Another Realism: The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence

Author(s): KARUNA MANTENA

Source: The American Political Science Review , May 2012, Vol. 106, No. 2 (May 2012),
pp. 455-470
Published by: American Political Science Association

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American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No. 2 May 2012
doi:10.1017/S000305541200010X

Another Realism: The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence

KARUNA M ANTEN A Yale University
A Ithough Gandhi is often taken to be an exemplary moral idealist in politics ; this article seeks to
/' demonstrate that Gandhian nonviolence is premised on a form of political realism, specifically
У X a contextual , consequentialist, and moral-psychological analysis of a political world understood
to be marked by inherent tendencies toward conflict , domination , and violence. By treating nonviolence
as the essential analog and correlative response to a realist theory of politics, one can better register the
novelty of satyagraha (nonviolent action) as a practical orientation in politics as opposed to a moral
proposition , ethical stance , or standard of judgment. Thè singularity of satyagraha lays in its self-limiting
character as a form of political action that seeks to constrain the negative consequences of politics while
working toward progressive social and political reform. Gandhian nonviolence thereby points toward
a transformational realism that need not begin and end in conservatism , moral equivocation , or pure
instrumentalism.

politics that emphasizes the play of passions and in-

Political nected claims: a view of politics in which power terests over ideal motivation, moral education, and
and conflict are taken to be constitutive and a
Political nected and conflict claims: realism are a typically view taken of to politics includes be constitutive in two which intercon- power and a
rational agreement, they do so for markedly differ-
suspicion of doctrines and theories that elide this fact as ent reasons. For the tradition of moderating realism,
carelessly idealist or Utopian. Realism is often equated the potential incompatibility between idealist moral-
with a kind of Machiavellianism, a hard-nosed insis- ism and practical politics concerns less the supposed
tence that norms of ordinary, individual, and/or legal inefficacy of strict moral codes in politics- what might
morality have to be relaxed or superseded in the face of be construed as the standard Machiavellian dilemma-
the contingency of political conflict or the intractabil- than the ways in which absolutist ethics, ideological
ity of ideological struggle.1 Here, realism reaches its certitude, and Utopian schemes can threaten political
denouement in the defense of power politics, reason order and lead to unrestrained uses of power. This
of state, or Realpolitik as the optimal way to navi- moderating realism therefore works through a broadly
gate the political world. However, alongside this more negative ethical horizon, orienting itself toward the
grimly celebratory realism- itself a kind of idealization prevention of civil breakdown, violence, cruelty, and
of the efficacy of political power- lineages of other re- domination over and against positive attempts to trans-
alisms can be discerned in Thucydides, Hobbes, and form or perfect citizens and polities. In its theoretical
especially the eighteenth-century liberalism of Mon- understanding, practical orientation, and intended ef-
tesquieu, Hume, Madison, and Burke, thinkers who fects, Gandhi's politics- the politics of nonviolence-
likewise provide sober assessments of the passions, converges with but also points beyond this tradition of
vices, and enthusiasms that drive political conflict and moderating realism.
competition but aim to restrain and moderate rather A new call for realism has recently emerged in po-
than extol them (Bourke 2007; 2009; Sabl 2002; 2011; litical theory, one that more loosely and eclectically
Shklar 1984; 1989; Whelan 2004; Williams 2005b). That builds on earlier Machiavellian, Marxist, and liberal
is, although both traditions of realism reject the search realisms.2 It too raises the familiar charge of excessive
for ideal political institutions in favor of a science of idealism and moralism, but directs it against the meth-
ods and aims of dominant strains of contemporary po-
litical philosophy, especially liberal theories of justice
(in the Rawlsian tradition) and, to a lesser extent, the
discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas. Raymond Geuss
Karuna Mantena is Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale
University, Box 208301, New Haven, CT 06520 (karuna.mantena@
yale.edu).
I am grateful to Danielle Allen, Asli Bali, Richard Bourke, Noah
Dauber, Faisal Devji, John Dunn, Bryan Garsten, Ramachandra
Guha, George Kateb, Melissa Lane, Rama Mantena, Samuel Moyn, 2 In twentieth-century political science, realism came to prominence
Isaac Nakhimovsky, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, Corey Robin, Melissa as a field-defining approach to the study of international relations,
Schwartzberg, David Scott, Marc Stears, Annie Stilz, and the review- one that privileged power and interest and, in the classic works of
ers and co-editors of this journal for their discerning comments and E. H. Carr (1946) and Hans Morgenthau (1948), emerged as a cri-
criticism. I would like to thank especially co-editor Kirstie McClure tique of liberal, Utopian, and moralist approaches. Here, again, we
for her insight, guidance, and generosity. might contrast Carr's realist critique of the naiveté (and therefore
1 Although Machiavelli is the inevitable touchstone here, Lenin and catastrophic inefficacy) of the liberal idealism of the interwar years
Schmitt might also be seen as purveyors of this harder edged political to Morgenthau's realism, which recommended a rational theory of
realism. In the latter cases, as well as in the broader range of Marxist national interest to avoid the excesses of ideologically driven foreign
realisms, idealist moralism is criticized for being not only ineffective policy. See Morgenthau's critique of U.S. action in Southeast Asia
(e.g., the case of Utopian socialism) but also ideological and itself a along these lines (1970). On the newer invocations of a realist po-
justificatory discourse of and for power (i.e., the case of liberalism), litical theory, see Galston's overview (2010) in the special issue of
to which a kind of revolutionary and radical Realpolitik is seen as the European Journal of Political Theory devoted to the latest turn to
appropriate response (see Geuss 2008, 23-33; cf. Bolsinger 2001). political realism.

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The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence May 2012
and Bernard Williams- two thinkers most closely iden- source for this reticence lies in a recurring objection to
tified with the call for a new political realism- have realism in both its classical and more recent formula-
objected to the ways in which contemporary political tions. Critics worry that the rejection of normativity as
philosophers treat political theory as a form of applied traditionally conceived- namely, the strict dichotomy
moral philosophy, in which a distinctive kind of norma- between is and ought that is characteristic of Kantian
tive theorizing takes precedence over all other forms and neo-Kantian thinking- undermines the possibility
of criticism, evaluation, and understanding. What they of normatively driven criticism of existing political ar-
ask for, instead, is a bottom-up approach, in which po- rangements and thereby signals a bias in favor of the
litical theory would begin from an understanding of status quo (Freeman 2009; Honig and Stears 2011).
the existing conditions and constraints of political life, Moderating realisms are perhaps especially susceptible
rather than a top-down method in which theoretical to the charge of conservatism, given their traditional
resolutions to political conflict are sought prior to and emphasis on questions of political stability, order, and
in abstraction from the work of politics (Geuss 2008; moderation over and against, for example, justice and
Williams 2005a; 2005b). revolution.4 The anxiety can equally stem from exactly
For Williams, both contemporary utilitarians and the kind of methodological correctives envisioned by
contractarians embody a form of political moralism, Geuss and Williams: The turn to anti-ideal, bottom-up,
in which the moral is given priority over the political. or immanent theorizing is seen to tether political possi-
In the case of utilitarianism, politics comes into play as bilities too closely to the given coordinates of political
the means to secure antecedently established ethical life and thereby tends toward a naturally conserva-
principles and values, whereas in social contract mod- tive, even pessimistic, outlook. Worst still, if politics is
els morality is meant to provide pre-political, struc- understood as determining, partly or wholly, its own
tural constraints on the legitimate exercise of power internal standards of evaluation, it opens the door to
(2005a, 1-2). In both cases, the sphere of political ac- harder edged realisms that dispense with the category
tivity seems inessential and external to the nature of of morality altogether.
norms and their realization. Geuss's understanding and These are strong challenges and important worries,
worry about moralism are more broad-ranging; for him but, as I show, they can be met or at least displaced
the dominance of what he terms the "ethics-first" ap- to make room for another realism, one that neither
proach to politics and political theory may be part of a forsakes an agenda of reform nor sacrifices ethics at
wider cultural-ideological condition in which academic the altar of power politics. In this reconstruction of
moralism finds its real-world analogs in the reckless realism, I enlist a seemingly unlikely candidate- M. K.
absolutisms of a George Bush or Tony Blair (2008; Gandhi. Gandhian nonviolence is often taken as an
2010b). Ultimately, for Geuss, moralism stems from exemplar of pure conviction politics. Indeed, among
and contributes to a serious confusion about the task of both critics and defenders, there is a tendency to char-
political theory. When that task is primarily construed acterize Gandhi as a moral idealist or absolutist,5 as
in terms of norm generation and justification- that is, someone who rejected utilitarian/Machiavellian polit-
in terms of a general ethical theory from which prin- ical thinking in which ends justify means and, instead,
ciples of conduct or institutional norms are deduced- evoked strict ethical limits to legitimate political action.
this very orientation toward systematicky and univer-
sality necessarily works at a remove from the unsta-
ble, conflict-ridden, imperfect world of "real politics" 4 I use conservatism less in the sense of political attitudes on a
conventional right-left spectrum, but rather to mark a philosoph-
(2008). Neither Geuss nor Williams eschews norma-
ical orientation to the mechanisms of sociopolitical change. Here,
tivity altogether in favor of a pure inductive political conservatism refers to a skepticism toward transformative and revo-
science, but both seek to tie normativity more closely lutionary politics, the violence and upheaval they unleash, as well as
to empirical and historical contexts, to real constraints their sustaining dispositions, ideologies, and ontologies. This skepti-
and real possibilities.3 cism can traverse the political spectrum; for instance, Hannah Arendt
(1963) and Michael Oakeshott ([1962] 1991), despite divergent politi-
In their concern about the unreality of political cal affiliations, shared a critical-conservative stance toward particular
philosophy, Geuss and Williams join a larger cho- forms of revolutionary politics. In addition, the contrast with the im-
rus of critics who have likewise decried the ten- moderation of hard-edged realism is instructive; its adherents from
dency of academic political theory- especially so- both right and left tend to align themselves with radical-revolutionary
politics.
called "high liberalism"- to ignore, misunderstand,
5 Iyer (1973) is the classic statement of Gandhi as a moral idealist
or actively evade politics (Honig 1993; Mouffe 1993; along Kantian lines. Recent work on Gandhi's political thought, es-
Newey 2001; cf. Dunn 2000; Isaacs 1995; Shapiro 2005). pecially Mehta (2010a; 2010b), Bilgrami (2003; 2009), Skaria (2002),
Yet there is a lingering reticence about what the turn to Devji (2005; 2010), and Howes (2009), has been productively moving
realism actually entails. That is, realism's main contri- away from the more traditional assumption of Gandhi's idealism.
Although some of this work has sought to render Gandhi's origi-
butions seem negative, as perhaps a needed and blunt
nality in terms of ethical as opposed to straightforwardly political
corrective, but as yet very far from offering a genuinely practice, the novel reconsideration of Gandhi's critique of modern
alternative mode of political theorizing. One important (liberal) politics and modern practices of judgment advanced by
these scholars is especially cogent and important. In this article I
connect these insights to and situate them within an older literature
3 As Honig and Stears (2011) have noted, Williams is much less on the theory and practice of nonviolence, such as the seminal work
suspicious of normative theory in general. But see especially Menke 's of Gregg (1935), Shridharani (1939), Bondurant (1958), Horsburgh
(2010) excellent elaboration of Geuss's critique of "normativism," as (1968), and Sharp (1973; 1979), to re-signify the theoretical relevance
well as the overall character of his realism. of Gandhi's politics and political thinking.

