CASE DIGEST: PEOPLE V. SERGIO (G.R. NO.
240053; THE MARY JANE VELOSO CASE)
CASE DIGEST: THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 240053, October
09, 2019 ] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS.
MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO AND JULIUS LACANILAO,
RESPONDENTS. HERNANDO, J.:
FACTS: Mary Jane Veloso, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and
Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius) were friends and neighbors in Talavera,
Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and susceptibility,
Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in
Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to
bring on her trip. She then asked Cristina why the luggage was heavy but
the latter simply replied that because it was new. The luggage was the
same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was
apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained
prohibited drugs.
The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to
suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the
Indonesian Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane
were already in police custody, and her testimony is vital in the
prosecution of Cristina and Julius.
The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions
relative to the taking of Mary Jane's testimony, viz.:
(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;
(b) No cameras shall be allowed;
(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; andl
(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.
Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the
Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon
Written Interrogatories. " It averred that the taking of Mary Jane's
testimony through the use of deposition upon written interrogatories is
allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is out of
the country and will not be able to testify personally before the court due
to her imprisonment.
Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition
should be made before and not during the trial. The depositions under
Rules 23 and 25 of the Rules of Court are not designed to replace the
actual testimony of the witness in open court and the use thereof is
confined only in civil cases. Also, they argued that such method of taking
testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or
to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987
Constitution. Finally, they claimed that the prosecution's reliance on the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit
Rule was misplaced because the affiants therein were still subject to
cross-examination.
The RTC granted the motion. CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUES:
[1] Does Rule 23 apply to criminal cases?
[2] Will allowing deposition of Mary Jane violate the right of the accused
to confront the witnesses?
HELD:
On Substantive Matters
The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e.,
Mary Jane's conviction by final judgment and her detention in a prison
facility in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, while awaiting execution by firing
squad; the grant by the Indonesian President of an indefinite reprieve in
view of the ongoing legal proceedings against Cristina and Julius in the
Philippines; and the conditions attached to the reprieve particularly that
Mary Jane should remain in confinement in Indonesia, and any question
propounded to her must only be in writing, are more than enough
grounds to have allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court.
The OSG's contentions are meritorious.
The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate court
that the State failed to show compelling reasons to justify the relaxation
of the Rules and the suppletory application of Rule 23. The Court also
cannot agree to its declaration that the constitutional rights of Cristina
and Julius to confront a witness will be violated since safeguards were set
in place by the trial court precisely to protect and preserve their rights.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
is inapplicable in the instant case
Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure ,
in order for the testimony of the prosecution witness be taken before the
court where the case is being heard, it must be shown that the said
prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial
as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the Philippines
with no definite date of returning.
Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category.
Therefore, a liberal interpretation of the Rules should be allowed. We
should not silence Mary Jane and deny her and the People of their right
to due process by presenting their case against the said accused. By the
CA's belief that it was rendering justice to the respondents, it totally
forgot that it in effect impaired the rights of Mary Jane as well as the
People. By not allowing Mary Jane to testify through written
interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived her of the opportunity to
prove her innocence before the Indonesian authorities and for the
Philippine Government the chance to comply with the conditions set for
the grant of reprieve to Mary Jane.
The extraordinary factual circumstances
surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant
the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary
Jane's testimony as a prosecution witness proper? Yes.
Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does
it state how a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same
time convicted of a grave offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a
foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the testimony of such
witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony
of a witness who is unable to testify in open court because he is
imprisoned in another country.
Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is
inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied
suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is compelling
reason.
Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant
case, the Court sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the provisions of
Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure in the interest of substantial
justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of testimony of Mary Jane
through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.
The deposition by written interrogatories
is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process
Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary
Jane's right to due process.
The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure
that all the parties have their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of
the government to follow a fair process of decision-making when it acts
to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an accused is accorded this
constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in
criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal chance to
present its evidence in support of a charge.
No violation of the constitutional right to confrontation of a
witness
Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the
constitutional right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius.
The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal
proceedings but also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. It has a two-fold
purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the
testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2) secondarily, to
allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness.
True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face
to face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the terms and
conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they are given ample
opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written
interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional
right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and Julius, through their
counsel, to file their comment and may raise objections to the proposed
questions in the written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution.
The trial court judge shall promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter,
only the final questions would be asked by the Consul of the
Philippines in Indonesia or his designated representative. The
answers of Mary Jane to the propounded questions must be written
verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would be given to the
counsel of the accused who would, in turn, submit their proposed cross
interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the prosecution
raised any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly rule on
the same, and the final cross interrogatory questions for the deposition
of Mary Jane will then be conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross
interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a transcribed copy
thereof shall be given to the prosecution.
The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has
likewise been upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the
taking of deposition, the trial court judge will be present during the
conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane.
Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally
safeguarded. The parameters laid down by the trial court are sufficient in
detail ensuring that Mary Jane will give her testimony under oath to
deter lying by the threat of perjury charge. She is still subjected to
cross-examination so as to determine the presence of any falsehood in
her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines enable the trial court judge to
observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her credibility. SO
ORDERED.
