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Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies ity to target the vast collection system in a laser-like
Volume 21 • Number 1 • $15 single copy price Winter 2014-15
© 2015 AFIO - Association of Former Intelligence
manner on a specific foreign policy related require-
Officers, All Rights Reserved ment is extremely limited. It is more appropriate to
think of these systems in terms of having built a giant
baseball catcher’s mitt. One can point it where one
thinks information may come from, but one has little
control over when the balls are thrown and their exact
Guide to the Study of Intelligence direction of flight. As a result, we miss far more than
we catch, and the timing of what we do catch rarely
coincides with the publication schedule of the PDB.
My Perspective on Intelligence The scatter-shot nature of intelligence collection
Support of Foreign Policy also makes it easy for analysts to fall into the “connect-
ing the dots” fallacy. Just because one has a dot does
not mean it is, or can be, connected to other dots. It is
by Carl Ford1 the same story with the best human source reporting.
It rarely, if ever, provides a complete picture. Sources
The key to providing intelligence support to our are human. They make mistakes and are plagued
foreign policymakers is delivering timely, relevant, with biases. The same is true for communications
and persuasive information. Sounds simple. Espe- intercepts. Since when can a couple of telephone
cially as we devote so many billions of dollars to the conversations and a few dozen e-mails be enough to
Intelligence Community (IC). In practice, however, tell much about someone, or what they stand for? This
the job of foreign intelligence analysts writing for the goes as well for overhead imagery. Although the US
President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and other assessments possesses the world’s most capable system for collect-
for senior officials is anything but straightforward. ing intelligence it doesn’t give analysts x-ray vision or
Foreign policy focused analysts must contend with a an ability to see what someone is thinking.
collection system geared primarily to military issues It does not help that intelligence managers are
that produces little new information germane to the prone to define success in terms of speed; the time
immediate requirements of policymakers including it takes for a piece of newly collected information
the President. Instead, reporters of current intelli- to reach a senior official. In order to speed up this
gence related to foreign policy matters depend largely process, very sensitive “eyes only” information is
for their insights on open sources, a few well-placed sometimes sent directly from collectors to the senior
human assets, a smattering of signals intelligence, policy-makers, leaving all-source intelligence analysts
and bits and pieces of imagery. For the foreign policy out of the loop. The item might be important, but it
focused analyst, squeezing as much as possible out also might be misleading or completely wrong. As
of an imperfect collection system becomes the true if that were not enough, relevance, in the managers’
measure of success. minds, is often simply that the information is classi-
Most of the intelligence budget goes to sup- fied and comes from the IC.
porting the Defense Department and its combatant This leads many managers in the IC to believe that
commands. This is not to suggest that foreign policy policymakers consider the news delivered by the IC
concerns are less important than military interests. their highest priority, and the analysts’ most import-
The information the collection systems produce is ant contribution. When, in fact, from my experience,
often extremely detailed and designed specifically for it demonstrates how little contact most intelligence
military support purposes, not civilian foreign policy officers have with policymakers. Of course, news of
officials in Washington. As a result, most of the raw fast breaking events or new situations interests senior
material available for foreign policy focused analysts policymakers, including the President, but it is not all
is derivative and not specifically collected to support they want or need. Indeed, I do not think I have ever
foreign policy. met a policymaker who was satisfied with the intelli-
The US’s intelligence collection system has its gence they were receiving — just the opposite. They
own style, its own rhythm, and policymakers’ priori- complain loudly, especially when they think there are
ties are not necessarily at the top of the list. The abil- no intelligence officers around. The IC’s overreliance
on producing “news” only exacerbates the problem.
1. The author was the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelli-
gence and Research from 2001 to 2003.

