Japanese-Australian Clash over the White Australia Policy,

1894-1919

Tomoko Horikawa

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Languages and Cultures, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

The University of Sydney

2022
 STATEMENT

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as
acknowledged in the text and has not been submitted for a degree at this or any other university.

Name: Tomoko Horikawa

Signature: _________________

Date: _________________

i
 ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the Japanese-Australian clash over the White Australia Policy during the
late 19th and the early 20th centuries. It explores the questions as to why Japan strongly objected
to the White Australia Policy and why Australia was uncompromising in its position of
excluding Japanese immigrants by placing these issues in a broad historical and international
context of the time, particularly the development of collective national identities in Japan and
Australia.

Japan and Australia developed their national identities almost simultaneously in the late 19th
century. In the case of Japan, after embarking on a frenzied modernisation and Westernisation
in order to achieve equality with the West, it attempted to establish an identity as a “civilised”
nation. Australians, for their part, embraced “British race nationalism” as the core foundation
of their nation and developed their identity as a white British nation. However, because of their
unique historical circumstances—in Japan’s case, because of its status as the only non-white
great power in a European-dominated international society, and in Australia’s, because of its
peculiar geo-cultural situation of being a white colonial outpost in the Pacific surrounded by
people with different race and culture—they were both insecure about the identities they
created for themselves, feeling that their national identities were constantly challenged and
threatened by external circumstances.

This thesis suggests that both nations’ visions of, and anxieties around, national identity greatly
influenced their responses to the issue of Japanese exclusion in Australia and argues that the
Japanese-Australian clash over the White Australia Policy can be interpreted as a clash between
a country which sought to reaffirm its civilised identity by achieving equality with the West
even on immigration issues and a country which was determined to defend its identity as a
culturally and racially homogeneous white British nation from the perceived threat posed by
the rise of a non-white power in the region. In other words, this thesis analyses the Japanese-
Australian confrontation over the White Australia Policy as a means of shedding light on how
the Japanese and Australians perceived their identities in the late 19th and the early 20th
centuries. In so doing, it aims to contribute to the existing literature on Japanese immigration
and the White Australia Policy and offer a more comprehensive analysis of the Japanese-
Australian clash over the White Australia Policy.

ii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Rebecca
Suter. She was indeed a perfect supervisor for me. She trusted me and gave me the freedom to
pursue my own research but offered me concise advice and criticisms when needed. Her
supervising approach enabled me, a mature-age student with three children, to continue
studying and eventually complete a PhD thesis. For that, I am forever grateful. My gratitude
also goes to Professor Sakuko Matsui and the University of Sydney for their generous research
travel grants. Without their financial support, this thesis would not have been possible.

Parts of Chapter V have appeared in the New Voices in Japanese Studies, Vol. 12 under the title
“Australia’s Minor Concessions to Japanese Citizens under the White Australia Policy” (2020).
I am very grateful to the two anonymous reviewers as well as the Series Editor, Ms Elicia
O’Reilly and the Guest Editor for Vol. 12, Dr Alexander Brown, for their valuable feedback.

I would also like to thank my family for their patience and support. Lastly, I would like to
dedicate this thesis to my parents, who taught me the importance of education and have always
encouraged me to pursue my dream.

iii
 EXPLANATORY NOTE

Japanese names are given in their Japanese order, with the family name preceding the given
name except for Japanese scholars whose publications are in the English language. The long
vowels ō and ū are indicated except for words which are commonly used in the English
language, such as Tokyo and Kyoto. Some key Japanese words have been used in the text in
order to give more accurate nuances, but in such cases, they are italicised, and the English
equivalents are provided in parenthesis.

iv
 CONTENTS

STATEMENT...………………………………………………………………………………... i

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………………iii

EXPLANATORY NOTE………………………………………………………………………. iv

CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………………………...v

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………...1

CHAPTER II: CONSTRUCTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES

IN JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA …………………………………......15

CHAPTER III: THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD…………………….……………48

CHAPTER IV: THE IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION ACT OF 1901.……....…....77

CHAPTER V: AUSTRALIA’S MINOR CONCESSIONS……………….……….100

CHAPTER VI: FEAR OF JAPAN AND WHITE AUSTRALIA…………………...127

CHAPTER VII: THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE……………………...……162

CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION……………….……………………………...……196

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………206

v
 CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the early aftermath of World War II, Japan’s Shōwa Emperor cited the White Australia Policy

as one of the war’s distant causes. While talking to some of his closest aides in early 1946, the

emperor expressed a view that “discrimination between yellow and white races remained, and

the rejection of immigrants in California and the White Australia Policy were … enough to

exasperate Japanese people.”1

Anti-Japanese immigration movements in California and America’s Japanese

exclusion legislation of 1924 are well studied historical phenomena, and their impact on the

deteriorating Japanese-U.S. relationship has been discussed by some scholars.2 In contrast, the

White Australia Policy’s impact on Japanese-Australian diplomatic relations is neither known

nor studied widely. This disparity is at least partly due to the fact that the number of Japanese

residents in Australia in the early 20th century was much smaller than the number of Japanese

residents in the United States during the same period. At the turn of the century, for example,

there were 85,000 Japanese in the United States, and by 1920 the number had jumped to

220,000.3 In Australia, on the other hand, there were 3,554 Japanese in 1901 and 2,740 in

1921.4

Despite the small number of Japanese living in Australia, the Japanese government

voiced strong and repeated objections to the White Australia Policy and expressed particular

dissatisfaction with legislation which classified Japanese along with Chinese and Kanakas.

1
Kinoshita Michio, Sokkin nisshi (The Diary of an Imperial Aide) (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1990), p. 211.
2
See, for example, Asada Sadao, “Nichi-bei kankei to imin mondai (Japanese-US Relations and Immigration
Question),” in Saitō Makoto (ed.), Demokurashii to nichi-bei kankei (Democracy and Japanese-American
Relations) (Tokyo: Nan’undō, 1973); Aruga Tadashi, “Hainichi mondai to nichi-bei kankei (The Question of
Japanese Exclusion and Japanese-American Relations),” in Aruga Tadashi and Iriye Akira (eds.), Senkanki no
nihon gaikō (Japanese Foreign Policy between Wars) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1984); Minohara
Toshihiro, Hai-nichi iminhō to nichi-bei kankei (Japanese Exclusion Legislation and Japanese-American
Relations) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002).
3
Thomas Sowell, Migration and Cultures: A World View (New York: Basic Books, 1996), p. 116.
4
A.T. Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia: The Background to Exclusion, 1896-1923 (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1964), p. 163.
1
Japanese diplomats argued, in their representations to British and Australian officials, that

Japan’s civilised status, and later great power status, in international society, meant that

Japanese immigrants required special consideration. However, Australia refused to accept these

arguments and remained adamant in its exclusion of Japanese immigrants.5

This thesis investigates the Japanese-Australian clash over the White Australia Policy.

It focuses on the period between 1894 and 1919—from the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation to the Japanese-Australian diplomatic confrontation over

Japan’s racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference. During this period, the Japanese

government repeatedly protested to the British and the Australian governments and pressed

them to exempt Japanese citizens from the application of the White Australia Policy.

However, as mentioned earlier, the Japanese population in Australia in the late 19th

and the early 20th centuries was small. This raises an obvious question: why did Japan protest

against Australia’s racial exclusion policy while the number of Japanese in Australia was not

very significant? Existing studies provide only a partial answer to this question. Scholars who

have studied the Japanese government’s official representations to the British and the

Australian governments have claimed that the reason behind Japan’s strong objection to the

White Australia Policy was Japan’s desire to protect its national pride and prestige.6 This, in

turn, gives rise to another question: if Japan’s objection to the White Australia Policy indeed

stemmed from Japan’s desire to protect its national pride and prestige, why was Japan so

concerned about its international reputation? At the same time, if the number of Japanese was

5
For a discussion of Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy between 1894 and 1901, see Tomoko
Horikawa, “Japan's Reaction to the White Australia Policy: International Society, Race Relations and the Quest
for Recognition.” MRes Thesis, Macquarie University, 2014.
6
Theses scholars include Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia; D.C.S. Sissons, “The Immigration Question
in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919,” paper presented to the Australian New Zealand
Association for the Advanced Science, 43rd Congress, Brisbane, May 1971; D.C.S. Sissons, “Immigration in
Australia-Japanese Relations 1871-1971,” in J.A. Stockwin (ed.), Japan and Australia in the Seventies
(Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972); Takeda Isami, “Haku-gō seisaku no seiritsu to nihon no taiō: kindai
ōsutoraria no tai-nichi kihon seisaku (The Establishment of the White Australia Policy and Japan’s Response:
Modern Australia’s Basic Policy towards Japan),” in Kokusai seiji (International Politics), 1981, vol. 68: 23-
43; Neville Bennett, “Japanese Emigration Policy, 1880-1941,” in Christine Inglis, et. al. (eds.), Asians in
Australia: The Dynamics of Migration and Settlement (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992);
Neville Bennett, “White Discrimination against Japan: Britain, the Dominion and the United States, 1908-
1928,” in New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 2001, vol. 3, no. 2: 91-105.
2
insignificant, why was Australia so unwavering in its determination to keep Japanese settlers

out of Australia? The existing literature has failed to address these questions satisfactorily. This

thesis seeks to fill this gap in the literature.

1.1. EXISTING LITERATURE

Research into Japanese immigration to Australia under the White Australia Policy in the field

of diplomatic history remains limited. Although both the White Australia Policy and Japanese

immigration are extensively studied subjects, the two literatures are distinct. On the one hand,

existing studies of the White Australia Policy mainly examine the domestic origins and

development of the policy. In most cases, these studies trace the origins of the policy to the

1850s, when a large influx of Chinese diggers to the Victorian and New South Wales goldfields

ignited fear and resentment among white miners and led these colonies to introduce legislation

to control Chinese immigration.7 They generally suggest that the White Australia Policy was

a product of racist ideology inspired by the doctrine of Social Darwinism and Australian

people’s desire to protect their high living standards, political conventions and cultural norms

from people with different backgrounds.8 Some studies cite Japan and the fear of the so-called

“Yellow Peril”9 as significant factors contributing to the development and consolidation of the

7
These studies include Myra Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920 (Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press, 1923); Charles Price, The Great White Walls are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North
America and Australia, 1838-1888 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1974); Kenneth Rivett
(ed.), Australia and the Non-White Migrants (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1975); Andrew Markus,
Fear and Hatred: Purifying Australia and California, 1850-1901 (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1979); James
Jupp, Immigration, 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1998); A.T. Yarwood, Attitudes to Non-
European Immigration (Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1968).
8
Scholars who emphasise the role of racism and racist ideology such as Social Darwinism include Andrew
Markus, Australian Race Relations, 1788-1993 (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994); Henry Reynolds, Frontier:
Aborigines, Settlers and the Land, 2nd ed. (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987); Henry Reynolds, North of
Capricorn: The Untold Story of Australia’s North (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2003); David Hollinsworth,
Race and Racism in Australia (Katoomba NSW: Social Science Press, 1998); Ann Curthoys, “Liberalism and
Exclusionism: A Prehistory of the White Australia Policy,” in Laksiri Jayasuria et. al. (eds.), Legacies of White
Australia: Race, Culture and Nation (Crawley, Perth: University of Western Australia Press, 2003); James
Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002). Keith Windschuttle in The White Australia Policy (Sydney: Macleay Press, 2004) and
Matthew Jordan in “Rewriting Australia’s Racist Past: How Historians (Mis)Interpret the ‘White Australia’
Policy’,” in History Compass, 2005, vol. 3, no.1: 1-32, in contrast, deny the role of racial ideas such as racial
hierarchy and Social Darwinism in policy’s formation and instead stresses cultural, economic and political
reasons.
9
The “Yellow Peril” referred to the notion of the yellow race threatening European supremacy and European
colonial control in Asia. In Australia, the “Yellow Peril” referred to the fear that Australia’s European
3
White Australia Policy. These studies, however, focus almost solely on Australia’s perception

of Asia and Japan.10 As a result, very few studies have analysed the impact the White Australia

Policy had on Australia’s relations with the countries whose citizens were the targets of the

policy.

The existing literature on Japanese immigration, on the other hand, largely focuses on

Japanese immigration to North America,11 and the volume of studies on Japanese immigration

to Australia is small. Furthermore, those studies which have examined Japanese immigration

to Australia have overwhelmingly adopted a social or cultural approach, depicting the lives and

experiences of Japanese immigrants in white Australia. 12 Within this context, studies of

Japanese immigration under the White Australia Policy in the field of diplomatic history are

few. This situation might be due to the tendency on the part of diplomatic historians to avoid

immigration issues. Minohara Toshihiro states that immigration is “unfamiliar territory” in the

field of political or diplomatic history, given its traditional emphasis on “national interests” and

“power.”13 Sean Brawley, for his part, observes that “immigration and foreign relations have

rarely met in any comprehensive historical analysis.”14

That said, there are a number of existing studies which have examined the White

Australia Policy’s impact on Japanese-Australian diplomatic relations, and Asian Migration to

population and their continent would be swamped by the teeming millions of Asians or yellow race. See
Neville Meany, “Australia and Japan: The Historical Perspective,” in Neville Meany (ed.), The Japanese
Connection: A Survey of Australian Leaders' Attitudes towards Japan and the Australia-Japan Relationship
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire,1988), p. 18; Neville Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-
14: A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901-23, Volume 1 (Sydney: Sydney University Press,
1976), p. 50-52, 72, 123.
10
These studies include Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920; Windschuttle, The White Australia
Policy.
11
See Asada, “Nichi-bei kankei to imin mondai”; Aruga, “Hainichi mondai to nichi-bei kankei”; Minohara
Toshihiro, Hai-nichi iminhō to nichi-bei kankei.
12
These studies include D.C.S. Sissons, “Karayuki-San: Japanese Prostitutes in Australia 1887-1916 – Part I,” in
Historical Studies, 1977, vol. 17, no. 68: 323-341; D.C.S. Sissons, “Karayuki-San: Japanese Prostitutes in
Australia 1887-1916 – Part II,” in Historical Studies, 1977, vol. 17, no. 69: 474-488; D.C.S. Sissons, “The
Japanese in the Australian Pearling Industry,” in Queensland Heritage, 1979, vol. 3, no. 10: 8-27; Yuriko
Nagata, Unwanted Aliens: Japanese Internment in Australia (St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press,
1996); Keiko Tamura, Michi’s Memories: The Story of a Japanese War Bride (Canberra: Pandanus Books,
2001); Pamela Oliver, Empty North: The Japanese Presence and Australian Reactions 1860s to 1942 (Darwin:
Charles Darwin University Press, 2007); Pamela Oliver, “Japanese Relationships in White Australia: The
Sydney Experience to 1941,” in History Australia, 2007, vol. 4, no. 1: 05.1-05.20.
13
Minohara, Hai-nichi iminhō to nichi-bei kankei, p. 5.
14
Sean Brawley, White Peril: Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to Australasia and North America, 1919-
1978 (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1995), p. 2.
4
Australia: The Background to Exclusion, 1896-1923 by A. T. Yarwood is one of them. While

the primary focus of the book is the development of the White Australia Policy and the

mechanism of restricting Asian immigration, it also provides a detailed account of Japanese-

Australian diplomatic negotiations over the issue of Japanese immigration. In analysing Japan’s

strong objection to Australia’s race-based immigration laws which also applied to Japanese

citizens, Yarwood argues that both Britain and Australia failed to appreciate Japanese diplomats’

“special claims of their country to international recognition” and “the urgency and vigour with

which Japan would resist any classification that implied her inferiority to the European

nations.”15 He claims that “the national pride that demanded the protection of emigrants from

overt racial discrimination” was a prime concern for Japanese leaders.16

Similarly, Neville Bennett, in his studies on the Japanese government’s migration

policy and its response to white settler societies’ racially discriminatory immigration policies

in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, argues that the Japanese government “made it clear

that…the nation would never tolerate being singled out, or nominated in a document, as an

inferior nation.”17 He further claims that the Japanese government’s objection focused upon

“her subjects being named in legislation as if her citizens were in the same category as Chinese,

Negroes or Kanakas.”18

Although many of D. C. S. Sissons’s works examine Japanese immigration from

cultural and social perspectives, some of his studies discuss the Japanese government’s reaction

to the White Australia Policy and its impact on Japanese-Australian diplomatic relations. In

“The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919,”

Sissons claims that Japan’s opposition to the White Australia Policy was “essentially a matter

of prestige.”19 He expounds on this in “Immigration in Australia-Japanese relations, 1871-

15
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 12.
16
Ibid., p. 17.
17
Bennett, “Japanese Emigration Policy, 1880-1941,” p. 26.
18
Bennett, “White Discrimination against Japan,” p. 94.
19
Sissons, “The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919,” p. 38.
5
1971” by arguing that even though the Japanese government never regarded immigration per

se as a national interest, “exclusion inevitably raised the question of national prestige” which,

to the Japanese government, “was a vital interest.”20

By examining primary source materials such as Japan’s official protestations and

representations, these scholars have concluded that the restriction on Japanese immigration to

Australia greatly offended Japan and harmed its national pride. Their claim is supported by

Takeda Isami, whose study relied extensively on Japanese-language primary sources in

addition to English-language archival documents. Drawing on the Japanese government’s

official correspondences with the British and the Australian governments, as well as its internal

memos, Takeda affirms that the Japanese government’s concern for the nation’s international

prestige played a significant part in shaping its response to the White Australia Policy.21

Other studies relevant to this thesis include the works by Naoko Shimazu, Asada

Sadao and Aruga Tadashi. Shimazu, in her book on the rise and fall of Japan’s racial equality

proposal of 1919, argues that immigration was an important diplomatic issue for the Japanese

Foreign Ministry because it feared that discriminatory treatment of Japanese immigrants in the

Anglo-Saxon territories would have negative implications on Japan’s international status as a

great power.22 Although the works of Asada and Aruga deal with Japanese immigration in the

United States, they are useful in shedding light on the issue of Japanese immigration in general

and Japanese immigration in the context of Japanese-Australian diplomatic relations in

particular. In “Nichi-bei kankei to imin mondai (Japanese-American Relations and

Immigration Question),” Asada uses the phrase “diplomacy of saving face (menmoku gaikō)”

to describe Japanese diplomacy over immigration.23 He argues that the Japanese government

was consistently interested in preserving “national dignity” and repeatedly protested to the

20
Sissons, “Immigration in Australia-Japanese Relations 1871-1971,” p. 194.
21
Takeda, “Haku-gō seisaku no seiritsu to nihon no taiō,” pp. 31-36.
22
Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (London: Routledge, 1998),
pp. 78-88.
23
Asada, “Nichi-bei kankei to imin mondai,” p. 164.
6
American government over immigration issues because the exclusion of Japanese citizens in

the United States would damage the “prestige of the Empire.”24 Aruga concurs with Asada’s

argument. He suggests that “since Japan did not need to send migrants to the United States, the

immigration problem in Japanese-U.S. relations was not an issue concerning national interests

but instead concerned national dignity.”25

In short, the existing literature acknowledges that national pride and prestige played

an important part in Japan’s foreign policy in response to the White Australia Policy and other

racially discriminatory immigration policies in white settler societies. However, these existing

studies have largely failed to analyse why Japan was so concerned about its national pride and

prestige and why its concerns for its international reputation played a major role in its response

to anti-Japanese immigration policies. Moreover, these studies, except for the work by Yarwood,

have mainly focused on Japan’s reaction to discriminatory laws and practices against Japanese

immigrants. As a result, the question as to why Australia maintained an uncompromising

attitude towards Japan’s repeated requests for special considerations for its citizens has

generally been neglected.

This thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature by placing the questions of national

pride and prestige in Japan’s objection to the White Australia Policy and Australia’s

unwavering position on excluding Japanese immigrants in the broad historical and international

context of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. More specifically, it examines the

development of collective national identities in Japan and Australia and analyses how the

discourse on national identity influenced each country’s response to the issue of Japanese

exclusion from Australia. In so doing, it introduces a new perspective to understanding the

Japanese-Australian confrontation over the White Australia Policy and contributes to the

existing literature on Japanese immigration and the White Australia Policy.

24
Ibid., p. 163.
25
Aruga, “Hainichi mondai to nichi-bei kankei,” p. 70.
7
1.2. NATIONAL/STATE IDENTITY

Simply put, the term identity refers to one’s “self-image,”26 “definition of self,”27 “sense of

self,” 28 or “sense of distinctiveness from others.” 29 Although the concept of identity is

commonly associated with individuals, the term identity in this thesis refers exclusively to the

collective self-image of groups, specifically that of nation-states, and the focus here is

collective identities of Japan and Australia or what are often called national or state identities

of these two countries.

When referring to a collective identity of a country and its people, the terms national

identity and state identity are often used interchangeably. Indeed, the distinction between

national identity and state identity is not easy to make, and to some extent, this distinction is a

result of different theoretical concerns or research interests. Those scholars concerned with

internal dimensions such as domestic politics, nationalism, nation-building or ethnic conflicts

tend to see identity as “national,” while scholars who emphasise the external dimensions such

as international relations and foreign policy tend to use the term “state identity.”30 However,

national and state identities often overlap. Therefore, while in some cases it is important to

differentiate between the two, for the purpose of this thesis, on the contrary, it is neither useful

nor possible to draw a clear line between “internal” and “external” dimensions or “national”

and “state” identities, as “national” identity often influence foreign policy and spill over to the

26
Jeffrey W. Legro, “The Plasticity of Identity under Anarchy,” in European Journals of International Relations,
2009, vol. 15, no. 1: 37-65, p. 40.
27
William A. Scott, “Psychological Bases of National Identity,” in Charles A. Price (ed.), Australian National
Identity (Canberra: The Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, 1991), p. 34.
28
Legro, “The Plasticity of Identity under Anarchy,” p. 37.
29
Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb, Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945 (London: Routledge,
2003), p. 18.
30
For a discussion of national and state identities, see Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin
Books, 1991); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006); William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What
States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” in International Organization, 1992, vol. 46,
no. 2: 391-425; Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” in American
Political Science Review, 1994, vol. 88, no. 2: 384-396; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Thomas Banchoff, “German Identity and European
Integration,” in European Journal of International Relations, 1999, vol. 5, no. 3: 259-289.
8
domain of international relations or of “state” identity. 31 Since this thesis examines both

external and internal aspects of identity in order to explore the complex process of identity

construction of Japan and Australia and their identities’ influence on their public opinions on

the domestic level and their international behaviour, it will use the terms Japan’s or Australia’s

identity, self-identity, national identity or state identity interchangeably to refer to collective

identities of these two countries.

Of course, no nation has a single monolithic identity. Instead, the identity of any single

country comprises an enormous range of facets. This thesis is aware of the danger of over-

homogenisation or over-simplification of a notion such as national identity which may

encourage the illusion that Japanese or Australian people ever possessed such singular

attributes. However, it is also alert to the fact that in any society or nation, there are dominant

or mainstream versions of identity which are constructed by opinion leaders. Since it is the

dominant versions of identity that are most influential, the focus of this thesis is the collective

identities of Australia and Japan defined by the articulate elite. These include both those within

the government—policymakers and bureaucrats—and those outside the government—public

figures including intellectuals and journalists.32

One valuable development in recent studies of foreign policy is increasing attention

to the importance of a nation’s identity and its role as a source of a state’s foreign policy.

Leading historian Akira Iriye argues that the foreign affairs of any country are built on certain

images and ideas about its position and role in the world and that how a country defines itself

is almost always at the basis of policy decisions.33 His view is supported by a growing number

of studies, both theoretical and empirical, which have been published by constructivist

31
For a discussion of the intricate relationship between national and state identities, see Bloom, Personal Identity,
National Identity and International Relations.
32
Anthony D. Smith argues that national identity comprises both cultural and political components and is located
in a political community as well as a cultural one. In other words, he claims that national identity is a product
of both a political doctrine prescribed by power-holders and mass public culture created and inspired by
influential public figures. See Smith, National Identity.
33
Akira Iriye, Japan and the Wider World: From the Mid-nineteenth Century to the Present (London: Longman,
1997), p. vii-viii.
9
International Relations scholars.

Constructivist scholars emphasise the impact of ideas. Unlike mainstream rationalist

International Relations theory, namely realism and liberalism, which assumes that a state, as a

rational actor, makes decisions based on material-interest-based calculations,34 constructivist

approaches highlight the importance of ideational factors in a state’s international behaviour.35

While state identity is only one of many ideational factors such as norms, values and culture

studied by constructivist scholars, these scholars regard the concept of state identity as

particularly significant in a state’s foreign policy.36 They claim that identity is the basis of

interests, which in turn shape an actor’s behaviour, 37 and that understanding how a state

develops its interests based on its identity is “crucial to explaining a wide range of international

political phenomena that rationalists ignore or misunderstand.”38

This thesis incorporates these insights regarding state identity and its impact on a

state’s foreign policy, which have thus far largely been absent in the interpretation of Japan’s

vehement objection to the White Australia Policy and Australia’s uncompromising attitude

towards Japan’s repeated protests to Australia’s racially exclusive immigration policy. In other

words, this thesis analyses the Japanese-Australian confrontation over the White Australia

Policy as a means of shedding light on how the Japanese and Australians perceived their

identities in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries.

From the late 19th century to the early 20th century, the period under investigation in

this thesis, both Japan and Australia developed and consolidated their respective national

identities. In the case of Japan, after embarking on a frenzied modernisation and Westernisation

34
See, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1948); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
35
Horikawa, “Japan's Reaction to the White Australia Policy,” p. 14.
36
The role of state identity in foreign policy has been widely discussed by constructivist International Relations
scholars. See Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It”; Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the
International State”; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in
Postwar Japan (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996); Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,”
in Scott Burchill, et. al., Theories of International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
37
Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” p. 392; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 231.
38
Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” p. 217.
10
in order to achieve equality with the West, it attempted to establish an identity as a “civilised”

power and sought acknowledgement by others as such. Australians, for their part, embraced

“British race nationalism” as the core of their national mythology and developed their identity

as a white British nation. However, because of their unique historical situations—in Japan’s

case, because of its status as the only non-white great power in a European-dominated

international society, and in Australia’s, because of its peculiar geo-cultural situation of being

a white colonial outpost in the Pacific surrounded by people of different race and culture—they

were both insecure about the identities they created for themselves, feeling that their national

identities were constantly challenged and threatened by external circumstances. Consequently,

both nations displayed an extraordinary degree of determination to safeguard their respective

identities. This thesis argues that both nations’ firm determination to preserve their fragile

collective identities greatly influenced their international behaviour and suggests that the

Japanese-Australian clash over the White Australia Policy should be understood against this

historical background.

1.3. APPROACH AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This thesis aims to arrive at a new understanding of the subject by examining how Japan and

Australia’s respective national identities in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries influenced

each nation’s response to the issue of Japanese exclusion in Australia. The period under

investigation starts from the mid-1890s and ends in 1919, when Japan’s proposal for racial

equality at the Paris Peace Conference was defeated mainly due to the strong opposition from

the Australian Prime Minister, William Morris Hughes. It would be, of course, possible to

extend the period of our inquiry as the White Australia Policy did not officially end until 1973,

when Gough Whitlam’s Labour government abandoned racial criteria in selection procedures

for permanent settlers. Indeed, as the Shōwa Emperor implied, discriminatory laws and

11
practices against Japanese immigrants had a lasting impact on Japan’s subsequent international

behaviour and may have contributed to Japan’s descent to war. However, the year 1919 is a

suitable point to conclude our inquiry because the Japanese-Australian diplomatic

confrontation at the Paris Peace Conference in many ways symbolises the clash between the

two countries over the exclusion of Japanese immigrants. In Paris, the Japanese delegates,

hoping to finally remove the Western-derived stigma of inferiority and reaffirm their nation’s

civilised identity, tirelessly engaged themselves in diplomatic negotiations with the delegates

from other countries to have the principle of racial equality enshrined in the League of Nations

Covenant. However, Australian Prime Minister Hughes, who viewed the Japanese proposal as

a direct attack on the White Australia Policy and a significant threat to his nation’s white British

identity, remained adamant in his opposition to Japan’s proposal and played the key role in its

ultimate defeat. The events at Paris revealed both nations’ firm determination to defend their

respective national identities, which was characteristic of the previous decades of negotiations

and tensions between them over the White Australia Policy. Following the dramatic Japanese-

Australian clash in Paris, however, during the 1920s, the situation became relatively calm

concerning the issue of Japanese exclusion in Australia. After Japan accepted limits on its navy

at the Washington Conference in 1922 and showed a willingness to cooperate with the major

Western powers, Australia’s anxieties about Japan, both military and migratory, subsided, and

Japan, for its part, more or less ceased to approach Australia to demand concessions in its

treatment of Japanese immigrants.39 For these reasons, this thesis focuses on the period up to

1919.

In addition to offering a new perspective to understanding the Japanese-Australian

clash over the White Australia Policy, this thesis also attempts to provide a complete picture of

39
The Australian officials who attended the Washington Conference, including George Pearce, the Minister of
Defence, expressed a view that Japan no longer had aggressive intentions towards Australia. See Neville
Meaney, Towards a New Vision: Australia and Japan through 100 Years (Sydney: Kangaroo Press, 1999), p.
73. At the same time, Japan’s economic growth during the 1920s reduced the number of Japanese wishing to
leave their country, and this partly contributed to Japan ceasing to approach Australia to demand concessions
on Japanese immigration. See Bennet, “Japanese Emigration Policy, 1880-1941,” p. 39.
12
Japanese-Australian diplomatic negotiations regarding the White Australia Policy over the two

and half decades from the mid-1890s. As pointed out earlier, the story of the Japanese-

Australian clash over the White Australia Policy has so far been recounted only in a fragmented

and unbalanced way, and there has been no comprehensive study on Japan’s responses to the

White Australia Policy and Australia’s responses to Japan’s repeated protests to Australia’s

racial exclusion policies. In view of this situation, this thesis aims to construct a more

comprehensive and balanced picture from available materials. For this purpose, the existing

literature aside, this study relies heavily on archival materials in Japan and Australia, including

official correspondences between the two countries and policy-related primary source materials

such as conference proceedings, internal government correspondences and parliamentary

debates in both countries. In addition to these governmental documents, this thesis will also

draw extensively from writings of influential public figures, including intellectuals and

journalists, in order to examine the domestic environment of the time.

The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter II provides the historical context of

this study and sets the foundations of the argument pursued throughout this thesis by analysing

the process of national identity building which took place almost simultaneously in Japan and

Australia from the mid-19th century. In the following chapters, the story of the Japanese-

Australian clash over the White Australia policy unfolds in roughly chronological order.

Chapter III examines the late colonial period (1894-1900), followed by Chapter IV, which

investigates Japanese-Australian diplomatic negotiation and confrontation leading up to the

introduction of the Immigration Restriction Act (IRA) of 1901. Chapter V explores concessions

the Commonwealth government made concerning the temporary entry of Japanese citizens to

Australia, while Chapter VI examines Australia’s growing fear of Japan before and during

World War I and its impact on the White Australia Policy. Chapter VII investigates the

Japanese-Australian clash over Japan’s racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference.

13
Although this chapter may not appear to be directly related to the subject of this thesis, as

mentioned earlier, it highlights important aspects of the Japanese-Australian confrontation over

the issue of Japanese exclusion. Finally, the conclusion summarises the characteristics of

Japan’s objection to the White Australia Policy and Australia’s response to Japan’s objection

as revealed in this study, and draws some conclusion as to how both nations’ visions of, and

anxieties around, national identity shaped their international behaviour as they related to the

White Australia Policy.

14
 CHAPTER II
CONSTRUCTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES
IN JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA

During the latter half of the 19th century, both Japan and Australia were engaged in the process

of constructing their respective national identities. At this time, Japan was emerging from the

long period of self-imposed seclusion (sakoku) under the Tokugawa shogunate (bakufu) regime,

and the Australian colonies were assuming responsibility for governing themselves in the new

land far away from the Mother Country in Britain. Consequently, both nations tried desperately

to find their place in the wider world in which they found themselves.

In the case of Japan, after embarking on a frenzied path of Westernisation and

modernisation in order to attain an identity as a civilised state, it adopted a nationalistic identity

and later began to stress its Asian identity. Australians, for their part, initially embraced a

liberal-humanitarian view of society after gaining local autonomy in the 1850s, but later

rejected their earlier liberal ideas and developed their identity as a white British nation.

This chapter examines the process by which Japan and Australia almost

simultaneously developed their national identities from the mid-19th century. The unique

circumstances under which both nations were engaged in this process will highlight the

importance they attached to protecting their identities and show how this might have influenced

their responses to the issue of Japanese exclusion in Australia.

2.1. REDEFINING JAPAN’S IDENTITY

Japan’s modern era began with the shock encounter with the West, when the four U.S. frigates

commanded by Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in Uraga Bay near Edo (current Tokyo) on

8 July 1853 and pressed the Tokugawa bakufu regime to grant American ships access to

Japanese ports. Prior to this, for more than two centuries from 1638 to 1853, Japan kept its door
15
closed to foreign counties except for the Dutch, Koreans and Chinese, with whom Japan

retained a highly restricted form of diplomatic and commercial relations. During this long

period of national isolation, Japan developed its status and identity as a “hermit” state, staying

largely outside the European international system.1

However, Perry’s coercive naval diplomacy brought an abrupt end to Japan’s “hermit”

status and identity. In the following year, Perry came back with eight ships, instead of four, and

successfully persuaded reluctant bakufu negotiators to sign the Treaty of Peace and Amity and

open Shimoda and Hakodate as ports of call for American ships. In 1858, Townsend Harris,

the American Consul permitted to reside in Japan under the aforementioned treaty, concluded

the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the Tokugawa government, and Japan was forced to

open five ports between 1859 and 1863 to American residence and trade. This treaty contained

two critical unequal measures; tariff restrictions and extraterritoriality, stripping Japan of its

sovereign prerogatives. The major European powers soon followed suit and signed similar

“unequal” treaties with Japan.2

These “unequal” treaties which the United States and the European powers concluded

with the Tokugawa regime forced it to abandon its isolationist policy and enter the international

system on terms defined by the West. The collapse of the country’s two-century-old policy of

seclusion under threats from the West, in turn, contributed to the demise of the Tokugawa rule

and led to the restoration of imperial rule under Emperor Meiji in 1868—a historic event widely

known as the Meiji Restoration.

1
Legro, “The Plasticity of Identity under Anarchy,” p. 49.
2
For a discussion of the unequal treaties imposed on Japan by the Western powers, see W.G. Beasley, The Rise
of Modern Japan (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1990), pp. 26-34. It is widely argued that when the
Western powers carried out gunboat diplomacy in the mid-19th century, Japan had no choice but to sign unequal
treaties with them. However, Michael R. Auslin claims that the Japanese were, in fact, skillful negotiators and
did not simply cave in to American and European demands. According to Auslin, Tokugawa and early Meiji
negotiators successfully asked for delays and specified limiting conditions and managed to assert some control
over the treaties and their content. See Michael R. Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties
and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
16
2.1.1. Developing a Civilised Identity3
The Meiji Restoration ushered in enormous changes in Japanese society. Under the completely

new political system, Japan embarked on the task of establishing a modern centralised state

and began to eagerly learn from the West.4 It should be noted, however, that building a modern

nation-state based on Western models was the only choice Japan had at the time. After Japan

abandoned its isolation policy and emerged from a long period of self-imposed seclusion, it

entered the international system which was characterised by European imperialism and the

assumed racial and cultural superiority of the West. Backed by their military power, European

nations imposed their norms and codes of conduct known as the “standard of civilisation” on

newcomers to European-dominated international society.5 Meiji leaders acknowledged that

their country was incapable of competing with the powerful West and recognised the need to

accept and fulfil the society’s standard in order to escape the threat of colonisation. They were

3
For a discussion of Japan’s attempt to develop its identity as a civilised state in the late 19th century, see
Horikawa, “Japan's Reaction to the White Australia Policy,” pp. 19-28.
4
Masaru Kohno, however, argues that suggesting that Japan prior to the encounter with the West lacked the
basic characteristics of a modern sovereign state was misleading and that the Tokugawa regime that existed
before the Meiji Restoration was comparable with any modern sovereign state, in terms of its exercise of public
authority and its ability to control the cross-border movement of goods, people and ideas. See Masaru Kohno,
“On the Meiji Restoration: Japan’s Search for Sovereignty?” in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,
2001, vol. 1, no. 2: 265-283. Mark Ravina, similarly, challenges the conventional narratives that portray the
Meiji Restoration as a response to the pressure imposed by the West and, instead, emphasises continuities on
either side of 1868 by suggesting that combinations of the ancient and modern were a central feature of the
Meiji Restoration. See Mark Ravina, To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan’s Meiji Restoration in
World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
5
Although no specific set of criteria for the “standard of civilisation” was ever codified, according to Gerrit W.
Gong, the criteria for the “standard of civilisation” included: to guarantee the life, liberty and property of
foreign nationals; to demonstrate a suitable governmental organisation; to adhere to the accepted diplomatic
practices; and to abide by the principles of international law.” See, Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of
“Civilisation” in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 179. In addition to these criteria
for the “standard of civilisation,” Douglas Howland suggests that “state will”–the will to defend itself in a
hostile world–is also a necessary, but often overlooked, quality for a civilised sovereign state. See Douglas
Howland, “International Law, State Will, and the Standard of Civilization in Japan’s Assertion of Sovereign
Equality,” in Robert J. Beck (ed.), Law and Disciplinarity: Thinking beyond Borders (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013), pp. 186-190. For a discussion of the “standard of civilisation” in the 19th-century European
international society, see also Shogo Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialization into Janus-Faced European International
Society,” in European Journal of International Relations, 2005, vol. 11, no. 1: 137-164; Shogo Suzuki,
Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society (New York:
Routledge, 2009); Gerrit W. Gong, “China’s Entry into International Society,” in Hedley Bull and Adam
Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Susumu Yamauchi,
“Civilization and International Law in Japan during the Meiji Era (1868-1912),” in Hitotsubashi Journal of
Law and Politics, 1996, vol. 24: 1-25, pp. 17-25.
17
also aware of China’s predicament6 and understood that if they did not comply with Western

rules and practices, Japan would suffer like China.7 Therefore, in order for Japan to survive in

the European international system and ultimately be accepted as a “civilised” member of the

society, Meiji leaders showed an unusual degree of willingness to learn from the West and

reform their nation explicitly on European models.

The Charter Oath, issued in the name of the emperor in April 1868, declared that “evil

customs of the past shall be broken off” and “knowledge shall be sought throughout the

world.”8 To this end, between 1860 and 1890, the Meiji government dispatched approximately

900 Japanese to the United States and major European countries on missions to learn the

essence of Western society and civilisation. 9 At the same time, a large number of foreign

advisers, educators and instructors (oyatoi gaikokujin) were hired by the Japanese central and

municipal governments, as well as in the private sector, to assist Japan in its quest for

modernisation. Meanwhile, under the slogans of bunmei kaika (civilisation and enlightenment),

fukoku kyōhei (enrich the country and strengthen the army) and shokusan kōgyō (increase

production and encourage new industry), the Meiji government carried out a series of policies

to modernise Japan by emulating Western technologies, institutions, ideas and values. These

efforts bore fruit with the introduction of a new school system, a new system of local

government, a new army and navy, a new banking system, new commercial code and criminal

code during the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s, and the promulgation of the nation’s constitution in

1889—all developed after an extensive study of Western models.10

6
As a result of Britain’s victory over China in the first Opium War (1839–42), Britain gained commercial
privileges and territorial and legal concessions in China. This was followed by the second Opium War (1856–
60), and these two conflicts marked the beginning of the era of unequal treaties and other inroads on
Qing sovereignty which ultimately toppled the dynasty in the early 20th century.
7
Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialization into Janus-Faced European International Society,” p. 13.
8
Cited in Wm. Theodore de Bary, et. al. (eds.), Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. 2, 1600-2000, 2nd ed., abr.
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 8 and Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 338.
9
One of the biggest of them was the Iwakura mission, where a large number of the Meiji leadership toured
America and Europe for 22 months from 1871 to 1873. The importance placed on the mission can be
understood by the size of its delegation. A total of 107 government officials, scholars and students participated
in it, virtually emptying the Japanese government for two years. See Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan,
pp. 355- 361.
10
For a discussion of Japan’s domestic reform during the early Meiji era, see Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan,
18
 While a group of reform bureaucrats inside government circles was the central force

behind Japan’s drive toward Westernisation and civilisation, the ideas they espoused were

strongly endorsed by intellectuals and educators outside the government. Among them was

Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of the most influential intellectuals and social thinkers during the early

Meiji period. Fukuzawa, who had a deep understanding of Japanese and Chinese history, as

well as Western learning, believed that Japan’s future direction would be determined by how

the Japanese understood Western civilisation and played a key role in advocating

Westernisation of Japan to achieve a civilised status.11 In his book Bunmeiron no gairyaku (An

Outline of a Theory of Civilisation) published in 1875, Fukuzawa claimed that “the nations of

Europe and the United States of America are the most highly civilised, while the Asian

countries, such as Turkey, China and Japan, may be called semi-developed countries, and

Africa and Australia are to be counted as still primitive lands.”12 He argued that in order for

Japan to advance toward civilisation from its present status of semi-civilised, it had to learn

from the West. 13 Tokutomi Sōhō was another widely recognised advocate for Japan’s

Westernisation in this era. Tokutomi, who ironically later became a staunch anti-Westernist,

exerted a tremendous influence on what Kenneth Pyle calls “the new generation” of Meiji

Japan.14 Tokutomi was convinced that the adoption of spiritual, as well as material, aspects of

Western society was imperative for Japan’s progress towards civilisation. Thus, he urged Meiji

Japanese youth to seek total Westernisation of Japanese society along the lines of 19th-century

pp. 54-120; Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan, pp. 371-413; Elise K. Tipton, Modern Japan: A Social and
Political History 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 39-58. In his study on the emergence, function, and
abolition of the 19th-century Western extraterritorial court system in Japan, the Ottoman Empire and China,
Turan Kayaoğlu argues that the Meiji government’s extensive domestic legal reform based on Western models
ultimately led to the Western powers’ decision to abolish extraterritoriality in Japan. See Turan Kayaoğlu,
Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 66-103.
11
Mohammad Shahabuddin, “The ‘Standard of Civilization’ in International Law: Intellectual Perspectives from
Pre-war Japan,” in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2019, vol. 32, no. 1: 13-32, pp. 22-24.
12
Cited in de Bary, Sources of Japanese Tradition, p. 35.
13
Ibid., pp. 35-42. For a detailed discussion of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s ideas and writings on the European standard
of civilisation, see Mohammad Shahabuddin, “The ‘Standard of Civilization’ in International Law: Intellectual
Perspectives from Pre-war Japan,” in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2019, vol. 32, no. 1: 13-32, pp. 22-
26.
14
Kenneth B. Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885-1895 (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1969).
19
liberal doctrine so that Japan could become a strong industrial nation, the equal of the Western

powers.15

Besides reconfiguring domestic institutions on Western models, the Japanese

government also attempted to demonstrate Japan’s capacity to meet the West’s “standard of

civilisation” by adopting European diplomatic practices. Meiji leaders believed that following

the norms of international society and abiding by the principles of international law were

critical components of the civilisation required for membership in European international

society.16 They, therefore, followed international law not only to avoid giving any pretext of

intervention to the European powers but also to publicise Japan’s ability to abide by the law

and gain a reputation as a civilised nation,17 and this was clearly displayed in Japan’s behaviour

during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). 18

During these two wars, Japan tried to impress Western nations by faithfully observing European

international law and practices. During the Sino-Japanese War, two eminent Japanese jurists

were attached to the Army and the Navy as legal advisors, and many more advisors were

involved during the Russo-Japanese War. Japanese soldiers and sailors were given orders to

strictly observe international law and to avoid any conduct that might attract accusations that

they were violating these codes.19

Japan’s meticulous observance of international law during the Sino-Japanese war was

in stark contrast to China’s “unlawful” behaviour. Ariga Nagao, one of the jurists

accompanying the Japanese military during the war, claimed that the Sino-Japanese War was a

war between a “civilised” nation and an “uncivilised” nation because while Japan closely

15
Ibid., pp. 4, 35-36.
16
Gong, The Standard of “Civilisation” in International Society, pp. 180-187. Kinji Akashi claims that the.
17
Yamauchi, “Civilization and International Law in Japan during the Meiji Era (1868-1912),” pp. 9-11, 24; Kinji
Akashi, “Japanese Acceptance of the European Law of Nations: A Brief History of International Law in Japan
c. 1853-1900,” in Michael Stolleis and Masaharu Yanagihara (eds.), East Asian and European Perspectives on
International Law (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), p. 19.
18
Tomoko Okagaki, Logic of Conformity: Japan’s Entry into International Society (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2013), pp. 59-75.
19
Hidemi Suganami, “Japan’s Entry into International Society,” in Bull and Watson (eds.), The Expansion of
International Society, p. 195; Shahabuddin, “The ‘Standard of Civilization’ in International Law,” p. 31.
20
followed international law, China did not observe any legal practice of war. 20 Japan was

particularly keen to demonstrate its ability to meet the European “standard of civilisation”

during the Sino-Japanese War, given that the war proceeded in parallel with the treaty revisions.

On 16 July 1894, a fortnight before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan signed the

Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Britain. According to the treaty,

Britain provisionally renounced extraterritoriality in Japan, with its actual abrogation to take

effect five years after the signing, allowing Japan to start a process of regaining its sovereignty.

The significance of the treaty also lay in the fact that it served as the basis for obtaining similar

agreements from the other European powers. Japan’s behaviour during the Sino-Japanese War

greatly impressed the Western powers and convinced them of the legitimacy of revising

unequal treaties with Japan.21 In 1899, the European treaty powers officially relinquished their

extraterritorial rights in Japan.22

While Japan overhauled its domestic institutions and faithfully adhered to the norms

of European international society in order to show its progress towards civilisation, it also

sought to develop and consolidate its identity as a civilised state. As discussed earlier, in its

quest for a civilised status, Japan accepted the European “standard of civilisation” and the

dominant belief in the superiority of the Western civilisation. This meant that in order for Japan

to attain a civilised identity, it had to acknowledge that its traditions, inherited ideas and

institutions were “old fashioned” or “out of date.”23 A consequence of this was Japan’s extreme

revulsion towards its Asian identity, as expressed in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s well-known article,

20
Okagaki, Logic of Conformity, p. 88; Yamauchi, “Civilization and International Law in Japan during the Meiji
Era (1868-1912),” pp. 10-11.
21
Gong, The Standard of “Civilisation” in International Society, pp. 184-186.
22
Various scholars, including Kinji Akashi, Douglas Howland and Susumu Yamauchi, argue that Japan’s mastery
of international law was a central factor in persuading the Western powers to relinquish their extraterritorial
rights in Japan and in earning international recognition of Japan’s sovereignty and civilised status. See Akashi,
“Japanese Acceptance of the European Law of Nations”; Howland, “International Law, State Will, and the
Standard of Civilization in Japan’s Assertion of Sovereign Equality”; Yamauchi, “Civilization and
International Law in Japan during the Meiji Era (1868-1912).”
23
Gong, The Standard of “Civilisation” in International Society, pp. 172-173, 187.
21
Datsu-a-ron (Leaving Asia).24 In the article, Fukuzawa insisted that “it was important for Japan

that it should not be associated in Western minds with a decrepit and backward Asia” and that

“Japan should part with Asia and go its own, Western-style way.”25 Subsequently, under the

slogan of datsu-a-nyū-ō (leave Asia and join Europe), Japan started rejecting traditional Asian

values and ideas and began to dissociate itself from the rest of Asia so that the newly

modernised and civilised Japan would not be lumped together with its uncivilised neighbours

by the West. In other words, in its attempt to attain an identity as a civilised state in a European-

dominated international society, Japan identified itself with the powerful West and tried to

reaffirm its civilised identity by distancing itself from its “uncivilised” and “backward” Asian

neighbours.

Whilst Japan was trying to redefine its identity, it also sought to demonstrate its

civilised identity on the international stage by behaving like the European powers. Mohammad

Shahabuddin argues that Japan’s political and military elites in the late 19th century equated

imperialism to civilisation and, as result, pursued Western-style imperialism against

neighbouring states.26 In other words, Japan, having accepted and conformed to the European

idea of the standard of civilisation, started applying “what she had learnt from the West in her

external affairs” and subsequently began to engage in coercive diplomacy towards its

“uncivilised” Asian neighbours.”27 In 1874, Japan launched a punitive expedition to Taiwan

in retaliation for the murder of 54 Ryūkyuan sailors by Paiwan aborigines (Taiwan’s indigenous

population), and this resulted in China’s recognition of Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryūkyū

Islands. Furthermore, just as the Western powers had imposed unequal treaties upon Japan, in

1876, Japan signed an unequal treaty with Korea, thereby ending the country’s seclusion, and

24
This article was published in the Japanese newspaper Jiji Shimpō on 16 March 1885.
25
Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan, p. 427.
26
Shahabuddin, “The ‘Standard of Civilization’ in International Law,” pp. 27-32.
27
Suganami, “Japan’s Entry into International Society,” p. 192; Yamauchi, “Civilization and International Law
in Japan during the Meiji Era (1868-1912),” p. 24. Douglas Howland similarly claims that far from remaining
a victim of Western imperialism, Japan followed their examples and proceeded to victimize others. See
Howland, “International Law, State Will, and the Standard of Civilization in Japan’s Assertion of Sovereign
Equality,” p. 183.
22
after the victory in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, Japan acquired most-favoured-nation status

with China. 28 Asian countries naturally reacted negatively to Japan’s coercive actions.

However, their response was not important for Japan, as it was demonstrating its newly

acquired identity to the European powers. Japan’s goal at the time was to be recognised by the

European powers as civilised and become a legitimate member of European international

society.29

2.1.2. Rise of Nationalism

Achieving a civilised state identity by emulating the Western powers was a dominant theme

during the early Meiji era. However, while the government was pushing ahead with the

civilisation and enlightenment movement, national consciousness was also increasing. 30

Kenneth Pyle argues that historical and cultural dislocations and uncertainties created by new

political and social order inspired by Western civilisation caused “psychological strain” and

“extraordinary mental agonies” and led to “the intense need felt by the Japanese for a national

identity in the modern world.”31 Although the revolutionary reform program upon which the

Meiji leadership embarked in 1868 saved Japan from being colonised by the Western powers—

the fate suffered by many Asian countries—it resulted in a profound alienation from their

country’s tradition and cultural heritage among Japanese people. For Japan, modernisation was

synonymous with Westernisation. Building a powerful industrial nation required rejecting

much of Japanese tradition and replacing it with techniques, values and practices borrowed

from the West. Many Japanese were troubled by this process because they saw in modernisation

the destruction of Japanese identity, and subsequently, they started searching for something in

their national past they could retain with pride as uniquely Japanese.32 One of the organisations

28
Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, pp. 140-176.
29
Ibid., pp. 140-141.
30
Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, pp. 19, 80-81.
31
Ibid., pp. 3-4, 20-22, 189.
32
Ibid., pp. 20-22, 53-54, 123.
23
advocating the preservation of the distinct Japanese national identity was the Seikyōsha

(Society for Political Education) founded in 1888. The declared purpose of the Seikyōsha was

kokusui hozon (preservation of national essence), the concept developed by one of its

prominent members, Shiga Shigetaka. Shiga and other Seikyōsha members asserted that only

by maintaining a distinct cultural tradition and identity could the Japanese feel equal to

Westerners and recover their national pride.33

The growth of national consciousness among the Japanese public was further

reinforced by the government’s effort to strengthen itself by fostering a sense of belonging to

the nation. After the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese state-builders deliberately destroyed

traditional loyalties to the family and to the local community and constructed national

allegiances in their place. They moved the emperor, who had been marginalised and politically

powerless for centuries in the ancient capital of Kyoto, to the new capital of Tokyo and made

him the central symbol of the nation. Moreover, from the late 1880s, the Meiji government

attempted to redefine a Japanese national identity by manufacturing a state orthodoxy and

imposing it upon the people. The orthodoxy was based on a myth of imperial sanctity and the

family-state principle. According to this myth, the Japanese nation was one great family, and

the Japanese people were all descendants of the divine emperor, differentiated by family ties

from outsiders. 34 Under the 1889 constitution, the emperor was enshrined as an absolute,

sacred monarch, preserving “an unbroken line” of a dynasty that had reigned “for ages past.”35

Thus, the promulgation of a constitution was intended not only to demonstrate Japan’s progress

towards civilisation as discussed earlier, but also to make the imperial institution a symbol of

national unity and identity.

The Imperial Rescript on Education issued in October 1890 was an official expression

33
For a detailed description of Seikyōsha, see Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, especially chapters 3
and 4.
34
For a detailed discussion of the making of late Meiji ideology and orthodoxy, see Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern
Myth: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
35
Tipton, Modern Japan, p. 61.
24
of the national orthodoxy. In contrast to the Charter Oath issued in 1868, there was no reference

to “evil customs of the past” that had to be discarded nor encouragement to seek “knowledge

throughout the world.” Instead, the Rescript implicitly sought to counter the indiscriminate

Westernisation of the early Meiji period by stressing traditional values of social harmony and

loyalty to the throne and gave a new direction to education.36

As a result of the efforts by governmental, as well as non-governmental, leaders, a

conservative brand of nationalism with the aim of preserving the distinct Japanese national

character and identity became prominent in the 1890s. Terms such as kokka (nation), kokumin

(citizens), teikoku (empire), nihonshugi (Japanism), kokutai (national polity), and kokusui

hozon (preservation of national essence) came to be commonly used and became extremely

“fashionable” during the last decade of the 19th century.37

The upsurge of national consciousness and nationalistic feeling was further

accelerated by increasing disillusionment with the West, which culminated at the Triple

Intervention after Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed

in April 1895, ceded Formosa, the Pescadores Island, and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan,

recognised Korean independence and obliged China to pay a large indemnity to Japan.

