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A Critique Of Consensual Democracy And Human Rights In Kwasi Wiredu's

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LUMINA, Vol. 21, No.1, March 2010, ISSN 2094-1188 HOLY NAME UNIVERSITY

A CRITIQUE OF CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN KWASI

WIREDU’S PHILOSOPHY

Fayemi, Ademola Kazeem

Department of Philosophy
Lagos State University
Badagry Expressway, P.M.B 1087
Apapa, Lagos State, Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

Discourses on democracy and human rights are polemically complex and pervasive in
contemporary politicking. Scholarly contributions are sporadically on the increase on the
necessity of democracy as a political messiah for many of the seemingly unending socio,
economic and political problems facing humanity in the 21st Century. Amidst this trail of
thoughts and concerns, is the clamour for recognition and observance of human rights. While the
twin issues of democracy and human rights are fundamentally held as universals, the underlying
assumption is that both are complimentarily exigent in contemporary political world. Democracy
here is understood within the context of majoritarian democracy.

Giving concession to Africa’s historical predicament and the dismal conditions of human
life and other spheres of existence in the continent, the trend of events appears to be one of a
shift of political paradigm from autocratic structures to that of majoritarian democracy. In the
drive towards democracy in Africa, African dictators and rulers, that is, the military and the
civilian, have for the most part, been under imperialistic influences and forces to adopt the
multiparty system of democratic governance. While it is arguable that such democratic system
has brought with it some gains, the fundamental question is, how substantial are these supposed
benefits, and to what extent has this majoritarian democratic model built on the strengths of the
indigenous institutions of politics in Africa?
The popular predominant assumption in our political sphere is that with the full
enthronement of majoritarian democracy together with its institutions in African State, many of
the problems bedeviling the continent, violation of human rights inclusive will be effectively
challenged and perhaps solved. While reacting to the above popularly held view on the viability
of majoritarian democracy to the African condition, and its promises for human rights, Kwasi
Wiredu critically maintains a particularistic deviation from these universally held political
themes.

Contrary to popular opinion on democracy as a sine qua non of human rights and
sustainable development, Wiredu insists that Africa’s political salvation cannot come from the
presently known model of majoritarian democracy. By extension, he posits that the supposedly
held universal human rights ideals are not all there is and should be for contemporary Africa.
The fundamental questions are what then are the arguments of Wiredu in support of his

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positions on consensual democracy and political problem of human rights? What does he
consider as the political problem of human rights? To what extent can his philosophical
postulates translate into reality and lived experience in 21st Century Africa?

These questions are central to the discussion in this paper. Our aim in the paper is to
critically examine Wiredu’s perspective on consensual democracy and the political problem of
human rights. The discussion in the paper is organized in four parts. In the first section, the paper
presents a general analytical exposition of the above referred concepts. Following this, the paper
presents the perspective of Wiredu on the two themes, consensual democracy and political
problem of human rights. The third section of the paper is a critical appraisal of Wiredu’s
perspective on these issues, with some concluding remarks.

Conceptualizing democracy and human rights

Without doubt, human rights and democracy have become two of the most burning issues
of contemporary national and international politics. The promotion, practice and vicissitudes of
democracy in different parts of the world have exposed the concept of democracy to some
definitional haze and diverse forms of interpretations1. The concept of democracy is pervasive in
modern values and political system, but elusive in definition. By the same word, different
theorist and ideologists mean many different things. The multi-dimensional nature of the
meaning of democracy is not unconnected with its various typologies. Types of democracy
include liberal, socialist, popular, direct, indirect or participatory, non –party, consensus and
deliberative democracies. In view of this pool of democracies, it is no surprise that, it is elusive
providing a clear-cut definition that will cover all these variants of democracy. However, the
attempts by scholar at encapsulating some set of principles and elements of democracy are more
instructive in overcoming the various problems in explaining and understanding the concept of
democracy. These elements are more or less central to these typologies of democracy. These
elements include: free and fair elections, open, accountable and responsible government, civil
and political and human liberties, and democratic society2.

