International Economic Law Notes
International Economic Law Notes
ECONOMIC LAW
Semester 1
1. Introduction
International economic law is an increasingly seminal field of international law that involves the regulation
and conduct of states, international organizations, and private firms operating in the international
economic arena.
The theory of international trade is customarily divided into two major branches:
The Theory of International Values which is the Pure or Real Theory of International Trade
Equilibrium
o Concerned with the determination of relative prices and real incomes in international trade,
abstracting from the intervention of money. The implicit assumption that whatever
adjustments of money wage and price levels or exchange rates required to preserve
international monetary equilibrium do actually take place is a potent source of difficulty and
confusion in applying the theory to actual problems.
The theory of the mechanism of adjustment which is the Monetary Theory of Balance-of-
Payments Adjustment
o in its classical formulation, was concerned with the automatic mechanism by which
international monetary equilibrium was attained or preserved under the gold standard and,
subsequently, with the automatic mechanisms of adjustment under fixed and floating
exchange rate systems.
1.1 Trade Theories
1.1.1 The Pure Theory of International Trade
The central concern of the pure theory of international trade is to explain the causes of international
trade and the determination of the equilibrium prices and quantities of traded goods and to analyse
the effects of trade on economic welfare; that is, the theory is concerned with both positive and
normative questions.
The normative concern is particularly dominant in the theory on the effects of tariffs and other
governmental interventions in international trade a perennial problem that has acquired new interest
in the modern world of planned economic development based on protected industrialization and
deliberate import-substitution.
1.1.2 The Classical Theory
The classical economists developed the basic concepts of the theory in two steps:
o Ricardo contributed the theory of comparative costs, which explained both the cause and the
mutual beneficiality of international trade by international differences in relative costs of
production; and
o John Stuart Mill added the principle that the relative prices of the goods exchanged must be
such that the quantities demanded in international trade are equal to the quantities supplied.
The fundamental point that the beneficiality of international trade depends in no way on the absolute
levels of economic efficiency or “stages of economic development” of the trading partners but only on
differences in their relative costs of production in the absence of trade.
The theory is reformulated here to bring out the essential point that what matters is differences in the
alternative opportunity costs of commodities in the absence of trade.
Ricardo’s own formulation, with its assumption of a single factor of production producing goods at
constant costs and its concept of a fundamental unit of real cost (hours of work), unnecessarily tied
trade theory to the labour theory of value.
The modern approach can incorporate theories of production of any desired degree of complexity
and specifically allows alternative opportunity cost to vary with changes in the production pattern.
However, as soon as more than one factor of production is introduced, the analysis of the effect FDs
of trade on economic welfare becomes more complex than in the classical system, and the
demonstration of gain from trade requires considerably more conceptual sophistication
1.1.3 The Modern Theory
The modern approach to the question of the gains from trade recognizes that the inauguration of trade
or a change in the conditions of trade, such as that involved in the erection or removal of tariff barriers,
Page 1 of 113
will have differential effects on the welfare of individuals either by changing the relative prices facing
them as consumers or by changing the relative prices paid for the factors of production.
In their absence, welfare conclusions can only be derived either on the assumption that a social
judgment of the desirable distribution of real income exists and is implemented consistently or in terms
of potential welfare, that is, in the sense that in one situation everyone could be made no worse off
and some be made better off than they would be in the alternative situation, by means of appropriate
compensations through transfers of income.
Ethical neutrality requires that this result should be true for all possible distributions of economic
welfare among individuals, not merely for the distribution that happens to prevail before or after a
change of situation. This requirement is satisfied by any change that makes more of all commodities
available to the economy or, in the limit, no less of any commodity, regardless of how the community
allocates its consumption among commodities.
1.1.3.1 Gains in International Trade
The gains from international trade are obviously dependent on the difference between the prices for
exports in terms of imports established in international trade and the prices that would rule in a closed
economy.
The classical economists attempted to relate the distribution of the gains from trade to the precise
point between the closed-economy comparative cost ratios at which the equilibrium international price
ratio fell.
In practice, while this approach has been applied in specialist studies of the welfare cost of protection,
economists have generally been content to analyse changes in countries’ gains from trade by
reference to changes in an index expressing one or another concept of the terms of trade.
1.1.4 The Heckscher-Ohlin
The classical theory of international trade explained trade by differences in the comparative
productivity of labour.
The existence of the differences in comparative costs underlying international trade, however, was
merely assumed and not explained by the theory.
Contemporary international trade theory attempts the more fundamental task of explaining these
differences by differences in the ratios in which countries are endowed with factors of production.
As commonly expounded and applied, the theory employs a simple but elegant model of production
and distribution in the national economy.
Example:
o The Heckscher–Ohlin model assumes a perfectly competitive economy in which two
commodities (call them X and Y) are produced by two factors of production (call them K and
L), utilizing production functions characterized by constant returns to scale and diminishing
marginal rate of substitution between the factors.
o The quantities of the factors available are assumed fixed, and the production functions are
assumed to be such that at any given ratio of the price of K to the price of L, the production of
X is K-intensive and the production of Y is L-intensive, in the sense that X employs a higher
ratio of K to L than does Y.
o For the analysis of international trade the world is assumed to be composed of two such
national economies, the production functions and factors are assumed to be identical in
the two countries, and the tastes of consumers in the two countries are assumed to be
similar, in the sense that, at the same commodity price ratio, they will consume the two goods
in roughly the same ratios.
o The production side of this model has two fundamental properties, from which an extensive
and elegant set of theorems can be derived.
These result from the assumption of constant returns to scale, which makes the ratios
in which factors are employed in the two industries depend only on their relative prices.
The assumption of the invariance of relative factor intensity, which links relative factor
prices uniquely to relative commodity prices; and the assumption of fixed factor
endowments, which links the production pattern uniquely to commodity or factor prices.
1.1.4.1 Stolper–Samuelson Relationship
It describes the relationship between relative prices of output and relative factor rewards; specifically,
real wages and real returns to capital.
Page 2 of 113
Stolper-Samuelson theorem emphasizes that the increase in the price of one good, along with other
conditions unchanged, increases the real income of production factor, which is intensively used in the
production of good whose price has increased.
The theorem states that under specific economic assumptions (constant returns to scale, perfect
competition, equality of the number of factors to the number of products) a rise in the relative price of
a good will lead to a rise in the real return to that factor which is used most intensively in the production
of the good, and conversely, to a fall in the real return to the other factor.
In the normal case, in which the two trading countries’ demands for each other’s exports are elastic,
a tariff will improve a country’ terms of trade and raise the internal price of imports, thus shifting
production toward import-substitutes and raising the real income of the factor used intensively in
producing them.
There are two “exceptional” cases:
o If the country’s own demand for imports is inelastic and if those who spend the tariff proceeds
have a stronger marginal preference for imports than the average consumer, the demand for
imports may increase and the terms of trade turn against the country.
o If the foreign country’s demand for imports is inelastic and if domestic consumers have a
stronger marginal preference for the export good than do foreigners, the terms of trade may
improve so much that the internal price of imports falls and the income-distribution effects are
opposite to those normally expected.
1.1.5 The Theory Second Best
Protection has been a perennial policy issue since long before the origins of international trade theory,
and international trade theorists in the main tradition of the subject have consistently been concerned
with advocating freedom of trade and exposing the innumerable fallacies of protectionist thinking.
Two arguments for tariffs have, traditionally been acknowledged as valid
The terms of trade (“optimum tariff”) argument, and
The infant industry argument, favouring temporary protection of industries capable eventually of
establishing themselves in international competition.
A customs union is, from the free trade point of view, a second-best arrangement; and the problems
dealt with in Meade’s analysis all involve choices among alternatives when the first-best, or welfare-
maximizing, solution is ruled out by assumption. This is the nature of most policy problems in
economics, in other areas as well as international trade, so that Meade’s theoretical construction is
of great general applicability.
1.1.6 Customs unions
Interest in the theory of tariffs has also been generated by the movement toward economic integration
in Europe and by the associated problem of the economic effects of customs unions and free trade
areas.
Such arrangements entail a simultaneous movement toward free trade and protection. The problem
is whether the net result is a gain or a loss of economic welfare for individual members, the union as
a whole, outsiders, and the world as a whole.
A customs union increases welfare to the extent that it creates trade by diverting demand from higher-
cost domestic to lower-cost partner products and decreases welfare to the extent that it diverts trade
from lower-cost, foreign to higher-cost, partner products.
1.1.7 The monetary theory of balance-of-payments adjustment
The pure theory of international trade assumes that money prices and costs will adjust passively to
the real equilibrium of the international economy.
According to the theory, the stock of international money (which was initially identified with gold and
silver, whose total quantity was assumed fixed, although the theory was subsequently extended to
incorporate deposit money and the intervention of central banks) would tend automatically to be so
distributed among nations that each would have the quantity it demanded, consistent with
international equilibrium.
An increase in the quantity of money in a particular country would raise prices there, decreasing
exports and increasing imports, bringing the exchange rate to the gold-export point and inducing an
outflow of gold, which would cause domestic prices to fall and foreign prices to rise until equilibrium
was restored with a generally higher level of world prices.
Page 3 of 113
2. Brief Historical remarks on GATT, and associated Institutions
2.1 Brief History of GATT
GATT is a legal agreement between many countries, whose overall purpose was to promote international
trade by reducing or eliminating trade barriers such as tariffs or quotas. According to its preamble, its purpose
was the "substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a
reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis."
The GATT was first discussed during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment and was the
outcome of the failure of negotiating governments to create the International Trade Organization (ITO).
It remained in effect until the signature by 123 nations in Marrakesh on 14 April 1994, of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, which established the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 1 January 1995. The WTO is the
successor to the GATT, and the original GATT text (GATT 1947) is still in effect under the WTO framework,
subject to the modifications of GATT 1994. The GATT, and its successor the WTO, have successfully
reduced tariffs.
The Bretton Woods Conference produced two of the most important international economic institutions of the
postwar period: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, commonly known as the World Bank.
The beggar-thy-neighbor tariff policies of the 1930s had contributed to the environment that led to war,
ministers discussed the need for a third post war institution, the International Trade Organization (ITO), but
left the problem of designing it to their colleagues in government ministries with responsibility for trade.
Beggar thy neighbour: In economics, a beggar-thy-neighbor policy is an economic policy through
which one country attempts to remedy its economic problems by means that tend to worsen the
economic problems of other countries.
It assumes that economics is a zero-sum game. In other words, if you want more income, you have
to take it from other countries.
The goal was to create an agreement that would ensure postwar stability and avoid a repeat of the mistakes
of the recent past, including the Smoot-Hawley tariffs and retaliatory responses, which had been a contributor
to the devastating economic climate that culminated in the death and destruction of the Second World War.
The 1947 GATT created a new basic template of rules and exceptions to regulate international trade between
members (referred to as contracting parties) and locked in initial tariff reductions that these countries
committed to establish.
2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of GATT
2.2.1 Advantages
Initially reduced tariffs
By increasing trade, the GATT promoted world peace
By showing how free trade works, GATT inspired other trade agreements.
It set the stage for the European Union.
GATT also improved communication between countries.
It provided incentives for countries to learn, among others, English, one of the languages of the world's
largest consumer markets. This adoption of a common language reduced misunderstanding. It also
gave less developed countries a competitive advantage. English gave them insight into the developed
country's culture, marketing, and product needs.
2.2.2 Disadvantages
Low tariffs destroy some domestic industries, contributing to high unemployment in those sectors.
Governments subsidized many industries to make them more competitive on a global scale.
Like other free trade agreements, GATT reduced the rights of a nation to rule its own people. The
agreement required them to change domestic laws to gain the trade benefits.
Trade agreements like GATT often destabilize small, traditional economies. Countries like the United
States that subsidize agricultural exports can put local family farmers out of business. Unable to
compete with low-cost grains, the farmers migrate to cities looking for work, often in factories set up
by multi-national corporations. Often these factories can move to other countries with lower cost
labour, leaving the farmers unemployed.
Page 4 of 113
2.3 Main provisions of GATT
GATT 1947 had three main provisions:
The First and the most important requirement was that each member must confer most favoured
nation status to every other member. All members must be treated equally when it comes to tariffs. It
excluded the special tariffs among members of the British Commonwealth and customs unions. It
permitted tariffs if their removal would cause serious injury to domestic producers.
The Second, GATT prohibited restriction on the number of imports and exports. The exceptions
were:
o When a government had a surplus of agricultural products.
o If a country needed to protect its balance of payments because its foreign exchange reserves
were low.
o Emerging market countries that needed to protect fledgling industries.
o In addition, countries could restrict trade for reasons of national security. These
included protecting patents, copyrights, and public morals.
The Third provision was added in 1965. That was because more developing countries joined GATT,
and it wished to promote them. Developed countries agreed to eliminate tariffs on imports of
developing countries to boost their economies. It was also in the stronger countries' best interests in
the long run. It would increase the number of middle-class consumers throughout the world.
2.4 GATT and Beggar thy Neighbour Policies
2.4.1 Corporation Tax
In a globalised world, there is a temptation for a country to cut corporation tax rates below the global average
to attract more inward investment. The country cutting corporation tax benefits from more investment, and
although tax rates are lower, they hope to make up tax revenue by attracting more firms.
However, if one country cuts corporation tax, you effectively are attracting firms away from other countries,
who lose out. Cutting corporation tax in many countries does not increase global economic welfare – it tries
to increase the specific economy of the country cutting welfare at the expense of other countries.
This can create a situation of tax competition – where countries keep cutting tax rates to attract investment.
However, the total level of investment does not increase; it is just competition for a certain level of investment.
In theory, strong tax competition could lead to very low corporation tax rates – and a situation where no one
has gained any more investment. The only real winners are companies who benefit from lower global
corporation tax rates.
2.4.2 Currency Manipulation
For example, in a depression, a country may seek to devalue their currency to increase exports and domestic
demand. However, if one country artificially keeps a currency undervalued – it means other countries suffer
from being relatively over-valued and lower domestic demand. This currency manipulation is a charge often
raised against China – claiming currency manipulation give Chinese exports a benefit over other countries.
2.4.2.1 Currency Devaluation
Currency wars are said to occur when countries seek to devalue their currency to gain a competitive
advantage. However, if one country seeks to become more competitive through devaluation, it means other
countries become less competitive. Therefore, they may respond by weakening their currency too. Thus, we
may get a situation of competitive devaluation where each country seeks to reduce the value of a currency.
This can lead to instability.
Often countries want to maintain a strong currency. A strong currency increases living standards and enables
cheaper imports. In addition, a devaluation may cause inflation because imports are more expensive and
Aggregate Demand rises. However, in a recession and liquidity trap, inflation is not seen as a problem and
therefore, countries seek to boost demand by the exchange rate.
Page 5 of 113
2.4.2.2 Why do countries want a weaker currency?
If you devalue your currency, it means your exports are relatively more competitive (cheaper to foreigners).
Therefore, you will export more. In addition, imports become more expensive so there should be a rise in
Aggregate Demand. This should help boost economic growth and reduce unemployment.
2.4.2.3 Problems with Currency Wars
Instability, which discourages investment and trade. Policies to weaken currency like printing money can
cause instability such as potential future inflation.
However, others argue the dangers of currency wars are overstated. They argue that in a deep recession,
countries facing deflation do the right thing to try to boost the money supply.
2.4.3 Quantitative Easing
Also known as large-scale asset purchases, is a monetary policy whereby a central bank buys predetermined
amounts of government bonds or other financial assets in order to inject liquidity directly into the economy.
In other words, Quantitative easing is an unconventional monetary policy in which a central bank purchases
government securities or other securities from the market in order to increase the money supply and
encourage lending and investment.
In essence, quantitative easing is a monetary policy instituted by central banks in an effort to stimulate the
local economy. By flooding the economy with a greater money supply, governments hope to maintain
artificially low interest rates while providing consumers with extra money to spend more freely, which can
sometimes lead to inflation.
The important thing to remember is that quantitative easing generally leads to short-term benefits with the
risk of exacerbating long-term problems. As a result, it is often used as a last resort when the economy faces
a great risk of a recession or depression.
2.4.4 Intervention Buying
By purchasing the assets of other countries, you increase the value of their currency. For example, if China
uses its foreign currency to buy US Treasuries, it increases demand for the dollar and therefore the dollar
becomes *stronger* compared to the Yuan.
2.4.5 Problems with a strong Currency.
In essence, if we consider a country like an individual, having a strong currency means the country can
accumulate more assets and resources for its people, thereby increasing the value of its country.
As for the reasoning that it decreases competitiveness that means that actual demand has reduced. This will
naturally cause people to diversify into some other business, overall, leading to much-improved productivity
and diversity.
It is true that a strong currency can have various advantages. Some of which are as follows:
Page 6 of 113
The price of imports falls. Therefore, living standards can increase as consumers and firms can benefit
from lower prices of imported goods. Some firms who rely on imported raw materials will see a fall in
costs. Consumers who buy expensive imports will see improved living standards and greater
purchasing power.
Incentives to cut costs. A strong currency makes exports less competitive. This creates an incentive
for exporters to:
o Look for efficiency savings / increase productivity.
o Diversify into less price sensitive exports. This is often exports with greater value added. This
can lead to long-term benefits for the economy and is arguably better than always trying to
compete through relying on the weak currency, which may encourage fewer incentives to be
efficient.
Can help reduce inflationary pressures. An appreciation in the currency can help prevent domestic
inflation and prevent the economy overheating. This is because imports are cheaper, and we get
relatively lower aggregate demand.
If a currency appreciates, then it can lead to a fall in domestic demand. Exports are less competitive, imports
are cheaper. For an economy which is already growing slowly, a strong currency will worsen this economic
slowdown.
A strong currency can also cause a deterioration in the current account.
For example, from 2002 to 2012, some members of the Euro found that they became very uncompetitive in
the Euro. The currency was too strong for the relative price of their exports. Because they couldn’t allow the
currency to depreciate, it led to a serious deterioration in their current account. With Portugal, Spain and
Greece all experiencing record levels of a current account deficit.
It depends on why a currency is strong
If it is strong because of strong economic fundamentals (e.g. rising productivity, strong growth) the economy
will be able to absorb the relative loss in competitiveness from a strong currency.
It also depends on when a currency is strong
If you have an economic boom (high growth, inflation) an appreciation can be beneficial. The appreciation in
the currency leads to a reduction in inflationary pressure, but high growth is maintained.
If you have a recession, a strong currency can make the recession deeper. In a recession, a strong currency
will lead to a further fall in domestic demand. This is particularly a problem for a country in the Eurozone. For
example, the value of the Euro is far too high for a country like Greece. Greece is fundamentally
uncompetitive; this is reflected in a current account deficit of over 10% of GDP. However, in the Euro, Greece
cannot pursue expansionary fiscal or monetary policy. Therefore, the strong currency contributes to a fall in
economic growth and deflation.
Page 7 of 113
2.5 The Principles of GATT 1994
The GATT 1994 consists principally of the provisions of GATT 1947, as ‘rectified, amended or modified by
the terms of the instruments which have entered into force before the entry into force of the WTO
Agreements’.
The Preamble to the GATT 1947 reveals that the main objective of GATT is the conduct of relations in the
field of trade and economic endeavour “with a view to raising standard of living, ensuring full employment
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the
resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods’.
2.5.1 General Provisions of GATT
The basic principle of GATT 1947 is the principle of non-discrimination from which the following other three
principles are derived:
1. The Most-favoured-nation principle (MFN)
2. The National Treatment Principle
3. The Reciprocity principle.
2.5.1.1 The Most Favoured Nation Principle
The most-favoured-nation principle is found in Article 1 of GATT 1947.