However, Russia, Germany and France were disturbed by Japan’s ambitions on the continent

and pressured Japan to renounce possession of the Liaotung Peninsula. The Triple Intervention

publicly humiliated Japan on the international stage and left a feeling of bitterness and

resentment on the part of Japan towards the West. Japan felt that although it had diligently

observed the rules and the norms of the European international system in order to be accepted

as a civilised member, it was not treated equally by the other powers and hypocritically

excluded from the Western community because of the dominant belief in the racial and cultural

superiority of the West.38 These sentiments towards the West, in turn, contributed to the shift

36
Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, pp. 120-121; Tipton, Modern Japan, p. 59.
37
Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, p 23; Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, p. 193.
38
Jo Sam-Sang, “Identity Crisis and Ideology: The Case of Meiji Japan,” in Northeast Studies, 2011, vol. 15:1-
25
in views and ideals among the Japanese public towards the West and their own nation, as

reflected in the changing attitudes of Tokutomi Sōhō.

As discussed earlier, during the early Meiji period, Tokutomi insisted that Japan’s

progress toward civilisation required the total Westernisation of Japanese society. However,

after the Triple Intervention, he abandoned his early idealisation of the West and began to

develop a critical attitude towards the Western powers, claiming that European civilisation was

built upon “barbaric” spirit and customs. 39 At the same time, he began to adopt more

conservative, nationalistic views and started arguing that Japanese traditions should be

preserved in order to enhance the national strength and well-being.40 Moreover, Tokutomi’s

renunciation of Westernism and his renewed sense of national pride were accompanied by his

new vision of Japan’s Asian mission. Writing in July 1895, Tokutomi compared Japan to

Imperial Rome and claimed that the Japanese had a mission to “extend the blessings of political

organisation” throughout the rest of East Asia and the South Pacific, “just as the Romans had

once done for Europe and the Mediterranean.” He asserted that it was the special destiny of

Japan, for “in East Asia only the Japanese have the ability for political organisation; only the

Japanese understand the concept of the nation-state.”41 John Pierson claims that Tokutomi’s

vision of Japan’s Asian mission was born out of his strong feeling of hostility and resentment

towards Western nations. 42 According to Pierson, Tokutomi believed that Japan had a

legitimate reason to engage in a mission to save weak Asian nations from European imperialism

and to guide backward Asian societies to modern civilisation, as he wrote in February 1986:

The countries of the Far East falling prey to the great powers of Europe is something that our nation
will not stand for. East Asia becoming a mire of disorder is something that our nation will not
tolerate. We have a duty to radiate the light of civilisation beyond our shores and bring the benefits
of civilisation to our neighbours. We have the duty to guide backward countries to the point of being
able to govern themselves. We have the duty to maintain peace in East Asia for this purpose. As a

28, p. 10; Tipton, Modern Japan, p. 82.

39
Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, p. 182.
40
John Pierson, Tokutomi Sōhō, 1863-1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1980), pp. 234-247; Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, pp. 173-187.
41
Quoted in Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan, p. 181; Pierson, Tokutomi Sōhō, 1863-1957, pp. 240-241.
42
Pierson, Tokutomi Sōhō, 1863-1957, pp. 240-241.
26
 man has his calling, so too does a nation have its mission.43

2.1.3. Pan-Asianism44

Pan-Asian thoughts and ideas such as expressed by Tokutomi existed even before the Triple

Intervention. In 1891 Miyake Setsurei, a leading member of the aforementioned Seikyōsha,

argued that the Mongolian civilisation was equal in maturity and sophistication to the Western

civilisation and that the Japanese, as the most talented member of the Mongoloid people, had

a mission to promote the cultural tradition and identity of Asia.45

Sven Saaler claims that Pan-Asian ideology was a critical factor not only in modern

Japan’s foreign policy but also in the process of creating modern Japan’s national identity.46

Pan-Asianism emphasised Japan’s commonalities with other Asian nations and advocated the

unity of Asian peoples and countries against European imperialism. Some of the most

prominent proponents of the early Pan-Asian ideas were Tarui Tōkichi (1850-1922), who in

his Daitō gappō ron (Treatise on the Union of the Great East) (1893) argued for a union of

Japan and Korea against Western encroachment, and Okakura Tenshin (1862-1913), who in

1903 famously proclaimed that “Asia is One” in The Ideals of the East.47 In the Meiji era, Pan-

Asianism was popular among the political opposition to the Meiji oligarchy, and was often

used to criticise the government’s overly pro-Western foreign policy and modernisation that

was accompanied by excessive Westernisation.48 However, it should be noted that during the

43
“Jishuteki gaikō no igi,” in Kokumin no tomo, 8 February 1896. Also quoted in Pierson, Tokutomi Sōhō, 1863-
1957, p. 241.
44
The historical phenomenon of Pan-Asianism is closely associated with Japanese imperialism and often
regarded as a tool for legitimising Japan’s colonial rule and territorial expansion in Asia. However, this thesis
focuses on the role of the early Pan-Asianism in the development of Japan’s national identity.
45
Miyake Setsurei, Gendai nihon bungaku zenshū (Anthology of Modern Japanese Literature), vol.5: Miyake
Setsurei shū (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1931), pp. 215-238.
46
Sven Saaler, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Overcoming the Nation, Creating a Region, Forging
an Empire,” in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (eds.), Pan- Asianism in Modern Japanese History:
Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp, 2-3.
47
Saaler, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History,” p. 5
48
For detailed discussions of Pan-Asian ideology and movements, see Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A.
Szpilman, Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, 1850-1920 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield,
2011); Sven Saaler, “The Construction of Asianism in Modern Japan: Kodera Kenkichi and his ‘Treatise on
Greater Asianism’ (1916),” in Modern Asian Studies, 2007, vol. 41, no. 6: 1261-1294; Saaler, “Pan-Asianism
in Modern Japanese History”; Kimitada Miwa, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japan: Nationalism, Regionalism
and Universalism,” in Saaler and Koschmann (eds.), Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History; Eri Hotta,
Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
27
Meiji era, Pan-Asianism was still in an embryonic stage and its popularity was limited to certain

sections of Japanese society, such as intellectuals and political activists.49

Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 was an important turning point for the Pan-Asian

movement in the sense that it accelerated the spread of Pan-Asian ideas not only in Japan but

also throughout Asia. It was the first time in modern history an Asian country defeated a major

Western power. Japan’s victory impressed in the minds of Japanese and other Asian peoples

that Europeans were not invincible. The idea of Asian solidarity, in defiance of the West,

became more realistic and convincing because of this victory.50 At the same time, Japan’s

triumph in the war with Russia boosted Japan’s self-confidence, which led Japan to perceive

itself more strongly as the leader (meishu) of Asia with a moral responsibility to assist its less

fortunate neighbours.51 Just as Miyake Setsurei and Tokutomi Sōhō had done a decade or so

earlier, advocates of meishuron (Japanese leadership) Pan-Asianism believed that Japan, as the

only Asian country which had successfully achieved modernisation and been accepted into the

hitherto all-Western club of civilised powers, had a special mission to fight against the

imminent threat posed by European imperialism and liberate Asia from Western oppression.52

Added to the growing popularity of Pan-Asianism as a result of Japan’s increasing

self-confidence was Japan’s further disillusionment and frustration with the West, which was

exacerbated by the “unfair” peace settlement after the Russo-Japanese War. The Treaty of

Portsmouth, which formally ended the Russo-Japanese War in September 1905, granted Japan

the control of Korea, the Russian leasehold over the Liaotung Peninsula, Russia’s railroad and

mining rights in southern Manchuria, and sovereignty over the southern half of Sakhalin Island

(Karafuto). However, as a result of U.S. intervention, Japan was denied indemnity to pay for

49
Saaler, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History,” pp. 4-5; Saaler, “The Construction of Asianism in Modern
Japan,” pp. 1281-1283, 1289.
50
For a discussion of heightened sense of Asian solidarity and the transnational character of Pan-Asianism, see
Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, pp. 26-28.
51
Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945, p. 58.
52
Saaler, “The Construction of Asianism in Modern Japan,” p.1286; Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, pp.30-
31; Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945, p. 58.
28
the expenses of the war. The Japanese public saw the incident as a great national humiliation

and a great betrayal by the West, which had praised Japan’s achievement throughout the war.53

Like the humiliating experience of the Triple Intervention a decade earlier, the Treaty of

Portsmouth confirmed Japan’s deep-seated suspicion that the Western powers were still

unwilling to recognise Japan as their equal despite Japan’s proven record of achievement. In

view of such developments, Pan-Asianism appeared to many as an attractive option for Japan’s

foreign policy.54

However, while the Japanese public was increasingly developing Pan-Asianist

orientation, the Japanese government, for its part, generally dismissed Pan-Asian thought and

movement as “romantic” and “idealistic,” in contrast to its “pragmatic” and “realistic”

approaches to foreign policy, and continued to follow a pro-Western policy to safeguard the

nation’s security and interests without alienating the West.55 During the Meiji period, Japanese

leaders were concerned that any talk of Japan’s special relationship with Asia might provoke

the West’s suspicion and incur its collective intervention, such as the Triple Intervention of

1895. Consequently, the Japanese government tried to dispel such suspicions among the

Western powers not only by refraining from using Pan-Asian rhetoric and suppressing the Pan-

Asian movement, but also by officially disclaiming any interest in seeking closer ties with its

Asian neighbours.56

During World War I, however, Pan-Asianism started penetrating into government

53
The peace settlement angered the Japanese public and provoked popular protests and mob riots. The most well-
known among them was the Hibiya Riot of 5 September 1905. For a detailed discussion of the Japanese
public’s indignation at the peace deal, see Shumpei Okamoto, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese
War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 165-223.
54
Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945, pp. 53-54.
55
Iriye, Japan and the Wider World, pp. 8-10; Saaler, “The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan,” p.
1289; Saaler, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History,” pp. 5-6.
56
The Japanese government’s efforts on this front were not limited to the national scene. For example, during the
Russo-Japanese War, when Russia together with Germany tried to rally opposition to Japan by inciting the
Yellow Peril fear and circulated propaganda to that end, the Japanese government sent Cambridge educated
Suematsu Kenchō to London and Harvard educated Kaneko Kentarō to the United States in order to dispel the
West’s suspicions regarding Japan’s Pan-Asian ambitions. See Komura to Hayashi, 28 October 1905, NGB-
37 (1904), 38 (1905) supplementary volume, Nichiro-sensō, (the Russo-Japanese War), vol. V, pp. 774-776.
See also Iriye, Japan and the Wider World, pp. 8, 17-19; Saaler, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History,”
p. 5; Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, p.36.
29
circles and official diplomacy. Japan’s emergence as the predominant power in the Asia-Pacific

region during the war brought an upsurge in Japan’s self-confidence, and this resulted in a large

volume of Pan-Asian writings during the last two years of the war. 57 These publications

contributed to the development of Pan-Asian thought, and by the war’s end, Pan-Asianism had

evolved into comprehensive and systematic ideology (shugi) with concrete contents, in contrast

to the vague idea of Asian unity that had been the norm until then. 58 Terms such as han

ajiashugi (Pan-Asianism), dai ajiashugi (greater Asianism) and zen ajiashugi (all Asianism)

began to appear frequently in newspapers and journals. By then, Pan-Asianism was no longer

the exclusive preserve of the political opposition but had come to be widely accepted not only

by the public but also by politicians.59 A clear sign that Pan-Asianism had penetrated deeply

into government circles was an essay written by Konoe Fumimaro, a three-time prime minister,

which appeared in an influential Pan-Asian journal Nihon oyobi nihonjin (Japan and Japanese)

just before his departure as a member of the delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in

December 1918. In his essay tilted Eibeihon’i no heiwashugi o haisu (Reject the Anglo-

American Based Peace), Konoe claimed that it was Japan’s mission to eliminate “the

discrimination against Orientals” and achieve “the equal treatment of the yellow race.”60

2.1.4. Insecure Identity

The foregoing discussion illustrates Japan’s struggle to redefine and establish its identity from

the mid-19th century. When Japan emerged from self-imposed seclusion and opened itself to

57
Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, p. 43.
58
Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, pp. 43-44. One of the most significant among these writings was Treatise
on Greater Asianism (Dai ajiashugi-ron) published in 1916 by Kodera Kenkichi, a politician and long-time
member of the Lower House of the Imperial Japanese Diet. Kodera, who spent a decade studying in Europe
and North America, offered a solution to the problem of integrating romantic ideas of regional Asian unity into
the government’s imperialist realpolitik foreign policy by referring to the positive role of pan-movements he
had observed while studying in the West. For a detailed discussion of Kodera’s contribution to the development
of Pan-Asian ideology, see Saaler, “The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan,” especially, pp, 1273,
1289-1290.
59
Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, p. 43; Saaler, “The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan,” p.
1283; Saaler, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History,” p. 7.
60
De Barry, Sources of Japanese Tradition, pp. 291-293. See also Nakanishi Hiroshi, “Konoe Fumimaro ‘Eibei
hon’i no heiwashugi o haisu’ rombun no haikei (The Background of Konoe Fumimaro’s ‘Reject the Anglo-
American Based Peace),” in Hōgaku Ronsō (Kyoto Law Review), 1993, vol. 132: 225-58, pp. 238-244.
30
the rest of the world, the international order that Japan encountered was characterised by

European imperialism and the assumed cultural and racial superiority of the West. In order to

be acknowledged as a civilised member of a European-dominated international society, Japan

accepted the society’s prevailing norms, identified with the European great powers and tried to

establish its identity as a civilised state by emulating powerful European nations. At the same

time, Japan regarded its Asian neighbours as uncivilised and engaged in coercive diplomacy

towards them, thereby reaffirming and demonstrating its newly acquired civilised identity.

Over time, however, with the rising tide of nationalism, the growing self-confidence

and the increasing disillusionment with the West, Japan repeatedly redefined its identity. In the

late 19th century, Japan created a national myth centred around the divine emperor and adopted

a nationalistic identity, emphasising its cultural and racial uniqueness and superiority. In the

early 20th century, Japan came to stress its Asian identity, with its ever-strengthening claim of

leadership in Asia and its mission to defend Asia against the West. However, despite the fluid

nature of Japan’s identity, one constant theme emerges from Japan’s attempt to redefine its

identity during the late 19th and the early 20th centuries—to attain an identity as a civilised

power equal to the major Western powers and superior to other Asian nations.

The goal of attaining a civilised international status and identity was achieved for the

most part with the abolition of extraterritoriality for the European powers in 1899 and Japan’s

triumph in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. However, it is important to note that as the only

non-white power in a European-dominated international society, Japan never felt secure about

its newly acquired international status and looked upon the European powers with suspicion.61

Japan’s distrust of the Western powers had been gradually increasing because of their earlier

refusal to recognise Japan as their equal worthy of treaty revision, 62 but it became more

pronounced as a result of the Triple Intervention in 1895 and the unfair peace settlement after

61
Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, p. 89; Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialization into Janus-Faced European
International Society,” p. 150.
62
Pierson, Tokutomi Sōhō, 1863-1957, pp. 240-241.
31
Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905. Japan felt that despite its proven record of achievement,

it continued to be excluded from the Western community because of the dominant belief in the

cultural and racial superiority of the West and Japan’s identification with the Asian race and

culture. As a result, Japan was extremely sensitive about its status and identity, particularly in

terms of how it was perceived and treated by others.63

The White Australia Policy, as well as racially discriminatory immigration policies in

other white settler societies, hit a raw nerve of Japan’s sensitivity. During the mid to late 19th

century, antipathy towards non-European immigrants became widespread in white settler

societies such as the United States, Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand, and by

the early 20th century, these societies practised some sort of measures to limit non-Europeans

entering and settling in their territories. 64 Under their race-based immigration laws, the

Japanese were put in the same category as Chinese and other “uncivilised” Asian people and

were labelled as undesirable immigrants. In other words, these immigration laws undermined

Japan’s claim for a “civilised” international status and identity and placed the Japanese beneath,

not on an equal footing with, European people. The Japanese government was concerned that

these discriminatory measures against Japanese immigrants would symbolise Japan’s

inferiority to European nations and damage Japan’s international prestige as a civilised state.65

As a result, in order to prove to the world and to itself that it was not inferior to the Western

powers, Japan was in a constant struggle to reaffirm and demonstrate its civilised status. This

was apparent, as we will see in the following chapters, in Japan’s constant diplomatic pressure

on Australia to exempt Japanese citizens from the operation of the White Australia Policy.

63
Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, pp. 89-102.
64
For a discussion of racially discriminatory immigration measures practiced in these societies, see Bennett,
“White Discrimination against Japan,” p. 91-95; Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, pp. 70-78.
65
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 12; Bennett, “Japanese Emigration Policy, 1880-1941,” p. 26;
Bennett, “White Discrimination against Japan,” p. 94; Sissons, “The Immigration Question in Australian
Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919,” p. 38; Sissons, “Immigration in Australia-Japanese Relations
1871-1971,” p. 194; Asada, “Nichi-bei kankei to imin mondai,” p. 164. Aruga, “Hainichi mondai to nichi-bei
kankei,” p. 70.
32
2.2. BUILDING A WHITE AUSTRALIA

Australia’s nation and identity building era was more or less coeval with that of Japan. Modern

Australia was founded as a group of six British colonies between 1788, when the First Fleet

arrived in New South Wales, and 1836, when South Australia was settled by the British. 66 In

all colonies except South Australia and Western Australia, the original purpose was to remove

convicts from Britain and to use them to found a new society. 67 The majority of English

convicts sent to Australia had urban backgrounds, with the largest numbers coming from

London and new industrial cities in the north. England was in a state of turmoil in the late 18th

and the early 19th centuries undergoing the Industrial Revolution. The dislocation of rural life

caused by the Industrial Revolution led to large slum populations in urban areas, and many

people fell into crime because of the economic and social uncertainties in the major industrial

cities. In short, the British convicts transported to Australia were products of social problems

of British industrialisation.68

However, by the 1830s, there was a spirit of reform in Britain, as represented by the

Chartist movement.69 This influenced Australia in many ways. Chartism formed in Britain in

the late 1830s around democratic principles embodied in the People’s Charter, which called for

six reforms to make the political system more democratic. The British authorities were terrified

66
The six colonies were New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and
Tasmania.
67
Losing the American colonies in 1783 was the major impetus for Britain’s decision to set up a new penal colony
in the Pacific, in terms of both domestic and strategic concerns. In the later years of the 18 th century, Britain
transported about 1,000 criminals a year to its colonies in North America. When the American War of
Independence broke out in 1775, however, Americans refused all further shipments of convicts and the passage
of convicts to North America was blocked. In order to solve a serious domestic problem regarding the
increasing number of criminals condemned to transportation, Britain had to find a new repository for the
convicts which North America had formerly absorbed. At the same time, Britain’s decision to send a fleet to
New South Wales owed much to the British-French rivalry in the Pacific. Following the lost war against
America, the British government was greatly concerned with preserving Britain’s status as a major power vis-
à-vis other European nations, especially France, and was determined to rebuild the strength of the Empire to
the pre-eminence that it had enjoyed prior to the War of Independence. The criminals sent to Australia provided
an ideal source of human capital for Britain to realise the military and strategic objectives of securing Britain
in the Pacific and excluding the French from what Britain regarded as the sphere of influence. For a discussion
of the reasons behind Britain’s decision to set up a convict colony in Australia, see Frank G. Clark, The History
of Australia (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2002), pp. 21-23; Frank G. Clark, Australia in a
Nutshell: A Narrative History (Sydney: Rosenberg, 2003), pp. 34-47.
68
For a description of English convicts transported to Australia, see Jupp, Immigration, pp. 3-6; John Rickard,
Australia: A Cultural History (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 24-25.
69
For a discussion of the Chartist movement, see Malcolm Chase, Chartism: A New History (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2007).
33
by the popularity of the Chartist movement and many Chartists, including some leaders, were

sent to Australia, where they spread their beliefs.70 Democratic principles were widely held by

those coming to Australia in the heyday of Chartist reformism between the 1830s and 1850s.

As well as the convicts who were transported to Australia for political offences of supporting

the Chartist movement, free immigrants also brought with them social and political aspiration

which had not been met in Britain, where Chartist demands failed to materialise.71 In the fluid

condition of colonial society, Chartist beliefs were readily embraced and generated an agitation

for the extension of political rights and the establishment of representative institutions. 72

Under these circumstances, the Australian colonies gained local autonomy in the 1850s73 and

created a liberal political system embracing such ideals as popular sovereignty, universal

human rights and individual human dignity.74 Coincidentally, the advent of self-government

in Australia took place at the same time as the Gold Rush and Australia’s first substantial

encounter with Asian migration, and the liberal ideals espoused by Australians during this

period were evident in their response to the first major wave of Asian immigrants to their nation.

2.2.1. The Gold Rush and Liberal Response

The discovery of gold in New South Wales and, more significantly, in Victoria during the 1850s

led to the arrival of many thousands of Chinese on the goldfields in these two colonies. By the

70
Stuart Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 94.
71
Free English settlers began arriving soon after the first convict settlement, and by 1838, free arrivals
outnumbered convicts partly due to the founding of South Australia, which did not take convicts. Many were
drawn to Australia because of the pastoral boom which lasted throughout the 1830s. See Jupp, Immigration.,
p. 19.
72
Rickard, Australia, pp. 35, 84.
73
The British parliament enacted the constitutions of New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria in 1855 and of
South Australia in 1856. Queensland separated itself from New South Wales and produced its own constitution
in 1859. However, the British government retained substantial powers and continued to exercise control over
external relations. It also appointed the governor and issued him instructions, and any colonial law could be
disallowed in London. See Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, p. 92; Clark, The History of Australia,
p.59; Clark, Australia in a Nutshell, pp. 119-120.
74
These ideals were central to Enlightenment ideas, which, according to John Gascoigne, were one of the most
influential ideologies of the 18th century British society. Gascoigne argues that European Australia’s early
origins were shaped by the world view of Enlightenment and that although in Europe long-established
institutions often stood in the way of the diffusion of Enlightenment values, in Australia, in the context of a
settler society, Enlightenment ideals were less challenged and took a particularly secure hold. For a detailed
discussion of Enlightenment’s influences in the Australian colonies, see John Gascoigne, The Enlightenment
and the Origins of European Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
34
end of the 1850s, the Chinese had become by far the largest group among the non-British

miners, making up 25 per cent of the mining population of Victoria in 1861. On the poorer

goldfields of New South Wales, the Chinese outnumbered Europeans, constituting 60 per cent

of the miners in 1861.75 The Chinese were not only the most numerous but also the most

distinctive non-British group on the goldfields, distinguished by their appearance, language,

customs, dress, mode of living, and even working methods. The vast majority of Chinese

miners were under contract to work for Chinese or European entrepreneurs, and their activities

were controlled by headmen. Unlike European diggers, Chinese diggers worked in large groups

and formed closely-knit, separate communities on the goldfields, which led to the development

of Chinese quarters on all the larger goldfields. The total dissimilarity of these people quickly

attracted attention to their presence and caused uneasiness and resentment among European

miners. 76 Especially from the mid-1850s, when gold yields slumped drastically and

competition for the available ground intensified,77 European miners, bitter about having to

compete with industrious Chinese miners, resorted to violence to forcibly expel them from

digging, which often resulted in a serious breakdown of law and order on the goldfields.78

To counter the growing antipathy towards the Chinese and the breakdown of law and

order, the colonial governments passed laws to restrict Chinese immigration. Victoria passed

an Act in 1855 that limited the number of Chinese each vessel could carry and imposed a

landing tax of ten pounds on every Chinese entering the colony. South Australia passed an Act

similar to Victoria’s in 1857, and New South Wales followed in 1861. 79 However, it is

75
Markus, Fear and Hatred, pp. 14-15; Markus, Australian Race Relations, 1788-1993, pp. 59-60.
76
Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, p. 19; Markus, Fear and Hatred, pp. 19-23, p. 39;
Markus, Australian Race Relations, 1788-1993, p. 60.
77
According to the Victorian Census of March 1854, there were 2,000 Chinese in the colony. The Chinese
population in the colony increased rapidly in the period between July 1854 and June 1855, with 15,000 arrivals,
while earnings of all diggers declined from an estimated $780 in 1852 to $284 in 1854. See Markus, Fear and
Hatred, pp. 14, 21.
78
There were a series of minor disturbances and large-scale riots on the goldfields against the Chinese miners
from the mid-1850s. The most famous ones are Buckland (Vic) riot of 1857 and Lambing Flat (Young, NSW)
riot of 1861.
79
Jupp, Immigration, p. 70; Markus, Fear and Hatred, pp. 25-33; Markus, Australian Race Relations, 1788-1993,
p. 67; S.H. Roberts, “History of the Contacts between the Orient and Australia,” in I. Clunies Ross (ed.),
Australia and the Far East; Diplomatic and Trade Relations (London: Angus and Robertson, 1935), pp. 5-6;
Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, pp. 21-35.
35
important to note that although these three colonies passed discriminatory laws against the

Chinese, they did so only after fierce debates and with some misgivings. Butler Aspinall, who

represented a goldfields electorate in Victoria’s Legislative Assembly, for example, denounced

the colony’s anti-Chinese legislation as “unEnglish and discreditable.” 80 Newspapers also

echoed these sentiments. The Sydney Morning Herald on 2 July 1858 wrote that it was

“preposterous” to suppose that Australia could be sealed off against the whole world and that

“the attempt itself is an outrage on the common rights of humanity.”81 Furthermore, these laws

were neither “universal” nor “prohibitive,” but rather “specific” and “restrictive.” 82 In other

words, these measures applied only to the Chinese and no other non-Europeans, and they did

not exclude them. They simply limited the number of Chinese people who could be brought by

any one ship and levied poll taxes on those who entered the colonies. Moreover, the legislation

was only temporary. As the Chinese population began to decline in the 1860s after the readily

available alluvial gold had been exhausted, all these discriminatory laws were repealed.

Victoria abolished its restrictive laws in 1865 and New South Wales in 1867.83 For the next

ten years, there was no restrictive legislation in Australia against Chinese entry. However,

during this time, Australian society and people were undergoing a major transformation which

drastically altered their ideas of race and nation. Although this transformation could be

attributed to several inter-related factors, it was mainly triggered by the combination of the

80
Quoted in Neville Meany, “‘In History’s Page’: Identity and Myth,” in Deryck Schreuder and Stuart Ward
(eds.), Australia’s Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 367.
81
Similarly, stressing on the British tradition of the open door that all immigrants were to be welcomed without
distinction, The Argus (Melbourne) on 12 August 1854 wrote that “one recoils from the thought of any
modification of this entire freedom of access as if it were a step in retrogression.”
82
Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, p. 17.
83
Based on these facts, Neville Meaney argues that during the first Gold Rush, the Australian colonies’
discriminatory measures against the Chinese were not motivated primarily by ideas of race but instead they
were a liberal era’s pragmatic response to a particular social problem. See Neville Meaney, “The Problem of
Nationalism and Race: Australia and Japan in World War I and World War II,” in Journal of the Oriental
Society of Australia, 2010, vol. 42: 1-29, p. 6-7; Meany, Towards a New Vision, p. 15. This contrast sharply to
the view taken by some historians who claim that racism was present in Australia from the time of British
invasion and settlement and that the pre-existing notion of British racial superiority led to the discriminatory
treatment of Chinese in the 1850s and 1860s. These scholars include Raymond Evans, “Keeping Australia
Clean White,” in Verity Burgmann and Jenny Lee (eds.), A Most Valuable Acquisition: A People’s History of
Australia since 1788 (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1988); Hollingsworth, Race and Racism in
Australia; Curthoys, “Liberalism and Exclusionism.”
36
diffusion of racial ideas and the rise of nationalism, resulting in the desire of Australians to

build a racially and culturally homogeneous nation.

2.2.2. Race Determinism, Social Darwinism and British Race Nationalism

The idea of race in Western society was not well defined until the mid-19th century, although

the superiority of European nations and peoples and the inequality of races were generally

accepted before then.84 However, a distinct thought system began to develop around the notion

of race and its significance in the mid-1800s. The form of a racial theory that emerged as a

central current in Western thought in the mid-19th century and predominated in Australia in the

late 19th and early 20th centuries was based on the tenets of racial determinism and Social

Darwinism. Racial determinism held that human populations were divided into a number of

biologically distinct races whose physical, intellectual and moral capacities were genetically

determined. According to this doctrine, race, a genetic attribute, was the most important

defining feature of human beings and race was considered to shape the characteristics not only

of individuals but also of whole societies.85 Social Darwinism, on the other hand, was founded

on the evolutionary theories of the English natural scientist Charles Darwin and the English

sociologist Herbert Spencer.86 This doctrine, which emerged in Europe and North America in

the 1870s, asserted that humans, like animals and plants, competed in a struggle for survival in

which a small number of races best suited to the prevailing environment would survive and the

weaker races would be subjugated or eliminated—the survival of the fittest races.87 On the

basis of this doctrine, it was alleged that various races were hierarchically ranked, with the

white Caucasians placed at the top of a “tree” of man above other races such as Mongoloid,

84
For a discussion of the development of racial ideas in Europe, see Markus, Australian Race Relations, 1788-
1993, pp. 1-17. See also Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy, pp. 32, 43, 67-68.
85
Markus, Australian Race Relations, 1788-1993, p. 1; Tavan, The Long, Slow Death of White Australia, p. 11.
86
Darwin’s The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection published in 1859 introduced his theory on
biological evolution and the process of natural selection. Spencer applied Darwin’s evolutionary ideas to
society, and as “Social Darwinism” it enjoyed much support.
87
Ellis Cashmore and Barry Troyna, Introduction to Race Relations (London: The Falmer Press, 1990), p. 35.
37
Negroid and Australoid, because of their superior strength, wisdom, culture and technology.

Moreover, it was also believed that interbreeding between races would drag the higher race

down to the lower, and therefore should be avoided.88

Andrew Markus argues that as a result of the diffusion of these racial theories, by the

end of the 19th century, Australians had a clear sense of themselves as different from and

superior to non-European peoples.89 He further argues that the development of racial ideas in

Europe led people to emphasise the significance of the common heritage, the distinctiveness of

peoples and their ties to their native lands, contributing to the rise of what he calls “closed form

of nationalism.” 90 It is important to note that the development of this “closed form of

nationalism” was also a result of another change occurring in Western societies in the 19th

century, namely modernisation.91

Modernisation was triggered by the Industrial Revolution, which began in Britain in

the mid-18th century and transformed the Western world during the 18th and 19th centuries.92

With the application of science and technology to agriculture, manufacture, commerce,

transport, communications, ideology and education, the old economic and social orders were

replaced by larger and more complex economic and social entities. The pattern of self-sufficient

family farms and village communities which had existed in traditional pre-modern Europe for

generations gave way to an interdependent impersonal nation-wide economic system.

Modernisation challenged ideas about a fixed and inherited social order which had given people

a settled sense of belonging. With the development of mobile mass urban societies, long-held

88
Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera, p. 7.
89
Markus, Australian Race Relations, 1788-1993, p.111.
90
Ibid., p.16.
91
Scholars who have written on the phenomenon of nationalism broadly agree that nationalism was a direct
product of the modern industrial era. These scholars generally acknowledge that nation is mostly a modern
phenomenon, and that the idea of nationalism arose out of and gained attraction following the traumatic
experience which accompanied the transition from traditional to modern societies. See Eric Hobsbawm,
Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); Neville Meany,
“Modernisation and Nationalism: A Historical Perspective on East Asian Geo-Politics,” in Neville Meaney,
Australia and the Wider World: Selected Essays of Neville Meaney (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2013).
92
For a concise description of modernisation, see Krishan Kumar’s contribution to the Encyclopedia Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/modernization. See also Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 19-38.
38
assumptions that a person’s birth and family status predetermined his/her role and place in

society became obsolete. Uprooted from their old certainties and at the mercy of economic and

social conditions which were in a constant state of flux, people had to find a new belief system

about social identity and belonging, or a powerful bonding “myth” in order to cope with the

disturbing changes brought about by modernisation.93

Nationalism provided perhaps the most compelling bonding and identity “myth.”94

Modernising nations were attracted to nationalism because it had the advantage of linking the

past which had been lost with the disturbing present. Nationalism generally romanticised the

past and drew on the elements in the pre-modern era to create a national myth about “a unique

people” who shared a common homeland, history, heritage, culture and traditions.95 One of

the critical features of nationalism was that it was absolute in its exclusions as well as its

inclusions.96 In other words, nationalism demanded that a nation should be composed of all

those and only those people who met the mythic definition of each distinctive people. In this

way, nationalism provided a powerful bonding myth and separate and exclusive identity to the

respective nations and their peoples.

Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, Australia underwent a rapid modernisation process

and was transformed from a collection of fragmented, locally based rural communities into an

93
For a brief but insightful discussion on modernisation’s negative effects on people’s social identities and the
development of national myth about collective identities, see Meaney, “Modernisation and Nationalism,” pp.
7-10.
94
Contemporary scholars of nationalism claim that nationalism is a socially constructed myth about, to use
Benedict Anderson’s well-known phrase, “imagined communities.” Anderson argues that nationality and
nationalism are “cultural artefacts” and that a nation is a “limited” or exclusive “imagined” community. In the
same vein, Elie Kedourie maintains that nationalism is an “invented doctrine” and Richard White claims that
national identity, which is a product of nationalist myth and sentiment, is an “invention” or “intellectual
construct” which has all been “artificially imposed upon a diverse landscape and population.” See Anderson,
Imagined Communities, pp. 4-7; Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1960), p. i; Richard White,
Inventing Australia: Images and Identity 1688-1980 (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. viii. Other scholars
who argue that nationalism is a socially constructed idea or myth include Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism:
A Study in its Origin and Background (New York: Macmillan, 1961); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger
(eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Hobsbawm, Nations and
Nationalism since 1780; Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Smith, National Identity.
95
Neville Meaney, “Britishness and Australian Identity: The Problem of Nationalism in Australian History and
Historiography,” in Australian Historical Studies, 2001, vol. 32, no. 116: 76-90, p. 78; Smith, National Identity,
p. 14.
96
Meaney, “Britishness and Australian Identity,” p. 78; Smith, National Identity, pp. 12, 78-79.
39
interdependent and predominantly urban society. 97 As a consequence, Australian people

sought psychological security by developing and consolidating their own national myth about

their collective identity and by redefining their nation and their identity in exclusive terms.98

In this process, they embraced the ideas of a new generation of English intellectuals such as

Sir John Seeley, E. A. Freeman, J. R. Green, and J. A. Froude. Seeley’s The Expansion of

England published in 1883 projected an image of a global, imperial Britain in which all those

of the British race and culture were united as one people. 99 These new generation of

intellectuals denounced liberalism for rejecting the British history and tradition. They, instead,

tried to reinvent the monarch as the symbol of the British Empire and encouraged people to

take pride in the British nation and race.100

This doctrine of British race loyalty was keenly adopted by the Australians, providing

them with a strong sense of social belonging and contributing to the creation of a national myth

of Australia as a British nation. Moreover, a universal, compulsory education system ensured

that children would be socialised into the creeds of Empire and British race loyalty. For

example, the oaths of loyalty in public schools were British. The maps of the world in every

schoolroom showed in vivid red the British Empire on which the sun never set, and history

taught at school and university was mainly the glorious story of the British Empire. 101

Australians at the end of the 19th century generally identified with British race tradition. They

defined themselves first and foremost as members of the Anglo-Saxon-Celtic or British people,

and they proudly thought of themselves as bound with all those who shared the same “crimson

97
By the end of the 1880s, Australia possessed a thriving agriculture sector, accompanied by rapidly growing
cities. For example, Melbourne's population grew from 280,000 in 1880 to 445,000 in 1889. By then,
Melbourne had reputedly become one of the richest cities in the world. See Robert B. Cervero, The Transit
Metropolis: A Global Inquiry (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1998), p. 320; Rickard, Australia, pp. 99-100.
98
Meaney, “In History’s Page,” pp. 368-369; Meaney, Towards a New Vision, p. 15.
99
John Robert Seeley, The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures (London: Macmillan, 1883).
100
For a discussion of the reinvention of the monarch as the symbol of the British national idea at the end of the
19th century, see David Cannadine, “The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy
and the Invention of Tradition,” in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, pp. 101-164.
101
Meaney, “Britishness and Australian Identity,” p. 79. For an in-depth discussion of the pervasiveness of British
customs and traditions in Australia during the late 19 th and the early 20th centuries, see Stewart Firth and
Jeanette Hoorn, “From Empire Day to Cracker Night,” in Peter Spearritt and David Walker (eds.), Australian
Popular Culture (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1979).
40
thread of kinship.”102

One important feature of Australia’s national myth in the late 19th and early 20th

centuries was that it was not English but British. That is, Australian people believed that

English, Welsh, Scots and Irish shared one culture, history, and heritage. Of course, this was

implausible, given that each of these peoples had its own homeland, language and traditions.

In this sense, Australia’s national myth was probably one of the most artificial among the myths

of the Western nations in the nationalist era. However, in Australia, the migrants from the

British Isles mixed together and, in many respects, homogenised their traditions, although the

English tradition was most predominant. Consequently, the British myth made more sense in

Australia than in Britain, and Britishness became a more powerful national ideal in Australia

than in Britain itself.103

Australia’s full embrace of British race loyalty was partly due to the fact that in the

late 19th century Australia had little in the way of pre-modern traditions to limit the growth of

national myth and nationalism as a social ideal and as the new form of collective identity.

However, it was also caused by Australia’s unique geo-cultural circumstances. As the

inhabitants of a white British colonial outpost in the pacific surrounded by people with different

cultures, traditions and races, many Australians felt that they were situated in a vulnerable

position with Asia’s vast population ready to swamp their big uncultivated land.104 One of the

most respected proponents of this idea of lurking threat from alien races in Australia’s near

north was Charles Pearson, an English liberal intellectual who migrated to Australia in the late

19th century and published a highly respected work entitled National Life and Character: A

102
In a speech to a Federation Conference banquet in 1890, Henry Parkes used the term “crimson thread of
kinship” to describe the ties of blood that existed between Britain and the Australian colonies. For an insightful
discussion of the notion of Britishness in Australia’s national myth and identity, see Meaney, “Britishness and
Australian Identity”; Neville Meaney, “Britishness and Australia: Some Reflections,” in The Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2003, vol. 31, no. 2: 121-135.
103
Meaney, “Britishness and Australian Identity,” pp. 79-81; Meaney, “Britishness and Australia,” pp. 126-129.
104
Gwenda Tavan, The Long Slow Death of White Australia (Carlton North, Victoria: Scribe Publications, 2005),
pp. 20-21; Reynolds, North of Capricorn, p. viii; Meaney, Towards a New Vision, p. 16.
41
Forecast in 1893.105 In it, Pearson encapsulated much of Australia’s anxieties about Asia by

anticipating the inevitable rise of the “lower races” (Asians, Africans and South Americans) as

they underwent modernisation. According to him, the “lower races” were increasing and would

continue to increase at a faster rate than the “higher races” (Europeans) and “the lower races”

would in due course free themselves from the domination of the “higher races.” Pearson

predicted that “the day will come, and perhaps is not far distant, when the European observer

will look around to see the globe girdled with a continuous zone of the black and yellow races,

no longer too weak for aggression or under tutelage, but independent or practically so.”106

Pearson argued that coloured and white races “cannot exist side by side” and therefore

Australians were “guarding the last part of the world, in which the higher races can live and

increase freely, for the higher civilisation.” In this contest, he further claimed that “the fear” of

Asian immigration which “the Australian democracy cherishes, and which Englishmen at home

find it hard to understand” was “the instinct of self-preservation, quickened by experience.”107

Pearson’s analysis of the race struggles heightened perceptions of the threat coming

from Australia’s neighbouring “lower races” and contributed to the rise of “Yellow Peril” fears

in Australian society. The “Yellow Peril” referred to the notion of the yellow race threatening

European supremacy and European colonial control in Asia. In the Australian context, it

specifically referred to the fear that Australia’s European population and their continent would

be swamped by the teeming millions of Asians or the yellow race.108 By the end of the 19th

century, these perceptions and fears had become the assumptions shared by the great majority

105
Charles Pearson, National Life and Character: A Forecast (London: Macmillan and Co., 1893). See also John
Tregenza, Professor of Democracy: The Life of Charles Henry Pearson, 1830-1894, Oxford Don and
Australian Radical (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1986).
106
Ibid., pp. 89-90.
107
Ibid., p. 17.
108
Keith Windschuttle claims that the term “Yellow Peril” was first used by Germany’s Kaiser Willhelm II in
1898 after he had read Pearson’s book. According to Windschuttle, National Life and Character had a
profound impact among intellectuals in Britain and the United States, including the future American President,
Theodore Roosevelt, and then British Prime Minister William Gladstone, with the latter commenting that
Pearson’s book should be read by everyone “concerned or interested in public affairs.” See Windschuttle, The
White Australia Policy, pp. 261-262. See also Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, p. 50-
52, 72, 123.
42
of Australians and had developed into what Neville Meaney calls “race nationalism.” 109

Meaney argues that this new “race nationalism” became the new forces generating a racially

exclusive view of society and contributed to the development of the White Australia Policy.110

It is important to note that under this doctrine of “race nationalism,” Australians’

anxieties were focused solely on the potential threat from the exterior, not the threat from within

their society. That is, although Pearson’s influential analysis of the race struggle and the dogma

of Social Darwinism served to foster the vision of Australia’s Asian neighbours invading its

vast continent and challenging the supremacy of the white race, the same did not apply to the

Aborigines. This was because the Aborigines were widely considered to be a dying race, unable

to compete in the struggle for the survival of the fittest races and therefore “doomed to wither

and die away.” 111 Consequently, during the parliamentary debates on the Immigration

Restriction Act of 1901, while many policymakers, including Prime Minister Edmund Barton

and Attorney-General Alfred Deakin, referred to the impending threat to white Australia from

Australia’s near north, very few parliamentarians gave thought to the Aborigines.112 In this

sense, the Aborigines were not only a dying race, but they were also “forgotten people.”113

The diffusion of racial ideas coincided with the rise of nationalism as the Australian

colonies felt the full effects of modernisation, and this led to the creation of the national myth

of Australia as white British society. During the last two decades of the 19th century, Australia

came to be imaged as a racially and culturally homogeneous society, and Australians came to

define their nation and themselves in absolute and exclusive terms. Furthermore, Australians’

profound geographical anxieties, especially their realisation from the late 19th century that their

109
Meaney, “The Problem of Nationalism and Race,” p. 4
110
Meaney, “The End of ‘White Australia’ and Australia’s Changing Perception of Asia, 1945-1990,” in
Australian Journal of International Affairs,1995, vol. 49, no. 2: 171-189, pp. 172-173; Meaney, “The Problem
of Nationalism and Race,” pp. 4-7.
111
Markus, Fear and Hatred, pp. xii, 257. See also Markus, Australian Race Relations 1788-1993, pp. 49-53;
Gavin W. Jones, “White Australia, National Identity and Population Change,” in Jayasuria et. al. (eds.),
Legacies of White Australia, pp. 112-113.
112
See Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates (hereafter cited as CPD), House of Representatives
Official Hansard, No. 36, 1901, Friday, 6 September 1901 and No. 37, 1901, Thursday, 12 September 1901.
113
Markus, Fear and Hatred, pp. xiii.
43
nation was uncomfortably close to an awakening Asia, increased their resolve to safeguard

Australia against the neighbouring “lower races.” The nature of Australian society was thus

undergoing a significant transformation from the late 1870s with the formation of British race

nationalism. This psychological transformation on the part of Australians resulted in an

increased intolerance and uncompromising attitude to non-European immigrants. From the late

1870s, for instance, an increase in the number of Chinese arriving in Australia was immediately

seen as a general racial threat from Asia and caused the colonists to enact legislation to ban

firstly all Chinese and then all coloured people from entering the colonies for permanent

residence.

2.2.3. Towards a White Australia

In 1875, gold was discovered in north-eastern Queensland, and in the next few years, there was

a large influx of Chinese miners to the newly discovered goldfields of the area.114 As a result

of the sudden increase in their numbers, hostility to Chinese migrants re-emerged. To cope with

the situation, the Queensland government, in contrast to the New South Wales and the Victorian

governments during the first Gold Rush of the 1850s and 1860s, acted immediately and passed

the Goldfields Act Amendment Act in 1876 in order to restrict Chinese access to the

goldfields.115 In the following year, it also passed the Chinese Immigration Restriction Act

based on the methods of the New South Wales government 16 years before.116

The arrival of thousands of Chinese at Port Darwin to work on railway construction

114
By 1877, there were 17,000 Chinee miners on the Palmer field alone compared to 1,400 white miners in the
district, making one person in seven in Queensland a Chinese. See Roberts, “History of the Contacts between
the Orient and Australia,” p. 7; Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, p. 40.
115
This Act imposed on “Asiatic and African aliens” a heavier license fee to mine or to carry on business on a
Queensland goldfield than on European miners or traders. However, the Act was disallowed by the Colonial
Office on the ground that it was against the terms of the Convention of Peaking and that the Act should be
modified in such a way as to make it “less directly and exclusively aimed at the subjects of a friendly Power
with whom it is for the advantage of the Empire that free intercourse should be maintained.” As a result,
Queensland passed an amended Bill in 1877, which replaced the specific “Asiatic and African aliens” with the
less objectionable “any person.” However, the amended Bill retained an additional license fee on Chinese
miners. See Roberts, “History of the Contacts between the Orient and Australia,” p. 7; Willard, History of the
White Australia Policy to 1920, p. 42.
116
Roberts, “History of the Contacts between the Orient and Australia,” p. 8; Willard, History of the White
Australia Policy to 1920, p. 50.
44
and the discovery of smallpox cases on several vessels in 1887 and 1888 further stirred up anti-

Chinese agitation. All through the 1880s, antipathy towards Chinese immigration kept growing,

and by the late 1880s, there was general agreement among the Australian colonies that Chinese

immigration had to be restricted. 117 At the Intercolonial Conference of 1888, the colonies

called for uniform legislation to regulate Chinese immigration and resolved to work towards

the goal of excluding Chinese immigrants. This resulted in the adoption of legislation against

Chinese immigration in all the colonies except for Tasmania.118 Moreover, when the colonial

governments were deliberating laws virtually prohibiting the entry of Chinese following the

Intercolonial Conference of 1888, the colonists did not argue in terms of specific circumstances

nor the necessity of civic order like their predecessors did in the 1850s and 1860s. Instead, they

stressed the imperative of race. Victorian Premier Duncan Gillies, for example, declared that

“members of the European family of nations joining our community become amalgamated with

the general population,” but the Chinese were “so entirely dissimilar as to render a blending of

the peoples out of the question. They are not only alien race but they remain aliens.” 119

Similarly, his New South Wales counterpart, Henry Parkes, asserted that “there can be no

sympathy, and in the future it is to be apprehended that there will be no peace, between the two

races.”120

During the last decade of the 19th century, the creed of British race nationalism

advanced further as the hostility towards the Chinese was replaced by a blanket opposition to

all non-Europeans. Until the early 1890s, the immigration of Asian peoples other than Chinese

had been very small, and the colonists had been concerned only with defending the white

British character of Australian society from Chinese immigrants. However, during the 1890s,

117
However, there was no numerical reason for the hostility towards Chinese. Except for the Northern Territory,
the number of Chinese did not increase in the 1880s. See Roberts, “History of the Contacts between the Orient
and Australia,” p. 9; Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, pp. 69.
118
Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, pp. 89-94; Price, The Great White Walls are Built, pp.
186-198.
119
Quoted in Price, The Great White Walls are Built, pp. 256-257.
120
Ibid.
45
a small stream of non-Chinese Asians including Indians, Syrians, Afghans and Japanese began

to trickle into the colonies and attracted the attention of the Australian public. By the mid-1890s,

anti-Chinese sentiments and movements had evolved into a broad doctrine of preserving

Australia from undesirable immigrants whose cultures, traditions, races and living standards

differed from those of the white British population. “A White Australia” became the watchword

as the colonial period drew to a close.121

2.3. CONCLUSION
During the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, both Australia and Japan were engaged in the

process of developing their respective collective identities. Achieving equality with the West

and attaining a “civilised” international status and identity were dominant themes in Japan’s

domestic and foreign policies during the Meiji era. Japan achieved this goal for the most part

with the abolition of extraterritoriality for the European powers in 1899 and Japan’s victory

over Russia in 1905. However, as the only non-white power of the time, Japan never felt secure

about its newly acquired international status and identity in relation to the other powers, which

were all Western. As a result, in order to prove to the world and also to itself that it was not

inferior to the European powers and superior to other Asian nations, Japan was in a constant

struggle to establish and redefine its identity, as reflected in the apparent shifts in the focus of

Japan’s identity during this period from Western, Japanese to Asian.

Australia in the late 19th century was also undergoing a similar process of developing

and consolidating its collective identity. The Australian colonies gained local autonomy in the

1850s at the high point of classical liberalism, and the colonists adopted a liberal humanitarian

view of society. By the late 1870s, however, as a result of Australia’s rapid modernisation and

the diffusion of ideas of racial determinism and Social Darwinism, Australians came to define

121
Myra Willard claims that this phrase was frequently used as early as 1896 to denote the Australian policy. See
Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, p.99.
46
their nation and themselves in absolute and exclusive terms. They embraced British race

nationalism and developed a national myth of Australia as white British society. It was a

process which equated nation with race. During the last two decades of the 19th century,

Australians consolidated their identity as a racially and culturally homogeneous white British

nation and sought to expunge all foreign elements from amongst them, as demonstrated by

their increased intolerance and uncompromising attitude to non-European immigrants from the

late 1870s. However, just like their Japanese counterparts, Australians never felt secure about

their identity due to the peculiarities of Australia’s geo-cultural circumstances. Australia’s

proximity to Asia and the fear of being swamped by unassimilable races made Australians

anxious about their identity as a white British nation. As a result, they sought assurance by

idealising the British Empire and keeping Asia and Asians at arm’s length.

Japan and Australia therefore developed their collective identities almost

simultaneously from the mid-19th century. Furthermore, they shared similar insecurity about

the identities they created for themselves, feeling that their national identities were constantly

challenged and threatened by external circumstances. Consequently, both nations displayed an

extraordinary degree of determination to safeguard their identities. The Japanese-Australian

clash over the White Australia Policy should be understood against this historical background.

47
 CHAPTER III
THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD

This chapter examines the late colonial period of Australian history. The main focus of the

chapter is from 1894 to the eve of the federation of the Australian colonies on 1 January 1901.

However, the chapter first examines the period before its main chronological focus in order to

show Meiji Japanese government’s initial attitude toward emigration of its citizens and

Australia’s reaction to the early Japanese presence in Australia. The first section of the chapter,

covering the period from 1867 and 1894, is also essential in terms of illustrating the changes

in both Japan’s and Australia’s responses to the issue of Japanese immigration in Australia.

As discussed in the previous chapter, in the early Meiji period, Japan was engaged in

a serious endeavour to develop its “civilised” state identity in a European-dominated

international society, and this was reflected in the Japanese government’s cautious attitude

toward migration. Although Japan abandoned its policy of national isolation in 1854 and in

1866 abolished the death penalty for those who sought to leave the country, the Japanese

government did not encourage emigration of its citizens for fear that they would be treated as

coolies. Australians, for their part, were developing their white British identity during this

period, and by the late 1880s had already restricted Chinese entry by legislation. However,

Japanese immigration was not the main concern of white Australians until the mid-1890s, as

the Chinese were the centre of Australia’s anxiety about Asia and the sole focus of the White

Australia Policy.

Thus during this initial phase, there was no major conflict between the two nations

over Australia’s racial exclusion policies. However, following the conclusion of the Anglo-

Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1894 and Japan’s defeat of China in the

subsequent year, Australia started viewing Japan as the primary threat from Asia. At the same

48
time, Japan, which was increasingly gaining confidence in its international status and identity

as a “civilised” state, began to object to the Australian colonies’ immigration restriction laws

aimed at its people. As a result, the diplomatic confrontation between Japan and Australia over

the White Australia Policy began.

