7, 3

AsianStudies,
Modern (I973), pp. 32I-347. Printedin GreatBritain.

in India
andNationalism
Imperialism
ANIL SEAL
Jstor 311848

the dominantthemesof world historyduringthe nineteenth

AMONG
and twentiethcenturieshave been the imperialismof the west and the
nationalismof its colonialsubjects.Nowherewere these themesderrel-
oped morespectacularlythan in SouthAsia; its historyquite naturally
came to be viewed as a giganticclash betweenthese two large forces.
The subjectthen was held togetherby a set of assumptionsabout the
imperialismof the Britishand the reactionsof the Indiansagainstit.
That imperialism,so it wasthought,had engineeredgreateffiectson the
territorieswhereit ruled. Those who held the power could make the
policy, and they could see that it became the practice. Sometimes
that policy might be formulatedineptlyor mightfall on stonyground
or evensmashagainstthe hardfactsof coloniallife. But forgood or ill,
imperialpolicy seemedto be the main force affiectingcolonialcondi-
tions. It emergedfrom an identifiablesource, the official mind of
Whitehall or the contrivancesof pro-consuls;and so the study of
policy-makingmade a frameworkfor investigationsinto colonial
history.
These assumptionswere convenient,but historiansof colony after
colony have knockedthem down. The emphasishas shiftedfrom the
elegantexchangesbetweenLondonand colonialcapitalsto the brutal
clashesbetweencolonialpoliticiansstrugglingat the more humdrum
levelswherethe pickingslay. No longerwill it do to exalt the workof
Mr Mothercountry,cobblingtogetherconstitutionsfor dependencies,
abovethe inescapableconstraintsinsidethem.The old assumptionthat
directimperialpowerwasstronghas beenreplacedby the new doctrine
that it was hobbledat every turn. It dependedon local allies. Local
conditionsmightbuckleits policies.Oftenit did not knowwhat it was
doing. Assumptionsabout the irresistiblepowerof imperialismwere
alwaysslipperynotions;lnow they are refutednotions.Once the study
of policy-makinglay in the mainstream;now it has retreatedinto
1 Perhapsthemostdevotedadvocateof imperialpowerwas Curzon,but bitterexper-
ienceled him to concludethat 'The Governmentof Indiais a mightyand miraculous
machine for doing nothing'. Curzon to Hamilton, g April I902. Gurson Papers,
Mss Eur F I I I/I6I, India Oice Library.
A 32I

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322 ANIL SEAL

backwaters.The effect upon the study of modern Indian historyis

plain. Historianshave switchedtheir attentionfrom imperialfiats to
Indianfacts,fromthe ramblinggeneralizationsof the Raj to the con-
cretenessof local studies,fromlargeimprecisionto minuteexactitude.
In so doing,theyhave demolishedpartof the frameworkof the subject.
At the same time they have crackedthe other casingwhich helped
to hold it together.Howevertentativeits beginnings,nationalismin
India usedto be seenas a generalmovementwhichvoicedthe interests
of large sectionsof the Indian people.Just as imperialpolicieswere
thoughtto lead to imperialpractice,so nationalistprogrammeswere
thoughtto emergefromnationalmovements.But muchthe samefind-
ingswhichhave beenfatalto the old viewsaboutimperialismhave also
destroyedthe viewthatnationalismwasa forceworkinggenerallyinside
a nation.As its provincial,and then its local rootshave been laid bare,
whatlookedlike an all-Indiamovementappearsas nothingof the sort.
Programmesproclaimedfrom above were at oddswith the way poli-
ticiansworkedlower down. What held true in one part of India was
not truein another.It is no longercredibleto writeabouta movement
groundedin commonaims,led by men with similarbackgrounds,and
recruitedfromwideninggroupswith compatibleinterests.That move-
ment now looks more like a ramshacklecoalitionthroughoutits long
career.Its unityseemsa figment.Its powerappearsas hollowas that of
the imperialauthorityit was supposedlychallenging.Its historywas
the rivalrybetweenIndianand Indian,its relationshipwithimperialism
thatof the mutualclingingof two unsteadymenof straw.Consequently,
it now seemsimpossibleto organizemodernIndianhistoryarourldthe
old notionsof imperialismand nationalism.But their disappearance
has had awkwardresults.
Havingfailedto discoverunitiesin the politicsof all-India,historians
cut theirlossesby turningto the studyof the regions,whetherdefined
as the old provincesof BritishIndia or as areaswith a commonlan-
guage.Theretheyhopedto findunitiesto help themregulatethesenew
fieldsof study:casteseemedto explainmuchaboutthe politicsof Bengal
and Madras,as did religiousallegiancein the Punjab,kinshipin the
United Provincesand languagein Orissaor the Karnatak.In turning
to the regions,and to the solidaritieswithinthem,thesescholarswerein
fact fallingbackon positionspreparedlong ago by the Britishadmini-
strators.Over and over again the Old India Hands had stressedthat
India was not a nation but a congeriesof countries,2each of which
2 Accordingto Sir John Strachey,'. . . the firstand most essentialthing to learn
about India [is] that thereis not, and neverwas an India, or even any countryof

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 IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA 323

containedlarge groupsof people who were held togetherby bonds

such as caste and kin, communityand language,and who could be
classedunderthesetidy headsforthe convenienceof the administrators.
Here were setsof ready-madeuniformitiesaroundwhich the historian
of the regioncouldcrystallizehis explanations.For a time it seemedas
thoughthe truismsof the Raj were to becomethe dogmasof the his-
torians.3But the roots of politicsturnedout to lie lower still. Other
workershave dug belowthe provinceand the region,into the district,
the municipality,eventhe village.Miningat suchdeeplevelshad led to
the caving-inof beliefsthat therewereregionaluniformitiescementing
Indian politics.What seems to have decided political choices in the
localitieswas the raceforinfluence,statusand resources.In the pursuit
of these aims, patrons regimentedtheir clients into factions which
jockeyedfor position.Ratherthan partnershipsbetweenfellows,these
were usuallyassociationsof bigwigsand followers.In otherwordsthey
were verticalalliances,not horizontalalliances.Local struggleswere
seldommarkedby the allianceof landlordwith landlord,peasantwith
peasant,educatedwith educated,Muslimwith Muslimand Brahmin
with Brahmin.More frequently,Hindusworkedwith Muslims,Brah-
mins were hand in glove with non-Brahmins;and notablesorganized
their dependentsas supporters,commissionedprofessionalmen as
spokesmenand turnedgovernmentservantsinto aides.In the everyday
decisionsof life as theyweretakenin manylocalities,the socialdockets
devisedby the administratorand adoptedby the historianhad little
meaning.
As knowledgehas increased,so has confusion.Politicsat the base
seem diffierentin kind from politicsin the provinceor in the nation.
Whateverforcesmayhavebroughtmenintopartnershipat thesehigher
levels, they can hardlyhave been the same as thosewhich made men
worktogetherin the neighbourhoods. Howeverpersuasivethe slogans
from the top, they can have made little impact upon the unabashed
scramblersfor advantageat the bottom.Indeed thereseemsno neces-
sary reason why the politics of these localitiesshould have become
enmeshedwith the largerprocessesat all. It is not obviouswhy bosses
India, possessingaccordingto Europeanideas,any sortof unity....' It is interesting
that this classicapologyfor Britishrule stressedits centralizingand unifyingimpact,
but denied that 'suchbondsof union can in any way lead towardsthe growthof a
single Irsdiannationality'.John Strachey,India(London,I888), pp. 5, 8.
3 lShe oRicialsof the Raj providedmany of the data upon which studiesof the
politicalarithmeticof the regionsare based, and administrativepracticerestedon
their categories.That is another reason why their argumentshave powerfully
influencedthe new wave amonghistoriansof India.

