IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA
(LAND DIVISION)
AT DAR ES SALAAM
LAND APPEAL NO.136 OF 2016
(Originating from the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Mkuranga in Land
Appeal No. 30 of 2016)
HERBERT ROGERS MWAIMU............................................ APPELLANT
VERSUS
ABDALLAH CHUMU YUSUFU............................................ RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Date of Last Order: 28.06.2021
Date of Ruling: 20.07.2021
A.Z.MGEYEKWA, J
This is a second appeal. The matter originates from Vikindu Ward
Tribunal in Civil Case No. 02 of 2016. At the centre of controversy between
the parties to this appeal is a parcel of land. The appellate tribunal determined
the matter and
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The material background facts to the dispute are as follows: The
respondent was the complainant at the Ward Tribunal, he successfully
claimed ownership of a piece of land located at Ngunguti hamlet in Vikindu
village within Mkuranga District. Dissatisfied, the appellant filed an appeal
before the District Land and Housing Tribunal. The decision from which this
appeal stems is the judgment of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for
Mkuranga in Land Application No. 30 of 2016.
Undeterred, the appellant has come to this Court seeking to assail the
decision of the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Mkuranga on four
grounds of grievance; namely:-
1. That the trial tribunal erred in law by failing to determine a fundamental
issue of Jurisdiction which was one of the grounds of Appeal before it.
2. That the trial tribunal without any reason grossly erred in law by failing to
consider and determine each and even ground of appeal raised.
3. That the trial tribunal further erred in law by failing to account any weight
to the evidence tendered before it.
4. That the trial tribunal further emed in law by failing to provide the opinion
of the assessors.
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When the matter was called for hearing before this court on 20th April,
2021, the court ordered the parties to argue the appeal by way of written
submissions whereas, the appellant’s Advocate filed his submission in chief
on 26th May, 2021 and the respondent Advocate filed his reply on 21st April,
2021. The appellant’s Advocate waived his right to file a rejoinder.
The appellant was the first one to kick the ball rolling. He opted to submit
on one ground and dropped the remaining grounds. The appellant argued
that the tribunal erred to rule that there was adverse possession, while the
records show that the dispute between the parties started before 2016. He
also blamed the District Land and Housing Tribunal for failure to consider and
determine each ground of appeal.
The appellant continued to submit that the respondent admitted that the
dispute existed since 2014. To support his submission he referred this court
to page 2 paragraph 1 of the tribunal proceedings. It was his view that the
issue of adverse possession was sustained without any justification. To
bolster his submission he cited the case of Moses v Lovegrove (1952) QB,
and Hughes v Griffin (1969) 1 All ER 460 where it was held that:-
“a person seeking to acquire title to land by adverse possession had
to cumulatively prove the followings;-
f) That the statutory period, in this case, twelve years has lapsed
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g) That there had been no interruption to the adverse possession
throughout the aforesaid statutory period.
The appellant continued to argue that the Chairman wrongly observed
that from 2004 to 2016 is twelve years, which under the doctrine of adverse
possession the respondent became the owner of the suit land as lightly found
by the trial tribunal.
On the strength of the above submission, the appellant beckoned upon
this court to allow the appeal with costs.
The respondents’ confutation was strenuous. The learned counsel for the
respondent came out forcefully and defended the trial court’s decision as
sound and reasoned. The respondents came out forcefully and defended the
trial tribunal’s decision as sound and reasoned.
The respondent argued that the Ward Tribunal determined the fact in
issue that the appellant wrongly sold the land which belonged to the
respondent. He went on to state that the appellant trespassed into the
respondent’s land and sold it to Henrick Elimelick Mgaya. He further
contended that since the respondent occupied the suit land since 2004
without being interrupted then by the time the appellant sold the suit land in
2016 he was barred by the law of limitation because the 12 years had lapsed.
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The respondent valiantly argued that the appellant did not institute any
dispute until 2016 when the respondent filed a suit at the Ward Tribunal.
On the strength of the above submission, the learned counsel for the
respondent contended that the appellant failed to exercise his right (if any)
rightly invoked by the tribunal and the appeal was rightly dismissed by the
tribunal.
