus with its positive charge
of electricity around which the negatively charged electrons de
scribe orbits, the whole resembling a miniature solar system.2
A theory to account for the distribution of the negative elec
trons in the atom was advanced in two American chem
1916 by
ists, G. N. Lewis Irving Langrnuir. According to this theory,
and
the electrons are arranged around the nucleus in concentric shells.
Their conception of the atom has been compared to the Chinese
toys which consist of a series of hollow balls, one within the
other. The one at the center would represent the nucleus, the
others the shells in which the electrons occur. According to their
theory, the shell next to the nucleus is capable of holding two
electrons, the next shell eight, the third shell eight, the fourth
shell eighteen, the fifth shell eighteen, the sixth shell thirty-two;
the seventh shell presumably could also hold thirty-two, but the
element with the greatest number of electrons, namely uranium,
has only six electrons in this shell. The number of electrons each
shell is capable of holding was arrived at from a number of con

!David Dietz, The Story of Science, p. 204.

Some interesting facts about the new conception of matter are:
1. The average electron revolves around its nucleus several thousand million
million times a second. This is a higher speed than the orbital speed of the
planets.
2. The diameter of the hydrogen molecule, the smallest one, is one one-
hundred and twenty-five millionth of an inch. The diameter of a large molecule
of starch is in the neighborhood of one ten-millionth of an inch. A particle must
be one hundred times larger than the molecule of starch to be visible in the most
powerful microscope.
3. The proton is about 1,850 times as heavy as the negative electron, but is
only about one eighteen-hundredth to one ten-thousandth the diameter of the
negative electron. The red positive electron discovered in 1933, has a mass the
same as that of the negative electron.
4. The atom, according to the Rutherford and Bohr theories, consisting of a
central nucleus and revolving electrons, is a sort of miniature solar system. The
proportion of empty space in the solar system Professor Jeans has compared to
six specks of dust inside the Waterloo Station in London, and the proportion of
empty spaces in the atom with its electrons as six wasps flying in the same
station (Cf. Sir James Jeans, The Universe Around Us, p. 102).
32 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

siderations, chiefly, the arrangement of the elements in the peri

odic table of Mendeleeff ."
The evolution of our concept of the atom thus far reveals how
it has passed from something extremely simple to something com
plex. What is more, the theory seemed to many to mean that
matter is really not matter at all, but only electrical charges. Phys
icists found they had to reshape their concept of matter, making it
much more abstract, some few even thought that we should
cease to speak of substance and begin to talk about behavior4

"Hydrogen, according to this theory, consists of an atom with a nucleus and

one electron in the first shell. Helium, the next in the series, has an atom con
sisting of a nucleus and two electrons in the first shell. Lithium, the third in the
scries, has a nucleus, two electrons in the first shell, and one in the second. Each
succeeding element adds an electron to the second shell, until neon is reached,
when the second shell is full. The neon atom has a total of ten electrons, two in
the first shell, and eight in the second. The next atom, sodium, has two electrons
in the first shell, eight in the second, and one in the third. And so it goes, until
uranium with its ninety-two electrons is reached — two in the first shell, eight
in the second, eight in the third, eighteen in the fourth, eighteen in the fifth,
thirty-two in the sixth, and six in the seventh.
The nucleus of an atom is not itself indivisible. Some substances are radio
active, e.g., uranium, radium, and thorium. Radio-activity indicates a spontaneous
break-up of the nuclei of the atom into radio-active substances. The nucleus of a
radium atom is transformed after sufficient time into the nucleus of a lead atom.
During the progress, three types of rays are emitted:
a) ./4-rays (Alpha) are positive charged particles. As they were emitted, they
formed helium. From this it was concluded that the A particle is the nucleus of a
helium atom. These particles sometimes moved at a speed of 12,800 miles per
second. The A-rzys are discharged from their parent with a velocity less than one
tenth of light.
b) B-particles (Beta) are negatively charged electrons, similar to those in atoms.
The velocity of these is almost equal to that of light.
c) Y-rays (Gamma) are not material at all. They are electromagnetic rays of
extremely short wave length.
Since the Y-ray is light or radiation, it follows that the disintegration of any
radio-active substances must involve a decrease in weight, since it is accompanied
by the emission in the form of Y-rays, e.g.:
of radiation
/0.8653 ounce lead
1 ounce of uranium /
0.1345 ounce helium
(0.0002 ounce radiation
Atoms are made up not only of protons and electrons; there is a third element,
electromagnetic energy. It is this which holds the bricks together. It is the cement
of protons and electrons. (Cf. James Jeans, The Universe Around Us, p. 113.)
4It is worth emphasizing at this point that some modern physicists confuse the
matter and substance, and erroneously believe that because in their view, science
reduces matter to behavior, the whole Scholastic notion of substance is overthrown.
Whitehead has done much to spread this confusion of thought which is quite
unjustified, historically and philosophically.
 THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 33

It
is easy to picture the atom as made up of a nucleus and
electrons revolving round about it like the planets about the sun.
But new scientific discoveries under Planck and Bohr are looked
upon by some as compelling us to give up picturing the atom
and to begin to think of it mathematically. The fundamental
entities of the atom are no longer picturable. The electron in the
new theory is not a particle but a system of waves which are
located within a spatial configuration which is not the same as
ordinary space, for each electron requires a three-dimensional
space to itself. Thus two electrons require six-dimensional space
and three electrons require nine-dimensional space, which ways
of reckoning space are purely mathematical devices. However,
they have experimental evidence behind them. Hence, the latest
atom theory is built on the wave motion as the basis of matter.
It has so asserted itself that the latest conception transcends the
limits of the pictorial imagination by postulating a projectile with
wavelike properties and a wave with projectilelike properties.
The electron is not something which is charged : it is the negative
electricity which charges. If it be considered as a wave, it

is,
ac
cording to some, wave without something that waves.
a

a
is,

Such in brief outline, suggestion of the changes in the con

a

cepts concerning the nature of matter, which have taken place in

science within comparatively short space of time. The universe
a

no longer conceived as being made up of four elements, but

is

of ninety-two. These elements are themselves not billiard balls,

but, according to certain theories, electrical charges, or waves,
concerning the nature of which science can tell us little beyond
their mathematical specification.
Professor Eddington, in the introduction to his Nature the
of

Physical World applies this changed conception of matter to

a

table, describing first from the non-scientific and then from

it

this scientific point of view, thus showing the diversity of out

look between the two:
"It commonplace object of that environment
is
[a

table]
a

which call the world. How shall describe it? has extension;
It
I

comparatively permanent; colored; above all, sub

is

is
it

is
it

it

stantial. By substantial do not merely mean that does not

it
I

collapse when lean upon it; mean that constituted of

is
it
I
I
by

'substance,' and that word am trying to convey to you some

I
34 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

conceptionof its intrinsic nature. It is a thing; not like space,

which is a mere negation; nor like time, which is — Heaven
knows what! But that will not help you to my meaning because
it is the distinctive characteristic of a 'thing' to have this sub
stantiality, and I do not think substantiality can be described
better than by saying that it is the kind of nature exemplified by
an ordinary table. . . .

"Table No. 2 is my scientific table. It is

more recent acquaint a
ance and I It does not belong to
do not feel so familiar with it.
the world previously mentioned — that world which spontane
ously appears around me when I open my eyes, though how
much of it is objective and how much subjective, I do not here
consider. It is part of a world which in more devious ways has
forced itself on my attention. My scientific table is mostly empti
ness. Sparcely scattered in that emptiness are numerous electric
charges rushing about with great speed; but their combined bulk
amounts to less than billionth of the bulk of the table itself.
a
Notwithstanding its strange construction, it turns out to be an
entirely efficient table. It supports my writing paper as satisfac
torily as table No. 1; for when I lay the paper on the little
it,

electric particles with their headlong speed keep on hitting the

underside, so that the paper maintained in shuttlecock fashion
is

at nearly steady level. . . .

a

"There
It

nothing substantial about my second table. nearly

is
is

all empty space — space pervaded,

by

true, fields of force, but

is
it

these are assigned to the category of 'influences' not of 'things.'

Even in the minute part which not empty we must not transfer
is

the old notion of substance. In dissecting matter into electric

charges, we have travelled far from that picture of which first
it

gave rise to the conception of substance, and the meaning of that

— — has been lost
by

conception ever had any the way. The

if
it

whole trend of modern scientific views to break down the

is

separate categories of 'things,' 'influences,' 'forms,' etc., and to

substitute common background of all experience. . . .
a

"I need not tell you that modern physics has

by

delicate test
and remorseless logic assured me that my second scientific table
the only one which really there — wherever 'there' may be.
is
is

On the other hand need not tell you that modern physics will
I

never succeed in exorcising that first table — strange compound

 THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 35

of external nature, mental imagery, and inherited prejudice —

which lies visible to my eyes and tangible to my grasp. . . ."*
Summing up the main results of modern science, Sir James
Jeans says:
"The tendency of modern physics is to resolve the whole ma
terial universe into waves, and nothing but waves. These waves
are of two kinds: bottled-up waves, which we call matter, and
unbottled waves, which we call radiation or light. If annihilation
of matter occurs, the process is merely that of unbottling im
prisoned wave-energy and setting it free to travel through space.
These concepts reduce the whole universe to a world of light,
potential or existent, so that the whole story of its creation can
be told with perfect accuracy and completeness in the six words:
God said, 'Let there be light.' "6
Mathematical physics thus comes very close to explaining away
matter altogether. The whole universe is presented for our con
templation in terms of waves, the radiation of light and heat be
ing represented as waves which move faster, and solid matter as
wave groups which move more slowly. If we ask the physicist
of what these waves are composed, he will answer that he must
not be taken too literally. Waves and motion for him are purely
relative conceptions, and in nature, are considered apart from our
relative point of observation. There is no difference between rest
and motion, for everything that moves from one point of view is
at rest from another, and vice versa.
Matter, thus, becomes identified with the metrical. For some
scientists a material thing is a bit of matter of which the metrical
characteristics remain identical through time; the thing lasts as
long as some test of measurement gives a sufficiently constant re
sult to assure him that it is the same. The picturable atom is not
the real atom. In order
to grasp the atom, one must represent it
by a collection of symbols. This is what is meant by identifying
the material and the metrical.
Time, therefore, is one of the important dimensions of a thing,
as we shall see shortly. Since time changes, matter changes. The
table in the morning is not metrically the same as the table in
the evening. Some new conceptions must therefore replace the

cEddington, Nature of the Physical World, pp. ix-xii.

"The Universe Around Us, p. 83.
36 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

old familiar one of matter existing in space through time. This

new concept is an "event," the consideration of which brings us
to a discussion of space-time.

Changed Conception of Newtonian Abstractions of

Absolute Space and Absolute Time
The three fundamental abstractions of Newton were: mass, ab
solute space, and absolute time. All other concepts were derived
from these three. The notion of mass was necessary for the ma
thematical distinction of the motion of material bodies. Newton
defined it as "the quantity of matter in the body as measured by
the product of its density and bulk." Newton's great contribu
tion to the notion of mass was its distinction from mere weight.
This idea of mass as giving matter the proper inertia as distinct
from weight was contained implicitly in Galileo and explicitly in
Baliani, but it never received scientific definition until the Prin-
cipia of Newton, who approached mass from the side of density,
having in mind the experiments of Boyle on the pressure and
volume of air.
Newton, speaking of mass as a physical quantity inherent in
the nature of a material body, writes in his Principia:
"It seems probable to me that God in the beginning formed
matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, movable particles, of
such sizes and figures, and with such other properties, in such
proportion to space, as most conduced to the end for which He
formed them; and that these primitive particles, being solids, are
incomparably harder than any porous bodies compounded of
them; even so hard as never to wear or break in pieces, no or
dinary power being able to divide what God Himself made one
in the first creation."
It is just such a description as this which serves as a basis for
the modern criticism of the Newtonian conception of mass.
Having isolated the notion of mass, Newton proceeded to give
an account of it as moving in absolute space and absolute time.7
This absolute space and time Newton admitted to be unob-
servable, but he arrived at it because he thought he had absolute

W. N. Sullivan, in The Bases Modern Science, p. 26 ft. Much indebtedness

of
'J.

due to this book in formulating this chapter.

is
 THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 37

motion and absolute motion implies absolute space and absolute

time. In the words of Newton, "absolute true and mathematical
time of itself and from its own nature, flows equally, without re
gard to anything external, and by another name is called 'dura
tion.' Absolute space in its own nature without regard to any
thing external remains always similar and movable."
In this relation, combining the notion of mass with absolute
space and absolute time, we have what modern physicists have
called the fallacy of "simple location," that is to say, of assuming
of a material body "here in time" and "here in space" without

is,
any reference to other regions of time and Matter there
space.
fore, according to this view, totally unlike tune which requires

a
certain period of time to exist at all. The whole of exists at

it
a

any period of time, however short. The modern physicist who

has done most to throw discredit on the Newtonian conception
of mass as physical quantity inherent in the nature of material
a

a
body in absolute and absolute time Professor Alfred
is

space
North Whitehead. In the name of modern physics, he contends
that incorrect to regard mass as permanent during all changes
is
it

of motion.
"The Ionian philosophers," he said, "asked, 'What nature
is

made of?' The answer couched in terms of stuff, or matter, or

is

material — the particular name chosen indifferent — which has

is

the property of simple location in space and time, or,

if

you adopt
the more modern ideas, in space-time. What mean
by

matter, or
I

material, anything which has this property of simple location.

is

By simple location mean one major characteristic which refers

I

equally to both space and time, and other minor characteristics

which are diverse as between space and time.
"The characteristic common both to space and time that
is

material can be said to be here in space and here in time, or here

in space-time, in perfectly definite sense which does not require
a

for its explanation any reference to other regions of space-time."8

"Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (1926), pp. 71, 72.
"This simple location of instantaneous material configurations what Bergson
is

has protested against, so far as concerns time and so far as taken to be the
is
it

it

fundamental fact of concrete nature. Ho calls distortion of nature due to the

it
a

intellectual 'spatialization' of things" (ibid., p. 74).

"It at once evident that the concept of simple location going to make
is

is

great difficulties for induction. For, in the location of configurations of matter

if
38 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

The more interesting is the question how the Newtonian con

ception of mass in absolute space and absolute time, which was
the "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" in the language of Pro
fessor Whitehead, became "events in relative space and relative
time," or "events in a spatio-temporal continuum." This takes us
into the evolution of the scientific conceptions which ended in
Einsteinian Relativity.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century it was generally be
lieved that space was filled with a subtle something which served
as the medium for communication of waves of light. The exist
ence of this hypothetical ether was assumed because scientists
felt that if light was a wave, and moved, or undulated, it had to
have something through which it could move. Though few
agreed concerning its nature, mostly all were agreed that if the
ether had any reality at all it should be possible to measure the
speed with which the earth was passing through it. If the speed
of the earth through ether could be measured, then ether could
be regarded as an absolute standard of rest. Just as in order to
measure the speed of an automobile, one must establish a fixed
point of start and a fixed point of finish, so it was thought that
ether would be a fixed point by which the velocity of the earth
and other bodies could be measured without reference to the
heavenly bodies which are only at rest for a given moment.
The problem was to measure the speed of the earth through
the ether. This was done by an instrument called the inter
ferometer, invented by Dr. Albert Michelson at the suggestion
of Dr. Edwin W. Morley in the year 1881. Its purpose was to
send out beam of light to two mirrors which would reflect it
a

back to the starting point. One beam was sent out in the direc
tion of the motion of the earth, and the other at right angles to
it. If the earth is traveling through the ether we should not ex

throughout a stretch of time there is no inherent reference to any other times,

past or future, it immediately follows that nature within any period does not
refer to nature at any other period. Accordingly, induction is not based on any
thing which can be observed as inherent in nature. Thus we cannot look to nature
for the justification of our belief in any law, such as the law of gravitation. In
other words, the order of nature cannot be justified by the mere observation of
nature. For there is nothing in the present fact which inherently refers either to
the past or to the future. It looks, therefore, as though memory, as well as induc
tion, would fail to find any justification within nature itself" (ibid., p. 75).
 THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 39

pect the two rays of light to get back to the point of intersection
at the same time.
Imagine two boats on a river traveling with equal speed. One
boat goes down the river and back, while the other crosses the
river — the two distances being equal. The boat which goes down
the river, for example, three miles, and travels with the current,
then back the three miles against the current, will make the jour
ney less quickly than the boat which travels three miles across
the river and back again. Measurements with rays of light ought
to show the same results as the boats, i.e., a beam of light sent
out in the direction of the earth, or with the ether current or
ether drift, and then reflected back again, should seem to an ob
server on the earth to require a longer time than a beam of light
traveling the same direction back and forth at right angles with
the current.
The astounding thing was that the two rays arrived back at
the starting point at the same moment. The experiment of
Michelson and Morley, as well similar experiments by R. J.
as
Kennedy and K. K. Illingworth, andlater on by Michelson failed
to show any certain variation which would serve as a measure
of the earth's motion through the ether of space. This was indeed
a disturbing factor in nineteenth-century physics and called for
some explanation.
The first attempt to explain the apparently negative result of
this experiment was suggested independently by Lorentz and
Fitzgerald, whose explanation became known as the "Lorentz-
Fitzgerald Contraction," or more commonly, "The Fitzgerald
Contraction." The suggestion was a bold one; namely, that the
length of objects contract in the direction of the motion. A
measuring rod in motion is something like rubber in the sense
that it can be shortened or be elongated. One can, for example,
imagine a ship traveling through water at high speed being
shortened the smallest fraction of an inch by its motion against
the waves. The scientific reason, however, why the measuring
rod shortens is that the rod is made up of electrical particles, and
when the rod is set in motion the electrical forces change because
of new magnetic forces between the particles. The reason why
we are shocked at the Fitzgerald idea is because we carry over
into the new physics the old notion of matter as something solid,
40 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

like a billiard ball, instead of something electrical like protons

and electrons.
Up to this time, physics had always assumed the constancy of
the measuring rod; now, according to this theory, the movement
of the rod, or the earth or planet on which the rod existed, had
The contraction

is,
to be taken into account. of course, small un
der ordinary circumstances, and depends not on the material of
the rod, but only its speed. Eddington estimates that rod on

a
the earth which travels about the sun at the rate of nineteen
miles per second has contraction of length of one part in
a

200,000,000 or ix/i inches in the diameter of the earth.9

But what application did the Fitzgerald contraction have to
the Michelson-Morley experiment? It served as an explanation
for the inability of that experiment to detect difference in the

a
ray of light sent out in the direction of the ether current and the
one sent out across it. rod contracts in the direction of its
If
a

motion, then the measuring rod which measured the ray of light
in the motion of the earth contracted sufficiently to neutralize
the difference, and hence the experiment showed negative re
a

sult. Later experiments supported the Fitzgerald contraction, par

ticularly the one which showed that the mass of an electron in
creases with the speed. The general conclusion according to this
theory was that the universe not what seems, and particularly
is

it

not what seems to be to our yardsticks and rulers. Already

it

revolution has run rampant over the empire of Newtonian

physics:
"According to the Newtonian scheme length definite and
is

unique; and each observer should apply corrections (dependent

on his motion) to reduce his fictitious lengths to the unique
Newtonian length. But to this there are two objections. The cor
rections to reduce to Newtonian length are indeterminate; we
know the corrections necessary to reduce our own fictitious
by

lengths to those measured an observer with any other pre

scribed motion, but there no criterion for deciding which sys
is

tem the one intended in the Newtonian scheme. Secondly, the

is

whole of present-day physics has been based on lengths measured

by

terrestrial observers without this correction, so that whilst its

'Op. at., p. 5. Cf. p. 247.

 THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 41

assertions ostensibly refer to Newtonian lengths they have ac

tually been proved for fictitious lengths.
"The Fitzgerald contraction may seem a little thing to bring
the whole structure of classical physics tumbling down. But few
indeed are the experiments contributing to our scientific knowl
edge which would not be invalidated if our methods of measur
ing lengths were fundamentally unsound. We now find that there
is no guarantee that they are not subject to a systematic kind of
error. Worse still we do not know if the error occurs or not, and
there is every reason to presume that it is impossible to know."10
In Einstein began to draw some very important and far-
1905
reaching conclusions from the Fitzgerald explanation of the
Michelson-Morley experiment, in his Restricted Theory of Rela
tivity. The problem was this: physics takes for granted that the
speed of light is constant, in round numbers 186,000 miles a sec
ond. But if the speed of light is constant, then there should be a
difference when light is sent out in the direction of the earth
and the ether current, or at right angles to that current. There
should be, it seemed, but the Michelson-Morley experiment
failed to detect with certainty the difference. Lorentz and Fitz
gerald explained the negative results by holding that the con
traction in one direction arose from motion relative to the ether,
and was due to electromagnetic influences, and this nullified the
difference. Their explanation, however, went no further than
saying that an experiment can never reveal motion relative to
ether.
Einstein went further, and held that there is no such thing as
fundamental motion or absolute space and absolute time, but
that space and time are relative to the observer and depend upon
his frame of reference. First, he suggested that since light always
travels at the same speed, whether in the direction of the earth
or against
it,

then the difference must be due to the observer.

The problem, simply, was whether to hold to absolute space and
time and deny the constant velocity of light, or to hold to the
constant velocity of light and say that time and space were rela
tive to the observer. Einstein chose the latter alternative. Hence,
should one observer find the time lapse between two events to be

MA. S. Eddington, Nature the Physical World, p.

of

19.
42 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

will not

by
is,
zero, that simultaneous, this estimate be shared
observers who are moving with respect to him.
Simultaneity loses its exact meaning with Einstein because time
relative to the observer. The distance between two flashes of
is

light not the same for observers who are moving relatively one
is

to another. Every man carries with him his own particular space
and his own particular time, and even his timepiece varies with
his motion. There no experiment which will show whether
is

an observer at rest. Time relative to the observer.

is

absolutely

is
This what Einstein calls the "relativity of simultaneity."11
is

Suppose, now, we imagine an observer in motion on one dis

tant star, and another in motion on another star, and another on
yet another different star, then time will be different for each of
them. Time relative to the time-frame of the universe from
is

which the observation made, but there no such thing as

is

saying that one time-frame right and the other wrong. Each is
is

is
relative to the observer in motion.
is

Space also relative. Suppose an observer on train drops

is

a
stone. To him
seems to fall straight down, but to an observer
it

along the track traces curve. An observer moving in the di

it

rection of yardstick will find that the yardstick shorter than

is
a

appears to an observer who at rest, relative to the rod. There

is
it

no unique right frame of space:

is

"There frame of space relative to terrestrial observer, an

is
a

other frame relative to the nebular observer, others relative to

other stars. . . . Distances, lengths, volumes — all quantities of
space-reckoning which belongs to frames — are likewise relative.
A
by

distance as reckoned an observer on one star as good as

is

We must
by

the distance reckoned an observer on another star.

not expect them to agree; the one distance relative to one
is

frame, the other distance relative to another frame. Absolute

is
a

distance, not relative to some special frame, meaningless."12

is

Physical space, then, like time, kind of frame in which we

is
a

""The old cosmology and the new are both, in one sense, correct. We may say
that the earth moves around the sun, or we may say that the sun moves around
the earth; and wh1chever we say we shall be right. We may only conceive of
their movements relatively" (Oswald Thomas, The Heavens and the Universe,
p. 108).
"Cf. Thomas, op. cit., p. 21.
 THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 43

locate the events of the external world, but there is no absolutely

right space-frame any more than there is an absolutely right
time-frame.
"Nature provides no indication that one of these frames is to
be preferred to the others. The particular frame in which we are
relatively at rest has a symmetry with respect to us which other
frames do not possess, and for this reason we have drifted into
the common assumption that it is the only reasonable and proper
frame; but this egocentric outlook should now be abandoned, and
all frames treated as on the same footing."13
Einstein thus sought to disabuse the scientific world of two pet
beliefs : one was that the interval of time between two events was
independent of the motion of the body, and the other was that
the distance between two points is independent of the motion of
the body of reference. In other words, length changes with mo
tion and time changes with motion. But if this be true, space
and time are mutually involved, as Minkowski held, and the
universe is intelligible only in terms of space-time. Between any
two events there is a spatio-temporal relation comprising so much
space and so much time.
The old conception of the universe thought not only of abso
lute space and absolute time, but also thought of each separately.
The new vision of many physicists regards space and time as
relative, and as bound up so closely one with another as to make
it almost impossible to detect any traces of their juncture.
In order to understand space-time, one must grasp the mean
ing of a four-dimensional world. Mathematics has been familiar
with a nondimensional figure, namely, the point, which is "an
angle with both the sides taken out." The edge of paper may
improperly, by abstraction, be regarded as having one-dimen
sional form, namely, length, without breadth or thickness. An
example of two-dimensional space is a baseball field which has
length and breadth. This room has three dimensions, for added
to length and breadth, there is height. Everyone is familiar with
these three dimensions of space, or with a three-dimensional con
tinuum. Now the fourth dimension broadly means three dimen
sions of ordinary space welded into one dimension of time; this

"ibid., p. 61.
44 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

four-dimensional volume is called the "spatio-temporal continu

um." Hence, the complete dimensional description of anything
is in terms of right or left, behind or in front, above or below,
sooner or later.
In reality, four-dimensional (length, breadth, thickness,
space
and time) resolves itself to our three-dimensional world, floating
in the stream of time.14 If time is an essential dimension of what
was formerly called matter, then instead of material things exist
ing in space through time, the physicist will change his termi
nology and speak of them as routes of events in a spatio-tem
poral continuum. What we call a table is one such route. The
table is just a name for that relation between events which per
mits us to speak of them as being on one route in space-time.
But what is an event? An ordinary event is an absolutely ir
reversible happening or fact, like dropping a meerschaum pipe
on the concrete floor. It is impossible to restore the status quo by
reversing the process: but a mathematical event is one in which
the status quo can be restored, because mathematics deals with
abstract ideas and ignores real events and real time. For example,
if I multiply two or more factors into a product, I can obviously
restore the factors again by the simple process of unmultiplica-
tion or division, and absolutely no remainder will be left over.
Now, all mathematical measurements are perfectly reversible,
If,

whether in one or four dimensions. then, the new four-dimen

sional measurements give us the complete and only truth about
the world we live in, follows that there can no more be real
it

events than real waves of radiation or real things made of matter.

We are thus left in world of geometrical measurements in
a

space-time where nothing exists to be measured except the ab

stract dimensions in terms of which the measurement carried
is

out.
must not be thought, however, that everything
It

so relative
is

by

that nothing absolute, as some philosophers have thought

is

applying relativity to the theory of knowledge, to morals, and

to religion. There have not been lacking philosophers who build
their systems upon physical theories, and who have seized upon
Einstein's theory and taught generalized philosophy to the
a

effect that "everything relative." This an unwarranted ex-

is

is

"Cf. Eddington, op. cit., p. 49 #.

 THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 45

tension of the Einstein theory, for as Bertrand Russell points out,

the word relative presumes "relative to something," and further
more there is something constant in the theory of relativity, al
most something absolute, for which reason Sir Oliver Lodge
says it might have been called a "fundamental theory." Though
space and time are relative to the observers, there is a relation
between these space-frames and time-frames. Herein lies possibly
the greatest contribution of Einstein, namely, the "absolute" char
acter of his theory of relativity. Although observers move in dif
ferent space-frames and different time-frames, there is a certain
relation between them, in which all can be agreed. If any given
observer takes his space and time measurements of any pair of
events and combines them in a certain way, he will get a certain
result. If another observer combines his measurements for the
same pair of events in the same way, he will get the same results.
Einstein thus makes it possible for an observer anywhere, under
any condition, to obtain the same apparent measurement of space.
According to his mathematical theory, the square of the space-
interval minus the square of the time-interval of any particular
combination of events is constant through free space. This for
mula holds true whether we are in motion relative to the room
or relative to the moon. This does not mean that the length of
the rod is the same in all cases, nor that any of the measurements
is the true one. It does mean, however, that two observers moving
with a uniform relative velocity can arrive at the same mathe
matical statement of the phenomena. More generally it means
that everything is not relative, in the sense that there is no uni
fication of relations, but that there is a certain relationship of
four-dimensional space which is constant for all observers, regard
less of the time and space.
"It is a striking merit of Einstein's theory that he succeeds in
expressing the laws of nature in a form which is the same for all
observers, whatever their motions and whatever their systems of
measurement. Einstein's theory enables us to isolate those absolute
features of the world which are entirely independent of the ob
server. For this reason, Einstein's theory of relativity could justly
be called the theory of absolutes, and if it had been so called,
many popular misunderstandings of it would have been avoided."15

"J. W. N. Sullivan, The Bases of Modern Science, p. 233.

46 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

This is an incomplete description of relativity, but it may be

deemed sufficient to hint at some of the changed conceptions
which have taken place in the three Newtonian abstractions of
mass, absolute space, and absolute time. Newton regards mass as
the completely unalterable part of a body. Whether a body is hot
or cold, moving or at rest, its mass remains absolutely the same,
so long as no part of it is lost. Einstein regards mass as variable
and dependent upon velocity, which is purely relative. In the
new physics, mass increases with velocity. Again, Newton re
garded space and time as absolute. Einstein regards each observer
as having his own space-frame and his own time-frame, both of
which are related inasmuch as all inhabit the same space-time.
Once the universe is regarded as a four-dimensional continuum,
then the space-frames and time-frames of different observers are
sections, as it were, of the continuum. Only those quantities
which refer directly to the four-dimensional reality itself are the
same for all observers.

The Mathematics Behind the Einstein Theory

A fuller explanation of the theory of relativity of space and
time involves understanding the mathematical philosophy behind
it. It is important to remember that until modern times, the
mathematical description of phenomena proceeded on the as
sumption that the measurements of nature conform to the geom
etry of Euclid, but this description is no longer regarded as essen
tial, and by some, no longer possible. Many Victorian physicists
could never understand anything unless they could make a model
of it; many twentieth-century physicists cannot understand any
thing unless they can state it mathematically. This change is
quite natural : if the old physicist thought the universe was made
up of material particles, it was only natural to think of it as made
up of cogs and gears. But once the new physicist thinks of the
universe in terms of electrical charges "invisible" forces,
and
mathematical symbols become the logical instrument of descrip
tion. Modern physics — in the sense, at least, of some of its pop
ular exponents — deals with a symbolical world, and since the
mathematician's stock in trade is symbols, he becomes the im
portant organ of expression.
"The universe appears to have been designed by a pure mathe
 THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 47

matician. . . . Our efforts to interpret nature in terms of the con

cepts of pure mathematics have, so far, proved brilliantly success
ful. It would now seem to be beyond dispute that in some way
nature is more closely allied to the concepts of pure mathematics
than to those of biology or of engineering, and even if the mathe
matical interpretation is only a third man-made mould, it at least
f1ts nature incomparably better than the two previously tried. . . .

The final truth about a phenomenon resides in the mathematical

description of it."16
But there is another difference. Not only does mathematics
play a more important role on the stage of new physics than on
the stage of the old, but it also plays an entirely different role.
Very simply, the geometry of space-time is not the geometry of
Euclid. There are other geometries besides the Euclidian, with
which we are most familiar, and the difference between them is
to be found in the formula they give for the distance between
two points. Up until modern times, scientific theory had no other
basis than Euclid, and the axioms of Euclid were regarded as
final and unchangeable. There was an occasional uneasiness about
the axiom concerning parallel lines, but in the eighteenth century
a logician, Saccheri, attempted a geometry based upon a denial
of Euclid's parallel axiom and by so doing produced the first non-
Euclidian geometry. Later, non-Euclidian geometries were at
tempted by Lobatschewsky in 1826 and 1840, by Gauss in 1831
and 1846, and by Bolyai in 1832.17 Later on Riemann invented
another such geometry and now it is known that a great variety
of them may exist. Provided geometrical axioms are consistent
with one another, it makes no difference which axioms one
chooses. The best geometry is that which best describes the ob
served behavior of our measuring appliances. Hence, one need
not assume that the space in which events take place is necessarily
Euclidian. Mathematics is not what it was in the days of Descartes
and Newton. In his Fifth Meditation Descartes says that the
properties of triangle do not depend on his mind. "This figure
a

has a certain nature of form or determinateessence which is im

mutable and eternal and which I have not invented, and which
in no way depends on my mind." But today the non-Euclidian

"Sir James Jeans, The Mysterious Universe, pp. 143, 150.

"Cf. William Dampier-Whetham, A History of Science, p. 220.
48 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

geometries hold that these properties are merely the consequences

of postulates with which we start, and how we start depends not
on the necessity of thought, but on our caprice. We do get differ
ent properties if we start with Riemann than if we started with
Lobatschewsky. The modern view, therefore, eliminates mathe
matical truth as correspondence with an objective reality. "A true
scientific theory merely means a successful working hypothesis.
. . . Truth, then, in science, is a pragmatic affair."18
Here is the point of demarcation between the mathematics be
hind the Newtonian physics and the mathematics behind the
Einsteinian physics. Newton proceeded on the assumption that
the geometry of space was Euclidian and that the measurements
made by rigid measuring rods would invariably conform to
Euclid, thus arriving at the law of gravitation in the following
manner: a body set in motion, for example, a ball, will proceed
in a Euclidian straight line, unless it is disturbed by other forces,
such as a bean or a pencil in its path, which will cause it to deflect.
But the planets do not move in a Euclidian straight line, but in
curves. Therefore, there must be a force acting upon them to
move from their straight lines, and this force Newton
them
called gravitation. Thus the law of gravitation was bound up
with the geometry of Euclid.
Now suppose that one did not use the geometry of Euclid and
the Euclidian straight line. Could one then dispense with the
force of gravitation ? In other words, would not a non-Euclidian
geometry render gravitation as an explanation unnecessary ? This
is precisely the procedure Einstein adopted in his Generalised

Principle of Relativity, published ten years after his first theory.

Acknowledging indebtedness to the findings of Minkowski, who
used a semi-Euclidian geometry, Einstein took a further step and
used the four-dimensional geometry of space-time, which meas
ured not the "distance" between two events, but the "interval"
between two events. By substituting non-Euclidian for Euclidian
geometry, Einstein was able to dispense with the explanation of
the force of gravitation.
It was not unreasonable, Einstein contended, that a different
geometry be used for different space-frames, for space has no
uniform geometry. In the neighborhood of the sun, for example,

"J. W. N. Sullivan, The Limitations of Science, p. 252.

 THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 49

the planets describe ellipses in space, but in the neighborhood of

a double star, a planet would not describe an ellipse. It follows,
therefore as the Scholastics held, that space and time are in some
way bound up with matter. The geometry of any portion of
space-time depends upon the distribution of matter in that region.
A planet moves round the sun in an ellipse not because there is
a force of gravitation pulling at but because that the natural

it,

is
motion of body, in the sort of space-time that exists in the
a

neighborhood of the sun.

"The geometry of the space-time region about the sun not

is
the same as the geometry of the space-time region about double-

a
star. . . We can no longer regard the properties of space and time
.

as being entirely independent of matter. On the old view the

by
properties of space and time, as determined measuring rods
and clocks, owed nothing to the presence of matter. On Einstein's
by

theory these properties are influenced matter. . . Newton in

.
terms of Euclidian geometry and the force of gravitation gave

a
by
description of the same region of phenomena. Einstein, em
ploying non-Euclidian geometry, has been able to dispose with
a

the notion of the force of gravitation."19

"J. W. N. Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 227-228.

"In consistent theory of relativity, there can be no inertia of bodies relatively
a

to 'space' but only an inertia of objects relative (A. Einstein,

to one another"
Cosmological Considerations on the Theory, Sitz, d. Pr. Ak. d. Wiss,
General
1917; F. S. C. Northrop, Science and First Principles, p. 96).
"From an observational standpoint, what would be the result of space manifest
ing itself as non-Euclidian? The geodesies would be curved, as contrasted with
Euclidian ones, and free bodies unsolicited by forces, would appear to follow
curves with constant speeds. Under the circumstances, would seem to be possible
it

to account for the curved paths of planets and projectiles without having to in
troduce disturbing force of gravitation. All we should do would be to assume
a

that space was suitably curved around large masses, such as the sun and earth;
and as result the geodesies, hence the path of free bodies, would be curved
in
a

turn. In particular, planets would now circle around the sun, not because the at
traction of the sun compelled them to do so, tearing them away from their
straight geodesies, but because the space around the sun being now curved, its
geodesies would automatically become curved lines" (A. d'Abro, The Evolution
of

Scientific Thought From Newton to Einstein, p. 538).

"Einstein's 'law' was found to admit of an easy interpretation in terms of
geometry. The effect of mass of gravitating matter was not, as Newton had
a

imagined, to exude 'force' but to distort the four-dimensional continuum in its

a

neighborhood. The moving planet or cricket ball was no longer drawn off from
its rectilinear motion by the pull of force, but by the curvature of the con
a

tinuum"- (Sir James Jeans, The Mysterious Universe, pp. 19-120).

1

Cf. A. S. Eddington, The Nature the Physical World, p. 157 ff.

of
50 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

This summary presentation of some modern theories of physics,

in which (a) matter as something solid and "substantial" gave
way to "electric behavior," and (b) in which the Newtonian con
ception of mass in absolute space and absolute time surrendered
to the relativity of space and time, and (c) in which a new
mathematical outlook involving non-Euclidian geometry sup
planted the Euclidian, is some indication of the far-flung changes
in the science of physics.
There is no denying the fact that the outlook on the physical
universe has undergone tremendous changes. Philosophy cannot
deny these changes without stultifying itself. There is no reason
why it should deny them until scientists themselves deny them.
The modern revolution in science is briefly a break away from
the Newtonian conception which
dominated science for two
hundred years. Although he did not share the mathematical a
priorism of his predecessors, like them, he dispensed with final
causes and found the cause of a phenomenon in its immediate
conditions. Furthermore for Newton the mass of a body was the
quantity of matter in it; inertia was the property of matter. But
when science began studying the problem of light, it was found
that nothing was known about it except its mathematical struc
tures. Newton thought we had to know the nature of the entities
we discussed. Some exponents of modern science say we know
only their behavior expressed mathematically. Hence the im
portance of a mathematical philosophy of science as J. W. N.
Sullivan correctly observes: "The truly significant change in mod
ern science is not to be found in its increased power to aid man's
progress, but in the change in its metaphysical foundations."20
But it is one thing to admit that physics has changed its cate
gories and enlarged its field and changed its mathematics, and
it is quite another thing to say that philosophy should do the
same. It is one thing to say that "science suggests a new cosmol
ogy," but it is quite another thing to say, as Dr. Whitehead does,
that "whatever suggests a cosmology suggests a religion," or even
a philosophy. It is against this idea that a protest must be raised.
In order to clear the ground for the correct theory, the physical
and mathematical philosophies of science must be investigated.

The Limitations of Sciences, p. 238.

 CHAPTER III
A CRITICAL APPRECIATION
OF THE PHYSICAL AND MATHEMATICAL
PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE

The physical and the mathematical philosophies of science both

agree that philosophy of science can proceed without the aid of
philosophical principles. They differ inasmuch as the physical
theory, like Positivism, contends that facts themselves are self-
sufficient knowledge. The mathematical theory holds that the
higher discipline of mathematics is needed to interpret physical
facts.
It is our contention that while both of these theories have their
merits they err in their exclusiveness. Facts themselves do not
give knowledge; mathematical interpretation of facts omits much
important knowledge. Hence, only a science with a universal
object such as metaphysics can best serve as that interpreter of
facts in the empirical order.
As a method the physical approach It to science has merits.
emphasizes the need of experiment in dealing with
and research
the physical order. As the Angelic Doctor has put it: "He who
neglects the experimental order in natural science falls into
error."1 The problems of physics, and biology, and chemistry
cannot be solved by a deduction from an abstract principle, and
despite the contrary impression, the Scholastics were the last to
say that they could. Furthermore, method it is perfectly
as a
within its rights in disclaiming any interest in how the funda
mental principles of philosophy are discovered. It can rightly

'De Trinitate Boetii, p. 6, art. 7.

51
52 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

ignore, for example, how the principle of causality or finality is

grounded in being. But as a philosophy the physical theory is
false. The error consists in its exclusive attachment to facts and
a denial of the applicability of philosophical principles to scientific
facts. It is one thing to say that the experimental method is nec
essary, but it is quite another thing to say it is the only method.
It is one thing to say that the experimenter must ignore or ab
stract from an inquiry into the foundation of philosophical prin
ciples; but it is quite another thing to deny that there are any
philosophical principles. In a more definite way the following
difficulties against the physical theory of philosophy of science
present themselves:
1. The physical theory repudiates metaphysics, and yet its ideas
lead insensibly to metaphysics. To deny the necessity or value of
metaphysics is to assert a metaphysical principle, just as to say
a religion must be without dogmas is to assert a dogma. The
defenders of the physical theory claim they are interested only
in the correlation of phenomena, and yet "the formula by which
they pretend to exclude all metaphysics often serves as the founda
tion of a metaphysical system which is purely sui generis."2 Their
error consists in confusing a justifiable method with a philosophy.
The method is experimental, but this they expand into a phi
losophy by saying that experiment only way of discovering
is the
truth. If any proof is needed to point the moral that in denying
philosophy they must construct one of their own, it is to be found
in the constant tendency to hypostatize the entities revealed by
the experimental Relativity of the physical order has
method.
been erected into the metaphysics that everything is relative, even
the Absolute. Space and time have been hypostatized into a
theodicy by Alexander with space as the body of God and time
as His soul. The physical fact of the immensity of the universe
has been erected by astronomers into a philosophical principle of
the insignificance of man. Thus at the very moment we are told
that experimental science has no need of philosophy, we hear a
philosophy built upon an environment turned into an entity, and
a spatio-temporal continuum converted into a God who is the
harmony of its epochal occasions.
2. The physical theory furthermore erroneously assumes that

*E. Meyerson, L'Explication, t. 1, p. 6.

