Gambling, Crime and Society

James Banks

Gambling, Crime
and Society
James Banks
Law and Criminology
Sheffield Hallam University
Sheffield, United Kingdom

ISBN 978-1-137-57993-5 ISBN 978-1-137-57994-2 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57994-2
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 Acknowledgements

I wish to express my ongoing appreciation of all my colleagues at the

Department of Law and Criminology, Sheffield Hallam University, who
continue to support my research endeavours. In particular, Katherine
Albertson, Richard Lynch, Jennifer Sloan, Nick Addis, Andrew Fowler,
Seamus Burns and Tony Murphy have offered significant words of
encouragement throughout the writing of this book. Beyond academia,
I would like to thank my friends and family who have provided much
support. Matt Rumpel, for bleary-eyed conversation and much amuse-
ment during our strolls across invariably muddy fields in wet weather.
Dougie, Alice, Grace and Archie, Andrew and Kathleen, Pat and
Richard, Owen, Georgia, Ben, Poppy and Bramble who always provide
welcome distraction. Mum, for your tentative enquiries as to how the
book was going, as well as your continued love and care. I would also
like to thank the team at Palgrave for their patience. This book is
dedicated to Naemi, who continues to watch over the happiest period
of my life, and Ted and Stan, my greatest pride and joy.

v
 Contents

1 Towards Global Gambling 1

2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops

and Criminality 31

3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal

Justice System 63

4 Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal Gambling 111

5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 137

6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual

Environments 183

7 Gambling and Crime: Myths and Realities 225

Index 239

vii
 List of Abbreviations

ACSU Anti-Corruption and Security Unit

AFC Asian Football Confederation
ARJEL Autorité de Régulation Des Jeux en Ligne
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
CONCACAF Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean
Association Football
CPGI Canadian Problem Gambling Severity Index
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DoS Denial of Service
DOJ Department of Justice
EGM Electronic Gaming Machine
eCOGRA eCommerce Online Gaming Regulation and Assurance
ELMS European Lotteries Monitoring System
ESSA European Sports Security Association
EWS Early Warning System GmbH
EU European Union
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDS Fraud Detection System
FIFA Federation Internationale de Football Association
FOBT Fixed Odds Betting Terminal
FTSE Financial Times Stock Exchange
GATS General Agreement of Trade in Services

ix
x List of Abbreviations

GDP Gross Domestic Product

HBLB Horserace Betting Levy Board
IBAS Independent Betting Adjudication Service
ICC International Cricket Council
ICSS International Centre for Sport Security
IOC International Olympic Committee
IPV Intimate Partner Violence
IRIS Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques
IRT Integrity Response Teams
ISM International Sports Monitoring GmbH
ITF International Tennis Federation
ITP Integrity Protection Teams
KYC Know Your Customer
LBO Licensed Betting Office
OC Organised Crime
RAY Raha-automaatiyhdistys
SAR Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China
SIU Sports Integrity Units
SOGS South Oaks Gambling Screen
TIU Tennis Integrity Unit
PGSI Problem Gambling Severity Index
UEFA Union of European Football Associations
UIGEA Unlawful Internet Gaming Enforcement Act 2006
UNCAC United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNTOC United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised
Crime
VLT Video Lottery Terminal
WPBSA World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association
WTO World Trade Organisation
 1
Towards Global Gambling

Across the globe, commercial gambling opportunities abound. For many

countries, the latter decades of the twentieth century oversaw the pro-
gressive transformation of gambling from an activity of dubious morality
into a mainstream leisure pursuit. Notably, the neoliberal economic
policies pursued by many states since the 1970s have led to the rapid
expansion of the commercial gambling industry and the widespread
availability of gambling products and services. As Reith (2007, p. 35)
recognises, states and their economic allies have harnessed growing pros-
perity, a culture of consumption, and the increased availability of cheap
credit, leading to ‘the massive proliferation of commercial gambling as a
global enterprise’. In particular, the last decade of the twentieth century
saw an acceleration of the deregulation and liberalisation of gambling
across many jurisdictions, with high-potency continuous forms of gam-
bling becoming ever more prevalent (Adams and Rossen, 2012).
Although these changes are by no means uniform or universal,1 in
North America, Australasia, Europe and parts of Asia, the liberalisation

1
Gambling remains illegal – and there is general opposition to gambling – in a number of
countries; primarily Islamic states, but also Israel.

© The Author(s) 2017 1

J. Banks, Gambling, Crime and Society,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57994-2_1
2 Gambling, Crime and Society

of gambling laws and policy has led to the widespread availability of a

panoply of different gambling products and services. Such changes are
most pronounced in the Western world, where games of chance have
come to represent a popular pastime for many, and are promoted by
governments and the leisure and entertainment industry as fun, con-
vivial and safe aleatory experiences. Here, scratch cards, lotteries, casino
gambling, sports wagering, electronic machine gaming, Internet betting
and bingo have all become commonplace activities that generate sig-
nificant profits for states and commercial operators alike.
For Markham and Young (2015, p. 2), such changes represent the
emergence of ‘Big Gambling’; an ‘industry-state gambling complex’ that
is driven by the political and economic self-interest of the elite rather
than any change to citizens’ patterns of consumption. Dwarfing the
revenues of other forms of entertainment such as music, movies and
theme parks, legal gambling is a hugely profitable and powerful industry
of aleatory consumption. Gambling is highly lucrative, with estimated
global gaming revenues reaching US$423 billion in 2014 (Morgan
Stanley, 2015). Land-based casinos, which constitute the 12th largest
industry in the world, accounted for 35 per cent (US$146 billion) of
global gaming revenues, lotteries contributed 29 per cent (US$121
billion), whilst ‘other gambling’, such as sports betting and pari-mutuel
racing, and online gambling represented 28 per cent (US$118 billion)
and 9 per cent (US$37 billion), respectively. Today, few regions of the
world remain untouched by the onset of global gambling.

Europe
In Europe, gambling has, historically, been subject to considerable
‘intellectual and political disapproval with strong moral overtones’
(McMillen, 1996, p. 7). Public and political concern has manifested
itself in government policies targeted at limiting (specific forms of)
gambling activity with a view to protecting citizens from exploitation,
disorder and vice. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, working-class gambling was attacked by both middle-class
moralists and the aristocracy for encouraging ‘idleness, indiscipline and
 1 Towards Global Gambling 3

profligacy’ (Ausubel, 1960, p. 41). By dissociating wealth accumulation

and disciplined labour, gambling was deemed to undermine the pro-
testant work ethic and threaten the foundations of capitalist societies:
‘The stability of industrial nations depended on the rational manage-
ment of time and money through diligent labour, investment, and self-
discipline: virtuous pursuits that were flouted by the actions of the
gambler’ (Reith, 2007, p. 34). In its disavowal of the ideological tenets
of Puritanism-cum-Capitalism, gambling was deemed to represent a
significant threat to social order and needed to be curtailed.
However, the twentieth century has witnessed the gradual legitima-
tion of gambling, which is underpinned by a steady shift in the social
and economic morality of capitalist societies (Cosgrove and Klassen,
2001). The rehabilitation of gambling is most pronounced in Britain
which has, for the past 50-odd years, presided over the most liberal
gambling regime in the European Union (EU), if not the world.
Although he cautions against over-simplification, Orford (2011,
p. 2082) suggests that gambling policy in Britain over the last century
can be divided into three distinct eras that have overseen the ‘progressive
dismantling’ of government restrictions on games of chance.
In late-Victorian and Edwardian society, anti-gambling attitudes
were explicit in state policies which sought to govern gambling through
a process of ‘selective prohibition’ (Dixon, 1991, p. 38). Most notably,
the National Anti-Gambling League, which was established in 1890,
waged a ‘strenuous and uncompromising’ moral crusade against the
‘national evil’ of betting and gambling (Ibid.). A paternalist concern
for the poor, women and children targeted by a ruthless ‘army of social
parasites in the shape of bookmakers and their touts’ (Rowntree, 1905,
p. vii) underpinned much opposition to betting. Calls for prohibition
were buttressed by gambling’s association with crime, although this
relationship was typically assumed rather than proven (Munting,
1996). This did not, however, stop the likes of J. A. Hobson (1905,
p. 15) asserting that: ‘The statistics of crime prove beyond all cavil that
gambling is the King’s highway to fraud and theft. This is not merely
because it loosens general morality and in particular saps the rationale of
property, but because cheating is inseparably associated with most actual
modes of gambling’. Such a viewpoint is reaffirmed by sociologist
4 Gambling, Crime and Society

Karl Mannheim (1940, p. 211) who was unstinting in his claim that
betting was a ‘prolific source’ of petty offending.
By the turn of the twentieth century, anti-gambling sentiment in
Britain had reached its zenith (Dixon, 1991). Significantly, the passing
of the Street Betting Act in 1906 sought to ‘drive working classes’
betting off the streets’, by outlawing gambling on horse racing unless
it took place at the racecourse itself (Miers, 2004, p. 270). However, the
post-war years saw anti-gambling sentiments begin to wane, with the
police repeatedly highlighting their inability to enforce the 1906 Act and
many politicians recognising the valuable taxation revenue stream that
legalised gambling could offer.
The introduction of the Betting and Gaming Act in 1960 ushered in
an era in which gambling was tolerated but not encouraged. The act
presented British citizens with a number of new avenues to gamble,
legalising off-course cash betting, as well as bingo halls and, inadver-
tently, casino gaming. Yet legalisation was tempered by the so-called
‘demand test’ which sought to ensure that provision was proportionate
to need. The principle of unstimulated demand inhibited any explosion
in gambling, by requiring potential licensees to demonstrate that their
establishment would fulfil unmet demand for gambling services. Under
this model, ‘the function of government was to regulate gambling to
protect consumers from exploitation, not to establish new gambling
media or promote participation in gambling for purposes of revenue
generation’ (Grun and McKeigue, 2000, p. 960).
Yet this approach did not last for long, as government attitudes
towards gambling shifted steadily from one of tolerance to one of
acceptance and sponsorship. In particular, the introduction of the
National Lottery etc. Act in 1993 saw a ‘ratcheting-up’ of opportunities
to gamble (Orford, 2012, p. 2083). Signalling the beginning of an era of
liberalisation of gambling policy, the emerging philosophy was one in
which gambling should be provided according to free market principles
(Orford, 2011). Constructed as a ‘legitimate’ (Reith, 1999, p. 103) form
of gambling, the National Lottery was depicted as a ‘tasteful and
acceptable way to win money, whilst generating funds for good causes’
(OFLOT, 1994, p. 20). This reflected broader discourse that sought to
reinforce the state’s view that gambling was no longer to be:
 1 Towards Global Gambling 5

[S]een as immoral, irrational, tawdry, exploitative, a vice that the nation

should be ashamed of. It was now to be seen as a harmless form of
entertainment like any other, something that people should be free to
choose to do without interference provided they did it responsibly, a
source of cultural and economic enhancement and, above all else, a
good example of ordinary business which ought to be allowed to innovate
and flourish with only those restrictions that were absolutely necessary.
(Orford, 2012, p. 2083)

The impact of the National Lottery on the rest of the gambling industry
was significant. In order to enable commercial betting and gambling
businesses to compete, the government sought to effect necessary
changes in policy through a process of deregulation (Kent-Lemon,
2007). Over the remaining years of the twentieth century, the Gaming
Board acquiesced to numerous requests by the commercial gambling
industry for a host of different amendments that impacted betting,
casino, gaming and bingo sectors, in turn, making gambling more
accessible, comfortable and potent. For example, Sunday racing and
advertising in bookmakers’ windows and on television was approved,
whilst the introduction of non-alcoholic drinks and snacks in betting
shops was a significant step in creating a more hospitable gambling
environment where customers would be more likely to linger. Bingo
halls, betting shops and casinos were permitted to diversify their portfo-
lio, increasing the number and types of games and gambling machines,
as well as the range of stakes and prizes on offer. The membership and
opening times of casinos also became less restricted, whilst the introduc-
tion of entertainment and dining facilities in many establishments
sought to strengthen gambling’s position as part of a broader package
of leisure and entertainment activities.
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the betting industry buoyed
by a softening of public and political attitudes sought further relaxation
of gambling prohibitions. The Gambling Review Body which reported
in July 2001 met the industry’s expectations, making 176 recommenda-
tions that largely proposed ‘fewer restrictions and new freedoms for
gambling promoters and consumers’ (Orford et al., 2009, p. 39). Most
of these recommendations were enshrined in the Gambling Act 2005,
6 Gambling, Crime and Society

which became fully operational in September 2007 and represented the

most significant change to the regulation of gambling in almost five
decades. Most notably, the principle of unstimulated demand was swept
away, replaced by a framework that is ‘not driven by any perceived
substantial change in consumer demand, but by supply-side self-interest’
(Miers, 2004, p. 474). With the demand criterion abolished, the expan-
sion of casinos, gaming machines, betting, bingo, lotteries and remote
gambling was now unconstrained.
In this new environment, commercial gambling in Britain has grown
to become one of the most accessible and heterogeneous gambling
marketplaces in the world (Wardle et al., 2014). Off- and online
gambling opportunities continue to multiply, with gaming machines,
casinos, sports and horse betting, bingo and a host of charitable lotteries
now offered by in the region of 3,000 different operators (Miers, 2016).
In particular, non-terrestrial forms of gambling, that can be accessed via
the Internet, interactive television and mobile phones, have proliferated.
The growth in availability of online gambling is matched by participa-
tion rates which have steadily increased from 0.2 per cent of the UK
adult population in 1999 to 10.6 per cent in 2010 (Sproston et al.,
2000; Wardle et al., 2007, 2011).
The expansion of commercial gambling in the UK is mirrored across
much of Europe. Contemporary gambling in Europe is governed by a
myriad of laws, regulations, restrictions and controls that reflect both the
unique historical development of gambling in different regions and
cultures, as well as variations in market size, participation rates and the
range of products and services offered by individual states (Binde, 2005;
European Casino Association, undated). Nevertheless, the trend in
many European nations is to one of expansion in both the provision
of gambling and citizens’ expenditure on gambling activities, irrespective
of the regulatory regime employed.
A significant number of countries, including Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Spain,
Slovakia and Slovenia, operate licence-based systems that allow com-
mercial businesses and foreign operators to apply for gambling licences
(Nikkinen, 2014). Like the UK, most of these nations have witnessed
the progressive liberalisation of their gambling laws from the latter part
 1 Towards Global Gambling 7

of the twentieth century. For example, gambling in Spain has undergone

major expansion since its legalisation in February 1977. As with other
countries in the EU, slot machines have played a key role in the growth
in its gambling provision, becoming commonplace in bars and restau-
rants since their introduction in 1981. Significant increases in spending
on gambling followed, until the economic crisis of 2008 plunged Spain
into recession and per capita expenditure began to wane (Jimenez-
Murcia et al., 2013). Despite this, Spain’s citizens still managed to
gamble €26.6 billion in 2011 (Ibid.).
Similarly, in France the introduction of slot machines into casinos in
1987 dramatically altered its gambling landscape, with the monopolistic
model which had held sway since the eighteenth century undergoing
significant change:

Within the space of a decade, the nature of gambling and games of chance
had evolved significantly. Casinos had now become places frequented on a
daily basis by working-class clientele. There was also a change in the
nature of the games offered. Instead of just the major lotteries offering
‘dream gambling’, a wide scale of ‘high-sensation’ gambling, played more
frequently and with instant results, was introduced. During the [2]0-year
period from 1987 to 2006, other operators also launched ‘sensation-
seeking’ games intended for a very wide market. Française des Jeux2 (at
the time with approximately 40,000 sales outlets) began marketing
scratchcards and ‘Rapido’, an on-screen lottery with frequent draws.
PMU3 (with approximately 10,000 sales out-lets) provided more wide-
spread betting on horses in outlets equipped with a dedicated television
channel. The whole market experienced this enlargement and transforma-
tion. (Valleur, 2015, p. 1873)

New gambling legislation, introduced in 2010, presented further oppor-

tunities for French citizens to gamble, by allowing private operators to
offer poker, sports and horse betting online. As of 2012, 26 five-year

2
Française des Jeux is the operator of France’s national lottery games.
3
Created in 1930 by French Horseracing Associations, PMU is a leisure company whose role is to
conceive the market, to offer pari-mutuel service and to promote betting on horseracing.
8 Gambling, Crime and Society

licenses had been issued, whilst a further 33 gambling operators were

marketing other forms of gambling in France (Nikkinen, 2014).
European states, such as Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania and Sweden, despite maintaining market monopolies,
have also experienced a growth in gambling, as a consequence of the
liberalisation of associated laws and policy. For example, from the 1970s
onwards, Germany has witnessed a steady erosion of its protective mea-
sures, in response to the commercialisation of gambling. Most signifi-
cantly, the growing sophistication of electronic gaming machines (EGMs)
intensified the gambling experience for many, by increasing the amount
of money that individuals could stake and win (Ludwig et al., 2013). The
gaming machine gambling boom which began in the 1980s has seen the
number of EGMs in Germany rise from 9,400 in 1980 to 265,000 in
2013 (Ludwig et al., 2013; Ziolkowski, 2014). Similarly, in Finland,
opportunities to gamble are abundant, leading to spending on gambling
doubling in the two decades since 1990: ‘slots machines are dispersed
openly in shopping centres, small shops, kiosks, gas stations, restaurants,
casino and casual gambling arcades, while sports betting and lotto service
points are also located densely’ (Tammi et al., 2015, p. 746). Three out of
four Finns aged 15 or more gambled a total of €1.6 billion in 2011 on
games offered by the three monopoly operators, Veikkaus Lottery, the
Slot Machine Association (RAY) and Fintoto (Ibid.).
In the Netherlands, the 1980s marked the beginning of its expansion in
gambling provision. Whilst lotteries, horse betting, sports wagering and
casinos had all been made available prior to this period, the legalisation of
slot machines outside of casinos in 1986 considerably enhanced opportu-
nities for citizens to gamble. The steady growth in the number of casinos in
the country, alongside the introduction of scratch cards in 1994, further
multiplied the availability of high intensity, instantaneous forms of gam-
bling. Moreover: ‘The visibility of gambling increased by sensational
advertising, by the establishment of luxurious amusement arcades and
casinos at premium locations, and by spectacular gaming shows on televi-
sion. The returns and profits of most gambling markets grew enormously’
(Kingma, 2004, p. 47). Between 1996 and 2004 gross gambling revenues
increased steeply before levelling off between 2004 and 2010 (Goudriaan,
2014). However, revenues may rise once again, as the Dutch government
 1 Towards Global Gambling 9

moves steadily and decisively towards legalising online gambling. The

Remote Gambling Bill seeks to modernise the country’s outdated gam-
bling laws and introduce legislation that will enable the licensing of
‘reliable and suitable’ Internet betting operators (Amsel, 2015).
Further opportunities to gamble are likely to occur across many EU
nations, as online gambling laws are liberalised and states who maintain
monopolised gambling environments begin to allow international com-
mercial betting operators to offer products and services to their citizens.
As Tammi et al. (2015, p. 747) note:

The rapidly growing private gaming industry has begun to demand dereg-
ulation and access to markets regulated by national monopolies. The trend
towards the free movement of goods and services in the European internal
market and similar global trends (WTO/GATS) have strengthened the
argument for deregulation. These forces and their counterforces – i.e. the
powerful national interests defending regulation – have created a policy
where gambling monopolies are under constant assault.

Rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have

been explicit that states cannot prohibit private or extraterritorial
Internet gambling businesses simply to protect their economic interests.
In turn, the European Commission continues to seek to develop a
comprehensive framework for online gambling that will enhance admin-
istrative cooperation among member states. Whilst the degree to which
states can reconcile their divergent regulatory profiles and develop a
sector-specific legislative framework remains unclear, it is evident that
the gambling industry as a whole is quickly developing into an integral
part of pan-European culture as a consequence of its omnipresent nature
and ease of accessibility (Forum Europe, 2011).

Australasia
In Australia, the development of increasingly liberal gambling regimes in
many states has given rise to the proliferation of opportunities to
gamble. As recently as the 1960s, on-course betting on dog and horse
10 Gambling, Crime and Society

racing represented the only legal forms of gambling in most Australian

states (Marshall, 1998). However, state governments and commercial
operators have harnessed an established working-class predisposition for
gambling (O’Hara, 1988) in the institutionalisation of myriad forms of
betting: ‘[F]undamentally it is because governments and industry have
responded to the social enthusiasm for gambling with legalisation,
attractive venues and an ever-expanding range of gambling options
that Australian gambling has grown to become one of the nation’s
major industries and social activities’ (Victorian Casino and Gaming
Authority, 1999, p. 11).
Most significantly, the legalisation and proliferation of EGMs, which
occurred in all states and territories with the exception of Western
Australia in the early 1990s, profoundly transformed the Australian
gambling industry (Delfabbro and King, 2012). Today, in the region
of 200,000 or 20 per cent of the world’s gaming machines are located in
the pubs, clubs, hotels and casinos of Australia (Lee and Kim, 2014).
This equates to one machine per 101 adults. EGMs, which are available
in the vast majority of Australia’s estimated 15,008 gambling outlets,
have accounted for 74 per cent of gambling growth in Australia in
recent years and represent more than 55 per cent of its total gambling
market (Australasian Gaming Council, 2009; Hing et al., 2002; Lee and
Kim, 2014).
Whilst EGMs have spearheaded the expansion of gambling in
Australia, numerous other forms of gambling have proliferated. For
example, horse racing has been transformed from a provincial activity
to a global gambling industry (Orford, 2011). This is reflective of the
growth of sports betting more generally which can, in part, be attributed
to the increased penetration of the Internet (Hing, 2010). Mindful of
both the risks and benefits of 24/7 Internet gambling, the Gambling Act
2001 introduced a federal regulatory regime of ‘managed legalisation’,
with the aim of protecting consumers, their personal details, winnings
and wagers (McMillen, 2000, p. 396). Under the act, Internet sports
and lottery betting may be offered to Australian residents by internal
licensed providers, although casino, poker, keno and instant win games
are prohibited. The act also bars extraterritorial operators from provid-
ing gambling services to Australians, although, to date, there have been
 1 Towards Global Gambling 11

no real attempts made by regulatory agencies to stop citizens accessing

offshore Internet sites or prosecute those operating illegal gambling
businesses.
New Zealand has also witnessed a gambling revolution, as neoliberal
reforms in the mid-1980s led to the growth of new opportunities to bet.
Prior to this:

[C]ommercial gambling in New Zealand had been a low-key affair,

made up mainly of non-continuous forms of gambling such as a
national raffle and on-track horse betting, where there is a reasonable
delay between a purchase and its outcome. (Adams and Rossen, 2012,
p. 1051)

A national lottery, Lotto, was introduced in 1987, whilst betting on

racing, which had previously only been offered on-course, was made
available via the telephone and then online, significantly increasing
citizens’ access to betting. Most notably, there was a marked increase in
high potency continuous forms of gambling, including scratch cards,
such as the Instant Kiwi scratch lottery, and EGMs, which quickly spread
throughout the country. The impact of these changes was immense, with
per capita expenditure doubling during the 3 years from 1988 to 1990,
after over a decade of stability (Volberg and Abbott, 1994). In the final
decade of the twentieth century, gambling expansion continued apace,
with New Zealand’s first Casino, Christchurch Casino, launching in 1994
after the passage of the Casino Control Act 1990. A further five establish-
ments opened over the next 13 years, ensuring that casino games were
readily available to much of the population (Adams and Rossen, 2012).
Although online gambling remains largely prohibited, the Gambling Act
2003 did make horse and sports betting and lottery products provided by
the New Zealand Racing Board and New Zealand Lotteries Commission
legal, whilst citizens have not been barred from other forms of Internet
gambling offered by extraterritorial sites.
Having grown considerably over the past three decades, gambling is
now a sizable industry in both Australia and New Zealand (Worthington
et al., 2007). In 2014, gambling revenues in Australia totalled $AU43
billion, equating to 1.05 per cent of Australia’s Gross Domestic Product
12 Gambling, Crime and Society

(GDP), whilst in New Zealand revenues topped $NZ2 billion, contri-

buting towards 1.6 per cent of New Zealand’s GDP4 (Australasian
Gaming Council, 2015a, 2015b; Dia.govt.nz, 2015). Industry growth
has been maintained despite prevalence studies indicating that gambling
participation rates continue to decline. In Australia, participation rates
have fallen from over 80 per cent at the turn of the century to approxi-
mately 64 per cent in 2014. Similarly, in New Zealand, the overall past-
year participation rate has declined significantly since 2006/2007 from
82.4 per cent to 70.3 per cent in 2012 (Productivity Commission, 2010;
Tu, 2013). With high-potency continuous forms of gambling super-
seding low potency non-continuous forms of gambling in both jurisdic-
tions, it appears that a smaller group of citizens who continue to gamble
more heavily underpin this ‘rapid escalation in consumption’ (Adams
and Rossen, 2012, p. 1052).

North America
In North America, gambling regulation continues to be liberalised,
despite some lingering concerns regarding the societal problems that
such activities can create (Anderson, 2012). So whilst certain sectors of
North American society remain strongly opposed to the spread of this
‘potentially dangerous vice’, for many, gambling represents a pleasurable
and socially acceptable activity (Wood and Williams, 2007, p. 521).
Increasing approval of gambling is evinced by prevalence survey data
which indicates that in the region of 80 per cent of citizens in both the
USA and Canada engaged in some form of gambling over the past 12
months (Welte et al., 2002; Canadian Partnership for Responsible
Gambling, 2015).
Gambling policy in Canada has undergone a ‘striking transformation’,
as a consequence of two amendments to the country’s Criminal Code
(Smith, 2013, p. 707). From being ‘low key, sporadic and restricted’ the

4
Gambling is categorized under the Arts and Recreation Sector in New Zealand which as a whole
contributed 1.6 per cent towards New Zealand’s GDP.
 1 Towards Global Gambling 13

1969 and 1985 amendments saw gambling opportunities proliferate

(Ibid.). Notably, the legalisation of gambling in 1969 resulted in gam-
bling activities becoming widely available across Canadian provinces,
transforming it into a popular pastime for many (Alberghetti and
Collins, 2015). Both federal and provincial governments were now able
to operate lotteries, whilst opportunities for charity sponsored gambling
also increased. Competition for gambling revenues was fierce, with
provincial lottery corporations forming alliances in order to oust the
federal government from the market. Provincial authority over gambling
was finally consolidated through the 1985 amendment, which granted
provinces exclusivity in the operation of lotteries and lottery schemes via a
computer, video device or slot machine. Essentially:

The 1969 and 1985 amendments removed centralized state control over
much gambling behaviour and shifted responsibility to the provinces for
licensing and regulation. In turn, provinces have, in effect, shifted respon-
sibility for the social control of licensed gambling to the private sphere
through management contracts with leisure industry businesses or to
Crown corporations. (Campbell et al., 2005, pp. 2–3)

Casinos spread rapidly across Canada throughout the 1990s, whilst

video lottery terminals (VLTs) and other lottery products also prolifer-
ated (Orford, 2011). By 2014, there were in excess of 35,000 gambling
venues spread across the country, including 192 Bingo facilities, 74
casinos and 217 horse racing venues for betting, and in excess of
97,000 EGMs (Canadian Partnership for Responsible Gambling,
2015). Collectively, they generated gross revenues of approximately
CAN$13.7 billion in 2013–2014.
The status of Internet gambling in Canada is less clear, as it is not
explicitly referred to in the country’s criminal code. It has, however,
been inferred that Internet gambling may be provided to residents by
the government of the province, alone or in conjunction with other
provinces, although private gambling operators and charitable organi-
sations are unable to offer Internet gambling services. Some First
Nation states have, nevertheless, sought to capitalise on the ambiguity
of the Canadian criminal code by introducing their own Internet
14 Gambling, Crime and Society

gambling sites and soliciting Canadian citizens’ custom. Most notably,

the Khanawake First Nation, which introduced its first gambling site
in 1999, has grown to become the eighth largest provider of online
gambling services in the world, hosting in the region of 100 different
Internet sites (Casino City, 2016).
In the USA, gambling is largely governed by individual states,
although it is also subject to federal law. For example, the US
Congress has prohibited sports betting, ruled on the nature of gam-
bling services to be offered by Native Americans and outlawed the
unauthorised interstate movement of lottery tickets (Nikkinen, 2014).
Nevertheless, much gambling policy is developed at a state level and
although there are significant differences in the freedoms and restric-
tions afforded government and commercial operators across these jur-
isdictions, there remains a general trend towards increased availability
and participation in gambling.
Whilst gambling continues to be a persistent part of the American
experience, its popularity has ebbed and flowed over time: ‘At various
points in history, gambling has been despised and criminalized,
tolerated, and embraced – often at the same time’ (Morse and Goss,
2007, p. 1). By the turn of the twentieth century, gambling was
prohibited in most states in America, yet citizens frequently violated
anti-gambling laws seeking out discrete yet illegal opportunities to
gamble (Schwartz, 2006). The 1960s marked the beginning of a
resurgence in legal gambling across the USA, with many states relax-
ing their laws in relation to games of chance (Petry and Blanco,
2013). New Hampshire introduced a state-run sweepstake in 1964,
with a number of other states instituting lotteries over the ensuing
years. Casino gaming also arrived in Atlantic City in 1978, following
its authorisation by New Jersey voters (Eadington, 1998). However, it
wasn’t until 1989 that legal casino gaming spread from a handful of
dedicated resorts to riverboats and Indian reserves, as well as cities,
towns and suburban environments in a significant number of other
states (Eadington, 1999). ‘Casino-style gaming’ also became widely
available in non-casino locations, with VLTs, slot machines, video
gaming devices and keno games introduced in bars and taverns
(Ibid.). Today, commercial casino gambling is available in 20 US
 1 Towards Global Gambling 15

states and Native American casinos across 30 states, whilst all states
with the exception of Utah and Hawaii offer some form of gambling.
Wagering on sporting events has also developed into a popular form
of gambling, despite only being legal in the state of Nevada. Here, the
number of betting establishments and gamblers, as well as the amounts
wagered, continue to grow. In recent years, the sports wagering handle
has increased markedly, rising 35.6 per cent between 2011 and 2014
(Lang, 2016). Today, in the region of US$3.9 billion is wagered across
Nevada’s 200 or so active sports books. However, legal betting is
dwarfed by illegal gambling on sporting events, which is widely con-
sumed across America. Although reliable figures on the scope of illegal
sports betting are difficult to identify, it is estimated by the National
Gambling Impact Study Commission that in the region of US$380
billion is wagered annually on sporting events. In particular, the revo-
lutionising technology of the Internet has been a huge propellant of
illegal sports betting.
US Internet gambling policy is schizophrenic in nature, prohibiting
most forms of online gambling, with the exception of domestic pari-
mutuel betting on horse racing and state lotteries (Stewart, 2011a,
2011b). Prior to the passage of the Unlawful Internet Gaming
Enforcement Act 2006 (UIGEA), congress relied upon the Wire Act
of 1961 to support its position that Internet gambling is a prohibited
activity. The antiquated act, which was originally passed in order to
combat organised crime and gambling via telephone communication,
unsurprisingly makes no mention of Internet gambling, yet has been
employed in a number of federal cases against online gambling busi-
nesses and their owners. The first federal case, which was brought against
Antiguan-based outfit World Sports Exchange, saw its owner and US
citizen Jay Cohen jailed for 21 months. Demonstrating that Internet
gambling operators could and would be prosecuted under the act, the
sentencing of Cohen led to most established Internet gambling operators
relocating to small Caribbean, Pacific and Mediterranean islands beyond
the reach of American courts.
In an effort to prevent the transfer of funds to offshore Internet
gambling sites that continued to solicit US citizens, the UIGEA was
passed in 2006. Under the act, businesses are prohibited ‘from
16 Gambling, Crime and Society

knowingly accepting payments in connection with the participation of

another person in a bet or wager that involves the use of the Internet
and that is unlawful under any federal or state law’. Whilst the
UIGEA did initially curb Internet gambling by US citizens, the
reduction was short lived, with demand quickly returning to and then
exceeding pre-enforcement levels (Bernhard and Montgomery, 2012).
And whilst some poker rooms and sports book operations stopped
accepting US custom, a number of operators, including Full Tilt Poker
and Pokerstars, looked to benefit from this decrease in competition and
increase their market share. As Banks (2014, p. 32) notes: ‘Despite its
immediate impact on the landscape of online gambling, it was unclear as
to the extent to which the Department of Justice (DOJ) would pursue
those who violated the UIGEA’. However, the indictment of three of the
largest Internet poker companies – Absolute Poker, Full Tilt Poker and
PokerStars – in 2011 demonstrated that the DOJ is willing to target those
defying US laws prohibiting financial transactions for unlawful Internet
gambling. In total 11 executives were indicted for a range of offences,
including money laundering, bank fraud and illegal gambling offences,
whilst the domain names of the poker sites were seized by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Despite these indictments, a number of overseas gambling opera-
tors continue to flout US law. Attacks on the UIGEA have also
appeared at a federal and a state level. A repeal of the act is supported
by politicians from both Republican and Democratic parties, with a
number of US senators seeking to pass bills that would introduce a
regulated gambling environment. Most recently, in July 2013, con-
gressmen Peter King introduced the Internet Gambling Regulation
and Consumer Protection and Enforcement Act that looks to over-
turn the UIGEA. A number of US States have also introduced
legislation that legalises Internet gambling. Delaware, Nevada and
New Jersey allow citizens to partake in certain forms of online
gambling, whilst it is expected that California, Pennsylvania, New
York and Mississippi will approve Internet gambling within the next
few years (Parry, 2015). Across North America, there now exists ‘two
parallel, marginally competitive gambling markets; one is an area of
enlarged government-sanctioned legal gambling offerings, the other is
 1 Towards Global Gambling 17

a viable illegal gambling trade that has proven difficult to suppress’

(Smith and Wynne, 1999, p. 8).

Asia
Although moves to legalise gambling have been slower in much of Asia,
in some countries there has been a steady shift towards deregulation and
the expansion of gambling operations. As McMillen (1996, p. 255) has
noted: ‘[D]espite the cultural predilection of Asian societies for gam-
bling, Asia itself has been the area of the world most resistant to casino
[and gambling] development’. For example, all forms of gambling were
illegal in China, until the State Council instituted a Welfare Lottery in
1987, followed by the Sports Lottery in 1994 (Orford, 2011). With
annual sales growing from US$2 million in 1987 to in excess of US$50
billion in 2013, both sweepstakes have proved highly popular with
citizens and generate significant funds for public welfare and the sports
industry (Wu and Lau, 2014). However, the Chinese government has
sought to distinguish between the social gaming of state-run lotteries
and traditional games, such as Mahong and Paiju, and the vice of illegal
gambling. Under China’s Criminal Law – which was introduced in
1979 and amended in 1997 and 2006 – ‘a person commits gambling
crimes if he or she profits by gathering people to engage in gambling,
running a gambling house or making gambling his/her profession, and is
punishable by imprisonment and a fine’ (Ibid.). Yet, despite casino
games, sports and horse betting and a host of other wagering activities
being outlawed in mainland China, citizens’ predilections are well
catered for at the gambling resorts that have developed in Macau and,
more recently, in Singapore and Hong Kong.
In particular, the pace and scale of the expansion of commercial
gambling in Macau has been extraordinary (Hing, 2010). In the space
of 14 years, Macau – a former Portuguese colony near Hong Kong – has
developed to become the world’s largest casino gambling destination.
Since the liberalisation of casino licensing in 2002, the Special
Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China has
been highly successful in attracting tourists, primarily from mainland
18 Gambling, Crime and Society

China, but also from across the globe. In 2013, gaming revenues reached
a record high of US$45.09 billion and continue to remain strong
(UNLV Center for Gaming Research, 2016).
By contrast, Singapore has experienced a more modest expansion of its
gambling provision. Until 1999, the sweep lottery represented
Singapore’s only legalised form of gambling, with all other wagering
activities prohibited. However, the launch of Singapore’s first professional
football league, the S-League, led to the introduction of football betting,
in order to help finance the development of clubs. The state-operated
sports book has also extended its presence online, offering ‘in game
betting’ on football matches via the Internet or its dedicated mobile
phone sports betting application. Further opportunities to gamble
resulted from a ministerial decision to lift a ban on casinos, with the
Casino Control Act of 2006 enabling the establishment of casinos as part
of ‘integrated resorts’ from 2010 (Winslow et al., 2015). Singapore’s two
casinos, Marina Bay Sands and Resorts World Sentosa, offer a wide array
of games, including slots, baccarat, blackjack, roulette and casino-style
poker games, and the resorts have quickly become a popular tourist
destination, ranked third behind Las Vegas and Macau in terms of gross
revenues (Ibid.). The state does, however, discourage its residents from
gambling at these large resort casinos. So whilst admission is free to all
foreigners, citizens of Singapore must pay a SGD 100 daily entrance fee.
Elsewhere in Asia, gambling remains largely illegal. For example, in
India, archaic laws which were framed in the nineteenth century mean
that a formal ban remains on most forms of gambling (Benegal, 2013,
p. 2062). The Public Gaming Act of 1867 seeks to ‘discourage people
from indulging in games of chance and probability’. Despite this, horse
racing betting and rummy are legal, whilst lotteries and casinos are
permitted in a small number of states. Yet restrictions on gambling in
most states have led to the development of a huge and varied illegal
market valued at approximately half of an estimated total gambling
market worth in the region of US$60 billion per annum (Ibid.). In
particular, the increased penetration of the Internet has enabled illegal
gambling on sporting events, most notably cricket, to flourish. Thus:
‘Online gambling operators, both domestic and offshore, operate with
impunity in India, thanks to inadequate legislation, lack of enforcement
 1 Towards Global Gambling 19

and an indifferent judiciary that allows unregulated and untaxed gam-

bling’ (Ibid., p. 2065). The widespread availability and popularity of
illegal forms of gambling – encompassing lotteries or satta games, sports
wagering and betting on political or electoral events – has, unsurpris-
ingly, led to calls for states to legalise the activity.
Similar calls for the decriminalisation of gambling have been made in
Taiwan where the growth of illegal opportunities to bet continues apace.
Under Taiwanese law, gambling is considered an activity that interferes
with good morals and is situated alongside rules governing indecent
exposure, the damaging of corpses and graves, and opioid use (Yen and
Wu, 2012). But whilst gambling laws forbid gambling in public places
and the operation of a casino or lottery in order to generate profit,
throughout the twenty-first century a number of policy changes have
eroded gambling prohibition. In 2002, the state approved the Public
Welfare Lottery Issue Act leading to the introduction of the first legal
gambling game in Taiwan, the Public Welfare Lottery. The government
also introduced laws to regulate the operation of electronic mechanical
games and pachinko, whose popularity has continued to mushroom.
Further efforts to combat illegal betting were introduced in 2008, with
the passage of the Taiwan Sports Lottery, which allowed citizens to bet
on the results of a range of sports, including baseball, basketball and
football matches that take place overseas. But because of a long history of
organised crime and corruption in Taiwanese football and baseball,
betting on national sporting contests remains illegal. Most recently, in
2008, the Taiwanese government has taken steps to legalise casino
gambling on Taiwan’s outer islands through the passage of the
‘Offshore Island Development Act’. However, to date, the scheme has
failed to acquire residents’ support and remains in limbo.

Academic Rationale for the Book

As preceding discussion demonstrates, the liberalisation, economic
deregulation and normalisation of gambling has occurred in many states
and jurisdictions across the world. Most notably: ‘Over the past several
decades, gambling in Western societies has emerged from the shadows of
20 Gambling, Crime and Society

dubious morality into the light of mainstream consumption, a transition

encouraged by the secularization of social life, the rise of consumerism,
the development of the industry, and regulatory liberalization’
(Cosgrove, 2010, p. 255). Gambling is attractive to governments as it
provides a significant revenue stream through taxation. Consequently,
the neoliberal economic policies pursued by many states since the 1970s
have resulted in a ‘rolling back’ of prohibitive gambling laws and the
significant expansion of gambling markets. The commercialisation, pri-
vatisation and increased competition between gambling providers is
encouraged, with gambling repackaged as a commodity to be ‘sanc-
tioned, taxed and regulated’ (Delfabbro and King, 2012, p. 1556). In
Europe, North America and Australasia, the growth in gambling provi-
sion is most pronounced, with states and commercial operators promot-
ing games of chance as social and safe aleatory activities. Quite simply:
‘Gambling has become mainstream, no longer regarded as a deviant
subcultural activity, but rather promoted by the state as entertainment
and a form of leisure’ (Cosgrove and Klassen, 2009, p. 3). Across
Western capitalist societies, citizens can now consume a panoply of
different ‘games of chance’, such as Internet poker, sports and race
betting, casino games, lottery tickets, EGMs and bingo. Significantly,
low potency non-continuous forms of gambling have been superseded
by high potency continuous forms of gambling, such as EGMs, casino
games and scratch cards, leading to an escalation in consumption
(Adams and Rossen, 2012).
Although the speed of change in Asia has been less dramatic, both
legal and illegal opportunities for gambling and betting have multiplied.
In particular, the development of casino resorts in Macau, Singapore and
Hong Kong is a notable regional trend that generates significant reven-
ues for both private operators and the state. Moreover, casino gaming,
sports and horse wagering, lotteries and Internet betting represent just
some of a range of different gambling activities that can be accessed
locally via either licit or illicit means. So whilst heavy restrictions on
both land-based and online gambling remain in places such as China,
South Korea and Japan, for example, gambling opportunities – primarily
via illegal Internet betting sites – are widely available and continue to be
enjoyed by many.
 1 Towards Global Gambling 21

It is therefore important to recognise that although this wave of

expansion in gambling products and services is not universal, it does,
nevertheless, represent a ‘global phenomenon’, having occurred across
many countries throughout the world (Kingma, 2004, p. 47). In such
jurisdictions, gambling is highly prevalent, profitable and potent, as
evinced by continued growth in citizen’s expenditure, industry profits
and state taxation revenues. Yet as opportunities for gambling have
multiplied, concerns regarding the public health impacts associated
with this activity have increased. For many, the excessive liberalisation
of gambling policy, which has heightened both the range and potency of
gambling products and services, has given rise to a number of harmful
social effects. In particular, the proliferation of high intensity continuous
forms of gambling, such as EGM’s, reflect the ‘neo-liberal regime’s
indefensible preference for the interests of commerce over those of
vulnerable and at-risk players’ (Miers, 2016, p. 165). As Orford
(2011, p. 24) recognises, the widespread availability of gambling is
associated with a multitude of ‘serious harms for individuals, families
and society’ including underage gambling, increased rates of problem
and pathological gambling, unemployment, debt, deterioration in per-
sonal health and self-esteem, familial dysfunction, family breakdown,
and crime and victimisation.
This book seeks to introduce readers to the complex ways in which
gambling, crime and society intersect, in the context of the increased
availability of gambling across many regions of the world. In an effort to
better understand the relationships between gambling and crime, aca-
demics and researchers from across an assortment of academic disciplines
have undertaken a range of studies that have explored various facets of
the gambling/crime nexus, identifying a number of different ways in
which these activities intersect and proposing a variety of different
categories of gambling-related crime. Much of this research is concen-
trated in Europe, Australasia and North America, but has significant
relevance to other jurisdictions in which opportunities to gamble pro-
liferate. Yet despite the plethora of relevant research exploring the links
between gambling and crime, to date, no academic has sought to under-
take a systematic examination of how these two phenomena are linked in
contemporary societies. In response, this book provides the first
22 Gambling, Crime and Society

theoretically and empirically driven assessment of the interrelationships

between gambling, crime and society. By providing a critical review of
the available literature, it will enable readers to engage with the crim-
inogenic challenges gambling brings to societies across the world and
give consideration to its policy and criminal justice implications.
Moreover, the book offers a tentative research agenda for scholars seek-
ing to address the notable gaps in academic and public knowledge.

The Structure of the Book

Chapter 2 considers the relationship between the proliferation and
propinquity of betting establishments and crime. It draws upon struc-
tural theories and wide ranging empirical evidence to explore the inter-
connections between the availability of gambling opportunities and
criminality. In the UK, the extent to which the presence of betting
shops – housing Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBT) – increases
incidences of incivility, anti-social behaviour and crime has framed
contemporary debate. Similar concerns have been raised in North
America where the large scale development of casinos and other gam-
bling establishments has taken place. Several different forms of crime
have been associated with the widening availability of gambling, includ-
ing crimes committed by operators, owners, employees and patrons of
gambling venues. In particular, the degree to which the legal expansion
of gambling operations – typically casinos – is associated with an
increase in street crime has been a principal focus of academic explora-
tion. The chapter assesses whether or not the research evidence supports
the assumption that the introduction of (certain types of) gambling
establishments leads to a rise in crime in and around their location.
Chapter 3 assesses the antecedence to, and relationship between,
gambling, problem gambling and crime. Exploring general, clinical
and correctional population surveys, as well as criminal justice data,
the chapter demonstrates that available evidence indicates that proble-
matic gambling behaviour is a significant criminogenic variable.
International research is consistent in its findings that gambling-related
crimes typically consist of non-violent property offences, although there
 1 Towards Global Gambling 23

is a growing body of evidence to indicate that gambling can, on occa-

sion, lead to violent crime. Yet, to date, there is limited empirical
evidence on the nature and trajectory of the relationship between
gambling and crime. The chapter also examines the relationship between
problem gambling and the administration of criminal justice. It con-
siders the degree to which problem gambling is identified and recorded
by criminal justice agencies, as well as the extent to which it influences
sentencing decision making. Furthermore, the chapter gives considera-
tion to the scope and effectiveness of treatment services offered within
criminal justice settings.
Chapter 4 explores the degree to which organised crime groups are
involved in both licit and illicit forms of gambling across the globe. It
offers a brief historical account of organised crime and its relationship
with gambling, before turning to consider how and to what extent the
two phenomena are linked in contemporary societies. It examines the
degree to which organised crime groups are involved in the illegal supply
of gambling services and the legal provision of gambling, and how they
exploit legal forms of gambling for nefarious activities. The chapter also
highlights how the involvement of organised crime in the business of
gambling has, on occasion, led to the corruption of law enforcement
officers and other government officials in certain regions of the world.
Chapter 5 considers the relationship between gambling, sport and
corruption. It demonstrates how the growing availability of sports bet-
ting has heightened opportunities for match-fixing across a range of
sporting disciplines and in most regions of the world. The prevalence,
motivations and organisational dynamics of betting-related match-fixing
are examined, as are the range of measures introduced by states, law
enforcement agencies, sporting organisations, betting operators and
gambling associations in order to better detect, prevent and prosecute
those involved in such forms of corruption. This includes the develop-
ment of new and existing legal provisions and sporting codes of conduct,
the introduction of integrity units, educational programmes and com-
pliance hotlines, and the establishment of early warning systems that
monitor sports betting for suspicious activity.
Chapter 6 explores the dimensions of crime that takes place in and
around Internet gambling sites and crime that is associated with
24 Gambling, Crime and Society

remote gambling, demonstrating how online gambling can act as a

cause of crime, as a conduit for crime or support other criminal
activities. The chapter illustrates how there are a number of obser-
vable threats posed by online gambling to site operators, consumers
and wider society. Opportunities for illegal gambling, money laun-
dering, and fraud and theft are significant, as are the risks posed by
cyber-extortionists. The chapter also examines the ongoing efforts of
international organisations, national governments, industry regulators
and operators, gamers, and other national and international bodies to
address the threats posed by the development of Internet gambling
markets across the globe.
In Chapter 7, the key aims of the book are readdressed in relation to
the theoretical and empirical evidence explored in the preceding chap-
ters. It synthesises the available research to illustrate how the construc-
tion of gambling as a vice, a deviant, criminal or criminogenic activity is
built upon many myths and a few ‘realities’. Empirical evidence illus-
trates how gambling can pose some crime problems across societies and
that there are a number of threats that must be addressed if gambling is
to be considered lawful, transparent and legitimate. However, given the
considerable gaps in (academic) knowledge, accumulated half-truths and
outright falsehoods continue to help structure the public experience. In
considering these gaps in knowledge the chapter outlines a future agenda
for research.

