Kamikaze Attacks

of World War II
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Kamikaze Attacks
of World War II
A Complete History of Japanese
Suicide Strikes on American Ships,
by Aircraft and Other Means

ROBIN L. RIELLY

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers

Jefferson, North Carolina, and London
 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGUING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA
Rielly, Robin L.
Kamikaze attacks of World War II : a complete history of Japanese suicide
strikes on American ships, by aircraft and other means / Robin L. Rielly.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-7864-4654-4
illustrated case binding : 50# alkaline paper

¡. Japan. Kaigun. Kamikaze Tokubetsu Kogekitai. 2. World War, 1939 –1945 —

Aerial operations, Japanese. 3. Kamikaze pilots— History. 4. World War,
1939 –1945 — Campaigns— Pacific Area. 5. World War, 1939 –1945 —
Naval operations, American. 6. Warships— United States—
History — 20th century. I. Title.
D792.J3R523 2010 940.54' 4952 — dc22 2010021494

British Library cataloguing data are available

©2010 Robin L. Rielly. All rights reserved

No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form

or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying
or recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publisher.

On the cover: Photograph of an attack on the

U.S.S. White Plains by a Japanese A6M Zero on October 25, 1944
(National Archives and Records Administration)

Manufactured in the United States of America

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers

Box 6¡¡, Je›erson, North Carolina 28640
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To Madeline Rose Booth
This page intentionally left blank
 Table of Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes,

Their Organization, and Disposition
1. The Development of the Samurai Class and Its Ethos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Kamikaze Traditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. Special Attack Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4. Development of the Tokko-tai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5. Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles:

A Detailed Account of the Attacks
7. Prelude to Mayhem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
8. The December Kamikazes, 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
9. Lingayen Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
10. Taiwan, Iwo Jima, and Ulithi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
11. Okinawa and the Ten Go Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
12. The Invasion of Okinawa, Week One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
13. The Onslaught Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
14. “...We Cleaned Up the Bodies...” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
15. A Miserable May . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
16. The War Winds Down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
17. Ketsu Go: Defending the Homeland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

vii
viii Table of Contents

Appendix I: U.S. Navy and Merchant Marine Ships Damaged

or Sunk by Kamikaze Attacks, 1942 –1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
Appendix II: Ship Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
Appendix III: American and Japanese Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334

Chapter Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
 Preface

For the past fifteen years or so I have focused my research efforts on American naval his-
tory in the World War II era. This research began with an interest in the ship on which
my father served during that war. I thought it would be my first and last effort in the area but
as time went on, one research project seemed to lead to another. I completed books on the
LCS(L) ships, then the radar picket ships at Okinawa and, in this work, the kamikaze expe-
rience.
Over the years there have been a number of books published on the kamikazes. Vir-
tually all focus on specific incidents, campaigns, or ships and their experiences as they encoun-
tered the Tokko-tai fliers or kamikazes. To this point no one has attempted a complete
accounting of the more than 400 incidents of kamikaze attacks on American ships in World
War II.
Some of the books written to date were by eyewitnesses to the carnage suffered by
the United States Navy ships that were attacked by the kamikazes in the Philippines and
at Okinawa. Still others were by former members of the Japanese naval and army air wings
whose fate assigned them to the special attack corps. Ultimately, they survived to tell of
their training and experience. A few former Japanese naval officers have written about the
kamikazes and sought to rationalize their participation in the organization that sent others,
much junior, to their deaths. In addition, there are works that seek to sensationalize the
kamikaze phenomenon. To my knowledge, no work exists that documents the numerous
attacks that took place against the American ships that served in the Pacific theater of oper-
ations. With that in mind, I have undertaken an examination of the kamikaze attacks during
the Second World War.
As the reader will note, there are a number of photos in this work from the National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland. I have spent many hours
of research there and have had excellent help from Rutha Beamon, Theresa Roy, Sharon Cully,
and Holly Reed in the still photo section. Barry Zerbe in the textual reference branch
has always been able to find materials hidden in the vast collection that have aided in my
research.
Numerous veterans of the war have generously consented to interviews and have aided
substantially in my understanding of the events. Their eyewitness accounts have been most
helpful. For their time and eyewitness testimony I am indebted to Dr. Donald L. Ball, John
L. Barkley, Frank Barnby, Ray Baumler, Earl Blanton, Dean Bell, William E. Bletso, Robert
Blyth, Harold H. Burgess, William R. Christman, George E. Davis, Mel Dean, W. A. Dworzak,

1
2 Preface

Melvin Fenoglio, David Gauthier, Earl O. Griffis, Claude Haddock, Edwin Hoffman Jr.,
Lawrence S. Katz, Harold Kaup, James Kelley, Doyle Kennedy, Capt. Richard M. McCool,
Franklin Moulton, Albert Perdeck, Harry Portolan, L. R. Russell, Mark Sellis, Tom Spargo,
Robert Sprague, Harold Tolmas, and Dr. Robert Wisner.
I benefited greatly from the interviews with karate master Teruyuki Okazaki who gra-
ciously shared his views of samurai tradition as well as his experiences as a middle school stu-
dent undergoing kamikaze training in Japan. Expert assistance in translating various Japanese
language materials was given by Takamichi Maeshima, to whom I am indebted.
Special thanks are due to my proofreaders Lucille Rielly and Ken Thompson who made
numerous invaluable suggestions about the text. In spite of their diligent efforts, the sole
responsibility for the accuracy of this work rests with the author.
 Introduction

It should be noted from the outset that this is a study of the kamikazes from the American
perspective. Sources used consist primarily of reports from army, navy, Marine, and merchant
marine units, as well as secondary published materials. Although some records exist in Japa-
nese pertinent to the operations of the Tokko-tai, many were officially destroyed in the after-
math of the war, leaving large gaps in the available documentation needed to cover the subject
from the Japanese perspective. Since the end of the war, many former members of the Japanese
military have attempted to piece together the history of various units to which they were
attached, some with great detail. The Reports of General MacArthur was an early attempt to
coordinate the many available Japanese materials that survived in the aftermath of World
War II. That work, along with the Japanese Monograph series, Allied Translator and Interpreter
Section reports and interrogations, and United States Strategic Bombing Survey reports have
provided a great deal of information as to how the Japanese formed and ran their special
attack corps.
The presentation of this material proved problematic. The chapters relating to kamikaze
traditions and the development of the special attack forces, which is covered in the first part
of the book, were easiest. The second part had to be organized as a chronicle, noting the
attacks on each ship in a day by day manner. There was no single ship or group of ships that
encountered kamikazes in exactly the same way and location. Attacks came singly or en masse,
on individual ships or groups of ships, there were few common denominators. This would
have made my chore easy as I could have followed the exploits of a ship as it wandered from
war zone to war zone. Since my focus was to demonstrate the extent of the kamikaze program,
I had to document the attacks as they occurred. There was simply no other way to approach
the task.
As time goes by, fewer and fewer of our World War II veterans are available to tell their
stories. As a result, it was not possible to delve into personalities in the case of most of the
ships. Accordingly, the information on most ships comes from ship action reports, war diaries,
numerous government publications and some personal interviews and correspondence
between me and survivors of kamikaze attacks. It was never my goal to delve into much of
the personal history of the men on the ships. Rather it was to document the magnitude of the
attacks during the war as this had not been done before and I thought it important to do so.
Throughout the text I have made continual use of the term “suicide.” The Japanese never
thought of the special attack missions as suicide. Rather, they were a means to an end, i.e.,
one aircraft had the ability to sink or seriously damage an enemy ship. Trading one man for

3
4 Introduction

one hundred seemed to be an excellent swap in a war in which human life came to mean very
little. The Japanese considered that the individual airman, seaman, or soldier was using special
attack tactics to defeat an enemy. The ethos and training of the Japanese army or navy man
made it possible to carry out such missions. As we shall see, this training did not coincide
with the formation of the Tokko-tai in October 1944, but rather was the result of decades of
militaristic training in civilian life as well. It is my contention that, contrary to popular belief,
the kamikaze was not simply a World War II phenomenon, but the culmination of centuries
of tradition.
In Appendix I, I have attempted to make a comprehensive list of all ships sunk or damaged
by special attack methods, including the most familiar air or kamikaze attacks. Less familiar
are the attacks made by the explosive speedboats, the Maru-re and Shinyo, as well as the attacks
by manned torpedoes or Kaiten and midget submarines. I believe the list to be complete,
although there are some who might include other vessels or delete some on my list. Further,
there is the possibility that a few ships that were struck by kamikazes may not be included.
On a few occasions in ship and aircraft action reports I have found mention of an unnamed
ship suffering a kamikaze attack for which no supporting records exist. Since it was not possible
to verify the attack, I have not included them.

Gray Areas
Compiling a list of ships damaged in kamikaze attacks has been somewhat difficult. The
primary problem revolves around just which ships to include. As the reader will note, my
standards are broad. Some ships suffered kamikaze attacks that were near misses, but still
caused damage to the ship. For instance, the destroyer William D. Porter DD 579 was sent to
the bottom on 10 May 1945 by a Val which crashed close aboard. It did not hit the ship, but
its bomb passed below the destroyer’s hull, where it exploded under water and opened her
seams. She sank three hours later. None of her crew died, but sixty-one were wounded. Palmer
DMS 5 was sunk on 7 January 1945 in a definite suicide attack; the plane, however, missed
her. Just prior to the impending crash, its pilot released two bombs which penetrated her hull
at the water line. The ship made a last minute hard turn toward the plane, causing it to over-
shoot. The two bombs opened her hull and she went down in six minutes, suffering sixty-
six casualties. Neither of these two ships was actually struck by the kamikaze plane, but were
certainly sunk in a kamikaze attack. Accordingly, they qualify for inclusion in this work. On
28 December 1944 the Liberty ship John Burke, carrying a cargo of ammunition, was pro-
ceeding from Leyte to Mindoro as part of a supply convoy. When the kamikaze aircraft struck
her the resulting explosion of the ship’s cargo was so great that when the smoke cleared there
was no trace of her. Following closely behind her was an Army FS ship, which was sunk when
John Burke exploded. The army ship was not struck by the kamikaze, but certainly sank as a
result of the kamikaze’s attack on the Liberty ship. In addition, many ships suffered minor
damage in a kamikaze attack, such as having a portion of a mast or antennae clipped off as a
kamikaze scored a near miss. They reported that they had been damaged in a kamikaze attack
and, therefore, are included herein.
Still other ships were so badly damaged by the kamikaze attacks that they were reduced
to hopeless hulks. In all likelihood they would have gone under eventually, but they presented
a hazard to navigation. American ships sunk them with gunfire or torpedoes. I have listed
them as sunk by kamikaze attack as that was the primary cause of their demise. Colhoun DD
801, sunk on 6 April 1945, and LCS(L) 33, sunk on 12 April 1945, are examples of this type of
sinking.
Casualty lists pose a particularly difficult problem. In the confusion attendant with a
 Introduction 5

kamikaze attack, many men were blown over the side or were vaporized by the explosions
and fires. Lists of dead, missing, and wounded were compiled by the ship’s officers, noting
that the majority of those listed as missing were presumed dead. Men were transferred off the
ship in critical condition and listed as probable fatalities but were alive at the time of transfer.
I have listed such cases as killed in action, since that was their prognosis. Of course, this is a
judgment call, but probably accurate in most instances. Still others, listed as “serious,” were
expected to survive but did not. In some action reports the record of casualties is missing. In
cross-checking action reports, war diaries, ship logs, and secondary sources it is obvious that
the data do not exist. In such cases I have inserted a question mark in the list to note that the
data are not available. In some ship documents the casualties are listed as “several,” “numer-
ous,” or some other non-specific term. Accordingly, I have used these terms in my list as they
represent the only data available. The resulting list of casualties in the appendices must there-
fore be considered to be close approximations of casualties, rather than definitive figures.
In the sources and literature pertaining to kamikaze attacks there are continual references
to the number of aircraft that set out from various air bases specifically to make kamikaze
attacks. However, many additional aircraft not flying a kamikaze mission made such attacks
when the pilot recognized that his plane was damaged and that he would probably perish.
Under those circumstances many chose to crash into an enemy ship rather than die without
causing damage to the enemy. Thus they became kamikazes on the spur of the moment. This
makes counting actual kamikaze missions difficult. Accordingly, I have counted any aircraft
that deliberately crashed into a ship as a kamikaze even thought that may not have been the
original mission. As noted in Chapter 4 the formal organization of the kamikaze units did
not start until 19 October 1944, with the first successful official sorties of those units’ planes
on 24 October 1944. However, American naval reports after the war do not draw a distinction
as to the date. As a result, the attack on Smith DD 378 at the Battle of Santa Cruz on 26
October 1942 is listed as a kamikaze attack in the BuShips Summary of War Damage to U. S.
Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, and Destroyers 17 October, 1941 to 7 December, 1942. Several
other officially designated kamikaze attacks also pre-date the October 1944 mark.
The reader should note that this is a listing of U.S. Navy ships and merchant ships that
flew the U.S. flag. Additional ships of allied navies were also hit, but these fall outside the
parameters of this work.
One final point that needs clarification relates to dates. To the west of the International
Date Line are several time zones that are relevant to this work, such as time zones Item (I)
and King (K). Events in these zones are one day ahead of time zones to the east, leading to
some discrepancies in dates. Occasionally writers use dates relative to the American mainland,
leading to some confusion. Dates and times in this work reflect those of the time zone in
which the attack occurred. Hopefully, this will explain the inconsistencies in dates between
this list and those published by some other researchers.
For readers who may be unfamiliar with the various ships and aircraft discussed in the
text, a visual depiction of ships and aircraft is shown in the final appendices.
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 PART ONE
The Genesis of the Kamikazes,
Their Organization, and Disposition

1. The Development of the

Samurai Class and Its Ethos

The Samurai and His Ethos

With centuries of tradition behind them, Japanese kamikaze pilots hurtled from the sky
into American ships during the last year of the war. The Tokko-tai or kamikaze did not sud-
denly appear in 1944 as a new feature in Japanese society, rather they were the culmination
of more than ten centuries of cultural development that made such tactics possible. How
these tactics became an integral part of the Japanese war machine in the later stages of the
war bears some discussion.
Although Japanese history in general is relatively unknown to Westerners, the exploits
of the samurai class are much more familiar. Many are not aware that the samurai class had
a profound effect on the customs and culture of the Japanese. These centuries-old cultural
traits are evident in the development of the kamikaze corps during World War II. To fully
understand the kamikazes it is necessary to trace the development of the Japanese martial
ethos through the rise and development of the samurai class, the original bearer of these traits.
The modern transformation of this ethos into the actions of the kamikazes during the war
are evidence of the strong tradition of the samurai that ran through Japanese culture.
The origins of the Japanese samurai class can be traced to the eighth century. Within the
following four hundred years they developed from a group of armed guards and soldiers into
a class that ruled Japan through its bafuku, or military government. Their position in Japanese
society and government would be paramount until the modernization of Japan during the
Meiji Restoration of 1868. Their value system, known as bushido, became the cultural heritage
of the Japanese nation as it entered the twentieth century. What bushido was and how it devel-
oped is important to the understanding of the kamikazes and their actions toward the end of
the war.

The First Kamikaze

The term kamikaze, or “Divine Wind,” dates to the thirteenth century, and refers to the
incident in which the Japanese survived the Mongol attempt at invasion through what they
considered to be divine intervention. Kublai Khan launched his first, and unsuccessful, inva-
sion of Japan in 1274. Determined to have Japan as a part of his empire, the great Khan con-
tinued to send envoys to the Kamakura Court, offering the Japanese a place under his authority

7
8 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

in a tributary relationship. On two occasions he received the heads of his envoys as an answer.
To bring the Japanese under his domination, he assembled a force of 140,000 men and launched
his second assault on the island empire in 1281. Northern Kyushu was the target and some
limited success in landing was achieved. However, a wall around Hakata Bay limited the Mon-
gols’ ability to land their forces for nearly two months. The end of the campaign came when
a large typhoon roared in out of the East China Sea and destroyed much of the Mongol inva-
sion fleet. Japan had been spared by the wind of the gods, a kamikaze. Only about half of the
Mongol invasion force made it back to China.
“Kamikaze,” used as a term to identify the Special Attack Corps, is generally thought to
be an erroneous pronunciation of the Japanese characters by Japanese-Americans. In the Impe-
rial Japanese Navy, the corps was called the Shimpu Tokubetsu-Kogekitai. The characters for
Shimpu can also be read as “kamikaze,” hence the commonly used name in Western works.
In the Japanese Army Air Forces, the units were known as Shimbu Tokubetsu-Kogekitai. Shimbu
translates as a “gathering of courageous forces.” Among the pilots and other military men,
the shortened name of To, Tokko-tai or Tokubetsu-Kogekitai was more commonly used. Inter-
cepted Japanese messages usually referred to the units simply as To.
The concept of the Divine Wind was alive and well during the war years and was fre-
quently referred to in newspaper and magazine articles. An editorial in the Asahi Weekly of
5 September 1943 explained how the Divine Wind worked for Japan.
This Divine Wind does not blow only in an adverse hour in answer to prayer. Needless to say it
blows in a desperate struggle in a righteous war which is waged in accordance with the Divine
will, but it is certainly not limited to the last decisive battle in which the enemy receives a
knock-out blow. In the first shot fired in the Great East Asia War, in the bold attack on Pearl
Harbour, which was launched against the enemy’s camp, and in the raid on the Philippines on
the same day, a Divine Wind, which can be reckoned as providential help, arose and caused an
auspicious beginning on behalf of Japan.1

The Bushido Code

The martial traditions of Japan have been handed down for over a thousand years. In
order to comprehend some of the forces that made the role of kamikaze acceptable to the
Japanese people, an understanding of these traditions is necessary. Japan’s military class, the
samurai, originated during the Nara Period (A.D. 710 –784). During that time period, large
landholders used their workers to defend their estates. As the estates grew in size over time,
a class of full-time warriors also developed. Ultimately, the assent to power by the samurai
class left the country under their control from 1185 until 1867, when four powerful clans, the
Hizen, Tosa, Satsuma, and Choshu overthrew the Tokugawa clan’s rule and set Japan on its
road to modernization.
The new government had to cope with increased pressure from the West. With its modern
armies and navies, the Western powers were deemed a serious threat. In an effort to increase
their national strength, the Japanese built a new type of military force. No longer would samu-
rai be the only bearers of weapons. Class distinctions were eliminated and the new army and
navy would rely heavily on conscripts. To identify the guiding principles of the new military
man, the government issued the Imperial Precept for the Military (1882). The document stressed
loyalty and self-discipline, virtues expected of samurai but not necessarily the values of those
conscripted.
The ethos of the samurai class was known as bushido, a set of traditions that emphasized
frugality, stoicism, honor, obedience, a sense of duty, a war-like spirit, loyalty, courage, and
self-discipline. Since the samurai ruled Japan for nearly seven centuries, it was natural that
 1. The Development of the Samurai Class and Its Ethos 9

their ethos would filter down to the lower classes and become a common value system among
the Japanese.
As Japan struggled to modernize and compete with the Western world, it realized the
necessity of reinforcing the bushido ethos in order to sustain and safeguard its unique identity
in a modern world. The well known work by Inazo Nitobe, Bushido the Soul of Japan (1904),
was a reminder to the Japanese of their military traditions and an attempt to keep the Japanese
in touch with their heritage. The idea of self-sacrifice and the belief that the individual existed
to serve the Emperor and the nation was inherent in the bushido code. Diving a bomb-laden
fighter or Oka into an enemy ship was an ideal demonstration of the spirit of the warrior. In
the Suicide Force Combat Methods Training Manual (1945), the Inspectorate General of the
Army Air Force asserted:
The essence of a “TO” [kamikaze] Force is complete disregard of life. Its unique power in com-
bat will be developed to the full by superlative skill in tactics and by a spirit which throws away
life for certain death. Enemy vessels at anchor or under way will be sunk without fail by a reck-
less collision, thereby the plans of the enemy will be confounded and the way to the total victory
of our army will be opened. The basis for victory of this kind of attack will depend absolutely on
the spiritual strength of our flying personnel.2

The idea of committing oneself completely to the attack was not a new one in Japanese
culture. In the traditional Japanese martial art of jujitsu the concept of taiatari o kurawasu,
which meant to charge against the opponent with one’s body, was well known. It implied that
success in a fight would come from complete commitment to the attack. In the mid–1920s
Capt. Yamaki, who later became Deputy Superintendent and Chief Instructor of the Kasum-
igaura Naval Flying School, wrote:
They [the Americans] know nothing about the real strength of Japan’s weapons. Then through
that dreadful flack our gallant airmen, imbued with the spirit of Bushido, will pierce their way
unwaveringly. Even though wounded by enemy bullets, they will stagger on, release their bombs
and torpedoes and crash headlong on the enemy’s battleships.... It can be assumed that America
and Britain will endeavor to gain a victory by an all-out air attack on a large-scale. Japan there-
fore will make every effort to meet this attack by sending out an overwhelming number of air-
men prepared to charge headlong and crash themselves on the decks of the enemy’s ships. 3

Many militaristic works were popular during the pre–World War II era and the emphasis
on the bushido code was strong throughout the educational system. Eiji Yoshikawa’s serialized
novel on the life of the famous swordsman, Miyamoto Musashi, ran in the Asahi Shimbun
newspaper from 1935 to 1939. It romanticized the life and ideals of Japan’s samurai class and
helped foster a military spirit in youth of the times. The modern conscript army was not the
samurai class of old but it embraced its traditions proudly.

Education for Death

The changes in the Japanese educational system that were instituted shortly after the
Meiji Restoration of 1868 became important factors in training the populace to accept a role
that would make it possible for them to sacrifice their lives in the name of the emperor.
Early attempts to revamp the educational system met with resistance from those who
feared that the Japanese would lose their national identity. This was further complicated by
the fact that the Japanese had a number of different educational models from which to choose.
Among them were the school systems of France, Germany, Russia, England, Holland, and the
United States. Attempts in the 1870s and early 1880s to adapt the French and then the American
models met with failure. It was reasoned that the systems of Western education were in conflict
with Japanese traditions and any successful modernization of the education system would
10 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

require that Japanese tradition and Western-styled modernization be melded. This was spelled
out in The Great Principles of Education put forth by the Emperor in 1879.
Faced with the reality that Japan lagged behind the Western nations in her political, mil-
itary, and educational development, the Japanese set out to adapt what was useful from the
West. This led to a wholesale attempt to adopt Western thinking and was reflected in the cur-
riculum of the schools. No centralized authority controlled the content of the curriculum
and, in short order, a wide range of textbooks reflecting Western democratic thought appeared
in the schools. The People’s Rights Movement was seen as the major influence causing these
changes. An alarmed Meiji government reacted to what they perceived as a threat and compiled
a list of books that would be proscribed in the schools. The trend toward governmental control
of the curriculum then gained momentum.
By 1885, the Japanese had begun to follow the highly centralized Prussian system. It
was seen as a vehicle by which the state could effectively conduct a program of political social-
ization within the country which was based on traditional Confucian thought. The role
of the state in the educational system would be to preserve tradition and foster an increased
sense of nationalism in the face of Westernization. The beneficiaries of this system of education
would realize that their role was to serve the state. By 1886, textbooks to be used in the
schools had to be approved by Japan’s Ministry of Education. From that point on state-
approved texts became the norm.
The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) was the next step in solidifying governmental
control of the Japanese mind. That document, along with later government decrees such as
the Educational Reform of 1941 (Imperial Ordinance No. 1483), fostered militaristic outlooks
and group cohesiveness. They would be useful tools of the Japanese government as it set about
unifying the country. The Emperor became an ultimate authority figure imbued with religious
sanction that was backed by Japanese tradition found in the sacred books of Shinto mythology,
the Kojiki and the Nihon Shoki. Photographs of the Emperor were placed in each school.
Annual ceremonies were conducted to reinforce the Imperial Rescript and develop an increased
reverence for the Emperor and his line. In this manner, the education to which elementary
and middle school children were subjected inculcated upon them a reverence for both Emperor
and nation that could not be separated.
The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 accelerated the militarization of the cur-
riculum. This received another boost in 1904 with the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War.
Teachers in the elementary and middle schools stressed war and patriotic themes in their les-
sons. Among these was the concept that duty to the Emperor and nation were primary. Math-
ematics and science classes used military examples for their study. Jingoistic themes prevailed
throughout the period and military indoctrination of the children was accomplished. As the
years passed, the ethics classes that had stressed loyalty to both Emperor and nation soon
began to emphasize devotion to the Emperor and his line above all else. By the end of World
War I, forces were at work within Japan that would change the role of Emperor to one in
which he would become the state.
In 1925, a new figure entered the Japanese school, the military officer. Military officers
were placed in all middle and high schools and military training subjects were introduced
into the curriculum. Students were required to participate in military drills for two hours
each week. By the time that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, this had increased. Writer John
Morris reported, “The amount of time devoted to military instruction is supposed to be about
five or six hours a week, but ‘special’ periods of instruction are often added.... The military
instruction included lectures on discipline and the merit of dying for one’s country. There is
also a certain amount of field work, which includes route marches of anything up to twenty-
five miles.”4 Students were given instruction in bayonet fighting, the use of hand grenades
 1. The Development of the Samurai Class and Its Ethos 11

and other modern military subjects. Additionally, students were required to attend a military
camp for a week each year where more intense military training was accomplished.
Shigeo Imamura, who eventually became a kamikaze pilot, related how this worked:
Another new subject for us was Military Training. Every boys’ secondary school had retired
army officers and non-commissioned officers on the faculty. In the first year we had mostly basic
training: marching, handling of the rifle and the like. The rifles we used were Model 38 Infantry
Rifles, the same ones used by the army. The training was very strict and in compliance with
army regulations. On rainy days, the officers lectured to us in classrooms on bits of military his-
tory and strategies. We didn’t necessarily like the training, but we all took it seriously as a mat-
ter of course. Speaking out against it in any way would have been interpreted as a traitorous act.
In our fifth year, we were marched about an hour to the Matsuyama Regiment’s shooting range
to practice shooting with real bullets.5

He recalled that as early as the fourth grade there was a required class in ethics. Students
were taught a series of lessons on nationalistic themes, which increased in detail and intensity
as the students worked their way through the first phase of their education in primary school.6
By 1937,
schools at all levels in Japan could not be and were not immune to the rising national and inter-
national tensions. Young children were told to finish breakfast early, assemble at certain spots in
their neighborhood and march to school in formation. Secondary school boys were made to
wear military-style leggings when coming to school and to salute any military officers they
might pass on their way.... In short, schools became semi-army camps, in form and in atmos-
phere.7

Forward-looking recruiters for the kamikaze programs extended their searches for can-
didates. Teruyuki Okazaki recalled his days as a student at Kurata Middle School in Nagaoka
City on Kyushu. Okazaki entered the school in 1941 at the age of 10. In 1943, the curriculum
became militarized under the control of the army. Students there were taught military tactics
to be used against an American invasion force. This included how to attack a tank by jamming
an explosive pole charge into its side. Another method involved hiding in a spider hole until
a tank passed over. The student would then pop up from the hole in which he had been crouch-
ing and set off a mine under the tank. Both methods involved the death of the student.8 Older
students were screened for kamikaze pilot training and, at the age of fourteen, Okazaki began
elementary training in the Tachikawa Ki-9. Nagaoka City had a small army airfield on the
side of town and the student pilots were taken there for flight training. Training consisted of
practicing take offs and diving on targets. No attempt was made to teach the prospective
pilots to land; the instructor took over and brought the plane down. The youth of the students
made it easy for them to accept the role of kamikaze pilot; for them it seemed a glorious way
to serve their country. The number of training hours was limited by the availability of fuel
and also by the danger from patrolling American fighter aircraft, particularly during 1944 –
1945 when Okazaki undertook flight training.9
By 1911 training in traditional martial arts such as kendo and judo had been introduced
into the normal and middle school curriculum as electives. Their popularity increased in the
1930s and, by the outbreak of the war with the United States, kendo was a requirement for
students in the fifth grade and above. 10 The martial arts were seen as important vehicles
through which the martial spirit and sense of self-sacrifice that would be required of the stu-
dents once they had reached draft age would be achieved. An emphasis on spirit was the result
of the realization that Japan lagged behind the Western powers in material strength. To com-
pete, the Japanese emphasized the importance of spirit in winning battles. In that manner,
they justified their expanding role in wars that had become increasingly dependent on mech-
anization and scientific advances.
12 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

The Tachikawa Ki-9 KAI Army Type 95-1 Medium Trainer Model B aircraft carried the Allied code
name “Spruce.” NARA 80G 169925.

Shigeo Imamura recalled that, upon entering Matsuyama Middle School, students were
required to participate in a one hour class of either judo or kendo every other week, a practice
that continued throughout their middle school experience. By the end of the three year period
many of the students had achieved black belt rank.11
In addition to indoctrinating children into the war effort, the Japanese went to great
lengths to convince the general population that war was necessary and desirable. Increasing
control of the media by the military was a part of Japanese society in the 1930s. By the time
of the Pearl Harbor attack, the military had virtually complete control of the newspapers,

Japanese middle school boys practice sword techniques using the wooden practice sword (bokken).
NARA 306-NT-1155-L-2.
Top: In this photograph, taken on 28 October 1936, elementary school girls practice sword techniques
with wooden practice swords to encourage their “Japanese spirit.” This type of training became the
norm for physical education classes in the 1930s. NARA 306-NT-1155-I-6. Above: Japanese college
girls visit the Headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Regiment in Tokyo for rifle training. This photograph
was taken on 19 May 1934. NARA 306-NT-1156-A-9.
14 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Top: School girls were also required to participate in military training drills. NARA 306-NT-1156-A-
8. Bottom: Students rest after a military style march on 31 May 1934. This was a regular part of the
military preparedness regimen in Japanese schools. NARA 306-NT-1156-A-12.
 1. The Development of the Samurai Class and Its Ethos 15

magazines, radio and movies. Numerous laws authorized this control and it became the con-
duit through which war propaganda was funneled to the populace. Most of the people pos-
sessed a minimal education and were unsophisticated with regard to international relations
and domestic politics. The propagandists put forth false information about non-existent vic-
tories, minimized the reporting of losses and generally led their citizens to believe that the
war was going well. As the end drew near and even the least sophisticated Japanese became
aware of the destruction visited upon their homeland, the propaganda told them that part of
the problem came from their lack of effort and patriotism and they were urged to work harder
and keep their martial spirit in readiness for the final battle.12
Shortly after the official beginning of the kamikaze corps in the Philippines in October
1944, the Imperial Headquarters Naval Information Department released a propaganda article
to the newspapers praising the kamikaze flyers and submariners and urging the workers to
emulate their sacrifice. It stated:
And so, you who strive day and night on the ramparts of production behind the guns must
remember that even one plane more is a sacred plane which rushes to destroy the enemy, when
that one plane has aboard the sacred spirit of a master of the KAMIKAZE Force. The young
eagles of the KAMIKAZE Special Attack Force who dare to dash headlong and happily to the
destruction of the enemy are waiting anxiously for that plane to fly to the front lines, saying to
themselves, “I too shall go.” So it is, the brave, ruddy-faced warriors with handkerchiefs tied
about their heads at peace in their favorite planes, sailing happily as if gathered to the fond bos-
oms of their mothers and the forms which dash out spiritedly to the attack along a path of
assault from which there is no return, do they not appear vividly before us? Increase production!
Stand firm! Drive on!13
 2. Kamikaze Traditions

Kamikaze Rituals and Traditions

Kamikaze pilots, prior to their take off, participated in a number of rituals and cere-
monies, designed to both bring them success in their missions and provide an opportunity
to express their feelings to the families and friends they were leaving behind. They included
the wearing of various articles of clothing and adornment, some of which allowed the kamikaze
pilot to have remembrances of his loved ones with him at the time of his death. Among these
were the headband (hachimaki), thousand stitch belt (sen-nin-bari), and mascot dolls
(masukotto ningyo). Many of the kamikazes carried swords with them, some of which were
family heirlooms and some that had been presented to them by their unit commanders. In
some cases other items were carried in the plane that were somewhat unique. As an example,
the ashes of Lt. Cmdr. Tsutomu Kairya, who had been killed during the training of the Thun-
derbolt Corps, were placed in a white silk pouch and carried by Lt. Kentaro Mitsuhashi on
his Oka mission on 21 March.1

Death Before Dishonor

The view of Americans toward the Japanese who participated in special attacks is varied.
There is a certain respect of the adversary based on the assumption that, as a group, the
kamikazes would perform acts that most Americans would not. There were several factors
that influenced the Japanese military men and made them capable of committing themselves
to the ultimate attack. They were: (1) tradition and group values, (2) a sense of obedience to
higher authority and (3) peer pressure.
Throughout the long history of Japan, the samurai class had a great influence. Although
the traditional class structure had been abolished during the Meiji Restoration, the ethos of
the samurai was carried forward into the new conscript army. Education in the pre-war era
included military drills and martial arts education. The values of the Japanese in the twentieth
century became imbued with archaic ideas that placed the Emperor and state first and sub-
jugated the will of the individual to group consensus. When asked to volunteer for a kamikaze
mission, it was virtually impossible for the individual pilot to go against what he perceived
as group approval of the mission. For the Japanese military man to question or disobey higher
authority was unthinkable. Throughout his basic military training, he had been subjected to
punishment for even the slightest infraction of the rules. It had been drilled into him time

16
 2. Kamikaze Traditions 17

Japanese Navy Lt. Kentaro Mitsuhashi salutes as he receives his orders for the ill-fated Oka mission
of 21 March 1945. The silk pouch carrying the ashes of Lt. Cmdr. Tsutomu Kariya hangs from his
neck. Photograph courtesy the Naval History and Heritage Command. NH 73095.

and again that orders must be obeyed without question. Japanese as individuals sought the
approval of their peers more so than those living in western cultures. Conformity was valued
over individualism and the nail that stuck up was hammered down. It was not acceptable to
go against the perceived beliefs or values of the group. As a result, Japanese pilots, sailors,
and infantrymen accepted the idea that their lives belonged to a power outside themselves
which was free to use it as it saw fit.

Hachimaki and Robes

The hachimaki, or headband, was frequently a part of the kamikaze’s wardrobe. These
originated with the samurai who tied them around their heads in order to keep hair and sweat
out of their eyes during battle. Adm. Soemu Toyoda, Commander in Chief of the Combined
Fleets, reinforced the tradition for the kamikazes when the first Oka mission was flown on 21
March 1945. He inscribed the words “Thunder Gods” on fifteen hachimaki, which were then
given to the Oka pilots. Occasionally these headbands were inscribed in blood. Navy Lt. Yasuo
Ichishima wore one on his mission on 29 April; it had been given to him by a friend. 2
Reports from American fighter pilots indicated that on at least one mission Japanese sui-
cide pilots wore white robes. One pilot from the carrier Bennington reported:
Almost as soon as I opened fire the Jap pilot opened the cockpit cover. Another burst from my
guns apparently killed him. I saw him slump forward, head down. A white material flowed from
his person and streamed in the wind. It appeared to be an Arab-type robe with large sleeves. As I
came up beside him and flew wing on his plane I could see the robe type suit flowing a foot
18 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

A pilot fastens a hachimaki around the head of his comrade. This photograph was taken in late 1944
or early 1945. Photograph courtesy the Naval History and Heritage Command. NH 73096.

behind him in the wind. I could not see his head.... It is possible that the robe suit had a white
hood attached but of this I could not be certain. Then I saw another trio of ZEKES. I started for
one head on.... The Jap pilot was wearing an outfit similar to the first pilot. 3

Thousand Stitch Belt

The sennin-bari, or thousand persons’ stitches, was another good-luck item worn by the
kamikaze, as well as by other members of the military. This was a white cloth about four to
five inches wide with a thousand stitches in red thread. On each end were cotton strings that
could be used to fasten it tightly about the pilot’s waist. Each stitch had been sewn on by a
different person, indicating their wishes for the success of the pilot on his mission. Usually
this was produced by a family member who asked the help of friends and other family members
in obtaining the stitches. Each pilot wrapped this long cloth around his waist. On occasion,
they sewed two five-sen coins into the sennin-bari. The value of each coin was one more than
four. Four in Japanese is read as shi, which also means death. Accordingly, the superiority of
the number five brought good luck as it was more than the death number.
Shigeo Imamura recalled that on his last visit home his mother presented a sennin-bari
to him as he was preparing to return to base. It had been produced by a young woman named
Michiko, who was a family friend.4
As he prepared for his kamikaze mission on 9 August 1945, navy Lt. (jg) Tohimasa
Hayashi, of the Shinpu Special Attack Unit, wrapped a sennin-bari around his waist that had
been sent to him by his mother. Flight PO 2d Class Tomio Matsuo did also. On 21 March he
wrote, “I am going, but I am not feeling lonely because I have the haramaki (stomach-band)
 2. Kamikaze Traditions 19

which mother made to protect me.”5 Although these sennin-bari did little to protect their
wearers from enemy aircraft or anti-aircraft barrages put up by the picket ships, they did
have another function. According to Richard J. Smethurst they “did serve to comfort the sol-
diers, however, and made them feel that loved ones and friends in the community cared for
them.”6 Still other items of cloth might be worn. Japanese flags might be inscribed with good

In this 1937 photograph the girl on the left is adding a stitch to a “thousand stitch belt” on the
Ginza in Tokyo. Such belts were worn as good luck omens by Japanese military men as they went to
war.

A sennin-bari from World War II. A five sen coin is sewn into the center of the belt. The inscription
on the right reads Kuwahara Takashi-kun, the owner’s name. To its left is the slogan bu-un-cho-kyu
or “eternal good luck in war.” This sennin-bari is from the Teri Jane Bryant collection. Photograph
courtesy Teri Jane Bryant.
20 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

luck messages from family and friends and given to the pilot at the last family meeting. These
were frequently carried on the mission, as well as smaller flags that were sewn to the uniform.

Dolls
Kimono-clad dolls were sometimes stitched to the pilot’s uniform or attached to his belt
to bring good luck. Referred to as masukotto ningyo (mascot dolls) or imon ningyo (keepsake
dolls), they were hand-made by Japanese women and sent to servicemen. It was considered
that they had a spirit of their own and would bring good luck to the kamikaze pilot. The
harshness of the pilot’s life left little room for beauty or anything that reminded him of the
softer side of life. A doll kept as a mascot in the pilot’s quarters and carried in the kamikaze
plane was a reminder of the better things in life. Some kept them as a memory of family mem-
bers they had left behind. Particularly touching were the words penned by Lt. Masahisa
Uemura to his infant daughter Matoko: “When you grow up and want to know about me,
please ask your mother and grandmother. I have left my album for you to see.... I am going
to take your doll with me as a
charm to ward off any danger to
my plane. This means that you
are with me.”7 Still other dolls
had been sent to the pilots to
demonstrate the peoples’ sup-
port of their efforts. Found in
the wreckage of a kamikaze
plane that crashed near LCI(G)
567 on 8 April was a doll and a
letter from schoolgirl Tsuko
Miwachi. She wrote:
Even the hearing of this name
arouses a deep emotion. Of
the acts of the American and
British devils, attacking and
surrounding on all sides our
army, poor in material
resources at this time of fierce
decision in the war. We are
raging at the unspeakable
destruction. We also as stu-
dents and laborers give help
to the men. With a clear
mind, daily to be able to rush
forth to the destruction of the
American ... is happiness. Of
the spirit of the SPECIAL
ATTACK FORCE, not stop-
ping till it strikes! In this is
the thought of the Gods I
believe. I believe it is the lofty
state of mind which will
make an eternal future of
great righteousness for the
Emperor’s sake. Ah, this A pilot climbs into the cockpit of his plane prior to the inter-
time, thinking, “if I were ception of a B-29 raid. Hanging from his harness are two
only a boy.” I grow more masukotto ningyo dolls carried for good luck.
 2. Kamikaze Traditions 21

envious; when I think of making a mascot to send to the men of the SPECIAL ATTACK FORCE
I am filled with a great happiness. With this mascot the fierce spirit which will crumble the
enemy ships into small pieces boils passionately, positively attack! Can you bear defeat? The
foolish rascals of America and Britain! I am in a mood to shout these things aloud. Since I made
the “mascot” in this spirit, it is doubtless unskillful, but please sink the enemy ships together
with the “mascot.” This is my greatest request.
Soon the mascot will take off gaily with the SPECIAL ATTACK FORCE. What will this be but
the greatest happiness? Though I myself am not in the attack, my spirit will be serving as a
member of the SPECIAL ATTACK FORCE.
Be of good health. I pray for great war results.8

Superstitions
Although Japan had entered into a period of modernization after the Meiji Restoration
of 1868, there was still an undercurrent of superstition that permeated Japanese thought. How
much any individual soldier or sailor believed in good luck or bad luck is subject to question.
However, it may be considered that those with lesser educations may have been more adversely
affected by the concept. Certain days of the year were considered to bring bad luck. These
were termed the Jippogure days.
JIPPOGURE means that all ten directions are closed and dark. These ten directions are the eight
horizontal directions and the up and down directions. The JIPPOGURE are the days when the
ten signs of the Element Zodiac and the twelve signs of the Animal Zodiac clash and become
dangerous for mankind.... They are considered the worst of all unlucky days and are sometimes
called KURO-BI, or dark days, meaning that death is certain on these days.9

The dates listed as Jippogure days for 1944 were January 21, March 21, May 20, July 19,
September 17, and November 16. For 1945 they were January 15, March 16, May 15, July 14,
September 12, and November 11.
In addition to the Jippogure days, Japanese superstition held there were the To Shi Bi, or
death days each year. In 1944, they were January 10 and 22; February 11 and 23; March 2, 14,
and 26; April 3, 15, and 27; May 5, 17, and 19; June 6, 18, and 30; July 8 and 20; August 9 and
21; September 10 and 22; October 12 and 24; November 1, 13, and 25; and December 3, 15,
and 27. In 1945, the days were January 4, 16, and 28; February 5 and 17; March 9 and 21; April
10 and 22; May 12 and 24; June 1, 13, and 25; July 3, 15, and 27; August 4, 27, and 28; September
5, 17, and 29; October 7, 19, and 31; November 8 and 20; and December 10 and 22.10
While some of the superstitions may have made the lower and less educated ranks uneasy,
it did little to affect the planners in the high commands of the army and navy.

The Farewell Ceremony

Prior to leaving on their last flight, the kamikaze pilots participated in a farewell cere-
mony. Yukihisa Suzuki, a kamikaze pilot who survived the war, described the activity.
I recalled the farewell ceremony at Himeji: Under the bright sunshine of April, all the personnel
of the air base gathered in front of the airplane shed and waited for the arrival of the members of
the Special Attack Corps from their rooms. In front of the sheds on a long table covered with a
white tablecloth were various foods ready to serve in honor of their heroic departure and for the
purpose of wishing them good luck: many bottles of sake, sake cups, dishes of dried cuttlefish,
dried chestnuts, sea weed, and balls of rice with red beans....
As we waited near the warming-up planes, our classmates appeared wearing new flight clothes
on the back of which was painted a small national flag, a crimson disk on a white ground. They
had green parachute belts. White silk scarves were around their necks. Some of them wore a
white cloth around their flight helmets. Some had sprays of cherry blossoms which was the sym-
bol of young and vigorous soldiers, especially young pilots, as the beautiful but fragile blossoms
22 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

A group of the earliest kamikaze pilots receives a ceremonial cup of saki from VAdm. Takajiro Onishi
in late 1944. Photograph courtesy the Naval History and Heritage Command. NH 73097.

bloomed for only a few days and then fell just like the young men who died in their prime. Some
had small dolls or other mascots hanging from their belts.”11

Once the pilots had assembled near their aircraft, a senior ranking officer usually made
a short patriotic speech praising their courage and devotion to the Emperor and the country.
The officiating officer might be quite high in the chain of command, depending on the impor-
tance of the mission. When the first Oka attack took off on 21 March 1945 from Kanoya, Corps
Cmdr. Okamura gave the speech and VAdm. Matome Ugaki attended to wish the attackers
well. These speeches usually included the prophecy that they would all meet in the future at
Yasukuni Shrine. As time wore on and kamikaze missions became common, fewer high officials
attended. In the final stages of the battle for Okinawa, the speech was frequently given by the
flight leader. The pilots drank a cup of saki and departed the field.

The Last Letter Home

Young men about to die had to say their farewells. In many cases they had seen their
families for the last time somewhere in the few months preceding their missions. All felt
inclined to leave their thoughts and wrote letters home advising their families not to worry,
that they were willingly going to their fate. Mixed in with their philosophy of life and death
were personal messages to fathers, mothers, siblings and friends. Frequently the pilot included
nail clippings and locks of his hair with the letter. Some also included a whole finger or a part
of one. These body parts could then be cremated and the ashes placed in the family shrine.
During Kikusui 4, navy Lt. (jg) Akio Otsuka met his death on 28 April 1945 off Kadena. In
his letter, penned the morning of his final mission, he wrote:
Believing in the certainty of our victory in the Great East Asia War, praying for your happiness,
and apologizing for all the deeds I did contrary to filial piety, I shall set off for the mission with a
smile on my face.
 2. Kamikaze Traditions 23

Tonight there is a full moon. While viewing the moon over the shore of Okinawa’s main
island, we will search for the enemy, and will carefully strike once he is sighted.
I shall die very courageously and, you will see, thoughtfully too.12

The attitude of some was fatalistic. One of the Betty crewmen on the ill-fated 21 March Oka
mission was Flight PO 2d Class Naokichi Kameda. He wrote, “A man will die sooner or later.
The value of being a man is given at the time of his death.”13 Perhaps all of this was just bravado
or perhaps he truly believed it. However, with their leader, VAdm. Ugaki, writing in his diary,
“Oh, what a noble spirit this is!”14 any self-respecting military man had to express similar senti-
ments. These letters, as well as all correspondence, were censored. Pilots writing to their families
could not express their true feelings. After the war, Flying Officer Ryuji Nagatsuka wrote:
My only excuse was that I could not write down my true thoughts because I knew that these pri-
vate memoirs would be read after my death, which would doubtless occur quite soon. Indeed, I
considered them as a sort of testament, which I was keeping for my nearest and dearest, and so
they contained only half-sincerities, carefully embroidered.15

Haruo Araki, an army officer who commanded the Eternity Air Unit which flew from
Chiran on 11 May 1945, wrote to his wife Shigeko:
Tomorrow I will dive my plane into an enemy ship. I will cross the river into the other world,
taking some Yankees with me. When I look back, I see that I was very cold-hearted to you. After
I had been cruel to you, I used to regret it. Please forgive me.
When I think of your future, and the long life ahead, it tears at my heart. Please remain stead-
fast and live happily. After my death, please take care of my father for me.
I, who have lived for the eternal principles of justice, will forever protect this nation from the
enemies that surround us.16

Yasukuni Shrine
Early in the Meiji Restoration, the government began to exercise increasing control over
religion in Japan, with an eye toward making Shinto the state religion. However, the Japanese
had long before combined elements of both Buddhism and Shinto in their personal beliefs
and governmental attempts to place Shinto above Buddhism met with rejection. By 1877 the
Japanese abandoned the effort and disbanded the Religious Ministry that had been instru-
mental in the program. Even attempts to control Shinto met with resistance and the govern-
ment finally divided Shinto into what they termed Shrine Shinto and Sectarian Shinto. The
government would maintain control over Shrine Shinto and use it as a means to foster alle-
giance to the Emperor; they held that it was the bearer of the true Shinto traditions. Shinto
shrines were under the control of the local, prefectural or national government, which would
maintain them and control their affairs. Tying all this together was the Imperial Rescript on
Education (1890) which identified the shrines as the center of Emperor worship. Governmental
officers officiated at each of the shrines, with Ise, Kashiwara and Meiji shrines among the
most prominent in the celebration of Emperor worship. Hachiman shrine, which celebrated
the god of war, was also one of the most important.
On Kudan Hill, near the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, sits the revered Yasukuni (Peaceful
Country) Shrine. Established in 1868 to commemorate those who gave their lives in the strug-
gle to build a new nation, it is the meeting place for the spirits of Japan’s war heroes. In 1879
it came under the authority of the Ministries of the Army and Navy. Shinto mythology held
that the spirits of Japanese warriors who die in battle are linked eternally to the shrine. They
reside there as god-like figures who guard the Empire and are the pillars upon which the
nation rests. By the early 1930s, as Japan engaged in war with China, the shrines took on
increasing importance. The annual day of celebration at the shrine became a national holiday
Children gather at Yasukuni Shrine to honor their fathers and brothers who died in the war with
China. This photograph was taken in the late 1930s. NARA 306-NT-1156-C-28.

Japanese airmen frequently paid their respects at local shrines prior to making their last sortie. In
this photograph, four pilots perform a ceremonial bow at a shrine. This photograph was a staged
re-enactment of the ceremony taken in November 1945 for the USSBS film Strategic Attack. NARA
342-FH-3A-3250.
 2. Kamikaze Traditions 25

and the military encouraged school children, their parents, and teachers to attend the cere-
monies. Celebrations to honor the war dead were held regularly at Yasukuni and morning
prayers for victory were a daily occurrence. The Emperor or his representative made regular
visits with donations for the upkeep of the shrine.
In the last days before their final missions, kamikaze pilots often referred to their meeting
at Yasukuni. Farewells by kamikaze pilots and speeches by their leaders frequently advised
them that they would all be together there at some point in the future. Common last words
between kamikaze pilots and their squadron mates often mentioned the eventual meeting.

Japanese Pilots’ Thoughts and Reflections on Kamikazes

It is logical to question the motives and feelings of those Japanese airmen who were
willing to sacrifice their lives in the service of their country. Generals and Admirals claimed
that the men were proud to die for their country and that, rather than committing suicide,
they were committing themselves to the destruction of the enemy. According to Lt. Gen.
Masakasu Kawabe, Commanding General of the General Air Army, “No matter how you look
at it, everyone who participated in these attacks died happily in the conviction that they would
win the final victory by their own death.”17 This may have been the view from above, but it
was not necessarily shared by the pilots themselves. Writings about the kamikazes in English
have not presented an accurate view. Many of their writings, such as the work by Rikihei
Inoguchi, echo the philosophy of the officers who sent the men to their deaths.18 Others’ writ-
ings selectively quote from diaries and letters sent by Tokko-tai pilots that demonstrate their
disillusion with the program.19 Recent scholarship by Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney has shed new
light on the process by which young men were convinced that participation in the special
attack program was acceptable.20 According to her, they were the victims of a carefully orches-
trated government propaganda program that utilized the cherry blossom as a symbol of both
nationalism and their youth.
Among the Special Attack Corps pilots were many who felt that the mission was a great
honor and that it was the best course of action. Labeled as kichigai (madmen) by their fellow
pilots, these fliers lived for the mission. To them there was no better way to express loyalty
and the bushido code than by crashing their plane into an enemy ship. One of these men,
Yoshi Miyagi, whose kamikaze plane was shot down on 19 May 1945, wrote of his pride in
the corps and the role that it played in the military traditions of his country. He rejected the
American notion that it was suicide and asserted that Special Attack Corps pilots were moti-
vated by patriotism and idealism.21 Navy Lt. (jg) Takuji Mikuriya of the Shinpui Special Attack
Unit, asserted that they would die happy, having given their lives for their country. 22
Others fell into the category of sukebei (liberals). These pilots were also willing to die
for their country but viewed the Special Attack Corps as a last resort rather than a preferred
method of combat. Hachiro Sasaki, a member of the Showa Special Attack Unit, evidenced
still another, more pragmatic, philosophy. According to him, it was a matter of fate. He had
been born Japanese and the role assigned to him in life was a responsibility to be accepted.23
Sasaki went down off Okinawa on 14 April. Oka pilot Keichi Itoh of the 722nd Tornado Corps,
reasoned that he was going to die in the war. If that were to be the case, he was consoled by
the fact that he would be making a contribution.24 Yasuo Ichijima, a member of the Special
Attack Corps who died piloting his plane in late April 1945, wrote:
I cannot believe that I shall die within a week. I feel neither depressed nor nervous.
When I try to imagine what my last moments will be like, everything seems like a dream. I
am not sure whether I will remain as calm as I am now when the time comes, but it seems to me
that it ought to be easy.25
26 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Some airmen were not opposed to flying such missions but remained realistic about their
chances for success. Yukihisa Suzuki described the special attack planes as being in such poor
condition that they would have a difficult time completing their missions. In addition to flying
antiquated aircraft, the kamikaze pilots also had to fly through large numbers of American
fighters just to reach their targets. The intense anti-aircraft fire from the ships made it nearly
impossible to crash into one. He was willing to go but not optimistic about his chances for a
successful mission. He referred to the obsolete and poorly maintained Kate which he was
assigned to fly as a “miserable coffin.”26
Others openly resented the decision to use the Special Attack Corps as a weapon. Flying
Officer Fujisaki, prior to flying his Sonia from Chiran at the end of April 1945, wrote his last
letter home. He accused the military leaders of “incompetence and stupidity,” 27 and claimed
that they were exploiting the patriotism of the young pilots. Lt. Yukio Seki was more realistic.
He told his compatriots that he flew his upcoming suicide mission from Mabalacat for his
wife, not his Emperor.28
It has been frequently asserted that all Japanese kamikaze pilots were volunteers, but not
all researchers seem to agree on this point. In an article on kamikazes in Air Power History
(1996), Professor Shogo Hattori asserted that there is evidence that “in the last few months
of the war about one third of them were not volunteers.”29 Yukihisa Suzuki reported the words
of his fellow pilot, Lt. Kawashima who stated: “I won’t volunteer to be a member of the Special
Attack Corps, but if I am selected and am obliged to go, I’ll do the best in my power. But I
don’t want to die. As I was born a man, I want to die as a man.” 30
When asked if the pilots who flew kamikaze missions had volunteered, Superior Pvt.
Guy Toko answered, “I never knew any.”31 He did, however, indicate that there were many
who did. He and one friend, both of whom were university educated, did not want to vol-
unteer. According to him, the volunteers were mostly from those who had attended military
schools or who had very little education.
Maj. Gen. Miyoshi, Commanding General of the 30th Flying Group, indicated that the
early kamikazes were all volunteers, but that later “it was made compulsory and that was
bad.”32 The first army kamikazes in the Philippines were mainly officers from the Army Air
Academy. At Okinawa they were mainly non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who were ordered
to become kamikazes. He claimed that they were not good pilots.
Perhaps the most coherent explanation of why pilots volunteered for kamikaze missions
was expressed by 1st Class PO Takao Musashi, a member of the 105 Fighter Flying Unit on
Cebu Airfield in the Philippines. Musashi stated that
no JAP pilot would volunteer for such a mission of his own free will, yet if volunteers were
called for, practically all pilots would volunteer. He explained by adding that no JAP would
question an order, and signified that the matter would be put to them in such a way that no one
would dare to do other than put his hand up. Apart from this, if a pilot did not volunteer, his
life would be made unbearable by other pilots.33

At the Tokyo detachment of the Kasumigaura NAC, Lt. (jg) Shigeo Imamura was working
as a flight instructor when the decision was made to organize a special attack unit from the
base’s pilots.34 After the commanding officer announced that there was to be the formation
of the unit and that married pilots, only sons, or oldest sons were exempt, he paused for a
few seconds and then asked for volunteers.
There was a big thud. It seemed like just about everyone stepped forward, cadets as well as
instructors. I was among them. It seemed that I gave no consideration to the fact that I was the
first son of the Imamura family. As a matter of fact, I don’t think I gave consideration to any-
thing. At the command, my body moved forward automatically. To volunteer to die for the
country seemed to me the only right thing to do. Was I scared? No, not at all. 35
 2. Kamikaze Traditions 27

Families of the pilots of the Special Attack Corps were justifiably proud of their sons,
brothers and family members who had made the supreme sacrifice, however, not all were
satisfied that the government had used them wisely. Many felt that it was a waste of patriotic
young men, and others were harshly critical of those who had ordered their loved ones to
their deaths. Those who had served and survived remembered their comrades with special
feelings since they were the only ones who could understand what they faced.
For those left behind, emotions ran the gamut from pride to a feeling of waste. Kunihei
Kobayashi, whose son Tsunenobu had died as an Oka pilot, wrote “How completely empty
it all was!”36 In a letter written on 6 January 1951, Motoji Ichikawa, a surviving member of
the Thunderbolt Corps, wrote:
The souls of the young men will never be able to rest in peace no matter how much the creators
of the Special Attack Forces tactics acclaim the gallant deeds of the dead. They took the utmost
advantage of the young men’s sincere desire to sacrifice themselves upon the alter of their coun-
try’s cause by covering their eyes and stopping up their ears.37

With so much dissension among the Japanese pilots, it is easy to understand how the
Americans could fail to comprehend the kamikazes’ motives. For the American sailors on the
ships and the pilots flying combat air patrol over their stations, the motives of the Japanese
were hard to fathom. Sonarman 2/c John Huber, who served on the destroyer Cogswell,
reported his feelings on the Oka:
Rumor has it that the Nips are using something like a flying torpedo, called a “Baka” bomb. It
takes one man to operate it. It is released from a heavy high flying bomber and the suicide pilot
aims it at a ship. Those guys must be nuts. 38

Long after the war ended, many of the Americans who served on the radar picket stations at
Okinawa were able to reflect on the situation. It was not infrequent to hear words of respect
for the kamikazes. As Bob Rielly, Quartermaster on LCS(L) 61 put it, “Those were brave
men.”39 Sailor Charles Brader, on LCS(L) 65, summed up the experience from American eyes:
They came in droves daily, sometimes hourly. And they were shot down in droves. Only on rare
occasions did the Kamikazes get through our defenses to crash with explosion and burning
slaughter into one of the ships at Hagushi or Buckner Bay [Nakagusuku Wan]. 40

No matter how Americans viewed it, it was still difficult to understand. Sonarman 1/c
Jack Gebhardt, who was on the destroyer Pringle when it was sunk by a kamikaze on 16 April
1945, said: “It was horrifying to try and comprehend someone intentionally diving through
a hail of deadly anti-aircraft fire with the sole purpose of killing themselves in a blinding
explosion.”41 As a final note, Japanese historian Saburo Ienage later wrote: “Legions of prom-
ising young men were sent off to meaningless deaths.”42

Japanese Bodies
After a kamikaze attack had taken place there was usually a period of time during which
the American ships’ officers could assess the performance of their crews and the enemy, repair
equipment, care for the dead and wounded, and search for bodies. On some occasions, the
bodies of kamikaze pilots were recovered and examined for information. The light minelayer
Aaron Ward reported:
It appears that at this time a description of the Japanese Kamikaze pilot, his personal equipment,
apparent skill and tactics is in order. (a) Equipment — Three bodies of pilots were recovered on
board ship and thoroughly examined. They were all found to be very young, although the muti-
lated condition of the bodies was such that an exact estimate as to age was not possible. All
pilots were definitely identified as males.
28 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

All pilots were wearing parachutes. As a matter of fact, the pilot of the first plane shot down
off our starboard quarter, bailed out just prior to the plane’s crash, was seen to catapult from the
cockpit across the ship with his chute partially opened, and fall into the water, attempting to
gather the shrouds of his chute together as he hit. The three pilots found on board were fully
equipped, even to the extent of oxygen masks, still on the faces of two of them.
Pilots were carrying very few personal effects, except one, who had two booklets; one on sui-
cide tactics and the characteristics of our own fire power, and the other one a personal notebook.
These were turned in to the Office of Naval Intelligence and proved to be of value to their repre-
sentative.43

It was not infrequent for American ships at Okinawa to find Japanese airmen floating in
the ocean. Many of those airmen were from planes that had accompanied the kamikazes on
missions as escorts or guide planes and had either bailed out of their planes or crash-landed
in the water. In some cases they were taken alive, but others killed themselves before being
taken aboard. On 5 May, the light minelayer Henry A. Wiley DM 29 spotted a Japanese flier
in the water. As the ship approached to capture him, he removed his life jacket and slipped
beneath the waves rather than be captured.
 3. Special Attack Aircraft

In the beginning stages of the kamikaze program, front line fighters were the primary
types of aircraft used in the special attacks. At Mabalacat, Philippines the first kamikaze
aircraft were Zekes in good condition flown by experienced pilots. Their successes led to
an expansion of the program. With Japan’s declining resources and her inability to train
replacement pilots expeditiously due to fuel shortages, inexperienced pilots ultimately became
the cutting edge of the kamikaze sword. The planes they flew were not the best; those were
reserved for the more experienced pilots and saved for defense of the homeland. Appearing
in the skies over the Allied ships were a variety of army and navy types. Some were current
models in poor condition; some were obsolete types, while still others were trainers. Inter-
estingly enough, some of the trainers had good success at Okinawa. Their fabric over wood
frame construction made them hard to detect on radar, and the proximity fuses used in the
U.S. Navy guns would not detonate near them as they would with metal aircraft. The most
commonly used planes in the special attacks were the Val, Sonia, Tony, Kate, Oscar, Dave,
Pete, Nate, and older Zekes, as well as trainers such as the Willow and the Shiragiku. The
attributes of the kamikaze aircraft varied so greatly that gunners on the ships might face any-
thing from an incoming Oka piloted bomb making 450 knots to a Willow trainer doing eighty
knots.

Oka Program
Although many aircraft were used for suicide missions against the American ships,
none had been specifically designed for the task. Zekes and other aircraft mentioned above,
loaded with extra bombs, were the main type of kamikaze encountered by the Americans.
However, one airplane was designed as a suicide plane from the beginning, the Oka or Cherry
Blossom.
By mid–1944, the situation was becoming desperate for the Japanese and naval officers
began to consider new methods of driving off the Americans. One of them, Lt. (jg) Mitsuo
Ohta, developed the concept of the piloted bomb. Ohta was a transport pilot with the 405th
Kokutai and was not an experienced aeronautical engineer. Ohta brought his plans to the
Aeronautical Research Institute at the University of Tokyo where he received expert help in
its design. These were refined and the plans were presented to the Dai-Ichi Kaigun Koku Gijit-
susho (First Naval Air Technical Arsenal) at Yokosuka in August of 1944. There Lt. Cmdr.
Tadanao Miki, head of the Futuristic Aircraft Design Section, was called in to examine the

29
30 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

plans. At first Miki rejected the idea, believing that the guidance system of the plane was to
be based on current technology, which was not effective. He was shocked when Ohta described
the ultimate guidance system, a human pilot. Miki refused to consider the idea but, when
Ohta volunteered to pilot the plane himself, he realized that the concept was viable. Later,
when the Americans became aware of the plane and the nature of its mission, they gave it a
new name, the Baka (fool). Since higher authority was supportive of the project, Miki turned
it over to his engineering team. Under Masao Yamana, Tadanao Mitsugi, and Rokuro Hattori,
the design was refined and a prototype made ready. By the end of September, 1944, ten Oka
Model 11s were ready for flight. Testing proceeded for the next four months, but production
began before the trials were completed. A total of 755 Oka Model 11s were built prior to the
beginning of the assault on Okinawa.
The Oka had a very limited range and had to be carried to the target by a mother plane,
usually a Betty bomber, although other types were capable of the task and sometimes used.
Since it weighed nearly two tons, the Oka cut the range of the mother plane and its speed.
The range of the Betty was normally about 2,000 miles. With the Oka on board it would be
about a quarter of that, and the Betty’s maximum speed declined from 230 to 140 knots. Its
maneuverability was also affected. As soon as a mother plane came under attack, the first
thing it did was to jettison the rocket powered craft in order to save itself. American aircraft
action reports indicate that this was done frequently.
At least a dozen Okas were captured on the first day of the invasion of Okinawa. Some
showed damage sustained during the initial onslaught. However, one perfect example was
shipped to the Technical Air Intelligence Center at Anacostia, Maryland for testing. The Divi-
sion of Naval Intelligence reported:
The theoretical maximum horizontal range of BAKA [Oka] when released at 27,000 feet is 55
miles. Fifty-two of these miles would be traveled at a glide speed of 229 miles per hour and at a
glide angle of 5 degrees 25 minutes. During the remaining three miles, the use of rockets would
accelerate the speed to 535 miles per hour in level flight with a corresponding increase in speed
as the diving angle was increased.
At a 50 degree or greater diving angle, maximum speed would be 618 miles per hour....
In attacking ships protected by heavy deck armor, it is presumed the rockets would be used at
the end of the run in a torpedo approach in order to score a close to the water line hit. If
launched from a distance, however, BAKA would be vulnerable to attack by fighters before
reaching a position to effectively complete its own attack. Lacking maneuverability, BAKA could
take but little evasive action in its unpowered glide and its only method of escape would be to
fire one or more of its rockets. In this event, and also in the case of BAKA using its rockets at the
start of the glide, the increased velocity secured from the rocket would dissipate before BAKA
could reach its target and its final terminal velocity would be substantially decreased. 1

In addition, the canopy on the Oka studied at Anacostia could be jettisoned, leading the TAIC
to speculate that it might have been designed for training or testing.
The Oka had a wingspan of 16' 5" and length of 19'10". Its fuselage was constructed of
aluminum alloy and the wings were made of stressed-skin plywood, with a fabric covering.
After dropping from the mother ship and gliding an appropriate distance, the pilot would
ignite the Oka’s rocket engines and hurtle toward his target. The 2,645 pound warhead was
packed with trinitro-anisol, a high explosive which would detonate upon impact with the
target vessel. Igniting the engine at the correct time was vital, since a high speed at impact
was desired in order to penetrate the hull of larger warships.
Recruitment for the Oka program began in August 1944. Volunteers were solicited from
all naval units, and from them was formed the 721st Naval Air Corps. The navy did not accept
sole surviving sons, elder sons or those with only one surviving parent. Applicants who had
families dependent on them were also not accepted. In addition, there were specific skills that
 3. Special Attack Aircraft 31

The above chart shows speeds for the Oka piloted bomb at various angles of attack.

had taken many hours of flight time to develop. Pilots skilled at dive bombing and torpedo
bombing were not accepted because it would take too long to replace them.
The 721st transferred from Konoike Naval Air Base to Hyakurigahara Naval Air Base
on 7 November 1944. Six hundred volunteers were selected for the unit and placed under
the leadership of its commander in chief, Cmdr. Motoharu Okamura. Spirit was high
among the men and within a short time they had taken the name of Jinrai Butai (Divine
Thunderbolt Corps) for themselves. Lt. Cmdr. Goro Nonaka was appointed as the Chief Flight
Officer.
Pilots who volunteered for the Oka program found that their training was limited. Oka
pilots did most of their training in the Zeke. After they had completed enough flight hours
to solo, they were given practice in the glide procedure. This consisted of flying a Zeke to a
high altitude and then gliding it downward toward the field at a 7:1 angle, which approximated
the glide path of the Oka. During the dive, the engine was throttled down to make the glide
more realistic. To give the pilots additional experience an Oka glider, the K-1 model, was
developed. It had no engine and used water ballast to represent the weight of engines and
explosives. A retractable skid was used to land the glider after the pilot had slowed its speed
by jettisoning the water ballast. Usually each pilot was allowed two or three runs in the training
Oka and then had to practice further in a Zeke.
Lt. Cmdr. Ohira, a test pilot attached to the Yokosuka First Naval Air Technical Arsenal,
assisted in the training of Oka pilots. According to him, the air speed at which the Oka was
released from the mother plane was crucial; it had to be close to 140 knots. Speeds greater or
lesser than that could result in a collision between the Oka and the bomber. He also noted
that the release altitude had to be at a 7:1 angle to the target.2
It is frequently assumed that pilots of the Okas and other suicide planes were of like
mind, that they all volunteered for the duty and willingly went to their deaths. In actuality,
the pilots had differing views. Oka pilot and commander of the 3rd Cherry Blossom Squadron,
32 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Marines inspect a captured Oka Type 11 at Yontan Airfield, Okinawa, 11 June 1945. NARA 80G 323641.

An Oka unpowered trainer shown after the war. Water ballast was used in place of the heavy explosive
charge and jettisoned just prior to landing. The skid was used in place of wheels. NARA 80G 193349.
 3. Special Attack Aircraft 33

The Oka Model 22 was powered by a turbojet engine. The air intakes for the jet may be seen on the
side of the fuselage. NARA 80G 193444.

This technical drawing of the Oka Model 11 from the Technical Air Intelligence Center in Anacostia,
D.C. was based on the Oka captured at Yontan Airfield during the invasion of Okinawa in April 1945.
NARA 80G 192694.
34 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

721st Naval Air Corps Lt. Morimasa Yunokawa, described himself as awestruck when he first
saw the Oka.3 Yunokawa survived the war, never having had the experience of flying the rocket
plane into an enemy ship. Others, however, were not so awe-inspired by the prospect of flying
it. Another pilot, Masazo Okubo, questioned whether the Imperial Japanese Navy had deluded
itself. He doubted that the Oka had the ability to make a decisive contribution to the Japanese
war effort. If the rocket plane were truly the super weapon that the Japanese high command
claimed, he could have accepted the mission. His view was that the Oka program was not sig-
nificant and that his death would be a waste.4 Flight Chief PO Konichi Okabi claimed that
suicide pilots preferred an Oka assignment over conventional types of kamikaze aircraft.
According to him, “In discussing the type of duty most preferred, all trainees come out for
duty in the BAKA-bombs [Oka]. Second choice was any sort of duty which offered an oppor-
tunity to go out on a suicide attack.”5
When the situation in the Philippines grew steadily worse for the Japanese, it was decided
to use the Oka against the American forces there. Fifty Oka Model 11s were loaded on the new
aircraft carrier Shinano for transport to the Philippines, departing from Tokyo on 28 November
1944. However, she was intercepted by the American submarine Archerfish and sunk by tor-
pedoes 138 miles southeast of Honshu. With her went the plans to send the Cherry Blossom
Squadrons into action in the Philippines.
Re-deployment of the squadrons began at the end of January 1945, with some assigned
to the Naval Air Bases at Izumi
and Miyakonojo. Their final des-
tination would be the base from
which they would launch their
attacks. These bases included
Tomitaka, Usa, Oita, and
Kanoya Naval Air Bases. First Lt.
Akira Hirano remained at
Konoike Naval Air Base to begin
a new unit, the 722nd Naval Air
Corps. Like the Divine Thun-
derbolts, this corps also gave
itself a nickname, the Tatsumaki
Butai (Tornado Corps). From
January until mid–March 1945,
the Cherry Blossom Squadrons
prepared for their destiny. With
American Task Force 58 operat-
ing 360 miles to the south of
Kyushu, it was determined that
an Oka attack was in order. The
1st Cherry Blossom Unit
reported to Kanoya on 21 March
in preparation for the mission.
Taking off at 0945 that morning
were eighteen Betty medium
bombers carrying fifteen Okas.
The piloted bomb had few controls as its function was simple. Fifty-five Zekes accompanied
Ten minutes was probably the maximum flight time as it hur- the bombers to fly cover. Shortly
tled toward its target. NARA 342-FH-3A-3211. after taking off, a number of the
 3. Special Attack Aircraft 35

The scene at Kanoya, just prior to the ill-fated mission of Lt. Cmdr. Goro Nonaka on 21 March 1945.
Nonaka led the flight of eighteen Bettys, fifteen of which carried Okas. They were all shot down by
carrier fighters from TF 58. To the right is Nonaka’s banner which reads Hi-Ri-Ho-Ken-Ten, an
acronym for a historical saying dating to the fourteenth century. For a further discussion see Naito,
page 70. Photograph courtesy the Naval History and Heritage Command. NH 73101.

Japanese crew members of the 721st Naval Air Corps relax prior to taking off in their Betty bomber.
Underneath the bomber is an Oka. The photograph was taken at Kanoya Naval Air Base in early 1945.
NARA 80G 90097.
36 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

This series of photographs was taken from the gun camera of an American fighter. It shows a Betty
carrying an Oka as it is being shot down. NARA 80G 185585. These photographs were shot on 1 April
1945 and probably show the first use of an Oka at Okinawa. At the time, the reports indicated that
the Betty was carrying a Henschel 293. See National Security Agency “Magic” Far East Summary #
389. 13 April 1945, B-3.

fighters developed problems with their fuel pumps and had to return to base, leaving only
thirty Zekes to protect the bombers. Leading the attack was Chief Flight Officer Lt. Cmdr.
Goro Nonaka, a flamboyant and experienced squadron leader who commanded the bombers.
His plane did not carry an Oka. Since this was the first attack of the new piloted bombs,
VAdm. Matome Ugaki came to the field to see them off. Oka pilots penned their last words
and boarded their bombers. Typical were the words of Flight PO Ataru Shimamura who
wrote: “I shall fall, smiling and singing songs. Please visit and worship at Yasukuni Shrine
this spring. There I shall be a cherry blossom, smiling, with many other colleagues. I died
smiling, so please smile. Please do not cry. Make my death meaningful.” 6
 3. Special Attack Aircraft 37

At about 1400, the light carrier Langley picked up the incoming attack when it was eighty-
five miles northwest of the task force. With such a large raid approaching, 150 fighters were
ordered aloft. Hellcats from VF-17 and VBF-17 off Hornet and VF-30 Hellcats from Belleau
Wood intercepted them sixty miles out. The fighter planes were soon joined by other Combat
Air Patrol (CAP) planes, bringing the total number of American fighters at the scene to
twenty-four. Burdened by their heavy cargo and making only 110 knots, the Bettys stood no
chance. Ten minutes into the battle eleven of them had been shot down. The others jettisoned
their Okas in a desperate attempt to escape, but of the total flight of forty-eight fighters and
bombers, only two badly shot up Zekes made it back to Kanoya.
Hellcats from VF-30 reported that “when attacked, the enemy bombers, and their low
fighter cover, dove and headed north, while the high cover came down on our fighters. As
soon as the enemy force was attacked the fighters deserted the BETTYS, despite their large
numerical superiority, leaving the bombers to shift for themselves as best they might.” 7 With
so many planes in the air, confusion reigned. American reports claimed that the raid consisted
of twenty-four Bettys and about twenty-four fighters flying cover. With so many aircraft in
the air, conflicting claims for shoot downs were inevitable. CTG 58.1 claimed that a total of
twenty-six Bettys, twelve Zekes and two Jacks had been shot down, with another two Zekes,
a Betty and a Tony damaged in the melee. The reports assert that Ens. W. H. Smith, Jr., from
VF-30 shot down three of the Bettys and Ens. J. V. Reber, Jr., got two Bettys and two Zekes.
Squadron mates Lt. (jg) H. W. Sturdevant and Ens. J. G. Miller each shot down four fighters.
Lt. (jg) Murray Winfield of VF-17 was credited with four and one-half Bettys. Pilots from
VF-86 reported shooting down eight Bettys and several Zekes. Ship and squadron action
reports described it as a “turkey shoot.” The raid had come no closer than thirty miles from
the ships.
The next attempted use of the Oka came during the battle for Okinawa. On 1 April 1945,
six Bettys with Okas departed from Kanoya Airfield. Among the Oka pilots was Flight Chief
PO Keisuke Yamamura. The Betty in which he was flying was shot down near Okinawa by
an American fighter and crashed in the water after jettisoning its Oka. Yamamura survived
and later found that only one of the six Bettys had made it back to base after becoming lost. 8
No American ships were hit by Okas on that date. From that point on, a number of missions
were launched from the bases on Kyushu with a few successes and many failures. Gradually,
the number of trained pilots diminished and the plan to replace them with an entirely new
unit was scrapped. The 722nd Naval Air Corps, which had been formed in January of 1945,
was not quite ready, and selected members of the three hundred man corps were sent to the
Divine Thunderbolts as replacements.
As the months wore on, it was painfully obvious that the battle for Okinawa was not
going well for the Japanese. They decided to keep their Okas in reserve for the anticipated
assault on the homeland. Komatsu Naval Air Base on Kyushu became the new home of the
Divine Thunderbolt Corps, with some units going to Matsuyama West Naval Air Base on
Shikoku. With the end of the battle for Okinawa came the last flight of Okas from Kanoya.
Participating in Kikusui 10 from 21 to 22 June were six Okas carried by Betty bombers. The
mission was led by Lt. (jg) Toshihide Fujisaki. Two of the Oka-carrying Bettys made it back
to base, unable to complete their mission. The four remaining Bettys with Okas fell victim
to Marine Corsairs. Of those, one made it to Radar Picket Station No. 15A, where it was shot
down by fighters from VMF-224. The other three were shot down near Radar Picket Station
No. 16A by VMF-314.
After recognizing that they were facing a new weapon, American navy leaders began to
evaluate the Oka. They noted that its extreme speed of 400 to 600 knots and small control
surfaces limited its maneuverability. In the early part of the Okinawa campaign, the Oka
38 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

attacks seemed to have been coordinated with attacks by other aircraft. This was designed to
distract the ships’ lookouts so that they missed the Oka’s approach. One of the warning signs
was the appearance of Betty bombers flying at a high altitude and then turning away from the
ships at a distance of about five miles. No standard approach was noted with Okas coming in
at an angle or skimming the water.
In practice, the most difficult part of the mission was probably delivering the Oka to
an area near enough to launch it. The Betty was not capable of flying very fast or well
with its payload. Once it neared the target area, at about 20,000 feet, the Oka pilot climbed
into the rocket glider and prepared for launch. When the mother plane was ready to drop
the Oka, it signaled to the pilot: “dot dot dot dash dot (o-wa-ri-ma-a-a-ku), this is the
end.”9 The Oka was then released from the mother ship and fell several thousand feet, picking
up speed on the way down. As it leveled out and headed toward the target ship, the pilot
ignited the rocket engines to increase the impact speed. The most crucial time to intercept
the Oka was during the initial drop, before it had picked up enough speed to outrun American
fighters.
Having identified the new enemy weapon, the Americans began to consider various
strategies to combat it. Since the Oka could not turn easily, a ship might avoid being hit
by radical maneuvering. Adjustments to the VT fuses could also be made, with settings
to compensate for the rocket plane’s speed. Gunners would probably have a greater chance
of hitting an Oka if they relied on tracers rather than trying to track it with their Mark 14
sights.
Most reports on the use of the Oka indicate that it was carried by Betty bombers. Early
in the Okinawa campaign 1st Lt. Dewey F. Durnford, Jr., of VMF-323, encountered a Helen
carrying an Oka thirty miles north of Ie Shima and shot it down.10 On 4 May 1945, pilots of
VC-90 reported one carried by a Dinah near Radar Picket Station No. 12. In all likelihood,
the parent plane was not a Dinah. Allied intelligence reports at the beginning of the Okinawa
campaign had indicated that any of the Japanese medium bombers could probably carry the
Oka.11 Later reports stated that “a Sky [Ten] Air Force order of 7 July discloses that the Japanese
are planning to use the twin-engine bomber Frances as a mother plane for Baka [Oka]. The
order directs the commander of Air Group 762 to use 12 plane crews to form a suicide attack
unit which will include about 9 Frances ‘capable of carrying’ Baka [Oka].” In addition, tests
were being carried out with the Peggy medium bomber as well. 12 Some models of the Peggy
and Frances had dorsal turrets, however, the Mitsubishi Ki-67-I Hiryu (Peggy) probably bore
the closest resemblance to the Mitsubishi Ki-46-II (Dinah), but was nearly twice the size. The
Dinah was just too small an aircraft to carry the heavy Oka. It seems obvious that the pilots
misidentified the mother plane.13
By this time, American intelligence had studied the Oka closely. It was evident that the
piloted bomb could be carried by any of the medium bombers with some modifications to
the parent plane. They concluded:
In addition to BETTY, the following aircraft are believed to be suitable for launching BAKA or
could be made satisfactory without major modifications:
PEGGY 1 Satisfactory. May need extended tail wheel.
HELEN 2 Possible. Would need longer tail wheel assembly or cut in bomb bay for horizon-
tal stabilizer. (A recent report indicates that BAKA may also have been launched
from HELEN).
SALLY 2 Possible. Would need extended (back) bomb bay and longer tail wheel assembly.
TAIZAN 16 Exp. Land Attack Plane. Expected successor to BETTY and could undoubtedly
be used. May be in limited production.
RITA 11 Possibly more than one BAKA.
FRANCES 11 May carry modified version of BAKA.14
 3. Special Attack Aircraft 39

During the period of the Okinawa campaign, between 18 March and 22 June 1945, Amer-
ican forces encountered a total of fifty-seven Okas. Of these, forty-two of the mother planes
were shot down before they could launch their deadly cargo. Four of the rocket powered
gliders actually hit American ships, but only one sinking was achieved when the destroyer
Mannert L. Abele was hit on 12 April. Two of the American reports might not have been accu-
rate. American intelligence speculated that the mother planes may have been carrying torpe-
does, not Okas.15

By May of 1945, the Allied forces had encountered the Oka piloted bomb and identified several planes
as possible carriers. Among them were the bombers Betty, Peggy, Helen, and Sally. War Depart-
ment — Navy Department Recognition Journal. Number 22, June, 1945, p. 5.
40 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Last Chance Weapons

The Oka was not the only potential rocket powered aircraft. As early as April 1945, the
Japanese were experimenting with rocket units added to Zekes in order to increase their speed
as they approached targets in their suicide runs. They found that it was too difficult to mount
them in the plane’s fuselage; however, two small rocket units, known as Funshinki, might be
mounted under the wings. Test results showed that “although there is a loss of speed of about

One of the special attack weapons under development at the end of the war was the Kawanishi Baika
(Plum Blossom). This was to be a manned version of the German V-1 buzz bomb that plagued London
during the war. It was in the last stages of development when the war ended. This model was found
at the end of the war and taken to the Technical Air Intelligence Center in Anacostia, D.C., for study.
The wingspan was 18'10", LOA 26'3", and the fuselage length 24'3". NARA 80G 400870.
 3. Special Attack Aircraft 41

The Nakajima Ki-115a Tsurugi (Sabre) was designed as a low cost kamikaze plane for defense of the
home islands. Although 105 were produced by the end of the war it never became operational.

five knots when they are not in operation, there is about a 30-knot gain in speed at an altitude
of 6,000 meters when they are put into operation.” 16 During the Okinawa campaign, there
were no reported uses of such rockets on Japanese special attack planes.
Had the war continued and had Japanese production not been severely hampered by
American air attacks, the I-Go guided bomb, under development, might have replaced the
Oka. Two models of this were being tested, with warheads of 660 and 1,760 lbs. The mother
plane, a Peggy or Lily, released the rocket bomb at about 5,000 feet and then guided it by radio
control to the target. Difficulties with the guidance system and army opposition slowed its
development.
The Japanese were also in the process of adapting the German V-1 “buzz bomb” for their
own uses. Their version, called the Baika or Plum Blosson, was still under development at
war’s end. This was to be a piloted version used in suicide attacks.
Japanese army planners took a practical approach to the problem. Recognizing that addi-
tional special attack planes would be needed in the defense of the home islands, they consulted
with the Nakajima company on the production of a new airplane that was specifically designed
for kamikaze attacks. Their initial charge to the company was on 20 January 1945. This plane
would be known as the Nakajima Ki-115 Tsurugi (Sabre). Specifications called for an airframe
that could mount a variety of engines, giving the Japanese the flexibility to use whatever was
at hand. Cheap, rapid production was the goal, and the new aircraft was to be capable of car-
rying a single bomb at a good rate of speed. Lightness would be achieved by using a wood
structure and dispensing with the added weight of guns and landing gear. The landing gear
would be jettisoned after take off since there would be no use for it. For training purposes
the aircraft was fitted with a crude set of landing gear which made ground handling charac-
teristics problematic. The Tsurugi was to have a top speed of around 342 miles per hour with
a range of 745 miles. This would be sufficient to fly from the home islands against any Amer-
ican invasion force. It would carry a single 1763 lb. bomb. Poor handling and flight charac-
teristics slowed production of the aircraft and by war’s end only 105 had been produced, none
of which became operational.17
 4. Development of the Tokko-tai

Kamikaze History and Development

Although kamikaze actions by Japanese fliers became well known during the battle for
the Philippines, there had been isolated incidents of special attacks prior to the fall of 1944.
Pilots whose planes had been damaged beyond repair and who had no chance of making it
alive back to their base sometimes attempted crash dives into enemy ships. These were indi-
vidual actions and decisions and not official Japanese military policy. Ens. Sadeo Nakamura,
a member of the 293rd Naval Air Unit at Nichols Field in Manila, asserted:
These attacks were made when pilots knew that escape was impossible, as for instance when
parts of structures were shot off or the airplane was in flames. They would then attempt to ram
ALLIED airplanes or ships, damaging them as much as possible, rather than crash uselessly.
These attacks depended on the feelings of the individual pilot at a given moment. 1

Japanese fighter ace Saburo Sakai further claimed that this sort of action was an “unwritten
convention”2 that was practiced by all pilots, be they Japanese, American, German, or British.
Early examples of such actions were fairly well-known in military circles, although they
were singular in nature and not an organized program. According to Capt. Mitsuo Fuchida,
one such incident took place at the battle of Midway. As the attack progressed and the Japanese
carriers Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu were destroyed, only the Hiryu remained operational. Lt.
Cmdr. Tomonaga, commanding the air group on Hiryu, made preparations for take off.
According to Fuchida:
Before the take off, one of the gas tanks of his airplane was found to have been punctured by a
shell hit received in the first attack. However, because of the pressing need for immediate tacti-
cal action there was no time to repair it. Moreover, since there was enough fuel for a one-way
flight, he took off for the torpedo attack with his plane in that condition. He did not leave any
word behind as he took off, but it was fully surmised that he had silently resolved to make his a
suicide attack.3

There are no U.S. Navy records indicating a kamikaze attack on American shipping that day.
The first recorded successful kamikaze attack came on 26 October 1942 when the destroyer
Smith DD 378 was hit during the Battle of Santa Cruz. She was part of Task Force 61, which
included Enterprise CV 6, South Dakota BB 57, Portland CA 33, San Juan CL 54, Porter DD
800, Conyngham DD 371, Shaw DD 373, Cushing DD 797, Preston DD 795, and Mahan DD
364. At 0800 the task force was maneuvering to allow Enterprise to launch her aircraft. Cushing
and Smith were providing anti-submarine screening. At 0944 radar picked up incoming enemy

42
 4. Development of the Tokko-tai 43

aircraft and the ships began to take evasive maneuvers. Japanese torpedo bombers plagued
the ships between 0944 and noon. At 1148 the ships fired on and hit a Kate. The gunfire set
the plane afire. In all probability its pilot realized that he would not survive and chose Smith
as his target. Smith’s action report details the attack:
At 1148 a flaming Japanese torpedo plane dived from slightly abaft the starboard beam, hit the
shield of Gun Number 2 and crashed on the forecastle deck port side and abreast Gun Number
1. There was an immediate flash and the forward part of the ship was enveloped in a sheet of
flame and smoke apparently caused by the bursting of gasoline tanks. The major portion of the
fuselage fell over the side, passed to port in flames and sank astern. At 1149 abandoned the
bridge.4

Firefighting commenced, but at 1153 a large explosion took place which spread small
fires over the decks. These were soon extinguished. In order to prevent additional ammo from
cooking off and her magazine from exploding, the forward magazine was flooded. She
approached South Dakota and the battleship was able to help extinguish her fires. At 1212 the
four forward torpedoes were jettisoned to prevent them from exploding and the ship began
to make headway, resuming its screening duties. About that time twenty more dive bombers
attacked the task force, but Smith had survived the crash and was not damaged further. She
suffered twenty-eight dead and twenty-three wounded. Although the concept of a kamikaze
attack was unknown to Americans at the time, later reports described this attack as such.5
In the fall of 1943 and for about a month at the beginning of 1944, Lt. Col. Koji Tanaka,
a staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters, surveyed the situation in New Guinea.

Smith DD 378 explodes as she is hit by a kamikaze during the Battle of Santa Cruz, 26 October 1942.
American documents claim that this is the first kamikaze attack on an American ship. NARA 80G
33333.
44 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Damage to Smith DD 378’s turret is in evidence as she refuels from South Dakota BB 57. NARA 80G
20675.

According to him, the army air units there suffered from a lack of operational aircraft, which
was caused by continual difficulties with the Type III Tony Fighter, the training of replacement
pilots, and command and infrastructure problems. In an effort to stop the constant raids,
some Japanese army pilots had resorted to crashing their planes into American B-17s and B-
24s. The use of these special attack methods by the army began in 1943 and lasted into the
spring of 1944. For example:
Sgt. Ono, attached to the 8 Air Div. and assigned to escorting convoys crashed his plane into an
enemy B 17 north of MADANG, NEW GUINEA, causing the enemy plane to crash and thus
accomplishing his mission of protecting convoys. In the latter part of May 1944, four fighter
planes under the command of Maj. TAKATA of the 5 Air Regt. decided to crash into an enemy
vessel off the southern shore of BIAK and sink it. It was believed that three of the four planes
crashed into the enemy destroyer, and the remaining one was believed missing.
The above two incidents were formally reported by wire to the Imperial General Headquarters
and the War Ministry by the Army commander of that area, and it is believed that rewards were
given.6

Although Takata’s flight came close to the American destroyer Sampson DD 394, the results
were not as successful as the Japanese reported. Takata’s flight consisted of four twin-engine
Nicks escorted by five Oscars. In the early evening of 27 May 1944, about 1641, Sampson was
covering the landing area on Biak Island when she was attacked by four single-engine fighters
which came in from the East. One was shot down by the ship and one by shore fire. Almost
simultaneously with the first attack, a second attack came in from the northeast at treetop
height. This raid consisted of the four Nicks led by Takata. They strafed the beach and dropped
 4. Development of the Tokko-tai 45

bombs which missed the nearby LSTs. The lead plane, probably Takata’s, was shot down and
crashed close to the LSTs and a second was shot down near the jetty. The third plane passed
over the ship and 20mm and 40mm fire from the destroyer hit an engine and set it afire. The
damaged plane circled and made a run on the Sampson, but heavy fire from the ship shot off
part of one wing and the plane passed over the bridge, narrowly missing it. It hit the water
about 400 yards off the destroyer’s starboard side, spreading flames onto SC 699, which was
cruising nearby. The fourth plane was driven off.
On board the sub-chaser, commanding officer Lt. (jg) J. W. Foristel watched as the third
plane circled and headed for his ship. After it was hit by fire from several ships, the plane’s
left wing hit the water about thirty yards off the port side. The Nick bounced off the water
and struck the ship near the water line, starting a raging gasoline fire which enveloped the
central part of the ship and reached to mast height. Eighteen men where either blown over-
board or jumped, including the commanding officer. Confusion made it difficult to determine
what had happened. Sonoma came alongside and assisted in putting out the fires. Two men
were killed, including William H. Harrison RM 2/c who was killed when the plane hit his
20mm gun station. Harrison’s body was found still in his harness. He had fired his gun until
the end.
Tanaka returned to Japan and reported his findings to the highest echelon of the Army
and recommended that the use of special attack operations be considered. Philosophical dis-
agreements sprang up among the top army officers. The discussion centered on whether or
not special attack tactics and squadrons should be under a mandate from the Imperial Army
or whether they should be strictly volunteer. Both the Inspector General of Aviation, Gen.
Korechika Anami and his deputy chief, Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, felt that they should be
strictly voluntary. After conversations with Maj. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, the Chief of the First
Bureau, General Staff Headquarters, it was decided not to order army pilots to engage in
special attack training.7 Shortly thereafter, in July 1944, the army “Aviation Inspector-General
sent a letter to all flight school superintendents requesting a list of special attack volunteers
be submitted. (A similar letter was sent from the War Minister to all air group commanders.)”8
Within a short period of time the army had selected fifty volunteers. Bomber pilots trained
at Hamamatsu and Hokoda Army Flight Schools and the fighter pilots at Hitachi and Akeno
Army Flight Schools. The following month, another sixty volunteers were accepted for special
attack training and the program began to grow. By fall of 1944, the army pilots were still
undergoing training, but the navy had also been considering special attacks. The program
was initiated by the navy using regular pilots who were asked to volunteer.
Japanese sources frequently credit RAdm. Masafumi Arima as the inspiration for the
beginning of the suicide attacks at the Philippines. Arima commanded the 26th Air Flotilla
which was based at Manila. On 15 October 1944, he decided to lead a strike against American
carriers near Luzon, an unusual undertaking for an officer of his high rank. Japanese reports
claim that Arima crashed his Zero into the carrier Franklin CV 13, but this is unlikely. Neither
Franklin nor the other carriers in the American force were hit by kamikazes that day.
The official beginning of the Japanese Navy’s kamikaze units came on 19 October 1944
when VAdm. Takijiro Onishi toured the base of the 201st Air Group at Mabalacat, Philippines.
Onishi had just been appointed commander of the First Air Fleet and recognized that Japan’s
position in the war was tenuous. He suggested to the air group’s leaders that suicide crashes
were their only chance to defeat the enemy. Within the hour the determination had been
made to use this extreme attack method and twenty-seven members of the 201st volunteered
for the mission. These men were not poorly trained beginners but were ranked among the
best pilots in the air group. Lt. Yukio Seki, a graduate of the Naval Academy, was selected as
their leader.
46 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

What took place at Mabalacat was a new strategy, one that would plan, organize and
coordinate this attack method. A new strategy was timely after the loss of 1,500 Japanese
airmen in the Marianas. With so many capable pilots gone, it would not be possible to replace
them in a short space of time.
The First Shimpu Special Attack Corps, having been formed at Mabalacat, soon went
into action. They consisted of four groups, the Asahi, Shikishima, Yamato, and Yamazakura
Units. On 21 October 1944, the corps began conducting unsuccessful sorties over the ocean
searching for American ships. On the morning of 25 October 1944, at about 0730, six Zekes
and their four escorts from the Asahi and Yamato Units found RAdm. Thomas Sprague’s
group of escort carriers off Samar. About the same time, Seki led the Shikishima Unit’s five
bomb-laden Zekes and four escorts off the field at Mabalacat and, at 1045, spotted another
carrier group under RAdm. Clifton Sprague. Their attacks were successful and one carrier
was sunk and several others damaged. With the success of these attacks in the Philippines,
Onishi’s strategy was validated. From this point on, the use of special attack units would be
given serious consideration in any operation.
The experiences of the Japanese during the Philippines’ campaign demonstrated that the
use of kamikaze planes was a
viable alternative. It had proven
to be the most effective attack
method, with a high percentage
of hits on American vessels. Of
the 650 suicide missions flown
during the Philippines’ cam-
paign, nearly 27 percent were
deemed successful.9 Part of this
success may be attributed to the
use of the Zeke. Its good speed
and maneuverability gave it an
advantage over the many obso-
lete types that would be flown
on the missions at Okinawa.
In addition, the first of the
kamikaze pilots were veterans
with significant flying skills.
This would stand in sharp con-
trast to the kamikaze pilots uti-
lized during the Okinawa
campaign, many of whom had
only basic flight training.
One might question how
the Japanese expected to win the
war by the use of such tactics.
By the time the American forces
invaded Okinawa, it was obvi-
ous to the Japanese that the pos-
sibility of victory had vanished
and that it was only a matter of
VAdm. Takajiro Onishi. Photograph courtesy the Naval History time before the home islands
and Heritage Command. NH 73093. were targeted for invasion.
 4. Development of the Tokko-tai 47

What did the Japanese high command hope to accomplish by sending its young pilots to certain
death? When faced with catastrophic losses, they had few options. In an interview conducted
by the Americans at the end of the war Capt. Rikihei Inoguchi, of the Tenth Air Fleet, discussed
the program’s goals. Inoguchi had been present at the inception of the kamikaze program in
the Philippines. He asserted that the Japanese never expected to win the war using such methods.
What was possible, however, was the achievement of acceptable conditions for its termination.
If the Americans were to sustain unacceptable losses from the special attack units, then they
might be willing to end the war with terms more favorable to the Japanese.10 Lieutenant Col.
Naomichi Jin, who served as Chief of Liaison Staff in the Thirty-Second Army Intelligence
during the battle for Okinawa, identified four reasons for the adoption of kamikaze tactics:
1. There were no prospect of victory in the air by employment of orthodox methods.
2. Suicide attacks were more effective because the power of impact of the plane was
added to that of the bomb, besides which the exploding gasoline caused fire —fur-
ther, achievement of the proper angle effected greater speed and accuracy than that
of normal bombing.
3. Suicide attacks provided spiritual inspiration to the ground units and to the Japa-
nese public at large.
4. Suicide attack was the only sure and reliable type of attack at the time such attacks
were made (as they had to be) with personnel whose training had been limited
because of shortage of fuel.11
Propaganda value was certainly a consideration. Capt. Katsuo Shima, head of the prop-
aganda section of the Naval General Staff, instituted a program that was aimed at convincing
the Allies that the Japanese would commit national suicide rather than surrender. The Special
Attack Corps was held up as an example of what the Allies could expect. In addition, Japanese
news sources wrote compelling stories of the heroism and successes of the kamikaze pilots.
In their desperation, the Japanese desire for a weapon that would end the American threat
overrode their common sense. The impetus toward further development of the kamikaze con-
cept was spurred on by exaggerated reports of their early success. Civilian workers on the
home front were encouraged to emulate the sacrifice of the kamikazes in their daily tasks. If
men could willingly go to their deaths for the nation, surely workers at home could be expected
to make great sacrifices as well. Pilots committing themselves to the ultimate sacrifice could
also look forward to a reward. Almost from the beginnings of the kamikaze campaign in the
Philippines, the pilots were given posthumous promotions. At first these were only one-rank
promotions but soon a two-rank promotion became the norm.
One of the curiosities of the kamikaze experience was the appearance of a small number
of Koreans among the ranks of the Tokko-tai. Crewmen on the destroyer Luce picked up a
Korean pilot after they had shot down his plane. He indicated that he was a farmer who had
been drafted into the military and forced to become a kamikaze pilot.12 The Japanese had
been accepting Koreans for military service since 1938 and began drafting them in April of
1944. According to some sources, eleven Koreans eventually became members of the Tokko-
tai.13 Among them were Capt. Kim San Phil, 2d Lt. Tak Kyon Hyen and Sgt. 1st Class Park
Ton Fun, all of whom are honored at the Yasukuni Shrine and the Chiran Peace Museum.14

Okinawa and the Ten Go Campaign

In order to achieve maximum success against the American invasion of Okinawa, it was
imperative that both the Japanese army and navy cooperate. Although both branches drafted
plans for the joint venture, the army plan was adopted. Col. Ichiji Sugita, former Operations
48 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Staff Officer at Imperial General Headquarters, would later claim that “the Navy took an
extremely negative and indifferent attitude in formulating the Outline of the Operations Plan
of the Imperial Army and Navy in January 1945. The new operations plan was formulated with
the agreement of the Navy only after enthusiastic suggestion by the Army.”15 This was also
the case with the planning for the Ten Go Operation. Capt. Toshikazu Omae, who served as
Planning Section Chief, Naval General Staff during that period, later reported:
The actual condition of the Navy’s air strength at that time (especially from the viewpoint of
training) regrettably would not allow the Navy to participate in the OKINAWA Air Operations
which were expected to occur in March or April. The Navy generally desired to avoid the hith-
erto gradual attrition of semi-trained personnel and did not wish to engage in operations at
OKINAWA and other fronts, much less the homeland, until about May, by which time it would
have accumulated sufficient fighting strength.16

Although both branches of the Japanese military were committed to cooperate against
the Americans at Okinawa, the planning ran into problems. Targets to be attacked by the
army forces were convoys and troop carriers. These vessels were easier to hit and pilots
required less training for the missions. By comparison, the navy targets were the carrier task
forces, which were more difficult to attack and required greater flying skills. Japanese navy
planning called for additional special attack training. According to Cmdr. Yoshimori Terai,
former officer in charge of Air Operations, Naval General Staff, “From the beginning, air
preparations (special attack planes) were not expected to be completed until the end of May.
Although we desired to delay the American advance on OKINAWA through the Second TAN
Operations (attack on ULITHI Base), but as a result of their failure, we were forced to face
the Okinawa Operations unprepared.”17
The situation was no better for the army. With the failure of the operations against Ulithi
and the accelerated advance of the American forces toward Okinawa, the army was caught in
the time trap as well. According to Japanese naval officers involved in the planning for Ten
Go, “the preparations of the 6 Air Army were even more behind schedule than those of the
Navy.”18 Still, cooperation between the branches was necessary. Navy Directive No. 540 of 1
March 1945 detailed the extent of that cooperation.
The Army-Navy Joint Central Agreement on Air Operations
1. Policy
To destroy the enemy, who is expected to invade the East China Sea and the vicinity, with a
display of the combined air strength of the Army and the Navy and at the same time to
strengthen the direct Homeland defense. In order to execute the above-mentioned operations,
emphasis will be placed on build-up and use of the special attack strength.
2. The principle of air operational guidance in each area:
a. Air operations in the East China Sea and the vicinity (Formosa, the Nansei Islands, South-
east China, Kyushu and Korea).
The Army-Navy air forces will immediately deploy in the East China Sea and the vicinity and
destroy enemy invading units.
The chief targets for the Navy air forces will be enemy carrier striking task forces, and for the
Army, enemy transport convoys. However, the Army will cooperate as much as possible in the
attack against enemy carrier striking task forces.19

Navy Directive No. 513, issued by Adm. Koshiro Oikawa on 20 March 1945, spelled out
the goals of the Ten Go Operation. Its first priority was the destruction of the American carrier
task forces that had been attacking Japan. This was to be accomplished by the mass use of
kamikaze aircraft, suicide boats, manned torpedoes, and midget submarines. A secondary
target was the American invasion fleet operating in and around Okinawa. Of particular impor-
tance were the air bases on Okinawa. Should they fall into American hands, the security of
the home islands would be further imperiled.20
 4. Development of the Tokko-tai 49

Training Program for Naval Aviators

The selection process for naval aviators was extremely rigorous. After enduring the brutal
discipline of recruit training, which included many physical beatings by petty officers, the
new seamen were assigned to a ship or unit. Beatings there continued until the individual
became a petty officer, then conditions improved a bit. Escape from the ranks of the common
seaman was by application to a specialist’s school and the passing of admission tests. In the
late 1930s, this was the procedure for becoming a pilot. Students enrolled in the Naval Academy
at Eta Jima also received harsh physical treatment, but not quite as brutal as that given to
enlisted men.
Tsuchiura, located fifty miles northeast of Tokyo, was the site of a Navy Fliers School.
There, selected members of the Imperial Japanese Navy underwent a rigorous program in
flight training. Famous Japanese Navy ace, Saburo Sakai, reported that when he was accepted
for pilot training in 1939, only seventy applicants out of 1,500 were admitted. Those selected
were a mixture of graduates of the Naval Academy at Eta Jima, enlisted non-commissioned
officers, and new recruits. Training there was even more brutal than basic training and other
specialized schools. Daily regimens of wrestling, swimming, pole climbing, one-hand hanging
for over ten minutes, gymnastics, springboard diving, and other forms of physical exercise
were utilized to improve balance, coordination and spirit. Dismissal was possible at any time
and Sakai reported that of his original class of seventy, only twenty-five graduated from the
ten-month course.21 These men became extremely talented and capable pilots. Once their
training had been completed, the navy pilots were frequently referred to as Umi no Arawashi
or Sea Eagles. This label was first used by Capt. Yamaki of the Kasumigaura Naval Flying
School.
Another base used for pilot training was Mie Naval Air Station. Shigeo Imamura reported
that in September 1943, 5,000 men were accepted into the Naval Air Reserve. Of this number,
half were sent to Tsuchiura and half to Mie for basic training. After Mie, Imamura went to
Isumi Naval Air Center and trained on the Willow intermediate trainer, a fabric covered
biplane.
Yukihisa Suzuki, who underwent special attack training at Hyakurigahara Air Base, did
his training in the same aircraft that would be used for the special attack mission. These were
Nakajima B5N2 torpedo bombers (Kate). Fuel was in short supply and the amount of training
time severely limited. Suzuki reasoned that it did not matter much as the flight was one way.
Taking off and being able to fly the plane would be sufficient. While at Hyakurigahara, Suzuki
and his fellow cadet officer pilots experienced the same type of brutal discipline that was com-
mon in the training procedure. On one occasion, following a day of mediocre practice, the
student pilots were lined up in several rows. After the chief flight instructor had expressed
his disappointment with the training, he left and four of his assistants took over. They
upbraided the cadets for several minutes and went through the ranks, punching each in the
face several times. Those who staggered or fell were beaten more severely, either by punches
to the face or by being beaten with sticks. This was a typical end to the daily training regimen.
Suzuki reported that in his earlier training at Himeji, he had seen a trainee beaten to death
by the administration of numerous punches to his face. 22 Apparently this was common
throughout the navy. Shigeo Imamura related how the same type of treatment was meted out
to students at Izumi as well.23
Another Japanese navy pilot, Flight Chief PO Konichi Okabe, began his training in 1943.
He spent three months in pre-flight training at Tsuchiura, after which he went on to Yatabe
for elementary flight training. After five months at Yatabe, he went to Nagoya for training as
a dive bomber pilot. After three months of training at Nagoya, he became an assistant flight
50 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

instructor. Three months of work as an assistant flight instructor qualified him as a full instruc-
tor and he remained there until 1945. On 1 March 1945, he was transferred to the No. 1 Attack
Flying Unit which was based at Kanoya. On 16 March, the unit transferred to Oita for practice
against ship targets. His Judy 33 was shot down over Okinawa a month later after flying a
kamikaze mission from Kanoya.24
One of the important factors influencing the outcome of any battle is the training of the
combatants. In the case of the Japanese army and navy air forces, the training began to decline
as the war progressed. At the beginning of the war with America, the Japanese had a number
of well-trained pilots. Prior to joining a combat unit, the average navy flier had completed
650 hours of flight time and the army pilots 500. This intensive training, along with the exclu-
sive admission requirements, weeded out all but the most talented candidates. Such a rigorous
and selective process, coupled with combat experience in China, meant that the Japanese
fighter pilots at the beginning of the war were equal or superior to their opponents. Added
to a pilot’s training experience was the superiority of the Zeke over its adversaries. It is easy
to see why the Japanese pilots enjoyed great success in the early stages of the war. However,
one problem for the Japanese was that they did not increase the pilot recruitment and training
programs early on and failed to recognize just how valuable their experienced pilots were.
When they lost a large percentage of them during the first year and a half of the war, they had
to scramble to train replacements. Aircraft flown by these men had little protective armament
and, if they were shot down, it was unlikely that they would be rescued. The Japanese system
of air-sea rescue was poor. A second problem hinged on the production and development of
new aircraft. Believing in the superiority of the Zeke, navy planners continually called for
improvements and modifications to the plane instead of pushing for newer designs. When
superior fighter designs were developed, it was too late in the war to produce them in the
numbers required to turn the tide of battle. An additional problem that they faced was the decline
in the amount of aviation gas available, making it difficult for student pilots to amass the number
of hours needed to polish their flying skills. Where once the Japanese pilots had an equal amount
of flying experience, by the end of the war, most Japanese kamikaze pilots had less than one hun-
dred hours in the air. Shigeo Imamura reported that by the time of his graduation from Oita, his
group had logged only seventy flight hours in Willows and Claudes. This stood in sharp contrast
to American pilots, who averaged 600 hours, making air combat a very one-sided affair. During
his interrogation at the end of the war, Cmdr. Yoshimori Terai indicated:
Until December 1940, the Japanese Naval Air Force training program consisted of the following
phases:
1. Elementary or basic training for 30 hours in Type-3 trainers or Type-90 seaplane trainers.
Following completion, candidates went to:
2. Intermediate training using Type-90 land trainers and Type-93 (WILLOW). After 40
hours, trainees moved to:
3. Advanced combat training where combat and obsolete combat type aircraft were
employed. 30 hours flight time in ZEKES, CLAUDES, KATES, VALS, ALFS, PETES, and
NELLS was required before candidates were assigned to:
4. Operational units. If selected for ship borne air groups, personnel had another 50 hours
training before leaving operational units.
In December 1940, elementary and intermediate training were combined but total flight time
of the two reduced by 10 hours.
... In the spring of 1944 the “skipping” of advanced combat training was stopped by the naval
General Staff and restored for all trainees because, (1) operational losses were excessive, (2)
longer period of training in the newer combat types consumed more aviation gasoline than
training in the less modern aircraft assigned to advanced combat training units and (3) tactical
units were then beginning to employ new plane types such as GEORGE, JILL, JUDY, MYRT, and
FRANCES which were “too hot” for any but experienced pilots to fly.25
 4. Development of the Tokko-tai 51

During the summer and fall of 1943, as the First Air Fleet was being organized, its commander
in chief had eliminated advanced training because he wanted to supervise his new pilots in
their advanced combat training. This practice lasted about a year and was scrapped for the
reasons cited above.
Apparently there was some variation in the training curriculum. One captured navy pilot
claimed that his first flight training was in a Type 96 Nell and that his training time was longer
than usual. American military intelligence interviewers speculated that this may have been
done as an experiment.26
The reduction in the number of training hours left large gaps in the hierarchy of skilled
pilots. Normally, those with many hours of flight time would be given the task of training
others and would serve as flight instructors. By the time of the Okinawa campaign, these
pilots were in short supply. Many students who had just finished their own flight training
were pressed into service as instructors. While experienced pilots might be able to do a good
job, these new instructors found themselves with about twice the student load of their pred-
ecessors. Some of the students recruited during the Okinawa campaign were as young as four-
teen. Still other pilots with more flying time were too valuable to expend in the kamikaze
program and were kept back at the bases. There they could train others and assist in the
defense of the homeland when it became necessary.
Fuel shortages sharply reduced the number of hours pilot trainees could practice in the
air. During training one might find that his aircraft’s engine was fueled by low octane gasoline
or a mixture of gas and alcohol, which did not allow for consistent running of the engine. As
the need for kamikaze pilots grew, some basic subjects such as navigation were dropped from
the curriculum. Kamikaze planes could be led to the target area by one plane piloted by an
experienced aviator. In short, as the Okinawa campaign wore on, the pilots flying missions
to Okinawa became increasingly less proficient than those who had fought the Americans in
other areas of the Pacific.
If better pilots were used on the kamikaze missions, it would be to provide escort fighter
protection and to report back on the results of the attack. Since the pilots flying the kamikaze
planes were relatively inexperienced, it was not long before the Americans recognized that
they were not the best of the Japanese airmen. According to Lt. A. P. Glienke, the commanding
officer of LCS(L) 115:
Suicide pilots do not seem to be experienced flyers, and have probably never had the experience
of operating an aircraft at the rate of speed attained in a suicide dive, from a position angle of
thirty degrees. They tend to overshoot, and if overshooting, depend on throwing the stick for-
ward to crash down on their target. If they are off the target, forward or aft, they will try a wing
over to crash down on their target.27

Training Program for Army Aviators

Training procedures for the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force were no less harsh than
what was previously described for the navy. Generally speaking, enlisted recruits were bru-
talized by their training NCOs much more than those who were destined to become officers.
Yasuo Kuwahara, who won Japan’s National Glider Championships in 1944 when he was
fifteen years old, was quickly recruited by the army for its enlisted pilot program. During his
three months of basic training at Hiro Air Base, he and his fellow recruits were continually
beaten and tormented by the NCOs in charge of them. So brutal was their treatment that, by
the end of his three months at Hiro, nine of the recruits had committed suicide. 28
Basic training at Hiro was three months of hell, interspersed with military subjects. Fol-
lowing that, the recruits went on to a six-month period of intermediate training. The first
52 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

three months of this intermediate training was filled with the study of aeronautics and other
military subjects related to flying. During the second half, the students had their first flying
experiences, training in the Tachikawa Ki-9 (Spruce) biplane. After three months of flying
the biplane, they moved on to single seat fighter trainers and finally on to the Nakajima Ki-
43 Hayabusa (Oscar).29
Not all training went smoothly. Those going through the program in the later stages of
the war sometimes found that it was interrupted. Ryuji Nagatsuka, in training to become an
officer in the Japanese Army Air Force, was in the second phase of his training in September
1944, when a fuel shortage hit and flying was suspended for ten days. A mixture of gas and
alcohol was substituted and the class got through a couple of more months. The training
cycle was cut short by one month and the student pilots were sent to the front lines to complete
their next phase in twin engine Ki-45 Toryus (Nick). After a month and a half there, they
were then sent back to Ozuki for further fighter training in Nakajima Ki-27 Type 97s (Nate).
In their last stage they also flew the advanced Nakajima Ki-43 fighters (Oscar) at Kumagaya
Flying School at Kagohara.30
In general, pilots training for the Special Attack Corps had to learn a variety of skills.
The army was the first to devote training time to kamikaze tactics. However, both army and
navy used similar methods. According to a report entitled “The Japanese Air Force,” by Col.
N. Brunetti:
Proof of the excellent maneuvering skill of which the Japanese pilots are capable is furnished by
the type of training the volunteer suicide pilots go through (Army school at ATSUGI, Navy
school at KANOYA). The most intricate piece of exercise consisted in hitting an air filled rubber
balloon which was towed by a plane. The pilot had to hit the balloon at the very closing phase of
any acrobatical maneuver.31

Fighters equipped with bombs were frequently used in the kamikaze attacks, but this
was an unusual configuration for many of the light fighter planes. The fighter pilots had to

The Mitsubishi Type 97 “Nate” was a front line fighter in the 1930s. By the time of the Philippines
campaign it was primarily used as a trainer. It also saw use as a kamikaze at Okinawa. NARA 342 FH
3B 35009.
 4. Development of the Tokko-tai 53

practice with dummy weights attached to the fuselage to get used to the additional take off
space needed when carrying bomb loads. At some bases a log was affixed under the plane to
simulate the bomb.
Nagatsuka claimed that there were two approaches for the Oscars and similar types of
fighter planes, one from a high altitude and one from low on the water. The high altitude
approach, from 16,000 to 20,000 feet, enabled the kamikaze pilots to use the clouds for cover.
Then they dove on their target at an angle of forty-five to fifty-five degrees. Once committed
to the dive, there was no turning back and no margin for error. The low level approach enabled
the planes to evade radar, as well as fire from the bigger guns on the ships, which could not
depress sufficiently to hit them.32
Pilot training in the Japanese Army Air Force came to an abrupt halt in April 1945. Con-
tinued bombing and strafing of the training fields made it difficult to get anything accom-
plished. Karasehara, on Kyushu, was the largest training center for kamikaze pilots; however,
it was high on the list of bases to be hit by American bombers. In addition, pilot shortages
made it necessary to utilize many of the instructors for combat missions. Fuel shortages con-
tinued to plague the air installations. Fields such as Chiran were difficult to supply since the
rail lines to the area had been bombed. Limited training was resumed in July, but it was too
late to be of any use to the war effort.
Pilot quality continued to decline. Lower admission standards were required in order to
get the necessary number of pilot recruits. Additionally, the standards for graduation were
relaxed. Col. Junji Hayashi, who served as Chief of Staff of the 51 Training Flying Division at
Gifu on Honshu, stated that the failure rate for pilot trainees was only ten percent, however,
of those who graduated, about twenty percent were ill-prepared. They were permitted to
graduate in spite of their weaknesses since the Japanese sorely needed pilots.33
 5. Tactics

Kamikaze Tactics
Organized kamikaze attacks began during the Philippine campaign, but by the time of
the Okinawa campaign, the attacks were much more intense and better planned. In the Philip-
pines, attacks by three to four planes were the norm. Japanese aviation strategists felt that a
small number of special attack planes, accompanied by a few escorts, had the best chance of
approaching the American ships undetected. The massed attacks at Okinawa were much larger
and better executed. Discussing the attack at Radar Picket Station No. 1 at Okinawa on 4 May,
the destroyer Ingraham reported
an estimated forty to fifty planes were thrown into the attack. The first planes were modern fast
types, appearing in small groups, or singly, and approaching from several widely separated sec-
tors. These attacks built up until the CAP had more than it could handle, at which time the
enemy began to slip through. Soon enough attackers had shaken free of our fighters to saturate
AA defense. At this period the enemy began attacking from all directions at different altitudes,
pilots apparently attacking independently as opportunities were offered. It was at this stage that
MORRISON took her first two hits and that the first formation of float planes put in their
appearance. The float planes came in from the north flying low and attracted many of our
fighters. Following the float plane attack came an intensified attack by fast land planes.
Observers state that the coordinated attack made upon this vessel came from a loose formation
from which each plane peeled off to attack from different directions as simultaneously as possi-
ble. After the fast planes had expended themselves two more formations of float planes
approached. Those two formations did not reach attack positions until well after the enemy’s
major effort had been exhausted.1

The tactics employed by the Japanese airmen in their kamikaze attacks were determined,
in large part, by the types of planes available and the relative amount of training completed
by their pilots. As previously noted, the Japanese had lost many experienced pilots by the
time of the Okinawa invasion. Training time had been cut considerably by the shortages of
aviation gas and pilots preparing for kamikaze missions were given the minimal training
needed to accomplish their goal. By the end of the war, army pilots training for the Special
Attack Units had only seventy hours of flight time and navy pilots only thirty to fifty hours.
An analysis of the different types of approach was offered by American naval intelligence.
The approaches fell into three categories. The single approach consisted of a single plane or
a single group of planes coming in from the same altitude. Ships operating near shore might
find this approach being used, as the enemy aircraft could utilize the land mass to confuse
radar. The double approach consisted of two groups of suicide planes which approached from

54
 5. Tactics 55

different altitudes and directions. One group was usually larger and served as a decoy. With this
approach, it would be difficult for the ships’ gunners to concentrate on both groups at once.
The larger group would occupy the ships’ gun crews while the smaller group slipped in from
the opposite side. Multiple approaches might be undertaken by a single group or multiple groups
that would break into individual attacks. It was difficult for the ships to defend themselves effec-
tively with the attacks coming from numerous altitudes and directions. This was deemed to be
the most dangerous type of attack because some of the kamikazes were sure to slip through.2
Destroyers and other ships on the screening stations preferred to take planes under fire
on the beam, or in the case of ships like the LCS(L)s from about 45 degrees off the bow. This
allowed maximum use of their guns. Recognizing this, the Japanese frequently tried to attack
from astern. The radar picket destroyer, Pritchett, reported that this was the tactic used during
the attack on Radar Picket Station No. 9 at Okinawa on 29 May 1945. Pritchett, Dyson, and
Aulick were patrolling in a column with the LCS(L)s 11, 20, 92, and 122 in formation nearby
when they were attacked by three Zekes. The Japanese planes were flying toward the ships on
the port beam and circled to make an attack from astern. As the destroyers turned to meet
them broadside, the planes turned again to keep their stern position. 3

The Attack
A standard attack by a group of kamikaze planes involved three elements: the special
attack planes, direct escort planes and intermediate escort planes. The direct escort planes
were responsible for providing close cover over the air base as the special attack planes took
off. As the mission progressed toward the ships at Okinawa, the direct escort planes stayed

Depending on the number and type of planes in the attacking unit, as well as the opposition they
expected to encounter, kamikazes used a variety of formations. The drawing above depicts two that
were commonly used. Since this was translated from Japanese, the reading begins at the upper right
and goes to the bottom left. CinCPacCinCPOA Bulletin No. 129 –45. Suicide Force Combat Methods
Special Translation Number 67. 27 May 1945, p. 7.
56 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

with the special attack planes to provide cover and keep the attack together. Prior to their
arrival at the scene of the attack, the direct escort planes had been preceded by the intermediate
escort planes. The job of the intermediate escort planes was to engage the enemy aircraft that
stood between the special attack group and the target. Once the path had been cleared of
enemy fighters and the special attack planes had crashed into their targets, the intermediate
force was to confirm their success. In some cases, the intermediate escort planes flew a different
route to the target in order to draw American fighters away from the special attack and direct
escort planes.
The pilot of the kamikaze plane had to arm his bomb once he sighted the enemy forces.
In early attacks in the Philippines, kamikaze planes carried a variety of explosives, including
mortar and artillery shells, as well as bombs. By the time of the battle for Okinawa, each type
of plane carried a specific bomb load.