Winter 2014-15 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 61

 INR’s Scheduled-based Reporting erage, INR emphasized topics especially relevant to
the Secretary. If another agency’s product was as good,
At the Department of State, analysts in the
or better, than we could provide on a current event, it
Bureau for Intelligence & Research (INR) attempt to
was added to our own material sent to the Secretary. In
take these factors into consideration by building their
cases where INR held a different opinion, we explained
approach around the policymakers’ schedule — not
why and how in a note. We continued to supply INR’s
the collection cycle. INR has been, and always will be,
Daily Brief, and added a copy of the Chairman of the
a current events reporting agency, if only because of
Joint Chiefs’ morning briefing courtesy of DIA’s rep-
its small size — 150 or so analysts. Basic, long-term,
resentative to INR.
and directed research is beyond its means. Only CIA
For INR, scheduled-based reporting meant
and DIA have the manpower resources necessary for
determining which questions to ask and making time
this sort of heavy lifting. What INR was designed for,
for the answers needing the most attention. In both
however, it does very well. Historically, its analysts
cases better planning was key. The deputy assistants
have stayed focused on a region or issue much longer
took responsibility for mapping out the Secretary’s
than those in other analytic offices, and the venerable
schedule as best they could, and, whenever possible,
INR Daily Brief they produce is widely admired for
sought advance notice of the President’s upcoming
its style and substance. The people in INR are truly a
events. At the same time, each INR office provided a
national treasure; their level of expertise is something
list of priority questions they anticipated in their area
for other organizations to match.
of expertise. They also looked for opportunities to
During my time at INR,2 I was fortunate to work
deliver their products at times that would maximize
for Secretary Colin Powell.3 He appreciated the value
their relevance. This was especially important for
of intelligence and emphasized his support for INR
matters not regularly making the headlines.
to his top policy advisors. His instructions to me
Managing such an approach required knowing
were clear. He looked to INR for more than the news.
a good deal about the policymaker’s priorities and
High on his list was the expectation that INR would
schedule. This type of information, admittedly, was
provide more detailed answers to his most pressing
not always easy to obtain. It started with INR taking
concerns, usually a mirror image of the President’s
the initiative to reach out to individual policymakers
priorities. He also wanted to know when INR’s views
throughout the Department of State each morning
differed from those of other agencies, and, given his
to provide a personalized intelligence briefing, and
military background, he expressed a preference for us
following up as necessary throughout the day. The
including a bit more from the military side of things
policymaker’s priorities — what was on the schedule
in his daily briefing package.
— were addressed first, followed by new developments
From my perspective as Director of INR, I could
in their area of interest. INR’s and the IC’s full range
see that the Secretary already received more intel-
of products was always available for the policymak-
ligence every day than he or any other top official
ers who liked to keep up with events outside of their
could plow through in six weeks. It came in the form
immediate area of responsibility.
of the PDB, regular contact with senior US and for-
For the briefer, it was an opportunity to develop
eign officials, INR’s Daily Brief, and a fair amount
a face-to-face relationship with a policymaker and for
of sensitive “eyes only” material from the National
gaining insights into priorities and upcoming events.
Security Agency (NSA). In addition, he regularly read
INR analysts were instructed to leave policy formula-
news directly from the Internet, received an oral brief-
tion to the policymakers and concentrate on identify-
ing from INR at each morning’s staff meeting, and
ing the key questions — the things policymakers do
received updates throughout the day from his senior
not have the time or knowledge to do themselves. It
policy officers. In short, he did not lack for news. It
is the policymakers’ job to decide on the policy direc-
was clear to me that much of the material he received
tion to take, and ideally the IC’s analytical expertise
was duplicative and infringed on the little time he
helps them understand the problems and challenges
had to think.
they will face. When an analyst strays off course into
Instead of always trying to match the PDB’s cov-
recommending policy choices, however, his or her
relevance and acceptance by policymakers suffers.
2. From May 2001 to October 2003. Adopting a schedule-based system requires
3. Colin Powell served in the US Army from 1958 to 1993 retir- more work. In-depth assessments are much harder
ing as a general and Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff. He served
as Secretary of State from January 2001 to January 2005. to produce than reporting the news and do not lend

