REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution
dated 14 March 2022 which reads as follows:
"UDK-17203 (Mary Cris Bedonia Guinalon v. Nelson Guinalon, Jr.). -
The Court resolves to GRANT petitioner Mary Cris Bedonia Guinalon's
(petitioner) motion for extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioner
assailing the Decision2 dated December 19, 2019 and the Resolution 3 dated June 9,
2021 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CV. No. 06842, which denied
petitioner's appeal for her failure to show that her matTiage with respondent Nelson
Guinalon, Jr. (respondent) is void ab initio, thereby affirming in toto the Decision4
dated October 3, 2017, 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Silay City, Branch 69 (RTC).
The Facts
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent met in 2003 through a common
friend when they were both applying for employment with the Philippine National
Police. In May 2005, she discovered that she was pregnant with respondent's child.
Thus, in June of the same year, they were married in a civil ceremony which was
solemnized by Presiding Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes (Presiding Judge
Magallanes). However, petitioner averred that they did not cohabit with each other
for five (5) years prior to their marriage, since petitioner was living at their family
home in E.B. Magalona while respondent was at the Regional Mobile Group (RMG)
Headquarters in Victorias City. 6
When she was about eight (8) months pregnant, petitioner learned from a
friend that respondent was having an extra-marital affair, which prompted her to go
Rollo, pp. 12-24 .
2
Id. at 30-48. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles with Associate Justices Marilyn B . Lagura-
Yap and Alfredo D. Ampuan, concurring.
3 Id. at 49-50. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles with Associate Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-
Yap and Lorenza Redulla Bordios, concurring.
4
RTC Decision is not attached in the rollo; see id. at 34-35.
See id. at 30.
6 Id. at 31.
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to the house shared by respondent and his p,1ramour Claire Bajos (Bajos). There,
she met Bajos and introduced herself as respondent's wife, which caught Bajos by
surprise. Baj os then called respondent, but when the latter realized that petitioner
was beside Bajos, he turned off his phone. After meeting Bajos, petitioner headed
for Bacolod to look for respondent. Not having fou nd him, petitioner j ust went
home. As she was about to go to sleep, she noticed that she was bleeding. Thus,
petitioner was rushed to the hospital where the doctors decided to induce the child's
birth. The following day, or on December 31 , 2005, she gave birth to their son.
Thereafter, she continued to search for respondent but to no avail. When they finally
met, respondent agreed to give petitioner and their child monthly support but
because of his loan, he was only able to give a net pay of Pl,500.00. After some
time, petitioner got tired of asking for support from respondent so she left him.
Petitioner also found out that respondent continued to live with Bajos, and that the
last time she saw respondent w~.s in 2013.7 The foregoing circumstances prompted
petitioner to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the
RTC, alleging that: (a) their marriage was celebrated without a marriage license;
and (b) respondent is psychologically incapacitated as manifested by his
abandonment, infidelity, and failure to give support. 8 ·
Despite receipt of summons, respondent did not file his answer. Nonetheless,
the case proceeded to trial. 9 Petitioner presented her own testimony and her
witnesses, namely: fellow police officers Marilyn Dumudumaya Arriola (Arriola),
Alfonso Separo Arriola, Jr. (Arriola Jr.), expert witness Milagros Hinayan Lagman
(Lagman), and Social Worker Officer II Judy Ybias-Empio (Ybias-Empio). 10
Arriola testified that respondent was assigned to the RMG Headquarters in
Victorias City, and that for four months after the parties were married, everything
went well. After four months, however, petitioner and respondent started to fight.
Respondent eventually left petitioner and lived at the RMG Headquarters. 11
On the other hand, Arriola, Jr. testified that after the wedding, petitioner and
respondent lived in the house of petitioner's parents at Brgy. Manta-angan, E.B.
Magalona. But after the birth of their child, petitioner and respondent parted ways,
and respondent would just visit petitioner at her family's house. However, when
petitioner and respondent fought, the latter no longer visited the former. Moreover,
respondent used to support petitioner by giving forty percent (40%) of his salary to
the latter, which stopped after some time. 12
Meanwhile, in her report, expert witness Lagman stated that both petitioner
and respondent are psychologically incapacitated. Notably, however, she only
explained that petitioner is suffering from a Conduct Disorder that might harm her
psychologically and emotionally if in close proximity with respondent. n
Id. at 33.
Id. at 31-32.
Id . at 14-15.
10
Id. at 32.
11
Id. at 33-34.
12
Id. at 33.
13
Id. at 34.