Having heard the submissions of both parties simultaneous with carrying
a thorough review of the original record, I wish to state from the outset that I
wish to begin with the third and fourth grounds which in my view if decided in
the positive, are sufficient to dispose of the entire appeal for reasons which
will unfold in the course. I have gone through the original proceedings and I
fully subscribe to the appellant's submission that the assessors' opinions
were not recorded
I have gone through the handwritten proceeding of District Land and
Housing Tribunal for Mkuranga specifically on the last pages the records do
not show that the assessors stated their opinion instead the Chairman
proceeded to set a date for delivering a judgment on 10th August, 2016 and
on 20th August, 2016 the Chairman delivered the judgment and
acknowledged on page 4 of his judgment that they concur with the
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unanimous opinions of both assessors. It is not seen anywhere the assessors
being invited to issue their written opinion as required under the law, or the
said opinion being read before the parties and recorded in the proceedings
as required under the law. The act of the trial Chairman to record the
assessors’ opinion without record the same was contrary to Regulation 19
(1) of the Land Dispute Courts (The District and Housing Tribunal)
Regulations, 2003 GN. 174 of 2003. The Chairman has to require every
assessor present at the conclusion of the hearing to give his opinion in writing
before making his judgment and the opinion be recorded in the proceedings.
The Court of Appeal of Tanzania in numerous cases stated that the
assessors' opinion must be expressly indicated in the record. In the case of
Hamisa S. Mohs in v Taningra Contractor Land Appeal No. 133 of 2009
where the Chairman did not indicate what opinioned, the judgment was null
and void and in the case of Edina Adam Kibona v Absolom Swebe (Sheli),
Civil Appeal No. 286 of 2017 it was held that:-
"... the opinion of assessors must be given in writing and be reflected
in the proceedings before a final verdict is issued”.
Equally, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania in the case of Ameir Mbarak and
Azania Bank Corp Ltd v Edgar Kahwili, Civil Appeal No. 154 of 2015
(unreported) held that:-
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“Therefore in our considered view, it is unsafe to assume the opinion of
assessors which is not on the record by merely reading the
acknowledgment of the Chairman in the judgment. In the
circumstances, we are of a considered view that assessors did not give
any opinion for consideration in the preparation of the Tribunal's
judgment and this was a serious irregularity."
Similarly, in the case of Tubone M warn beta v. Mbeya City Council, Civil
Appeal No 287 of 2017 (unreported), the Court of Appeal of Tanzania stated
that:-
“In view of the settled position of the law, where the trial has been
conducted with the aid of the assessors,...they must actively and
effectively participate in the proceedings so as to make meaningfully
their role of giving their opinion before the judgment is
composed...since regulation 19(2) of the Regulations requires every
assessor present at the trial at the conclusion of the hearing to give his
opinion in writing, such opinion must be availed in the presence of the
parties so as to enable them to know the nature of the opinion and
whether Page 4 of 6 or not such opinion has been considered by the
Chairman in the final verdict."
The Court further held that:
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"For the avoidance of doubt, we are aware that in the instant case the
original record has the opinion of assessors in writing which the
chairman of the District Land and Housing Tribunal purports to refer
to them in his judgment. However, in the view of the fact that the
records do not show that the assessors were required to give them,
we fail to understand how and at what stage they found their way into
the Court record. And in further view of the fact that they were not
read in the presence of the parties before the judgment was
composed, the same has no useful purpose."
Inspired by the incisive decisions quoted above, applying the same in the
instant appeal, it is evident that a fundamental irregularity was committed by
the tribunal Chairman. I shall not consider the remaining grounds of appeal
as the same shall academic exercise.
From the above findings and analysis, I invoke the provision of section 43
(1), (b) of the Land Dispute Courts Act, Cap. 216 which vests revisional
powers to this court and proceed to revise the proceedings of the District
Land and Housing Tribunal for Mkuranga in Appeal No. 30 Of 2016 in the
following manner: -
(i) The proceedings in Appeal No. 30 Of 2016 and the orders made
thereof are hereby quashed.
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(ii) I remit the case file to the District Land and Housing Tribunal for
Mkuranga, before a different Chairperson and the same set of
assessors.
(iii) The matter to proceed at the District Land and Housing Tribunal for
Mkuranga before another Chairman within 8 months.No order as to
costs.
Order accordingly.
Dated at Dar es Salaam this date 20th July, 2021.
A.Z.MG KWA
JUDGE
20.07.2021
Judgment delivered on 20th July, 2021 in the presence of both parties.
A.Z.MGEYEKWA
JUDGE
20.07.2021
Right of Appeal fully explained.
THZ?