 A CRITICAL APPRECIATION 53

facts constitute scientific knowledge. Facts as facts do not make

knowledge, for the affirmation of a constant character
scientific
of a common subject is mere repetition. Experiments may abound,
but there is no necessary increase in knowledge. The only pos
sible way facts can be brought to the level of knowledge is by
interpretation.3 A cat walking through a laboratory sees the facts
in the test tubes and probably sees them better in the dark than
the scientist himself. And yet the cat is unable to construct a
scientific theory, law, or hypothesissimply because it lacks the
capacity to synthesize and correlate the facts in terms of a higher
knowledge. As Professor Wolf, of the University of London, has
so well observed: "It is right that science should keep as close
as possible to observed facts, and not indulge in unnecessary
But the tendency may also be carried too far. What
speculation.
is commonly called observation includes over and above actual
sense-elements, not only such supplements of memory and image
ry as make wool look soft or ice look hard and cold, but also
distinct elements of interpretation. This is not usually noticed,
because the interpretation is so rapid and spontaneous that the
sense-elements and the interpretation coalesce in experience, the
whole of which appears to be given immediately."4
I thought I saw a banker's clerk
alighting from a bus.
I looked again and saw it was
a hippopotamus.
The fact considered in its pure individuality is not the object
of science, but only the object of sensation. The fact as regards
sensation represents itself and nothing else. In order to elevate
the fact to the scientific order, interpretation is necessary, but in
terpretation is complete outside the sphere of the sensible. The
facts are necessary as the sole and unique proof of the compati
bility or incompatibility of subject and predicate, but these facts
must be set in motion by something nonfactual.5 Science is not
born without the conjunction of two elements: facts and ideas.6

*L. Marechal, Etudes sur la Psychologie des Mystiques, t. 1, p. 7.

4A. Wolf, Essentials of Scientific Method, p. 119.
'"Experimentum indiget aliqua ratiocinatione circa particularia per quam con-
fertur unum ad aliud" (In Post. Anal., lib. 2, lect. 20).
"If it be objected here that the idea which interprets the facts is derived from
54 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

It does not seek the ultimate cause of the facts which it investi
gates, but it does seek the secondary cause. That is why a rational
principle is involved in every scientific law. An arrow flies toward
its target. This is a fact. The fact becomes of interest to the sci
entist only at the moment when we investigate the necessary
relation between the arrow and the target. The mind must per
ceive a bond between the two, namely, something which would
render the nonsuccession of the two phenomena contradictory.
But when do they become noncontradictory ? Only when the
rational element has been discovered, i.e., when the phenomenon
is something which must be produced.
"Empiricism breaks down, however, in failing to account for
the fundamental assumption underlying all scientific procedure;
namely, that the logically necessary relations which hold between
mathematical expressions hold of natural phenomena themselves.
No physicist for a moment doubts that all the unforseen logical

consequences of a true physical hypothesis must necessarily hold

for the physical universe in which that hypothesis is true, and
that, if any of these consequences turn out to be false, it must
be due to the falsity of our original assumption and not to the
fact that nature fails to behave in accordance with the rules of
mathematical deduction or computation. So long, therefore, as
the laws of logic and mathematics are applicable to the physical
universe, necessity of a certain kind, namely, the necessity which
connects ground and consequent, must be predicated of it. It
would not be difficult to show that this is precisely the necessity
which commonsense and physical science actually attribute to the
causal relation. A stone thrown up must fall down after its up
ward velocity is spent and it has thus become a free body, if we
assume, as we do, the law of gravitation. If carbon combines with
oxygen and thus burns, any substance like paper, made of wood
pulp, must burn. The consequences in both cases are necessary
and physically explained, though the major premises are contin
gent. If the law of gravitation or that of valency could themselves
be deduced from another law — for example, some law of electro-
magnetism — the realm of physical explanation would be wid
ened and greater unity be introduced. But the logical character

observation, the answer must be deferred to the chapter on metaphysics. There it

will be shown that the principle of interpretation is intellectual.
 A CRITICAL APPRECIATION 55

of physical explanation would remain unaltered. Actually, the

is,
search for physical causes or explanations thus, hunt for ap

a
propriate major premises or middle terms. The principle of caus
ality (as distinct from particular causal laws) thus simply the

is
general maxim that physical phenomena are connected according
to invariant laws. While this maxim properly postulate or

is

a
resolution of the scientific understanding to look for such con
nections, can be maintained only because the world of physics
it

full of universal elements or relations which repeat themselves

is

indefinitely."7
St. Thomas says that doctor may, for long time, consider
a

a
the efficacy of remedy for disease, for example herb which
a

a
cured the fever of Socrates, and then Plato, and then Aristotle.
These constitute series of concrete facts or composite image
a

a
of what has taken place under different circumstances. Experi-
mentum nihil aliud videtur quam accipere aliquid ex multis in
memoria retentis. This constitutes the matter of induction, but
when the doctor proceeds to consider absolutely that the herbs
cured the fever, universal proposition formed which can
is
a

serve him as rule in the practice of medicine, which general

a

principle dependent not only upon the experiment, but also

is

upon his intellectual powers of rationalizing the experiment.8

Science, therefore, takes as its base, experience or experiments
which are as free as possible from the infiltration of premature
hypothesis.9 At its summit, however, appears an ensemble of

'Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, p. 225. For detailed refutation of the
a

physical theory we refer to the works of Emil Meyerson, who holds that the
scientific investigator obeys consciously or unconsciously two principles: con
formity to law, and causation (Identite et Realite, pp. 34—36).
Meyerson takes up position midway between Dogmatism and Positivism.
a

Science for him not strictly empirical; rather the progressive application
it
is
is

of the principle of identity to nature in the shape of causal urge (ibid., pp.
a

369, 380). In opposition to Comte and Mach, he argues that science really seeks
the explanation of things in terms of the identification of cause and effect. Thus,
in Meyerson's opinion, science utterly and thoroughly ontological. In pushing
is

this idea too far, Meyerson finally arrives at the extreme Hegelian position of
holding the "rationality of the real." The only difference between Meyerson and
Hegel that Hegel held that there was only one Rational. Meyerson holds there
is

are several.
•in Post. Anal., lib. 2, lect. 20; cf. lib. lect. 42.
1,

'Cf. Aristotle, Post. Anal., lib. 1, c. xxxi, no. 5; St. Thomas, lect. 42; Aristotle,
lib. 2, c. xii (alias, xiii) no. 18; St. Thomas, lect. 15; Aristotle, lib. 2, c. xii
(alias, xiii) nos. and 16; and St. Thomas, lect. 13 and 15.
2
56 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

characters naturally grouped together which express themselves

in some general law whose very statement is an assertion that
there is something outside and beyond the phenomenon and em
pirical. Take, for example, the experiment of Pasteur concerning
fermentation, which is often cited as the specimen of an inductive
method, but which really is not wholly inductive. How could
Pasteur conclude that the fermentation is due exclusively to liv
ing germs in the atmosphere, and not, for example, to contact
with the air itself, except that somehow in advance he held for
certain that the living germ is a cause proportionate to the phe
nomenon? But this implies a syllogism: that which produces
fermentation is a cause proportionate to that effect, having al
ready in itself the bacilli life which it can communicate; but the
germs in the air are of such a kind; therefore, they can produce
the fermentation. A sufficient cause being found active, one does
not need to search elsewhere.10 In the inductions of Pasteur the
principle of sufficient reason and of causality play an important
role, for without the principle derived from metaphysics, viz.,
that identical effects refer to the same causes, he would never
have been able to draw his conclusions.
Whether the scientist is conscious of it or not, the postulate on
which he works is the intelligibility of nature. The scientist is a
discoverer, not an inventor. He finds rational descriptions for the
universe because rationality is there. An inventor inis a creator,
asmuch as he pours rationality into that which he makes. The
scientist unravels that rationality when he understands the ma
chines of the inventor, and he does something analogous to it
when he interprets the universe.
3. Empirical science, it was said, assumes consciously or un
consciously ideas and principles which lie outside the domain of
observation. This does not mean it is to be criticized for not
showing their origin or proving their reasonableness. It only
means a philosophy built on such a method is wrong in ignoring
them, or in denying the debt. The Scholastic criticism hinges
precisely on this point. Empiricism must use rational principles
which are not of purely empirical origin. The principles it de
rives from a superior science, for no science proves its own first

"J. de Tonquedec, La Critique de la Connaissance, p. 277.

 A CRITICAL APPRECIATION 57

principles. Thus Scholasticism agrees with the mathematical the

ory in holding something nonfactual must interpret the
that
facts. It disagrees with the mathematical theory, as we shall see,
by denying that mathematics is the supreme interpreter of the
facts.
The principles of interpretation which experimental science
uses are borrowed from a higher discipline, for no science, says
St. Thomas, demonstrates its own principles. Mathematics does
not prove that things which are equal to the same thing are
equal to each other, nor does physics prove the legitimacy of in
duction.11 If each science had to prove its own first principles,
and the principles upon which these in their turn depended, there
would be an infinity of premises which it would be impossible
to traverse, and the human mind could never of itself make that
voyage over the sea of an unlimited number of propositions.12
In order to escape the admission that science assumes its own
first principles, which in turn are based upon others of which
there must be a first, it has been suggested that by a circular way,
propositions could depend upon one another and thus prove
themselves reciprocally. This, however, is a vain escape, for such
a procedure would be a vicious circle. It would seem that in a
system the same propositions would serve two roles, and con
tradictory ones, at one and the same time; the r61e of a proof
and the role of a conclusion, which would mean that the proposi
tions rested upon no proof whatever.13
Since their own proximate first principles,
sciences assume
which are proved by other superior sciences, the Scholastics held
rigidly to a hierarchy of sciences. The physics of the Middle
Ages, for example, which was a kind of philosophy of nature,
received its principles from metaphysics, but physics in its turn
delivered its principles over to botany; arithmetic subordinated
itself to metaphysics, and music subordinated itself to arithmetic.
There was a formal subordination between what they called a

"Manifestum est non est uniuscujusque

quod scientiae demonstrare principia
sua propria (In Anal.,
Post. lib. 1, lect. 17).
"St. Thomas in Post. Anal., lect. 7, c. 22; lect. 34, 35, and 36; St. Thomas, 1,
2. Aristotle, Metaphysics, lib. c. 4, no. 2; St. Thomas, lib. 4, lect.
3',

6.

"Aristotle, Post. Anal., lib. 1, c. 3, no. 3. St. Thomas, lect.

8.
58 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

subaltern and a superior science.14 The details of this hierarchy

we shall examine later. St. Thomas very clearly taught that to
deny the dependence was to make science mere opinion or faith,
and that if it limited itself to mere empirical knowledge, it would
draw but dubious conclusions.15
The conclusion is that the physical theory as a method is cor
rect, but as a philosophy is wrong. Philosophy of science needs
more than facts to arrive at conclusions, and the principles by
which it interprets these facts are furnished it by a higher science
which is generally metaphysics. Every scientific law supposes an
ontological X on which is grounded the stability of knowledge.
Any scientific law may in turn be explained by a wider law, but
the last law in the series, while it explains all the others, is still
left unexplained. It is impossible to go back in an infinite series
of dependent propositions, otherwise we would never have the
present proposition. Ultimately, there must be some principle
upon which others are based and which is beyond the phenom
enal world.16 The physical theory collapses with the necessary
recognition of the dependence of principles. But even to keep
within the domain of the physical theory itself, it must be re
membered that the very fact that the scientist is able to make a
law about phenomena is a refutation of phenomenalism, for a
law of itself and by itself is not phenomena. This brings us to a

consideration of the mathematical theory.

"Ad quintum dicendum, quod etiam in scientiis humanitus traditis sunt

quaedam principia in quibusdam earum quae non sunt omnibus nota, sed oportet
ea supponere a superioribus scientiis, sicut in scientiis subalternatis supponuntur
et creduntur aliqua a superioribus scientiis subalternantibus; et hujusmodi non
sunt per se nota nisi superioribus scientiis (De Trinitate Boetii, q. 2, art. 2, ad 5).
Ille qui habet scientiam subalternatam non perfecte attingit ad rationem sciendi,
nisi in quantum, eius cognito continuatur quodammodo cum cognitione eius qui
habet scientiam subalternantem (De Veritate, q. 14, art. 9, ad 3).
Cf. The Prologue of de Coelo: In scientiis esse processum ordinatum, prout
proceditur a primis causis et principiis usque ad proximas causas, quae sunt ele-
menta constituentia essentiam rei.
"Si autem aliquis alicui proponat ea quae in principiis per se notis non in-
cluduntur, vel includi non manifestantur, non faciet in eo scientiam, sed forte
opinionem vel fidem (De Veritate, q. n, art. 1; De Veritate, q. 12, art. 1, and 1
Mela., lect. 1).
MOmnes scientiae particulares utuntur ipso ente, quod tamen principaliter con-
siderat. Philosophus Primus (in Meta., lib. 3, lect. 5).
 A CRITICAL APPRECIATION 59

The Mathematical Theory of the Philosophy of Science

The mathematical theory admits that some higher principles
of interpretation are needed than those which belong to the
purely empirical order. But these principles, it holds, are to be
found not in metaphysics but in mathematics. Again it must be
borne in mind that as a scientific method the mathematical in
terpretations of facts may be legitimate. Physicists find they can
best manipulate the materials of their science in terms of mathe
matical symbols, for nature it seems "is more closely allied to the
concepts of pure mathematics than to those of biology or en
gineering."17 They thus build up hypotheses, or "a system of
mathematical propositions which have for their end and purpose
to represent of experimental laws as simply and
the ensemble
completely is no slight break with the Vic
as possible."18 This
torian scientist who was largely interested in things as an en
gineer, who might construct a model of a thing so that it could
be explained mechanically in terms of levers, gears, and forces.
The modern mathematical physicist is interested in things pri
marily as a mathematician who can describe them in terms of
pointer readings. A word about the mathematical method before
touching upon it philosophy of science.
as a
It is perfectly legitimate for the science of physics to interpret
its findings in terms of mathematics. The Scholastic justification
is,

of this proposition is that the more abstract a science the more

Mathematics
its principles can be applied to other sciences. the
is

most abstract of all sciences with the exception of metaphysics.

may therefore shed its light upon the less abstract sciences,
It

and in this particular instance on physics, thus giving rise to

mathematical physics.19
Mathematical physics in the eyes of the Scholastics scientia
is

media as was suggested above. This means the matter of the sci
ences drawn from the physical order, but the form, or the
is

"Sir James Jeans, The Mysterious Universe, p. 143.

"Emile Picard, Vn Coup d'Oeil sur I'Uistorie des Sciences et des Theories
Physique, pp. 37, 123.
"Quanto scientia aliqua abstractiora et simpliciora considerata, tanta ejus prin-
cipia sunt magis applicabilia allis scientiis. Unde principia mathematica sunt ap-
plicabilia naturalibus, non converso; propter quod Physica est ex suppositione
e

mathematica, sed non converso (in De Trinitate Boetii, q. 5, art. 3, ad 6).

e
60 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

aspect under which it is studied, is mathematical.20 Mathematical

physics is indeed a modern science. It

is,
therefore, bit startling

a
to read in the works of St. Thomas the statement that "it not

is
improper for mathematical principles to be used in interpreting
natural sciences."21
Thus far the same admission must be made of the mathemat
ical method as was made of the physical theory; namely,

is
it
legitimate within limits. The physical method cannot dispense
with facts under the penalty of not being science, but must

it
a
dispense with the idea that all knowledge empirical. In like

is
manner, the mathematical method within its rights in inter
is
preting an elephant sliding down
grassy hillside in terms of
a
mathematical pointer readings; but quite unreasonable when is
it

elevates the mathematical interpretation into philosophy or

it

a
mysticism, or when insists that its scientia media scientia

is
it

a
a

suprema. Here we pass to consideration of the mathematical

a

philosophy of science. Mathematics not the "Queen of the

is

Sciences" as Professor Levy believes,22 or the "first of the sciences"

is,

Professor Cohen believes.23 as we shall show, based on

It

as

a
high degree of abstraction, namely, quantitative being. But there
in this universe realm of ideas which are beyond the quanti
is

tative, and which therefore belong to higher and supreme

a

science, namely, metaphysics. Furthermore, the necessity or at

"Quaedam vero sunt mediae quae principia mathematica ad res naturales ap

plicant, ut musica et astrologia: quae tamen magis sunt affines mathematicis, quia
in earum consideratione quod est physici, est quasi naturale; sicut musica con-
id

siderat sonos non inquantum sunt soni sed inquantum sunt secundum numeros
et propter hoc demonstrant
proportionabiles: conclusiones suas circa res naturales,
per media mathematica; et ideo nihil prohibet inquantum cum naturali
si

sed
communicant, materiam sensibilem respiciunt. Inquantum enim cum mathematica
communicant, abstractae sunt (In De Trinitate Boetii, q. 5, art. 3, ad 6).
"Scientia quae se habet ex additione ad aliam, utitur principiis ejus in demon-
strando, sicut geometra utitur principiis arithmeticis; magnitudo enim addit posi-
tionem supra numerum; unde junctus dicitur esse unitas posita. Similiter autem
corpus naturale addit materiam sensibilem super magnitudinem mathematicam;
ideo non inconveniens in demonstrationibus
naturalis utatur principiis
si

et est
mathematicis (In De Coelo, lib. lect. 3; lib. 3, lect. 3).
1,

Scientiae mediae, communicant cum naturali, secundum id quod est materiale

earum consideratione; differunt autem secundum quod in earum considera
in

id

tione est formale; et ideo nihil prohibet has scientias interdum cum naturali eas-
dem habere conclusiones (In De Trinitate Boetii, q. 5, art. 3, ad 7).
"The Science, p. 82.
of

Universe
"Reason and Nature, p. 171.
 A CRITICAL APPRECIATION 61

least the logical consistency of mathematical principles is not

based on intuition, but is derived from a superior science with a
broader object and more universal vision.
i. Even in the realm of pure mathematics, the mathematician
may use any set of symbols he desires within any given region
of space-time;24 he may even go so far as to maintain that any
one set of symbols fits the scheme as well as any other, but to
erect this method into a philosophy and confuse independence
of any one special meaning with independence of all meaning
is unjustified and unwarranted. Rather it is true that because
mathematics is in the possible types of order, the
interested
mathematician can find different symbols for the different pos
sible entities thus symbolized. If pure mathematics were only
symbols, it would be impossible to speak of real discoveries. A
mathematical account of reality may be the only commodious
way of manipulating reality, but utility must not be confused
with truth. The final explanation of things is not in terms of
symbols but in terms of intelligence, and this involves meta
physics. Even pure mathematics is regarded only as a commo
dious invention to handle nature and is not free from defects.
The higher mathematics fails firstly, to correspond with the phys
ical situation from error, and secondly, its equa
so as to be free
tions embrace only a very small part of reality. Professor P. W.
Bridgman of Harvard University has well developed both these
points:
"Mathematics appears to fail to correspond exactly to the phys
ical situation in at least two respects. In the first place, there is the
matter of errors of measurement in the range of ordinary experi
ence. Now, mathematics can deal with this situation, although
somewhat clumsily, and only approximately by specifically sup
plementing its equations by statements about the limit of error,
or replacing equations by inequalities — in short, the sort of thing
done in every discussion of the propagation of error of measure
ment. In the second place, and much more important, mathe
matics does not recognize that as the physical range increases,

"Some pure mathematicians hold that the manipulation of symbols may be

purely meaningless.Lewis, Survey of Symbolic Logic, p. 355. Hence, the dispute
among mathematicians as to whether pure mathematics has for its basis intuition
or logical consistency.
62 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

the fundamental concepts become hazy, and eventually cease en

tirely to have physical meaning, and therefore must be replaced

by other concepts which are operationally quite different. . . . The
structure of our mathematics is such that we are almost forced,
whether we want to or not, to talk about the inside of an electron,
although physically we cannot assign any meaning to such state
ments. As at present constructed, mathematics reminds one of
the loquacious and not always coherent orator, who was said to
be able to set hismouth going and go off and leave it."25
2. Professor Cohen finds still other defects in mathematical phi
losophy of science by showing it is based upon a neglect or for-
getfulness of the metaphysical doctrines of universals:
"The assumption that numbers and mathematical or logical
laws are mental is due to the even more widespread notion that
only particular sensible entities exist in nature, and that relations,
abstractions, or universals cannot have any such objective exist
ence — hence they are given shadowy existence in the mind.
a
But this is a shabby subterfuge: for these numbers or relations
are also numbers and relations of things, and any assertion with
regard to these abstractions is either true or not. Now truth, what
it is,

ever it not quality which inheres in proposition simply

is is

because mental, but

proposition true because of factors
is
a

If,

other than the fact that now think this proposition. there
I

fore, abstractions had no existence except in the mind making

them, no assertion into which they entered could possibly be true
— except the assertion that now think such and such proposi
a
I

tion. . .
.

"Logic and pure mathematics, then, apply to nature because

they describe the invariant relations which are found in it. When
we consider natural objects purely as the embodiments of such
relations we are said to idealize these objects, or to consider them
as ideal limits. But such idealization gives us the essential con
ditions of what truly exists."26
The mathematical method disinterested in the efficient cause
is
3.

and the final cause or the goodness of thing and should not
it
a

be so disinterested. never discusses, for example, whether an

It

"The Logic Modern Physics, pp. 62, 63.

of

"Reason and Nature, pp. 203, 204-205.

 A CRITICAL APPRECIATION 63

equilateral triangle is better than an isosceles triangle.27 Neither

is the mathematical method concerned with an efficient cause or
the origin of a series of events which are mathematically cor
related. As St. Thomas put it:
"The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were
something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in real
ity. Now it is becoming that everything should have an efficient
cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of
mathematics has an efficient cause, still its relation to that cause
is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the
mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object
from its efficient cause."28
The method of mathematical physics may ignore both the
efficient and final causes because outside its scope. But a philos
ophy of science built upon this method cannot ignore these, and
that is just where the mathematical philosophy of science breaks
down. Aristotle has reminded us that there are four causes: effi
cient, final, formal, and material. Mathematical physics does an
swer questions concerning the stuff of which the universe is made
and the mathematical forms (symbols) by which it may be in
terpreted. But as a philosophy of science it does not solve the
riddle of "Who made the universe?" and "What is its purpose?"
The Power behind the universe, and the Goodness toward which
it is directedrepresent the normal interests of every inquiring
mind. The discipline which ignores these, and must ignore them
by its very method, can therefore hardly claim to be a complete
philosophy of life.
The conclusion is that the physical theory and the mathemat
ical theory of science are valid methods but not valid philos
ophies. Facts need interpretation; the physical theory forgets that
it has no such principles of interpretation within its own bosom.

"In mathematicis autem nulla demonstratio fit hoc modo quod hoc modo sit
quia melius est sic esse, aut deterius si ita non esset. Puta si diceretur quod
angulus in semicirculo est rectus quia melius est quod sic sit quam quod sit a aims
vel obtusus. . . . Mathematicanon moventur nec movent, nec habent
autem
voluntatem. Unde in eis non consideratur bonum sub nomine boni et finis (St.
Thomas, In Meta., lib. 3, lect. 4).
"1, q. 44, art. 1, ad 3; Cf. R. G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p. 185; F. A.
Lindemann, "The Place of Mathematics in the Interpretation of the Universe,"
Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 29, p. 15.
64 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

The mathematical theory forgets that wonder about origin and

devotion to moral purposes of human en
are integral aspects
deavor. Metaphysics has a higher degree of abstraction than that
of quantity in movement, namely, being as being. It is this object
which makes it first physics or the science of the fundamental
causes of all that and therefore the only solid basis for
is, phi

a
losophy of science.
 CHAPTER IV

THE VALUE OF SCIENCE

Although the problem of whether or not science needs the com

plement and background of metaphysics is more important than
the purely criteriological problem of knowledge, the latter can
not be passed over without discussion. That is why this chapter
is introduced as a kind of parenthesis. It is the scientists them
selves who have insisted on the question of the value of science,
for no other reason than that because many of them abandon the
problem of the atom for the problem of knowledge. Hence, the
frequency of such questions as: "Does science deal with the real
world?" "Are its conclusions purely subjective?" "Has science
any reference to the common-sense world of daily experience?"
"Are the objects which physics affirms in any sense independent
of the mind which conceives them?" "Is a table a wooden board
on four wooden legs, or is it a whirling dance of protons and
electrons?" "What is the relationship between the Eddington
table No. i, and the Eddington table No. 2?"
To come quickly to the point, a common answer at the present
time is the answer of idealism, and the general solution is that
of idealism. The mind is represented as imposing its own con
cepts upon the external world and in the course of its exploration
rediscovering the features which it put there. The table which
is "really there" is the scientists' table of protons and electrons,
the familiar table of everyday experience is the fruit of "external
nature, mental imagery and inherited prejudices."1 There is very

S. Eddington, Nature of the Physical World, p. xiv.

'A.
The same idea is to be found in the works of Professor Jeans who holds that
familiar objects which are not "waves" do not belong to "the ultimate nature
of things" (The Mysterious Universe, p. 44).

65
66 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

little difference, it will be seen, between the "substratum of

mathematical point events" and the noumenal world of Kant.2
As Professor Eddington has put "We have found that where

it,
science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained
from nature that which the mind has put into nature." The
idealistic tendency of modern physics in part to be ac

is
by

counted for the natural tendency to exaggerate reaction

a
from one extreme to another, and in this instance, the reaction
from materialism of the last century. The old physics thought
of the universe in terms of matter or stuff, i.e., something into
which one could put one's teeth. Common sense took exactly the
same view and held that the physical world was the real world.
At the present time, however, some scientific men contend that
the real of physics not the real of ordinary sense perception,
is

but merely or our outlook on the real. The physical

ourselves
world, in this new view, not something lying out there wait
is
by

ing to be discovered scientists; something which becomes

is
it

modif1ed or even partially constructed when discovered. The ab

stractions of physics are not objectively real things, but symbols
by

of the real, or better still, symbols constructed the mind of

the scientist. These symbols do not bring us in touch with reality,
for they have meaning only in the closed circle of the scientist's
outlook. The scientist, according to this view, not interested in
is

what the symbols symbolize.

The idealist solution to the problem of knowledge can be best
summed up in the form of two propositions, statements of which
are drawn from the two leading scientist-philosophers of our
day, who begin with distinction between appearance and reality,
a

of

after the manner of the idealists generation ago for whom

a

both the world of sense and the world of science are only ap
pearances of reality which underlies them. Both Professor Jeans
a

and Professor Eddington arrive at the same conclusion; namely,

that the ultimate nature of the universe mental. The former
is

reached his conclusion because of the seeming impossibility to

B. S. Haldane, Possible Worlds, p. 124.

'].

"The interpreters of the new knowledge and understanding, Sir James Jeans,
Sir Arthur Eddington, Professor Millikan, General Smuts, to mention only few,
a

have almost without exception approached their problems against background

a

of outworn Idealist philosophy" (H. Levy, The Universe Science, p. vi).

of
 THE VALUE OF SCIENCE 67

conceive anythingpure thought to which the modern

save
mathematical description of. the universe could apply. The latter
reached his by reflecting that the only direct knowledge we
possess is the knowledge of mental states. All other knowledge
is inferred. Many a religious Fundamentalist has embraced both
these statements with open arms, because they represent a swing
away from the materialism of the last century, and also because
they admit science deals with only a partial aspect of reality,
thus leaving room for mysticism, esthetics, and morality. It is
our contention that if morality and religion and God have no
more basis than a loophole left by an idealist interpretation of
science, they are not worth having. Rather, it
wiser to seems
show the fallacy of the idealist science than to accept its infer
ences. Hence, a word about its two arguments and then a critical
appreciation of them.
1. The familiar world of sense experience is not entirely ob

jectively real, but is to some extent a product of the scientists'

reasoning. The physicist believes he has
right to re-present the
a
problem of perception because of the new knowledge given to
us by his science concerning light, and by the science of psychol

ogy concerning the nervous system. Many modern physicists con

tend that the external world is not something we perceive, but
rather something we construct from messages which reach the
brain along the nerves. The mind "weaves an impression out of
the stimuli traveling along the nerves to the brain."3 Not only

*A. S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, pp. 240, 278, 317, 100
Professor Eddington "Consider how our supposed acquaintance with the
states:
lump of matter is attained. Some influence emanating from it plays on the ex
tremity of a nerve, starting a series of physical and chemical changes which are
propagated along the nevrve to a brain cell; there a mystery happens, and an
image or sensation arises in the mind
which cannot purport to resemble the
stimulus which excites it. Everything known about the material world must in
one way or other have been inferred from those stimuli transmitted along the
nerves. It is an astonishing feat of deciphering that we should have been able to
infer an orderly scheme of natural from such indirect communication.
knowledge
But clearly there is one kind of knowledge which cannot pass through such
channels, namely, knowledge of the intrinsic nature of that which lies at the far
end of the line of communication. The inferred knowledge is a skeleton frame,
the entities which build the frame being of undisclosed nature. For that reason
they are described by symbols, as the symbol x in algebra stands for an un
known quantity. The mind as a central receiving station reads the dots and
dashes of the incoming nerve-signals. By frequent repetition of their call-signals
68 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

the familiar qualities of Locke — color, temperature,

secondary
sound and texture — but also the primary qualities are fancies
projected by the mind into the external world. Hearing is the
motion of molecules; sound is a wave in the atmosphere; solidity
is the characteristic of spatial juxtaposition of atoms; smell is
something given off by something belonging
a body, rather than
to a body. The substantiality of
body (the word substantiality
a
as used by modern physicists is confused wrongly with the tradi
tional notion of substance) is also the product of the brain's
capacity for world-building. Substance does not belong, therefore,
to the everyday world of sense-experience, for physics has done
away with substance, having "chased the solid substance from
the continuous liquid to the atom, from the atom to the electron,
and there it has been lost."4 If substance survives at all, it is be
cause it is "a fancy projected by the mind into the external
world."5 This idealist vision of the world of sense is quite general,
according to Professor Jeans. "There is," he says, "a wide measure
of agreement, which on the physical side of science approaches
almost to unanimity, that the stream of knowledge is heading
towards anon-mechanical reality."6 The world, as seen by science,
is not the world as it really is.7 It is to some extent subjective, in
asmuch as its subject matter is modified and molded by the
sense apparatus which explores it.
The foregoing proposition attributes the properties of the
2.
world of sense to the constructive activities of the mind. The sec
ond proposition underlying modern physics attributes the prop
erties of the world of science to the same constructive activities.
It equivalently states that the world of modern physics is not
objectively real, but is a product of the scientists' world-building.
Professor Eddington tells us just how a scientist would begin to

the various transmitting stations of the outside world become familiar. We begin
to feel quite a homely acquaintance with 2LO and 5XX. But a broadcasting
station is not lik,e its call signal; there is no commensurability in their nature. So
too the chairs and tables around us which broadcast to us incessantly those signals
which affect our sight and touch cannot in their nature be like unto the signals
or to the sensations which the signals awake at the end of their journey" {Science
and the Unseen World, pp. 22, 23).
'Nature of the Physical World, p. 318.
'Ibid.; cf. Jeans, The New Background of Science, pp. 10 ff.
"The Mysterious Universe, p. 148.
'Joseph Needham, The Sceptical Biologist, p. 245.
 THE VALUE OF SCIENCE 69

build aworld. He would not, like the Victorian scientist, go out

in. search of "atomic bricks," but rather in search of "relations
and relata." "The relations unite the relata; the relata are the
meeting point of the relations. The one is unthinkable apart
from the other."8
It is evident from the foregoing that the physicist is interested
only in abstracted aspects of the scientific world, and these aspects
are determined, in part, by the
at least mind of the physicist who
abstracted them. "Ultimately, it is the mind that decides what is
lumber — which part of our building will shadow the things of
common experience and which have no such counterpart."9 In
other words, the physicist deals with a symbolic world. He is not
interested in the problem of an elephant sliding down a grassy
hillside, but only in the "pointer readings" or mathematical sym
bols of that problem.10
But if our knowledge of the scientific universe is mathemat
ical, is this mathematicalknowledge derived from an observation
of the empirical world? Professor Jeans rejects this notion and
falls back on the Kantian subjectivist solution that mathematics
is a creation of pure thought. Like Descartes and Leibnitz before
him, mathematics is a priori. The world, in this view, works
mathematically, because our minds have put mathematics into
it by the mere process of knowing it. It is as if we invented a
game, made our own rules, and then discovered that someone
in the outside world was playing the same game according to
the rules we devised.
". . . the shadow of a game of chess, played by the actors out
in the sunlight, would remind us of the games of chess we had
played in our cave. Now and then we might recognise knights'
moves, or observe castles moving simultaneously with kings and
queens, or discern other characteristic moves so similar to those
we were accustomed to play that they could not be attributed to
chance. We would no longer think of the external reality as a
machine; the details of its operation might be mechanical, but in
essence it would be a reality of thought : we should recognise the
chess-players out in the sunlight as beings governed by minds

'Nature of the Physical World, p. 230.

'Ibid., p. 233.
"Ibid., p. 252.
70 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

like our own; we should find the counterpart of our own thoughts
in the reality which was for ever inaccessible to our direct
observation.
"And when scientists study the world of phenomena, the
shadows which nature throws on the wall of our cave, they do
not find these shadows totally unintelligible, and neither do they
seem to represent unknown or unfamiliar objects. Rather, it seems
to me, we can recognize chess-players outside in the sunshine
who appear to be very well acquainted with the rules of the
game as we have formulated them in our cave. . . .
"And now it emerges that the shadow-play which we describe
as the fall of an apple to the ground, the ebb and flow of the
tides, the motion of electrons in the atom, are produced by actors
who seem very conversant with these purely mathematical con
cepts — with our rules of our game of which we formulated
chess,
long before we discovered that the shadows on the wall were also
playing chess."11
In another and later work he adds unblushingly :
"The law and order which we find in the universe are most
easily described and also, I think, most easily explained in the
language of idealism. ... In brief, idealism has always maintained
that, as the beginning of the road by which we explore nature
is mental, the chances are that the end also will be mental. To
this present day science adds that, at the farthest point she has
so far reached, much, and possibly all that was not mental has
disappeared, and nothing new has come in that is not mental."12
Professor Jeans carries this conclusion on to natural theology
and argues: structure and relations have taken the place of sub
stance. But structure are intelligible only in terms
and relations
of mathematics. Hence, mathematics is the best interpreter of the
universe. But mathematics is something which is spun out of our
own mind. Having spun we apply
it,

to the universe and we

it

find that the universe therefore mathematical, or the sum of

is

its mathematical properties. The universe therefore the result

is

of thought which exists in the mind of the

mathematical
a

"Mathematician which God."

is

"The Mysterious Universe, pp. 137, 138, 139.

"The New Background Science, p. 298.
of
 THE VALUE OF SCIENCE 71

"To my mind, the laws which nature obeys are less suggestive
of those which a machine obeys in its motion than of those which
a musician obeys in writing a fugue, or a poet in composing a
sonnet."
"It does not matter whether objects 'exist in my mind or that
of any other created spirit' or not; their objectivity arises from
"13
their subsisting 'in the mind of some Eternal Spirit.'
In summary, the idealist tendency in modern physics, as rep
resented by Professor Eddington and Professor Jeans, holds that
the world of sense and the world of science are both quasi-crea-
tions of our own mind, and if we chose to inquire further into
the metaphysics, we would learn that these two worlds of sense
and of science are only appearances of a reality which lies behind
them, which is God. Here scientists would admit that they "feel
it necessary to concede some background to the measures" which
physics studies, namely, an "external world; but the attributes of
this world, except insofar as they are represented in the measures,
are outside scientific scrutiny."14
Before undertaking a criticism of these views it must be ad
mitted that it is conceivable that one might fall into the error of
idealism, for a double reason : first, the difficulty the mind has in
conceiving or representing those objects which are so much at
seeming variance with common-sense observation. It is easy to
understand an elephant as separate from the pointer readings by
which the scientist describes but not so easy to see the
it,

is
it

continuity between the two. Furthermore, the scientist when

confronted with an unscientific mind, always finds difficult to
it

translate his mathematical interpretation of the universe into

simple proof, and may therefore be led to conclude that he
is

living in an entirely different world from the concrete and ob

servable world of the lay mind.
But making allowances for these difficulties the idealist solu
tion of the problem of the value of science, both as regards the
world of sense and the world of science, quite unsatisfying.
If
is

science to be science, must have real value and must put

is

it

us in contact with reality.

"Mysterious Universe, pp. 146, 147.

"Nature the Physical World, p. xiii.
of
72 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

As regards the presumed disparity between the world of

1.

sense and perception, it will be recalled that the scientific idealist

holds that if there were no perceiving subject, there would be
no warmth, no color, and no smell. "It is Mind which transmutes
the symbols. The sparsely spread nuclei of electric forces become
a tangible solid; their restless agitation becomes the warmth of
summer; the octave of aethereal vibrations becomes a gorgeous
rainbow."15
But it certainly should not, and it does not follow that there
is a break of continuity between the external world and sensible
perception. Granted that perception proceeds from the messages
which reach the brain along the nerve fibers. The fact is they do
originate, and they must originate, as the result of the impact
of something on the sense organs. If perceptions are code mes
sages, asProfessor Eddington calls them, then they must have a
source from which they come and there must be real things to
which they refer. The first thing known is not my perception,
but the thing perceived. As Professor Joad has well observed:
"What I do know intimately and directly is neither mind nor
brain, neither mental events nor terminals of nerve fibers, but
physical objects such as tables and chairs and people. Nor, I think,
would it ever occur to anyone outside a philosophical classroom
or a physicist's laboratory to assert that I know anything but
physical objects. Certainly I do not, in the brief and uncertain
glimpses I
do get of my own mind, observe it weaving secondary
qualities out of messages reaching the brain, and then projecting
them into the external world, which is one of the things which,
on Professor Eddington's theory of world building, my mind is
constantly doing.
"I in fact, find any introspective evidence for world
cannot,
building, and the account of the process given by Professor Ed
dington bristles with difficulties as I have tried to show. It con
fuses mind with brain, brain with sense organs, and sense organs
with objects which impinge upon them. And these objects it
represents at one moment as starting-points of a process of world
building, which at other moments it makes responsible for their
production."16

"Ibid., p. xvii.
MC. E. M. Joad, Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science (London, 1932), pp.
39-40.
 THE VALUE OF SCIENCE 73

2. The more important problem, however, is whether the sci

entist's mathematical interpretation of the universe has only a
symbolic value or a real value. Again it will be recalled that ac
cording to the idealist position, the world of modern physics is
not objectively real but in some way the construction of the
mind. The great difficulty against this view is the difficulty of
Kantian philosophy, namely, how to account for the correspond
ence between what is inside the mind and what is outside the
mind. Kant denied that causality had any intrinsic relation with
the objective world, or was ever abstracted from it. He therefore
could never explain why the category of causality properly ap
plied itself to the sensible phenomenon of succession, rather than
the category, for example, of beauty. The idealistic physicist has
exactly the same difficulty. Why does the mind create the symbols
which it does create? Professor Joad well argues that if the mind
is forced to "carve out from a featureless world of point-events
whatever kind of familiar world it pleases, is it conceivable that
it would carve out motor smashes, wars, missed trains and den
tists' drills ? Are we not driven to the view that reality must con
tain, and contain in its own right, certain marks or features
which the mind discovers and which constitute the framework
within which the 'working-up' process takes place; that, in other
words, the reason why my mind carves out 'tiger' in circum
stances in which I cannot escape from tiger, and not 'bitten' is
that something corresponding to a tiger really is there?
"Reality contains, if not all the objects and differences we
know, at least the ground for all the objects and differences we
know. We cannot, then, regard the familiar world as a structure
fashioned by the mind from a featureless world of mathematical
unless we are prepared to answer the question,
point-events, why
do we not fashion it better than we do? That we could, if we
had a free hand, create a better world, in the sense of a world
nearer to our hearts' desire, the necessity which most of us are
palpably under of constructing an imaginary world to make up
for the defects of the real one we perceive, is sufficient evidence.
And the imagined worlds are really created worlds, just because
the perceived world is not."17

"Ibid., pp. 117-118.

74 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

". . . The abstract scheme of structures and relations which

forms the basis of the mathematical physicist's process of world
building is suggested by the everyday world. The question which
of the various measures of structure will be ultimately selected for
world building by the mathematical physicist, and which rejected
as lumber is decided by reference to the everyday world, the test
which is applied to them being that of helping to form a world
which will 'shadow the things of common experience.' Thus the
world of common experience is the datum from which the physi
cist starts and the criterion by which he determines the validity
It
is,
of the structure he raises. therefore, presupposed as real and

objective throughout."18
begin with the external world of external
Since perceptions
3.

objects, wholly untrue to say that there nothing in com

is

by is
it

mon between what the ordinary man knows reality and what
by

the scientist means reality. There no unbridgable distance

is

between the two tables of Professor Eddington. Science and com

mon-sense-observation are not in conflict any more than they have
been at any other time since the beginning of the world. Science
has always corrected the ordinary sense-observation. My eyes see
an oasis on the horizon; but my "scientific mind" tells me that
what see may still look like an oasis, but know
It

mirage.
is
a

I
I

not. see stick bent in water: the scientific explanation of

is
it

a
I

its seeming bentness the effect of the luminous rays passing

is

through the double medium of air and water. The only difference
between the two tables of Professor Eddington and the oasis and
mirage that the scientific analysis of the "brute fact" has gone
is

further in the case of the table than in the case of the oasis and
the mirage. The opposition between the two
only apparent,
is

and there no reason why we should conclude that we have

is

been divorced entirely from reality and that all ground has been
cut from beneath our feet.
And in the higher realm, the correspondence between mathe
matical perception of the universe and the universe itself does
not justify the conclusion that mind
A

lawgiver to nature.
is
a

more reasonable interpretation seems to be that the mind dis

covers the mathematical character of the universe, but does not

"ibid., P. 46.
 THE VALUE OF SCIENCE 75

impose it. The universe is not mathematical because the mind

endows it with mathematical qualities, but because the universe
being rational in its structure admits of a rational description in
terms of mathematics. It seems odd, indeed, that the scientific
world had to wait for the year 1900 and Planck's famous paper
before our mathematical minds should mold nature to their own
laws. The whole idealist position is the attribution to a scientific
mind of what in reality belongs to the Divine Mind. It is the
characteristic of the Divine Intellect to determine and measure
reality; it is the characteristic of human intellect to be measured
and determined by nature, except in works of art.19 The eye does
not create reality. The Divine Mind, however, does create reality,
but in no way is determined by it. The idealist's position in sci
ence thus attributes to the human mind that which traditional
thought has ascribed to God.
The modern philosophical view of science begins with a philo
sophical theory and a very unjustifiable one at that; namely,
idealism. In reacting against mechanism, science has gone to the
opposite extreme of asserting that now it merely introduces us
not to reality, but to ourselves.The scientist who starts his in
vestigations wearing the colored glasses of idealism will neces
sarily divert his brain from the problems and confusions of an
all too real outward world to a state of passive and unreal mathe
matical mysticism. Professor H. Levy, of the Department of
Mathematics of the University of London, believes that the prob
lem of the value of scientific knowledge, which is not a problem
of science at all, has become one because the leading scientists
today are primarily mathematicians. "By profession and mental
ity, mathematicians have forged a colossal weapon of thought
that has tended to obscure the physical basis on which the whole
structure rests, and science and the modern world have taken on
the appearance of a terrifying mathematical theorem."20 It might
be added that the modern concern with the kind of world science
investigated is due less to the fact that the scientists are mathe

"Intellectus divinus est mensurans non mensuratus; sed intellectus noster est
mensuratus non mensurans quidem res naturales, sed artificiales tantum (De
Veritate, q. 1, art. 2).
In sciendo mensuramur per res quae extra nos sunt (In Meta., lib. 1o, lect. 2,
1, q. 21, art.
2).
*The Universe of Science, p. 33.
j6 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

maticians, than to the fact that they are philosophers, and in

particular, philosophers who have read Kant without criticizing
his Critique.