BOMBS CARRIED BY JAPANESE ARMY AIR FORCE KAMIKAZE PLANES4

Type of Plane Type of Bombs Used Number of Bombs Carried Loading Position
Ki-46-1 Dinah No. 80 GP Bomb (Navy) 1 ¥ 800 kg Beneath Fuselage
[1,763 lbs.]
Ki-8 Frank 250 kg bomb 2 ¥ 250 kg Beneath Wings
[551 lbs.]
Ki-43 Model 3 250 kg bomb 2 ¥ 250 kg Beneath Wings
Oscar 3
Ki-27 Nate 250 kg or 500 kg bomb 1 ¥ 500 kg Beneath Fuselage
[1,102 lbs.] 2 ¥ 250 kg
Ki-45 Nick 250 kg bomb 2 ¥ 250 kg Beneath Wing
Ki-51 Sonia 250 kg or 500 kg bomb 1 ¥ 250 kg or 1 ¥ 500 kg Beneath Fuselage
Ki-36 Ida 250 kg or 500 kg bomb 1 ¥ 250 kg or 1 ¥ 500 kg Beneath Fuselage
Ki-54 Hickory No. 80 GP Bomb (Navy) 1 ¥ 800 kg Beneath Fuselage
Ki-79 Improved Nate 250 kg bomb 1 ¥ 250 kg Beneath Fuselage
Ki-9 Spruce 100 kg bomb[220 lbs.] 2 ¥ 100 kg Beneath Fuselage
Ki-86 Cypress 50 kg bomb [110 lbs.] 1 ¥ 50 kg Beneath Fuselage
Ki-48 Lily No. 80 GP Bomb (Navy) 1 ¥ 800 kg Bomb Bay
Ki-67 Peggy No. 80 GP Bomb (Navy) 2 ¥ 800 kg 1 in Bomb Bay,
1 in Fuselage

Bombs normally carried by army aircraft were smaller than those carried by navy aircraft
which were designed to sink ships. Since Allied shipping had become a primary target, the
army had to borrow larger bombs from the navy. This led to some problems fitting them to
army aircraft. Army fighters normally could carry a 1,102 lb. bomb but, with the change in
their mission at Okinawa, borrowed the 1,763 lb. bomb from the navy. Some army units began
to train in the use of torpedoes in May 1944 and used them at Okinawa beginning in April
1945. The navy continued to develop larger bombs, but there was a limit to their size since
they did not have the heavy bombers which could carry the additional payload.
Various conditions, such as weather, aircraft type, or the presence of enemy fighters
would determine if the attack were to be conducted at a low or high altitude. In the case
of individual attacks, the pilot’s altitude, speed and angle of attack had been predetermined
by various studies. One of the more important factors that a pilot had to consider was
his plane’s speed at the moment of impact. If his aircraft did not have sufficient speed it would
lessen the effect and the plane and bomb might not penetrate the ship’s hull or deck. If
the air speed was too great, such as in a diving attack, it might make the plane rise and throw
off the pilot’s aim. Kamikaze pilots had been trained to know the characteristics of their air-
craft.
When kamikazes attacked in force they had additional considerations. Guide planes
 5. Tactics 57

played an important role in a kamikaze attack, keeping the planes from getting in the way of
each other and insuring that the force operated with maximum effectiveness. The Suicide
Force Combat Methods Training Manual stated:
As soon as the attack is ordered the planes will form a fairly extended column, following the
plane of the commander, and will begin to approach the enemy at top speed. Then, when the
plane of the commander makes its final run-in (TOSSHIN) the pilots, without additional orders,
will pick their targets from those assigned previously and will make their attack runs. At this
moment they must strive to attack one ship with one plane.
At the time of the attack run the conditions encountered by the “TO” Force will usually be
extraordinarily difficult and violent. All sorts of confusion and error must be anticipated. Even
at this time each pilot must burn with the desire to sink his target and fulfill his mission by
bravely and calmly making an attack run which means certain death.5

Pilots were further directed to attack the target ships using a variety of different altitudes and
bearings in their final run.
Many of the kamikaze attacks were attempted at a low level, perhaps only twenty to
thirty feet off the water. As the planes approached at this low altitude, they skimmed under
radar detection. However, at that angle they were easier to hit. Planes attacking from an
extreme high angle were more difficult targets, and it was one of the most effective of the
attack positions. When directly overhead, it was almost impossible for a ship to fire on them.
At Okinawa Cmdr. R. H. Holmes, commanding officer of the destroyer Bennion, found his

Kamikaze units varied their approaches to take advantage of existing conditions. This diagram,
reproduced from captured Japanese documents, illustrates the use of cloud cover and surprise attacks
using low level flying. Suicide Weapons and Tactics “Know Your Enemy!” CinCPac-CinCPOA Bulletin
126 –45. 28 May 1945, p. 6.
58 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Horizontal attacks were preferred when surprise was a possibility. Suicide Weapons and Tactics
“Know Your Enemy!” CinCPac-CinCPOA Bulletin 126 –45. 28 May 1945, p. 10.
 5. Tactics 59

ship under attack by several kamikazes at Radar Picket Station No. 1 on 28 April 1945. Bennion’s
lookouts spotted one circling directly over their heads and watched in frustration as it spiraled
downward. “At this point the plane was circling at 80°–90° position angle making a track
impossible and allowing the guns to bear only seconds at a time.... Extreme difficulty in
loading was experienced due to the maximum elevation and slewing in train of the 40 MM
guns.”6 It was not until the plane entered a steep glide to make a run from astern that Bennion’s
gunners were able to hit it.
Japanese air commanders had given a great deal of thought to the types of approaches
and the angles of attack of their kamikaze planes. Their knowledge had been formalized in
manuals developed by both the Japanese Army Air Force and the Japanese Navy Air Force.
One of these, developed by the army and published in February 1945, gave detailed descriptions
for the ideal angle of attack for aircraft such as the Nick, Lily, Sonia, Peggy, Nate, Ida, and

Diving attacks from a high altitude were preferred, particularly when the attacking formation
included a large number of aircraft. Suicide Weapons and Tactics “Know Your Enemy!” CinCPac-
CinCPOA Bulletin 126 –45. 28 May 1945, p. 10.
60 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Spruce. Details for the attack included the altitude and speed at which to begin the attack, as
well as the angle of attack for each plane. 7
The low angle approach was used for surprise attacks or in conditions of low visibility,
such as dawn, dusk or poor weather. A high angle approach was more frequently used when
the raid was large. By May 1945, American naval intelligence noted that the Japanese were
emphasizing the low altitude approaches with greater frequency. In many cases, they skimmed
the waves on the way in. This made it difficult to pick them up, either visually or by radar.
Combat air patrol planes flying at a higher altitude had a difficult time shooting them down,
as they had to dive to get near them. Corsairs in particular, because of their weight, might
have difficulty in pulling out of their dives and risked crashing into the ocean. If the kamikazes

The bow-on attack was frequently used against American carriers. Suicide Weapons and Tactics
“Know Your Enemy!” CinCPac-CinCPOA Bulletin 126 –45. 28 May 1945, p. 10.
 5. Tactics 61

were low enough, the guns of the target ship might not be able to depress sufficiently to fire
on them and, if they did, they risked hitting other ships on patrol in the area. In addition, it
was much more difficult to maneuver away from a plane approaching at a low altitude. 8
Part of the decision to utilize the lower approaches might have stemmed from the difficul-
ties encountered when pilots put their planes into a steep dive. Heavily laden with a bomb
and diving at full throttle, the plane would encounter two problems. The first was increased
pressure on the control surfaces, making it difficult for the pilot to adjust his course toward
a moving target. The second problem was the high speed increase in lift and its effect on
accuracy mentioned above.
Cpl. Yasuo Kuwahara, after having flown escort for several kamikaze missions, wrote:
In my own estimation, the best procedure was to descend anywhere from ten to five thousand
feet, the sun at our tails. The dive varied from forty-five to sixty degrees, leveling out at about
five hundred yards from the target, striking for the stern as low to the water as possible.
Thus an approach was effected below the angle of the bigger guns. It was advantageous for
another reason: that way ships were in danger of hitting each other with their own ammunition.9

Advantages of the lower approach were noted by Cmdr. Bruce McCandless, CO of the destroyer
Gregory. He claimed that the “steep diving attacks are more spectacular and probably more
damaging when successful, but [the] tendency is to overshoot. The more nearly horizontal
runs, or shallow glides, appear to have a higher percentage of hits.” 10
Additional skills had to be learned by kamikaze pilots, among them the identification
of ships and enemy aircraft. Each type of ship was given a different priority, with both
army and navy identifying aircraft carriers as the most important target. The priority
after that was given to battleships, cruisers and transports. Carriers could be put out of
action if hit in the forward elevator. Kamikazes attempted to approach the carrier from astern,
giving the ship a limited ability to avoid the crash. At Okinawa the radar picket ships noted
that kamikazes seemed to pick the amidships sections or the bridge as the target, hoping to
cause the most damage there. According to the Suicide Force Combat Methods Training Man-
ual:
The collision point will vary with the type of plane, kind of target, its size, and speed, but in the
event of a steep diving collision it will be on the deck, amidships, if possible between the stack
and the bridge, and for carriers, at the elevators. In case of an extreme low altitude horizontal
collision, the best point will generally be amidships slightly above the water line. 11

During the final dive, some of the kamikazes strafed the intended target, but many did
not. This sometimes proved confusing to men on the ships. They did not understand that
many of the kamikaze planes were not equipped with machine guns since their pilots had
little or no experience using them. LCS(L) 85 noted further:
The pilots are either not well trained or their judgement is bad, for they miss many ships, even if
it is by a close margin. Some suicide planes do not carry bombs, but just rely on their gasoline to
create a fire and the plane to do damage. Also most of them do not carry machine guns, or else
they would do more strafing.12

Inexperienced pilots had a difficult time identifying various types of American ships and
also had difficulty in zeroing in on a specific part of a ship. It was not unusual for pilots to
confuse oilers, LCTs and LSMs with carriers. With numerous American CAP planes in the
air near the targets, many kamikazes opted to crash into the nearest available target rather
than be shot down while searching for a carrier. What frequently occurred at Okinawa was
that the first ships encountered by the kamikazes were the ships on the radar picket stations
and screens. Therefore, destroyers, destroyer escorts, LSM(R)s and LCS(L)s became prime
targets of opportunity.
62 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Guide Planes
Kamikazes heading for the Okinawa area were usually guided and covered by more expe-
rienced pilots whose job it was to ensure that the kamikaze got through to the target. American
planes intercepting them would have an easy time shooting down the kamikazes, which were
piloted by men with far less experience and training. Additionally, their aircraft were poorly
equipped for dogfighting Hellcats and Corsairs. Many ship action reports indicated that a
couple of Japanese planes kept their distance and seemed to be directing the kamikazes in
their attacks. Ingraham reported:
Furthermore, the airmanship displayed by the pilots of these two formations was of low order.
These two formations reminded one of flocks of pelicans— each bird following the leader in a
loose, ragged file and flying very close to the water. Only one individualist broke away to
approach independently. All fell easy prey to our fighters. The impression gained was that the
leader of each formation was an experienced aviator, but that all of the others had barely enough
flight time to solo.13

As the kamikaze campaigns against Okinawa began, the suicide planes had a great deal
of support. Many Japanese fighter aircraft flew protective cover for them so they could reach
their targets. As the months wore on, the fighter strength of the Japanese was diminished, as
well as the quality of the planes employed by the special attack units. Where air superiority
once insured some success in the kamikaze attacks, the Japanese now found themselves in the
position of frequently sending single planes on the missions or using training planes for night-
time attacks since they did not have the ability to protect them.
As noted above, in the earlier stages of the Kikusui attacks on the American forces at
Okinawa, more planes were available and more of them of a high quality. As the campaign
wore on, the Japanese kept their better fighters for defense of the home islands. Occasionally
more advanced planes appeared over Okinawa, but the outmoded Zeke was the most frequently
used. Because of its good speed and maneuverability it was probably the most successful of
the kamikaze planes in the Philippines and at Okinawa.

Use of Window
In order to cover their approach, designated aircraft in the kamikaze attack group dropped
“window,” a cloud of small metal strips designed to confuse radar. In an attack on 16 April,
three Judys left Kanoya to attack American shipping at Okinawa. When they came in sight of
their target and were fired upon by the ship, the lead plane dropped window. No special device
was used, the observer in the rear cockpit area simply opened a box and scattered it over the
side of the plane. This type of defensive maneuver was effective in many cases. The destroyer
Morrison, attacked at Radar Picket Station No. 1 on 4 May 1945, was totally confused by the
use of window, a major factor leading to her sinking.

Timing the Attack

Since the protective combat air patrol planes were most numerous during the daylight
hours, the kamikazes planned their attacks to coincide with the return of the planes to their
bases or carriers. This was just at sunset, as the CAP had usually been sent back to base and
there was enough light to see the target. Men on the destroyers were well aware of this. With
regard to the attack on his ship at Radar Picket Station No. 9 at Okinawa on 17 May, Lt. B.
M. Demarest, fighter director officer on the destroyer Douglas H. Fox, reported that within a
few minutes after the Eldorado had ordered the CAP back to base, the enemy began to appear.
 5. Tactics 63

It seemed obvious that they were monitoring the Fighter Director (FD) and Identification
Friend or Foe (IFF) networks and were just waiting for the CAP to leave the area. Demarest
elaborated:
The enemy stayed low over the horizon to the west, out of sight of our radars and CAP until the
latter was ordered to base. Darkness was falling rapidly, and although surface targets were clearly
visible, aircraft were but small black dots on the refraction blurred evening sky. With suspicious
promptness a bogey appeared within two minutes after our F.D.O. had reported our Dusk CAP
on steer for base. He was shot down, but not before he had drawn into the attack at least ten
more planes. DOUGLAS H. FOX seemed to be singled out as the principal target for the group,
either as the leading ship or the larger DD present. For a minute or two, every plane maneu-
vered for position in all quadrants and then, obviously on signal, a coordinated attack was
launched. One and perhaps two planes are known to have withdrawn and heckled later but these
made no attempt at the use of suicide tactics.14

Cloudy, rainy nights were welcomed by the ships as the poor weather kept the kamikazes
away. Most dreaded of all were bright, moonlit nights, which made the ships highly visible
and perfect targets. Enemy planes were hard to see in the night sky, particularly if they
approached from a low angle. The phosphorescent wake of the ships was also a dead giveaway,
pointing at their sterns like a giant arrow on the ocean. Attacks during daylight hours exposed
the kamikazes to the fire of the ships and the threat of interception by the combat air patrol.
Rainy days held the best promise for the Japanese, as their planes were able to use cloud cover
to hide their approach.
The primary means that Americans had of determining if a plane was friendly was by
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), but this was not always reliable. According to the com-
manding officer of the light minelayer Shannon, Lt. Cmdr. W. T. Ingraham:
On several occasions it has been proven conclusively that the enemy has in their possession our
Mk.6 IFF system. Several times have planes showed “lights” and proved themselves to be bogies
by suiciding into ships. Up until this time [15 July 1945] we have been almost correct in assum-
ing that any plane showing lights was friendly. Now our primary means of identification during
darkened hours is of doubtful value.... It is believed that Jap suicide planes often turn on their
running lights when in a Kamikaze attack so as to draw fire from the 40mm. The aviator is then
able to ride in on the tracers. Tracer ammo should be reduced to a minimum at night and
40mm radars installed as fast as possible so effective control of 40mm fire may be had. 15

Although the Japanese were able to rationalize the need to use the extreme methods of
the Special Attack Corps, American commanders did not feel they were justified. Their success
would be determined by pilot training and expertise. Cmdr. L. E. Schmidt, Commanding
Officer of the destroyer Isherwood, commented:
The percentage of successful suicide attacks is probably about the same as the percentage of suc-
cessful glide-bombing, dive bombing and torpedo attacks. An enemy who has the requisite
experience, skill, and lack of understanding of the principles of longevity to crash his aircraft
into a target undoubtedly could conduct a successful attack by, to us, more conventional meth-
ods.... The suicide pilot who is not endowed with the prerequisites necessary for conducting a
successful bombing or torpedo run is considered hardly capable of carrying through a properly
executed suicide attack.
It may be concluded, therefore, that the primary value of the suicider is his psychological
effect upon our combat personnel.16

In this respect, Schmidt had identified the psychological impact of suicide attacks as a primary
reason for the use of the Special Attack Corps. Japanese planners knew that the poorly trained
pilot was likely to be shot down before reaching his target. Therefore, the only sure way to
overcome the awesome material advantage of the American forces was by psychological means.
For the individual Japanese airman, the use of such tactics was considered acceptable. Capt.
64 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Rikihei Inoguchi explained, “We must give our lives to the Emperor and Country, this is our
inborn feeling. I am afraid you cannot understand it well, or you may call it desperate or fool-
ish. We Japanese base our lives on obedience to Emperor and Country. On the other hand,
we wish for the best place in death, according to Bushido. Kamikaze originates from these
feelings.”17 It should be noted that Inoguchi did not pilot a special attack plane and that he
survived the war.

Problems Identifying Japanese Aircraft

The identification of ships and aircraft was of paramount importance. Only by visual
means could one be certain if the aircraft approaching his ship was friendly or not. Numerous
training aids and manuals were developed to assist American personnel in the identification
of aircraft. Many instances of American aircraft being shot down by gunners on American
ships had been recorded. Further, determining if the aircraft belonged to the Japanese army
or navy could assist in revealing their base of origin, be it a land base or carrier.
Japanese aircraft appearing over the American ships were numerous and of varied models,
particularly during the Okinawa campaign. It was frequently difficult, in the heat of battle,
to determine just which type of aircraft the Japanese were flying. Confusion of identification

Top: The Mitsubishi A6M5 Reisen, or Zero, was also known by the Allied code name Zeke. NARA
80G 248975. Bottom: The Allied code name for the Nakajima Ki-44 Shoki was Tojo. NARA 80G
192160.
 5. Tactics 65

was common, with ships and pilots alike reporting differences in the planes encountered. In
many cases, Oscars, Zekes and Tojos were mistakenly identified. At other times, spatted,
fixed-gear Japanese aircraft such as Vals, Sonias and Anns were frequently confused. This led
CinCPac-CinCPOA to state, “It appears that perhaps VALS have been used in the greatest
number of suicide attacks. This may be explained partly by the confusion between VAL and
other planes with landing gear down.”18
At Radar Picket Station No. 11A off Okinawa on 3 June 1945, the destroyer Cassin Young,
the light minelayers Thomas E. Fraser, Robert H. Smith, and LCS(L)s 16, 54, 83, and 84 were

Top: The Nakajima Ki-43-11b Hayabusa was assigned the code name Oscar. NARA 80G 167062. Bot-
tom: This Mitsubishi Ki-30 light bomber photographed in December 1944. The code name for this
aircraft was Ann. NARA 80G 169802.
66 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

on patrol when they were attacked by two Japanese planes. One plane was shot down by the
CAP and the other crashed into LCS(L) 16. Robert H. Smith and LCS(L) 16 reported both
planes as Zekes, but LCS(L)54 reported that the plane hitting the 16 was an Oscar. LCS(L) 84
reported that one was a Zeke and one an Oscar and LCS(L) 83 described the one shot down
as an Oscar.
The action report of the destroyer Anthony for 7 June 1945 indicated the approach of two
planes, but the observers could not determine if they were Nates or Vals. In a later incident,
the aircraft action report for CAG-40 identified five enemy planes as Vals. A study of the gun
camera film after the incident showed that four of them were Sonias.
The Kawasaki Ki-45 Toryu (Nick), a twin engine fighter, was easy to confuse with another

Top: The Aichi D3A1 dive bomber was code named Val. NARA 80G 345604. Bottom: The Mitsubishi
Ki-51 was code named Sonia. NARA 80G 169862.
 5. Tactics 67

twin engine plane, the Mitsubishi Ki-46-11 (Dinah). On 4 May, the destroyers at RP Station
No. 2 at Okinawa, Lowry DD 770, Massey DD 778, James C. Owens DD 776, and the support
ships LCS(L)s 11, 19, 87 and LSM(R) 191 reported an attack on them by a Dinah, but the Action
Report of VF-85 for that day claimed it was a Nick. Confusion over the identification of plane
types was common. In the case of some of the larger attacks a variety of planes were used,
both army and navy, adding to the problem of identification.

Declining Resources
Japanese aircraft used at the beginning of the Okinawa Ten-Go campaign were diverse
but most were combat types specially adapted for use as special attack planes. With parts in
short supply, the Japanese began to prioritize their repair procedures. By the beginning of the
Okinawa campaign Japan’s aircraft situation was serious. American naval intelligence inter-
cepted a transmission from Japan’s Bureau of Aeronautics dated 30 March 1945. Apparently
the strain of war was having its effect on the air depots. The bureau put forth a list of aircraft
and aircraft repairs that were prioritized. The Third and Fifth Air Fleets were directed to
recondition land planes and seaplanes, and the Tenth Air Fleet was directed to recondition
land planes, operational trainers and intermediate land trainers in that order. Only minor
plane repairs were to be made on the Betty, Jack, Irving, Kate, Grace, Val, Tess, Jake, Pete,
Alf, Dave, Susie, Rufe, Rex and the land transport version of the Betty and the Nell. The only
aircraft to receive major repairs were the Zeke, George, Judy, Jill, Frances, and Myrt as these
were most important to the Japanese war effort. Major repairs that had begun on the Emily
and the Mavis were to be completed.19
Still another intercepted message from the headquarters of the Tenth Air Fleet to five of its
Naval Air Depots on 18 April 1945 continued to give evidence of problems: With the decrease in
production of new aircraft, the parts and materials allotted to this Fleet have been used in
repairing planes. At present, however, we have on hand only enough planes for about 70% of
our suicide attack personnel. Under present war conditions we deem it essential that this defi-
ciency be speedily overcome. Do everything, therefore, to speed up repair work, and advise us of
the types and number of planes which can be delivered.20

Aircraft slated for use against the allied forces at Okinawa were sent from the factory to
air depots for testing and preparation for delivery to operational units. Two problems faced
the depots working on these new planes. To begin with, poor production made it necessary
for new aircraft to undergo additional work before they could be sent on to a squadron. Sec-
ondly, a shortage of qualified mechanics to work on the planes meant that the repairs would
not be as good and would take more time to complete.
The engine was the most critical element to be tested on a new airplane. Before 1945, the
engine would be run for five hours at the factory and then the plane flown for another ten
hours. Decreases in the amount of fuel available for testing began to take a toll. By 1945 the
engine would have a two hour test at the factory. It would be run for an hour and a half and
then disassembled to insure that there were no defective parts. It would be reassembled and
run again for another half hour. The plane was then assembled and given a two hour flight
test. After delivery to the air depot it was flown for an additional three hours. The plane was
then delivered to the transport unit to be flown to the fields on Kyushu. It would arrive there
with less than ten hours on the engine. Japanese experience had shown that any problems
with the engines would develop after ten hours. Therefore, the planes delivered to front line
units had a high failure rate. Many crashed en route to their units or shortly after having been
put into service.
As the battle for Okinawa raged and incessant raids on the homeland increased, the sit-
68 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

uation began to change. American estimates of the effectiveness of raids by B-29s and other
aircraft indicated that the Japanese ability to launch attacks against the ships at Okinawa was
seriously hampered. As a result of these raids the repair and maintenance facilities at Tachiarai,
Oita, and Omura were damaged, severely hindering the ability of the Japanese army and navy
to repair aircraft. With the extensive damage to hangars and other repair facilities at many
of the bases, it became difficult to service aircraft as would normally be done. Serviceability
rates dropped to almost forty-five percent. Squadrons at Kanoya in particular, as well as many
other bases, found themselves unable to launch raids. Just as they were preparing strikes, the
B-29s came in and disrupted their operations. With so many American aircraft attacking the
bases, it was necessary to divert four of Kanoya’s fighter units scheduled for use against Oki-
nawa to CAP duties over Kyushu.
One of the means that the Japanese used to protect their dwindling air forces was the
“fly away” strategy. If American bombing raids were detected soon enough, Japanese aircraft
units could be redeployed to bases in Shikoku, Honshu and Korea to avoid destruction. In
addition, daily life at the bases was strained by constant calls to alert. This limited the ability
of the Japanese to complete repairs to runways, hangars and other facilities that had been pre-
viously bombed. With all these difficulties at the bases, it was not possible to launch the con-
certed attacks that had been planned by the army and navy. 21 The overall effects of these raids

Kanoya Airfield on Kyushu was considered to be one of the most important airfields in Japan, making
it a constant target for American planes. Here, two SB2C Helldivers and an F4U Corsair from Task
Force 58 strike the field on 13 May 1945. U.S.S. Bennington CV 20 Serial 0021 3 June 1945. Action
Report of USS Bennington (CV 20) and Carrier Air Group Eighty-Two in Support of Military Oper-
ations at Okinawa 9 May-28 May (East Longitude Dates) Including Action Against Kyushu.
 5. Tactics 69

diminished the ability of the Japanese to fly their aircraft against American ships at Okinawa.
As terrible as the ordeal of the American ships was, it would have been far worse if the Kyushu
bases had not been attacked regularly by both army air force bombers and other aircraft from
carriers and the bases on Okinawa and the Marianas.
As the Okinawa campaign reached its finale, it was obvious that the Japanese were not
giving up. In spite of great losses to their industrial production, there were no signs that they
would surrender. Their military leaders were convinced that the Japanese spirit, Yamato
daimashii, would overcome the material advantages of the Allied forces. No matter how out-
numbered, some still felt that victory was possible. Shortly after the war, Lt. Gen. Masakazu
Kawabe told his interrogator, Col. Ramsey D. Potts,
The Japanese, to the very end, believed that by Spiritual means they could fight on equal terms
with you, yet by any other comparison it would not appear equal. We believed our Spiritual con-
viction in victory would balance any scientific advantages and we had no intention of giving up
the fight. It seemed to be especially Japanese.... That’s probably a contention that you cannot
understand — that’s the Japanese feeling; we’d made up our minds to fight to the very last man
and thought we still had a chance.22

To the south, the airfields on Taiwan and in the Sakishima Gunto were attacked by
aircraft from the British carrier task force under VAdm. H. B. Rawlings. These raids took
place between 26 March and 20 April 1945, as well as from 3 to 25 May. Also from 8 April on
into June, American escort carriers under RAdm. Durgin regularly attacked the fields in the
Sakishima Gunto.
By the end of April 1945, parts shortages and attrition from combat activities had severely
strained the regular combat units. The Japanese began to use aircraft from naval training
units for special attacks. Reports by
the United States War Department’s
Military Intelligence Service indi-
cated that 1,550 biplane trainers and
650 monoplane trainers were being
readied for use as special attack
planes by the Imperial Japanese
Navy’s Tenth Air Fleet.23 Estimates
in early May revised the number of
these aircraft upward. According to
Maj. Gen. Kazuo Tanikawa:
In addition to combat planes in
tactical units, the Japanese have an
estimated total of 1,460 combat
planes in training units, and 2,655
advanced trainers and 3,100 ele-
mentary trainers. Combat planes
from both Army and Navy train-
ing units have been used for oper-
ations; in a few instances Army
advanced trainers have appeared
in combat.... The Japanese Navy
has been preparing to use a sub-
stantial number of trainers in the
Ryukyus operations, and opera-
tional reports state that a few
biplanes have been seen in the
Ryukyus area. Moreover, two new VAdm. Jisaburo Ozawa. NARA 890JO 63425.
70 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

air flotillas scheduled to be formed on 5 May were to include ten training air groups and to be
assigned to the Third Air Fleet.... An estimated 500 trainers were thus to be transferred to tacti-
cal command, presumably in preparation for tactical deployment.24

By mid–May, a new air flotilla had been formed to participate in Kikusui No. 7 and included
a single-engine trainer unit. Still another unit, flying elementary trainers, participated in
night attacks during that period.25 Kikusui No. 8, which took place from 27 to 29 May, included
the use of navy trainers as suicide planes.
By the end of May, it was obvious that the battle for Okinawa was a lost cause. The army
became less enthused about continuing special attacks against the Americans and preferred
to maintain their strength in preparation for the coming battle for the homeland. With the
last offensive of the 32nd Army from 4 to 5 May a failure, “the Army abandoned hope in the
outcome of the Tengo Air Operation.”26 From that point on, the army would focus its efforts
on homeland defense. About that time, Adm. Toyoda received a new assignment. He was
promoted to Chief of the Naval General Staff and VAdm. Jisaburo Ozawa was appointed to
replace him as Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. Ozawa was one of the best fleet
commanders in the Japanese Navy and an excellent strategist. Careful planning was a hallmark
of his strategies and, once committed to a course of action, he was persistent in its completion.
His promotion caused a problem in protocol as Ozawa was junior in rank to Lt. Gen. Sug-
awara. Accordingly, the 6th Air Army was released from the jurisdiction of the combined fleet
and was once again under the authority of the Commanding General of the General Air Army,
Gen. Masakazu Kawabe, as required by Imperial General Headquarters, Army Department

The ungainly Kyushu K11w1 Shiragiku trainer became increasingly useful as a kamikaze during the
latter stages of the Okinawa campaign. This plane, shown at Sasebo Air Base on Kyushu in September
1945, is painted white with green crosses by American direction. Planes painted in this manner were
used for courier service from mid–September to mid–October 1945. NARA USMC 138377.
 5. Tactics 71

Directive No. 1336 of 26 May 1945.27 VAdm. Takajiro Onishi replaced Ozawa as the Vice Chief
of the Naval General Staff.
In early June 1945, reports about another training plane to be used for suicide attacks
began to circulate. According to the Military Intelligence Service, “Recent messages have dis-
closed Japanese plans for extensive tactical use of Shiragiku trainers.... MIS estimates that
total current production of Shiragiku is at the rate of about 100 per month.”28 Still more train-
ers would be used as suicide planes in other parts of Japan in response to the anticipated
American invasion of the homeland. Reports in early June indicated the construction of ten
new airfields in central Honshu and a total of 6,170 trainers of various kinds in both army
and navy training units.29 This change in the use of training units had been ongoing through-

Japanese naval air cadets prepare their Yokosuka K5Y intermediate trainers for flight. The aircraft
carried the code name Willow. In the latter stages of the war the aircraft became an effective kamikaze
weapon.
72 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

out 1945 but, by mid–June, American reports asserted that “the distinction between tactical
and training units has largely broken down.”30
Biplane trainers had been used as kamikazes at Okinawa but an intercepted message
from the Japanese Bureau of Aeronautics to navy bases on 13 June stated that “‘in view of the
present war situation,’ the elementary trainer Willow hereafter will be considered one of the
more important types of planes to be used as suicide planes.”31
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea

Explosive Speedboats
The best known of the special attack methods involved the use of aircraft to attack ships.
The Japanese, however, had developed several other weapons to commit the ultimate sacrifice.
The most effective of these tactics were the explosive speedboats, which were considered a
serious threat in the Philippines and at Okinawa. Piloting some of these special attack speed-
boats were young men only fifteen or sixteen years of age. They had been recruited from
junior and senior high school and were promised special privileges and posthumous promo-
tions. Others were a few years older and had more of an education.
Both the Japanese army and navy had special attack boats, but their method of attack
differed. The army boats were commonly known as Maru-re (liaison boats). This was a general
term that was used to describe both the boats and their units. At Imperial Headquarters the
units were referred to as maru-ni or Renraku Tai (Liaison Unit). Army boats carried two
depth charges on racks behind the driver. In theory, the driver of the Maru-re approached the
target at a high speed, swerved at the last moment and dropped the depth charges alongside
the target ship. Set to explode three to four seconds after release, the explosives would only
sink about ten feet before detonating. There was no depth charge mechanism for detonation.
The depth charges might explode before the boat could escape, killing the pilot. In addition,
many died as the ships they just attacked sank them with gunfire as they attempted their get-
away.
Navy special attack speedboats were known as Shinyo (ocean shakers), and operated
in a different manner. In the bow of a Shinyo was a 595 lb. explosive charge that would go
off as the boat rammed into the side of a target vessel. On 16 February 1945, the Japanese
sank three LCS(L)s at Mariveles Harbor in the Philippines in this manner. LCS(L) and
LCI gunboats and PT boats were particularly watchful for these enemy speedboats and
hunting them was one of their important duties in the Philippines. As the invasion of
Okinawa was underway, the gunboats once again resumed their suicide boat hunting
duties.
The speedboats were produced in numerous small shipyards, therefore their construction,
size and engines varied slightly. They were constructed of wood and were from sixteen
and one-half to twenty-one feet in length, with a beam of about six feet. Speeds differed
according to the engine, but their designed speed was in the twenty to twenty-five knot
range.

73
74 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

The Navy Shinyo Program

The Japanese navy designed seven Shinyo boats for these missions, designated as Types
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8. “Type 4 was never designated because of the superstition attached to
“shi,” its Japanese pronunciation, which can also mean “death.” 1 Of the two types, the Type
1, Model 1 and Type 5 were the only ones to become operational.
The beginnings of the navy program can be traced to experiments in the late
1930s, during which time the Japanese studied various hull designs developed by American,
British, and Italian designers. Their primary concern at that point was the development
of torpedo boats and the eventual design of their 18-meter torpedo boat was based on
these efforts. As the war with America reached its third year, the Japanese began to experiment
with various weapons that would produce maximum effect for less cost and effort, both finan-
cially and in terms of manpower. This resulted in the beginnings of the Shinyo program in
March 1944. The Shinyo fit the bill since a successful strike by a small motorboat might sink
an enemy transport or troop carrier, exchanging the loss of one Shinyo pilot for many enemy
troops.
The first design was designated the Shinyo Type 1 and involved scaling down the 18-
meter torpedo boat. However, the torpedo boat was designed as a planing hull and had to
operate at high speeds. The Shinyo would need to move into position stealthily and slowly
before opening up to full speed during the final attack. Planing hulls do not operate all that
well at slower speeds, particularly in a chop; they take water over the bow. This was discovered
when the first models were tested on 27 May 1944. The Japanese had produced two at Tsurumi,
made of wood, and six of steel plate at their facilities in Yokosuka. As a result, the bow section
had to be redesigned to correct this tendency. In addition, the use of steel in the production
was problematic, given the shortage of steel supplies and skilled steel workers. Producing
them in wood was the only practical method, as they could be built and repaired locally, wher-
ever they were to be used. The redesign of the bow section resulted in the first model, the
Shinyo Type 1, Model 1.
The Shinyo Type 1, Model 1, was constructed of wood and had an inboard engine mounted
for direct drive. It was first tested in July of 1944 and proved acceptable. It measured 16' 8" in
length and was designed for a maximum speed of twenty-three knots. Powered by a Toyota
six cylinder automobile engine, the craft would prove to be reliable. An explosive charge of
595 lbs. was mounted in the bow. It was sufficient to damage or sink many smaller vessels.
This charge could be set to detonate on impact or the pilot could set it off himself at the
appropriate time. Models produced near the end of the war also had two rudimentary rocket
racks mounted on either side of the pilot’s seat, which were capable of firing 4.7-inch rockets,
each of which weighed about fifty lbs. The two rockets carried an anti-personnel load similar
to shotgun pellets that would be used against automatic weapons crews on board the ships
they were attacking.

Organization and Deployment in the Philippines

The original plans for stationing Shinyo units on Corregidor called for seven units and
a headquarters platoon. These were sent to Corregidor at various times from September
through December 1945.
Plans formulated in August called for the construction of Navy surface raiding bases at Davao
and Sarangani Bay on Mindanao, at Tacloban on Leyte, and at Lamon Bay on Luzon. The boat
units and maintenance personnel began arriving on Luzon early in September, but the projected
bases in the southern and central Philippines were not completed in time to permit deployment
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 75

before the invasion of Leyte. On Luzon the surface raiding forces were concentrated at four
main points of anticipated invasion — Lingayen Gulf, Manila Bay, Batangas, and Lamon Bay. 2

By the time of the re-capture of Corregidor in Manila Bay, the Japanese had organized
their remaining forces in the area into the Manila Bay Entrance Defense Force. This was com-
manded by navy Capt. Takashi Itagaki, who was also the senior staff officer of the 31st Base

Shinyo Type 1 Shinyo Type 1 Model 1

Shinyo Type 2 Shinyo Type 5

Above and following page: U.S. Naval Technical Mission To Japan. Ships and Related Targets Japanese
Suicide Craft. January 1946, pp. 10 –21.
76 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Shinyo Type 6 Model 1 Shinyo Type 7

Shinyo Type 8

Force. The officer in charge of the surface special attack forces, consisting of the Shinyo, was
Lt. Cmdr. Shoichi Oyamada. The Shinyo Tai Forces stationed on Corregidor included the fol-
lowing:
Unit No. Commanding Officer Officers NCO & EM Total
Headquarters Platoon - 0 18 18
Suicide Unit (Shinyo-tai)
9th Suicide Unit Lt.(jg) Kenjiro Nakajima 7 169 176
10th Suicide Unit Lt. Ishikawa 8 175 183
11th Suicide Unit Lt. (jg) Shigeo Yamazaki 7 194 201
12th Suicide Unit Lt. (jg) Yoshihisa Matsueda 7 192 199
13th Suicide Unit Lt. (jg) Horikawa 6 181 1873
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 77

Shinyo Type 5s built near the end of the war were equipped with rocket racks on either side of the
pilot. These are shown at Sasebo, Japan on 18 October 1945. Army Signal Corps Photograph.

One of the units so dispatched was the 13th Special Attack Unit under Lt. (jg) Horikawa
which set sail from Japan in early November 1944. It was torpedoed by an American sub on
14 November and all of its boats and many of its men were lost. Survivors of the sinking
finally made it to Corregidor where their unit was reconstituted. The Shinyo Tai units suffered
additional losses while on Corregidor. Their boats were stored in tunnels at the base of Cor-
regidor and that led to several disasters. On 23 December 1945, as Shinyo Tai units were
preparing to attack approaching American forces, one boat caught fire. The fire quickly spread
and when the disaster was over, fifty boats and one hundred men had been lost. American
sources claimed that these explosions took place because “personnel were so little trained in
the wiring of the explosive that several accidents occurred.”4 This was followed a couple of
weeks later when, on 23 and 24 January 1945, American air raids hit the tunnels and destroyed
about twenty-five boats. An explosion in the tunnels on 10 February wiped out another forty-
five boats. Remaining boats were shifted to the Malinta Tunnel, a huge complex beneath the
rock that had been constructed in 1922 and originally used by the American forces as an arse-
nal. Later, when the Japanese attacked Corregidor, MacArthur used the tunnel as his head-
quarters and also as the location for the hospital. It had several entrances, one of which was
near the water and used by the navy for storage and launching of Shinyo. By the time of the
actual assault on Corregidor and Manila, the Shinyo units were seriously under strength, with
the number of boats down to about one hundred.
78 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Shinyo Type 1 engine on a boat captured at Okinawa. NARA 80G 31429.

In addition to the boats, the Shinyo units had additional weaponry issued to them for
use as the situation required. For example, on 8 February 1945, the 12th Shinyo Unit on Cor-
regidor was estimated to have:
Unit Weapons:
Suicide crash boats 55
Rifles (Type 38) 63
13mm rapid fire guns 4
Pistols 15
Hand grenades 4 per person5
This Shinyo, on tracks outside its cave on Corregidor, was part of the 9th Suicide Boat Unit under
Lt. (Jg) Kentaro Nakajima. The forward hatch of the vessel may be seen lying on the ground next to
it. Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT. Serial 0907. Action Reports, MARIVELES—CORREGI-
DOR Operation, 12 –16 February 1945. Enclosure (G).

Once Corregidor was captured, American

forces got their first good look at the way in
which the Shinyo explosives were set up. The
charge itself was circular in shape with a row
of spikes on its forward surface. Separated from
the spikes was a circular metal band covered
with rubber to prevent corrosion. The band
carried current from the fuse inserted into the
rear of the charge. As the boat crashed into its
target, pieces of wood in front of the band
pushed the band into the spikes, completing
the circuit and causing the electric detonator
to go off. A second hand-activated detonator
was inserted in the rear of the charge. If the
electric circuits failed, the explosive charge
could be set off by hand. A switch box which
monitored the circuitry was near the driver’s
seat, allowing him to test the circuits and resort
to the manual detonator if need be.6

With the forward hatch removed, it is possible

to see the 595 lb. explosive charge in the bow of
the Shinyo. Commander Task Force SEVENTY-
EIGHT. Serial 0907. Action Reports, MARIVE-
LES—CORREGIDOR Operation, 12 –16 February
1945. Enclosure (G).
80 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Left: Metal spikes in the front of the charge were linked to a trigger mechanism. As the boat made
contact with its target, the spikes were driven into the metal band in front of it, making contact and
completing the explosive circuit. The metal band was rubber covered to prevent corrosion, necessi-
tating the use of spikes to puncture the rubber. Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT. Serial
0907. Action Reports, MARIVELES—CORREGIDOR Operation, 12 –16 February 1945. Enclosure (G).
Right: This is a view of the explosive charge after it has been removed from the Shinyo. Commander
Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT. Serial 0907. Action Reports, MARIVELES—CORREGIDOR Operation,
12 –16 February 1945. Enclosure (G).

Organization and Deployment at Okinawa

Two Shinyo Tai Units, Numbers 22 and 42, were assigned to the defense of Okinawa.
These two units were based at Chinen and Yonabaru respectively. Both bases were in the
southeast part of Okinawa, and these small vessels frequently attacked American ships in
Nakagusuku Bay. In early attacks on the island, prior to its invasion, many of the boats were
destroyed by air raids.
By comparison, the Imperial Japanese Army’s suicide boats were more numerous. Eight
suicide boat regiments were assigned to the Okinawa area They were Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 26, 27,
28, and 29. Suicide Boat Regiments Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 were based on several islands of the
Kerama Retto group. Although they launched some attacks prior to 1 April, they were captured
early in the campaign so that use of them was denied to the Japanese. Other units continued
to attack American shipping where possible, but vigilant LCS(L) and LCI(G) gunboats
destroyed many. Patrolling against the Shinyo and Maru-re was officially known as “fly-catch-
ing.” The sailors soon referred to it as “skunk patrol.”

The Army Maru-re Program

By late 1943, Japanese army planners, as well as those of the navy, had recognized that
the fortunes of the Japanese empire were in decline.
In April, 1944, Lieutenant General Suzuki, then Commander-in-Chief of the Army’s Shipping
Headquarters in Ujina, won a resounding support of his staff officers when he openly insisted
that the defense of the small islands should not be left solely to their air corps, and the naval
defense matters be dealt with directly by his own troops on site. The new tactical concept as
drawn up by General Suzuki called for quiet deployment of a countless number of light-weight,
manned torpedoes in their simplest mechanical form along selected beaches near anticipated
enemy landing zones.7
The specifics laid out by Suzuki were approved by Imperial Headquarters and research
on the new weapon commenced. The result was the development of torpedo and explosive
boat prototypes in May of 1944, with continued testing for the next month or two. Shortly
thereafter, with the fall of Saipan, it became army policy to adapt special attack methods to
bolster their sagging air defenses. This was particularly important for many of the islands
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 81

could not expect significant air support in the face of an American invasion. This policy was
spelled out in the Guidelines Pertaining to Military Operations Covering Smaller Islands.8
Two types of explosive boats were developed by the army, one utilized primarily for
training, and the second for actual combat missions. The training boat was designated as the
Ujina model and was about 16' 5" in length with a 5' beam. It was constructed of cyprus or
other suitable wood. The second boat was the operational model and known as the Heihon
model. Heihon boats were slightly longer and beamier and constructed of plywood veneers,
in what was basically a cold-molded process. Both could be powered by one of several engines,
usually dependent upon availability. Most prevalent were the Toyota and Nissan engines,
developing 60 and 70 hp respectively. The Toyota was preferred over the Nissan as the former
had less of a problem with spark plugs getting wet. With these engines, the maximum speed
of the boats was in the twenty to twenty-two knot range. In addition, six cylinder Chevrolet
auto engines were also used on some models. The Chevrolet engine put out 85 hp and could
power the boat at an estimated speed of thirty-five knots.9 Directions issued to the harbor
construction units which oversaw the maintenance of the boats indicated that the engines
could easily catch fire and had to be checked after each run of one to five hours. In addition,
high speeds would throw spray into the engine area and damage the starter motor. If it were
to get wet it would be ruined within a month.10

Armament
Unlike the navy boats which carried an explosive charge in the bow area, the primary
means of attacking an enemy ship was by the use of two depth charges. These were dropped
next to the hull of an enemy ship. The targets were troop transports, supply ships and other
similar, unarmored ships as the depth charges were of such a size that they would not do
much damage to an armored warship. The early model Heihon boats carried two seventy lb.

This overhead drawing of a Japanese army Maru-re explosive speedboat shows the early version
which carried a depth charge on either side of the pilot’s position. Allied Translator and Interpreter
Section South West Pacific. Interrogation Report No. 749. Corporal Nobuo Hayashi. Appendix D.
82 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

depth charges, one on either side of the pilot’s seat. However, they soon proved to be too
small and the later boats carried two charges of 265 lbs. each. These depth charges were not
pressure activated, but rather utilized a timer which would allow them to sink to a depth of
about ten feet prior to exploding. Timing on these attacks was critical as the pilot had to
approach the target vessel at high speed, swerve at the last moment and release the charges.
In later models the two depth charges were mounted on racks aft the driver’s seat. No other
armament was carried on the boats, but pilots were encouraged to carry hand grenades which
might be used for close in attacks if other means were not available to them.
The pilot of the boat risked death as he dropped the charges. A mistake in his timing
would leave him too close to the explosion to escape, and many of the pilots were killed or
thrown into the water after the depth charge had destroyed their suicide boat. It was possible

American personnel inspect a Japanese Maru-re Type 5 suicide boat at Kerama Retto on 10 April
1945. This model was used by the Japanese army. The racks aft the driver’s compartment held two
depth charges. Attacking the target, the pilot would swerve next to the ship and drop the depth
charges which were set to go of at a shallow depth, blowing a hole in the ship. Official U.S. Navy Pho-
tograph.
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 83

to survive, as many ships reported seeing a Maru-re making its escape. Lookouts on the
Charles J. Badger DD 657, which was attacked on 9 April 1945 at Okinawa, saw their attacker
head away from the destroyer at high speed before they could react. In that case, the pilot
made good his escape as well as his attack.

Tactics
Japanese explosive speedboats were used for night attacks. During the day they remained
hidden in small streams, on river banks, or near the beaches where they could be camouflaged

Formation 1 Formation 1 to Formation 2

Maru-re boats would move from their hiding places and follow Formation 1 until they reached open
water, at which time they would shift to Formation 2. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section—
Southwest Pacific Area Serial 912. Appendices F and G.
84 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

with tree branches, foliage, grass, or whatever material was at hand to keep them secure from
aircraft, gunboats, and PT boats. After dark they were launched and proceeded in single file
(Formation 1) down the river until they reached open water. At that point they formed into
two columns (Formation 2) for the approach to the enemy ships. Signals for the formation
changes were made utilizing a white light from the commander’s boat, moved in various
directions to indicate position changes among the Maru-re fleet. The change to attack forma-
tion was signaled using a red light. This generally took place about one hundred meters from
the target ships. Individual boats would take on a target. If the number of boats was greater
than the target vessels, two would participate in the attack, approaching from opposite sides
in order not to get in each other’s way. The final attack run saw the boats moving in at fifteen
knots with the closest boat of the leaders going after the farthest targets. At five meters from
the target vessel, the Maru-re made a ninety degree turn, cut loose the depth charges and
increased to top speed in hopes of escaping the explosion; few did.11 This was the general
practice for the 19th Liaison Boat Battalion which was stationed at Binubusan, Luzon. Other
tactics would be used if the number of enemy ships was smaller, including the sending of only
one or two boats to attack the transports. Enemy shipping coming within one hundred miles
of the base was fair game, as that was the
extreme range for the boats. At that distance,
no return to base was anticipated. Long range
missions would see the boats cruising toward
the target at about five knots so as to conserve
fuel and not cause attention to themselves by
excessive engine noise.

Formation 2 Formation 2 to Attack Formation

After proceeding toward the target vessels using Formation 2, the boats would shift into Formation
3 in preparation for the attack. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section—Southwest Pacific Area
Serial 912. Appendix K.
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 85

Attack Formation

After proceeding toward the target in the Number 3 Formation, the boats would attack. At this point
target selection would be based on the number of target vessels as compared to the number of Maru-
re available for the attack. Where possible a target vessel would be approached by two boats, one
from port and one from starboard. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section—Southwest Pacific Area
Serial 912. Appendix K.

Training
Interviews with captured Japanese Maru-re pilots revealed their training program. Cpl.
Nobuo Hayashi, a squad leader for the 19th Liaison Boat Battalion, was captured near Tigbulan,
Luzon on 1 February 1945. He discussed the training program that he had undergone after
volunteering for the liaison boat program.
The training program started approximately July 1944 at TESSHIMA (TOYOSHIMA) in the
Inland Sea. Training ground was later removed to UJINA Area August 1944. Boat operators
would receive from one to three months training.... In the middle of August 1944, boat opera-
tors assembled at UJINA, where they were outfitted. Then proceeded to KONOURA, ETAJIMA
Barracks where they were organized. They received one week’s basic training ashore. Then they
were sent to TAIBI, east of ETAJIMA, where the unit’s boats were assembled.... They remained
86 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

there for approximately 10 days, receiving simple instructions concerning motors and motor
repairs from an Army sergeant. Returned to ETAJIMA. At first they boarded a UJINA Model
Liaison Boat, along with the platoon leader as instructor, and four other men. They took turns
as helmsmen for a period of one week. Then each was assigned a UJINA Model boat and prac-
ticed following the leader’s boat on very erratic courses for two days. The number of boats in
this stage of training was not fixed. Then for one week, they practiced number 2 formation....
This part of the training was continued by First Lieutenant NAKAMURA. Upon completion of
this and, until he left ETAJIMA, he received training in attack formation, in changing from
number 2 formation to attack formation, and in actual attack runs.12

Subsequent sessions saw the trainees practicing their attack runs against various types of Japa-
nese landing craft and merchant ships. Of course, no actual depth charges were used in these
practice runs. At other times the depth charges were dropped when no ships were in the vicin-
ity. At the completion of the training, Hayashi was “issued a new uniform, sword, canteen,
helmet, life jacket, dog tag, and eight inch wide band to be wrapped around the body as a
precaution against underwater explosions.”13

Organization and Deployment in the Philippines

Army Maru-re boats were organized into battalions, with each battalion consisting of
approximately 100 –150 men divided into three companies of thirty each. Assigned to the bat-
talion would be between seventy-five and one hundred boats, depending on the availability
of the boats and the area the battalion needed to cover. In order to keep the existence and
purpose of these battalions as secret as possible, they were referred to officially as “Fishing
Battalions.” Accompanying each “Fishing Battalion” was a maintenance and service battalion,
referred to as “Harbor Construction Battalions.”14 This unit was responsible for building the
base, maintaining it, and keeping the boats in good repair. Orders for the harbor construction
battalions read:
When the unit CO is informed of the plans where the unit will be stationed, he will receive
detailed instructions. He will then reconnoiter the area and lay his plans.
a. Points to be observed when reconnoitering the selected position.
(1) How easily boats and supplies can be brought ashore
(2) Slope of shore line and general terrain featured
(3) Waves, tide, and wind
(4) Obstacles at water’s edge
(5) Difficulties of construction and extent of necessary construction
(6) Equipment and personnel necessary for the construction
(7) Water supply (boiled or distilled)
(8) Billeting facilities (caves)
(9) Protection from air attacks
(10) Presence of local repair shops
(11) Condition of repair and supply facilities of other forces
(12) Local technicians available
(13) Facilities for camouflaging
(14) Ease with which depth charges, fuel, etc. can be accumulated.15

These were serious considerations given that many of the boats were lost to American air
attack, as well as the shore bombardment of PT boats and LCI type gunboats.
In early 1945 Allied intelligence identified locations for some of the army battalions in
the Philippines as follows:
Fishing Battalion Number Date Location
1 January 1945 San Fernando
2 3 January 1945 Batangas
3 21 January 1945 Pangasinan
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 87

Fishing Battalion Number Date Location

9 22 November 1944 San Fernando
11 [no date given] Ternate
12 2 January 1945 Port Sual
13 Transport sunk en route P.I. remaining company at Binubusan with 19th Battalion
15 December 1944 Manila
16 [no date or location given]
17 26 December 1944 Obando
18 19 January 1945 Dampalit
19 1 February 1945 Binubusan
20 [no date or location given]
105 January 1945 Batangas
106 January 1945 Batangas
107 [No date] Ternate
111 February 1945 Legaspi
112 17 January 1945 Port Sual
114 January 1945 Batangas
115 25 November 1944 Talin Bay
117 February 1945 Obando and Bulacan
118 13 February 1945 Obando16

Organization and Deployment at Okinawa

Army Maru-re boats were organized into battalions consisting of about one hundred
boats each with 104 pilots. Each battalion was divided into three boat companies. Additional
support and command personnel were included with each company. After the organization
of the first thirty battalions at Etajima in late 1944 was completed, they were given their assign-
ments.
A total of sixteen out of these thirty battalions were assigned to the Philippines as follows: 5 to
Ramon Bay on the eastern coast, 1 to Manila, 1 to Lingayen Bay, 1 to Ternate and 8 to Bandagas
on the southern coast. For Okinawa, nine SBRs [battalions] were deployed as follows: 3 in the
Kerama Archipelago, 4 on Okinawa Island, and 2 on Miyakojima Island. The remaining 5 of the
30 SBRs [battalions] were posted to Taiwan. In addition, another 12 regiments [battalions] (31st
through 40th, 51st and 52nd SBRs [battalions]) completed their deployment across Japan for
homeland defense.17

An assessment of the situation at Okinawa had been made earlier on, with prospective
enemy landing zones identified. Assignment of the battalions to specific areas reflected these
expectations. In order of probability the landing zones were identified as “(1) Hagushi-Oyama
Beach, (2) Naha-Itoman, (3) Kadena Beach, (4) Minatogawa, and (5) Nakagusuku Bay. In
order to facilitate a timely scramble which could cover any one of these five districts, the First
Special Boat Battalion was deployed on Zamami Island, the Second on Akajima Island and ...
the Third on Takashiki Island.”18 Located in the southern section of Okinawa were the 26th,
27th, 28th, and 29th Special Boat Battalions. The first three Special Boat Battalions were all
located on islands of the Kerama Retto, a string of islands to the south west of Okinawa that
would be the site of the first American landings at Okinawa. In the opening days of the cam-
paign the three battalions were put out of commission. Approximately three hundred boats
were captured by the Americans, and the battalion personnel retreated to the hills where they
continually launched attacks and harassed the Americans until the end of the war.

ARMY SUICIDE BOAT REGIMENTS (SBRS)* AT OKINAWA

SBR Number Commanding Officer Date Arrived Location at Okinawa
1st SBR Capt. Hiroshi Umezawa 10 Sept. 1944 Zamami Island, Kerama Retto
2nd SBR Capt. Yoshihiko Noda Late 1944 Akajima and Keruma Islands,
Kerama Retto
88 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

SBR Number Commanding Officer Date Arrived Location at Okinawa

3rd SBR Capt. Yoshitsugu Akamatsu 26 Sept, 1944 Tokashiki Island, Kerama Retto
26th SBR Capt. Mutsuo Adachi 14 Dec. 1944 Tokashiki Island, Kerama Retto
27th SBR Capt. Shigami Okabe Dec. 1944 –Jan. 1945 Yonabaru, Nakagusuku Bay
28th SBR Capt. Toshio Honma Mid-Feb. 1945 Minatogawa and Naha
29th SBR Capt. Hisanori Yamamoto 17 Feb. 1945 Chatan, NE of Naha
*In the report by Lt. CO. Masahiro Kawai, the units are referred to as Suicide-Boat Regiments. However, their size
indicates that they were probably equal in size to what would be considered a company. 19

Organization and Deployment at Taiwan, Iwo Jima and Japan

Both Shinyo and Maru-re boats were sent to Iwo Jima and Taiwan, however, their use
was limited at those two islands. On Iwo Jima there was little cover for the boats and the two
units sent there, Shinyo Squadrons 3 and 4, were decimated in preliminary air raids against
the island in preparation for the invasion.
Taiwan was bypassed as MacArthur had determined that his main focus was to be the
recapture of the Philippine Islands. This strategy was favored by the navy as well, as they saw
no need to concentrate forces on the island. It was too far from the Japanese home islands to
be of any use in a final invasion of Japan. This did not mean that the Japanese forces there
were any less prepared for an invasion. After forming in Japan, the suicide boat units were
transferred to Taiwan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. Originally scheduled to arrive in Taiwan
in October 1944, they did not arrive until December 1944 and January 1945. The poor results
shown by the suicide boats in the Philippines were attributed to a lack of time for proper
preparation. Planning for the invasion of Taiwan would be more thorough, as there was more
time and valuable lessons had been learned from the experience of the suicide boats in the
Philippines. Both the army and navy had agreed on a plan for defense of the island which
included the use of suicide boats. It assigned units as follows:
Local Military and Naval Agreement on
Sea Offensive Operations
Commander of the Tenth Regional Army
Commandant of the TAKAO district
No. I. Policy.
The army liaison vessels [Maru-re] and the naval one-man torpedo boats [Shinyo] will be secretly
based in the southern part of FORMOSA under a unified program in order to make sudden attacks
and destroy any enemy convoy attempting to land. This operation is called Operation 8.
No. II. Designated Points.
1. The disposition of units of Operation 8 is as follows:
20th Naval Raiding Unit — HIGASHIISHI Vicinity.
21st Naval Raiding Unit — BOSAN Vicinity
22nd Naval Raiding Unit — SHISHI GASHIRA (Area between BOSAN and BORYO).
23rd and 8th Naval Raiding Units— Outer harbor of TAKAO
24th Naval Raiding Unit — Between TAINAN and TAKAO (Southern side of the mouth of
NISOKOKEI River.)
25th and 5th Naval Raiding Units— Vicinity of the NISOKOKEI River south TAIWAN.
One unit of one-man torpedo boats— KAIKO, KOSHUN-GUN
One unit of one-man torpedo boats— TOKO Vicinity
Two units of one-man torpedo boats— Northern foot of JUZAN, SAEI
One unit of one-man torpedo boats— BOKOTO.
2. The army liaison ship unit will be under the command of the commandant of the TAKAO
Naval Guard District for the operation.
3. The time for the execution of Operation 8 will be early morning (by dawn) of the next day
after the enemy convoy has anchored. However, if circumstances permit, the operation
may be carried out on the same night that the enemy anchors.
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 89

4. The objectives of the attack will be the anchored enemy transports. However, depending on
the circumstances, the smaller ships may be attacked.
5. The purpose of the attack is to make one mass attack to avoid successive attacks utilizing
complete surprise.
6. The detailed points of attack will be decided by the attacking unit, under naval coordina-
tion. However, several plans may be prepared according to the expected anchorage position
of the enemy and will be simple instead of being tactical and complicated. 20

It was expected that the American invasion would take place in southern Taiwan, so the
suicide boats were concentrated there. However, strategic planning for an invasion included
the possibility that the actual invasion of Taiwan could be in the north, where there were
more important air bases. To cover that contingency, half of the suicide boat units could be
shifted to the north. There they would establish bases further inland to avoid losses that might
come from pre-invasion bombardment. In Japanese Monograph No. 52, it was reported that
an estimated 450 Maru-re and 900 navy Shinyo were available in Taiwan for use against Amer-
ican transports.21
Invasion of the home islands was of greater concern to the Japanese. To defend against
the coming invasion the Japanese began to hold back on the expenditure of their forces
toward the end of the Okinawa campaign. In addition to aircraft, numerous Shinyo and
Maru-re units were stationed throughout Japan in preparation for the assault on Japan
proper.

Cmdr. Liui F. Kuo of the Chinese navy and John Keinle F 2/c from LCS(L) 96 inspect the engine of a
Japanese Shinyo at Amoy on 6 April 1945. Official U.S. Navy Photograph.
90 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

Kaiten
The concept for the development of the manned torpedo came from two junior officers,
Ens. Sekio Nishina and Lt. (jg) Hiroshi Kuroki. The two were midget submarine pilots who
recognized both the value of the midget submarine and its shortcomings. A new type weapon
was needed, one that combined the attributes of the midget submarine with that of the faster
torpedo. They evolved plans for utilizing the Type 93, Model 3 “long lance torpedo” as its
base.
As junior officers, they had little ability to influence naval planning and policy, so they
sought expert help. It was their good fortune to make contact with Hiroshi Suzukawa,
a designer at Kure Naval Arsenal. Looking over their sketches, Suzukawa saw an opportunity
for the creation of a new weapon. The three men combined their skills and spent the
latter months of 1942 working up plans for the new vessel. Rejection by the Naval General
Staff was not enough to halt the progress of the three men. They continually revised and
fine tuned their plans for the new weapon. In February 1944, their efforts were finally
rewarded when they were afforded the chance to build a prototype. Concerned that the
new weapon was a suicide weapon, the navy high command required the installation
of an escape hatch. While this seemed to alleviate their concern, any pilot close enough
to leave the manned torpedo would not be able to survive the nearby detonation of its
massive warhead. Production of the prototype was to take place at the secret naval base at
Kure.22
Actual work on the prototype Kaiten manned torpedo began in March 1944 and by
August of that year it had gone into production. Based on the Type 93 Model 3 torpedo, the
Kaiten would be the ultimate torpedo, one that would be guided to its target by a pilot. Its
3,418 lb. explosive warhead insured that a successful attack would result in the sinking of
most any ship in the U.S. fleet. In all, four different types of Kaiten, Types 1, 2, 4, and 10 were
designed, but only the Type 1 became operational.
Kaiten Type 1 utilized parts of the Type 93, Model 3 torpedo. Warhead size was increased
and a control compartment for the pilot was fitted between the forward section housing the
warhead and air tanks and the torpedo body. This model was fueled by oxygen as was the
original torpedo. A manually operated periscope was fitted into the sail. Hatches above and
below the pilot allowed access to the steering compartment. Since four to six Kaiten were car-
ried on the deck of an I-Class mother sub, access to the Kaiten from the mother sub was
effected through the use of a tube between two of the Kaiten and the sub. Access to the others
required the sub to surface so the pilots could use the upper hatch. The pilot could manually
set his course or use an electric gyroscope to guide his hand-controlled steering apparatus.
The explosive charge could be detonated by either a built in inertia-type pistol or electrically
by the pilot.
Type 1 Kaitens were designed to reach a depth of one hundred meters, however
they leaked at that depth but were able to withstand the pressures at sixty meters. The
run toward the target vessel would usually be at periscope depth until the course could
be determined, at which time the Kaiten make the final run to the target at a depth of
about five meters. Speed was controlled by the pilot, and the manned torpedo could
reach speeds of thirty knots. At that speed its range was about fourteen miles. A longer range
of forty-eight miles was possible if the Kaiten were run at twelve knots. In practice, a com-
bination of various speeds would be tested, with the slower speeds used in the early part of
the approach and an increase to maximum speed once the Kaiten was within striking dis-
tance.23
Kaiten Type 2 was a dedicated model, that is, it was designed as a manned torpedo, not
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 91

adapted from the regular naval torpedo. It was a much larger vessel than the Type 1 and
designed to have a maximum speed of forty knots at a range of fifteen miles. Powered by an
engine designed to run on a combination of hydrogen peroxide and hydrogen hydrate, it was
vastly different from the oxygen fueled Kaiten Type 1. Difficulties in engine development

Kaiten Models 1, 2, 4, and 10. U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan. Ships and Targets Japanese Sui-
cide Craft. January 1946, pp. 23, 26.
92 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

slowed production of the vessel, however, by December 1944, the Japanese had two ready for
testing. Constant problems developed during the testing phase of the Kaiten Type 2 and the
project was halted in favor of still another model, the Type 4.
The Kaiten Type 4 model was designed as an improved Type 2, however, it also ran
into problems. The engine was modified to run on a combination of kerosene and oxygen,
a modification that would decrease the weight of the fuel and allow the size of the war
head to be increased to 3,968 lbs. Between January and March of 1945, five of the model
were produced and tested. Engine problems once again proved to be the major difficulty.
Although the redesign of the Kaiten Type 4 had the desirable effect of increasing the size
of the warhead, the engine problem could not be overcome and the project had to be aban-
doned.
Kaiten Type 10 was the final attempt at an improved model. New developments in storage
batteries made the use of electric motors a possibility. However, their relative lack of power
made it necessary to downsize the vessel to about “one-third the size of the Type 1 and to
have only 300kg [661 lbs.] of explosive.”24 The lack of a lower escape hatch made it impossible
to carry it on a submarine for underwater launch. It is surmised that this model was probably
to be launched from shore at invading American ships or carried on a surface ship and
launched on the water’s surface. There are no production figures available for this type and
it is likely that it was in the planning stage at war’s end.

This Kaiten variant was probably designed to launch from shore to be used against amphibious
assaults or anchored transports. It was captured at Truk. NARA 809G 276351.
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 93

American sailors inspect a Kairyu submarine at Yokosuka Naval Yard, 11 September 1945. These subs
were fitted with an explosive warhead. NARA 80G 338383.

Selection of Kaiten Personnel and Their Training

As compared to the pilots of the explosive speedboats, the Kaiten pilots were older and
better trained. Shortages of available aircraft for kamikaze missions had left a surplus of
trained pilots, men whose skills and qualifications could be transferred to the newly developing
Kaiten corps. Presented to trainee pilots at both the Tsuchiura and Nara Naval Air Bases in
August 1944, was a new prospect, one that would make use of their burgeoning talents. The
Kaiten was described to the trainees as a super weapon that would easily annihilate an enemy
ship. Although over a thousand trainees volunteered for the new mission at Tsuchiura, only
one hundred were chosen. Candidates selected for the new weapon had a combination of
physical strength and strong will, fighting spirit, and minimal family responsibilities. At the
conclusion of their training at Tsuchiura and Nara, the prospective Kaiten pilots were shipped
off to the next stage of their training at Otsujima Island.25
Once established at Otsujima, pilots undertook training in the manned torpedo.
They quickly learned that the project was top secret and that the weapon was not to
be described in regular terms. It was known as the “circle six metal fitting,” 26 a term so
nondescript that it could have been used to describe basically any type of hardware. All
of the manned torpedoes and midget submarines would use this type of label in order to
prevent the enemy from learning of their existence. Although there were numerous Kaiten
pilots in training, their progress was hampered at first by a shortage of vessels in which
to train. Classroom lectures, information sharing meetings, and lectures of various types on
94 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

the mechanics of the Kaiten occupied the first stage of their training, which lasted for a couple
of months.
Training in the Kaiten was hazardous. Each of the manned torpedoes had its own idio-
syncrasies which required constant attention. Tight controls, greased fittings, and the close
proximity of controls to one another was problematic. But the naval high command had cor-

Top: Practice runs for the Kaiten involved tying one or two of them to the Kaiten chaser boat. This
fifteen meter long boat would take them out into the bay where the trainee would climb aboard.
Once all systems were checked, the Kaiten would be released and the chaser boat would follow, some-
times helping to locate the Kaiten if it sank, or warning it if it was about to hit something. Shizuo
Fukui, Compiler. Japanese Naval Vessels at the End of War. Administrative Division, Second Demo-
bilization Bureau, Japan. April 25,1947, p. 165. Bottom: Cradles to hold Kaiten are shown on the Japa-
nese submarines I-58 and I-53.
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 95

rectly deduced that aircraft pilots would be able to handle them. The Kaiten were prone to
dive or climb without warning. Sometimes they launched themselves downward and stuck in
the mud at the bottom of the bay. Launching the Kaiten for practice runs was effected by lash-
ing one or two of them to a fifteen meter work boat, which transported them out into the
bay. After an early mishap and loss of life, the work boat was assigned to follow the trail of
the Kaiten through practice. If it did not surface when it was supposed to, bubbles emitted
from the sub might help in determining its location. It was not infrequent for a diver to
descend to the bay bottom, hook cables to a Kaiten and raise it to the surface, in that manner
saving the student pilot for another day. Pilots manning these torpedoes knew that they were
on their own and that rescue might not be possible. During Kaiten training, fifteen prospective
pilots lost their lives, including the co-creator of the Kaiten, Lt. Hiroshi Kuroki, who met his
fate on 6 September 1944.

Kaiten Missions
In spite of the intense training undergone by the Kaiten pilots, their success rate would
be dismal. A number of missions were sent out, but the missions were either unsuccessful or
the mother subs were sunk with all hands lost. Only Mississinewa AO 59, sunk at Ulithi on
20 November 1944, and Underhill DE 682, sunk off the Philippines on 24 July 1945, were suc-
cessful missions for the manned torpedoes. The liberty ship Pontus H. Ross was struck at Hol-
landia, New Guinea on 11 January 1945, but it suffered very little damage. Some Kaiten which
launched at target vessels were spotted and blown up by enemy fire, while still others hit reefs
or were otherwise unable to complete their missions. Japanese sources indicate that in the

Japanese submarine I-47 is shown with Kaiten on her decks as she departs from Otsujima on 20 April
1945. She was headed for Okinawa where she launched two of her Kaiten. Neither was successful in
striking an American ship.
96 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

After the loss of Guadalcanal and other islands in the south, the Japanese recognized the need for
ships which could rapidly transport men and material to their island strongholds. The 1st Class
Transport, shown above, was designed in mid–1943. In addition to troops and other supplies they
could carry either four Daihatsu landing barges, two Koryu midget subs, or six Kaiten. Transport
No. 5, shown above with a Koryu on her deck, was lost in the Philippines.

course of these missions approximately seventy-five Kaiten pilots were killed, along with the
entire crews of the eight Kaiten carrying subs that were sunk.27
Fleet submarines, I-36, 37, 44, 47, 48, 53, 56, 58, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162, and 165 were mod-
ified to carry the Kaiten. Transport subs I-361, 363, 366, 367, 368, 370, 372, and 373 were also
converted. The last year of the war also saw surface combatants modified to carry Kaiten. The
largest of these was the cruiser Kitakami, which was capable of carrying eight Kaiten that
could be launched off her stern. The destroyers Namikaze and Shiokaze, along with several
Matsu class destroyers such as Take were also converted. Many of these ships had suffered
war damage and were converted while under repair.28 None of them ever went into battle to
launch Kaiten.
After the fall of Guadalcanal it became apparent to the Japanese that they had a need for
high speed transports that could deliver men, supplies, and equipment to their numerous
island strongholds. In mid–1943 they designed the 1st Class Transport, which could carry
needed troops and equipment. An additional feature of the ships was that they could also
carry either six Daihatsu landing barges, two Koryu midget subs, or six Kaiten. The Koryu
could be launched while the ship was underway, making for a speedy delivery. Most of the
transports were lost during the war. Additionally Light Escorts Types A and B were under
construction at the end of the war. One of their functions would be the local delivery of Kaiten
throughout Japan.

KAITEN CARRYING SUBMARINES

Submarine Type Length Date of Conversion No. of Kaiten
I-8 J3 323' 1944 4
I-36 B1 356' 1945 6
I-37 B1 356' 1945 4
I-44 B2 356' 1944 6
I-47 C2 358' 1945 6
I-48 C2 358' 1944 4
I-53 C3/4 330' 1945 6
I-56 B3/4 356' 1944 4
I-58 B3/4 356' 1944 6
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 97

Submarine Type Length Date of Conversion No. of Kaiten

I-156 KD3A/B 330' 1945 2
I-157 KD3A/B 330' 1945 2
I-158 KD3A/B 330' 1945 2
I-159 KD3A/B 330' 1945 2
I-162 KD4 320' 1945 5
I-165 KD5 320' 1945 2
I-361 D1/2 Transport 248' 1945 5
I-363 D1/2 Transport 248' 1945 5
I-366 D1/2 Transport 248' 1945 5
I-367 D1/2 Transport 248' 1945 5
I-368 D1/2 Transport 248' 1945 5
I-370 D1/2 Transport 248' 1945 5
I-372 D1/2 Transport 248' 1945 5
I-373 D1/2 Transport 248' 1945 5
Some subs, such as I-47, 53, 58 and others, were initially fitted to carry four Kaiten and
later refitted to carry more. Figures above reflect the final configuration.29

Kairyu and Koryu

Successes at Pearl Harbor and the limited successes of the Kaiten spurred further devel-
opment of the small submarine projects. These midget submarines were generally referred

Koryu midget subs were designed to carry two conventional torpedoes in their bow. Shizuo Fukui,
Compiler. Japanese Naval Vessels at the End of War. Administrative Division, Second Demobilization
Bureau, Japan. April 25, 1947, p. 197.
98 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

to as Ko-Hyoteki (A-targets), to disguise their existence, and were of two types, the Kairyu,
or Sea Dragon, and the Koryu, or Scaly Dragon. It is probable that their planned use was for
defense of the home islands in the face of an American invasion.
The Koryu measured eighty-six feet in length with a beam of nearly seven feet. Two 18"
torpedoes were mounted in its bow tubes. This was a true submarine with long distance capa-
bilities. Its five man crew could take it to depths of 330 feet and, on the surface, its cruising
speed of eight knots gave it a range of one thousand miles. Capable of sixteen knots submerged,
it did not become operational until early 1945, as its first model was completed. By war’s end
only 110 of a projected 540 had been built,30 none of which became operational. The major
production center was at Kure, with others constructed at Maizuru, Tamano, Nagasaki, Kobe,
Yokohama, Yokosuka, Kawasaki, Niigata, Harima, and Hitachi. The scarcity of torpedoes
toward the end of the war would probably have led to its use as a suicide weapon, however,
American air raids continually interrupted production.
A smaller sub, the Kairyu, was also developed at war’s end. This vessel had a crew of two
and was fifty-seven feet long. Although it could dive to 650 feet, it was slower than the Koryu
and only had a range of about 450 nautical miles. Originally designed to carry two 18" tor-
pedoes on the outside of their hulls, they also fell victim to the torpedo shortage that plagued
the Koryu. Models were found in Yokosuka Naval Yard after the war with 1,300 lb. explosive

The Kairyu, or Sea Dragon, was originally designed to carry a single torpedo. Shortages of torpedoes
at war’s end made the mounting of an explosive warhead the logical progression. This turned it into
a suicide weapon. Shizuo Fukui, Compiler. Japanese Naval Vessels at the End of War. Administrative
Division, Second Demobilization Bureau, Japan. April 25, 1947, p. 198.
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 99

Kairyu submarines at Yokosuka shipyard on 11 September 1945. Subs numbered 4018 and 4016 can
be identified as training subs because they have two periscopes and a longer sail. NARA 80G 338384.

warheads fitted, indicating that they would be used in ramming attacks like the Kaiten. Pro-
duction figures for this sub were 250 of a projected 760 by September 1945. The major pro-
duction center for these was Yokosuka, followed by Yokohama, Uraga, Hakoate, Sakurajima,
Fujinagata, Osaka, Innoshima, Uranosaki, and Hayashikane. Some of the subs at Yokosuka
were built as training subs with an extended superstructure and two periscopes. 31
An even smaller sub, the Shinkai (sea vibrator), was not put into use. To keep its existence
secret it was referred to as the Maru-Kyu Kanamono or “Number 9 metal fitting.” This forty-
foot-long sub carried a two-man crew and was designed to attach magnetic mines to the
underside of ship hulls. When this proved impractical a contact warhead was fitted to the ves-
sel. Its electric motors limited its speed to about nine knots and its development and pro-
duction was abandoned after only one was completed at Ourazaki Works, Kure Naval Base.
Another small sub, about forty-six feet long, was never given a name. It was simply des-
ignated as the U-Metal Fitting (U-Kanamono) in keeping with the secrecy surrounding the
development of these types of vessels. It carried two men and could only make about three
knots. One torpedo was mounted in its nose. This limited its use to local defense. Fourteen
were built at Kure in the spring and summer of 1944, but they never became operational.32
One other midget sub, the M-Kanamono or “M-Metal Fitting,” was about the same size
as the U-Kanamono. It had tracks and was designed to crawl along the bottom and attach
magnetic mines to enemy vessels. One experimental model was produced at Ourazaki Works,
Kure but never saw production.
As the war entered its final stages, more emphasis was placed on the development of new special
attack weapons. Two smaller special attack vessels were developed at the end of the war but not put
into use. The Shinkai (top) was about forty feet in length and designed to attack ships anchored near
shore. It carried a two man crew and could make nine knots. Only one of these was produced at Kure
Naval Yard and proved unwieldy in sea trials. The U-Kanamono or U-Metal Fitting never had a name
other than its secret developmental designation. It was about thirty feet in length. Fourteen were
produced at Kure Naval Yard, but they were never put into service. Shizuo Fukui, Compiler. Japanese
Naval Vessels at the End of War. Administrative Division, Second Demobilization Bureau, Japan.
April 25,1947, p. 204.

By the end of the war the Japanese, in desperation, created a number of special attack weapons out
of whatever materials were available. This one appears to be made from an aircraft fuel drop tank.
This vessel, described as a “human torpedo,” was found on Saipan. Its diving planes indicate that it
could partially submerge, but the design of the canopy could not take much water pressure. It prob-
ably ran just under the surface. The photograph was taken on 6 January 1949 at NAB Saipan. NARA
80G 452861F.
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 101

The Suicide Soldier

The discussions preceding this section have referred to the use of a variety of mechanical
weapons designed to wreak havoc on American and Allied forces during the course of countless
battles. Not mentioned previously are the tactics used by individual Japanese soldiers on the bat-
tlefields of Asia during the Second World War. These ranged from massed infantry group charges
into waiting death, which was considered preferable to waiting for the enemy to annihilate them
in their bunkers, caves, and foxholes, to the use of small explosives to disable American armor.
Reports from numerous Japanese units indicate that the formation of “suicide squads” was a
common tactic. The Antitank Combat Reference, issued by the Japanese army, indicated:
Antitank combat is based principally on close-quarters assault, the essence being thorough
training in and the execution of suicide tactics.... In attacking, the assailant carrying explosives
must dash against the tank in a spirit of self-sacrifice, while the antitank weapons must engage
the tank. If one man and one antitank gun can destroy one tank and its crew, their mission will
be well accomplished, especially if the tank is a heavy or super heavy tank.33

The simplest weapon devised to combat American tanks was the lunge antitank mine.
This was a cone-shaped explosive charge attached to the end of a six foot pole. The mine con-
tained about twelve pounds of explosive and could penetrate six inches of armor plate if it
were to strike at a ninety degree angle. American military intelligence described its use:
Perhaps the oddest of these antitank charges is the so-called “Lunge Mine” encountered on Leyte
Island. This weapon — an armor-piercing charge on the end of a pole — derives its name from
the way in which it must be thrust against the side of a tank in order to detonate.
The mine is an explosive-filled, sheet-steel cone, about 12 inches long and 8 inches in diame-
ter at the base. As in all hollow charges, the cavity in the bottom of the cone tends to guide the
force of the explosion out from the bottom of the cone and against the armor plate of the target.
A metal sleeve extends from the top, or point end, of the cone and houses the simple firing
device — a nail on the end of the broomstick-like handle which fits into the sleeve. The detona-
tor is a little more than an ordinary blasting cap set into the top of the cone, where the nail will
strike the cap if the handle is jammed down in the sleeve.... Three legs, 5¼ inches long, are
attached to the bottom of the cone; the Japanese claim that these legs increase the penetrating
power of the weapon. The penetrating effect of the charge is greater when the explosion occurs a
few inches away from the armor.
The Japanese suicide soldier has been taught to wield this weapon as he would a rifle and bay-
onet. The prescribed method of operation is for the soldier to remove the safety pin as he
approaches the tank to be attacked, and to grasp the center of the handle with his left hand, and
the butt end with his right. Then, holding the stick level, with the mine to the front, he lunges
forward as in a bayonet attack, thrusting the three legs on the mine base against the side of the
tank. The shock of contact will break the shear wire and the striker nail will be shoved into the
detonator cap, thus exploding the mine as it is held against the armor. At this point the Jap sol-
dier’s mission ends for all time.34
According to military intelligence the lunge mine was a “pure suicide weapon.”
Still another method of self-annihilation practiced by the Japanese Army involved the
use of mines, or satchel charges against tanks. On the island of Biak in late May 1944, “a Biak
Jap, who was lying in the road in front of tanks, was discovered and shot, an antitank mine
tied to his body exploded. In the Central Pacific, a Japanese prisoner explained that his job
was to climb on an advancing tank and hold a demolition charge against its side until it
exploded.”35 These tactics became noticeable during the battles in the Philippines and at Oki-
nawa, where American tanks became increasingly effective against Japanese positions.
Emphasis on the development of new weapons in the Japanese arsenal focused on aircraft
and ships, leaving little development of weapons for the individual soldier. As a result, Japanese
military technology had not kept pace with the development of American armor, leading to
an increase in the use of individual soldiers to attack tanks with explosive charges.
102 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

By early 1945 Japanese suicide attacks against tanks were well known. In this drawing, a Japanese
soldier is about to thrust a pole charge against the side of the tank. The ensuing explosion would
ensure his demise. War Department, Military Intelligence Division. Intelligence Bulletin Vol. III,
No. 2, March 1945. Washington, D.C., p. 65.

The Kirikomi Tai, or suicide assault units, were originally developed with each unit
having an officer at its head. As the campaign for the Philippines and later Okinawa wore on,
this put a serious dent in the number of infantry officers available. As a result, the units were
organized with superior privates as their leaders, thus slowing the loss of officer personnel.
Japanese Army officers were not lacking in methods of sacrificing their troops. According
to a War Department intelligence bulletin:
Jap combat troops have been instructed to use what actually amounts to a human antitank
minefield. If Japanese troops in defensive positions use this tactic as Tokyo directs, ten-man
tank-assault units will be organized from reserve troops for every platoon in the line. These
units will be deployed in two ranks, 100 yards in front of their respective platoons. There will be
a distance of about 30 yards between ranks, and an interval of 50 yards between individuals. The
rear rank will be staggered to cover the intervals in the front rank. When so deployed, each man
will dig a spider hole with a carefully camouflaged cover. When a U.S. attack is anticipated, these
suicide units will take their positions in the spider holes, and each man will be armed with a
shoulder-pack box mine, a small smoke candle, two hand grenades, and a pistol, if he has been
carrying one.36

As an American tank passed over his spider hole or nearby, the soldier would emerge from
the hole and detonate the mine under or near the tank. These spider holes were well
camouflaged to prevent discovery by American infantry accompanying the tanks.
When encountering possible American minefields, the Japanese sometimes resorted to
the most expedient method of finding the mines. Under normal circumstances, mine detecting
equipment would be used and mines dug up individually. Two American soldiers who had
served in the Solomons, reported a novel Japanese approach to finding mines: “Some Japanese
commanders would line up a detail of soldiers the entire length of the field, and walk them
across. As the soldiers detonated the mines, replacements would be sent in to continue the
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 103

In this Japanese propaganda photograph from around 1942 Japanese infantrymen attack an American
Stuart M3 tank. The date and location of the photograph is unknown, but the Stuart tank was used
only in the battle for Bataan Peninsula in 1942 and also by Australian troops in New Guinea. The
Japanese characters read from right to left “Gunjin wa Buyu o Sho Fuheshi,” which translates as
“One must respect the soldier’s military tradition.”

path. This form of human mine detection was used by the Japs so that their main force could
go through quickly.”37 How widespread this practice was remains to be seen, however, it is
indicative of the mindset of the Japanese soldier and his commanders.
In addition to targets on land, the individual army or navy man went after American
shipping. Swimming from shore to an anchored American ship armed with a mine, small
explosive charge or even hand grenades was a common occurrence. These methods were
described in the Allied Land Forces S.E.A. Weekly Intelligence Review in early January 1945:
A new type of Japanese “suicide platoon” has come to light on PELELIU Island. The organization
was made up of Japanese and locals who were drafted into the unit. Among them was 2nd Class
Pfc TOKUSABURO, Uehara, who was captured by Allied forces.
The PW’s unit was made up of good swimmers to begin with and, in addition, was given time
to practice free style swimming under water. Members were taught to swim under water
towards the enemy landing craft until they were within distance to throw hand grenades into the
boats. They were instructed to throw their grenades, which were timed for four to five seconds,
immediately after removing the pins. (the means whereby the grenades were kept dry is not
recorded).
The men were also instructed to swim with mines in front of them for attacks against landing
craft. Single-horn type anti-boat mines which were used were supported in the water by wooden
frames to which they were connected with wire. Showing themselves as little as possible, the
swimmers pushed the mines against oncoming boats.
The unit was to be employed only at night, so it was not believed that the swimmers would be
able to approach the boats during daylight. However, because of the severe bombing and naval
104 Part One — The Genesis of the Kamikazes, Their Organization, and Disposition

A definite suicide attack involved a soldier hiding in a “spider hole” with an anti-tank explosive
charge. As the tank passed over his hole the soldier emerged and detonated the mine, destroying
both the tank and himself. War Department Military Intelligence Division. Intelligence Bulletin Vol.
III, No. 11, July 1945, p. 1.
 6. Kamikazes on Land and Sea 105

fire which proceeded the Allied landing on PELELIU Island, the PW’s unit was never able to
assemble.38

Numerous ship action reports describe attacks by swimmers and their annihilation by
rifle and pistol fire. LCI(G) 404, patrolling near Yoo Passage in the Palau Islands on 8 January
1945, received a message that swimmers were attacking ships in the area. She was soon under
attack herself.
The Commanding Officer of LCI(G) 404 later stated that during this period all hands including
himself were engaged shooting swimmers and in damage control.... By 0300(K) sufficient infor-
mation was received from LCI(G) 404 to learn that swimmers carrying explosive charges had
attacked her. Enemy swimmers approached the ship toward the bow and stern. All the enemy
were killed with the exception of one who was seen to dive under the fantail. Immediately after-
wards, an explosion occurred hitting the steering engine room. Flooding was controlled and
watertight integrity was maintained. Shortly after the explosion LCI(G) 404 sighted and
destroyed and empty enemy raft two hundred feet astern of them.39

No casualties resulted from the attack, but the ship reported that her port rudder was blown
off and her starboard rudder damaged beyond repair. Her skegs were torn loose and her aft
hull plating was seriously damaged also. Such attacks were not unusual in the islands of the
Pacific and American shipping would also undergo swimmer attacks at Okinawa.
Although the spectacular crashes of a kamikaze aircraft into a ship was the most notable
of the suicide attack methods, it is probable that more Japanese servicemen met their deaths
by simpler means. Countless thousands, armed with mines, satchel charges, pole charges, and
their government issued rifles, went to their deaths in the service of the Emperor by dashing
into enemy fire to plant their explosives against American tanks or swimming toward an
American ship carrying explosives. Still others furiously charged into American guns rather
than face capture. The number of men who died in such endeavors will never be known.
This page intentionally left blank
 PART TWO
The Kamikaze Chronicles:
A Detailed Account of the Attacks

7. Prelude to Mayhem

The possibility of a war between Japan and America had long been considered by Amer-
ican planners beginning shortly after the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 –1895. Japan’s
burgeoning power, as demonstrated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, gave added impetus
to the need for contingency plans should the United States and Japan go to war at some point
in the future. This planning, known in general as War Plan Orange and in the later 1930s as
the Rainbow Plans, proved to be a close predictor of American activities in the war. Fortu-
nately, the Americans were not caught totally unprepared as the possibilities of war with Japan
had long been considered.
During the course of World War II, two major American thrusts toward Japan had devel-
oped. In the southern Pacific areas, General Douglas MacArthur’s forces had moved across
the islands in a semi-circular route heading toward the Philippines and the islands to the
north, leading to the home islands of Japan. In the central Pacific, the American naval forces
under Admiral Chester Nimitz had forged ahead, staging amphibious assaults on one island
after another. By early 1944, the two arms of the pincer were rapidly closing in on the inner
defense line of the Japanese Empire.1
At that point the next target became the subject of debate. MacArthur, his vision
colored by his close affinity to the people of the Philippines, saw retaking the islands as
the logical next step. Naval planners disagreed, believing that the Philippines could be
bypassed in favor of an assault on the Marianas, Taiwan, and China, placing the Americans
in a better position to attack Japan proper. At a meeting held between MacArthur, Nimitz,
and President Franklin Roosevelt in Honolulu on 26 July 1944, MacArthur’s view prevailed,
in part because Japanese advances along the coast of China had made that an even more
difficult target. The next assault on Japanese held territory would come on the island of Leyte
in the Philippines.

Air Cover
The invasion of the Philippines presented numerous problems, among them the threat
from Japanese air attacks. Carrier aircraft, including both Hellcats and Wildcats, were usually
the first line of defense for the ships. In addition, the navy was responsible for supporting the
landings at Leyte. However, once the invasion forces had gained a foothold, additional aircraft
from the Far East Air Forces, under Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, joined the fray.
The landings at Leyte centered around the northern end of Leyte Gulf near the town of

107
108 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

San Jose and to the south at Dulag. Both areas had airfields that were important to the support
of troops and the suppression of enemy aircraft. Immediately to the north of the San Jose
landing area was Tacloban air strip, a spit of land which jutted out into the water. The strip
proved ideal for the landing of supplies from the LSTs. However, the mountain of material
stacked on the airfield made it nearly impossible for the soon-to-land ground echelons to pre-
pare the field for their aircraft. In frustration, Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, commander of the
Allied Air Forces, issued a threat to bring in bulldozers to clear out the area, even if it meant
 7. Prelude to Mahem 109

By the time of the invasion at Leyte Island, the Japanese had developed numerous airfields throughout
the Philippines. This Philippine airfield map is based on General Staff, Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers. Reports of General MacArthur The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific Vol. 1 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 177, 248.
Landing craft streak toward the beach during the landing at Leyte, Philippines on 20 October 1944.
Official U.S. Navy Photograph.

LSTs landing supplies near the airstrip at Tacloban, Leyte Island. The piles of supplies on the airstrip
made it nearly impossible for the ground crews to prepare the airstrip. Lt. Gen. Kenney threatened
to bulldoze the supplies into the ocean if they were not removed promptly. U.S. Coast Guard Pho-
tograph.
 7. Prelude to Mahem 111

During the battle off Samar, the unfinished Tacloban airstrip provided refuge for Navy fighters from
the beleaguered escort carriers that could not make it back to their ships. At Tacloban they landed
under bad conditions, were refueled, and headed back to the battle. This FM-2 Wildcat had a rough
landing. NARA 342 FH 4A 40839.

Tacloban airstrip was located on Cataisan Point, a spit of land just to the north of the town of San
Jose and across the water from the town of Tacloban. This photograph, taken during late October
1944, shows the airstrip from the north looking south. NARA 80G 102183.

pushing the supplies back into the water. It is not clear how seriously Kenney’s threat was
taken, but within four days of the initial assault on the beaches at San Jose, the Far Eastern
Air Forces (FEAF) sent ground echelons for the 49th and 475th Fighter Groups, the 421st
Night Fighter Squadron, and the 305th Airdrome Squadron to establish the base at Tacloban.
On 27 October 1944, thirty-four P-38 Lightnings of the 9th Fighter Squadron, 49th Fighter
The initial landings at Leyte Island took place on the eastern side and were followed shortly thereafter
by landings on the western side of the island.

Maj. Richard I. Bong poses next to his P-38 Lightning “Marge.” Bong was the war’s leading ace with
forty confirmed kills. He died test piloting a P-80A jet fighter on 6 August 1945. NARA 342 FH 4A 06742.
 7. Prelude to Mahem 113

Maj. Thomas B. McGuire, Jr., poses on the wing of his P-38 Lightning “Pudgy.” McGuire, flying with
the 432nd Fighter Squadron, was the war’s second leading ace, with thirty-eight kills. He died while
flying a mission in the Philippines. NARA 342 FH 4A 10405.

Cmdr. David McCambell, of Essex CV-9’s VF 15, is shown in the cockpit of his F6F Hellcat on 29
October 1944. McCambell finished the war with a total of thirty-four kills, fifteen of which were made
in the skies over the Philippines during the Leyte Operation. NARA 80G 258195.
114 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Three kamikazes crash near ships at Leyte after being shot down. This photograph was taken in
November 1944. NARA 80G 1022358.

Group, arrived at Tacloban and would attack Japanese airfields and intercept their aircraft
attempting attacks on the fields and American ships. Within the next several weeks other
squadrons would arrive so that by mid–November two P-38 fighter groups would be operating
over Leyte.
Dulag Airstrip was taken on 21 October 1944, but conditions there were not as favorable
as those at Tacloban, and the field did not become operational until 21 November 1944 when
the 475th FS moved there from Tacloban.
In spite of the early difficulties in establishing air bases, the American flyers were for-
midable adversaries for the Japanese. Some of the leading aces of the war operated in the skies
over the Philippines. Among them were Majs. Richard I. Bong and Thomas B. McGuire. Flying
their P-38s, Bong finished the war with forty enemy aircraft kills to his credit and McGuire
close behind with thirty-eight. The navy ace, Cmdr. David McCambell of VF-15, had thirty-
four kills to his credit. McCambell flew his F6-F Hellcat off Essex CV-9.

The Kamikazes Appear Off Taiwan

Several kamikaze attacks took place just prior to the actual invasion of the Philippines
at Leyte, even though the formal kamikaze program would not begin for several days. On 13
October 1944, Franklin CV 13 was operating off Taiwan as the flagship of TG 38.4 under
RAdm. Ralph E. Davison. Also included in the task group were Enterprise CV 6, Belleau Wood
CVL 24, San Jacinto CVL 30, New Orleans CA 32, and Biloxi CL 80. Screening for the group
 7. Prelude to Mahem 115

were ten destroyers. The carriers had busied themselves for two days, sending 254 sorties to
attack targets in the Toshien-Takao area of Taiwan. Franklin had already recovered its planes
when, at 1825, four Japanese Betty bombers made it through the screening destroyers to launch
an attack on the carriers. Their low altitude of about fifty to seventy-five feet off the water
probably was the primary factor that allowed them to escape detection. Franklin and the other
carriers let loose with their 20mm and 40mm anti-aircraft guns. One of the Bettys dropped
its torpedo 500 yards out and Franklin’s CO, Capt. J. M. Shoemaker, ordered full left rudder.
The torpedo passed under the carrier’s fantail, missing the ship by yards. The Betty, hit numer-
ous times by anti-aircraft fire, went out of control. The bomber’s shallow dive caused it to
strike a glancing blow on the flight deck abaft the carrier’s island, and it went over the side
of the ship without causing any significant damage. San Jacinto and Franklin took a second
plane under fire. Lt. A. J. Pope, of Franklin’s VF-13, was approaching the carrier for a landing.
He was able to maneuver his plane to get a burst of gunfire into the Betty, assisting in its
destruction. Enterprise and Belleau Wood combined their fire to shoot down the third Betty.
The fourth, now on track to attack Franklin, launched its torpedo and then passed closely
over Franklin’s bow where it was taken under fire and shot down. Again Franklin’s CO handled
his ship perfectly. He “ordered right full rudder and personally rung up ‘Back Full’ on the
starboard engine. This maneuver caused the ship to slow its forward motion and pull the bow
away from the on-rushing torpedo. The torpedo finally passed within 50 feet of FRANKLIN’S
bow and continued on through the Task Group.”2 Damage to Franklin was minimal, but she
suffered one dead and ten wounded.
Reno CL 96 was operating off Taiwan as part of TG 38.3 from 12 to 14 October 1944. Tai-
wan was alive with Japanese airfields and they responded with heavy air raids against the ships
attacking them. Reno had shot down six enemy planes before a Jill attempted to crash her. At
1711 on 14 October it made it through her anti-aircraft fire to hit the aft part of her main deck,
damaging turret six and nearby parts of the ship. Damage to the ship was minimal, although
the crash wounded nine of her crew. The turret was able to resume firing, but there was some
question as to whether its fire was accurate at that point as the crash had altered its align-
ment.

Kamikazes in the Philippines

Although there had been kamikaze attacks off Taiwan, the major kamikaze assault in
1944 would come in the Philippines. Larger ships had been the targets at Taiwan, but in the
Philippines everything from PT boats to carriers would be attacked. Sonoma ATO 12, was not
so fortunate as other, larger ships. The little fleet tug was already forty-two years old as she
faced her greatest challenge of the war, survival in the face of an enemy air attack. To her
went the dubious distinction of being one of the first American ships sunk by a kamikaze in
World War II. Sonoma was operating as part of Task Unit 78.2.9 as the invasion of Leyte began
and, with her task unit, entered San Pedro Bay on 20 October. At 0805 on the morning of 24
October 1944, she sent her small boat with seven men to dive for an anchor which had been
lost by LSM 21. She then headed for the merchant ship Augustus Thomas to resupply her fresh
water stores.
Augustus Thomas had steamed from Hollandia, New Guinea to San Pedro Bay in Leyte
Gulf. She arrived in San Pedro on 20 October and was anchored, awaiting her turn to offload
her cargo. Beginning around 0820, enemy planes began to attack ships in the area. A Sally
passed by her stern and was shot down by a nearby ship. At 0839 four more Sally bombers
attacked the ships and were hit by gunfire and set aflame. One, damaged by fire from Thomas,
passed in front of her and crashed into LCI(L) 1065 to her port, exploding and setting it afire.
116 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

The Sally bomber, which had a loaded weight of over 21,000 lbs. and whose fuselage was one-
third the length of the LCI(L) proved to be too much for the small amphibious ship. The
troop carrier went down within minutes. Thirteen men died and at least eight were injured.
Sonoma began to fire on the incoming planes as well. She was about to cast off from the mer-
chant ship, but it was too late. Before she could get underway she was crashed at 0845. Explo-
sions shook her 175' frame and she began to ship water. According to her action report:
The plane had gone completely through the deckhouse wiping out the forward engine room
bulkhead sections of both starboard and port outboard bulkheads and two intermediate longitu-
dinal bulkheads. Burning gasoline was sprayed into the engine room and throughout the mid-
ship section setting the radio shack, directly overhead, afire. Two bombs must have been
released just before the plane struck, and it is believed these went beneath the hull exploding
between the SONOMA and the AUGUSTUS THOMAS, causing the deluge of water from the
port side which in momentarily beating down the flames, allowed many personnel time to
escape.3

LCI (G) 72 came to her aid along with Chickasaw ATF 83 and assisted in extinguishing the
fires. Once they had been extinguished, LCI(G) 72 pulled away and Quapaw ATF 110 came
alongside to assist with pumping. It was decided to get her into shallow water before she sank.
Chickasaw attempted to push her into the beach at nearby Dio Island but ran the risk of run-
ning aground. All of the gear and guns that could be salvaged were stripped off her. Sonoma
was fast losing the battle and finally sank in eighteen feet of water, her main deck only two
feet under water.

The tug Sonoma ATO 12 rests off Dio Island, San Pedro Bay, Philippine Islands, on 20 October 1944.
She was one of the first two ships sunk by a kamikaze in World War II. NARA 80G 325819.
 7. Prelude to Mahem 117

The bombs released by the plane caused significant damage to Augustus Thomas. Sub-
sequent investigation by divers revealed a hole ten by sixteen feet in the bilge, along with sev-
eral other smaller holes. Within minutes her engine room had twenty six feet of water and
attempts were made to pump her out. On 3 November, after unsuccessful attempts to clear
the water from her engine room, she was beached nearby.4
Also hit that day in San Pedro Bay was the liberty ship David Dudley Field. A kamikaze
crashed her starboard bridge, ricocheted off her No. 7 and 6 gun tubs and went over the side.
Field was particularly vulnerable to serious damage as her cargo included 4,500 tons of gasoline
and other supplies. Fires started by the plane were quickly extinguished and damage to the
ship was minor. Four men were injured.

The Surigao Strait Attacks

The opening salvo of what was to be the beginning of the formal kamikaze attacks took
place on 25 October 1944 in the Philippines. American forces had made their main landings
on Leyte beginning on 20 October 1944. Recognizing the importance of the establishment of
an American beachhead in the Philippines, the Japanese formulated an appropriate response.
In order to disrupt the landings and supply of troops, the Japanese planned to send a massive
force into Leyte Gulf to destroy transports and their supporting gunships. VAdm. Jisaburo
Ozawa would lead a decoy group of carriers to the north of the invasion site in order to draw
off Adm. William Halsey’s carriers. Ozawa’s carriers were actually no threat as the number
of planes they carried had been diminished since their sortie and by 25 October they had only
twenty-nine aircraft left. To the south, a force led by VAdms. Shoji Nishimura and Kiyohide
Shima would enter the area by means of a run through Surigao Strait, which ultimately was
halted. The Central Force, commanded by VAdm. Takeo Kurita, included the mega-battleships
Yamato and Musashi accompanied by three other battleships, thirteen cruisers and nineteen
destroyers. They approached Leyte through San Bernadino Strait. This Central Force came
under heavy air and surface attack by American forces and was weakened somewhat by the
loss of Musashi and four of the cruisers. It seemed as though Kurita would retreat, but he
maneuvered and headed for the American jeep carriers of Task Unit 77.4.2 (Taffy 2) and their
escorts operating off Samar. Heavy damage was inflicted on the American ships, particularly
the destroyers as they attempted to thwart the attack on their carriers. With Halsey decoyed
to the north and VAdm. Jesse B. Oldendorf regrouping from his battle with the Japanese
Southern Force, the escort carriers and their destroyers took the brunt of the assault, with
Gambier Bay CVE 73 sunk by enemy gunfire. At the moment when the prospects for survival
of the carriers seemed in doubt, Kurita withdrew his forces, leaving the carriers to survive
for another day. However, as the carriers were fighting off Kurita’s force, they came under
attack by kamikazes.
Task Group 77.4, which contained a number of escort carriers under the command of
RAdm. Thomas L. Sprague, was divided into three parts, each commonly known by their call
sign “Taffy.”
Taffy 1— Task Unit 77.4.1— RAdm. Thomas L. Sprague commanding
Sangamon CVE 26 (Flagship)
Suwannee CVE 27
Chenango CVE 28
Santee CVE 29
Saginaw Bay CVE 82
Petrof Bay CVE 80
Screen: McCord DD 539, Trathen DD 530, Hazelwood DD 531, Edmunds DE 406, Richard S.
Bull DE 402, Richard M. Rowell DE 403, Eversole DE 789, Coolbaugh DE 217
118 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Taffy 2 — Task Unit 77.4.2 — RAdm. Felix B. Stumph commanding

Natoma Bay CVE 62 (Flagship)
Manila Bay CVE 61
Marcus Island CVE 77
Kadashan Bay CVE 76
Savo Island CVE 78
Ommaney Bay CVE 79
Screen: Haggard DD 555, Franks DD 554, Hailey DD 556, Richard W. Suesens DE 342, Aber-
crombie DE 343, Oberrender DE 344, LeRay Wilson DE 414, Walter C. Wann DE 412
Taffy 3 — Task Unit 77.4.3 — RAdm. Clifton A. F. Sprague —commanding
Fanshaw Bay CVE 70 (Flagship)
St. Lo CVE 63
White Plains CVE 66
Kalinin Bay CVE 68
Kitkun Bay CVE 71
Gambier Bay CVE 73
Screen: Hoel DD 768, Heermann DD 532, Johnston DD 821, Dennis DE 405, John C. Butler DE
339, Raymond DE 341, Samuel B. Roberts DE 823

Each of the three units was assigned to a different sector in Leyte Gulf, however, the kamikazes
had no problem locating them and began their attacks even as the ships were escaping from
Kurita’s force. “Their regular operating areas were 30 to 50 miles apart; that of Taffy 1 to the
southward, off northern Mindanao, that of Taffy 2 (Rear Admiral Stump) in the center of
the entrance to Leyte Gulf, and that of Taffy 3 (Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague) to the north-
ward, off Samar.”5
The ships of Taffy 1 came under attack early in the morning. Santee CVE 29 took the
first kamikaze hit at 0740 as a Japanese plane managed to sneak in over the formation and
dive into her flight deck on the port side. It struck forward of the elevator and did not disable
its function, although it started fires as it went through the deck and into the hangar area.
These were quickly brought under control and by 0751 the ship was fully operational. Sixteen
men had been killed and twenty-seven wounded. However, her ordeal was not over, as within
a few minutes, she took a torpedo hit from Japanese submarine I-56, which had been stalking
the ships. This caused some hull damage and the carrier took a six degree list to starboard,
which was righted by 0935. Santee was soon back in action and kept station with the other
ships in the group.6
About the time that Santee was hit, Suwannee’s gunners spotted a kamikaze plunging
toward her. Shells from Suwannee’s anti-aircraft guns struck the plane and it plunged down-
ward, narrowly missing Sangamon. Twenty-four minutes after Santee was hit, Suwannee came
under attack. At 0804 an enemy torpedo bomber made a successful dive, crashing through
her deck just forward of the aft elevator and putting it out of commission. Its 551 lb. bomb
went off between the flight deck and the hangar deck killing, and wounding a large number
of the crew. The explosion tore a hole twenty-five feet in diameter in the hangar deck. Damage
control parties put out the flames and made emergency repairs to the flight deck. Suwannee
was able to launch her planes within a short time. In the midst of the action, Petroff Bay CVE
80 shot down another kamikaze that tried to crash her.
Taffy 3’s carriers did not avoid the kamikazes that day. After they had escaped the atten-
tions of the Kurita’s Central Force, they came under air attack from land based aircraft of the
201st Air Group from Mabalacat. Once they had launched their aircraft to attack elements of
the Kurita’s force, lookouts on Kitkun Bay CVE 71 spotted five Zekes heading their way. This
was the flight of the Shikishima Unit, which had left its field at about 0725. Let by Lt. Yukio
Seki, the flight consisted of five bomb-laden Zekes with four more Zekes flying cover. At 1049
gunners on Kitkun Bay opened fire on the enemy aircraft.
 7. Prelude to Mahem 119

The battle off Samar on 25 October 1944 pitted major elements of the Japanese navy against the forces
covering the landings at Leyte. Success by the Japanese would have doomed the invasion. It was
during this battle that the first massed kamikaze attacks began. Commander Task Unit 77.4.2 (Com-
mander Carrier Division 24) Serial 00114. Reoccupation of Leyte Island in the Central Philippines
During the period from 18 October 1944 to 29 October 1944, including the Air-Surface Engagement
with Major Units of the Japanese Fleet on 25 October 1944. 2 November 1944, p. 24.

One Zeke crossing ahead of the ship from port to starboard, upon being brought under fire,
climbed rapidly, rolled and made a suicide dive directly at the bridge strafing as it came down.
This plane passed over the island, crashed into the port catwalk and fell into the sea about 25
yards on the port bow. Its fragmentation bomb exploded as the plane crashed, causing fires and
other damage to the ship.7
The resultant blast killed one man and wounded another twenty. At 1052, as they watched
the sky for other enemy assailants, they observed a Japanese plane crash through the flight
deck of the St. Lo CVE 63, which was cruising nearby. Flames burst from the flight deck and
smoke billowed, followed by several explosions. The plane’s bomb had set off the carrier’s
torpedo and bomb magazine; St. Lo was finished. At 1104 her crew began the sorry task of
abandoning her and, at 1121, she went to the bottom. The jeep carrier suffered 114 killed and
an unknown number of wounded in this action.
120 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

St. Lo CVE 63 burns after being hit by a kamikaze on 25 October 1944. This photograph was taken
from Kalinin Bay CVE 68. NARA 80G 270511.

Shortly after St. Lo was hit, a Zeke made a run on White Plains. White Plains turned
sharply to port as the plane made its dive. Her maneuvers were successful and the plane nar-
rowly missed her, splashing close aboard her port side. The ensuing explosion sent parts of
the plane and pilot up onto the deck. Although the plane had missed her, eleven of her crew
suffered injuries.
Kitkun Bay formed up with the other remaining carriers, Fanshaw Bay CVE 70, White
Plains, and Kalinin Bay. She sent two FM-2 Wildcats from VC-5 aloft to act as CAP over the
ships. At 1123 a Judy came in from the stern and made a suicide run on Kitkun Bay. Accurate
fire from the carrier shot both wings off the plane and it spiraled in fifty yards off the port bow.
Its bomb hit the water twenty-five yards off the starboard bow and exploded. Debris from the
plane rained down on the carrier’s forecastle, but the damage to her was not substantial.
Kalinin Bay came under attack about the same time as Kitkun Bay. In her case, three
Zekes were the perpetrators. The first was spotted to starboard at an altitude of 5,000 –6,000
feet and dove downward toward the ship. Although hit repeatedly, the Zeke managed to get
through the hail of fire and crashed into the flight deck, tearing a large hole and starting fires.
Most of the plane failed to penetrate the deck and went over the side. Shortly thereafter, a
second Zeke was sighted making a similar dive. This plane was hit and on fire as it “struck
the after port stack, catwalk, and 20 millimeter mount”8 before crashing into the sea. Damage
to the ship was minimal. Following closely on the heels of this Zeke was another which missed
the ship completely. It hit the water fifty yards off the port quarter and its bomb exploded,
but there was no effect on the ship. Five men died and fifty-five were wounded in the attacks
on Kalinin Bay. Heermann, Dennis, John C. Butler, and Raymond patrolled the area picking
up survivors.
 7. Prelude to Mahem 121

Sequence photographs showing an attack on White Plains CVE 66 on 25 October 1944. In the top
photograph crewmen crouch as they spot the approach of a Japanese Zeke. In the bottom photograph
the Zeke is about to crash close astern. Although it did not hit the carrier, the explosion damaged
her enough to send her to the States for repair. Top — NARA 80G 272870, Bottom — NARA 80G
272842.
122 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Suwannee CVE 27 burns after a Zeke crashed through her flight deck on 25 October 1944. NARA
8OG 270662.