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324 ANIL SEAL

in Tanjoreor Belgaumshouldhavesoughtalliesin Madrasor Bombay,

still less in all-Indiacircles.But thereis no denyingthat such linkages
existed,and that they came to exerta vast influenceover the country's
politics.The IndianAssociationand the Unionistpartyeachspanneda
province;the Hindu Mahasabha,the anti-untouchability leaguejthe
movementsfor sanatanadharmaand cow-protectionworked across
several provinces; the Home Rule Leagues, the National Liberal
Federation, the Indian National Social Conference,the a]l-India
Scheduled Castes Federation,the Khilafat Party and the Muslim
Conferenceclaimedto be nationalbodies;while the Congressand the
Muslim League were undeniably all-India organizations. Non-
cooperation,civil disobedience,and the movementsfor Quit India and
for Pakistanwerenot the productsof the villagegreen.It wouldbe a
sterilehistoriography whichresigneditselfto declaringthat thesewere
the productsof linkageswhosenatureis unknown.The resultwouldbe
the disintegrationof the subject.
One of the main tasksin its reintegrationmust be to identify the
forces which drove Indian politics upwardsand outwardsfrom the
odditiesof the locality,or downwardsfrom the hollow generalitiesof
all-India,which bonded their politicalactivitiestogether,and which
determinedthe nature of the relationsbetween them. This work of
reconstructionmust also find an explanationfor the extraordinary
volatilityand discontinuityof politicalbehaviourin so muchof India,
as well as for the palpablegap betweenwhat politiciansclaimed to
representand what they reallystood for. The prioritiesof politicians,
the rolesthey played, the principlesthey claimedto support,seem to
havevariedas they movedbetweenone arenaand another;in eachand
everysphere,the alliancesthey madeshowedextremeshiftsand turns.
Membersof the Justice Partyin the nineteen-twentieswere the Con-
gressmenof the nineteen-thirties. Cooperators becamenon-cooperators.
The gaolbirdsof civil disobediencecameout forcouncilentry.Congress
Muslimsturnedroundand supportedPakistan.These are large prob-
lems, and they call for large solutions.It is not good enoughfor the
historianto set up an explanationof the workingsof politicsat one level
and then cast aroundfor a few supportingexamplesat another,higher
or lower, convenientlyforgettingthat most of these casesactuallycut
acrossthe grain of his argument.In the analysisof a politicalsystem
whichworkedat differentlevels,modelsappropriateforoneof themcan-
not simplybe transposedto the others.Local, provincialand national
politicsworkedas they did becausethey were interconnected;it is the
connectionswhich must be elucidated.The problemis centralto the

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 IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA 325

historyof all colonial nationalismsin moderntimes. Formedout of

disparate aspirationsand grievances,they were somehow genera-
lized into unitiesstrongerthan theirown contradictions.In the Indian
context, the problem takes this form. A great deal of local Indian
politics(although,as we shallsee,not all) wasorganizedintofactionsby
the influenceof the strongupon the weak,and into systemsapparently
insulatedfrom each other. Lateralconnectionsand solidaritieswhich
mighthaveunitedthemwerefew.Yet theycameto be linkedwithother
systems,therebyproducinglarge movements.What was the natureof
thoselinkages?
Severalexplanationshave been suggested.One line of argumenthas
stressedthe enduringimportanceof traditionalforcesthroughoutall the
changesin modernIndia. Webs of kinshipand of clan, solidaritiesof
communityand ritual might be seen as conservingor regenerating
supra-localunities. Another argumentassertsthat the development
of the economydrove the localitiesinto larger and largersystemsof
productionand exchange.Admittedlytherewas no nationaleconomy:
developmentwasfar too patchyfor that. But in somepartsof India the
increasein cashcrops,the growthof tradingcommunitiesandthe devel-
opmentof the professions stimulatedboth townand country,encourag-
ing the spreadof socialgroups,whetherthey wererich peasantsin the
Andhra delta, traders along the Ganges, the western-educatedin
Calcuttaor businessmenin Bombay.Thereis meritin both arguments.
Certainlythere were cases in most regionswhere the emergenceof
largergroupingscan bestbe explainedby linkageswhichwerethe result
of traditionalor economicforces.It is still more suggestivethat some
of thesegroupingstendedto sticktogetherthroughthickand thin, an
atypical trait which was to give them great importancein Indian
politics.However,these casesof horizontalconnectioncannotexplain
how linkageswere forged between the host of factionsthat did not
possesssolidaritiesof this sort. Yet it was preciselythese factionsthat
were the stuff of most Indian politics.On the unsteadybase of local
squabblesfor spoils rested the largerpoliticalsystemsof India: the
Justice and Unionistparties,and the Congressitself,werelargelybuilt
out of this rubble.Both typesof politicsneed to be explained,but the
argumentsmentionedso far can applyonlyto the loyaltiesof horizontal
connectionand not to the vast massof politicalsystemswhich lacked
them. In orderto providea moregeneralexplanation,we proposean
alternativeapproach.
This entailsreopeningthe studyof government,althoughnot along
the old lines. The argumentthat the rule of strangersin India goaded

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326 ANIL SEAL

their subjectsinto organizing against it is not our concern. The suggest-

ion that government prepared its own destruction by fostering an
intellectual elite is not relevant.4The fact that the power of imperialism
was far from irresistible can readily be admitted. What is important
about the role of government is the structure which the British created
for ruling their Indian empire. However much they may have relied on
Indian collaborators, their government was organized for the power
and profit of their imperial system throughout the world. In the pursuit
of this aim, they needed to treat their Indian possessionsas a whole.
Though they were the successors of nawabs and maharajahs galore,
they were in India not as partitioners but as unifiers. Essentially, the
Indian empire was meant to be indivisible.5Hence it was ruled through
a chain of command stretching from London to the districts and
townships of India; hence too, the government of India he]d sway over
all-India, so that even the pettiest official intervention in a locality
issued from a general authority. These administrative lines formed a
grid which at first rested loosely upon the base. Later it was pressed
down more firmly by the heavier intervention of the Raj in local matters
and by the growth of representative institutions. Indians needed to
treat with the Raj, and increasingly they came to do so by exploiting its
structure of control and the forms in which its commands were cast.
This called for a political structureof their own which could match the
administrativeand representativestructureof the Raj, and was in time
to inherit its functions. In this way we may help to explain the nature
of the linkages which were to bind together the very diffierentactivities
of Indians in arenas large and small.

II

We shall begin by looking afresh at the interplay between imperialism

and Indian political society. It is our hypothesis that the structure of
imperial government can provide a clue to the way Indian politics
developed. This structure in India cannot be explained by Indian
considerations alone. It is obvious that the development of the Raj
moved widdershinsto the tendencies prevalent in the British empire as
4 Graduates and professional men in the presidenciesundoubtedlyhad a largepart
to play in the politicsof provinceand nation.But they were not quite as important
as they once appeared.Some of the suggestionsin Anil Seal, The Emergenceof Indidn
NationQlism (Cambridge, I 968), havedroppedthroughthe trapdoorof historiography.
s Of coursethe presidenciesliked to recall their separatehistoricalpasts. So did
the princes.But the SupremeGovermenterodedtheselittle local vanities.

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 IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA 327
a whole. When the Britishwere relying upon the techniques of informal
empire to better their world position, their Indian possessions stood
out as a huge exception, as a formal empire on the grand scale. At the
very time they were slackening control over many of their colonies,
they were tightening London's hold over India. Incongruities of this
sort continued into the twentieth century, when the administrative
diversitiesin the new African colonies contrasted with the uniformities
of the Raj, and when imperial control over defence and foreign policy,
splintered throughout much of the empire, remained as firm as ever in
India. Most of the essential aspects of the connection between Britain
and India remained substantially unchanged until I947. Why should
this have been so ? The reasonsfor these incongruities lie in the perma-
nent importance of India to the position of Britain in the world and the
permanent difficulties of maintaining the British position in India.
India's worth was clear to Pitt and Dundas; the establishment of
British power in India was matched by her growing importance as a
base for further expansion in the Indian Ocean and the Yellow Sea.
During the nineteenth century India became a good customer for
Britishmanufactures;she was to become a useful supplier of raw mater-
ials, a crucial element in the British balance of payments and a field for
large capital investment. But the balance sheets of imperialism do not
reveal the full importance of the Raj to the British Empire. Imperialism
is a system of formal or informal expansion, driven by impulsesof profit
and of power, each of which feeds on the other. India's growing foreign
trade helped to push the influence of the British deeper into west and
east Asia alike. Her growing military power underwrote the informal
influence they were developing in those regions, as well as the formal
empire which they built in Burma, Malaya and East Africa. India
became the second centre for the extension of British power and in-
fluence in the world; and when she dropped this role after I947, the
British empire did not take long to disappear.
Throughout the century and a half of British rule, the Raj was
being worked in the service of interests far larger than India herself,
since they bore upon the British position in the world. That is why the
control of the Raj as a system of profit and power had to lie in London.
And that is why London's control over India had to be matched by the
increasingly tight grip of the Governor-Generalover his subordinate
administrations.These imperial aims combined with the circumstances
in India itself to determine the structureof government and the nature
of its administration.The British wanted to pull resourcesout of India,
not to put their own into India. Therefore the administrativeand mili-

