Dean PsychoanalysisAIDS 1993
Dean PsychoanalysisAIDS 1993
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TIM DEAN
Twice as many Americans were killed by AIDS in the first nine years of
the epidemic (June 1981 to June 1990) as were claimed as casualties in the nine
years (1964-73) of the Vietnam War. As I write this in the summer of 1991,
after a full decade of the epidemic, over 110,000 Americans have died as a
consequence of AIDS, and at least one million more are thought to be infected
with HIV. Within another year it is expected that the number of American
AIDS deaths will be almost double last year's figure. These statistics, including
the projection that in less than another decade from now forty million people
worldwide will be infected with HIV, achieve the philosophical status of Kant's
mathematical sublime: they are so extensive as to be unthinkable. What can
psychoanalysis, which works on the human subject in his or her particularity,
say or do in the face of such epidemic dimensions?
Because psychoanalysis addresses itself to the subject of speech, it recog-
nizes that every body, including the sick body, is caught in a network of signifiers,
a network that mortifies all bodies by precluding access to either one's own
jouissance or any knowledge of the body outside of symbolic structures. Thus
* This paper has benefited from suggestions made by Dan Buccino, Chris Lane, Tova Perl-
mutter, Suzanne Yang, and especially from Jason Friedman's close attention.
insofar as AID
body, it also
renders AIDS
makes AIDS a
tion is that n
of psychic pr
investigation
ical question o
Yet AIDS is
cannot remain
proceeds from
-as has largely
construction
Beyond the ef
to diagnose m
to AIDS, this
homosexual d
subject of th
associated wi
internal sourc
the politically
sition is fram
distinct from
themselves,"
phenomena of
gay people an
while also rev
cursivity for
The
My first the
acknowledging
AIDS) insofar
real of the so
as the discour
repressed as s
is encountere
1. See Cindy Pa
Desire: Pornograp
the essays collect
MIT Press, 1988).
against homo
relation of m
adaptive psy
patible with
authorize the
compatibility
of an adequat
(216). Social
heterosexual,
subject is lack
the-Father. C
a reality from
psychosis is
sufficient distance has not been obtained.6
Psychosis names a primordial disturbance of the subject's relation to lan-
guage such that the paternal metaphor, which signifies castration, does not
become part of the subject's symbolic universe because it is foreclosed from the
Other and therefore from the unconscious. Lacan summarizes thus: "It is in an
accident in this register and in what takes place in it, namely, the foreclosure
of the Name-of-the-Father in the place of the Other, and in the failure of the
paternal metaphor, that I designate the defect that gives psychosis its essential
condition, and the structure that separates it from neurosis" (215). Because
"foreclosure" (forclusion), which is Lacan's translation of the Freudian term
Verwerfung (also translatable as "rejection," "repudiation," or "exclusion"), is
distinct from repression, a structural-as opposed to phenomenal-distinction
exists between neurosis and psychosis. This distinction invalidates the diagnostic
category of the "borderline" patient (and thus points to one of many important
differences between Lacan and Kristeva, for whom the "borderline" category is
central). In contrast to the neurotic subject, who experiences a return of the
repressed in the symbolic (the discourse of the Other), the psychotic subject
experiences a return in the real of what has been foreclosed of the symbolic.
How is American society psychotic about AIDS? Recall that the S in the
acronym AIDS stands not for "signifier" but for "syndrome," and that therefore
AIDS is to be understood not as a specific disease (it is not in itself contagious
or communicable) but rather as a condition of the body, an index of the body's
vulnerability to disease, to its surround, and to itself. The analogy of socia
psychosis enables us to understand AIDS as a condition of the body politic, an
6. To this distinction between reality as norm-to which Lacan says our only access is
imaginary-and the traumatic real (to which we have neither imaginary nor symbolic access an
which is governed by the death drive) should be added the differential of Freud's "psychic reality"
(which is governed by the pleasure principle and therefore immune to the claims of external
empirical reality): Lacan's real is quite different from both.