Page 62 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Winter 2014-15

themselves to the short timelines of the PDB and other Secretary to pass on his thanks to the author suggests
daily reporting. Producing quality analyses takes time. he liked what he read. “Atta boys” are rare in the
Unless one can anticipate important questions suffi- intelligence business, making this one all the more
ciently in advance, analysts do not have time to prepare special. For the report writer, my Russian analyst, and
a proper and useful answer. Thinking ahead is key. the entire Bureau, it was an unexpected, but gratefully
Sometimes the valuable input to the policymaker accepted compliment.
can be as simple as preparing information in advance That occurrence argues against the conventional
about the size and frequency of past anti-America wisdom in the IC that senior officials do not have
demonstrations in the Middle East. This helps put new time to read long, detailed pieces, and that it is better
events into perspective as they happen. During the run to provide them with just the highlights. True, we
up to the Iraq War, senior officials were particularly mostly send summaries to our consumers, but not
interested in the “Arab Street’s” reaction to US policy. necessarily because that is what they want from us. I
Instead of just reporting an anti-American demon- have found that when policymakers are preoccupied
stration had happened somewhere in the region, INR with an issue, they are eager to receive anything we can
wanted to provide a more useful answer. It asked: give them. They read more, get quickly up to speed on
Was the event a regular occurrence or was it about what current reporting has to offer, and cast about for
average? Was it larger, or smaller in size, and what more details. Continuing to offer up short, summary
had prompted the event— Iraq, the Israel-Palestinian articles leaves them frustrated and unsatisfied.
issue, or other complaints? In one instance, the lead What policymakers are looking for most is
article in most current reporting from the Intelligence “good” intelligence, meaning intelligence that is
Community highlighted increased opposition in the timely and relevant to their top priority of the moment.
region to the US policy on Iraq. The reports were Short and sweet may suffice in the early stages of a
based on evidence from two separate demonstrations. policy challenge, but as a problem wears on, the poli-
It turned out in both instances that the size of each cymaker’s requirements evolve. Details become more
demonstration was well below average levels for those important. They start asking questions, wanting more
cities. One of the demonstrations was focused on US in-depth answers. Opinions, even those of the IC’s
support for Israel; the other on a local issue unrelated experts, are not what they expect to hear. Once they
to anti-American activities. Judging strong opposition become engaged fully in an issue, only new evidence
to US Iraq policy was a reasonable “guess” at the time, and the rationale for the conclusion suffices.
but using the demonstrations cited as evidence, was Even then, analysis may only serve to force them
sloppy and wrong. to question their own views, not buy another’s ideas
Another example of focused INR analysis hook, line, and sinker. Actually influencing a pol-
involved a trip to Russia by the President and the Sec- icymaker’s views — the intelligence officer’s Holy
retary of State. A senior INR Russia analyst, learning Grail — depends almost entirely on the strength of
of the trip, took the initiative to call on the services of the evidence. Even if one is the world’s expert on a
a colleague outside INR for help. His friend, a Foreign topic, don’t expect the policymaker to take your word
Service Officer (FSO), had worked almost daily with for it. Information is not useful intelligence until the
the then more junior Vladimir Putin while both were policymaker is persuaded it makes sense.
stationed in St. Petersburg. Thinking that the FSO’s Much of the persuasion must be done on paper,
recollections and impressions would help him in pre- making the job all that much harder. Policymaker’s
paring for the upcoming trip, INR’s analyst asked his face-to-face interactions with intelligence officers are
friend to jot down his experiences on paper. He agreed. usually brief, and often the information is presented
A few weeks later a lengthy report arrived, all 50 or by non-experts. A better approach, but difficult to
60 pages of it, so well written that we decided to send implement, is giving the policymaker direct contact
the entire manuscript to the Secretary, adding only with analysts.
a note from INR summarizing the paper’s findings. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, was
It turned out the Secretary read the entire paper, not a good example of a policymaker who has learned
just the summary, and he decided to take the report the value of the face-to-face format. Knowing he had
with him on the trip. At some point, he shared the been tasked by the President to deliver an important
report with the President. The President’s notes in the message to a foreign leader, I once suggested he meet
margin suggested he read most, if not all of the paper with INR analysts before his departure. Even though
on the airplane. Moreover, the President’s asking the his trip was only days away he agreed to a short meet-