4. The problem whether science has a real value is much like

a modernization of the Scholastic dispute of whether an idea is
an id quo or an id quod. In modern language this means, do
mathematics have a relation to reality or are they only a mathe
matical symbol? The modern idealist would hold that scientific
knowledge is "that which is known" instead of that "by which"
reality is known. St. Thomas' criticism of the subjective theory
of knowledge is therefore quite to the point. In many places in
his writings he contends that we know reality before we know
the idea of reality, which in modern scientific language means
we know the objective intelligible scientific world before we
know the ideas which represent them. Thus he gives two reasons
against the subjectivism which would teach that the ideas are
only "that which" we know, and not "by which" we know:
"Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only
the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is cog
nizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According
to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression,
namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this
species is what is understood.
"This
is,

manifestly false for two reasons. First, be

however,
cause the things we understand are the objects of science; there
fore what we understand merely the intelligible species in the
it if

is

soul, would follow that every science would not be concerned

with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species
within the soul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists
all science about ideas, which they held to be actually under
is

stood. Secondly, untrue, because would lead to the opinion

is
it

it

of the ancients who maintained that whatever seems, true and

is

that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For

if

the faculty knows its own impression only, can judge of that
it

only. Now thing seems, according to the impressions made on

a

the cognitive faculties. Consequently the cognitive faculty will

always judge of its own impression as such; and so every judg
ment will be true: for instance, taste perceived only its own
if

impression, when anyone with healthy taste perceives that

a
 THE VALUE OF SCIENCE 77

honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a cor

rupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally
true; for each would judge according to the impression on his
taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact, every
sort of apprehension.
"Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related
to the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved
thus. There is a twofold action, one which remains in the agent
for instance, to see and to understand and another which passes
into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and each
of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the
form from which proceeds an act tending to something external
is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is
a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which proceeds
an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object.
Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible

is,
thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that the in
by

telligible species, the form which the intellect understands.

is

by

But since the intellect reflects upon itself, such reflection un

it

by
derstands both its own act of intelligence, and the species
which understands. Thus the intelligible species that which
is
it

understood but that which primarily understood

is

secondarily;
is

the object, of which the species the likeness. This also appears
is
is

from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that like
like. For they said that the soul knows the earth
by

known
is

If,
by

outside itself the earth within itself; and so of the rest.

therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth,
according to Aristotle (De Anima, iii. 38) who says that stone
a

not in the soul, but only the likeness the stone; follows
of

it
is

by

that the soul knows external things means of its intelligible

species."21
The stone that which first known and not the idea of the
is

is
by

stone, except indirectly the act of reflection when the intellect

turns back upon itself, otherwise our knowledge would be only
of ideas instead of things.22

"l. q. 85, art. 2.

"Lapis est id quod intelligitur, non autem species lapidis, nisi per reflexionem
intellectus supra seipsum, alioquin scientiae non essent de rebus, sed de speciebus
intelligibilibus q. 76, art. 2, ad 4).
(1

Objectum intellectus est ipsa rei essentia, quamvis essentiam rei cognoscat per
78 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

The idea, then, is not that which we see, it is that by which we

see. The difference between these two notions sums up the fun

damental difference that separates modern idealism in all its forms

from Thomistic realism. The idea is not a substitute for reality,
nor is it a museum of samples, as M. Blondel would have us be
lieve; nor is it a rubric under which we catalog an object, as
M. Bergson believes it to be; nor is a symbol inexpressive of real
ity, as Jeans and Eddington believe. It is not a portrait or an in
strumental sign like a medal which is first known before making
known. It is a sign the like of which does not exist in the material
is,

world of bodies, that formal sign of which the nature to

is
a

signify and to make known before being itself known

by
reflexion.23
The problem of knowledge posited in these words: How can
we be sure that the idea corresponds with the reality? does not
exist for St. Thomas. There can be no question of correspondence
when there presence or identity. "It the real immediately
is

is

which know. But something beyond thought unthinkable,

is
a
I

said. But the real not something beyond thought.

It
is

is

is
it

a
presence and an independent one which do not posit. Whether
I

welcome or refuse and

it,

my love my hate can never alter

it
I

or change it. Whether pleases me to say so or to believe

it,

there
it

will never be another truth for me than that which

it

expresses."24
There no problem of correspondence, as there no error
is

is

where there identity. The abstractive intuition of

is

is

essence
without error. Error can exist only where there composition,
is

and here there no composition.25 The fault of modern idealism

is

to make the idea closed object instead of an open relation,

is

ejus similitudinem, sicut per medium cognoscendi (De Vet. q. 10, art. 4, ad 1).
Cf. Contra Gentiles, lib. c. 46; lib. 2, c. 73, 75, 98; lib. 3, c. 49. "Intellectio
1,

enim qua lapis intelligitur ad lapidem terminatur" (Sylvester, lib. 1, cap. 53, 1).
Cf. q. 5, art. 1, "Sed in ipso immediate res cognita attingitur" (John St.
of

Thomas, Phil. Nat., 3, q. 5, art. 1); Cajetan in Summa, 1, q. 85, art. 2. Also
t.

P. Cordovani in S. Tommaso D'Aquino, Revisti di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, Luglio-

Agosto, 1924, p. 241 S.
"Jacques Maritain, "L'Intelligence d'apres M. Maurice Blondel," Revue de
Philosophie, July-August, 1923. Cf. Reflexions sur Vlntelligence 1924, p. 33.
,

MLeon Noel, Notes d'EpistSmologie Thomiste.

"Objectum intellectual est quod quid est, circa quod non errat, sicut neque
sensus circa proprium sensibile (1. q. 57, art. 1, ad 2).
 THE VALUE OF SCIENCE 79

and a photograph of a thing instead of the thing photographed.

"A

is,
which is not the representation of anything
representation
at the same time and under the same formal relation, related and
non-related."26
The idea never the direct object of the knowledge of the in
is

by
tellect, but only the indirect. only another act, reflex one,

It
is

a
that the intellect attains the idea. The thing always known be

is
fore the idea of the thing.27

"Garrigou-Lagrange, Dieu, Son Existence et Sa Nature, p. 138.

"Veritas est in intellectu sicut consequens actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per
intellectum: consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum quod judi
cium intellectus est de re secundum quod est; cognoscitur autem ab intellectu
secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum non solum secundum
quod cognoscit actum suum sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem ejus ad
rem: quod quidem cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi,
quod est ipse intellectus, in cujus natura est ut rebus conformetur (De Veritate,
q. 1, art. 9).
the intellect seizes the reality of the thing under its ratio, what the differ
If

is
ence between the ratio existingin the mind and the ratio existing in reality?
What the difference between the ratio of man existing in the mind, and the
is

ratio of man existing in Peter? Observe that the question merely the difference
is

of ratio, and not the difference between the universal and the particular.
As far as the ratio of the thing concerned, there no difference whether
is

is

it
in the mind or outside the mind. The ratio the essence and the essence the
is

be
is

same in both; otherwise, there would be no identity and no true knowledge.

But the ratio the same in both, there no difference between them? The
is

is
if

difference difference of existence. The essence the same in both, but the
is

is
a

existence different. The ratio has different mode of existence outside the mind
is

than has inside the mind. Outside the mind its mode of existence material
it

is

and individual. Inside the mind without these material and individuating
is
it

notes. But there different mode of existence than that of the nature of
is

is a

thing? St. Thomas can rightly say: "The nature of the thing which known
is

truly outside the mind, but has not the same mode of being outside the mind
it

as has when known" (1. q. 56, art. 2, ad 4).

it

is
it

"The ideas are not more excellent than the things as far as their manner of
representation concerned, but they are far more noble as regards the mode of
is

their being." (Species autem intellectus nostri non sunt excellentiores rebus ipsis
quantum ad repraesentationem, licet sunt excellentiores ad modum essendi.) De
Veritate, q. art. 10.
8,

In the material nothing exactly parallel to intentional being in

universe there
is

the intellectual order. Knowledge

an assimilation. But assimilation proceeds ac
is

cording to the nature of the one assimilating. In the physiological process of as

similation, not necessary that the plant life continue the same mode of exist
is
it

ence in the animal tissue as did in its external environment. sufficient that
It
is
it

the chemical constituents remain the same. "The essences of material things are
in the human intellect, as thing known in the one knowing, and not according
a
80 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

An important corollary of doctrine is that intellectual this

knowledge is in indirect relation with the singular. The intel
lectual knowledge of the nature of things is not without value
for the world of individuals. Abstraction does not mean the bank
ruptcy of the individual. The concept is not formed in mid-air as
a separate and independent entity, without any relation whatso
ever to the singular and the particular. Though the mind knows
only universals directly, it nevertheless knows singulars indirectly.
For Thomas says: "Our intellect cannot know the singular
as St.
in material things directly and primarily. The reason of this is
that the principle of singularity in material things is individual
matter, whereas our intellect . . . understands by abstracting the
intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted
from individual matter is the universal. Hence our intellect
knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as it were
by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because . . . even
after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to
understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in which it under

to their real mode of being, as the intellect does not apprehend things according
is,

to their mode of being, that according to their materiality, but according to

being" (1. q. 51, art. 1, ad 2; q. 50, art. c.j q. 57, art. 1, ad 2).
of

its mode
2

The ultimate reason of intentional being in the intellect to supply the defi
is

ciencies of naturalbeings. (De Veritate, q. 2, art. 2.)

Thus, they are enabled to acquire mode of perfection which not theirs by
is
a
is,

nature. thanks to this gift, that man can sum up all creation within himself
It

and give glory to God in the name of all visible creation.

The intellect, then, according (i.e., the being of its own
to its entitative being
nature, in virtue of which activity), terminates by the idea,
immanent
it

possesses
but according to its intentional being terminates in the thing known. (Haec est
perfectio cognoscentis in quantum est cognoscens; quia secundum hoc cogno
a

scente aliquid cognoscitur quod ipsum cognitum aliquo modo est apud cogno-
scentem, et ideo in De. Anima, dicitur anima esse quodammodo omnia, quia
3

nata est omnia cognoscere. Et secundum hoc modum possible est ut in una re
totius universi perfecto existat. De Veritate, q. 2, art. 2.)
"Knowledge requires double union, firstly, union in entitative being, by
a

which the subject put in contact with the thing, then union by which one
is

becomes the other, which accomplishes itself in intentional being. Thus nec
is
it, it

essary that our intellect be determined by an accident which affects in its

entitative being, order that receive in itself the intentional being, and that the
in

it

act of knowing be produced" (Jacques Maritain, op. cit., p. 63).

The idea, therefore, both subjective and objective — true, but only under
is

different relations. subjective

It

as regards its entitative being, but objective

is

as
regards its intentional being; subjective as regards its being, and objective as
regards its value.
 THE VALUE OF SCIENCE 81

stands the species, as is said in De Anima, iii. 7. Therefore, it un

derstands the universal directly through the intelligible species,
and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And
thus it forms the proposition, Socrates is a man."26 The particular
means by which abstract ideas join the individuals is through
imaged thought, or what the Scholastics called "conversion to the
phantasm."29
It according to this doctrine, which makes the
is the phantasm,
link between the idea and the sensible thing in the external world.
The Angelic Doctor held rigidly to imaged thought not as a
mere speculative question; but as a very practical one. In phi
losophy it means that our abstract ideas are not mere abstractions
which belong to an ideal world, but they are applicable to each
and every individual thing. The laws of thought are therefore
laws of reality, and thanks to the phantasm, the most abstract of
these laws will have some bearing on even the most insignificant
particular thing.30

"1. q. 86, art. 1. Cf. De Veritate, q. 10, art. 5; De Anima, c. 3, lect. 8; 4 ad 50,

q. 1, art. 3, sol and ad 1; Quod. 7, q. 1, art. 3; De Veritate, q. 2, art. 4. ad 1;

Contra Gentiles, lib. 1, cap. 63, 65; lib. 2, cap. 97.
"Quid tamen sit res ilia, ignotum est. Sic enim res ilia et nota quodamodo et
ignota est. Nota quidemin alio . . . ignota autem secundum suam rationem
formalem, et in proprio conceptu. . . . Nota quantum ad quaes-
consequenter
tionem quia est, ignota est quantum ad quaestionem quid est. Et hoc modo
singulare materiale notum est intellectui nostro" (Cajetan, in 1. q. 86, art. 1).
"Contingentia prout sunt contingentia cognoscuntur directe quidem a sensu, in-
directe autem ab intellectu" (Ibid., t. q. 86, art. 3).
"Intellectus noster . . . per quaindam reflexionem redit in cognitionem ipsius
phantasmatis, dum considerat naturam actus sui. . . . Inquantum ergo intel
lects noster, per similitudinem quam accepit a phantasmate reflectitur in ipsum
phantasma a quo speciem abstrahit, quod est similitudo particularis, habet quan-
dam cognitionem de singulari secundum continuationem quamdam intellectus
ad imaginationem (De Veritate, q. 2, art. 6).
*°St. Thomas gives two reasons for imaged thought: "In the present state of
life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is quite impossible for our
intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms. And
of this there are two indications. First of all because the intellect, being a power
that does not make use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in
its act through the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were not re
quired the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now
sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part, make use
of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is dear that for the intellect to understand
actually, not only when it acquires fresh .knowledge, but also when it applies
knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of
the other powers. For when the act of the imagination is hindered by a lesion of
 82 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

5. It may be objected that the new science of mathematical

physics with its mathematical interpretation of nature represents
a complete divorce from the real, on the ground that there is no
relation between the mathematical symbols and the world so
symbolized. Curiously enough this objection was already familiar
to St. Thomas, who answers it by observing that mathematical
symbols are not a complete and total abstraction from the phys
ical world. In order to understand his answer, it must be recalled
that the Scholastics very properly distinguished between common
matter and individual matter. The common matter of a man is
flesh and blood; the individual matter or materia signata is this
particular flesh and blood which is proper to him and to no one
else of his species. Now mathematical symbols, such as those

the corporeal organ, for instance, in a case of frenzy, or when the act of the
memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered
from actually understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge. Sec
ondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand
something he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which
as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is
that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples
before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding.
"Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the
thing known. Wherefore, the proper object of the angelic intellect, which is en
tirely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body.
Whereas the proper object of the human intellect which is united to a body, is a
quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of
visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs
to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal
matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual
stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth.
Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known com
pletely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual.
Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And,
therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of
necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing
in the individual. But if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form;
if,

or as the Platonists say, the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the
individual; there would be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms
whenever understands" (1. q. 84, art. 7).
it

Cf. John of St. Thomas, Philosophia Naturalis, p., q. 10, art. 4.

3

Sed experimento patet quod etiam ille, qui jam acquisivit scientiam intel-
ligibilem per species intellectus non potest actu considerare illud cujus scientiam
habet nisi occurrat aliquod phantasma. Et inde est quod laeso organo imagina-
ei

tionis impeditur homo non solum ab inteligendo aliquo de novo, sed etiam con-
siderando ea, quae prius intellexit, ut patet in phreneticis (De Mem. et Rem.,
lect. 2).
 THE VALUE OF SCIENCE 83

which would represent table No. 2 are abstracted from its con
crete individual matter, but not from common matter, for the
symbols refer to a quantity symbolized. "Quantity is a substance
before other sensible qualities are. Hence, quantities such as
numbers, dimensions, and figures, which are the terminations of
quantity can be considered apart from sensible matter; but they
cannot be considered without understanding the substance which
is subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them
from common intelligible matter. Yet they can be considered
apart from this or that substance, for that is to abstract them
from individual, intelligible matter."31 Mathematical concepts are
therefore not totally and completely divorced from all sensible
matter. By abstraction they are considered apart from but this

it,
does not mean divorced from it.32 The very fact that mathemat
ical expressions of scientific laws can be applied to the real world
proof of the realistic basis of these laws. The mind does not
is
a

put the correspondence between the symbols and reality into

reality; discovers the correspondence.
it

Dean Inge rightly emphatic in his latest book in saying: "I

is

maintain, with Meyerson, that science fundamentally oncolog

is

ical. Its starting point assumes

It

common-sense philosophy.
is

that the objects studies are real."33

it

The whole confusion about the alleged subjective character

6.

of scientific laws grounded upon forgetfulness that mathe

is

matical physics what the Scholastics called scientia media, or

is

mathematization of the sensible. Every science constituted

is
a

of material and formal object. The material object what

is is

is
a
a

studied; the formal object the aspect or the how studied.

is

it

The new mathematical physics from the material point of

is,

view, science of the real world, but soon leaves that concrete,
it
a

real world to manipulate in terms of mathematical symbols. St.

it

Thomas, much in advance of his time, very insistent on this

is

point. The foundation of the mathematical outlook in the

is

sensible order, but its development not, but since every science
is
by

to be judged the object upon which works, mathematical

is

it

"1, q. 85, art. 1, ad 2.

"Licet esse non possint nisi in materia sensibili in eoram tamen definitione ma
teria sensibilis non cadit (in Phy., lib. 1, lect. 1).
"God and the Astronomers, p. 41.
84 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

physics is more of a physical science than a mathematical science.*4

Hence, those who say that scientific theories are subjective con
cern themselves with only the formal aspect of the science, just
as those who go to the other extreme and say that it should al
ways keep both feet on the ground and concern itself only with
the sensible fact, emphasize the material aspect. The true solu
tion lies in the Scholastic recognition of mathematical physics as
a scientia media, i.e., as a science which is materially a physical
science, but formally a mathematical science.36
The conclusion to be drawn is that despite the mathematical
and symbolic interpretation of the physical world, science has a
real value and a reference to the objective order. Max Planck ad
mits that there are some who deny such objectivity, but contends
that "it is obvious that if physical science as such were to accept
this position, of research, then it would find
as the exclusive basis
itself trying to support on a very inadequate
a huge structure
foundation. A science that starts off by predicting the denial of
objectivity has already passed sentence on itself."36
The Scholastic position was precisely this, and it is daily con
firmed by the fact that the necessary relations which hold be
tween mathematical expressions, hold of phenomena themselves,
and that the logical consequences of any hypotheses must hold
true for the physical universe, otherwise the hypotheses are built
on air. Finally, every scientist fully knows that if any hypothesis

"Dicuntur autem scientiae mediae, quae accipiunt principia abstracta a scientiis

pure mathematicis, et applicant ad materiam sensibilem. . . . Hujusmodi autem
scientiae, licet sint mediae inter scientiam naturalem et mathematicam, tamen
dicuntur hie a philosopho esse magis naturales quam mathematicae, qua unum-
quodque denominatur et speciem habet a termino: unde quia harum scientiarum
consideratio terminatur ad materiam naturalem, licet per principia mathematica
procedat, magis sunt naturales quam mathematicae (in Phy., lib. 2, lect. 3).
*5In qualibet cognitione duo est considerare, scilicet principium et finem sive
terminum. Principium quidem ad apprehensionem pertinet, terminus autem ad
judicium, ibi enim cognitio perficitur. Principium igitur cujuslibet nostrae cog-
nitionis est in sensu . . . sed terminus cognitionis non semper est uniformiter:
quandoque enim est in sensu (physica) quandoque in imaginatione (mathema
tica) quandoque in solo intellectu (metaphysica). (De Trinitate Boetii, q. 6. art.
2.)
Mathematical physics need not and does not interest itself in the inner nature
of things, or their
essences. It operates on the real only from the mathematical
point of view. (Cf. Jacques Maritain, Les Degres du Savoir, p. 270.)
"Where is Science Going? p. 80.
 THE VALUE OF SCIENCE 85

fails to work, it is not because nature has gone wrong or mis

behaved, but because the hypothesis fails to agree with
itself
nature. Science is real and objective. Qui sensum negligit in na-
turalibus incidit in errorem." To affirm with Professor Jeans that
the universe is but the product of Divine Thought does not an
swer this difficulty. "There is much that is embraced by thought,
even human thought, which does not pertain to the structure of
the physical universe, which is both finite and of a definite type.
And the universe, as conceived by science, has at any rate some
degree of substantiality. It is not mere appearance in the sense
of being a something that comes and goes as we open or shut
our eyes, but is somehow there for all to observe. Scientific ob
servers do not make which they describe for us.
the structures
Rather do they find them inscribed, so to speak, like engravings
or pictures, in a something which used to be called matter, then
ether, but now is called space. Physical reality is not mere
thought, though it is meaningless apart from thought; and it is
just there that the difficulty arises. We cannot completely account
for the physical universe by ascribing it to divine thought, for
divine thought neither needs a vehicle in which to express itself,
nor has so expressed itself except in this particular and finite

"In De Trinitate Boetii, q. 6, art. 7.

"Leslie J. Walker, Science and Revelation, pp. 60, 61.
 CHAPTER V ,

THE SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE

The term science means something quite different for our gen
eration than it did not so many generations ago. It used to mean
knowledge in the strict sense of the term; i.e., not mere acquaint
ance which was gained by experiment, classification, and obser
vation, but also an understanding of things in terms of the why
and wherefore, and an explanation of things in terms of prin
ciples and causes. Today the term signifies merely, in the lan
guage of Sir Arthur Thomson, "a system of critical knowledge,
giving empirical descriptions of things and changes. . . . Science
never asks the question: 'Why?' The average mind today hardly
ever thinks of science in any other manner than as if it were
identified with experiment." Science is generally understood to
mean that experience reveals such and such information. And
yet the term has not always had such a delimited meaning.

Definition of Science
According to the Scholastics, science was made up of the series
of true propositions, explicative of the order of things in terms
of causes both primary and secondary. The end and purpose of
any science was, therefore, the acquisition of certitude, through
causes,1for the sake of the perfection and the happiness of man.2
Hence, in the natural order, that science which most profoundly
sought the ultimate causes of things was the supreme science of
sciences. For both Aristotle and the Scholastics such science was

'Nam cognitio causarum alicujus generis est finis ad quem consideratio scientiae
(In Met. Proemium, lib. 1).
pertingit
2Omnes autem scientiae et artes ordinantur ad unum, scilicet ad hominis per-
fectionem quae est ejus beatitudo (Ibid.).
86
 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE 87

metaphysics, which gave the propter quid of knowledge as against

the mere quia of the more particular branches.3 Theology is a
science, just as much as physics or chemistry. "We must bear in
mind," says St. Thomas, "that there are two kinds of sciences.
There are some which proceed from a principle known by
the natural light of the intelligence, such as arithmetic and ge
ometry and the like. There are some which proceed from prin
ciples known by the light of a higher science : thus the science of
perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry,
and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that
sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles
established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science
of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on
authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so
sacred science is established on principles revealed by God."4
The traditional view of science, then, is much broader than the
narrower view of our own time. Science meant knowledge for
the Scholastics: it means experiment and observation for the
modern mind.

The Object of Science

1.Passing from the definition of science to an analysis of its
nature, there is more general agreement between the traditional
and the modern view. For the Scholastics, science is concerned
with natures. Scienta est de universalibus. Science is concerned
with natures or universals or forms or patterns, simply because
they are communicable. The nature of man is the same in Peter
as in Paul; the nature of water is the same in the laboratory as
in the drinking glass. The form or nature can be shared by
many individuals, and hence, a knowledge of the nature of one
thing tells us something about the nature of another thing.5 In

*Unde cum certitudo scientiae per intellectum acquiratur ex causis, causarum

cognitio maxime intellectualis esse videtur. . . . Illi
qui sciunt causam et propter
quid scientiores sunt et sapientiores illis qui ignorant causam, sed solum sciunt
quia. Experti autem sciunt quia, sed nesciunt propter quid (in Meta. lib. 1, lect.

41, q. 1, art. 2.
"Communicatio enim consequitur rationem actus, unde omnis forma quantum
de se communicabilis est (1 d. 4, q. 1, art. 1 De Veritate, q. 1, art. 5, 1 d. 19, q.
4, art. 2. 1, q. 70, art. 3).
88 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

the purely experimental sciences there is not revealed, of course,

the intimate nature of anything, but there is revealed that which
corresponds to it in that order, namely, the common character
istics. This is what Aristotle meant when he said that the object
of science is the necessary and the universal; man and not this
man.6 That which is universal belongs to all the subjects because
they are what they are.
This traditional outlook is recognized by modern philosophy
of science. Morris R. Cohen, for example, writes that "it ought
to be obvious that the application of laws to phenomena pre
supposes the existence of real classes, that many things and proc
esses are really alike. If there were no real likeness, no examples
of identity in different instances, the formulation of scientific
laws would be without any possible application. The great con
venience of classification and the fact that the same things can
be classified in different ways for different purposes, do not jus
tify the conclusion that there is nothing in the things classified
corresponding to the properties which serve as principia divi-
sionis. There is no evidence for the nominalistic or phenomenal-
istic view that the universe really consists of atomic sensations
and that scientific laws are fictions or nothing but convenient
shorthand symbols for groups of separate facts that have noth
ing real in common. The scientific pursuit of rational connec
tion presupposes that things do have certain common natures
and relations. The economic efficiency of scientific knowledge
is based on something in the facts."7
"The vulgar prejudice against the reality of universals is really
due to the fact that we cannot point to them and say: Here they
are — that they cannot be localized in space. But for that
is,

matter, neither can our civil rights, our debts, or our philosoph
ical misunderstandings and errors; and yet no one has seriously
doubted the real existence of the latter."8
"Changes cannot have any definite character without repeti
tion of identical patterns in different material. the growth of
If

science dissolves the eternity of the hills or the fixity of species,

also discovering constant relations and order in changes
is
it

'Post. Analy., 1, 3.
1

Reason and Nature, p. 153.

'ibid., p. 204.
 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE 89

which previously seemed chaotic and arbitrary. In daily life we

find no difficulty in asserting that an individual or object main
tains its character in the stream of change. Scientifically this
constancy is expressed in the accurate language of mathematics
by the concept of the invariant, not the isolated constant but that
which remains identical amidst variation. We may say then that
the nature of anything is the group of invariant characters."9
The physicists', the chemists', and the biologists' interest in
the universals will, as it was said above, not be in the search for
the intimate nature of things in the metaphysical sense of the
term, but only in the common characteristicsof which Needham
gives the following example: "If the scientific mind is faced
with five hundred balls of all shades of grey from pure black
to pure white, it will separate them into groups of greys, but
these are discontinuous, whereas from the common-sense point
of view one could not have less than five hundred groups, for
all the balls are by definition different. It is only by what has
been called an 'arbitrary falsification of the object's nature' that
classification can be carried out at all. Even in the case of two
black balls, the scientific mind will sweep them into the same
box, unconscious of the fact that one of them is slightly less of
a sphere than the other, if it happens at the moment to be in
terested in blackness and not globularity."10
2. Science is concerned only with universals or common char
And yet the experimental work is done only on in
acteristics.
dividuals. The reconciliation of these two statements is that
science experiments on the individual because it is typical of a
group or representative of a universal. St. Thomas says that it is
impossible to know anything without concerning oneself with
the individual, but science is not derived from the individual as
individual.11 The reason science must deal with individuals is
because natures do not exist in an abstract state, but only con
cretely in individuals.

'Op. at., p. 157.

"Joseph Needham, The Sceptical Biologist, p. 232.
"Impossible est aliquid scire prius quam perveniatur ad individua. Non autem
accipitur hie individuum singulare, quia scientia non est de singularibus (In Meta.,
lib. 2, lect. 4; Ibid., lib. 7, lect. 14, lib. 11, lect. 8; in Post. Anal., lib. 1, lect. 16;
2 d 24, q. 2, art. 4, ad 6; De Veritate, 1, q. 2, art. 13, ad 8).
90 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

The Divisions of Science

In treating this subject, we need a correction of the modern
notion that science means wholly an empirical investigation.
Just as it is wrong to think that science in general means only
the study of observable phenomena, so too it is wrong to think
that science may admit of no general subdivisions. As a matter
of fact, the two broad divisions of science are the deductive and
the inductive. A deductive science is a science of explanation;
an inductive science is a science of observation.
No special study on induction is to found in Aristotle or
be
the Scholastics, although Albert the Great uses the method quite
extensively. The usual explanation of this silence is that the
ancients and the Scholastics were unscientific, or that they exag
gerated the deductive method, or were ignorant of induction.
This is not true, for both the ancients and the Scholastics always
distinguish between deduction and induction,12 or the method
which proceeded from the general to the particular, from that
which proceeded from the particular to the general.13 St. Thomas,
as we have seen, expressly taught that the experimental method
was absolutely necessary for the natural and the physical sciences,
and to neglect it was to fall into error;14 and furthermore, that
in these sciences judgment must be based upon observation.15
If did emphasize the deductive rather than the
the Scholastics
inductive method, it was not because they were ignorant of the
latter, but because they were more interested in teaching than in
the discovery of empirical facts. St. Thomas was typical of their
spirit when he held that the slightest knowledge of God was
worth more than the knowledge of all created things.
Christopher Dawson has done much to correct the prejudice
that Roger Bacon was the founder of the experimental method.
"It was from Grosseteste that Bacon derived his distinctive philo
sophical and scientific views, above all his conviction of the im-

"Unus per demonstrationem, alius per inductionem (In Post. Anal., lib. I, lect.
30).
"Demonstratio procedit ex universalibus; inductio autem procedit ex parti-
cularibus (Ibid.).
"Qui sensum negligit in naturalibus incidit in errorem (In De Trinitate Boetii,
q. 6, art. 2).
"Ut hoc modo judicemus de rebus naturalibus secundum quod sensu ea demon-
strat (Ibid.).
 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE CT

portance of mathematics. . . . But Bacon's experimental science is

not the verification of hypothesis by experiment, the inductive
method which Aristotle describes so admirably in the Posterior
Analytics; it is primarily the realization of science in practical
results. It is the knowledge that teaches man to transmute metals,
to read the future in the stars and to prolong human life for
centuries. . . .

"Thus Bacon was no devotee of pure science. His attitude is

fundamentally far less scientific than that of Aristotle or even
that of St. Thomas. But though this detracts from his greatness
as a thinker, it does nothing to diminish his personal originality,
and his historical significance. It is true that he does not dominate
his age with the commanding authority of an Aquinas, he seems
it altogether as a kind of intellectual
at first sight to stand outside
outlaw. Nevertheless, it would hardly be. an exaggeration to
maintain that it was not St. Thomas, the pure intellectualist, but
Roger Bacon, the scientific visionary and the reputed inventor
of gunpowder, who was the typical representative of the new
tendencies of European thought. The former looks backward to
the classical perfectionof the Hellenic-Mediterranean tradition,
the latter forward to the brilliant and disorderly progress of the
Western mind. For, after all, it is not the Hellenic ideal of pure
science — the construction of an intelligible order — but Bacon's
ideal of science instrument of world conquest and exploita
as an
tion, which is that of the modern world. When Bacon sings the
praises of the experimental science that can create automobiles
and flying machines and devices that will destroy a whole army
in a single instant, he is the prophet of modern science, and his
visions have been more than realized in these days of airplanes
and poison gas: though whether Christendom has been so much
the gainer by it all as he believed is another question. . . .

"But if this is one side of the truth, it is not the whole truth.
In reality both of these elements contributed to the formation of
the European scientific tradition. The pragmatic experimentation
of the Baconian ideal could have borne no fruit apart from the
intellectual training and discipline which were provided by
Aristotelian scholasticism."18
To return to the Scholastic position, the distinction between

""The Origins of the European Scientific Tradition," The Clergy Review, Vol.
2, No. 3, Sept., 1 93 1, pp. 200-203.
02 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

the deductive and the inductive is based upon the fact that science
studies the natureof things. But the nature of things is either
"known" or it is "hidden." The nature of things is said to be

is,
known when it can be isolated from a concrete existence, that
itself. A triangle may be known in its nature quite
by

known
apart from any particular concrete realization of it.17 This does
not mean that the nature known in completely perfect man

is

a
ner. On the other hand, certain natures are hidden, in the sense
that they are manifested by only in external circumstances; for

by
example, iron expanded heat known its visible manifes

is
tations.
In his commentary on the Posterior Analytics Aristotle, St.

of
Thomas develops further the difference between the deductive
and inductive sciences. A deductive science starts with the uni
versal; the inductive starts with the singular. In deduction,

is
it
because know that Peter man that conclude he mortal,

is
is
a
I

but not because know that thunder noise in the clouds

is
it

is
a
I

that conclude that the result of an electrical charge. In the

it
is
I

latter instance of induction there an inference or reason, in the

is

broad sense of the term, for the observed facts do lead to gen
a
eral rule. But this inference operates exclusively because of the
observed facts: through them that the general cause appears.
it
is

In deductive reasoning there are three terms, the major, minor,

and conclusion, but in inductive reasoning there are only two,
namely, the singulars and the universals.18 Induction has no
middle term. limits itself to show the fact of the accord of sub
It

ject and predicate, for example, bodies falling in vacuum cover

a

the same space in the same time. Here there no question of

is

merely proves that common

It

cause. character belongs to

a

"Nam considerare formas et quidditates rerum absolute, videtur pertinere ad

philosophum primum. . . Naturalis (scientia)
. non considerat de forma in-
quantum est forma,
sed inquantum est in materia
(In Phys., lib. 2, lect. 4).
Quaedam igitur sunt speculabilia quae dependent materia secundum esse,
a

quia non nisi in materia esse possunt; et baec distinguuntur, quia dependent
quaedam materia secundum esse et intellectum, sicut ilia in quorum definition?
a

ponitur materia sensibilis: unde sine materia sensibili intelligi non possunt: ut in
definitione hominis oportet accipere carnem et ossa: et de his est physica sive
scientia naturalis Trinitate Bo'etii, q. 5, art. 1).
(In De
"Dicit ergo primo quod quibus formantur duae propositiones concludentes ter-
tiam, manifestum est, quod hae propositiones, ex quibus proceditur in syllogismo
demonstrativo secundum formam praedictam, sunt principia et suppositiones (In
Post. Anal., lib. 1, lect. 30).
 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE 93

subject not by cause but by ensemble of corresponding particular

facts, ab aequivalenti. Induction answers an sit.
In other words, in the deductive sciences we proceed from uni
versal to consequences, but in inductive sciences from singulars to
universals. Professor Morris R. Cohen rather prejudices this very
important distinction between the two by saying that "induction
is the method of discovering general truths, while deduction is
merely a method of exposition."19 As a matter of fact, deduction
is rather the explanation than the method of exposition. His de
scription of induction is correct for, strictly speaking, experimen
tation as John of St. Thomas has pointed out, is not so much to
force a conviction as to introduce a universal.20

Contingency of Inductive Sciences

Contingency is here contrasted with universality and necessity.
The term inductive sciences is used to indicate what the modern
mind generally calls science. It has already been suggested how
of the past century and the beginning of this century,
at the close

philosophers of science, such as Duhem, Poincare, Mach, Bou-

troux, and LeRoy all held to the contingent character of science.
In more recent times, this has become much more generally rec
ognized for more valid reasons. Professor Robert Millikan, in his
work Evolution in Science and Religion, emphasizes with italics
the conclusion that we must abandon the "Science-Knows-It-All-
Theory" of the last century: "Here was a completely new phe
nomenon — a qualitatively new discovery and one having noth
ing to do with the principles of exact measurement. As listened I
and as the world listened, we all began to see that the nineteenth
century physicists had ta\en themselves a little too seriously, that
we had not come quite as near sounding the depths of the uni
verse, even in the matter of fundamental physical principles, as
we thought we had."21 Bertrand Russell states that, "the limita
tions of scientific method have become much more evident in
recent years than they ever were before. They have become most
evident in physics, which is the most advanced of the sciences,
and so far these limitations have had little effect upon the other

"Op. cit., p. 131.

"Non est ordinata ad probandum seu convincendum intellectum sed ad in-
troducendum in universalia (Logica, pars 1, illust. q. 8, art. 2).
"Pp. 1o-11.
94 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

sciences,"22 and again, "All scientific laws rest upon induction,

which, considered as a logical process, is open to doubt, and not
capable of giving certainty."23 "Where principles and concepts
have persisted past their time of usefulness, this has been due to
the inertia of the mental habit. No scientific principles are sac
rosanct; no scientific theory is held with religious convictions."24
Dr. C. E. M. Joad and Dr. J. S. Haldane have enumerated some
of the reasons for the limitation of the scientific method. One
reason is that the scientific method, in the word of the latter,
takes the "juice" out of reality. Presented with a concrete fact,
science abstracts from it certain aspects or factors which are
amenable to its particular form of treatment, and concentrates on
these to the exclusion of the rest. The scientific method must
needs be mechanistic. In order to study a living organism, it
must be taken to pieces and what is left out is precisely that which
makes it a living organism. In other words, it is just insofar as
the organism is not merely an aggregate of parts that the scientific
treatment breaks down.25
Another reason given for the contingent character of science
is that the history of science reveals an increasing number of un

satisfactory theories which have their day and then are thrown
into the discard. In other words, the history of science makes
scientists much more skeptical of the certainty of their conclu
sions than ever before. Such was the argument that led William
James to develop his theory of pragmatism.
But these reasons are not nearly so fundamental as those given
by St. Thomas, who advances three arguments in proof of the
contingency of science:
1. The disproportion between the observable and the observed.
2. The necessarily contingent character of the individual.
3. The want of a nexus between necessary first principles and
groupings of empirical facts.
1. But what is the reason for the contingent character of sci

ence? Why is incertitude involved in scientific conclusions? In

certitude is caused first by the fact that the experimental world

"The Scientific Outlook, p. 74.

"Ibid., p. 67.
"J. W. N. Sullivan, The Limitations of Science, p. 259.
MC. E. M. Joad, Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science, p. 200; J. S. Haldane,
The Sciences and Philosophy, p. 69.
 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE 95

deals with matter.26 The form or nature of thing is indefinitely

a
communicable. The nature "man" may be shared by any number
of individuals. But that which individualizes the nature or the
form is matter. Science is concerned with the nature of a thing,
not in its abstract form, but in its observable, material, and phe
nomenal appearance. But these may be multiplied indefinitely.
Forms or patterns, as we shall see, are indefinitely communicable.
The form H20 can be shared by all the waters in the world.
The form man can be shared by Plato, Socrates, and all who
have ever lived. The number of brains which may be studied in
a psychologicallaboratory is to all general purposes infinite, be
cause brains may be found in countless individuals. But the
number of brains which have been actually experimented with
is,

is quite limited. There therefore, tremendous disproportion

a

between the observable and the observed, the experimentable and

the experimented. Hence, the empirical scientist cannot lay claim
to the absolute certitude of his conclusions. Since he has not in
vestigated all the facts, and since the peculiar character of the
matter in some natures may be different from the matter in
others he can claim no greater certitude than probable certitude.
So long as there verification in every possible in
wanting
is

stance, there can be no absolute certitude in science. That why,

is

St. Thomas tells us, that those sciences which are most given to
the study of singular instances are most subject to error.27
Professor Cohen likens the contingency of the physical laws

"Incertitudo causatur propter transmutabilitatem materiae sensibilis. . . .

Quanto magis proceditur versus particularia, tanto magis itur versus infinitum
(Post. Anal., lib. 1, lect. 14).
Contingentia in rebus sensibilibus est conditio consequens materiam individuan-
tem sensibilia q. 86, art. 4).
(Cajetan, 1.,
The uneliminable character of contingency but the logical expression of the
is

metaphysical Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, p. 152.

fact of individuality.
"Ex hoc vero quod ejus consideratio est circa res mobiles, et quae non uni-
formiter se habent, ejus cognitio est minus firma, quia ejus demonstrationes, ut in
majori parte sunt ex hoc quod contingit aliquando aliter se habere: et ideo quanto
aliqua scientia magis appropinquat ad singularia, sicut scientiae operativae, ut
medicina, alchemia et moralis, minus multi-
possum habere de certitudine propter
tudinem eoram quae consideranda sunt in talibus scientiis, quorum quodlibet
si

omittatur, frequenter erratur; et propter eorum variabilitatem (De Trinitate Boetti,

q. art. 1).
6,

Patet ergo quod inducens facta inductione quod Socrates currat, et Plato, et
Cicero, non potest ex necessitate concludere quod omnis homo currat nisi detur
sibi respondente quod nihil aliud contineatur sub homine, quam ista quae
a

inducta sunt (In Post. Anal. lib. 2., lect. 4).

o6 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

to the contingency associated with such social phenomena as

birth rates and marriages. "From this point of view, the classic
notion of uniform laws of nature holding with absolute accuracy
for the smallest atom as well as for the largest star cluster can
be replaced by the more modest doctrine of empirical or statistical
constants holding in limited fields. Our knowledge of physical
phenomena is in some respects like that of social phenomena
when studied through such facts as marriage rates, birth rates,
tables of exports and imports, etc. . . .