Be that as it may, there is an impressive body of jurisprudence on the complex,

intriguing, fluid and controversial subject of human rights from period of great antiquing to
contemporary times3. The idea of human rights stresses the universal humanity, which man
enjoys and shares with his fellowmen. Human right is the expression of the rights of man. These
rights have been variously defined, explained and justified from one historical epoch to another
with shifts and modifications here and there4.

Human rights may be defined as those rights, which all human beings enjoy simply by
virtue of their humanity, the deprivation of which would constitute a grave affront to man’s
natural sense of justice. According to Osita Eze, human rights represent demands or claim, which
individual or groups make on society, some of which are protected by law and have become part
of lex lata, while others remain aspirations to be attained in the future5. In similar vein,
U.O.Umozuruke conceives of human rights as claims, which are invariably supported by ethics
and which should be supported by law, made on society, especially by its official managers, by
individuals or groups on the basis of their humanity6.

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There are several ways of classifying human rights. These rights are generally grouped
under five sub-headings: Civil, Political, Social Economic and Cultural rights8. It must be noted
that while these rights are best observed and recognized under a democratic setting than any
other forms of government, all these rights have been recognize and enshrined in numerous
international conventions. The most important of these conventions is the international Bill of
Human Rights, proclaimed and adopted at various times by the General Assembly of the United
Nations. Significantly, human right is not merely a matter of a specific state; it is rather a
common cause of concern for all governments and all peoples of the world community. Though,
in recent times, this claim of universality of human rights has been a subject of controversy as
there is the argument on the particularistic characterization of these rights9. It is on such
presupposition that we have the various regional charters on human rights such as the African
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.

While undoubtedly, there are certain peculiarities in human rights that make particularism
possible and meaningful, the supposed dilemma between the two perspectives become
insignificant when we realize that human rights in both are geared towards the same goals
respect for cultures, human values and dignity, tolerance of ideas and beliefs, promotion of peace
and human development. Human rights at the universal level spell out the highest ideals, while
the multicultural diversifications give the universal standards a regional flavour that eases their
acceptability and implementation.

Democracy and human rights in Kwasi Wiredu’s philosophy

Human rights, as earlier clarified, are claims that an average human being is entitled to
make simply by virtue of their status as human being. Kwasi Wiredu attempts an analysis of the
fundamental of human rights. In doing this, he firstly examines the Akan conception of a person.
According to him, the Akan conception of a person has both descriptive and normative aspects
that are directly relevant not only to the idea that there are human rights, but also to the question
of what those rights are10. A person according to the Akan thoughts is a composition of three
elements, which are the life principle (Okra), the blood principle (Mogya) and the personality’s
principles (Sunsum). Okra is a divine element from God, which everybody possesses. It is the
same in all men and makes all persons to have an intrinsic value. Associated with this value is a
concept of human dignity, which implies that every human being is entitled in an equal measure
to a certain basic respect.
Explicating on the relevance of Okra aspect of a person to human rights, Wiredu says
Okra is the right of each person, as the recipient of a destiny, to pursue that unique destiny
assigned to him by God11. In other words, with Okra, everyone has the right to do his own thing,
and be ready to accept responsibilities of one’s own choices. Through the possession of Okra,
Mogya and Sumsum, a person is situated in a network of kinship relations that generate a system
of rights and obligations.

Of first appearance in the world; one is totally defenseless, dependent and need care and
protection of others. During this early childhood days, Wiredu noted that one has the greatest
right to receive help, care, love and affection. All these can be said to be the right to be nursed.
Mogya (literally blood) is held by the Akan to come from the mother and is the basis of lineage.
There is a right attached to it, and this is the right to land, at least a plot, from the ancestral
lineage holdings. These human rights are entitlements of every Akan by virtue of being a human

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being. Though Wiredu noted that in traditional Akan society, there was no state backing in terms
of sanctions for violators of the rights. However, they were deeply felt and complied with by
member of the society.