The carriers of Taffy 1 came under attack again the next day as twelve Judy dive bombers
and a number of Zekes went after them starting about noon. A combat air patrol from Santee
drove many off, but Suwannee suffered her second crash in as many days. Prior to her being
attacked, one of Suwannee’s torpedo bombers shot down a Tony which had lined up an attack
on Petrof Bay. Suwanee was landing her planes when the Japanese aircraft made their attack.
A VT landed at 1238I, shortly before three enemy planes were spotted astern three or four miles
out, at 10,000 feet. One “Zeke” made a slow slight turn, and came right in, at a 45 degree dive,
started strafing at 3000 feet and crashed into the VT, landed a half minute before, parked on the
forward elevator, causing an instantaneous explosion of both planes. The pilot, Lieutenant Bei-
delman, and two crewmen are missing.... One to three minutes later there was a second explo-
sion in the catapult machinery space, in all probability caused by a second bomb from an enemy
dive-bombing plane, starting a fire in the elevator well.9

Suwannee’s forward elevator was smashed in the explosions, and within a short time, seven
of her Wildcats and two Avengers burst into flame and blew up. It took several hours before
the flames were under control. Her total casualties for the attacks on 25 and 26 October were
eighty-five dead, 102 missing, and fifty-eight wounded.

Leyte
Benjamin Ide Wheeler, carrying a load of troops and general supplies including gasoline,
was hit at 1045 on 27 October as she was anchored at Leyte. A Japanese bomber, on fire from
 7. Prelude to Mahem 123

anti-aircraft guns on other ships, crashed her waterline, holing it and setting off part of her
cargo of gasoline. Quick work by her firefighters and damage control crew limited the damage.
She had two killed and three wounded.10
Intrepid CV 11 had been operating off the Philippines as part of RAdm. Gerald F. Bogan’s
Task Group 38.2, along with the carriers Hancock CV 19, Bunker Hill CV 17, Cabot CVL 28,
and Independence CVL 22. On 30 October she sent her CAG-18 planes to attack Clark Field.
As the CAG-18 planes were on their mission the Japanese struck back. A kamikaze hit one of
Intrepid’s port gun tubs, killing ten men and wounding another six. Fortunately, the damage
was slight and within a short time she resumed normal activities. Franklin CV 13 was operating
nearby as part of RAdm. Ralph E. Davison’s Task Group 38.4, along with Enterprise CV 6,
San Jacinto CVL 30, and Belleau Wood CVL 24. Five kamikazes eluded the CAP and two made
it through to crash Franklin and Belleau Wood. One crashed close aboard Franklin and a
second crashed her and holed her flight deck. A third dropped a bomb which missed its target.
It peeled off and crashed into Belleau Wood holing her flight deck. Belleau Wood’s losses were
twelve CAG-21 planes, ninety-two killed and fifty-four wounded. Franklin lost thirty-three
CAG-13 planes, fifty-six men dead and fourteen wounded. Both carriers made it back to
Ulithi for repairs.

Franklin CV 13 and Belleau Wood CVL 24 burn after being hit by kamikazes off Luzon on 30 October
1944. Both ships had extensive damage and had to be escorted back to Ulithi for repairs. NARA 80G
326798.
124 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Fire fighting teams fight blazes on Belleau Wood CVL 24 after she was crashed by a kamikaze off the
Philippines on 30 October 1944. Official U.S. Navy Photograph.

TOTAL DAILY SORTIES BY JAPANESE ARMY

AND NAVY, 25 –31 OCTOBER 1944

Date Fourth Air Force (Army) First Combined Base Air Force (Navy)
25 October 162 195 (18)
26 October 161 70 ((5)
27 October 70 52 (14)
28 October 98 51
29 October 43 31 (14)
30 October 2 6 (6)
31 October 51 28
Figures in parentheses represent kamikaze aircraft.11

On 1 November 1944, kamikazes attacked elements of the Seventh Fleet Task Group 77.1
on patrol in Leyte Gulf. The task group consisted of Mississippi BB 41 as the flagship of RAdm.
 7. Prelude to Mahem 125

G. L. Weyler, Commander Task Group 77.1, California BB 44, Pennsylvania BB 38, Phoenix
CL 46, Boise CL 47, Nashville CL 43, H.M.A. S. Shropshire, Killen DD 593, Abner Read DD
526, Ammen DD 527, Bush DD 529, Leutze DD 481, Newcomb DD 586, Bennion DD 662, Hey-
wood L. Edwards DD 663, Richard P. Leary DD 664, Robinson DD 562, Bryant DD 665, Claxton
DD 571, and H.M.A.S. Arunta. The kamikaze’s targeted H.M.A.S Shropshire, but gunners on
board the ship drove them off. Ammen DD 527 was the next target. At 0952 a twin-engine
Frances hit the destroyer amidships between her stacks and then careened off the ship and
into the sea. Significant damage and fires were the result but she kept station. The attack
caused the death of five men and the wounding of another twenty-one. Bush DD 529 and
Killen DD 593 sustained damage from bombs but remained in the fight.
Around 1339 Cmdr. A. M. Purdy, the CO of Abner Read DD 769, was guiding his ship
near Claxton. Two Vals were spotted incoming at ten miles. Abner Read went to general quar-
ters and began to maneuver. As the planes came into range, she opened fire, but to no avail.
Despite heavy and accurate fire from 40mm and 20mm guns, the plane, in flames and with the
port wing shot away, dived steeply downward across 40mm mount No. 3 and the after torpedo
mount, then went over the portside. The starboard wing or the engine hit the 40mm director
platform on the starboard side of the after stack, the breech end of the after torpedo tubes
(trained 275 degrees relative) and the port 20mm machine guns. The latter were knocked over
the side. An intense fire immediately engulfed the surrounding area. 12

A bomb carried by the Val and released just prior to impact, penetrated the forward starboard
side of the ship, exploding in the after fireroom. Fires quickly spread in spite of the CO’s
orders to stop and back the ship in order to prevent fanning the flames. Claxton moved in to
assist but had to stand off as a huge explosion took place in the after part of Abner Read.
Preparing for the worst, the crew disarmed depth charges and torpedoes and jettisoned them
to prevent their exploding. However, five torpedoes in the after mount could not be reached
and their impulse charges cooked off and launched them. For the next several minutes, both
ships had to dodge the erratic torpedoes as Abner Read neared her fate. Internal explosions
rocked the ship as various magazines and other combustibles burned. Damage to the fire
mains and pumps prevented adequate water pressure from being achieved, and fighting the
rapidly spreading fires became increasingly difficult. With fires continuing unchecked and
the ship down by the stern and listing, Cmdr. Arthur M. Purdy gave the order to abandon
ship. By 1358, the destroyer was listing twenty degrees when she was abandoned. Abner Read
rolled over to ninety degrees and sank stern first at 1417 in thirty-five fathoms of water.13
Patrolling the area near Abner Read was Claxton DD 571. She came to the aid of Abmer
Read and began picking up survivors. About 0950, as she pursued her rescue duty, a kamikaze
exited from the cloud cover and then made a successful dive on her. The plane hit the water
and exploded close aboard, causing her seams to open and flooding the after living quarters.
Five of her men were killed and twenty-three wounded. In spite of her damage, she continued
her rescue mission, eventually picking up 187 survivors from Abner Read.
Later that day, at 1812, Anderson DD 411 took a kamikaze hit. Three Oscars came in at
the ship from over Panaon Island. She took them under fire and they turned away. However,
one turned back and made a dive on her. In spite of being hit by 20mm and 40mm gunfire,
the plane got through, caught its right wing tip on the ship’s stack and hit the port side.
Burning gasoline covered the deck in the area of the crash and the number 1 and 2 boilers
were put out of commission by the impact. With fires spreading the destroyer jettisoned her
torpedoes. The fires were out by 1855 and Anderson was covered by Bush, which supplied
extra medical assistance. She had sixteen dead and twenty wounded. 14
Liberty ships and the later victory ships, along with official U.S. navy and army ships
such as attack transports and cargo carriers, were an essential part of the invasion fleet. To
126 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

land troops and cargo was an indispensable mission and these ships came under attack as
well.
During World War II, 2,751 liberty ships were built, with the first launched in 1941. They
were 441 feet long and could make ten to twelve knots. Since more speed was desirable, a new
and similar ship was designed, the victory ship. Victory ships were 455 feet long but could
make an estimated fifteen knots. The first of the 534 victory ships built was launched on 28
February 1944. Armament for the ships was varied, but most carried a 4" or 5" stern gun, a
3" bow gun, six to eight 20mm guns, with some of the liberty ships also mounting a pair of
37mm bow guns. Manning these guns was an Armed Guard consisting of twenty-eight men
and one officer.15 The rank of the officer was usually from ensign to lieutenant. Still another
type of freighter was in the group. These were the United States Maritime Commission C1
and C1-M types, of which 173 were built during World War II. At 412' and 418' l.o.a. respec-
tively, they could make fourteen knots. A number of these cargo carriers participated in the
landings at Leyte, Mindoro, and Lingayen Gulf. During November of 1944, many of them
were damaged in kamikaze attacks.
Matthew P. Deady, under the command of Master K. D. Frye, had arrived in San Pedro
Bay, Leyte Gulf on 29 October, after steaming from Hollandia, New Guinea with ten other
freighters and their seven escorts. She was anchored in Tacloban Bay when, at 0535 on 3

A member of the Armed Guard on board a liberty ship practices sighting in the five inch rifle. The
Armed Guard was composed of members of the U.S. Navy assigned to each liberty ship and victory
ship to man the weapons which were essential to the defense of the ship. Photograph from the Library
of Congress — Farm Security Administration — Office of War Information Photograph Collection.
 7. Prelude to Mahem 127

Liberty and victory ships were produced in a number of shipyards such as this one at the Bethlehem
Fairfield shipyards near Baltimore, MD. Visible behind the flag on the bow is the tub for the five inch
gun. Photograph from the Library of Congress — Farm Security Administration — Office of War
Information Photograph Collection.

November, she came under attack. A Japanese dive bomber dropped a stick of bombs which
missed her. It then turned around and made a strafing run on her from astern. The ship’s
gunners nearly emptied their 20mm magazines into her and may have wounded the pilot.
This may have been a kamikaze crash as the last act of a dying pilot. He crashed his plane
into the No. 2 gun tub and exploded in a ball of fire. Nearby oxygen and acetylene tanks
128 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

exploded from the fire and a number of men were blown overboard. It had been a costly
attack from the standpoint of personnel losses. In addition to two Navy Armed Guard mem-
bers who were missing and presumed dead, four had been burned. Army troops on board
counted twenty-two dead, thirty-five missing and over one hundred injured in the attack.
Shortly after the initial attack, five more Japanese aircraft strafed the men in the water and
dropped anti-personnel mines on them as the smaller ships attempted to rescue them. Two
of them were shot down by fire from the ships.16
The next day, on 4 November, Cape Constance, carrying a load of general supplies, was
anchored in Tacloban Bay when she was attacked. A twin-engine bomber made a run on her
but, under fire from the ship’s armed guard, it crashed into one of the ship’s booms, disinte-
grated and its parts skidded off the deck into the water. Debris was everywhere but the crew
quickly extinguished the fires and cleaned up. Her damage was insignificant and only one
man received minor injuries.
Lexington CV 16, operating as a part of RAdm. Frederick C. Sherman’s Task Group 38.3,
had just finished the final stages of attacks on the withdrawing Japanese fleet. Her CAG-19
planes assisted in the sinking of the heavy cruiser Nachi on 5 November. Around 1300, seven
Japanese aircraft were reported approaching the ships. One was shot down by the CAP but
the others ducked into cloud cover and escaped destruction. At 1325 a Zeke made a dive on
Lexington and was shot down a thousand yards away. Her action report for the day indicates:

Shortly thereafter, another enemy plane, identified also as a Zeke, was sighted making a similar
attack. This plane was also taken under fire and although hit many times by 20MM and 40MM
shells and afire, managed to drop its bomb and crash the ship on the starboard side of the island
structure aft. The bomb exploded against the armor plate of Battle Two completely shattering it
and destroying all of the Secondary Conn equipment and communications in the area. The
plane completely disintegrated upon striking the island. The resulting fragments and gasoline
explosion along with the bomb blast and bomb fragments caused serious damage to the signal
bridge, several 30MM and 40MM batteries and caused many casualties. Damage control meas-
ures were immediately taken to extinguish the fires and within twenty (20) minutes, in spite of
exploding ammunition and electrical arcing, all fires were out.17

When the struggle was finally over, she counted her dead and wounded. Fifty had perished
in the attack and another 132 were wounded. Although she was capable of continuing flight
operations, she headed back to Ulithi with her group on 7 November.
The liberty ships Leonidas Merritt, Thomas Nelson, William A. Coulter, Morrison R. Waite,
Matthew P. Deady, and Alexander Majors, all of which had transited in convoy from Hollandia,
New Guinea to Leyte without incident, were anchored in Dulag Harbor, Leyte on 12 November
1944. Also sailing that route was the liberty ship Jeremiah M. Daily which anchored nearby
in Leyte Gulf. In addition to a variety of supplies, the Alexander Majors and Thomas Nelson
had gasoline as part of their cargoes and Nelson also carried some ammunition. The worst
disasters of the day would be Thomas Nelson and Jeremiah M. Daily
Thomas Nelson was at anchor off Dulag on Sunday, 12 November 1944, along with about
twenty or so other cargo carriers. At 1127 three kamikazes approached the ships from the west
northwest and dove on them. One struck Leonidas Merritt and a second clipped Matthew P.
Deady. The third crashed into the aft end of Thomas Nelson. It struck the jumbo boom on
Nelson’s No. 4 hatch and pieces of the plane continued on through the port side bulwark. Its
bomb penetrated the deck and exploded. Fires raged on deck and between decks and it took
four and one-half hours to put them out. The crash killed 136 men, including 133 troops on
board, and injured an additional eighty-eight.18 Leonidas Merritt was hit on her forward deck,
causing severe damage to the ship but only lost only three men, with another thirty-six report-
ing various injuries. Matthew P. Deady, already damaged from a kamikaze crash on 3 Novem-
 7. Prelude to Mahem 129

Gunners on Lexington CV 16 fire on a Zeke as it makes its kamikaze attack on the carrier on 5 Novem-
ber 1944. The successful kamikaze attack killed forty men and wounded another 132. NARA 80G
270495.

ber, had another close call. As the planes approached her, she successfully fired on them and
drove one off course. It narrowly missed the bridge and clipped the ship’s antennae before
plunging into the sea thirty feet of her port beam.
Jeremiah M. Daily, carrying troops, was hit at 1420 when four enemy aircraft appeared
over the anchored ships. With over one hundred ships anchored in the area, her chances were
good that she would not be singled out, however, that was not to be the case. One of the
planes dropped a bomb on another ship, peeled off, and headed for Daily. It crashed into her
wheelhouse spreading flaming gasoline over the decks and igniting fuel stowed nearby. Reports
credited the CO of the Armed Guard with extreme bravery. According to the report:
Carl Mather Kube Lt. (jg) U.S.N.R. Service no. 342997, after ringing the General Alarm on the
flying bridge, put on the phones to give orders to gunners that were manning their guns. Louis
C. Tyus manned his gun and opened fire under Lt. Kube’s orders. Despite the fact that the plane
was flying straight for them both, Lt. Kube and Louis C. Tyus never moved from their battle sta-
tion until after the explosion. When the plane crashed the explosion blew Lt. Kube across the
bridge. He received burns on 90% of his body and a cut above the left eye. He walked off the
bridge a few minutes later unassisted to get first aid for his burns and wound.
Louis C. Tyus was burned from his waist up. The gun tub he was in was demolished. He came
off the bridge without help.19

Fires spread by the fuel caused extensive loss of life until they were finally extinguished after
1800. The crash killed one hundred-six men, including one hundred troops. Forty-three others
on board the ship were injured.20
130 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Damage to Lexington CV 16’s 20mm Group 7 starboard mounts is seen after the kamikaze attack of
5 November 1944. NARA 890G 270499.

In mid-morning on 12 November, at 1029, Morrison R. Waite came under attack as a

flaming Zeke headed toward her in a crash dive. “S1c William H. MC NEESE, No. 1 20 mm
gun position, continued to fire at the aircraft until it struck the ship which blew him out of
the gun tub.”21 The Zeke hit the port side and holed the ship. Within fifteen minutes the fires
were under control and she could tend to her dead and injured. Twenty-one died and forty-
three were injured.
Alexander Majors, carrying trucks, troops, oil, and gas was potentially a floating bomb.
 7. Prelude to Mahem 131

However, the Zeke that attacked her at 1718 hit the mainmast and exploded above the deck.
Fires were started in gasoline drums stored on her deck, but since the blast had not penetrated
the deck they were brought under control with assistance from a nearby LCI. Two died and
fifteen others were injured.22 At various dates, the ships completed unloading, making tem-
porary repairs and then headed back to San Francisco for final repairs.
William A. Coulter, carrying 3,500 tons of general supplies, took a hit in her aft end from
a Zeke at 1745, but the plane skidded off the deck and into the water. Minor damage to the
ship occurred but no one had been killed. Minutes later a second Zeke crashed close aboard
after being hit by the ship’s gunfire, but its explosion caused no further damage. Sixty-nine
of the officers, crew, armed guards, and passengers reported injuries.
The landing craft repair ships Egeria ARL 8 and Achilles ARL 41 were also struck that day,
with Achilles losing thirty-three men and suffering another twenty-eight wounded. At 1300,
Achilles lookouts spotted three Zekes. The second of the planes peeled off and, in spite of
being under fire, crashed into the foredeck and penetrated it. Pieces of the plane’s fuselage
bounced along the deck and went over the stern. Within minutes fires were raging and the
crew had all they could do to keep them under control. Their efforts were hampered since,
as in many cases of kamikaze crashes, the impact and subsequent explosions knocked out fire
mains. By 1900 the fires were nearly out and the grim task of counting the dead began in
earnest. She remained in San Pedro Bay until 27 November and then departed for Hollandia
and repairs.
Egeria ARL 8 was at anchor about a thousand yards from Achilles when that ship was hit.
Moored on her port side was LSM 138 and LCI(L) 430, and moored on the starboard side of
the ship was LCI(L) 364. The four ships made a tempting target. A Zeke with a bomb made
a run on Caribou IX 114, anchored nearby, and was turned away by gunfire. It then headed
for the Egeria and her three companions. The only one of the three ships able to fire on the
plane was the LCI(L) 430. Its fire caused the plane to veer off and circle around the three
ships, coming in to attack the LCI(L) 364 from the port side. Fire from the 430 destroyed the
plane about twenty-five feet off LCI(L) 364. Its bomb went off and opened a large hole in the
port side of the 364. Egeria had minor damage but twenty-one of her men, who had been
working on LCI(L) 364, were wounded in the attack. With her flooding on the increase, LCI(L)
364 was towed into shallow water to be beached by LCI(L) 977.
Alpine APA 92 was struck by a kamikaze at 0729 on 18 November. She was in the process
of debarking troops at Leyte when two Japanese planes approached her position. She fired on
and shot down one of the planes off her starboard quarter, but the second made it through a
hail of anti-aircraft fire to crash flaming into her port side. The twin explosions of the aircraft
and its bomb spread fires over the ship but they were out within a half-hour. Once the fires
were out, she continued the task of getting her troops ashore and then left for Manus and
repairs. Her casualties were five dead and twelve injured.23
Four more of the merchant ships, Nicholas J. Sinnett, Gilbert Stuart, Alcoa Pioneer, and
Cape Romano suffered at the hands of the kamikazes 18 –19 November. The first two were lib-
erty ships and the latter two CI types. On 12 November, at 0724, Nicholas J. Sinnett had a
close call at Leyte as a kamikaze made an attempt on her but struck the freighter only a
glancing blow before hitting the water. She had no damage and no casualties. At the same
time that Sinnett was attacked, Gilbert Stuart was hit by another of the planes in the group.
She was another potential floating bomb. Along with general supplies and troops, she also
had on board 6,000 barrels of gasoline stored in her hold. Fortunately for them, the troops
had already left the ship. The kamikaze attacked the ship from dead ahead, striking the ship’s
funnel and the starboard gun tub. It eventually came to rest on the aft end of the ship. Her
bombs went off, burning gasoline flowed down into the ship, and fires began to spread. Luck
132 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

was on her side and the fires never reached the hold where the gas was stored.24 Chickasaw
ATF 83 helped her extinguish her fires. She lost six men and had eleven injured. Alcoa Pioneer
was the biggest concern in the group with her cargo of 1,200 tons of gasoline. She was crashed
at 0710, but the fires were contained on deck and put out within five minutes. All hands rec-
ognized the necessity of extreme measures in their firefighting and they responded magnifi-
cently. Six died and thirteen were injured, a small toll for a potentially large disaster. The
courage of her Armed Guard unit was noted by the ship’s master, Lt. Cmdr. Andrew W. Gavin
USNR (inactive), when he wrote:
The following report is from my own observation, and I have approximately 30 feet of moving
pictures that I took only a few seconds after the crash, which I am sending to the Armed Guard
Center at San Francisco. If the pictures turn out alright, you will see courage and fortitude that
is beyond description. You will see 20 mm gun tub No. 2 practically a sieve from shrapnel and
still burning, and S1c Patrick Henry Stevens, No. 306-32-38, still pointing his gun although
badly burned and one arm almost severed.
You will see in gun tub No. 4 and No. 6, Ottis B. Caraley, S1c No. 938-61-47, William Ellis
York, S1C, No. 932-59-12, Carl Winton Lee, S1c, No. 861-17-31 all standing at their guns
although the entire part of the gun platform is ablaze. Caraley and Lee are wounded.
In gun tub No. 3, Leroy Vincent Kirk, S1c No. 313-27-62, is critically wounded, and Edward
Larcy Grigchy, S1c, No. 382-99-75, although badly burned, and tub full of shrapnel holes, is still
occupying his gun. The same is true at all the guns.
At guns No. 5 and No. 7 which are abreast of the stack on the starboard side, Lloyd Earl
Chapde, GM — No. 613-13-16, Edward Henry Kocardora, S1c — No. 661-46-34, and Gilbert C.
Baker, S1c No. 867-25-92, were still at their stations, although the entire vicinity is a shamble,
Chapda and Kocardora are injured. It was their gun that hit the plane diving on the GENERAL
FLEISCHER [anchored nearby and unhit].25

Cape Romano was the least likely to suffer any loss to the invasion effort. She had been bombed
three weeks prior to this attack and was laying at anchor with an empty hold when a plane
struck the port side of her bridge, hit a gun tub, and went over the side. The explosion caused
some minor damage but there were no casualties. 26
James O’Hara APA 90 arrived in a convoy of fifteen transports from Guam, carrying the
army’s 77th Division. They anchored at Leyte on 22 November and the following day began
to disembark their troops. At 1114 a Zeke, under pursuit by four P-38 Lightnings, appeared
two miles from the ship and turned toward her in a suicide run. It was taken under fire and
lost a wing about one hundred feet from the ship, causing the pilot to lose control. The
remainder of the plane struck the side of the transport and disintegrated in an explosion. Its
remains went into the water and minor gasoline fires spread in the immediate area but were
quickly put out. The ship had minimal damage and no casualties.27
The Task Force 38 carriers would once again feel the wrath of the kamikazes as the Philip-
pine campaign wore on. On 25 November RAdm. Gerald F. Bogan’s TG 38.2 carriers were
operating about sixty miles due east central Luzon. Their planes were busy attacking Clark
Field and the area around Manila when, at 1253, a Zeke made it through the combat air patrol
and crashed one of Intrepid’s port gun tubs, killing ten and wounding six of her men. The
plane continued on its path, holing her flight deck before its bomb went off. Fires started by
the crash were extinguished and the ship resumed station. Her action report indicates that
this was not the end of the action:
At 1258 the task group changed course to 175° T. The enemy plane, a Zeke, bore in on this vessel
firing 7.7 MM and 20 MM machine guns. At 1259 he landed on the port side about frames 140 –
142 and skidded all the way to the bow, where part of the engine, the pilot’s torso, and plane
wreckage remained on the flight deck. This plane also had been armed with a bomb, which
passed through the flight deck and exploded on the hangar deck about frame 107. This explosion
killed several officers and men, set fire to aircraft in the hangar deck and in the surrounding
 7. Prelude to Mahem 133

area. After the last crash, ceased firing. Although enemy planes were in the vicinity for some
time afterward, none approached within range of this ship’s guns.28

By the time the attacks ended, Intrepid had shot down five enemy aircraft, including the two
that crashed her. At the end of the day her casualties included sixty-nine dead and thirty-five
wounded.
At 1254 a Zeke came at Cabot high from astern and hit the edge of her flight deck on the
port side. Three minutes later a second Zeke came in from high on her port bow and exploded

This is the first in a sequence of two photographs showing a Yokosuka D4Y2 Suisei Model 33 (Judy)
bomber about to hit Essex CV 9 on 25 November 1944. NARA 80G 270710.
134 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

This is the second in a sequence of two photographs showing a Yokosuka D4Y2 Suisei Model 33 (Judy)
bomber about to hit Essex CV 9 on 25 November 1944. NARA 80G 270649.

Essex CV 19 is on fire after the kamikaze attack of 25 November 1944. This photograph was taken
from South Dakota BB 57. NARA 80G 270748.
 7. Prelude to Mahem 135

Damage to Essex CV 9 after the kamikaze attack of 25 November did not stop her and she was soon
back in action. NARA 80G 270731.

close aboard the port side. Cabot’s deck was showered with bomb fragments and debris from
the plane. Minor fires were quickly extinguished and a survey of the ship indicated that her
damage was slight.29 She wound up with two small holes in her flight deck, thirty-six dead
and sixteen wounded. Of the TG 38.2 carriers, Hancock fared the best. The Zeke that attacked
her was blown apart about a thousand feet over the ship. Debris rained down on the flight
deck starting small fires, and ten to twelve feet of its fuselage fell on her deck amidships. Small
fires started by the debris were quickly extinguished but no serious damage was incurred. She
had two men injured.30
Essex CV 9, a part of RAdm. Frederick C. Sherman’s Task Group 38.3, was hit at 1255
when a Judy crashed her port side flight deck. The plane did not carry a bomb, however, its
gasoline exploded, setting fires on the deck and catwalk. Her flight deck was damaged in the
crash, along with her Group 4 20mm battery and hangar deck in the area of the impact. The
fires were brought under control and by 1326 she was able to resume flight operations. Damage
to the carrier was minor, but fifteen men were killed and forty-four wounded. 31

27 to 29 November 1944
Task Group 77.2 under RAdm. T. D. Ruddock was stationed in Leyte Gulf awaiting new
orders. On 29 November, as the ships were preparing to refuel they were attacked by an esti-
mated twenty-five to thirty planes. St. Louis CL 49 was hit by two, Colorado BB 45 and Mont-
136 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

pelier CL 57 by one, and Maryland BB 46 by another. The most serious casualties were incurred
by Maryland when a kamikaze struck her between her number one and two turrets killing
thirty-one and wounding thirty of her men.
The sub-chaser SC 744, commanded by Lt. Donald S. Stroetzel, was escorting a barge
full of high octane gasoline from Tacloban Harbor to Liloan where a PT base was under con-
struction. At 1133 the ship received a radio call that Japanese aircraft were in the area and they
went to general quarters.32 Within minutes a Zeke was spotted with two P-38s hot on its tail.
Crewmen watched as the Zeke outmaneuvered the Lightnings; it shot down one and then
turned to make a strafing run on the sub-chaser. The little wooden ship responded with anti-
aircraft fire and the plane seemed to lose control. The sub-chaser was riddled with bullets
from the Zeke as it made its dive. It seemed to the crew that their fire had killed the pilot, but
it made no difference. Already on a crash course, the Zeke flew right into the SC 744, striking
it near the stern. Its bomb, released prior to the crash, missed the ship, blowing up in the
water off the bow. As the smoke settled it was obvious that the ship was still afloat and not
on fire, but there were casualties. Six men were missing and two on the starboard 20mm gun
were seriously wounded. The final toll for the sub-chaser was seven dead and three wounded.
The tug TP 114 picked up one man who had been blown overboard and then came to the aid
of the SC 744. The ship was towed back to Tacloban, but sank at 0420 on 30 November while
tied up at a dock. Her wounds had been too severe for her to survive.33
Colorado BB 45 was in company with Maryland BB 46, West Virginia BB 48, New Mexico
BB 40 and the cruisers Minneapolis CA 36, Columbia CA 56, Denver CL 57, Montpelier CL 57,
and St. Louis CL 49 as part of RAdm. T. D. Ruddock’s Task Group 77.2. Screening for the
group were the destroyers Mustin DD 413, Lang DD 399, Aulick DD 569, Saufley DD 465, Ren-
shaw DD 499, Waller DD 466, Conway DD 507, Pringle DD 477, Eaton DD 510, Cony DD 508,
Nicholas DD 449, Jenkins DD 447, and Laffey DD 724. With the initial invasion of Leyte com-
pleted, the task group was assigned to provide security for convoys transiting the gulf.
A combination of no perceived action, impending foul weather and the need to replenish
fuel supplies, placed the ships at a disadvantage the morning of 27 November. The task group
was circling the tanker Caribou IX 114, and West Virginia was taking on fuel as the attacks
began. At 1125 a large group of approximately thirty bogeys were picked up as they closed on
the ships. West Virginia was targeted by a bomber but escaped damage. Colorado took the
first hit when a kamikaze crashed her port side. “The plane and its bomb exploded on 5"/51
caliber gun No. 8, destroying the gun and inflicting numerous casualties among personnel in
the casemate and on 40mm mounts No. 6 and No. 18. The second plane and bomb exploded
in the water but inflicted no damage to the ship or personnel.”34 A second plane was a narrow
miss but crashed in the water close enough to cause additional damage. Nineteen men were
killed and seventy-two wounded, but damage to the battleship was minor. At 1145 Montpelier
came under attack by four planes. Three were shot down at a distance from the ship but one
kamikaze crashed short, bounced off the water and hit her side. Montpelier’s damage was
minimal but she had eleven wounded. In all, the ships shot down a total of eleven planes
during the raid.
St. Louis became the next target with the attack of a Judy at 1112. The plane dropped a
bomb and then spun into the water 1,500 yards away from the cruiser.
At 1137 St. Louis opened fire with port anti-aircraft battery at a group of four enemy planes.
Subsequent to this the action was rapid and continuous with six successive diving attacks upon
this ship [St. Louis] until approximately 1215, commencing with a suicide dive from well aft on
the port quarter and almost astern which plane, at 1138, although on fire and upside down,
managed to crash at about ten feet inboard from starboard at frame 128, the forward starboard
corner of the hangar area. At this time the ship was slowly turning right at a formation speed of
fifteen knots, conforming to the circular formation. The bomb of the plane is believed to have
 7. Prelude to Mahem 137

had instantaneous fusing and the mutilated remains of the pilot, together with his engine, para-
chute, scarf, back armor, one tire, two machine guns of about 12.7 calibre, self-sealing gas tank
material and various other miscellaneous items, came to rest in the after end of the GSLK store-
room on the third deck level, having penetrated bulkhead 126 at the forward lower starboard
corner of the hangar space. The gasoline fire from the plane and the fire from other materials in
the hangar which were ignited thereby caused a considerable fire and this, it is believed, may
have attracted the succeeding attacks on the ship by indicating a damaged ship and the possibil-
ity of “finishing her off.”35

Five more kamikazes dove on St. Louis, most splashing far enough from the ship as not to
damage her. One, however, crashed close aboard the port side and ruptured the ship’s hull
just below the armor belt. Planes identified by the ship’s observers included Judys, Hamps,
Jills, and Vals, indicating that this was an attack by Japanese navy aircraft. Casualties aboard
St. Louis were sixteen dead and forty-three wounded.
The task group had a break on 28 November, but the kamikazes returned the next day.
The ships were under orders to depart the area and had just begun their trip back to Manus
when the Japanese attacks began. Just after sunset, a kamikaze made it through the overcast
sky and hit Maryland between her No. 1 and No. 2 turrets, causing heavy casualties and explod-
ing in a fiery ball of flame. When her fires were eventually brought under control, the battleship
continued on her way. Thirty-one died and thirty were injured by the crash. Simultaneous
to this attack, two nearby picket destroyers, Saufley DD 465 and Aulick DD 569, came under
attack. Both were on anti-submarine screen at the entrance to Leyte Gulf. Saufley had minor
damage when one plane crashed her and killed one crew member, but Aulick fared much
worse. At 1750 she was attacked by six Oscars. One made it through the hail of anti-aircraft
fire, dropped a bomb which missed, and crashed close aboard. Expert ship handling by Aulick’s
CO, Cmdr. J. D. Andrew, helped his ship escape a strike. He ordered that the ship’s engines
be backed full, which probably threw off the pilot’s timing and caused him to overshoot. A
second came in from aft the ship and was taken under fire by 20mm, 40mm, and 5" guns. It
was hit numerous times probably killing the pilot. Its wing clipped the starboard side of the
bridge and it spiraled down to explode on the foredeck. The force of the explosion sent shrap-
nel flying throughout the area, killing thirty-two men and wounding another sixty-four.
Aulick’s No. 2 gun was put out of commission. With the immediate threat gone, she was able
to come to the aid of Saufley, whose condition was still being evaluated.36
 8. The December Kamikazes, 1944

Although the initial assaults on the eastern side of Leyte had been completed by early
December, the assault on the opposite of the island was just underway. Beginning on 7 Decem-
ber, additional American army units would land in Ormoc Bay. The vast number of ships
transiting from Leyte Gulf to Ormoc Bay would prove to be irresistible targets for the Japanese
air forces and their kamikaze units.
The liberty ship Marcus Daly was heading for Leyte as part of a convoy of forty-one ships
that had steamed from Hollandia, New Guinea escorted by five navy ships. Off Mindanao the
ships came under air attack on 5 December. One Japanese plane dove on Marcus Daly at 1500
and was hit repeatedly by her fire. It is not clear if the plane was on a kamikaze run as it was
strafing the ship, however, the plane was damaged severely. In all likelihood the pilot recog-
nized that he would crash and decided to ram his plane into the ship. It came in from behind
the cargo carrier, its wing clipped part of the foremast and hit the foredeck. Its bomb, estimated
to be a 500 lb. device, exploded along with the airplane. Marcus Daly became a ball of fire
with flames reaching one hundred feet. Her bow area had severe damage and both sides near
the bow were blown out. Firefighting commenced and within a few hours the fires were under
control. In addition to her cargo she carried 1,200 troops, sixty-two of whom were killed in
the crash. Three others died and forty-nine more were wounded.1 Although damaged, she
made it to Tarragona Gulf at Leyte under her own power.
At 1515, John Evans came under attack when a Zeke made a run on her. Reports indicate
that the plane was hit a number of times. The pilot was believed to be dead when his plane
crashed into Evans atop her deck house, between the main mast and her stack, and went into
the water off her starboard side. The explosion from its bomb caused minimal damage but
four men were wounded.2
On 5 December 1944, as the third anniversary of Pearl Harbor approached, ships off
Leyte had little time for remembrance. Lamson DD 367, Flusser DD 368, Shaw DD 373, and
Drayton DD 366 were operating as part of Task Group 78.3 engaged in landing the Seventy-
Seventh Division in Ormoc Bay. The troops were carried on LSTs. Included in the group were
twelve destroyers, nine high speed transports, four LSTs, thirty-one LCIs, twelve LSMs, nine
fleet minesweepers, two sub-chasers and one rescue tug. It would prove to be a successful day
for the Japanese aviators. Elements of three Special Attack Units had recently arrived in the
Philippines. Active in the kamikaze effort this day was the army’s Fugaku Special Attack Unit,
which would see action for the first time.3
Enemy aircraft had been in the area the previous evening, but weather conditions pre-

138
 8. The December Kamikazes, 1944 139

This map shows the supply route from the Leyte area to the Mindoro attack area, 13 –17 December
1944. Ships plying this route were under constant threat of kamikaze attacks. Commander Task Unit
77.12.7 (Commander Carrier Division 24) Serial 00130. Action Report Covering Operations in Con-
nection with Occupation of Mindoro Central, Philippine Islands, 13 December 1944 to 17 December
1944, Inclusive. 25 December 1944, p. 14.

vented them from attacking. At 0105 on 5 December the ships came under attack as an enemy
plane bombed the area but missed their targets. This continued to be the pattern for the next
few hours. At 0450 an enemy plane tried to bomb Drayton, but it was a close miss. The explo-
sion killed two men and wounded seven more. It was a precursor of things to come. At 0900
a Dinah conducted a reconnaissance of the ships but was shot down by fire from Lamson.
Drayton’s action report details the events of the day:
By 1100 the Task Unit had arrived and was proceeding northbound through Suragao Strait to the
westward of Dinagat Island. Cloud cover was nearly 9 ⁄10, about 6500 feet. SC radar range was
restricted to about five miles because of land interference. DRAYTON was in condition I-Easy.
Four P-38s were overhead as CAP, controlled by the LAMSON. At about 1103 two groups of
bogies were reported over the inter-fighter director circuit. These plotted nearly overhead.
Almost simultaneously a suicide plane was observed to crash near the SHAW. DRAYTON
opened fire on a diving plane on the port quarter and shot it down in flames. Several other
planes were fired upon with unobserved results. A Val with fixed landing gear approached in a
dive from the starboard quarter. All batteries took this plane under fire. Left full rudder was
applied (speed 25 knots) and the plane passed down the starboard side with the wing tip just
missing the bridge. His speed was in excess of 350 knots. When it appeared the plane would
miss completely it stood up on its left wing and struck in the vicinity of gun No. 1. Most of the
wreckage of the plane passed clear of the ship but part of the wing and landing gear caused dam-
age to the ship. A serious fire was started from burning gasoline and the powder and projectile
ready service boxes were broken open and powder and projectiles strewn around the deck
within the flames. In spite of the intense heat none of the projectiles exploded. Some of the pow-
140 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

der went off but with a burning rather than explosive force. All powder and projectiles were jet-
tisoned immediately and the fire extinguished using water and CO 2.4

Drayton suffered minor damage in the attack, but had six killed and twelve wounded. As her
crew fought the fire other planes attacked her and were disposed of handily. She shot down
at least one and damaged three others. As the attack on Drayton was taking place, an Oscar
crashed into LSM 20, killing eight of her men and wounding nine. It was a fatal blow and the
landing ship was sunk by the attack. Within minutes a Val made a run on LSM 34 and missed,
but a second Val targeted LSM 23. The ship’s CO, Lt. K. K. Hickman, ordered flank speed and
right full rudder in order to avoid the attack. The Val bounced off the water fifty feet from
the starboard beam and crashed into the superstructure at deck level. Its 551 lb. bomb pene-
trated the LSM’s hull about a foot above the water line. Fortune shone upon the landing ship
as the bomb was a dud. However, the impact of the plane turned the chart house and radio
room into a raging inferno, but the fires were brought under control in fifteen minutes. She
had eight dead and another seven wounded.5 The P-38s of the 9th Fighter Squadron, who
were flying CAP, took their toll on the enemy aircraft by shooting down three Vals and three
Oscars. Estimates of twelve to fifteen enemy planes in the area had made their numbers inad-
equate for the task. The surviving ships began the trip back to their base.
Conducting anti-submarine and radar picket patrol between Amagusen Point on Leyte
and the mid-channel in south Surigao Strait on 5 December was Mugford DD 389. She
observed the attacks on the LSMs and Drayton and, along with LaVallette DD 448, sped to
the aid of the stricken ships. Drayton and Shaw escorted the undamaged LSMs back to Leyte.
LaValette headed for Surigao Strait to patrol there and Mugford joined Flusser to screen for
the remaining ships. In short order another air attack developed. At 1710 a Val attempted to
bomb Mugford, but missed by two hundred yards. It flew off but returned a few minutes later
and made a run on the destroyer. Mugford’s gunners were on target, but they failed to bring
it down. The Val crashed into the port side of Mugford at 1716. A couple of minutes later
another Val approached the ship but was shot down by two P-38s. Mugford temporarily lost
power and was taken in tow by LSM 34. Within the hour her fires were under control and
she was once again to able to proceed under her own power. She had eight dead and sixteen
wounded.
On 7 December Mahan DD 364 was patrolling off Ormoc Bay between Ponson Island
and the western tip of Leyte Island on anti-submarine and picket duty for the group. She was
equipped with a fighter director team and had seven army P-38 Lightnings overhead on
combat air patrol. At 0943 enemy aircraft were reported in the area, and within five minutes
they made their appearance near the ships. Mahan went to flank speed and prepared to engage
them. The attacking planes consisted of nine twin-engine bombers, accompanied by four
fighters which approached from eighty degrees on Mahan’s port bow. She took them under
fire but ceased when three P-38s engaged the Japanese aircraft. One fighter was quickly shot
down by a P-38 and a second Lightning got two more. The third P-38 shot up two of the
bombers, one of which banked right and made a dive on Mahan, followed by several other
bombers. Mahan’s action report reveals:
The first plane to attack leveled off about fifty feet above the water, broad on the starboard
beam, at a horizontal range of about 2000 yards, and headed for the bridge structure. Others fol-
lowed the first plane at intervals of about 1,500 yards. The first plane to come in burst into
flames and blew up about fifty yards from the ship, abreast 5" gun No. 3, about 30 feet above the
water, as a result of the ship’s 20 MM and 40 MM fire, the concussion knocking four men over-
board off Gun 3 but otherwise doing no damage. The second bomber to come in apparently
misjudged his altitude or was momentarily blinded by the explosion of the first plane. In any
event, he passed overhead, just above the stacks, went out about 2000 yards on the port beam,
low over the water, and came back in, hitting the ship abreast 5" Gun No. 2, between the water-
 8. The December Kamikazes, 1944 141

line and the forecastle deck level. A P-38 came in, trying to shoot him down before he reached
the ship but was unable to do so. In the meantime, the third bomber to start in was shot down
by the ship’s 5" gun fire about 2500 yards on the starboard beam, the fourth bomber was shot
down by 20mm and 40mm fire about 200 yards off the starboard side, abreast the after deck
house, the fifth bomber hit the ship just abaft the bridge, starboard side, at the forecastle deck
level, knocking down the forward stack and foremast, and the sixth bomber to come in hit on
the starboard side, abreast 5" gun No. 2, about at the waterline. About the same time, the second
bomber, that had passed overhead, hit on the port side as previously explained. The seventh
bomber to come in either lost his nerve or decided that the ship had already been sufficiently
damaged as he did not attempt to crash the ship. Instead, he came in strafing the after part of
the ship from starboard, passed astern, and came back strafing the bridge and forward part of
the ship from port.6

Three other bombers made strafing runs on the ship. Two of them crashed in the water after
being hit by the ship’s fire and fire from P-38s and another was driven off. Army P-40s of the
110th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron joined the fray and a sizeable dogfight ensued.
Mahan, separated from the other ships by the action, bent on thirty-four knots to rejoin
them. Recognizing that the high speed was fanning the flames, the CO, Cmdr. E. G. Campbell,
took into account the fact that the fires below were out of control and that the forward mag-
azine could not be flooded due to a break in the fire main. At 1001 he gave the order to get all
wounded and unnecessary personnel off the ship. Depth charges were put on safe and torpe-
does were jettisoned in preparation for the worst. At 1020 the forward magazine blew and the
ship had to be abandoned. Walke DD 723 and Lamson arrived on the scene and began rescuing
survivors. RAdm. A. D. Struble, Commander of the Ormoc Attack Group, recognized that

P-38 Lightnings of the 36th Fighter Squadron, 8th Fighter Group at the airfield at San Jose, Mindoro
Island, 20 December 1944. NARA 111-SC-A30104.
142 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

the situation for Mahan was hopeless. Rather than leave her burning hulk as a hazard to nav-
igation, he ordered Walke to sink her. Gunfire and torpedoes did the job and, at 1150, Mahan
slipped beneath the waves. She suffered six dead and thirty-one wounded.
Ward APD 16, had landed four officers and 104 enlisted men of the 77th Division. She
recovered her boats and took station near Mahan, Scout AM 296, and Saunter AM 295, assisting
them as they conducted anti-submarine patrols. The nine bombers that attacked Mahan passed
over her and she took them under fire but no hits were scored. Shortly thereafter, she noticed
that they were attacking Mahan. A few of the bombers survived the encounter with Mahan
and the P-38s and made a run on Ward.
The leading plane appeared to have been hit as it was trailing smoke. The WARD commenced
firing at these planes with both 3" 50 cal. and 20MM batteries. The 20MM appeared to be hit-
ting but the leading plane continued to close the ship leveling off somewhat just before striking
the portside of the WARD in the vicinity of the troopspace and the boiler room. Serious fires
immediately broke out in the WARD fuel tanks under the troopspace having been ruptured and
ignited. When it became evident that the fires could not be controlled with the available equip-
ment aboard, orders were given to abandon ship because of the danger from unflooded maga-
zines.7

For the second time in the space of an hour, RAdm. Struble gave the order to sink one of his
ships. O’Brien DD 725 opened fire on the transport and sank it. As a result of the attack,
several men were badly burned but none died.

Ward APD 16 burns in Ormoc Bay on 7 December 1944 after being hit by a kamikaze. Ward was so
badly damaged that she was abandoned. O’Brien DD 725 sank her with gunfire shortly after. NARA
80G 270774.
 8. The December Kamikazes, 1944 143

As news of Mahan’s plight reached the group, Lamson was ordered to replace her on
picket duty. As she approached the area she saw the aerial battle over the ships and was soon
sending fighters to intercept enemy aircraft. Between 1045 and 1145, she vectored her aircraft
to intercept five bogeys. By 1130 the landing ships had finished disembarking troops and pre-
pared to leave the area. Fortunately, Lamson experienced a lull in the aerial attacks until
around 1400. About that time, a Dinah made a run on the ship and dropped a bomb which
missed. Sharp-eyed gunners on Lamson hit the plane with a number of shells and it crashed
into the water after passing over the ship. At that point Lamson had twelve P-38s under her
control, but the Dinah had evaded them. Lamson’s action report states:
Following this attack there was a lull of about one minute and we came to the ready. Then three
planes made a low fast torpedo approach on the U.S.S. EDWARDS coming in over HIMUQUI-
TAN ISLAND. Two of three planes were seen to be shot down and the third went over her mast,
possibly hitting it and disappeared. At the same time a Tony came around from behind
HIMUQUITAN ISLAND and made a low fast approach on our starboard quarter. Control man-
aged to get on the plane at about a range of 1,000 yards, but guns one and two were in the blind.
The plane came in weaving and strafing. Its approach was on our starboard quarter thirty feet
off the water but it crossed slightly to amidships as we went hard left. It hit number two stack
with its right wing and spun around crashing into the after port corner of the transmitter room
and drove on in until the propeller was impeded in the portside of the after Combat bulkhead.8

Lamson’s midship area was engulfed in flame and survivors of the crash were driven to the
extreme ends of the ship to escape the fires. To the men on either end it seemed as if the entire
ship beyond their view was engulfed in flames. As the rescue tug ATR 31 came alongside to
assist with the firefighting, the ship’s First Lieutenant, Lt. Edgar H. Woods, organized fire-
fighting parties and began the task of saving the ship. Hampered by shrapnel wounds in both
legs, he managed to start the work that would eventually prove essential to the ship’s continued
existence. The firefighting teams could do little since the ship’s water pressure was too low
to be effective and the handy billys were not adequate enough to do the job. Lamson’s fires
were soon deemed to be out of control and Capt. W. M. Cole, CO of DesRon 5, determined
that she should be sunk. After her crew had been taken off, ATR 31 continued to fight the
fires and eventually succeeded. The decision to sink the destroyer was reversed and ATR 31
took her under tow. The ships began to make their way back to safety accompanied by Flusser
DD 36. However, another air attack soon began and Flusser had to maneuver to protect herself.
In the melee that followed, the destroyer was narrowly missed by four bombs but managed
to shoot down a Dinah. After dark the attacks subsided and the CO of Lamson, Lt. Cmdr. J.
V. Noel, Jr., along with two officers and four crewmen, went back on board Lamson to assist
in her tow back to San Pedro. The remainder of her trip was uneventful, but the attacks had
killed four men and wounded seventeen.
Noel reported that the kamikazes apparently had devised new tactics:
During the first part of December it was noted that the Japanese were using a new method of
approach from their suicide attacks. In November these planes would come in high and dive in a
manner very similar to dive bombers. However, starting about the first of December their
approach was low, fast, and weaving, similar to that of a torpedo plane, but from the quarter or
stern. This new approach has four very definite advantages:
(1) Evades early radar and visual detection.
(2) Makes director tracking difficult due to blind.
(3) Forward guns unable to bear.
(4) Results in greater percentage of hits.9

The Japanese were refining their special attack methods. Ships covering the withdrawal
of the transports from the beach were also under attack. Destroyers Smith DD 378, Hughes
DD 410, and the destroyer transport Cofer APD 62 all dodged kamikazes, but Liddle APD 60
144 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

was not so lucky. She shot down one Zeke only thirty feet off her port side but shortly there-
after, at 1120, a Zeke crashed her flying bridge. The CO of Liddle, Lt. Cmdr. L.C. Brogger,
was killed immediately in the blast. Between the strafing attack of the first Zeke and the crash
of the second, thirty-six men were killed and twenty-two wounded. After tending to the dam-
age, the ship got underway and headed back to the convoy.
It seems strange that kamikazes would select a minor combatant as a target, but several
did so in the early afternoon of 10 December when they went after four PTs on patrol at Leyte.
PT 323 was crashed amidships, nearly cutting the small boat in half. Her CO, Lt. (jg) Herbert
Stadler, was killed in the impact, along with the second officer, Ens. William Adelman. Eleven
more were wounded. Being small and fast, the PTs were a hard target but another plane
attempted to crash PT 532. The PT went to flank speed and made a hard turn, leaving the
kamikaze to splash in its wake.10
LST 737 had landed troops of the 718th and 536th Amphibian Tractor Battalions at
Ormoc beginning at 0740 on 7 December. She had avoided any direct attacks during her
unloading of the troops and their equipment, but the day was not over. From 1434, as she
maneuvered to keep station in her convoy, the ships were under continual threat from Japanese
aircraft. At 1619 a Zeke approached her from astern. She fired on it and set it ablaze. When
the plane was only 500 yards away it dropped its bomb, which fell short and exploded in the
water one hundred yards aft of the ship. Although damaged, the Zeke continued on course
and crashed into her on the starboard side. Two men were killed and four wounded, but the
crash did not seriously damage the LST and it maintained course. At 1626 another enemy
plane attacked the LST and her gunners demolished it off the starboard bow. 11
LSM 318 had successfully discharged her cargo when she came under attack as she
attempted to retract from the beach. Three Betty bombers and four Oscar fighters overflew
the area and dropped some bombs, but they missed the ships. LSMs 18 and 19, along with an
LCI, were similar sitting ducks, but they all escaped damage. Once the ships had retracted
from the beach they maneuvered to join their convoy. Army P-38s kept the enemy planes at
bay until around 1525 when four Oscars went after the ships. As one Oscar attacked the LSM
18, two made a run on LSM 318 and were taken under fire. LSM 318’s gunners were on target
and shot down one of the Oscars bound for her and also the one that was going after LSM
18. According to LSM 318’s action report: “the third OSCAR passed overhead (it appeared that
he overestimated the height of the target and overshot). He continued out over the water,
flying low on a course that took him out on our Starboard beam for a distance of about 8000
yards (estimated). He then went into a climbing turn to Port, apparently to gain altitude for
his next attack.”12 As he turned a P-38 tried to shoot him down but missed. The Oscar came
in low on the water, followed by the P-38. Gunners on the 318 tried in vain to shoot the plane
down, but it crashed into the starboard side of the ship at the waterline. Its bomb penetrated
the ship’s side and exploded in the engine room. LSM 318’s steering was disabled, along with
her port engine and both generators. With her rudder jammed to full right, the LSM circled
and attempted to put out her fires. As frequently happened with ships attacked in this manner,
her fire-fighting equipment, lines, pumps and other apparatus were damaged, making effective
fire-fighting problematic. Other ships attempted to assist in fighting her fires, but persistent
enemy air attacks prevented their success. The order had to be given to abandon ship and, in
the early hours of 8 December, she sank.
William S. Ladd was part of the same convoy of forty ships that included Marcus Daly.
They had left Hollandia on 29 October and headed for Leyte. Ladd was anchored south of
Dulag on 10 December when she came under attack at 0858. Her cargo was particularly haz-
ardous, consisting of 600 tons of gas and explosives. As Marcus Daly was under attack, another
Val from the group of four made a run on Ladd, crashing into her. Its fuselage and bomb went
 8. The December Kamikazes, 1944 145

down into the No. 4 hold, causing an explosion. Two and one half hours of firefighting com-
menced, but it was a losing battle. Drums of gasoline began to explode one after another, and
the ship began to take on water. As flames approached the ammunition stores, her Master,
Nels F. Anderson, gave the order to abandon ship at about 1000. Her hulk continued to burn
until it settled by the stern. By 2100 she was still burning with her stern resting on the bottom
in about ten fathoms of water. She was later sunk. Miraculously only sixteen aboard had been
injured.13
Marcus Daly, which had been severely damaged on her way to Leyte on 5 December, was
hit again at 1700 on 10 December as she was in the process of offloading supplies in Tarragona
Gulf, Leyte. Four enemy aircraft, described as either Zekes or Tojos, approached the ships in
the area and two were shot down. One plane crashed her port side and parts of it hit LCT
1075 which was alongside receiving cargo. Fires were quickly extinguished and overall damage
was not heavy, but Marcus Daly had another eight men wounded.14 On board LCT 1075, one
man died instantly and ten were wounded, one of whom later died. The 119" LCT was a mass
of flames and beyond saving. Its burning hulk was towed to the beach after the fires were
extinguished.
Hughes DD 410 was crashed by a Betty on 10 December off the southern tip of Leyte. The
plane demolished her engine room and caused severe damage to the ship. She was towed back
to San Pedro Bay where she underwent temporary repairs. Her dead and wounded numbered
twenty-three.
Reid DD 369 was part of Task Unit 78.3.8 charged with escorting ten LSMs and three
LCI(L)s to Ormoc Bay to resupply American forces there. Other destroyers in the task unit
were Caldwell DD 605, Coghlan DD 606, Edwards DD 619, Smith DD 378, and Conyngham
DD 371. Flying overhead was a CAP of four Corsairs. At 1500, snoopers began to appear on
the radar screens, but turned away out of gun range. Around 1700, twelve bogeys approached
the convoy from dead ahead. They were tentatively identified as Jills and the ships went on
alert. The Corsairs swung into action and went after them. As Reid was in the leading edge
of the convoy, she took the Japanese planes under fire at 10,000 yards and turned to starboard
to bring her guns to bear. Two of the Corsairs got behind the Jills and began to attack them
as the ships fired on the enemy planes. Reid shot down three enemy aircraft before one hooked
its wing in the starboard whaleboat, pivoted over, and crashed into her waterline. Its bomb
exploded, opening her seams. A fifth plane strafed her and crashed close aboard her port bow.
Another plane strafed her, passed over her superstructure and crashed close aboard the star-
board bow. The plane that delivered the coup de grace came in from astern, crashed the No.
3 gun and slid forward to the port side 40mm gun tub where it came to rest in a flaming ball
of fire. Its bomb penetrated the hull and blew up in the after magazine room, effectively
ripping apart the entire stern section. In the space of about fifteen seconds, Reid had suffered
two hits and five close crashes. Her action report revealed:
The ship began lurching to starboard, it was much faster than a roll. The first indication of
instability was a violent lurch to about sixty degrees, the ship whipped back to about thirty then
to seventy back to fifty and then to 89° still making twenty knots. The firerooms had cut their
fires and had opened the safety valves. In the engine room both ahead and astern throttles were
jammed. The word to abandon ship was passed by the commanding officer locally but could not
be given over any telephones or P.A. system. The commanding officer [Cmdr. Samuel A.
McCornock] was the last person as far as is known to leave the ship. He stood on the port side of
the director trunk and carefully looked over the ship which at that time was lying on the star-
board side down by the stern with the entire ship under water up to No. 1 stack down which
water was pouring, the ship still had a slight headway. The survivors were strung out astern a
distance of about three hundred yards. The ship sank about fifteen seconds later in 600 fathoms
of water.... A member of the gun crew of gun No. 1 was knocked down by the upper half of the
Jap pilot’s body whose plane crashed at the waterline at gun No. 2. 15
146 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Her depth charges went off, injuring and killing some of the men in the water. Others fell
victim to Japanese planes which strafed them until they were driven off by Corsairs. Reid lost
about 150 men in the attack.

The End of December

On 13 December, the kamikazes did not sink any ships, but took a heavy toll of dead
and wounded in their attacks on Nashville CL 43, Caldwell DD 605, and Haraden DD 585.
With the landings at Ormoc completed, the American forces turned their attention to Min-
doro. RAdm. A. D. Strubble, Commander Task Group 78.3, was escorting a group of ships
for an assault on Mindoro. Nashville CL 43 with the RAdm. Struble and various navy and
army officers on board led the attack force which consisted of Nashville, twelve destroyers,
nine destroyer transports, thirty LSTs, twelve LSMs, thirty-one LCI(L)s, sixteen minesweepers,
and additional supporting craft. Accompanying them was a Close Covering Group led by
RAdm. Russell S. Berkey. This consisted of three cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-three
PTs. In order to deceive the Japanese, the two groups split apart and made a feint toward
Palawan. Once darkness fell, the two resumed their original course at flank speed and made
for the beaches at Mindoro. There they would establish an airfield that would prove useful in
the remainder of the campaign for the Philippines. To support the landing further, a Heavy
Covering and Carrier Group under RAdm. L. Theodore D. Ruddock, Jr., joined them. It
included six escort carriers, three vintage battleships, three light cruisers and eighteen destroy-
ers. Air cover was provided by a CAP of Lightnings and Corsairs. 16
Although they had made an attempt to deceive the Japanese, a grouping of that many
ships was hard to conceal. Japanese reconnaissance planes and subs had spotted the force as
it moved toward Mindoro. At 1415, as the ships passed the southern tip of Negros, a Japanese
fighter with two 110 lb. bombs slipped in over Siguijori Island and crashed Nashville in the
port main deck waist. Both bombs went off on deck and gasoline fires engulfed the area near
the crash. Ammo in the 5" service boxes cooked off, along with 40 mm and 20 mm ammo
from nearby gun mounts.17 Although damage to the ship was not severe, Nashville had to head
back to Leyte with Stanly DD 478 as an escort. Strubble transferred his flag to Dashiell DD
659 and the group continued on its way to Mindoro. One hundred thirty-five men had died
and another 190 were killed. Wounded in the attack was the head of the army forces, BGen.
William C. Dunckel. His Chief of Staff, Col. Bruce C. Hill, died, along with Strubble’s Chief
of Staff, Capt. Everett W. Abdill, and several other senior officers.18 Although only a single
plane had slipped through, the toll was deadly.
Haraden DD 585 was also headed for Mindoro as part of Ruddock’s Heavy Covering and
Carrier Group. At 1715, as the destroyer was making twenty-five knots, she encountered four
aircraft coming at her on her starboard beam. One was identified as an American navy Wildcat
which was in pursuit of a Val and two Oscars. Haraden took them under fire but scored no
hits; the Wildcat did. It shot down the Val and then one of the Oscars. According to the ship’s
action report:
The remaining Oscar banked sharply to his left, gained a little altitude and then headed directly
toward this ship, bearing about 060 relative. He was smoking, and receiving 20mm and 40mm
hits. The approach was very shallow glide — almost at constant altitude. Just before the plane
crashed, it banked to the left, the right wing striking the pilot house and torpedo director — the
fuselage crashing into the forward stack where it exploded. 19
Her topsides were severely damaged as was her forward engine room. Twiggs DD 591 came
alongside to assist in firefighting on Haraden which was dead in the water. Within a couple
of hours Haraden’s condition was stable and she headed back to San Pedro for preliminary
 8. The December Kamikazes, 1944 147

repairs. Fourteen of her men had been killed and another twenty-four wounded. From San
Pedro she headed back to Hawaii and then to Puget Sound for further repairs.
Caldwell DD 605 had a close call on 11 December when she shot down a suicide Zeke
only twenty feet off her starboard beam. The ship was covered with water and gas, but had
no damage or casualties. At 0805 on 12 December she was escorting landing craft at Ormoc
when she was jumped by several enemy planes. She fired on several Dinahs and drove them
off. The destroyer then caught the attention of three Zekes which were escorting the Dinahs
and they made a run on her. Her action report details the attack:
Two Zekes peeled off for dive-bombing and were kept under fire by the main battery. The third
Zeke came down the port side, under continual machine gun fire, crossed the stern in a steep
bank. One landing gear was flopping out. He went into a vertical bank and at 0807 hit the ship
just as he was turning over on his back. One wing hit the bridge, one the break of the forecastle,
and the fuselage in Main Radio. Simultaneously, the ship was straddled with several bombs
(according to observers on the other ships), one striking and exploding No. 2 Handling Room. A
bomb from the suicide plane glanced off No. 2 Gun and exploded just to the starboard of No. 1
Gun. This was a perfectly planned and excellently coordinated attack. 20

Fires broke out but were soon extinguished by her damage control parties, however, the dam-
age was extensive. Thirty-three of her crew were killed and another forty wounded. With her
temporary repairs completed, she headed for San Francisco and an overhaul.
Further attacks continued from 15 through 28 December 1944. The kamikazes damaged
the destroyers Ralph Talbot DD 390, Foote DD 511, Bryant DD 665, the escort carrier Marcus
Island CVE 77, PT 84, and Southard DMS 10 and the merchant ships Juan De Fuca and William
Sharon. Sunk were LSTs 460, 472, 479, and 738 along with PT 300. Typical of the experiences
of the landing ships were those of the LSTs 738 and 472 on 15 December.
LST 738 was operating as part of a group of thirty LSTs in Task Unit 78.34 under Capt.
Richard Webb during the landings at Mindoro on 15 December 1944. As the LSTs in the unit
jockeyed for position to make their landings, they came under attack by a group of approx-
imately ten Zekes, Kates, Tojos, and Oscars. At 0850, LST 605 had a close call as she shot
down a Zeke which subsequently crashed into the water twenty feet off her port quarter after
missing the ship by only five feet. As it exploded in the water, the force of the blast slightly
injured men on the fantail. Shortly after 0900 the ships opened fire on the planes and shot
several down with their combined fire. In the midst of the air attack, two Kates were seen
making a run on LST 738 from a low altitude. Fire from the 738 and nearby Moale DD 693
hit the planes but did not shoot them down. The first crashed the LST hitting it “amidships
just above the waterline. Explosion and fire resulted ... the plane was carrying bombs at the
time. The second plane which dove for LST 738’s bridge and Conn missed and was shot down
by DD693 to the port of LST 738.”21 Repair parties went to work fighting fires but were ham-
pered by the damaged fire mains caused by the crash. Confusion reigned among the army
troops and they were ordered by the commanding officer to abandon the ship. To prevent
explosions the LST’s crew flooded her magazines, making firefighting even more difficult.
Added to this was the problem of her cargo. Nestled in her hold were drums of aviation gas
and a load of oxygen bottles, the perfect combination for massive explosions. In due course
a second explosion ripped through the ship and most of the crew abandoned it.
At this time the Captain [Lt. J. T. Barnett], the Pharmacist Mate, first class; and one radioman
were all that could be observed aboard. The Captain personally destroyed the IFF radar and the
SOS radar. The radioman was then ordered to stern and he went over the side. Another heavy
explosion shook the ship throwing the Captain and Pharmacist Mate to the bridge deck. Deci-
sion was then made that all hope was gone and that even efforts of DD693 to come alongside
would be useless. The Captain then went to the main deck and waited to see if the DD693
wished to come alongside but a final blast again threw him to the deck and caused the DD693 to
148 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

back off rapidly. Oil on the water about LST 738 was burning by this time and a few personnel
were observed working hard to get away. After ordering the Pharmacist Mate, first class, over the
side, both sides of the ship at water line were checked for personnel on lines. Several were
observed and were ordered away. When they were away from the ship, the Captain then went
over the side.22

The final blast was severe enough to put a hole in Moale’s bow. One of her men was killed
and ten wounded. On board LST 738 no one had died, but several men were injured. The
landing ship was a burning hulk; the next morning she was sunk by gunfire.
LST 472 underwent a similar experience as she stood by in preparation for landing her
troops and supplies. The same attack that saw the demise of LST 738 finished her also. Her
action report noted:
The formation [of Japanese planes] appeared to be heading towards the beach where the other
landing craft were unloading but made a sharp bank and headed towards the ships standing by
in the waiting area. One plane headed for the subject ship’s bow, coming in on the starboard
side, was fired upon by her guns and splashed in the water on the port side of the ship. At the
same time two more planes were coming in on the starboard beam, the foremost heading for the
stern, was fired upon and splashed on the port quarter hitting the after gun tubs and leaving
part of her wing in the tub as the plane went over. Following this plane, and lower over the
water, was a third plane which was headed directly for the starboard side. This plane appeared to
commence the long low dive at approximately 3500 yards and was taken under fire by the ship’s
guns at that time. All guns that could bear on her were firing up until the time the plane crashed

Moale DD 693 stands by LST 738 after she was hit by a kamikaze on 15 December 1944. A number
of men may be seen in the water between the ships. NARA 80G 294593.
 8. The December Kamikazes, 1944 149

into the side of the ship at deck level just forward of the main deck superstructure. The plane’s
engine and parts of the burning ship were scattered from starboard to port across the main deck,
while the bomb apparently landed in the tank deck and exploded there. The plane appeared to be
badly shot up as it approached the ship with parts of its wings and tail dropping off while still in
flight.23

Several other planes strafed the ship and then tried to crash her. Under fire from the LST’s
guns, they were damaged and crashed close aboard. Meanwhile, fires from the crash and the
subsequent explosion of the bomb reached her hold where she was carrying a supply of gaso-
line. The explosion and another that soon followed spelled the death knell for the ship. At
1100, her wounded skipper, Lt. John L. Blakley, was able to give the order to abandon ship.
Her condition was hopeless and she was sunk by gunfire around midnight.
Howorth DD 592 was in Magarin Bay, Southwest Mindoro Island on 15 December. She
had been assigned to bombard the shore in preparation for upcoming amphibious landings.
At 0850 her lookouts spotted a Paul II in the area and the ship headed for deeper water in
order to be able to maneuver in case of an air attack. At 0855 seven Zekes made their appear-
ance and the ship opened fire a minute later. Three more Zekes approached the ship from
another direction and Howorth’s gunners turned one away on fire with the likelihood that it
crashed. The two remaining Zekes made a suicide run on the ship which went to twenty knots
and made a hard left turn in order to bring its guns to bear. One Zeke was hit at a range of

Fires blaze on LST 472 at Mindoro after she was hit by a kamikaze on 15 December 1944. NARA 80G
294601.
150 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

PT 297 picks up survivors from LST 472 after the kamikaze attack of 15 December 1944. NARA 80G
294583.

500 yards, and the pilot lost control. His plane passed closely over the ship and crashed twenty
feet off the starboard side. Its bomb went off underwater but caused no damage to the ship.
Parts of the plane and its pilot were later found on the ship. Howorth’s action report detailed
the next attack:
The Commanding Officer [Lt. Cmdr. E. S. Burns], upon seeing that the first plane had missed,
reversed the rudder (giving full right rudder). About 20 seconds to 30 seconds later, the second
plane crashed into the air search radar antenna with his undercarriage, opening his gasoline
tanks and spraying the ship with gasoline. The plane continued its dive with the right wing
glancing off the port bow carrying away the life lines on the port side from frame 8 to 33 and
putting a slight dent in the forecastle deck at frame 14 about three feet from the ship’s side; luck-
ily no fire resulted. He crashed into the water just off the port bow sending up a column of
water which covered the ship including the director. The ship continued in its right turn and
proceeded to a northerly heading then turning left, standing about a mile west into an area with
more sea room and covering AMs in area. At 0900 two LSTs No. 738 and No. 472 were observed
burning in the transport area about three miles northwest from the ship’s position at this time.
Three destroyers were attempting to assist them in putting out the fires and rescuing survivors. 24

Ralph Talbot DD 390 was screening in the Sulu Sea for Task Group 77.12 between 13 and
16 December. They were providing air cover for Task Group 78.3 during the landings on Min-
doro. Haraden was part of this group and had been crashed by a kamikaze on 13 December.
On 15 December the task group again came under attack by a total of at least fifteen planes,
nine of which were shot down by the ships and their CAP. The attacks began at 0400 and con-
tinued on into the morning hours. At 0813 observers on Ralph Talbot DD 390 picked up an
 8. The December Kamikazes, 1944 151

incoming Oscar at 1,100 yards and took it under fire. It exploded 300 yards from the ship, its
debris striking the starboard side and main deck of the destroyer. Damage to the destroyer
was minimal and only one man was injured.25
A number of PT boats were operating in Mangarin Bay by this time. On 15 December
some of them dodged kamikazes. Last minute maneuvers and sharp boat handling by their
skippers saved PTs 77, 223, 230, and 298. A couple of days later, on 17 December, PTs 75, 84,
and 224 came under attack by three planes. Two missed their targets and crashed into the sea
and the other was shot down. PT 75 had the closest call when one of the planes missed her
by only fifteen feet. The explosion blew five men overboard, four of whom suffered shrapnel
wounds.26 On 18 December the PTs luck ran out. According to PT 300’s action report:
At approximately 1600 on 18 December 1944 PT boats of TASK GROUP 70.1.4WERE
ATTACKED BY THREE (3) ENEMY AIRCRAFT, TYPE Val, approximately three hundred yards
off shore of Camimanit Point, Mindoro Island, Philippine Islands. While maneuvering to meet
the attack U.S.S. PT 300 was hit by enemy aircraft, which made a suicide dive on the boat, com-
ing in low from the PT’s starboard quarter, hitting the PT amidship of the engine room causing
the boat to break in two. The stern sank immediately but the bow remained afloat for about
eight (8) hours with about two (2) feet of the forepeak showing above water enveloped in flames
from the burning gasoline around it.27

The entire crew, with the exception of three men, were blown over the side by the crash. Eight
men died and seven were wounded, including her skipper, Lt. Cmdr. Almer P. Colvin.
Resupply of the Mindoro invasion force was a top priority. On 19 December a convoy
“consisting of 25 ships, 14 LST and six chartered freighters, escorted by eleven destroyers
departed Leyte Gulf,”28 bound for Mindoro. The convoy came under attack at 1600 on 21
December in the Sulu Sea, west of Panay. At 1705 ten Japanese aircraft were sighted, among
them a number of Betty bombers. Shortly thereafter, a number of single-engine fighters iden-
tified as Oscars and Tojos, made their appearance. Armed Guard gunners on the liberty ship
Juan de Fuca brought down one of the planes and then watched as two Oscars crashed into
LSTs 460 and 479. LST 460 was carrying a large supply of gasoline and ammunition. The
kamikaze’s crash set off fires that were impossible to stop and she had to be abandoned. LST
479 was crashed amidships. The Oscar that hit her carried a pair of bombs that set the aft end
of the ship ablaze and knocked out her steering. In the midst of this, other planes attacked
and disrupted the firefighting efforts. Finally she had to be abandoned. Casualties were high
among the LST’s crews, but an additional 107 of the 774 soldiers on the LSTs were killed also.
Juan De Fuca was crashed next in spite of her anti-aircraft fire. She was crashed by a plane
that hit her No. 2 hatch. Fortunately her cargo was not explosive and the fires were put out
in short order. Her casualties included two dead and seventeen wounded.29 Foote DD 511,
acting as escort for the convoy, was attacked at the same time. She shot down one Tojo and
the second crashed into the water close aboard her port side. At 1738 she shot down a Lily.
Her damage in these attacks was minimal and she had no casualties.
Bryant DD 665 was screening off the southern tip of Mindoro Island with seven other
destroyers of Task Group 78.3.13 on 22 December. At 0945 a lone Zeke came in on her star-
board bow. The ship’s CO, Cmdr. P. L. High, ordered flank speed and left full rudder. The
plane responded by banking right to target the ship’s starboard quarter. Again the CO ordered
right full rudder to keep his guns bearing on the Zeke. Numerous hits from the ship’s 20mm
and 40mm guns threw the plane off course and it disintegrated in an explosion fifty yards off
the port beam. A shower of debris and shrapnel descended upon the deck, wounding one
man. It had been a close call for Bryant but she was unscathed.30
The southwestern part of the nearby island of Mindoro offered an excellent location for
an airfield, particularly since there were already four fields in the area that had fallen into dis-
152 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

use. The American forces did not need to capture the entire island but needed to establish a
perimeter around the town of San Jose for the purpose of ensuring security for the airfield.
On 15 December 1944 BGen. William C. Dunckel watched as his troops made an unopposed
landing on the beaches off San Jose. Included in the landing was the 19th Regimental Combat
Team of the 24th Division and the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team. Although
their landing was unopposed, they would be in need of supplies, which would put navy ships
in peril.
Pringle DD 477 and Gansevoort DD 608 were operating as part of Task Group 78.3.15
which was screening the Mindoro Resupply Unit. This was a group of sixty ships of various
kinds, including LSTs, LCIs, liberty ships, seaplane tenders and about thirty PT boats. Other
destroyers in the screen included Bush DD 529, Stevens DD 47, Philip DD 498, Edwards DD
619, Sterret DD 407, and Wilson DD 408, along with the high speed minesweeper Hamilton
DMS 18.
The Mindoro Supply Unit left the Dulag anchorage in Leyte Gulf, formed up, and headed
for Mindoro through Surigao Strait on 27 December 1944. The following day, at 1020, the
kamikazes made their first attack. The liberty ships John Burke and William Sharon both took
hits. William Sharon was cruising with the convoy when, at 1022, three Vals appeared over
the ships. One dove on William Sharon and strafed her decks. The ship’s Armed Guard
returned fire and set the plane ablaze, but it hit the No. 4 gun tub and bounced into the port
side of the flying bridge. The commanding officer of the ship’s armed guard, Lt. (jg) Gerhardt
E. Ernst, was killed in the action. His decapitated body, minus one arm and one leg, was iden-
tified after the action ended. Raging fires gutted the ship as Wilson came alongside to assist.
After four hours the fires were finally extinguished, but the ship was in no condition to con-
tinue. Survivors were transferred off the ship and she was abandoned. The following day her
dead were removed by Spencer WPG-36 and she was towed back to San Pedro by the tug Grap-
ple ARS-7. Among her crew, eleven men died and eleven were wounded. John Burke, carrying
a full load of ammunition, was not so fortunate. The Val that hit her caused explosions that
disintegrated the ship and killed all sixty-eight men on board. “The debris from this ship
killed and wounded over two dozen men on other ships nearby.”31 Following close behind in
the convoy was an unidentified army Freight and Supply ship. The enormity of the explosion
sank her as well. Rescuers pulled two of her survivors from the water, but one died shortly
thereafter.32 Also damaged in the explosion was LST 750, which had a large number of casu-
alties in addition to some damage to the ship. She dropped back from the convoy and fell
victim to a torpedo from a Betty. Damage to her was so severe that she had to be abandoned.
Her hulk was sunk by Edwards. Francisco Morazan, shielded by nearby ships also suffered
some slight damage and had three men wounded. PT 332 had her seams opened by the blast.
At 1845 four planes attacked the convoy and Pringle shot down a Betty at 1901. On the
29 December the Japanese continued to stalk the convoy. Zekes attacked the ships between
0716 and 0722 before they were driven off. Pringle had a close call at 1703 when a Zeke tried
to crash her, passed between her stacks, and crashed in the water fifty yards to port. A Betty
then tried to torpedo her, but it missed and was shot down.
The fleet made it to Mindoro on 30 December and the ships began unloading their sup-
plies. Enemy aircraft had been in the vicinity since early morning. Gansevoort shot down one
at 0416 and fired on another at 0707. At 0700 the LSTs began to beach themselves in Mangarin
Bay and the destroyers took up screen. By 1530 reports began to come in of approaching
enemy aircraft and the ships readied themselves. Pringle spotted a Val making a suicide run
on her, but her fire was too late and the plane crashed into her No. 5 40mm mount. The fires
were quickly extinguished and the destroyer resumed station. Eleven of her men were killed
and twenty were wounded. At 1548 observers on Gansevoort watched as a Japanese fighter
 8. The December Kamikazes, 1944 153

dropped bombs on Porcupine and then turned toward them. The destroyer went to flank speed
and turned to bear all guns on the incoming kamikaze, but to no avail. It struck the port side
of the ship near the loading machine. Its bomb exploded below decks near boilers 3 and 4
and the plane itself started fires. Within a few minutes the destroyer was listing six degrees
to starboard. Philip and Wilson came alongside to assist with firefighting, and by 1620 the fires
were out. Seventeen men were killed and fifteen wounded. Gansevoort was towed to a nearby
anchorage, but she was not finished.33
Porcupine, carrying a load of aviation gasoline for the forces at Mindoro, had no luck at
all that day, save the bad kind. When the ammo carrier John Burke was hit on 28 December,
she was one of the nearby ships that sustained damage and also had one man killed as the lib-
erty ship blew apart. Concern for her safety led to her movement to a supposedly safer anchor-
age, but it was not to be so. Around 1550 on 30 December, reports came in of twelve enemy
aircraft approaching the ships. According to Porcupine’s action report:
Our P-38 interceptors engaged the enemy planes but four dive bombers broke through. One of
these enemy dive bombers came in low over the water on our port beam and we opened fire
with all of our port guns. The four port 20mm guns were scoring hits on the plane but were
unable to divert it from its course. The plane, identified as a Japanese Val, was strafing as it came
in. At about 1555 the plane’s bomb was dropped on the main deck a few feet aft of the mid-ships
deck house and the plane crashed in after it. The explosion of the bomb and the crash of the
plane caused the number two deep tanks to be ruptured, the generators and switchboards to be
knocked out, and the engine room was flooded with black oil and diesel. The plane tore out the
after bulk heads of the mid-ships house which immediately caught fire and spread rapidly. The
engine of the plane went through the hull of the ship a few feet aft of the engine room on the
starboard side near the water line, tearing a large hole and rupturing number six cargo tank.
Personnel casualties included everyone in sick bay, two men from damage control and one man
who had been hit by strafing and was being treated in sick bay. 34

In short order it was determined that no help was available and that the fires had spread out
of control. The ship was abandoned and the damaged destroyer Gansevoort, which was
anchored nearby, was ordered to torpedo the stern of the ship in order to bring the fires under
control. The shallow water prevented a successful hit and fires spread to the gasoline tanks.
Porcupine was engulfed in flames and burned to the water line, a total loss. Seven of her men
were listed as missing and presumed dead and another eight were wounded. On 1 January
1945, the remaining members of the crew were air-lifted from Mindoro to Leyte. As they flew
over their ship they noted that she was still burning. 35
The thirty PT boats in the convoy were serviced by Orestes AGP 10. Around 1600, as
Pringle, Gansevoort, and Porcupine were under attack, a Val crashed into Orestes’ starboard
side amidships, causing extensive damage and fires. Its bomb exploded inside the ship, causing
heavy casualties. Nearby LCIs helped put them out, but the PT tender was put out of action.
She was beached nearby for repairs and then towed back to Leyte. Temporary repairs allowed
her to depart Leyte on 27 February 1945 and she arrived in San Francisco on 13 May. After
extensive repairs she returned to Samar, but the war had just ended. The kamikaze attack had
effectively terminated her war career. Her heavy casualties included fifty-nine dead and 106
wounded.
 9. Lingayen Gulf

Having established beachheads at Leyte and Mindoro, the American forces next targeted
Lingayen Gulf, in the northwestern part of the island of Luzon. A successful landing there
would give army troops the ability to form up and maneuver as they marched the one hundred
miles south to capture Manilla. Task Force 77, under VAdm T. C. Kincaid, was scheduled to
attack the Lingayen Gulf area. It consisted of 685 ships, not counting minor combatants. The
landing was scheduled for 9 January 1945. Prior to that, Adm. William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet
would unleash their fast carriers for air strikes in the area around Lingayen Gulf on 6 –7 Jan-
uary. Immediately following those strikes would be an attack by Task Group 77.2, the Bom-
bardment and Fire Support Group and also the Lingayen Fire Support Group under VAdm
J. B. Oldendorf. Oldendorf ’s fleet consisted of 164 ships including the battleships California
BB 44 (flag), Colorado BB 45, New Mexico BB 40, Mississippi BB 41, West Virginia BB 48, and
Pennsylvania BB 38. Also a part of the fleet were cruisers, escort carriers, destroyers, and
numerous other ships and smaller craft.
Within the next few days additional ships would be hit and sunk. The various task groups
began departing Leyte for Lingayen Gulf on 2 January, with the slower ships leaving first. The
next day the fleet was spotted by the Japanese who sent a Val crashing into the deck of the
oiler Cowanesque AO 79. She suffered minimal damage, but had two men killed and one
injured. Orca AVP 49 had a kamikaze splash close aboard. The seaplane tender was not dam-
aged but six of her crew were wounded.
The escort carriers put up a sizeable combat air patrol to thwart further attacks. Once
in the Sulu Sea, however, the attacks began in earnest. On 3 January, kamikazes from the field
at Sarangani nearly hit Makin Island CVE 93. Combat air patrol planes accounted for fifteen
to twenty Japanese aircraft during the period from 3 to 5 January. On 4 January, at 1712, a
twin-engine bomber dove successfully on Ommaney Bay CVE 79. Prior to hitting the escort
carrier’s starboard side, the plane released two bombs. One penetrated the flight deck and
exploded on the hangar deck below among fully-gassed aircraft. The second bomb penetrated
through the hangar deck and damaged fire mains, making the fighting of fires impossible.
Fires raged throughout the ship, cooking off ammunition as they approached the torpedo
warhead storage area. With no way to extinguish the flames, the ship had to be abandoned.
Her torpedo warheads finally went off, dooming the ship. She was finished off by a torpedo
from the destroyer Burns DD 588. Ninety-three of her men were killed and sixty-five wounded.
The following day her sister jeep carrier Savo Island CVE 78 had a close call, but the kamikaze
that attempted to crash her struck a glancing blow, causing little damage and no casualties.

154
 9. Lingayen Gulf 155

The capture of the island of Luzon began with the landings at Lingayen Gulf. Once the area had been
captured American army units moved south toward Manila while the American navy moved down
the western coast of the island and closed on Manila Bay from seaward.
156 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Ommaney Bay CVE 79 burns after the kamikaze strike of 4 January 1945. NARA 80G 273153.

Also hit and sunk that day was the liberty ship Lewis L. Dyche. The ship, a part of the
Minesweeping and Hydrographic Group, under Cmdr. Wayne R. Loud, had broken off from
the main group to anchor at Mindoro. At 0820 a Val came in twenty feet off the water and
struck her amidships. The ammo carrier and her men did not stand a chance. The ship evap-
orated in a giant fireball, killing all sixty-nine on board. The blast sent debris flying all over
the harbor, killing or wounding men on nearby ships.
The following day, 5 January, the kamikazes were out in force. Falling victim to them
would be seven more ships, none of which were sunk. Louisville CA 28, serving as flag for the
group, suffered an attack on that day when three kamikazes roared in from the field at Mabal-
acat.
One struck HMAS ARUNTA stationed in the screen just forward of LOUISVILLE’s port beam;
one was shot down close aboard the DD on LOUISVILLE’s port bow; the third came through
the screen and headed straight for LOUISVILLE. It could not be taken under fire by the
LOUISVILLE until after it had passed the DD. At the speed the plane was travelling, very little
time was left to knock it down. All LOUISVILLE guns that could bear were shooting. Plane was
smoking, but kept on coming, headed straight for the foremast structure. By swinging the ship
hard to port, CO diverted the blow from the comparatively fragile and vulnerable foremast
structure to Turret 2 and the pilot house. All guns’ crews continued to shoot until the plane
struck.1
The plane crashed into the starboard side of the ship forward of amidships. Its two bombs
detonated, blowing holes in the deck and damaging the side of the chart house. The cruiser’s
CO, Capt. R. L. Hicks, was burned in the attack and incapacitated. Cmdr. W. P. McCarty, the
 9. Lingayen Gulf 157

ship’s XO, took command. Fifty-eight others were injured. It did not prevent the cruiser from
completing her mission. In his endorsement to the ship’s action report, J. R. Hamly, Chief of
Staff Cruiser Division Four, suggested that the kamikaze attacks were flown by skilled pilots
and represented a serious threat to the ships. He further suggested the development of a new
weapon to combat them. This would be a “super type flame thrower that has a range of 300 –
400 yards which might explode the plane or burn the wing coverage sufficiently to cause the
plane to drop in to the sea before it can strike the ship.”2 Although it sounded interesting,
the weapon was not developed.
The escort carrier Manila Bay CVE 61 was operating as a part of the San Fabian Carrier
Group T.U.77.4.2 under RAdm. F. B. Stump. Late in the afternoon a group of Zekes, estimated
at between six to eight in number, attacked the carriers and their screen.
It is believed that at least one of these was shot down by the screen; one hit the H.M.A.S. AUS-
TRALIA amidships; one clipped the radar antennae of SAVO ISLAND and plunged into the sea
alongside; one was shot down just before reaching NATOMA BAY, crashing alongside that ship;
and two attacked MANILA BAY. The first of these last two scored a direct hit on the flight deck;
the second hit the starboard yardarm and plunged into the sea about thirty feet off the starboard
quarter.3

Both planes were handled by experienced pilots. They weaved in toward the carrier, evading
anti-aircraft fire and strafing the ship on their approach. The first plane hit at the base of the
island structure and its bomb penetrated the deck, exploding in the hangar and the radar

A Japanese kamikaze dives on Natoma Bay CVE 62 on 5 January 1945. The plane missed the carrier.
NARA 80G 273553.
158 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Manila Bay CVE 61 burns after being hit by a kamikaze on 5 January 1945. NARA 80G 337999.

transmitter room. Fires enveloped the area but were quickly extinguished. Within twenty-
four hours the escort carrier was back in action. She lost twenty-two dead and fifty-six
wounded.
The small combatants were not spared either. On the morning of 5 January LCI(G) 70
had been covering the activities of Underwater Demolition Team No. 8 as they attempted to
reconnoiter the beach at Lingayen White Beaches One and Two. That task accomplished, the
gunboat attacked various targets on the beaches. Later in the afternoon, at 1974, a Zeke
approached from the stern, clipped off her mast and antenna and dug into her three inch gun
tub near the forecastle area. The gun was rendered inoperable and her communications were
knocked out. Six of the crew were killed and nine injured.
The tug Apache ATF 67 took a minor hit from a kamikaze but only had three men
wounded. She continued on duty after some minor patch work. The destroyer escort Stafford
DE 411 was screening the escort carrier Tulagi CVE 72, along with Helm DD 388 and two
other ships when the kamikazes roared in. Stafford took a crash in her starboard side and lost
two dead and twelve wounded. Nearby Helm had a close call as another kamikaze narrowly
missed her important parts, took off a mast and searchlight and crashed alongside the ship,
wounding six men.
January 5 had been a bad day for the ships, but 6 January would prove even more deadly.
Fifteen ships would suffer at the hands of the divine wind flyers, one of which would be sunk.
It would tough going for the “big boys” with two battleships and four cruisers taking the
brunt of the assault along with five destroyers and several other ships.
New Mexico BB 40, in the midst of shore bombardment off San Fernando Point and the
Poro Isthmus area with other ships of Task Unit 77.2.1 the San Fabian Fire Support Unit,
 9. Lingayen Gulf 159

came under kamikaze attack at 1159 on 6 January. A Zeke came in from astern and crashed
her on the port wing of the navigation bridge. Its bomb, judged to be a 551 pounder, killed
the CO, Capt. R. W. Fleming, along with several other officers and visiting dignitaries. Damage
to the superstructure was significant but did not impede the battleship’s mission. The ship’s
Executive Officer, Cmdr. J. T. Warren, assumed command and within minutes other planes
attacked. At 1209 the ship was hit by an Oscar which crashed on its port bow. At 1305 the ship
resumed shore bombardment, but kamikazes still continued to plague her. She was strafed
by another Japanese plane at 1437. From around noon until 1939 there were continual flights
of enemy aircraft in the area, along with the American combat air patrol, making the situation
confusing. The battleship fired on and hit a number of these, but none came close enough to
crash the ship. New Mexico suffered thirty dead and eighty-seven wounded in the attacks of
6 January. At 1719 New Mexico received word that California BB 44 had been hit by a kamikaze.
California was the flagship of VAdm. J. B. Oldendorf ’s Task Group 77.2 Bombardment
and Fire Support Group. The group was cruising in Lingayen Gulf when, at 1718, two Zekes
52s appeared near the island on a parallel course to the ships. Within minutes the aircraft,
which seemingly had come out of nowhere, were on a collision course with the ships, flying
only twenty-five feet off the water. California knocked one down with her 5"/38 battery but
“the plane that crashed the CALIFORNIA was hit several times. At 1720 this plane turned
toward the ship in a steeply banked climbing turn and came over the starboard beam striking
the after side of the mainmast tower at the 05 level a little to port of the centerline. At the
same time mount number 4 was penetrated by a 5" shell which exploded inside the mount.” 4
Although no bomb was observed on the Zeke, the magnitude of the explosion made it likely
that it carried one. The blast, accompanied coincidentally by the ship’s own 5" shell explosion,
caused extensive fires. When the toll was taken, it was found that forty-eight men had died
and another 155 were injured. Expert fire control and damage control parties stabilized the
situation, but a number of the ship’s guns had been knocked out. Her action report for the
incident indicates that her “Battle Efficiency is estimated to have been reduced to 75%.” 5
Walke DD 723 was attacked about the same time as New Mexico. At 1155 her lookouts
spotted four enemy planes, judged to be Oscars, coming in at a low altitude approximately
six miles distant. Walke took them under fire. The first Oscar was hit by the ship’s guns and
disintegrated and the second crossed over the ship and crashed in the water nearby. The third,
strafing on the way in, crashed into the port side of the ship’s bridge and the fourth was shot
down off the port quarter. Within a short time the fires caused by the plane were under control
and the destroyer resumed station. The kamikaze had killed twelve men and injured another
thirty-four. Among the dead was her CO, Cmdr. George F. Davis. Walke’s action report noted
that a variety of approaches were being used by the kamikazes, with the low level attack being
the most successful. It also noted that kamikazes seemed to have ships’ bridges as their primary
targets.6
Early in the morning, at 0130, Allen M. Sumner DD 692 replaced Barton DD 722 which
had been in charge of the minesweeper support unit working the area. Within an hour enemy
aircraft were stalking the ships. Over the next couple of hours the skies were active as she and
nearby ships fired on and drove off Japanese aircraft. At 1158 three Japanese planes identified
as Zekes or Judys, made runs on her. The first two were successfully avoided, but the third
approached on her port bow, strafing her on the way in. It hit the No. 2 stack and crashed
into the after torpedo mount. The plane’s bomb hit torpedo mount No. 2 and exploded on
the starboard side of the main deck. The plane skidded off the deck and landed in the water
on the starboard side of the ship. About the same time another plane hit her on the port side
of the bridge. Damage to the ship was not serious but fourteen men died and nineteen were
injured. The damaged Sumner was relieved by Ingraham DD 694.
160 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Long DMS 12 was one of the old four-stack destroyers launched in 1919 that had been
converted to a high speed minesweeper. She was engaged in sweeping activities in the gulf
when two Zekes roared in. Her CO, Lt. Stanly Caplin, ordered her to twenty-five knots as
they took the enemy planes under fire. One missed but the other crashed her port side amid-
ships only a foot above the water line. With the ship effectively sectioned off by flame and the
danger of the forward magazine exploding, Caplin gave permission for men in the forecastle
to get off the ship. This was mistakenly interpreted as an abandon ship order and all vacated
the vessel. Hovey DMS 11, another of the former four-stack destroyers, stood by to assist and
picked up her crew and officers. Regrouping on the Hovey, Caplin and his men prepared a
boarding party to fight the fires but were slowed by constant enemy air attacks. After a few
hours of waiting for a break in the action, another plane hit Long in the same spot and broke
her back. She rolled over and went under the following morning. One of her men died and
thirty-five were wounded.
Brooks APD 10 was put out of action that day as well when a kamikaze crashed her portside
starting fires and disabling her. Three of her men were killed and eleven wounded. She was
towed back to San Pedro for repair by the merchant ship SS Watch Hill and decommissioned
at the beginning of August.
Columbia CL 56 was operating as part of the Lingayen Fire Support and Bombardment
Unit. At 1424, an enemy plane made a dive on her, narrowly missing the cruiser and crashing
close aboard. The ship was jolted as its bomb went off underwater. The only damage was to
an antenna which had been clipped off as the plane passed over. At 1730 a Val dodged through
her hail of anti-aircraft fire and struck her on “the main deck on the port side of number four
turret; the engine penetrated the main deck, and the bomb penetrated to the first platform
deck where it struck the barbette turret 4 and exploded. A very serious fire resulted in the
main and second decks. Casualties and damage were very heavy.”7 Her No. 4 turret was put
out of commission and the magazines of turrets Nos. 3 and 4 were flooded. With the fires out
and damage temporarily repaired, Columbia took station with her group. Thirteen men had
died and forty-four were wounded.
Minneapolis CA 36 was operating as part of TG 77.2.1 San Fabian Fire Support Unit and,
along with New Mexico BB 40, Mississippi BB 41, West Virginia BB 48, H.M.A.S. Australia,
H.M.A.S. Shropshire and several destroyers, was en route to the eastern side of the entrance
to Lingayen Gulf to bombard San Fernando and Poro Point. Air attacks developed around
the ships starting at 1121 and lasted until 1829. Observers on Minneapolis watched as a kamikaze
crashed on New Mexico at 1159.
At 1157, lookouts on New Mexico spotted four enemy aircraft closing on her from astern
and the ship took them under fire. One went down off a nearby destroyer, but one managed
to get through her fire and crashed the port outboard corner of the bridge. Its bomb, estimated
at 500 lbs., went off and caused heavy casualties on the bridge and nearby areas. Her com-
manding officer, Capt. R. W. Fleming, sustained mortal injuries in the attack and New Mexico’s
XO, Cmdr. J. T. Warren took command. The battleship had thirty dead and eighty-seven
wounded but continued on her mission.8
At 1437 Minneapolis was attacked by a plane that crossed her bow and then passed down
her port side. It crashed close aboard her starboard side, taking with it her starboard paravane
and causing superficial damage to the ship. Two men were wounded in the attack. 9
Louisville, which had suffered two kamikaze hits the previous day, came under
attack again on 6 January. At 1731 a Japanese plane crashed her starboard side near the bridge
structure, causing heavy damage to the bridge and surrounding area. The severe fires
were extinguished quickly before they could cook off the ammo in the Mount No. 41
clipping room. As they fought the fires caused by this plane, they discovered that another
 9. Lingayen Gulf 161

plane, which they had shot down close aboard, had set fire to the starboard side of the
ship. This fire was quickly put out. In addition to putting the cruiser out of action, the
attack killed thirty-six and wounded fifty-six. Among the dead was RAdm. Theodore E. Chan-
dler.10
Richard P. Leary DD 664 was part of the anti-submarine screen for Task Group 77.2. A
kamikaze came in on her port bow, apparently heading for the larger ships nearby. Leary took
it under fire and the plane banked and made a run on her. It was hit with 20mm and 40mm
gunfire and one hundred yards from the ship, it went slightly off course, its wing clipping the
ship and splashing close aboard. It was believed that the pilot had been killed and that his
death saved the ship from serious damage. Only one man was injured.11 Newcomb DD 586
was also screening nearby when she came under attack at around 1700. Heavy air attacks in
her area kept her gunners busy, and they took two Tonys under fire as the planes tried to crash
their ship. One hit the water twenty-five yards off her port quarter, showering the ship with
shrapnel which killed two men and wounded fifteen.
O’Brien DD 725 took a kamikaze hit at 1427 as she was providing cover for a minesweeper
group consisting of Southard DMS 10, Hopkins DMS 13, and Chandler DMS 9. Two planes
dove on her as she was passing the destroyer Barton. One crashed close to Barton but missed.
The second hit O’Brien’s fantail and tore off a large chunk. The luck of the Irish was on her
side and she suffered no casualties, although she had to retire from the area for repairs.
Southard, one of the minesweepers being screened by the ships, took a kamikaze hit on her
port size at 1732, which started fires. Within a half hour the fires were out and Breese DM 18
towed her to safety. She was back in action the next day in spite of the loss of six of her men
who were wounded in the attack.
Palmer DMS 5 was engaged in mine sweeping along with Hopkins in Lingayen Gulf on
7 January. At 1834 the ships went to general quarters with bogeys reported heading in their
direction. Palmer was attacked by a twin-engine Frances. At 1837 the plane made its run at
masthead height. The assumption on the part of the ship’s Commanding Officer, Lt. W. E.
McGuirk, was that this was a suicide run and he acted accordingly. He ordered emergency
full speed and full left rudder in order to get under the path of the incoming plane. His strategy
worked, the flaming plane narrowly missed his ship and crashed 150 yards to starboard of the
ship. However, in spite of his plane being in flames and on its way down, the Japanese pilot
had the presence of mind to release his two bombs about a hundred feet from the ship.12 They
were right on target and hit the ship on the port waterline, blowing a huge hole in its side.
The ship quickly flooded and within six minutes went down by the stern.13 Hopkins and Breese
DM 18 picked up the survivors. Palmer’s casualties were twenty-six dead and thirty-eight
wounded.
The ships had a brief respite from air attacks the following day, 8 January, but Callaway
APA 35 took a hit on her starboard bridge which killed twenty-nine of her men and wounded
twenty-two. Her damage temporarily repaired, she discharged her troops and headed back to
Ulithi for repairs.
On the by-passed Palau Islands, ships were still in grave danger. The ability of the Japanese
to launch attack with aircraft or ships was long gone in this area, however, simpler methods
of attack prevailed. Japanese swimmers managed to successfully attack LCI(G) 404 in the early
morning of 8 January 1945 as she was anchored in Yoo Passage. Dean DeSirant and Ray Vayda
were on watch at 0208 when they spotted a small light off the ship’s stern. They shined their
searchlight on the water and spotted about a dozen Japanese swimmers near the stern of the
boat. They sounded general quarters and began firing at the Japanese swimmers. A few minutes
later the water erupted with a large explosion. Robert F. Heath, a S1/c on board LCI(G) 404,
would later write:
162 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

I just got off my 2000 –2400 watch when a big explosion knocked me out of my bunk. It was
about 0200 when GQ sounded. We all raced to our gun stations. The Japs had floated a magnetic
bomb out to our ship. They secured a line onto our anchor housing and lowered the bomb into
the water and pulled the fuse. It blew open the rear bottom of the ship and buckled the entire
deck and destroyed our two propellers. It messed up our engine room and the engines did not
work. The hole was big enough to drive a Jeep through.14

By the time the shooting was over, the swimmers had all been killed and LCI(L)404 was dis-
abled. Fortunately there had been no casualties. She was towed to Peleliu for repairs, then on
to Ulithi and finally back to the states. Her wartime career was over.
At 0545, LST 912 was making smoke to cover the ships in her area. Noise from her fog
generator drowned out the sound of an approaching Val, and her smoke made it impossible
to spot the incoming plane. This may have been an accidental kamikaze crash as the ship’s
action report indicated that “although it may have been a suicide dive, it is believed that the
Val was forced down by one of our night fighters reported in the air and thought he was going
into a cloud and crashed this ship by accident. One of the DD’s of the escort reported that
the plane appeared to head for our fog generator.”15 Pilot error or not, the result was the same.
The landing ship had damage to her boat deck and suffered four dead and four wounded.
Also hit that day were the two escort carriers Kadashan Bay CVE 76 and Kitkun Bay CVE 71.
The attacks began early in the morning with a group of Zekes going after the escort carriers.
One broke through the CAP and made a bombing run on Marcus Island CVE 7. Its bomb
missed and it turned off heading for Kadashan Bay. It struck the carrier amidships, adjacent
to the bridge area, tearing a hole in the carrier’s side. The ship began to flood and was soon
down by the bow. With her fires out and temporary repairs complete, the carrier managed to
stay with the group but sent her planes to Marcus Island for recovery. On 12 January she
headed back to Leyte for repairs and then on to San Francisco for an overhaul. Her duties as
a warship were over and her next assignment would be to ferry new planes to the war zone
for other carriers. The attack, although severe for the ship, had cost her only three wounded
men.
Kitkun Bay and Shamrock Bay CVE 84 were providing air cover for VAdm. T. S. Wilkin-
son’s Task Force 79 as it headed for the Lingayen landings. Late in the afternoon the group
was attacked by six Japanese aircraft. H.M.A.S. Westralia seemed to be a prime target and was
narrowly missed by a bomb. However, an Oscar dove into Kitkun Bay at 1857, striking her
portside amidships at the waterline. About the same time, she was hit by fire from the shore
on her port side, resulting in a double hit. She managed to keep station, but within a short
time she was listing thirteen degrees to port. Her casualties were sixteen dead and thirty-
seven wounded. Chowanoc ATF 100 towed her out of the area. With temporary repairs com-
pleted, she made it back to Leyte for more work and then on to San Pedro, California for a
total overhaul.
The following day, Hodges DE 231 had a close call at 0650 when a twin-engine kamikaze
from Nichols Field clipped off her foremast and crashed off the side of the ship. No casualties
resulted from the attack and Hodges continued on her mission. Columbia CL 56, found herself
surrounded by landing craft as they made their way to shore for the invasion. Unable to
maneuver in the congested area, she was a set up for a kamikaze attack. Her action report
indicates that at 0745 on 9 January:
a Japanese Tojo, with a 250 kgm [551] bomb, crashed the forward main battery director. The
director and plane carried completely over the side clear of the ship. His bomb exploded on
impact resulting in a very serious fire, heavy damage and many casualties in the forward super-
structure. The forward fire control stations were demolished and the gunnery and air defense
officers were wounded, but control was taken aft by assistants and the scheduled bombardment
was commenced at 0818 in preparation for the landing which took place at 0930. 16
 9. Lingayen Gulf 163

Within the space of a few hours she was able to complete her mission. Her casualties, twenty-
four dead and sixty-eight wounded, were taken off by Harris APA 2.
Mississippi BB 41 was operating nearby. Her mission was to fire on targets in the towns
of Dagupan and Calasiao. With her bombardment activities finished for the day, Mississippi
stood by for call fire. Shortly before, four Vals had set off from Tuguegarao Field on a kamikaze
mission escorted by four fighters. With haze obscuring the nearby land, they were able to
approach the gulf undetected. At 1303 Mississippi’s lookouts spotted one of the Vals above as
it released its bomb, which missed the ship. A second Val came at her out of the sun and the
ship’s anti-aircraft batteries took it under fire. Apparently the ship’s fire hit the Val’s engine
as it was reported that its motor was out. “This plane leveled off in a shallow glide as it passed
over forecastle and struck the ship on port side below bridge level, proceeding in a straight
line until it was brought up against AA gun No. 6 and fell clear of the ship over the port side.
A bomb carried by the plane exploded shortly after hitting the water.”17 The battleship soon
had other kamikazes to fire upon, one of which hit H.M.A.S. Australia operating nearby. Mis-
sissippi’s fires were quickly put out and medical assistance was provided for her casualties. She
had twenty-six dead and sixty-three wounded.
On anti-submarine patrol off the western entrance to Lingayen Gulf was the destroyer
escort LeRay Wilson DE 414. Early in the morning at 0710, on 10 January, a twin engine
kamikaze bore in on her about twenty-five feet off the water from dead ahead and was not
spotted until it was almost too late. Fire from the ship set its port wing and engine on fire,
but did not deter the plane from its goal. It crashed into Wilson’s port side, its starboard wing
doing much of the damage to the gun tubs in that area. Six of her men were killed and seven
wounded by the attack. The next day her CO, Lt. Cmdr. M. V. Carson, headed her back to
Manus Island for repairs.
The ships had a brief respite from airborne kamikazes. However, they were not safe. The
Japanese focused their efforts at Lingayen Gulf on waterborne kamikazes, with the suicide
boats hitting nine ships, sinking one.
The transport ship War Hawk AP 168 steamed into Lingayen Gulf on 9 January 1945 to
deliver her troops and cargo. Little did her commanding officer and crew know what lay
ahead. Port Sual, on the southwest side of the gulf, was home to the 12th Fishing Boat Battalion
under the command of Capt. Isao Takahashi. Originally composed of nearly one hundred
Maru-re suicide boats, attrition had diminished the attacking force to about seventy. During
the night of 9 –10 January 1945, the entire battalion sortied to attack American ships in the
gulf. The boats were from three companies led by 2nd Lts. Hayashi, Uemura, and Tahara.
At about 0320, the destroyer Philip DD 498 picked up the incoming boats on her radar
and sounded the alarm. From that point on, and for the next hour and a quarter, alert gun
crews on Philip, Robinson DD 562, and Leutze DD 481 began firing on targets of opportunity.
The crowded anchorage and the large number of anchored ships made it difficult for the
destroyers to move at their customary speed. Additionally, the close proximity of many of
the Maru-re, made it impossible for the ships’ guns to depress sufficiently to take them under
fire. One exploded only twenty-five yards off Philip, having been hit by 20mm gunfire. Many
of the boats made it through the anchored ships and struck home.
LST 925, anchored in the area, was among the first to be attacked by Maru-re. At 0335
her lookouts spotted a boat approaching from the port side while another approached from
starboard. Realizing that she had been detected, the boat on the port side, turned away, but
the boat to starboard made its attack, dropping its depth charges and turning away. They did
not get far as the ship’s gunners hit the boat and killed its occupants. They reported that the
Maru-re carried a crew of six, which was unusual for the boats. About the time that the
gunners fired on the Maru-re, its depth charges went off. The ship suffered extensive damage
164 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

and the crew went rapidly to work to effect repairs. To add to her problems, she was attacked
by a Val at 0705 but shot it down. Three days later she was able to land her troops and cargo
and head for repairs.
At 0410 War Hawk took a suicide boat hit which opened a twenty-five foot hole in her
side and killed sixty-one of her men.18 Quick work by her repair crews saved the ship for
further service. Robinson DD 562 reported being attacked by a small boat at 0414 which came
along her port side. It dropped its depth charges and sped away. There was no damage to the
ship and only some minor injuries to the crew.
LST 610 was at anchor in Lingayen Gulf on 10 January 1945. At 0436 she was attacked by
an undetected Maru-re. The blast knocked out one of her engines, which led to later problems
when she attempted to beach and discharge cargo. As she fought to repair the damage, her
lookouts spotted another Maru-re heading for LST 735. They took it under fire and sank it.
None of her crew was seriously wounded, suffering only superficial cuts and bruises.
LST 1028 was about 450 yards east of LST 925 when she was hit. She weighed anchor and
got underway with the objective of coming alongside the 925 to assist her. By 0358 she was
in the process of tying up to her port side and checking her condition when she was relieved
by a tug. LST 1028 backed off and anchored 250 feet away. At 0441 her lookouts spotted a
small craft off the starboard quarter at a distance of 800 yards. The ship’s gunners were put
on alert and within minutes the sound of a small boat engine could be heard; the Maru-re
was making a run on the landing ship. At 300 yards the LST opened fire but her guns could
not depress sufficiently to hit the boat. Rifle fire failed to stop it either. Her action report indi-
cated that
the Torpedo Boat seemed to hit side of Ship on Port side at frame 31, lurched out about 10 yards
then headed back jugging skin of Ship on Port side going towards Bow. When the enemy Tor-
pedo Boat was about even with forward Port Booby Hatch, a terrific explosion rocked the Ship
fairly lifting it out of the water on Port side as objects and tons of water blew straight up in the
air past the Conn. Almost everyone in the Ship was knocked violently down, some being hurt
seriously being thrown against bulkheads, gun tubs and other objects. In the Conn we were
knocked down, signal light blown off to deck below, binnacle compass sheered off its stand, etc.
When over effects of blast we saw the torpedo Boat on Starboard side racing down towards stern
about 50 feet away.19

Within a few minutes the Maru-re had distanced itself far enough from the LST as to be vul-
nerable to her gunfire. It was hit in a cross-fire by the ship’s forward and aft guns and blew
up. Power was out throughout the ship, and a tug towed her in to the beach where she under-
went repairs. Fourteen of her men had been injured in the attack.
LCI(G) 365 was anchored about three miles off shore in Lingayen Gulf on 10 January.
At 0430 her Officer of the Deck reported a huge explosion about 800 yards off her starboard
beam. LCI(M) 974 had been hit and sunk by a Maru-re, although they did not realize it at the
time. Gunfire from the destroyers Robinson, Leutze, and Philip was observed, but the men on
board the gunboat could only guess at the cause. Radio transmissions picked up by the 365
indicated that there were survivors of her sister gunboat in the water, and all eyes turned to
the water’s surface in search of them. At 0443 lookouts spotted a small craft about 150 –200
yards off the port beam. It was challenged as it slowly approached the 365 but did not respond.
The 20mm gun crews were ordered to open fire and hit the boat a number of times before
their gun jammed. It was too late. The Maru-re made its final run and dropped its depth
charges alongside the gunboat at about 0445. Lt. (jg) John M. Hoctor, the CO of LCI(G) 365
was injured when the blast tore the binnacle loose on the conn. Below decks three men were
injured but none seriously. Men were ordered to stand by to abandon ship as the LCI(G) 442
came alongside to render assistance. By 0720 the ship was listing to port and pumps were
 9. Lingayen Gulf 165

unable to keep up with the flooding. LCI(L)s 442 and 676 began to tow her toward the beach
to prevent her loss in case she sank. The fleet tug Hidatsa ATF 102 arrived to assist at 1530.
After all hands had been transferred off the ship and she was stabilized, a skeleton crew
remained aboard for the long tow back to Pearl Harbor. She was out of the war. 20
Eaton DD 510 became aware of the presence of Maru-re about 0320, as they began their
attacks on LST 925. At 0439 her lookouts sited an unidentified object to port and she changed
course to investigate. Her challenges went unheeded and “at 0500, after maneuver had put
small craft on port bow, illuminated with signal searchlight and discovered a small boat with
two men in enemy uniform bent over a large object, similar to a depth charge, high in the
stern. Opened fire with automatic weapons at 0519, when boat was abeam to port, and saw
it destroyed by an explosion after first few bursts had hit.”21 The blast sent numerous pieces
of shrapnel flying toward the ship, killing one man and wounding fourteen. In addition to
Maru-re, Eaton also had to contend with suicide swimmers. At 0830 her lookouts spotted two
swimmers in life jackets to port. They appeared to be swimming along with a bundle, possibly
containing hand grenades or other explosives. As Eaton maneuvered to close in on the swim-
mers, one pulled out a pistol, shot his companion and then himself rather than be captured. 22
LST 610 suffered serious damage when she was struck by Maru-re at 0436. Elsewhere in
the area, LST 548 was hit on her port side by a Maru-re at 0524, but had little damage. More
Japanese suicide swimmers were in the area, and between 0946 and 1310, Belknap APD 34
reported a number of them in the water with explosives tied to their backs. None were able
to get near the ships and many were machine gunned and killed in the water. 23
Wading ashore later that evening was Probational Officer Toshio Taniguchi of the 12th
Fishing Boat Battalion. At 0300 that morning he had set out with his battalion to attack the
ships anchored in Lingayen Gulf. As his boat approached the ships it was fired upon and
tracers from the American guns severed the ropes that held his depth charges in place. His
Maru-re had only gone a short distance before the jettisoned depth charges went off, over-
turning his boat. Taniguchi clung to a floating box and eventually made it to shore that
evening north of Port Sual. The following day, tired and hungry, he made the mistake of
asking a Filipino native for food. After feeding him and watching him fall asleep, the Filipino
called in the local guerrilla forces, which took him into custody and turned him over to the
American navy. Taniguchi was a platoon leader in the 12th Liaison Boat Battalion. Contrary
to popular belief, many of the explosive boat pilots had finished their high school education
or technical educations and were in college. Taniguchi had finished one year at Kyoto Uni-
versity when he was drafted into the army.
He was inducted in December 1943 and spent the following year in various training
assignments until he was sent to the Liaison Boat School at Kondura on Etajima. He was there
from 10 September 1944 to 1 October 1944. Upon graduation as a probational officer, he was
sent to Luzon in the Philippines and then on to Port Sual as part of the 12th Liaison Boat Bat-
talion. There he headed a platoon with eight NCOs and nine boats. His battalion “consisted
of three companies each of three platoons, and had 100 liaison boats.”24 Prior to the attack on
9 –10 January, his battalion had lost about thirty of its boats to air raids and coastal shelling.
The group that sortied that night was the entire remaining force. Apparently this was the end
of the battalion, as the evening’s combat destroyed most of their boats.
DuPage APA 41 had landed her troops on the shore near San Fabian on 9 January. The
following day she was scheduled to depart the area for Leyte carrying casualties from ships
and army units. As she maneuvered to join the departing convoy she was the target of a
kamikaze. The plane was identified as a twin-engine Nick that crashed into her navigation
bridge at 1915. Flaming debris was scattered down the deck as the transport lumbered forward.
Quick action by her fire control parties put the fires out and DuPage continued on her way.
166 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

This chart shows the organization of the Army Liaison Boat Battalion Number 12, which was stationed
at Port Sual on Lingayen Gulf, Philippines. Adapted from Allied Translator and Interpreter Section
South West Pacific. Serial No. 938 Interrogation Report No. 775, p. 12.