The ‘National treatment’ is a liberal economic concept, which is difficult to implement because it potentially
impedes the fulfilment of national development policy. The national treatment principle prohibits
discrimination between imported and like domestic products. GATT does not define “like products”. In
addition, it is left to the GATT panels to decide what constitutes a “like product”. The overall purpose of Article
III is to ensure that the determination of “like product’ is not made in such way that it infringes the regulatory
authority and domestic policy options of contracting parties. In so doing, the WTO panels usually consider
tariff classifications, nature of the product, internal use, commercial value, and price and substitutability.
In the legal framework of the GATT, the national-treatment-principle supplements the MFN principle, which
gives third parties the opportunity to benefit from concessions already negotiated. However, there are certain
exceptions. In Article XX(g) of the GATT, among others, exempts measures ‘relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption’.
In addition, Article XX (i) excludes measures:
“involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such
materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the domestic price of such materials is held
below the world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan; Provided that such restrictions shall not
operate to increase the exports of or the protection afforded to such domestic industry, and shall not depart
from the provisions of this Agreement relating to non-discrimination”.
2.5.1.3 The Reciprocity Principle
One of the objectives of GATT is to give a mutual advantage to all contracting parties. The Preamble to the
GATT describes the contracting parties as:
“Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade
and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce”.
GATT encourages negotiations based on the reciprocity principle. Article XXVIII (1) provides:
“The contracting parties recognize that customs duties often constitute serious obstacles to trade;
thus negotiations on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis, directed to the substantial
reduction of the general level of tariffs and other charges on imports and exports and in particular to
the reduction of such high tariffs as discourage the importation even of minimum quantities, and
conducted with due regard to the objectives of this Agreement and the varying needs of individual
contracting parties, are of great importance to the expansion of international trade. The
CONTRACTING PARTIES may therefore sponsor such negotiations from time to time”.
The reciprocity principle and its implementation may be found in the following Articles:
Article III(1) prohibits the use of internal tax for the purpose of affording protection to domestic
production.
Article VI condemns dumping if it causes or threatens material injury. This Article permits levying of
anti-dumping duties to offset dumping.
Article VII establishes general principles of valuation and Article VIII provides that fees and charges
must not constitute an indirect protection.
The reciprocity principle has these consequences:
A concession which is given to another country must be carried out on an equitable basis
All contracting parties will gain an advantage from every negotiated concession by the negotiator and
the advantage would be given reciprocally through the application of the MFN principle
All imported goods must be treated equally to, and promptly and adequately as, domestic products.
Page 9 of 113
Infant Industries
The strict application of the reciprocity principle in relations between developed and developing countries
could be to the latter’s disadvantage because developing countries may want to develop ‘infant industries.
Developing countries frequently promote their infant industries with the purpose of raising the general
standard of living of their people. Hence, the protection of infant industries may make it difficult for some
developing countries to implement direct reciprocity between developed countries and developing countries.
Breach of GATT obligations violates the legitimate expectations that a member country has in regard to the
reciprocal performance of obligations by other member countries. If a member country acts in a manner
inconsistent with its obligations, it will potentially be subject to retaliatory action by other member countries,
provided his relevant dispute resolution procedures have been followed. The GATT imposes an obligation
on member countries seeking to impose trade sanctions in response to an alleged breach of GATT
Obligations, to use the WTO dispute resolution process. There are, however, many exceptions within the
GATT that may provide a defence to a claim for breach of a country’s obligations.
The obligations of GATT members (which result in corresponding rights of other members) include MFN
treatment, national treatment and the granting of tariff concessions. GATT members must also seek to
eliminate or reduce non-tariff barriers such as subsidies, dumping and quantitative restrictions.
In particular, GATT members must grant other contracting parties equal tariff treatment or MFN trading status
automatically, and domestic policy must be non-discriminatory. This requires that internal taxes and other
charges, laws, regulations and other requirements affecting business transactions be applied to domestic
entities and foreign concerns on an equal basis.
The GATT also requires transparency of the laws and regulations in respect of trade. Under Article X, the
contracting parties must publish, among other things, their trade policies, and laws, import and export
systems and domestic regulations in respect to trade. In addition, on becoming a member, a country may not
raise its tariffs for a period of three years. After this period, any move to modify o raise tariffs must be
discussed with other contracting parties. Should a country increase its tariff rates in one category of products,
it may be required to reduce the rates in another category or categories.
2.5.1.4 The Escape Clause
Article XIX(1)(a) of GATT provides that, where
“as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of obligations incurred by a contracting
party under this Agreement… any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party
in such increased quantities and under such conditions cause or threatens serious injury to domestic
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, members may impose increased
tariffs on imported products or suspend its obligations or withdraw or modify any concessions
granted.”
This Article justify the taking of temporary action to adjust imports. Article XIX is implemented by the WTO’s
Agreements on Safeguard.
The escape clause has already been implemented by some countries (For example, the United States
implemented it in Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (as amended): This USA section of their legislations
reads: “import relief may be granted if increased imports are a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to
the domestic industry producing a like or competitive product”. Hence, for example, the ‘unforeseen
development’ part of Article XIX (1) (a) is not part of the American law on International Trade.
2.5.2 Legal Framework for Dispute Resolution
The procedure for dispute resolution under GATT is found in
Article XXII and XXIII; and
Annexure 2 to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), namely the
“understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes”.
The full Article XXII states: “Consultation”
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate
opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by another contracting
party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
Page 10 of 113
2. The contracting parties may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any contracting party
or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution
through consultation under paragraph 1.
If consultations fails, a member may seek multilateral consultation with the contracting parties as a whole
under Art. XX (2-+). This consultation process outlined in Article XXII becomes a more formal process of
dispute settlement in Article XXIII (1) which provides for consultations in specific instances. If agreement
cannot be reached, Article XXIII (2) provides procedures for investigation, possibly resulting in the
authorization of suspension of concessions or other obligations by the complaining member.
2.6.3 Preferential Treatment
Preferential treatment is provided for in Article XVIII and Part IV of the GATT, but other Articles are also
relevant. The prohibition of “quantitative restrictions” contained in Article XI of the GATT is subject to an
exception regarding measures imposed for balance-of-payment purposes.
This exception is found in Article XII with special provision for developing countries being made in Article
XVIII s B of GATT. Under these provisions, any country may restrict the quantity or value of imports in order
to safeguard its external financial position to protect its balance-of-payment or to ensure a level of reserves
adequate for the implementation of its program of economic development. However, restrictions must not
exceed those necessary to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in monetary reserves;
or if such reserves are very low, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase. Due regard must be paid to special
factors which may affect reserves nor the need for reserves. As the conditions improve, the restrictions must
be progressively relaxed.
2.6.4 Development Programs
Part IV of GATT, consisting of Articles XXXVI, XXXVII, XXXVIII commits developed countries in assisting
developing countries in their development programs.
The developed countries agreed that “There is need for a rapid and sustained expansion of the export
earnings of the less-developed countries” (Article XXXVI(2) and for “positive efforts designed to ensure less-
developed contracting parties secure a share in growth in international trade commensurate with the needs
of their economic development’ (Article XXXVI(3).
Article XXXVI which sets out the general principles and objectives, recognizes the development needs of
less-developed contracting parties. It emphasizes the importance to these countries of improved market
access, commodity price stability, and the diversification of economic structures.
The commitments of developed contracting parties are contained in Article XXXVI(1)(a). They undertake,
among other things, to “accord high priority to the reduction and elimination of barriers to products currently
or potentially of particular export interest to less-developed contracting parties, including customs duties and
other restrictions which differentiate unreasonably between such products in their primary and in their
processed forms”. More importantly, Article XXXVI(8) of the GATT provides that “the developed countries do
not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and
other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties”.
Contracting parties, without prejudice to any bilateral consultations that may be undertaken, are obliged to
consult with other concerned countries to reach solutions satisfactory to all contracting parties to further the
objectives set out in Article XXXVI. In the course of these consultations, the reasons for not complying with
the provisions of Article XXXVII(1-3) are examined.
In accordance with Article XXXVIII(2)(C), the consultations by the contracting parties may result in joint action
designed to further the objectives of GATT. In particular, Article XXXVIII provides for joint action, where
appropriate, to take action:
To provide improved and acceptable conditions of access to world market for primary products of
particular interest to developing countries;
To devise measures designed to attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices for exports of such
products.
To seek appropriate collaboration in matters of trade and development policy with the United Nations
and its organs and agencies, including institutions that may be created based on recommendations
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Page 11 of 113
To analyse the export potential of developing countries to facilitate access to export markets for the
products of the industries thus developed; and
To seek appropriate collaboration with governments and international organizations.
2.7 Structure of the WTO
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an intergovernmental organization that is concerned with the
regulation of international trade between nations.
The WTO deals with regulation of trade in goods, services and intellectual property between participating
countries by providing a framework for negotiating trade agreements and a dispute resolution process aimed
at enforcing participants' adherence to WTO agreements, which are signed by representatives of member
governments and ratified by their parliaments. The WTO prohibits discrimination between trading partners,
but provides exceptions for environmental protection, national security, and other important goals. Trade-
related disputes are resolved by independent judges at the WTO through a dispute resolution process.
They prescribe special treatment for developing countries. They require governments to make their trade
policies transparent by notifying the WTO about laws in force and measures adopted, and through regular
reports by the secretariat on countries’ trade policies.
These agreements are often called the WTO’s trade rules, and the WTO is often described as “rules-based”,
a system based on rules. But it is important to remember that the rules are actually agreements that
governments negotiated.
The Uruguay Round agreements (incorporated in the Marrakesh Declaration) are the basis of the present
WTO system. Additional work is also now underway in the WTO. This is the result of decisions taken at
subsequent Ministerial Conferences, in particular the meeting in Doha, November 2001, when new
negotiations and other work were launched.
2.7.1 Overview of WTO Agreements
The agreements fall into a simple structure with six main parts: an umbrella agreement (the Agreement
Establishing the WTO); agreements for each of the three broad areas of trade that the WTO covers (goods,
services and intellectual property); dispute settlement; and reviews of governments’ trade policies.
The agreements for the two largest areas — goods and services — share a common three-part outline, even
though the detail is sometimes quite different.
They start with broad principles:
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) (for goods),
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
Then come extra agreements and annexes dealing with the special requirements of specific sectors or issues.
Finally, there are the detailed and lengthy schedules (or lists) of commitments made by individual countries
allowing specific foreign products or service providers access to their markets. For GATT, these take the form
of binding commitments on tariffs for goods in general, and combinations of tariffs and quotas for some
agricultural goods. For GATS, the commitments state how much access foreign service providers are allowed
for specific sectors, and they include lists of types of services where individual countries say they are not
applying the “most-favoured nation” principle of non-discrimination.
Page 12 of 113
3. Exceptions to GATT
3.1 Exceptions Security Interest
3.1.1 Article XXI - Security Exceptions
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to require any contracting party to furnish any
information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests;
or to prevent any contracting party from taking any action, which it considers necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests
Relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived.
Relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other
Goods and materials as are carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a
military establishment;
Taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under
the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Recent international trade disputes between the United States and other Members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) have raised thorny questions about the relationship between national sovereignty and
the multilateral rules-based trading system.
In response to the Trump Administration’s imposition of tariffs on U.S. imports of certain steel and aluminium
products pursuant to authority provided in Section 232 of the US Trade Expansion Act of 1962, several WTO
Members have brought dispute settlement cases against the United States.
The complaining parties, which include Canada, China, and the European Union, among others, have argued
that the Section 232 measures, along with exemptions from the application of these measures for certain
countries, are contrary to U.S. obligations in the WTO agreements. Many of these obligations are contained
within various provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO’s foundational
agreement governing parties’ international trade in goods. In retaliation to the Administration’s tariffs, some
of the complaining countries have imposed tariffs on certain U.S. exports without awaiting the outcome of
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. These retaliatory measures, in turn, have been challenged by the
United States at the WTO.
In defence of the steel and aluminium tariffs, the United States has cited national security reasons.
Specifically, the United States contends that the tariffs are necessary to ensure the long-term viability of the
domestic steel and aluminium industries, which must meet U.S. national defence requirements, by protecting
the industries from foreign competition. The United States has argued that even if the steel and aluminium
measures are inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the GATT, a WTO adjudicator cannot examine whether
the Section 232 measures violate the GATT because the United States considers the measures to be
necessary for the protection of its “essential security interests” under GATT Article XXI—the so-called
“national security exception.”
The new USA tariffs were imposed in pretext of ART. XXI (b)
GATT Article XXI’s Exception for Essential Security Interests
The meaning of the national security exception in Article XXI of the GATT - a provision also is implicated in
a recent WTO dispute between Russia and Ukraine; a blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the
United Arab Emirates; and a few other disputes.
GATT Article XXI does not clearly address whether a WTO panel should either
1. Completely defer to a WTO Member’s judgment that its trade measures are justified to protect the
Member’s national security or
2. Evaluate, at least to some degree, whether the Member’s use of the exception is valid.
Although WTO Members and parties to the organization’s predecessor, the GATT, have invoked Article XXI
a few times in trade disputes, neither the WTO members nor a WTO panel have formally interpreted the
Article XXI exception to define its scope.
Page 13 of 113
In the absence of current formal guidance, if a WTO panel or the WTO’s Appellate Body were to interpret
Article XXI, the deciding body would likely rely on Article 3.2 of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding,
which states that the WTO agreements should be interpreted “in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law.”
The WTO’s Appellate Body has not established a formal process for interpreting the WTO agreements, but
it has generally relied on the rules for treaty interpretation incorporated into Articles 31-33 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties to ascertain the intended meaning of WTO agreement provisions.
In past cases, the Appellate Body’s interpretive approach has examined various factors, including three
particularly relevant to Article XXI’s interpretation:
1) “The ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the WTO agreements in their context and in the
light of their object and purpose”—a method that also uses relevant canons of treaty interpretation
(e.g., the principle that an interpreter must give effect to all the terms of a treaty);
2) WTO Members’ subsequent practices in applying the WTO agreements that establish consensus of
the WTO membership as to the agreements’ interpretation; and
3) Relevant rules of international law that do not conflict with the agreements (e.g., the Vienna
Convention’s concept of “good faith”). The Appellate Body has sometimes supplemented the meaning
derived from these methods by considering the drafting history of the provision.
3.1.2 Text, Context, and Purpose of the WTO Agreements
The Appellate Body’s approach to interpreting the WTO agreements has often focused on the ordinary
meaning of the relevant WTO provisions, as informed by the context in which those provisions appear, and
in light of the purposes of all of the WTO agreements.
Applying these interpretive methods to Article XXI provides some guidance as to its intended meaning. On
the one hand, Article XXI, which states that nothing in the GATT prevents a WTO Member from taking “any
action which it considers necessary” to protect its “essential security interests,” arguably makes each WTO
Member the sole judge of whether its trade-restrictive actions are justified. In other words, once a WTO
Member has invoked the exception to justify a measure potentially inconsistent with its GATT obligations, a
WTO panel cannot independently evaluate whether the WTO Member’s use of the exception is essential to
its security interests or fits within the enumerated list of national security justifications in Article XXI(b).
Interpretive context provided by other GATT provisions arguably supports this broad view of the Article XXI
exception. GATT Article XX provides general, non-security-related exceptions to GATT obligations;
WTO Members can rely upon these exceptions when implementing certain public policy measures that
restrict trade. However, unlike the Article XXI exception, GATT Article XX does not provide an exception for
measures that an individual Member subjectively “considers necessary” to protect its interests.
Perhaps as a result, WTO panels have examined whether a Member’s invocation of an Article XX exception
is objectively valid. Thus, it could be argued that, in contrast to the general exceptions in Article XX, the
Article XXI national security exception was intended to be “self-judging.” In addition, several other
provisions of the WTO agreements beside Article XXI use the word “considers” when reserving judgment
about a particular matter to a single specified actor.
A broad reading of Article XXI could also arguably be consistent with the WTO’s stated objective to serve as
the “common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members.” The WTO is a
trade organization that arguably lacks competence to deliver an opinion on matters of national security—a
point made by one of the representatives of the parties to the drafting of the GATT.
On the other hand, it could be argued that a WTO panel should not completely defer to a WTO Member’s
judgment about the appropriateness of invoking GATT Article XXI and must evaluate whether use of the
exception is proper. At least one scholar and former WTO Appellate Body Member has argued that the United
States must at least demonstrate to the panel that the Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminium fit within
one of the three specific categories of actions that a Member may take for national security reasons
enumerated in Article XXI(b):
1) Actions related to nuclear materials.
2) Actions related to traffic in arms or ammunition and traffic in other goods “carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment.”
3) Actions “taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.”
Page 14 of 113
A narrower view of the exception might also draw support from certain canons of treaty interpretation. The
Appellate Body has repeatedly applied the principle that an interpretation must give effect to all provisions of
a treaty. If a WTO panel declined to evaluate whether the United States’ justification for the Section 232 of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, measures fits within Article XXI (b)’s list, the list would arguably become
ineffective, contravening this principle of treaty interpretation.
Furthermore, the Appellate Body has stated that, under the Vienna Convention, a treaty should be interpreted
under the assumption that its parties will make reasonable use of its exceptions and perform their obligations
in good faith. Therefore, the United States arguably must prove that it adopted the Section 232 measures in
good faith for national security reasons rather than to circumvent its trade obligations and protect domestic
industries.
The argument for a more limited scope of the Article XXI exception may also draw support from one of the
central purposes of the WTO agreements and dispute settlement system: to provide “security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system” so that businesses can conduct international trade with
certainty.
Arguably, allowing a WTO Member to take any measure it deems essential to its security interests would
defeat this objective by undermining the predictability and certainty of the rules-based system. A reading of
Article XXI that permits WTO Members to retain complete discretion over use of the exception could lead
countries to enact a multitude of protectionist measures under the guise of national security, potentially
undermining the purpose of WTO rules.
A Further argument that might be in favour of USA and others invoking the security exception is that “an
interpretation of Article XXI that would allow a WTO panel to review a WTO Member’s use of the exception
would perhaps interfere with a Member’s sovereignty because the panel could substitute its judgment
regarding the validity of a national security justification for that of the invoking Member”. For example, so far,
the United States has argued that Article XXI is drafting history, which a panel might rely upon as a
supplementary means of interpretation, shows that the drafters intended to preclude such a result.
The above argument could be countered with the following potential response: “Although the practices of
some parties to the GATT suggest that the Article XXI exception is broad, this historical practice is not
necessarily an indication of how the entire WTO membership interprets the Article XXI exception”. Support
for this answer can be found in the early drafting history of Article XXI for the notion that a panel may review
a WTO Member’s use of the Article XXI exception. In fact, one of the U.S. negotiators and drafters of an early
version of Article XXI reportedly stated that the exception was not intended to be “so broad that, under the
guise of security, countries will put on measures which really have a commercial purpose,” suggesting some
limits to the scope of Article XXI.
Paragraph (c): “any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security”.
Again, there is no official invocation of this Paragraph (c) under current WTO. But mainly this paragraph
would cover situations where the country is under UN Sanctions such currently North Korea or to some extent
Iran. But there are some references to it by individual countries when Iraq in 1991 was at war with Kuwait
(annexation of Kuwait) and the subsequent Desert Storm war that liberated Kuwait and the position then
assumed by Saddam Husain (then Iraqi President) and few other countries.
For example the India’s 1994 background document for simplified balance-of-payments consultations notes
that while almost all of India’s trading partners received most-favoured-nation treatment in the issue of import
licences, import licences were not issued for imports from countries facing UN mandated sanctions, at the
time (in 1994) were Iraq, Fiji, Serbia and Montenegro”. Again, in Brazil’s 1994 notification on import licensing
noted that the import licensing system of Brazil applied for goods entering from or exported to any country
except for those covered by UN embargoes. The import licensing notification of Cyprus similarly noted that
imports from certain countries were prohibited in accordance with United Nations resolutions. The 1993
licencing notification of Norway noted that all imports from Iraq and Serbia/Montenegro were prohibited.
Other invocations of Article XXI during GATT 1994 Discussions at the Negotiating Council Meetings.