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Lastly, in her report, social worker Ybias-Empio noted that petitioner has long
been playing the dual role of a father and a mother to their son, and that in the best
interest of the child, sole custody must be granted to petitioner. 14
The RTC Ruling
15
In a Decision dated October 3, 2017, the RTC upheld the marriage of
petitioner and respondent, and denied the petition for lack of merit. 16 The RTC
opined that the psychologist presented by petitioner failed to make any direct and
conclusive finding that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder which
renders him incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a husband. The RTC likewise
found that except for the certificate of marriage, petitioner failed to present any other
evidence to support her claim that her marriage with respondent was solemnized
without the requisite marriage license. 17
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. 18 Hence,
petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 19 dated Decei.nber 19, 2019, the CA denied the appea l and
affirmed in toto the RTC mling. 20 With regard to the absence of marriage license,
the CA declared that the marriage of petitioner and respondent was exempted from
the license requirement for having complied with the five (5)-year cohabitation
requirement. It noted that the solemnizing officer, Presiding Judge Magallanes,
personally examined the petitioner and respondent and their affidavit of
cohabitation before performing their marriage ceremony under Article 34 of the
Family Code. Having found the same to be in order, Judge Magallanes certified that
'no marriage license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Art. 34 of
Executive Order No. 209' and signed the Oath of Solemnizing Officer. 21
As to the claim of psychological incapacity, the CA held that there is nothing
in the psychologist's report to suggest the existence of respondent's psychological
incapacity. Moreover, it cannot accept the claim of petitioner that she is likewise
psychologically incapacitated since her petition did not contain such allegation. In
any event, the CA found that petitioner failed to prove her own psychological
incapacity, as there is no indication of any behavioral problems on her part, and that
her supposed Conduct Disorder was not deeply rooted prior to their marriage.
Neither was it shown that the same was incurable. 22
14
Id. at 34.
15
RTC Decision is not attached in the rollo; see id. at 34-35.
16
See id. at 34-35.
17
See id. at 35.
18
The judgment denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration was not attached in the rollo.
19
ld. at 30-48. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles with Associate Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-
Yap and Alfredo D . Ampuan, concurring.
20
Id. at 48.
21
Id. at 37-39.
22
Id. at 39-47.
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March 16, 2022
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied in a
Resolution23 dated June 9, 2021; hence, this petition. 24
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Comi's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in ruling
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not void ab initio.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that as correctly found by the CA, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent was exempted from the license requirement
for having complied with the five (5)-year cohabitation requirement. Article 34 of
the Family Code states:
ARTICLE 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a
man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall
also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Records reveal that it was only after personally interviewing and examining
the parties and their evidence that the solemnizing officer, Presiding Judge
Magallanes, certified that 'no marriage license was necessary, the marriage being
solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive Order No. 209,' and thereafter, signed the
Oath of Solemnizing Officer. The execution of the certification and the oath is the
solemnizing officer's official duty, and is thus presumed to have been regularly
performed absent other evidence to the contrary.25 In this regard, it is settled that the
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence
of irregularity or failure to perform a duty, 26 which petitioner failed to show in this
case.
On the claim of psychological incapacity, it is well to emphasize that in the
recent case of Tan-Anda! v. Anda! (Tan-Andal), 27 the Court abandoned the previous
jurisprudential framework on psychological incapacity, clarifying that the said
concept is 'neither a mental incapacity nor only a personality disorder that must be
proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or
enduring aspects of a person's personality, called 'personality structure,'
which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines
the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or
her to understand and, more importantly, to comply with his or her essential marital
obligations. ' 28
23
Id. al 49-50. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles with Associate Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-
Yap and Lorenza Redulla Bordios, concurring.
24
ld. at 12-24
25
See Section 3 (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
26
Abbas v. Abbas, 702 Phil. 578, 592 (2013).
27
G.R. No. 196359, May 11 , 2021.
2K Id.
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In Tan-Andal, the Court further held that in psychological incapacity cases,
petitioner spouse must prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence.
However, proof of a spouse's personality aspects need not be given by an expert.
'Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the
latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently
observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge will
decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to
assume the essential marital obligations.' 29
In light of the Comt's fundamental paradigm shift in viewing psychological
incapacity as a purely legal, rather than a medical or clinical concept, the
requisites in determining psychological incapacity, namely: incurability, gravity,
and juridical antecedence, were refined accordingly.
In particular, psychological incapacity is incurable only in the legal (not
medical) sense in that the incapacity is 'so enduring and persistent with respect to a
specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective
personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the
union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.' In order
for the said requisite to obtain, there must be '[a]n undeniable pattern of a
persisting failure to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive
spouse that must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a
psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other. ' 30
Meanwhile, for psychological incapacity to be considered as grave, it should
be shown that the same is not merely based on 'mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes (or] occasional emotional outbursts' nor mere
'refusal, neglect(,] difficulty, much less ill will' 31 of the alleged incapacitated
lli!!:ll'.· In this regard, 'a deeper and fuller assessment of the alleged incapacity must
be done such that it is clearly and convincingly shown that the fulfillment of the
essential marital obligations is not merely feigned or cumbersome but rather,
practically impossible because of the distinct psychological makeup of the
person relative to his or her spouse. ' 32
Lastly, juridical antecedence - which, to note, is based on the phrase ' at the
time of the celebration of the marriage' in Article 36 of the Family Code - means
that the incapacity is determined to exist during the time the marriage is
celebrated, although it manifests thereafter.