Although her structural damage was not heavy, her personnel losses were. She had taken 189
casualties, thirty-two of whom were dead.
Although the war front had moved on, ships away from the front lines were still in danger.
This threat came from Japanese submarines and Kaiten which were still able to operate in
rear areas. A near miss was scored by a Kaiten from the I-47 which sortied with the Kongo
Group heading for Hollandia, New Guinea in late December, 1944. Kaiten pilots Lts. (jg)
Teruo Kawakubo and Atsuro Hara, Flight PO 1st Class Katsumi Sato and Chief PO Minoru
Muramatsu were on board to attack enemy shipping with their manned torpedoes. Lt. Cmdr.
Zenji Orita guided his submarine into the harbor at Hollandia among the anchored American
ships. Four of the Kaiten were launched but only one caused some minor damage. On board
the Pontus H. Ross, a liberty ship carrying trucks, ammunition, gas and food supplies, men
went about their business. It was early in the morning of 11 January, around 0615, when they
heard a scraping noise on their port side. The Kaiten had struck the ship a glancing blow and
finally exploded off the port bow. Although the hull plating was dented, no serious damage
to the ship occurred. Although they were shaken by the nearby explosion, the crew was unin-
jured.25 Another Kaiten exploded nearby, but of the four launched, only one had come close
and it failed to sink a ship. The Japanese claimed that they had sunk four transports, but the
report was inaccurate as usual.
January 12–13 saw the resumption of air attacks in force, with another thirteen ships suf-
fering at the hands of the kamikazes. Particularly hard hit were the liberty ships and transports.
Early in the morning at about 0658, the destroyer escorts Gilligan DE 508 and Richard W. Sue-
sens DE 342 came under attack as they performed their anti-submarine screening duties at
the western entrance to Lingayen Gulf. Gilligan’s lookouts spotted a twin-engine Betty only
about a thousand yards away. Quickly turning to port to bring her starboard batteries under
fire, the ship fell victim to a crewman’s error as he deserted his post and knocked over the
operator of the nearby 5" battery director. As a result, fire from that gun was limited to only
fourteen rounds. More might have made the difference, but the Betty bore straight in, hitting
the 40mm gun tub and director, killing twelve men and wounding thirteen more. It was a
costly error, with the aircraft’s gasoline igniting in a giant fire ball which eventually was put
 9. Lingayen Gulf 167

out. Gilligan returned to Leyte for repairs on 17 January and went back to Pearl Harbor for
complete repairs a few weeks later. Richard W. Suesens came under attack a few minutes later
at 0729. Accurate fire from the destroyer escort probably killed the pilot, threw the plane off
course, and caused it to narrowly miss the ship. It crashed close aboard but still managed to
wound eleven of her men.26 Also suffering an air attack was Belknap APD 34. At 0750 four Tonys
appeared near the transports and one made it through the hail of anti-aircraft fire to crash into
Belknap’s No. 2 stack. Thirty-eight of her men were killed and forty-nine wounded.27
The first of the cargo carriers to be hit was the Elmira Victory. At 0800, a kamikaze
appeared through the smoke screen in the transport area and caused some minor damage as
it struck her No. 5 hatch. This was not the case with the second plane, which made it through
the combined gunfire of the surrounding ships to crash into Elmira Victory, holing her just
above the waterline. Fires started by the crashes were quickly extinguished, a fortunate thing
as the ship was carrying 7,542 tons of ammo and an additional seventy-five torpedoes on
deck. Had she gone up, her entire crew would have died and ships near her would have suffered
heavy casualties. Her injuries were light, with only six wounded. Next on the list was the
liberty ship Otis Skinner, another ticking bomb with its load of 7,000 tons of explosives and
gasoline. At 1253 she was struck on her starboard side, starting fires and holing the hull. Fires
raged throughout the area and below decks, but miraculously they were put out before her
cargo could explode. Only two of her crew were injured, another miracle. Early in the evening,
more of the liberty ships had to endure kamikaze attacks. Lookouts on Edward N. Westcott
spotted an incoming kamikaze at around 1800. Her armed guard took it under fire with the
bow gun and 20mm guns and hit it, blowing it apart a scant thirty yards from the ship.
Although it had missed, the debris from the plane caused damage in the after deck area, but
injured only eleven men. Kyle V. Johnson took a hit at 1830 when a kamikaze struck her star-
board side and passed into the interior of the ship. Among the cargo carried by the ship was
gasoline, and the crew flooded the compartment to keep it from exploding. Although the fires
were out within an hour, the explosion of the plane had taken its toll on the troops. Quartered
below deck were 506 troops bound for the invasion beaches at Lingayen. One hundred twenty-
eight of them died in the crash, along with one crew member. Nine crew members were
wounded as well as two members of the Armed Guard. In spite of her damage the ship made
it to port where she disembarked her troops and cargo.28 David Dudley Field took a kamikaze
hit about the same time. Her cargo was less hazardous than some of the other ships, consisting
of general army supplies and pontoons. Her would-be attacker was driven off course by fire
from the ship’s Armed Guard, its wing tip hitting the ship. The bomb that it carried exploded
in the water on the port side of the ship, but no serious damage was caused by the attack.
Minor injuries were sustained by eight of her crew.29
LST 700 came under attack at 0810 on 12 January. She was part of a convoy of LSTs
heading back to Leyte from Lingayen Gulf after having discharged their supplies. Seven Zekes
headed in toward the convoy and one attempted to drop a bomb on Gage APA 168, but missed.
It followed up with a suicide run but crashed harmlessly into the ocean. A second plane made
a run at LST 268 but was shot down by gunfire from the 268 and the 700. Another Zeke made
a run on Gage, but between her fire and that of four CAP fighters, it was driven off. A fourth
Zeke came in on the 700, was driven off and pursued by a CAP plane. Both the CAP fighter
and the 700 scored hits on it, and it appeared as though the kamikaze was finished. However,
at the last moment, its pilot gained control and headed for a nearby YMS. It crashed before
it could hit the ship. By 1015 the attack was over and the ships resumed course. On board LST
700, several men had been injured by shell fragments, but the ship had only minor damage.
However, the next morning would be different. At 0800 on 13 January, a lone Zeke crashed
her amidships on her starboard side. Her action report stated:
168 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

The plane was in a dive coming fast towards the portside of this ship, apparently towards the
bridge. As the plane closed, two 20mm and one 40mm on the port side opened fire. Several hits
were observed on the plane.... Plane flew over port side and crashed into weather deck 10 ft.
inboard of starboard side, between frame No. 27 and No. 28. Ship lost headway immediately.
Auxiliary and main engine rooms were flooded. Signal was sent to LST 268 to take us under
tow. LST 911 stood by. Two of the crew were observed in water and were picked up by an SC.
OTC dispatched tow DMSs to screen us. Ship started to list to starboard and steadied when list
approximated 15 degrees.30

Minor fires caused by the crash were quickly put out. YMS 47 and Monadnock CM 9 assisted
the LST, which had been holed from her deck to her side, below the waterline. LST 268 began
to tow her back to Mangarin Bay, Mindoro Island and Jicarilla AT 104 completed the tow. She
had eight wounded and two dead.
On the morning of 13 January, a convoy under RAdm. R. L. Conolly made preparations
to leave Lingayen Gulf. Included in the group was the Mount Olympus AGC-8 with VAdm.T.
S. Wilkinson aboard. At 0821 an enemy plane appeared to be making a dive on Mount Olympus
but swerved off at the last moment and crashed into Zeilin APA 3 which was steaming nearby.
The ensuing crash and fires killed eight and wounded thirty-two, but the ship resumed sta-
tion.
The kamikaze threat at Luzon had just about run its course, but they would have one
more victim, the escort carrier Salamaua CVE 96. She had been operating off Lingayen Gulf
from 6 through 13 January, providing air support for the infantry that had landed, as well as
the ships in the gulf. Her action report describes the attack:
13 January dawned, a dull day with heavy cloud cover at 8,000 feet. Our Combat Air Patrols
were orbiting at 20,000 feet and at 7,000 feet, and we were engaged in routine flight operations,
when without warning, about 0858, an enemy suicide plane, carrying two 200 Kilo [440 lb.]
bombs, one under each wing, plunged through the flight deck, and penetrated to the Tank Tops.
One bomb exploded and fires were started on the Flight Deck, Hangar Deck, and spaces below.
The second bomb failed to explode and went through the starboard side of the ship at the water
line. The bomb which exploded holed the starboard side below the water line in some ten places.
There was immediate loss of power, communications, and steering. The after engine room and
the compartment next aft were flooded, putting the starboard engine out of commission. The
Ship’s Company went immediately to General Quarters, and in the following ten minutes shot
down two enemy aircraft. SALAMAUA proceed independently on the port engine, but in com-
pany with T.U. 77.4.1 until ordered to retire that night about 1925.31

The speed with which the attack had developed had left little time for the ship’s gunners to
draw a bead on the incoming plane. The best that they could was prevent the next two from
hitting her. With temporary repairs keeping the flooding at bay, she limped back to Leyte, the
last kamikaze victim of the campaign for the Philippines.
With the attacks of 12 to 13 January the airborne kamikaze threat ended. The Japanese
realized that the Philippines were lost and began evacuating their aircraft to Taiwan in an
attempt to save the remaining ones. Some of the units spent all their aircraft in the effort and
then disbanded their air organization to fight as ground troops. Cmdr. Tadashi Nakajima of
the 201st Air Group, stationed at Mabalacat, described the last attack on the ships heading for
Lingayen as taking place on 5 January 1945. Forced to disband at that point, the mechanics
managed to patch together five more Zekes for a final mission, which took off on 6 January,
only about a week prior to the ending of the attacks.32

Suicide Boats Resurface

Army Maru-re boats were stationed throughout the Philippines and attacks on American
shipping continued. The 19th Liaison Boat Battalion was headquartered at Binubusan, just
 9. Lingayen Gulf 169

south of Manila Bay. This battalion had been seriously weakened when the transport carrying
them to the Philippines was sunk in November 1944, taking with it most of the men and all
of their boats. Only a few of the original men from 19th Liaison Boat Battalion survived. Once
settled in Binubusan, the Second Company from the 15th Liaison Boat Battalion was trans-
ferred to the 19th, giving them only one company with a total of nineteen boats and twenty-
eight pilots.
The 19th Liaison Boat Company left its river hideout about midnight on 31 January 1945
headed for American ships anchored near Nasugbu. Amphibious Group 8 had just arrived
carrying 11th Airborne Division troops on LSTs. Among the ships patrolling the anchorage
were the destroyers Russell DD 414, Conyngham DD 371, Shaw DD 373, and Flusser DD 368,
destroyer escorts Lough DE 586, Presley DE 371, and Richard W. Suesens DE 342, along with
PCs 1129 and 623.
Piloting one of the Maru-re was Cpl. Nobuo Hayashi. His rank made him a squad leader
in the battalion, although the shortage of boats was such that the distinction meant little.
Hayashi was twenty-one years old and had volunteered for the army in April 1944, giving him
only about ten months from his entrance into the military to his capture. After leaving the
base at Binubusan, Hayashi headed his boat out into the gulf and turned toward the ships
anchored off Nasugbu, north of Talin Point. He was accompanied by a second member of his
platoon. In the dark, he thought that he was aiming for a transport but soon found out it was
an American warship. Hayashi went on the attack. He put his throttle in and headed for the
ship at high speed, dropping his depth charges near the ship’s hull. His Maru-re had not trav-
eled far before the charges went off, destroying his boat and killing his companion. He found
himself in the water while men on the warship fired rifles at him. He managed to swim clear
and made it to shore. Once there he headed back along the beach to his base, where he found
it deserted. Hayashi rounded up some supplies and headed for the battalion’s river hideout
but was captured by Filipino guerrillas the following day and turned over to the Americans.
The Maru-re of the 19th Liaison Boat Company had a busy night. PC 1129 had been the
first to spot the incoming suicide boats at about 2230 and notified the destroyer escort Lough,
which ordered the PC to investigate. Within minutes she was surrounded by a swarm of
Maru-re.
Earl O. Griffis, Sr., a native of Mercerville, NJ, had enlisted in the navy on 15 December
1942 at the age of eighteen. After going through basic training at Great Lakes, he found himself
in Florida, attending seamanship school and preparing for the delivery of his new ship, the
PC 1129. The ship had been built in Bay City, Michigan and sent down the Mississippi River
to meet her new crew. Griffis became a plank owner and his journeys on the ship had taken
him from Miami to the islands of the Pacific, where the sub-chaser would see action at Green
Island, Bouganville, Peleliu, New Guinea, and finally the Philippines where she met her end.
Griffis, who served as a cook on board the ship, had just finished baking bread in the
galley and went on deck to get some fresh air. He was standing near the port 40mm gun tub
when he spotted the Maru-re approach. Moments later he felt an explosion and was blown
back to the fantail. The Maru-re had dropped its charges amidships, holing the ship near the
engine room and trapping Motor Machinist’s Mate Mack McGuire below. Within seconds
the ship began to list. A ship’s electrician, who had both legs broken in the blast, made it up
the ladder hand over hand and escaped death. The order was given to abandon ship, and men
went over the side in life preservers and life rafts. They watched from the water as their ship
rolled over, and went under. Griffis recalled swimming to a life raft and hanging on for the
next four hours until they were picked up by Lough.33 The destroyer escort picked up seven
of her officers and fifty-six enlisted men who had survived. The PCs normally had a comple-
ment of sixty-four men, but only one had died in the attack.34 The following day they were
170 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

transferred to Anderson DD 411 for their trip to safety. How many of the survivors were
wounded was never determined, as they were quickly sent back for rest and rehabilitation.
Lough spotted a number of the boats about 1000 yards ahead and went to twenty knots
to close the distance, firing on the boats with her 20mm and 40mm guns. In the process she
sank at least six of the boats and was unharmed during the action. Claxton had a torpedo
launched at her during the fray but it missed. It is probable that the Maru-re were supported
by Japanese torpedo boats since the Maru-re did not have the ability to carry or launch tor-
pedoes. The following morning a search of the shore line was made with the intent of finding
and destroying the Maru-re base. It resulted in the destruction of another two boats. 35
The problems caused by the Maru-re led to the assignment of a number of PT boats and
LCI gunboats to seek out and destroy them. From that point on, the small American com-
batants would be on “skunk patrol,” as the chore came to be known. Motor Torpedo Boat
Squadrons 28 and 36 had begun operations in the area in mid–January and were primarily
concerned with intercepting and destroying barges. However, the events at Nasugbu led to
increased patrols, which resulted in the destruction of many other beached suicide boats by
the PTs. Between 14 January and 11 February 1945, the PTs destroyed another twenty-four
suicide boats, fifty-one barges, three luggers, a forty-foot motor launch, and a 6,000 ton
freighter.36
Once the immediate threat from the Maru-re was over, destruction of any remaining
boats in the area became of paramount importance. Detailed to ferret out the boats in the
vicinity of Talin Bay were the LCI(G)s 73, 442, and 558. The difficulty of finding the Maru-
re hideouts was pointed out in the action report of LCI(G) 558:
At 1210, 1 February, 1945, entered Talin Bay in company with LCI(G) 442 and LCI(R) 73.
Destroyer support unit cruised at the head of the bay. Our mission was to discover and destroy
enemy small craft. We did not discover any suspicious craft but destroyed three baroque [sic]
canoes that might have served for an enemy suicide attempt on our ships when anchored at
night. There were numerous groups of bushes overhanging the water edge where enemy craft
may have been concealed from us. It was impossible to penetrate the thick foliage with our
binoculars even at 200 yards. We strafed one large growth of suspicious overhanging bushes but
the effective results are dubious. Returned from the mission at 1350.37

As the American army drove southward from Lingayen toward Manilla, additional Amer-
ican navy units began the task of developing their attack on Corregidor and nearby islands
as a prelude to landing troops to take the city. To slow the American advance, the Japanese
once again resorted to the use of their suicide boats. One of the most successful of the Japanese
navy Shinyo attacks came at Mariveles Harbor, near Corregidor, early in the morning on 16
February 1945. Six LCI(R) gunboats and six LCS(L)s had participated in the attack near Mariv-
eles and on Corregidor during the daylight hours. Their task was to provide close inshore fire
support in preparation for the landing of American troops. Included in the ships from Group
1, Flotilla 1, were six of the newly designed LCS(L)s, numbers 7, 8, 26, 27, 48, 49. As dusk fell,
the LCS(L)s were ordered to anchor across the mouth of Mariveles Harbor between Gorda
Point and Cockines Point as a screen for the beached landing craft. Unbeknownst to them,
a fleet of approximately forty-one navy Shinyo boats had left their caves in Corregidor, only
four miles away, to attack them. Thirty-three of these were from the 12th Shinyo-tai Unit
under the command of Lt. Yoshihisa Matsueda. The other eight were from the 9th Shinyo-tai
unit under Lt. (jg) Kenjiro Nakajima. At about the same time, thirty-three more Shinyo, under
the command of Lt. Cmdr. Shoichi Oyamada set out from Corregidor. Eight were to join in
the attack at Mariveles and the remaining twenty-five were to proceed to Subic Bay. It is likely
that the twenty-five boats did not make it to Subic Bay and fell victim to PT boats and other
American warships. Later interrogations of survivors of the suicide boat units indicated that
 9. Lingayen Gulf 171

LCI(G) 442 fires its port 40mm gun at suspected suicide boat locations on beach at Talin Point, near
Nasugbu, Philippines on 31 January 1945. This area is just to the south of Manila Bay. Accompanying
her on the mission were LCI(G)s 72 and 558. NARA 80G 273135.

“on the night of 15 February 1945, all boat operators got drunk first, and 10 of the boats
returned giving various excuses for not attacking.”38 LCS(L) 7, under Lt. Franklin L. Elder,
was hit and sunk by two boats at 0305. She went down within minutes. At about the same
time the 27, 26, and 49 were also crashed by Shinyo.
Claude Haddock, S 1/c, on board the LCS(L) 49, was on watch on the conn and Lt. Harry
W. Smith, CO of the 49, was asleep below. When Haddock saw LCS(L) 7 hit, he immediately
wakened the CO who sounded general quarters. About that time, the 49 suffered its first hit.
Haddock went to the engine room to assist in fighting fires but was told that power had been
knocked out. A second Shinyo hit on the port side, dooming the ship. The life raft had been
blown overboard, its bottom knocked out by the blast. Haddock went over the side, swam to
it, and with some other members of the crew, managed to paddle in to shore. He was not
wounded but recalled that his ears rang for a couple of weeks.39 The 49 and 26 exploded, rolled
over and went under.
Dean Bell, S 2/c, on board LCS(L)26, was in the crew compartment when his ship was
hit. The rear portion of the compartment was set afire and two men tried to go up the ladder
to escape. Each burned to death before he could make it out. At that point, the water was up
to Bell’s chest. He was about to go up the forward ladder and someone told him to wait. In
a few minutes he was told to go. He grabbed the handrail, which was extremely hot, and the
flesh on his hands was burned away. He made it to the top and onto the deck. Immediately
in front of him he saw his life jacket on the deck. Officers were trying to free the life raft. Bell
172 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Three Imperial Navy Shinyo suicide boats are shown on tracks leading from their cave to the water
on Corregidor. A series of caves may be seen in the cliff side. This made it difficult to eradicate the
boats with air or naval attack, but left them vulnerable to disaster if one caught fire in the tunnel.
This photograph was taken on 27 February 1945. NARA 111-SC-263697.

tried to put his life jacket on, but with his badly burned hands he could not tie it. He was told
to jump. When he hit the water the jacket came off since it was not tied. A shipmate swam
over, held him in a scissors with his legs and tied the life jacket on him. He told him to swim
to a nearby life raft, but when they got there it was sinking under the weight of too many
men. They were then told to swim to shore and, once there, found that many other survivors
had made it to the same spot on a rocky shoreline. An LCT later picked them up and Bell was
sent to a hospital ship. He would spend two years in the hospital before being discharged with
a disability from the burns.40
Lt. Risley Lawrence, CO of LCS(L) 27, had managed to get his ship underway. His sharp-
eyed gunners destroyed three of the boats before the fourth hit her a few feet off the port
beam. Risley’s quick thinking saved his ship, he ran it up on the beach to prevent its sinking.
Along the way his gunners finished off a fifth Shinyo.
Harry G. Meister, who served as Engineering Officer on the LCS(L) 27, would later write:

It was at the time the LCS(L(3) 49 took her hits that the Commanding Officer of this vessel real-
ized that suicide boats were ramming these ships and orders were immediately passed to heave
around on the stern anchor and prepare to get underway. Word was given to all gun stations to
watch for small boats and their wakes and fire at anything. By this time all machine guns of this
vessel were firing at targets and suspected targets. At approximately 0326 the LCS(L)(3) 26 was
hit on her port side and within 30 seconds on her starboard side. It turned keel up and sunk
 9. Lingayen Gulf 173

This tunnel on Corregidor housed Imperial Navy Shinyo boats that were used to counter the American
assault on the Manila Bay area. NARA 111-SC-263698.

within one minute of the first hit. Several boats were seen in the water approaching this vessel at
this time. One persistently bore in on the port side and was engaged first by rifle fire and its
occupant was hit, several men hearing him scream. His boat then turned away and was then
sunk by 40mm machine gun. Boats were observed on both sides and one on the port side was
caught in concentrated 40mm and 20mm machine gun fire and was seen to sink. At this time
one on either side was observed to be bearing in amidship. The one on the port side was engaged
by both forward and aft 40mm and 20mm machine guns on that side but even though hit many
times, it bore in below the depression possible by all guns and was seen to explode approxi-
mately 3 feet from this vessel.... Ship had gotten underway and headed for nearest land at this
time.... Boat on starboard side was hit by 20mm machine gun fire repeatedly but closed in. For
some reason, probably because of the slow speed, this boat did not explode but lay along side,
under the depression angle of the machine guns.... Boat was seen to come out from the starboard
bow and as soon as it could be engaged by 20mm on that side, it was hit again and seen to
sink.41

When the battle was over, LCS(L)s 7, 26, and 49 had been sunk and LCS(L) 27 was severely
damaged but salvageable. Sixty men had died in the suicide boat attacks, making it a very
successful night for the 12th Shinyo-tai Unit.
The Shinyo attack at Mariveles was the last major attack of the suicide boats in the Philip-
pines. Sporadic attacks continued at various places in the Philippines as the Allied forces con-
tinued to subdue Japanese resistance on many of the islands. As the struggle for the island of
Davao was under way, the suicide boats struck again. In the evening of 10 –11 May 1945, ships
anchored in Taloma bay, Davao Gulf were attacked by the boats. Army FS 225 was hit and
174 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Mariveles Harbor was the scene of a deadly attack on the LCS(L) ships on 16 February 1945. Sunk in
the attack were LCS(L)s 7, 26, and 49. In addition, LCS(L) 27 was badly damaged. Commander Task
Force SEVENTY-EIGHT (Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force) Serial 04. Action Reports—Spe-
cial MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Operation, 12 –16 February 1945. 12 April 1945, p. 31.

LCS(L) 27 shown shortly after her commissioning near Portland, Oregon. Official U.S. Navy Photo-
graph.
 9. Lingayen Gulf 175

sunk. This act was akin to swatting a hornet’s nest and for the next several days LCI (G)s 21,
22, PTs 106, 342, 343 and 335 joined with Howard DE 346, Key DE 348, Flusser DD 368, and
Leland E. Thomas DE 420 to attack various suspected bases in the area. They sank several
enemy PT boats and destroyed PT and suicide boat bases.42 This put an end to the special
attack threat in Davao Gulf.
 10. Taiwan, Iwo Jima, and Ulithi

The kamikazes had regrouped and reorganized after their exodus from the Philippines
and were ready for action off Taiwan. Although the airfields on the Philippines were no longer
active bases for action against the American fleet, those on Taiwan were. Shortly after arriving
on Taiwan, the Japanese navy’s First Air Fleet formed a new special attack unit based at Tainan
on 18 January. It was to be known as the Niitaka Unit.1 Adm. Halsey led the fast carriers of
Task Force 38 in attacks against the Taiwan air bases in an attempt to suppress their ability
to launch kamikaze attacks against American shipping in the Philippines
On 21 January 1945 Halsey’s carriers, positioned one hundred miles to the east of the
southern part of the island, made their strikes, hitting major air bases and accounting for 104
enemy aircraft on the ground, as well as shipping in several of their ports. Little air opposition
was encountered, with two of three Japanese planes shot down as they attempted to intercept
the navy fighters.2
The presence of enemy carriers off their coast had not gone unnoticed by the Japanese.
Earlier in the morning on 21 January, the Niitaka Unit sent six Judy single-engine bombers
and eleven Zekes on a kamikaze mission. They flew from the bases at Shinchiku, Tainan, and
Taichu. All six of the Judys and four of the Zekes were designated as kamikazes, while the
remaining Zekes flew escort.3
Ticonderoga CV 14 had been conducting normal flight operations with her CAG-80 air-
craft when she was struck by a kamikaze at 1208. The plane crashed through her flight deck
and its bomb went off just above the hangar deck. Aircraft stored on the hangar deck were
set afire and a number of her men were killed by the blast. Although many of her crew were
casualties, the pilots of CAG-80 managed to escape unharmed. Fire-fighting occupied the
carrier’s crew for the next fifty minutes. According to the ship’s action report:
A second kamikaze, believed armored because of its apparent ability to withstand many hits,
struck the ship from the starboard side at the base of the forward 5-inch director on top of the
island structure, starting severe fires in that vicinity. Its bomb apparently exploded just inboard
of the island, firing planes and ripping holes in the flight deck, and killing and wounding
upwards of one hundred personnel. The Captain was severely wounded and the Air Officer
killed by this second bomb explosion. No trace of the Gunnery Officer has been found and he is
considered missing in action. The Executive Officer was severely wounded by shrapnel appar-
ently from another ship in the formation shortly before the second plane crashed. 4

Within two hours the fires were brought under control and the crew set about tending to the
dead. Wounded men had been under care since the beginning of the attacks and many had

176
 10. Taiwan, Iwo Jima, and Ulithi 177

Ticonderoga CV 14 burns after being hit by two kamikazes off Taiwan on 21 January 1945. This pho-
tograph was taken from Miami CL 80. NARA 80G 273151.

been saved through the efforts of the ship’s medical team. Ticonderoga’s CO Capt. Dixie Kiefer,
in spite of his severe wounds, remained on the bridge until he was assured of the safety of
the carrier and its men. Twelve hours would elapse before he would be taken to sick bay. The
big carrier had suffered 143 men killed or missing and 202 wounded in action. Late in the
afternoon she was escorted back to Ulithi for repairs.
The destroyers Brush DD 745 and Maddox DD 731 were acting as pickets for the carriers.
At 1310, about an hour after Ticonderoga received her second hit, Maddox was crashed by a
Zeke. The plane had managed to sneak toward the destroyer by accompanying a returning
flight of Hellcats. Her action report indicated:
Analysis indicated that enemy suicide plane returned from strike with friendly fighters, taking
advantage of broken cloud cover to prevent detection and at all times sufficiently close to
friendly planes that no unfriendly indications were apparent on radar.... At the instant the sui-
cide plane commenced his dive, there was a 4 plane CAP overhead at about 1,000 feet and two
returning strikes of about 11 F6F’s at 1500 feet. The planes were all considered friendly. About 10
seconds before the crash, the suicide plane wiggled his wings and was at that time the middle
plane of three; the two outboard planes being friendly F6F’s in the process of orbiting at 1500
feet. This plane commenced a steep dive firing machine guns. He leveled off just aft of radio
antennae marked No. I, [in the following drawing] his left wing clipped this antennae, driving
him down through No. 41 40mm, marked II which his undercarriage struck and upsetting the
plane to superstructure deck position III at frame 68, where the explosion took place. His bomb,
estimated at 132 kg. [291 lbs.] was delayed a split second only.... Had the plane landed 10 feet
further aft, the ship would have broken in two.5
178 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

This sketch from the action report of Maddox DD 731 shows the areas referred to in the report above.
USS Maddox DD 731 Serial 0010. Action Report 21 January 1945—Forwarding Of. 26 January 1945, p.
4.

Maddox’s casualties of seven killed and thirty-three wounded would have been much
higher had the plane hit almost anywhere else on the ship. As it was, there were serious
concerns about her hull strength. She formed up with the convoy heading back to Ulithi along
with Ticonderoga.

Iwo Jima
As the attacks at Lingayen were underway, final preparations for the assault on Iwo Jima
were taking place. By the end of 1944, American bombers were flying regular missions over
Japan from their bases on Saipan. However, the lengthy trip was made difficult by the prospect
of no safe place to land between Japan and Saipan if the planes ran out of fuel or were damaged.
Iwo Jima would serve as a safe haven for planes which could not make it back to base. Addi-
tionally, fighter aircraft, which had shorter ranges than the bombers, could be stationed there
to provide escort service on the bombing missions. As a result, Iwo Jima was added to the
list of islands scheduled for invasion. The story of that endeavor takes much telling, however,
this work is only concerned with the instances of kamikaze attacks during that epic struggle.
Two carriers would be struck by kamikazes at Iwo Jima, owing in large part to the annihilation
of Japanese air forces by American naval ship bombardment and air action. Both attacks took
place from 20 to 21 February 1945.
The kamikaze aircraft attacking the American ships came from the Mitate Unit No. 2,
601st Air Group, Third Air Fleet. The unit was based to the west of Yokohama, Japan, in the
Kanto Plains area at Katori Naval Air Base. VAdm. Kimpei Teraoka had authorized the for-
mation of this special attack unit on 16 February 1945. Divided into six units, the Mitate force
totaled twelve fighters, twelve carrier bombers, and eight torpedo bombers divided into five
groups. They sortied from their base on 21 February, refueled at Hachijo Jima, and headed
for Iwo Jima.6
Bismarck Sea CVE 95 was part of RAdm. C. T. Durgin’s support group providing air sup-
port and cover for the invasion. Other carriers in the group were Makin Island CVE 93, Lunga
Point CVE 94, Saginaw Bay CVE 82, Rudyerd Bay CVE 81, and Anzio CVE 57. Bismarck Sea
had just recovered her planes when, at 1730, she was ordered to scramble them again to inter-
cept incoming bogeys which later proved to be friendly. After once again recovering her own
planes, she found it necessary to take on three additional planes from other carriers and had
to send four of her fighters below to the hangar deck without degassing them. This would
prove to be a serious problem in the coming minutes. At about this time incoming raids were
reported and, at 1845, the enemy planes were spotted approaching the ships. In the poor vis-
 10. Taiwan, Iwo Jima, and Ulithi 179

ibility at dusk it was difficult to see them until a Betty was spotted making a low altitude run
on Lunga Point. Gunners on Bismark Sea took it under fire and shot it down.
Lunga Point CVE 94 came under attack again at 1846. She was about twenty-one miles
east of Iwo Jima. Eight of her fighters were in the area flying CAP and four of her torpedo
bombers were on anti-submarine patrol. When reports of the incoming raid came in, she
launched an additional four fighters to augment the CAP. Five Jills approached her from the
northeast and Bismarck Sea and a destroyer took them under fire. One of the planes made a
torpedo run on Lunga Point and its torpedo passed closely by her bow. The plane was crashed
into the sea 200 yards to port. A second plane followed the first and its torpedo passed by as
well. It escaped destruction and flew off. Immediately following the first two planes, a Jill
dropped its torpedo off the starboard beam of Lunga Point and was hit by her gunfire. This
torpedo passed astern of the jeep carrier, which scored many hits on the plane. In flames and
severely damaged, the plane made a kamikaze run on Lunga Point. It exploded right next to
the ship and lost a wing. The remaining parts of the plane crashed on the deck and skidded
overboard to splash on the port side of the carrier.7 Damage to the ship was light, but eleven
of her crew were wounded. A fourth plane, following closely behind the other three, took a
direct hit from a 5" gun and disintegrated. Lunga Point had escaped with minimal damage.
Although gunners on Bismarck Sea had shot down a plane headed for Lunga Point, they
missed another plane heading directly for the starboard side of their own carrier. Hits were

Crewmen from Lunga Point CVE 94 examine wreckage from a Jill that crashed her on 21 February
1945. U.S.S. Lunga Point (CVE 94) Serial 020. Action Report—Occupation of IWO JIMA, 10 February
1045 to 11 March 1945. 11 March 1945, Enclosure I.
180 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

scored on the plane from the time it was 1,000 yards out, but it could not be shot down. Its
low level attack made it impossible for the ship’s guns to depress sufficiently, so the final part
of its run was unimpeded. The ship’s action report reveals:
This plane struck the ship abeam of the after elevator. On entering the ship it knocked four tor-
pedoes from the starboard rack and scattered them about the hangar deck. The elevator cables
were parted and the elevator fell to the hangar deck. The after fire main was damaged. The
conflagration station turned on the water curtains and sprinklers. There was no supply to the
after curtain and sprinklers.... This fire appeared controllable until a second heavy explosion
occurred about two minutes later just forward of the elevator which killed a large number of the
fire fighters. Eye witnesses report that this explosion was caused by a second plane which came
through the flight deck and exploded among the fighters parked at that spot. These planes were
full of gasoline and the fire became intense and uncontrollable. This second explosion blew the
entire rear of the hangar deck out and bulkheads on the gallery deck were blown in. The decks of
the clipping rooms above were apparently ruptured and a quantity of 20 or 40 mm ammunition,
or both, began exploding and made the area untenable.8

The entire aft end of the ship was on fire and the crew had little ability to extinguish the
flames. It was obvious that she was doomed. Her CO, Capt. J. L. Pratt, gave the order to aban-
don ship at 1905. Men went into the dark water, but it was not a good night for picking up
survivors. Rough seas hampered recovery and Japanese planes strafed the men in the water.
As the CO prepared to leave the ship it was rocked by a huge explosion, which may have been
torpedoes cooking off. The stern section of Bismarck Sea disappeared in the blast and the ship
took a heavy list to starboard. She rolled over and sank at 2115. Her casualties included 119
dead and ninety-nine wounded.
Saratoga CV 3, operating as the flagship for Task Unit 52.2.4 under Capt. L. A. Moebus,
came under attack about the same time as the other carriers. The first attack on her was at
1700, when she was jumped by six Zekes and Judys. According to her action report:
Coordinated attack by 6 Japanese suicide planes commenced coming in from out of the clouds to
the east. Opened fire. Planes (1 or 2) strafed ship while coming in fast. No. 1 plane hit and on
fire, crashed into starboard side, frame 104, penetrated into hangar deck. Violent explosion. No.
2 plane, hit and on fire, hit water and bounced into starboard side, frame 147, at water-line.
Violent explosion. 5 degree list to starboard. No. 3 plane shot down clear of the ship. No. 4
plane from astern updeck dropped bomb into anchor windlass through port catapult and
crashed into water. 1703 ... No. 5 plane, hit and burning, headed for bridge, carried away anten-
nae and signal halyard, crashed into port catapult and exploded violently. No. 6 plane hit and
burning, crashed into airplane crane on starboard side, dropped bomb at frame 25, starboard
flight deck, parts of the plane landing in number one gun gallery, rest of plane went over the
port side.9

Men fought fires for the next hour and a half until the next attack developed. At 1846 three
more kamikazes made runs on the ship. The first two were shot down, but the third dropped
a bomb on the flight deck, crashed into the deck and skidded off into the sea. Expert firefighting
saved the ship and by 2031 she was landing aircraft again. Her casualties were heavy, 143 dead
and 202 wounded. At 2130 she headed back to Eniwetok for repairs.
Kamikazes made their last effort at Iwo Jima on 21 February. At 1718 five Hamps flew
over the island. LST 477 was the first ship struck as one made a crash dive into her starboard
side forward. Its 551-lb. bomb caused significant damage below, but the ship was not mortally
wounded. However, her casualties numbered nine dead and five wounded. Immediately there-
after she shot down another Hamp making a run on a sister LST on her port beam and drove
away a third. Firefighting on board the ship was made difficult as approximately 3,000 rounds
of 20mm ammunition was cooked off by the fires.10 Another Hamp picked LST 809 as a target
and made its attack from out of the sun on the ship’s port quarter. Fire from the LST killed
 10. Taiwan, Iwo Jima, and Ulithi 181

On 21 February 1945 Saratoga CV 30 took a kamikaze hit on her forward flight deck while partici-
pating in the invasion of Iwo Jima. This photograph was taken seconds after the crash. NARA 80G
273674.

the pilot and his plane narrowly missed the conning tower, clipping some halyards and insu-
lators on the mainmast stay.11

Ulithi
Ulithi Atoll was considered to be one of the most important bases for the United States
fleet during World War II. Positioned near enough to the enemy to be used as an advanced
base for staging attacks at the Philippines, Okinawa, and eventually Japan, it had a huge harbor
and a number of islands that could be used for supply purposes. Ships damaged in the active
war areas frequently headed to Ulithi for repairs, and many invasion forces utilized the base
as their staging area. It was taken over by U.S. forces on 22 September 1944, and by early 1945
was taking in over 300 tons of supplies daily. An area on the island of Mog Mog was set aside
for recreation and fortunate sailors could get a couple of warm beers, swim, and play ball if
they wished. Bands frequented the island and it provided a brief respite from the tension of
war. However, it was not untouchable. Only the severe losses of the Japanese air arms prevented
them from giving it more attention. This did not apply to the submariners who piloted the
Kaitens.
In the course of Kaiten missions between 8 November 1944 and 18 August 1945, the I-
37, 44, 48, 56, 165, 368, and 370 were sunk by American attacks. Targets for these sorties
182 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Ulithi Atoll possessed a lagoon which could contain a large number of ships. This photograph was
taken on 15 March 1945 as the American forces prepared for the invasion of Okinawa. Official U.S.
Navy Photograph by Ensign Steinheimer. NARA 80G 305606.

included Ulithi Atoll, the Admirality Islands, Hollandia, New Guinea, Apra Harbor, Guam,
Iwo Jima and, as the invasion of Okinawa began, the waters around Okinawa. Only two of
the missions were successful, the first claiming the fleet oiler Mississinewa AO-59 at Ulithi
Atoll on 20 November 1944 and the second the destroyer escort Underhill DE 682 on 24 July
1945. Earlier, the liberty ship, Pontus H. Ross had been lightly damaged by a Kaiten at Hol-
landia, New Guinea on 11 January, but it was not much of a victory for the Japanese sub-
mariners.
Departing on their mission to Ulithi on 8 November 1944 were the I-36, I-37 and I-47,
which carried four Kaiten each. This was the Kaiten group known as Kikusui or “Floating
Chrysanthemums.” I-37, under Lt. Cmdr. Nobuo Kanemoto, carried Kaiten pilots Ens.
Kazuhiko Kondo and Hideichi Utsunomiya, Lt. Yoshinori Kamibeppu, and Lt. (jg) Katsutomo
Murakami. She was to attack American shipping in the Kossol Passage at the northern end
of the Palau Islands group. Surfacing to check her bearings just before 0900 on 19 November
1944, I-37 was spotted by the net-layer Winterberry AN 56 which quickly radioed her position
to the destroyer escorts McCoy Reynolds DE 440 and Conklin DE 439. Both ships dropped
depth charges which sank the sub with all hands. She had no chance to launch her Kaiten.
The sub I-36, commanded by Lt. Cmdr. Iwao Teramoto, carried Kaiten which were to
be piloted by Ens. Taichi Imanishi and Yoshihiku Kondo and Lts. (jg) Kentaro Yoshimoto
and Kazuhisa Toyozumi. Their target was the northern section of the Ulithi Atoll anchorage.
 10. Taiwan, Iwo Jima, and Ulithi 183

One Kaiten, piloted by Imanishi, was launched on 20 November, but was not successful. His
Kaiten may have run into mechanical difficulties, surfaced, and been bombed by aircraft from
Marine Air Group 45. In any event, he was unsuccessful in striking an American ship and
was killed during the mission. The other three Kaiten malfunctioned and were not launched.
The sub returned to its base at Otsujima.
On board the sub I-47 were the Kaiten pilots Ens. Akira Sato and Kozo Watanabe, along
with Lts. (jg) Sekio Nishina, and Hitoshi Fukuda. Theirs would be the only successful mission
in the Kikusui group. The commanding officer, Lt. Cmdr. Zenji Orita, was the overall com-
mander of the Kikusui group. At 0930 on 19 November, I-47 went to periscope depth inside
the Ulithi anchorage to observe potential targets. The atoll was full of ships of varying descrip-
tions, from carriers and cruisers to smaller ships. The next day’s attack was sure to be suc-
cessful.
At 0415 on 20 November 1944, the Kaiten piloted by Lt. (jg) Sekio Nishina slipped away
from the I-47. On board were the ashes of the co-inventor of the Kaiten, Lt. (jg) Hiroshi
Kuroki, which his friend Nishina carried with him. Within the next fifteen minutes the other
three manned torpedoes were underway as well.12
On the anchored fleet oiler, Mississinewa AO 59, men shook the sleep out of their eyes
and answered reveille. It was 0530 on 20 November 1944. At about that time the Kaiten, sup-
posedly piloted by Nishina, hit the Mississinewea.13 Within minutes fires and secondary explo-
sions rocked the ship and the call to abandon ship was given. Men jumped overboard, only

This sketch shows the plans for converting an I-15 type submarine to carry Kaiten. Shizuo Fukui,
Compiler. Japanese Naval Vessels at the end of War. Administrative Division, Second Demobilization
Bureau, Japan. April 25, 1947, p. l42.
184 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

to be engulfed by flames from burning oil, while others managed to fight their way to safety.
At 0900 the ship rolled over and sank. Miraculously only sixty officers and crewmen of her
complement of 298 had perished.
In the meantime, the destroyer Case DD 370 had spotted and rammed another of the
Kaiten in Mugai Channel as it attempted to attack the cruiser Chester CA 27. The ramming

The fleet oiler Mississinewa AO 59 is obscured by smoke from massive explosions after being hit by
a Kaiten manned torpedo at Ulithi Atol on 20 November 1944. This photograph was taken from
Patoka AO 49. NARA 80G 272777.
 10. Taiwan, Iwo Jima, and Ulithi 185

broke the Kaiten in two and it sank. A third Kaiten nearly hit the light cruiser Mobile CL 63.
It was sunk by depth charges shortly thereafter by the destroyer escorts Rall DE 304, Weaver
DE 741, and Halloran DE 305. Still another of the Kaiten hit a reef and exploded. Thus ended
the sortie of the Kikusui Group. Although one sub had been lost and four of the five Kaiten
failed, the sinking of the Mississinewa had been successful. As usual, exaggerated reports went
back to fleet headquarters, claiming that the manned torpedoes had sunk three carriers and
two battleships.
The Japanese decided to give Ulithi some further attention on 11 March 1945, as they
launched an air attack. Noting the extreme number of ships at Ulithi, VAdm. Matome Ugaki,
commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, had been planning an attack for some time. Japa-
nese reconnaissance planes checked Ulithi on 9 March and reported the presence of six carriers
and nine escort carriers. Ugaki correctly surmised that Task Force 58 had returned and directed
that the second Operation Tan be implemented. He gave the order for the Azusa Special Attack
Unit to take off for Ulithi as soon as possible, but incomplete weather reports delayed the
start of the operation until the next day. Taking off from Kanoya at 0900 were twenty-four
twin-engine Frances14 medium bombers. Many experienced mechanical problems during the
long flight and reported back to base that they had been forced to make emergency landings.
Ugaki waited patiently until about 1900 when reports were radioed back that the planes were
diving on American carriers at Ulithi. These reports may have pleased Ugaki, but in fact only
six of the planes had made it to the atoll. Subsequent reports to the CinC of the Combined

Randolph’s flight deck is in disarray after the kamikaze attacks of 11–12 March 1945 at Ulithi. USS
Randolph CV 15 Serial 004. Action Report for 11–12 March 1945, Attack by Enemy Plane at Ulithi. 20
March 1945.
186 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Fleet led him to recognize the failure of the operation. Reconnaissance aircraft checking Ulithi
the next day reported that it looked as though it had not been hit at all. 15
Randolph CV 15 had returned to the lagoon on 1 March after completing missions against
Japan in the area of Tokyo and supporting the landings on Iwo Jima. While at Ulithi, her crew
had time to train, get off the ship for some much needed R & R and replenish the ship’s
supplies. She sat comfortably at anchor, under condition II, which meant that her anti-aircraft
guns were manned, including two 5"/38 twin mounts and five 40mm quad mounts. Hancock
CV 19, anchored nearby, first picked up the incoming raid of four planes around 1945 and the
ships went to general quarters. According to Randolph’s action report:
At 2007 RANDOLPH was struck by a Japanese twin-engine Navy bomber, type Frances, which
approached at low altitude and high speed from a bearing relative to the ship of 120 degrees to
140 degrees. The angle of glide was very slight if any. Impact occurred at the edge of the flight
deck on the starboard side about 15 feet from the stern. The bomb load, which possibly may
have been previously released, penetrated the hull and interior bulkheads several feet below the
flight deck before exploding violently.... Parts of the plane were seen to fall in the water, others
fell through the hole in the flight deck caused by the explosion, and still others were found in
various places on the flight deck. Three bodies were found and identified as Japanese, one of
which wore the insignia of a lieutenant in the Navy.16

In the area where the plane struck, men had just finished watching a movie on the hangar
deck and had cleared the area. Another show was about to begin and men lounging on the
fantail were beginning their walk to the movie area. Had the plane hit in the middle of a show,
the casualties would have been much higher. Flames from the crash and explosion were intense,
and ammunition began to cook off. In time the fires were brought under control and by 0050
they were out. Repairs and care for the wounded and dead became the dominant order.
Twenty-five men died and 106 were wounded in the attack. Ulithi was not the safe haven
many thought it to be.
 11. Okinawa and the Ten Go Campaign

The inter-service rivalry between the Japanese army and navy had to be set aside if success
was to be achieved against the American forces invading Okinawa. Both branches had
plans that would include cooperation with the other, however, the army plan was eventually
selected and put into action. The Outline of the Operations Plan of the Imperial Army
and Navy was put forth in January of 1945, but only by great pressure was the army able to
get it adopted. Col. Ichiji Sugita, who served as Operations Staff Officer at Imperial General
Headquarters, noted that there was a great deal of resistance from the navy staff over its
adoption.1 Planning the specialized Ten Go Operation was no different. At that time, the Plan-
ning Section Chief of the Naval General Staff was Capt. Toshikazu Omae. It was his assertion
that the navy had lost so many of its experienced pilots that the next generation, still in the
training phase, would not be ready to participate in the operation at Okinawa until May of
1945.2
An additional problem for the two branches had to do with their traditional missions.
Army aviators usually operated against ground forces and targets, which did not require as
much training as did that of the naval aviators. Navy airmen usually attacked ships, which
were moving targets. This required more training time, hence the inability to produce pilots
ready for the Okinawa campaign. Additionally, the navy wanted more time to train special
attack pilots. This problem of cooperation was not a question of willingness as much as a
practical consideration.
Cmdr. Yoshimori Terai, one time head of Air Operations, Naval General Staff, indicated
that training of the special attack pilots would not be completed until the end of May 1945.
The best that the navy could do was the attack on American forces at Ulithi on 10 –11 March
1945 which failed. This put the navy in the position of sending their flyers against the Amer-
icans at Okinawa before they were ready.3
Although they had prevailed in the planning for the Okinawa operations, the army was
similarly unprepared along with the navy. They had hoped to slow the American advance by
striking a significant blow against the Americans at Ulithi. With the acceleration of the Amer-
ican timetable, the army also found itself unprepared for Okinawa. Naval officers asserted
that the 6th Air Army was even less prepared than the navy’s air arm. 4
The major air assault against the Americans at Okinawa was termed the Ten Go Opera-
tion. The operation featured a series of ten massed aircraft attacks against the ships in the
Hagushi anchorage and the waters surrounding Okinawa. Flying a combination of bombers
and fighters the Kikusui, or “Floating Chrysanthemum,” raids were designed to overwhelm

187
188 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

American defenses. In between these large raids would be a number of smaller attacks that
would seek out specific targets.
The goals of the Ten Go operation were detailed in Navy Directive No. 5410 of 1 March
1945. It called for the cooperation of both the army and navy in defeating the approaching
American forces in the East China Sea. Further, both branches were to cooperate in bolstering
the defense of the home islands. At the center of the attacks on the Americans would be the
varied special attack weapons that had proved effective in the Philippines. Army units were
assigned the primary task of attacking troop and supply convoys, while the navy would go
after the American carriers. This seemed a practical plan as the carriers would be harder
targets to hit, and skilled navy torpedo and dive bombers would have a better chance of
success against that type of ship. Of course, if army planes happened to have a clear shot at
the carriers, they would seize the opportunity. 5
It is obvious that the planning for Ten Go followed the traditional concept of the “decisive
battle,” that Japanese planners continually sought. If the American forces were placed in a
position that could be overwhelmed by a superior, or better spirited Japanese force, then the
war would end in a manner favorable to Japan. In this vein, Navy Directive No. 513, was issued
by Adm. Koshiro Oikawa on 20 March 1945. Oikawa identified the first priority of the cam-
paign to be the American carrier forces that ranged up and down the coast of Japan wreaking
havoc on her cities and military installations. All types of attacks were to be used in this cam-
paign, with heavy reliance on special attack methods. This would include the use of aircraft,
suicide boats, manned torpedoes and midget submarines. Once the carrier forces were dealt
with, the next priority would be assigned to the invasion forces which were poised ready to
strike at Okinawa. The airfields at Yontan and Kadena were particularly important as they
would serve as perfect bases from which the Americans could launch attacks on Japan’s home
islands.6 Once the carrier forces had been eliminated, the American forces at Okinawa would
become the first priority. Subsequent developments after the initial invasion of Okinawa on
1 April 1945 forced Japanese planners to alter their view of the situation. No longer was a deci-
sive battle possible, and the emphasis shifted from the concept of the decisive battle to one
in which the Americans would be bloodied in such a way as to discourage them from pro-
ceeding further. RAdm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, Chief of the Operations Bureau of the Naval
General Staff, envisioned it as a war of attrition.7
To maximize the use of their assets during the Ten Go Operation, the 6th Air Army,
commanded by Lt. Gen. Michio Sugawara, was placed under the jurisdiction of Adm. Soemu
Toyoda, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. This consolidation of the two air forces
became effective 19 March 1945.
Cooperation between the two branches was furthered by Navy Directive No. 516 of 8
April 1945, which put forth a plan for sharing airbases in both Korea and Japan. Army air
bases at Iwaki, Togane, Oshima, Yabuki, Yokoshiba, Miyakonojo East, and Niijima, would
be shared with the navy. The army would have access to navy air bases at Kanoya, Kochi,
Oita, Saishu-To and the islands of Hachijo-Jima, and Tanegashima. The army’s 7th and 98th
Air Regiments, as well as some of the navy’s units, would utilize the fields at Tachiarai, Hama-
matsu, and Nittagahara. Navy forces based on Kyushu and under attack by American aircraft,
could temporarily evacuate their planes to Gunzan and Keijo army air bases in Korea. 8
The swiftness of the American thrust toward Okinawa was anticipated by the Japanese,
but their state of readiness precluded a prompt response. This led American commanders to
an uneasy sense of security, although they knew that the Japanese were capable of much stiffer
resistance. Reality set in with the advent of the first of the Kikusui raids which began on 6
April Nine additional massed raids would last until 22 June, at which time the Americans
declared the battle for Okinawa over. A variety of bases were used to generate these raids and
 11. Okinawa and the Ten Go Campaign 189

Japanese air bases in Korea were used as places of refuge when American aircraft attacked their home
bases on Kyushu. Aircraft would use the “fly-away” tactic to avoid being destroyed. The route shown
here is typical for aircraft stationed at Kanoya, Nittagahara, and Fukuoka. Adapted from Magic FES
421, 15 May 1945.

included those of the Third, Fifth and Tenth Air Fleets and the Sixth Air Army on Kyushu,
as well as the Fifth Air Army at Keijo, Korea. From Taiwan, elements of the First Air Fleet
and Eighth Air Division sent their planes aloft and headed them toward Okinawa. The
kamikaze attacks in the Philippines, while greatly successful, would pale in comparison to the
magnitude of those launched against the Americans at Okinawa. Part of this strategy had to
190 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

do with the quality of the pilots engaged in the campaign. In the Philippines, top pilots flew
well-maintained aircraft in small groups and managed to sneak through American defenses
to strike their ships. By the time of the campaign for Okinawa, fewer of the experienced pilots
remained and many of the aircraft flown by the relatively inexperienced pilots were obsolete
or in poor repair. The only way for them to get through to the American forces would be to
launch them in mass raids, which would ensure that at least some would succeed.
In researching this topic the author has attempted to compile a comprehensive list of
actual suicide attacks and also to determine the number of special attack sorties launched by
the Japanese. Records of American naval ships are accessible, and it is possible to make a rea-
sonably complete list of ships attacked using action reports, war diaries, and ship logs. How-
ever, determining the extent of Japanese special attack sorties is not possible. This is due in
large part to the destruction of many Japanese records after the war ended. An early list of
statistics for the kamikaze sorties during the Okinawa campaign was compiled by The United
States Strategic Bombing Survey and included in Japanese Air Power, published in 1946. This
list included figures for both the Japanese army and navy. However, a later study in the
Japanese Monograph series compiled by the Second Demobilization Bureau, working under
the General Headquarters Far East Command, shows much higher figures for the Japanese
navy sorties. Japanese Monograph No. 141 Okinawa Area Naval Operations Supplement Statistics
on Naval Air Strength which was published in 1949, differs significantly. Unfortunately there
are no similar, later studies of the Japanese army special attack sorties. As a result, the chart
shown below is a combination of the two sources, with navy figures taken from JM 141 and
army figures from the USSBS study. In all probability the actual numbers for the army sorties
are higher but, given the available data, this is the most complete list possible.

SORTIES OF AIRCRAFT —1ST, 3RD, 5TH, AND 10TH

AIR FLEETS, 14 FEBRUARY 1945 –19 AUGUST 1945
Date Navy Special Attack Navy Regular Sorties Total Sorties
14 February 1945 to 5 March 1945 259 520 779
26 March 1945 to 4 May 1945 1,207 2,529 3,736
5 May 1945 to 22 June 1945 368 1,609 1,977
23 June 1945 to 19 August 1945 62 5,195 5,257
Total Naval Sorties for the period 1,896 9,853 11,749

SORTIES OF AIRCRAFT — 5TH, 6TH AIR ARMIES, AND 10TH

AIR FLEET, 6 APRIL 1945 –22 JUNE 1945
Date Army Special Attack Army Regular Sorties Total Sorties
6 –7 April 1945 125 * *
12–13 April 1945 60 * *
15 –16 April 1945 45 * *
27–28 April 1945 50 * *
3 –4 May 1945 50 * *
10 –11 May 1945 80 * *
24 –25 May 1945 100 * *
27–28 May 1945 50 * *
3 –7 June 1945 30 * *
21–22 June 1945 15 * *
Total Army Sorties for the period 6059 * *
*Data not available
The chart for Navy sorties takes in a much greater period from the inception of American attacks around Okinawa
until the end of the war. The Army statistics reflect only numbers for the ten massed Kikusui raids from April through
June of 1945.
 11. Okinawa and the Ten Go Campaign 191

Japanese Naval Air Force

By the time the Okinawa campaign began at the end of March 1945, the Japanese had
reorganized their aerial attack efforts against the American forces. Taiwan, to the south of
Okinawa, was in an important strategic position. Its proximity to the island would make it
possible to launch kamikaze raids against the invasion forces at Okinawa. Between Taiwan
and Okinawa was a string of islands, the Sakishima Gunto, which included the islands of Ishi-
gaki Shima and Miyako Jima. Aircraft flying from Taiwan to Okinawa would be able to refuel
on these islands or wait there
for an opportune moment to
complete their missions. The
First Air Fleet under VAdm.
Takajiro Onishi was based on
Taiwan. Bases for the First Air
Fleet on Taiwan included
Taichu, Kobi, Matsuyama,
Takao, Shinchiku, Tainan,
and Giran. Units of the Third,
Fifth and Tenth Air Fleets
flew from Japan proper. The
Third Air Fleet was com-
manded by VAdm. Kimpei
Teraoka, while the Tenth was
under VAdm. Minoru Maeda.
VAdm. Matome Ugaki com-
manded the Fifth Air Fleet.
They were under the overall
direction of the Commander
of the Combined Fleet, Adm.
Soemu Toyoda.
Toyoda had graduated
first in his class at the Naval
Academy in 1905 and became
an admiral in 1931. He was
one of the most capable of the
Japanese naval officers and, by
the mid–1930s, was the head
of the Naval Affairs Bureau.
In that capacity he encoun-
tered problems with the Japa-
nese army’s high command,
and from that point forward
he maintained an adversarial
relationship with the army.
His ascent to the position of
Chief of the Naval General
Staff came during the Oki-
nawa campaign. This photograph of Adm. Soemu Toyoda was probably taken in
VAdm. Matome Ugaki’s September 1944. NARA 80JO 63365.
192 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Fifth Air Fleet, based at Kanoya Naval Air Base on Kyushu, operated directly under the orders
of Adm. Toyoda. In order to coordinate the attacks against the Americans at Okinawa, some
consolidation of the air fleets and armies was necessary. On 1 April, Toyoda placed the Tenth
Air Fleet under Ugaki’s operational control, and on 16 April he added the Sixth Air Army as
well. As the Okinawa campaign wore on, the Third Air Fleet also came under his jurisdiction,

Airfields used by the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force during the
battle for Okinawa. Adapted from CinCPac-CinCPOA Bulletin No. 166 –45. Airfields in Kyushu. 15
August 1945.
 11. Okinawa and the Ten Go Campaign 193

giving him a large force at his disposal. This combination of navy and army units was known
as the First Mobile Base Air Force.
The First Mobile Base Air Force, comprised of the aforementioned units, operated from
various airfields on Kyushu, which was the southernmost island of Japan. Ugaki’s headquarters
was at the main base of Kanoya, but others such as Kagoshima, Hakata, Omura, Hitoyoshi,
Miyakonojo, Miyazaki, Kokubu, Kushira, Kasanohara, Ibusuki, Iwakawa, Tsuiki, Oita, Izumi,
and Usa launched both orthodox and kamikaze raids against the Americans at Okinawa. At
times the American forces had difficulty determining the sources of the raids, as the Japanese
pilots flying off Kyushu’s bases flew circular routes designed to confuse them as to their ori-
gin.
Kanoya was considered to be the most important of the Japanese air bases. Training
and repair facilities at the base were extremely important to the war effort. So extensive
was the technical side of the base that aircraft could readily be assembled after parts had
been shipped there. Adjoining the base were satellite fields whose functions were integrated
with that of Kanoya.10 The Amami Archipelago stretches from the southernmost tip of Kyushu
to Okinawa proper. Airfields on these islands, including Amami-O-Shima, Kikaiga Shima,
and Tokuno Shima, were ready-made pit stops for the planes transiting from the Kyushu
fields to the battle front at Okinawa. During the course of the campaign these fields became
increasingly important targets for the American forces in their attempt to thwart the kamikaze
attacks.

Bases to the north and southwest of Okinawa were forward staging areas for attacks on American
forces at Okinawa. Planes flying from bases on Taiwan used Ishigaki Shima and Miyako Jima. Aircraft
flying from Kyushu used Kikaiga Shima and Amami O Shima.
194 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

NAVY AIR FIELDS AND PRINCIPAL USES

Kyushu
Amakusa (Goryo) Rear base for suicide seaplanes
Hakata Important rear base for seaplanes such as Paul bombers, suicide Jakes, and
Alfs normally stationed at Ibusuki
Ibusuki Seaplanes such as Paul bombers, suicide Jakes, and Alfs
Izuki Alternate field for fighters
Izumi Twin-engine bombers of Tenth Air Fleet
Kagoshima Alternate field for fighters
Kanoya Headquarters Fifth Air Fleet, fighters, interceptors, Zeke fighter-bombers
employed to attack US task forces, twin-engine bombers in tactical units
including Betty/Oka
Kisaratsu Headquarters Third Air Fleet
Kasanohara Fighters
Kasumigaura Headquarters Tenth Air Fleet
Kokubu No. 1 Fighters, Tenth Air Fleet suicide Zekes and Vals
Kokubu No. 2 (Ronchi) Tenth Air Fleet suicide Zekes and Vals (satellite base)
Komatsu Rear base for twin-engine bombers in tactical units including Betty/Oka
Kushira Single engine torpedo bombers in tactical units and also Tenth Air Fleet
training units
Miho Rear base for twin-engine bombers in tactical units including Betty/Oka
Miyazaki Twin-engine bombers in tactical units including Betty/Oka
Oita Airfield and seaplane base
Omura Interceptors, patrol planes, suicide planes
Saeki Rear base for Kushira units, training and maintenance base for Fifth Air
Fleet
Takuma Important rear base for seaplanes such as Paul bombers, suicide Jakes, Alfs
normally stationed at Ibusuki
Tomitaka Zeke fighter-bombers employed to attack US Task force, earlier use as base
for twin-engine bombers in tactical units including Betty/Okas
Usa Rear base for Kushira units, rear base for twin-engine bombers in tactical
units including Betty/Oka
Rear base for Betty/Oka Units at Kanoya and Miyazaki
Taiwan
Karenko Primary fighter base
Shinchiku Headquarters First Air Fleet from mid–April 1945, fighters
Taichu (Toyohara) Fighters
Matsuyama (Taihoku) Reconnaissance planes
Takao (Shozokan) Headquarters First Air Fleet until mid–April 1945, medium bombers
Tansui Reconnaissance planes
Korea
Genzan Zeke fighters and trainers11

Japanese Army Air Force

Three Japanese army air force units were responsible for attacks against the American
forces during the Okinawa campaign. They were the Eighth Air Division, the Sixth Air Army,
and a few elements of the Fifth Air Army. The headquarters for the Eighth Air Division was
at Matsuyama (Taipei), Taiwan and it was under the command of Maj. Gen. Kenji Yamamoto.
Additional army bases on Taiwan were at Karenko, Toen, Shoka, Heito, Choshu, Giran, Ryu-
tan, Ensui, Mato, Hachikai, and Kagi. It was not unusual for aircraft from the Eighth Air
Division to use the smaller island air bases on Ishigaki-Shima and Miyako-Jima as forward
staging areas for their attacks on American forces at Okinawa.
The Sixth Air Army had moved its headquarters to Fukuoka on 18 March 1945. There
Lt. Gen. Michio Sugawara, the head of the Sixth Air Army, planned his strategy. Other Sixth
Air Army bases on Kyushu included Kikuchi, Tachiarai, Nittagahara, Chiran, Miyakanojo,
Kumamoto and Kumanosho. Sugawara operated under his immediate superior, Gen.
 11. Okinawa and the Ten Go Campaign 195

Masakazu Kawabe, who served as commander of the Air General Army. The army shared use
of the fields at Tokuno Shima, Ammami-O-Shima, and Kikaiga-Shima. There they were able
to refuel aircraft that had flown south from bases on Kyushu and wait for the opportunity to
launch their attack. These bases were vulnerable to attack by the American carrier task forces,
and planes stationed there frequently used Korean airfields as a refuge, withdrawing to them
when they sensed an imminent American attack such as that on 18 March 1945. Bolstering
these Korean bases became imperative as America stepped up its air attacks. Some air units,
previously stationed in China and Kyushu, were moved to airfields such as Gunzan and Keijo
to prepare them should their presence be needed at Okinawa or in defense of the Kyushu
bases.12 As the invasion of the home islands loomed in the not too distant future, the preser-
vation of the remainder of Japan’s air forces became increasingly important. Withdrawal of
Sixth Air Army aircraft to Korea would further that goal. Gunzan served as a base of refuge
as well as the headquarters for Lt. Gen. Takuma Shimoyama’s Fifth Air Army. Although their
attacks on American forces at Okinawa were not that numerous, the 16th and 90th Fighter
Regiments and the 8th Fighter Brigade managed to send their Lily bombers on an estimated
thirty to forty sorties against the Americans.13
As noted previously, special attack aircraft units frequently flew from Kyushu to the
island bases to the south. This enabled them to have a greater range, however, the increasing
air superiority of the American forces made this more difficult as the Okinawa campaign pro-
gressed. Tokuno Shima was a favorite target of the Americans, and the Japanese suffered sig-
nificant losses when they attempted to use the island base. Fitting extra fuel tanks on the
aircraft made it possible to extend their range and fly directly from Kyushu, but the extra
flight time wore on the pilots and their poorly maintained aircraft.
The organization of the special attacks differed between army and navy. Whereas the
navy had special attack aircraft in each of their units, the army had complete units consisting
of all kamikaze aircraft. These were “volunteer” units, however, in time volunteers became
difficult to find. Men were transferred from training and tactical units into the special attack
units, bypassing the volunteer procedure.
As the impending invasion of Okinawa loomed near, the Sixth Air Army had assembled
nine special attack units on Kyushu to combat the Americans at Okinawa. This gave the army’s
air force sixty kamikazes to add to those of the navy. Six additional units remained in eastern
Japan. Of the units sent to the Kyushu bases only three, the 20th, 21st, and 23rd Shimbu Units,
were fully operational and combat ready. This number did not seem up to the task, and within
a short time ten additional units were added, placing a strain on human as well as material
resources. Pilots just out of flight school were assigned to the new special attack units with
little hope of getting through American air cover to make successful sorties against the massive
forces arrayed at Okinawa. Their obsolete aircraft, poorly maintained and equipped, further
added to the great odds stacked against them. Nonetheless, they endeavored to make the best
of a bad situation and carried out their orders faithfully.
Army special attack units consisted of twelve airplanes, but the rigors of the Okinawa
campaign soon lessened the number to an average of six by June of 1945. Japanese planners
envisioned up to two hundred units by the end of the battle for Okinawa, but the decline in
Japan’s prospects kept about two-thirds of these in reserve for homeland defense. The concept
of the decisive battle no longer applied to Okinawa. If it was decisive, then victory had fallen
to the Americans.
On 19 March 1945, the Commander of the Mainland Defense Army had placed the Sixth
Air Army under the command of the Combined Fleet Commander, Adm. Toyoda to improve
cooperation between the two rival branches. Toyoda’s staff planned the attacks and then
informed VAdm. Ugaki and Lt. Gen. Sugawara . The two would then consult on the specifics
Airfields on Taiwan served as bases for the Japanese Army Air Force 8th Air Division and the Imperial
Japanese Navy First Air Fleet. Adapted from CinCPac-CinCPOA Bulletin No. 102 –45. Translations
Interrogations Number 26 Airfields in Formosa and Hainan. 25 April 1945, p. 6.
 11. Okinawa and the Ten Go Campaign 197

of the attack. Although he operated under Ugaki’s authority, Sugawara could determine the
number of aircraft to be used, their tactics, and other details. A crucial aspect of the kamikaze
attack was support by fighter escorts. The number of navy aircraft available for this task was
greater than that of the army. A major problem in regard to this joint venture turned out to
be communications. Neither branch was comfortable having to work with the other, partic-
ularly given their traditional rivalry for resources and their differing ideas of strategy.
A meeting of army air brigade commanders at Fukuoka on 25 March 1945 set the stage
for the army’s participation in the defense of Okinawa. Their planning for the upcoming
struggle saw the assignment of various air groups to specific bases. Initial attacks would be
instituted by the 1st Attacking Group (59th Air Regiment, 5 suicide plane units). This group
was assigned to Kikai-ga-Shima and would be closest to the invasion forces. Moved there in
secret, it was hoped that their attacks would come as a surprise to the Americans. Following
that was the 2nd Attacking Group (101st Air Brigade, 102nd Air Brigade and 2 suicide units)
which had transferred to Miyakanojo. Their attacks would follow closely on the heels of the
1st Attacking Group. Future sorties would be performed by the 3rd Attacking Group (103 Air
Regiment, 65th Air Regiment, 66th Air Regiment, and 2 suicide units) based at Chiran and
Bansei. All of these bases were in southern Kyushu and within ready striking distance of Oki-
nawa. Two heavy bomber regiments were held in reserve at Tachiarai and Kumamoto in
northern and central Kyushu respectively.14
Drawing on their distinct expertise, navy flyers would attack enemy warships, while the
army would concentrate on transport shipping. The navy fliers, trained at hitting faster targets,
would stand a better chance of hitting a destroyer or cruiser than would the army pilots. The
slower transports were better targets for the less experienced army aviators.
As previously noted, neither branch was ready for action at the beginning of the invasion
of Okinawa. This led to constant delays and the inability of the branches to carry out plans.
Two regiments of the Sixth Air Brigade, Third Attacking Group would fly the first missions
to Okinawa using Tokuno Shima as their staging area. To prepare for the attacks on 28 March,
some of the brigade units advanced planes to the island’s airfield. Eight of the planes came
from the 103rd Air Regiment and the 66th Air Regiment supplied ten. The remainder came
from the 65th Air Regiment. At 0600 on 29 March, they sortied to attack American ships in
the Okinawa area.
Japanese reports were exaggerated as usual, claiming that they had hit three warships
and a transport,15 but this is not reflected in American reports for the day with only LSM(R)
188 and LCI(G) 560 noting damage. The Japanese continued to advance aircraft to the islands
to the south of Kyushu in preparation for further attacks.
The next Japanese attack took place on 1 April 1945, as the American invasion of Okinawa
commenced. On Tokuno Shima, twenty-five aircraft from the 65th, 66th, and 103rd Air Reg-
iments, and an additional eight special attack planes from the 20th Shinbu Unit, were poised
for the dawn attack. They took off at dawn and headed for Okinawa and their destiny.

JAPANESE ARMY AIR FIELDS AND PRINCIPAL USES

Kyushu
Chiran Army reconnaissance and suicide planes
Fukuoka Headquarters Sixth Air Army
Karesahara Transports and Army airborne training base
Kumamoto Alternate field for twin-engine bombers
Kumanosho Alternate field for twin-engine bombers
Miyakanojo Principal Army fighter base
Nittagahara Alternate field for twin-engine bombers
Tachiarai Major base for twin-engine bombers16
198 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Taiwan
Ensui Training base
Giran Fighters
Kagi Medium bombers
Taichu (Toyohara) Fighters
Taihoku (Matsuyama) Headquarters Eighth Air Division, twin-engine bombers and reconnaissance
planes
Tansui Reconnaissance planes17
Korea
Gunzan Fighters, training center
Keijo Headquarters Fifth Air Army, fighters

Types of Planes
The Imperial Japanese Army Air Force flew the fighters Tojo, Oscar, Nate, Frank, Tony,
and Nick, reconnaissance planes Dinah and Sonia and the bombers Lily, Helen, Sally, Peggy,
and Mary. These were good aircraft designs and many Japanese naval officers considered them
superior to those of the navy. Kamikaze missions frequently used the Sally, Oscar, and Sonia,
however, American reports indicated that Oscars and Tonys were the army planes most fre-
quently encountered.18 Nates were used on many of the missions but their age and general
condition made them a poor choice. Frequent breakdowns, the difficulty of obtaining parts,
and worn out engines made them problematic. Added to this was the shortage of maintenance
and repair people, as many had been stranded on by-passed islands during the island-hopping
strategy of the Allied forces. A number had been lost in the Philippines as well. Poorly trained
replacements had difficulty keeping up with the work and many performed it badly due to
their inexperience. Aircraft production facilities in Japan were under constant attack by Amer-
ican bombers and that, coupled with the shortage of skilled aircraft laborers, made them put
out products of inferior quality. As the end of the war approached, both the production and
quality declined.
The army units on Kyushu faced additional problems. They were plagued by continual
attacks from American aircraft off the carriers, as well as the fields on Okinawa, Iwo Jima,
and the Marianas. The bombing of rail lines slowed the delivery of aviation gas and limited
their ability to launch missions. Gas had to be trucked in, and frequently the gas that did
arrive was of poor quality, mixed with various other combustibles that limited the flying range
and performance of the aircraft.
In like manner, the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force also had problems. They used a
variety of aircraft for the kamikaze missions: fighters, dive bombers, and trainers. The Zeke
(Zero), Jack, Rufe, Irving, and George fighters were commonly seen at Okinawa. Bombers
such as the Betty, Frances, Val, Judy, Kate, the reconnaissance plane Pete, and the Shiragiku
and Willow trainers were commonly used to attack American forces. The Zeke was the most
effective of the planes used on the suicide missions because of its great maneuverability and
speed. However, the addition of a bomb to increase the effect of its attack made it less maneu-
verable and difficult to handle. The Val dive bomber, equipped with dive brakes, was also a
very successful kamikaze plane. A late addition to the kamikaze force was the Willow trainer.
These wood and fabric biplanes were slow but maneuverable. Radar had a difficult time picking
them up and VT fuses used by the Americans would not detonate near them. Their only draw-
back was the size of the bomb load they could carry, since they were not designed as war
planes. The destroyer Pritchett, under attack at Radar Picket Station 9A on 29 July, noted:
“They were, however, highly maneuverable and used effective evasive tactics when under
fire.”19
 11. Okinawa and the Ten Go Campaign 199

Since none of the conventional aircraft were designed to be used as kamikazes, they had
to be specially modified for the mission. Kasumigaura Naval Air Depot modified the Willows
by adding bomb racks to enable them to carry 250 kg. [551 lbs.] bombs. Their engines were
also modified to allow them to run on alcohol. Since it was difficult to start their engines on
alcohol, they were primed with regular gas to get them started.
In surveying the suicide attacks at Okinawa, American reports asserted that the most
numerous of the Japanese aircraft used in suicide missions was the Val, followed by the Zeke
and then the Judy.20 Many of them were in poor repair due to the shortage of parts. Still others
had come from the production lines with defects. Quality control was deficient and many of
the parts that went into the aircraft were faulty. For instance, the George had many problems
with landing gear. According to Capt. Minoru Genda, “It was very poor. Much worse than
the average Japanese plane. In dive bombing or strafing, if the plane reached a speed of 420
M.P.H., the gear was apt to fall apart in the air. About one-fourth of the pilots we lost in
combat were lost for this reason. It got to be a better plane toward the end.”21 Another problem
with the George was that its engine sometimes stopped dead in mid-flight, causing many
crashes.

Prelude to the Invasion

Although the actual invasion of Okinawa, code named Operation Iceberg, began on 1
April 1945, the weeks leading up to the landings were fraught with danger as ships performed
various duties in the Okinawa area in preparation for the assault. Task Force 58, under VAdm.
Marc Mitscher was assigned to attack Japanese airfields on Kyushu as a prelude to the landings
on Okinawa. If the Japanese aircraft could be destroyed on the ground, there would be less
of a chance for them to attack American ships during the invasion. Intrepid CV 11 was operating
along with Yorktown CV 10, Langley CVL 27, and Independence CVL 22 as a part of RAdm. A.
W. Radford’s Task Group 58.4. A dud bomb did no damage to Enterprise, but a Betty made
a run on Intrepid and nearly succeeded. It was shot down close aboard and the explosion from
the plane set fires on the carrier’s hangar deck. Although the ship itself suffered little damage,
two men died and forty-three were wounded.
On 19 March, the ships again came under attack as their planes were in the process of
carrying out missions against Japanese shipping near the Inland Sea and the ports of Kure
and Kobe. Wasp CV 18, commanded by Capt. O. A. Weller, took a bomb at 0710 which smashed
through her flight deck into the hangar deck before exploding on the Number 3 deck, killing
101 men and wounding another 269. Her action report reveals that shortly thereafter at 0834
a JILL was sighted high overhead as he started a 50° dive between clouds at this ship. Sky One
controlling Mount No. 51 and Sky three controlling Mounts No. 43 and No. 53 in barrage com-
menced fire at about 4000 yards followed immediately by Sky Four controlling Mounts No. 52,
54 and 44 and all 40mm and 20mm on the ship that could bear. This plane came down dead
center until hit in the engine by a 5" VT projectile at about 2500 yards. Successive repeated hits
by all calibers set the plane aflame all over and put him out of control. This destructive fire com-
bined with an emergency turn to the right by ship control caused this Kamikaze attacker to
crash close aboard the port side and abreast of the deck edge elevator. 22

This crash caused minor damage to the carrier, and no personnel casualties occurred.
The following day 20 March, the destroyer Halsey Powell DD 686 came under attack. She
had been part of the screen covering the Fast Carrier Task Force. Around 1400 she was alongside
the carrier Hancock CV 19 topping off her fuel tanks. Enemy raids had been in the area most
of the morning but seemed to abate at that time. She had just cast off from the carrier when
an air attack developed. A Zeke made a dive on Hancock, overshot the carrier and crashed
200 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

The hangar deck of Intrepid CV 11 is on fire after a Betty crashed close aboard while operating off
Shikoku as part of TF 58 on 18 March 1945. This photograph was taken from Enterprise CV 6. NARA
890G 274205.

into Halsey Powell. It was not clear if the engines of the destroyer were damaged and they
were stopped momentarily for a check. Unfortunately for Halsey Powell, her steering had been
knocked out by the Zeke, which had penetrated her deck after hitting near her No. 5 5" gun.
With no control of her steering, the destroyer was nearly run down by Hancock, but a last
minute burst of speed put her in the clear. Stephen Potter DD 538 and later The Sullivans DD
537 stayed with Halsey Powell for cover. Enemy planes continued to plague the ships, and sev-
eral were driven away after being hit by fire from Halsey Powell and The Sullivans. It was
determined that the ship could make way by steering with her engines and she began the slow
trip back to safety. Twelve of her men had died and twenty-nine were injured in the attack. 23
Biloxi CL 80 suffered minor damage on 26 March. She was operating northwest of Oki-
nawa when, at 0618, a kamikaze crashed her port water line and holed her. Its bomb was a
dud, sparing the cruiser serious damage, but two of her men were injured. Also suffering
minor damage on 26 March was the light minelayer Robert H. Smith DM23, when a kamikaze
crashed about twenty-five yards on her port beam after passing closely over the ship.
As the invasion of Okinawa drew near, numerous ships were involved in shelling the
island prior to the landing of troops. Callaghan DD 792 had a close call at 0605 on 27 March
when a Val’s landing gear clipped her mast as it attempted a crash. It crashed fifty feet to port
of the ship. O’Brien DD 725 was cruising near Kerama Retto at 0624 on 27 March when a
large formation of aircraft appeared overhead. Most turned out to be American, however, at
least two were not. The first, described as a fighter type, made a run on the ship and was hit
 11. Okinawa and the Ten Go Campaign 201

Crewmen examine the hole in the deck of Halsey Powell DD 686 after she was struck by a kamikaze
while screening off Kyushu on 20 March 1945. Official U.S. Navy Photograph.

by 20 mm and 40 mm fire when it was only 300 yards away. It flamed and went into the sea
only seventy-five yards from the destroyer’s starboard beam. A Val dove on the destroyer from
nearly overhead. O’Brien’s action report indicates that
another enemy plane was sighted well in a dive on the ship. Ship was maneuvered radically in an
attempt to bring the forward battery to bear, and all available guns opened fire. Although hit
many times by 20MM and 40MM shells, the plane continued to dive and crashed into the ship
forward of amidships on the port side, passing through the superstructure deck to the starboard
side.... The plane is believed to have carried a 500 pound bomb which exploded on the starboard
side just aft of the bridge structure.... Fires were started throughout the damaged area. Changed
speed to 10 knots and came around into the wind to aid in firefighting. All available repair par-
ties and non-essential gun personnel were engaged in firefighting and rescue and care of
wounded personnel.24

The explosion of the Val’s bomb set off a magazine. Gwin DM 23 and Shannon DM 25, cruising
nearby, approached the destroyer to offer assistance, but it was determined that it would be
best if they remained close by for anti-aircraft support. The firefighting by O’Brien’s crew
proved effective, and within the space of twenty-five minutes her fires were brought under
control. In the ensuing carnage, fifty men had been killed and seventy-six wounded. Shannon
escorted her back to the transport area and Gwin continued to patrol for survivors. O’Brien
202 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

was sent back to Mare Island for repairs. About the same time that O’Brien was under attack,
Gilmer APD 11 was crashed by a Val with minor damage and light casualties.
Operating off Okinawa was RAdm. Morton L. Deyo’s Task Force 54 Gunfire and Covering
Force. One of the larger ships, Nevada BB 36, suffered a kamikaze crash on 27 March. Seven
kamikazes appeared overhead in the morning. At 0621 three Nates headed in toward the ships.
One selected Nevada, which promptly took it under fire. Her action report indicated:
The “NATE” was first sighted almost dead ahead at about 0621. The 5"/38 battery opened fire
just prior to his making a 90° turn and starting a “suicide glide” headed directly for the foremast
of the ship and ending on the NEVADA’S main deck aft. Fire was maintained when the plane
turned while a new solution was obtained. One hit was observed and the plane left a trail of
smoke. The 40MM and 20MM batteries commenced firing as the enemy plane came within their
range. 5" bursts obscured the plane momentarily. The plane commenced burning fiercely and the
40’s and 20’s were observed to hit.25

The effect of the fire was that part of the plane’s starboard wing was shot off and it crashed into
the main deck aft. It really didn’t matter if the plane was whole or in parts, the result was the
same. Burning gasoline made a mess of things, the plane’s bomb caused additional damage and,
when it was over, Nevada had eleven dead and her main battery turret had been damaged.
At about the same time that Nevada was under attack, Dorsey DMS 1 was also struck.
She was underway to Kerama Retto for logistics when three Vals approached her starboard
bow. She took them under fire and the formation split into two. One Val passed down her
starboard side, circled aft and dove on her from astern. In spite of being hit numerous times,
the Val made it through the ship’s fire and crashed the port side of Dorsey’s main deck at 0620.

Flames and smoke billow from the hole in Nevada BB 36 ’s aft deck after she was crashed by a Nate
off Okinawa on 27 March 1945. Official U.S. Navy Photograph.
 11. Okinawa and the Ten Go Campaign 203

The torso of the Japanese pilot who crashed Nevada BB 36 on 27 March is recovered in the wreckage
of his airplane. NARA 80G 274504.

Several men were blown overboard but were subsequently picked up. Damage to the ship was
minor, but Dorsey suffered three dead and two wounded. Within minutes a Betty dropped
two bombs on Dorsey which missed. The plane was shot down by other ships in the vicinity. 26
Also suffering damage that day was Foreman DE 633. She had a Val crash close aboard at 0623
after grazing her starboard bow. One of her crew was injured.
Japanese suicide boats, which had proved troublesome in the Philippines, made their
debut at Okinawa. During the evening of 27 to 28 March 1945, LCI(G) 461 was on patrol near
Tokashiki Shima when she spotted a Maru-re at 0515. She opened fire with her 20mm guns
and hit the boat, effectively putting it out of action. Seconds later, there was a massive explo-
sion. Apparently during the attack, the trigger for the depth charges carried by the boat had
been set off and exploded. Shortly thereafter the gunboat fired on a raft, destroying it. Two
Japanese were seen swimming to shore to escape.
From 28 to 29 March, several gunboats from Flotilla 6 were assigned to anti-small boat
screening west of Okinawa. At 0037 on 29 March, they were on patrol just west of Okinawa
when they came under attack. LCI(G)s 452, 558, 559, and 560 fired on and drove off a twin-
engine plane. At 0300 lookouts on LCI(G) 558 spotted a Maru-re headed in her direction on
the starboard side. The ship took it under fire at a distance of 1,000 yards. Her 40mm gunfire
threw it off course but it continued its attack. As it closed the gunboat at an estimated twenty
knots, the ship’s .50 caliber machine gun scored a number of hits on it. The OOD ordered
flank speed and full left rudder, causing the suicide boat to strike a glancing blow amidships.
Apparently the pilot of the boat was unable to loosen his depth charges at the appropriate
204 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

time and they exploded fifty yards astern of the LCI(G) 558. The Maru-re disappeared when
the depth charges went off. The gunboat fired on and turned away several other boats in the
following hours, but none approached her. One pilot, apparently with a healthy respect for
the ship’s gunfire, dropped his charges at a distance and took off, opting to fight another day.27
That same morning at 0330, as LCI(G) 452 was patrolling off the Hagushi beaches, she was
attacked by a Maru-re. It was driven off by the ship’s intense 40mm and 20mm gunfire. At
about the same time, LCI(R) 646 was on patrol further west off Kerama Retto. At daybreak
the gunboat spotted three suicide boats and challenged them. One turned toward the ship
and was demolished by 40mm gunfire. Additional gunfire from a nearby destroyer, combined
with fire from her sister gunboats, sank the other two.
Shortly thereafter, as LSM(R) 189, Barton DD 722, and Henry A. Wiley DM 29 were cruis-
ing near the LCI(G)s, lookouts on LSM(R) 189 saw a Maru-re drop its depth charges near the
bow of LCI(L) 560. The 189 approached to render assistance, at which time the suicide boat
turned toward her to make a run. A shell from her 5" gun blew it out of the water. A short
time later another boat approached the LSM(R) and was sunk by 40mm fire. LCI(G) 560 was
not damaged but soon had a closer call. At 0615 three Nates attacked the gunboats. One went
down off the bow of LCI(G) 560, a second passed over and flew away, and the third grazed
her conn and took off her mast. It caused some minor damage and injured one man.
LSM(R) 188 was one of twelve newly-converted landing ships medium (188 –199). The
LSM(R)’s task was inshore fire support and she was ideally suited for the role. With her draft
of only 7' 9" fully loaded, she was capable of getting close inshore to bombard a landing area or
shore target with rockets and gunfire. LSM(R)s 188 –199 were all assigned to the Okinawa cam-
paign as their first war effort. Their armament consisted of a single 5"/38 dual purpose gun
mounted aft, two 40mm anti-aircraft guns, three 20mm anti-aircraft guns, seventy-five 4-rail
MK36 rocket launchers and thirty 6 rail MK30 rocket launchers. In the ships numbered from
196 to 199, the rocket launchers were improved and those ships carried eighty-five automatic
MK 51 rocket launchers. For its intended purpose it was a fearsome ship. However, many met
their fate at Okinawa because they were used in roles other than shore attack. Their 206' length,
coupled with their relatively slow speed of thirteen knots and poor anti-aircraft capabilities,
made them easy targets for the kamikazes. The rationale for placing them on the radar picket
stations was that since they were larger than the LCS(L)s they would be more capable of towing
damaged destroyers. LSM(R) 188 would be the first of the group damaged at Okinawa.
During the evening of 28 –29 March, three days prior to the actual invasion of Okinawa,
the 188 was patrolling about eight miles east of Naha when she came under attack. At about
0600 on 29 March, the ship’s lookouts spotted enemy aircraft to starboard and took them
under fire. One plane appeared to be hit by the ship’s fire. A second plane, although hit, circled
around and came at the rocket ship. It was on fire as it passed over the ship. Pieces of the air-
craft fell off, hitting the ship and causing an explosion on deck before the plane crashed sev-
enty-five yards to starboard. It had been a close miss but the damage was still extensive, she
was out of the war. Fifteen men had died and thirty-two were injured.
Indianapolis CA 35, in the company of Salt Lake City CA 25, was cruising eleven miles
west of Zampa Misaki at 0708 on 31 March when she came under attack. An Oscar emerged
from cloud cover and made a run at her starboard side. Although it was hit by 20mm gunfire
from the ship, it managed to pass over most of the cruiser before crashing into the port side
of the main deck near the side of the ship. Its bomb penetrated the deck and then passed
through the side of the ship to explode alongside. She was repaired the next day at Kerama
Retto and was soon back in action. Her casualties were nine dead and twenty wounded.
The invasion had not yet taken place, but ships and men had already suffered at the hands
of the Tokko-tai fliers.
 12. The Invasion of Okinawa, Week One

Having secured a substantial foothold in the Philippines, the American leadership deter-
mined that the next goal for the combined navy and army forces would be the island of Oki-
nawa, situated only 350 miles south of Japan’s island of Kyushu. Defense of the island was
sure to be intense and the attacking ships and troops could expect regular air attacks from
the island of Taiwan to the south, as well as Kyushu to the north. To assault the island, the
navy would commit 1,213 ships with still another 104 as support vessels. The number of army,
navy, and Marine personnel assigned to the task was over 450,000. With the importance of
the island uppermost in the minds of both adversaries, the battle was destined to be bloody.
As usual, the focus here will be on the ships and their struggles against the kamikazes.
On 1 April 1945, the attack transport Alpine APA 92 was operating as part of Task
Group 51.13 carrying troops for the invasion of Okinawa. In addition to her cargo of 117
combat vehicles, she also carried fifty-nine tons of gas, 125 tons of explosives and eleven tons
of demolition explosives. Alpine was a bomb waiting to go off. It is unclear if the embarked
army troops knew this it, but it did not add to their sense of well-being if they did. They
numbered forty-eight officers and 828 enlisted men of various units, including infantry, field
artillery, medical detachments, and others. Fortunately, Alpine had already landed them and
was retiring off shore when she was hit by a kamikaze. Her action report of 10 April 1945 indi-
cates:
At approximately 1904 “FLASH RED — CONTROL YELLOW — All ships make smoke” was
broadcast over voice circuits. About 1905 “stop smoke — do not make smoke unless ordered by
me” received over voice circuit from CTF 51. All guns were alerted and immediately thereafter
two (2) planes were reported approaching from just abaft the starboard beam, position angle
twenty-five degrees. Planes were sighted and identified as enemy (low wing, single engine
fighters— probably ZEKES or TOJOS). At the same time the planes were sighted they were taken
under fire by many ships, much of the fire being indiscriminate and directed at other tracer
streams rather than the targets.... Orders were issued at that time for all gunners who were on
the target to commence firing. 20MM guns No. 1 and 3 opened fire, expending thirty (30)
rounds before losing the target. Planes were seen to diverge, one going into a dive on our star-
board beam and the second sheering off to the left and passing astern. Sight of the second plane
was momentarily lost as attention was directed to the first and closer plane. Almost immediately
attention was brought back to the second plane by firing of the after 20MM guns ... the plane
which ultimately crashed into the ship was approaching in a steep dive from one point on the
port quarter, altitude then about 1,000 ft. First impression was that the plane would overshoot
the ship. The plane then went into a half roll to the left that brought the wings into a vertical
position and the under side of the fuselage towards the starboard side of the signal bridge. 1

205
206 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

The crash into Alpine’s starboard side at the main deck started fires and set off several explo-
sions. Within a short time she was listing seven degrees to port. However, the firefighting
efforts of her crew were effective and by 2300 the ship was secure. None of her cargo of gas,
ammo, or explosives had been set off. Nonetheless, sixteen of her men had died and nineteen
were wounded. After off-loading the remainder of her cargo, she headed back to the U.S. for
repairs.
The light minelayer Adams DM 27 was patrolling southeast of Kerama Retto when she
was attacked by Japanese aircraft. A Japanese plane made a run on her, was hit by her gunfire,
went out of control and crashed just aft of the ship. Its two bombs went off under the ship,
jamming the rudder, and she was unable to maneuver. As she steamed in right hand circles,
two other planes attacked her. Mullany DD 528 shot one down and Adams the other. She was
towed back to Kerama Retto for repairs.2
Simultaneously with the landings at the Hagushi area, the American forces faked a landing
at the southeastern part of Okinawa. A number of landing ships and transports from Task
Group 51.2 were engaged in the “demonstration landing.” LST 884, carrying 300 Marines to
the demonstration, was hit at 0549 when a kamikaze crashed her port quarter and set off her
ammo stores. With fires raging, Van Valkenburgh DD 656 and LCS(L)s 115, 116, 118, and 119
came alongside to render aid. Parties went aboard to assist in fighting the fires, and hoses
from these ships provided water to extinguish the flames. Earl Blanton, who served as a gun-
ner’s mate on the LCS(L) 118, later wrote:
Then we had a boarding party to board the LST to fight fire below decks and I honestly wanted
to go but they wouldn’t let me. I had to stay with my gun and a couple men in case of further air
attack. The fellows had a steady battle below decks and when things started looking pretty good
the ammo started going off. It’s lucky it didn’t all go off at once. And for the first time I was a
little scared. It went off in small explosions and bursts but yet powerful enough to blow stuff all
over the ship. It sounded like a regular battle going on with the shells dinging around inside the
ship. The boys cut a hole in a bulkhead next to a magazine and stuck a hose through with a fog
nozzle and cooled it down. After this magazine was cooled down most of the fire was out. It
started at 0600 and it was now 1200. The LST had a good bit of water in her from the hoses and
had a bad list to the starboard which was good. It raised the hole on the port side up from the
water.3
Beginning at 1225 they started pumping her out to correct the list. Twenty-four men had died
and twenty-one were wounded in the attack.
LST 724, cruising just ahead of the 884, also came under attack about the same time. The
Tony that attacked her fell under her guns and crashed only fifty feet from the ship, blowing
two men overboard and littering the port quarter with engine parts. She suffered no damage
and the two men were recovered by a small boat from LST 884.
Also crashed by a kamikaze during the demonstration was the attack transport Hinsdale
APA 120, which was carrying units of the Second Marine Division. In the early morning hours,
as she maneuvered to take her place for the bogus landing, she came under attack. At 0550
she was crashed by a Tony carrying three bombs which struck her at the waterline on her port
side. One bomb exploded in the engine room and another in the fire room. A third bomb did
not go off and was removed a few days later. Fires broke out and the crew set about working
to save their ship as she lay dead in the water. The fires were quickly extinguished and the
ship stabilized. She was towed back to Kerama Retto for preliminary repairs. Her casualty list
was sixteen dead and thirty-nine injured.4
West Virginia BB 48 had been bombarding the beaches and inshore area near the Hagushi
beachhead in support of the landings. At about 1910 three bogeys were reported approaching
the area. An Oscar with a 551-lb. bomb made it through her anti-aircraft fire at 1913 to crash
her superstructure deck. Its bomb penetrated the deck, but it was a dud, saving the battleship
 12. The Invasion of Okinawa, Week One 207

This sketch, from the action report of LST 724, shows the attack on LSTs 724 and 884 on 1 April 1945.
U.S.S. LST 724 Serial 121. Anti-aircraft Action Report—submission of. 3 April 1945, p. 5.
208 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

from further damage. Nonetheless, four men had died and twenty-three were injured in the
attack. She repaired her damage and was able to continue on her mission.5
The following day, 2 April, would see several more of the transports hit by kamikazes.
Included in the lot were Achernar AKA 53, Tyrrell AKA 80, Dickerson APD 21, Telfair APA 210,
Goodhue APA 107, and Henrico APA 45.
Early in the morning of 2 April at 0043, Achernar was struck as she headed for night
retirement south of Kerama Retto. She had transported personnel from VMF(N)-543 to Oki-
nawa. The Marine fighter squadron would be based at Kadena air field. A Sonia struck her
starboard side above the main deck, its bomb penetrating below. According to Japanese
records, this was one of the first kamikaze attacks carried out by the Japanese army air forces.
Capt. Minoru Hasegawa and 2nd Lt. (jg) Nishi Yamamoto piloted the two special attack air-
craft. Their flight had taken off from Tokuno Shima and was escorted by nine fighters from
the 66th and 103rd Air Regiments of the Army Third Attack Division.6 The crash caused two
explosions, one from the plane and the second from its bomb. They were nearly simultaneous
and started fires through the area of the impact. Expert firefighting measures by the crew soon
had the blaze under control. The ship had taken a list to port which was soon corrected, and
the ship looked after its casualties of which there were five dead and forty-one wounded.
Tyrrell AKA 80 had finished landing her troops at the Hagushi beachhead and had
remained in the area to support the landings. She had a close call at 0555 when a twin-engine
bomber attempted to crash her but narrowly missed the bridge. It clipped off the antenna,
struck a boom, and careened into the water before exploding close aboard. Debris rained
down upon the ship’s deck, but it was not seriously damaged.
Dickerson had been operating with Task Unit 51.7, landing troops and supplies at Keise
Shima in the Kerama Retto islands. The invasion attempt was completed and some of the
troops of the 77th Division had been taken back on board for transport elsewhere. Dickerson
retired to Transport Area Fox, which was about twenty miles southwest of Okinawa to await
further orders. Nearby, Shannon DM 25 had fired on and driven off a twin engine plane. It
had been hit by her gunfire and was smoking as it headed for other ships in the area. About
1830 Dickerson’s lookouts spotted three Zekes and two Nicks converging on the transports.
The Nick that had been hit by Shannon circled over the ship and came in on the Dickerson
from astern. It was taken under fire by the ship’s stern guns but to no avail. Lt. (jg) James D.
Ebert, who had just been relieved as Officer of the Deck at 1825, related what happened next:

I saw the plane hit the top of number one stack. At that point I was thrown to the deck by a loud
blast. Upon recovering my senses undoubtedly only a few seconds later, I found the situation to
be grave. Two fire-controlman, Lt. (jg) GEORGE, and myself were apparently the only men alive
forward of the galley deck house. The plane had swept the galley deck, killing most of the two
gun crews there; a few had jumped just before the crash and were saved. It evidently then
crashed into the base of the bridge structure, toppling the mast over towards the after end of the
ship. The entire well deck and bridge structure below me were a mass of flames. The four of us,
unable to move aft, turned forward for a means of escape. Jumping from the flying bridge to the
twenty millimeter platform forward of the bridge, we then jumped to the deck of the forecastle.
There we found a scene of almost indescribable horror. An explosive force, of undetermined
origin, had completely eliminated number one three inch gun, leaving a hole in the deck twenty
to twenty-five feet wide, across the forecastle, and twelve to fifteen feet in length. The C.P.O.
quarters below was a mass of rubble. The men serving on number one gun were horribly muti-
lated; from the devastation wrought, it is my opinion that a bomb, very likely dropped from a
plane above was the cause. It could have hardly come from the suicide plane, considering the
angle of his approach.7

Bunch APD 79 came alongside to assist in firefighting and Herbert APD 22 picked up survivors.
Confusion reigned as both the ship’s CO, Lt. Cmdr. Ralph E. Loundsbury, and its XO, Lt. A.
 12. The Invasion of Okinawa, Week One 209

G. McEwen, had been killed. The remaining officers led the crew in firefighting, but with the
fires approaching the ship’s magazine and the nighttime conditions, it was determined that
it was necessary to abandon ship. Bunch continued fighting the fires until they were under
control. Reboarding the ship the next day, the surviving officers with a skeleton crew stayed
on board as she was towed back to Kerama Retto. Dickerson was declared a total loss, towed
out to sea and sunk on 4 April 1945. Her casualties were fifty-four dead and ninety-seven
wounded.
The attack transport Henrico APA 45 was hit about the same time. She was part of Task
Group 53.4 and was carrying reserve troops of the 305th Regimental Combat Team and the
Headquarters Company of the 77th Division. As with Dickerson, she was retiring to a night
position to the southwest of Kerama Retto when she was hit by a twin-engine Frances.
At 1830 four planes were spotted at a distance of about seven miles from the ships but
were soon lost in the cloud cover. Within minutes a Tony appeared and headed for Henrico
but turned away. At 1836 a Frances came out of the clouds and made a run on the transport.
Army gunners manning the starboard 40mm took it under fire along with one of the ship’s
20mm guns, but they failed to stop its progress. Two minutes later it crashed into Henrico
on the starboard side of her bridge deck. As with most kamikazes, this one carried a bomb
which penetrated the deck and exploded below. Fire mains were damaged in the impact and
the subsequent explosion which made firefighting a problem. Power to the engines was soon
out and the ship went dead in the water. Hobson DM 26 and Suffolk AKA 69 stood by to assist
as the crew fought the fires. By 2100 they were under control, but the ship was unable to move
under her own power. Hobson began to tow her back to Kerama Retto at 2330 and Yume ATF
94 took over at 0530. It was a costly crash for the American forces, forty-nine had died and
125 were wounded in the attack. Her action report for the incident revealed that the crash
killed Henrico’s temporary Commanding Officer, Capt. W. C. France, the Commander Trans-
port Division Fifty, Capt. E. Kiehl, the Commanding Officer of the 305th Regiment, Col. V.
J. Tanzla, and Col. L. O. Williams, Executive Officer of the 305th Regiment.8 Henrico was put
out of the war.
Telfair APA 210 and Goodhue APA 107, which were in the company of Henrico, were also
in retirement the evening of 2 April when they were both struck by kamikazes. At 1830 an
estimated ten Japanese aircraft assaulted ships in the area of which three made runs on the
two transports. One crashed into the sea after being struck by the combined fire of the two
ships, but the second and third found their marks. Telfair was crashed by a Sally between her
starboard and port kingposts before the plane skidded off the side of the ship to land in the
water.9 At 1849 Goodhue took the hit on her aft 20mm gun tub as a Nick struck her a glancing
blow and then crashed close aboard. On board Telfair one man died and sixteen were
wounded, whereas Goodhue’s losses included twenty-four dead and 119 wounded.
LCI(G)s 568 and 465 also came under kamikaze attack on 2 April. The two gunboats
were on “skunk patrol” in the area between Motobu Peninsula and Ie Shima looking for
suicide boats, PT boats, and midget subs. Daylight hours on 2 April had seen the ships iden-
tifying onshore targets and firing on them as they were discovered. At 1845 a Japanese plane,
either a Tony or a Judy, crashed into the aft gundeck of LCI(G) 568. The ship’s gunners had
taken it under fire on the way in and it seemed as though the damage threw the plane off
target. The impact and subsequent explosion knocked out the ship’s two 20mm guns. One
man died and four others were injured. At about the same time another plane dove on LCI(G)
465, but fire from the ship caused it to crash short of its target. 10
Task Unit 51.92 (Gunboat Division Six) was on patrol on the eastern coast of Okinawa
on 3 April 1945. Included were LCI(G)s 79, 82, 347, 453, 455 and 725. Each of the gunboats
was operating in assigned sections about three miles long and two miles wide, with the Tracy
210 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

DM 19 overlapping their patrols to seaward. The sky was dark with no moon. The following
morning, at about 0125, a Shinyo was observed forward of LCI(G) 82 making a run on the
gunboat from seaward.
The order to open fire was given. Approximately fifty rounds were fired from the 30 caliber
machine gun on the conning tower; but the fire was believed to have gone astern of the boat.
The 40mm and 20mm gunners were unable to get off any fire at all. The 20mm gunner states
that he was unable to loosen the retaining clamp and train the gun around in time to fire. The
40mm pointer either froze in his seat or did not see the target (which is improbable considering
that the boat was approaching from the moonlit side.) (The 40mm pointer is still missing and
consequently a statement from him cannot be presented.)
The boat approached rapidly, turned, and crashed into the ship on the port side just forward
of the conning tower. A double explosion resulted, tearing a large hole in the side of the ship....
The explosion knocked out all the ship’s lights and the ship immediately heeled to starboard. 11

Flames began shooting out from forward areas of the ship and ammunition soon began
to explode. Water mains had been ruptured by the blast and fighting fires was not possible.
The CO, Lt. (jg) Theodore Arnow, gave the order to abandon ship. Wounded men were put
in life rafts and LCI(G) 347 picked up a number of them twenty minutes later. Tracy picked
up others. At 1500 an inspection party reboarded the gunboat and found her to be nearly bro-
ken in two forward of the conning tower. The blast had ripped a hole in the port side approx-
imately twenty feet long. After destroying sensitive paperwork and equipment the party left
the ship. At about 1600 the ship rolled over, broke in two and went under. Eight men had
died in the attack and eleven were wounded.
On 3 April Hambleton DMS 20 was steaming with Lindsey DM 32, Ellyson DMS 19, Rod-
man DMS 21, and Emmons DMS 22 when she was damaged by a kamikaze. At 1745 a Val came

The above chart shows the numbers of aircraft active in the ten Kikusui attacks at Okinawa from 6
April through 22 June 1945. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) Naval Analysis Division.
The Campaigns of the Pacific War. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p.
328.
 12. The Invasion of Okinawa, Week One 211

at her from dead ahead and was taken under fire by all the ships in the group. The pilot made
a run on her bridge but apparently was hit by fire from the ships. The plane struck Hambleton
a glancing blow with its right wing and hit the water off her port quarter. Damage to the ship
was minimal and there were no casualties.
Wake Island CVE 65 was operating southeast of Okinawa on 3 April. At about 1730 enemy
aircraft were picked up on radar approaching her position. Simultaneous with this she hit
some rough water which flipped two of her Wildcats overboard and tossed several more
around. Two kamikazes attempted to crash her, one splashing close aboard her port bow and
the other just off her starboard side. The starboard plane exploded and opened her hull below
the waterline, causing flooding. Significant damage was done to her hull and areas below
deck, but by 2140 she was heading to Kerama Retto under her own power. She received tem-
porary repairs and headed to Guam on 6 April for five weeks of additional repair work. She
had no casualties from the attack.12
LST 599, carrying personnel of VMF-322, was anchored off Kerama Retto when she was
crashed by a Tony at 0715 on 3 April. The plane that hit her was one of a flight of eight Tonys
operating as special attack aircraft and escorted by five additional Tonys. They were from the
105th Air Regiment at Matsuyama Air Base on Taiwan. The Tony penetrated her deck and
caused massive damage to the ship and its cargo. VMF-322 suffered the loss of most of its
equipment and had twenty-one wounded.13 This attack was a double hit for the kamikaze
pilot. Stored on the deck of LST 599 was LCT 876, which also sustained serious damage in
the attack. On board the LST twenty-one men were injured while the LCT crew had two
injured.

Kikusui No. 1
Beginning on 6 April 1945, the Japanese launched a series of ten massed raids against the
American forces at Okinawa. The combined operation was known as the Ten Go Campaign
and each of the ten raids were referred to as Kikusui 1 through 10. The first and largest of these
raids was from 6 to 7 April and, according to the USSBS study, consisted of 230 kamikazes
from the navy and 125 from the army, escorted and supported by 344 other aircraft from both
the Japanese army and navy air wings. They would take their toll on the ships at Okinawa
with a total of twenty-six ships damaged or sunk by kamikazes in the two-day raid. Of these,
Bush DD 529, Colhoun DD 801, and LST 447 would be sunk and Leutze DD 481, Morris DD
417, Mullany DD 528, Newcomb DD 586, Witter DE 636, Rodman DMS 21, Defense AM 317,
Maryland BB 46, and Bennett DD 473 suffered heavy damage.
The destroyer Newcomb DD 586 was screening for St. Louis CL 49 on 6 April when she
came under heavy attack Although the combat air patrol, coupled with the radar picket ships,
had managed to intercept and shoot down a large number of incoming planes, the magnitude
of this raid was such that it was impossible to get them all. Many slipped through the big blue
blanket and made it to the Hagushi area where ships of every description were busy supplying
and supporting the invasion. Newcomb estimated that there were at least forty enemy aircraft
in the area near her. She was attacked by seven of them, four of which struck her. The other
three fell under her guns.
She was patrolling about six miles south of Ie Shima in the company of Howorth DD 592
when the first enemy planes appeared. The combat air patrol could be observed over and near
the island as they shot down many aircraft. Newcomb noted that the Japanese pilots seemed
to be inexperienced. They apparently were incapable of any but the most elementary evasive
maneuvers, and the Hellcats pursuing them had no problem closing on them and shooting
them down. At 1612 Howorth took the first hit as a kamikaze struck her 5"/38 director and
212 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

superstructure, killing nine men and wounding fourteen. A few minutes later, at 1624, it was
Newcomb’s turn. She combined fire with Howorth and shot down a Val. A minute later another
Val made a dive on her and crashed into the water only twenty feet off her starboard beam.
Together the destroyers shot down two more attackers. Howorth seemed to be their first choice
as a target and four more planes were shot down by the two destroyers. At 1710 the ships were
ordered to their night retirement positions, but within a half hour two more planes made a
try at Howorth and missed, splashing into the sea. Newcomb took her first kamikaze hit at
1800. A minute or so before the crash, her lookouts observed a plane coming in low on the
water headed for her port beam. Although the ship’s gunners fired on the kamikaze they
couldn’t stop it. It crashed into Newcomb’s after stack, starting fires in the upper handling
room of nearby 5"/38 mount No. 3. Within minutes a second plane tried for her and was shot
down, however, a third could not be stopped and crashed her amidships near the torpedo
workshop. The bomb from this plane caused a massive explosion. She reported:
All power was lost at this time as both engine rooms and the after fireroom were blown into a
mass of homogeneous rubble. The after stack, both torpedo mounts, all amidship superstruc-
ture work, 40 mm mounts and magazines were disintegrated and blown over the side. The deck-
ing from frame 102 to 137 was ruptured longitudinally and blown up to port at a 45 degree angle
and down to starboard. A huge fire was raging through the after deck house area, including
number three upper handling room and the crew’s after head. Smoke and flames towered over
NEWCOMB to heights of over 1000 feet. The situation was grave as NEWCOMB slowed and
came to rest dead in the water on an approximately easterly heading 3000 yards from the screen-
ing ships of TG 54.2. With intentions of polishing NEWCOMB off a fourth plane raced towards
NEWCOMB from the port beam and although under fire by her forward batteries came through
to crash into the forward stack spraying the entire amidship section of NEWCOMB, which was
a raging conflagration, with a fresh supply of gasoline.14

Leutze DD 481 came alongside to render assistance at 1811. As she was preparing to assist
in firefighting, another plane made a run on Newcomb, struck her a glancing blow and plowed
into Leutze at the waterline. The bomb went off underwater and the effect on Leutze was the
same as if she had been torpedoed. She cleared away from Newcomb to tend to her own damage
and Beale DD 471 took over her firefighting duties. The bomb had effectively put her out of
commission. In addition to extreme flooding in her aft section, Leutze’s two shafts were bent
and only her starboard engine had limited power to move the ship. Leutze was in danger of
sinking and all topside material that could be jettisoned went over the side in order to improve
her stability. Her commanding officer, Lt. Leon Grabowski, rallied his men and, through a
superhuman effort, Leutze remained afloat. Defense AM 317 towed her back to Kerama Retto.15
The fleet minesweeper had her share of action earlier in the day. Around 1800 she had been
attacked by four Vals. One went down under her guns, but two crashed her, wounding nine
men. Damage to the ship was minimal and she remained in the area, rescuing men from New-
comb and Leutze.16 Newcomb was taken in tow by Tekesta ATF 93 and screened by Twiggs DD
591 and Porterfield DD 682. She arrived at Kerama Retto around 0930 the next morning and
dropped anchor. Newcomb and Leutze looked as though they were ready for the scrap yard,
but they were repaired and eventually returned to duty.
Morris DD 417 was on patrol off Ie Shima on 6 April and encountered enemy aircraft
throughout the day. At 1330 a Sally made a run at her but was driven off after Morris’ gunners
scored some hits on it. Seconds later the Combat Air Patrol dove on it and shot it down. At
1640 she fired on three Vals that approached her position.
Witter DE 636 was on patrol southeast of Okinawa when she came under attack. At 1611
she was approached by two Japanese aircraft and took them under fire. Both were hit by her
guns and one crashed a distance from the destroyer escort, but his companion made it through
to crash into Witter at the starboard waterline. As with most attacks, the plane released its
 12. The Invasion of Okinawa, Week One 213

bomb just prior to the impact, allowing it to penetrate the side of the hull and explode below.
The site of the crash was perfect for the kamikaze, and Witter immediately began taking water.
Fires started by the attack were quickly extinguished and, with the help of Morris, Richard P.
Leary DD 664, Gregory DD 802, and Arikara ATF 98, she eventually made it back to Kerama
Retto under her own power. Witter numbered six dead and six wounded among her casual-
ties.17

The destroyer Newcomb DD 586 was attacked by a kamikaze on 6 April 1945 as she was screening for
the cruiser St. Louis CL 49 off Okinawa. NARA 80G 330100.
214 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Damage to Newcomb DD 586 is in evidence after the attack of 6 April 1945. NARA 80G 330105.

Griffin APD 38 and Gregory were under attack and managed to shoot down three planes,
one of which narrowly missed Griffin. At about that time, Hyman DD 732 came under attack.
She shot down several kamikazes, but a Hamp got through and crashed near her torpedo
tubes, setting the area on fire. She managed to extinguish the flames as even more kamikazes
attacked her, two of which she shot down. Sterrett DD 407, cruising nearby, shot down a Val
at 1725. At 1811, it was Morris’ turn. She picked up an incoming Kate at twenty miles and fol-
lowed it on her radar. At 10,000 yards she opened fire with her main battery, and shortly
thereafter, with her 40mm and 20mm guns. Although the plane seemed to be hit, it made it
through to crash into Morris between her No. 1 and No. 2 5" guns, causing an immediate
explosion and fires. As with many kamikaze crashes, the impact and explosion damaged fire
mains and firefighting ability was compromised. Griffin came alongside to assist in firefighting.
By 2030 Morris’ fires were out and she began the trip back to Kerama Retto under diminished
speed with the other damaged ships. Her losses were thirteen dead and forty-five wounded. 18
Mullany DD 528 was in company with several other ships patrolling to the east of Oki-
nawa when she was hit by a kamikaze at 1745. The plane was a low wing fighter described as
either a Tojo, Oscar, or Zeke. The destroyer took it under fire at 6,000 yards and scored some
hits but not enough to stop the attack. It crashed Mullany on the port side of the after deck
house. Her action report indicates that
the plane hit at about 1746, exploded with a spray of gasoline, and started large fires. The area
between 5" mount No. 3 and mount No. 5 was ablaze, 40mm ammunition was exploding about
the burned area. The deckhouse, 40mm mount and director, were a mass of torn wreckage.
 12. The Invasion of Okinawa, Week One 215

Leutze DD 481 was damaged by a kamikaze as she came to the aid of Newcomb DD 586 on 6 April
1945. USS Leutze DD 481 Serial 0080. Action Report, War Damage Report, 6 April 1945. 5 May 1945.
Enclosures.

Leutze DD 481 suffered heavy damage to her port side aft in the attack.