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328 ANIL SEAL

tary systemhad to pay for itselfwith Indianrevenues.At the top, this

calledfora skilledbureaucracycapableof handlinglargeissuesbearing
upon the economyand the army.But at lower levels this controlhad
to be looser.There, imperialends had to be satisfiedby moremodest
programmes. The chiefsourceof Indianrevenuelay in land, and it had
to be collectedfrommillionsof payers.In the localitiesthe main tasks
wereto securethe cheapand regularcollectionof revenueand to see to
it that the districtsremainedquiet. But these taskswere beyond the
unaided capacity of the Britishadministratorson the spot.6British
agents were costly. Happily, Indian collaboratorswere not, and for
much of the businessof extractingtributeand keepingthe peace, the
Britishwere contentto followthe preceptsof Clive and Cornwallisby
relyingon the help of influentialIndianspreparedto work with the
regime. It was in the administrationof the localities that the vital
economiesin ruling had to be made. There, governancehad to be
pursuedby simplerarrangements, suchas the frontiermethodsof Nikel
Seynin the Punjabor the lonelypatrolsof CrossBeamesin the wildsof
Orissa,or by enlistingthe cooperationof zemindars,mirasidars,taluk-
dars,and urbanrais.
By acceptingsuchmenas theirlocalcollaborators, the Britishwerein
fact strikinga politicalbargain.Its termswere that they could depend
on the collectionof revenue,providedthattheydid not asktoo officious-
ly who paid it; and that they might take public order for granted,
providedthat they themselvesdid not play too obtrusivea part in
enforcingit. The Britishbuilt the framework;the Indiansfitted into
it. Local bargainsof this sort were of great advantageto the British
becausetheyreducedIndianpoliticsto the level of hagg]esbetweenthe
Raj and smallpocketsof its subjects,a systemwhich kept them satis-
factorilydivided.Thesewere solid gains, but they had to be paid for.
In return,the Britishhad to acquiescein an arrangementwherestrong
local intermediariescould blockthem from meddlingin the affairsof
those who owned land, or controllingthe others who tilled it. This
meant in practicethat the Britishwere winkingat the existenceof a
legal underworldwhere the privatejustice of faction settled conflicts
with the blowsof lathis,or where,at the best,the strongcouldget their
own way in the courts.In the mythologyof empire,the age of Elphin-
stone, Munroand Thomasonseemsone of heroicsocial engineering;
but underthe pinnaclesof their Raj lay a ground-floorrealitywhere
Indiansbattledwith Indians,sometimesfor the favoursof the district
officer,sometimesto do each otherdownwithoutreferenceto him and
6 Whitesettlers,once prohibited,laterwere nevermore than a handful.

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 IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA 329

his bookof rules.At theselevels,it might be the Britishwho governed,

but it was Indianswho ruled.
This is not to suggestthat at any periodthe Raj was merelya night-
watchmanand receiverof tribute;7or that its systemsof collaboration
simplymeantconfirmingthingsas they were. Even underJohn Com-
pany,governmentratified,or upset,socialand economicarrangements
whichextendedfar beyondthe localities.In this rupturingof the auto-
nomyof regionsand localitieslies one of the chiefinnovationsof British
rule. The Raj definedthe formsand establishedthe categorieseven in
matterswhere its subjectswere alloweda free hand. Alreadyin this
period Indian responsehad to take note of Britishregulation.After
I843 men fromSind, Gujarat,Maharashtra and the Karnatakhad to
vie with each other for the favoursof an administrationrun from
Bombaycity. Once men had been classedas zemindarsor ryotsin the
settlements,they had to accept these classificationswhen they treated
with government.
But the irruptionof governmentinto the regionsand localitieswent
muchfurtherin the secondhalf of the nineteenthcentury.As imperial
interestsexpanded,so did theirdemandsupon India. Indianrevenues
had to pay for an armyliableto defendBritishinterestsoutsideIndia;s
they had to meet the growingoverheadsof administration;they had to
guaranteeloansfor the railways.Thesedemandswere harderto meet.
In I858 the Crowninheritedfromthe Companya regimecrippledby
poverty,and until the end of the centurythe reorganizedgovernment
wasneverto escapefromSnancialweakness.A costlydashin and out of
Afghanistan,a fall in silveror a bad monsooncouldtip Indianfinances
into deficit. Criseswere likelier than windfalls.Direct taxes yie]ded
little.9Lockedin thesefetters,the Raj had to createmoreresourcesand
7 Many of the land settlementsof the Raj werealsodesignedto stimulateagrarian
improvement;its canalsbroughtnew land under cultivation;its improvementsto
transportlinkedcitieswhichit had done so muchto create.It sent Indiansto school,
partlyto train cheap clerksfor its offices,but also to create economicmen. But to
judge the Raj as an immenselypowerfulsystemof governmentmakessenseonly in
termsof policy-making.In practice,many of its effiortswere buckledby the hard
factsof Indiansociety.
8 About a third of the total expenditureof the Indian governmentin the four

decades beforeWorld War I was on its army. Statisticaltables on government's

finances(and on many otheraspectsof Indiansocietyand economy)are being pre-
pared,with thehelpof C. Emery,by themodernIndianhistoryprojectat Cambridge,
financedby a grantfromthe SocialSciencesResearchCouncil.It is hopedto publish
theseresultssoon.
9 Expandingits revenueswas a difficulttaskfor a governmentwhich relied upon
so regressivea systemof taxation. Income tax was obstructedby Indian interests,
customsdutieswerekeptlow by imperialinterests,opiumwas threatenedby humani-

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33o ANIL SEAL

takeits cut. Tributefromthe leaseof franchisesto local notableswasno

longerenoughto meet the bill. Loosecontrolsby Londonof Calcutta,
by Calcuttaof its provinces,by provincialcapitalsof the districtshad
all to be tightened.Raisingrevenuesmeant a greateradministrative
interventionin the affairsof Indian society, going deeper than the
previoussystemhad done. But such an interventionwas exposedto
the perennialdilemmaof the Raj. If the administrativecost of inter-
veningwas not to overtakethe returnsand the securityof the statenot
to be put at risk,Indiancollaborationwouldhaveto be muchextended.
So the Raj mitigatedits administrativedriveby devisingnew methods
of winningthe cooperationof a largernumberof Indians.Systemsof
nomination,representationand election were all means of enlisting
Indiansto workfor imperialends.
The Governmentof India Act of I858 had createda Secretaryof
State whosepowersstretchedfar beyondthose of his predecessor,the
Presidentof the Boardof Control.He was in continuoustouch with
policy-making;beforelong he had won 'abundantpowerin one way or
anotherof enforcinghis views';10and he coulddemanddue obedience
from all Britishauthoritiesin India. Thus the constitutionalprinciple
becameestablishedthat '. . . the finalcontroland directionof affairsof
Indiarestwiththe HomeGovernment,and not withthe authorities. . .
in India itself'.1lEven the Acts of I9I9 and I935 kept Londonin com-
mand of the centre,and until I947 the vital attributesof sovereignty
remainedthere.12Londondid whatit pleasedwith India'sarmy;it took
her to war, and it broughther to peace; Londonalone could alterher
constitution.It wasLondonthattookthe decisionsaboutthesiphoning-
offof Indianrevenues,the paceof Indiandevelopment,and the deploy-
mentof Indianpower;andthesecontrolswerekeptintactuntilLondon
decidedto divideand quit.
Not only did the natureof imperialaims call for London'scontrol
tarianinterests.Until the beginningof the twentiethcentury,governmentfinances
continuedto be proppedup by the peasants,since receiptsfromland revenuewere
greaterthan receiptsfromall other taxesput together.
1oSir CharlesWoodquotedin R. J. Moore,SirCharles Wood'sIndianPolicys853-66
(Manchester,I 966), p. 39.
11A. C. Banerjee,IndianConstitlltionalDocllments
s757-z947 (Calcutta,I96I, third
edition), II, 3 I9.
12 Controlover defenceand foreignpolicy was not even mentionedin the Mon-
tagu-Chelmsfordreport; the Governmentof India Act of I935 stated that this
controlwas to remainin Britishhands (26 Geo. V, c. 2, section I I). Londonalso
kept the true underpinningsof profit.It was fromLondonthat Indian loans came;
Londonmanipulatedthe exchangerate of the rupeeas it saw fit and knockedIndia
off the gold standardwhen that suitedits purpose.Even the grantingof tariS auto-
nomy to India meant less in practicethan in publicity.