The United States embargo on trade with Cuba, which was imposed by means of Proclamation 3447 by the
President of the United States, dated 3 February 1962, was not formally raised in the contracting parties but
notified by Cuba in the inventory of non-tariff measures. The United States invoked Article XXI as justification
for its action.
Page 15 of 113
3.1.3 Relationship between Article XXI and general international law.
For example: On the discussion in Council of a certain 1986 Report on “United States -Trade Measures
Affecting Nicaragua”, whose report was never adopted by the Council, the reported referenced the different
views of the parties to the dispute concerning the relationship between Article XXI and general international
law including decisions of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.
In discussion at the Forty-seventh Session of the Negotiating Council Meetings before WTO, in December
1991 concerning trade measures for non-economic purposes against Yugoslavia, the representative of India
stated, “India did not favour the use of trade measures for non-economic reasons. The representative of
India argued that such measures should only be taken within the framework of a decision by the United
Nations Security Council. Therefore, in the absence of such a decision or resolution, there was a serious risk
that such measures might be unilateral or arbitrary and would undermine the multilateral trading system”.
3.1.4 Invocations of Article XXI by the United States
At various times since the inception of GATT1947, but prior to WTO, the United States had invoked Article
XXI a few times to justify trade restrictions on the world stage.
In the late 1940s, during the early stages of the Cold War, the US Congress passed the Marshall Plan, part
of which established an export-control regime. It provided that products that were in short supply or of
particular military significance could be licensed freely to 16 Western European countries, but exports to
Eastern Europe were controlled carefully. The then Czechoslovakia republic (now two countries, Czech and
Slovakia) challenged the export-control regime, arguing that it violated the Most Favoured Nation principle
enshrined in Article I of GATT - essentially the cornerstone of the rules-based trading system.
The Czechoslovakian delegates argued that an expansive interpretation of Article XXI would undermine the
entire premise of GATT. In response, the United States asserted that Article XXI overrode Article I and
permitted it to restrict exports to Eastern Europe. By a vote of 17-1 margin (with three abstentions and two
absent) the GATT’s Contracting Parties voted to support the U.S. interpretation of Article XXI.
In May 1985, the then US President Ronald Reagan utilized such an exception to issue an executive order
that prohibited all trade between the United States and Nicaragua. The administration justified the embargo
on the grounds that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua posed a national security threat to the United
States. The Nicaraguan government challenged the embargo, arguing that it did not target an “essential
security interest” [as required under Article XXI (a)] and that it was not established during a time of “war or
other emergency in international relations” as required by Article XXI (b) (iii). The Reagan administration
countered that Article XXI’s national security exception granted GATT’s Contracting Parties exclusive rights
to determine whether trade with a particular country threatened its own national security. An overwhelming
majority of Contracting Parties to GATT agreed with the United States that Article XXI is essentially self-
judging.
Concerns about abuse of the security exception were recognized from the beginning. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiators feared that the exception would create a "very big loophole in the whole
GATT Charter.” The delegation from the United States, which drafted the exception, shared this concern
stating that there "was a great danger of having too wide an exception . . . that would permit anything under
the sun.” Therefore, the exception was drafted so it could be invoked in limited circumstances-such as war
or international emergencies, but then left to the Member States' sole discretion when invoked in those
circumstances.
The WTO regime includes a number of devices to dress this concern, including opting out of normal trade
relations, opting in to deeper trade relations, granting preferential treatment to developing countries
consistent with security interests, and protecting against the nullification or impairment of Member States'
legitimate expectations even in the absence of a WTO violation. These arrangements provide broad
discretion to act in furtherance of the national interest without violating trade rules. As such, Member States
quite often can advance national objectives without the need to invoke the security exception.
Notwithstanding these mitigating factors, a self-judging security exception poses grave risks. If abused, it
could undermine the entire WTO regime. But the practice of WTO Member States is to invoke the security
exception in good faith, with a margin of discretion. A Member State may do so because of a fear of sanction,
out of a sense of norm legitimacy, or because it is in its self-interest to do so.
Page 16 of 113
Compliance with a self-judging rule offers useful insights into larger questions of why nations obey
international law. Rational choice and normative theories best explain compliance with a self-judging
international norm.
3.1.5 Discretionary Benefits under GATT
In addition to the opt-out and the opt-in approaches, discretionary tariff preferences serve as the third major
factor that mitigates bad faith applications of the security exception.
The WTO rules authorize developed countries to "accord differential and more favourable treatment to
developing countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties."
These benefits under these so-called "Generalized System of Preferences" (GSP) are subject to "negative
conditionality"-conditions that must be satisfied for a developing country to receive the benefit. Because these
benefits are discretionary, a Member State can grant, deny, suspend, or remove them if doing so is in the
national interest. Moreover, these benefits may be accorded "notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of
the General Agreement.”
In other words, preferential treatment for developing countries is not discrimination against developed
countries. Granting or denying GSP benefits is not a WTO violation, therefore there is no need to invoke a
WTO exception to grant or deny these benefits. Rather than resort to measures that violate WTO rules-such
as a trade embargo - the first-place developed countries typically turn to punish a misbehaving developing
country is to withdraw discretionary tariff preferences.
Thus far, the WTO Appellate Body has identified only one significant limitation on the granting and withdrawal
of GSP benefits: similarly, situated developing countries cannot be treated differently. Thus, in reviewing
whether the European Union's drug-trafficking condition for GSP eligibility was consistent with the WTO, the
Appellate Body concluded that the policy "may be found consistent with the 'non-discriminatory' requirement
only if the EU proves, at a minimum, that the preferences granted under the Drug Arrangements are available
to all GSP beneficiaries 'that are similarly affected by the drug problem.”
The GSP programs of the United States and the European Union illustrate the use of discretionary benefits
to sanction Member States without the need to invoke a security exception. Targeted countries have little
recourse to challenge the withdrawal of a discretionary benefit.
3.1.6 Nullification and Impairment of Benefits
In rare cases, a Member State may challenge the conduct of another Member State that nullifies or impairs
expected trade benefits, even in the absence of a WTO violation.
GATT 1947, Art. XXIII: If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the
Agreement is being impeded as the result of the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement. . .the contracting party may, with a view to
the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other contracting
party or parties which it considers to be concerned."
Article XXIII(2) - "If the contracting parties consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such
action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting
party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be
appropriate in the circumstances.".
The theory of the "non-violation remedy" is that Member State action that does not violate the WTO may
nonetheless undermine the benefits of promises made during tariff negotiations. "The idea underlying “the
non-violation remedy” is that the improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected from
a tariff concession can be frustrated not only by measures proscribed by the General Agreement but also by
measures consistent with that Agreement.
The remedy for a successful non-violation claim is unique. Because there is no WTO violation, the
Member State is not required to remove the measure that nullifies or impairs the anticipated benefit. As for
damages, the WTO's recommendation is for a "mutually satisfactory adjustment,” a standard that is distinct
from, and likely lower than, violation cases where the level of authorized suspension of concessions is
"equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.
The drafting history of GATT indicates that the non-violation remedy was intended to cover measures invoked
under the security exception. For example, the Indian delegation, in particular, considered it critical to provide
Page 17 of 113
Member States with the power to challenge abuses of the security exception using the non-violation remedy,
because "the knowledge of the possibility of such counter action would serve as a deterrent to any misuse of
the security exceptions”. The drafting committee recognized that this remedy was appropriate for security
exception invocations.
The working party considered that this sub-paragraph on the NVNI remedy would apply to the situation of
action taken by a Member pursuant to Article XXI of GATT 1947. Such action, for example, in the interest of
national security in time of war or other international emergency would be entirely consistent with the Charter
but might nevertheless result in the nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to other Members. Such
other Members could, under those circumstances, have the right to bring the matter before the Organization,
not on the ground that the measure taken was inconsistent with the Charter, but on the ground that the
measure so taken effectively nullified benefits accruing to the complaining Member.
In essence, the non-violation remedy addresses security measures that cannot reasonably be anticipated,
discouraging unreasonable invocations, and is available to a Member State subject to unforeseeable trade
sanctions. Recourse to the non-violation remedy has been rare, reflecting the fact that it is an "exceptional
remedy" that "should be approached with caution”. This can be concluded from the fact that Member States
"negotiate the rules that they agree to follow and only exceptionally would expect to be challenged for actions
not in contravention of those rules. The infrequent success of a non-violation remedy suggests that this
approach may be relevant in only the most controversial national’s security invocations.
Page 18 of 113
4. WTO dispute settlement system
The general exceptions provided for in Art XX of the GATT and Art XIV of the GATS deal particularly with the
following:
1. The text, purpose, and structure of the general exceptions
2. The scope of the general exceptions, such dealing with health, morals, fraud and environment
3. The requirements to be met to fall within the general exceptions
4. The clauses which require certain measure falling within the general exceptions not be applied in a
manner constituting arbitrary or unjustified discrimination
5. A range of other issues, which include the application of the general exceptions other that the GATT
or GATS
GATT 1994 exceptions
Purpose of Art XX:
The purpose of this article is to ensure that members are not precluded from adopting measures that pursue
policy objectives that the members agree are legitimate and important. The words ‘nothing in this agreement’
in the chapeau make it clear that the exceptions within Art XX will apply to all obligations in the GATT.
The exceptions are limited and conditional as per the GATT Panel Report and within the Appellate Body
Report in relation to Shrimp matter. Art XX does not allow members to justify measure that is prima facie
inconsistent with provisions of GATT on any policy grounds. The measure must pursue one of the policy
objectives set out in Art XX. This must satisfy the requirements found in the subparagraphs.
In order to achieve the objective, it should be ‘necessary’ in the case of being to protect public morals, to
protect human, animal or plant life or health, securing compliance with laws which are not inconsistent with
provisions of the agreement relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies, the protection
of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practice or must not be applied in any
way that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between members or a disguised restriction
on international trade.
Structure of Art XX
Art XX provides for exceptions, not primary obligations. This generally play no role until after the measure at
issue was found to be prima facie inconsistent with one of the primary obligations in the GATT. As soon as
the complaint was established as an inconsistency, the respondent may invoke one or more of the exceptions
to justify the measures. The respondent will bear the onus of proving two things which is known as the two-
tiered test.
Two things to be proven:
1. That the measure meets the requirements set out in one of the subparagraphs of Art XX. That is
relates or is necessary to achieve objective.
2. That the measure is not inconsistent with the chapeau. (Within principle of good health)
Once the respondent demonstrates the above elements, the exception will apply, and the measure of the
issue will not be inconsistent with the GATT.
Example:
The Appellate Body’s report in Brazil known as Rethreaded Tyres to which Art XX was invoked. An import
ban on rethreaded tyres due to shorter life span compared to new tyres and this led to the creation of tyre
dumps. The tyre dumps became breeding grounds for the spread of dengue, yellow fever and malaria which
also created health risks in relation to fumes released. Brazil argued that the bad was justified because it was
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health and was not inconsistent with the requirements of
the chapeau.
The Appellate body noted that the panel found the ban prima facie inconsistent with Art XI: 1 of GATT since
it was quantitative restriction on imports. The Appellant body further noted that the purpose was to protect
human life and health and found that the ban was necessary to achieve that objective. Lastly, the body found
Brazil applied the ban in a manner constituting arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination by providing
exemptions to some countries but not others for reasons which were unrelated to protection of life or health.
The import band was found not to be justified under Art XX (b) and was inconsistent with Art XI: 1 of the
GATT.
Page 19 of 113
DS58: United States – import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products
Consultations were sought with the United States by Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand for ban of importation
of shrimp and shrimp products from the complainants (consultation seekers) which was imposed by the US
under S 609 of the US Public Law. This were seen as violations of Art I, XI and XIII of the GATT, to which
nullification and impairment of benefits were alleged.
A panel was established to which the Dispute Settlement Body deferred to a panel. The DSB panel were
requested to set more panels with other countries which was then consolidated to one single panel, thereafter
a panel report was circulated to members. The panel thus found that the import ban in shrimp and shrimp
products applied by the US was inconsistent with Art XIl1 of the GATT and could not be justified under Art
XX of the GATT.
The US then notified the intention to appeal the panel. The appellant body reversed the panel’s findings due
to the US measure at issue was not within the scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Art XX of
the GATT but concluded that the US measure, which did qualify for provisional justification under Art XX (g),
but failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau. The DSB adopted both bodies report.
Exceptions
Further exceptions exist known as the general and security exceptions in Art XX and XXI of the GATT, Art
XIV and XIV of the GATS. These exceptions are known as key provisions of the agreements, allowing
members to justify a number of non-trade policy ground measures that would otherwise be inconsistent with
the WTO agreement. This includes protecting the environment, public health and public morals, preventing
deceptive practices. This provides mechanisms for balancing trade liberalisation with important policy
objectives which the members choose to pursue.
The exceptions serve a similar function, which ensure that the GATT and GATS do not require members to
compromise their essential security interests. The security exceptions featured less prominently in WTO
litigation.
4.1 Rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes:
Based on the Dispute Settlement Understanding (the document).
This is attached to the WTO as Annexure 2
It is considered to be the most important achievement of the Uruguay Round Negotiations.
4.2 WTO in terms of settling disputes:
The central pillar of the WTO can be said to be dispute settlement.
This is regarded to be the unique contribution by the WTO to stabilize the global economy.
The procedure of the WTO underscores the rule of law and makes the trading system more
secure and predictable.
4.3 System under old GATT:
A procedure for settling disputes existed under the old GATT, but it had no fixed timetables,
rulings were easier to block, and many cases dragged on for a long time inconclusively.
Each case needed its own terms of reference
The Uruguay Round agreement introduced a more structured process with more clearly
defined stages in the procedure.
It introduced greater discipline for the length of time a case should take to be settled, with
flexible deadlines set in various stages of the procedure.
It sets out in considerable detail the procedures and the timetable to be followed in resolving
disputes.
If a case runs its full course to a first ruling, it should not normally take more than about one
year — 15 months if the case is appealed.
The agreed time limits are flexible, and if the case is considered urgent (e.g. if perishable
goods are involved), it is accelerated as much as possible.
Now Panels are established by Dispute Settlement Bodies.
Page 20 of 113
4.4 Principles under WTO dispute settlement:
Object and purpose of WTO dispute settlement system:
Primary objective: prompt settlement of disputes between WTO members concerning their
respective rights and obligations under WTO.
Article 3.3 of DSU: the prompt settlement of disputes is “essential to the effective functioning
of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of
Members”.
Article 3.2 of DSU: “The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members
recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered
agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law”.
4.5 Institutions under WTO dispute settlement:
DSU is one of the important instruments of the WTO in protecting the security and predictability of
the multilateral trading system.
Page 21 of 113
4.6 Methods of dispute settlement
i. Consultations or negotiations
ii. Adjudication by panels and the Appellate Body
iii. Arbitration
iv. Good offices, conciliation, and mediation.
4.6.1 Consultation:
The DSU expresses a clear preference for resolving disputes through consultations”, i.e,
negotiations between the parties to the dispute.
Therefore “consultations” or at least an attempt to consultations, must always precede
‘adjudication’.
The Rules and procedures for consultations are set out in Article 4 of the DSU.
If ‘consultations’ fail to resolve the dispute, the complaining party may resort to ’adjudication’
by a panel, and if parties to the disputes appeal the findings of the Panel, adjudication by the
Appellate Body follows.
Page 22 of 113
4.7.2 Compulsory jurisdiction:
The jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement is compulsory in nature (article 23.1 of the
DSU states:
“When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or
impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of
any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules
and procedures of this Understanding”.
Based on this, a complaining member is obliged to bring any dispute arising under the
covered agreements to the WTO dispute settlement system.
The Uruguay Round agreement also made it impossible for the country losing a case to block
the adoption of the ruling. Under the previous GATT procedure, rulings could only be adopted
by consensus, meaning that a single objection could block the ruling. Now, rulings are
automatically adopted unless there is a consensus to reject a ruling — any country wanting
to block a ruling has to persuade all other WTO members (including its adversary in the case)
to share its view.
Although much of the procedure does resemble a court or tribunal, the preferred solution is
for the countries concerned to discuss their problems and settle the dispute by themselves.
The first stage is therefore consultations between the governments concerned, and even
when the case has progressed to other stages, consultation and mediation are still always
possible.
First stage: consultation (up to 60 days). Before taking any other actions the countries in dispute
must talk to each other to see if they can settle their differences by themselves. If that fails, they can
also ask the WTO director-general to mediate or try to help in any other way.
Second stage: the panel (up to 45 days for a panel to be appointed, plus 6 months for the panel to
conclude its decision). If consultations fail, the complaining country can ask for a panel to be
appointed. The country “in the dock” can block the creation of a panel once, but when the Dispute
Settlement Body meets for a second time, the appointment can no longer be blocked (unless there
is a consensus against appointing the panel).
Officially, the panel is helping the Dispute Settlement Body make rulings or recommendations. But
because the panel’s report can only be rejected by consensus in the Dispute Settlement Body, its
conclusions are difficult to overturn. The panel’s findings must be based on the agreements cited.
The panel’s final report should normally be given to the parties to the dispute within six months.
In cases of urgency, including those concerning perishable goods, the deadline is shortened to three
months.
Page 24 of 113
5. Anti-Dumping Agreement
Agreement on implementation of Art VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. Under Art VI:1
of the agreement principles were laid out such as that anti-dumping measures shall be applied under
circumstances provided for in Art VI, this is pursuant with investigations initiated and conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the agreement. The provisions govern the application of Art VI as to how action should
be taken under anti-dumping legislation or regulation.
Dumping is known as a mechanism in which the market share within a country can be expanded. The export
price is therefore below that of the manufacturing costs, which is lower than normal value.
To further elaborate the contracting parties, recognize that dumping to which products of one country are
introduced within another at less than normal value. It causes or threatens to injure an established industry
within the territory of the contracting party or the establishments of the domestic industry.
5.4 Art VI: 11 Duration and Review of Anti-Dumping Duties and Price undertakings
The duty of anti-dumping shall remain as long as long as necessary to counter dumping which causes the
injury. The authorities shall review the imposition of the duty where warranted, on their own initiative or
provided that the reasonable period elapsed. The interested party could therefore submit information
substantiating the need for review of such. This right to request whether the imposition of the duty is
necessary to offset dumping exist to the interested party. Whether such injury would continue or be removed,
varied, or both. If the authorities determined that such is no longer necessary under review, it shall be
terminated.
Page 26 of 113
6. Sanitary & Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
The measures that WTO members apply can be classified as sanitary (relating to human or animal life or
health) or phytosanitary (relating to plant life or health). They are commonly known as SPS measures.
The international trade aspect of the SPS Agreement basically means that, in seeking to protect health, WTO
members must not use SPS measures that are: unnecessary, not science-based, arbitrary, or which
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.
This Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, directly or indirectly,
affect international trade. Such measures shall be developed and applied in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement.
For the purposes of this Agreement, the definitions provided in Annex A shall apply.
The annexes are an integral part of this Agreement.
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights of Members under the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade with respect to measures not within the scope of this Agreement.
6.2 Definitions
6.2.1 Sanitary or phytosanitary
Sanitary or phytosanitary measure are – any measure applied:
a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from the
entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms, or disease-causing
organisms.
b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages, or feedstuffs.
c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from diseases
carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or
d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, establishment or
spread of pests.
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and
procedures including, inter alia, end product criteria; processes and production methods; testing, inspection,
certification and approval procedures; quarantine treatments including relevant requirements associated with
the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival during transport; provisions
on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and packaging and
labelling requirements directly related to food safety.
6.2.2 Harmonisation
The establishment, recognition, and application of common sanitary and phytosanitary measures by different
Members.
