Institute for National Strategic Security, National Defense University

Resistance Dynamics and Social Movement Theory: Conditions, Mechanisms, and Effects
Author(s): D.W. LEE
Source: PRISM , Vol. 6, No. 3, special operations in a chaotic world (2016), pp. 130-149
Published by: Institute for National Strategic Security, National Defense University
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26470469

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 AUTHOR

shamsnn

Socioethnic and ideological divides have catapulted Syria into a civil war that has
destroyed the unity of the region since 2011.

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Resistance Dynamics and
Social Movement Theory
Conditions, Mechanisms, and Effects
BY D.W. LEE

Understanding Current Conflicts

Contemporary conflicts have become more transnational, protracted, irregular, and resistance-
centric.1 They can be best described as protracted internal conflicts with multiple state actors and
nonstate actors intervening much like the multidimensional hybrid operational environment
discussed in Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 2022.2
This article aims to explain how to harness the emerging strategic utility of nonstate actors
by utilizing well-established bodies of knowledge on resistance dynamics. This objective is based
upon the observation that an increasing number of external state actors overtly or covertly inter-
vene in intrastate conflicts by exploiting the environment’s resistance potential in order to increase
their respective strategic influence.3 Similarly, both internal and external nonstate actors take
advantage of interstate conflicts or political instability stemming from failing states. The current
conflicts in Iraq and Syria certainly meet this characterization; as do those in Ukraine, Yemen,
Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali, and Libya. More state actors are supporting or sponsoring political
movements in intrastate conflict, making the termination of fighting very difficult. For instance,
the resilience of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is largely attributed to the pro-
tracted Syrian civil war in which regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey all spon-
sor local movements. In addition, external nonstate actors such as ISIL, al-Nusrah, and Hezbollah
are also deeply involved in the conflict. In other words, these current conflicts represent a sample
of a larger shift in warfare. As of this writing, Uppsala University’s world conflict data program
compiles 40 conflicts in the world for 2014. All but one of them are intrastate conflicts and 13 of
them are internationalized.4 In short, state actors are actively leveraging and taking advantage of
the resistance potential of groups engaged in civil conflicts.

D.W. Lee is a lecturer in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California.

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LEE

The United States must adapt to this oper- by movements to exploit the conditions. The
ational environment in order to achieve discussion of mechanisms accompanies a
national policy objectives. Key to this goal is a description of the effects that can be expected
shared problem identification that will lead to when movements take advantage of these con-
mitigation and reduction of the fog and fric- ditions. The article concludes with a discussion
tion inherent in a hybrid operational environ- of some of the essential traits associated with
ment. Problem identification begins with effective resistance in highly repressive envi-
understanding how external groups are lever- ronments.
aging and harnessing the resistance potential This article is mostly informed by social
of organic movements toward their respective movement theory and collective action theory.
strategic interests. By understanding how resis- Other disciplines also address resistance.
tance potential is shaped toward strategic However, political sociology offers the deepest
objectives, we can also better determine how insights into internationalized civil wars and
to replicate the best practices of supporting resistance given its disciplinary focus on revo-
and sponsoring robust organic movements. lutionary, resistance, and insurgent dynamics.
In order to fight successfully in this com- The article offers a broad overview of the mul-
plex hybrid environment, a deep understand- tidisciplinary resistance literature as opposed
ing of resistance dynamics is critical. Without to an in-depth case study of a single resistance
understanding resistance dynamics, it becomes movement. The main purpose is to distill com-
next to impossible to identify who is working monly established and empirically validated
with adversarial state actors and how their patterns and mechanisms of resistance. I also
nonstate surrogates gain political support use resistance and insurgency interchangeably
against our own strategic interests. Our recent throughout. Given how extensively organic
unsuccessful attempt at building a surrogate movements have been utilized by external
force in Syria is a good reminder of why it mat- actors, one’s resistance movement is frequently
ters to harness the utility of organic resistance. another’s insurgency.6 Pragmatism guides this
Instead of building a sustainable movement article; it aims to learn the best practices from
with an armed wing, we thought a program all forms of robust movements regardless of
designed to train and equip a few dozen com- their political orientation.
mandos would suffice.5 This article intends to
delineate the strategic dynamics of resistance
What is a Resistance Movement?
and discuss the utility of resistance as a strate- In order to harness the utility of resistance, this
gic tool. article begins with some definitions, both doc-
I will begin with a discussion of how resis- trinal and academic. The Department of
tance is conceptualized in doctrinal and aca- Defense defines a resistance movement as “an
demic terms to distill the essential characteris- organized effort by some portion of the civil
tics of the concept. Then I will highlight three population of a country to resist the legally
aspects of resistance: antecedent conditions, established government or an occupying
mechanisms, and effects. I will identify what power and to disrupt civil order and stability.”7
antecedent conditions facilitate resistance, fol- In political science or sociology, resistance is
lowed by a variety of mechanisms employed notoriously difficult to define due to its