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA
(LAND DIVISION)
AT PAR ES SALAAM
LAND APPEAL NO. 271 OF 2020
(Arising from the Judgment and Decree of the District Land and Housing
Tribunal for Kilombero and Ulanga and Malinyi Districts at Ifakara, in
Land Application No. 41 of 2018, by Hon. Kamugisha)
TABU MOHAMED SAADAN................................................. APPELLANT
VERSUS
ISSA MAGWILA (in person and in the capacity as the
Administrator of Estate of the Late Minisha Mohamed..... RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Date of last Order: 04.08.2021
Date of Judgment: 11.08.2021
A.Z.MGEYEKWA
This appeal is against the Judgment and Decree of the District Land
and Housing Tribunal for Kilomero I Ulanga at Ifakara, in Applications
No.41 of 2018. The material background facts to the dispute are not
difficult to comprehend. They go thus: The respondent on his own
capacity and in the capacity of the administrator of the estate of Minisha
i
Saadan filed a suit at the District Land Housing Tribunal against the
appellant calcimining for land ownership of the house situated at Lumemo
area within Ifakara Township in Kilombero District. The respondent
contended that the landed property was constructed in the clan land. He
claimed that the ownership passed by survivorship from one generation
to another and he is the current owner of the suit property. On her side,
the appellant contended that the suit property belonged to her mother
one Zuhura Issa Milandu who passed away. The appellant claimed that
she is the administrator of the estate of the late Zuhura Issa Milandu. She
claimed that her late mother has never been a licensee instead she
occupied the suit property and build a permanent house therein.
After the determination of the case, the trial tribunal decided in favour
of the respondent The Chairman dismissed the appellant’s claims and
declared the respondent the lawful owner of the suit land on the ground
that the applicant did not prove her ownership. Being aggrieved with the
tribunal decision, the appellant came before this court praying for this
court to allow the appeal, quash and set aside the Judgment and Decree
of the trial tribunal with costs. The appellant raised six grounds of
grievance, namely:-
1. That, the District Land and Housing Tribunal erred in law and fact for
holding that, the appellant's mother was a mere licensee despite the
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fact that, the respondent by his own will allocated his disputed land to
the appellant's mother in 1970.
2. That, the District Land and Housing Tribunal erroneously held in favour
of the respondent despite the fact that the disputed land has been
occupied by the appellant’s mother in 1970.
3. That, the District Land and Housing Tribunal erroneously held in favour
of the respondent despite the fact that the disputed land has been in
possession of the Appellant for 20 years since the demise of the
respondent’s mother in law.
4. The trial District Land and Housing Tribunal erroneously held in favor
of the respondent despite the fact that the appellant built a house for
her Mother without any claim of ownership over the disputed land from
the respondent.
5. That, the Chairman of the trial tribunal erred in law and fact for reaching
judgment basing on inconsistent and contradictory evidence.
6. That, the trial District Land and Housing Tribunal failed to assess,
analyze and evaluate evidence on record hence it came up with the
wrong conclusions.
The merit of the appeal was addressed by way of written submissions.
When the matter was called for hearing on 17th March, 2021, the appellant
enjoyed the legal service of Mr. Simon Lameck Mpina, learned counsel
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while the respondent enjoyed the legal service of Mr. Barnaba Lugua
learned counsel. The appellant filed his submission in chief on 16th April,
2021 and the respondent's Advocate to file a reply on 17th May, 2021 and
the appellant’s Advocate filed a rejoinder on 31st May, 2021. However, the
respondent’s Advocate for his own reasons filed his reply on 21st May,
2021 out of time without applying for extension of time. Therefore, this
court proceeded to grant the appellant’s Advocate request to determine
the matter exparte against the respondent.
Supporting the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant opted to
combine and argue all grounds of appeal generally. On his view all
grounds of appeal hinged on one question of proper analysis and
evaluation of evidence. The issue for determination was whether the trial
tribunal’s judgment in favour of the respondent was supported by
evidence.
The learned counsel for the appellant started with a brief background of
the facts which led to the instant appeal which I am going to summarize
his submission as follows;
He claimed that the disputed land originally belonged to the respondent.
In 1970 the respondent gave his in law, the appellant’s mother. She further
submitted that the appellant’s mother stayed in the suit land for a long time
without any disturbance from the respondent until her demise in 1995. He
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went on to state that after her demise, the suit land remained with the
appellant for 20 years until 2016 when the dispute over the suit property
erupted.
Mr. Mpina continued to argue that the appellant is an Administratrix of
the estate of her late mother who died in 1995 leaving behind the suit
property. It was his view that the appellant as a successor of her late
mother is entitled to whatever belonged to her mother including the suit
land that was granted to her mother by the respondent in which the
applicant made some efforts to improve the house therein.
The learned counsel for the Appellant went on submitting that the suit
land belonged to her as the successor of her late mother, who had
obtained the same from the respondent for free. And that the appellant’s
mother was not a mere licensee to the respondent as there were no
instructions from the respondent to the appellant’s mother in possessing
the suit land.