Page 28 of 113
iv. Members shall ensure that where copies of documents are requested by interested Members, they
are supplied at the same price (if any), apart from the cost of delivery, as to the nationals of the
Member concerned (when "nationals" are referred to in this Agreement, the term is be deemed, in the
case of a separate customs territory Member of the WTO, to mean persons, natural or legal, who are
domiciled or who have a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment in that customs
territory).
v. General reservations: Nothing in this SPS Agreement shall be construed as requiring: (a) the provision
of particulars or copies of drafts or the publication of texts other than in the language of the Member
except as stated in paragraph 8 of this Annex; or (b) Members to disclose confidential information
which would impede enforcement of sanitary or phytosanitary legislation or which would prejudice the
legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises.
Regional
Harmonisation
conditions
Equivalence Transparency
Appropriate level
Risk assessment
of protection
Page 30 of 113
Q: If a country exports machinery, not agricultural commodities. Why do they need to know about the SPS
Agreement and SPS measures?
A: While the exports themselves may not represent a risk, they may be contaminated with soil or plant
residues, or may be shipped using packaging materials such as timber pallets or plant straw. SPS measures
are therefore relevant to all exporters and importers.
Establishing animal or plant health status, and developing appropriate SPS measures, involves the
collection of a lot of varied information from many different sources.
This information is of continuing value, and it is important that it is organised, categorized and stored
so that it is readily retrievable.
To identify risks and to research, develop and implement science based SPS measures, WTO
members need access to personnel trained in appropriate areas of expertise.
Access to expertise in the detection and diagnosis of animal and plant pests and diseases is needed
to support trade in agricultural commodities, including skills in entomology, plant pathology, veterinary
pathology, epidemiology, and taxonomy.
Quarantine and inspection officers trained in sampling and detection techniques are needed at import
entry and export exit points.
Collections of specimens, reference material on insects and plants, and laboratories equipped with
diagnostic facilities, are of great importance.
Implementing the SPS Agreement in Namibia is going to cost us a lot and our resources are scarce.
Will it be worthwhile?
A recent World Bank study found that the costs of complying with international food standards may be less
than expected and that the benefits may be underestimated because they are harder to measure than the
costs. The report also notes that those developing countries that have adopted international standards have
maintained or improved their access to markets for agricultural commodities and are in a good position to
continue to do so. A technical assistance specialist speaking at a recent WTO workshop pointed out that
countries sometimes underestimate the resources they have available to implement the SPS Agreement. For
example, they might have many of the people with the expertise required but need to bring them together in
the one agency.
Page 31 of 113
7. Technical Barriers to Trade
7.1 What are technical barriers to trade?
These can be seen as a category of non-tariff barriers to trade
These are the widely divergent measures that countries use to regulate markets, protect their
consumers, or preserve their natural resources (among other objectives), but they also can be
used (or perceived by foreign countries) to discriminate against imports in order to protect
domestic industries.
The term "technical barriers to trade" (TBT) refers to mandatory technical regulations and
voluntary standards that define specific characteristics that a product should have, such as its
size, shape, design, labelling / marking / packaging, functionality, or performance.
The specific procedures used to check whether a product is in compliance with these
requirements are also covered by the definition of TBT. These so-called "conformity
assessment procedures" can include, for example, product testing, inspection, and certification
activities.
TBTs are usually introduced by government authorities with a legitimate public policy objective
in mind.
Nevertheless, TBTs often have an impact on trade and the competitiveness of exporters, and in
particular small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Adjusting products and production processes to comply with different requirements in export
markets, as well as demonstrating compliance with these requirements, increase product costs
and time-to-market, and can ultimately hurt the competitiveness of a country’s exporters.
Therefore, many of the exporters put technical requirements at or near the top of their concerns
on trade barriers.
7.1.1 WTO and the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement:
The objective of the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade as a
preventive instrument is to ensure that such measures do not result in discrimination or arbitrary
restrictions on international trade.
The Agreement does not in any way undermine the right of governments to take measures to
pursue legitimate public policy objectives, it simply aims to ensure that such measures are
prepared, adopted and applied according to some basic principles, in order to minimize the
negative impact on trade.
7.2 The structure of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement:
The TBT agreement applies to technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment
procedures. They are each treated in separate portions of the Agreement.
Technical regulations are dealt with in Articles 2 and 3
Standards are governed by Article 4. Article 4, however, makes an explicit reference to Annex
3 of the Agreement. Annex 3 of the Agreement contains the Code of Good Practice for the
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards (“Code of Good Practice”). This
“Code” is very important. It is in the Code where almost all of the substantive provisions
governing the treatment of standards are found.
Conformity assessment procedures are dealt with in Articles 5 and 9 of the TBT Agreement.
The principles and rules discussed in Articles 10 through 15 of the TBT Agreement are applicable
to each of these areas. There are however certain minor differences in scope and treatment.
In the WTO Agreement, important provisions, definitions, are found in Annexes. In the TBT
Agreement, Annex 1 provides definitions and Annex 3 contains the Code of Good Practice.
Page 32 of 113
7.3 Principles of the Technical Barrier to Trade Agreement:
5 Core Principles:
Transparency
Non-
discrimination
Proportionality
and national
treatment
Use of
international Equivalence
standards
7.3.1 Transparency:
A WTO Member planning to introduce a measure that might have an important impact on trade
should notify this to the WTO and take into account comments submitted by other countries on the
draft legislation.
Transparency is the process whereby the creation, terms, and application of technical regulations,
standards and conformity assessment procedures are made public, and opportunities are provided
for the public (including other Members) to comment on proposed technical regulations, standards
and conformity assessment procedures.
Transparency obligations are found throughout the WTO Agreement.
The WTO TBT Agreement requires Member countries to:
Notify draft measures to the WTO at an early stage, when comments from third countries can
still be taken into account in the legislative process
Allow sufficient time (usually 60 days) for other WTO Members to comment on the draft measure
in writing, and take these comments into account in the final version of the measure
Ensure that all adopted measures are promptly published (for example in that country's Official
Journal)
Allow a reasonable period between the publication and entry into force of the measure, to allow
foreign operators to adapt their products to the new requirements. This delay should be of at
least 6 months, except in those cases where a measure needs to be implemented immediately
in order to address an urgent health, safety, environmental or national security concern.
Transparency obligations take several different forms and are applicable at different points in the
promulgation and application of a measure. They include the following requirements set out in
Articles 2.9, 2.10, 5.6 and 5.8 as well as Annex 3 (L), (M), (N) and (O):
Page 37 of 113
7.4.6 Equivalence:
WTO Members should consider accepting technical regulations of other Members as equivalent to
their own, provided that these measures are an effective way of addressing the objectives pursued.
Members are encouraged to accept foreign conformity assessment procedures as “equivalent” to
their own procedures provided they are satisfied that those procedures offer an assurance of
conformity with standards and technical regulations equivalent to their own procedures.
Although the notion of equivalence is not mentioned in the Code of Good Practice (applicable to
standards), the principle of equivalence is made applicable to standards through Article 6.1
(conformity assessment procedures).
Members are encouraged to enter into negotiations for the mutual recognition of the results of
conformity assessment procedures. By accepting the results of another Member’s conformity
assessment procedures, testing costs are reduced and less time is lost. Confidence in a trading
partner’s testing procedures would seem to be a prerequisite to the acceptance of a mutual
recognition agreement.
The relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement on equivalence and mutual recognition are:
o for technical regulations: Article 2.7 (on equivalence)
o for standards: none but equivalence is incorporated in Article 6.1 are: conformity assessment
procedures
o for conformity assessment procedures: Article 6 (on both equivalence and mutual
recognition).
There is some skepticism among WTO Members concerning the effectiveness of international
standardization efforts, and the extent to which harmonization, equivalence and mutual recognition
can be increased between countries at different stages of development.
7.5 Aim of TBT Agreements:
The purposes of the TBT Agreement can be broadly described as:
assuring that technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures do not
create unnecessary obstacles to international trade, while
leaving Members adequate regulatory discretion to protect human, animal and plant life and
health, national security, the environment, consumers, and other policy interests.
The TBT Agreement seeks to assure that:
mandatory product regulations
voluntary product standards, and
conformity assessment procedures (procedures designed to test a product’s conformity with
mandatory regulations or voluntary standards) do not become unnecessary obstacles to
international trade and are not employed to obstruct trade.
The TBT Agreement seeks to balance two competing policy objectives:
i. The prevention of protectionism, with
ii. The right of a Member to enact product regulations for approved (legitimate)
public policy purposes (i.e., allowing Members sufficient regulatory
autonomy to pursue necessary domestic policy objectives).
(1) The Prevention of Protectionism
The progressive tariff reductions that have taken place in the GATT/WTO framework have left
certain industrial and political leaders looking for other means of protecting their industries. These
means of protection frequently take the form of non-tariff barriers (i.e., means other than tariffs
for protecting business sectors).
Page 38 of 113
Technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures are all potential non-
tariff measures that are sometimes used for protectionist purposes. As such, they can be
potential barriers to international trade.
The TBT Agreement establishes rules and disciplines designed to prevent mandatory technical
regulations, voluntary standards, and conformity assessment procedures from becoming
unnecessary barriers to international trade. However, the TBT Agreement seeks to leave
Members with sufficient domestic policy autonomy to pursue legitimate regulatory objectives
(2) The legitimate regulation of products for public policy purposes:
The need to assure that Members retain sufficient regulatory autonomy to accomplish domestic
policy goals. Domestic regulations can accomplish several objectives unrelated to protectionism.
For example, domestic regulations can serve as a means of protecting consumer health and
safety, the environment and national security.
Domestic regulations can also further economies of scale, and increase consumer confidence,
by assuring uniform technical and production standards.
Economic development, and the improved education that should result, can lead to demands
from consumers and sometimes the business community for an increase in regulations or
standards.
Both the preamble of the TBT Agreement and Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement identify certain
regulatory goals that are deemed “legitimate” for regulatory purposes.
Article 2.2 sets forth a list of legitimate TBT objectives which includes
- protection of life/health (human, animal and plant),
- safety (human)
- protection of national security,
- protection of the environment, and
- prevention of deceptive marketing practices
The list of legitimate objectives in Article 2.2 is not exclusive. While not specified, it is widely
agreed that technical harmonization (for example, regulations that standardize electrical
products, computers, communications equipment, etc.), and quality standards (for example
grading requirements for produce and commodities) are legitimate.
Both technical harmonization and quality standards are already widely utilized, particularly by
developed country Members.
The TBT Agreement seeks to achieve a fine balance between permitting Members the
regulatory autonomy to protect legitimate interests (through the use of technical regulations,
standards and conformity assessment procedures) and assuring that technical regulations,
standards and conformity assessment procedures do not become unnecessary obstacles to
international Article 2.2 TBT.
If the TBT Agreement is applied too strictly, the legitimate policy interests of Members will be
thwarted. If the TBT is applied too laxly, technical regulations may be used for protectionist
purposes and the gains Members have achieved through progressive rounds of tariff reductions
may be lost.
Some sensitivity is required when dealing with TBT issues. Developing countries fear that trade
measures (technical regulations and standards) allegedly taken by developed countries for social
policy goals may in reality be for protectionist purposes. Developed countries fear that the TBT
Agreement will be applied too strictly and that trade measures designed to pursue legitimate
social policy objectives will be struck down.
7.6 Brief history of TBT:
GATT 1947 Technical regulations and standards are not treated in great detail in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).
Historically, Article III of the GATT 1947 on national treatment was subject to abuse. Early in the
life of the GATT 1947, certain contracting parties began to use technical regulations and
inspection requirements as trade barriers, necessitating the establishment of a stronger regime
Page 39 of 113
governing the application of technical regulations and standards. This gave birth to the
“Standards Code” of 1979.
Standards Code of 1979: After prolonged negotiations in the Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations,
a plurilateral agreement (i.e., an agreement not signed by all GATT contracting parties) was
concluded in 1979. This served as a basis for the WTO’s TBT Agreement. With only 32
signatories, and few teeth (therefore, being dependent on consensus, the GATT 1947 system
lacked a strong enforcement mechanism), the Standards Code nevertheless provided a good
testing ground for how best to discipline the use of technical regulations and standards
TBT Agreement: The Uruguay Round, which entered into force on 1 January 1995, bears a
resemblance to the Tokyo Round Standards Code. However, much was learned from the Tokyo
Round experience, and some of the weaknesses of the Tokyo Round agreement were remedied
in the WTO’s TBT Agreement.
First, the TBT Agreement is a multilateral as opposed to a plurilateral agreement meaning that it
applies to all WTO Members – it forms part of the Uruguay Round’s “single undertaking”. Second,
the TBT Agreement has a much stronger enforcement mechanism, being subject to the WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
7.7 Scope of the TBT objectives:
The TBT Agreement is applicable to “technical regulations” “standards”, and “conformity
assessment procedures” applicable to technical regulations and standards. These terms are each
defined in Annex 1 of the Agreement. These definitions establish the general scope of the
Agreement.
(i) Technical Regulation:
Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Annex I of the TBT Agreement a “technical regulation” is a: Document
which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods,
including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also
include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements
as they apply to a product, process or production method.
In EC – Sardines the Appellate Body referring back to its Report in EC –Asbestos set forth a three-
part test for determining if a measure is a technical regulation:
1) the document applies to an identifiable product or group of products.
2) the document must lay down one or more product characteristics; and
3) compliance with these characteristics must be mandatory
(ii) Standard:
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Annex I of the TBT Agreement a “standard” is defined as a: Document
approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or
characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with which compliance is
not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging,
marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.
(iii) Conformity Assessment Procedure:
Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Annex I of the TBT Agreement, a “conformity assessment” procedure
is: Any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in technical
regulations or standards are fulfilled.
Paragraph 3 further explains that conformity assessment procedures include, inter alia, procedures
for sampling, testing and inspection; evaluation, verification and assurance of conformity;
registration, accreditation and approval as well as their combinations.
Page 40 of 113
Questions concerning the scope of the application of the TBT agreement:
TBT measures and the GATT 1994:
With respect to the relationship between the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement and the
applicability of the GATT 1994 to TBT measures, the Panel in the case EC – Asbestos stated the
following:
Both the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement form part of Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement
and may apply to the measures in question.
Consequently, although we do not in principle exclude application of the TBT Agreement
and/or the GATT 1994 to the Decree, we have to determine the order in which we should
consider this case.
According to the Appellate Body in European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, when the GATT 1994 and another Agreement in Annex 1A
appear a priori to apply to the measure in question, the latter should be examined on the
basis of the Agreement that deals “specifically, and in detail,” with such measures.
The Panel thus decided to examine first whether the measure at issue was consistent with
the TBT Agreement, the agreement that deals specifically and in detail with what was
allegedly a TBT measure.
The definitions of a “technical regulation” and a “standard” are ambiguous with respect to one point.
Does the TBT Agreement govern technical regulations and standards applicable to manufacturing
“processes and production methods” (“PPMs”) when the PPMs utilized are not detectable in the final
product –so-called “Non-Product-Related PPMs” (“NPR-PPMs”)?
This is a controversial question. The view generally held in the trade community is that the
TBT Agreement was not intended to apply to PPMs, unless the PPM is product-related
(detectable in the final product). However, Members have notified certain NPR-PPMs to the
TBT Committee (“Notification” in the TBT sense of the term means to inform officially other
WTO members of a particular action through the WTO Secretariat). This has been the case,
for example, for eco-labelling schemes based on a life-cycle analysis.
SPS v TBT measures?
Article 1.5 of the TBT Agreement provides: “The provisions of this Agreement do not apply to
sanitary and phytosanitary measures as defined in annex A of the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures”.
Pursuant to Annex A (1) the SPS Agreement, an SPS measure is any measure applied:
(a) To protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising
from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms,
or disease-causing organisms.
(b) To protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks
arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods,
beverages, or feedstuffs.
(c) To protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from
diseases carried by animals, plants, or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment
or spread of pests; or
(d) To prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry,
establishment or spread of pests.
Page 41 of 113
TBT Agreement and Government Procurement Specifications
The TBT Agreement is not applicable to purchasing specifications prepared by governmental
bodies for production or consumption requirements of governmental bodies. Such measures
could fall instead under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (“AGP”).
However, not all WTO Members are bound by the AGP, and not all government procurement
activities fall within the AGP.
The TBT Agreement and Import Prohibitions
Although the definition of technical regulation does not list import prohibitions or bans among
the covered measures, the TBT Agreement is applicable to certain import prohibitions and
bans. The TBT Agreement applies when an import prohibition or ban is based on product
characteristics, and exceptions to the prohibition or ban (based also on particular product
characteristics) exist.
7.8 The growing importance of TBTs in the multilateral trade context
In the context of WTO, the European Union has consistently pushed to:
Achieve greater harmonization, through more widespread use of international standards
Adopt a more risk -oriented approach in deciding what conformity assessment procedures
should be used for assessing compliance of products
Improve the implementation of transparency provisions, to ensure that trade partners are
systematically consulted on regulatory initiatives that might influence trade
Promote and enhance the effectiveness of technical assistance to developing countries in
the TBT field.
7.9 Overview of the TBT Agreement:
Although the TBT Agreement has three separate fields of application (technical regulations,
standards, and conformity assessment procedures), there are common principles and rules that are
generally applicable throughout. The common principles and rules in outline are as follows:
Non-discrimination
The prevention of unnecessary obstacles to international trade
Legitimate objectives
Necessity
Reasonableness
Changed circumstances
Harmonization
Use of international standards
Equivalence and Mutual recognition
Transparency
Derogations in the event of urgent measures.
Page 42 of 113
8. Regional Trade Agreements
Regional Trade Agreements:
Most Regional Trade Agreements are created under Article XXIV of GATT.
8.1 Text of Article XXIV of GATT: Territorial Application — Frontier Traffic — Customs
Unions and Free-trade Areas
The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan customs territories of the contracting
parties and to any other customs territories in respect of which this Agreement has been accepted.
Each such customs territory shall, exclusively for the purposes of the territorial application of this
Agreement, be treated as though it were a contracting party.
A customs territory shall be understood to mean any territory with respect to which separate tariffs or
other regulations of commerce are maintained for a substantial part of the trade of such territory with
other territories.
The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development,
through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the country’s parties
to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area
should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of
other contracting parties with such territories.
The provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties,
the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement
necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area; Provided that:
a.) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of a customs
union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such union
or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or
agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the
duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation
of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, as the case may be;
b.) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a free trade
area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent territories
and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the adoption of such interim agreement
to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not parties to such agreement shall
not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce
existing in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim
agreement as the case may be; and
c.) any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall include a plan and schedule
for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable length
of time.
Page 43 of 113
The degree to which an RTA grants preferential access—the margin of preference—can be
substantial: For example, the US imposes a 25 percent tariff on imported light trucks, but qualifying
light trucks made in fellow NAFTA countries Canada and Mexico face no tariff.
But market access can also come from reduced non-tariff barriers such as reduced regulations.
It should be noted that the margin of preference varies among RTAs, among economic sectors in an
RTA, and even within one sector over time (the more multilateral liberalization spreads, the lower the
margin of preference).
Some RTAs do not liberalize trade substantially and thus are less economically consequential for
their members.
Page 44 of 113
Critics argue that regional production leads to exploitation in developing countries and places
downward pressure on wages in wealthy countries, thus also weakening labor unions and the rights
they promote.
Supporters argue that greater efficiency means regional production can more effectively compete in
an increasingly global economy and that without regional production, manufacturing jobs would still
flow out of relatively wealthy countries and the so-called exploited workers in poor countries would
find themselves jobless.
Page 45 of 113
for Central Africa (CAEMC), and the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the
Comoros.
Page 46 of 113
Second, when countries form an RTA, their governments not only lower tariffs vis-à-vis their RTA
partners, as they are supposed to do; they also bring down the trade barriers on imports from countries
outside the bloc. This is not part of the agreement, so governments liberalize externally because they
choose to do so – and without any type of reciprocity from the favoured non-members of the bloc.