While it may indeed be difficult-if not scientifically impossible-to
determine the existence of psychological incapacity at the exact point in time that
the couple exchanged their 'I dos', it is sufficient, however, that the petitioner
demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the incapacity, in all
reasonable likelihood, already exists at the time of the marriage's celebration.33
To determine the reasonable likelihood of its existence at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, the Court, in Tan-Andal, held that 'proof of juridically antecedent
29
Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, 11 May 202 1.
,o Id.
11 Id.
32 Id.
,1 Id.
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psychological incapacity may consist of testimonies describing the environment
where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a
particular behavior.'
Further, the concept of juridical antecedence must be understood to include
the ordinary experiences of the spouses in making their essential decision to enter
into marriage not only prior to the marriage itself but more importantly during their
' lived conjugal life' together since - as the law itself states, a marriage can be
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code 'even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization' . As the parties have yet to assume
any of the essential marital obligations prior to being married, the Court discerns
that the experience of marriage itself is the litmus test of self-realization,
reflecting one's true psychological makeup as to whether or not he or she was
indeed capable of assuming the essential marital obligations to his or her
spouse at the time the marriage was entered into. Thus, to determine whether
psychological incapacity is juridically antecedent, 'judges must reconstruct the
marital decision-making process of an individual, just like inquisitive investigators.
The judge must trace back and examine all the manifestations before and during
marriage to find out if such non-fulfillment relates to the intrinsic psychological
makeup of the person relative to his or her specific partner, and not just some mere
difficulty that ordinary spouses, at some point in time, are bound to go through.
Accordingly, the judge must confirm that the non-fulfillment was not caused solely
by any factor that emerged only during the marriage but one which, in all reasonable
likelihood, existed at the time the marriage was entered into.'
Applying the foregoing, the Court finds that the totality of evidence
presented failed to clearly and convincingly prove the existence of psychological
incapacity in accordance with the above-stated jurisprudential parameters.
To recount, petitioner ave1Ted that respondent's psychological incapacity is
manifested by his acts of infidelity, abandonment, and failure to give support.
With respect to respondent's infidelity, petitioner narrated that during her
eighth month of pregnancy, she discovered that respondent was having an extra-
marital affair. Thereafter, respondent continued to live with his paramour. Anent the
claim of abandonment, the witnesses testified that the parties were harmoniously
living together after their wedding up until they started to fight. Because of their
quarrels, respondent left the house and completely stopped visiting petitioner.
As the Court sees it, the foregoing acts demonstrate an undeniable pattern of
persisting failure on respondent's part to fulfill his duty as a present, loving, faithful,
respectful, and supportive spouse to petitioner. Respondent's unfaithfulness and
abandonment were not just a singular incident/affair. Instead, it endured and
persisted, as in fact it has been nine (9) years since petitioner last saw respondent in
2013. Consequently, respondent's non-compliance with his essential marital
obligations cannot be considered as merely feigned. On the contrary, his acts show
that it is already highly improbable for him to live together with petitioner and their
child, and thus, fulfill his duties and obligations as a husband and a father. As
pointed out by petitioner, 'he was not just incapacitated to perform his marital
obligation, he in fact never performed his marital obligation. ' 34 Hence, as to
34
Rollo, p. 22.
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respondent's infidelity and abandonment, the requisites of gravity and incurability
are present.
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that petitioner failed to prove the
requisite of juridical antecedence. Indeed, it is difficult to fully ascertain whether a
person is truly capable of giving his or her self at the time the marriage was entered
into. Thus, it is sufficient that petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing
evidence that the incapacity, in all reasonable likelihood, already exists at the time
of the celebration of marriage. This may be achieved by looking into the
circumstances prior to the couple's marriage, and most especially, during their
lived conjugal life.