Moreover, Wiredu observes some other veritable harvests of human rights in traditional
Akan society. These include “the right of any well-defined unit of political organization to self-
government, the right of all to have a say in the enstoolment or destoolment of their chiefs or
their elders and to participate in the shaping of governmental policies, the right of all to freedom
of thought and expression in all matters: political, religious and metaphysical, the right of
everybody to trial before punishment, the right of a person to remain at any locality or to
leave”12, among others.

The observance, recognition and strict adherence to all these rights were, according to
Wiredu, facilitated by the Akan democratic political system. However, these ideals are no longer
the order of the contemporary world, as there are apparent and severe violations of human rights.
Human rights abuses are of many kinds and causes. Violations may come from individuals or
from governments. The former may be rightly termed private transgressions; the latter constitute
political oppression. While both are condemnable, the latter is what principally engages
contemporary concerns with human rights. As Wiredu notes, “it is a multi-facetted problem, but
it is quite clear that the greatest part of it comes from the ways of governments”13.

On the basis of the above, Wiredu noted and considered one general kind of human rights
abuse in African political world. This human rights abuse, he called denial by governments, the
right to decisional representation of citizens. Many African governments have been in the
forefront of this abuse of right to political representation. Wiredu argues that the majoritarian
democracy, which is routinely recommended and even practiced by most African states have
been responsible for many of the violations and abuses of human rights.

In order to forestall this situation, Wiredu explores the alternative plausible democratic
system, called consensual democracy. Using the methodological approach of conceptual
decolonization, Wiredu explores the hypothesis that a non-party and consensual democracy
might be better in forestalling, many of the causes of violations of human rights, and other social
political problems, in Africa. According to Wiredu, a non-party system based on consensus as a
central principle of political organization in Africa could avoid the evident problems of both the
one-party system and the multi-party system, which he said were imposed by the West.
According to Wiredu, the traditional Akan practices of political decision-making did
reflect an idea of consensus, which was conducive to the securing of an important human right14.
In fact, he succinctly called the Akan, a ‘culture of consensus’. The attribute is also shared by
some other African traditional systems of govermeent, such as the Zulu and Swazi of Southern
Africa. But what is consensus? Kwame Gyekye, as cited by Kaphagawani, defines consensus to
mean “taking into account, individual person’s views and opinions before all important decisions
are made, the esteem and promotion of mutual tolerance and patience and attitude of
compromise”15. Defined in this sense, consensus presupposes an original position of diversity of
people and opinions. Wiredu characterizes consensus using such terms as ‘faith’,
‘reconciliation’, ‘restoration of goodwill’, ‘moral opinions’ among others.

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However, through consensus, dialogue can function to produce compromise that are
agreeable to all or at least, not obnoxious to any. As a political decision procedure, consensus,
Wiredu tells us, requires in principle, “that each representative should be persuaded, if not of the
optimality of each decision, at least of its practical necessity, all things considered”16.

Akan traditional political system was based on kinship. Every lineage in a town or village
had been elected by consensus on grounds of seniority, reputation of wisdom, and rhetorical
abilities. Lineage here means all the individuals of a common ancestry. The associations of all
the lineage heads form the local government council, which was presided over by the Ohene
(Chief), the natural ruler of the locality. A local council had authority only over local affairs. But
representative of a number of councils constituted a regional council presided over by a
paramount chief.

Irrespective of the level, deliberation was the most important feature of the traditional
system of decision-making. Deliberation here has two methodological aims: first to elicit
differences of opinion and, second, to iron them out in search of consensus. In reaching
consensus, Akan political system, as a matter of principle, discredits the idea and practice of
majority as an adequate basis for decision-making. Though, decision by consensus is a much
more difficult process than decision by majority vote, yet they preferred the former to the latter.
The latter subordinates the will of the minority to that of the majority in the matter of a given
decision, by the simple act of voting. That is what the former avoids by seeking the goodwill of
all members through sincere dialogue17.