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American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No. 2
From this angle, Gandhi appears as primarily a political The central contention of this article is that explor-
moralist- a moral critic of politics and an advocate of ing the convergence between Gandhian politics and
a severe political morality. However, this view under- political realism offers key insights into both phenom-
plays the extent to which Gandhi's politics were sus- ena. First, we understand the nature and distinctiveness
tained not only by the strength of moral convictions but of Gandhian politics more deeply when placed in this
also by sharp political analysis and judgment. Indeed, tradition. The novelty of nonviolent action is put into
I contend that Gandhi's understanding of politics was sharp relief when viewed as the essential analog and
fundamentally realist, and it is this underlying realism correlative response to a realist theory of politics. The
that renders nonviolence a plausible practical orien- article therefore begins by reconstructing the key com-
tation in politics and not purely a moral proposition, ponents of Gandhi's theory of politics, focusing on what
ethical stance, or standard of judgment. Gandhi understood to be the sources and dynamics of
To think of Gandhi as a realist implies more than an violence and escalation in politics. The next section
acknowledgment of his skill as a political leader and turns to the analysis of satyagraha and considers why
strategist. To be sure, Gandhi was a much more prag- and under what conditions nonviolent action, accord-
matic politician than is usually assumed in the popular ing to Gandhi, could counteract the tendencies toward
image of the saint-as-politician (see Brown 1972; 1977; coercion inherent in politics. I specify two aspects of
Dalton 1993; Rudolph and Rudolph 1967). However, the politics of nonviolence: its general principles and
I invoke the term "realism" to register a theoretical the strategic-situational contexts that both define satya-
coherence in Gandhi's understanding of politics: an graha and render it effective. In conclusion, I suggest
orientation and view of the political world that would that if we, with Gandhi, take political action, rather
place Gandhian politics squarely within the ambit of than the construction and legitimation of norms, as
political realism. Specifically, Gandhi's political think- the starting point of politics and political theorizing,
ing involved several substantive theses about politics the realist call to attend closely to dynamics of power,
that resonate especially strikingly with the tradition conflict, and domination can be mobilized on behalf
of moderating realism referred to earlier. At the core of principled and progressive politics. This reading of
of Gandhi's realist theory of politics was a contextual, Gandhi thereby seeks to enable another realism that
consequentialist, and moral-psychological analysis of a can navigate a way out of its traditional impasses, a
political world understood to be marked by inherent transformational realism that need not begin and end
tendencies toward conflict, domination, and violence. in conservatism, moral equivocation, or pure instru-
Animated by a powerful negative horizon of violence, mentalism.
Gandhi was attuned to the unintended consequences
of political action, especially the ways in which ideal-
ism and moralism, despite the best of intentions, could
enable ideological escalation and violence. This under-
standing of the sources and legitimation of violence INTERACTION AND THE DYNAMICS
was tied to a moral psychology that emphasized the OF VIOLENCE: GANDHI'S THEORY
causal force of affect- of pride and egotism- over rea- OF POLITICS
son and rationality in political conflict. Thus, Gandhi's
open opposition to Machiavellian and utilitarian ethics, The Problem of Idealism
rather than signaling moral absolutism or idealism, in
fact drew him closer to another kind of realism. What Gandhi famously claimed that he was "not a visionary"
distinguishes Gandhi's realism from other moderating but rather a "practical idealist" ([1920e] 1999, 134). A
realisms is its ability to blend a negative, even conser- practical orientation to politics, which put ideals into
vative, orientation against violence with a progressive practice, was understood as one that turned fundamen-
program of sociopolitical transformation. The novelty tally on the problem of political means. In politics,
of Gandhian satyagraha (nonviolent action) lies in its Gandhi contended, "means are after all everything"
self-limiting character; it is a form of action that seeks ([1924b] 1999, 310); they not only shape the realization
both to constrain the negative consequences of poli- of political ends but are also implicated in the very
tics and work toward the reform of existing political nature of political conflict. As is often recognized, the
relations and institutions. call to scrupulously attend to the question of means was
a sharp rejection of the logic of expediency in politics.
6 Terchek is alone in explicitly characterizing Gandhi as a political Gandhi considered modern politics to be saturated by a
realist. Although he does not explore the realist angle in detail- it kind of instrumentalist, means-ends thinking, in which
comes in the epilogue to a book that primarily focuses on Gandhi's violence and coercion had become widely permissible
theory of autonomy in the face of modernity- Terchek suggestively
and explicitly defended as legitimate. However, the re-
notes that Gandhi's "civic realism" took seriously the ways in which
"power is unavoidable, seductive, and important" (1998, 232-34). jection of instrumentalist calculation in politics, and
Howes (2009) is the most sophisticated and extended attempt to more broadly the "doctrine of the sword ... in this age
recover the practical aspects of Gandhi's philosophy along broadly of the rule of brute force" ([1920e] 1999, 133), was not
realist lines (although he does not evoke the term "realism" in the
only directed at a kind of prosaic Machiavellianism.
same theoretical sense I do). Howes tries to deemphasize what he
takes to be moral and spiritual aspects of Gandhian nonviolence in The risk of sliding into rationalizations of political vio-
an effort to formulate a more "credible pacifism" that is grounded lence was just as acute for political idealisms in which
in a realistic and theoretically nuanced analysis of political violence. right or noble ends work to enable, justify, or redeem