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 RESISTANCE DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

multidisciplinary nature. It can arguably range three different angles: antecedent conditions,
from armed guerillas to symbolic gestures mechanisms, and effects.10 This is a very useful
depending on which academic discipline way to think about resistance as the synthesis
defines it. 8 Because of this diversity, I use a helps us understand what one should include
broad academic definition of resistance in to develop a resistance movement. That is, the
order to avoid a potential bias: “[collective United States should understand what condi-
and] active efforts to oppose, fight, and refuse tions to factor in, what activities to support,
to cooperate with or submit to … abusive and what effects can be expected toward the
behavior and…control.”9 We can infer three end-state.
shared characteristics from the definitions: Figure 1 depicts typical processes in the
organization, civilian components, and disrup- development of resistance movements. They
tion or coercion against some authority. are organized in three categories: conditions,
Unfortunately, these definitions offer little mechanisms, and effects. The utility of these
on how to recognize resistance potential and categories is threefold. First, there is much con-
leverage it toward a strategic objective. This is fusion about what factors promote robust
where social movement theory can inform us resistance, often conflating what is available in
of the process of resistance. Based on the polit- the environment with what activities should
ical process model developed by Douglas be emphasized. Second, little discussion exists
McAdam, we can approach resistance from on what effects external actors can facilitate

Figure 1: Social Movement Approach to Resistance Dynamics

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with and through surrogate movements. represent broad factors and should not be
Without understanding recurring links understood as specific prescriptions.
between conditions, mechanisms, and effects,
it is almost impossible to confidently support
Conditions
resistance elements. Figure 1 clarifies some of Antecedent conditions are independent of any
the confusion and suggests what to look for, other explanatory variable. 11 An antecedent
what to do, and what to achieve to support a condition can be defined as “a phenomenon
robust resistance movement. The categories whose presence activates or magnifies the
action of a causal law or hypothesis.” 12 In

Jarek Tuszyński

Catholic priest Jerzy Popieluszko’s sermons mobilized a broad segment of the Polish population. His
martyrdom immensely expanded the political opportunities for the opposition movement.

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 RESISTANCE DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

essence, antecedent conditions are locally been ordered to shoot.14 Similarly, Archbishop
available ingredients that can be enhanced or Oscar Romero of El Salvador gave a great deal
amplified through active mechanisms toward of political legitimacy to political opposition
robust resistance. In order to support resis- groups such as the Democratic Revolutionary
tance then, it is critical that intelligence prepa- Front and the Farabundo Marti National
ration of the battlefield begin by analyzing Liberation Front (FMLN).15 His support for
what conditions exist in the operational envi- resistance groups opposing the El Salvadoran
ronment. regime was so powerful that he too was assas-
Social movement theory suggests four sinated. At his funeral, more than 100,000
major types of antecedent conditions: politi- mourners gathered demanding both land and
cal, economic, social, and informational. political reforms.16 The FMLN’s guerilla force
Political conditions can be factions within the was still very weak and unable to mount effec-
regime or the existence of political opposition tive offensives against the government. The
groups. Such political groups might be formal army fired on the mourners, killing dozens.
or informal. In addition, nonpolitical entities This massacre quickly became a mobilizing
can also expand political opportunities for narrative for opposition groups. In fact, the
resistance movements. For instance, Jerzy assassination of Romero drove many sympa-
Popieluszko was instrumental in providing thizers and nonviolent activists to actively sup-
political legitimacy to the Polish opposition port and join the FMLN guerrillas.17
movement and Solidarity. Popieluszko was a Elections provide unique political oppor-
Catholic priest who routinely delivered anti- tunities for resistance. The overthrow of
communist sermons and gave both religious Slobodan Milosevic took place right after the
and nationalist speeches in support of rigged presidential election of 2000. Marcos
Solidarity. His sermons mobilized such a was also overthrown following the 1986 snap
broad segment of the Polish population that election in the Philippines where the appear-
the regime had him assassinated in 1984. ance of election fraud was quickly utilized for
Ironically his martyrdom immensely expanded mobilization. Cardinal Ricardo Vidal almost
political opportunities for the opposition immediately made a statement condemning
movement. the apparent election irregularities. Where
Religious leaders creating political oppor- elections are used as a tool of political legiti-
tunities for resistance movements are not mation, resistance potential follows. The key
uncommon. Cardinal Jaime Sin of the is to maintain continuously updated informa-
Philippines was able to turn the tide in 1986 tion about political events and elections in
when the first “people’s power” movement countries of interest. Even draconian regimes
managed to oust Ferdinand Marcos.13 Marcos tend to allow elections if only to achieve inter-
ordered his military to crush the opposition national legitimacy. This provides a unique
movement supporting Corazon Aquino, opportunity to map the political landscape of
widow of the assassinated senator Benigno the regime.
Aquino Jr. Cardinal Sin immediately issued a Certain economic conditions are highly
statement urging Catholics to go out and pro- associated with the onset of resistance move-
tect the protesters from the troops who had ments. However, not all robust resistance