3.1. THE INITIAL PHASE

3.1.1. 1867-1890

From 1635 to 1866, under the Tokugawa bakufu regime, Japanese people were forbidden, on

pain of death, to go abroad or return home from overseas. In 1866, after two and a half centuries

of national isolation, an edict was issued allowing people to apply for passports to travel abroad

for the purpose of study or trade.1

The Japanese presence in Australia is as old as the edict which ended the prohibition

of foreign voyages for Japanese people. According to D. C. S. Sissons, the first Japanese to

arrive in Australia were members of two troupes of Japanese jugglers and acrobats that

performed at the Princess Theatre in Melbourne in December 1867. 2 Sissons points out that

almost all the early arrivals from Japan were theatrical performers and that although Japanese

acrobats and jugglers were quite popular and became a common sight in major Australian cities,

the Japanese arrivals during the 1870s and 1880s were very infrequent and very small in scale.3

This was because until the early 1890s, the Japanese government maintained a very cautious

attitude toward emigration of its citizens in order to prevent Japan’s international reputation

being tarnished by becoming a source of coolie labourers.4

The first sign that the Japanese government started to relax its attitude appeared in

1
A translation of the edict is given in John R. Black, Young Japan, Yokohama and Yedo (London: Trubner, 1880),
vol. 1, pp. 416-417.
2
D.C.S. Sissons, “Australian Contacts with Japan in the Nineteenth Century,” in Towards a New Vision: A
Symposium on Australian and Japanese Relations (Sydney: Japan Cultural Centre, 1998), p. 7. For a detailed
description of the earliest arrivals from Japan, see also D.C.S. Sissons, Australian- Japanese Relations: the
First Phase, 1858-91 (Canberra: Dept. of International Relations, Australian National University, 1971).
3
Sissons, “Australian Contacts with Japan in the Nineteenth Century,” pp. 4, 8.
4
Bennett, “Japanese Emigration Policy, 1880-1941,” pp. 24-26.
49
1883, when it permitted 37 Japanese citizens to go to Thursday Island to work for an Australian

pearler, Captain John Miller, for two years. In the late 19th century, Australia had a thriving

pearling industry along its northern coast, most notably at Thursday Island in the Torres Strait

and at Broome in Western Australia. Pearl shell was very popular for decoration, particularly

for buttons, and was found in abundance in these waters. By 1880 Australia had become the

largest producer of pearl shell in the world.5 However, most Europeans were reluctant to be

engaged in the dangers and hardships of pearl diving. As a result, from the early 1880s,

Thursday Island pearl lugger owners started to seek labour in Japan, particularly in villages in

Wakayama prefecture.6

The case involving Captain Miller represented the first labour contract approved by

the Japanese government for its nationals to work in a foreign country.7 However, it did not

mean that the Japanese government had reversed its policy regarding emigration. It merely

marked a change in the government’s attitude from “blanket disapproval” of all emigration of

indentured labourers to “grudging approval” of emigration under contract, as long as emigrants

were involved in occupations which, in the Japanese government’s opinion, did no injury to

Japan’s national prestige and their contracts reflected this condition. 8 In negotiations with

Captain Miller and the British authorities lasting for six months, the Japanese provincial and

central authorities carefully examined the contract and required several amendments. Among

other things, they made sure that labourers would be paid satisfactorily and receive proper

medical attention and insisted that a surety must be provided in the person of a local residence

who would guarantee the performance of the contract.9 The Japanese central authorities, after

due consideration of the terms of the contract, gave their permission. On 6 August 1883, Asada

5
Meaney, Towards a New Vision, p. 51.
6
For a general discussion of Australia’s pearling industry and Japanese involvement in the industry, see Sissons,
“The Japanese in the Australian Pealing Industry.”
7
Sissons, Australian- Japanese Relations, p. 13.
8
Sissons, “Immigration in Australia-Japanese Relations 1871-1971,” p. 195; Sissons, “The Immigration
Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919,” p. 21.
9
For correspondences between Japanese provincial and central authorities, John Miller and British authorities,
see Nihon gaikō bunsho (Japan’s Foreign Policy Documents, hereafter cited as NGB)-1883, pp. 440-449.
50
Tokunori, the Foreign Ministry’s Communications Bureau Chief and the Secretary to the

Foreign Minister, wrote to the Governor of Kanagawa prefecture:

This contract with foreigner to work overseas in the pearling industry is essentially different from
labourers going abroad to do ordinary menial tasks for foreigners. Only a small number with diving
skills will be employed. Moreover, if specific agreements are made as indicated in the appended
documents, there need be no concern that they fall into a predicament like that of slaves. 10

Impressed by the performance of these pearl divers, other Australian pearlers started

seeking labour in Japan. In the following year, Burns and Philp & Co. recruited about 50

Japanese for various pearlers on Thursday and Prince of Wales Islands in the Torres Strait

through a British firm in Kobe, Fearon Law & Co. However, this time they failed to refer the

matter to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo. Alexander Marks, the Honorary Consul for Japan

based in Melbourne,11 immediately brought this to the attention of the Foreign Ministry. In his

letter to the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister, Yoshida Kiyonari, Marks described the poor

working conditions of the Japanese divers and recommended that “all the Japanese on the

fishing grounds should be sent back to Japan.”12 Accordingly, on 19 February 1886, Yoshida’s

successor, Aoki Shūzō, instructed Marks to secure the repatriation of all Japanese employees

on the Islands except for those who were unable to do so under their contractual obligations.13

In the following month, on 20 March 1886, the Foreign Ministry instructed Kanagawa and

certain other prefectural authorities to discourage people from going to Australia to engage in

pearling and, where this proved ineffective, to submit the proposed contract to the Foreign

Ministry for its approval.14

10
Asada to the Governor of Kanagawa prefecture, 6 August 1883, Ibid., p. 444.
11
When Japan first sought official representation in the Australian colonies, it appointed Australians with a
Japanese connection as honorary consuls for the purpose of protecting the rights of its citizens and advancing
its interests. Alexander Marks became Japan’s first consul in Australia in 1879, and by late 1880s his consular
responsibilities covered the colonies of Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and “Van
Diemen’s Land.” Following Tokyo’s appointment of Japanese career consuls to Queensland in 1896 and New
South Wales in 1897, Mark’s role was reduced to that of consul of Victoria.
12
Marks to Yoshida, 24 February 1885, NGB-1885, pp. 518-531; Marks to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
(position vacant at the time), 2 October 1885, Ibid., p. 543.
13
Aoki to Marks, 19 February 1886, NGB-1886, p. 507.
14
The Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru to the Governors of Kanagawa and certain other prefectures, 20 March 1886,
Ibid., p. 511.
51
 Because of the Japanese government’s negative attitude towards emigration and its

effort to ensure that its nationals would not be exploited or ill-treated, after this incident until

the early 1890s, no Japanese labourer left for Australia with the consent of the central

government.15 As a result, the number of Japanese on Thursday Island had declined to about

100 by the end of 1891, and there were less than 500 Japanese in entire Australia in 1891.16

3.1.2. The Early 1890s

During the late 1880s and the early 1890s, the Japanese government, in order to relieve the

pressure of overpopulation and economic difficulties in rural areas, began cautiously

encouraging its citizens to work overseas.17 The government’s more positive attitude towards

emigration was evident in the communications from the Foreign Ministry to Marks. Hitherto

the Foreign Ministry had been reluctant to issue passports to contract labourers. However, on

11 November 1891, the Vice Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu informed Marks:

The Government’s present policy towards emigration is not to restrain our labourers by severe laws
from going overseas. If they are able to make proper agreements and work overseas, it places no
obstacles in their way. Indeed, our attitude is to assist them as best we can. 18

The government’s policy reversal may have been the result of the replacement of Aoki Shūzō

as Foreign Minister by Enomoto Takeaki in May 1891. Enomoto was particularly active in

promoting Japanese emigration to Pacific Rim countries. In 1891 he created a section for

emigration in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and in 1893, he founded the Shokumin

Kyōkai (the Japan Colonisation Association) to boost external trade and emigration.19

By the mid-1890s, the government had further relaxed its controls on emigration, and

15
Sissons, Australian- Japanese Relations, p. 17.
16
Sissons, “The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919,” p. 22; Sissons,
“Australian Contacts with Japan in the Nineteenth Century,” p. 10.
17
Meany, Towards a New Vision, p. 48. Some scholars such as Neville Bennett and Sean Brawley emphasise the
importance of overpopulation in Japan’s migration policy. See Bennett, “Japanese Emigration Policy, 1880-
1941”; Brawley, White Peril.
18
Hayashi to Marks, 11 November 1891, NGB-1891, p. 42.
19
Sissons, “The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919,” p. 23; Sissons,
“Immigration in Australia-Japanese Relations 1871-1971,” p. 197; Sissons, “Australian Contacts with Japan
in the Nineteenth Century,” p. 11.
52
many private emigration companies were established with links to Japanese shipping lines. The

first among them was the Yoshisa Emigration Co. founded in December 1891 by Yoshikawa

Taijirō, Vice President of the NYK (Nihon Yūsen Kaisha), Japan’s largest shipping company.

These newly emerging emigration companies acting in association with shipping liners hired

the majority of Japanese labourers sent overseas in the 1890s. 20 The Meiji government

originally named the United States, Hawaii, Canada, and Australia “favourable” destinations.21

As a result, despite its proximity to the Asian mainland, during the late 19th century, most

Japanese migrated to the West. As of 1900, more than half of Japanese living overseas were

either in Hawaii or mainland America. Even within its own Pacific region, over three-quarters

of Japanese emigrants lived in Australia.22

While many private emigration companies were being set up in Japan in the early

1890s, large sugar plantations in North Queensland were searching for labour for their cane

fields. As is the case in the pearling operation, Europeans were not keen on physically

demanding work in a tropical climate and asked for high wages. As the supply of Pacific

Islander or “Kanaka” labour declined, the plantation owners were seeking alternative workers,

and the Japanese were introduced as a substitute for cheap Kanaka labour.23

The Yoshisa Emigration Co. brokered the recruitment of the first group of Japanese

indentured labourers for Australian cane fields. In November 1892, 50 Japanese arrived aboard

NYK’s steamship Sakata Maru to work at plantations in North Queensland for a period of three

years.24 These Japanese workers so greatly impressed their employers with their diligence,

20
Meaney, Towards a New Vision, p. 48; Isao Tanno, “Meijiishin kara shōwashoki madeno nihon no ōsutoraria,
nanyō eno nihonjin imin no rekishi – kuīnzurando eno satōkibisaibai imin, oyobi mokuyōtō, burūmu,
arafurakai eno shinjukaisaishu imin wo chūshin toshite (The History of Japanese Emigrations to Australia and
the South Sea Islands from the Meiji Era to the Showa Era before World War II: Focusing on the Sugar Cane
Cultivation in Queensland and the Fisheries of Pearl Shells in Thursday Island, Broome and the Arafura Sea),”
in Kanagawa daigaku kokusai keieironshū (Kanagawa University international management review), 2018,
No. 55: 9-44, p. 11.
21
Bennett, “Japanese Emigration Policy, 1880-1941,” p. 27.
22
Sowell, Migrations and Cultures, p. 106.
23
Yūichi Murakami, “Australia’s Immigration Legislation, 1893-1901: The Japanese Response,” in Mackie Vera
and Paul Jones (eds.), Relationships: Japan and Australia, 1870s-1950s (Parkville, Victoria: University of
Melbourne, Department of History, 2001), p. 47; Meaney, Towards a New Vision, p. 50.
24
Sissons, “The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919,” p. 23; Sissons,
“Immigration in Australia-Japanese Relations 1871-1971,” p. 197.
53
dependability and skill that they were soon followed by others. In the following June, 520

Japanese contract workers arrived and were distributed among various plantations.25 While

the first group of 50 Japanese workers attracted little attention among the local community, the

arrival of a large number of Japanese indentured labourers in 1893 provoked hostile comments

in the press and the parliament. 26 In the Queensland Legislative Assembly, for example, a

Labor parliamentarian, Joseph Turley, warned that the cheap Japanese labour would drive out

the white labour because “Jap… is a very capable man and a great imitator.”27

It was also around this time that the increasing pace of Japanese arrivals at Thursday

Island began to cause concern. The number of Japanese residents on the island increased

rapidly in the early 1890s, rising from about 100 in 1891 to 720 in March 1894. By 1894, the

Japanese had become the largest national group working in the pearling industry in the Torres

Strait.28 Even though there was a very high death rate among the divers, around one in ten each

year, and many others suffered long-term incapacity from divers’ paralysis or the “bends,” the

Japanese divers were lured by the prospect of making their fortunes.29 The sudden upsurge in

the number of Japanese divers on Thursday Island alarmed the Queensland government. On 21

March 1894, Premier Hugh Nelson, through Marks and the British government, urged the

Japanese government to adopt “some measures to check a movement which is likely before

25
Sissons, “The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919,” p. 24. For a
discussion of Yoshisa’s role in brokering Japanese labourers for Queensland sugarcane industry in the 1890s,
see Tanno, “Meijiishin kara shōwashoki madeno nihon no ōsutoraria, nanyō eno nihonjin imin no rekishi,” pp.
11-12.
26
For comments in the press regarding the introduction of Japanese labourers, see The Worker, 8 July 1893. The
Worker was a newspaper affiliated with the Australian Labor Party and published in Brisbane between 1890
and 1974. For comments made in the Queensland Parliament, see Queensland Parliamentary Debate
(hereafter cited as QPD), Legislative Assembly, Wednesday, 28 June 1893, pp. 136-144.
27
Joseph Turley, Labor, 28 June 1893, Ibid., p. 144.
28
Sissons, “The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919,” p. 25; Sissons,
“Immigration in Australia-Japanese Relations 1871-1971,” p. 197; Meaney, Towards a New Vision, p. 51. For
a comprehensive discussion of Japanese involvement in Australia’s pearling industry in the late 19 th and the
early 20th centuries, see Tanno, “Meijiishin kara shōwashoki madeno nihon no ōsutoraria, nanyō eno nihonjin
imin no rekishi,” pp. 12-28.
29
Meaney, Towards a New Vision, pp. 52-53. Moreover, when a group of ten Japanese pearl divers who had won
£22,500 in the 1890 Tattersall’s Melbourne Cup sweepstake returned to their village in Wakayama prefecture,
they greatly impressed their local community and this led many more people from the same prefecture to
migrate to Australia in the next few years. See Sissons, “The Japanese in the Australian Pealing Industry,” pp.
13-14; Sissons, “Australian Contacts with Japan in the Nineteenth Century,” pp. 10-11.
54
long to lead to serious difficulties.”30 The Japanese government duly complied with Nelson’s

request. A large number of Japanese pearl divers were from Wakayama prefecture, and they

usually departed from Kobe in Hyōgo prefecture. On 13 July 1894, Vice Foreign Minister

Hayashi Tadasu wrote to the Governors of Hyōgo and Wakayama prefectures and instructed

them to pay much closer attention to those who attempted to migrate to the Torres Strait and to

make an extra effort to regulate Japanese emigration to the area through the enforcement of the

Emigration Protection Regulations.31

The Emigration Protection Regulations were enacted in April 1894 in order to regulate

the activities of emigration companies and protect the interests of emigrants. 32 Even though

the Japanese government began cautiously encouraging emigration in the early 1890s, and

subsequently many emigration companies were established, the government maintained its

controls on the emigration of its citizens and remained vigilant in protecting both migrants and

the national interests. The Japanese government was particularly concerned that unregulated

emigration of labourers would lead to the exclusion of its nationals in the countries of

settlement and thus damage the nation’s prestige. The letter from the Foreign and Home

Ministers transmitting the draft regulations to Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi indicated that one

of the objectives of the regulations was to prevent the United States and Australia from passing

legislation to exclude Japanese immigrants.

…Emigration has become the fashion in recent years and recruiting and brokering agents are
springing up everywhere. We need to prevent any adverse effects this is generating by ensuring that
the number of distressed people overseas does not increase and by issuing a warning to those who
mislead good citizens for their own profit. Because of the continuous arrival of these emigrants, the
United States is enforcing its contract labour regulations stringently and people are calling for
Japanese exclusion. In Australia too, Japanese immigration is likely to become an important political
issue. Above all else, it is crucial that we exercise proper control over emigration in the interests of
good relations with these countries.33

30
Nelson to Marks, 21 March 1894, NGB-1894, vol. 2, p. 652.
31
Hayashi to the Governors of Hyōgo and Wakayama prefectures, 13 July 1894, Ibid., p. 659.
32
Imperial Ordinance No. 42 of 1894. For the text, see NGB-1894, vol. 2, pp. 619-622. Two years later, in April
1896, the Japanese government passed the Emigration Protection Act and the regulations became a law.
33
Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu and Home Minister Inoue Kaoru to Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi, 12
February 1894, NGB-1894, vol. 2, pp. 618-619.
55
The Emigration Protection Regulations stipulated that all labourers had to have passports,

written contracts and sureties which were to cover the procedure for assistance or repatriation

in the case of sickness or distress. The regulations also laid down rules on emigration agents

and stated that all emigration agents must be approved by and registered with the local

authorities and that agents which used fraudulent methods to recruit labourers were punishable

by fine.34 These regulations were effective in preventing any substantial rise in the number of

Japanese on Thursday Island for the next couple of years.35

3.1.3. Japanese and Australian Responses during the Initial Phase

During the early 1890s, the Japanese began to dominate the pearl-diving communities dotted

along the northern coastline of Australia and also to work as indentured labourers on North

Queensland sugar cane plantations. The Japanese presence in these areas caused some public

agitation in the local communities. However, as the vast majority of Japanese were hired to do

jobs that were seen as ill-suited for white European labourers in remote tropical locations, the

Japanese presence in Australian cities was very limited. 36 In this respect, the Japanese in

Australia at the time were quite different from their Chinese counterparts, whose population

was almost ten times larger than that of the Japanese and whose presence was visible in many

parts of Australia.37

As discussed in the previous chapter, in an age of “race nationalism,” Australians had

come to view Asia and its vast population as a threat to its white British character, and in 1888

the colonies, moved by this apprehension, passed uniform laws practically prohibiting the entry

34
Ibid., pp. 619-622.
35
They did not, however, have any effect on reducing Japanese emigration to the mainland, as most Japanese
working at sugar plantations on mainland Queensland were recruited by emigration companies with proper
contracts of employment. Such emigration was not restricted by the Emigrants Protection Regulations. See
Sissons, “The Immigration Question in Australia Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919,” p. 26.
36
Takeda Isami, Monogatari ōsutoraria no rekishi (The Story of Australian History) (Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho,
2000), p. 64.
37
In 1901, for example, the number of Japanese nationals residing in Australia was 3,554 compared with 30,542
Chinese nationals. See Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 163.
56
of Chinese, who were initially the focus of Australia’s fear of Asia. In contrast, until the mid-

1890s, there was no significant anti-Japanese sentiment and movement among the white

Australian population. Even though there was some localised public agitation to the increasing

number of Japanese indentured labourers in remote tropical areas, the anti-Japanese feeling

was not yet widespread in Australia and the local residents opposed Japanese workers mainly

for economic reasons. Japan, for its part, having yet to establish its international status and

identity as a “civilised” power, was eager to comply with Australia’s requests to regulate the

flow of Japanese immigrants to Australia. The Japanese government was concerned that

unregulated emigration of its nationals would incite racial hostility in Australia, which would

lead to the establishment of prohibitory laws to exclude Japanese people and, in turn, damage

the nation’s international reputation.38 Thus, during the initial phase of Japanese immigration

to Australia, there was no major diplomatic confrontation between the two nations. However,

this was all about to change in the mid-1890s with the signing of a commercial treaty between

Great Britain and Japan.

3.2. ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which was signed on 16 July 1894

just before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, horrified the Australian colonies. The new

treaty, the first equal treaty between Japan and a Western nation, offered reciprocal tariff

preferences to the signatory nations and their territories but contained a clause which posed

problems for British colonies including those in Australia. Article one stated;

The subjects of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel, or
reside in any part of the dominions and possessions of the other Contracting Party, and shall enjoy
full and perfect protection for their persons and property.39

38
Sissons, “The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919,” pp. 25-26;
Sissons, “Immigration in Australia-Japanese Relations 1871-1971,” pp. 194-197.
39
NGB-1894, vol. 1, p. 95. For the full text of the treaty, see NGB-1894, vol. 1, pp. 94-105.
57
In short, the treaty granted reciprocal rights of travel and residence, and if Australia were to

join the treaty, it also accorded Japanese nationals the right to enter and reside in Australia. The

Australian colonies were thus suddenly faced with a possible influx of Japanese immigrants to

Australia.

However, the new treaty was not immediately binding on the British colonies. Article

19 stipulated that the treaty would only apply to Britain’s self-governing colonies if they

expressed their intention to adhere within two years from the date of its ratification. On 31

December 1894, the British government sent copies of the treaty to the Australian colonies and

informed them that if they wished to be brought within the operation of the new treaty, notice

should be given before 25 August 1896.

The signing of the new treaty between Great Britain and Japan prompted debates on

the future of Japanese immigration in Australia. Unlike previous discussions on Japanese

immigration, this time the matter was debated in terms of inviolability of the white British

character of the nation, not in terms of labour competition. For example, a Labor

parliamentarian from Queensland, John Kingsbury, while conceding that the Japanese had

proved their equality with the British by signing the treaty, insisted that Japanese immigration

should be restricted because Japanese methods of living, religious observances, customs and

morality were entirely alien to those of the British.40 Meanwhile, The Sydney Morning Herald

argued that “no commercial benefits that we can conceive would be commensurate with the

evils that might come upon Australia from an unrestricted influx of Asiatic races.”41

The Australian colonies were thus reluctant to give their consent to the treaty in spite

of its attractive commercial benefits. Their reluctance was further enhanced by the news of

Japan’s victory over China in April 1895. Japan’s defeat of China and its subsequent rise to the

pre-eminent Asian power made Australians realise that Japan would be a force to be reckoned

40
John Kingsbury, Labor, QPD, Legislative Assembly, Friday, 31 August 1894, p. 403.
41
The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February 1895.
58
with politically and led them to view Japan as the primary threat from Asia.42 About a month

after Japan’s victory over China, The Sydney Morning Herald spoke of “the presence in the

Pacific of a warlike and resourceful Power.”43 The Age, for its part, drew readers’ attention to

the implication of Japanese military power on the immigration question and stressed the need

to restrict Japanese immigration because “the presence of Japanese in large numbers in any

part of this continent would afford an excuse for the fussy intervention of their Government,

with possibly demands for the redress of grievances on the part of its subjects.”44 The colonial

leaders echoed these sentiments and expressed their apprehension about Japan’s rising military

power and the diplomatic percussion that could result from the establishment of a sizable

Japanese community in the colonies. For example, in his second reading speech on the

Coloured Races Restriction and Regulation Bill, George Reid, the Premier of New South Wales,

without explicitly referring to Japan, warned his fellow parliamentarians of “the evil and

dissensions” that could follow the formation of coloured minorities from the “great populous

nations of the east.”45

In short, Australians were alarmed by the possibility of a powerful nation interfering

in the colonies’ immigration policies to protect its overseas nationals from overt racial

discrimination. They were concerned that if a large number of Japanese were to settle in

Australia as a result of Australia’s entry into the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty, it could

provide Japan with an excuse to intervene in Australia’s domestic affairs.46 Prompted by their

determination to prevent a potential influx of Japanese immigrants, the Australian colonies

decided to take concerted action on the Japanese question and agreed to debate the issue at an

42
Willard, The History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, p. 109; Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, pp.
7-8.
43
The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 May 1895.
44
Quoted by John Plummer in his contribution to The Japan Daily Mail on 23 September 1895 titled “Australia
and Japan.” See Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 8.
45
George Reid, Free Trader, 13 October 1896, New South Wales Parliamentary Debates (hereafter cited as
NSWPD), Legislative Assembly, p. 3948.
46
In his discussion of Australia’s reactions to the Japanese victory of 1895, A.T. Yarwood shows how the
Australian colonial leaders were concerned about the prospect of Japan interfering with the colonies’
immigration policies to protect its citizens from racial discrimination and tried to prevent this situation even
though there was no urgent need to do so. See Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, pp. 6-8.
59
Intercolonial Conference in Sydney on 4 and 5 March 1896.

3.3. INTERCOLONIAL CONFERENCE OF 1896

The first Intercolonial Conference met in Melbourne in 1863 in order to discuss inter-colonial

issues such as post, telegraph, customs duties, tariffs and trade. In the 1880s, the restriction on

Chinese immigration became a primary concern of these conferences, and in the 1890s, with

the rising tide of Australian nationalism, Intercolonial Conference played a vital role in the

movement towards Federation. 47 The Intercolonial Conference of 1896 was promoted by

George Reid, the Premier of New South Wales, and Charles Kingston, the Premier of South

Australia who was a strong supporter of the Federal movement and White Australia. The

resolution reached at the 1896 conference included three main items: (1) the Australian colonies

should extend their existing anti-Chinese immigration legislation to all coloured races; (2) the

exemptions for British subjects (e.g. Indians) should be withdrawn; (3) the Australian colonies

should not adhere to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1894.48

Two of the three decisions, items (1) and (3), concerned Japan. Tariff preferences

contained within the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty was very appealing for the Australian

colonies, which had been suffering from an economic downturn since 1890 and had already

explored the Japanese market for their primary products. 49 However, the delegates at the

Sydney Conference unanimously decided not to join the treaty, rejecting the prospect of

increased bilateral trade.50 Instead, by denying Japan reciprocal rights of travel and residence

and by extending the provisions of the Chinese Restriction Acts to all coloured races, the

47
Kevin T. Livingston, Richard Jordan and Gay Sweely, Becoming Australians: The Movement towards
Federation in Ballarat and the Nation (Kent Town, South Australia: Wakefield Press, 2001), p. xi; Takeda,
“Haku-gō seisaku no seiritsu to nihon no taiō,” p. 25.
48
Takeda, “Haku-gō seisaku no seiritsu to nihon no taiō,” p. 25; Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 5.
49
Hatcho Yui, “Jinshu byōdō gensoku to gōshū no hantai: The Historical Background of Australia’s Opposition
to the Japanese Proposal,” in Kyushu kōgyō daigaku kenkyū hōkoku jinbun shakaigaku, 2013, vol. 61: 85-90,
p. 88.
50
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 5; Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, pp. 109-
110; Takeda, “Haku-gō seisaku no seiritsu to nihon no taiō,” p. 23.
60
premiers of the Australian colonies expressed their intention to give the White Australia Policy

their highest priority.

The agreements reached at the conference received overwhelming approval from the

Australian press. For example, The Daily News in Perth praised the delegates for “affirming

the necessity” of “extending the provisions of the Chinese Immigration Act so as to embrace

all coloured races.”51 The Sydney Morning Herald, for its part, expressed its support for the

conference’s decisions by claiming that “the most glittering prospects” of the bilateral trade

promotion should not distract the colonies from their allegiance to the principle of racial

purity. 52 However, contrary to the favourable reactions from the press, the conference’s

decisions, as well as the subsequent colonial legislation, provoked strong objections from the

Japanese government.

3.4. AFTER THE CONFERENCE

In early 1896 Japan opened its first Australian consulate in Townsville, and in April Nakagawa

Tsunejirō was appointed as the first Japanese Consul in Australia. Nakagawa’s main tasks were

to monitor the welfare of the Japanese workers in the region and to report on circumstances in

the Australian colonies. Writing to Vice Foreign Minister Hara Takashi on 29 April 1896,

Nakagawa expressed his concern that the Australian colonies might soon introduce bills to

exclude all Asian people including Japanese and suggested that the utmost care should be taken

in selecting migrants contracted to work overseas.53

Nakagawa’s concern proved correct. In accordance with the resolution reached at the

Intercolonial Conference, in September 1896, New South Wales introduced the Coloured Races

Restriction and Regulation Bill, and South Australia and Tasmania subsequently introduced the

Coloured Races Restriction Bills, which restricted the entry of non-European races into these

51
The Daily News (Perth), 7 March 1896.
52
The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 March 1896.
53
Nakagawa to Hara, 29 April 1896, NGB-1896, pp. 907-909.
61
colonies. However, these bills had to overcome a few hurdles before they could become laws.

First, the British government had to grant Royal Assent to these bills. Second, the Japanese

government did not approve the restriction of immigrants based on colour or race, especially

when the Japanese were categorised with other Asian races, and pressured the British

government to reserve these bills.

The introduction of these bills by the Australian colonies angered the Japanese

authorities. In Japan, Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu complained to the British envoy in

Tokyo, Ernest Satow, that Japan was being unfairly discriminated against by the Australian

colonies and informed him of the Japanese government’s intention to make official

representations to the British government.54 Meanwhile in Britain, the Japanese Minister in

London, Katō Takaaki, met with British Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury to protest against the

proposed bills in the three Australian colonies and a similar bill in New Zealand.55 During their

meeting on 25 November 1986, Katō denounced the bills as “wholly gratuitous” in view of the

very small number of Japanese living in those colonies. Katō further expressed regret over “the

indignity” inflicted on his country by these colonies “in treating Japanese as if they were

Chinese” and requested Salisbury to prevent Royal Assent from being granted to these colonial

bills.56 Japan’s protest proved effective. Although the Colonial Office’s memoranda showed

that it sympathised with the Australian colonies’ desire to avoid “the permanent presence of a

considerable element of an inferior race,” it advised the Crown against assenting to Australian

immigration restriction bills based on colour or race.57 As a result, these colonial bills were all

reserved.

54
Ian Ruxton (ed.), The Diaries of Ernest Satow, British Minister in Tokyo (1895-1900): A Diplomat Returns to
Japan (Raleigh, North Carolina: Lulu Publishing, 2010), p. 183.
55
New Zealand also passed the Coloured Immigration Restriction Act in 1896.
56
Katō’s note of 25 November 1896, enclosed in Under-Secretary, Great Britain, Foreign Office (hereafter Br.
FO.) to Under-Secretary, Great Britain, Colonial Office (hereafter Br. CO.), 30 November 1896 reporting
Salisbury’s conversation with Katō of 25 November 1896, The National Archives of the United Kingdom
(hereafter cited as TNA): CO 201/620; Katō’s interview with Salisbury on 25 November 1896 was also
described in Katō’s letter to the Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu on 29 November 1896, NGM-1896, pp.
915-917.
57
Br. CO. memoranda of 27 November 1896, TNA: CO 201/619.
62
 When colonial premiers assembled in London for Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee

celebrations in June 1897, Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, seized

the opportunity to explain the reasons for the suspension of these colonial bills. In his speech

to the Australian representatives at the Colonial Conference, Chamberlain displayed a very

sympathetic attitude to the colonies’ immigration policy. He said:

We quite sympathise with the determination of the white inhabitants of these Colonies, who are in
comparatively close proximity to millions and hundreds of millions of Asiatics, that there shall not
be an influx of people alien in civilisation, alien in religion, alien in customs, whose influx, moreover,
would most seriously interfere with the legitimate rights of the existing labour population. 58

However, at the same time, he expressed his opposition to the method of restriction adopted,

advising the premiers that their colonial immigration restriction bills failed to honour “the

traditions of the Empire, which make no distinction in favor of or against race or colour.”59

Chamberlain, therefore, advised the colonies to adopt a less offensive and more indirect method

of restriction by following the example of the immigration restriction legislation of the Natal

province of South Africa. The Natal Immigration Restriction Act of 1897 restricted the entry

of “undesirable” immigrants through the imposition of a dictation test. Chamberlain hoped that

the premiers would agree on some “form of words which will avoid hurting the feelings of any

of Her Majesty’s subjects,” while at the same time protecting the Australian Colonies against

“any invasion” from alien races.60

The delegates at the conference were unable to reach an agreement on immigration

issues. However, a compromise measure was suggested by Reid and tentatively accepted by

Chamberlain. It was decided that the colonies would continue the direct prohibition of non-

Europeans other than British subjects and deal with coloured British subjects in a separate and

preferential clause. Chamberlain agreed to this arrangement on the assumption that Japan had

58
Proceedings of a conference between the Secretary of State for the colonies and the premiers of the self-
governing colonies, at the colonial office, London, June and July 1897, State Library of New South Wales, p.
13.
59
Ibid, p. 13.
60
Ibid, p. 14.
63
“submitted to this legislation.”61

However, on the very day of the conference debate, the Japanese Minister in London,

Katō Takaaki, left a memorandum addressed to British Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury asking

for the exemption of Japanese immigrants from the colonial immigration bills.62 Salisbury was

not very sympathetic to Katō’s request. In his reply to Katō’s memorandum, Salisbury stated

that given that these colonial bills exempted merchants, students and tourists, “the Japanese

Government will doubtless recognise that all reasonable cause for complaint has been removed,

more especially as it appears from your Memorandum that there is no prospect of Japanese

subjects emigrating to Australia in large numbers.” In the same letter, Salisbury also referred

to “a strong determination” shared by the people of the colonies “to preserve unmistakably the

European character of Australian Colonisation” against “the enormous surplus population of

Asia.”63

Dissatisfied with Salisbury’s response, on 1 September 1897, Katō met with Salisbury

at the British Foreign Office and again requested him to induce the Australian colonies to

exempt Japanese citizens from the operation of their immigration bills. “The Japanese

government understands and sympathises with the desire of the people of the colonies to defend

their land from being swamped by the enormous surplus population of Asia,” Katō told

Salisbury. “However, we cannot allow any legislation which regards our people as being on the

same level as other Asian people and treats our people in the same way as the Chinese.” Katō

stated that Japan would oppose any legislation which “confuses the distinction between the

Japanese and other Asian people” and “damages our national pride” because “the Japanese are

far superior to other Asian people.”64

61
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 13.
62
Katō’s memorandum to Salisbury of 8 July 1897 was mentioned in Salisbury to Katō, 24 August 1897, NGB-
1897, p. 610.
63
Salisbury to Katō, 24 August 1897, Ibid., pp. 610-611.
64
The conversation between Katō and Salisbury which took place during the meeting on 1 September 1897 was
recorded in the confidential letter from Katō to the Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu of 2 September 1897,
Ibid., pp. 605-609.
64
 In spite of his efforts, however, Katō felt that he had still not been able to persuade

Salisbury and the British government on the merits of his case.65 Thus he wrote his famous

letter, which has been quoted by various scholars:

From a material point of view there was no very great grievance of which Japan could complain.
The actual immigration was very small, and the class of Japanese who chiefly desired to enter the
Australian colonies were exempted by special provisions from the prohibitions of the Colonial Bills.
But the point which had caused a painful feeling in Japan was not that the operation of the prohibition
would be such as to exclude a certain number of Japanese from immigrating to Australasia, but that
Japan should be spoken of in formal documents, such as the Colonial Acts, as if the Japanese were
on the same level of morality and civilization as Chinese and other less advanced populations of
Asia.66

In reply, Salisbury wrote to Katō and informed him that:

Mr. Secretary Chamberlain has again brought the matter to the notice of the Colonial Governments
concerned, but he has little hope of their arriving at any solution of the difficulty which would
remove the objections entertained in Japan to the wording of the prohibitions clauses in the Bills
referred to.67

After receiving this reply from Salisbury, Katō communicated his disappointment to Tokyo,

stating that “in the end, there is regrettably almost no chance of us winning the case.”68

3.5. NEW SOUTH WALES

Katō’s pessimistic prediction proved correct. Upon his return to Australia, on 18 November

1897, New South Wales Premier George Reid introduced the Immigration Restriction Bill and

the Coloured Races Restriction and Regulation Bill, the former based on the Natal model and

the latter directly excluding coloured races except for British subjects. Furthermore, the New

South Wales government withdrew the conditional exemption clauses covering missionaries,

tourists, merchants, students, men of science and their families and domestics, claiming that

65
In his confidential memorandum to Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu of 5 October 1897, Katō expressed his
frustration with the British government and his determination to seek exemptions for its citizens from the
operation of the bills and to block Royal Assent to these bills in their original forms. Katō to Ōkuma, 5 October
1897, Ibid., pp. 618-622.
66
Katō to Salisbury, 7 October 1897, TNA: FO 46/548. This letter has been quoted by many scholars including
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 14; Sissons, “Immigration in Australian-Japanese Relations, 1871-
1971,” p. 199; Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, p. 80.
67
Salisbury to Katō, 28 October 1897, NGB-1897, p. 632.
68
Katō to Ōkuma, 2 November 1897, Ibid., p. 631.
65
they would be misused.69

In 1897, a year after the first Japanese consulate opened in Townsville, the second

Japanese consulate in Australia was established in Sydney. Consul Nakagawa in Townsville

was relocated to Sydney to become its first Consul. Nakagawa closely observed the situation

developing in the colony and reported it back to the Japanese government. Referring to the

newly introduced immigration bills which banned the entry of coloured races including

Japanese, Nakagawa, in his telegram of 23 November 1897 to Japanese Foreign Minister Nishi

Tokujirō, insisted that Japan should “decidedly protest to British Government for bringing an

inconvenience under ignominious treatment of the Japanese equal to Africans and

Polynesians.”70 Nishi then wrote to Katō in London and told him that it was a “dishonour” for

the Japanese to be regarded as the same as Africans and Polynesians and ordered him to protest

to the British government.71

Meanwhile, in Sydney, Nakagawa sent a letter of representations to Reid concerning

“the unfriendly character” of the colony’s proposed immigration legislation. Nakagawa

stressed that “so far as Japan is concerned, New South Wales has no reason to fear alien

immigration” as “the Japanese Government does not wish to lose any of its subjects” and

Japanese people “are under no necessity to emigrate” thanks to the country’s spectacular

economic and industrial development in recent years. Nakagawa then suggested “an

arrangement by treaty or otherwise that will practically secure for New South Wales, so far as

Japan is concerned, all that the proposed legislation can secure.”72

However, Reid and his fellow parliamentarians were unprepared to make concessions.

They were determined to keep all coloured races out of their colony and did not wish to take

any risks. During the parliamentary debates on the Coloured Races Restriction and Regulation

69
See NSWPD, Legislative Assembly, 24 November 1897, pp. 5041-5042.
70
Nakagawa to Nishi, 23 November 1897, NGB-1897, p. 654.
71
Nishi to Katō, 29 November 1987, Ibid., pp. 652-653.
72
Nakagawa to Reid, 24 November 1897, NGB-1898, vol. 2, pp. 56-58.
66
Bill, a Labor parliamentarian, Edward O’Sullivan, for example, emphasised the danger that

coloured immigrants represented for European civilisation.

Unless we do something to prevent the inroad of these races, they will swarm into Australia and
subvert our civilisation…. The inroads of the Chinese, Japanese, and other Asiatics are a great
danger to our civilisation.73

In London, Katō renewed his complaints. On 26 January 1898, he wrote to Salisbury and again

requested the British government not to approve the New South Wales immigration bills in

order “to ensure the maintenance and preservation of the cordial relations now happily existing

between our respective countries.”74

In spite of the efforts by Nakagawa and Katō, both bills passed through the Legislative

Assembly. However, the British government did not give its assents to the bills but instead

advised the New South Wales parliament to amend them on the Natal model.75 In the end, the

New South Wales parliament withdrew the Coloured Immigration Restriction and Regulation

Bill and made a minor amendment to the dictation test of the Immigration Restriction Bill.76

This time assent was given to the bill, and Katō did not oppose. In a confidential note to Foreign

Minister Ōkuma, Katō praised the British government for persuading New South Wales to

withdraw the old bill. The new bill “is not able to bring ignominy to our people” and “I am sure

that the Imperial Government is quite satisfied,” wrote Katō.77

3.6. OTHER COLONIES

While the Japanese government was preoccupied with the developments in New South Wales,

the Western Australian parliament amended its bill in compliance with Chamberlain’s request

and passed an immigration bill based on the Natal model. The bill was given Royal Assent on

73
NSWPD, Legislative Assembly, 24 November 1897, pp. 5053-5054.
74
Katō to Salisbury, 26 January 1898, NGB-1898, vol. 2, pp. 65-67.
75
Salisbury advised Katō in his letter of 16 February 1898 that Chamberlain had again urged the New South
Wales government to consider adopting the Natal model. Salisbury to Katō, 16 February 1898, Ibid., p. 87.
76
The words “any language of Europe” in the dictation test was changed to “some European Language” to leave
the selection of the language to the immigrant.
77
Katō to Ōkuma, 12 July 1898, NGB-1898, vol. 2, pp. 94-95.
67
23 December 1897. In a confidential letter to Katō on 25 January 1898, Salisbury informed

Katō of the passage of the bill in Western Australia “containing provisions substantially the

same as those of the Natal Act, which would seem to meet the views of the Japanese

Government so far as an education test is concerned.” Salisbury further added that the bill

“contains no general provisions which could be considered as casting a slur upon any particular

race of people.”78 The Japanese government made no objection. Tasmania followed Western

Australia and enacted legislation based on the Natal model. In Victoria and South Australia, on

the other hand, no new immigration legislation was introduced.79

The immigration restriction laws passed in the three Australian colonies (Western

Australia, New South Wales and Tasmania) marked a departure from previous colonial

immigration laws, which had specifically targeted the Chinese. Under the new colonial laws,

the Japanese were considered as a coloured race along with the Chinese, Indians and Kanakas.

However, the Japanese government reluctantly accepted these colonial laws as the Natal

language test formula awarded the Japanese the appearance of equality with Europeans.

3.7. QUEENSLAND

Queensland took a different course of action from the other colonies. At the Intercolonial

Conference in March 1896, Queensland, along with the other colonies, supported the resolution

not to adhere to the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894. However, on 16 March 1897,

Queensland joined the treaty by means of a special protocol. Queensland’s decision was

influenced by the prospect of a significant commercial benefit which could be expected from

trade expansion with Japan. It was also influenced by the fact that the Queensland economy

was heavily dependent on the non-European coloured labour force, including Japanese

labourers in the sugar and pearling industries in the tropical north.80 Yet Queensland Premier

78
Salisbury to Katō, 25 January 1898, Ibid., p. 69.
79
Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, p. 115.
80
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, pp. 15-16; Takeda, Monogatari ōsutoraria no rekishi, pp. 64-76; Henry
68
Hugh Nelson was concerned with some of the privileges afforded to Japanese immigrants under

the treaty. 81 Consequently, the protocol contained the following clause, which granted

Queensland the power to regulate the immigration of Japanese labourers and artisans:

The stipulations contained in the first and third articles of the above named Treaty, shall not in any
way affect the Laws, Ordinances, and Regulations with regard to trade, the immigration of labourers
and artisans, police and public security which are in force, or may hereafter be enacted in Japan or
in the said Colony of Queensland.82

The inclusion of this clause in the protocol shows that the Japanese government was willing to

make a substantial compromise (i.e. virtual exclusion of labourers and artisans) in order to

persuade Queensland to join the treaty and conclude a so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with

Japan. In fact, a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” such as the one between Japan and Queensland was

Japan’s preferred solution for problems involving Japanese immigration. Under this formula,

Japan was afforded the most favoured nation treatment concerning the right of entry, while it

agreed to voluntarily regulate the emigration of its citizens, allowing Japan to maintain the

appearance of being granted equal treatment with European nations on immigration.83 This

was the nature of the agreements Japan reached with the United States and Canada in the early

1900s.

Although Japan indicated to Britain that it would be satisfied if the Australian colonies

legislated on the lines of the Natal Act, Japan preferred reciprocal arrangements regarding

immigration. In the late 1890s, the Japanese government repeatedly requested the other

colonies to sign a similar agreement as Queensland. For example, as discussed in the previous

section, the Japanese Consul in Sydney, Nakagawa Tsunejirō, approached New South Wales

Premier Reid in late 1897 and offered an arrangement such as the one between Queensland and

P. Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth Century to World War II (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1991), p. 80.
81
Murakami, “Australia’s Immigration Legislation, 1893-1901,” p. 52.
82
Quoted in Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 16; Murakami, “Australia’s Immigration Legislation,
1893-1901,” p. 53.
83
Sissons, “Immigration in Australian-Japanese Relations, 1871-1971,” p. 195; Bennett, “Japanese Emigration
Policy, 1880-1941,” p. 30.
69
Japan. Nakagawa’s successor, Eitaki Hisakichi, also approached Reid with the same offer while

assuring Reid that Japan had no intention of encouraging migration to Australia.84 However,

Reid rejected these offers.

After it signed the protocol in March 1897, the Queensland government did not impose

any restriction on the entry of Japanese of any class until July 1898, on the ground that Japan

had given the assurance that the Emigration Protection Act of 1896 would reduce the flow of

Japanese to Queensland.85 However, the number of Japanese arrivals to the colony, particularly

to Thursday Island, began to increase soon after the protocol was signed. 86 By 1898 the

Japanese had outnumbered the European population on Thursday Island, 619 to 608, and had

become the largest single group at the pearl-shelling centre of the island.87

This does not mean that the Japanese government did not attempt to control the flow

of Japanese emigrants to Queensland. Indeed, it made some sincere efforts to regulate Japanese

migration to the colony. For example, in response to the rapid increase in the number of

Japanese on Thursday Island, on 14 May 1897, the Acting Japanese Consul in Townsville,

Morikawa Kishirō, conveyed his concern to Vice Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō. Morikawa

reported that the Queensland government was unhappy with the continuous flow of Japanese

labourers to the Island and that hostility toward the Japanese had been expressed in the press

throughout the colony. He thus suggested that restrictions should be temporarily imposed on

the departure of emigrants in large numbers. 88 Morikawa also wrote to Foreign Minister

Ōkuma Shigenobu and urged that emigration to Thursday Island should be suspended. 89

84
See Eitaki to Reid, 16 May 1899 and 7 June 1899, NGM-1899, pp. 693, 696.
85
Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, p. 116; Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 16.
The Emigration Protection Act was enacted on 8 April 1896. The Act required all labourers desiring to emigrate
to a foreign country to obtain official permission to do so. Under the Act, the Japanese government had the
power to restrict, suspend or prohibit emigration to any country if it thought such action was expedient for
reasons of foreign policy. For the text of the Act see NGB-1986, pp. 976-994.
86
This was partly due to the establishment of a monthly Australian service by NYK with steerage accommodation
at half the prevailing price in April 1897. See Sissons,” Australian Contacts with Japan in the Nineteenth
Century,” p. 11.
87
Meaney, Towards a New Vision, p. 53.
88
Morikawa to Komura, 14 May 1897, NGB-1897, pp. 600-602. For the hostile comments towards the Japanese
expressed in the press, see particularly The Brisbane Courier, 12 May 1897 and The Settler and South
Queensland Pioneer (Toowoomba), 15, 22 May 1897.
89
Morikawa to Ōkuma, 9 June 1897, NGB-1897, p. 603.
70
Instructions to this effect were promptly issued to local authorities by Vice Foreign Minister

Komura on the ground that anti-Japanese sentiment is gaining momentum in the colony.90 The

Japanese government’s willingness to cooperate with Queensland in restricting the entry of

Japanese labourers and artisans was also apparent from the comment made by Komura to the

Acting Japanese Consul in Townsville on 22 January 1898:

It is not our policy to ignore various problems and encourage emigration so that a few people can
travel overseas. Accordingly, until there is a complete change in the attitude of the people in the
colony toward Japanese immigration, we shall continue to prohibit free emigrants from going
there.91

Nevertheless, the flow of Japanese into the colony did not stop. From the end of 1896

to the end of 1898, the numbers of Japanese in Queensland rose from 2,225 to 3,247. 92

Consequently, the Queensland government concluded that the control exercised by the

Japanese government was insufficient and requested the Japanese government not to issue

passports to emigrants unless their application had been previously submitted to and approved

by the Queensland government. 93 As the Chief Secretary of Queensland, Thomas Byrnes,

pointed out in his letter to Acting Japanese Consul Masuda in Townsville, the Queensland

government was entitled to regulate the entry of Japanese labourers and artisans under the

Protocol of 1897. 94 However, the Queensland government’s new restriction on Japanese

immigrants greatly upset the Japanese government. In a confidential letter to Masuda on 30

September 1898, Vice Foreign Minister Hatoyama Kazuo stated that the Japanese government

90
Komura to prefectural Governors, 9 June 1897, Ibid., pp. 602-603.
91
Komura to Masuda, 22 January 1898, NGB-1898, vol. 2. pp. 62-63.
92
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 16; Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, p. 116.
The official estimate for 1898 was referred to in the communication from James Dickson to Iijima Kametarō
on 3 October 1900, NGB-1900, p 485. The great majority of the Japanese in Queensland were indentured
workers in the pearl-shelling and sugar-growing industries. There were also some notorious cases in which the
restrictions imposed by the Japanese government were circumvented by the emigration companies. For
example, on 16 July 1898, 59 Japanese labourers recruited by an immigration company in Wakayama
prefecture landed at Thursday Island bearing passports for the Northern Territory. This incident was described
in the confidential report from the Acting Japanese Consul in Townsville, Masuda Itaru, to the Vice Foreign
Minister, Komura Jutarō, on 25 July 1898. In the same report, Masuda also pointed out that there was a
continuous flow of Japanese emigrants arriving at Thursday Island and other parts of Queensland bearing
passports made out for the colonies other than Queensland. See NBG-1898, vol. 2, pp. 101-106.
93
Byrnes to Masuda, 23 July 1898, Ibid., p.107; Byrnes to Masuda, 29 July 1898, Ibid., pp.113-116.
94
Byrnes to Masuda, 29 July 1898, Ibid., pp.113-116.
71
“deeply regretted” the recent decision by the Queensland government, which, in his opinion,

was unnecessary because the Japanese government had already suspended free emigration to

Queensland under the provision of the Emigration Protection Act. Hatoyama also expressed

his concern that the new restriction might inconvenience and embarrass Japanese merchants

and other travellers who, under the Emigration Protection Act, were not obliged to obtain

passports from the Japanese authorities and who, under the Protocol of 1897, were not

regulated by the Queensland government. 95 Hatoyama thus insisted that the Japanese

government should request the Queensland government to reconsider its decision.96

There followed a protracted correspondence between Masuda’s successor, Nakayama

Kakichirō, and Byrnes’ successor, James Dickson, regarding this matter. 97 In the end, an

agreement was reached that only labourers and artisans were required to obtain passports

previously approved by the Queensland government, and for people from other classes, the

Japanese government would issue documentation indicating their status. Even though the

Japanese government was not entirely satisfied with the arrangement, it accepted the

arrangement and cooperated with the Queensland government in restricting Japanese emigrants

to the colony without voicing further objections.98

However, the Japanese government vigorously protested when the Queensland

government attempted to give the policy of restriction a prohibitive character. On 12 April 1899,

Satō Torajirō, the president of the Japanese Society of Thursday Island and an employer agent

for the supply of Japanese labour on the island, made an application for permission to introduce

about 50 labourers to the island to meet a scarcity of labour following the extensive loss of life

95
Under the stipulation of the Emigration Protection Act, only labourers and artisans were required to obtain
passports, and the Protocol of 1897 only granted Queensland the power to regulate the immigration of Japanese
labourers and artisans.
96
Hatoyama to Masuda, 30 September 1898, NBG-1898, vol. 2, pp. 118-120.
97
For the correspondences between the two, see Nakayama to Dickson, 19 December 1898, NGB-1899, pp. 671-
673; Dickson to Nakayama, 16 January 1899, Ibid., pp. 673-676; Nakayama to Dickson, 24 January 1899,
Ibid., pp. 676-677; Dickson to Nakayama, 7 March 1899, Ibid., pp. 681-683; Nakayama to Dickson, 20 March
1899, Ibid., pp. 686-687.
98
Sissons, “The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan 1875-1919,” p. 33.
72
in a hurricane. The Queensland government rejected his application stating that it was “opposed

to the introduction of Japanese labour of any kind into Queensland.”99 The Acting Japanese

Consul in Townsville, Nakayama Kakichirō, on instructions from his government in Tokyo,

protested to the Queensland government. In his letter of representations to the Chief Secretary

of Queensland, James Dickson, Nakayama declared that the new prohibitive measure “must be

regarded as being oppressive” and asked Dickson to reconsider “the prohibitive aspect of the

adopted measure.”100 In response, Dickson defended his government’s new policy by stating

that it was based on the desire of the Australian colonial governments that “no undue proportion

of people of Asian race should permanently settle in this Continent.” He further claimed that

these “fundamental principles of all Australian legislation on the subject of alien immigration”

had been implicitly recognised by the Japanese government “as reasonable.”101

In November 1899, the newly appointed Japanese Consul in Townsville, Iijima

Kametarō, displayed a firm determination to block Queensland’s total prohibition on Japanese

immigration. In his representations to the Queensland government, Iijima declared that “it is

not agreeable to the Japanese Government to see their subjects included in the general category

of Asiatic races, without any consideration being paid to their state of civilisation.” He,

therefore, expressed his intention “to secure to our subjects similar treatment to that which

other European aliens are enjoying from the respective Government.” 102 After prolonged

negotiations between the Queensland and the Japanese governments over what Iijima described

as “disagreeable collision,”103 in October 1900, they reached a settlement that the Japanese

population of Queensland on 31 October 1898 (3,247, around 0.65 % of the total population of

99
This case was described in the letter from the Acting Japanese Consul at Townsville, Nakayama Kakichirō, to
the Japanese Foreign Minister, Aoki Shūzō, on 19 June 1899 and in the letter of representations from
Nakayama to the Chief Secretary of Queensland, James Dickson, on 9 May 1899, NGB-1899, pp. 698-700.
100
Nakayama to Dickson, 23 September 1899, Ibid., pp. 720-721.
101
Dickson to Nakayama, 10 October 1899, Ibid., pp. 721-723.
102
Iijima to Dickson, 6 November 1899, Ibid., pp. 723-726; Iijima to Philip, 20 August 1900, NGB-1900, pp.
474-480.
103
NGB-1900, p. 477.
73
Queensland at that time), 104 would be set as the limit of the number of Japanese in the

colony.105 However, in the months that followed, Japan made no special efforts to restore its

number to 3,247. The total number of Japanese residents in Queensland at the 1901 census was

only 2,269.106 This indicates that, as the Japanese government had been insisting all along,

Japan had no intention of promoting immigration to Queensland or the other Australian

colonies. It was not the reason behind Japan’s objection to Australia’s immigration policies.

Rather, Japan opposed the colonies’ discriminatory immigration legislation which treated its

people in the same way as Chinese and other Asian people. In other words, the Japanese

government, determined to protect Japan’s dignity and prestige as a “civilised” state, objected

to the implication that the Japanese were not superior to other Asians and inferior to Europeans.