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The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence May 2012
the use of dubious political means.7 It is important to tation of ends becomes all too easily implicated in the
keep in mind the extent to which Gandhi's political justification of various forms of political coercion.
thinking was animated and framed by a continual worry Second, idealism can facilitate tendencies toward
about the potential for violence in the gamut of idealist ideological entrenchment in politics. Where previously
enthusiasms- from anarchist nationalism, aggressive the strong attachment to principles papered over cor-
religious revivalism, to revolutionary Marxism- that rosive moral compromises, here the worry is that
shaped the ideological landscape of Indian anticolo- when political disagreements are framed as arguments
nial politics.8 Indeed, Hind Swaraj , Gandhi's famous over fundamental principles, the potential for political
1909 tract on Indian home rule, was occasioned by and progress may dissipate in an atmosphere of increasing
structured as an argument with militant nationalism hostility and polarization. Consider Gandhi's response
and its recommended tactic of the time, the targeted to Nehru's entreaty in 1933 to define more sharply the
political assassination. egalitarian goals of the Indian National Congress's fu-
In Gandhian terms, the signature failing of political ture economic policy:
idealism is its focus on ends at the expense of means.9
This disjuncture between means and ends is associated I know that though there is such an agreement between
with two kinds of political hazards. First, the commit- you and me in the enunciation of ideals, there are tempera-
ment to ideals when detached from a specification of mental differences between us. Thus you have emphasized
the necessity of a clear statement of the goal, but having
means is subject to a distinct form of moral erosion;
once determined it, I have never attached importance to
namely, it can have a morally disinhibiting effect on its
the repetition. The clearest possible definition of the goal
proponents.10 "[T]o serve the noblest of causes," polit- and its appreciation would fail to take us there if we do not
ical idealism becomes susceptible to taking and legit- know and utilize the means of achieving it. I have, there-
imating "short-violent-cuts to success" ([1924c] 1999, fore, concerned myself principally with the conservation
442). The temptation to use any and all available means of the means and their progressive use. I know that if we
for even small or temporary gains seemingly becomes can take care of them, attainment of the goal is assured. I
greater in proportion to one's belief in and attachment feel too that our progress towards the goal will be in exact
to ends. The dynamic may actually function in the re- proportion to the purity of our means. If we can give an
ocular demonstration of our uttermost truthfulness and
verse; that is, it might be precisely because the gains are
non-violence, I am convinced that our statement of the
small or nonexistent (or even negative and deleterious)
national goal cannot long offend the interests which your
that insisting on the Tightness of principles becomes
letter would appear to attack. We know that the princes,
ever more politically urgent. In either case, the exal- the zamindars, and those who depend for their existence
upon the exploitation of the masses, would cease to fear
and distrust us, if we could but ensure the innocence of
our methods. We do not seek to coerce any. We seek to
7 In the midst of an abstract discussion about whether killing could convert them. This method may appear to be long, perhaps
ever be conceived of as a duty (i.e., for the protection of others), too long, but I am convinced that it is the shortest. ([1933b]
Gandhi made this observation: "Few men are wantonly wicked. The
1999, 393)
most heinous and most cruel crimes of which history has record
have been committed under cover of religion or equally other noble
motive" ([19271 1999, 184). What Gandhi termed his "temperamental differences"
8 For Gandhi, idealism was a not term of abuse or criticism, although with Nehru are couched in terms of a broader state-
he often tried to signal its limitations and offered his own "intensely ment about why the clarification of goals "would fail to
practical" idealism as an example of how principles ought to be take us there" without a serious consideration of effec-
given a definite, practical shape in political work and action. The
interpretation here of Gandhi's worry about idealism is pieced to- tive means. More subtly, Gandhi implied that the ways
gether from the manner in which he criticized and debated some in which ends are invoked, presented, and insisted on
of his main political rivals, namely, adherents of movements that can themselves engender resistance; that is, they may
seemed to combine a (misplaced) faith in the efficacy of violence
prove counterproductive to the process of converting
with ostensibly "noble" political motives. I explore later some of
the ways that Gandhi understood this coincidence or commingling natural opponents to the cause of reform. At the ex-
of principle and violence to be linked to corrupting forms of self- treme, an uncompromising insistence on ideals may
righteousness, vanity, and egotism. not only lead to the use of coercion but may also slide
9 Mehta (2010a) has made the most forceful case for viewing into a moralistic politics of conviction or ideological
Gandhi's political thinking and practice as premised on a stark re-
dogmatism that, for Gandhi, were especially liable to
jection of the "inherent idealism" of modern politics. For Mehta,
idealism is necessarily tied to a teleology that gives meaning to po- breed contempt and engender a logic of escalation.
litical action only in relation to its contribution to the realization of Importantly, in both these scenarios, the actual pro-
final ends such as progress, peace, and security and thus renders all cesses of political interaction and contestation, espe-
politics instrumental to those ends.
cially the subjective-psychological investments and re-
10 Following Horsburgh (1968, 41-53), I adopt the term "moral ero-
actions they provoke, are seen to objectively threaten
sion" to signify the process through which increasing conflict loosens
moral constraints. What is at issue is less the mere fact of positing the attainability of ends advanced. The practical and
ideals in politics than their disassociation from the means of realiza- moral hazards of political idealism- the moral erosion
tion. Mehta tends to emphasize the former in his understanding of that leads to the use of coercive tactics and forms of
Gandhi's anti-idealism and therefore sees Gandhi as more starkly contestation that produce an atmosphere of hostility-
rejecting all politics oriented toward transformative ends. In these
terms, Mehta provocatively asks us to consider Gandhi "not just as
point to what Gandhi took to be acute dangers in-
having a very different politics, but rather, in some crucial sense, as herent in the very practice of politics. In other words,
being a deeply anti-political thinker" (2010a, 363). Gandhi's insistent call to attend to "the conservation

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American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No. 2
of the means and their progressive use" is closely tied convincing in every detail or that it is the only plausi-
to a view of politics as a realm marked by recalcitrance ble realist theory available. Rather, exploring Gandhi's
and tendencies toward conflict and violence. Pointing understanding reveals a great deal about what nonvio-
to idealism's indifference to political means is there- lence entails as a practical political orientation and as a
fore another way of signaling its larger blindness to set of strategic responses rather than simply an ethical
the internal dynamics of political life that shape the stance or standard of moral judgment. The two interre-
realization of ends. lated aspects of Gandhi's theory of politics to which I
Idealisms, old and new, have a difficult time thinking wish to draw attention are the origins and legitimation
conceptually about the practical constraints of political of violence and the dynamics of escalation. In sum,
activity. This is indeed one of the most insistent charges they represent the twin dangers of political life. Thus
made by the new realists; namely that contemporary Gandhi's challenge was to demonstrate how satyagraha
political philosophy does not dwell long enough on could appropriately respond to these dangers; that is,
problems of implementation, especially political im- how it could work as a mode of effective political ac-
pediments to implementation (Geuss 2008; Williams tion that neither enabled escalation nor justified and
2005b). More often, political philosophy assumes or en- reenacted coercion.
visions apolitical or extrapolitical models of how ideal
theory could be enacted in the world. For instance,
when political conflict is understood as a contestation Cycles of Violence
over rival conceptions of the good or the just, the search
For Gandhi, at the metaphysical level, himsa or vio-
for consensus or agreement becomes the presumed
lence is an ever-present feature of life. In Jain, Hindu,
solution to the problems of politics. Here, educative
and Buddhist thinking, himsa is understood as harm or
models, in which public reason through debate and
injury to any living being. In what is usually considered
discussion is thought to lead to the dissemination and
the most radical interpretation of the doctrine, Jain
transformation of political values, take the place of pol-
monks take great care to only eat food prepared by
itics. Alternatively, political theory speaks in the voice
others, clear walking paths of insects before treading,
of the state or from a position of power, concerning
and filter water or wear masks to avoid destroying mi-
itself with outlining legislation or policy along pro-
croscopic life, all the while accepting that some forms of
posed normative guidelines. As Williams has noted, the
injury are unavoidable. Gandhi similarly took the fact
implied reader or "listener"- whether it is a Supreme
that basic bodily functions necessarily involved himsa
Court Justice or high-level policy maker - is here akin
as a sign of its ineradicability. One common ethical
to the omnipotent legislator or founder; that is, some-
response to the problem of himsa is the renunciation
one who functions with as few "purely political re-
of action, an imperative to make one's footprint in the
strictions" as possible (2005b, 57-58). To critics, these
world as infinitesimal as possible and to practice a va-
assumptions are taken to exemplify political philoso-
riety of forms of nonattachment to body and world. In
phy's, and especially contemporary liberalism's, ten-
contrast, Gandhi held to a notion of renunciation that
dency toward the evasion of politics.11 This evasion
"should be sought for in and through action" ([1928b]
might also be understood as an absence of a theory of
1999, 131). The answer was not a negative withdrawal
politics in the sense that liberal philosophy lacks a the-
from the world, but rather a form of detached or self-
oretical account of political constraints, contestation,
and resistance and of what to do in the face of recalci- less action that aimed at actively minimizing harm and
suffering (Gier 2004, 28-39, 51-65).
trance (whether conceived in terms of party dynamics,
Gandhi's turning of ahimsa (nonviolence) outward,
entrenched interests, or ideological recalcitrance).
as an imperative to relieve worldly suffering, signaled a
A realist theory of politics focuses not only on how
much broader understanding of the sources and conse-
political processes affect the realization of political
quences of himsa. In translating the metaphysical doc-
goals but also sees the dynamics of political interac-
trine into avowedly social and political terms, Gandhi
tions as radically reformulating political possibilities.
The extent to which Gandhi had a clear and distinct effectively reinvented the theory of ahimsa in a manner
that often dismayed traditional adherents (see Parekh
theory of politics with strong realist undertones has
1989b, 120-55). Gandhi was often piqued by dogmatic
been, to my mind, drastically undervalued. This realism
forms of ahimsa that "made non-killing a blind fetish"
is the essential counterpart to a means orientation in
and were seemingly motivated more by the care of
politics as well as the practical grounds of the politics of
one's soul than the suffering of others:
nonviolence. Gandhi's theory of politics focuses on the
moral-psychological dimension of political interaction
and contestation, especially the tensions and tempta- The current (and in my opinion, mistaken) view of ahimsa
tions that propelled modern politics in the direction has drugged our conscience and rendered us insensible to
a host of other and more insidious forms of himsa like
of escalating conflict and violence. My claim here is
harsh words, harsh judgments, ill-will, anger and spite and
not that Gandhi's understanding of these dynamics is
lust for cruelty; it has made us forget that there may be
far more himsa in the slow torture of men and animals, the
11 For many critics, such as Mouffe (1993), Honig (1993), and Newey starvation and exploitation to which they are subjected out
(2001), the rejection of politics is partly a symptom of a deeper liberal of selfish greed, the wanton humiliation and oppression
impulse that takes the overcoming or suppression of politics as its of the weak and the killing of their self-respect that we
telos.
witness all around us today. ([1928a] 1999, 59)

