Visual Biometrics
Visual Biometrics
course be lost, stolen, or duplicated. The same goes for Face-recognition technology
things that you know, such as passwords or personal ID As Figure 1 shows, all face-recognition technologies
numbers. Biometrics relies on who you are—on one of share certain commonalities, such as emphasizing those
any number of unique characteristics that you can’t lose sections of the face that are less susceptible to alteration,
or forget. including the upper outlines of the eye sockets, areas sur-
Most biometric systems can be set to varying degrees rounding the cheekbones, and sides of the mouth.1
of security, which gives you more flexibility to determine Facial-scan technology works well with standard PC
access levels. Increasing security in biometric systems video capture cameras and generally requires cameras
sometimes makes them more restrictive, resulting in an that can capture images at least at 320 × 240 resolution
increased false rejection rate. The net effect of false and at least 3 to 5 frames per second. More frames per
rejection rates is usually nothing more than inconve- second, along with higher resolution, will lead to better
nience. However, if security is set too low, the false performance in verification or identification, but higher
acceptance rate might increase, which turns out to be rates typically aren’t required for basic one-to-one veri-
potentially far more serious since it involves an unau- fication systems that compare your face scan to a tem-
thorized person gaining access to protected resources. plate you’ve previously stored on the verifying system.
Furthermore, many companies use biometric securi- Because such cameras cost as little as $50.00, and
ty in addition to standard passwording systems—as a demo versions of leading vendors’ software are freely
layer of additional identity verification. Of course, many available, facial recognition is one of the few biometrics
biometric systems are expensive and sacrifice some mea- with which you can experiment on a limited budget. For
sure of personal privacy. To verify your face, finger, or facial recognition at long distances—especially for crowd
iris, you must have some personal data on file in the ver- recognition systems (see Figure 2)—a strong correlation
ifying system—personal data that can be stolen or made exists between camera quality and system capabilities.2
public. But biometric systems are becoming increasing- And for large-scale one-to-many searches—where you
ly popular both as standalone security systems and as might be comparing a face scan to several thousand face
added security largely because of one trait: convenience. templates to discover somebody’s identity—processor
speed is critical. But getting started
doing one-to-one verification can be
almost as cost effective as a standard
passwording system.
Face-recognition process
As with all biometric technologies,
1 Visionics’ sample capture, feature extraction,
FaceIt face- template comparison, and matching
recognition define the process flow of facial-scan
biometric sys- technology. The sample capture
tem creating a process will generally consist of 20
face template. to 30 seconds during which a facial-
recognition system will take several
Courtesy of Visionics
Courtesy of Visionics
rejected. This comparison is based on the similarity of
the newly created template against the template on file.
One variant of this process is the use of facial-scan tech-
nology in forensics. The templates come from static pho-
tographs of known criminals and are stored in large
databases. The system performs a one-to-many search 2 Face-recognition software used to recognize individuals in a crowd—like
of these records to determine if the detainee is using an the kind used in Las Vegas or at high-security events—typically scans
alias. If the database has only a handful of enrollees, this crowds actively and tries to match the scans with a large database of
kind of search isn’t terribly processor intensive. But as known criminals. Crowd scanning technology, like Visionics’ FaceIt software
databases grow large, into the tens and hundreds of shown here, requires high-end video capture devices and fast processors.
thousands, this task becomes more difficult. The system
might only narrow the search to several likely candi-
dates and then require human intervention at the final track them and crop them out of the scene, matching
verification stages. the face against a watch list. FaceIt can also compress a
Another variable in identification is the dynamic face print into the 84-byte template for use in smart
between the target subjects and capture device. cards, bar codes, and other limited-size storage devices.
Standard verification typically assumes a cooperative FaceIt uses what the company calls local-feature
audience, one consisting of subjects motivated to use analysis to represent facial images in terms of local
the system correctly. Facial-scan systems, depending on building blocks. Visionics developed this mathematical
the exact type of implementation, might also have to be technique based on the understanding that all facial
optimized for uncooperative subjects. Uncooperative images can be synthesized from an irreducible set of ele-
subjects are unaware that a biometric system is in place, ments, not what you might assume to be the basic ele-
or don’t care, and make no effort to be recognized. ments of the face, such as the eye, nose, or mouth. These
Facial-scan technologies are more capable of identify- elements are derived from a representative ensemble of
ing cooperative subjects. faces using statistical techniques that span multiple pix-
els and represent universal facial shapes but aren’t com-
Visionics’ FaceIt technology monly known facial features.
Visionics FaceIt technology is a face-recognition bio- According to Visionics, more facial building elements
metric system that can automatically detect human pres- exist than facial parts. However, synthesizing a given
ence, locate and track faces, extract face images, and facial image to a high degree of precision requires only a
perform identification by matching against a database small subset (12 to 40 characteristic elements) of the total
of people it has seen before. The technology is typically available set. Identity is determined not only by which
used for one-to-many searching, verification, monitor- elements are characteristic but also by the manner in
ing, and surveillance. To determine someone’s identity which they’re geometrically combined—that is, by their
in identification mode, FaceIt computes the degree of relative positions. FaceIt maps an individual’s identity
overlap between the live face print and those associat- into a mathematical formula—which the company calls
ed with known individuals stored in a database of facial a face print—that the system can match and compare to
images. The system can return a list of possible individ- others. According to Visionics, the face print resists
uals ordered in diminishing score or it can simply return changes in lighting, skin tone, eyeglasses, facial expres-
the top match and an associated confidence level. sion, and hair variations. The face print contains the infor-
In verification mode, the face print can be stored on mation that distinguishes a face from millions of others.