Steering control and other communications to the part of the ship abaft the after deck house
were lost. Power throughout the 5" and 40mm battery was temporarily lost, but shift to emer-
gency power was carried out, and in about twenty seconds control of 5" mounts No. 1 and No.
2, and 40mm mounts No. 41, No. 42, No. 43, and No. 44 was recovered.... The initial explosion
carried away parts of the after bulkhead of the after engine room, spraying the engine room with
fuel oil and scalding water from auxiliaries adjacent to that bulkhead. This drove the engine
room personnel forward, and after clearing debris from the top of the main deck hatch, they
abandoned the engine room, with all hands safe, one man receiving first degree burns on neck
and ears. The after generator failed at this time.19
216 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

A kamikaze attack on 6 April 1945 caused this damage to Morris DD 417 as she patrolled off Ie Shima.
NARA 80G 330109.

In an attempt to safeguard the

ship, torpedoes and depth
charges were jettisoned. How-
ever, some of the depth charges
could not be reached and,
before long, they began to cook
off. The first exploded at 1809
killing a number of the crew
and damaging the ship further.
Seeing an opportunity, another
kamikaze lined up for a run on
the ship but was hit by fire from
the ship’s 5" guns and shot
down. This plane was followed
by a third which was also
destroyed. LCI(G) 461 was the
first ship to come to Mullany’s
aid. She played water on the
fires with her hoses and assisted
in the firefighting. Gherardi
DMS 30, Purdy DD 734, Execute

Morris DD 417 ’s starboard side

was severely damaged. NARA 80G
330101.
 12. The Invasion of Okinawa, Week One 217

AM 232, and PGM 10 soon arrived on the scene to assist Mullany. At 1829, with ammunition
continuing to cook off and the fires spreading, her CO, Cmdr. Albert O. Momm, gave the
order to abandon ship as Gherardi stood by. Capt. Frederick Moosebrugger, in command of
the destroyer screen, had ordered Purdy DD 734 to assist Mullany. Momm reported on board
Purdy DD 734 and after consultation with Purdy’s CO, Cmdr. Frank L. Johnson, it was deter-
mined that further efforts should be made to save Mullany. Purdy set about pouring water on
the flaming destroyer and finally managed to extinguish the fires. Momm reboarded his ship
with a skeleton crew and the ship limped back to Kerama Retto. Mullany had thirty dead and
thirty-six wounded.
Emmons DMS 22, Rodman DMS 21 and Macomb DMS 23 were supporting Sweep Unit
11 which was clearing the channel between Okinawa and Iheya Retto on 6 April. At 1515
Macomb reported two enemy aircraft approaching their position and the ships went to general
quarters. A large flight of enemy planes headed for Okinawa passed near the ships. The pres-
ence of Tonys, Vals, and Zekes, indicated that both Japanese army and navy air arms were
active in the attack. One made a dive on Rodman, crashing into her port bow. Its bomb was
released just before the impact and exploded under the ship. Fortunately Rodman’s engineering
plant was undamaged by the crash and she was still able to maneuver. A second plane dropped
a bomb which missed. Emmons came to the aid of her sister ship to assist in firefighting, but
Rodman’s crew had everything under control. Emmons and Macomb circled the area providing
anti-aircraft support for the damaged minesweeper. Later estimates of the number of bogeys
in the area ran from fifty to seventy-five. A number of them attacked the three ships, and
Rodman sustained two more crashes but remained afloat. Emmons came under attack next.
Her action report indicated:
As we supported the USS RODMAN many attacks were directed at us. Tonys, Vals and Zekes
were identified. The USS EMMONS definitely “splashed” six planes before suffering the first of
five hits. During this time four other attacks missed the ship by a matter of a few yards. All five
hits occurred in rapid succession, almost instantaneously, and were well coordinated. The first
hit was taken on the fantail at about frame 175; the second on the starboard side of the pilot
house; the third on the port side of Combat Information Center; the fourth on the starboard
side of number three five-inch gun; and the fifth near the water line at frame 30, starboard
side.... All of the hull aft of frame 175 was entirely missing and serious damage was inflicted on
the port screw rendering it inoperable. The entire bridge structure was destroyed and fire raged
in all spaces from frame 67 forward to gun one, from the main deck up. Little or nothing
remained of the decks from the main deck to the bridge overhead in that area. 20
Wounded in the attack on Emmons was her skipper, Lt. Cmdr. Eugene N. Foss, and command
of the ship passed to Lt. John J. Griffin, Jr. Maximum damage to the minesweeper was caused
by the combination of aircraft crash and the accompanying bomb, as each of the planes was
judged to carry a bomb in the attack. Extinguishing fires in the aft section of the ship was
problematic as the heat continually cooked off ammo in the ready boxes. Water pressure in
the mains was lowered and many of the hoses were punctured by shrapnel from the crashes
and explosions. With so much damage, flooding began to increase and Emmons was down by
the stern with a ten degree list to starboard. After the second and third crashes, men began
to abandon the ship even though the order had not been given. Lt. Griffin, upon getting to
the main deck, came to the realization that he was the senior officer aboard. The crew remained
on board with the exception of the wounded, who were placed in life rafts and put over the
side. Those seriously wounded were kept aboard as transferring them was too difficult. By
1800, with the fires out of control and the ship continuing to settle, Griffin gave the order to
abandon ship. At 1930, as PGM 11 came alongside for the transfer of casualties, a heavy explo-
sion rocked the interior of Emmons signaling its doom. She was abandoned and her hulk was
sunk the next morning by Ellyson DMS 19. The attacks on these ships was costly. Rodman had
218 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

The bow of Rodman DS 21 shows extreme damage after the kamikaze attack on 6 April 1945. Official
U.S. Navy Photograph.

sixteen dead and twenty wounded and Emmons suffered sixty-four dead and seventy-one
wounded. Rodman was towed back to Kerama Retto for temporary repairs and then sent back
to the states. She was out of the war.
Ammunition carriers were particularly valuable targets for the kamikazes, and on 6 April
three of them came under attack at Kerama Retto. Las Vegas Victory escaped damage but
Hobbs Victory and Logan Victory were both destroyed. At 1645 enemy aircraft dove on the
three ships at Kerama Retto. Las Vegas Victory shot one down and was not hit, however, Logan
Victory was. Logan Victory was carrying 9,033 tons of explosives plus drums of oil. Her attacker
came in low on the water and crashed her amidships. Its explosion spread fire over the deck
and into the hold where it ignited some of her stores. With the threat of a super explosion
and the fires raging out of control, her Master, Charles Hendrickx, gave the order to abandon
ship. Fifteen of her crew died in the attack. Hendrickx was wounded by a 20mm shell that
cooked off; he died later. With the possibility of a massive explosion threatening the harbor,
the ship was sunk by gunfire. As soon as these attacks began, Master Kenneth F. Izant ordered
Hobbs Victory to weigh anchor and get underway. She did not get far as two hours later she
came under attack by a pair of kamikazes. Her Armed Guard report for the action revealed:

One (1) aircraft was shot down by intense fire from the harbor area and crashed into the water
inside the harbor nets. The second aircraft changed course and approached on a course of 265
degrees relative, and headed directly into the ship. All guns were manned and intense fire was
maintained throughout the encounter. The aircraft was smoking but apparently under complete
control. The approach of the aircraft was about 30 or 40 feet from the water level. Pilot crashed
the aircraft into the side of the ship just forward of the midships at boat deck level. The crash
caused a terrific explosion, and flames covered the deck. No strafing was apparent. No. 6 20MM
 12. The Invasion of Okinawa, Week One 219

tub was immediately aft of the point of impact. Russell LeRoy Evjen S1c USN-I 869 71 53 who
was in No. 6 tub, was blown into the water and received injuries from which he died a short
time later aboard the AM 310. Chester Lee McNealy S1c V-6 USNR 982 08 58, who was also in
No. 6 tub, was blown into the water and was not recovered. From the flame enveloping the gun
tub and the nature of the explosion, it is felt that the subject man was killed. At 1915 the same
day, on orders from the Master and approved for the Armed Guard crew by the Armed Guard
Officer, all personnel abandoned ship in life boats and life rafts.... Merchant radioman Gordon
Brown was killed and Merchant radioman Charles Hickman received severe leg injuries. It is felt
that Mr. Hickman’s life was saved by the quick thinking of Grady Driver GM2c 311 79 84, Don
Taylor Combs S1c 803 45 86, and Roy Cleo Goldman S1c 624 77 72. These Navy personnel
applied a tourniquet to the injured leg while Mr. Hickman was in the life boat, and thereby pre-
vented him from bleeding to death.21

Izant gave the order to abandon ship at 1855 and everyone went into lifeboats, rafts, or over
the side. Success AM 310 picked up survivors, but thirteen men had died in the attack. She
continued to burn through the night until she blew up at 0300 the next morning and sank.
LST 447 had landed her cargo at the Hagushi beachhead and was heading to an anchorage
at Kerama Retto at 1627 when she spotted a pair of Zekes heading for the harbor. She scored
hits on one, which then turned and crashed into her just above her waterline at 1630. Its bomb
penetrated below and exploded. Fires raged and, with her firefighting capabilities compro-
mised, her CO, Lt. Paul J. Schmitz, gave the order to abandon ship at 1640. Willmarth DE
638 and ATR 80 made a valiant attempt to extinguish the flames but it was a futile exercise.
LST 447 burned for the next day and finally sank. Her casualties included five dead and sev-
enteen wounded.22
Facility AM 233 came under attack at 1710 when a Val and a Zeke made a run on her.
The 185' minesweeper shot one down and drove the other off. At 1723 a Zeke was shot down
twenty feet off her bow; its wreckage passed under the ship and damaged her screw. Two
more Zekes were lining up for another attack at 1833 but were shot down by the CAP. Her
damage in the attack was minimal and she had no casualties. At about the same time, Fieberling
DE 640 dodged a kamikaze’s crash. The plane passed closely over her superstructure and
clipped her mast. She had no casualties.
Haynsworth DD 700 came under attack at 1250 on 6 April. The ships in her task group
had been under attack sporadically all morning. A bogey was detected approaching the for-
mation, and within minutes, a Judy with two Corsairs on its tail appeared and dove on the
destroyer. Haynsworth unleashed its anti-aircraft batteries and the plane turned away. A few
minutes later it made a violent turn back toward the ship, this time with three or four Corsairs
in pursuit. The force caused by the turn made its bomb drop off and it crashed harmlessly in
the ocean, but the plane continued on course. In spite of heavy anti-aircraft fire from the
ship, it crashed into Haynsworth’s main radio transmitter room. Fires erupted on and below
decks. The destroyer’s CO, Cmdr. Robert A. Brodie, Jr., stopped the engines and turned out
of the wind to ease the effect of the wind on the fires which were gaining in intensity. It took
nearly an hour to extinguish the flames. Part of the problem in fighting the fire was the intense
smoke which obscured the area of the fires. Brodie turned the ship from time to time so that
the smoke did not block firefighting efforts. Haynsworth had fourteen dead and twenty
wounded.

The Yamato Mission

The American attack on Okinawa forced the naval high command to make decisions
that did not always seem to make sense. One such decision was to send their largest warship,
the Yamato, on a suicide mission. This mission was to coincide with the beginnings of the
220 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

first Kikusui Operation which was scheduled for 6 –7 April 1945. The Yamato and her fleet
would be considered a part of this special attack operation. The Second Fleet and its flagship,
the battleship Yamato, was ordered to attack the American invasion fleet lying off the Hagushi23
anchorage at Okinawa. Prospects of the fleet actually reaching the island were slim, however,
the Combined Fleet Headquarters felt that her presence at sea would attract numerous enemy
planes from Okinawa, that would take the pressure off the 32nd Army there and allow them
to resist the American invasion and inflict greater losses on the Americans. It was a true
suicide mission.
At a meeting prior to the sortie, commanding officers of the ships in the Second Fleet
voiced their objections. They did not mind sacrificing themselves and their ships in battle but
saw little chance that they would even reach their assigned target at Okinawa. American air
power was overwhelming, and the chances of success for ships without air cover was slim.
Steaming for Okinawa on the morning of 6 April 1945 would be Yamato, accompanied by the
light cruiser Yahagi and the destroyers Fuyutsuki, Suzutsuki, Yukikaze, Isokaze, Hamakaze,
Kasumi, Hatsushimo, and Asashimo. Only enough fuel for a one way trip was allotted to the
ships. If they reached Okinawa they would beach themselves and act as stationary artillery
platforms to support Japanese ground troops ashore.
The ships left their anchorage around in the Inland Sea around 1500 on 6 April 1945.
Within hours they were spotted by American B-29s and American submarines which shad-
owed the fleet as they went out to sea. Air cover was provided by ten Japanese aircraft which
soon went back to their bases. It would not have mattered, as the attack on the fleet would
encompass hundreds of American aircraft. They would have been but a slight nuisance.
Hancock CV 19, steaming with TF 58, had sailed north to intercept the Japanese force
heading for Okinawa. It included the battleship Yamato, along with the light cruiser Yahagi
and eight destroyers. Hancock’s planes were launched at about 1000 but could not locate the
Japanese ships. At 1212 she was bombed by a Japanese plane, which then turned and crashed
into her flight deck, holing it and setting fire to aircraft parked nearby. Her damage control
parties soon had the fires under control and the ship was able to resume her duties. She landed
her aircraft at 1630. Her dead numbered sixty-two and her wounded seventy-one.
American aircraft began to appear on the scene by 1230 and, within ten minutes, carrier
planes from Bennington had struck the battleship with the first bombs and torpedoes. This
was followed by numerous other bombs. Within the space of the next three hours the ship
was hit by fifteen torpedoes and still more bombs. Capt. Kosaku Ariga chose to go down with
his ship which slid beneath the waves at about 1500 on 7 April 1945. The mighty battleship
had not been able to get more than about ninety miles south of Japan on her way to Okinawa.
Yahagi was hit by bombs and torpedoes from San Jacinto’s planes. After suffering strikes from
twelve bombs and seven torpedoes, she went to the bottom. Hamakaze, given equal attention
by the carrier aircraft, went under as well. Asasimo, Kasumi, and Isokaze were so badly dam-
aged in the attacks that they were scuttled and sunk north of Yamato. Only Fuyutsuki, Suzut-
suki, Yukikaze, and Hatsushimo managed to limp back to their base in Japan, all heavily
damaged.
Maryland BB 46 was operating as part of Task Force 54 to the west of Okinawa. She had
been sent to intercept the Yamato force also. At 1846 on 7 April the ships went to general
quarters with enemy aircraft reported in the area. A few minutes later Maryland opened fire
on an attacking plane. Her gunners managed to knock out the plane’s engine, but it continued
to glide in and crashed on top of turret No. 3. Its 551-lb. bomb exploded, adding to the carnage.
Her medical officer reported:
The plane burst into flame and was demolished, the bomb exploding. The 20 millimeter anti-
aircraft mounts, located on top of the turret were demolished, and burning fragments and 20
 12. The Invasion of Okinawa, Week One 221

The Japanese super battleship Yamato receives two direct bomb hits from the Curtis Helldiver flown
by 3rd Fleet pilot Lt. Cmdr. Arthur L. Dowling. Yamato was hit many times and sunk in this engage-
ment. NARA 80G 349726.

millimeter shells were strewn about the quarterdeck. Most of the personnel attending the battery
were blown from their stations. Apparently, some were blown overboard. Fragments of others
were scattered over the quarterdeck and were hanging from the mainmast.
Great flames, covered with clouds of black smoke, leaped from the top of turret three, and
extended down to its base. In the glare of the flames, the quarterdeck was littered with debris,
dead, and wounded men. In addition to this, there was the exploding of 20 millimeter ammuni-
tion, from the heat of the flames. The flame and flying fragments from the explosion, extended
to the top of the mainmast, and to the anti-aircraft battery on the quarterdeck, burning and
wounding men attending these stations....
Owing to the close proximity of the burning plane and the bomb explosion to the men in
the anti-aircraft batteries atop of turret number three, the number of missing and killed in
relation to the number of surviving wounded, was comparatively high. Of the eighteen men
atop of turret three, all were killed or missing, except four. One, who was blown off the
turret, had a traumatic amputation of the right arm, about three inches from the shoulder
joint, severe intracranial injuries, blast and burns. He never regained consciousness, and
expired about fifteen minutes after the explosion. The second, was seen to arise from the top
of the turret after the explosion, and walk off into space — amid the smoke and flames, landing
on the quarterdeck below. Besides severe burns and blast, he had multiple compound fractures
of the extremities, and evidences of intracranial injuries. He never regained consciousness,
and expired about midnight, in spite of heroic treatment. The third man was lowered from
the top of the turret by means of the canvas, parachute harness, stretcher. He suffered from par-
tial traumatic amputation of the right leg, shrapnel wounds, burns, and blast. The fourth man
climbed down from the turret without help, and was suffering from blast, burns, and shrapnel
wounds.24
222 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Maryland extinguished the fires, collected her dead and wounded and resumed her station.
She had suffered thirty-dead and thirty-six wounded. On 14 April she departed Okinawa and
escorted other ships back to the states where she was repaired at Puget Sound.

The Ordeal of the Radar Picket Ships

Many ships, performing various duties at Okinawa, came under attack by kamikaze air-
craft. Among the greatest losses of life and shipping were those that took place on the radar
picket stations (RP) surrounding the island. In the Philippines the Japanese had made ample
use of their new special attack methods, and the navy high command anticipated that the sit-
uation at Okinawa would be much worse. In order to intercept the kamikaze raids coming in
from southern Kyushu and Taiwan, they devised a plan to ring the island with a series of
radar picket stations. Steaming on each station would be a destroyer, specially equipped with
radar to detect incoming raids before they could reach the main body of American ships and

One of the important screens, and one that saw a great deal of action during the campaign for Oki-
nawa, was the special radar picket screen. On each station a fighter director destroyer, accompanied
by other destroyers and support gunboats, alerted the combat air patrol to the approach of Japanese
aircraft from Kyushu and Taiwan.
 12. The Invasion of Okinawa, Week One 223

troops at Okinawa proper. Working in conjunction with these radar picket destroyers would
be a combat air patrol. In theory, the radar picket destroyer would detect an incoming raid
and vector the combat air patrol to intercept it, thus preventing the raid from reaching Oki-
nawa. The effectiveness of the combat air patrol was excellent and, although many aircraft
did slip through the net, many did not. Within a brief time, the Japanese began to recognize
the effectiveness of the radar picket ships and targeted them so as to knock out the eyes and
ears of the early warning system. Within a week or two of the inception of the radar pickets,
it became necessary to bolster the radar picket destroyer with additional support, and a com-
bination of other destroyers and destroyer types, as well as LCS(L) gunboats, LSM(R)s and
PGMs were on patrol. In all, a total of 206 ships served on this duty. Of that number, sixty
were either sunk or damaged in kamikaze attacks,25 making it arguably the most hazardous
surface naval duty of World War II.
Radar picket duty at Okinawa began on 26 March 1945 and lasted until 14 August 1945.
In the opening days of the ordeal, Kimberly DD 521 was the first casualty, taking a hit from a
kamikaze at RP No. 9 on 26 March. Two Val dive bombers from the First Air Fleet on Taiwan
zoomed in for the kill. Kimberly’s gunners were on their mark and, although the Val was hit
a number of times, it still managed to crash into the destroyer’s aft 40mm gun mount. Four
men were killed and fifty-seven wounded. A few days later, Kimberly headed back to the
states; for her the war was over.
The invasion of the main island of Okinawa took place on 1 April 1945, and within the
week, the radar pickets again suffered casualties. Patrolling RP No. 1 on 6 April 1945 were
Bush DD 529 and LCS(L) 64, while on nearby RP No. 2 Colhoun DD 801 kept a lonely vigil.
Headed for the picket stations was the first massed Kikusui raid of the Okinawa campaign,
with a combination of nearly 700 Japanese kamikazes and conventional aircraft. The attacks
began early in the morning on 6 April, and by day’s end both of the destroyers would be sunk.
The first bogeys appeared at 0245, attacking all three of the ships intermittently for the
next three hours. With daybreak came combat air patrol coverage and the situation eased for
a few hours, in spite of continual raids approaching the ships. Finally, at about 1420, radar
on the ships picked up numerous flights of Japanese aircraft and, by 1500, the ships were
swarmed by fifty to sixty Japanese aircraft. They were focusing on Bush and also on Cassin
Young DD 793 on nearby RP No. 3. After driving off a number of Japanese aircraft, Bush was
crashed by a Jill flying from Kushira Naval Air Base on Kyushu. It hit her amidships on the
starboard side and its bomb went off. The forward engine room was damaged and within a
short time the destroyer had taken on a ten degree list to port.
On nearby RP No. 2, Colhoun received word that Bush was hit. Combat air patrol planes
from the carriers Belleau Wood, San Jacinto, Hornet, Anzio, and Bennington swarmed overhead,
knocking out numerous Japanese aircraft, but there were too many. Colhoun headed for RP
No. 1 to assist Bush and LCS(L) 64. Arriving at RP No. 1 at 1600, Colhoun found Bush “dead
in the water smoking badly and down by the stern. The destroyer still had remains of what
appeared to be a Betty plastered on her starboard side amidships. She was being circled by a
group of enemy planes, consisting of three Zekes at angels 10, [10,000 feet altitude] seven Vals
at angels 7 and two Zekes at angels 5.”26 Colhoun directed LCS 64 to remove personnel and
provided covering fire by placing herself between Bush and incoming aircraft. After shooting
down a Val and then a Zeke, Colhoun took her first hit when a Zeke crashed her port bow.
Its bomb went through the deck and blew up in the after fireroom. Colhoun was holed below
the waterline and on fire. As firefighting was underway, another Zeke and two Vals made their
suicide run. LCS(L) 64 and Bush shot down one of the Vals and Colhoun shot down the Zeke.
The second Val hit on the starboard side, its bomb breaking the destroyer’s keel. Fires raged
throughout Colhoun and she was soon dead in the water. Additional aircraft bombed and
224 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

crashed the two destroyers. At about 1800 Bush went under, her crew having been rescued by
LCS(L) 64.
Meanwhile the situation on board Colhoun had grown desperate. She had been crashed,
bombed, and strafed by additional aircraft and was beyond hope. With no chance of saving
the ship, the CO, Cmdr. G. R. Wilson, ordered his men to abandon ship. LCS(L)s 84 and 87
removed crewmen as Cassin Young DD 793 stood by. Cassin Young attempted to tow Colhoun,
but the heavy seas soon parted the line. By the time a fleet tug arrived on the scene, Colhoun
had a twenty-three degree list which was increasing by the minute; half the ship was awash.
Unable to save the destroyer, Cassin Young sank her with gunfire around midnight.27
As all this was taking place, Bennett DD 473 had moved from her assigned position at
RP No. 4 to cover RP No. 2, which had been vacated by Colhoun in her attempt to assist Bush.
With the sinking of the two vessels, she shifted over to RP No. 1 to aid in searching for sur-
vivors. Patrolling at RP No. 4, Bennett and LCS(L) 39 had been busy driving off kamikazes
with their gunfire when Bennett was crashed by a Val at 0857. The plane slammed into her
side, bounced off and sank. Its bomb penetrated the hull near the waterline and exploded
inside. Damage was not severe, although the destroyer suffered three dead and eighteen
wounded. LCS(L)s 109, 110, 111, and 114 had been support firepower in these stations and drove
off or shot down several enemy aircraft.
Hyman DD 732 was operating about five miles north of Ie Shima on anti-small boat
patrol on 6 April. She went to general quarters at 1553 with enemy aircraft reported in the
area. American and Japanese aircraft engaged in dogfights over Ie Shima and at 1615 a Zeke,

Bush DD 529, at left, maneuvers to escape kamikaze attacks at RP No. 1 on 6 April 1945. Her maneu-
vering was unsuccessful and she was sunk that day. Colhoun DD 801, at the bottom right, is obscured
by smoke from fires caused by a kamikaze hit. NARA 80G 317258.
 12. The Invasion of Okinawa, Week One 225

Colhoun DD 801, having suffered a kamikaze crash, attempts to evade further attacks at RP No. 1 on
6 April 1945. She was subsequently hit again and sank later that day. NARA 80G 317257.

under pursuit by two Hellcats, headed for the destroyer. Her 5" gun disintegrated the plane
at 2,500 yards. During the next five minutes Hyman shot down a Zeke and a Nick, but, at
1626, a Hamp made an attack on her. This plane’s attack was coordinated with the Nick that
had just been shot down. Gunners from Hyman shot a wing off the plane, but it still managed
to hit the destroyer’s forward torpedo tube between the two stacks. A large explosion followed
quickly, either from a bomb carried by the plane or the ship’s torpedoes cooking off. The
plane’s engine careened across the deck, exploded, and blew a hole in the deck. Gasoline fires
consumed the area and 40mm ammo was jettisoned to prevent it from exploding. At about
this time another Zeke made a dive on the ship, shifted its attack in the face of Hyman’s fire,
and crashed into Howorth DD 592 which was coming to aid her. Howorth was struck in the
main battery director but her fires were soon extinguished. The crash caused her nine dead
and fourteen wounded. Gunners on Hyman then shot down what they identified as a Fred,
which was a German designed FW 190. Whether this identification was accurate remains to
be seen. It crashed off Hyman’s port bow. Sterrett DD 407, Rooks DD 804, Howorth, and Hyman
combined fire to account for another two Vals.28 Hyman extinguished her fires, tended to her
casualties and headed back to Hagushi to transfer them. She had ten dead and forty wounded.
Howorth headed for Kerama Retto and repairs.
The destroyer escort Wesson DE 184 was screening with LCI(G) 452 and LCI(M) 588 off
Ie Shima on 7 April when she came under attack. Three enemy aircraft passed her bow at
0917 and she took them under fire. They may have been a diversion, as almost immediately
another plane dove on her from starboard, striking her amidships. Its crash caused fires and
226 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

This drawing indicates the nature of the damage sustained by Sterrett DD 407 in the kamikaze attack
at Okinawa on 9 April 1945. Industrial Department, Scientific & Test Group, Puget Sound Navy Yard.
War Damage Report—USS Sterrett (DD407) Action of 9 April 1945. Appendix B.

flooding which the destroyer escort soon brought under control. Lang DD 399 assisted her
in pumping and escorted her back to Kerama Retto. Her casualties included eight dead and
twenty-three wounded.29 YMS 81 had a near miss that day as well. Her attacker crashed close
aboard, causing minor damage. No one was injured in the attack.
Gregory DD 802, patrolling on RP No. 3 along with LCS(L)s 37, 38, and 40, came under
attack on 8 April. At about 1830, one of four Sonias made a suicide run on LCS(L) 38. Under
fire by the gunboat and the destroyer, she was turned away as were two other planes attacking
the ships. At 1813, one of the Sonias hit Gregory’s port side amidships near the water line. For-
tunately the ship’s gig took the hit, saving the destroyer from serious damage. Some flooding
occurred, but the destroyer was soon back in action with only two men wounded in the attack.
Sterrett DD 407 was patrolling Radar Picket Station No. 4 along with LCS(L)s 24 and 36
on 9 April when she was hit by a kamikaze. At 1825 Sterrett’s radar picked up incoming bogeys
and the ships went to general quarters. Within minutes, five Vals were spotted approaching
the ships. Four headed for Sterrett and she shot down three. The fourth made it through to
crash into her starboard side in spite of being hit by the ship’s 20mm and 40mm guns. The
fifth headed for LCS(L) 36, but the gunboat’s fire caused it to overshoot. It clipped off the top
of the mast and crashed close aboard. Five of her men were wounded in the attack. On board
Sterrett two men were wounded in the attack and the damage was quickly brought under con-
trol. She had been struck in a non-vital area and was soon underway for Pearl Harbor and
repairs.30
Kikusui No. 1 had been the first of what would be ten raids. It was the largest series of
air attacks that the Japanese would launch at Okinawa and it was deadly. Six ships were sunk
and another nineteen hit with varying degrees of damage. Over fifteen hundred men were
casualties, with just over half that number killed.
 13. The Onslaught Continues

The American forces had landed en masse on the beaches at Hagushi and quickly captured
the airfields at Kadena and Yontan. Awaiting the chance to attack them were the Maru-re
pilots of the 26th SBB which was based at Itoman under Capt. Mutsuo Adachi. Their order
to attack came at midnight on 8 April 1945.
The regiment commander then gave more specific orders as follows: “All operating units to com-
mence attack at 23:00 hours, April 8. The First Company is to take the Itoman-Kerama-Kadena
route, the Second Company the Itoman-Oroku-Naha-Kadena route, and the Third Company the
Itoman-Kerama-Aampa-Kadena route. All the three companies left Itoman for the assigned
operations at 23:00 hours as scheduled. Although the Regiment suffered great casualties en
route, its command post received a report from a company commander of the 62nd Division,
who was on patrol duty on a beach north of Naha, that about 10 transports and also about 10
destroyers, minesweepers, etc. had been sunk or damaged by the Regiment’s [battalion’s] sui-
cide-boats.”1

Japanese reports were extremely optimistic. American records reveal that the only ships
damaged were the destroyer Charles J. Badger DD 657 and the transport Starr AKA 67.
Charles J. Badger was on a fire support station just north of Naha and about 8,000 yards
off shore at 0405 on the morning of 9 April. Her main battery pointer reported:
No reports on JP circuit in advance. Heard what sounded like two (2) cylinder engine close
aboard. My impression was that it was a small plane. Explosion followed almost immediately.
Silent period on JP circuit; then came report “Small craft bearing 090 heading out.” Made this
report to control officer. Climbed out of Director, looked on that bearing but saw nothing. 2

The destroyer had its engines temporarily knocked out by the attack, as well as hull damage.
Nearby, the destroyer Purdy fired on one of the boats and drove it away. A third target, the
cargo ship Starr, was undamaged when some of her landing craft moored alongside took the
brunt of the explosion. Many of the boats had been destroyed en route to the target area and
still others were fired upon and sunk in the anchorage.3 In spite of the size of the attack, the
Japanese had failed to make a dent in the invasion force.
Kidd DD 661 was part of the screen covering Task Group 58.3, which was providing air
support for the landing zone at Hagushi. The ships were steaming east of Okinawa when, at
1346 on 11 April, an incoming raid was picked up by Black DD 666. At 1354 a kamikaze dove
on Black but was shot down by her fire and the combat air patrol. Overhead other enemy
planes fell victim to the CAP flyers. At 1408 Kidd fired on another Japanese plane and drove
it off. About the same time two enemy aircraft:

227
228 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

were seen in a mock dogfight behind the stern of the BLACK, which was then 1500 yards on our
starboard beam. Immediately one of them began a diving turn, descended to water level and
began a run on the BLACK, coming in so as to keep the BLACK directly in the line of fire of this
ship. It was taken under fire by the BLACK, and upon reaching that ship pulled up sharply to
clear, then resumed his course, again getting as close to the water as possible. At this time it was
taken under fire by the starboard machine guns of the KIDD, but that fire, though hitting, and
causing the plane to start smoking did not succeed in destroying the plane, and it crashed into
the forward fireroom at the water line.4

The kamikaze, carrying a 551 lb. bomb, crashed the ship and penetrated its interior. The
plane’s bomb continued through, passing out the port side of the ship before exploding. As
usual with these attacks, the plane’s impact and subsequent explosion damaged fire mains
and set off fires. Within five minutes the damaged area of the ship had been isolated and she
was able to make twenty-two knots. Hale DD 642 came alongside in an attempt to transfer
her medical doctor to Kidd. At 1639 both ships came under attack by another kamikaze, but
their gunfire drove it away smoking. McNair DD 679 relieved Hale at 1930 and escorted Kidd
to Task Unit 50.18.7 which was headed for Ulithi. Pumping continued for the next day or two
as the ship made its way back for repairs. Among the seriously wounded in the kamikaze’s
crash was the ship’s CO, Cmdr. H. G. Moore. Lt. B. H. Brittin, although wounded himself,
was able to take temporary command and rallied the crew to fight the fires and tend to the
wounded. As the ship was en route to Ulithi, Brittin’s wounds finally disabled him and Lt. R.
L. Kenney took temporary command. It had been an expensive event for the destroyer; thirty-
eight had died and fifty-five more were wounded in the crash. Bullard DD 660, cruising with
Black, watched as the destroyer was hit. She fired on Black’s attackers but failed to shoot any
down in spite of hitting both. At 1357 an enemy plane made a run at her and passed behind
her superstructure, clipping off antennae and lifelines before plummeting over the side. The
destroyer escaped with minimal damage and no casualties. Hank DD 702, acting as a radar
picket for the Task Group, was attacked by a Zeke about 1640. Her gunfire drove it off course
and it crashed close aboard. Her damage was slight, but three of her men were killed and one
wounded in the attack. She joined the other ships heading for Ulithi and repairs. Bullard DD
660 also had a close call. She was operating near Kidd when she was attacked at 1357. Her
damage was minor and she continued her operations. Also hit that day with minor damage
was Missouri BB 63. The battleship was part of Task Group 58.4 and was near Intrepid CV 11
and Yorktown CV 10 on 11 April when the ships encountered enemy aircraft. The air raids
began at 1110 and lasted until nearly 2400. CAPs from Intrepid and Yorktown were kept busy
and shot down a number of enemy aircraft during this period. One Zeke finally got through
to Missouri and struck her at 1440. Her action report detailed the event:
The pilot, flying low, attempted to lift the plane above the main deck and crash. The left wing
tip struck the side of the ship at frame 169 starboard about three feet below the main deck edge.
The plane was then deflected towards the ship and the nose hit the ship on a butt strap at frame
160½ . The propeller cut the main deck beading about frame 159. The pilot and canopy were
thrown on deck and crashed into the floater net stowage aft of Quad Mount 17. Parts of the
engine, ratio equipment and a machine gun were thrown about the deck. The right wing of the
plane was torn loose and catapulted into the air moving forward along the starboard side; the
rest of the plane falling into the water. The wing passed over the forward corner of 5" mount No.
7, damaging the left gun bloomer, across 20 mm group 11, landing on the 01 level at frame 102,
inboard of 5" mount No. 3.5

Fires from the crash were quickly extinguished and the damage to the battleship was minor.
She had one man wounded in the attack.
About the same time that Kidd was struck by a kamikaze, another crashed Enterprise CV
6, which was operating as part of Task Group 58.3. At 1410 she was struck a glancing blow by
 13. The Onslaught Continues 229

This Japanese Zeke hit Missouri BB 63 on 11 April 1945 causing minimal damage to the ship and
wounding one man. Official U.S. Navy Photograph.

a Judy, which hit her port quarter and then crashed close aboard. Damage from this crash
was slight, but another Judy hit her at 1510 starting fires which were quickly extinguished.
Although she was able to resume duty two days later, she joined the group heading for Ulithi
where she underwent repairs.6 Also damaged that day was the destroyer escort Samuel Miles
DE 183. She incurred some light damage on 11 April when a kamikaze crashed close aboard
killing one of her crew.
Kikusui No. 2 savaged the ships at Okinawa on 12 April. Included in the attack were 185
kamikazes, along with 195 conventional aircraft flying escort missions and attack missions.
Standing between them and the other ships at Okinawa were the radar pickets.
Purdy, Cassin Young, and LCS(L)s 33, 57, 114, and 115 patrolled RP No. 1 on 12 April. By
the end of the day five of the ships would be hit by kamikazes and one sunk. Directly in the
path of the Japanese aircraft flying from Kyushu, the ships at RP No. 1 began to pick up raids
around 1112 on 12 April. Coming in on the radar picket station was a combination of forty
Japanese aircraft, including Vals, Kates, Zekes, Oscars, and Bettys. The combat air patrols
from the carriers Petroff Bay, Intrepid, Langley, and Bunker Hill were working in conjunction
with the ships. In spite of their valiant efforts they would not be able to save the ships below.
Purdy and Cassin Young took a flight of three Vals under fire at 1337. Their combined
fire shot one down, but a second dove to about five hundred feet and then headed for Cassin
Young which maneuvered wildly to keep its guns to bear on the plane. It crashed fifteen feet
off its port quarter. The third Val was shot down by the two destroyers as it prepared for a
230 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

run on Purdy. At 1334 a fourth Val was shot down off Purdy’s starboard bow. Still another Val
made a crash dive on the Young, crashing into the foremast. “This plane had strafed in its
dive and exploded in mid-air forty feet above the ship, causing numerous personnel and ship
casualties.”7 Within minutes another Val was shot down off the starboard beam. Overhead
the combat air patrol accounted for another ten enemy aircraft. Cassin Young headed back to
Kerama Retto. On board the destroyer one man had died and fifty-nine were wounded.
Purdy came under attack from her starboard quarter. LCS(L) 114 and Purdy combined
fire to shoot down the Val. Within the space of the next twenty minutes the destroyer shot
down an additional three Vals. Finally another Val managed to evade the blanket of fire laid
down by Purdy and LCS(L) 114 and get through to the destroyer. It hit the water twenty feet
off the destroyer’s starboard side, bounced up and crashed into her. Its bomb was released in
the action and penetrated the hull. It exploded inside the ship killing thirteen men and wound-
ing twenty-seven. Purdy lost steering control, most of her internal communications, and par-
tial power as a result of the bomb. She headed back to the anchorage to tend her wounded
and repair the ship.
While Purdy and Cassin Young were fighting off kamikazes, LCS(L) 57 came under attack
as well. At 1347 the first of eight aircraft made runs on her. One was shot down fifty yards
from the gunboat. Shortly thereafter, another plane began a strafing run on the ship and
sharp-shooting gun crews killed the pilot. His out-of-control plane hit the forward 40mm
gun tub, putting it out of action. At 1352 three Nates made a run on the ship. Two were shot
down, but the third, after being hit numerous times, exploded only ten feet from the ship.
The explosion blew an eight foot hole in its side. Lt. Harry L. Smith, CO of LCS(L) 57, took
stock of his ship. Two of its three 40mm guns were out of action, the steering was out, and
she was beginning to list to starboard. Emergency steering measures were taken and the ship
prepared to head back to Okinawa, but her ordeal was not over. Another Nate closed on the
ship, hotly pursued by CAP fighters. It went down under the combined fire of the 57 and the
CAP. At 1430 another Nate slipped through the fire from the ship and the CAP and crashed

This sketch shows the damage to Purdy DD 734 from a kamikaze bomb at Radar Picket Station # 1
off Okinawa on 12 April 1945. The Val carrying the bomb was shot down twenty feet off the ship, ric-
ocheted off the water and hit Purdy in the side. Its bomb penetrated the destroyer and exploded
inside. Commandant, Navy Yard, Mare Island. U. S. S. Purdy (DD734)—War Damage Report, 11 Sep-
tember 1945.
 13. The Onslaught Continues 231

into the bow of the gunboat, disabling the 40mm bow gun and killing two men. Listing heavily
to starboard, the 57 started on her journey back to Okinawa.
LCS(L) 33 had been standing by the 57 and Purdy and picking up men who had been
blown overboard when she came under attack herself. At 1500 two Vals attacked her, one from
port and one from starboard. Her gunners downed the Val to port, but the Val on the starboard
side crashed her amidships and exploded. The impact broke the fire main and made firefighting
impossible. The ship, a ball of fire, began to list heavily to port and the order to abandon ship
was given. Her magazines began to explode from the fires, and within a short while she was
barely afloat. Purdy sank her flaming hulk with two five-inch rounds and headed back to Oki-
nawa.
LCS(L) 115, coming to the aid of the 33, was strafed by a Val as she attempted to pick up
survivors. Although she shot the plane down twenty-five feet off her port side, two of her
men were wounded. LCS(L) 114 managed to escape damage and was able to rescue men from
Purdy. Twenty men had died and 175 were wounded on the ships at RP No. 1 that day.
On Radar Picket Station No. 2, Stanly DD 478 was on patrol with Lang DD 399, LSM(R)s
197 and 198 and LCS(L)s 31, 52, and 116. At 1351 she was directed to assist Cassin Young at
Radar Picket Station No. 1. At 1426 a Val made a suicide attempt on her but was shot down
off her starboard quarter. About twenty minutes later, her lookouts were amazed to see a
small aircraft approaching the ship at an extremely high rate of speed. Her action report indi-
cated that it “outran our Combat Air Patrol.”8 Her gunners were unable to score a hit on the
plane and it crashed through her bow and exploded in the water on her port bow. She had
been struck by an Oka piloted bomb. The relatively thin plating on her hull had saved her, as
the Oka was designed to punch through heavy armor plate prior to detonating. Shea was left
with a hole through her bow and three men injured. Moments later, a second Oka was
observed headed toward the ship. It was taken under fire by automatic weapons and hit several
times. A tip of its wing came off and it passed just over the ship clipping off the ensign. Two
to three hundred yards past the ship the pilot tried to bank for another run but hit the water
and exploded. Stanly had a lucky day; the potential for disaster had been great.
Other radar picket stations were to prove hazardous on 12 April as well. Patrolling Radar
Picket Station No. 14 was Mannert L. Abele DD 733, along with LSM(R)s 189 and 190. At 1320
an incoming raid of three Vals was reported closing on the station. Within minutes the aircraft
were spotted and dove on the ship. One was hit by both Abele and LSM(R) 189 before it
crashed into the sea close aboard the LSM(R). LSM(R) 190 shot down a second Val which
narrowly missed her. Shortly thereafter two Kates tried to crash the 189 but were shot down
close aboard. One clipped the ship’s conning tower, knocking two men overboard. LSM(R)
190 then successfully fired on another Val, sending it into the sea. Walter C. Wann DE 412 had
a close scrape at 1418 when she shot down a Val which tried to crash her. The plane hit the
water twenty feet off her port bow. One man was injured but the ship was unharmed in the
attack. By 1400 the air was abuzz with numerous enemy planes and the destroyer radioed for
additional CAP planes to cover her. Four Lillys appeared and one made a run on the destroyer.
However, it gave up in the face of the ship’s fierce gunfire. Shortly thereafter, three Zekes had
better luck. Two tried to crash the ship which successfully shot one down. At 1445 the second
hit the ship’s after fireroom on the starboard side causing serious damage. Its bomb went off
inside the ship’s engine room and the destroyer began to lose headway. Still another attack
awaited the destroyer.
A few hours earlier a flight of nine Betty bombers had taken off from Kanoya Air Base
in Southern Kyushu. Each carried an Oka and they were headed directly for the ships at RP
No. 14. Arriving overhead near the radar picket station, the crew on one of the Bettys prepared
to launch its flying bomb. At about the same time that the Zeke hit the Abele, the Oka dropped
232 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

from the Betty and headed in toward the destroyer. Once glide speed had been attained the
pilot, Lt. (jg) Saburo Doi, fired its rocket engines. It accelerated to over 400 miles per hour
within a minute or two. Cmdr. A. E. Parker, the CO of Mannert L. Abele, later wrote:
1446 — A second plane was sighted skimming water at a terrific speed on starboard beam. This
plane was a small mid wing job with no projections, large fuselage, stubby wings and painted
light blue-grey or aluminum. By this time ship had lost nearly all headway. This missile hit at
waterline abreast No. one fireroom causing another terrific explosion and shock. Ship was felt to
buckle rapidly. Executive Officer who had appeared on bridge was sent below to direct Repair
Parties and abandoning ship.
1448 — Bow and stern sections parted and sinking rapidly with bow and fantail rising. The
bow section took an initial list to port on parting from stern section. Bridge personnel were
directed to abandon ship. In a matter of seconds water was up to after bridge deck gratings at
which time the last of bridge personnel pushed themselves out into water.
1449 — Bow and stern sections disappeared below water.9
Those who escaped from the ship faced additional danger. A Zeke strafed the survivors and
dropped a bomb on them, wounding more of the men. Nearby, LSM(R) 189 shot down a Kate
which was making a run on her. In spite of being hit by fire continuously, the Kate persisted
and crashed into the ship’s conning tower wounding a number of men. With the immediate
action over, the two LSM(R)s picked up survivors from Abele. At 1646 Jeffers DMS 27 and
LCS(L)s 11 and 13 arrived on the scene to assist in rescue attempts. Jeffers had narrowly escaped
an Oka attack at RP Station No. 12 about the same time that Abele was hit. She collected sur-
vivors from the two LSM(R)s and headed back to the anchorage. Mannert L. Abele was the
first ship to be sunk by an Oka but would not be the last.
The destroyer escort Rall DE 304 was operating as part Task Group 51.5, the anti-sub-
marine screen, off the Hagushi landing beaches on 12 April. This was a crucial task as the sup-
plies and reinforcements for the troops ashore were continually unloaded in that area. By
early afternoon many planes had managed to slip past the radar picket ships and their accom-
panying CAP to make it to the Okinawa area. Rall went to general quarters at 1335 and saw
no less than twelve raids approach the area during the next hour and a half. The tenth raid
was the one that caused her trouble. Corsairs were seen shooting down enemy aircraft to the
north, and as the planes came into range, they were tracked and then fired upon. A Nate
peeled off from the group of enemy planes and came at Rall from her starboard side. True to
kamikaze tactics, a second plane made a run on her from port. Both planes were taken under
fire and the ship increased its speed to eighteen knots. The plane to port was shot down, but
the plane to starboard came in only ten feet off the water, made it through the ship’s fire, and
crashed into the starboard side of the DE just under the deck level. Its 551-lb. bomb penetrated
the ship and passed completely through, exploding fifteen feet off the port side. Two Vals
then dove at the ship; one was shot down and the other turned off smoking. A third Val
approached from the starboard bow, ran into a shell from the ship’s 3"/50, and disintegrated
300 yards away. Almost simultaneously the ship was strafed by an Oscar. Its shells hit a depth
charge locker and caused an explosion that blew three men off the ship. In the space of about
three minutes, Rall had suffered a number of kamikaze attacks, but had survived. Rall’s CO,
Lt. Cmdr. C. B. Taylor, Jr., led his men in quickly extinguishing the ensuing fires. Rall had
twenty-one dead and thirty-eight wounded. She tied up to Pinkney APH 2 to transfer her
wounded and moved to Clamp ARS 33 for temporary repairs the next day. On 15 April she
went to Kerama Retto for further repairs and then on to Ulithi to complete them. 10
The light minelayer Lindsey DM 32 was also a part of Task Group 51.5 screening the
Hagushi area. She was heading for the area near Zampa Misaki, north of the Hagushi landing
beaches, to aid Jeffers DMS 27. Jeffers had been assisting LSM(R) 189 after she was hit by a
kamikaze. At 1445 she observed the ships of Task Force 54, just east of her, come under attack.
 13. The Onslaught Continues 233

Within minutes she had three torpedo bombers off her starboard bow and took them under
fire. These were followed by four Vals which she also fired on. The first group turned off, but
the Vals split into two formations and came at her from port and starboard. At 1450 one of
the Vals crashed her starboard side and, in less than a minute, a second Val hit her port bow
near her No. 1 gun. The force of the second explosion blew out the fires from the first, and
about that time the ship went dead in the water. However, the blast had basically demolished
her bow. Burning gasoline covered the surface of the sea and her CO, Cmdr. C. E. Chambers,
ordered her full astern to back out of the conflagration. At this point, Lindsey was only six
miles from Aguni Shima and began to back towards that island. Champion AM 314 closed on
the ship to lend medical assistance and, at 1701, the fleet tug Tawakoni ATF 114 arrived to tow
her in. This was a slow process as a large piece of the ship’s plating hung off the starboard
bow into the water, acting as “a sea anchor and as a huge rudder.”11 The wounded were trans-
ferred to PCE 853. She listed eight known dead, forty-six missing, and sixty wounded.
The transports were also hit on 12 April. Minot Victory, under Master A. Jensen, had
arrived the day before as part of a convoy. She was anchored at Hagushi when she came under
attack at 1455 by a single engine kamikaze that approached her from starboard, only twenty
feet off the water. She opened fire with her starboard 20mm guns when the aircraft was only
1,500 yards out. Her gunfire was effective and the aircraft went out of control, rising enough
to miss the hull and crash into the ship’s No. 4 kingpost. The ensuing crash sent flaming gaso-

The bow of Lindsey DM 32 was demolished when she was crashed by a Val on 12 April 1945. NARA
80G 330108.
234 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

line over the bridge area, burning several members of the armed guard, of whom five were
wounded. In spite of the crash, the ship suffered little damage aside from a number of .30
caliber bullet holes resulting from the plane’s strafing.12
Zellars DD 777 had been part of Task Force 54 sent to intercept the Yamato force. With
the possibility of large air attacks, the Task Force remained together. At 1443 the first enemy
planes were detected at a range of nine miles. Zellars’ action report revealed that
at 1450 observed three Jills, 15 feet above the water, making a coordinated attack on this vessel
from port quarter. Commenced firing, rang up 25 knots, and put rudder hard left to bring all
guns to bear. Planes were sighted at about 5000 yards, fire was opened at 4500 yards; the first
plane was splashed about 1800 yards from the ship, the second was splashed about 3000 yards
from the ship and rudder shifted to hard right. Fire was shifted to the third plane and hits were
observed with 40MM but the computer solution had not caught up to him when he crashed into
the port side of Mount Two handling room.... The plane carried a bomb estimated at 500 KG
[1,102 lbs.]which crossed the ship through several light bulkheads, penetrated the main deck on
the starboard side and exploded in the scullery passage adjacent to plotting room. 13

Firefighters effectively put out the ship’s fires within a short period of time. However, in the
midst of her recovery, another plane made a run on the ship but was brought down by the
combined fire of Zellars and surrounding ships. Bennion DD 662 came alongside and trans-
ferred her medical officer to assist with the wounded. Within an hour after her kamikaze
attack she was heading for Kerama Retto and repairs. In the “Recommendations and Conclu-
sions” section of her action report for the attack she noted that a lone destroyer might be able
to shoot down two attacking aircraft, but if there were three, one was sure to make it through.
Also suggested was that a new “weapon be developed, such as a cluster of rockets, with range
of about 500 yards, locally trained and elevated, to take care of planes inside of 5" gun range.” 14
Suggestions like this one were sometimes seen in action reports, but little could be done with
only a few months left in the war.
Tennessee BB 43 was the flagship of Task Force 54 and was near Zellars when that destroyer
was crashed. Soon it was her turn. Her lookouts observed a group of around seven Vals and
Kates operating in the skies near her. Five of these made a run on the battleship and four were
shot down close aboard. However, one Val made it through and struck the ship on the star-
board side aft, wiping out a quad 40mm gun and hitting two 20mm guns and then another
quad 40mm before sliding over the side. Its bomb, estimated to be a 250 lb. device, penetrated
the deck and exploded below. Sheets of flame rose from the area and many were killed. For
Cpl. W. H. Putnam, one of the ship’s Marine contingent, it was to be an interesting time. Put-
nam was at his battle station as pointer on the Quad 40mm mount No. 9 when the kamikaze
hit. He later reported:
Myers, first loader, told me to jump down in the bucket. I couldn’t get out of my seat, so I
grabbed hold of the sight (ring sight) and tried to jump over it. My intentions when I jumped
was to land in the bucket, but I went over the side, not realizing it until I hit the water. As I
came up from the water there was the plane, or what was left of it, burning on the water. I
couldn’t swear it was the plane, probably part of it or pieces of it. The whole area around me
was on fire. Kept my eyes closed and dove under and came up where the water wasn’t burning.
That was the last thing I saw until I got on this raft. The raft was a long piece of 12 ¥ 12 and I
think it might have been a raft from the ship. It was all broken up. I don’t know how long it was
before I got on the raft, maybe five or ten minutes, maybe longer than that. When I saw a para-
chute was hanging on the raft with a headless body on it (body identified by the destroyer that
picked me up as the Jap pilot). That’s the only body I saw. 15

Putnam was picked up later by a destroyer. Tennessee lost twenty-two men and had seventy-
three wounded.
At about the same time that Zellars and Lindsey were attacked, Whitehurst DE 634 was
 13. The Onslaught Continues 235

also struck. She had been on anti-submarine patrol to the southwest of Kerama Retto when
she was crashed by a Val. At 1442 her lookouts spotted four Vals approaching the area, one
of which attacked Crosley APD 87. Two others were engaged by the CAP, but the fourth turned
off and made a run on Whitehurst. It dove on her from port, and her 20mm guns scored a
number of hits but could not stop it. It crashed into the port side of Whitehurst’s bridge. As
the Val was in its final moments, two other planes attacked Whitehurst, one from aft and one
from the starboard beam. Both went down after being hit by the destroyer escort’s guns. The
entire bridge area was engulfed in flames and communications were out. Everyone in the
Combat Information Center (C.I.C.) and the pilot house was killed in the crash, as were most
in the radio room below. The forward gun crews had lost a large percentage of their men, and
those not killed outright were seriously injured. For the next hour her crew fought the fires,
and by 1610 had them all out. In the meantime, Crosley APD 87 and Vigilance AM 324 had
come alongside to render aid. Emergency steering measures were put into use and Whitehurst
made it back to Kerama Retto at 1745 where she would undergo repairs.16 Thirty-seven had
been killed and the same number wounded in the attack.
On 13 April, Connolly DE 306 had a near miss as a group of five Vals appeared overhead
under attack by Hellcats. One broke away and made a dive on the destroyer escort. Sharp-
shooting gun crews hit the plane and caused it to go out of control, splashing only thirty feet
off the starboard bow of the ship. The ship suffered minor damage to her sound gear and sur-
face search radar when the Val’s bomb went off, but repairs were quickly made and the ship
continued operating.
April 14 to 15 gave the ships at Okinawa a brief respite from the Kikusui attacks, but New
York BB 34 had a narrow miss on April 14 as a kamikaze hit her catapult and spotting plane
but caused no further damage. Sigsbee DD 502 was not so fortunate; the kamikaze that hit
her killed twenty-two of her men and injured seventy-four. Sigsbee, Harrison DD 573, Hunt
DD 674, and Dashiell DD 659 were on patrol with two other destroyers of Task Group 58.8
northeast of Okinawa when incoming Japanese planes were reported. At 1355 a twin-engine
bomber approached the ships followed by a CAP fighter. The fighter was seen to flame and
go down, probably from the bomber’s tail gun. A few minutes later four aircraft appeared on
Sigsbee’s port beam and seemed to engage in a dogfight. A Judy broke away from the melee
and made a dive on Hunt, cruising nearby. Four CAP planes followed it and then turned away,
as it looked as though it was about to crash into the sea. This was not to be so. The plane
recovered from the dive and headed for Hunt at only twenty-five feet off the water. Sigsbee
and Hunt both fired on the plane which grazed Hunt as it crashed close aboard at 1348, wound-
ing five of her crew. Other enemy planes were under attack by the CAP fighters. A Zeke closed
on Sigsbee from her starboard bow and the ship took it under fire. Cmdr. G. P. Chung-Hoon
ordered full left rudder and flank speed to bring all his guns to bear on the approaching plane.
Unfortunately, the kamikaze came too close before the guns could train on it. It hit Sigsbee’s
fantail and its bomb caused a large explosion. The destroyer’s engines were stopped and she
went dead in the water. Her aft guns were mostly damaged and of no use in the following
minutes. She jettisoned her depth charges and torpedoes in order to maintain stability. As
she sat dead in the water, four more planes tried to finish her off. A Zeke peeled off from the
group and attacked her, but fire from Sigsbee and her companion destroyers shot down the
would-be kamikaze. Another Zeke closed on her starboard quarter and was shot down. The
remaining two Zekes made runs on the destroyers but both went down in flames. Sigsbee had
lost steering control, and her port engine was out of commission. Her main deck from frame
170 aft was gone and her stern began to settle, but pumping stabilized the situation. Dashiell
began to tow her back to safety at 1623 and was soon relieved of the task by Miami CL 89 and
then Munsee AT 107.17 She arrived at Apra Harbor, Guam, on 20 April with her main deck
236 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Sigsbee DD 502 is down by the stern after a kamikaze strike on 14 April 1945. This photograph was
taken from Miami CL 89. NARA 80G 328580.

awash. She would undergo temporary repairs in safety. After repairs at Guam made her sea-
worthy again, she made her way to Pearl Harbor where a new sixty-foot section of stern was
welded on. Her losses were twenty-two dead and seventy-four wounded.
Gladiator AM 319 escaped serious damage on 12 April. She fired on and destroyed a
kamikaze, splashing it off her starboard beam. The resulting rain of debris caused some minor
damage to the ship.
YMS 331 was sweeping in the area between Kerama Retto and Okinawa with CTG 52.6.3
at 0120 on the morning of 16 April when she was attacked by a Shinyo. It approached from
her port quarter, swung astern, and came in on her starboard quarter. The ship’s 20mm guns
hit the boat and blew it up only ten feet off the ship. The concussion rocked the ship but no
one was injured and no damage to the ship occurred.18
Kikusui No. 3 was launched on 16 April and involved 165 planes sent to attack the Amer-
ican ships at Okinawa. Wilson DD 408 was on patrol off Kerama Retto when she observed
two Japanese aircraft and took them under fire. One made a run on her and was shot down
seventy-five yards to starboard, ricocheted off the water and hit Wilson in her 40mm gun tub.
It then spun across the deck and landed in the water on the port side. Its 220-lb. bomb pen-
etrated the ship, but only the booster charge went off, causing slight damage. It was removed
intact from the ship a couple of days later. Wilson had five dead and three injured in the
attack, but damage to the ship was minimal. She was repaired and back in action within a
few days.
LCI(G) 407 was on patrol east of Okinawa the morning of 16 April when she came under
attack. A Val was spotted flying low over the island of Taka Hamare and circling toward the gun-
 13. The Onslaught Continues 237

boat. She brought all guns to bear on the plane, which now approached from her starboard side.
“The Val was hit repeatedly as he came in and 40 mm shells were observed striking the engine
of the plane when it was as close as 50 yards.... The Val did not catch on fire but lurched when
hit by 40mm. The plane crashed into the starboard ramp forward and the forecastle. Gasoline
and water sprayed the ship when the plane hit, but there was no fire.”19 The plane’s bomb went
off close aboard, holing the ship, but damage was minimal. Only one man had a minor injury.
The pilot’s lifeless body was found in the boatswain’s locker after it was ejected from his plane.
Bowers APD 40 was operating in the anti-submarine screen about six miles north of Ie
Shima. She had shot down one plane early in the morning, but around 0939 was attacked by
two Vals. Her action report reveals the details:
When the two aircraft bore 320 relative and at a range of 4 –5 thousand yards, they separated.
One approached directly toward the ship. This one was shot down at a range of about 1000
yards. In the meantime the other aircraft, later identified as a Val, was on a course parallel with
but opposite to our own, flying down our port beam. This aircraft remained at a range of about
4000 or 5000 yards. All three guns of the main battery and the 1.10 quad mount were firing at it.
On reaching a point just abaft the port beam, the aircraft turned directly toward us. All port
side guns opened fire. Some 20mm and 1.10 projectiles could be seen bursting in the plane, but
no flame resulted nor were any parts shot away. The plane attacked in a glide strafing the decks.
One man was wounded from the machine gun fire. It is this observer’s opinion that the pilot
intended to crash into the ship on this run, but in the face of heavy A/A fire became confused
and missed by a scant few feet. The enemy plane passed directly over the after 3"/50 gun so low
that if the gun had been elevated a little more, it would have crashed. The aircraft almost struck
the water on the starboard side, but regained control and commenced gaining altitude.... When
the plane had reached a range of about 1000 to 1500 feet and an altitude of about 50 feet, it
began a counter-clockwise turn with the obvious intention of re-attacking from dead ahead or
on the starboard bow. The Captain began to maneuver the ship to try to keep the Val on the
starboard beam. However, in a continuous, approaching sweep, the plane came in from a rela-
tive bearing of about 060, crashing into the upper forward section of the flying bridge at the
Asdic hut level. The bulkhead was penetrated by the impact, and through a long hole, the air-
craft embedded itself in the Asdic hut. There was an instantaneous explosion of high octane
gasoline with resultant fire enveloping the entire upper part of the bridge and pilot house.20

After the fires were brought under control and she headed back to safety, she counted forty-
eight dead and fifty-six wounded among her crew. On the casualty list was her CO Lt. Cmdr.
C.F. Highfield and the ship’s XO, Lt. S. A. Haavik, both of whom were seriously wounded.
Her Gunnery Officer, Communication Officer, ASW/CIC Officer, and Supply Officer were on
the bridge at the time of the crash. All four of them perished.
Shortly after Bowers was struck, Harding DMS 28 came under attack by two Vals. The
high-speed minesweeper had been sent to accompany Shea DM 30 at Radar Picket Station
No. 14. She shot the first Val down to port at 0958 and then shifted her attention to the second
plane which was attacking her starboard beam. Her gunners hit the plane numerous times
and it crashed in the water just short of its target. Water and debris showered the ship and
the Val’s bomb exploded underwater, holing her hull. The speed of the ship caused her to
scoop water into the hole and within minutes she was listing severely to port. Once the ship
lost headway she began to right herself but was still down by the head and listing ten degrees
to port. She was able to make it back to Kerama Retto under her own power after transferring
her casualties. She had twenty-two dead and ten wounded.21
The oiler Taluga AO 62 was one of those floating bombs. Her cargo of 300,000 gallons
of aviation fuel would make a devastating explosion if it were to go off. Fortunately for her,
the kamikaze that struck her bridge, spun off and crashed into her forward well deck and did
not set off the gas. Her fires were quickly extinguished to the relief of all ships in the area,
but she had twelve men injured.
238 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

The damage to Bowers DE 637 after the kamikaze crash of 16 April 1945. U.S.S. Bowers (DE-637)
Serial No. 001. Damage, Detailed Report of. 29 April 1945. Enclosure (S), No. 8.

The carriers of Task Force 58 had cruised north to attack the kamikaze’s airfields on
Kyushu and then returned to the area of Okinawa. Intrepid CV 11 was a part of Task Group
58.4, steaming east of Okinawa on 16 April. The carrier went to general quarters at 1327 as
incoming flights of enemy aircraft were spotted close to the ships.
The first plane approached the Intrepid from dead ahead and it was shot down just off the star-
board bow. It was identified as a Tony. A few seconds after a second plane attacked, approaching
from ahead. This was a Zeke and was shot down by fire from the entire Task Group; just off the
port quarter. The third plane attacked from astern, changed its course, and dived at the Mis-
souri. It was shot down prior to completing its attack. At 1336 two planes attacked the Intrepid
from astern, the first of which was shot down and crashed to starboard. The second plane was
hit but continued its run and crashed on the flight deck. The engine and parts of the plane
pierced the flight deck crashing on the hangar deck carrying what was estimated to be a 250
kilogram [551 lbs.] APA bomb. The bomb dished the armored hangar deck about 4", then appar-
ently exploded about 3 feet above the deck forward of its first contact. This explosion pierced
the armor leaving a hole 5 ¥ 5 feet. The hole in the flight deck was 12 ¥ 14 feet. The crash and
bomb explosion started large fires on the hangar deck among planes parked there. The fire was
extinguished in about one hour. However, 40 planes on the hangar deck were ruined by the
explosion, fire and salt water drenching of the sprinkler system. No. 3 elevator was damaged
beyond repair.22

The indomitable carrier resumed station. Although damage to her was slight, she had ten
dead and eighty-seven wounded. Missouri, operating nearby, had a close call when the Zeke
mentioned above clipped her stern crane and crashed just off her stern with a violent explosion.
It showered the aft end of the ship with debris, but there was little damage and no casualties.
Of the many battles at the Okinawan radar picket stations, the one at RP No. 1 on 16
 13. The Onslaught Continues 239

April was among the most intense. Pitted against the kamikazes that day were Laffey DD 724
and LCS(L)s 51 and 116. By the end of the day, all three ships would be hit and forty-three
men would be dead, with an additional eighty-four wounded. Although the station was covered
by a combat air patrol of VF-10 Corsairs from Intrepid CV 11, there were so many kamikazes
in the area that they were just outnumbered. Attacks on Laffey began around 0827 when a
raid of approximately fifty planes approached the station. At 0830 lookouts on Laffey spotted
four Vals about eight miles from the ship. Her gunners opened fire and the group split in two,
approaching from each side of the ship. Two were shot down to starboard at ranges of 3,000
and 9,000 yards and the other two shot down to port, with an assist by an LCS(L). Simulta-
neously, two Judys dove on the ship, one on each beam. The one to port strafed the ship on
the way in and wounded several men. Both were shot down, but the one to port exploded
near the number two stack causing some minor damage. At 0839 another Val attacked from
the port bow. Hit by fire from the 5" gun and the port machine guns, it struck a glancing blow
on top of gun mount three and crashed in the water. Six minutes elapsed before another Judy
was shot down on the starboard beam, but another Judy came in from the port bow and
crashed into the gun mounts of group 23, putting both the No. 43 and 44 20mm mounts out
of commission. Gasoline covered the area and started fires. Moments later Laffey was struck
by a Val, putting her No. 3 5" mount out of commission. The plane’s bomb exploded, starting
fires and wounding a number of men.
This plane was followed by another on the starboard quarter which dropped bomb two feet
inboard of deck edge to starboard aft of mount three and then crashed into the side of mount
three. Shortly thereafter an unidentified Jap plane came out of the sun in a steep glide, then lev-
eled off when just above the water and dropped bomb which landed on the port quarter above
the propeller guard, possibly an attempt at skip bombing. Plane was under brief fire by after
20MM mount of group 24 but the plane made his escape apparently unharmed. The bomb
struck the ship at or just below the deck edge and exploded in 20MM magazine C-310M. Flying
fragments from this explosion ruptured hydraulic leads in the steering gear room and jammed
the rudder while it was 26 degrees to port. After that, evasive maneuvers were confined to rapid
acceleration and deceleration, as the ship swung through tight circles with full engine power still
available.23

Two more kamikazes followed, both hitting the after deckhouse. An Oscar, with a Corsair in
hot pursuit, sped over the ship and clipped the SC antenna, knocking it off. The Oscar, having
been hit by fire from Laffey, crashed to starboard. With his plane damaged in the melee, the
Corsair pilot bailed out and his plane went down. A Judy crashed close board and the explosion
from the plane and its bomb knocked out electric power to the No. 2 5" mount.
The crew of Laffey had a brief respite, but the next attacks were not far off. As they tended
to their ship, its wounded and dead, another Val dropped a bomb just off the port side at
0906, causing additional damage. The CAP quickly shot him down. Within seconds, another
Val made a run on the ship from the starboard bow and dropped its bomb, wiping out the
20mm Group 21 guns. Fire from the ship caused him to overshoot and he went down under
fire from the CAP. CAP fighters followed another Judy in from the port bow and he flamed
under the combined fire from the ship and a Corsair, splashing close to the destroyer. This
was the final attack of the day and Laffey had survived, although most of her guns had been
damaged or put entirely out of commission. Cmdr. Julian Becton, the CO of the ship, summed
up the situation:
During the eighty minute action the ship was attacked by a total of twenty-two planes, being
struck by eight enemy planes, seven of which were with suicidal intent, the eighth being the Val
who dropped a bomb on the fantail and then knocked off the starboard yardarm as he passed
over the ship.
Five of the seven planes which struck the ship inflicted heavy personnel and material damage.
240 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Besides the planes which crashed into the ship with their bombs still aboard, four bombs were
dropped on the ship, three of which struck the fantail. The ship’s gunnery personnel shot down
nine of these twenty-two attacking planes.24
Laffey was taken in tow by Macomb DMS 23. PCE 851 evacuated the wounded and later
transferred them to a hospital ship. Pakana ATF 108 took over the tow at 1430, and Tawakani
ATF 114 came alongside to assist in pumping out the injured destroyer. She had suffered thirty-
one dead and seventy-two wounded in the battle.
LCS(L) 51 also saw her share of the action that day. At 0815, as Laffey was under attack,
a Val made a run on the gunboat. Taken under fire by the 51’s 20mm and 40mm guns, the
plane hit the water near her. At 0850 she shot down another Val that was diving toward Laffey
as the plane passed in front of the ship. Still another plane crossed her stern heading for Laffey,
and this was also shot down by the gunboat’s sharp-shooting gun crews. Fifty minutes later
the 51 took another Val under fire as it dove on her port bow and sent it to a watery grave.
Another Val attacked the gunboat at 1010. This plane came in low on the port side, and fire
from the ship blew it apart only about twenty-five away. Its engine continued on and struck
the ship just under the deck bead where it became embedded. Twenty minutes later the gun-
boat’s lookouts spotted a Zeke to starboard heading for Laffey. They shot it down promptly
and then watched as Laffey took its last hit from another Japanese plane. LCS(L) 51 had a
lucky day; she had shot down six kamikazes and had no wounded or dead among her com-
plement. Her only real damage was a souvenir Val engine embedded in her hull. She cruised
the area picking up men who had been blown overboard from the Laffey and assisting the
destroyer as she reorganized for the trip back to the anchorage.25
Bryant DD 665 had been patrolling on Radar Picket Station No. 2 and came to the aid
of Laffey. She soon found herself in the midst of the brawl. At 0934, as she headed toward
Laffey, she was attacked by six Zekes. She shot one down and the second was seen smoking
as it crashed into her bridge area. Its bomb penetrated her hull causing a great deal of damage
to the interior departments of the bridge area, but her hull was still sound. Her crew’s attempts
at firefighting were successful and, within a short time, the fires were out. She sustained casu-
alties numbering thirty-four dead and thirty-three wounded. For her the war was over. She
soon headed back to the states for repairs.26
LCS(L) 116 was not so lucky. She fired on her first Val at 0840, but it was out of range.
At 0905 three Japanese planes made a run on the gunboat. Two were turned away by the ship’s
gunfire, but the third crashed into her aft twin 40mm gun. Its bomb went off, killing and
injuring men in the area. Two more planes attacked the 116. A Hellcat from the CAP had one
blazing as it headed toward the ship, and the gunners on 116 finished it off. It hit the water
200 yards away. The second plane clipped the antenna as it flew over. Numerous hits from the
ship’s guns sent it into the water one hundred yards to starboard. With the action over, the
officers and crew assessed the damage. Wounded men were transferred to Macomb DMS 23.
LCS(L) 32 began to tow the ship back to the anchorage and ATR 51 completed the mission.
LCS(L) 116 had suffered twelve dead and twelve wounded.27
Patrolling on Radar Picket Station No. 14 on 16 April 1945 were Pringle DD 477, Hobson,
DMS 26, LSM(R) 191, and LCS(L) 34. A radar picket patrol consisting of two VMF-323 Corsairs
and a CAP of four Corsairs from VMF-224 covered the ships from overhead. Pringle’s CIC
picked up incoming enemy aircraft about 0815. Fifteen minutes later the ships spotted a Zeke
at about 12,000 yards making a run on the destroyer. They took evasive action and a 5" round
from Pringle connected. It went down 2,000 yards from the ship. At 0910 three Vals were spot-
ted approaching the ships and were taken under fire. One low flying Val crashed after flying
through a shell splash which evidently confused or startled the would-be kamikaze. A second
Val made it through a hail of gunfire from the rapidly turning ships and crashed Pringle behind
 LCS(L) 116 had damage to her aft 40mm gun tub after a kamikaze attack. NARA 80G 342581.

The engine from a Japanese Zeke protrudes from the side of LCS(L) 51 after she was attacked at Radar
Picket Station No. 1 on 16 April 1945. Official U.S. Navy Photograph.
242 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

The Aichi D3A Type 99 carrier bomber was code named Val. Photograph courtesy the National
Archives.

The Yokosuka D4Y Suisei, or Judy, was frequently used in kamikaze attacks at Okinawa. NARA 80G
169285.
 13. The Onslaught Continues 243

the base of her No. 1 stack. The ensuing explosion from the Val’s 1,102 lb. bomb was the death
blow; the force of the blast buckled Pringle’s keel, breaking her in half. Lt. Cmdr. J. L. Kelley,
Jr., the ship’s CO, gave the order to abandon ship and she went down within five minutes in
500 fathoms of water. Pringle’s casualties were sixty-five dead and 110 wounded.
Hobson, cruising nearby, had managed to shoot down one of the planes but could not
save her companion. Shortly after Pringle was hit, a Val made a run on the mine sweeper.
Hobson’s gunners blew it apart close aboard but its bomb, estimated at 250 lb., penetrated
the minesweeper amidships, exploding inside. The ship was still afloat and functioning
although damaged. She lost four men with another eight wounded.
The support ships, LCS(L) 34 and LSM(R) 191, came under attack as they headed for
Pringle and Hobson. Three Vals made a run on the 34 which drove off one and shot down two.
LSM(R) 191 accounted for one kamikaze and drove off another. The support ships commenced
rescuing survivors when the action subsided. PCE(R) 852 arrived at the station and began the
task of transferring survivors from the other ships.
Kikusui No. 3 had been costly. Bowers, Laffey, and Pringle had been seriously damaged
and twelve other ships were hit by the kamikazes. A total of 171 men had died and 299 were
wounded.

The Suicide Boats Return

Both the Japanese navy and army had demonstrated the use of their suicide boats during
the campaign for the Philippines. The interrogation of captured Japanese boat operators in
that area had indicated the presence of large numbers of such boats at Okinawa.28 Accordingly,
the American navy decided that destruction of these boats prior to the invasion was imperative.
It was known that many of the boats were in the Kerama Retto area, a group of islands that
would have other valuable uses as well. As a part of the capture of Kerama Retto, just prior
to the actual invasion of Okinawa proper, it was determined that all efforts should be made
to suppress the Japanese attempt to launch suicide boats. Numbers of the small amphibious
gunboats, such as LCS(L)s, LCI(G)s, LCI(M)s, and LCI(R)s were involved in the effort.
Although the initial landings at Okinawa had taken place two weeks before, there were
still plenty of suicide boats remaining in the area to cause problems. From 15 to 16 April
LCI(G) 659 was on patrol near the town of Naha. She reported:
At 2335 (K), 15 April and again at 0225 (K), 16 April, 1945, this ship contacted and sank two
Japanese small suicide craft. The first was detected by a cruiser initially and shortly afterwards
by this vessel. We approached to about 300 yards of the boat and then illuminated the target and
opened fire with two 20 MM’s and one .50 caliber machine gun. The boat, underway and pro-
ceeding at a slow but increasing speed in the opposite direction, caught fire almost immediately
and a few seconds later exploded and sank, the explosive charges it carried presumably causing
the explosion.
The second boat was contacted by radar at 0218 (K); we closed the target and when about 250
yards from it, illuminated it and opened fire. Three 20 MM’s and two .50 caliber machine guns
riddled the boat, but it did not catch fire or explode as the previous one had, and at first it
attempted evasive action to keep out of our lights. It suddenly disappeared altogether from sight
and from the radar screen and was assumed to have sunk as no further trace of it could be
found.29

Benham DD 796 was operating as a radar picket for TG 58.6 along with six other destroy-
ers. They were east of Okinawa on 17 April when they came under attack. A large raid of
about fifteen to twenty planes headed for the pickets. The CAP was controlled by Cushing
DD 797 which soon accounted for several of the enemy planes. This action caused the remain-
ing raid to split and head in different directions. At 0824 two Georges approached the ship
244 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

but were shot down by the CAP. At 0940 the combined fire of the destroyers brought down
another plane which crashed inside the formation. Benham then came under attack. At 0945
a George dove on Colahan DD 658, leveled off at the last minute, and headed for Benham’s
bridge. Benham turned sharply to left to bring her guns to bear and went to flank speed. After
it was hit numerous times by fire from the destroyer, the plane began to slip out of control,

This map of the Kerama Retto islands shows the location of the Naval Surface Raiding Squadrons.
Military History Section — General Headquarters Far East Command Military Intelligence Section
General Staff. Japanese Monograph No. 135 Okinawa Operations Record, p. 154.
 13. The Onslaught Continues 245

LCS(L) crewmen examine a captured Shinyo at Kerama Retto. Photograph courtesy Ed Castelberry.

and finally hit the water fifty feet off Benham’s fantail, exploding on impact. The explosion
blew the pilot into the air and opened his parachute. As Benham’s crew watched, his lifeless
body drifted down into the sea. Benham’s gunners continued firing as the plane approached
the ship. A shell from the 5"/38 guns exploded close to the ship and the shrapnel killed one
man and wounded eight.30
Isherwood DD 520 was operating west of Kerama Retto on an anti-submarine screen on
22 April. At about 1725 she picked up an incoming raid on her radar at a distance of eleven
miles. Shortly thereafter, three Vals approached the ships. Two dove on other ships in the
area and missed, but one picked Isherwood as its target. It was taken under fire at 11,000 yards
and turned off, only to appear on the starboard beam a few minutes later. Isherwood maneu-
vered radically to keep her guns bearing on the plane, but the Val continued to evade her
gunfire, making its final run at only thirty feet off the water. It struck the destroyer’s No. 3
gun mount causing numerous fires. Nearby depth charges were engulfed in flame, and
attempts to put out the fires were to no avail. At 1816 several of them cooked off and caused
extensive damage to the aft end of the ship. Forty-two of her men died and forty-one were
injured by the Val’s crash. With her fires under control and the flooding stopped, Isherwood
headed back to Kerama Retto under her own power. At 1857 she fired on a Zeke, but was
unable to stop it from crashing Swallow AM 65. The hit was perfect, just at the starboard
waterline amidships. Swallow flooded, took a forty-five degree list, and a few minutes later
went under in eighty-five fathoms of water. Among her crew only two died and nine were
injured.31 About the same time that Isherwood encountered her kamikaze, Wadsworth DD 516
came under attack. A Judy made a run on her at 1829 and was hit by her 20mm and 40mm
fire. The plane was driven off course and crashed into the water fifteen feet off her starboard
side. A second Judy was taken under fire and flew away smoking. She had minor damage to
her hull, but only one man was injured.32
Hudson DD 475 was a lucky ship. She managed to get through the war without losing
246 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

A Marine stands guard near Shinyo found on Aka Jima, Kerama Retto. These Shinyo were hidden in
caves and then transported to the water on trailers. The trailer can be seen under the nearest Shinyo.
Official USMC photograph.

any of her crew. The nearest she came was on 22 April when a kamikaze passed over her before
crashing close aboard. On its way past, it clipped one of her chiefs in the head. He was her
sole casualty of the war and he was only wounded.33 Ransom AM 283 had a close call when a
Val made a run on her. Her gunners hit the plane when it was 200 yards out and it was burning
on the way in. A hard right turn at the last moment caused the Val to miss the ship and splash
fifteen feet off the port beam. Its bomb went off and damaged the ship but not seriously. She
had no casualties.
On 22 April 1945 the ships patrolling Radar Picket Station No. 14 were Wickes DD 578,
Van Valkenburgh DD 656, LSM(R) 195, and LCS(L)s 15, 37, and 83. At about 1700 incoming
raids were picked up approaching the station. Ten CAP Corsairs from the MAG-31 field at
Yontan on Okinawa were overhead on patrol and were sent to intercept the incoming enemy
aircraft. Several were shot down by the Corsairs, however, one Val managed to slip through
and made a run on Wickes. It was shot down by the destroyer. At 1828 another Val slipped by
and also headed for Wickes. Hit by gunfire from the destroyer, it changed course and picked
LCS(L) 15 as its target. It crashed into the port side of the gunboat and its bombs went off
mortally wounding her. Within seconds she took a thirty degree list to starboard as fires
spread throughout the ship. At 1832 the word was given to abandon ship and she went under,
stern first, at 1834. Wounded men clung to whatever floating debris could keep them up. The
other ships at RP No. 14 picked up the survivors. Fifteen men had died and another eleven
were wounded.
 13. The Onslaught Continues 247

Although Maru-re and Shinyo boats were of a specific design, occasionally other varieties
of boats were used in the attacks. This became the case as the standard suicide boats began
to diminish in number due to American air and naval attacks. One such boat attacked LCI(R)
763 on the evening of 26 –27 April 1945. At 0501 on 27 April the gunboat spotted a boat about
400 yards off her port quarter and set out to investigate. While it was illuminated by the ship’s
searchlight, it began to move away and then turned to make a run on the 763. The CO of the
763, Lt. H. H. Goff, increased the ship’s speed at the last moment and the suicide boat passed
ten yards behind it. Circling around, the gunboat took the suicide boat under fire with its
40mm and 20mm guns, setting it afire and sinking it. The two occupants of the boat were
killed in the engagement. It is probable that the occupants of the boat planned to attack Amer-
ican ships with rifle fire and grenades. At this point in the Okinawa campaign, many of the
original suicide boats had been destroyed and the Japanese would use whatever was at hand
to attack their enemy.
At 0013 on 28 April, LCI(G) 347 sighted a boat several hundred yards off her port side.
It was travelling slowly, as Shinyo did, so as not to arouse suspicion. At first the lookouts
thought it was just a whitecap but, upon further investigation, found it was an enemy small
boat. After it was hit with a number of 40mm and .50 caliber rounds, it went dead in the
water about thirty-five yards off the ship. The ship’s gunners took aim and let loose again.
The result was a massive explosion which shook the gunboat and knocked out power for a
few seconds. Fortunately, the ship was not damaged.
Operating in Nakagusuku Bay was the 27th SBB, commanded by Capt. Shigemi Ikabe.
Later Japanese estimates indicate that “just before the commencement of the operation, about

This photograph shows a Shinyo variant found in the Naha estuary on 6 July 1945. The device on the
bow may have been used as a net cutter, allowing this craft to open American defenses and allow
other boats through. NARA 80G 325336.
248 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

280 vessels were available (only one company of the 29th Sea Raiding Squadron arrived; its
main body was left on Amami Oshima because of the sinking of its transport). Of these, 124
craft sortied and presumably hit enemy vessels.”34 The remaining craft fell victim to aerial
and gunboat attacks as they lay on shore. The battalion launched a strike of fifteen boats on
25 April 1945, but lost most of them to defensive fire from the American ships in the bay.
The 27th SBB, commanded by Capt. Shigemi Okabe, launched another attack from their
base at Tomigusuku on Nakagusuku Bay late in the evening of 27 April. The dark night made
it difficult for most of the fourteen boats to get through, however, some did. The destroyer
Hutchins DD 476 was in Nakagusuku Bay conducting harassing bombardment that night. She
had just anchored when one of her lookouts heard a muffled engine sound to port but could
not spot anything.
At 0435 ½ a very fast and very small skimmer type craft was observed making a high speed turn
away from the ship about 25 feet out from 40 MM No. 4. Lookout on 40 MM No. 1 saw it
although vision was partially blocked by gig hanging in davits.... At 0436 about twenty seconds
after boat swerved away from ship a large explosion occurred in vicinity of forward port depth
charge throwers.35

The force of the blast threw men against bulkheads and knocked many down. Multiple cases
of sprains and bruises were reported, with two men possibly suffering broken backs. The
after engine room had absorbed much of the damage and was flooding at the rate of 2,000
gallons per minute. Quick work by the crew got the flooding under control and they set about
to assess the damage. Hutchins was injured but not mortally. The next morning Preston DD
795 accompanied her back to Kerama Retto where she underwent repairs.
LCS(L) 37 had been assigned to patrol the shoreline in Nakagusuku Bay, along with
LCI(L) 679 and LCS(L)s 24, 38, and 39, in search of suicide boats. Ships operating in the bay
were under constant threat from them, as they were hidden in the dunes in the area and could
easily be launched from the beach at night. In the area known as China Saki, the ships fired
on various objects on the beach but were not sure if they had destroyed any suicide boats.
Kikusui No. 4 began on 27 April and ended the following day. Heading for the ships at
Okinawa were 115 kamikazes plus their escorts and conventional attack aircraft. Although a
number of ships would be hit, the casualty toll would not be as great as in previous raids.
At 2145 Canada Victory fell victim to a kamikaze. She was anchored off Hagushi Beach
and covered by smoke from the small boys in the area. A clearing in the smoke made her
visible to a cruising kamikaze which spotted her and attacked. Her Armed Guard’s action
report detailed the attack.
At or about the hour of 1930 on 27 April 1945 all personnel were called to general quarters after
enemy aircraft had been reported by radio in the vicinity. The small craft was assigned to throw
out a smoke screen over the SS CANADA VICTORY. At about 2115 on the same date the vessel
assigned for smoke screening ran out of fog oil and proceeded ashore to replenish its supply. At
that hour darkness had set in with only a slight moon showing. A Japanese plane came in on a
noiseless glide using the moon to outline the silhouette of the ship. The plane was not visible
except for a split second before it crashed into the after mast and dropped rearward into No. 5
hold, at the same time exploding.... The explosion blew out the side of the ship and caused it to
settle in the water.
Abandon ship order was given [by the ship’s Master, William MacDonald] about 2200 and all
survivors left the vessel. They were picked up by small craft in the vicinity and such first-aid as
was necessary was given.
In the explosion two (2) naval personnel were killed. W. C. Noah S1c 849 35 39 USN-I died as
a result of burns and was buried in the Army Cemetery in Okinawa. Edward O. Johnston S1c
850 15 61 USN-IO was killed in action. Johnston’s decapitated remains were seen and identified
by members of the Armed Guard crew. The remains were left aboard ship at the time of the
sinking.36
 13. The Onslaught Continues 249

Canada Victory went down stern first. Three men had died in the attack and five were
wounded.
Late in the evening of the 27th, while Rathburne APD 25 patrolled as part of the transport
screen off the Hagushi beach area, she came under attack. She was on alert when, at 2207,
one of a group of six enemy aircraft crashed into her port bow. Both the plane’s engine and
its 220-lb. bomb passed directly through the ship, the bomb exploding underwater on the
ship’s starboard side. The forward section of the ship was covered with burning gasoline, but
the fires were quickly extinguished. After hitting the ship, the bulk of the plane went over the
port side and sank. Rathburne had a close call but she was alright. Her speed had to be kept
to around seven knots because of the hole in her bow, but she made it back for repairs on her
own. Ralph Talbot DD 390 was also screening off Hagushi when two kamikazes attacked her
at 2040. One struck her in the starboard side aft and the other crashed close aboard. The ship
began to flood, but it was quickly brought under control and the destroyer headed to Kerama
Retto for repairs. Her casualties were five dead and nine wounded.
At about 0028, on 28 April, lookouts on LCS(L) 37 spotted what they believed to be a
navigation can about a thousand yards from the ship. As the ship began to approach the
object, it began its high speed run from dead ahead. Unfortunately, a signalman tripped,
knocking the communications wire loose from the gunnery officer’s phones and delaying the
response. The order to fire was shouted to the gun crew, but the Maru-re had already come
close enough so that the guns could not depress enough to hit it. The pilot dropped his two
depth charges on the port side, turned and sped away. Both went off under the ship. Gunners
on the ship exploded the boat as it sped away, killing the driver. A second man, who had been
blown out of the boat, was machine gunned and killed. The entire episode had only taken a
few minutes. LCS(L) 37 was afloat and three of her crew had suffered minor injuries, but she
had sustained serious damage. Her main engines were damaged beyond repair and her rudder
jammed, but she survived the attack. LCI(R) 648, patrolling nearby, came to her assistance
and picked up one of her men who had been blown overboard by the initial blast. The next
day she was towed to Kerama Retto for repairs.37 Japanese reports claimed a destroyer and a
transport sunk that night, but the only casualty was LCS(L) 37.
Although the gunboats were doing a creditable job in keeping the Maru-re at bay, they
could not stop them all. The cargo ship Bozeman Victory had a close call at 0210 on 28 April
when she was hit by one of the explosive speedboats while at anchor. Her hull plates were
damaged along with her bearings and other parts of the ship. While the damage was serious,
she was not holed and her crew was not injured. Several of the main bearings on her port
propeller shaft were cracked, which basically immobilized the ship. This attack had the poten-
tial for great destruction, as the ship was carrying a cargo of 6,000 tons of ammunition.38
Later that morning, at 0545, LCS(L) 40 patrolled near the beach at China Saki Point and
spotted a number of small boats near the seawall. She took them under fire and destroyed
eight small craft on the beach. In all likelihood these were suicide boats. The next day, at
0520, she destroyed another four boats on the beach near Chinen Misaki. For the next week,
the area was abuzz with suicide boats and swimmers, but they were all sunk or dispatched
quickly.
The hospital ships Pinkney APH 2 and Comfort AH 6 both suffered kamikaze crashes on
28 April. As non-combatants it was expected that they would not be subject to enemy action,
but the assumption was wrong. Pinckney APH 2, anchored at Kerama Retto, was hit at 1931
when a Val struck the aft end of her superstructure, setting the ship ablaze and killing a
number of her patients. The crash blew a hole thirty feet in diameter in her deck and she
began to take on water. Rescue tugs and other small ships assisted in the firefighting, but the
flames took three hours to extinguish. She was temporarily repaired at Kerama Retto and
250 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

headed back to the states on 9 May for permanent repairs.39 Between her crew and patients
she had thirty-five dead and twelve wounded. Among the wounded was her CO, Cmdr. A. A
Downing.40 It is possible that her standard navy grey paint job may have confused the kamikaze
pilot who may have mistaken her for an attack transport. Apparently, the Japanese pilot had
followed a PBM back to its base at Kerama Retto in order to avoid detection. No such con-
fusion could be claimed by the pilot who crashed into Comfort at 2041. She was steaming due
south of the southern tip of Okinawa and brightly lit when she was hit. The plane passed over
her at masthead height, circled around, gained altitude, and crashed into her superstructure
deck. The plane and its bomb penetrated the hull and did considerable damage to the operating
room. “At the time of the attack, the entire surgical staff of the Army hospital unit aboard
and the Naval medical officer of the ship’s company, were in surgery, operating on casualties
recently evacuated from Okinawa. As the entire surgery was demolished, everyone working
there was killed instantly, with the exception of one Army surgeon, who was suffering from
shock.”41 Minor fires broke out and the ship took a slight list, but these problems were soon
remedied. Included in the casualty list were doctors, nurses, crew, and patients. In all, thirty
were killed and forty-eight wounded.
Ralph Talbot DD 390 was on patrol off the Hagushi beaches when she came under attack
by two Japanese planes. According to her action report:
At 2201, the roar of a plane’s motor as heard close aboard, and a single-engined fighter appeared
dead ahead, at about 100 feet altitude, headed directly for the bridge in a 40° dive, at high speed.
At this moment, left standard rudder was on, and the ship was moving to the left in its zig-zag
plan. It is believed that this movement saved the superstructure from a direct crash. The plane
flashed past the starboard wing of the bridge at an estimated speed of 300 to 400 knots, within
25 feet of the bridge, and crashed on the starboard side aft at frame 165, just forward of number
4 gun. One wing sheared off and swept past number 4 gun, causing numerous casualties, and
crumpling against the depth charge racks and after smoke generators. The engine and fuselage
struck the side of the ship near the waterline, causing a hole of about 14 x 16 feet, rupturing fuel
tanks, magazines, and living compartments. A small fire was started on the fantail from gaso-
line-soaked wreckage of the wing, but was quickly extinguished by the survivors of the crew of
gun number 4 using a fire hose. No bomb or belly tank was observed as the plane flashed past
the bridge, and the absence of any explosion indicates that no bomb was carried, and that gaso-
line supply was low. The major part of the wreckage was washed clear of the ship, and a large
fire broke out in the wake of the ship.42

Three minutes later, a second kamikaze came in on her starboard quarter and crashed only
twenty-five feet off the ship. Her fires were soon put out and her flooding controlled by 2213,
but she suffered five dead and nine wounded. She made it to Kerama Retto for repairs under
her own power.
The ships on the radar picket stations around Okinawa were once again in the line of
fire. Patrolling on RP No. 1 on 27 April were Aaron Ward DM 34, Mustin DD 413 , LCS(L) 11,
and LSM(R) 191. Late in the evening of 27 April, incoming enemy aircraft were picked up on
Aaron Ward’s radar. At 2130 Ward shot one down. Fifteen minutes elapsed before the next
raid arrived, but gunfire from the ships turned the intruders away. This pattern of attack,
ship firing, and raids turning away from the ship continued periodically until early in the
morning on 28 April. Finally at 0240, two twin-engine Bettys flying from the field at Kanoya,
bombed the ships at RP No. 1, but all the bombs missed. The Bettys then tried to crash into
Aaron Ward, but both were shot down during their final approach. The line up at RP No. 1
changed on the 28th with Bennion DD 662 and Ammen DD 527 relieving Aaron Ward and
Mustin respectively. LCS(L) 23 relieved LCS(L) 11. Most of the day was relatively quiet, but
at 1830 the action heated up. Bennion picked up incoming raids and vectored her CAP to
intercept them, they shot down twelve planes. In spite of their valiant effort, some planes
 13. The Onslaught Continues 251

made it through. An Oscar dove on Bennion and, in spite of being hit by the ship’s fire, man-
aged to clip the destroyer’s No. 2 stack before splashing off the starboard side. Damage to the
ship was minimal and there were no casualties.
Radar Picket Station No. 2 was patrolled by Daly DD 519 and Twiggs DD 591. At 1700 the
ships picked up a raid estimated at between eight and ten planes. A half hour later two flights
of Vals appeared, one to port and one to starboard. Daly’s gunners made short work of three
of the Vals, but a fourth took aim at her bridge. Ordnance flew from Daly’s 20mm and 40mm
guns but could not deter the kamikaze’s plunge. It clipped Daly’s No. 2 torpedo tube and con-
tinued on to splash and explode twenty-five yards to port of the destroyer. Within a few min-
utes Daly shot down another attacker off her stern. Although damage to the ship was minimal,
Daly had two men killed and fifteen wounded. Twiggs shot down two planes, however, they
exploded too close to the ship and opened her seams. She made it back to safety under her
own power with only two men wounded.
Wadsworth DD 516 was patrolling RP No. 12 with LSM(R)s 190 and 192 on 28 April. The
ships had their hands full with a kamikaze attack at 2007. One was shot down by LSM(R) 190
and a Kate went down under Wadsworth’s guns. However, a second Kate narrowly missed the
ship but clipped the ship’s gig before exploding close off the side of the ship. No casualties
resulted from the near miss, but the ship incurred minor damage. Wadsworth shot down two
more aircraft in the following two hours but none got through to her.
Shortly after Wadsworth encountered her kamikaze, LCI(G) 580 suffered a hit. She was
heading for her anti-small boat patrol station west of the Okinawa beaches and was about half
way between Okinawa and Kerama Retto when she came under attack. Her attacker made a
run on her from north to south, but the ship’s gunners could not spot the plane until it was
heading away. A few minutes later at 2048, after the plane had circled around, it came in and
crashed her starboard side. Its bomb exploded close aboard wounding gunners in her 40mm
gun tub. It could have been worse since small combatants such as the LCI gunboats were not
that large and were relatively thin-skinned. A single kamikaze hit could easily sink them, in
fact several such craft went under after kamikaze hits. In spite of the crash LCI(G) 580 was
relatively unscathed, counting numerous shrapnel holes in her hull and superstructure. The
fires that were started were soon extinguished, and the ship headed back to Kerama Retto to
transfer her wounded and effect repairs. She had six men wounded, most of whom were in
the forward gun tub.43
The last two days of April held no rest for the ships at Okinawa. The constant threat of
a kamikaze attack kept many at general quarters. Haggard DD 555, Uhlmann DD 687, and
Hazelwood DD 531 were part of the screen for RAdm. A. W. Radford’s Task Group 58.4 carriers
on 29 April. At 1627 the ships went to general quarters with bogeys reported in the area.
Three aircraft approached the ships, but as soon as they were within firing range they turned
away. At 1653 four Zekes made their approach and were taken under fire by Uhlmann who
reported to Haggard, “Four Zekes in our vicinity, heads up. Two Zekes are diving on you.”44
Lookouts on Haggard immediately spotted a Zeke 52 closing on her stern with four Hellcats
on its tail. Haggard opened fire with a combination of 20mm and 40mm guns but could not
score any hits. The Zeke continued on its course with one Hellcat in pursuit. It ran a parallel
course to the ship and when abeam, turned directly into Haggard, strafing on the way in. At
about 1657, the Zeke crashed Haggard’s starboard beam just below the waterline. A minute
later, a second Zeke 52 plunged toward the ship, crashed ten feet off the bow, and exploded.
Water and debris covered the ship’s bridge. Haggard was flooding and had fires to put out but
had assistance. San Diego CL 53, Hazelwood, and Walker DD 517 came to help. Walker took
her in tow and they headed back to Kerama Retto. Haggard had eleven dead and forty
wounded.
252 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

This photograph shows the damage to Hazelwood DD 531 after the kamikaze attack of 29 April 1945.
Official U.S. Navy photograph.

Shortly after Haggard was hit, Hazelwood was ordered to stand by her for protection. At
1720 additional enemy planes appeared on the scene. One made a dive on Hazelwood and
crashed close aboard her port quarter. Ten minutes later a second plane came in on her from
astern. Strafing on the way in, its right wing hit the after stack and gun No. 44 director and
finally crashed the ship’s superstructure. Its bomb exploded on deck and the area was engulfed
with flames. McGowan DD 678 , Melvin DD 680, Colahan DD 658, Flint CL 97, and San Diego
came to her aid, picking up survivors and casualties who had been thrown overboard.
McGowan and Melvin came alongside and played water on the fires.45 The toll on Hazelwood
had been heavy; forty-six killed, including her CO, Cmdr. V. P. Douw. Twenty-six more of
her crew were wounded. She was taken in tow by McGowan, but by next morning was able
to proceed to Kerama Retto on her own, albeit slowly.
In the early morning hours of 30 April two more American ships were hit, a liberty ship
and a minelayer. The S. Hall Young, sailing under Master Peter F. Butler, was anchored in
Nago Bay when she was hit by a kamikaze at 0345 in the morning. Included in her cargo were
gas and explosives, but the crew extinguished the fires before they were set off. She was holed
and in need of repair, but her casualty list was light; only one man was injured. Terror CM 5
was anchored at Kerama Retto when she was crashed at 0400. Ships around her had spotted
the plane and the Coast Guard cutter Bibb fired on it, but the plane made it through to crash
Terror’s starboard side. One of its bombs exploded on the communications deck and the other
penetrated the deck to explode below. Damage to the ship was significant, but the fires did
not reach her magazine. Bibb quickly sent her medical officer to assist, but he was injured
while trying to board Terror and had to return to his own ship. Another doctor was sent to
assist Terror, which had suffered forty-eight dead and 123 wounded. She underwent temporary
repairs at Okinawa and headed to Saipan for permanent repairs on 8 May.46
 14. “...We Cleaned Up the Bodies...”

The 27th Suicide Boat Battalion’s final attack came on the evening of 3 May 1945, but
had limited success in spite of grandiose claims. The cargo ship Carina AK 74 was anchored
in Nakagusuka Bay on the evening of 3 –4 May. At 0114 on the morning of 4 May, a nearby
minesweeper spotted a suicide boat and illuminated it with her searchlight. Within a few
minutes the boat crashed into an LCVP which was tied up next to Carina. The explosion
opened her seams but the LCVP had taken most of the impact from the explosion. Nonetheless,
cracks in the ship’s deck and hull were discovered the next day and the ship’s CO reported
that “the Carina is not seaworthy and would break up in a moderate sea.”1 About a half-hour
later, at 0156, Paducah Victory had a close call when a suicide boat slipped past her guards
and brushed alongside her. Either her depth charges were duds and failed to detonate or her
pilot lost nerve. When last seen, she was heading away from the ship at high speed and dis-
appeared into the gloom.2 With that sortie, the 27th depleted its supply of boats and afterward
made only sporadic attacks using canoes, a practice which soon led to its extinction.3
It had been difficult to combat the suicide boats, particularly since they attacked at night.
During the day the best possibility was to spot them on the beach and destroy them there.
This method presented its own difficulties. LCS(L)113 reported:
Boats are cleverly concealed. It is necessary to gaze intently at one spot for some time before a
boat can be detected. They are generally hidden along a sandy beach. Small sand dunes are made
use of and you may be able to just see a small part of the boat sticking up from behind a small
rise in the sand. Most of the boats were placed with the bows headed towards the beach. The
enemy cuts off palmetto and fills the boat up with it as well as pushing it into palmetto clump. If
you see a low row of palmetto within a palmetto clump you must keep looking for some time
before you can suspect that a boat is hidden there. If you suspect the presence of a boat or have
any doubts you had best open fire and clear some of the palmetto away with gun fire. It is rather
dangerous for the man, but it is best to have at least one lookout in the mast for better spotting.
... Enemy generally places a number of boats in one place. When approaching a sandy beach it
is a good idea to look for paths leading down to the beach and notice grass to see if it is well
worn and scuffed. If it is then this is likely a skunk nest. 4

The third of May saw the beginning of Kikusui raid No. 5, which would include 125
kamikazes plus their supporting aircraft. Patrolling Radar Picket Station No. 9 were Bache
DD 470, Macomb DMS 23 and LCS(L)s 89, 111, and 117. At 1810 Bache picked up incoming
bogeys and the ships went to general quarters. Control of the Combat Air Patrol was passed
from the amphibious command ship Mount McKinley AGC 7 to Macomb. The turnover caused
some difficulties in communication, and the Combat Air Patrol reached their interception

253
254 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Japanese suicide boat units camouflaged their boats on shore to protect them from air attack and
ship fire. This camouflaged boat was discovered on Zamami Jima in the Kerama Retto islands off
Okinawa on 10 April 1945. NARA 80G 314031.

point too late to catch the incoming Japanese planes. At 1829 the first kamikaze appeared, a
Tony. It crashed off Bache’s port quarter. A minute later a second Tony crashed into Macomb’s
gun No. 3. Its bomb passed into the hull of the mine sweeper and exited the port side where
it exploded in the water. As a result, damage was limited and the fires started by the crash
were soon extinguished. Macomb counted four dead, three missing and fourteen wounded.5
Little DD 803, Aaron Ward DM 34, LSM(R) 195, and LCS(L)s 14, 25, and 83 were on
patrol at Radar Picket Station No. 10 on 3 May. Little and Ward were separated from the
support gunboats by a distance of about five miles. Without supporting firepower, their
chances of survival were lessened. Since the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) was usually
on the fighter director destroyer, the responsibility for placement of the various ships fell
under his command. Two bogeys were spotted on radar at a distance of twenty-seven miles
and the CAP, consisting of four Hellcats, was sent to intercept them. The two managed to slip
past the CAP and were soon spotted making a run on Aaron Ward with the Hellcats in hot
pursuit. Both of the enemy aircraft were Val dive bombers, one of which was quickly shot
down. Parts of the destroyed plane ricocheted off the water and landed on the destroyer’s
deck. The second Val was shot down in flames 1,200 yards from the ship. The distraction
caused by the two Vals allowed a Zeke, previously undetected, to slip through the ship’s fire
and crash into Ward. Its bomb went off and the after engine room and fire rooms were set
on fire and began to flood. Many men were killed and wounded. The ship sustained serious
damage from the impact and began to slow down. In addition to her other damage, her rudder
 14. “...We Cleaned Up the Bodies...” 255

had been jammed, causing her to circle to port. At 1859 additional enemy planes attacked the
station. Aaron Ward shot down a Val and a Betty. Still another Val made a run on her and,
damaged by her gunfire, clipped her stack and crashed close aboard. Within minutes another
Val appeared and headed for the minelayer. In spite of being hit repeatedly by the ship’s fire,
it crashed into the main deck. Its bomb exploded just off the port beam, holing the ship. Sec-
onds later, another Val successfully crash dived on the ship, followed by a Zeke at 1916. Burning
gasoline spread over the deck, igniting 40mm ammunition and hindering efforts to fight fires
and tend to the wounded. Having sustained crashes from two Vals and two Zekes, the Aaron
Ward was dead in the water. Her ordeal was not over. Obscured by smoke and fire, another
enemy plane slipped through at 1921, crashing into the superstructure deck at the base of the
number 2 stack.
This plane carried a bomb. The force of the explosion blew the plane, number 2 stack, search-
light, and guns 26 and 28 into the air, the mass falling across the superstructure deck just aft of
number 1 stack above the main deck, as there were several large holes blown in the main deck
over the after fire room.
This was the last hit on the AARON WARD. She suffered five direct hits from the
Kamikazes— three of whom carried bombs— plus the hit on number 1 stack which caused little
damage. In addition, 4 planes had been shot down.6

Ward’s crew struggled mightily and managed to keep her afloat.

Little sustained her first kamikaze strike on her port side at 1843, followed by another a
few minutes later. Between the two crashes she managed to shoot down one other plane.
About 1945 two Zekes crashed her simultaneously, one from starboard and another from over-
head. Bombs from the aircraft broke her keel and she took a starboard list. Her CO, Cmdr.
Madison Hall, Jr., gave the order to abandon ship. At 1855 she sank beneath the waves, another
victim of the special attack forces. She had been hit by four kamikazes and had shot down
two others. LCS(L) 83 and Nicholson DD 442 cruised the area and picked up survivors.7 Little’s
casualties were thirty dead and seventy-nine wounded.
While the attacks on Aaron Ward and Little were going on, the support gunboats headed
in their direction to lend fire support. LSM(R) 195 lost her starboard engine and fell behind,
making her an isolated target for the enemy. Designed as a rocket ship to bombard the enemy
shore prior to an amphibious assault, she was not the best choice for anti-aircraft support.
Two twin-engine planes attacked from port and one made it through the hail of fire to crash
into the port side of the ship. Rockets and munitions exploded, adding to the damage and
spreading fires. The water mains had been knocked out by the impact and fire and rocket
explosions continued to spread. At 1920 her CO, Lt. W. E. Woodson, gave the order to abandon
ship. LSM(R) 195 sank about twenty-five minutes later. Shortly after she went under, flames
reached her 5" powder magazine and set off a tremendous underwater explosion. At about
2145 Bache DD 470 arrived and began rescuing survivors.8 LSM(R) 195’s casualties were eight
dead and sixteen wounded.
The three LCS(L) gunboats also had their share of the action. LCS(L) 25 was the target
as a kamikaze made a run on her at 1909. LCS(L) 14 helped her splash it astern of the 25.
Pieces of the plane ricocheted off the water and broke the mast, while other parts showered
the ship with debris. One man was killed, eight wounded, and two blown over the side. At
1916 two planes dove on the LCS(L) 83; both missed and crashed into the sea. The 83 continued
toward the sinking ships and was soon attacked by another kamikaze which she promptly
shot down. As she maneuvered to pick up survivors the gunboat had to fight off an Oscar.
The ship’s gunners sent out a torrent of fire and the plane crashed close aboard the gunboat.
In all, it had been a disastrous day for the ships at RP No. 10.
Shannon DM 25, which had been on screen nearby, was sent to aid Aaron Ward. She
256 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

arrived at RP No. 10 at 2100 to find that, in addition to the damage sustained by Aaron Ward,
Little and LSM(R) 195 had been sunk and LCS(L)25 had been damaged as well. Aaron Ward
was towed back to Kerama Retto by Shannon DM 25. In the attacks, forty-five of her men had
been killed and forty-nine wounded.
From 3 to 4 May Morrison DD 560, Ingraham DD 694, LSM(R) 194, and LCS(L)s 21, 23,
and 31 were patrolling Radar Picket Station No. 1. Aware of the disaster at RP No. 10, they
were particularly watchful, but they would suffer the same fate. By mid-afternoon bogeys
began to appear on the radar screens. Morrison directed the CAP toward two Dinahs around
1600 and they sent both flaming into the sea. The remainder of the evening was uneventful,
with bogeys occasionally showing up on radar, but none nearing the station. At 0150 the next
morning the situation changed. Ingraham escaped an enemy bomb and was unable to fire on
the plane in the darkness. A number of enemy aircraft continually approached the area, keep-
ing the ships at general quarters till dawn. At 0540, twelve VF-9 Hellcats from Yorktown
reported to the area for CAP duty. Corsairs from VMF-224 at Okinawa and additional Hellcats
from Yorktown soon joined the group, placing around thirty-two American fighters over the
area.
At 0715 the first bogey approached the station and Morrison sent a division of Corsairs

Yorktown CV-10 fighter squadrons took their toll of would-be kamikazes at Okinawa. One of the
better known fighter squadrons was VF-9. One of VF-9s divisions was led by Lt. Eugene Valencia.
The division, flying their Hellcats, became known as the “Flying Circus.” Here they pose for a publicity
photograph after their score of Japanese planes totaled fifty. From left to right are Lts. Harris Mitchell
(10 kills), Clinton Smith (16 kills), James French (11 kills), and Eugene Valencia (23 kills). NARA 80G
700016.
 14. “...We Cleaned Up the Bodies...” 257

after it. They reported splashing one Oscar. A Val, initially spotted on radar, managed to slip
past the Corsairs and made a beam run on Morrison’s port side. Hit repeatedly by the
destroyer’s guns and the Corsairs, it passed over the ship and crashed in the water only twenty
feet away from the ship. By 0732 the sky was full of Nicks, Nans, and Vals engaged in dogfights
with the CAP or being shot down as they bore in toward the destroyers and their support
gunboats. Morrison radioed back for additional help because of the size of the enemy force
and, within a short time, the CAP numbered forty-eight planes. A Val made a run on Morrison
at 0745 and was caught between the ship’s fire and that of the CAP. The same thing occurred
soon after and another Val was shot down at 0810. Firing on the enemy planes became prob-
lematic for the American ships as they were wary of hitting their own aircraft. Morrison came
under attack again when a Zeke made a run on her, followed by Corsairs. The Zeke was shot
down fifty yards from the ship by the combined gunfire of both the destroyer and the CAP.
By this time, radio reports indicated that the CAP had shot down an Oscar, six Vals, two
Zekes, two Nicks, a Frances and a Myrt. Morrison’s luck ran out at about 0825 when two
Zekes made a run on her. The first Zeke was hit by the ship’s guns and afire, however, it still
managed to get through and crash into the base of the forward stack. The second Zeke was
hit repeatedly and managed to get through also, crashing into the main deck after first hitting
the No. 3 5" gun. Seven twin-float biplanes appeared on the scene and joined in the attack.
VT fuses would not detonate near these craft as they were constructed of canvas over wood
frames. Although their speed was slow, they were maneuverable and kept up with Morrison’s
evasive maneuvers. At 0834 the first hit the destroyer’s 40mm gun No. 45 and 5" gun No. 3.
The impact ignited powder in the handling rooms and caused a huge explosion and fire ball,
killing and wounding many men. The 5" gun was blown off its foundation and landed nearby
on the deck. Within minutes a second bi-plane, chased by Corsairs, landed in the ship’s wake,
taxied forward, took off, and crashed into the No. 4 5" gun, causing another massive explosion.
With so much damage, the stern went under and the ship rolled on its starboard side. Mor-
rison’s skipper, Cmdr. James R. Hansen, gave the order to abandon ship. She pointed her bow
to the sky and slid beneath the waves at 0840 in 325 fathoms of water.9 One hundred fifty-
nine men had died and 102 were wounded.
The next ship sunk that day at RP No. 1 was LSM(R) 194. Commanded by Lt. Allen M.
Hirshberg, the rocket ship had little chance to defend herself with so many kamikazes over-
head. The problem for the LSM(R) was her armament. Whereas the other ships had radar-
directed fire control and twin and quad mounted 40MM guns, the LSM(R) only had two
single 40mm mounts and a single 5" gun, neither of which were director controlled. At 0838
a single Tony with a bomb managed to evade fire from LCS(L) 21 and the LSM(R) and crash
into the stern of the rocket ship.
Fires were started in the aft steering and engine room. The boiler blew up. The handling room
was in flames. Fire and flushing system was ruptured. Sprinkler systems all turned on but it is
questionable that much water was forthcoming. The after damage control party were all badly
burned and Commanding Officer called forward damage control to proceed aft and take over.
The ship immediately started to settle by the stern with a list to starboard before the hose could
be rigged to pump out, the ship had settled too far to save, with water washing up on main deck
aft. The order was given to abandon ship for all except 40 mm gun crews. Then ordered 40 mm
gun crews to abandon ship, following which Commanding Officer abandoned ship. Ship settled
straight down stern first. About 5 minutes after she went down a terrific explosion occurred.10

The underwater explosion knocked out the gyro compass, sprung water mains and split several
seams on LCS(L) 21 which was coming to her assistance. Ingraham’s action report for the day
noted that the LSM(R) “sank with her guns blazing as she went down.” 11 The rocket ship had
thirteen dead and twenty-three wounded.
258 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Ingraham came under attack shortly after Morrison. At 0822 she shot down a Val off her
starboard bow. In the space of the next few minutes she accounted for another three planes.
At this point Morrison and LSM(R) 194 had been sunk and Ingraham became the prime target.
She managed to shoot down four more kamikazes before a Zeke slipped through and crashed
her port side at the waterline. Its bomb exploded inside the ship’s forward diesel room, seri-
ously damaging the ship and leaving a thirty foot gash in the port side. The fireroom began
to flood and the crew set about doing the work necessary to save their ship. Heroism in the
crew was not lacking.
The two men on duty in the forward diesel room were literally blown to bits, and the seven men
in the I.C. room and Plot were believed lost. There were two fire-controlmen, however, who
were unwilling to take this for granted. While the ship was still settling and was thought to be
sinking, James E. Vaught, FCR3c, and Charles J. Pittenger, FC3c, worked their way below
through a mass of twisted and jagged metal, through dense fumes and smoke, in water and oil
up to their shoulders, to the I.C. room, where Richard E. O’Connor, EM3c, stunned by the blast
of the explosion, and burned, was trapped. By dint of great perseverance they succeeded in free-
ing the injured man and bringing him up on deck.12

With the flooding under control, Ingraham headed back to Ie Shima. She was met by a tug
on the way back, which took her under tow and a PCE(R) which took off her wounded. Ingra-
ham had fourteen dead and thirty-seven wounded.
The LCS(L) gunboats had a busy day. LCS(L) 21 took her first plane under fire at 0817,
as Morrison was being attacked. She hit the Val and it crashed 800 yards from the ship. She
then spotted a Zeke heading for Morrison and shot it down astern of the destroyer. Still another
kamikaze headed for the gunboat and it was shot down 2,000 yards out. At that point a Val
made a run on the gunboat. Shells from the 21’s 40mm guns hit the plane, setting it afire. It
turned away and crashed into the stern of LSM(R) 194, dealing it the fatal blow.
LCS(L) 21 searched the area and crowded 187 survivors on board from Morrison and fifty
from LSM(R) 194. Added to her regular complement of seventy-one men, this placed 308
men on board the diminutive gunboat, which measured only 158' in length with a beam of
23'. It was so crowded that the crew could barely man their guns. In the midst of all this,
LCS(L) 23 shot down four enemy aircraft and was credited with an assist on three more.
LCS(L) 31 took her first kamikaze attack at 0822 when a Zeke made a dive on her port
beam. It got no closer than 2,000 yards from the gunboat before it was hit repeatedly. It passed
closely over the ship, clipping the ensign off the mast before crashing into the water fifty feet
to starboard. A minute later another Zeke made a run from the port bow. Although it was
hit many times it did not alter course. It passed between the ship’s conning tower and the for-
ward twin 40mm gun tub. The wings hit both the gun tub and the conning tower. Two men
were killed in the gun tub and one was injured. Its engine tore off the starboard 20mm gun
and the remains exploded off the starboard beam, killing three men and injuring two. A sig-
nificant portion of the gunboat’s fire power had been wiped out in the course of a couple of
minutes. This did not help, as shortly thereafter a Val made a run directly at the conning
tower from the port beam. The 31’s gunners scored many hits on it and drove it off course.
Unfortunately, it was not far enough off course and crashed into the main deck aft the deck
house. Burning gasoline spread throughout the area. Two men were killed, three injured and
two blown overboard from the impact. As crewmen worked to put out the flames, gunners
on the starboard 20mm gun spotted a Zeke headed for Ingraham and took it under fire. They
shot it down only twenty-five yards off their port quarter. Another enemy plane fell under
the guns of the 31 at 0855. As a result of the action, LCS(L) 31 had eight dead and eleven
wounded. She headed back to the Hagushi anchorage for repairs.
On Radar Picket Station No. 2 Lowry DD 770 had a close call at 0834 when an incoming
 14. “...We Cleaned Up the Bodies...” 259

kamikaze crashed close off her port bow. The ship sustained minor damage, but two men
were killed and twenty-three wounded.
At RP No. 10, Cowell DD 547 came under attack by two Vals. She shot down one which
attempted a crash, but pieces of the plane landed on her, damaging her No. 4 Mk. 51 director
and the gyro action of the Mk. 14 sight. Gwin DM 33 managed to down eight, but one got
through and crashed her after deck house. There was little damage to the high-speed
minesweeper but she counted two dead and nine injured. LSM(R) 192, one of the support
ships on the station, had a close call as a plane missed her conning tower, clipped some of the
rocket launchers and went over the side. One crewman was injured.
Nearby, on Radar Picket Station No. 12, Luce DD 522, LSM(R) 190, and LCS(L)s 81,
84, and 118 were on patrol. Early in the morning on 4 May, enemy aircraft were reported
heading for the station. At 0145 Luce fired on and turned away a pair of enemy aircraft which
were heading toward her. With daybreak CAP aircraft appeared, giving some comfort to
the sailors on the ships below. At around 0730 enemy raids were reported incoming and
the CAP was vectored out to meet them. They reported splashing a number of enemy
aircraft, however, some managed to slip through. At 0805 lookouts on Luce spotted two fighter
type aircraft approaching her and the ship went to twenty-five knots. The two aircraft split
apart and lined up for runs on opposite sides of Luce. The destroyer took them under fire but
both managed to make it through. The first crashed 100 feet off her starboard beam knocking
out power momentarily and cutting some power to her guns. Immediately after the first plane
hit the water, the second crashed into Luce’s port side aft disabling her port side engine, her
5" mounts Nos. 3, 4 and 5, and several of her 20mm and 40mm guns. She began to flood aft
and within three minutes had a heavy list to starboard. It was obvious that she was going to
sink and the order to abandon ship was given as she settled by the stern. At 0815 her bow
pointed skyward and she disappeared beneath the waves. The rapidity of her sinking, com-
bined with the damaged interior communications in the ship, trapped many men below. They
went down with the ship. Three minutes after her sinking one of her depth charges went off
underwater, causing injury to many survivors in the water. Luce had 149 dead and 94
wounded.13
LSM(R) 190, supporting Luce on the picket station, was also sunk that day. About the
same time that Luce came under attack, a Dinah flew over the LSM(R) 190’s stern and dropped
a bomb which missed. It was taken under fire and damaged. This may have been an instance
of the pilot recognizing that his fate was sealed and becoming a kamikaze on the moment.
The Dinah did a wing over and crashed into the ship’s 5/38 mount, setting it ablaze. The
crash seriously injured a number of men, including the ship’s CO, Lt. R. H. Saunders. The
ship’s Communications Officer, Ens. Tennis, took command of the ship. Broken fire mains
hampered firefighting and the flames continued to spread. At this point the ship suffered her
second kamikaze hit of the day as a Val crashed into her port beam igniting fires in her engine
room. Several other planes attempted to bomb her, and one struck in the area of the Mk. 51
director tub. It was at this point that Luce sank. LSM(R) 190 was beginning to list heavily to
port and the fires were out of control. The CO was carried from the conn, and after consul-
tation with his surviving officers, decided to abandon ship. The rocket ship sank at 0850.
LCS(L) 84 began the task of picking up survivors but the LSM(R) 190 had thirteen dead and
eighteen wounded.14
Radar Picket Station No. 14 was patrolled by Shea DM 30, Hugh W. Hadley DD 774,
LSM(R) 189, and LCS(L)s 20, 22, and 64. Although it was a bright, sunny day, smoke from
the anchorage area had drifted to the station and cut visibility to about 2,000 yards. Nearby
and overhead, numerous aircraft engaged in dogfights as American fighters shot down many
enemy aircraft. Shea’s action report indicates:
260 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

At 0959 (-9) a Japanese piloted rocket bomb was sighted close aboard to starboard and headed
directly for SHEA. This bomb emerged from haze to westward at very high speed and hit the
SHEA between 3 –5 seconds after first sighting. During this brief interval, only one 50-caliber,
one 20mm, and one twin mount 40mm were able to open fire. The appearance of this bomb was
exactly as pictured in JICPOA Intelligence bulletin No. 40 of 16 April 1945, and the bomb was at
very low altitude in about a 10° glide when it hit the ship. Speed can only be estimated as very
fast.15

An Oka struck Shea on the starboard side of her bridge, passed through the ship and
exploded in the water fifteen feet off the side of the ship. She suffered a great deal of damage
to her port side hull plating from the explosion, as well as various interior spaces where
the fuselage of the plane had passed through. Twenty-seven of her men died and ninety-one
were wounded, but the ship was afloat. It was surmised that the relatively thin hull plating
of the ship saved her as the Oka was designed to penetrate much thicker armor prior to explod-
ing.
While the radar picket ships had their fill of action, ships elsewhere were in peril as well.
Idaho BB 42 was attacked by two Vals and three Kates at 1452 on 3 May. She shot them all
down, but one exploded close off her port quarter. Another crashed close aboard her port
quarter and exploded, flooding her blisters. Shrapnel was sent flying over her deck but the
ship had only minor damage.
Hopkins DMS 13 had a close call on 4 May when she was narrowly missed by a kamikaze
that crashed close aboard. She had left the anchorage at Kerama Retto at 0630 along with
Gayety AM 239, and YMSs 89, 327, 331, and 427. Their assignment was to sweep for mines off
the island of Tori Shima. Hopkins had the assignment as acting as fire support for the group
and its CO, Cmdr. T. F. Donahue, was also the OTC. At about 0730 the group received notice
of approaching enemy air raids and went to general quarters. The first Japanese plane, a Betty,
was spotted at 0816 as it passed south of the formation. A minute later a Val was seen diving
on Hopkins’ port beam. It was taken under fire by the ships and passed closely over Hopkins,
clipping her superstructure wiring, and it crashed twenty yards off Hopkins’ starboard beam.
A second Val closely followed the first and appeared heading for Gayety. Gunfire from the
minesweeper disrupted the pilot’s aim and he crashed close aboard Gayety’s stern. The near
proximity of the crash forced several men overboard and the YMSs maneuvered to pick them
up. At 0942 another plane was picked up on radar. This one was a Betty carrying an Oka. It
came to within six miles from the ships and dropped its manned bomb at 0945. As it turned
away it was caught by American fighters and shot down. The Oka seemed to target YMS 331,
but the minesweeper maneuvered out of its way. Unable to follow the small ship’s movement,
it singled out Gayety for its attack. Her action report detailed the event.