Representation under the Akan political system involved two things first, the
representation of each lineage in council, second, the representation of each representative in the
making of each decision. Both representations were secured through consensus. The implication
of this is that the people have a right of representation by having their consent factored into every
decision, through their representatives. In other words, consensual political system as practiced
in traditional Akan society recognized and observed the fundamental human right to be
represented in any political council in which decisions are made on the people’s behalf. This type
of human right, right to decisional representation in government, is the hallmark of consensual
democracy, and arguably, is conspicuously lacking in majoritarian democracy.

By majoritarian democracy, Wiredu means a multi-party system of politics in which the

party that wins the most seats at an election is normally entitled to form the government. In such
a set up, the losing party or parties become(s) the opposition, singly or compositely18. Under this
majoritarian model of democracy, one still finds the minority representatives casting votes. But
the point is that they will be overridden by the votes of the majority. This means that the right of
the former and of their constituencies to be represented in the actual making of decisions is
rendered nugatory. This makes the struggle for power to be fierce and confrontational. Thus,
rather than promote consensus and cooperation, the multi-party system generates conflicts and
disaffection19.

The above alienation of right of being well represented can be argued to be one of the
most persistent causes of political instability in Africa. In many contemporary African states,
certain groups of people and ethnic groups have found themselves consistently in the position of

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the minority both numerically and politically, and this means that they will consistently found
themselves outside the corridors of power. This situation has led not only generated enmity in the
society; it has also culminated into a condition where the fundamental human rights of decisional
representation of this category of people are permanently denied with impunity.

As a rescue to the above, Wiredu believes that the alternative is not the one-party system
because that is even worse to human promotion and sustenance of social order. The plausible
alternative, he opines, is to build on the potential for democracy based on the culture of
consensus and non-party politics in some African traditional political systems. Wiredu, therefore,
makes plea for a non-party consensual democracy in contemporary African. A non-party
democratic system,

…is one in which parties are not the basis of power. People can
form political associations to propagate their political ideas and
help to elect representatives to parliament. But an association
having the most elected members will not therefore be the
governing group. Every representative will be of the
government in his personal, rather than associational
capacity20.

In the areas of filling top legislative and executive positions, Wiredu believes that the elected
representatives may elect a leader and charge her/him with the responsibility of forming an
administration reflecting the consensus principle. Under this democratic arrangement, the merit
of ideas is the driving force, which promotes not just formal representation but substantive
representation of people. Hence, the possibility of being marginalized in the process of decision-
making is unlikely.

He argues further that this type of political arrangement will make it possible for all
concerned to participate in power and it has the benefit of reducing the adversarial political
practices and post-electoral conflict that is characteristic of multi-party system in Africa. This
non-party consensual model of democratic representational government, Wiredu concludes, is an
African alternative to the Western multi-party democracy; it is the antidote to the unending crisis
of fundamental human rights abuse in Africa. Wiredu envisages that the citizens’ right to
representation will be respected under this political arrangement where governments are not
formed by parties, but by the consensus of electoral representatives.

A Critique of Kwasi Wiredu’s Notions of Consensual Democracy and Human Rights

Wiredu’s intellectual concerns and passion for the emergence of an alternative paradigm
of democracy that will promote better human right on the continent in 21st Century Africa is
quite appealing and worthy of appraisal. At least, working within the interstice of his program of
conceptual decolonization, Wiredu has attempted in looking inwards towards some of our
indigenous democratic ideals and values with the view to showing that traditional Africans had a
system of democratic arrangement that is quite different from the Western model and, which can
be built upon in contemporary Africa.

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It is within this deictic understanding that he proposed a non-party consensual democracy

as a plausible political messiah to many of the problems bedeviling contemporary Africa,
especially that of political problem of human rights in 21st century Africa. However, we should
critically note here that this attempt by Wiredu is externally induced by the urge to demonstrate
that some traditional African societies had a similar experience with such Western states where
consensual democracy is the adopted model (such as New Zealand and East Timor), even
though, this is not disclosed by Wiredu.