3.8. CONCLUSION

During the 1890s, the Australian colonies introduced legislation that for the first time restricted

the immigration of Asian people other than Chinese. These laws were prompted by the colonial

leaders’ determination to protect the racial purity and the white British character and identity

of their nation. At the same time, these immigration laws also reflected their fear of Japan. This

fear of Japan was not triggered by internal situations (e.g. a rapid increase in the Japanese

population in Australia), but rather by external factors. In other words, Japan and Japanese

immigration started attracting attention in Australia in the 1890s because of the developments

that took place outside Australia, including the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of

Commerce and Navigation in 1894 and Japan’s defeat of China in the following year. These

events cemented Japan’s position as the key Asian power and brought Japan into the centre of

104
Pam Oliver, Allies, Enemies and Trading Partners: Records on Australia and the Japanese (Canberra:
National Archives of Australia, 2004), p. 14.
105
A proposal to this effect was made by Iijima in his letter to Dickson on 18 November 1899, and Dickson
expressed his government’s willingness to accept the proposal in his letter to Iijima on 3 October 1990. See
NGB-1899, p. 763; NGB-1900, pp. 483-486.
106
Sissons, “Immigration in Australia-Japanese Relations 1871-1971,” pp, 198-199; Sissons, “The Immigration
Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan 1875-1919,” p. 35.
74
Australia’s anxiety about Asia. Alerted by the possibility of a powerful nation interfering to

protect its overseas nationals from overt racial discrimination, the Australian colonies rushed

to prevent a potential influx of Japanese immigrants.

At the same time, Japan’s rise to pre-eminent Asian power status also led to changes

in the Japanese government’s attitude toward the emigration of its citizens and its response to

the exclusion of the Japanese in Australia. Prior to the mid-1890s, the Japanese government

displayed a very cautious attitude to emigration and a very conciliatory attitude to Australia’s

request to regulate the flow of Japanese people into the colonies. However, from the mid-1890s,

it took on a more assertive position on these issues and began to object to the Australian

colonies’ immigration restriction legislation aimed at its people. As Japan’s position rose on

the international stage, Japan started claiming that the Japanese were far superior to other

Asians to whom, in Japan’s opinion, restrictive immigration laws should be applied. Japan also

began to demand that its nationals would be regarded as being on the same plane as Europeans.

Consequently, the Japanese government objected to its citizens being subject to the same

legislation as Chinese or other Asian people and insisted that, as citizens of a “civilised” state,

the Japanese should be exempted from the colonies’ immigration laws which were aimed at

“uncivilised” people.

It is, however, important to note that Japan’s objection to the Australian colonies’

racially discriminatory immigration legislation was not based on material interests. That is

Japan had no desire to increase the number of Japanese migrating to Australia. Rather, the

Japanese government was concerned that being nominated in colonial legislation as an

undesirable immigrant country would indicate Japan’s inferiority to the Western powers and

damage Japan’s international prestige as a “civilised” state. Ironically, however, because of

Japan’s rising international status, Japan became the focus of Australia’s anxiety and led the

Australian colonies to introduce legislation to exclude Japanese immigrants along with

75
“uncivilised” people of Asia.

Japan pressured Britain not to assent to any colonial immigration bill which overtly

discriminated against Japanese citizens. By the late 19th century, friendship with Japan was

becoming increasingly important for Britain. The British, therefore, could not ignore Japan’s

request and acted accordingly. As a result, after obstinately refusing to make any concessions,

the Australian colonies had to either withdrew their original bills or amend them on the Natal

model. Queensland alone among all the Australian colonies adhered to the Anglo-Japanese

Commercial Treaty by means of a special protocol in order to enjoy the commercial benefit it

afforded while maintaining the right to regulate the entry of Japanese labourers and artisans.

However, instead of enjoying a cordial relationship with Japan, Queensland had to face

continuous diplomatic interventions from Japan when it tried to restrict the entry of Japanese

labourers and artisans even though it was entitled to do so under the protocol. Queensland’s

brief but bitter experience with Japanese immigration was to have a profound effect on

Commonwealth immigration policy. The new Commonwealth was determined to retain

unrestrained control over immigration and rejected Japan’s repeated offer that it would

voluntarily regulate the emigration of its citizens in return for the exemption of Japanese

nationals from the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901. This, as we will see in the next chapter,

led to more confrontations between the two nations over the White Australia Policy.

76
 CHAPTER IV
THE IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION ACT OF 1901

This chapter examines Japanese-Australian diplomatic negotiation and confrontation leading

up to the introduction of the Immigration Restriction Act (IRA) in December 1901. On 1

January 1901, the Australian colonies federated to become the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Immigration Restriction Act was the first major piece of legislation introduced by the

newly formed Commonwealth Parliament, and the enactment of the IRA after receiving Royal

Assent on 23 December 1901 symbolised the formal establishment of the White Australia

Policy.

The IRA was intended “to place certain restrictions on immigration and to provide for

the removal from the Commonwealth of prohibited immigrants.”1 However, the IRA neither

mentioned White Australia nor nominated non-Europeans as “prohibited immigrants.” This

was mainly due to diplomatic pressure applied by Britain and Japan urging Australia not to

introduce legislation of an overtly discriminatory character. Instead, the restrictions were

enforced by means of a dictation test in a European language. 2 It was widely understood,

though nowhere stated in the Act, that the test would apply only to non-European immigrants

and it should be in a language not known to the immigrants, thus making it practically

impossible for non-Europeans to migrate to Australia.3

As in the late colonial period, Australia’s intention to enact immigration legislation

based on colour or race provoked strong objections from Japan. The Japanese government

argued that its citizens should be exempted from the operation of the new Commonwealth’s

immigration law and continued to press Australia to enter into a treaty or agreement which

1
See Australian Government, Federal Register of Legislation, Immigration Restriction Act 1901,
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C1901A00017.
2
According to Section 3(a) of the IRA, “any person who when asked to do so by an officer fails to write out at
dictation and sign in the presence of the officer a passage of fifty words in length in a European language
directed by the officer” would fall into the prohibited category. Ibid.
3
Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera, p. 9.
77
would formally put the Japanese on the same level as Europeans. However, the Australian

government firmly rejected Japan’s requests and objections, and at the very birth of the

Commonwealth, White Australia became enshrined as the founding self-definition and self-

identity of the new nation.

4.1. FEDERATION AND THE INTRODUCTION OF THE IRA

On 1 January 1901, the Australian colonies came together as a nation.4 It is widely accepted

that the major impetus for the Federation was the colonists’ desire to find a common solution

to such intercolonial issues as post, telegraph, tariffs, customs duties, transport, defence and

immigration.5 Myra Willard argues that among these matters of common concern, the desire

to safeguard themselves against a possible influx of Asian immigration was one of the most

powerful factors which drew the colonies together.6 During the era of British race nationalism,

Australians felt that they were in danger of being swamped by people from nearby and heavily

populated Asia, who would taint the purity of the white race and pose threats to the British

character of Australian society. Consequently, during the late 19th century, the Australian

colonies introduced legislation to restrict coloured immigration. However, the experience of

the late colonial period, particularly Queensland’s lone decision to join the Anglo-Japanese

commercial treaty, had shown to the colonial leaders that success of the White Australia Policy

was almost unattainable without the unification of the Australian colonies. 7 Thus, the

establishment of a uniform law to effectively control non-European immigration was the prime

4
The new Commonwealth was, however, not sovereign. It had no diplomatic status abroad. It could not declare
war or peace with foreign powers and had to rely on the British Navy for its security. The head of state was
the British monarch, and the British Parliament and the British Privy Council had the power to invalidate
Commonwealth laws as far as they affected external affairs. See White, Inventing Australia, p. 111; Helen
Irving, To Constitute a Nation: A Cultural History of Australia’s Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), p. 26.
5
Takeda, Monogatari ōsutoraria no rekishi, pp. 83-88; Irving, To Constitute a Nation, pp. 2-5. Until the
Federation, the six colonies were separate political entities. In 1900, the colonies still managed their own
defence, postal services and economies, collected their own customs duties at colonial borders for revenues
and administered their own immigration policies. See Clarke, Australia in a Nutshell, pp. 166-170.
6
Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, p.119.
7
See Chapter III of this thesis.
78
concern for the new Commonwealth. Accordingly, during the election campaign for the

inaugural Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia in March 1901, each of the three

parties contesting in the elections (Protectionist, Free Trade and Labor) declared its

commitment to the achievement of White Australia.8 While no party won a majority, the leader

of the Protectionist Party, Edmund Barton, was able to form a government with the support of

the Labor Party, which held the balance of power, against the opposition Free Trade Party.

These three political parties which dominated the early Commonwealth politics

disagreed on many policy issues. However, they all agreed on the principle of excluding

coloured immigrants. The White Australia Policy was, therefore, the perfect tool for the Barton

government for uniting the divided parliament and for strengthening the position of the

government.9 Under these circumstances, when the first Commonwealth Parliament opened in

Melbourne in May 1901, Barton wasted no time and introduced the Immigration Restriction

Bill on 5 June after bills for the administration of the Commonwealth government were dealt

with.10

4.2. CONSUL EITAKI

The introduction of the immigration bill by the new Commonwealth government had, in fact,

been long anticipated by the Japanese Consul in Sydney, Eitaki Hisakichi. Eitaki succeeded

Nakagawa Tsunejirō as the Japanese Consul in Sydney in January 1899. Like his predecessor,

Eitaki’s main task was to monitor and report on the situation in the colonies, particularly

regarding the exclusion of the Japanese in Australia. Not long after his appointment, Eitaki

recognised the possibility that the future Commonwealth government might introduce

legislation aimed at excluding coloured immigrants including Japanese. On 19 August 1899,

8
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, pp. 19 -22.
9
Ibid., pp. 19-22: Takeda, “Haku-gō seisaku no seiritsu to nihon no taiō,” p. 30.
10
Murakami, “Australia’s Immigration Legislation, 1893-1901,” p. 59. See also CPD, House of Representatives
Official Hansard, No. 23, 1901, Wednesday, 5 June 1901, p. 740.
79
almost two years before the Immigration Restriction Bill was introduced to the Commonwealth

Parliament, he alerted the Japanese Foreign Minister, Aoki Shūzō, that “after the Federation of

the Australian colonies, this issue (restriction of coloured immigrants) is very likely to resurface,

and the Japanese government should be well prepared to handle the situation.”11

The Japanese government was thus aware that the issue of coloured immigration

would be discussed in the newly formed Commonwealth Parliament. On 3 May 1901, Eitaki,

foreseeing the Commonwealth’s proposal for “Alien Restriction” legislation, wrote to Barton

even before the bill was brought before the Parliament.12 In his letter, Eitaki insisted that the

new legislation should not place the Japanese indiscriminately among non-European people.

He wrote:

The Japanese belong to an Empire whose standard of civilization is so much higher than that of
Kanakas, Negroes, Pacific Islanders, Indians, or other Eastern peoples, that to refer to them in the
same terms cannot but be regarded in the light of a reproach, which is hardly warranted by the fact
of the shade of the national complexion.13

In the same letter, Eitaki acknowledged Australia’s right to restrict immigration.

However, he expressed his objection to legislation which excluded Japanese immigrants based

on colour and urged Australia to enter into an agreement with Japan to exempt Japanese citizens.

“My Government recognise distinctly the right of the Government of Australia to limit in any

way it thinks fit the number of those persons who may be allowed to land and settle in Australia,”

wrote Eitaki. However, he suggested that “as Japan is under no necessity to find an outlet for

her population,” Australia should “formulate some proposal, which being accepted by my

Government, would allow of the people of Japan being excluded from the operation of an

Act.”14 Eitaki also reminded Barton of the growing trade between the two countries. Japan’s

11
Eitaki to Aoki, 19 August 1899, NGB-1899, p. 710.
12
Eitaki to Barton, 3 May 1901, NGB-1901, pp. 791-792; National Archives of Australia (hereafter cited as
NAA): A8, 1901/203/1.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid. As discussed in the previous chapter, an informal agreement, or so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” was
Japan’s favoured solution for problems concerning restriction of Japanese immigration. Under this formula,
the Japanese government agreed to voluntarily regulate the emigration of its citizens, while being afforded
most favoured nation treatment regarding the right of entry. In this way, Japan could at least maintain the
80
appeal for the consideration of bilateral trade links, however, did not invite much of Australia’s

attention. The share of exports to Japan was only 0.42 per cent of the total Australian trade in

the years 1899-1903, which was insignificant compared with exports to the United Kingdom

(49.56 per cent) or the United States of America (6.92 per cent).15

4.3. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

Meanwhile, the British government was also aware of the Commonwealth’s impending

immigration bill and warned the Australian government against introducing legislation of an

overtly discriminatory character. In his despatch to Governor-General Lord Hopetoun of 14

May 1901, Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain expressed his hope that the Commonwealth

government would not draft an immigration bill which would openly discriminate against the

Empire’s coloured subjects or which would antagonise the Japanese. Chamberlain told

Hopetoun that Japan’s protest was having “peculiar force at the present time owing to the

position of affairs in the Far East,”16 subtly hinting at, but not openly disclosing, Britain’s

secret alliance discussions with Japan.

Despite the pleas from both the Japanese and the British governments not to introduce

racially discriminatory immigration legislation, on 5 June 1901, Barton moved the first reading

for the Immigration Restriction Bill without consulting the British government. Furthermore,

Barton withheld the distribution of the bill,17 and, as a result, the Japanese government did not

receive a copy of the bill until the end of July.18 Unaware of the submission of the Immigration

Restriction Bill to the Parliament, on 3 July 1901, Japanese Foreign Minister Sone Arasuke

sent a telegram to the Japanese Minister in London, Hayashi Tadasu, and instructed him to

appearance of being accorded equal treatment with European nations. This was the nature of the agreements
Japan reached with the United States in 1907 and with Canada 1908.
15
Murakami, “Australia’s Immigration Legislation, 1893-1901,” p. 61. See also Appendix IV in Yarwood, Asian
Migration to Australia, p. 166.
16
Cited in Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 27.
17
CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 23, 1901, Wednesday, 5 June 1901, p. 740.
18
Murakami, “Australia’s Immigration Legislation, 1893-1901,” p. 61. This fact was also referred to in the letter
from Eitaki to the Japanese Foreign Minister Sone Arasuke, 30 July 1901, NGB-1901, pp. 797-798.
81
“appeal to the goodwill of the British government to prevent the introduction of the bill or to

remove a clause which is disadvantageous to our citizens.”19 The next day, on 4 July 1901,

Hayashi wrote to British Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne and requested the British

government to advise the Australian government not to introduce a bill which would severely

restrict non-European immigration or to eliminate provisions unfair to Japanese citizens.20

This request from Hayashi to Lansdowne was justified considering the unique nature

of the British-Australian relationship at the time. Although the British government was not

responsible for the Australian government’s action on immigration, it could not entirely relieve

itself of responsibility for immigration legislation in self-governing dominions. This was

because the British government held power to disallow Commonwealth legislation which it

disapproved. Hayashi’s request of 4 July was sent to the Colonial Office from the Foreign

Office, and Lansdowne was to respond to Hayashi after confirming the intention of the

Commonwealth through Colonial Secretary Chamberlain. 21 On 31 July 1901, however,

Lansdowne replied to Hayashi merely stating that “no communication on the subject has been

received at the Colonial Office from the Commonwealth government, but a copy of your

(Hayashi’s) note will be forwarded to the Governor-General to be laid before his Ministers.”22

The Japanese government was thus kept in the dark about the progress and the nature of the

bill.

4.4. THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEST

While Australia did not make any effort to meet Japan’s request for entering into an

arrangement for the restriction of Japanese immigration, in the bill introduced on 5 June, Barton

replicated the Natal pattern and adopted an education test for regulating immigration. This was

19
Sone to Hayashi, 3 July 1901, Ibid., p. 797.
20
This matter was referred to in the letter from Hayashi to the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Francis Bertie, of 8 August 1901, NGB-1901, p. 811.
21
Takeda, “Haku-gō seisaku no seiritsu to nihon no taiō,” p. 32.
22
Lansdowne to Hayashi, 31 July 1901, NGB-1901, pp. 809-810.
82
because Barton feared that a direct bill which openly excluded coloured races would result in

the delay or even the refusal of Royal Assent. 23 Barton, furthermore, departed from the

precedents of the immigration restriction legislation of New South Wales, Western Australia

and Tasmania, and initially proposed a test in the English language rather than a European

language.24 This modification of the education test, from a European to the English language,

was intended to appease Japan’s protest because such a test did not ostensibly differentiate

between European and non-European countries.25 It was the point repeatedly raised by the

Japanese authorities during the late colonial period. At the same time, this modification also

conformed to the new Commonwealth’s British race patriotism and self-identity as a white

British nation.26 After examining the bill, Eitaki praised the choice of the English language in

the education test as “being formulated after due consideration of our government’s protest.”27

In Eitaki’s opinion, as he stated in his letter to Japanese Foreign Minister Sone, a test in the

English language “would place the Japanese on an equal footing with Europeans except for the

British and Americans.”28 He, therefore, concluded that “the Imperial Government does not

object to such a test.”29

Barton’s proposal for the English language test was, however, vigorously opposed in

the Parliament. While some members doubted the effectiveness of the education test,30 many

others objected to the Natal method because they thought it was a “back door” measure. 31

Henry B. Higgins, a Protectionist from Victoria, for example, argued that Australians should

achieve their desire of maintaining racial and cultural homogeneity by a “direct method”

23
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 26.
24
In the original bill, Clause 4 (a) defined a prohibited immigrant as any person who failed to pass a test in the
English language, in contrast to the colonial test in a European language.
25
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 27; Takeda, “Haku-gō seisaku no seiritsu to nihon no taiō,” p. 31.
26
Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, p. 109.
27
Eitaki to Sone, 7 August 1901, NGB-1901, pp. 804-805.
28
Eitaki to Sone, 30 July 1901, Ibid., pp. 797-798.
29
Ibid.
30
For example, J.C. Watson stated that he did not think that “the Natal legislation has been efficient.” See Mr.
Watson, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 36, 1901, Friday, 6 September 1901, p. 4635.
31
Mr. James Manifold, Ibid., p. 4663.
83
instead of a “hypocritical method.”32 The choice of the English language in the education test

also attracted fierce opposition. Many members feared that the English language test would

further deter the immigration of non-English speaking Europeans, which was already at a low

level.33 William McMillan, the acting leader of the opposition Free Trade Party, claimed that

a test in English could exclude Welshmen but would not keep out Japanese labourers because

“Japan is becoming at present a highly-educated nation” and predicted that “in a few years

there will not be a Japanese labourer who will not be able to fulfil this test.”34 J. C. Watson,

the leader of the Labor Party, also expressed his dissatisfaction with Barton’s test clause.

Declaring that it would be “an error to pass any legislation which would place a bar in the way

of immigration from other European nations,” he raised a possibility that Australia would be

swamped by educated Asians. “With the Oriental, as a rule,” stated Watson, “the more educated,

the more cunning he becomes, and the more able, with his peculiar ideas of social and business

morality, to cope with the people here.” Watson labelled the Natal method as “ineffective” and

“roundabout.” He therefore expressed his intention to move an amendment which would

explicitly prohibit the entry of “any person who is an aboriginal native of Asia or Africa.”35

These parliamentary debates shocked the Japanese government and distressed Eitaki,

who had optimistically believed that an education test in the English language would be

adopted by the Commonwealth Parliament. Alerted by this turn of event, Eitaki renewed his

efforts. On 11 September, Eitaki wrote to Barton and requested him not to abolish the English

language test. Eitaki stated that the Japanese government was willing to accept the English

language test even though it was “a source of great inconvenience” because “it paid Japan the

courtesy of placing her upon an equal footing with other nations.” Eitaki, however, argued that

32
Mr. Higgins, Ibid., p. 4659.
33
Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, p. 124; Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 27;
Tavan, The Long Slow Death of White Australia, p. 10.
34
Sir William McMillan, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 36, 1901, Friday, 6 September
1901, pp. 4626-4627.
35
Mr Watson, Ibid., pp. 4636-4638. For the proposed amendment, see Mr. Watson, CPD, House of
Representatives Official Hansard, No. 39, 1901, Wednesday, 25 September 1901, p. 5180.
84
the test in a European language “will completely alter the scope of the Bill” and the Japanese

government would object to it. He again reminded Barton that the Japanese government was

“quite ready at any moment to give any assurance, or to enter into any suitable arrangements

for controlling immigration to Australia.” In this way, argued Eitaki, they could avoid “the

friction and irritation which might be caused by the passage of an Act framed under a

misapprehension” that “Australia is in danger of an influx of Japanese immigrants.”36

4.5. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE BILL

On 12 September, the day after Eitaki sent his letter to Barton, the second reading for the

Immigration Restriction Bill was held in the House of Representatives. During the

parliamentary debates on the day, as well as the debates a week earlier, several members

emphasised the importance of maintaining the racial purity of the new nation in defending the

Immigration Restriction Bill. Isaac Isaacs, a Protectionist from Victoria, later Justice of the

High Court and the first Australian born Governor-General, for example, argued that it was

necessary to ensure that “Australia shall be white, and that we shall be free for all time from

the contamination and the degrading influence of inferior races.”37 The acting leader of the

opposition Free Trade Party, William McMillan, argued that it was necessary to “prevent any

large infiltration of alien elements” into the national life in order to “uphold the purity of the

race of Australia.”38 Even the Labor Party, the party which represented people who would

suffer most economically from an influx of coolie labour, emphasised the importance of race

in opposing non-European immigration. J. C. Watson, the first national leader of the party,

declared that:

The objection I have to the mixing of these coloured people with the white people of Australia –

36
Eitaki to Barton, 11 September 1901, NGB-1901, pp. 822-823.
37
Mr. Isaacs, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 37, 1901, Thursday, 12 September 1901, p.
4845.
38
Sir William MacMillan, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 36, 1901, Friday, 6 September
1901, pp. 4626-4627.
85
 although I admit it is to a large extent tinged with consideration of an industrial nature – lies in the
main in the possibility and probability of racial contamination.39

As the debates unfolded in the new legislature, one prevailing theme emerged; the

preservation of Australian nationality from the threat from alien races, who would taint the

racial and cultural homogeneity of the new nation and thus disturb the national unity.

Throughout the debates on the bill, the White Australia Policy and the Immigration Restriction

Bill, which embodied the principle of White Australia, were spoken of as a policy to preserve

the white British character of the Commonwealth and unite the new nation. It was claimed that

non-Europeans could never assimilate with the white Australian population, would forever

remain as an alien element in the population and would therefore disturb the peace and stability

of the nation. Consequently, it was argued that the maintenance of a racially homogeneous

population was essential for building a united and cohesive nation.40 “The unity of Australia

is nothing, if that does not imply a united race,” declared Alfred Deakin, the Protectionist

Attorney-General of the first Commonwealth government, the third Prime Minister of the

Commonwealth of Australia and one of the most dominant figures of the early

Commonwealth. 41 In his passionate speech on the Immigration Restriction Bill on 12

September 1901, Deakin told his colleagues that White Australia was “part of the first

principles by which the Commonwealth was to be administered and guided” in order to ensure

that only those people who shared common loyalty to common ideals could be founding

members of the new nation. Thus, he continued:

A united race means not only that its members can intermix, intermarry and associate without
degradation on either side, but implies one inspired by the same ideas, and an aspiration towards the
same ideals, of a people possessing the same general cast of character, tone of thought – the same
constitutional training and traditions – a people qualified to live under this Constitution – the
broadest and the most liberal perhaps the world has yet seen reduced to writing – a people qualified
to use without abusing it, and to develop themselves under it to the full height and extent of their

39
Mr. Watson, Ibid., pp. 4633-4634.
40
Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, pp. 188-201; Margot Hentze, “Australia and Oriental
Immigration 1900-1934,” in Ross (ed.), Australia and the Far East, p. 50; Markus, Fear and Hatred, pp. xiv-
xv. See also CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, particularly No. 36, 1901, Friday, 6 September
1901 and No. 37, 1901, Thursday, 12 September 1901.
41
Mr. Deakin, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 37, 1901, Thursday, 12 September 1901, p.
4807.
86
 capacity.42

For Deakin, White Australia was a foundational policy of the new Commonwealth which

would dictate the character and destiny of the new nation. He believed that racial unity was

essential for national unity and that in order to preserve the unity and character of the nation,

the Commonwealth could admit immigrants only if within a reasonable time they showed a

willingness and a capacity to integrate ideally as well as racially with the white Australian

population. Deakin had formed an opinion, through Australia’s own experience with coloured

(particularly Chinese) immigrants and the experience of other countries (notably the United

States), that non-Europeans had neither this willingness nor this capacity.43 The Immigration

Restriction Act was to protect the population and institutions of Australia from contamination

by supposedly inferior and unassimilable races and ensure that Australia would enjoy a

“purified beginning freed from the threat of pollution and disorder that…came from coloured

people in numbers.”44 It was central to the process of nation-building. It was a key strategy in

building a white British Australia from which all others would be excluded.

During his speech, Deakin distinguished between the various “coloured races,”

expressing high regard for the Japanese by stating that Japan was “the highest and most

civilised among the nations of the world.” He even conceded that “a nation which is capable

of the achievements which Japan is able to exhibit” was justified in resenting “any

unnecessarily offensive legislation on the part of another nation.” This gave his fellow

parliamentarians the impression that he was defending Japan. However, when asked whether

he advocated Japanese immigration, Deakin replied that “the Japanese require to be absolutely

excluded.” He contended that “the Japanese require to be excluded because of their high

42
Ibid., p. 4807.
43
During the debates on the Immigration Restriction Bill, references were often made to the situation in the
United States. For example, during the speech he made on 12 September 1901, Deakin spoke of “difficulties”
faced by the United States regarding Asian immigration and warned not to “fail to lay those lessons to heart.”
See Mr. Deakin, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 37, 1901, Thursday, 12 September
1901, p. 4806.
44
Irving, To Constitute a Nation, pp. 100-101.
87
abilities.” “The Japanese are the most dangerous,” declared Deakin, “because they most nearly

approach us, and would, therefore, be our most formidable competitors.” Deakin, moreover,

insisted that “the fact that while they remain an element in our population, they are incapable

of being assimilated makes them all the more to be feared.” The effect of contact between the

two peoples, according to Deakin, would not be to lift the Japanese up to Australian standards

but to drag Australians to the level of Japanese. Deakin then affirmed that the purpose of

applying the education test was to “exclude alien Asiatics as well as the people of Japan against

whom the measure is primarily aimed.”45

Speaking right after Deakin, William Morris Hughes, a Labor member for West

Sydney and a son of Welsh-speaking parents, expressed his objection to the English test,

arguing that it would discriminate more against Gaelic and Welsh-speaking Britons than it

would against educated Japanese. Hughes also criticised the Commonwealth government for

its subordination to Britain and Japan in framing the most central and fundamental policy of

the new nation. “On the threshold of our national career as a young nation,” he claimed, “there

seems nothing for us to do but to take our stand boldly with one voice” in order to “have a

white Australia uncontaminated.” Hughes insisted that Australians should not be denied “the

necessity of maintaining the purity of our race” because “we shall offend the Japanese or annoy

and embarrass His Majesty’s ministers.”46 In response to the fierce opposition to his proposal

for the English language test, Barton agreed that if the Watson amendment were rejected, he

would submit an amendment of his own to replace the English language test with a test in any

European language.47

45
Mr. Deakin, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 37, 1901, Thursday, 12 September 1901, pp.
4812, 4816.
46
Mr Hughes, Ibid., pp. 4819-4825.
47
Mr Barton, Ibid., p. 4834.
88
4.6. JAPAN’S RESPONSE

The parliamentary debates on the Immigration Restriction Bill were widely publicised in the

press, and Eitaki followed the proceedings closely.48 On 13 September, Eitaki read the portion

of the debate that had taken place on the previous day in a Sydney newspaper.49 The debate

itself and Barton’s concession to introduce an amendment to replace the English language test

compelled Eitaki to lodge an official protest to the Australian government. In his letter to Barton

on 16 September, Eitaki confessed to being perplexed by Deakin’s speech and asked whether

Deakin was “serious” when he said that the Japanese must be excluded “not on account of their

bad qualities, but because of their good points.” Eitaki also expressed the Japanese

government’s discontent with Barton’s proposed amendment to make the education test in any

European language instead of the English language. “The English test was regarded by my

Government as courteous to Japan,” stated Eitaki, “inasmuch as it placed her upon an equal

footing with other nations,” but “the amendment now proposed must be regarded as

discourteous.” Eitaki then requested that “the Japanese shall not be marked out to suffer a

special disability” and proposed that Japanese citizens should be tested in the Japanese

language because he could not find “any sufficient reason why the Japanese language should

not be regarded as upon the same footing with” European languages.50

Soon after he sent this letter to Barton, Eitaki was able to examine a full copy of the

12 September debate, which drew further complaints from Eitaki. In his letter to Barton of 20

September, Eitaki strongly condemned Deakin’s public declarations that the bill was primarily

aimed at the Japanese. “My requests that the Japanese might be treated in the same manner as

the European nations have not been of any avail,” stated Eitaki, “and the Bill is unmistakeably

and professedly aimed at the Japanese upon grounds which must form the subject of the

48
Oliver, Allies, Enemies and Trading Partners, p. 14.
49
This fact was referred to in his letter to Barton on 16 September 1901, NGB-1901, p. 824.
50
Eitaki to Barton, 16 September 1901, Ibid., pp. 823-826.
89
strongest possible protests should it be passed.” 51

While pressing Barton not to pass any immigration law which discriminated against

Japanese citizens, on 17 September, Eitaki held a press conference in Sydney in order to explain

Japan’s position on the Commonwealth’s immigration restriction legislation. 52 During the

press conference, Eitaki acknowledged the Commonwealth’s rights to restrict immigration.

However, he insisted that “by reason of their importance as a nation,” and “because the

Japanese belong to an empire whose standard of civilisation is so much higher” than that of

other Asian nations, the Japanese should either “be exempt from the scope of the bill” or “be

placed upon the same footing as European nations.”53 In the meantime, in mid-September, the

Japanese Consul in Townsville, Iijima Kametarō, sent an anonymous letter entitled

“Immigration Restriction Bill: The Japanese Point of view” to several Australian newspapers.54

In the letter, Iijima argued that it was “quite absurd” to treat Japanese “as an inferior and less

civilised race” because “anyone who has been watching the transformation of Japan during the

last thirty years” would “grant Japan the rank of great power.” He also stated that the Japanese

government had “no desire to encourage emigration of their subjects to a country where they

are not welcomed.”55

However, these efforts by Iijima and Eitaki did not exert any influence on Barton.

After the narrow defeat of Watson’s amendment in the Lower House on 26 September, Barton

submitted his own amendment, replacing the English language with any European language in

the education test.56 On 9 October, the third reading of the Immigration Restriction Bill took

place, and the Lower House passed the bill which contained the education test “in any European

51
Eitaki to Barton, 20 September 1901, Ibid., pp. 826-827.
52
Takeda, “Haku-gō seisaku no seiritsu to nihon no taiō,” p. 34.
53
Eitaki’s interview was published by the leading newspapers such as The Age in Melbourne (18 September
1901), The Ballarat Star (19 September 1901) and The Telegraph in Brisbane (19 September 1901).
54
Several newspapers, including The Brisbane Courier (21 September 1901) and The Evening Star published the
letter (this fact was referred to in Iijima’s letter to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō of 28 September 1901,
NGB-1901, p. 830).
55
The whole text of Iijima’s letter to newspapers was included as an attachment to the communication from Iijima
to Komura on 28 September 1901, NGB-1901, pp. 831-835.
56
CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 39, 1901, Thursday, 26 September 1901, p. 5288.
90
Language” to be applied to intending immigrants.57 The next day, on 10 October, Eitaki sent

yet another letter to Barton and expressed his regret that “racial prejudice should be so strong

as to seek expression” in the Commonwealth’s inaugural immigration legislation.58

Eitaki’s repeated representations to Barton remained unanswered until 14 October,

when Barton finally replied to Eitaki. However, even then, Barton displayed his usual

uncompromising attitude, stating that the Immigration Restriction Bill “involves no unfriendly

or other discrimination between immigrants on the mere ground of colour.”59 Eitaki again

wrote to Barton on 22 October and challenged Barton’s statement, claiming that the Japanese

government would “fail to follow your contention that no unfriendly discrimination between

immigrants is intended” in the immigration bill.60 Barton did not reply to Eitaki’s letter. In

short, while the parliamentary debates on the Immigration Restriction Bill took place, the

repeated approaches by Eitaki were largely ignored by Barton.

4.7. JAPAN’S APPEAL FOR BRITISH INTERVENTION

Having failed to move Barton, the Japanese government changed its tactics. In early October,

Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō instructed Eitaki and the Japanese Minister in

London, Hayashi Tadasu, to approach the British government and ask for its intervention.61

Accordingly, on 5 October 1901, Eitaki wrote to Governor-General Lord Hopetoun conveying

Japan’s “high dissatisfaction” with the proposed bill. He stated that the Japanese government

considered the education test “racial, pure and simple.” Eitaki also informed Hopetoun that he

had requested Barton to “avoid legislating in such a manner as to make distinctions affecting

the Japanese on the ground of race and colour.” “My communications, however,” he continued,

“were not fortunate enough to produce the desired effect” and the Japanese government

57
CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 41, 1901, Wednesday, 9 October 1901, pp. 5801- 5828.
58
Eitaki to Barton, 10 October 1901, NGB-1901, pp. 846-847.
59
Barton to Eitaki, 14 October 1901, Ibid., p. 848.
60
Eitaki to Barton, 22 October 1901, Ibid., pp. 848-849.
61
Komura to Eitaki, 4 October 1901, Ibid., p. 840.
91
considered that the proposed bill “clearly make a racial discrimination.” 62 Hopetoun was

disturbed by Japan’s protests, and he duly responded to Eitaki’s representations through his

private secretary, E. W. Wallington. Wallington acknowledged the Japanese government’s

“high dissatisfaction” with the bill and informed Eitaki that “His Excellency (the Governor-

General) has submitted the representations contained in your communication for the earnest

consideration of his Responsible Advisers.”63

In London, Japanese Minister Hayashi was also appealing for intervention by the

British government. On 7 October 1901, Hayashi wrote to British Foreign Secretary Lord

Lansdowne and requested him to urge the Australian government to modify the dictation test

in the immigration bill in such manner “as to place Japanese subjects on the same footing with

those of European nationalities.” Hayashi explained that Japan felt unable to accept the new

Commonwealth’s immigration law because, in contrast to earlier colonial legislation, it was

“intended to apply in all parts of Australia” and “to all Japanese, …even well educated…unless

they can write in any of the European languages.” “The result being,” he argued, “practically

the closing of that continent to Japanese subjects in general.”64

The British government was, however, not moved by Hayashi’s argument. In 1897, as

a result of Japan’s protests, the Colonial Office had advised the Australian colonies to model

the Natal Immigration Act and adopt a language test in their immigration laws. The Under-

Secretary of the Colonial Office, H. Bertran Cox, noted that “the test proposed in the Australian

Immigration Bill…would therefore appear to meet what hitherto have always been understood

by both His Majesty’s Government and by the Colonial Governments to be the wishes of the

Japanese Government in this matter.”65 Thus, Colonial Secretary Chamberlain did not wish to

62
Eitaki to Hopetoun, 5 October 1901, Ibid., p. 843.
63
Wallington to Eitaki, 10 October 1901, Ibid., p. 847.
64
Hayashi to Lansdowne, 7 October 1901, Ibid., pp. 853-854.
65
Under-Secretary, Br. CO., H. Bertran Cox, to Under-Secretary, Br. FO., Francis Bertie, 18 October 1901, quoted
in Gordon Greenwood and Charles Grimshaw (eds.), Documents on Australian International Affairs
(Melbourne: Thomas Nelson, 1977), pp. 391-392. A copy of the letter was also enclosed in the correspondence
from Eitaki to Komura, 7 December 1901, NGB-1901, pp. 855-856.
92
request the Australian government to make more modification, especially since he did not think

“there is any prospect that Commonwealth Government would be able to entertain such a

suggestion.”66 As a result, the Colonial Office did nothing other than to transmit a copy of

Hayashi’s letter to Governor-General Hopetoun with an appendix indicating the Japanese

government’s position in 1897.67 Hopetoun was still troubled by the controversy. After the bill

was passed by the House of Representatives on 9 October, he wrote to Chamberlain once again.

Hopetoun stated that since the bill was “distasteful” to Japan and since it was essential to avoid

friction with that nation “in the immediate future”—a clear reference to alliance negotiations—

he wanted to know whether the bill should be reserved.68

Despite Hopetoun’s concern, the second reading of the Immigration Restriction Bill

in the Senate began on 13 November, and the bill was passed on 6 December. However, the

Japanese government did not give up its effort to try and secure British intervention. In London,

Hayashi, on instruction from Tokyo, requested British Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne to

induce the Governor-General not to assent to the bill. In his letter of 16 December, Hayashi

acknowledged that the Commonwealth’s immigration bill had been “framed in such a way as

to avoid the objections on the part of the Imperial Government,” but criticised the bill as being

“aimed for the purpose to which the Imperial Government must take exception.”69 In other

words, Hayashi claimed that the Japanese government was not opposed to how the bill looked

or how it was worded, but to how it was intended to be used. This was a significant departure

from the position taken by the Japanese government during the late colonial period. In the late

colonial period, the Japanese government was mostly concerned with being granted the

appearance of equality with European nations. As a result, in 1897, the Japanese Minister in

London, Katō Takaaki, only requested that the wording of the colonial immigration bills should

66
Ibid.
67
This fact was mentioned in the letter cited above. Ibid.
68
Telegram, Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 12 November 1901, TNA: CO 418/10/394-5.
69
Hayashi to Lansdowne, 16 December 1901, NGB-1901, pp. 858-859.
93
not appear to classify Japanese people with “the Chinese or other less advanced populations of

Asia.”70 Yet four years later, Katō’s successor, Hayashi Tadasu, argued that Japan was not

opposed to how the bill was “framed” but to the “purpose” of the bill.71 To support his case,

Hayashi quoted from the statements made by Barton and Deakin during the parliamentary

debates on the bill, in which they declared that the bill was not aimed at Europeans but was

primarily aimed at the Japanese. He called these statements “monstrous declarations.” Hayashi,

moreover, politely alluded to the ongoing Anglo-Japanese Alliance talks and requested the

British government to induce the Australian government “to dispense with those legislation

quite unfair to one of the friendliest nations with the United Kingdom.”72

This letter of representations from Hayashi came at a very inconvenient time for the

British government. The Anglo-Japanese alliance negotiation had entered its final and most

delicate stage in late 1901.73 Lansdowne, who had been informed of Chamberlain’s approval

of the Immigration Restriction Bill, was concerned about the repercussions the bill might have

on the ongoing alliance negotiations. “The passage of such a Bill in the face of protest from the

Japanese Government would be most unfortunate at the present time,” Lansdowne told

Chamberlain. He therefore asked Chamberlain whether it would be possible to disallow the

bill. 74 In short, Lansdowne recognised that the passing of anti-Japanese immigration

legislation by the Commonwealth might have an adverse effect on the alliance. However, the

Foreign Office was unable to tell Australia about the alliance negotiations, which had been

conducted in secret. It was then up to Colonial Secretary Chamberlain to decide whether or not

to apply any pressure on the Commonwealth government.75

70
Katō to Salisbury, 7 October 1897, quoted in Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 14; Sissons,
“Immigration in Australian-Japanese Relations, 1871-1971,” p. 199; Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, p.
80. See also Chapter III, 3.4. of this thesis.
71
Hayashi to Lansdowne, 16 December 1901, NGB-1901, pp. 858-859.
72
Ibid.
73
Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907 (London: Athlone
Press, 1966), pp. 204-216.
74
Under-Secretary, Br. FO. to Under-Secretary, Br. CO., 25 December 1901, TNA: CO 418/16/404.
75
Ian Nish, “Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1901-1911,” in The Australian Journal of Politics and
History, 1963, vol. 9, no. 2: 201-212, p. 203.
94
 As it turned out, Chamberlain was not very sympathetic to Lansdowne’s concern. He

again reminded Lansdowne that the Japanese government had previously approved the Natal

method adopted in the bill. He also pointed out that the Japanese government was not opposed

to the legislation itself but the opinions expressed in the parliamentary debates. The British

government “can only take account of the wording of the Bill alone and not of remarks made

during the debate on the Bill which have no binding force whatever,” argued Chamberlain. He

then raised the possibility that “if the present Bill were disallowed, the only result would be the

passage of a more drastic measure.”76 In other words, even with the alliance hanging on the

balance, Chamberlain was unwilling to instruct the Governor-General to withhold assent to the

bill in view of Australia’s apparent determination to carry it through. In the end, Chamberlain’s

view prevailed, and the Foreign Office reluctantly concurred with the Colonial Office. In short,

Japan was unable to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the ongoing alliance talks

to request Britain to advise Australia to modify the bill in Japan’s favour.

The main reason for Japan’s failure to exploit the alliance negotiation to put pressure

on Britain lay in the fact that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the first priority in Japan’s

foreign policy at the time. 77 To become Britain’s ally was a substantial gain for Japan’s

international prestige and had a significant bearing upon Japan’s quest for achieving equality

with the West and attaining an identity as a “civilised” power. The alliance also secured moral

and financial support from Britain in preparation for the war against Russia.78 This is not to

deny the importance of the alliance for Britain. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to assure

Britain’s position in the Far East and enable it to withdraw warships from Far Eastern to

European waters. 79 Yet the alliance meant more for Japan than for Britain. Thus, in his

76
Under-Secretary, Br, CO. to Under-Secretary, Br. FO., 4 January 1902, TNA: CO 418/16/391-4. Chamberlain’s
position on this matter was also conveyed in the letter from Lansdowne to Hayashi, 8 February 1902, NGB-
1902, pp. 732-734.
77
Nish, “Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1901-1911,” p. 204.
78
Ibid.
79
Ian Nish, “The Origin and Negotiations of the Anglo-Japanese Agreements of 1902,” M.A. Thesis, London
University 1958, Part 3, Chapter 5; Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 41.
95
communications with the British government regarding Japanese immigration in Australia,

Japanese Minister Hayashi made “petitions” but could not afford to make “threats.”80

Meanwhile in Sydney, on 21 December, Eitaki wrote to Governor-General Hopetoun

asking him not to give his assent to the bill on the grounds that the bill might come into conflict

with the existing agreement between Japan and Queensland.81 Hopetoun was away on a trip

to Western Australia, but his secretary promised Eitaki that he would send his letter to the

Governor-General. However, on 23 December in Perth, Hopetoun, who had decided not to

reserve the bill based on the advice from Chamberlain, assented to the bill before receiving

Eitaki’s letter. 82 The Governor-General’s assent put an end to the Japanese government’s

resolute, and yet, very difficult attempt to put its citizens on an equal footing with Europeans

in the Commonwealth’s inaugural immigration legislation.

4.8. CONCLUSION

The establishment of the Immigration Restriction Act after receiving Royal Assent on 23

December 1901 was the embodiment of the new Commonwealth’s self-definition and self-

identity as a white British nation. The IRA was established in order to preserve the national

myth of Australia as a racially and culturally homogeneous white British nation and to unite

the new Commonwealth from the looming threat from alien races.

The leaders of the new nation believed that maintaining a racially homogeneous

population was essential for preserving the unity and character of their nation. They also felt

strongly that their country possessed the right to determine the composition of its own

population and that non-European coloured races, who were unable to assimilate with the white

Australian population, should be excluded from the process of nation-building. At the same

80
Takeda, “Haku-gō seisaku no seiritsu to nihon no taiō,” p. 35.
81
Eitaki to Hopetoun, 21 December 1901, NGB-1901, pp. 864-865.
82
Murakami, “Australia’s Immigration Legislation, 1893-1901,” p. 66. This fact was also referred to in the letter
from Hayashi to Hopetoun, 31 December 1901, NGB-1902, p. 713.
96
time, however, they were also aware that they should frame their immigration restriction

legislation in such a way as to do the least damage to imperial interests. Consequently, the

Commonwealth government replicated the colonial immigration laws and adopted the

education test in any European language on the grounds that the Japanese government had

previously approved this method.

However, the European language requirement in the legislation of 1901 produced

strong objections from Japan to both the British and the Australian governments. In 1897, the

Japanese government merely demanded that the wording of the colonial legislation should not

appear to classify Japanese people with Chinese or other “uncivilised” Asian people. However,

in 1901, it insisted that it was opposed to the content, not the form, of the Commonwealth

immigration legislation, and requested the Australian and the British governments to place

Japanese citizens on the same footing as Europeans. This represented a significant shift in

Japan’s foreign policy. During the late colonial period, Japan was primarily concerned about

avoiding damage to its emerging international reputation as a “civilised” state. As a result, it

accepted the discriminatory treatment of its citizens as long as it was accorded the appearance

of equality with European nations. However, in 1901, with its growing confidence on the

international scene, Japan believed that as a “civilised” power which was engaged in alliance

negotiations with Britain, its citizens deserved equal treatment with Europeans. Consequently,

the Japanese government pressed the Commonwealth government to conclude a reciprocal

arrangement, or so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement, in order to exempt Japanese citizens from

the operation of the Act while assuring the Commonwealth that Japan had no intention of

promoting migration to Australia.

Australian Prime Minister Edmund Barton, however, almost completely ignored

repeated approaches by the Japanese Consul in Sydney, Eitaki Hisakichi. Maintaining the

principle of inviolability of a White Australia, Barton firmly rejected Japan’s requests for the

97
relaxation of the restriction on Japanese immigrants. Furthermore, from September 1901, with

Alfred Deakin’s speech in which he claimed that “the Japanese require to be excluded because

of their high abilities,”83 the Immigration Restriction Bill became increasingly anti-Japanese

in its character.

However, it should be noted that during the early years of the Commonwealth,

Australians saw Japan mainly as a migratory, not military, threat to their country. When Deakin

declared that “the Japanese were the most dangerous”84 during the parliamentary debates on

the Immigration Restriction Bill, he was not thinking of Japan as a military or strategic threat.

Instead, he perceived Japan and Japanese immigration to be the greatest threat to the white

British character of the new nation.85 As we will see in Chapter VI, Australia began to see

Japan as a military threat only after its victory over Russia in 1905.

While the Immigration Restriction Bill was being debated in the parliament, Japan had

been engaged in secret negotiations with Britain over the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Moreover,

the final phase of the alliance negotiations coincided with the passage of the Immigration

Restriction Bill and the Governor-General’s assent to the bill. In this sense, Japan was in the

perfect position to exert diplomatic pressure on Britain so that it would induce Australia to

grant some special consideration to Japanese citizens. However, Japan was unable to exploit

the opportunity afforded by the alliance negotiations because the alliance was more important

for Japan than for Britain. At the same time, the British government was unprepared to follow

Japan’s policy reversal. Partly at Japan’s request in 1897, Britain had urged the Australian

colonies to withdraw their Coloured Races Restriction Bills and to restrict non-European

immigration by means of an education test. In Britain’s opinion, the form of the

Commonwealth immigration bill was based on the explicit recommendation of the Japanese

83
Mr. Deakin, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 37, 1901Thursday, 12 September 1901, p.
4812.
84
Ibid.
85
Meany, The Search for Security in the Pacific, pp. 107, 115-116; Meaney, “The problem of nationalism and
race,” p. 9.
98
government, and therefore, should be satisfactory to Japan.

Despite Japan’s continuous efforts, the Immigration Restriction Bill was eventually

passed by both Houses without exemptions for Japanese citizens and received Royal Assent on

23 December 1901, thus closing Australia to further permanent settlement by the Japanese. For

over half a century thereafter, the only Japanese allowed to enter Australia were a small number

of merchants, students and tourists on temporary visas and contract labourers for the pearling

industry. However, it might be noted that Japan’s diplomatic efforts with Australia produced

some positive results after the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. From 1904, the

Australian government sought in many ways to render the policy of exclusion less offensive to

Japan. This will be the subject of the next chapter.

99
 CHAPTER V
AUSTRALIA’S MINOR CONCESSIONS

This chapter explores concessions Australia made concerning Japanese immigration in the

early 20th century. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Immigration Restriction Act of

1901 made it practically impossible for non-Europeans to migrate to Australia. However,

Japanese citizens enjoyed certain privileges and special treatments which were not afforded

to other non-Europeans under the White Australia Policy. Although the Commonwealth

government was determined to exclude Japanese permanent settlers from Australia, it sought

in many ways to make the policy of exclusion less offensive to the Japanese.

In the early 1900s, two minor modifications to the IRA were implemented to relax

the restrictions imposed on the temporary entry of Japanese citizens. The first of these, the

Passport Agreement, was concluded in 1904. The agreement permitted Japanese merchants,

students, and tourists to enter Australia temporarily without having to take the dictation test,

which was mandatory for all other non-Europeans. In the following year, the dictation test of

the IRA was altered from a European language to “any prescribed language” 1 thereby

granting Japanese immigrants nominal equality with their European counterparts.

Furthermore, in the administration of Commonwealth immigration laws, Japanese citizens

received far more lenient treatment than other non-Europeans.2

These concessions were, however, not afforded to Japanese citizens during the first

few years of the IRA’s operation as Prime Minister Edmund Barton firmly rejected Japan’s

repeated remonstrations. The Commonwealth government started displaying a conciliatory

attitude to the Japanese immigration question only after Alfred Deakin replaced Barton as

1
See Australian Government, Federal Register of Legislation, Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1905,
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C1905A00017.
2
Oliver, “Japanese Relationships in White Australia,” pp. 3-6. According to Pamela Oliver, many files held at
the National Archives of Australia show that Australian officials displayed respect and afforded extra
courtesies to Japanese people who were considered to be of “high class.” See Oliver, Allies, Enemies and
Trading Partners, p. 23.
100
Prime Minister in September 1903.

5.1. JAPAN’S SUSTAINED EFFORT & BARTON’S CONTINUED REJECTION

Even after the Immigration Restriction Bill received assent from the Governor-General and

became law, Japan continued its effort to prevent the IRA from being applied to its citizens.

The Japanese government kept pressing the Commonwealth government to afford Japanese

citizens some special treatments and exempt them from the operation of the IRA. However,

Prime Minister Barton maintained an uncompromising attitude towards Japan’s approaches

and protests. The first of such cases was the negotiation concerning the Japanese-Queensland

protocol and agreement.