"Laboratory workers know how difficult it is to get phenomena

to repeat themselves even approximately, i.e., within the range
that we call the limit of probable error, and they will readily sub
scribe to the statement in Chwolson's great international text
book that when we study physical phenomena more closely we
can convince ourselves that there is almost no physical law which
can be exactly verified. . . . The primary laws of mechanics, as
of any other branch of physics, are now seen to be logically con
tingent, i.e., they are not to be derived from the non-temporal
laws of logic."28
Long before the modern view of the contingent character of
science was developed, St. Thomas taught that the system of
astronomy presented in his day was not necessarily the true one.
There is no reason, he says, why the Ptolemaic system of the
universe should be the true one. Later on, when scientific meth
ods are improved and scientific instruments perfected, it may be
that a new theory will be propounded which will be more in
accord with facts.29 St. Thomas reminds us also that Aristotle
did not accept all the scientific conclusions of his day, and in so
doing was perfectly within reason, for they were only problematic
and by no means certain.30 The Angelic Doctor himself is not

"Op. cit., pp. 221-223.

"Licet enim talibus suppositionibus factis appareaot solvere, non tamen oportet
dicere has suppositions esse veras, quia forte secundum aliquem alium modum
nondum ab hominibus comprehensum, apparentia circa Stellas salvantur (In
De Coelo, lib. 2, lect. 17, n. 2).
"Dicendum quod Aristoteles non fuit hujus opinionis, sed existimavit quod
omnes motus coelestium corporum sunt circa centrum terrae . . . postmodum
autem Hipparchus et Ptolemaeus adinvenerunt motus eccentricorum et epicyclorum
ad salvandum ea quae apparent sensibus in corporibus coelestibus, unde hoc non
est demonstratum, sed suppositio quaedam (In DeCoelo, lib. 1, lect. 3).
... ad octavum dicendum, quod opinio Ptolemaei de epicyclis et eccentricis
 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE 97

certain that the astronomical theories of his own time explain the
heavens and the movements of the sun and stars for "some other
theory might explain them."31
2. A second reason for the contingency corollary of science is a
of the preceding, and is based on the contingent character of the
individual. Science studies natures, patterns, or forms. But it
cannot study these natures, patterns, or forms in themselves, for
they do not exist in an ideal state, as Plato believed.
By its very
method, science must study these natures as they are "localized"
in individuals, from which it hopes to deduce common aspects.32
Now, necessity belongs to the nature of things, e.g., a triangle
must have three sides; but contingency belongs to the fact that
its nature is individualized, materialized, or concretized, e.g., it
is not necessary that a triangle be made up of wood or steel. In
Scholastic language, necessity belongs to natures, and contin
gency belongs to the individual.33 Since science deals with indi
viduals, it is necessarily contingent. St. Thomas has put the ar
gument very clearly: "Contingent things can be considered in
two ways: either as contingent, or as containing some element
of necessity, since every contingent thing has in it something
necessary; for example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent;
but the relation of running to motion is necessary, for it is neces

non videtur consonare principiis naturalibus, quae Aristoteles ponit, et ideo ilia
opinio sectatoribus Aristotelis non placet (De Trinitate Bo'etii, q. 4, art. 3, ad 8;
Cf. In Metaphysics, lib. 12, lect. 10; In De Coelo, lib. 1, lect. 3, n. 7).
"Cf. 1. q. 32, art. 1, ad 2. In Job xxxviii, lect. 2, where St. Thomas shows a
connection between scientific theories and debilitas cognitionis humanae. Also,
De Coelo, lib. 2., lect. 17, n. 1 et 8. The sole ambition, says St. Thomas, that one
can have concerning the explanation of the comets is to arrive at a "possible
solution." The reason is because in this matter sensible knowledge can teach us so
little. (In Meteor, lib. 1, lect. 11, n. 1.)
The same is true of the study of earthquakes; only a truth aliquod moio is
possible. (In, Meteor, lib. 1, lect. 1, n. 7 et 9.)
Physics and the scientiae mediae, because they treat sensible and particular
things, are less certain than mathematics (in Post. Anal. lib. 1, lect. 41, n. 3;
ibid., lect. 42, n. 3; in Meta. lib. 1, lect. 2; lib. t1, lect. 7; De Trinitate Bo'etii,
c. 6, art. 1).
"There is no attempt to impose here the notion that science must study the
ens, nature or essence of things. That is why the term "common aspects" of
nature is used.
"Ilia proprie ad singularia pertinent quae contingenter eveniunt; quae autem
per se insunt vel repugnant attribuuntur singularibus secundum universalium
rationes (in Perihemenias, lib. 1, cap. 9, lect. 13).
The uneliminable character of contingency is but the logical expression of the
metaphysical fact of individuality. Morris R. Cohen, op. cit., p. 152.
98 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

sary that Socrates moves if he runs. Now, contingency arises from

matter, for contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and
potentiality belongs to matter; whereas necessity results from
form, because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in
the subject. But matter is the individualizing principle: whereas
the universal comes from the abstraction of the form from the
particular matter. Moreover . . . the intellect of itself and directly
has the universal for its object;while the object of sense is the
singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object of the in
tellect. . . . Therefore, the contingent, considered as such, is
known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect; while
the universal and necessary principles of contingent things are
known only by the intellect. Hence, if we consider the objects of
science in their universal principles, then all science is of neces
sary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus some
sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things."34
3. The third reason for the contingency of science is the wide
gap which separates principles and conclusions. There is a first
principle in the speculative order and a first principle in the
moral order, from which many other principles and conclusions
may be deduced. The first principle of the speculative order,
which is the only one which concerns us here, is the principle of
identity or in a negative form, the principle of contradiction. This

"1, q. 86, art. 3.

Making some allowances for differences in terminology, Dr. Joad practically
gives the same reason for the contingency of science. Science deals with common
individual aspects of reality, but the reality escapes. ". . . if all the different ac
counts, the physiological, the chemical, the physical, the psychological, the behav-
iouristic, the psycho-analytic, the economic, the statistical, the biological, the an
thropological, and the novelist's, were collated, supplemented with other accurate
and complete but partial accounts and worked up into a comprehensive survey,
they would still fail to constitute the truth about a man. And they would fail to
do this, not because some particular piece of information had been left out, or
some particular point of view forgotten — for, it would be urged, no matter
how complete the collection of scientific accounts might be, the truth would still
elude them — but because they would remain only a set of separate accounts of
different parts or aspects, and a man is more than the different parts or aspects
which are ingredients in him. True knowledge of man is not, in other words, the
sum-total of the complete and accurate accounts of all different aspects, even
is,

if those accounts could be made exhaustive. True knowledge or at least in

cludes, knowledge of the man as whole. To know man as whole to
it is
a

know him as personality, for personality the whole which, while in

is
a
a

tegrates all the parts and so includes them within itself, nevertheless something
is

over and above their sum" (Philosophical Aspects Modern Science, p. 203).
of
 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE 99

first principle is known immediately upon a knowledge of the

terms. For example, we know the meaning of part
as soon as
and the meaning of whole, we know that the part cannot be
greater than the whole. In like manner, as soon as we know the
meaning of being and the meaning of nonbeing, we know that
a thing cannot be and not be at one and the same time, and under
the same formal consideration.35 Just as to expand and to grow
are natural acts of the body, on condition of receiving food, so
the habitual knowledge of first principles is in the soul on con
dition that its terms come from without.36
Naturally, knowledge is grouped about the first
the closer
principles, the more certain it is. One can readily be certain that
a tree cannot be an ox because of its proximity to the principle
of contradiction and the principle of identity. The first principle
of thought is the foundation of all our intellectual constructions,
and there is no certitude unless knowledge can be resolved back
into the first principles. Just as the nearer we get to the sun, the
nearer we get to light, so too the closer we get to first principles,
the closer we get to certitude.37 The further we get away from
first principles, the less the certitude. It is not easy to see the rela
tion, for example, between a first principle of 'thought and the
Freudian proposition that every dream is an unfulfilled sex libido.
Hence, there is not the certainty in this proposition as there is
in a proposition of mathematics or metaphysics.
Now, since physical science, which treats of the constitution
of matter and the movement of the heavens, is remote from the
firstprinciples of thought, and since certainty is based upon
proximity to the first principles, it follows that the conclusions

1-2, q. 51, art. 1.

"Ipsa principia immediata non per aliquod medium extrinsecum cognoscuntur
sed per cognitionem proprium terminorum. . . . quia in talibus propositionibus
ut supra dictum est praedicatum est in ratione subjecti (In Post. Anal., lib. 1,
lect. 7; De Veritate, q. 8, art. 15; Cajetan, 1-2, q. 51, art. 1; Contra Gentiles, lib.
1, c. 2, no. 2).
"Nullius scientiae certitudo potest esse nisi per resolutionem in prima sui prin
cipia (1. d. 35, q. 1, art. 3, ad 2).
Quanto medium demonstrationis est propinquius primo principio, tanto demon-

stratio est potior (In Post. Anal. lib. 1, lect. 38).

Sicut intensio lucidi attenditur per accessum ad aliquid summe lucidum cui
quanto aliquis magis appropinquat, tanto est magis lucidum (1-2, q. 22, art. 1,
ad 1).
100 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

of the philosophy of science must necessarily be problematic.

That is why St. Thomas held that even in moral sciences there
is not always a great deal of certitude, because it is difficult in
many instances to see the relation between the first moral prin
ciple that good must be done and evil avoided, and the remote
application of that principle to the economic order.38
These three reasons given by Aquinas for the contingency of
the laws of science are not always the same as those given by the
scientists themselves, though the conclusion is the same. Both
agree that there is much contingency about science, but for differ
ent reasons. The scientific reason is less philosophical and is ar
rived at often by a historical survey of the scrapping of one sci
entific theory after another in the course of time. But there are
not wanting those, however, who arrive at the conclusion from
philosophical considerations. Professor Cohen rightly says that
no amount of reasoning can altogether eliminate contingency
from the scientific order, because it is rooted in its very nature,
or as St. Thomas would say, it is intrinsic to matter as such.
Hence, when science is face to face with two scientific hypotheses,
it cannot decide which is true by an appeal to a first principle,
because the first principle is too unrelated and too distant from
the hypotheses. Experiment or observation of crucial facts is
needed for the elimination of one or the other. "Hence, though
no number of single experiments and observations can prove an
hypothesis to be true, they are necessary to decide as to which of
the two hypotheses is the preferable as showing great agreement
with the order of existence. This shift from the question of
whether a general proposition is true to the question whether it
is better founded than its rival is the key to the understanding of
the role of probable and inductive reason."39
Whether, therefore, one looks at the contingency of science
from the philosophical reasons as given by St. Thomas, or from
historical considerations as given by James, who was thus led to
Pragmatism, one very clear proposition emerges; namely, em
pirical science by its very nature is not absolutely certain in its

"De Trinitate Boitii, q. 6, art. I.

"Morris R. Cohen, op. cit., p. 82. What fundamental principles of mechanics
are actually true, cannot be determined a priori but only by examining the ex
perimental evidence which involves elements of contingency (ibid., p. 210).
 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE 101

conclusions. At the close of the past century and the beginning

of this, it was generally held that the conclusions of science were
absolutely certain, which fact accounted for much of the nonsense
written about the conflict of science and religion. One needs only
to pick up the antiquated works of Draper or White to realize
that not a single scientific fact, which they alleged as a proof
against religion, would be accepted as true by any scientist living
today. The testimonies of Russell and Millikan as quoted above,
concerning the contingent, are typical of the new humility of
empirical science. Such recognition of limits was not inspired
by any veneration for the superiority of religious and theological
truths, but solely by a consideration of the history of science and
the very nature of experiment, and this precisely is why the new
humility is meritorious. The statement that scientific conclusions
are the only absolutely certain body of truths in the world is not
only an unhistorical statement, not only a philosophical error, but
also unscientific nonsense. As F. R. Tennant has so well ex
pressed it: "Half a century ago, it was taught that the scientific
method is the sole means of approach to the whole realm of
possible knowledge; that there were no reasonably propounded
questions that science could not reasonably hope to answer; no
problems worth discussing to which its method was inapplicable.
Such belief is less widely held today. Since many men of science
became their own epistemologists, science has been more mod
est."40 Or if the testimony of convincing than
a scientist is more
that of philosopher, Professor Eddington even more forcefully
a
states that "that overweening phase, when it was almost neces
sary to ask the permission of physics to call one's soul one's own,
is past.""

The Hierarchy of Sciences

Very little attention is paid to the hierarchy of sciences, which
accounts for so much of the confusion in modern thought. As
J. S. Haldane has so well said: "A widespread idea exists that
the sciences simply supply incontrovertible facts for the philos
ophers to make what they can of, in conjunction with other in
dependently ascertained facts. A classical and extraordinary im
portant example of the application of this idea is furnished with

"Philosophical Theology, Vol. 1, p. 333.

aThe Nature of the Physical World, p. 344.
102 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Newton's Principia. In that great work the mechanical concep

tion of the visible world is represented as a philosophical truth.
. . . Most of the modern civilized world has agreed with him in

this conclusion, which has thus become to such an extent part

of the generally accepted intellectual outfit of modern times that
it is only by great effort, and at the risk of being regarded as
mere cranks, that we can bring ourselves to question it."42
In the same work, Professor Haldane undertakes to investigate
the hierarchy of sciences, but he does it not from the point of view
of the dependence of one science but from the point of view of
the "break" or hiatus between them. Biology, he insists, cannot
be reduced to physics for the mechanical explanations of life are
insufficient.43 Psychology cannot be reduced to biology, for con
scious activity manifests organic unity not only as regards space-
relations, but also as regards time-relations.44 When finally he
reaches a point when theology is to be considered as a distinct
and separate science, he refuses to make the admission, though
the reader cannot but see that if the difference between
help
mind and body make for a difference in sciences, why should
not the difference between man and God make equally for a
difference in sciences.
The hierarchy of sciences is best approached not by emphasiz
ing the differences, but the relations, between them, and partic
ularly the relationship based on intellectual dependence.45 Such
a basis for the hierarchy of sciences was laid down first by Aris
totle at the peak of Greek thinking, then again in the thirteenth
century by St. Thomas at the peak of Scholastic thinking. The
modern world can hardly ignore the authority of such minds
and their reasons in the solution of problems which may be
really no less actual today than they were in their days.
The three supreme sciences, according to Aristotle and St.

"Science and Philosophy, p. 4.

"Ibid., p. 18.
MOp. cit., pp. 95 and 99. The author, however, is very much confused about
the nature of a soul, regarding it as a "supernatural entity," introduced from
without as a kind of unscientific afterthought. The reading of 1, q. 76 of St.
Thomas' Summa would have saved him from such an erroneous view.
""Far more important than a classification of the sciences and a comprehension
of their unsifted deliverances would be an arrangement of the different depart
ments of knowledge in order, according to dependence of one of them on
another, and presupposition of one of them by another" (F. R. Tennant, Philos
ophy of the Sciences, p. 20).
 SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE 103

Thomas, are, in the ascending order, physics, mathematics, and

metaphysics. The reason for this division is based upon the na
ture of the abstraction, which will be explained in detail in the
next chapter. Any event or group of events may be viewed from
different degrees of abstraction. A man jumps from a bridge.
The psychologists make abstraction from everything except the
mental which prompted the suicide; the biologists abstract
state
from everything except the dying organism; while the physicists
are interested in the man, not as mind, or as organism, but as a
falling body.
In like manner, the three supreme sciences are based upon
different degrees of abstractedness. The mind, amidst the flux
of sensible things presented to may limit itself to the considera
it,

tion of material things and their properties, which are experi

mentally observable. This would give the science of physics.46
The object of the mind, as regards the beginning of its knowl
edge, cannot exist without sensible matter, but can be con it
ceived without for nothing sensible or experimental enters
it,

into the definition of cube root. This second degree of abstrac

a

tion which concerns itself only with quantity, number, and ex

tent, quite apart from their sensible manifestation in material
things, the science of mathematics.
is

Finally, the mind can concern itself with things not inasmuch
as they quantitative (mathematics) but only inasmuch as
are
they are or have being, for there are certain objects of knowledge
which cannot only be conceived without matter, but which can
also exist without matter, such as truth. This science which con
cerns itself with being as being the science of metaphysics, and
is

belongs to the third degree of abstraction.47 The three degrees of

"The science of physics of the Middle Ages not exactly like the science of
is

the present day, but more of natural philosophy. This distinction will be made
a

clearer in developing the need of philosophy of nature.

a

"Quaedam igitur sunt speculabilia quae dependent materia secundum esse,

a

quia non nisi in materia esse possunt et haec distinguuntur quia dependent
quaedam materia secundum esse et intellectum, sicut, ilia in quorum definitione
a

ponitur materia sensibilis: unde sine materia sensibili intelligi non possunt, ut in
definitione hominis oportet accipere carnem et ossa, et de his est physica sive
scientia naturalis. Quaedam vero quamvis dependeant materia secundum esse,
a
104 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

abstraction thus give the three supreme sciences as conceived by

the Scholastic synthesis, namely, physics, mathematics, and meta
physics.48
It has been suggested that in addition to the physical and
mathematical theoriesof philosophy of science, there remains
yet another which is the metaphysical. Just how metaphysical
science can be applied to the experimental order must be pref
aced by a statement of the Scholastic doctrine of metaphysics.

non tamen secundum intellectum, quia in eorum definitionibus non ponitur ma

teria sensibilis, ut linea et numerus, et de his est mathematica. Quaedam vero
sunt speculabilia quae non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia
esse possunt, sive numquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et angelus, sive in qui-
busdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas et actus unum
et multa, et hujusmodi, de quibus omnibus est theologia, id est divina scientia,
qui praecipuum cognitorum in ea est Deus. Alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id
est transphysica, quia post physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus
competit in insensibilia devenire. Dicitur etiam philosophia prima in quantum
scientiae aliae ab ea principia sua accipientes eam sequuntur (De Trinitate Bo'etii,
q. 5, art. 1).
"Mathematical physics, it was stated above, is a scientia media between physics
and mathematics. In the very nature of things, physics is posterior to metaphysics,
because it adds something to beingin the abstract state, namely,
considered
quantity and mobility. As St. Thomas says: "Sed scientiae particulars sunt pos-
teriores secundum naturam universalibus scientiis, quia subjecta eorum addunt ad
subjecta scientiarum universalium; sicut patet, quod ens mobile de quo est na-
turalis philosophia addit supra ens simpliciter, de quo est metaphysica, et supra
ens quantum de quo est mathematica; ergo scientia ilia quae est de ente et
maxime universalibus est certissima" (in Meta., lib. 1, lect. 2).
 CHAPTER VI

ABSTRACTION AS THE CONDITION OF

METAPHYSICS

Modern philosophy has its prejudices, but none are deeper than
its contempt for metaphysics. Truth as an ideal has been gen
erally surrendered in the pragmatic belief that there is no such
thing as Truth with a capital T. Truth is ambulatory; we make
it as we live. As Ibsen said: "Thinkers fought their way into the
land of scepticism and now have to fight their own scepticism."
Authority is generally impugned and yet the authority of philos
ophers is accepted without any criticism of the arguments be
hind their statements. No one today thinks of refuting, for
example, the Thomistic proofs for the existence of God, but
everyone thinks that Kant has refuted them, when in reality he
refuted Wolff only by starting with a principle which naturally
made all knowledge of the transcendental impossible. The whole
conception of causality, finality, order, substance, nature, abstrac
tion which make up the great tradition of philosophy has been
"refuted" over and over again. But that is just the question: Do
those who refute these ideas really understand them? Take, for
example, the idea of substance, which it is claimed, has been
repudiated by modern science. The substance which is rejected
by modern science is not the substance of the great tradition, but
an erroneous notion which equates substance with a "chunk of
matter," or "stuff" as Professor Whitehead believes. Substance is
not subjected to scientific refutation, for science by its very meth
od and nature can touch only the accidents of the substance,
which is quite a different thing. Neither has the idea of abstrac
tion been understood, most present-day philosophers equating it
105
106 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

with classification, which is as different from abstraction as night

from day.
In the field of theology, one finds the same misunderstandings
as, for example, when H. G. Wells attacks the Virgin Birth and
all the while identifies it with the Immaculate Conception. A
criticism of critiques would, it seems, be very much in order;
for the cure of sophistication is to be "twice subtle." Philosophy
can learn much by going back to study the "refuted" principles
at first hand. It may learn that these principles yet remain to be
refuted, for they are what Bergson has called "the natural meta
physics of the human mind."1 Going back does not mean retro
gressing. It means going back to the wisdom of the ages in order
to go forward, for philosophy is like a wheel; it makes progress
only by going backwards.
Fundamentally, there are two general theories concerning the
origin of intellectual knowledge known to modern philosophy:
one theory, Idealism, holds that intellectual knowledge comes
from the inside; the other theory, Empiricism, holds that knowl
edge comes from the outside, and that ideas are merely the sum
of sensations. German philosophy has been the principal expo
nent of the first theory, and English has been the principal ex
ponent of the second theory.
In his search for the source of this conceptual knowledge which
he called a priori, Kant committed the fatal error of not dis
tinguishing between the two senses in which the term a priori
must be used.
a) That which is not given formally in experience is a priori
in one of the term.
sense

b) That which has its source in the mind is a priori in another

sense of the term.
The two meanings are quite distinct, but Kant made one
equal the other, stating that that which is not formally given in

'"Orientation towards the fine minds of all time believe, the secret of
is,
I

wisdom in philosophy no less than in the world of humane letters. For this
it
is

fineness and largeness of mind — the magnanimity that puts the central things
in the centre and which takes as its standard that which man recognizes as truth
when life at its fullest and his soul at its highest stretch — this and this
is is

is
is

it

alone that the final place of understanding. For, in the long run, human
is
it

nature as whole that passes judgment, not only upon every attempt to improve
a

but upon every pretence to know and to understand it" (Wilbur Urban,
it,

it

The Intelligible World, p. 37).

 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS 107

experience has its source uniquely in the mind, and, therefore,

has no objective value.
He denied a mean between an origin which is wholly empirical,
and an origin which is wholly intellectual, that is to say, between
an empiricism which demands only sensations in consciousness,
and an idealism which demands mind. But there is a mean
a
between the two of which Kant apparently knew nothing, and
that mean is abstraction, which is a link between the empirical
and the intellectual.
According to the Scholastic doctrine which Kant ignored, the
intellectualconcept is:
a) Not produced in an independent fashion by activity of the
mind, as he believed, nor
b) Furnished wholly by sensible data, as Locke and Hume
believed, but
c) Results from an intellectual purification of the sensible data
by an intellectual act, which is called abstraction.
The scholastic doctrine thus stands in the virtuous mean be
tween two extremes. The sensible world gives the "raw material"
in intellectual knowledge; and the intellect, instead of being a
mold, as Kant imagined, is a light which reveals the inner mean
ing of the sensible data. That which results from the combina
tion of the two gives rise to a knowledge which is beyond the
senses.2 The process by which the intellect discovers the intel-
legibility of the sense data is called abstraction.

Necessity of Abstraction
Among other reasons, two may be given for the necessity of
abstraction, one drawn from man in relation to the universe be
low him, the other drawn from man in relation to the universe
above him. The first reason is more or less a reason of fitness.
It is not an ultimate reason. It is given because its point of de
parture is common ground between the modern and the com
mon-sense philosophy, namely, the progress and continuity of
the universe. Independent of this consideration, the argument
has nothing final about it. It merely implies that if modern phi
losophy does not admit abstraction, it is untrue to its principles
of evolution and progress and continuity of the universe.

^n re apprehensa per sensum intellecrus multa cognoscit, quae sensus percipere

non potest (1, q. 78, art. 4, ad 4; 1, q. 84, art. 6, ad 3; 2-2, q. 12, art. 4).
108 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Biological categories and biological conceptions of the universe

and even of God dominate modern thinking. The gradual evolu
tion and unfolding of the universe are the presuppositions and
the very basis of its conclusions. Considering the world from this
point of view, one of the first things that strikes us is the neces
sity of assimilation as a condition of life. Without the possession
of the "other" in some way or other, life as we know it on this
universewould be impossible. In order to assimilate, the object
must in some way be in the one assimilating. The plant which
nourishes the animal and the animal which nourishes man must
in some way be assimilated to the animal and to man. The law
of nature is that the higher kingdom must always dominate over
the lower kingdoms. When the lower dominates over the higher,
there is death.
Not only is assimilation the condition of life, but this assimila
tion varies according to the nature of the one assimilating. This
principle has often been put by the Scholastics in this fashion:
Quidquid recipitur recipitur secundum modum recipientis. To
put the principle dynamically we may say that if there is prog
ress and continuity in the universe, then each higher kingdom
or phase of this progress should reveal a new and more perfect
kind of assimilation. As we ascend in the scale of being, we will
find a moire perfect possession of the "other." Assimilation is
possible only where there is a principle which is not material.
Crystals do not assimilate, but merely juxtapose. The more per
fect the life, the more perfect the assimilation. Life is immanent
activity. As immanence increases, assimilation increases in per
fection.
The vegetable has an immanent principle, but one whose ob
ject is its own body. Its mode of assimilation is in relation to its
organism. It assimilates the chemicals, but in doing so, commits
what Bergson has called the "original sin of thought," namely,
the process of cutting up reality. Instead of possessing the "other"
in the perfect unity of its being, which is the ideal of assimilation,
it merely juxtaposes material part to part in its organism. It splits
up reality because it cannot attain reality in its unity and essence.
The animal kingdom, on the contrary, possesses a more perfect
assimilation. In its search for the conquest of the "other" it assim
ilates according to its nature. Being different from plant life,
its assimilation is of a different kind. The object of its vital prin
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS IOQ

ciple is not the organism as such, but the totality of all sensible
things.3 At this point the principle, quidquid recipitur recipitur
secundum modum recipientis, becomes, cognitum est in cognos
cente secundum modum cognoscentis. Thanks to its sense facul
ties, the animal can possess the sensible qualities of sensible
things. It assimilates them to itself in a nonmaterial way. It is
approaching the ideal assimilation which is the possession of the
It falls short of

it,
other as the other. however, because

it
possesses
knowledge only of juxtaposed notes or qualities, just as the plant
a

possesses plant and mineral life in does not

It
juxtaposed way.

a
by

have that power which can find the bond that unites these
it

notes. Its knowledge disparate, not unified. While there less of

is

is
the splitting-up process here than in the plant kingdom, not

is
it
entirely free from it. still subject to matter. The term of its
It
is

sensible knowledge never anything but matter in the broad

it is

sense of the term — the sensible or useful good apprehended

is
by

the senses. Though be still imperfect

in its assimilation,
it

there progress in the domination of matter

nevertheless such
is

as compared with the plant, that we are predisposed to believe

that spiritual nature which completely transcends matter, will
a

be all-intelligent.
Coming now to man, we find higher power of assimilation
a

because his nature higher. As St. Thomas puts it:

is

"The nobler
is,

form the more rises above corporeal matter,

it
a

merged in matter, and the more

by

the less excels matter

is
it

it

its power and operation; hence, we find that the form of mixed
a
by

body has another operation not caused its elemental qualities.

And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more
we find that the power of the form excels elementary matter; as
the vegetative soul excels the form of metal, and the sensitive
soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul the highest
is

and noblest of forms. Wherefore, excels corporeal matter in its

it

power in which
by

power, the fact that has an operation and

it

corporeal matter have no share whatever. This power called

is

the intellect."4
continuous and progressive, man should have
If

the universe
is

higher power of assimilation than that found in animals, for

a

possession of the "other" the condition of cognitional life as

is

"John of St. Thomas, Phil. Nat., 3, q. 4, art. 1.

t.

41, q. 76, art. c.

1
110 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

well biological life, due proportions being guarded.5 I£ there

as
is to be an advance over the lower orders, this assimilation can
not be a mere juxtaposition of vital elements as in plant life, nor
a juxtaposition of qualities as in animal life, but a complete pos
session of the "other" in its unity. It is much greater to possess in
oneself the nobility of another being, than merely to have a rela
tion with being which is exterior to us.6
a noble
But, how can this possession of the "other" in its unity and
essential structure take place? Certainly not by a material prin
ciple. The intellect cannot be an organism for the simple reason
that the two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same
time. No material body could receive the form of another body
unless it lost the form it already possessed.7 Unless sodium and
chlorine lost their forms or their determining principles, they
could not unite to form sodium-chloride. therefore, the know
If,
ing principle were material, would render impossible certain
it

kinds of knowledge, just as coated tongue precludes the possi

a

bility of certain tastes.8 We cannot become the "other" materially,

because materiality the reason of the incommunicability and
is

impenetrability, and knowledge demands its communicability.

Only that principle which lacks that condition of restrictive ma
teriality, and has certain amplitude and extension, can become
a

the other while remaining itself.9 The knowing principle, there

fore, must be spiritual.
Here the principle, "whatever received, received according
is

is

"Cognitio fit secundum assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam (1, q. 76,

art. 2, ad 4). Intellectus noster repraesentat per quandam assimilationem rem in
tellect;! m
(De Veritate, q. 2, art. 1).
Est quaedam assimilatio per informationem quae requiritur ad cognitionem
Sent. d. 34, q. 3, art. ad 4).
1,
(/

"De Veritate, q. 22, art. n.

''Contra Gentiles, lib. 2, cap. 49-50.
Intelligere autem non potest esse actus corporis, nec alicujus virtutis corporeae,
quia omne corpus determinatur ad hic et nunc (1, q. 50, art. 1. Cf. 2, 15, q.
d

1, art. c). Quia non potest unum fieri alterum seu trahere ad se formam alterius,
3

ut alterius, in ipso esse materiali et entitativo, in quo existit; sic enim posset fieri
alterum et trahere illud ad se, nisi per aliquam immutationem unius in alterum.
. . . Receptio ergo ista debet fieri immateriali modo, quia non potest fieri sec
undum conditionem materiae, cujus proprium est coarctare et restringere formam
et reddere illam incommunicabilem ulteriori subjecto et componere cum altera
secundum transmutationem in esse (John of St. Thomas. Cursus Philosophicus
,

p. q. 4. 4. ad 1).
3

'Sum. Theol., 1» q. 75, art. 2.

'John of St. Thomas, Phil. Nat., 3, q. 4, art. 1.
t.
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS III
to the modality of the one receiving," now applies. But since the
intellect is spiritual, it assimilates sensible knowledge in a spir
itual way, but to assimilate spiritually means to intussuscept with
out matter, and this process is called abstraction.
Just as there are in the stomach certain juices, or enzymes,
which "break up" the food in order that its food value may pass
into the organism, so too the intellect has an abstractive power
which separates the nature or essence from the sensible data.
The enzymes take up only that part of food which nourishes the
body, and the intellect, in like manner, takes up only that part
of the sensible material which nourishes the mind, namely, the
If,

natures or essences. therefore, the universe progressive, and

is
assimilation manifests itself in the hierarchy of creation, then
if

we should expect to find higher form of assimilation in man

a

than in the lower creature. our contention that in man this

It
is

assimilation reaches point where the mind possesses the other

a

in its totality, or wholeness — not its material wholeness, but its

meaning wholeness, and this called abstraction. What digestion
is

in the biological order, that abstraction in the intellectual.

is
is

Second Argument
The ultimate argument for the necessity of abstraction not
is

the one given above, which merely an argument of fitness

is

and which proves only that abstraction in perfect accord with

is

universe that continuous and progressive. The final reason

is
a

for the necessity of abstraction drawn from the human in

is

telligence in relation to the intelligences above it. This argument

assumes the Divine, but worth giving here to indicate the
is
it

In
by

nature of abstraction. the critique of the intelligence made

modern philosophers, abstraction has been made to appear as
the outcome of man's evolution. As man developed from the
lower forms to the higher, he found himself under the necessity
of handling matter for practical and scientific purposes. Being
nature, abstraction developed in him to fit ex
by

"toolmaking"
perience into convenient molds of action. Conceptual knowledge
M. Bergson
by

thus represented development from below

is
a

and in response to new needs.10

For the Angelic Doctor, the reason of conceptual knowledge

10M. Bergson, L'Evolution Creatrice.

112 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

is just the contrary!It is not his distance from the animal that
renders abstraction necessary; it is his distance from God. Ab
straction is not a condition of a push from below; it is a result
of a fall from above. Abstraction is necessary because our intellect
is imperfect. This is the fundamental reason.
For a right understanding of the Thomistic system, we must
keep in mind that intelligence is not identical with human intel
ligence. The two are not identical and peculiar one to another.
When Averroes made intelligibility in se equal human compre-
hensibility, he said a "ridiculous thing."11 The human intelligence
is only one of the forms of the intelligence, and the very lowest
form, the other forms being angelic and divine. Man is the only
intellectual being with a body. The very fact that the more
perfect intellectual beings have no body proves that the intel
ligence of itself does not require a body. Human intelligence of
itself does require a body, it is true, but not because the body is
the organism by which the intellect functions. Rather it is be
cause the intellect operates on material things. "The body is nec
essary for the action of the intellect," says St. Thomas, "not as
its organ of action, but on the part of the object."12
Ifour intelligence, as it is naturally constituted on this earth,
could receive the same light that is given to angels, we would
have no further need of using sense knowledge, nor would we

"Metaphysics, lib. 2, lect. 1.

"1 q. 75, art. 2, ad 3.
The higher forms in their broadest division are the angelic and the divine.
Man, strictly speaking, is not intellectual; he is rational. Rationality is a quality
proper to the animal genus, and is not to be attributed either to God or to angels.
"Rationale est differentia animalis et Deo non convenit nee angelis" (St.
Thomas, 1, d. 25, q. 1, art. 1, ad 4).
Cf. VlntelUctualisme de St. Thomas, Pierre Rousselot (Paris: 1908), part 1.
Angelic intelligence being free from matter is much more powerful than our
own, for matter is the reason of unintelligibility. Being united with an animal
is,

organism as our human intelligence therefore,

is,

must operate on matter.

It
it

natural for to use the phantasms.

it

"Et similiter naturale est animae quod indigeat phantasmatibus ad intelligen-

dum; ex quo tamen sequitur quod diminuatur in intelligendo substantiis super-
a

ioribus" (De Spirit. Creaturis, q. art. 2, ad 7).

1,

But at the same time being an intelligence and thus serving as the link between
the world of matter and spirit, man participates in finite way with the Light
a

which makes all things intelligible, namely, the Light of God. This light has
been given to intellectual creatures
in

graduated way, the intellectual creatures

a

which are more near to God participating in more fully than those at greater
it

distance.
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS 113

have any further need of abstraction.13 Angelic knowledge is not

derived from the material universe but from inferred ideas. The
angels see more in their ideas than we see in ours, because the
light of their intelligence is greater. Light is that which manifests
anything according to the sense of vision. In an extended sense,
it signifies a manifestation in the order of knowledge.14 The
human soul in the natural order has received only a small en
dowment of this light.15 Thanks to this light, however, which
operates in one way through the active intellect, we are able to
seize the ratio of things — a privilege which would be denied us
if we did not have Abstraction, then, is a necessity in virtue
it.16

of the weakness of the intellectual light in us. Ex debilitate in-

tellectualis luminis in nobis.
To say that our intellect lacks the light of God and angels —
a light which reveals the particular in the universal, and the

individual in the species — and which defect of light must be

— is equivalent to saying that abstraction
supplied by abstraction
is an imperfection. And this is precisely the common-sense no
tion. Common-sense philosophy has not defended abstraction be
cause it has regarded it as an imperfection; it has merely insisted
on its necessity as a result of our present condition on earth. It
is universally admitted that it is an imperfection. The Angelic
Doctor explicitly calls it an imperfection. In his treatise on Spir
itual Creatures, he writes:
"Abstraction is an imperfection of the intellectual operation."
The light of man's intelligence is like the twilight compared to
that of God's and angels', and hence his intellectual vision is ob
scure. The fullness and perfection of the light comes only in that

"Si vero sit aliquis intellectus a rebus cognitionem non accipiens, universale ab
eo cognitum non erit abstractum a rebus, sed quodammodo ante res praeexistens;
vel secundum ordinem causae sicut universales rerum rationes sunt in Verbo Dei;
vel saltem ordine naturae sicut universales rationes rerum sunt in intellectu
angelico(1, q. 55, art. 3, ad 1).
"Primo quidem est institutum ad significandum id quod facit manifestationem
in sensu visus; pcstmodum autem extensum est ad significandum quod facit
manifestationem secundum quamcumque cognitionem (1, q. 67, art. 1 c).
"Ilia lux vera illuminat sicut causa universalis,a qua anima humana participat
quamdam particularem virtutem
(1, q. 79, art. 4, ad 1).
"Intellectus agentis est illuminare . . . intelligibilia in potentia in quantum per
abstractionem facit ea intelligibilia actu (1, q. 54, art. 4, ad 2).
114 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

order which is the perfection of the order of nature; namely, the

order of grace, and this order is beyond the scope of philosophy.17
Abstraction, then, is not a development from a lower form in
response to human needs. It is not our nearness to the beast which
makes it necessary. It is our distance from God. It is not from
any lower form of knowledge because it is higher than the lower
forms, as we shall prove. Being more perfect than the lower
forms, it cannot come from, nor develop from them, for the
more perfect cannot come from the less perfect.18 It has not
been formed because man became a toolmaker; it has been given
by an Eternal Light, because that Light is the destiny of man.
It is an imperfection, and this St. Thomas is the first to grant,
but it is an imperfection with a promise, and its promise is the
Light, the Life, and the Love — God Himself.

The Nature of Abstraction

Even view of the universe reveals that there are
a superficial
a multiplicity of individuals enjoying the same natures. There
are, for example, thousands and thousands of individual horses,
but they all participate in the nature of the horse. There are
millions of men, but there is only one type or pattern, man.
In other words, things are made up of a double element, one
a form or pattern which makes the type, the other sensible
matter which makes the type an individual, such as John.19 The
form, or ratio, or pattern "man," is capable of being possessed

"Abstractio accidit intellectuali operationi, et pertinet ad imperfectionem ipsius,

ut ex his quae sunt intelligibilia in potentia, scientiam capiat; sicut est de im-
perfectione visus vespertilionis, quod necesse habeat videre in obscuro (De Spirit.
Creat., q. 1, art. 5).
"Imperfecta autem a perfectis sumunt originem et non a converse) (De Spirit.
Creat., q. 1, art. 1, ad 25).
Oportet etiam quod ante esse imperfectum in aliquo genere inveniatur id quod
est perfectum in genere illo: quia perfectum est naturaliter prius imperfectum
sicut actus potentia (De Spirit. Creat., q. 1, art. 5 c).
"Est materia principium et radix hujus individuationis non quatenus est in
potentia, et indifferens ad plures formas, sic enim potius est principium generis
quod est totum potentiale, sed dicitur principium individuationis quatenus est
ultimum subjectum ultra quod non fit communicatio, et sic reddit ipsas formas,
et tntam entitatem non communicabilem pluribus, quod est proprium individui,
et sic principium incommunicandi est principium individuandi (John of St.
Thomas, part 2, q. 9, art. 3).
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS 115

by all humanity; in fact, no man can be said to be a member of

the human race unless he shares the pattern "man" with the rest
of his fellow men. That is why the Scholastics spoke of the cotn-
municability of forms or patterns. All science assumes

it,
for sci
ence not interested in the individual as such, but only in the
is

individual as type or representative of nature. Scientia est de

a

universalibus. There hardly work of St. Thomas in which

is

a
this doctrine not in evidence. "Every form, inasmuch as
is

is
it
form, communicable, and communicability pertains to its
is
a

nobility."20 "The form,

form, can be found in many things,
as
inasmuch as communicable"21 and "capable of being par
is
It it

ticipated."22 becomes individual only through matter which

contracts and limits its amplitude.23 Matter in no way perfects
but rather the form the perfection of the matter.24
it,

is

forms de se are communicable and capable of being partic

If

by

great number of beings, because they are separa

is

ipated
it
a

ble from matter. We do not say they are separated — this was
the error of Plato.
Butforms are separable from matter, and knowledge de
if

pends upon the assimilation of other forms, then the condition

of knowability separability from matter. A thing knowable
is

is

inasmuch as separable from matter.25 The animal never

is
it

knows thing in its ratio, or rationally because never knows

it
a

"1, art. 1.
d.

4. q.
1

"1, d. 19, q. 4, art. 2.

"2, d. 3, q. art. 2, ad 2; Met. lib. lect. and 2; lib. lect. 10; Quod. q.
7,
1,

8,

7, art. 3; q. 3, art. 2, ad 3; q. 7, art. 1; John of St. Thomas, 2, p. 1, q. 11, art.

t.

21.
Communicatio enim consequitur rationem
actus, unde omnis forma quantum
de se, communicabilis est (1, d. 4, q. art. 1; De Veritate, q. 2, art. 5).
1,

"Forma participabilis non individuatur nisi per materiam in qua accipit esse
determinatum (2, d. 3, q. Forma autem non perficitur per
1, art. 2, ad 1).
materiam contrahitur (1, q. 7, art. 1). Materia
sed ma^is per eam ejus amplitudo
est principium restringendi et coarctandi formam (John of St. Thomas, Cursus
Phil., p. q. 14, 16, a. 1). "The form either the nature of the thing itself,
is
d
1

as in simple beings, or else constituent of the thing as in those things which

is
it

are composed of matter and form" (2. q. 13, art. 1).

*l q. 70, art. 3, c.
Form, therefore, the reason for communicability, but matter the reason
is

is

for the mere fact that the form or pattern "man" becomes individualized as
"this man Socrates," and becomes incapable of being the form or pattern of
Aristotle.
"Unaquaeque res infantum est intelligibilis inquantum est separabilis materia
a

(John of St. Thomas, Logic, I, p. 2, q. 27, art. 1, and Phil. Naturalu, 3, p.

t.

q. 10, art. 2).