At 0947: the Baka Bomb [Oka] approached Task Group at terrific speed, estimated at 350 to 400
knots, and decreasing altitude steadily. GAYETY executed hard turn to port, at same time taking
the Baka under fire with all automatic weapons as they could be brought to bear. The Baka
Bomb next appeared to be making low altitude run on the YMSs.... As the Baka passed over
leading YMS (nearest to GAYETY) and increased altitude slightly to avoid hitting the YMSs’s
mast, it became clear that its objective was not YMS but GAYETY. Bursts from port guns were
now seen to be hitting the Baka which continued its low level straight run on port quarter of
GAYETY. At a range of about 500 yards a cowling or nose ring appeared to fly from the Baka
and fall into the sea. A few seconds later the Baka Bomb appeared to disintegrate very rapidly,
turned end over end, and crashed into the water at an estimated 15 yards off GAYETY’s port
40mm gun; it did not detonate.... Parts of the Baka bomb passed over this vessel from port to
starboard striking the starboard 40mm gun in several places, damaging it beyond repair. Human
flesh (presumed to be that of the pilot) and pieces of Baka Bomb debris (plywood and alu-
minum) were scattered over the boat deck at the 40mm guns and over the fantail. The starboard
40mm gun was the only material casualty. 16
 14. “...We Cleaned Up the Bodies...” 261

Debris from the disintegrated Oka rained down on the ship’s deck, wounding three of
her men. It had been a close call but the ship was basically undamaged.
The escort carrier Sangamon CVE 26 had put into Kerama Retto for supplies on 3 May
and then headed out to rejoin Task Unit 52.1.3 the following day. An incoming raid at 1902
supplied targets for Marine Corsairs from the fields on Okinawa, but one got through to make
a run on Sangamon, narrowly missing the carrier. At 1925 Fullam DD 474 picked up an incom-
ing raid and vectored nearby night fighters to intercept it. The plane, a Nick, managed to slip
past the night fighters and made it to Sangamon, where it crashed into her flight deck at 1933.
It released a bomb just prior to the crash which penetrated the flight deck and exploded.
Sangamon became a ball of fire and attracted the attention of nearby ships which came to her
aid. Hudson DD 475, LSM 14, and LCS(L)s 13, 16, and 61 pulled alongside and began playing
water on the fires even as her crew fought them topside. Fires raged below deck and on deck,
cooking off 20mm and 40mm ammo, as well as .50 caliber rounds from the aircraft. LCS(L)
13 broke her mast in a collision with Sangamon’s flight deck but no one was injured. She then
assisted the carrier’s crew in jettisoning burning planes by attaching lines to several and pulling
them over the side of the flight deck. One plane landed on Hudson’s fantail, near the depth
charges. Her crew quickly shoved it over the side before they could go off. The destroyer also
sustained damage from the carrier’s overhanging flight deck. In addition, two of her 40mm
mounts were rendered inoperable by the encounter with the carrier. After laying water on
her for about fifteen minutes Hudson moved off and the LCS(L)s and LSM 14 continued
firefighting. By 2230 most of the fires were out, Sangamon had survived. Damage to her was
extensive, however, and so were her casualties. She had forty-six dead and 116 wounded.
In the evening of 3 –4 May 1945, LCS(L) 12 was on skunk patrol south of the Hagushi
anchorage as part of Task Unit 52.19.3. At about 0220 in the morning on 4 May her lookouts

Sangamon CVE 26 had severe damage to her deck and elevator after the kamikaze attack of 4 May
1945. NARA 80G 336257.
262 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

The Kawasaki Ki-45 KAIa Army Type 2 fighter carried the Allied code name “Nick.” NARA 80G
129458.

spotted two suicide boats lying dead in the water about 2,500 yards from the ship. The gunboat
made its approach, turning so as to place her starboard bow toward the boats. Star shells,
fired by nearby ships, illuminated the area and the LCS(L) challenged the two boats unsuc-
cessfully. The suicide boats got underway on different courses and evaded the gunboat, which
was in pursuit. Finally, at 0230, one of the boats was taken under fire at a range of 500 yards
as it made a run on the gunboat. It was driven away and LCS(L) 12 lost sight of it. Reports
from nearby ships indicate the she had disabled it and it was dead in the water. One of them
sank it.
Birmingham CL 52 was anchored off Hagushi on 4 May. Around 0835 a formation of
enemy planes was reported heading for the area sixty miles out. American fighters shot down
a number of them but several made it through to threaten the anchored ships. An Oscar with
a bomb dove on Birmingham from directly overhead and crashed through her main deck. Its
bomb exploded in the cruiser’s sick bay, killing or wounding everyone in the area. It took a
half hour to extinguish the fires started by the plane’s explosion. Her main deck had a hole
fifteen by eighteen feet and the deck in the area was blown upward. Birmingham’s hull was
bulged outward on the starboard side, adjacent to the blast. It was a successful strike for the
kamikaze. He took with him fifty-one dead and eighty-one wounded.
Suicide boats were still a threat. At 0040 on the morning of 4 May, Spectacle AM 305
sighted one but was unable to engage it. However, at 0200, she spotted several and opened
fire. The first was hit at 0232 when her shells hit the suicide boat’s explosive charge and it
detonated. Even though the explosion was over 700 yards away, Spectacle’s 185' hull was shaken
by the blast. Shortly after 5 in the morning she fired on and sank two small canoe type boats.
 14. “...We Cleaned Up the Bodies...” 263

These were frequently used by Japanese soldiers to close in on a ship so that they could throw
hand grenades, virtually a suicide mission.17
LCS(L) 53 was on anti-small boat patrol on the evening of 4 –5 May 1945. Her station
was north of Naha and west of Kezu Saki and was roughly two miles long. At 0105 on May 5,
she spotted two suicide boats near shore. Reefs in the area made her cautious in her approach.
AGM 305, cruising nearby, fired on one of the boats. The second headed for open water, but
the 53 lost its radar track due to interference. At 0207 she sighted the suicide boat about 400
yards to seaward and sank it with 40mm fire. Eleven minutes elapsed and two more blips
showed on the 53’s radar screen. These were to the south and the gunboat headed in their
direction. Star shells were used to illuminate the area and the boats were spotted about 1,200
yards off. One was hit by the ship’s fire and sank, but the other made a speedy getaway. 18
On 6 May Pathfinder AGS 1 suffered a kamikaze crash on her after gun platform. Damage
to the survey ship was light, but one man was killed in the attack. On 8 May, the seaplane
tender St. George AV 16, operating at the seaplane base at Kerama Retto, fell victim to a
kamikaze which crashed her seaplane crane, killing three and wounding thirty.
Oberrender DE 344 was operating in the outer screen north of Kerama Retto on 9 May.
At 1840 enemy aircraft were reported to be in the area and the ship went to general quarters.
Soon a bogey was reported heading for her and she went to flank speed at 1850. Oberrender
maneuvered to bring her guns to bear on the plane and took it under fire. One of her 5" gun
bursts loosened the plane’s port wing and it flapped in the air as the plane closed on the ship,
finally coming off when the plane was only 250 yards away. This caused the plane to swerve
to the right, but not sufficiently to miss the ship. At 1852 it struck and demolished gun tub
No. 25. The plane’s bomb penetrated her hull and exploded in the forward fireroom, disabling
the ship which went dead in the water. PCE(R) 855 came alongside and took off her casualties.
Tekesta ATF 93 towed her in to Kerama Retto.19 Oberrender’s navy career was over. She was
damaged so badly that she was declared a total loss and decommissioned on 11 July 1945. Her
casualties were eight dead and fifty-three wounded.
The same day, England DE 635 was patrolling station B11, which was northwest of Kerama
Retto. At 1951 she picked up a raid of three bogeys closing on her position and went to flank
speed. Three Vals headed for her position and one made a dive on her. At 1855 it crashed into
her superstructure just as the CAP was shooting down the other two. Her action report for
the day said:
The Val that hit contained 2 Japs wearing parachutes and carried bombs. The plane had been
seriously damaged by ship’s gunfire before it hit. One wheel had been shot off and the plane was
burning and smoking around the engine and the pilot in the forward cockpit was slumped over
his controls as if dead, while the one in the after cockpit apparently was in control.... Flying
bridge and signal bridge were completely surrounded by smoke and flames; and, for a while, it
seemed that all hands there were completely trapped. Consequently some of the men stationed
on the signal bridge and some of those who had come from combat, jumped over the side, tak-
ing with them several wounded who probably would not have been saved otherwise. Some of the
men from the bridge, including the acting executive officer who had been in combat, went to the
main deck by climbing down No. 2 life raft and swinging down from there, while men below
sprayed them with water.... Due to the smoke and fire the Commanding Officer gave the order
to clear the bridge, although at the time no way was seen to accomplish this. Most of those on
the flying bridge escaped by getting on top of the sound shack and jumping to No. 3 and 34
20mm guntubs.20

Heat from the fires cooked off 20mm shells as the men commenced firefighting. The ship
was still at flank speed, not knowing that the other Vals had been shot down. At 1919 Vigilance
AM 324 was observed closing on the ship. England stopped to contact her since her commu-
nications were out. Vigilance was also able to help in firefighting and picking up survivors
264 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

who had gone overboard. At 2200 Gherardi DMS 30 arrived to assist with firefighting and
sent her doctor and a medical party aboard to help with the wounded. The tug Gear AT 34
arrived at 2300 to tow her. Although England was capable of steaming on her own, her com-
manding officer, Lt. Cmdr. J. A. Williamson, correctly assessed the situation. She was still
ablaze and had many wounded aboard. Attempting to get back into the harbor at Kerama
Retto without radar, charts, or gyro compass at night would have been too risky. In addition,
the harbor was covered by a thick blanket of smoke to protect ships from the kamikazes. Gear
towed her back to safety and the ship anchored about 0130 the next morning. Thirty-five of
her crew had died and twenty-seven were wounded in the kamikaze attack.
Kikusui Raid No. 6 was scheduled for 10 to 11 May. A total of 150 special attack planes,
seventy from the navy and fifty from the army, would head for Okinawa along with their
escorts. The radar picket ships would be prime targets. In spite of their heavy losses, it was
obvious that the kamikazes had not lost their spirit. Flight PO 1/c Isao Matsuo, of the 701st
Air Group at Miyazaki Air Base, wrote his last letter to his parents:
Dear Parents,
Please congratulate me. I have been given a splendid opportunity to die. This is my last day.
The destiny of our homeland hinges on the decisive battle in the seas to the south where I shall
fall like a blossom from a radiant cherry tree. How I appreciated this chance to die like a man.
Think well of me and know that I also died for our country. May my death be as sudden and
clean as the shattering of crystal.
Written at Miyazaki on this day of my sortie.
Isao21

Patrolling Radar Picket Station No. 15 were Evans DD 552, Hugh W. Hadley DD 774,
LSM(R) 193, and LCS(L)s 82, 83, and 84. A combat air patrol of sixteen VF-85 Corsairs from
Shangri-La covered the station. Two additional Corsairs from VMF-323 flew radar picket
patrol above the station. Radar picket patrol usually involved two to four Corsairs from the
Marine air groups at either Kadena or Yontan fields on Okinawa. Their task was to remain
close to the picket ships in case any kamikazes slipped through the combat air patrol, which
usually tried to intercept them at a distance of twenty-five to fifty-miles from the ships. At
1935 on 10 May, the destroyers fired on and destroyed an enemy plane. The radar picket station
was active all night from the 10th to the 11th as enemy aircraft passed through the area, keeping
the ships at general quarters for most of the time. Around 0740 on May 11, bogeys were
reported heading for the station. Shortly thereafter, a Jake from the seaplane base at Ibusuki
on Kyushu, made a run on the ships and was shot down by Hadley. Additional incoming raids
appeared on radar and Hadley vectored combat air patrol Corsairs to intercept them. Estimates
of the number of planes heading for the station ran to 156. Basically the entire Kikusui raid
was headed straight at the ships at RP No. 15, making it the largest air battle at the radar
picket stations that would take place during the campaign.
By 1755 reports from the CAP indicated that they had shot down from forty to fifty of
the enemy planes, but that still left over one hundred enemy aircraft to attack the ships. Some
of these planes would bypass the station but many would not. With so many enemy planes
in the area, it was impossible for the CAP to stay near the ships. At times the dogfights were
ten to twenty miles away, leaving little protection for the picket ships.
From this time on the Hadley and the Evans were attacked continuously by numerous enemy
aircraft coming at us in groups of four to six planes on each ship. During the early period,
enemy aircraft were sighted trying to pass our formation headed for Okinawa. These were flying
extremely low on both bows and seemingly ignoring us. The Hadley shot down four of these....
The tempo of the engagement and the maneuver of the two destroyers at high speed was such as
to cause the Hadley and the Evans to be separated by distances as much as two and three miles.
 14. “...We Cleaned Up the Bodies...” 265

This resulted in individual action by both ships. Three times the Hadley suggested to the Evans
to close for mutual support and efforts were made to achieve this but each time the attacks pre-
vented the ships from closing each other. The Hadley closed the four small support ships several
times during the engagement.22

After initially splashing four of the planes passing by, Hadley came under direct attack.
From 0830 to 0900 her gunners shot down twelve more kamikazes as they made runs on her
from all directions. Evans, in the meantime, had been hit and was out of action and unable
to assist her. Hadley requested that the CAP return to the area as the ships were being over-
whelmed. For the next twenty minutes Hadley was alone and surrounded by enemy planes.
They came at her from all sides and she shot down ten more, but some got through. “As a
result of this attack, the Hadley was (1) Hit by a bomb aft (2) By a BAKA bomb seen to be
released from a low flying BETTY (3) Was struck by a suicide plane aft (4) Hit by suicide
plane in rigging.”23 The CAP came to the rescue and shot down numerous enemy planes as
Hadley lay dead in the water. She was flooding rapidly and fires raged throughout the ship,
setting off munitions. Her CO, Cmdr. Baron J. Mullaney, gave the order to prepare to abandon
ship. The wounded and most of the crew were put over the side. Remaining on board was a
group of fifty officers and crew who made a last ditch effort to save the rapidly listing ship.
Although the odds were heavily against them, they succeeded and the ship remained afloat.
She was towed back to Ie Shima and eventually to the United States. Her condition was such
that she was decommissioned and scrapped. Twenty-eight of her men had died and another
sixty-seven were wounded in action, but they had shot down twenty-three kamikazes, includ-
ing the ones that crashed the ship. Mullaney summed up the experience of his crew:
No Captain of a man of war ever had a crew who fought more valiantly against such over-
whelming odds. Who can measure the degree of courage of men who stand up to their guns in
the face of diving planes that destroy them? Who can measure the loyalty of a crew who risked
death to save the ship from sinking when all seemed lost? I desire to record that the history of
our Navy was enhanced on 11 May 1945. I am proud to record that I know of no record of a
Destroyer’s crew fighting for one hour and thirty-five minutes against overwhelming enemy air-
craft attacks and destroying twenty-three planes. My crew accomplished their mission and dis-
played outstanding fighting abilities.24

The fury of the aerial assault had forced the destroyers to go to high speed, separating
them from each other and from the support gunboats by two to three miles and negating the
possibility of mutual fire support. While Hadley was undergoing her ordeal, so was Evans. At
0753 the destroyer took an approaching Jake under fire.. After being hit numerous times the
plane exploded about 1,000 yards off the starboard quarter. The magnitude of the explosion
indicated that the plane was carrying a bomb. For about another half hour Evans was not
threatened. However, at 0830 her radar began tracking three Kates approaching from the port
quarter. All three were shot down within the next few minutes. Enemy aircraft continued to
appear and, over the span of another fifteen minutes, the destroyer splashed a combination
of seven Tonys, Kates, Jills, and Zekes. Another Kate under fire and burning managed to get
off a torpedo aimed at Evans. Her CO, Cmdr. Robert J. Archer, ordered hard left rudder, and
the torpedo passed twenty-five yards across her bow. It had been a close call. Immediately
thereafter, a Tony went down under the guns of both Hadley and Evans and crashed at 3,500
yards. A Val made the next suicide attempt, but gunfire from the ship made him lose control
and he passed over and crashed 2,000 yards off the starboard bow. An Oscar dropped a bomb
which missed, then was shot down as it attempted a crash into the ship. An Oscar and Jill
attacked from the port side and both were shot down close aboard. Within minutes a Tony
made a run and went down under Evan’s guns. The destroyer took its first hit at 0907 when
a Judy crashed into her port bow at the waterline, holing the ship. Evans began to flood in
266 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

the forward crew compartment. Another Tony was shot down at 8,000 yards when it suffered
a direct hit from one of the destroyer’s 5" guns. At 0911 Evans took her second kamikaze hit
when a plane crashed into her just below the waterline on her port side. As the ship began to
flood in the after engine room, two more kamikazes hit her. The first was an Oscar which hit
her from overhead and released a bomb that penetrated the deck and exploded inside. This
bomb blew out both of the forward boilers. A second Oscar hit the ship from the starboard
side, starting fires and causing additional damage. As a result of these successful kamikaze
crashes Evans was dead in the water. The final kamikaze attack for Evans came at 0925 when
two Corsairs chased an enemy plane into the destroyer’s guns. Fire from the CAP and the
ship caused it to overshoot and it passed over the bridge to crash close aboard. LCS(L) 84
closed on the Evans and began to assist in fighting the fires. LCS(L)s had extra firefighting
equipment aboard and this was of great benefit to many ships that they accompanied. LCS(L)
82 and Harry E. Hubbard DD 748 came alongside to assist, picking up survivors, transferring
wounded and lending equipment. For the support gunboats, 11 May was also hazardous. In
the ensuing melee, LCS(L) 82 shot down three kamikazes and assisted in the destruction of
two more. Up until around 0900 most of the attacks had been aimed at the two destroyers.
This was still the case when the gunboat spotted a Jill with a torpedo heading for Evans at
0837. She took it under fire at 3,500 yards and scored several hits. The flight of the Jill became
erratic, it dropped its torpedo, which missed the Evans and slowly crashed into the sea. At
0845 she assisted the LCS(L) 84 in splashing a Tony which approached from her port side.
All around her aircraft crashed into the water, falling victim to the guns of the CAP, destroyers,
and other gunboats. An Oscar headed for the ship from the starboard bow and the ship’s gun-
ners began scoring hits at around 1,000 feet. As the plane passed over the ship it broke in half,
with the wings and engine falling toward the ship. Lt. Peter G. Beierl, the CO of the 82, ordered
flank speed and the pieces fell into the ship’s wake. At 0940, LCS(L) 82 faced a direct attack
when a Val, chased by the CAP, approached her from astern. She scored hits at a range of 400
yards and the plane passed by and narrowly missed Evans. A few shells from the gunboat hit
the forecastle of Evans and started fires. The 82 came alongside and began to assist in firefight-
ing.25
LCS(L) 83 found herself in the middle of the action.
Several planes were reported coming in astern. One of them came around our starboard side but
was driven off. They then attacked from all directions and altitudes. The destroyers were much
closer now running roughly south east. Several planes attacked them from high altitudes. We
fired at these and knocked one down astern of one of the destroyers. Another plane came in
astern, climbed and made a dive at the 84 on our starboard quarter. Our guns took this one
under fire. The tail was knocked off. It crashed slightly to starboard of the 84. We next took two
planes under fire over the DD 774. They got away I believe. A plane made a run on the DD 552
low from astern, dropped a bomb, climbed then went very low. The destroyer and LCS 82 were
firing at it. It glided for a while and finally crashed. We were firing at a plane making a dive on
the DD 774 when we discovered a plane coming in on us dead ahead. The forward guns
switched to it. It immediately burst into flames and exploded. The gasoline fumes blinded us on
the conn. Another plane came in after the 82 astern of us. We took it under fire. It broke up and
fell astern of the 82. All ships were maneuvering independently by this time. Corsairs arrived for
air cover. The destroyers had been hit several times and were separating.... LSM 193 and LCS 83
headed for the DD 774. The LCS’s 82 and 84 headed for the DD 552.26

Working in conjunction with the destroyers and the other gunboats, LCS(L) 83 shot down
three Zekes and a Tojo between 0900 and 0939. She then moved in to pick up survivors and
assist Evans. LCS(L) 84 spotted a Zeke making a dive on her at 0858. Her gunners made short
work of it and it crashed only ten feet off her starboard bow. Damage to the ship was negligible
and one man was wounded.
 14. “...We Cleaned Up the Bodies...” 267

Although LSM(R)s were not noted for their anti-aircraft abilities, the gunners on LSM(R)
193 demonstrated that they were the equal of any others on RP No. 15 that day. At 0845 a Kate
made a dive bombing run on Evans but missed. It peeled off and headed for LSM(R) 193 in
an apparent crash attempt. It was shot down by a combination of 5" and 40mm fire. At 0859
her gunners spotted a Kate to starboard gaining altitude for a crash dive on the rocket ship.
Hits from the 5" and 40mm guns caused it to splash. Thirteen minutes later 193 shot down
a Hamp to starboard and a few minutes later destroyed a second. Another plane dove on
Hadley and she helped shoot it down. With the immediate action over, the LSM(R) went to
the assistance of Hadley, helping put out fires and tending to the wounded. At 1401 she began
to tow the destroyer back to the anchorage, assisted by ATR 114. LCS(L) 83 remained alongside
the destroyer to assist as needed.27
With her condition stabilized, Evans was towed back to the anchorage at Ie Shima by
Arikara ATF 98 and Cree ATF 84. She had lost thirty men and twenty-nine more were wounded
in the attacks. Evans’ score for the day was fourteen enemy aircraft. 28
Harry F. Bauer DM 26 was patrolling Radar Picket Station No. 5 along with Douglas H.
Fox DD 779 on 11 May. Supporting them with additional firepower were LCS(L)s 52, 88,
109 and 114, along with PGM 20. As daylight arrived so did the enemy planes. By 0800
the picket ships were under attack. Harry F. Bauer opened fire on a Dinah that closed her
position from the northwest and drove it off. The CAP of four Marine Corsairs from VMF-
441 at Yontan caught up with it in short order. Second Lt. Willis A. Dworzak shot it down.
One Zeke attempted a crash and left its wingtip on board Bauer as it crashed just off the side
of the ship. At 0822 another Zeke clipped the depth charge rack and lines before splashing
thirty yards off the starboard quarter. Its bomb catapulted off the plane and landed 200 feet
away in the water. The ships continued to fire on incoming aircraft and hit another. However,
a second plane crashed close aboard LCS(L) 88, killing the CO, Lt. Casimir L. Bigos, and
seven others. Nine others among the officers and crew were wounded, two of whom would
later expire. The gunboat had damage to her aft 40mm gun tub and rudder; she was out of
the war. PGM 20 came to her assistance. Lookouts on Harry F. Bauer spotted four more enemy
planes coming in from the starboard quarter. The first, believed to be a Tojo, was shot down.
Immediately after, a Zeke made its run from the starboard beam. Bauer’s gunners took it
under fire as both ship and plane maneuvered violently. The Zeke went down in flames thirty
yards off the ship’s starboard quarter. At 0833 another Zeke made its run on the ship. Bauer’s
action report states:
Opened fire on ZEKE closing from north (on starboard beam) at range about 8000 yards. Hits
were observed, but again the poor functioning of VT ammunition hindered in effecting a splash.
Toward the end of the run he dipped his starboard wing and with it knocked a depth charge on
the forward port K-gun onto the main deck. His wing caught in the life line on the port side of
the superstructure deck snapping it and catapulting his bomb about two hundred feet clear of
the port side. A burst from the 40 mm hit his tail as he approached the ship, blasting it from the
plane. He splashed seconds later clear of the side to port.... During the last three runs, the CAP
reported splashing the fourth fighter type plane (a ZEKE). Thus of the seven attacking planes in
the area, none got away. Neither FOX nor support craft fired in latter attacks, shooting at planes
overhead which were believed part of CAP. None was splashed.29
Harry F. Bauer had escaped with only one injury and superficial damage. LCS(L) 88 was towed
back to Kerama Retto by Ute ATF 76.
It had been a productive day for the pilots of VMF-221. They had flown off Bunker Hill
CV 17 at 0700 that morning and headed out to fly CAP over the radar picket ships. In the
course of the day’s action, the seven F4U-1D Corsairs had encountered a number of enemy
aircraft menacing the picket ships at Radar Picket Station No. 15. Below them were Hugh W.
Hadley, Evans, LSM(R) 193, and LCS(L)s 82, 83, and 84. Between their arrival at 0800 and
268 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

LCS(L) 88 suffered significant damage in the kamikaze attack of 11 May 1945. Official U.S. Navy Pho-
tograph courtesy Art Martin.

their departure from the area at about 0915, they shot down a Betty carrying an Oka, one
Frances and one Jill. They regrouped and headed back to Bunker Hill just in time to see it
come under attack. Their action report indicated:
At approximately 0915 the two flights rendezvoused over reference point Tare and proceeded
back to base [Bunker Hill]. They were orbiting the base at 1500' when Captain Swett sighted two
planes almost over the Bunker Hill and about 3000' above his flight. He turned toward them and
one of the planes began to dive toward the Bunker Hill. Captain Swett called out over the radio
to the CU that two kamikazes were diving at her. The ship however did not fire at the first plane
and he crashed into the planes on the after end of the flight deck. (Time app. 1020.)
In the meantime Lieutenant Glendinning’s section had started after the second plane but
despite full power was unable to close on him. They therefore opened fire out of range but their
fire was ineffective. The plane immediately dove on the center section of the Bunker Hill. (The
f wd. port bank of 20mm on the Bunker Hill scored many hits on the second plane and he was
flaming as he hit the deck.)
At this time they sighted a 3rd bandit but were unable to close before he was splashed by the
D.D. screen. Captain Baldwin’s division immediately joined the C.A.P. while Captain Swett
directed his division to circle the survivors in the water (which they did from 1020 to 1130) and
dropped dye marker to assist D. D.s in their rescue missions.30

With Bunker Hill severely damaged, the VMF-221 Corsairs had to land on Enterprise CV 6,
touching down at 1130.
The attack on Bunker Hill caused the greatest number of casualties of any kamikaze
attack in World War II. Killed in the attack were 396 men, with another 264 wounded. The
kamikazes that struck Bunker Hill were a part of the total of thirty-seven Zekes that sortied
from the bases at Kanoya and Kokubu on Kyushu.31 The first Zeke was piloted by Yasunori
Seizo. Seizo’s plane strafed the ship on its way down. The 551-pound bomb he released just
prior to the crash passed through the deck and the side of the ship, exploding overboard.
Shrapnel from the bomb blast killed and wounded many men aboard the carrier. The second
plane was piloted by Kiyoshi Ogawa. Ogawa’s plane was hit on the way in and crashed into
 14. “...We Cleaned Up the Bodies...” 269

the ship while on fire. His bomb blew a hole in the deck that was fifty feet in diameter and
extended three decks below the flight deck.32
Seamam 1/c Al Perdeck had just climbed into his bunk, three decks below the flight deck.
Perdeck was a plane captain and his job was to look after his Curtiss SB2C Helldiver. Twice
that morning there had been two calls to general quarters and two for torpedo defense and
he had headed to his plane, which was his general quarters station. As he lay in his bunk, he
recalled:
I don’t know how to describe it, it wasn’t like a bang, not like a boom, it was a noise. I didn’t
know what the hell it was. A gush of air came through the compartment.... Then I went forward,
trying to go up that double hatch and as I got my head above the deck, I says, “I’m not going up
here.” The folded wings of the planes each have three machine guns in the wings and those
machine guns were firing ... so my better judgment told me I ain’t going up this way. 33

Perdeck eventually made his way aft, along the way crawling through thick black smoke
and over the bodies of some of his dead shipmates. He emerged from the stern area and came
up on the deck. What he saw shocked him, bodies were everywhere and the fires were raging.
The kamikazes had done their job well. When the fires had subsided, the odious task of col-
lecting the bodies began. Perdeck remembered, “And then we cleaned up the bodies, they
brought them up from three decks below, two decks below and they laid them out on the
hangar deck and it was an ugly, ugly sight — they got mutilated, their arms with no flesh on
them, we had them in a few rows— about five rows I think — and then they had a burial at
sea.”34

Bunker Hill CV 17’s burned and melted aircraft and damaged elevator are in evidence after the
kamikaze attack of 11 May 1945. NARA 80G 259964.
270 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Bunker Hill’s fires were intense after she was struck by two kamikazes. NARA 80G 274266.

With so many dead, the medics soon ran out of body bags and had to put two men in
each bag, weighted down with a shell casing. In spite of her heavy casualties, Bunker Hill sur-
vived the attack.
While major attacks from above plagued the ships at Okinawa, individual suicide swim-
mers were still active below. Early in the morning on 11 May the cargo ship C. W. Post was
anchored off Ie Shima when she noted the presence of five enemy swimmers in her vicinity
 Bunker Hill burns as The Sullivans DD 537 stands by in foreground. NARA 80G 274264.

Crewmen and firefighting crews scramble to save their ship after it was hit by two kamikazes. NARA
80G 323712.
272 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Bunker Hill crewmen look over the bodies of their shipmates after the kamikaze attack of 11 May
1945. NARA 80G 323708.

along with a small boat. The would-be suiciders were dispatched by gunfire from a nearby
patrol craft.35 Shortly thereafter, the crew of C. W. Post watched in horror as a kamikaze made
a successful attack on another cargo ship nearby, the M. S. Tjisadane.
Ship’s Master J. Naerabout had anchored M. S. Tjisadane near C. W. Post and Panamint
AGC-13 on 10 May 1945. At 0904, observers on M .S. Tjisadane saw Panamint open fire on an
aircraft that was approaching her. At this point they realized that this was just one of three
that were headed directly at M. S. Tjisadane. The first was a Jill which was taken under fire
but managed to launch a torpedo which first missed M. S. Tjisadane and then curved around
and missed Panamint. At this point a second Jill was taken under fire and crashed forward of
Tjisadane. Meanwhile, the first Jill continued its attack, making a low altitude run on the ship
which ended in its crash into the booms of the number two hold, erupting in a ball of flame.
Parts of the plane were scattered over the deck and some went over the side. Moments later
a Betty made a run on the cargo ship but was shot down 900 yards astern. Fire fighting on
the cargo ship was effective and, by 0918 the flames had been extinguished. She had not suffered
significant damage, but four men were killed and nine wounded in the attack.36 Although the
invasion was in its sixth week, there was no safe haven at Okinawa.
 15. A Miserable May

Although the first eleven days of May had seen numerous attacks by the kamikazes, the
remainder of the month would prove just as deadly. During this period the Japanese launched
two more of their Kikusui attacks from 24 to 25 May and again from 27 to 28 May. Two ships
would be sunk and many others would be hit. The toll of dead and wounded continued to
rise.
New Mexico BB40 was returning from Kerama Retto to the Hagushi anchorage at 1903
on 12 May 1945 when a bogie was reported in her area. She went to general quarters at 1910
and a minute later fired on an incoming George, which was strafing the ship. A shell from
one of her 5" guns exploded under the plane, lifting it up at the last moment and causing it
to miss the battleship. However, its bomb went off, showering the ship with shrapnel. It
crashed near her stern. A few minutes later a Frank, which took advantage of the distraction
caused by the George, hit her amidships on the gun deck near the base of the stack. Fires
caused by the explosion were quickly extinguished and New Mexico dropped anchor at 1920.
The battleship had fifty-four dead and 119 wounded.
The destroyer escort Bright DE 747 was patrolling an anti-submarine screen off Okinawa.
At 1325 she had relieved Sims APD 50 and was on station Baker 12. An incoming raid was
reported at 1918 and the crew, already at general quarters, spotted a single engine plane low
on the water making a run on her port beam. Fire from Bright struck the plane and damaged
its engine and port wing, however, it was not sufficient to stop it. At about 1840 it crashed
into the ship’s fantail and exploded. Bright’s rudders were jammed at hard left and she had
to cut her speed to five knots to avoid collisions with other ships in the area. Two of her men
in the aft steering area were severely injured. McClelland DE 750 came to her aid and stood
by for assistance. Her crew managed to get the fires out and Gear ARS 33 towed her into
Kerama Retto. She remained there for several days undergoing temporary repairs and then
joined a convoy headed for Ulithi on 21 May for further work.1
Ever wary of the possibility of a suicide boat attack, anti-small boat screens were con-
stantly on patrol near the anchorages at Okinawa. Such a screen was in operation the evening
of 12–13 May 1945. Patrolling to the south and west of the Hagushi beach anchorage at Okinawa
was Task Unit 52.19.3, which consisted of seven LCS(L) gunboats, the 19, 53, 82, 83, 84, 86,
and 111. Four of the ships, LCS(L)s 19, 82, 84, and 86, patrolled on a line southwest of the
anchorage. At 2330 LCS(L) 84 made contact with a small craft and went to general quarters.
She sent out a request for illumination, and within a short time, starshells went off overhead
exposing the suicide boat. Reports indicate that it was about twenty feet long and held four

273
274 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

men in an open cockpit. The 84 fired on the boat and it swerved away and headed toward
LCS(L) 19 which was patrolling on an adjacent station. Thomas E. Fraser DM 25 was notified
and picked up the boat with her arc light, illuminating it so that the gunboats were able to
spot it. This was much more effective than the small signal lights on the LCS(L)s and enabled
them to spot the suicide boats at a greater range. The 19 increased her speed and turned so
that she was broadside to the small craft and let go with her 20mm and 40mm guns. At 0012
on 13 May, she scored hits on the boat and it sank a few minutes later. Fifty-two minutes
later, at 0104, the gunboat spotted another Shinyo crossing her bow 800 yards dead ahead. As
the distance closed to 600 yards she turned to port and let go with a broadside. The Shinyo
was hit by 20mm fire and sank at 0012.2
LCS(L) 82 made its first suicide boat contact at 2353 on 12 May when her commanding
officer, Lt. Peter G. Beierl, spotted a boat about seventy-five yards dead ahead. He gave the
order to go to flank speed and hard left rudder in order to set his gunners up for a starboard
broadside against the boat. The ship’s twelve inch signal light illuminated the boat which
then picked up speed and headed for the gunboat’s starboard bow. For a while the boat was
obscured by smoke from the guns, but soon appeared about fifteen feet off the ship’s bow and
then swerved toward the ship. The gunboat’s speed was greater and the Shinyo passed behind
the ship and headed for open water. The 82 gave chase and was finally able to spot the boat
at a range of about 300 yards. By this time a nearby APD had managed to illuminate the boat
with its arc light. Both ships fired on the boat and it went dead in the water and began to
burn about 0019. It sank soon after.3 Suicide boats continued to plague the area and Spectacle
AM 305 reported sinking six the night of 14 –15 May.
On 13 May Bache DD 470 was patrolling Radar Picket Station No. 9 along with Cowell
DD 547, LSM(R) 198, and LCS(L)s 23, 56, and 87. The ships came under attack at 1745 as three
Petes approached the station. The two Marine Corsairs flying Combat Air Patrol made short
work of them. An hour later the ships were under attack again. Three Vals were the attackers
this time. Two made simultaneous runs on Bache from both sides and were promptly shot
down near the ship. The third Val made it through the ship’s fire. Its wing struck the ship
near the No. 2 stack and the plane bounced along the deck and exploded. Its bomb, jarred
loose by the impact, bounced off the deck and exploded a few feet in the air. The ship lost
steam and electric power and the guns had to be handled manually. Other kamikazes tried to
get at her but were prevented by the Combat Air Patrol and the support ships. Once her fires
were under control at 1912, she transferred off her most seriously wounded to the LCS(L)s
for treatment. LCS(L) 56 began the task of towing her back to Kerama Retto for repairs and
Lipan ATF 85 took over. She had forty-one killed and thirty-two wounded.4
Enterprise CV 6, commanded by Capt. G. B. H. Hall, was still operating as part of Task
Force 58. Along with the other carriers of the force she had been attacking the airfields on
Shikoku and Kyushu. Early in the morning of 14 May the carriers came under attack as they
headed back to Okinawa. A large raid of twenty-six enemy planes descended on the carriers
and one Zeke chose Enterprise as its target. The large carrier maneuvered in an attempt to
evade the plane and took it under fire with its five inch guns. The plane ducked in and out of
cloud cover, evading the ship’s fire. The carrier’s action report describes the maneuvers of the
kamikaze:

The dive was very shallow, not at any time exceeding 30°. Previously his speed, as indicated by
computer solution, had been in the vicinity of 250 knots. As the ship turned, his relative bearing
increased to 185 or 190. No evasive tactics were employed although slight changes in the attitude
of the plane indicate the pilot was correcting his point of aim as the ship turned. At an esti-
mated distance of 100 –200 yards from his point of impact flipped over in a left hand snap roll
ending up on his back. When the plane passed Air Defense Forward a distance of 140 feet from
 15. A Miserable May 275

the terminal point the pilot had steepened his inverted dive so that he finally struck in a 40°–50°
dive.
When the plane issued from the cloud all the guns that could effectively bear opened fire
immediately.... The bomb explosion in No. 1 elevator pit caused fires to break out on 5 inch
groups I and II (forward starboard and port respectively), and the forward starboard 20MM bat-
tery. The fire was extinguished in approximately thirty minutes, the abandoned guns remanned,
and jettisioned ammunition replaced.5

The Zeke’s bomb penetrated the carrier’s deck and exploded below. Parts of the forward ele-
vator were blown 400 feet in the air. This crash caused the death of thirteen of her crew and
the wounding of another sixty-eight. Eight men, who had been blown overboard, were picked
up by Waldron DD 699. However, the attacks were not finished. Two more Zekes attacked at
0803 and were shot down. Ten minutes later Enterprise assisted in shooting down a Zeke that
was making a suicide run on Bataan CVL 29. The final attack came at 0817 when another Zeke
came at the carrier from dead astern and was driven off by the ship’s guns. At the time of
these attacks “the big E” had thirteen planes aloft. They landed safely on the other carriers.
Enterprise rejoined her task group for refueling and further service.
Douglas H. Fox was patrolling Radar Picket Station No. 9 along with Van Valkenburgh
and LCS(L) 53, 65, 66, and 67 on 17 May when she encountered kamikazes. At 1926, four
Oscars flying from the field at Karenko South on Taiwan attacked the radar pickets. Two went
down under the combined firepower of the ships and Douglas H. Fox accounted for a third.
However, a fourth made it through and hit Fox’s deck near her No. 1 and 2 5"/38 mounts.
Mount No. 1 was totally destroyed and No. 2 was damaged badly. Fires started by the explosions
were fought successfully and were completely out fifteen minutes later. The swarm of
kamikazes had done their best, but in the end Fox claimed five, Van Valkenurgh three and
LCS(L) 53 one. On board
Douglas H. Fox nine men
had died and thirty-five
were wounded.6
Sims APD 50 was
screening west of the
Hagushi area on 18 May
when a Tony attacked her.
The plane came in on her
port bow and was taken
under fire. At 200 yards,
Sims’ gunners knocked its
port wing off. At about the
same time a second plane
dove on her starboard
quarter and also sustained
damage from the ship’s
guns. Both went down just
off her port side. The
explosion shook the ship
and caused minor damage, A Zeke, carrying a 551 pound bomb, rolls over on its back just prior
but there were no casual- to crashing into the flight deck of Enterprise CV 6 on 14 May 1945.
USS Enterprise CV 6 Serial 0273. Action Report of USS Enterprise—
ties. Sims had a lucky day. CV6—in Connection with Operations in Support of Amphibious
LST 808 had been hit Landings at Okinawa 3 May to 16 May 1945—Phase III. 22 May 1945,
by a torpedo on 18 May p. 26.
276 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

while anchored at Ie Shima. Her damage had been serious, and two tugs towed her to shallow
water nearby where she came to rest on a reef. At 1837 on 20 May a Japanese plane crashed
into her forward superstructure, penetrated her decks and set the ship afire. On board was a
five man security team which had one man injured. The tugs Tekesta ATF 93, YTB 404, and
YTL 488 came to her assistance and put out the fires. At that point she was damaged beyond
repair and the navy salvaged equipment that was still useable.
At the same time that LST 808 was under attack, nearby John C. Butler DE 339 was also
attacked. At 1831 two Zekes passed by the ship, circled around near Motobu Peninsula, and

Parts of Enterprise’s elevator may be seen after being blown high over the carrier after she was hit
by a Zeke with a 551 pound bomb on 14 May 1945. This photograph was taken from Bataan CVL 29.
USS Enterprise CV 6 Serial 0273. Action Report of USS Enterprise—CV6—in Connection with Oper-
ations in Support of Amphibious Landings at Okinawa 3 May to 16 May 1945—Phase III. 22 May
1945, p. 28.
 15. A Miserable May 277

Enterprise CV 6 ’s crew fights fires after the kamikaze crash on 14 May 1945. NARA 80G 274352.

headed for the ships near Ie Shima. Seven more planes appeared off her starboard side and
split into two groups. Butler’s anti-aircraft fire brought down five planes and crippled another
before one got close enough to cause damage. Fortunately, it only clipped her antennae and
crashed close aboard the starboard beam. Three of her crew had minor injuries.
A short while later at 1950 the liberty ship Uriah M. Rose was attacked by an Oscar while
in Nakagusuku Bay. The ship’s gunners scored on it along with gunners from neighboring
ships. It came in sixty feet over the ship and tried to crash but hit the water fifty feet off the
port side. The ensuing explosion jarred the ship and caused some minor damage but no casu-
alties. She had escaped destruction.
On 20 May Chase APD 54 was underway five miles north of Kerama Retto when she was
278 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

attacked at 1915 by a Zeke carrying two 220-lb. bombs. The plane did not hit her but crashed
in the water about ten yards off her starboard beam. Its bombs went off under water and parts
of the plane showered the aft end of the ship. Her starboard shaft was damaged and her
steering was jammed. Chase’s after engine room began to flood and had to be abandoned. As
she lay dead in the water, another plane dove at her but was driven away by her gunfire. Impec-
cable AM 320 came to her aid. By 1941 the ship was listing seven degrees to starboard and the
list increased to ten and one half degrees by 1950. Chase was informed that Shackle ARS 9 was
on the way from Kerama Retto to take her in tow. With PCE(R) 852 and Converse DD 509
standing by, her commanding officer decided that she had to be abandoned. At 2018 she was
listing sixteen degrees to starboard and it looked as though she could not be saved. All non-
essential personnel were ordered aboard Impeccable. Finally, with her list at nineteen degrees,
all remaining personnel were transferred to Impeccable. Converse came alongside and stood by.
Miraculously, the list stopped increasing and a skeleton repair party returned to the ship with
additional pumps from Converse. Shackle arrived with more pumps and by 2300 the flooding
was under control. Shackle towed her back to Kerama Retto where she underwent emergency
repairs.7 Although no one was killed in the attack, thirty-five of her men had been injured.
Thatcher DD 514 was patrolling in the outer screen at Okinawa on 20 May. O’Neill DE
188 patrolled to her southwest and Fair DE 35 to her northwest. At 1835 raids were reported
heading for the area. John C. Butler DE 339 reported that she was under attack by four aircraft
and Anthony DD 515 went to her aid. At 1920 an Oscar was spotted off Thatcher’s port bow
making a run on her at a low altitude. The plane passed down the port side of the destroyer
and circled around her stern. A couple of minutes later it crashed into Thatcher’s main deck
aft the superstructure. Explosions rocked the destroyer and fires broke out. Immediately on
the heels of the Oscar, two more planes came in on Thatcher’s port quarter but were driven
off by her gunfire. Boyd DD 544 and Pavlic APD 70 came alongside to assist with firefighting.
At 2030, with her fires under control, Thatcher headed for Kerama Retto. She reported:
It is thought that the OSCAR type aircraft which struck the THATCHER carried two bombs,
estimated at 500 pounds each. One of these detonated on contact, carrying away the lower part
of the mast, destroying the radar transmitter room and CIC, damaging the forward part of the
deck house and number one stack, and the after part of the bridge superstructure. The other
bomb is thought to have entered the water just short of the ship and exploded in close proxim-
ity to hull or at instant of penetration causing the rupture in the hull, destroying the diesel gen-
erator room.... Deckhouse forward of one stack demolished. After part of bridge superstructure
and forward part of number one stack and searchlight platform badly damaged. 8

Thatcher had fourteen dead and fifty-three wounded.

Register APD 92 had arrived at Okinawa on 19 May and the next day was assigned to the
screen. Ten Zekes headed in her direction at 1923. Four of them gave their attention to the
APD, with two heading in from her starboard side, one from astern, and one from dead ahead.
Under fire from her guns, two of the planes were shot down and a third driven off smoking.
However, the plane making a run on her from her bow clipped the kingpost on the port side
and crashed close aboard. The kingpost was damaged by the hit and struck the No. 3 40mm
gun tub, severely damaging the ship. None of her crew died, but twelve were injured, including
her commanding officer.9
Kikusui No. 7 ran from 24 to 25 May. Included in the attacks would be 165 kamikazes
from both army and navy.
William C. Cole DE 641 came under attack twice from 24 to 25 May. An Oscar attacked
her as she patrolled off Ie Shima and nearly crashed the ship. Its gunners hit it with anti-
aircraft fire and the plane grazed the torpedo tubes, passed over the ship, and crashed close
aboard the starboard beam. The action report for the event indicated that:
 15. A Miserable May 279

The entire hull was littered with debris of the plane, including engine parts, fuselage, and partial
pieces of human flesh. The pilot, just prior to the planes crashing, was thrown clear and aft in
such a way that his parachute opened partially. During his short descent the body had a limp
appearance. From a post action inspection of the quantities of internal organs and flesh that
were strewn about the ship in the vicinity of the crash, it is safe to assume the pilot was dead
prior to hitting the water.10

The ship suffered some mild shock damage from the explosion but nothing serious. Later in
the day she shot down a Tony which hit the water 1,000 yards from the ship.
The EC(2) type cargo ship Segundo Ruiz Belvis had a close call while anchored at Ie
Shima. At 0130 on May 25, a kamikaze made a run on her, heading directly toward her bow.
Accurate fire from a pair of LCIs nearby shot the plane down only 100 yards from the ship.
Her decks were strewn with shrapnel and debris from the plane but no serious damage
occurred and she suffered no casualties.
At 0142 on 25 May, a twin engine bomber passed over Cowell DD 547 as she was patrolling
Radar Picket Station No. 16. The plane clipped her mast and antenna and crashed close aboard,
showering the ship with debris and wounding two men. Damage to the ship was minimal, a
rare event for the radar picket ships. Stormes DD 780 did not fare as well. She was patrolling
Radar Picket Station No. 15 along with Drexler DD 741, Ammen DD 527 and LCS(L)s 52, 61,
85, and 89. The ships had been continually threatened by enemy aircraft from the preceding
evening until the time Stormes was hit. At about 1900 the ships went to general quarters. This
was a precautionary move as it was near the time the combat air patrol fighters usually began
to return to their bases. Japanese airmen were aware of this and frequently planned their attacks
for the evening hours and before daylight so as to avoid the presence of the Hellcats, Corsairs,
and Wildcats. As if on pre-arranged signal, the kamikazes appeared around 2000, with many
of them heading toward the ships at Hagushi. Several remained in the area of the radar pickets
and began to attack them. At 0905 lookouts on Stormes observed a Tojo making a dive on
Ammen and took it under fire. “Stormes opened fire with 5" and automatic weapons. The plane
then did a half loop and came down on its back in a near vertical dive on the STORMES’ after
torpedo mount. The impact was followed by violent shaking of the ship and heavy fires billowed
aft from the torpedo mount and 5" mount three.”11 The torpedo mount was demolished in the
crash and the plane’s bomb penetrated her deck and exploded in her after 5" magazine. Force
from the explosion went upward and damaged the deck, as well as downward, where it tore a
hole in the bottom of the ship. The aft end of Stormes’ keel was blown off and her struts were
bowed slightly. Flooding was brought under control, but when it was over, the destroyer was
down three and one-half feet at the stern. Stormes’ crew quickly put out the fires and Sproston
DD 577 escorted her back to base. Her CO, Cmdr. W. N. Wylie, paid tribute to his adversary:
The enemy pilot was an excellent flyer. He handled his plane quickly and executed an attack
which presented an ever changing deflection problem at difficulty position angles. He took full
advantage of his tremendous speed without ever losing control of his plane. He executed a half
roll to insure a hit in the last 500 feet of his dive.12

Early in the morning of 25 May, at 0025, O’Neill DE 188 came under attack at the Hagushi
anchorage by a Japanese plane described in her action report as an “advanced army trainer,
type 15.”13 The plane appeared out of the smoke, circled O’Neill, and made a run on her from
dead ahead. The destroyer escort took it under fire, and one of her 5" shells exploded the
plane close aboard her starboard bow. Its explosion sent the plane’s engine into the forecastle
and the superstructure was splattered with shrapnel. Sixteen of O’Neill’s crew were wounded.
Two of the more fortunate ships that day were Guest DD 472 and Sims APD 50. Both had
planes splash close aboard. Guest had no casualties and Sims suffered eleven wounded, but
both ships had only minor damage.
280 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Least fortunate of the ships hit that day was Barry APD 29. She had only been at Okinawa
about ten days when she was attacked by two Vals while on patrol off Okinawa. One made it
through her anti-aircraft fire to crash near her bridge, and the other passed over the ship and
was soon shot down by other ships in the area. Severe fires broke out and threatened her mag-
azines. The ship was abandoned, but flooding eventually put an end to the threat to her mag-
azines and she was re-boarded and saved. However, her condition was such that she was too
far gone and was decommissioned. Thirty of her men were wounded in the attack. Her hulk
would be sunk later in an attempt to use her as bait for the kamikazes.14 In his endorsement
of the ship’s action report, Capt. J. N. Hughes, Commander Transport Division 102, noted
the vulnerability of the older destroyers:
1. To present date a total of six of these old APD’s (ex “four stacker” destroyers) have
been hit by suicide aircraft. The basic report illustrates how ill-equipped to meet
present day problems in the forward area these old ships are. The average age of
ships in this division (including APD-36) is over 26 years.
2. Japanese aviators have repeatedly shown a preference for attacking types that give
ineffective opposition on account of their light armament and unwieldy turning
circle. On this account the old APD’s, with their antiquated design and consequent
sluggish handling characteristics are select targets for enemy airmen.
3. The very large turning circle of the “four stacker” destroyer types is well known to
the high command. When these old ships are a part of a composite unit under
attack their sluggish handling proves mutually embarrassing to and embarrassed by
the modern ships and thereby actually increases the hazard to the newer vessels.
4. It is recommended that such of the old APD’s as have survived be withdrawn to
rear areas for escort and training duties. The men who bring these ships into the
forward area feel that they are being given a job to do but nothing to do it with. 15
Spectacle AM 305 was operating as part of the suicide boat and submarine screen between
Ie Shima and Okinawa on 25 May. Early in the morning, about 0505, her after engine governor
failed and it became necessary for her to operate on her forward engine while she repaired
the problem. At 0805, as the repairs were underway, she came under attack. A kamikaze
attempted a run on a nearby destroyer escort but missed it and crashed into the water.
Moments later a George also headed for the DE, pulled up and headed for Spectacle. As the
George attacked the 185' minesweeper, her CO, Lt. G. B. Williams, ordered flank speed and
a hard turn to starboard to give his gunners maximum opportunity to bear on the plane,
which was coming in from astern. In spite of Spectacle’s maneuvers the plane crashed just aft
of her starboard beam. Its engine and bomb went through the hull and into the after engine
room. The explosion and subsequent fires cooked off ammo in the 40mm magazines and set
the depth charges on fire. A number of men were blown overboard and were further imperiled
by the ship. Its rudder had been jammed to full right by the blast and the ship circled around,
narrowly missing the men in the water. Firefighting measures were instituted and the fires
were brought under control. LSM 135, LCI(M) 353 and several other ships came to her assis-
tance, picking up crewmen from the water and helping with the firefighting. In the midst of
all this, another plane crashed into LSM 135 and a fourth was driven away after making an
attempt on one of the ships. It was hit by gunfire and flew off smoking. LCI(M) 353 took
wounded aboard and headed back to Ie Shima. Spectacle had suffered twenty-nine dead and
six wounded. She was towed in by Tekesta ATF 93. Her action report for the day indicated
that:
The crash demolished the crew’s and CPO’s heads, the two 40mm magazines amidships on the
main deck, general workshop, laundry, all of these between frames 52 and 62, also blew up and
 15. A Miserable May 281

ripped open the boat deck (01) between those frames, bulged out hull on both sides, demolished
the port 40mm gun, mount and foundation, smashed the motor whaleboat and put starboard
40mm out of action. In the after engine room the main engine was ruined, all piping and acces-
sories near the point of penetration were ripped and torn. The bulkheads at frame 52, main
deck, were bulged forward, all hatches in the amidship passageway leading forward were blown
out except for one at frame 44 leading into the mess hall. The hatch, starboard side leading to
the after main deck, was blown out, and all other hatches in the vicinity were bulged out from
force of explosion. Six bodies were recovered from the wreckage and one in the engine room
were nude. Due to this fact, and to the general disruptive force, and due to the lack of wide-
spread gasoline fires, it is believed this plane carried a small bomb which exploded on impact. 16

At 0810 LSM 135 had been ordered to assist Spectacle which was on fire three miles south-
east of Ie Shima. She arrived on the scene and began rescuing survivors from the mine sweeper
when she was attacked by two Tonys. Her action report stated:
At approximately 0845 the ramp was being raised when two planes identified as Jap Tonys sud-
denly appeared out of the low hanging clouds and approached from dead astern at low angle
(almost mast head height) and continued in face of the fire of our 20 MM. guns. One plane hit
the conn and parts of the plane and possibly a bomb continued by force into the starboard side
forward crew’s compartment, and through to the bottom spraying the well deck and the weather
deck with gasoline and parts of the plane. The other plane veered off. The conn was enveloped
in flames immediately. At the same time the forward crew’s compartment was engulfed in flames
and burning oil due to the puncturing of the forward fuel tanks and escaping of oil into the
compartment. Due to the instantaneous fire of the burning fuel oil completely enveloping the
compartment it was impossible to save those survivors of the AM 305 and those members of
ship’s company there assisting them.17

Water mains had been broken by the explosions and firefighting was impossible. With fires
raging and the ship beginning to list to starboard, it was obvious that she was not going to
be saved. Burning oil leaked out of the ship and surrounded her and she was abandoned.
William C. Cole DE 641 and Tekesta ATF 93 rescued most of the survivors. Her commanding
officer, Lt. H. L. Derby, Jr., and ten of her crew were dead, with ten more of her crew wounded
in the attack. The ship drifted onto a reef off Ie Shima and was declared a total loss.
Sims APD 50 had suffered some minor damage from a close miss on 18 May. Again on
25 May she had a similar experience. At 0033 in the morning, an unidentified plane attacked
her and crashed close aboard her starboard beam. The ship had little damage, but the explosion
of the plane and its bomb wounded eleven men.
The high speed transport Roper APD 20 ran afoul of the kamikaze horde at 0921 on 25
May. She was patrolling the screen with Abercrombie DE 343 and two other destroyer escorts.
At 0703 she transferred ten men from her engineering force to Barry APD 29, which had suf-
fered a kamikaze strike at 0100 that morning. She then resumed patrol and was near Aber-
crombie when she was hit. A Zeke, with three Corsairs in hot pursuit, broke through the
clouds four miles away. In all probability the Zeke had not set out from its base on a kamikaze
mission. However, with little chance of escaping the Corsair, the Zeke picked Roper as a target
and made its run. Certain that the Zeke would fall victim to the Corsairs, Roper held fire but
the plane made it through to crash her forecastle.
When the plane struck the forecastle, its gasoline exploded throwing a sheet of flame up about
200 feet, the port wing entered the starboard side making a hole roughly six feet square, five feet
above the water line. The motor hit No. 1 3" 50 Cal. Gun mount, and with the starboard wing or
part of the fuselage glanced into the air and exploded about 30 feet over the water and 50 feet
from the port side near the stern. Several fragments which appeared to be pieces of the motor
block were found on the after deck, and it is believed to be one of these fragments which killed
the First Lieutenant, who was crouching just forward of the after deck house ordering the men
in the repair parties to hit the deck.... The Pilot’s flying helmet, pieces of his leather jacket, and
small pieces of his anatomy were left hanging on Gun No. 1.18
282 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

The fires started by the explosion were extinguished by 1030. Roper transferred her injured
to Relief AH 1 and headed back to Kerama Retto escorted by Abercrombie and two Corsairs
where temporary repairs were completed by 30 May. Roper had one dead and ten wounded.
Bates APD 47 was on patrol two miles south of Ie Shima and had a busy night from 24
to 25 May. Continual calls to general quarters occurred between 2000 and 0430, and she fired
on planes along with Shannon DM 25 which was cruising nearby. At 0700 she was relieved by
William Seiverling DE 441 and headed back toward Ie Shima. Constantly under general quarters
from 0800 to 0845, she fired on a plane about 0900. At 1115 three Vals, at first thought to be
American planes landing on Ie Shima headed for Bates. William Seiverling and Bates took
them under fire, but one approached Bates from port and dropped a bomb, which exploded
close aboard her starboard side, opening her seams. Moments later it crashed into Bates’
fantail on the starboard side. The second Val crashed into Bates’ wheelhouse on the port side.
Gasoline fires spread instantly and Bates lost power. Minutes later, just as Bates was beginning
to recover, the third Val bombed her. It missed the ship, but the bomb exploded so close
aboard the port side that Bates incurred additional severe damage. Fuel oil leaked out and
was ignited by the existing fires. Soon the burning oil had spread over the side and the ship
was in the midst of a sea of fire. Gosselin APD 126 attempted to close on Bates, but had to
back off due to the extreme fires on the water. With the fires continuing to spread and the
water mains out, the order to abandon ship was given. Cree ATF 84 managed to get a line on
her later in the afternoon and towed her burning hulk to the anchorage at Ie Shima, but it
was too late. At 1923, the burning ship rolled over and went under in twenty fathoms.19
Twenty-one of her men had died and thirty-five were wounded.
At 0233 on 25 May, Guest DD 472 was patrolling off the Hagushi anchorage, just north
of Yontan airfield, when she came under attack by a single engine plane. It struck her mast
and hit the water fifty yards off her starboard beam. She had minor damage and no casual-
ties.
Forrest DMS 24 was on patrol in Nakagusuku Bay on 26 May when she was hit by a
kamikaze. She had cut her speed and was in the process of slowing the ship when, at 2249, a
Val with a 551 pound bomb struck her on the starboard side just below the main deck. Accord-
ing to her action report:
Evidently the bomb was broken by impact and the forward half bounced across to settle against
the hull, first platform deck, above the after port corner of the chill box. When it exploded,
apparently with delayed nose fuse, it created a depression in the first platform deck at that point,
split the main deck athwartships from port side to midships and turned the two pieces back
against the adjacent stanchions, made a hole in the port side, and bulged the forward and after
bulkheads of the forward mess hall. The explosion created one heavy black cloud of smoke
approximately twenty feet in diameter, but no noxious fumes or gasses were observed.20

Tawakoni ATF 114 came immediately to her aid and the process of firefighting and pumping
her out commenced. She was down by the head but made it to Kerama Retto on her own
twenty-seven hours later where she tied up alongside Nestor ARB 6 for repairs. Her casualties
were five dead and thirteen wounded.
PC 1603 was moored at Taka Shima on 26 May when she came under attack. Apparently
the ship was not aware that there were enemy aircraft in the area. A Tony crashed her port
bow and buried itself below, its tail protruding from the ship. Now alerted, the crew spotted
another incoming kamikaze but they were too late. It crashed their starboard side and gasoline
from its tanks erupted in a ball of fire. It was fortunate for the crew that the bombs carried
by the planes did not go off. So thin were the sides of the PC that the bombs passed right
through without exploding. Her casualties were three dead and fifteen wounded. She was
towed back to Kerama Retto and declared a total loss. 21
 15. A Miserable May 283

Kikusui No. 8 ran from 27 to 28 May and would include 110 special attack aircraft, sixty
from the navy and fifty from the army. Conventional escorts and attack planes would also
participate in the attacks.
Braine DD 630 was patrolling Radar Picket Station No. 5 along with Anthony DD 515 and
LCS(L)s 13, 82, 86, and 123 on 26 May. Covering the ships was a CAP of army air force Thun-
derbolts. Foul weather forced them to return to base around 0700, leaving the picket ships
unguarded. Several Vals approached the station and began their attack. LCS(L) 123 shot down
one as it attempted a run on Braine. It crashed close aboard the destroyer. A second Val headed
for Anthony and was hit by anti-aircraft fire from Anthony and Braine. Braine took a third
Val under fire without realizing that the second had regained control and was heading right
for her. It crashed into her number 2 handling room. Moments later another Val crashed her
amidships and its bomb penetrated her deck. Interior damage to the ship, as well as her
bridge, was caused by this attack. So many fires broke out from the two kamikaze crashes
that the ship was effectively divided into three parts. Communication between them was
destroyed, and men in each section were on their own in determining how to save their ship. 22
Braine’s rudder was jammed, and with the lack of communications, the ship circled continually
at about ten knots, putting men in the water in peril. Other ships in the area had to take
evasive measures so that they would not collide with her. Hot on the heels of the first two
Vals, a third made its attack. This one went after LCS(L) 86 but was shot down by the combined
fire of the support ships. At about the same time, a Val made its attack on Anthony but was
shot down close aboard. The pilot’s body along with other debris from the plane showered
down on Anthony, but damage to the destroyer was minimal, and she had no casualties.
On board Braine, many men had been killed and wounded. A number went into the
shark infested waters. Walter C. Gaddis, a machinist mate on board Braine, survived the blast
from the two planes and wound up in the water. The LCS(L) gunboats came to the destroyer’s
aid, picking up their men and shooting at the sharks which were attacking them.23 Gaddis
was rescued and “looked back and saw a shark hit someone in the water and throw him into
the air.”24 Anthony and the gunboats came alongside Braine and assisted with firefighting and
the rescue of survivors. A number had been killed by sharks. John Rooney, a yeoman on board
LCS (L) 82, recalled, “We recovered one who had not made it, hanging pale and lifeless in his
Mae West, a leg torn away, the other arm gone, gutted by the sharks. He had escaped the
terror of incineration on his ship.”25
Enemy aircraft continued to threaten the ships. At one point Anthony and the LCS(L)s
had to cast off from Braine in order to combat enemy planes. In the midst of the fray, ten
men in the water were carried away by the current and drifted out of sight of the ships. They
were fortunate, as a call had been made to the “Dumbo” patrol of Hamlin AV 15 at Kerama
Retto. At 0917, Lt. M. W. Kouns set his PBM-5 Mariner down in the choppy waters and
rescued the men. One of them died en route to safety. Anthony began to tow Braine back to
Kerama Retto and was relieved of the chore by Ute ATF 76. Braine’s casualties were sixty-six
dead and seventy-eight wounded.
Loy APD 56 was hit by a kamikaze at 2320 on 27 May while on anti-submarine patrol off
Okinawa. At 2332 her lookouts spotted a Jill circling the ship and lining up for a suicide run.
As the plane approached the ship, Loy’s gunners let loose with a barrage of 40mm and 20mm
fire and the plane crashed just off the starboard side of the ship. Pieces of the plane made a
number of small holes in her side and some flooding in the engine room was experienced. Hot
shrapnel from the explosion pierced some drums of fog oil and gasoline on the fantail, and
major fires engulfed the aft end of the ship. Within a short time the fires were under control
and the flooding stopped. Loy headed back to Hagushi under her own steam to transfer casu-
alties and lick her wounds.26 Three of her crew had been killed and fifteen wounded.
284 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Rednour APD 102 had been on anti-submarine screen off Okinawa near Loy and observed
the attack on her. She was soon under attack herself. At 2345 an Oscar made a run on her
from her starboard quarter and crashed into her fantail on the starboard side. The plane’s
explosion blew a ten foot hole in the deck and engulfed the area in a fireball. Within ten min-
utes the fires were under control. Depth charges were jettisoned as a precaution and the flood-
ing in the aft compartment was stopped. Pavlic APD 70 came to her aid and sent its medical
officer on board to assist in treating casualties. At 0030 another plane menaced the ship but
was turned away by her gunfire. She made it back to Hagushi to transfer her wounded at
0145.27 Three of her men had died and thirteen were wounded.
The hydrographic ship Dutton AGS-8 had arrived at Okinawa on 1 April along with the
invasion fleet. Her job had been to survey various bodies of water, determining safe passages,
good anchoring ground, and suitable locations for amphibious landings. On 27 May she was
en route from Nakagusuku Wan to Kimu Wan when she came under attack. It was a cloudy,
wet day, with intermittent rain and low visibility. At 0735 bogeys were reported in the area
and the ship was put on alert. Five minutes later three Vals were spotted heading toward Oki-
nawa, but they changed course as American fighters headed to attack them. Their new course
put them on path to fly near Dutton. One passed by Dutton’s stern and was taken under fire
by the ship with no hits scored. It turned off and headed for a nearby destroyer escort. The
second plane dove on Dutton’s port beam. Dutton’s gunners hit the plane and probably killed
the pilot, causing the plane to lift up and crash into the forward section of the bridge. The
remaining parts of the plane crashed into the starboard forecastle and went over the side.
Debris from the crash and a shower of water came down on Dutton’s deck, but she had not
suffered a mortal wound. Her CO, Lt. Frederick E. Sturmer, aware of his ships limited anti-
aircraft capability, headed for the company of other ships in order to protect his vessel against
the increasing number of bogeys overhead. As they headed away from the area, a muster of
the crew revealed that one man had been blown overboard and was missing. Dutton returned
to the scene of the attack and searched for thirty minutes and could not find him. SC-1338
took over the search and Dutton left the area. The crewman was never found and presumed
dead.28
LCS(L) 52 was on patrol at Radar Picket Station No. 15A on 27 May, along with LCS(L)s
55, 56, and 61. They were the support group for Ammen DD 527 and Boyd DD 544. During
the daylight hours the ships had driven off several would-be kamikazes. Neither destroyer
was damaged, but at 2047, a Zeke made a run on LCS(L) 52. LCS(L)s 61 and 82 both hit it
with their fire and the plane crashed only twenty yards off the starboard quarter of LCS(L)
82. The explosion damaged the gunboat, killed one officer and wounded another. Nine of the
crew were also injured. She headed back to Hagushi for repairs with 61 as an escort. Along
the way a Betty bomber circled the two ships and came in astern the 52. It passed over and
was hit by shells from the gunboat but continued on course heading for the conn of LCS(L)
61. The 61’s aft 40mm battery took it under fire and literally lifted the aircraft upward as it
passed directly over the gun tub. A hard left turn at the last second, ordered by the CO Lt.
Jim Kelley, saved the ship as the bomber crashed twenty feet off her port bow. A section of
the tail bounced back off the water and landed on the ship, injuring Bosun’s Mate Joe Colum-
bus. Aside from one man injured, the 61 escaped unscathed.
The sinking of another destroyer on a radar picket station was not far away. Patrolling
RP No. 15A on 28 May were Drexler DD 741, Lowry DD 770, and LCS(L)s 55 and 56. By this
time it was standard practice to have at least two destroyers and four support gunboats on
each radar picket station, however, with the damage to the LCS(L) 52 the previous day and
the assignment of LCS(L) 61 as her escort, that left only two support gunboats on the station.
Drexler’s radar picked up six twin-engine Franceses approaching the station about 0643.
 15. A Miserable May 285

The two radar picket patrol Corsairs from VMF-322 went after them, shot down two and
damaged two others. Another plane from the group slipped by and made a run at Lowry.
The DREXLER came left sharply and opened fire immediately at about 12,000 yards range, firing
directly over the U.S.S. LOWRY as the plane closed. The plane appeared to be making its suicidal
dive on the LOWRY which was 800 yards on the starboard beam of the DREXLER as a result of
our turn. This plane was hit but came on in, missed the LOWRY by a few feet passing directly
over her, and looked as if it was going to crash; however, it recovered and seemed to stumble
into this vessel striking between the main deck and waterline ... just slightly forward of the star-
board 40MM Quad mount. The ship in this vicinity was sprayed with gasoline which started a
fire, but the fire was quickly brought under control.29

The impact knocked the 40mm quad off its mount and ruptured steam lines in the ship.
Almost immediately another Frances dove on Lowry and was shot down by a hit from one of
Drexler’s 5" guns. At this point, Drexler was dead in the water and an easy target for still
another Frances that came in on her starboard bow. The Corsairs drove it off but did not
shoot it down. It circled and made another run on the destroyer, which scored numerous hits
on it with 40mm and 20mm gunfire. Although the plane appeared about to crash, the pilot
recovered control and came back at the ship for a third run. This time he was successful and
crashed into Drexler on the port side. Its bomb went off inside the ship and Drexler rolled
over to starboard, pointed her bow skyward, and slipped beneath the surface. Less than a
minute had elapsed between the kamikaze hit and Drexler’s sinking. The quick roll-over of
the ship prevented many men below from getting out. One hundred fifty-eight died and fifty-
one were wounded. Lowry had shot down two enemy aircraft. The LCS(L)s patrolled the area
rescuing survivors.
Transports and cargo ships were important targets for the kamikazes. Keeping supplies
from the American forces would slow down their advances on the Japanese army on Okinawa.
On 28 May several of them suffered kamikaze attacks.
Brown Victory was anchored off Ie Shima carrying 1,000 tons of gas and trucks when she
was crashed by a kamikaze at 0745 on 28 May. Fortunately, the kamikaze that hit her did not
score a direct hit on the hull or superstructure. It crashed into the victory ship’s after mast
and broke in two, with a major portion of the plane hitting the water to starboard. Its bombs
exploded, starting fires and killing four men and injuring sixteen more. Damage to the ship
was minor and she continued operations.
Mary A. Livermore’s cargo was a mundane mix of cement, lumber, and machinery. She
was anchored in Nakagusuku Bay when she was attacked. Her assailant was a float plane that
maneuvered its way toward the ship and crashed into the chart room at 0515. Its bomb
destroyed the area around the chart room and the captain’s quarters. Fires damaged various
areas of the ship and killed her master, James A. Stewart. Along with Stewart, ten men perished
and six were injured. The ship survived the attack and, with temporary repairs, made it back
to San Francisco for an overhaul. Anchored nearby was Josiah Snelling, carrying a similar
cargo. At 0800 a kamikaze made a run on Sandoval APA 194, missed and then crashed Josiah
Snelling. However, it experienced a similar fate as other kamikazes which went after cargo
ships. Heavy masts and booms for shifting cargo were part of the deck furniture on these
ships and it was hard to crash into the ship’s bridge or deck without running afoul of these.
The kamikaze hit her forward winches and then her booms before it went through the deck.
Fires broke out below, but the cement was non-flammable and the fires were quickly extin-
guished. Twenty-five of her men were injured.30
Sandoval APA 194 was carrying a SeaBee unit and its equipment. She anchored in Nak-
agusuku Bay on 27 May and began to offload her troops and cargo. She had just resumed her
offloading at 0737 the following morning when she was crashed by a Tony which hit her
286 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

wheelhouse. As she fought the fires, another kamikaze dove on her and missed, splashing
2,000 yards off the ship. Her XO was one of eight men killed, and her CO was among the
twenty-six wounded.
LCS(L) 119 had been assigned skunk patrol on the north side of the Hagushi Anchorage.
She arrived at her patrol station at 1830 on 27 May. Early the next morning she was attacked
by three Japanese aircraft. A Betty made a run at 0007 and was taken under fire by the ship’s
20mm and 40mm guns. The plane flamed and lost its right wing, causing it to splash in the
water only fifteen feet from the ship. Its bomb went off and the ship was covered with gas
and shrapnel. At 0015 a Rufe was spotted on the port quarter making a run at the gunboat.
It went to flank speed and opened fire, but the Rufe made it through and crashed her starboard
quarter. The center of the ship was transformed into a mass of fire and communications
within the ship were down. Her fire mains had been broken by the crash and it was impossible
to fight the fires. As she struggled to launch her life rafts, another Rufe made a run and
dropped two depth charges but did not crash the ship. No further damage was sustained from
this incident, but it was too late. Her CO, Lt. E. Saroch, Jr., gave the order to abandon ship.
LCS(L) 119 had fourteen dead and eighteen wounded. She was towed in to Kerama Retto
where she was cannibalized to provide parts for other ships as she was being repaired. On 14
June Ute ATF 76 towed her to the Marianas. Eventually she made it back to Treasure Island,
California, for a complete overhaul.31
Two ships were hit by kamikazes on 29 May. One was Shubrick DD 639, operating on
Radar Picket Station No. 16A, and the other was Tatum APD 81 serving on a picket station
off the Hagushi beaches. In the early evening, Tatum came under attack by four enemy aircraft.
She fired on the first which crashed close aboard. Its bomb, released by the impact, went

The Nakajima A6M2-N Navy Type 2 fighter seaplane carried the Allied code name Rufe. It was devel-
oped along the same lines as the Zeke. NARA 80G 169840.
 15. A Miserable May 287

through the ship’s side; fortunately, it was a dud. The mass of the plane bounced off the water
then off Tatum’s side but fell back harmlessly into the sea, causing a few dents in her side plat-
ing. She then drove off another plane with her fire and shot down the third close aboard. The
fourth plane made its run on Tatum and was hit by many shells from the fast transport. It hit
the water only thirty feet from its port bow. The plane’s bomb went off underwater, rocking
the transport, but she held together. The accumulation of several close misses by the aircraft
had damaged the transport, and she was repaired later after she was relieved.
Shubrick DD 639 was underway for Radar Picket Station No. 16A at 2357 and had just
been relieved by Bradford DD 545 at Radar Picket Station No. 11A when a two plane raid
approached the ships. Bradford made short work of her attacker splashing it 200 yards astern.
Shubrick spotted the second plane and slowed to decrease her wake so that she could not be
spotted. The ships at RP No. 11A took the plane under fire but failed to hit it. It spotted
Shubrick and made a run on the destroyer but was shot down 3,500 yards off the ship. A few
minutes later at 1012 another kamikaze hit her starboard quarter. This one had slipped in
unseen by anyone. Its 551 lb. bomb blew a thirty foot hole in the ship’s deck and blew out
her starboard side. In short order the ship began taking on water in her aft engine and fire
rooms. Topside, ammo in the 20mm and 40mm gun tubs began to explode, and at 1029 one
of her depth charges went off. The explosion blew out most of the fires but also killed one of
the crew and injured several others. She was listing three degrees to port and down by the
stern as Van Valkenburgh DD 656 and Pavlic APD 70 came to her assistance, taking off her
wounded and helping with the firefighting. The tug Menominee ATF 73 arrived at 0400 and
took her in tow back to Kerama Retto. Shubrick had thirty-two killed and twenty-eight
wounded.
Thus ended the month of May at Okinawa. Seventy-four ships had been hit by airborne
kamikazes of which nine were sunk. In addition, two were hit by suicide boats, one of which
sank. In the kamikaze attacks of May 1945, 1,620 men had died and 2,073 were wounded.
 16. The War Winds Down

On 1 June 1945, Task Unit 32.19.12, consisting of LCS(L)s 61, 62, 65, 81, 82, and 90 departed
the Hagushi area for patrol. They circled the southern part of Okinawa and entered Naka-
gusuku Wan on the southeastern part of the island. Their targets were suicide boats and swim-
mers. By this time many of the suicide boat units had lost their boats to American gunfire,
and the remaining personnel frequently attacked by using canoes or by swimming. At 2230
on 5 June, LCS(L) 62 picked up a nearby boat on radar. Star shells revealed a solidly built
twenty foot dugout canoe. On board were six Japanese wearing breech cloths and two of them
were wearing swimming goggles. They had gear piled in the bottom of the canoe and covered
by a tarp. The commander of the task unit, Lt. Cmdr. B. D. Voegelin, ordered them to take
prisoners if possible. After circling the canoe for several minutes they used the bullhorn to
order the Japanese to surrender. When their order was ignored, they fired on the boat and the
swimmers went overboard. Small arms were issued to the crew and they killed five of the
men. The sixth tried to swim away, but fire from the ship stopped him and he was dragged
aboard. As the crew was about to tie him up, he went over the side and tried to escape. He
swam back to the canoe and could not be enticed back on board the gunboat. Having enough
of this, the CO ran over the canoe, thus ending the life of the Japanese swimmer.
It was difficult to capture Japanese soldiers since one could never trust that the individual
they encountered was not on a suicide mission. In the same area on 4 May, LCS(L) 40 had
encountered a swimmer. According to the ship’s action report:
0608: Sighted enemy swimmer about 600 yards northwest of Chinen Misaki. Closed him
and attempted to bring him aboard, but when alongside he drew a hand grenade from out of
his shirt and attempted to throw it at the men rescuing him. He was dispatched with small
arms fire. This man was in full uniform less helmet and life jacket. He spoke English and on
our approach asked us to help him.
0639: Sighted second enemy swimmer about 1600 yards east of Yonabaru. This man was in
full uniform including helmet and wore a life jacket but had removed his shoes. Remembering
the experience of the previous swimmer he was dispatched at a distance of 300 yards with small
arms fire.1

Thus, the CO of a ship had to quickly determine if the individual was truly in need of rescue
and could be captured or if he was a threat to the ship and its crew. Most preferred to err on
the side of caution.
Kikusui No. 9 was scheduled for 3 to 7 June 1945. Twenty navy and thirty army special
attack planes would undertake kamikaze missions at Okinawa. The number of aircraft avail-

288
 16. The War Winds Down 289

able for these missions was beginning to decline by this time. Accompanying the Kikusui raid
would be additional planes flying escort for the kamikazes, as well as others flying conventional
missions.
At anchor in Chimu Wan was LCI(L) 90. Her task in the area was to act as the harbor
entrance control unit. Around 1340 a Val appeared out of the clouds and seemed to be making
a run on a small Marine encampment on the nearby island of Taka Hanare. It spotted the
anchored LCI(L) and changed its purpose. In his action report for the day the ship’s CO, Lt.
(jg) J.A. Spear, questioned whether it was an actual suicide attack or a pilot error that caused
the Val to crash his ship. He noted that the plane strafed on the way in, dropped a bomb fifty
yards to starboard of the ship and struck a glancing blow on the aft section of the conn. It
almost seemed as if he was trying to pull up when he hit. However, this type of attack was
not inconsistent with kamikaze crash methods, so the incident is open to question. The ship
had its number one gun manned, but since the plane came in from astern, the ship was unable
to fire on it. It was also unclear if there were air raid warnings broadcast for the area, as the
signalman on watch was killed in the crash and the records destroyed. Damage to the landing
craft was serious and she had one dead and seven injured on her casualty list. 2
Mississippi BB 41 and Louisville CA 28 were operating off the southwestern tip of Okinawa
to prevent the escape of Japanese personnel by boat or small craft. At about 1933 on 5 June,
two Tony’s roared in and made an attack on them. One chose Mississippi and the other went
for Louisville; both were successful. Mississippi was making about six knots and in the process
of making a 180 degree turn when she was hit. Both of the planes had been picked up on radar
and mistakenly identified as Corsairs. The Tony crashed into her starboard quarter and both
of its bombs went off. However, the sides of the battleship were too thick for them to penetrate.
Mississippi’s hull was buckled inward in two places, one where each of the bombs had hit.
After the plane and the bombs exploded, there were small fires on board the ship, but they
were quickly extinguished. Damage to her was minor, although one man had been killed and
eight wounded. Mississippi continued on her patrol.3 At about the same time that Mississippi
was hit, the second Tony crashed into Louisville. This plane approached from the island and
came out of cloud cover. Its low approach put it in line with several LCI gunboats and it
“hedge-hopped” over them to get at the cruiser. It struck on the port catapult, demolishing
a SC-1 Seahawk observation plane and cutting through the after half of the No. 1 stack before
skidding over the side of the ship. The number 1 stack was demolished and other parts of the
ship suffered minor damage in the area. Casualties were high, with eight men killed and
thirty-seven wounded.4
In spite of the efforts of the patrolling ships around Okinawa, suicide boats were still
considered a threat. In addition, the Japanese also had the ability to use landing barges to
move troops or to escape from tight corners as the American troops closed in on them in
southern Okinawa. J. William Ditter DM 31 and Harry F. Bauer DM 26 were on flycatcher
patrol on 6 June, along with several LCI gunboats. At 1708 the ships went to general quarters
with notification that several enemy planes were approaching their position. Harry F. Bauer’s
gunners took aim at an incoming Betty and hit it numerous times. The twin-engine bomber
passed over the ship in flames and crashed 2,000 yards to starboard. Moments later a Val was
taken under fire and crashed only ten yards off the ship’s starboard beam and passed under
the ship. This attack caused some minor damage to the minelayer but she suffered no casu-
alties.5 Minutes after Harry F. Bauer was damaged, J. William Ditter came under attack. She
was not as fortunate as her companion: a kamikaze crashed her No. 2 stack at 1714, and a
second plane crashed her port side below the main deck at 1723. The second crash opened a
hole in her hull that was five by fifty feet. Fires broke out and were soon extinguished. Her
main problem was flooding of her forward engine room and after fire room. The minelayer
290 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

went dead in the water with a two degree list to port. Harry F. Bauer came to her aid to cover
her. LSM 708 came alongside to render aid. With the flooding stopped, she was towed to
Kerama Retto by Ute ATF 76. She suffered ten dead and twenty-seven wounded in the attack.6
Natoma Bay CVE 62 was operating off Okinawa on 7 June when she suffered a kamikaze
strike. At 0635 she was approached by two Zekes. The first came in from astern, strafed the
ship, and made a wing over into the flight deck. Its bomb exploded below decks and resulted
in a twelve by twenty foot hole in the deck. Immediately thereafter, its companion was taken
under fire by the ship’s gunners and crashed close aboard. The escort carrier was damaged,
but not mortally. She had one killed and four wounded, but her fires were out quickly and
she resumed operations later that evening.7
Anthony DD 515 was on patrol at Radar Picket Station No. 15A on 7 June, along with
Walke DD 723, Bradford DD 545 and LCS(L)s 18, 66, 86, and 94. The ships had been at general
quarters frequently on 6 June and had shot down an Oscar near Walke. They went to general
quarters again late in the afternoon of the 7th with the approach of enemy aircraft, which
subsequently fell victim to the CAP. Her action report indicated:
Visitors came again during afternoon and evening. At Battle Stations 1427–1505, during which
time our CAP splashed three planes.
Dusk attacks commenced about 1850 on many stations. Our destroyer group went to 25
knots. At 1855 visually sighted two planes (NATES or VALS) approaching out of low haze from
starboard quarter. Went to maximum speed with hard right rudder. At 1858 one plane splashed
by 40MM at about 2,000 yards while in an almost straight approach. Other plane must have had
instructions to get in from port side, for he continued in an end around stern chase, finally
crossing stern, came up port side at about 1,500 yards, banked sharply and came in. We couldn’t
figure what held him up, for the machine gun fire of this ship and BRADFORD could be seen
hitting and taking chunks out of plane. He splashed alongside to port just forward of No. 1 5"
mount, and part of plane flipped over the forecastle and ended up in the water to starboard.
Dished in side between frames 24 and 27, with one 4" ¥ 5" hole in CPA quarters, carried away
lifelines and stanchions for 25' on port side. The whole forward part of ship, including bridge
and director got one big slug of water and burning gasoline. Fortunately the water was sufficient
to put out the fire, and after all gas ran off forecastle there was no fire on board. Much wreckage
came aboard, including parts of the pilot.8

Five of Anthony’s men were either washed overboard or blown overboard by the crash. Three
of them were injured but none seriously. LCS(L)s 66 and 86 recovered them and returned
them to Anthony. The tradition for such service by the gunboats was to reward them with a
supply of ice cream. The small LCS(L)s could not make or store this treat but larger ships
such as a destroyer could. At 1904, Anthony fired on an approaching Val off her starboard
beam and alerted the CAP, which shot it down.
On 10 June Radar Picket Station No. 15A was patrolled by William D. Porter DD 579,
Aulick DD 569, Cogswell DD 651, and LCS(L)s 18, 86, 94, and 122. William D. Porter served as
the fighter director for the station. A radar picket patrol of two planes circled the ships and
a CAP of eight Corsairs from VMF-212 and VMF-314 flew nearby. At 0823 the VMF-314 divi-
sion observed Val a mile and half away. Their efforts to shoot it down were in vain as it slipped
through their fire and crashed just off Porter’s stern. It exploded underwater, lifting the stern
of the destroyer and dropping it again in a violent movement. Cmdr. C. M. Keyes later wrote:
It is not known whether the explosive was carried within the plane or in a bomb which might
have been released, but it is believed that the explosion occurred nearly directly under the ship,
under the after engine room or slightly aft of it. All the events of this paragraph occurred within
a space of seconds. Pertinent to the failure of any ship in company to make radar contact on this
plane until it had closed to 7000 yds., and the failure of this ship to make radar contact at all was
a later report from one of the LCS’s which had recovered parts of the plane, that paper and wood
appeared to have been used extensively in its construction.9
 16. The War Winds Down 291

The description of the recovered pieces may be explained by the fact that Vals had fabric cov-
ered control surfaces.
The after engine room and fire room began to flood rapidly and steam lines were rup-
tured, causing the area to fill with steam and effectively cutting power to the rest of the ship.
The four LCS(L)s came to Porter’s assistance and two tied up on either side of the ship to aid
in pumping. By 0836 the ship had an eight degree starboard list and the stern was below water.
Topside gear, torpedoes, depth charges and other weighty items were jettisoned in an attempt
to keep the ship afloat, but the list continued to increase and more of the stern slipped under.
Sixty-one men had received minor injuries in the blast and they were transferred off the ship
and onto the LCS(L)s. The 18, 94, and 122 were ordered to stand off and the 86 remained tied
to the destroyer. By 1108 it was obvious that nothing could be done to save the ship, which at
that time had a twenty-five degree starboard list with the stern about sixteen feet under water.
LCS(L) 86 took the CO and the remainder of the ship’s company on board and cast off. At
1120 the ship pointed her bow skyward and slipped beneath the waves. She was more fortunate
than most ships, none of her crew died and those who were injured had relatively minor ones.
LCS(L) 122, which assisted Porter as she was in her death throes, was soon to be a target
herself. Commanded by Lt. Richard M. McCool, she resumed radar picket duty at the station
along with Ammen DD 527, Aulick DD 569, Cogswell DD 611, and LCS(L)s 19, 86, and 94. The
following day at 1845, Ammen, the fighter director ship, picked up incoming enemy planes
at a distance of forty-two miles and the ships went to general quarters. Two Vals appeared,
making a run on the ships at 1900. Both planes were shot down by their combined fire. One
crashed in the water, however, the second was able to crash into the conning tower of the

William D. Porter DD 579 being assisted by LCS(L)s 86 and 122 prior to her sinking after being hit
on Radar Picket Station No. 15A. NARA 80G 490024.
292 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

William D. Porter DD 579 goes under stern first as LCS(L) support ships stand by rescuing survivors.
NARA 80G 490028.

LCS(L) 122. Commanding Officer McCool was knocked unconscious by the blast and
wounded. He quickly recovered and, in spite of his wounds, rescued a number of his men
and rallied the ship’s crew. McCool directed firefighting measures that saved his ship. Finally
when the ship was stable, he and a number of other wounded men were removed from the
ship for transport back to a hospital ship. Eleven men had died and twenty-nine were
wounded. LCS(L) 86 began to tow the 122 back to port. For his bravery and leadership that
day McCool was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.
The liberty ship Walter Colton arrived at Okinawa on 29 May. On 11 June, as she was at
anchor in Nakagusuku Bay, she was attacked by a Val. It first made a run at LSD 6, then gained
altitude and headed for Walter Colton. Under intense fire from ships in the area, it passed in
front of her bow, circled around and made a run at the ship’s bridge. It missed the bridge,
but struck her No. 3 boom and crashed close aboard. Anti-aircraft fire from other ships in
the area hit Colton, but overall, she escaped serious damage. Although her damage was light
and no one was killed, several of the men on board reported injuries.10
Twiggs DD 591 was a veteran of the infamous radar picket lines at Okinawa. She had
taken a kamikaze hit on 28 April and was back in action. She had just come off duty at Radar
Picket Station No. 2 and was sent to the area off Naha to bombard remnants of the Japanese
army. At 3030 on 16 June she came under attack by a Jill. It launched its torpedo, which was
right on target. It struck Twiggs port side and her No. 2 magazine went off. Not satisfied with
his success, the pilot circled around and crashed his Jill into the ship. In spite of valiant efforts
by Capt. George Philip and his crew, Twiggs was doomed. In a short time the fires had reached
the after magazine which blew up, effectively finishing the ship. LCS(L) 14 attempted to close
the destroyer to assist in firefighting, but the fires were too intense. Twiggs went under, taking
with her 184 men, including her CO. An additional thirty-four of her men were wounded.
 16. The War Winds Down 293

President Harry S Truman presents the Congressional Medal of Honor to Lt. Richard M. McCool for
his actions during the kamikaze attack on his ship, LCS(L) 122, at Okinawa. Official U.S. Navy Pho-
tograph courtesy Capt. Richard M. McCool USN (Ret.).

On 21 June LSM 59 and Lipan ATF 85 were in the process of towing Barry APD 29 out
of Kerama Retto. She had been damaged so extensively in a kamikaze attack on 25 May that
she was decommissioned. The plan was to anchor her offshore where she would be a decoy
for kamikazes. Unfortunately, the kamikazes would have one more chance at her and would
take another ship with her. At 1841 a kamikaze crashed LSM 59 on her starboard side aft.
Moments later, Barry also took a kamikaze hit. “The plane that hit the U.S.S. LSM 59 went
through the tank deck into the engine room and tore a large hole in the bottom of the ship.
The stern was engulfed in flame and smoke and began to settle immediately. All electrical
power and both main engines were knocked out when the plane hit.”11 The fires started by
the crash were put out in short time, but the rapidly flooding LSM was beyond saving. Her
CO, Lt. D. C. Hawley, gave the order to abandon ship. At 1846 her bow rose in the air and at
1854 she went under stern first. From the time she was hit by the kamikaze until she went
under, only thirteen minutes had elapsed. She had two dead and eight wounded. Barry was
also crashed during this attack and finally went under a short while later.
About the same time that LSM 59 and Barry were under attack, the seaplane tenders
Curtis AV 4 and Kenneth Whiting AV 14 were also hit. They were anchored in the seaplane
area at Kerama Retto when two planes, either Franks or Georges, made a high speed run on
the ships. “The first plane struck the CURTISS on the starboard side; the second plane pulled
up into a climb and was believed to be getting in position for a run on the port side of the
CURTISS prior to being hit by AA fire and crashing close aboard the KENNETH WHITING
294 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

(AV14).”12 Kenneth Whiting had a close call, but her damage was minimal. None of her crew
members were killed and only five were injured. On board Curtiss fires raged below decks
and threatened the ship’s magazine. Executive Officer, Lt. Cmdr. J. W. Coghlin, ordered three
hoses lowered down the dumbwaiter, and at 1925 four tugs, Shackle ARS 9, Chickasaw ATF
83, ATA 124 and ARS 73 came alongside and added water to the area. By 2200 it appeared as
though the fires were nearly out and the ship was listing to port. The tugs were ordered away,
but Shackle had to return at 0625 the next day to help extinguish a difficult fire. By 1000 all
fires were out and Curtiss began the task of tending to her casualties, of which there were
forty-one dead and twenty-eight wounded. A gruesome reminder of the horror of a kamikaze
attack was noted in the XO’s report when he recommended that: “All belts worn about the
waist should be stenciled on the inside, in at least two places, and preferably with one inch
letters if possible. Since many of the casualties were found without arms, legs, or heads, the
only immediate means of identification were their belts, which were invariably in excellent
condition, and required merely cutting to be removed and read.”13
Halloran DE 305 had a close miss on 21 June when a Nick made a run on her. It strafed
her midships area and was shot down close aboard without hitting the ship. However, its
bomb sent shrapnel flying all over the ship killing three men and wounding twenty-four.
The last of the Kikusui raids, No. 10, ran from 21 to 22 June. Thirty navy and fifteen
army special attack planes would fly their last missions to Okinawa. Accompanying them
would be other army and navy aircraft on conventional missions. The situation at this point
was obvious to the Japanese, and they would save their special attack plans to combat the
invasion of the Japanese home islands which was predicted for the near future.
Ellyson DMS 19 was screening with Foreman DE 633 on 22 June. The ships came under
attack and a Zeke crashed fifty feet off Ellyson’s bow. She had one man killed and four
wounded, but damage to the ship was minimal.
Also hit on 22 June was LSM 213, which was crashed while in Kimmu Bay. Her damage
was severe and her casualties included three dead and eight wounded. At Nakagusuku Bay
LST 534 was unloading supplies when a Zeke roared in and struck her forecastle area. Its
bomb penetrated the deck and blew a hole in her bottom. Fires raged and were eventually
put out, but the ship settled by the bow and grounded in twelve feet of water. She had three
killed and thirty-five wounded.
Thatcher DD 514 was in Nakagusuku Bay, having ridden out a typhoon. At 1950 on 19
July, two Oscars came out of the overcast sky and one made a dive on Thatcher. The two had
just passed down the starboard side of the ship when one suddenly made a wingover and
crashed into the port side of the ship just above the waterline. It was a glancing blow and the
ship did not sustain any serious damage. The plane lost a wing, which remained on the ship,
and sank about twenty feet off the port bow. Two of Thatcher’s men were wounded but the
ship was basically unscathed.
American forces had become aware of the existence of the Kaiten. As a result, it became
increasingly difficult for Japanese submarines to conduct operations against anchorages. Sub
commanders were wary of taking unnecessary risks under such circumstances. Targeting an
anchored ship did not take as much skill as attacking a convoy, but in time the Kaiten pilots
and sub commanders began to acquire the necessary skills.

Attack operations with “Kaiten” were frequently conducted. Although the attack procedure was
primarily to assault enemy vessels at anchorage, as a result of training, skill was steadily
acquired in attacking cruising vessels. The Submarine Force insisted on positive tactics in con-
nection with cruising vessels and, although the Combined Fleet opposed it, this tactic was
adopted.
The reason advanced for advocating attacks on cruising vessels was that it had become more
 16. The War Winds Down 295

and more difficult to effect surprise attacks on anchored vessels because of the enemy’s counter-
measures. Security near the anchorage was very strict and “Kaiten” attacks only increased the
losses to mother submarines. The possibility of explosion of “Kaiten” before reaching their tar-
get became greater because of enemy antisubmarine measures at anchorages.
Those opposing the attack on cruising vessels held that it was difficult to attack in rough seas
using a periscope with a low line of visibility. In addition, further training was required for the
“Kaiten” crews before cruising vessels could be successfully attacked.14

The American attack on Southern Kyushu on 18 March 1945 and the invasion of Okinawa
soon after, made it imperative to change strategies. Henceforth, attacks on cruising vessels
would be attempted in order to head off attacks on the home islands.
Leaving the base at Otsujima between 14 July and 8 August 1945 was the Kaiten Group
Tamon, consisting of six subs, the I-47, I-53, I-58, I-363, I-366, and I-367. The I-53, under
Lt. Cmdr. Saichi Oba, left its home base on 14 July 1945. On board were six Kaiten and their
pilots, Flight POs 1st Class Tsutomo Kawajiri, Masahiro Arakawa, Takahashi, and Sakamoto,
Ens. Toyooki Seki, and Lt. (jg) Jun Katsuyama. She encountered an American convoy on 24
July about 285 miles east of Cape Engano, Luzon which was bound from Okinawa to Leyte.
Escorted by Underhill DE 682, the convoy consisted of five patrol craft, three sub chasers a
reefer and several LSTs. The convoy had been shadowed by a Japanese reconnaissance plane
which reported its position to I-53.
The skipper of the Underhill, Cmdr. R. M. Newcomb, USNR, was notified that the convoy
was under surveillance. I-53 and its Kaiten lay in wait. At 1415 lookouts on Underhill spotted
a mine which the DE took under fire. Within minutes her sonar detected submarine activity
and the battle was on. PC 804 picked up the sound of the sub’s screws and Underhill laid
depth charges in the area, believing that she was dealing with only one sub. She did not realize
that I-53 had launched two Kaiten piloted by Katsuyama and Arakawa. Reports indicate that
Underhill rammed and sank one Kaiten, although this is unproven. Aiming to ram a second
sub, she apparently ran into one of the Kaiten. Its 3,000 lb. warhead exploded, blowing the
forward half of Underhill completely off and killing her CO. The forward section sank imme-
diately, taking with it many men. The senior surviving officer of the ship, Lt. (jg) Elwood M.
Rich, later reported:
I then heard the lookout report another periscope. Then I heard the range reported from some-
where as 700 yds. Shortly after that we got the word “Stand By To Ram.” I went to the Log
Room and braced myself and I felt two slight jars as though the ship had scraped something.
Then came the explosion. There were two explosions in quick order, the second one seemed to
be the biggest. The light went out with the explosion, and I lost my phones. In feeling around
for my phones, I felt water coming into the log room and decided to go out on deck. I started to
go forward and ran into steam and spraying oil, so I went aft. When I got out on deck I found
the ship was still afloat. I was trying to get in touch with control when I realized that the whole
forward half of the ship had been blown off, just aft of the bridge. 15

Underhill had been finished off by a Kaiten, making her the first warship so destroyed. PCs
803 and 804, cruised the waters picking up survivors. Of the 238 men on board the destroyer
escort, 112 died, including her commanding officer. It was a solitary but successful victory
for the I-36 and her manned torpedoes.
Although there had been numerous sorties for the better part of a year, only two noted
successes were achieved. In spite of grandiose claims in their action reports, only two verifiable
sinkings had been achieved at the loss of eight Japanese submarines, their Kaiten, and their
crews.
Even though the war was nearly over, occasional kamikaze attacks continued right to
the end. Patrolling Radar Picket Station No. 9A on 29 July were Callaghan DD 792, Pritchett
DD 561, Cassin Young DD 793, and LCS(L)s 125, 129, and 130. One of the interesting things
296 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

about the kamikaze experience is that some ships took numerous serious hits, such as Laffey,
and did not sink, while others such as the William D. Porter would be sunk by only one
attacker. This would also be the case with Callaghan.
The CO of Callaghan was Cmdr. C. M. Bertolf. Also on board was the Commanding
Officer of Destroyer Squadron Fifty-Five, Capt. A. E. Jarrell. At about 0030 a bogey was picked
up at a distance of thirteen miles. The plane’s speed was estimated to be about ninety knots
and seemed to indicate that it was one of the biplane trainers that the Japanese had begun
using as kamikazes. This was a navy Willow intermediate trainer, one of about a dozen that
had flown from Taiwan that evening. Their relatively slow speed and maneuverability made
it possible for them to readily adjust to changes in ship position or course. This one proved
no exception. Although it was taken under fire by both Pritchett and Callaghan, it managed
to crash into the main deck of Callaghan in a vital spot. Although the biplane could not carry
a very heavy bomb, its 220 pounder did the trick. It penetrated the deck of Callaghan and
exploded in the after engine room putting it out of commission and jamming the ship’s rudder.
Capt. Jarrell later wrote:
When I got outside, the entire after half of the ship appeared to be in flames. Actually the ship
was in flames from about frame 118 to about frame 150; this is from just abaft number 2 stack to
approximately the forward depth charge throwers. I was informed that there was no fire main
pressure forward and that many key repair personnel had been knocked out when the second, or
major explosion occurred. These personnel had been very prompt in initiating firefighting meas-
ures immediately after the first explosion occurred, and many were eliminated when the second
explosion occurred very shortly after they arrived on the scene. The LCS’s were ordered by
blinker tube to close Callaghan and fight fires. The stern of the after end of Callaghan was sub-
merged, with main deck under water, up to the forward depth charge throwers, which were
awash.16
Wounded men were lying on the deck and Capt. Jarrell tried to notify the CO, Cmdr. Bertolf,
that he should abandon ship. He found that Bertolf had already given the order and the process
was underway. By 0150 the wounded and most non-essential personnel had been transferred
to the LCS(L)s. It was felt at that time that the ship might still be saved and towed back to
port. However, at 0155 ammunition below decks began to explode and the intensity of the
explosions increased, making further salvage efforts impossible. The remaining personnel
abandoned ship and she went under stern first at 0234 in 600 fathoms. Her casualties were
forty-seven dead and seventy-three wounded.
In the midst of the maneuvering, after Callaghan was hit, another Willow approached
the ships and struck Pritchett, causing minor damage. The plane had been hit by fire from
Pritchett and, within minutes, she shot down another. Meanwhile, Cassin Young shot down
a biplane that was approaching her for a run. Several others were driven away by gunfire from
the ships.
LCS(L) 130, skippered by Lt. William H. File, Jr., headed toward Callaghan to lend assis-
tance. Along the way she picked up twenty-seven survivors from the ship that had been blown
overboard. At 0110 she came alongside the stern of the destroyer and began fighting fires. She
was ordered to stand off at 0135, and ten minutes later spotted a Willow approaching the for-
mation. Her 20mm and 40mm guns managed to take chunks out of the plane’s flimsy fuselage
and it crashed into the water about 400 yards to her port. She then returned to Callaghan
and, with her bow practically touching the destroyer, continued to assist in firefighting. Her
efforts contributed materially to saving the ship. As a result her CO, Lt. File, was awarded
the Silver Star.
Cassin Young took aboard the survivors from Callaghan and, in the company of LCS(L)
129, brought them back to the Hagushi Anchorage where they were transferred to Crescent
City APA 21. Cassin Young was now in a seemingly safe location back at the anchorage. How-
 16. The War Winds Down 297

ever, this was not to be the case. That evening she was assigned to screen a station at the
entrance to Nakagusuku Bay on the southeast part of Okinawa. At 0300 on 30 July, bogeys
were picked up on the radar screens. Two planes approached the ship and were fired upon.
One made it through and crashed into the destroyer’s starboard side. Cmdr. J. W. Ailes, III,
CO of Cassin Young, later wrote:
As a result of the explosion which accompanied crashing of the plane, much damage was done to
the forward superstructure and enclosed equipment from the director level to the main deck and
all the deckhouse forward of the galley including the uptakes of No. 1 and 2 boilers and No. 1
stack were damaged beyond repair. Blast effect downward caused extensive damage to the for-
ward fireroom and machinery therein necessitating abandoning of the fireroom but personnel
were trapped by the sealing of both accesses. Broken steam lines in the forward engine room
necessitated abandoning of that station which was so ordered with instructions to secure all
machinery. Subsequently turbines, reduction gears and bearings overheated and were damaged
due to the absence of lubrication.17

Aulick DD 569, patrolling nearby, came to the aid of Cassin Young. Her wounded were
transferred and brought back to Cascade AD 16 and Hamul AD 20 for care. As a result of the
attack, twenty-two men died and forty-five were injured. It was one of the last successful
kamikaze attacks of the war, and it took its toll.
Horace A. Bass APD 124 was operating as part of the anti-submarine screen off Hagushi
on 30 July. At 0230 a biplane came out of the dark and made a dive on her. It had been spotted
on radar some time earlier but lookouts were unable to pick it up. The suddenness of its attack
made it impossible to train the ship’s guns on it. Fortunately, the pilot aimed too high and passed
over the ship, taking with him parts of the life raft and some davits. It struck the water close
aboard the port side and its bomb went off with a bright orange flash. Men on the ship were
knocked over and fragments from the bomb killed one man and wounded fifteen others.18
The carriers of Task Force 38 had spent several days sending their planes to attack targets
in Northern Honshu. Borie DD 704, Hank DD 702, John W. Weeks DD 701 and Benner DD
807 were on Tomcat patrol fifty miles southwest of Task Force 38 on 9 August. The pickets
came under attack about 1456 when a Val crashed Borie, hitting her between her mast and
five inch gun director. Its bomb passed through the ship and exploded close aboard with
shrapnel causing damage to the starboard side and killing and wounding a number of her
men. Control of the ship from the bridge was lost and steering was shifted to the secondary
conn. It only took twenty minutes to bring the fires under control, but the fires continued to
cook off 40mm ammo from the gun tubs near the crash. Borie was able to resume formation
but several of her guns had been disabled. Killed in the crash were forty-eight of her crew,
with sixty-six wounded. The ship returned to the safety of the task force where medical officers
from Alabama BB 60 and Abbot DD 629 came aboard to assist with her wounded. The fol-
lowing day her wounded were transferred to the hospital ship Rescue AH 18.19
Hank came under attack next. At 1522 a Zeke dove on her from dead ahead and crashed
off her port quarter. Debris from the plane showered the deck and caused injuries. At 1549 a
Frank made its dive on the ship and was also shot down close aboard after losing a wing.
Once again Hank received a shower of debris and gasoline but no serious damage to the ship.
She had one death and five injuries from the attacks. The remainder of her day was spent
searching for men from Borie who had been blown overboard in the crash.20
Lagrange APA 124 had the dubious distinction of being the last ship struck by a kamikaze
in World War II. She was anchored in Nakagusuku Bay on 13 August when she was crashed
by a kamikaze. According to her action report for the day:
At 1947 ½ enemy plane first noticed approaching directly on ship, 165° T, 1000 yards, position
angle 10°, dive angle 10°, speed estimated 300 m.p.h., low-wing monoplane, single radial engine,
This diagram shows the attack on Borie DD 704 on 9 August 1945. U. S. S. Borie (DD704) Serial 0222-45.
Action Report Operations During the Period 2 July 1945 to 15 August 1945. 15 August 1945, Enclosure (C).