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The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence May 2012
Based on this more expansive understanding of himsa , resentment, retrenchment, and retaliation- or what is
Gandhi came to emphasize structural aspects of vio- often prosaically referred to as the cycle of violence.
lence in a host of social, economic, and political institu- Even when committed for the sake of justice or a final
tions. He famously declared the modern state to repre- peace, violence necessarily puts into motion chains of
sent "violence in a concentrated and organized form" animus and dissension that ultimately result in insta-
([1934] 1999, 318), exemplified both in its coercive ca- bility. Overt violence was merely an extreme instance
pacity to enforce obedience and in its tendency toward on what was, for Gandhi, a very expansive spectrum of
centralization and hierarchy (Mantena n.d.). Likewise, forms of force, domination, coercion, and imposition
he took industrial economies to be premised on insti- that themselves seemed definitive of modern politics.
tutional centralization, exploitation, and inequality. Even ostensibly mild forms of coercion- for example,
What concerns us here, more than its structural when a democratic majority adopts legislation that is
aspects, is violence as a dynamic feature of politi- unpalatable to a minority- can initiate similar dynam-
cal contestation. For Gandhi, political action- like all ics of antipathy and hostility that likewise lead to inse-
action- intervenes in a complex causal web. Action cure and illegitimate outcomes.
initiates irreversible chains of cause and effect, which The subjective- or moral-psychological dimension-
Gandhi understood to be so intricate as to be unknow- of violence is equally important in the manner of its
able and therefore unmasterable in any deep or final justification. Implicit in the turn to violence is a claim
sense.12 The political analog of the metaphysical prob- to infallibility; according to Gandhi, however, human
lem of himsa was therefore an understanding of politics beings were "not capable of knowing the absolute truth
as necessarily interactive and deeply consequentialist, and, therefore, not competent to punish" ([1921b] 1999,
where chains of intentionality and responsibility rever- 451). Gandhi's objection here is often construed as an
berate in unforeseen and unintended ways. One funda- epistemological critique of violence, founded on a con-
mental implication of this view is that individual will, ception of truth as many-sided.15 Yet for Gandhi, the
intention, or motive alone cannot fully exhaust, master, posture of infallibility was also a moral-psychological
or determine the outcomes of political action.13 To ad- one; it was a problem of pride and, at the same time,
mit indeterminacy in the face of the interactive logic of of weakness and cowardice. The extreme irreversibility
politics, however, is not to foreswear attempts to shape of violence demands hubris in its undertaking and in
political trajectories. Here the analogy with Gandhi's its continued justification, a precarious subjective ori-
response to himsa assumes added force: Rather than entation that makes acknowledging errors of judgment
abjuring the consequentialism of politics and recom- and policy reversals difficult and rare. For Gandhi, the
mending withdrawal, Gandhi put forward a model of fortitude that accompanies violence was a brittle pos-
self-limiting action, action that could do as much as turing, a papering over of ego-driven investments. The
possible to internally constrain these negative effects militant Hindu "who will protect by force of arms a few
and still work toward positive political goals. cows but make away with the butcher" and the militant
Consequentialism14 of this kind demands attention nationalist "who in order to do supposed good to his
to the mechanisms that interactively shape political country does not mind killing off a few officials. . .are
outcomes, especially the recurring entailments of po- actuated by hatred, cowardice, and fear. Here love of
litical action. By entailments, I mean effects and con- the cow or the country is a vague thing intended to
sequences of particular kinds of political action that satisfy one's vanity or soothe a stinging conscience"
may not be logically given in the nature of political ([1916] 1999, 253-54). Conviction is motivated by a
ideals or intended by political actors but nevertheless need to protect and project one's self, betraying an
regularly recur as their reactive outcome. For Gandhi, egotism grounded in weakness rather than, in Gandhi's
the problem of political entailment was especially acute terms, a genuine and detached commitment to truth.16
in the case of violence, for in being an absolute, irre- Finally, Gandhi was concerned with the long-term,
versible deed, violence initiates definite dynamics of unintended consequences of violence; namely the ways
in which violence attains moral and political legitimacy.
For Gandhi, when coercion is deemed rightful conduct
12 As he put it in Satyagraha in South Africa , "as every part has against recalcitrant opponents or enemies (again, this
its place in a machine, every feature has its place in a movement can apply both to the extreme case of war/revolution
of men, and as a machine is clogged by rust, dirt and the like, so
or everyday modes of democratic politics), the result is
is a movement hampered by a number of factors. We are merely
instruments of the Almighty Will and are therefore often ignorant that everyone is more inclined to become power seek-
of what helps us forward and what acts as an impediment. We must ers, either for protection or as emulators, and thus all
rest satisfied with a knowledge only of the means, and if these are become accustomed to and accept competitive domi-
pure, we can fearlessly leave the end to take care of itself" ([1925c]
nation as the preeminent mode of modern politics. Far
1999, 261).
13 Howes (2009), drawing on Arendt, also emphasizes the unpre-
dictable nature of politics, suggesting that one of the realistic advan-
tages of nonviolence is that it might be better equipped to respond 15 Parekh (1989a, 142-70) is a classic statement, but see Bilgrami's
to the challenge of contingency. (2003) striking critique.
14 Here, I am using consequentialism in a nontechnical sense to refer 16 It is telling that when Gandhi extolled courage and fearlessness as
to a view in which consequences are central to political analysis and "the most soldierly of a soldier's virtues" they were associated with
calculation (rather than to specific moral theories, such as utilitari- the willingness to die, to sacrifice one's life, and not with the will
anism, which judge the moral status of an act based primarily on its and desire to kill, which, on the contrary, were thought to stem from
consequential effect). cowardice and weakness ([1916] 1999, 252-53).

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American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No. 2
worse than individual acts of violence or demonstra- moral criticism are ineffectual or, worse still, coun-
tions of force is therefore the universal respect given terproductive, because repeated attempts to demon-
to the capacity for imposition such that power and strate the rightness of one's position and the correlative
domination appear as markers of legitimate author- wrongness of one's opponent's elicit resistance. As Bil-
ity. This was the foundation of Gandhi's exhortation grami has provocatively argued, criticism for Gandhi
in Hind Swaraj to Indians to find a mode of resist- can never be pure in motive, and moralizing criticism
ing British rule that did not at the same time emulate directed at others is easily susceptible to corruption
(and thereby legitimate) imperial claims to authority. (egotistic investments) and has "the potential to gen-
Gandhi famously claimed that "the English have not erate other psychological attitudes (resentment, hos-
taken India; we have given it to them. They are not in tility) which underlie inter-personal violence" (2003,
India because of their strength, but because we keep 4136). Here contestation stirs the passions that more
them" ([1909] 1999, 261). For Gandhi, it was not the often than not result in entrenchment and escalation
mere preponderance of force that brought or kept In- rather than moderation and agreement.
dia under British rule but Indian weakness. Emulation In Hind Swaraj , Gandhi offered the following para-
and the turn to violence were marks of this weakness; ble to outline the manner in which a response to in-
they demonstrated the continued acquiescence to the justice can easily lead to an escalation that undoes the
logic of imperial conquest and legitimated material conditions of a just resolution. In this example, the dy-
domination as an acceptable foundation of political namic of confrontation begins with a thief illegitimately
authority (see Nandy 1983). stealing your property. Full of anger, you resolve to
punish the thief who has stolen from you, "not for your
own sake, but for the good of your neighbours." You
Affect and Escalation organize an armed band to counterattack; the thief
responds defiantly and "collects his brother-robbers"
The second feature that was fundamental to Gandhi's and "pesters your neighbours," who complain that the
understanding of politics was the inherent tendency robber has only resorted to open threats against them
towards escalation in conflict. The problem of es- "after you declared hostilities against him." You feel
calation is closely tied to an idea of political ac- badly that you have exacerbated the situation but feel
tion that emphasizes its interactive effect in complex trapped. Knowing you will be "disgraced if you now
causal sequences. Political conflict, confrontation, and leave the robber alone," you instead distribute arms
antagonism characteristically proceed through a dy- to all your neighbors "and so the battle grows ... the
namic logic of actions, reactions, and counter-reactions. result of wanting to take revenge upon the robber is
Again, for Gandhi, these dynamics of contestation in- that you have disturbed the peace; you are in perpetual
clude moral-psychological elements that drive them fear of being robbed and assaulted; your courage has
beyond mere conflicts of interest. The performative given place to cowardice" ([1909] 1999, 288-89). One
aspect of political interaction transforms political ac- of the overt lessons of this story is that choosing the
tors' motivations and subjective investments. There- improper means to respond to injustice can have unin-
fore to speak of the ways in which violence (or co- tended and deleterious consequences: more violence,
ercion or contestation) expectedly leads to forms of injustice, and instability. The parable also shows how
entrenchment, resentment, and mutual hostility is to the investment in and motivation for seeking justice
call attention to the central role of affect in political and redress are imbricated in the agent's sense of self
life. As we have seen, Gandhi was especially attuned such that this investment itself becomes a vehicle for
to this particular dimension and took passions such as escalation and a barrier to reaching a lasting and just
pride and egotism- and their derivatives such as anger, resolution. The attachment to principle, perversely, be-
ambition, humiliation, insolence, revenge, retaliation, comes more important as the consequences become
etc.- to be key forces for understanding the structure negative or less tangibly beneficial. And principled
and psychology of violence and escalation. Thus un- conviction functions as an alibi for a violence born of
dercutting or moderating these same passions would weakness.
be central to the dispositional politics of nonviolence.
Humility and fearlessness must be cultivated to avoid
the slide into the egotism, hubris, and cowardice that PRINCIPLES OF NONVIOLENT ACTION
engender violent escalation.
To note the importance of people's emotional and It was in response to this specific understanding
psychological attachment to belief is also to recognize of politics- one that emphasizes the dynamics of
distinct limits to rational persuasion in politics. For violence and its legitimation and the tendency toward
Gandhi, political conflicts, even when based in a ratio- escalation in political contestation- that Gandhi
nal conflict of interest- between landlord and peasant, developed modes of intervening in politics that would
upper caste and lower caste- have a tendency, in and constrain and counter the adverse consequences of
through contestation, to take on an increasingly ideo- politics. Gandhi was acutely aware that all political
logical character. In particular egoististic passions are action, even ostensibly nonviolent action, held within
activated and heightened when beliefs are questioned itself tendencies toward escalation and latent violence.
and contested, as they inevitably are in the realm of This was particularly true of collective action, not only
politics. In such situations rational argumentation and when it threatens spontaneous or mob violence but also