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 2
Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos,
Betting Shops and Criminality

Introduction
As Chapter 1 demonstrates, over the latter decades of the twentieth
century, opportunities for gambling have proliferated, most notably
throughout Europe, North America and Australasia, but also in other
regions of the world. Such growth has continued into the twenty-first
century, with a host of new forms of gambling supplementing and
superseding many of the more traditional wagering activities. Whilst a
significant proportion of this growth in gambling provision has taken
place online – which has, in turn, had a detrimental impact on the rate
of attendees at land-based gambling venues – casinos, bingo clubs and
bookies continue to feature prominently in many towns and cities across
the Western world. Yet despite the emergence of gambling as a main-
stream leisure activity, specific forms of wagering continue to raise
anxiety and concern among certain sections of society. In particular,
the growth of land-based casinos in North America and the widespread
availability of FOBT coupled with the clustering of betting shops in
the UK have led to intense debate regarding the costs and benefits
of bricks and mortar gambling. Some opponents of (the growth in)

© The Author(s) 2017 31

J. Banks, Gambling, Crime and Society,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57994-2_2
32 Gambling, Crime and Society

legalised gambling argue that casinos and betting shops invariably lead to
an increase in anti-social and criminal behaviour in the communities in
which they are located. In turn, the impact that land-based gambling
establishments have on society remains a highly debated, political and
sensitive subject.
Across North America, casino gambling represents the largest seg-
ment of the legal gambling industry. In the US, casinos continue to
be particularly popular in economically depressed regions, with leg-
islators and community leaders turning to casino gambling to boost
local revenues and flagging economies. Thus, recession and other
national and international economic challenges have led to many
states supporting the introduction of new casinos with a view to
creating or stimulating growth and tourism – and, in turn, generating
new tax revenues – irrespective of the potential costs such activities
may have on communities (Eadington, 1999). Writing in 1998,
Miller and Schwartz noted that the past decade had witnessed a
boom in the number of new American casinos, particularly on
Native American reservations and through the introduction of river-
boat gambling in a number of states including Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Mississippi and Missouri. Today, Native American casinos
operate out of 30 different states, whilst in the region of 450
commercial casinos are located across 20 states and generate in excess
of US$40 billion per year (UNLV, 2016).
But as ‘gambling has grown, dire predictions have been made con-
cerning gambling’s effect on society’ (Stitt et al., 2003, p. 253). Anti-
gambling interest groups have been insistent that the potential costs
associated with the opening of licensed premises outweigh the economic
benefits such establishments bring to societies. Gambling establish-
ments, it is alleged, cause a range of social problems, such as gambling
addiction, alcoholism, organised crime and the exploitation of the poor.
Other social and economic concerns include domestic violence, property
crime, increased prevention, treatment and regulatory costs, divorce,
bankruptcy and drug and alcohol abuse. In turn, the arrival of a new
casino is invariably accompanied by apocalyptic pronouncements from
journalists, political commentators and state legislatures on the impend-
ing menace the gambling venue will visit on communities:
2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops and Criminality 33

The impact would be this: casinos would bring a substantial increase in

crime . . . Crime would rise because of crime related problems of compul-
sive gamblers, the constant exposure of casino workers to substance abuse
and other social ills, the pervasive availability of alcohol to casino patrons,
and the growing problem of teenage gambling addiction. (Curran, 1995,
pp. 2–3)

As Zabielskis (2015, p. 128) notes: ‘Such scenarios play off popular and

deeply engrained sentiments that gambling itself is just plain bad – and
that therefore, by simple logic, a casino must be even worse’. Concerns
regarding the association between casinos and crime may also be rooted
in the historic connection between gambling and organised crime and
corruption, as well as more recent links between casinos and street crime
(Park and Stokowski, 2011). But whilst the view that casinos cause crime
is held by some in US society, this may no longer be a widely held belief.
As Fenich (1998, p. 37) notes, we ‘should be aware of the relationship
between crime and casino gaming is that traditional beliefs in this regard
are changing. What was thought to be undisputed fact a mere few years
ago is no longer true’. This is evinced by opinion polls which indicate
that the public is generally supportive of legalised gambling, although
lingering concerns about its social and economic costs and benefits do
remain (Piscitelli and Albanese, 2000, p. 446). Nevertheless, there are
regional differences, with casino gambling continuing to prove contro-
versial in some states, and referenda on casinos being defeated ‘in many
US jurisdictions, partially because voters perceived of a connection with
increased crime’ (Miller and Schwartz, 1998, p. 126). Thus, although
casinos may well present an effective means of generating significant state
revenues, some in society still hold fears that the opening of new
gambling establishments will increase undesirable and criminal elements,
including organised crime figures, as well as offending behaviour more
broadly.
Similar concerns are in evidence in the United Kingdom, with
public anxiety and fear directed at the (perceived) proliferation of
betting shops. Although today the bookie represents the most visible
component of the gambling industry in Britain, it is easy to forget
that off-course betting was only legalised in 1960. Determined to
34 Gambling, Crime and Society

avoid a descent into an ‘orgy of gambling’, the then Tory Home

Secretary Rab Butler insisted that betting shops had blacked out or
shuttered ‘dead windows’ so as to offer as little enticement as possi-
ble. As Butler recalled in his memoirs, ‘the House of Commons was
so intent on making betting shops as sad as possible, in order not to
deprave the young, that they ended up more like undertakers’ pre-
mises’ (cited in Hey, 2008). Nevertheless, up to 10,000 betting shops
opened within the first six months of legalisation. Only in 1986 with
the advent of further legislation were betting shops permitted to
make cosmetic improvements, although this hardly amounted to
the creation of gaming and gambling nirvana; hot drinks machines,
seating and television feeds from racecourses were permitted (Ibid.).
Yet the betting shop business, which by the 1980s was dominated by
William Hill, Ladbrokes, Coral and Mecca, was successful. A series of
corporate mergers and takeovers followed as the success continued;
William Hill joined the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100
in 2004 (it is now part of the FTSE 250).
Despite initial growth in the number of betting shops in the UK,
their numbers have actually declined from over 16,000 in the 1970s to
in the region of 8,700 today (Newall, 2015). However, the recent
resurgence in the number of bookies on Britain’s high streets stems
largely from the success of FOBTs, which were introduced ‘under the
radar’ in 2001 after the bookmaking industry recognised that the
profits electronic gambling generated for casinos could help prop up
stores struggling with an ageing race-betting clientele. Nevertheless, as
Banks and Moxon (2012) note, there remains something of a stigma
attached to betting shops; ‘the drab image of the illegal backstreet
bookie has never quite been shaken off: a “blight on Britain’s high
streets” as the self-styled “queen of shops” Mary Portas (2011) would
have us believe’. Contemporary concerns centre on the damaging
effects of FOBTS which are to be found in most betting shops in
Britain. Anti-gambling campaigners have argued that the profitability
of FOBTs has led to the clustering and proliferation of betting shops
across most towns and cities. In response, a number of politicians, local
councillors and community groups have objected to the granting of
new licenses, claiming that increased numbers of betting shops leads to
2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops and Criminality 35

more crime and anti-social behaviour, as well as exacerbating a range of

other social and economic harms, in the communities in which they are
located.
This chapter gives consideration to the extent to which land-based
gambling establishments cause crime and social harm. It begins by exam-
ining how criminological theory can help explain gambling-related crime,
before focusing on how the relationship between casinos and crime has
been theorised. Discussion then turns to examine those – principally
North American – studies that have sought to establish whether or not
the introduction of land-based gambling establishments – primarily
casinos – is linked to increases in crime. Finally, the impact of prevalence
and propinquity of betting shops and FOBTs on local communities in the
UK is explored. The chapter demonstrates that whilst there is evidence
that FOBTs have a damaging effect on both individuals and commu-
nities, there is little in the way of empirical research that supports widely
held beliefs that FOBTs and Licensed Betting Offices (LBOs) cause crime
and anti-social behaviour.

Theorising Crime, Gambling and Casinos

Criminological theory is helpful in making sense of a wide array of
gambling-related crimes. Typically, criminal behaviour may be under-
stood through three different levels of analysis – the individual, the
interactional and the social structural – yet as Smith et al. (2003,
p. 32) state: ‘It is important to note that the theoretical approaches are
not necessarily distinct, they may, in fact, be complementary and amen-
able to integration’. Individual theories focus upon how a person’s
characteristics may contribute to their offending behaviour, whilst inter-
actional theories consider how social bonds and social relationships can
shape an individual’s likelihood of engaging in crime. Finally, social
structural level theories give consideration to how social order and social
change may impact on gambling-related crime. Each of these different
levels of explanation are particularly pertinent to gambling-related crime
and hold great utility in explaining a range of offences including illegal
gambling, fraud, theft and family violence, as well other crimes
36 Gambling, Crime and Society

associated with gambling venues and gambling activities, such as drug

dealing, money laundering and loan sharking.
For example, rational choice theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986)
suggests that individuals will balance the effort and reward of commit-
ting a gambling-related crime, such as engaging in illegal gambling or
operating an illegal gambling business, against the likelihood of being
caught and the severity of the punishment that could be imposed.
Thus, as Smith et al. (2009, p. 171) note: ‘Individuals engaging in
such activities as illegal sports betting or card games, according to this
perspective, have rationally concluded that the benefits or rewards
anticipated from these activities sufficiently exceed the risk of legal
and informal punishment and other costs to justify pursuing these
behaviours’.
Social learning theory may also be applied to an individual’s involve-
ment in illegal gambling, suggesting that the criminal behaviour is
learned through both imitation and direct experience. Such a theoretical
perspective does not simply apply to ‘conventional’ gamblers but also
‘problem’ gamblers as:

Repetitive participation in illegal gambling and betting activity may result

from the same processes of acquisition, performance and repetition of
behaviour . . . What distinguishes so-called “problem” gamblers, then, is
the frequency or extent of their involvement in illegal gambling and
betting rather than the processes or mechanisms by which they became
involved. (Smith et al., 2003, p. 35)

Alternatively, gambling-related crimes committed by problem or

pathological gamblers may be the result of an underlying characteristic
or personality trait, such as impulsivity, risk taking, sensation seeking
or rebelliousness, that increases the likelihood of individuals engaging
in both offending and problem gambling behaviours. Interactional
theories, such as Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) control theory,
posit that both problem gambling and gambling-related crime stem
from low self-control coupled with increased opportunity which
heightens the potential for such activities to occur. As Magoon et al.
(2005, p. 695) note:
2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops and Criminality 37

The basis for low self-control can be found in poor socialization during an
individual’s early years, often stemming from ineffective parenting. The
interactional level also includes social control theories describing how rules
of a society are followed based on an individual’s belief and involvement
in, as well as attachment and commitment to, that society (Akers, 1991;
Hirschi, 1969). When the societal bond is weak or diminishes over time,
social controls deteriorate, and deviant behaviour is more likely to occur.

Whilst individual and interactional criminological theories help

elucidate the motivational forces behind gambling-related crime,
structural theories enable us to better understand how criminal
opportunities arise. Stitt and his colleagues (Stitt et al., 2003;
Barthe and Stitt, 2007) suggest that routine activity theory (Cohen
and Felson, 1979) combined with the concept of hot spots (Sherman
et al., 1989) demonstrates great utility in theorising why gambling
establishments – such as casinos – may act as locations where crime
and disorder takes place.
Routine Activity Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) focuses on the
convergence (in time and space) of a motivated (rational) offender, a
suitable or vulnerable target and the absence of capable informal or
formal guardianship, features that are believed to pre-exist in every single
crime situation. Cohen and Felson (1979, p. 591) theorise that routine
patterns of behaviour,1 which remove people from the relative safety of
household and family activities, can see them placed in environments
where they are more likely to become a victim of predatory crime: ‘Not
only do routine legitimate activities often provide the wherewithal to
commit offences or to guard against others who do so, but they also
provide offenders with suitable targets’. Predatory crimes involve those
offences that ‘definitely and intentionally damage the person or property
of another’ (Glaser, 1971, p. 4) and are not simply an indicator of social
breakdown, but are a ‘by product of freedom and prosperity as they
manifest themselves in the routine activities of everyday life’ (Cohen and
Felson, 1979, p. 605).

1
In short, routine activities centre on ‘where people spend their time and with whom they come
into contact’ (Messner and Blau, 1987, p. 1037).
38 Gambling, Crime and Society

Developing the ecological element of routine activity theory, Sherman

et al. (1989) employ the concept of ‘hot spots’ to explain how specific
locations are conducive to criminal activity, resulting in a dispropor-
tionate number of incidents of crime and/or anti-social behaviour. They
highlight how crime is not randomly distributed across society but
clusters around specific locations and addresses. Such arenas are typically
characterised by forbidden or specifically encouraged activities, like the
consumption of alcohol, which can increase the incidence of crime (Stitt
et al., 2003, p. 256). This indicates that the routine behaviour char-
acteristics of specific places or hot spots contribute to higher levels of
crime. Environmental criminologists (Brantingham and Brantingham,
1995) point towards the potential for gambling establishments to act as
crime generators or crime attractors. Crime generators represent estab-
lishments to which large numbers of people are drawn for non-criminal
reasons, but their collective presence increases opportunities for offend-
ing and victimisation. Crime attractors represent establishments to
which individuals are drawn specifically to engage in criminal or deviant
behaviour. In such environments, the ‘convergence of motivated offen-
ders, suitable victims and the absence of capable guardians increase the
likelihood of predatory crime’ (Stitt et al., 2003, p. 256).
Johnson and Ratcliffe (2014, p. 5) suggest that casino-related
criminal opportunities ‘abound and potential offenders are likely to
be aware of them’. They identify three principal factors that are likely
to increase criminal opportunities, crime and victimisation. First, the
availability of alcohol in casinos is likely to lower the vigilance of
potential victims, whilst increasing the confidence of potential offen-
ders. As Barthes and Stitt (2009b, p. 140) note: ‘The routine activ-
ities uniquely common to casino environs, such as drinking, partying,
vacationing and relaxing are activities which are likely to coexist with
various types of crimes’. Second, the significant amounts of money
held or won by customers creates suitable targets for crime. Money is
central to the entertainment activity in casinos and, unlike other
forms of leisure and entertainment, this money, in the form of
tokens, is typically on display. Moreover, successes are easily observed
by third parties:
2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops and Criminality 39

When a casino patron wins a large payoff on the most common form of
casino gambling, slot machines, casinos ‘advertise’ the fact with bells,
lights, and whistles. These customs of keeping money or chips in plain
view in table games and drawing attention to individuals who hit big on
slot machines make it simple to assess an individual’s suitability as a
potential crime target. (Stitt et al., 2003, p. 256)

Third, the nature of gambling and the economic decision making

inherent within such transactions may have criminogenic implications:

Individuals with low self-control may be less judicious in their playing

decisions and as a result more likely to find themselves in compromised
economic situations. In turn, casinos may be attractive places to those
with low self-control because they encourage risk-taking behaviours, a
characteristic found to be associated with criminal behaviour (Gottfredson
and Hirschi, 1990). Such individuals may engage in criminal activity to
compensate for their losses. (Johnson and Ratcliffe, 2014, p. 5)

In accordance with routine activities and hot spot theory, it has been
argued that casinos and other gambling establishments demonstrate
much of the criteria for an increased likelihood of offending behaviour,
crime and victimisation. But whilst such theorising may be deemed
appropriate in explaining the hypothesised relationship between casinos
and crime, it is necessary to examine those empirical studies that have
explored the impact of such venues on crime rates.

Studies on Casinos and Crime

A host of different studies have examined the impact of casinos on crime
rates at both a city and county level, drawing mixed conclusions as to the
extent to which the two are related. Much of the initial research in this
area focused on Atlantic City and other small US cities and towns where
new casinos were opening. A number of these early research studies
support the hypothesis that casinos encourage crime. For example,
40 Gambling, Crime and Society

Hakim and Friedman (1985) found that recorded crime levels were
higher for all types of offence2 in the Atlantic City region in the year
after the casinos opened. They also demonstrated that levels of crime had
risen in localities adjacent to Atlantic City and along the Garden State
Parkway within 30 miles of Atlantic City, indicating that communities
located close to gambling establishments may suffer spillover effects
without gaining any of the benefits from casino gambling.
Ochrym (1988) also examined the impact of casino legalisation in
Atlantic City on street crime. He suggested that criminals actively
sought out the ‘tourist environment’ of Atlantic City because the
likelihood of detection and arrest was lower, as tourists are less likely
to report crimes. Thus, Ochrym concluded that both the legalisation of
casino gambling and the subsequent increase in tourism resulted in a
rise in crimes across Atlantic City. Similarly, Friedman et al.’s (1989,
p. 622) longitudinal analysis of crimes in Atlantic City identified that
all offence types with the exception of larceny increased in the post-
casino years indicating that ‘casinos might have “brought” significantly
more crime than the population increase warranted’. Such a finding is
reiterated in Hakim and Buck’s (1989) analysis which found that crime
was higher in the post-casino years 1978 to 1984, in comparison to
pre-casino years 1972 to 1977, when other factors3 were controlled for.
The greatest increases were for violent crime and auto theft and the
smallest for burglary. And whilst there was some spatial crime spillover
into adjacent areas, this diminished rapidly the further away the locality
from Atlantic City.
Presenting one of most significant early studies on casinos and crime
that questioned earlier research findings, Albanese (1985) notes that
when the average daily population is controlled for, the personal risk
of victimisation actually declines, despite the growth in the number of
daily visitors to Atlantic City. Albanese (1985, pp. 40–41) convincingly
argues that there are fundamental flaws in early research (New York

2
Hakim and Friedman’s study examined four types of property crime – robberies, burglaries,
larcenies and vehicle thefts – and violent crimes.
3
Unemployment, population, community wealth.
2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops and Criminality 41

State, 1979; Sternlieb and Hughes, 1983; Hakim and Fiedman, 1985)
purporting to demonstrate a link between casinos and street crime:

The reports illustrate an upsurge in street crime, however, by relaying

increases in the number of Uniform Crime Reports Index Crimes (i.e.
murder, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft) that
occurred in Atlantic City from 1977 to 1980. In 1977, for example, 4,391
Index crimes were reported to police in Atlantic City. By 1980, this
number had risen to 11,899. What this comparison fails to accomplish,
however, is the accurate presentation of the risk of crime to citizens in
Atlantic City. That is to say, crime statistics can be extremely misleading
when they fail to account for: (1) changes in the population at risk, (2)
changes in criminal opportunities, (3) changes in law enforcement
resources and priorities, and (4) changes in crime elsewhere in the state.

Albanese’s research demonstrates that although Atlantic City may have

seen an increase in the extent of crime, the likelihood of victimisation
actually decreased due to an even faster growth in the daily population of
the city. This indicates that ‘the increase in serious crime in Atlantic City
has been more than offset by an increasing population there. The result
has been a slight reduction in the likelihood of being victimized there’
(Ibid: 43). Thus, Albanese concluded that, ‘casinos have no direct effect
on the serious crime in Atlantic City, and that crime has risen due to
factors other than casinos themselves’ (Ibid.).
Other studies have returned similar findings for both Atlantic City
and other metropolises. For example, Curran and Scarpitti’s (1991)
follow-up study sought to distinguish between casino-based crime
which took place in or on the premises of Atlantic City casinos and
those community-based crimes that occurred across Atlantic City. Like
Albanese, Curran and Scarpitti concluded that the legalisation of casinos
did not lead to a significant rise in index offences. They also found that
standardised community crime rates for offences that happened outside
of gambling establishments were consistent with comparable cities.
Chang’s (1996) examination of the impact of casinos on crime, utilising
data for 118 different criminal offences from Biloxi, Mississippi, drew
similar findings. Chang identified how there was a substantial decrease
42 Gambling, Crime and Society

in overall crime rates during the first full year that casinos were in
operation, with crime rates returning to their pre-casino level during
the second year. Overall, data indicated that there was no measurable
increase in crime during the first 2 years following the opening of the
casinos. Likewise, Giacopassi and Stitt’s (1993) study of Biloxi found no
general increase in crime a year after the introduction of casinos, whilst
Phipps (2004), who devised an empirical model to examine the impact
of the opening and closing of urban casinos on two nearby neighbour-
hoods in Windsor, recorded that there was no evidence that calls to the
police had increased as a consequence of the presence of casinos in the
area. By contrast, Hyclak’s (2011) economic analysis of casinos and
campus crime concluded that more crime, specifically car thefts and
robberies, were reported on college campuses located within 10 miles of
a casino.
Other city-level research has employed matched quasi-experimen-
tal designs. For example, Stitt et al. (2003) compared monthly crime
rates across casino and non-casino cities pre and post introduction,
and found that although the addition of casinos led to marginally
significant increases in larceny, liquor violations, homicide and pros-
titution, these differences disappeared when the population at risk
was controlled for. Highlighting how crime had increased in some
jurisdictions and fallen in others following the introduction of a new
casino, the researchers noted that while casinos present environments
conducive to crime, it does not necessarily lead to rises in the level
of crime:

[A]nalysis yielded few consistent findings across the test and control
communities. Crime rates increased significantly in some casino commu-
nities, some remained relatively stable, and others decreased. The authors
conclude that crime does not inevitably increase with the introduction of a
casino into a community, but that the effects of casinos on crime appear to
be related to a variety of variables which are only poorly understood. (Stitt
et al., 2003, p. 253)

Stitt and his colleagues determined that they could make no ‘definitive
conclusion regarding the effect of casinos on crime’ (Ibid.: 280).
2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops and Criminality 43

Providing the first analysis of casinos and ‘hot spots’, Barthes and Stitt
(2007, 2009a, 2009b) examined the spatial distribution of crime around
casinos in Reno, Nevada. They suggested that casino hot spots demon-
strated a greater association with public drunkenness, drugs and trespas-
sing, as well as reports of suspicious activity than non-casino hotspots.
Their research also indicated little in the way of temporal disagreement
between casino and non-casino hot spots when exploring the distribu-
tion of disorder crimes by the hour. Although the research team identi-
fied that nearly a quarter of the city’s crime occurred within 1000 feet of
casinos, controlling for the ‘population at risk’ enabled a clearer picture
of the criminogenic effects of casinos. By accounting for the rise in
tourism near casinos, Barthe and Stitt (2009b) identified that the crime
incident rate decreased sharply, indicating that the likelihood of victi-
misation was lower in the downtown casino area than in the surround-
ing non-casino areas of the city. Barthe and Stitt (2009b, p. 151)
concluded that:

[W]hile it has been consistently argued by many that casinos generate

crime, this latest analysis is yet another empirical verification that casino
venues may not be all that different from non-casino environs in terms of
prevalence and patterns. Barthe and Stitt (2007) provided evidence that
casinos may not be deserving of the label ‘hot spots’ for crime. Then
Barthe and Stitt (2009a) further found that casino generated ‘hot spots’
were not very different from non-casino ‘hot spots’ in terms of crimino-
genic patterns.

Similarly, Johnson and Ratcliffe’s (2014) examination of 96 months of

crime incident data sought to establish the impact of the opening of a
new casino in Fishtown, Philadelphia. The researchers identified that the
casino had no appreciable effect on violent street felonies, vehicle crime,
drug crime or residential burglary in the surrounding community. Drug
offences and residential burglary did, however, fall in areas surrounding
the casino neighbourhood after it opened suggesting ‘a diffusion of
benefits possibly tied to a change in local police patrols’ (Ibid: 1).
Like city-level research, empirical studies using county data have also
yielded mixed results. For example, a county-level analysis in the state of
44 Gambling, Crime and Society

Wisconsin has indicated that casino presence is related to significant

increases in both violent crime and property offences (Thompson et al.,
1996, 1997; Gazel et al., 2001). Thompson et al.’s (1997) study of the
impact of Indian casinos compared crime data from counties containing
casinos and 13 counties bordering two or more casino counties with
other counties in the state. The researchers found that between 1991 and
1995 counties with or near casinos recorded arrest rates and major crime
rates that were 12.2 per cent and 6.7 per cent higher than non-casino
counties. Thompson and his colleagues concluded that the introduction
of casinos is associated with a rise in crime and that: ‘The costs we have
specifically identified suggest that the positive benefits of gambling are
probably being overstated by proponents of expanded gambling’ (Ibid:
89). Elsewhere, Evans and Topoleski’s (2002) exploration of the impact
of Indian casinos on crime draws on data spanning 1985 to 1998 for all
counties in the United States and identified a significant increase in
property crime, as a result of rises in larceny and theft, 4 years after the
opening of Indian casinos.
Piscitelli and Albanese (2000) have suggested that casinos may attract
a disproportionate number of people who exhibit low self-control,
including criminals. Examining the rate of criminally inadmissible per-
sons seeking entry to Canada following the opening of a new casino,
they noted that although the rate rose – increasing most notably a year
after the opening of Casino Niagara – data was insufficient to answer the
question as to whether or not casinos attract criminals. Thus: ‘Some
criminals may be coming to Canada to commit crimes, whereas other
criminals may be coming simply to gamble and not to contribute to the
crime rate’ (Ibid.: 455).
Research has also explored spatial (Koo et al., 2007) and temporal
(Grinols and Mustard, 2006) lag effects of casinos, indicating that non-
casino counties adjacent to casino counties record higher rates of crime
and casino counties are associated with notable increases in crime as time
progresses from the intervention date. Employing trend line and regres-
sion analyses of outcomes in three states with casinos – Michigan,
Indiana and West Virginia – as well as Ohio that borders these states,
Koo et al. (2007) identified no statistically significant negative effect on
unemployment, bankruptcy or crime rates after the casinos had opened.
2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops and Criminality 45

They did, however, note that: ‘[T]here are other social costs that some
attribute to gambling (e.g., drug and alcohol usage, domestic violence,
child abuse and abandonment, etc.) that were not part of this analysis
since valid county-wide prevalence rates of these socially dysfunctional
behaviors were not as accessible’ (Ibid.: 379).
By contrast, Grinols and Mustard’s (2006) expansive study of crime
data for 170 casino and 3,165 non-casino counties between 1977 and
1996 identified that casinos increased all index offences with the excep-
tion of murder. Controlling for more than 50 variables, the researchers
estimated that casino-related crime costs each US citizen US$75 per
year. However, the research identified a time lag, with increases in crime
only occurring 3 to 4 years after casinos had opened. A positive and
significant rise in violent crime after 4 years of the opening of a casino
was also recorded. Grinols and Mustard concluded that 8 per cent of
crime in casino counties can be attributed to casinos. Significantly the
research team focused on structural costs as opposed to the probability of
being victimised, excluding the number of visitors to the area when
calculating crime rates. Walker’s (2008, p. 10) critique of Grinols and
Mustard research highlights how their failure to account for tourists in
crime calculations is misleading:

[C]learly the ‘diluted’ crime rate4 is the appropriate one to use if we are
trying to measure the risk to residents and/or visitors of being victimised.
The Grinols and Mustard “undiluted” crime rate will overstate the crime
rate in tourist (casino) counties. This is perhaps the most significant
problem in the Grinols and Mustard paper.

In addition to not accounting for changes in the population, the study

also fails to account for changes in law enforcement resources and
priorities. Grinols and Mustard (2008, p. 21) dismiss Walker’s criti-
cisms, noting that he merely presents potential and not actual problems:
‘Some are well-known statistical issues, some are data limitations, and
some are methodology issues. All of his concerns speak of potential

4
Adjusted for temporary visitors.
46 Gambling, Crime and Society

problems. He includes no new research or statistical results to provide

evidence that the potential problems are actual problems or that they are
important’. In turn, they argue that there is little reason to alter the
conclusions of their research. Nevertheless, similar concerns regarding
the failure to account for the impact of population change have been
recorded elsewhere (see, e.g. Albanese 1985).
Miller and Schwartz (1998) claim that most studies of casinos and
crime involve little more than data dredging and simply take for
granted that casinos are different to other leisure and entertainment
facilities that attract large numbers of tourists. They note that: ‘We
have not found here any compelling evidence to suggest that there is
something unique about casinos that causes an increase in street crime
in the surrounding area’ (Ibid., p. 126). This is reaffirmed by Park
and Stokowski (2011, p. 289) who note that comparative studies are
lacking: ‘Many studies about crime in places that allow casino gam-
bling found that crime increased after casinos opened, but to date,
there are no published studies comparing actual crime effects across
different types of tourism places’. In response, Park and Stokowski
examined a sample of rural Colorado counties, comparing crime rates
in ‘casino counties’, ‘ski counties’, ‘natural resource access counties’
and ‘cultural tourist attraction counties’. They identified that whilst
there was no variation in violent crimes and total arrests across the
four types of tourism counties studied, there were differences in
property crime. However: ‘Contrary to common perceptions, though,
the average crime rate for total property crime was significantly higher
in ski resort counties than in casino gaming counties. Differences
were significant even after controlling for such variables as police
numbers, average traffic volume, time, and growth levels’ (Park and
Stokowski, 2011, p. 298).
More recently, Humphreys and Lee’s (2010) and Humphreys and
Soebbing’s (2014) examination of the relationship between VLTs and
casino gambling and crime in the province of Alberta, Canada, found no
significant relationship between gambling and crime rates for a host of
different offences including credit card fraud, drugs, prostitution, rob-
bery and shoplifting. Employing data from the Uniform Crime
Reporting Survey between 1977 and 2008 they note that:
2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops and Criminality 47

The results indicate only a weak relationship between casinos and crime in
Alberta . . . the presence of a casino in a community was associated with an
increase in robberies and decrease in shoplifting under $5,000. All of the
other estimated parameters on the casino indicator variable were not
statistically different from zero at conventional levels. (Humphreys and
Lee, 2010, p. 21)

Similarly, Reece’s (2010) analysis of crime data across Indiana counties

over the period 1994 to 2004 shows an increase in burglaries a few years
after the casino had opened, but a significant fall in larceny, motor vehicle
theft, aggravated assault and robbery. Reece (2010, p. 157) concluded
that there is ‘very limited support for the proposition that new casinos
increase local crime rates’. Such a finding is reiterated by Nichols and
Tosun (2013) whose analysis of county-level crime data between 1994
and 2009 demonstrated that the legalisation of casinos resulted in an
increase in crime-related to casinos in some circumstances and not others.
For Piscitelli and Albanese (2000), there are two fundamental pro-
blems with studies measuring crime before and after the introduction of
casinos, which undermine claims that casinos cause crime. First, studies
have failed to distinguish between crime which is as a consequence of
economic development and increases in population and crime which
results from the introduction of a casino. Second, researchers have been
unable to distinguish between crime related to casinos and crime unre-
lated to casinos. As they note: ‘This is difficult to establish because
prostitution, for example, may occur both with and without legal
gambling, but precipitous increases soon after the implementation of
legal gambling are often used as an indirect indication of cause and
effect’ (Ibid., 448). In their review of casino and crime research, to
inform policy debate concerning the potential development of a casino
resort in the Greater Toronto Area, Canada, Philander and Bernhard
(2012, p. 1, emphasis in original) aptly summarise the research to date:

The findings of our review generally support a view that the proposed
casino-resort might increase the total volume of crimes in the area, but
that there will be an insignificant effect on the crime rates overall (when
adjusted for the number of people in the area). That is with respect to the
48 Gambling, Crime and Society

total volume of crime, casinos seem to have an impact similar to other large
recreation/tourism draws, such as a hockey game or the Canadian National
Exhibition. With respect to the crime rate, however, casinos are typically
found to have no significant effects, as the increase in volume is generally
explained by the number of temporary visitors in the area. Put another way,
there should be no increased risk of crime related harm to nearby residents.
These findings were consistent between studies that focused on jurisdictions
within Canada, and in other international locations.

Ultimately, there is much variation in conclusions drawn from empirical

studies examining casinos and crime. As Walker (2010) and Philander
and Bernhard (2012) recognise, the more robust research studies (Gazel
et al., 2001; Wilson, 2001; Stitt et al., 2000; Giacopassi et al., 2001;
Evans and Topoleski, 2002; Stitt et al., 2003; Grinols and Mustard,
2006; Barthe and Stitt, 2007, 2009a, 2009b; Reece, 2010; Humphreys
and Lee, 2010) have been conducted within the last 10 to 15 years.
Consistent across this research is the finding that casinos can increase the
total volume of crime within the locality, but that this is the product of
increased tourist and traffic levels as opposed to the introduction of a
casino itself. Such a finding reaffirms Parker’s (1994, p. 2) early review of
crime data from a host of cities across the US which concluded that:
‘The data do not support the conventional wisdom that there is a
demonstrated link between casino establishments and crime. In fact,
the data indicate that few statistical patterns or discernible crime trends
could be related directly to the introduction of casino gaming into a
municipality’. So although localities may experience an increase in a
number of different types of crime, casino gambling is not in itself
responsible for these rises.

Licensed Betting Offices, Crime, Anti-Social

Behaviour and Public Fear
In the UK, the proliferation and clustering of LBOs has generated
significant local and national concern that they visit a number of harms
on communities, including increased levels of crime and anti-social
2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops and Criminality 49

behaviour. Despite the threat to bricks and mortar betting establishments

posed by the rapid expansion of Internet gambling, the number of
betting shops on Britain’s high streets has grown steadily and significantly
over the last 5 years, sustained largely by the success of FOBTs. As
Lamont (2016) recognises:

It is a rare British high street that has not come to be kitted out, today, in
the colours of the bookmakers. In every town, on every retail row, the
routine sweep of bank and salon and shrunken supermarket will be
studded at almost mathematical intervals by the red of a Ladbrokes
storefront or the blue and yellow of a William Hill, likely as well by the
blue of a Coral, the blue and red of a Betfred, the pale green of a Stan
James or the clover-leaf shade of a Paddy Power. In total, there are around
9,000 licensed betting shops in the UK.

For some local residents, betting shops, which often appear alongside
pawnbrokers and money lenders, are a blight on high streets and
neighbourhoods. Demireva (2014) notes that many citizens see LBOs
as one of a number of predatory industries that have pushed out small
retailers, exploited citizenry and damaged local communities:

The rise of these ‘unsavoury’ businesses, fuelled by the recession, is chan-

ging the face of their neighbourhoods for the worse. Residents claim that
small businesses and community groups are disappearing followed shortly
by the arrival of opportunistic organisations such as betting shops. That
may not actually be what’s happening, but that’s how local people see it.

Underpinning a significant amount of criticism of the impact of betting

shops on local communities and wider society is their association with
the increased availability of FOBTs. The profitability of FOBTs has
driven the sustainability, proliferation and clustering of betting shops
across Britain, generating approximately £900 per week per machine or
in the region of £1.5 billion for bookmakers (Hancock and Orford,
2014). FOBTs are electronic machines that offer a host of different
games, most notably roulette, but also blackjack, bingo, and virtual
horse races, that allow players to gamble pre-set amounts at fixed odds.
50 Gambling, Crime and Society

Introduced to betting shops in the UK in 2001, the Gambling Act allows

for up to four machines to be sited on betting premises (Woodhouse,
2014). Players are able to wager between a minimum bet of £1 and a
maximum bet of £100 with a maximum prize of £500. According to
Gambling Commission statistics, there were 34,436 machines in opera-
tion across gambling establishments in Britain in 2013/2014, represent-
ing a 10 per cent increase since 2008/2009. Critics argue that FOBTs
have a significant detrimental impact upon society. Dubbed the ‘crack
cocaine of gambling’, their proliferation has been linked to increases in
money spent gambling, problem gambling, money laundering, violence
in betting shops and gambling-related acquisitive crime.
Recently, Tombs and Turner (2015) have suggested that the failure to
effectively regulate FOBTs in Britain is tantamount to a ‘state-corporate
harm’; harm caused by private companies and facilitated by the state.
Borrowing from the term ‘state corporate crime’, developed by US
criminologists in the 1990, harm represents:

[A]n illegal or socially injurious social action that is the collective product
of the interaction between a business corporation and a state agency
engaged in a joint endeavour. These crimes involve the active participation
of two or more organizations, at least one of which is private and one of
which is public. They are the harmful result of an interorganizational
relationship between business and government. (Kramer, 1990, p. 1)

For Tombs and Turner (2015), the ‘dominant preference for self-
regulation’ is a consequence of the benefits that the gambling industry
and governments derive from this arrangement. For gambling busi-
nesses, FOBTs are highly profitable, whilst the state is able to derive
significant tax revenues from such forms of gambling. FOBTs appear
to be a ‘class targeted’ form of gambling, with LBOs clustered in
economically and socially deprived areas where they are able to extract
revenues from already marginalised populations (Ibid.).
Indeed, international research examining the social and geographical
patterning of FOBTs indicates that machines are clustered in high areas
of socio-economic deprivation. In New Zealand, ‘excess provision’ of
electronic gaming machines has been identified in areas classified as
2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops and Criminality 51

highly deprived (Wheeler et al., 2006). Whilst researchers acknowledge

that they can draw no link between gaming machine location and the
development of problem gambling: ‘It is clear that gaming machines are
disproportionately sited in the most deprived areas of New Zealand,
potentially influencing or at least facilitating the development of problem
gambling habits in those who can least afford them, and thus impacting
adversely on wellbeing’. A similar trend in the spatial distribution of
EGMs has been identified in Australia and Canada (Marshall, 1998;
Livingstone, 1999; Marshall and Baker, 2001; Gilliland and Ross, 2005).
For example, Gilliland and Ross (2005) have recorded that the preva-
lence, adoption and density of VLTs in the municipalities of Montréal
and Laval, Quebec, strongly correlate with borough socio-economic
conditions. The spatial distortion of opportunities to gamble presents a
significant risk to vulnerable populations, leading to higher levels of
gambling and gambling-related problems. Likewise, Marshall and
Baker’s (2001: 273) examination of time-series socio-economic distribu-
tions of EGMs in Melbourne and Sydney found that: ‘As EGMs have
proliferated, growing recognition has emerged that EGM distribution
closely reflects levels of socioeconomic disadvantage. More machines are
located in less advantaged regions’. Finally, Livingstone (1999) demon-
strates that poker machines in Victoria are strongly marketed and located
close to the most disadvantaged of municipalities.
Such patterning is also evident in the UK. In the first study to map
the location and density of gambling machines in Britain, Wardle
(2015) examined the extent to which geographic areas with high den-
sities of FOBTs exist and compared the socio-economic characteristics
of such areas with other areas. Geospatial analysis revealed 8,861
‘Machine Zones’, representing areas with a 400 meter radius around
FOBT venues, and 384 ‘High Density Machine Zones’ holding one or
more gambling machine per hectare. Significantly, the researchers iden-
tified that there was a ‘significant correlation between machine density
and socio-economic deprivation’, with High Density Machine Zones
recording greater levels of income deprivation, economic inactivity and a
younger age profile than other areas (Ibid.: 201). Wardle (2015, p. 201)
concluded that: ‘[T]he distribution of gambling machines in Great
Britain, in line with other international jurisdictions, displays a
52 Gambling, Crime and Society

significant association with areas of socio-economic deprivation. The

profile of the resident population living in High Density Machine Zones
mirrors the profile of those most at-risk of experiencing harm from
gambling’.
Fears that FOBTs and betting shops, both individually and cumula-
tively, result in an increase in crime and anti-social behaviour continues
to underpin much opposition to the licensing of new premises. As Berry
(2013) notes, alongside concerns regarding gambling addiction:

A second objection to betting shops is based on the largely anecdotal

evidence that betting shops attract anti-social behaviour. This is heigh-
tened by the now familiar image of groups of men loitering outside shops.
Indeed, Newham’s decision to refuse Paddy Power’s license was based on
the likelihood of crime and disorder; they lost in court because the judge
believed the evidence for a link was not strong enough.

Nevertheless, claims that the growth in LBOs has led to increases in

crime continue to be espoused by local councillors, anti-gambling
campaigners and, most notably, the national media. In particular,
the British print press regularly draw links between LBOs and crime
in their reporting. For example, in 2015, the vast majority of the
newsprint media reported on police statistics showing a 20 per cent
increase in incidents of betting shop crime that required police
attendance. Figures released under a Freedom of Information request
highlighted that incidents of crime rose from 7,436 in 2013 to
9,083 in January to September 2014, with newspapers attributing
this rise to the increased availability of FOBTs. Articles associating
LBOs and FOBTs with violent crime, money laundering and rob-
bery have also appeared in many newspapers. In a recent Guardian
article focusing on a presentation given by London flying squad
officers to the gambling industry, it was reported that 200 of 523
serious robberies against commercial premises in the capital in 2015
were of betting shops, whilst bookies also accounted for 70 per cent
of robberies at commercial premises that involved a firearm (Ramesh,
2016). Such coverage is, undoubtedly, likely to fuel public fear and
concern regarding LBOs and FOBTs.
2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops and Criminality 53

Yet research on betting shops, crime and incivility is scant and there is
little empirical evidence to suggest that betting shops increase crime and
anti-social behaviour. For example, a study conducted by GeoFutures
(Astbury and Wardle, 2015) on behalf of the Responsible Gambling
Trust demonstrates that approximately half of LBOs are located in town
centres where crime rates are significantly greater than out-of-town
locations. However, when segmenting the crime events recorded by the
police within the past six months, the study did find that the: ‘Crime
density is higher in proximity to LBOs, particularly in off-centre loca-
tions, which is true for most crime types’. But whilst this indicates that
crime density is greater in the vicinity of LBOs, it does not demonstrate
that betting shops cause this crime. As Kumar and Yoshimoto’s (2016)
working paper suggests, crime-prone areas could well attract gambling
shops. Employing betting shop data from the UK Data Service and the
Gambling Commission, and crime data from the Metropolitan Police
Service’s record system, alongside a host of other data sources, Kumar and
Yoshimoto explored the causal effect of local crime on the number of
betting shops in London boroughs between 2007and 2015. By examin-
ing average crime rates in neighbourhood boroughs, the researchers
identified that a: ‘1% increase in the crime rate causes a 1.2% increase
in the number of betting shops (per capita). Expressed in a different way,
a new betting shop is opened in a borough for every 1.4% increase in
local crime rate, on average’ (Ibid., 16).
Elsewhere, Gilmore’s (2012, p. 21) observational study into crime,
disorder and nuisance linked to LBOs found that ‘many of the
incidents recorded in the study did not concern the gambling licen-
sing objectives and were at most incidents of nuisance or misbeha-
viour and fell short of what could be described as crime and disorder’.
Moreover, there was little evidence to suggest that an increase in
incidents of crime, anti-social behaviour and harassment were linked
to the clustering of betting shops, although it was noted that this
clustering may well be interpreted by passers-by as creating a ‘critical
mass’. Gilmore notes that although LBOs do not necessarily cause
crime, their presence is associated with specific forms of crime includ-
ing violence, minor criminal damage, low-level anti-social behaviour
and harassment of passers-by.
54 Gambling, Crime and Society

It is possible that such an association is reinforced by the masculine

environment of the betting shop. Of the few academic qualitative
studies that have explored betting shops, Cassidy’s (2014a, 2014b)
ethnographic research provides the most vivid and compelling account
of this setting. For Cassidy (2014a, p. 188, emphasis my own), the
hegemonic masculinity found in London’s betting shops ‘is partly a
reflection of a more generic idea of men as numerate, intelligent and
potentially dangerous’. Cassidy records that low-level violence was a
common occurrence in bookies and although more serious violence
was rare, it did take place:

The majority of the violence I observed during fieldwork was limited

to angry verbal exchanges, pushing and shoving. I also recorded seven
more serious incidents, ranging from two men fighting after a dis-
agreement, to a brawl which damaged furniture and spread out into
the street. I saw only one weapon, a knife brandished as a warning,
and blood was spilt on four occasions. The police attended the brawl,
the other fights were stopped by staff and customers. Some of this
violence was directed towards staff. A man who threatened a female
colleague with a golf club was roughly ejected by other customers, an
event which anticipated an incident in 2013 when a man attempting
to rob a betting shop in Plymouth died after being restrained by
regulars, one of whom said at the time: ‘They would do that in a
shop like this, it is our betting shop . . . The staff become your friends,
it’s a little family, and it’s no different to a member of your family
being threatened’ (Sawer, 2013). Some of the Plymouth regulars
didn’t even notice that an attempted burglary had taken place:
‘When I walked in they were on the floor. They were scuffling but I
just thought it was a fight’ one said. Low-level violence of this kind
was also unexceptional in the betting shops where I worked. (Cassidy,
2014a, pp. 182–183)

Collectively, such evidence directs us towards an understanding of

why LBOs may be associated with crime and anti-social behaviour
in the public imagination. Yet it does not in any way substantiate
claims that betting shops cause, facilitate or attract crime. As Griffiths
(2011, p. 9) notes:
2 Bringing Crime to the City? Casinos, Betting Shops and Criminality 55

Although a few studies have shown associations between gambling and

crime there is no empirical evidence showing that gambling venues
(including betting shops) cause crime. Most of the empirical evidence
concerning the relationship between crime and gambling concerns the
criminal consequences of problem gambling (including those ‘addicted’ to
gambling). In order to be a cause of crime, betting shops must be both a
necessary and sufficient condition for the crimes in question to occur. This
paper finds that they are neither.