Nevertheless, Wiredu deserved some commendations for his intellectual unraveling of

one of the most fundamental aspects of human rights, which he called right of decisional
representation. Of course, one may be prompted to ask whether this type of human rights is new
such that it is not included in the lofty documents of International and Regional Declarations on
human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts in article 21 that “everyone
has a right to take part in the government of his country directly or through freely chosen
representatives.” But does this mean Wiredu is saying nothing new?

On the contrary, the point Wiredu is making, and with justification I think, is that this
declaration is not as instructive as might have been hoped, because it is possible for citizens to
have freely chosen representatives without real decisional representation. And this is exactly
what happens in majoritarian political system where in principle; there is consent without
consensus21. It is on the basis of his distinction between human right of representation as evident
in either the United Nations Declaration on human right and the more stringent right to
decisional representation that I believe Wiredu’s intellectual acumen deserved to be commended.

The major strength of Wiredu’s analysis of consensual democracy is that he succeeds in

exposing how one-party dictatorial and multi-party democracies in many African states have
been very repressive of oppositions. This political repreassion, for Wiredu has a fundamental
effect of an abuse on the right to decisional representation of the citizens.

However, in an attempt to provide a way out of this abuse, Wiredu offers an alternative
mode of non-partisan consensual democracy. This is where I think, Wiredu’s work is becoming
conceptually flawed. The question may be asked: to what extent can the citizen’s be truly
represented even in consensual representative democracy? How is the interest of a dictator for
instance, reconcilable with that of the dominated and oppressed? Is the whole idea of consensual
democracy as canvassed by Wiredu not pretentious? Wiredu opined that the major problem
confronting majoritarian democracy in Africa has to do with multi-party politics and the
aftermath alienation of human right of representation. While the latter is indisputable, it is not
totally correct on the part of Wiredu to have considered non-party consensual democracy as the
perfect antidote to the former, multi-party majoritarian democracy. Consensual democracy is as
problematic as majoritarian democracy.

Wiredu’s critique of the multiparty system and his claim that there was none in traditional
African politics can be vitiated. While there were no formal political parties as we have in
today’s democracy, we cannot deny that people of like minds will always identify with one
another and come together to discuss how their interests can be articulated and promoted.
Besides, in parts of Africa with heavy presence of monarchism, they did have preliminary plans

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on who to succeed the reign of power among the different royal candidates from the established
ruling houses. Political parties in majoritarian democracy function primarily in like manner. And
as such, it can be argued that there was still an informal political association in traditional
African political settings, which in no way means total absence. In fact, party politics is not as
inherently evil as painted by Wiredu, and his advocacy for non-party democratic polity in
contemporary Africa does not in any way foreclose the impossibility of recurrence of those
internal factors that make multi-party system problematic in non-party system.

In all societies, including traditional Africa, there are always conflicts and tension, which
are either resolved by stronger party having their way or the weaker being realistic enough to
concede22. If indeed we have the type of consensus that Wiredu is venerating in African culture,
we would not have had cases of intra-ethnic wars, civil uprisings and migration of certain
segments of society to other locations. Cases of these abound in pre-colonial African history.
Documentations of the Yoruba experiences, for specific instance, can be found in the historical
and anthropological writings of Johnson (1956), Fadipe (1970), Akinyogbin and Ayandele
(1980) among other related literatures.

The above is, at least, an exception to and attestation to Wiredu’s accounts that statecraft
in many parts of traditional Africa was based on the principle of consensus. Even if we take for
granted the existence of this democratic element of consensus in traditional Africa, we may
perhaps ask: do agreed notions mean agreed actions? Does consensus in principle mean
consensus in practice? Wiredu characterizes consensus with terms such as ‘faith’,
‘reconciliation’, ‘reconciliation of goodwill’, etc. the question as aptly put by Emmanuel C. Eze
is, to what extent do these ideas and notions make sense for the vast majority of traditional
Africans without unnecessary appeal to ancestral, religious and mythological scaffoldings? Is the
ability of the Akan to arrive at consensus actually a product of their fundamental belief in the
power of reason or is it the power of their belief in a shared and common past and future (carried
forward in the myths of origins) that leads them to the employment of reason and rational
discussion as a means of achieving and sustaining this shared life-form?23