3,
Il6 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

it apart from this individual. It can never separate the form from
the matter because it has not a mind transcendent to its organism.
So true does intelligibility vary with separability from matter
that the moment when you reach a point where there are things
without matter, the intellect and that which is known are one
and the same.26
What, then, is the conclusion? If forms de se are communica
separable from matter, and separability from matter
is,

ble, that
constitutes intelligibility, then the material things about us are
intelligible in potency. They are not intelligible in act, because
de facto forms are individualized in matter. That to say, the

is
pattern "man" individualized in this man, e.g., John. not

It
is

is
because the form or the nature of man individualized in this

it is
particular man that unintelligible; because
is

asso

is

is is
it

it
ciated with matter.27 The material universe consequently intel
ligible in potency.28 The natural knowable things antedate our
knowledge and constitute its measure.29 the intelligibility in
If

potency were not already in our sense knowledge, would not

it
be possible that we should ever know the thing.30 Things are
intelligible apart from ourselves; they constitute our measure;
we do not constitute their measure. We do not put intelligibility
into things, except artificially; we discover it.31
What now the condition of intelligence? separability of
If
is

forms from matter constitutes the power to be known, or know-

what constitutes the power to know, knowledge?
It

ability, or
is

"Idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur (1, q. 55, art. 1, ad 2; and 1, q. 87,
art. 1, ad 3).
"Singulare non repugnat intelligibilitati inquantum est singulare, sed inquan-
tum est materiale, quia nihil intelligitur nisi immaterialiter (1, q. 76, art. 2, ad
3). Id quod 1epugnat intelligibilitati est materialitas (Contra Gentes, lib. 2, cap.
75)-
aRes quae sunt extra animam sunt intelligibiles in potentia (De Veritate, q.
10, art. 6). Ex his quae sunt intelligibilia in potentia scientiam capiat (De Sp.
Creat., q. 2, art. Cf. 1, q. 79, art. 3, ad 1; 1, d. 35, q. 1, art. 1, ad 3).
6.

"Scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra et mensura ejus (1, q. 14,
art. ad 3).
8,

"Si autem ita esset quod sensus apprehenderet solum id quod est particulari-
tatis, et nullo modo cum hoc apprehenderet universale in particulari, non esset
possible quod ex apprehensione in nobis cognitio universalis
sensus causaretur
(2. Post Analy., lect. 20). Intentio universalitatis non est nisi in singularibus (1,
q. 85, art. 2, ad 2). Natura speciei numquam est nisi in his individuis (Contra
Gentes, lib. 2, c. 75).
nA forma quae est in anima nostra procedit forma quae est in materia arti-
in

ficialibus; in naturalibus autem est contrario (Lib. Met., lect. 7, 8).

6,
7
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS 117

separation from matter. The condition of the act of intellectual

knowledge is separation from matter, as the condition of know-
ability is the separability from matter. Matter is the reason of
impenetrability. Knowledge demands, as we have seen, an assim
ilation of the other. To receive the other while remaining oneself
is possible only to a spiritual faculty which is not determined to
the hie et nunc}2 Knowledge implies, therefore, the reception of
the form without the matter. But can a form exist without mat
ter? Is there anything intrinsically impossible about such a con
dition? The answer of the Angelic Doctor is to be found in a
work of his youth, De Ente et Essentia. He writes:
"It is impossible that there should be any matter without form,
but it is not impossible that there should be form without matter.
Form, form, does not depend on matter. If one thing is the
as
cause of another thing, the cause can exist without the thing
caused, but not vice versa. The form is the cause (formal) of the
composite. 'Forma dot esse materiae! It can, therefore, exist apart
from matter."33
In order, therefore, that knowability be reduced to knowledge,
the nature of the individual thing given through sense knowl
edge must without its individual notes, which con
be revealed
stitute the very reason of its unknowability . The intelligible in
potency can become the intelligible in act only by a denudation
of its matter.34 It is not yet intellectual nourishment any more
than the plant is ready-made nourishment for the animal. The
nutritive elements of the plant are only in potency for the ani
mal; in order that the animal may utilize them, its nutritive
faculty must be active.35 In like manner, in order that we may

"Angelus autem cum sit immaterialis est quaedam forma subsistens et per
hoc intelligibilis in actu (1, q. 56, art. 1, c).
Ipsa immaterial itas substantiae intelligentis creatae non est ejus intellectus, sal
ex immaterialitate habet virtutem ad intelligendum (1, q. 56, art. 1).
"Immaterialitas alicujus rei est ratio quod sit cognoscitiva; et secundum modum
immaterialitatis est modus cognitionis (De Anima, lib. 3, c. 8).
"Oportet quod intelligibile in potentia fiat intelligibile in actu per hoc quod
ejus species denudatur ab omnibus apenditiis materiae (1, d. 35, q. I, art. 1, ad
3; and 2, d. q. 1, art. 1, c.; and 1 d. 8, q. 5, art. 2, c).
""All sensible things are in act outside the senses, hence the senses are merely
passive in face of their reception" (1, q. 79, art. 3, ad 1).
"Man comes to the knowledge of sensible colour through two things: (1) visible
object, (2) a light by which it is seen. So also in intellectual knowledge, two
things are required, namely: (1) the intelligible things, (2) the light by which it
is seen. This light is the Active Intellect" (2, d. 9, q. 1, art. 2, ad 4).
Il8 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

grasp the intelligible in potency, we must have an intelligence

in The intellect, too, must have its digestive system, or the
act.
power of taking the intellectual wheat (form or pattern) from
the sensible chaff. This is the function of the active intellect.
"The necessity of positing an active intellect is due to the fact
that the nature of material things which we know does not exist
outside the soul immaterially and intelligibly but is there in act,
intelligible in potency only. Hence, it is fitting that there should
be some power which makes these natures intelligible in act. . . .
This power in us is called the 'active intellect.'36 By this power
of extraction the principium essendi becomes the principium cog
noscenti, and these are identical, so far as the thing known is
concerned; for a thing is knowable by the principle."37
The human mind, because it is spiritual, has the power of
assimilating other forms or patterns to itself, not by merely tak
ing up their sensible predicates as an animal does by sense knowl
edge, but by possessing the subject in which these predicates in
here. This means that the mind is capable of seizing the intel
ligibility or ratio of the sensible phenomena.
The active intellect, in grasping the intelligibility of a thing,
or that which makes it what it functions somewhat like an
is,

X-ray. Let the bones of the hand represent the nature or pattern
of the hand (this very imperfect analogy, because the nature
is
a

q. 54, art. 4.
I

"Such an 1ntellect was unnecessary for Plato, for whom the universals (direct)
are in act outside the mind" (De Spirit. Creat., art. 4). Formae sensibiles vel
a

sensibilibus abstractae, non possunt agere in mentem nostram nisi quatenus per
redduntur (De Veritate, q. 10, art.
6,

lumen intellectus agentis immaterialis ad

St. Thomas denies that there should be any faculty corresponding to the active
intellect in the sensible order, because "material things as regards their being
outside the mind, are already in act sensibly, but they are not in act intellectually"
q. 84, art. 4, ad 2). Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per
(1

aliquod ens actu; sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur
ponere aliquam viritutem ex parte intellectus, quae facit intelligibilia in actu, per
abstractionem specierum conditionibus materialibus et haec est necessitas ponen-
a

di intellectum agentem (1, q. 79, art. 3; De Veritate, q. art. 9). Ilia lux vera
8,

[Deus] illuminat sicut causa universalis, qua anima humana participat quam-
a

dam particularem virtutem q. 79, art. 4, ad 1).

(1

"Mud quod principium essendi est etiam principium cognoscendi ex parte

est
rei cognitae, qui per sua principia res cognoscibilis est, sed illud quo cognoscitur
ex parte cognoscentis est similitudo rei vel principiorum ejus quae non est prin
cipium essendi ipsius rei nisi forte in practica cognitione (De Veritate, q. 2, art.
3. >d 8).
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS IIQ

of a thing is not a core but a principle), and let the flesh and
blood represent the sensible phenomena. The X-ray shining upon
the hand reveals the "inner nature" of the hand, without its
sensible "individuating properties," and in like manner, the ac
tive intellect reveals the nature of the thing while neglecting
those qualities which individualize. Abstracted from matter,
which made it incommunicable, it becomes communicable, as a
nature or pattern, and hence can be assimilated by a soul, which,
because of its spirituality, is capable of possessing other forms or
patterns besides its own. St. Thomas explains this process in these
words:
"Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm :

it does more; by its own power it abstracts the intelligible species

from the phantasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because,
just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunc
tion with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active in
tellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction there
from of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active intellect
abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, inasmuch as
by the power of the active intellect we are able to disregard the
conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration
the specific nature, the image of which informs the passive in
tellect."38
The great difference between the Idealist and the Scholastic
notion is that for the latter the mind does not in any way impose
intelligibility; it discovers it. The senses contribute the "raw ma
terial," or the intelligible in potency, and the mind contributes
not the intelligibility, but the refining power of discovering the
gold of intelligibility by eliminating the alloy of sensible data.
Abstraction is the necessary minimum to explain the facts. It is
certain that we get our ideas from the sensible world. It is also
equally certain that our ideas do not express the sensible as re
vealed by sensation. The assertion of an operation which dis
engages the ratio or pattern or intelligibility from the sensible
data is the conclusion of these two facts. "The power of using
abstractions is the essence of the intellect, and with every increase
in abstraction the intellectual triumphs of science are enhanced."39

"1 q. 85, art. 1, ad 4.

"Bertrand Russell, The Scientific Outlook,, p. 84.
120 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

The view of abstraction can be made clearer by setting it in

relief with some of the familiar misconceptions.
a) Abstraction is not the suppression of irrelevant details,
though this is the mistaken notion of the Head of the Depart
ment of Philosophy of the College of the City of New York:
"As long as one regards an object," he says, "only from one or
two points of view, one's knowledge is abstract. . . . Knowledge
is abstract when something has been drawn away from the full
ness of its reality and made to stand by itself."40
This erroneous view of abstraction fails to consider the double
sense of "the fullness of reality." The fullness of reality may
mean either the intelligible "fullness" which is the pattern, or
form, of a thing, such as the nature of man in "it-makes-no-dif-
ference-which-man," or it may be a particular concrete individual
"fullness," such as the man, John Smith. Science is interested
only in the first kind of fullness, for it studies this particular
individual plant, not because it is this particular individual plant,
but because it is a type of other individuals.
Abstraction does draw something away from the concrete, but
what it draws is the meaning, or the essence, or the definition of
the thing. To complain against the intellect because it does not
read, consider, and take in the individuating in revealing
notes,
the nature, is like criticizing an eye for not hearing. The intellect
does not see the particulars, but the senses do, and this is precisely
what they are for.41
The "fullness of reality" in the second sense of the term is
perceived by a combination of both intellect and senses, the senses
knowing the particular characteristics, the intellect knowing the
nature. And even though the intellect does abstract the nature
from the "this-ness" it does not distort that nature by representing

"Then follows a passage which reveals not only a want of understanding of a

detail of the Scholastic system, but its wholeness and entirety. "They rejected one
entire side of human existence — the bodily — as unworthy. They drew away
from it with a kind of horror." The Enduring Quest, p. 34.
Dr. Overstreet is very careful not to name the "medieval ascetics" who held
this doctrine.
"Contingentia prout sunt contingentia cognoscuntur directe quidem a sensu,
indirecteautem ab intellectu (1, q. 86, art. 3 c).
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS 121

it as separate from the individuating notes, and therefore dis

torted, but only separately.42
The modern objection against abstraction, which contends that
it distorts reality or represents it falsely by leaving out details, is

it,
not new. St. Thomas knew and stated in these words:

it
"It would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal
from the phantasms. For the
by
and material things abstraction
intellect false understands an object otherwise than as
is

it
if
it

really is. Now, the forms of material things do not exist as ab

by
stracted from the particular things represented the phantasms.

by
Therefore, we understand material things abstraction of the
if

species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intellect.

by
"Abstraction," he answers "may occur in two ways: First,
way of composition and division; thus we may understand that
one thing does not exist in some other, or that separate there
is
it
by

from. Secondly, way of simple and absolute consideration;

thus we understand one thing without considering the other.
Thus for the intellect to abstract one from another things which
are not really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode
of abstraction, imply falsehood. But, in the second mode of ab
straction, for the intellect to abstract things which are not really
abstract from one another, does not involve falsehood, as clearly
appears in the case of the senses. For we understood or said
if

that colour not in coloured body, or that separated from

it,
is

it
is
a

there would be error in this opinion or assertion. But we con

if

sider colour and its properties, without reference to the apple

which coloured; or we express in words what we thus under
if
is

stand, there no error in such an opinion or assertion, because

is

an apple not essential to colour, and therefore, colour can be

is

understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the things

which belong to the species of material thing, such as stone,
a

or man, or horse, can be thought of apart from the indi

a

vidualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the

species. This
by

what we mean abstracting the universal from

is

the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that

"Ea vero quae sunt in sensibilibus abstrahit intellectus; non quidem intelligens
ea esse separata, sed separatum vel seorsum intelligens (De Anima, Lib. 3, Lect.
12).
122 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

by
apart from its indi
is,
considering the nature of the species

If,
by
vidual qualities represented the phantasms. therefore, the
intellect said to be false when
it is understands thing otherwise

it

a
than as is, that so the word otherwise refers to the thing

if
is
understood; for the intellect false when understands thing

is

it

a
otherwise than as is; and so the intellect would be false

if
it

it
abstracted the species of stone from its matter in such way as

a
a
to regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But
not so, the word otherwise be taken as referring to the one
if
is
it

who understands. For quite true that the mode of under

is
it

standing, in one who understands, not the same as the mode

is
of thing in existing; since the thing understood immaterially

is
a

in the one who understands, according to the mode of the intel

lect, and not materially, according to the mode of material

a
thing."43
Here we touch on
Abstraction does not mean classification.
b)

point which very easily admits of confusion. Hence must be

it
a

kept in mind that presently the discussion hinges on philosophical

abstraction. Now, there has sprung up in modern science new

a
kind of abstraction, called classification, which means the group
ing of common characteristics; for example, the physicist takes
water, abstracts its quantitatively measurable aspects, reaches re
sults about these aspects, and ignores the rest. Science, therefore,
classifies things according to their common aspects. The results
of these abstractions do not apply, therefore, to the intrinsic na
ture of reality but only to those aspects which the scientist has
selected for treatment.
Of this latter kind of abstraction which scientific classifica
is

tion, we do not speak, because our present concern with philo

is

sophical abstraction of natures, or rationes, or patterns. The phi

losopher has no quarrel whatever with the scientists' identifica
by

tion abstraction with classification. But what right, then,

of

does one say that abstraction not classification? When that

is

statement made, refers to the attempt to erect scientific clas

is

it

into philosophical abstraction and to identify the latter

sification
with the common aspects of things. This the error, for exam-
is

"l, q. 85, art. ad 1.

I,
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS I23

pie, of Alfred North Whitehead, which runs through his work,

Science and the Modern World.44 Philosophical abstraction is not
the union of common characteristics, for one thing alone suffices
to give the mind, at least directly, the nature of anything. The
reason is because a nature is in one thing as well as in a thousand.
The form or pattern stone is in one stone, and hence, one stone
suffices as the "raw material" for abstraction.45 Neither plurality
nor individuality is the concern of the mind at the moment of
abstraction.48
If abstraction is none of these things, what is it ? It is the proc
ess by which the intellect extracts from the sensible data, the
essence of the sensible data. It reads into the interior of things,
and disengages its ratio." The ratio is the subject of sensible
predicates, the interior bond which ties together the phenomena
and that which corresponds to the definition of a thing. Ab
straction leaves out nothing which belongs to the intelligible
order; it is not a distortion of reality, but its comprehension.
Abstraction, then, is that mental process by which the poten
tial intelligibility of the things is rendered actually intelligible by

44"It is the task of philosophy

to work at the concordance of ideas conceived
as in the concrete facts of the real world. It seeks those generalities
illustrated
which characterize the complete reality of fact, and apart from which any fact
must sink into an abstraction. But science makes the abstraction, and is content
to understand the complete fact in respect to only some of its essential aspects.
Science and Philosophy mutually criticize each other, and provide imaginative
material for each other. A philosophic system should present an elucidation of
concrete fact from which the sciences abstract." (Alfred North Whitehead, Ad
ventures of Ideas, p. 187.)
"Una ratio lapidis in omnibus (De Spirit. Creat. q. 1, art. 11, ad 1).
Objectum intellectus nostri secundum praesentem statum est quidditas rei ma-
terialis (1, q. 85, art. 8, c).
Ipsa natura cui accidit, non est nisi in singularibus (1, q. 85, art. 2, ad 2).
"Ideo si quaeratur utrum ista natura possit dici una vel plures, neutrum con-
cedendum est; quia utrumque est extra intellectum ejus et utrumque potest sibi
accidere (De Ente et Essentia, c. 3).
For this same reason, abstraction does not first primarily give genus or species
as some believe, but the ratio.
Universal (ratio) can exist in many things, but it need not inhere necessarily
in many things:
"Universale est quod natum est pluribus inesse, non autem quod pluribus inest;
quia quaedam universalia sunt quae non continent sub se nisi unum singulare,
sicut sol et luna" (Meta., Lib. 7, led. 13).
"Dicitur enim intelligere quasi intus legere. . . . Objectum enim intellectus est
quod quid est. . . . Res enim intelligibiles sunt quodammodo interiores respectu
rerum sensibilium (2-2, q. 8, art. 1).
124 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

the possessing of the ratio, or form, or pattern in the knowing

mind. The idea in the mind is the form in the concrete world,
except that it is endowed not with concrete, but with mental or
intentional being as the Scholastics called it. In its content it is
quite different from the classified common characteristics of sci
entific objects, and not to be confused with them.
Abstraction is the condition of the science of metaphysics, but
in no way is its content. The next chapter introduces us to the
fundamental idea arrived at by abstraction, not in the chronolog
ical, but in the ontological order.
 CHAPTER VII

THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

A general assumption in modern thinking is that the mind is

never able to rise to a knowledge of necessary and universal first
principles, and hence can never come to a rational knowledge
of God. Hence, the business of philosophy is to discuss values
generated by the scientific and the empirical order. There is
hardly a single work today on the subject of metaphysics which
does not assume that value is one of the ultimate categories. A
few decades ago, value had merely an economic significance, but
today it has a profound philosophical and theological significance.
Professor Pringle Pattison, for example, says that "at the present
time philosophy is carried on more explicitly in terms of value
than at any other time."1 Professor D. S. Robinson likewise
affirms that "since the time of Kant all progressive theologians
have shifted the emphasis away from the abstract philosophical
arguments for the existence of God to the searching question,
What value does God have in human experience?"2 Professor
Whitehead goes so far as to suggest that God is subservient to
"
value. "The purpose of God," he writes, is the attainment of
value in the temporal world."3
To what causes must we attribute the present-day emphasis on
the philosophy of values? There would seem to be three reasons
for its popularity, one rather reasonable, the other two quite un
reasonable. The first reason is that philosophers have quite clearly

'The Idea of God, p. 39.

'The God of the Liberal Christians, p. 118.
'Religion in the Maying, p. 100. Cf. R. B. Perry, General Theory of Values, p.
1213; J. S. Mackenzie, Ultimate Values, p. 172; Bertrand Russell, What I Believe,
p. 25; R. W. Sellars, Evolutionary Naturalism, p. 342.

125
126 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

seen that scientific categories alone are inadequate to satisfy the

needs and aspirations of the human soul. There must be some
thing beyond and outside the realm of succession and conse
quence, which involves the moral and ethical universe as well as
the mathematical and physical; that other realm they call the
world of values. While it is reasonable to contend that since sci
entific formulas do not exhaust the needs and potencies of man,
therefore there must be another world than a physical one, it is
not reasonable to conclude that this other world is necessarily a
world of values.
The next and unjustified reason for the philosophy of value is
the denial of substance, of which mention was made in the pre
vious chapter. Descartes bequeathed to the world the notion that a
substance is just a "chunk of matter" or "stuff." As science made
progress, it was discovered that the universe is not made up of
chunks of matter or of atoms which resembled billiard balls, but
of electrical charges which are constituted of proton and electron.
As science discovered that chunks of matter are only moods of
electrical behavior, those who thought a substance was a chunk
of matter concluded that there was no such thing as substance.
It was in reality a straw man that was destroyed and not the
traditional doctrine of substance. But the philosophical world
seemed to make no distinction between the two, having accepted
the Cartesian tradition as final. It thus came to assume that there
are no substances in the world but only qualities, and hence
Professor Alexander builds a whole philosophy upon qualities,
making even deity a quality. A hierarchy of qualities was then
developed and value was put at the head, and thus it became the
corner stone of the new philosophy.
A thirdreason for the philosophy of value is the denial of truth,
which has its roots in Hegel, who rationalized error, and James,
who derationalized truth. Added to this was the idealist tradition
that we could never know the objective nature of things but
only their subjective impressions. This meant that we could never
know truth, which was the correspondence of the mind with
objective reality. Now, if the mind could never know truth, it
followed that the supreme concern of philosophy would not be
the acquiring of truth, but only the value that certain subjective
impressions had for us. Philosophy thus ceased to be a search for
 THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS 127

truth, and in the words of Professor Mackenzie, "Truth is essen

tially a mode of value and nothing more."
Apart from these considerations, there lurks at the bottom of
the whole philosophy of value a serious error. Value can never
be the primary concern of philosophy, nor its ultimate object,
first of all because values are related to consciousness. There can
be no value where there is no appreciation of worth. Hence, a
philosophy of value is bound to leave out of consideration those
things which are unconscious or unrelated to a mind, and leav
ing these out dismisses from its subject matter much of the uni
verse.4 Philosophy must be more than human in its content; it
must also be cosmic. It should embrace not only human values
or the appreciations of things by human beings, but also being
as being, otherwiseit is not universal and catholic. But the only
is,

philosophy which embraces all that the philosophy of being

is

or metaphysics. includes not only values but even those things

It

which perhaps human minds consider of no value. Existence

is
its field of labor, and broader and greater than this there none.
But what much more important that value can never be is
is

is

fundamental because value assumes existence. Things have value

and they have value only because they exist. therefore, not
is,
It

value which makes things existential for our minds, existence

is
it

which makes them valuable. The ultimate concern, then, of phi

losophy must be, and can be, only that which universal and
is

that which underlies all values, namely, existence or being; and

philosophy ever to return to sanity, must forget its sub
if

it
is

jective moods and fancies, must cease interesting itself in cate

gories which are based upon human appreciation, and begin to
interest itself in those things which are objective and universal.
In other words, philosophy ever again to be philosophy,
is
if

it

must return to study of that which has been the object of all
a

really great philosophical inquiry since the beginning of philos

ophy; namely, being. Sanity in reason will be purchased not
by

hearkening to the cry, "Zuriick zu Kant!" but rather, "back to

being." this philosophy which we would here trace out in
It
is

its barest outlines.

The mind, was said in the preceding pages, knows the in
it

4For full treatment of the problem of value Leo Ward's Philosophy

of

see
a

Values.
 128 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

telligibility of things or the nature of things. That was the cri-

teriological problem on the value of knowledge. We now pass
on to the metaphysical problem of the universal object of knowl
edge, which is the idea of being.

Being: The Object of Metaphysics

Every faculty has a particular and a general object. The par
ticular object of the eye may be a green house or a red apple.
But the general object of vision, which exhausts all of its capac
ities and potencies, is color. The particular object of the sense of
hearing may be the sound of a horn or the sigh of a waterfall.
But the general object under which all particular objects is
grasped is sound, for unless a thing be sound it cannot be heard.5
And so on knowledge. Now, the
for the other faculties of sense
human intellect has a particular object, which is the nature of a
particular thing, such as the nature of man or the nature of a
stone. But it also has a universal object under which all of its
knowledge is grasped, and that universal object is being in all its
latitude.6

r'Proprie autem illud assignatur objectum alicujus potentiae, vel habitus, sub
cujus ratione omnia referuntur ad potentiam, vel habitum; sicut homo et lapis
referuntur ad visum, inquantum sunt colorata; unde coloratum est proprium ob
jectum visus (1, q. 7, art. I c.).
'Quidditas autem rei est objectum intellectus (De Veritate, q. 1, art.
proprie
12; 1, q. 82, art. 4, ad 1; De Veritate, q. 1, art. 1. 1, d. 8, q. 1, art. 3; in Meta.,
lib. 4, lect. 6).
Intellectus autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis (1, q. 79, art.
2, ad 3; Cajetan 1, q. 79, art. 2, III;
C. G. lib. 2, cap. 98; 2-2, q. 2, art. 3).
The particular object of the human intellect, the angelic intellect, and the
divine intellect, is different in each case. In one instance the object is the essences
of material things, in another infused ideas or essences, and in the third the
divine essence. But the universal object of al! three intellects is the same, namely,
being (Sylvester, C. G., lib. 1, cap. 48, n. 2; John of St. Thomas, Phil. Natur., t.
3, p. 3, q. 10, art. 3).
This double object of the human intelligence is ultimately based on the nature
of man. Man is the bridge between the world of pure matter and pure spirit, and
thus partakes of both. The proportionate object represents his relation to matter;
the adequate object to spirit. The active power of the mind (active intellect) is
specific and proper to man inasmuch as he is united to a body; it operates only
on the material. The passive power inasmuch as it operates on the spiritual has a
far greater expanse of knowledge. The cause is more noble than that which under
goes the change, it is true, if they are referred to the same thing, but the latter is
greater than the producing cause when they refer to different things. The active
power of marble, e.g., is practically negligible. Passively, however, it can become
 THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS 120

To
say that the universal object of the human intellect is "the
whole of universal being" or being in all its latitude, means that
our knowledge may oscillate between two extremes of being. It
may include in its knowledge one extreme, which is prime matter
or pure potency; at another extreme it may include God, which
is Pure Act.7 It may include these extremes because, to the idea
of being, nothing is opposed, not even the idea of nothing, for
nothing is intelligible only as a negation of being. Being, there
fore, is the common object of the intellect, not only because every
object conceived in some way falls under its categories, not only
because we know a thing on condition that it is a being, but also
because the idea of being is the necessary foundation of every
operation of the mind. It is worth dwelling on the relation of
being to three mental operations. It can be stated in the form of
three propositions: (a) every idea; (b) every judgment; and (V)
every reasoning process is ultimately intelligible in function of
being.
a) First of all, every idea is ultimately intelligible only in
function of being. An idea which is representative of a thing,
and is not merely a juxtaposition of predicates, can never explain
that thing unless in some way it gives the reason of the being of
the thing — its ratio entis. The idea of man is not intelligible by
the mere addition of the notes of sociability, visibility, and the
like, because an idea is intelligible and representative of its ob
ject only inasmuch as it represents the reason by which that
thing is what it is. That by which man is man is in virtue of his
being a rational animal. From this notion, which is the very
reason of his being, all other notes, such as sociability, and visibil
ity, have their meaning. Nothing is intelligible unless the whole
Whenever we want to know the nature of a
being is explained.
thing we ask the question, what is it?, which question betrays

the form of Moses, of David, of Paul, or any of an infinite number of other

The passive intellect accordingly, greater than the active, for its object
is,

forms.
the "whole of universal being" (1, q. 79, art. 2, ad 4). Intellectus autem res-
is

picit suum objectum secundum communem rationem entis; eo quod intellectus

possibilis est quo est omnia fieri. Unde secundum nullum diversitatem entium di-
versificatur potentia intellectus possibilis(1, q. 79, art. 7).
'In latitudine entis sunt duo extrema, scilicet Deus gloriosus, Actus Purus
omnino, et materia prima, pura potentia omnino (Cajetan, De Ente et Essentia,
6,

cap. q. 12).
130 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

the fact that the nature of things is intelligible only in terms of

being.
b) Not only is every idea intelligible in terms of being, but
also every judgment is intelligible only in function of it. What
the intelligence has separated in its first operation, namely, ab
straction, it restores now by judgment, which is its second
operation.8
Because the intellect is imperfect and its light is feeble, it does
not seize the complete reality of the sensible object. It grasped
its ratio but it did not attain its sensible phenomena. Hence it is
that the mind seeks to know more about the object. It asks such
questions where is it? when is it? and how is it? In other
as,
words, it for determinations of that object, and there are
seeks
ten possible determinations which give rise to the ten praedica-
menta, or the possible modes of predication. What is important
to remember is that these diverse modes of predication follow
diverse modes of being of the subject of which they are predi
cated.9 What, then, is the relation between the subject and the
predicate? It must always and necessarily be a relation of being.
As the idea is more than the mere juxtaposition of notes — namely,
the very reason and law of those notes — so, too, the judgment is
something more than juxtaposition of ideas. It is the identity of
subject and predicate This iden
as expressed by the verb to be.
tity which commands the synthesis imposes itself in virtue of the
simple analysis of the terms in the case of self-evident judgments,
and in virtue of the consideration of the fact in the case of em
pirical judgments. The intelligence never communicates to the
phenomena an intelligibility which they do not possess them
selves.10
Every judgment resolves itself to this formula:
5 is P.
It is impossible to make a judgment of anything without the
copula, which is a form of the word being, at least in an implied
way. The judgment that man convalesces is nothing else than a

"Sylvester, Contra lib. 1, cap. 58, n. 2.

Gentiles,
In Mela., lib. 5, lect. Verum est quod hoc nomen ens, secundum quod im-
9.
portat rem cui competit hujusmodi esse, sic significat essentiam rei, et dividitur
per decem genera (Quod., q. 2, art. 3).
"L'Etre et les Principles Metaphysiques, N. Balthasar (Louvain), p. 10.
 THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS 131

judgment that man is convalescing.11 Every verb can be resolved

into the verb to be.
This verb to identity of the subject and the
be expresses the
predicate and thus satisfies the mind's craving for unity,12 and
the identity is real, not logical.
So true is it that every judgment is the expression of the iden
tity of the subject and the predicate by the verb to be, that we
revert to concrete terms in expressing the qualities of a finite
creature. We never for example, "John is goodness," because
say,
it is not true that John exhausts the predicate goodness. Herein
we recognize the identity between subject and predicate expressed
by the verb. But we do and can say, "John is good," because good
is a concrete term and denotes a participation. John participates
in the nature of goodness, hence he is good. In this proposition
as well as in the preceding, the reason for our choice of words
is based upon the consciousness we have that the verb to be ex

presses identity between the subject and predicate.13

"Quia vero quaedam praedicantur, in quibus manifeste non apponitur hoc

verbum Est, ne credatur quod illae praedicationes non pertineant ad praedica-
tionem entis, ut cum dicitur, homo ambulat, idea consequenter hoc removet, dicens
quod in omnibus hujusmodi praedicationibus significatur aliquid esse. Verbum
enim quodlibet resolvitur in hoc verbum "Est," ut participium. Nihil enim dif-
feret dicere, homo convalescens est et homo convalescit et sic de aliis. Unde patet
quod quot modis praedicatio fit, tot modis ens dicitur (in Meta., lib. 5, lect. 9).
"Compositio intellectus est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur. Non
enim intellectus sic componit ut dicat quod homo est albedo, sed dicit quod homo
est albus, id est habens albedinem (1, q. 85, art. 5).
"We may use the expression, "John has goodness," because the verb has de
notes a participation.
The identity is outside time and space, and hence every proposition past or
future is reducible to being. Washington was the first president of the
"George
United States" signifies George Washington (a word that represents a dead man)
is identical to the first president of the United States. The very reason why the
verb to be is put so often in the present is is because it expresses no time.
Kant failed to recognize the adequate object of the intelligence — being in its
latitude — and confined himself solely to the proper object; the essence of material
things had nothing common between the object in the mind and the object out
side the mind. He therefore made analytical judgments pure tautologies.
The depth of St. Thomas's understanding of the relation
of identity existing
between the subject and predicate is seen in his treatise on definitions. A defini
tion is not, strictly speaking, an analysis of the subject (Post. Anal., lib. 1, lect.
22). The verb is should unite the object defined and its definition to express the
identity of the two, but the attributes of the things themselves should not be
united by the verb is. De facto, our dictionaries bear out this doctrine, none of
them uniting the attributes by the verb is. The use of our language is more than
I32 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

c) The third operation of the mind is reasoning, and no rea

soning process is intelligible except in function of being. The
modern objection against the syllogism is that it gives no new
knowledge; it is a mere tautology. The objection dates from
Sextus Empiricus in ancient times and Stuart Mill in more mod
ern times. It is imagined that the major proposition is made up
of of experiences which have been juxtaposed to express
a sum
a certain generality. The conclusion, then, it is said, is merely
one of these experiences, which has already been contained in
The conclusion

is,
the major proposition. therefore, nothing but
tautology.
But the relation between the major and the conclusion one

is
of act and potency, and not one of container and the thing con
tained. The major proposition gives the very reason being of

of
the conclusion in the case of priori reasoning, and the reason
a

the being of the affirmation of thing in posteriori reasoning.

of

a
a

The syllogism not, therefore, progress from the universal to

is

the particular, except from the point of view of pure logical rela
may often be that the conclusion has the same universal
It

tions.
ity major proposition. The reason of the conclusion con
as the

sequently not because contained in the premises, as apples

is
it
is

are contained in box, but because there in the very reason

is

it
a

its being. The relation between the two organic and vital;
is
of

its progress growth; not mere sleight-of-hand performance

is
a

a
by

which we extract from box that which we previously put

a

there. The syllogism in showing to the mind

by

its mean term

the reason of the identity of the extremes, necessitates the mind
by

to see this identity the light of the premises.14

Suppose the contrary were true, and that the premises instead
of being the ratio essendi of the conclusion were merely the sum

mere custom, as evidenced by this fact. Its distinctions and its rules, at least its
is

most important ones, are based on the very nature of the intelligence itself.
is,

The truth and falsity of judgment in like manner, reducible to being. When
a

we say something to be, we affirm the proposition to be true; and when we say
something not to be, we say the proposition not to be true (Meta., lib.
lect. 9).
5,

Nam ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. Cum enim dicimus
esse, significamus veram; et cum dicimus non esse, significamus
esse non esse
veram; in affirmando vel negando.
et hoc sive
"For refutation of the doctrine of Mill and his successors, see commentary of
St. Thomas on Perihermenias, lib. 1, cap. vii, lect. 10.
 THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS 133

total of experiences from which aparticular experience were

extracted. In such a case the more profoundly the premises were
the fruit of experience and juxtaposed images, the greater should
be the possible conclusions in them. But the contrary
contained
is the case. The more the premises are lifted out of their depend
ence on experimental verification and the closer they are united
to a being, the greater is the number of conclusions which may
be drawn from them. There are many more conclusions to be
drawn from a major proposition immediately related to the
principle of identity or the principle of contradiction which are
known upon the knowledge of the terms, than in a major propo
sition based on ten thousand experiences the juxtaposition of
which gives the proposition, "Every neurosis is traceable to a sex
libido."
In summary, the three operations of the mind have no intel
ligibility except in function of being. Ultimately they are re
ducible to the adequate object of the human intelligence. Every
concept is in answer to the question, "What is it?" Every judg
ment is in answer to the question, "Is it?" Every reasoning process
is in answer to the question, "Why is it?" Nothing is intelligible
except in function of being, and everything that is known is re
ducible to it. Being is the soul" of every concept, of every judg
ment and of every reasoning. It is the foundation of all intel
ligibility. Not even the possible is knowable except through be
ing, the possible being that which is capable of being.1* The pos
sible falls under the object of the intelligence, for being as the
object of the intelligence means all that exists or can exist.16 It
need hardly be mentioned that there is nothing given in the
whole realm of the intellect's knowledge of being. The proper
object, which is being in material things, is abstracted from ma
terial things, the adequate object (being in all its latitude) is
attained by a certain elaboration of the ideas already received.

uReducit omnes modos possibile et impossible ad unum primum et dicit quod

quae dicuntur secundum potentiam omnia dicuntur per respectum ad
possibilia
unam primam potentiam, quae est prima potentia activa (Meta., lib. 5, lect. 14,
15, 16, 17).
"The idea of nothing is not substitution of another reality for the idea of being,
as Bergson believed. The nothing of any real or possible thing is thought, and
not imagination. Hence, the idea of absolute nothingness is obtained by the nega
tion of the wholeness of being.
134 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

God, who stands at one extreme of the latitude of being, is not

given in any idea, as the ontologists maintained, but is acquired
by reasoning." The intellect is only in potency to these things
asit is in potency to all else. But there is nothing to prevent a
knowledge of them at least extensively and analogically, inas
much as the soul is spiritual.

Realism of the Object of Metaphysics

Being, then, is the basis of all mental operations. But it is not
an abstraction with no relation whatever to reality. Because it
is said that being in all its latitude is the object of the intelligence,
and that that idea may embrace anything from non-being to
God, it must not thought that it is infused, or that it is a
be
purely mental concept, or a name under which is embraced
created things. The intellect, however, does not come upon the
idea of "being as being" at the chronological beginning of its
metaphysical life, for such abstractions are never first. Those who
misunderstand the Scholastic position believe this to be the case,
and hence assert that Scholastic metaphysics deals only with un
real abstractions. It is the contrary which is true; metaphysics
starts with both feet on the ground and in the open air; the first
thing known is being in a confused way, namely, as the being
of this concrete object before me, whatever it may be. Meta
physics can start with a piece of chalk. "Concrete being in the
sensible nature is the first thing known in a confused way."18
Just as in our knowledge of the nature of a thing, so in our
knowledge of being, we advance from the imperfect to the per
fect. "The whole can first be known with a certain confusion
before the parts are distinctly known."19 Children first call all
men "father," St. Thomas remarks, and then only later pass on
to determine their father from other men.20
When we are unable to tell one man from another man, the

"De Veritate, q. 9, art. 2, ad 8; 1, q. 87, art. 3, ad 1.

"Ens concretum quidditate sensibili est primum cognitum cognitions confusa
(Cajetan, De Ente et Essentia, p. 1).
WQ. 85, art. 3.
"Necesse est dicere, quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a
phantasmatibus et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cog-
nitionem devenimus, sicut et contra angeli per immaterialia materialia cognoscunt
(1, q. 85, art. 1).
 THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS I35

ratio man is said to known confusedly, because in that ratio

be
men are confused. So, too, being first presents itself to the intel
ligence in such a way that substance and accident are confused
in it. Its concept is therefore imperfect and at the same time in
proportion with the perfective power of the intelligence.21 When,
therefore, being is said to be that which is first known, it is not
to be understood as abstract in a state of universality and separa
tion from everything inferior, but as concrete and residing in
some determined thing which at this moment appears to our
knowledge as a certain predicate of it.22
From this confused and imperfect being which is spontane
ously abstracted by our intelligence from some concrete existing
thing, the intelligence passes on to
more perfect knowledge.a
The process is that of explicitation, because it is "in this notion
that all others are included in some indistinct and unified way
as in their principle."23
Gradually being is separated from its
confused knowledge and brought more and more into the dis
tinct. From the more concrete it is brought to the less concrete.
As it increases in its immateriality, the division of sciences be
comes more and more marked, until the highest of human sci
ences is reached; namely, metaphysics.24 In the science of meta
physics, being is considered not inasmuch as it is quantity in

"Ilia autem ratio confundens sic indeterminata et confusa non potest esse nisi
ens, quia solum in illo confunditur substantia cum accidenti; ergo ejus conceptus
est maxime imperfectus et consequenter maxime proportionatus potentiae imper-
fectae (John of St. Thomas, Phil. Naturalis, 1 part., q. 1, art. 2).
"Ita quod in ipso objecto sic occurrente, non discernuntur determinatae rela-
tiones, sed solum accipitur, seu conceptus secundum quamdam indetermina-
tionem, in qua quidquid ad tale objectum pertinet, et fere est idem quod cog
nosces rem quoad an est, atque idem est dicere quod in aliquo objecto, ut totum
actuate est, incipimus a cognitione entis, id est, a cognitione praedicati ita confusi,
quod non discernantur praedicata in eo inventa et determinatae rationes, sed
praecise cognoscatur, id quod nulla est discretio, nee segregatio, scilicet ipsum esse;
hoc enim est maxime confusum quia maxime indistinctum. (Ibid.)
"Omnia alia includuntur quodammodo in ente unite et indistincte sicut in
principio (1 Sent., d. 8, q. 1, art. 3).
"John of St. Thomas, Logica, t. 1, q. 28, art. 1, p. 2.
In a more detailed manner, the stages by which we mount up to the idea of
being as being, which is the object of metaphysics, are threefold: the first stage
is spontaneous experience; the second is total abstraction of the idea of being;
and the third is the formal abstraction of the idea of being. In the first stage,
which is spontaneous experience, we grasp the idea of being in a most elemen
tary manner. It is that knowledge which comes to us in a very unreflected way
when in our ordinary experience we say that such a thing
is,

e.g., "this is," or,

"that is." The apprehension of being, in this sense, confused but actual. The
is
I36 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

motion (physics), nor inasmuch as it is quantity alone (mathe

matics), but inasmuch as it is being, i.e., being as being (meta
physics).
In this connection it is worth remarking that divine being is
not necessarily logical being. This confusion is often made by
some modern philosophers, in treating the problem of the exist
ence of God. The being of God is made to be identical with
logical being. Hegel may have been responsible for this confusion
but certainly nothing is further from the thought of the Angelic
Doctor. In his De Ente et Essentia he writes: "When we say
that God is Pure Being, we must guard against the error of those
who say that this being is the same as universal being, by which
everything is constituted in its particular nature. The Being of
God is such that no possible addition can be made to it.2S The

second state, which is total abstraction, in place of just and instinctive affirmation,
the intelligence in some way reflectively perceives the unity of being. It contains
no distinct order of reality explicitly, but nevertheless it possesses a virtual knowl
edge of them all, e.g., I arrive at the idea of the genus animal. This idea has a
certain unity which embraces within itself vertebrates and invertebrates, fish, mam
mals, etc. There is here a unity perceived but the diverse applications of that genus
to all of the species are not yet made, though they can be made. Hence, in the
idea of being obtained by total abstraction, there is an extreme confusion at the
interior of the idea. This stage of being is universal but known with a virtual and
confused knowledge. The third or formal abstraction of being in no way refers
directly to the concrete but it does not follow from that that it has no relation
ship with it. By formal abstraction, e.g., I arrive at an abstract idea of the triangle;
namely, a surface with three sides. It is not necessary to apply this definition to
any particular triangle, equilateral or isosceles. The concrete richness of that ab
stract idea is always understood. So, too, with the idea of being which I per
ceive by formal abstraction is the most immaterial which we can ever attain,
differing as it does from the mathematical abstraction because of the absence of
images or symbols (P. J. Webert, Essai de Metaphysique Thomiste, p. 49 ff).
Total abstraction gives an attribute which is applicable to the whole of the
subject, and expresses itself by a concrete term, such as "a human." Formal ab
straction, on the other hand, expresses itself by an abstract term, such as "hu
manity." Formal abstraction is the basis of the division of the sciences. ( Cf. De
Veritate, q. 1, art. 1; Contra Gentiles, lib. 1, cap. 25).
35Nec oportet, si dicimus quod Deus est esse tantum, ut in errorem eorum inci-
damus, qui Deum dixerunt esse illud esse universale, quo quaelibet res formaliter
est. Hoc enim esse, quod Deus est, hujus conditionis est, ut nulla sibi additio
fieri possit. Unde per ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum ab omni esse:
propter quod in commento nonae propositionis libri de Causis dicitur quod indi-
viduatio primae causae quae est esse tantum, est per puram bonitatem ejus. Esse
autem commune, sicut in intellectu suo non includit aliquam additionem, ita nee
includit in intellectu suo aliquam praecisionem additionis; quia si hoc esset, nihil
posset intelligi esse, in quo semper esse aliquid adderetur (De Ente et Essentia,
cap. 7).
 THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS I37

very purity of the perfection of His Being distinguishes Him

from all other being. It is for that reason that we read in the
commentary of the ninth proposition of the treatise De Causis
that the First Cause, which is Pure Being, finds the reason of
His Perfection in His Perfect Goodness. But abstract being, or
being in general, does not exclude in its concept the possible ad
dition of a particular determination." Furthermore, being, which
is the object of metaphysics, has a minimum of comprehension
and maximum of extension; i.e., it applies to everything, but
a
describes nothing in particular. God, on the contrary, has the
maximum of comprehension and the minimum of extension.
Being is the object of the intellect as color is the object of the
eye. But being is no sterile object. It has a dynamic character and
is capable of expansion through universal relations into tran
scendental properties which have the same extension as being.