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 IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA 33I

overIndia;it alsocalledforcontroloverits subordinateadministrations

to keep them in line with Britishpurposes.The CharterAct of I833,
which broughtthe SupremeGovernmentinto being,had also granted
the Governor-General in Councilcontroloverthe entirerevenuesof all
the territoriesin British India. Point by point, the governmentin
Calcuttahammeredhometheseadvantages,strengthening its manager-
ial services,framinga centralbudget,andregulatingfinancesso thatthe
provinceshad to live on whateverdolesthe centresawfit to allowthem.
One by one, the old freedomsof the Presidencieswere moppedup by
Calcutta.In I893 the Bombayand Madrasmilitarycommandswere
abolished;duringthe early twentiethcenturythe centralgovernment
graduallywrestedfromthe provincestheir controlover relationswith
the princelystates.It becamethe orthodoxyof constitutionallawyers
that,whateverthe rightsandthe dutiesof the provincesin runningtheir
affairs,yet '. . . in all of them the Governmentof India exercisean
unquestionedright of entry. . .'13During the nineteenthcenturythe
provinceshad been degradedinto mere agentsof the centre. In the
twentiethcenturyadministrative necessitymightdemanddecentraliza-
tion and politicalpressuresmightcall for devolution,but even the Acts
of I9I9 and I935 werenot permittedby the rulersof India to threaten
centralcontrolovermattersthat cruciallyaffectedimperialpurposesin
India.14In termsof formalconstitutionalhistorytheseActs may have
alteredthe workingarrangements of the Raj; butin termsof powerthey
weresimplychangesin the methodsby whichthe Britishpursuedtheir
essentialaims.
But managersneed agents,and in the Indianempirethesehad to be
the provincialadministrations. The generalprinciplesof legislationand
administrationwere laid down fromabove, but the executionof both
had to be undertakenin the provinces.In the later nineteenthcentury
Londonand Calcuttadecidedthat moreneededto be done with their
Indianempire:tenancylegislation,new lawsaboutcontractand trans-
forof land, public works,irrigation,public health,forestconservancy,
faminecodes,takkaviloans,educationbothprimaryand secondary,all

3 Reforms(Calcutta,I9I8),
Reporton IndianConstitlltional para.49, p. 33.
14 After I9I9 the provinceshad assuredmonies of their own; but the central
governmenttook a firmergrip than beforein auditing their accounts.Again, the
provincial governmentsadministeredthe Criminal Investigation Departments
foundedbetween I905 and I907; but importantintelligencework was always left
to oicers from the central CID after I9I9, and the reformsof I935 led to the
appointmentin the provinceof a CentralIntelligenceOfficerwho was responsible
to the IntelligenceBureauin New Delhi. Sir PercivalGriEths, Eo GllardMy People.
The Historyof theIndianPolice (London,I 97I), pp. 342-54.

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332 ANIL SEAL

came to be in the day'sworkfor this improvinggovernment.Much of

the legislationwasframedin the provinces.Mostof the actualworkwas
done in the provinces.Provincialsecretariatsand districtofficershad
new dutiespiled upon them. The local armsof all the centraldepart-
ments,whetherforestryor agriculture,commerceor industry,exciseor
education,werejerkedinto a new activity.The hordesof pettyofficials
whohadbeengovernmentservantsmorein namethanin deed,nowhad
to respondmoreefficientlyto ordersfromabove.
Butthesedevelopmentshad to be paidfor. Sincegovernmentneeded
to squeezethe last rupee out of its territories,this in turll could only
mean more thoroughinterventionon its part. In pullingup the slack
at the base of the system,the Raj called upon its provincesand their
agents to meddle more actively below. The easy-goingcollaboration
whichhad guidedaffairsin so manylocalitieswas no longeradequate
forthosepurposes.Hencetherewereboundto be big upsetsin old fran-
chises.Butherewasthe rub.Evenunderthe old system,therehad been
plentyof upsets.Afterthe risingof I 857, the Britishbecamepreoccupied
with the stabilityof theirrule,moresensitiveto Indianpressures,more
alertto Indianopinion.They werewell awarethat they had to soothe
discontentsand, whereverpossible,deflectthem againstotherIndians.
The new situationcomplicatedthat task:the heavierthe intervention,
the higherthe risk.
Betweenthe pressuresof imperialdemandsandof Indiandiscontents,
the Raj negotiateduneasily.In obedienceto the former,therehad to be
morerule-makingand generalinstructionsfromheadquarters,and the
powerof the bureaucracieshad to smackharderupon Indian society.
On the other hand, these new intrusionsinto old immunitieswere
balancedby the developmentof a systemof representation, designedto
makeadministrative pressuresmoreacceptable,the rule-makingprocess
less arbitrary,and the recruitmentof Indian assistantsat the lerrels
where they were needed less difficult.This system was set to work
particularlyat the pointsof executionratherthan of command.
To begin with, there were strongpragmaticgroundsfor granting
Indiansa limitedsay in the conductof local affairs.l5These were not
in the mainthe reasonsthatappealedto Riponin hisfamousresolution,
nor have they been emphasizedby historianswho see local self-govern-
mentas the firststagein the politicaleducationof Indians.As Lawrence
15 But leading Indian politicians, concernedto change the structureof the
LegislativeGouncils,quicklylost interestin local self-governmentwhen they saw
that it was to begin and end in the localities;only when it came to be tied more
firmlyto the structureof ruleabove,did theirinterestin the municipalitiesand rural
boardsrevive.

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 IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA 333
and Mayowereacutelyaware,financialstringencymadegoodsenseof
changeswhich successfullyloaded the new municipalitieswith police
and conservancycharges. When municipal and local boards were
formedin mostof the provincesafterI88X, economywas againthe clue.
These local institutionsalso aided the Raj in its searchfor resources.
Their powers were small, but the sums they raised and disbursed
steadilyincreased.They had anotherusefulrole to play. They enabled
governmentto associateinterestsin the localitiesmore widely, and
balancethem morefinely,than had the old rule of thumbmethodsof
the Collector.16
Beyondthesepragmaticconsiderations, the wideningof the represen-
tativesystemcarriedpoliticaladvantagesof a differentsort.It brought
moreIndiansinto consultationaboutthe managementof their afEairs;
yet it kept them at workinsidea frameworkwhichsafeguardedBritish
interests.In otherwords,the new systemwas castingwidernets to find
collaborators.Conversations in the dak bungalowor on the Collector's
verandah were no longer a satisfactorymeans for selecting them.
Nominationbased on the representationof interestswas one way of
findingthem; electionsfoundevenmore.Bothmethodsworkedto keep
themin equipoise.In thisway,representation becameone of thevehicles
for drivingdeeperinto local society.
But thesemodestrepresentative bodieswereto becomeimportantfor
another reason. Once the British extended municipal and district
boardsinto mostof the provinces,theywenton to usethemforpurposes
beyondthe limitedspheresof local taxationand administration.The
Britishfoundthemconvenientas a wayof adding,firsta representative,
'andlater an elective,veneerto the superiorcouncilswhich they were
now developing.After the India CouncilsAct of I 86 I, provincial
legislativecouncilswere set up in Madras,Bombayand Bengal; the
North-westernProvincesobtaineda councilin I886, and the Punj'abin
I897. The Act of I892 increasedthe numberof nominatedmemberson
these councils;but it also admittedthe electiveprincipleby the back
door,sincenominationsmightnow be recommexlded by specificIndian
organizations.In practice,this came to mean that districtboardsand
municipalities,'
togetherwith landlords,chambersof commerceand
universities,nominateda few members.In I909 the Morley-Mixlto
reformsextended the links between higher and lower councils and
16 Thus,for example,the membership of the ruralboardsin the CentralProvinces
was intendedto representthe interestsof landlordsand traders;duringthe eighteen-
eightiessometownsin the Punjabbegan to reserveseatsfor communities.Much the
sameprocesscan be seen in the municipalitiesof the United ProvincesbeforeI9I6.