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movements are attributable to economic especially in less than fully developed coun-
downturns. Typically, conditions often linked tries. Second, even if such conditions were
with the onset of resistance include income observable, the classical model offers no causal
inequalities, under-employment, unemploy- mechanisms to link the assumed individual
ment, inflation, or income stagnation. Note psychological disequilibrium with collective
that it is often external shocks that trigger the mobilization. It just offers a leap of faith
exacerbation of these conditions. Economic between individual psychology and collective
measures taken by external actors can create a action. Thus, Fearon and Laitin show with
more conducive environment for organic resis- their empirical analysis of the Minority at Risk
tance.18 dataset that ethnic divides or grievances alone
Ungoverned or under-regulated econom- rarely explain the intensity or duration of civil
ics can also provide opportunities for resis- wars.23 In fact, they provide statistical evidence
tance groups to generate resources to sustain that the outbreak of intrastate conflicts cannot
themselves. These unsanctioned economic be explained by the strength of political griev-
areas typically have built in informal or auton- ances. This is not a trivial finding given how
omous channels of resource extraction and popular the notion of grievance is in the com-
redistribution. The autonomy of the Bazaar in mon understanding of insurgent dynamics.
Iran was a major factor during the Iranian Third, the antiquated classical theory of insur-
revolution of 1979. 19 The Bazaar provided gency cannot explain how resistance can take
much needed resources to key organizers of place in developed countries.
the resistance when the regime cut subsidies Individual grievances do play a role in the
and stipends to students and academics.20 development of resistance. The question is
Economic conditions themselves are how. Typically, grievances become instrumen-
rarely sufficient for resistance to emerge or to tal when they are exploited and framed by
take hold. While economic conditions groups or networks actively seeking to create
throughout the Middle East were generally opportunities for collective mobilization. For
comparable in the 1980s and 1990s, insurgent the special operations forces (SOF) commu-
movements emerged in only a few select coun- nity to harness resistance potential, then, the
tries.21 While all major macroeconomic indica- focus should be on both the existing condi-
tors were comparable in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, tions and the activities of political actors. This
Morocco, and Tunisia between 1980 and 1992, is in essence what Emirbayer and Goodwin call
only the first two countries experienced major the problem of agency, warning of the false
insurgent movements. This reflects the explan- promise of structural determinism.24 In other
atory poverty of the classical model of resis- words, one cannot properly leverage resistance
tance which links collective action directly to unless potential (antecedent conditions) is
individual psychological conditions. Several understood in the context of agency (purpose-
flawed assumptions explain the limited ana- ful activities).
lytic value of the classical model.22 First, it is Socioethnic divides and existing dissident
almost impossible to observe and measure networks provide great potential for resistance.
individual psychological conditions in order In particular, external actors can leverage such
to see how they may impact resistance, conditions to establish a robust organizational

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 RESISTANCE DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

platform. It is no coincidence that most robust or matter to other entities.”27 Translated to the
resistance movements emerge from pre-exist- concept of resistance, causal mechanisms are
ing ties and networks. These pre-existing ties the activities and techniques used by insur-
typically have built-in mechanisms to coordi- gents or activists to exploit and accelerate the
nate information and action across civil soci- antecedent conditions for resistance purposes.
ety. Ethnic divides can be a powerful fault-line Effects, then, are the outcomes insurgents
to promote resistance initially. However, an intend to accomplish by exploiting the condi-
isolated group can be an easy target for the tions through a variety of mechanisms.
regime to marginalize and vilify. The SOF com- United States Special Operations
munity must pay attention to what network Command (SOCOM) recently released a con-
resources socioethnic groups can contribute to cept paper that emphasizes cultivating soldiers
the creation of broad coalitions of resistance “with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to
movements as opposed to just relying on a understand and influence human actions and
single subgroup. activities.”28 The same concept paper stresses
Ideological conditions refer to existing the need to link these activities to creating
grievances stemming from economic dispari- desired effects in the human domain. 29
ties or structural strains such as income Understanding how mechanisms are related to
inequalities, unemployment, underemploy- effects is not only academically useful, but also
ment, or discrimination. In essence, these con- operationally relevant to the human domain.
ditions often stem from social, economic, or
Conversion/Co-optation and Effects
political strains. They also include existing
norms of collective action and violence that When opposition political groups support a
can be utilized to justify mobilizing large resistance movement, the latter typically gains
groups for resistance. For instance, a sense of legitimacy quickly. This legitimacy can also be
victimization is often used by Islamists to jus- used to gain support from the population. For
tify jihad. 25 Typically, insurgents will try to the movement, this is perhaps the quickest
align their ideology with socially accepted path to leveraging existing groups to elevate its
themes of dissent.26 Instead of treating resis- political appeal. As Robert Helvey demon-
tance ideology as a monolithic worldview, it is strates, conversion is a powerful mechanism to
more useful to approach it as a set of griev- transform potential political fractures into
ances specifically framed to motivate and jus- resistance.30 He notes that the Serbian opposi-
tify collective action. tion movement was able to oust Slobodan
Milosevic in 2000, even though the regime
Causal Mechanisms and Effects possessed much more powerful coercive
Mechanisms refer to the causal links between means, because some of the Serbian police and
antecedent conditions and outcome variables. bureaucrats withdrew their loyalty.31 In essence,
In the social sciences, a causal mechanism is regime sympathizers were converted to support
defined as “physical, social, or psychological the opposition movement.
processes through which agents with causal Conversion is the process by which the
capacities operate, but only in specific contexts movement signals to the pillars of regime sup-
or conditions, to transfer energy, information, port that they will be disenfranchised by the

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movement.32 The movement will work with However, internal conversion and external
some regime elements to either facilitate or network building are not mutually exclusive
stabilize the eventual transfer of political mechanisms. Rather, they should be consid-
authority. This is a different way to establish ered complimentary processes designed to
auxiliary and underground networks for resis- leverage political fractures. Conversion can
tance. Instead of creating purpose-built net- also be used in the steady state. A political
works from elements outside of the ruling claim made by the resistance movement can
coalition, the logic of conversion would pre- gain popular support if an existing political
scribe identifying moderate or disgruntled fac- party or influential dissidents also endorse it.
tions within the power structures of the The interests of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
regime. Resistance can be considered as a zero- Guards Corps in Lebanese politics are often
sum political game where one defection or advanced in this way by Hezbollah, thus
acquiescence means a twofold gain for the achieving a synthesis between strategic resis-
movement and a twofold loss to the regime. tance networks and smaller operational net-
From this perspective the benefits of conver- works.
sion become clear compared to those of build- Chenoweth and Stephen also confirm this
ing external resistance networks to match the relationship with their qualitative and statisti-
regime’s coercive capacity. cal analysis of regime-change campaigns. 33