Thus, to date, the association between LBOs and crime remains assumed
rather than proven.

Conclusion
The growth and widespread availability of land-based forms of gambling
continue to generate much concern and anxiety amongst certain sections of
society. Most notably, US and UK citizens remain fearful that the intro-
duction of betting establishments leads to an increase in a number of social
ills, including criminal and deviant behaviour. In the US, such concerns
centre on the expansion of the casino industry into and across 30 different
states, with claims from state legislatures, the media and wider society that
such establishments bring with them street crime, violence, white collar
offending and organised crime, alongside other social problems including
addiction, alcoholism and exploitation of the poor. In the UK, the pro-
liferation and propinquity of FOBTs and LBOs across most towns and
cities are accused of causing an upsurge in crime, violence, anti-social
behaviour and harassment in the communities in which they are located.
Criminological theory posits that gambling establishments may well
act as locations where crime and anti-social behaviour take place, pre-
senting environs in which predatory criminals and suitable targets meet.
In particular, the widespread availability of alcohol, significant quantities
of cash and absence of capable guardians suggests that casinos may
represent hot spots, which are conducive to higher levels of crime. In
response to such theorising, a host of studies have sought to assess the
effect that casinos have on crime rates at both a city and county level.
56 Gambling, Crime and Society

Yet three decades of research has drawn mixed conclusions as to the

relationship between casinos and crime, with some studies identifying
that the introduction of casinos may be associated with increases in
(certain types of) offending in and around casinos, across neighbouring
areas and the county or state, whilst other studies have recorded little in
the way of compelling evidence to suggest that increases in crime may be
associated with casinos. Most pertinently, evidence indicates that although
the number of crimes may increase in the period after the introduction of a
casino in a specific location, this is invariably the consequence of the
increased number of visitors to the area. Consequently, when the total
population at risk is accounted for, there is little evidence to suggest that
casinos heighten crime.
In contrast to the significant body of research examining the relation-
ship between casinos and crime in North America, there is a dearth of UK
research exploring the relationship between FOBTs and LBOs and crime
and anti-social behaviour. As such, the link between crime and incivility
and betting shops appears to be based on public and political perception
and misrepresentation rather than research evidence. Yet whilst this
chapter has failed to demonstrate a link between the increased availability
of land-based forms of gambling and crime through its examination of
studies drawing upon jurisdictional crime rates, it does not unequivocally
demonstrate that increased legal gambling availability does not affect the
amount of crime in society. It may well be that the growth in gambling
establishments housing FOBTs, alongside the proliferation of other
forms of high-intensity gambling, increases the number of problem
gamblers and, in turn, the number of criminogenic problem gamblers
who commit crimes to fund their gambling activities or related shortfalls
in finance. It is to this subject that discussion now turns.

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 3
Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime
and the Criminal Justice System

Introduction
The widespread availability of land-based gambling establishments in
certain regions of the world has led to much consternation that they
increase predatory street crime, violence and anti-social behaviour. In
the US, the spread of casinos across 30 different states has been met with
accusations by some sections of society that they lead to rises in crime
not just in the vicinity of the casino, but across the city, county and state.
Yet the empirical evidence to support the supposition is mixed, with a
host of city- and county-level research yielding findings that both sup-
port and repudiate the claim that casinos cause crime. Similar concerns
are in evidence in the UK where the proliferation and clustering of LBOs
that house FOBTs have been accused of being responsible for greater
levels of crime, violence, criminal damage, anti-social behaviour and
harassment in the (often socially disadvantaged) communities in which
they reside. Yet in contrast to the large number of North American
studies examining the relationship between casinos and crime there is a
dearth of research in the UK that has sought to explore the claimed link
between betting shops and crime and anti-social behaviour. Thus, to

© The Author(s) 2017 63

J. Banks, Gambling, Crime and Society,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57994-2_3
64 Gambling, Crime and Society

date, the association between LBOs and crime is assumed rather than
proven by research evidence. This has not, however, prevented the
development of fears amongst many that the introduction of a new
LBO will heighten a variety of social ills including crime and incivility in
the communities in which they are located. Such a discourse is sustained,
in part, by local and national media reports, local councillors and anti-
gambling campaigners who have argued vehemently against the intro-
duction of new shops in many towns and cities across Britain. Most
significantly, many opponents of the liberalisation and deregulation of
gambling, which has led to the spread of high-intensity continuous
forms of gambling such as electronic gaming machines, contend that it
is linked to increases in gambling addiction and problem gambling
which, in turn, result in increases in crime.
This chapter, in part, seeks to explore the relationships between
problem gambling and crime. Whilst chapter 2 examined the relation-
ship between gambling and crime at a population level, this chapter
explores it at an individual level. Griffiths (2014, p. 7) notes that
problem gambling refers to a broad spectrum of gambling-related
behaviours: ‘Although there is no absolute agreement, commonly
‘problem gambling’ is used as a general term to indicate all of the
patterns of disruptive or damaging gambling behaviour’. This encap-
sulates differing severities of addiction and is associated with a host of
different terms, including but not limited to ‘addictive’, ‘at-risk’ ‘exces-
sive’, ‘compulsive’, ‘dependent’, ‘disordered’, ‘impulsive’ and ‘patho-
logical’. As such problem gambling behaviour may be best understood
as existing ‘on a continuum, with extreme, pathological presentation at
one end, very minor problems at the other, and a range of more or less
disruptive behaviours in between. Moreover, this behaviour is some-
thing that is mutable’ (Ibid., p. 6). Although global estimates of
problem gambling are not feasible, a review of 80 separate studies in
30 different countries1 (Alberta Gambling Research Institute, 2013)

1
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus – Northern, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Isle of Man, Italy,
Lithuania, Macau, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, Singapore, South
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States.
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 65

suggests that the prevalence of problem gambling is 1.5 per cent across
these jurisdictions (Gowing et al., 2015).
It is the aim of this chapter to provide a comprehensive examination
of the prevalence, nature and relationships between gambling, problem
gambling and offending behaviour. It also gives consideration to the
role of gambling and problem gambling in the administration of
justice. This includes the extent to which problem gambling is recorded
by criminal justice agencies, the role it plays in the sentencing of
offenders and the extent to which treatment services are available in
criminal justice settings.

Defining Gambling-Related Crime

Early definitions of gambling-related crime focused on criminal
offences that are motivated by a desire to obtain money in order to
fund either an individual’s gambling habit or their gambling-related
shortfalls in finance. For example, Blaszczynski and McConaghy’s
(1994a, p. 133) classification of offending behaviour distinguishes
between crime that is directly related to gambling and offences that
are indirectly related to gambling: ‘A criminal offence committed by a
gambler or partner to fund his or her gambling either directly and/or
indirectly to fund a shortfall of living expenses due to gambling’.
Crofts (2002) is critical of this dichotomy citing how her research
demonstrates that crimes can be simultaneously both directly and
indirectly related to an individual’s gambling behaviour. Moreover,
Blaszczynski and McConaghy’s classification does not extend to non-
financial crimes, such as domestic violence, despite a growing body of
evidence indicating that such crimes may result from problem gam-
bling (Crofts, 2002). Recognising this shortcoming, the Centre for
Criminology and Criminal Justice, Monash University (2000, p. 9),
extended their definition of gambling-related crime to include ‘crime
perpetrated or precipitated by persons with a gambling problem’.
Whilst covering a much broader range of offending behaviour, this
definition raises the question of what constitutes a ‘problem gambler’.
Furthermore, ‘it can readily be seen that even a problem gambler can
66 Gambling, Crime and Society

commit a crime that is unrelated to his or her gambling’ (Bellringer

et al., 2009, p. 23). In response, Croft’s (2002, p. 16) definition
encapsulates a broad spectrum of offending behaviour, including both
crimes related to problem gambling and gambling-related crime more
broadly (South Australian Independent Gambling Authority, 2002).
Most notably, Crofts definition includes non-financial crimes such as
familial violence: ‘Offences committed as a consequence of, committed
in order to support, committed as a significant result of, or significantly
related to the defendant’s desire, need or compulsion to gamble’ (Crofts,
2002, p. 16). This wide ranging definition is most appropriate for shaping
proceeding discussion of the relationships between gambling and crime.

Population Studies of Problem Gamblers

and Crime
A growing body of international research has sought to explore the
relationship between problem gambling and crime. Such research has
typically employed one of three approaches to generating a study sample
(Marshall and Marshall, 2003; Bellringer et al., 2009): First, a number of
studies have identified a sample of problem gamblers by screening the
general population. Problem gamblers are then questioned about any
criminal behaviour; second, studies have examined the criminal activities
of problem gamblers who utilise gambling help or treatment services;
and, third, researchers have explored the gambling behaviours and crim-
inal activities of those who have come into contact with the criminal
justice system. Such research has primarily involved surveying correctional
populations, although a limited number of studies (see, e.g. Crofts, 2002)
have assessed whether criminal offences are linked to gambling through an
examination of court files, police arrest and prison data.

General Population Surveys

General population surveys have typically returned low rates of self-

reported gambling-related offending among research participants. For
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 67

example, an early study by Abbott and Volberg (1992) recorded that 19

per cent of the interviewer-determined pathological gamblers from the
1991 New Zealand National Survey admitted considering committing a
criminal offence to fund their gambling activities or gambling debts,
whilst 10 per cent reported that their gambling had resulted in ‘contact’
with the police. Despite this figure, none of the respondents stated that
they had appeared in court or been imprisoned as a consequence of a
crime related to their gambling behaviour.
In Australia, population studies have drawn differing conclusions as to
the relationship between problem gambling and crime. Dickerson et al.’s
(1996) ‘doorknock’ survey of 2,744 participants across four capital cities
recorded that 22 per cent of respondents self-identified as problem
gamblers. Of this figure, one-third had experienced difficulties with
the police as a consequence of their gambling. Yet, as Marshall and
Marshall (2003, p. 18) recognise, ‘this number is likely to be conserva-
tive, as the survey did not explore the self-reported commission of
gambling related crime, only those who have been detected by the
police’. Similar criticisms can be made of the Australian Productivity
Commission (1999) national community survey of 3,498 respondents,
which sought to identify whether individuals had come into contact
with the police or appeared in court as a consequence of offending
related to gambling. Findings revealed that 27 per cent of respondents
with severe gambling problems had committed a criminal offence linked
to their gambling, whilst 11 per cent admitted having done so within the
past 12 months. Thirteen per cent also reported becoming involved with
the police and appearing in court as a consequence of gambling-related
crimes, which were typically property-related offences such as larceny,
embezzlement and the misappropriation of goods and funds. By con-
trast, Taylor et al.’s (2001) South Australian telephone survey found that
less than 1 per cent of problem gamblers stated that they had committed
a crime in order to fund their gambling, whilst fewer than 2 per cent had
been in contact with the police and 1 per cent had been in court to
defend charges relating to their gambling. Similarly, the Queensland
Household Survey (Queensland Treasury, 2001) recorded that there was
little evidence to support the proposition that problem gamblers commit
crime as a consequence of their gambling.
68 Gambling, Crime and Society

Most recently, the Allen Consulting Group (2011) undertook a wide

ranging study examining the social and economic impact of gambling in
Tasmania. As part of the research, a supplementary survey of 2,027
adults asked respondents questions relating to criminal offending. This
included whether or not they had experienced imprisonment, arrest by
the police, had contact with the police as a perpetrator of an offence,
borrowed money from family members or friends without their knowl-
edge, or engaged in acts of theft, embezzlement, fraud or forgery in the
past 12 months. If respondents had experienced any of these events then
they were categorised as a ‘self-reported offender’. Extrapolating from
this sub-sample to the total Tasmanian adult population, the average
prevalence of gambling-related crimes was estimated to be 5.4 per cent.
Moreover, 8.3 per cent of low and moderate risk gamblers and problem
gamblers were recorded as self-reported offenders in comparison to 4.9
per cent of the population of non-problem gamblers and non-gamblers.
The researchers concluded that ‘among the entire adult population in
Tasmania, low and moderate risk, and problem gamblers are 1.75 times
more likely to report that they have engaged in gambling-related offend-
ing compared to non-problem and non-gamblers’ (Allen Consulting
Group, 2011, p. 15).

Clinical Population Surveys

Estimates of gambling-related crime committed by problem gamblers who

access clinical services are consistently higher than rates of gambling-related
offending recorded by problem gamblers drawn from general population
surveys. An early research study by Brown (1987) focused on criminal
offences committed by Gamblers Anonymous attendees and identified
that offending behaviour related to problem gambling was centred on
acquisitive income generating offences. Rates of offending were consider-
ably higher than those found amongst the general population, possibly
because gamblers are ‘under constant extreme financial pressure’ as a result
of their addiction (Ibid., p. 108). Similarly, Blaszczynski et al.’s (1989)
exploration of sociopathy, crime and gambling identified that of a sample
of 77 pathological gamblers attending a one-week treatment programme,
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 69

59 (54.1 per cent) admitted having committed a gambling-related crime,

with 23 (21.1 per cent) charged with a criminal offence. This compared
with 25 (22.9 per cent) individuals who admitted having committed
a non-gambling crime and 11 (10.1 per cent) who were charged for
the offence. A larger survey (Blaszczynski and McConaghy, 1994b) of
152 clients in a treatment programme and 154 members of Gamblers
Anonymous in New South Wales recorded similar findings, with over half
(59 per cent) confessing to having committed a gambling-related offence
during their lifetime and a quarter (24 per cent) reporting that they had
been convicted for a gambling-related offence.
Comparable findings have been recorded elsewhere. For example,
Meyer and Fabian’s (1992) interviews with a sample of 437 members
of Gamblers Anonymous in Germany identified that 54 per cent of
clients admitted engaging in crime in order to fund their gambling.
Significantly, Meyer and Fabian (1992, p. 61) highlighted that patho-
logical gambling can lead to delinquent behaviour, as those admitting
crime were ‘more excessive in their gambling, experienced a higher
degree of subjective satisfaction through gambling. They also showed
more pronounced problem behaviour and more psychosocial problems
because of gambling’. A later study (Meyer and Stadler, 1999) recorded
similar levels of offending among problem gamblers receiving treatment
or self-help. Comparing the criminal activity of problem and non-
problem gamblers, 59 per cent of a sample of 300 problem gamblers
from in- and outpatient treatment centres and self-help groups admitted
committing a crime in the past year, with 35 per cent being arrested and
28 per cent convicted for their crime. In contrast, 22 per cent of non-
problem gamblers drawn from the general population recorded commit-
ting a crime, of which 6 per cent were arrested and 3 per cent convicted.
Other studies have recorded higher and lower levels of illegal conduct
among problem gamblers who access help services. Notably, two studies
by Jackson et al. (1997, 1999) recorded that 30 per cent of a sample of
1,452 client participants and 20 per cent of a sample of 2,209 client
participants accessing Victorian Counselling Agencies admitted commit-
ting a gambling-related offence. Studies by Doley (2000), Potenza et al.
(2001), Dickerson (2004) and the Australian Productivity Commission
(1999) have returned similar findings. Potenza et al.’s study of
70 Gambling, Crime and Society

individuals seeking help through a 24-hour gambling helpline found

that approximately 20 per cent of a sample of 826 callers reported
engaging in some form of criminal activity, whilst client data from
Doley’s examination of gambling treatment programme BreakEven
revealed that one in three (30 per cent) clients reported committing a
crime to fund their gambling. Likewise, figures from Dickerson’s (2004)
study of 763 problem gamblers accessing counselling services identified
that 22 per cent admitted committing a gambling-related offence, and
the Productivity Commission’s survey of 404 counselling agency clients
recorded slightly elevated levels of gambling-related crime among parti-
cipants, with 44 per cent of respondents admitting involvement in illegal
activity. By contrast, significantly higher rates of offending were
recorded in a study (Folino and Abait, 2009) of 62 gamblers engaged
with a support group in Argentina, with 77 per cent admitting having
committed at least one illegal act because of their gambling.

Criminal Justice Data

A host of different studies exploring the relationship between gambling

and crime have derived their data from criminal justice settings. This
includes official sources, such as arrest, court and prison data, as well as
surveys of offender populations subject to incarceration or community
sanctions.

Arrest, Court and Prison Data

Employing DSM-IV criteria2 in order to examine the prevalence,

correlates and consequences of pathological gambling among arrestee
populations in Des Moines, Iowa and Las Vegas, Nevada, McCorkle
(2002) found that the prevalence rate of severe gambling problems is

2
The criteria are detailed in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorder published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). To be diagnosed as a
pathological gambler according to the DSM-IV, an individual must meet at least 5 of the 10
diagnostic criteria, and all criteria are granted equal weight.
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 71

far greater in arrestee populations than in the communities from which

they are drawn. Over 10 per cent of arrestees in Las Vegas and 4.4 per
cent of arrestees in Des Moines met the DSM-IV criteria for patholo-
gical gambling. This compared to an estimated state prevalence rate of
3.5 per cent in Nevada and 1 per cent in Iowa (Volberg, 1995, 2002).
McCorkle also recorded that obtaining money to gamble or pay off
debts accrued through gambling or other problem gambling-related
issues was the principal factor in one in four assaults, one-third of all
property offences and one-fifth of all crimes relating to the supply of
drugs.
Smith et al.’s (2003) examination of the relationship between
gambling and crime in Edmonton drew upon 5,196 police files.
Employing a broad definition of gambling-related crime,3 the research
team discovered that 4 per cent (n 208) of files included incidents of
gambling-related offending. Manual reviews of court files undertaken
by Crofts (2002) and Marshall and Marshall (2003) also found that a
small sample of cases could be linked to problem gambling. Crofts
examination of 2,779 New South Wales Local and District court files
relating to fraud, theft and violent offending between 1995 and 1999
recorded that 2.3 per cent (n 65) of cases were connected with
problem gambling. Similarly, Marshall and Marshall’s review of 500
randomly selected South Australian magistrates’ court files suggested
that 2.4 per cent (n 12) of cases were gambling related. Examination
of judgement transcripts from a further 1,800 cases between January
2000 and June 2003 found that just 1.3 per cent (n 23) could be
linked to gambling. Whilst Marshall and Marshall note that senten-
cing judgement transcripts were a valuable source of court informa-
tion on the role of gambling in offending behaviour, the variability in
the comprehensiveness of data, alongside the challenges of accessing
such data, hampered their ability to establish a link between gambling
and crime.

3
Smith et al. (2003) explored criminal activity that is both directly and indirectly gambling
related. This includes illegal gambling, criminogenic problem gambling, crimes that occur in and
around gambling venues, and family abuse caused by another family member’s gambling
involvement.
72 Gambling, Crime and Society

Zurhold et al.’s (2014) study of problem gambling among prisoners

in Hamburg, Germany, involved both the screening of pre-trial detai-
nees at prison entry and a full scale survey of inmates’ personal records.
The screening of 792 pre-trial detainees identified that 6.6 per cent of
males suffered from problem gambling, whilst the review of the person-
nel records of 1,236 inmates identified that 7.5 per cent of males and 3.6
per cent of females were problem gamblers. Moreover, approximately
half (46.7 per cent) of those prisoners suffering from problem gambling
were serving a sentence for a gambling-related crime. Although the
prevalence estimation is lower than most other international studies, it
is consistent in its identification that the prevalence of problem gam-
bling is higher in the correctional population than it is in the general
population. The lower prevalence estimation could well be a conse-
quence of the use of prison records as a data source:

Prison records completely rely on the information documented by the

court, the prison administration and other prison staff. Most often infor-
mation on gambling problems is based upon self-reports by convicts, and
they might not admit to an existing problem gambling behaviour.
Consequently, a major limitation of prison records as a data source is
that problem gambling might be underreported in the records, and
respective estimations represent the minimal proportion. (Ibid., p. 318)

A broader range of key documents – police charge sheets, witness statements,

pre-sentence reports, offenders’ prior criminal history transcripts, trial judges’
sentencing remarks and appeal decisions – were employed in the Australian
Institute of Criminology and PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (2003) examination
of ‘serious fraud’ prosecutions heard in Australia and New Zealand in 1998
and 1999. Examining 155 separate files involving 208 defendants – 183 of
whom were convicted of the charges detailed in the cases – it was identified
that gambling was the second most frequent primary motivator of offending,
accounting for 14.7 per cent of individuals convicted for their crimes. More
recently, a comprehensive study by the Victorian Responsible Gambling
Foundation (Perrone et al. 2013) analysed data held by a number of different
criminal justice agencies, including the Victoria Police, the Victorian
Supreme and County Courts, the National Coroners Information System,
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 73

Corrections Victoria and the Neighbourhood Justice Centre. Data indicated

that gambling-related offences accounted for between 1.2 and 4.3 per cent of
the cases examined.

Correctional Population Surveys

Surveys exploring the relationship between crimes and gambling disor-

ders have largely focused on criminal justice populations. Research stu-
dies in Australia, Germany, the UK, the US, New Zealand and Canada
have all identified significantly higher prevalence rates of pathological and
problem gambling among prison inmates than the general population
(Lahn, 2005). Such work has also returned higher rates of gambling-
related offending than studies with clinical and general populations.
Surveys of Australian prison populations consistently reveal significant
rates of problem gambling among inmates. For example, an early study
(Blaszczynski, 1994) of 60 prisoners in Western Australia identified that
13 (21.7 per cent) inmates met the criteria for problem gambling.
Similarly, Powis’ (2002) survey of inmates in Queensland prisons
recorded that 17.4 per cent of the prison population suffered from
problem gambling, whilst 6.7 per cent were currently serving a prison
sentence for a gambling-related offence, 7.3 per cent admitted having
received a prison sentence for a gambling-related crime in the past and
12.4 per cent claimed to have committed a gambling-related offence in
the past without prosecution. Further research, also in Queensland,
reported that 25 to 30 per cent of inmates admitted having problems
with gambling and 5 per cent stated that they had committed an offence
in order to gamble (Australian Institute for Gambling Research and the
Labour and Industry Research Unit 1996). Most recently, Lahn’s (2005)
study of 102 offenders attending correctional centres in Canberra
recorded that 34 per cent of inmates were identified as having some
form of gambling problem. This figure is 18 times higher than the rate
reported in the Australian Capital Territory general population estimate
and 16 times higher than the national average. Lahn recorded that a
significant percentage of problem gamblers had committed crimes that
were either directly or indirectly related to their problem gambling.
74 Gambling, Crime and Society

Results also demonstrated that the greater the severity of problem gam-
bling the higher the percentage of inmates admitting to gambling-related
crimes, rising from 21 per cent for moderate problem gamblers to 56 per
cent for severe problem gamblers. Moreover, a significant percentage of
inmates recognised as exhibiting severe gambling problems had com-
mitted offences directly related to their gambling. Approximately 69 per
cent of severe problem gamblers had engaged in crimes to fund their
gambling activities, whilst 26 per cent of those with moderate gambling
problems admitted doing so.
Prevalence rates of between 5.2 per cent and 38 per cent have been
recorded across a host of different studies that have examined adult
prison populations in the US (Lesieur and Klein, 1985; Templer et al.,
1993; Walters, 1997; Walters and Contri, 1998; Anderson, 1999;
Kerber, 2000, 2001a, 2001b; Kerber and Harris, 2001; Kerber et al.,
2001; Wallisch and Kerber, 2001; McCorkle, 2002). This is signifi-
cantly higher than the US national prevalence rate, which is estimated to
be between 1.3 per cent and 1.9 per cent, depending on the assessment
instrument employed. For example, Anderson’s (1999) survey of 233
adult male felons across four Midwest state medium and minimum
security institutions revealed that 35 per cent of participants exhibited
some problem with gambling and 38 per cent were recorded as problem
gamblers. Higher rates of criminal activity and ‘emotional problems’
were recorded among those inmates who scored three or more on the
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS).4 By contrast, a survey of 363
prison inmates in a Pennsylvanian medium security federal prison
recorded significantly lower rates of problem and probable pathological
gambling at 7.4 per cent and 5.2 per cent, respectively (Walters, 1997).
Such figures are, nevertheless, three to four times the rate found in
general population studies (Volberg, 1993).
Studies in New Zealand and Canada have also identified significant
rates of problem gambling amongst prison inmates and notable levels of
gambling-related crime. For example, a New Zealand study of 357 male

4
The South Oaks Gambling Screen is a 20-item questionnaire based on DSM-III criteria for
pathological gambling.
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 75

and 94 female prisoners identified that 15 per cent of men and 26 per
cent of women surveyed admitted to committing crime in order to fund
gambling or pay gambling debts (Abbott et al., 2000; Abbott and
McKenna, 2000). Moreover, Abbott et al.’s (2005, p. 538) study of
recently sentenced male prisoners in four New Zealand prisons con-
cluded that:

The large majority of gambling-related offending was reported by problem

gamblers. Furthermore, those with severe problems offended more often
than those with less serious problems. Consistent with previous research
(Australian Productivity Commission, 1999), the great majority of gam-
bling-related crimes reported were non-violent though the men indicated
that they most often engaged in burglary to obtain money to gamble or to
pay gambling debts. A small number of problem gamblers were respon-
sible for a disproportionate number of total offences.

Turner et al.’s (2007) study of 257 male offenders incarcerated in the

Millhaven Assessment Unit of the Correctional Service of Canada
estimated that the prevalence of pathological gambling was significantly
higher than in the general population, with the Canadian Problem
Gambling Severity Index (CPGI),5 DSM-IV and SOGS scores record-
ing that 9.7, 6.2 and 11.7 per cent of inmates suffered from patholo-
gical gambling. Combining these measures resulted in a pathological
gambling prevalence estimate of between 6.7 per cent and 14.1 per
cent, whilst approximately 27 per cent of participants reported some
degree of problem gambling. A significant but complex interrelation-
ship between gambling and crime was also identified, with those with
severe gambling problems reporting that they had committed a greater
number of income-producing offences than those with less severe
gambling problems. Approximately 59 per cent of pathological gam-
blers reported committing crimes as a result of their gambling, in
comparison to 33 per cent of sub-clinical problem gamblers and 7
per cent of non-problem gamblers. Furthermore, 56 per cent of

5
The Problem Gambling Severity Index is a non-clinical, nine-item measure of problem gam-
bling. It is a component of the Canadian Problem Gambling Severity Index (CPGI).
76 Gambling, Crime and Society

pathological gamblers admitted to committing their current offences in

order to support their gambling activities. This compared to 2 per cent
of sub-clinical problem gamblers and 1 per cent of non-problem
gamblers. A second study (Turner et al., 2009) of 254 incarcerated
male federal offenders returned similar findings, with differing preva-
lence score estimates depending on the screening tool used. Disordered
gambling was measured using Problem Gambling Severity Index
(PGSI), DSM-IV-TR6 and SOGS, yielding estimates of 9.4, 6.3 and
13 per cent, respectively. Gambling was the primary motivator of
offending behaviour in a significant proportion (65.2 per cent) of
severe problem gamblers and a fifth (20 per cent) of all moderate
gamblers. Turner et al.’s (2013) most recent study of 422 incarcerated
offenders employed the CPGI and found that the prevalence rate was
8.9 per cent prior to imprisonment and 4.4 per cent during imprison-
ment. The researchers note that: ‘Depending on the measure used the
results of this study suggest that prevalence of previous-year severe
problem gambling among offenders prior to incarceration was 7–12
times higher than that found in the general population. Even during
incarceration the rate was 4–5 times higher than the general popula-
tion’ (Ibid., p. 448).
A small number of studies indicate that problem gambling is also
prevalent in offenders subject to probation, parole or community sen-
tences. A survey of 102 Australian Capital Territory (Australian
National University Centre for Gambling Research, 2003) correctional
clients who were either in custody, on remand or under a community
corrections order recorded that 34.3 per cent of participants had some
form of gambling problem, with severe problem gambling affecting 15.7
per cent of survey participants. Gambling was also identified as a
motivator for offending, with one quarter of problem gamblers stating
that gambling had contributed to their crimes and 45.7 per cent noting
that they had stolen or illegally obtained money in order to finance their
gambling or associated debts. In the UK, a study of a small sample of 46
offenders on probation found that 4.5 per cent were identifiable

6
A ‘text revision’ of the DSM-IV.
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 77

problem gamblers (Ricketts et al., 2000). The study did not, however,
explore the relationship between individuals’ offending and their pro-
blem gambling.
Studies of juveniles within correctional facilities have also recorded
high rates of problem gambling. For example, Maden et al.’s (1992)
survey of 404 juveniles across nine different juvenile prisons in England
recorded excessive gambling among 12 per cent of their sample, of
which 2.2 per cent demonstrated gambling pathology. Westphal and
Johnson (2006) surveyed 343 jailed and 1,293 imprisoned offenders
aged between 10 and 19, comparing them to a random sample of
12,036 Louisiana students from grades 6 to 12 inclusive. Findings
indicated that juvenile offenders gambled more frequently than the
school sample, while juvenile offenders were also more likely than
students to be classified as pathological gamblers. Moreover, 13 per
cent of the juvenile offenders identified their arrest as gambling related.
Most pertinently, results indicated that ‘Pathological gambling may
pose a risk factor for incarceration in the juvenile age group’ (Ibid.,
p. 330), with pathological gamblers twice as likely as non-pathological
gamblers to have had a gambling-related arrest. Finally, Yeoman and
Griffiths’ (1996) survey of 1,851 juvenile offenders in South West
England recorded that 4 per cent of juvenile crime was associated
with gaming machine use.

Understanding the Problem Gambling-Crime

Relationship
Evidence indicates that problematic gambling behaviour is a significant
criminogenic variable, with research studies recording rates of gambling-
related crime ranging from four to 90 per cent (Perrone et al., 2013).
Some studies have sought to examine the connection between problem
gambling and crime, indicating that there are a number of different ways
in which the two activities may be related. Yet there remains ‘limited
empirical evidence on the nature, trajectory and fluidity of the gam-
bling-crime relationship’ (Ibid., p. 67). Thus, the relationship between
gambling and crime remains unclear.
78 Gambling, Crime and Society

It has been suggested that the relationship between gambling and

crime may be categorised in three principal ways (Centre of Gambling
Research, 2003; Lahn and Grabosky, 2003; Marshall and Marshall,
2003): First, the relationship may be coincidental, with no link between
gambling and offending behaviour; second, the relationship may be co-
symptomatic, whereby both gambling and offending behaviour are symp-
toms of other underlying factors; or, third, the relationship may be
instrumental, whereby there is a causal association between gambling
and offending behaviour. Typically acquisitive in nature, ‘gambling-
related offences’ are either directly or indirectly related to gambling
behaviour. Directly related offences are those crimes committed in
order to fund gambling habits, whilst indirectly related offences are
those crimes committed in order to repay gambling debts and replace
gambling losses.
Yet as Perrone et al. (2013) note, unpicking the causal relationship
between problem gambling and crime is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, the discrete nature of the categories in the aforemen-
tioned typology is not able to account for the subtleties of offending
behaviour. For example, a problem gambler may be engaged in a range
of offending behaviour, some of which is linked to their problem
gambling and some of which is not. Second, within correctional
systems, problem gamblers may exhibit a number of comorbid symp-
toms, including substance misuse, alcoholism and personality disor-
ders. Identifying the extent to which problem gambling is linked to
crime is likely to be difficult, particularly as criminal justice interview-
ing or assessments may focus on these other issues. Third, studies may
only identify problem gambling and crime amongst offenders and not
actually establish whether offenders have committed gambling-related
crime. Fourth, research that draws upon data from criminal justice files
may record multiple motivators for the offence. In such cases, whilst
findings may be able to establish whether or not gambling is a motiva-
tion for the commission of a crime, it cannot demonstrate with any
degree of certainty that it is the motivation (Crofts, 2002). Moreover,
this attempt to classify gambling and crime is further complicated by
‘the fluid and interconnected nature of the problem gambling and
crime relationship. A sizeable proportion of problem gamblers escalate
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 79

their criminal activities from co-incidental to instrumental during their

life’ (Perrone et al., 2013, p. 21).
Abbott et al. (2000) propose two hypotheses regarding the relation-
ship between gambling and crime, which are supported by research
evidence: First, offending occurs relatively late in the development of
problem gambling for a significant number of problem gamblers who
would not otherwise have committed crime; and, second, gambling-
related crimes form part of a wider array of criminal and anti-social
activities committed by offenders. Lesieur’s (1979, 1984, 1987) ethno-
graphic research supports the proposition that problem gambling pre-
cedes and precipitates offending behaviour. Both Lesieur (1984) and the
Australian Productivity Commission (1999) identified how problem
gamblers resort to illegal activities to obtain money for gambling when
all legal avenues for financing are blocked. Problem gamblers become
engaged in a ‘spiral of options and involvement’ wherein they utilise all
available legal means of funding their gambling activities or shortfalls in
finance caused by gambling until they are no longer available (Lesieur,
1979). This suggests that problem gamblers turn to crime:

Generally, because they experience the following sequence of events: asset

losses; accumulating debts; exhausting legal means of obtaining funds
including drawing on savings and retirement funds; borrowing from
family and friends; cash advances on credit cards; and loans from financial
institutions or “loan sharks” until committing a crime becomes their only
option. (Smith et al., 2003, p. 19)

Thus, as gambling intensifies and legal avenues for funding are blocked,
problem gamblers engage in illegal activity to finance their gambling
ventures: ‘Dependent of personal value systems, legitimate and illegiti-
mate opportunity, perceptions of risk, the existence of threats (e.g. loan
sharks) and chance, gamblers became involved in more and more serious
illegal activity’ (Ibid.). This indicates that for many problem gamblers
crime is the last option as they seek to ‘chase’ their losses (Blaszczynski
and Silove, 1996).
Other studies suggest a strong link between pathological gambling
and crime, as the likelihood of offending increases with the severity of an
80 Gambling, Crime and Society

individual’s gambling problem. For example, Rosenthal and Lorenz’s

(1992) research indicates that pathological gambling is a criminogenic
factor that causes crime. They identified that the vast majority of
pathological gamblers commit crime that is specifically gambling related
late in the development of the disorder. Thus, as Bellringer et al. (2009,
p. 36) recognise: ‘This is a population that is essentially non-violent and
which turns to property crimes out of desperation over gambling losses
and their sequelae’. Such a perspective is reaffirmed by Blaszczynski and
McConaghy’s (1994b) study of pathological gamblers. Echoing the
earlier work of Lesieur (1984) and Meyer and Fabian (1992) amongst
others, they identify how players continue to gamble in order to recoup
their losses, leading to a rapid depletion of available funds for gambling:

Once legitimate sources are exhausted, the pathological gambler becomes

caught in a predicament in which anxiety, depression and cognitive dis-
tortions combine to impair judgement and appropriate decision-making
processes. Despite the recognition that gambling was instrumental in
producing financial crises, the almost delusional belief is held that gam-
bling provides the only means of escape . . . Many pathological gamblers
described a state of despondency over the paradoxical situation that further
gambling would increase their predicament, but that without such gam-
bling their ability to eliminate debts seem none existent. Under these
conditions the propensity to use illegal methods to obtain gambling
funds was substantially increased. (Blaszczynski and McConaghy, 1994b,
pp. 119–120)

In demonstrating that pathological gambling temporally preceded the

commission of the first crime and that the presence of a crime was
associated with the level of current financial debt, Blaszczynski and
McConaghy (1994b, p. 121) suggest that: ‘It is not unreasonable to
assume that gamblers seeking treatment represent the more pathological
end of the dimensional spectrum of problem gambling and the group at
the greatest risk of offending’.
This view point is reaffirmed by Meyer and Stadler (1999) whose
survey of 300 pathological gamblers in treatment and 274 gamblers in
the general population indicates that ‘addictive’ gambling behaviour is
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 81

a key criminogenic factor. This was particularly notable in relation to

property offences. Through an exploration of social attachment, per-
sonality, pathological gambling and criminal behaviour, Meyer and
Stadler identified that although pathological gambling alone could not
explain criminal behaviour, it was a more important causal factor than
personality or social attachment variables. Similarly, a New Zealand
study of inmates identified that 15 per cent of males and 26 per cent
of females surveyed admitted committing crime in order to fund
gambling or pay gambling debts (Abbott et al., 2000; Abbott and
McKenna, 2000). Increased severity of gambling problems was asso-
ciated with higher rates of gambling offending amongst male prison-
ers. By contrast, the majority of female problem gamblers stated that
they were engaged in offending behaviour prior to their development
of problem gambling and related offending. Moreover, a third of
female respondents noted that they had gambled instead of commit-
ting crime, suggesting that for some offenders gambling may reduce
the frequency of their offending behaviour.
Such findings indicate that criminal activities move from coincidental
to instrumental during the lives of some problem gamblers. More
recently, Perrone et al.’s (2013, p. 68) qualitative data hints at a far
more complex gambling crime relationship, with ‘multi-faceted and co-
occurring factors contributing to behavioural escalation into crime’. Of
those surveyed, 56.7 per cent of prisoners committed a crime prior to
commencing gambling and only 5.6 per cent reported simultaneously
starting to gamble and offend. The gambling-related crime sub-sample
returned similar findings, with 59.7 per cent of respondents stating that
their criminal activity preceded gambling and 8.1 per cent recording
simultaneous engagement in gambling and crime. Most significantly,
‘the offender’s gambling patterns, physical and psychological well-being
and social and financial situations varied from offence to offence and/or
time period to time period (for example, drug addicted, employed/
unemployed during some offending) resulting in consequent changes
to the nature of the gambling-crime relationship over time’ (Ibid.).
A number of academic studies suggest the existence of an impul-
sive or anti-social subtype of problem gambler (see, e.g. Blaszczynski
et al., 1997; Potenza et al., 2001; Blaszczynski and Nower, 2002;
82 Gambling, Crime and Society

Williams et al., 2008; Mishra et al., 2011). Under this hypothesis,

problem gambling can co-occur with criminal, deviant or anti-social
behaviours in some individuals because of a common predisposition.
For example, Potenza et al. (2001) suggest that a certain proportion of
gamblers are ‘action seekers’ who are likely to engage in both proble-
matic gambling and crime which will see a significant number of such
individuals imprisoned at some point, irrespective of their gambling
activities. Similarly, Mishra et al. (2011) identified that gambling and
anti-social behaviour are forms of risk taking that share common
determinants. They identified that personality traits associated with
risk-acceptance accounted for a notable portion of variance in gambling,
problem gambling and anti-social behaviour. Moreover: ‘Antisocial
tendencies (aggression and psychopathic tendencies) explained a signifi-
cant portion of additional variance in severe antisocial behavior but not
moderate or minor antisocial behavior. When controlling for personality
traits associated with risk-acceptance, the relationship between gambling
and antisocial behavior was greatly diminished’. In sum, the study
supports the assertion that gambling and anti-social behaviour are
manifestations of similar personality traits.

Types of Crime Related to Gambling

Research studies have identified that a broad range of crimes, including
offences against the person, may be gambling related. In particular,
criminal acts committed to fund gambling activities or gambling-related
shortfalls in finance are evident throughout many of the studies under-
taken. Most common are crimes of fidelity or acquisitive crimes, includ-
ing larceny, robbery, fraud, theft, embezzlement and the passing of
counterfeit currency. As an early study of criminal offences committed
among a sample of Gamblers Anonymous clients and hospital treated
pathological gamblers found:

The nature of gambling-related property offences varied considerably

from theft from family members to large scale premeditated and sophis-
ticated embezzlement. At the petty end of the spectrum, gamblers forged
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 83

their spouse’s signatures on cheques or in opening new joint accounts,

stole petty cash, engaged in shoplifting to subsequently sell the goods at
significantly reduced prices and stole from fellow employees at work. One
enterprising individual paid a female stranger fifty dollars to impersonate
his wife while he signed documents to establish a loan at a financial
institution. More serious offences included a repeated theft of vehicle
spare parts for illicit sale, distribution and sale of marijuana and the
embezzlement of significant amounts on a regular basis from large cor-
porations and banks. (Blaszczynski and McConaghy, 1994b, p. 124)

Blaszczynski and McConaghy identified that larceny (32 per cent of

respondents) and embezzlement (22 per cent) were the most common
offences committed by gamblers, whilst respondents also admitted
offences of misappropriation (7 per cent), burglary (5 per cent), shoplift-
ing (4 per cent), armed robbery (3 per cent) and drug trafficking (2 per
cent). That gambling-related crimes typically consist of non-violent
property crime is repeated across international jurisdictions. For exam-
ple, Magoon et al. (2005) recorded that 42.4 per cent of problem and
pathological gamblers in New Zealand admitted to borrowing or steal-
ing money to meet shortfalls in their finances caused by gambling, whilst
Meyer and Stadler (1999) identified that 37.7 per cent of a sample of
pathological gamblers across in- and outpatient treatment centres in
Germany had committed fraud.
A number of studies have highlighted how a range of deception-related
offences are particularly prevalent among problem gamblers. Crofts’s
(2002) analysis of court files in New South Wales, Australia, identified
the prominence of fraud, with 48 of 63 cases centring on offences such as
larceny by a clerk, obtaining by false pretences or cheques not paid on
presentation. Likewise, Smith et al.’s (2003) analysis of police recorded
crimes in Edmonton, Canada, found that 176 of 208 (85 per cent)
gambling-related crimes were fraudulent in nature. Most notably, the
passing of counterfeit currency was connected to problem gambling.
Such a link is reiterated in Warfield’s (2008) extensive review of
Australian court records over a 10-year period. Warfield identified 528
cases of gambling-related fraud including defrauding of the government,
falsification of accounts, forgery, fraudulent misappropriation, stealing as
84 Gambling, Crime and Society

a servant and use of false documentation. The misappropriated money

was used to fund a number of different gambling activities, most notably
poker-machine addiction (56 per cent of the cases/average amount
stolen, nearly AUS$65,000) and casino gambling (23 per cent; average,
AUS$71,000), but also horse racing (8 per cent; average, almost
AUS$71,500) and TAB7 gambling (6 per cent; average, just over
AUS$5,600). In a survey of 155 offenders by the Australian Institute of
Criminology and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003), gambling was second
only to the purchasing of luxury goods and services, as a means through
which the proceeds of crime were spent. Victims typically included
family, friends and employers.
Research indicates that the aggregate cost of gambling-related crimes to
victims is substantial. Blaszczynski and McConaghy’s (1994b) survey of
clients in treatment and help services identified that the median cost of
offences was AUS$300. However, much greater costs have been recorded
elsewhere. Crofts (2003) examination of court files from local and district
courts in New South Wales found that the average amount of stolen goods
per offender amounted to AUS$73,800 totalling AUS$4,206,572 for 63
offenders. The vast majority of cases centred on fraud or theft by an
employee, with 78 per cent of cases involving offences directly related to
an individual’s gambling habit. Warfield (2008) recorded that gambling-
related fraud averaged AUS$658,343.05, totalling AUS$102,701,516, for
the 156 cases identified from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2007. Most
recently, Perrone et al.’s (2013) study recorded that overall quantifiable
losses in 100 cases of gambling-related crime totalled AUS$37,278,441.
There was, however, significant variation in costs associated with offenders’
gambling crimes, which ranged from as little as AUS$2 through to
aggregate costs exceeding AUS$4 million. The average cost of crimes per
court case was AUS$372,784.40 or AUS$337,094.45 if outliers were
excluded. Victims included individuals and businesses both related and
unrelated to the offender. Crimes committed against employers were
typically opportunistic in nature, with offenders abusing their position in

7
Totalisator Agency Board in Australia and New Zealand, universally shortened to TAB, is the
name given to monopoly totalisator organisations.
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 85

an organisation to defraud employers or clients by accessing or taking

control of money, accounts and auditing processes. In addition:

It is important to note that a criminal offence often affects multiple

victims, some of whom are impacted indirectly by the financial burden
experienced by the primary victim (such as those in the victim’s support
network, employees and the entire community). This phenomenon is
referred to as the ‘multiplier effect’. The monetary estimates cited above
are therefore undoubtedly a gross underestimation of the financial impact
of gambling-related crime. (Ibid., p. 65)

The costs of problem gambling are not merely financial. As the

Australian Productivity Commission (1999) have noted, problem gam-
bling can place a significant strain on familial relationships, with part-
ners experiencing deception, arguments, separation, inter-domestic
violence and divorce. Children may also be exposed to neglect, physical
and psychological abuse and poverty. As preceding discussion demon-
strates, typically offences committed by problem gamblers have been
understood to be non-violent in nature (Lesieur, 1984). However, it has
been claimed that despite the predominance of monetary crimes ‘vio-
lence, child neglect and crimes against the person are becoming more
prevalent’ (Bellringer et al., 2009, p. 24). Moreover: ‘There may also be
a link between violence and obtaining money to gamble, for example by
verbally or physically abusing, by intimidating or threatening relatives or
friends in order to obtain money, or by threatening, intimidating,
physically assaulting or committing armed robbery on others’ (Ibid.,
p. 27). The preconception that gamblers only commit acquisitive crimes
in order to fund their gambling activities or shortfall in living expenses
may well be why some surveys (see, e.g. Blaszczynski and McConaghy,
1992) excluded violent offences from their classification of gambling-
related crime. Thus, as Marshall and Marshall (2003) suggest, levels of
violent gambling-related crime could well be understated in research
because researchers may not expect there to be a relationship and, in
turn, may not ask about it, offenders may not admit to it, and victims
may be less likely to report it, whilst criminal justice agencies may not
draw an association between violent offending and gambling behaviour.
86 Gambling, Crime and Society

Despite acquisitive crime appearing to dominate the offending beha-

viour of problem gamblers, there is growing research evidence to indi-
cate that a significant number of individuals also engage in drug offences
and violent crime, a notable amount of which may well be gambling
related. For example, a US survey 2,307 arrestees identified that 20 per
cent of those who had sold drugs were pathological gamblers seeking to
either support their gambling habit or meet gambling-related shortfalls
in finance (Ashcroft et al., 2004). A further 25 per cent of those who had
committed an assault in order to obtain money were pathological
gamblers (Ibid.). This corresponds with McCorkle’s (2002) study
which identified that 20 per cent of drug sales and 25 per cent of assaults
were committed by pathological gamblers.
Other studies indicate that gambling may be related to a host of
different violent acts. For example, Warfield (2008) uncovered evidence
of five murders which were related to attempts to conceal gambling-
related frauds, whilst Smith et al. (2003) Canadian survey recorded that
1.5 per cent of incidents of domestic violence were gambling related. An
early study by Brown (1987) argued that violent crime committed by
gamblers is likely to be coincidental and associated with concurrent
alcohol abuse. Whilst Brown does speculate that long-term problem
gambling could lead to ‘moral slippage’ and, in turn, violent behaviour,
he highlights that gamblers are predisposed to non-violent, financially
motivated acquisitive offending. Such a finding is likely to reinforce
‘conventional wisdom’, which posits ‘that crime committed by gamblers
is an almost benign ‘least harm’ act motivated simply by a need to obtain
money to pay already incurred gambling debts’, and may well be: ‘In
part, the reason for the relatively late acknowledgement of violent crimes
being committed in relation to gambling’ (Bellringer et al., 2009, p. 26).
Thus, as Griffiths et al. (2005) recognise, we are only just beginning
to understand the relationship between gambling and violence. Recent
research has provided evidence that one of the most common adverse
impacts of problem gambling is relationship dysfunction, which is
characterised by financial difficulties, psychological issues and family
conflict (Dowling et al., 2009; Hodgins et al., 2006; Jackson et al.,
1999; Kalischuk et al., 2006). Whilst spouses and intimate partners are
typically most affected by the interpersonal and intrapersonal distress
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 87

that problem gambling can cause, evidence also indicates that the impact
of problem gambling stretches beyond significant others to include
extended family members, such as parents or children, who may be
financially and emotionally affected (Hodgins et al. 2006). This is
particularly pronounced when the problem gambler has no spousal or
intimate partner support (Ibid.). Most disconcertingly, such research
also points toward problem gambling constituting a specific risk factor
for family violence. Available evidence indicates that violence is most
likely to occur in a domestic environment when gamblers’ frustration
and anger over their losses manifest in aggressive acts towards spouses,
partners or family. A longitudinal New Zealand study (Bellringer et al.
2009) of Pacific parents residing in South Auckland recorded that
fathers identified as at risk/problem gamblers were three times more
likely than non-problem gamblers to report perpetration of physical
violence. By contrast, at risk/problem gambling mothers were much
less likely to report acting violently than non-problem gamblers.
A small body of international research that has examined the relation-
ship between problem gambling and intimate partner violence (IPV) has
consistently recorded a high occurrence of both victimisation and per-
petration of IPV (Afifi et al., 2010; Bland et al., 1993; Echeburua et al.,
2011; Korman et al., 2008; Liao, 2008; Lorenz and Shuttleworth, 1983;
Raylu and Oei, 2007). Dowling et al.’s (2016) systematic review of the
empirical evidence relating to the association between problem gambling
and IPV suggests a ‘significant relationship’, with six studies providing
evidence of a link between problem gambling and IPV victimisation and
ten studies providing evidence of a relationship between problem gam-
bling and IPV perpetration. A meta-analysis of available research identi-
fied that 38.1 per cent of problem gamblers reported being victims of
physical IPV, whilst 36.5 per cent reported being perpetrators of physi-
cal IPV (Ibid.) The prevalence of problem gambling in IPV perpetrators
is 11.3 per cent (Ibid.).
Whilst the exact relationship between problem gambling and IPV
perpetration and victimisation is unclear, some researchers (Afifi et al.,
2010; Korman et al., 2008; Muelleman et al., 2002) hypothesise that
problem gambling directly or indirectly leads to IPV: ‘It has been
suggested that gambling losses and other problems may result in the
88 Gambling, Crime and Society

manifestation of stress, anger, and financial crisis within the home and
lead to the perpetration of violence by the problem gambler against
intimate partners’ (Dowling et al., 2014, p. 56). Others (Korman et al.,
2008) have suggested that problem gambling may be a consequence of
IPV perpetration, acting to regulate the perpetration of IPV. That
problem gambling is linked to both perpetration and victimisation is
reiterated by Suomi et al.’s (2013) study of 120 help-seeking family
members of problem gamblers. Interviews identified that over half of
respondents had experienced family violence in the past 12 months, with
20 per cent reporting only victimisation, 10.8 per cent reporting only
perpetration and 21.6 per cent reporting both victimisation and perpe-
tration of family violence. Suomi et al. (2013, p. 12) concluded that
problem gambling ‘precedes both victimisation and perpetration of
family violence’.