here is not o
but concerns
sulating Laca
more than a
where it thin
excludes. AID
AIDS current
To fully arg
nuities of La
periodization
quoting, "On
supposedly r
Les Psychose
first publica
differ signif
the Name-of-the-Father remains unformulated in the Third Seminar, and is
hardly even implied in the earlier parts of the seminar from which Lacan's
headnote claims the 6crit derives. Conversely, the familiar maxim that "what is
foreclosed in the symbolic returns in the real," which is repeated in the seminar,
takes up its position among the waste matter in which his first frolics occur, much as the law of
symbolization in which his desire must operate catches him in its net by the position of the part-
object in which he offers himself on arrival in the world, in a world in which the desire of the
Other lays down the law." The relation between the analyst and the turd as object a is prefigured
early in the Third Seminar, in which Lacan proposes another 'justifiable" analogy, this time between
the analyst and a dipotoir-a container for night soil, a kind of cesspit (Le Seminaire livre III: Les
Psychoses (1955-1956), ed. Jacques-Alain Miller [Paris: Seuil, 1981], p. 39). As object a in the
transference, it is this impossible place that the analyst must occupy.
11. The etymological link between "symptom" and "syndrome" reinforces the implications of
the notion of a social "symptom": in a profound way, AIDS names the condition of contemporary
American society. I should perhaps add that my use of the term "symptom" at this point accords
with Lacan's later, more radical conceptualization of the symptom as sinthome, the "fourth order,"
which grounds the ternary orders of imaginary, symbolic, and real in their Borromean structure,
thereby giving consistency to the subject's being through jouissance (see Jacques Lacan, "Les paroles
imposees" [Legon du seminaire Le sinthome], ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, in Johann Listing, Introduction
d la topologie, trans. Claude Leger and Michael Turnheim [Paris: Navarin, 1989], pp. 83-91). Slavoj
2izek summarizes Lacan's development of the concept of the symptom in The Sublime Object of
Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), pp. 55-84.
12. Lacan himself contributes to such a periodization by referring, in "On a Question," to his
1932 psychiatric thesis, De la psychose paranoiaque dans ses rapports avec la personalitM, and commenting:
"An early study of paranoia led me thirty years ago to the threshold of psychoanalysis" (184). At
this juncture Lacan thus characterizes his own early work as "pre-Freud." I discuss the epistemology
of periodizing Lacan in "Historicizing Lacan?" Newsletter of the Freudian Field vol. 6, no. 1/2 (1992),
forthcoming.
13. It is the complete failure to consider this crucial discrepancy that mars the otherwise useful
account provided in Michael Walsh, "Reading the Real in the Seminar on the Psychoses," in Criticism
and Lacan: Essays and Dialogue on Language, Structure, and the Unconscious, ed. Patrick Colm Hogan
and Lalita Pandit (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), pp. 64-83.
reached the p
may be consid
The L
It is entirel
linguistic sys
view profoun
chosis. Yet in
theorize AIDS
"theory," cert
(tenaciously h
case for several reasons.
First, although psychoanalytic theory emphasizes the determining effects
of the signifier upon the human subject, it is also, as I will argue, the only
contemporary theory equipped with a rigorous concept of extradiscursivity.
However, the concept of object a, which represents a cause outside of-but not
preceding-language, has been almost universally lost in the Anglo-American
tendency to assimilate Lacan as merely one among many versions of French
structuralism or poststructuralism.