Wiredu’s response to Eze’s queries suggests that it is the logical power of the ideas
presented through rational discussion that is responsible for the culture of consensus among the
Ashantis. In view of this, Eze’s critical knot against Wiredu is that if the traditional mythological
origins, which Eze concedes to be the primary justifications of consensual politics as against
Wiredu’s power of reason can no longer hold today (due to the influences of secularism and
religious pluralism), and it is held by Wiredu that what we need today is consensual politics, then
Wiredu will need to drastically reconstruct the origin and basis of consensual democracy.
Besides Eze’s critical conclusion, the question can still be asked, is the consensual democratic
principle emphasized by Wiredu still retrievable to cope with the complexities of contemporary
societies? Bearing in mind that traditional African societies were relatively small which could
warrant the idea of consensus, the reality of the ultra complex state of human relation in
contemporary Africa, can hardly leave room for that kind of wide consultation and dialogue
required of consensual democracy.

Superficially, consensual democracy seems to be a rectification of the problems inherent

in representative democracy, especially, with respect to the necessary and perennial exclusion of

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the minorities and the strict competitive and adversary nature of multi-party politics. But upon
further critical examination, we would realise that these supposed attractions of consensual
democracy are questionable within the contemporary African context. The principle of
consensus, according to Wiredu, was the ideal of social and political ordering in many traditional
African societies, and suggestive of Wiredu, he recommended that contemporary African
societies should adopt this model as a viable alternative to the current Western model of
representative democracy.

We should note that what actually facilitated the adoption of consensus principle in some
parts of traditional African societies was because of the need for collective labour in the then
agrarian economy, which demanded cooperation, mutual assistance and shared decisions.
Because of this economic motive, consensual procedures were not usually questioned as they
became part of a commonly accepted tradition of those communities. But this economic
condition that facilitated the spirit of consensus among traditional Africans is no longer there in
our today’s world. While political democracy in our world today has its own economical
ideological correlate, which is capitalistic and individualistic in character, it is quite difficult, if
not impossible to return to the agrarian mode of economic and societal organization in
contemporary Africa.

Also inadequate in Wiredu’s analysis is his emphasis on the clan as a basis of leadership,
an arrangement which required “the establishment of a hierarchy of clans”. In consonance with
Mahmood Mamdani, this type of leadership arrangement is now archaic. Contemporary Africa is
a cosmopolitan society where different people with different and diverse cultural and historical
background co-exist. Contra Wiredu, what is now needed is the democratization of leadership
and governance in a manner that allows all citizens to become equal members of a single
political community25.

In the main, let us take for granted, that Wiredu’s proposal should be given a free hand of
operation as he has envisaged in contemporary African democratic process. That is, even if
consensual democracy were to be adopted in contemporary Africa, despite the forces that
militate against it, Wiredu failed to provide in his work, concrete outlines by which consensual
democratic model can translate in reality, and how it will overcome the problems of abuse and
violations, which have always been the faith of human rights in many parts of Africa. To actually
address the political problem of human right as opposed to mere paying of lip services, Wiredu
ought to have spelt out the kind of structures, measures and policies that would be required to
make a consensual democracy work in today’s Africa. This is an evident shortcoming in
Wiredu’s analysis.

We may ask further the extent to which people be truly represented in consensual
representative democracy? Contrary to Wiredu’s view that the major problem confronting the
present model of democracy in Africa is multi-party politics, I think the major problem of
democracy in Africa is that of how the true will of the people will reflect in the results of
elections. Wiredu clearly neglected this without knowing that the underlying principles and goals
of consensual and non-party democracy, as he advocates, is bound to fail as long as it involves
elections. What Wiredu should have concentrated on and which he did not, is the problem of
how to ensure true political reforms in contemporary African states such that will allow for a

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truer reflection of the will of the people in elections, and consequently, governance. If this could
be achieved in line with the true spirit of federalism, it will be a good foot-hold to realizing the
right to decisional representation of citizens in African politics.