The Profile of Individuals Who Commit

Gambling-Related Crime
Issues of representativeness mean that obtaining a profile of individuals
who commit gambling-related crime is challenging (Marshal and
Marshall, 2003). As illustrated earlier, most studies have relied on self-
reported criminal activity by samples of gamblers utilising gambling help
or treatment services or offenders subject to incarceration or community
sanctions, which is likely to be skewed towards particular types of
gambler and/or particular demographics. Nevertheless, a number of
international research studies (Crofts, 2002; Australian Institute of
Criminology and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003; Ledgerwood et al.,
2007; Warfield, 2008; Perrone et al., 2013) have given consideration
to demographic characteristics as well as the offence-specific nature of
problem and pathological gamblers.
Like crime statistics more generally, males are overrepresented in
gambling-related crime data. For example, Crofts’s (2002) analysis of
district court files identified that 86 per cent of gambling-related cases
involved men, whilst the Australian Institute of Criminology recorded
that men were the defendants in 79 per cent of the serious fraud cases
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 89

examined. The significant overrepresentation of males among offenders

suffering from problem gambling is reaffirmed by a number of studies.
For example, Warfield (2008) recorded that 58 per cent of a sample of
528 gambling-related cases being heard in Australian courts involved
male defendants, whilst a study (Australian National University Centre
for Gambling Research, 2003) of community corrections populations in
Queensland found that males comprised 79 per cent of problem gam-
blers in the sample. Similarly, Perrone et al. (2013) examination of
gambling-related crime in Victorian higher courts identified that 80
per cent of defendants were male. Studies of offenders in North
America have drawn similar findings, with men accounting for 62 per
cent of a sample of US pathological gamblers who had committed crimes
(Ledgerwood et al., 2007), 60 per cent of Canadian problem gamblers
convicted of passing counterfeit currency and 69 per cent admitting to
fraud offences (Smith et al., 2003).
There is significant variability in the age of offenders across
research samples. Reviews of Australian court data (Blaszczynski
et al., 1989; Crofts, 2002; Warfield, 2008; Perrone et al., 2013)
identified that the age of defendants charged with gambling-related
offences ranged from 15 to 84 years. Offenders were most commonly
aged in their 30s to mid-40s, although this varied across offence type
(Australian Institute of Criminology, 2003; Ledgerwood et al., 2007;
Perrone et al., 2013).
Far less is known about the educational attainment and employment
status of offenders. The Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice,
Monash University (2000) recorded that offenders appearing at court or
serving a sentence for a gambling-related offence tended to be young
single males on low incomes. Blaszczynski et al. (1989) also considered
the income status of those committing crime, identifying that patholo-
gical gamblers who engaged in both gambling and non-gambling-related
crime came primarily from lower socio-economic groups. Across the
sample, the median income was AUS$21,625 in comparison to an
average annual income of AUS$25,000 for the Australian general popu-
lation. Approximately 44 per cent of respondents annual income was less
than AUS$20,000, 46 per cent earned between AUS$20,000 and
AUS$40,000 and 10.1 per cent earned in excess of AUS$40,000.
90 Gambling, Crime and Society

Perrone et al.’s (2013) research recorded that most defendants are

educated to secondary school level (76.6 per cent), whilst approximately
one-fifth had a university qualification (17.1 per cent). At the time of
committing their gambling-related offences, two-thirds of defendants
were in paid blue-collar (50.7 per cent) or white-collar occupations (49.3
per cent). Defendants held a wide range of different jobs, including
labourer (17.9 per cent), sales worker (6 per cent), clerical and admin-
istrative worker (16.4 per cent), professional (10.4 per cent), machinery
operator and driver (4.5 per cent), community and personal services
worker (1.5 per cent), technician or trades worker (16.4 per cent), and
manager (26.9 per cent).
Potenza et al.’s (2001) study of US adult gambling helpline callers
discovered that gamblers with arrests were more likely to be men who
were unemployed, single and with alcohol and drug problems. They also
noted that gamblers with criminal justice involvement secondary to gam-
bling represent ‘a more ill subpopulation of problem gamblers’. A number
of studies (Perrone et al., 2013; Ashcroft et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2003;
Crofts, 2002) have identified that multiple co-morbid or co-existing
financial pressures linked to drug and alcohol dependency, alongside
gambling-related debts, are commonly cited by criminals as underpinning
their offending behaviour. Within prison populations co-presenting or co-
morbid issues, such as alcohol abuse, substance misuse and mental health
disorders feature frequently. Marshall et al. (1997) indicate that these issues
may co-occur and even influence an individual’s gambling behaviour.

Problem Gambling and the Criminal Justice

System
Problem Gambling as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing

Problem gambling is not typically seen as a mitigating factor in senten-

cing by courts. For example, in a recent Tasmanian Court of Criminal
Appeal case (Johnstone v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 9, para. 13) the
court did not dispute the defence’s assertion that the defendant’s crimes
were as a consequence of his gambling addiction but ruled that it did not
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 91

consider that it ‘should treat as mitigatory the fact that the appellant
offended, and offended on a massive scale, because of a gambling
addiction’. Similarly, in Victoria, Australia, although problem gambling
is recognised as an important issue in the lives of many offenders, it
rarely serves to mitigate an individual’s sentence (Perrone et al., 2013).
An examination of 70 Court of Appeal cases in England and Wales
where gambling issues were brought to the attention of the court also
indicates that judges are unwilling to accept problem gambling as
mitigating evidence or as an explanation for crime (Brooks and
Blaszczynski, 2011). This may well be because no evidence of problem
gambling was submitted. Instead, only evidence that the defendant had
gambling debts was raised by defence lawyers. Brooks and Blaszczynski
(2011, p. 85) suggest that the introduction of ‘baseless claims as a
defence serves only to undermine those cases where defendants are
genuinely suffering from a gambling problem and where such a condi-
tion might be considered a mitigating factor with referral to rehabilita-
tion services’. Likewise, Crofts (2002, p. 40) noted that ‘fake’ problem
gambling represents a real challenge for courts and is likely to further
impede the introduction of problem gambling as a mitigating factor in
sentencing.
There is, however, increasing evidence of gambling addiction impact-
ing on sentencing decision making in some criminal cases. For example,
in the vast majority of Canadian provinces, gambling addiction has
become a justification for rehabilitative sentences. Prior to 1980,
Canadian courts were largely unwilling to accept gambling as a mitigat-
ing factor in the sentencing of offenders (Smith and Simpson, 2014).
However, the recognition of pathological gambling as a mental health
disorder in the DSM-III led to judges identifying gambling addiction as
a justification for rehabilitative sentencing. So although gambling addic-
tion is ‘not an exculpatory defence in Canada, [it] is increasingly
considered in sentencing, where judges deliberate the nature and the
context of the crime along with any aggravating or mitigating factors’
(Ibid., p. 322). Further progress has been made in the US where in 2001
Judge Farrell implemented the first Gambling Treatment Court in
Amherst, New York. Applying therapeutic jurisprudence principles to
criminal cases involving defendants with gambling addictions, the court
92 Gambling, Crime and Society

seeks to rehabilitate individuals who commit offences as a consequence

of their compulsive gambling, whilst also ensuring that they are held
accountable for their crimes.
Elsewhere, Taylor (2004) notes that despite case law across all
Australian jurisdictions providing examples of courts rejecting gam-
bling addiction as a mitigating factor, there are also a number of
examples of courts identifying problem gambling as an addictive
behaviour or mental disorder that warrants rehabilitative rather than
retributive sentencing. Such a finding is reiterated in a report com-
missioned by the Tasmanian Government’s Department of Treasury
and Finance, and undertaken by the Allen Consulting Group and the
University of Melbourne (2011), which notes that although gambling
is generally not considered to be a mitigating factor in sentencing by
courts: ‘Australian case law on this issue is unclear and inconsistent,
with substantial variability between (and in some cases within) jur-
isdictions in the treatment of problem gambling. For instance, pro-
blem gambling can be considered as an addictive behaviour, or as a
mental disorder warranting special treatment’ (Ibid., p. v). Thus,
Australian case law appears ‘confused and contradictory with signifi-
cant variation in the status of problem gambling as an addictive
behaviour or mental disorder necessitating specific treatment between
different jurisdictions’ (Taylor, 2004, p. 141).
Today, judiciary are habitually confronted with the argument of
diminished responsibility for pathological gamblers who have com-
mitted gambling-related crimes (Minchin, 2006). Whether or not pro-
blem gambling should act to mitigate sentencing or justify rehabilitative
measures is also subject to ongoing legal and academic debate. Given the
strong evidence to suggest a correlation between problem gambling and
criminal behaviour, it has been argued by some that gambling ‘addic-
tion’ should be taken into account in criminal sentencing, as happens
with drug and alcohol abuse (Ibid.). However, in most jurisdictions
around the world:

[T]here is no formal mechanism to issue some form of rehabilitative

sentence for individuals suffering from problem gambling at the time of
their offence. There is precedent for such action in other areas of criminal
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 93

activity. For example, in many jurisdictions there are specialist drug courts
to deal with drug-related crime. (Ibid.)

Blaszczynski and Silove (1996) suggest that whilst legal responsibility should
not be diminished by a diagnosis of pathological gambling, it should be a
factor in sentencing, as receiving appropriate treatment can reduce the risk of
recidivism. In turn, Brooks and Blaszczynski (2011) propose a public health
framework, arguing that problem gambling is not simply an individual
problem, but is shaped by the social economic environment which gives
rise to gambling opportunities. As such, problem gamblers are, to a certain
extent, the victims of the proliferation of gambling products and services and
courts should recognise them as such when passing sentence. Such a view-
point echoes the work of Hinshaw (2005, p. 333) who argues that the
expansion of legalised gambling opportunities across significant parts of the
world, and the concomitant rise in problem gambling and gambling-related
crime, merits the establishment of gambling treatment courts: ‘As a result of
the growth in legalized gambling and the gaming industry, it understandably
follows that the number of compulsive gamblers has and will increase to
some degree. Likewise the number of crimes committed as a result of
compulsive gambling will increase accordingly’. Thus, Hinshaw argues for
a therapeutic jurisprudence that offers rehabilitation alongside accountabil-
ity for offenders whose crimes are a product of their compulsion to gamble.
Undoubtedly, the introduction of appropriate sentencing responses for
gambling-related offending that are integrated into existing rehabilitative
sentencing processes would help to ‘prevent future harm to the community,
the offender’s family and the offender arising from continued problem
gambling and any associated offending’ (Allen Consulting Group and the
University of Melbourne, 2011, p. 21). With opportunities to gamble
continuing to proliferate across many regions of the world, such a develop-
ment may be considered both timely and necessary.

Gambling in Prison

Given the significant body of research examining the gambling activities

of correctional populations prior to imprisonment, it is somewhat
94 Gambling, Crime and Society

surprising that there has been rather little consideration of gambling that
occurs in correctional environments. This may well be because gambling
is typically prohibited within the prison estates of most countries (Williams
et al., 2005). Consequently, inmates may be reluctant to discuss activities
that constitute a disciplinary offence and may lead to some form of
sanction. Thus, to date, only a handful of studies have explored the
gambling activities of inmates during their incarceration (Jones, 1990;
Williams et al., 2005; Williams and Hinton, 2006; Williams, 2008;
McEvoy and Spirgen, 2012; Beauregard and Brochu, 2013a, 2013b;
Jarvis, 2016). Moreover, much of this research has focused on the pre-
valence and types of games played in prison, with few studies examining
the impact gambling may have on individuals either during or after their
sentence.
Collectively, this research indicates that ‘gambling is a common feature
of prison life’ (McEvoy and Spirgen, 2012, p. 75). Williams et al. (2005)
suggest that approximately 40 per cent of inmates gamble at some point
during their time in prison. This includes games of cards, sports betting
and bingo, which provide opportunities for inmates to socialise, alleviate
their boredom and be entertained. Other studies have also indicated that
gambling may be a notable component of prison subcultures. For exam-
ple, a survey of 178 inmates by the Department of Corrections in
Queensland recorded that 46 per cent of inmates admitted to gambling
whilst in prison (although the prevalence rate may well be higher as a
further 10 per cent of inmates chose not to answer the question)
(Queensland Government, 2002). In another study (Australian National
University Centre for Gambling Research, 2003), 60 per cent of 102
offenders across five Australian Capital Territory prisons reported that they
gambled in prison. Significantly, the vast majority of these inmates were
identified as probable pathological gamblers. Lower rates have, however,
been reported in two studies of male and female inmates in New Zealand,
with 28 and 26 per cent of respondents admitting to gambling whilst in
prison (Abbott and McKenna, 2005; Abbott et al., 2005).
In the US, Williams’ (2008) survey of 150 male probationers or parolees
in the state of Utah found that half of the sample (78) reported gambling
whilst in jail or prison. Of this figure, 25 per cent reported gambling four
to five times a week, while 17 per cent (13) reported gambling ‘everyday’
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 95

and 35 per cent (27) considered themselves to be ‘highly skilled’ gamblers.

Similarly, McEvoy and Spirgen’s (2012) study recorded that inmates and
correctional officers and staff in two medium security prisons in Ohio were
in agreement that over 50 per cent of inmates gambled on a regular basis.
Respondents claimed that gambling was a notable feature of the under-
ground economy of correctional institutions, with few efforts made by staff
to deter or prevent inmates from engaging in such activities.
Williams (2008) suggests that, for many, gambling is a leisure experi-
ence that is not necessarily problematic, but could instead provide
potential rehabilitative and health promoting properties for specific
offender-clients. Furthermore, gambling may act as a ‘counterpoint to
the monotony of prison routine’, reduce stress and allow certain cate-
gories of inmate, such as ‘sex offenders’, to gain acceptance among their
‘peers’ (McEvoy and Spirgen, 2012, p. 70). Likewise, Beauregard and
Brochu (2013a, 2013b) found that inmates in three Canadian peniten-
tiaries identified relieving boredom and passing the time as the principal
reasons why they gambled. Such a finding is reaffirmed in a number of
other studies of both male and female inmates who gamble (Abbott and
McKenna, 2000; Queensland Government, 2002; Australian National
University Centre for Gambling Research, 2003). The excitement asso-
ciated with betting, a means through which individuals can build
relationships with other inmates, acquire protection and enhance their
self-esteem were also cited as reasons for gambling (Beauregard and
Brochu, 2013a, 2013b). But whilst the value of gambling in prison
has been highlighted by some, researchers have largely failed to explore
the deleterious effects that gambling may have on both individual
inmates and the prison environment more broadly.
Consequently, the impact of gambling on prisoners both during and
after imprisonment remains unclear, with only a handful of studies giving
consideration to how gambling shapes prison life and the implications it
has for community re-entry and reoffending. For example, McEvoy and
Spirgen (2012) found that inmates and correctional officers were in agree-
ment that gambling in prison could do further harm to inmates.
Respondents suggested that significant risks are ‘associated with generating
debts in a predatory environment and failing to pay. Accusations of
cheating and resentment over losing bets also can spark intense and violent
96 Gambling, Crime and Society

confrontations’ (Ibid., p. 73). Elsewhere, May-Chahal et al.’s (2012,

p. 383) study recorded that ‘researchers were informed of serious fights
and violence in the context of gambling debt, issues where prisoners
inherited debt when they moved into a gambling debtor’s cell or bed
and incidents of violence in their families including a murder that was
described as being “caused by gambling”’. Individuals may also develop
complex gambling issues whilst in prison (Williams, 2010). Moreover, the
development or continuation of gambling addiction during incarceration
may have implications for resettlement and increase the likelihood of
reoffending. Williams and Walker (2009, pp. 412–413) identified that
gambling can have a significant impact on re-entry into society as:

[O]ffender problem gambling in the community often is paired with

substance abuse or crime. Furthermore, offenders with gambling problems
may alienate family members and drain financial resources specifically due
to compulsive gambling. Building support during re-entry is crucial for
offenders under the best of circumstances, but it seems problem gambling
further complicates this process.

Despite such findings we still know very little regarding prisoners’

gambling activities and how this may impact on their re-entry into
society. Further research is certainly necessary if we are to develop
appropriate treatment and support for such populations.

Problem Gambling Treatment Within Criminal

Justice Settings

Problem gambling is likely to have a significant impact on an indivi-

dual’s likelihood of reoffending. Thus, it make sense that treatment
focused rehabilitative programmes should be targeted at problem gam-
blers within correctional environments. Treating problem gambling can
be effective in reducing the likelihood of individuals committing further
crime. As Brown (1987) recognised, post-release gambling-related con-
victions can be halted by effective changes to an individual’s gambling
behaviour. This is reaffirmed by a host of other studies which have
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 97

concluded that ‘offering problem gambling treatment to offenders could

help reduce the cycle of gambling, debt and crime’ (McKenna et al.,
2013, p. 17). Thus, appropriate intervention or rehabilitative pro-
grammes represent a cost effective means through which gambling-
related crime and recidivist behaviour may be reduced or prevented, in
turn ameliorating some of the social, property and correctional costs that
result from the widespread availability of opportunities to gamble
(Emshoff et al., 2008).
Despite this, problem gambling treatment provision with correctional
populations is underdeveloped in almost all regions of the world. As
Williams et al. (2005, p. 684) note: ‘Many countries have problem gam-
bling treatment programs available for the general populace (with the
lowest prevalence rates), but very few have programs available for incarcer-
ated populations (with the highest prevalence rates)’. Similarly, May-
Chahal et al. (2012, p. 373) have highlighted that: ‘[T]here is currently
no co-ordinated national activity focused on solutions to gambling pro-
blems in the UK criminal justice system, and little elsewhere in the world’.
They suggest that this could in part be because of a lack of understanding of
the scale of problem gambling within correctional institutions across the
globe or a failure to acknowledge the possible relationship between problem
gambling and offending behaviour. Moreover: ‘problem gambling is not
considered a high priority for intervention by prison authorities, relative to
more strongly linked criminogenic behaviours such as violence or alcohol or
drug abuse’ (McKenna et al., 2013, p. 95). So although offenders may be
perceived as an undeserving population, the institution of intervention or
rehabilitative programmes that adequately address the problems and con-
cerns of incarcerated offenders with gambling issues should be considered a
penal priority (Walters, 1997).
A range of gambling interventions may be employed in prisons
including telephone counselling services for inmates, training for prison
staff, addiction focused interventions and problem gambling specific
programmes (Lahn and Grabosky, 2003). Yet as Perrone et al. (2013,
p. 29) have identified:

Despite the plethora of research on ‘what works’ with regards to treatment

programs for corrections populations in general, knowledge on effective
98 Gambling, Crime and Society

gambling-specific treatment programs within correctional settings is in its

infancy. In particular, within the correctional environment, problem
gambling treatment services remain largely undocumented and unevalu-
ated. Where evaluations have been attempted, they are often based exclu-
sively on participant self-reports as the only measure of treatment success.

Studies of psycho-educational programmes in North America have demon-

strated an impact on offender behaviour including fewer disciplinary
reports (Walters, 2005), improved attitudes, knowledge and behaviour
towards their problem gambling (Nixon et al., 2006), and lower levels of
pathological and problem gambling in the 12 months after treatment
(Marotta, 2007). Notably, Nixon et al.’s (2006) evaluation of an awareness
and prevention programme in Lethbridge Correctional Facility in Alberta,
Canada, revealed that the 49 inmates that completed the six-session
program over 18 months exhibited an increase in cognitive error recogni-
tion and their attitudes towards gambling became much more negative.
More generally, there is a significant body of evidence that indicates
that psychological intervention, typically through cognitive-behavioural
interventions, is effective in treating problem gambling (Pallesen et al.,
2005). Thus, incarcerated offenders may be able to recover from pro-
blem gambling through the appropriate use of intervention and treat-
ment. Such support would undoubtedly be welcomed by some
prisoners. A study by the Department of Corrections in Queensland,
Australia recorded that 43 per cent of surveyed inmates stated that they
would be interested in engaging in a gambling-related rehabilitative
programme if it was offered by correctional services. However, Lahn
and Grabosky (2003) suggest that most problem gamblers will not self-
identify or pursue help. Thus, it is necessary that criminal justice services
seek to actively identify such individuals and ensure that they engage in
the requisite treatment. As McKenna et al. (2013, p. 19) recognise:

The captive nature of a prison population means that some of the

impediments to accessing treatment are alleviated. Through prisoner
screening, or an identified link between an offence and problem gambling,
prisoners can be advised or instructed via court orders to attend treatment
as part of their prison-based rehabilitation.
 3 Gambling, Problem Gambling, Crime and the Criminal Justice . . . 99

Yet, to date, few jurisdictions have introduced problem gambling

treatment programmes or services for offenders, despite there being a
need for rehabilitative measures that can help individuals ‘break the
cycle of gambling, debt and crime’ (Turner et al., 2009, p. 153).
As such, far more needs to be done to support offenders with
gambling problems, particularly through the development of rehabi-
litative programmes targeted at correctional populations. Moreover,
it is essential that such programmes are subject to rigorous evalua-
tion if we are to better understand the impacts of different treatment
programmes on the offending and recidivism rates of correctional
populations.

Conclusion
Problem gambling is a significant criminogenic factor. Population
studies have repeatedly identified that problem gamblers commit
crime, although there is significant variation in prevalence rates
between general, clinical and correctional sub-populations. Most
notably, surveys of correctional populations and studies utilising
arrest and court data have consistently identified significantly higher
rates of pathological and problem gambling among offenders than the
general population, and recorded high rates of gambling-related
offending when compared with both clinical and general populations.
Much of this offending appears to be acquisitive in nature, with
researchers identifying a broad range of crimes committed by gam-
blers in order to fund their gambling activities or gambling-related
shortfalls in finance. The financial impact of such crime is often
significant, effecting individual victims, businesses and wider society.
Disconcertingly, there is also growing evidence that violent crime may
be associated with problem gambling. In particular, a number of
studies have identified a high occurrence of both victimisation and
perpetration of intimate partner violence, whilst there is also evidence
to suggest that gambling-related stress, anger and violence may impact
on the family more broadly. Undoubtedly, further research exploring
problem gambling and its impact upon families is essential in order to
100 Gambling, Crime and Society

use the findings to help shape best practice relating to the education,
prevention and treatment of gambling-related harm.
Despite evidence of an association between problem gambling and
crime, courts have not typically considered problem gambling to be a
mitigating factor in sentencing. There is, nevertheless, evidence that some
courts in Australia, Canada and the US have recognised that gambling
addiction is a causal factor in the committal of crime and ruled that the
defendant and the community may be better served by a rehabilitative
rather than retributive sentence. Given the widespread availability of
high-intensity forms of gambling in many regions of the world and the
concomitant rise in both problem gambling and gambling-related crime,
it seems only logical that courts institute therapeutic jurisprudence
principles to address the negative effects of state sponsored gambling on
individuals’ propensity to commit crime. Yet for such an approach to be
effective, it is essential that governments develop effective gambling
treatment programmes in criminal justice settings. Currently, few pro-
grammes exist and there has been little in the way of rigorous evaluation
of those that do. Undoubtedly, the introduction of effective rehabilitative
measures targeted at gamblers in criminal justice settings has the potential
to aid community re-entry and reduce their likelihood of reoffending.

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 4
Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal
Gambling

Introduction
Organised crime is a subject that continues to capture the public
imagination, conjuring stereotypical images of mafia mobs engaged in
large-scale criminal rackets involving violence, extortion, drug smug-
gling, people trafficking and money laundering. Such crime groups are
regularly the subject of cinematic and televisual dramas, as well as
popular literature and documentaries. In particular, organised crime’s
association with gambling is well established in the cultural imagery of a
number of societies. For many, Las Vegas is synonymous with gambling
and organised crime, and stems from the 1940s when the Italian-
American mafia began to support and operate casinos. Skolnick’s book
House of Cards (1978) documents this period, highlighting how the
‘ambiguities of organised crime infiltration and control’ saw the state
seeking investors – many of whom had histories of illegal gambling and
bootlegging amongst other illicit activities – to fund and operate casinos.
Likewise, a significant number of those with the skills to run casinos and
casino games had ‘gained their experience in illegal settings’ (Cassillo,
2006, p. 347). This required organised crime groups to conceal their

© The Author(s) 2017 111

J. Banks, Gambling, Crime and Society,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57994-2_4
112 Gambling, Crime and Society

ownership of Las Vegas casinos, as well as the criminal histories of those

working within them, in turn developing valuable ‘fronts’ through
which to launder money and embezzle tax revenues, whilst a relaxation
of licensing laws and regulations were often ‘bought’ from public offi-
cials (Ibid.)
Yet, as Derevensky (2012, p. 5) notes, many of the casinos once
owned by organised crime families are today run by ‘boards of directors
of multinational corporations listed on the stock exchange’. From the
late 1970s, gambling in Las Vegas entered an era of ‘sanitization’, as
crime rates fell and gambling transitioned from being mob run to
corporate run (Ferentzy and Turner, 2009). By 1999, the National
Gambling Impact Study Commission (1999) were asserting that, as a
result of state regulation, organised crime’s ownership and operation of
casinos had been purged, with public corporations now running most of
the gambling establishments in Nevada. Despite such change, the elim-
ination of organised crime in Las Vegas does not appear to have been
recognised by film-makers, with cinematic representations continuing to
construct a distorted image of gambling and gambling establishments.
Turner et al. (2007) note that a number of movies draw strong links
between organised crime and casinos, suggesting that such groups’
involvement in gambling does not simply remain in the past, but
continues today. So whilst films such as Casino Bugsy and The
Godfather trilogy present scripts which are, in part, derived from real-
life historical links between organised crime and gambling, recent
movies such as Shade, Viva Rock Vegas, The Cooler, Walking Tall and
Get Shorty intimate that organised crimes involvement in legal and illegal
gambling is an ongoing problem, whilst such a relationship is also
‘hinted at’ in films such as The Hustler, The Cincinnati Kid, Rounders,
Owning Mahowny and Ocean’s Eleven (Ibid.). Moreover, popular tropes
in films worldwide depict heavily armed gambling-related heists or
threats of physical coercion, despite most casino-related crimes being
financial rather than violent (Zabielskis, 2015).
That cinematic representations of gambling frequently focus upon
either crimes committed against casinos or criminals who run gam-
bling operations may well explain, in part, why opinion polls continue
to demonstrate that a significant proportion of society associates
 4 Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal Gambling 113

gambling with crime (Azmier, 2000; Gambling Commission, 2012).

This chapter is responsive to the broad perception that gambling is
intrinsically related to organised crime and seeks to examine the extent
to which empirical research demonstrates that crime groups are
involved in legal and illegal gambling enterprises. In his comprehensive
review of crime problems relating to gambling, Spapens (2008) sug-
gests that there are three principal ways in which organised crime
groups may be involved in gambling. First, organised crime groups
may be engaged in the illegal supply of gambling services. This could
be a consequence of their inability to access the legal gambling market,
but is more likely a result of criminal entrepreneurs recognising the
significant profits to be made through the provision of games and
services to citizens of countries where such forms of gambling are
illegal. Second, criminal organisations may seek to penetrate the legal
gambling and betting sector, in order to engage in illicit acts such as
embezzlement, fraud and money laundering. The Italian-American
mafia’s infiltration of Las Vegas is, undoubtedly, the most notable
example of this. Third, organised crime groups may also utilise legal
forms of gambling for nefarious activities. This includes money laun-
dering through EGMs or casinos and placing bets in betting shops or
online on ‘fixed’ sporting events. Crime groups may also seek to cheat
legitimate gambling businesses – or their customers – through a range
of activities including computer-based crimes, stealing from VLTs and
defrauding casinos and other gambling establishments.
This chapter employs Spapens’ typology to structure the academic
research that has examined organised crime’s involvement in gam-
bling; both past and present. It demonstrates that research has been
sporadic and is concentrated in specific regions of the world. For
example: ‘In Europe illegal forms of gambling, or the possible pene-
tration of criminals into the legal betting and gaming sector, have
attracted little academic interest to date – or at any rate the lack of
internationally accessible publications would tend to suggest that this
is the case’ (Spapens, 2008, p. 20). Nevertheless, available research is,
collectively, able to shed some light on the scope, nature and orga-
nisational dynamics of organised crime groups’ involvement in legal
and illegal gambling.
114 Gambling, Crime and Society

Organised Crime
As Albanese (2000, p. 410) recognises: ‘Definitions of organized crime
are numerous and vague’. This may well, in part, be because:

[D]iscussions related to ‘organized crime’ are steeped in politics – from the

creation of illegal markets in the first place, to the declarations of the size
of the ‘threat’ and the passing into force of extra-ordinary legislation to
attack the problem. The advantage of “organized crime” is that it can be
whatever the speaker wants it to be – a massive threat, a theatrical legacy,
or petty criminals and hoodlum bikers. The lack of consensus around the
term, the invisibility of much of the activity, and the natural links into the
lives of the public for a large percentage of what are demand driven
commodities, allows for a sense of personal relevance and fascination.
(Beare and Naylor, 1999, p. 3)

Consequently, formulating an agreed operational definition of orga-

nised crime continues to prove challenging, with Von Lampe (2016)
recording in excess of 150 different definitions employed by scholars,
national and international agencies, organisations, and associations.
Van Duyne (1996, p. 53) suggests that in response to the difficulty
in applying concepts and theories of organised crime to empirical
research and, in particular, studies showing ‘a less well-organized land-
scape of organizing criminals’ we may be betting understanding the
variety of economic activities of crime groups as ‘crime enterprises’,
rather than through the less conceptually clear framework of organised
crime. For Van Duyne (1991, p. 54), a crime enterprise is a ‘durable
market-oriented unlawful cooperative with a hierarchical and spatial
organization, whose principal means of making profits is by breaking
the law’.
Yet, more recently, Albanese (2000, p. 411) has noted that there is
‘emerging consensus’ on what constitutes organised crime, delineat-
ing four principal elements that underpin such activities: First,
organised crime is an ongoing operation; second, the criminal orga-
nisation operates rationally for profit; third, the organisation uses
force or threats of force to achieve their goals; and, fourth, such
 4 Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal Gambling 115

groups corrupt public officials and law enforcement agencies in order

to maintain immunity from prosecution. Thus, organised crime may
be best understood as: ‘A continuing criminal enterprise that ration-
ally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great
demand. Its continuing existence is maintained through the use of
force, threats, monopoly or control, and/or the corruption of public
officials’ (Albanese, 2002, p. 581). For Albanese (2010), organised
crimes involves three principal activities – the provision of illicit
goods, the provision of illicit services, and the infiltration of business
and government – and is distinct from traditional crimes such theft or
assault because it involves ‘planning, multiple participants, and
require[s] corrupt measures such as threats to maintain and protect
their ongoing criminal activities’.
But whilst this may point towards a well-defined phenomenon, it is
worth noting that organised crime has been applied to a broad range of
groups engaged in a wide array of gambling-related crimes by research-
ers. This is undoubtedly, in part, a consequence of the clandestine and
polymorphous nature of organised crime, which means that it is likely
to take a variety of forms and appear at different times in different
jurisdictions (Wright, 2005). Nevertheless, as Ferentzy and Turner
(2009, p. 117) rightly note:

The difficulties in distinguishing between OC [(organised crime)]

and “regular” crime need not, on their own, preclude a discussion
of OC. Scientific inquiries, for example, have a long tradition of
accepting what are called “working definitions” – the idea being that
despite a lack of consensus on the meaning of terms and concepts,
one can still proceed with a study. Essentially, there is more than one
way to define OC – and given the fact that a degree of organization
is endemic to most criminal activity, such confusion should not be
surprising.

In response, this chapter seeks to take into account all studies that have
examined various aspects of organised crime and gambling, irrespective
of definitional ambiguities, and, following Ferentzy and Turner’s lead,
direct readers to a variety of different views and opinions.
116 Gambling, Crime and Society

Organised Crime and Illegal Gambling

The most significant link between gambling and crime is also the most
obvious; in many regions of the world, specific forms of gambling remain
illegal (Ibid.). As highlighted in Chapter 1, across most Islamic states, all
forms of gambling remain illegal. This has not stopped, however, gam-
bling and black market lotteries, which operate out of local coffee houses,
appearing in some of these territories (Feener, 2013). More typically,
countries such as China, the United States, Canada and Australia have
allowed for certain forms of gambling whilst prohibiting others. As
Spapens (2008, p. 21) notes: ‘For as long as gambling has existed, it has
attracted the attention of the authorities, and some games of chance have
been curbed or completely outlawed, in some cases temporarily or locally’.
In turn, organised crime groups have emerged to service the needs of
citizens wishing to engage in illicit forms of wagering activity. For exam-
ple, sports betting remains illegal across all US states with the exception of
Nevada, which hosts in excess of 200 sports books and turns over
approximately US$4 billion in wagers per year. Nevertheless, US citizens’
appetite for sports betting across the rest of the country is succoured by an
army of betting agents whose links to organised crime remain unclear
(Coontz, 2001; Moodie, 2002). American bettors are also able to access
the numerous US-facing offshore betting sites that are located throughout
the Caribbean and in South America. As Chapter 6 illustrates, organised
crime is active in the area of Internet gambling, operating online poker,
casino and sports betting businesses from regulation light jurisdictions
beyond the reach of US law enforcement. This enables criminal entrepre-
neurs to solicit US citizens’ custom without fear of reprisal and launder
their ill-gotten gains, including profits made from unrelated illegal activ-
ity. Thus, as Albanese (2015) notes, although the extent of illegal gam-
bling remains unknown, technological developments have enhanced
opportunities for individuals to engage in illicit wagering activities.
Illegal sports betting, black market gaming machines, illegal online betting
and Internet sweepstake cafes represent just some of the many ways in
which organised criminals have avoided paying taxes, cheated customers
and funded a range of other illegal activities.
 4 Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal Gambling 117

Historically, illegal gambling has proved a popular business for

organised crime groups who have used a combination of threats,
violence and bribery to maintain market share, limit competition
and ensure that law enforcement remains ‘blind’ to their activities
(Albini and McIllwain, 2012). Such business techniques are typically
employed in illegal settings, but are sometimes transferred to the legal
gambling industry when specific wagering activities become monopo-
lised by organised crime groups. As preceding discussion illustrates,
this was certainly the case in Nevada in the 1940s, where the mob’s
proficiency in running legitimate casino operations stemmed from
their past illicit gambling activities (Pontell et al., 2014). However,
the rigorous regulatory practices instituted in many regions of the
world have stymied organised crime’s ability to access legal gambling
businesses. Moreover, as Arthur et al. (2014, p. 51) note: ‘One of the
common rationales for government legalization of gambling is to
reduce illegal gambling and to divert illegal gambling revenues into
government coffers. Theoretically, when legal opportunities to gamble
are created, illegal gambling should decrease because gamblers will have
no motivation to patronize illegal forms’. This was certainly the case in
the UK, where the passage of legislation permitting licensed betting
shops in 1960 led to the rapid decline of the ‘bookies runner’ and
illegal street corner betting (Dixon, 1991). By contrast, the introduc-
tion of government managed betting parlours in Australia resulted in a
significant expansion of illegal sports and race betting (Dixon, 1996),
whilst in Holland the legalisation of casino gambling, which was
targeted at reducing illegal and uncontrolled gambling, did little
more than inflate the number of illegal casinos (Thompson and
Pinney, 1990). Nevertheless, Pontell et al., (2014, p. 2) claim that
the proliferation of legal opportunities to gamble across many regions
of the world has reduced the need for illegal gambling: ‘Illegal gam-
bling has been impacted by the de-criminalisation or legalisation of
wagering, most notably the result of attempts by governments to
increase their income in a manner that for most taxpayers is relatively
painless. Lotteries, racetrack betting, and, most particularly, big-time
casinos, now dot the international landscape’.
118 Gambling, Crime and Society

Yet there is evidence to suggest that illegal gambling remains a core

economic activity of organised crime groups in North America. For
example, Moodie (2002) found that between 1997 and 2002, in
Ontario, Canada, there were 1,370 occurrences of illegal gambling,
leading to 2,069 people charged with 3,517 criminal offences. In excess
of US$6 million of items were seized in these cases, including 2,034
illegal slot machines and US$1.23 million in cash. Moodie (2002, p. 7)
suggests that:

Illegal gambling, while appearing to be a minor part of a Traditional

Organized Crime (TOC) network, is actually a foundation upon which
most other illicit activities are supported. Illegal bookmaking, card dens
and video gambling machines are Traditional Organized Crime’s main
source of revenue. Illegal gambling and related crimes such as loanshark-
ing, money laundering and corruption provide working capital to invest
in more legitimate enterprises, thereby strengthening their entire illicit
operation.

Furthermore, a special investigation into book-making in Toronto and

surrounding regions identified that in excess of US$4.6 million was spent
on illegal sports betting over a 90-day period (Ibid.). From these figures,
Moodie deduced that a minimum of US$380 million dollars in illegal
gambling revenues were being generated annually in Ontario, whilst
92 per cent of this money funded traditional organised crime groups.
Similarly, within Alberta, Canada, there remains ‘a general sentiment’
that illegal gambling is readily available and organised crime groups are
likely to be involved in its supply (Arthur et al., 2014). For example,
Smith et al. (2003, p. 12) note that:

Police intelligence reports cited by Smith and Wynne (1999) claim that
Asian criminal gangs are prominent in illegal gambling in western
Canada’s four largest cities and, to a lesser extent, so are Italian, Greek,
Portuguese, and eastern European groups. These groups operate primarily
in niche markets, particularly in their own cultural enclaves. Moreover,
law enforcement agents concur that organized crime involvement in illegal
gambling is seldom restricted to gambling. A hallmark of organized
crimes’ fascination with illegal gambling is that it complements other
 4 Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal Gambling 119

illegal activities such as money laundering and loan sharking and is a way
of accumulating money that can be used for other illicit purposes (Lyman
and Potter, 2000).

Albanese’s (2015) report for the American Gaming Association repre-

sents the most insightful and recent examination of illegal gambling and
organised crime in North America. Prior to this study, there had been
little in the way of a systematic analysis of cases centring upon illegal
gambling enterprises and, consequently, we know very little about who
are involved in such activities, the organisational dynamics of such
operations and the nature of the threat they pose to society. In response,
Albanese (2015, p. 1) provides an analysis of US federal convictions of
those involved in the operation of illegal gambling enterprises for a single
year, enabling ‘the nature and extent of the connection between illegal
gambling businesses and organized crime [to] be documented through
facts, rather than perceptions or anecdotes’.
The research demonstrates that despite a host of different gambling
opportunities being available across most US states, a number of wager-
ing activities remain illegal and present great opportunity for such games
to be provided illicitly. Analysis identifies that strong ties between
organised crime and illegal gambling remain in America, with 80 indi-
viduals across 23 different states convicted under federal law for their
involvement in operating illegal gambling businesses. The 40 distinct
illegal gambling enterprises identified in these cases can be grouped into
four general types of operation: illegal online and offshore betting; illegal
gambling parlours and in person games; illegal gambling as part of a
larger organised crime enterprise; and animal fighting and betting
operations.
Illegal online and offshore betting represented the most common type
of illegal gambling enterprise. Primarily consisting of Internet sports
betting businesses, illicit online and offshore gambling operations
accounted for 38 per cent of all federal convictions of illegal gambling
enterprises in 2014. Although the vast majority of websites were located
offshore – principally in Costa Rica, which has been highly successful in
cultivating a hospitable environment for US-facing betting, casino and
poker operations – in an attempt to evade US gambling laws, a number
120 Gambling, Crime and Society

of businesses also operated from within 10 different states in the US.