There is increasing evidence of external trade liberalization following an RTA, especially in developing
countries. The lower external tariffs provide a double blessing: they imply that RTAs are responsible
for more trade liberalization than they mandate (amplifying trade creation) and for less trade
discrimination than might be expected (limiting trade diversion).
At first, it may seem odd that governments, pressured by special interests as they are virtually
everywhere, would voluntarily lower their external tariffs without any compensation from the favoured
countries. But it does make sense. Suppose that domestic special interest groups pressure the
government and induce it to set relatively high tariffs, which allow the domestic industry to maintain
high prices and enjoy a large market share. If subsequently the country enters into a RTA, export-
oriented firms benefit (and support the agreement) because of the better access to foreign markets,
whereas purely domestic firms suffer from the tougher competition from the RTA partners. But this
also weakens the domestic firms’ stance on protection against non-members. The reason is that the
free access to the domestic market enjoyed by the partners’ exporters under the RTA lowers the
market share of the domestic industry.
As a result, the RTA makes any price increase generated by a higher tariff less valuable for the
domestic industry: now whenever the government attempts to help domestic producers through higher
external tariffs, the partners’ producers absorb part of that surplus.
In other words, the RTA creates ‘leakage’ in the trade policy redistributive channel. External
protection also becomes more costly, because of the trade diversion that accompanies the RTA. As
a result, external tariffs tend to fall after the formation of an RTA both because the economic marginal
cost of external protection rises and because the political- economy marginal gain from external
protection falls.
For developing countries, empirical research supports this rationale because trade preferences tend
to lead to lower external tariffs. Results for the United States and the European Union (EU), however,
indicate that they are less likely to reduce external tariffs on goods where preferences are offered.
But since the tariffs of both the United States and the EU are very low to start with, and cannot be
raised because of their WTO commitments, there is not much room for change anyway.
8.5 Problems with RTA’s:
The discriminatory character of these agreements has raised three main concerns:
that trade diversion would be rampant, because special interest groups would induce governments
to form the most distortionary agreements
that broader external trade liberalization would stall or reverse; and
that multilateralism could be undermined.
Theoretically, all of these concerns are legitimate, although there are also several theoretical arguments that
oppose them. Empirically, neither widespread trade diversion nor stalled external liberalization has
materialized, while the undermining of multilateralism has not been properly tested. There are also several
aspects of regionalism that have received too little attention from researchers, but which are central to
understanding its causes and consequences.
Page 47 of 113
9. RTA-AFCFTA -Africa Continental Free Trade Area
The African Continental Free Trade Area is a free trade area consisting of 28 countries. It was created among
54 of 55 African Union Nation. This free trade is providing for the largest participating countries apart from
the World Trade Organization.
This agreement required of members to remove tariffs from 90% of goods, allowing for free access to
commodities, goods and services across the African continent. The United Nations Economic commission
for Africa estimate that this will boost intra-African trade.
9.3 Institutions
The institutions established to facilitate the implementation has been set in phase 1 of negotiations, however,
phase 2 can establish more committees via protocols. Currently a Secretariat is established for the
coordinating the implementation of the agreement. This secretariat is an autonomous body within the African
union, working closely with the AU commission. It is a independent legal personality which will receive budget
from the AU. The council of ministers will decide Headquarter, structure, role, and responsibilities. The
Assembly of African Union Heads of State and Government will be the highest decision-making body. The
Council of Ministers will be responsible for trade providing trade policy oversight and ensuring effective
implementation and enforcement of this Agreement.
More committees have been established. Dispute resolution rules and procedures still to be negotiated. The
Committee of senior Trade Officials implement the council’s decisions and is responsible for development of
programs and action plans for implementation of this Agreement.
9.4 Implementation
The AfCFTA is to be implemented in phases, which is still under negotiation. The first phase in Kigali provided
for trade protocols, dispute settlement procedures, customs cooperation, trade facilitation and rules of origin.
Page 48 of 113
This covered goods and services liberalization. This included reduction in tariffs of 90% of goods. The
operational phase was called for in 2019 to which 5 operational instruments were activated to govern AfCFTA:
1. The rules of origin
2. The online negotiating forum
3. The monitoring and elimination of non-tariff barriers
4. A digital payment system
5. The African Trade Observatory
Therefore, phase 2 negotiations are underway since February 2019 and expected to finish end of 2020. As
per 12th summit in July 2019, gaps were identified within phase 1, leading to further negotiations divided into
2 sub phases:
phase 1: covering trade in goods and trade service disciplines and a dispute settlement; tariff concessions to
negotiation on rules of origin, trade in services, the specific commitments etc.
phase 2: focusing on cooperation on investment, competition and intellectual property rights.
In relation to the matter of tariff concession, such is an important source of government revenue, it also
reduces import competition and protect domestic industries. All states aim to reach the same level of tariff
liberalisation. 90 % of the tariff lines should be liberalised, whilst 10% is divided in 2 categories. The 10% is
divided to 7% of sensitive products and 3% excludes from liberalisation entirely.
LCD: 10 years to achieve 90% liberalisation, 13 years to eliminate tariffs on sensitive products. Angola, Sao
Tome and Principe will graduate to LCD status in 2021 and 2024
Non-LCDs: 5 years to achieve liberalisation, 10 years to eliminate tariffs on sensitive products – may retain
status quo of liberalisation in year 6
Both LCD and Non-LCD can exclude 3% of tariff lines but excluded product may not account for more than
10% of total trade.
G6: consisting of Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe face challenged and has been
provided a 15 year phase out period. How to divide the 10% will still be determined.
Page 49 of 113
LDCs Countries: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia.
G6 countries: Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe
At the Niamey submit, the implementation of liberalisation commitments in relation to LDC’s facing adjustment
challenges were addressed. African Export–Import Bank (Africa’s largest trade bank) unveiled $ 1 billion
financing facility to support countries in order to adjust in manner to sudden tariff losses as the result of
AfCFTA agreement. The digital payment system is to be developed within collaboration of AU domesticating
intra-regional payments. A simplified trade regime to be developed, which is very important within substantial
communities of informal traders.
This Agreement is thus a flagship project of the AU, the other project focusing on industrial and infrastructure
development will be important for LCDs as they deal with challenged of implementation.
Page 50 of 113
10. SADC Protocol on Trade
As SADC has many more protocols, the specific protocol we’ll be covering is Protocol on Trade
1996. Other protocols such as on Finance and Investment, 2006; Declaration on Productivity, 1999;
Trade in Services, 2012; and Transport Communications and Meteorology, 1996 deals with trade
as well.
This protocol constitutes cooperation of SADC’s goals on economic development and poverty
eradication.
10.1 SADC in general
10.1.1 Member of SADC
SADC exists of 16 member states. The following states are members:
Angola Botswana DRC Lesotho Madagascar Malawi
Swaziland South Africa Seychelles Namibia Malawi Mauritius
Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Comoros
Page 53 of 113
10.7 Exceptions
10.7.1 General
Art 9 provided for general exceptions subject to which measures applied will not constitute arbitrary
or unjustified discrimination between member states, or disguised restrictions on intra-SADC trade.
Nothing within Art 7 and 8 (Quantitative import and export restrictions) shall be construed as to
prevent the adoption or enforcement of any measurement by the member state. Such measures to
be set if:
- necessary to protect public morals or maintain public order
- necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health
- necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations consistent with the WTO
- necessary to protect intellectual property rights, or deceptive trade practices
- relating to transfer of gold, silver, precious or semi-precious stones or metals
- imposed for protection of national treasures of artistic, historic, or archaeological value
- necessary to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs in any exporting member state
- in relation to conservation of exhaustible natural resources and environment
- necessary to ensure compliance with existing obligations under the international agreements.
10.7.2 Security
Nothing within the protocol under Art 10 will prevent a member state from taking measures in
protecting security interest or maintaining of peace.
10.8 National Agreement
Member states under Art 11 shall accord immediately or unconditionally, to goods traded in the
community the same treatment to goods produced nationally in relation to all laws, regulations, and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use.
10.8.1 Standard and technical regulations on trade
A member state shall use international standards relevant within standard-related measure, except
id such would be ineffective or inappropriate in fulfilling the legitimate objectives. This standard
measure to be used should conform to international standard which should not create an obstacle
within trade. Such should not reduce levels of safety, the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health of the environment or consumers, or prejudice member state rights. Such should consider
the international standardization to which such measures should be practicable, compatible in order
to facilitate trade in goods and services in the community. The member state will thus except such
as equivalent technical regulation of other member states, and if such differ, to provide that an
adequately fulfilment towards the objectives in relation to their regulations. A member state on
request of another state, should seek appropriate measures in order to promote compatibility of
specific standards or confirm assessment procedures maintained in said territory, with such
maintained in the other member states.
10.9 Anti-dumping measures
Art 18 provides that the protocol will not prevent anti-dumping measures which are in conformity
with the WTO.
10.10 Subsidies and countervailing measures
Art 19 provides that member states shall not grant subsidies which will distort or threaten competition
within the region, however, may continue such in accordance with Article III. A member state may
offset the effects of subsidies subject to WTO provisions, levy countervailing duties on a product of
another state. A member state may introduce a new subsidy if it is in accordance with the WTO.
Page 54 of 113
10.11 Protection of infant industries
Art 21 provides that upon application, member state may apply for a measure which promote an
infant industry, to which a member state is authorised to suspend certain obligations of the protocol
in respect of the like goods imported from other member states. However, this should be subject to
WTO provisions. The committee can then impose terms and conditions in authorizing such,
preventing excessive disadvantages which may result in trade imbalances. The committee will
regularly review the protection of infant industries by a member state.
Page 55 of 113
11. Rules of origin – Agreement on rules of Origin (WTO agreement)
11.1 Article 1: Rules of Origin
Rules of Origin is defined as laws, regulations and administrative determinations on general application
applied by any member to determine the country of origin of goods. The rules of origin are not related to
contractual or autonomous trade regimes leading to the granting of tariff preferences.
The rules of origin include all rules of origin used in non-preferential commercial policy instruments. Such
include: Most favoured-nation treatment; anti-dumping and countervailing duties; safeguard measures; origin
marking requirements; and any discriminatory quantitative restrictions or tariff quotas. These shall also
include rules of origin used for government procurement and trade statistics.
Merits:
Simplicity and predictability. HS is used for multi-purpose language and established as a common Customs
language.
Demerits:
In HS chapters extensive knowledge is needed (Traders and custom officers are familiar with the HS). This
HS is not always suitable for origin determination purposes.
Page 57 of 113
Can be expressed within two ways: Maximum allowance for non-originating materials or minimum
requirement of domestic content
Merits:
Suitable to address certain goods which are refined or value-added. The value provides a simpler threshold
than manufacturing or processing operations.
Demerits:
Lack of predictability and consistency due to currency fluctuation and exposure to transfer pricing. Thus,
difficulty to calculate the real value of the good.
- A criterion of manufacturing or processing operations: a good transformed when the good has
undergone specified manufacturing or processing operations
Merits:
More technical, objective criteria
Demerits:
Frequent modifications to catch up with technological developments. More precise, longer, and detailed texts
required.
Page 58 of 113
11.7.3 Documentary evidence
Evidence for a good to benefit from the preferential regimes. The evidence can be a certificate issued by
competent authorities, a certified declaration of origin certified by a competent body or an origin declaration
made by a commercial document from the supplied, producer, manufacturer, exporter, importer or competent
person.
Competent authority is stipulated in free trade agreements, in general requirements, the procedure of issue,
the validity of the proof of origin and possible exemptions from proof of origin.
Page 61 of 113
Given the obvious importance of the rights and obligations in the GATS for this extensive and
growing sector of the world economy, it is perhaps surprising that so few disputes have been brought
relating to this Agreement in the WTO to date.
Council for Trade in Services:
This Council on Trade in Services operates under the guidance of the General Council (WTO
General Council) and is responsible for overseeing the functioning of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS).
It is open to all WTO members, and can create subsidiary bodies as required.
Articles in GATS:
Article I:3(a) of the GATS defines the expression “measures by Members” very broadly. According
to this definition, the GATS covers virtually all levels of government activity – central, regional or
local as well as non-governmental bodies that have powers delegated to them by governments.
Article I:3(a) reads as follows:
Article 3 (scope & definition)
For the purposes of this Agreement:
(a) “measures by Members” means measures taken by:
(i) central, regional or local governments and authorities; and
(ii) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by central, regional
or local governments or authorities.
In fulfilling its obligations and commitments under the Agreement, each Member shall take
such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure their observance by regional
and local governments and authorities and non-governmental bodies within its territory.
The term “measure” is defined in Article XXVIII of the GATS as follow:
(a) “measure” means any measure by a Member, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule,
procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form.
As a result of the combined effect of above two definitions, the obligations and disciplines of the
GATS apply to all forms of intervention by central, regional, and local governments as well as non-
governmental bodies with delegated governmental powers.
A “measure” includes laws, regulations, rules and decisions of courts and administrative authorities,
but it also covers practices and actions of governments or non-governmental bodies with delegated
governmental powers. Examples of measures would include legislation of a Member, by-laws of a
municipal authority, and rules adopted by professional bodies in respect of professional
qualifications and licensing. All such measures could potentially come within the scope of the GATS.
It is important to note that each Member has an obligation to take reasonable measures to ensure
that all “sub-national” levels of government and non-governmental bodies with delegated
governmental powers within its territory comply with the disciplines of the GATS.
The question of whether a particular action of a government constitutes a “measure by a Member”
within the meaning of Article I:1 has not specifically arisen as yet in any WTO dispute settlement
case. The scope of the GATS, however, does not extend to actions of purely private persons or
enterprises which do not exercise any delegated governmental powers.
The phrase “affecting trade in services” has been interpreted by the Appellate Body. In Canada –
Autos case, the Appellate Body stated that “two key issues must be examined to determine whether
a measure is one ‘affecting trade in services’”. Those issues are:
Page 62 of 113
First, whether there is “trade in services” in the sense of Article I:2; and, second, whether the
measure in issue “affects” such trade in services within the meaning of Article I:1.
Page 63 of 113
Paragraph (d) of Article I:2 “by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural
persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member” – “Mode 4” – describes the mode of
supply known as “movement of natural persons”. This is where a service provider of one Member
travels to the territory of another Member in order to supply the service. An example would be the
case of a doctor from one Member who travels to the territory of another Member to perform surgery
on a patient. This mode requires the presence of natural persons of another country within the
territory of the Member where they are supplying a service.
Mode 4 refers to the temporary migration of workers, to provide services or fulfill a service
contract. Because the current framework of Mode 4 allows for only temporary movement of workers
across borders to provide services, and their visa as well as their right to stay and work are tied to
their original terms of employment or contract and to their employer.
Misconceptions of GATS:
Civil society representatives have repeatedly voiced concerns about public policy implications
of the GATS. Such concerns revolve, inter alia, around the Agreement’s perceived impact on
governments’ ability to regulate socially important services and ensure equitable access
across regions and population groups. It has been alleged that the concept of progressive
liberalization, combined with the commercialization of some public services in individual
countries, could result in subjecting core governmental activities to external (multilateral)
disciplines.
There have also been assertions that the Agreement contravenes basic notions of national
sovereignty, requiring governments against their will to liberalize access and/or to accept
constraints on socially motivated subsidy schemes.
The complexity of the GATS and the absence, in potentially relevant areas, of authoritative
legal interpretations may have added a sense of uncertainty.
In response, the WTO Secretariat has authored, or contributed to, several publications
explaining the structure and functioning of the Agreement and, by the same token, debunking
frequently traded myths. Relevant sources include a Special Study, Market Access:
Unfinished Business, a brief booklet, GATS: Fact and Fiction, and a Joint Study with the
WHO, WTO Agreements & Public Health.
The Facts:
First and foremost, it may be worth reiterating one of the core concepts of the Agreement,
the distinction between services liberalization and deregulation. Domestic
regulations are not considered as barriers to market access and national treatment under
the GATS and, therefore, are not subjected to trade negotiations. No WTO Member has
ever questioned this basic tenet.
Moreover, there are various exemption clauses in the Agreement, including Articles XII,
XIV and XIV bis, that allow governments to ignore their obligations in specified
circumstances with a view, for example, to protecting public security or life and health.
The Secretariat is not aware of any cases to date where these provisions proved
insufficient to address legitimate policy interests.
Should a Member feel the need to withdraw or modify its market access and national
treatment obligations in a given sector, procedures are available under Article XXI. At the
request of affected trading partners, the modifying Member is required to negotiate any
necessary compensatory adjustment and, if unsuccessful, to accept arbitration. These
procedures have been invoked only recently, after a long time since the Agreement
entered into force. In turn, this testifies to the continued scope for political flexibility,
despite the existence of scheduled commitments, in critical circumstances.
Page 64 of 113
Services provided in the exercise of governmental authority are fully exempt from
coverage.
No changes are envisaged in the new rounds of negotiations. The Negotiating Guidelines
and Procedures explicitly provide that the existing structure and principles of the GATS
shall be respected.
Consensus is the basic decision-making principle in the WTO. Like the GATT or the
TRIPS Agreement, the GATS thus poses no risk to national sovereignty. It is simply not
possible in negotiations within the purview of WTO to outvote a Member and/or subject it
to disciplines that it is not prepared to accept. Moreover, it is worth bearing in mind that,
as a last resort, nothing would prevent a frustrated government from quitting the
Organization altogether. However, this has not happened to date.
On the contrary, GATT/WTO membership has continued to prove highly attractive.
12.2 Complexity of the GATS:
The GATS is structurally more complex than the GATT. Among the most conspicuous differences
are the existence of four modes of supply and of two distinct legal parameters – market access and
national treatment – to determine conditions of market entry and participation. Thus, while a tariff
schedule under GATT, in its simplest form, displays one tariff rate by sector, all specific
commitments under the GATS consist of at least eight inscriptions, four each under market access
and national treatment.
This relatively complex structure is intended to enable Members to accommodate sector- or mode-
specific constraints that they may encounter in the scheduling process and to liberalize progressively
their services trade in line with their national policy objectives and levels of development. Complexity
can thus be viewed, in part, as a precondition for effectiveness and flexibility.
The Agreement seeks to address such concerns. First, it expressly recognizes the situation of
developing countries and provides individual Members with “appropriate flexibility” for opening fewer
sectors and liberalizing fewer types of transactions in line with their development situation.
While these provisions in Article XIX:2 may have been intended mainly to protect developing
countries from overly ambitious commitments that, especially in the absence of appropriate
regulatory frameworks, may cause excessive adjustment pains, they also protect from undue
negotiating pressure across too wide a range of sectors and policy areas.
Moreover, Article XXV of the GATS expressly recognizes the need for the WTO Secretariat to
provide technical assistance to developing countries. The Article needs to be read in conjunction
with the Negotiating Guidelines and Procedures of March 2001 and, even more important, the Doha
Ministerial Declaration of November 2001. The Declaration further emphasizes, and elaborates on,
the role and necessity of technical co-operation and capacity building.
Page 65 of 113
service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than the Member accords to like
services and service suppliers of any other country.
This Part II also establishes certain general transparency obligations and provides important
exceptions for certain economic integration agreements and labor markets integration agreements
that meet prescribed requirements. In addition, it contains certain provisions designed to ensure
transparency and due process on subjects such as domestic regulation, recognition of standards
and criteria for the authorization, licensing and certification of service suppliers, monopolies and
exclusive service suppliers, business practices, payments and transfers, and government
procurement.
There are provisions allowing restrictions on trade in services to be imposed in the event of serious
balance-of-payments or external financial difficulties, as well as general exceptions and security
exceptions providing legal justification for certain measures taken to protect certain enumerated
social, environmental or security policy objectives. Finally, provisions in this Part II mandate further
negotiations in areas including domestic regulation, emergency safeguard measures, subsidies and
government procurement.
12.4 MFN Treatment
Under Article II of the GATS, each Member is required to “accord immediately and unconditionally
to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it
accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country”.