In this case, petitioner and respondent had been living together for five (5)
years prior to their marriage. However, petitioner failed to present any proof
demonstrating respondent's tendencies or any other similar behavior prior to their
marriage. Likewise, there was no evidence describing the environment where
respondent lived that may have led him to perform his alleged behaviors. As such,
the Court cannot conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence that, in all
reasonable likelihood, respondent was already predisposed prior to their marriage
to behave as he did. On the contrary, it appears that respondent's behaviors were
merely brought about by a circumstance that surfaced during their marriage. To
note, everything was well between petitioner and respondent after their wedding,
and they only started to fight four (4) months thereafter. This event triggered
respondent to leave petitioner and to stop visiting her. Hence, respondent's
manifestations appear to have happened during their marriage and not at the time of
its celebration. In all, since petitioner has not submitted any evidence relative to
respondent's behavior, character, or background prior to the marriage, there is no
clear and convincing showing of the 'durable or enduring aspects of (respondent's)
personality, called "personality structure,"' as required in Tan-Andal.
On this score, it is well to point out that sexual infidelity and abandonment
are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 35 of the Family Code. Hence, for
these grounds to rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the
nullification of marriage, the requisite of juridical antecedence must be clearly and
convincingly shown to exist. Otherwise, if the Court were to treat psychological
incapacity as a condition that arises only after the marriage's celebration, then the
concept would not be any different from legal separation, which allows the spouses
to live apart from each other at the time the grounds manifest themselves. While
sexual infidelity and abandonment can be both manifestations of psychological
incapacity and grounds for legal separation, the Court must view these acts under
the lens of gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence in order to declare a
marriage null and void under Article 36. Verily, these three requisites are the
defining factors of psychological incapacity that separate the said concept from legal
separation, albeit the manifestations and grounds thereof overlap in theory.
As regards respondent' s purported failure to provide support, records show
that respondent supported petitioner b y giving her forty percent (40%) of his salary.
35 Art. 55. A petitio n for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
xxxx
(10) Abandonme nt of petitio ner by respo ndent without justi ft able cause for more than o ne year.
xxxx
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In fact, one of petitioner's witnesses even testified that respondent entrusted him to
bring the money to petitioner. Moreover, petitioner even admitted that respondent
used to give his net pay of Pl,500.00, and that she was the one who decided to stop
asking for support from the latter. In any event, it was not shown that respondent
deliberately withheld the same for unjustifiable reasons. Consequently,
respondent's supposed fai lure to provide financial support cannnt also be equated
to psychological incapacity.
Relevantly, even considering the psychological report, there is nothing
therein to suggest the existence of respondent' s psychological incapacity. Indeed,
as the CA pointed out:
The [petitioner] heavily relied on the psychological evaluation
report which does not even explain how the [respondent's] condition
could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted and incurable within
the contemplation of the law and settled jurisprudence thereon. In fact,
there is nothing in the report to suggest the existence of [respondent's]
psychological incapacity. 36
Meanwhile, with respect to petitioner' s contention that she was also
psychologically incapacitated, her supposed 'Conduct Disorder' was not shown to
have made it impossible for her to understand and comply with her essential marital
obligations. The expert witness' report is wanting in details as it failed to indicate
how her conduct disorder constitutes an undeniable pattern of persisting failure on
her part to be a present, loving, faithful , respectful, and supportive spouse so as to
demonstrate a psychological anomaly or incongruity relative to respondent. In fact ,
as petitioner herself had demonstrated, the report contradicts her characterization as
being responsible and dependable. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
Significantly, Psychologist Lagman's report is not consistent,
too, with the social worker's evaluation of [petitioner]. It was
established in the Social Case Study Report that [petitioner] took care
of her son since birth, and has long assumed dual role of the single
parent. The social worker's assessment of [petitioner] as someone
responsible and dependable is corroborated by the two witnesses who
both know [petitioner] and [respondent]. What is more, these two
witnesses attested to the fact of [petitioner's] effort to keep her
relationship with [respondent] intact. 37
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 19,
2019 and the Resolution dated June 9, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB CV. No. 06842 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."
6
J Rollo, p. 40.
37
Jd. at 46.
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March 16, 2022
INOTUAZON
1 rk of Court f>u,r-/)A/
25 MAY 2022
MAN LA PAO AND MANLAPAO LAW OFFICE (reg) JUDGMENT DIVISION (x)
Counsel for Petitioner Supreme Cou11, Manila
759 Javelona Street
Brgy. Villamonte, 6100 Bacolod C ity PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (x)
LIBRARY SERVICES (x)
OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR (reg) [For uploading pursuant to A.M . No. 12-7-SC]
Hall of Justice
Si lay C ity, Negros Occidental OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ATTORNEY (x)
OFFICE OF THE REPORTER (x)
NELSON GUINALON, JR. (reg) PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY (x)
Respondent Supreme Court, Manila
Lot 29, Block 17, Capitol Kabugwason Homes
Brgy. Mansilingan, 6100 Bacolod C ity COURT OF APPEALS (reg)
Visayas Station
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE (reg) Cebu C ity
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69 CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 06842
Silay C ity
(Civil Case No. 286 1-69) Please notify the Court of any change in your address.
UDK-17203. 03/l 4/2022(70)URES
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