Illegal casinos, private clubs and slot machines located in bars and shops
were also identified by law enforcement in 10 different states and
represented 25 per cent of federal convictions of illegal gambling busi-
nesses. Despite multiple forms of gambling being available in these
states, the availability of illegal parlours and in-person games, which
often had ties to illegal Internet gambling sites, suggests ‘that there are
many games and locations operating outside the scope of existing legal
gaming alternatives’ (Ibid.: 3).
In some of the cases reviewed, illegal gambling businesses formed
part of a much larger organised crime enterprise and represented just
one of a number of different criminal activities. Involving both
traditional and non-traditional organised crime groups, cases centred
on illegal gambling businesses operated by a Texas methamphetamine
trafficking group, the Armenian Power Gang, Outlaws Motorcycle
Club, a New York Chinatown gang, a Russian-American organised
crime group, the Philadelphia Costra Nostra group and several
families of the New York Cosa Nostra group. Finally, animal fighting
and betting operations, involving either dog-fighting or cock-fighting,
were discovered in five different states in 2014 and had notable local
followings.
Evidence indicates that illegal gambling appears to be a largely
middle aged enterprise, with the average age of offenders ranging
from 48 to 55 years old,1 dependent on crime type. Illegal enterprises
were also sizeable and sustained, with the average number of persons
involved in each business ranging from 8 to 33,2 whilst enterprises
had been in operation for an average of between 4 and 11 years.3

1
Average age of offenders: 55 years old for online and offshore betting, 49 years old for gambling
parlours and in person games, 53 years old for larger organised crime enterprises, 48 years old for
animal fighting and betting.
2
Average number of individuals identified as being involved in the operation of illegal gambling
enterprises: 13 for online and offshore betting, 8 for illegal gambling parlours and in person
games, 33 for larger organised crime enterprises, 8 for animal fighting and betting.
3
Average length of time in business: 7 years for online and offshore betting, 4 years for parlour and
in person games, 11 years for larger organised crime enterprises, 4 years for animal fighting and
betting.
 4 Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal Gambling 121

As well as being charged with running an illegal gambling business,

individuals were also prosecuted for a range of other offences, includ-
ing but not limited to money laundering, racketeering, conspiracy
and extortion; offences that are often linked to illegal gambling
businesses. Some of the cases involving larger ongoing organised
crime groups saw individuals prosecuted for homicide and drug
trafficking, whilst cruelty offences were levelled against those indivi-
duals involved in animal fighting.
Albanese (2015, p. 6) notes that state, local and federal agencies
were involved in joint investigations that led to the successful pro-
secution of illegal gambling business: ‘This is because the primary
investigative methods used (wiretaps, undercover agents, and infor-
mants) involved police at different levels of government. Informants
and undercover work often occurs at the state and local level,
whereas wiretaps and additional informants are often obtained at
the federal level’. Successful prosecutions of illegal gambling enter-
prises resulted in prison sentences and substantial forfeitures.
Individuals involved in online and offshore betting and parlour
and in-person games received sentences averaging 2 years, whilst
slightly lengthier sentences averaging 3 years were handed down to
those involved in animal fighting because cruelty to animals and
other offences co-occurred in such cases. Sentences averaging 5 years
were received by those engaged in illegal gambling as part of larger
organised crime enterprises, ‘because these cases more often involved
repeat and career criminals. These cases were also more likely to
involve extortionate threats and violence. The longest sentences
imposed were two life sentences, imposed in a Cosa Nostra case
and a Chinatown gang case because homicides were involved’ (Ibid.).
Forfeitures averaged US$500,000 in online and offshore betting
cases and animal fighting and betting cases, US$300,000 in illegal
gambling parlour and in-person betting cases, and US$3 million in
cases where illegal gambling was part of a larger criminal organisa-
tion enterprise. Seizures in a number of individual cases were sig-
nificantly higher than this, with up to US$900,000 forfeited in
animal fighting and betting cases, US$1.3 million forfeited in illegal
gambling parlour and in-person gambling cases, US$20 million in
122 Gambling, Crime and Society

online and offshore betting cases, and US$468 million where gam-
bling was part of larger organised crime enterprises. Clearly:

These large criminal forfeitures demonstrate the huge volume of cash

generated by illegal gambling enterprises, none of which is taxed, and
much of it was used to fund other organized crime activity, such as money
laundering, loansharking, and other crimes. Of course, there is also likely
rampant cheating of customers, through rigged games and unfair payouts,
but illegal gamblers cannot complain, because they are participating in
gambling enterprises operating outside the law where there is no regula-
tion or oversight, and complaints are not welcome. (Albanese, 2015, p. 6)

Clearly, Albanese’s analysis reveals that many of the illegal gambling

enterprises in the United States are large and long term; catering for a
significant demand for gambling outside of the law. Most notably, as
this study and Chapter 6 illustrates, online and offshore betting is a
growing challenge for law enforcement agencies, with many illegal
gambling sites going unidentified or remaining situated beyond the
reach of US law enforcement agencies. With most convictions secured
through joint investigations involving state, local and federal law enfor-
cement agencies, providing training on successful investigative methods,
alongside the introduction of law enforcement task forces focused on
illegal gambling enterprises, could help increase the identification and
successful prosecution of those involved in illegal gambling businesses
(Ibid.). And whilst the sentences for operating illegal gambling busi-
nesses may not, be lengthy, significant forfeitures can cripple illegal
gambling enterprises, preventing the resumption of an operation once
an individual’s sentence has been served. Albanese (2015, p. 7) sum-
marises by noting that:

In conclusion, this analysis of all federal court convictions for operating

illegal gambling businesses during 2014 shows that these businesses oper-
ated for many years, a large volume of untaxed illicit profits was generated,
and these profits were used to advance other criminal objectives. On the
other hand, the large forfeitures obtained can be used to help fund
additional law enforcement effort in this area, and these same forfeitures
 4 Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal Gambling 123

make it difficult for illegal operators to get back into business after
conviction. However, as long as the demand for prohibited forms of
gambling remains, especially sports betting, it is likely that new illegal
operators will emerge to cater to this demand.

Opportunities for the supply of illegal gambling are also prevalent in parts
of Asia, where many forms of gambling are prohibited. Wang and
Antonopoulos (2015) present a unique insight into the involvement of
organised crime groups in illegal gambling in the People’s Republic of
China. Their review of organised crime cases – revealed through a crime
crackdown in Chongqing, a major city in Southwest China – indicates that
illegal gambling is a significant business enterprise for the vast majority of
criminal groups in mainland China. Wang and Antonopoulos suggest that
organised crime is involved in three principal gambling-related business
activities. This includes both the provision of illegal gambling services
through local-traditional gambling dens and/or the provision of illegal
wagering through online gambling networks. Criminal groups have also
infiltrated the legal betting sector, operating trans-regional gambling rings
across mainland China and Macau.
Local gambling dens run by crime groups are commonplace in main-
land China and are facilitated, in part, by the corruption of local police
officers and government officials. Guanxi ties or personal connections
play a vital role in financing such ventures, attracting players and
securing protection from police officers and government officials. And
although threats and violence may be used in the collection of debts,
guanxi practice4 is often the preferred route for settling gambling arrears.
Alongside more traditional forms of in-person illegal gambling, the
increased penetration of the Internet in China has enabled online
gambling networks to flourish, providing Chinese citizens with a host
of different illegal betting opportunities. Whilst the scale of illegal
Internet betting in China is unknown, it is certainly sizeable, with
estimates indicating that it is worth somewhere between US$12 billion

4
Guanxi practice involves the cultivation of personal relationships and networks of mutual
dependence.
124 Gambling, Crime and Society

and US$75 billion per year (Monaghan, 2008; Gainsbury, 2012). In

April 2014, China’s largest online gambling ring – receiving bets total-
ling in excess of HK$140 billion – was broken by Shanghai police
(Wang and Antonopoulos, 2015). Yet, despite the best efforts of the
Chinese government and law officials to target and block Internet
gambling sites, and prosecute, fine and freeze the accounts of those
engaging the operation of such illegal enterprises, there remains in the
region of 200 different Chinese language sites that accept players from
China in operation (Beach, 2009; Gainsbury, 2012; Casino City, 2016).
Match-fixing and gambling – which will be discussed in greater detail
in Chapter 5 – also presents a significant problem, with the Chinese
government initiating a crackdown on the betting-related manipulation
of Chinese football matches. Ongoing investigations have resulted in the
prosecution of 12 football clubs and 58 current and former players,
officials and referees for a range of match-fixing, gambling and bribe
taking offences. Organised crime groups, utilising Internet betting sites
in order to profit from arranged matches, play a key role in manipulating
the outcome of games:

Illegal entrepreneurs or football club owners fix matches by employing

their guanxi networks. Guanxi members (e.g., soccer officials, referees, and
players) feel obliged to manipulate matches in order to meet the demand
of their networks. It is undeniable that violence and threats are used by
illegal entrepreneurs to punish players who refused to cooperate, but
guanxi strategies, in most circumstances, function as a major tool for
them to fix matches and earn illegal profits through online betting.
(Ibid.: 16)

In demonstrating how guanxi practices play a key role in financing and

marketing illegal gambling ventures, debt collection and police suppres-
sion, Wang and Antonopoulos illustrate how illicit gambling businesses
retain great profitability for organised crime groups in Asia.
Collectively, this body of research indicates that although organised
crime may not dominate illegal gambling, they continue to operate
crime enterprises that centre on the supply of illegal gambling products
and services to citizens in states where specific forms of wagering activity
 4 Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal Gambling 125

are prohibited. Undoubtedly, much of this crime goes unidentified,

unreported and unrecorded. As such, it may be inferred that the supply
of illegal gambling, possibly by organised crime groups, is likely to take
place in other – if not most – regions of the world.

Organised Crime and Legal Gambling

Discussion of the degree to which organised crime infiltrates the legal
gambling sector has traditionally focused on the involvement of the
Italian-American mafia in Las Vegas (Spapens, 2008), although, more
recently, there is a growing number of studies that have explored crime
and corruption in China and, more specifically, the casinos of Macau
(Pontell et al., 2014; Wang and Antonopoulos, 2015; Zabielskis, 2015;
Lo and Kwok, 2016). By contrast, there is limited and largely anecdotal
evidence of organised crime’s involvement in gambling in Europe.
However, Gounev (2012) suggests that legitimate gambling businesses
in Europe are particularly vulnerable to penetration by criminals, whilst
organised crime groups may also become involved in the operation of
gambling businesses. He notes that in both France and Sweden, orga-
nised crime groups have sought direct ownership of gambling services,
most notably gaming machines. For example, in Sweden, Hell’s Angels
control many gaming machines in restaurants, employing violence and
intimidation to ensure that owners allow them to install machines in
their establishments. Likewise, in France, organised crime groups have
sought to take ownership of all gaming machines in restaurants within
specific territories. Elsewhere, Spapens (2008) examined the infiltration
of the electronic gaming sector in the Netherlands by organised crime.
Spapens (2008, p. 38) suggests that prior to the legalisation of EGMs in
1986, many machines were in operation in Dutch bars and restaurants
with rumours that some of these machines had been installed ‘under
duress’. Yet even after legalisation it was claimed that one in five EGMs
in Rotterdam was linked to groups involved in drug trafficking and
serious crime, whilst in Amsterdam it was claimed that half of all EGMs
were controlled by five criminal groups. For Spapens, the penetration of
the Dutch EGM sector in the 1980s was principally the product of the
126 Gambling, Crime and Society

poor screening of licence applicants, although this is no longer the case

today, as: ‘The likelihood of people with a criminal past being able to get
in on the EGM sector [has been] reduced to virtually zero as a result of a
closer scrutiny of licence applications’ (Ibid.: 39).
As well as profiting through the ownership of EGMs, organised
crime groups have also been successful in exploiting vulnerabilities
inherent in such machines, defrauding legal gambling establishments
of significant amounts of money. McMullan and Perrier’s (2007a,
2007b) examination of an organised criminal scheme to defraud
VLT machines in Canada explores the organisational dynamics of
this computer crime and the challenges facing law enforcement agen-
cies. They note that thefts and frauds targeted at EGMs are nothing
new, with custom-made devices being employed to manipulate the
internal mechanisms of traditional slot machines. However, the ‘crack-
ing’ of VLTs involves a variety of more sophisticated techniques which
typically require computer hardware, computer programming lan-
guages, microprocessors and microcontrollers, as well as a high level
of technical competence. For example, one law enforcement officer
reported how:

Three subjects would travel to a business with VLTs. First person would
stay in the vehicle with a lap top computer, radio equipment, etc. Second
and third subjects would enter the business. The player would be outfitted
with a video camera, communication equipment, an ear piece and a power
source. This person would focus the camera on the terminal screen and
relay the playing/spinning of the screen to the operator in the vehicle
enabling the computer guru to determine where the screen was in the
random mode. From here the person with the computer using high speed
equipment could tell how far away the terminal was from paying out.
When the device was close to paying out the person inside the business
would be told to increase the bet from five credits to 50 credits.
(McMullan and Perrier, 2007a, p. 45)

The criminal group studied by McMullan and Perrier was significantly

bigger, consisting of around a dozen family members and work
colleagues from programming and engineering professions. Such ‘kinship
 4 Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal Gambling 127

relationships assured secrecy and group integration that protected the core
technologies in the task environment from most regulatory and policing
scrutiny’ (Ibid.: 48). A variety of roles were undertaken by individuals in the
crime group, with ‘technical experts’ planning VLT cyber-attacks, ‘accom-
plices’ ‘casing’ terminal locations, relaying information to and from the
VLT site to the experts, and undertaking the frauds, whilst ‘lookouts’
sought to prevent the team’s discovery. Moreover: ‘Not all members were
used in each and every cyber-attack and the team moved different players in
and out to avoid suspicion’ (Ibid.). Unlike the cyberextornists discussed in
Chapter 6, this organised crime group ‘did not tap economics of scale’,
remaining geographically local and limited, and failing to develop the
‘stable alliances’ that would have ensured greater and more sustained profits
(Ibid.: 49). Nevertheless, their ‘earnings’ were significant, with an estimated
‘take’ per machine of approximately CA$ 1,000, amounting to in the
region of CA$ 0.5 million for the 4 years the scam was in operation
(Ibid.: 48).
In Asia, organised crime groups appear to have been highly successful
in infiltrating the legal casino industry. As Chapter 2 illustrates, casino
gambling is often assumed to foster a hotbed of crime and vice, yet
North American studies, which have principally focused on the degree to
which casinos cause crime in the towns and cities in which they are
located, have failed to return compelling evidence that this is the case.
By contrast, recent qualitative research centring on the casino industry
in Macau (Pontell et al., 2014; Wang and Antonopoulos, 2015;
Zabielski, 2015; Lo and Kwowk, 2016) indicates that organised crime
plays a prominent role in the day-to-day functioning of the industry.
Representing the largest income-producing gambling destination in the
world and deriving in excess of 90 per cent of its GDP from casinos and
casino-related industries, Macau is, to all intents and purposes, a ‘casino
state’. The burgeoning casino economy has brought great wealth to
some, although many in society remained marginalised, unable to avail
themselves of the prosperity that gambling brings. Pontell et al. (2014)
have suggested that ‘the rapid growth and weak regulation of the casino
industry in Macau has enabled various forms of corruption to thrive,
from bribery and kickbacks during construction phases to illegal gam-
bling by politicians and money laundering by criminal elements’
128 Gambling, Crime and Society

(Banks, 2014, p. 5). Prior to 2002, a state-sanctioned gambling mono-

poly led by Hong Kong billionaire businessman Stanley Ho held sway in
Macau. Organised crime was a prominent feature of the gambling scene,
with contraband, drugs, prostitution and money laundering ‘prominent
practices’ as was the corruption of officials (Pontell et al., 2014). Lo and
Kwok (2016) document the role of ‘damazai’ or ‘dead-chip dealers’
in pre-twenty-first-century Macau. Damazai, who were primarily
triad members, played a key role in attracting gamblers to Macau’s
VIP casino rooms, profiting through dead chip loans (with a commis-
sion rate of 1.2 per cent) and chip-rolling.5 Triad members also engaged
in loan sharking, prostitution and drug offences.
Throughout the 1990s, the damazai enterprise was self-regulated by
organised crime groups who secured: ‘cartel agreements of the business
and related service operations, and determined and enforced sanctions
for non-compliance of shared norms (Leong, 2002). Under such self-
regulation, a symbiotic relationship was maintained among all parties
that produced a stable business environment for two decades’ (Lo and
Kwowk, 2016, p. 4). However, triad conflict occurred 2 years prior to
Portugal’s handover of Macau to China, as the lucrative nature of
damazai enterprises saw the 14K triad, led by the notorious
BrokenTooth – dubbed the Triad King of Macau by the media –
engage in overt violence in a battle for territories with rival triad
gang, the Shui Fong:

The ‘14K-Shui Fong’ conflict resulted in a series of killings, bomb

attacks, manslaughter, arson and shootings. It was alleged that many
local law enforcement officers sided with the triads and those who did
not were threatened or injured. When triad warfare became a serious
threat to the social order of Macau, the government brought in judges
and law enforcement officers from Portugal, hoping to control the

5
VIP players are given a set of ‘dead chips’ by a damazai which they use to place bets. Winnings
are paid out using the casino’s standard cash chips. When the player has run out of the dead chips
that have been provided by the damazai, they then purchase more dead chips using the cash chips
they have accumulated. Each of these buy-ins will be recorded. At the end of play a percentage
refund is calculated. This will be presented to the player or junketeer as per the terms of agreement
that the casino has with the parties concerned.
 4 Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal Gambling 129

violence, but to no avail. Eventually, after a failed attempt to assassinate

a senior Portuguese police official, Broken Tooth was arrested, put to
trial and imprisoned for 15 years in 1999. (Lo and Kwowk, 2016, p. 4)

The return of Macau to Chinese rule in 1999 signalled a change in the

operation of its gambling industry, with a Las Vegas style of corporate
governance introduced. Yet VIP rooms have not disappeared and
damazai have reimagined themselves as ‘junkets’ engaged in identifying
high roller gamblers and debt collection. Since the handover of Macau
to mainland China, casino-related crimes have, however, become
‘more white collar-financial, less foot soldier violent, in the current
era of transnational corporate consolidation and growth’ (Zabielskis,
2015, p. 141). Lo and Kwok’s (2016) observations and interviews with
triad members, VIP-room contractors, police officers and Chinese
officials between 2012 and 2015 reveal that triad groups continue to
dominate Macau’s gaming industry and, in particular, the operation of
high-stakes VIP casino rooms. So although some individuals con-
tracted to run VIP rooms are businessmen with triad connections,
the Dor or reputation of triads remains crucial in securing casino
management’s trust. However, in contrast to pre-Chinese rule, dama-
zai or junkets rarely engage in violence either to claim territories or
collect debts, ‘mainly because their triad backgrounds provide a repu-
tation for violence (Gambetta, 1993) that reduces the actual use of
violence in extra-legal governance under an entrepreneurial environ-
ment’ (Lo and Kwowk, 2016, p. 9).
Instead of violence and extortion, VIP rooms are run in an entrepre-
neurial mode akin to a ‘bank-like business enterprise’. Some triads and
businessmen solicit investors, who provide financial capital for crediting
gamblers in return for a fixed monthly dividend. This new more civilised
mode of operation ‘is not without its problems’ (Ibid.: 11). Fraud is
commonplace:

Many fraud cases have occurred nowadays. The case of Huang Shan is the
tip of the iceberg. Some junkets claimed they represented a junket com-
pany to accept investors’ funds by offering them a higher than standard
interest rate, and then absconded with the money. The problem with the
130 Gambling, Crime and Society

current model is that whales6 have a gambling cycle, normally two years.
After two years, their financial resources would drain up and the junkets
would lose resourceful customers. Unless the junkets can locate new
customers and bring in new resources, the company would be financially
insecure. (Ibid.: 9)

Even after the introduction of a junket organisation, ‘Associacao de

Mediadores de Jogos Entertenimento de Macau’, charged with self-
regulating the industry, and laws preventing organised criminals engaging
in such enterprise, ‘unlicensable’ junkets have remained in operation.
Wang and Antonopoulos (2015) note how Chinese gangs also exploit
Macau’s casinos by working with junket operators in settling customers’
debts. As gambling is outlawed in mainland China, many citizens travel
to Macau, in order to engage in wagering activities. However, citizens
are prohibited from taking more than 20,000 RMB at a time, and
US$50,000 in total, out of China per year. Junkets play an important
role in enabling Chinese citizens to circumvent this restriction, provid-
ing credit to high rolling gamblers in Macau, who repay these loans to
junket operated sub-agencies in mainland China. Problematically: ‘In
this situation, the ability of junket operators to earn commission will
largely depend on whether gambling debts can be recovered’ (Ibid.: 11).
As gambling debts are not legally collectable in China, this has become a
profitable enterprise for Macau’s four major crime syndicates the 14K
triad, the Shui Fong (also known as the Water Room Gang), Wo Shing
Wo and Big Circle Boys. In each case, these criminal syndicates have
chosen ‘either to set up subagencies in mainland China or to team up
with mainland Chinese gangs in order to chase mainland gamblers who
fail to make good their losses in Macau’ (Ibid.). So despite the introduc-
tion of American-operated casinos in the mid-2000s, organised crime
groups continue to represent the most profitable junkets, as they provide
the only means casinos have of accessing the most wealthy and therefore
lucrative clients, whilst ensuring that debts are collected in mainland
China. In sum:

6
A whale, who is also sometimes referred to as high roller, is a player who wagers significant
amounts of money.
 4 Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal Gambling 131

[T]he increasing significance of mainland junket operators in Macau’s

VIP rooms is due to their ability to employ their guanxi ties to coordinate
a series of illegal activities across the China-Macau border, including the
recruitment of wealthy patrons and the collection of gambling debts.
Furthermore . . . guanxi practices are sufficient to encourage debtors to
fulfil their responsibilities, and violence is not a necessary strategy for
trans-regional gambling.’ (Ibid.: 13)

Lo and Kwowk (2016) have also illustrated how organised white-collar

crimes, most notably casino scams and money laundering, feature in
Macau. In VIP rooms, ‘grifters’ and casino scam syndicates sublet rooms
where they dupe players out of their money. As Zabielskis (2015, p. 147)
notes:

Classic casino-related crimes familiar in other venues are not without

perpetrators in Macau, and the modus operandi involved are limited
only by the imagination and ingenuity of criminal intent – plus the skills
with which they are realized. These include rigging slot machines, bribing
dealers, hiding tiny cameras up sleeves, creating distractions as covers for
theft of chips from both dealers and other players, and slipping additional
chips onto winning bets after play has been completed.

Alongside betting-related frauds, money laundering is often found in

VIP rooms and stems from widespread corruption in China: ‘There was
less money laundering in the 1990s when customers were mainly
Hongkongers. To date, the majority of them are mainland Chinese
and a lot of corrupt money is involved. They need a mechanism, such
as VIP rooms, to clean the dirty money’ (Lo and Kwowk, 2016, p. 13).
As Skolnick (1978, p. 45) suggests: ‘The world of gambling offers a
portfolio of anonymous expenditure’ and presents great opportunity for
the laundering of money acquired illegally without the knowledge of tax
authorities. In particular, the casinos of Macau present ideal venues
through which illicit proceeds may be laundered and turned into
‘respectable cash’ (Ibid.). Money laundering regularly occurs in the
VIP rooms of Macau and appears to take two principal forms (Lo and
Kwowk, 2016): First, laundering may simply involve collusion between
132 Gambling, Crime and Society

a casino and a player; and, second, players may, unbeknown to the

casino, choose a specific game through which to ‘wash’ clay chips for
regular chips, losing only the house ‘vigorish’.7 In particular, commis-
sion-free baccarat or roulette, blackjack or the Chinese big-small game
represent low-risk games through which organised crime groups can
launder their ill-gotten gains.

Conclusion
Gambling is often associated with organised crime. Historically, orga-
nised crime groups have been involved in the provision of both legal and
illegal gambling, whilst they have also been able to exploit legal forms of
gambling for a range of nefarious activities. In particular, the Italian-
American mafia’s involvement with illegal and legal gambling in Las
Vegas has been immortalised in numerous fictional and factual accounts
which continue to structure public understanding. Today, the involve-
ment of organised crime in gambling is less clear. This is primarily
because the clandestine, innovative and mutable nature of organised
crime poses great challenges for those seeking to research it and, subse-
quently, there is a dearth of research exploring the role such groups play
in the supply of legal and illegal gambling products and services. What
research is available suggests that organised crime groups are involved in
a range of gambling activities across different regions of the world.
Whilst it is difficult to ascertain the extent of illegal gambling, it has
been suggested (Arthur et al., 2014; Pontell et al., 2014) that the
significant expansion of legal opportunities to gamble in many countries
has led to a fall in demand for illegal gambling. Many states do, however,
only allow certain forms of gambling, whilst continuing to prohibit
others. This is most notable in China and the US where illegal gambling
provided by organised crime groups appears to feature prominently. In
the US, citizens are presented with numerous opportunities to engage in

7
Vigorish is the amount charged by a gambling establishment for its services. It may also be called
the vig, cut take or juice.
 4 Organised Crime, Gambling and Illegal Gambling 133

sports betting – which is illegal in every state with the exception of

Nevada – via either the numerous illegal betting agents that are located
throughout the country or the raft of offshore betting sites that are but a
few keystrokes away. Evidence gathered from criminal justice agencies
also indicates that organised crime groups are involved in the supply of
electronic gaming machines, illegal parlours and in-person games, and
animal fighting and betting rings, as well as a host of allied activities
including money laundering, loansharking and corruption. Similarly, in
China, organised crime groups continue to supply citizens with a range
of different illegal gambling products and services, operating both local-
traditional gambling dens and online gambling networks.
Unlike illegal gambling, organised crime’s involvement in legal gam-
bling may well have been halted in many regions of the world, with
rigorous regulation and licensing processes requiring applicants for
gambling licenses to demonstrate that they are ‘fit and proper’ persons.
Police records and business histories are explored, in order to ensure that
applicants do not have ties to organised crime groups. Yet such processes
are not effective in all regions of the world. Despite efforts to eradicate
organised crime from the junket industry in Macau, triad groups con-
tinue to feature prominently, providing VIP rooms with high roller
gamblers and ensuring that debts are collected. There is also evidence
to suggest that crime groups utilise legal gambling venues for a variety of
other illicit acts, including money laundering and a range of casinos
‘scams’ that dupe players out of their money.
Collectively, this research indicates that organised crime continues to
play some role in the provision of both legal and illegal gambling,
although the extent of its involvement is hard to ascertain. Anecdotal
evidence far outweighs research evidence, yet this may be considered
unsurprising given the challenges in studying criminal activities and
criminal organisations. The furtive and changeable nature of organised
crime enterprises means that few researchers are able to access to such
groups and individuals, with many studies relying on data derived from
criminal justice agencies or media reporting. Thus, to date, only a
handful of studies have sought to examine the relationship between
organised crime and gambling in contemporary society. Ultimately:
‘These facts, coupled with the longstanding difficulties involved in the
134 Gambling, Crime and Society

study of criminal activities and criminal organisations, render organised

crime’s current role in gambling as hard to ascertain as at any other time
since its inception in the 1920s’ (Ferentzy and Turner, 2009, p. 137).

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 5
Gambling, Sport and Corruption

Introduction
Sport is a fundamental component of contemporary society and cul-
ture. A truly global phenomenon, sport acts as a key site of economic,
political and cultural engagement that is both celebrated and critiqued
in equal measure. Sporting events are visible spectacles that serve to
symbolise, reflect and celebrate the social and cultural values and beliefs
of nations, regions and localities. Sport also retains the potential to
shape the lives of individuals and communities, by acting as an impor-
tant vehicle through which health and well-being, education, societal
equality, social capital, sustainability and peace may be promoted and
actioned. States, sporting organisations, commercial businesses and not-
for-profit organisations frequently champion the transformative poten-
tial of sporting events, activities and facilities, while governments
commit significant public resource to sporting infrastructures because
of the perceived benefits sport can bring to society. A labour-intensive
growth industry, sport also represents a significant component of the
global economy. Within the European Union, sport contributes
€294.36 billion or 2.98 per cent to the region’s gross value added; a

© The Author(s) 2017 137

J. Banks, Gambling, Crime and Society,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57994-2_5
138 Gambling, Crime and Society

figure comparable to the EU’s agriculture, forestry and fishing

industries combined (SportEconAustria et al., 2012). A core com-
ponent of leisure, tourism and media industries, vast swathes of
society spend considerable time and money consuming and partici-
pating in sporting activities. Sport is thus a social and commercial
powerhouse as well as a beacon of hope, resilience and reinvention
for many.
Yet sport is also frequently associated with a variety of social ills,
including crime, violence, social inequality, the exploitation of
migrant labour, economic and social disadvantage, and poverty
(Jarvie, 2012). For example, football continues to be dogged by
cases of racism and corruption. Across many of Europe’s top lea-
gues, racist incidents involving players, officials and supporters make
news headlines with unnerving regularity. Disconcertingly, levels of
racism appear to be particularly rife in Russia, where the 2018
World Cup will be hosted, with a 2014 report issued by the Fare
Network and Sova Center documenting over 200 cases of discrimi-
natory behaviour at Russian football matches during the past two
seasons. While the Federation Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA) claim to have increased their anti-discrimination efforts
throughout the World Cup qualifiers, the organisation itself remains
embroiled in a bribery and corruption scandal relating to the selec-
tion of World Cup host countries and the restriction of broadcasting
rights to specific providers. In May 2015, a 47-count indictment
was unsealed by a federal court in Brooklyn, USA, charging 14
defendants with a host of offences, including racketeering, wire
fraud and money laundering through which they sought to enrich
themselves through the corruption of international football (United
States Department of Justice, 2015). Ongoing investigations have
led to the arrest of numerous leading FIFA officials, with 16 more
defendants charged in December with offences relating to ‘rampant,
systemic, and deep-rooted’ corruption (BBC Sport, 2015). Concerns
have also been raised regarding the working and housing conditions
of the estimated 1.5 million migrant workers involved in building
facilities in preparation for the 2022 World Cup in Qatar. Amnesty
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 139

International (2015), who continue to monitor conditions in the

lead up to the event, recently published a report condemning the
ongoing exploitation of the migrant worker population, with work-
ing conditions described as ‘oppressive’ and ‘pathetic’ (BBC News,
2015a).
Such harms extend far beyond the sport of football, with incidents
of violence, bullying, doping and cheating undermining a host of
other sporting activities. In 2015, world athletics governing body,
the International Association of Athletics Federations, suspended
Russia from all track and field events following the identification
of a state-sponsored doping programme that included swapping
positive doping samples for clean ones. Elsewhere, the American
National Football League has been plagued by a series of on- and
off-field controversies. In 2014, a video surfaced showing former
Baltimore Ravens running back Raymell Mourice Rice violently
assaulting his then fiancé Janay Palmer in an Atlantic City elevator
before dragging her unconscious body out of the door. In the same
year, Miami Dolphins guard Richard Dominick Incognito Jr. was
suspended indefinitely following an investigation which found that
he had verbally abused fellow player Jonathan Martin with racial
slurs and sexual taunts over two seasons. Martin eventually left the
team at the start of the 2013 season, as a consequence of the severe
psychological pressure exerted on him by Incognito. Cases of cheat-
ing have also served to further undermine the integrity of this sport.
The ‘Deflategate’ or ‘Ballghazi’ scandal of 2014, eventually led to the
suspension of New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady for his
part in his team’s tampering of match balls in order to gain an unfair
advantage. Similarly, New Orleans Saints ‘Bountygate’ scandal
revealed that between 2009 and 2011 the team operated a bounty
pool for ‘big hits’ on opponents, with players rewarded US$1,000
for ‘cart-offs’ and US$400 for ‘whacks’.
World sport continues to face an array of social issues and pro-
blems which undermine its integrity. Most recently, society and, in
turn, scholars have focused their critical lens’ on the convergence of
gambling and sport, expressing concern as to the potential harms
140 Gambling, Crime and Society

wrought by their association. This chapter examines the growing

interdependence of gambling and sport and the criminological chal-
lenges that have emerged from this relationship. Specifically, the
chapter explores how the increased availability of betting on sporting
events can undermine the integrity of sport. It gives consideration to
the prevalence, motivations and organisational dynamics of betting-
related match-fixing, before assessing the mechanisms through which
national and international bodies seek to detect, prevent and prose-
cute such forms of corruption. The chapter demonstrates how
match-fixing and the manipulation of sporting events are universal
deviancies, impacting a range of sporting disciplines across all regions
of the world. It illustrates how changes to the structural features of
contemporary betting have increased the potential for the corruption
of sporting events by criminal elements seeking to profit from
irregular betting on sports markets. In response, a host of law
enforcement agencies, sporting organisations, gambling industry
bodies and betting operators have been involved in the formulation
and implementation of a wide array of initiatives targeted at identi-
fying and preventing match-fixing.

Gambling and Sport

Gambling has a long-standing relationship with a variety of different
sports. Indeed, in some countries, certain sports are sustained only
because of their ‘attractiveness as media for betting’ (Forrest and
Simmons, 2003, p. 598), while other sporting activities derive signifi-
cant benefits from their close association with gambling. Most notably,
horse racing is synonymous with betting. In the UK, horse racing
established itself in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as an
activity through which all social classes could succour their desires to
gamble on sport (Munting, 1996). The popularity of gambling on races
saw betting become ‘the manure to which the enormous crop of horse-
racing and race-horse breeding in this and other countries is to a large
extent due’ (Black, 1893, p. 349). Today, racing is funded, in part, by a
levy raised on betting turnover of bookmakers and the successor
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 141

company to the Tote,1 which is distributed by the Horserace Betting

Levy Board2 (HBLB). The HBLB applies levy funds to a wide range of
schemes in direct support of horse racing, including race prize money,
race day services on racecourses, integrity services, industry training and
education, and veterinary science and education. With an estimated yield
of £60.1 million generated annually through the levy (HBLB, 2015),
betting occupies ‘a central position in relation to the funding of racing’
(Cassidy, 2002, p. 67). Similar levies exist els.ewhere, with Australia,
France, Ireland and New Zealand, for example, imposing levies on horse
and dog racing, as well as some other sports. Yet the sustainability of
horse racing as a betting product has recently been called into question
(Thomas, 2014). Young gamblers’ preference for betting on other sports,
most notably football, has led to a decline in off-course betting activity.
Whilst the demise of the horse racing industry may well be overstated, a
marked increase in the cost of media rights, alongside declining turnover,
has reduced the profitability of horse racing for betting shops.
One sport’s loss is another sport’s gain. The proliferation of interest in
football as a medium for betting has been harnessed by both gambling and
football industries. Whilst team sports do not typically need the betting
industry in order to survive, many have come to recognise the financial
benefits such an alliance can bring. Copyright and database rights repre-
sent a means through which the sports sector has sought to derive
revenues, with fixture lists, and club and player names warranting a
financial return for their commercial use by betting operators in the
creation of markets and determination of odds (European Gaming and
Betting Association, 2015). However, this has not always been the case. In
1936, the Football Association tried, without success, to prevent the Pools
company and bookmakers from printing coupons of the weekend’s games
by withholding the fixtures from them (Holt, 1989). Despite its best

1
The Tote, formerly the Horserace Totalisator Board, is known for its pool bets such as the
Scoop6, and is the only organisation in the UK which is allowed to run pool betting on
horseracing. Established in 1928 following the introduction of the Racecourse Betting Act, the
Tote was owned by the UK government until it was sold to Betfred in July 2011.
2
The Horserace Betting Levy Board is a UK statutory body of the Department for Culture, Media
and Sport. Established by the Betting Levy Act 1961, the HBLB operates in accordance with the
provisions of the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 (as amended).
142 Gambling, Crime and Society

efforts not to be associated with gambling, attempts to suppress fixtures

proved unpopular with supporters and the Football Association was left
with little choice but to alter its position and agree to provide fixture lists
in return for a proportion of football pools turnover (Forrest and
Simmons, 2003). Today, database rights are fiercely contested, with little
agreement among the sports sector, betting operators and legal profes-
sionals as to whether or not fixtures lists, sporting schedules and other
forms of data qualify for protection under intellectual property law.
DataCO, a company owned by the Premier and Football League, collect
fees from newspapers and magazines, broadcasters, websites and book-
makers for the publication of fixtures and other forms of match data. And
whilst the English Court of Appeal has ruled that fixture lists should be
protected by the sui generis right that was introduced in the EU Database
Directive of 1996, this is at odds with European Court of Justice which
has ruled against copyright protection for fixture lists and sports event
schedules under the directive.
Despite such conflict, the relationship between gambling and sport is
one characterised by ongoing growth in mutually beneficial commercial
ventures. In particular, sporting clubs and associations have developed a
symbiotic relationship, ‘as costs associated with sports increase and fans
represent an ideal market for . . . gambling’ (Gainsbury and Blaszczynski,
2012, cited in Parliament of Australia, 2012, p. 253). No better is this
exemplified than within football where league associations and their clubs
have sought to maximise sponsorship and commercial revenues through
partnerships with gambling operators. The 2015/16 season of the English
Premier League saw 18 of the 20 competing teams secure such deals. AFC
Bournmouth (Mansion.com), Crystal Palace (Mansion.com), Stoke City
(bet365), Sunderland Athletic (Dafabet), Watford (138.com), West
Bromwich Albion (TLCBET) and West Ham United (Betway) displayed
online gambling companies on their shirts, in deals totalling in excess of
£22million3 (Miller, 2015). The value of shirt sponsorship for clubs can

3
AFC Bournmouth/Mansion, £750,000; Crystal Palace/Mansion, £5 million; Stoke City/
Bet365, £3 million; Sunderland Athletic/Dafabet, £5 million; Watford/138.com, £1.4 million;
West Bromwich Albion/TLC Bet, £1.2 million; West Ham United/Betway, £6 million (Miller
2015).
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 143

be significant, representing between 2 and 10 per cent of their annual

revenue (Miller, 2010). A further 12 teams4 hold secondary tier partner-
ship and sponsorship deals with betting operators, including Betfair,
BetVictor, Bodog, Bwin, Coral, Marathonbet and William Hill, whilst
lower division English football league clubs have developed lucrative shirt
and partnership deals with the likes of Dafabet (Blackburn Rovers),
Matchbook.com (Brentford), Smarkets (Queens Park Rangers) and
12Bet (Wigan Athletic). Such partnerships may be considered unsurpris-
ing, as financial fair play rules require clubs to maximise their sponsorship
whilst traditional forms of revenue dry up (Gibson, 2013).
In addition, football league associations have also sought to increase their
revenues through sponsorship and partnerships deal with gambling com-
panies. In 2012, William Hill signed a deal with the Football Association to
become the ‘official betting partner’ of the England team, followed by FA
Cup in 2014. The English Football League sealed a multi-year £30 million
deal with Sky Bet for the title rights of the Championship, League 1 and
League 2 divisions from the 2013/14 season (Rumsby, 2013), whilst
Ladbrokes became the title sponsor of Scotland’s four professional football
leagues for 2 years from the 2015/16 season. In a deal reported to be worth
in the region of £4 million, Scotland’s football leagues have been renamed
the Ladbrokes Premiership, Ladbrokes Championship, Ladbrokes League
1 and Ladbrokes League 2 (BBC News, 2015b).
Thus, betting marketing strategies are no longer restricted to the mar-
gins of society. Instead, the contemporary sporting experience is charac-
terised by ‘dynamic sports betting advertising filling spaces that would
traditionally have been free of gambling advertising’ (Thomas, 2012).
Billboard, old media, direct mail, website, email and in-stadia advertising,
community sponsorship programmes, sporting endorsements, and brand
ambassadors all feature as part of a portfolio of direct and indirect market-
ing techniques that seek to both attract new customers and retain existing
ones. Thomas et al.’s (2012, p. 150) census of sports betting marketing
during Australian football league matches identified that ‘there was rarely a

4
Arsenal, Aston Villa, Chelsea, Everton, Leicester City, Liverpool, Manchester United, Newcastle
United, Norwich City, Southampton, Swansea City, Tottenham Hotspur
144 Gambling, Crime and Society

time during the match when audiences were not exposed to some form of
marketing for sports betting’. The proliferation of stadium advertising has
occurred in many jurisdictions across the globe, with wagering venues,
billboards and static and dynamic signage, scoreboard advertising, big
screen commercials, shirt and team sponsorship, and integrated advertising
becoming the norm. Complimenting and enhancing television commer-
cials, in-stadia advertising of gambling has begun to structure the sporting
experience for many. In New Zealand, gambling has overtaken alcohol and
fast food as the most common sponsor of junior, community and national
sports, as the industry seeks to align itself with ‘healthy’ and popular
consumer leisure activities (Maher et al., 2006).
Across Europe, an array of regulatory frameworks govern the adver-
tising of gambling products and services. Often divergent in nature,
some states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, prohibit
all forms of gambling advertising (Van Rompuy, 2014), whilst in other
countries, such as Ireland and Luxembourg, outdated gambling legisla-
tion means that no rules on gambling advertising exist. However, most
states allow the promotion of authorised gambling products and services.
For example, France, Spain, Italy and Denmark all allow for in-game
promotion and the integration of gambling into the commentary and
coverage of sporting events, albeit with some restrictions. In the UK, the
government’s liberal approach to gambling has resulted in £138.7 mil-
lion being spent on television advertising in 2013 by the major high
street chains, including Coral, Ladbrokes, Paddy Power and William
Hill, while online giants Bet365 and Betfair appear in most commercial
breaks that accompany televised sporting events. Consequently, consu-
mers are now bombarded with gambling advertisements, which have
increased ‘from 152,000 in 2006 to 537,000 in 2008 after the market
was liberalised, reaching 1.39 million in 2012’ (Ofcom, 2013). This
represents a 600 per cent increase since 2006 (Ibid.). Despite represent-
ing just 6.6 per cent of the total number of gambling advertisements on
television, sports betting has shown even greater growth, rising from
3,000 spots in 2006 to approximately 91,000 spots in 2012 (Ibid.). This
represents a growth of 3,000 per cent since 2006 and nearly 2,000 per
cent since the introduction of the Gambling Act 2005, which liberalised
the UK’s advertising regulations. Significant investments have also been
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 145

made in other countries. In Italy, the gambling industry spent in region

of €38 million on television advertising in 2010, accounting for 55 per
cent of total advertising spending for the year, whilst in Sweden gam-
bling companies’ expenditure on marketing quadrupled between 1995
and 2006 (Binde, 2007). Similarly, Canada has witnessed a steady
growth in the marketing and promotional budgets of gambling compa-
nies, with the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation spending in
excess of CAD$570 million per annum, a figure which continues to
grow year on year (Williams et al., 2007).
The cosiness between professional sport and gambling has been sub-
ject to intense criticism by its opponents who claim that it has had a
detrimental impact on public health. Critics argue that the endorsement
of gambling by sports associations, clubs and personalities increases the
potential for a range of social harms to occur. This includes problem
gambling, underage gambling, gambling-related crime and significant
financial loss. In particular, the association of gambling with sport and
sporting celebrities can act to normalise the activity, influencing both
uptake and consumption. Most problematically, it has been identified
that young people receive and decode advertisements to gamble, leading
them to start betting at an earlier age (Korn et al., 2005; Derevensky
et al., 2007, 2010; Monaghan et al., 2008). Evidence also indicates that
other ‘vulnerable’ social groups, including problem gamblers, are more
susceptible to messages to gamble (Grant and Kim, 2001; Griffiths and
Wood, 2001). Further concerns have been raised that the close ties
between gambling and sport has impacted upon the integrity of a large
number of sporting disciplines. In particular, there is a growing societal
perception that the availability of new forms of betting has heightened
opportunities for match-fixing.

The Fix We’re In

The increased availability of betting products and services has given rise
to much debate regarding its impact on the integrity of sport. In
particular, there is ongoing concern that new betting products have
presented significant opportunities for criminal entrepreneurs to collude
146 Gambling, Crime and Society

with corrupt sportspeople to fix sporting events for financial gain.

However, it is important to recognise that the fixing of a sporting
event is not necessarily related to betting. Instead, sports may be fixed
for future team advantage, for example progressing in a tournament,
winning a title, achieving promotion or avoiding relegation, etc. (Banks,
2014). Recognising this, a number of studies (Gorse and Chadwick,
2010, 2011; KEA European Affairs, 2012) have adopted broad defini-
tions of the manipulation of sporting events that encompass both bet-
ting and non-betting-related corruption in sport, as well as doping and
corruption in relation to the governance of sport. For example, Gorse
and Chadwick suggest that: ‘Corruption in sport involves any illegal,
immoral or unethical activity that attempts to deliberately distort the
result of a sporting contest for the personal material gain of one or more
parties involved in that activity’. Narrower in focus, Maennig’s (2005,
p. 189) definition of corruption can be applied to both betting and non-
betting-related match-fixing:

[I]n sport, corruption may take the form of behaviour by athletes who
refrain from achieving the level of performance normally required in the
sport in question to win the competition and instead intentionally permit
others to win, or behaviour by sporting officials who consciously perform
their allocated tasks in a manner at variance with the objectives and moral
values of the relevant club, association, competitive sports in general and/
or society at large.