Spc. Kristina Truluck/U.S. Army

Humvee down after Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant attack in Mosul, Iraq 2014-06-14

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 RESISTANCE DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

While civil resistance methods are statistically Lina Khatib demonstrates how ISIL co-opted
correlated with successful resistance move- existing Sunni tribes to accelerate its expan-
ments, the likelihood of such success is heavily sion.37 The rapid fall of Mosul can be partially
influenced by the magnitude of defectors. 34 explained by conversion in that Sunni police
Several causal mechanisms warrant further and soldiers had little reason to fight due to
explanation. First, regime defectors can greatly Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki’s systemic per-
enhance the perceived viability of the resis- secution of the Sunni population. ISIL contin-
tance movement. In 1986, Defense Minister ued to make local alliances to accelerate its
Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff pace of expansion.
Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos in the In Syria, ISIL essentially rehired civil ser-
Philippine Army used the Reform the Armed vants and teachers to maintain control of areas
Forces Movement (RAM) to support the polit- under their control as long as they agreed to
ical opposition movement in the Philippines.35 use ISIL’s ideology.38
With the Catholic Church’s backing and To summarize, the effect of conversion can
Aquino’s street demonstrations gaining be profound. It can establish broad political
momentum, the RAM proved to be a key ele- legitimacy for the resistance movement. It can
ment of the movement’s success.36 help the movement leverage or pool resources
Second, regime defectors can deliver criti- with existing organic institutions to accelerate
cal intelligence to the movement. Such intel- its pace of growth. Most importantly, it can
ligence can be utilized to send surgical signals help the resistance movement become very
to other fence-sitters that the movement poses hard for the regime to repress as such oppres-
no threat to them or siding with the regime sion is more likely to trigger a political back-
will harm their future position. Defection can lash. This is what Gene Sharp calls “political
also be subtle and nonphysical. Endorsements Jiu-jitsu,” which he defines as a process
from existing political groups can be powerful through which violent repression is exploited
catalysts as well. to elevate the legitimacy of resistance and thus
Third, regime defectors typically can bring garner popular support.39
subordinates and equipment to the move-
Resource-Generation and Effects
ment, which tend to be resource-poor, espe-
cially in the beginning. In the steady state, Resistance is not cheap. It requires a wide vari-
existing political groups can provide wider ety of activities to gain popular support and
access to the movement with their communi- maintain access to the population. These activ-
cation platforms and constituency networks. ities include information campaigns, publica-
In short, conversion is a critical mechanism to tions, public demonstrations, and cultural and
consider given how resource intensive it can be educational events, to name just a few. Self-
to build an effective resistance movement that sufficiency is, therefore, a critical requirement
can withstand the regime’s superior coercive for any resistance movement. State actors can
power from scratch. easily use official and financial means to starve
Growing evidence suggests that conver- dissident groups. Audits are frequently used to
sion was one of the main mechanisms ISIL suppress dissident groups of financial
used to expand both in Syria and Iraq. In Iraq, resources. It is no surprise that robust

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LEE

resistance movements such as Hamas and resources, such as street games mocking then
Hezbollah sustain themselves with a variety of Serbian president Milosevic. Other movements
legal and illegal financial and commercial also employ fund-raising events. Memorial ser-
enterprises. vices are a good example of events used by a
It is convenient to think that external wide variety of resistance movements. Setting
actors can greatly help the movement by pro- up charities that accept donations from inter-
viding the required resources to finance vari- national actors is another example. Another
ous activities. However, there is a big caveat: mechanism is nesting the movement within
the success of resistance largely depends on its existing groups that have built-in mechanisms
perceived legitimacy. No matter how secretive of collecting and distributing membership fees
external support can be, just a single exposure for services. However, these movements use
can completely rob the movement of authen- the resources to develop self-sustaining plat-
ticity and legitimacy—this single point of fail- forms instead of just focusing on acquiring
ure is something the planner should be very kinetic capabilities. One of the first activities
careful about. of Hezbollah was collecting trash, and since
Successful resistance movements generally then, it has established diverse new social
develop their own internal mechanisms to institutions, ranging from schools to hospitals.
generate resources in order to avoid being per- T h e t r e e a r my i n Ku n a r P r ov i n c e,
ceived as a puppet of outside influence. Otpor, Afghanistan, is another example of a dissident
a Serbian resistance movement, is famous for group with humble beginnings. It started as an
using creative ways of generating its own agricultural development project led by the

Omar Siddeeq Yousif

Humble Beginnings: ANA soldiers sit in Kunar Province, home of the tree army, a militant organization
that began their journey with little resources and have become a self-sustaining resistance group with
the common goal of eliminating the Taliban.