In the light of the foregoing flaws and antimonies in Wiredu’s notion of consensual
democracy, the apparent conclusion is that these problems stifle the plausibility of his idea of
human rights, its realization and promotion in the 21st century Africa. While this paper is not
totally discrediting Wiredu’s discovery of right to decisional representation, rooted in ancient
African tradition, and which currently is lacking in both the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, the stance of the paper is that
Wiredu’s exploration of the necessary interconnectedness of consensual democracy and the right
to decisional representation must be critically revised.

No doubt, his systematic application and extension of the methodological ideal of

conceptual decolonization to the category of human rights has led to a discovery of some harvest
of human rights within the indigenous understanding of the Akans. His exploration of the rights
to care, love, and affection in early childhood days, right to land from the ancestral lineage
holdings, based on the Akan conception of person is indeed, an enviable contribution to African
jurisprudence. However, in spite of the loftiness of his concept of human rights, the problems
which his notion of right to decisional representation has to do basically with its necessary
interrelationship with the consensual principle of democracy.

Given the string of problems, which his notion of consensual democracy is fraught with,
it ip so facto, stifles the possibility of the latter being a sine qua non to the reality of his much
vaunted right to decisional representation in contemporary Africa. This throws up the critical
question of whether there cannot be the existence and observance of the right to decisional
representation without consensual democracy in practice. Contrary to Wiredu’s strict analysis of
a necessary and symmetrical relation between consensual democracy and right to decisional
representation, I think there could still be a right to decisional representation without a
consensual democratic framework.

As a consequence of the above, the crucial task now, is to avoid the inadequacies and
shortcomings in the proposed model of Wiredu’s consensual democracy through seeking an
alternative democratic theory. This is important in order to provide a sound theoretical
foundation of democracy that will give credence to, and foster the respect, observance and
promotion of the right to decisional representation in contemporary African politics.

While Wiredu has made his own contributions to indigenous African understanding of
human rights and democracy, the challenge before contemporary African philosophers is to
continue and further expand the discourse beyond Wiredu’s wall. This will be done with no other
aim than to reflect on how to emerge a viable, strong and better model of democracy, sin qua
non, for the promotion of the right to decisional representation in 21st Century African politics26.

End notes

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1
T Adediran,. Democracy and the rule of law: History, concepts and contending ideas. In
Nigeria: Democracy and the rule of law. Edited by A. Ajomo (et al). Lagos: Obafemi Awolowo
Foundation, 1996, p.47.
2
D. Beetham, & Boyle, K. What is democracy? Eighty questions and answers. Paris: UNESCO,
1995, p. 7.
3
O.C. Eze, Dissent in a democratic polity. In Democracy and the law. Edited by Osibajo, Y. and
Awa. K. Lagos: Federal Ministry of Justice, 2001, p.3.
4
It is not intended here to embark on historical excursion of idea of human rights. For a
comprehensive review of the historical development of the concept, see: A. Rosenbaum (Ed.)
The philosophy of human rights (London: Ardioych Press, 1980).
5
Ibid., p. 15.
6
U.O. Umozuke, Human rights and democracy in the 21st century: The African challenges. In
Law, human rights and the administration of justice in Nigeria. Edited by M.T. Ladan. Zaria;
Ahamadu Bello University Press, 2001, p.38.
7
A. K Fayemi, “Rethinking personalism and human rights in 21st century Africa”. In Revue de
l’Enseignement et de la Recherche Philosophiques”, numero special, Anee: (2009), p.240.
8
This grouping should not be taken as rigid, since they are closely interrelated. For more details
on the components of each of the human rights see: O.N. Oyekan, Human rights in Nigeria:
Millennium perspective (Lagos: Perfect Concept, 2001).
9
Ad referendum, on the debate between universalism and relativism in human rights discourse,
see O. A. Balogun and A.K Fayemi, “The relevance of Ifa to jurisprudence and human rights
discourse” in Legal theory: Proceedings of the International Conference on Philosophy and the
Law in Africa, (Nsukka: University of Nigeria Virtual Library, 2008).
Retrievable from: http://www.unn.edu.ng/index.php/Social-Sciences/View category.html/
10
K. Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1996, p. 158.
11
Ibid
12
Ibid., p.169
13
Ibid., p.172.
14
Ibid.
15
D.N. Kaphagawani, Democratic practice in Africa: Some arguments. Quest. Vol. III. (2)
December, 1993, p. 78.
16
Wiredu, Op.cit., p.189.
17
Ibid. p.175.
18
Ibid., p.176.
19
O. Oladipo, Tradition and the quest for democracy in Africa. Polylog: Forum for intercultural
philosophy, 2. Retrievable online from: http://them.polylog.org/2/fooen.htm. 2001.
20
Wiredu, Op.cit., p.179.
21
Ibid., p.187.
22
K. A. Owolabi, Can the past salvage the future? Indigenous democracy and the quest for
sustainable democratic governance in Africa. In Philosophy, democracy and responsible
governance in Africa. Edited by J. O.Oguejiofor. Rome: LIT VERLAG Munster, 2003, p.439.
23
E. C Eze, Democracy or consensus? Response to Wiredu. In Postcolonial African philosophy:
A Critical Reader. Edited by E. C. Eze. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, p. 82.