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 ANIL SEAL
334
enlargedthe role of local men. Twelveof the twenty-sevenmembersof
theLegislativeCouncilof the Governor-General were to be chosenby
thenon-official members of the councils;
provincial and in each of the
provincialcouncilsa number of members were to be elected by the
municipalitiesand districtboards.At the same time, specialinterests
such as landlords,Muslimsand businessmenhad the right to elect
membersto both provincialcouncilsand the councilof the Governor-
General.
Throughoutthis evolutiontwo processeswere at work. First, it is
evident that Governmentwas now balancinginterestsby separating
theminto categoriesof its own defining.Who were 'the Mohammadan
Commanityin the Presidencyof Bengal'or the 'Landholdersin the
United Provinces',each Of whom was to elect one memberto the
Governor-General's Council?Neitherof these bland categoriesmade
any senseat the locallevelin Bengaland the United Provinces;bothof
them ignoredthe diffierentinterestsand rivalriesamong those groups
whom the Britishbundledtogetherin a phrase.
In the secondplace,the spreadof representation had nowproduceda
legislativesystemwhich extendedfrom the lowestto the highestlevel
in India.In one sensethe systemformeda sortof representative pyramid.
In mostprovincesthe sub-districtboards acted as electoralcollegesfor
part of the membershipof districtboards. Together with the munici-
palities,theseboardselectedmembersto the provincialcouncils,which
in turn electedmembersto the imperialcouncil.But in a widersense
the Britishhad nowconstructeda representative andlegislativestructure
whichcomplementedtheiradministrative structure.Togetherthesetwo
systemscreatedbondsbetweenthe localitiesand the higherarenasof
politicsand administration.
While the reformsof I9I9 upsetthe pyramid,they greatlystrength-
enedthesebonds.Localbodiesno longerelectedto provincialcouncils,
but they wereboltedmuchmorefirmlyinto provincialpolitics.As part
of the bargainof dyarchy,localself-government becamethe responsibi-
lity of ministerswho wereappointedfromamongnon-officialmembers.
They usedtheirinfluenceoverlocal aiairs to rewardtheirfriendsand
punishtheircritics.But therewas anotherside to the coin. Membersof
localboardsandof provincialcouncilsalikewerenowelectedon a much
widerfranchise.Hencea widerrangeof localinterestshad to be cajoled.
Membersof the new provincialcouncilsfound that their constituents
weremuchmoredisposedto re-electthemwhenthe livesof thesevoters
had beensweetenedby tit-bitsflungto themby the niinisters.Charityin
the localitynow beganin the province.

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 IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA 335
The hierarchyof Britishrule throughIndiancollaborationsurvived
the reformsof I935. The centre still kept a firm grip over sovereign
authority,reservingimportantpowersoverthe provincesand givingits
Indian collaboratorslitt]e say in these safeguards;by granting the
provincesthe substanceof self-government, by wideningthe electorate,
the Britishensuredthat their provincialsuccessorshad also to take
account of far larger numbersof Indians who had the vote. While
shootingNiagara,the Britishsawto it thattheircentralpowersremained
intact and that India was still ruled by an interconnectedsystemof
government.The federalprovisionsof the I935 Act never came into
operation.The uncertaintythat flowed from this, togetherwith the
outbreakof war, meantthat thisAct was only a temporarysettlement.
The proposalsfrom the Viceroy, the missionsfrom London,and the
talksat Delhiwerepreludesfortransferof powerat the centrewhichthe
Raj had guardedso jealouslyfor so long.
As preparationsto concession,whetherinterimor final, the British
stuckto their old strategyof thrustingtheir subjectsinto broad cate-
goriesanddivisions.The Hindus,Muslims,Sikhsand DepressedClasses
definedby the CommunalAwardof I932 werethe penultimateclassifi-
cationsin a policy which ended in Partition.By the federalarrange-
mentsof I935 an even moreimprobablecategory,the Indian Princes,
wasbroughtinto the game.Thiswaspartand parcelof a processwhich
can be seenbothin the administrative and the representative
systemsof
the Raj in India. As governmentintervenedmore, as its regulations
becamemore uniform,its rulesmore Olympian,the categorieswhich
definedIndian diversityhad to becomemore and more abstractand
rough-hewn.What remainedtrue from first to last was that Indians
could not affiordto ignorethem in theirpoliticalresponse.

III

In this section, the emphasiswill lie on the forces which brought

togetherthe po]iticsof smalland largerarenasin India.By scrutinizing
linkages,perhapssomeof the puzzlesof modernIndianhistorywill be
resolved:Whyhavegood argumentsaboutthe natureof politicsat one
level lost cogencywhen appliedto another?Why have Indian politi-
cians played such apparentlyinconsistentroles in diffierentspheres?
Whyhave they claimedto standforone interestwhenin fact theywere
pursuinganother? How have the politics of constitutionalismand

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336 ANIL SEAL

agitationbeen connected? What has governedthe timingof outbursts

of activityand of relapsesinto quiescence?
A straightforwardhypothesisprovides a way into the problem.
Governmentwas interveningin the local aSairsof its subjects.These
interrrentions
tookplaceinsidea systemof rulestretchingfromLondon
to the Indianvillage. Governmentwas pressingupon the unevenand
disjointedsocietiesof its subjects;they reacted, and their reactions
differed.Indiandiversityensuredendlessvariationsin theirresponseto
governmentpressure,normallyuniform,but they all had to devise
systemsof politicswhichenabledthemto reactat the pointswherethat
pressurewas applied.In respondingto governmentIndianshad to be
adaptable,and here one pliancymet another.Howevermuch it may
have blusteredto the contrary,the llaj was designedto respondto
somepressuresfromits subjects,who werethusencouragedto organize
to treat with it. Some saw advantagein doing so. Otherssaw it as
necessaryinsuranceagainstdisadvantages.Eitherway, their effiortsto
exploitthe networkof governmentconstituteone of the forceslinking
the arenasof Indianpolitics.
But the argumentmust go beyondthis simplehypothesis.Govern-
ment interventionmightbe on the increase;but it nevergainedexclu-
sive possessionof the lives of its subjects.Indiansstood firmlyby their
own essentials,whetherthese were mattersof ritual, family feuds or
localstanding.The llaj, plasticin manymattersbutunbendingin some,
maintainedits reservedtopics. So too did its subjects.l7Neither side
cared much about the other'sl8Hence many of the Indian responses
to government'sinitiativeswere for limited purposesand at limited
periods.
Thereis anotherqualificationto the hypothesis.It wouldbe conven-
ient if Indian political action had been simply a responseto British
initiative;but it wouldbe too convenientto be true.Admittedly,there
werepartsof the countrywithfew interestsbeyondthoseof the locality;
and herekinshipspunsmallwebs,buyingand sellingweredonein tiny
marts,and religioushorizonsseldomlay beyondthe nearbytempleor
mosque.In the arid MadrasDeccan, for example,commoninterests
17 One consequenceof the reformswas the growinginterventionby Indians in
matterswherethe Raj had alwaysfearedto tread:the Hindu ReligiousEndowments
Act of I926 wasnot a measurethatthe MadrasGovernmentwouldhavepassedbefore
devolution.
18 Of course,when the Britishretreatedupon the centre,their concernwith the
detailsof the religiousand social prejudicesof their subjectsbecame more remote
than ever, while Indian interestin the powerswhich the Britishretainedbecame
much keener.

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 IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA
337
were narrow, and government institutions provided the chief impulse
for bringing village and firkarinto wider systems. But other regions had
more powerful solidarities. Whatever moved the rich peasants such as
the jotedars of Midnapore, the patidars of Gujarat and the ryots of the
Andhra deltas, the Agarwal enthusiastswho traded along the Ganges,
or the Khilafatists of Hindustan, it was not merely a desire to parley
with their rulers. Granted, they could not ignore the Raj, since it had
helped to widen the opportunitiesfor trade and to heighten the resent-
ments of Muslims. But they possesseda community of interest which did
not simply arise from the behest of the llaj. Cases such as these make it
clear that the bald hypothesis with which we began cannot provide a
total explanation of the problem of linkages.
Early in the nineteenth century Indian politicians were already
anxious to negotiate with London. That is evidence of the logic of the
interconnection. Over high policy, such as the constitution or fiscal
issues or the employment of covenanted civilians, it was not Calcutta
which could satisfy them, but only the ultimate authority. From the
time of Rammohan Roy's passage to England, every reconsiderationof
India's constitution by parliament led to a rush of Indian petitions to
Westminster,and the setting-upof organizationsto backthem. The Bom-
bay Association, the Deccan Sabha, and the Madras Native Association
owed their existence to the Charter revision of I853. In the eighteen-
eighties, hopes for constitutional crumbs created several new associa-
tions in the presidency capitals and then in I885 joined them together
into the Indian National Congress. At first this mendicancy by the
nation led to little more than annual festivals, where provincial dele-
gates met, orated and dispersed.
Their provincial organizations might seem hollow, with nothing to
lose but their prospectuses;but they had an operational part to play. As
officialsand legislaturesin the provinces took more of the decisions and
made more of the rules, butting into local sanctuaries, shuffling the
standing of men and their share of the booty, they gave district bosses
reasons for negotiating with the administration at heights to which
they had not previously been minded to climb. It was through the
provinces that government intervened; hence it was through provincial
politics that local men hoped to influence it. Searching for credentials,
coteries in the capitals sought supportersup country; needing a forum,
mofussilmen sometimes turned to the magniloquently named bodies in
the cities.
The Raj itself had cut the steps which these petitionershad to mount;
it had also defined the tests they had to pass. Its administration had
B