Second, the AIDS epidemic has been from its very beginning a source of
linguistic crisis: the rapid transformations of nomination, the proliferation of
acronyms, euphemisms, and metaphors, plus the birth of whole new social and
scientific discourses, together with the development of strategies of discursive
censorship, attest to a characteristically postmodern linguistic formation in
which language itself, let alone sex, seems "unsafe." The very term "AIDS"-
whose connotative ironies have become so naturalized that many of us find its
enunciation routine, while for others it remains so alarmingly new and volatile
that they find it impossible to let the term pass their lips-is mutating once
more: "HIV disease" seems to be establishing itself as the preferred, more
accurate term.21
20. See the widely disseminated cover article by Daniel Harris, "AIDS and Theory," Lingua
Franca 1 (June 1991), pp. 1, 16-19, which takes a thoroughly anti-intellectual, reactionary stance
in order to argue that any theorizing about AIDS is worse than useless. Harris's crude logic,
mobilized principally against what he conceives as the influence of deconstruction on ACT UP,
opposes thought to action, and argues for the latter at the expense of the former: a counsel to
thoughtless action.
21. On the case for renaming the syndrome "HIV disease," see Simon Watney, "Taking Liberties:
An Introduction," Taking Liberties: AIDS and Cultural Politics, ed. Erica Carter and Simon Watney
(London: Serpent's Tail, 1989), pp. 14-17. The independent, nonprofit AIDS service, HERO
(Health Education Resource Organization), for which I work in Baltimore, is one example of a
group that has recently substituted "HIV disease" for "AIDS" in all its printed material.
Media language usage with respect to AIDS is analyzed in Watney, Policing Desire; and the
October special issue devoted to AIDS is also heavily weighted toward linguistic and visual
At this homological level, one of whose rhetorical costs consists precisely in the
failure to resist the disinformation ("AIDS virus") of which it speaks, it appears
undecidable whether illness is a metaphor or metaphor a kind of illness, a
disabling condition of the subject of discourse.
The notion of illness as metaphor is, of course, an allusion to the work of
Susan Sontag, whose book AIDS and Its Metaphors has been wholeheartedly
denounced, in terms self-consciously drawn from the medical discourse on
AIDS, as "opportunistic" because of its heterosexist, homophobic "silence about
representations--or "discursive constructions"-of the syndrome: see Crimp, ed., AIDS: Cultural
Analysis/Cultural Activism, especially Jan Zita Grover, "AIDS: Keywords," pp. 17-30.
22. Paula A. Treichler, "AIDS, Homophobia, and Biomedical Discourse: An Epidemic of Sig-
nification," in AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism, p. 31. Subsequent references give pagination
in main text.
people with A
metaphors."23
Sontag's book
homophobia th
women and ga
phor such that
end up inscrib
now, however,
discourses on AIDS and metacritical discourses about those discourses seem
unable to avoid terms of disease. These discourses are themselves diseased,
contaminated, in the sense that their distanced metacritical purity is impossible
to maintain, and the language of AIDS thus appears as part of its discursive
object.24
I would like to propose an alternative emphasis to that implied by the
deconstructive tendency of this part of my argument by suggesting that it is the
subject of discourse who is "diseased," rather than language. The radical
dis-ease to which the subject is introduced via the signifier is in fact part of
Lacan's account of psychosis, for one of the things thrown into relief by the
dilemma of the psychotic patient is our common malaise as linguistic subjects:
"How do we not sense that the words we depend upon are imposed on us, that
speech is an overlay, a parasite, the form of cancer with which human beings
are afflicted?"25 Lacan's question is rhetorical because it is precisely our failure
fully to "sense" speech as imposed that prevents us from succumbing to psy-
chosis. If Lacan had survived to witness the ravages of the AIDS epidemic,
would his question formulate AIDS, rather than cancer, as figure for the afflic-
tion particular to subjectivity? And would such a formulation, in its supposed
generalization of AIDS at the price of gay specificity, count merely as one more
"opportunistic" relation to AIDS?
The struggle to speak or remain silent about AIDS is certainly in larg
measure a struggle, as another commentator has put it, "to say or not to say
the word 'gay."'26 But to argue that AIDS has unleashed an epidemic of signi
fication is not tantamount to claiming that American society's symbolization
of the deaths, of the personal and political struggles of gay men-has been in
any way adequate. Since symbolization is defined in a Lacanian perspective by
23. Susan Sontag, AIDS and Its Metaphors (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1989). The critiqu
comes from D. A. Miller, "Sontag's Urbanity," October 49 (Summer 1989), pp. 91-101.