The Transcendental Properties of Being

In one of the masterly pages of De Veritate,26 St. Thomas has
emphasized that all things are intelligible in function of being.
"That which the intellect conceives as best known and in which
all other intellectual conceptions are resolved is the idea of being.
All other conceptions of the intellect therefore express something
which is an addition to being. But to being cannot be added any
differences which are extrinsic to like those differences which
it,

add themselves to genus, or accidents which add themselves

a

to subject, for these differences extrinsic to being would be

a

nothing, because everything in nature whatsoever

is,

being.
is
it

Being not in genus, as Aristotle has proved in his Third Boo\

is

Metaphysics. When, therefore, we say that all conceptions ex

of

press an addition to being, they do so inasmuch as they express

by

modality of being which not expressed the sole word,

is
a

being."27
"There are also the general modes being which belong to
of

"Q. 1, art. 1.
""Among the modalities of being we must distinguish first the special modal
ities of being which constitute
the diverse categories and genera of the real. Sub
stance does not add to being difference, which signifies an entirely different
a

nature than being, but expresses the special mode of being, namely, per se ens.
it

The same true of all the other categories."

is
I38 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

every being. These modes of being extend themselves beyond

the categories and for this reason are called the transcendentals."28
"Finally, every being may be considered relative to that which
by its nature has a relation to all things; i.e., the soul or the
spiritual nature. The soul is born to become all things, as Aris
totle proved in the Third Book of De Anima. In the spiritual
soul is the cognitive and the appetitive faculty. The relation of
being to the appetite is expressed by the word good, which is
defined in the beginning of ethics as that which all things desire.
The relation of being to intellect is expressed by the word true.
Every being, actual or possible, has these three properties: it is
one, it is good, it is true. Affected by a negation, it is one; affected
by a relation, it is good and true. Supposing for the moment the
existence of God, being has three relations with the Supreme
Cause."29
The important conclusion to be drawn from this passage is
that being, which is the object of the intellect, has certain prop
erties which are transcendental, not in the Kantian sense that
they are independent of experience, but in the genuinely meta
physical sensethey transcend all categories and genera.
that
These transcendental properties, because they are not bound to
any category of time or place, are universal. They are not new
entities but only new relations within being itself, and their ex
tension is just as wide as being.
As St. Thomas put it: "Every being may be considered relative
to that which, by its nature, has a relation to all things, i.e., the

"The general modes of being are in turn divided, according as they attach
themselves to a being considered in itself, or as they attach themselves to a being
relative to another thing. That which belongs to a being considered in itself may
belong to it either affirmatively or negatively. Affirmatively it is its essence, which
is expressed by the word thing (res), which differs from being (ens) as Avicenna
states in the beginning of his metaphysics, inasmuch as the word ens is derived
from the act of being, whereas the word thing expresses the quiddity or the
essence of the being.
Negatively, that which belongs to every being considered in itself is indivision,
which is expressed by the word one (unum). To say that a thing is one is to say
that it is undivided. If now the modes of being are considered in their relation to
something else, every being, inasmuch as it is distinct from another thing, merits
the name something (aliquid). Thus every being is one, inasmuch as it is un
divided in itself, as it is something inasmuch as it is divided or distinct from other
things.
"De Veritate, q. 1, art. 1.
 THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS I39

soul." But the soul has two faculties: the intellect and the will;
one the speculative faculty of knowing; the other the practical
faculty of doing. Being has relations to these faculties; inasmuch
as being is related to an intellect, it is true; inasmuch as being
is related to a will, it is good. Truth is not a new thing added to
being: it is only a new relation within that which is just as
universal as being, namely, an intellect.
Similarly goodness is
not a new thing added to being, it is only being affected with
relation toward that which is just as universal as being, namely,
a will. Hence, according to the Scholastic adage, ens et verum
convertuntur , ens et bonum convertuntur , i.e., everything that is
is true, inasmuch as it has a relation to a mind; everything that
is is good, inasmuch as it has a relation to a will.30 Being is intel
ligible, because conformed to mind, and in the final analysis,

"Beauty, as related to the transcendental, is discussed by Jacques Maritain in his

Art and Scholasticism.
"As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true de
notes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference be
tween the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowl
edge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is accord
ing as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite,
namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true,
is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is
related to the appetite — and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the
desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object
is good, so, since the true is the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the
object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the
object understood, so that also thething understood is said to be true in so far as
it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation
to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an in
tellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect
by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially
to the intellect upon which it does not depend. Now we do not judge of a thing
by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is
said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it
depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true as being related to
our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the
form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the
signs of truth in the intellect.
"In the same way, natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the
likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which
possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the
divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily
in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Con
sequently there are various definitions of truth. . . . The definition that Truth
is the equation of thought and thing is applicable to it under either aspect" (1, q.
16, art. 1).
140 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

therefore, all things are true because conformed to the divine

Mind, and all beings are good, because conformed to the divine
Will."
It has always been a tenet of the Great Tradition that being
has certain attributes which are transcendental; namely, every
being is good, one, and true. These "modes," as St. Thomas
calls them, do not add anything to being. For example, unity is
being considered in its distinctness from other things; truth is
being as thought of; and goodness is being as desired. Unity is
not always quantitative; it is also transcendental, which is wider.
Truth as an attribute of being implies1 a thinker. Whatever is
can be thought of, and is in this sense co-extensive and identical
with being. All reality intelligible; it has meaning.
is therefore
Mind and reality are not unrelated. There is an intercommunica
tion between them. From this follows the definition of truth as
the conformity of thing and mind. Form is common to both.
The thing is materialized form; the idea is that form abstracted
from matter, as explained in the chapter on abstraction. When
the mind knows, it recognizes the conformity of the thought
and the thing. This is just another way of saying it knows the
thing as it truly is.
Goodness is the form of being. "Good is
third transcendental
that which all things desire." A being is desirable because it is
good; i.e., there is something in things which makes us want
them. The good has an analogical meaning, as we shall see in
the following pages. Not everything is good in the same sense.
The universe is made up of a hierarchy of good things. It would
seem things are not good, e.g., a cancer.
at first sight that some
But a cancer may be good as cancer, although it may be bad in
relation to the body. Evil is a deprivation, or the absence of
good. "It is no evil for a man not to have wings, because he is
not by nature apt to have them . . . but it is an evil not to have
hands, because he is by nature apt to have them and ought to
have them, if he is to be perfect; and yet the same is no evil to
a bird."32

"P. Descoqs, Institution's Metaphysicae, p. 319; S. J. McCormick, Scholastic

Metaphysics, p. 73 ff.;
J. Rickaby, General Metaphysics, p. m
ff.; De Veritate
q. 1, art 2. M. C. D'Arcy, Thomas Aquinas; Grabmann-Zybura, Introduction to
the Theological Summa of St. Thomas; Grabmann-Michel, Thomas Aquinas.
"Contra Gentiles, lib. 3, cap. 3.
 THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS 141

Since evil is nothing positive, there can be no principle of evil.

It has no meaning except in reference to something good. These
are pointsof elementary metaphysics and can be found developed
in any Scholastic treatise. Dean Inge in his God and the Astron
omers has developed these transcendental properties, but calls
them values. In fairness to him, it must be said that he does not
make the mistake of so many modern philosophers by making
them subjective. Like A. E. Taylor33 and Wilbur Urban34 both
of whom have seen the importance of the Great Tradition, he
holds that "a value which has no existence is no value. It is ...
a matter of faith for us that whatever is is in its nature intel

ligible."85

The Analogy of Being

If
there is any one point in Scholasticism which seems never
to have penetrated non-Scholastic circles, it is that of the analog
ical character of being. Because it has not penetrated, the word
anthropomorphism has become like a yellow fear-sign, frighten
ing minds away from ever considering God in terms of human
experience. We are told that we must not interpret the Being of
God in the light of human knowledge, under the penalty of
being "anthropomorphic." No philosopher who loves his science
would ever dare run the risk of having that gigantic label thrown
at him. But the curious side of it all
is,

that at the very same

moment these thinkers are saying we must not interpret God in
terms of human experience, they proceed to interpret Him in
terms of the new physics. We must not, they tell us, say that
God Person, because we are reading our personality into
is
a

God; but we may, they continue to tell us, say that God
is

space-
time, as ProfessorAlexander has done, or that God the "har
is

mony of epochal occasions," as Professor Whitehead has done.

by

names, why not be

If

we are going to be frightened

by

by

frightened "physico-morphic" as well as "anthropomorphic"

?

There seems to be much more reason for shrinking from mak

ing God in the form of physics, than in making Him in the
form of man. seems more reasonable that God should
It

be con-

"Faith Moralist.
of
a

"The Intelligible World.

"P. 177.
142 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

sidered in the light of the highest thing in creation, rather than

in terms of the lowest, and certainly as regards religious inspira
tion, we think anyone of us would find it easier to bend a knee
to a Personal God than to a "Harmony of Epochal Occasions,"
however harmonious it might be.
The crux of the problem, however, is not whether it is a graver
sin to be "physico-morphic" than to be "anthropomorphic," but
rather whether or not there are certain items of experience which
enable us to interpret God. It is the Scholastic position that there
is a way of understanding something of the nature of God with
out being "anthropomorphic" or "psysico-morphic," and that is by
the analogy of being.
There are not two, but three ways of predication: the univocal,
the equivocal, and the analogical. In univocal predication a term
is used in exactly the same sense when applied to two different
objects; in equivocal predication a term is used in a totally differ
ent sense when applied to two different objects, e.g., in puns; in
analogical predication, a term is used in partly the same sense
and partly a different sense.
a) Univocal predication of terms cannot be applied to God,
because effects do not totally resemble their cause. Just as in the
physical order there is a loss of energy in the transfer of energy,
so too in the metaphysical order the effect does not attain to the
perfection of the cause. No cause can communicate its own iden
tity.Now, if God is Pure Being and the world is created being,
then we must not expect to find His attributes in creatures in
exactly the same way as they are in Him. "Wise" is a quality in
creatures, but God has no qualities. He is Wisdom. The term
wise cannot, therefore, be applied in exactly the same sense to
God As St. Thomas puts it: "The reason is that
as to creatures.
every effect that is not an adequate result of the power of the
agent cause, receives the similitude of the agent, not in its full
degree, but in a measure that falls short of the agent, so that
what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent
simply, and in the same manner; as, for example, the sun by the
exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms
in all inferior things. In the same way, as said above, all perfec
tions existing in creatures divided and multiplied preexist in God
simply and united. Thus, when any name expressing perfection
 THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS I43

is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea

from other perfections, as, for instance, by this name wise ap
plied to a man, wesignify some perfection distinct from a man's
essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all
similar things; whereas when we apply it to God, we do not
mean to signify anything distinct from His Essence, or Power,
or Existence. Thus also this name wise applied to man in some
degree circumscribes and comprehends the things signified;
whereas this is not the case when applied to God; but it leaves
the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the sig
nification of the name. Hence it is evident that this name wise
is not applied in the same way to God and man. The same rule
applies to other names. Hence, no name is predicated univocally
of God and creatures."36
b) Neither is equivocal predication to be used in applying
terms to God, for otherwise we would have no knowledge of
Him atall, but only equivocation or puns. The only similitude
between God and man would then be merely a nominal one
and not a real one.37 St. Thomas, in speaking of equivocal predi
cation, writes: "Neither on the other hand are names applied to
God and creatures in purely equivocal sense, as some have
a
said. If that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing
could be known or proved about God at all; but everything
would be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is
against the philosophers, who proved many things about God,
and also against what the Apostle says: The invisible things of
God are clearly seen from the things made (Rom. i. 20). There
fore it must be said that these names are said of God and crea
is,

tures in an analogous sense, that according to the sense of

proportion."38
There still remains another form of predication which
is
c)

the analogical, in which terms are used partly in the same sense
and partly in different sense. The metaphysical basis of analog
a

ical predication (a) effects do, in some sense, resemble

that
is

their cause; (b) and yet, they do not, for the cause transcends

"Summa Theologica, 1, q. 13, art.

5.

"Contra Gentes, lib. 1, cap. 33.

"Summa Theologica, 1, q. 13, art. 5.
144 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

the effect. Inasmuch as there is some similarity between God and

creatures, terms may be applied to God eminenter ; inasmuch as
there is dissimilarity between God and creatures, certain terms
may be negated of God to give a knowledge of Him, as when
we speak of a hero as being "fear-less."39 St. Thomas, passing on
to the analogical attribution, continues: "This occurs in two ways,
as regards the use of names, either according to the proportion
of many things to one, as for example, when we speak of urine
and medicine in relation and in proportion to the health of the
body; of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause,
or because one thing has proportion to another, as health is said
of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in
the animal body. In this way some things are said of God and
creatures analogically, and neither in a purely equivocal nor
purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures.
Thus, whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according
to the order that exists of a creature to God as its principle and
cause; wherein preexist excellently all perfections of things. This
mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivoca
tion and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as
it is in universals, one and the same, yet also it is not totally
diverse as in equivocals, but it must be said that name used in
a multiple sense signifies various proportions as regards some one
thing, as health applied to blood signifies the animal health, and
applied to medicine signifies the cause of health."40
In conclusion, then, there are certain terms which are free
from imperfection in their formal aspect, e.g., goodness, truth,
and beauty. These names belong to God before they belong to
creatures; but as regards their signification, the inverse is true.41
These names may be applied analogously to God and to creatures.
Analogously means a kind of proportion which can more prop-

"Cum omne agens agat in quantum actu est, et per consequens agat aliqualiter
simile, oportet formam facti aliquo modo esse in agente; diversimode tamen. . . .
Quanto vero effectus non adaequat virtutem agentis, forma non est secundum
eandem rationem in agente et facto, sed in agente eminentius (De Pot. q. 7,
art. 5).
Effectus enim a suis causis deficientes non conveniunt cum eis in nomine et
ratione; necesse est tamen aliquam inter similitudinem inveniri; de natura
ea
enim agentis est ut agens sibi simile agat, cum unumquodque agat secundum
quod actu est (Contra Gentes, lib. 1, cap. 30).
"1, q. 13, art. 3, ad 1.
"1, q. 13, art. 3, ad 1.
 THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS I45

erly be called proportionality, which is "the relation between two

things which have not a direct relation, in virtue of which one
of them is to the other what the second is to the fourth. Thus
the number six has a likeness with the number four, in that the
first is the double of three and the second is the double of two."42
"If, therefore, there is no proportion between the finite and the
infinite, it does not follow that there is no proportionality, since
what the finite is to the finite, that the infinite is to the infinite,
and thus it is that the similitude between God and creatures
must be understood, namely, that God is in the same relation
to that which concerns Himself, as the creature is in relation to
that which concerns itself."43
Now, it was said above that there are some terms which imply
no imperfection in their formal aspect, and these may be applied
to God according to the analogy of proportionality. Being has no
formal imperfection because it abstracts from all matter and all
limitation of genera and species, and hence can be used to ex
press the Perfect Being (once its existence is proved) with the
analogy of proportionality. Goodness and truth, in their formal
aspect, and also abstract from all finite limitations, can be used
to express Perfect Being (once its existence is proved) by the
same kind of analogy.
These terms can be applied to anything according to their na
ture. Good, for example, may be applied to a tree, a dog, a man,
or a virtue, by the analogy of proportionality. That is to say, a
tree is "good" according to its nature; a dog is "good" according
to its nature, a man is "good" according to his nature, and once
the existence of God is proved, then it can be said that God is
"Good" according to His nature. But since His nature is that of
Perfect Being, then Goodness must be applied in its perfect sense.
The same must be said of all other terms involving no intrinsic
imperfection. Thus, analogy is the via media between agnosticism
and anthropomorphism.
There are other names which have not this formal perfection
and these, of course, cannot be applied to God properly, i.e., by
the analogy of proportionality, but only metaphorically. For ex-

"Dt Veritate, q. 2, art. 11.

"Ibid., q. 23, art. 7, ad 9.
146 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

ample, what a king is to man, that lion is to animals. Such

a
names as king, wrathful, light, etc., are applied to God not
properly but metaphorically, as when we say, God is fire, or God
is angry.44 This distinction between proper and metaphorical at
tribution is completely lost sight of today by modern philosophers,
as it was by Maimonides in the Middle Ages. What St. Thomas
said against Maimonides applies equally well today to the Phi
losophers of Value and Space-Time. "There is [for him] no
difference between saying God is wise and God is angry and
God is fire."45
Only one modern philosopher, and certainly the greatest of
them all, Professor A. E. Taylor, has sensed the necessity of
analogical predication in metaphysics. It is worth quoting him
at some length : "I should like here to explain what I take to be
the source of confusion in the minds of those who think that
the merely nonexistent can be the subject of a significant judg
ment of value. It is the old and deadly error of supposing that
a word must be either simply univocal or merely equivocal, the
same fatal error which Spinoza commits when he assumes that
either will and understanding, when they are ascribed to God,
mean precisely the same thing as will and understanding in our
selves,or the double employment of the same words is as purely
accidental as the double use of the vocable dog for the friend of
man who guards our houses and a group of stars in the nightly
sky. In exactly the same way, it is often assumed that 'existence'
or 'actuality* must either mean exactly what it does when we
discuss the question whether the sea-serpent exists, or whether
Prester John actually existed, that occupation of definite re
is,

gion in the historical series of spatio-temporal events, or mean

nothing at all. Then, since 'ideals' clearly must not be said to
exist in this sense, asserted that 'ideals' or 'values' simply do
is
it

not exist at all. Under the baneful influences of an evil nominal-

istic tradition, inherited from the senility of scholasticism which
a

had lost its vigour, the great Aristotelian conception of the 'anal
ogous' use of predicates has been allowed to fall out of our mod
ern thought, with disastrous consequences. simply not true
It
is

that the alternatives, univocal predication — equivocal predica-

"Ibid., q. 2, art. 11; De Potentia, q. art.

7,

5.

KDe Potentia, q. 7, art. 5.

 THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS 147

don, form disjunction. That is plain from the elemen

a complete

tary examples produced by Aristotle himself, when he wants to

illustrate the meaning of analogy. When I say that a wise ad
viser and director is a physician of the soul, I am manifestly not
predicating 'physician' of such a man in the same sense in which
I say of Mr. Jones, or Mr. Smith, Fellows of the Royal College
of Surgeons, that they are able and experienced physicians. But
it is equally plain that the use of the word 'physician' here is no
mere historical accident of language, as it is a mere historical
accident that I call a certain group of stars 'the Dog,' rather than
'the Cat' or 'the Dodo.' My soul indeed, not is,
body, and

is
it
a
not dieted with albuminoids or carbohydrates, nor dosed with
tonics or aperients. But there real appositeness in the meta
is
a

phor use. But for an historical accident might call the group
I

I
of stars cat, dodo, hyena, or anything you please, as appro
a
a

priately as call them dog; all that matters that, whatever

is
a
I

word use, should be understood which group have in mind.

it
I

I
But happy and well-chosen metaphor am using when
is
it

I
speak of physician of souls, or call the wise statesman who
a

brings his country safely through perils and disorders the 'pilot
who weathers the storm.' The one not Kvplws, in the strict sense,
is

medical man, nor the other seaman, but true that the
is
it
a

one stands to his 'penitent' as the physician to his patient, the

other to the nation as the pilot to the vessel and its company.
Analogy in the strict sense, 'analogy of proportionality' gen
is
a

uine feature in the structure of things. So again analogy in the

is

looser sense. As Aristotle observes, surgical implement not

is
a

surgical in the precise sense in which an eminent operator

is

surgical, but again, no accident of language that we use the

is
it

same epithet in both cases."46 From the idea of being we now

pass on to the judgments about being.

"A. E. Taylor, The Faith Moralist (London, 1930), pp. 51-53.

of
a
 CHAPTER VIII
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS

The mind has three operations: the formation of ideas, judg

In the order of time, the first idea of
ments, and reasonings.
the mind may be man, toy, house, or anything. In the onto-
logical order, or the order which conditions thinking, the first
idea is the idea of being, which has transcendental relations with
unity, truth, and goodness. "Being is that which the mind con
ceives as most known and is that into which all its other con
ceptions are resolved."1
From the consideration of the primary concept of knowledge
we now pass on to the first judgment of the ontological order. A
judgment composition of ideas. The first judgment in the
is a
ontological order must naturally be an affirmative one, and the
second a negative one. For the minimum that we can say about
anything is to affirm its existence or to deny its existence.2 The
first judgment, therefore, will be being is being, or the prin
ciple of identity. This principle is not an equation, for an equa
tion is merely a conditional identity; e.g., 3* =
6 is true on con
dition that that x = 2. There is nothing conditional in the
affirmation that being is being, or that the same is the same.
Rather it means everything is its own nature. Expressed nega-

1-11, q. 94, art. 2; 3, q. 10, art. 3.

"Duplex est operatio intellectus una qua cognoscitquod quid est, quae vocatur
indivisibilius intelligentia, alia qua componit et dividit — in utraque est aliquod
primum: in prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in concep-
tione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens; nee aliquid hac operatione potest
mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens. Et quia hoc principium 'impossibile est esse
et non esse simul' dependet ex intellectu entis, sicut hoc principium 'omne totum
est majus sua parte' ex intellectu totius et partis; ideo hoc etiam principium est
naturaliter primum in secunda operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et
dividends (Meta., lib. 4, lect. 2).
 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS 149

tively, this judgment is that it is impossible that

thing be itself a
and be another thing at one and the same time, and under the
same formal consideration, and this is the principle of contra
diction. As St. Thomas puts that which first falls under our

it,
apprehension and in function of being all things are
being,
is

understood. Hence, the first undemonstrable first principle, which

that we cannot affirm and deny thing at the same time,

is
is

a
founded upon the reason being and non-being, and upon this
of
principle all others are grounded? Thus

by
the affirmation and
the negation of the idea of being, we arrive at the two principles
of identity and contradiction. Now third formula formed

is
a
by

the union of the two.

contradiction to say that round, not
If

square
is

is

is
it

is it
a

contradiction to say that red, because not of

is

square

it
a

the nature of square to be red. In one case we are talking about

a

the nature of thing, and in another case of one of the accidents,

a

namely, color. A square could be green without ceasing to be

a
square. At this point one touches upon the principle of sufficient
reason; namely, everything has its reason of being, or every being
has sufficient reason, or everything intelligible.4 This
is

is
a

fundamentally the principle of causality.

*1-n, q. 94, art. 2. Kant, in his Critique Pure Reason, held that this prin
of

ciple of contradiction involved temporal element, namely, "at the same time"
a

(zugleich), and hence deprived of universal value. Kant failed to see that "at
it

the same time" (in indivisibili) or simultaneity the very negation of time.
is

Furthermore both the nunc in tempore, and the nunc aeternitatis — abstract from
the idea of succession and therefore of time.
The principleof sufficient reason universal in its application, and embraces
is

not only the things which we understand, but even those we do not, for that
which renders anything possible in itself, that which makes intelligible for us.
is

it

We do not understand everything, but we do know that each thing capable of

is

being understood, not by our intellect, at least by another (Contra Gentiles, lib.
if

2, cap. 98).
St. Thomas bases his three first proofs for the existence of God on the prin
ciple of sufficient reason: "quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod
est" (1, q. 2, art. 3). See Contra Gentiles, lib. 2, cap. 15, where St. Thomas
asserts as follows: "Omne quod alicui convenit non secundum quod ipsum est,
it

per aliquam causam convenit," or in 1, q. 3, art. 7, "quae secundum se diversa

ei

sunt non conveniunt in aliquod unum, nisi per aliquam causam adunantem ipsa,"
or again, in 1, q. 44, art. 1, ad 1, "quod est, sed non per se, est ab alio."
This principle not mere repetition of the principle of being, for adds to
is

it
a

being the note origin: "id unde habeat ut sit." differs from the principle of
It
is of

identity, which analytic in the sense that the predicate implied in the nature
is

of the subject, as the elements of the definition are in the subject defined. The
principle of sufficient reason, on the contrary, affirms the contingent, not from the
point of view of that which defined, but from properly immediate consequent.
is

a
150 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Everything must have a sufficient reason either in itself or in

another; in itself, if what belongs to it is by reason of its intrinsic
constitution. It is of the intrinsic nature of a square, for example,
to have four sides. From this point of view the intrinsic reason
of being is nothing than the principle of identity; it envisages
else
the substance as essence. If a thing has not a sufficient reason in
itself, then it must have it in another. For example, it is not the
essential constitution of a square figure to be red. Here the reason
of being is not intrinsic but extrinsic, hence, that which belongs
to a being without belonging to its inner constitution and nature,
like color to a square, must have its reason of being in another.5
The existence of a contingent being, such as color to a square,
can find its reason of being only in another. The impossibility of
infinite regress is implied in the very term reason of being. To
assert that a being which has not in itself its reason of being has
not in another its reason of being, is to contradict the principle of
contradiction.6
The term reason of being is more general than that of cause,
but from its consideration there flow the four causes without
which the understanding of anything is impossible. The reason
of being of a thing is either intrinsic or extrinsic, i.e., either in
itself by its very nature, or it is in another, i.e., caused. Every
reality of the physical world possesses a certain degree of being
according to its cause. Causality in the physical being thus re
solves itself into two principles or internal causes, form and mat
ter, and two principles or external causes efficient and final.

Formal
J

Intrinsic
Reason Material
I

of
.<;

Being „ . . Efficient
„.
I

Extr1ns1c <
.

that on which something depends for its existence

A

cause
is

under any of the foregoing titles:

'Omne quod alicui convenit non secundum quod ipsum est, per aliquam causam
ei convenit, nam quod causam non habet primum et immediatum est (Contra
Gentiles, lib. 2, c. 15).
'Quae secundum se diversa sunt non conveniunt in aliquod unum, nisi per ali
quam causam adunantem ipsa (1, q. 3, art. 7).
 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS 151

a) Formal cause, which specifies it intrinsically and makes a

thing what it is rather than another thing, e.g., John has the na
ture of man and not the nature of a horse.
b) Material cause which individualizes it: John is a man, but
he is not Peter, although Peter is a man.
c) Efficient cause which produces e.g., secondary efficient

it,
cause of John his parents. The Primary Cause God.
is

is
Final cause which ordains to an end, e.g., John directs
d)

it
his activities to the study of philosophy rather
than medicine,
and in the really final order of things to the Absolute Good
which God, rather than the particular good which passing
is

is
a
pleasure. And all these flow directly from the principle of identity
in the
of

sense that to deny any them is to fall into contradic

a
tion, which mental suicide.7
is

now remains to distinguish the traditional idea of cause from

It

its erroneous conceptions. The two most common views are those
derived from the Kantian tradition and the tradition of Hume.
Kant held that the principle of causality has no objective value,
i.e., that regulative use for unifying sense
it

possesses merely
a

experience. Hume, on the contrary, claims that we cannot see

causality and therefore cannot know causes; that our senses show
us succession, not causation, antecedents and consequences, but
not causesand effects, and we have no right to believe anything
which our senses do not show. Of these two views, the latter
is

the more prevalent at the present day and has found its most
Hessen, Das Kausalprinzip. He
by

recent expression in work

a

J.

holds that the principle of causality not an axiom in the proper

is

sense of the word and that there nothing in thought which

is

obliges us to say that because thing becomes must be caused.

it
a
is,

There he holds, no such thing as "Denknotwendigkeit."

The empirical objection rests upon the belief that causality
is

'In principiis per se notis, ordo quidam invenitur, ut quaedam in aliis sim-
pliciter contineantur; sicut omnia principia reducuntur ad hoc, sicut ad primum:
impossibile est simul affirmare et negare (II— II, q. 1, art. 7).
For the development of these causes, see: Garrigou-Lagrange, Dieu, pp. 178-
179; Sens Commun, passim, La Principe de Finalite; E. Hugon, Les Vingt Quatre
Theses Thomiste, p. 61 ff.; P. Webert, Essai de Metaphysique Thomiste, p.
J.

284 ff.; Pedro Descoqs, Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis, 1, p. 468 ff.

t.

For the correlation of these four causes, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, lib. 5, and St.
Thomas' Commentary on that same book, lectio 2.
152 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

a fact of experience. I strike a match, for example, upon a rough

surface.The temperature of the sulphur increases by the friction
and the match lights. Two phenomena are here observed; name
ly,

the striking of the match and its combustion. The cause in

this case, as in every case, they argue, rests upon an experimental
fact and upon nothing else. reduces itself to succession more

It

a
or less observable in time.
our contention that the principle of causality not based
It
is

is
upon temporal succession. There temporal succession of day

is
a
and night and night and day, and yet none of us have the least
inclination to say that night the cause of day and day the

is
is

cause of night. study philosophy after my dinner, but the dinner

I

not the of my studying philosophy. There must therefore

is

cause
be something else in cause than mere temporal succession, and

if
we pass on to an analysis of we will find that involves certain
it

it
extra-temporal elements.
Causality resides more in the notion of dynamism than in the
crude notion of succession. Dynamism implies two things:

a
thing changes its state, or to one state succeeds another. Now,

it
may be immediately objected that here one dealing with tem
is

poral succession, first because cause should precede the change

a

in time, and secondly because its action coincides with the be

ginning of the new state. But this does not exhaust the problem.
The change of state or dynamism involves two extra-temporal
elements: (1) the cause ought to be proportionate quantitatively
to what succeeds it; the tumbling of the tower of Pisa, for exam
by

ple, could not be explained little child standing alongside

a

of it. (2) The cause ought to be related to the new state qualita
tively; for example, carrying rabbit's foot in one's pocket does
a

not cure blindness. But the metaphysics involved in both of these

conditions are essentially outside of time.
Returning now to the notion of dynamism, causality implies
that an object derived from preexisting existence. The effect
is, is

in some way before begins to exist. Its possibility pre

is
it

supposed. The movement of ball not the same as the ball

is
a

itself. has received new determination. There

It

fecundity
is
a

somewhere, but the fecundity nothing absurd. This new

of

is

determination in the order existence must have

of

subject
of

inherence. Only an existent thing in motion can give existence

 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS 153

(motion). Causality, therefore, belongs to the order of existence,

and it is the actualization of a force and hence the effect cannot
preexist the cause?
1. The idea of cause, therefore, does not come from the vision

of succession nor from external experience such as the resistance

that bodies offer our hands, nor from internal experience which
is brought to us through the sensory nerves, for the senses reveal
not the causality but merely the fact of succession. Causality can
not be perceived by the senses, in the same way that color or
sound can be perceived. It is not sensibile per se, rather it like

is,
substance, reality of the intelligible order and hence only
a

sensibile per accidens. "Qui statim percipitur ab intellectu ad oc-

cursum rei sensatae."9 The senses see succession; the intelligence
sees the reason of the succession. The intellect alone perceives be
ing as such, and sense control belongs to the order of being or
the actualization or realization of being. follows that only
It

a
faculty whose object being can perceive it. makes no differ
It
is

ence then what sensible image gives us the idea of causality, as

makes no difference whether John or Peter who gives
is
it

it

us the idea of man. Causality does not depend upon the sensible
experiences alone but upon its relation with being. We are ab
solutely certain that every being which could possibly be has
need of being realized either
is,

an efficient cause, that has need

of

in time or in eternity, because the intelligence has this intuition:

by

namely, an existence which does not belong to this being, its

by

intrinsic constitution can belong to only another.

it

The principle of causality in no way anthropomorphic.

It
is

is

"Change the union of the diverse, and consists of two elements, potentiality
is

First of all,
and actuality. thing does not become what is: ex ente non ens,
fit
it
a

qui jam est ens. Secondly, nothing can come from nothing: ex nihilo nihil fit.
What becomes therefore result of an intermediary between being and nothing
is

ness, or inherent possibility, or potentiality. Becoming, therefore, passage

is
a

from potentiality to actuality, and since potentiality, not actuality (the stick
is

which capable of burning not burning stick) necessary that there be

is

is

is
it
a

some extrinsic principle which actualizes it. Ens in potentia non reducitur in actum
nisi per aliquod ens in act it. That active principle efficient cause. A third
is

formula, and much more just, that everything which by its essence does not
is

imply existence possesses by cause. In the order of existence the effect pos
it

tulates cause, but the cause does not postulate an effect. the existence of the
It
is

effect which imposes the cause — the principle of causality true — the ex
if

is

istence of being which can be cause does not impose the effect.
a

'De Anima, lib. 2, lect. 13.

154 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

not an external projection of an internal experience as an or

dinary fact of life. It is not a generalized experience. It is the
object of a first notion which belongs to the human intelligence,
not because it is human, but because it is intelligence. Inasmuch
as it is human, our intellect has for its object the nature of sen
sible things; inasmuch as it is intelligence, it has for its formal
object the whole latitude of being.10
2. On the other hand, just as it is not derived wholly from
experience, neither is it a creation of the mind, as the Kantian
school would have it. Kant knew that there were certain prin
ciples of the mind which had universal and necessary character,
such as the principle of causality. He furthermore saw that these
features called for some sort of philosophical explanation, which
was much more than the empiricists ever saw. But Kant's fault
was to assume, falsely, that a judgment which is not wholly
derived from experience must be wholly due to the innate con
stitution of the mind — an assumption which quite disregards
the whole process of abstraction which reveals that knowledge
of causality results from a conjunction of the mind and reality.
It is quite true that when we affirm certain necessary propositions
to be necessarily and universally true, we do so, not because the
mind imposes certain molds on our sensory thinking, but rather
because our intelligence recognizes the objective relationship be
tween the terms involved in the proposition. We understand why
the predicate must of necessity accompany the subject, and to
attribute this necessity to a "form" of the mind and not to ob
jective evidence is to run counter to the facts of consciousness
and to set up a theory in place of facts.
Here we touch upon one of the fundamental fallacies of the
whole Kantian critique. If the principle of causality has no ob
jective basis but is merely a form of the mind, why is it that
when we see succession, or better still when we see dynamite
explode when a spark is applied, we attribute causality and not
one of the other forms of the understanding? Why do we apply
the form of causality any more than the form of quality or
quantity or relation, which are also forms of the mind? If the
mind applies causality when there really is causality, it must be

i, q. 12, art. 4.
 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS 155

because there is some intrinsic relationship existing between the

mind and things. Either there is a relationship existing between
the form which is in my mind and the sensible experience which
calls for its application, or there is not. If there is some relation
ship, then the principle of causality is something more than sub
jective and is not void of objective basis. If there is no relation
ship, then why does my mind always apply the form of causality
when the external world demands and not some other form

it,
which does not demand?
it

That terrible divorce of the things which God hath joined to

gether, namely, mind and matter, and which certain philosophers
by

divorced spurious distinction of phenomena and nature, has

a

led them into more than one contradiction. On the one hand,
Kant holds that causality just mere form under which we
is

group sensible phenomena but whose validity for the numinal

world we have no means of judging. On the other hand, he holds
by

that numina exercise veritable producing sensa

causality
a

tions antecedent to the mental operation which organizes these

intermental phenomena. Thus, at one time, he says we cannot
know the numina; at another he says we must postulate their
existence, otherwise the raw material of our knowledge remains
unaccounted for. In one instance he denies the principle of causal
ity, or asserts to be mental form, and in the other implies its
it

subjective validity. Of course, once granted that mind has

is
it

no real relation with reality, then the idealist critique of causality

irrefutable. But that just the point to be proved, and that
is

is

is
it

false assumption which rarely criticized but which needs so

is

much criticism.
the principle of causality metaphysical and transcenden
if If

is
3.

by

tal, its nature its foundation its indirect relation with the
is

principle of identity, therefore independent of time and

is
is it

space; its objectivity grounded on an abstractive communion

if

with the real, follows that the physical theories no more affect
it

its validity than the discovery of manganese affects mother-love.

And yet some physicists and philosophers live under the illusion
that new physical theories have rendered the principle of causality
null and void. There no quarrel with the scientist when he
is

decides to ignore causality in the physical order and restrict him

self wholly to the relation between events. He has perfect right
a
I56 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

to limit his scope as much as he pleases. It is only when he says

that science disproves causality that he is challenged. For exam
ple, Professor Eddington makes distinction between causation
a
and causality. He calls causation the "relation of effect to cause";
and causality the "symmetrical relation which does not distin
guish between cause and effect." Physics, he goes on to tell us,
is not concerned with causation but with causality. This is a
perfectly valid limitation of the physical field. He may ignore
entirely causation if for no other reason than because physics
bases itspredictions on statistical laws.11
But when the physicist tells us that the quantum theory has
disproved the principle of causality (the distinction of Eddington
is not here recognized) then either the physicist does not under
stand the principle of causality, or he does not understand the
methods and limitations of his own science. The quantum theory,
as developed by Heisenberg, Bohr, and others, asserts that atoms
are not determined, but have "free will" in the sense that their
behavior This is known as the "principle
is not subject to law.
of indeterminacy" which is supposed to have overthrown causality.
According to this principle, a "particle may have position, or it
may have velocity, but it cannot in the exact sense have both,"
i.e., if you know where you are, you do not know how fast you
are moving, andif you know how fast you are moving, you do
not know where you are. You can see an electron, says Bertrand
Russell, only when it emits light, and it emits light only when it
jumps, so that to see where it was you have to make it go else
where.12

Just how the physicist arrives at the quantum theory does not
interest us from the philosophical point of view, but it does in
terest us when he says that it disproves causality. Einstein, for
example, is quite certain that the particular phenomena of the
quantum theory with
are inconsistent causality. He thinks the
only reason Aristotle and the Scholastics arrived at the idea of
cause was because "no idea of objective experiment in the scien
tific sense had yet arisen. Therefore, they were content with de
fining the metaphysical concept of cause."13

"The Nature of the Physical World, pp. 295-299.

"The Scientific Outlook, p. 92.
"Max Planck, Where is Science Going?, pp. 202-203.
 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS 157

The foregoing treatment of causality shows at once how false

this statement is. It was not because Aristotle and the Scholastics
had no jumping electrons that they arrived at the metaphysical
concept of cause; it was because cause, by its very nature, is meta
physical. One might just as well say the reason why Plato and
Peter were considered men by Aristotle and the Scholastics was
because behaviorism had not yet "proved" that man is a bundle
of ganglia. Man is made up of ganglia and nerves, but man just
simply is not only ganglia and reflexes. In like manner, causality
is not just "objective experiment." But even insofar as objective
experiment is concerned, it is hardly true to say that Aristotle and
the Scholastics knew nothing about it. Albertus Magnus certainly
knew the meaning of objective experiment14 as Dr. Schwertner's
excellent work on that great Scholastic well reveals.15 And even
the most cursory reading of Aristotle's treatise on the soul betrays
an acquaintance with the objective experiment which is hardly
inferior to that of our day. Professor Einstein tells us that "to
meet quantum physics we must further refine our concept of
causality." To of Dr. Eddington: quantum
use the language
theory may make it necessary to revise "causality" or the sym
metrical relation of events, but not "causation" or the reason of
being of events.
One might multiply texts ad nauseam in proof of the general
misconception of the principle of causality. Professor Weyl, writ
ing on the metaphysical implications of science, for example, says
that "The law of causality can in fact only be made clear in con
nection with a complete phenomenological description of how
reality constitutes itself . . . from the immediate data of conscious
ness."16 Max Planck, in like manner, writes: "I firmly believe,
in company with most physicists, that the quantum hypothesis
will eventually find its exact expression in certain equations which
will be a more exact formulation of the law of causality."17
Finally, P. W. Bridgeman links up causality with the new physics
of space and time: "There are certain spatial and temporal im-
,4Multitudo enim temporis requiritur ad hoc ut experimentum probetur ita
quod in nullo fallit. . . . Oportet enim experimentum in uno modo, sed
non
secundum omnes circumstantias probare, ut certe et recte principium sit operis.
(Albertus Magnus, Ethic, 111, t. 2, c. 25).
"St. Albert the Great, Chapter 13.
"The Open World, p. 43.
"Where is Science Going"?, pp. 143-155.
158 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

plications in the causality concept, so that it can best be discussed

in this order after our examination of space and time."18
The physicist may very properly exclude the consideration of a
metaphysical cause from his experiments, but when he assumes
that the quantum theory or the new outlook on space and time
alter the notion of causality, he is unmindful of the origin of that
all-important principle.
The fundamental principles of causality are not the result or
the conclusion of an experiment in the scientific sense of the
term. The three phases of a scientific experiment, according to
Claude Bernard, are observation, comparison, and motivated
judgment, which is produced without the intervention of a mean
term. But for the formation of a first principle there is no need
of observation in the scientific sense, or experiment, but of a sen
sible experience which furnishes the matter or the raw material
of the principle. The following propositions sum up the Scho
lastic doctrine of the origin of first principles:

a) Experience is not the efficient or formal cause of our assent

to the first principles, but only the instrument which furnishes
the matter of that cause, or the material cause.19 There is no
question of comparing the data furnished by the senses, or of
watching succession of phenomena. Empirical science claims
there is no other motive for assent to a first principle than sen
sible experience. On this view,
principle is at the mercy of a
a

discovery. Traditional thought agrees with the empirical position

in holding that sensible experience is necessary, but it disagrees
by making that experience the condition of the principle, but not
the principle itself. A window is a condition of light in a room,
but it is not light. Experience certainly is not the unique reason
why the mind assents to the proposition: "A thing cannot be
and not be at one and the same time and under the same formal
consideration." The truth of this proposition is independent, so

"The Logic of Modern Physics, p. 80.