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338 ANIL SEAL

carvedits peoplesinto largeadministrative blocks;l9and it had set up a

systemof representingthem. In effiectIndianswere now being invited
to voice the interestsof others,if they could show credentialsas the
spokesmenof a block.This amountedto a licence,almosta command,
to form associationsintelligible to government.For the ambitious
politicianthe entrancefee wasto assertor pretendaffinitieswith those
who had been bundledinto the samecategory.20 Someof theseassocia-
tions weresmall,claimingto speakfor parochialinterests;but others,
such as the National MuhammadanAssociationof Calcuttaand the
British Indian Associationof Bengal, bravely claimed wider con-
stituencies.
As the Britishextendedtheir representativesystems,the growthof
these asso-ciations becameself-sustaining.As a promotersuccessfully
assertedhis claim to speak with government,he might hope for
nominationto the higher councils, for greater influence over the
regulationsand usefulcontactsamongthe bureaucratsat the top. But
the promoter'sgain was likely to mean his competitor'sloss; and the
best hope for the loserwas to adopt the same tacticsas the winnerfor
whom they workedso well. The result was often an organizational
tit-for-tatwhere the formingof one associationprovokedthe forming
of a rival.At leastthismightpreventone'scasefromgoingby default;it
might cast doubt on the credibilityof his opponents;and at best it
mightpluckfromthemthe covetedaccoladeof officialrecognitiorl.But
competitivenessled to more than that. llivalry forced opponentsto
searchfor supportersat lowerlevels.The IndianAssociationdid so in
Bengal,and so did Tilakin Bombay,whenhe wooedcity labourersfor
his Home llule League.It compelleddefeatedgroupsto lookfor a]lies
at theirown level elsewhere,as the Ghosebrothers,BipinChandraPal
and Aurobindowere doing when they approachedTilak in Poona
duringthe swadeshiand boycott agitations.It might compelthem to
seekhelp at higherlevels,as the Hinduzealotshad in mindwhen they
formedan all-IndiaHindu Mahasabhain I909. Associations]ooking
19It suitedthe administrativeconvenienceof the Britishto deem that throughout
India,a landlordwasa landlordandthat a Muslimwasa Muslim.Deemingis always
dangerous,and manyhistorianshave been misledby this exampleof it. Sir Herbert
Risley was responsiblefor much of the category-making behindthe Morley-Minto
reforms;but we need not suppose that such a distinguishedethnographer,with
thousandsof castes-tohis credit,believedthat Indianscould reallybe shut into such
large boxes.
20 In the towns and villages, men of differentreligions,castes and occupations

workedpromiscuously together,heedlessof the categoriesof the censusandlegislation.-

Indianshad to don new caps to fit the rules. Clornwallis's zemindarsand Munro's
ryotshad done much the same.

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 IMPERIALISM AND uNATIONALISM IN INDIA 339
for supportabove, below, and at their sideYproliferated greatly.Now,
they requiredpoliticianswhoseprofessionwas to act as intermediaries
and spokesmen,men at home with the governmentalgrid and the
matchingstructureof politics,able to shuttlebetweenarenas.Some-
times they had no base of their own, and this very freedomfrom the
websof local interestgave them a role that went beyondthe localities.
The careers of Dadabhai, Gokhale, the Ali brothers,the Nehrus,
Jinnah and Gandhi himselfshow the increasingimportanceof the
professionof politics.2lAssociations,like cricket,were Britishinnova-
tions,and, like cricket,becamean Indian craze.
This explanationhas been baldly stated becausethe purposeof an
introductionis to introduceand the rangeof casesis immense.But the
visit to India of the Secretaryof State at the end of I9I7 provided
strikingillustrationsof the-processthat had been at workvAs-soonas
Montagu arrived,deputationsand memorandacascadedupon him.
222 associationsaddressedrepresentations to him. They werejust the
tip. Manyothergroupswouldhave approachedhim had they not been
turnedaway.Still othersleft theircasesin the handsof largerbodies.22
The I I 2 deputationswhichwon an audiencewith Montaguhad clearly
been organizedin terms of the categoriesdevised by the British.
Nineteen claimed -to represent landowners; eleven, businessmen;
twenty-three,Muslims;five,high-casteHindusandeight,the sdepressed
classes'.Again,the fact that ninety-fourof themlimitedtheirmember-
ship to one or otherof the Britishprovinces,showshow trulythe lines
for Indian politicalorganizationtracedthe administrativeboundaries
of the Raj.23That manyof theseclassifications existedonly in the think-
ing of the Raj is plainfromthe rivalrieswhichnow cameinto the open.
Forty-fourrepresentations in all had beenreceivedfromMuslimbodies;
they showeddivisionsso glaringas to cast doubt on the existenceof a
Muslimcommunityat all. In the Punjabthe provincialbranchof the
Muslim League, having seceded from the all-India body in protest
21 These are examplesof political brokers(and in due coursemanagers)at the
top; they had innumerablecounterparts,who performedmuch the same function
at lowerlevels:Rafi AhmedKidwai of the United Provinces,RangaswamiIyengar
and Satyamurtiin Madras,and AnugrahaNarayanSinha in Biharare middlemen
of this sort.
22 'Addresses presentedin India to . . * the Viceroyand . . . the Secretaryof State
for India', ParliamenSyPapers,I9I8, XVIII, 469-587.
23 Theirmembership alsoillustratesthat a politicianmightbe forcedto play many
roles. As Montagu'sadvisersrecognized,'One individual might, and often did,
appear as a member of several deputations,which represented,for instance, his
religious community,his social class or professionalinterest, and his individual
politicalviews'.Ibid.,472.

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 ANIL SEAL
34o
againstthe Congress-League scheme,now led a cat-and-dogexistence
with the new provincialbody which had been improvisedto take its
place. Therewas also the PunjabMuslimAssociation,whichhad been
foundedby landlordsand claimedto speakfor 'humbleragriculturists,
the great bulk of the populationof this province'24-a memorable
example of how categoriescould be profitablyconfused.But for a
communityto split, it did not have to be large.The Ahmadiyasect of
dissidentMuslimsmighthaveseemedsmallenoughto see the virtuesof
unity; but while their chief spokesmanrejectedthe Congress-League
schemefordemandingtoomuch,its'immediateadoption'wasdemanded
by the AhmadiyaAnjumanIshaat-i-Islam,a 'bodyof about50 persons
establishedat Lahore'.25In the United Provinces,again, Muslim
opinion was sharply divided. Here the provincial branch of the
League supportedthe joint scheme, while the UP Muslim Defence
Associationrejectedit. Less concernedwith constitutionalformulae,
the ulema of the provincesheld more antiqueviews.At the Deoband
seminarythe maulviscalled for an alim on every council, while the
Majlis Muid-ul-Islamof Lucknowsimply demandedthat the Jewish
Secretaryof State shouldbring India underthe rule of the true prin-
ciplesof the Koran.
The exploitationof communityfor politicalrivalrywas matchedby
the exploitationof the caste categoriesof the census. Montagu met
several deputationswhich each claimed to speak for all the forty
millionnon-Brahmins of the MadrasPresidency.They split along the
usual lines, the MadrasPresidencyAssociationsupportingthe Con-
gress-League scheme,the othersrepudiatingit. Butanotherdeputation,
from the Adi DravidaJana Sabha, raised the spectreof six million
untouchablesin the south, harassedby Brahminsand non-Brahmins
alike,forwhomthe only hopelay in specialrepresentation.Thisindeed
wasthe prizethesouthernpoliticiansyearnedforjespeciallythosewhom
Montagu was spared from seeing. The alleged unity of the non-
Brahminscould not hold firm against such a prospect:Nadukottai
Chetties,Tiyyas,Nadars,Marawars,Lingayats,VisvaBrahmins,26 Adi
Andhrasand Panchamasall called for it.27OrthodoxBrahmins,Jains,
24 Ibid., 478-
25 Ibid., 479, 486-
26 These pretentious pot-makers,the Visva Brahmins,managedto split into five
separateassociations,with threedistinctdemands.
27 Solomon'sproblemwas child'splay comparedto Montagu's;the Governorof
Madras,who had to work the minister'ssolutionsby balancingthese claimsinside
dyarchy,bitterlycomplained:'Oh, this communalbusiness.I am being bombarded
by all sorts of sub-castesof the non-Brahminsfor special representationand as I

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 IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA 34I