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The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence May 2012
when the sheer strength of numbers does the work of version, convertibility implies a very tight imbrication
compelling or coercing compliance. Therefore such that means would have to embody their ends. In
Gandhi's challenge was to create, define, and delineate Hind Swaraj , for example, Gandhi offered an organic
the conditions through which nonviolent action, metaphor that seemingly so intertwined means and
especially in its collective form, could mitigate these ends that no end could function as such, or ever come
negative dynamics and repercussions. The term to light, if it were not already given in the means used to
Gandhi invented for the forms of self-limiting political attain it: "[T]here is just the same inviolable connection
action he proposed and practiced is satyagraha. between the means and the end as there is between
Satyagraha , Gandhi insisted, is not simply a species the seed and the tree.. . . We reap exactly as we sow"
of pacifism, nonresistance, or passive resistance ([1909] 1999, 287). In the strong version, then, means
([1925c] 1999, 94-98). Rather it is open, adversarial, are ends-creative ; action consistent with this view might
and extra-institutional, a form of direct action that take the form of exemplary or principled action (in
mobilizes and refashions techniques of collective the Arendtian sense), in which the principle or end is
protest to take the place of traditional methods of expressed and entailed in the act (Horsburgh 1968, 41-
political violence, as nonviolent equivalents of war and 53; cf. Dalton 2003). Gandhi's understanding of swaraj
revolution (Horsburgh 1968; Shridharani 1939). Civil or self-rule may be the clearest instance of an end
disobedience, noncooperation, the boycott, strike, that is constitutive of the act itself. As is well known,
and hartal (full work stoppage) are viable forms of Gandhi repeatedly distinguished swaraj for India from
satyagraha but only when embedded within a robust the mere fact of political independence from Britain.
politics of nonviolence. Self-rule for Gandhi was premised on a fundamental
Gandhian satyagraha , therefore, does not imply one moral-psychological transformation, an overcoming of
set course of action or a static injunction to restrict fear, and in this sense, it was an immanent achievement
action to nonviolence, but rather the strategic inter- that could not be granted or given by the British. Politi-
play of nonviolent techniques, methods, and stances cally, swaraj was attained through individual and collec-
that in themselves have to be as various and dynamic tive practices of self-rule that worked to make British
as the nature of political conflict itself. In other words, rule irrelevant. In this, Gandhi contended that "the
satyagraha is best understood not as a norm but a prac- attempt to win swaraj was swaraj itself."17 The need
tice; its "objective is not to assert propositions, but to for full convertibility between means and ends is espe-
create possibilities" (Bondurant 1958, vii). As a prac- cially urgent in the case of abstract ends such as swaraj.
tice, satyagraha functions at two levels, one strategic Abstract ends need grounding in immediate, intimate,
and situational, and another in terms of general prin- and precise practices18 as a way to ward off the temp-
ciples and orientation (Bondurant 1958, 36-48, 102- tation to look for "short-violent-cuts" for temporary
4). Ultimately, what proves to be effective nonviolent but ultimately self-defeating gains. Gandhi therefore
action- action that works by transforming the psycho- refused any abstraction- temporal or conceptual- of
logical valence of violence in the dynamics of political ends from means, because it was precisely that separa-
conflict- turns out to be extremely context dependent tion that opens up the possibility of coercion, a point
(an aspect I explore more fully in the next section). Mehta eloquently elaborates (2010a, 369).
Here I focus on what is arguably the most original In a second and more strategic sense, reciprocity be-
aspect of Gandhi's understanding of satyagraha as a tween means and ends implies a vigilance in which
form of action, namely, its radically self-limiting char- it is crucial "to adopt means to fit each case" ([1909]
acter. I outline the defining principles of satyagraha in 1999, 288) and creatively enact a variety of nonviolent
terms of the orientation, mechanism, and dispositions methods and dispositions to overcome resistance to
that render it "a force containing within itself seeds of transformative action- for it is also in the gap between
progressive self-restraint" (Gandhi [1925c] 1999, 174) means and ends that projects of political reform and
and thereby the capacity to attenuate coercion and es- transformation run aground. Here, Gandhi's varied
calation in politics. agenda for social and economic reform illustrates well
the idea that the means adopted determine the extent
to which the goals of reform can be progressively re-
Means and Ends alized. In the case of caste equality or Hindu-Muslim
unity- two central components of Gandhi's construc-
A primary tenet of Gandhi's realism was his insistence tive program- means and ends come together in that
on a means orientation to politics. This orientation the transformation of relations of mistrust, domination,
serves, on the one hand, as an antidote to the kinds and inequality is at once both the goal and mechanism
of disjunctures between means and ends characteristic of reform. Moreover, in enacting reform- as well as
of political idealism and of instrumentalism; on the the collective goal of self-rule- political action takes
other, it pointedly frames politics in terms of the prob-
lems and possibilities of political action. To prioritize
17 In this vein, Devji discusses the idea of a temporal coincidence of
means does not dispense with the question of ends, but
means and ends in which the purposes of nonviolent action "were
instead seeks to reformulate its reciprocal relationship
achieved in the very moment of their expression" (Devji 2010, 374).
to means. Gandhi's understanding of means and ends 18 This is one way to situate Gandhi's obsession with the charka
to be, in his words, "convertible terms" ([1924d] 1999, (spinning wheel) and, more generally, the idea of constructive work.
497) suggests two kinds of articulations. In its stronger See also Mehta (2010b, 368-69).

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American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No. 2
place sequentially and in shifting contexts, within and to interrupt the dynamic of escalation. As Niebuhr
through political engagements that are more inter- thoughtfully noted, by enduring "more suffering than
active and iterative, and therefore necessarily more it causes," satyagraha "mitigates the resentment" of the
strategic than what is implied in the strong reading political opponent, "resentments which violent conflict
of exemplary or principled action. always create" (1932, 247).
The charged language of self-suffering has the ten-
dency to evoke heroic, even masochistic, feats of self-
Discipline and Suffering
abnegation; yet following Niebuhr, self-suffering might
If the prioritization of means defines the orientation of be better described as disciplined action- free of per-
satyagraha , its substance lies in suffering. For Gandhi, sonal resentments and ambitions- that demonstrates
"non-violence in its dynamic condition means con- this detachment through action that involves the will-
scious suffering" ([1920e] 1999, 135). Tapas/tapasya , ingness to sacrifice (Niebuhr 1932, 246). To suffer
usually translated by Gandhi as both self-suffering meant to fully bear the burdens of acting; it demanded
and self-discipline, was therefore the distinguishing that acts of protest, resistance, and reform involved
feature of all modes of nonviolent action and key the sacrifice of something from which one benefits and
to their effectiveness.19 For Gandhi, suffering prop- the risk of severe consequences, from ostracism to vi-
erly practiced was noncoercive, and its mode of op- olent reaction. In the context of noncooperation with
eration forestalled and disrupted the escalating logic authority, whether in the form of a boycott of state in-
of politics. Moreover, the disposition toward sacrifice stitutions, civil disobedience, or labor strikes and work
implied in suffering allowed for self-correction and stoppages, the act would prove most efficacious, most
self-examination, a disciplined humility that was per- demonstrative of conviction, when the satyagrahi visi-
formed and cultivated through detached action. In the bly sacrificed tangible benefits (in terms of money and
disciplined suffering that nonviolent action seeks to prestige) and bore adverse consequences (such as being
dramatize, these aspects coalesce to enable a distinct jailed or fired) in a forthright and disciplined manner.
process of resolution, which Gandhi strikingly termed For Gandhi, the mitigation of resentment was only
a dynamic of political conversion. one side of what made conscious and deliberate suf-
The literal meaning of satyagraha is "truth-force" fering effective. Suffering, for Gandhi, "appeals not to
or the search for and insistence upon truth ([1921b] the intellect, it pierces the heart," working not by per-
1999, 451-52]; [1925c] 1999, 64, 93; cf. Parekh 1989a, suading but by converting political opponents ([1939]
143). Truth, for Gandhi, was absolute and universal; 1999, 196). Conversion was therefore associated with
indeed it served as another name for God. At the a kind of action that was more affective than intellec-
same time, Gandhian truth lacked any positive, sub- tual in orientation and effect. Although most directly
stantive definition; it was a name for an absolute that opposed to coercion, conversion was also contrasted
was in principle unknowable and inaccessible in any to persuasion and condemnation, where the latter im-
final or total sense. Thus, insistence on it went hand plied modes of argumentation and criticism that in-
in hand with a view of truth as necessarily many-sided hibited moderation and bred hostility. For Gandhi, as
(Bondurant 1958, 17). Each individual not only had was noted before, reason and rational argument had
his or her own path to truth but also knowledge of distinct limits in politics. Reason could easily cover
it was only ever partial and always liable to be incor- over and engender obstinacy, self-righteousness, and
rect. To recognize fallibility was to accept that people's dogmatism. Indeed Gandhi thought that deeply held
(partial) views of justice will necessarily conflict, "for beliefs and principles were almost always less ratio-
what appears to be truth to the one may appear to be nal than they might appear, and the intellect worked
error to the other" ([1920a] 1999, 206). For Gandhi, hardest to supply arguments and proofs for beliefs that
"the main reason why violence is eliminated" in satya- had their origins and grounding elsewhere. However,
graha is because the satyagrahi (the nonviolent actor) suffering enabled a different kind of reasoning:
"gives his opponent the same right of independence
and feelings of liberty that he reserves to himself, and Suffering is the law of human beings; war is the law of
he will fight by inflicting injuries on his own person" the jungle. But suffering is infinitely more powerful than
([1920b] 1999, 217). By turning the onus of action- the the law of the jungle for converting the opponent and
opening his ears, which are otherwise shut, to the voice of
responsibility for the consequences of action- inward
reason. Nobody has probably drawn up more petitions or
in this manner, suffering becomes noncoercive in its
espoused more forlorn causes than I, and I have come to
outward effect. When this kind of truth-force turns out
this fundamental conclusion that, if you want something
to have mistakenly used (i.e., in a cause that is unjust), really important to be done, you must not merely satisfy
then "only the person using it suffers." The disciplined the reason, you must move the heart also. The appeal of
satyagrahi does not "make others suffer for his mis- reason is more to the head, but the penetration of the heart
takes" ([1909] 1999, 293) and instead turns the conse- comes from suffering. It opens up the inner understanding
quences of failure inward, into acts of self-examination in man. ([1931] 1999, 48)
and correction. Most importantly, suffering functions
Gandhi held that dramatic displays of commitment-
19 "Real suffering bravely borne melts even a heart of stone. Such is through acts of conscious and willed suffering- would
the potency of suffering, or tapas. And there lies the key to Satya- effectively weaken entrenched positions. Disciplined
graha" (Gandhi [1925c] 1999, 18). and self-effacing action triggered an opening and