"Non acquiruntur per ratiocinationes sed solum per hoc quod eorum termini
innotescunt, quod quidem fit per hoc quod a sensibilibus accipitur memoria, a
memoria experimentum et ab experimento illorum terminorum cognitio (in
Meta., lect. 6); Sensibilia sunt prima principia cognitionis humanae (II - II , q. 173,
art. 3); Intellectus humanus in potentia respectu intelligibilium (I, q. 79, art.
est
2); Quaedam statim a principio naturaliter homini innotescunt absque studio et
investigatione: et hujusmodi sunt prima principia (Quaes. Disput. De Virtutibus,
q. 1, a. 8).
 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS I59

little at the mercy of concrete and individual experiences that it

gains nothing in intensity or truthfulness or certainty by having
them repeated a million times. On the contrary, it is this prin
ciple which makes most sensible phenomena intelligible. Con
crete sensible facts of themselves have no necessity about them,
as Kant well saw. In order to give first principles their univer
sality and necessity, one must have recourse to other factors.20
b) The efficient cause of assent to first principles is the mind.
This is the reasoning of Aristotle in the fifteenth chapter of his
Posterior Analytics, in which he shows that a sensitive knowledge
should precede a knowledge of principles, but in which he is
careful not to make sensible data the total cause of the principles.
To bridge the abyss between sensible data and the universal char
acter of first principles, he points the action of a faculty superior
to the senses. Without the intervention of this faculty, which is
the intellect, it would be impossible to escape from the sensible
and the particular. It is worth noting that Aristotle and the Scho
lastics called the intellect, not an object known, not a knowledge,
or an innate form, but a faculty. This is where the Aristotelian
and the Scholastic doctrine break with Kant and the idealists.
The first principles do not preexist in the mind. The only two
things which preexist first principles are the mind and the sen
sible experience, and these two suffice for the formation of first
principles. The purpose of the mind is not to apply in a Kantian
fashion the a priori form to subjective impressions. In the tradi
tional view it is not only the matter but also the form of knowl
edge which is given in experience. By matter is here understood
phenomena in the Kantian sense; by form, the laws, the ratio,
the principle which unite the phenomena into a subject. We
do not say that the form thus understood is given in actu in
the sensible experience, but only that it is there in potentia.
c) Abstraction is the necessary condition of the assent to first
principles.21 Metaphysical abstraction, as we have already pointed
is,

out, is not classification, that preference shown to certain

a

accidental aspects and the neglect of others. In the abstraction of

nQuia sensus est singularium, scientia autem consistit in hoc quod cognoscimus
universale (in Post. Andy., lib. 2., lect. 42).
"Praeexistunt in nobis quaedam scientiarum semina, scilicet primae concep-
tiones intellectus quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur per species
sensibilibus abstractas sive sint complexa ut dignitates, sive incomplexa sicut
a

ratio entis et unius quae statim intellectus apprehendit (De Veritate, q. 11, art. 1).
16o PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

the idea of being, which is the foundation of metaphysics, it is

not necessary that the mind compare a multiplicity of objects
in order to find that being is common. One grain of sand has
enough being about it to furnish the raw material for the ab
straction of being as being. It is not necessary to have a seashore
to begin one's metaphysics. When the intellect abstracts being
and non-being from the sensible order, and this it can do imme
diately and without experiment, it already has the elements for
the mind's assent to fundamental principle of philosophy.
a

d) The formal reason for the assent of the mind to a first

principle is the objective and immediate evidence of that prin

ciple. For example, "just as soon as the mind abstracts the idea of
whole and the idea of part from sensible experience, it imme
diately sees that the whole is greater than the part.22 Since the
first idea in the ontological order is being, it follows that the first
principle will be a judgment about being: "That which first falls
under our apprehension is being, and in function of being all
things are understood. Hence, the first undemonstrable first prin
ciple which is that we cannot affirm and deny a thing at the same
time, is founded upon the reason of being and non-being, and
upon this principle all others are founded."23
The words "at the same time" in this proposition do not imply
it depends on time. Their meaning is "at once or together." For
that reason Aristotle used the word ama and St. Thomas added
"Impossible eidem simul inesse et non inesse idem, sed addendum
est et secundum idem."21 It
relation of the subject and ob
is the
ject (which are concepts of the intellect and not images of the
sense) which is the basis of this principle. It
is is,

therefore, outside
time.25 The first principle of thought which affirmatively the

"I-II, q. 51, art. 1. Ipsa principia immediata non per aliquod medium extrin-
secum cognoscuntur sed per propriam terminorum .
cognitionem . quia in
.

talibus propositionibus ut supra praedicatum est in ratione subjecti (Post. Anal.,

lib. 1, lect. 7; De Veritate, q. art. 15 c.; Cajetan, 1-11, q. 51, art. 1; Sylvester,
8,

in Contra Gentiles, lib. 2, cap. 2, n. 2).

"t-i1, q. 94, art. 2. In principiis per se notis ordo quidam invenitur, ut
quaedam in aliis implicite contineantur, sicut omnia principia reducuntur ad hoc
sicut ad primum, impossible est simul affirm.ire et negare. 11-11, q. 1, art. 7.
Nee aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens (in Meta,
lib. 4, lect. 6).
MIn Meta., lib. 4, lect.
6.

"For refutation of the objections made against the first principles by Bergson
a

and his followers, see Sheen, God and Intelligence, pp. 153 ff.
 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS 161

principle of identity, and the second which is the principle of

contradiction are the bases of all thinking and the indirect foun
dation of the reason of being. The human intellect never learns
these principles; it does not assume them; it arrives at them im-

k mediately upon a knowledge of the terms which make them up.

All other propositions possess certitude because of their intrinsic
"
or necessary relation with these dignitates" as the Scholastics and
Aristotle called them.26 They constitute the motive force of all
reasoning, for nothing moves unless it is moved by another. Any
chain of reasoning if carried back far enough would take us to
the first principles of thought, and if we could see the application
of first principles and all the other principles implicitly contained
in them, we would have an understanding of all the truths of
the natural order.27 It is the forgetfulness of these principles
which has made for the anarchy in thinking in so much of the
anemic philosophy of our day. It is the steadfast adherence to
these principles which makes the great tradition of Aristotle and
the Scholastics just as imbued with vitality today as it ever was.
Before applying the principles of metaphysics to empirical sci
ence, it is worth repeating what was said at the beginning of this
treatment of metaphysics; namely, the need of going back. The
first principles of the great tradition have never been refuted.
Quite apart from the fact that the natural is the irrefutable, they
have not been refuted because they have not been known. What
has been refuted is the belief that causality is an a priori subjective
form, or that it is based solely on experiences of succession and
consequence, or that it is a dogma of thinking, or an assumption,
or that finally it was arrived at, in the language of Einstein, in
the days of "Aristotle and the Scholastics, before the idea of ob
jective experiment in the scientific sense had arisen." The first
principles of thought are none of these things. Some day philos
ophy may go back to the great tradition, which is synonymous
with common sense, and like the man who left England in a row-

"Non enim vel certitudo in his quae sunt a principiis,

potest esse aliqua firmitas
nisi principia essent firmiter stabilita (De Veritate, q. 16, art. 2); Quanto medium
demonstrationis est propinquius primo principio tanto demonstratio est potior

(Post. Anal. lib. 1, lect. 38); Conclusiones scimus et eis credimus propter principia
(I- II, q. 65, art. 1, ad 4).
"Post, Anal., lib. 1, lect. 1.
162 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

it,
boat and then came back and discovered philosophy too, may
discover what believes to be really new Truth. And the new

it

a
Truth will be theold Truth, grounded on the immutable prin
ciples of reason. When that day and hour comes, philosophers
will wonder why anyone was ever foolish enough to believe that
the quantum theory had disproved the Principle of Causality.
 CHAPTER IX

THE METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF SCIENCE

The Philosophy of Nature

The two dominant theories of science are the physical and the
mathematical, the one limiting itself to experience and the other
to a mathematical or symbolic interpretation of experience. Both
of these are valid methods of science, but not valid philosophies.
The physical theory surfers from the same effect as humanism;
it attempts to live on its own fat and breathe the very air which
it has already exhaled from its scientific lungs. The mathematical
theory lacks reality as a philosophy and ignores the efficient and
final of things, which must be considered in any complete
causes
system of thought.
There yet remains the metaphysical theory of science which
consists in the application of the immutable necessary principles
of thought to the experimental data gathered by science. The
metaphysical theory of science is not a substitute but a com
plement of the physical and mathematical theories. The first two
describe phenomena in terms either of secondary causes or mathe
matics; the metaphysical theory explains phenomena in terms of
This conjunction of metaphysical principles with
first principles.
the data of science constitutes what the Scholastics called a Phi
losophy of Nature.
Philosophy of nature is not pure metaphysics, but applied
metaphysics. It differs from metaphysics in two ways: (a) Meta
physics considers forms or patterns abstracted from matter; phi
losophy of nature considers forms inherent in matter. The sculp
tor, for example, is not concerned with brass as brass, but as
brass inasmuch as it is capable of becoming a statue. In like

163
164 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

manner, philosophy of nature does not interest itself in pure ab

stractions, but rather in the nature of things as they are in the
external world.1 (b) Metaphysics is concerned only with primary
causes of being, whereas philosophy of nature is concerned only
with of inorganic or organic bodies, or the dynamic char
causes
acters of the physical universe.2
Having distinguished the science of metaphysics from the sci
ence of the philosophy of nature, it now remains to define the
science of the philosophy of nature. knowledge "which has
It is a
for its object all nature, or changeable being as such, and its onto-
logical principle which makes such change or mutability intel
ligible. It is essentially a philosophy of mutability. Aristotle in
founding it showed that an ontology of the sensible world is
possible, not because the world is sensible, but because it implies
in its structure certain intelligible invariables which depend upon
forms which specify them."3 In other words, just as the science
of mathematical physics is formed by the application of mathe
matics to physics, so, too, the science of the philosophy of nature
is formed by the application of the fundamental principles of
metaphysics to the natural sciences. In no sense is the philosophy
of nature to be understood as an ornament of the result of sci

'Nam considerare formas et quidditates rerum absolute, videtur pertinere ad

philosophum primum. Secundus solvit, quod sicut medicus considerat nervum, et
faber aes usque ad aliquem terminum, ita et naturale formas. Medicus enim
non considerat de nervo inquantum est nervus, hoc enim pertinet ad naturalem,
sed inquantum est subjectum sanitatis; et similiter aut alicujus hujusmodi. Et
similiter naturalis non considerat de forma in tantum considerat de nervo, in
quantum pertinet ad sanitatem, cuius causa considerat nervum; similiter naturalis
in tantum considerat de forma inquantum habet esse in materia. Et ideo terminus
considerationis scientiae naturalis est circa formas, quae quidem sunt aliquo modo
separatae, sed tamen esse habent in materia. . . . Sed quomodo se habeant formae
totaliter a materia separatae, et quid sint, vel etiam quomodo se habeat haec
forma, idest anima rationalis secundum quod est separabilis, et sine corpore ex-
istere potens, quid sit secundum suam essentiam separabile, hoc determinare
et
pertinet ad philosophum primum (Commentary on Physics of Aristotle, lib. 2,
lect. 4).
'Hoc autem ideo dicit, quia considerare de causis inquantum hujusmodi, pro-
prium est philosophi primi; nam causa in eo quod causa est, non dependet a ma
teria secundum esse, eo quod in his etiam quae a materia sunt separata, invenitur
ratio causae. Sed a philosopho naturali assumitur consideratio de causis propter
aliquam necessitatem; nec assumitur ab eo considerare de causis, nisi secundum
quod sunt causae naturalium mutationum (Com. on Physics of Aristotle, lib. 2,
lect. 5).
'Jacques Maritain, Les Degres du Savoir, p. 346.
 METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF SCIENCE 165

ence, with some very vague but noble explanations and reflec
tions. It is a real science in the strictest sense of the term, though
it is one which has completely passed out of existence in modern
times.
It might be well for those who will be inclined to protest that
the philosophy of nature is not a legitimate science to remember
that all knowledge is made up of two things: first of all, facts,
and secondly, their interpretation.
Philosophy of nature takes account of these two fundamental
principles. Its facts are the facts of science, whether they be re
vealed by biology, zoology, psychology, physics, chemistry, or
comparative religion. Naturally facts change, understanding here
by facts what science considers as such at any given period. Facts
in our day are not the same as the facts in the time of Aristotle
or Thomas Aquinas. But the principles by which these facts are in
terpreted have not changed, for common sense remains essentially
the same throughout the ages. Facts of chemistry revealed in the
days of St. Thomas are not the same as the chemical facts revealed
to us today. In
his day it was generally believed that the earth
was made up of four elements: air, earth, fire, and water — a
heritage of the early Grecian sciences. Today we know that there
are not four elements but ninety-two elements. But while the
science of chemistry has changed its outlook, it is not true to say
that philosophy has changed its principles. The principle of iden
tity, the principle of contradiction, the principle of finality, the
principle of the ordered harmony of the universe remain just as
true today as they did thousands of years ago. There is no reason
in the world, therefore, why these immutable principles should
not be applied to the new facts of our day just as they were
applied to the facts of ancient days. There is very likely to be an
unwarranted prejudice on the part of modern scientists to the
effect that simply because the scientific facts have changed, there
fore philosophical principles are inapplicable to them, and that
our knowledge is quite superior to the knowledge of the ancient
and the middle ages. It is to be granted that our facts are better,
but it is not quite so certain that our interpretation is better. If
Aristotle could return to the world today, he might astound it
with his interpretation of the new chemical and physical facts
which have been revealed by science.
166 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

The modern world, too, is apt to forget that the great advance
which has been made in science is due to an advance in technol
ogy, as Professor Whitehead has pointed out. Our instruments
are far better than the instruments of the ancients, but there is
nothing to indicate that our reasoning about the facts discovered
by these better instruments is superior to that of the ancients.
After all, if we concern ourselves with facts alone, what is the
difference between the facts revealed by new science and the
facts of the days of Aristotle? It is principally a difference in
measurement. In simple terms, the ancients measured in terms
of yards; we measure in terms of inches. We speak of protons
and electrons, they spoke of atoms; we speak in terms of light-
years; they spoke in terms of years. Our facts are more minute;
but is our reasoning about those minute factors better than their
reasoning? I dare say that if Physical Relativity had been dis
covered by a contemporary of Aristotle, he would not have re
written his Ethics in terms of Relativity. And if the Quantum
Theory had been discovered by Albert the Great, his pupil,
Thomas of Aquin, would not have made the University of Paris
revise its concept of causality; not because the Church would have
forbidden him, but because his reason would have told him it
would be unreasonable to do so.
Since the science of the philosophy of nature is concerned with
the application of philosophical principles to the facts of science,
it would follow that its primary interest is the search of the
causality behind the facts. Causality here does not mean the har
mony or orderly relation existing between facts, but rather the
reason or the intelligibility of the facts themselves. As Aristotle
has pointed out, there are four causes : efficient, final, formal, and
material. The efficient cause answers the question, "Who made
this being?" The final cause answers the question, "Why was it
made?" The formal cause, "According to what pattern was it
made?" The material cause, "Of what stuff was it made?"4

'Causae autem quadrupliciter dicuntur: quarum una est ipsa causa formalis,
quae est ipsa substantia rei, per quam scitur quid est unaquaeque res. Constat
enim, ut dictum est secundo physicorum quod non dicimus aliquid esse alicujus
naturae priusquam acceperit formam. Et quod forma sit causa, patet; quia quaes-
tionem qua dicitur quare est aliquid, reducimus tamquam ad rationem ultimam
ad causam formalem, incipiendo a formis proximis et procedendo usque ad ul
timam. Patet autem quod quare quaerit de causa et principio. Unde patet quod
forma est causa. Alia vero causa est materials. Tertia vero causa est efficiens, quae
 METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF SCIENCE 167

Without attempting to establish any necessary hierarchy of

sciences on the lower order, one could begin with the three su
preme sciences according to Aristotle and the Scholastics, and
then add any number of the empirical sciences of our day, e.g.,
metaphysics, physics, biology, psychology, etc.
mathematics,
Philosophy of nature, in any one of these levels, would be
formed by applying metaphysics to the data of these empirical
sciences:
Mathematics.
Physics.
Biology.
Psychology.
Metaphysics applied to mathematics gives mathematical logic,
or the ultimate reason for the coherence of mathematics. Applied
to the experimental data of physics, metaphysics gives cosmology.
Metaphysics applied to the experimental data of biology gives
the philosophy of life, or what Driesch has called "The Philos
ophy of the Organism."
Under no consideration must it be thought that philosophy of
nature does away with any experimental sciences. As a matter
of fact, it would cease to exist without them. The more perfect
they are in their facts, the more perfect will be the search for
their causes. Nor is there any question here of asking that phi
losophy of nature supplant mathematical physics. It could not
by its very nature, for they have different vivifying principles,
like a plant and a dog. The purpose of the philosophy of nature,
as the very terms imply, is to inquire into the intelligible behind
the facts of nature, and to discover if possible their explanation
or their causes.

est unde principium moms. Quarta quae opponitur causae effi-

causa est finalis,
cienti secundum oppositionem principii Nam motus incipit a causa effi-
et finis.
ciente, et terminatur ad causam finalem. Et hoc est etiam cujus causa fit aliquid,
et quae est bonum uniuscujusque naturae. Sic igitur causam finalem per tria
notificat; scilicet quia est terminus motus, et per hoc opponitur principio motus,
quod est causa efficiens; et quia est primum in intentione, ratione cujus dicitur
cujus causa: et quia est per se appetibile, ratione cujus dicitur bonum. Nam bonum
est quod omnia appetunt (Metaphysics of Aristotle, Lib. 1, lect. 3).
168 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Cosmology
Every science is made up of and a formal object.
a material
The material object is the matter which is studied; the formal
object is the particular angle or aspect in which it is studied. In
the science of cosmology, the material object would be the whole
of inanimate nature, embraced by physics, in the broad sense of
the term chemistry, crystalography, numerology, and kindred
sciences. The phenomena of the atom, the crystal, chemical
bodies, the strata of the earth, once they have been fairly studied
in detail by the empirical scientists, become the raw material of
the science of cosmology. This has been done in splendid fashion
by J. A. McWilliams in his textbook entitled Cosmology.
The formal object of cosmology is the application of funda
mental philosophical principles to the facts. Empirical scientific
investigation does not give their final solution in ultimate terms
of intelligibility. Metaphysics asks four questions of the inorganic
matter delivered over to it by the scientists: first of all, what is
its efficient cause? secondly,what is its formal cause? thirdly,
what is its final cause? fourthly, what is its material cause, or its
ultimate constitutive elements? Cosmology has, therefore, the
task to determine, inasfar as it is possible, the essential characters
of the phenomenal realities and the reasons of the laws which
rule them. This study is all the more important because empirical
scientists themselves have renounced all pretensions to know or
exhaust all the richness of phenomena. Experience alone is the
unique force of the knowledge which the empirical scientist seeks
to discover. But the phenomena which fall under the external
senses are only an aspect of reality, and only a part of its whole
being. When the chemist, for example, has finished his investiga
tion of the atom, resolved it to its very last elements, and dis
covered it to be made up of protons, electrons, or waves, there
is still room for the philosopher to ask the question: What ren
ders the atom possible, or what is necessarily required that it be
what it is? All
the philosopher needs to know is what the chemist
It makes no difference what that unit
is,

regards unit.
as a
whether be the old atom of the Greeks, or the billiard-ball
it

atom of the Victorians, or the protons and electrical charges of

our own day. Regardless of what the unit of chemistry may be
 METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF SCIENCE 169

discovered to be, it still remains for the philosopher to ask, what

are the final conditions of its intelligibility, and thus arrive at
the ideas of matter and form. The mathematical theory would
hold that the only way in which the atom could be made intel
ligible is through the application of mathematical or geometrical
symbols.
"The mathematical theory implies (1) the principle of identity,
(2) the principle of mechanical causation, (3) the doctrine that
only relations are causes, (4) the thesis that the method of hy
pothesis is the fundamental scientific method, and (5) the epis-
temological principle that the real world is suggested by, but not
contained in, the world of sensation."5
The Scholastic theory holds, however, that metaphysical prin
ciples may be applied to that unit. In the language of Dr. North
rop, which may be properly interpreted:
"The functional theory implies (1) the principle of teleology,
(2) the primacy of the method of abstraction, (3) the episte-
mological principle that the real world is contained in the world
of sensation, (4) the doctrine that matter and form are mere
attributes of a process, or 'event,' or dynamic type of substance,
and (5) the thesis that there is only one real individual in nature
which is the 'event,' or process, or dynamic substance, termed
nature as a whole."6
The doctrine of matter and form, or hylomorphism as it has
been called, is just as true today as it was in the days of Aristotle.
It no more changes than the fundamental principles of govern
ment. The necessity of executive, legislative, and judicial functions
remain quite independent of the changes in government. The
doctrine of matter and form belongs to another world than that
of Eddington's explanation of the elephant in terms of pointer
readings, as Dr. Noel indicates in the Preface. The philosopher
of nature will have no quarrel with the mathematician for apply
ing his principles to the chemical unit, for mathematical abstrac
tion is one of the very legitimate degrees of abstraction. But he
does quarrel with the mathematician who says that that is the
only kind of abstraction, for as we have already pointed out,

"F. S. C. Northrop, Science and First Principles (New York, 1931), p. 25.
*Op. cit., p. 25.
170 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

there still remains the metaphysical whose principles are applica

ble to the whole of being.
Cosmology has ceased to be a recognized science today in any
philosophical curriculum outside of Scholastic circles, most likely
because philosophy means, for many today, merely the systema-
tization of the sciences. They believe that all that philosophy can
do is accept the teachings of positive science, systematize the ex
perimental data, group them in some sort of synthetic way, with
out attempting to give any explanation. But there is no reason
why the higher principles of metaphysics cannot be applied to
chemical beings, simply because they possess being, and thus
seek out the explanation of phenomena, not in terms of mathe
matics but in the light of reason.7
The physical theory which would limit the explanation of
physical or chemical phenomena to the physical or chemical
order alone fails to account for the fundamental assumption un
derlying all scientific procedure; viz., the scientific laws which
are the laws of thought are also the laws of reality. No physicist
in the world doubts that all the unforeseen logical consequences
of a true physical hypothesis must necessarily hold for the phys
ical universe in which that hypothesis is true, and that, if any of
these consequences turn out to be false, it must be due to the
falsity of the assumption or the hypothesis, and not to the falsity
of nature. As long as there is any connection between the phys
ical laws and reality, some kind of necessity must connect them.
The philosopher investigates in what this necessity consists, and
attributes it to some causal relation.
As Morris R. Cohen has put it:
"If the law of gravitation or that of valency could themselves
be deducedfrom another law — for example, some law of electro-
magnetism — the realm of physical explanation would be widened
and great unity be introduced. But the logical character of physi
cal explanation would remain unaltered. Actually, the search for
is,

physical or explanations
causes thus, hunt for appropriate
a

major premises or middle terms. The principle of causality (as

'Et quia omne quod habet materiam mobile est, consequens est quod ens
mobile sit subjectum.Naturalis autem philosophia de naturalibus est. Naturalia
autem sunt quorum principium est natura. Natura autem est principium motus
et quietis in eo in quo est. De his igitur quae habet in se principium motus est
scientia naturalis (in Vhy., lib. 1, lect. 1).
 METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF SCIENCE 171

distinct from particular causal laws) is thus simply the general

maxim that physical phenomena are connected according to in
variant laws."8
"On the other hand, unless physical nature behaves according
to the laws of diversity (excluded middle and contradiction) not
principle could be applied to

it,
a single mathematical and

it
might, as far as physics concerned, one big blooming buzz
is
be
ing confusion. ... not necessary, for purposes of physics, to
It
is

believe that nothing ever can happen except what adequately

is
by

described the actually known laws of physics. . . . Mechanism

as formulation of the laws of masses in motion basic branch

is
a

a
of physics, but not an adequate account of the whole of it. An
adequate analysis of the latter bears out the contention that not
formless matter, or blind sensation, but mathematical and logical
relations form the intelligible substance of things. But the world
must contain more than this form the concepts and procedure
if

of physics are to have meaning."9

Biology
Just as possible to apply philosophical principles to physics
is
it

in order to form the science of cosmology, so possible to

is
it

apply them to the science of biology. The material object of

biology organic life, whether be an amoeba or man. The
it
is

a
by

formal aspect which biology studies life observation and

is

experiment. The very method of this study, as well as the in

struments with which works, limits the biologist to the tan
it

gible, the observable, and the phenomenal.

The biologist,
by

his very method, must inquire into the

spatial and mechanical conditions of life. The philosopher should
not quarrel with him simply because he does not speak of the
soul, for he necessarily makes abstraction of the spiritual prin
ciple in his work of observation and experiment. The biologist
merely codifies the appearances but he does not legislate con
of life. His method in
is,

cerning the essence certain sense,

a

necessarily mechanistic. He can only observe the observable, but

the vital principle which unifies phenomena does not come with-

"Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature (New York, 1931), p. 226.

'Ibid., pp. 229-230.
172 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

in the range of his technique. A mechanistic philosophy is quite

a different matter.10 Professor Haldane has well understood the
limitations imposed upon him by his experiment and investiga
tion, when he says: "All we can do is to investigate life from the
standpoint of the ordinary laws of material change. There might
be, of course, continuous miracles happening in connection with
life. If so, they are, at any rate, outside the sphere of science.
Possibly the extraordinary phenomena of reproduction and re
covery from disease and injury do involve an unintelligible or
miraculous element. But though we cannot at present see any
possibility of accounting for them, no course is open to us except
to push physical and chemical investigation as far as we can."11
Since the business of the biologist is to push physical and
chemical investigation of life as far as he can, it is not his privi
lege as a biologist to suggest any principle which would explain
life as such. That, however, he may do as a philosopher of life
by applying the higher principles of thought to his data.
One extreme school of biology denies that there is any superior
science to illumine its experimental data, and by that same token
elevates the mechanistic method into a mechanistic philosophy.
The other extreme is Vitalism which, as biology, teaches exist
ence of an entelechy or form. The philosophy of mechanism or
vitalism does not belong to biology as such.12 If biology is to be a
natural science, its phenomena must be subject to observable con
ditions from which definite results may be expected. To make
conditions observable and laws verifiable, the biologist must re
strict himself to objects in space and time which are perceptible
to all observers. Biological phenomena of science,
are objects
therefore, only to the extent that they involve physically verifiable
elements. This is not a denial of the existence of a vital principle,
or a soul, for the biologist when he leaves the technique of his
laboratory may seek more ultimate explanation of the phenomena
of life than that which is given by the description of its mechan
ics and conditions. When he does seek the more ultimate ex

'""Mechanism need not be materialistic. It is possible to maintain it on methodo

logical grounds; while leaving the philosophical question untouched" (J. S. Need-
ham, The Sceptical Biologist, p. 34).
"Materialism, p. 20.
"Jacques Maritain, cf. Les degris du Savoir.
 METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF SCIENCE 173

planations by an appeal to the directly unverifiable, he produces

not biology as such, but a philosophical biology or the philosophy
of life.
The biologist may very well, after having exhausted all the
mechanical conditions of life, apply philosophical principles, e.g.,
that of finality, and thus arrive at an Animistic position which
posits that all life is intelligible only in terms of a vital principle.13
Much of the opposition of the biologists to the animistic posi
tion has been due to their belief that the vital principle is
juxtaposed to the physicochemical constituents of life, instead of
being related to it as form to matter.14 That accounts for the
opposition of J. S. Haldane and others to the vitalist position,
of which mention shall be made later.15 When, however, Hans
Driesch entitles his treatise on the explanation of life The Phi
losophy of the Organism, Haldane is quite unjustified in quar
reling with him, for Driesch there asserts that the vital position
is known not by explaining biology, but by explaining biology
plus philosophical principles. The soul cannot be seen in a bio
logical laboratory, any more than pain can be seen on an operat
ing table. If it were admitted that the processes in which matter
and energy are concerned are by themselves purely mechanical,
it would lead to a great scientific confusion. The biologist cannot
begin experiments with the assumption that an invisible and
intangible "something" which interferes with these mechanical
processes exists within the bodies of organisms. With such an
assumption, the biologist would never know where he was; the
assumption will explain "anything and everything that occurred
in the living organism, but in practice it cannot be definitely
tested in the investigation of individual phenomena and is thus
practically in detail
useless as a working hypothesis."18
When the modern biologist carries his empirical investigation
as far as he possibly can, and has exhausted his study of the
physical-chemical constituents of life the philosopher may then

"The term "animistic" is used here to distinguish it from mechanism and

vitalism as two exaggerated biological theories. Mechanism makes the method of
biology a philosophy denying a vital principle; vitalism attempts to bring a
vital within the range of directly verifiable
principle facts.
"Jacques Maritain, Les Degris du Savoir, p. 393.
"J. S. Haldane, op. cit., pp. 66 67, 73.
"Ibid., p. 70.
174 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

show his facts do not account entirely for the unity of life, and
may therefore conclude to some nonspatial, nonmechanical prin
ciple called the entelechy or soul. Empirical science as such has
nothing to say concerning an entelechy or form. It is functionally
impossible for any experimental science to discover the non-
spatial and the nonobservable, it is impossible for a biol
just as
ogist to discover justice in the brain or for a. physician to dis
cover the redemptive value of pain in a body. These are con
clusions drawn by reason from empirical science.
The position which we have just here outlined is the position
taken by Aristotle in his treatise on the soul. It is also the method
followed by Thomas Aquinas in his treatise on the nature of
the soul which appears in the first part of the Summa Theologica,
in which he defines the soul as the first principle in those things
which live.17 He arrives at that conclusion, not from experiment,
but from the application of rational principles to observable facts.
A biologist who says that there is no such thing as a soul has
not kept in the domain of biology, just as a philosopher who says
there are no mechanical or physical of life has not
constituents
kept in the domain of philosophy. A biologist knows there is a
soul only when he ceases to be a biologist and becomes a philos
opher. The philosopher, in like manner, knows there are phys
ical and chemical constituents of life when he ceases to be a
philosopher and becomes a biologist.
There will be more general acceptance of the Scholastic phi
losophy of life when philosophers make the distinction between
Vitalism biology and Vitalism as a philosophy of life (Ani
as

mism). J. S. Haldane cannot accept Mechanism,18 but neither can

he accept Vitalism because the "entelechy" seems to him to be
a "supernatural entity introduced from without." Once it is un
derstood that the entelechy or vital principle is arrived at only
by the application of metaphysical principle to biological facts,
this objectionwill disappear, for the soul is not a "supernatural
entity," but the "form" of the organism, or to speak figuratively,
an architect disposing and arranging matter to be such and such

"I, q. 75, art. 1.

""Though the physico-chemical or mechanistic conception of life is still very
much alive in the minds of popular writers, I think
it is now far from being
so among serious students of biology" (The Philosophical Basis of Biology, p. 12).
 METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF SCIENCE 175

a living organism. Without ever using the term "form" or "vital"

principle, philosophers of life, have by the application of the
principle of formal and final cause arrived at the conclusion that
some nonmechanical X is necessary to explain life. Applying
these principles to the phenomena of biology, they argue that :
a) The behavior of an organism cannot in all cases be
interpreted in terms of response to environment. The response
of a machine to its environment is automatic. Wind the spring
and the watch goes and it stops when it has run down, but a
salmon, for example, continues to leap in its endeavor to over
come the rocks until it succeeds.

b) Every organism is more than the sum of its parts. A ma

chine is an aggregate, that is to say, it is the arithmetical sum
of its nuts and bolts and gears. Hence, you can dissect it and put
it together again, but you cannot dissect a living body and put
it together again. A
living organism is more than a "system of
pipes and tubes," in the phrase of Addison.
c) A living organism exhibits an inner drive to reach its ap
propriate form and structure, and when it has reached to
maintain it. An embryo of certain kinds divided may yet have it,
in each one of the divided sections complete embryo. Driesch
a

argues there must be some principle of unity within an organism

(formal cause) which urges to reach its appropriate form struc
it

ture. cannot be divided into parts so that each part

A

machine
will be complete But certain living organisms do.
machine.
a

Therefore, there must be some nonphysical X to explain these

phenomena. This some call "entelechy"; others, an "inner force";
but the Scholastics have always called vital principle or soul.
it
a

And thus
by

forms its philosophy of life the union of meta

it

physics and observable biological phenomena. The "Scholastic

philosopher," Dr. U. A. Hauber, in an excellent treatment of
mechanism, writes: "If true to the principles of St. Thomas we'll
gather into his treasury the findings of the materialistic me
chanists and make those findings an integral part of his philo-
sophia perennis."19
Philosophy of nature as here outlined might also be constructed
by

not only applying first principles to the experimental data of

""Mechanistic Conception of Life," New Scholasticism, Vol. 7, No. 3, p. 200.

176 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

physics and biology, but also to the experimental data of psy

chology. There was a grave need at the end of the last century
of studying the mind in its phenomenal manifestations, as Aris-
totle did in his treatise on the Soul, and St. Thomas in his
treatise De Anima. In the first two books of this treatise
there is a treatmentof memory, sensation, sleep, and the move
ment of animals, and in the third book a treatment of the char
acteristic mental operations of a man.
But now the reaction seems to have gone to the other extreme,
and from a dearth of experimental
study of psychic phenomena,

it,
psychology has become surfeited with and in many instances
has identified itself with physiology. When Wundt's Physiolo-
gische Psychologie was published five years, Henry Holt asked
William James to write similar work on that subject. James
a

labored twelve years and produced Psychology,

his Principles

of
in 1890. One of the fundamental assumptions of the book which
James held in common with all Wundtians was that nemo psy
chologus nisi physiologus, which, being interpreted, meant that
the primary cause of any mental process always correspond
is

ing activity in the nervous system. At the present time behavior

ism achieves great success in interpreting the behavior of human
beings, without the assumption that they have minds, while the
theories of psycho-analysts attempt to demonstrate clearly the de
pendence of the rational upon nonrational elements. In 1929 the
Ninth International Congress of Psychology met at Yale Univer
sity, bringing students of the psyche from all parts of the world
to listen to papers on the following subjects: "Learned and un
learned responses in goldfish"; "The effect of diet deficient in
a

vitamin on sex behavior in male rats"; "The Vibrato in artistic

E

voices"; "The Dodge pendulum-photochronograph as used in

the registrationof eyelid reactions"; "Slant in handwriting and
sinistral tendencies"; "A modified kinohapt"; "Experiment in the
control of eliminative functions and related projects"; "Develop
ment of post-rotational head niptagmus in squabs"; "Controlled
observations on the behavior of kittens towards rats from birth
to five months of age"; and "Maturation and practice in the co
ordination of pecking reactions in chicks."
This extreme of identifying physiology with psychology affords
an interesting comparison with the new physics. Physics, which
 METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF SCIENCE Vf]
normally should have no interest in the mental, has become
with Eddington and Jeans, and psychology, which nor
idealistic
mally should have an interest in the mental, has become ma
terialistic.
When experimental limits itself to rats and kittens,
psychology
squabs and eyelids, philosophy of nature has little opportunity
for formation. But when experimental psychology delivers over
its findings concerning phenomenal manifestations of the mind,
then the philosopher of nature may apply his philosophical prin
ciples. The application of metaphysical principles may force the
psychologist to the conclusion of a rational soul, just as the ap
plication of metaphysical principles to the data of biology forced
him to conclude to a vital principle.20 There is some indication
that such a type of psychology is about to be reborn. Dr. Rudolph
Allers, of the University of Vienna, declared that "we have rea
son to believe that the gradual evolution of modern psychology
will bring it still nearer to the great truths worked out by the
Fathers and the Great Christian thinkers of a later date. Though
they may not be aware of those scholars who are today en
it,

of

deavoring to enlarge our knowledge psychology are contribut

ing to the philosophia perennis."21
The philosophy of nature, therefore* concerned with the
is

rational explanation of observable, mental, psychic or conscious

states and functions. Through reasoning processes will come
it

to the conclusion that the soul the form of the body.

If
is

it

studied the soul as separated from the body, would cease

it

to be philosophy of nature, and begin to be metaphysics.22 St.

Thomas explicitly taught that psychology natural science
is
a

""In man's mentallife, as whole of connected experiences, there must be

a
a

some connecting-thread in virtue of which those experiences are his, and his alone.
The supposition that this thread an abiding substance, or soul, perhaps the
is

is
a

only one that explains the facts, and invoked on precisely the same grounds
is
it

as the continuous individuality which we ascribe to tree, though the supposi

is

tion of mental atoms so to speak, and of hypothetical laws as to their interactions,

may suffice for quasi-mathematical description of the facts" (F. R. Tennant,
a

Philosophy Sciences, p. 14).

of

"The New Psychologies, p. 80.

"Terminus autem scientiae naturalis est circa formas quae quidem sunt aliquo
modo separatae, sed tamen habent esse in materia. . Sed quomodo se habeant
.
.

formae totaliter materia separatae . . . hoc determinare pertinet ad philosophum

a

primum (Phy., lib. 2, lect. 4).

I78 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

and not apurely metaphysical science, because metaphysics makes

abstractions from all matter. Psychology does not make this ab
straction because animistic operations either are functions of
material organs, if they are independent of them as in thought,
or they are dependent upon the body for the sensible data.23
Philosophy of nature, when applied to experimental data, will
not have the certitude of metaphysics for the reasons given above
in studying the contingency of nature, but it will develop science
in the real sense of the term, and train the mind to rise above
the purely phenomenal explanation of the mouse in the piano,
who, seeing the hammer fall upon the strings "concluded" that
the hammer itself was the sole explanation. Experimental theory
has not given the final explanation when it gives the quia or
"because," for there is yet room for the propter quid or the "on
account of which." When the mind seeks this, it arrives at the
conclusions that there is some great Musician who is playing the
piano, and who knows the harmony of the universe and the laws
of beauty far more than the little scientific mouse crawling
among the hammers. The principles of metaphysics may be ap
plied to physics, biology, psychology, and the other sciences to
make a philosophy of nature, but may the categories of physics,
biology, and psychology be applied to philosophy? This problem
is investigated in the next chapter.

"Primo movet dubitationem circa passiones animae et solvit eam. Secundo ex

hujusmodi solutione ostendit quod cognitio de anima pertinet ad philosophum
naturalem seu ad physicum (De Anima, lib. 2, lect. 4).
 CHAPTER X

RELATIONS BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY

AND SCIENCE

The hierarchy of sciences is a kind of pyramid with meta

physics at the summit. Physics studies qualitative being, inas
It
is is,
much as it is susceptible of movement. therefore, less uni
versal in its scope than mathematics, which indifferent to mo
tion but fixes its attention on being, inasmuch as quantita is
it

tive. Metaphysics abstracts from all the peculiar aspects of the

lower sciences, and indifferent as to whether being organic
is

is

or inorganic, mental or physical, material or spiritual, terrestrial

or celestial. fixes its whole attention on being, inasmuch
It

as it
being.
is

A science with
more universal object and principle may be
a

applied to lower science, as mathematics applied to music.

is
a

But a science with more restricted object may not apply its
a

principles to higher science.

a

There an important text of St. Thomas in de Trinitate Bbetii

is

on this very point. Mathematics, he says, may be applied to

physics because the principles of the former are more general,
but the principles of physics may not be applied to the science
of mathematics.1 The part may not dictate to the whole, nor the
citizen to the government, nor the science of the physical to the
science of the mental and physical. The methods and contents of
the various sciences in the hierarchy differ, and hence the cate
gories of one are not applicable except analogously to the cate

'Principia mathematicae sunt applicabilia naturalibus, non autem converse

e

propter quod physica est ex suppositione mathematicae et non converso (q. 5,

e

art. 3, ad 5).

179
 18o PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

gories of another science. That is why a changed conception in

physics does not mean a new philosophy or even a new religion.
The difference between the sciences is grounded on abstraction
from being, hence there Thomas has put "no uniform

is,
as St.

it,
method of science."2
The method of physics of sociology nor
not the method

is

is
the method of chemistry the method of religion. Neither are the
objects of any of these sciences the same, otherwise there would
be no distinction of sciences.3 This being so, fallacy to

it
is
a
suppose that philosophy should change its principles with every
new advance in biology, psychology, chemistry, or physics. There
are fads in science, just as there are fads in clothes, and during
the past few generations these fads have been sociology, biology,
psychology, and When Comte popularized sociology,
physics.
philosophers began to sociologize everything. The raggy rem
nants of this Lyricism to be found today in Levy-Bruhl, and
is

Durkheim, for whom God "divinized society." The next pop

is

ular science was biology, but as soon as Darwin presented evolu

tion to the world, philosophers evolutionized everything, Grant
Allen even writing on the "Evolution of God." Next, psychology
came into vogue and after James and Meyers revealed the sub
conscious, philosophy lost consciousness, then its mind, and finally
its soul, and now physics the popular science and to be up to
is

date, philosophers make everything come from space-time, even

God.
There no protest here against the sciences themselves, but
is

against philosophy absorbing their categories and forgetting its

own birthright. To protest against this Lyricism
of

Science on
the part of philosophy lays one open to the charge of being an
obscurantist. To some minds, disagreeing with the application
of physical-chemical categories to the sum of knowledge con
is

sidered as vicious as disagreeing with the multiplication table.4

'Peccant qui uniformiter in tribus speculativae partibus procedere nituntur (De

Trinitate Bo'etii, q. art. 2).
6,

"In divinis neque ad sensum, neque ad imaginationem debemus deduci; in

mathematicis autem ad imaginationem et non ad sensum; uniformiter in tribus
speculativae partibus procedere nituntur (De Trinitate Bo'etii, q.
6,

art. 2).
4Fulton Sheen, Religion Without God, p. 250; Sheen, Old Errors and New
J.