This MFN obligation applies generally to all services and all service suppliers (through all modes of
supply), except where MFN exemptions have been inscribed in a Member’s List of MFN Exemptions
in its Schedule in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Annex on Article II Exemptions:
Key terms to consider in interpreting the MFN obligation are: “services”, “service suppliers” and “like
services and service suppliers”. The term “services” is defined very broadly in Article I:3(c) of the
GATS to include “any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental
authority”.
“Service supplier” is defined as “any person who supplies a service” and includes natural and
juridical persons as well as service suppliers which provide their services through forms of
commercial presence, such as a branch or a representative office.
It is important in any dispute involving claims under the GATS to first identify the precise nature of
the services at issue in the case. Typically, Members have listed service sectors and sub-sectors
according to the Services Sectoral Classification List which refers to the more detailed United
Nations Central Product Classification system (“CPC”). In the EC – Bananas III case, for example,
there was a dispute about whether the relevant services were “distributive trade services”, a
relatively broad sector, or “wholesale trade services”, a narrower sub-sector, as described in a
headnote to section 6 of the CPC. It is also necessary to identify the relevant modes of supply of
the service and who the suppliers of the service are. This is not as easy as it may seem.
The Appellate Body clarified that the MFN obligation in Article II of the GATS applies both to de jure
as well as to de facto discrimination. A measure may be said to discriminate de jure in a case in
which it is clear from reading the text of the law, regulation or policy that it discriminates among
services or services suppliers of different countries. If the measure does not appear on the face of
the law, regulation or policy to discriminate, it may still be determined to discriminate de facto if on
reviewing all the facts relating to the application of the measure, it becomes obvious that it
discriminates in practice or in fact.
In this case, the Appellate Body stated as follows:
Page 66 of 113
The obligation imposed by Article II is unqualified. The ordinary meaning of this provision does not
exclude de facto discrimination. Moreover, if Article II was not applicable to de facto discrimination,
it would not be difficult – and, indeed, it would be a good deal easier in the case of trade in services,
than in the case of trade in goods – to devise discriminatory measures aimed at circumventing the
basic purpose of that Article [Article 1:3 (c)].
In order to determine whether services or service suppliers of different countries – for example,
Country A and Country B – are discriminated against, it is necessary to examine: 1) the origin of the
services and/or the service suppliers; and 2) whether the services and/or service suppliers of
Country A and Country B are “like”. With respect to the supply of services across borders (Mode 1),
the location of the service supplier is critical in determining the origin of the service. In other words,
if the suppliers of the service at issue are located in Country A as well as in Country B, then the
origin of the service is the same as the location of the service supplier. If a service is supplied through
commercial presence (Mode 3), the key factor in determining the origin of the service is the origin
of the supplier.
The terminology used in the GATS is “a service supplier of another Member”, which can include
either “a natural person of another Member” or “a juridical person of another Member”. A
“natural person of another Member” is defined as a natural person who resides in the territory of that
other Member or a national or, in certain cases, a resident of that other Member. A “juridical person
of another Member” can be either: 1) a juridical person which is constituted or otherwise organized
under the law of that other Member and is engaged in substantive business operations in the territory
of that other Member; or, 2) in the case of a service that is supplied through commercial presence,
a juridical person which is owned or controlled by natural or juridical persons of that other Member.
The issue of whether services or service suppliers of different Members are “like” has only been
addressed peripherally in one WTO dispute to date. Although lessons could obviously be drawn
from the interpretation of the term “like products” in provisions of other agreements, such as Article
III:2 and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, the terms “like services” and “like service suppliers” in the
context of the GATS raise much more difficult conceptual problems.
In EC – Bananas III case, the panel held that:
The nature and the characteristics of wholesale transactions as such, as well as each of the
different subordinated services mentioned in the headnote to section 6 of the CPC, are “like”
when supplied in connexon with wholesale services, irrespective of whether these services
are supplied with respect to bananas of EC and traditional ACP origin, on the one hand, or
with respect to bananas of third-country or non-traditional ACP origin, on the other...
Indeed, it seems that each of the different services activities taken individually is virtually the
same and can only be distinguished by referring to the origin of the bananas in respect of
which the service activity is being performed. Similarly, ... to the extent that entities provide
these like services, they are like service suppliers.
Thus, it is reasonably obvious that services that are the same or similar to each other should be
determined to be “like”. A determination of the “likeness” of services should include an examination,
on the facts, of the characteristics of the service, its classification and description in the CPC, and
an analysis of consumer preferences.
In EC – Bananas III case, the panel found that wholesale transactions and subordinated services
described in the headnote to section 6 of the CPC were “like” when supplied in connection with
bananas originating from certain countries with the same type of wholesale services supplied in
connection with bananas originating from other countries. That panel, however, also assumed that
Page 67 of 113
when there are suppliers which are providing services that are “like”, those suppliers will also be
“like service suppliers”. There has been no case to date other than the first panel report in EC –
Bananas III that has examined the question of whether services are “like services” or whether
service suppliers are “like service suppliers”.
There could be much more difficult situations in other cases in which it would not be as clear that all
service suppliers supplying the same or similar services would necessarily be “like service
suppliers”. In addition to the characteristics of the services that the service suppliers provide, there
could be other supplier- related factors that could demonstrate that the suppliers are not “like”. Such
factors might include the size of the enterprises, the nature of their businesses, the number of
employees, the types of assets they possess, the nature of their technological activities, or in the
case of professionals, their education and training. There could be situations in which the service
suppliers, examined from the perspective of supplier-related factors rather than the characteristics
of the service, are sufficiently different from each other that they could be found to be not “like service
suppliers”.
In Canada – Autos case, the Appellate Body stated that the analysis of whether or not a measure
is consistent with Article II:1 of the GATS should proceed in several steps. First, a threshold
determination must be made under Article I:1 that the measure is covered by the GATS. This
requires that a demonstration that there is “trade in services” in one of the four modes of supply,
and also that the measure at issue “affects” this trade in services. Once that is demonstrated, the
next step is to compare, on the facts, the treatment by the Member concerned of the services or
service suppliers at issue of one Member with the treatment of the “like services” or “like service
suppliers” of any other country. In Canada – Autos the Appellate Body emphasized that panels
must be careful to analyze the effect of the measure on the conditions of competition among the
service suppliers “in their capacity as service suppliers”.
The MFN obligation in Article II:1 applies to both de jure and de facto discrimination, as determined
by the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III case.
Therefore, in order to determine whether or not services or services suppliers of one Member have
been treated less favorably than services or service suppliers of another country, a panel must
analyze, on the facts, whether the measure has altered, or has the potential to alter, the conditions
of competition between the services or service suppliers of one Member as compared with like
services or like service suppliers of another country. This analysis will necessarily be very fact
intensive.
Finally, it is important to note that the MFN obligation in Article II:1 applies very broadly to all
“measures by Members affecting trade in services” in all service sectors, with the important
exceptions of services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority, and measures listed in a
Member’s Schedule and meeting the conditions of the Annex on Article II Exemptions. Such
measures include subsidies.
Page 68 of 113
Members are also required to respond promptly to all requests from other Members for
specific information on any of their measures of general application, and also to establish
enquiry points to provide such specific information to other Members.
12.6 Increasing Participation of Developing Countries in GATS
In Article IV of the GATS the special needs of developing and especially least-developed
countries are recognized.
In particular, the increasing participation of developing country Members in world services
trade is to be facilitated through negotiated specific commitments, by different Members, in
their Schedules, relating to: the strengthening of developing countries’ domestic services
capacity, efficiency and competitiveness, including through access to technology; the
improvement of developing countries’ access to distribution channels and information
networks; and the liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export
interest to developing countries.
Special priority is to be given to least-developed countries, and particular account shall be
taken of the serious difficulties such countries have in accepting negotiated specific
commitments in view of their special economic situation and their development, trade and
financial needs.
Page 69 of 113
With respect to monopolies and exclusive service suppliers, each Member is required to ensure that
such suppliers within their territories do not act in a manner inconsistent with that Member’s MFN
obligations and specific commitments.
Furthermore, where a Member’s monopoly supplier competes, either directly or indirectly, in the
supply of a service outside of the scope of its monopoly rights, that Member is required to ensure
that such a supplier does not abuse its monopoly position to act in a manner inconsistent with that
Member’s commitments under the GATS. These requirements apply also to exclusive service
suppliers where a Member, through its regulation, authorizes or establishes a small number of
service suppliers and substantially prevents competition among those suppliers.
(Article IX of GATS)
Members also recognize that certain business practices of service suppliers may restrain
competition and restrict trade in services. Members are required to enter into consultations with
other Members, upon request, with a view to eliminating such restrictive business practices.
For example, if such a party seeks to invoke paragraph (a) of Article XIV, it would have to prove that
its measure is “necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order”. This provision has
never been interpreted, and neither has a similar provision in Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. With
respect to the “public order” justification, there is a footnote to paragraph (a) which clarifies that this
exception “may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of
the fundamental interests of society”.
Article XIV reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement of any Member measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order.
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Agreement including those relating to:
Page 70 of 113
(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the effects of a
default on services contracts.
(ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and
dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual
records and accounts.
iii) safety.
(d) inconsistent with Article XVII, provided that the difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring
the equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes in respect of services or
service suppliers of other Members.
(e) inconsistent with Article II, provided that the difference in treatment is the result of an
agreement on the avoidance of double taxation in any other international agreement or
arrangement by which the Member is bound.
Page 73 of 113
referring to the inscriptions in that Member’s Schedule. The Schedules are annexed to the GATS
and form an integral part of the treaty text.
The general part of any Member’s GATS Schedule takes the form of items arranged in four columns,
specifying in each case:
the sector subject to commitments.
the terms, limitations and conditions on market access for each scheduled sector designated
by mode of supply.
the conditions and limitations on national treatment for each scheduled sector designated by
mode of supply.
the undertakings relating to additional commitments, if any.
where appropriate, the timeframe for implementation of such commitments; and
the date of entry into force of such commitments.
The sectoral part of a Member’s Schedule is preceded by “horizontal commitments”, that is, a list of
the commitments and limitations that apply generally to all scheduled sectors. Many of these
horizontal commitments relate to derogations from market access and national treatment obligations
regarding particular modes of supply, such as “presence of natural persons”.
For example, most Members inscribed horizontal commitments to limit the movement of natural
persons in all scheduled service sectors to intra-corporate transfers covering essential personnel or
short-term (i.e., temporary) business visitors not employed in the host country.
Sector-by-sector entries in the Schedules then indicate the nature and extent of the commitments
that each Member has agreed to undertake. Under each designated sector, these commitments are
inscribed separately for each of the four modes of supply. The following is a descriptive list of the
levels of commitments that could be inscribed in a Member’s Schedule:
Full commitment
“None” is inscribed in the Schedule under the relevant mode of supply. This means that the Member
agrees to accord full market access or national treatment rights, with no conditions or qualifications,
to services and service suppliers of other Members.
Commitment with limitations
The Member inscribes the specific limitations, conditions or qualifications that limit the scope of its
market access or national treatment commitments. Often, Members have inscribed specific
measures that they viewed as otherwise inconsistent with the market access or national treatment
obligations.
No commitment
“Unbound” is inscribed in the Schedule under the relevant mode. This indicates that the Member
remains free to maintain or establish any measures inconsistent with the market access and national
treatment obligations.
No commitment technically feasible
The Member indicates that in the sector in question, the supply of the service cannot occur under
one of the modes (e.g., cross-border supply of hairdressing services.
Article XXI of the GATS sets forth rules and procedures under which a Member may modify or
withdraw any specific commitment in its Schedule.
Page 74 of 113
In order to commence proceedings to modify or withdraw a commitment, at least three years must
have elapsed from the date of the entry into force of that commitment. At the request of any Member
affected by a proposed modification or withdrawal, the Member seeking to modify its commitment
must enter into negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on any necessary compensatory
adjustment In any such negotiations, the objective is “to maintain a general level of mutually
advantageous commitments not less favourable to trade than that provided for in the Schedules of
specific commitments prior to such negotiations”. Any compensatory adjustments agreed through
negotiation with affected Members must be made on an MFN basis.
12.10 Dispute settlement under GATS:
1. Consultations:
• Under the GATS, as in any other dispute settlement proceeding in the WTO, the parties to a
dispute are required to first consult with each other about the matter in contention. The GATS
contemplate two types of consultations: bilateral and multilateral.
Article XXII.
1. Each Member shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity
for, consultation regarding such representations as may be made by any other Member with respect
to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement. The Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) shall apply to such consultations.
2. The Council for Trade in Services or the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) may, at the request of a
Member, consult with any Member or Members in respect of any matter for which it has not been
possible to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.
Finally, a Member may not make a claim under Article XVII of the GATS, dealing with national
treatment, in a case involving a measure that falls within the scope of an international agreement
between the parties to the dispute relating to the avoidance of double taxation. If there is a
disagreement between the Members as to whether a measure falls within the scope of such an
international agreement, both parties may agree to bring this matter before the Council for Trade in
Services. The Council shall then refer such a matter to arbitration, and the decision of the arbitrator
is final and binding on both parties.
12.10.1 Special Procedures for Specific Services Sectors.
The Decision on Certain Dispute Settlement Procedures for the GATS provides that any panel
dealing with complaints relating to trade in services should be composed of well-qualified
governmental or non-governmental individuals who have experience in trade in services and,
include persons with expertise in the sector at issue in the dispute. The Annex on Financial Services
also requires that in any dispute involving financial services, panelists must have the necessary
expertise in prudential issues and other financial matters.
The Annex on Air Transport Services precludes the GATS and its dispute settlement rules and
procedures from applying to any measures affecting:
(a) traffic rights, however granted; or
(b) services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights.
The GATS does apply, however, to measures affecting:
(a) aircraft repair and maintenance services.
(b) the selling or marketing of air transport services; and
(c) computer reservation systems. However, in these latter areas, the dispute settlement rules
and procedures apply only where specific commitments have been assumed by the Member
concerned, and where dispute settlement procedures in other bilateral or multilateral
agreements and arrangements have been exhausted.
Page 75 of 113
13. TRIPS
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an international
agreement administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) that sets down minimum
standards for many forms of intellectual property (IP) regulation as applied to nationals of other WTO
Members.
The areas of intellectual property that it covers are:
1) Copyright and related Rights (i.e. the rights of performers, producers of sound recordings and
broadcast organizations)
2) Trademarks, including service marks
3) Geographical indications, including appellations of origin
4) Industrial designs
5) Patents (including the protection of new varieties of plants
6) the Layout-designs of integrated circuits; and
7) Undisclosed information, including Trade Secrets and test data.
Page 76 of 113
• Dispute Resolution and Parallel Importation ("International Exhaustion of Intellectual Property
Rights"): "For purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement" (other than regarding
national treatment and most favored nation obligations), "nothing in this Agreement shall be
used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights." (Article 6)
• Articles 3 and 4 contain national treatment and most favoured nation obligations, respectively,
concerning the "protection of intellectual property," subject to specified exceptions
(particularly those contained in international conventions such as the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971), the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (1967) and the Rome Convention (International Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, on 26
October 1961.)
13.3 Different types of intellectual property rights:
13.3.1 Patents:
A patent consists of a disclosure of an invention to the public in exchange for a limited period of
time to exclude others from using the invention without the owner's consent.
A patent may be granted if the invention meets the statutory requirements of novelty (it’s new),
utility (it’s capable of practical application), and non-obviousness (the invention would not be
obvious to someone of ordinary skill who practiced in the technical field in question). These
statutory requirements apply to both product and process inventions.
(Patent rules vary from country to country.
A patent contains "claims" which define the scope of invention. A patent also often contains a
drawing illustrating the invention claimed. In most countries the patent applicant must disclose
the "best mode"–the best method known at the time of application–of practicing the invention.
Page 77 of 113
Who Receives the Patent if There are Competing Applications? "First to Invent" vs. "First to
File”:
In the cases of competing patent applications, the United States awards the patent to the
"first to invent"; However, all other countries (including Namibia) issuing patents award
patents to the “first to file”.
TRIPs Requirements for Patents: Patentable Subject Matter:
• Subject to the exceptions discussed below, patents must be available "for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application." (Article 27.1)
• Members may bar the patenting of inventions in order to "protect public order or morality,
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is
prohibited by their law." (Article 27.2)
• The TRIPs Agreement also permits Members to exclude from patentability: diagnostic,
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals; and plants and
animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production
of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. However,
Members must provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by
"effective sui generis system" (e.g. plant breeders rights) or any combination thereof. (Article
27.3)
• Subject to the provisions on transition periods, permissible exclusions from patentable
subject matter, and "mailbox requirements" for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical
product patent applications, "patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are
imported or locally produced." (Article 27.1)
Scope of rights:
TRIPs Agreement requires that a patent must exist for a minimum period of 20 years from the
date of filing of the patent application. (TRIPs Article 33).
A product patent confers on its owner the right to prevent third parties not having the owner's
consent from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing for such purposes the
patented product. (Article 28.1)
A process patent confers on its owner the right to prevent third parties not having the owner's
consent from the act of using the process, and from using, offering for sale, selling or importing
for such purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process. (Article 28.1)
Members Not Providing Article 27 Consistent Product Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemicals on 01 January 1995 had to Comply with the
Mailbox/ Exclusive Marketing Rights Requirements in Articles 70.8 and 70.9:
The "mail box" requirements in Article 70.8 enable foreign patent applicants to preserve their
filing dates (a critical issue in "first to file" patent systems) for the eventual award of
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical product patents once the transition period has
expired.
Similarly, TRIPs Article 70.9 requires that WTO Members not currently in compliance with
TRIPs requirements for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical product patent protection
provide exclusive marketing rights to applicants for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical
Page 78 of 113
product patents, for five years after marketing approval is granted in that Member, or until a
product patent is granted or rejected in the Member, whichever period is shorter, provided that,
subsequent to the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, such patent has been granted and
marketing approval received in another WTO Member.
As noted earlier, the TRIPs Council has agreed to grant a waiver to least-developed countries
until 01 January 2016 regarding the exclusive marketing rights obligation for pharmaceutical
products. This decision was subject to approval by the WTO's General Council.
Report of the Appellate Body, India–Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, The Appellate Body determined that India did not provide TRIPs consistent
mailbox and exclusive marketing rights for foreign holders of pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical product patents, as required by TRIPs Articles 70.8 and 70.9. The Appellate Body
also held that Indian legislation complying with TRIPs Articles 70.8 and 70.9 should have been
in effect since 01 January 1995–the entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
Trade secrets:
- Secret information that has commercial value, which the person lawfully in control of such
information is taking reasonable steps under the circumstances to keep secret (e.g., keeping
the information locked in a safe when not in use, non-disclosure clauses in employment
agreements).
- Trade secrets are valuable. Some examples of trade secrets are the Coca Cola formula,
customer lists, and confidential pharmaceutical test data used to obtain governmental
marketing approval.
How do patents and trade secrets differ?
Patents expire at the end of their term (e.g., 20 years from date of filing); trade secrets have no
expiration date as long as they remain secret. Most states Countries have their own laws protecting
Trade Secrets. These laws also vary from one country to another.
TRIPs Agreement
Article 39.1 requires Members to enable persons who lawfully are in control of "undisclosed
information" (trade secrets) to prevent such information "from being disclosed to, acquired
by, or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial
practices" as long as the information remains a trade secret.
It also Prohibits unfair commercial use of test or other data, the origination of which involved
considerable effort, used in approving the marketing of pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical products employing new chemical entities. (TRIPs Article 39.3).
13.3.2 Trademark:
A trademark (or service mark) is any sign or combination of signs capable of distinguishing
the goods or services of one firm from another. Some countries have two types of trademarks:
registered and unregistered trademarks.
Most common law jurisdictions grant trademarks on the basis of “first use”. By contrast, civil
law jurisdictions usually grant trademarks on the basis of “first to register”.