Lagrange APA 124 was the last American ship to be hit by a kamikaze during World War II. Damage
from the crash is shown in the photograph above. NARA 80G 331974.
 16. The War Winds Down 299

Lagrange APA 124 after the kamikaze crash. Lagrange APA 125 Serial 043. War Damage Report. 29
August 1945.
300 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

identified as a Tojo or Zeke. Plane passed 25 feet over No. 3 hatch, starboard wing hitting star-
board No. 3 forward boom, left wing hitting port kingpost. 1948 plane crashed into after port
side of superstructure cabin deck, causing explosion and large fires rising 200 feet into the air,
resulting in immediate loss of all electric power and the use of steam fire pumps, all ventilation,
inter-ship and intra-ship communication, main propulsion unit, fresh water system, and auxil-
iary condensing system; damage resulting from simultaneous explosion of plane and inwardly
carried bomb.21

A few minutes later a second plane hit her kingpost and hit the water twenty yards to
port. Its explosion showered the ship with debris, water and gas. Damage to the cargo ship
was significant and her casualties were twenty-one dead and eighty-nine wounded. With these
two crashes, the damage to American ships ended. However, a third plane approached
LaGrange but was driven off by other ships in the area. It was not to be the last sortie by the
divine wind fliers. They would continue to fly against American ships until several days after
the official end of the war, albeit unsuccessfully.
The announcement of the surrender of Japan by the Emperor was greeted with mixed
emotions by the men of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. Some wept in silence and
accepted the “unbearable,” while others swore to continue the battle. Conflicts tore through
the minds of many as to whether to disobey an Imperial decree and continue the struggle or
to end their lives in traditional, honorable ways. For those in the higher command who had
sent many young men to their deaths, the thought of living on after them was unacceptable,
and a number of high-ranked officers committed suicide. Some, not so quick to end their
own lives, were captured alive, tried as war criminals, and executed.
VAdm. Matomi Ugaki, who had commanded the First Mobile Base Air Force, was one
such military man who struggled with the Emperor’s decision. On 11 August 1945, as the end
of the war approached and talk of surrender circulated, he wrote in his diary:
Though an emperor’s order must be followed, I can hardly stand to see us suspending attacks
while still having this fighting strength. I think many things remain to be done after consulting
with those brave men willing to die. When and how to die as a samurai, an admiral, or a
supreme commander, a subject I have long resolved in my mind, should be seriously studied for
the sake of the future of the Japanese nation. I renewed a resolution today of entrusting my body
to the throne and defending the empire until death takes me away. 22

A couple of days later, on 15 August 1945, Ugaki and the rest of Japan listened to the
Emperor’s message of capitulation. Realizing that he would not receive official orders to sur-
render for several hours, Ugaki prepared himself for a final kamikaze mission. He noted, “We
haven’t yet received the cease-fire order, so there is no room for me to reconsider. I’m going
to follow in the footsteps of those many loyal officers and men who devoted themselves to
the country, and I want to live in the noble spirit of the special attack.” 23
At 1600 VAdm. Matome Ugaki bid farewell to his men, boarded a Suisei (Judy) dive
bomber and flew to his doom over Okinawan waters. Accompanying him were twenty-three
other men of the 701st Air Group flying ten more Suiseis. American records do not show any
kamikaze attacks at Okinawa that day, so it is likely that the planes simply crashed into the
sea.
 17. Ketsu Go: Defending the Homeland

Preparations for defense of the Japanese home islands revolved around the plan that the
Japanese termed Ketsu Go. Included in this plan were estimations of how the United States
would attack Japan. It was generally assumed that the attack would come on the southernmost
of the main islands, Kyushu, with a later attack in the Kanto Plains area near Tokyo and
Yokohama.
A significant portion of this plan involved the use of special attack weapons. The declining
situation had forced the Japanese to the realization that conventional warfare was not an
option. Only by use of special attack methods could they hope to stave off the American offen-
sive directed against their homeland. Decades of militarization of the Japanese school system
had regenerated the traditions of the samurai class and made it possible for them to accept
the promulgation of these methods. A brief recollection of their history indicated to the lead-
ership of Japan that this was a long-accepted method of fighting.
The concept of special attack tactics (the tactic of resorting to one-way or suicidal missions for
certain destruction of the target) was not entirely new in the history of the Japanese Army and
Navy. The Port Arthur blockade in the Russo-Japanese War, the demolition mission of the three
demolition tube heroes (Nikuden-Sanyushu) in the China Incident and the midget submarines
employed at Pearl Harbor, all possessed some features of special attack tactics. There are also
many instances in the history of Japan in which men voluntarily acted in a manner similar to a
special attack mission, but these acts were not specifically ordered by their superiors. The attacks
carried out by the Kamikaze Special Attack Unit and the Type “A” Midget Submarine Unit
(Cebu) during the operations in the Philippines area, during and after October 1943, were prob-
ably the first attack missions that were planned and ordered by competent commanders. The
results achieved by these special attack units were unexpectedly good in comparison to the small
force committed.... These desperate attack tactics employed by field forces were inevitably
reflected in the policies adopted by those concerned with war preparations. 1

Success in the use of kamikaze aircraft and explosive speedboats in the Philippines and
at Okinawa had demonstrated to the Japanese that a minimal investment in men and equip-
ment could pay dividends that far surpassed the abilities of their meager resources. This
resulted in an increased demand for the production of special attack weapons. With the fall
of the Philippines and Iwo Jima it became clear to the Japanese high command that the invasion
of the home islands was imminent. Okinawa would prove to be a stepping stone toward that
eventuality. The production of Shinyo, Maru-re, and Kaiten was accelerated, as well as the
development of newer types of special attack aircraft such as the Nakajima Kikka, Kawanishi
Baika, Nakajima Ki-115 Tsurugi and the Mitsubishi J8M Shusei. The navy alone planned to

301
302 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Under development at the end of the war by the Japanese navy was the Mitsubishi J8M1 Shusei or
Sword Stroke. It was a rocket powered interceptor modeled after the German Messerschmitt ME 163B.
The development of this plane was necessitated by the need for an interceptor that could successfully
defend against the B-29. NARA 80G 193477.
This Japanese twin-engine jet, the Nakajima Kikka (Orange Blossom), is shown under construction
at the Nakajima factory on Honshu on 6 October 1945. NARA 111-SC-225102.

Military History Section, Army Forces Far East. Japanese Monograph No. 174 Outline of Naval Arma-
ment and Preparations for War Part VI, p. 12.
304 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

have at lease 5,000 special attack planes ready to meet the invasion. By 1 March 1945, plans
were in force to shift the entire strategy of the naval air forces to one which the special attack
method was the primary means of combating the enemy.2
According to navy planning, a number of training aircraft were to be converted so that
they could carry bombs on special attack missions.
Type of Aircraft Bombs (kg) Number
Type-93 Intermediate Trainer (Willow) 250 [551 lbs.] 1
Type-2 Intermediate Trainer (Cypress) 250 1
Shiragiku Utility Trainer 250 2
Type-94 Reconnaissance Seaplane (Alf ) 250 2
Type-95 Reconnaissance Seaplane (Dave) 250 1
Type-Zero Reconnaissance Seaplane(Jake) 250 2
Type-Zero Observation Plane(Pete) 250 1
Type-Zero Training Fighter (Zeke) 250 1
Type-Zero Carrier Fighter (Zeke) 250 or 1
500 [1,102 lbs.] 13

Many of these converted aircraft would make their first appearance during the battle for Oki-
nawa and they took a terrible toll. The training aircraft, particularly the biplanes constructed
of fabric over wood frames, were hard to detect and just as hard to shoot down as the American
VT fuses were designed to explode upon proximity to metal. Even a direct hit on these aircraft
would cause little damage, as the shell would pass right through the fabric and continue on
its path.
Japanese estimates were that the earliest invasion of their home islands would not come
before September of 1945. As a result, their planning used that date as a target for completion
of their preparations. They correctly surmised that the invasion would be in Kyushu and
would consist of at least ten divisions transported by 1,000 transport ships. Their estimations
of needed special attack aircraft to sink at least half of these transports would be 3,000, with
additional aircraft to be used against carriers and other warships. If that many transports,
and their troops could be sunk, then the invasion could be stopped. All available aircraft that
could be used as kamikazes were to be repaired as soon as possible, and the development of
the newer types was scheduled.

CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE OF SPECIAL PLANES (PROJECTED/ACTUAL)

The first number given is the projected figure as of 20 June 1945, and the second is the actual production
as of 15 July 1945. Figures for months including August and later are estimates of production.
Special Attack Plane May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Oka Model 22 6 49/48 30/5 50/20 60/40 60 60
Oka Model 43 2 10/8 22/12 38 65 80
Kikka (Aeronautical Dept.) Experimental 12 0/2
Manufacture 13 125 0/20
Final 11
Kikka (Naval Technical Dept.) 10 40
Shusei 35/1 90/12 145/37 225/88
Ki 115 Tsurugi 0/40 10/10 150 320 4004

In order to accommodate the vast numbers of aircraft, existing fields would be repaired
and a number of other fields constructed. Aircraft would have to be hidden from sight in var-
ious ways, including underground and in makeshift shelters. These did not have to be elaborate
structures as the battle would be considered decisive. Either the Japanese would prevail with
their massed special attack forces or they would face annihilation by landed American forces.
Existing in Japan by summer of 1945 were seventy airfields and twenty-four seaplane bases.
These were referred to by the Japanese as “pasture ground” in order to disguise their true
 17. Ketsu Go 305

By the end of the war the Japanese had managed to place various special attack weapons throughout
their country, many in residential areas. Here a woman passes by an Oka stored in a revetment. The
photograph was taken in September 1945, shortly after the end of the war. NARA 80G 375010.

nature. Some of the bases were designed with special catapults that could launch the Oka,
since the previous method of having them carried to the target by a Betty bomber was not
feasible. These would be located at Izu Peninsula, Southern Boso Peninsula, Eastern Boso
Peninsula, Tsukuba, Miura Peninsula, Oi, Tanabe, and Toba and were slated for completion
between July and November 1945. Collectively they would have forty-seven catapults and
sheds for 270 Oka.
In reviewing their experiences at Okinawa and in the Philippines, the Japanese discovered
that an adjustment in their methods of aerial attack might be in order. Since larger ships were
not usually disabled or sunk by a single crash they determined to modify their attack methods.
The Chief of the First Bureau, Naval General Staff stated in a letter that American ships did
not have armor plating below the water line. Notably important was the area near the stern,
which was particularly vulnerable. If a kamikaze could crash into the water in such a manner
as to have his bomb explode under the ship, it was felt that there was a good chance that the
ship would be disabled or sunk.5 William D. Porter DD 579 met her fate at Okinawa in just
such a manner. Her CO, Cmdr. C.M. Keyes, reported:
The plane struck the water close aboard to port, abreast the after engine room. There was a sin-
gle violent, but almost silent explosion, which seemed to lift the ship bodily and drop it again in
a quick movement. The Commanding Officer who had been asleep in the sea cabin was awak-
ened by the explosion, and coming out on the bridge was informed by the Officer of the Deck
that the ship had been struck by a Val. It is not known whether the explosive was carried within
306 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

Both seaplanes and biplane trainers were to be important parts of the special attack effort as the
invasion of Japan by the Americans commenced. These aircraft, found at Otsu Naval Air Base on
Lake Biwa after the war, would have been essential elements of the campaign. This photograph was
taken on 16 October 1945 and shows a number of the aircraft disassembled and ready for destruction.
NARA 111-SC 218696.

This Tachikawa Ki-9 “Spruce” army trainer is shown at the end of the war in kamikaze configuration.
Biplane trainers of this sort were being prepared for use as kamikazes against the expected American
invasion of the home islands. To amplify the destruction caused by the plane’s impact, a fifty-five
gallon drum of gasoline was strapped into the back seat of the aircraft. This is visible in the photo-
graph. The plane was assigned to the 21 Hikoshidan Shireibu Hikodan or 21st Air Brigade which was
stationed at Kikuchi, Japan. In the middle of the chrysanthemum painting on the rudder is the Japa-
nese hiragana character for To, which was short for Tokko-tai or Special Attack Corps.

the plane or in a bomb which might have been released, but it is believed that the explosion
occurred nearly directly under the ship, under the after engine room or slightly aft of it. 6

The explosion opened the seams of the ship’s hull and resulted in rapid flooding of the engine
room as well as damage to the starboard propeller shaft. Three hours and five minutes after
the initial underwater explosion Porter pointed her bow skyward and went to the bottom.
 17. Ketsu Go 307

After studying reports of kamikaze actions in Okinawa, the Naval General Staff recommended that
future kamikaze attacks attempt to crash under the stern of an American ship in order to create max-
imum damage. Military History Section, Army Forces Far East. Japanese Monograph No. 174 Outline
of Naval Armament and Preparations for War Part VI, pp. 39 –40.

Methods of increasing the effect of a kamikaze crash were also suggested. The newly
designed Ki-115 Tsurugi, which was planned as a special attack weapon from the onset, could
achieve greater impact speed if the wings could be jettisoned as the plane began its final dive.
This would prevent the plane from spiraling out of control if an American fighter or anti-air-
craft fire damaged one wing. Plans to implement the changes to the Tsurugi were put into
308 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

action. Additional studies would include “testing of explosive charges ... producing a more
powerful bursting effect, to be employed by the special attack plane by loading it with liquid
oxygen, hydrogen peroxide or yellow phosphorous, be studied and tested.”7 Tests were soon
conducted at Takeyama and Kure with positive results, and recommendations were made to
produce new bombs for the special attack planes.
Once the American campaign at Okinawa was underway, invasion of the home islands
was of great concern to the Japanese. To defend against the coming invasion, the Japanese
began to hold back on the expenditure of their forces toward the end of the Okinawa campaign.
In addition to aircraft, numerous Shinyo and Maru-re units were stationed throughout Japan
at her remaining bases in preparation for the assault on Japan proper. Listed below is the dis-
tribution of Koryu, Kaiten, Kairyu, and Shinyo as of 27 July 1945, a scant two and one-half
weeks before the Japanese surrendered.

DISPOSITION OF SURFACE AND UNDERWATER

SUICIDE UNITS AS OF 27 JULY 1945*
Location Koryu Kairyu Kaiten Shinyo
Yokosuka Naval District 0 180 36 775
Including Hachijoshima
Osaka Guard District 0 24 4 50
Kure Naval District 48 24 32 225
Sasebo Naval District 4 24 46 1,000
Maizura Naval District 3 0 0 0
Chinkai-Wan Guard District 0 0 0 100
Chichi Jima Base 0 0 0 150
Haha Jima Base 0 0 0 80
Oshima Defense District 1 0 0 225
Miyako Surface Escort Unit 0 0 0 50
Ishigaki Surface Escort Unit 0 0 0 200
Takao Guard District 3 0 0 325
Mako Base 0 0 0 125
Chushan Surface Escort Unit 0 0 0 175
Hainan Guard District 0 0 0 125
Hong Kong Base 0 0 0 125
Amoy Base 0 0 0 100
Combined Fleet 18 0 0 0
Totals 77 252 118 3,8308
*These figures represent the actual disposition of these weapons. Additional units had been produced but not delivered
to operational forces.

Japanese estimates of the effectiveness of these four types of suicide weapons were typ-
ically optimistic. Koryus and Kairyus had sufficient maneuverability and range to intercept
enemy transports 200 –300 miles from the shore. The Kaiten was limited in this sense, and
the high command felt that they would be wasted in attacking transports. Instead, they were
to be used against escort ships, which would be a more suitable target for them. For Koryus,
Kairyus, and Shinyos, the most important targets would be the transports which carried troops
and equipment for the invasion landing. Attack plans called for the Japanese to mount a
massed attack the first evening that the transports were anchored. Ideally this would be sup-
ported by air special attack forces in order to create maximum confusion in the American
fleet. According to them, “Loss of surface and underwater special attack forces was expected
to be ten percent and the probability of success was estimated at 2:3 for ‘KORYUS,’ 1:3 for
‘KAITENS’ and ‘KAIRYUS,’ and 1:10 for ‘SHINYOS.’ The results would be about 60 ships by
‘KORYUS,’ 120 by ‘KAIRYUS’ and ‘KAITENS,’ and 90 by ‘SHINYOS,’ or a total of approx.
260 transports.”9
The increased emphasis on these types of weapons indicated pragmatism on the part of
 17. Ketsu Go 309

The magnitude of the special attack submarine effort can be seen in this photograph of the midget
submarines found at Kure Naval Base at the end of the war. NARA 80G 351875

Sasebo, one of the major naval bases on the island of Kyushu, was also home to a large number of
Shinyo. This photograph, taken after the war, shows suicide boats that were positioned there to
counter American landings. NARA 127GW 1523-140564.
310 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

the Japanese. They were aware of their inability to produce first rate weapons so they turned
to the only practical solution. Japanese reports indicated:
In light of the national production capacity sinking with the fall of the PHILIPPINES and OKI-
NAWA, our efforts were concentrated on the mass production of “underwater special attack
weapons” which required only a comparatively simple process to manufacture as well as in the
mobilization of planes already made. Furthermore, the mass production of special planes such as
“KIKKA” [twin engine jet similar to the German Me 262] and TYPE “KI”—115 [Tsurugi] was
taken up to increase our fighting strength notwithstanding the sceptical opinions in some quar-
ters.10

The establishment of bases throughout Japan was imperative, and the Japanese set about
to complete as many as possible before the expected invasion date. Manned torpedoes, suicide
boats and midget submarines, as well as Okas and other special attack craft, were delivered
to these bases as rapidly as possible. “Human torpedo bases were being built on the southern
coast of Kyushu, the southern coast of Shikoku and the coast extending from Izu Peninsula
to Bose Peninsula, where enemy landings were anticipated. Submarines I-56, I-57, I-58, I-59
and I-62 were charged with the mission of delivering human torpedoes to these bases.” 11

Location of Special Attack Bases, 15 August 1945

By mid–August 1945 the plan to emphasize special attack tactics in the defense of the
home islands was in evidence throughout Japan. These three maps show the locations of the
bases devoted to utilizing water-borne special attack weapons, including suicide boats, human
torpedoes, and midget subs. Many of the bases had provisions for more than one type of
weapon and the symbols on the maps indicate the major weapon to be used at the base. By
15 August 1945 many of the bases had been supplied with special attack weapons while others
were in readiness awaiting delivery. The list below indicates the number of weapons at each
base as of 15 August 1945. In this list, MS stands for Midget Submarine, HT for Human Tor-
pedo, and Sc for Surface Crash Boat. It should be noted that a number of bases had the capa-
bility to support more than one type of weapon. In some cases there is a double listing, such
as the use of MS twice. This indicates that two types of midget subs were planned for the
base.
Kyushu Bases Sasebo MS ¥ 4, Sc ¥ 50 Suzaki HT ¥ 12, Sc ¥ 32
Aburatsu MS ¥ 0, HT ¥ 10 Sendaikawaguchi Sc ¥ 0 Tachibanaminato MS ¥ 0, HT ¥
Daidotsu HT ¥ 3, Sc ¥ 74 Shinjo Sc ¥ 0 0
Gamae HT ¥ 0, Sc ¥ 0 Sotonoura HT ¥ 7, Sc ¥ 25 Teyuki Sc ¥ 0
Hinatadomari HT ¥ 0 Tainoura Sc ¥ 52 Tomariura HT ¥ 0, Sc ¥ 3
Hosojima HT ¥ 12, Sc ¥ 26 Tomariura Sc ¥ 0 Urado HT ¥ 12, Sc ¥ 94
Ibusuki Sc ¥ 0 Tomioka Sc ¥ 26 Usa Sc ¥ 0
Intsuji Sc ¥ 0 Totoro Sc ¥ 71
Karatsu MS ¥ 0, HT ¥ 0, Sc ¥ 26 Tsuno Sc ¥ 26 Honshu Bases
Kataura Sc ¥ 0 Uchinoura HT ¥ 6, Sc ¥ 0 Aburatsubo MS ¥ 42, Sc ¥ 0
Kawatana Sc ¥ 285 Ushibuka Sc ¥ 0 Ajiro HT ¥ 0
Kojimaura Sc ¥ 0 Utsumi Sc ¥ 0 Anamizu MS ¥ 0
Kyodomari Sc ¥ 52 Yamakawa Sc ¥ 0 Anamizu MS ¥ 0
Madomari HT ¥ 0, Sc ¥ 0 Yatake MS ¥ 0 Arari MS¥0, Sc ¥ 0
Makinoshima Sc ¥ 52 Arasaki HT ¥ 0
Matsushima Sc ¥ 26 Shikoku Bases Ego MS ¥ 0
Mimisu Sc ¥ 0 Kashiwajima HT ¥ 0, Sc ¥ 18 Ena Sc ¥ 0
Mogushi Sc ¥ 52 Komatsujima MS ¥ 24, HT ¥ 4, Enoura MS ¥ 17, HT ¥ 0, Sc ¥
Nakamagoshi MS ¥ 0, Sc ¥ 0 Sc ¥ 50 0
Nokonoshima Sc ¥ 0 Moroto MS ¥ 0 Futaijima HT ¥ 0
Nomaike Sc ¥ 0 Mugigaura HT ¥ 8, Sc ¥ 0 Gokanosho MS ¥ 0, Sc ¥ 0
Okami HT ¥ 16 Shimizu HT ¥ 0, Sc ¥ 19 Hachinoe Sc ¥ 0
Saeki MS ¥ 7 Sukumo MS ¥ 0 Hagihama MS ¥ 0
 17. Ketsu Go 311

Hata MS ¥ 0 Obana HT ¥ 0 Toba MS ¥ 0, HT ¥ 0, SC ¥ 100

Hazama HT ¥ 0 Obuchi Sc ¥ 0 Tohi HT ¥ 0
Hikari HT ¥ 30 Odawa HT ¥ 0 Uhara Sc ¥ 52
Iinuma SC ¥ 26 Ohima MS ¥ 4 Uraga MS ¥ 3
Inatori Sc ¥ 6 Oi HT ¥ 0 Yokohama MS ¥ 4
Iwaibukuro Sc ¥ 49 Okitsu HT ¥ 0, Sc ¥ 0 Yokosuka MS ¥ 73 (MS ¥ 4)
Kasado MS ¥ 1, HT ¥ 22 Omaezaki Sc ¥ 0 Yoshimi MS ¥ 0, HT ¥ 0, Sc ¥ 0
Katana Sc ¥ 0 Ona Sc ¥ 0 Yura Sc ¥ 0
Katsuryama ¥ MS ¥ 11 Onahama MS ¥ 10, SC ¥ 26 Yuyawan HT ¥ 0
Katsuura MS ¥ 0 Oura MS ¥ 104
Katsuura MS ¥ 0 Otsushima Sc ¥ 11 Small Island Bases
Koajiro Sc ¥ 0 Sanenoura Sc ¥ 0 Amami O Shima MS ¥ 0, Sc ¥
Koamikurahama HT ¥ 0 Sasagawa Sc ¥ 25 150
Kominato Sc ¥ 26 Shigeura MS ¥ 0 Hachijojima HT ¥ 8, Sc ¥ 50
Kure MS ¥ 29, HT ¥ 22, MS ¥ Shimisu Sc ¥ 0 Saishuto Sc ¥ 100
9 Shimoda MS ¥ 12, Sc ¥ 38 Shodoshima MS ¥ 0
Maizuru MS ¥ 6 Shimonoseki MS ¥ 22 Tainoura Sc ¥ 52
Manazura HT ¥ 0 Shimozu Sc ¥ 0 Takeshiki MS ¥ 0
Matoya MS ¥ 0 Shinjomura Sc ¥ 0
Mihogaseki MS ¥ 0 Sotokawa Sc ¥ 52 Other Bases
Minato Sc ¥ 45 Sunako Sc ¥ 25 Bonin Islands— Sc ¥ 91
Moriya Sc ¥ 0 Sunosaki Sc ¥ 0 ChuShantao Is. Sc about 100
Nagatsuro Sc ¥ 18 Tago MS ¥ 1, Sc ¥ 0 Korea — Chinkai MS ¥ 0
Nanaruiura MS ¥ 0 Tanabe Sc ¥ 0 Miyako Is. Sc about 200
Nonohama MS ¥ 0 Tatamiishiura Sc ¥ 0 Taiwan Sc about 300
Above, previous, and opposite page: These three maps give an indication of the extent of planned use
for the water-borne special attack squadrons. Bases for midget submarines, Kaiten, and suicide boats
were scattered throughout Japan in preparation for the American invasion. Adapted from Military
History Section, Army Forces Far East. Japanese Monograph No. 174 Outline of Naval Armament
and Preparations for War Part VI, pp. 48 –50.
 17. Ketsu Go 313

The Fukuryu Underwater Attack Units

Although most of the special attack weapons had required much technical expertise to
develop there were some that did not. The Fukuryu or “crawling dragons” fell into that category.
The concept for these early underwater warriors did not arise until the last year of the war as the
invasion of Japan proper loomed on the horizon. Although the Japanese had used frogmen and
suicide swimmers during the war, these Fukuryu were to operate underwater using self-contained
breathing devices, in some ways similar to contemporary scuba equipment. In tests near the end
of the war, Lt. Masayuki Sasano reported that he was able to remain underwater at a depth of
from three to eight meters for nearly eight and one half hours.12 In April 1945, development of
these forces was placed under the command of Capt. K. Shintani, a former destroyer commander.
He was the commander of the 71st Totsugekitai (Arashi), headquartered at Yokosuka.
In a manner similar to the recruitment of Kaiten pilots, the navy drew upon air corps
trainees. As noted before, the shortage of aircraft for special attack missions had led to a
surplus of pilots, many of whom could be used in other ways. Although volunteers were used
at first, by the end of the war, at least half of the men in the Fukuryu force were draftees.
Planned for the fall of 1945, the Fukuryu force was to number 6,000 men by 30 September
1945, with combat readiness to be completed two weeks after that. Two other units, the 81st
Arashi at Kure and the Kawatana unit at Sasebo were also planned, but they were not organized
by war’s end. However, when the war ended on 14 August 1945, the Japanese had completed
the training of 1,200 Fukuryu in the 71st at Yokosuka, with another 2,800 ready to begin train-
ing. Two battalions of 650 men each with another four battalions in training were to be sta-
tioned at Yokosuka and ready for combat in Tokyo Bay.
The entire process was slowed by the difficulties in producing the appropriate diving
suits and equipment. Each Fukuryu wore a complete diving suit and helmet similar to a “hard
hat diver.” Strapped to his back were two tanks of compressed oxygen, each holding 214 cubic
inches. Weights attached to a belt helped him to remain on the bottom. No swim fins were
used. The “crawling dragon” was supposed to walk along the bottom and attack enemy shipping
314 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

with a mine mounted on the end of a pole. Thrusting the pole into the underside of the ship
would set off the contact charge and blow up an enemy landing craft. The Fukuryu would die
in the explosion and hopefully would sink the invading landing craft.
The pole mounted explosive device was the Type 5 Attack Mine, which had some simi-
larities to pole charges used by suicide infantry troops against tanks.
The Type 5 Attack (Suicide) Mine was essentially a charge of explosive mounted on a stick
equipped with a contact fuse.... Immediately behind the charge was a floating chamber. The
weapon could be balanced so that it was readily handled underwater. Its use was simple. The
diver rammed the front end against the bottom or side of a boat. He was, of course, destroyed....
Computations indicated that a charge of 20 kg [44 lbs.] of TNT or TNA would be safe to
another man at a 40 meter distance. Based upon tests made upon a target boat of double-bot-
tomed construction, it was decided that a 10 kg [22 lbs.] charge would accomplish the desired
result.13

Although plans for the force included the production of at least 10,000 of the mines, none
were ready by the end of the war. In like manner, the production of diving suits had been
slowed, with only about a thousand ready on 15 August 1945.
In order to be effective, the Fukuryu would have to be in place prior to the actual invasion
attempt. To achieve this, the construction of underwater pillboxes was planned. Some of these
would be constructed of concrete and then sunk, while others would be built into obsolete
or damaged merchant vessels that would then be sunk at the appropriate locations. Pillboxes
or sunken ships would have compartment space of around 1440 square feet and would be able

Fukuryu, or crawling dragons, wore dry type underwater suits and hard diving helmets. Air was sup-
plied by two tanks on their back containing compressed oxygen. No swim fins were used as the
Fukuryu was supposed to walk on the bottom of the bay. U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan.
Target Report —The Fukuryu Special Harbor Defense and Underwater Attack Unit—Tokyo Bay. Jan-
uary, 1946, pp. 11–12.
 17. Ketsu Go 315

Plans for the use of the Fukuryu included underwater bases. One would be concrete pillboxes sunk
to the bay floor, while others would be obsolete merchant ships with built in compartments. These
would be sunk to the bay floor as well. Forty to fifty men could stay for up to ten days in such an
underwater base. U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan. Target Report —The Fukuryu Special Harbor
Defense and Underwater Attack Unit—Tokyo Bay. January, 1946, p. 15.

to accommodate forty to fifty men. A tour of duty in such an underwater living space would
be about ten days, at which time the men would be rotated out. Each living space would have
food, water, air, and other necessities to sustain life. It is not clear if any of these were actually
in place by the end of the war. Japanese naval officers denied that any had been constructed,
however, a sonar search of likely locations in Tokyo Bay turned up four possible sites. It had
been expected that they would be at a depth of less than one hundred feet, but these were at
about 180 feet. The hazards of working at these depths led the U.S. Navy to call off further
investigation.
316 Part Two — The Kamikaze Chronicles

What Might Have Been

At the end of the war President Harry Truman made the decision to use the power of
the atomic bomb against the Japanese homeland. Many historians debate the effect that the
bombs had on terminating the war, as well as the rationale for using them. The author has
no desire to enter into the discussion over the appropriateness of that decision. The work pre-
sented herein has demonstrated the willingness of the Japanese military man to die for his
country. What percentage of the civilian population shared their fervor is debatable. Had the
invasion of the Japanese home islands occurred in late 1945, it is obvious from the foregoing
that the Japanese military was committed to utilize special attack methods as their first line
of defense. The number of lives that would have been lost on both sides in that endeavor has
always been speculative. What seems obvious is that the price in human suffering would have
been high.

The Special Attack Forces: A Continuation of Tradition

It is common to think of the kamikaze or special attack corps as a solitary phenomena
linked to the Japanese airman of World War II. However, as investigation has shown, the
practice of special attack was common throughout the Japanese armed forces in and before
World War II. Evidence exists that it was practiced in modern warfare as far back as the Russo-
Japanese war in 1904. The concept of giving up one’s life for the cause since it was not the
individual’s property antedates modern times. The tradition can be seen in many instances
over the lengthy history of the samurai class. I would suggest that the continuance of the tra-
dition has another meaning.
Japan, faced with the prospect of conflict between the values of the modern world and
those that were considered Japanese traditions, struggled continually to find a position that
would allow them to retain their unique “Japan-ness” in the face of modern influences from
the west.
This is not to suggest that the creation of the Tokko-tai was a deliberate effort to reinforce
the tradition. Rather it was simply one more manifestation of the struggle within the Japanese
mind.
How this tradition was displayed is part of the history of Japanese military exploits in
the twentieth century. That this spirit was amply displayed by the members of the armed
forces of Japan who willingly gave their lives for their state and emperor gives evidence of the
survival of tradition in the face of modern pressure. In that sense, the special attack program
may be viewed as a success even though it did not stop the American juggernaut.
 Appendix I: U.S. Navy and Merchant
Marine Ships Damaged or Sunk by
Kamikaze Attacks, 1942–1945

Compiling a list of ships damaged or sunk in kamikaze attacks has presented several
problems. First of all there is the question of inclusion. Numerous ships suffered close calls
and had only minor damage, such as the loss of a mast or antenna. Others ships not actually
touched by the kamikaze airplane were severely damaged or sunk. Many not struck by the
airplane or other weapon suffered casualties from explosions in close proximity to the ship.
Some ships suffered kamikaze attacks on several occasions. If the attacks took place on different
days they are considered to be separate incidents. Ships falling into that category are listed
more than once.
I have taken a broad view of kamikaze attacks and included every ship that suffered
direct or indirect damage or casualties as a result of a kamikaze attack. The attacks were com-
mitted by aircraft, manned torpedoes, suicide boats, and suicide swimmers.
Secondly, I have every confidence that there are additional ships damaged by kamikazes
that I have not been able to find in spite of several years of dedicated research on the subject.
Here and there in action reports I found mention of ships that may have been damaged in
the attacks, but no further information. These are not great in number, however, I am sure
that there are probably a few ships that I have missed. That having been noted, I believe this
to be the most complete and comprehensive list yet developed by any historian dealing with
the subject.
It will be noted that the list begins with several attacks that predate the unofficial for-
mation of the naval kamikaze units on 19 October 1944 and their first sorties two days later.
These have been identified in official American reports as kamikaze attacks and therefore have
been included.
A third problem with constructing this list relates to the number of casualties. For most
of the ships there are action reports, war diaries, or ship logs that give casualty figures. How-
ever, the lists of killed and wounded in those documents cannot be considered accurate. Many
sailors were transferred off their ship after an attack with the expectation of surviving, only
to pass away from complications later on. Others, whose prognosis was terminal, managed
to survive. In some cases, there are no statistics available for the attack and I have simply
inserted a dash to indicate the lack of information. Some action reports note that “several”

317
318 Appendix I

or “numerous” casualties occurred and I have included that wording in the list as there are
no other data available. As a result, the list below must be considered an approximation of
the numbers of dead and wounded resulting from kamikaze attacks in World War II.
Ship Location Date Cause Killed Wounded
1942
Smith DD 378 Battle of Santa 26 October Air Attack 28 23
Cruz
1944
Franklin CV 13 Taiwan 13 October Air Attack 1 10
Reno CL 96 Taiwan 14 October Air Attack 0 9
David Dudley Field Philippines 24 October Air Attack 0 4
Augustus Thomas Philippines 24 October Air Attack 0 2
Sonoma ATO 12* Philippines 24 October Air Attack 7 36
LCI(L) 1065* Philippines 24 October Air Attack 13 8+
Santee CVE 29 Philippines 25 October Air Attack 16 27
Suwanee CVE 27 Philippines 25 October Air Attack 46 55
Kitkun Bay CVE 71 Philippines 25 October Air Attack 1 20
White Plains CVE 66 Philippines 25 October Air Attack 0 11
St. Lo CVE 63* Philippines 25 October Air Attack 114 -
Kalinin Bay CVE 68 Philippines 25 October Air Attack 5 55
Suwanee CVE 27 Philippines 26 October Air Attack 30 83
Benjamin Ide Wheeler Philippines 27 October Air Attack 2 3
Intrepid CV 11 Philippines 29 October Air Attack 10 6
Belleau Wood CVL 24 Philippines 30 October Air Attack 92 54
Franklin CV 13 Philippines 30 October Air Attack 56 14
Ammen DD 527 Philippines 1 November Air Attack 5 21
Abner Read DD 526* Philippines 1 November Air Attack 22 56
Anderson DD 411 Philippines 1 November Air Attack 16 20
Claxton DD 571 Philippines 1 November Air Attack 5 23
Matthew P. Deady Philippines 3 November Air Attack 61 104
Cape Constance Philippines 4 November Air Attack 0 1
Lexington CV 16 Philippines 5 November Air Attack 50 132
Leonidas Merritt Philippines 12 November Air Attack 3 6
Thomas Nelson Philippines 12 November Air Attack 136 88
Jeremiah M. Daily Philippines 12 November Air Attack 106 43
William A. Coulter Philippines 12 November Air Attack 0 69
Morrison R. Waite Philippines 12 November Air Attack 21 43
Alexander Majors Philippines 12 November Air Attack 2 15
Egeria ARL 8 Philippines 12 November Air Attack 0 21
LCI(L) 364 Philippines 12 November Air Attack - -
Achilles ARL 41 Philippines 12 November Air Attack 33 28
Matthew P. Deady Philippines 12 November Air Attack 0 0
Alpine APA 92 Philippines 18 November Air Attack 5 12
Nicholas J. Sinnett Philippines 18 November Air Attack 0 0
Gilbert Stuart Philippines 18 November Air Attack 6 11
Alcoa Pioneer Philippines 19 November Air Attack 6 13
Cape Romano Philippines 19 November Air Attack 0 0
Mississinewa AO 59* Ulithi 20 November Kaiten 62 95
James O’Hara APA 90 Philippines 23 November Air Attack 0 0
Essex CV 9 Philippines 25 November Air Attack 15 44
Intrepid CV 11 Phillippines 25 November Air Attack 69 35
Hancock CV 19 Philippines 25 November Air Attack 0 2
Cabot CVL 28 Philippines 25 November Air Attack 36 16
Colorado BB 45 Philippines 27 November Air Attack 19 72
SC 744* Philippines 27 November Air Attack 6 7
St. Louis CL 49 Philippines 27 November Air Attack 16 43
Montpelier CL 57 Philippines 27 November Air Attack 0 11
Maryland BB 46 Philippines 29 November Air Attack 31 30
Saufley DD 465 Philippines 29 November Air Attack 1 0
Aulick DD 569 Philippines 29 November Air Attack 32 64
Marcus Daly Philippines 5 December Air Attack 65 49
LSM 20* Philippines 5 December Air Attack 8 9
 Ships Damaged or Sunk, 1942 –1945 (by date) 319

Ship Location Date Cause Killed Wounded

LSM 23 Philippines 5 December Air Attack 8 7
Drayton DD 366 Philippines 5 December Air Attack 6 12
Mugford DD 389 Philippines 5 December Air Attack 8 16
John Evans Philippines 5 December Air Attack 0 4
Ward APD 16* Philippines 7 December Air Attack 0 several
Mahan DD 364* Philippines 7 December Air Attack 6 31
Liddle APD 60 Philippines 7 December Air Attack 36 22
Lamson DD 367 Philippines 7 December Air Attack 4 17
LSM 318* Philippines 7 December Air Attack several k & w
LST 737 Philippines 7 December Air Attack 2 4
Marcus Daly Philippines 10 December Air Attack 0 8
William S. Ladd* Philippines 10 December Air Attack 0 10
Hughes DD 410 Philippines 10 December Air Attack 14 26
LCT 1075 Philippines 10 December Air Attack 2 9
PT 323* Philippines 10 December Air Attack 2 11
Reid DD 369* Philippines 11 December Air Attack Appx. 150 dead
Caldwell DD 605 Philippines 12 December Air Attack 33 40
Haraden DD 585 Philippines 13 December Air Attack 14 24
Nashville CL 43 Philippines 13 December Air Attack 133 190
Howorth DD 592 Philippines 15 December Air Attack 0 0
Ralph Talbot DD 390 Philippines 15 December Air Attack 0 1
Marcus Island CVE 77 Philippines 15 December Air Attack 1 1
LST 738* Philippines 15 December Air Attack 1 10
LST 472* Philippines 15 December Air Attack 6 several
LST 605 Philippines 15 December Air Attack 0 several
PT 75 Philippines 17 December Air Attack 0 4
PT 300* Philippines 18 December Air Attack 8 7
LST 605 Philippines 21 December Air Attack 5 11
Juan De Fuca Philippines 21 December Air Attack 2 17
LST 460* Philippines 21 December Air Attack - -
LST 749* Philippines 21 December Air Attack - -
Foote DD 511 Philippines 21–22 December Air Attack 0 0
Bryant DD 665 Philippines 22 December Air Attack 0 1
Francisco Morazan Philippines 28 December Air Attack 0 3
William Sharon Philippines 28 December Air Attack 11 11
Unidentified Army FS Ship Philippines 28 December Air Attack lost all but 1 man
John Burke* Philippines 28 December Air Attack 68 0
William Ahearn Philippines 28 December Air Attack - -
PT 332 Philippines 28 December Air Attack 0 0
Gansevoort DD 608 Philippines 30 December Air Attack 17 15
Pringle DD 477 Philippines 30 December Air Attack 11 20
Orestes AGP 10 Philippines 30 December Air Attack 59 106
Porcupine IX 126* Philippines 30 December Air Attack 7 8
1945
Orca AVP 49 Philippines 2 January Air Attack 0 6
Cowanesque AO 79 Philippines 3 January Air Attack 2 1
Ommaney Bay Philippines 3 January Air Attack 93 65
CVE 79*
Lewis L. Dyche* Philippines 4 January Air Attack 69 0
Helm DD 388 Philippines 5 January Air Attack 0 6
Apache ATF 67 Philippines 5 January Air Attack 0 3
LCI(G) 70 Philippines 5 January Air Attack 6 9
Stafford DE 411 Philippines 5 January Air Attack 2 12
Manila Bay CVE 61 Philippines 5 January Air Attack 22 56
Savo Island CVE 78 Philippines 5 January Air Attack 0 0
Louisville CA 28 Philippines 5 January Air Attack 1 59
Louisville CA 28 Philippines 6 January Air Attack 36 56
Allen M. Sumner Philippines 6 January Air Attack 14 19
DD 692
Richard P. Leary Philippines 6 January Air Attack 0 1
DD 664
New Mexico BB 40 Philippines 6 January Air Attack 30 87
Walke DD 723 Philippines 6 January Air Attack 12 34
320 Appendix I

Ship Location Date Cause Killed Wounded

Long DMS 12* Philippines 6 January Air Attack 1 35
Brooks APD 10 Philippines 6 January Air Attack 3 11
O’Brien DD 725 Philippines 6 January Air Attack 0 0
Minneapolis CA 36 Philippines 6 January Air Attack 0 2
California BB 44 Philippines 6 January Air Attack 45 151
Newcomb DD 586 Philippines 6 January Air Attack 2 15
Columbia CL 56 Philippines 6 January Air Attack 13 44
Southard DMS 10 Philippines 6 January Air Attack 0 6
Palmer DMS 5* Philippines 7 January Air Attack 26 38
LST 912 Philippines 8 January Air Attack 4 4
Kadashan Bay Philippines 8 January Air Attack 0 3
CVE 76
Callaway APA 35 Philippines 8 January Air Attack 29 22
Kitkun Bay CVE 71 Philippines 8 January Air Attack 17 36
LCI(G) 404 Palau Islands 8 January Suicide Swimmers 0 0
Hodges DE 231 Philippines 9 January Air Attack 0 0
Columbia CL 56 Philippines 9 January Air Attack 24 68
Mississippi BB 41 Philippines 9 January Air Attack 26 63
Hodges DE 231 Philippines 9 January Air Attack 0 0
Du Page APA 41 Philippines 10 January Air Attack 32 157
LeRay Wilson Philippines 10 January Air Attack 6 7
DE 414
War Hawk AP 168 Philippines 10 January Suicide Boat 61 32
Robinson DD 562 Philippines 10 January Suicide Boat “No serious injuries”
LST 548 Philippines 10 January Suicide Boat 0 0
LST 610 Philippines 10 January Suicide Boat 0 0
LST 925 Philippines 10 January Suicide Boat 1 8
LST 1028 Philippines 10 January Suicide Boat 0 14
LCI(M) 974* Philippines 10 January Suicide Boat - -
LCI(G) 365 Philippines 10 January Suicide Boat 0 4
Eaton DD 510 Philippines 10 January Suicide Boat 1 14
Pontus H. Ross Hollandia 11 January Kaiten 0 0
Elmira Victory Philippines 12 January Air Attack 0 6
Otis Skinner Philippines 12 January Air Attack 0 2
Edward N. Wescott Philippines 12 January Air Attack 0 11
Kyle V. Johnson Philippines 12 January Air Attack 130 9
David Dudley Field Philippines 12 January Air Attack 0 8
Gilligan DE 508 Philippines 12 January Air Attack 12 13
Richard W. Suesens Philippines 12 January Air Attack 0 11
DE 342
Belknap APD 34 Philippines 12 January Air Attack 38 49
LST 700 Philippines 12 January Air Attack 2 8
LST 700 Philippines 13 January Air Attack 2 2
Zeilin APA 3 Philippines 13 January Air Attack 8 32
Salamaua CVE 96 Philippines 13 January Air Attack 15 88
Ticonderoga CV 14 Taiwan Area 21 January Air Attack 143 202
Maddox DD 731 Taiwan Area 21 January Air Attack 7 33
PC 1129* Philippines 31 January Suicide Boat 1 several
Army FS 309 Philippines 1 February Suicide Boat 0 0
LCS(L) 7* Philippines 16 February Suicide Boat 2+ -
LCS(L) 26* Philippines 16 February Suicide Boat - -
LCS(L) 27 Philippines 16 February Suicide Boat 2 23
LCS(L) 49* Philippines 16 February Suicide Boat 24 22
Bismarck Sea CVE 95* Iwo Jima 21 February Air Attack 119 99
LST 477 Iwo Jima 21 February Air Attack 9 5
LST 809 Iwo Jima 21 February Air Attack 0 0
Lunga Point CVE 94 Iwo Jima 21 February Air Attack 0 11
Saratoga CV 3 Iwo Jima 21 February Air Attack 123 192
Randolph CV 15 Ulithi 11 March Air Attack 25 106
Intrepid CV 11 Kyushu 18 March Air Attack 2 43
Wasp CV 16 Kyushu 19 March Air Attack 0 0
Halsey Powell DD 686 Kyushu 20 March Air Attack 12 29
Kimberly DD 521 Okinawa 26 March Air Attack 4 57
 Ships Damaged or Sunk, 1942 –1945 (by date) 321

Ship Location Date Cause Killed Wounded

Robert H. Smith DM 23 Okinawa 26 March Air Attack 0 0
Biloxi CL 80 Okinawa 26 March Air Attack 0 2
O’Brien DD 725 Okinawa 27 March Air Attack 50 76
Foreman DE 633 Okinawa 27 March Air Attack 0 1
Gilmer APD 11 Okinawa 27 March Air Attack 1 3
Nevada BB 36 Okinawa 27 March Air Attack 11 47
Dorsey DMS 1 Okinawa 27 March Air Attack 3 2
Callaghan DD 792 Okinawa 27 March Air Attack 0 0
LCI(G) 558 Okinawa 29 March Suicide Boat 0 0
LSM(R) 188 Okinawa 29 March Air Attack 15 32
LCI(G) 560 Okinawa 29 March Air Attack 0 1
Indianapolis CA 35 Okinawa 31 March Air Attack 9 20
Adams DM 27 Okinawa 1 April Air Attack 0 0
Alpine APA 92 Okinawa 1 April Air Attack 16 19
Hinsdale APA 120 Okinawa 1 April Air Attack 16 39
LST 884 Okinawa 1 April Air Attack 24 21
LST 724 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 0 0
West Virginia BB 48 Okinawa 1 April Air Attack 4 23
Dickerson APD 21* Okinawa 2 April Air Attack 54 97
Goodhue APA 107 Okinawa 2 April Air Attack 24 119
Henrico APA 45 Okinawa 2 April Air Attack 49 125
Achernar AKA 53 Okinawa 2 April Air Attack 5 41
LCI(G) 568 Okinawa 2 April Air Attack 1 4
Telfair APA 210 Okinawa 2 April Air Attack 1 16
Tyrrell AKA 80 Okinawa 2 April Air Attack 0 0
Hambleton DMS 20 Okinawa 3 April Air Attack 0 0
LST 599 Okinawa 3 April Air Attack 0 21
LCT 876 Okinawa 3 April Air Attack 0 2
Wake Island CVE 65 Okinawa 3 April Air Attack 0 0
LCI(G) 82* Okinawa 4 April Suicide Boat 8 11
Bush DD 529* Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 94 32
Colhoun DD 801* Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 35 21
Howorth DD 592 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 9 14
Hyman DD 732 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 10 40
Leutze DD 481 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 7 34
Morris DD 417 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 13 45
Mullany DD 528 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 30 36
Newcomb DD 586 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 40 51
Haynsworth DD 700 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 14 20
Witter DE 636 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 6 6
Fieberling DE 640 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 0 0
Emmons DMS 22* Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 57 71
Facility AM 233 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 0 0
Rodman DMS 21 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 16 20
Defense AM 317 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 0 9
San Jacinto CVL 30 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 1 5
LST 447* Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 5 17
Logan Victory* Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 15 9
Hobbs Victory* Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 13 2
YMS 331 Okinawa 6 April Air Attack 1 2
Wesson DE 184 Okinawa 7 April Air Attack 8 23
Hancock CV 19 Okinawa 7 April Air Attack 62 71
Maryland BB 46 Okinawa 7 April Air Attack 31 38
Bennett DD 473 Okinawa 7 April Air Attack 3 18
YMS 81 Okinawa 7 April Air Attack 0 0
Gregory DD 802 Okinawa 8 April Air Attack 0 2
Sterrett DD 407 Okinawa 9 April Air Attack 0 9
Charles J. Badger Okinawa 9 April Suicide Boat 0 0
DD 657
LCS(L) 36 Okinawa 9 April Air Attack 0 5
Starr AKA 67 Okinawa 9 April Suicide Boat 0 4
Enterprise CV 6 Okinawa 11 April Air Attack 0 18
Samuel Miles DE 183 Okinawa 11 April Air Attack 1 0
322 Appendix I

Ship Location Date Cause Killed Wounded

Hank DD 702 Okinawa 11 April Air Attack 3 1
Kidd DD 661 Okinawa 11 April Air Attack 38 55
Missouri BB 63 Okinawa 11 April Air Attack 0 1
Bullard DD 660 Okinawa 11 April Air Attack 0 0
Minot Victory Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 0 5
Riddle DE 185 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 1 9
Stanly DD 478 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 0 3
Walter C. Wann DE 412 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 0 1
Tennessee BB 43 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 22 73
Idaho BB 42 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 0 13
Rall DE 304 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 21 38
Whitehurst DE 634 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 37 37
Lindsey DM 32 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 52 60
Zellars DD 777 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 29 37
Purdy DD 734 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 13 27
Cassin Young DD 793 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 1 59
LCS(L) 33* Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 4 29
LCS(L) 57 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 2 6
Jeffers DMS 27 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 0 0
Mannert L. Abele Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 79 35
DD 733
LSM(R) 189 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 0 4
Gladiator AM 319 Okinawa 12 April Air Attack 0 0
Connolly DE 306 Okinawa 13 April Air Attack 0 0
New York BB 34 Okinawa 14 April Air Attack 0 2
Sigsbee DD 502 Okinawa 14 April Air Attack 22 74
Hunt DD 674 Okinawa 14 April Air Attack 0 5
YMS 331 Okinawa 16 April Suicide Boat 0 0
Wilson DD 408 Okinawa 16 April Air Attack 5 3
LCI(G) 407 Okinawa 16 April Air Attack 0 1
LCS(L) 51 Okinawa 16 April Air Attack 0 0
LCS(L) 116 Okinawa 16 April Air Attack 12 12
Laffey DD 724 Okinawa 16 April Air Attack 31 72
Intrepid CV 11 Japan Area 16 April Air Attack 10 87
Bryant DD 665 Okinawa 16 April Air Attack 34 33
Hobson DMS 26 Okinawa 16 April Air Attack 4 8
Missouri BB 63 Okinawa 16 April Air Attack 0 2
Harding DMS 28 Okinawa 16 April Air Attack 22 10
YMS 331 Okinawa 16 April Suicide Boat 0 0
Taluga AO 62 Okinawa 16 April Air Attack 0 12
Bowers APD 40 Okinawa 16 April Air Attack 48 56
Pringle DD 477* Okinawa 17 April Air Attack 65 110
Benham DD 796 Japan Area 17 April Air Attack 1 8
Wadsworth DD 516 Okinawa 22 April Air Attack 0 1
LCS(L) 15* Okinawa 22 April Air Attack 15 11
Isherwood DD 520 Okinawa 22 April Air Attack 42 41
Hudson DD 475 Okinawa 22 April Air Attack 0 1
Swallow AM 65* Okinawa 22 April Air Attack 2 9
Ransom AM 283 Okinawa 22 April Air Attack 0 0
Ralph Talbot DD 390 Okinawa 27 April Air Attack 5 9
Hutchins DD 476 Okinawa 27 April Suicide Boat 0 20
Rathburne APD 25 Okinawa 27 April Air Attack 0 0
Canada Victory* Okinawa 27 April Air Attack 3 5
Bozeman Victory Okinawa 28 April Suicide Boat 0 6
LCS(L) 37 Okinawa 28 April Suicide Boat 0 3
LCI(G) 580 Okinawa 28April Air Attack 0 6
Comfort AH 6 Okinawa 28 April Air Attack 30 48
Pinkney APH 2 Okinawa 28 April Air Attack 35 12
Bennion DD 662 Okinawa 28 April Air Attack 0 0
Twiggs DD 591 Okinawa 28 April Air Attack 0 2
Daly DD 519 Okinawa 28 April Air Attack 2 15
Wadsworth DD 516 Okinawa 28 April Air Attack 0 0
Haggard DD 555 Okinawa 29 April Air Attack 11 40
 Ships Damaged or Sunk, 1942 –1945 (by date) 323

Ship Location Date Cause Killed Wounded

Hazelwood DD 531 Okinawa 29 April Air Attack 46 26
LCS(L) 37 Okinawa 29 April Suicide Boat 0 4
S. Hall Young Okinawa 30 April Air Attack 0 1
Terror CM 5 Okinawa 30 April Air Attack 48 123
Macomb DMS 23 Okinawa 3 May Air Attack 7 14
Little DD 803* Okinawa 3 May Air Attack 30 79
Aaron Ward DM 34 Okinawa 3 May Air Attack 45 49
Idaho BB 42 Okinawa 3 May Air Attack 0 0
LSM(R) 195* Okinawa 3 May Air Attack 8 16
LCS(L) 31 Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 5 2
Ingraham DD 694 Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 14 37
Morrison DD 560* Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 159 102
LSM(R) 194* Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 13 23
Hopkins DMS 13 Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 1 2
Gayety AM 239 Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 0 3
Lowry DD 770 Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 2 23
LCS(L) 25 Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 1 8
Gwin DM 33 Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 2 9
LSM(R) 192 Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 0 1
Luce DD 522* Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 149 94
Sangamon CVE 26 Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 46 116
LSM(R) 190* Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 13 18
Cowell DD 547 Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 0 0
Carina AK 74 Okinawa 4 May Suicide Boat 0 6
Shea DM 30 Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 27 91
Birmingham CL 62 Okinawa 4 May Air Attack 51 81
Pathfinder AGS 1 Okinawa 6 May Air Attack 1 0
St. George AV 16 Okinawa 8 May Air Attack 3 30
England APD 41 Okinawa 9 May Air Attack 35 27
Oberrender DE 344 Okinawa 9 May Air Attack 9 51
Army FS 225* Philippines 10 –11 May Suicide Boat - -
Evans DD 552 Okinawa 11 May Air Attack 30 29
LCS(L) 84 Okinawa 11 May Air Attack 0 1
Bunker Hill CV 17 Okinawa 11 May Air Attack 396 264
LCS(L) 88 Okinawa 11 May Air Attack 7 9
Harry F. Bauer DM 26 Okinawa 11 May Air Attack 0 1
Hugh W. Hadley Okinawa 11 May Air Attack 28 67
DD 774
M. S. Tjisadane Okinawa 11 May Air Attack 4 9
New Mexico BB 40 Okinawa 12 May Air Attack 54 119
Bache DD 470 Okinawa 13 May Air Attack 41 32
Bright DE 747 Okinawa 13 May Air Attack 0 2
Enterprise CV 6 Kyushu 14 May Air Attack 13 68
Douglas H. Fox Okinawa 17 May Air Attack 9 35
DD 779
Uriah M. Rose Okinawa 18 May Air Attack 0 0
Sims APD 50 Okinawa 18 May Air Attack 0 0
LST 808 Okinawa 20 May Air Attack 0 1
Chase APD 54 Okinawa 20 May Air Attack 0 35
Thatcher DD 514 Okinawa 20 May Air Attack 14 53
Register APD 92 Okinawa 20 May Air Attack 0 12
John C. Butler DE 339 Okinawa 20 May Air Attack 0 3
Guest DD 472 Okinawa 25 May Air Attack 0 0
Stormes DD 780 Okinawa 25 May Air Attack 21 6
O’Neill DE 188 Okinawa 25 May Air Attack 0 16
Cowell DD 547 Okinawa 25 May Air Attack 0 2
William C. Cole DE 641 Okinawa 25 May Air Attack 0 0
Barry APD 29 Okinawa 25 May Air Attack 0 30
Bates APD 47* Okinawa 25 May Air Attack 21 35
Segundo Ruiz Belvis Okinawa 25 May Air Attack 0 0
Roper APD 20 Okinawa 25 May Air Attack 1 10
Spectacle AM 305 Okinawa 25 May Air Attack 29 6
LSM 135* Okinawa 25 May Air Attack 11 10
324 Appendix I

Ship Location Date Cause Killed Wounded

Sims APD 50 Okinawa 25 May Air Attack 0 11
PC 1603 Okinawa 26 May Air Attack 3 15
Forrest DMS 24 Okinawa 26 May Air Attack 5 13
Braine DD 630 Okinawa 27 May Air Attack 66 78
Dutton AGS 8 Okinawa 27 May Air Attack 0 1
Anthony DD 515 Okinawa 27 May Air Attack 0 0
Rednour APD 102 Okinawa 27 May Air Attack 3 13
LCS(L) 119 Okinawa 27 May Air Attack 12 6
Loy APD 56 Okinawa 27 May Air Attack 3 15
LCS(L) 52 Okinawa 27 May Air Attack 1 10
LCS(L) 61 Okinawa 27May Air Attack 0 1
Drexler DD 741* Okinawa 28 May Air Attack 158 51
Sandoval APA 194 Okinawa 28 May Air Attack 8 26
Mary A. Livermore Okinawa 28 May Air Attack 11 6
Brown Victory Okinawa 28 May Air Attack 4 16
Josiah Snelling Okinawa 28 May Air Attack 0 25
LCS(L) 119 Okinawa 28 May Air Attack 14 18
Shubrick DD 639 Okinawa 29May Air Attack 32 28
Tatum APD 81 Okinawa 29 May Air Attack 0 3
LCI(L) 90 Okinawa 3 June Air Attack 1 7
Mississippi BB 41 Okinawa 5 June Air Attack 1 8
Louisville CA 28 Okinawa 5 June Air Attack 8 37
J. WilliamDitter Okinawa 6 June Air Attack 10 27
DM 31*
Harry F. Bauer DM 26 Okinawa 6 June Air Attack 0 0
Anthony DD 515 Okinawa 7 June Air Attack 0 3
Natoma Bay CVE 62 Okinawa 7 June Air Attack 1 4
William D. Porter* Okinawa 10 June Air Attack 0 61
DD579
LCS(L) 122 Okinawa 11 June Air Attack 11 29
Walter Colton Okinawa 11 June Air Attack 0 76
Twiggs DD 591* Okinawa 16 June Air Attack 184 34
Thatcher DD 514 Okinawa 19 July Air Attack 0 2
Kenneth Whiting Okinawa 21 June Air Attack 0 5
AV 14
Halloran DE 305 Okinawa 21 June Air Attack 3 24
LSM 59* Okinawa 21 June Air Attack 2 8
Barry APD 29* Okinawa 21 June Air Attack 0 0
Curtiss AV 4 Okinawa 21 June Air Attack 41 28
Ellyson DMS 19 Okinawa 22 June Air Attack 1 4
LSM 213 Okinawa 22 June Air Attack 3 10
LST 534 Okinawa 22 June Air Attack 3 35
Thatcher DD 514 Okinawa 19 July Air Attack 0 2
Underhill DE 682 Philippines Area 24 July Kaiten 112 -
Callaghan DD 792* Okinawa 29 July Air Attack 47 73
Pritchett DD 561 Okinawa 29 July Air Attack 0 0
Cassin Young Okinawa 29 July Air Attack 22 45
DD 793
Horace A. Bass APD 124 Okinawa 30 July Air Attack 1 15
Hank DD 702 Japan Area 9 August Air Attack 1 5
Borie DD 704 Japan Area 9 August Air Attack 48 66
Lagrange APA 124 Okinawa 13 August Air Attack 21 89
6,805 9,923
The number of ships damaged in kamikaze attacks was 407. Of this number, sixty were sunk.
*Ships marked with an asterisk were either sunk outright by a kamikaze attack or deemed unsalvageable or a hazard
to navigation and sunk by American gunfire or torpedoes.
Casualty figures marked with a dash (-) indicate that there are no data available.
 Appendix II: Ship Types

American Ship Classes

Throughout the text ships are identified by name, type, and number. For instance, the
designator BB indicates that the type of ship is a battleship and the number following it iden-
tifies the particular ship. The numbers would also identify the particular class of ship. Accord-
ingly, U. S. S. New Jersey BB 62, is a battleship belonging to the Iowa Class which carried the
numbers BB 61 through BB 66. Larger ships were named, but smaller ships such as LSTs,
LCI(L)s and others were not named and only known by their hull numbers.
Listed below are the official type designations and their meanings.
AD — Destroyer Tender CV — Aircraft Carrier
AGM — Auxiliary Ship CVE — Escort Carrier
AGP — Motor Torpedo Boat Tender CVL — Aircraft Carrier, Light
AGS — Surveying Ship DD — Destroyer
AH — Hospital Ship DE — Destroyer Escort
AK — Cargo Ship DM — Light Minelayer
AKA — Cargo Ship (Attack) DMS — High Speed Minesweeper
AM — Fleet Minesweeper FS — Army Freight and Supply Ship
AO — Fuel Oil Tanker LCI(G)— Landing Craft Infantry (Guns)
APA — Transport (Attack) LCI(L)— Landing Craft Infantry (Large)
APD — High Speed Transport LCI(M)— Landing Craft Infantry (Mortars)
APH — Transport Fitted for Evacuation LCS(L)— Landing Craft Large (support)
of Wounded LCT — Landing Craft Tank
ARB — Repair Ship (Battle Damage) LSD — Landing Ship (Dock)
ARL — Repair Ship (Landing Craft) LSM — Landing Ship Medium
ARS — Salvage Vessel LSM(R)— Landing Ship Medium (Rockets)
ATF — Ocean Tug (Fleet) LST — Landing Ship (Tank)
ATO — Ocean Tug (Old) PC — Patrol Craft
ATR — Ocean Tug (Rescue) PCE(R)— Patrol Craft (Rescue)
AV — Seaplane Tender PGM — Patrol Motor Gunboat
BB — Battleship PT — Motor Torpedo Boat
CA — Heavy Cruiser SC — Sub Chaser
CL — Light Cruiser SS — Submarine
CM — Coastal Minelayer YMS — Motor Minesweeper

325
326 Appendix II

Scale: One square equals 100 feet.*

 Ship Types 327

Scale: One square equals 100 feet.

328 Appendix II

One square equals 50 feet.

 Ship Types 329

Scale: One square equals 50 feet.

330 Appendix II

Scale: One square equals 50 feet.

 Ship Types 331

Scale: One square equals 25 feet.

332 Appendix II

Scale: One square equals 50 feet.

 Ship Types 333

*The charts in this appendix come from several issues of the U.S. Army–Navy Journal of Recognition.
In each case they were drawn on a different scale, so a direct visual comparison of ships of different
types is not possible. The scale of the drawings is indicated at the bottom of each graphic. The sources
are:
U.S. Naval Vessels: Bureau of Aeronautics of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Army-Navy Journal of Recognition,
No. 1, September 1943, pp. 26 –27.
Minor U. S. Warships: Bureau of Aeronautics of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Army-Navy Journal of Recognition,
No. 5, January, 1944, pp. 26 –27.
Landing Ships and Craft: U.S. War and Navy Departments, Recognition Journal, No. 17, January 1945,
pp. 26 –27.
Merchant Vessels: U.S. War and Navy Departments, Recognition Journal, No. 10, June 1944, pp. 26 –
27.
Most of the ship types and classes mentioned in the text are contained in these graphics, as well as
some that are not. It should be noted that the first two charts, U.S. Naval Vessels, were developed in
September 1943 and do not show ship development at the end of the war. Some ships, like the Sumner-
Gearing destroyers, are thus omitted.
 Appendix III:
American and Japanese Aircraft

Presented here are silhouettes of American and Japanese aircraft, most of which are men-
tioned in the text. The number of American aircraft is much smaller as bombers and transports
were not used to combat kamikaze aircraft. Japanese aircraft depicted herein are more numer-
ous as virtually any aircraft capable of flying to the intended targets were pressed into service
as kamikazes. The planes used as kamikazes ranged from trainers to bombers and fighters.
The ability of American and Allied forces to differentiate their own aircraft from that of
the enemy was of paramount importance. Failure to do so could allow an enemy to slip
through or for an Allied plane to be brought down by friendly fire. To aid in identifying
various aircraft and ships, recognition manuals and journals were published by the Allied
forces and disseminated throughout the war zone as an aid.
Identifying Japanese aircraft types had proven problematic in the early stages of the war.
In the beginning months of 1942, members of the Directorate of Intelligence, Allied Air Forces,
Southwest Pacific Area devised a code name system to assist in identifying Japanese aircraft.
These code names used male and female first names as well as the names of trees and birds.
Within a short period of time the code names had proven acceptable throughout the U. S.
armed forces. By early 1943 the names had been published officially in the War Department’s
Recognition Pictorial Manual FM 30-30 and shortly thereafter in the U. S. Army–Navy Journal
of Recognition. The latter publication put forth its first monthly edition in September of 1943
and continued to the end of the war. Male first names were used for fighter aircraft and recon-
naissance seaplanes. Bombers of various sizes and types from single engine to quadruple
engine were designated by the use of female first names. Reconnaissance aircraft not equipped
with floats also used female first names as did flying boats. Tree names were used for trainers
and the names of various birds were used for gliders. Transports were given female first names
beginning with the letter “T.” The code name designators were quickly put into use and
remained the primary method of identification until the end of the war.
Occasional exceptions to the rule were observed as the Nakajima Ki-42-II was nicknamed
Tojo and the Zeke was more popularly known as the Zero. A few aircraft, such as the Willow
and Shiragiku trainers, did not have silhouettes published in the recognition manuals and
journals as their appearance in the war zones did not occur until near the end of the war.
Since aircraft profiles depicted in this appendix came from several sources, there is no
common scale. Accordingly, no direct visual comparison of size is possible.

334
American Aircraft 335

U.S. Army
336 Appendix III

U.S. Navy
Japanese Aircraft 337

Japanese Army
338 Appendix III
Japanese Aircraft 339

Japanese Navy
340 Appendix III
 Japanese Aircraft 341

Source: Training Division, Bureau of Aeronautics, War Department FM 30-30: Recognition Pictorial
Manual (Washington, D.C.: Navy Department, 1943), with Supplement No. 1 of November 1943 and
No. 2 of August 1944.
This page intentionally left blank
 Chapter Notes

Chapter 1 datsumi Society), Listen to the Voices from the Sea

1. Far Eastern Bureau, British Ministry of Informa- (Kike Wadatsumi no Koe), trans. Midori Yamanouchi
tion, Japanese Translation Series No. 121, November 13, and Joseph L. Quinn (Scranton: The University of
1943, The General Counter-offensive and the Divine Scranton Press, 2000), p. 225. Hereafter Listen to the
Wind, translated by Edward Band from the editorial in Voices....
the Asahi Weekly, 5 September 1943. 3. Suicide Weapons and Tactics Know Your Enemy!
2. Inspectorate General, Army Air Force, Suicide CinCPac-CinCPOA Bulletin 126 –45, 29 May 1945, p. 21.
Force Combat Methods Training Manual, February 1945, 4. Shigeo Imamura, Shig: The True Story of an
translated as CinCPac-CinCPOA Bulletin No. 129 –45, American Kamikaze (Baltimore : American Library
Suicide Force Combat Methods Special Translation Num- Press, Inc., 2001), p. 78.
ber 67, 27 May 1945, p. 2. 5. Naito, p. 114.
3. Far Eastern Bureau, British Ministry of Informa- 6. Richard J. Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar
tion, Japanese Translation Series No. 167, November 9, Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community
1944, Shigeki Oka, The Air Defense of Japan, trans. Ed- (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p.
ward Band. 153.
4. John Morris, Traveller from Tokyo (London: The 7. Andrew Adams, ed., The Cherry Blossom
Book Club, 1945), p. 47. Squadrons: Born to Die, by the Hagoromo Society of
5. Shigeo Imamura, Shig: The True Story of an Kamikaze Divine Thunderbolt Corps Survivors, intro.
American Kamikaze (Baltimore : American Library Andrew Adams, ed. and suppl. by Andrew Adams, trans.
Press, Inc., 2001), pp. 34 –35. Nobuo Asahi and the Japan Technical Company (Los
6. Ibid., p. 17. Angles: Ohara Publications), 1973, p. 15.
7. Ibid., p. 29. 8. Commander Fifth Amphibious Force, Transla-
8. Teruyuki Okazaki, interview, 21 February 2009. tion of a Japanese Letter, 11 June 1945.
9. Teruyuki Okazaki, interview, 6 September 2003. 9. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section South
10. G. Cameron Hurst III, Armed Martial Arts of West Pacific Area, Report No. 76: Prominent Factors in
Japan Swordsmanship and Archery (New Haven: Yale Japanese Military Psychology Research, Part IV, 7 Febru-
University Press, 1998), pp. 164 –165. ary 1945, pp. 6 –7.
11. Imamura, p. 33. 10. Ibid., p. 7.
12. For a more detailed description of how the mili- 11. Yukihisa Suzuki, “Autobiography of a Kamikaze
tary managed to control the mind of the average Japa- Pilot,” Blue Book Magazine, Vol. 94, No. 2 (December
nese citizen see: Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War (New 1951), pp. 92–107, Vol. 93, No. 3 (January 1952), pp. 88 –
York: Pantheon Books, 1978); also Toshio Iritani, Group 100, and Vol. 93, No. 4 (February 1952), p. 107.
Psychology of the Japanese in Wartime (New York: Kegan 12. Listen to the Voices..., pp. 229 –230.
Paul International, 1991), pp. 19 –76. 13. Naito, p. 114.
13. Cabinet Information Board, Op-16-FE Transla- 14. Vice Adm. Matome Ugaki, Fading Victory: The
tion No. 264 WDC 38549, Kamikaze Special Attack Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941–1945, trans. Masa-
Force, 9 July 1945, p. 3. taka Chihaya (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1991), p. 485.
15. Ryuji Nagatsuka, I Was a Kamikaze: The Knights
of the Divine Wind, trans. from the French by Nina
Chapter 2 Rootes (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 102.
1. Hatsusho Naito, Thunder Gods: The Kamikazes 16. Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook, Japan
Tell their Story (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1989), at War: An Oral History (New York: The New Press,
p. 115. 1992), p. 160.
2. Nihon Senbotsu Gakusei Kinen-Kai (Japan Me- 17. Lt. Gen. Masakazu Kawabe, USSBS Interrogation
morial Society for the Students Killed in the War-Wa- No. 277, 2 November 1945.

343
344 Notes — Chapters 3 and 4

18. See Rikihei Inoguchi and Tadashi Nakajima, The Nobuo Asahi and the Japan Technical Company (Los
Divine Wind (New York: Bantam Books, 1978). It is un- Angles: Ohara Publications, 1973), p. 144.
fortunate that too few sources about the kamikazes have 4. Ibid., pp. 162–163.
been published in English. Most of those extant have 5. CinCPac-CincPOA Bulletin No. 170 –45, Trans-
been of three types: (1) translations of work by pilots lations Interrogations Number 35, 7 July 1945, p. 101.
and officers who seek to justify their participation in the 6. Hatsuho Naito, Thunder Gods: The Kamikaze Pi-
program, (2) publications with a leftist flavor, tending lots Tell Their Story, trans. Mayumi Ichikawa (Tokyo:
to discredit Japan’s participation in the war, and (3) Kodansha International, 1989), p. 114.
journalistic writings by Western bushidophiles seeking 7. VF-30 Action Report No. 17–45, 21 March 1945.
to glorify the exotic aspects of Japanese culture. 8. Naito, pp. 141–144.
19. See Listen to the Voices from the Sea. 9. Yukihisa Suzuki, “Autobiography of a Kamikaze
20. See Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Kamikaze, Cherry Pilot,” Blue Book Magazine, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Jan. 1952),
Blossoms and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aes- p. 92.
thetics in Japanese History (Chicago: The University of 10. VMF-323 Action Report No. 10, 16 April 1945.
Chicago Press, 2002). 11. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum-
21. Jean Larteguy, ed., The Sun Goes Down: Last Let- mary No. 385, 9 April 1945, p. 52.
ters from Japanese Suicide-Pilots and Soldiers (London: 12. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum-
William Kimber, 1956), pp. 141–143. mary No. 475, 8 July 1945, pp. 7–8.
22. Listen to the Voices..., p. 215. 13. For a closer comparison of the three aircraft, see
23. Ibid., p. 128. Rene J. Francillon, Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War
24. Adams, p. 75. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979). The Dinah is
25. Larteguy, p. 148. discussed on pp. 168 –177, the Peggy on pp. 186 –191, and
26. Suzuki, p. 95. the Frances on pp. 462–467.
27. Nagatsuka, p. 172. 14. Technical Air Intelligence Center Summary No. 31
28. Ibid., p. 197. Baka (Anacostia, D.C.: Technical Air Intelligence Cen-
29. Shogo Hattori, “Kamikaze Japan’s Glorious Fail- ter, June 1945), p. 3.
ure,” Air Power History, Spring 1996, Vol. 43, No. 1, p. 15. Director Air Intelligence Group, Statistical Analy-
17. sis of Japanese Suicide Effort Against Allied Shipping Dur-
30. Suzuki, p. 92. ing OKINAWA Campaign, 23 July 1945, p. 6.
31. Superior Pvt. Guy Toko, USSBS Interrogation 16. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum-
No. 386, 20 November 1945, p. 5. mary No. 451, 14 June 1945, pp. 7–8.
32. Maj. Gen. Miyoshi, USSBS Interrogation No. 17. Rene J. Francillion, Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific
352, 9 November 1945, p. 6. War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979), pp. 241–243.
33. First Class PO Takao Musashi, ADVATIS Inter-
rogation Report No. 15, circa 1945, p. 9.
34. Imamura, pp. 99 –100.
35. Ibid. Chapter 4
36. Adams, p. 153. 1. Ens. Sadao Nakamura, ADVATIS Interrogation
37. Ibid., p. 180. Report No. 1, p. 4.
38. Sonarman 2d Class John Huber, USS Cogswell 2. Saburo Sakai with Martin Caidin and Fred Saito,
DD 651, Personal Diary, 1944 –45, p. 48. Samurai! (New York: ibooks, Inc., 2001), p. 308.
39. Quartermaster 2d Class Robert F. Rielly, LCS(L) 3. Capt. Mitsuo Fuchida, Doc. No. 49259 in Gen-
61, interview, 19 May 2001. eral Headquarters Far East Command Military Intelli-
40. Pharmacists Mate Charles Brader, LCS(L) 65, LCS gence Section, General Staff, Statements of Japanese
Men in a Spectacular Part of Okinawa Campaign, type- Officials on World War II (English Translations) Volume
script, undated, p.1. 1, 1949 –1950, p. 123. Hereafter MIS Statements
41. Sonarman 1st Class Jack Gebhardt, USS Pringle Vol 1.
DD 477, Naval Historical Foundation Oral History Pro- 4. U.S.S. Smith DD 378, Serial 00327, Action Report,
gram, Recollections of Sonarman 1st Class Jack Gebhardt U.S.S. Smith, October 26, 1942, 2 November 1942, p. 3.
USN, 7 November 2000. 5. Bureau of Ships Navy Department, Destroyer Re-
42. Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War 1931–1945: A Crit- port —Gunfire Bomb and Kamikaze Damage Including
ical Perspective on Japan’s Role in World War II (New Losses in Action 17 October, 1941 to 15 August 1945.
York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 183. 6. Lt. Col. Koji Tanaka, Doc. No. 49807 in General
43. USS Aaron Ward DM 34 Serial 005 Action Report Headquarters Far East Command Military Intelligence
13 May 1945, pp. 8 –9. Section, General Staff, Statements of Japanese Officials
on World War II (English Translations) Volume 4, 1949 –
1950, pp. 159 –161.
7. Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, Doc. No. 49258 in
Chapter 3 General Headquarters Far East Command Military In-
1. Air Intelligence Group Division of Naval Intelli- telligence Section, General Staff, Statements of Japanese
gence, Observed Suicide Attacks By Japanese Aircraft Officials on World War II (English Translations) Volume
Against Allied Ships, OpNav-16-V No. A106, 23 May 2, 1949 –1950, p. 68.
1945, p. 87. 8. Col. Manjiro Akiyama, Doc. No. 58512, MIS
2. Lt. Cmdr. Ohira, USSBS Interrogation No. 457, 2 Statements Vol. I, p. 16.
November 1945. 9. United States Strategic Bombing Survey Naval
3. Andrew Adams, ed., The Cherry Blossom Analysis Division, Japanese Air Power (Washington,
Squadrons: Born to Die, by the Hagoromo Society of D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 64.
Kamikaze Divine Thunderbolt Corps Survivors, intro. 10. General Headquarters, Far East Command Mili-
Andrew Adams, ed. and suppl. Andrew Adams, trans. tary Intelligence Section, Historical Division, Interro-
 Notes—Chapter 5 345

gations of Japanese Officials on World War II (English report in National Archives RG 38 Records of the Chief
Translations), Vol. 1, 1949, p. 237. of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Mono-
11. Lt. Col. Naomichi Jin, USSBS Interrogation No. graph Files Japan 1939 –46, pp. 1001–1015.
356, 29 October 1945, p. 2. 32. Nagatsuka, p. 164.
12. Ron Surels, DD 522: Diary of a Destroyer: The ac- 33. Col. Junji Hayashi, USSBS Interrogation No. 357,
tion saga of the USS Luce from the Aleutian and Philip- 2 November 1945, p. 5.
pines Campaigns to her Sinking off Okinawa (Plymouth,
NH: Valley Graphics, 1996), pp. 104 –105.
13. Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Kamikaze, Cherry Blos-
soms and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics Chapter 5
in Japanese History (Chicago: The University of Chicago 1. USS Ingraham DD 694 Serial 004 Action Report 8
Press, 2002), pp. 163, 252–253. May 1945, p. 19.
14. Albert Axell and Hideaki Kase, Kamikaze, Japan’s 2. Air Intelligence Group Division of Naval Intelli-
Suicide Gods (London: Pearson Education Limited, gence, Observed Suicide Attacks by Japanese Aircraft
2002), pp. 164 –168. Against Allied Ships, OpNav-16-V No. A106, 23 May
15. Col. Ichiji Sugita, Doc. No. 58512 in General 1945, p. 6.
Headquarters Far East Command Military Intelligence 3. USS Pritchett DD561 Serial 037 Action Report 10
Section, General Staff, Statements of Japanese Officials July 1945, p. 10.
on World War II (English Translations) Volume 3, 1949 – 4. Inspectorate General, Army Air Force, Suicide
1950, p. 342. Force Combat Methods Training Manual, February
16. Capt. Toshikazu Omae, Doc. No. 50572 in Gen- 1945, translated as CinCPac-CinCPOA Bulletin No.
eral Headquarters Far East Command Military Intelli- 129 –45, Suicide Force Combat Methods Special Transla-
gence Section, General Staff, Statements of Japanese Offi- tion Number 67, 27 May 1945, pp. 17–18. Hereafter
cials on World War II (English Translations) Volume 4, SFCMTM.
1949 –1950, p. 319. 5. SFCMTM, pp.13 –14.
17. Cmdr. Yoshimori Terai, Doc. No. 50572 in Gen- 6. U.S.S. Bennion (DD 662) Serial 153 Action Report
eral Headquarters Far East Command Military Intelli- 9 June 1945, enclosure T, 28 April 1945.
gence Section, General Staff, Statements of Japanese Offi- 7. SFCMTM, pp. 8 –13.
cials on World War II (English Translations) Volume 4, 8. Air Intelligence Group Division of Naval Intelli-
1949 –1950, p. 321. gence, Observed Suicide Attacks by Japanese Aircraft
18. Cmdr. Yoshimori Terai, RAdm. Sadatoshi Against Allied Ships, OpNav-16-V No. A106, 23 May
Tomioka, and Capt. Mitsuo Fuchida, Doc. No. 50572 1945, p. 5.
in General Headquarters Far East Command Military 9. Yasuo Kuwahara and Gordon T. Allred, Kamikaze
Intelligence Section, General Staff, Statements of Japa- (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957), p. 127.
nese Officials on World War II (English Translations) Vol- 10. U.S.S. Gregory (DD 802) Serial 0109 Action Report
ume 4, 1949 –1950, p. 317. 10 May 1945, p. 19.
19. Headquarters Far East Command Military His- 11. SFCMTM, p. 13.
tory Section, Imperial General Headquarters Navy Di- 12. USS LCS(L)(3) No. 85 Serial 22 Action Report 26
rectives Volume II, Directives No. 316 –No 540 (15 Jan 44 – July 1945, p. 2.
26 Aug 45) Special Directives No. 1–No. 3 (2 Sep 45 –12 13. USS Ingraham DD 694 Serial 004 Action Report 8
Sep 45), p. 143. May 1945, pp. 19 –20.
20. Ibid., pp. 161–162. 14. USS Douglas H. Fox DD 779 Serial 004 Action Re-
21. Saburo Sakai with Martin Caidin and Fred Saito, port 24 May 1945, pp. 1, 6.
pp. 29 –32. 15. USS Shannon DM25 Serial 021-45 Action Report
22. Yukihisa Suzuki, “Autobiography of a Kamikaze 15 July 1945, VIII, p. 1.
Pilot,” Blue Book Magazine, Vol. 94, No. 3 (January 16. U.S.S. Isherwood (DD 520) Serial 0098 Action Re-
1952), pp. 98 –99. port 1 May 1945, Enclosure (A), p. 19.
23. Shigeo Imamura, Shig: The True Story of an 17. Capt. Rikihei Inoguchi, IJN in USSBS Interroga-
American Kamikaze (Baltimore : American Library tions of Japanese Officials Volume I, p. 60.
Press), p. 68. 18. Suicide Weapons and Tactics Know Your Enemy!
24. CincPac-CincPOA Bulletin No.170 –45, Transla- CinCPac-CinCPOA Bulletin 126 –45, 29 May 1945, pp.
tions Interrogations No. 35, 7 July 1945, pp. 95 –100. 15 –17.
25. United States Strategic Bombing Survey Naval 19. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum-
Analysis Division, Interrogations of Japanese Officials Vol. mary No. 381, 5 April 1945, pp. 1–3.
II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 20. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum-
1945), p. 533. mary No. 394, 18 April 1945, p. 7.
26. Report From Captured Personnel and Material 21. United States Fleet Headquarters of the Com-
Branch Military Intelligence Service, U.S. War Depart- mander in Chief Navy Department, Washington D.C.
ment, Interrogation of Prisoner of War No. 1376, 12 Effects of B-29 Operations in Support of the Okinawa
March 1945. Campaign From 18 March to 22 June 1945, 3 August 1945,
27. USS LCS(L)(3) 115 Serial 42 Action Report 16 April p. 1.
1945, p. 5. 22. Lt. Gen. Masakazu Kawabe, USSBS Interrogation
28. Yasuo Kuwahara and Gordon T. Allred, Kamikaze No. 277, 2 November 1945, p. 4.
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1957), p. 61. 23. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum-
29. Ibid., p. 33 ff. mary No. 404, 28 April 1945, pp. 1–2.
30. Ryuji Nagatsuka, I Was a Kamikaze: The Knights 24. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum-
of the Divine Wind, trans. from the French by Nina mary No. 423, 17 May 1945, pp. 2–3.
Rootes (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 44 ff. 25. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum-
31. Col. N. Brunetti, “The Japanese Air Force,” typed mary No. 421, 15 May 1945, pp. 6 –8.
346 Notes — Chapters 6 and 7

26. Maj. Gen. Kazuo Tanikawa, Doc. No. 59121 in 26. Ibid., p. 21.
General Headquarters Far East Command Military In- 27. This estimate is compiled from information on
telligence Section, General Staff, Statements of Japanese the website of the All Japan Kaiten Pilot’s Association.
Officials on World War II (English Translations) Volume 28. Shizuo Fukui, Japanese Naval Vessels at End of
4, 1949 –1950, p. 216. War (Japan: Administrative Division, Second Demobi-
27. Ibid., p. 216. lization Bureau, 1947), pp. 12, 27, 33.
28. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum- 29. The chart is based on information in Mark Stille,
mary No. 445, 6 June 1945, B p.6. Imperial Japanese Navy Submarines 1941–45 (New York:
29. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum- Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2007) and Shizuo Fukui, Japa-
mary No. 444, 7 June 1945, p. 7. nese Naval Vessels at End of War (Japan: Administrative
30. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum- Division, Second Demobilization Bureau, 1947).
mary No. 451, 14 June 1945, pp. 3 –4. 30. Fukui, p. 197.
31. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum- 31. Ibid., p. 198.
mary No. 452, 15 June 1945, pp. 5 –6. 32. Ibid., p. 204.
33. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section South
West Pacific, Enemy Publications No. 405 Antitank Com-
bat Reference, 24 September 1945, p. 1.
Chapter 6 34. War Department Military Intelligence Division,
1. U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan, Japanese Intelligence Bulletin Vol. III, No. 7, March 1945, pp. 64 –
Suicide Craft, January 1946, p. 1. 66.
2. Reports of General MacArthur, Japanese Opera- 35. War Department Military Intelligence Division,
tions in the Southwest Pacific Area, Volume II, compiled Intelligence Bulletin Vol. III, No. 5, July 1945, p. 3.
from Japanese Demobilization Bureau Records, Facsim- 36. War Department Military Intelligence Division,
ile Reprint, 1994, pp. 572–573. Intelligence Bulletin Vol. III, No. 11, January 1945, p. 15.
3. Maj. James E. Bush, et al., Corregidor — February 37. War Department Military Intelligence Division,
1945, typescript (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1983), p. 3 –6. Intelligence Bulletin Vol. III, No. 4, December 1944, p. 19.
4. Commander Task Force Seventy-Eight, Serial 38. Allied Land Forces South East Asia, Weekly Intel-
0907, Action Reports, Mariveles — Corregidor Operation, ligence Review No. 14, For
12 –16 February 1945, 12 April 1945, Enclosure (G), Japa- Week Ending 5 January 1945, p.7.
nese Suicide Boats, pp. 1–3. 39. LCI(L) Flotilla Thirteen War Diary for January
5. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section South 1945, 2 February 1945, p. 3.
West Pacific Area, Prisoner of War Preliminary Interro-
gation Report: Chief Petty Officer Yoshio Yamamura, 4
March 1945, p. 2.
6. Commander Task Force Seventy-Eight, Serial Chapter 7
0907, Action Reports, Mariveles — Corregidor Operation, 1. How closely the American military plans in the
12 –16 February 1945, 12 April 1945, Enclosure (G), Japa- Pacific followed the original plans is subject for much
nese Suicide Boats, pp. 1–3. discussion. For an in-depth study of War Plan Orange
7. Lt. Col. Masahiro Kawai, The Operations of the and its varieties see the comprehensive work by Edward
Suicide-Boat Regiments in Okinawa, National Institute S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat
for Defense Studies (undated), p. 1. Japan, 1897–1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
8. Kawai, p. 2. 1991).
9. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section South 2. U.S.S. Franklin (CV13), Serial 0036, Report of Ac-
West Pacific, Research Report No. 125, 27 March 1945, tion with Japanese Aircraft on 13 October 1944, 20 Octo-
pp. 1–2. Hereafter ATIS RR No. 125. ber 1944, p. 2.
10. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section South 3. U.S.S. Sonoma (ATO-12), Serial 113, Action Re-
West Pacific, Spot Report No. 195, 27 February 1945, pp. port, 3 November 1944, p. 2.
6 –7. Hereafter ATIS Spot Rept. No. 195. 4. Armed Guard Unit SS Augustus Thomas, Report
11. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section South of Voyage, SS Augustus Thomas From Langemak Bay,
West Pacific Area, Interrogation Report No. 749, Corporal New Guinea to Leyte, p. I, 5 May 1945, pp. 2–4.
Nobuo Hayashi, pp. 6 –7. 5. Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval
12. ATIS RR No. 125, p. 20. Operations in World War II, Volume Twelve, Leyte, June
13. Ibid., p. 14. 1944 –January 1945 (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001), p.
14. Ibid. 243.
15. ATIS Spot Rept. No. 195, pp. 5 –6. 6. USS Santee CVE 29, Serial 0018, Action Report —
16. ATIS RR No. 125, pp. 13 –14. Leyte, Philippines Operation, Enclosure A-3, p. 2.
17. Kawai, p. 3. 7. USS Kitkun Bay CVE 71, Serial 005, Surface Action
18. Ibid. Report Submission of — Covers Battle off Samar on 25 Oc-
19. Ibid., pp 3 –9. tober 1944 in Task Unit 77.4.3, 28 October 1944, p. 2.
20. Japanese Monograph No. 52 History of the 10th 8. USS Kalinin Bay CVE 68 Serial 0102, Action Re-
Area Army, 1943 –1945, p. 53. Hereafter JM No. 52. port of 25 October 1944 — Engagement With Enemy Units
21. Ibid., pp. 50 –53. East of Leyte, p. I., Supplement to, 4 November 1944, En-
22. Yutaka Yokota with Joseph D. Harrington, Suicide closure (A).
Submarine! (New York: Ballantine Books, 1961), pp. 24 – 9. U.S.S. Suwannee CVE 27, Serial 008, Action Re-
33. port, Leyte Operation, 6 November 1944.
23. U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan, Japanese 10. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval
Suicide Craft, January 1946, pp. 22–24. Operations, Memorandum for File — Summary of State-
24. Ibid., p. 27. ments by Survivors of the SS Benjamn Ide Wheeler, 8
25. Yokota, pp. 13 –19. March 1945, p. 1.
 Notes—Chapter 8 347

11. General Staff, Supreme Commander for the Al- Anti-Aircraft — 27 November 1945, 9 December 1945, pp.
lied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur, Japanese Op- 2–3.
erations in the Southwest Pacific Area Vol. II — Parts 1 & 36. USS Aulick DD 569, Serial 00170, Report of Action
II, Facsimile Reprint, 1994, p. 405. on 29 November 1944, Forwarding of, 8 December 1944,
12. Bureau of Ships Navy Department, Destroyer Re- Enclosure (B), p. 1.
port — Gunfire Bomb and Kamikaze Damage Including
Losses in Action 17 October, 1941 to 15 August, 1945, 25
January 1947, p. 96.
13. Ibid., pp. 96 –98. Chapter 8
14. U.S.S. Anderson (DD411) Serial 00139, Action Re- 1. Robert M. Browning, Jr., U.S. Merchant Vessel
port — LEYTE Operation, 26 October–8 November 1944, War Casualties of World War II (Annapolis: Naval Insti-
9 November 1944, pp. 2–4. tute Press, 1996), p. 463.
15. This is given as a representative number. In the 2. Armed Guard Report S.S. John Evans, Report of
Armed Guard reports, which all contain rosters of the Voyage, S.S. John Evans, 14 December 1944, pp. 2–3.
Armed Guard members, the numbers vary between 3. Special Staff U.S. Army Historical Division, Japa-
twenty-six and twenty-eight, plus an officer in charge. nese Monograph No. 12 — 4th Air Army Operations,
16. Armed Guard Report SS Matthew P. Deady, Re- 1944 –1945, p. 50.
port of Voyage S.S. Matthew P. Deady, K. D. Frye, Master, 4. USS Drayton DD 366, Serial l084, Action Report,
5 January 1945, pp. 3 –4. 9 December 1944, p. 2.
17. U.S.S. Lexington CV 16 Serial 0390, Attacks on 5. USS LSM 23, Serial 085, Antiaircraft Action Re-
Luzon Island on 5 and 6 November 1944 (East Longitude port, 9 December 1944, pp. 4 –5.
Dates)— Action Report of, 22 November 1944, p. 3. 6. USS Mahan DD 364, Serial 007, Report of Ac-
18. S.S. Thomas Nelson, Enemy Action Report, S.S. tion — Amphibious Landing, Ormoc Bay, 7 December
Thomas Nelson, 12 February 1945, pp. 1. 1944, 11 December 1944, p. 3.
19. Leading Petty Officer, U.S. Naval Armed Guard 7. USS Ward APD 16, Serial 8249, Report of Ac-
Unit S.S. Jeremiah M. Daily, Disaster, report of, undated, tion — Ormoc Bay Amphibious Operation, 7 December
circa November 1944, p. 1. 1944, 16 January 1945, p. 2.
20. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval 8. U.S.S. Lamson (DD367), Serial 02, Action Re-
Operations, Memorandum for File, Summary of State- port — Ormoc Bay Operation — 6 –7 December 1944, 13
ments by Survivors of the SS Jeremiah M. Daily, 20 Jan- December 1944, p. 4.
uary 1945, pp. 1–2. 9. Ibid., Enclosure (D) p. 1.
21. 500th Bombardment Squadron (M) AAF, Com- 10. Robert J. Bulkley, Jr., At Close Quarters: PT Boats
mendation of Armed Guard, 20 November 1944, p. 1. in the United States Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute
22. Armed Guard Unit SS Alexander Majors, Report Press, 2003), pp. 394 –395.
of Voyage Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea to Leyte, Philip- 11. USS LST 737, Serial 142, Action Report, Amphibi-
pine Islands, 6 December 1944, pp. 1–3. ous Assault on Western Coast of Leyte Island, Philippine
23. James A. Mooney, Ed., Dictionary of American Islands, 9 December 1944, pp. 1–3.
Naval Fighting Ships, Vol. I, Part A (Washington, D.C.: 12. USS LSM 318, Serial 007, Report of Action —
Naval Historical Center, 1991), p. 220. Ormoc Bay, p. I, Amphibious Operation, 7 December
24. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval 1944, 16 January 1944, p. 3.
Operations, Memorandum for File, Summary of State- 13. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval
ments by Survivors of the SS Gilbert Stuart, 30 March Operations, Memorandum for File, Summary of State-
1945, pp. 1–2. ments by Survivors of the SS William S. Ladd, 20 Febru-
25. Lt. Cdr. Andrew W. Gavin, USNR (inactive), ary 1945, pp. 1–2.
Master SS Alcoa Pioneer to CO Armed Guard Center, 14. Armed Guard Unit S. S. Marcus Daly, Heroism
12th Naval District, Treasure Is., San Francisco, Calif., and Bravery of gun crew, Recommendation for, 26 De-
letter of 19 November 1944, pp. 1–2. cember 1944, pp. 3 –4.
26. Robert M. Browning Jr., U.S. Merchant Vessel War 15. USS Reid DD 369, No Serial, U.S.S. Reid (DD369)
Casualties of World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Amplifying Report of Action on 11 December 1944, 3 Feb-
Press, 1996), pp. 455 –457. ruary 1945, pp. 1–3.
27. USS James O’Hara APA 90 Serial 062, Action Re- 16. Capt. Walter Karig, Lt. Cmdr. Russell L. Harris
port Period 3 November to 24 November 1944, 29 Novem- and Lt. Cmdr. Frank A. Manson, Battle Report Victory
ber 1944, pp. 1–2. in the Pacific (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc.,
28. U.S.S. Intrepid (CV11), Serial 0249, War Diary, 1949), pp. 105 –107.
U.S.S. Intrepid (CV11)— Month of November 1944, 7 De- 17. USS Nashville CL 43, Serial 06, Report of Anti-
cember 1944, p. 38. Aircraft Action 13 December 1944 — Forwarding of, 8 Jan-
29. U.S.S. Cabot CVL 28, Serial 0058, War Damage uary 1945, p. 5.
Report, 9 December 1944, pp. 1–4. 18. Karig, p. 110.
30. USS Hancock CV 19, Serial 0136, Action Report 25 19. USS Haraden DD 585, No Serial, Action Report —
November 1944, 29 November 1944, p. 2. Forwarding of, Covers Action on 13 December 1944 in Sulu
31. U.S.S. Essex (CV-9), Serial 0244, Action Report — Sea, In Task Unit 77.12.7, 25 December 1945, p. 4.
Action off Luzon 25 November 1944, 9 December 1944. 20. USS Caldwell DD 605, Serial 003, Report of Action
32. Theodore R. Treadwell, Splinter Fleet: The with the Enemy, Ormoc Bay, Philippine Islands, December
Wooden Subchasers of World War II (Annapolis: Naval 11–12, 1944. 15 December 1944, p. 3.
Institute Press, 2000), pp. 191–192. 21. U.S.S. L.S.T. 738, No Serial, Preliminary Action
33. Ibid., pp. 196 –197. Report: Submission of, Covers Air Attack While Maneu-
34. USS Colorado BB 45, Serial 1093, Anti-Aircraft vering off San Jose Sector, Southwestern Mindoro, on 15
Action Report, 5 December 1944, Enclosure (F), p. 2. December 1944, 29 December 1944, p. 1.
35. U.S.S. St. Louis CL 49, Serial 0030, Action Report, 22. Ibid., p. 2.
348 Notes — Chapter 9

23. U.S.S. L.S.T. 472, No Serial, Report of Action of 10. U.S.S. Louisville CA 28, Serial 0003, Action Report,
the USS LST 472 from 17 November 1944 to 15 December U.S.S. Louisville (CA28) in Seizure and Occupation of
1944, Culminating in Its Loss on 15 December 1944, 29 Luzon Area, 2 January to 12 January 1945, 6 March 1945.
December 1944, p. 2. 11. U.S.S. Richard P. Leary (DD-664), Serial 0125, Ac-
24. USS Howorth DD 592, Serial 0106, Special Action tion Report for period 6 January 1945 to 18 January 1945,
Report Anti-Aircraft Action by Surface Ships, Submission 20 January 1945, pp. 1–2.
of, 15 December 1944, p. 2. 12. USS Palmer DMS 5, Serial 0003, AA Action Re-
25. USS Ralph Talbot DD 390, Serial 081, Actions by port — Forwarding of, 14 January 1945, p. 2.
Surface Ships — Report of, 23 December 1944, pp. 1–3. 13. USS Palmer DMS 5, Serial 0004, Action Report of
26. USS PT 75, No Serial, Action Report — PT 75 — U.S.S. Palmer (DMS-5)— Forwarding of, 12 January
17 December 1944, 15 January 1945, p. 1. 1945, pp. 1–8.
27. USS PT-300, Serial 0105, Loss of USS PT-300, 18 14. Robert F. Heath, With the Black Cat USS LCI
December 1944, Report of, 20 December 1944, pp. 1–2. Flotilla 13 (Chico, CA: The Technical Education Press,
28. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Liberation of the 2003), p. 75.
Philippines Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944 –1945 15. U.S.S. LST 912, Serial 013, Action Report — Anti-
(Edison, NJ: Castle Books), p. 34. Aircraft Action 8 –9 January 1945, Lingayen Gulf Opera-
29. Browning, p. 467. tion, San Fabian Attack Force — Blue Beach Unit, 12 Jan-
30. U.S.S. Bryant (DD665), Serial 059, Anti-Aircraft uary 1945, p. 2.
Action Report — Submission of, 22 December 1944, pp. 16. U.S. S. Columbia CL 56, Serial 06 of 23, Action
1–2. Report — Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, p. I — Period 1–9 January
31. Browning, p. 470. I have tried in vain to discover 1945, 22 January 1945, Enclosure A, p. 3.
the hull number of this ship. The reports of CTG 77.11 17. USS Mississippi BB 41, Serial 015, Action Report —
below, as well as other reports, do not identify the ship Bombardment Operations in Lingayen Gulf, Luzon,
by hull number. Philippine Islands During Period 6 –9 January 1945 and
32. Commander Task Group 77.11 (Commander Including Collateral Supporting Actions and Operations
LCI(L) Flotilla 24), Serial 004, Action Report 27 Decem- During Period 3 –18 January 1945, 30 January 1945, p. 10.
ber to 31 December 1944 Leyte-Mindoro p.I, 4 January 18. James L. Mooney, Ed., Dictionary of American
1945, p. 3. Naval Fighting Ships Volume VIII (Washington, D.C.:
33. U.S.S. Gansevoort DD 608, Serial 008, Action Re- Naval Historical Center, 1981), p. 98.
port, Uncle Plus 15, Mindoro Resupply Echelon, 27 19. U.S.S. LST 1028, Serial 9, War Diary: Narrative
Through 31 December 1944, 1 January 1945, p. 11. account of USS LST 1028 from time of damage by enemy
34. USS Porcupine IX 126, No Serial, Action Report Torpedo Boat 10 January 1945, until towed off Beach 28
Covers AA Action en Route & In Landing Area Mindoro January 1945, 29 January 1945, p. 2.
Culminating in Sinking of Ship 30 December 1944, 17 Jan- 20. USS LCI (G) 365, No Serial, Action Report, Sub-
uary 1945, p. 2. mission of, Covers Fire Support Activity for Lingayen
35. Porcupine, p. 2. Landings on 9 and 10 January 1945, 12 January 1945, pp.
2–4.
21. U.S.S. Eaton (DD510), Serial 08, Action report for
period 4 –14 January 1945, 23 January 1945, p. 5.
Chapter 9 22. Eaton, pp. 5 –6.
1. U.S.S. Louisville (CA28), Serial 005A, Action Re- 23. USS Robinson DD 562, Serial 03, Action Report —
port, U.S.S. Louisville (CA28) in Seizure and Occupation Amphibious Assault on Luzon, Philippine Islands at Lin-
of Luzon Area, 2 January to 12 January 1945, 12 January gayen Gulf, Period 31 December 1944 to 15 January 1945,
1945, p. 2. 20 January 1945, p. 12.
2. U.S.S. Louisville (CA28), Serial 005A, Action Re- 24. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section South
port, U.S.S. Louisville (CA28) in Seizure and Occupation West Pacific Area, Serial No. 938, Interrogation Report
of Luzon Area, 2 January to 12 January 1945, 12 January No. 775, 1 September 1945, p. 3.
1945, First Endorsement, p. 2. 25. Robert M. Browning, Jr., U.S. Merchant Vessel
3. U.S.S. Manila Bay (CVE-61), Serial 001, U.S.S. War Casualties of World War II (Annapolis: Naval Insti-
Manila Bay Action Report: Operations in Support of the tute Press, 1996), pp. 478 –479.
Landings at Lingayen, p. I (1–19 January 1945), Part I 26. U.S.S. Richard W. Suesens (DE 342), Serial No.
Narrative, pp. 2–3. 003, Action Report, Lingayen Operation, 18 January 1945,
4. USS California BB-44, Serial 0030, War Damage, pp. 2–3.
Report of — Report of Damage Sustained by Ship During 27. U.S.S. Belknap (APD34), Serial No.002-45, Action
Enemy Aircraft Attack at 1720(I) 6 January while en route Report — Lingayen Guf Operation, Luzon Island, Philip-
to Lingayen Gulf Landings, Suicide Plane Crash the Cause, pine Islands, 15 March 1945, p. 6.
25 January 1945, pp. 1–2. 28. Lt. (j.g.) Roy Abshier (D), USNR, Commanding
5. Ibid., p. 2. Officer, Naval Armed Guard, Report of Voyage, SS Kyle
6. USS Walke DD 723, Serial 06, Action Report for V. Johnson from Houston, Texas to San Francisco, Cali-
2 –10 January 1945, 18 January 1945, Part V, p. 3. fornia, 16 March 1945, pp. 2–5.
7. U.S.S. Columbia CL 56, Serial 06 of 23, Action Re- 29. Browning, pp. 479 –481.
port — Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, p. I,— Period 1–9 January 30. USS LST 700, Serial 209, Action Report, Covers
1945, 22 January 1945, Enclosure A, p. 2. Anti-Aircraft Actions While Retiring from Landings at
8. U.S.S. New Mexico BB 40, Deck Log, 6 January Lingayen Gulf on 12 –13 January 1945, 19 January 1945,
1945, pp. 20 –22. p. 2.
9. U.S.S. Minneapolis CA 36, Serial 005, U.S.S. Min- 31. U.S.S. Salamaua (CVE-96), Serial No. 002, Action
neapolis (CA36) Report of Participation in Bombardment Report for Period of 27 December 1944 to 18 January 1945,
of Lingayen Gulf, p.I. 6 –10 January 1945, inclusive, 17 5 February 1945, pp. 3 –4.
January 1945, pp. 1–6. 32. Captain Rikihei Inoguchi, Commander Tadashi
 Notes—Chapters 10 and 11 349

Nakajima, and Roger Pineau, The Divine Wind: Japan’s 12. For a more detailed discussion of these missions
Kamikaze Force in World War II (New York: Bantam see Michael Mair, Oil, Fire, and Fate: The Sinking of the
Books, 1978), pp. 103 –108. USS Mississinewa (AO-59) in WWII by Japan’s Secret
33. Earl Griffiths, Jr., CS/2 PC 1129, interview Octo- Weapon (Platteville, WI: SMJ Publishing, 2008), pp.
ber 21, 2009. 268 –341.
34. U.S.S. Lough (DE 586), Serial No. 75-45, War 13. There is no substantive way to determine which
Diary of the U. S. S. Lough DE-586) for the month of Feb- of the four kaiten actually hit the Mississinewa, however,
ruary 1945, 3 March 1945, p. 1. Japanese sources attribute it to Nishina.
35. Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval 14. The aircraft code named “Frances” by the allies
Operations in World War II: The Liberation of the Philip- was the Yokosuka P1Y1 Navy bomber Ginga. It had a
pines Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944 –1945 (Edison, top speed of 340 mph at 19,355 feet and a normal range
NJ: Castle Books, 2001), pp. 191–192. of 1,036 nautical miles. It could carry a 2,205-lb. bomb
36. Robert J. Bulkley Jr., At Close Quarters: PT Boats load and mounted a flexible 20mm cannon in the nose
in the United States Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute and one rear-firing 20mm cannon.
Press, 2003), pp. 420 –422. 15. Adm. Matome Ugaki, Fading Victory: The Diary
37. USS LCI(G) 558, No Serial, Action Report — Na- of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941–1945, trans. by Masataka
sugbu — Luzon — P.I. Landing Operation of, 5 February Chihaya (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1945, p. 3. 1991), pp. 547–551.
38. Commander Task Force Seventy-Eight, Action 16. USS Randolph CV 15, Serial 004, Action Report
Report, Mariveles — Corregidor Operation, 12 –16 Febru- for 11–12 March 1945, Attack by Enemy Plane at Ulithi,
ary, 1945, 12 April 1945, Enclosure (G), p. 2. 20 March 1945, p. 3.
39. Claude Haddock, S 1/c, LCS(L) 49, interview 24
July 2008.
40. Dean Bell, S 2/c, LCS(L) 26, interview 11 August
2007. Chapter 11
41. Harry G. Meister, Lt. Cmdr. USNR (Ret.), USS 1. Col. Ichiji Sugita. Doc. No. 58512 in General
LCS(L)3-27: A WWII Amphibious Landing Craft Support Headquarters Far East Command Military Intelligence
Vessel (Vancouver, WA: Harry & Gene Meister, 2002), Section, General Staff, Statements of Japanese Officials
p. 16. on World War II (English Translations) Volume 3, 1949 –
42. Commander Task Unit 78.2.58 (Commander 1950, p. 342.
LCS(L) Flotilla One), Serial 057, Davao Gulf Opera- 2. Capt. Toshikazu Omae, Doc. No. 50572 in Gen-
tions —11 to 19 May 1945, 20 May 1945, pp. 1. eral Headquarters Far East Command Military Intelli-
gence Section, General Staff, Statements of Japanese Offi-
cials on World War II (English Translations) Volume 4,
1949 –1950, p. 319.
Chapter 10 3. Cmdr. Yoshimori Terai, Doc. No. 50572 in Gen-
1. Capt. Rikihei Inoguchi, Cmdr. Tadashi Nakamima eral Headquarters Far East Command Military Intelli-
and Roger Pineau, The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze gence Section, General Staff, Statements of Japanese Offi-
Force in World War II (New York: Bantam Books, 1978), cials on World War II (English Translations) Volume 4,
pp. 116 –117. 1949 –1950, p. 321.
2. Samuel Elion Morison, History of United States 4. Cmdr. Yoshimori Terai, RAdm. Sadatoshi
Naval Operations in World War II: The Liberation of the Tomioka, and Capt. Mitsuo Fuchida, Doc. No. 50572
Philippines Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944 –1945 in General Headquarters Far East Command Military
(Edison, NJ: Castle Books 1959), p. 179. Intelligence Section, General Staff, Statements of Japa-
3. Inoguchi, pp. 117–121. nese Officials on World War II (English Translations) Vol-
4. U.S.S. Ticonderoga (CV-14), Serial 020, Action Re- ume 4, 1949 –1950, p. 317.
port of Operations in Support of Amphibious Operations 5. Headquarters Far East Command Military His-
in Lingayen Gulf Area of Luzon, p. I, for period 3 through tory Section, Imperial General Headquarters Navy Di-
21 January 1945, 27 January 1945, p. 2. rectives Volume II, Directives No. 316 –No. 540 (15 Jan
5. USS Maddox DD731, Serial 0010, Action Report 44 –26 Aug 45) Special Directives No. 1–No. 3 (2 Sep 45 –
21 January 1945 — Forwarding of — Covers Damage as a 12 Sep 45), p. 143. Hereafter Navy Directives Vol. II.
Result of Suicide Plane Crash Aboard While on Picket 6. Ibid., pp. 161–162.
Duty in Task Group 38.1, 26 January 1945, Enclosure A, 7. RAdm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, Doc. No. 50572 in
pp. 3 –4. General Headquarters Far East Command Military In-
6. Inoguchi, pp. 122–124. telligence Section, General Staff, Statements of Japanese
7. U.S.S. Lunga Point (CVE 94), Serial 020, Action Officials on World War II (English Translations) Volume
Report — Occupation of IWO JIMA, 10 February 1945 to 4, 1949 –1950, p. 326.
11 March 1945, 11 March 1945, pp. 3 –4. 8. Navy Directives Vol. II, p. 164.
8. USS Bismark Sea (CVE 95), Serial 001, Action Re- 9. Second Demobilization Bureau, Monograph No.
port USS Bismark Sea off Iwo Jima 21 February 1945, in- 141 (Navy) “Okinawa Area Naval Operations” Supple-
cluding Circumstances of the Resultant Sinking of the ment Statistics on Naval Air Strength (General Head-
Ship, 25 February 1945, p. 2. quarters Far East Command Military Intelligence Sec-
9. U.S.S. Saratoga (CV3), Serial 007, U.S.S. Saratoga tion, General Staff, 1949) and United States Strategic
(CV3) Action Report for period 0900 (K) to 2130 (K), 21 Bombing Survey (Pacific), The Campaigns of the Pacific
February 1945, 26 February 1945, p. 3. War (Washington, D.C.: United States Government
10. U.S.S. LST 477, Serial 38, Battle Damage — First Printing Office, 1947), p. 328.
Report of, 4 March 1945, p. 3. 10. Headquarters XXI Bomber Command Tactical
11. USS LST 809, Serial 03, Anti-Aircraft Action Re- Mission Report, Missions No. 46 and 50, 27 and 31 March
port, 6 March 1945, p. 4. 1945, 30 April 1945, p. 2.
350 Notes — Chapter 12

11. Robin L. Rielly, Kamikazes, Corsairs, and Picket 7. USS Dickerson APD-21, No Serial, Loss of USS
Ships: Okinawa 1945 (Philadelphia: Casemate Publish- Dickerson, 2 –4 April 1945, 10 April 1945, Enclosure (A),
ers, 2008), Appendix IV, pp. 369 –371. pp. 1–2.
12. National Security Agency, Magic Far East Sum- 8. USS Henrico APA 45, Serial 004, Action Report
mary Number 400, 24 April 1945, pp. 1–2. Covers Suicide Plane Attack on 2 April 1945 While Un-
13. Maj. Gen. Ryosuke Nakanishi, USSBS Interroga- derway in Night Retirement Course West of Kerama Retto,
tion No. 312, 4 November 1945. Okinawa Gunto, Report Covers 26 March–1 April 1945,
14. Military History Section — General Headquarters 23 April 1945, p. 1.
Far East Command Military Intelligence Section Gen- 9. U.S.S. Telfair (APA-210), Serial 004, Action Report
eral Staff, Japanese Monograph No. 51 Air Operations on for 2 April 1945, submission of, 14 April 1945, pp. 1–2.
Iwo Jima and the Ryukyus, p. 24. 10. USS LCI(G) 568, Serial 5-45, Anti-Aircraft Action
15. Ibid., p. 27. Report by USS LCI(G) 568, 7 April 1945, pp. 1–2.
16. CINCPAC PEARL Dispatch AI 58199, 3 May 1945. 11. USS LCI(G) 82 Action Report, No Serial, 14 April
17. Based on Japanese Monograph No. 135 Okinawa 1945, p. 3.
Operations Record (8th Air Division), p. 249; CinCPac- 12. U.S.S. Wake Island CVE 65, Serial 064, Action Re-
CinCPOA Bulletin No. 102–45, Translations Interroga- port — Ryukyus Operation — 21 March 1945 to 6 April
tions Number 26 Airfields in Formosa and Hainan, 25 1945 — Inclusive Dates, 9 April 1945, Part III, pp. 2–3.
April 1945, p. 6; CinCPac Pearl Dispatch AI88009, 18 13. War Diary VMF-322, 1 April to 30 April 1945, Ap-
June 1945. pendage : Report of Maj. Edward F. Camron, Com-
18. Director Air Intelligence Group, Statistical Analy- manding Officer (Ground) Assault Echelon, VMF-
sis of Japanese Suicide Effort Against Allied Shipping Dur- 322.
ing OKINAWA Campaign, 23 July 1945, p. 4. 14. U.S.S. Newcomb DD 586, Serial 0018, Action Re-
19. USS Pritchett (DD 561), Serial 045, 6 August 1945. port for 6 April 1945 Covers Heavy Damage Received as
20. Director Air Intelligence Group, Statistical Analy- Result of Four Suicide Plane Crashes Aboard on 6 April
sis of Japanese Suicide Effort Against Allied Shipping Dur- 1945, 14 April 1945, p. 5.
ing OKINAWA Campaign, 23 July 1945, p. 4. 15. USS Leutze DD 481, Serial 0080, War Damage Re-
21. Capt. Minoru Genda, USSBS Interrogation No. port, 6 April 1945, 5 May 1945, pp. 1–2.
329, 12 November 1945. 16. Defense (AM-317) Deck Log, 6 –7 April 1945, pp.
22. U.S.S. Wasp CV 18, Serial 0104, Action Report, 5 17–18.
April 1945, Enclosure (A), pp. 4 –5. 17. U.S.S. Witter (DE636), Serial 038, Action Report
23. USS Halsey Powell DD 686, Serial 007, USS Halsey (Advance Copy)— Okinawa Shima, 6 April 1945, 6 April
Powell (DD686) Action Report for the Period 14 March to 1945, Enclosure (B), pp. 1–3.
25 March 1945 Inclusive (Annex A), 4 April 1945, pp. 4 – 18. USS Morris (DD417), Serial 001, Action Report —
5. Okinawa Jima Operation —(1 April 1945 to 7 April 1945),
24. USS O’Brien DD 725, Serial 048, Action Report, 17 April 1945, pp. 3 –6.
U.S.S. O’Brien (DD725) 21 March–4 April 1945, Operat- 19. U.S.S. Mullany (DD528), Serial 020, Action Re-
ing in Task Group 51.1 During Landing and Support of port — Preparation for, and Landing on Okinawa Gunto,
U.S. Army and Marine Corps Troops on the Island of Nansei Shoto, from 15 March 1945 to 6 April 1945, 16 April
Kerama Retto in the Nansei Shoto Group of the Ryukyu 1945, p. 7.
Islands, 12 April 1945, p. 9. 20. U.S.S. Emmons (DMS 22), Serial (None), Action
25. USS Nevada BB 36, Serial 028, Anti-Aircraft Ac- Report and sinking of USS Emmons (DMS 22), 6 April
tion Report, 5 April 1954, p. 1. 1945, 12 April 1945, p. 2.
26. USS Dorsey DMS 1, Serial 082, Action Report, 12 21. Armed Guard Report S. S. Hobbs Victory, Report
April 1945, pp. 2–3. of Voyage of S.S. Hobbs Victory, 8 May 1945, pp. 2–3.
27. USS LCI(G) 558, No Serial, Report of Capture of 22. Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval
Okinawa Gunto, Phases 1 and 2, 21 July 1945, pp. 2–3. Operations in World War II, Volume Fourteen — Victory
in the Pacific 1945 (Boston: Little Brown and Company,
1960), pp. 195 –196.
23. This was the site of American landings and
Chapter 12 adjacent to the former airfields at Yontan and Kadena.
1. U.S.S. Alpine (APA-92), Serial No. 081, Okinawa Lying off shore in this area were numerous war-
Shima, Nansei Shoto Operation —1–6 April 1945 — Re- ships, supply ships, and troop transports. It was a prime
port of, 10 April 1945, enclosure (A), p. 16. target for kamikaze attacks during the campaign and
2. James L. Mooney, ed., Dictionary of American thus was heavily guarded by American aircraft and
Naval Fighting Ships Volume I, Part A (Washington, D.C.: ships.
Naval Historical Center, 1991), p. 53. Hereafter DANFS. 24. USS Maryland BB46, Serial 0100, Action Report —
3. Earl Blanton, Boston-To Jacksonville (41,000 Miles Operations Against Okinawa Island — Nansei Shoto — 21
by Sea) (Seaford, VA: Goose Creek Publications, 1991), March 1945 –14 April 1945, 23 April 1945, Enclosure (E),
p. 58. pp. 16 –18.
4. U.S.S. Hinsdale APA 120, Serial 073-45, Action 25. Rielly, pp. 351–353.
Report — Period 16 March–23 April 1945, 23 April 1945, 26. USS Colhoun DD 801, No Serial, Action Report,
pp. 1–3. Invasion and Occupation of Okinawa Nansei Shoto, April
5. U.S.S. West Virginia (BB 48), Serial (00254), Ac- 1 to April 6, 1945, and loss of the USS Colhoun (DD801),
tion Report — Bombardment and Fire Support of Landings 27 April 1945, p. 8.
on Okinawa Island and Adjacent Islands, 21 March 1945 27. U.S.S. Cassin Young (DD793), Serial 002, Action
to 24 April 1945, inclusive, 28 April 1945, pp. 12–13. Report, Capture of Okinawa Gunto Phases One and Two,
6. Robin L. Rielly, Kamikazes, Corsairs, and Picket 21 July 1945, p. 6.
Ships: Okinawa 1945 (Philadelphia: Casemate Publish- 28. USS Hyman DD 732, Serial 028, Action Report —
ers, 2008), p. 58. Assault and Occupation of Okinawa Gunto — Nansei
 Notes—Chapter 13 351