By contrast – and in line with broader public perceptions – other studies

have stressed match-fixing’s association with irregular betting5:

[A]ny manipulation or attempted manipulation of a result or aspect of

a game with the aim of enrichment on the sports betting market. In
fact, the action of corrupting a sportsperson is only relevant if it is
carried out in parallel with the placement of sums of money in the

5
The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (2013: 18) defines irregular betting as ‘all types
of betting based on match-fixing’.
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 147

form of bets in licensed betting outlets, or more specifically on online

betting sites. (IRIS, 2012, p. 6)

The manipulation of sporting events is a global problem, impacting a

range of sporting disciplines. In the twenty-first century, football,
cricket, tennis, basketball, horse racing, ice hockey, snooker, rugby and
sumo wrestling have all been blighted by incidents of betting-related
match-fixing. Most notably: ‘The sports disciplines most affected by the
manipulation of results are paradoxically those that are best equipped to
detect and fight against this scourge’ (University Paris 1 Panthéon-
Sorbonne and International Centre for Sport Security, 2014, p. 7).
Football has, in particular, become victim to a significant number of
betting-related fixes in recent decades, which have been subject to wide-
spread media coverage and raised significant public concern. In 2014,
the Head of Interpol, John Abbott, noted that between 60 and 80
countries had reported suspected incidents of match-fixing for each of
the last 3 years (Collett, 2014). Subsequently, the issue has risen up the
sporting agenda of international organisations, national associations,
governments and other sporting bodies.
Recent cases of betting-related match-fixing in football have occurred
in Australia, Italy and the United Kingdom, with players, referees, team
managers, club executives and agents identified as being involved in the
manipulation of sporting events for financial gain. In Italy, in 2011,
Operation: Last Bet, a joint investigation by prosecutors in two Italian
cities, Cremona and Bari, identified a number of fixes across Serie B,
Lega Pro Prima Divisione and Lega Pro Seconda Divisione games. The
Scommessopoli match-fixing and betting scandal, as it became known,
has seen a number of players and ex-players, including retired Italian
internationals Giuseppi Signori and Cristiano Doni and former
Fiorentina midfielder Mauro Bressan, receive football bans ranging
from 1 to 5 years.
More recently, both Australia’s A League and the UK’s Football
League have become embroiled in betting-related scandals. In 2013,
Reiss Noel and Joe Woolley, who played for the Southern Stars in the
Victorian Premier League, pleaded guilty to conduct that corrupts a
betting outcome at Melbourne Magistrates Court (BBC Sport, 2013).
148 Gambling, Crime and Society

Along with co-conspirators, players David Obaze, Nicholas McKoy and

coach Zia Younan, the pair sought to fix the results of four games in
which the team conceded 13 goals without scoring. In an unsophisti-
cated yet international multi-million dollar operation, the players
manipulated the results of games according to instructions delivered
over the phone to facilitator Segaran ‘Gerry’ Subramaniam and ‘yelled’
to them from the sidelines.
The UK’s media have also been active in uncovering attempts to fix
matches. Following two separate investigations by the Sun and the
Daily Telegraph newspapers, as well as information supplied by anti-
match-fixing organisation FederBet, a number of individuals were
arrested by the National Crime Agency (NCA) on suspicion of fixing
English Association Football matches. On 17 June 2014, Singaporean
businessmen Krishna Sanjey Ganeshan and Chann Sankaran, along-
side footballer Michael Boateng, were found guilty of conspiracy to
commit bribery by Birmingham Crown Court. In a second trail, also in
Birmingham, former Premiership footballer turned football agent
Delroy Facey and footballer Moses Swaibu were found guilty of con-
spiring to bribe players and sentenced to 2 years and 6 months and
16 months, respectively.
The complex economic dimensions of transnational match-fixing are
best demonstrated by the infamous Bochum case of 2009. During an
extensive police investigation, 323 suspicious matches were detected
across Germany, Switzerland and Turkey, with 347 suspects identified
throughout a host of European countries, including Austria, Belgium,
Croatia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Turkey (KEA
European Affairs, 2012). An estimated €12 million was paid to players,
coaches, referees and sports federation officials, in order to facilitate the
manipulation of matches, with relevant bank accounts and financial
transactions identified in Germany, Malaysia, China, Isle of Man,
Singapore, Russia, Austria, the Netherlands, Malta and Slovenia
(Lücke, 2011; Council of Europe, 2012). Investigations led to the jailing
of Croatian Ante Sapina in 2011 for 5 years and 6 months on football
corruption charges, after he confessed to fixing in the region of 20
matches between 2008 and 2009. Sapina masterminded a sophisticated
transnational network of criminal entrepreneurs engaged in fixing largely
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 149

lower league matches outside of Germany. Betting ‘in-play’ the group

sought to profit by fixing events – such as the number of goals in a
match – rather than the final outcome of a game. Corrupt games
included a World Cup Qualifier between Liechtenstein and Finland in
2009 wherein Sapina paid a Bosnian referee €40,000 to fix the result by
ensuring that two goals would be scored in the second half (Abbot and
Sheehan, 2013). The game finished 1–1 with both teams scoring in the
second half, one goal via an extremely dubious penalty awarded to
Finland. Sapina had previously been jailed for 3 years in 2005 for paying
Bundesliga referee Robert Hoyzer to fix matches in 2003 and 2004 by
‘inventing penalties’ (Brooks et al., 2013). Hoyzer was sentenced to a
prison term of 2 years and 5 months for his part in an operation that is
said to have earned Ante Sapina, along with his brothers Milan and
Filip, in excess of €2 million. To date, German courts have sentenced 14
individuals to a total of 39 years imprisonment, while guilty parties have
also been convicted in Austria, Finland, Hungary and Slovenia. Other
criminal proceedings are still pending.
A host of other sports have experienced recent incidents of match-
fixing. In 2000, Delhi police arrested and charged South African captain
Wessel Johannes ‘Hansie’ Cronje with fixing a One-Day International
Series against India by underperforming. Three other South African
cricketers, Nicky Boje, Herschel Gibbs and Pieter Strydom, were also
implicated. Delhi police uncovered a recording between Cronje and
London-based bookmaker Sanjay Chawla, a representative of an
Indian betting syndicate, in which Cronje revealed information regard-
ing the team selection. Cronje admitted receiving payment of between
US$10,000–15,000 for ‘forecasting’ results. In a statement to the King
Commission of Inquiry into alleged cricket match-fixing, Cronje
admitted receiving US$30,000 to persuade South African players to
lose wickets in 1996 during the third test of his team’s tour of India.
Cronje also stated that he had conveyed an offer of US$250,000 dollars
to lose a one-dayer, during a team meeting in Mumbai in 1996. By
making a full disclosure regarding his role in match-fixing, Cronje
admitted to receiving in excess of US$100,000 in bribes from gamblers
since 1995 and despite receiving immunity from criminal prosecution in
South Africa, on the 11 October 2000 the United Cricket Board of
150 Gambling, Crime and Society

South Africa banned Cronje from playing or coaching cricket for life.
On the 22 July 2013, more than 13 years after the Indian police
investigation began, Delhi Police finally filed a First Information
Report relating to the match-fixing case of 2000 naming the now
deceased Cronje.6
More recently, in 2010, the Pakistan cricket team’s captain, Salman
Butt, alongside fellow players Mohammid Asif and Mohamad Amir, was
charged with conspiracy relating to spot fixing under the UK’s
Prevention of Corruption Act 1907, Criminal Law Act 1977 and
Gambling Act 2005 (Qureshi and Verma, 2013). The investigation by
Scotland Yard followed the release of video footage and text messages by
undercover reporters for the News of the World newspaper which impli-
cated the players and Indian businessman Mazher Mahmood in arran-
ging to bowl a ‘no ball’ or ‘wide’ delivery at specific points in an over in
the Lords test between England and Pakistan in 2010. This information
was used by gamblers to profit through betting on a range of different
markets relating to the match. In sentencing the defendants at
Southwark Crown Court, Mr Justice Cook was explicit about the
dangers posed to sport:

It is the insidious effect of your actions on professional cricket and

the followers of it which make the offences so serious. The image and
integrity of what was once a game, but is now a business is damaged
in the eyes of all, including the many youngsters who regarded [the]
three of you as heroes and would have given their teeth to play at the
levels and with the skill that you had. You procured the bowling of 3
no balls for money, to the detriment of your national cricket team,
with the object of enabling others to cheat at gambling. (The
Telegraph, 2011)

Mazhar Majeed was sentenced to 2 years and 8 months imprisonment,

Salman Butt to 2 years and 6 months, Mohammad Asif to 1 year, and
Mohamad Amir to 6 months.

6
Cronje was killed in a plane crash in South Africa’s Western Cape province in 2002.
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 151

Snooker has also become embroiled in betting-related match-fixing,

with Premier League player Stephen Lee arrested in 2010, following
suspicious betting patterns in the UK championship in 2009. Although
the World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association (WPBSA)
would later confirm that the Crown Prosecution would not be taking
further action over the claims, Lee was eventually charged by the WPBSA
for breaching sections 2.8 and 2.9 of the Members Rules and Regulations
relating to three matches at the 2008 Malta Cup, two matches at the
2008 UK Championship, one match at the 2009 China Open and one
match at the 2009 World Snooker Championship. At an independent
tribunal chaired by Adam Lewis QC, Lee was found guilty of seven
counts of providing information not publicly available with the intention
that it be used by the other person for or in relation to betting, and
entering into an agreement to influence the outcome or conduct of a
game or frame. Lee was banned from the sport for 12 years.
Corrupt practices have also infiltrated a range of other sports, including
horse racing, tennis and sumo wrestling. In December 2011, 11 indivi-
duals, including jockeys Paul Doe, Kirsty Milczarek, Greg Fairley and
Jimmy Quinn, were found guilty by the British Horseracing Authority of
breaching rules by conspiring to not ride a horse to its merits for personal
reward or knowing that it had been laid at a betting exchange to lose (BBC
Sport, 2011a, 2011b; Jackson, 2011). The four jockeys, who were paid
£5,000 for each ‘fixed’ race by criminal associates, received bans totalling
26 years, whilst former owners Maurice Sines and James Crickmore were
found guilty of operating a network of jockeys and punters to lay their
horses and ‘warned off from the sport for 14 years’ (Jackson, 2011). In the
same year, the Japan Sumo Association cancelled the 2011 grand tourna-
ment as a result of a National Police Agency investigation that uncovered
telephone text messages that indicated that wrestlers or stablemasters were
fixing matches. A total of 23 athletes were found guilty of match-fixing and
expelled from the association, in a scandal that the Japanese Prime Minister
described as a ‘betrayal of the people’ (BBC News, 2011). Similarly, the
Tennis Integrity Unit has banned a number of players and officials from
the sport following investigations and disciplinary hearings to establish
whether or not they had committed corruption offences. Australian Daniel
Koellerer was banned from the sport for life and fined US$100,000 after
152 Gambling, Crime and Society

being found guilty of betting-related match-fixing. More recently, a num-

ber of other players, including Russian Andrey Kumatsov, Dutch national
Yannick Ebbinghaus and Polish countrymen Piotr Gadomski and
Arkadiusz Kocyla, as well as French tennis official Morgan Lamri, have
been banned or suspended for breaking betting rules and manipulating
sporting events. Claims that match-fixing in tennis is widespread have been
fuelled by recent claims by the BBC (BBC News, 2016) that secret files
show that, over the last decade, 16 players who have ranked in the top 50
have been repeatedly flagged to the Tennis Integrity Unit (TIU) over
suspicions they deliberately lost matches.
Collectively, such cases indicate that match-fixing is a ‘universal
deviancy’ (Hill, 2014, p. 10) effecting most sports and most regions of
the world. As the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and International
Centre for Sport Security (2014, p. 7) recognise:

A review of the documented and relayed cases of the manipulation of sports

competitions leads to an indisputable conclusion: these abuses currently
concern all States and all regions of the world, blight some sport disciplines
and threaten competitions presenting low stakes (in sports, and economic-
ally) as well as those of an international character. Cases of corruption
involve athletes as well as their professional entourage, clubs, “official”
stakeholders of sports organisations and even referees. Regardless of the
perspective used to analyse these cases, the manipulation of sports compe-
titions comes out as a global phenomenon in every sense of the term.

Given its clandestine nature, the magnitude of match-fixing in sport is

extremely difficult to estimate. Despite there being some confusion
around suspected and proven cases of corruption, a number of different
studies have sought to calculate or estimate the incidence of match-fixing
in sport. Early studies by Maennig (2005) and Forrest et al. (2008)
identified 22 and 26 suspected or attempted cases of betting-related
match-fixing dating back to the year 2000. Both Gorse and Chadwick
(2011) and Kalb and Boltony (2011) provide a list of cases of betting
and non-betting-related match-fixing over a 10-year period between
2000 and 2010. They identified 57 and 64 incidents, respectively.
Gorse and Chadwick’s (2011) study for the Remote Gambling
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 153

Association analysed a database of 2,089 cases of corruption in interna-

tional sports and recorded that only 2.73 per cent of cases collated
represented incidents of match-fixing, with 1.63 per cent identified as
cases where inside information had been used for the purpose of betting.
Their findings indicate that doping is far more prevalent than match-
fixing, with proven cases of doping 60 times more likely to occur than
the betting-related manipulation of sporting events. However, these
findings ‘must be read with caution’, as the formation of the World
Anti-Doping Agency in 1999 has led to the extensive monitoring of
athletes (KEA European Affairs, 2012, p. 12). Furthermore, the study
does not record the potentially significant number of undetected or
unrecorded incidents of betting and non-betting-related manipulation
of sporting events. Thus, as Maennig (2005, p. 203) notes:

[I]t must also be assumed that the known cases merely represent the tip of
the iceberg. In industrialised countries such as Germany, 5% at most of
corruption cases are brought to light (Bannenberg and Schaupensteiner,
2004). This figure, which is specific to corruption, corresponds well with
the estimation that the level of undiscovered cases of crimes in the
economy as a whole can (implicitly) be as high as 96% in some
areas . . . Assuming that the levels of undiscovered cases prevalent inter-
nationally and in sport are comparable, this would imply that the actual
extent of corruption in sport is greater than reported . . .

A number of other organisations operate early warning systems that

monitor online and offline sports betting across a number of different
gambling sites, alerting sports federations and law enforcement agencies
of suspicious betting activities. The European Sports Security Association
(ESSA), which was founded in 2005, has seen a steady rise in alerts from
45 incidents of irregular betting in 2009 rising to 58 in 2010, 61 in 2011,
109 in 2012 and 148 in 2012 (ESSA, 2012, 2013, 2014; KEA European
Affairs, 2012). Nevertheless, few of these alerts translate into suspicious
betting activity that warrants referral to the relevant sporting and
regulatory authorities. In 2009, only one incident was confirmed as
suspicious, 4 in 2010, 8 in 2011, 6 in 2012 and 30 in 2013. These
numbers, although increasingly slightly, continue to remain small. Any
154 Gambling, Crime and Society

increase could well be a consequence of greater monitoring as opposed

to a rise in the number of irregular and suspicious betting activities, but
given that ESSA’s screening systems extend to an integrity network of
just 19 regulated betting operators and a small percentage of all sport-
ing events it is unlikely to identify a significant percentage of all fixed
matches.
As part of a broader ‘environmental scan’ that sought to ascertain
the existing and potential future threats to – and vulnerabilities of –
professional football, Interpol (2013) sought to assess the scale of match-
fixing globally. They found that in a 12-month period between the 1 June
2012 and the 31 May 2013, global media reported on allegations, inves-
tigations or imposed penalties for match-fixing or illegal betting related to
match-fixing in football in over 70 countries across six continents (Ibid.).
This is, however, certainly a conservative estimate, as a consequence of
significant limitations in the data set:

Due to the confidential nature of data obtained through the course of law
enforcement investigations, the environmental scan contained in this
report was compiled using open source information reported in the
media to identify the size and scope of match-fixing. As such, it was not
possible to determine definitively the total number of match-fixing cases,
people arrested, or the exact amount of money spent on football betting
annually. (Ibid: 9)

In Europe, Europol (2013) identified 380 individual attempts to fix

professional football matches, including Champions League and World
Cup fixtures, across 13 different countries. Involving match officials,
club personnel and administrators, as well as players and serious crim-
inals from at least 15 different countries throughout Europe, fixers are
alleged to have generated profits of €8 million through payments of €2
million and the wagering of €16 million across legal and illegal betting
markets. Europol recorded a further 300 suspicious matches that took
place in Africa, Asia, Central and South America. Speaking in January
2013, FIFA Director of Security Ralf Mutschke estimated that a further
‘50 national leagues outside of Europe are being targeted by organized
crime figures in the betting market’.
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 155

Available evidence indicates that match-fixing is an ongoing problem

that impacts a wide range of sporting activities across the globe.
Attempts to quantify incidents of match-fixing lack precision and
there is little evidence that the manipulation of sporting events is on
the increase (Maennig, 2005). However, some academics (Forrest et al.,
2008; University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and International Centre
for Sport Security, 2014) suggest that changes to the structural features
of betting in contemporary societies have heightened the threat posed by
gambling to the integrity of sport. Most notably, the growth in Internet
gambling has increased both the opportunities for, and the likelihood of,
the manipulation of sporting events.

Increased Opportunities for Match-Fixing

Forrest et al. (2008) suggest that greater liquidity in sports markets,
coupled with the globalisation of gambling, the advent of betting
exchanges, lower transaction costs, availability of in-play wagering
and proposition betting, cumulatively present increased opportunities
for match-fixing. Since the first Internet gambling site began taking
wagers in 1996, online sports betting has grown exponentially.
Today, sports betting markets are ‘highly liquid’ (Ibid: 158), account-
ing for nearly half of an online gambling market worth an estimated
US$23.7 billion (Stocks, 2015). Greater liquidity increases a fixer’s
potential profits whilst diminishing their likelihood of detection.
Highly liquid sporting events also enable the fixer to transact greater
amounts of money without lowering the price. Moreover, as signifi-
cant amounts of money can be wagered, with little effect on market
odds or the aggregate volume of bets, then the likelihood of discovery
is reduced significantly.
The chances of detection are diminished further by the globalisation
of the marketplace, primarily as a consequence of Internet betting, as
well as the large amounts of illegal betting, particularly in Asia, and
interferences between legal and illegal operators (Sorbonne-ICSS, 2014).
The legal complexity of Internet gambling means that a significant
number of black and grey market operators have emerged, soliciting
156 Gambling, Crime and Society

bets from citizens irrespective of an individual state’s laws. In particular,

Asia is home to a number of semi-legal and illegal sports betting opera-
tions who will not share their data with authorities (Buschmann, 2013).
According to Hill (2008):

No sophisticated fixer ever works directly in the European gambling

market. The amounts they can place with those bookmakers are too
small and regulated to make it worth their while. In the multi-billion
pound sports betting market, only 30–40 per cent is in the legal market,
the rest is in the, mostly illegal, Asian gambling markets.

This poses a problem for sporting associations, law enforcement agencies

and others charged with the protection of the integrity of sporting
competitions as:

It is very difficult to obtain reliable information about Asian book-

makers because they rarely exchange data with the sports movement.
One of the reasons for the lack of transparency stems from links to
unregulated ‘street betting’. In Asia many bets are placed between a
punter and a local agent who is, in effect, an unregulated bookmaker.
This agent then has to recycle his customers’ money in an official
circuit composed of super-agents (at the regional level) and mega-
agents (at the national level) who pool the stakes and risks. Mega-
agents usually re-invest these stakes on an official (although still illegal)
market with Asian online bookmakers. Where they are dealing with
large sums of uncertain origin, these bookmakers are unwilling to share
information about their customers with sports organisations or public
authorities. (Sportaccord, 2011, p. 41)

Reduced transaction costs also increase the profitability of bettors and

fixers by raising the rate of return. In order to compete in a global
marketplace, many operators have reduced their profit margins by
improving their odds and cutting commission on wagers. Moreover,
high payout rates by Asian gambling sites and other operators located in
offshore jurisdictions that do not tax stakes increases the profitability of
fixes. Offshore sites and countries that seek to attract operators through
low taxation and weak monitoring present further challenges to those
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 157

seeking to identify irregular betting. The ‘“race to the bottom” or

regulatory laxity’ (Zborowska et al., 2012, p. 86) that has occurred in
a number of small Caribbean, Pacific and Mediterranean islands further
weakens authorities’ monitoring capabilities. With little regulation, cer-
tification or legal oversight, many gambling operations that are based in
‘regulation light’ countries are likely to act as a haven for fixers to
transact bets.
Increases in live betting and proposition betting, in part, as a con-
sequence of the emergence of betting exchanges, have further enhanced
opportunities for fixers. Betting exchanges enable customers to place
‘lay’ bets, wagering that an outcome will not occur. Forrest et al. (2008,
p. 160) suggest that horse racing may be particularly susceptible to
corruption as a consequence of the popularity of exchanges, although
they caution that: ‘The problem appears real to the extent that a number
of conspiracies have been alleged in British racing’. The potential for the
fixing of horse racing to occur is, however, reiterated by Brown and Yang
(2015, pp. 21–22) who note that:

Incidences of horses being fixed to lose – in order that their connections

can profit from lay betting on the exchanges – are numerous. This has fed
the impression that there is a new widespread form of corruption afflicting
horse racing . . . When we examined a recent year of betting exchange data,
however, there was little sign of adverse selection in the pricing of lay bets.
Actual win probabilities closely corresponded with implied win probabil-
ities, suggesting that the examples of horses being fixed to lose are not
signs of a pervasive problem in the sport. A note of caution should
nevertheless be struck. Horse race betting is big business in the UK. In
our 1-year sample, bets with a total value exceeding 6 billion GBP were
struck. The rewards from fixing horse races are therefore great. It is also
undoubtedly true that it is operationally easier to fix a horse to lose a race,
than it is to fix a horse to win.

The monitoring of bets is further complicated by the growth in

proposition betting and live wagering. Proposition bets relate to the
occurrence or non-occurrence of an event during a game which is
not directly related to its final outcome. Most notably, cricket has
158 Gambling, Crime and Society

been highlighted as being particularly susceptible to spot fixing and

other proposition type bets:

For example it is now possible to gamble on: a set number of wides, or the
number of no-balls in a designated over and/or match; bowled or caught out
at a specific point in the innings; the total number of runs at which a batting
captain will declare and the timing of a declaration; all of these are open to
manipulation by players on the field. It is therefore of some concern that
many players are approached to ‘deliver’ or inform others of these ‘plays’ so
that vested gambling interests – individual or organised (Wilde, 2011) – can
make a profit during the playing of a match. (Brooks et al., 2013, p. 97)

Incidents of malpractice may also involve players underperforming during

the early stages of a match before seeking to win the event. However, as
strong players sometimes engage in ‘tanking’ – whereby they seek to
conserve energy by performing below their optimal level – during early
rounds of tournaments, identification of such betting-related malpractice is
likely to be difficult (Forrest et al., 2008, p. 160). Moreover, the rapid
expansion of live betting poses significant challenges for those seeking to
detect the manipulation of sporting events, as identifying irregular betting
patterns in real time is complicated by the speed with which odds move.
Nevertheless, the suggestion that live betting and proposition betting
are linked to match-fixing has been disputed by some. A recent study by
Asser Institute (2015) utilised, for the first time, quantitative empirical
evidence to examine potential links between betting-related match-fixing
cases and specific types of sports bets. The study draws upon a dataset of
suspicious football matches detected by Sportradar’s Fraud Detection
System (FDS) over a period of 5 years and representative samples of
pre-match and live football matched bets placed with sports betting
exchange Betfair. Sportradar’s FDS employs pre-delineated algorithms
to monitor betting activity on in excess of 53,000 cricket, football, futsal,
handball, rugby, snooker and tennis matches per year. Between May 2009
and November 2014, Sportradar’s FDS detected 1,625 highly suspicious
football matches worldwide that appear to have been targeted for betting-
related match-fixing. Of this figure, 88 per cent (1,435 matches) of
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 159

suspicious betting activity related to domestic football, whilst 6 per cent

(96 matches) were linked to international matches and 6 per cent (94
matches) to national team games. Pertinently, the study concluded that:
‘The claim that side bets pose significant match fixing risks lacks empirical
support’ (Asser Institute, 2015, p. 35). Moreover: ‘The claim that live
betting . . . poses a specific or greater match fixing risk in comparison to
traditional pre-match betting lacks empirical support’ (Ibid.: 35). Instead,
betting-related match-fixing is primarily related to the final result of a
match, most notably the number of goals or winning margin. However, it
should be cautioned that the Asser Institute’s conclusions were drawn
purely from an analysis of betting on football. As such, live betting and
proposition betting could well be linked to malpractice in other sports,
such as horse racing, cricket or tennis.
Ultimately, changes to the betting landscape, most notably as a
consequence of the growing popularity of Internet betting, has
presented greater opportunities for criminal entrepreneurs to profit
through the betting-related manipulation of sporting events.
Nevertheless, the likelihood of a successful fix is premised on the
fixer’s ability to navigate and negotiate their way through a series of
stages of corruption.

The Organisational Dynamics of Match-Fixing

Betting-related match-fixing is the product of one or the combination
of: corrupt sportspeople (including senior officials and administrators);
criminal elements colluding with corrupt sportspeople; or criminal ele-
ments forcing innocent sportspeople into corrupt activities (Gaming and
Association, 2015). However, the process through which a sporting
event is fixed is complex and success is not guaranteed. In one of the
very few attempts to examine the organisational dynamics of match-
fixing, Hill’s (2009, 2014) ethnographic study of the manipulation of
football matches identified five distinct and separate stages to establish-
ing a sporting fix, namely: access, set up, calling the fix, performance and
payment.
160 Gambling, Crime and Society

First, the gambling corruptor needs to access the players or at least one
influential player.7 This is likely to be challenging as the corruptor may
not have the necessary connections or access to the sports world that
facilitates ‘direct contact’. For Hill (2009, p. 419), long-term corruptors
working in domestic leagues engage in activities amounting to ‘some-
thing akin to seduction’ to establish a connection with a player. This
may, however, be problematic if corruptors wish to fix international
matches and tournaments, as differences in cultural background or
language barriers may prevent the establishment of a relationship
between the corruptor and the corruptee in a short space of time. A
second approach to accessing players is for corruptors to utilise runner-
arranged contacts. In such a scenario, the corruptor may employ agents
or ‘runners’ to secure access between themselves and the players. This
can have the added benefit of distancing the corruptor from the act of
corruption and therefore protect them from detection and prosecution.
Depending on the context in which the fix takes place, the ‘setting
up’ of a fixed game can take two principal forms. In leagues of high
corruption, corruptors employ a ‘fast bucks approach’ often directly
phoning potential corruptees and propositioning them (Ibid.). In
leagues of low corruption, corruptors need to employ more subtle
techniques of persuasion. By manufacturing ‘counterfeit intimacy’ or
building pseudo-relationships with players, corruptors are able to
propose match-fixing as a natural by-product of their relationship.
Hill documents how corruptors utilise a number of strategies to
weaken or exploit weaknesses in potential corruptees, including the
use of neutral language through which they seek to normalise acts of
match-fixing.
It is a ‘significant change in attitude, from friendliness to menace, that
drives the next stage of match-fixing’ (Ibid.: 424). This stage of the

7
Hill (2009, 2014) notes that an influential player who is charged with the responsibility of
organising a fixing network within his own team is not necessarily chosen because of his position
on the field or ‘playing capital’. Rather, it is because of his social connections with the corruptor
and his perceived corruptibility that makes him a suitable target. Nevertheless, heads of fixing
networks inside teams do typically have high playing capital, usually being a senior player with
authority and influence. Most importantly, the player will have a good idea as to which teammates
can be persuaded to fix a match.
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 161

process also presents the greatest opportunity for significant financial loss
or profit. Thus, when ‘calling the fix’, the dynamics of the corruptor and
player’s relationship changes dramatically: ‘[T]he corruptor has to make
sure that the players will follow instructions to the absolute letter.
Failure to do so ensures an enormous loss of money on the corruptor’s
part. The stage of establishing a relationship with the player is over, now
it is business’ (Ibid.). Alongside fixing the game, corruptors must also fix
the betting market by identifying odds and placing a bet or bets that will
return the greatest profit. This can prove challenging for corruptors as
they must succeed in wagering a sufficient amount of money without
detection by bookmakers or the early warning systems that monitor
sports betting markets for suspicious activity. Successful gamblers will
find that bookmakers may refuse to take their bets or may only be
willing to let them wager small amounts. In order to circumvent such
limitations, match corruptors may employ third parties, known as
‘runners’, ‘beards’ or ‘mules’, to place bets on their behalf. Corruptors
also seek to hide their bets by ensuring that the market on which they
bet is highly liquid (Ibid.). This means the placement of a large bet or
cumulatively large bet is likely to have a small impact on the movement
of odds. Alternatively, corruptors may look to ‘fix with the market’
(Ibid.: 426, emphasis in original). So, for example, if a strong team is
playing a weak team the market will expect the strong team to win. The
corruptors will therefore fix the weak team to lose by a specific number
of goals, betting on this outcome. That the game is fixed will be difficult
to identify as the result that occurs is as the market expected. Whilst
profits are likely to be smaller in such fixes, there is also a much smaller
chance of detection by authorities.
According to Hill, the final two stages of match-fixing involve per-
formance and payment. In order for a player to fix a match and achieve
the desired outcome, they must underperform. Engaging in ‘deceptive
mimicry’ (Gambetta, 2005), match-fixing players or referees must
underperform whilst simultaneously pretending to play to the best of
their ability. Thus, underperformance represents a form of passive
corruption whereby the fix is delivered by a player or match official
failing to do what they could do to the best of their abilities. Finally,
payment must be made, with the transaction remaining hidden or
162 Gambling, Crime and Society

deniable. To achieve this, Hill notes how some corruptors would pay
players with winning tickets bought from lottery winners. Nevertheless,
most payments to corrupt players in gambling fixes were ‘unsophisti-
cated cash payments’ (Ibid.). Payments typically take two forms. First,
advances or ‘coffee money’ are paid to players prior to the game and
symbolise a willingness to fix the match. The main payment is then
made after a game has been successfully fixed. This is likely to take place
in a neutral location unrelated to the player’s day-to-day activities.
At first, the challenges a fixer faces in manipulating a sporting event for
financial gain may seem overwhelming. However, through the use of
coercion and trust, a fixer can be successful in crafting a network of corrupt
players or officials and fixing a sporting contest. As Hill (2009, 2014)
demonstrates, through five distinct stages of corruption – access, set-up,
calling the fix, performance and payment – fixers have been able to corrupt
sportsmen and enrich themselves through the sports betting market.

Theorising When and Where Match Fixing

Is Most Likely to Take Place
A number of criminological theories can help us understand the motiva-
tion behind betting-related match-fixing. Evidence suggests that betting-
related match-fixing is largely economically motivated with both players
and corruptors seeking financial gain through such activities. Forrest
et al. (2008) highlight that the manipulation of sporting events is more
likely to take place when athletes are poorly paid or if their salary level is
regarded as unjust. A FIFPro study (2012) indicates that corruptors
target players whose clubs fail to pay their salary or bonuses on time.
The research found that 55 per cent of respondents who had been
approached to consider fixing a match were not paid their salary on
time, whilst 59.2 per cent of players approached were not paid their
bonuses on time. The report concludes that: ‘Players who do not receive
their salaries are very vulnerable to becoming involved in match fixing.
The longer the salary is in arrears, the greater the risk that the player will
respond to requests to participate in manipulating matches’ (Ibid.: 16).
As Merton’s (1968) strain theory indicates, athletes or officials who are
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 163

unable to achieve their financial goals through legitimate means may

innovate, with betting-related manipulation of sporting events a means
through which they can achieve their goal of wealth creation. Thus, for
some athletes ‘the risk of getting caught is outweighed by the possibility
of the riches promised by the gambler’ (Goodfellow, 2005, p. 25).
Whilst betting-related match-fixing is largely motivated by the desire
to profit through the manipulation of a sporting event it can also enable
criminal groups to launder money (Peurala, 2013). Routine activity
theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) focuses on the convergence (in time
and space) of the motivated (rational) offender, suitable or vulnerable
target and the absence of capable informal or formal guardianship,
features that are believed to pre-exist in every single crime situation.
Applied to betting-related match-fixing:

[T]he occasions for criminals have never been greater than today. Sports
betting on the Internet offers criminals various opportunities and large
sums of money are involved. When matches are manipulated in different
countries and betting takes place on the Internet, the risks for criminals
getting caught are not great. (Peurala, 2013, p. 273)

Under such a model, the size of bribe and the probability of a successful
fix are likely to be weighed against the likelihood of detection and the
penalty if caught, as well as feelings of guilt and the potential for blame by
teammates for underperformance. Such theorising points towards the
need to identify situational crime prevention measures through which to
deny or reduce the opportunity for corrupt behaviour. Law enforcement
agencies, sporting organisations, gambling industry bodies and betting
operators have been active in introducing a range of measures that seek to
reduce situations conducive to the betting-related corruption of sport.

Preventing Match-Fixing
Over the last decade, states, law enforcement agencies, sporting organi-
sations, betting operators and gambling associations have implemented a
range of legal, educative and preventative measures targeted at reducing
164 Gambling, Crime and Society

opportunities for the betting-related manipulation of sporting contests

and successfully prosecuting those found guilty of match-fixing offences.
This includes creating and enforcing new laws and codes of sports ethics,
introducing anti-match-fixing educational programmes, establishing
integrity units and integrity hotlines in specific sports and advancing
early warning systems that monitor gambling markets for irregular
betting and suspicious activities.

Legal Provisions

A host of national and international legal provisions may be exercised

in the prosecution of individuals engaged in the betting-related
manipulation of sporting events. However, as a comparative study
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013) on the applic-
ability of criminal law provisions concerning match-fixing and irregu-
lar betting across 198 countries has identified, few countries appear to
effectively address the danger of match-fixing. Instead: ‘A large num-
ber of substantial loopholes in the offences established in the legisla-
tion of many countries seriously hamper the efforts of law enforcement
agencies and judicial authorities to combat match-fixing at the
national, and even more so, at the international level.’ Both the
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime
(UNTOC), although applicable to match-fixing, suffer a number of
limitations. For example, the scope of the UNCAC does not extend to
cover betting-related match-fixing, whilst UNTOC does not protect
whistleblowers and many cases are unlikely to fall under its provisions,
despite the fact that the convention is targeted at organised and serious
criminality including match-fixing. Of the 19 jurisdictions covered by
the study, only five have introduced specific or ad hoc criminal

8
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong (Special
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China), Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and the United States of America.
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 165

offences for match-fixing. However, even in such cases, legislation is

undermined by the fact that it does not extend to all sporting compe-
titions, possible occurrences of match-fixing or perpetrators, whilst the
goal of match-fixing offences is not clearly defined.
In Europe, a European Commission report Match-fixing in Sport
(KEA European Affairs, 2012) mapped the criminal law provision on
match-fixing of 27 EU member states. The review recorded that the
‘European legal landscape is not uniform’, with states utilising or
having in place a range of laws through which incidents of match-
fixing may be prosecuted (Ibid.: 2). Specifically, four categories of
offence are used by states in the prosecution of fixers. A large number
of countries prosecute the manipulation of sporting events through
corruption or fraud provisions. Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Slovakia and Slovenia all draw upon criminal codes relating to
fraud, whilst in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France,
Luxembourg, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden match fixers can be
prosecuted under corruption charges. A further nine countries
employ a range of sport-specific offences to incidents of match-fixing.
Bulgaria, France and Spain have established specific offences on
match-fixing in their criminal codes. Elsewhere, Italy, Malta and
Portugal have introduced sports offences as part of their sports crim-
inal law, whilst Cyprus, Greece and Poland employ sports corruption
offences in their sports law. Only the UK prosecutes match-fixing as a
gambling offence under Section 42 of the Gambling Act 2005, which
covers cheating in gambling. Ultimately, ‘these provisions differ
greatly as regards the act to be criminalised as well as the scope,
objective and subjective elements of the offences or the relevant
sanctions’ (Ibid.). The significant variation in the ways in which states
respond to match-fixing is problematic, as the transnational nature of
such corruption requires coherence amongst states’ legislative provi-
sions, in order to successfully detect, evidence, apprehend and prose-
cute those involved.
In an effort to overcome such complexities and harmonise states’
responses to match-fixing, the Council of Europe has passed a
number of resolutions since 2008 inviting members to embrace a
166 Gambling, Crime and Society

range of preventative measures and policies. These resolutions cul-

minated in the adoption of the final text of the ‘Convention on the
Manipulation of Sports Competitions’ in July 2014 and its signing
by 15 States9 in September 2015. Broadly, the convention seeks to
prevent, detect and punish the manipulation of sporting events. A
principal component of this convention is the development of
national platforms that enable the effective exchange of information
and international co-operation between public authorities, sports
organisations and sports betting operators. Whilst the convention
undoubtedly represents a new milestone in efforts to combat the
manipulation of sporting events, match-fixing is ‘yet to become a
policy and judicial priority all over Europe’ or, indeed, the world
(KEA Affairs, 2012, p. 44).

Sporting Codes of Conduct

In order to reduce the risk of gambling leading to corruption, a

number of sporting bodies’ ethical codes of conduct explicitly state
that engagement in betting or activities related to betting are prohib-
ited. For example, the International Olympic Committee (2016)
(IOC) stipulates in articles 7, 9 and 10 of its code of ethics that: ‘All
forms of participation in, or support for betting related to the Olympic
Games, and all forms of promotion of betting related to the Olympic
Games are prohibited’. Moreover, betting should not ‘by any manner
whatsoever, infringe the principle of fair play, show non-sporting
conduct, or attempt to influence the course or result of a competition,
or any part thereof, in a manner contrary to sporting ethics’. Further to
this, in December 2015, the IOC Executive Board approved the
Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of
Competitions. The code tasks sporting organisations with harmonising
their regulation, in order to protect sporting competitions from the
risk of manipulation:

9
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Lithuania,
Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Switzerland.
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 167

Acknowledging the danger to sports integrity from the manipulation of

sports competitions, all sports organisations, in particular the International
Olympic Committee, all International Federations, National Olympic
Committees and their respective members at the Continental, Regional
and National level and IOC recognised organisations (hereinafter, ‘Sports
Organisations’), restate their commitment to safeguarding the integrity of
sport, including the protection of clean athletes and competitions as stated
in Olympic Agenda 2020.

Such codes are combined with a programme of awareness-raising and

intelligence systems in a concerted effort to tackle a crime that ‘is
poisoning sport in every corner of the world’ (IOC, 2016).
Numerous other international sporting organisations outlaw sports
betting among its participants. For example, article 25 of FIFA’s code of
ethics forbids athletes from directly or indirectly being associated with
betting or being actively or passively involved with betting companies,
organisations or concerns. Likewise, the International Cricket Council
(ICC) Anti-Corruption Code for Players, which was revised in
November 2014, outlines severe penalties for those engaged in corrup-
tion, betting or the misuse of inside information, with bans ranging
from a period of 6 months to a maximum of a lifetime, depending on
the nature and severity of the offence.

Integrity Units, Educational Programmes and Integrity

and Compliance Hotlines

Integrity units have been introduced across a range of sporting disci-

plines at both national and international levels, as part of a strategic
response to attempts to manipulate and corrupt events for financial gain.
Launched in 2011, Interpol’s Integrity in Sport unit is charged with
creating and executing a global sport-integrity initiative that is focused
on anti-match-fixing training and education, as well as the prevention of
match-fixing and irregular betting. In partnership with FIFA, who have
donated €20 million to fund the 10-year project, it seeks to better
prepare key actors in football to recognise, resist and report corruption
168 Gambling, Crime and Society

and match-fixing attempts.10 Similarly, independent, not-for profit

sport safeguarding organisation the International Centre for Sport
Security (ICSS) introduced its own integrity unit in 2011, in order to
support international sporting codes and preserve the integrity of sport
across the globe. In particular, the ICSS’s Integrity Response Teams
(IRT) and Integrity Protection Teams (ITP) act ‘to provide protective,
proactive and rapid reactive support to sport and government stake-
holders, across investigations, intelligence, legal, betting monitoring,
tactical and strategic operational issues’.
Sports Integrity Units (SIU) have also been established by sporting
associations, such as the ICC, the International Tennis Federation (ITF)
and World Snooker, and betting regulators, such as the UK’s Gambling
Commission. For example, the TIU was introduced after an environ-
mental review of integrity in professional tennis (Gunn and Rees, 2008)
which identified that betting-related match-fixing represented a signifi-
cant threat to the sport. Likewise, the ICC’s Anti-Corruption and
Security Unit (ACSU) was founded following a number of betting-
related incidents of match-fixing in international cricket matches.
However, both units have come under scrutiny for failing to effectively
tackle corruption in their sports. The ACSU has been criticised for its
inability to secure a significant conviction since it was established 14
years ago, despite an estimated £3.5 million being spent annually on the
unit, leading to claims it could be disbanded (Hoult, 2014). Similar
concerns continue to plague the TIU. In the wake of claims of wide-
spread fixing in international Tennis, authorities have launched an
independent review into their anti-corruption practices to ensure that
the unit is fit for purpose.
Despite such criticisms, SIUs are undoubtedly needed to identify
(potential) breaches of integrity and protect against internal and external
threats to their sport. Thus, as Lord (2013) predicts:

10
FIFA signed a contractual agreement with Interpol in 2011 to finance a €20 million 10-year
Integrity in Sport programme designed to combat match fixing as well as irregular and illegal
betting through training, education and prevention. The programme has, however, been sus-
pended by Interpol in response to an ongoing police investigation into corruption and bribery at
football’s world governing body (BBC News 2015b).
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 169

The establishment of SIUs across many other sports will increase, as the
phenomenon of sport manipulation continues to grow. It is a soft crime,
and in some jurisdictions internationally it is not a declared crime.
Transnational crime is extremely complex in nature and is expensive to
investigate. There will be an increasing requirement for individual sport-
ing organisations to establish their own sport-integrity capability as part of
their due diligence and prevention, education and training programmes.

Consequently, SIUs are likely to act as an important mechanism

through which states, law enforcement agencies and sporting orga-
nisations can work collaboratively to monitor and prevent corruption
in sport.
The introduction of integrity and compliance hotlines act as an alter-
native means through which sporting authorities seek to derive informa-
tion regarding the violation of sporting codes, suspicious approaches or
other activities related to the manipulation of sporting events. The IOC,
FIFA and UEFA operate hotlines and web pages through which athletes,
coaches, referees and the public can report match-fixing and other forms
of corruption. That reports can be made anonymously and confidentially
is stressed, with a view to encouraging the reporting of suspicious inci-
dents. Some national associations have also introduced match-fixing
hotlines. For example, the Scottish Football Association, in partnership
with independent charity Crimestoppers, introduced an anonymous
phone service as part of a campaign targeted at a broad range of illicit
activities that compromise the national sport. Similarly, the Dutch
Football Federation created a hotline for citizens to report match-fixing
activities in the country, following an investigation by a football publica-
tion Voetbal International which revealed that games in the Netherlands
were being manipulated by international organised crime syndicates.
Educating athletes and officials regarding the dangers posed by match-
fixing represents an important strategy in the fight against match-fixing.
Underpinning training programmes is a philosophy that educated and
aware sportsmen and women are more likely to report suspicious inci-
dents and help prevent corruption. Thus, a range of education and
training initiatives have been implemented by sporting associations and
law enforcement agencies. For example, FIFA and Interpol introduced in
170 Gambling, Crime and Society

2013 a series of e-learning programmes in five languages, with the aim of

preventing players, coaches and referees becoming victims of organised
crime groups. Elsewhere, the Australian government’s National Integrity
Sports Unit has introduced a ‘Keep Australian Sport Honest’ online
program, and an Integrity e-learning programme for Olympic athletes
and officials was launched by the IOC ahead of the 2016 Olympic Games
in Rio, indicating the value placed in educating sportsmen and women
about match-fixing and its damaging effects on sport and wider society.

Early Warning Systems

In order to identify incidents of betting-related corruption in sport, a

number of early warning systems have been introduced by sporting
organisations, betting operators and associations, and commercial enter-
prises. Sports betting monitoring systems ‘are founded on contractual
information-sharing arrangements and act in real time to allow for
relatively rapid intervention’ in combating illegal and irregular betting
activity (Bricknell, 2015, p. 8). The Institut de Relations Internationales
et Stratégiques (2012) (IRIS) suggests that detection and warning systems
fall into three distinct categories. First, there are those systems that have
been developed by individual gambling operators in order to protect their
business. For some sites, this extends to detecting money-laundering and
fraud in sport. For example, betting exchange Betfair operates a monitor-
ing system that tracks clients, betting volumes and changes in odds
(Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, 2012). As a betting
exchange, Betfair cannot be impacted financially by match-fixing, but the
manipulation of sporting events related to exchange betting can have a
detrimental impact on their image. Second, there are warning systems
that are shared between operators in order to further assess common risks.
Information sharing between lotteries and private operators has become
commonplace, enabling them to better assess levels of risk. Thus, even ‘in
the event of doubt, if imitation is established by other operators, then the
level of suspicion rises. Sharing tools helps to check whether other betting
media have been targeted by corruptors’ (Ibid.: 73). Third, a number of
warning systems have been integrated into sports organisations and focus
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 171

on specific sporting events and competitions. In addition to the systems

detailed above, McCarthy (2014) notes that private commercial monitor-
ing organisations, such as Sportradar, and monitoring units set up within
regulatory organisations, such as the UK’s Gambling Commission, repre-
sent two further forms of betting market monitoring.
Early warning systems have developed rapidly since their introduction
little over a decade ago. In the wake of the 2005 Bundesliga match-fixing
scandal, FIFA introduced, in 2006, a prototype early warning system in
order to safeguard the integrity of the organisation’s competitions. By
2007, FIFA had established Early Warning System GmbH (EWS) as an
independent unit charged with monitoring betting on behalf of a host of
different sports organisations and associations. The successful trialling of
FIFA’s EWS at the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 led to the IOC
launching its own early warning system, International Sports Monitoring
GmbH (ISM) in 2009. Data on betting is derived from in excess of 400
different betting companies who have contractual arrangements with EWS
in order to help identify the betting-related manipulation of sporting
events. Private security service Sportsradar launched its first betting mon-
itoring service in 2005. Its Fraud Detection System is now employed by a
host of different sporting organisations, including the Union of European
Football Associations (UEFA), the Asian Football Confederation (AFC)
and the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean
Association Football (CONCACAF), amongst others. Not-for-profit orga-
nisation ESSA also operates a monitoring system, sharing data with sports
organisations such as FIFA and the IOC as well as gambling regulators such
as the UK’s Gambling Commission and equivalent organisations in
Alderney, Malta and Gibraltar. The global geographic distribution of its
members and its access to a wide range of data, including the bettor’s
identity, geographical distribution of bets, and volume of wagers, means
that ESSA’s monitoring system is more sophisticated than Sportradar’s
FDS, which uses mathematical algorithms to seek to identify suspicious
patterns in betting activity.
Nevertheless, the ability of such systems to detect incidents of betting-
related manipulation of sporting events is unclear. Hill (2014, p. 425)
suggests that despite the proliferation of early warning systems across a
panoply of sporting disciplines any claims as to the infallibility of such
172 Gambling, Crime and Society

systems is ‘patent nonsense’. A former UEFA employee involved in the

implementation of their system gives weight to this claim, highlighting
how Sportradar’s monitoring system and FIFA’s early warning system
are only able to identify individual large bets and not multiple smaller
bets that may constitute suspicious betting activity. An even greater
deficit is that these systems recognise ‘almost exclusively the large and
mid-sized betting shops in Europe. The many smaller, and sometimes
semi-legal and illegal betting companies in Asia have no interest in
cooperating with the official associations’ (Buschmann, 2013).
Criticism has also been levelled at ESSA’s monitoring system, in a
report from the ICSS and the Sorbonne (2014). They note that the
number of alerts deemed to be ‘suspicious’ and reported to the relevant
sporting and regulatory authorities by ESSA was markedly lower than
the number reported by the European Lotteries Monitoring System
(ELMS) to UEFA and FIFA. They note that the low number of alerts
in comparison to the high number of confirmed cases of corruption of
competitions indicates that ‘either the ESSA system is not so effective in
practice, or that some alerts are deliberately not transmitted to the sports
movement’ (Ibid.: 229). This could well be because organised crime
groups are beginning to understand and learn how to avoid such
monitoring systems (Ibid.). Moreover, such systems are likely to have
a displacement effect, pushing betting and wagering to ‘the margins of
the industry’ (Bricknell, 2015, p. 8) where illegal or unregulated, inter-
nal or offshore online gambling businesses operate. Undoubtedly com-
bating match-fixing is both challenging and complex given:

[T]he issues connected to sports betting, including the huge increase in

betting operators (some of which are located in tax havens), the afore-
mentioned expansion of betting options and increased returns, the often
inadequacy of regulatory response and the emergence of a new model of
professional bettor who has adopted more sophisticated means of avoiding
detection. (Bricknell, 2015, p. 8)

Sorbonne and ICSS (2014) suggest that transferring the responsibility

for alerts to national regulators of sports betting, as has happened in Italy
and France, may serve to enhance the quantity and quality of alerts and,
 5 Gambling, Sport and Corruption 173

in turn, improve the effectiveness of the monitoring systems of betting

operators. Alternatively, the imposition of specific rules regarding bet-
ting data by public authorities could serve to provide clear guidelines as
to when operators should alert public and/or sports authorities.