Winter 2014-15 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 63

ing (fifteen minutes) with the analysts, working the “Part Two: The Policy-Analyst Relationship,” pp. 71-106, in
session into an already jam-packed schedule. I chose Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations,
ed. by Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce.
five or six true experts from various INR offices. The
lead briefer, a political analyst considered by his peers “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures
are Inevitable,” a Research Article by Richard Betts,
to be a world-class expert, had met with the foreign pp. 61-80, World Politics, Brookings, October 1978.
leader on several occasions; rounding out the team http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?-
were experienced analysts in military affairs, eco- fromPage=online&aid=7629164&fulltextType=RA&file-
nomic issues, nuclear weapons, and terrorism. Each Id=S0043887100010182.
was given a brief opportunity to introduce themselves For a behind the scenes look at the interaction of
and to share their expertise. foreign policy and intelligence none are better than
Secretary Armitage then began the back-and- Bob Woodward’s:
forth with a question; followed by INR’s responses;
Bush at War. Simon & Schuster, New York, 2002.
and then by a number of follow up questions. The ses-
Plan of Attack. Simon & Shuster, New York, 2004.
sion lasted almost an hour (despite repeated attempts
by his administrative assistant to end it). Not long after Covert Action is one of the most complicated
he returned from his trip, he asked me to bring the aspects of intelligence and foreign policy. The best
team back for a debrief. Armitage included a summary explanations I have found is “Covert Action,” pp. 165-
of his mission, what information from the analysts 179, Chapter 8, in Mark Lowenthal’s Intelligence: From
had been most useful, and his personal assessment Secrets to Policy, (CQ Press, Washington, DC, 2009).
of the foreign leader. Although this sort of debrief is CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, is
not always possible, the experience was an especially the best source for how the IC covers foreign policy
rewarding for the analysts. Ideally, this should be the analysis:
norm, not the exception. “Analytic Professionalism and the Policymaking Process:
I believe INR’s scheduled-based reporting — Q&A on a Challenging Relationship” CIA. https://www.cia.
focusing on the policymaker’s top priorities and daily gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/pdf/OPV2No2.pdf.
schedule not just the daily collection intake – has paid The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occa-
dividends. The INR analysts’ work was more relevant sional Papers: Volume 2, Number 3, Sherman Kent’s
to the work of the Department, without sacrificing Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations, Jack
the news cycle or becoming its slave. The guiding Davis. https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-pa-
pers/pdf/OPV2No3.pdf.
philosophy was to satisfy what the Secretary and
those supporting him most needed each day, not just Intelligence Community and Policymaker Integration,
Intelligence Community and Policymaker Integration:
report the serendipitous intelligence inherent in the A Studies in Intelligence Anthology, 2013. https://www.
collection cycle. For me that is what delivering timely, cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-pub-
relevant, and persuasive information to the policy- lications/books-and-monographs/intelligence-communi-
makers is all about. ty-and-policymaker-integration/index.html.
Intelligence and Policy: The Evolving Relationship,
Roundtable Report, June 2004, Center for the Study
Readings for Instructors of Intelligence. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/
There are few studies specifically focusing on IntelandPolicyRelationship_Internet.pdf.
the IC’s support for foreign policy. The voluminous Intelligence, Policy, and Politics: The DCI, the White House,
works on analytical tradecraft contain much relevant and Congress: A Symposium, CIA, 2013. https://www.cia.
material, and several of the best introductory texts gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/
dedicate whole chapters to the topic such as: intel-policy-and-politics/index.html.
“The Analyst and the Customer,” pp. 277-293, Chapter 15 President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973
in Robert M Clark’s Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Arab-Israeli War. Center for the Study of Intelligence
Approach, (CQ Press, Washington, DC, 2007). Presidential Series, 2013. https://www.cia.gov/library/pub-
“The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy: Get- lications/historical-collection-publications/arab-israeli-war/
ting Analysis Right,” a Brookings Foreign Policy Paper nixon-arab-isaeli-war.pdf.
Series, Number 18, September 2009, monograph by Strategic Warning & The Role of Intelligence: Lessons
Kenneth Lieberthal. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ Learned from the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslova-
research/files/papers/2009/9/intelligence%20community%20 kia, CIA Historical Collection Division.https://www.cia.
lieberthal/09_intelligence_community_lieberthal.pdf. gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/

Page 64 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Winter 2014-15

 czech-invasion/soviet%20-czech-invasion.pdf. Mr. Ford has served for over 40 years in a variety of
military, intelligence, policy and academic positions.
CIA, The Center for the Study of Intelligence, is
As an Army intelligence officer he served two tours
also the best source for studying the policymakers’ in Vietnam and another in the Defense Intelligence
perspective on intelligence: Agency as a China analyst. He joined CIA’s Office of
Strategic Research in 1974. In 1978 he was selected
“Insightful Interviews: A Policymaker’s Perspective On as a Congressional Foreign Affairs Fellow for Senator
Intelligence Analysis,” Jack Davis, 1993. https://www. John Glenn focusing on arms control and foreign
cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/ policy. The following year he became a professional
vol38no5/pdf/v38i5a02p.pdf. staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations
“A Policymaker’s Perspective on Intelligence Analysis, CIA. Committee. He returned to CIA as the National
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelli- Intelligence Officer for East Asia in 1985. In 1989 he
gence/kentcsi/docs/v38i5a02p.htm. was seconded to the Department of Defense to be
the principal deputy assistant secretary for interna-
Intelligence Analysis and Policymaking: The Views of Ambas- tional security affairs until 1993. Upon retiring from
sador Herman J. Cohen, Jack Davis, Studies in Intelligence, CIA that year he consulted until appointed by the
1995. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of- President in 2001 as the Assistant Secretary of State
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/davis-pdfs/ for Intelligence and Research. He retired from the
the-views-of-ambassador-herman-j-cohen-davis-1995.pdf. Department of State in October 2003. He has since
The Challenge of Managing Uncertainty: Paul Wolfowitz on taught at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign
Intelligence Policy-Relations, Jack Davis, 1995. https:// Service and George Mason University. He has a BA
www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/ in Asian Studies and a MA in East Asian Studies from
Florida State University.
kent-csi/vol39no5/pdf/v39i5a05p.pdf. H

Winter 2014-15 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 65