Buddhistsand Christiansall joined in the rush,and in all somethirty-

eight groupsin Madrasdemandedspecial considerationand special
rights.Madraswasthe extremeexampleof thegeneraltrendthroughout
India. In every province,at every level and inside every category,
politicalassociations wereformedasthe expressionof claimandcounter-
claim, of group and counter-group,of competitorsvying for the
favourof the Raj by playingpoliticscouchedin its own formulae.
The Secretaryof Statemadehisway to theserancorouscaravanserais
in the period before his new constitutiondevolved powers to the
provincesand gave Indiansa share of them. Until then many local
politiciansdid not keepa continuousline opento the province.Associa-
tions were, of course,one of the ways of doing so, but they were not
enoughto ensuresuccessin the everydayaffairsof localities.There,the
old arts were still the best. No amountof bombinatingin the British
Indian Associationcould by itself give a zemindarcontrol over his
neighbourhood;the man who walked tall in the SarvajanikSabha
might be withouta shredof powerin Poona; therewere earthierand
surerwaysof pursuinginterests.Theseassociationsweresuchimperfect
indicationsof men'srealprioritiesin the localitiesthat we cannotassert
that theirexpansioncompletelyexplainsthe growinglinkagesin Indian
politicsapparentin Montagu'stime.
Yet nearlyall localitieswere being pulled into largerworlds.Two
politicalforcesdrew them upwards,the one constitutional,the other
agitational.The pressureof provincialbureaucraciesupon the little
sanctuariescontinuedto grow, and to interSeremore with their lives.
The Madrasgovernment,for example,raisedits revenuesfrom eight
croresof rupeesto twenty-fourbetweenI880 and I920. Somepartwas
redistributedwithin the province.To sharethesegolden showers,the
men in the localitieshad to surrendersomeof theirisolation.The twin
instrumentsof nominationand election made it easier to influence
provincialdecisionsafter I 909. The Act of I 9 I 9 greatly extended
representation, and it also gave a smatteringof powerin the provinces
themselvesto Indianpoliticians,not leastthe powerof spendingmoney
in theirlocalities.This broughta heightenedrealityinto elections;and,
as we have seen, it made the politiciansboth of the centreand of the
localitymoredependenton each other.
But anothermotorfor drivingloca] affairsup to higherarenaswas
believe there are some 250 of these, I am not likely to satisfymany in a councilof
I27. You'rea nice fellow to have given me this job!' Willingdonto Montagu, 20
February Ig20. WillingdonPapers, India Oice Library.David Washbrookdug
out this gem.

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342 ANIL SEAL

providedby the developmentof Indian politics.The formingof the

Home Rule Leaguesand the alliancebetweenthe Congressand the
MuslimLeaguein I9I6 were portentsof agitationswhich could now
be set in motionby bodiesclaimingto standfor all-Indiainterests.By
I920, these agitationswere dominatingpolitics.28Gandhishouldered
aside the old Congresshands who had previouslyclaimed to speak
for the movement.His own agitation,fortifiedby his a]liancewith
the Khilafatists,emergedas the non-cooperation campaignof I920-22.
In practicethe campaignwas a seriesof interconnecteddistrictbattles,
foughtby men fromthe localities.The hillmenof Kumaon,the coolies
of Assam,the headmenof Oudh,the turbulentpeasantries of Midnapore
and Guntur,Kairaand Bhagalpur,were all usingwhat were allegedly
nationalissuesto expresstheirlocal complaints.Localgrievanceswere
chronicand narrow,but they put the stuffinginto campaignswhich
were intermittentand wide. It was not possiblefor the localitiesto
rejectthe linkagesof agitation.For the provincialand nationalleader-
ships to press the Britishat the top, they had to cause the base to
fu]minate,and so they did all they couldto bringthe localitiesinto the
movement.Many localitieswelcomeda wider agitationas a meansof
paying oS old scoresagainstthe administrationand those who sided
with it. But in any case, had they ignoredthe movement,they would
haveriskedlosingall influenceuponwhat was clearlya growingpower
in theirprovince.
Some of the supportersfromthe localitiesmade awkwardallies for
the leadership.Nationaland provincialcampaignerswith large inter-
eststo watchhad to be moreprudentthan men whoselocal grievances
werenot assuagedby all-Indiastrategies.WhenGandhiwantedto cool
his campaignin I922, the men of Bardoliand Gunturwerespoilingfor
a fight;his effortsto observethe armisticein I93 I meantnothingto the
peasantsof Rae Barelior BaraBanki.But thesedifficultiesin control-
ling agitationwere balancedby its successin bringingever morelocal
politiciansinto the ambitof the provinces.
Duringthe quiescentperiodbetweenI922 and I928, many of these
agitationallinks snapped,and provincialpartiesalmostclosed down
shop in the districts.But it was businessas usual in the political ex-
changesof the provincialcapitals,wherejobbersorganizedfactionsto
enterand breakthe councils,or to workthem.It matteredlittleto these
28 Constitutionalpoliticsand agitationrode in unsteadytandemthroughoutthis
period.The defeatof the constitutionalists
in I920 was more tacticalthan strategic.
By December I920 when the Nagpur Congressmet, the first electionsunder the
reformshad come and gone. By the time of the next electionsin I923, the Swaraj
partywas in the frontseat, and Gandhiwas back-pedallingfromgaol.

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 IMPE:RIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA 343
groupingswhetherthey retainedformalallegianceto the Congressor
not; they did so only whenit suitedtheirconvenience,and whenit did
not, they left the Congressto theirrivals.They steppednimblyin and
out of the all-India organizations,like so many cabs for hire. From
local torporand nationalinsignificance,Indian politicswere rescued
by constitutionalchanges.The Award had settled the share of the
communities.By extendingthe electorate,the imperialcroupierhad
summonedmore playersto his table. By transferringpolitical power
to politiciansin the provinces,he madethemthe mainagenciesof inter-
vention in the localities. Now there was no help for it. Local men
were forcedinto connectionswith thosewho claimedto representthe
big battalionsandwouldcontroltheirdestiniesin the future.At lastthe
localitieswere solderedto the provinces.
Butthe agitationsand negotiationswhichled to the Act of I935 had
alsogivena new importanceto organizationsclaimingto representall-
India interests.Gandhireturnedto take controlof civil disobedience;
Congressspokewithonevoice at the SecondRoundTableConference.
Once powerin the provinceswas up for bids,interestsoutsidethe Con-
gressalsoneededtheirnationalspokesmen.So the Muslimsreorganized
underJinnahin I93P5, and groupswith even shakierall-Indiacon-
nections,such as the DepressedClasses,found it necessaryto have a
negotiatorof theirown. All thesespokesmengrew in statureby being
recognized,even if reluctantly)by Delhi and London, as the pleni-
potentiariesof constituentsin the provinces.Butjust as the Ra; had to
counter-balanceprovincialdevolutionby strengtheningits centre,so
Indianpoliticiansat the centrehad to confrontan analogousproblem
sinceprovincescontrolledby Indiansmightgo theirown way. The only
safeguardopento the leadersof Congressand Leagueagainstprovincial
autonomywas to constructcentralcontrolsstrongenoughto tie their
provincialsatrapsto them. In this difficulttask they were helped by
two trends.Althoughthe I935 Act was intendedby the Britishto con-
tain Indianpoliticswithinthe provincesX they couldnot be checkedat
that level. Somefactions,such as thoseled by Pant in the United Pro-
vinces, Rajagopalachariin Madrasand Kher in Bombay,cheerfully
gluttedthemselveswith powerin the provincesbetweenI937 and I939.
But plentyof othershad no powerto enjoy.Hence the CongressHigh
Commandcouldarbitratebetweenthe 'ins'and 'outs'of the provinces,
andin the CentralProvinceswentto the lengthof breakinga-ministry.29
Provincialleaderswhosehopeshad been permanentlybOasted by the
29 Once war came Vallabhbhaiorderedall the Congress
ministersto quit office.
Reluctantlythey obeyed.