24. Lee Edelman makes a related argument in "The Plague of Discourse: Politics, Litera
Theory, and AIDS," South Atlantic Quarterly: Displacing Homophobia 88 (Winter 1989), pp. 301-17
25. Cited by Jacques-Alain Miller, "Teachings of the Case Presentation," Returning to Freu
Clinical Psychoanalysis in the School of Lacan, ed. and trans. Stuart Schneiderman (New Haven: Y
University Press, 1980), p. 49.
26. Helena Michie, "A Few Words About AIDS," American Literary History 2 (Summer 1990
p. 328.
[The contrary
under the tit
is written by
S2- Si
And Lacan introduces this analytic discourse under the session title "The Cas-
trated Master" by declaring that "the psychoanalytic discourse finds itself ver
precisely at the opposite pole of the discourse of the master" (100). L'envers
la psychanalyse is the seminar for the 1969-70 year; its reference to the maste
discourse as the discursive structure of politics is made in the aftermath of Ma
1968 and should be understood therefore as implying that what is contrary t
psychoanalysis is precisely the hegemonic ideological formation against which
struggles were being waged. Psychoanalysis is political precisely to the exten
that the discursive position of the analyst diametrically opposes that of the
master discourse, for the latter of which all division is repressed by the unici
of certainty:
S1
$--
29. Jacques Lacan, "A Love Letter" (1973), in Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the Ecole
Freudienne, ed. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose, trans. Jacqueline Rose (New York: Norton,
1982), pp. 152-53.
30. Although it would be correct to argue that the Enlightenment philosophy from which the
American political tradition derives enshrines the individual in his autonomy (rather than the
family) as the fundamental unit of social address, my suggestion is that the master discourse on
sexuality addresses the family insofar as the individual accedes to his sociopolitical "rights" only in
a familial context: persons achieve "individual" status only by fulfilling certain ideological prereq-
The past de
imagery-his
matic-about
zation of nat
most recent
supply if mo
made to sym
Ronald Reaga
until late 198
the epidemic
The work of
private doma
various kind
into the publ
signifies. One
private, dom
public spect
Lacan's term
"quilting"-of
may press t
functioning
six years of
tradition of
semiosis with
it is displaye
Although cu
mourning, in
tion of the f
as inadequate
of mourning
in Jeff Nunokowa, "'All the Sad Young Men': AIDS and the Work of Mourning," in Inside/Out:
Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories, ed. Diana Fuss (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 311-23, and the
essays by Gregg Bordowitz, Crimp, and Martha Gever in Crimp, ed., AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural
Activism.
34. Jacques Lacan, "Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father Seminar," Television: A Challenge to
the Psychoanalytic Establishment, ed. Joan Copjec, trans. Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss, Annette
Michelson, and Jeffrey Mehlman (New York: Norton, 1990), p. 85.
demand as the
is articulated by
name of the deceased.
That the quilt functions as a potent identificatory signifier in American
society is left in no doubt by the testimonies of those quilters who have produc
panels for people they never met or whom they knew only slightly. Inspired b
a photographic "quilt" published by Newsweek in 1987 ("The Face of AID
profiled 302 people dead from AIDS in the year ending July 1987), many
readers were symbolically impelled to symbolize their identification with th
chronic loss occasioned by AIDS. As one such woman, 'just a housewife," p
it: "I felt bad about all the people who die of AIDS that nobody knows."35 Th
quilt's testimonial power-the power of a homemade Si-has been officially
recognized by the collective decision to show it in the nation's capital one mor
time, despite the acknowledgment at its last full showing in Washington, D.C.