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The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence May 2012
rethinking of commitments, enabling a new form of about how given a particular context and set of practi-
reason "strengthened by suffering" ([1925b] 1999, 382). cal constraints, one must seek the right means to enable
Gandhi was acutely aware that an unrestrained or a projected end. Thus far, I have focused on constraints
egotistic politics of conviction was especially liable to in terms of recurring structures of resistance and en-
engender a logic of escalation. He therefore insisted demic sources of violence in political contestation. Ac-
that nonviolence could not be a movement of "brag, tion also takes place within determinate relationships
bluster, or bluff," but rather one premised on the cul- and encounters, in which individuals and groups con-
tivation of "unobtrusive humility" ([1921a] 1999, 203). front and engage each other from a given standpoint.
Not bravado or brinkmanship but the performance of Political interactions have a different character and en-
self-effacing and self-sacrificing acts would do the polit- tail differential effects depending on where antagonists
ical work of demonstrating firmly held political convic- find and position themselves, for example, within rela-
tions and compelling attention to them. Nonviolence tions of power, legacies of domination, forms of dis-
avoids condemnation in the form of criticism and judg- agreement, and stages of polarization. Being respon-
ment of the actions of others, since "the more it speaks sive to these variations in situational standpoints is
and argues, the less effective it becomes" ([1936] 1999, another reason why the politics of satyagraha had to
402). Rather than enhancing its power through moral- be dynamic, strategic, and contextual.
izing, the convincing action of the nonviolent agent A central contention of political realism is that con-
text is an essential, even determinative, starting point
grows most in his opponent when he least interposes his of political action and judgment. The emphasis on
speech between his action and his opponent. Speech, es- context implies a view of politics as always histori-
pecially when it is haughty, betrays want of confidence and cally and institutionally located and a sense that po-
it makes one's opponent skeptical about the reality of the litical decision making- in the face of the brute con-
act. Humility therefore is the key to quick success. ([1921a] tingencies and complexities of political life- has to be
1999, 203) situational to be effective. In this vein, realists have
taken political judgment to be less a theoretical sci-
To be effective, acts of suffering required discipline, ence in which right conduct can be deduced from uni-
where discipline meant learning to detach the self from versal principles and more akin to a skill or art, a
desire for the fruits of action and the egotistic invest- form of practical reason that is sensitive to particulars
ment in principles. The dispositional training for satya- (Galston 2010; Geuss 2010a). One perennial worry with
graha therefore required a cultivation of humility and judgment conceived in these terms is that it often leads
fearlessness, the willingness to sacrifice one's life and to the conclusion that politics requires making unpleas-
an overcoming of the ego's passions and attachments. ant moral choices or, indeed, a suspension of moral
Gandhi's repeated prescriptions to be pure and self- norms. Emphasizing flexibility and mutability can also
less in motive, coupled with his celebration of personal make political judgment appear mystical or, worse still,
asceticism, have given great cause to view him as a a cover for plain decisionism. Gandhi's understanding
moral absolutist or ethical purist in politics. He cer- of satyagraha offers more defined parameters or pre-
tainly extolled a model of moral perfection in which dis- cepts for determining the appropriate course of action
ciplined purity and self-abnegating humility were cen- in given contexts. It suggests that one can think more
tral modes and avowed aims. Yet these moral virtues constructively about paradigmatic contexts of political
also functioned as distinctly political dispositions on conflicts and the kinds of political responses they de-
which the success (and not just the moral legitimacy) mand, thereby helping navigate the terrain between
of nonviolent action depended. That is, the imperative morally strict categorical imperatives and morally lax
for detached and disciplined action was not just a way to decisionism. Gandhian satyagraha was especially at-
assert the legitimacy or authenticity of the political act tuned to structural and historical relations of power and
nor a sign of the ethical purity of the actor but also a key the sequences and stages of polarization that framed
determinant of the anticipated efficacy of nonviolent contestation between antagonists and potential allies.
action. Purity of motive implied removing all traces There is a tendency to take civil disobedience, partic-
of anger and resentment toward one's opponent, as ularly the Indian anticolonial campaign against British
well as personal vanity and ambition vis-à-vis the ends rule, as the exemplary instance of satyagraha , to which
of action, so as not to invite bitterness and antipathy. one should turn to tease out its conceptual underpin-
Selfless suffering likewise was thought to demonstrate nings. Although commentators will refer to Gandhi's
the strength of conviction in a nondogmatic manner other campaigns of the time, such as the campaigns
that interrupted the escalation of mutual hostilities. against untouchability and for Hindu-Muslim unity,
Therefore, in the context of the theory and practice of they often take them to be indicative of Gandhi's
nonviolence, the formulation and defense of purity and progressive social views rather than as themselves
selflessness, as well as suffering, detachment, humility, theoretically significant examples of nonviolent poli-
and discipline, were avowedly political. tics in action.20 Against this tendency, Skaria (2002)
has reformulated the category of ahimsa as a set of
CONTEXTS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION
20 The exemplary status of the nonviolent movement for swaraj also
Gandhian realism takes the fundamental questions stems from its historic successes in contrast to the ambiguity and
about politics to be questions about political action, controversy over the impact of Gandhi's other campaigns. Whereas