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 ANIL SEAL
344
Communal Awardhad every reasonto cling to their centre. In this
to
way, the adhesionof the Muslimsof the United Provinceshelped
the Leaguealive duringthe two lean years before the war.
keep
The othertrendstrengthening the centreswasthe steadyraisingof the
constitutionalstakes.The offiersof Linlithgowin I940 and of Crippsin
I942 promisedan immediateshare in
the centralgovernmentand a
post-dated cheque for its controlafter the war. These were matters
but
beyond the provincialpoliticians.They couldwhip theirown dogs,
interests into
noone else's.Only men claimingto take all the nation's
and having the all-India organizations to back these claims,
account,
dead]y end-game played with
couldwork at such altitudes.In the
theCabinetMissionand Mountbatten, these politicians claimed
Wavell,
the Pandora's
tobe custodiansof all the setsof interestscrammedinto
everythingto
boxesof the Congressand the League.Now there was
Those who
playfor: the prize was the masteryof the subcontinent. The
forit had to providea firmleadership to their followers.
competed
of the Muslim
sizeof the stakeletJinnahbreakat lastthe independence
and thirties
bossesin the Punjab.Just as the agitationsof the twenties
so the crisis
hadswungthe localitiesbehindthe provincialleaderships,
the national
ofthe last days of the Raj swung the provincesbehind had
leaderships. The parallelwent further.Just as civil disobedience
leaders had
beencomplicatedby enrages who went furtherthan their below
from
wished,nowon the eve of independencetherewerepressures
of manceuvre. Jinnah was hoistwith
whichreducedthe leaders'freedom and
was harassed by the Sikhs
hisown petardof Pakistan,and Nehru Val-
Jinnah and
the Hindu Mahasabha.But in the outcome,Nehru,
heads, and
labhbhaiPatel settledthe fate of the provincesover their
of the new
all but one of them30marchedobedientlyinto one or other
soldered
nationsof India and Pakistan.At last the provincehad been
to the centre.
* * *

Simply put,
These interpretationsarise from two main arguments. levels;
working at several
Indianpoliticswerean interconnectedsystem When
of those levels.
and governmenthad muchto do with the linking
some of its
these argumentsare applied to modern Indian history, not be
need
conundrumslook less intractable.In the first place, we
at the base
dismayedif someof the hardfactswhichhave beenrevealed
in which politicsworkedat
of thesystemseemto runcounterto theways
30 The North-WestFrontierProvince.

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 IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA 345
other points. Once Indian politicianswere pressedinto treatingwith
governmentand their fellow subjectsat several levels, they played
severalroles,eachof whichmightseemto makenonsenseof the others.
But those who varied their tunes between bucolic patter and urban
suavity were not brazenimpostors.To make use of the system,they
had no choicebut to play thosecontradictoryroles.In catchingthem
out at their tricksand dwellingon theirinconsistencies,historiansare
simplyplayinga game at which the administrators used to excel. But
to demonstratethat Indian politicianswere not always what they
claimed to be is not to describewhat they were. Moraljudgment is
easy; functionalanalysisis hard. Perhapsour approachwill help to
makethe one moredifficultand the otherless arduous.
Secondly,the partplayedby ideologyin the growthof Indianpolitics
can now be re-assessed.Those who have convincedthemselvesthat
India is the home of spiritualvalueshave found them everywherein
her politics;othershave seen nothingbut homohominilupus.The truth
seemsto lie in between.Whateverheld togetherthe gimcrackcoalitions
of provinceand nation,it wasnot passionfora commondoctrine.It was
lowerdown that ideologywas important.Illustratingthe wit and wis-
dom of MohamedAli would be unprofitableas well as painful; but
thereis no gainsayingthe Hinduzealotryin the localitiesof Hindustan,
or the Muslimresentmentsagainstit which lent that adventureran
improbablefame. Ideologyprovidesa good tool for fine carving,but
it does not makebig buildings.
We can make some inroadsinto a third question.Many historians
have arguedthat the timingof Indian agitationwas governedby the
imminenceof Britishconcession.The pointis a simpleone; it wasmade
by-Simon; and it is demonstratedby the landmarksof constitutional
changefrom I853 until I947. Yet at the lowerlevelsthesesimplicities
meltinto a morerevealingcomplexity.There,governmentintervention
helpedto createthe agitationsovercowprotectionin I 893, the partition
of Bengalin I905, the canalcoloniesof the Punjabin I907, the munici-
palitiesof the United Provincesbefore I9I6, the cooliesof Assamin
I92I-22, the riglrtsof villageofficersin the Kistnaand Godaverideltas
-in I922, and the agrariangrievancesof Gujarat,Oudh and Andhra
duringthe Depression.Agitationsof this sortfed into the largermove-
ments, helping to start and sustainthem, often survivingthem and
remainingat hand for the next all-Indiacampaign.
This conclusionalters our ideas about the nature of these large
campaigns.Manylocalgrievancesdraggedon, whetherthe leaderships
were militant or not. When the malcontentsof the neighbourhood

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346 ANIL SEAL

alignedthemselveswith the provincialand nationalcampaignswhich

arosefromtime to time, they hopedto exploittheseissuesfor theirown
causes.The small issues,which historiansused to neglect, moved on
diXerentclocksfromthe largeissueson which studyhas been concen-
trated. Small discontentsexistedbeforethey were caught up by the
agglutinativetendenciesof larger campaignsand they went on sim-
meringafterthe largeagitationshad cooled.Many localitieshad their
irreconcilables, men whoseinterestscould not be pattedsmoothlyinto
the prudencesof provincialpolitics,and who turnedinto permanent
'outs'.Thisheld good at higherlevelstoo. Aftertheirpositionhad been
explodedby the CommunalAwardand by the silentconsentto it of the
all-IndiaCongress,Bengalis,who had hithertobeen amongits leaders,
now becamemalcontentsat the nationallevel,willingto makecommon
cause with the mavericksof other provinces.Subhas'sForwardBloc
lookedbackwardsto the old triangleof LaljBal and Pal, to the Home
Rule Leaguesor the HinduMahasabhaof BhaiParmanand.All ofthem
were coalitionsof 'outs'.
In turn,thishelpsto explainthe relationsbetweenthe constitutional
and the agitationalsidesof Indianpolitics.Formanyhistorians,Indian
politicskepton makingcleanbreaksfromone to the other; the smooth
formulationswhich Saprupennedat Albert Road in Allahabadwent
unheard every time the trouble-makersescaped from their cages.
Thiswasnot thewaymatterswent.Aswe haveseen,the rootsof political
activityin the localitiestwistedin many directions.Local grievances
alwayslookedfor the bestoutlets.We cannotmakea simpledistinction
betweenthe constitutionalists, who scamperedfrom boardto councilX
and the agitatorsfrom less accommodatingareas who shunnedsuch
opportunism.Local studies reveal that there was much interaction
between them. Even the most uncooperativeareas had to work
throughgovernmentinstitutions;even the dacoitscould not disregard
them.31Gandhi freely allowed satyagrahisto hold posts in local
government,and the presidentof the Ahmedabadmunicipalityin the
mid-twentieswas a not unknownagitatornamed VallabhbhaiPatel.
The conversewas true as well. Constitutionalists
reactilybecameagita-
tors when local conditionsforced them to do so. The law-abiding
municipalityof Nagpurorganizedone satyagrahaover flags, and the
time-servers of Jubbulporeweresweptinto anotheroverforests.Many
local men were dual-purposepoliticians,switchingtheir bets between
constitutionalism and agitationaccordingto the temperof their sup-
31 Manyvillageshiredtheirchowkidars
fromthe criminaltribes,followingthe old
adage.

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 IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA 347
portersand the calculationof their interest.These ambiguitieswere
sharedby men at all levels.
These conclusionssuggest that some of the difficultiesin Indian
historycan be met by puttingnew life into old fictors and that the
subjectcanbe reintegratedby seeingtherolesof imperialismandnation-
alismin a differentlight. Imperialismbuilt a systemwhichinterlocked
its rule in locality, provinceand nation; nationalismemergedas a
matchingstructureof politics.The study of local situations,the com-
ponents of these larger wholes, cannot by itself identify a bedrock
reality.The Raj had smashedthe autonomyof localities;the historian
of Britishrule cannotput it togetheragain. Indianpoliticshave to be
studiedat each and everylevel; none of them can be a completefield
of studyon its own. Eachof themrevealsonly that partof socialaction
whichdidnotdependuponinterconnection. As thatpartbecamecaught
up by the linkingforcesof Indianhistory,it steadilyshrank.
In no colonial situation can government'spart be ignored. We
have suggestedthat much of the crucialworkof connectingone level
with anothercamefromits impulses.Thishypothesiscan explainmany
of the problemsof linkage.Othersstill elude us. We need more facts
about such bonds as kinship patterns,urban ties, professionaland
educationalinterests.All that can be said at presentabout arguments
built upon them is that they are probablysignificant,possib]ycrucial,
but certainlynot general.In the meantime,the rangeof caseswhich
can be explainedby lookingat imperialismand nationalismin the new
way suggeststhat theirimportancehas been too hastilymarkeddown.
Perhapsthis volumewill do somethingto bring them back into their
own.

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