in 1989, that it had grown too large ever again to be displayed there in o
piece. Over 14,000 panels are scheduled for simultaneous display in Washingt
on Columbus Day weekend, 1992.36
In March 1987, three months before the first quilt panel was sewn and
with presidential silence on the topic of AIDS still unbroken, another America
tradition was revived for symbolic purposes: civil rights activism. Founded b
Larry Kramer, the "direct-action group" ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unlea
Power) takes as its rallying slogan "Silence=Death." This austerely brief text,
"Silence=Death," is typically set beneath the figure of a pink triangle for whic
it thereby functions as legend (a pink triangle being the symbol appended to
gay men in Nazi death camps), and the whole thus intensifies its rhetoric
urgency via allusion to the Holocaust as the contemporary signifier of absolut
horror. Unsurprisingly, the slogan has itself generated much discourse an
many competing interpretations of its significance and effectiveness, not leas
because its structure dramatically conflates a causal relation with an ident
relation.37 First, the equation points to the perpetuation of AIDS deaths as a
direct consequence of governmental silence and inaction. Silence as a refusal
symbolization also functions as a disavowal of death, a refusal to allow AI
deaths to signify; silence thus performs a kind of second death on top of th
first, physical death by forestalling the mourning that allows the dead to achie
their proper relation to the living. The double logic of the slogan therefore
35. Cindy Ruskin, Matt Herron, and Deborah Zemke, The Quilt: Stories From The NAMES Projec
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), p. 61.
36. I am grateful to Michele Cinq Mars of The NAMES Project, San Francisco, for providing
me with this information before its official announcement, and for confirming factual details about
the quilt.
37. Besides Harris's article (note 20) and Edelman's (note 24), see Patton, Inventing AIDS,
pp. 126-30, Crimp's introduction to AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism, pp. 3-16, and his
response to Edelman's argument in Douglas Crimp, "Mourning and Militancy," October 51 (Winter
1989), pp. 3-18.
course there are at least some members of ACT UP who are activists while
explicitly subscribing to philosophical theories incompatible with the dictionar
definition. Douglas Crimp, for example, takes a standard Foucauldean line in
introducing the best collection of AIDS work to date when he writes, "I asser
to begin with, that 'disease' does not exist.... AIDS does not exist apart fro
the practices that conceptualize it, represent it, and respond to it."39 No "prac-
tice" conceptualizes, represents, or responds to anything without the interven-
tion of the signifier and the consequent installation of "practice" within the fie
of discourse. Yet the tendency remains to consider the signifier's interventio
as an avoidable barrier to effective political intervention, and to consider the
"talking cure" no real cure at all.
This paradoxical tendency, which is one of the greatest stumbling blocks
for any political program centered on "direct action," is caught in the title of
collection of ACT UP documents and archival material coedited by Crimp
AIDS Demo Graphics. AIDS demography, the study of population statistics wit
respect to AIDS, is achieved in this book by presenting graphic images-ph
tographs and posters-that function demonstratively, as examples (the boo
presents itself in the classic American genre of the handbook) and as actual,
active interventions. The prefix demo- is inflected according to its "proper,"
etymological (Greek) meaning, people, but also according to its colloquial mean
ing, as an abbreviation of demonstration (whose Latin root has nothing to do wit
the Greek word for people). The titular demo thus signifies people acting
intervening symbolically via organized public demonstrations in the political
spheres that affect their lives: "This book . . . is meant as direct action, puttin
the power of representation in the hands of as many people as possible."40 Ye
this book is precisely demo-graphy, people writing, people caught in a signifie
whose defining characteristic is displacement of the subject elsewhere than the
place of his conscious intention, for which reason representative power is dis
placed and deferred at the moment of its dissemination-a qualification th
nevertheless should not discourage the effort. Recognition of language's non-
transparency does not eliminate that opacity; however, eliminating a naiv
conception of representational power may indeed help us wield more accurately
the very significant power representation and rhetoric hold over our lives.