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24
L. Villoro, On consensual democracy: Concerning Kwasi Wiredu’s ideas. Polylog:
Forum for intercultural philosophy, 2. Retrievable online from: http://them.polylog.org/2/fooen.htm.
2000.
25
M. Mamdani, When does a settler become a native? Reflections on the colonial roots of
citizenship in Equatorial and South Africa. Text of an inaugural lecture as A. C. Jordan Professor
of African Studies, University of Cape Town, (13 May 1998), p. 24.
26
In pursuance of this charge, I have elsewhere argued for an eclectic model of African
democracy, which when fully explored, could allow for a better promotion of human rights, right
to decisional representation inclusive. For details on the eclectic theory of African democracy,
see: A.K Fayemi, “Towards an African theory of democracy”, in Research Review: A journal of
the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, Vol.25, No. 1, 2009. A further
consideration of this theory is considered in a different yet unpublished paper titled,
“Implications of an eclectic theory of African democracy for human rights (eto) and
responsibilities (ojuse) in Yoruba Jurisprudence”.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Nigeria: Democracy and the rule of law. Edited by A. Ajomo (et al). Lagos: Obafemi
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Akinjogbin, I.A. and Ayandele, E.A. 1980. Yoruba land up to 1800. In Groundwork of Nigerian
history. Edited by Ikime Obaro. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.

Beetham, D. & Boyle, K. 1995. What is democracy? Eighty questions and answers. Paris:
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Diamond, L. 1998. Class ethnicity and democracy in Nigeria: The failure of the first republic.
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Eze, O.C. 2001. Dissent in a democratic polity. In Democracy and the law. Edited by Osibajo, Y.
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Eze, E. C. 1997. Democracy or consensus? Response to Wiredu. In Postcolonial African

philosophy: A Critical Reader. Edited by E. C. Eze. Oxford: Blackwell.

Fadipe, N.A. 1970. The Sociology of the Yoruba. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
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Kaphagawani, D.N. 1993. Democratic practice in Africa: Some arguments. Quest. Vol. III. (2)
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Mamdani, M. 1998. When does a settler become a native? Reflections on the colonial roots of
citizenship in Equatorial and South Africa. Text of an inaugural lecture as A. C. Jordan
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Oladipo, O. 2001. Tradition and the quest for democracy in Africa. Polylog: Forum for
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Owolabi, K. A. 2003. Can the past salvage the future? Indigenous democracy and the quest for
sustainable democratic governance in Africa. In Philosophy, democracy and responsible
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Umozuke, U.O. 2001. Human rights and democracy in the 21st century: The African challenges.
In Law, human rights and the administration of justice in Nigeria. Edited by M.T. Ladan.
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