The introduction of the IRA put the future of the Japanese-Queensland protocol of

1897 and the subsequent agreement of 1900 under question. 3 Japan insisted that these

agreements were not affected by the introduction of the IRA, but Australia argued that the

IRA effectively annulled them. On 31 December 1901, Eitaki Hisakichi, now the Acting

Consul-General for Japan, wrote to Governor-General Hopetoun and raised this matter. In his

letter, Eitaki presented the Japanese government’s view that Japanese immigration to

Queensland would not be “in any way affected by the new immigration Act.” Eitaki also

notified Hopetoun that in accordance with the Japanese-Queensland agreement of 1900, some

Japanese passengers had left Japan onboard the Japanese mail steamer on 24 December 1901.4

E. W. Wallington, the private secretary to the Governor-General, responded to Eitaki’s letter

and conveyed Hopetoun’s opinion that the Japanese-Queensland agreement of 1900 was “only

a declaration of policy by the Queensland Government” and contained “no promise that

restrictive legislation will not be passed” by the future Commonwealth government. 5

3
On 16 March 1897 Queensland joined the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894 by means of a special
protocol, and the 1900 agreement allowed the entry of Japanese up to the limit of 3,247 to Queensland.
4
Eitaki to Hopetoun, 31 December 1901, NGB-1902, p. 713.
5
Wallington to Eitaki, 16 January 1902, Ibid., p. 717.
101
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth government conceded on the latter point and approved the

entry of 44 Japanese on board the Japanese mail steamer landing in Queensland.6 Yet, in his

telegram of 17 January 1902, Barton advised Eitaki that the decision not to raise any objection

to the entry of Japanese on board the mail steamer must not be taken as a precedent and that

no further similar concession would be made in the future.7 In a separate telegram on the

same day, Barton also informed Eitaki of Attorney-General Alfred Deakin’s opinion that as a

result of Queensland’s change of status on entering the Commonwealth, the agreement

between Japan and Queensland was no longer binding.8

In the end, Japan compromised on this issue. Eitaki informed Barton that although

the Japanese government held that the protocol of 1897 and the agreement of 1900 were still

in force until they were formally nullified, “in deference to the wishes of the Commonwealth

Parliament,” it “will now consider the understanding to have terminated.” However, Eitaki

requested that the Commonwealth government would honour the entry permits which had

already been granted to Japanese citizens.9 Barton immediately responded and consented to

Eitaki’s request.10 Subsequently, on 13 February 1902, Barton informed the Commonwealth

Parliament that Japan was going to allow the Japanese-Queensland protocol and agreement

to lapse.11 However, it was not until July 1908 that the Japanese government, at the request

of the Commonwealth government, formally denounced the protocol of 1897. Meantime,

Japan continued to grant tariff preferences to Queensland under the Anglo-Japanese

commercial treaty of 1894.12 The Japanese government’s willingness to accept the de facto

termination of the protocol and the agreement prevented the disagreement between the two

countries from escalating. However, it did not mean that Japan had given up its struggle. In

6
Hunt to Eitaki, 9 January 1902, Ibid., pp. 713-714.
7
Barton to Eitaki, 17 January 1902, Ibid., p. 720.
8
Barton to Eitaki, 17 January 1902, Ibid., p. 718.
9
Eitaki to Barton, 30 January 1902, Ibid., pp. 728-730.
10
Barton to Eitaki, 30 January 1902, Ibid., p. 730.
11
Mr. Barton, CDP, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 7, 1902, Tuesday, 13 February 1902, p.
10041.
12
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 85.
102
fact, following the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in early 1902, Japan renewed

its effort to prevent the IRA from being applied to its citizens.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded on 30 January 1902.13 The alliance,

which was announced suddenly after secret negotiations, caused a diplomatic sensation

around the world. It formally acknowledged Japan’s modernisation and admitted Japan to the

ranks of the great powers.14 As a result of Britain’s alliance with Japan, Australia, as part of

the British Empire, also became Japan’s ally. On the whole, Australia responded to the news

of the alliance as a loyal member of the Empire and warmly welcomed it. 15 Australia’s

response was in a way, as Henry Frei puts it, “anticlimax” given that both countries had been

engaged in a bitter dispute leading up to the introduction of the IRA. 16 The reason for

Australia’s warm and subdued response to the alliance lay in the fact that Australia did not

see Japan as an immediate threat to its security. During the first few years of Commonwealth,

Japan was seen only as a migratory threat to Australia, not a military one, and Australians’

hostility to Japanese migrants did not extend to Japan itself.17 As a result, the alliance was

positively perceived as a counter to Russian expansion in Asia and the Pacific.18 For example,

Prime Minister Edmund Barton greeted the news of the alliance “with satisfaction,” stating

that its effect on the Commonwealth’s naval and military position was “rather beneficial than

otherwise.” 19 At the same time, Barton maintained that the alliance would not have any

13
The alliance committed each of the parties to “come to the armed aid of the other and wage war in common”
should either be attacked by more than one power in order to “maintain the status quo” in the Far East. For
the full text of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance, see William Macmahon Ball, Australia and Japan
(Sydney: Thomas Nelson, 1969), pp. 9-11.
14
For a detailed discussion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, see Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance; Nish
“Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1901-1911.”
15
Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, p. 116-117; Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and
Australia, p. 83; Roberts, “History of the Contacts between the Orient and Australia,” p. 25.
16
Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, p. 83.
17
Scholars including D.C.S. Sissons and Neville Meaney argue that Australia started viewing Japan as a military
threat only after Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905. Until then, the Commonwealth government regarded
Russia and France as posing a greater threat to Australian and imperial interests in the Pacific. See D.C.S.
Sissons, “Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923,” MA thesis, The University of Melbourne, 1956, pp.
21-24; Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, pp. 116-117.
18
Roberts, “History of the Contacts between the Orient and Australia,” p. 25; Meaney, The Search for Security
in the Pacific, 1901-14, pp. 116-117; Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, p. 83.
19
The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 February 1902; The Age (Melbourne), 14 February 1902.
103
bearing on the Commonwealth’s immigration policy, declaring that “with respect to the

Australian Alien Immigration Act, I do not see that the treaty itself will make any

difference.”20 Japan, however, had different ideas. With its confidence greatly enhanced as a

result of the alliance with Britain, the Japanese government renewed its demand for equality

for its citizens.

The news of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was passionately welcomed by people

from all sections of Japanese society. On the day that the singing of the alliance was widely

publicised in Japan, both houses of the Japanese Imperial Diet greeted the news with

“thunderous applause.” 21 The Japanese business community similarly hailed the alliance,

with the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce (Tokyo Shōgyō Kaigisho), the Commerce and

Economic Council (Shōkō Keizai Kai), and the Commerce and Industry Club (Shōkō Kurabu)

jointly holding a banquet to celebrate the occasion. 22 Newspapers in Japan echoed these

sentiments. 23 For example, Jiji Shinpō praised the alliance between Japan and “the most

powerful and most civilised nation in the world.”24 Asahi Shimbun, for its part, commented

that the alliance enhanced Japan’s “national dignity and prestige.”25 Similarly, in his speech

delivered at the headquarter of the Shinpotō (the Progressive Party) on 14 February 1902,

former Japanese Prime Minister, Ōkuma Shigenobu, called the alliance “the diplomatic

success which the whole Japanese nation should be most pleased with.” He further declared

that the alliance had dramatically lifted Japan’s standing in international society and put Japan

on an equal footing with the “great powers (rekkyō).”26

In short, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance boosted Japan’s confidence in its international

20
Ibid.
21
Reported in Asahi Shimbun, 13 February 1902.
22
Reported in Jiji Shinpō, 14 February 1902; Asahi Shimbun, 14 February 1902.
23
See February 13, 14, and 15 issues of Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Jiji Shinpō, Hōchi
Shimbun and Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun.
24
Jiji Shinpō, 13 February 1902.
25
Asahi Shimbun, 13 February 1902.
26
Reported in Asahi Shimbun, 15 February 1902; Yomiuri Shimbun, 15 February 1902; Jiji Shinpō, 15 February
1902.
104
status and identity. Subsequently, the Japanese public and politicians alike began to openly

resent discriminatory treatment Japanese people faced in certain countries. For example, in

an article titled “the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Great Powers (Nichi-ei dōmei to rekkyō),”

Asahi Shimbun criticised the anti-Japanese immigration legislation and practices in white

settler societies such as the United States and Canada.27 In the Japanese Diet, questions were

raised regarding discriminatory treatments of Japanese citizens in Australia and other

countries. In early March, a Lower House member, Nemoto Tadashi, submitted a question

asking whether or not the Japanese government would take any measures against the virtual

exclusion of Japanese labourers in Australia and anti-Asian immigration legislation and

movements in the United States.28 Similarly, Ōishi Masami, also a Lower House member,

questioned the government about its policy regarding Australia’s anti-Japanese immigration

legislation. In response to these questions, Prime Minister Katsura Tarō stated that although

the Imperial government “unfortunately” had failed to prevent the IRA, negotiations were

again underway with the British government.29

The Australian press was aware of Japan’s public opinion against the

Commonwealth’s immigration policy, and on 11 March 1902, The Argus reported that:

The attitude of the Australian Commonwealth to Japanese immigrants is attracting much attention
in Japan, particularly since the conclusion of the treaty between that country and Great Britain.
The Japanese Government has been questioned on the subject in the Diet, and in reply, a statement
was made that the Government believed that steps had been taken for the removal of the
discrimination of Australian legislation against Japanese subjects and that it was further believed
that those steps would be successful.”30

On the day that the article appeared, the leader of the Labor Party, Chris Watson, questioned

Prime Minister Barton about the article during the parliamentary debates. However, Barton

27
Asahi Shimbun, 31 March 1902. Prior to this, in February 1902, various newspapers praised the Canadian
Central government for advising the provincial government of British Columbia to amend the anti-Japanese
immigration legislation which it had passed during the previous parliamentary session. See Asahi Shimbun,
16 February 1902; Jiji Shinpō, 16 February 1902; Yomiuri Shimbun, 17 February 1902.
28
Nemoto’s question was endorsed by more than 30 fellow Lower House members. See “Question regarding
the exclusion of Japanese in the Pacific area” submitted by Nemoto Tadashi, 6 March 1902, the 16th Japanese
Imperial Diet Proceedings, Kanpō (Japanese Government Official Gazette), Meiji 35th year (1902), vol. 27,
p. 575.
29
Ibid., p. 573.
30
The Argus (Melbourne), 11 March 1902.
105
dismissed Watson’s question and declared that “there is no discrimination against Japanese

subjects that I know of in any Australian legislation” and “no such negotiations as are hinted

at have been initiated.”31

Barton’s statement greatly upset Eitaki. On 21 March 1902, Eitaki wrote to Barton

and disputed his claim by reminding him of Attorney General Deakin’s statement made in

September 1901 that the dictation test of the IRA was “primarily aimed at the people of

Japan.” 32 Barton, however, remained indifferent to Japan’s protests. He replied that “the

contention that the test in an European language implies discrimination against Japanese

subjects has already been discussed” between the Japanese and the British governments and

he was therefore neither “required or entitled to add anything” to the matter.33

Meanwhile, in London, Japanese Minister Hayashi Tadasu was seeking to secure

British intervention in order to have the IRA disallowed.34 Section 59 of the Commonwealth

of Australian Constitution Act stipulates that the King or the Queen may disallow any law

within one year from the Governor-General’s assent.35 On 11 June 1902, Hayashi met with

the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Lansdowne, and requested the British

government to disallow the IRA or to induce the Commonwealth government to amend it.

Hayashi also attempted to see Barton, who was in London for the Colonial Conference at the

time, in order to discuss the possibility of an amendment that would exempt Japanese citizens

from the operation of the Act.36 However, Barton declined Hayashi’s request for an interview

through Colonial Secretary Chamberlain, stating that “in the present temper of the Australian

31
Mr Watson and Mr Barton, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 11, 1902, Tuesday, 11 March
1902, pp. 10819-10820.
32
Eitaki to Barton, 21 March 1902, NGB-1902, pp. 743-744.
33
Barton to Eitaki, 8 April 1902, Ibid., pp. 745-746.
34
In his telegram of 13 March 1902 to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Komura Jutarō, Eitaki insisted that Japan
should urge the British government to disallow the IRA under Section 59 of the Commonwealth Constitution
Act. Komura immediately instructed the Japanese Minister in London, Hayashi Tadasu, to approach the
British government. See Eitaki to Komura, 13 March 1902, Ibid., p. 738; Komura to Hayashi, 19 March 1902,
Ibid., pp. 738-740.
35
See Australian Government, Federal Register of Legislation, Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2013Q00005, Section 59.
36
These facts were referred to in the confidential letter from Hayashi to Komura, 18 June 1902, Ibid., pp. 751-
752.
106
people, it would be useless to attempt any amendment to the IRA of 1901.”37

In fact, in January 1902. Barton, weary of Eitaki’s repeated approaches, requested

Chamberlain that “communications on international matters between the Representatives of

the United Kingdom and Japan should, as far as practicable, be made through the regular

diplomatic channels in London and Tokyo.”38 As part of the British Empire, Australia in 1902

was subject to imperial foreign policy, and Australia had to conduct its diplomacy primarily

through London. This arrangement was indeed a great obstacle for Australia’s initiative in its

foreign affairs. However, it could also be used to filter and diffuse complaints from other

countries, and Barton took full advantage of it. 39 By insisting that Japanese approaches

should be administered through formal British diplomatic channels, Barton successfully

averted Japan’s diplomatic offensive and freed himself from any future discussions on

Japanese immigration issues. The British government, for its part, readily accepted Barton’s

request. This was because, in the opinion of the Colonial Office, direct negotiations tended to

“withdraw the foreign relations from the control of H.M.G.”40 In other words, the British

government welcomed Barton’s request as a way of preserving Britain’s supremacy in

imperial foreign policy.41

In the end, in spite of Japan’s repeated approaches to the British and the Australian

governments, King Edward VII, on the advice of the Colonial Secretary, decided not to

37
Copy of the letter included in the correspondence from the Under-Secretary, Br. CO. to the Under-Secretary,
Br. FO., 10 July 1902, TNA: CO 418/23/584. Also quoted in Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 174
(Chapter 2 footnote 33).
38
Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 18 January 1902, TNA: CO 418/18/52. See also Yarwood, Asian Migration to
Australia, p. 85.
39
Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, pp. 117-118.
40
The Under-Secretary, Br. CO. to the Under-Secretary, Br. FO., TNA: CO 418/18/85, Also quoted in Meaney,
The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, p. 118.
41
Until the end of World War II, Australia was formally and constitutionally a dependent part of the British
Empire, possessing neither a defence nor a foreign policy of its own. However, Neville Meaney argues that
the belief that Australia in those years had no interest in international affairs is a myth. He observes that from
the end of the 19th century, successive Australian governments were aware of their peculiar geo-political
circumstances and developed defence and foreign policies within the formal framework of the British Empire
in order to protect Australia’s external interests. Meaney also points out that on a few occasions, the
Commonwealth government even attempted to advance its own interests over the imperial interests,
especially on Pacific affairs. However, the British government, which had control over the making of
imperial foreign policy, refused to accept that Australian interests should have a dominant say in determining
policy. See Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, especially Chapter 1and Chapter 4.
107
exercise power contained in Section 59 of the Australian Constitution Act to disallow the

Governor-General’s assent to the IRA. Subsequently, the Acting Prime Minister, Alfred

Deakin, publicised the decision on the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 5 September

1902 and announced that the Act would continue to be in force.42

As the preceding discussion indicates, Edmund Barton, throughout his term as Prime

Minister, showed little inclination to listen to, let alone comply with, Japan’s requests and

remonstrations. Having employed an education test in any European language as a non-

discriminatory means of exclusion in the Commonwealth’s inaugural immigration legislation

in 1901, Barton was not willing to do anything more. As a result, Japan was unable to gain

any concession regarding the restriction on the entry of its citizens into Australia.43 However,

this was about to change with the arrival of Alfred Deakin as Prime Minister in September

1903.

5.2. PRIME MINISTER DEAKIN

Alfred Deakin became the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia on 24

September 1903, after having taken over leadership of the Protectionist Party from Edmund

Barton, who had retired to become one of the founding justices of the High Court. The arrival

of Deakin spelt a change in the Commonwealth policy regarding the entry of Japanese citizens.

In contrast to Barton, who maintained an uncompromising attitude to Japan’s continued

approaches and protests, Deakin was prepared to resolve Japanese immigration issues.

As we recall from the discussion in the previous chapter, in September 1901, during

42
For the full text of the announcement on the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette of 5 September 1902, see
NGB-1902, pp. 758-759.
43
The only exception was Japanese pearl divers. In 1902, the pearl-shelling industry bases in Thursday Island,
Darwin and Broome became the sole exceptions to the policy of excluding indentured coloured labour. The
objection that the practice violated the principle of white Australia was raised and Royal Commissions were
appointed by the Queensland and the Commonwealth governments. However, the investigators at Thursday
Island and Broome reported that owners would be ruined if they had to pay the high wages necessary to
attract white men to the work and recommended that exemptions were to be granted from the dictation test
to allow the introduction of coloured labourers on condition of compulsory repatriation on expiry of contract.
See Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 96.
108
the parliamentary debates on the Immigration Restriction Bill, Deakin made a statement

which displayed the high regard he held for Japan. Although Deakin claimed that “the

Japanese require to be absolutely excluded,” he conceded that “a nation which is capable of

the achievements which Japan is able to exhibit” was justified in resenting “any unnecessary

reflection upon its character by another nation.”44 Deakin thus insisted that “when it becomes

necessary for us to exclude people like the Japanese, it is reasonable that we should exclude

them in the most considerate manner possible, and without conveying any idea that we have

confused them with the many uneducated races of Asia and untutored savages who visit our

shores.”45 These statements foreshadowed the policy that Alfred Deakin as Prime Minister

would formulate concerning the issue of Japanese immigration. Throughout his term as Prime

Minister, Deakin implemented a series of new policies towards Japan, both at legislative and

administrative levels, in order to relax the restrictions imposed on Japanese citizens by the

IRA. The first of these was the Passport Agreement of 1904.

5.3. THE PASSPORT AGREEMENT OF 1904

Not long after Deakin took office, the Russo-Japanese War broke out in February 1904. The

outbreak of the war prompted Deakin to reassess Australia’s standing in relation to Japan. In

particular, two letters from Dr John Mildred Creed, a member of the Legislative Council of

New South Wales, seemed to have imparted some urgency to Deakin’s appreciation of the

matter.46 Creed’s first letter, written shortly before the outbreak of the war on 30 December

1903, began by declaring that the continued exclusion of the Japanese under the IRA was a

subject which “must be dealt with in the very near future” in order to ensure Australia’s

“ultimate safety as a nation.” Creed argued that if Japan was victorious in the imminent war

44
Mr. Deakin, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 37, 1901, Thursday, 12 September 1901,
pp. 4812-4813.
45
Ibid.
46
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, pp. 86-87.
109
with Russia, “her standing among the nations will be so vastly increased that she is not likely

to tamely submit to what she considers a national humiliation and what would now be a

graceful concession will then possibly have to be yielded to superior force.”47 In his second

letter, written soon after the outbreak of the war and dated 25 March 1904, Creed put forward

a suggestion that Japanese of the non-labouring class who had passports issued by their

government should be admitted to Australia.48 This letter appears to have been successful in

persuading the Deakin government to take some urgent conciliatory measures towards Japan

on immigration.

On 16 April 1904, Atlee Hunt, the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs,

sent a confidential letter to the new Acting Japanese Consul-General, Iwasaki Kazuo, to

ascertain whether the Japanese government was still interested in an arrangement such as

former Japanese Consul-General Eitaki had proposed to Deakin in October 1902.49 In the

letter, Hunt suggested that Japanese merchants, students and tourists with passports

sufficiently identifying them as such and specifying the purpose and duration of their visits

would be allowed to enter Australia with the condition that their document should be

examined at the first port of call. He promised that if the Japanese government was amenable

to the suggestion, Prime Minister Deakin would frame a formal communication to Iwasaki on

the subject. 50 Iwasaki replied immediately stating “I shall wait, with much pleasurable

anticipation, the promised formal communication from your respected Chief upon this

matter.”51 Before this could be done, however, Deakin resigned from his office on 27 April

1904 after the Labor Party withdrew its support over the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill.52

47
Creed to Deakin 30 December 1903, published in The Argus (Melbourne), 17 March 1904. This letter was
also quoted in the letter from Tayui to Komura, 28 March 1904, NGB-1904, vol. 2, pp. 223-224.
48
Creed to Deakin, 25 March 1904, published in The Daily Telegraph (Sydney) on 23 April 1904.
49
Hunt to Iwasaki, 16 April 1904, NGB-1904, vol. 2, pp. 225-227. In October 1902, Eitaki approached Deakin,
then Acting Prime Minister, and suggested that if the IRA would not be wholly disallowed, it should at least
be amended so that Japanese citizens with passports showing them to be merchants, students or tourists would
be exempted from the operation of the Act. See NGB-1902, pp. 757-758.
50
Hunt to Iwasaki, 16 April 1904, NGB-1904, vol. 2, pp. 225-227.
51
Iwasaki to Hunt, 18 April 1904, Ibid., pp. 227-228.
52
The chief objective of the Bill was to prevent and settle industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any
one state. See Australian Government, Federal Register of Legislation, Commonwealth Conciliation and
110
Following this, Hunt explained to Iwasaki that under these political circumstances, some

delay would be unavoidable, but promised that the matter would not be overlooked or unduly

delayed.53

Deakin was succeeded by Chris Watson, the leader of the Labor Party, and after a

lapse of several months, the question of immigration from Japan was revived towards the end

of Watson’s short-lived Labor government. On 10 August 1904, William Morris Hughes, the

Minister for External Affairs, informed Iwasaki that the Commonwealth government had

decided to allow Japanese merchants, students and tourists to enter Australia temporarily

without being subjected to any restriction, provided that their passports specified the purpose

and duration of their visits. 54 Hughes explained that on arrival in the Commonwealth,

Japanese citizens in these categories would not have to take the dictation test prescribed by

the IRA and that if they wished to stay longer than 12 months, they could lodge an application

for a certificate of exemption for the desired term. At the same time, Hughes stressed that the

Commonwealth had not abandoned any of its rights under the IRA and that it preserved the

control over Japanese passport holders.55 As it happened, however, before the agreement was

reached with Japan, the Watson government also fell victim to the Conciliation and Arbitration

Bill and resigned on 18 August 1904.56 George Reid, the leader of the Free Trade Party, was

sworn in as Prime Minister, and it then became his responsibility to conclude the agreement

with Japan.

The day after Reid took office, on 19 August 1904, he received a letter from Iwasaki

Arbitration Act 1904, https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C1904A00013. When Deakin became prime

minister on 24 September 1904, his Protectionist Party did not have a majority in either House and formed
government only by means of a coalition with the Labor Party. The Labor Party, in turn, insisted on widening
the scope of the legislation, which Deakin found unacceptable. This resulted in the resignation of his cabinet.
The ongoing issue surrounding the legislation also resulted in the resignation of the Chris Watson (Labor)
and George Reid (Free Trade) cabinets.
53
Hunt to Iwasaki, 21 April 1904, NGB-1904, vol. 2, p. 228.
54
Hughes to Iwasaki, 10 August 1904, Ibid., pp. 242-243.
55
Ibid. The Minister for External Affairs had the power under Section 4 of the Passport Agreement to revoke a
certificate of exemption at any time.
56
Like Deakin’s Protectionist government which preceded Watson’s Labor government, Watson did not
command a majority in either the House of Representatives or the Senate. The Watson government lasted
only four months, and he was succeeded in August 1904 by the leader of the Free Trade Party, George Reid,
who finally passed the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill with Labor's support.
111
stating that Iwasaki had been authorised by the Japanese government to accept the terms and

conditions of the proposed agreement. Iwasaki concluded his letter by expressing his hope

that “this exemption may be the means of promoting intercourse and improving trade relations

between Japan and the Commonwealth of Australia.”57 In response, Reid notified Iwasaki

that the arrangement would take effect from 1 October 1904.58 Accordingly, the Passport

Agreement was concluded between Japan and Australia in October 1904. The agreement

allowed Japanese merchants, students and tourists to enter Australia without restriction, as

long as their passports specified the purpose and duration of their visits.

The Passport Arrangement of 1904 was the first substantial concession the

Commonwealth government made regarding the entry of Japanese citizens. However, unlike

the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreements that Japan concluded with the United States and

Canada in 1907-08, the Passport Agreement of 1904 granted the Japanese no right of entry

for permanent residence.59 Furthermore, the Commonwealth government made clear that it

preserved all of its rights under the IRA and that it retained its power over Japanese residents

in Australia. Following a year of residence in Australia, a Japanese passport holder could only

extend his stay by securing a Certificate of Exemption from the dictation test (CEDT) which

might be renewed annually at the discretion of the Department of External Affairs. In other

words, while the Commonwealth government tried to pacify the Japanese opposition to the

IRA by affording them an exemption which was not accorded to other non-Europeans,60 it

was determined to maintain the basic principle of the White Australia Policy.

5.4. THE IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION AMENDMENT ACT OF 1905

Although Australia made some conciliatory moves towards Japan by implementing the

57
Iwasaki to Reid, 19 August 1904, NGB-1904, vol. 2, pp. 243-244.
58
Reid to Iwasaki, 24 August 1904, Ibid., p. 244.
59
The Australian government sought unilaterally to control Japanese immigration by means of Commonwealth
legislation. This contrasted with American and Canadian approach to Japanese immigration, which involved
bilateral U.S.-Japanese and Canadian-Japanese agreements negotiated in 1907 and 1908, respectively.
60
The only exception was India. The Passport Agreement was also reached between Australia and India in 1904.
112
Passport Agreement, the IRA still classified the Japanese in the same category as other non-

European people under the term of the dictation test in a European language. Some in the

Australian political circles started to question the rationale and efficacy of the discriminatory

treatment and the implied inferiority of Japanese people contained in the IRA. The most

prominent of them was Bruce Smith, a Free Trade Party member from New South Wales.

Smith was a vigorous opponent of the IRA even prior to its enactment and one of the very few

members of the House of Representatives who openly voiced opposition to the restrictions

placed on the entry of the Japanese into Australia.61 After the IRA was introduced, Smith

continued to campaign against restricting non-white immigration and pressed for an

arrangement with Japan in order to improve commercial and political relations between the

two countries.62

Towards the end of 1904, Smith submitted a notice of motion to the House of

Representatives.63 In his motion, Smith declared that “the time has arrived for differentiating

the Japanese people from other Asiatic races with whom they have been impliedly grouped

under the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901.” He then proposed to amend the IRA to make

the admission of the Japanese to Australia the subject of mutual arrangement or to include the

Japanese language as one of the options for the IRA’s dictation test.64 Australian newspapers

reacted favourably to Smith’s proposal. Brisbane’s Telegraph, for instance, commented that

Smith’s motion was “the crystallisation of the feeling of Australia towards Japan at the present

day.” The newspaper observed that before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, “most

Australians looked upon the Japanese as a swarm of coloured aliens of somewhat barbaric

61
See Mr. Bruce Smith, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 39, 1901, Wednesday, 25
September 1901, pp. 5153-5167.
62
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 32.
63
On 28 November 1904, Smith expressed his intension to submit a notice of motion to the House of
Representatives on the following Thursday, 8 December 1904. Smith then submitted his motion to the House
of Representatives on 28 September 1905.
64
Mr. Bruce Smith, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 39, 1905, Thursday, 28 September
1905, pp. 2941-2958. The text of the motion was also quoted in the letter from Iwasaki to Komura, 15
December 1904, NBG-1904, vol. 2, pp. 247-249.
113
instincts” but since the war, the Japanese “have lifted themselves far above the level of all

other Asiatic races.” It then argued in favour of the proposed amendments, stating that “we

do not wish to impose any stigma; we wish to enter into relations of mutual respect with a

people whom the motherland has been fit to accept as an honoured friend and ally.”65

As the above article indicates, Japan’s success in its war against Russia was making

a big impression in Australia. Even before the war was over, newspapers across the country

started speculating about how Japan might react to Australia’s treatment of Japanese

immigrants in the event of its potential victory over Russia. For example, on 29 March 1905,

Hobart newspaper The Mercury wrote:

when the war is over, and the rulers of Japan are able to turn their attention to other things, we shall
not be surprised if reprisals with Australia are undertaken. Japan will certainly have the right to
exclude Australians and their produce, and we cannot expect the Imperial authorities to back up
any protest which may be made.66

Melbourne newspaper The Argus, for its part, commented in its editorial on 22 April that “as

a great power, admitted into the fraternity of civilised nations - and the result of the war must

be to place her in that position - she will need to be approached with a courtesy and a

consideration hitherto conspicuous by their absence.”67

Amid these agitations about Japan’s potential reaction to Australia’s immigration

policy, Deakin commenced his second term as Prime Minister on 5 July 1905 and immediately

returned to the task of removing from the IRA any possible source of friction with Japan. A

little more than a month after resuming office, around the same time as the Anglo-Japanese

Alliance was renewed on 12 August, Deakin sent a confidential memo to Japanese Consul-

General Iwasaki in Sydney, asking for the Japanese government’s suggestions regarding the

impending review of the IRA. At the same time, he insisted that the Commonwealth

65
The Telegraph (Brisbane), 2 December 1904.
66
The Mercury (Hobart), 29 March 1905.
67
The Argus (Melbourne), 22 April 1905. This editorial was also included in the letter from Japanese Consul in
Townsville Tayui to Japanese Foreign Minister Komura of 10 June 1905, NGB-1905, vol. 2, pp. 241-245.
114
government was not contemplating any change to the basic policy of the IRA and remained

opposed to the introduction of permanent settlers from Japan.68

On 18 September 1905, shortly following Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War

on 5 September, Deakin held an interview with Iwasaki, accompanied by Atlee Hunt, the

Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, and Edward Foxall, the English secretary to

the Japanese Consul-General. At the interview, Deakin raised the possibility of inserting a

clause in the IRA which would have the effect of exempting Japanese citizens from the

operation of the Act. Deakin suggested that the new clause should provide that the IRA would

not apply to the subjects of any nation with which the Commonwealth had made a “treaty” or

a “special agreement” on the subject of immigration.69 By a “treaty” or a “special agreement,”

Deakin did not mean the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1894, which

conferred reciprocal rights of travel and residence to the signatory nations and their territories.

Instead, he referred to the kind of agreement which had been suggested by then Japanese

Consul in Sydney, Eitaki Hisakichi, in his letter to Prime Minister Edmund Barton of 3 May

1901, namely that Japanese immigration should be regulated by mutual arrangement rather

than by immigration restriction legislation based on race.70

However, it seems that there was a misunderstanding in connection with the word

“treaty.” Contrary to Deakin’s intention, Iwasaki came to hope that Australia was prepared to

accept the terms and conditions of the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty of 1894 just as

Queensland had done.71 Deakin, on the other hand, assumed that the issue might be settled to

Japan’s complete satisfaction by negotiating a reciprocal treaty or agreement on immigration.

68
According to A.T. Yarwood, this letter has not survived; see Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 89.
However, the letter’s existence and content can be deduced from the letters from Hunt to Iwasaki, 23 October
15, and from Iwasaki to Katsura, the Acting Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 10 November 1905, NGB-
1905, vol. 2, pp. 256-257, 261-265.
69
The content of the interview was reported in the letters from Iwasaki to Katsura, 10 November 1905, Ibid.,
pp. 256-257.
70
This fact can be deduced from the content of Hunt’s letters to Iwasaki of 10 and 23 October 1905. See Hunt
to Iwasaki, 10 October 1905, Ibid., pp. 258-260; Hunt to Iwasaki, 23 October 1905, Ibid., pp. 261-264.
71
Iwasaki to Hunt, 16 October 1905, Ibid., pp. 260-261; Iwasaki to Hunt, 6 November 1905, Ibid., pp. 264-265.
115
Deakin believed that a reciprocal arrangement would remove any suggestion of race

superiority and could not possibly be the subject of offence to the Japanese government.72

However, Deakin had misjudged the affair, as shown when Iwasaki accused Deakin of

misleading him. Iwasaki claimed that Deakin had initially alluded to the Anglo-Japanese

commercial treaty of 1894 and that there could not have been any misunderstanding as to

what had been agreed upon between Deakin and himself during their previous meetings and

correspondences. 73 In response, Hunt refuted Iwasaki’s accusation and expressed the

Commonwealth government’s desire to meet the Japanese government’s wishes so far as they

were consistent with the basic policy of the Commonwealth.74 After a protracted, sometimes

fiery, correspondence between Iwasaki and Hunt regarding this matter, in which neither side

was willing to change his position,75 Iwasaki declared that the negotiation had “failed.”76 In

other words, Deakin’s offer, which conceded all that Eitaki had asked for in 1901, was not

accepted by Japan.

Nevertheless, Deakin went ahead and submitted a draft bill to the House of

Representatives on 10 November 1905, substituting any prescribed language for any

European language in Section 3 (a), and inserting a new Section 4 (a), which provided for the

exemption from the dictation test of the citizens of any country with which the

Commonwealth had made an arrangement regulating their admission. 77 The Immigration

Restriction Amendment Bill passed the House of Representatives on 6 December78 and the

Senate on 12 December79 and received Royal Assent on 21 December 1905.80 However, no

72
Hunt to Iwasaki, 10 October 1905, Ibid., pp. 258-260.
73
Iwasaki to Hunt, 16 October 1905, Ibid., pp. 260-261.
74
Hunt to Iwasaki, 23 October 1905, Ibid., pp. 261-264.
75
See letters; Hunt to Iwasaki, 29 September 1905, Ibid., pp. 257-258; Hunt to Iwasaki, 10 October 1905, Ibid.,
pp. 258-260; Iwasaki to Hunt, 16 October 1905 Ibid., pp. 260-261; Hunt to Iwasaki, 23 October 1905, Ibid.,
pp. 261-264; Iwasaki to Hunt, 6 November 1905, Ibid., pp. 264-265.
76
Iwasaki to Hunt, 6 November 1905, Ibid., pp. 264-265.
77
CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 45, 1905, Friday, 10 November 1905, pp. 4942-4946.
78
CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 49, 1905, Wednesday, 6 December 1905, pp. 6309-
6374.
79
CPD, Senate Official Hansard, No. 50, 1905, Tuesday, 12 December 1905, pp. 6662-5705.
80
For the full text of the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act, see Australian Government, Federal Register
of Legislation, Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1905.
116
arrangement for reciprocal entry regulations between Japan and Australia was ever submitted

for the approval of the Commonwealth Parliament, as required by the new Section 4 (a). This

was primarily due to Japan’s consistent refusal of such an arrangement, given that Australia

insisted on preserving its unrestricted right to legislate against Japanese immigration and

remained opposed to the admission of permanent settlers from Japan.81

The Immigration Restriction Amendment Act of 1905 was prompted by Japan’s

rising international status as a result of its victory over Russia, with the perceived implications

of Japan’s military success spurring Prime Minister Deakin to attempt to make the White

Australia Policy less offensive to the Japanese. By amending the dictation test of the IRA from

“European language” to “any prescribed language,” Deakin tried to remove the implication

of Japan’s inferiority to European nations and accord the Japanese an appearance of equal

treatment as their European counterparts. Moreover, he was prepared to exempt Japanese

citizens of all classes from the dictation test of the IRA by concluding a bilateral agreement

with Japan on immigration. However, in spite of these concessions, Deakin was adamant that

the Commonwealth would not join the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation

of 1894, which offered Japanese citizens full liberty to enter, travel or reside in any part of the

British dominions. In short, although Deakin was willing to grant Japan nominal equality with

their European counterparts, he was not ready to abandon the Commonwealth’s basic policy

of restricting Japanese immigration.

5.5. ADMINISTRATIVE CONCESSIONS

In addition to implementing the Passport Agreement of 1904 and the Immigration Restriction

Amendment Act of 1905, the Commonwealth government also tried to make the IRA less

offensive to the Japanese through its administration of immigration laws. Broadly speaking,

81
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 89; Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, p. 84.
117
Japanese living in Australia around this time were subject to two iterations of Commonwealth

policy: the state and federal laws themselves, and the way these laws were selectively

enforced by customs and immigration officials, police, and bureaucrats in government

departments.82 Policy administration, which is guided by national interests, is not monolithic.

In the case of Japanese immigration, this point was particularly noticeable. Japanese people,

who were considered to be of “high class” thanks to Japan’s international status as a civilised

power, received far more lenient treatment than other non-Europeans and were treated with

respect and extra courtesies by Australian officials.83

One incident in particular highlighted this point. In February 1904, a Japanese labour

inspector named Mr Tabei was travelling in Queensland’s sugar plantation district when he

was ordered by a tramway guard to move to the special wagon reserved for coloured

passengers. Having been made aware of the mistake, R. G. Johnson, the Chairman of the

Hinchinbrook Shire Council, where the incident took place, immediately sent a telegraph to

Mr Tabei expressing his regret for what had happened.84 However, the Japanese Consul in

Townsville, Tayui Rinzaburō, complained forcefully to the Hinchinbrook Shire Council,

calling the regulations to have a separate car for coloured people “distinctly racial

discrimination.”85 Tayui also wrote a letter of complaint to the Chief Secretary of Queensland,

Sir Arthur Morgan, stating that “my countrymen should be treated more properly in the

tramway and that such a mistake should not be repeated in future.” Tayui requested Morgan

to instruct the Hinchinbrook Shire Council to rescind such regulations or at least to exempt

82
Oliver, “Japanese Relationships in White Australia,” pp. 3-5.
83
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, pp. 84, 96-103; Oliver, Allies, Enemies and Trading Partners, p. 23;
Oliver, “Japanese Relationships in White Australia,” pp. 4-6.
84
Instructions had been issued by the Hinchinbrook Shire Council to the tramway guards that Chinese, Japanese
and Kanakas were not allowed to ride in the same carriage as Europeans, although there was no difference
in the fare. These instructions were unwritten informal regulations but were strictly enforced. In the case of
Mr Tabei, he was travelling with a first-class ticket. This incident, the following apology from the Chairman
of the Hinchinbrook Shire Council and the tramway regulations were described in detail in the letters from
the Japanese Consul in Townsville, Tayui Rinzaburō, to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Komura Jutarō, of 22
June and 30 July 1904, See NGB-1904, vol. 2, pp. 231-241.
85
Tayui to Johnson, 25 February 1904, Ibid., pp. 233-234.
118
Japanese nationals from them.86 The Shire Council immediately decided to withdraw the

guidelines stipulating that no coloured people were allowed to ride in the white people car.87

Several months after this incident occurred, the Passport Agreement between Japan

and Australia was concluded in October 1904, allowing Japanese merchants, tourists, and

students to enter Australia on passports for 12 months. As mentioned earlier, an important

feature of the Passport Agreement of 1904 was that it preserved the Commonwealth

government’s control over Japanese passport holders. At the end of the first year, passport

holders could extend their stay by securing CEDTs, which could be renewed annually at the

discretion of the Department of External Affairs.

In 1910, the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney, Uyeno Kisaburō, criticised the

uncertainty of this system in a letter to the Minister for External Affairs, Lee Batchelor. 88 In

the letter, Uyeno pointed out that the Department of External Affairs seemed to regard five

years as the maximum duration of residence of Japanese passport holders. He argued that this

practice was “undoubtedly a serious interruption and a great handicap” to the business of

Japanese companies based in Australia because it subjected them to “the inconvenience of

periodically changing expert and experienced men for novices.” Uyeno also drew Batchelor’s

attention to the difference which seemed to exist between the Australian and Japanese

interpretations of the term “merchant.” He stated that in Australia the term referred only to

the principals of wholesale establishments, while in Japan it also meant retailers, clerks,

assistants and anyone employed in any department of mercantile business. He insisted that

the Australian exports to Japan, which were valued at £ 1,267,963 in 1908, required

“permanent oversight by resident and responsible managers” with “the help of competent

86
Tayui to Morgan, 10 June 1904, Ibid., pp. 235-236.
87
On 7 July 1904, a clerk of the Hinchinbrook Shire Council sent a letter to the Chief Secretary of Queensland,
notifying him that “My council…have cancelled these instructions and at the present time there is nothing to
cause any inconvenience in the way indicated in the Japanese Consul’s letter.” See NGB-1904, vol. 2, pp.
240-241.
88
Uyeno to Batchelor, 18 April 1910, NGB-1910, vol. 2, pp. 144-147. When corresponding with non-Japanese
government officials, Uyeno spelt his surname as Uyeno, not Ueno. This thesis follows his spelling for his
name.
119
Japanese clerks and assistants.” He therefore requested the Department to “remove the limit

which appears to have been prescribed to the extensions of exemptions” and “to ensure the

definition of the term ‘Merchant’ more closely approximating to that of the Japanese.”89

In his response, the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Atlee Hunt,

declined to promise that Batchelor would carry out Uyeno’s requests. He stated that it would

not be possible for Batchelor “to sanction an interpretation of a term of the agreement which

would tend to lessen the power of the Department to control immigration.” “As regards the

length of the period of residence,” continued Hunt, “Mr. Batchelor appreciates the force of

reasons sent out in Mr. Uyeno’s letter but regrets that he cannot see his way to remove all

restrictions so as to enable one with a passport to remain in Australia indefinitely.” Hunt,

however, added that “at the same time, he does not propose to hold that 5 years is the utmost

limit which can be allowed as the period of a merchant’s stay in Australia” and that the

Minister would “consider applications on their individual merits.”90 In other words, Hunt

alluded that the Department was willing to consider Uyeno’s requests favourably. Hunt

concluded his letter by saying:

Mr. Batchelor knows that the Consul-General will understand to how large an extent this Department
is dependent on the information which he alone is able to supply in these cases and the Minister
relies fully on that information having been substantiated by independent inquiry by the Consulate
General before being submitted for his consideration.”91

This final paragraph of Hunt’s letter to Uyeno illustrates the character of the relationship and

the degree of trust between the Department of External Affairs and the Japanese Consulate-

General, in which the Department held the information provided by the Consul-General in

high regard.

This was indeed the case, as is shown in Pamela Oliver’s study of the Japanese

89
Ibid.
90
Hunt to Uyeno, 5 July 1910, NGB-1910, vol. 2, pp. 149-150.
91
Ibid.
120
community in Sydney during the period of the White Australia Policy. 92 In 1916, two

Japanese men applied for entry permissions for their wives. One of the men was a sub-

manager of a large Japanese trading firm in Sydney and approached the Consul-General. The

other, a clerk, applied directly to the Department of External Affairs. The sub-manager was

granted permission for his wife to live in Sydney, but the clerk was refused.93 These two cases

highlight the importance of consular connection. Indeed, these cases also indicate that the

status of the applicants mattered, and Oliver acknowledges that higher class people received

more favourable consideration. 94 However, Oliver also discusses the case of a laundry

business owner who approached the Consul-General and was granted a 12-month CEDT,

which demonstrates that consular recommendations, irrespective of the status of the

applicants, were a crucial factor in obtaining CEDTs. This indicates that the Consul-General’s

endorsement was considered highly by the Department of External Affairs and that the

department was ready to grant entry permissions or extensions of exemptions to Japanese

whose applications were supported by the consulate.95

The importance of consular connection was also displayed in 1918 in an unusual case

concerning entry permission for a family member of a Japanese passport holder. Under the

Passport Agreement, family members of a Japanese passport holder were admitted into

Australia and allowed to remain for so long as the passport holder maintained his status.96

Although this provision was understood to apply only to a passport holder’s wife and children,

Inouye Shin, an employee of the Mitsui Bussan Ltd., one of the largest Japanese trading firms,

attempted to bring his mother to Australia. The manager of the Sydney branch of the Mitsui

Bussan, Urabe Takae, approached the Japanese Consul-General, Shimizu Seizaburō, and

requested him to ask the Commonwealth government to grant Inouye’s mother permission to

92
See Oliver, “Japanese Relationships in White Australia.”
93
Ibid., p. 5.
94
Ibid.
95
Ibid., pp. 5-6.
96
See Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, pp. 99-100.
121
enter Australia.97 In a letter to Atlee Hunt, now the Secretary of the Department of Home and

Territories, Shimizu explained that the word “families” was interpreted somewhat differently

in Japan and could refer to children and parents, including a widowed mother, who might

otherwise have to remain alone in her own country.98 In response, Hunt, while reminding

Shimizu that “the arrangement was only intended to apply to the admission of a passport

holder’s wife and children,” notified that “no difficulty, however, will be raised in regard to

the landing of Mrs. Inouye.” He then requested Shimizu to submit a formal application on

behalf of Inouye’s mother while he was “advising the Customs authorities at Thursday Island

and Sydney to regard this lady as coming within the scope of the passport regulations.”99

In addition to the close relationship between the Japanese Consulate-General in

Sydney and the Department of External Affairs (later the Department of Home and Territories),

Hunt’s personal relationship with the English Secretary to the Japanese Consul-General,

Edward Foxall, also influenced how the IRA was administered with respect to the Japanese.100

This is demonstrated by the following case concerning entry permissions for Japanese

domestic servants. In a private letter to Hunt on 8 July 1918, Foxall inquired about the

possibility of allowing Japanese servants to enter Australia. Foxall explained that Japanese

wives temporarily residing in Australia, particularly those with small children, were in great

need of Japanese domestic help. He provided Hunt with the list of twelve families who wished

to bring domestic help from Japan, adding that they were all managers or other important

business people employed by big Japanese trading companies, such as Mitsui Bussan and

Kanematsu, and were based in Sydney and Melbourne.101 In response, Hunt notified Foxall

97
Urabe to Shimizu, 25 October 1918, NGB-1918, vol. 1, p. 261.
98
Shimizu to Hunt, 25 October 1918, Ibid., pp. 262-263.
99
Hunt to Shimizu, 29 October 1918, Ibid., p. 264.
100
The close relationship between the two is indicated by the fact that they addressed each other “Atlee” and
“Ted” in their correspondences. See Foxall to Hunt, 8 July 1918, Ibid., pp. 256-258; Hunt to Foxall, 11
September 1918, Ibid., pp. 258-259. The importance of their personal relationship, which enabled them to
conduct “the behind-the-scenes negotiations” is also pointed out by Pamela Oliver. See Oliver, “Japanese
Relationships in White Australia,” p, 4.
101
Foxall to Hunt, 8 July 1918, NGB-1918, vol. 1, pp. 256-258.
122
that the Department of Home and Territories was prepared to grant permission for the

admission of Japanese servants in the five Sydney cases where there were small children.

However, Hunt commented that “the matter is not without difficulty” and requested Foxall

“for the present to limit the arrangement to Sydney” and to ensure that “it should not become

generally known in Thursday Island, Cairns, or Broome, as applications from those towns

would raise questions of very considerable difficulty." Hunt concluded the letter by asking

Foxall to inform him in advance when the five servants were scheduled to arrive so that he

might give the necessary instructions to the customs authorities.102

The foregoing discussion illustrates the importance of the close personal relationship

and the mutual trust which had developed over the years between Japanese and Australian

bureaucrats, which in turn enabled Japanese citizens to receive lenient and courteous

treatments in the administration of the Commonwealth immigration laws. Practically all the

business of the Department of External Affairs and later the Department of Home and

Territories with the Japanese was conducted indirectly through the Consul-General, who

ensured that his countrymen were treated in respectful manners deemed appropriate for

citizens of a civilised power. Australia, for its part, was aware of Japan’s high level of

discontent with the White Australia Policy and was willing to comply with Japan’s requests

as long as they did not conflict with the Commonwealth’s basic policy of excluding Japanese

permanent settlers.

5.6. CONCLUSION

The Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 placed the Japanese under the same category as

other non-Europeans by means of the European language test and closed Australia to

permanent settlement by the Japanese. Even after the IRA was enacted, the Japanese

102
Hunt to Foxall, 11 September 1918, Ibid., pp. 258-259.
123
government persisted in its objection and tried to prevent the IRA from being applied to its

citizens. However, during the first few years of the Commonwealth, with Edmund Barton as

Prime Minister, Japan was unable to gain any concession from Australia.

The arrival of Alfred Deakin as Prime Minister in September 1903 spelt a change in

the Commonwealth’s policy in regard to Japanese immigration. In contrast to Barton, who

avoided any direct involvement in the conduct of foreign affairs, Deakin was prepared to

resolve the Japanese immigration issues personally and sought in many ways to render the

policy of exclusion less offensive to the Japanese. The Passport Agreement of 1904, the

Immigration Restriction Amendment Act of 1905 and lenient and courteous treatment

Japanese citizens received in the administration of the Commonwealth immigration laws were

symbolic of Deakin’s policy toward Japan.

Particularly, in his attempt to amend the IRA in 1905, Deakin tried to place the two

countries formally on an equal footing by negotiating a reciprocal agreement by which each

party bound itself to restrict emigration to the other. Deakin thought that such an agreement,

being reciprocal in its terms, would be satisfactory to the Japanese government. Furthermore,

this was essentially what the Japanese Consul in Sydney, Eitaki Hisakichi, had proposed to

then Prime Minister Edmund Barton in 1901. However, Eitaki’s successor, Iwasaki Kazuo,

rejected Deakin’s proposal, insisting that Australia had to adhere to the terms of the Anglo-

Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1894, which offered Japanese citizens full

liberty to enter, travel or reside in any part of the British Dominions.103 In short, Iwasaki

rejected what his predecessor had proposed to Barton in 1901 because the Commonwealth

government was unwilling to abandon its fundamental assumption that it preserved its rights

to restrict Japanese immigration.

This is yet another shift in Japan’s foreign policy, reflecting its growing confidence

103
NGB-1896, vol. 1, p. 95. For the full text of the treaty, see NGB-1896, vol. 1, pp. 94-105.
124
in its international status and identity. As discussed in the previous chapters, in 1897, the

Japanese government accepted the discriminatory treatment of its citizens as long as the

wording of the colonial immigration bills did not appear to classify its people with other Asian

peoples. However, in 1901, Japan was no longer content with merely being accorded the

appearance of impartiality and requested the Commonwealth government to enter into a

reciprocal agreement in order to place the two countries formally on an equal footing. Then

in 1905, Japan rejected the Commonwealth’s proposal for a reciprocal arrangement, which

the Japanese government itself had proposed to the Commonwealth government four years

prior, unless the Commonwealth government was ready to give up its basic policy of

restricting Japanese immigration. As a nation which had established its status and identity as

a “civilised” power after its signing and renewal of the alliance with Britain and its victory

over Russia, Japan was no longer prepared to tolerate any sign of slight from the

Commonwealth government.

Nevertheless, despite Japan’s rejection, Deakin introduced the Immigration

Restriction Amendment Act in 1905, which granted Japanese immigrants nominal equality

with their European counterparts with regard to the dictation test contained in the IRA. This

followed the Passport Agreement which had been concluded between Australia and Japan in

the previous year. Moreover, in the administration of the Commonwealth immigration laws,

Japanese people, who were considered to be of a higher class than other non-European people,

received far more lenient treatment than other non-Europeans and were afforded respect and

extra courtesies by Australian officials. The conciliatory attitudes displayed by the

Commonwealth government towards Japanese citizens were prompted by Japan’s rising

international status as well as continuous diplomatic efforts by the Japanese government. At

the same time, these concessions, particularly at administrative levels, were granted thanks to

the close and cordial relationship between the Department of External Affairs (later the

125
Department of Home and Territories) and the Japanese Consuls-General in Sydney, who was

conscious of the need to ensure that his countrymen were treated respectfully.

However, it is important to note that the concessions Australia made concerning

Japanese immigration were minor. They only applied to temporary entry and were confined

to certain classes of the Japanese. Even while offering these concessions, the Commonwealth

government consistently made clear that none of its rights under the IRA would be abandoned

and that it retained control over Japanese citizens in Australia. In other words, although Japan

fought for changes to Australia’s immigration regime and achieved some minor concessions

thanks to its status as a civilised power, it was unable to change Australia’s basic policy

regarding the exclusion of Japanese permanent settlers.

Moreover, while Japanese citizens were enjoying certain privileges and special

treatments from the Commonwealth government, the fear of Japan was growing in Australian

society. As a result of Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 and its emergence as the

predominant power in the western Pacific, Australia’s attitude towards Japan was transformed,

and Australians came to regard Japan as a military, as well as migratory, threat to Australia.

Australia’s growing fear of Japan and its impact on the White Australia Policy will be explored

in detail in the next chapter.

126
 CHAPTER VI
FEAR OF JAPAN AND WHITE AUSTRALIA

This chapter explores Australia’s growing fear of Japan and its impact on the White Australia

Policy. It covers the period from Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 to the end of World War

I in 1918 and is divided into two sections. The first section examines the period before the

outbreak of World War I in 1914, and the second section examines the development during the

war. The period under investigation in this chapter more or less overlaps with the period studied

in the previous chapter. However, the focus of this chapter differs vastly from that of the

previous chapter. Unlike the previous chapter which examines concessions the Commonwealth

government made concerning the temporary entry of Japanese citizens to Australia, this chapter

focuses on Australia’s determination to preserve the White Australia Policy in the face of

Japan’s growing military power.

As discussed in the previous chapter, conciliation was the keynote of Prime Minister

Alfred Deakin’s policy towards Japanese immigration. Yet behind the scenes, the fear of Japan

was growing in Australian society. Following Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 and its

emergence as the predominant power in the western Pacific, Japan came to be regarded as a

military, as well as migratory, threat to Australia. Australia’s fear of Japan was further enhanced

following the outbreak of World War I. During the war, all Britain’s resources were committed

to the task of defeating its European enemies, with the result being that British power in the

Pacific declined. Japan, on the other hand, took advantage of the preoccupation of the Western

powers in the European conflict to prosecute its ambitions in Asia and the Pacific and extended

its hegemonic influence in the region. These developments resulted in Japan’s growing

confidence in its international status and its new diplomatic assertiveness on issues relating to

Australia, which, in turn, intensified Australia’s fear of Japan and strengthened its resolve to

127
exclude Japanese settlers and maintain racial purity of the nation.

6.1. PRE-WORLD WAR I PERIOD (1905-1914)

6.1.1 Australia’s Fear of Japan

The fear of Japan was the central issue of the Commonwealth government’s defence and

foreign policy for nearly half a century after Federation. As we recall from the discussion in

the previous chapters, Australians first became mindful of Japan at the end of the 19th century

due to Japan’s rising international status, and the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, which

embodied the White Australia Policy, was primarily aimed at the Japanese. That said, during

the first few years after Federation, the fear of Japan figured very little in the minds of

Australians, and Japan was not seen as a major defence threat to Australia.1

However, all this changed with Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905. Japan’s defeat of

Russia, combined with the withdrawal of the British Royal Navy in the Pacific to meet the

German challenge in the North Sea, alarmed Australians. With the absence of a British fleet in

the Pacific, the position of Japan was transformed from a safeguard against Russian expansion

in Asia to a potential threat to Australia.2 The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in July

of the same year did not provide any comfort to Australians. They no longer had faith in the

reliability of Japan as Britain’s ally. They also had grave doubts as to Britain’s capacity,

especially when challenged in Europe, to come to Australia’s aid in the Pacific. 3 Faced with

the possibility that they might be compelled to defend themselves, Australians feared for their

1
D.C.S. Sissons, “Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923,” pp. 21-24. According to Sissons, during the first
few years of Commonwealth, Japan was seen only as a migratory, not military or defence, threat to Australia,
and the Commonwealth government regarded Russia and France as posing greater defence threats to
Australian and imperial interests in the Pacific. See also Meaney, Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14,
pp. 116-117.
2
Various scholars, including D.C.S. Sissons, Neville Meaney and Henry Frei, have discussed an intense fear
Australians harboured towards Japan after Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905. See Sissons, “Attitudes to
Japan and Defence, 1890-1923”; Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14; Neville Meaney,
Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923: A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901-23, Volume
2 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2009); Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia.
3
Nish, “Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1901-1911,” p. 202; Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and
Australia, p. 85; Neville Meaney, “E.L. Piesse and the Problem of Japan,” in Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard
(eds.), Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from Federation to the Second World War
(Kew, Victoria: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2000: 61-76), p. 61.
128
safety and survival and felt extremely vulnerable.4

This sense of crisis and vulnerability was clearly expressed in a comment made by

Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, chief architect of Australian defence and foreign policy from

1903 to 1910. On 12 June 1905, three weeks after Japan’s victory in the Battle of Tsushima,

Deakin stated that “Australia, which used to depend largely on its isolation for security,” was

now within “striking distance of no less than sixteen foreign naval stations,” of which the

strongest was Yokohama. “Japan at her head-quarters is, so to speak, next door while Mother

Country is many streets away.”5 The Labor Party’s spokesman on defence, George Pearce, was

equally apprehensive about Japan’s growing military power and its implication for Australia.