Conclusion
Sport is an integral component of nations, regions and localities’ social
and cultural fabric, as well as an important political platform and a key
site of economic activity. The transformative capacity of sport continues
to be harnessed by states and other agents who seek to utilise its status to
promote a range of initiatives and values, including equality, peace,
health and well-being. As such, the importance of sport in contemporary
societies is undeniable. However, a host of social issues and problems
ranging from crime and violence to racism and corruption continue to
undermine sport’s integrity. Most recently, concerns have centred on the
degree to which new forms of betting have increased opportunities for
match-fixing in sport. Changes to the structural features of betting have
created new challenges for those seeking to prevent the manipulation of
sporting events for financial gain. Notably, the growth in Internet betting
presents a particular problem, as it has led to greater liquidity in sports
markets, the globalisation of gambling, the advent of betting exchanges,
lower transaction costs and the increased availability of in-play wagering
and proposition betting, all of which cumulatively present increased
opportunities for irregular betting. Anxieties have been heightened by a
number of high-profile cases of fixing impacting a range of sporting
disciplines, including football, cricket, tennis, basketball, horse racing,
ice hockey, snooker, rugby and sumo wrestling. In response, states, law
enforcement agencies, sporting organisations, betting operators and gam-
bling associations have introduced a host of legal, educative and preven-
tative measures focused on decreasing the likelihood of match-fixing and
successfully prosecuting those engaging in such activities. This includes
the development of national and international legal instruments, integ-
rity units, educational programmes, integrity and compliance hotlines
and early warning systems. Such measures are undoubtedly necessary, as
174 Gambling, Crime and Society

match-fixing scandals can reduce the credibility and attention given to

sports, as well as the revenues of teams, athletes and sporting events.
Attendances may drop and television viewing figures decline in response
to incidents of match-fixing. Thus, fixing can have a significant and long-
lasting impact on the public’s interest in sporting events and, in turn,
damage the financial health of clubs and associations. Moreover, the
ability of sport to act as vehicle of social good may be weakened by
such corruption. With the betting-related manipulation of sporting
events presenting a notable threat to a host of disciplines, competitions
and events across all regions of the world, combating match-fixing is
undoubtedly a major priority for those charged with the governance of
sport. Ensuring that the integrity of sport is protected from organised
criminals is likely to be an ongoing battle.

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 6
Internet Gambling, Crime
and the Regulation of Virtual
Environments

Introduction
In January 1996, Antigua-based company, InterCasino, became the
first Internet gambling site to accept an online bet (Williams and
Wood, 2007). Quick to take advantage of the advent of gambling
software and encrypted communication protocols, which enables
online monetary transactions, a host of other sports and horse race
betting sites and casino and poker operations were launched from the
Caribbean, Europe, Australia and Central America (Schwartz, 2006;
Williams et al., 2012). Most notably, Caribbean and Central American
countries, such as Belize, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
Grenada, the Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St Kitts and Nevis, and
Turks and Caicos, represented natural destinations for many Internet
gambling businesses, as limited licensing, legislation and enforcement,
coupled with low taxation, created hospitable environments in which
to operate (Williams and Wood, 2007). By the turn of the twentieth
century, the number of Internet gambling sites in existence neared
1,000, as licensed sports books, casinos, lottery, poker and bingo sites
were introduced across a host of other jurisdictions including the

© The Author(s) 2017 183

J. Banks, Gambling, Crime and Society,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57994-2_6
184 Gambling, Crime and Society

United Kingdom, Alderney, Austria, Gibraltar, the Isle of Man, the

Kahnawake Mohawk reserve in Canada and Malta.
Within two decades, online gambling has developed rapidly into a
diverse, sophisticated and complex global e-commerce marketplace of
aleatory consumption. Today, there are in excess of 3,500 Internet
gambling sites in existence, consisting of 1,278 casinos, 775 sports
books, 465 bingo sites, 336 poker rooms, 213 lotteries, 79 fantasy
sports operators, 53 skill games sites, 12 betting exchanges and 324
spread betting, forex and binary options trading sites (Casino City,
2016). Located throughout 70 different countries, such sites present a
significant proportion of the world’s population with a panoply of
different opportunities to gamble (Casino City, 2016). In 2013, the
online gambling market was worth an estimated US$23.7 billion (H2
Gambling Capital, 2015). Accounting for 45.8 per cent of the gross
gambling yield, the sports betting segment is the most lucrative form
of Internet gambling, while the casino segment equates to approxi-
mately 20.9 per cent of the industry’s aggregate value (Ibid.). But
whilst market value gross gambling yields continue to demonstrate
‘impressive growth, they are somewhat hampered by legislation in
many countries. [Nevertheless] as online gambling laws are gradually
liberalized worldwide, we can expect to see even more impressive
growth figures in the future’ (MarketLine, 2015, p. 7). In turn, it is
predicted that the online gambling market will grow to be worth
US$37.4 billion by 2018, as new markets emerge and other geogra-
phical regions open up their markets to external competition (H2
Gambling Capital, 2015).
Increased Internet penetration is also likely to lead to new oppor-
tunities for online gambling, with participation rates increasing glob-
ally. Estimating the percentage of a population that use the Internet
to gamble is difficult, but international studies indicate that between
1 and 30 per cent of adults have gambled online (Petry, 2006;
Williams and Wood, 2009; Gainsbury, 2010; Wardle et al., 2011).
Evidence also reveals that Internet gambling participation rates
continue to increase internationally. For example, successive waves
of British Gambling Prevalence Survey (Sproston et al., 2000;
Wardle et al., 2007, 2011) have recorded that adult participation in
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 185

Internet gambling has risen from 0.2 per cent in 1999 to 10.6 per
cent in 2010, whilst the Australian Productivity Commission (2010)
have also recorded significant growth in online wagering. The acces-
sibility, affordability and anonymity of Internet gambling undoubtedly
make it attractive to consumers. As Gainsbury (2012, p. 73) notes,
although we know little about individuals’ motivations for Internet gam-
bling habits, ‘gambling rates overall do not appear to have increased,
suggesting that Internet gamblers may have adopted this form in addition
to or instead of other forms of gambling.’ Moreover, as start-up and
operating costs of online gambling businesses are low, and the popularity
of and participation in Internet gambling continues to grow, then this
e-commerce market is likely to continue to be an attractive proposition to
established land-based-operators, industry newcomers and investors alike
(Summerfield and Loo, 2010).
The rapidity with which Internet gambling has developed has
proved challenging for many jurisdictions who continue to suffer from
a ‘cultural lag’ (Wood and Williams, 2012, p. 121), unable to develop the
legal, technological and regulatory frameworks that enable them to
respond to all of the new challenges and risks posed by a complex, diverse
and ever-shifting marketplace. Thus, the unique features of Internet
gambling, coupled with the fragmented nature of governance, present
significant opportunity for crime and victimisation. As Chapter 5 illus-
trates, changes to the make-up of gambling wrought by the Internet have
given rise to an increased risk of the betting-related manipulation of
sporting contests. This presents a significant threat to the integrity of a
wide array of sporting disciplines, impacting all states and all regions of
the world. Disconcertingly, the advent and spread of Internet gambling
across the globe poses a number of other crime threats to individual
gamblers, online operators and wider society. This chapter examines
the rapid growth of Internet gambling into a complex, dynamic and
heterogeneous marketplace of aleatory consumption and the crime
threats and problems that have emerged as a consequence of the unique
features of online gambling. It gives consideration to the frequency,
dimensions and mechanics of Internet gambling-related crime, alongside
the legal, technological and educational frameworks that states have
instituted in response to these crime problems.
186 Gambling, Crime and Society

Internet Gambling Policy: Challenges

and Opportunities
States have responded very differently to the advent of and rapid growth
in Internet gambling. Many countries have embraced the opportunity to
derive significant revenues from this new medium for gambling,
although there is much variation in the regulatory regime employed;
ranging from a high level of state oversight to highly liberalised market-
places that leave the progress of Internet gambling to free market forces.
However, states typically operate marketplaces that allow for Internet
gambling but in put place certain restrictions on the activity. This may
include allowing some forms of gambling but not others, restricting
which sites citizens are legally able to use, or hosting Internet gambling
sites whilst prohibiting citizens from using them. By contrast, some states
specifically outlaw all forms of Internet gambling and other, primarily
Islamic countries, have extended their bans on all forms of gambling to
include those activities that take place online (Williams et al., 2012).
States that have sought to legalise and regulate the provision of
Internet gambling have adopted a number of different approaches to
controlling market entry and the operational activities of betting sites.
A number of states have limited the provision of Internet gambling to
a small number of government-owned or government-controlled sup-
pliers or restricted the market to a handful of private operators. Other
countries allow for both government-controlled service providers in
tandem with commercial operations based within state, while some
states allow externally located commercial operations to market
Internet gambling products to their citizens. As Casabona (2014)
recognises the bewildering array of approaches to regulating Internet
gambling may be distilled into five broad categories: (1) totally prohi-
bitive jurisdictions where Internet gambling is forbidden, (2) protec-
tionist prohibitive systems that allow gambling, but only if the Internet
operator is licensed domestically. Such an approach seeks to outlaw
foreign providers from offering citizens gambling products and ser-
vices, (3) completely liberal systems that do not place any hindrances or
limitations concerning the nationality of players and the origin of
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 187

online operators, (4) restrictive liberal jurisdictions that prohibit licensed

operators from delivering their services to gamblers from countries where
gambling is prohibited and (5) liberal prohibitive systems that allow online
gambling business to operate from the country, but prohibit businesses
from soliciting residents’ custom. Ultimately, Internet gambling across the
globe is shaped by a vast assortment of complimentary and contradictory
wagering practices, laws, regulations, prohibitions and provisions
(Church-Sanders, 2011), which can only be briefly summarised here.
The diversity of ways in which states regulate Internet gambling is
exemplified by Europe where ‘no “unite de doctrine” has developed
among the roughly 40 independent countries and the handful of semi-
independent territories’ (Häberling, 2012, p. 284). Such complexity is
maintained despite the European Commission’s best efforts to develop
increased cooperation and a joined-up approach amongst member states.
Thus, regulatory regimes are governed largely by the needs and cultural
preferences of individual nations and, as such, divergent approaches of
questionable compatibility continue to co-exist (Gainsbury, 2012). A
significant number of states have adopted ‘protectionist prohibitive
systems’, with 25 per cent of Europe and 40 per cent of Scandinavia
operating marketing monopolies that see specific forms of gambling –
primarily lotteries, but sometimes sports betting and other wagering
activities – provided by state-owned operators. For example, Austria’s
lottery and casino games are subject to a monopoly licence that has been
held by Austrian Lotteries since 1986. Similarly, in Norway, Finland
and Sweden, government-owned companies supply Internet gambling
services within state. This includes Norsk Tipping and Norsk Rikstoto
delivering online lotteries and horse racing to Norwegian citizens,
Veikkaus, Raha-automaatiyhdistys (RAY) and Fintoto supplying lot-
teries, sports betting and horse racing in Finland, and Svenska Spel
operating as the sole provider of lotteries, bingo, poker and sports
betting in Sweden.
Many other European jurisdictions maintain a monopolistic position
towards specific forms of gambling – typically lotteries – whilst simulta-
neously operating liberal systems that allow for commercial competition
in the provision of sports betting, horse racing, poker and casino games.
188 Gambling, Crime and Society

In the UK, under the Gambling (Licensing and Advertising) Act 2014,
externally based remote gambling businesses are able to solicit citizens’
custom as long as they hold an operating licence. Amending the
Gambling Act 2005 which operated a ‘white list’ of countries able to
offer UK citizens gambling services – irrespective of the vagaries of
their regulatory frameworks – the new legislation is said to ‘ensure that
all remote gambling operators offering services to British consumers will
be subject to consistent regulation’. Most importantly for a country
losing significant tax revenues overseas, the 2014 Act saw the introduc-
tion of a 15 per cent point of consumption tax levied on all betting
companies operating in the UK irrespective of geographical location.
Other countries, including Spain, Denmark, Italy, France and
Belgium, have begun to slowly liberalise their approach to Internet
gambling, increasing opportunities for certain types of commercial
operator to apply for a licence to run sports betting, horse racing, casino
games and poker tournaments. As a European Commission (2014,
p. 39) study on the role of regulators for online gambling has noted:

Up to half of the Member States are currently considering changes to their

online regulatory frameworks, in particular with a view to be able to better
deal with specific challenges, such as betting fraud and advertising, and
more generally to be able to carry out enforcement of national regulation
more effectively.

But although a significant number of European countries have intro-

duced legislation that allows for increased competition in the supply of
gambling few have acted upon it instead continuing to maintain market
conditions that are unfavourable to new operators.
Prohibitive systems shape much of North American and Australasian
gambling policy. In Australia, the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 under-
pins a liberal prohibitive system which outlaws interactive gambling
services to residents,1 whilst allowing businesses to solicit overseas

1
Casino, poker, keno and instant win games are prohibited. Sports, horse race and lottery betting
are allowed.
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 189

custom. Likewise, New Zealand does not allow gambling operators based
within its borders to offer residents online gambling services – with the
exception of sports, horse racing and lottery betting – although it does
not prohibit citizens from gambling with overseas operators. In the
US, under the Wire Act 1961, pari-mutuel betting on horse racing and
state lotteries are allowed, but all other forms of Internet gambling are
forbidden (Stewart, 2011a, 2011b). Reinforced by the passage of the
Unlawful Internet Gaming Enforcement Act 2006, banks, financial
services and other businesses are prohibited from undertaking electronic
fund transfers for the purpose of Internet gambling. Excluding fantasy
sports and any activity permitted by Interstate Horse Racing Act 1978,
the bill seeks to prevent US citizens from funding overseas gambling
accounts in order to wager on sports betting, casinos games or poker.
Canada has, by and large, also adopted a prohibitive protectionist stance
towards Internet gambling. Falling under provincial jurisdiction, gam-
bling more generally is permitted so long as it is operated and regulated
by local governments (Gainsbury and Wood, 2011). A significant num-
ber of Canadian provinces have introduced various forms of Internet
gambling following a rule change in 2003 by the then Federal Minister
for Agriculture, Lyle Vanclief, that horse racing bets may be placed using
‘any telecommunications device’. Subsequently, horse racing track opera-
tor Woodbine Entertainment began taking Internet bets from Canadian
citizens in 2004, whilst Atlantic Lottery Corporation introduced online
lottery games and sports betting to those residing in the Atlantic pro-
vinces of Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and
Newfoundland. British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec have also intro-
duced various forms of Internet gambling, including sports betting,
lotteries, casino games and poker. Nova Scotia have ruled out introdu-
cing Internet gambling, while Alberta, Labrador and Newfoundland are
yet to present opportunities for Internet gambling to their citizens.
Across Asia, South and Central America, and Africa, states have also
responded very differently to the onset of Internet gambling. A number
of countries, such as Brazil, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and South
Africa, prohibit both the provision of and participation in Internet
gambling. By contrast, Panama and Costa Rica have created liberal
environments receptive to US facing sports, casino and poker operators,
190 Gambling, Crime and Society

in turn deriving significant revenues from Internet gambling (Church-

Sanders, 2011). Others, including Chile, Venezuela, Singapore, South
Korea, Japan and India, allow for some Internet gambling services
provided by a handful of licensed operators, while the Philippines
currently allow Internet gambling services by extraterritorial operators.
Where gambling is prohibited, attempts to stop the provision of Internet
gambling by external operators continues to prove challenging. For
example, China’s significant efforts to stop illegal Internet gambling
sites appears to have been unsuccessful, with in excess of 185 different
Chinese language Internet gambling sites continuing to accept Chinese
citizens’ custom (Monaghan, 2008; Gainsbury, 2012). Similarly, in
Argentina and Brazil extraterritorial websites continue to offer services
to their citizens in flagrant defiance of government prohibitions.
With states adopting an array of different regulatory positions towards
Internet gambling, inconsistency and ambiguity characterise a global
arena wherein highly regulated markets, highly liberalised markets or
unregulated markets, closed markets and monopolies inharmoniously
co-exist. In turn, black and grey market operators pose a particular
challenge to states’ efforts to prohibit (certain forms of) Internet gam-
bling or restrict market entry to licensed operators.

Illegal Internet Gambling

The anonymity, accessibility and interactivity of Internet gambling have
made it a popular platform for legal forms of aleatory consumption. This is
evinced by the notable growth in consumers accessing legal opportunities to
gamble online (Sproston et al., 2000; Wardle et al., 2007, 2011; Australian
Productivity Committee, 2010; Gainsbury, 2010). The online environ-
ment does, however, also present significant opportunity for individuals to
either knowingly or unknowingly engage in illegal gambling activities.
Illegal gambling takes three principal forms that pose a threat to states
and their societies (Banks, 2014): First, Internet gambling sites may accept
bets from a resident in a country that prohibits online gambling; second,
Internet gambling sites may operate without an appropriate licence; and
third, Internet gambling sites may accept bets from underage gamblers.
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 191

Unlicensed gambling operations present a significant challenge to

many states seeking to control market entry and the operational activ-
ities of Internet gambling sites. Where Internet gambling is largely
prohibited, such as the US and China, for example, black market
operators, often located in external jurisdictions, have emerged to service
the strong inherent demand of the general public for gambling.
Similarly, throughout Europe and other jurisdictions where protection-
ist prohibitive regimes have been adopted, in order to limit gambling or
specific forms of gambling to state-owned monopolies or licensed,
regulated and taxed private gambling operators, illegal or quasi-legal
operations continue to represent significant competition. The challenges
facing even the most liberal gambling markets are exemplified by a
recent press release by the UK’s Gambling Commission which highlights
the threat posed by illegal sites employing encrypted payment methods:

We are concerned about illegal gambling operators providing facilities for

gambling to consumers in Great Britain. An operator needs to be licensed
by the Gambling Commission regardless of where they are located in the
world, if they provide facilities for gambling to consumers in Great
Britain. We have written to a number of website operators offering prizes
of money or money’s worth to gamblers in Britain that are not licensed by
us. Bitcoin comes under the category of money’s worth and therefore any
operator offering this facility to gamblers in Britain requires an operating
licence or they are acting illegally. (Gambling Commission, 2015)

In order to effectively levy taxes and derive surplus from the industry,
jurisdictions must be successful in their efforts to restrict the availability
of and access to illegal competition. Estimating the number of illegal
gambling services and size of the illegal gambling market is extremely
difficult and dependant, in part, on the position adopted by a state
towards Internet gambling. Cyber-security firm CERT-LEXSI (2006)
calculated that of the 14,823 online gambling sites that can be accessed
by European players less than 15 per cent hold any form of licence. The
European Commission divides such sites up into illegal or black market
operators and grey market operators. Black market operators provide
citizens with online gambling services despite holding no gambling
192 Gambling, Crime and Society

licence, whilst grey market operators hold a licence in one or more

Member State yet provide online gambling services in other Member
States despite not having obtained the requisite authorisation to do so
under national legislation. Significant profits can be made through illegal
and grey market activity with an estimated US$24 billion in gross
gaming revenues generated in 2011 (H2 Global Capital, 2012).
For citizens to gamble at legal sites, states must ensure that licensed
forms of gambling present an attractive offer when compared to those
made available elsewhere (Forrest, 2012). Failure to do so is likely to see
some citizens migrate to grey and black market operators who offer better
value for money. For example, France’s notoriously stringent regulatory
framework, introduced in May 2010 and regulated by Autorité de
Régulation Des Jeux en Ligne (ARJEL), requires Internet gambling
operators to acquire a licence for each individual type of game offered.2
IP blocking, prison sentences and fines for non-licensed operators are
employed in order to deter in excess of 550 illegal operations from
soliciting French citizens’ custom (Norwegian Gaming and Foundation
Authority, 2012). Yet, due to the ‘relatively uncompetitive terms of the
French licensing system . . . the leakage to illegal and unlicensed gaming
companies continues unabated’ (Bettson Group, 2014). A 2014 survey
conducted by France’s Observatory of Games and Monitoring Centre for
Drugs and Drug Addiction found that despite ARJEL’s efforts to prohibit
unlicensed sites 47 per cent of poker players gamble at such sites, whilst
23.5 per cent play exclusively at unlicensed sites (Angioni, 2014).
Furthermore, 26.2 per cent of respondents access unlicensed sites for
horse race betting and 34.7 per cent for sports betting (Ibid.).
Elsewhere, illegal gambling operations have grown to command size-
able chunks of countries’ gambling markets. For example, the Greek
government estimated that approximately 250 unauthorised gambling
sites, of which 60 have Greek language versions, are in operation in the
country (European Commission, 2012). Such sites generate an annual
turnover of in the region of €2 billion; a figure which is equal to that of
the state’s bricks and mortar betting monopoly. Similarly, in Germany,

2
Poker, sports betting or betting on horses.
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 193

where licensed Internet sports betting remains economically unattrac-

tive, and online gaming is strictly forbidden under the German
Interstate Treaty on Gambling 2012, less than 5 per cent of interactive
gambling activity occurs within state, compared to an average of 42 per
cent across the EU28 (Hofmann et al., 2014). With a sizeable grey and
black market existing to service the needs of its citizens, Germany
continues to miss out on a sizeable tax income from a gross win that is
likely to exceed €2 billion annually (Ibid.).
Seemingly operating with impunity and in flagrant contradiction of
many states’ gambling laws, illegal Internet betting operations and their
owners have become the target of law enforcement intervention, most
notably in the US where a raft of offshore sites continue to solicit
American citizens’ custom irrespective of Internet gambling’s illegality.
Yet, even here, only a small number of prosecutions have taken place
since the passage of the Unlawful Internet Gaming Enforcement Act
20063 (UIGEA) in December 2009. With successful prosecutions of
illegal Internet gambling operators few in number, black and grey
market operators continue to pose a significant threat to states and
their societies, by offering a service to both those barred from Internet
gambling or seeking better value for their betting activities. As a con-
sequence, licensed gambling services lose custom, states see a significant
reduction in tax income, while the potential for harm through underage
gambling, problem gambling, fraud and theft is heightened.

Who Are the Virtual Villains? Cyber-nomads,

Dot.cons and Assemblages
Internet gambling-related crimes may be committed by a range of differ-
ent actors including site operators and/or their employees, players and
other ‘criminal entrepreneurs’. McMullan and Rege’s (2010) research

3
The UIGEA ‘prohibits gambling businesses from knowingly accepting payments in connection
with the participation of another person in a bet or wager that involves the use of the Internet and
that is unlawful under any federal or state law’.
194 Gambling, Crime and Society

suggests that online criminal entrepreneurs range from solo actors to

dynamic, amorphous and loosely connected assemblages who engage in
singular, but often substantial, crimes in and around online gambling
sites. In McMullan and Rege’s typology, three distinct categories of
criminal entrepreneur that exhibit various levels of skill and sophistication
are identified. First, ‘cybernomads’, solo criminal actors, differ in their
skills, motivations and technological acumen, but typically either purchase
or manufacture ‘toolkits’ that enable individuals to cheat and steal from
online gambling sites and their clientele. More advanced cyber-nomads,
often akin to professional criminals, engage in the production of malware,
technical intelligence and personal information that can be sold on to
others through the underground economy. Alternatively, advanced hack-
ers may execute their own attacks on gambling sites or subcontract their
services to other criminal groups. Second, ‘dot.con teams’ may consist of
small-scale organised crime groups, players, consultants or web and gam-
bling site owners, managers and employees who unite to commit acts of
fraud, theft or money laundering. Online players may collude with other
players to cheat opponents or engage with gambling site insiders who
provide privileged information that enables the committal of crimes
against both employers and their clientele. Moreover, such organised
crime groups may utilise online gambling sites to launder money and
‘clean’ their proceeds from various criminal activities. Finally, ‘criminal
assemblages’ consist of dynamic and complex criminal networks that
engage in ongoing extortion, phishing, identity fraud and money launder-
ing enterprises. More formal and continuous than dot.con teams, the
scale, intensity and duration of their criminal activity means criminal
assemblages are more likely to be identified by corporate and government
agencies who become involved in ‘techno wars’ with the criminal group,
as they seek to limit crime and victimisation visited upon online gambling
communities. In short, Internet gambling sites can operate as a source of
criminal activity, as a vehicle for crime or support other criminal enter-
prise. Criminal entrepreneurs may target gambling operations and/or their
clientele or utilise gambling sites as a conduit for crime. Moreover, in
order to engage in fraudulent activities, criminal entrepreneurs may enlist
gambling organisations, their employers and clientele or disguise them-
selves as legitimate online gambling operations or customers. Similarly,
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 195

legitimate gambling businesses may employ corrupt practices as profits

turn to losses and once genuine patrons may seek to engage in criminal
practices in order to reduce their deficits. Nevertheless, this dense tangle of
virtual villains and victims can be simplified to identify a number of
distinct forms of e-crime and modus operandi of gambling site operators
and their employees, users of online gambling sites, criminal entrepreneurs
and organised crime groups, who either utilise gambling sites as a conduit
for nefarious activities or specifically target gambling operators and their
clientele. It is to these crimes that discussion now turns.

Staying Online: Cyber-extortion and Denial

of Service Attacks
Ensuring that their sites stay online continues to present one of the
greatest challenges facing Internet gambling businesses. The emergence
of crime syndicates that target Internet gambling sites that do not have
the appropriate hardware and defensive infrastructures to filter and
process substantial amounts of data traffic in real time is a significant
problem for the industry. Crime syndicates engage in cyber-extortion
through the use of ‘real or threatening actions combining computer
intrusion, theft, destruction and modification of data, social engineering,
and fear for purposes of unlawful economic gain’ (McMullan and
Rege, 2007, p. 649). Closely resembling a ‘real-world’ racket, criminal
entrepreneurs seek payment from gambling site operators in exchange
for ‘protection’ from Denial of Service (DoS) or, more frequently,
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks (Lovet, 2006). Demands
are made via an email to betting companies, with extortionists mandating
the wiring of money – most recently, in the form of Bitcoins – to a
specific account (Solana, 2015). Failure to make payment typically results
in an attack that prevents or severely limits a site’s ability to complete
betting transactions, in turn impacting the operator’s custom, profits and
reputation. DDoS attacks see criminal entrepreneurs form a ‘botnet’ of
compromised ‘zombie slave’ computers, by installing software on their
systems that enable them to be controlled by a master computer, unbe-
known to their owners. This botnet is herded into a single DDoS attack
196 Gambling, Crime and Society

that is directed at a chosen target. Such attacks result in a gambling

operator’s networks or server being ‘inundated with thousands of false
requests that consume all available disk space, central processing unit
time, bandwidth capability, or physical network components’ (Banks,
2014, p. 68). Flooding Internet gambling sites with fake requests, servers
are overwhelmed, networks crash and operators are knocked offline, in
turn preventing legitimate customers from placing their bets.
Occurring since the turn of the twenty-first century, when a fledgling
industry was ill prepared for electronic extortion activities, crime syndi-
cates continue to target gambling sites that do not have the defensive
capabilities to withstand DDoS attacks. Many of the targeted sites are
located offshore, in highly liberalised or unregulated markets, and do not
have access to a law enforcement agency with the resources, skills and
inclination to pursue attackers. Citing government and industry sources,
McMullan and Rege (2007, p. 649) note that ‘criminals have hit every
major Internet betting site from the Caribbean to Australia and taken
down hundreds of online casinos and payment processing companies’. US
facing companies Betgameday, Betcascade, Bluegrasssports, Caribsports,
Pinnaclesports, Sportsbook and Casino, Vipsports were all subject to
attacks in 2004, whilst, in the UK, Betdaq, Totalbet, UKBetting and
William Hill reported extortion demands and DDoS attacks before the
2004 Cheltenham Festival (Nuttall, 2004; Ward, 2004; McMullan and
Rege, 2007). More recently, Betfair’s betting exchange and fixed odds
sportsbook was knocked offline by a DDoS attack, whilst Malta-licensed
BETAT Casino’s service was interrupted with extortionists demanding a
ransom of 10 Bitcoin – approximately US$2,200 – to cease the assault
(Solana, 2015).
Primarily occurring during big money events or games, such as the
Breeders Cup, the Grand National or the Super Bowl, criminal gangs
demand protection fees of between US$10,000 and US$50,000
(Nuttall, 2004; Ward, 2004). It is estimated that 10–15 per cent of
cyber-extortion demands are met by Internet gambling operators
(Cullingworth, 2004), with the success of online extortion ‘premised
upon the extorted funds being clearly less than the potential loss caused
by any downtime’ (Banks, 2014, p. 69). Yet payment does not always
result in a halt in attacks. For example, Costa Rican bookmaker Betcris
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 197

met extortionist’s demands on several occasions, as the ransoms rose

from US$500 to US$40,000 (Menn, 2010). When Betcris finally
refused to meet the attackers’ demands, its website was immobilised
within minutes by a DDoS attack that consumed all available disk space,
central unit processing time and bandwidth capability. According to
Betcris’ general manager Mickey Richardson, the extortionist’s estimate
that the attack had cost his business ‘more than twenty times’ what the
criminals had asked for was pretty accurate.
It is, however, much more difficult to estimate the extent and total cost
of DDoS attacks against Internet betting sites. Gambling companies are
likely to underreport such offences, in order to maintain the integrity of
websites and preserve the confidence of their customers. By contrast cyber-
security companies may well exaggerate the dangers posed in order to profit
through the sale of computer and information security (Banks, 2014). For
example, cyber-security company Goldsecurity (2015) estimate that 9 out
of 10 Internet gambling businesses have been victims of a DDoS attack in
the last month, costing sites in the region of US$40,000 per hour of
downtime. The firm indicates that the regularity with which Internet
gambling organisations are subject to attacks could well be because the
skills required to undertake a DoS or DDoS attack are no longer simply
held by a small number of ‘experts’, but are widely available to those who
are less technically proficient. Part of a broader democratisation of cyber-
crime, an underground economy of DDoS ‘toolkits’ or ‘botnets for hire’
has emerged. Costing approximately US$38 per hour, it is suggested that
botnets for hire are behind 40 per cent of all attacks, with DDoS ‘hit and
run attacks continu[ing] to be popular because of their low cost and ease of
deployment’ (Goldsecurity, 2015).
In response to a surge in attacks against critical infrastructures and
private businesses more broadly, a number of states have introduced
legislation that enables them to prosecute those engaged in DoS and
DDoS attacks (Rege, 2010). For example, in the US, DoS and DDoS
attacks are federal crimes under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
1986, Australia prosecutes individuals under the Cybercrime Act 2001
and South Africa criminalised such behaviour through its Electronic
Communications and Transactions Act 2002. Across Europe, states
have been slower to respond to the threat posed by such attacks.
198 Gambling, Crime and Society

However, in the UK, the Computer Misuse Act was amended in 2006
making it illegal for individuals to disrupt or intend to disrupt a
website. Furthermore, individuals may be prosecuted for supplying
toolkits or botnets for hire, with a sentence of 10 years permitted
under the new legislation. Similar amendments have been made in
Germany where the Bundestag modified an existing law to criminalise
DoS attacks and the launching of other forms of computer sabotage
targeted at either individuals or businesses. Yet, as McMullan and Rege
(2007, p. 659) have identified, the ‘fissured structure of law enforce-
ment within and between nation-states’ undermines their ability to
evidence, identify, apprehend and prosecute those engaging in DoS
and extortion activities. Engaging in coordinated investigations invol-
ving law enforcement agencies from a number of different jurisdictions
often proves challenging, with resource constraints and limited tech-
nological knowledge and expertise stymieing efforts to arrest DoS
attackers. Moreover, legal differences as to what constitutes an offence,
where the offence occurred, which laws can be applied, which court has
jurisdiction and what sanctions can be imposed further complicates the
judicial process (Ibid.). With cyber-offences a low-priority for police
forces internationally (Jewkes, 2010), it remains unlikely that many
states will dedicate significant resources to the pursuit of offenders
located in other jurisdictions across the world.
In response to the rising threat posed by extortionists and the limited
response of state enforcement agencies, many online gambling sites have
turned to the commercial computer crime control industry for technolo-
gical solutions. Recognising that the permanent elimination of such
attacks is impossible, Internet gambling services and other online busi-
nesses have begun to focus on ‘survivability instead of security. That is, it
may be impossible to prevent a DDoS attack, but you can take steps to
survive the attack’ (Prowell, Kraus and Borkin, 2010, p. 13, emphasis in
original). Cyber-security companies, such as Arbor Networks, Corero
Networks Solutions, Radware, Prolexic Technologies and VeriSign, sup-
ply online gambling businesses with a range of DDoS prevention and
mitigation hardware and software. The cost of such services is significant,
with basic fees starting at around US$35,000 per year but often totalling
in excess of US$100,000 (Rashid, 2011; Ungerleider, 2013). Yet such fees
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 199

are likely to be considered relatively small when compared to the potential

loss in revenue caused by service outages as part of a ‘digital shakedown’
(McMullan and Rege, 2007, p. 652). What is certain is that DDoS attacks
and extortion demands are likely to continue to affect the Internet gam-
bling industry, as criminal entrepreneurs seek to secure their share of this
US$40 billion industry.

Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

That online gambling sites can be used to launder money, as the final
stage of a successful criminal enterprise or in order to fund illicit activities,
has been highlighted by both law enforcement agencies and their govern-
ments (Government Accountability Office, 2002; RSeconsulting, 2006).
Most recently, Europol’s 2013 EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat
Assessment identified that:

Global e-commerce offers criminals multiple opportunities to generate

proceeds and retain the profits of their criminal activities. OCGs
[(Organised crime groups)] use the Internet to target the financial sector
and exploit various online financial products and services in order to
conceal the criminal origins of their proceeds. Virtual currencies, electro-
nic banking, online gambling and online auctions now feature heavily in
money laundering techniques. (European Police Office, 2013, p. 16)

In particular, concerns have been raised that gambling sites are used as a
conduit for the laundering of money for terrorist financing (Financial
Action Task Force, 2012). However, there is little in the way of sub-
stantive evidence to support such a proposition, with only one recorded
case of laundering via gambling sites in order to finance terrorist
activity4 (MHA Consulting, 2009; Sparrow et al., 2009). Citing the

4
In 2007, a suspected terrorist Tariq al-Daour used stolen credit card numbers purchased on the web to
fund accounts at 43 different Internet gambling sites. Laundering the money through sites including
AbsolutePoker.com, Betfair.com, BetonBet.com, Canbet.com, Eurobet.com, NoblePoker.com and
ParadisePoker.com, winnings were withdrawn and transferred to online bank accounts controlled by
al-Daour and his associates.
200 Gambling, Crime and Society

low operational costs of attacks in London and Madrid, Levi (2009)

notes how terrorist activity may be financed in a multitude of different
ways. For Levi, E-gaming represents just ‘one potential source of terror-
ist finance among many others; and even if it was connected with
terrorist plots (as some newspaper sources have claimed and as is
evidenced in one UK case), terrorists would not have found it difficult
to find another source of funding or “value transfers”’ (Ibid.: 10). As
MONEYVAL (2013, p. 15), in a report undertaken on behalf of the
Council of Europe, recognise: ‘Studies on this topic conducted by
private researchers seem to indicate that the ML/FT [(money launder-
ing/terrorist financing)] risks related to regulated online gambling are
low and the sector is not likely to be the preferred option for money
launderers or terrorist financiers.’
More broadly, despite concerns raised by Europol and the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) that Internet gambling sites present a general
threat of money laundering, there is a dearth of evidence to support such a
viewpoint. As a 2005 report undertaken on behalf of the Interactive
Gaming Council recognises, the evidence that Internet gambling is a
conduit for money laundering is ‘scant’. Notably, the Internet Crime
Complaint Center5 has yet to record a complaint about money laundering
through Internet gambling sites. This could well be because e-gaming
money laundering risks are reduced through Know Your Customer
(KYC) controls and the high traceability of transactions in regulated
markets. Such evidence indicates that it is not Internet gambling per se
that gives rise to an increased risk of money laundering. Rather, it is the
anonymous and instantaneous nature of new payment technologies that
are susceptible to the laundering of money (NFC Global, 2005).
A variety of national laws and international legal instruments and
treaties govern money laundering, placing an array of due diligence
obligations on businesses, such as Internet gambling sites, and financial

5
The Internet Crime Complaint Center was introduced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
in partnership with the National White Collar Crime Center. The centre receives Internet-
related criminal complaints which may be researched, developed or referred to local, state,
federal or international law enforcement and/or regulatory agencies for further investigation
where appropriate.
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 201

services that could be susceptible to laundering activities. Particularly

prominent is the intergovernmental organisation the FATF on money
laundering whose framework for combating laundering and terrorist
financing is endorsed by over 180 countries. Although its 40 recom-
mendations are only applicable to casinos – including online casinos –
and not all forms of (Internet) gambling, a number of member states,
including the UK, Malta and Austria, have extended this directive to
cover online lotteries and sports betting, in response to the hybridisa-
tion of gambling formats (Häberling, 2012). Consequently, gambling
sites within such jurisdictions must operate a reduced transaction
threshold of US$3,000, verify the identity of customers and ensure
that all transactions can be attributed to that specific customer. Like
the revised FATF Recommendations, the European Union’s Third
Anti-Money Laundering Directive requires that only casinos must
adhere to anti-money laundering/combating terrorist financing
legislation. Problematically, this leaves other areas of gambling vulner-
able to miss-use by criminals. In response, the Fourth Anti-Money
Laundering Directive, adopted on 20 May 2015, has broadened the
scope of the directive beyond ‘casinos’ to cover the whole of the
gambling sector. Monitoring transactions amounting to €2,000 and
the enhancement of cross-border cooperation between Financial
Intelligence Units form part of a wider array of measures that enable
a ‘risk-based approach’ to the monitoring of gambling activities across
Europe.
Some states have introduced their own money laundering regulations
that are responsive to both FATF recommendations and EU directives,
and specific to either the online environment or land-based and Internet
gambling. For example, Alderney, who hosts a significant number of
Internet gambling operators, introduced The Alderney eGambling
(Money Laundering Amendments) Regulations 2008, which places
exacting regulatory requirements on Internet gambling sites. This
includes stringent due diligence tests, new reporting procedures and
employee screening processes that will better ‘forestall, prevent and
detect money laundering and terrorist financing’ (Alderney Gambling
Control Commission, 2008, p. 12). Similarly, in the UK, the Gambling
Commission’s second edition of guidance for remote and non-remote
202 Gambling, Crime and Society

casinos, Money laundering: the prevention of money laundering and com-

bating the financing of terrorism, provides operators with a raft of ‘man-
datory’ and ‘advisory’ risk management policies and procedures relating
to customer due diligence, KYC controls, monitoring for suspicious
activity and reporting suspicious activity, internal control and record
keeping. Yet, as Brooks (2012, p. 306) notes, while regulatory bodies
undoubtedly play an important role in the formation of risk mitigation
measures: ‘Online sites rather than the Gambling Commission, law
enforcement bodies and sporting institutions are really the “front-line”
defence against money laundering’. Thus, anti-money laundering may
be undermined by operators’ failure to adopt those measures introduced
at a sectoral level by national regulators and collective industry bodies or
those regulatory frameworks introduced at an international level by
regional bodies.
In particular, poor KYC procedures and mixed gambling chains
employed by some operators are likely to present challenges to those
seeking to identify customers and trace transactions. The non-face-to-
face nature of Internet gambling can result in player’s holding multi-
ple accounts, using ‘front people’ that engage in gambling transac-
tions on their behalf or ‘mules’ who will agree to let their account be
used to facilitate illicit activities. Moreover, allowing players to credit
winnings or unused funds to a different bank account or move money
from land-based gambling operations to Internet services can increase
the chance that Customer Due Diligence6 processes are circum-
vented. As McAfee (2014, p. 9) recognise, ‘the number of [deposit
and withdrawal] options available demonstrates that would-be money
launderers have many opportunities to obfuscate money flows
through online gambling sites, and ultimately make the task for law
enforcement more difficult.’ More problematically, unlicensed gam-
bling sites may not require players to deposit funds through licensed
financial institutions that are responsive to anti-money laundering
(MONEYVAL 2013).

6
Customer Due Diligence measures are employed in order to check a customer’s identity and
ensure that they are who they say they are.
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 203

Thus, opportunities for money laundering are likely to be greater in

unregulated or poorly regulated jurisdictions as: ‘In such environments,
anti-money laundering could well be wholly dependent upon the mea-
sures employed by payment processers’ (Banks, 2014, p. 76). As
MONEYVAL, in a report commissioned by the Council of Europe,
recognised:

One of the major vulnerabilities appears to be directly linked to unre-

gulated online gambling. In an environment where the operation of
online gambling is not subject to a supervisory framework, the suscept-
ibility to abuse increases drastically. It is easy for criminals to infiltrate
the sector or to manipulate online gambling operations for illegal
purposes, in the absence of adequate control systems. (MONEYVAL,
2013, p. 15)

Available evidence indicates that although some ‘leakage’ of money

laundering into online gambling is inevitable, the threat is reduced
significantly in regulated environments when sites comply with licensing
conditions and risk mitigation strategies (Levi, 2009, p. 19). Risks are,
however, magnified in unregulated environments and at unlicensed sites
where criminal entrepreneurs may operate a site specifically for the
purposes of money laundering or utilise other sites as conduits for
their ill-gotten gains. So: ‘Although the legal framework can define the
requirements for licensed operators, greater collaboration between law
enforcement agencies to target unlicensed sites is required, particularly
with those that operate outside the visible Internet (such as those that
operate on TOR7)’ (McAfee, 2014, p. 14). Nevertheless, with more and
more states introducing regulatory frameworks through which to licence
and govern online operators and, in turn, enacting international and
regional money laundering directives, the opportunities for criminals to
wash their proceeds from crime through Internet gambling sites appear
to have diminished significantly.

7
TOR is a free software that enables anonymous Internet communication.
204 Gambling, Crime and Society

Theft and Fraud

Given the size of the industry, the number of operators, volume of players
and money held in gambling accounts, available as prizes, and flowing
between sites and various ancillary organisations, the Internet gambling
marketplace is ‘replete with criminal potential’ (McMullan and Rege,
2010, p. 69). Opportunities for fraud and theft present themselves in and
around Internet gambling sites and may be committed by site operators
and/or their employees, players and other ‘criminal entrepreneurs’. In
particular, black and grey markets present an increased likelihood of
consumer victimisation, as sites operating in such arenas are less likely
to offer consumer protection and responsible gambling measures or
follow formalised dispute resolution procedures. In such environments,
‘rogue bookmakers’ may engage in a range of criminal behaviours, includ-
ing stealing players’ deposits, winnings, means of payment or identity, or
defrauding players through the use of ‘rigged’ games or vague terms and
conditions of service which are used to ‘rule’ against a player (Banks,
2013, 2014).
‘Deposit-only bookmakers’, that take customers money but do not
disburse any winnings, present a particular threat to consumers using
Internet gambling sites in jurisdictions with little or no regulation. The
itinerant nature of unlicensed online gambling sites means that criminal
groups can easily introduce a new site, accumulate the deposits and
banking details of players before going offline without making payment
to customers (McMullan and Rege, 2010). Such sites typically operate
from domain registrations that are concealed through the use of either
anonymisers or proxy domains. This obfuscates ownership and makes it
unclear to consumers as to where the site is located and whether or not
they hold an appropriate license. Upon ‘closing’ some sites will reappear
under a new name. For example, Banks (2014) reports that a Costa Rica-
based sports book spent its last 2 months of operation altering bets,
removing players’ funds and closing accounts before going offline.
Within a month, a ‘new’ site was launched. Operating from the same
server and with a very similar Internet Protocol address, the site appeared
to bear all the hallmarks of the previous rogue sports book.
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 205

Securing customers’ trust and getting them to sign-up and deposit

money is likely to pose the greatest challenge to those operating scam
outfits and/or unlicensed sites. In order to enhance their authenticity
and credibility, such sites may employ fake kite marks of social respon-
sibility that are used to indicate that they hold an appropriate operating
licence, are accredited by an independent third party or subject to
regulatory oversight and dispute resolution procedures. Displaying
logos from organisations such as eCOGRA,8 the UK’s Gambling
Commission,9 GamCare10 or the Independent Betting Adjudication
Service11 can serve to make sites appear legitimate, safe and secure. For
example, a recent announcement by the UK’s Gambling Commission
(2016) warned consumers:

[T]o beware of gambling with www.betowen.com. This operator is not

licensed by the Gambling Commission despite claiming that it is on its
website. BetOwen is of considerable concern and the Commission is
taking action. In the meantime consumers are being advised not to deposit
money with this website.

Other criminal entrepreneurs may launch imitations of legitimate Internet

gambling operations by ‘lifting’ their design, graphics and content to
construct a webpage forgery that fools unwary players into depositing
their money (Griffiths, 2009). Through the use of cloned websites,
criminal entrepreneurs may also secure the login details of players along-
side banking information which enables them to commit further identity-
based crimes.

8
eCOGRA is an internationally accredited testing agency and player protection and standards
organisation that provides an international framework for best operational practice requirements,
with particular emphasis on fair and responsible gambling.
9
The UK’s Gambling Commission is an independent non-departmental public body that
regulates commercial gambling in Great Britain in partnership with licensing authorities.
10
GamCare is a registered independent charity that works directly helping problem gamblers,
their friends and family, by providing advice on the phone and online or through face-to-face
counselling.
11
The Independent Betting Adjudication Service (IBAS) is an independent third party offering
resolution of unresolved disputes between a customer and an IBAS registered bookmaker.
206 Gambling, Crime and Society

The regulated gambling environment also presents challenges for both

businesses and consumers. Despite the start-up costs of Internet opera-
tions being considerably lower than those of their land-based equiva-
lents, a highly competitive online environment means that Internet
gambling is characterised by low profit margins and high percentage
payouts (RSeconsulting, 2006). As such, gambling operators need to
sustain a high turnover in order to survive. A fall in revenue, particularly
during the close seasons of popular sports for betting, may see some
poorly financed operators struggle to make payments to players. This
can lead to once legitimate operators engaging in fraudulent practices,
failing to honour winnings and refusing to sanction withdrawals in order
to ‘survive’ (Cabot, 2004). As a business’ profits turn to losses, the
likelihood of the non-payment of customers increases, with some sites
eventually ‘disappearing’.
Other licensed Internet gambling sites have employed more insi-
dious techniques to defraud customers. As Banks (2014, p. 97)
recognises:

Complex terms of agreement and wager requirements prevent customers

withdrawing their money and many find their winnings and deposit
locked inside an account until all funds are exhausted. Moreover, rogue
gambling organisations often employ vague terms to ‘rule’ against players,
‘palp’ or void (winning) bets and refuse to make payment because the
player is deemed ‘professional’, has not entered into the ‘spirit’ of a
promotion or has ‘abused’ the bonus awarded.

Suggesting that a player is involved in professional trading or syndicate

betting, or that the odds were ‘out of line’ and ‘not of mark value’ have
been employed as justifications by both licensed and unlicensed opera-
tors when cancelling bets. Applying such ‘rules’ retroactively enables
online operators to void winning bets whilst ignoring, and thus profiting
from losing wagers.
That online gambling presents opportunities for cheating by other
players has also been identified, with online poker players in particular
raising concerns regarding the fairness of games. Wood and Griffiths
(2008, p. 90) study of online poker players identified that:
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 207

There was a lot of suspicion amongst the professional players that some-
times they were playing against computer programs (bots12), particularly
when they lost. Similarly, there was a fear amongst some that certain
computer viruses could be used by another player that would allow them
to see other players’ cards. Talking to other players using the chat facility
was one way that a player could be sure that they were in fact playing with
real people.