Trademarks are territorial; if you want trademark protection in another country, you must file
in that country; international protection through the Madrid Protocol is possible. The Madrid
Protocol permits the nationals of Madrid Protocol members to file a single international
trademark application to obtain protection in multiple members of the Madrid Protocol.
Six-month priority periods for foreign trademark filings under the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (1967).
Page 79 of 113
TRIPs Agreement and Trademarks
TRIPs Agreement incorporates the substantive obligations of Articles 1 through 12 and Article
19 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1967). The TRIPs
Agreement mandates protection for both trademarks and service marks. Trademarks and
service marks must have a minimum term of seven years and must be renewable
indefinitely. (Article 18)
Restrictions on cancellation of trademark registrations for non-use:
- "If use is required to maintain a registration, the registration may be cancelled only
after an uninterrupted period of at least three years of non-use, unless valid reasons
based on the existence of obstacles to such use are shown by the trademark owner.
- Circumstances arising independently of the will of the owner of the trademark which
constitute an obstacle to the use of the trademark, such as import restrictions on or
other government requirements for goods or services protected by the trademark, shall
be recognized as valid reasons for non-use." (Article 19.1)
The TRIPs Agreement states that the owner of a registered trademark has the "exclusive
right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of
trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to those in
respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would result in a likelihood of
confusion.”
(Article 16.1) Parallel importation (unauthorized importation of genuine trademarked
products):
- Except with respect to the National Treatment and Most Favored Nations obligations in
Articles 3 and 4, parallel importation ("exhaustion of intellectual property rights") is not
subject to dispute resolution under the TRIPs Agreement (TRIPs Article 6).
Enhanced Protection for "well-known" marks:
In determining whether a trademark is well-known, Members shall take account of the knowledge of
the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in the Member concerned
which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark. (Article 16.2)
Under the Paris Convention (which is generally incorporated by reference into the TRIPs
Agreement), well-known marks are entitled to protection in all Paris Convention/TRIPs
Members, regardless of whether the mark is registered. (For an interesting discussion of the
general issue of when an unregistered well-known mark must be protected see the decision by the
Supreme Court of South Africa, Appellate Division, in McDonald’s Corporation v. Joburgers
Drive-Inn Restaurant (PTY) Limited, (1997 (1) SA 1 (A)).
Geographical indications:
TRIPS sets forth standards to regulate international intellectual property protection and
enforcement, and establishes international minimum standards for geographical indications.
Part II, Section 3 of TRIPS, in Articles 22-24, specifies the minimum standards of protection that
WTO Members must provide for geographical indications.
Geographical indications are for purposes of the TRIPS Agreement, a type of intellectual
property.
Article 22(1) of the TRIPS Agreement defines it as "indications which identify a good as
originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given
Page 80 of 113
quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its
geographic origin.“
The TRIPS Agreement requires that WTO Members provide the legal means for interested
parties to prevent the use of a geographic indication that:
1. Indicates or suggests that a good originates in a geographical area other than the true
place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to the geographical origin of
the good; or
2. Constitutes an act of unfair competition.
The TRIPS Agreement also provides for an "enhanced" minimum level of protection for
geographic indications that identify wines and spirits.
WTO Members are required to provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent the
use of geographic indications even if they do not imply that the wines or spirits originate in
a place other than the true place of origin.
The TRIPS Agreement provides some exceptions to these requirements. For instance,
TRIPS does not require that a WTO Member extend protection to a geographic indication if
that geographic indication is the "generic" name for the goods in the Member.
Another exception to the protection afforded arises in situations where a trademark already
exists. Where a trademark has been applied for or registered in good faith, or where the rights
to the trademark have been acquired through actual use in good faith, either (1) before the
date of application of the TRIPS Agreement for a particular WTO member, or (2) before the
GI was protected in its country of origin, the trademark maintains its legal presumption of
superiority, based on the principle of "first-in-time, first-in-right.”
Page 81 of 113
13.3.3 Copyrights and related rights:
A copyright protects the expression of the idea, but not the idea itself. By contrast, a patent protects
the use of the idea.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971):
The Berne Convention provides a high level of "formality free" copyright protection.
The Berne Convention has recently been "updated" for the digital age by the WIPO Copyright
and Performances and Phonograms Treaties.
The U.S. did not join the Berne Convention until 1989 because of the many provisions of U.S.
copyright law that were incompatible with Berne (e.g., mandatory copyright notices, copyright
renewal, shorter copyright term than life plus 50 years, mandatory registration with the
Copyright Office).
The TRIPs Agreement:
Incorporates substantive obligations of Berne Convention (1971) other than provisions on
moral rights of authors (i.e., right to be acknowledged as the author and right of the author to
object to changes in a copyrighted work that would reflect adversely on the author).Copyright
protection is only available for expression, and not for ideas, procedures, methods of
operation, or mathematical concepts. (Article 9.2).
Articles 3 and 4 of the TRIPs Agreement contain fairly broad exceptions to national treatment
and most favored nation obligations regarding copyrights and related rights, including the
exceptions in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971)
and the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations ("Rome Convention").
Members must permit authors and their successors in interest the right to bar rental of
computer programs, sound recordings and cinematographic works (exemption permitted if
no widespread copying of such cinematographic works has occurred in a Member because
of rentals).
Copyrighted works originating in a WTO/Berne member are automatically protected in all
other WTO/Berne members without formalities (i.e., copyright registration and copyright
notices are not required).
13.3.4 Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits (Semiconductor Mask Works):
Members must provide a ten-year term of protection counted from the date of filing of an
application for registration or from the first commercial exploitation wherever in the world it
occurs. (Article 38.1)
The following are infringements of a protected layout-design if performed without
authorization of the right holder:
importing, selling, or otherwise distributing for commercial purposes a protected
layout-design, an integrated circuit in which a protected layout-design is incorporated,
or an article incorporating such an integrated circuit only in so far as it continues to
contain an unlawfully reproduced layout-design.
(Article 36) Innocent infringers may continue using a layout-design, with respect to
stock on hand or ordered before being notified that there was an unlawful reproduction
of a protected layout-design, but they must pay a reasonable royalty to the owner of
rights in the layout-design. (Article 37)
Page 82 of 113
13.3.5 Industrial Designs
WTO Members must provide at least 10 years of protection to independently created
industrial designs that are new or original.
Designs that are functional may be excluded from protection. (Article 25.1 and 26.3)
Members must provide reasonable cost-effective protection to textile designs. Textile
designs may be protected either through industrial design law or copyright law. (Article 25.2)
Enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement:
Part III of the TRIPs Agreement--"Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights"--contains provisions
on general obligations, civil and administrative procedures and remedies, provisional measures,
border measures and criminal procedures. It should be noted that Part III contains only a general
description of mandatory and permissive provisions, but not detailed rules governing the application
of such provisions. Enforcement issues are becoming increasingly important as more countries
enact laws which are generally TRIPs consistent. Increasingly, the compliance issues in the IPR
area will not be inadequate foreign laws, but rather inadequate enforcement of TRIPs-
consistent IPR laws.
General Obligation: Members Must Permit "Effective Action" Against Infringement
Article 41 describes the general obligation of Members, both with respect to enforcement of
intellectual property rights and procedural due process. From the perspective of intellectual
property owners, Article 41.2 contains a critically important general enforcement obligation:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures...are available under their law so as to
permit effective actions against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered
by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies
which constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be applied in
such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for
safeguards against their abuse. (Article 41.1)
It should be noted that this language is mandatory, not merely permissive; extends to all
intellectual property rights covered by the TRIPs Agreement; and specifically requires
"expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to
further infringements." This paragraph is the cornerstone for IPR enforcement obligations
under the TRIPs Agreement.
Injunctions, Damages and Disposition of Infringing Goods:
Members must make available to IPR rights holders "civil judicial procedures concerning the
enforcement of any intellectual property right covered" by the TRIPs Agreement. (Article 42)
Courts in WTO Members must have the authority to order a party to desist from an infringement,
including to prevent the entry into domestic commerce of imported goods that involve the
infringement of IPR’s, immediately after customs clearance. Courts must also have the authority to
award damages for infringements. (Articles 44 and 45)
Courts must have "the authority to order that goods that they have found to be infringing be, without
compensation of any sort, disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to
avoid any harm caused to the right holder, or unless this would be contrary to constitutional
requirements, destroyed."
Courts must also have "the authority to order that materials and implements the predominant use of
which has been in the creation of the infringing goods be, without compensation of any sort,
disposed outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to minimize the risks of further
Page 83 of 113
infringements." Except in "exceptional cases", simply removing the unlawfully used trademark does
not permit the release of the goods into the channels of commerce. (Article 46)
Deterrent Criminal Sanctions Required: Trademarks and Copyright Infringement on a
Commercial Scale:
Members must "provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful
trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies available shall
include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the
level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity."
Members must also provide, in "appropriate cases", for seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the
infringing goods and of any materials or implements the predominant use of which has been in the
commission of the criminal offense. (Article 61)
TRIPS: Enforcement: (Border Enforcement)
Trademark and copyright owners must have the right to petition customs authorities for orders
barring the release of imported goods into free circulation, where they have "valid grounds for
suspecting that the importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright goods may take
place...". (Article 51)
Members may also permit applications for suspension of customs release of goods that involve
other intellectual property rights (e.g., patents) provided that the requirements of Articles 51 through
60 are satisfied. Such suspension of customs clearance procedures may also be adopted regarding
the export of infringing goods.
Any right holder seeking to suspend the release of goods by customs authorities is "required to
provide adequate evidence to satisfy the competent authorities that, under the laws of the country
of importation, there is prima facie an infringement of the right holder’s intellectual property rights
and to supply a sufficiently detailed description of the goods to make them readily recognizable by
the customs authorities. The competent authorities shall inform the applicant within a reasonable
period whether they have accepted the application and, where determined by the competent
authorities, the period for which the customs authorities will take action." (Article 52).
Article 55 imposes stringent time limits on the suspension of customs clearance. Within ten working
days after the applicant has been served notice of the suspension of customs clearance,
proceedings leading to a decision on the merits of the case must be initiated by a party other than
the defendant or a competent authority must have "taken provisional measures prolonging the
suspension of the release of the goods..." In "appropriate cases" this time limit may be extended by
another ten working days. Otherwise, if all other conditions for export or import have been complied
with, the goods must be released by customs authorities.
Competent authorities must have the authority "to require an applicant to provide a security or
equivalent assurance sufficient to protect the defendant and the competent authorities and to
prevent abuse. Such security or equivalent assurance shall not unreasonably deter recourse to
these procedures." (Article 53). Members must give both the right holder and the importer "sufficient
opportunity" to have goods detained by customs authorities inspected. (Article 57)
As noted earlier in the discussion of Article 46, Members must give their competent authorities the
authority to order the destruction or disposal of infringing goods. Of particular interest to trademark
owners is a provision that bars the re-exportation of counterfeit trademark goods "in an unaltered
state or subject them to a different customs procedure, other than in exceptional circumstances."
(Article 59)
Page 84 of 113
14. World Bank and IMF
14.1 World Bank Group
The World Bank
World Bank Group, a member of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, and a family of
five international organizations that make leveraged loans to poor countries:
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
International Development Association (IDA)
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
The World Bank Institute (WBI) creates learning opportunities for countries, World Bank staff and clients, and
people committed to poverty reduction and sustainable development. WBI's work program includes training,
policy consultations, and the creation and support of knowledge networks related to international economic
and social development.
The World Bank Institute (WBI) can be defined as a "global connector of knowledge, learning and innovation
for poverty reduction". It aims to inspire change agents and prepare them with essential tools that can help
achieve development results. WBI has four major strategies to approach development problems: innovation
for development, knowledge exchange, leadership and coalition building, and structured learning. World
Bank Institute (WBI) was formerly known as Economic Development Institute (EDI), established on 11 March
1955 with the support of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. The purpose of the institute was to serve as
provide an open place where senior officials from developing countries could discuss development policies
and programs. Over the years, EDI grew significantly and in 2000, the Institute was renamed as the World
Bank Institute. Currently Sanjay Pradhan is the Vice President of the World Bank Institute
Page 85 of 113
Finance Corporation, the Bank offers financing to subnational entities either with or without sovereign
guarantees. For borrowers needing quick financing for an unexpected change, the IBRD operates a Deferred
Drawdown Option which serves as a line of credit with features similar to the Bank's flexible loan program.
Among the World Bank Group's credit enhancement and guarantee products, the IBRD offers policy-based
guarantees to cover countries' sovereign default risk, partial credit guarantees to cover the credit risk of a
sovereign government or subnational entity, and partial risk guarantees to private projects to cover a
government's failure to meet its contractual obligations. The IBRD's Enclave Partial Risk Guarantee to cover
private projects in member countries of the IDA against sovereign governments' failures to fulfil contractual
obligations. The Bank provides an array of financial risk management products including foreign exchange
swaps, currency conversions, interest rate swap, interest rate caps and floors, and commodity swaps. To
help borrowers protect against catastrophes and other special risks, the bank offers a Catastrophe Deferred
Drawdown Option to provide financing after a natural disaster or declared state of emergency. It also issues
catastrophe bonds which transfer catastrophic risks from borrowers to investors. The IBRD reported $26.7
billion in lending commitments for 132 projects in fiscal year 2011, significantly less than its $44.2 billion in
commitments during fiscal year 2010.
Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option: The Development Policy Loan with a Catastrophe Deferred
Drawdown Option (Cat DDO) is a contingent credit line that provides immediate liquidity to IBRD member
countries in the aftermath of a natural disaster. It is part of a broad spectrum of risk financing instruments
available from the World Bank Group to help borrowers plan efficient responses to natural disasters. The Cat
DDO gives a government immediate access to funds after a natural disaster, a time when liquidity constraints
are usually highest. This type of financing is typically used to finance losses caused by recurrent natural
disasters. It is most effective as part of a broader risk management strategy in countries highly exposed to
natural disasters.
Page 86 of 113
assets. The IFC is in good financial standing and received the highest ratings from two independent credit
rating agencies in 2010 and 2011.
14.6.1 1944–1968
Before 1968, the reconstruction and development loans provided by the World Bank were relatively small.
The Bank's staff was aware of the need to instil confidence in the bank.
When the Marshall went into effect in 1947, many European countries began receiving aid from other
sources. Faced with this competition, the World Bank shifted its focus to non-European countries. Until 1968,
its loans were earmarked for the construction of income-producing infrastructure, such as seaports, highway
systems, and power plants, that would generate enough income to enable a borrower country to repay the
loan.
14.6.3 1989–present
Beginning in 1989, in response to harsh criticism from many groups, the bank began including environmental
groups and NGOs in its loans to mitigate the past effects of its development policies that had prompted the
criticism. It also formed an implementing agency, in accordance with the Montreal Protocols, to stop ozone-
depletion damage to the Earth's atmosphere by phasing out the use of 95% of ozone-depleting chemicals,
with a target date of 2015. Since then, in accordance with its so-called "Six Strategic Themes," the bank has
put various additional policies into effect to preserve the environment while promoting development. For
example, in 1991, the bank announced that to protect against deforestation, especially in the Amazon, it
would not finance any commercial logging or infrastructure projects that harm the environment.
In order to promote global public goods, the World Bank tries to control communicable disease such as
malaria, delivering vaccines to several parts of the world and joining combat forces.
Page 89 of 113
14.8 Poverty reduction strategies
For the poorest developing countries in the world, the bank's assistance plans are based on poverty reduction
strategies; by combining a cross-section of local groups with an extensive analysis of the country's financial
and economic situation the World Bank develops a strategy pertaining uniquely to the country in question.
The government then identifies the country's priorities and targets for the reduction of poverty, and the World
Bank aligns its aid efforts correspondingly.
Forty-five countries pledged US$25.1 billion in "aid for the world's poorest countries", aid that goes to the
World Bank International Development Association (IDA) which distributes the loans to eighty poorer
countries. While wealthier nations sometimes fund their own aid projects, including those for diseases, and
although IDA is the recipient of criticism, Robert B. Zoellick, the former president of the World Bank, said
when the loans, that IDA money "is the core funding that the poorest developing countries rely on”.
World Bank organizes Development Awards which is a competitive grant program that surfaces and funds
innovative, development projects with high potential for development impact that are scalable and/or
replicable. The grant beneficiaries are social enterprises with projects that aim to deliver a range of social
and public services to the most underserved low-income groups.
Page 90 of 113
harmful to economic development if implemented badly, too quickly (“shock therapy”), in the wrong sequence
or in weak, uncompetitive economies.
One of the strongest criticisms of the World Bank has been the way in which it is governed.
While the World Bank represents 188 countries, it is run by a small number of economically powerful
countries.
These countries (which also provide most of the institution's funding) choose the leadership and senior
management of the World Bank, and so their interests dominate the bank.
Titus Alexander argues that the unequal voting power of western countries and the World Bank's role
in developing countries makes it similar to the South African Development Bank under apartheid, and
therefore a pillar of global Apartheid.
In the 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF forged the Washington Consensus, policies which included
deregulation and liberalization of markets, privatization, and the downscaling of government. Though the
Washington Consensus was conceived as a policy that would best promote development, it was criticized
for ignoring equity, employment and how reforms like privatization were carried out. Joseph Stiglitz argued
that the Washington Consensus placed too much emphasis on the growth of GDP, and not enough on the
permanence of growth or on whether growth contributed to better living standards.
The United States Senate on Foreign Relations report criticized the World Bank and other international
financial institutions for focusing too much "on issuing loans rather than on achieving concrete development
results within a finite period of time" and called on the institution to "strengthen anti-corruption efforts”.
Criticism of the World Bank often takes the form of protesting as seen in recent events such as the World
Bank Oslo 2002 Protests, the October Rebellion, and the Battle of Seattle. Such demonstrations have
occurred all over the world, even amongst the Brazilian Kayapo people.
Another source of criticism has been the tradition of having an American head the bank, implemented
because the United States provides the majority of World Bank funding. "When economists from the World
Bank visit poor countries to dispense cash and advice," observed The Economist in 2012, "they routinely tell
governments to reject cronyism and fill each important job with the best candidate available.
Page 91 of 113
to its member states for signature on 18 March 1965. Twenty states immediately ratified the convention. The
convention establishing the ICSID entered into force on 14 October 1966.
14.11.1 Governance
The ICSID is governed by its Administrative Council which meets annually and elects the centre’s Secretary-
General and Deputy Secretary-General, approves rules and regulations, conducts the centre’s case
proceedings, and approves the centre’s budget and annual report. The council consists of one representative
from each of the centre’s contracting member states and is chaired by the President of the World Bank Group,
although the president may not vote. The ICSID's normal operations are carried out by its Secretariat which
comprises 40 employees and is led by the Secretary-General of the ICSID. The Secretariat provides support
to the Administrative Council in conducting the centre’s proceedings. It also manages the centre’s Panel of
Conciliators and Panel of Arbitrators. Each contracting member state may appoint four persons to each panel.
In addition to serving as the centre’s principal, the Secretary-General is responsible for legally representing
the ICSID and serving as the registrar of its proceedings.
14.11.2 Membership
ICSID's 158 member states which have signed the centre’s convention include 157 United Nations member
states plus Kosovo. Of these member states, only 150 are "contracting member states", that is they have
ratified the contract. Former members are Bolivia, Ecuador (withdrew 2009), and Venezuela, which withdrew
in 2012.
All ICSID contracting member states, whether or not they are parties to a given dispute, are required by the
ICSID Convention to recognize and enforce ICSID arbitral awards.
14.11.3 Activities
The ICSID does not conduct arbitration or conciliation proceedings itself, but offers institutional and
procedural support to conciliation commissions, tribunals, and other committees which conduct such matters.