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 RESISTANCE DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell with historically reoccurring patterns of suc-

(NRCC), working under Task Force Mountain cessful resistance movements.
Warrior (TFMW), and it quickly became a self- Brokers who organically connect structur-
sustaining resistance movement against the ally disjointed groups in order to facilitate bloc
Taliban.40 Key to its success was the NRCC’s recruitment play an irreplaceable role. Shin-
emphasis on imparting economic skills and Kap Hand provides a detailed account of how
codes of honor to Afghan partners, which in the American revolutionaries overcame inter-
turn propped up the perceived legitimacy and nal stratification against the British Empire.43
viability of the movement. 41 Trainees were Paul Revere and Joseph Warren were not in
recruited only from respected families. And by leadership positions, but they provided the
working with one of the best agricultural critical connective tissue between the thinkers
departments in Afghanistan, the partners man- and the doers of the American Revolution.44
aged to provide essential skills and services to Similarly, single members of the National
their home villages. Once the tree army was S o c i a l i s t G e r m a n Wo r k e r s ’ Pa r t y
sufficiently developed, its network was able to (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei,
drive insurgents out of the area by establishing NSDAP) in the 1920s and 1930s were instru-
itself as a legitimate resistance movement mental to the rapid expansion of the move-
against the insurgency and taking over timber- ment. 45 The primary function of the single
ing from the Taliban. members was to identify key influencers in
Illegal timbering and smuggling lumber existing networks and organizations in order
was one of the most profitable illegal activities to bring them under the NSDAP in a wholesale
financing the Taliban in Kunar Province.42 By fashion. In other words, they were mobile bro-
far, the tree army remains one of the most suc- kers focusing on bloc recruitment.
cessful and self-sustaining resistance move- A similar pattern of network development
ments supported by the U.S. against the was observed in Poland in the 1970s and
Taliban. 1980s. Early members of Polish anti-commu-
nist opposition realized that isolated student
Bloc Recruitment, Mass Mobilization, and
activism was not sufficient to challenge the
Effects
communist regime. Their resistance was well
Mass mobilization mechanisms for resistance organized but quickly suppressed by the
differ from individual recruitment. The pace of regime’s divide and conquer tactics as students
growth and the scale of growth must be were framed as over-privileged troublemakers.
achieved concurrently as weak movements can Realizing this failure, Adam Michnik estab-
be easily controlled or even co-opted by the lished civic organizations such as the Workers
regime. This is why successful movements have Defense Committee in Poland (Komitet Obrony
empirically employed a specific mobilization Robotnikkow, KOR) and the Society of Scientific
mechanism called bloc recruitment. Individual Studies (Towarzystwo Kursow Naukowych, TKN)
recruitment and bloc recruitment are not in order to connect Solidarity with other clus-
mutually exclusive. The argument of this arti- ters of resistance that did not necessarily align
cle is to complement existing mechanisms with each other. 46 KOR was not an overtly
political organization. Its mission was to

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provide legal assistance and support for jailed broad coalition of dissident and existing sub-
demonstrators and their families.47 TKN was a groups. In other words, the notion of solidarity
mobile educational program. In practice, it was built into the overall resistance landscape.
was called the Flying University where academ- Similar dynamics were also observed in
ics and cultural figures organized dispersed Italy during the formation of clandestine polit-
events to discuss sensitive topics such as Polish ical militancy in the 1970s. Donatella della
national literature.48 Porta meticulously shows that most dedicated
The perceived neutrality of civil brokers members of the Red Brigades, the Proletarian
was perhaps the single most important organi- Armed Groups, the Front Line, the Communist
zational innovation that key leaders engi- Fighting Formations, and a few other minor
neered through trial and error. Jacek Kuron clandestine groups came from existing politi-
and Adam Michnik learned in the 1970s that cal groups and associations through interper-
focused yet unconnected resistance could be sonal ties. 50 What della Porta empirically
easily neutralized by the regime’s divide and shows is that overt networks and affiliations
conquer strategy. The success of Solidarity in play the role of a large pool composed of
the 1980s in replacing the Polish communist potential recruits who can be mobilized
regime cannot be explained without taking through existing and multiple personal ties
into account the role of civic networks specifi- into a more selective and cohesive subgroup.
cally founded to coordinate and manage a The magnitude of trust-based ties built and

Figure 2: Polish Opposition Network, 1980/198149

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 RESISTANCE DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

sustained in routine overt political organiza- instance, while personal poverty may be a
tions predicts the level of commitment common economic condition, it can bridge to
expressed by those who joined the under- regime incompetence, corruption, or nepo-
ground militant groups.51 tism. The youth bulge that was exacerbated by
In sum, the United States must learn how the global recession was blamed on the cor-
to identify and assess the potential of organic rupt and nepotistic regimes in the Middle East
brokers in order to facilitate bloc recruitment. during the Arab Spring. In many ways, the self-
Learning about relational dynamics among immolation of Tunisian street vendor
and across existing networks is critical and is Mohamed Buazizi captured and collectivized
not a trivial matter. Relational information is a widespread individual grievance of economic
qualitatively different from individual attri- inequality. It was not an isolated incident, but
butes in that the latter are used to recruit indi- was framed as a symptom of deep-seeded
viduals, while the former informs the planner structural issues affecting many like Buazizi.
about how heterogeneous groups and net- Frame amplification is the technique
works converge or diverge along different designed to imbue the bridging frame with an
political issues. Understanding those fault active sense of agency by invoking resonating
lines can be a critical factor in expanding the social or religious norms.55 For instance, it can
scope of mobilization. be framed that college graduates are under-
employed or unemployed not because of a
Framing, Messaging, and Effects
structural economic strain, but because the
Perhaps the most effective mechanism to regime is actively skimming the benefits of
achieve a rapid rate of bloc recruitment is stra- national resources. It is well documented that
tegic framing. Strategic framing is the process ISIL and its predecessor al-Qaeda in Iraq con-
by which the movement combines grievances sistently used targeted violence to amplify the
with political arguments regarding three latent sectarian tension between Sunni and
frames: diagnostic, prognostic, and motiva- Shia populations.56 By accentuating and exac-
tional. Instead of merely reproducing existing erbating the divide, ISIL has sought to mobi-
individual grievances, strategic framing pro- lize and recruit disenfranchised Iraqi Sunnis.57
vides interpretive schemes designed to induce Returning to the Arab Spring, the death of
a shared consciousness for collective action. In Buazizi in Tunisia and the murder of Khaled
fact, SOCOM stresses the need to understand Said in Egypt were quickly amplified as state-
and adopt culturally relevant messaging sponsored campaigns of unbridled violence
themes in order to localize information opera- against the population.58 Incidents of violence
tions.52 If political or economic dissatisfaction were quickly utilized by existing movement
is the ingredient of collective action, then stra- networks in what Wendy Pearlman calls
tegic framing is the catalyst. Snow and Benford “microfoundations of uprising.”59 These inci-
provide four specific mechanisms of this align- dents were reframed as moral judgments
ment process: bridging, amplification, exten- invoking the violation of shared norms, dig-
sion, and transformation.53 nity, and life. Vilification is a common tech-
Frame bridging is how individual condi- n i q u e u s e d f o r f r a m e a m p l i f i c a t i o n . 60
tions are bridged to a structural issue.54 For Vilification has two processes. First, it begins