“Japan has shown that she is an aggressive nation,” declared Pearce. He then rhetorically asked;

“What has always been the effect of victory and of conquest upon nations? To obtain fresh

territory? … Is there any other country that offers such a temptation to Japan as Australia

does?”6 Pearce also expressed his deep distrust of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by stating;

“Great Britain is at present at amity with Japan. A treaty has been signed between the two

Powers. But should we not be foolish if we took that to be a guarantee for all time?”7

In short, following Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905, Australia’s fear of Asia and

the Yellow Peril came to be focused on Japan. Moreover, Australia’s fear of Japan was no

longer only of a migratory but also of a possible military invasion. Japan had become the

preeminent naval power in the western Pacific, unconstrained by any rival, and was free to

extend its influence in the region and threaten Australia’s security. D. C. S. Sissons observes

that between 1907 and 1914, the fear of Japan became acute and widespread in Australian

society. 8 This fear of Japan, in turn, found expression in various ways, including the

establishment of the Commonwealth’s own defence program and Australia’s search for

4
Meaney, “The Problem of Nationalism and Race,” p. 8; Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, p. 84;
Meany, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, pp. 120-129.
5
The Herald (Melbourne), 12 June 1905.
6
Senator Pearce, CPD, Senate Official Hansard, No. 47, 1905, Wednesday, 22 November 1905, p. 5546.
7
Ibid.
8
Sissons, “Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923,” p. 48-75.
129
American protection against Japan.9

The period from 1905 to 1910 was marked by the growing support among all

Australian political parties for the creation of Australia’s own defence program.10 Proposals

for defence build-up were adopted by each succeeding government during this period—by

Alfred Deakin’s Protectionist government in 1907, by Andrew Fisher’s Labor government in

1909, by the fusion government (a coalition of the Protectionist and the Free Trade parties

headed by Deakin) in late 1909 and by the second Fisher Labor government in 1910. From

1909, the Commonwealth government began construction of a string of naval bases and arms

factories, acquired the battle-cruiser Australia of the most advanced Dreadnought class to head

a new naval force, created a fledgling Australian air force and introduced compulsory military

training for all young men.11

The successive Commonwealth governments justified these measures and the

extraordinary increase in Commonwealth expenditure12 by pointing to the impending threat

from Asia to the white British character of the Australian nation. For example, in August 1907,

three months before the announcement of compulsory military training as government policy,

the Defence Minister in Deakin’s Protectionist government, Thomas Ewing, argued that “if this

9
Australia’s growing fear of Japan also found expression in other ways including numerous allegations of
Japanese espionage and the popularity of invasion scare novels. During this period, various allegations were
made that Japanese tourists, entertainers, and pearl divers were acting as spies in Australia and neighbouring
island groups. See Pam Oliver, “Interpreting ‘Japanese activities’ in Australia, 1888-1945,” in Journal of the
Australian War Memorial, 2002, vol. 36: 1-13; Meaney, Towards a New Vision, p. 66; Frei, Japan’s Southward
Advance and Australia, p. 88. At the same time, Australia’s fear of Japan also found its way into popular
culture. In this period, the theme of the looming threat from Japan permeated Australian popular culture and
resulted in a large number of poems, paintings, cartoons, plays, films, and novels dealing with hypothetical
Japanese invasion of Australia. See Neville Meaney, “‘The Yellow Peril’: Invasion Scare Novels and Political
Culture,” in Meaney, Australia and the Wider World, pp. 75-94.
10
There was also a strong support for the Commonwealth’s own defence program among the Australian public
during this period, which was indicated by the formation of various voluntary associations including the
National Defence League. The National Defence League was established in November 1905 with the support
of both Labor and Liberal politicians such as Chris Watson, William Morris Hughes, Alfred Deakin and
Thomas T. Ewing. It was an organisation devoted to the cause of compulsory military training and to increased
naval defence. See Sissons, “Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923,” p. 72 and chapter 2, footnote 8.
11
For a detailed discussion of the Commonwealth’s defence build-up during this period, see Meaney, The Search
for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, chapter 5, 6 and 7, especially, pp. 150-158, 175-202. See also Frei, Japan’s
Southward Advance and Australia, pp. 86-88.
12
For example, when Deakin announced his government’s defence scheme on 13 December 1907, he proposed
a naval programme of £1.3million to provide 9 submarines and 6 destroyers etc. After the Labor Party came
to power in 1908, its government proposed an even larger naval program for 23 destroyers at the cost of £2.3
million. When the navy scheme was put into effect in 1910, it pushed up defence expenditure by more than
200 per cent. See Sissons, “Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923,” p. 60, Frei, Japan’s Southward
Advance and Australia, p. 87.
130
country is to remain the home of the white man …we must seek to knit together the white men

of this and other lands in preparation for that last deadly conflict which will assuredly come

upon Australia.”13 In the following year, when Ewing introduced his defence bill in September

1908, he described the scheme as “designed to keep Australia intact and white.”14 In a similar

vein, in November 1907, the Labor Party’s defence spokesman and its future Defence Minister,

George Pearce, stated; “I have never feared, nor do I now fear, the invasion of Australia by any

European nation…. But I do recognise that in the East there are peoples alien to us in race,

religion and ideals, industrial and social.” He then declared that “our White Australian

legislation is so much waste paper unless we have rifles behind it, and are prepared to back it

up by force, if necessary.”15 In 1909, Deakin’s new Defence Minister, Joseph Cook, echoed

Pearce’s sentiment. At the second reading of the defence bill, Cook drew the attention of his

fellow parliamentarians to “the existence, not far from our shores of 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 of

the best trained troops in the world” belonging to “a nation whose ideals are, in many respects,

as unlike our own as it is possible for them to be.” He then claimed that “Australia is the most

distant and…the most vulnerable part of the British Empire…surrounded by nations hungering

for room and breathing space.”16

These statements clearly illustrate that Australian defence policy during this period

was dominated by the fear of Asia, and there is no doubt that Australian political leaders had

Japan in their mind when they made these statements. At the same time, it is difficult to ignore,

from these statements, a remarkable degree of reciprocal connection between the

Commonwealth’s defence policy and its concern for the preservation of the White Australia

Policy. Several scholars have also pointed out this connection. For example, H. I. London states

that “to a very great extent Australian defence policy was nothing but a disguise for the

13
Mr. Ewing, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 34, 1907, Thursday, 22 August 1907, p. 2239.
14
Mr. Ewing, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 40, 1908, Tuesday, 29 September 1908, p.
454.
15
Mr. Pearce, CPD, Senate Official Hansard, No. 45, 1907, Thursday, 7 November 1907, pp. 5682-83.
16
Mr. Joseph Cook, CPD, House of Representatives Official Hansard, No. 38, 1909, Tuesday, 21 September 1909,
p. 3615.
131
protection of White Australia against the yellow peril.”17 Neville Meaney, when discussing

Australia’s response to the potential threat from Japan, similarly argues that “in dealing with

the Japanese question it is difficult to separate the prudential considerations of geo-politics

from the irrational feelings of racial determinism.”18 Ian Nish, for his part, calls Australia’s

apprehension about Japan’s predominant naval power in the Pacific during this period “only an

extension of the immigration problem.”19

Of course, it would be wrong to argue that the White Australia Policy was the only

factor behind the Australian defence policy in the first half of the 20th century. However, there

is no reason to doubt from the statements above that the Commonwealth’s defence policy

during this period was highly influenced by the idea of race and the perceived threat from Japan

to the White Australia Policy. Commonwealth leaders believed that in order to ward off a

possible invasion by Japan and preserve the racial purity of their nation, they had to build their

own defence program, especially in view of the fact that Britain was preoccupied with

European affairs. Indeed, a defence policy based on the White Australia Policy was myopic,

lacking foresight for its broader implications. However, it should be recalled from the

discussion in Chapter II that white Australia had been elevated to a national myth upon which

the nation’s unity, identity, and self-preservation depended.20

The reciprocal connection between defence and the White Australia Policy was also

evident when in early 1908 Prime Minister Deakin invited America’s Great White Fleet—the

fleet of sixteen U.S. battleships—to visit Australia during its proposed world cruise. Writing to

the American Ambassador to Britain, Whitelaw Reid, on 7 January 1908 to extend his invitation

to the U.S. fleet, Deakin stated that he was “anxious to have some opportunity of expressing

our sympathy with our kinsmen in their timely demonstration of naval power in what may

17
H.I. London, Non-white Immigration and “White Australia” Policy (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1970),
p. 13.
18
Meaney, “The Problem of Nationalism and Race,” p. 11.
19
Nish, “Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1901-1911,” p. 207.
20
For a detailed discussion of Australia’s national myth and its influence on Australia’s national identity, see
chapter II, section 2.2 of this thesis.
132
loosely be termed our Oceanic neighbourhood.”21 Deakin obviously considered that the U.S.

fleet visit would display Anglo-Saxon solidarity and America’s naval power in the Pacific and

demonstrate to Japan that Australia was under the protection of a friendly and powerful white

neighbour.22 At the same time, Deakin’s move was prompted by his apprehension about not

only military but also migratory threats from Japan. Replying to an English journalist, Richard

Jebb, Deakin declared that Australians were looking forward to welcoming America’s Great

White Fleet “because of our distrust of the yellow races in the North Pacific and our recognition

of the ‘entente cordiale’ spreading among all white races who realise the Yellow Peril to

Caucasian civilisation, creeds and politics.”23 Deakin was aware of the widespread antipathy

towards Japan and Japanese immigration in America, which had been intensified by the

disputes between Japan and America over discrimination against Japanese residents in

California.24 He therefore attempted to display the common interest of the two countries in

resisting Japan’s challenge to their immigration policies. In his anonymous article in The

Morning Post of 14 April 1908, Deakin wrote; “For Australia, the entrance of a fleet under the

Stars and Stripes into the Pacific is an incident of the utmost significance…the act is popularly

associated with the racial disputes which recently became acute in the West of the Dominion

and of the great Anglo-Saxon Republic.” Deakin then declared; “Nowhere in the Empire, and

perhaps nowhere outside the Southern States of the Union, is the importance of the colour

question more keenly realised than in the Commonwealth.”25

21
Quoted in Sissons, “Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923,” Chapter 2, footnote, Section IIIc, 5; Meaney,
The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, p. 164; Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy, p. 272.
22
Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, pp. 163-166.
23
Letter, Deakin to Jebb, 4 June 1908, Deakin-Jebb Correspondence, National Library of Australia (hereafter
cited as NLA) MS 339/1/19A-B. Also quoted in Meaney, The End of ‘White Australia’ and Australia’s
Changing Perception of Asia, 1945-1990,” p. 175; Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy, p. 272.
24
On 11 October 1906, the San Francisco Board of Education attempted to force 93 Japanese students who were
attending public schools in San Francisco to attend the segregated Chinese school. The city’s Japanese
residents protested, and when the School Board refused to reverse its decision, they alerted the Japanese media
and the Japanese government. The Japanese government formally protested and the tension quickly escalated
between the two nations until the American President, Theodore Roosevelt, intervened. As a result of the
negotiation between the two countries, Japan and the United States reached the Gentlemen’s Agreement in
1907, whereby Japan agreed to limit the issuing of passports to travel to the United States to certain categories
of business and professional men, and Roosevelt agreed to urge the San Francisco Board of Education
to rescind the order to segregate Japanese students from white students in the schools.
25
The Morning Post was a conservative daily newspaper published in London from 1772 to 1937. From 1900,
133
 Deakin clearly overstressed the similarities of the Australian and American situations

with respect to Japanese immigration. Unlike America, Australia did not have a sizable

Japanese minority, which contributed to the escalation of the immigration problem in Japanese-

American relations. 26 Nevertheless, the visit of America’s Great White Fleet was a huge

success. When the fleet of sixteen U.S. battleships visited Sydney and Melbourne in August

1908, over a quarter of Australia’s population turned out to welcome it with great enthusiasm,

reflecting the prevailing fear of and anxiety about Japan among the Australian public.27

6.1.2. Alliance Renewal

By 1911, anti-Japanese sentiment in Australia and other Dominions had become so intense that

the British government could no longer ignore them. As a result, even though the British

government was adamant that the final decision on imperial diplomacy rested with it, it

consulted Dominion representatives regarding a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at a

special meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) on 26 May 1911, during the first

week of the Imperial Conference.28

At the meeting, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, declared; “In the

interests of strategy, in the interests of naval expenditure, and in the interests of stability, it is

essential that the Japanese Alliance should be extended.”29 Grey explained that if the alliance

was not renewed, Britain would have to leave its Dominions in the Pacific undefended or to

Deakin wrote anonymous commentaries on Australian politics for the paper, continuing even after he had
become Prime Minister. This article is quoted in Sissons, “Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923,”
Chapter 2, footnote, Section IIIc, 5; Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, p. 166.
26
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 92; Sissons, “Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923,” p. 62.
27
Newspapers also echoed these public sentiments. For example, The Daily Telegraph declared that “in the
Pacific America and Australia have common interests” and “the sense of racial and historic kinship which is
so abundantly in evidence” on the occasion of the U.S. fleet visit. The Age, for its part, commented that
Americans and Australians showed that “blood is thicker than water.” See The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 21
August 1908 and The Age (Melbourne), 2 September 1908.
28
Nish, “Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1901-1911,” pp. 209-211. In this detailed discussion of
Australia’s influence on the negotiations for the original Anglo-Japanese Alliance during 1901 and the revised
alliances during 1905 and 1911, Nish argues that while Australia had been outside the negotiations in 1901
and 1905, in 1911, it exerted some influence on the third Anglo-Japanese Alliance as the British government
felt compelled to consult Australia over its renewal.
29
G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London:
H.M.S.O., 1926), vol. VI, pp. 789-790.
134
rebuild its Pacific naval power. If the latter was chosen, Britain would need help from the

Dominions given that it had to maintain its battleships in the North Sea to counter the German

challenge. Yet, as Grey pointed out, even with the resources of the Dominions and Britain

combined, it was virtually impossible to bring British naval power in the Pacific up to parity

with the Japanese. When the issue was presented to the Dominion representatives in these terms,

they had no choice but to give their consent.30

At the same time, Grey assured the Dominions that the alliance would be extended on

the understanding that it “does not in any way affect the question of the freedom of the

Dominions to deal with the question of immigration.” 31 Consequently, the Dominion

representatives approved the renewal unanimously, and the alliance was renewed on 13 July

1911, four years before it was due to lapse. In other words, Australia and the other Dominions

consented to the alliance renewal on the understanding that they retained the right to restrict

Japanese immigration.

However, the renewal neither eased Commonwealth leaders’ anxiety about Japan nor

restored their faith in the alliance. On his way home from Britain after the Imperial Conference,

the Australian Defence Minister, George Pearce, travelled through Japan. Upon his return to

Australia, Pearce commented that he was impressed by “wonderful alertness combined with

untiring energy” of the Japanese. He then insisted that “Australians should arm themselves to

be in readiness for any emergency.”32

The Anglo-Australian differences over the question of the threat from Japan and the

reliability of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were effectively illustrated in March 1914 by

Australian Prime Minister Joseph Cook’s reaction to the proposal from Winston Churchill, the

First Lord of the Admiralty. As Britain’s naval building race with Germany intensified,

30
Ibid. For the details of Grey’s position presented to the Dominion representatives and their responses to Grey’s
arguments during the CID meeting of 19011, see Meaney, Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-1914, pp.
213-223: Nish, “Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1901-1911,” pp. 210-211.
31
Gooch and Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. VI, pp. 789-790.
32
The Argus (Melbourne), 23 October 1911.
135
Churchill asked the Commonwealth government to send its capital ships to the North Sea,

arguing that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance made the presence of such ships in the Pacific

redundant. 33 However, Cook flatly rejected Churchill’s request. He complained that being

asked to “rely upon the Japanese treaty alone for the peace of the Pacific” raised “very serious

questions” and generated a “very serious situation” for Australians as they were “under treaty

obligations with a nation whose people they might not admit to their shores.” Cook further

declared that Australians “had their white Australia policy, and they must at all cost defend

it.” 34 The Anglo-Australian disagreements over the alliance and Australia’s apprehension

about Japan continued to grow beyond the outbreak of World War I.

6.1.3. Japan’s Response

The Japanese government was aware of hostile sentiment towards Japan in Australia as it

received regular reports from Sydney on issues concerning Japanese residents in Australia.35

The Japanese public was also aware of widespread public antipathy towards Japan and

discrimination against and mistreatment of Japanese nationals in Australia and other white

settler societies as they were frequently reported in Japanese newspapers. Particularly, the San

Francisco Board of Education’s decision to force Japanese students to attend the segregated

Chinese school in October 1906 and a race riot in Vancouver in September 1907, when a large

group of white people rallying for restrictions on Asian immigration attacked Chinatown and

the adjacent Japantown, were widely reported in the Japanese press and generated much public

anger in Japan.36

33
Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-1914, p. 249.
34
The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 March 1914.
35
For example, in August 1908, the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney, Uyeno Kisaburō, sent detailed reports
to his government back home on the public display of anti-Japanese feelings in Australia during the American
fleet visit to Australian ports. See Uyeno to Hayashi, 19 August 1908, NGB-1908, vol. 1, pp. 169-170; Uyeno
to Komura, 7 September 1908, Ibid., pp. 170-177.
36
The most influential newspapers in Japan, including Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Jiji
Shinpō, Hōchi Shimbun and Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, reported the developments in San Francisco every
day in the mid-October 1906 and attacks on Japanese residents and increasing anti-Japanese sentiment in
Canada almost every day in the mid-September 1907. Asahi Shimbun, for example, denounced these incidents
as “racial discrimination” and an “insult to our nation.” See Asahi Shimbun, 17 October 1906 and 11 September
136
 Although attracting much less attention in the press than the San Francisco and

Vancouver incidents, the anti-Japanese sentiment expressed during the U.S. fleet visit to

Sydney and Melbourne in 1908 was also condemned by newspapers in Japan. For example,

Asahi Shimbun called the occasion “public hysteria” and lamented that “the more passionately

Australians welcome the U.S. fleet, the more intense the anti-Japanese sentiment becomes.”37

Australia’s racially discriminatory immigration legislation was also denounced by the Japanese

press. In February 1905, for instance, while Japan was waging a successful war campaign

against Russia, Asahi Shimbun called the Immigration Restriction Act an “outdated folly.”

“Japanese soldiers were praised for exhibiting exemplary conduct,” it asserted, “and the

ongoing war has quashed a long-held belief that there is a huge gap in ability between Asians

and Europeans.”38 The newspaper also stated that “it is indignant” that “Australia equates the

Japanese with black and Chinese people under the law.”39

It should be remembered that while Australia was becoming increasingly

apprehensive about the rise of Japan and building military against a possible Japanese invasion,

Japan’s confidence in its international status and its resentment towards the West were also

growing. Just as Japan’s victory over Russia made Australia take notice of Japan’s military

might, the victory significantly increased Japan’s international prestige and boosted Japan’s

self-confidence. However, as a result of the “unfair” peace settlement brokered by the

Americans, Japan was denied indemnity to pay for the expenses of the war.40 The Japanese

public felt humiliated and betrayed by the West, just as they did after the Triple Intervention a

decade earlier,41 and protested against the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth which ended the

1907.
37
Asahi Shimbun, 28 August 1908.
38
Ibid., 21 February 1905.
39
Ibid., 14 November 1905.
40
See pp. 27-28 of this thesis.
41
The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed after Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, ceded Formosa, the
Pescadores Island and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan, recognised Korean independence and obliged China
to pay a large indemnity to Japan. However, the Russian, German and French governments were disturbed by
Japan’s ambitions on the continent and forced Japan to renounce possession of the Liaotung Peninsula. This
incident is widely known as the Triple Intervention. See p. 24 of this thesis.
137
Russo-Japanese War.42 They believed that despite Japan’s proven record of achievements, the

Western powers were still unwilling to recognise Japan as their equal and hypocritically

excluding Japan from the Western community because of the dominant belief in the racial and

cultural superiority of the West.43 The continued refusal by Australia and other white settler

societies to grant Japanese immigrants the same treatment as European immigrants was also

evidence of the West’s hypocrisy. All these events added to Japan’s growing suspicion,

frustration and resentment towards the West, which, in turn, contributed to the rising popularity

of Pan-Asianism in Japan.

As discussed in Chapter II, Pan-Asianism advocated the solidarity of Asian peoples

and countries in defiance of the West, and its popularity increased in tandem with the Japanese

public’s growing confidence in their country and their increasing resentment towards the West.

Japan’s triumph in the war with Russia and the “unfair” peace settlement after the war were

catalyst for these sentiments and further increased the popularity of Pan-Asianism in Japan.

However, as also pointed out in Chapter II, during the Meiji period, the Japanese government

generally dismissed Pan-Asian thought and movement as romantic or idealistic, and continued

to follow a pro-Western foreign policy to safeguard the nation’s security and interests without

alienating the West.44

The Japanese government’s pro-Western foreign policy was clearly reflected in the

fact that Australia’s discriminatory immigration policy did not negatively affect Japan’s

decision to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905. When the second Anglo-Japanese

Alliance was being negotiated, Japan was at war with Russia and eager for the continued

support provided by the alliance. Britain recognised its strong bargaining position and

requested that the scope of the alliance be extended to India. The Japanese Ambassador in

42
The peace settlement angered the Japanese public and provoked popular protests and mob riots. The most well-
known among them was the Hibiya Riot of 5 September 1905. For a detailed discussion of the Japanese
public’s indignation at the peace deal, see Okamoto, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War,
pp. 165-223.
43
See p. 28 of this thesis.
44
See p. 28 of this thesis.
138
London, Hayashi Tadasu, realised that his government was reluctant to accept the wider

obligation Britain was calling for and sent a confidential telegram to the Japanese Foreign

Minister, Komura Jutarō, in order to persuade his government to consent to renewing the

alliance. In his telegram, Hayashi listed three benefits Japan was likely to reap from the alliance

renewal. They were; to receive support from the great powers at the end of the war; to foil the

plot, inspired by the Yellow Peril fears and prepared by Russia and Germany, to build a

European alliance against Japan; and to foster sympathy between the Japanese and the Anglo-

Saxons, which might discourage the United States and the British Dominions from excluding

Japanese labourers because they were of a different race. Hayashi further added that “if this

race question is left unresolved, it will create serious complications in the future.”45

In short, Hayashi considered that the Yellow Peril fears and Japanese immigration

problems in America and the British Dominions were factors which might encourage, rather

than discourage, his government to extend the alliance as Britain wished. We do not know

whether or not Hayashi’s telegram had any effect on the government’s decision as Foreign

Minister Komura replied noncommittedly that Hayashi’s view would “no doubt receive due

consideration.”46 However, as it happened, the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed on

12 August 1905, two years before the first was due to lapse, and was announced to the world

on 27 September 1905, just as the Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill

was being introduced to the House of Representatives. This shows that discrimination against

Japanese immigrants in some British Dominions did not prevent Japan from renewing the

alliance. On the contrary, as Hayashi had contemplated, immigration problems which Japan

experienced in these countries might have added to Japan’s feeling of isolation on the

international stage and increased its dependence on the alliance with Britain.

The Japanese government’s continued pro-Western approach was also apparent in its

45
Hayashi to Komura, 20 May 1905, NGB-1905, vol. 1, pp. 14-15.
46
Komura to Hayashi, 21 May 1905, Ibid., p. 15.
139
handling of anti-Japanese sentiments in Australia. Indeed on a few occasions, the Japanese

Consul-General in Sydney condemned blatant displays of hostility towards Japan in Australian

society. For example, in his speech on 15 May 1906, then Acting Consul-General, Iwasaki

Mitsuo, blamed Australian newspapers and politicians for manufacturing “misrepresentations,

appealing to ignorance, and thus arousing prejudices which blind the judgment, and awaken

distrust, hatred and fear” of Japan.47 However, the Japanese government’s main response to

Australia’s increasing antipathy towards Japan was to redouble its effort to ease the Australian

public’s anxieties and create a favourable image of Japan among them. In his opinion piece on

the White Australia Policy, the Vice Consul in Sydney, Miho Gorō, argued that the fear of Japan

was born out of ignorance and misinformation and suggested that the Japanese Consul-General

should approach the Australian press in order to influence Australian public opinion in Japan’s

favour 48

In fact, during this period, the Japanese government often tried to insert in newspapers

articles which portrayed Japan in a positive light.49 For instance, when public reference to

Japanese menace was widespread in anticipation of the U.S. fleet visit in 1908, the Japanese

Consul-General in Sydney, Uyeno Kisaburō, had an interview with a Sunday Times reporter in

an attempt to “dispel misconceptions held by the Australian public about Japan and to stem

anti-Japanese sentiment in Australia.”50 During the interview, Uyeno stated that he was “fully

convinced” that the American fleet visit would “lead to further security and peace in the Pacific.”

When asked about the timing of the cruise—that it was taking place so soon after the disputes

47
The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 May 1906.
48
This opinion piece was enclosed in the confidential letter from Consul-General Saitō in Sydney to Foreign
Minister Hayashi of 4 September 1911. In it, Miho also suggested that the Japanese government should
organise reciprocal commercial tours between Japan and Australia in order not only to promote commerce but
also to promote communication and deepen friendship between the two countries. See NGB-1911, vol. 2, pp.
547-554.
49
In 1907, Edward Foxall, a private English secretary to the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney and the author
of the book titled “Colorphobia, and Exposure of the White Australia Fallacy” published in Sydney in 1903,
was deeply concerned about the bad press Japan was getting in Australia and suggested to Foreign Minister
Hayashi that he would write pro-Japanese articles under a pseudonym and publish them in English language
newspapers in Japan and newspapers in Australia and Britain. See Foxall to Hayashi, 2 December 1907, NGB-
1907, vol. 3, pp. 151-156.
50
Uyeno to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, 7 September 1908. NGB-1908, vol. 1, p. 170.
140
between Japan and America over discrimination against Japanese residents in California in

1907—Uyeno responded that “there is nothing at issue between Japan and America.” 51 In

March 1911, an article titled “Japan Friendly: Consul-General’s Assurance” was published in

various Australian newspapers. In the article, the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney, Saitō

Miki, claimed that “Japan's only object so far as Australia is concerned” was “commercial

relations and friendly feelings.”52 Similarly, in May 1913, the Acting Consul-General, Yatabe

Yasukichi, tried to ease the Australian public’s concern about Japanese immigration by stating

that the Japanese government “takes every possible precaution to prevent people from

emigrating to lands where it is not the desire of friendly powers that they should go.”53

As a matter of fact, as Yatabe claimed, during the period between the Russo-Japanese

War and World War I, the Japanese government made very little effort to convince the

Commonwealth government to amend its immigration restriction legislation to exempt

Japanese citizens from the operation of law. This could be another indication of the Japanese

government’s pro-Western approach, although Ian Nish argues that this was because of Japan’s

disillusionment with Australia after it failed to conclude similar Gentlemen’s Agreements as

those concluded with the United States and Canada in 1907-1908.54 Whether or not Nish’s

interpretation is correct will not be examined here. However, the fact remains that between

1906 and 1914, Japan seldom protested against the Commonwealth immigration legislation.55

51
The Ballarat Star, 25 August 1908; The Bendigo Independent, 25 August 1908.
52
The Bathurst Times, 22 March 1911; The Daily Herald (Adelaide), 22 March 1911.
53
The Age (Melbourne), 15 May 1913; The Border Morning Mail and Riverina Times (Albury), 16 May 1913;
The Huon Times (Franklin, Tasmania), 21 May 1913.
54
Nish, “Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1901-1911, p. 207. Nish observes that by 1910 the Japanese
government was no longer inclined to protest about the Commonwealth immigration legislation and argues
that this was due to Japan’s disillusionment with Australia. While Japanese immigration into Australia
continued to be governed unilaterally by the Commonwealth legislation, that into the United States and Canada
was altered to a bilateral basis by agreements negotiated with these government in 1907 and 1908.
55
NGB-1906, vol. 2; NGB-1907, vol.3; NGB-1908, vol. 2; NGB-1909, vol. 2; NGB-1910, vol. 2; NGB-1911, vol.
2; NGB-1912, vol. 1; NGB-1913, vol. 1; NGB-1914, vol. 1 have been consulted, but they do not disclose any
formal representations by the Japanese government to the Commonwealth government regarding the
Commonwealth immigration legislation or the Japanese government’s attempt to persuade the Commonwealth
government to modify the Immigration Restriction Act. Indeed, in 1913 and 1914, the Japanese government
tried to have Japanese long-term residents of Australia exempted from the operation of the Sugar Cultivation
Act of 1913, which restricted cultivation of sugarcanes to white famers in Queensland, and correspondences
took place between the Japanese Consul-General and the Queensland government. However, this legislation
was state legislation of Queensland and, moreover, it was not immigration legislation.
141
Indeed, the Japanese government’s internal correspondences reveal that discussions took place

within the government regarding the exclusion of Japanese settlers in Australia. However, these

discussions did not result in formal representations from the Japanese to the Australian

government. For example, between March and July 1913, the Acting Japanese Consul-General

in Sydney, Yatabe Yasukichi, and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Makino Nobuaki, discussed

the looming possibility of exclusion of Japanese nationals who already possessed permanent

residency in Australia.56 Yet, the Japanese government did not lodge any formal protest to the

Commonwealth government regarding this matter. The most the Japanese government asked

for during this period was that special considerations be given to its citizens within the terms

of existing Commonwealth immigration legislation, such as the cases discussed in the previous

chapter. However, this was about to change after the outbreak of World War I.

6.2. WORLD WAR I

6.2.1. Australia’s Reaction to the War
On 4 August 1914, Britain declared war on Germany. The news of Britain’s entry into the war

was greeted with a fervent welcome in Australia. Australian people, who took great pride in

belonging to the British Empire and white British race, welcomed the war with patriotic

enthusiasm. They embraced the war as a struggle for the survival of the British Empire and

race and were determined to defeat Germany in order to restore the glory and pre-eminence of

the British Empire. Accordingly, Australia loyally offered extensive naval and military

assistance to the Mother Country, virtually handing over its navy to the Admiralty and sending

the Australian Imperial Force to the European warfront.57

After Britain’s entry into World War I, Japan quickly joined in the war to fulfil

56
See Yatabe to Makino, 26 March 1913; Makino to Yatabe, 28 May 1913; Yatabe to Makino, 16 July 1913,
Yatabe to Makino, 31 July 1913, NGB-1913, vol.1, pp. 135-139.
57
For a discussion of Australia’s patriotic support for the war, see Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-
1923, pp. 21-55.
142
obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the Japanese navy immediately offered

convoying service to Australian troops. However, in spite of Japan’s entry into the war on the

Australian side and its contribution to the Allies’ war effort, the coming of the European conflict

rekindled the Commonwealth’s fear of Japan. After the outbreak of the war, Britain committed

all of its resources to the task of defeating its European enemies, and as a result, British power

in the Pacific declined. This decline was apparent straight away when the Japanese battle-

cruiser, Ibuki, escorted the first ANZAC troops across the Indian Ocean in November 1914.

During the war years, a great part of patrolling of the Australian coastline and convoying of

troops between Australia and Europe was done by the Japanese navy.

Formally, the Commonwealth government always gave proper recognition to Japan,

along with the British Empire’s other allies, in patriotic speeches and displays.58 Yet behind

the scene, Australia’s pre-war anxieties about Japan continued to grow. Despite Japan being

Britain’s ally, its commitment to the war was minimal. Unlike Australia, Japan did not send

troops to fight on the Western front and limited its participation in the war almost exclusively

to East Asia and the Pacific. From the moment Japan entered the war on the British side,

Commonwealth leaders feared that Japan might exploit the opportunities afforded by the war

in Europe to extend its empire in Asia and the Pacific.59 These fears were confirmed during

the early stages of the war when Japan occupied the German Pacific islands north of the equator

in October 1914 and when it made the infamous Twenty-One Demands60 on China in January

1915, which, if accepted, would have made China a Japanese protectorate. Japan’s seizure of

Germany’s North Pacific islands was particularly alarming to Australia as it brought Japan

58
Meaney, Towards a New Vision, p. 69; Roberts, “History of the Contacts between the Orient and Australia,” pp.
27-28.
59
For a discussion of Australia’s suspicion of Japan during the war, see Sissons, “Attitudes to Japan and defence,
1890-1923,” pp. 76-85; Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, pp.91-99; Meaney, “The Problem of
Nationalism and Race,” pp. 9, 19; Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy, p. 273.
60
Twenty-one Demands were a set of demands made by the Japanese government to special privileges in China
during World War I. The demands included Japan’s railway and mining claims in Shandong province,
special concessions in Manchuria, Sino-Japanese control of the Han-Ye-Ping mining base in central China,
access to harbors, bays, and islands along China’s coast, and Japanese control, through advisers, of Chinese
financial, political, and police affairs.
143
much closer to Australia’s own Pacific territories. Australians were concerned that if Japan’s

frontier extended to the equator, it would establish bases within easy striking distance of

Australia and threaten Australia’s national interests and security, including the racial purity of

the nation. 61 As a result, the Commonwealth government tried desperately to stop Japan’s

southward advance.62 However, the British government, preoccupied with European tensions,

was not always sympathetic to Australia’s apprehension.63

In many ways, the developments in the Pacific following the outbreak of the war

confirmed in the mind of Commonwealth leaders all that they had feared. That is, the possibility

of having to face the menace of Japan at a time when Britain was engaged in a struggle for

survival in Europe was about to become a reality. Thus, although Australians had identified

themselves with Britain’s cause in the war, they understood well the implication of the

European conflict for their own security in the Pacific. They were aware that Australia and

Brittan did not share the same strategic priorities and that under certain circumstances, Britain

might be unwilling and unable to help Australia to fend off the threat from Japan. Furthermore,

at this very time when Japan was extending its hegemonic influence in the Asia-Pacific region,

the Commonwealth government felt the impact of Japan’s new assertiveness on the

international stage through its persistent pressure on Australia to enter into the Anglo-Japanese

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which would have an effect of exempting Japanese

citizens from the application of the White Australia Policy.

61
For a detailed discussion of Japan’s seizure of German North Pacific islands and Australia’s reaction to it, see
Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, pp. 56-76; Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia,
pp. 95-99.
62
Australia had long held the fear of Japan’s southward advance or Nanshin. For Australia’s apprehension about
Japan’s southward advance, see Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia.
63
Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, pp. 56-76; Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia,
pp. 95-99.
144
6.2.2. Commercial Treaty

In 1911, about the time when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed for the last time,64

Britain and Japan signed a new commercial treaty in place of that of 1894.65 As discussed in

Chapter III, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1894 offered

reciprocal rights of travel and residence in addition to reciprocal tariff preferences to the

signatory nations and their territories, and so did the 1911 treaty. However, as was the case

with the 1894 treaty, the provision of the new treaty did not automatically extend to the self-

governing Dominions unless they expressed their desire to adhere to the treaty. Australia

declined in 1911 to join the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty as it did in 1894, and this

decision was accepted by the Japanese government.66 However, after the outbreak of war in

1914, Japan’s trade with Australia grew rapidly, and the Japanese government became acutely

aware of the commercial benefit which Australia’s entry into the treaty would bring. As a result,

the Japanese government started pressuring the Commonwealth government to accede to the

Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911.67

Interestingly, Japan’s persistent effort to achieve this objective began following its

naval and military success at the end of 1914 and its concomitant awareness of its pre-eminent

position in the region and its enhanced value to the Allies’ war cause.68 Furthermore, in the

same way that it had carried out a two-way attack on the Immigration Restriction Bill in 1901,

the Japanese government during the war pursued its goal of persuading Australia to join the

64
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was signed on 30 January 1902, was renewed and extended twice, in
August 1905 and in July 1911.
65
The second Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed on 3 April 1911 and came into
effect on 17 July 1911.
66
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 94; Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, p. 102.
67
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 94, Appendix IV, p. 166; Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-
1923, p. 102.
68
In early November 1914, Japanese troops successfully assisted British troops in sieging Tsingtao on the
Shantung peninsula, China in the first Anglo-Japanese operation of the war. Moreover, after the German navy
defeated the Royal British navy in the Battle of Coronel off the coast of central Chile on 1 November 1914,
British had to appeal for Japanese assistance, and the Japanese navy joined the Australia in hunting down the
German squadrons in the East Pacific. Thus, Japan had proved itself to be an indispensable ally to Britain and
a decisive factor in the conduct of war against Germany. See Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia,
p. 97; Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, p. 72.
145
commercial treaty simultaneously in London through the Japanese Ambassador and in Sydney

through the Japanese Consul-General.

In January 1915, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Katō Takaaki, sent a confidential

letter to the Japanese Ambassador in London, Inoue Katsunosuke, and instructed him to ask

the British government to induce Australia to sign a commercial treaty with Japan. In the letter,

Katō emphasised the importance of promoting bilateral trade. “The trade relations between

Australia and Japan have been steadily growing since the outbreak of the present European

war.” “The lack of a commercial treaty between the two countries,” argued Katō, was “a source

of great inconvenience.” 69 Katō was aware that Australia might be reluctant due to

“apprehensions in connection with the immigration question.” But he stated that the Japanese

government had “a long-established policy not to send immigrants to Australia” and had “no

intention whatsoever to depart from this policy.”70

Inoue presented Japan’s position to the British government, and the Colonial Secretary,

Lewis Harcourt, duly conveyed Inoue’s message to the Commonwealth government. 71 When

the Commonwealth government failed to reply to Harcourt, however, the Japanese government

directly approached the authorities in Melbourne. This move was partly prompted by the

observation by the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney, Shimizu Seizaburō, who had written

to Foreign Minister Katō that “the time is propitious for raising this matter with the Australian

government.” “Since the outbreak of the war, there has been a remarkable development in trade,

and Australian people’s sentiments towards Japan have completely changed,” he stated.

“Australians are beginning to show sincere deference towards the Japanese Empire.”72

On 10 June 1915, Shimizu had a lengthy interview with the Australian Prime Minister,

Andrew Fisher. During the interview, Shimizu told Fisher of Japan’s desire that Australia

69
Katō to Inoue, 15 January 1915, NGB-1916, vol. 1, pp. 183-184.
70
Ibid.
71
Harcourt to Munro Ferguson (Governor-General), 19 March 1915, NAA: A 981/38 (1).
72
Shimizu to Katō, 28 May 1915, NGB-1916, vol. 1, p. 187.
146
should become a party to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty while assuring that Japan

would control emigration to ensure that Australia’s immigration policy would not in practice

be violated. Shimizu explained that this would remove “hindrances” to the future development

in trade relations and contribute to “cordiality based on the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese

Alliance.”73 On the following day, Shimizu visited Governor-General Munro Ferguson and

sought his support for Australia’s entry into the commercial treaty. Shimizu, however, failed

to gain a favourable response from either of them. 74 Refusing to give up, Shimizu next

approached the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Hugh Mahon. But this proved to be

no more successful. Mahon brushed him off, saying that since the Commonwealth government

was preoccupied with the ongoing war, there was no time to debate the matter.75 Having failed

with Fisher, Munro Ferguson, and Mahon, Shimizu then turned to the Secretary of the

Department of External Affairs, Atlee Hunt, with whom he claimed to “have a cordial and close

relationship.”76 However, Hunt did not help his cause. Like Mahon, Hunt told Shimizu that

due to the pressure of the war, there was no prospect of the treaty being debated in the

parliament.77 In short, Shimizu’s diplomatic offensive against Australia was largely ignored

by the Commonwealth government.

The reason behind Japan’s persistent effort in seeking a commercial treaty with

Australia was, as mentioned by Katō and Shimizu, to a large extent commercial. Japan’s trade

with Australia had increased considerably since the outbreak of the war. Japan had been

particularly successful in supplying many of the goods which Australia could no longer obtain

from Germany. Shimizu reminded Fisher of this development during their meeting on 10 June

73
The content of this interview was reported in the confidential despatch from Shimizu to Japanese Foreign
Minister Katō Takaaki of 22 June 1915, NGB-1916, vol. 1, pp. 191-192. See also Fisher’s note on interview,
10 June 1915, NLA: MS 2919/6/89.
74
The details of this visit were reported in the confidential despatch from Shimizu to Katō of 22 June 1915, NGB-
1916, vol. 1, pp. 191-193.
75
Shimizu’s meeting with Mahon was reported in the confidential despatch from Shimizu to Katō of 22 June
1915, Ibid.
76
Shimizu to Katō, 22 June 1915, Ibid.
77
The content of this interview was reported in the confidential despatch from Shimizu to Katō of 22 June 1915,
Ibid.
147
1915. 78 However, at the same time, Japan’s motives for pushing this issue so forcefully

stemmed from its increasing confidence in its international status and its desire to have

Australia acknowledge its importance as Britain’s ally in the war. As Shimizu stated at the

luncheon hosted by the Millions Club 79 in Sydney on 22 April 1915, a commercial treaty

between Japan and Australia would show that there had been “unmistakable evidence of the

weakening of those feelings of suspicion” since the outbreak of the war, and would help to

strengthen “the bond of friendship” between the two countries.80 “There is no earthly reason,”

declared Shimizu, “why Japanese and Australians should not be as good friends, comrades, and

Allies in the realm of commerce as we have been upon the battlefields of China or on the docks

of our ships on the Pacific Ocean.” 81 Shimizu considered that a commercial treaty with

Australia would not only remove obstacles to increasing Japan’s export to Australia but also

remind Australians of Japan’s contribution to the war as Britain’ ally and the British Empire’s

dependence upon Japan. Moreover, it would help to remove the greatest insult to the Japanese,

namely the application of the White Australia Policy to Japanese citizens.82 It was not that the

Japanese government had any desire to encourage emigration to Australia. Indeed Japan

repeatedly insisted that it had no intention of departing from its long-established policy of not

sending emigrants to Australia and was willing to give “appropriate assurance” similar to those

given to the United States and Canada.83 However, the Fisher government was resolute in its

rejection of the Japanese proposal. Just as Prime Minister Barton dismissed Japan’s repeated

requests to exempt Japanese citizens from the operation of the Immigration Restriction Act in

1901 by avoiding negotiating directly with the Japanese government, Fisher rejected Japan’s

78
See Shimizu to Katō, 22 June 1915, Ibid.
79
The Millions Club was founded in 1912 with the aim of making Sydney the first Australian city to reach a
population of one million. It was founded by Arthur Rickard, a property salesman and developer, who enlisted
the support of a number of leading politicians and businessmen. The Millions Club later became The Sydney
Club.
80
Shimizu quoted in The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 April 1915; The Clarence and Richmond Examiner
(Grafton), 24 April 1915.
81
Ibid.
82
Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, pp. 106-107.
83
See Katō to Inoue, 15 January 1915, NGB-1916, vol. 1, pp. 183-184; Shimizu to Katō, 28 May 1915, Ibid, p.
187; Shimizu to Katō, 22 June 1915, Ibid, pp. 191-193.
148
repeated requests to adhere to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty by refusing to engage in

discussions with the Japanese government. As a result, Japan was unable to gain any concession

from the Commonwealth government regarding the commercial treaty and the restriction on

the entry of its citizens into Australia.

On 27 October 1915, William Morris Hughes succeeded Fisher as Prime Minister.

After the change of government, Shimizu, having failed to move the Fisher administration,

wasted no time and immediately returned to the task of persuading Australia to join the

commercial treaty. On 14 December 1915, Shimizu had his first interview with Hughes, during

which he expressed his “desire for an amicable resolution” for the treaty question.84 Shimizu

explained to Hughes that the Japanese government had been in negotiations with the British

and the Australian governments over Australia’s entry into the commercial treaty and insisted

that since the treaty question would certainly be raised during Hughes’s upcoming visit to

London,85 Hughes should give his serious consideration to the way Australia would enter into

the treaty. In response, Hughes promised to duly consider “this very important matter” and

relay his decision to Shimizu before his departure for London in late January.86

Shimizu next approached the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, Malcolm

Shepherd, who had accompanied Hughes to the interview and whom Shimizu had previously

been acquainted with. However, Shepherd dismissed Shimizu’s approach by saying that “the

time is not opportune to debate the matter. …the British Empire is at this very moment pulling

all its available recourses to fight this Great War.” Shimizu, however, was not put off easily

and concluded the meeting demanding that Prime Minister Hughes would keep his promise

84
The content of the interview was described in detail in the confidential note from Shimizu to the Japanese
Foreign Minister, Ishii Kikujirō, of 20 December 1915, NGB-1916, vol. 1, pp. 194-195. In the letter Shimizu
explained that although he approached Hughes immediately after Hughes became Prime Minister in October
1915, Hughes had been away in Queensland engaging in campaign to rally support for a by-election and
therefore Shimizu could not secure a meeting with Hughes until December.
85
On 21 January 1916, Hughes left Australia and arrived in England on 7 March, where he stayed until mid-June
before attending the Paris Economic Conference held on 14 June. He arrived back in Australia on 8 August
1916.
86
See Shimizu to Ishii, 20 December 1915, NGB-1916, vol. 1, pp. 194-195.
149
and respond to him without fail.87 Shimizu’s behaviour deeply disturbed Hughes. Following

the meetings, Hughes expressed his concerns about “how far the Japanese may put pressure on

us during the war to secure the m.f.n. (most-favoured-nation) treatment or even for the

admission of coloured races to Australia.”88

On 13 January 1916, the Commonwealth cabinet considered the treaty question, and

it was decided to defer discussion of the matter until after Hughes had spoken to British

ministers during his forthcoming visit to England. Meanwhile, Shimizu was to be given “no

encouragement” to expect that Australia would become a party to the treaty “in the immediate

future.” 89 On 19 January, Hughes informed Shimizu of the Commonwealth government’s

decision.90 Shimizu was not pleased with the outcome. Reporting to Foreign Minister Ishii of

his lack of success, Shimizu wrote that “Hughes, while admitting that the commercial treaty

would need to be revised after the war, stated that the time is premature to consider the matter.”

“Hughes nonetheless promised to give the matter due consideration,” he continued, “if the

British government should raise the question during his visit to the United Kingdom.” Shimizu

concluded that Japan had “no choice but to wait until after his arrival in London and persuade

the British government to take action.”91 Hughes left Australia on 21 January 1916, two days

after he notified Japan of the Commonwealth’s decision, and arrived in England on 7 March

1916.

However, before Hughes arrived in London, adverse developments for the Allies in

Europe strengthened Japan’s bargaining position. In February 1916, when the British Royal

Navy was struggling against the German navy and British resources were being strained to

breaking point, Britain asked for additional Japanese naval assistance in the Mediterranean and

the Indian Ocean.92 The Japanese government, while eager to offer such assistance, sought

87
Ibid.
88
Quoted in Munro Ferguson to Bonar Law, 22 December 1915, NLA: MS 696/3900.
89
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 94; Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, p. 132.
90
Reported in Shimizu to Ishii, 20 January 1916, NGB-1916, vol. 1, p. 183.
91
Ibid.
92
Reported in Inoue Katsunosuke, the Japanese Ambassador to London, to Ishii Kikujirō, the Japanese Foreign
150
“some evidence of Britain’s friendliness”93 in return for the service, in particular, that Australia

should accede to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty.94 During his meeting with the British

Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, on 18 February 1916, the Japanese Ambassador in London,

Inoue Katsunosuke, insisted that in order for the Japanese government to justify its action and

placate the Japanese Diet and the Japanese public, the British government would need to

provide “a satisfactory guarantee” for the resolution for the treaty question. He explained that

the Japanese public would resent Japan paying to defend countries which discriminated against

them.95

Inoue was not exaggerating about Japan’s domestic opinion. Since the outbreak of

World War I, Japan’s international status had risen dramatically, and Japanese people had

become much more confident about their country. They knew that Japan’s contribution was

indispensable to Britain and a decisive factor in the conduct of the war against Germany. Aware

of Japan’s enhanced value to the alliance, they wished to see tangible rewards for their service.

In many ways, they regarded Australia’s entry into the commercial treaty with Japan, which

would allow Japanese citizens to be treated, at least in form, like Europeans, as Japan’s rightful

reward for its contribution in the war and even more as an emblem of national success. For

example, in August 1915, in a speech to the Japanese Emigration Association, the Japanese

Prime Minister, Ōkuma Shigenobu, stated that because the British navy had “felt incompetent”

in the Pacific and the Japanese squadrons had exhibited “extraordinary strength,” Australians,

who had previously discriminated again the Japanese and talked of cooperating with the United

States against Japanese invasion, would have to modify their anti-Japanese feelings. “As a

Minister, 4 February 1916, NBG-1916, vol. 3, p. 382; Inoue to Ishii, 9 February 1916, Ibid., pp. 382-383; Inoue
to Ishii, 10 February 1916, Ibid., pp. 383-384.
93
Letter, Hughes to Pearce, 21 April 1916, Australian War Memorial (hereafter cited as AWM): 3DRL2222/3/3.
Also quoted in Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, p. 93; Meaney, Australia and World Crisis
1914-1923, pp. 145-146; Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 94.
94
Japan also asked for the Straits Settlements to allow qualified Japanese doctors to practice in the colonies. See
Inoue to Ishii, 18 February 1916, NGB-1916, vol. 3, pp. 384-385.
95
The content of this meeting was reported in the letter from Inoue to Ishii of 18 February 1916, NGB-1916, vol.
3, pp. 384-385 and Grey to the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir William Conyngham Greene, 21 February
1916, TNA: FO 410/65. This episode was also described in the letter from Hughes to Pearce, 21 April 1916,
AWM: 3DRL2222/3/3.
151
result of the condition created by the present war,” asserted Ōkuma, “Australia would have to

show respect to the Japanese and would be obliged to make concessions to Japan.”96 Japanese

newspapers also expressed these sentiments. Asahi Shimbun, for example, commented that

given that “Australia owes much to Japan for peace in its ocean, the maintenance of its trade

and the stability of its life-style,” it was “ridiculous” that the lack of a commercial treaty

enabled Australia to refuse the entry of Japanese citizens. The newspaper thus called for the

“immediate conclusion of a commercial treaty between Japan and Australia.”97 Furthermore,

in February 1916, the Japanese Diet passed a resolution urging the government to bring an end

to anti-Japanese actions in Australia and the British South Seas.98 The chief proponent of the

resolution, Konishi Kanau, complained that Australia humiliated Japan by treating its citizens

like Chinese and Indians and demanded that all barriers to Japanese immigration and trade in

Australia and South Pacific islands be removed.99

Grey was aware of the above Diet resolution as well as Japanese domestic opinions as

he was receiving regular reports from the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir William

Conyngham Greene.100 He therefore understood that in order to persuade Japan to contribute

more to the Allies’ cause, Britain had no choice but to comply with Japan’s request. 101

96
Nihon imin kyōkai hōkoku (The Japanese Emigration Association Report), vol. 2, published on 13 August 1915,
pp. 4-9.
97
Asahi Shimbun, 2 August 1916.
98
The resolution also recommended the establishment of a regular steamship service from Japan to the South
Pacific islands and Northeast Australia.
99
Konishi Kanau 5 February 1916, the 37th Japanese Imperial Diet Lower House Proceedings, Kanpō (Japanese
Government Official Gazette), Taishō 5th year (1916), vol. 21, pp. 443-444.
100
The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA) holds a large number of correspondences between
Greene and Grey druigng World War I. See TNA: FO 371. In fact, the Commonwealth government was also
receiving regular reports from Greene. In January 1915, the Commonwealth government requested Greene
and the New South Wales trade commissioner in Kobe, J.B. Suttor to inform the Commonwealth government
of Japan’s regional aims and ambitions. This move was prompted by Australia’s increasing suspicion about
Japan. Furthermore, in 1916, based on the advice from Suttor, the Defence Minister and the Acting Prime
Minister, George Pearce appointed James Murdoch, a British language expert who had spent many years in
Japan, to a lectureship in Japanese at the University of Sydney and the Royal Military College at Duntroon in
order to educate cadet officers about Japan and explain Japan to Australia’s national security officials. See
Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, p. 144.
101
The British authorities were also disturbed by the information from Greene in Tokyo of growing anti-British
sentiments in Japan. He reported that the Japanese public had come to see the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as an
obstacle to their expansionist aims and cited articles in the press that were urging a revision of the alliance.
Moreover, the news that Germany had been trying to tempt Japan to withdraw from the conflict by offering
Japan a greater control in East Asia and the Pacific also alarmed the British authorities. Although Japan had
signed the London Agreement under which the Allies had promised not to make a separate peace with the
enemy and the Japanese government had informed the British government of the German approaches, the
British government was greatly troubled by Germany’s attempt to divide the Allies. See Meaney, Australia
152
Consequently, when Grey met Japanese Ambassador Inoue in London on 21 February 1916,

he was very conciliatory. Grey stated that the British government appreciated Japan’s position

and offered to arrange a meeting between Inoue and Australian Prime Minister Hughes after

the latter’s arrival in London in the following month.102 When Grey and Inoue met again on

22 March 1916, Grey promised that he would advise Hughes to consider the treaty question

with his cabinet if Japan could provide assurances to the Commonwealth government on

immigration similar to those given to Canada and America. 103 As a result, when Hughes

consulted the British government about Japan after his arrival in London, he was confronted

with enormous pressure to concede to the Japanese demand. Grey was frank about the need to

appease Japan. He told Hughes that the further Japanese naval assistance desired by Britain

would not be forthcoming unless some concession was made to Japan’s request regarding

Australia.104

As it happened, however, at the end of March 1916, the Japanese government decided

to send a naval squadron to the Indian Ocean before the Commonwealth government informed

Japan of its decision on the treaty.105 Yet, it did not mean that Japan had given up its pursuit

for a commercial treaty with Australia. In fact, as the Japanese Consul in Singapore, Fujii

Minoru, pointed out to Foreign Minister Ishii, the Japanese government probably considered

that the display of its naval power in the region might make Australia more amenable to its

demand, as it had specifically asked the British government to inform Australia that the

Japanese naval force would be operating off Australia’s coast.106

After six weeks in London, during which Hughes had several long meetings with the

new Colonial Secretary, Andrew Bonar Law, and Grey regarding Japan, Hughes wrote to the

and World Crisis 1914-1923, p. 144.