Mr. Mpina further lamented that had it been licensee to the respondent
the appellant’s mother and appellant herself would not have stayed in the
suit land without any interference or directives from the respondent in
which the appellant’s stayed for more than 40 years. He added that and
the appellant was in possession of the suit land for 20 years from the
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demise of her late mother, hence that the issue of adverse possession
comes in favour of the appellant.
On the strength of the above submission, Mr. Mpina faulted the trial
tribunal decision for deciding in favour of the respondent because he had
a better title to the suit property.
After a careful perusal of the record of the case and the final
submissions submitted by both parties. In determining the appeal, the
central issue is whether the appellant had sufficient advanced reasons to
warrant this court to overrule the findings of the District Land and Housing
Tribunal for Kilombero.
In my determination, I will consolidate all grounds of appeal because
they are intertwined. The appellant is complaining that the tribunal failed
to analyse and evaluate the evidence on record. I have perused the
respondent’s evidence he claimed that he is the lawful owner of the suit
landed property. He claimed that he allocated the disputed house to his
mother in law as a licensee until she passed away. The appellant also
claims that she is the lawful owner since her mother lived in the suit land
for more than 20 years. Both parties agreed that the suit land originally
belonged to the respondent one Issa Magwila, the respondent It is the
respondent who invited the appellant’s mother to stay in his land upon the
respondent being married to the appellant's sister. Therefore, as long as
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both parties admitted that the respondent is the original owner, the
appellant was duty-bound to prove that her mother was not a mere
licensee by proving the transfer of ownership from the respondent to
Zuhura Mirandu otherwise the issue of the appellant's ownership cannot
arise.
The main issue for determination as discussed by the trial Chairman in
Application No. 41 of 2018 is who is the lawful owner of the land in
dispute? Reading the tribunal records, I have noted that the Chairman
determined the matter on page 6 para 1 where he stated that:-
"In the absence of the clear evidence to prove disposition of the
suit land from the applicant to the respondent’s mother the same
remains in the ownership of the applicant”.
I fully subscribe to the Chairman findings, the appellant was required
to prove the disposition of the suit landed property from Issa Magwila to
Zuhura Mirandu. I have perused the tribunal records, there was no
evidence to show the transfer of ownership from the respondent to the
late Zuhura Mirandu and there was no evidence to prove that transfer was
effected from the late Zuhura Mirandu to Tabu Mohamed Sadan, the
appellant. The appellant has admitted that the suit property belonged to
her mother thus she has no legal base to claim ownership over a property
that did not belong to her. There was a need for the appellant to adduce
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sufficient evidence to show how the suit land was transferred from the
respondent to the appellant's mother for the appellant to obtain a better
title.
Additionally, I differ with Mr. Mpina observation that the appellant
obtained the suit property after staying in the suit land for more than 20
years without being disturbed. The licensee used the suit land on behalf
of the owner, therefore, there is no any automatic transfer from the
licensee to the occupier. In other words, the late Zuhura Mirandu was a
licensee, not an occupier, therefore, the doctrine of adverse possession
is inapplicable in this case. It is worth noting that there is no time limit for
the licensee to use the land until when the owner demands his land.
Therefore, the appellant cannot come before this court claiming ownership
over a piece of land that was not in her possession.
In my view, the appellant ought to have proved her ownership as to
how the suit land was transferred from the respondent to her mother for
the appellant to obtain a better title. Failure by the appellant to produce
tangible evidence to prove her ownership of the suit land is marked failure
to her side.
For the reasons given above and as stated earlier, one of the canon
principles of civil justice is for the person who alleges to prove his
allegation. The same was held in the case of Abdul Karim Haji v
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Raymond Nchimbi Alois and Another, Civil Appeal No. 99 of 2004
(unreported) the Court of Appeal of Tanzania held that:-
"...It is an elementary principle that he who alleges is the one
responsible to prove his allegations."
Applying the above authority of the law, I do not think the appellant
proved his claims to the required standard of the law.
For the aforesaid reasons, I am satisfied that, in the instant appeal,
there are no extraordinary circumstances that require me to interfere with
the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Kilombero findings. Therefore,
I find that this appeal is without merit because the appellant did not prove
to the required standards her ownership to the suit property. I therefore
dismiss this appeal without costs.
Order accordingly.
Dated at Dar es Salaam this date 11th August, 2021.
A.Z.MGEYEKWA
A
JUDGE
11.08.2021
Judgment delivered on 11th August, 2021 via audio teleconference
whereas both parties were remotely present.
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A.Z.MGEYEKWA
JUDGE
11.08.2021
Right of Appeal fully explained.
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