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LEE

with a polarization process where competitors Frame transformation is the process of

are lumped into a generic “other” category. revitalizing a perhaps stagnating ideology. An
Second, the “other” category is repeatedly anti-regime narrative may need to be revamped
associated with socially and culturally negative in order to earn international support or rec-
traits.61 ognition. Typically, the movement may invoke
In frame extension the normative judg- a “far enemy” to justify the need to work with
ment established with the amplification pro- external actors. It is no coincidence that
cess is extended to various groups within the Solidarity’s narrative aligned the Polish com-
population. 62 That is, because the regime is munist regime with the Soviet Union, just like
actively defrauding the national economy for Zawahiri went from the near enemy of the
personal greed and to satisfy its “oligarchy,” it Egyptian state to the Far Enemy of the West.
is not only college graduates but also the entire Perhaps this is where the Arab Spring failed to
middle class that are suffering from poor eco- take advantage of the opening political oppor-
nomic conditions. In Tunisia, labor move- tunity of elections. The secular camps within
ments quickly seized the moment and orga- the overall opposition coalition were not as
nized nation-wide demonstrations showing well organized as the Muslim Brotherhood,
solidarity. In Egypt, what started as an urban- thus failing to transform their “opposition nar-
based anti-Mubarak voice quickly became a rative” to a “political narrative.”
national narrative about Egyptian national These are just a set of a few mechanisms
pride. By this process the claim of one group typically employed by movements to trans-
is extended to represent a broader set of social form individual grievances into a powerful
groups. ideology of political mobilization. 63 Once a

Figure 3: Simplified Typology of Repression

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 RESISTANCE DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

narrative is developed by codifying and dis- attention. Given the definitions discussed ear-
seminating it through print or online media, lier, it should be clear that modern resistance
these mechanisms can sustain the movement often takes place in politically austere environ-
very effectively. Even the current narrative of ments. This means sponsoring resistance
ISIL can be described in a similar fashion. should factor in substantial measures of
While the genesis of ISIL is uniquely Iraqi regime repression. Thus, it is necessary to
Sunni, its information operations have examine some of the typical obstacles to sus-
adopted the narrative of the far enemy and tained collective action in order to identify
vilification of the West to justify why foreigners what traits to look for when looking for resis-
should do whatever it takes to join the tance movements to sponsor.
Caliphate and mobilize themselves to commit A resistance movement challenging the
lone-wolf attacks on civilian targets. government or occupying force is most likely
External support can play a critical role in to face a multitude of repressive efforts. Figure
enhancing the movement’s strategic framing. 3 represents a simple typology of state repres-
Recent research on the Arab Spring clearly sion. While state repression can be categorized
indicates that external media outlets can create in multiple ways, typically it can be conceptu-
an echo effect to elevate the salience of certain alized by two factors: scope of repression and
political themes and frames. 64 Even if the method of repression. Vertically it ranges from
regime shuts down social media or even the kinetic to nonkinetic and, laterally, it ranges
Internet, external communication and dis- from collective to individual. Four types of
semination outside the country corresponds to repression are commonly used against opposi-
elevated popular interest and support for resis- tion movements: leadership targeting, leader-
tance. In fact, this was not unique to the Arab ship cooptation, resource control, and dele-
Spring. Keck’s and Sikkink’s extensive case gitimation.67 This typology should work as a
studies of transnational movements demon- check list for planners to factor in what types
strate how a political claim travels outside, of support organic resistance movements
amplified by external media outlets or epis- would need in order to withstand regime
temic communities, and then reenters the repression and survive.
country of origin to empower the movement.65 When a resistance movement or insur-
They call this pattern of resistance growth the gency challenges a regime, the latter will first
“boomerang” effect.66 Applied to resistance, an try to remove the leaders by arresting or killing
external supporter can surgically guide this them. However, decapitation rarely leads to
well-established pattern to enhance the per- organizational collapse of insurgent or terror-
ceived viability of an organic opposition ist movements.68 When leadership targeting is
movement. not sufficient or successful, the regime will
often employ resource control measures to
Conclusion starve the challengers.69 These include shutting
This article identifies critical conditions, mech- down social institutions, audits, and financial
anisms, and effects that can be utilized for sup- sanctions. In addition, regimes will often try
porting resistance movements. However, one to divide and disrupt movements through
environmental factor deserves additional nonlethal means. Such efforts include