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American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No. 2
broad-ranging practices of neighborliness that seek to or her inherent power and liberty to reject or revise
create, reform, and sustain political relationships in ac- the conditions of consent. The fact that "less than a
cordance with Gandhian notions of justice and equality. hundred thousand white men should be able to rule
Skaria rightly conceptualizes ahimsa as less a static po- three hundred and fifty million Indians" ([1920g] 1999,
sition than an ongoing activity, a "rigorous politics" that 279-80) offered proof that British rule was unthink-
works through different and distinct modes of tapasya able without Indian collaboration. It also attested to
to produce the conditions of neighborliness (957). In its inherent instability (and that of all political regimes)
this vein, Skaria offers a very suggestive typology for when the actions of government become corrupt, un-
distinguishing forms of nonviolent action in terms of just, or otherwise intolerable. "In politics," Gandhi
the structural relationship between political partners insisted, the use of satyagraha "is based upon the im-
and antagonists. In his view, nonviolent action is differ- mutable maxim, that government of the people is pos-
ently enacted when practiced vis-à-vis political superi- sible only so long as they consent either consciously
ors, equals, or inferiors/subalterns. Against dominators, or unconsciously to be governed" ([1914] 1999, 217).
or superiors, one would enact a politics of confronta- Therefore unjust laws and regimes can be radically
tion, resistance, and civil disobedience; with equals, destabilized by acts of withdrawal of that consent,
one sought political friendship; with the subaltern, one through a politics of active noncooperation with au-
would demonstrate service and seek atonement (957, thority.
976-81). Here I connect this typology to Gandhi's own At one level, constructive satyagraha was the nec-
twofold differentiation between destructive and con- essary flipside of nonviolent resistance and noncoop-
structive satyagraha and the more abstract contrast he eration; it entailed the active creation of new modes
drew between relations with a tyrant versus those with of individual and collective self-rule to redeem and
a lover. reconstitute the political space made available by with-
drawal. For Gandhi, in the context of Indian anticolo-
nial politics, the exemplary site for experimenting with
Destructive and Constructive Satyagraha
constructive satyagraha was the platform of village re-
Destructive satyagraha revolves around the tactics of form and revitalization known as the "Constructive
civil disobedience and noncooperation. It is a mode of Programme." The constructive program was a multi-
militant and direct political action against unjust laws faceted program of social reform that, in its more rad-
or an unjust political order, an order with which you ical turns, aimed at something like a nonviolent social
are in, or place yourself in, an antagonistic relationship. revolution. It came to enfold an expanding set of so-
By contrast, constructive nonviolent action is driven cial, cultural, and economic reform campaigns- from
less by an urgency to resist, withdraw, or undo existing the promotion of khadi (home-spun cloth) and cot-
political authority than by the need to create political tage industries, the abolition of untouchability, and the
bonds and forms of association and authority on a vol- striving for communal harmony to campaigns for san-
untary and noncoercive basis. Constructive action can itation, education, and prohibition ([1941] 1999). The
also function as a form of political judgment, linked constructive program was often criticized, especially
to an ethics of effective leadership, of how to make from within the Congress, for being nonpolitical. It
alliances and coalitions, overcome divisions, and solve was charged with distracting Gandhi and Congress pol-
political disagreement. In constructive satyagraha , we itics from the goal of capturing state power, for being
see most clearly how nonviolence was not merely a obscurantist and traditional (this claim was especially
negative recipe for resistance but the grounds for gen- directed at the khadi campaign), and for instigating
erative political action. social division when national unity was deemed most
Nonviolent resistance in the form of mass civil dis- urgent (i.e., on the issue of untouchability). However,
obedience and noncooperation is the clearest exam- for Gandhi, in this precise form- centered around vil-
ple of Gandhi's belief that political authority was ulti- lage renewal and protection- constructive work was
mately based not on force alone but on some kind of the necessary counterpart to the anticolonial demand.
consent, however minimal or unconscious. For Gandhi, To attain swaraj , the strategy of noncooperation had
the very machinery of modern government necessarily to be twinned with a positive program of constructing
relied on the extensive cooperation of subjects: "Ev- nonviolent forms of rule, authority, and association.
ery citizen silently but none-the-less certainly sustains In this sense, the constructive program functioned as
the Government of the day in ways of which he has political preparation for independence, as itself a series
no knowledge. Every citizen renders himself respon- of experiments in self-rule.
sible of every act of government" ([1920d] 1999, 94). Moreover, the forms of satyagraha envisioned in
Gandhi's radical account of responsibility served to the constructive program were also meant to high-
make visible the individual's active (even if unwitting) light the centrality of, and intimate a model for,
collusion in the production of authority and thus his the everyday practice of nonviolent politics.21 These

Gandhi's critique of untouchability is considered to have been impor- 21 In a 1938 speech to Ghaffar Khan's Khudai Khidmatgars, the
tant and consequential (exactly how consequential and the character famous nonviolent movement of the Northwest Frontier Province,
of that influence are, however, subject to continuing debate), the Gandhi reiterated the importance of ordinary forms of constructive
attempt at forging Hindu-Muslim solidarity is generally taken to satyagraha in the following terms: "Our civil disobedience or non-
have been a more striking failure. co-operation, by its very nature, was not meant to be practiced for

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The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence May 2012
campaigns explicitly eschewed state action or legisla- (or national narrative) that could convince Hindus and
tion as the means for effecting radical social and eco- Muslims that they shared political interests and goals
nomic reform; indeed this rejection is what rendered (or that they already formed a single political com-
these campaigns nonviolent. If Gandhi was suspicious munity) but a mechanism that could disarm growing
of the legitimacy and efficacy of state-directed legisla- enmity and escalating distrust:
tion in general, he thought that the problem of coercive
or imposed reform would be most acute in the arena When men become obstinate, it is a difficult thing. If I pull
of social and economic life. Imposed reform would one way, my Moslem brother will pull another. If I put on
not only produce reaction and resentment but also superior airs, he will return the compliment. If I bow to
threaten to induce a scale of polarization that could him gently, he will do it much more so; and if, he does not,
instigate widespread civil conflict and even outright I shall not be considered to have done wrong in having
bowed. When the Hindus became insistent, the killing of
civil war. Gandhi's proposed antidote to the poten-
cows increased. In my opinion, cow-protection societies
tial escalating spiral of ideological conflict inherent in
may be considered cow-killing societies. ([1909] 1999, 272)
communal, intercaste, and economic conflict was the
radical localization of the arena of struggle for reform.
Here we see the central mechanisms of satyagraha , suf-
While national in scope, the constructive program was
fering and sacrifice, mobilized toward creating the con-
to be conducted as village-level campaigns. For Gandhi,
ditions for mutual respect, trust, and equality. More-
entrenched forms of economic and social oppression
over, this attempt required a sensitivity to the nature of
(for example, stemming from land distribution and
the structural and historical relationship between Hin-
caste inequality) required engagement at an intimate
dus and Muslims. Thus, the "heart unity" that Gandhi
scale, because intimacy set the conditions for conscious
sought could not ignore or deny the difference in sta-
atonement and resisted the abstracting logic of ideo-
tus and interests of each community; indeed it was
logical competition and stalemate. In a positive sense,
premised on the heightened duty of the Hindu com-
localized constructive nonviolence taught satyagrahis
munity as the majority community to "surrender out
to orient themselves toward the reform of that with
of strength to the Mussalman in every mundane mat-
which they were most intimate; that is, it insisted that
ter" ([1925a] 1999, 159). Trying to create the conditions
political action began from the situatedness of the self
of unity- overcoming mutual distrust and feelings of
in its most intimate worlds.
superiority/inferiority or insecurity- was, for Gandhi,
One of the most striking examples of constructive
"essentially the work of Hindus" ([1921c] 1999, 18).
satyagraha in the realm of political judgment and po-
That is, it was incumbent on those in positions of power,
litical leadership was Gandhi's understanding of the
strength, and security to both accept their responsibil-
conditions for forging Hindu-Muslim unity. Although
ity for enmity and actively seek its undoing.22
the creation of greater Hindu-Muslim unity was a
central plank of the constructive program, it was by
all accounts a deep political failure both for Gandhi Context and Coercion
and Congress politics, evidenced in the polarizations
Thus, the techniques as well as the dispositional politics
that resulted in partition. Yet it was Gandhi's involve-
of satyagraha had a different valence depending on the
ment with the pan-Islamic Khilafat movement (1919- context of encounter. Even the most militant forms of
24) that had initially elevated him to a position of na-
resistance had to take a specific form to produce the
tional leadership in the first major mobilizations against
right effect and transform structures of political conflict
British rule. The Khilafat campaign eventually dove-
and political authority. As noted earlier, Gandhi saw
tailed with the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-
proper acts of satyagraha as dramatizing self-suffering;
22), and the period is often taken to be the heyday
resisters had to show that in acts of withdrawal they
of Hindu-Muslim solidarity. Despite its later unrav-
consciously sacrifice something from which they ben-
eling, the distinctive formula that Gandhi articulated
efit and "voluntarily put up with the losses and incon-
in the period as the basis for Hindu-Muslim unity
veniences that arise from having to withdraw" ([1920c]
and friendship remains provocative. Skaria (2002) and
1999, 399). Although the aim and form of resistance
Devji (2005) have both drawn attention to the nov-
elty of Gandhi's formulation of political friendship as
22 Gandhi's formula for Hindu-Muslim friendship was most explicit
one that is performed through unconditional acts of
and arguably most effective during the Khilafat campaign. Although
solidarity. Rather than a strategic alliance of interest, never renounced, it was never again given such prominence nor
based on a kind of quid pro quo- in which, for instance, practiced so publicly in Congress politics. There were, however, some
Hindu support for the Khilafat demand would be tied meager attempts: consider Gandhi's offer to Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
to Muslim acceptance of a ban on cow slaughter- the leader of the Muslim League and founder of Pakistan, of the
prime ministership as a way to ward off partition in the eleventh
Gandhi attempted to "win permanent friendship with
hour. More interestingly, Rajagopalachari, one of Gandhi's closest
Mussulmans" in "a spirit of love and sacrifice indepen- political associates, argued for various forms of compromise on the
dent of expectation of any return" ([1920f] 1999, 119). question of Pakistan, from accepting the League resolution of 1940 to
What Gandhi proposed was not primarily an ideology a lifelong campaign to resolve the Kashmir despite. Rajagopalachari
often formulated these various acts of reconciliation in Gandhian
terms, as unilateral acts of friendship meant to dissolve suspicion
all time. But the fight which we are today putting up through our and fear; his striking maxim for peace with Pakistan was "not peace
constructive nonviolence has validity for all time; it is the real thing" at any cost but friendship at any price." On this, see Srinivasan's
([1938] 1999, 146). excellent study (2009, 9, 139-44, 163-74).