A number of incidents of poker players being defrauded by other players,

employees or former employees of gambling operators may well be behind
such concerns. Most notably, the superuser scandals involving two of
the largest Internet poker providers, Absolute Poker and UltimateBet,
stunned the online poker community and are likely to have heightened
concerns about the integrity of online gambling.
The Absolute Poker scandal in 2007 saw a former executive and an
unnamed former consultant of the company defraud high roller players of
in excess of US$800,000 over a 40-day period (see Palmer, 2007; Levitt,
2007; Gaul, 2008; Ware, 2008). By using superuser account #363 the
former consultant was able to enter poker tables as an observer and see, in
real-time, the hole cards of every other player at the poker table. This
information was communicated to the executive controlling a player
account with the alias ‘Potripper’, enabling him to know when other
players were bluffing and when he had a stronger hand. Upon losing a
heads-up contest against Potripper in a high roller US$1,000 dollar buy-in
tournament and suspecting foul play, competitor ‘CrazyMarcos’ requested
a copy of the hand history. In error, Absolute Poker provided the player
with not only the hand history of the tournament, but also a record of all
the cards held by players, their IP and email addresses. The data confirmed
what CrazyMarcos and other players had suspected: suspicious betting
patterns and improbable winning hands. POTRIPPER had seen every
flop unless his opponents had pocket queens or better and never lost a
showdown throughout the whole tournament. A cross check of IP
addresses identified that player #363 had entered the table after the first

12
An electronic bot is a computer program that undertakes automated tasks.
208 Gambling, Crime and Society

two hands and remained as an observer for the rest of the tournament. A
further six superuser accounts were identified, indicating that fraudulent
activities were more extensive than at first thought. A subsequent inves-
tigation by the Kahnawake Gaming Commission discovered that, over a
six week period from the 14 August 2007, seven accounts were used to
compromise Absolute Poker’s systems, by taking part in live poker games
with customers and using software that enabled the accounts to view in
real time the hands of the other players. Although they refused to name
the guilty parties, the Commission recorded that it had ‘identified the
person(s) responsible for the impugned activities and has directed that
[Absolute Poker] take action to have these person(s) removed from
playing any role in [Absolute Poker’s] “mind or management” and/or
operations and to provide proof, acceptable to the commission, that this
has been done’ (Kahnawake Gaming Commission, 2009a, pp. 1–2).
Although Absolute Poker was fined US$500,000, the company retained
its operating licence.
A second significant cheating scandal emerged in 2008, at Costa Rica-
based and Kahnawake-licensed poker site UltimateBet.com. Once again,
players evidenced and reported suspicious betting patterns and improbable
winning hands from an account operated by ‘NioNio’. UltimateBet con-
firmed ‘abnormally high winning statistics for the suspect accounts’, with
NioNio winning 13 of 14 sessions, amassing US$£300,000 in just 300
hands (Gaul, 2008; Ware, 2008). An investigation by players showed that
the win rate defied statistical odds, with NioNio winning 114 big blinds
per 100 hands over the 8,000 hands that he had played. By way of
comparison, the very best professional players seek to achieve a win rate
of 15 big blinds per 100 hands. In essence, NioNio’s win rate was ‘about
equal to winning the Powerball jackpot three days in a row’ (Gaul, 2008).
Like Absolute Poker, UltimateBet was subject to an investigation by the
Kahnawake Gaming Commission, headed by former New Jersey gambling
official Frank Catania. Identifying fraudulent activities over several years
that had cost players’ in the region of US$20 million, Catania recom-
mended that UltimateBet’s operating licence be revoked. Rejecting
the recommendation, the Commission instead chose to fine UltimateBet
US$1.5 million and ordered them to reimburse all of those adversely
affected by the cheating (Kahnawake Gaming Commission, 2009b).
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 209

There have been a number of other notable incidents of players working

either alone or with others to engage in fraudulent activities. For example,
PokerStars have investigated a number of incidences of ‘forced disconnec-
tion’ through DoS attacks (Jones, 2013a, 2013b). Targeted at individual
players, DoS attacks are used to knock them offline at a critical moment in
the poker game. As the victim is ‘timed out’ their hand is automatically
folded, allowing the attacker or their accomplice to claim the pot unchal-
lenged. More recently, Swedish national operator Svenska Spel suspended
14 accounts amidst claims of a bot-based cheating conspiracy on its poker
sites. In response to a complaint by a poker player, the operator uncovered
suspicious betting activity that indicated that illicit computer programs
that automate online poker play were in use (Wood, 2013). Occurring
over a 6-month period, a total of US$280,000 was reimbursed to affected
players. Referring the incident to Swedish police led to the identification of
five individuals who were found guilty at a District Court of aggravated
fraud and sentenced to probation (Wood, 2014). With both parties dis-
satisfied with the decision, the case was referred to the Court of Appeal who
ruled that there was insufficient evidence that the defendants sought to
harm the plaintiffs and that the threshold for fraud had not been reached
through the use of artificial intelligence (Glatzer, 2016).
Elsewhere, a suspected bot ring involving players primarily from
Russia and Kazakhstan won in the region of $1.5 million at the
$0.50/$1 and $1/$2 pot-limit Omaha tables on PokerStars, causing
much outrage amongst duped players. In condemning the actions of
the offenders, PokerStars highlighted that:

We work very hard to stay ahead of people who attempt to violate our
rules and invest significant resources (human and software) in detec-
tion and mitigation of violations, including the use of prohibited
software, such as bots. In such cases, over 95% of offenders are detected
proactively by PokerStars, with less than 5% identified by players. We
always welcome the assistance of players in enforcing the rules of our
games, because it can add focused insight that complements the meth-
ods used by our own systems. At the same time, we continually upgrade
our detection capabilities in attempt to stay ahead of the bad guys.
(Galtzer, 2015)
210 Gambling, Crime and Society

Other reported crimes have typically involved hackers accessing online

gambling accounts to enable the theft of funds from players and site
owners or modifying betting software to increase their win percentage
(Reuters, 2001a; RSeconsulting, 2006). For example, Canadian software
company CryptoLogic, who develop online casino games, reported that
hackers had accessed the firm’s servers, enabling 140 gamblers to win
US$1.9 million in a matter of hours. Elsewhere, a British-based gambling
entrepreneur stole over 400 billion poker chips from online gaming
company Zynga, laundering the stolen chips – worth in the region of
US$12 million – through a series of fake Facebook accounts before
selling them at vastly reduced prices (Morris, 2011). Similarly, in 2013,
a 19-year-old Argentinean was charged with stealing in the region of
US$600,000 by hacking into money transfers and Internet gambling
sites and rerouting appropriated funds directly to his bank account
(Rettmuller, 2013). Undoubtedly:

The incidence of Internet fraud has hit every sector of online commerce,
from banking to shopping sites. But casino attacks are considered a ripe
target for hackers, who are enticed by the large number of casinos still
operated in poorly policed jurisdictions such as the Caribbean and by the
large number of wagers they handle. (Reuters, 2001b)

Moreover, those cases identified by gambling operators, consumers,

regulatory authorities and academic researchers are likely to represent
‘the tip of the iceberg’ (McMullan and Rege, 2012, p. 342), with many
more crimes going unreported and unrecorded.

Gambling, Crime and Order Maintenance

Internet gambling is governed by a diverse array of regulations and
regulators. Online order maintenance involves gambling sites and their
integrity teams, network infrastructure and Internet service providers,
governmental regulators, national and international policing organisations,
private security services and sports betting intelligence units. Moreover,
recent research by McMullan (2012) and Banks (2013, 2014) has
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 211

demonstrated that, in a landscape of legal uncertainty and regulatory

diversity, consumers can play an important role in maintaining order in
virtual worlds, as well as taking steps to prevent online victimisation. Banks
(2014, p. 107) suggests that some players employ their technical compe-
tence and knowledge of the online gambling environment to avoid victi-
misation. His analysis of an ‘advantage player’13 subculture suggests that
players assess the various characteristics of Internet gambling sites through
an iterative process:

Initially, individuals engaged in a rapid, heuristic analysis of the design of

a large number of relevant websites. Individuals then undertook a more
systematic assessment of the content of sites, focusing upon how well they
demonstrate integrity, security, honesty and expertise. Finally, individuals
integrated personal experience, through their use and interaction with the
site. Thus, the way in which websites are promoted, marketed, structured,
and the pedagogical and security features embedded have significant
ramifications for both consumer trust in online gambling and trust in
(specific) online gambling operators.

This suggests that players demonstrate an acute awareness of jurisdic-

tional regulation, site legality and player protection mechanisms, care-
fully considering both the online operator and gambling market before
signing-up and depositing their money. Yet such a finding contradicts
the work of Wood and Williams (2010) who note that Internet
gamblers more broadly give little consideration as to the legality of a
site nor are they influenced by the jurisdiction in which a site operates
from.
McMullan’s (2012) examination of the Absolute Poker and UltimateBet
poker scandals does, however, demonstrate that consumers can play an
important role in discovering incidents of fraud and theft at gambling sites.

13
At its simplest, advantage play refers to the legal use of strategies of mathematical advantage
when ‘gambling’ online in order to substantially reduce or remove the risk inherent in the
transaction. Advantage players seek to exploit weaknesses in gambling operator’s products and
promotions to generate profits. These weaknesses are typically found in sports and horse betting,
casino games (such as blackjack and roulette) and slot machines. Advantage players use a number
of strategies including, but not limited to, match betting, bonus hunting and arbitrage.
212 Gambling, Crime and Society

In both cases, online communities performed a key role in gathering

evidence and alerting authorities to the crimes, despite assurances from
the poker operators that their sites were secure and that no cheating had
taken place. McMullan (2012, p. 105) highlights how in the Absolute
Poker fraud:

End users wrote software to decode the hand history data and posted
tables, and statistical findings on blogs and in chat rooms that stated that
the win rate for Potripper “was 100 times faster than a good player could
reasonably win” . . . Further investigations by poker forums, published at
sites such as Pokeronamac, Pokerroom.com, Two Plus Two.com, revealed
that Potripper’s email address was cross-referenced to a cable modem in
Costa Rica allegedly owned by a former president of AP. This email
address, in turn, was traced to Absolute Entertainment SA, located at
the data centre owned by Mohawk Internet Technologies. Within two
hours of these online revelations, the domain server for the email address
was suddenly deleted from the web.

Similar investigations conducted by consumers were evident in the

UltimateBet case, with forums generating in the region of 1,000
threads regarding the fraudulent activity, leading to UltimateBet and
their regulator the Kahnawake Gambling Commission being inun-
dated with complaints. Such cases demonstrate that where formal
crime control and player protection mechanisms are weak or lacking,
civilian policing can, on occasion, become a ‘potent influence on the
online behaviour’ of gambling operators (Ibid.: 107). Moreover, as
Banks (2014) has recognised, if there are strong dispute resolution
mechanisms in place, players will follow the complaints process if they
come into conflict with a betting operator. These examples suggest that
responsibilising consumers for their own crime control and personal
safety when online may be invaluable, given the challenges states face
in trying to regulate or prevent (certain forms of) Internet gambling. As
previous discussion has demonstrated, in jurisdictions, such as America
and China, for example, the prohibition of gambling has given rise to
black markets where citizens are afforded few of the player protection
measures and dispute resolution processes available in regulated
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 213

jurisdictions. And despite the inherent risks such activities pose, large
swathes of such countries’ populations continue to gamble at illegal
sites. In response, states have combined legal measures targeted at both
consumers and operators with a host of different technological and
educational preventative strategies in order to limit citizens’ access to
and use of black and grey market gambling operators. This includes
prohibiting advertising by external gambling suppliers, ensuring that
domestic financial institutions prevent gambling related transactions to
and from unlicensed sites, filtering illegal gambling sites from search
engines and preventing access to sites by blocking the IP addresses of
specific operators. Yet the effectiveness of such measures may well be
limited. As Forrest (2012, p. 40) notes:

Technology adapts to facilitate circumventions of restrictions.

Advertising shifts to international social network and other websites.
Word spreads on how individuals can still reach unauthorised websites.
New financial products, such as e-wallets, are developed as alternatives
to credit cards in wagering on foreign websites. Perhaps most impor-
tant of all, there is political constraint on how heavy-handed enforce-
ment of all these measures can be because of a strong social consensus
that the Internet should be free.

Educating the public regarding the dangers posed by unlicensed and

unregulated sites may, therefore, be the most effective approach
through which to limit the potential harms of illegal gambling.
Moreover, as Williams et al. (2012) have noted, the development of
reputable and well-regulated government and private Internet gam-
bling businesses in many jurisdictions of the world means that there is
far less need for consumers to access sites that may engage in illicit
business practices. Thus, ensuring that citizens can distinguish between
legal and illegal gambling operators could well prove a key to limiting
engagement with black and grey markets and reducing the potential for
crime and victimisation.
With states appearing largely impotent in tackling illicit extraterritor-
ial operators from soliciting citizens’ custom and few successful prosecu-
tions taking place, outlawing Internet gambling may not be the most
214 Gambling, Crime and Society

effective approach to creating a safe and secure gambling environment.

As the European Commission (2014, p. 1154) has recognised:

[I]f gambling activities were prohibited – especially after periods of wide-

spread legal availability of gambling services – the result would be to create
black or grey markets of illegal or questionably illegal gambling, so the
option of prohibition is one that would have to be evaluated in terms of
the social and economic costs that would follow from trying to enforce
laws against activities that have a strong inherent demand among the
general public.

Prohibition can only work if there is strong law enforcement and, to

date, this has been lacking in almost all jurisdictions across the globe
(Fiedler, 2014). Moreover, there is no guarantee that protectionist
prohibitive systems that limit the provision of Internet gambling to
certain wagering activities provided by a small number of licensed
operators will ‘canalise’ the illegal gambling market, in turn, diminishing
social costs, strengthening security and increasing government revenues
(McMullan, 2015). For example, although France has sought to offer
Internet gambling to its citizens, its stringent regulatory regime, which
has led to poor gambling value for players, sees many of them continue
to migrate to illegal extraterritorial sites that offer better value for money.
Once again, the failure/inability of the state to enforce its position has
led to residents continuing to trade outside of their country and illegal
operators continuing to profit by securing a significant share of the
market. In the face of the limited willingness or ability of states to
enforce their prohibitive stance, a more liberal regulated Internet gam-
bling environment may offer citizens greater protection from the crime
threats posed by online gambling. However, such an approach requires
states to carefully balance the provision of safe and secure Internet
gambling opportunities against the social and economic costs wide-
spread gambling may bring. As discussed in Chapter 1, the growing
availability of state-sanctioned remote forms of gambling is likely to
contribute to a range of social ills such as a growth in underage gam-
bling, increased rates of problem and pathological gambling, debt,
familial dysfunction, and crime and victimisation. Whether states can
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 215

develop licensing systems that are attractive to Internet gambling busi-

nesses, whilst generating desired taxes and limiting the negative effects of
gambling on societies is likely to be a significant challenge.

Conclusion
In little more than two decades, Internet gambling has grown to become
a multi-billion dollar industry that provides citizens from a significant
proportion of the world’s countries with an ever-expanding array of
wagering activities and opportunities. Casino games, sports betting,
horse race wagering, bingo, lotteries and poker feature as part of a
sophisticated, heterogeneous and dynamic Internet gambling market-
place. In response to the emergence and rapid growth in Internet
gambling, states have sought to develop appropriate mechanisms
through which to govern their marketplace and those operating within
it. There is, however, much variation in the way in which states regulate
Internet gambling, ranging from outright prohibition to highly liberal-
ised free market systems. However, many states have adopted prohibitive
systems that permit certain forms of gambling provided by a select
number of licensed operators.
Yet the anonymity, accessibility and interactivity of Internet gambling
continues to pose a number of challenges and crime threats to site
operators, consumers and wider society. In particular, the development
of black and grey gambling markets undermines states’ efforts to control
both the market entry and operational activities of online gambling
businesses. Misappropriating income from licensed operators and
depriving states of tax revenues, illegal unlicensed Internet sites pose a
particular problem, as they continue to offer gambling services to citi-
zens even if it contravenes a country’s laws. Such sites increase the risk of
underage gambling and the dangers posed to problem gamblers, as well
as presenting significant opportunity for fraud and theft to occur.
Evidence indicates that fraud and theft has been committed in and
around gambling businesses by site operators and/or their employees,
players and other ‘criminal entrepreneurs’. Fraudulent operators may
steal players’ deposits or winnings, means of payment or identity. Players
216 Gambling, Crime and Society

can also be defrauded through fixed games and/or vague gambling rules
or terms of service. Moreover, criminal entrepreneurs employ a variety of
computer techniques, including viruses, hacking and DDoS attacks, to
steal money or defraud both gambling operators and their customers.
Gambling sites, particularly in jurisdictions with poor or non-existent
regulatory regimes and supervisory mechanisms, also present a risk of
money laundering, as they may not use licensed financial institutions or
adhere to anti-money laundering protocols. Online gambling businesses
are also confronted by the dangers of crime syndicates who target
weaknesses in the infrastructures of their sites, threatening DDoS attacks
if extortion demands are not met. Occurring since the turn of the
twenty-first century, such attacks have become more widespread, as
DDoS toolkits and ‘botnets for hire’ have been made readily available
on hacking forums. With law enforcement intervention stymied by
jurisdictional ambiguity, resource constraints and limited technological
knowledge, many businesses have turned to technological solutions to
combat the threat posed by cyber-extortionists and DDoS attacks.
Subsequently, a host of cyber-security firms now provide Internet
gambling sites with DDoS prevention and mitigation hardware software
that although costly is substantially cheaper than the potential loss of
revenue – and future custom – caused by a service outage.
This chapter has demonstrated how the rapid growth in Internet
gambling, the complexity of the online marketplace and the challenges
of regulation present significant opportunities for criminals to target
gambling sites, their operators and their clientele. Limiting the threats
posed to businesses and players is an ongoing enterprise, with states,
regional bodies, industry associations, gambling site operators and
consumers enacting a host of different provisions and processes direc-
ted at preventing crime in and around online gambling sites and which
serve to make Internet gambling more controlled, transparent and
lawful. Moreover, directing consumers away from grey and black
market operators towards legal, licensed and regulated business appears
essential if opportunities for fraud, theft, laundering, underage and
problem gambling are to be reduced. With research into Internet
gambling in its infancy, we are only just beginning to understand the
impact it has on society. Further research that examines the
 6 Internet Gambling, Crime and the Regulation of Virtual . . . 217

criminogenic consequences of Internet gambling is undoubtedly neces-

sary if we are to develop appropriate safeguards for operators, consu-
mers and society more broadly.

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 7
Gambling and Crime: Myths and Realities

Across many regions of the world, the liberalisation of gambling laws

has led to the rapid expansion of commercial gambling. The latter part
of the twentieth century saw an acceleration of the deregulation of
gambling in a number of jurisdictions, enabling betting opportunities
to proliferate. In particular, large parts of the Western world have over-
seen the transformation of gambling from a ‘shadowy’ enterprise into a
mainstream leisure activity, with high-potency continuous forms of
gambling becoming ever more prevalent (Adams and Rossen, 2012).
Today, casino gambling, electronic machine gaming, sports wagering,
Internet betting, lotteries, bingo and scratch cards represent just some of
a panoply of different products and services that are readily consumed by
citizens throughout Europe, North America and Australasia.
In Europe, states have sought to either maintain government-run
gambling market monopolies or develop licence-based systems that
enable commercial businesses and foreign operators to hold gambling
licences (Nikkinen, 2014). Despite the variation in regulatory regime
employed by different countries, many European states preside over
continued growth in opportunities to gamble, citizens’ expenditure on
gambling, and state and industry revenues. North America has similarly

© The Author(s) 2017 225

J. Banks, Gambling, Crime and Society,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57994-2_7
226 Gambling, Crime and Society

seen a resurgence in availability and participation in legal gambling,

despite certain forms of gambling, most notably sports betting and
Internet wagering, remaining prohibited. Government-sanctioned gam-
bling has, nevertheless, spread rapidly across both the US and Canada,
whilst illegal forms of gambling also continue to feature prominently. In
Australasia, despite a fall in the number of individuals reporting past-
year participation in gambling (Productivity Commission, 2010; Tu,
2013), data indicates that there continues to be a rapid escalation in both
consumption and industry profits (Australasian Gaming Council,
2015a, 2015b; Dia.govt.nz, 2015). In contrast to developments in
much of the Western world, state-sponsored gambling and betting has
been slower to advance in Asia, although the introduction of casino
resorts in Macau, Singapore and Hong Kong represents a notable
regional trend and have been highly successful in generating huge
gambling revenues through large numbers of visitors to the region.
Electronic gaming machines, Internet betting and land-based casinos
underpin much of gambling’s expansion across the world, representing
highly profitable and potent aleatory experiences that are widely con-
sumed by citizenry for leisure and entertainment purposes. With the
gambling industry reimagined ‘as a legitimate purveyor of thrills, excite-
ment, fun and hope’, for many betting and gambling have become ‘a
socially acceptable recreational pastime’ (Banks, 2014, pp. 2–3). However,
despite increased acceptance, indeed popularity, of such wagering activ-
ities amongst significant sections of society, the growth in global gambling
is by no means approved of by all. Markham and Young (2015) have been
highly critical of the rise of ‘Big Gambling’ arguing that the alliance
between the state and the gambling industry is predicated on self-interest
rather than any change in citizens’ desires to gamble. Nevertheless, citi-
zens’ expenditure continues to grow as does industry profits and state
taxation revenues. Yet as the range and potency of betting products and
services multiply, gambling has emerged as a significant public health
issue. Researchers have evidenced that the growth in gambling activities
can lead to a wide array of economic, social and psychological harms that
impact a considerable portion of the population (Orford, 2011). Harmful
effects include increased rates of problem and pathological gambling,
unemployment, debt, depression, familial dysfunction, family breakdown,
 7 Gambling and Crime: Myths and Realities 227

and crime and victimisation. In turn, scholars continue to explore the

deleterious effects that the widespread availability of state-sponsored gam-
bling has on society.

Myths and Realities

The preceding chapters have sought to contribute to this discussion and
developing research agenda through their exploration of the manifold
actual, possible and probable interconnections between crime and gam-
bling. Evidence indicates that although the contemporary climate is one in
which gambling is viewed as legal and legitimate, opinion polls indicate
that, for some, gambling remains synonymous with crime (Azmier, 2000;
Gambling Commission, 2012). Yet such a view is only partially supported
by empirical evidence, which collectively suggests that:

The relationship between gambling and crime is complex and dynamic.

There are likely to be different types of crime associated with gambling and
variations among jurisdictions, across cultures and over time. Therefore, to
refer simply to a single relationship between gambling and crime ignores
complexities. A multiplicity of relationships between gambling and crime
must be recognised. (Campbell and Marshall, 2007, p. 544)

For many, gambling’s association with crime stems from fictional and
factual portrayals of the Italian-American mafia’s involvement in legal
and illegal gambling in Las Vegas from the 1920s onwards. But although
organised crime groups influence here has waned, the spread of casinos
across other US states has raised concerns that they bring with them
crime, disorder and vice. Yet evidence to support the hypothesis that
casinos act as hot spots for various forms of street crime is mixed. Over
the last three decades, a host of US studies have sought to establish
whether or not casinos impact on crime, drawing on recorded crime
rates at both a city and a county level. Collectively, this research
indicates that although casinos can increase the total volume of crime
within a locality, this is typically explained by the increased number of
visitors to the area. Moreover, increases in crime, as a consequence of
228 Gambling, Crime and Society

increases in tourism, are not unique to casinos, occurring in areas where

other forms of leisure and entertainment are located (Park and
Stowkoski, 2011). This suggests that conventional wisdom that casinos
cause crime is not supported by empirical evidence (Parker, 1994;
Walker, 2010; Philander and Bernhard, 2012).
Similarly, in the UK, empirical evidence demonstrating an association
between LBOs – which house FOBTs – and crime and anti-social
behaviour is scant. This is principally because there has been little in
the way of research exploring the perceived relationship, rather than as a
consequence of any failure to establish that LBOS and/or FOBTs have
an effect on crime rates. So whilst empirical evidence indicates that the
density of electronic gaming machines is correlated with socio-economic
deprivation – mirroring other international jurisdictions – and, in turn,
may be responsible for myriad forms of harm, there is, to date, only
anecdotal evidence that EGMs and LBOs lead to an increase in crime
and incivility in the communities in which they are located.
Population studies do, however, indicate that problem gambling is a
significant criminogenic factor, with surveys of general, clinical and
correctional sub-populations recording notable levels of gambling-
related offending. Whilst there is much variation in the rate of patholo-
gical and problem gambling, and gambling-related crime recorded by
these surveys, studies of correctional populations consistently demon-
strate significantly higher rates of gambling disorders, as well as higher
rates of gambling-related offending, than general population studies (see,
e.g. Williams et al., 2005). Gambling-related offending appears to be
primarily acquisitive in nature, with gamblers engaging in a wide variety
of offences, including larceny, robbery, fraud, theft and embezzlement,
to fund their gambling activities or gambling-related shortfalls in
finance. There is, however, a growing body of evidence to suggest that
problem gambling manifests itself in acts of violence and violent crime
(Laursen et al., 2015; Roberts et al., 2016). Significantly, there is
emerging evidence that problem gambling presents a specific risk factor
for intimate partner and family violence (Suomi et al., 2013; Dowling
et al., 2016). Thus, the criminogenic effects of problem gambling appear
significant and varied, impacting both the public and the private sphere,
individual victims, businesses and wider society.
 7 Gambling and Crime: Myths and Realities 229

Developing an understanding of the nature, trajectory and fluidity of

the relationship between problem gambling and crime has, however,
proved challenging for researchers. Yet available evidence suggests that,
for many problem gamblers, offending occurs relatively late in the
development of their condition. In such cases, crime represents the
final option after all legal routes to funding gambling activities or
shortfalls in finance are closed (Lesieur, 1979, 1984; Blaszczynski and
Silove, 1996). Other studies (Rosenthal and Lorenz, 1992; Blaszczynski
and McConaghy, 1994) suggest a clear association between pathologi-
cal gambling and crime, with the likelihood of offending increasing
with the severity of disorder, whilst a further body of research has
purported to demonstrate that gambling and offending, for some, are
symptoms of other underlying factors, notably impulsivity, antisocial
tendencies and increased risk acceptance (Blaszczynski et al., 1997;
Potenza et al., 2001; Blaszczynski and Nower, 2002; Williams et al.,
2008; Mishra et al., 2011).
A smaller body of work has focused on the degree to which organised
crime groups are engaged in the provision of legal and illegal opportu-
nities to gamble. Although such research has been sporadic, it does
suggest that contemporary gambling environs present opportunities
for the involvement of organised criminals in both licit and illicit
enterprises. Whilst the proliferation of legal opportunities to gamble in
many regions may have reduced the demand for illegal gambling, partial
prohibitions in some countries present opportunities for organised crime
groups. Most notably, in the US and China, gambling prohibitions have
given rise to the illegal supply of electronic gaming machines, gambling
parlours and dens, Internet betting sites, and animal fighting and betting
rings (Albanese, 2015; Wang and Antonopoulos, 2015). This work also
indicates that organised crime’s penetration of the legal sector has, in
many regions of the world, been curbed through rigorous regulation and
licensing processes that ensure that gambling businesses are lawful,
transparent and legitimate. However, in Macau, despite the introduction
of legislation designed to curtail organised crime’s involvement in the
casino industry, triad groups maintain a prominent role in the operation
of VIP rooms, soliciting high rollers custom and collecting debts in
mainland China.
230 Gambling, Crime and Society

Evidence also indicates that organised crime groups exploit legal

forms of gambling for a variety of nefarious activities, including
money laundering, fraud and theft, cyber-extortion, and match-fixing.
In particular, the betting-related manipulation of sporting events has
been recognised as a ‘universal deviancy’ (Hill, 2014, p. 10), impacting
most sports and most regions of the world. Changes to the structural
features of betting wrought by the Internet have given rise to increased
opportunities for irregular betting. Greater liquidity in sports markets,
the globalisation of gambling, the advent of betting exchanges, lower
transaction costs, and the increased availability of in-play wagering and
proposition betting, cumulatively pose a particular problem to those
charged with maintaining the integrity of sport. Thus, ensuring that
sporting events and competitions are protected from the corrupting
effects of organised criminals has emerged as a significant issue, with
states, law enforcement agencies, sporting organisations, betting opera-
tors and gambling associations instituting a number of legal, educative
and technological measures aimed at reducing the opportunities for
match-fixing and successfully prosecuting those found guilty of the
betting-related manipulation of sport.
Equally, a variety of educational, technological and legal measures
have been directed towards preventing crime and maintaining order in
online environments. Evidence indicates that virtual villains range from
solo criminal actors to complex and dynamic organised crime networks
that engage in a variety of criminal activities in and around gambling
sites, which are targeted at both legitimate gambling businesses and their
clientele (McMullan and Rege, 2010). Notably, cyber-extortion and
distributed denial of service attacks emerged at the turn of twenty-first
century as a new ‘racket’ through which organised criminal groups
sought to secure a share of the highly lucrative online gambling industry
(McMullan and Rege, 2007). Directed at sports betting sites during ‘big
money events’, demands for the wiring of money in return for protec-
tion from crippling attacks that can knock sites offline are issued with
alarming regularity. Today, most sites invest heavily in DDoS preven-
tion and mitigation hardware and software, in order to prevent outages
and a potential loss of revenue. The virtual environment is also host to a
large number of unlicensed black and grey market gambling sites that
 7 Gambling and Crime: Myths and Realities 231

solicit citizens’ custom in contravention of many states’ laws. Incidents

of fraud and theft – which have also taken place at a number of licensed
and legal gambling sites – are more likely to occur at such sites, as
consumers have little recourse to the player dispute resolution proce-
dures that are available in regulated jurisdictions. Consequently, opera-
tors are able to steal players’ deposits, winnings, means of payment and
identities, whilst players may also be defrauded through ‘rigged’ games
or vague terms of service (Banks, 2013).
As Smith and Wynne (1999) have noted, there is a general perception
that the increased availability of gambling products and services results
in an increase in crime. Yet, as preceding discussion illustrates, the
relationship between gambling and crime ‘is far from straightforward’
(Banks, 2014, p. 6). Legal forms of gambling ebb and flow, presenting
opportunities for the provision of illicit forms of gambling when and
where there is public demand. In particular, unlicensed Internet betting
sites have emerged, alongside more traditional illegal land-based gam-
bling venues, in regions where (certain forms of) wagering activities are
prohibited. Yet as Munting (1996, p. 36) has recognised: ‘By definition
the extent of illegal gambling cannot be measured’ and, as such, it is hard
to identify the magnitude of illegal gambling in a specific region or
whether it has increased or decreased over time. It is, however, logical to
assume that the increased availability of legal forms of gambling in many
states will decrease the need for citizens to engage with illegal gambling
operators. Nevertheless, it is evident that criminals will still seek out
opportunities for the provision of illicit gambling products and services
when and where there is demand. Crimes related to land-based or online
gambling venues are more likely to take place if a business is illegal and
unlicensed or when due diligence and regulatory procedures are not
adhered to. In such environments, fraud and theft, money laundering,
extortion and betting related to the manipulation of sporting events
represent just some of a number of crime threats to consumers, busi-
nesses and wider society.
There is little evidence to suggest that the introduction of legalised
gambling establishments has a significant impact on the overall crime
rate in the jurisdictions in which they are located. Thus, public fear and
concern appears to be based upon political and media ‘contentions that
232 Gambling, Crime and Society

an association exists between’ gambling, crime and anti-social behaviour

rather than any demonstrable link (Arthur et al., 2014, p. 50). Evidence
does, however, more clearly indicate that problem gamblers engage in
crime in order to fund their gambling or shortfalls in finance. Whilst
international studies show that problem gamblers represent a small per-
centage of the total population of many countries (Gowing et al., 2015),
rates of problem gambling are, on average, up to 20 times greater amongst
offender populations when compared to the general community (Perrone
et al., 2013). Moreover, rates of reported offending are significant, ranging
from 4 to 90 per cent of problem gamblers surveyed (Ibid.). Such findings
have significant implications for criminal justice systems across the world,
particularly if the expansion of state sponsored gambling opportunities is
implicated in a rise in problem gambling and gambling-related crime.
Under a public health framework, the proliferation of state-sponsored
legal opportunities to gamble requires states to institute measures to
mitigate the damaging social, psychological and economic effects of wide-
spread gambling. This compels countries’ criminal justice systems to be
responsive to problem gambling-related crime, developing mechanisms
through which problem gamblers can be identified and recorded, intro-
ducing gambling-specific treatment programmes within correctional set-
tings and directing courts to apply therapeutic justice in cases where
gambling problems are identified as underpinning an individual’s offend-
ing behaviour. Such measures may be considered essential in reducing
some of the harms caused by gambling, preparing offenders for commu-
nity re-entry, reducing the likelihood of reoffending and halting the cycle
of gambling, debt and crime (Turner et al., 2009).
Such recommendations are not, however, in themselves, enough. As
Livingstone and Wooley (2007) forcibly argue, post harm corrections
cannot correct the damage caused by gambling. Instead, societies need to
develop supply side harm reduction measures that reduce gambling
demand, constrain supply, or concentrate gambling opportunities.
Developing a better understanding of the criminogenic consequences
of (specific forms of) gambling could, in turn, add weight to demands
for government initiated supply side strategies that reduce gambling
participation and gambling-related harms.
 7 Gambling and Crime: Myths and Realities 233

Advancing Understanding of Gambling

and Crime in Society
There are a number of avenues for further empirical research, which could
advance our understanding of the relationships between gambling and crime.
As Chapter 2 highlighted, the resurgence of LBOs across many towns
and cities in the UK has led to increased concerns that they bring with
them a host of social ills, including crime, anti-social behaviour and
disorder in the communities in which they are located. Yet, to date, there
has been very little research that has explored the impact of betting shops on
crimes rates nor do we have a clear idea of the frequency with which crime
occurs on such premises. Research addressing these shortfalls in knowledge
could have significant crime prevention implications. For example, if bet-
ting shops are identified as sites for specific crimes, such as violence, then
this would enable the development of appropriate measures to safeguard
staff, customers and the wider community. More broadly, developing an
understanding of how and why gambling establishments may, at certain
times, in certain places, present increased crime risks to players, providers
and citizenry could inform the advancement of mechanisms that enhance
personal safety and lawfulness in and around such venues.
Assessing the impact of the encroachment of gambling products and
services into the domestic sphere represents a second area for examination.
In particular, the effects of the increased availability of myriad forms of
remote gambling on problem gambling and family life warrant sustained
exploration. This may be considered particularly pertinent, given the grow-
ing body of evidence indicating that problem gambling can lead to violence,
which may be directed at intimate partners or extended family members. In
turn, further examination of the potential relationships between problem
gambling and both the victimisation and perpetration of family violence
may be considered a research priority. This should enable us to develop a
better understanding of the nature, trajectory, fluidity and impact of any
problem gambling-family violence relationship, as well as any risk factors for
comorbid problem gambling and family violence. In turn, findings could be
invaluable in helping shape best practice relating to the education, preven-
tion and treatment of gambling-related harm.
234 Gambling, Crime and Society

Developing a body of research focused on problem gambling and the

administration of justice is also a research priority. Our limited knowledge
of the gambling–crime relationship and the effectiveness of treatment
programmes within criminal justice settings impede the introduction
and implementation of appropriate mechanisms designed to identify
and record problem gambling and reduce the harms caused by gam-
bling-related crime. Moreover, we know very little about gambling that
takes place in the prison environment and the implications such activities
may have on individuals both pre- and post-release. Thus, establishing the
treatment needs of offenders exhibiting problem gambling is essential, as is
ascertaining factors that will encourage offenders to seek out and engage
with treatment programmes. Finally, all treatment programmes employed
as part of an individual’s sentence must be subject to rigorous evaluation,
in order to identify the degree to which they aid community re-entry and
reduce the likelihood of further gambling-related offending.
Collectively, such gaps in knowledge highlight how our under-
standing of gambling-related offending and harm reduction mea-
sures is in its infancy. Developing a research agenda that examines,
and helps us better understand, the relationships between gambling
and crime in contemporary society is, therefore, essential if we are
to reduce the social harms caused by the proliferation of opportu-
nities to gamble.

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 Index

A Australia, 9, 10, 11, 12, 51, 64n1,

Absolute Poker, 16, 207–208, 67, 72, 73, 83, 84n7, 91, 98,
211, 212 100, 116, 117, 141, 142, 147,
Acquisitive crime, 50, 82, 85, 86 164n8, 183, 188, 196, 197
Adams, P.J., 1, 11, 12, 20, 225
Advertising, 5, 8, 143–145, 213
Albanese, J. S., 33, 40, 41, 44, 46, B
47, 114, 115, 116, 119, 121, Banks, J., 16, 34, 128, 146, 190,
122, 229 196, 197, 203, 204, 206, 210,
American Gaming Association, 119 211, 212, 226, 231
Animal fighting and betting Betcris, 196–197
rings, 133, 229 Betting exchanges, 151, 155, 157,
Anti–social behaviour, 22, 35, 38, 158, 170, 173, 184, 196, 230
48–55, 63, 82, 228, Big gambling, 2, 226
232, 233 Bingo, 2, 4–6, 13, 20, 31, 49, 94,
Asia, 1, 17–19, 20, 123, 124, 127, 183, 184, 187, 215, 225
154, 155, 156, 172, 189, 226 Black Friday
Atlantic City, 14, 39–41, 139 Blaszczynski, A., 65, 68, 69, 73, 79–81,
Australasia, 1, 9–12, 20, 21, 31, 83–85, 89, 91, 93, 142, 229
225, 226 Botnets, 195, 197, 198

© The Author(s) 2017 239

J. Banks, Gambling, Crime and Society,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57994-2
240 Index

C E
Canada, 12, 13, 44, 46, 47, 51, Early warning systems, 23, 153, 161,
64n1, 73, 74, 75, 83, 91, 98, 164, 170–173
100, 116, 118, 126, 145, Electronic gaming machines, 8, 10,
164n8, 184, 189, 226 11, 13, 20, 21, 50, 51, 64,
Casino City, 14, 124, 184 113, 125, 126, 133, 226,
Casinos, 2, 5–8, 10, 13, 15, 18, 22, 228, 229
31–35, 37–48, 55–56, 63, Europe, 1, 2–9, 20, 21, 31, 113, 125,
111–113, 117, 120, 125, 127, 138, 144, 154, 165, 166, 172,
130, 131, 133, 183, 184, 189, 183, 187, 191, 197, 201, 225
196, 201, 202, 226, 227, 228 European Commission, 9, 165, 187,
Cheating, 3, 95, 113, 116, 139, 165, 188, 191, 192, 214
194, 206, 208, 209, 212 Extortion, 111, 121, 129, 194, 196,
China, 17, 18, 20, 116, 123–125, 198, 199, 216, 231
128, 129–133, 148, 151,
164n8, 189, 190, 191,
212, 229 F
Clinical population surveys, 68–70 Family violence, 35, 87, 88, 228, 233
Control theory, 36 Financial action Task Force, 199,
Correctional population surveys, 22, 200, 201
73–77 Finland, 8, 64n1, 149, 165,
Council of Europe, 148, 165, 166n9, 187
200, 203 Fixed Odds Betting Terminals, 22,
Court of Justice of the European 31, 34, 35, 49–52, 63, 228
Union, 9 Football, 18, 19, 124, 138, 139,
Cricket, 18, 147, 149, 150, 141–143, 147, 148, 154, 158,
157–159, 173 159, 167
Criminal Code of Canada, 12, 13 Forced disconnection, 209
Criminal justice data, 22, 70 Forrest, D., 140, 142, 152, 155, 157,
Criminological theory, 35, 37, 162 158, 162, 192, 213
Cross–border activities, 201 Forums, 212, 216
France, 6, 7, 8, 64n1, 125, 141, 144,
165, 172, 188, 192, 214
D Fraud, 3, 16, 24, 35, 46, 68, 71,
Denial of service attacks, 82–84, 86, 88, 89, 113, 126,
195–199, 230 127, 129, 131, 138, 165, 170,
Department of Justice, 16, 138 193, 194, 204, 209, 211, 212,
Deposit–only bookmakers, 204 228, 230, 231
 Index 241

G India, 18, 149, 190

Gambling Commission, 50, 53, 113, Integrity units, 23, 164, 167–170
168, 171, 191, 201, 202, 205, International Olympic
205n9, 212, 227 Committee, 166, 167,
Gambling related crime, 21, 22, 170, 171
35–37, 65–74, 78, 81, 83–85, Internet gambling, 9–11, 13, 15, 16,
88–90, 93, 100, 115, 145, 185, 23, 24, 49, 116, 120, 124, 155,
193, 228, 232, 234 183–217
General population surveys, 66–68 Islamic countries, 186
Germany, 8, 64n1, 69, 72, 73, 83,
148, 149, 165, 166n9, 192,
193, 198 K
Great Britain, 51, 64n1, 205n9 Kahnawake, 184, 208, 212
Grey markets, 155, 190, 191, 192, KEA European Affairs, 146, 148,
193, 204, 213, 230 153, 165
Griffiths, M.D., 54, 64, 77, 86, 145,
205, 206
L
Las Vegas, 18, 70, 71, 111–113, 125,
H 129, 227
Harm, 21, 35, 48, 50, 52, 93, 95, Legalisation, 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 34, 40,
100, 139, 145, 193, 209, 213, 41, 47, 117, 125
226, 228, 232–234 Levi, M., 200, 203
Hill, D., 152, 156, 159, 160, 160n7, Licensed Betting Offices, 35, 48–55,
162, 171, 230 63, 64, 228, 233
History, 2, 6, 14, 19, 23, 33, 72, Licensing, 13, 17, 52, 53, 112, 133,
111, 112, 117, 207 183, 203, 205n9, 215, 229
Horse racing, 4, 10, 13, 15, 18, 84, Lotteries, 2, 6, 8, 13, 14, 15,
140, 141, 147, 151, 157, 159, 17–20, 116, 117, 170, 187,
187–189 189, 201, 225
Hot spots, 37, 38, 39, 43, 227

M
I Macau, 17, 18, 20, 64n1, 123, 125,
Identity theft, 194, 204, 215 127–131, 133, 226, 229
Illegal gambling, 11, 15–18, 24, 35–36, Market size, 6
71n3, 111–134, 190–192, 213, Match fixing, 23, 124, 140,
214, 227, 229, 231 145–155, 158–174, 230
242 Index

McMullan, J.L., 126, 193–196, Player protection, 205n8, 211, 212

198, 199, 204, 210, 211, 212, Poker, 7, 10, 16, 18, 20, 51, 116,
214, 230 119, 183, 184, 187–189, 192,
Money laundering, 16, 24, 36, 50, 206–212
52, 111, 113, 121, 127, 128, Population studies, 66, 67, 74, 228
131, 133, 138, 170, 194, Prison, 66, 70, 72–75, 77, 90,
199–203, 216, 230, 231 93–98, 121, 149, 192, 234
Monopolies, 7–9, 117, 187, 190, Problem gambling, 22, 23, 36, 50,
191, 225 51, 63–100, 145, 193, 216,
228, 229, 232–234
Problem gambling-crime
N relationship, 77–82
National Anti-Gambling League, 3
National Lottery, 4, 5, 11
Netherlands, 8, 64n1, 125, 148, 165, R
166n9, 169, 183 Rational choice theory, 36
Nevada, 15, 16, 43, 70, 71, 112, Rege, A., 193–199, 204, 210, 230
116, 117, 133 Regulation, 6, 12, 112, 116, 127,
New Zealand, 11, 12, 12n4, 50, 51, 133, 145, 157, 166, 187, 201,
64n1, 67, 72–75, 81, 83, 84n7, 210, 211, 216, 229
87, 94, 141, 144, 164n8, 189 Revenue, 2, 4, 8, 11–13, 18, 20, 21,
North America, 1, 12–17, 20, 21, 32, 33, 50, 112, 117, 118,
22, 31, 32, 56, 89, 98, 118, 141–143, 174, 186, 188, 190,
119, 225 192, 199, 206, 214–216, 225,
226, 230
Rossen, F., 1, 11, 12, 20, 225
O Routine activity theory, 37, 38, 163
Offshore gambling sites, 15, 119
Organised crime, 15, 19, 23, 32, 33,
111–134, 170, 172, 194, 195, S
227, 229, 230 Sentencing, 15, 23, 65, 71, 72, 73,
76, 89, 90–94, 121, 122,
148–150, 192, 198, 234
P Singapore, 17, 18, 20, 64n1, 148,
Participation rates, 6, 12, 184 190, 226
Pathological gambling, 21, 69, 70, Snooker, 147, 151, 158, 168
71, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 91, Social learning theory, 36
93, 214, 226, 229 Spain, 6, 7, 64n1, 144, 165, 188
 Index 243

Spapens, T., 113, 116, 125 Triads, 128–130,

Sponsorship, 4, 142–144 133, 229
Sporting codes of conduct, 23,
166–167
Sports betting, 2, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, U
18, 23, 36, 94, 116, 118, 119, UltimateBet, 207, 208,
133, 143, 144, 153, 155, 156, 211, 212
158, 161–163, 166, 167, 170, United States of America, 164n8
172, 184, 187–189, 192, 193, Unlawful Internet Gambling
201, 210, 226, 230 Enforcement Act
State-corporate harm, 50 Unlicensed operators, 206
Strain theory, 162

V
T Video Lottery Terminals, 13, 14, 46,
Taiwan, 19 51, 113, 126, 127
Taxation, 4, 20, 21, 156, 183, 226 Vigorish, 132, 132n7
Tennis, 147, 151, 152, 158, Violent crime, 23, 40, 44–46,
159, 168 52, 86, 228
Theft, 3, 24, 35, 40, 42, 44, 47, 68,
71, 82, 84, 115, 126, 193–195,
204, 210, 211, 228, 230, 231 W
Treatment, 23, 32, 65, 66, 68–70, Williams, R.J., 82, 94, 97, 145, 183,
80, 83, 84, 88, 92, 93, 96–99, 184, 186, 213, 228, 229
232–234 Wire Act, 15, 189