PRISM 6, no . 3 FEATURES | 145

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LEE

cooptation, infiltration, reintegration prom- political, economic, social, and ideological

ises, and selective incentives. foundations built during the steady state that
If a resistance movement is to succeed in enable the movement to deflect regime repres-
coercing or disrupting its targeted regime, it sion and turn it into a rallying point. 73
becomes critical for the former to have organic Resistance movements succeed when they can
capabilities that can be utilized to withstand strategically employ both lethal and nonlethal
and overcome state repression. Historically, methods instead of relying on a single strategy.
movements typically acquire these capabilities When resistance movements are not balanced,
by employing various nonkinetic and nonvio- they often lead to undesirable strategic conse-
lent activities such as providing essential ser- q u e n c e s, s u c h a s wa s t h e c a s e o f t h e
vices and organizing public events to garner Nicaraguan Contras, where neither the surro-
popular support.70 This is why this article high- gates nor the sponsor achieved their respective
lights the processes used by insurgents to objective.74 If resistance is to be employed as a
develop organic political support, resource strategic tool for advancing national security
independence, organizational resiliency, and goals, the United States must carefully factor
ideological legitimacy. These processes can be in the intricate dynamics between conditions,
found across different environments ranging mechanisms, and effects. Tactics of guerilla
from East and Central Asia to the Middle warfare are no longer sufficient to inform us
East.71 This resiliency often stems from a coali- how to harness the strategic nature of resis-
tion of multiple networks. This multiplicity tance. PRISM
may carry an operational liability. However, it
is the same factors that give resistance a dif-
fused and broad “attribution” characteristic:
repression on one is an attack on everyone.
Social movement theory calls this mechanism
the “repression backfire.”72
The regime will typically have more coer-
cive capacity than the resistance movement. It
is common to think that lethal aid is what
resistance needs to compete with the regime’s
military and security forces. Lethal aid may
prove effective against weakened or fragile
regimes, but not against mature autocratic
regimes such as North Korea, China, Iran, or
Russia. Lethal assistance also carries a hefty
political price.
Social movement literature suggests that
what enables the movement to compete effec-
tively against the regime is not how well it
fights with brute force, which is typically
expressed as guerilla warfare. Rather, it is the

146 | FEATURES PRISM 6, no . 3

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 RESISTANCE DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Notes Nonviolent Conflict, Columbia University Press, 2011,

pp. 160-2.
14
Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why
1
Glenn Johnson & Doowan Lee, “Revisiting Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic of
the Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Nonviolent Conflict, Columbia University Press, 2011,
Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, December, 2014. p. 161.
2 15
U.S. Army, ARSOF 2022, United States Army Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991, Cambridge
Fort Bragg, NC, 2013, 3. University Press, 2001, p. 197.
3 16
Note that internal conflicts can be a civil war Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective
or an internal political confrontation or both. Action and Civil War in El Salvador, Cambridge
4
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/ accessed University Press, 2003, pp. 26-27.
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July 28, 2015. Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective
5
For a good discussion on why the surrogate Action and Civil War in El Salvador, Cambridge
force was so ineffective, see David Maxwell, “Why the University Press, 2003, p. 105.
18
New Syrian Army Failed: Washington and Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach
Unconventional Warfare, War on the Rock: http:// to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare Magazine,
warontherocks.com/2015/08/why-the-new-syr- Vol. 26, No. 3, 2013, p. 30.
19
ian-army-failed-washington-and-unconventional- Benjamin Smith, “Collective Action with and
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6
For a good large-N statistical analysis of Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: a Social
external support for armed groups, see Zeec Maoz and Movement Theory Approach, Indiana University
Belgiin San-Akca, “Rivalry and State Support of Press, 2004, pp. 187-9.
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Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1947-2001, Benjamin Smith, “Collective Action with and
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2012. without Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in Iran,” in
One of their findings is that supporting only armed Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: a Social
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7 21
U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02: Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp. 10-16.
22
Associated Terms, Washington, D.C.: Government For an example of how structural strains are
Printing Office, November 2010 (as amended through inadequately used to explain revolutionary move-
15 June 2015), p. 206. ments, see Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change,
8
For a detailed discussion how each discipline Stanford University Press, 1966.
23
defines resistance, see Hollandder and Einonhner, James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin,
“Conceptualizing Resistance” Sociological Forum, Vol. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American
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Profitt, 1996: 25 from Hollandder and Mustafa Emirbayer & Jeff Goodwin,
Einonhner, “Conceptualizing Resistance” Sociological “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of
Forum, Vol. 19, No. 4 Agency, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 99, No. 6,
10
Douglas McAdam, Political Process and the 1994.
25
Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, University David A. Snow & Scott C. Bryd, “Ideology,
of Chicago Press, 1982. Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements,
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Henry E. Brady & David Collier, Rethinking Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review, Vol.
Social Inquiry, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004, 12, No. 1, 2006.
26
p. 274. David A. Snow & et al, “Frame Alignment
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Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Processes. Micromobilization, and Movement
Students of Political Science, Cornell University Press, Participation,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 51,
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Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why Alexander L. George & Andrew Bennett, Case
Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic of Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,