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American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No. 2
were intended to break the machinery of government, strategy. At the same time, even in the context of the
this end was not to be attained through instilling fear, broadest calls for general noncooperation, escalation
intimidating, embarrassing, or otherwise humiliating took place in precise stages and had to be tied to
the government into submission: specific demands, demands that could be reasonably
negotiated or met by opponents. Pure escalation could
This battle of non-cooperation is a programme of pro- never become a goal of its own. Thus, at every stage
paganda by reducing profession to practice, not one of of confrontation, demands had to be publicly declared,
compelling others to yield obedience by violence direct or justified, and circulated, and avenues for negotiated
indirect. We must try patiently to convert our opponents. settlements (including face-saving measures) had to be
If we wish to evolve the sprit of democracy out of slavery, kept open (Bondurant 1958, 40). Acts of disobedience
we must be scrupulously exact in our dealings with oppo-
and resistance, in addition to being disciplined and de-
nents. We may not replace the slavery of the Government
fined, thus were meant to work less through humili-
by that of the non-co-operationists. We must concede to
our opponents the freedom we claim for ourselves and for
ating or triumphing over an enemy but by producing
which we are fighting. ([1920h] 1999, 66) conditions for progressive and iterative resolutions.
Context mattered not only in the general sense that
Gandhi insisted that if the price for acting was borne it shaped the aims and methods of political action but
primarily by the satyagrahi , then whatever coercion also in that any particular tactic or technique could
existed was internally directed and thus not a form be felt as coercive, depending on the specific struc-
of violence against the opponent. To demonstrate this ture and sequence of confrontation. Gandhi took great
quality of nonviolence, Gandhi often invoked a distinc- pains to establish and justify the precise conditions in
tion between forms of political boycott in which one which nonviolent tactics could be deployed without
inducing escalation or enacting coercion. He devoted
legitimately withdrew support from an unjust institu-
tion (i.e., through disobeying or ignoring the laws of enormous energy to clarifying, calibrating, and out-
the village headman or district collector) and extreme lining the exact conditions of disciplined satyagraha ;
forms of social boycott that would deny social services indeed these searching examinations were a central
or otherwise ostracize or intimidate these same offi- feature of his voluminous writings (especially in his in-
cials. In satyagraha one did not punish the wrongdoer house journals, Navajivan , Young India , and Harijan ).
as such; rather one "must combat the wrong by ceasing These responses ranged very broadly, from detailing
to assist the wrong-doer" ([1920c] 1999, 399). Gandhi exacting rituals of daily self-discipline; differentiating
deemed punishment to be outright coercion and hence retaliatory and productive forms of boycotts, strikes,
illegitimate. Moreover, in terming the act "coercive" and work stoppages; to distinguishing legitimate from
Gandhi also considered it to be politically ineffective illegitimate grievances of satyagrahis in prison. Despite
Gandhi's careful calibrations of the fine line between
because it targeted individuals rather than institutions
and, importantly, accelerated the given dynamics of coercion and conversion, they often appeared to his
entrenchment. critics to be little more than sophistries, and the charge
There has always been a great deal of controversy that nonviolence necessarily works through moral co-
ercion has continued to shadow it.
about whether the logic of nonviolent protest, espe-
cially in its most confrontational moments, actually To gauge how complicated the issue of coercion was
works in this way or whether it necessarily succeeds on and how crucial the contexts of political conflict were,
the back of another kind of coercion.23 Gandhi himself for Gandhi, in shaping it, I refer here briefly to per-
declared satyagraha to be a militant and not passive haps the most controversial tactic in Gandhi's polit-
form of resistance, often invoking military metaphors ical repertoire and one that most often was seen as
to describe the tactics and discipline of his nonviolent morally coercive: the political fast or hunger strike. The
army. It is also clear that in the context of oppos- majority of Gandhi's fasts were personal acts of self-
ing manifestly unjust regimes (i.e., when a regime is purification, penance, prayer, and remembrance. Even
deemed incapable of internal reform as was the case, many of his more public fasts are best understood as
in Gandhi's view, of British rule in India after the Am- acts of self-purification after political failures, to atone
ritsar massacre24) escalation would become a conscious for falling short of his own ideals and the lapses of his
followers (i.e., when he felt responsible for outbreaks
of violence) (Gandhi 2008, 827-31). However, Gandhi
23 Although Gandhi was insistent that truly nonviolent action was did also fast for straightforwardly political reasons, to
noncoercive, even his defenders question the plausibility of this influence the course of events, most famously as the
claim. Bondurant (1958) explicitly and positively terms the moral prelude to the Poona Pact of 1932 and to quell commu-
force of satyagraha as working through "nonviolent coercion" (9- nal riots at partition. He was acutely aware that fasts
11). Howes (2009) argues that Gandhi underestimates the "intersub-
could very easily be coercive, and thus he elaborated
jective violence" that nonviolence necessarily effects (122). Here, I
want to trace Gandhi's understanding of why he thought nonviolence precise and demanding rules for their undertaking. A
could in principle be noncoercive without entering into the impor- fast was always to be a weapon of last resort, used
tant question of whether in fact this has been in case in its actual only after all other avenues had been exhausted. To
enactment.
attest to how reluctant Gandhi was to carry out this
24 The massacre at Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar, Punjab, in April
1919 was a key catalyst of the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-
tactic, it is worth remembering that he at no time fasted
22), the first major mass nonviolent campaign calling for Indian self- against the British government or British rule as such,
rule. and never in the name of an open-ended demand for

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The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence May 2012
independence. For Gandhi, fasting against a political the transformative possibilities in and of politics but
antagonist or enemy functioned only to escalate bitter- in insisting that political action has to begin from, and
ness and conflict, because one's enemy would necessar- work outward from, the givens- the situated contexts
ily experience the fast as exhortative and coercive. One and inherent dangers- of political life. And it is in this
could not "fast against a tyrant" but only against those respect that Gandhian realism serves as an instructive
whose consciences could be stirred by the willingness example of exactly the kind of realist reversal in the
to sacrifice one's life ([1933a] 1999, 377). Only in the directionality of political theorizing that scholars such
context of that kind of relationship- Gandhi called it as Geuss and Williams have recommended.
a relationship of love- would fasting work as moral The key lies in Gandhi's central focus on the question
suasion and not as sheer blackmail. The categories of of action, especially the manner in which the ques-
tyrant and lover had, for Gandhi, "a general applica- tion of means is taken as the fundamental problem of
tion. The one who does injustice is styled 'tyrant.' The and for politics. The Gandhian imperative to construct
one who is in sympathy with you is the 'lover.'" The nonviolent means not only puts into sharp relief the
true satyagraha fast "should be against the lover and for ethical and practical dilemmas of political violence but
his reform, not for extorting rights from him" ([1924a] it also prioritizes action and contexts of action in a
1999, 323). This does not mean that in practice all of manner that works to helpfully displace and reformu-
Gandhi's fasts conformed to these strict criteria; indeed late realism's normative bind. The traditional dilemma
Gandhi himself admitted his own lapses in this regard. about normativity- about the relationship between is
But it does vividly demonstrate the degree to which and ought- arises partly because of a prior framing and
Gandhi was attuned to the ambiguities of moral co- implicit assumption that political theorizing primarily
ercion in nonviolent resistance and, more importantly, concerns itself with the constitution, generation, and
how for Gandhi the question of the appropriate uses justification of norms. If that is the perspective from
of nonviolent action in general was closely tied to an which one views the realism/idealism debate, then re-
assessment of the contexts and dynamics of specific alism may well come up short. But if we were to shift
political confrontations. the is/ought question from the domain of norms to that
of action , the issue is no longer one of how normative
guidelines (the ought ) can be derived from the web of
CONCLUSION: FROM NORMS TO ACTION existing beliefs and constraints (the is), which can ad-
mittedly pose fundamental challenges for the practice
At its core, realism asks us to confront the question of criticism. Rather, the question becomes one of inter-
of what is given- immutable and endemic- in politics. rogating the conditions and mechanisms by which we
In the tradition of moderating or liberal realism, the can move from the world as it is to the world as it ought
given is often linked to aspects of human nature and to be. That is, from the standpoint of political action,
psychology, to passions and interests that are viewed the is/ought question is reconfigured as a means/ends
as perhaps partially tamable but never wholly over- question, one in which the tighter imbrication of the
come. Montesquieu, Hume, and Madison based their normative and the empirical that realism recommends
political analyses on a motivational realism of this kind can be enabling rather than constrictive. In Gandhi, we
and thereby rejected the view that politics and polit- can see how tethering political potentiality to the given
ical institutions ought to require or depend on great constraints of political life does not entail an a priori
transformations of fundamental human passions. Such restriction on imaginative possibilities; it only insists on
attempts to reshape, educate, or suppress human na- scrupulous attention to the means of working out from
ture would either be foolhardy or dangerous. Instead, and through these constraints toward envisioned ends.
workable political institutions had to take into account In this form of realism, the ends and goals of political
and constrain (in indirect ways) the inevitable play of life may even be high-minded, demanding, and radical
pride and self-interest in politics. (as surely many of Gandhi's were), but the means for
Gandhi's politics were also premised on an under- the effectuation of norms cannot be left unspecified
standing of the crucial role of passions such as pride and, hence, unreal. In this manner, with Gandhi, politi-
and self-regard in politics, yet he was straightforwardly cal realism can perhaps be rescued from its association
a moral perfectionist. In this respect, the pertinent dis- with amoral instrumentalism and status quo politics
tinction or question was not whether but how political and instead be viewed as offering an alternative way of
passions can be constrained. Gandhi did not look to thinking pointedly and precisely about the conditions
political institutions to check, harness, or moderate for effective and principled political action.
the most unstable and dangerous passions. Institutions
were untrustworthy in this regard and more often than
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