But what about ACT UP's implicit recognition in its slogan of the power
of the signifier in relation to life, the power of silence to cause death? In on
sense, the implication of the slogan-namely, that if silence=death, then
speech=life-runs directly against the Lacanian thesis that speech mortifies th
subject, that the signifier itself entails a certain death. However, in another
sense, the assumption behind both activism and the quilt that symbolization
That this seminar, dated April 29, 1959, should revert in its formula for psy-
chosis to a moment preceding the insights of the psychosis icrit, composed early
in 1958, confirms that any periodization of Lacan's teaching cannot proceed
adequately by chronology. Nevertheless, the notion that psychosis and mourning
are linked in a relation of structural inversion supports our thesis that the social
relation to AIDS is properly psychotic as a consequence of its refusal of a
signifier for AIDS that would provide for mourning: silence = death.
It is worth re
of mourning,
When Freud d
terms: melanch
society continu
of thousands o
taken by acti
mourning revi
as the definin
psychosis beca
as pathological
the lost object)
in the Freudian
identified and chastises it with the viciousness of a hatred that is the underside
of any love relationship having the status of "ambivalence." From this under-
standing Freud develops his concept of the superego, which Lacan will refor-
mulate in the seminar on L'ethique de la psychanalyse through the concepts of the
noxious neighbor and jouissance.
What about those of us so torn by grief at the losses occasioned by AIDS
that the act of mourning the objects of love is transformed into identification
with the cause of loss? I am thinking here of a comment by Larry Kramer, who,
recounting the conditions under which he founded ACT UP and responding
with justifiable ire to President Bush's denunciations of AIDS activism, declared:
"ACT UP is impolite, abrasive, rude-like the virus that is killing us."45 Iden-
tification with the cause of loss only unleashes an aggressivity whose ultimate
aim, no matter against whom or what it is directed, is death.46 Ambivalence
toward the object of love may indeed be endemic to any love relation, yet Freud
emphasizes ambivalence as one of the prerequisites for the transformation of
mourning into melancholia. How much more ambivalent must homosexual love
be in a homophobic culture, and therefore how much more prone to melan-
cholic identification -and the subsequent unleashing of murderous
aggression-must gay men be in the age of AIDS?
In an essay remarkable, among other things, for its willingness to engage
with psychoanalysis and for the emphasis it places on the unconscious, Crimp
43. However, society remains perfectly willing to render meaningful the deaths of those perceived
through a disavowed tautology as "innocent victims" -for example, children-on condition that
the latter maintain a nonsexual status.
44. Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917 [1915]), The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1957), vol.
14, p. 249.
45. Kramer, "Ten Years of Plague," p. 62.
46. Freud stresses that the melancholic's desire for suicide is simply a displacement onto his ego
of his unconscious murderous wishes toward the loved object.
47. Crimp, "Mourning and Militancy," p. 10. Subsequent references give pagination in main text.
48. Jacqueline Rose, "Where Does the Misery Come From? Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the
Event," in Feminism and Psychoanalysis, ed. Richard Feldstein and Judith Roof (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989), pp. 25-39.
49. Joel Fineman, "The Sound of O in Othello: The Real of the Tragedy of Desire," October 45
(Summer 1988), pp. 82-83.
50. David Leavitt, Family Dancing (New York: Knopf, 1984), pp. 79-94.
51. Cynthia Ozick, The Shawl (New York: Vintage, 1990). Dr. Tree Pursues Rosa, "a madwoma
and a scavenger," in order to subject her to his study of Holocaust survivors, based on a theor
entitled-in a perfectly American amalgam of Freud and Disney-"Repressed Animation."