Shoto — 27 March–14 April 1945 — Including Attack and 21. USS Harding DMS-28, Serial 006, War Damage
Damage of USS Hyman by Japanese Planes on 6 April Report 14 June 1945, pp. 1–2.
1945, 21 April 1945, pp. 7–14. 22. U.S.S. Intrepid (CV11), Serial 0046, War Diary,
29. DANFS Volume VIII, 1981, p. 206. U.S.S. Intrepid (CV11)— Month of April 1945, 22 June
30. U.S.S. Sterrett (DD 407), Serial 0139, Return from 1945.
Combat Area with Battle Damage, Report of, 8 May 1945, 23. U.S.S. Laffey (DD724), Serial 023, Report of Op-
p. 1. erations in Support of Landings by U.S. Troops in Kerama
Retto — Okinawa Area March 25 to April 22 1945, In-
cluding Action Against Enemy Aircraft on April 16, 1945,
29 April 1945, p. 25.
Chapter 13 24. U.S.S. Laffey (DD724), Serial 023, p. 26-A.
1. Lt. Col. Masahiro Kawai, The Operations of the 25. U.S.S. LCS(L) 51, No Serial, Anti-Aircraft Action,
Suicide-Boat Regiments in Okinawa (National Institute Okinawa, 16 April 1945, 20 April 1945, pp. 1–2.
for Defense Studies, undated), p. 6. 26. U.S.S. Bryant DD 665, Serial 025, Action Report—
2. USS Charles J. Badger DD 657, Serial 002, Action Amphibious Assault on Okinawa Gunto, 28 April 1945,
Report of USS Charles J. Badger (DD657) for 9 April 1945, pp. 11–14.
19 May 1945, p. 5. 27. U.S.S. LCS(L) 116, Serial 1, Action Report, Opera-
3. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States tions in Vicinity of Okinawa, 1 April to 16 April, 1945, 18
Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XIV, Victory April 1945, pp. 1–2.
in the Pacific 1945 (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 28. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section South
1960), pp. 217–218. West Pacific Area, Research Report No. 125, Liaison Boat
4. USS Kidd DD 661, Serial 002-45, Action Report — Units, 27 March 1945.
11 April to 15 April 1945, 16 April 1945, p. 2. 29. USS LCI(G) 659, No Serial, Action Report, Report
5. USS Missouri BB-63, Serial 087, Action Report of Action Night of 15 and 16 April 1945, 19 April 1945, pp.
Covering Operations Against Kyushu, 18 –19 March; 2–3.
Shore Bombardment of Okinawa, 24 March Against Ok- 30. U.S.S. Benham (DD796), Serial No. 033, AA Ac-
inawa, 25 March–6 May 1945, 9 May 1945, Enclosure tion Report, USS Benham (DD796) of 17April 1945, 24
(C-1). April 1945, pp.1–3.
6. U.S.S. Enterprise CV-6, Deck Log, 10 –13 April 31. U.S.S. Swallow (AM65), No Serial, Action Report,
1945, pp. 391–399. 25 April 1945, pp. 1–3.
7. U.S.S. Cassin Young (DD793), Serial 002, Action 32. USS Wadsworth DD 516, Serial 028, Action
Report, Capture of Okinawa Gunto, Phases One and Two, Report for the Invasion of Okinawa Jima, 24 June 1945,
21 July 1945, p. 6. p. 31.
8. USS Stanly DD 478, Serial 087, Occupation of Ok- 33. James L. Mooney, ed., Dictionary of American
inawa Gunto — 25 March–13 April 1945, 17 April 1945, Naval Fighting Ships Volume III (Washington, D.C.:
p. 3. Naval Historical Center, 1968), p. 386. Hereafter
9. U.S.S. Mannert L Abele (DD733), No Serial, Ac- DANFS.
tion Report from 20 March through 12 April 1945, includ- 34. Military History Section — General Headquarters
ing damage to and loss of ship, 14 April 1945, Enclosure Far East Command Military Intelligence Section Gen-
(B), p. 2. eral Staff, Japanese Monograph No. 135 Okinawa Opera-
10. USS Rall DE 304, Serial 0016, Action Report, First tions Record, p. 119.
Phase of the Occupation of the Nansei Shoto (Okinawa 35. USS Hutchins DD 476, Serial 019, Action Report
Shima), 26 April 1945, pp. 1–5. Okinawa Operations Phases One and Two, 7 May 1945,
11. USS Lindsey DM 32, No Serial, Action Report — p. 7.
Okinawa Operation, No Date, p. 22. 36. Commanding Officer, Armed Guard Unit, SS
12. Armed Guard Report S.S. Minot Victory, Report Canada Victory, Disaster Report SS Canada Victory, 1
of the Voyage, S.S. Minot Victory from Okinawa, Japan June 1945, p. 1.
to San Pedro, California, 25 May 1945, p. 2. 37. USS LCS(L) 37 Action Report of 28 April 1945, Re-
13. USS Zellars DD 777, Serial 0033, Report of vised 14 May 1945, p. 2.
Capture of Okinawa, Phase One and Two, 1 May 1945, p. 38. Armed Guard Unit S.S. Bozeman Victory,
7. Report of Voyage, S.S. Bozeman Victory, 9 June 1945, pp.
14. Ibid., p. 11. 1–2.
15. USS Tennessee BB 43, Serial 0121, Amplifying Re- 39. DANFS Volume V, p. 311.
port of the Heavy Coordinated Air Attack on the Tennessee 40. U.S.S. Pinckney (PH-2), Deck Log, 27–28 April
12 April 1945, 16 May 1945, Enclosure (A), p. 8. 1945, pp. 117–118.
16. USS Whitehurst DE 634, Serial 0087, Anti-Aircraft 41. U.S.S. Comfort (AH-6), Serial C-68, Aerial attack
Action Report of 12 April — Forwarding of, 21 April 1945, and Resultant Damage — report of, 1 May 1945, p. 7.
pp. 1–4. 42. U.S.S. Ralph Talbot (DD390), Serial 043, Action
17. USS Sigsbee DD 502, Serial 045, Action Report — by Surface Ships — Report of, 9 May 1945, Enclosure (A),
Operations in Support of the Invasion of Okinawa — Pe- p. 3.
riod 14 March 1945 –20 April 1945, 29 April 1945, Enclo- 43. USS LCI(G) 580, No Serial, Action Report — Ok-
sure (A), pp. 15 –27. inawa Operation, 1 July 1945, pp. 2–4.
18. U.S.S. YMS 331, Serial 4559, Action Report, 17 44. USS Haggard DD 555, Serial 056, Report of Anti-
April 1945, p. 1. Aircraft Action by Surface Ships, 12 May 1945, p. 1.
19. USS LCI (G) 407, No Serial, Anti-Aircraft Action 45. USS Hazelwood DD 531, Serial 0065, Report of Ac-
Report, 16 April 1945, p. 1. tion Against Japanese Suicide Planes — 2 –9 April 1945,
20. U.S.S. Bowers (DE-637), Serial No. 003, Action Enclosure (A), p. 1.
Report of The U.S.S. BOWERS (DE-637), 1–24 April 1945, 46. U.S.S. Terror CM 5, Serial 0125, AA Action Report,
15 May 1945, Enclosure (A), pp. 9 –10. 9 May 1945, pp. 1–3.
352 Notes — Chapters 14 and 15

Chapter 14 of Capture of Okinawa Gunto, Phases I and II, 25 March

to 11 June 1945, 12 June 1945, p. 38.
1. U.S.S. Carina AK 74, Serial 09-45, Action Report, 30. VMF-221 Aircraft Action Report No. 63, 11 May
21 May 1945, p. 2. 1945.
2. Armed Guard Unit S.S. Paducah Victory, Report 31. Military History Section — General Headquarters
of Voyage, SS Paducah Victory, 4 June 1945, p. 2. Far East Command Military Intelligence Section Gen-
3. Lt. Col. Masahiro Kawai, The Operations of the eral Staff, Japanese Monograph No. 141, “Okinawa Area
Suicide-Boat Regiments in Okinawa (National Institute Naval Operations” Supplement Statistics on Naval Air
for Defense Studies, undated), p. 7. Strength, Chart A.
4. U.S.S. L.C.S. (L) (3) 113, Action Report, 16 May, 32. Maxwell Taylor Kennedy, Danger’s Hour: The
1945, p. 3. Story of the USS Bunker Hill and the Kamikaze Pilot Who
5. USS Macomb DMS 23, Serial 103, Anti-Aircraft Crippled Her (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), pp.
Action of 3 May 1945, Report of, 5 May 1945, pp. 1–2. 284 –292.
6. USS Aaron Ward DM 34, Serial 005, Action Report 33. Interview with Albert Perdeck, S 1/c U.S.S.
for 3 May 1945, 13 May 1945, p. 6. Bunker Hill CV 17, 13 August 2009.
7. USS Little DD 803, No Serial, Report of Action Be- 34. Ibid.
tween U.S.S. Little (DD 803), and Enemy Aircraft on May 35. Armed Guard Unit SS C. W. Post, Report of Voy-
3, 1945 (E. L .D.), 7 May 1945, pp. 3 –5. age, SS C. W. Post from Oakland Callifornia to Ie Shima,
8. USS LSM(R) 195, Serial F9-05, Action Report — 23 May 1945, pp. 1–2.
Battle of Okinawa, 3 May 1945, 5 May 1945, p. 2. 36. Armed Guard Unit M. S. Tjisadane, Report of Voy-
9. USS Morrison DD 560, Serial 030, Action Report age M. S. Tjisadane, 15 June 1945, pp.1–3.
of USS Morrison on Air Engagement 4 May 1945, 10 May
1945, pp. 1–4.
10. U.S.S. LSM(R) 194, Serial F9-6, Action Report —
Battle of Okinawa — 4 May 1945, 6 May 1945, p. 1.
Chapter 15
11. USS Ingraham DD-694, Serial 0010, Iceberg Op- 1. U.S.S. Bright (DE-747), Serial 028, War Diary for
eration, 4 May 1945, 17 June 1945, p. 2. period ending 31 May 1945, 5 June 1945, p. 5.
12. Ibid., p. 3. 2. USS LCS(L)(3)19, Serial No. 0-4, Action Report,
13. USS Luce DD 522, No Serial, Action Report on 18 May 1945, pp. 1–2.
Ryukyus Operation, 24 March–4 May 1945, 4 May 1945, 3. U.S.S. LCS(L)(3) 82, No Serial, Action Report,
pp. 5 –21. USS LCS(L)(3) 82 of 12 –13 May 1945, Enclosure (A), pp.
14. USS LSM(R) 190, Serial F9-04, Action Report — 2–3.
Battle of Okinawa, 4 May 1945, 18 August 1945, pp. 1–5. 4. USS Bache DD 470, Serial 0126, Action Report —
15. U.S.S. Shea (DM30), Serial 004, Battle Damage Okinawa Jima Operation, 16 March 1945 to 2 June 1945,
Incurred 4 May 1945 — Report of, 15 May 1945, p. 2. 2 June 1945, Enclosure (A), p. 7.
16. U.S.S. Gayety (AM 239), Serial 037, Action with 5. USS Enterprise CV 6, Serial 0273, Action Report
Enemy Suicide Planes on 4 May 1945, Report of, 10 May of USS Enterprise — CV6 — in Connection With Opera-
1945, pp. 2–3. tions in Support of Amphibious Landings at Okinawa 3
17. USS Spectacle AM305, War Diary, May 1–31, 1945, May to 16 May 1945 — Phase III, 22 May 1945, pp. 15 –
p. 1. 16.
18. U.S.S. LCS(L)(3) 53, Serial No. 051, Action Report 6. U.S.S. Douglas H. Fox (DD779), Serial 004, Action
of Anti-Small Boat Patrol on the Night of 4 to 5 May 1945, Report — Action against enemy aircraft attacking this ship
1 June 1945, p. 1. while on Radar Picket Station Number Nine off Okinawa,
19. U.S.S. Oberrender (DE 344), Serial 006, Action Re- Nansei Shoto, May 17, 1945, 24 May 1945, pp. 1–3.
port on Okinawa Operation, Phases I and II, from 9 April 7. USS Chase APD 54, Serial No. 005, War Damage
1945 to 10 May 1945, 18 May 1945, pp. 3 –4. Report, 10 June 1945, pp. 1–3.
20. U.S.S. England (DE-635), Serial No. 005, Oki- 8. U.S.S. Thatcher (DD 514), Serial 0121, Action Re-
nawa Operation — Action report of, 13 June 1945, pp. 17– port, U.S.S. Thatcher (DD514), Okinawa Gunto, 16 –20
18. May 1945, pp. 6 –7.
21. Translation of letter written by Flight PO 1/c Isao 9. U. S. S. Register (APD-92), Serial No. 031, Action
Matsuo, 11 May 1945. Report, Suicide Air Attack night of 20 May 1945, 26 May
22. USS Hugh W. Hadley DD 744, Serial 066, Action 1945, pp. 1–4.
Report, Action Against Enemy Aircraft Attacking This 10. U.S.S. William C. Cole DE 641, Serial No. 022,
Ship, While on Radar Picket Station Number Fifteen, Off War Diary for Month of May 1945, 4 June 1945.
Okinawa, Nansei Shoto, 11 May 1945, 15 May 1945, p. 2. 11. USS Stormes DD 780, Serial 072, Action Report, 1
23. USS Hugh W. Hadley DD 744, Serial 066, p. 3. June 1945, p. 2.
24. Ibid., pp. 5 –6. 12. Ibid., p. 9.
25. U.S.S. LCS(L)(3) 82, Serial 72-45, Action Report, 13. USS O’Neill DE 188, Serial 044, Action Report —
Okinawa Campaign, USS LCS(L) 82, 26 July 1945, En- Operations at Okinawa, Nansei Shoto, From April–June
closure (A), pp. 1–3. 1945, 10 June 1945, p. 3.
26. U.S.S. LCS(L) (3) 83, Serial 020-45, Action Report 14. James L. Mooney, ed., Dictionary of American
of Okinawa Campaign, 16 April to 21 June, 26 July 1945, Naval Fighting Ship Vol. I A-B (Washington, D.C.: Naval
Enclosure (h), p. 1. History Center, 1991), p. 101.
27. U.S.S. LSM(R) 193, Serial 007, Action Report, Bat- 15. U.S.S. BARRY (APD-29), Serial: 024, Anti-Air-
tle of Okinawa 11 May 1945, 13 May 1945, pp. 2–3. craft Action Report, First Endorsement, 3 June 1945, pp.
28. U.S.S. Evans DD 552, Serial 004, Action Report, 1–2.
Anti-aircraft Action off Okinawa 11 May 1945, 22 May 16. U.S.S. Spectacle (AM305), Serial 042, Anti-Air-
1945, pp. 6 –9. craft Action Report — Japanese Plane Suicide Attack, Ie
29. U.S.S. Harry F. Bauer (DM26), Serial 006, Report Shima, 25 May 1945, 1 June 1945, pp. 2–3.
 Notes—Chapters 16 and 17 353

17. U.S.S. LSM 135, No Serial, Action Report — Attack 11. USS LSM 59, No Serial, Action Report — Sinking
by Japanese Suicide Plane 25 May 1945, Ie Shima, Ryukyu of the U.S.S. LSM 59 by Japanese Suicide Plane on 21 June
Rhetto, Resulting in Loss of Ship — U.S.S. LSM 135, 1 June 1945, 23 June 1945, p. 1.
1945, p. 1. 12. U.S.S. Curtiss (AV4), Serial 0010, Action Report,
18. U.S.S. Roper (APD 20), Serial 022, Action Re- 1 July 1945, p. 2.
port — Suicide Plane Crash on U.S.S. ROPER (APD-20) 13. Ibid., Enclosure A, p. 3.
25 May 1945, 31 May 1945, pp. 6 –7. 14. Military History Section Headquarters, Army
19. U.S.S. Bates (APD 47), No Serial, Action Report — Forces Far East, Japanese Monograph No. 184 Submarine
Attack and Bombing by Japanese Suicide Planes May 25, Operations in the Third Phase Operations Parts 3, 4, and
1945 — Okinawa — Resulting in Loss of Ship, 1 June 1945, 5, 1960, p. 144.
pp. 1–3. 15. Action Report, No Serial, LTJG Elwood M. Rich,
20. USS Forrest DMS-24, Serial 001, War Damage Re- USN, Senior Surviving Officer — USS Underhill (DE682),
port, Report of Damage Sustained From Suicide Plane 30 July 1945, p. 22.
Crash Aboard, Ship in Task Group 51.5 Patrolling off Ok- 16. Commander Destroyer Squadron 55, Serial 0023,
inawa, 12 June 1945, p. 1. Anti-Aircraft Action Report for Action of 29 July, 1945 —
21. William J. Veigele, PC Patrol Craft of World War II Loss of U.S.S. Callaghan (DD792), 7 August 1945, En-
(Santa Barbara, CA: Astral Publishing Co., 1998), p. 222. closure (A), p. 5.
22. U.S.S. Braine (DD630), Serial 0013, U.S.S. 17. USS Cassin Young DD-793, Serial 003, Iceberg Op-
BRAINE Action Report — Engagement with Japanese Air- eration Memorandum Report of Radar Picket Duty off
craft off the Island of Okinawa on 27 May 1945, pp. 1–5. Okinawa — Under Kamikaze Attack 29 and 30 July, 1 Au-
23. John Rooney, Mighty Midget U.S.S. LCS 82 gust 1945, p. 2.
(Phoenixville, PA: John Rooney, 1990), p. 140. 18. U.S.S. Horace A. Bass (APD 124), Serial 024, Ac-
24. USS Braine DD 630 website, http://www.uss- tion Report, Defense of Okinawa, 30 July 1945, 9 August
brainedd630com/witness.htm, p. 4. 1945, p. 2.
25. Rooney, p. 140. 19. U.S.S. Borie (DD704), Serial 0222-45, Action Re-
26. U.S.S. Loy (APD 56), Serial 16, Ships Damage Re- port — Operations During the Period 2 July 1945 to 15 Au-
port — Summary of, 30 May 1945, pp. 1–2. gust 1945, 15 August 1945, pp. 1–2.
27. U.S.S. Rednour (APD 102), Serial 022, General Ac- 20. USS Hank DD 702, Serial 046, USS Hank
tion Report, 26 April to 8 June 1945 — submission of, 11 (DD702) Action Report — Operations with Task Force 38
June 1945, pp. 2–4 Against Japanese Empire During Period 1 July–16 August
28. USS Dutton AGS 8, Serial 62–45, Action Report of 1945, 20 August 1945, pp. 2–3.
Attack by Enemy Suicide Plane, 28 May 19345, pp. 1–2. 21. USS Lagrange APA 124, Serial 040, Action Re-
29. U.S.S. Drexler (DD741), Serial 01, Action Report, port — Forwarding of, 22 August 1945, pp. 1–2.
Involving Loss of U.S.S. Drexler (DD741), 26 June 1945, 22. VAdm. Matome Ugaki, Fading Victory: The Diary
pp. 1–2. of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941–1945, trans. Masataka
30. Robert M. Browning, Jr., U.S. Merchant Vessel Chihaya (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
War Casualties of World War II (Annapolis: Naval Insti- 1991), p. 659.
tute Press, 1996), pp. 514 –515. 23. Ugaki, p. 664.
31. USS LCS(L) 119, Serial 00201, Action Report, 2
June 1945, pp. 3 –4.
Chapter 17
1. Military History Section Headquarters, Army
Chapter 16 Forces Far East, Japanese Monograph No. 174 Outline of
1. USS LCS(L) 40, Serial 202, Action Report on, 8 Naval Armament and Preparations for War, Part VI, pp.
August 1945, pp. 6 –7. 8 –9. Hereafter JM No. 174.
2. USS LCI(L) 90, No Serial, Action Report of Oper- 2. Ibid., p. 12.
ations of 3 June 1945, 8 June 1945, pp. 1–2. 3. JM No. 174, p. 13.
3. USS Mississippi BB-41, Serial 004, War Damage, 4. JM No. 174, pp. 28 –29.
Suicide Plane Attack, 5 June 1945, 8 July 1945, pp. 1–3. 5. JM No. 174, pp. 39 –40.
4. U.S.S. Louisville CA 28, Serial 0014, Report of War 6. U.S.S. William D. Porter (D579), Serial 00236, Re-
Damage Sustained as a Result of Japanese Suicide Plane port of Loss of USS William D. Porter, 10 June 1945, 18
Hit, June 5, 1945, 11 June 1945, pp. 1–6. June 1945, pp. 2–3.
5. U.S.S. Harry F. Bauer DM 26, Deck Log, 6 June 7. JM No. 174, p. 20.
1945, pp. 442–443. 8. Military History Section Headquarters, Army
6. U.S.S. J. William Ditter DM 31, Deck Log, 6 June Forces Far East, Japanese Monograph No. 85 Preparations
1945, pp. 376 –378. for Operations in Defense of the Homeland, Jul. 1944 –Jul.
7. James L. Mooney, ed., Dictionary of American 1945, Annexed Sheet # 3. Hereafter JM No. 85.
Naval Fighting Ships, Vol. V (Washington, D.C.: Naval 9. Ibid., p. 28.
History Division, 1970), p. 23. 10. JM No. 85, p. 15.
8. U.S.S. Anthony (DD515), Serial 042, U.S.S. An- 11. History Section Headquarters, Army Forces
thony (DD515)— Action Report, Okinawa Campaign, 28 Far East, Japanese Monograph No. 184 Submarine Oper-
May–24 June 1945, 26 June 1945, p. 2. ations in the Third Phase Operations Parts 3, 4, and 5, p.
9. USS William D. Porter DD-579, Serial 00236, Re- 162.
port of Loss of USS William D. Porter, 10 June 1945, 18 12. U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan, Target
June 1945, p. 3. Report : The Fukuryu Special Harbor Defense and
10. Armed Guard Unit S.S. Walter Colton, Report of Underwater Attack Unit — Tokyo Bay, January 1946,
Voyage, S. S. Walter Colton from March 28, 1945 to 24 p. 9.
July, 1945, 26 July 1945, pp. 2–4. 13. Ibid., p. 7.
This page intentionally left blank
 Bibliography

The bibliographic section for this work is quite extensive. In order to fully document the numerous
kamikaze attacks on American ships during World War II it was necessary to check as many records
as possible. This included ship logs, action reports, and assorted government reports dealing with
the kamikazes, their organization, and activities. As an aid to other researchers the numerous primary
source materials have been listed according to the facility in which they were found. Where possible,
particularly for materials from the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park,
Maryland, the various records groups have been listed as an aid to further expedite the research of
others.
The textual record groups of particular use at the Naval History and Heritage Command in Washing-
National Archives were: ton, D.C., are preceded with the letters NH.
RG 18: WWII USAAF Mission Record Index-Fighter Materials listed as being miscellaneous are in the
Groups and Squadrons author’s collection. They may be available at the Na-
RG 19: Records of the Bureau of Ships tional Archives or other facilities, but they came into
RG 24: List of Logbooks of U.S. Navy Ships, Stations my possession in various ways not associated with
and Miscellaneous Units, 1801–1947 any formal collections. Primary source materials and
RG 38: Records of the Chief of Naval Operations their locations are listed by location. Specific reports
RG 127: Records of the United States Marine in each category are listed in the end notes for each
Corps— Aviation Records Relating to World War chapter. It should be noted that official reports from
II the era display a wide variety of formats. In some in-
RG 165: War Department General and Special Staffs stances parts or all of the document title may appear
RG 243: Records of the United States Strategic in capital letters while in other similar documents,
Bombing Survey they do not. The use of periods, commas, and hy-
RG 457: Records of the National Security Agency phens is also fairly diverse. I have listed them here in
The photo archive groups used were: their original form.
RG 19: Records of the Bureau of Ships, Series Z
RG 80G: General Records of the Dept. of the Navy,
1941–1945
RG 80 JO: General Records of the Dept. of the Navy, Primary Sources
1789 –1947 AIR FORCE HISTORICAL RESEARCH
RG 111: SC Records of the Army Signal Corps, 1941– AGENCY, MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE
1945
RG 127 MC: Records of the US Marine Corps Records of the 7th Fighter Squadron January 1941–
RG 306 NT: United States Information Agency, New March 1945. Microfilm Publication A0716.
York Times Paris Bureau Collection Records of the 8th Fighter Squadron January 1942–
RG 342 FH: Records of the U.S. Air Force Com- August 1947. Microfilm Publication A0718.
mands, Activities, Organizations Records of the 9th Fighter Squadron January 1941–
August 1947. Microfilm Publication A0719.
Photographs obtained from the National Archives Records of the 49th Fighter Group January 1941–June
all have the credit beginning with the letters NARA 1946. Microfilm Publication B0143.
and followed by the specific record group such as Records of the 318th Fighter Group. Microfilm Pub-
80G, 111-SC and so forth. Photographs from the lication BO522–2309.

355
356 Bibliography — Primary Sources

Records of the 318th Fighter Group Narrative. Mi- Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts
crofilm Publication BO239-2078. 8 December 1943 to 7 December 1944. Washington,
Records of the 431st Fighter Squadron September D.C.: U.S. Hydrographic Office, 1945.
1944 –August 1945. Microfilm Publication A0807. Bureau of Ships Navy Department. NAVSHIPS A-4
Records of the 432nd Fighter Squadron May 1943 – (424). Summary of War Damage to U.S. Battle-
April 1945. Microfilm Publication A0807. ships, Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers and Destroyer
Records of the 433rd Fighter Squadron May 1943 – Escorts 8 December 1944 to 9 October 1945. Wash-
June 1945. Microfilm Publication A0808. ington, D.C.: U. S. Hydrographic Office, 1945.
Records of the 475th Fighter Group May 1943 –July Cabinet Information Board. Op-16-EE Translation
1945. Microfilm Publication B0632. No. 264. “Kamikaze Special Attack Force.” Weekly
Report of 8 November 1944.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CINCPAC PEARL Dispatch AI 58199. 3 May 1945.
Fukui, Shizuo. Japanese Naval Vessels at End of War.
Archival Manuscript Collection. Deyo, Morton L.
Japan: Administrative Division, Second Demobi-
Papers of VAdm. M. L. Deyo USN 1911–1981. Call
lization Bureau, 1947.
Number 0535S.
Headquarters Far East Command Military History
Deyo, VAdm. M. L. Kamikaze. Typescript, circa
Section. Imperial General Headquarters Navy Di-
1955.
rectives Volume II. Directives No. 316- No. 540 (15
Military History Section — General Headquarters Far
Jan 44 –26 Aug 45) Special Directives No. 1–No. 3
East Command Military Intelligence Section Gen-
(2 Sep 45 –12 Sep 45).
eral Staff. Microfilm Records, Shelf 8489, Reels 1,
Industrial Department Scientific & Test Group,
5, 7, 10, 13, 14.
Puget Sound Navy Yard. War Damage Report —
Japanese Monograph No. 6. 35th Army Operations,
USS Sterrett (DD 407) Action of 9 April 1945.
1944 –1945 (Reel 1).
U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan. Japanese Sui-
Japanese Monograph No .7. Philippines Operations
cide Craft. January 1946.
Record, Phase III Jan.–Aug. 1945 (Reel 1).
_____. Target Report — The Fukuryu Special Harbor
Japanese Monograph No. 8. Philippines Operations
Defense and Underwater Attack Unit — Tokyo Bay.
Record, Phase III Dec. 1944 –Aug. 1945 (Reel 1).
January 1946.
Japanese Monograph No. 12. 4th Air Army Operations
War Department Military Intelligence Division. In-
1944 –1945 (Reel 1).
telligence Bulletin. Various volumes and dates from
Japanese Monograph No. 51. Air Operations on Iwo
November 1944 through August 1945. Specific ar-
Jima and the Ryukyus (Reel 5).
ticles are listed in the chapter endnotes.
Japanese Monograph No. 52. History of the 10th Area
Army, 1943 –1945 (Reel 5).
Japanese Monograph No. 53. 3rd Army Operations in NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
Okinawa March-June, 1945. Army Defense Opera- ADMINISTRATION, COLLEGE PARK , MD
tions (Reel 5). RG 18: WWII USAAF Mission Record
Japanese Monograph No. 85. Preparations for Opera- Index—Fighter Groups and Squadrons
tions in Defense of the Homeland, Jul. 1944 –Jul.
USAAF Squadron and Groups Mission reports and
1945 (Reel 7).
Squadron and Group Histories for the: 1st, 19th,
Japanese Monograph No. 86. War History of the 5th
21st, 34th, 333rd, 418th (N) and 548th (N) Fighter
Air Fleet (The Ten Air Unit) Operational Record
Squadrons and the 318th and 413th Fighter Groups.
from 10 February 1946 to 19 August 1945 (Reel 7).
Japanese Monograph No. 135. Okinawa Operations RG 19: Records of the Bureau of Ships
Record (Reel 10). BuShips General Correspondence 1940–1945 LSM(R)/
Japanese Monograph No. 141. (Navy) Okinawa Area L 11–3 to C-LSM(R)/S 29 –2.
Naval Operations Supplement Statistics on Naval BuShips General Correspondence 1940–1945 LSM(R)/
Air Strength. August, 1949 (Reel 10). S87 to LSM(R) 188 –189/S 17.
Japanese Monograph No. 174. Outline of Naval Arma- BuShips General Correspondence 1940–1945 LSM(R)/
ment and Preparations for War, Part VI (Reel 13). S87 to LSM(R) 188 –189/S 17.
Japanese Monograph No. 184. Submarine Operations in BuShips General Correspondence 1940 –1945 C-DD
the Third Phase Operations Parts 3, 4, and 5 (Reel 14). 552 to DD 553.
BuShips General Correspondence 1940 –1945 C-DD
MISCELLANEOUS MATERIALS 734/L 11–1 (350-C-44LIL).
Allied Land Forces Southeast Asia Weekly Intelligence BuShips General Correspondence 1940 –1945 DD
Review. No. 1. “More Suicide Tactics.” For week 741–C-DD 742.
ending 5th January, 1945. p. 7.
Bureau of Ships Navy Department. Destroyer Re- RG 24: List of Logbooks of
port —Gunfire Bomb and Kamikaze Damage In- U.S. Navy Ships, Stations, and
cluding Losses in Action 17 October, 1941 to 15 Au- Miscellaneous Units, 1801–1947
gust 1945. Ship Logs
Bureau of Ships Navy Department. NAVSHIPS A-3 Amphibious command ships: Ancon AGC 4, Biscayne
(420) Summary of War Damage to U.S. Battleships, AGC 18, Eldorado AGC 11, Panamint AGC 13.
 Bibliography—Primary Sources 357

Carriers: Belleau Wood CVL 24, Bennington CV 20, Smith DM 23, Shannon DM 25, Shea DM 30,
Block Island CVE 106, Chenango CVE 28, Essex CV Thomas E. Fraser DM 24.
9, Franklin CV 13, Hancock CV 19, Hornet CV 12, Patrol craft: PC 1129.
San Jacinto CVL 30, Wasp CV 18, Yorktown CV 10. Patrol crafts rescue: PCE(R)s 851, 852, 853, 854, 855,
Destroyer escorts: Bowers DE 637, Edmonds DE 406. 856.
Destroyers: Alfred A. Cunningham DD 752, Ammen Patrol motor gunboats: PGM 9, PGM 10, PGM 17,
DD 527, Anthony DD 515, Aulick DD 569, Bache PGM 20.
DD 470, Barton DD 722, Beale DD 471, Bennett Specific log references are listed in the chapter end
DD 473, Bennion DD 662, Boyd DD 544, Bradford notes.
DD 545, Braine DD 630, Brown DD 546, Bryant
DD 665, Bush DD 529, Callaghan DD 792, Caper- RG 38: Armed Guard Reports
ton DD 650, Cassin Young DD 793, Charles Aus- For the merchant ships Alcoa Pioneer, Alexander Ma-
burne DD 570, Claxton DD 571, Cogswell DD 651, jors, Augustus Thomas, Benjamin Ide Wheeler,
Colhoun DD 801, Compton DD 705, Converse DD Bozeman Victory, Canada Victory, C. W. Post,
509, Cowell DD 547, Daly DD 519, Douglas H. Fox George Von L. Meyer, Gilbert Stuart, Hobbs Victory,
DD 779, Drexler DD 741, Dyson DD 572, Evans DD James O’Hara, Jeremiah M. Daily, John Evans, John
552, Foote DD 511, Frank E. Evans DD 754, Fullam S. Burke, Juan de Fuca, Kyle V. Johnson, Logan Vic-
DD 474, Gainard DD 706, Gregory DD 802, Guest tory, Marcus Daly, Matthew P. Deady, Morrison R.
DD 472, Harry E. Hubbard DD 748, Heywood L. Waite, Minot Victory, M. S. Tjisadane, Paducah
Edwards DD 663, Hudson DD 475, Hugh W. Hadley Victory, Segundo Ruiz-Blevis, Thomas Nelson, Wal-
DD 774, Ingersoll DD 652, Ingraham DD 694, Irwin ter Colton, William A. Coulter, William S. Ladd,
DD 794, Isherwood DD 520, James C. Owens DD and William Sharon.
776, John A. Bole DD 755, Kimberly DD 521, Knapp
DD 653, Laffey DD 724, Lang DD 399, Laws DD RG 38: Records of the Chief of Naval
558, Little DD 803, Lowry DD 770, Luce DD 522, Operations—Office of Naval Intelligence
Mannert L. Abele DD 733, Massey DD 778, Moale Monograph Files — Japan 1939 –1946 1001–1015
DD 693, Morrison DD 560, Mustin DD 413, Nichol- Air Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence. Naval Avi-
son DD 442, Picking DD 685, Preston DD 795, ation Combat Statistics World War II. OPNAV-P-
Pringle DD 477, Pritchett DD 561, Purdy DD 734, 23V No. A 129. Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Putnam DD 757, Richard P. Leary DD 664, Rowe Chief of Naval Operations Navy Department, 17
DD 564, Russell DD 414, Shubrick DD 639, Smalley June 1946.
DD 565, Sproston DD 577, Stanly DD 478, Sterett Air Intelligence Group, Division of Naval Intelli-
DD 407, Stoddard DD 566, Stormes DD 780, Van gence. Air Operations Memorandum No. 81. 18 May
Valkenburgh DD 656, Wadsworth DD 516, Walke 1945.
DD 723, Watts DD 567, Wickes DD 578, Wilkes DD Air Operations Memorandum No. 82. 25 May 1945.
441, Willard Keith DD 775, William D. Porter DD Air Operations Memorandum No. 83. OpNav-16-V #
579, and Wren DD 568. S234. 1 June 1945.
Fleet minesweeper: Defense AM 317. Air Operations Memorandum No. 88. 6 July 1945.
Fleet tugs: Arikara ATF 98, Cree ATF 84, Lipan, ATF Brunetti, Col. N. The Japanese Air Force (undated).
85, Menominee ATF 73, Pakana ATF 108, Tekesta Chain of Command of Naval Air Forces Attached to
ATF 93, Ute ATF 76. the Combined Fleet (as of August 15th 1945).
High speed minesweepers: Butler DMS 29, Ellyson Data Table — Japanese Combat Aircraft.
DMS 19, Emmons DMS 22, Forrest DMS 24, Gher- Director Air Intelligence Group. Statistical Analysis
ardi DMS 30, Hambleton DMS 20, Harding DMS of Japanese Suicide Effort Against Allied Shipping
28, Hobson DMS 26, Jeffers DMS 27, Long DMS 12, During OKINAWA Campaign. 23 July 1945.
Macomb DMS 23, Rodman DMS 21, and Southard Japanese Suicide Effort Against Allied Shipping During
DMS 10. OKINAWA Campaign, Statistical Analysis of. OP-
High speed transports: Barber APD 57, Clemson APD 16-VA-MvR. Serial 001481916. 23 July 1945.
31, Frament APD 77, Ringness APD 100. Observed Suicide Attacks by Japanese Aircraft Against
Landing crafts support (large): 11 through 22, 31, 32, Allied Ships. OpNav-16-V # A106. 23 May 1945.
34 through 40, 51 through 57, 61 through 67, 68, Photographic Interpretation Handbook—United States
70, 71, 74, 76, 81 through 90, 92 through 94, 97 Forces. Supplement No. 2. Aircraft Identification. 15
through 105, 107, 109, 110, 111, 114 through 125, and April, 1945.
128 through 130. Secret Information Bulletin, No. 24.
Landing ships medium: 14, 82, 167, 222, 228, 279. Technical Air Intelligence Center. Summary # 31
Landing ships medium (rockets): 189, 191, 192, 193, Baka. OpNav —16-V # T 131. June 1945.
196, 197, 198, 199. United States Fleet Headquarters of the Commander
Landing ships tank: 472, 477, 534, 554, 605, 610, 700, in Chief Navy Department, Washington D.C. Effects
724, 737, 738, 750, 778, 808, 809, 912, 925, 1025, of B-29 Operations in Support of the Okinawa Cam-
1028. paign From 18 March to 22 June 1945. 3 August 1945.
Light mine layers: Aaron Ward DM 34, Gwin DM 33, U. S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan. Index No. S-
Harry F. Bauer DM 26, Henry A. Wiley DM 29, J. O2 Ships and Related Targets Japanese Suicide
William Ditter DM 31, Lindsey DM 32, Robert H. Craft.
358 Bibliography — Primary Sources

_____. O-01-1 Japanese Torpedoes and Tubes Article I 694, Irwin DD 794, Isherwood DD 520, John A. Bole
Ship and Kaiten Torpedoes. April 1946. DD 755, Kidd DD 661, Killen DD 593, Kimberly
DD 521, Knapp DD 653, Lamson DD 367, Lang DD
RG 38: Records of the Chief of Naval 399, Laffey DD 724, Laws DD 558, Leutze DD 481,
Operations—Records Relating to Naval Little DD 803, Lowry DD 770, Luce DD 522, Mad-
Activity During World War II dox DD 731, Mahan DD 364, Mannert L. Abele DD
Action Reports 733, Massey DD 778, Morris DD 417, Morrison DD
Amphibious command ships: Ancon AGC 4, Biscayne 560, Mugford DD 389, Mullany DD 528, Mustin
AGC 18, Eldorado AGC 11, Panamint AGC 13. DD 413, Newcomb DD 586, O’Brien DD 725, Pre-
Attack transports: Alpine APA 92, Callaway APA 35, ston DD 795, Pringle DD 477, Pritchett DD 561,
Du Page APA 41, Goodhue APA 107, Henrico APA Purdy DD 734, Putnam DD 757, Ralph Talbot DD
45, Hinsdale APA 120, James O’Hara APA 90, La- 390, Reid DD 369, Richard P. Leary DD 664, Robin-
grange APA 124, Sandoval APA 194, Telfair APA son DD 562, Rowe DD 564, Russell DD 414, Samp-
210, Zeilin APA 3. son DD 394, Saufley DD 465, Shubrick DD 639,
Battleships: California BB 44, Colorado BB 45, Mary- Sigsbee DD 502, Smalley DD 565, Smith DD 378
land BB 46, Mississippi BB 41, Missouri BB 63, Ne- Sproston DD 577, Stanly DD 478, Sterrett DD 407,
vada BB 36, New Mexico BB 40, New York BB 34, Stoddard DD 566, Stormes DD 780, Taussig DD
Tennessee BB 43, West Virginia BB 48. 746, Thatcher DD 514, Twiggs DD 591, Van Valken-
Cargo ship: Carina AK 74. burgh DD 656, Wadsworth DD 516, Walke DD 723,
Cargo ship attack: Achernar AKA 53, Starr AKA 67. Watts DD 567, Wickes DD 578, Wilkes DD 441,
Carriers: Belleau Wood CVL 24, Bennington CV 20, William D. Porter DD 579, Wilson DD 408, Wren
Bunker Hill CV 17, Cabot CVL 28, Essex CV 9, En- DD 568, Zellars DD 777.
terprise CV 6, Franklin CV 13, Hancock CV 19, Hor- Escort carriers: Bismark Sea CVE 95, Kadashan Bay
net CV 12, Intrepid CV 11, Lexington CV 16, Ran- CVE 76, Kalinin Bay CVE 68, Kitkun Bay CVE 71,
dolph CV 15, San Jacinto CVL 30, Saratoga CV 3, Chenango CVE 28, Lunga Point CVE 94, Manila
Ticonderoga CV 14, Wasp CV 18, Yorktown CV 10. Bay CVE 61, Marcus Island CVE 77, Natoma Bay
Cruisers: Biloxi CL 80, Birmingham CL 62, Columbia CVE 62, Ommaney Bay CVE 79, Salamaua CVE
CL 56, Indianapolis CA 35, Louisville CA 28, Min- 96, Sangamon CVE 26, Santee CVE 29, Savo Island
neapolis CA 36, Montpelier CL 57, Nashville CL 45, CVE 78, St. Lo CVE 63, Suwannee CVE 27,Wake
Reno CL 96, St. Louis CL 49. Island CVE 65, White Plains CVE 66.
Destroyer escorts: Bowers DE 637, Bright DE 747, En- High speed transports: Barr APD 29, Bates APD 47,
gland DE 635, Fieberling DE 640, Gilligan DE 508, Belknap APD 34, Bowers APD 40, Brooks APD 10,
Halloran DE 305, Hodges DE 231, John C. Butler Chase APD 54, Dickerson APD 21, England APD 41,
DE 339, LeRay Wilson DE 414, Lough DE 586, Gilmer APD 11, Horace A. Bass APD 124, Liddle APD
Oberrender DE 344, O’Neill DE 188, Rall DE 304, 60, Loy APD 56, Rathburne APD 25, Register APD
Richard W. Suesens DE 342, Samuel Miles DE 183, 92, Sims APD 50, Tatum APD 81, Ward APD 16.
Stafford DE 411, Walter C. Wann DE 412, White- Landing craft infantry (large): 90.
hurst DE 634, William C. Cole DE 641, Witter DE Landing craft infantry (mortars): 974.
636, Underhill DE 682, Wesson DE 184, Witter DE Landing craft infantry (rockets): 763.
636. Landing crafts infantry (guns): 70, 82, 365, 407, 558,
Destroyers: Abner Read DD 526, Allen M. Sumner 568, 580, 659.
DD 692, Ammen DD 527, Anderson DD 411, An- Landing crafts support (large): 7, 11 through 21, 26,
thony DD 515, Aulick DD 569, Bache DD 470, Beale 27, 31, 32, 34 through 40, 48, 49, 51 through 57, 61
DD 471, Benham DD 796, Bennett DD 473, Ben- through 67, 68, 81 through 90, 94, through 109,
nion DD 662, Borie DD 704, Boyd DD 544, Brad- 110, 111, 113,114 through 117, 119 through 125, 129,
ford DD 545, Braine DD 630, Brown DD 546, 130.
Bryant DD 665, Bullard DD 660, Bush DD 529, Landing ships medium: 14, 20, 23, 28, 59, 82, 135,
Caldwell DD 605, Callaghan DD 792, Caperton DD 167, 213, 216, 222, 228, 279, 318,477 809.
650, Cassin Young DD 793, Charles J. Badger DD Landing ships medium (rockets): 188, 189, 190, 192,
657, Claxton DD 571, Cogswell DD 651, Colhoun 193, 194, 195, 197.
DD 801, Converse DD 509, Cowell DD 547, Daly Landing ships tank: 447, 460, 472, 534, 548, 599, 610,
DD 519, Douglas H. Fox DD 779, Drayton DD 366, 700, 737, 738, 749, 778, 808, 884, 912, 925, 1025, 1028.
Drexler DD 741, Dyson DD 572, Eaton DD 510, Light mine layers: Aaron Ward DM 34, Adams DM
Evans DD 552, Foote DD 511, Frank E. Evans DD 27, Gwin DM 33, Harry F. Bauer DM 26, Henry A.
754, Fullam DD 474, Gainard DD 706, Gansevoort Wiley DM 29, J. William Ditter DM 31, Lindsey DM
DD 608, Gregory DD 802, Guest DD 472, Haggard 32, Robert H. Smith DM 23, Shannon DM 25, Shea
DD 555, Halsey Powell DD 686, Hank DD 702, Ha- DM 30, Thomas E. Fraser DM 24.
raden DD 585, Harry E. Hubbard DD 748, High speed minesweepers: Butler DMS 29, Dorsey
Haynsworth DD 700, Hazelwood DD 531, Heywood DMS 1, Ellyson DMS 19, Emmons DMS 22, Forrest
L. Edwards DD 663, Howorth DD 592, Hudson DD DMS 24, Hambleton DMS 20, Harding DMS 28,
475, Hughes DD 410, Hugh W. Hadley DD 774, Ha- Hobson DMS 26, Hopkins DMS 13, Jeffers DMS 27,
raden DD 585, Helm DD 388, Hutchins DD 476, Macomb DMS 23, Palmer DMS 5, Rodman DMS
Hyman DD 732, Ingersoll DD 652, Ingraham DD 21, Southard DMS 10.
 Bibliography—Primary Sources 359

High speed transports: Barber APD 57, Barry APD 29, Commander Fifth Amphibious Force CTF-51 and
Bates APD 47, Belknap APD 34, Chase APD 54, Clem- CTF-31 Serial 0268 Report of Capture of Okinawa
son APD 31, Dickerson APD 21, Horace A. Bass APD Gunto Phases I and II. 17 May 1945 –21 June 1945.
124, Liddle APD 60, Loy APD 56, Rathburne APD 25, 4 July 1945.
Rednour APD 102, Register APD 92, Ringness APD Commander Fifth Amphibious Force letter of 11 June
100, Roper APD 20, Sims APD 50, Ward APD 16. 1945. Translation of a Japanese Letter.
Hospital ships: Comfort AH 6, Pinckney APH 2. Commander Fifth Fleet. Serial 0333 Action Report,
Minelayer: Terror CM 5. RYUKYUS Operation through 27 May 1945. 21 June
Minesweepers: Defense AM 317, Facility AM 233, 1945.
Gayety AM 239, Gladiator AM 319, Ransom AM Commander Task Force Fifty-One. Commander
283, Spectacle AM 305, Swallow AM 65, YMS 331. Amphibious Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet. Serial 01400
Motor torpedo boats: PT 75, 300. Report on Okinawa Gunto Operation from 17 Feb-
Oilers: Cowanesque AO 79, Taluga AO 62. ruary to 17 May, 1945.
Patrol crafts rescue: PCE(R)s 851, 852, 853. Commander Task Force 54. Serial 0022 Action Re-
Patrol motor gunboats: PGM 10, PGM 20. port — Capture of Okinawa Gunto, Phase II 5 May
Repair ship — landing craft: Egeria ARL 8. to 28 May 1945. 4 June 1945.
Seaplane tenders: Curtiss AV 4, Hamlin AV 15, Kenneth Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT. Serial
Whiting AV 14, Orca AVP 49, St. George AV 16. 0907. Action Reports, MARIVELES — CORREGI-
Sub chaser: SC 699. DOR Operation, 12 –16 February 1945. 12 April
Survey ship: Dutton AGS 8. 1945.
Transport: War Hawk AP 168. CTF 31 to TF 31, TG 99.3, 29 May 1945.
Tugs: Apache ATF 67, Arikira ATF 98, Cree ATF 84, CTF 51 to TF 51 16 April 1945.
Lipan ATF 85, Menominee ATF 73, Pakana ATF CTF 51 to TF 51 24 April 1945.
108, Sonoma ATO 12, Tawakoni ATF 114, Tekesta CTU 52.9.1 OUTGOING MESSAGE OF 17 APRIL
ATF 93, Ute ATF 76. 1945.
Unclassified vessel: Porcupine IX 126. Task Force 51 Communication and Organization Di-
Various serials and dates were used for each ship. gest, 1945.
Specific reports are listed in the chapter end notes.
Destroyer Division, Mine Division, LSM, LCS
CINC-CINCPOA Bulletins
Flotilla, Group, Division Reports, War Diaries,
Airfields in Kyushu. Bulletin No. 166 –45, 15 August
and Histories
1945.
Commander Destroyer Division 92 Serial 0192. Ac-
Airways Data Taiwan Chiho Special Translation No.
tion Report. 23 July 1945.
36, 1 June 1945.
Commander Destroyer Division 112 Serial 030. Ac-
Daito Shoto Bulletin No. 77–45, 20 March 1945.
tion Report Amphibious Assault on Okinawa
Digest of Japanese Air Bases Special Translation No.
Gunto. 18 April 1945.
65, 12 May 1945.
Commander Destroyer Division 120 Serial 002. Ac-
Suicide Force Combat Methods Bulletin No. 129 –45,
tion Report — Okinawa Gunto Operation, for Pe-
27 May 1945.
riod from 29 April through 4 May 1945. 6 May 1945.
Suicide Weapons and Tactics Know Your Enemy! Bul-
Commander Destroyer Division 126 Serial 08. Action
letin No. 126 –45, 28 May 1945.
Report, Attack by Japanese Aircraft off Okinawa
Translations Interrogations Number 26. Bulletin No.
Gunto on Hyman — 6 April, 1945, and on Purdy,
102 –45, 25 April 1945.
Cassin Young, Mannert L. Abele and Supporting
Translations Interrogations Number 35. Bulletin No.
Gunboats on 12 April 1945. 15 April 1945.
170 –45, 7 July 1945.
Commander Destroyer Squadron 2 Serial 00551. Ac-
CinCPac, 5th Fleet, Task Force, Task Group tion Report, Okinawa Gunto Operation 1 March to
and Task Unit Records, Reports, Communiques 17 May 1945. 1 June 1945.
Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet (TF 52) Serial 000166 Commander Destroyer Squadron 24 Serial 0118. Ice-
16 March 1945 Operation Order A6 –45. berg Operation, 23 –27 May 1945. 29 May 1945.
CinCPac Adv. Hdqtrs. 17 April 1945. Commander Destroyer Squadron 24 Serial 0155. In-
CinCPac United States Pacific Fleet Serial 0005608 vasion of Okinawa Jima, 19 April–28 May 1945. 18
War Diary for the Period 1 March through 31 March June 1945.
1945. 11 April 1945. Commander Destroyer Squadron 24 Serial 0166. In-
_____. 0005643 War Diary for the Period 1 April vasion of Okinawa Jima, 28 May to 27 June 1945.
through 30 April 1945. 13 May 1945. 28 June 1945.
_____. 0005685 War Diary for the Period 1 May Commander Destroyer Squadron 45 Serial 00138.
through 31 May 1945. 13 June 1945. Report of Capture of Okinawa Gunto Phases 1 and
_____. 0005748 War Diary for the Period 1 June 2, Commander, Destroyer Squadron Forty-Five for
through 30 June 1945. 15 July 1945. the Period 27 March to 21 June 1945. 27 June 1945.
_____. 0005801 War Diary for the Period 1 July Commander Destroyer Squadron Forty-Nine. Serial
through 31 July 1945. 9 August 1945. 0011. Action Report — OKINAWA CAMPAIGN—
_____. 0005849 War Diary for the Period 1 August 9 March 1945 to 23 June 1945. 28 June 1945.
through 31 August 1945. 9 September 1945. Commander Destroyer Squadron 55. Serial 0023.
360 Bibliography — Primary Sources

Anti-Aircraft Action Report for 29 July, 1945 Loss of DD-475 Dispatch 5 June, 1945.
U.S.S. Callaghan (DD792). 7 August 1945. LCI(L)(3) Flotilla Thirteen. War Diary for January
Commander Destroyer Squadron Sixty-Four. Serial 1945. 2 February 1945.
032. Report of Capture of Okinawa Gunto, Phases LCS Group Nine Operation Order No. 1–45 Annex
1 and 2. 25 June 1945. Dog Fighting Instructions.
Commander LCS(L) Flotilla THREE Serial 621. LCS Group Eleven Serial 0138 Composite Action Re-
LCS(L) Flotilla THREE Staff — Factual History of. port Okinawa Gunto 1 April 1945 –21 June 1945.
21 November 1945. LCS(L)(3) Flotilla Five Confidential Memorandum
Commander LCS(L) Flotilla FOUR Serial 25 –46. No. 5 –45, 10 July 1945.
War History, Commander LCS(L) Flotilla FOUR. Navy Carrier Air Group and Individual Squadron
6 January 1946. Histories, War Diaries and Aircraft
Commander LCS(L)(3) Group 11 Serial 0138. Action Action Reports
Report Capture and Occupation of Okinawa Gunto For CAG-40, 46, 47, 82, VBF-17, VC-8, 83, 85, 90,
Phases I and II. 30 July 1945. 93, 96, VF-9, 10, 12, 17, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 33, 40,
Commander LSM Flotilla Nine Serial 006. War Diary 45, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, and 90(N). Various dates.
for the Month of March 1945.
Commander LSM Flotilla Nine Serial 021. War Diary War Diaries
for the Month of April 1945. Amphibious command ships: Ancon AGC 4, Biscayne
Commander LSM Flotilla Nine Serial C010. Action AGC 18, Eldorado AGC 11, Panamint AGC 13.
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This page intentionally left blank
 Index
Numbers in bold italics indicate pages with illustrations.

Aaron Ward DM 34 27, 250, 254 – 306; Ozuki 52; Saishu-To 188; Air Fleet 45, 51, 176, 189, 191,
255, 256, 323 Saeki 194; Tachiarai 67, 188, 194, 223; 1st Attack Flying Unit 49; 1st
Abbot DD 629 297 197; Takume 194; Tanegashima Cherry Blossom Unit 34; 1st
Abdill, Capt. Everett W. 146 188; Togani 188; Tokuno Shima Shimpu Special Attack Unit 138;
Abercrombie DE 343 118 195, 197, 208; Tomitaka 34, 194; 3rd Air Fleet 67, 189, 191, 192; 3rd
Abner Read DD 526 125, 318, 321 Tsuchiura 93; Tsuiki 193; Usa 34, Cherry Blossom Squadron 31;
Achernar AKA 53 208 193, 194; Yabuki 188; Yokoshiba 5th Air Fleet 67, 189, 191, 192;
Achilles ARL 41 131 188; Yonatan 188; see also Air- 10th Air Fleet 47, 67, 69, 189, 191,
Adachi, Capt. Mutsuo 88, 227 bases, American 192; 26th Air Flotilla 45; 30th
Adams DM 27 206, 321 Airbases, Korea: Gunzan (Genzan) Flying Group 26; 201st Air
Adelman, Ens. William 144 188, 194, 195, 197; Keijo 188, 189, Group 45, 118, 168; 293rd Naval
AGM 305 263 195, 197 Air Unit 42; 405th Kokutai 29;
Aguni Shima 233 Airbases, Philippines: Cebu 26; 601st Air Group 178; 701st Air
Ailes, Cmdr. J. W. III 297 Mabalacat 29, 45, 46, 118, 156, Group 264, 300; 721st Naval Air
Airbases, American: Kadena 227, 168; Manila 45; Nichols 42, 162; Corps (Jinrai Butai) 30, 31, 34,
265; Yontan 227, 264, 267, 282; Tuguegarao 163 35; 722 Naval Air Corps (Tat-
see also Airbases, Japan Airbases, Taiwan: Choshu 194; sumaki Butai) 16, 25, 27, 34, 37;
Airbases, Japan: Akino 45; Ensui 194, 197; Giran 191, 194, 197; Azusa Special Attack Unit 185;
Amakasa 194; Amami-O-Shima Hachikai 194; Heito 194; Kagi 194, Niitaka Unit 176; Shinpui Special
195; Atsugi 52; Bansei 197; Chi- 197; Karenko 194, 275; Kobi 191; Attack Unit 18, 25, 46; Showa
ran 23, 26, 53, 194, 197; Fukuoka Mato 194; Matsuyama (Taipei) Special Attack Unit 25
189, 194, 197; Gifu 53; Hachijo- 191, 194, 197, 211; Ryutan 194; Aka Jima 87
Jima 188; Hakata 193, 194; Shinchiku 176, 191, 194; Shoka Akagi 42
Hamamatsu 45, 188; Hiro 51; 194; Taichu 176, 191, 194, 197; Akamatsu, Capt. Yoshitsugu 88
Hokoba 45; Hotoyoshi 193; Tainan 176, 191; Takao 115, 191, Akeno Army Flight School 45
Hyakurigahara 31, 49; Ibusuki 194; Tansui 194, 197; Toen 194 Alabama BB 60 297
193, 194; Iwakawa 193; Iwaki 188; Aircraft Armament 56 Alcoa Pioneer 131, 132, 318
Izuki 194; Izumi 34, 193, 194; Aircraft Units, Japanese Army: 5th Alexander Majors 128, 130, 318
Kadena 188, 208; Kagohara 52; Air Army 189, 194, 195; 6th Air Allen M. Sumner DD 692 159, 319
Kagoshima 193, 194; Kanoya 34, Army 197; 6th Air Brigade 197; Allied Land Forces S.E.A. Weekly In-
35, 37, 50, 52, 62, 67, 188, 189, 7th Air Regiment 188; 8th Air telligence Review 103
192, 193, 194, 231; Karesahara 53, Division 189, 194; 8th Fighter Alpine APA 92 131, 205 –206, 318,
197; Kasanohara 193, 194; Ka- Brigade 195; 16th Fighter Regi- 321
sumigaura 194, 199; Katori 178; ment 195; 20th Shimbu Unit 195, AM 232 217
Kikaiga-Shima 193, 195, 197; 197; 21st Air Brigade 306; 21st Amami-O-Shima 193, 194
Kikuchi 194; Kisaratsu 194; Shimbu Unit 195; 23rd Shimbu Ammen DD 527 125, 250, 279, 284,
Koichi 188; Kokubu 193, 194; Ko- Unit 195; 51st Training Flying 291, 318
matsu 37, 194; Konoike 34; Ku- Division 53; 59th Air Regiment Amphibious Group 8 169
mamoto 194, 197; Kumanosho 197; 65th Air Regiment 197; 66th Anami, Gen. Korechika 45
194, 197; Kushira 193, 194, 223; Air Regiment 197, 208; 90th Anderson DD 411 125, 170, 318
Matsuyama West 37, 194; Mie 49; Fighter Regiment 195; 98th Air Anderson, Master Nels F. 145
Miho 194; Miyakanojo 34, 193, Regiment 188; 101st Air Brigade Anthony DD 515 66, 278, 283, 290,
194, 197; Miyakanojo East 188; 197; 102nd Air Brigade 197; 103 324
Miyazaki 193, 194, 264; Nagoya, Air Regiment 197, 208; 105th Air Anti-Tank Combat Reference 101
49; Nara 93; Niijima 188; Nitta- Regiment 211; 105th Fighter Fly- Anti-tank tactics see suicide soldier
gahara 188, 189, 194, 197; Oita ing Unit 26; Fugaku Special At- Anzio CVE 57 178, 223
34, 50, 67, 188, 193, 194; Omura tack Unit 138 Apache ATF 67 158, 319
67, 193, 194; Oshima 188; Otsu Aircraft Units, Japanese Navy: 1st Arakawa, Flight PO1c Masahiro 295

369
370 Index

Araki, Haruo 23 Binubusan 84 Chickasaw ATF 83 116, 132, 294

Archer, Cmdr. Robert J. 265 Birmingham CL 62 262, 323 Chimu Wan 289
Archerfish SS 311 34 Bismarck Sea CVE 95 178 –180, 320 Chinen Misaki 249, 288
Ariga, Capt. Kosaku 220 Black DD 666 227–228 Chowanoc ATF 100 162
Arikara ATF 98 213, 267 Blakley, Lt. John L. 149 Chung-Hoon, Cmdr. G. P. 235
Arima, RAdm. Masafumi 45 Bogan, RAdm. Gerald F. 123, 132 Clamp ARS 33 232
Armed Guard 126, 129, 132, 152, Boise CL 47 125 Claxton DD 571 125, 170, 318
167, 218, 219 Bong, Maj. Richard I. 112, 114 Cofer APD 62 143
Army Air Academy (Japan) 26 Borie DD 704 297, 298, 324 Coghlan DD 606 145
Army Air Force Units (US): 9th Bowers APD 40 237, 238, 243, 322 Cogswell DD 651 27, 290, 291
Fighter Squadron 111; 36th Boyd DD 544 278, 284 Colahan DD 658 145
Fighter Squadron 141; 49th Bozeman Victory 249, 322 Cole, Capt. W. M. 143
Fighter Group 111; 305th Air- Brader, Charles 27 Colhoun DD 801 4, 211, 223 –224,
drome Squadron 111; 421st Night Bradford DD 545 287, 290 225, 321
Fighter Squadron 111; 475th Braine DD 630 283, 324 Colorado BB 45 135, 136, 154, 318
Fighter Group 111, 114 Breese DM 18 161 Columbia CA 56 136, 160, 162–163,
Army FS 225 173, 323 Bright DE 747 273, 323 320
Army FS 309 320 Brittin, B. H. Lt. 228 Columbus, Bosun’s Mate Joe 284
Army Ground Units (US): 19th Brodie, Cmdr. Robert A. Jr. 219 Colvin, Lt. Cmdr. Almer P. 151
Regimental Combat Team 152; Brogger, Lt. Cmdr. L. C. 144 Combs, S1c Don Taylor 219
24th Division 152; 77th Division Brooks APD 10 160, 320 Comfort AH 6 249 –250, 322
132, 138, 192, 208, 209; 305th Brown Victory 285, 324 Conklin DE 439 182
Regimental Combat Team 209; Brown, Gordon 219 Conolly, RAdm. R. L. 168
536th Amphibious Tractor Bat- Brunetti, Col. N. 52 Connolly DE 306 235, 322
talion 144; 718th Amphibious Brush DD 745 177 Converse DD 509 278
Tractor Battalion 144 Bryant DD 665 125, 147, 151, 240, Conway DD 507 136
The Army-Navy Joint Central 319, 322 Cony DD 508 136
Agreement on Air Operations 48 Buckner Bay see Nakagusuku Bay Conyngham DD 371 42, 145, 169
Arnow, Lt. (jg) Theodore 210 Bullard DD 660 228, 322 Coolbaugh DE 217 117
ARS 73 294 Bunch APD 79 208 –209 Corregidor 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 170 –
Arunta H.M.A.S. 125, 156 Bunker Hill CV 17 123, 229, 267– 171, 172, 173
Asashimo 220 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 323 Coughlin, Lt. Cmdr. J. W. 293
ATA 124 294 Burns, Lt. Cmdr. E. S. 150 Cowanesque AO 79 152, 319
ATR 114 267 Burns DD 588 154 Cowell DD 547 259, 274, 279, 323
ATR 31 143 Bush DD 529 125, 152, 177, 211, Cree ATF 84 267, 284
ATR 51 240 223 –224, 321 Crescent City APA 21 296
ATR 80 219 bushido 5, 8 –9, 25, 64 Crosley APD 87 235
Augustus Thomas 115, 117, 318 Bushido the Soul of Japan 9 Curtis AV 4 293 –294, 324
Aulick DD 569 55, 136, 137, 290, Butler, Master Peter F. 252 Cushing DD 797 42, 246
291, 297, 318
Australia H.M.A.S. 157, 160, 163 C. W. Post 270, 272 Daly DD 519 251, 322
Cabot CVL 28 123, 133, 135, 318 Dashiell DD 659 146, 235
Bache DD 470 253, 274, 323 Caldwell DD 605 145, 146, 147, 319 Davao Gulf 74
Baka see Oka California BB 44 125, 154, 159, 320 David Dudley Field 117, 167, 318, 320
Baker, S1c Gilbert C. 132 Callaghan DD 792 200, 295 –296, Davis, Cmdr. George F. 159
Bakufu 5 321, 324 Davison, RAdm. Ralph E. 114, 123
Barnett, Lt. J. T. 147 Callaway APA 35 161, 320 Defense AM 317 211, 212, 321
Barry APD 29 280, 281, 293, 323, Campbell, Cmdr. E. G. 141 Demarest, Lt. B. M. 62–63
324 Canada Victory 248 –249, 322 Dennis DE 405 118, 120
Barton DD 722 159, 161, 204 Cape Constance 128, 318 Denver CL 57 136
Bataan CVL 29 275 Cape Engano 295 DeSirant, Dean 161
Bates APD 47 282, 323 Cape Romano 131, 132, 318 DesRon 5, 143
Battle of Santa Cruz 5, 42, 43 Caplin, Lt. Stanly 160 Deyo, RAdm. Morton L. 202
Beale DD 471 212 Caraley, S1c Otis B. 132 Dickerson APD 21 208 –209, 321
Becton, Cmdr. Julian 239 Caribou IX 114 131, 136 Divine Wind 5, 9
Beierl, Lt. Peter G. 266, 274 Carina AK 74 253, 323 Doi, Lt. (jg) Saburo 232
Belknap APD 34 165, 167, 320 Carson, Lt. Cmdr. M. V. 163 Donahue, Cmdr. T. F. 260
Bell, S2c Dean 171–172 Cascade AD 16 297 Dorsey DMS 1 202–203, 321
Belleau Wood CVL 24 37, 114, 115, Case DD 370 184 Douglas H. Fox DD 779 62, 63,
123, 124, 223, 320 Cassin Young DD 793 65, 223 –224, 267, 275, 323
Benham DD 796 243 –246, 322 229, 295 –297, 322, 324 Douw, Cmdr. V. P. 252
Benjamin Ide Wheeler 122–123, 318 Chambers, Cmdr. C. E. 233 Dowling, Lt. Cmdr. Arthur L. 221
Benner DD 807 297 Champion AM 314 233 Downing, Cmdr. A. A. 250
Bennett DD 473 211, 224, 321 Chandler DMS 9 161 Drayton DD 366 138, 139, 140, 319
Bennington CV 20 17, 220, 223 Chandler, RAdm. Theodore E. 161 Drexler DD 741 279, 284 –285, 324
Bennion DD 662 57, 59, 125, 234, Chapde, GM Lloyd Earl 132 Driver, GM2c Grady 219
250 –251, 322 Charles J. Badger DD 657 83, 227, Du Page APA 41 165 –166, 320
Bertolf, Cmdr. C. M. 296 321 Dulag 108, 114, 128, 144, 152
Bibb 252 Chase APD 54 277–278, 323 Dunckel, BGen. William C. 146, 152
Bigos, Lt. Casimir L. 267 Chenango CVE 28 117 Durgin, RAdm. Calvin T. 178
Biloxi CL 80 114, 200, 321 Chester CA 27 184 Durnford, Ist Lt. Dewey F. Jr. 38
 Index 371

Dutton AGS 8 284, 324 Gear ARS 34 264, 273 Hattori, Prof. Shogo 26
Dworzak, Lt. Willis A. 267 Gebhardt, Sonarman 1/c Jack 27 Hawley, Lt. D. C. 293
Dyson DD 572 55 Genda, Capt. Minoru 199 Hayashi, Col. Junji 53
General Fleischer 132 Hayashi, Cpl. Nobuo 81, 85, 169
Eaton DD 510 136, 165, 320 Gherardi DMS 30 217 Hayashi, Lt.(jg)Tohimasa 18
Ebert, Lt. (jg) James D. 208 Gilbert Stuart 131, 318 Hayashi, Lt. 163
Edmunds DE 406 117 Gilligan DE 508 166 –167, 320 Hayashikane 99
Educational Reform of 1941 (Imper- Gilmer APD 11 202, 321 Haynsworth DD 700 219, 321
ial Ordinance No. 1483) 10 Gladiator AM 319 236, 322 Hazelwood DD 531 117, 251–252, 323
Educational system, military train- Glendinning, Lt. 268 Heath, S1c Robert F. 161
ing in 9, 10, 16 Glienke, Lt. A. P. 51 Heermann DD 532 118, 120
Edward N. Wescott 167, 320 Goff, H. H. Lt. 247 Helm DD 388 158, 319
Edwards DD 619 143, 145, 152 Goldman, S1c Roy Cleo 219 Hendrikx Master Charles 218
Egeria ARL 8 131, 318 Goodhue APA 107 208, 209, 321 Henrico APA 45 208, 209, 321
Elder, Lt. Franklin L. 171 Gosselin APD 126 282 Henry A. Wiley DM 29 28, 204
Eldorado AGC 11 62 Grabowski, Lt. Leon 212 Herbert APD 22 208
Ellyson DMS 19 210, 217, 294, 324 Grapple ARS 7 152 Heywood L. Edwards DD 663 125
Elmira Victory 167, 320 The Great Principles of Education Hickman, Charles 219
Emmons DMS 22 210, 217–218, 321 (1879) 10 Hickman, Lt. K. K. 140
England APD 41 263 –264, 323 Gregory DD 802 61, 213, 214, 226, Hicks, Capt. R. L. 156
Enterprise CV 6 42, 114, 115, 123, 321 Hidatsa ATF 102 102
274 –275, 276, 277, 321, 323 Griffin APD 38 214 High, Cmdr. P. L. 151
Ernst, Lt. (jg) Gerhardt E. 152 Griffin, Lt. John J. Jr. 217 Highfield, Lt. Cmdr. C. F. 237
Essex CV 9 114, 133, 134, 135, 318 Griffis, Earl O. Sr. 169 Hill, Col. Bruce C. 146
Eta Jima 49, 85, 86, 87, 165 Grigchy, S1c Edward Larcy 132 Hinsdale APA 120 206, 321
Evans DD 552 264 –267, 323 Guest DD 472 279, 282, 323 Hirano, Lt. Akira 34
Eversole DE 789 117 Guidelines Pertaining to Military Hiryu 42
Evjen, S1c Russel LeRoy 219 Operations Covering Small Is- Hitachi Army Flight School 45
Execute AM 232 216 –217 lands 81 Hitachi 98
Gwin DM 33 201, 259, 323 Hobbs Victory 218 –219, 321
Facility AM 233 219, 321 Hobson DMS 26 209, 240, 243, 322
Fair DE 35 278 Hachimaki 16, 17, 18 Hoctor, Lt. (jg) John M. 164
Fanshaw Bay CVE 70 118, 120 Haddock, S1c Claude 171 Hodges DE 231 162, 320
Far East Air Forces (FEAF) 111 Haggard DD 555 251–252, 323 Hoel DD 768 118
farewell ceremony 21–22 Hagushi anchorage 206, 208, 232, Hokoda Army Flight School 45
Fieberling DE 640 219, 321 248, 249, 250,261, 273, 275, 282, Hollandia 126, 138, 144, 166, 182
File, William H. Jr. Lt. 296 283, 286, 288, 296 Holmes, Cmdr. R. H. 57
First Mobile Base Air Force 193, 300 Hailey DD 556 118 Honma, Capt. Toshio 88
fishing battalion see suicide boats Hakoate 99 Hopkins DMS 13 161, 260, 323
Fleming, Capt. R. W. 160 Hale DD 642 220 Horace A. Bass APD 124 297, 324
Flint CL 97 252 Hall, Capt. G. B. H. 274 Horikawa, Lt. (jg) 76, 77
Flusser DD 368 138, 140, 143, 169, Hall, Cmdr. Madison Jr. 255 Hornet CV 12 223
175 Halloran DE 305 185, 294, 324 Hovey DMS 11 160
Foote DD 511 147, 151, 319 Halsey Powell DD 686 199 –200, Howard DE 346 175
Foreman DE 633 203, 294, 321 201, 320 Howorth DD 592 149 –150, 211–212,
Foristel, Lt. (jg) J. W. 45 Halsey, Adm. William F. 117, 154, 225, 319, 322
Forrest DMS 24 282, 324 176 Huber, Sonnarman 2/c John 27
Foss, Lt. Cmdr. Eugene N. 217 Hamakaze 220 Hudson DD 475 245 –246, 261, 322
France, Capt. W. C. 209 Hamamatsu Army Flight School 45 Hugh W. Hadley DD 774 259, 264 –
Francisco Morazan 152, 319 Hambleton DMS 20 210 –211, 321 267, 323
Franklin CV 13 45, 114, 115, 123, 318 Hamlin AV 15 283 Hughes, Capt. J. N. 280
Franks DD 554 118 Hamly, J. R. 157 Hughes DD 410 143, 145
French, Lt. James 256 Hamul AD 20 297 Hunt DD 674 235, 322
Frye, Master K. D. 126 Hancock CV 19 123, 135, 199, 220, Hutchins DD 476 248, 322
Fugaku Special Attack Unit 138 318, 321 Hyen, 2nd Lt. Takkyon 47
Fujinagata 99 Hank DD 702 228, 297, 322, 324 Hyman DD 732 214, 224 –225, 321
Fujisaki, Flying Officer 26 Hanson, Cmdr. James R. 257
Fujisaki, Lt. (jg) Toshihide 37 Hara, Lt. (jg) Atsuro 166 Ichijima, Yasuo 25
Fukuda, Lt. (jg) Hitoshi 183 Haraden DD 585 146 –147, 150, 319 Ichikawa, Motoji 27
Fukuryu 311, 314 –315 haramaki see sennin-bari Ichishima, Lt. Yasuo 17
Fullam DD 474 261 Harbor Construction Battalions see Idaho BB 42 260, 322, 323
Fun, Sgt. 1c Park Ton 47 suicide boats Ie Shima 38, 237, 258, 265, 270,
Funshiki 40 Harding DMS 28 237, 322 276, 277, 280, 281, 286
Fuyutsuki 220 Harris APA 2 163 Ienaga, Saburo 27
Harrison, RM2c William H. 45 I-Go 41
Gaddis, MM Walter C. 253 Harrison DD 573 235 Ikabe, Capt. Shigemi 247–248
Gage APA 168 167 Harry E. Hubbard DD 748 266 Imamura, Lt. (jg) Shigeo 10, 18,
Gambier Bay CVE 73 117, 118 Harry F. Bauer DM 26 267, 289 – 26, 49
Gansevoort DD 608 152–153, 319 290, 323, 324 Imanishi, Ens. Taichi 182
Gavin, Lt. Cmdr. Andrew W. 132 Hasegawa, Capt. Minoru 208 imon ningyo see masukotto ningyo
Gayety AM 239 260 –261, 323 Hatsushimo 220 Impeccable AM 320 278
372 Index

Imperial General Headquarters, Kasumigaura Naval Flying School LCI(G) 21 175

Army Department Directive No. 9, 26, 49 LCI(G) 22 175
1336 of 26 May 1945 71 Katsuyama, Lt. (jg) Jun 295 LCI(G) 70 158, 319
Imperial Headquarters Naval In- Kawabe, Lt. Gen. Masakasu 25, 45, LCI(G) 72 116
formation Department 10 69, 195 LCI(G) 73 170
Imperial Precept for the Military Kawajiri, Flight PO 1/c Tsutomo 295 LCI(G) 79 209
(1882) 8 Kawakubo, Lt. (jg) Teruo 166 LCI(G) 82 209, 210, 321
Imperial Rescript on Education, The Kawanishi: Baika 301 LCI(G) 347 209, 210, 247
(1890) 10, 23 Kawasaki 98 LCI(G) 365 164 –165, 320
Independence CVL 22 123, 199 Kawashima, Lt. 26 LCI(G) 404 105, 161–162, 320
Indianapolis CA 35 204, 321 Kelley, Cmdr. J. L. Jr. 243 LCI(G) 407 236 –237, 322
Ingraham, Lt. Cmdr. W. T. 62 Kelley, Lt. James 284 LCI(G) 442 165, 170, 171
Ingraham DD 694 54, 63, 159, 256, kendo 11, 12, 13 LCI(G) 452 202, 203, 225
258, 323 Kenneth Whiting AV 14 293–294, 324 LCI(G) 453 209
Innoshima 99 Kenney, Lt. Gen. George C. 107, LCI(G) 455 209
Inoguchi, Capt. Rikihei 25, 47, 64 108, 110 LCI(G) 461 202, 216
Intrepid CV 11 123, 132, 133, 199, 200, Kenney, Lt. R. L. 228 LCI(G) 465 209
228, 229, 238, 239, 318, 320, 322 Kerama Retto 80, 200, 206, 208, LCI(G) 558 170, 203 –204, 321
Isherwood DD 520 63, 245, 322 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 217, 218, LCI(G) 559 203
Ishigaki Shima 191, 194 219, 225, 230, 232, 235, 236, 237, LCI(G) 560 203, 204, 321
Ishikawa, Lt. 76 244, 245, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, LCI(G) 567 20
Isokaze 220 256, 260, 261, 263, 264, 267, 273, LCI(G) 568 209, 321
Itagaki, Capt. Takashi 75 274, 278, 282, 293 LCI(G) 580 251, 322
Itoh, Keichi 25 Ketsu Go 301 LCI(G) 659 243
Itoman 227 Key DE 348 175 LCI(G) 725 209
Izant, Master Kenneth F. 218 Keyes, Cmdr. C. M. 290, 305 LCI(L) 90 289, 324
Kezu Saki 263 LCI(L) 364 131, 318
J. William Ditter DM 31 289 –290, Kidd DD 661 227–229, 322 LCI(L) 430 131
324 Kiefer, Capt. Dixie 177 LCI(L) 442 164, 165
James C. Owens DD 776 67 Kiehl, Capt. E. 209 LCI(L) 676 165
James O’Hara APA 90 132, 318 Kikusui Attacks 1 211ff, 222, 226; 4 LCI(L) 679 248
Japanese Air Power 190 22, 248; 5 253; 7 70, 278; 8 283; 9 LCI(L) 977 131
Japanese Monograph Series No. 52 288; 10 37 LCI(L) 1065 115, 318
89, 190 Killen DD 593 125 LCI(M) 353 280
Japanese pilot training 49 –53 Kimberly DD 521 223, 320 LCI(M) 588 225
Japanese superstitions: Jippogure Kimu Wan 284 LCI(M) 974 164, 320
21; To Shi Bi 21 Kincaid, VAdm. T. C. 154 LCI(R) 646 204
Jarrell, Capt. A. E. 296 Kirk, S1c Leroy Vincent 132 LCI(R) 648 249
Jeffers DMS 27 232–233 Kirokomi Tai see suicide soldier LCI(R) 763 247
Jenkins DD 447 136 Kitakami 96 LCS(L) 7 170 –173
Jensen, Master A. 233 Kitkun Bay CVE 71 118, 120, 162, LCS(L) 8 170 –172
Jeremiah M. Daily 128, 129, 318 318, 320 LCS(L) 11 55, 67, 232, 250
Jicarilla AT 104 168 Kobayashi, Tsunenobu 27 LCS(L) 12 261–262
Jin, Lt. Col. Naomichi 47 Kobe 98 LCS(L) 13 232, 261, 283
John Burke 4, 152, 153, 319 Kocardora, S1c Edward Henry 132 LCS(L) 14 254, 255, 292
John C. Butler DE 339 118, 120, 152, Kojiki 10 LCS(L) 15 246, 322
276 –277, 278, 323 Kondo, Ens. Kazuhiko 182 LCS(L) 16 65, 66, 261
John Evans 138, 319 Kondo, Ens. Yoshihiku 182 LCS(L) 18 290, 291
John W. Weeks DD 701 297 Korean kamikaze pilots 47 LCS(L) 19 67, 273, 274
Johnson, Cmdr. Frank L. 217 Koryu 96, 97, 98, 308, 309 LCS(L) 20 55, 259
Johnston, S1c Edward O. 248 Kouns, Lt. M. W. 283 LCS(L) 21 256, 257, 258
Johnston DD 821 118 Kube, Lt. (jg) Carl Mather 129 LCS(L) 23 250, 256, 258, 259, 274
Josiah Snelling 285, 324 Kublai Khan 7 LCS(L) 24 226, 248
Juan De Fuca 147, 319 Kumagaya Army Flying School 52 LCS(L) 25 254, 255, 256, 323
judo 12 Kure Naval Base 90, 98, 99 LCS(L) 26 170 –175, 320
Kurita, VAdm. Takeo 117, 118 LCS(L) 27 170 –174, 320
Kadashan Bay CVE 76 118, 162, 320 Kuroki, Lt. (jg) Hiroshi 90, 95 LCS(L) 31 231, 256, 258, 323
Kairya, Lt. Cmdr. Tsutomu 16 Kuwahara, Cpl. Yasuo 51, 61 LCS(L) 32 240
Kairyu 93, 98, 99, 308 Kyle V. Johnson 167, 320 LCS(L) 33 4, 229, 231, 322
Kaiten 91, 92, 95, 294, 301, 308; LCS(L) 34 240, 243
development of 90 –92; missions Laffey DD 724 136, 239 –240, 243, LCS(L) 36 226, 321
95 –96, 181–185, 294 –295; train- 296, 322 LCS(L) 37 226, 246, 248, 249, 322,
ing 93 –95 Lagrange APA 124 297, 298, 299, 323
Kaiten Group Tamon 295 300, 324 LCS(L) 38 226, 248
Kalinin Bay CVE 68 118, 120, 318 Lamon Bay 74 LCS(L) 39 224, 238
Kamakura Court 7 Lamson DD 367 138, 139, 141, 143, 319 LCS(L) 40 226, 249, 288
Kameda, Flight PO2c Naokichi 23 Lang DD 399 136, 226, 231 LCS(L) 48 170
Kamibeppu, Lt. Yoshinori 182 Langley CVL 27 37, 199, 229 LCS(L) 49 170 –174, 320
kamikaze training 11, 49 –53, 54 Las Vegas Victory 218 LCS(L) 51 239 –241, 322
Kanemoto, Lt. Cmdr. Nobuo 182 LaVallette DD 448 140 LCS(L) 52 231, 267, 279, 284, 324
Kasumi 220 Lawrence, Lt. Risley 172 LCS(L) 53 263, 273, 275
 Index 373

LCS(L) 54 65, 66 LSM 21 115 Mariveles Harbor 170 –174

LCS(L) 55 284 LSM 23 140, 319 Maru-re 4, 73, 80, 81, 82, 89, 163,
LCS(L) 56 274, 284 LSM 34 140 165, 168, 169, 202–203, 204, 247,
LCS(L) 57 229, 230 –231, 322 LSM 59 293 249, 301; deployment 86 –89; de-
LCS(L) 61 27, 261, 279, 284, 288, 322 LSM 135 280 –281 velopment of 80 –81; formations
LCS(L) 62 288 LSM 138 131 83 –85; training 85 –86
LCS(L) 64 223 –224, 259 LSM 213 294, 324 Maru-re units: 1st 80, 87; 2nd 80,
LCS(L) 65 27, 275, 288 LSM 318 144, 319 87; 3rd 80, 88; 4th 80; 9th 87; 11th
LCS(L) 66 275, 290 LSM 708 290 169; 12th 169; 13th 169; 15th 169;
LCS(L) 67 275 LSM(R) 188 204, 321 16th 169; 17th 169; 18th 169; 19th
LCS(L) 81 259, 288 LSM(R) 189 204, 231, 232, 259, 322 84, 85, 168 –169; 20th 169; 26th
LCS(L) 82 264, 266, 267, 273, 274, LSM(R) 190 231, 251, 252, 323 80, 87, 88, 227; 27th 80, 87, 88,
283, 288 LSM(R) 191 67, 240, 243, 250 247, 248, 253; 28th 80, 87, 88;
LCS(L) 83 65, 66, 246, 254, 255, LSM(R) 192 251, 259, 323 29th 80, 87, 88, 248; 105th 169;
264, 266, 267, 273 LSM(R) 193 264, 267 106th 169; 107th 169; 111th 169;
LCS(L) 84 65, 66, 224, 259, 264, LSM(R) 194 256, 257, 258, 323 112th 169; 114th 169; 115th 169;
266, 267, 273 –274, 323 LSM(R) 195 246, 254, 255, 256, 323 117th 169; 118th 169
LCS(L) 85 61, 279 LSM(R) 197 231 Mary A. Livermore 285, 324
LCS(L) 86 273, 283, 290, 292 LSM(R) 198 231, 275 Maryland BB 46 136, 137, 211, 220 –
LCS(L) 87 67, 224, 274 LST 268 167, 168 221, 318, 321
LCS(L) 88 267, 268, 323 LST 447 211, 219, 321 Massey DD 778 67
LCS(L) 89 253, 279 LST 460 147, 151, 321 masukotto ningyo 16, 20
LCS(L) 90 288 LST 472 147, 148, 149, 150, 319 Matsueda, Lt. (jg) Yoshihisa 76, 170
LCS(L) 92 55 LST 477 180, 230 Matsuo, Flight PO1c Isao 18, 264
LCS(L) 94 290, 291 LST 479 147, 151 Matthew P. Deady 126, 128, 318
LCS(L) 109 224, 267 LST 534 294, 324 McCambell, Cmdr. David 113, 114
LCS(L) 110 224 LST 548 165, 320 McCandless, Cmdr. Bruce 61
LCS(L) 111 224, 253, 273 LST 599 211, 321 McCarty, Cmdr. W. P. 156
LCS(L) 113 253 LST 605 147, 319 McClelland DE 750 273
LCS(L) 114 224, 227, 230, 231, 267 LST 610 164, 165, 320 McCool, Lt. Richard M. 291–292,
LCS(L) 115 51, 206, 227, 231 LST 700 167, 168, 320 293
LCS(L) 116 206, 231, 239, 241, 322 LST 724 206, 207, 321 McCord DD 539 117
LCS(L) 117 253 LST 735 164 McCornock, Cmdr. Samuel A. 145
LCS(L) 118 206, 259 LST 737 144, 319 McCoy Reynolds DE 440 182
LCS(L) 119 206, 286, 327 LST 738 147–148, 319 McEwen, Lt. A. G. 209
LCS(L) 122 55, 290, 291–292, 324 LST 749 319 McGowan DD 678 252
LCS(L) 123 283 LST 750 152 McGuire, Maj. Thomas B. 113, 114
LCS(L) 125 295 LST 808 275 –276, 323 McGuire, MM Mac 169
LCS(L) 129 295, 296 LST 809 180 –181 McGuirk Lt. W. E. 161
LCS(L) 130 295 LST 884 206, 207 McNair DD 679 228
LCT 876 211, 321 LST 911 168 McNealy, S1c Chester Lee 219
LCT 1075 145, 319 LST 912 162, 320 McNeese, S1c William H. 130
Lee, S1c Carl Winton 132 LST 925 163 –164, 320 Meister, Lt. (jg) Harry G. 172
Leland E. Thomas DE 420 175 LST 1028 164, 320 Melvin DD 680 252
Leonidas Merritt 128, 318 Luce DD 522 47, 259, 323 Miami CL 89 235
LeRay Wilson DE 414 118, 163, 320 Lunga Point CVE 94 178 –179, 320 midget submarine see Kairyu and
Leutze DD 481 125, 163, 164, 211, Koryu
212, 215, 321 M. S. Tjisadane 272, 323 Miki, Lt. Cmdr. Tadanao 29 –30
Lewis L. Dyche 156, 319 MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 68, 107 Mikuriya, Lt. (jg) Takuji 25
Lexington CV 16 128, 129, 130, 318 MacDonald, Master William 248 Miller, Ens. J. G. 37
Liberty Ships 4, 125 –126, 127, 252 Macomb DMS 23 217, 240, 253 – Mindoro Resupply Unit 152
Liddle APD 60 143, 144, 319 254, 323 Mindoro 149 –153, 154
Liloan 136 Maddox DD 731 177–178, 320 Minneapolis CA 36 136, 160, 320
Lindsey DM 32 210, 233, 234, 322 Maeda, VAdm. Minoru 191 Minot Victory 232, 322
Lipan ATF 85 293 Mahan DD 364 42, 140–142, 143, 319 Mississinewa AO 59 19, 182–184,
Little DD 803 254 –255, 323 Maizuru 98 185, 318
Logan Victory 321 Makin Island CVE 93 154, 178 Mississippi BB 41 124, 152, 160, 163,
Long DMS 12 160, 230 Manila Bay CVE 61 118, 157–158, 319 288, 320, 324
Loud, Cmdr. Wayne R. 156 Manila Bay Entrance Defense Force Missouri BB 63 228 –229, 238, 322
Lough DE 586 169, 170 75 Mitate Unit No. 2 178
Louisville CA 28 156, 160 –161, 289, Mannert L. Abele DD 733 39, 231– Mitchell, Lt. Harris 256
319, 324 232, 322 Mitsubishi Shusei 301, 302, 304
Loundsbury, Lt. Cmdr. Ralph E. 208 Marcus Daly 138, 145, 318, 319 Mitsugi, Tadanao 30
Lowry DD 770 67, 258 –259, 284, Marcus Island CVE 77 118, 144, 147, Mitsuhashi, Lt. Kentaro 16, 17
285, 323 162, 319 Miwachi, Tsuko 20
Loy APD 56 283, 324 Marine Corps Air Units: MAG-31 Miyagi, Yoshi 25
LSD 6 292 246; MAG-45 183; VMF-212 290; Miyako Jima 191, 194
LSM 14 261 VMF-221 268; VMF-224 37, 240, Miyazaki, Maj. Gen. Shuichi 45
LSM 18 194 256; VMF-314 37; VMF-322 211, Miyoshi, Maj. Gen. 26
LSM 19 144 285; VMF-323 38, 240, 264; M-kanemono 99
LSM 20 140, 319 VMF(N) 543 208 Moale DD 693 147, 148
374 Index

Mobile CL 63 185 Newcomb, Cmdr. R. M. 295 PC 804 295

Moebus, Capt. L. A. 180 Newcomb DD 586 125, 161, 211– PC 851 240
Momm, Cmdr. Albert O. 217 212, 213, 214, 295, 320 PC 853 233
Monadnock CM 9 168 Nicholas DD 449 136 PC 1129 169 –170, 320
Mongol invasion 7, 8 Nicholas J. Sinnet 131, 318 PC 1603 282, 324
Montpelier CL 57 135 –136, 318 Nicholson DD 442 255 PCE(R) 852 243, 278
Moore, Cmdr. H. G. 228 Nihon Shoki 10 PCE(R) 855 263
Moosebrugger, Capt. Frederick 217 Niigata 98 Pennsylvania BB 38 125, 152
Morris, John 10 Nimitz, Adm. Chester 107 People’s Rights Movement 10
Morris DD 417 211, 212, 213, 214, Nishimura, VAdm. Shoji 117 Perdeck, S1c Al 269
216, 321 Nishina, Lt. (jg) Sekio 90, 183 –184 Petrof Bay CVE 80 117, 118, 122, 229
Morrison DD 560 54, 62, 256 –257, Nitobe, Inazo 9 PGM 10 217
258, 323 Noah, S1c W. C. 248 PGM 11 217
Morrison R. Waite 128, 130, 318 Noda, Capt.Yoshihiko 87 PGM 20 267
Mount McKinley AGC 7 253 Nonaka, Lt. Cmdr. Goro 31, 35, 36 Phil, Capt. Kim San 47
Mount Olympus AGC 8 168 Philip, Capt. George 292
Mugford DD 389 140, 319 O’Brien DD 725 142, 161, 200 –202, Philip DD 498 152, 153, 163, 164
Mullaney, Cmdr. Baron J. 265 320, 321 Phoenix CL 46 125
Mullany DD 528 206, 211, 214 –217, O’Connor, EMC 3/c Richard E. 258 pilot training (Japan) 49 –53
321 O’Neill DE 188 278, 279, 323 Pinkney APH 2 232, 249, 322
Munsee AT 107 235 Oba, Cmdr. Saichi 295 Pittenger, FC3c Charles J. 258
Murakami, Lt. (jg) Katsutomo 182 Oberrender DE 344 118, 263, 323 Pontus H. Ross 95, 182, 320
Muramatsu, CPO Minoru 166 Ogawa, Kiyoshi 267, 268 –269 Pope, Lt. A. J. 115
Musashi, Miyamoto 9 Ohira, Lt. Cmdr. 31 Porcupine IX 126 153, 319
Musashi, PO1c Takao 26 Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko 25 Porter DD 800 42, 306
Musashi 117 Ohta, Lt. (jg) Mitsuo 29 –30 Porterfield DD 682 212
Mustin DD 413 136, 250 Oikawa, Adm. Koshiro 48, 188 Portland CA 33 42
Oka 17, 27, 231, 232, 260, 261, 268, Potts, Col. Ramsey D. 69
Nachi 128 304, 305; development 29 –30; Pratt, Capt. J. L. 180
Naerabout, Master J. 272 K-I trainer 31, 32 missions 37, Presley DE 371 169
Nagasaki 98 38, 39; testing 30; Model 11 30, Preston DD 795 42
Nagatsuka, Flying Officer Ryuji 23, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 304; Model 22 Pringle DD 477 27, 136, 152, 240 –
52, 53 33, 304 243, 319, 322
Nago Bay 252 Okabe, Flight CPO Konichi 34, 49 Pritchett DD 561 55, 198, 295 –296,
Naha 88, 227 Okabe, Capt. Shigami 49, 88 324
Nakagusuku Bay 80, 87, 88, 247, 248, Okamura, Cmdr. Motohara 22, 31 PT 75 151, 319
282, 284, 285, 288, 292, 294, 297 Okazaki, Teruyuki 10 PT 77 151
Nakajima, Lt. (jg) Kenjiro 76, 79, Okubo, Masazo 34 PT 84 147, 151
170 Oldendorf, VAdm. Jesse B. 117, PT 106 175
Nakajima, Cmdr. Tadashi 168 154, 159 PT 223 151
Nakajima Tsurugi 41, 301, 304, 307 Omae, Capt. Toshikazu 48, 187 PT 224 151
Nakajima Kikka 301, 303, 304 Ommaney Bay CVE 79 118, 154, PT 230 151
Nakamura, 1st Lt. 86 156, 319 PT 297 150
Nakamura, Ens. Sadeo 42 Onishi, VAdm. Takajiro 22, 45, 46, PT 298 151
Namikaze 96 191 PT 300 147, 151, 319
Nashville CL 43 125, 146, 319 Ono, Sgt. 44 PT 323 144, 319
Nasugbu 169, 171 Orca AVP 49 154, 319 PT 332 152, 319
Natoma Bay CVE 62 118, 157, 290, Orestes AGP 10 153, 319 PT 335 175
324 Orita, Lt. Cmdr. Zenji 183 PT 342 175
Navy Air Units (U.S.): CAG-13 Ormoc Bay 138, 145, 146 PT 343 175
123; CAG-18 123; CAG-19 128; Otis Skinner 167, 320 PT 532 144
CAG-21 123; CAG-40 66; CAG- Otsujima 93, 183 Purdy, Cmdr. A. M. 125
80 176; VC-5 120; VC-90 38; VF- Otsuka, Lt. (jg) Akio 22 Purdy DD 734 125, 217, 227, 229 –
9 256; VF-10 239; VF-13 115; VF- Outline of the Operations Plan of 230, 231, 322
15 114; VF-17 37; VBF-17 37; VF-30 the Imperial Army and Navy 187 Putnam, Cpl. W. H. 234
37; VF-85 67, 264; VF-86 37 The Outline of the Operations Plan
Navy Directive No. 513 (1 March of the Imperial Army and Navy Quapaw ATF 110 116
1945) 48 (1945) 47
Navy Directive No. 513 (20 March Oyamada, Lt. Cmdr. Shoichi 76, 170 Radar Picket Stations 222; 1 59,
1945) 48, 188 Ozawa, VAdm. Jisaburo 69, 70, 115 223, 229, 231, 238 –239, 250, 256;
Navy Directive No. 516 (8 April 2 67, 223, 224, 231, 240, 251, 292;
1945) 188 Paducah Victory 253 4 224, 226; 5 267; 9 55, 62, 223,
Navy Directive No. 540 48 Pakana ATF 108 240 253, 274, 275; 9A 198, 295; 10
Navy Directive No. 5410 (March Palmer DMS 5 4, 161, 320 254, 256, 259; 11A 65, 287; 12
1945) 188 Panamint AGC 13 272 232, 251, 254; 14 231, 237, 240 –
Nestor ARB 6 282 Parker, Cmdr. A. E. 232 241, 246, 259; 15 267, 279; 15A
Nevada BB 36 202, 203, 321 Pathfinder AGS 1 262, 323 284, 290; 16 279; 16A 286 –287
New Mexico BB 40 136, 152, 158 – Patoka AO 49 184 Radford, RAdm. A. W. 199, 251
159, 160, 273, 319 Pavlic APD 70 278, 284, 287 Rall DE 304 185, 232, 322
New Orleans CA 32 114 PC 623 169 Ralph Talbot DD 390 147, 150 –151,
New York BB 34 235, 322 PC 803 295 248, 250, 319, 322
 Index 375

Randolph CV 15 185, 186, 320 Sato, Lt. (jg) Akira 166, 183 Stadler, Lt. (jg) Herbert 144
Ransom AM 283 245, 322 Saunders, Lt. R. H. 259 Stafford DE 411 158, 319
Rathburne APD 25 248, 322, 324 Saunter AM 295 142 Stanly DD 478 146, 231, 322
Rawlings, VAdm H. B. 69 Savo Island CVE 78 118, 154, 157, 319 Starr AKA 67 227, 321
Raymond DE 341 118, 120 SC 699 45 Stephen Potter DD 538 200
Reber, Ens. J. V. Jr. 37 SC 744 136, 318 Sterrett DD 407 152, 214, 225, 226,
Rednour APD 102 284 SC 1338 284 321
Register APD 92 278, 323 Schmidt, Cmdr. L. E. 63 Stevens, S1c Patrick Henry 132
Reid DD 369 145 –146, 319 Schmitz, Lt. Paul J. 219 Stevens DD 479 152
Relief AH1 282 Scout AM 296 142 Stewart, Master James A. 285
religion (Japanese) 23 –25 Segundo Ruiz Belvis 279, 323 Stormes DD 780 279, 323
Reno CL 96 115, 318 Seizo, Yasunori 268 Stroetzel, Lt. Donald S. 136
Renraku Tai 73 Seki, Ens. Toyooki 295 Struble, RAdm. A. D. 141, 142, 146
Renshaw DD 499 136 Seki, Lt. Yukio 45, 118, 295 Stumph, RAdm. Felix B. 118, 157
Rescue AH 18 297 sennin-bari 16, 18, 19 Sturdevant, Lt. (jg) H. W. 37
Rich, Lt. (jg) Elwood M. 295 71st Totsugekitai 311 Sturmer, Lt. Frederick E. 283
Richard M. Rowell DE 403 117 Shackle ARS 9 278, 294 Submarines, Japanese: I-8 96; I-15
Richard P. Leary DD 664 125, 161, Shamrock Bay CVE 84 162 183; I-36 96, 182; I-37 96, 181, 182;
213, 319 Shangri-La CV 38 265 I-44 96, 181; I-47 96, 97, 166, 182,
Richard S. Bull DE 402 117 Shannon DM 25 63, 201, 208, 255 – 183, 295; I-48 96, 181; I-53 96, 97,
Richard W. Suesens DE 342 118, 256, 282 295; I-56 96, 81, 310; I-57 310; I-
166 –167, 169, 320 Shaw DD 373 138, 139, 169 58 97, 295, 310; I-59 310; I-62
Riddle DE 185 322 Shea DM 30 237, 259 –260, 323 310; I-156 96; I-157 96; I-158 96;
Rielly, QM2c Bob 27 Sherman, RAdm. Frederick C. 128, I-159 96; I-162 96; I-165 96, 181;
Robert H. Smith DM 23 65, 200, 321 135 I-361 96; I-363 96, 295; I-366 96,
Robinson DD 562 125, 163, 164, 320 Shima, Capt. Katsuo 47 295; I-367 96, 295; I-368 96, 181;
Rodman DMS 21 210, 211, 217–218, Shima, VAdm. Kiyohide 117 I-370; 96, 181; I-372 96; I-373 96
321 Shimamura, Flight PO1c Ataru 36 Success AM 310 219
Rooks DD 804 225 Shimbu Tokubetsu-Kogekitai 8 Suffolk AKA 69 209
Rooney, Yeoman John 283 Shimoyama, Lt. Gen. Takuma 195 Sugawara, Lt. Gen. Michio 70, 188,
Roosevelt, Pres. Franklin 107 Shimpu Tokubetsu-Kogekitai 8 194, 195, 197
Roper APD 20 281–282 Shinano 34 Sugita, Col. Ichiji 47, 187
Ruddock, RAdm. Theodore D. Jr. Shinkai 99, 100 Suicide Force Combat Methods
136, 146 Shintani, Capt. K. 311 Training Manual 9, 57, 61
Rudyerd Bay CVE 81 178 Shinyo 4, 73 –80, 77, 78, 79, 80, 89, suicide soldiers 102, 103, 104
Russell DD 414 169 236, 245, 246, 247, 254, 262, suicide swimmers 103, 105
Russo-Japanese War 10 274, 301, 304; deployment 74 – Surigao Strait 117
80, 88, 243, 308; development The Sullivans DD 537 200, 271
S. Hall Young 252, 323 74; technical drawings 75 –76; Suwanee CVE 27 117, 118, 122, 318
Saginaw Bay CVE 82 117, 178 units 9th 76, 170; 10th 76; 11th 76; Suzukawa, Hiroshi 90
St. George AV 16 263, 323 12th; 76, 78, 163, 170, 173; 13th Suzuki, Lt. Gen. 80
St. Lo CVE 63 118, 119, 120, 318 76, 77; 22nd 80; 24th 80 Suzuki, Yukihisa 21, 26, 99
St. Louis CL 49 135, 136, 137, 211, 318 Shiokaze 96 Suzutsuki 220
Sakai, Saburo 42, 49 Shoemaker, Capt. J. M. 115 Swallow AM 65 245, 322
Sakamoto, Flight PO1c 295 Shropshire H.M.A.S. 125, 160 Swett, Capt. 268
Sakishima Gunto 191 Shubrick DD 639 286 –287, 324
Sakura Jima 99 Sigsbee DD 502 235 –236, 322 Tacloban 74, 108, 110, 111, 114, 126,
Salamaua CVE 96 168, 320 Sims APD 50 273, 275, 279, 281, 128, 136
Salt Lake City CA 25 204 323, 324 Taffy 1, 2, 3 see Task Units 77.4.1,
Sampson DD 394 44 –45 Sino-Japanese War 10 77.4.2, 77.4.3
Samuel B. Roberts DE 823 118 Smethurst, Richard J. 19 Tahara, Lt. 163
Samuel Miles DE 183 229, 321 Smith DD 378 5, 42, 43, 44, 143, taiatari o kurawasu 9
samurai 5 145, 318 Taka Hamare 236
San Bernadino Strait 117 Smith, Lt. Clinton 256 Taka Shiki Island 87
San Diego CL 53 251, 252 Smith, Lt. Harry L. 171, 230 Taka Shima 282
San Fabian 165 Smith, Ens. W. H. Jr. 37 Takahashi, Capt. Isao 163
San Jacinto CVL 30 114, 115, 123, Sonoma ATO 12 45, 115 –116, 318 Takahashi, Flight PO1c 295
220, 223, 321 South Dakota BB 57 42–43 Takata, Maj. 44
San Jose 108, 141, 152 Southard DMS 10 147, 161, 320 Take 96
San Juan CL 54 42 Spear, Lt. (jg) J.A. 289 Taluga AO 62 237, 322
San Pedro Bay 115, 117, 126, 143, Special Attack Corps 8, 20 –21, 25, Tamano 98
145, 152, 160 26, 27, 47, 52, 63 Tan Operation 48, 185
Sandoval APA 194 285 –286 Special Attack Force see Special Tanaka, Lt. Col. Koji 43, 45
Sangamon CVE 26 117, 261, 323 Attack Corps Taniguchi, Probational Officer
Santee CVE 29 117, 118, 122, 318 Spectacle AM 305 262–263, 280 – Toshio 165
Sarangani Bay 74 281, 323 Tanikawa, Maj. Gen. Kazuo 69
Saratoga CV 3 180, 181, 320 Spencer WPG 36 152 Tanzla, Col.V. J. 209
Saroch, E. Jr. Lt. 286 Sprague, RAdm. Clifton A. F. 46, Task Force 38 132, 176, 297
Sasaki, Hachiro 25 118 Task Force 54 202, 220, 232, 234
Sasano, Lt. Masayuki 311 Sprague, RAdm. Thomas L. 363, 117 Task Force 58 34, 185, 220, 238, 274
Sato, Flight PO1c Katsumi 183 Sproston DD 577 279 Task Force 61 42
376 Index

Task Force 77 154 Toyoda, Adm. Soemu 17, 70, 188, West Virginia BB 48 136, 152, 160,
Task Force 79 162 191, 192, 195 206 –208, 321
Task Group 38.2 123, 132 Toyozumi, Lt. (jg) Kazuhisa 182 Westralia H.M.A.S. 162
Task Group 38.3 128, 135 TP 114 136 Weyler, RAdm. G. L. 125
Task Group 38.4 114, 123 Tracy DM 19 209 –210 White Plains CVE 66 118, 120, 121,
Task Group 51.5 232 Trathen DD 530 117 318
Task Group 52.6.3 236 Treasure Island 286 Whitehurst DE 634 235, 322
Task Group 53.4 209 Truman, Pres. Harry S 293, 316 Wickes DD 578 246
Task Group 58.1 37 Tsuchiura Navy Fliers School 49, Wilkinson, VAdm. T. S. 162, 168
Task Group 58.3 227 93 William A. Coulter 128, 131 318
Task Group 58.4 199, 228, 238, 251 Tsurumi 74 William Ahear 319
Task Group 58.6 243 Tulagi CVE 72 158 William C. Cole DE 641 278 –279,
Task Group 58.8 235 Twiggs DD 591 146, 212, 251, 291, 281, 323
Task Group 70.1.4 151 322, 324 William D. Porter DD 579 4, 290,
Task Group 77.1 124, 125 Tyrrell AKA 80 208, 321 291, 292, 296, 305, 324
Task Group 77.12 150 Tyus, Louis C. 129 William S. Ladd 144 –145, 319
Task Group 77.2 35, 136, 154, 161 William Seiverlling DE 441 282
Task Group 77.2.1 160 Uehara, Pvt. 2c Tokusaburo 103 William Sharon 147, 152, 319
Task Group 78.3 138, 146, 150 Uemura, Lt. Masahisa 20 Williams, Col. L. O. 209
Task Group 78.3.13 151 Ugaki, VAdm. Matome 185, 192, Williams, Lt. G. B. 280
Task Group 78.3.15 152 193, 300 Williamson, Lt. Cmdr. J. A. 264
Task Unit 32.19.12 288 Uhlmann DD 687 251 Willmarth DE 638 219
Task Unit 50.18.7 228 Ujina 85, 86 Wilson, Cmdr. G. R. 224
Task Unit 51.7 208 U-kanemono 99, 100 Wilson DD 408 152, 153, 236, 322
Task Unit 51.92 209 Ulithi Atoll 48, 177, 178, 182, 185, Winfield, Lt. (jg) Murray 37
Task Unit 52.1.3 261 186, 228, 229, 232 Winterberry AN 56 182
Task Unit 52.19.3 261, 273 Umezawa, Capt. Hiroshi 87 Witter DE 636 211, 212–213, 321
Task Unit 52.2.4 180 Underhill DE 682 95, 182, 295 –296, Woods, Lt. Edgar H. 143
Task Unit 77.12.7 139 324 Woodson, Lt. W. E. 255
Task Unit 77.2.1 158 Underwater Demolition Team No. Wylie, Cmdr. W. N. 279
Task Unit 77.4.1 (Taffy 1) 117, 118, 8 158
122 United States Strategic Bombing Yahagi 220
Task Unit 77.4.2 (Taffy 2) 117, 118, Survey (USSBS) 190, 211 Yamaki, Capt. 9, 49
157 Uraga 99 Yamamoto, Maj. Gen. Kenji 194
Task Unit 77.4.3 (Taffy 3) 118 Uranosaki 99 Yamamoto, Capt. Hisanori 88
Task Unit 78.2.9 115 Uriah M. Rose 277, 323 Yamamoto, 2d Lt. Nishi 208
Task Unit 78.3.8 145 Ute ATF 76 267, 283, 286, 290 Yamamura, Flight CPO Keisuke 37
Task Unit 78.34 147 Utsunomiya, Ens. Hidieichi 182 Yamana, Masao 30
Tatum APD 81 286 –287, 324 Yamato 219 –220, 221, 234
Tawakoni ATF 114 233, 240, 282 Valencia, Lt. Eugene 256 Yamato daimashii 69
Taylor, Lt. Cmdr. C. B. Jr. 232 Van Valkenburgh DD 656 206, 246, Yamazaki, Lt. (jg) Shigeo 76
Technical Air Intelligence Center 275, 287 Yasukuni Shrine 22, 23, 24, 25, 36,
30 Vaught, FCR 3/c James E. 258 47
Tekesta ATF 93 212, 276, 280, 281 Vayda, Ray 161 YMS 31 236, 260, 321, 322
Telfair APA 210 208, 209, 321 Victory ships 126 YMS 47 168
Ten-go 47, 48, 67, 70, 187, 188, 211 Vigilance AM 324 235, 263 YMS 81 321
Tennessee BB 43 234, 322 Voegelin, Lt. Cmdr. B. D. 288 YMS 89 260
Tennis, Ens. 259 YMS 327 260
Terai, Cmdr. Yoshimori 48, 187 Wadsworth DD 516 245, 250, YMS 331 236, 260, 321, 322
Teramoto, Lt. Cmdr. Iwao 182 322 YMS 427 260
Teraoka, VAdm. Kimpei 178, 191 Wake Island CVE 65 211, 321 Yokohama 98, 99
Terror CM 5 252, 323 Waldron DD 699 275 Yokosuka 74, 98, 99, 311
Thatcher DD 514 294, 323, 324 Walker DD 517 251 Yokosuka First Naval Air Technical
Third Fleet 154 Walker DD 723 141, 159, 290, 319 Arsenal 31
Thomas E. Fraser DM 24 65, 274 Waller DD 466 136 York, S1c William Ellis 132
Thomas Nelson 128, 318 Walter C. Wann DE 412 118, 231, Yorktown CV 10 199, 228, 256
Thunderbolt Corps see Aircraft 322 Yoshikawa, Eiji 9
Units, Japanese Navy; 722 Naval Walter Colton 292, 324 Yoshimoto, Lt. (jg) Kentaro 182
Air Corps War Hawk AP 168 164, 320 YTB 404 276
Ticonderoga CV 14 176 –177, 320 War Plan Orange 107 YTL 488 276
Tokashiki Island 88 Ward APD 16 142, 319 Yukikaze 220
Tokko-tai 4, 7, 8, 25, 204, 316 Warren, Cmdr. J. T. 159, 160 Yume ATF 94 209
Toko, Pvt. Guy 26 Wasp CV 18 199, 320 Yunokawa, Lt. Morimasa 34
Tokubetsu-Kogekitai see Tokko-tai Watanabe, Ens. Kozo 183
Tokugawa 8 Watch Hill 160 Zamami Jima 87, 254
Tokuno Shima 193, 195, 197, 208 Weaver DE 741 185 Zampa Misaki 204, 232
Tomioka, RAdm. Sadatoshi 188 Webb, Capt. Richard 147 Zeilin APA 3 168, 320
Tomonaga, Lt. Cmdr. 42 Weller, Capt. O. A. 199 Zellars DD 777 234, 322
Tori Shima 260 Wesson DE 184 225 –226, 321