The centre has two sets of rules that determine how cases will be initiated and conducted, either under the
ICSID's Convention, Regulations and Rules or the ICSID's Additional Facility Rules. To be processed in
accordance with the ICSID Convention, a legal dispute has to exist between one of the centre’s contracting
member states and a national of another contracting member state. It must also be of a legal nature and
relate directly to an investment. A case can be processed under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules if one of
the parties to the dispute is either not a contracting member state or a national of a contracting member state.
However, most cases are arbitrated under the ICSID Convention. Recourse to ICSID conciliation and
arbitration is entirely voluntary. However, once the parties have consented to arbitration under the ICSID
Convention, neither party can unilaterally withdraw its consent.
The ICSID Secretariat may also administer dispute resolution proceedings under other treaties and regularly
assists tribunals or disputing parties in arbitrations among investors and states under the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNICTARL)'s arbitration regulations. The centre provides
administrative and technical support for a number of international dispute resolution proceedings through
alternative facilities such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Netherlands, the London Court
of International Arbitration, and the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France.
The ICSID also conducts advisory activities and research and publishes Investment Laws of the World and
of Investment Treaties. Since April 1986, the center has published a semi-annual law journal entitled ICSID
Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal.
Although the ICSID's proceedings generally take place in Washington, D.C., parties may agree that
proceedings be held at one of a number of possible alternative locations, including the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, the Regional Arbitration Centres of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee in Cairo, in
Kuala Lumpur, or in Lagos, the Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration in Melbourne, the
Australian Commercial Disputes Centre in Sydney, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, the Gulf
Cooperation Council Commercial Arbitration Centre in Bahrain, the German Institution of Arbitration, the
Maxwell Chambers in Singapore, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, and the Centre for
Arbitration and Conciliation at the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota (Colombia).
Page 92 of 113
Case studies
The Indonesian government was sued in June 2012 by a London-based mining company Churchill Mining
after the local government revoked the concession rights held by a local company in which the firm had
invested. The government is countering the Churchill case, claiming that Churchill did not have the correct
type of mining licenses.
In October 2012, an ICSID tribunal awarded a judgment of $1.8 billion for Occidental Petroleum against the
government of Ecuador. Additionally, Ecuador had to pay $589 million in backdated compound interest and
half of the costs of the tribunal, making its total penalty around $2.4 billion. The South American country
annulled a contract with the oil firm on the grounds that it violated a clause that the company would not sell
its rights to another firm without permission. The tribunal agreed the violation took place but judged that the
annulment was not fair and equitable treatment to the company.
Irish oil firm Tullow Oil took the Ugandan government to court in November 2012 after value-added tax (VAT)
was placed on goods and services the firm purchased for its operations in the country. The Ugandan
government responded that the company had no right to claim tax on such goods prior to commencement of
drilling. The case also attracted criticism for Tullow's use of local legal representation, Kampala Associated
Advocates (KAA); the Ugandan law firm was founded by Elly Kurahanga, the president of Tullow's operations
in Uganda and concerns were raised over his impartiality in the issue.
Tobacco major Philip Morris sued Uruguay for alleged breaches to the Uruguay-Swiss BIT for requiring
cigarette packs to display graphic health warnings and sued Australia under the Australia-Hong Kong BITS
for requiring plain packaging for its cigarettes. The company claims that the packaging requirements in both
countries violate its investment.
Page 93 of 113
15. Foreign Direct Investments
As Globalisation has become evident within 1990s, this produces successful exploiting of foreign investments
whish increased growth within economy in developing countries. Such growth lead to competition among
countries, attracting more foreign investors. However, in developing economies, such development becomes
limited by changes occurring in demand and technology, slowing such growth. An opportunity providing high
profits and low interest rates, with an external stimulus to an investment is imperative to boost capital
formation in the economy.
Developing countries have low levels of productivity which leads to low level of wages, low level of savings
and investments. Thus, producing again low productivity levels. An external injection of foreign investments
acts to break the cycle. The investment supplements national savings, facilitate access to internationally
available technologies and management, raising efficiency and expanding output, in order for the inward
spiral to trajectory economic growth and prosperity.
The developing, emerging and transition of economies liberalize foreign capital regimes and pursue policies
in order to attract investment. Foreign investment can be in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and
foreign portfolio investment (FPI).
15.1 Difference between Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment
FDI is motivated within long-term realization of returns from an enterprise in a foreign country involving
establishment of a physical entity. All capital contributions like stock acquisitions, reinvestments of business
profits by a parent firm in foreign subsidiary or direct lending by subsidiary company are included in FDI. As
such, a direct interest takes place as foreign investor has influence in the managing and strategic decision-
making.
FPI is aimed at short-term benefits, and frequently adjust to the short-term conditions in host country. FPI
can readily be withdrawn in unfavourable business conditions.
Within FPI and FDI when violating net inflows, FDI is smaller than FPI. Countries thus aspire to FDI due to
highly volatile and erratic nature of FPIs. FDI can result in financial instability and can rapidly respond to
economic changes. FDI is invested in financial assets; changes in rate and volume of reinvestment can result
in fluctuation and instability. As such FDI can borrow funds locally in order to export capital, generating rapid
capital outflow.
However, volatility between FDI and FPI flows are smaller in developed economies than in developing
economies. Thus, the investor is to make a strategic choice between FDI and FPI. FDI requires higher
investment-specific costs than FPI, as FDI cannot be readily adjusted and FPI can be attuned immediately
to short-term changes in environment.
FPI is found to wash out and be found irrelevant in the long run as FDI contribute to the growth rate of the
economy more due to yielding higher returns. FDI foreign equity flows is larger in a developing country then
developed ones, as high production cost in developed countries makes a project less profitable while high
transparency in developed economies makes FPI more efficient.
Page 94 of 113
elements of a direct investment relationship may be indicated through a number of factors, such as
representation in board of directors, participation in policy-making processes, interchange of managerial
personnel, access to technical information and provision of long-term loans at lower existing market rates.
Page 95 of 113
15.6 Green-field Investment
In terms of green-field investment, is a launching venture, thus prepping the green field. The projects are
foreign direct investments, simply known as direct investments that provide the highest degree of control for
the sponsoring company.
Indirect investment occurs one’s specifications are done, employees are trained to company standards,
fabrication processes can be tightly controlled, purchasing of foreign currencies.
The distance between Greenfield project and indirect investments are referred to as brown field investments.
Within such a corporation leases existing facilities and land which are adapted to suit the needs. Renovation
and customization result in lower expenses and quicker turn-around that building a building from scratch
Pro Cons
Tax breaks, financial incentives Greater capital outlay
Everything done to specifications More complex to plan
Complete control of venture Longer term commitment
Page 96 of 113
Therefore, FDI is due to favourable domestic business climates, which results from government policies
towards trade liberalization, launching of privatization programmes, and modernization of investment codes,
adoption of international FDI agreements and development of few priority projects of wider economic impact.
Multinationals take more liberal FDI regimes for granted, and consider the convergence of FDI regimes to be
the natural consequence of globalization. As such, openness to FDI may be characterized by diminishing
returns.
Privatisation of state-owned enterprises that couple with economic reforms have been successful in inducing
FDI in developing countries. Privatisation lead to rising share in FDI services and growing importance in
Mergers & Acquisitions. Such can produce additional investment. This also sends an optimistic signal
regarding the government’s commitment to economic reform.
Other determinants include resource-seeking MNC’s being more selective on grounds of accessibility of raw
materials, complementary factors of production, mainly labour and nature and quality of physical
infrastructure. As the market-seeking FDI is important in size and growth of the host country, while the
efficiency-seeking FDI looking for cost competitiveness.
Countries with larger market size, faster economic growth and higher degree of economic development have
the potential to provide more and better opportunities for marketing. For efficiency seeking MNCs,
productivity-adjusted labour costs, availability of sufficiently skilled labour, business-related services and
trade policy reflecting openness and exchange rates are vital. The degree of development of host countries
is important as it positively related to domestic entrepreneurship, education level and local infrastructure.
Developing countries tend to make use of labour-intensive technology and produce for domestic and
international markets. As such within the economic development the outward and inward FDI position relates.
As an increase within the country’s income increase, the enlarged outward FDI will generate as economy
grows and income increases. Outward FDI from developing countries has undertaken to access localized
innovative assets and capabilities. Asset-seeking FDI tries to engage dynamic competitive advantage for
strategically locating itself around geographically dispersed local innovation centres.
Push factors rise in South-South flows being wealth in emerging markets, rising cost of labour and non-
tradable, breaking up of domestic monopolies, new technology and communications leading to improved
information sharing and reduced transaction costs, strategic desire to procure inputs such as oil, capital
account liberalization regarding outward FDI, changes in trade barriers, regional trade agreements ad
government policies encouraging outward FDI.
Pull factors include large and growing markets, geographical proximity, ethnic and cultural ties, supply of
cheap labour, abundance in raw materials, incentives in host countries, the ability to use domestic skilled
labour to design and operate projects abroad at low cost and to lower the costs of technical personnel and
management preferential treatment of foreign companies and export markets through preferential treatments.
Page 98 of 113
This recession impacting a lot of developing countries, this is a result of protracted and deepening problems
which affected financial institutions and liquidity crises in financial markets.
Page 99 of 113
16. Foreign Convention on Sale of Goods
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) (CISG)
CISG governs contract for international sale of goods between private businesses excluding sales to
consumers and sales of services, and sales of certain specified types of goods. This applies to contracts for
sale of good between parties whose places of business are in different contracting states, or when the rules
of private international law lead to the application of the law of a contracting state.
16.2.1 UNCITRAL:
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law being a subsidiary body of the U.N. General
Assembly which is responsible for helping to facilitate international trade and investment.
As such the official mandate is “to promote the progressive harmonization and unification of international
trade law, through conventions, model laws, and other instruments that address key areas of commerce,
from dispute resolution to procurement and sale of goods. This was necessary when national government
started to realise that a global set of standards and rules were needed to harmonize national and regional
regulations.
Activities of UNCITRAL:
- Co-ordinating the work of active organizations and encouraging co-operation
- Promoting wider participation of existing international conventions and wider acceptance of existing
models and laws.
- Preparing or promoting adoption of new international conventions, model laws and uniform laws.
- Promoting codification and acceptance of international trade terms, provisions, customs and
practice in collaboration where appropriate with organizations which operate in said field.
- Promoting ways and means of ensuring uniform interpretation and application of international
conventions and uniform laws
- Collecting and disseminating information on national legislation and modern legal developments,
including case law
- Establishing and maintaining a close collaboration with the UN Conference on Trade and
Development
- Maintaining liaison with other UN Organs and specialized agencies concerned with international
trade.
As CISG is written in Palin business language, it allows for the judges to have the opportunity to make the
convention workable in range of sales situations. However, it is problematic because of the reluctance of
some courts to use solutions adopted on the same point by courts in other countries, creating inconsistent
decisions. As such CISG advocates that the judges which interpret the CISG should use methods familiar to
them from their country, rather than attempting to apply general principles of the convention or rules of private
international law.
Within interpreting the CISG, the international character of the convention is taken into account, the need for
uniform application and need for good faith in international law. Disputes over interpretation of the CISG are
resolved through applying the general principles of the CISG, where there are no principles, but the matters
are governed by the CISG (a gap praeter legem) by applying the rules of international private late.
Praeter legem:
Outside of the law, referring to an item that is not regulated by law and is not illegal. Items are generally
labeled praeter legem include certain customs.
Contra legem:
A key point of controversy being whether a contract requires a written memorial to be binding, the CISG
allows for sale to be oral or unsigned, but in certain countries, contracts are not valid unless in writing. Oral
contracts are accepted in many countries, to which states have no objection to sign. States with strict written
requirement exercised have the ability to exclude articles under the oral contract, enabling them to sign. As
the CISG is not complete, gaps are filled with applicable National Law taking in due consideration of the
conflict of law rules applicable and the place of jurisdiction.
CISG database as Pace University is considered most comprehensive collection of legal materials in
relation to CISG and most helpful tools within interpreting whilst unifying sales law.
CISG excuses party from liability to claim damages if failure to perform is attributable to an impediment
beyond the party’s, or third-party sub-contractors’ control, which could not be reasonably be expected.
Thus, the extraneous event known as force majeure and frustration of the contract or impossibility doctrine.
When seller refunded the price paid, the seller must also pay interest to the buyer from the date of payment.
The interest rate is based on rates in current seller’s state. The payment of interest is to make restitution and
not of the buyers right to claim damages. In a mirror of the seller’s obligations, where a buyer has to return
the goods and the buyer is accountable for any benefits received.
16.8.2 Hardship
This concept usually discussed within hardship clauses introduced in contracts in international trade,
however, is used within legislation too. Hardship is used in National Security regulations, to be regarded as
the subjective effect of a detrimental nature upon the person concerned which include any matter of
appreciable detriment being financial, personal, or otherwise. However, in Namibia and South Africa,
situations of hardship do not discharge a party of its liability.
For Hardship to exist, three elements need to exist:
1. Beyond either party, self-induced hardship is irrelevant,
2. Must be fundamental character,
3. Must be entirely uncontemplated and unforeseeable.
This part is clarified as the primarily to States, no to business-people attempting to use the convention for
international trade. They may have a significant impact upon the CISGs practical applicability, thus requiring
careful scrutiny when determining each particular case.
Prescription law (limitation laws) have the same basic objective: to provide a limitation period appropriate to
commercial transactions and to provide uniformity among diverse legal rules. Thus, the rationale given in
domestic law on prescription are fully captured by CISG read together with the Limitation Convention.
Page 108 of 113
The basic limitation period prescribed by the Limitation Convention: 4 years, however, subject to
qualifications:
-the seller and buyer may not extend or shorten the period in original agreement. The limitation period can
be started afresh by written acknowledgement of the obligation arising from the sales contract. Alternatively,
a party against which the claim has been asserted may extend the limitation period by written declaration.
However, the effect is that if the party does so before the original period has run. The party may renew the
extension one or more times, however, may not extend beyond the absolute limit of 10 years.
The Convention's rules for calculating the limitation period and the effect of legal holidays are self-
explanatory. Limitation Convention, arts. 28, 29. The Gregorian calendar is used as the standard for
measuring a year. Limitation Convention, art. 1(3)(h).
In some jurisdictions, the duty costs of the goods may be calculated against a specific Incoterm (for
example in India, duty is calculated against the CIF value of the goods, and in South Africa the duty
is calculated against the FOB value of the goods).
Because of this it is common for contracts for exports to these countries to use these Incoterms,
even when they are not suitable for the chosen mode of transport. Care must be exercised to ensure
that the liability issues are addressed by negotiation with the customer.
The seller makes the goods available at his/her premises. This term places the maximum obligation
on the buyer and minimum obligations on the seller. The Ex Works term is often used when making
Either the seller does not load the goods on collecting vehicles and does not clear them for export,
or if the seller does load the goods, he does so at buyer's risk and cost. If parties wish seller to be
responsible for the loading of the goods on departure and to bear the risk and all costs of such
loading, this must be made clear by adding explicit wording to this effect in the contract of sale.
The buyer arranges the pickup of the freight from the supplier's designated ship site, owns the in-
transit freight, and is responsible for clearing the goods through Customs. The buyer is also
responsible for completing all the export documentation.
These documentary requirements may cause two principal issues. Firstly, the stipulation for the
buyer to complete the export declaration can be an issue in certain jurisdictions (not least the
European Union) where the customs regulations require the declarant to be either an individual or
corporation resident within the jurisdiction.
Secondly, most jurisdictions require companies to provide proof of export for tax purposes. In an Ex
Works shipment, the buyer is under no obligation to provide such proof, or indeed to even export
the goods. It is therefore of utmost importance that these matters are discussed with the buyer
before the contract is agreed. It may well be that another Incoterm, such as FCA seller's premises,
may be more suitable.
The seller delivers the goods, cleared for export, at a named place. This can be to a carrier
nominated by the buyer, or to another person nominated by the buyer.
It should be noted that the chosen place of delivery has an impact on the obligations of loading and
unloading the goods at that place. If delivery occurs at the seller's premises, the seller is responsible
for loading the goods on to the buyer's carrier. However, if delivery occurs at any other place, the
seller is deemed to have delivered the goods once their transport has arrived at the named place;
the buyer is responsible for both unloading the goods and loading them onto their own carrier.
CPT replaces the venerable C&F (cost and freight) and CFR terms for all shipping modes outside
of non-containerized sea freight.
The seller pays for the carriage of the goods up to the named place of destination. Risk transfers to
buyer upon handing goods over to the first carrier at the place of shipment in the country of Export.
The Shipper is responsible for origin costs including export clearance and freight costs for carriage
to named place (usually a destination port or airport). The shipper is not responsible for delivery to
the final destination (generally the buyer's facilities), or for buying insurance. If the buyer does
require the seller to obtain insurance, the Incoterm CIP should be considered.
This term is broadly similar to the above CPT term, with the exception that the seller is required to
obtain insurance for the goods while in transit. CIP requires the seller to insure the goods for 110%
of their value under at least the minimum cover of the Institute Cargo Clauses of the Institute of
London Underwriters (which would be Institute Cargo Clauses (C)), or any similar set of clauses.
The policy should be in the same currency as the contract.
- DAT – Delivered at Terminal (named terminal at port or place of destination) - now replaced
by DPU (Delivery at Place Unloaded).
The previous term DAT meant that the seller covered all the costs of transport (export fees, carriage,
unloading from main carrier at destination port and destination port charges) and assumed all risk
until destination port or terminal. The terminal could be a Port, Airport, or inland freight interchange.
Import duty/taxes/customs costs were to be borne by Buyer.
Can be used for any transport mode, or where there is more than one transport mode. The seller is
responsible for arranging carriage and for delivering the goods, ready for unloading from the arriving
conveyance, at the named place. Duties are not paid by the seller under this term. The seller bears
all risks involved in bringing the goods to the named place.
Seller is responsible for delivering the goods to the named place in the country of the buyer, and
pays all costs in bringing the goods to the destination including import duties and taxes. The seller
is not responsible for unloading.
This term is often used in place of the non-Incoterm "Free in Store (FIS)". This term places the
maximum obligations on the seller and minimum obligations on the buyer. With the delivery at the
named place of destination all the risks and responsibilities are transferred to the buyer and it is
considered that the seller has completed his obligations.
The following four (4) INCOTERMS deal with both Sea and Inland Waterway Transport:
It is important to note that these terms are generally not suitable for shipments in shipping
containers; the point at which risk and responsibility for the goods passes is when the goods are
loaded on board the ship, and if the goods are sealed into a shipping container it is impossible to
verify the condition of the goods at this point. Also, of note is that the point at which risk passes
under these terms has shifted from previous editions of Incoterms, where the risk passed at the
ship's rail.
The seller delivers when the goods are placed alongside the buyer's vessel at the named port of
shipment. This means that the buyer has to bear all costs and risks of loss of or damage to the
goods from that moment. The FAS term requires the seller to clear the goods for export, which is a
reversal from previous Incoterms versions that required the buyer to arrange for export clearance.
However, if the parties wish the buyer to clear the goods for export, this should be made clear by
FOB means that the seller pays for delivery of goods to the vessel including loading. The seller must
also arrange for export clearance. The buyer pays cost of marine freight transportation, insurance,
unloading and transportation cost from the arrival port to destination. The buyer arranges for the
vessel, and the shipper must load the goods onto the named vessel at the named port of shipment
according to the dates stipulated in the contract of sale as informed by the buyer.
Risk passes from the seller to the buyer when the goods are loaded aboard the vessel. This term
has been greatly misused over the last three decades ever since Incoterms 1980 explained that
FCA should be used for container shipments.
Seller must pay the costs and freight to bring the goods to the port of destination. However, risk is
transferred to the buyer once the goods are loaded on the vessel. Insurance for the goods is NOT
included.
Exactly the same as CFR except that the seller must in addition procure and pay for the insurance.
This is a trade term requiring the seller to arrange for the carriage of goods by sea to a port of
destination and provide the buyer with the documents necessary to obtain the goods from the carrier.