choanalytic ac
matics, princ
mappings bas
which all the
and meaningle
map the subje
an object as by
the effects o
terms-jouissa
nifier of sexu
drive," accord
represents in
The J
It is alwa
siderable
as there a
the manif
-Sigmun
Disco
Perhaps the
segregates and
life-and with
its combinatio
resistance of
theoretical dis
by the Ameri
of Lacan, mea
Freudian deat
If for Barthes in 1973 the relevant distinction is between the text of
pleasure and the text of bliss (jouissance), this is because Lacan has already
55. Lacan, "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet," p. 11. The best account of Lacan's
use of topology is Jeanne Granon-Lafont, La topologie ordinaire de Jacques Lacan (Paris: Point Hor
Ligne, 1985). What are we to make of the fact that the development of topological science i
historically coincident with the emergence both of "the homosexual" as a discrete ontological identity
and of psychoanalysis (all late-nineteenth-century, quintessentially modern phenomena)?
56. Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, p. 205. In an 6crit from the same period, Lacan concludes
that "every drive is virtually the death drive" ("Position de l'inconscient," Ecrits [Paris: Seuil, 1966
p. 848).
57. Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang,
1975).
58. Sigmund Freud, "Zeitgemisses Uber Krieg und Tod," Gesammelte Werke (1913-1917), bd. 10
(London: Imago, 1946), p. 351.
59. Sigmund Freud, "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death" [1915], Standard Edition, vol.
14, p. 289.
itself torrid (o
could also read
of fire (burnin
second reading
cause remains
"jouissance is f
version of the t
is achieved at
"a pound of fle
ance is therefo
only substanti
Jouissance and
scious) are stri
pleasure princ
text, for insta
Apropos of Sad
as "the law of
jouissance is ch
acceptance of
death is compl
impossible for t
Sade's value f
object of the O
a "right to jou
ative. As Lacan
recognized, wo
evermore outd
to slip, by an
than the egoi
jouissance, is e
jouir de] your
any limit stop
the taste to sa
ethical-law in
64. Cited by Leo Bersani, "Is the Rectum a Grave?" in Crimp, AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural
Activism, p. 197. Subsequent references give pagination in main text. Although I disagree with her
interpretation of it, I am grateful to Frances Ferguson for discussing Bersani's essay with me.
I suppose to k
to know how to
In the course
Seminar, Lacan
neighbor is in
our desire is p
Other. Homop
be appreciated
are capable of
in their uncon
pendent upon
onism not onl
but is internal
dependence u
sexual enjoym
forms of hom
self-antagonis
they argue th
around a centr
that neither
identity is sel
through the r
In this respe
homosexual jo
pressed by R
Dugas, whose
origin of Nor
from effects
ance of the Ot
politically exp
two opposite y
and Leo Bersa
issue on AIDS.
by him to wh
Like Lacan in
version of sex in favor of "the inestimable value of sex as-at least in some of
its ineradicable aspects-anticommunal, antiegalitarian, antinurturing, antilov
ing" (215). Thus in a completely opposite way to Crimp, Bersani embrace
certain image of the Other's noxious jouissance as it is associated with gay se
Such a position is dependent, however, upon a certain heterosexist conflatio
in Bersani's argument of sex with fucking-in this case, homosexual anal pen
etration (buttfucking). Anal penetration is indeed the archetypal sexual
associated with the Other's jouissance, as is suggested by Lacan's enigmatic r
erence in "Kant with Sade" to "spintrian jouissance" (jouissance of the sphincte
defined by the OED as "pertaining to [male prostitutes and] those who seek ou
or invent new and monstrous forms of lust"), and as is illustrated by the fate
Sade's Justine, who, during her interminable submission to every whim of sex
caprice (following the "right to jouissance"), is buttfucked countless times, b
only once, symbolically, is she vaginally raped."