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Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, had the following qualities: desire to protect the local
Harvard University, 2005, p.137. community from alien influences, theocratic
28
Operating in the Human Domain, Version motivations, and obligation due to some prior
1.0, United States Special Operations Command, association based on family, group, or individual.
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Tampa, Florida, August, 2015, p. 38. Harry R. Bader, Clint Hanna, Clint Douglas,
29
Operating in the Human Domain, Version & John D. Fox, “Illegal Timber Exploitation and
1.0, United States Special Operations Command, Counterinsurgency Operations in Kumar Province of
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30
Robert L. Helevey, On Strategic Nonviolent Among Insurgents, Criminal Cartels, and
Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals, Albert Communities Within the Forest Sector, Journal of
Einstein Institution, Harvard University, 2004. Sustainable Forestry, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2013, Pp. 333-4.
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Robert L. Helevey, On Strategic Nonviolent Shin-Kap Han, “The Other Ride of Paul
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32 44
Ibid. Shin-Kap Han, “The Other Ride of Paul
33
Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why Revere: The Brokerage Role in the Making of the
Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic of Nonviolent American Revolution,” Mobilization: An International
Conflict, Columbia University Press, 2011. Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2009.
34 45
Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why Marryjane Osa, “Networks in Opposition:
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Felipe B. Miranda ed, Democratization: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 92.
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Philippine Perspectives, University of the Philippines Ibid.
47
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Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Ibid., p. 96.
49
Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, University of Pittsburgh Ibid., P. 99.
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Press, 1995, pp. 133-9. Donatella della Portan, “Recruitment
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Lina Khatib, The Islamic State’s Strategy: Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations:
Lasting and Expanding, Carnegie Middle East Center, Italian Left-Wing Terrorism,” International Social
June 2015, pp. 6-11. Movement Research, Vol. 1, JAI Press, 1988.
38 51
Lina Khatib, “The Islamic State’s Strategy: Donatella della Portan, “Recruitment
Lasting and Expanding,” Carnegie Middle East Center, Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations:
June 2015, pp. 10-11. Italian Left-Wing Terrorism,” International Social
39
Gene Sharp, How Nonviolent Struggle Works, Movement Research, Vol. 1, JAI Press, 1988, pp. 159-63
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Albert Einstein Institution, Harvard University, 2013, Operating in the Human Domain, Version
pp. 112-5. 1.0, United States Special Operations Command,
40
Harry R. Bader, Clint Hanna, Clint Douglas, Tampa, Florida, August, 2015, p. 53.
53
& John D. Fox, “Illegal Timber Exploitation and David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven
Counterinsurgency Operations in Kumar Province of K. Worden, & Robert Benford, “Frame Alignment
Afghanistan: A Case Study Describing the Nexus Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement
Among Insurgents, Criminal Cartels, and Participation, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51,
Communities Within the Forest Sector, Journal of No. 4, 1986.
54
Sustainable Forestry, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2013. Ibid.
41 55
Harry R. Bader, Clint Hanna, Clint Douglas, Ibid.
56
& John D. Fox, “Illegal Timber Exploitation and “February 2004 Coalition Provisional
Counterinsurgency Operations in Kumar Province of Authority English Translation of Terrorist Musab Al
Afghanistan: A Case Study Describing the Nexus Zarqawi Letter Obtained by United States
Among Insurgents, Criminal Cartels, and Government in Iraq.,” February 2004, U.S.
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Specifically, the NRCC ensured the Afghan partners

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 RESISTANCE DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

57 70
Karen Bach, “Iraq Sectarian Violence: Sunnis Paul K. Davis & et al, Understanding and
Protest Amid Al Qaeda Calls To Arms,” Archive of Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism,
Huffington Post, (February 1, 2013), http://karen- RAND Corporation, 2012.
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bachxy.blogspot.com/2013/02/iraq- sectarian-vio- Paul K. Davis & et al, Understanding and
lence-sunnis-protest.html. Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and
58
Wendy Pearlyman, “Emotions and the Terrorism, RAND Corporation, 2012. The RAND
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Differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, Foreign Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey, the Maoist
Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3, 2011. insurgency in Nepal, and al-Qaida.
59 72
Wendy Pearlyman, “Emotions and the Backfire is defined as a public reaction of
Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings,” Perspectives outrage to an event that is publicized and perceived as
on Politics, American Political Science Association, unjust. For a detailed discussion on backfire
Vol. 11, No. 3, 2012, p. 396. dynamics, see David Hess & Brian Martin,
60
Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Framing Jihad: “Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of
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Social History, Vol. 49, No. S12, 2004, pp. 164-66. Paul K. Davis & et al, Understanding and
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Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Framing Jihad: Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism,
Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda’s RAND Corporation, 2012.
74
Struggle for Sacred Authority,” International Review of For a detailed account about the Contras and
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62
David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven Kinzer, Blood of Brothers, David Rockefeller Center for
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63
For additional mechanisms and techniques,
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Struggle for Sacred Authority,” International Review of flickr.com/photos/61606819@N07/5606924846>.
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Sean Aday & et al, “New Media and Conflict neric License < https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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65
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Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Kostka in Warsaw. At <https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/
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See Jennifer Earl for a detailed discussion on neral_-_33.jpg>. Licensed under CC Attribution-Sha-
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Toward a Theory of Movement Repression,” licenses/by-sa/3.0/>. Photo unaltered.
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Jennifer Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: media.org/wiki/File:Humvee_down_after_isis_attack.
Toward a Theory of Movement Repression,” jpg>. Licensed under CC Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0
Sociological Theory, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2003, pp. 48-49. International. <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-sa/4.0/deed.en>. Photo unaltered.

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