Labels, p. 153.
 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 181

It is important to this point by insisting, first of all, that

stress
a philosophy which is a lyricism of science is not a true philos
ophy, and secondly, the philosophical ideas of the Great Tradi
tion, such as substance, God, morality, were not based upon any
particular cosmology, and therefore are not overthrown by
cosmology.
First of all, the lyricism of quite unjustified, for as
a science is
St. Thomas so well remarks: "There is no uniform method of
science." A hierarchy of sciences exists and the distinction be
tween the sciences in that hierarchy is grounded upon the differ
ent degrees of abstraction. The categories of biology are not ap
plicable to physics, except analogically; the categories of sociology
are not applicable to mathematics; the predicate of the sentence
"the moon is made of green cheese," cannot be applied to the
subject of the sentence, "John is a man"; so neither can the forms
of science be applied to philosophy except poetically. Oxygen and
hydrogen, atoms and protons, are not studied in the same way
as justice and fortitude. We simply cannot put a man into a
crucible to see if he will give off unmistakable green fumes of
envy. It is one thing to say space and time are inseparable in the
new outlook of science, but quite another thing to say that God
is space-time. Because the universe can best be studied in terms
of mathematics, it does not follow that God is a mathematician,
as Jeans would hold; because physics discovers space and time
are relative to the observer, it does not follow that ethics is relative,
as Westermarck believes. Relativity is good and proper within
its own domain, but it becomes absurd when it is expanded into
saying that everything is relative and that we have four toes on
one foot counted one way, and six on the other foot counted the
other way.
Furthermore, why should physics be the supreme science to
tell us what morality, values, and God really are? By what right
has the science which studies quantity become the authority rul
ing over the sciences of quality? By what logic does the scientist,
who tells us the nature of the atom, become the scientist to tell
us there is no soul ? Is there no other standard for the hierarchy
of sciences than that which makes the scientia scientiarum the
one which makes the minutest physical discovery? If physics is
going to dominate metaphysics, and mathematics, logic, where,
182 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

then, shall the process stop? Will the Egyptologist soon claim to
be the interpreter of liturgy, and the detective the interpreter of
theology, simply because both deal with mystery? "No one,"
writes A. E. Taylor, "would think of regarding the verdict of an
archeologist or a chemist on a moot point of law as deriving
any particular value from the eminence of the archeologist or
the chemist in his known subject; no one would attach any
weight to a Lord Chancellor's opinion about the genuineness of
an alleged Rembrandt, or a disputed fragment of Simonides, be
cause the opinion was that of the best Lord Chancellor the
country every possessed."5 The sciences are valid in their own
sphere, but not to the whole of knowledge; they are good as far
as they go, but they do not go everywhere.6
The philosopher who knows the method and content and prin
ciples of his science will therefore not become excited when a
new physical theory is offered to the world. Hence, we have
little sympathy for those philosophers who, forgetting the prin
ciples which gave them certitude within their field, feel that the
Quantum Theory proves free-will, or that there is a God because
the physics of Eddington and Jeans say there is a God. The
Quantum Theory has nothing more to do with the proof of
free-will than a proton has to do with a wish to be moral. The
existence of God did not wait for Eddington and Jeans, and
those fundamentalists who enthused about science becoming the-
istic are very apt to find their theism overthrown when the the
ories of these two notable scientists are upset. The life of a phys
ical theory today has only about the life of a peace treaty.
The mere "incalculability" or indeterminate character of the
atom is not a valid basis for the freedom of the will, and per
haps it was to those scientists who believed there was such a
basis that Einstein directed a merited "There are sci
rebuke.
entific writers in England who are illogical and romantic in
their popular books, but1 in their scientific work they are acute
logical reasoners."7 The lyricism of the Quantum Theory to
"prove" free-will or to "disprove" causality is grounded upon a
double meaning of the word "determined" : "In one sense a quan

5"The Vindication of Religion," in Essays Catholic and Critical.

"See F. J. Sheen, Religion Without God, Chap. 8.
''Where is Science Going? p. 473.
 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 183

tity is determined when it is measured, in another sense an event

is determined when it is caused. The Principle of Indeterminacy
has to do with measurement, not with causation. . . . There is
nothing whatever in the Principle of Indeterminacy to show that
any physical event is uncaused."8 Not all the scientists like to see
their theories made a philosophy. Speaking in the same vein,
Max Planck definitely states that: the human will has nothing
whatever to do with the opposition between causal and statistical
physics. Its importance is of much more profound character and
is entirely independent of any physical or biological hypothesis.9
The Quantum Theory, which deals with atomic jumps, has
nothing to do with voluntary "jumps" or resolutions, neither has
mathematical physics anything to do with God. Jeans believes
that because geometry applies to the world, therefore, God is a
mathematician. When Eddington delivered an international
broadcast on the atom, journalists headlined "Day of Materialism
Over." Immediately science was hailed as giving support to God,
but the philosopher whose God has no more support than the
idealist theory of Eddington and Jeans will very soon find him
self without a Creator. It is not often that Bertrand Russell can
be quoted with approval, but in his Scientific Outloo\, he prop
erly anathematizes this spirit of philosophy which looks to sci
ence for all the proofs of all its theses. He shows that "Edding
ton deduces religion from the fact that atoms do not obey the
laws of mathematics, and Jeans deduces it from the fact that
they do."10 In these instances and many others, a "physical science
has fallen a victim to the Zeitgeist."11
A of the lyricism of science
is,

second remark apropos that

contrary to the general opinion of Carr, Whitehead, Alexander,
Langdon-Davies, philosophy, religion, and morals are not
grounded upon any system of cosmology, and therefore do not
pass away with it. A
new cosmology no more suggests new
a

religion than new art. simply has nothing to do

It

suggests
it

with it. may bring new or new difficulties, but

It

analogies,
it

brings no new entity. A new cosmology brings only new cos-

a

"Bertrand Russell, Scientific Outlook, p. 105 ff.

"Op. tit., p. 102.
"P. 108.
"Edwin Schroedinger, 1st die Milieu bedingt.
N'

atur-wissenschaft
184 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

mology. The modern scientist does not claim to tell us what

things are in their essence, for he can only define things by their
properties, or by their behavior. Aristotle and the Scholastics
built their metaphysics, ethics, and religion on principles which
depended in no way upon a cosmological theory. The Scholastic
belief about life being dependent upon a vital principle did not
depend upon the biology of the time which believed in spon
taneous generation,neither did Aristotle's hylomorphism depend
upon the antiquated four-element theory of cosmology. There
are some things in life which do not rest on an entirely empirical
basis, and those who would botanize on their mother's grave
are apt to miss that great truth. In this connection Ronald Knox
correctly observes: "It is not to be disputed that the ancients did
think of earth, air, fire, and water as irreducible elements, and
that sometimes they built quaint superstructures of scientific be
lief upon these premises; St. Hilary informs us, for example, that
salt is made out of fire and water. I have no notion why. But
torture my brain as I will, I cannot see where our common no
tions of religion and ethics are based upon some form of physical
speculation, rather than another. If somebody discovered tomor
row that it was all a mistake about atoms and electrons, and that
after all there was and there could not be anything smaller than
electrons, I
should not find my faith in any way strengthened,
or the work of Christian apologetics one tittle easier. ...
It is all
very well to tell me that the chair I am sitting on is in reality a
mass of whirling electrons, but it is I who am based on the chair,
not my faith. St. Thomas never told me that it was not a mass
of whirling electrons; and even if he had and I was now forced
to disbelieve him, I should not therefore conclude that his specu
lations about the nature of God were equally inaccurate. For the
life of me, I cannot see what the trouble is supposed to be about."12
This brings philosophical reason which involves
us to a more
the relation of philosophy and the sciences. This problem is not
the same as the philosophy of nature. By philosophy here is
meant the science of metaphysics, which studies the four causes
in terms of the intelligibility of being. By the term "science" is
meant empirical science. It will be recalled that above we noted

^Broadcast Minds, pp. 211-212.

 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 185

two differences between philosophy of nature and metaphysics.

Keeping this in mind, the problem here discussed is the relation
between philosophy (metaphysics) and empirical science. The
usual method for treating the relation between the two is that
accepted by Professor Meyerson, namely, to describe the differ
ence in terms of method alone.
The difference between the two is double, according to Meyer-
son: first, science treats the particular and philosophy the general.
Science limits its field of observation to a very small group of
phenomena, whereas philosophy extends itself to the whole realm
of reality.13 The second difference between science and philos
ophy is their attitude toward submission to facts. Meyerson con
tends that philosophy is so concerned with the intelligibility of the
world, that it forces its steps and denies the difficulties it meets
in the way. Science, on the contrary, is less concerned with the
end of the journey, and is more concerned with facts. Manifestly,
this is a very incomplete description of the relation between
philosophy and science.
But what are the relations between philosophy and science?
To answer this question one must again distinguish between the
material and the formal objects of philosophy and science, i.e.,
what is studied, and the aspects under which it is studied. The
object of philosophy and science in a sense to be denned is the
same, but the formal approach or the method of study is differ
ent. The object of both is being, for the mind is necessarily con
cerned with being, whether it be mental, ontological, physical,
or spiritual. But the method of study is different. Science studies
being by relating phenomena among themselves and by coor
dinating them into laws.
The method of philosophy on the contrary is entirely different.
It starts from entirely different principles, arrived at by studying
the conditions of intelligibility, such as the principle of con
tradiction in the speculative order. One is descriptive, the other
is explicative; one is concerned with the quia; the other is con
cerned with the propter quid.14 Science is concerned with a par-

"La Deduction Relativiste, p. 270.

"Illi qui sciunt causam et propter quid, scientiores sunt et sapientiores illis qui
ignorant causam, sed solum sciunt quia. Experti autem sciunt quia, sed nesciunt
propter quid (in Meta., lib. 1, lect. 1).
186 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

ticular and definite in its phenomenal manifestations,

essence
whereas philosophy is concerned with essence as such. There is
no conflict between science and philosophy, nor can one ever re
place the other any more than "justice," which is abstract and
spiritual, can be replaced by a physiological study of the way
the word is pronounced. Though distinct, they are not necessarily
separated as our study of philosophy of nature has shown, for
the connection between metaphysics and empirical science in the
philosophy of nature is due to a different degree of abstraction.
The following propositions sum up the Scholastic position con
cerning philosophy and science. Philosophy and science both deal
with being, but from different points of view. Physics, for exam
ple, treats of inorganic material being; biology treats of organic
being; psychology treats of mental being. But philosophy treats
of being as being.15 There is no particular science which studies
universal being or the fullness of all that
is,
except metaphysics;
every other science treats of only part of that being. The em
a

phasis of physics in the older terminology was on ens mobile,

but the emphasis of metaphysics on ens inquantum est ens}6
is

not true to say, then, as does Professor H. Levy of the

It
is

University of London, that mathematics the "Queen of the

is

15Diversae scientiae sunt de diversis entibus; et multa entia sunt quibus non
possunt attribui omnes causae. . . Ista scientia (philosophia) considerat ens in-
.

quantum est ens (in Meta., lib. 3, lect. 4).

'"Nulla scientia particularis ens universale inquantum hujusmodi,
considerat
sed solum aliquam partem entis divisam ab aliis: circa quam speculator per se
accidens, sicut scientiae mathematicae aliquod ens speculantur, scilicet ens quan
tum. Scientia autem communis considerat universale ens secundum quod ens: ergo
non est eadem alicui scientiarum particularium. Nam(Ibid., lib. 4, lect.
3)
.
.
.

omnes inquantum sunt entia vel substantiae, pertinent ad considera-

substantiae
tionem hujus scientiae: inquantum autem sunt talis vel talis substantia, ut leo vel
bos pertinent ad scientias speciales. . . .
Hoc autem ens immobile superius est et nobilius ente mobili, de quo considerate
naturalis. Et quia ad illam scientiam pertinet consideratio entis communis, ad
quam pertinet consideratio entis communis, ad quam pertinet consideratio entis
primi, ideo ad aliam scientiam quam ad naturalem pertinet consideratio entis
communis; et ejus etiam erit considerare hujusmodi principia communia. Physica
enim est quaedam pars philosophiae, sed non prima, quae considerat ens com
mune, entis inquantum hujusmodi. . . . Et per hoc patet, quod
et ea quae sunt
scientia quae hujusmodi entia pertractat, prima est inter omnes, et considerat com
munes causas omnium entium. Unde sunt causae entium secundum quod sunt
entia quae inquiruntur in prima philosophia, ut in primo proposuit (ibid., lib. 4,
lect. 1).
 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 187

Sciences,"17 because the sciences which treat of being in general

is higher than that which treats of being as quantitative. Aris
totle, and St. Thomas after him, held that metaphysics was the
higher.18 The philosopher is not so much concerned with the
phenomenal relationship between things, even though it be
treated in terms of pointer readings, but in that which makes
a man cry "Oh!" In other words, wonder is the inspiration of

philosophy, and wonder is inseparable from cause and reason.

There is in this sense some relationship between the philosopher
and the poet, who is a lover of myths.19
There is a double relation between philosophy and the sciences.
The relation of one discipline to another may be that of the
dependence of part to whole, or the dependence of principles,
for one science depends on another science for its first principles.20
From the first point of view, every science whether it be em
pirical or deductive is in some way dependent on metaphysics.
The reason is that each science treats of being in some particular
aspect, whereas metaphysics treats in general of being as being.
Physics treats of being as quantitative; psychology treats of be
ing as mental; biology treats of being as organic; and so on, for
all the other sciences. Philosophy or metaphysics is not, then, just

"The Universe of Science, p. 83.

"Sapientia vero considerat causas primas. Unde ibidem dicitur caput scien-
tiarum (ibid., lib. 1, lect. 1).
"Et ex quo admiratio fuit causa inducens ad philosophiam, patet quod philo-
sophus est aliqualiter philomythus, idest amator fabulae quod proprium est poe-
tarum. Unde primi qui per modum quemdam fabularem de principiis rerum
tractaverunt, dicti sunt poetae theologizantes, sicut fuit Perseus, et quidam alii,
qui fuerunt septem sapientes. Causa autem, quare philosophus comparatur poe
tae, est ista, quia uterque circa miranda versatur. Nam fabulae, circa quas ver-
santur poetae, ex quibusdarr. mirabilibus constituuntur. Ipsi etiam philosophi ex
admiratione moti sunt ad philosophandum (ibid., lib. 1, lect. 2).
MAliqua scientia continetur sub alia dupliciter. Uno modo ut pars ipsius, quia
scilicet subjectum ejus est aliqua pars subject! illius, sicut planta est quaedam
pars corporis naturalis. . . . Alio modo continetur una scientia sub alia ut ei
subalternata, quando scilicet in superiori scientia assignatur quid eorum
propter
de quibus scitur in scientia inferiori solum quia: sic musica continetur sub arith-
metica (in de lib. Boetii de Trinitate, q. 5, art. 1, ad 5).
Though all other sciences treat of parts of being, they are not parts of meta
physics. "Accipit enim unaquaeque scientiarum unam partem entis secundum spe-
cialem modum considerandi, alium a quo modo consideratur ens in meta-
physica; unde proprie loquendo, subjectum illius non est pars subjecti metaphy-
sicae; sed hac ratione considerata ipsa est specialis scientia aliis condivisa" (ibid.,
q. 5, art. 1, ad 6).
188 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

a synthesis of the points of view of the other sciences, as Professor

Overstreet and others would have us believe, but rather an en
tirely new point of view of reality in its totality. Just as biology
is not the sum of the sciences of botany and zoology, but a new
science, so too metaphysics is more than a synthesis of the em
pirical sciences. There is consequently no opposition of science
with science, because they belong to different degrees of abstrac
tion. Lower sciences are not merely coordinated by metaphysics,
but rather they are ordered to it as their supreme end.21 Science
deals only with an aspect of reality based on an abstraction, and
therefore can never give us reality as such. Only the science
which is disinterested in only in the in
aspects and interested
telligibility of things can completely satisfy the mind, and that
science is metaphysics, which treats of the whole of reality — be
ing as being — whereas the particular sciences treat only of an
is,

aspect of that whole. There then, real relation between the

a

empirical sciences and metaphysics, and mere logical relation of

a

correlation of the various branches of knowledge.22

From another point of view, there dependence of other
is
a

sciences on metaphysics as regards their first principles, though

this dependence sometimes very indirect and mediate. The
is

reason that no science proves its first principles, but accepts

is

them from superior science, until finally one reaches meta

a

physics, which defends its own principles.23 one removed from

If

"Sapientia non dividitur contra scientiam, sicut oppositum; sed quia se habet
ex additione ad scientiam. Est enim sapientia, ut dicit Philosophus (vi Ethic.)
caput omnium scientiarum, regulans omnes alias, inquantum de altissimis prin-
cipiis est. . . Sapientis autem est ordinare; et ideo ista scientia altissima, quae
.

omnes ordinat et regulat, sapientia dicitur; scientiae vero nomen aliis in-
alias
ferioribus relinquitur (in de Trinitate Boetii, q. 2, art. 2, ad 1).
"Ista scientia altissima, quae omnes alias ordinat et regulat sapientia dicitur
(ibid., q. 2, art. 2, ad 1).
"Inferiores scientiae nee probant sua principia, nee contra negantem principia
disputant, sed hoc relinquunt superiori scientiae supremae vero inter eas, scilicet,
metaphysica, disputat contra negantem sua principia, adversarius aliquid con-
si

cedit; autem nihil concedit, non potest cum eo disputare; potest tamen solvere
si

rationes ipsius (ibid., q. 1, art. 8).

1,

Scientia quae se habet ex additione ad aliam, utitur principiis ejus in demon-

strando, sicut geometra utitur principiis arithmeticae (De Coelo, lib. 1, lect. 3).
Etiam in scientiis humanitus traditis sunt quaedam principia in quibusdam earum
quae non sunt omnibus nota sed oportet ea supponere superioribus scientiis,
a

sicut in scientiis subalternatis supponuntur et creduntur aliqua superioribus

a

scientiis subalternantibus et hujusmodi non sunt per se nota nisi superioribus

scientiis (de Trinitate Bo'etti, q. 2, art. 2, ad 5).
 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 189

the science of biology, zoology, psychology, or physics the meta

physical principle of identity, or the principle of contradiction,
one would immediately make it impossible to draw conclusions
even in the limited field of any of these sciences. The principle
of contradiction, e.g., is so much assumed and implied in scien
tific investigation that a theory or hypothesis is immediately
called in question when a contrary group of facts is alleged
against it. But the principle of contradiction belongs to the sci
ence of metaphysics.24
Because metaphysics is the supreme science, due to the fact
that it treats of being as being, and not being as quantitative,
vital, organic, or inorganic, it does not follow that it can dictate
to the empirical sciences. Empirical sciences do not depend upon
philosophy except as regards their principles.25 The reason is that
empirical science upon an abstraction which determines
is based
its method, and to force a science to destroy its method would
be to destroy the science itself. Furthermore, the more developed
the empirical sciences the better is the raw material upon which
metaphysics may speculate to build a scientia media or the Phi
losophy of Nature.
But an empirical science is dependent on philosophy as re
gards its principles. Facts as facts do not constitute scientific
knowledge. Phenomena must be correlated. But they can be cor
related only according to certain laws of the mind, and the
laws of the mind are the laws of philosophy. Every empirical
science, to arrive at a theory, must assume the principle of iden
tity or contradiction.26 Even though a prejudice against the
natural metaphysics of the human mind would make the scientist
reject the universality of the principle of identity and contradic
tion, nevertheless he would have to adopt it in his limited field
under the penalty of never making sense out of his facts. The

MUt maxime apparet in eo quod est maxime primum principium, scilicet quod
impossible est idem esse et non esse. Unde omnes scientiae particulares utuntur
hujusmodi principiis sicut utuntur ipso ente (in Meta. lib. 3, lect. 5).
"Jacques Maritain, Revue de Philosophie, July-Aug., 1926, p. 365.
"... Ad philosophum potius pertinet consideratio dignitatum, inquantum ad
ipsum pertinet consideratio ends in communi, ad quod per se pertinent, hujusmodi
principia prima, ut maxime apparet in eo quod est maxime primum principium,
scilicet quod impossible est idem esse et non esse. Unde omnes scientiae par
ticulares utuntur ipso ente, quod tamen principaliter considerat philosophus
primus (ibid., lib. 3, lect. 5).
I9O PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

physicist with the principles inasmuch

need only be concerned
as they apply to inorganic dynamic being, but in that limited
field he must accept them.27
This brings to a close this treatise on the philosophy of science.
In no sense is it a complaint against a scientific method, but
rather against a theory of basing philosophy upon scientific con
clusions alone. It admits that the physical and the mathematical
theories are valid within limits, but that a complete philosophy
of nature is impossible without the application of immutable
metaphysical principles to scientific facts. And yet, this philos
ophy of nature is not meant to supplant but to complement the
physical and mathematical theories.
All those philosophies which were built upon a scientific theory
passed away with the scientific age. To marry the spirit of any
age means to be a widow in the next. The trouble with such
philosophies is that they suit only the spirit of the age, and are
suitable for no other. There is historical warrant for the state
ment that within twenty years Professor Alexander's space-time
philosophy will be just as much behind the times as the mecha
nistic philosophy of Spencer is today behind the times. It may
also very well be that some of the scientific theories mentioned
in this book will be antiquated before the book is published. But
in hundred years from now some philosophers of the Great
a
Tradition will apply the immutable principles of common sense
to judge the latest lyricism of a Barnes or a Whitehead of that
future day.
Fortunately there is a leaven of philosophers in the world who
abstain from imposing their theories upon scientists, holding all

"Rationem autem, quare omnes scientiae utuntur, sic assignat; quia unum-
eis
quodque genus subjectum alicujus scientiae recipit
praedicationem entis. Utuntur
autem principiis praedictis scientiae particulates non secundum suam communi-
tatem, prout se extendunt ad omnia entia, sed quantum sufficit eis; et hoc sec
undum continentiam generis quod in scientia
subjicitur, de quo ipsa scientia
demonstrationes affert. Sicut ipsa philosophia naturalis, utitur eis secundum quod
se extendunt ad entia mobilia, et non ulterius ...
in prima quidem opera-
tione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc
quod dico ens; nee aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi; nisi intelligatur
ens. Et quia hoc principium impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex
intellectu entis sicut hoc principium, omne totum est majus sua parte ex intel-
lectu totius et partis; ideo hoc etiam principium est naturaliter primum in secunda
operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et dividends (ibid., lib. 4, lect. 2).
 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IQI

the while to first principles. There is also a leaven of scientists

who protest against philosophers making their theories ridiculous
by lyricizing them to construct an ephemeral philosophy. These
two groups will keep developing minds within the banks of
sanity. The point of juncture between philosophers and scientists
will be in the development of the philosophy of nature, which
formed such an important role in Scholastic education. Thanks
to this discipline, which is born of the union of metaphysical and
empirical sciences, minds will get not a lopsided view of the
universe, but one which embraces both primary and secondary
causes. Philosophers will not say free-will is proved because of
the Quantum Theory, nor will scientists say that causality is dis
proved because of the Quantum Theory. Rather, one will bring
the facts of an ordered universe and the other will seek the rea
son of that order in Mind. To man will come the new vision
which will be the return of an old one, that the whole universe
is an ascending scale of perfection; that the business of the sci
entist is to plunge into the infinitely big universe with its light
years, and the infinitely little universe with its atoms and elec
trons, to discover the laws governing their behavior; that the
task of the scientist is not done until he has unwrapped, as it
were, the last shell of irrationality from the visible world by his
experiment and his research; and finally that the philosopher will
seek of the behavior of things not
to discover the intelligibility
in terms of mathematics or secondary cause, but in terms of the
First Cause, who is as much outside the universe as the artist is
outside his painting. Then will come to man the understanding
of the words of Paul : "all are yours" — everything in the world,
every bird and beast, flower and tree, every atom and every star
— "all are yours," but you, you the crown of creation, you the
scientist and the philosopher, you the searcher and the seeker,
you are God's, for "man's final bliss consists in the supernatural
vision of God."28

2-2, q. 2., art. 3.

 INDEX
Abstraction, 6, 103, 105, 159, 160; cited Metaphysics of Aristotle,
definition of, 123, 124; erroneous 151, quoted 166
views of, 120; identified with clas quoted Met. Proemium, 86
sification, 122, 123; modern objec quoted Meteor, 97
tion of, 121; nature of, 1 14-122; quoted Perihemenias, 97, cited
necessity of, 107, 108, m-114 132
Aeterni Patris, xi ■philosophia perennis, xxi
Agnosticism, 145 quoted Physics, 83, 84,
92,
Albert the Great, 4, 90 170, 177
Albertus Magnus, quoted Ethic, 157; quoted Physics of Aristotle, 164
(The Great), 166 quoted Post. Anal., 53, cited
Alexander, S., 52, 126, 141, 183, 190; 55. 57. quoted 89, 90, 92, 95, 97,
cited Space, Time and Deity, 24 cited 99, quoted 116, 131, 160, 161
Aliotta, Professor, quoted The Ideal quoted Quaes. Disput., 158
istic Reaction Against Science, 8 cited Quod., 81, 115, quoted
Allen, Grant, 180 130
Allers, Rudolph, quoted The New Psy cited / Sent., 11o
chologies, 177 quoted Summa Theologica, 77-
Anthropomorphism, 141, 145 79. 83, 98, cited 99, 102, 107, cited
Aquinas, Thomas, St., xi, 3, 91, 94, and quoted 109, cited 11o, quoted
142, 165; on subjectivism, 76 112, 113, cited 115, quoted 11 6-1 20,
cited Cajetan, 81, quoted 95, 122, 123, 128, 129, 131, 134, 139,
cited 99, 128, 160 143, cited 144, quoted 148-151, cited
-cited Contra Gentiles, 81, 99, 154, quoted 158, cited 161, 174
11o, quoted 116, cited 128, 136, Aristotle, 2, 3, 23, 90, 92, 102, 147,
quoted 140, 143, 149, 150 J56. r57, 16°, 161. 164. 165, 166,
-cited De Anima, 81, quoted 169, 174, 184, 187, cited 176; cited
117, 121, 153, cited 176, quoted 178 Metaphysics, 57, 151; cited Post.
cited De Causis, 137 Anal., 88, 91, 92, 159; cited Third
quoted De Coelo, 58, 60, 96 Book, of De Anima, 137, 138
■quoted De Ente et Essentia, Atom, 29, 33
117, 123, 129, 136 Averroes, 112
quoted De Potentia, 144, 146 Avogadro, Amadeo, on atoms, 30
quoted De Spirit. Creat., 114,
118, 123 Bacon, Roger, 4, 90, 91
quoted De Trinitate Bbetii, 51, Baliani, 36
58-60, 84, 85, 90, 92, 95-97, cited Balthasar, N., cited L'Etre et les Prin
100, quoted 103, 179, 180, 187, 188 ciples Metaphysiques , 130
quoted De Veritate, 58, 75, 79, Barnes, H. E., 190; cited Philosophy,
80, cited 81, quoted 87, 89, cited 99, 23
11o, quoted 115, 116, 118, cited Being, 128-133, 135, 137-139; analogy
128, quoted 134, cited 136, quoted of, 141-147
137, cited 138, 140, quoted 145, Bellarmin, 14
146, 159, cited 160, quoted 161 Bergson, Henri, 24, 37, 78, 106, 108;
-quoted Metaphysics, 58, 63, 75, cited VEvolution Creatrice, 111
87, 89, 96, 97, 104, cited 112, 115, Bernard, Claude, 15, 158; cited Intro
quoted 116, 123, cited 128, 130, duction a I'etude de la medicine ex-
quoted 131, 133, 148, 158, 160, perimentale, 13
185-187, 189, 190 Biology, 5, 171-176

193
194 INDEX
Blondel, M., 78 Dietz, David, quoted The Story of
Bohr, 33, 156; Quantum Theory, xx Science, 31
Bolyai, 47 Draper, 101
Boutroux, M., 15, 93; cited De la Con- Driesch, Hans, 167, 175; cited The
tin gence des lots de la Nature, 14 Philosophy of the Organism, 173
Boyle, Robert, 36; cited The Skeptical Duhem, Pierre, xix, 13, 15, 93; cited
Chemist, 30 Essai sur la Notion de Theorie Phy
Bridgman, P. W., 61, 157; quoted The sique de Platon a Galilie, 14; cited
Logic of Modern Physics, 62, 158 La Thiorie Physique, x, 2
Brightman, E. H., cited The Problem Durkheim, 180
of God, 23
Brunschvicz, Leon, cited Les Etapes de Eddington, A. S., xi, xix, 66, 78, 157,
la Philosophie Mathimatique , 23 169, 177, 182, 183; quoted Science
and the Unseen World, 67; quoted
Cajetan, cited De Ente et Essentia, 134 The Nature of the Physical World,
Carr, H. Weldon, 183; cited Changing 19, 20, 25-28, 33, 34, cited 40,
Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics, quoted 41, cited 44, 49, 65, 68,
23; quoted The General Principle of quoted 69, 71, 101, cited 156
Relativity, 24 Einstein, xix, 16, 24, 42, 43, 45, 46,
Cartesian tradition, 5 !56, J57, 161, t82; cited Cosmolog-
Causality, 5, 149-158, 162, 166, 183; ical Considerations on the General
principle of, 6 Theory, 49; cited Generalized Prin
Cause, efficient, final, formal, material, ciple of Relativity, 48; cited Re
63 stricted Theory of Relativity, 41;
Certitude, 99, 100 theory applied to philosophy, 44
Chwolson, 96 Electrons, 31-33
Cohen, Morris R., quoted Reason and Empirical method, 5
the Nature of Things, 21, 55, 60, Empiricism, 106
62, 88, 89, 93, 95, 97, 100, 170, 171 Euclid, 48
Collingwood, R. G., cited Speculum Evil, 140, 141
Mentis, 63
Comte, Auguste, 3, 9, 11, 180; cited First principles,xx, 98, 99, 125, 158-
Positive Philosophy, 10 161; of metaphysics, 148
Conception of science, 10 Fitzgerald contraction, 39-41
Contingency, 14; of inductive science, Freud, 99
93-95; °£ science, 96-98, 100
Copernicus, 5 Galileo, 14, 36
Cosmology, 168-171, 183, 184 Garrigou-Lagrange, quoted Dieu, Son
Critique of science, xi, xii Existence et Sa Nature, 79, cited,
151; cited La Principe de Finalite,
D'Abro, A., quoted, 18; quoted The 151; cited Sens Commun., 151
Evolution of Scientific Thought from Gauss, 47
Newton to Einstein, 17, 49 Geometry, four dimensional, 48; mod
Dalton, John, cited New System of ern views, 47
Chemical Philosophy, 30 God, 140, 143; a Mathematician, xix;
Dampier-Whetham, W. C. D., cited A as Being, 136, 137; conception of,
History of Science, 5, quoted 47 141; existence of, 136; interpretation
D'Arcy, M. C, cited Thomas Aquinas, of, 142; transcendence of, xx
140 Grabmann-Michel, cited Thomas
Darwin, 1 80 Aquinas, 140
Dawson, Christopher, 90, quoted Cler Grabmann-Zybura, cited Introduction
gy Review, 91 to the Theological Summa of St.
Deduction, 90, 92 Thomas, 140
Democritus, xxi Grosseteste, 90
Descartes, 6, 7, 69, 126; cited Fifth
Meditation, 47 Haldane, Lord R. B., xx; quoted The
Descoqs, Pedro, cited lnstitutiones Reign of Relativity, 24
Metaphysicae Generalis, 140, 151 Haldane, J. S., 101; quoted Material-
 INDEX 195

ism, 172, cited 173; quoted The Knox, Ronald, quoted Broadcast Minds,
Philosophical Basis of Biology, 174; 184
cited The Sciences and Philosophy,
94, quoted 102 Langdon-Davies, 183
Haldane, J. B. S., cited Possible Worlds, Langmuir, Irving, 31
66 Lavoisier, Anton, 30
Hauber, U. A., quoted New Scholas Leibnitz, 23, 69

5,
ticism, 175 Lenzen, Professor, 19
Hegel, 126, 136 Leo XIII,

x
Heisenberg, 156 Le Roy, 15, 93; cited La Science Posi
Das Kausalprinzip, 151 Liberte in Bibliotheque du
J.,

Hessen, tive et

la
Holmes, John Haynes, cited My Idea Congress International de Philoso
God, 24 phie de 1900,
of

14
Hugon, E., Les Vingt Quatre Theses Levy, H., 186; cited The Universe

of
Thomister, 151 Science, 1, 60, quoted 66, cited 75,
Hume, 4-6, 107, 151 quoted 187
Hylomorphism, 169, 184 Levy-Bruhl, 180
Lewis, G. N., 31; cited The Survey

of
Ibsen, 105 Symbolic Logic, 61
Idealism, 65, 67, 69-71, 75, 106, 119 Light, 39
Ideas, 129, 130 Lindemann, F. A., cited Philosophy, 63
Illingworth, K. K., 39 Lobatschewsky, 47
Induction, 90, 92 Locke, 68, 107
Inge, Dean, cited God and the Astron Lodge, Sir Oliver, 45
omers, xxi, quoted 83, cited 141 Lorentz, 39
6,

Intelligence, 11 117
Mach, Ernest, 13, 15, 93; cited Die
James, William, 94, 100, 126, 180; Mechanik in ihrer Entwickfung, 12
cited Principles Mackenzie, S., 127; cited Ultimate
of

Psychology, 176
J.

Jeans, Sir James, xix, xx, 66, 78, 177, Values, 125
181- 183; quoted Mathematical As Maimonides, 146
the Universe, Marechal, L., cited Etudes sur
of

la

pects 25; quoted Psy

The Mysterious Universe, 19, 47, chologie des Mystiques, 53
49, 65, cited 59, 68, 70, 71; cited Maritain, Jacques, cited Art and Scho
The New Background Science, 1, lasticism, 139; cited Les Degres du
of

68, 70; quoted The Universe Around Savoir, xi, 84, 164, 172, 173; Re
Us, 31, 32, 35 flexions sur I'lntelligence 78, 80;
,

Joad, C. E. M., cited Philosophical As cited Revue de Philosophic 78, 189

pects Modern Science, 1, quoted Mass, 36, 37
of

72-74, cited 94, quoted 98 Mathematical physics, scientia media,

a

John of St. Thomas, quoted 114; 83, 84

quoted Cursus Philosophicus, 11o, Mathematical Theory, 2, 16, 18, 20,
115; cited De Mem. et Rem., 82; 21, 163; difficulties, 59, 62,
63

quoted Logica, 93, 115, 135; cited Mathematics, 9, 103, 104, 136; in
5,

Philosophia Naturalis, 82, 109, Einstein Theory, 46-48; necessity of,

6;

quoted 11o, 115, cited 128, 135; universality of,

6

quoted Sent., 135 Matter, xix; changed conceptions con

/

Judgment, 130, 131, 148 cerning, 29, 30-36; identified with

metrical, 35
Kant, Emanuel, 3-5, 9, 12, 73, 76, Maxwell, cited Scientific Papers, 17
105-107, 125, 127, 149, 151, 154, McCormick,
J.,

S. cited Scholastic
I55, '59! critique of science, x; Metaphysics, 140
positivism, x; quoted Critique McWilliams, A., cited Cosmology,
of

J.

Pure Reason, 168

7

Kant's Knowledge, Mechanism, 172-174

6

Kennedy, R.
J.,

39 Mendeleeff, 32
Kepler, 14 Mercier, Cardinal, xi
Knowledge, origin, 106; problem of, Metaphysics, 9, 10, 103, 104; depend
3
 196 INDEX
ence of science on, 188, 189; first Physics, 5, 9, 103, 104, 136, 176, 177,
principles, 148-151; necessity of, ix; 181; idealistic tendencies, 66; mathe
neglect of, 3; object of, 125-142; of matical, 35; modern, 34, 41
Middle Ages, xii; supreme science, Picard, Emile, cited Un Coup d'Oeil
60 sur I'Historie des Sciences et des
Meyers, 180 Theories Physique, 59
Meyerson, Emil, cited Indentite et Re Planck, Max, 33, 75; cited Where is
ality, 55; cited La Deduction Rela- Science Going?, 182, 183, quoted
tiviste, 185; L'Explication, 52 84, 156, 157
Michelson, Albert, 38-40 Plato, 26, 115, 122
Milhaud, G., 15; cited Le Rationcl, 14 Poincare, xi, 2, 12, 15, 93; cited La
Mill, Stuart, 11, 132 Valeur de la Science, 13; cited Sci
Millikan, Robert, 101; quoted Evolu ence et Hypothise, 13
tion in Science and Religion, 93 Positivism, xx, 9, 10, 16
Minkowski, 48; space and time, 43 Pragmatism, 2, 3, 11, 15, 100
Molecule, 30 Prediction, analogical, 143, 144; equiv
Montague, Wm. L., quoted Essays in ocal, 143; univocal, 142
Honor of John Dewey, 24 Proton, 31
Morley, Edwin W., 38-40 Prout, 30
Motion of the earth, 38-40 Psychology, 176-178
Pythagoras, 26
Nature, of things, 92
Needham, Joseph, cited The Sceptical Quantum Theory, 156, 162, 166, 182,
Biologist, 68, quoted, 89, 172 183; Bohr, xx
Neo-Scholastics, xi
Newton, 37, 47, 48, 50; cited Princi- Realism, 72-74
pia, 36, 102 Reasoning, 132, 133
Newtonian conceptions, of absolute Relativity, 166, 181; Einsteinian, 38;
space, 46; of absolute time, 46; of theory of, xix, xx
mass, 46 Renoirte, Fernand, xi, xix, 2
Newtonian method, 5 Revue Neo-Scholastique, 2
Noel, Leon, 169; Notes d'Epistemologie
J.,

Rickaby, General Metaphysics, 140

Thomiste, 78 Riemann, 47
Northrop, F. S. C, cited Science and Robinson, D. S., quoted The God
of

First Principles, 4, 16, 49, quoted 8, the Liberal Christians, 125

26, 169 Rousselot, Pierre, cited L'lntellectualis-
me de St. Thomas, 112
Osiander, 14 Russell, Bertrand, 45, 101; cited Evolu
Overstreet, Harry A., 188; quoted The tionary Naturalism, 125; quoted An
Enduring Quest, 21, 120 Outline Philosophy, 9; cited The
of

Scientific Outlook, 23, 156, quoted

Pattison, Pringle, quoted The Idea of 18, 93, 94, 119, 183
God, 125 Rutherford, Sir Ernest, 30
Perry, R. B., General Theory of Values,
125 Saccheri, 47
Philosophia perennis, St. Thomas Scholastics, 3, 4, 156, 157, 161, 184;
Aquinas, xxi on metaphysics, xix; on science, xix
Philosophy, 1o; a mysticism, 24-28; a Schroedinger, Edwin, quoted 1st die
synthesis of sciences, 21-24; of sci Naturwissenschaft Milieu bedingt?
,

ence, xix, 3; of values, 126, 127 183

Philosophy and science, divorce of, 16; Schwertner, cited St. Albert the Great,
historical relation, 1; relation be 157
tween, 179, 180, 184-188 Science, 10; certitude of, 95; definition
Philosophy of nature, xx, 2, 3, 165, of, 86; divisions of, 90-92; end and
167. 175. 177. 178, 189; definition, purpose of, 86; hierarchy of, 57,
164; not metaphysics, 163 101-103, 167, 179, 181; lyricism of,
Physical Theory, 2, 13, 16, 18, 21, 180, 181; mathematical method, 1,
163; difficulties, 52-61; tenets, 17 2; mathematical theory of, xx; meta
 INDEX 197

physical theory of, xx; objects of, the Sciences, 1, quoted 19, 102, 177
83, 87-89; physical method, 1, 2; Thilly, Frank, quoted Immanuel Kant,
physical theory of, xx; value of, 65

5
Science and philosophy, divorce of, 4; Thomas, Oswald, quoted The Heavens
historical relation, 1 and the Universe, 42
Thompson,

J.,
Scientific laws, dependence of, 58; ob 30

J.
jective validity of, 14; value of, 11 Thompson, Sir Arthur, 86
Scientific method, xix, 1, 3; sole ap Tonquedec, de, cited La Critique de

J.
proach to reality, 17 Connaissance, 56

la
Scientific theory, xix
Secondary causes, xx Universals, 80, 89
Sense experience, 6 Urban, Wilbur M., xxi; quoted The
Sense knowledge, 6 Intelligible World, 106, cited 141
Sextus Empiricus, 132
cited God and Intelligence,
J.,

Sheen, F. Values, 125

24, 160; cited Old Errors and New Vitalism, 172, 174
Labels, 180; cited Religion without
Walker, Leslie Science and

J.,
God, 180, 182 quoted
Space, four dimensional, Revelation,

85
43, 44
7; absolute, 37, 38; Ward, Leo, cited Philosophy Values,
6,

Space and time,

of
changed conceptions, 36-41, 43, 45; 127
relation to matter, 49; relative, 42 Webert, P. J.,quoted Essai de Meta-
Spencer, 190 physique Thomiste, 136, cited 151
Spinoza, 146 Wells, H. G., 106
Substance, 105 Westermarck, xxi, 181
Sullivan, W. N., quoted The Bases Weyl, cited The Open World, 157
J.

Modern Science, 18, 36, 45; White, 01

of

quoted The Limitations Science, Whitehead, A. N., 32, 38, 50, 105, 141,
of

48-50, 94; cited The Physical Na 66, 183, 190; quoted Adventures

of
1

ture the Universe, Ideas, 22, 123; cited Religion in the

of

29
Sylvester, cited Contra Gentiles, 130, Making, 23, quoted 125; cited Sci
160 ence and the Modern World, 23,
quoted 37, cited 123
Tait, 17 Wolf, A., quoted Essentials
of

Scientific
Taylor, A. E., 146; quoted in Essays Method, 53
Catholic and Critical, 182; quoted Wolff, 105
The Faith Moralist, 141, 147 Wundt, cited Physiologische Psycholo
of
a

Tennant, F. R., quoted Philosophical gic 176

Theology, 101; cited Philosophy
of
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