Bersani pictures the rectum as a grave "in which the masculine ideal of
proud subjectivity is buried," an ideal that he unmistakably identifies with th
ego. It is thus the ego-shattering jouissance of receptive rectal sex that leads h
to characterize sexuality as "a tautology for masochism" (217).72 The problem
with this fascinating psychoanalytic argument is its ultimate appeal to the ga
ego as an agent of mastery, for in the face of AIDS Bersani recommends "an
arduous representational discipline," which involves "the pain of embracing,
least provisionally, a homophobic representation of homosexuality" (209
order to make the gay man's rectum a metaphorical grave for "the sacrosan
value of selfhood, a value that accounts for human beings' extraordinary wi
ingness to kill in order to protect the seriousness of their statements" (222
Recent U.S. foreign and domestic policies, including the political responses t
AIDS, must compel increasingly vigorous assent to Bersani's characterization
the fatal dangers of upholding "the sacrosanct value of selfhood." Howev
any appeal to the ego, even an appeal for it to solicit its own shattering, mu
count as a nonpsychoanalytic solution, for in seeking to eliminate the significa
of the unconscious, Bersani's recommendation implicitly advocates a redemp
tion of subjectivity-if not of selfhood-as such. The crucial distinction we w
able to make earlier (with the help of Vergetis) between a subject founded i
71. Lacan, "Kant with Sade," p. 67 (and Swenson, "Annotations," p. 95). For Justine's spint
fate, see "Justine, or Good Conduct Well Chastised" (1791), The Marquis de Sade,Justine, Philoso
in the Bedroom, and Other Writings, trans. Richard Seaver and Austryn Wainhouse (New York: Gro
1966), pp. 447-743.
72. This idea is developed in Bersani, "Sexuality and Aesthetics," October 28 (Spring 19
pp. 27-42 (reprinted as Chapter 2 of The Freudian Body), in order to argue that masoch
nevertheless "serves life" rather than death because "it is only because sexuality is ontologic
grounded in masochism that the human organism survives the gap between the period of shatte
stimuli and the development of resistant or defensive ego structures" (p. 34).
A Cure?
73. Georges Bataille, who is mentioned only once in "Is the Rectum a Grave?" and not at all in
The Freudian Body (but see Chapter 4, "Literature and History: Malraux and Bataille," The Culture
of Redemption, pp. 102-23), was of course a significant contemporary influence on Lacan; yet a
reliable account of the mutual rivalry and influence obtaining between Bataille and Lacan remains
to be written.
74. But see Francois Leguil and Danible Silvestre, "Psychanalystes confrontes au SIDA," Ornicar?
45 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-13, and Tim Dean and Graham Hammill, eds., Psychoanalysis and AIDS, a
special issue of South Atlantic Quarterly, forthcoming.
75. Such an account might begin by considering the contributions of members of the Freudian
Field to the discussion of perversion, a term used descriptively, indicative of a structure, rather
than evaluatively, redolent of moral censure. See particularly Marie-Hdlne Brousse et al., "L'homo-
sexualite masculin dans les structures cliniques," Traits de perversion dans les structures cliniques (VIkme
Rencontre internationale du Champ freudien, Paris, Juillet 1990) (Paris: Navarin, 1990), pp. 162-
71.
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American socia
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overemphasis
concept of the
theorize the death drive.
My argument is that in a psychotic society we are all PWAs. The question
remains: Is there a cure for this, if not yet a cure for AIDS? One of Lacan's
many revisions of the orthodox theory of psychosis was his demonstration that
psychosis is not untreatable via the talking cure ("On a Question," 214). However,
Lacanian psychoanalysis offers nobody a cure for subjectivity. Rather, it insists
upon a confrontation with the very condition of subjectivity: that the death
drive inhabits our being, that death is at the heart of life, and that there is
therefore something fundamentally incurable in being human. Because AIDS
has become a figure for death in life, we may say that although the acronymic
S stands for syndrome, a condition of the body, it stands also for the subject of
the signifier, $. Living with language, we are also now, as a consequence of the
political specificities of contemporary U.S. society, living with AIDS. If ACT UP
sometimes makes its point by writing AID$, my final point must be the reminder
that we are subjects of AID$.