a smart card or in a computerized record. FaceIt match-
es the live print to the stored one. If the confidence score Fingerprint-recognition technology
exceeds a certain threshold, then the match is success- For decades, fingerprinting was the common ink-and-
ful and the system verifies the user’s identity. FaceIt can roll procedure used when booking suspects or conduct-
find human faces anywhere in the field of view and at ing criminal investigations. Today, forensic scientists use
any distance—depending on the quality of the video fingerprint applications in large-scale one-to-many
capture device being used—and it can continuously searches on databases of up to millions of fingerprints. In
4 July/August 2002
return detailed data. Silicon chips are small enough to template and store it in memory or
be integrated into many devices that can’t accommo- on disk.
date optical technology. Like many fingerprint-biometric
Ultrasound technology, although considered perhaps technologies, the actual fingerprint
the most accurate of the finger-scan technologies, isn’t image is never stored and can’t be
yet widely used. Ultrasound can penetrate dirt and constructed from templates. To iden-
residue, countering a main drawback to optical tech- tify or verify a fingerprint, a propri-
Conclusion
Biometrics technology has come a long way from sim-
pler forms of systems security. But are biometrics-based
systems more secure or do they simply require crackers
to become more proficient at breaking into systems? To
recognize your fingerprint requires that a template of
your fingerprint actually be present in the system that
diameter iris, Daugman’s algorithms provide 3.4 bits of verifies your access. If you want to pass as somebody
data per square millimeter. This information density else, presumably you’d have to either have that person’s
means that each iris can have 266 unique spots—com- finger with you or you’d need to change the verifying
pared to 10 to 60 unique spots for traditional biometric template residing in the system that verifies your print.
technologies.7 Cracking into a system and replacing a legitimate
The first step in scanning an iris is locating it with a print with your own isn’t easy to do unless the system’s
dedicated camera no more than three feet from the eye security is poor. While biometric proponents stress the
(see Figure 6). After the camera situates the eye, Iridian’s strength of their proprietary technologies or biometrics
algorithm locates the outer and inner edges of the iris in general, no system is ever completely secure. Bruce
and then proceeds to analyze it. Iridian’s algorithm uses Schneier once pointed out that all computer security is
2D Gabor wavelets8—transforms used typically in visu- like putting a wooden stake in front of your house and
alization applications—to filter and map iris segments hoping that tresspassers will run into it.9 Contrary to
into hundreds of vectors. The wavelets assign values what many biometric proponents would have us
drawn from the orientation and spatial frequency of believe—that biometric security outclasses traditional
select areas of the iris and they then form an IrisCode. forms of security—all biometric systems are, after all,
According to Daugman, the equal-error rate (the point at another form of computer security with its own set of
which the likelihood of a false accept and false reject are strengths and weaknesses.
the same) is one in 1.2 million for IrisCodes. Biometrics effectively trade some amount of privacy
When the pupil expands and contracts—something and cost effectiveness for ultimate convenience—and
that occurs naturally with any change in lighting—it these systems are certainly no less secure than standard
skews and stretches the iris. Iridian’s algorithms account passwording systems. Passwording systems are cheap.
for such alteration after locating the iris boundaries at Complex biometric scanning equipment is usually
the outer and inner edges. Daugman draws the analogy expensive. But biometrics seems to be where the indus-
6 July/August 2002
try is headed. Aside from the Orwellian connotations,
biometrics systems offer an enormous amount of con-
venience to users. And, in the present political climate, 7 Panasonic’s
it’s hard to counter the argument that we should adopt Authenticam
biometric systems simply as additional layers of securi- uses Iridian
ty on top of traditional passwording systems. ■ Technologies’
Private ID soft-
ware to offer
References one-to-many
1. H. Wechsler et al., Face Recognition: From Theory to Appli- identification
cation, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1998. for applications
2. P.J. Phillips et al., The Feret Evaluation Methodology for Face- such as informa-
Recognition Algorithms, NISTIR 6264, Nat’l Inst. of Stan- tion access or
Courtesy of Panasonic
dards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Md., 1998, even videocon-
http://www.itl.nist.gov/iaui/894.03/pubs.html#face. ferencing.
3. A.K. Jain et al., “An Identity-Authentication System Using
Fingerprints,” Proc. EuroSpeech 97, IEEE CS Press, Los
Alamitos, Calif., 1997, pp. 1348-1388.
4. N. Ratha et al., “A Real-Time Matching System for Large
Fingerprint Databases,” IEEE Trans. Pattern Analysis and 8. D. Gabor, “Theory of Communication,” J. Institute of Elec-
Machine Intelligence, vol. 18, no. 8, Aug. 1996, pp. 799-813. trical Engineers, vol. 93, no. 26, Nov. 1946, pp. 429-457.
5. K. Karu and A.K. Jain, “Fingerprint Classification,” Pattern 9. B. Schneier, “Cryptographic Design Vulnerabilities,” Com-
Recognition, vol. 29, no. 3, 1996, pp. 389-404. puter, vol. 31, no. 9, Sept. 1998, pp. 29-33.
6. L. Flom and A. Safir, Iris Recognition System, US patent
4,641,349, Patent and Trademark Office, Washington, Contact Kirk L. Kroeker at [email protected].
D.C., 1987.
7. J.D. Daugman, “High-Confidence Visual Recognition of Contact editor Michael Potel at [email protected].
Persons by a Test of Statistical Independence,” IEEE Trans.
Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, vol. 15, no. 11, For more articles on biometrics, see the July 2002 issue of
Nov. 1993, pp. 1148-1160. Computer.