102
The content of this meeting between Inoue and Grey was reported in the letter from Inoue to Ishii of 21
February 1916, NGB-1916, vol. 3, pp. 385-386.
103
The content of this meeting was reported in the letter from Inoue to Ishii of 23 March 1916, NGB-1916, vol.
3, pp. 388-389.
104
Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p. 94; Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, pp. 144-145.
105
Ishii to Inoue, 26 March 1916, NGB-1916, vol. 3, pp. 389-390; Inoue to Ishii, 28 March 1916, Ibid., p. 390.
106
Fujii to Ishii, 4 May 1916, Ibid., pp. 390-391.
153
Acting Prime Minister and the Defence Minister, George Pearce, about his grave misgivings

about Japan and his firm determination not to give in to the Japanese demand:

My dear Pearce, I hardly know how to begin to tell you the story of what is going on in England…all
our fears - or conjectures - that Japan was and is most keenly interested in Australia are amply borne
out by facts. Grey told me that the Japanese Ambassador had been pressing him before my arrival
about the Commercial Treaty…. Grey believes Japan will stand behind Britain - he admits however
that there is a large and growing party in Japan who look askance at the alliance and with favour on
Germany. It is to me quite clear that in the event of temporary reverse to the Allies, the Japanese
government might not be able - even if they so desired - to keep Japan behind Britain…. The position
is aggravated …by the fact that Britain has approached Japan with a view to obtaining naval
assistance - say in the Mediterranean - and that the Japanese Government, while ready enough to
grant this, ask for some evidence of Britain’s friendliness towards her in order possibly to justify her
action or placate the opposition…. I told Grey that Australia would fight to the last ditch rather than
allow Japanese to enter Australia.107

Despite Hughes’s grave misgivings about Japan,108 on 9 June 1916, Grey brought

Hughes and Inoue together at the Foreign Ministry in London for a face-to-face negotiation.

However, direct diplomacy did not resolve the differences between the two nations. Inoue

explained that one of the main reasons behind Japan’s push for a commercial treaty with

Australia was its desire to remove the discriminatory handicaps applied to the Japanese

conducting commerce and attaining residence in Australia. In response, Hughes told Inoue that

while he would support the extension of the most-favoured-nation tariff regime to Japan, he

could not agree to apply the same principle to the entry of Japanese citizens into Australia.

Inoue then argued that it was “extremely unfair” that Japanese nationals in Australia were not

treated in the same way as Australian nationals in Japan. To this, Hughes responded that the

Commonwealth parliament was “more democratic” than the British parliament and there was

little prospect of the Commonwealth parliament consenting to Japan’s request. At the end of

the meeting, Inoue told Hughes that the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney would be briefed

107
Hughes to Pearce, 21 April 1916, AWM: 3DRL2222/3/3. Also quoted in Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and
Australia, p. 93; Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, pp. 145-146; Yarwood, Asian Migration to
Australia, p. 94.
108
Hughes’s apprehension about Japan was further heightened by the news of a Japanese naval squadron visit to
major Australian ports in May and June 1916. Although Japanese Consul-General Shimizu Seizaburō
explained that the visit was a friendly gesture of wartime alliance, the fact that Japan’s decision to send a naval
squadron to Australia corresponded very closely in time to the Japanese-Australian negotiations on the
commercial treaty in London made Commonwealth leaders suspect that Japan might be using the occasion to
demonstrate its naval dominance in the Pacific in order to sway Australia’s decision in Japan’s favour. See
Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, pp. 154-155.
154
on the content of this meeting and would continue the discussion in Australia from where it

was left off.109

On 8 August 1916, Hughes arrived back in Australia after a brief stopover in Paris to

attend an economic conference. Shortly after his return, Hughes addressed a meeting of

members of both Houses of Parliament. There he expressed his fear of “a thousand millions of

coloured people” and advocated conscription in order to provide full support to Britain to fight

in the European war because:

Japan would challenge White Australia Policy after the war, Australia would then need the help of
the rest of the Empire, and if she wished to be sure of getting it, she must now throw her full strength
into the war in Europe.110

Subsequently, anti-Japanese rhetoric dominated the 1916 referendum debate over conscription.

In fact, during the 1916 referendum campaign, both those for and those against conscription

appealed to the fear of Japan to bolster their respective cases. The pro-conscriptionists argued

that Australia should conscript all available manpower to assist the Mother Country to win the

war because it would need Britain’s help after the war to defend white Australia against future

Japanese challenges. The anti-conscriptionists, on the other hand, argued that sending

conscripts abroad would leave the country undefended if the war was prolonged and Japan

should change sides in the conflict. They also claimed that conscription would lead to the

breakdown of the White Australia Policy by allowing many Asian labourers into Australia to

fill the shortage of white labourers. 111 So widespread were these references to Japanese

menace during the conscription campaign that the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney,

Shimizu Seizaburō, issued a press statement to complain publicly. He declared that the

assertions about Japan’s “ulterior motives” were “baseless” and “awkward and unpleasant from

109
The content of the interview was described in Inoue to Ishii, 11 June 1916, NGB-1916, vol. 1, pp. 202-203.
110
Quoted in L.F. Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes: A Political Biography, vol. 2: The Little Digger, 1914-
1952 (Sydney: Angus & Robertson Publishers, 1979), p. 167. See also Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and
Australia, p. 95.
111
For conscription debates, see Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, pp. 158- 182; Frei, Japan’s
Southward Advance and Australia, p. 95; Meaney, “The Problem of Nationalism and Race,” pp. 9-10; Takeda,
Monogatari ōsutoraria no rekishi, pp. 150-154; Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes, p. 199.
155
both sides.”112 It is quite astonishing that all this took place during the war, in which Japan

was an ally of the British Empire.

Meantime, while the highly controversial conscription debate was underway, 113

Japanese Consul-General Shimizu in Sydney had been briefed on the discussions that had taken

place in London and been instructed to resume the negotiation with Hughes in Australia.114 On

21 August 1916, Shimizu tried to see Hughes while the latter was in Sydney, but Hughes

declined Shimizu’s request for a meeting due to his tight schedule.115 A few days later, on 23

August, Shimizu met with the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, Malcolm

Shepherd, who informed Shimizu that even though the Prime Minister had been contemplating

on the treaty question, because of the pressure of the ongoing war, he had not yet had an

opportunity to discuss the issue with his cabinet.116 After his meeting with Shepherd, Shimizu

repeatedly requested a meeting with Hughes, but Hughes kept rejecting Shimizu’s requests on

the pretext of a busy schedule and poor health. 117 On 28 June 1917, Shimizu finally saw

Hughes. There Shimizu emphasised the benefits Australia would reap from signing a

commercial treaty with Japan. However, Hughes insisted that since international order would

need a major overhaul after the war, it was advisable to postpone the negotiation on this matter

to later dates.118 Having failed to move Hughes, on 3 July 1917, Shimizu wrote a letter to

Hughes, in which he stated that he was “aware of the views… set forth by you in the

conversation you had with the Japanese Ambassador in London” and assured Hughes that “the

112
The Age, 21 October 1916, p. 12.
113
When the first national referendum was held in October 1916, the pro-conscription group, which included
Hughes, was defeated. Because of the political crisis which resulted from this referendum, Hughes and his
supporters broke away from the Labor party and formed a coalition government with the Liberals, with Hughes
as Prime Minister and Joseph Cook, the leader of Liberals, as deputy prime minister. Hughes, who remained
undaunted by this defeat, attempted another referendum in December 1917, only to be defeated for the second
time.
114
See Ishii to Shimizu, 17 June 1916, NGB-1916, vol. 1, p. 202; Ishii to Shimizu, 10 August 1916, Ibid., p. 206.
115
See Shimizu to Ishii, 23 August 1916, Ibid., pp. 206-208.
116
Ibid.
117
See Shimizu to Ishii, 10 October 1916, NGB-1916, vol. 1, pp, 208-211; Shimizu to Japanese Foreign Minister
Motono Ichirō, 27 December 1916, Ibid., pp. 211-213; Shimizu to Motono, 17 July 1917, NGB -1917, vol. 1,
pp. 155-156.
118
The content of the meeting was described in Shimizu to Motono, 17 July 1917, NGB -1917, vol. 1, pp. 155-
156.
156
difficulties to which you then referred may be overcome without any great trouble by a frank

exchange of ideas and opinions.”119 After sending this letter, Shimizu attempted to see Hughes,

but his request for a meeting was again rejected.120 In short, Shimizu’s repeated approaches

were again largely ignored by the Commonwealth government.

During World War I, Japan, with its renewed sense of national pride and confidence,

was much more assertive in its dealings with Australia than it was during the pre-war period.

The dramatic rise of Japan’s status on the international stage throughout the war strengthened

the country’s desire to achieve equality with the West and led to its persistent campaign to

convince Australia to accede to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty and treat Japanese

citizens, at least in form, like Europeans. However, despite the Japanese government’s firm

determination and the pressure from the British government to appease Japan, Hughes refused

to entertain the idea of admitting Japanese immigrants or of adhering to the commercial treaty.

Like his predecessor, Andrew Fisher, Hughes was determined not to compromise on the White

Australia Policy and successfully warded off Japan’s diplomatic offensive by refusing to enter

negotiations with Japan on immigration. As a result, Australian-Japanese negotiations over

Australia’s race-based immigration policy had again reached an impasse.

6.3. CONCLUSION

From 1905 onwards, Japan had a very unsettling influence on Australia. The transformation of

the strategic situation in the Pacific, created by Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 together

with Britain’s simultaneous withdrawal of its fleet from the Pacific to meet the German naval

challenge in the North Sea, greatly alarmed Australians. With the absence of the British Royal

Navy, Japan had emerged as the predominant power in the western Pacific and a potential

military, as well as migratory, threat to Australia. The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

119
Shimizu to Hughes, 3 July 1917, Ibid. pp. 157-158.
120
See Shimizu to Motono, 17 July 1917, Ibid., pp. 155-156.
157
in 1905 and 1911 did not ease Commonwealth leaders’ deep distrust of Japan. They had no

faith in the reliability of Japan as Britain’s ally or Britain’s capacity, especially when challenged

in Europe, to come to Australia’s aid in the Pacific. Lacking any assurance from Britain,

Australians feared for their own safety and survival.

The increased fear of Japan in Australian society during this period found expression

in various ways, including Australia’s search for American protection against Japan and the

establishment of Australia’s own defence program. Between 1905 and 1914, all of Australia’s

defence planning was directed to countering hypothetical Japanese invasion. It is important to

note that the Commonwealth’s defence policy during this period was highly influenced by its

concern for the preservation of the White Australia Policy. Commonwealth leaders feared that

if they did not build their own defence program, Japan, with its new military capability, might

take advantage of Britain’s preoccupation with European affairs to invade their country and

threaten racial purity of their nation. In other words, there was a remarkable degree of

reciprocal connection between Australia’s perception of Japan as a military threat and its

perception of Japan as a migratory threat.

The Japanese public was aware of anti-Japanese sentiment and discrimination against

Japanese citizens in Australia and other Western countries, and they resented the contradiction

between Japan’s rising international status and the implicit inferiority of their country contained

in the discrimination against Japanese immigrants. This resentment towards the West, in turn,

contributed to the growing popularity of Pan-Asian ideas and movement in Japanese society.

However, while the Japanese public was voicing anti-Western sentiment and developing Pan-

Asian orientation, the Japanese government, for its part, continued with its pro-Western foreign

policy in order to safeguard the nation’s security and interests on the international stage.

Accordingly, the Japanese government’s main response to the increasing antipathy towards

Japan in Australian society was to redouble its effort to establish a favourable image of Japan

158
among the Australian public. Consequently, between 1906 and 1914, the Japanese government

made very few attempts to convince the Commonwealth government to modify its immigration

restriction legislation to exempt Japanese citizens from the operation of law. In other words,

the Japanese public’s anger and resentment towards Australia and the West during the pre-

World War I period were unable to influence the Japanese government’s basic foreign policy

or its approach towards the White Australia Policy.

The outbreak of World War I, however, brought a significant change to the Japanese

government’s attitude towards the White Australia Policy. While Europe was beset by conflict,

Japan was the unchallenged master of Asia and the Pacific and took advantage of the situation

to extend its hegemonic influence in the region. Moreover, as the war dragged on, Britain

became heavily reliant on Japan’s assistance and Japan became an indispensable ally and a

decisive factor in the conduct of the war against Germany. Aware of its pre-eminence in the

region and its enhanced value as Britain’s ally, Japan became more self-confident and assertive

on the international stage.

For Australians, these indications of Japan’s ambition and diplomatic assertiveness

were very disturbing. As proud members of the British Empire and white British race,

Australians identified with Britain’s cause in the war and rushed to offer aid to the Mother

country. However, in spite of Japan’s entry into the war on the Australian side and its

contribution to the Allies’ war effort, Commonwealth leaders had no faith in Japan and became

confirmed in their old suspicion that Japan was seriously interested in forcing Australia, by

diplomacy or by arms, to accept its emigrants. Furthermore, they were keenly aware of the

limit of Britain’s power and its indifference to Australia’s apprehension and plight. As a result,

during the war, Australian political leaders came to fear that should Japan demand as a reward

for its wartime services that its citizens be allowed to enter and settle freely any part of the

Empire, then Britain might succumb to the pressure. In fact, this fear was confirmed in early

159
1916, when Japan requested Britain to urge Australia to adhere to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty

of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 in return for Japan’s additional naval assistance to the

Allied cause, and Britain pressured Australia to comply with the Japanese demand.

Throughout World War I, the Japanese government carried out a persistent campaign

to convince the Commonwealth government to accede to the Anglo-Japanese commercial

treaty, which would in principle have exempted Japanese citizens from the application of the

White Australia Policy. It was not that the Japanese government had any desire to encourage

migration to Australia. Rather, Japan, which saw its international status rise dramatically during

the war, wanted Australia to officially acknowledge that its citizens were not inferior to

Europeans by granting Japanese immigrants the same treatment as their European counterparts.

Indeed, Japan was aware that Australia might be reluctant to join the treaty due to

apprehensions in connection with the immigration question and suggested securing the treaty

against uncontrolled immigration with a Gentlemen’s Agreement, similar to those they had

already signed with Canada and America. If this proposal had been accepted, the actual

arrangements for the admission of Japanese nationals to Australia would have remained the

same, although their basis would have been different. Instead of there being a law to exclude

all Japanese, modified by an agreement that merchants, students and travellers were allowed to

enter, there would have been a treaty giving all Japanese the right of entry, modified by an

agreement that labourers, artisans and the like were not allowed to enter. Under either

arrangement, only Japanese of certain classes were allowed to enter Australia.

Nevertheless, in spite of the delicate war situation and continuous pressure from both

the British and Japanese governments, the successive Commonwealth governments refused to

join the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. They would grant Japan most-favoured-nation

tariff treatment but remained adamant that there could be no compromise on the White

Australia Policy. Even though Canada and America were content with their arrangements with

160
Japan, Australia regarded racial purity of the nation as inviolable and was determined to protect

its white British character and identity. Moreover, Japan’s persistent, and at time intimidating,

pressure on Australia to comply with its demands and Britain’s unhelpful stance and its

disregard of Australia’s predicament heightened the sense of vulnerability in the mind of

Commonwealth leaders and strengthened their determination to do whatever they could to

defend the White Australia Policy against the threat posed by Japan.

Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes left Australia early 1918 for

Europe for the anticipated Peace Conference. There, Australia’s firm determination to preserve

the White Australia Policy and Japan’s resolve to achieve equality with the West would, as we

will see in the next chapter, climax into the ultimate clash between the two nations over Japan’s

proposal to insert a racial equality clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

161
 CHAPTER VII
THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

This chapter examines the Japanese-Australian clash over Japan’s racial equality proposal at

the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The Paris Peace Conference was convened in January

1919 following the end of World War I in order to conclude peace treaties between the

victorious Allied Powers and the defeated Central Powers.1 The decision to create the League

of Nations—the first international organisation whose principal mission was to ensure lasting

world peace and a just and equitable post-war international order—and the drafting of its

Covenant also took place during the conference.

Japan was accorded the status of great power by its Western allies at the end of the

war and attended the Peace Conference as one of the five victor powers responsible for drafting

peace treaties and the Covenant of the League of Nations.2 At the conference, Japan proposed

to insert a clause in the League of Nations Covenant affirming the principle of racial equality.

However, the proposal faced strong opposition from Australian Prime Minister William Morris

Hughes and was eventually defeated.

In many ways, the events at the Paris Conference symbolise the conflict between

Japan and Australia over the White Australia Policy. Japan, having achieved great power status,

attempted to finally remove the Western-derived stigma of inferiority and reaffirm its

international status and identity as a “civilised” power through a racial equality proposal.

However, Hughes, who viewed the Japanese proposal as a direct attack on the White Australia

1
The treaties prepared at the Paris Peace Conference include the Treaty of Versailles (signed on 28 June 1919
with Germany), the Treaty of Saint-Germain (signed on 10 September 1919 with Austria), the Treaty of
Neuilly (signed on 27 November 1919 with Bulgaria), the Treaty of Trianon (signed on 4 June 1920 with
Hungary) and the Treaty of Sèvres (signed on 10 August 1920 with the Ottoman Empire) which was
subsequently revised by the Treaty of Lausanne (signed on 24 July 1923). At the conference, Germany was
forced to accept full blame for the war and asked to pay huge reparations. It was also forced to give up all
overseas possessions. As a result, the disposition of Germany’s former colonies became one of the central
issues at the conference. For a detailed account of negations and decisions at the Paris Peace Conference, see
Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2001).
2
Other victor powers were the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy.
162
Policy and a significant threat to his nation’s white British character and identity, vigorously

opposed it. Just as Australia had been unwavering in its opposition to exempting Japanese

citizens from the White Australia Policy, throughout the conference, Hughes remained adamant

in his opposition to the Japanese proposal. In the end, despite Japan’s continuous effort to

persuade Australia to change its position, the racial equality proposal was defeated mainly due

to Hughes‘s strong opposition.

In her comprehensive study of Japan’s racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace

Conference, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919, Naoko Shimazu

investigates the reasons behind “the rise and fall of the racial equality proposal” by exploring

the respective positions taken by the three main protagonists in racial equality negotiations in

Paris—“the Japanese who proposed it, and the British and Americans who opposed it.” 3

Shimazu argues that the racial equality proposal was motivated by the Japanese government’s

desire to solve Japanese immigration problems in the Anglo-Saxon territories to protect Japan’s

international reputation as a great power as well as its attempt to gain domestic support for the

League of Nations. In light of this, she concludes that Japan’s intention in submitting the

proposal was not to achieve “universal racial equality” but “to secure racial equality for

Japanese nationals.”4 As for the Anglo-American opposition to the proposal, Shimazu argues

that the British, facing strong opposition from its Dominions, opposed the Japanese proposal

in order to maintain the imperial unity, and the Americans opposed it because of the high level

of anti-Japanese immigration sentiments in California. Shimazu also claims that U.S. President

Woodrow Wilson, who was the chairman of the League of Nations Commission, sacrificed the

Japanese proposal in order to secure British support for his ultimate goal of creating the League

of Nations.5

This chapter engages closely with Shimazu’s work and greatly benefits from her

3
Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, p. 2.
4
Ibid., P. 166.
5
Ibid., pp. 117-163, 166-168.
163
archival scholarship, analysis and insights. However, unlike Shimazu’s work, which focuses

on the Anglo-American responses to the Japanese proposal as well as Japan’s motivations in

introducing the racial equality proposal, this chapter highlights Australia’s role in the ultimate

defeat of the Japanese proposal and Japan’s persistent, but failed, effort to persuade Australia

to accept the racial equality proposal. In so doing, it aims to show that the Japanese-Australian

diplomatic confrontation over the racial equality proposal at the Paris Conference was greatly

influenced by both nations’ visions of and anxieties around their respective national identities

and, therefore, was an epitome of the previous decades of negotiations and tensions between

the two nations surrounding the issue of Japanese immigration.

7.1. THE RISE OF THE RACIAL EQUALITY PROPOSAL

For Japan, racial equality was essential for completing its modern national identity as a

civilized nation. As has been discussed throughout this thesis, from the late 19th century, Japan

had pursued the goal of achieving equality with the West first by removing unequal treaties

which the Western powers had imposed upon it and then by trying to persuade white settler

societies to give up or modify their race-based immigration policies which discriminated

against Japanese citizens. Having been accorded the status of great power at the end of World

War I, it was important for Japan to have racial equality acknowledged in order to become truly

equal to the other great powers. In this sense, the racial equality proposal was consistent with

Japan’s long declared policy of achieving equality with the West. Nevertheless, the Japanese

government’s decision to introduce the racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference

derived, at least partly, from the specific domestic situation in Japan at the time, namely

swelling anti-Western public opinion demanding the end to discrimination against Japanese

people and the pro-Western Hara government’s need to placate anti-Western and anti-League

164
domestic sentiment.6

Hara Takashi, the leader of Seiyūkai, one of Japan’s main political parties in the early

20th century, became Prime Minister of Japan on 28 September 1918 after the dissolution of

the Terauchi cabinet. Hara was the first commoner to head the Japanese government, and as

such, he was regarded as the symbol of the democratic spirit of the Taishō period.7 Unlike his

predecessors, Terauchi Masatake and Ōkuma Shigenobu, whose wartime governments had

followed expansionist policies and alienated Japan from the United States and Britain, Hara

adopted a pro-Western foreign policy. He believed that Japan should cooperate with the West

and support the creation of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference in order to

restore Japan’s damaged relations with the Western powers and prevent further international

isolation of Japan.8

However, Hara’s pro-Western and pro-League foreign policy was not representative

of Japan’s national opinion at the time. In general, the Japanese public was sceptical of the

Western, particularly the Anglo-Saxon, powers and the League of Nations. They saw the

League as an attempt by the United States and Britain to maintain the status quo and entrench

their global hegemony.9 They were doubtful as to whether the League would be a genuinely

fair organisation which would benefit the weak as well as the powerful Western nations.10 This

distrust was partly prompted by the deterioration of Japan’s relationship with some Western

countries during World War I, but it had also been long fostered by the belief that the Japanese

had been unfairly treated by the West on the basis of race despite Japan’s proven record of

6
For an analysis of the role of Japan’s domestic politics in the rise of the racial equality proposal, see Shimazu,
Japan, Race and Equality, pp. 38-67. For a discussion of Japan’s domestic opinion calling for the end to racial
discrimination, see Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s
Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008),
pp. 285-288.
7
Iriye, Japan and the Wider World, p. 44.
8
For a discussion of Japan’s deteriorating relationship with Britain and America during World War I, see Iriye
Akira. Nihon no gaikō (Japanese Foreign Policy) (Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho, 1996), pp. 71-75. For Hara’s pro-
Western foreign policy, see Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, pp. 42-44.
9
See Asahi Shimbun, 4 November 1918.
10
These sentiments were expressed in Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 24, 30 January 1919.
165
achievements. 11 The Japanese public was suspicious of the sincerity of U.S. President

Woodrow Wilson’s initiative to create a world body with the aim of perpetuating international

peace and justice while his country was practising discrimination against Japanese immigrants.

For example, Asahi Shimbun in its editorial commentated that as long as discrimination based

on race and religion existed, the equality which Wilson was advocating would merely be

equality among European nations and peoples.12 Similarly, Kokumin Shimbun argued that the

objective of the League’s establishment would not be fully realised so long as Japanese and

other coloured races were treated differently in white societies.13 Subsequently, the Japanese

press started insisting that Japan should demand a solution to the racial discrimination question

within the framework of the League of Nations. For example, Asahi Shimbun argued that it was

essential to solve the problem of racial prejudice and discrimination in order for the upcoming

Peace Conference to attain real and lasting international peace and justice.14 The newspaper

further stated that if Wilson, who had been advocating justice and humanity, did not support

the abolition of racial discrimination, he would be “the world’s biggest hypocrite.”15

These public debates received an important boost from intellectuals and politicians

who echoed the wider public opinion and demanded an end to racial discrimination. One of the

most important figures among them was Konoe Fumimaro. 16 As discussed in Chapter II,

Konoe wrote an article titled “Eibeihon’i no heiwashugi o haisu” (Reject the Anglo-American

Based Peace) in December 1918, just before his departure for Paris to attend the Peace

Conference. In the article, Konoe adopted a Pan-Asian and anti-Western attitude and severely

criticised the Anglo-American-oriented international order and the Anglo-American notion of

peace. He also attacked the proposal for the League of Nations as the ideology of “upholding

11
See Asahi Shimbun, 22 October 1918; Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 30 January 1919.
12
Asahi Shimbun, 5 December 1918.
13
Kokumin Shimbun, 3 November 1918.
14
Asahi Shimbun, 1 December 1918.
15
Asahi Shimbun, 30 January 1919.
16
Konoe Fumimaro was a key political figure in Japanese politics in the late 1930s. He served as Prime Minister
during the outbreak of war with China in 1937 and later during the negotiations with the United States in 1941.
166
the status quo” by Britain and the United States and called for the abolition of racial

discrimination by claiming that “the discrimination against Orientals” was “a grave

humanitarian problem that no defender of justice should overlook.”17 Konoe’s position against

the League of Nations was significant in the sense that there was a great deal of scepticism

towards the League even within the Japanese delegation to the Peace Conference.

Deep distrust of Hara’s pro-League foreign policy among the public and within the

government was also evidenced by the formation of various associations in early 1919. One of

the largest of them was the League to Abolish Racial Discrimination (Jinshuteki Sabetsu

Teppai Kisei Taikai), which advocated that the abolition of racial discrimination should be a

crucial part of Japan’s peace policy at the upcoming Peace Conference.18 The association held

its first mass public meeting in Tokyo on 5 February 1919, which attracted around three

hundred participants including representatives from the three major political parties—Seiyūkai,

Kenseikai and Kokumintō—as well as members of ultra-right-wing associations and military

officials who did not approve of the Hara government’s pro-Western policy.19 The fact that

the association included members of Seiyūkai exposed the deep dissatisfaction felt by some in

the Hara’s ruling party.

The preceding discussion reveals a significant level of scepticism towards the League

of Nations in Japanese society caused by the ongoing discrimination against the Japanese in

Anglo-Saxon countries and territories. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Hara had to

show to the Japanese public that his government was seeking some sort of solution to the

problem of racial discrimination at the upcoming Peace Conference in order to placate the

public opinion which opposed his government’s pro-Western and pro-League policy. 20

17
Quoted in de Barry, Sources of Japanese Tradition, pp. 291-293. See also Nakanishi, “Konoe Fumimaro ‘Eibei
hon’i no heiwashugi o haisu’ rombun no haikei,” pp. 238-244.
18
See Uchida (Japanese Foreign Minister) to Matsui (Japanese Ambassador to Paris), 31 January 1919, NGB-
1919, vol. 3, part1, p. 437 and Uchida to Matsui 12 February 1919, Ibid., pp. 440-443.
19
This mass public meeting was discussed in Uchida to Matsui, 6 February 1919, Uchida to Saionji, 8 February
1919, Ibid., pp. 439-440.
20
This view is also presented by Naoko Shimazu, See Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, pp. 38-67.
167
Accordingly, on 26 December 1918, Japanese Foreign Minister Uchida sent a telegraph to

Japanese Ambassador Chinda in London regarding Japan’s basic policy at the Paris Peace

Conference, which included the following instruction:

The League of the Nations is one of the most important issues, and the Imperial Government agrees
with its ultimate objectives. However, racial discrimination between nations has not yet been
eliminated and depending on how the League’s objectives are accomplished, Japan may suffer great
disadvantages…. Nevertheless, if the League of Nations is to be established, Japan cannot remain
isolated outside the League, and if there appears any tendency towards the establishment of a definite
scheme (the League), the delegates should, so far as the circumstances allow, make efforts to ensure
suitable guarantees against the disadvantages to Japan which may arise from racial prejudice. 21

7.2. PREPARING THE RACIAL EQUALITY PROPOSAL

Upon receiving the instruction from Tokyo, the Japanese plenipotentiaries in the upcoming

Paris Peace Conference, Makino Nobuaki and Chinda Sutemi, started preparing a clause which

would come to be known as the racial equality proposal.22 To this end, they first approached

the Americans because they expected America to be the fiercest opponent of the racial equality

proposal due to the widespread antipathy towards Japanese residents in the West Coast states.

Moreover, given that the League of Nations was President Wilson’s pet project, they deemed

it appropriate to confer with the Americans first.23 On 2 February 1919, Makino and Chinda

visited Colonel Edward House, President Wilson’s trusted advisor, and sought his advice on

how they should incorporate the principle of racial equality in the League Covenant.24 Makino

and Chinda decided to speak with House, instead of Wilson or other American delegates,

21
Uchida to Chinda, 26 December 1918. The same directive was also sent to former Japanese Foreign Minister
Makino Nobuaki in a separate telegram. See NGB-1918, vol. 3, pp. 677-678.
22
The Japanese delegation to the Paris Conference was made up of a total of sixty-four members including five
plenipotentiaries—Saionji Kinmochi (former Prime Minister and the delegation head), Makino Nobuaki
(former Foreign Minister), Chinda Sutemi (Ambassador to London), Matsui Keishirō (Ambassador to Paris)
and Ijūin Hikokichi (Ambassador to Rome). Although Saionji was the official head of the delegation, his role
was symbolic and limited by his ill health, making Makino the de facto chief of the delegation. Neither Prime
Minister Hara nor Foreign Minister Uchida attended the conference as they felt unable to leave their newly
elected government in Japan. See the entry for 22 November 1918, Hara Keiichirō (ed.), Hara kei nikki (The
Dairy of Hara Kei), vol. 8 (Tokyo: Kangensha, 1950).
23
See Matsui to Uchida, 15 February 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 443-446. America’s primary objective
at the conference was the implementation of the Fourteen Points, which President Wilson had outlined to the
United States Congress in January 1918. Among them, Wilson was particularly invested in the goal of
establishing the League of Nations and personally took charge of the task by becoming chairman of the League
of Nations Commission. See Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, pp. 9,150-154.
24
Charles Seymour (ed.), The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 4 (London: Ernest Benn, 1928), pp. 320-
321. See also Matsui to Uchida, 15 February 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 443-446.
168
because the Japanese government regarded him to be sympathetic to the Japanese.25 House did

not betray their expectation and told the Japanese that he “deprecated racial, religious or any

other kinds of prejudice.”26 Subsequently, during the following weeks, Makino and Chinda, in

consultation with House, produced a draft proposal with which both the Japanese and

Americans were satisfied.27 The Japanese delegates did not want to submit the proposal to the

League of Nations Commission themselves and asked Wilson to present it as his own

amendment to the religious freedom article (Article 21). Wilson readily agreed to the Japanese

request.28

Having obtained consent from the United States, the Japanese delegates next tried to

secure Britain’s approval. The Japanese also regarded Britain to be a possible opponent of their

proposal because of race-based immigration policies practiced in the Dominions, but they were

hopeful that Britain would support the Japanese proposal because of its status as Japan’s ally.29

However, it turned out that they were too optimistic. Contrary to their expectations, British

Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour showed no inclination to support the Japanese proposal

during his meeting with House on 10 February 1919.30 This was because in the course of his

conversation with House, Balfour interpreted the Japanese proposal as an immigration proposal,

demanding unrestricted entry of Japanese and other non-white immigrants into British

25
Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, p. 17. House was known for his diplomatic skills, as opposed to Wilson’s
“self-righteous idealism,” and in Paris, House and Wilson worked as a team. As the racial equality proposal
was not Wilson’s primary interest, subsequently House was entrusted with the negotiation. See Lake and
Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, pp. 289-290.
26
Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, pp. 320-321. See also Matsui to Uchida, 15 February 1919,
NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 443-446.
27
House requested Makino and Chinda to prepare two resolutions, one being what they most desired and the
other being what they would be willing to accept in lieu of the one they preferred. In other words, he suggested
that they should indicate their maximum and minimum expectations. House then conferred with Wilson, who
immediately rejected Japan’s maximum position due to its mandatory character. Wilson, who was keenly aware
of the difficulties associated with immigration problems on the American West coast because of his firsthand
experience of the row over the Californian Alien Land Law in 1913, knew that it would be virtually impossible
to persuade California to abandon its discriminatory immigration legislation. Subsequently, Makino and
Chinda, in consultation with House, revised the proposal, and after making some modifications, they came up
with a compromise draft with which both the Japanese and Americans were satisfied. See entries for 4 and 5
February 1919, Edward M. House Diaries, Yale University Library Digital Collections,
http://digital.library.yale.edu/cdm/landingpage/collection/1004_6.
28
See Matsui to Uchida, 15 February 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 443-446.
29
See Matsui to Uchida, 15 and 16 February 1919, Ibid., pp.443-446, 449-451.
30
Makino and Chinda, who were expecting little resistance from the British, had accepted House’s offer to
discuss the proposal informally with the British. See Matsui to Uchida, 15 February 1919, Ibid., pp.443-446.
169
territories. Balfour did not believe that the Dominions “would tolerate a great Japanese flow of

immigration.” 31 Moreover, Balfour’s interpretation of Japan’s racial equality proposal as

implying immigration effectively left the Japanese proposal in the hands of the Dominions.

The immigration question had always been challenging for the Japanese government

due to its dual nature as a policy area. As is clear from the discussion throughout this thesis,

Japan, as a country sending immigrants, regarded immigration as a diplomatic issue. This was

mainly because the Japanese government was concerned that discriminatory treatment of its

citizens in white settler societies would imply Japan’s inferiority to white European nations and

damage Japan’s international prestige as a “civilised” power. As a result, the Japanese

government pressed these societies, with little success, to modify their immigration laws or

exempt Japanese citizens from them. However, white settler societies, including Australia and

other British Dominions, which were receiving immigrants, perceived immigration as a

domestic policy matter and were unwilling to give in to Japan’s diplomatic pressure. 32 The

British government shared the Dominions’ view on immigration. It had long been the policy of

the British government to treat immigration as a Dominion issue, separate from imperial

foreign and defence policy issues, and it was happy to give the Dominions the much-desired

sphere of autonomy in their immigration policies.33 As a result, once the British government

interpreted the racial equality proposal as an immigration proposal, it was unwilling to

intervene in the racial equality negotiation and left it to the Dominions to set the policy for the

Empire.

As expected, the Dominions vigorously opposed the Japanese proposal. They saw it

as a threat to their race-based immigration policies and objected to the inclusion of the principle

of racial equality in the League Covenant in any form. Belfour took into account the opposition

31
Quoted in Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, p.19.
32
Naoko Shimazu also points out the dual nature of the immigration question. See Shimazu, Japan, Race and
Equality, p.69.
33
Ibid., pp.121-125.
170
of the Dominion leaders and told House that if the Japanese proposal were accepted, the League

would be burdened “with perpetual controversy incapable of satisfactory solution.” 34

Although the Japanese delegates had expected some resistance from the British, they were

taken aback by the fact that the British government valued the Dominions’ opinion more than

that of its ally. As a result, Makino and Chinda, who previously had preferred to let the

Americans do their negotiating for them, decided to negotiate directly with the British and

subsequently conferred on several occasions with Balfour and Robert Cecil, who was one of

the principal players in the racial equality negotiations for the British Empire. While personally

sympathetic to Japan’s position, they both indicated that they could not meet Japan’s wishes in

any way. Cecil further commented that questions such as religious freedom and racial equality

were not directly related to the League and, therefore, should not be included in the Covenant.35

Nonetheless, by 12 February 1919, the Japanese and the American delegates had

reached an agreement on the wording for the proposal which was “as mild and inoffensive as

possible” and all the members of the British Empire delegation except for Australian Prime

Minister Hughes, whom House described as the “stumbling block,” were willing to accept.36

Although Wilson had previously agreed to submit the Japanese amendment as his own, by then,

he had become less keen on the idea. As a result, the Japanese delegates decided to present

their proposal to the League of Nations Commission themselves on 13 February 1919. Makino

and Chinda knew that the chance of their proposal being accepted was very slim, but they had

to show to the aroused public opinion back home that they were doing their best to fight the

injustice inflicted on them by the West.37

Hughes was informed beforehand of Japan’s intention. In writing to Acting Prime

Minister William Watt in Melbourne, Hughes expressed his apprehension about the Japanese

34
Quoted in Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, p.19.
35
The content of the Japanese delegates’ meeting with their British counterparts was described in the letters
from Matsui to Uchida, 15 and 16 February 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 443-451.
36
See the entry for 13 February 1919, Edward M. House Diaries.
37
See Matsui to Uchida, 15 and 16 February 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 443-451.
171
proposal. He told Watt that Japan was “insisting that open door to all nationalities shall be

accepted.” Australia would have “no guarantee…that League will uphold us in our policy of

excluding Asiatics, and if overcrowded countries represented on the League demand entrance

to Commonwealth and League gives decision against us, forces of League will be directed

against us.”38 Hughes was obviously convinced that Japan’s racial equality proposal would

pose a serious challenge to the White Australia Policy.

7.3. THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE

The Australian contingent at the Paris Peace Conference was small. In addition to Prime

Minister Hughes, it comprised Navy Minister Joseph Cook, Solicitor-General Robert Garran,

John Latham and Frederic Eggleston. The British Dominions such as Australia initially did not

have independent representations at the conference. However, leaders of some of the self-

governing Dominions, most notably Hughes and his Canadian counterpart, Robert Borden,

insisted that their countries’ considerable contribution during World War I entitled them to

separate seats at the conference and successfully convinced Britain to accept the presence of

delegations from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland and India.39

The Paris Peace Conference was the first occasion for Australia and the other Dominions to be

present in their own right at a major international conference. However, since the five victor

powers (United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) dominated the decision-making

process, the Dominions’ ability to influence the outcomes at the conference was minimal.40

Nevertheless, as has been explained earlier, the British government’s interpretation of Japan’s

38
Cable, Hughes to Watt, 13 February 1919, NAA: CP360/8 B1/3.
39
19.35 per cent of New Zealand’s whole male population, 13.48 per cent of Canada’s, 13.43 per cent of
Australia’s, and 11.12 per cent of South Africa’s served in World War I. Consequently, the Dominions felt that
they were entitled to be involved in the peace settlement, and the British government could not ignore their
opinions because of their significant contributions to the British war effort. See Shimazu, Japan, Race and
Equality, p. 122; L.F. Fitzhardinge, "Hughes, Borden, and Dominion Representation at the Paris Peace
Conference," in Canadian Historical Review, 1968, vol. 49, no. 2: 160–169; R.C. Snelling, "Peacemaking,
1919: Australia, New Zealand and the British Empire Delegation at Versailles," in Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 1975, vol. 4, no. 1: 15-28.
40
Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, pp. 14-15; Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, pp. 340-341.
172
racial equality proposal as demanding unrestricted immigration of Japanese citizens into its

territories led the Dominions to take control of the negotiations surrounding the Japanese

proposal within the British Empire delegation. In other words, the racial equality proposal was

the only area where the Dominions, especially Australia, were able to play a prominent role.

Hughes, who headed the Australian delegation, was sceptical of Wilson’s liberal

internationalism and had no faith in the League of Nations as a guarantor against aggression.

He instead embraced the idea of realpolitik and was determined to further Australia's interests

at the Peace Conference.41 Shortly after arriving in Paris, Hughes gave a press interview in

which he outlined Australia’s position for the peacemaking:

Australia wants the German islands in the Pacific and the exaction of indemnities from Germany.
She favours the League of Nations, but does not want promiscuous immigration, and claims to make
whatever economic arrangement she pleases. She opposes the ‘freedom of seas” and limiting of
Great Britain’s naval supremacy.42

Hughes also publicly declared his attitude towards Japan:

The Japanese are a highly intelligent people, but their ways are not our ways. We would regard with
suspicion any geographical advance by Japan towards Australia. 43

At the Peace Conference, with these as his theme, Hughes demanded that Germany should pay

the full cost of the war and be permanently disarmed so that it would never again be able to

challenge the global dominance of the British Empire. In regard to the Pacific region, which

touched Australia more directly, Hughes was determined to stop Japan’s southward advance.

Thus, he tried to prevent Japan from acquiring the German North Pacific islands, fought for

Australia’s right to annex German New Guinea and associated islands in the South Pacific as

a barrier against Japan, and when it failed, sought restrictions on immigration into mandated

territories administered by Australia.44 When Hughes learned about Japan’s intention to submit

41
Meaney, Towards a New Vision, pp. 23-24. See also Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, pp. 340-
404; Snelling, "Peacemaking, 1919," pp. 15-28.
42
The Argus (Melbourne), 20 January 1919.
43
The Herald (Melbourne), 23 January 1919.
44
Snelling, "Peacemaking, 1919," pp. 15-28. Although Japan and Australia fought for their right to annex the
173
a racial equality proposal, he immediately saw it as Japan’s attempt to force Australia to accept

its immigrants and, therefore, a great threat to the white British character and identity of his

nation. Consequently, as we will see in the ensuing discussion, Hughes displayed extreme

determination to block Japan from inserting any form of words in the Covenant of the League

of Nations which might challenge, even faintly, the White Australia Policy.

7.4. JAPAN’S INITIAL DEFEAT

At the Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations Commission was established at the

plenary session of 25 January 1919 for the purpose of drafting the Covenant of the League of

Nations.45 On 13 February 1919, Makino presented to the League of Nations Commission the

racial equality proposal as an amendment to Article 21, which dealt with freedom of religion.

The Japanese delegates decided to introduce the racial equality proposal as an amendment to

Article 21 as it was Wilson’s favourite article, and they considered it unlikely to be defeated.46

The amendment read:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties
agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of States members of the League equal and
just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their
race or nationality.47

former German possessions in the Pacific which they had occupied during the war – Japan in the North Pacific
and Australia in the South Pacific - it was decided that Japan would administer the North Pacific islands and
Australia the South Pacific islands under the third-class mandate. The third-class mandate provided that
mandated territories be “administered under the laws of mandatory State as integral portions thereof” and
enabled Australia to apply its own immigration laws to New Guinea. As Hughes later recognised, for Australia,
the mandate compromise was preferable to outright sovereignty because it prohibited Japan from fortifying
the ex-German islands north of the Equator that came under its control. See also Ernest Scott, Official History
of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, vol. XI - Australia during the War (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1937),
pp. 781-782, 787.
45
The League of Nations Commission consisted of two members from the United States (Wilson, the chair of
the commission, and House), the British Empire (Cecil and Jan Smuts), France (Léon
Bourgeois and Ferdinand Larnaude), Italy (Prime Minister Orlando and Vittorio Scialoja) and Japan (Makino
and Chinda) and one member each from Belgium, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Portugal,
Romania and Serbia. During the first four months of 1919, the Commission met 15 times in an attempt to
negotiate the exact terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations. For a discussion of the drafting of the
League of Nations Covenant, see F. S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-
1946 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988).
46
Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, p. 20.
47
The text of this proposal can be found in Matsui to Uchida, 15 February 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, p.
446.
174
 In the speech he made on the occasion, Makino argued that the principle of religious

and racial equality was fundamental to the ideal of the League of Nations which they were

about to establish. He stated:

It is not necessary to dwell on the fact that racial and religious animosities have constituted fruitful
source of trouble and warfare among different peoples throughout history…. I am aware of difficult
circumstances that stand in way of acting on principle embodied in this clause, but I do not think it
insurmountable...and it is hoped that matter be taken in hand on such opportunity as present. What
was deemed impossible before is about to be accomplished. Creation of League itself…is a noble
example.48

However, at the same time, Makino acknowledged that the question of race prejudice was “very

delicate and complicated” and tried to assure commission members who were sceptical of the

Japanese proposal by declaring that “the immediate realization of the ideal equality of treatment

between peoples” was not proposed. Makino instead stressed that the proposal “enunciates

principle of equality” and suggested that it might be “regarded as invitation to government and

peoples concerned to examine more closely and seriously, and to devise some acceptable means

to meet deadlock which at present confronts different peoples.”49

Nevertheless, Cecil, who was leading the British Empire delegation, objected to the

proposal by saying that it had “raised extremely serious problems within the British Empire.”

He therefore insisted that despite “the nobility of thought which inspired” Makino, it would be

best to postpone its examination to a later date. 50 Although some nations supported the

Japanese proposal, the majority was in favour of Cecil’s suggestion that the amendment would

be set aside for the time being.51 Wilson, for his part, was ready to abandon the religious

freedom article without any hesitation after witnessing a significant opposition to the article

with the Japanese proposal attached. 52 As a result, Japan’s initial attempt to insert a racial

equality clause in the League of Nations Covenant was defeated.

48
For the text of Makino’s speech, see Matsui to Uchida, 15 February 1919, Ibid., pp. 446-449.
49
Ibid.
50
David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1928), vol. 2, p.325.
51
See Matsui to Uchida, 16 February 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp.449-451; Miller, The Drafting of the
Covenant, vol. 2, p. 325.
52
Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, vol.1, p. 269.
175
7.5. JAPAN’S SUSTAINED EFFORT AND HUGHES’S PERSISTENT OPPOSITION

Japanese newspapers did not report the defeat of 13 February until 18 February. Overall, the

Japanese press’s reaction to the defeat of the proposal was subdued, simply reporting that the

racial equality proposal had been rejected, and did not voice anger, dismay or any other

opinions.53 The Japanese government in Tokyo, for its part, instructed the delegates in Paris to

renew their efforts to have the racial equality proposal accepted as soon as it learned of the

defeat by sending the following directive to Paris:

The abolition of racial discrimination is one of the most critical demands of the Imperial Government
regarding the League of Nations. Although it has previously been defeated at the Peace Conference,
it should not be abandoned because it would affect the future interest of the Empire. We, therefore,
must carefully consider how to accomplish our objective.54

Makino and Chinda recognised that Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes

was the most persistent opponent of the Japanese proposal and that winning his consent would

be imperative for the success of the racial equality proposal. On 14 March 1919, they met with

Hughes. There, they stressed that Japan merely wished to have the principle of racial equality

accepted and was not demanding immediate abolition of existing race-based immigration

policies of any member states of the League of Nations. They also told Hughes that the racial

equality principle was in accordance with the broad objective of the League and that the

Japanese public felt passionate about the issue. They then informed Hughes of Japan’s intention

to resubmit the proposal at the earliest opportunity and asked Hughes to consider the matter

carefully as they were willing to accommodate his views.55

53
See, for example, 18 February 1919 editions of Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun and Yomiuri
Shimbun.
54
This directive was issued on 27 February 1919. See “Jinshu sabetsu teppai ni kansuru mondai (The Question
regarding the Abolition of Racial Discrimination),” 2.4.2.2. Kokusai renmei: jinshu sabetsu teppai (The
League of Nations: The Abolition of Racial Discrimination), vol.3, Diplomatic Record Office, Tokyo. At the
same time, the Japanese government in Tokyo instructed the delegation in Paris to negotiate directly with the
British government, which controlled the Dominions’ foreign policy. This indicated Tokyo’s inability to
comprehend the situation in Paris. As discussed earlier, after Britain interpreted the Japanese proposal as an
immigration proposal, it regarded the proposal as a dominion issue. Being in Paris, Makino and Chinda
understood the need to engage directly with the Dominions. As a result, contrary to the instruction from Tokyo,
they made a decision to negotiate independently with the Dominion leaders. See Matsui to Uchida, 16 February
1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 449-451. Uchida to Matsui 4 March 1919, Ibid., p. 455.
55
In their telegram to Foreign Minister Uchida sent on the following day, the Japanese delegates in Paris
described the interview with Hughes in detail. See Matsui to Uchida, 15 March 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part
176
 Hughes’s response was negative. He acknowledged that as a matter of principle, he

did not disagree with the abolition of racial discrimination. However, he stated that “as a

practical issue,” the proposal was ladened with “serious and difficult problems” and therefore

he could not accept it. 56 Nevertheless, as indicated in the Japanese plenipotentiaries’

correspondence to Tokyo on the meeting, Hughes apparently left them with the impression that

if the right wording could be found, he might consent to the proposal.57

Makino and Chinda thus revised the wording of the racial equality proposal and

subsequently sought another meeting with Hughes. However, Hughes avoided seeing them on

the pretext of illness.58 They then presented the following proposal to Australian Solicitor-

General Robert Garran and asked him to pass it on to Hughes.

Equality of nations being a basic principle of League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree
to endorse principle of equal and just treatment to be accorded to all alien nationals of States member
of the League.59

The reference to “making no distinction, either in law or fact, on account of their race or

nationality” in the original version had been removed. However, on the following day, Garran

informed the Japanese that although the revised proposal was much more “abstract” than its

predecessor, Hughes believed that it still conveyed the same message as the original one and

hence was unacceptable.60

In fact, Hughes probably had no intention of accepting the Japanese proposal even if

its wording had been drastically revised. In an interview with The Sun several days after his

meeting with the Japanese delegates, Hughes publicly declared that:

1, pp. 471-472. See also Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes, p. 403.

56
Ibid.
57
See Matsui to Uchida, 15 March 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 471-472.
58
On 25 March, the Japanese delegation in Paris informed Foreign Minister Uchida that although they had on
several occasions sought another meeting with Hughes, he had always avoided it, excusing himself either on
the grounds of travel or sickness. See Matsui to Uchida, 25 March 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 483-
484.
59
For the text of the revised proposal, see Matsui to Uchida, 25 March 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 483-
485.
60
Matsui to Uchida, 25 March 1919, Ibid., pp. 483-485.
177
 Australia cannot agree to the incorporation of the principle of equality of races in the League of
Nations Covenant. Australia will not agree to the adoption of the principle of equality of races in
any other form by the Peace Conference if it conflicts with our interests. We cannot deviate an inch
from our expressed position in regard to the Japanese question. 61

A few days later, Hughes also commented that “the Australians desired to build up an all British

population of 15,000,000 as early as possible” and it was “impossible for the British Dominions

to agree to the Japanese demands for equality of treatment towards all nationals.”62

In the meantime, Hughes’s staunch behaviour seemed to have also agitated American

public opinion, and the American government became concerned about the mounting American

domestic opposition to the Japanese proposal.63 As a result, the American delegation in Paris

decided that the adoption of the racial equality proposal in the way the Japanese had put forward

was neither possible nor desirable.64 Therefore, when Makino and Chinda showed House the

revised proposal that they had presented to Garran, House requested that its wording be further

revised. House also insisted that the proposal should be placed in the preamble, instead of in

the body, of the Covenant, which would have the effect of depriving it of any binding force.

The Japanese, being aware that their proposal would never be approved unless they amended

it substantially, agreed to House’s request.65

Subsequently, the Japanese delegates in Paris made extensive changes to the proposal.

61
The Sun (New York), 19 March 1919.
62
The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 March 1919.
63
The Japanese government was aware of the mounting American domestic opposition to the racial equality
proposal, and on 14 March 1919, the Japanese Ambassador to Washington, Ishii Kikujirō, delivered a speech
to the Japan Society in New York in an attempt to dissociate immigration from the racial equality proposal.
However, in retrospect, it appears that Ishii’s speech inadvertently led the American public to focus their
attention on the subject and fuelled American domestic opposition to the racial equality proposal. For example,
The Washington Evening Star mentioned that America should pay close attention to Japan’s next move on this
issue, while The Washington Post argued that if Japan’s demand for open door should be accepted, America
should decline to join the League of Nations. For the reporting of American newspapers’ criticism of Ishii’s
speech, see Asahi Shimbun, 19, 21 and 22 March 1919. Politicians from the West Coast of the United States
were also vocal opponents of the Japanese proposal. Senator James Phelan, a Democrat from California, for
example, claimed that what was occurring on the American Pacific Coast amounted to a Japanese invasion.
Phelan also cabled the American delegation in Paris and requested Wilson to reject any declaration dealing
with racial equality to be inserted in the Covenant and to exclude such domestic matters as immigration and
naturalisation from the jurisdiction of the League. The West Coast states were united in opposing racial
equality and senators from these states publicly declared that “if Japan insists upon equality for her citizens in
immigration, that simply means that either Japan or the United States will not be a signatory to the League of
Nations.” See The New York Times, 16, 22, 25 March 1919.
64
The American attitude to the radical equality proposal is discussed in the letter from Matsui to Uchida of 20
March 1919. See Matsui to Uchida, 20 March 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 479-480
65
See Matsui to Uchida, 25 March 1919, Ibid., pp. 484-485.
178
On 22 March, they submitted to Wilson through House the following clause to be inserted in

the preamble and received consent from the Americans.66

by the endorsement of the principle of equality of all nationals of States members of the League.67

The revised version was much shorter and simpler than its predecessor, and reference to “race”

and “equal and just treatment” of all nationals was removed. Indeed, it was so different from

the original proposal that it was impossible to claim that the new version implied Japan’s desire

for unrestricted immigration. This shows that, as the Japanese delegates insisted at the League

of Nations Commission meeting on 13 February and at their meeting with Hughes on 14 March,

Japan’s proposal was only a matter of principle which was not meant to affect the immigration

policy of the member states. At the same time, the Japanese delegates’ willingness to produce

an abstract statement of “equality of all nationals” indicates that they were determined to have

some form of racial equality proposal accepted in order to appease aroused public opinion back

home and to avoid public humiliation on the international stage as a result of repeated defeats

of their racial equality proposal.

However, when Makino and Chinda met with Cecil and sought Britain’s support for

the new proposal, his response was negative. He told the Japanese that personally he would not

hesitate to approve it, but it was essentially Australia’s problem, and Britain was not in a

position to give any definitive response. When the Japanese delegates met Cecil again the

following day, he told them that the Dominion Prime Ministers were adamant in their

opposition and suggested that the Japanese should negotiate with them directly.68 Accordingly,

the Canadian Prime Minister, Robert Borden, arranged a meeting between the Japanese

delegates and the Dominion leaders in order to work out a compromise.

On 25 March 1919, a meeting attended by Cecil, Makino, Chinda and the Dominion

66
Ibid.
67
The text of the proposal is cited in Matsui to Uchida, 25 March 1919, Ibid.
68
See Matsui to Uchida, 25 March 1919, Ibid., pp. 483-484.
179
Prime Ministers took place in the Canadian Prime Minister’s suite. There, the Japanese

delegates explained that their proposal was simply a declaration of a principle and that as such,

it had no direct relationship with the immigration problem. They also explained that since

Japanese public opinion was inflamed over the issue, they sincerely sought the Dominions’

consent. 69 The Dominion leaders expressed their sympathy with Japan’s position, but they

objected to the word “equality” because it could affect their immigration policies concerning

not only the Japanese but also the Chinese and Indians. However, the Japanese delegates

refused to delete the word insisting that it was essential to their proposal.70

After much debate, Borden suggested a compromise formula which read:

by the endorsement of the principle of equality between States and just treatment of their nationals. 71

Under this new formula, foreign nationals were to be entitled to “just” but not “equal” treatment.

When the Dominion Premiers were asked their opinion on this formula, all of them except for

Hughes expressed their consent. Hughes claimed that although he was not unsympathetic to

the Japanese stand, as a representative of Australian public opinion, he had no choice but to

express his opposition. He further insisted that the problem was not the way it was drafted but

the idea which underlay the Japanese proposal. After declaring that the other Prime Ministers

were free to do whatever they wished and that he would do what he needed to do, he stormed

out of the room.72

69
The content of the meeting was described in Matsui to Uchida, 30 March 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1,
pp.487-490. Indeed, from mid-March, the Japanese public was becoming increasingly vocal on the issue of
racial equality. For example, on 14 March 1919, the League to Abolish Racial Discrimination (Jinshuteki
Sabetsu Teppai Kisei Taikai) held a committee meeting and passed a resolution that if the racial equality
proposal was not accepted at the Peace Conference, they would oppose the League of Nations. See 15 March
1919 editions of Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun etc. Moreover, in mid-March, various newspapers started
expressing frustration at the Japanese delegates’ failure to have the racial equality proposal accepted and
started criticising the Anglo-Saxon powers for opposing the Japanese proposal. However, it seems that the
Japanese government was reluctant to inform the Japanese public on the developments in Paris. When
questioned about the issue at the Lower House Session on 26 March 1919, Foreign Minister Uchida replied
that “it is not in the nation’s interest to disclose the content of the racial equality negotiations.” See Asahi
Shimbun, 27 March 1919 and Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai, 26 March 1919, the 41 st Japanese Imperial Diet
Lower House Proceedings, Kanpō (Japanese Government Official Gazette), Taishō 8 th year (1919), vol. 30,
pp. 533-535.
70
See Matsui to Uchida, 30 March 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp.487-490.
71
The text of the compromised formula can be found in Matsui to Uchida, 30 March 1919, Ibid.
72
See Matsui to Uchida, 30 March 1919, Ibid.
180
 Since it was essential for the British Empire Delegation to adopt a unified stance, the

Dominion Premiers tried to convince Hughes to change his position in line with the other

Dominions. However, Hughes was unresponsive to their suggestion to reconsider the Borden

formula.73 Instead, he made the following statement to the press:

Australia cannot accept a proposal which strikes at the root of a policy we have long maintained and
which is vital to our existence…. The amendment, no matter how innocuous it may seem in form,
is certainly aimed at giving the League control of question relating to immigration, naturalisation….
I feel sure that the people of Australia would not sign the Covenant, if it contains any such
amendment as it is proposed.74

The Japanese delegates understood Hughes’s strong opposition to their proposal and

acknowledged that “the fate of the proposal rests on one man, the Australian Prime Minister.”75

They, therefore, appealed to the South African Defence Minister, Jan Smuts,76 to ask British

Prime Minister Lloyd George to persuade Hughes to change his position. However, Smuts

replied that because Hughes’s position as a delegate at the Peace Conference was quite

independent in regard to the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Lloyd George was unwilling to

interfere. Smuts moreover told the Japanese that since Hughes was very stubborn, if they tried

to interfere, it would only intensify his opposition.77 Nevertheless, on 28 March, Smuts met

with Hughes and urged him to concur with the majority Dominion view. As expected, Hughes

was adamant in his opposition. He warned Smuts that if the Japanese proposal was adopted, he

would make a speech in the plenary session expressing his strong opposition and would refuse

to sign the League Covenant. 78 Subsequently, Smuts told the Japanese that if Hughes

73
Henry Borden, (ed.). Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs (London: Macmillan, 1938), vol. 2, pp. 925-927;
Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes, p. 12.
74
Hughes’s statement was widely reported in Australian newspapers and newspapers abroad. See for example,
The New York Times, 28 March 1919; The Sun (Sydney), 30 March 1919; The Herald (Melbourne), 31 March
1919; The Daily Mail (Brisbane), 31 March 1919; The Daily Herald (Adelaide), 31 March 1919. A few days
later, London’s Morning Post carried a long press statement by Hughes in which he declared that Australia
would not sign the Covenant if the Japanese proposal was accepted in any form. See The Morning Post, 29
March 1919.
75
See Matsui to Uchida, 30 March 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 487-490.
76
Jan Smuts was a South African statesman and the second Prime Minister of South Africa. Although Smuts’s
political career was centred around South Africa, he was close to British Prime Minister Lloyd George, who
was impressed with Smuts’s abilities, and served in Lloyd George’s war cabinet during World War I.
77
See Matsui to Uchida, 30 March 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 487-490.
78
Ibid. See also the entry for 29 March 1919, Edward M. House Diaries.
181
continued to oppose the Japanese proposal, the British Empire Delegation as a whole would

have to vote against it.79

On 31 March, Smuts informed the Japanese delegation that he had proposed to Hughes

that the compromise formula suggested by Borden should be balanced by a declaration in the

Covenant specifying that legislation with respect to immigration or naturalisation was a

domestic matter outside the jurisdiction of the League of Nations. Hughes, according to Smuts,

seemed to be willing to consider this. 80 The Japanese delegates, however, asked Smuts to

withdraw his proposal straight away. While willing to give private assurances that Japan’s racial

equality proposal did not have any practical implication for immigration, they refused to

incorporate such a concession in the Covenant of the League of Nations. They explained that

the Japanese government had not spent years trying to remove from the U.S.-Japan Commercial

Treaty a clause that explicitly recognised the right of either party to restrict immigration, only

to see such a right enshrined in the League Covenant. They expressed their concern that if

Smuts’s proposal were adopted, the forms of equality which they had achieved with the United

States and Canada through Gentlemen’s Agreements would become meaningless. 81 The

Japanese delegates’ reaction to Smuts’s proposal indicates that what Japan was aiming to gain

through the racial equality proposal was a formal declaration that Western powers would

renounce their right to discriminate against the Japanese based on their colour and thus finally

remove the Western-derived stigma of inferiority for the Japanese. Needless to say, Japan’s

rejection of Smuts’s proposal further convinced Hughes that Japan was intending to force

Australia to accept its immigrants through the racial equality proposal.82

79
Matsui to Uchida, 30 March 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 487-490.
80
Matsui to Uchida, 2 April 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 492-493; W.M. Hughes, The Splendid
Adventure: A Review of Empire Relations within and without the Commonwealth of Britannic Nations
(London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1929), p. 359; Borden, Robert Laird Borden, vol. 2, pp. 925-927; Cable,
Hughes to Watt, 31 March 1919, NAA: CP360/8 B1/3; Scott, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-
1918, vol. XI, p. 790.
81
Ibid.
82
Hughes, in his speech to the Commonwealth Parliament after his return from Paris, used the Japanese rejection
of Smuts’s suggestion as justification for his refusal to accept the Japanese delegates’ private assurance that
what they sought was only a statement of principle. See Mr. Hughes, CPD, House of Representatives Official
Hansard, No. 37, 1919, Wednesday, 10 September 1919, pp. 12174-12176.
182
 While the Japanese delegates in Paris, assisted by Dominion Premiers, continued with

their effort to find a way to persuade Hughes to reconsider his position, Hughes remained

opposed to the Japanese proposal and kept insisting that if the Japanese proposal were to be

included in the League Covenant, he would attack it at the plenary session and would not sign

the Covenant. 83
Hughes’s violent opposition prompted South African Prime Minister Botha

to say to Makino “strictly between ourselves, I think he is mad!”84 As it appeared that the

whole draft of the Covenant would be completed at the League of Nations Commission meeting

of 11 April, the Japanese delegates decided to present their proposal then. Meanwhile, Makino

and Chinda sought a meeting with Hughes in order to try and persuade him to change his mind

on the issue, but he declined on the grounds of illness.85

In the end, Hughes succeeded in bringing down the Japanese proposal. The British

government, conscious of the need to preserve imperial unity, decided that the British Empire

Delegation as a whole would vote against the proposal. The Americans also indicated that they

would oppose the proposal.86 Nonetheless, the Japanese delegates felt that they had no choice

but to submit the proposal at the final meeting of the League of Nations Commission on 11

April.87

7.6. HUGHES’S TRIUMPH

On 11 April 1919, the League of Nations Commission met for the last time in order to complete

the final draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations. There, Makino presented the following

83
Borden, Robert Laird Borden, vol. 2, pp. 925-927; Matsui to Uchida, 13 April 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part
1, pp. 496-497.
84
Matsui to Uchida, 13 April 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 496-497.
85
Ibid. However, the Japanese delegates concluded that this was merely an excuse as they saw Hughes in his
seat at the plenary session on 11 April 1919.
86
During his meeting with Makino and Chinda on 29 March, House told the Japanese that the United States
would have to support the British position due to the growing anti-Japanese sentiments and movements on the
West Coast. House confided to the Japanese that “while we would agree to the pallid formula … unless Hughes
promised not to make trouble, we would be against putting it in.” See the entry for 29 March 1919, Edward
M. House Diaries. For an in-depth analysis of the reasons behind British and American rejection of Japan’s
racial equality proposal, see Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, pp. 117-163.
87
Matsui to Uchida, 13 April 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 496-497. In this telegraph, Matsui described
in detail the content of the negotiations which took place in early April 1919.
183
clause which had been suggested by Borden as an amendment to the preamble of the Covenant:

by the endorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals.88

In his speech, Makino portrayed the amendment as a response to “the grievances of the

oppressed nationalities” brought about by “the wrongs of racial discrimination which is, and

was, the subject of deep resentment on the part of a large portion of the human race.” Implicitly

referring to Japan’s particular situation, he added that the “feeling of being slighted had long

been a standing grievance with certain peoples.” Makino then argued that if the League of

Nations was intended to be “a world instrument for enforcing righteousness” and “fairer justice

throughout the world,” Japan’s “reasonable and just claim” should be accepted. At the same

time, however, Makino emphasised that Japan’s proposal was simply setting forth “a general

principle” for “the future international intercourse” between the member nations of the League

and was not intended to “encroach on the internal affairs of any nation.”89

Makino’s speech was reasonable, fair and compelling. However, Cecil, even though

he was “personally entirely in accord with the idea advanced by the Japanese Delegation,” had

to accommodate the position of Hughes as the representative of the British Empire and stated:

The British Government realised the importance of the racial question, but its solution could not be
attempted by the Commission without encroaching upon the sovereignty of States members of the
League. One of two things must be true: either the points which the Japanese Delegation proposed
to add to the Preamble were vague and ineffective, or else they were of practical significance. In the
latter case, they opened the door to serious controversy and to interfere in the domestic affairs of
States members of the League.90

Chinda refuted Cecil’s argument by insisting that Japan’s amendment called for “nothing more

than the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals” and did not raise “the

question of race or of immigration.” He added that Japanese public opinion was “so strongly

behind” the amendment and “the national aspirations of Japan were depending upon its

88
The text of the final version of the Japanese proposal can be found in Matsui to Uchida, 13 April 1919, Ibid.,
pp. 497-500.
89
The text of Makino’s speech can be found in Matsui to Uchida, 14 April 1919, Ibid., pp. 500-502.
90
Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 2, p. 389.
184
adoption.” Chinda further stated that if the amendment was rejected, the League of Nations

would be “most unpopular” in Japan because it would be an indication “that the equality of

member states of the League was not recognised.”91 Then Wilson, as the chairman of the

League of Nations Commission, opened the floor for discussion. The French and the Italian

representatives expressed their support for the proposal. Even the Chinese, who were in conflict

with the Japanese over the Shantung question, spoke in favour of the amendment.92 Next,

Wilson spoke. Although he acknowledged the importance of “the equality of nations” and “just

treatment of any nation,” Wilson stated that “the discussion that raises national differences and

racial prejudices” should “be forced as much as possible into the background.”93 Apparently,

Wilson’s primary concern at this stage was to avoid any controversy when the League of

Nations was about to be created.94 However, the Japanese delegates were not ready to shelve

the proposal, especially after hearing the overwhelmingly favourable response to it, and asked

for a vote to be taken on the matter.95

What happened next is well known. Due to the absence of Smuts and the Belgium

delegate, there were, apart from Wilson as Chairman, 16 delegates present. Eleven voted for

the proposal.96 No negative vote was registered, which meant that votes of the British Empire,

the United States, Portugal, Poland, and Romania were not taken. Wilson then declared that the

proposal was defeated as it had failed to gain unanimous support.97 Immediately, this ruling

was challenged by Makino and other delegates. 98 Wilson acknowledged that the majority

voted in favour of the proposal but stated that “strong opposition had manifested itself against

the amendment and under these circumstances, the resolution could not be considered as

91
Ibid., p. 390.
92
The Chinese delegate, Wellington Koo, stated that he “should be very glad indeed to see the principle itself
given recognition in the Covenant.” See Ibid., pp. 390-391. See also Matsui to Uchida, 13 April 1919, NGB-
1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp.497-500.
93
Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, p. 462.
94
Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, p. 30.
95
Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 2, p. 391.
96
Those who voted for the proposal were Japan (2 votes), France (2), Italy (2), Brazil (1), China (1). Greece (1).
Serbia (1), and Czechoslovakia (1), totalling eleven.
97
Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, p. 463-464.
98
Matsui to Uchida, 13 April 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 497- 500.
185
adopted.” 99 It was obvious to everyone that by “strong opposition” Wilson referred to

Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes.

7.7. SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION

The Japanese government in Tokyo did not send further instructions regarding racial equality

negotiations to the plenipotentiaries in Paris after the defeat of 11 April.100 Makino and Chinda,

however, kept working with the Americans and Dominion Premiers in order to have a racial

equality provision included in the Covenant’s preamble. Having been defeated in the League

of Nations Commission, they decided to present their case at the plenary session. Smuts tried

to convince the Japanese delegates not to resubmit the proposal at the plenary session in order

to prevent an open clash between Japan and Australia, which Wilson was eager to avoid.101

House also met with Makino and Chinda on a few occasions and continued the negotiations.102

In Japan, there was a swelling public opinion against the League of Nations after the

second defeat of the racial equality proposal on 11 April 1919. On 24 April, for instance, the

aforementioned League to Abolish Racial Discrimination (Jinshuteki Sabetsu Teppai Kisei

Taikai) held its third mass public meeting attended by more than 200 people. At the meeting,

the participants unanimously endorsed the resolution demanding that Japan should refuse to

join the League of Nations if the racial equality proposal was not accepted.103 Newspapers in

Japan displayed the same attitude and vociferously denounced the League of Nations

Commissions for rejecting Japan’s racial equality proposal. For example, Asahi Shimbun, after

99
Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 2, p. 392.
100
NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, which contains the Japanese government’s documentary records on the racial
equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference was consulted, but there was no recorded instruction from
Tokyo to Paris regarding racial equality negotiations in Paris after 11 April 1919. Naoko Shimazu also points
outs the lack of instruction from Tokyo to Paris after 11 April. See Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, p. 33.
101
Although these meetings between the Japanese and Smuts were not reported back to Tokyo by the Japanese
plenipotentiaries in Paris, they were recorded in British sources. See Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, pp.
33-34.
102
See the entries for 15 and 26 April 1919, Edward M. House Diaries.
103
See 25 April 1919 editions of the major Japanese newspapers including Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun,
Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun etc. This mass public meeting was also discussed in the telegraph from Uchida to
Matsui, 25 April 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, p. 504. The frequency of the telegraph from Tokyo to Paris
reporting the activities of this association indicates that the Japanese government was feeling much pressure
from this association.
186
declaring that 11 April would be the day Japanese people would not readily forget, argued that

it would be better to leave the League of Nations than to “face humiliation.”104

During the Paris Peace Conference, the racial equality proposal was a focus of the

Japanese press, reflecting the high level of public interest in the issue.105 In general, Japanese

newspapers portrayed the racial equality proposal as an uncompromisingly “just” demand.106

Consequently, acceptance or non-acceptance of the racial equality proposal came to be viewed

as the principal factor in judging the legitimacy of the League as an organisation aimed at

promoting international justice.107 Moreover, the Japanese press widely argued that Japan had

a moral duty as the only non-white great power to demand racial equality as a symbol of

standing up to the European imperial powers. For example, Asahi Shimbun in its editorial

insisted that it was “Japan’s mission” as “the representative of all coloured people” to have the

racial equality proposal accepted. “Japan must advance this just demand and contribute to the

lasting world peace, which is the main objective of the League of Nations,” it declared.108

A statement like this, as well as the statement made by Makino on 11 April 1919 at

the League of Nations Commission, reveals the depth of Pan-Asianism, particularly of

meishuron (Japanese leadership) Pan-Asianism, which permeated Japanese society at the time.

As discussed in Chapter II, advocates of meishuron Pan-Asianism perceived Japan as the leader

(meishu) of Asia with a moral responsibility to assist its less fortunate neighbours. They

believed that Japan, as the only Asian country which had successfully achieved a civilised great

power status in the European-dominated international system, had a special mission to liberate

104
Asahi Shimbun, 27 April 1919. Other newspapers in Japan also expressed the same sentiments. See, for
instance, Yomiuri Shimbun, 4, 12, 17 April 1919, Hōchi Shimbun, 15, 20 April 1919, Kokumin Shimbun, 6, 10,
16 April 1919. Moreover, on 6 April 1919, Kokumin Shimbun, published a statement by former Prime Minister
Ōkuma Shigenobu to the effect that Japan should refuse to join the League of Nations if the racial equality
proposal was rejected.
105
The major newspapers in Japan, including Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun,
which were published during the Paris Peace Conference were consulted, and it appears that the number of
articles on the racial equality proposal during the conference far exceeded the number of articles on other
issues discussed at the conference. See also Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, pp. 54-60.
106
See, for example, Asahi Shimbun, 12, 29 March 1919; Yomiuri Shimbun, 4, 12 April 1919.
107
See, for example, Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 14 March 1919.
108
Asahi Shimbun, 12 March 1919.
187
Asia from Western oppression. 109 However, as Shimazu points out, neither the Japanese

government in Tokyo nor the Japanese delegation in Paris was driven by the altruistic motive

of seeking universal racial equality or universal abolition of racial discrimination. 110 As

discussed earlier in this chapter, Japan’s racial equality proposal was prompted by the deep-

seated resentment among the Japanese public towards Western nations, which had long been

fostered by the belief that the Japanese had been unfairly treated by the West on the basis of

race. Behind the conception of the racial equality proposal, therefore, lay Japan’s anxieties

around its international status and identity that Japan had not been fully accepted as an equal

member of the Western club of civilised great powers. Thus, the aim of the proposal was to

abolish racial discrimination against Japanese people and secure racial equality for them so that

Japan could finally achieve equality with the West and reaffirm its “civilised” identity. In other

words, even though the racial equality proposal used such terms as equality and just treatment

of all nationals, what Japan was demanding was Japan’s equality with the Western great powers

and just treatment of its citizens.

The Japanese government was clearly under immense public pressure to succeed in

racial equality negotiations. The pressure was further intensified by the fact that the two

territorial settlements which the Japanese government had taken for granted had not been

resolved in Japan’s favour. The Peace Conference imposed mandates system on the Pacific

islands north of the Equator rather than Japan’s outright annexation and the final decision on

the Shantung settlement was not reached until 30 April.111 Thus, the Japanese delegates in

109
Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945, p. 58; Saaler, “The Construction of Asianism in Modern
Japan,” p.1286; Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, pp.30-31. See also p. 27 of this thesis.
110
Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, p. 166.
111
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, a territorial claim for the former German colonies of Shantung
and the Pacific islands north of the Equator was one of Japan’s two key demands at the Paris Peace Conference
alongside an acceptance of the racial equality proposal. The fact that the Shantung negotiations coincided with
the final phase of the racial equality negotiations generated allegations that the Japanese government devised
the racial equality proposal as a “bargaining chip” to obtain a favourable settlement over Shantung. However,
this allegation lacks credibility given the fact that in February 1917, Japan secured Britain’s assurance that it
would back Japan’s claim to the German possessions in the North Pacific at the end of the war in return for
Japan’s continuing naval cooperation in the Allied war effort. In other words, Japan did not need to concoct a
racial equality proposal to acquire Shantung because Japan’s rights to Shantung had been already secured.
Moreover, as D.C.S. Sissons points out, during the Peace Conference, the Japanese delegation in Paris did not
receive any instruction from Tokyo to link the Shantung and the racial equality proposal. In view of these facts,
188
Paris had to find a way to bring the racial equality proposal to “a satisfactory conclusion.”112

On the morning of 28 April, the British Empire Delegation was informed that Makino

intended to deliver a speech at the plenary session outlining Japan’s position and the sequence

of events which had led to the failure to include racial equality principle in the League Covenant.

Hughes, concerned that the Japanese might blame him for the defeat of their proposal, reacted

negatively to the news and said that he might be forced to speak out. Smuts, meanwhile, advised

Makino not to make a provocative speech.113 That afternoon, Makino made a measured speech

on racial equality at the plenary session, which was recorded in the minutes of proceedings of

the conference as instructed by the government in Tokyo.114 In his speech, Makino presented

Japan’s position and expressed the Japanese government’s and people’s “poignant regret” at

the failure of the Commission to approve of their “just demand for laying down a principle

aiming at the adjustment of this long-standing grievance.” Makino then reiterated Japan’s

determination to continue with its effort to have the principle of racial equality recognised by

the League of Nations.115 Hughes did not voice any objection to Makino’s speech.116

Without a doubt, Hughes played a central role in defeating Japan’s racial equality

proposal in Paris. For two months from the time when he first learned about Japan’s racial

the validity of the so-called “bargaining chip” theory is highly implausible. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to
assume that the humiliating defeat of the racial equality proposal strengthened the Japanese government’s
determination to win the Shantung settlement in order to preserve Japan’s national dignity and prestige as a
great power on the international stage. For a discussion of Japan’s territorial claim and the final settlement of
these territories at the Peace Conference, see Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, pp. 347-363.
For a discussion of the “bargaining chip” theory, see Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, pp. 143-148. For a
discussion on the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1917, see Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, pp.
249-250. For a discussion of the lack of instruction from Tokyo to Paris to link the Shantung and the racial
equality questions, see Sissons, “The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan,
1875-1919,” pp. 11-12. NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, which contains the Japanese government’s documentary
records on the Paris Peace Conference was also consulted, but there was no recorded instruction from Tokyo
to Paris linking the two issues. For the Japanese government’s firm determination to settle the Shantung
question after the second defeat of the racial equality proposal, see NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 88-362.
112
Matsui to Uchida, 13 April 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, p. 497.
113
Minutes of BED Meeting, 28 April 1919, TNA: CAB 29/28. See also Meaney, Australia and World Crisis
1914-1923, p. 376.
114
On 30 March, Tokyo sent instructions to the Japanese delegation in Paris outlining various possible courses
of action to be taken in case of the rejection of the proposal. The option chosen by Makino and Chinda was to
secure the inclusion of a statement of Japan’s position in the minutes of proceedings of the conference. Should
they be unable to secure this, they were to delay signing the covenant. See Uchida to Matsui, 30 March 1919,
NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 486-487.
115
The text of Makino’s speech of 28 April 1919 can be found in Matsui to Uchida, 28 April 1919, Ibid., pp. 504-
508.
116
Meaney, Australia and World Crisis 1914-1923, p. 376.
189
equality proposal in mid-February to its final defeat in mid-April, Hughes persisted in his

opposition and refused to compromise despite the repeated pleas from Japan and other

delegates at the Paris Conference. Hughes was convinced that Japan’s real intention behind the

racial equality proposal was to force Australia and other white settler nations to accept Japanese

immigrants. He feared that Japan’s proposal would pose a serious threat to the racial purity and

the white British character of Australia and was determined to block the Japanese attempt at

any coast.117

It should be noted that Hughes’s position against the Japanese proposal and his

underlying justification for the opposition, namely the defence of the White Australia Policy,

were supported by both political leaders and the general public back home.118 For example,

Melbourne’s Herald claimed that “the strenuous defence made by Mr Hughes” in resisting the

attack on “the liberties and racial purities of Australia should be strongly supported.” 119

Similarly, The Register commented that “Australians will warmly approve of” Hughes’s fight

against Japan’s racial equality proposal.120 In the Senate, Hughes was praised for expressing

“the views of 90 per cent of the electors of Australia” that “this continent shall be preserved for

the white races.”121 Moreover, when Hughes returned home from Paris after fifteen months of

absence, he was hailed widely as the defender of White Australia.122 Years later, Hughes wrote

in his memoir of the Paris Peace Conference that:

117
At the same time, it is important to note that Hughes’s performance in Paris was also a political statement
directed at his domestic audience for the upcoming general election in Australia, and he was trying to capitalise
on his success at the Peace Conference for the sake of his own political survival back home. See W.J. Hudson,
Billy Hughes in Paris: The Birth of Australian Diplomacy (Melbourne: Nelson, 1978), p. 117. The Japanese
delegates in Paris were also aware of this. In his correspondence to Japanese Foreign Minister Uchida on the
meeting of 25 March 1919, Matsui expressed his view that Hughes’s defiant behaviour was a political message
for his people back home. See Matsui to Uchida, 30 March 1919, NGB-1919, vol. 3, part 1, pp.487-490.
118
However, Hughes’s unyielding stance in Paris was not universally applauded in Australia. The Sydney Morning
Herald, for example, criticised Hughes for embarrassing the country with his unstatesmanlike manner and for
conducting a publicity campaign for the upcoming Australian general election in Paris. See The Sydney
Morning Herald, 11 April 1919. For similar criticism, see The Argus (Melbourne), 24 January, 31 March 1919.
119
The Herald (Melbourne), 31 March 1919.
120
The Register (Melbourne), 31 March 1919.
121
Senator Pratten, CPD, Senate Official Hansard, No. 26, 1919, Thursday, 26 June 1919, p. 10111.
122
See for example The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 September 1919. In the Parliament, even many of his former
embittered colleagues in the Labor Party hailed him for his effort in Paris. See CPD, House of Representatives
Official Hansard, No. 38, 1919, Thursday, 18 September 1919, pp. 12532-12581.
190
 The “White Australia” policy… is an integral part of the national life of the Australian people, and
although the subject of much hostile criticism, the geographical, racial and economic circumstances
of the Commonwealth amply justify it. Australia, by her attitude towards Eastern peoples, does not
arrogantly assert her superiority over other races: it is dictated by the instinct of self-preservation.
The “White Australia” policy is a gesture of defence, not of defiance. We do not regard Asiatics as
inferiors, but as different from ourselves, believing that the ideals, traditions, and standards of living
in the East are so incompatible with our own that we could never live with them as fellow-citizens.123

Hughes’s uncompromising stance against the Japanese racial equality proposal was a

manifestation of his strong belief in Australia’s national identity as a white British nation and

his firm determination to have absolute barriers against the threat to White Australia. For him,

his fight was essential for national survival, and his conviction was at one with that of the

Australian people.

In Japan, Hughes’s vehement opposition to the racial equality proposal was

extensively reported in newspapers during the Peace Conference. As a result, the Japanese

public regarded him as responsible for preventing Japan’s proposal from being included in the

League Covenant, and much of Japan’s resentment came to be directed against Australia.124 In

fact, when the proposal was defeated for the second time on 11 April, Makino blamed Hughes

for inciting a crisis in Japanese-Australian relations. In his interview with an Australian

journalist, Keith Murdoch, Makino issued a “grave warning” that “public opinion in Japan

would hold Australians accountable” for the failure to recognise the principle of racial equality

in the League of Nations Covenant. Makino also claimed that since the “whole rising

democratic feeling and pride of Japan” demanded the conference to acknowledge that “all men

are born free and equal,” the defeat of the Japanese proposal caused by Australia’s lone

opposition would “seriously compromise” Japanese-Australian relations.125

123
Hughes, The Splendid Adventure, p. 357.
124
See, for example, Asahi Shimbun 17, 24, 30 March 1919 and 3, 8 April 1919.
125
After the second defeat of the Japanese proposal on 11 April 1919, Makino summoned an Australian journalist,
Keith Murdoch, to express Japan’s grievance against Australia. This interview was reported in many
newspapers in Australia. See for example, The Scone Advocate (Scone), 11 April 1919; The Daily Observer
(Tamworth), 11 April 1919. See also Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 14 April 1919. Similarly, in an interview
with Adam McCay, a journalist whom The Herald and The Sun had sent to Japan in May 1919, Prime Minister
Hara Takashi deplored Hughes’s role in the rejection of the racial equality proposal by stating that “Japan was
disappointed at the attitude adopted by the Australian representative on the subject of racial discrimination.
We had expected that the resolution would be easily passed through the Conference.” See The Herald
(Melbourne), 3 June 1919.
191
 However, what really angered the Japanese public was the fact that not only Britain

but also the other great powers seemingly condoned the behaviour of Hughes, which was so

blatantly racist and unquestionably unreasonable in opposing “Japan’s just demand.” 126 In

general, the Japanese public felt betrayed by Western countries, especially by Britain, which

gave in to Hughes’s violent opposition at the expense of its ally, and the United States, which

initially supported Japan’s racial equality proposal but later opposed it due to the mounting

domestic opposition. 127 These two countries’ role in defeating the Japanese proposal was

widely seen as a testimony to their hypocrisy and self-interest. 128 Consequently, Japanese

newspapers overwhelmingly argued that Japan should not join the League of Nations, which

professed itself as promoting international justice but refused to accept racial equality.129 One

paper went a step further and insisted that Japan should give up its attempts to be identified

with the Western powers because no matter what Japan did, they would not accept it as their

equal.130 The defeat of the racial equality proposal obviously increased Japan’s suspicion of

and resentment towards the West and its sense of isolation on the international stage.131

7.8. CONCLUSION

The Japanese-Australian clash over Japan’s racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace

Conference of 1919 remains one of the most significant incidents in the history of Japanese-

Australian diplomatic relations. At the Peace Conference, Japan proposed to insert a clause in

the Covenant of the League of Nations affirming the principle of racial equality. Japan’s

proposal was consistent with its long-declared policy of achieving equality with the West. At

the same time, Japan’s swelling public opinion against the West triggered by the continuing

126
Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 17, 18 February 1919.
127
Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 29 March, 3, 20 April 1919.
128
Asahi Shimbun, 17 April 1919; Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 25 April 1919.
129
See for example, Kokumin Shimbun, 6, 10, 15 April 1919; Yamato, 24 April 1919; Hōchi Shimbun, 15, 20
April 1919.
130
Yorozu Chōhō, 19 April 1919.
131
For more comments expressing Japan’s disappointment at and resentments towards the West, see Lake and
Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, pp. 303-305.
192
discrimination against Japanese citizens in Western countries, which contradicted Japan’s

international status and identity as a civilised power, played an important part in the Japanese

government’s decision to introduce the racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference.

Having been accorded the status of great power by its Western allies at the end of the war, the

Japanese government hoped to finally remove the Western-derived stigma of inferiority and

instructed its plenipotentiaries at the Peace Conference, Makino Nobuaki and Chinda Sutemi,

to press for the insertion in the League Covenant of a clause which would forbid member states

from discriminating against non-nationals on the basis of race.

Japan’s proposal was supported by a majority of the countries represented at the

League of Nations Commission. However, the chief objection came from Australian Prime

Minister William Morris Hughes, who viewed the Japanese proposal as a direct attack on the

White Australia Policy. Just as Australia had earlier refused Japan’s request to exempt Japanese

citizens from the White Australia Policy, Hughes rejected Japan’s proposal to have the racial

equality principle enshrined in the League Covenant. The British government’s interpretation

of the Japanese proposal as demanding unrestricted immigration of Japanese and other non-

white immigrants into its territories, combined with its desire to maintain the imperial unity,

left the proposal in the hands of the Dominions and enabled Hughes to influence the official

position adopted by the British Empire Delegation. In the end, Hughes managed to persuade

not only Britain but also the United States and other delegates at the Peace Conference to reject

even the most watered-down version of the Japanese proposal.

There was no good reason for Hughes to oppose the final version of Japan’s proposal.

Its words were vague and were only to appear in the preamble to the League Covenant with no

biding force on the member states. Indeed, Hughes at one point indicated that he would be

willing to accept the final version of the Japanese proposal if Japan would agree to an

amendment to the Covenant explicitly excluding immigration and naturalisation from the

193
jurisdiction of the League of Nations. However, the Japanese delegates refused to concede on

this point. Although they would assure privately that Japan’s proposal was a matter of principle

which was not meant to affect the immigration policy of the member states, they refused to

express it explicitly as it would protect the very principle of discrimination to which they

objected. What was important to Japan was that the Western powers would formally renounce

their right to discriminate against Japanese people on the basis of their colour. What Japan

desired was an official declaration by the Western powers that Japan was not inferior to

European nations.

Without a doubt, Hughes played a central role in defeating Japan’s racial equality

proposal in Paris. In spite of the effort by the Japanese and other delegates at the Peace

Conference to persuade him to reconsider his position, Hughes stood adamantly opposed to the

Japanese proposal because of his conviction in Australia’s national identity as a white British

nation and his determination to preserve the racial purity of his country. Indeed, throughout the

racial equality negotiations, Hughes portrayed his fight against the Japanese proposal as a fight

to defend the White Australia Policy, and his unbending stand against any concession towards

Japan in Paris was overwhelmingly supported by his people back home.

As a result of Hughes’s vigorous opposition, Japan’s racial equality proposal

underwent a substantive change in the period of just over two months before it was finally

defeated. What originally sounded like an immigration proposal evolved to become a very

abstract statement. The final version of the proposal said nothing about “race” but instead only

referred to “equality of nations” and “just treatment of their nationals.” This shows that, as the

Japanese delegates in Paris consistently insisted, Japan merely wanted to have the principle of

racial equality officially declared without any practical implication for immigration. At the

same time, Japan’s willingness to accede to an abstract statement of “equality of nations”

indicates that the Japanese government in Tokyo and its delegates in Paris were determined to

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have some form of racial equality proposal accepted in order not only to placate aroused public

opinion back home but also to avoid public humiliation on the international stage and preserve

the dignity and prestige of Japan as a civilised great power.

However, despite the significant shift in the content of the proposal, the Japanese

delegates in Paris and the Japanese public alike consistently emphasised that their proposal was

a “just” demand. Especially, at the final stages of the racial equality negotiations, they started

claiming that Japan was representing oppressed people of Asia and other coloured people in

the form of racial equality proposal. This claim reflected the depth of Pan-Asianism that

permeated Japanese society at the time and Japan’s perception of itself as meishu (the leader)

of Asia, which had, in turn, derived from Japan’s growing confidence on the international stage

and its increasing resentment towards the West. Nevertheless, Japan’s racial equality proposal

was not driven by the altruistic motive of seeking universal racial equality or universal abolition

of racial discrimination. What Japan was demanding, instead, was the abolition of racial

discrimination for Japanese people and Japan’s equality with the Western great powers. At the

bottom of the racial equality proposal was Japan’s self-identity as a civilised great power and

its desire to be recognised as such by the other great powers.

In the end, however, Japan’s bid at Paris to finally achieve equality with the West and

reaffirm its “civilised” identity through the racial equality proposal was blocked by the staunch

opposition of the Australian Prime Minister, who was determined to have an absolute barrier

against the threat from Japan to the White Australia Policy and the white British character of

his nation. In this sense, the Japanese-Australian clash over the racial equality proposal at the

Paris Peace Conference was symbolic of the previous decades of conflict between the two

nations over the White Australia Policy and was a manifestation of both nations’ anxieties

around their respective national identities and their firm determination to defend their fragile

identities.

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 CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

This thesis has investigated the Japanese-Australian clash over the White Australia Policy

during the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. As stated in Chapter I, it has sought to arrive at

a new understanding of the subject and contribute to the existing literature by examining how

Japanese and Australian visions of, and anxieties around, national identity influenced each

nation’s response to the issue of Japanese exclusion in Australia.

During the period under investigation in this thesis, Japan and Australia developed

and consolidated their national identities, and both had comparable, if very different, challenges

in making sense of their respective identities. Achieving equality with the West and attaining a

civilised status were dominant themes in Japan’s domestic and foreign policy after it entered

the European-dominated international system in the late 19th century. To this end, Japan

embarked on the task of establishing a modern centralised state by emulating the West, accepted

the prevailing norms of European international society, identified with powerful European

nations and tried to reaffirm its “civilised” identity by distancing itself from its “uncivilised”

Asian neighbours. However, as the only non-white and non-Western power of the time, Japan

was insecure about its international status in relation to the other powers and looked upon them

with suspicion. As a result, Japan was in a constant struggle to defend and assert its civilised

identity in order to prove that it was both equal to the Western great powers and superior to

other Asian nations.

Australians during the same period were also in the process of developing their

national identity. It was a process which equated nation with race. They embraced British race

nationalism and developed a collective identity as a racially and culturally homogeneous white

British nation. However, just like their Japanese counterparts, Australians never felt secure

196
about their identity due to the peculiarities of their geo-cultural circumstances. Australia’s

proximity to Asia and the fear of Yellow Peril—the fear that Australia’s European population

and their continent would be swamped by the teeming millions of Asians or yellow race—made

Australians anxious about their white British identity. As a result, they sought assurance by

idealising the British Empire and by removing all foreign elements from among them under

the White Australia Policy.

For Australia, Japan was the embodiment of the Yellow Peril of Asia, which threatened

its identity and continued existence as a white British nation. Although at the beginning of the

era of Australia’s British race rationalism, Australia’s fear of Asia was focused on China, from

the late 1890s, with Japan’s rising international status, Japan became the centre of Australia’s

Yellow Peril anxieties. Consequently, the new Commonwealth enacted the Immigration

Restriction Act of 1901, which symbolised the formal establishment of the White Australia

Policy, and severely restricted the entry of the Japanese and other non-Europeans to Australia.

For Japan, being a target of the White Australia Policy was a great insult to its national

pride and prestige as a civilised state. As the only non-European “civilised” power, Japan

objected to its citizens being subject to the same legislation as “uncivilised” Chinese and other

Asian people, from whom the Japanese were trying to distance themselves. Japan also opposed

any implication that it was inferior to European nations, whose civilisation it had set out to

emulate. The White Australia Policy undermined Japan’s claim that its standard of civilisation

was far superior to that of other Asian nations and put the Japanese in the same category as

other Asians. It labelled Japanese people as undesirable immigrants and placed them beneath,

not on an equal footing with, European people. Japan fiercely resented the humiliation of the

White Australia Policy and thus repeatedly requested that Japanese citizens be exempted from

the application of the White Australia Policy.

Australia was, however, unwavering in its policy of excluding Japanese settlers. In

197
spite of the strong objection from Japan and the continuous pressure from Britain not to offend

its ally, Australia remained adamant that there could be no compromise on the White Australia

Policy. While it was willing to make some concessions concerning the temporary entry of

Japanese citizens to Australia in order to render the policy of exclusion less offensive to the

Japanese, the Commonwealth government refused to alter its basic policy regarding the

exclusion of Japanese permanent settlers. In this respect, the position of Australia was quite

distinct among white-majority settler nations in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. While

Canada and America were content with their Gentlemen’s Agreements with Japan on

immigration, and despite the fact that Japan repeatedly assured Australia that it had no intention

of promoting migration to Australia, Australia regarded racial purity of the nation as inviolable

and was determined to protect its white British character and identity.

This thesis has set out to explore the reasons behind Japan’s vehement objection to the

White Australia Policy and Australia’s uncompromising attitude towards Japan’s repeated

protests against Australia’s racially exclusive immigration policy, the questions which have

thus far been only partially answered in the existing literature. This study has provided answers

to these questions in that it has revealed the prime importance both nations attached to

safeguarding their respective national identities, which, in turn, greatly influenced their attitude

towards the White Australia Policy. As discussed in Chapter I, contrary to the logic of

mainstream rationalist International Relations theory, which views state behaviour as governed

by material interests, constructivist scholars argue that states often engage in international

behaviour that appears to gain them little material reward because of their desire for preserving

their national identity. This study of the Japanese-Australian clash over the White Australia

Policy has confirmed this. It has been demonstrated throughout the thesis that Japan’s objection

to the White Australia Policy cannot be entirely explained by rationalist theory as Japan did not

wish to increase migrants to Australia. In other words, Japan was not interested in gaining

198
material interests. Similarly, Australia’s unwavering position against Japan’s protest was

irrational since Australia was not in danger of being invaded by a large number of Japanese

immigrants. Rather, their responses to the issue of Japanese exclusion in Australia were greatly

influenced by their visions of, and anxieties around, national identity.

At the same time, this study has also shown the two nations’ evolving responses to the

issue of Japanese exclusion from Australia against the background of ever-changing

international circumstances. Although Japan continued to object to the White Australia Policy,

Japan’s reaction to Australia’s restrictive immigration policy did not remain constant. It

changed in both substance and form, reflecting Japan’s rising position in the international

sphere and its increasing confidence in its status and identity. During the late colonial period

in the late 1890s, Japan was primarily concerned about avoiding damage to its emerging

international reputation as a “civilised” state and merely demanded that the wording of the

colonial legislation should not appear to classify Japanese people together with Chinese or

other “uncivilised” Asian people. However, in 1901, Japan was no longer content with simply

being accorded the appearance of impartiality and requested the Commonwealth government

to enter into a reciprocal agreement, or so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement, in order to exempt

Japanese citizens from the operation of the Immigration Restriction Act and place the two

countries formally on an equal footing. Yet, in 1905, Japan, with its growing confidence on the

international scene as a result of its signing and renewal of the alliance with Britain and its

victory over Russia, rejected Australia’s proposal for a reciprocal arrangement on immigration

unless the Commonwealth government was ready to give up its basic policy of restricting

Japanese immigrants. During World War I, Japan, aware of its pre-eminent position in the Asia-

Pacific region and its enhanced value as Britain’s ally because of its contribution to the Allies’

war effort, carried out a persistent campaign to convince the Commonwealth government to

accede to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty, which would in principle have exempted

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Japanese citizens from the application of the White Australia Policy. Then, at the Paris Peace

Conference of 1919, Japan, having been accorded the status of great power by its Western allies

at the end of the war, attempted to finally remove the Western-derived stigma of inferiority and

pressed for the insertion in the League of Nations Covenant of a clause which would forbid

member nations from discriminating against non-nationals on the basis of race. Japan insisted

that it was representing oppressed people of Asia and other coloured people in the form of a

racial equality proposal, reflecting Japan’s perception of itself as meishu (the leader) of Asia.

In response to Japan’s rising international status and its changing attitude to the White

Australia Policy, Australia’s position on the issue of Japanese immigration also evolved. As

stated earlier, Australians began to perceive Japan and Japanese immigration as the greatest

threat to their white British character and identity at the end of the 19th century as a result of

Japan’s rising international position. Consequently, the Australian colonies chose not to adhere

to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1894, which offered reciprocal

rights of travel and residence, as well as reciprocal tariff preferences, to the signatory nations

and their territories, but instead extended their anti-Chinese immigration legislation to all non-

Europeans including the Japanese. After the federation of the Australian colonies in 1901, the

Commonwealth government rejected Japan’s repeated requests to exempt Japanese citizens

from the new Commonwealth’s inaugural immigration legislation and decided to exclude the

Japanese, along with other non-European people, from Australia under the Immigration

Restriction Act of 1901. As a result of Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 and its emergence

as the predominant power in the western Pacific, Japan came to be regarded as a military, as

well as migratory, threat to Australia. This prompted the Commonwealth government to

establish its own defence program in order to counter hypothetical Japanese invasion and

preserve the racial purity of Australia. Australia’s fear of Japan was further enhanced during

World War I due to Japan’s renewed diplomatic assertiveness and the decline in British power

200
in the Pacific. Japan’s persistent pressure on Australia to adhere to the Anglo-Japanese

commercial treaty in order to effectively exempt the Japanese from the application of the White

Australia Policy and Britain’s disregard of Australia’s predicament heightened the sense of

vulnerability in the mind of Commonwealth leaders and made them even more determined not

to give in to the Japanese demand. Then at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Australian

Prime Minister William Morris Hughes, who viewed Japan’s racial equality proposal as a direct

attack on the White Australia Policy and a significant threat to his nation’s white British

character and identity, played a central role in defeating the Japanese proposal.

Over the years, the crux of Japan’s objection to the White Australia Policy and

Australia’s response to Japan’s objection shifted, reflecting Japan’s rapidly rising international

status and Australia’s changing perception of the threat posed by Japan. As its position rose in

the international sphere, Japan became keenly aware of the contradiction between its

international status and identity as a “civilised” power and the treatment of its citizens as

undesirable immigrants in Australia and other white settler societies. Japan was determined to

rectify this contradiction as anti-Japanese immigration policies such as the White Australia

Policy would signify Japan’s inferiority to European nations and damage Japan’s international

reputation. In other words, as the existing literature on Japanese immigration’s impact on

Japan’s foreign policy has pointed out, Japan objected to discriminatory measures and practices

against Japanese immigrants in order to preserve its international prestige,1 which, in turn,

derived from Japan’s identity as a “civilised” power.

However, ironically, because of Japan’s rising international status, Japan became the

focus of Australia’s anxiety, and this led Australians to discriminate against the Japanese as one

of the “uncivilised” peoples of Asia. Moreover, the fact that Japan was the only country which

openly challenged and had any capability to reverse the White Australia Policy either militarily

1
See Chapter I, 1.1. “Existing Literature” of this thesis.
201
or diplomatically increased Australia’s anxieties towards Japan. In other words, Japanese

diplomatic pressure, which stemmed from Japan’s increasing confidence in its international

status and identity, strengthened Australia’s determination to keep the Japanese out of their

country in order to preserve the white British character and identity of the Australian nation.

The Japanese-Australian clash over Japan’s racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace

Conference of 1919 was the culmination of the previous decades of negotiations and tensions

between the two nations over the White Australia Policy. In the end, Japan’s bid at Paris to

finally achieve equality with the West and reaffirm its “civilised” identity through the racial

equality proposal was blocked by Australian Prime Minister Hughes’s resolve to protect his

nation’s white British identity and the unwillingness on the part of Britain and the United States

to oppose Hughes’s stance. The events at Paris confirmed in the mind of the Japanese that the

West was unwilling to accept Japan as its equal because of racial difference, and deepened

Japan’s suspicion of and resentment towards the West. At the same time, Japan’s persistent

effort at Paris to have the racial equality proposal adopted heightened Hughes’s conviction that

Japan was intending to force Australia to accept its immigrants and strengthened his

determination to do whatever he could to defend the White Australia Policy and the white

British character of his nation from Japan.

This investigation into the Japanese-Australian clash over the White Australia Policy

has revealed the plight of the two nations which desperately tried to protect their fragile national

identities. Japan, an Asian nation wanting to be accepted by the European powers as their equal,

resented the humiliation of the White Australia Policy and sought exemption from Australia’s

race-based immigration policy in order to reaffirm its “civilised” identity. Australia, a culturally

and racially European nation obsessed with the fear of Asia, for its part, was determined to

defend its white British identity and continued existence as a white British outpost in the Pacific.

The two nations shared similar insecurities about their respective national identities, and their

202
firm determination to safeguard their identities manifested itself as a conflict between them

over the White Australia Policy. In this sense, the Japanese-Australian clash over the White

Australia Policy can be interpreted as a clash between a country which sought to reaffirm its

civilised identity by achieving equality with the West even on immigration issues and a country

which was determined to defend its identity as a culturally and racially homogeneous white

British nation from the perceived threat posed by the rise of a non-white power in the region.

This thesis has examined the question of Japanese immigration in Australia. Unlike

many of the existing studies which have explored the subject from cultural and social

perspectives, this thesis has approached the issue of Japanese immigration as a subject of

diplomatic history between a country which sends migrants and a country which receives them.

As discussed in Chapter I, immigration is an understudied subject in the area of diplomatic

history. Diplomatic historians with their traditional focus on “national interests” and “power”

have largely avoided the subject of immigration. 2 This disinclination on the part of these

scholars might also be due to the dual nature of the immigration question. As is clear from the

discussion throughout this thesis, Japan, as a country sending immigrants, regarded

immigration as a diplomatic issue. However, Australia, a country receiving immigrants,

perceived immigration as a domestic policy matter and showed little inclination to listen to, let

alone comply with, Japan’s requests to modify its immigration policy. Yet, although a country

receiving immigrants might perceive immigration as a domestic issue, its restrictive

immigration policy can have a substantial consequence on its relationship with a country whose

citizens are the target of the policy. Immigration is, therefore, a vital part of diplomatic or

international relations, and this has been clearly illustrated in this study. While examining the

immigration question from cultural and social perspectives is an essential academic endeavour,

it is also imperative to expand the scope of the investigation and explore immigration’s impact

2
Minohara, Hai-nichi iminhō to nichi-bei kankei, p. 5.
203
on diplomatic relations, and further research in this area is highly encouraged.

In addition to departing from the conventional approach to the study of Japanese

immigration in Australia and studying immigration as a subject of diplomatic history, this thesis

has also incorporated insights from the discipline of International Relations by drawing upon

the concept of state identity and its impact on a state’s foreign policy. In this sense, this study

has adopted a cross-disciplinary approach. While this thesis has employed a historical

methodology and examined both primary and secondary sources to construct a narrative-based

historical explanation, it has, at the same time, constructed a theoretically informed explanation

by interpreting historical evidence within the conceptual framework adopted in the discipline

of International Relations. In other words, by combining the strengths of theories of

International Relations and empirical evidence of history, this thesis has filled a significant gap

in the literature and has offered a more comprehensive analysis of the Japanese-Australian

clash over the White Australia Policy.

Of course, this study is not without its limitations. In the course of investigating

Japanese-Australian diplomatic confrontation, this thesis has become Tokyo or Sydney-

focused and paid little attention to problems at local levels, such as the issues surrounding

Japanese pearl-shell labourers in northern Australia who comprised the majority of Australia’s

Japanese population in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. Immigration is a multi-layered,

multi-dimensional complex issue with its effects extending to social, cultural, political and

diplomatic areas, as well as at central and local government levels. In view of this, one

suggestion for future research is to take a multi-disciplinary, holistic approach and examine the

immigration question from many different avenues and at many different levels in order to gain

a comprehensive understanding of the complex nature of the immigration question.

Another suggestion for future research is to compare the Japanese-Australian

diplomatic confrontation over the White Australia Policy with cases involving Japan and other

204
nations. While this study briefly referred to the difference between the Australian response to

Japan’s objection to its race-based immigration policy and the American and Canadian

responses in order to highlight Australia’s uncompromising attitude to Japan, it did not explore

the difference further. A comparative study between the Commonwealth policy on Japanese

immigration in the early 20th century and those of the United States and Canada would comprise

an interesting topic for future research. By the same token, this thesis did not discuss the

difference between Australia’s position on Japanese immigration and that on Chinese

immigration except for mentioning that the Chinese were the sole target of the early White

Australia Policy before Japan became the centre of Australia’s anxiety at the end of the 19 th

century. Comparing the Commonwealth policy on Japanese immigration and that on Chinese

immigration would also be a useful undertaking for future research.

These limitations notwithstanding, this thesis has made a significant contribution by

introducing new perspectives and approaches to the existing scholarship on Japanese

immigration and the White Australia Policy. It is hoped that this study will inspire other

scholars to explore the immigration question further in order to better understand this complex

issue.

205
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